INEQUALITIES AND CONFLICTS IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN HISTORY

A Comparative Perspective

JAN ZÁHOŘÍK

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Introduction

This book deals with multiple causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa in modern and contemporary history. Comparative method is used for better understanding how complex the root causes and subsequent consequences of these conflicts are. The initial idea behind this book was to put conflicts in Africa into a broader perspective that simply goes beyond colonial legacies. Of course, colonial impact on fabrication of states, nations, and ethnic groups and various local or internal inequalities, such as in Rwanda or Congo, is obvious. On the other hand, Ethiopia, that has no or only very minimal direct experience with foreign colonialism, has become a playground for various civil wars, conflicts, or regional disputes. In other words, we can hardly take the European colonial legacy as the main or sole root cause of conflicts in Africa or elsewhere. Of course, colonialism played a crucial role in setting up various social, ethnic, and economic inequalities but there are multiple sources of conflicts which need to be taken into account as well.

That is why Ethiopia is analyzed in the last chapter as a special case. The first two chapters deal with historical legacies (chapter one) in terms of ethnicity, nationalism, or regional discrepancies and inequalities, and various root causes of conflicts and separatist movements that (may) have their origins in multiple causes that include natural resources, unstable socio-political environment, ethnically divided population, or regional imbalances. On the other hand, previous predictions on how the African continent would end up divided and fragmented in a perpetual chain of separatist movements, civil wars and turbulences have not been fulfilled. Although the majority of African countries, with a few exceptions, witness and experience peaceful and relatively stable political development, much needs to be done in terms of diversifying their economic sectors that includes a growing middle class.

The African states have inherited in its majority rather weak administration, limited order and law, and mostly significant inequalities either in terms of ethnic privileges and disadvantages, regional and economic imbalances, fragmented elites, as well as access to natural resources, citizenship and political participation, and/or social discrepancies. They have also inherited more or less artificially created borders that in many cases were a matter of constant re-definitions and negotiations well up until World War II.[1] However, as is discussed in the last chapter, Ethiopia itself has been accused of behaving as an imperial power subjugating neighboring nations and societies. The image of Ethiopia as an imperial power compared to the great European colonial powers have kept coming up since the 1960s with the rise of ethno-nationalist movements that were in one way or another influenced by Marxism or socialism.

The main reason behind this volume is to examine multiple reasons of conflicts, wars, and political turmoil in Africa while combining various approaches such as historical, political, international, as well as socio-economic. As will be seen on the following pages, conflicts in modern and contemporary history of Africa come as a result of structural inequalities, historically inherited inequalities between various groups, societies, and regions. The rise of nationalism in Africa, that in one way or another coincided with the flow of socialist, Marxist, and other external influences and thoughts, is usually seen as a reaction to European colonialism. This is mostly the case of ethno-nationalist movements that came up as a result of the European colonial "divide and rule" policy of categorization of people into various ethnic groups and the subsequent system of ethnic favoritism, privileges, advantages and disadvantages. However, interestingly enough, Ethiopia, which has never been colonized (just like Liberia), has experienced and still is experiencing the same, if not even more intensive, process of formation of various ethno-nationalist, nationalist, or separatist movements that can hardly be blamed on European colonial legacy alone.

Therefore, this monograph seeks to explore various types of conflicts related to above-mentioned aspects that include a wide range of causes and roots, but that are also a part of regional, international, or even global issues such as the spread of socialism, Marxism, and/or globalization. The majority of African conflicts that are based on various types of inequalities may claim that one of the root causes lies in colonial legacy (typically, a genocide in Rwanda). This is, however, not true when it comes to Ethiopia because if foreign colonialism influenced post–World War II development of ethno-nationalist movements, conflicts, and political turbulences, then it was only rather indirectly. Africa, as an important actor and factor of the Cold War, should thus be seen in regard to conflicts, tensions, and competing nationalisms, as a part of broader global trends and as a result of interactions between local and global. The rise of nationalism in Africa came up not only as an

internal process reacting to decades of colonial rule and as a result of psychological effect caused by World War II, but also as a part of an international wave of emancipation that first spread across Asia and subsequently began to influence large parts of the African continent, including Ethiopia that was not a part of any European colonial empire.

This book is composed into three larger units. The first deals with historical issues related to the rise of nationalist movements, context of colonial rule, decolonization, and global affairs. As an Africanist/historian, I am particularly interested in the links between past and present, therefore, the whole book, despite its rather interdisciplinary character, was meant as a response to a simple question: why does history matter?[2] The book intends to see and perceive inherited inequalities and subsequent conflicts or tensions in a historical perspective. This requires a broader overview of major processes that shaped the continent at least since the first half of the twentieth century.

The second part takes into account comparative aspects of conflicts, unrest, and inequalities in Africa in terms of citizenship, natural resources, ethnic favoritism, as well as regional imbalances. While some conflicts may have seemingly economic roots, we cannot forget that there is a whole set of variables that contribute, shape and reshape the nature of social relations and regional or ethnic status. A number of case studies are used for a comparative approach.

The third part deals with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa as a specific case due to the fact that Ethiopia has never been colonized, except for the short-lived period of Italian occupation. One of the main aims of this volume is to take into account multiple contexts and interlinked complexities of many kinds of conflicts in Africa, in other words, to put our understanding of contemporary events in Africa in a historical, comparative perspective—history matters. At the same time, despite focusing on historical contexts, I came to the conclusion that the best way to understand development and progress of conflicts is to get inspiration from other disciplines such as political science, international relations, development studies, or anthropology—social science matters. Different parts of this volume were written in different periods. Some of them are inspired by my earlier works as I have been working on modern and contemporary history and politics of Ethiopia for the last ten years. Especially in the last stage of this process, I discussed some of the particular issues with several scholars who helped me to shape my understanding of complex social, political, ethnic, economic, and environmental issues related to conflicts and inequalities in Africa. I would like to thank Jean-Nicolas Bach, Aleksi Ylönen, and Alexander Meckelburg at first for some of their insights during our meetings either in Pilsen, Addis Ababa, or Khartoum. Throughout the years, several colleagues and friends have been helpful in discussing and bringing up their insights on various themes that form part of the book. I would like to thank Massimo Zaccaria, Antonio

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NOTES

1. Camille Lefebvre, "'We have tailored Africa': French Colonialism and the 'artificiality' of Africa's borders in the interwar period." *Journal of Historical Geography* 37: 181–202.

2. I would like to thank Moritz Mihatsch for his brilliant lecture in Budapest, October 2017, and Pilsen, April 2018, which served as a great inspiration in this.

Chapter One

African Colonial and Postcolonial Past and the Rise of Nationalism

Studying African conflicts, inequalities, and other forms of social, economic, environmental, political, or cultural imbalances, disputes, or antagonism leads us necessarily to the past. We have to know how modern African nations and states were born, what kind of challenges the postcolonial societies had to deal with, or how the past may influence the present, especially when mixed with other variables such as economic, or political issues. The main reason behind this chapter is to give a historical background to the study of conflicts and inequalities. These can be of multiple types and shapes and may include regional economic inequality, ethnic and cultural inequality, inequality in terms of access to power, and many others. In order to provide a clearer idea of historical linkages to recent events in some parts of Africa, some concrete case studies are used to depict how a deep past played a certain role in recent events, such as in the genocide in Rwanda.

Nationalism in Africa, in one way or another, has been a phenomenon studied by many scholars from various disciplines. Nationalism, as a modern phenomenon, was on the rise in Africa since the first half of the twentieth century. Despite the fact that in most parts of Africa, nationalist movements began to flourish in the era of decolonization, we can observe the enormous rise of ethno-national movements also in regions that never experienced European colonial rule, like Ethiopia. The ways in which nationalist movements appeared and grew were multiple. As rightly summarized by Amoah, nationalism can be "ethnonational, subnational, national, consociational, international, transnational, multinational, or supranational."[1] Nationalism can also be accelerated by colonialism, oppression, expansion, economic growth or decline, socio-economic marginalization, etc. As defined by Amoah, each form of nationalism would satisfy some, if not all, of the

following attributes: 1) a large centralized government (or state); 2) a common territory; 3) a collective proper name; 4) common myths of ancestry or origin; 5) a common language; 6) a common economic life and policy; 7) common rights and duties for all citizens, plus a common mental makeup; 8) ideological background serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and contributing to the emergence of the nation; 9) existing links between the masses and the aristocracy; 10) a common public culture or education system.[2]

While the rise of socialism, Marxism, and nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa has usually been explained by colonial experience, or as a reaction to colonialism (finding an alternative to "capitalism"), this doesn't work in Ethiopia. However, Ethiopia witnessed the rise of ethno-national movements with the same or even greater intensity than in some other parts of Africa. Since the 1960s, leftist intellectuals "embraced socialism to address the needs of the peasantry."[3] And as it seems, identity politics, and politicization of ethnicity, as well as identity-based conflicts are not rare in Ethiopia but they become almost a necessary part of Ethiopia's path towards state-building and democratization. However, as discussed by Kidane Mengisteab, consensus "on national integration is critical for the success of a federal arrangement, since identities not interested in national integration are unikely to participate in its establishment and attempts to impose it on such groups may undermine the arrangement as well as the whole process of state-building."[4]

There exist a broad agreement on the influential role of colonialism in articulating ethnic identities in Africa. The impact of colonialism itself is still a matter of passionate debate among various communities of historians who blame each other, from Eurocentrism to Afrocentrism.[5] It is not our aim to discuss positives or negatives of the European colonialism in Africa, but generally it is indubitable that approximately eighty years of European rule in Africa, creation of colonial systems and principles of inequality between the colonizers and the colonized had a remarkable impact on the social and political climate in one way or another. Later, this climate was inherited by the newly independent regimes. Mostly Marxist authors usually depicted European colonialism in Africa as a tool of oppression and exploitation of a black man by a white man. The most important in this matter is perhaps Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*,[6] who acknowledges Marx's legacy. As is suggested by another historian of colonialism, Adu Boahen, in his crucial work titled *African Perspectives on Colonialism*,[7] truth or reality would be somewhat more complicated as he points at two basic aspects of colonialism: an era of peace after World War I, and the creation of African states. From a different perspective, Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts put together a remarkable volume on *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* where they, together with a number of es-

teemed authors, discuss various ways that African employees could in one way or another influence, manipulate, or modify processes in the construction, function, and legal apparatus of the colonial systems.[8]

The existence of state in Africa is by some theoreticians challenged as they talk about the so-called crisis of state in Africa,[9] partly caused by a legacy of colonialism, because without colonialism modern African states would not exist in the form we know today. Similarly significant (with direct psychological and physical impacts) aspects of colonialism included various forms of oppression and violence, manifested by suppression of anti-colonial West African revolts, elimination of the Herero rebellion in former German South-West Africa, or clearly brutal behavior of colonial masters in Congo Free State during the rule of Leopold II and the race for rubber. On the other hand, African states can be seen as successful, because despite all thinkable barriers and obstacles, an African state is a functioning element or, as observed by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa works*.[10] Sure, creation of mostly artificial borders did not respect the existing social and cultural environment, but the emergence of ethnic identities is a process that started after the colonial regimes were born. Most of the borders were simply delineated on the tables of European governments as a result of the Berlin conference, 1884–1885. There could not be any other solution than creation of artificial entities bringing many questions and a lot of unresolved problems. Despite the fact that most of the state borders in Africa were created artificially, there exist some evidence of how European powers tried to use and reuse existing pre-colonial borders for their purposes, and therefore, it shows the longevity of such borders in time. One of those examples is Vincent Hiribarren's account on the history of Borno.[11]

One such example still visible today was a separation of speakers of one language into various colonies governed by different European powers and thus having different administrative systems, language of instruction, economic opportunities, jurisdiction, etc. Bakongo people can be taken as an example, being divided into four colonies, French Congo, Belgian Congo, Angola, and Gabon.[12] Somali-speaking peoples were divided into five completely different settings and administrative environments: Ethiopia, French Somaliland (Djibouti today), Italian Somalia, British Somaliland, and the British colony of Kenya. Social and political consequences of the Scramble for Africa have led to the growth of nationalist and separatist movements and tendencies that were legitimized by colonial past (Eritrea, Somaliland).

Every European power tried to develop its own administrative system and differed also in perception of Africans, though generally we can state that the tendency was to look upon an African as an inferior being. The Era of Imperialism, as the late stage of European colonialism is usually called (ca. 1870–1960) meant a true superiority of one society over another, its control facilitated by the technological lead of Europe.[13]

The French colonial system, based on a direct rule and direct control over the colonies, suggested vast expenditures and energy spent on creation of massive administrative apparatus and involvement of French bureaucrats. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the French wanted to create an undisrupted Francophone territory that would connect Senegal with the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This was blocked by the competing British plans to connect Cairo with Cape Town and resulted in an almost clash of both armies at Fashoda (1898) in what is now Sudan.[14]

The strategy of South Sudan was based on strengthening of political and cultural dominance in all spheres of African life and society. Due to a long-lasting Anglo-French rivalry and international political and economic superiority of Great Britain, the program of the French colonial policy became a "cultural export" based on assimilation, i.e., spread of the French language and culture in newly conquered territories. A part of this was a strategy to educate "loyal" African political elites in order to keep the continuity of French dominance in emancipating colonies after World War II. The first presidents of independent African Francophone countries were thus close friends of France and spent at least part of their lives in Paris. Here we can place for instance the first Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor, first President of Côte d'Ivoire Félix Houphouët-Boigny, or the first President of Niger, Hamani Diori.[15]

The idea of unification of Francophone colonies in Africa via linguistic and cultural assimilation had to prevent these countries from disintegration experienced by some of the Portuguese or Belgian colonies in the era of early independence. The strong patrimonial relation of the colonial metropole to its colonies was largely manifested by the de Gaulle government's unwillingness to allow any visible liberalization or emancipating mechanisms due to fears of chaotic and quick decolonization. The example of Guinea that voted for independence in 1958 in a referendum offered by France, or of Algeria that in a French collective memory was considered a part of France on African soil, show how worried Paris was of losing its power and prestige, including economic and cultural significance, in Africa. Despite this fact we cannot overestimate French cultural imperialism as only some 15% of people in Francophone Africa speak French while the rest of the population gives preference to local languages.[16]

Shortly after World War II, the French government came up with the concept of "French Union" under whose shelter the various components were divided into six categories that included European France, Algeria, old colonies in the Caribbean and four communes in Senegal, new colonies mostly in French Africa, protectorates in Morocco, Tunisia, and Indochina, and mandates in Togo and Cameroon.[17] However, it was not the intention of any of the colonial powers to bring quick decolonization and independence to Africa.

The British, unlike the French, developed (in many of their colonies) the system of indirect rule that did not rely on such financial efforts but obviously affected lives of individuals in the same manner. This was remarkable primarily in "pearls of the British Empire" such as Kenya or Nigeria. However, unlike the French the Brits did not have any desire to assimilate Africans.[18] They allowed Africans many of their traditional institutions as the main aim was economic profit, not cultural dominance. British, or generally European colonialism, owed much to great explorers and personalities such as Cecil Rhodes who in fact established the basis of British imperialism in South Africa. North Rhodesia, named after him, soon became one of the most important components of the British Empire. The richest area was the region along borders with the former Belgian Congo that came into being as the Copper Belt due to vast deposits of copper and other minerals. However, the British, just like any other imperial power, were rather insensitive to rich and vast cultures and histories of their colonial subjects, and rather portrayed them as the primitive "other."[19] Together with "scientific" superiority and "knowledge" about "the other," all colonial powers had to prove military and technological superiority. Not surprisingly, to any hegemonic power there is a resistance against economic and cultural oppression.[20]

The 1950s in Africa were characterized by an increasing role of African or Pan-African nationalism whose highlights were marked by independence of the Sudan (1956), Ghana (1957), and Guinea (1958). However, in former Belgian colonies, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo, belated decolonization that did not reflect transformations and changes in the rest of Africa led to ethnic violence, political turmoil, and severe crises. While the British and the French allowed at the end of the 1950s certain political dialogue leading towards greater emancipation and later independence, Portuguese colonies under the Salazarist regime sought to incorporate its colonies more intensively as Portugal did not show good economic figures and thus needed the colonies' natural resources to maintain its economy. Portugal considered its colonies as provinces, similar to the French approach to French Algeria.

The Portuguese colonial system was based, according to Paul Nugent, on a kind of a social Darwinism,[21] which was derived from a hypothesis that Africans could not contribute anything to the development of society. Portuguese three-stages system of assimilation composed of destruction of traditional societies, infiltration of Portuguese culture, and integration of detribalized Africans to Portuguese society and remained largely only a theoretical concept. Reality saw an unequal system in which the so-called *assimilados* could use certain privileges while natives (*indígenas*) were taken as a second-class category of people. If anyone wished to belong to the category of *assimilado*, he or she had to show adequate knowledge of the Portuguese language and prove principles of a civilized lifestyle.[22] Portuguese control over colonial possessions and its unwillingness to start the decolonization

process led to creation of diverse liberation movements with different ideological and foreign backing, primarily in Angola.[23]

In the Belgian mandate territory of Ruanda-Urundi, the Tutsi aristocracy was elevated to the role of real rulers of the country and the Tutsis became a privileged society while the Hutu farmers and Pygmies named Twa became officially second-class citizens. It was this polarization of the society in which former social categories became fixed ethnic categories that gave Rwanda and Burundi a genocidal character. Tutsis enjoyed relative advantages including wealth, education, and power. Belgian impact on formation of ethnic and even racial categories is indubitable, as was the growing demographic rates and overpopulation. At the same time, mythologization of the past and of the ethnic identities came into being during colonial rule, especially under the supervision and direct involvement of the Catholic Church having a monopoly on education. Hamitic hypothesis based on anthropological prejudices and racial theories of the nineteenth century played a significant role in perceiving Africans, and Africa in general, as a continent without culture and history, where everything of some civilizing value was brought in by the Hamites, or semi-white people. In Rwanda and Burundi, the Hamitic hypothesis and use and abuse of rich local mythology led to creation of separate races that made further social and political development in both countries very complicated.[24] Here we get to everlasting problems of ethnicity, which scholars study from either primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist positions. Colonialism obviously categorized people into different groups and ethnic groups were taken as given, as impermeable entities.

ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa can be taken as a special region in Africa as it was colonized by several powers so that no power occupied a larger territorial unit (that would be comparable to, for instance, French West Africa or French Equatorial Africa, except for a very short-lived Italian East African Empire era), and the major regional power was the only country in Africa that defeated a European imperial army and maintained its independence. In historical perspective and retrospect, one crucial question regarding the Horn of Africa comes back over and over again: was Ethiopia really a colonial empire and was it really so different from the rest of Africa? To answer these questions we have to distinguish our present knowledge from that of the past. Baz Lecocq put it rightly when he asked: "How does historical discourse influence the present, and how does the present influence historical discourse?"[25] These are questions which necessarily entered any kind of historical research in regard to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in general. Probably nowhere else has the historical discourse been so by politicized and ethni-

cized as in Ethiopia, which has a long history of nationalisms, conflicts, civil wars and political tensions and turmoil, and where ethnicity and religion usually play a remarkable role of mobilizing factors. Ethiopian history has been a very complex and complicated, multi-faceted and dynamic process which cannot be put into a few simplifying statements and categories. So is the historiography which corresponds in its width to the broad and all-encompassing nature of the history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.[26]

From the present point of view, Ethiopia is by many authors depicted as a colonial power which colonized and subjugated a wide range of minorities inhabiting mainly the southern, eastern and western fringes of the Ethiopian Highlands.[27] Such simplifying notions usually narrow the studied subject on ethnic or racial issues while they rather neglect many other factors which are even more important including land, societies, social changes, classes, power relations, military, international dimensions and many others. States and societies undergo perpetual changes and progresses in a context of a wide range of factors, both internal and external. Proper understanding of (in this case) African past needs to put all these aspects into the context of the time which we study and not to put our current images and concepts or prefabricated ideas of our past into it. Contrasting discourses on history of Ethiopia have filled recent debates among academics, political activists and the general public, but have been discussed elsewhere.[28]

One of the perspectives which has become popular is the colonial perspective, which is usually promoted by various Oromo scholars in the diaspora, while some other authors have a little reserved opinion on this. Recently, plenty of materials have been written on "conquest, exploitation, and deculturation"[29] "control and dominance,"[30] or "genocide."[31] Ethiopia has been depicted as a colonial power that conquered territories inhabited by many different societies that were forcefully incorporated to the Empire and subjugated. One of the major disagreements concerning identity and nationalism in Ethiopia within the academic public is the essentialist-social constructivist debate, which has been profoundly discussed by Günther Schlee elsewhere.[32] It is not the aim of this article to discuss theoretical backgrounds of these disputes. On the other hand, any kind of debate concerning ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia, which seems to be very much politicized of late, needs to take a look back in history and analyze complex historical processes without recent lenses influenced by the above-mentioned academic disputes.

Ethiopia, Historiography, and Nationalism

Ethiopia, despite being ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for many centuries based on the three "powers" – the Emperor, the Orthodox Church, and Amharic language – was not a "one-way" street or 'black and white' state as it would seem from today's point of view. The Shawan kingdom, which stood

at the forefront of the socio-political dynamics of the modern Ethiopian state in the nineteenth century, was a culturally diverse, cosmopolitan and prosperous territory with international trade links and local or regional blood connections.[33] Three historical stages – Imperial, socialist, federal – through which Ethiopia has undergone gave rise to many different perspectives on its history by both Ethiopian and foreign scholars, historians, anthropologists, political scientists and quite recently, political activists. These new waves of scholarship have brought not only new perspectives on relations between various ethnic groups as they simply put ethnicity to the forefront of research, but based their assumptions and writings on subjectivity, emotions, and simplified statements.[34] It is very striking that many of the recent debates concerning ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia completely ignore some crucial factors of socio-political development in Ethiopia such as religion, regional competition and balance, and cross-border as well as international and transnational issues. Tadesse Tamrat, for instance, wrote about the rise of religious nationalism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a significant sign of territorial expansion and wars with neighboring (mostly but not only) Muslim regions.[35] The rise of religious nationalism among Muslim populations is also challenging "traditional" views on Ethiopian history as strictly "ethnic-based."[36]

In Ethiopian studies in general, the center-periphery model seems to prevail, usually being associated with the expansion of the Shawan kingdom and the rise of the "modern" Ethiopian state. However, the inherited borders, as well as symbols and myths of this "modern" Ethiopian state complicate our view on the Ethiopian societies and diversities. The centralized nature of the Ethiopian state, as Jean-Nicolas Bach argues, is precisely the reason why it is so difficult to think beyond this center-periphery dichotomy in Ethiopia.[37] Due to a complex history of expansions, local power centers, and various coalitions it is difficult to define what and who exactly belongs to the center and periphery. As Bach further states, current "developmentalist" discourse basically contributes to fostering center-periphery fictions and by using this dichotomy between center and periphery, the ruling party legitimizes its economic and political reforms under the shelter of the "developmental state."[38] This also seems to be closely related to the never-ending debates on the nature of ethnicity as centers and peripheries sometimes tend to be portrayed in ethnic ways (for instance, Amharas vs. Oromos). While constructivists emphasize that ethnicity is not "supra-historical and quasi-natural membership in a group, but rather a social identity constructed under specific historical-political circumstances," for essentialists ethnicity is associated with "'primordial ties' and a 'given' common history (ancestry), culture and language."[39] As we will see later, the Ethiopian government uses rather essentialist approaches mixed with center-periphery dichotomy in order to legitimize its policies and actions. The same, however, is used and employed

by many of their critics, particularly the diaspora. This has been vividly analyzed by Günther Schlee examining the "politics of difference."[40] This essentialist approach to ethnicity done by the Ethiopian government gets more and more support from research such as Kjetil Tronvoll's account on human rights abuses and "ethnic" patterns in these acts of violence.[41]

Before getting to a deconstruction of nationalisms in Ethiopia in historical perspectives, we should put Ethiopia in a broader context of Africa. Due to the absence of European colonialism in Ethiopia, this country has often been excluded from larger comparative studies concerning decolonization as well as nationalism, which in Africa arose as a necessary consequence of colonialism. Colonial state and later the independent nation-state have largely contributed to the emergence of "modern conception of ethnic identity."[42] Unlike the rest of Africa (except for Liberia), Ethiopia has been mythicized as an independent Empire living in relative isolation, peace, unity and civilization. These myths were completely broken in 1974 and nowadays, Ethiopia shows a remarkably high level of internal as well as external tensions, conflicts, and instability.

For many recent authors, Ethiopia is a colonial state of the Amharas that colonized dozens of ethnic groups as Oromos or Somalis in what is now known as Ethiopia, but before 1855 were independent territories.[43] Such a statement is partly true but needs to be examined in a broader perspective. At the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia was one of a few African states that had a capability to defeat a European army (comparable to the Zulu victory at Isandlwana over the British in 1879). Due to growing European presence in the Horn of Africa that included French interests in Bab-al-Mandeb, British securitization of trade routes in Yemen and British Somaliland, Mahdist expansion in the Sudan, and primarily the Italian colonial ambitions in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia had the only chance to secure its territory by militarization and expansionism.

Why are we putting these facts into a broader comparative study? Because what characterizes recent Ethiopian historiography is the lack of complexity and comparison and abundance of ethnicized histories and "historical narratives based on each group's collective memory" which were mostly "constructed along nationalist lines."[44] These views usually lack any kind of comparative methods or broader insights that would put the studied problem into a context of that time. Such a situation may lead to creation of a *parallel history* based on personal emotions, assumptions and subjective feelings. Therefore, there is a need to contextualize the processes that have led to conflicts, political turbulences and unresolved disputes in Ethiopia in a broader context of colonial and postcolonial Africa and to analyze it in certain stages as it developed through the last sixty years.

Political scientists and anthropologists have published plenty of articles and material on nationalism, ethnic conflict and identity issues in Ethiopia

but perhaps surprisingly there exist rather minimal examination of these issues in historical research, let alone comparative history. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the study of nationalisms in Ethiopia is so politicized and ethnicized. We can take a look at the development of nationalisms in Ethiopia in four stages. First, we have to take into account a simple fact that despite its oppressive nature, the Ethiopian state successfully kept its territorial integrity untouched and protected it against foreign invaders. Without this success, there would be no Ethiopia and the development of nationalist movements would look very different when facing a foreign (European) colonial power.

The very first stage of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was that of the 1896 victory at Adowa over the Italian forces. The image of Ethiopia as a unique African power that was able to defeat a European power had been created. Historically, the battle of Adowa sheltered the centuries-long process of "unification" of Ethiopia. The concept of Ethiopian unity, on the other hand, was challenged by the Italian acquisition of the colony of Eritrea in 1890 and had significant consequences for further development of Ethiopia. The Italian presence in Eritrea weakened the hegemony of Tigray and approved the rise of Shawa as the dominant core of Ethiopian expansionism.[45] These two centers of power have had a long history of rivalry at least since the sixteenth century.[46] The second phase of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia is related to the Eritrean and Somali issues, the incorporation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian federation and unification of the state, and the issue of Ogaden, which challenged the Pan-Somali ideology. The third phase of nationalism is related to civil unrest and protests against the centralized power of Imperial Ethiopia and the rise of various associations and Marxist ideology. The last phase is characterized by ethno-nationalist movement throughout Ethiopia which emerged as a response to the Derg military socialist regime. This also includes recent political turbulences as the very last phase of this last stage. To make it a bit more complicated, we can also take a look at the emergence of nationalism in Ethiopia in rural-urban binary opposition. While the rural population still forms about 81% of the total population of Ethiopia, it was, as Shimelis Bonsa said, the capital city of Addis Ababa that gave Ethiopia its modern face and it was there where the nationalist agenda was produced. Addis Ababa "provided the crucial space where the infrastructures of a modern nation – including a central government, a modern bureaucracy, and a national economy – were laid down."[47]

In all of these cases, which will be discussed later in a deeper comparative perspective, we can find several historical paradoxes which are not reflected in contemporary literature on the history of Ethiopia. First of all, we have to ask, where are the sources of the rise of ethno-national identities that filled the research on Ethiopia so much in last couple of decades? It has been claimed that social change tends to produce stronger communal identities.[48]

Recently, it seems that the role of social and cultural factors have been rather downplayed by many authors dealing with ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia which only contributes to politicization of discourse on the modern and contemporary history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

COLONIAL RULE AND DECOLONIZATION IN AFRICA

World War II had an enormous impact on emancipation movements and decolonization in Asia and Africa. Asian countries began to gain independence earlier, shortly after the last wounds of the war healed, while in the case of Africa it was much slower. Colonial powers began to search for ways to remodel and reshape their colonial empires so that European control would last longer, while fulfilling demands of indigenous populations at the same time. This, however, did not happen.

Decolonization in Africa, by its nature, was a social change leading to emancipation of Africans and social and cultural transformation as a necessary alternative to colonial rule. Decolonization after the World War II was a necessary process that was accelerated by the independence of India and Pakistan, although it seems now that the aim of Great Britain (as well as other powers) was not to abandon the Empire, but rather to reinvigorate it.[49] Despite a continuous fall of the Empire, white supremacy did not disappear from the colonized world so quickly, as was the example of South Africa. There, the policy of apartheid legitimized the white rule and any kind of equality would question this "legitimacy." On the other hand, other dominions were long based on white supremacy and it took a long time until the so-called first nations, or the indigenous populations were made equal by law.[50] This image of "indigenous people" of Africa and other colonized worlds was based on superiority of race and religion and despite missionary education, Africans were seen for many decades by colonial administrators as "double bastards, both in their own indigenous heritage and in the European inheritance that many of them so enthusiastically embraced and sought to domesticate."[51]

The process of decolonization led to continuous and slow (although in some cases, such as Guinea, very quick) loss of white supremacy and transfer of power into the hands of local elites, many of them educated in the West and some of them loyal to their colonial masters. Recent studies also show the involvement of, for instance, West African Muslims into the decolonization process, although they can hardly be put into the category of "African nationalists."[52] This category was dominated by Western educated intellectuals, many of whom later became political leaders of the newly independent states. The increasing international pressure to implement human and civil rights paved the way for not only various anti-colonial movements in the

colonies, but also civil rights movements in the colonial metropoles. Racial superiority began to be challenged by ethno-national, nationalist as well as international movements such as Pan-Africanism. In this process, Ethiopia played a specific role, on one hand as an inspiration due to its history of victory over European colonialism. On the other hand, Ethiopia lacked those kinds of links that other colonies had with their former colonial masters.

Pan-Africanism, which once hailed Ethiopia as a symbol of African purity and independence, failed to create a unified and homogenous continent which was rather an illusion from its very beginning.[53] Despite this, Pan-Africanism played a remarkable role in the decolonization period and had a great impact on nationalist movements in Africa, although the ideology of Pan-Africanism was in sharp contrast with nationalist movements in African colonies seeking independence and not any kind of federation with other former colonies. That is why so many federal projects failed (e.g., Mali and Senegal, or Ghana and Guinea) because they were unable to overcome the historical, linguistic and territorial heritage of European colonialism. Moreover, the Cold War context prevented these projects from fruitful implementation. The case of Guinea, surrounded by hostile environments in the early days of its independence when it faced troubles not only from the West, but also from other former members of French West Africa closely tied to Paris, speaks for itself.[54]

In the era of decolonization, Africa witnessed genuine and new-born – in a certain sense virgin – waves of nationalist movements which were characterized by the efforts of colonized nations to proclaim independence or at least to gain greater autonomy. It was World War II that served as accelerator of emancipation and independent thoughts and ambitions. Nationalism in Africa after World War II can be divided into several groups depending on the political and social environment in which it was rooted. The main nationalist sources were Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, and Ethno-nationalism. These were not necessarily in opposition but could be compatible, at least in some cases. On the other hand, it is clear that, for instance, Pan-Arabism did not coincide very well with Pan-Africanism and both ideologies had quite divergent trajectories of political goals and ambitions. The oldest nationalist movements of these are Pan-Africanism and Pan-Islamism whose first rise to political and social significance took place at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Despite many differences between Ethiopia and the rest of Africa under colonial rule, we can find some general similarities between these two entities in the process of the development of nationalist movements and social transformations. As suggested by Crawford Young, the era of decolonization was the “golden age” of associational life and thus the rise of civil society.[55] In the 1950s in many corners of Africa, including Ethiopia, we can see the rise of various associations including trade unions, student associations, eth-

no-regional political parties (mainly in countries like Congo, Nigeria) and the growth of state bureaucracy as well as private business. Many perspectives have been "invented" in terms of evaluating the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa, ranging from optimistic hopes dedicated to the independence of African states and societies in the early stage of the 1960s, through dependency theories in 1970s and 1980s, until a pessimistic approach which considered a postcolonial state in Africa as an "alien model of a nation-state."[56]

Not surprisingly, many of the African states ended up very soon in some form of authoritarian rule, ranging from those who were supported by a former colonial power, to those more radical in terms of dealing with historical/colonial heritage. Due to the lack of contact and understanding between states and societies, we have to distinguish an official nationalism (state nationalism) from other types of nationalism (ethno-nationalism) which were created as the result of failed hopes and dreams of early generations of intellectual elites. Not surprisingly either, socialist and Marxist tendencies became popular among African (including Ethiopian) intelligentsia and students as well as trade unions and workers because of its alternative to European capitalism, which was necessarily associated with colonialism.

Pan-Arabism, together with Pan-Africanism, served as the most important accelerator of nationalism in North Africa shortly after the end of World War II. In 1952, Egypt proclaimed independence, only a year after Libya. But Egypt's case was more important because of its historical significance, and because Egypt has traditionally been a center of the Arab and Islamic world. Moreover, its geographical position connected African, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean environments. Pan-Islamism as a powerful means of social mobilization played a significant role since the beginning of the twentieth century, and Egypt especially served as a center of reformist Islamic thinking. But due to the more or less secular character of African nationalism before and after World War II, the importance of Pan-Islamism gained momentum mainly in the era of independence when secular states in North Africa witnessed the first serious socio-political crisis. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was a heyday for most of the Islamic movements in North, West, and East Africa, and since that period we can see the rise of various movements inspired by the events in Iran. Moreover, as a reaction to the rise of Shi'a Islam, Wahhabist Saudi Arabia strengthened its efforts to export its ideology and to stop the influence of Iran in Africa.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethno-nationalism was a major challenge to Pan-Africanism because, unlike Pan-Africanism, ethno-nationalism was aimed to serve various nationalities to proclaim independent states, and thus fragment already existing states into smaller territories. From the very beginning of the formation of political parties in many of the African states, ethno-nationalism served as a major means of social mobilization and people were instructed to vote for their ethnic parties and representatives. In countries like Nigeria,

Democratic Republic of Congo, or Kenya, there was a lack of national identity feeling and political parties had very serious ethnic and regional attachments thus making it impossible to reach a national consensus. With no surprise, Nigeria and Congo ended up in years of conflicts which up to date have been uneasy to completely overcome.

Fragmentation of Nigeria and Congo, two very important states in Africa, was the biggest obstacle for Pan-Africanist dreams of African unity, common African government, parliament, and currency. If these countries were unable to reach consensus, how then were more than fifty states supposed to reach the goal of unity? Disunity did not reach only these ethnically diverse states, but was also the case of much smaller and relatively homogeneous countries like Rwanda or Burundi. From the very beginning of the decolonization process, it was clear that both countries could not reach any national unity.

After new independent states were created, the international community, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), did everything it could to maintain the integrity of African states. It was clear that any disintegration in one part of Africa could inspire other emancipation, or separatist movements, in other parts of the continent.

As a result of decolonization, which accelerated after the Bandung conference in 1955, in the 1950s a number of African states gained independence from their former colonial masters. These were Libya (1951), Egypt (1952), Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia (1956), Ghana (1957), and Guinea (1958). The end of 1950s brought an extremely evident pressure on decolonization and independence of African nations which gained its momentum in 1960, since then claimed as a "year of Africa" when 17 states in Africa gained independence. Most of them were Francophone states but generally it was a great success for the continent as whole. This was a result of the late colonial project of the "developmental" colonial state that was supposed to make the Empire richer and more legitimate.[57]

Due to many internal problems and unresolved or even inherited disputes between various groups, a number of African states had to face serious challenges from inside that were caused mostly by lack of any national feeling in these newly born entities. Previous colonial rule did not tend to promote national unity due to obvious reasons; moreover, colonialism was based on the "divide and rule" policy which usually privileged certain "loyal" societies while marginalizing other ones. Typical examples are the French relationship to the Wolof in Senegal, or the prominent position of the Tutsi under the Belgian rule in Rwanda. Practically all major events in Africa after 1945 were in one way or another influenced by the Cold War. Nationalist projects led by usually tiny elite, like in the Belgian Congo for instance, were heavily impacted by outside events and ideologies contributing to what might be called a Cold War nationalism.[58] In an attempt to produce national coher-

ence, new states attempted to construct a sense of nationalism with cultural and historical depth that would resonate with all of the nation's people. However, in many cases, due to a lack of coherence, nationalism tended to be centered around the history, language, and cultural attributes of one dominant ethnic group.[59]

It was no surprise that in some of African states, separatism as a form of nationalism became a natural phenomenon. Separatism is usually a tendency of one group to separate a part of a territory of a state from the rest of the country in order to create a new independent state (secession) or an effort to unite an ethno-cultural community in one political entity (irredentism). In the postcolonial era, Africa witnessed several of such separatist movements with varying levels of success. Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea, to new a few, were the most challenging to the integrity of states in Congo/Zaïre, Nigeria, and Ethiopia respectively. The multi-ethnic character of societies and their cultural diversity are not themselves causes of separatism but form at least their important basis. Separatist tendencies are very often perceived in strictly ethnic connotations, but it is not necessarily the case every time. For instance, people inhabiting the Comoro Islands belong to one ethno-linguistic community but in 1997–2002, an island of Ndzuwami formed a de facto semi-independent quasi-state.[60]

Some of the nationalist/separatist movements proved their effectiveness after decades of clashes while others did not reach any goal or demand in the same time frame. There can be obviously multiple reasons, but one of the main ones is the internationally rooted proclamation of indivisibility of African states guaranteed by the UN as well as by the OAU and the AU. This is the reason why still the only two successful separatist/nationalist movements are Eritrea (which was formed within the borders of a former self-named Italian colony), and South Sudan, for whose independence there was an enormous international support caused by almost fifty years of civil war. In the same logic, Western Sahara, whose territory lies in what was formerly known as the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro, is eligible for independence but many other factors are against it. When the Republic of Somaliland proclaimed independence in 1991, it was justified by the "colonial" borders it had.

Another group of nationalist and separatist movements are those who demand certain territory inside existing states without any "colonial" boundaries, such as Eritrea, Somaliland, or Western Sahara. Ethno-regional and nationalist struggle inside heterogeneous states can be witnessed in places where there does not exist an equal distribution of wealth, where a certain group is marginalized or oppressed or where there are other, for instance, international, interests involved. There we may count the movement in the Congolese province of Katanga in the era of early independence. The then head of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe, supported by Belgian military forces and

secret service, as well as by the CIA, proclaimed independence of Katanga.[61] Another, and still recent, example can be found in Senegal, where Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) seeks independence of this southern region from the rest of the country. Its action is, according to its proclamations, justified by historical marginalization accompanied by economic exploitation and religious as well as cultural oppression from the side of the Wolof who form a ruling majority of Senegal. The strategy of this movement is derived from economic marginalization. Moreover, the leader of the MFDC, Abbot Diamancouné, refuses to speak about "separatism" as according to him Casamance has never belonged to Senegal but is closely related to the cultural history of neighboring Guinea-Bissau.[62]

DIVERSITY OF THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE IN AFRICA

While the majority of African countries are ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, homogeneity is found in only a small number of them. An intergovernmental conference on language policy in Africa, which took place in Harare in 1996 under the shelter of UNESCO, defined eight countries as homogeneous. The term itself means that more than 90% of inhabitants of the country speak one language. Among those countries we may find Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, and Swaziland.[63]

Several African countries have in last decades witnessed development of what we may call a linguistic nationalism in relation to a state-directed effort leading to linguistic homogenization.[64] Non-democratic language policies are often linked to bloody conflicts and ethnic tensions. Batibo claims that such ethnic movements are not motivated only by an effort to maintain indigenous languages in a given country, but by an aim of local authorities to maintain linguistic plurality of their country.[65] On the other hand, linguistic revivalism can be successful only in such a case when it is supported by state institutions and a concerted effort of its speakers to preserve it as a mother tongue.

The fact that languages are a necessary part of politics, and that the question of standardization of languages can be abused by political representation, is more than obvious. In recent past, language and his standardization has become quite often a subject of political clashes in several African countries. During Siyad Barré dictatorship (1969–1991) a Latin script was introduced for a Somali language despite the Osmaniya script legalized in 1961. Moreover, Barré's secularist regime strongly stepped against Arabic and Arabic script preferred by Muslim authorities.[66]

Languages were for a long time taken as an inseparable part of ethnic identity, but several recent researches have shown that such a claim does not

have an absolute validity. As an example, we may point at Senegalese Serer who have been, since independence in 1960, completely Wolofized. But since then, there has been a concerted effort by Serer elites and people to strengthen elements of Serer culture and ethnic identity. Serer consider Wolof to be inferior, and development of ethnic identity without their own language was seen as a defense of the Wolof domination.[67]

Some authors[68] claim that the main barriers to promotion of African languages into education were brought not only by colonialism but also by the insufficient will of many African rulers to bring changes in the era shortly after independence. Ouedraogo states that African politicians were afraid of problems connected with promotion of African languages in schools and at institutions and it was more comfortable to keep things as they were, including language policy, inherited borders, etc.[69] It is related to the term "collective amnesia" originally used by Prah[70] and developed by some other scholars.[71] This means a disastrous result of language policies in Sub-Saharan Africa with all their negative consequences, including the decrease of indigenous African wisdom and knowledge stemming from previous generations and Pre-colonial times. The theory of "collective amnesia" in a certain sense follows Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.[72] There the author claims that after the "invasion" of Europeans, African skills, knowledge, and values were substituted by European values and knowledge.

In the case of Ethiopia, it is quite problematic to speak about a postcolonial state, just like it is in a very different setting of South Africa, for instance. One of the main features of postcolonial states was their bureaucratization. In the case of Ethiopia, all three regimes, Imperial, socialist, and federal, have relied on massive bureaucracy. Recent trends have focused on a key government objective which is the "Democratic Development State."[73] As analyzed by Sabine Planel, the current government's techno-bureaucratic rule rather complicates any development and leads many farmers to servitude under the state domination. Vulnerability of the countryside is at the same time one of the most explosive issues of today in Ethiopia.

In international and economic perspectives, the above-mentioned opinions, as stated by Roy-Campbell[74] mean that disuse of African languages in education and devaluation of knowledge incorporated into these languages accredits Africa to a position of receiver rather than contributor. African countries thus receive technology, know-how, skills, publications and other elements from foreign countries without being perceived as contributors to a common social wealth in the era of globalization. Roy-Campbell[75] even blames African countries that in the past, instead of developing African know-how, only followed the development policy of Western countries by which they failed in the effort to systematically promote indigenous practices in development processes. Language became an indubitable part of these

processes because European languages used in education supported modernization coming from the West as something desirable and broadly expected.

Besides languages, territory and multiple identities were among those elements that the African postcolonial states had to deal with. Vincent Hiribarren gives an example of the concept of "Kanuri nation" that is widely used among academics across the Lake Chad basin (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Chad). The ancient Empire of Kanem-Borno thus serves in a way as a part of cultural revival across the Lake Chad basin showing the difficulties of colonial legacies across borders.[76] Just like in Ethiopia (which has no history of European colonialism), in Nigeria the competition between ethno-nationalism and state nationalism can be observed with the same intensity.

ETHNICITY, NATION, AND RACE

When it comes to Africa, the general public has been very often confronted with the term "ethnicity" which has become a word seemingly explaining conflicts or tensions anywhere in Africa. Ethnicity and ethnic identity, just like nation or nationalism can – probably due to the frequency with which they are used – become a matter of misunderstanding, misinterpretation or confusion.[77] It is evident that the term ethnicity itself has its origin in a long-lasting European effort to find "racial" categories that were mostly developed during the early stage of colonialism and have their roots in evolutionary anthropology from the turn of the eighteenth century.[78] Although today the concept of race is not relevant, ethnic categories remained despite their controversial consequences and connotations. Moreover, in many African countries ethnicity seems to stand in the forefront of political development and recent political theories count ethnic identity as one of the core categories.[79]

Be as it may, ethnic group has substituted as a modern variety of the ancient term "tribe," which had many rather pejorative connotations and was associated with "backwardness" and "primitivity." It took a long time until it was replaced by "ethnic group."[80] Mafeje states that "tribes" were, to a certain extent, a colonial invention of contemporary anthropologists who tended to categorize colonial subjects into various categories.[81] When the first missionaries and ethnographers came to Africa in the nineteenth century, all Africans simply had to be put into some category, some "tribe." These tribes were in many cases created on the basis of seeming and supposed features such as language, culture, common history, physical traits, etc. The first "ethnic maps" created included clearly defined tribal borders.[82]

Ethnicity is usually considered a problem as far as the modern history of Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned. The reasons, according to Chabal and Daloz, are the following: 1) it is viewed as an inconvenient leftover from a previous "traditional" age and a hindrance to modernization; 2) or as a divi-

sive political weapon used by unscrupulous political operators. The two authors, in my opinion, rightly point at the fact that such an interpretation of the term itself is rather "mechanistic" while it is needed to consider ethnicity as a "dynamic, multi-faceted and interactive cluster of changeable self-validated attributes of individual-cum-collective identities."[83] Tegegne Teka adds, pointing at Ethiopia, that the urban population does not welcome ethnic-based policy and that it is not clear "how the rural population feels and the extent to which it endorses ethnic federalism."[84]

Even though there is no generally accepted definition of ethnicity which might be used as a benchmark, we have at least two historically acknowledged approaches how to study ethnicity. The first, the so-called *Primordialist* model counts with ethnic boundary markers – religion, dress, language or other symbols – which distinguish one ethnic group from the other. The second, the so-called *Constructionist* or *Instrumentalist* model suggests that although ethnic groups maintain boundaries such as language to mark their identity, people may modify and shift their language and ethnic identity in different types of social interaction. The latter was an important step because it moved ethnicity from culture or changed approach to ethnicity from *static* to *interactional*. One of the most important works in this sense was Frederick Barth's *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*,[85] although it might be argued that boundaries may not serve as a means of division but also as "places" where people and groups meet.

Ethnicity or ethnic identity is usually used as a certain construct by which we want to distinguish differences between "us" and "them," very often in cases where there were none before. The fact that we identify ourselves in cultural-historical terms differently than someone else does not necessarily mean that we act in all situations on the basis of ethnicity, mainly in political context.[86]

Most of the scholars claim that accenting ethnicity as means of organization or mobilization creates the potential for political manipulation by emphasizing various differences and otherness.[87] Previous experience from Africa (Biafra, Somaliland, Sudan, the Congo, to name a few) shows us how illusory tendencies leading towards a "nation state" can be and how they led in many cases to repeated violence. One of the main problems of contemporary Ethiopia is its accent on ethnicity and ethnic differences, which on one hand make it almost impossible to reach a "national" consensus, and on the other hand it creates space for various political activists and scholars to even deepen the politics of difference by pointing at the shared suffering of their people. While the Ethiopian constitution puts emphasis on the necessity of self-determination of nations, its only result is the rule of representatives of a minority governing a country composed of dozens of different groups. Thus what we can hear and see is persuasion of at least a part of political circles in

Ethiopia and the diaspora who claim that the problem of Ethiopia lies in its colonial past as they compare Ethiopia to other, European, colonial powers.

The basic aspect of ethnicity, the division between "us" and "them," can be abused in terms of creating and sharpening differences for the purpose of political mobilization. There belong also many types and forms of stereotypization used by each community to label and name "the other." There exist a high number of stereotypes which usually stand in sharp contrast with what other people think of themselves. People usually have a natural tendency to describe "us" in positive terms while to attribute "them" with negative or pejorative stereotypes.[88]

As shown by Patrick Chabal, ethnicity is a historical and to a certain extent hybrid category composed of social, economic and cultural traits and the category itself has been fluid, i.e., that genealogy of each group was very broad and all encompassing, people could enter and leave ethnic groups, and their geographic borders were rather vague.[89] During the colonial period the need of European administrators to collect "data" about the colonized subjects led to fixation of ethnic identities. People still could change their identity but what changed dramatically was the "instrumentalization of ethnicity as the main feature of social identity."[90]

Patrick Manning gives several examples of the creation of several artificial and fixed as well as flexible identities. When during the colonial period the Lingala language was extended in the Congo due to the military forces (*Force Publique*), all the speakers of this language were later labeled as members of the Bangala tribe although they did not identify themselves as such. On the contrary, in Niger a certain amount of flexibility related to profession and lifestyle was to be seen between Hausa and Tuaregs. Hausa are farmers and traders while Tuaregs are nomads and herders. Repeating droughts led in some periods to the Tuaregs settling in cities. They adopted an agricultural life so that they became ethnic Hausas, adopting their language and customs. During the rainy seasons and migration to northern areas, Hausas could become Tuaregs.[91] Ethnicity was thus perceived as identity related to a certain lifestyle and form of livelihood. Desert and nomadic lifestyle was labeled as Tuareg, trade and urban lifestyle was associated with Hausa identity.

On the other hand, since the end of World War II, Marxism already began to penetrate Africa, having a significant impact on the idea of overcoming differences. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), backed by the communist ideal, hoped to unite all ethnic, regional, or religious groups. Especially in Guinea, which gained independence in 1958, the RDA tended to unite all inhabitants for the process of emancipation from French colonial rule.[92]

COLONIAL LEGACIES AND INEQUALITIES

Perhaps a perfect example of a country which experienced a genocide with root causes going back to colonial times, is Rwanda. Numerous authors studied the contexts, consequences, causes, and impacts of the genocide, but a deeper understanding of the root causes must necessarily include historical links and deeds such as "ethnic favoritism," officially legalized inequalities between groups of people and subsequently a combination of demographic, economic, social, and environmental causes as analyzed, for instance, by David Newbury.[93] Rwanda is a small country in Equatorial Africa which has become known for the 1994 genocide that finished a century-long development of polarization of society in its socio-economic, political as well as cultural consequences. The early roots of the genocide can be found already at the end of the nineteenth century when first under German, and later during Belgian colonialism. Two "racial" entities were formed within one nation which had for centuries lived together sharing common history, language, cultural traits, religion, and socio-political organization and institutions.[94] However, social scientists and historians until very recently could not agree on the initial phase of "antagonism" between Hutu and Tutsi, whether it was a matter of the Tutsi conquest long before European colonialism came to Rwanda, or whether the politics of distinction was a matter of the European policy of divide and rule.[95]

In 1923, Rwanda was officially approved by the League of Nations as the Belgian-mandated territory within Ruanda-Urundi. Already before this rather formal act, Belgium had professed to respect native institutions of both colonies and the Belgian administration had only to play the role of a guide following the principles of indirect rule.[96] In reality, Belgian influence on the local political and social environment was greater than it might seem. Tutsi aristocracy was put into a place of indubitable superior "race" and rulers of the country with supervision by their Belgian administrators. Hutu farmers and Twa hunters were destined to a role of second-class citizens or subjects with no privileges. It was this polarization of society and the division between the rulers and the ruled which had later imprinted the genocidal character to Rwanda and Burundi. Until World War II, the Tutsi aristocracy enjoyed the fruits of superiority in terms of social privileges including distribution of wealth, access to education, power and influence.[97]

Retrospectively, we may say that the polarization of society in Rwanda was caused by several interrelated factors. Belgian impact on formation of ethnic, or racial in this case, identities is indubitable; the growing demographic curve and overpopulation of Rwanda and Burundi is linked to it as well; mythologization and re-invention of collective identities done by the Catholic Church was allowed by its monopoly on education, which was until the 1940s mostly offered to Tutsis while Hutu were allowed to attend only to

gain education (in smaller numbers) in worse schools.[98] One of the notable Belgian representatives said in the 1920s that the "Tutsis were destined to rule,"[99] which openly approved the direction of the Belgian administration giving privileges to one part of society while marginalizing the other.

The existence of the Rwandan monarchy in pre-colonial times, indigenous religion centered on a God (*Imana*) and the institution of a king (*mwami*) led the Belgian colonial representatives to a presumption that the Tutsi kings were descendants of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians who had migrated from Ethiopia to the Great Lakes region centuries ago. There, according to Belgians, they conquered local Bantu people.[100] Below the king, several levels of chiefs existed including *mutwale wa buttaka* (chief of land), *mutwale wa ingabo* (chief of people), and *mutwale wa igikingi* (chief of pastures). These three functions could be united in one person. Nevertheless, in times of unrest and uncertainty and in troubled regions these functions were divided within the king's policy of "divide and rule." The first category of chiefs could be administered also by Hutu chiefs due to their mode of livelihood based on agriculture.[101] Although the chiefs were subordinated to the king and the level of control was quite high, the level of immediate control decreased with the distance of a region from the center. Two pre-colonial institutions which were later used and abused by Belgians were *uburetwa* and *ubuhake*. The first was de facto a forced labor established in the nineteenth century by Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, and later during the Belgian administration it became a part of a tax system imposed upon Hutu subjects. It was legitimized by a contribution to the national development. The latter was a clientelist system involving two persons, a patron (*shebuja*), usually a Tutsi, and a client, vassal (*garagu*). Both sides could enter the relationship freely so it was not comparable to slavery. Both *uburetwa* and *ubuhake* were institutionalized by Belgians as inseparable parts of a colonial system until it was abolished by law in 1954.[102] Belgians had shifted the dependency of one person to another person to a level of dependency where one group of people was subjugated to another group of people.[103] This was amplified by many other ideological aspects which will be discussed below.

This was not however the only direct impact on social relations done by the Belgian authorities in Rwanda. General underestimation of the role of chiefs and their statuses as well as simplified generalization over many other social issues led to the situation in which Tutsis gained a status of a privileged and advantaged society while Hutus were put into the category of labor force. In reality, pre-colonial Rwanda was not based on an opposite relation between Hutus and Tutsis but rather on the relation between center and periphery. While the posts of chiefs were reserved almost only for Tutsis, both Hutus and Tutsis formed the rest of the population, subordinate citizens.[104] Belgian colonialism thus helped to create unchangeable identities of Hutu and Tutsi although it was not unusual in the pre-colonial period for

Hutu farmers to accept the Tutsi identity in order to obtain a greater number of livestock. In other words, colonialism transformed the social identity to ethnic identity.

It was the Catholic Church that played the leading role in ideologization and mythologization of ethnic identities, as it preferred from the very beginning Tutsi elites above all other social elements. For Catholics, the beginnings were not as unchallenged as it might seem. The royal court was relatively reserved towards the White Fathers which was the result of previous German lack of interest to the development of Christian missions in Ruanda-Urundi.[105] The then king Musinga impersonated a barrier for the Catholic Church in its efforts to establish the Christian kingdom. In 1925, White Fathers blamed Musinga of being nostalgic for paganism or even German Protestantism. After a prolonged dissatisfaction with Musinga's resistance, in 1930 Monsignor Léon Classe wrote an article in Belgium called Un Triste Sire. A year later, Musinga was deposed by vice-governor Voisin and bishop of the Catholic Church as he was blamed of being an impediment to development. His son Rudahigwa, a successor to the throne, was baptized in 1943 and received names Charles (after cardinal Lavigerie, Voisin and the Belgian Prince), Léon (as Classe), and Pierre (after general governor Ryckmans).[106]

Rudahigwa became Mutara III and formed probably the most important element connecting the Tutsi dominance with the power of Catholic Church. Nevertheless, missionaries did not tend to cooperate with the Tutsis only in economic and political terms. Behind the White Fathers' support of Mutara III Rudahigwa there appeared several ideological reasons which quickly deepened in the 1930s and 1940s. These were formulated already in 1927 by Léon Classe: "As for ourselves, from a religious point of view, since that is our perspective, we think from experience that the Tutsi element is for us better, more active, more committed, more capable of playing the role of inspiring the masses, and those who exercise the happiest directing influence on the masses. . . ."[107] It is not surprising that the Tutsi elites did not discourage the Catholics from their prejudices and stereotypes based on unchangeable races and historically god-given superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu. In the 1930s the Catholic Church already controlled education and curricula all over the country. Already in 1929 the *Group Scolaire d'Astrida* (today Butare) was established as one of the main educational institutions of the Tutsis. Generally, the Tutsis were destined to gain better education than the Hutu who were meant to become workers and taxpayers.[108]

The only opportunity for Hutu to obtain higher education was to become a student of theology at the seminar in Kabgayi and Nyikibanda. After graduation these students faced problems of finding qualified jobs, resulting in further frustration, which finally led to the social revolution in 1959.[109] Ruanda-Urundi remained after World War II under Belgian rule but this time not as a mandate of the League of Nations but United Nations–mandated

territory. In 1949 Mutara III Rudahigwa visited Belgium for the first time and consecrated his adherence to the Catholic Church. In 1950, a ten-year plan for the development of Ruanda-Urundi was approved by the Belgian administration.[110]

In 1952, the Belgian administration initiated significant reforms, which counted a higher representation of the Hutu delegates in local and regional councils in order to reach a resolution on elimination of existing dominance of the Tutsi part of society. In 1953, election councils included 7,674 of Hutu (56.58%), 5,442 of Tutsi (41.4%) and 22 of Twa (0.22%) representatives. The reforms were calculated with future strengthening of indigenous social and political institutions, which would lead to further democratization of the country including a higher percentage of indigenous representatives in election bodies.[111]

The Hutu Manifesto, originally called "Report on social aspect of racial native problem in Rwanda," published on July 12, 1957, divided the racial question into three levels: political monopoly, socio-economic monopoly, and cultural monopoly. The critique of the political monopoly was based on long-lasting superiority of the Tutsi kings and chiefs where the Hutu chiefs had played only a minimal role rather being exceptional. Socio-economic monopoly stemmed from an absolute dominance of the Tutsi people when it came to functions, privileges and advantages with direct economic benefits. Cultural monopoly was defined as a superiority of the Tutsi in terms of noble race whose cultural traits were regarded supreme. The Hutu Manifesto was aimed to promote and develop the Hutu part of Rwandan society in each of these levels in order to get rid of the Tutsi leadership.[112] Belgians were aware of the legitimate arguments and power the Hutu Manifesto had being simply a resonation of the ambitions of frustrated and marginalized Hutu elites.

In October 1957, Mutara II Rudahigwa received a letter from the Hutu elites that was based on the ideas of the Hutu Manifesto. There they appealed on fulfillment for several fundamental demands such as equal and rightful representation of all three groups (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) of people in Rwanda in the Supreme and regional councils.[113] The Manifesto came as a result of already existing notions among the Hutu elites that the Hutu people were first colonized by the Tutsi and later by Europeans. The authors of the Manifesto used similar ideological vocabulary as the Catholic Church. The Manifesto thus argued for elimination of disproportionality in which numerical minority ruled numerical majority, in this case the Hutu. Social, economic, and political reforms leading to promotion of power and rights of the Hutu were the only way out. The Manifesto was directed not only to Belgian authorities but more importantly to Belgium and the United Nations as it aimed to point at insufficient conditions in which indigenous inhabitants of Rwanda had lived under twofold colonization. Such appeal was necessary to understand as a

part of the general post-war emancipation and self-determination movement of the era of decolonization.

One cannot think that the Belgian pro-reform shift was led by naïve pro-Hutu commitment. Still it was necessary to keep caution in order to maintain order and prevent the country and people from chaos and unrest.[114] The Tutsi elites refused to even discuss conflicts between clans and tribes (*ubgoko*) and stressed the fact that the Rwandese *mwami* was the head of all Rwandese people, not only Tutsi. The Supreme Council, which had met on June 9–12, 1958, in order to solve the Hutu-Tutsi problem, even stated that ethnic categories like Hutu and Tutsi were non-existent and thus there was not any ethnic problem.[115] The crucial difference between the Hutu nationalism and the Tutsi nationalism lay in the way in which both perceived the roots of the colonial problem. While the Hutu called for elimination of the Tutsi colonialism first, the Tutsi pressed for an independent Rwanda and thus to end the European colonialism. Under such circumstances polarizing the society and political elites within the country, Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa, at the meeting of the Supreme Council, said towards the Hutu demands: "It is a damaging increasing noisy propaganda spread by a small group acting under foreign influence with communist ideas. Their intention is to divide the country. They would not succeed to divide a country whose national unity and secular political force organization has annihilated the most powerful attackers. The country is reunited to identify, cut down, eradicate, and burn that ill tree which is infecting its life."[116]

Despite the Belgian control over social and political issues, the authorities were aware of the necessity to implement the reforms. Anyway, in official documents, the problem of Hutuization of the Tutsi system was never mentioned, as the principle of Africanization of Rwanda was the primary factor of the native development and democratization. Mandate administration and above all the direct impact of the Church became inevitable obstructions to development. The only possible scenario for the Rwandan elites to reach a positive development in their country would be the Africanization of the political system. In spite of such proclamations and plans, Belgians did not allow a complete regime change as they intended to keep a grip on power in the late 1950s. The word "independence" was not a part of the colonial vocabulary of that time. Among some Belgian officials, plans for a decolonization of Ruanda-Urundi and Africanization of its political system acted like a treason of Belgium that had invested so much for the development of the country and its functional apparatus.

The more visible the Hutu emancipation movement was, the more intense was the refusal of the Tutsi elites who simply rejected the Hutu demands by pointing at "historically approved" Hamitic myth concerning their racial superiority. The Hutu Social Movement was founded in June 1957 in Kagbayi for the purpose of democratization of Rwandese institutions and judicial

system. A very tense situation and ethno-political polarization of society was accelerated by the sudden death of Mutara III Rudahigwa on July 25, 1959, in Bujumbura showing a deep rupture between the Hutu and Tutsi elements of society. After the mwami's death, the Supreme Council did not waste time with the election of his successor. At its meeting, which had taken part shortly after Mutara's funeral, Jean-Baptiste Ndahundurwa, a son of the former Mwami Musinga and a step-brother of Mutara III, was elected mwami under the name Kigeri V.[117] Such a quick action was by Belgian authorities, Hutu elites and the Catholic Church considered a coup d'état and caused many negative reactions. Although Kigeri V seemed to Ruanda-Urundi vice-governor Jean-Paul Harroy as an appropriate candidate, the speed with which he was inaugurated made him feel puzzled as it was not a result of general consensus, especially in such a tense period of time.[118] Having this situation done, representatives of the Hutu political party APROSOMA (*L'Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse*) sent a letter to vice-governor Jean-Paul Harroy in which they touched on the basic problems of fundamental royal symbols of Rwanda monarchy. These were, according to the authors, a proof of the Tutsi superiority and thus needed to be revoked and substituted by new symbols. The most crucial one was the royal drum Karinga considered an emblem of the kingdom and the Nyiginya dynasty. In order to create equal society where symbols of each group would be valued properly, APROSOMA suggested recognizing new symbols of the state, each being a characteristic element of each society: a farmer's hoe (Hutu), stick of a pastoralist (Tutsi) and a spear of hunter (Twa). At the same time, they demanded higher representation of Hutu and Twa chiefs in so far unseated or vacant posts. This initiative was one of many which marked the social revolution that affected Rwanda at the end of 1959.

In autumn 1959, new political parties came to existence in Rwanda. Their appearance only corresponded with already existing polarization of society into two blocks, each divided into moderate and radical current. Already in 1957, the APROSOMA party was created. Despite being regarded as a Hutu party, its program was supposed to address masses irrespective of ethnic affiliation. The case of MDR-PAREMHUTU (*Mouvement Démocratique Populaire/Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu*), formed in November 1959 on the basis of the Hutu Social Movement, was different as it spoke directly to Hutu people even though it proclaimed democratization of existing institutions.[119] The program of PARMEHUTU was based on a very radical Hutu nationalism stemming from the ideology of the Hutu Manifesto. Destruction of the kingdom and elimination of the Tutsi colonialism was to be an introduction to general decolonization and democratization.

Turbulent development in 1959 resulted in series of attacks and counter-attacks. The whole social revolution gave the Hutu militants a "free hand" with which they began to victimize local Tutsi civilians, burning their homes,

killing and beating them. Soon after, violence spread all over Rwanda and the UN mission sent to Rwanda at the beginning of 1960 estimated the number of dead at around two hundred.[120] The Belgian administration directly contributed to the Hutu social revolution by setting no restrictions and limitations to it, not mentioning the fact that they directly called for advantaging of the "Hutu element." Belgians imposed a state of emergency and Colonel Guy Logiest became a primary actor of the Hutu revolution when he stated that the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were responsible for the public unrest. Under such conditions he began to substitute the Tutsi chiefs with Hutu chiefs resulting in a final phase of the social revolution.[121] Meanwhile, violence forced thousands of Tutsi civilians to take refuge in neighboring Uganda, in April 1960 there were already 22,000 Tutsi refugees. The PARMEHUTU party, which viewed itself as the leading Hutu power, called for an exodus of the Tutsi people to the homeland of their fathers somewhere in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), or to return if they would respect the real democracy, meaning the rule of the Hutu.[122]

On January 28, 1961, 3,126 representatives of the Hutu power gathered in Gitarama with another approximately 25,000 people waiting to hear results of this meeting which entered history as the coup d'état of Gitarama. This event abolished monarchy in Rwanda and established a republic with president Mbonyumutwa and a government led by Prime Minister Grégoire Kayibanda. A UN Commission reacted to this coup with the following words: "Racial dictatorship of one party was established in Rwanda, and the development of last eighteen months leaned on transition from one type of oppressive regime to another. Extremism is awarded and there is a danger that the [Tutsi] minority will face defenselessly the abuse of power."[123]

The foundation of an independent Rwanda in 1962, victory of the Hutu political parties in autumn of 1961, and ambivalent attitude of the Belgian administration towards increasing tensions presented the first major threat to the cohabitation of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Tens of thousands of Tutsis were forced to leave the country, especially to neighboring Uganda, which proved to be decisive for the 1994 genocide. Appalling presumptions of several representatives of Francophonie about Rwandese identity had been fulfilled. Roots of this situation can be found already in the era of colonialism and failed decolonization of Rwanda, which Belgians did not manage properly.

FIRST CRISES OF LATE DECOLONIZATION AND EARLY INDEPENDENCE

Soon after the independence euphoria disappeared, many regions in Africa ended up or began to experience their first crises that usually combined local

and global affairs and factors. The Democratic Republic of Congo has long served as an example of failed decolonization and fragmented state as a result of Belgian colonial rule that did not do much to promote social stability, ethnic equality, and access to education. Therefore, it is not surprising that taking into account enormous natural resource wealth in Congo, the country quickly became one of the main battlefields of the Cold War.[124] The Congo crisis of the early 1960s also saw the first real victim of the Cold War, Patrice Lumumba, democratically elected first Prime Minister of a newly independent Democratic Republic of Congo. Congo is also a perfect example of the combination of direct and indirect impacts on the fragility of the state. These include inherited weakness of state institutions undermined by lacking nation-building process that was initiated at the very latest stage of colonialism, ethno-regional discrepancies and imbalances in terms of access to global markets and infrastructure, as well as global contexts of the Cold War in which former colonies became primary "laboratories" of foreign powers' struggle.

Joseph-Désiré Mobutu played a major role in developments following Congolese independence, although his position remained somewhat covert until the decisive year of 1965. The perpetual crises in the Congo have been explained by some as resulting from the belated decolonization of the country and also by specific conditions that prevented nationalism from becoming fully accepted by the majority of the population; the majority of the population continued to favor ethnic self-consciousness and thus the fragmentation of the Congo. For a long time, even Belgium supported the idea of a unitary state, only changing its mind and turning to federalism after Lumumba's victory.[125] Congolese politics were thus very divided, partly between socialism and "capitalism" (i.e., pro-Belgian), and partly between Pan-Africanists and nationalists proposing a unitary state and federalists or separatists tending to seek a weakening of the central government in order to realize their objectives. The achievement of a strong and centralized state, the position supported by socialist countries (the Soviet Union and its allies, including, primarily, Czechoslovakia), was the last thing the Western powers (Belgium, France, the United States) wished to see in the newly independent Congo. At the height of the Cold War, Communist infiltration into the Congo was the least desired development for Belgium and thus it developed its neo-colonial strategy in Katanga, which was ended by intervention from the UN. Moïse Tshombe was then to serve as Prime Minister of the central government, but had limited success in consolidating power.[126]

While Lumumba and his followers (later known as Lumumbists) preferred not to be engaged in the neo-colonial and Cold War struggle, their opponents from the pro-Western camp had no objection to receiving support from the former colonial power and fulfilling goals that had been established by Brussels or the CIA. This camp of politicians included, among others,

Joseph Kasavubu, Jason Sendwe, Ildephonse Kasengwo and Laurent Kabila (who in 1997 became president after Mobutu's death). Despite internal problems and Katanga's secession attempt, it was really a number of external factors that systematically eroded Congolese integrity and sovereignty. Belgium and the United States played the most significant role, but some of the neighboring countries, such as Rhodesia, had a great impact on developments in the Congo as well. Rhodesian representatives sought to engage the Congo in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The UN mission that was supposed to monitor Congolese politics and effect Katanga's reunification with the Congo did not come about easily. Some of the UN Security Council countries were rather hesitant (France, Great Britain, China) and some (the Soviet Union) were forced to agree with the resolution only as a result of pressure applied by many of the African states.[127]

The last Belgian soldier left the capital city of Leopoldville on July 23, 1960, and the UN began to build missions all over the Congo, except for Katanga, a decision that made the local government particularly open to the idea of cooperating with Belgium. Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General of the UN, refused any of the unilateral help being offered by the Soviet Union, Ghana and Guinea, a decision for which he was later criticized as he sought to ease Western control over the country.[128] Due to the pressure coming from both the Congolese government and the African public, Dag Hammarskjöld had little room for maneuver as the Western powers were determined to retain their dominant influence in the Congo and to prevent socialist states from stepping in as new "guides." In a secret document addressed to his advisor, Hammarskjöld expressed his willingness to negotiate with Moïse Tshombe about the future of the Congo and about his assurance that Tshombe's political career was not under threat or in danger of being interrupted in any sense of the word.[129]

At the end of August 1960, it was clear that Lumumba had become one of the main threats in the eyes of the Western powers as he continually disagreed with the way the UN was seeking to resolve the Congo crisis. He constantly expressed his disgust at Dag Hammarskjöld, claiming that the UN mission in the Congo represented, in one way or another, only the substitution of "Belgian colonialism by the colonialism of the UN."[130] The Congo crisis was to unceasingly affect the Congo and the Cold War reality up until the end of 1960. It was also the last attempt by Lumumba to completely decolonize the Congo; however, he failed as he was arrested and moved to Elisabethville, with the agreement of Mobutu, Kasavubu and Tshombe. There, he was killed on January 17 during the so-called Operation Barracuda.[131] Lumumba's elimination very much affected future relations between Mobutu's Congo and the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which were the most prominent socialist states to involve themselves in the Congo. Lumumba's assassination was widely covered and

criticized in the media worldwide and by the public. Subsequent conflicts in the Congo were not only the result of political and/or ideological clashes between Lumumbists and pragmatists, but had much wider variety of causes.

NEO-PATRIMONIAL RULE IN AFRICA

Michael Schatzberg focused his research on the cultural logic of legitimacy in Africa. In his book titled *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa* with a subtitle *Father, Family, Food*, Schatzberg explains how political legitimacy is constructed in selected countries of Africa that include Kenya, Senegal, Cameroon, Congo, and several others. According to his analysis, in those countries, the growth of a nation is compared to the growth of a child, and similarly, nation is compared to family. The notion of political fathers "at the head of a national family is durable and seems to travel well in time and space."[132] Besides family-nation discourse, there exist enough evidence that the newly independent states in their majority valued security over democracy. Not only such countries as the Congo, or Nigeria, but also Tanzania where the fears of division and fragmentation were quite significant and almost tangible among the TANU party leaders. Julius Nyerere's vision was to create a state of "multiracial unity" in order to avoid conflicts similar to those in Rwanda/Burundi, or the Congo.[133]

Newly formed governments were taken under deep analysis by Bratton and van de Walle and they came to a conclusion that a typical institutional characteristic of African regimes is neo-patrimonialism. The main feature of this lies in the fact that the main authority in the state is not related to an institution, but to a person. Rulers of such regimes sought to gain presidential seats not because of public interests but only for their own enrichment. Governmental administrative posts, licenses, contracts, projects and employments depended on ruler's personal preferences or even actual mood. In theory, some of the observers called these political systems private instruments of those in power rather than states.[134]

One of the common features of postcolonial states in Africa that significantly contributed to a formation of opposition political and military movements was the phenomenon of personal rule. States with a strong dominant person at the forefront were a proof and consequence of colonial policy of "divide and rule" in which there was no space for formation of a wide and erudite political elite. On the contrary, newly independent countries ruled by leaders usually maintained frequent contacts with the former colonial metropolis or in other cases with newly established power blocs such as the Soviet Union and its allies. The context of the Cold War contributed to the impossibility of creating truly functional democratic plural political systems respecting opinions of the majority. Strong personal rule either based its

power on ethnic majority or dominant political subject (Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire), or on ethnic minority or region that dominated the military and economic sectors of the country (Gabon, Congo).

Very often such an autocrat came to power after a military coup that became one of the basic (although simplified) features of postcolonial Africa. Nigeria is in this matter probably the most notorious country as the majority of governments in postcolonial period came into being after military coup. Especially in the first three decades of independence (Cold War era) the military type of rule prevailed and military coup as a means to get to power was dominant in many African countries. Strong personal and neo-patrimonial rule in a certain sense followed a tradition of chieftainship in pre-colonial Africa with the difference that neo-patrimonial postcolonial rule was based on violation of law, oppression and clientelism, while the pre-colonial era was based on a clearly limited set of rules. Instead of democratization, many African independent states underwent decades of neo-patrimonial rules characterized by the relationship between a leader and the administrative apparatus chosen and controlled by him. A neo-patrimonial state has three main features: personal rule, clientelist system and kleptocracy.[135] Other forms of governance are sometimes labelled as statist due to the fact that power of the ruler was unlimited and the ruler himself took the state and its inhabitants as his own property.

Another feature of the modern African state is elections. However, ever since independence, the vast majority of African states have had experience with elections, most of them already from the era of decolonization. During the Cold War, the elections did not make sense in most of the countries due to the authoritarian nature of their governments; after 1991 with the wave of democratization, space has been opened for multiple political parties and actors. In some cases, this has led to repeated electoral crises as a result of ethnically divided societies such as in Niger, Nigeria, or Côte d'Ivoire. Already mentioned electoral violence in Kenya associated with the elections basically since the 1990s is evidence of how fragile the elections can be in a state with institutions and power based on ethnic exclusion and privileges. Nigerian elections, for instance, have been usually surrounded by suspicion of corruption and fraud and contributing to occasional violence committed by armed youth militias.[136]

Elections in Ethiopia are a relatively new phenomenon. On one hand, it coincides with the introduction of a seemingly "democratic" environment after 1991, but at the same time elections in Ethiopia have been limited to the technical process repeated every five years. Due to the dominance of one political party and one particular ethnic minority, the elections in Ethiopia "have had the negative effect of widening the ethnic lines."[137]

GLOBAL CONTEXT

The end of the Cold War in Sub-Saharan Africa was characterized by the fall of authoritarian regimes and efforts leading towards national conferences that would include all relevant parties. State-controlled centralized economic systems stepped away as new liberal trends entered Africa, and in many cases the dominance of one particular group was replaced by multi-ethnic and multi-party governments respecting ethnic diversity.

Samuel Huntington is an author of the "Third wave" thesis, which in 1974–1990 and later after the fall of Iron Curtain brought democracy to such different countries as former Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, South Africa, and the Philippines. Huntington distinguishes five cases of regime changes from non-democratic to democratic. The first he calls a cyclic scheme in which a certain country moves in periods from democratic to authoritarian rule, usually in Latin America, but also in Nigeria. The second is called a model of second attempt in which a democratic system fails and is replaced by authoritarian regime, but democratic waves inside finally win being more mature after earlier failures. These can include Portugal and Spain, and from Africa we could perhaps add the Gambia and Botswana. The third model is an interrupted democracy in less stable regimes like India and Uruguay in the 1970s and 1980s. Another model, according to Huntington, is a direct transition from authoritarian to democratic regime, like in Mexico, Guatemala, or Romania. The last scheme is decolonizing, which seems the most appropriate for most of the African countries, but it presupposes that the former colonial power inculcated democratic institutions in the colony and that it will be able to maintain them.[138] This was largely omitted in Africa because on one hand the connection between European powers and Africa was so strong, and on the other the Cold War realities did not allow development of democratic institutions (perhaps with an exception of Mauritius and Botswana) and in many cases under above-mentioned circumstances turned into civil wars (Congo) or authoritarian rules (Guinea, Mali, etc.). In most cases the democratization process did not develop in Africa until the early 1990s, therefore Huntington did not include Africa in his last scheme.

The significant absence of Africa in Huntington's work coincides with how the West looks at Africa and how we explain history and politics of "the other." The beginning of the 1990s found many African states in a period of economic crisis and political instability as well as vast transformations for which at least some of the countries were not prepared. Therefore, the term "African crisis" came into being.[139] So far, this monograph can also create an image of negative lenses we use in order to analyze postcolonial Africa, which is not the intention. However, it can coincide with the marginalization of Africa on the international scene as well as with what Patrick Chabal calls a "re-traditionalization" of African societies.[140] Moreover, the majority of

African states faced massive population growth in last two decades and generational conflicts that quite frequently corresponded to political and ideological conflicts. Since the 1990s we can observe demographic trends making African societies "younger" with average age between 15 and 25 years.[141]

While the newly formed African independent states showed a high level of centralization and absence of civil society, after the end of the Cold War decentralization entered Africa together with creation of regional and local governments and provincial responsibility. In last two decades, about 80% of all developing countries have undergone a process of decentralization. In Sub-Saharan Africa only a minority of countries did not start or left the decentralization process.[142] Although a system of local governments emerged, mainly in former British colonies, these were in reality rarely responsible for education, health care, and infrastructure. Only after 1990 with the fall of oppressive regimes it was possible to apply earlier theoretical principles of "self-rule" and "shared-rule." For authoritarian regimes, it was not desirable to talk about leaving absolute control over state institutions and regional resources, with the exception of the Nigerian military regime in 1976 that initiated a so far unseen decentralization program.[143]

If we talk about democratization and decentralization in Africa as expected concepts bringing economic growth, prosperity and stability, it is perhaps a legitimate question which type of democracy we should apply. Despite being difficult to define democracy as a concept applicable on all types of society, there exist several attributes universally accepted for all types of democratization processes. There we talk primarily about *good governance*, where we could put pluralism, transparency, rule of law, and decentralization. On the other hand, in many African states (for instance, Ethiopia), there exist a huge difference between decentralization at the theoretical and practical level. The same is true in many other issues. As noted by Fantu Cheru, political participation cannot be distinguished from other freedoms. In order to make democracy rooted in Africa, there needs to be other reforms such as social reform and reduction of economic inequalities.[144]

Democracy or decentralization is usually considered one of the main conflict preventions (not only) in Africa. Nevertheless, many African countries encounter several other problems, therefore it is first necessary to focus on territorial, economic, and political inequalities. Peace and justice is thus a condition to the development of democracy. Participation in civil society or engagement of all relevant subjects in the peace process, elimination of marginalization of any of the participating parties, and strengthening of civil society has had to follow. From the international community perspective, civil society growth should become one of the main priorities in reaching peace, as stated, for instance, by Fantu Cheru.[145]

After the Cold War, strategies on how to cope with regime change and global transformations were multiple. As an example, we may use Magnus-

son's and Clark's comparison of Republic of Congo and Benin. Francophone Africa under the influence of France organized between 1990 and 1992 a series of so-called sovereign national conferences that usually included dozens or even hundreds of participating parties and associations. Not in all countries did these conferences lead to regime change. In both compared states the conference contributed to regime change or democratization. In Benin, the regime of Marxist President Mathieu Kérékou and in Congo Denis Sassou-Nguesso were transformed into national conferences that brought both states to democratic elections. Also in Benin, former World Bank official Nicéphor Soglo won the elections, primarily in the South, while his rival Kérékou dominated the North. Similarly, regional differences characterized elections in Republic of Congo. However, the reasons why politics in both countries turned back to former leaders are very different. Magnusson and Clark see the collapse in several levels,[146] of which the first is related to *quality of leadership*, second with various types of personalities operating in political parties, and third with types and outcomes of democracy. Different types of political personalities and different manifestations of political leadership may treat democracy in different ways which at the end of the day contributes to different scenarios in compared countries.

While the main political actors in Benin respected democratic and constitutional principles, in Congo originally popular Pascal Lissouba was blamed for fueling violent clashes in the period of 1992–1994 which gave his opponents a strong argument and weapon. Both leaders, Kérékou and Sassou-Nguesso, were able to leave their Marxist rules, and especially the latter use a strong French backing in order to return to Congo in 1997 as a "new hope" for many people. While Kérékou adapted to democratic principles and gained respect of the international community, Sassou-Nguesso brought Congo back to the 1980s, at least when it comes to political culture.[147]

Failed democratization of the Republic of Congo shows several aspects that can be applied to many other developing countries, not only in Africa. Intensive dependency on natural resources and international influences (in this case: France) in connection with undeveloped truly plural political culture and absence of alternative political elites contributed to, unlike in Senegal or Benin, devaluation of moral values in politics and intensified struggles between ethnic and regional groupings. French intervention also reflects failed reform of French foreign policy which, according to Jacques Chirac, claimed plural democracy was a luxury for Africa.[148] On one hand, France supported democratic transitions in countries like Benin, on the other in those with higher economic significance, the approach was very different, as could be seen in Congo, Chad, Gabon, etc.

The end of the Cold War did not have an impact only on African governments, but primarily changed the global context that had significant influence on conflicts so far. While during the Cold War the logic of conflicts in Africa

was more or less predictable (East vs. West), the collapse of the USSR had a great impact on various movements, guerillas, and governments. Keeping and maintaining conflicts and violence was easier in areas with greater natural resources than in regions with no economic significance. The Cold War had brought plenty of light weapons to Africa among which the AK47 known as the Kalashnikov dominated.[149] Easy access to the international market via diamonds and other marketable sources made the Coast of Guinea and Horn of Africa highly militarized areas. The impact of the Cold War could become clear in some aspects and some places in a longer perspective, as was the case of Ethiopia when Mengistu's army in leaving the country sold their equipment to locals in Southern Ethiopia, contributing to further militarization of the "Ethiopian periphery."

Accordingly, the global context was manifested in the use of telecommunication technologies that made action readiness easier and more effective for many guerilla and rebellion movements. On the other hand, it is now easy to trace satellite telephones used by various warlords. After the end of the Cold War, the attention of world powers turned towards the failed states as possible sources of global terrorism after 9/11. Possible asylum that terrorists could gain in Africa raised much concern in the West, especially after the Somali experience. Some of the African leaders soon after 9/11 declared their preparedness to stand side by side with Washington, D.C., and the Pentagon in the "war on terror." However, some of these governments could use their anti-terrorist campaigns against political opposition or regional disturbances.[150]

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War generally contributed to a decrease of importance of Africa in global terms as its role of a "Cold War laboratory ended." Western powers lost any motivation to be militarily engaged in regions that did not belong to their priorities. Similarly, an early OAU principle of inviolability of borders in Africa vanished when in 1979 the Tanzanian forces crossed Ugandan borders in order to overthrow the Idi Amin regime, and when in 1998 a war broke out in Democratic Republic of Congo and almost all neighboring countries were involved in one way or another.[151] Civil conflicts and wars were affected by the fall of the Iron Curtain in one more way: it was a lack of ability of the international community to understand and react to changing dynamics of violence in Africa as documented by examples of Rwanda and Somalia in the first half of the 1990s. The Cold War was replaced by a different reality but transnational links, global challenges and local conflicts remained more or less the same or became intensified. While Somalia, for instance, was during the Cold War influenced by both the USSR and the United States in different time periods, after 1991, and more specifically after 9/11, new international links began to find their way to Somalia. It was especially 9/11 and subsequent US invasion

in Afghanistan that brought "a new generation of Somalis into international jihad."[152]

Shortly after independence, a huge number of Africans left their original homelands because of political, or economic reasons and found their new homes in the United States or former colonial powers, Paris, London, Lisbon, Brussels, as well as in other destinations including Sweden, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, later also Finland, Norway, Denmark, or to a little extent the former Soviet Union and its allies.

Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Africans left their homes in order to find a better future or simply to survive due to political oppression. Unfortunately for Africa, many of these people belonged to the educated elite and intelligentsia which then had disastrous effects on many sectors of socio-economic profiles of African states, including health care, education, engineering, technologies, or social services.

The African Diaspora has ever since played a twofold role in the development of African politics, society, and economy. First, a lot of African families relied on finances sent by their relatives from outside, moreover, many businessmen from the diaspora supported the development in their original homelands through building new hotels, restaurants, schools, libraries, etc. On the other hand, quite a significant number of Africans living in the diaspora began to form opposition movements or at least to accent various problematic issues of political development in Africa.

Many of the members of the diaspora were writers, playwrights, artists, university teachers, and scientists who used their knowledge and talents to form an alternative world to the existing propaganda that many of African authoritarian regimes tended to create in order to keep their power untouched and unchallenged. One such example could be the Somalian author Nurrudin Farah, whose work from the very beginning was aimed to criticize African dictatorial regimes in general, of course, with special focus on Somalia.[153] The same can be said about Ahmadou Kourouma from Côte d'Ivoire, or Nigerian Nobel-prize winner Wole Soyinka.[154] These members of the African Diaspora gained a significant audience in the West but had little impact on what actually was happening in their countries of origin due to strong censorship and lack of access to foreign information in general.

Besides these activities, the African Diaspora began to form organized movements, associations, and even liberation fronts in order to challenge the legitimacy of their respective African governments which were during the era of World War II characterized by strong authoritarianism, one-party states, terrible human rights records, and disastrous economic conditions. The diaspora can be perceived in many ways. First, generally as the African Diaspora, which plays a role as representative of a continent and finds most of its support from the Afro-American community in the United States or in generations of immigrants in Western Europe. Second, a huge number of

various ethnic diasporas related to their original homelands, states, regions, and nationalities in Africa is to be seen all over America and Europe. Third, the diaspora has become a necessary component of a globalizing society, connecting their new and old homelands through various activities and contributing to the development of prosperity to African countries as well as bridging Africa and the West.

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Chapter Two

Separatism, Marginalization, and Inequalities

In this chapter, we will deal with multiple sources and contexts of inequalities, separatist movements, and conflicts in Africa with the use of multiple case studies. As we will see, conflicts and various political tensions or turbulences usually have more than one root cause or variable. Therefore, it is difficult to come up with any generalizing statements about the nature of conflicts in Africa, or anywhere else in the world. The chapter will discuss some concrete examples and case studies related to social, economic, as well as political structural problems, inequalities and discrepancies in terms of access to wealth, equality, or any other benefits of the state. At the very beginning, it has to be said that the absolute majority of conflicts in present-day Africa occur inside the states, therefore, they are internal disputes based on socio-economic, political, historical, and other inherited inequalities, and less frequently on cross-border or inter-state violence. The Horn of Africa in this case is perhaps an exception with wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or between Somalia and Ethiopia, but still a large number of conflicts take place within the state borders. The predictions about state failure and fragmentation did not come true.

Frances Stewart discussed the existence of major horizontal inequalities that include "economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups."[1] As can be seen in the example of Ethiopia, these inequalities exist and contribute to conflict situations. Ethnicity is in this case not a cause but rather a mobilizing factor. Ethnicity has become a troubled concept that comes into play anytime anyone speaks about any kind of conflict, especially in Africa. Perhaps paradoxically, the most "protracted and bitter ethnic conflicts are often staged between ethnic groups who, at the level of culture, are very similar, such as the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda."[2]

A classical study regarding ethnic conflicts and separatist movements was published by Donald Horowitz.[3] Horowitz distinguishes between several categories of ethnic groups and regions according to their dispositions to separate from an existing state. As suggested by Horowitz, the highest tendencies to secessionism show the most backward groups in the most backward regions while the lowest tendencies to secede are shown by the most advanced groups in the most advanced regions. An advanced group is such group which profited from education and employment opportunities. Such groups are regarded as intelligent, hardworking and dynamic by others.[4]

By advanced regions Horowitz means economically well situated territories especially when it comes to natural resources and other economically lucrative commodities. Horowitz's main argument, therefore, is that links between a position of a group and a region has an impact on the level of probability of secessionism.[5] The weakness of this model is its simplification, but it serves as an illustrative model for further analyses. Usually, as shown by Keller,[6] there are many more factors that come into play. Not all the groups inhabiting a certain region incline towards secessionism. A lot of countries have more than one important region, and the level of economic position based on *per capita* incomes can be rather simplified. Reality "on the ground" is in other words a bit more complicated.

Any kind of categorization of separatist movements is always tricky because it seems to be rather static, while the existence and activities of such movements tend to change in time and space. Consequently, it has an impact on their level of legitimacy, goals, success, strategies, methods, and existence as such. However, we can perhaps categorize separatist movements into several categories according to their level of success and legitimacy in the struggle for independence or emancipation. The only successful movements were those of Eritrea and South Sudan, while unsuccessful were those of Biafra and Katanga. Among movements with a high level of legitimacy we can count those of Cabinda, Western Sahara, and Somaliland while those having lower level of legitimacy are movements from Casamance or Ogaden. The situation of Oromo movements (not only the Oromo Liberation Front) is rather mixed and difficult to categorize.

Most of these groups base their actions on postcolonial demands related to a certain territory which was in previous historical periods governed either separately or enjoyed some relative autonomy, or it was conquered and incorporated into newly formed states. With the exception of Eritrea (1993), and recently South Sudan (2011), none of these movements gained international recognition as a necessary step towards full sovereignty. Therefore, not even a specific colonial existence and experience brings any reason for international recognition. Factors leading towards international recognition are multiple and they may include specific institutional legacies such as borders, administrative activities, or public institutions that may serve local elites for

construction of an elementary institutional frame delivering trust and legitimacy to public mobilization. If the local population recognizes historical value of these colonial institutions or if they remember their activity, these can be used by local elites as tools for control over the population and create a competition to the sovereign state. As shown by Englebert, this can be an example of Diola people in Casamance whose elites are otherwise excluded from governmental positions.[7]

Another source of explanation for the success or failure of a separatist movement can be the time of their actual establishment or birth. In the modern and contemporary history of Africa we can observe basically two periods which led to a growth of conflicts and separatist motives. First of all, it was the period shortly after the year of Africa (1960) that was a part of the broader Cold War context. The second period started at the end of the Cold War and the fall of many authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. These were facing in many cases a military opposition supported by one of the blocs (either the USSR or the United States). Probably the most illustrative example of these is the Democratic Republic of Congo in which Belgians supported the creation of Katanga as well as Kasaï led by Albert Kalonji. The Congo crisis brought one important issue which was a unificatory and integratory role of the newly established Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU in its Charter supported keeping the integrity of existing states and did not allow separatist movements to proclaim independence. The case of Biafra can serve as a good example. When in 1967 Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed unilaterally independence of the Biafran state in fear of domination by the Muslim North, an absolute majority of states in Africa stood behind Nigeria and its tendency to keep integrity of the state.[8]

The end of the Cold War in Africa brought a new beginning as Africa ceased to serve as a "laboratory" for the global powers. At the same time, a good number of non-democratic regimes ceased to exist and some of the ethno-regional movements could hope to fulfill their dreams of having an independent state. Only in two cases after 1991 did this process end with success, in Eritrea and South Sudan. Mali and Niger had to face Tuareg rebellions aimed at establishing an independent state of Azawad, a scenario repeated several times since independence, with the last occasions in 2011–2013.[9]

The main risk of separatist movements and conflicts is its internationalization or spread across borders because in a neighboring country it may inspire similar tendencies. Independence of Eritrea surely served as an inspiration and at the same time legitimizing factor for the demands of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Unilaterally proclaimed independence of the Republic of Somaliland in 1991 inspired other parts of Somalia to do the same, as was the case of Puntland in 1998. Christopher Clapham speaks about "disciplined insurgencies" in Ethiopia and Eritrea that created "disciplined states"

in contrast with "weakly organized insurgencies" often based on clan structures but unable to transform themselves into a functioning government.[10]

Other risk lies in the growing militarization of a state that deals with separatist attempts. In order to keep the integrity of the state, and very often with international support, ruling elites have to increase funding for repressive forces to eliminate tensions within the country, which in turn may lead to side effects such as a decreasing economic situation and subsequent socio-economic tensions. Mengistu's rule in Ethiopia was characterized by an extreme level of militarization and governmental spending on military forces. In the mid-1980s as much as 54% of the annual budget went to the military while educational, health care, and other sectors remained largely neglected.[11] Generally, it can be stated that military regimes spend more finances on repressive forces causing severe shortages in public services. This has been the case of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia and others. As a result, socio-economic pressures combined with ethnic, religious, human rights, and other issues have created further instability in various regions of those particular states.[12] It is not a coincidence that the most successful and most democratic countries in Africa are those that have never experienced internal or inter-state conflicts and therefore they were not forced to spend their budgets on military forces instead of public services. These may include Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius.

In 1990 Alexis Heraclides came up with a thesis that secessionist movements are closely linked to external influences. He claims that secessionism can be seen as kind of a neocolonialism because those who support these movements do not do it for altruistic reasons. The reasons are mostly purely economic and political. Multiethnic states or states with separatist legacies are not likely to support neighboring separatist or secessionist movements.[13] Despite the fact that his research was related to the study of the Cold War era, it can be applied to the post–Cold War era as well. However, after 1991 we can observe much fewer separatist movements than in previous decades.

YOUTH, GUERILLAS, AND REBELS

While the first two decades of political development of postcolonial Africa were marked by a prevalence of authoritarian regimes and military coups, since the end of the 1970s we can observe growth of guerilla movements, rebellions, or unrests organized in many cases by dissatisfied urban youth. This coincides mainly with economic factors, the deteriorating socio-economic situation of various countries, high unemployment, regional differences, corruption, and clientelism. Youth unemployment and subsequent frustration has had an impact not only on Ethiopia but many other countries as well. Taking the Ethiopian example, we can see that downsizing the public

sector has had an impact on primarily urban youth. People with university degrees expect somewhat naturally secured government employment. Since this is not always happening, such a situation may result in a deep social frustration and creates a space for unrest.[14] Lack of opportunities in education and employment sectors has become a significant part of the constant criticism of renowned activists and civil society members such as Wangari Maathai, who gives an example of Asian economic "tigers" while accusing African governments of neglecting education while investing in "security" and wars.[15]

Most probably the first successful movement in this regard was the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN) in Chad led by Hissène Habré that took power in 1979 just to put the country into a bloody civil war with an international dimension. Another successful movement was the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda led by Yoweri Museveni (still president of Uganda in 2018).[16] Together with the end of the Cold War and with a weakening of state power the number of guerilla movements multiplied. At the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, many countries in the Gulf of Guinea from Senegal to Côte d'Ivoire, in the Great Lakes Region, as well as in the Horn of Africa were affected by these changes and turmoil. In many cases, these movements proved to be successful, especially economically due to vast potential in natural resources that included diamonds, gold, coltan, and many others. Struggle for control over these resources showed that at least in some cases the main aim is not to fight against the enemy but to keep and maintain the struggle in order to institutionalize violence for the benefit of these movements.[17] On the other hand, any kind of generalization may be misleading as we always have to take into account specific local social, cultural, economic, political, and ethnic factors.

In this regard, authors use the term "marginalized youth" to refer to those that feel the need to come up with a "radical alternative" to the existing order that is associated with clientelism and which keeps urban youth in a socially, economically, and politically marginalized position. Violent conflicts cause endless humanitarian problems and prolonged crises, very often crossing borders from one country to another. As shown by Fondo Sikod, since 1980 up to 29 African states have been affected by some form of war or conflict. These wars cost millions of lives and about ten million people have had to leave their homes. Whenever a civil conflict breaks out, groups fighting against the local government are labelled as rebels. However, motives that these groups have for starting a struggle may have many different variables and depend also on local terrain that may play a crucial role in tactics used. Small and poorly equipped groups usually use the hit-and-run tactics targeting governmental forces or basic infrastructure.[18]

Although scholars usually distinguish between *stationary* and *roving* bandits it seems that in the last twenty years there is a prevalent tendency to

consider African armed rebellions as predatory, tending to control lucrative areas of natural resources.[19] Paul Collier is author of the thesis about the trap of natural resources that is based on the premise that some less developed countries are unable to use income from exploitation of these natural resources for economic growth, and in some cases natural wealth contributes to the trap of conflict.[20] The characteristic feature of such countries is a dominant role of the army in political life, whether it is Nigeria, Burundi, or Egypt. As a reaction to colonial rule, many African states decided to follow the path of some form of "socialist experiment" usually based on authoritarian rule of the first generation of African rulers, anti-colonial heroes, whether it was Ahmadou Sékou Touré in Guinea or Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, or Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. Extraction of oil and diamonds in combination with foreign interests contributed significantly to brutal conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. Due to the weakness of state institutions in a number of Sub-Saharan states and their lack of economic diversification combined with (in some cases) dominance of one ethnic group, nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and other negative trends, latent and open conflicts tend to return almost regularly. While some Western countries such as Norway or Great Britain use oil revenues for economic development and public projects, many African states are unable, due to above-mentioned reasons, to follow the same trends and paths.

If we get back to armed conflicts and rebellions and their connections to local resources, we can see that in some cases (mostly very poor countries) they act like some private companies that do not even need the local population to gain legitimate support. Their only sense of being is exploitation of local resources necessary to buy sophisticated weaponry in order to keep control over "their" territory. State institutions are very often unable to respond to such threats.[21] Violence is a part of any kind of such rebellion, guerilla, or organization controlling economically beneficial territory. In many cases, urban youth play a crucial role in these conflicts, attacking the rural population due to the fact that urban youth do not have access to what the rural population has—land. One marginalized group (urban youth) thus can operate on the territory inhabited by another, totally different group. Of course, too much generalization can be misleading.

For instance, Lord Resistance Army in Acholiland, Northern Unganda, is neither a group of roving "uncared-for" youngsters terrorizing local population nor a group of stationary bandits with strict structure and order. Most probably it is something between these two types of movements. What is striking in this case is that their rebellions turn against people for whose "emancipation" they allegedly fight.[22] Mono-causal perspectives, therefore, are not useful face-to-face in various local, regional, social, ethnic, religious, as well as economic aspects related to each case. Joschka Philipps, for instance, came up with a detailed explanation of existence of youth gangs in

Conakry as being a result of the whole range of root causes such as socio-economic factors, primarily poverty, political ethnicity, lack of legitimacy of the government, and/or social breakdown. These gangs act like extended families based on solidarity and sharing of food and other basic commodities, and in a certain sense substitute the state's dysfunctional system in an atmosphere of social breakdown.[23]

Until relatively recently, Clapham's typology of armed guerillas served as a respected source of understanding of these groups: 1) liberation movements (anti-colonial); 2) separatist (e.g., Polisario); 3) reformist (Museveni's NRA in Uganda); 4) warlords (Foday Sankoh's RUF in Sierra Leone). As discussed, for instance, by Bøås and Dunn, nowadays, it seems that this categorization is not sufficient for reflecting upon the multi-causal nature of existence of armed forces and guerillas in Africa as it in a certain sense looks rather statically, which is generally a problem for any kind of typologies.[24]

Explanation of existence and actions of rebel movements thus depend on multiple factors which are not easy to categorize and generalize. Why rebels commit violence against local citizens can have multiple explanations. The first is that causes of violence usually lie in the form and shape of the pre-conflict regime and use and abuse of natural resources. If there is anything that may connect all such movements, it is dysfunctional government and state institutions, and manipulations of economic resources that serve for rulers (e.g., Mobutu, Samuel Doe, Sassou-Nguesso, Taylor, etc.) to privilege some while disadvantaging others. Ruling elite then becomes a part of an informal economy through which it keeps and maintains significant wealth and power, the best example of which is Equatorial Guinea.[25]

REGIONAL MARGINALIZATION

Politics of identity is in many cases interlinked with natural resources, regional and social marginalization that in an environment full of corruption, clientelism, and oppression of opposition can turn to violent conflict in which collective identities usually serve as an ideal mobilization factor. In regard to natural resources, environmental changes (drought, ecological disasters, degradation of soil, floods), and regional marginalization (lack of basic infrastructure, absence of development) tensions tend to grow between different groups of people if each of them has a different level of access to the natural resources or benefits from them. While the conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in the West-African Sahel region usually show a rather local dimension, violence related to oil extraction in, for instance, Nigeria, is strongly linked to global context due to a simple fact that oil production is a matter of global market and foreign interests. In both cases, however, it is a matter of unequal access to natural resources, either land or oil or any other resource.

Regional and socio-economic marginalization can also be closely related to ethnic or social exclusion. Bøås and Dunn have researched the *majimbo* discourse in Kenya, which Daniel arap Moi used for political exclusion while targeting non-Kalenjin who were generally inclined to oppose the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party. Ethnic exclusion was followed by marginalization in the Rift Valley as the Maasai leaders called for targeting them. Thousands of people were either killed or displaced. Non-Kalenjin ethnic groups, such as the Luhya, Luo, Kikuyu, were attacked by Kalenjin leaders. Political violence along ethnic lines became almost a norm during the 1990s and this pattern remained the same or exploded with even greater intensity in last decade.[26] Elections in summer 2017 were no different despite the fact that the Kenyan Supreme Court annulled presidential elections in August 2017 and ordered them to repeat within 60 days, so far an unprecedented act in Sub-Saharan Africa.[27]

Pastoralists and Farmers in Sahel

While pastoralism is rather dominant in East Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania), in the last couple of decades the attention of social scientists has turned also to West-African Sahel where local conflicts tend to rise as a result of lack of natural resources, degradation of fertile soil, migration, or insufficiently regulated access to the land.[28] Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon consider changing patterns in the use of resources and growing competition in combination with the decline of "traditional" mechanisms of conflict resolution. The authors, however, propose a question whether we can talk about conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in this case, and refer to the fact that first we have to define the main subject, conflict.[29] In this book we can observe wide variability of conflicts (not only) in Africa, including pastoralists/farmers conflicts. By conflict we usually mean a wide range of interactions and mutual relations between groups in regard to natural resources. On the other hand, these relations are qualitatively different with different origins and roots, actors, and results.[30] The authors thus distinguish between conflicts of interests, competitive conflicts, and violent conflicts that differ in terms of use of land or other resource, lack of resource (e.g., water), or if it is a truly violent long-lasting conflict that can have many roots and varying progress (see table 2.1).[31]

In relation to the lack of any of natural resources we talk about the so-called *environmental scarcity*, defined as the lack of renewable resources which is caused by environmental degradation as a result of systems of land use. These can change due to population growth, and/or inadequate use of the land that contributes to its degradation. A number of authors claim that environmental scarcity in semiarid parts of Africa is caused by human activities.[32] Land and water are the two most important resources for which pas-

Table 2.1. Typology of Violent Conflicts over Natural Resources

Types of violent conflicts	Examples
Individual violence	Competition among individuals at the local level
Group violence	Robbery, Murders, Raids on herds
State violence	Action of the state against one group usually for political reasons; Mass displacement
Political violence	Military violence in order to suppress certain population, control over resources; Intrastate war; Enslavement; Property destruction; Occasional violence

Source: Hussein, Sumberg, Seddon 1999: 401.

toralists and farmers may come into conflict. For West African countries, land is the main resource due to the fact that incredibly high portions of population are employed in agriculture (see table 2.2).

Most of the above-mentioned countries are to be found at the very bottom of the human development index (HDI) which means that a vast number of people rely on favorable good harvests. Changing regulations and mechanisms in the land use puts farmers and pastoralists against each other, just like it does in case of locals and migrants. The result of these seemingly marginal clashes can be a departure of part of the population or a direct state intervention.[33] Due to climate change in the Sahel, migration, demographic growth and lack of fertile land it is clear that conflict over land becomes one of the main sources of troubles. When it is mixed with an issue of citizenship, indigeneity, and identity, like in Côte d'Ivoire, it can spread out to an open civil war. As Anthony Nyong and Charles Fiki state, conflicts in West Africa in the Sahel region have one common root, and that is most frequently conflict over natural resources.[34]

As shown by Sten Hagberg in the example of drought-affected region of Dori in Burkina Faso, in the last couple of decades several parts of the territory witnessed the so-called rural exodus. This is caused by lack of land and work opportunities as well as by lucrative employment options in richer regions such as the northern part of Côte d'Ivoire, or in urban centers. Recently, many young people find jobs in the industrial sector because Burkina Faso is an important producer of gold. Migrants still support their families in the Dori region. During severe drought in 1984 many people left the region and only a few of them have returned.[35]

Different demands, legislative, and also historical and political consequences mean that in many parts of Africa conflicts over land and natural

Table 2.2. Percentage of People Employed in Agriculture in West African Countries

Country	Size (km ^{2})	Number of inhabitants	Agriculture
Mauritania	1,030,700	3,205,060	50%
Mali	1,240,192	13,796 354	80%
Niger	1,267,000	15,878,271	90%
Nigeria	923,768	152,217,341	70%
Chad	1,284,000	10,543,464	80%
Burkina Faso	274,200	16,241,811	90%
Guinea	245,857	10,324,025	76%
Senegal	196,722	12,323,252	77.5%
Cameroon	475,440	19,294,149	70%

Source: based on www.cia.gov

resources have different shape, outcomes, and solutions. Andreas Dafinger and Michaela Pelican, for instance, compared relations between farmers and pastoralists in Burkina Faso and northwestern Cameroon in regard to their socio-economic, historical, and political influences that contribute to different approaches to land sharing between various communities, either in ethnic or labor context. The authors compared the area of Boulgou in the Southern part of central Burkina Faso and Northeastern province of Cameroon. Boulgou was by the time of their research inhabited by about 350,000 farmers and about one-tenth of this number were pastoralists. Ethnically, they can be divided into agro-pastoralist Fulani and agriculturalist Bisu. For centuries, Fulani resisted any kind of influence of non-Fulani ethnic groups and elements.

Common migration of Fulani and Bisu into Boulgou area several centuries before in a certain sense explains why there prevails a principle of the first arrival in regard to legitimacy of land use.[36] Both societies live in mutually interlinked social structure because while the Fulani use the fields of Bisu for their harvests, farmers increase their income by constructing the houses of the Fulani or by renting their herds to them. Other authors, as Breusers, Nederlof and van Rheenen, analyzing relations between Fulani and Mosi groups in Burkina Faso, speak about symbiotic relations rather than "increasing number of conflicts."[37] If there are any conflicts in the Boulgou area, they have very low intensity and are related to "classical" conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. The first accuse the latter of destructing their fields by the herds while the latter blame the first of cultivating their crops on traditional paths of the herds.[38]

Besides conflicts over land, quite a usual area of conflict occurs around water wells or water sources. Such an example was studied by Thébaud and Batterbury in Southeastern Niger among the Fulani and Tubu. The authors claim that such conflicts may occur due to climate changes in recent decades.[39] Mainly modern concrete water wells became witnesses to clashes, and in the 1970s Niger police forces had to frequently intervene in the Diffa region. Moreover, international context reached local relations between Fulani, Tubu and pastoralist Arabic-speaking groups when the Chadian army of Hissène Habré entered Niger, which increased trade with weapons and ammunition and subsequently clashes between local pastoralist groups. In 1989 they then signed peace accords, but occasional low-level conflicts were reported even years after.[40]

The aforementioned examples show that interethnic and social links between various communities are multi-level and any kind of generalization leads to misunderstanding. Mark Moritz, for instance, points at a theory which should not be forgotten by social scientists, and that is a theory of permanent conflict. This is based on a need of maximalization of gains and needs by one of the actors, either a local chief or any other authority.[41] Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk, on the other hand, speak about incompatibility of various strategies in land use combined with other cultural and social factors.[42] If there exist complementary strategies mediating understanding and decreasing conflict then it is possible to prevent tensions. As stated above, it seems obvious that the most frequent cause of conflict between pastoralists and farmers is lack of resources, and different claims, strategies, and mechanisms related to conflict prevention, resolution and mediation.

Niger Delta

While conflicts and tensions between pastoralists and farmers in West African Sahel reach rather a local dimension, the Delta Niger area is not only overpopulated and rich in oil, but it also shows an international dimension of the conflict related to the extraction of that strategic commodity. As discussed by Jeffrey Herbst, economic motivations belong to the most frequent strategies, together with political indoctrination and ethnic mobilization, in how to motivate fellow rebels or citizens to an armed action.[43] Oil, just like other strategic commodities such as diamonds or gold, belong to exploitable and tradeable resources that help to preserve conflicts. Various rebellions can appear and keep alive just due to the presence of exploitable resources and commodities. On the other hand, recent cases of violence showed that militias can exist even without exploitable resources as was the case of Cobra, Zulu, and Mamba militias in Congo-Brazzaville.

The situation in Niger Delta fits well into Herbst's theory as it combines coordination of economic motives with political and ethnic mobilization.[44] As discussed earlier, economic causes in the form of long-standing marginalization contributed to the birth of specific identities having a political dimension and motivation. On the other hand, local militias do not resemble those from Sierra Leone or Liberia, as child-soldier abuse or extreme violence against civilians has not been reported.

The Niger Delta includes nine Nigerian federal states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers). The region belongs to the most ethnically diverse Nigeria which can be proved by the existence of five sub-groups of Niger-Congo languages spoken there: Ijoid, Edoid, Delta Cross, Yoruboid, Igboid. Obviously, it is an overpopulated region which is supposed to have more than 45 million inhabitants in 2020 on an area of around 112,000 square kilometers.[45]

The Niger Delta belongs to the main areas of oil in the Gulf of Guinea and forms an absolute part of Nigeria's income. Paradoxically enough, poverty in this region tends to increase which leads us to the issues of unequal redistribution of wealth, regional and social marginalization. This process started during colonial period when the Delta area was divided between the Eastern and Western province. In both provinces, the Delta inhabitants became minorities with minimal or no access to education, state administration, or lucrative employment. This marginalization was formalized by Richards' constitution in 1946 when the provinces turned into regions and Delta inhabitants remained marginalized on the peripheries of both regions. In order to protect those citizens, Niger Delta Congress (NDC) was formed and the first political demands were formulated for a specific separated entity of the Delta.[46]

The postcolonial history of Nigeria was shaped in military rules and coups with occasional, rather short-lived, civilian governments. Military coup was thus not an exception but rather a rule in the case of Nigeria and we can hardly find in Africa a country with such a number of coups between the 1960s and 1990s.[47] In an atmosphere of boiling tensions and continuous regional and socio-economic marginalization, the first revolt of Isaak Adaka Bora took place in the 1960s, proclaiming the Republic of Delta Niger Nations. Despite being suppressed after only 12 days, it was the first attempt to formulate demands for self-determination of this particular region. When the civil war broke out in 1967 in Biafra, General Yakubu Gowon relied on the dissatisfaction of Delta Niger people with the Igbo rule which was a correct assumption that contributed to the weakening of Biafra forces before the war itself.[48] After the war, the Delta Niger people expected some kind of reward for their help in the war against Biafra but until the mid-1970s, no response came from Lagos in this regard. In 1976, the so-called Niger Delta Basin Development Authority was formed and that was, from the governmental

point of view, the solution to Delta Niger demands. In the following years and decades, the production of oil tended to increase together with mounting ecological and economic tragedies of the local population.[49]

The Niger Delta is the richest territory in Nigeria for oil and gas fields. Despite this, the GDP per capita is the lowest in Nigeria which shows dramatic socio-economic imbalance and inequalities to which people react by organizing into militias and various local organizations demanding the right for self-determination. After the Biafra war during which the government of Biafra unilaterally nationalized Shell company refineries, President Yakubu Gowon came up with a decree in 1969 whose intention was to first collect revenues from oil at the federal level and then to redistribute it to the federal states. This led further to the proclamation of a unitary state and abolishment of federal structures.[50] During the following regimes of Shehu Shagari and Muhammad Buhari the oil revenues increased but paradoxically so did the debts of Nigeria.

Nigerian federalism, military regimes, and regional inequalities in natural resources revenues led to both worsening of ethnic relations and mobilization of masses along ethnic lines. During the 1970s and 1980s it was not unusual when the Nigerian central government preferred various regions through clientelism while others were neglected, having no or minimal political representation and no access to advantages from the oil industry. Ethno-regional polarization intensified in times of economic crisis during the 1980s when the Nigerian debt dramatically increased.[51]

Dominance of military regimes with authoritarian and centralizing tendencies affected group relations inside Nigeria. It was the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) imposed in 1983 that truly accelerated separatist tendencies in the so far marginalized Niger Delta. Due to economic inequality, social policy advantaging other regions, as well as ecological degradation, frustration grew among local societies resulting in the formation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP) in 1990.

When in 1993 Sani Abacha gained power through another coup, the Niger Delta witnessed enormous growth in terms of oil extraction with serious and disastrous consequences for local societies. Ruthless activities of oil companies only helped local ethno-regional movements to grow and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was formed. Success of MEND in a certain sense benefitted from an unclear structure of the leadership, well-targeted media propaganda, and attacks on oil facilities as well as the ability to form coalitions with other ethnic militias in the region.[52] During the years of Sani Abacha's rule, the Niger Delta region attracted international attention as Abacha granted concessions for oil extraction to Shell, as well as other companies, including ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Total and ENI. By then, the Delta Niger contributed 90% of the daily export of oil from Nigeria.[53]

The regime reacted to the protests against Sani Abacha's ruthless rule with persecutions of various opposition leaders and intellectuals such as Wole Soyinka, who was forced to leave the country and went into exile. Other methods included imprisonment and death sentences, with the most prominent opposition leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, being hanged. This author of "The Ogoni Bill of Rights" demanded rightful and just distribution of oil revenues and protection of human rights. Subsequent protests and demonstrations that included attacks on oil fields and pipelines resulted in numerous deaths and had an impact on the oil industry itself.[54]

Despite the lack of media attention in recent years, it seems that the conflict remains in latent form as it has its roots in politics of identity, colonial past, economic marginalization, and postcolonial authoritarian regimes. A number of existing ethnic regional movements and militias, both active and inactive, still struggle for self-determination of the Niger Delta. Already during its early stage, the NDC party, one of the most significant voices of the Niger Delta, formulated the so-called Niger Delta Manifesto, inspired by Marxist thoughts which are obvious from the second preamble. A Marxist approach is obvious also from other articles of the Manifesto as it deals with capitalism and colonization of the Niger Delta while the authors try to find ways and solutions in revolutionary movements of the Socialist world.[55] Leftist and radical Marxist rhetoric was characteristic for a part of the Nigerian diaspora. This was rather logical as the socialist world (in their pragmatic and ideological view) supported movements struggling for self-determination in the so-called capitalist world.

Conflicts in the Niger Delta are rooted in legitimate demands of minorities for better treatment from the Nigerian central government(s) and international oil companies. Strategies employed by the most important actors in the region prevent any kind of long-standing and peaceful solution leading to positive development for all engaged parties. At the same time it is necessary to prevent conflicts between various communities inside the region via armed groups and militias. One of the main recommendations for a long-lasting peace is starting a dialogue between the federal government and Delta Niger governments as well as various organizations at all levels of conflicts, decentralization, positive entrepreneurial environment, development of education, diversification of economic sources, especially when it comes to agricultural, petrochemical industry, tourism and employment policy.[56]

Tuaregs in Mali and Niger

One of the movements with a long history of protests and calls for emancipation in Africa has been the Berber movement, which resulted in the so-called Berber Manifesto. Since independence, such a movement was also born in West Africa among the Tuareg people who speak the Tamasheq language

and use the Tifinagh script. Most of the Tuaregs live in Mali and Niger. Tuaregs have been traditionally nomadic pastoralists and due to the Trans-Saharan trade, they adopted Islam centuries ago. Their society has been divided into many clans and is stratified into nobility, free, and slaves. Mali and Niger formed a part of French West Africa and belonged to the less developed countries, as compared, for instance, to Senegal. When Mali gained independence in 1960, 95% of inhabitants relied on agriculture and pastoralism.[57]

The government was not able to face Tuareg demands for autonomous administration and the country sank into economic decline, corruption and decreasing standards of living. Modibo Keita intended to modernize the country but ruled through an authoritarian regime in the name of "Scientific Socialism" with a strong orientation towards the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s the Malian economy was devastated and Keita turned to the West, particularly France, for support. However, opposition within the country was mounting and in 1968 the first coup took place in Bamako. Mousa Traoré, a member of the military forces, stood at the forefront of the coup and became the second president of Mali, seeking to incorporate Mali more into the global economy.[58]

One of the main challenges of independent Mali was to handle the Tuareg rebellion. Tuaregs, according to their own mythology and ideology, see themselves as "racially" superior to settled farmers. During the colonial period the Tuaregs stayed at the periphery of the state although they maintained symbiotic relations with farmers through economic exchange. However, when the independent Mali was formed, Tuaregs remained excluded from the decision-making process and did not have any direct material profit coming out of independence. Tuaregs perceived the socialist government with a high degree of distrust, especially when it came to access to land. In the 1950s, some Tuaregs came to the conclusion that one of the solutions to their peripheral position would be an independent state leading towards unification of all Tuaregs inhabiting Mali, Niger, and southern Algeria into one unit called Azawad.[59] Racial discourse, according to Baz Lecocq, is still at least latently present in Northern Mali, as race is primarily associated with religion, behavior and descent.[60]

After 1960, discrimination of the Tuaregs, the land reform threatening their privileged access to land, and subsequent sedentarization policy, resulted in an open rebellion by the use of hit-and-run tactics. Attacks intensified during 1963 and the government sent military troops to pacify the Tuareg territories. During the following two decades, West Africa was affected by repeated periods of drought which had a significant impact on pastoralist communities due to the loss of herds. A significant number of people sought refuge in camps or urban centers trying to adapt to new modes of livelihood. Members of the Tuareg elite blamed the central government of

neglecting their communities and of insufficient distribution of food to drought-affected territories in order to eliminate remnants of Tuareg opposition towards the government.[61] Social change, however, came from the Tuaregs themselves. Many younger Tuaregs began to leave Mali to North Africa, primarily Libya, where many of them formed part of "Islamic Legions" of Muammar Qaddafi who sent them to places such as Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, or Pakistan.[62]

Throughout the 1980s, many of the Tuareg people gained experience in wars in the Middle East and with the end of the Cold War they began to return to their original homeland. There, many of them could not find any employment, also due to uprooting. Coincidentally, by the end of the 1980s, Libya supported Tuaregs in order to weaken governments in Mali and Niger due to their anti-Libyan activities in the war in Chad. When in 1991 another coup took place in Mali, Tuaregs organized the second rebellion which the government was not able to handle effectively, except for declaration of a state of emergency. Peace agreements from Algiers, known as the Tamanrasset Accords, from January 1991, led to incorporation of the Tuaregs into the Malian army and governmental posts. Despite these peace agreements, violence did not disappear from the northern part of Mali. The National Pact from 1992 declared that the highest priority was the neutralization of groups of fighters and up to 1998 about 3,000 Tuaregs were incorporated into the military forces. Another huge task was to repatriate thousands of refugees who left the country, primarily to Algeria and Mauritania.[63]

The third key to success was respect for Tuareg culture and traditions for which a deeper level of decentralization was needed. Despite these steps towards accommodation of diversity, northern Mali remained an area of unrest and fear for a long time. Many societies felt threatened by the Tuareg militias and formed their own movements, such as the so-called Ganda Koi among the Songhay-speaking communities. Another unresolved issue was that the military forces lived for decades with a stereotypical image of the Tuaregs as those who are "violent" and "opportunistic," which was only fueled by the Tuareg revolt within the army in northern Mali. The Malian government invited the Red Cross and other organizations in order to assist in training of soldiers in human rights issues, professional ethics, and respect for law and order.[64]

During the 1990s, several people within the army leadership seemed to have a more sensitive approach to Tuareg issues. This was the case of Hamidou Marika, himself of Bambara origin, who had a Tuareg wife and thus could communicate more effectively with the Tuareg communities. At least some of the activities of the Tuaregs were supported by foreign actors such as Muammar Qaddafi or POLISARIO in Western Sahara. Due to large numbers of Tuaregs living in Algeria, Niger, Libya, and Mauritania, these countries also had interests in Mali. Tuaregs in the diaspora, in Europe and the

United States, have kept strong links to various Islamic organizations around the world and lobbied in France for a better image of their communities in Mali.[65]

In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, colonial administrators went so far as to invent races, Hutu and Tutsi, whose construction was by and large influenced by Christian missionaries.[66] Jean-Loup Amselle states that a status of race was ascribed to the West African Fulanis. Amselle analyzes the process of the creation of a myth of a typical Fulani man who was associated with specific features, and in case a European traveler met some Fulani who did not show these characteristics, it was taken as a departure from typical Fulani features.[67] Invention of identities was not only manifested in local or ethnic forms but was directly attached to the existence of the state itself. This was especially the case for different European heritages in places like Somalia (Italian and British Somaliland) or Cameroon (German and later French and British).

Borders between African states were by and large outlined at the end of the nineteenth century and only small number of African states/borders were created by natural historical process (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho, etc.). Artificial division of territories, which for centuries were inhabited by certain groups of people, is closely related to the issue of land. The world is in the twenty-first century still to a great extent characterized by conflicts over territory, and territoriality thus remains one of the principles and roots of conflicts. Current research in regard to territoriality and globalization has shown three basic features of territoriality, globalization, and conflict:

1. While states still have demands on certain territories, very often by violent means, causes of many territorial demands remain unclear. Globalization may and may not strengthen them.
2. Territorial conflicts remain crucial aspects of escalation of violent tensions despite a clear decrease of inter-state conflicts. Globalization can either decrease or increase situations in which territoriality influences internal conflicts.
3. Micropolitics of territorial relations and territorial gains contribute to construction of territorial regimes. Borders are therefore perceived as sources of tensions and symbols of conflicts, obstacles or barriers of military defense or attack. Globalization and conflict influence border regime and jurisdiction and change according to time and territory.[68]

For anthropologists, territoriality is usually considered a delineation of borders and behavior inside these borders. Political science understands territoriality in a narrower sense of territorially determined political rule. Individuals can be distinguished on the basis of their territorial *attachments* and *detachments*. Diaspora is usually characterized by a strong connection with

the original homeland, though in this case it is very often an idealized or even mythical relation based on "black and white" reality caused by a long-lasting detachment from the given environment. Within the diaspora, the so-called *long-distance nationalism* is the most obvious phenomenon which has a clearly ideological character.[69] Crawford Young in this context speaks about naturalization of territorial nation as a necessary prerequisite for the construction and maintenance of integrity of African states because within these states dozens of different societies have shared, due to an artificial creation of borders, the same territory but have not shared common national mythology. Only a few African states had shared pre-colonial history and thus a consciousness of national integrity, namely Morocco, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Some other states at least evoke a historical existence going beyond the borders of colonialism (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Tunisia, Madagascar). It is obvious that contemporary Oromo studies would question Young's premise of national integrity of Ethiopia as it is regarded as a colonial, Abyssinian domain in which the Oromo (and other people) belonged to those oppressed and thus had no national "feeling." Young argues that there exist three causes or theories clarifying the maintenance of national integrity despite the existence of artificial borders. These reasons are the following: international refusal of separatist attempts stemming from the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and later African Union, absence of alternative mechanisms for defining territoriality (e.g., ethnic principle, which has proved to be rather explosive), and the theory of rational choice in which political elites whose existence is tightly related to the existence of the state would have to, in case of potential dismantling of the state, risk too much with rather uncertain result.[70]

RESOURCE CURSE AND CONFLICTS: CONGO

We left the Democratic Republic of Congo, or former Zaïre, during the time of the first crises of an independent state that were largely influenced by colonial legacies and global, Cold War, context. Congo is also usually taken as an example of a "resource curse" as those countries with weak institutions, non-diversified economies, and large territory with densely populated little places where rebel forces may easily hide and form, as stated by Paul Collier.[71]

Studies on resource curse have been dealing with resource abundance in a socio-political environment that is lacking sufficient institutions, stable political system, diversified economy, civil society, and stable neighborhood. Typically, some of the states in Sub-Saharan Africa that have abundance of profitable commodities such as oil, diamonds, or gold, have had serious

troubles with keeping stability and prosperity. This has been the case of Angola (up until 2002 when Jonas Savimbi died).

Desperate lack of educated elites and absence of Congolese national consciousness contributed to formation of various ethno-regional political parties that defended interests of their respective areas or ethnic groups. Anti-colonial nationalism emerged in the 1920s with the movements of Ngunzists and Kimbanguists that had milleniarist ethos and were blamed for being responsible for strikes and workers' revolts. The Catholic Church claimed these movements were manipulated by Protestants. Even though especially the Kimbanguists presented a certain challenge to the colonial political system, no major movement had a widespread impact in Congo. On the other hand, in the 1950s Belgian authorities were afraid of the potential joined forces of Kimbanguists and the ABAKO political party,[72] which only supports our notion of ethno(-religious) regionalism in Congo.

After the death of Lumumba, political development in Congo was strongly influenced by ethnicization and regionalization of politics and by the Cold War. Congo witnessed the same situation as Angola a decade later. An engagement by the CIA, Cuban "export of revolution," and public discourse was centered on such themes as betrayal of independence by imperialist intervention and martyrdom of Patrice Lumumba. The legacy of Lumumba prevailed years after his execution as a number of Lumumbists launched a series of uprisings in order to weaken the state center in Leopoldville and proclaim a truly independent nation according to earlier visions of Patrice Lumumba. The years between 1960 and 1965 were thus a theatre for various movements emanating from a desperate lack of national consciousness. Struggles between the government and movements of Kimbangu heirs, Lumumba's followers or Mulelists, surrounded around Pierre Mulele, a leader of a quasi-Maoist rebellion group in Kwilu region, proved the need to strengthen the role of Congolese army and security forces in order to centralize the country before it broke into several states.[73]

It was the character of ethno-regional fragmentation of the Congo that brought Mobutu to the center of attention, first during Lumumba's premiership, and second during the civil war, when Mobutu, as an army general, proclaimed himself ruler and overthrew President Joseph Kasavubu in 1965. The threat of fragmentation, ethnic violence and tribalism mixed together with personal aspirations and dictatorial ambitions moved Mobutu towards the policy of Africanization or *authenticité*. The dominance of Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches to state and society were popular in the era of decolonization and early independence days, and the Soviet Union, as an anti-imperialist superpower was seen as an implementation of truly democratic, popular ideas that could replace the so far dominant Western colonial stereotypes of superiority of Europe and subjugation of Africans. In these circumstances, the struggle over Congo's future was one among many struggles

between pro-Western and anti-imperialist forces in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paradoxically, Mobutu's pro-Western orientation did not correspond to his politics of state centralization, anti-Westernization and above-mentioned politics of *authenticité*. Such a step was necessary to legitimize his power while facing potential regional unrest and a deteriorating economic situation. Backed by France, the United States and other Western powers, Mobutu's era of dictatorship could not be harmed by any internal struggle as Western allies were prepared to send military support in case of emergency. Failure of the political development, oppression of political opposition and brain drain put Congo on the list of countries with similar symptoms of a newly found authentic policy of nation-building (Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique). A history of Belgian colonialism, Mobutu's dictatorship and lack of educated elites with national aspirations contributed to the contemporary development as Laurent Kabila stepped into Kinshasa in 1997 proclaiming himself President of Democratic Republic of Congo. His assassination four years later had complex causes including direct foreign engagement and exploitation of natural resources by struggling semi-autonomous units backed by external partners, but it needs to be seen in the general scope of political development of Congo where strong personal rule as a symbol of state defined socio-political development since Leopold II. Mobutu and Kabila might be considered a certain reincarnation of Leopold, a notion that at least Mobutu accepted in his early days in power.

Socio-economic Dimension

Historically, Congo was since Leopold II in a state of underdevelopment, as until the late 1950s no skilled doctors, lawyers or businessmen were present there. The Belgian educational system gave a free hand to the Catholic Church (which benefited from grants of land and customs and other concessions), produced no qualified forces in order to keep the indigenous population far from higher education and knowledge. The result of this policy was that the middle class, necessary for economic development, was almost non-existent in Congo at the time of independence. Education in the hands of the Congolese people was perceived as a tool towards anti-colonialism and even Communism, which Belgians and Americans were afraid of in Congo.[74] In such a state, only a tiny minority of educated and highly skilled men could claim leadership on a national level, and, moreover, due to an underdeveloped socio-economic situation, Congolese leaders, namely Mobutu, had no vast opposition which would blame them for economic and political failure.

In the 1990s we may talk about a rather economic conflict in DRC for which exploitation and control over natural resources was symptomatic. DRC is one of the richest countries in Africa in terms of natural resources, and economic interests of various factions became a central point of tensions

to which the international community contributed by direct or indirect support of struggling parties. In the 1990s the situation in DRC can be described as "disintegration and privatization of the state."[75]

Since the 1970s, an informal economic resort had been created in Eastern and Central parts of the Congo due to lack of sufficient infrastructure and the rise of local *big men* loyal to Mobutu. Clandestine commerce began to be widespread in Kivu, Kasai and Katanga. Rebellious forces that had been formed in or outside the Congo had not only a military and ideological basis but also their own economic interest connected to ethno-regional territory. Warlord territories are thus the main product of Mobutu's policy.[76] The impact of the deteriorating economic situation has had its social connotations as well, since the child-soldiers have been recruited as fighting guerrillas. This process of *déparentélisation*, as stated by Joseph Tonda,[77] affected socio-economic life in many families, villages and towns as children, whose number ranged from 30,000 to 50,000, did not attend schools nor did they work at home in the fields of their parents.

International Factors

Conflict in the Congo has been, at least since the Rwanda genocide, directly affected by international political development. Despite Mobutu's democratization process that he was forced by the international community to promote, the political system remained the same and economic crisis became more acute. Political opposition in the 1990s was incoherent and divided and thus unable to reach its goals—to end Mobutu's regime. In such conditions the major blow to the regime came not from inside, but from outside the country and included a number of neighboring as well as more distant countries with Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi at the first followed by Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville and even Eritrea.[78]

The major effect from neighboring countries came from Rwanda where in 1994 an unprecedented genocide took place between Hutu and Tutsi. Institutionalized antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi which had been created during the colonial period and culminated in the decolonization era resulted in a series of ethnic clashes and refugee flows that had a serious impact on the social and economic situation mainly in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo.[79] Displacement and ethnic reintegration became one of the major challenges for further political development in Congo and was accompanied by serious problems including ethnic violence, marginalization and discrimination.[80] Struggling forces, Interahamwe on one side and Rwandan Patriotic Front on the other, have had direct impact on opposition anti-Mobutu coalition that in 1996–1997 moved through Congo to overthrow the regime. Struggles between Hutu and Tutsi on the Congo soil created an atmosphere of violence and fear and helped some semi-independent forces to claim their

demands and wishes. One of the most known forces was presented by a Tutsi regional leader Laurent Nkunda. Several authors see mutual relation between social crisis of post-genocide Rwanda and the disastrous development in the Congo.[81]

After the fall of Mobutu and the rise of Kabila to power, anti-Kabila movements began to emerge in eastern parts of Congo. Kabila's decision in July 1998 to dismiss the Rwandan forces of the Forces Armées Congolaises sowed a seed of tension as the Ugandan and Rwandan governments proclaimed the anti-Kabila hostility backed by "national interests." Rwanda's role in the conflict since its beginning seemed to be crucial, as it was the Rwandan forces who have helped Kabila to seize power in Congo. The war against Mobutu and the war against Kabila showed certain similarities as they both began with ethnic Tutsi taking up arms against attacks undertaken by government supporters. The Rwanda-Congo border became one of the most dangerous places in the world. In both wars, Rwanda initially denied any engagement while soon after admitted its participation for humanitarian and defensive reasons. Uganda in both cases joined the game.[82]

Ethnicity and Refugees

There has been still only limited attention focused on the spilling of instability across borders in central Africa with regard to ethnicity as a mobilizing factor of conflicts.[83] In this context, Porto warns against simplistic views on ethnic conflicts since it depends on the perspective from which we perceive such a conflict, whether ethnicity is inherited or contextual or negotiable.[84] The main part of still continuing ethnic conflict has occurred in North and South Kivu, which Mamdani claims – according to local conventional wisdom in Goma and Bikavu – is where "losers from Rwanda end up; and it is from Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda."[85] It is documented that between July and September 1994, more than one million Rwandans crossed the border into Congo, including those directly involved in the genocide.[86] While the Hutu coming from Rwanda could be labeled as "refugees," the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) composed mainly of Tutsis coming from their Ugandan base could be considered invaders seeking to fight Forces Armées Rwandaise and Interahamwe guerillas.

What followed could be regarded as manipulation of ethnic identity as the category of "Banyamulenge" was ascribed to those coming home. These were the Rwandan Tutsis in eastern Congo, for whose purposes myths had been created in order to prove their "ethnic identity." Stories told that they were original inhabitants of eastern Congo who migrated a long time ago to Rwanda and now they are simply on their way home.[87] While the main militia were formed by Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis, "indigenous" armed groups were formed in order to protect civilians and land against invaders

and refugees. Just as Banyamulenge became identified with all Congolese Tutsis, the term Mayi Mayi indicated the "indigenous" militias. Intensification of the conflict has to be viewed together with the strengthening feeling of local citizens in eastern Congo who soon began think of Rwandan troops as of an occupation army.

Despite manipulations with ethnic categorization there exists an agreement among scholars that the conflict in Congo has not been provoked by ethnic competition but it rather developed as a consequence of previous accumulated factors of the conflict, both internal and external. Local specificities of ethnic tensions in South and North Kivu are beyond the scope of this study and are to be found in Mamdani.[88]

Congo Crisis Contextualized

In a historical perspective, anti-colonial nationalism and liberation movements spread all over Africa through the 1950s as political elites began to emerge and the results of World War II allowed such movements to accent their demands and needs. The era of independence and the state-making process was filled with a series of prolonged conflicts and civil wars that were directed against authoritarian non-democratic regimes (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan), against colonial powers unwilling to allow native people self-government (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Zimbabwe), because of economic reasons (Sierra Leone, Liberia), or due to secessionist and separatist ambitions (Nigeria, Eritrea, Mali). The level of internal armed conflicts was rather minimal with the only exception being the Great Lakes area including Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo. These territories witnessed incomparable violence that had been rare elsewhere in Africa in the years shortly after 1960. While in the majority of other African countries the ruling class simply inherited a state apparatus and the anti-colonial mobilization gave legitimacy into the hands of rulers who, in vast majority of cases, became dictators or autocrats (Guinea, Ghana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mali). In former Belgian colonies, decolonization was so quick and chaotic and the internal political situation so fragile and fragmented that it was not surprising when some of these countries proceeded to civil war (Congo) or found themselves on the brink of genocide (Rwanda).

In terms of political development and emergence of political parties, during the era of decolonization a number of African countries followed a similar scenario. Political parties based on regional or ethnic factor coincided with the lack of national consciousness that colonial regimes usually did not want to support. Emergence of ethnic political parties in many cases contributed to ethnic hostilities and the rule of one dominant ethnic which marginalized and discriminated against the others. Such a development occurred in Nigeria with Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo being the major "ethnic groups" and

each represented by its own party. In Ethiopia, the rule of the Amhara dynasty contributed to formation of opposition parties (mainly Oromo, Somali, Afar and other) and movements struggling for self-determination and an equal share of power and wealth. Some countries had been united under the personal rule of a charismatic autocrat or dictator and political life was usually under the control of a national party while the opposition was systematically oppressed. Guinea, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire could be taken as illustrative examples.

Socio-economic factors of conflicts are one of the most common features of post-independence conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic marginalization in Nigeria, Sudan, or Mali has led to many quarrels between states and regions. Access to natural resources, land, and water seem to be crucial for imploding conflicts on the local, regional, as well as the state level.

Beth Elise Whitaker put into contrast refugee flows from Rwanda to Congo and from Rwanda to Tanzania and she found several differences in these cases. Her main question was focused on divergent outcomes the influx of Rwandan refugees had. Although Tanzania was also undergoing social and political changes at the time of the refugee flows from Rwanda, the political climate was generally different since the government was moving towards economic liberalization and a multi-party system.[89]

As important as the level of political atmosphere, differing levels of politicization of ethnic identities in Congo and Tanzania played a crucial role. While there have been well documented attempts to manipulate ethnic identities for political purposes in Congo, leading to clashes between "indigenous" and people of Rwandan culture living on Congolese soil without any proof of their Congolese origin, in Tanzania, no such event happened. This was due to a strong emphasis of former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere to form a Tanzanian identity by which he sought to prevent the country being torn apart along ethnic lines.[90] Moreover, as pointed out by Whitaker, the refugee flows from Rwanda contributed to strengthen the Tanzanian identity as opposed to Banyarwanda or Zairois.[91] Even though, scholars usually recall the failed system of Nyereres' *ujamaa*, it has to be stated that the accent on socialism created a space for de-ethnicization of Tanzanian politics which helped the country lessen the risk of ethnic clashes as seen in Congo or Rwanda.[92]

Generally, there exists a consensus about the need to rebuild the war-torn societies by installing legitimate political authorities, but the problem which the international community has to deal with is how to forge these authorities and what strategies and roles these can undertake in such a process. The engagement of the international community in managing conflict and peacemaking process in Congo seemed to be needed from its very beginning. For these purposes the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) was created in order to engage in the organization of elections.[93] But

the problem of governance and conflict will not disappear with voting alone since multiple factors of conflict and disorder are interconnected. Diplomatic efforts are not the only solution. These have to be carried out together with stabilizing effects, reduction of corruption in order to promote economic prosperity, promoting medical care and food industry and tirelessly working on a peace-building process without which the region of Eastern Congo (or generally the Great Lakes area) will be destabilized again.[94]

The role of a mediator in African conflicts proved to be successful in a number of cases, and it is no surprise that South Africa played such a respected role since it is a major African economy and a regional power. Its democratic system, moreover, legitimize South Africa's international political actions, not mentioning a respect of its former leaders, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. South Africa's involvement in the Congo crisis has proved crucial for the peace-building process. Other factors have included the weakness of political rivals in Congo, commitment of the international community through CIAT and the exhaustion of African stakeholders. All countries directly involved in the conflict have gradually lost legitimate justification for presence or support of whatever side.[95]

As we have seen previously, the conflict in the Congo, which still seems to be far from settled, has been created by multiple factors which led some authors to regard the conflicts as "complex wars of the Congo."[96] Although the economic interests of the contemporary Congo conflict have been emphasized recently as the most remarkable, all previously mentioned causes deserve the same attention because of their interlinking nature.

Restoration and order in Congo can be achieved only through international assistance, including all neighboring countries which have been more or less directly involved in the continual conflict in Congo, and through basic security needs as proposed by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Its report on Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Development marked three main issues for restoration of order in post-conflict areas: 1) Restoration of order and security through establishment of key social institutions; 2) Strengthening of the capacity for long-term, routine law enforcement by nationals of the country; 3) Demobilization and disarmament of former combatants and the attempt to reintegrate them into civil society.[97]

All the above-mentioned aspects which the international community sees as vital for the peaceful development in Congo were deteriorating throughout last decades due to historical legacy, failure of the political process, strong personal rule, lack of educated elites, militarization of various regions due to cross-border violence and trade, lack of interest of the international community (especially in the 1990s) and rich natural resources under control of local competing authorities. By showing all of these factors I wanted to point at the fact that many of the contemporary conflict situations in Africa tend to be explained by economic reasons, which probably corresponds to an Africa

boom as witnessed by the Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, American, Russian and European companies having their interests in most of the African countries. The example of Congo, and the complexity of factors contributing to conflict situations, may serve as an instrument for other areas of tensions like the Niger Delta region or Darfur which are usually explained only through economic lenses (oil). An interdisciplinary approach combining historical and anthropological inquiries to political science and political economy seems to be an appropriate tool for understanding complexities of African societies and conflict situations, which might then be helpful in search for post-conflict solutions and conflict management.

CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND CONFLICT

It seems that scholarly literature did not pay so much attention to the issue of interrelation of citizenship and conflict until the Côte d'Ivoire civil war. It was this conflict that ruined a prosperous country and revealed the significance of citizenship in politics and daily lives of every individual. Hundreds of thousands of people worldwide live in miserable conditions and without access to basic needs just because of the fact that the political elite derive their support from a part of the population while the rest remains restricted from power and elections. Countries like Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Côte d'Ivoire share more or less the same conditions in which parts of minorities cannot register their children to schools, cannot get access to health care, cannot get travel documents or employment due to a certain vacuum they have to live in. The Côte d'Ivoire conflict showed how the issue of citizenship is related to political struggle in which some actors are excluded from political competition or marginalized in one way or another due to failure to fulfill certain conditions prescribed by preconceived citizenship law. The basic factor in such conflict is manipulation with citizenship laws and in this specific case can be seen as part of colonial legacy.

One of the first cases that pointed at the issue of "otherness," identity, and colonial past was the Berber question in North Africa whose originally intellectual and secondly real fight for identity recognition inspired many other movements fighting for emancipation. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Berber society in North Africa was in defensive mode. On the contrary, nationalism related to Islam and Arabic language was on the rise as the basic component of Algerian identity which was against a hundred-year-long idea of French colonial rule. France intended to incorporate the Kabyle Berbers to Christian-European civilization and strengthen their only superficial Islamic identity. Due to these reasons, the Berber nationalism was seen by the Arab majority with suspicion as it was associated with French colonial rule. Muhammad

Chafik was the main author of the so-called Berber Manifesto, a document signed by hundreds of Moroccan Berber intellectuals in 2000 as a result of a decades-long struggle for cultural emancipation. The Berber Manifesto questioned previous interpretation of Moroccan history and official interpretation of collective identity.[98]

The Manifesto stated that diversity was more a contribution to civilization than an obstacle to its development, and called for creation of universal civilization respecting diversity as a necessary prerequisite for its progression and maturity. The Berber Manifesto stood at the beginning of the so-called Berber cultural movement that had its cultural as well as ethnic element and refused religion as a tool of law. The Berber cultural movement thus presented Morocco not as a part of the Muslim world but rather as a geographical, cultural, and ethnic crossroads.[99]

While in the 1920s the Berber marginalization was on the way in Algeria and Morocco, more recently globalization contributed to the rise of the Amazigh identity primarily due to the Internet and the Berber diaspora searching for recognition of Berber culture in both North Africa and Western Europe/North America. In last couple of years there is a growing tendency to gain a Berber autonomy according to the Catalan model in Spain. In Algeria, a movement for autonomy of Kabylia came into being with an accent put on: 1) respect for human rights regardless race, language, sex, religion; abolishment of polygamy, and establishment of modern family law; 2) guaranteed freedom of expression; 3) democracy—rule based on multiparty political system and elected representatives.

In regard to citizenship and identity in Africa, it is wise to outline various forms and categories and space in which conflicts of any kind can be generated. First of all, we should explain the rise and development of *citizenship law* in colonial Africa. Citizenship is defined by Crawford Young as formal status of individual membership in national community inferior to sovereign institutions of the state.[100]

Perhaps the most frequent conflicts occur between indigenous and newcomers, especially when it comes to access to land. Less frequent though more brutal case can be exclusion and denationalization of part of the population which is due to ideological reasons taken as threat. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi we could see an importance of personal documents (ID) without which a citizen ceases to be a citizen and whose acquisition or revocation can be influenced by ideological and propagandistic causes. Last but not least, elimination of political candidates via citizenship belongs to one of the most actual strategies of oppression and marginalization.

The coming of Europeans to Africa and subsequent foundation of colonial rule brought multiple changes and new norms of governance and administration. Together with establishment of colonial empires it was necessary to deal with the status of colonized people and their position. The question of

nationality and origin was derived from *ius soli*, the principle according to which gave citizenship to a man born in certain state. On the other hand, it did not mean the right to education or political participation as these were given to a minority of people during colonial rule.[101] Jeffrey Herbst reconstructed changes in models of citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa. Former Belgian and French colonies all followed *ius sanguinis* principle as did their former colonial masters. Among Lusophone countries, only Moçambique changed its former *ius soli* model, while there were many Anglophone countries that did so—Botswana, Ghana, Sudan, Malawi, Zambia.[102]

Construction of state in Africa whose features are rooted in colonial history inclines towards institutionalization of ethnic demands, rights, and privileges, creating differences and unequal statuses between individual groups in terms of access to citizenship.[103] A typical example of this inadequate and insensitive approach to the issue of group identities and territoriality can be seen in Kenya, a British colony in which inter-ethnic relations were malformed by population displacement and expropriation of Kikuyu land for the use of large plantations. Displaced people usually clashed with pastoralists due to the access to land.[104]

Similarly, colonialism had an impact on a "privileged" group of Asians who formed in many colonies an important business class while in the postcolonial period they had to legitimize and prove their loyalty to the ruling regimes.[105] Collective and individual identity as well as citizenship depended on colonial order and laws that differed from state to state. However, postcolonial states inherited colonial codes and laws which dealt with terms such as natives, migrants, settlers, etc.[106] It is evident that this pre-colonial impact on relations between individuals and societies and its codification and institutionalization led in the postcolonial period during the era of economic failures to a greater danger of conflicts and violence. This has usually led to the rise of extremism and radicalization instead of political liberalization and respect.[107]

Generally, all colonial subjects were disadvantaged, although even among them a certain kind of inequality was maintained. The term native or *indigene* associated subjugated status and lower culture as well as impossibility to participate in decision-making process that dealt with the rights of the natives.[108] The status of Africans coincided with anthropological thinking of the time when there was no space between the colonizer and the colonized. Africans were denied any share in the rise of civilization despite the fact that Europeans encountered number of ancient civilizations during the conquest of Africa's interior. For instance, Cecil Rhodes, during his exploration of Zimbabwe's hinterland, based his knowledge on Portuguese sources from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Brits thus thought they had discovered ancient mines of King Solomon without considering having seen an existence of black civilization.[109] Due to very specific historical, cultural,

and religious aspects a unique "white" community of the Boers (later Afrikaners) came into being in South Africa. A racially superior approach to local native inhabitants of South Africa was manifested also in naming of "the others." Adam Kuper analyzed this process of naming of "the others" in the example of the use of terms such as "Kafr," "Hottentot," or "Bushman" until the foundation of the Apartheid regime in which racial categories of "colored," "blacks," and "Asians" were officially legalized and codified.[110]

After the European powers established their rule over Africa they began to consolidate their supremacy by implementing civil colonial codes which, for instance in the British colonies, acknowledged their subjects status of "British protected persons" having less rights than British citizens. In Francophone Africa there existed a category of full citizenship (*citoyens français à part entière*) for those who moved from Africa to France and whose descendants and a category of French colonial subjects (*sujets français*) to which the inhabitants of colonies belonged. These were put under the *code de l'indigénat*, or the code that was first introduced in Algeria in 1887.[111] Especially after the Conference in Brazzaville in 1944 the French distinguished between Africans and *évolués*, i.e., those who obtained Western education and *paysans* (farmers). *Évolués* could be incorporated into French institutions but their numbers were so small that they did not represent any major threat for the French. In 1945, France allowed Africans to vote although the voters were distinguished between citizens (*citoyens*) and subjects (*sujets*), resulting in twenty seats in the French parliament reserved for African representatives.[112]

Two categories of citizenship were used also by Portugal in its colonies where it was distinguished between the natives (*indígena*) and non-natives (*não-indígena*). The same distinction could be seen in other colonies of other European powers.[113] In some cases, two categories of citizens resulted in territorial segregation, most notably in South Africa but to a certain extent also in Lusophone countries and Italian East Africa for a brief period of time. Due to needs of colonial economies regulating migration of people, institutions for natives were founded under supervision of colonial authorities.[114]

The difference between natives and non-natives usually lay in a wide specter of taxes that the natives were forced to pay either in natural or in cash mode. Similarly, the natives were limited in their mobility while non-natives were not allowed to travel freely outside the colony. In this matter, South Africa served as the state with probably the highest number of restrictions in the world. Culturally and racially defined groups had to, according to ideologues of Apartheid regime, develop separately. Assimilation was strictly forbidden. Afrikaners, whose National Party won elections in 1948 and institutionalized Apartheid regime then, followed a long-lasting tradition of biologically motivated racial discrimination. Formation of Apartheid was taken by Afrikaners as an attempt to deal with the numerical superiority of the

black population which in their perspective could easily threaten the white minority. In Apartheid South Africa, socio-cultural engineering affected all levels of society and artificially created categories which were forcefully imposed on all inhabitants. Some of the societies even lost the right to become citizens of South Africa as they were put into the so-called *bantustans*. The state decided where individual societies could live, with whom they could meet, or which job they could have. Meanings of culture, nation, and race were modified according to the needs and demands of the Apartheid regime.

Existence of various populations for centuries formed a specific social and ethnic composition of South Africa. Apartheid in South Africa structured the whole society on the basis of belief in absolute cultural differences that resulted in racially defined laws. The Registration Law from 1950 divided societies in South Africa into four categories including the whites, Asians, colored and blacks. These categories exceeded "races" and for definition of these groups it was necessary to implement other aspects such as customs, norms of behavior, or recognition by their neighbors. Stressing cultural specifics became a tool of segregation policy criticized by many, for instance, by an anthropologist Adam Kuper, who, protesting against the laws, burned his ID. He presented his skepticism in a book titled *Culture: An Anthropologists' Account* where he states that by putting emphasis on cultural differences we support popular beliefs in biological origins of cultural identities.[115]

Beside South Africa, which was a specific case indeed, IDs in Africa combined *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*. The second suggests that citizenship is based on the origin of parents who are themselves citizens of the particular state. In each case, discrimination based on color of skin, kinship and origin was relatively frequent in both the colonial and postcolonial period.[116] In many countries laws and citizenship were created in order to serve the needs of the ruling majority while undermining "foreign" elements such as Asians in Uganda, Lebanese in Sierra Leone, or first black and later white population in Zimbabwe.[117] Until these days, laws in Liberia and Sierra Leone in regard to citizenship are based on "authenticity of race." In Sierra Leone, a person can become a citizen at birth only if he/she is of "black descent." In Malawi, citizenship is given at birth to those for who at least one parent is not only a citizen himself/herself but has to be also a "person of African race."[118] In this regard, dual citizenship made a lot of African governments nervous due to alleged lack of loyalty to the country. Dual citizenship "threatened" the concept of nation-building to which new African leaders were heading as necessary prerequisite to prosperity. Nation-building and Africanization of state administrative as well as educational system coincided with the issue of "indigeneity" and "genuineness" of citizenship.[119]

Legislative codification of relations between natives and migrants causes serious questions in some African countries up to the present. Migration of

people throughout the continent stands at the background of diversification of African societies, with Bantu societies migrating to East and South Africa from the already overpopulated Chad Basin. The nature of migrations changed throughout centuries and ages and it was colonialism that came up with the most significant changes as Europeans were engaged in forced migration of people from one colony to another due to the need for labor force for mining or agricultural production. Similarly the slave trade and return of former slaves to Africa in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone brought still evident impact on relations between local societies and the newcomers.[120]

In Africa there exist two groups of people whose right to citizenship is because of some underlying reason. The first are descendants of migration waves of Asians, mainly of "Lebanese" origin. The word "Lebanese" is usually prescribed to people of Arab descent as was the case of such communities in Sierra Leone. The second and much larger group is formed by African migrants who came from one colony to another due to better paid jobs and opportunities.[121]

In Ethiopia, which cannot claim any European colonial legacy, the federal model along ethno-linguistic lines led to the "demarcation of federal boundaries framing citizenship along ethno-linguistic criteria."[122] A number of authors have dealt with links between autochthony, citizenship, and conflict. One of the recent attempts is Bøås and Dunn's volume on *Politics of Origin in Africa* in which they claim that the process of "colonialism has contributed intimately (and uniquely) to the development of autochthony in modern African politics."[123] The authors claim that one of the main issues related to autochthony and conflicts in Africa is access to land. With the advent of colonialism, previously open space was demarcated as "territory," and became divided by international, regional and ethnic borders.[124] They also state that in many African countries the "opening up of political space has frequently had the unforeseen effect of increased ontological uncertainty as questions of political identity are pushed to the forefront."[125] The rise of autochthony is, according to some authors, associated with the role of the regional big men, which is one of the features of modern African states. In an atmosphere of political liberalization, the role of regional big men has increased and in some cases such as Liberia they became an alternative to the existing government.[126]

Sierra Leone

Civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–1996 and 1997–1999), perhaps more than the war in Liberia, shocked the international community by its brutality with which young militants, frequently children, treated civil inhabitants. Sierra Leone was gaining publicity through a number of documentary films that quite deeply analyzed the situation, such as those by Sierra Leonean native

Sorious Samora who gained a number of international awards for his movie *Cry Freetown*,[127] that deals with irrationality of violence and abuse of child-soldiers as well as peace education.

Unrest in Sierra Leone started on March 23, 1991, when a group of young armed rebels crossed the borders in order to finalize their attempt to overthrow the rule of Joseph Momoh and his All People's Congress (ACP). The following decade was filled with perpetual wars and instability that came as a result of struggle between three groups—Revolutionary United Front (RUF), National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). All these militias were labelling themselves as revolutionary but their common feature was warlord strategy and economic exploitation combined with brutal violence against civil inhabitants. And increased level of violence became a primary feature of all those groups as each of them decimated different regions and different societies.[128]

Sierra Leone is a multi-ethnic state inhabited by about sixteen ethnic groups speaking various languages such as Krio, Mende, Temne, Kono, Susus, etc. Mende are the largest group forming about 30% of the population. Temne are considered an original society although probably coming from Futa Djallon in what is now Guinea.[129] Sierra Leone, just like Liberia, is divided into two zones. The coast is dominated by the Krio speakers, descendants of freed slaves from the United States who were sent there at the end of the eighteenth century. The interior is inhabited by original population. In 1896, the British protectorate was declared over Sierra Leone. Throughout its history, the country witnessed clashes between new settlers and indigenous population.

Due to the British system of indirect rule, the so-called Paramount Chiefs gained power in a system which Mahmood Mamdani labelled as "decentralized despotism."[130] From economic point of view, British colonialism brought an increased production of palm products and groundnuts that benefited from railway construction. On April 27, 1961, Sierra Leone became independent and Milton Margai, head of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), became its first Prime Minister.[131] David Keen assumes that already in the early stage of postcolonial development ethnicity played an important role. Politicized ethnicity was derived from the territorial division of the country on Creolized and indigenous parts. In other words, despite the existence of the independent state, the process of nation-building was not able to overcome differences and resentments between societies.[132]

This conflict became visible in 1967 when the ACP political party won the elections and Siaka Stevens was supposed to become Prime Minister. Siaka Stevens appealed on connection of all anti-Mende forces which the military forces, dominated by Mende officers, saw as a threat to its dominance.[133] The following period was characterized by multiple coups and counter-coups that were won by Siaka Stevens who cleared the army leader-

ship of Mende leaders. Ethnic tensions increased and when Stevens closed the railway from Freetown to the Eastern regions, it was interpreted as an attempt to isolate the region not voting for APC.

In 1968–1973, the politics of APC was focused on elimination of those chiefs who did not support the party. There exist a certain amount of suspicion that the ruling party initiated waves of violent acts among various chieftaincies on the basis of their political and ethnic affiliation.[134] After the 1973 elections APC gained majority in the Parliament but Sierra Leone remained a de facto one-party state. In 1985 Siaka Stevens resigned and was replaced by General Joseph Saidu Momoh, of Limba origin. This change led to a broad persuasion that a Limba dynasty was only meant to increase ethnic tensions.[135] Momoh only inherited a system that was by some labeled as "seventeen years of grasshopper raids" in which corruption and clientelism reached new heights fostering inter-ethnic and political tensions.[136]

The invasion of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was to overthrow this regime and bring what was seen as a need for ethnic equality and justice. The leader of RUF, Foday Sankoh, was a former officer in the Sierra Leonean army who was imprisoned after a coup attempt in the 1970s. After his release, he left the country and gained training in Libya and assisted Charles Taylor in his efforts to overthrow Samuel Doe in Liberia. The tactics of both men were similar: guerilla warfare in Liberia and Sierra Leone was led along very brutal lines by unprecedented violence, raping, abuse of child-soldiers, kidnappings, etc.[137]

Under external and internal pressures, Sierra Leone returned to a plural political system in 1991 when the United Front of Political Movements (UNIFORM) was formed. Together with RUF they presented the biggest challenge to APC.[138] After the civil war broke out, a group of young officers of the Sierra Leonean army staged a coup on April 29, 1992, that was legitimized by no interest of APC to end the civil war. The soldiers promised a quick end to the war and return to a democratic rule. The military coup, headed by Valentine Strasser, was seen by ordinary citizens as a welcomed change that all were waiting for, anticipating economic and social reforms. Nevertheless, initial enthusiasm faded away very quickly as the soldiers stayed in power until 1996 when the peace treaty was signed in Abidjan on November 30 between the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and democratically elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.[139]

A worsening economic situation, however, was not favorable to the democratic regime and in 1997 another military coup took place, led by Johny Paul Koroma. The following year, ECOMOG forces seized Freetown and Kabbah returned to the presidential palace. RUF continued in unrest and even intensified their violence against civilians. In January 1999, they were able to seize most parts of the capital city. Fights continued until 2000 when RUF even captured forces of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

(UNAMSIL). What followed was heavy fighting between the British forces on one side, and RUF and West Side Boys on the other, the latter being a fraction of soldiers separated from military forces. To complicate matters even more, another rebel group was formed in Guinea having the aim to operate in diamond-rich areas. An embargo imposed on Liberia due to Taylor's support of RUF proved fruitful as RUF failed to turn into a political party due to the way they treated civilians. Therefore, Ahmed Kabbah won the subsequent elections in 2002 and Sierra Leone started its path towards peace and reconciliation.[140]

EXPLANATION OF CONFLICTS

While some consider conflict an irrational war without any clear causes,[141] others take it as a highly rational, though brutal, act that coincides with crisis of modernity caused by a failure of patrimonial system of APC government.[142] The work of Paul Richards is interesting in its shift from "new barbarism" which is usually taken as an explanatory factor for many conflicts and which brought Africa into kind of a "dark age." Richards thinks of act of war as a performance, or the way by which people reach power, through violence and terror. Similarly, he considers war as a discourse in which the fighting groups use changing symbols of a globalized world (mobile and satellite telephones, press conferences, etc.). War in this sense is a type of text, a violent attempt to tell the story.[143] Similarly important, Richards' analysis of the civil war in Sierra Leone is a cultural theory stemming from the concept of "excluded intellectuals" who stood behind the goals and mobilization of RUF. This was sharply contested by Yusuf Bangura who considers Richards analysis as inaccurate at best and he claims that it comes out of ideas rather than real facts and their interpretations. Bangura criticizes Richards' assumption that the destruction of Njala University was a rational act while the educated elites stood behind ideological roots of RUF.[144]

Richards' critiques question the thesis about "excluded intellectuals" and speak about a struggle of poor people whose characteristic is a lack of political consciousness.[145] Ismail Rashid stressed the engagement of students in politics that was on the rise since the 1970s when the students were the main bearers of Marxism. The first revolutionary ideas were brought to Sierra Leone in the mid-1980s from North Korea and Libya. Radicalized students mediated the Marxist visions between the campus and marginalized urban youth.[146] In this regard, some authors point at the contrast between Foday Sankoh who gained only a basic education, and the revolutionary movement in Sierra Leone, which is usually interpreted as rebellion of marginalized students or elites with no opportunities.[147]

As can be seen, theories focused on one causality face usually the most serious critiques as they underestimate other factors that contribute to the conflict or war. The first factor was a failure of state power, or better to say, the predatory nature of state power that developed during Stevens' years. Corruption and clientelism infiltrated all levels of state administration. The President himself forced his employees to falsify documents. Obviously, only a small sector of the society benefitted from this system while other were excluded.[148] Education became a privilege during Stevens' and Momoh eras, and those who gained education could not utilize their acquired skills and knowledge because the system of corruption and clientelism linked to ethnic and political ties made a labor market kind of a static mechanism. Violence and a certain form of gangster-like behavior, as stated by Kandeh, dominated in APC politics, and therefore, when violence turned against its policy, it was no surprise.[149] Another factor of mounting violence was the so-called sobelization of the army. Sobelization is a word meaning a fusion of soldier and rebel, and can be found in those countries which tend to lack law and order and are replaced by high levels of corruption and clientelism. Military officers then tend to behave as sobels in order to enrich themselves and not fulfill their roles of soldiers protecting civilians.[150]

Nathaniel King conducted fieldwork in Sierra Leone focusing on perceptions of the roots of civil war among Sierra Leoneans and came to a conclusion that one of the main terms that appeared was "marginalization." Citizens of Sierra Leone thus did not consider the civil war as an act lacking reason and origin. Marginalization, in other words, comes through all the above-mentioned factors that include corruption, tribalism, poverty, centralization of power and bad governance. In such situations the marginalized people aspire to three goals: their individual and collective humanity; their individual and collective citizenship; and their survival. Methods that they use in order to reach their goals can be, of course, violent.[151] Bøås and Bjørkhaug found similar conclusions, in other words, marginalization entered all spheres of life and contributed largely to the conflict.[152]

CONFLICTS AND LOGIC OF VIOLENCE

It is useful to use the opportunity of civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia as well as genocides in Rwanda and Burundi to take a look at the phenomenon that is closely attached to them. We may call this phenomenon a logic of collective violence usually spreading out in non-democratic regimes with low capacity to govern and where we may find huge discrepancies between those who are in power and those who are powerless. Recently, research on collective violence has been done, for instance, by Charles Tilly and Hugo Slim.[153]

If we stay in the Great Lakes region, we may find several common features of collective destruction which civil wars usually bring. Tilly in this regard reminds us that opportunism is a certain continuation of civil conflicts, like in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 when the main clash did not occur on the line between Hutu and Tutsi but between the "Hutu Power" and the rest. This is the reason why there were so many "moderate" Hutus killed by the *genocidaires* including Interahamwe militias.[154]

Conflict between Hutu and Tutsi militias in Eastern Kivu in Democratic Republic of Congo where the Rwandese conflict moved after 1994 is claimed by Mahmood Mamdani as a crisis of postcolonial citizenship,[155] although this situation has no similarity with that of Côte d'Ivoire. Already during colonialism, thousands of Rwandans were settling in Kivu as a labor force and later Mobutu allowed them to acquire Congolese citizenship as his regime relied on these migrants as a loyal electoral basis. After decades of settlement in Kivu, the region became overpopulated which caused pressure on settlers and "newcomers," resulting in reconsideration of citizenship. Violence committed by Congolese civilians and militias on Tutsi "migrants" in a certain sense legitimized Rwandan intervention and invasion of Congo in the 1990s,[156] leading in turn to intensification of collective violence.

The logic of murdering civilians goes back to the Middle Ages although its phases, intensity and consequences can, obviously differ. An important sign of civil conflicts lie in eliminating a human potential of "the other." In last twenty years, conflicts in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi became notorious for violence committed on women and children. Young boys and teenagers are the most targeted group in wars generally because their elimination decreases fighting potential of the enemy. However, in such cases like Srebrenica, Congo, or Rwanda, we could see a strategy of capturing, murdering, and raping women and young girls in order to "contaminate" them.[157] In last decades, terrifying stories of forced spread of HIV virus by infected soldiers becomes a common strategy in various places of Africa, which has a significant psychological impact. Examples when sadism takes place are also not so rare: i.e., cases in which people are forced to incest, or children are forced to watch how their parents are being raped or tortured or mutilated.[158]

Selected revenge is also a part of violent conflicts, though less accented.[159] For instance, ten Belgian soldiers killed by radical Hutus at the beginning of the genocide in April 1994 were taken as symbols of those who gave power to the much hated Tutsi aristocracy, seen by the eyes of Tutsi minority. However, sexual violence becomes at least seemingly more and more frequent in zones of conflict due to the HIV/AIDS "weapon."[160] Probably nowhere else is rape of women so frequent than in Congo, where in 2006 militias of already mentioned Laurent Nkunda became known for sexual attacks.[161] Sexual violence is frequent not only in civil conflicts or wars, it becomes "popular" as means of oppression in "casual" incidents such as

demonstrations or anti-governmental protests as was the case of Guinea—Conakry in September 2009 when soldiers of the military junta of Dadis Camara raped many women and killed about 160 people in clashes with protesting civilians.[162]

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Chapter Three

Historical Perspectives on Multiple Inequalities in Ethiopia

As has already been mentioned several times, there are obviously multiple root causes of conflicts (not only) in Africa which need to be taken into consideration. However, as a historian the author is convinced that a proper understanding of any kind of situation, and conflicts are that sort of situation, need a proper historical evaluation in order to find solutions for future reconciliation and peace. Recent political turbulences in Ethiopia which started in 2015 after the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan was proclaimed will not be a part of this chapter. These are still highly actual and constantly changing, with some recent positive trends taking place while still being a rather vulnerable country due to unresolved historical grievances, socio-economic disparities, political tensions, and demographic challenges. This chapter will therefore discuss historical root causes of what has led to ongoing anti-governmental protests in Ethiopia. Particular attention will be given to the Oromo issues which the author has studied the most in regard to Ethiopia.

CENTRALIZATION AND ASSIMILATION

The modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented through the eyes of the ruling circles, mostly ignoring the fact that outside what was called Abyssinia there existed a number of political units with their own political, religious, and social systems that contributed to the diversity of Ethiopia in many ways. That is also why there is no agreement between scholars on whether we should talk about unification or re-unification, the process that took place in 1855 and continued until the beginning of the

twentieth century when Ethiopia gained more or less the shape we can see today.

The expansion of the Ethiopian state into the Oromo-speaking areas was not a task of subjugation and domination. As everything in history, all expansions and intercultural contacts bring not only disasters and conflicts, but also new opportunities and development. Moreover, during the era of the Princes (*zemane mesafint*), territory of what is now Ethiopia was challenged by Egyptian influence which even counted with the conception of the province of *al Habasha* and by perpetual wars between various Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan and other principalities.[1] This was, for instance, the case of Jimma town, the most important Oromo trading area in South-west Ethiopia (ca. 375km from Addis Ababa). In the nineteenth century the town was known for its slave trade as the slaves were taken mostly from the Omo river areas.[2] After Menelik II's rise to power the town was incorporated into the Ethiopian state structures but remained largely intact by any significant influences coming from the north. Ras Gobena, on behalf of Menelik II, signed an agreement with Abba Jifar II in which Menelik agreed to respect the full internal autonomy of Jimma kingdom, not to station troops, and not to construct churches there. Abba Jifar II recognized Menelik II as his overlord, agreed to pay annual tribute and assist and even accompany Menelik's army in military campaigns.[3]

Both before and during the state formation in Ethiopia, in every region one could see plenty of local clashes between various clans or powerful individuals who were able to command strong private armies. Several studies have shown that this was also the case of Wällagga region in Western Ethiopia, claimed to be one of the centers of Oromo nationalism. Unlike some recent studies which try to depict the Oromo unity and national identity as a historical, centuries-long fact, Wällagga region, just like any other place in what is now Ethiopia, witnessed clan clashes and land disputes between powerful individuals which simply lacked any kind of "ethnic" dimension because ethnic identities as we know them today were not yet articulated.[4] Another important factor that contributed to the ever-changing dynamic development in Ethiopia was migration and marriage politics, which is known also from European history as an important tool by which powerful elites were able to extend their territories or secure their independence. Such was the case of both the Imperial court in Shawa as well as local and regional political units including Jimma, Limmu-Enarea, Kaffa and many others.[5] Moreover, as is shown by many examples from the nineteenth century, not only Shawa, but simply all political units (no matter whether we call them states, kingdoms or tribes) tended to extend their control over trade routes and slave routes. This was the case of Jimma, Limmu-Enarea (the so-called Gibe states), Shewa and plenty of smaller clan units of which, by supreme

military power and a number of coincidences Menelik II became the most successful.[6]

Reasons of Menelik's success are definitely multiple and are related to various structural changes including a growing market, introduction of a standing army, growth of infrastructure and incorporation of various subjects into the economy of Shawa. For instance, the long-distance trade was dominantly a matter of the Oromo and Afar Muslims, who were able to trade with neighboring Muslim territories. By prohibiting them to own the land and practice agriculture, Muslims turned to trade and have become the dominant aspect of all-Ethiopian trade.[7]

Hostilities, which recent authors[8] attribute to the Amhara and Oromo struggle, were common in all areas where territorial expansion took place. The same expansion which the Ethiopian state underwent in the second half of the nineteenth century was done by many of the Oromo clans in peripheral regions of what is now Ethiopia. At the Ethio-Sudanese borders, for instance, the Oromo clan led by Jotee Tullu of Leeqa Qellem invaded the Goma territory and established his rule over the Goma before the rise of Menelik II.[9] Another strategy or practice aimed at gaining social, political or religious benefits was the practice of *mogaasa* (adoption) based on assimilating alien individuals to the Oromo nation.[10] Assimilation was not only an official practice of the Imperial court but a natural process of expansion (both in territorial and political or economic senses) of the Oromo people and many other groups in the Horn of Africa. That power struggles were never a one-way process is shown by Triulzi on the example of Kumsa Moroda, who, as a ruler of Nekemte, achieved a relatively great autonomy and power to expand to Western peripheries.[11]

From regional and historical perspectives, there were many differences among various Oromo-speaking regions in Ethiopia in terms of access to land and administrative practices within state structures. While in eastern Wällagga, for instance, landlords and governors were dominantly Amharic-speaking "outsiders" from Addis Ababa, in the western part of the region, as well as in Jimma, many local Oromo leaders took part in state structures and cooperated with the Imperial court; only a few Amhara civil servants worked there mostly as teachers and policemen.[12] Ethnicity was not an important issue during the early days of the twentieth century. As a country with strong and vivid religiosity, Islam and Christianity played more significant roles and so did the regional aspect dividing the population between "locals" and "outsiders" without direct ethnic connotations. The so-called "outsiders" were actually landlords and usurpers of land which created a gap between the society and state in Ethiopia and contributed to the development of what is called "moral ethnicity."[13] John Markakis speaks about "provincialism" in depicting "parochial identities based on territorial divisions, regional loyalties and local interests."[14]

Two aspects played an important role in the "nation-building" and "state-building" process in Ethiopia at the end of the nineteenth century. These were the struggle against foreign invaders and threats (Mahdists, Egyptians, European powers) and internal challenges that included primarily Muslims who were, mainly for Tewodros II and Yohannes IV, the archenemies. While the main aim of the Emperors was to keep the Christian identity of Ethiopia, for Muslims, the primary aim was the survival of their faith.[15] Religious expansion during the heyday of the Imperial regime was accompanied by perpetual changes in religious settings. Not only by the rise of Orthodox Christianity, which formed the core element of the Solomonic dynasty, but also due to the response of a local people which brought many religious alternatives. For instance, people of the Gamo Highlands partly accepted Orthodox Christianity but on the other hand, the expansion of Northerners gave opportunity to the rise of a local cult called *Essa Woga* whose central point was "the abolition of sacrifices and sacrificers."[16] Protestant churches played a remarkable role especially in Ethiopia's Western and South-western territories. It is observable that in many corners of Ethiopia, like Dembi Dollo in Western Wällagga, the significance of foreign churches is of no doubt as they have contributed to the development of these areas in terms of education and health care. In Dembi Dollo, these were mostly Protestant churches contributing significantly to the development of schools, libraries, and health care in the town that was for a long time "abandoned" by the government due to its earlier links to the Oromo Liberation Front. Only recently, the town has experienced significant changes including renewal of domestic flights to Addis Ababa.

Adowa Legacy

The battle of Adowa has had two main legacies. In Italy, it was presented as one of the most tragic battles in European history and the most disastrous Italian defeat.[17] In Italy emotions were so tense that when the news reached Italian cities, riots that occurred afterwards forced Francesco Crispi and his government to leave.

The Ethiopian economy during and after Menilek's rule was strongly influenced by its close relation to Italy, France and Great Britain. According to several treaties on financial and economic help leading to creation of the National Bank of Abyssinia in 1905, several foreign banks were interested in its initiation.[18] Ethiopia's relations with Europe were based on a number of treaties defining their mutual borders and affairs. The treaties signed on October 28, 1902, between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia define borders between Ethiopia and the neighboring European colonies.[19]

When on November 2, 1930, the Emperor Haile Selassie I was unveiling Menilek's statue, he expressed in his speech, with his typical nobility, sincere admiration for his predecessor: "Let history tell what achievements Emperor Menilek II made for his people and his country, for it will be impossible for Us now to enumerate them all here. No matter how intelligent and brave, no one on earth can escape death and Emperor Menilek II had to pass from this world on December 13, 1913, after having worked as much as he could for the growth of Ethiopia and the progress of his people."[20] The truth is that despite many controversial opinions on Menilek's policy towards "periphery," or his colonizing policy, it was him who gave Ethiopia an international credit and respect, though uneven as compared to European countries.

While Adowa became an indubitable symbol of European colonial defeat in Africa, the meaning of Dogali had rather internal Ethiopian connotations. When in 1987 the International Symposium dedicated to the centenary of Dogali was organized by Addis Ababa University, the then ruler of Ethiopia, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam took the opportunity to put the battle of Dogali into the context of the then Eritrean struggle for independence.[21] For Mengistu the battle of Dogali was the campaign by which the African people proved their ability to maintain their independence. Mengistu also emphasized the role of Ras Alula, as the main leader of the Ethiopian army at Dogali. For Mengistu, Alula was a killer of enemies on Eritrean soil which was during the Eritrean war highlighted by the media. Mengistu himself saluting the Alula monument was displayed all over the country.[22] In the above-mentioned speech he did not forget to compare the Ethiopian struggle against Italians to that of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war when he stated that "independence implies the elimination of all conditions of vulnerability to aggression and the attainment of self-sufficiency in all spheres. As backwardness remains to be the source of all our problems, we must forcefully struggle to rid ourselves of this cardinal foe."[23]

Lij Iyasu and the "Wind of Change"?

The official Ethiopian historiography, as was established during the Haile Selassie period, portrayed Lij Iyasu as almost a traitor to the Solomonic dynasty and the Empire. Recent historical findings and research have shown a little different view on Lij Iyasu and occasionally he appears in discussions with fellow Ethiopians as one of the real heroes of the Ethiopian past connecting people of different ethnic or religious origin. Several recent authors including Cecil Barnes, Harold Marcus or Bahru Zewde have started the process of rehabilitation of Iyasu, which has become a difficult task after such a long period of time in which Iyasu gained a negative image and is surrounded by many stereotypes.

Bahru Zewde, a prominent Ethiopia historian, states that Iyasu's intention was not to disestablish Orthodox Christianity in favor of Islam. Moreover, he argues that his policy was based on the idea to "redress the injustices of the past," and to make "Muslims feel at home in their own country."[24] Harold Marcus explains some of Lij Iyasu's concrete steps undertaken in order to emancipate local Muslims. He inaugurated a program of taxing Christian gentry in Harar and Dire Dawa and made some Muslim foreigner a *nägädräs* who superintended customs and markets in both towns, which was seen by Ras Tafari as treason to the Christian dominance. Lij Iyasu's desire was to "reduce tyranny under which Muslims lived and to lessen the exploitation they suffered. He wanted to transform himself into a more national and neutral figure, not flexibly identified with the Christian ruling caste."[25]

The most probable reason why Iyasu's image was so negatively portrayed throughout the twentieth century, is the fact that he was not fully part of the Shawan establishment, which was the crucial factor in power relations inside Ethiopia. Iyasu, as a son of Ras Mikael of Wällo, a Muslim Oromo who later converted to Christianity, and married the daughter of Menelik, was weakened by regional governors and the Council of Ministers, created by Menelik. His reign was thus characterized by the everlasting struggle between the center and the periphery where he intended to gain support from local Muslims by making them equal to Christians.[26]

Colonialism and the Emperor

Emperor Haile Selassie was usually portrayed as a modernizer of Ethiopia, which is partly true but can be attributed only to the first years of his power during which the first constitution came into being (1931), where a completely new elite of government officials and "urban plutocrats has taken place beside the old."[27] But the true modernization was limited by enormous centralization, bureaucracy, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and censorship.[28] The basic network of towns and generally the level of urbanization was still very low at the beginning of Haile Selassie's rule as the country was traditionally based on small villages and isolated homesteads.[29] Probably the most non-modern aspect of Haile Selassie's rule was the extreme centralization which affected many levels of administration and daily lives of ordinary Ethiopians. The Emperor appointed all governors down to the *woreda* level, except for Wällo and Hararghe provinces where governors were appointed by the Crown Prince. Such an arrangement gave rise to a strong patronage system in which "each official at the higher rung used his influence to promote his men at the lower rung."[30]

Despite the ethnic and regional aspects that come into play in regard to Eritrean nationalism and the struggle for self-determination, a historical and colonial heritage should be taken into account as well. As rightly pointed out

by Tekeste Negash, Eritrea was a result of the Italian colonialism which was responsible for the economic infrastructure and Mediterranean lifestyle, and the British administration which gave the country "political freedom and democratic practices"[31] unknown in Ethiopia to which Eritrea was incorporated.

Mekuria Bulcha pointed at the discrepancy between usual persuasion of politicians, according to whom a language homogenization is a necessary step towards social and economic development, and the case of Ethiopia, which tells us that the opposite is true. The policy of "one language one nation" became an obstacle to socio-economic development, because insistence on the use of a single language prevented vital information from reaching the majority of the population. Radio Ethiopia, for instance, broadcasted all information regarding health, agriculture, or education only in Amharic. This means that the "Amharic only" education and administration kept disadvantaged the Oromo (and others') education for a long period of time.[32]

Colonial perspective, which is one of the perspectives we can use when considering the modern history of Ethiopia, cannot be simplified as a colonial conquest of Amharas against Oromo and other Southern peoples. Moreover, simplifications never help any serious research and understanding of the problem of study. Amharic-speaking people in general have never formed any privileged class or group inside Ethiopia. Power relations in Ethiopia were formed, just like in Rwanda or Burundi or some other "traditional" kingdoms or units in Africa, on the basis of regional and social relations and status. Since 1855, it was mainly Shawa and politicians from Shawa (who were not only Amharas) that dominated the political scene in Ethiopia and were responsible for further expansion southwards. Siegfried Pausewang, for instance, was one of those who claimed that there does not exist an "Amhara" identity, but at least two different Amhara identities meaning "rural" and "urban" (ethnically mixed) assimilated cultural Amhara "who understand themselves as Ethiopians with an Amhara language."[33] Especially in the countryside among peasants, no matter in which part of today's Ethiopia, people used to identify themselves regionally as Gondare, Gojjame, just like Oromo-speaking people used to identify themselves along clan-lines (Borana, Guji, Arssi, Macha, etc.).[34] John Markakis' already mentioned "provincialism" as the main feature of traditional Ethiopia can be best shown on the example of the region of Shawa in contrast to Tigray. When it comes to Shawa he says that "this province lacks a distinct identity and provincial consciousness" as it is composed of "Shawa Amhara" and "Shawa Oromo" societies while Tigray region in the northern part of Ethiopia "is the most self-conscious province of Ethiopia."[35]

Such a regional focus is supported by a historical course of revolution leading to the fall of the Haile Selassie regime. Besides the clearly territorial and to a certain sense "anti-colonial" struggle in Eritrea, other uprisings had

specific local and regional roots which had little to do with ethnic sentiments but rather with socio-economic factors and situation. The Wäyane rebellion, Bale rebellion or the uprising in Gojjam at the end of 1960s arose as a combination of various factors including religious rights, agricultural taxes and others.[36] Beside spatial differences social ones need to be taken into consideration as well. Revolution was to a certain degree a matter of urban intelligentsia, mainly students, who within the so-called *zemecha* campaign had a direct impact on the revolutionary climate in the countryside, as shown by Donald Donham in the example of Maale in southern Ethiopia.[37]

Any colonial perspective thus needs to be looked upon as a historical process of regional power relations and has to be distinguished between various types of colonial perspective. The first one is obvious – the Eritrean struggle of independence after Eritrea was fully incorporated into the Ethiopian state in 1962. The Somali-inhabited Ogaden region can be put into the same category, as the Somali-speaking people tend to have only a minimal attachment to the Ethiopian state, no matter which historical period we are dealing with. Up to 1957, there were, for instance, no schools in the Ogaden despite many promises given by Haile Selassie. Outbreak of secessionist attempts in Ogaden gained momentum in 1963 after the imposition of the tax by the court and more openly in 1969 after Siad Barre's accession to power in Somalia.[38] At the very local level, there remained rivalry between Ogaden pastoralists and the Ishaq clan which diversifies our understanding of Somali nationalism.[39]

More important for the rise of nationalist movements was the regional rivalry inside Ethiopia alienating Shawa and Tigray regions.[40] Gebru Tareke has rightly stated that there exist two historical heritages in Ethiopia and two historical narratives. The first one is related to Axum whose direct successor is said to be Tigray. The second heritage is connected with the unification of Ethiopia and the Shawan expansion. During the twentieth century, Tigray was always an economic backwater in Ethiopia, similar to many other regions. In other words, the Tigray-Shawan rivalry had a great impact on the development of various movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).[41]

MARXISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EMANCIPATION

Until 1974, the Emperor Haile Selassie was the main symbol of Ethiopia in the international arena. Ethiopia, at that time, was an active actor in African politics, resulting in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, with its seat in Addis Ababa. Due to Haile Selassie's charisma and leadership, Ethiopia was able to cooperate closely with both the West and the East. Especially for the United States, Ethiopia represented a prospective ally

for American policy in this part of Africa. Even though Washington needed a strategic ally in the region, it was fully aware of the shortcomings of the regime, including the fact that Ethiopia was a feudal regime that exploited peasants, tolerated religious inequality and repressions, and was unable to resolve the status of Eritrea.[42] However, the Imperial regime was to enter into a state of collapse at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s under a combination of factors, including peasant rebellions, student movements, and a military uprising. In September 1974, the regime came to an end and the rule of the Solomonic dynasty was replaced by the military regime, i.e., the Derg (Council).[43]

The revolution itself had multiple causes and in many ways fragmented the country like no other event in Ethiopia's history. In the words of Gebru Tareke, amid "the tangled web of social cleavages and shifting alliances, fractions of the landed upper class were ranged against the state: tenants against landlords; village communities against venal bureaucrats; national minorities against ethnic hegemonism; Muslims against Christians; and periphery against core."[44] Bahru Zewde vividly and in a very detail analyzed the student movements in Ethiopia from 1960 to the revolution. As he shows, besides Marxist-Leninist influence, it was the ethnic question which for some of the major proponents kept coming up as the main part of their dissatisfaction with the Imperial rule. New terms such as "fake Ethiopian nationalism"[45] began to circulate.

The transition period of 1974–1977 brought significant changes within society but also a degree of frustration arising from the fact that the regime was unable to meet the hopes, needs and demands of the ordinary people who had supported the revolution of 1974. Instead, the population was confronted by the rise of a militarized, highly centralized, and even more oppressive regime. Since 1962, the ongoing Eritrean war of independence had consumed the energies of the Ethiopian military forces and nothing changed in this regard after 1974. The Derg regime reacted to Eritrea's efforts to rid itself of Ethiopian hegemony through recourse to the same, or even more severe and intense responses than had been the case with its Imperial predecessor. The regime had one significant advantage; in the 1970s, the Eritrean issue had been largely ignored by the international community as all demands for self-determination were taken as illegitimate or problematic.[46]

Marxism was a powerful, and to a certain extent a logical response to European colonialism as it rhetorically gave space and accent to solidarity and equality to the people. The period of the 1950s and 1960s was the heyday of Marxist and generally anti-colonial and leftist ideologies for the former colonial world in Africa and Asia. From a political point of view, Marxist regimes have never been the same and their main characteristic was—especially in Africa—eclecticism both in ideological interpretation or policy practice.[47] The rise of Marxism coincides with the development of nationalist

movements in Africa, including Ethiopia, where the circumstances for the development of such movements and ideologies were little different. Still, we can find several similarities. Many of the nationalist movements in Africa began as student movements or were created around the workers' and trade unions, teachers and student associations, etc. In many parts of Africa, the situation after the Second World War led to a continuous development of the Middle class, educated elites, allowed a young generation to study in Europe and gain education outside the country in order to contribute to the socio-economic development of its homeland after their return. For France, for instance, the main idea after the war was to create a "Europeanized" Africa under colonial rule with a modern African working class as a crucial element.[48] Before 1941, education in Ethiopia was conducted in the French language and many Ethiopians studied in France and thus it was no surprise that for many young Marxist intellectuals in Ethiopia, the French Revolution was the model. Marxism was by these elites viewed as an unchallengeable truth, representing "a principled way to reject the West that had supported Haile Selassie and hence Ethiopia's backwardness."[49]

Due to the Cold War context and the fear of outside interference, many of the African governments preferred single party politics which was meant to keep the integrity of states. What was common to almost all regimes in Africa, was a high level of centralization of administration which had to deal with many different demands of class, ethnic, and regional entities.[50]

Despite being out of the "colonial" Africa, Ethiopia was not an isolated island, and to a certain extent was influenced by global and continental changes. Africa and Asia were heavily influenced by the rise of Marxism, Socialism, and other -isms as a way of reacting to colonial past and as a way to deal with the postcolonial future of countries whose diversities were fragile and vulnerable. The same can be said about Ethiopia's role in the development of nationalism in many African countries for which Ethiopia served as an independent symbol of African purity. Under the influence of external dynamics of the early 1960s, Ethiopia witnessed the creation of Confederation of Labor Unions in 1962, followed by the rise of student and teachers associations. This alone was not the most crucial aspect leading towards the development of nationalist movements in Ethiopia. Two factors need to be mentioned first. Primarily, the preferential treatment of the military forces from the Imperial court leading to pay increases alienated other actors including civil servants and trade unions whose demands were not met with such success. The second factor was the rise of external influence coming from Marxist students. It has been documented that in 1974 shortly before the fall of Haile Selassie, of 4,500 university graduate students in Ethiopia, 1,000 of them gained their education abroad.[51] In the mid-1960s, the Ethiopian Student Movement came into being with branches in Addis Ababa, Western Europe and North America. These were the early days of active Marxist-

Leninist student groups formulating ideology directed against the archaic feudal and capitalist order.

The early protests of Ethiopian students did not take place in Ethiopia that much, but were rather a matter of several hundred students living in the United States during the 1960s who accused Haile Selassie of repression, torturing and any opposition voices, massacring peasants and calling for the dismantling of the feudal regime with slogans like "Feudalism no, people's democracy yes."[52] Although ethnic issues had been probably in the minds of some of the intellectuals of that time, no one mentioned them directly.[53]

The power of Marxism as a mobilizing power has been experienced in many corners of the developing world and the Horn of Africa was no exception. From a broader perspective, the revolution in Ethiopia was seen by many Marxists as inspirational and for Fidel Castro the success of the Ethiopian revolution later in 1974 was "of enormous importance for Africa."[54] As admitted by a Pan-African activist Bereket Habte Selassie: "Its appeal consists in the promise that it offers to the larger mass of populations that their lives would be better off after they shake off the shackles of oppression of the dominant classes, be they feudal lords or exploiting merchant classes."[55]

Ethiopia had long been seen as an island in Africa due to the lack of communication between the country and rest of the continent. This situation changed dramatically after the Second World War as Ethiopia became an active member of Pan-African initiatives and Haile Selassie himself was seen as a noble man with a great reputation as the leader of a great African nation that survived European colonialism and defeated one of the colonial powers. Besides Haile Selassie and other members of the government and diplomacy, it was the student exchange that enabled the spread of Pan-African and Marxist ideas into Ethiopia. At the end of the 1950s, with the coming of several hundred African students to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was still perceived by its own citizens as a little different, as found out by Balsvik.[56] But the decolonization period brought several changes into Ethiopia as well. With its aspirations to become the headquarters of African integration process resulting in the creation of the Organization of African Unity, Ethiopian intellectuals and students began to emphasize the African part of Ethiopia's history. Ethiopian students in 1957 took part in a Pan-African student conference in Kampala and although it is dubitable how much influence it had on the development of Pan-African ideology inside Ethiopia, it is clear that through these networks Ethiopian students became aware of foreign ideologies and foreign problems that other African societies had to deal with in regard to decolonization. And through these networks, many Ethiopian students came into contact with some radical Marxist theories presented, for instance, by Kwame Nkrumah.[57] This Pan-African leader visited Ethiopia in 1957, the year of Ghana's independence, which had a significant impact on

formation of anti-colonial thinking among the younger generation of educated intellectuals.[58]

The rise of Marxism in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa can be observed in the same trajectories. At the end of colonial rule, almost all European powers allowed larger numbers of students to acquire higher education and generally the conditions for African colonial subjects were developing and improving. In Ethiopia, some reforms took place especially after the abortive coup in 1960 and during the 1960s and early 1970s the number of students as well as teachers grew rapidly. This helped a middle class to be developed mainly in bigger towns while the peasants lived in the same conditions as at the beginning of the twentieth century.

During the Derg regime, the Imperial policy of appointing officials from the center to the regions and local levels continued and the scenario remained the same, local officials only had to be loyal upward. Such a system again bypassed "the indigenous structures of decision-making and identity formation."[59] Centralization remained in the hands of a narrow elite, this time the military forces, which despite being supported at the beginning by student movements, largely ignored what teachers and students thought. By the end of 1974, the military forces, were looked upon as "dishonorable replacement of the Imperial regime."[60]

Marxism influenced Ethiopia and especially its younger generation of students with the same intensity as it was in the rest of Africa during the time of decolonization. The rise of the Derg regime gave opportunity for many (not only) Oromo cadres to become a part of the ruling class while the regime itself fought against any kind of ethnic nationalism which emerged in the mid-1970s. Thus, the Oromo society itself was polarized between supporters of the Derg military regime and those who stood against it and wished to reach a higher level of self-determination resulting in an independent Oromia which would give the region more stability.[61] It was during the Derg regime, and especially at the end of its existence when the colonial perspective began to be accented from the Oromo part of society. While the military junta lost the war in 1991 after a coordinated struggle of major liberation fronts, the colonial perspective prevailed with the unresolved social and ethnic disputes over the structure and shape of the Ethiopian state and the right to self-determination. On the other hand, the Ethiopian state and its territory have been redefined by the independence of Eritrea, which came into being in 1993.

The military regime of the Derg had a great impact on social relations in Ethiopia. Not only did it establish the land reform under the slogan "land to the tiller," but due to its authoritarian and centralizing character, suspicious of any kind of opposition, it divided families and drastically changed collective relations in villages at any local level. Proponents of Marxism were privileged while those who remained "inactive" or "silent" could be impris-

oned with no accusation, spending years in prison in terrible conditions with minimal or no access to health care and food.[62]

In the 1970s during the era of the rise of the so-called ethno-nationalist movements, many of these groupings were inspired by Marxism-Leninism, although we may expect a certain amount of eclecticism in ideological and practical issues. A pragmatic approach to reality and ethnic/national questions of Ethiopian regimes can be well observed in Gerard Chaliand's note: "Yesterday when the world was apparently simple and straightforward, it was reassuring to see the United States backing Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, who was in turn fighting against a liberation movement backed by 'progressive' countries. Today we have the reverse pattern: a regime in Ethiopia claiming to be Marxist-Leninist suppressing liberation movements in Eritrea and the Ogaden, and behaving imperially."[63]

Eritrean nationalism, then represented by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), although based in culturally and linguistically similar areas, felt the "necessity to create a disciplined nationalist liberation army impervious to social, ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological divisions."[64] Not only these internal aspects could shape the face of nationalism in Eritrea, but also external forces usually came into play especially during the Cold War. African conflicts were thus largely prolonged and influenced by foreign and global dynamics. In Eritrea, EPLF sought to isolate itself from these processes and external links, be they through an exile leadership or supportive regional states.[65]

ETHNICITY

Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic country with more than 80 ethnic groups speaking about the same number of languages. Contemporary ethnic composition of Ethiopia is a result of historical processes of conquests and re-conquests that have shaped the relationship between the center and the periphery. The center has traditionally been represented by societies speaking Semetic languages with the Amhara as the ruling group. Since the thirteenth century, Orthodox Christianity has been an indisputable part of the political development and decision-making process. The so-called periphery was inhabited by pastoralist or agro-pastoralist communities of Cushitic-speaking peoples of whom the Oromo, Somali, and Afar are the most numerous. The relationship of these two entities has played a significant part in modern and contemporary history in Ethiopia and is closely connected to the problem of identity.

Negative stereotypes about each of those groups are a part in constant debates either among scholars or (and primarily) among political activists on the Internet. One of the accounts dealing with historical stereotypes in regard to the Oromo was written by Jeylan Wolyie Hussein. As the author claims,

negative stereotypes, in this case about the Oromo people, may have and often have, direct political consequences, resulting in political and economic marginalization.[66] Tobias Hagmann and Mohammud H. Khalif showed how such historical stereotypes affected Ethiopian-Somali relations and therefore also "Ethiopian-Somali" or "Somali-Ethiopian" identity. Ethnic federalism was not particularly favorable to those groups that shared a joint Somali-Oromo identity (such as the Gabra, Guji, Jarso, etc.) as these communities had to settle for affiliation with either the Somali or the Oromiya region (and subsequently Somali or Oromo identity). Border conflicts and disputes combining land and ethnic issues have arisen along the border between Somali and Oromia regions.[67]

Contemporary Ethiopia can be perceived as a country of multiple identities depending on the perspective we adopt. Until 1970s the official political line followed the pattern of Ethiopianization or Amharization (depending on our perspective), which basically meant a dominant ethnic strategy employed by the Amhara in order to unify the country under characteristic symbols of the Ethiopian state—the Amharic language, Amharic culture and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Since 1970s, the opposition against Haile Selassie and later against the socialist government has begun to articulate their hostility towards Ethiopia and loyalty to their own or new-born identity—Oromo, Wolayta, Sidama, Somali, etc.

Intensified ethnic rivalry and politicization of ethnicity has been a characteristic feature of recent developments in Ethiopia. However, as shown by Patrick Chabal, in Sub-Saharan Africa it was greatly exacerbated after independence.[68] While in other African countries such a development was an inevitable result of European colonialism, in Ethiopia the situation was different since Ethiopia was the only African country that defended its independence against European powers (except for a short period of Italian occupation in 1936–1941).

However, due to an expansionist policy and history of stereotyping within what is now Ethiopia, the "colonial" and "racial" discourse reminds us the European stereotyping of Africans making "savagery" and "civilization" kind of fixed and permanent conditions.[69] An image of Ethiopia as the only remaining "pure" kingdom in Africa represented by Haile Sellassie outshined internal problems inherently stemming from an autocratic power of a tiny minority of Amharic-speaking nobility. Resistance against the regime of Haile Sellassie in 1960s and 1970s brought out an aspect until then almost unknown in Ethiopia—identity crisis. Ethiopia has since then been presented as a colonial power and an oppressive regime that saw its heterogeneity as an obstacle to progressivism and modernization and tended to homogenize the nation by all possible means. The main players in the redefinition of the Ethiopian identities were Oromo scholars. Since the 1960s, history and its interpretation, as has been shown earlier, have become a sensitive area where

numerous attempts at reinterpretation and reinvention have been made. Identity has since then become a used, abused, and over-used word with no clear boundaries and definition. The problem of the Oromo and their place in the history of Ethiopia can be thus perceived as a problem of identity and a problem of interpretation of Ethiopian history.[70]

Traditionally, Ethiopia has been described as a country of civilization and centuries-long history of statehood. Although these stereotypes are now being redefined and modified, it is true that in Ethiopia one may find quite rare existence of various types of rule in different historical periods, including the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia, Oromo kingdoms in Gibe, as well as various non-state political units on the fringes of the Ethiopian highlands.

Geographically speaking, Ethiopia can be divided into highlands, forming the central and northern part of the country, and lowlands, to be found on the so-called periphery along Ethiopia's borders with Somalia, Kenya, and South Sudan mainly. That is also why people divide themselves between Highlanders, mostly farmers, and Lowlanders, mostly pastoralists. The Ethiopian Highlands are fertile and green which stands in opposite to Lowlands where one can find some of the hottest places on Earth, including the Afar desert. Markakis also speaks about highland and lowland peripheries as less integrated parts of Ethiopia which still need to be integrated and developed.[71]

Ethiopia's administrative regions have changed its shape through past centuries until the recent establishment of the so-called ethnic federalism which divided the state into nine "ethnic" states, including Tigray, Amhara, Benishangul/Gumuz, Oromia, Gambella, Southern Nationas, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region, Somali, Afar, and Addis Ababa, with Dire Dawa and Harar having a special status. Until recently, many people in Ethiopia use in daily speech older, historical, names of Ethiopian regions including Gojjam, Gondar, Wällo, Wällagga, Illubabor, and so on.[72]

Ethno-linguistically, we can divide Ethiopia into various groups including Nilo-Saharan speakers, Omotic, Cushitic, and Semitic linguistic varieties which contribute to a mixture rarely seen anywhere else. Elites of mainly Amhara and Tigrayan societies have traditionally formed the ruling elite in the central and northern part of what is now Ethiopia, while various Oromo clans especially in the nineteenth century established a number of Oromo kingdoms in the region of Gibe. Pastoralist societies on the fringe of Ethiopian highlands have not developed sophisticated political systems which would concur to those on the highlands. That is also one of the reasons they were incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century during the reign of Emperor Menelik II.

The modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented through the eyes of the ruling circles, mostly ignoring the fact that outside what was called Abyssinia there existed a number of political units with their own political, religious, and social systems that contributed to the

diversity of Ethiopia in many ways. That is also why there is no agreement between scholars on whether we should talk about unification or re-unification, the process that took place in 1855 and continued until the beginning of the twentieth century when Ethiopia gained more or less the shape we can see today.

The Ethiopian Empire was based on three pillars which played the most important role since the fourteenth century. These were the person of the Emperor, the Orthodox (Tewahedo) Church, and Amharic language. These necessary components of rule of the royal court survived until 1974 when Haile Selassie's regime fell down after a series of protests, famine, and unrest that affected many parts of the country. Amharic language still forms a basis of social and administrative, as well as educational background of society in most parts of Ethiopia, and the Orthodox Church still belongs to the most powerful institutions in Ethiopia despite official separation of religion and politics since 1974.

The Oromo and Oromia

The Oromo people belong to the largest of the ethnic groups in Africa, and since the sixteenth century they have formed an inseparable part of the history of what is now Ethiopia. Oromia, as a homeland of all Oromo people, forms a necessary part of Oromo nationalism since every nation needs to have its original homeland. The country of origin, as proposed by Braukämper, lies between "the Darassa country and the upper Dawa in the West and the Ganale valley in the east."[73] The search for an Oromo homeland and theories regarding its origin have differed through time, at least since Enrico Cerulli, but in the last three decades, debates focusing on Oromia as a natural homeland for all its people have been evident in scholarly meetings, publications, and vocabulary. Recently, there have been many attempts to deeply analyze, research, and understand Oromo history in many localities throughout Ethiopia. There exist a significant number of various theses at major Ethiopian universities that have contributed to this development, and Ethiopia has produced a good number of respected historians of great international reputation. Particular attention is now given to the study of oral history especially in areas that have not been sufficiently covered by traditional official historiography.

The territory of Oromia can be seen in three perspectives. First, territory is a physical space in which a group of people lives and makes use of the material potential, thus having an emotional attachment to it. Second, territory can be defined as a political unity which creates borders between "us" and "them;" it can both unite and divide. Third, territory has gained, especially over the last two decades, a new, virtual meaning. We can therefore speak about "virtual territory" with regard to the Internet communities, mainly

those living in the diaspora. This third concept of territoriality is characterized by the absence of direct contact with the physical territory itself, but implies a strong emotional attachment to it. Anderson's long-distance nationalism[74] is strongly related to contemporary nationalist movements, including the Oromo nationalist movement in the diaspora.

In the process of the formation of a territory as a political entity, we can distinguish between a "project of an elite," and a "peoples' project."[75] The first deals with a situation in which a political and/or intellectual elite stands at the forefront of the political (separatist/secessionist/irredentist/revolutionary) movement, aiming to establish an independent political territory. The rest of the population usually remains in the position of onlookers and passive voices. On the other hand, a "peoples' project" can be defined by a societal and emotional attachment to such a movement, and especially the participation of large parts of society. Such participation can be manifested in various ways, from passive support to military action. In the history of Africa, Southern Sudanese and Eritrean independence movements can be regarded as "peoples' projects," while some of decolonization movements were rather "projects of elites" lacking any kind of homogenizing unity of all people.

Since the 1960s, the Oromo national consciousness has begun to emerge and new perspectives on the (thus far) undisputed Ethiopian history have been presented. Words like "Abyssinian colonialism," "ethnocide," "conquest," "tyranny," "terrorist regime" and others have entered the vocabularies of social scientists and political activists. Authors with more complex and structured opinions have usually been blamed for demonizing the Oromo nationalists and vilifying the Oromo national liberation movement.[76] The concept of Ethiopian colonialism has broadly become an accepted fact and the so-called Ethiopian Empire has been put into the same category as the great European colonial powers.[77] It has been argued that the Oromo were colonized during the last decades of the nineteenth century and various sources have provided much and varied information regarding the reduction of the Oromo (and other non-Semitic) population due to the Abyssinian conquest. Although it is obvious that the expansion of the Ethiopian state was accompanied by conflicts, wars and battles against "the others," it is evident that the inability to present clear and indubitable data creates an opportunity for exaggeration and over-simplification. Moreover, conflicting perspectives and the process of creating a concept of "Otherness" are now necessary parts of the whole debate surrounding nationalism in Ethiopia.[78]

Under Imperial rule, the Oromo people were not able that much to publicly express their identity. Especially when it came to the language used in public places and institutions, Amharic was the only accepted language, while the use of Afaan Oromo in schools was strictly prohibited.[79] After the fall of the Haile Selassie regime, there was a short period of enthusiasm,

which stemmed from a seemingly equal ethno-linguistic emancipation policy, manifested by the alphabetization campaign and the use of several languages in the media. However, this resulted in a political "hangover" because of the Derg's inability to meet the needs and demands of the people in Ethiopia, regardless of their origin. Nevertheless, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a period of enormous growth in relation to Oromo studies since many authors began to use the rhetoric of "invented" Oromo history and identity. Mekuria Bulcha states that this rhetoric "is closely connected with the erroneous belief that Ethiopia is an ancient and immutably natural identity."[80]

In 1991, a coalition of forces defeated the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam and a new wave of enthusiasm filled the air in Ethiopia. However, shortly after the transitional period began, disagreements between the major parties (the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front [OLF]) took place and resulted in the isolation of the OLF. Since the beginning of the 1990s, OLF as the dominant representative of Oromo nationalism has been accused of being a terrorist organization. Recent development shows that there are big hopes put into new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who in July 2018 visited the United States and immediately after, social media and Oromo-run media in the United States began to express big hopes for unification of all Ethiopians.[81] On the other hand, particularly around Dembi Dollo area, the tense situation and occasional killing, such as that of a pregnant woman Birhane Mamo,[82] continued during the same time raising doubts that any of the positive vibes reached the real ground. However, as can be seen, the use of modern means of communication has become an important issue on both sides of the playground, both in Ethiopia as well as among the diaspora.

While a significant part of the diaspora calls for a real unification and political emancipation of all Ethiopians, during the last two decades Ethiopia has witnessed quite a significant cultural emancipation of the Oromo. Ethiopian bookshops offer hundreds of books written in Afaan Oromo, the language itself is taught at universities, and various Oromo Research Centers and Institutes began to exist doing research on Oromo history, society, and language. Recent anti-governmental protests have shown that for many people the changes have been superficial or minimal at best.[83] For most of the protesting people, political emancipation seems to be the next step, although there is no general agreement among the Oromo intellectual and academic community as to what such political emancipation should look like, whether it should be achieved through general political reforms inside Ethiopia, or through secession. It is still the case that many Oromos are dissatisfied with the lack of development in their country as compared to some other regions. The difference is visible especially when we compare the level of development in, for instance, Awassa—the capital city of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region, and Jimma, Nekemte, not to mention

Dembi Dollo, where almost no investment has been made in the town since 1993 up until 2009 when the author of this book spent some time there. Dembi Dollo thus became one of the last cities in Ethiopia to experience asphalt roads and other development projects including already mentioned renewed flight connection with Addis Ababa.

For a long time, there has been a sense of disadvantage among many Oromo people throughout Oromia. During the author's several stays in Jimma, for instance, people on many occasions expressed their lack of understanding for enormous growth and development of towns such as Bahir Dar, Mekelle, or Awassa while they felt that Jimma, despite being historically important, lacked this rapid growth. Such discrepancies and imbalances, along with many other obstacles to peace and development, have created an atmosphere of frustration among the Oromo people that has been largely expressed during the Oromo protests since 2015.

Comparing the last there consecutive regimes in Ethiopia, none of them were in favor of the Oromo minority. At the same time, an absence of a genuine Oromo political party that would have a political program based on unification of Oromo people was a tangible obstacle. What seems to be the common opinion of the Oromo elite in Ethiopia is that such a political party has to be created in Ethiopia, not outside, in order to gain legitimacy. This has been rather difficult as there exist a number of different political opinions and voices representing the Oromo. Up until spring 2018 this seemed to be rather utopian.

The central unification point of the Oromo community is the belief in the Gadaa System as a democratic way of social and political organization. The Gadaa System is the central philosophical thought about the human existence. In Oromo society, structural institutions are constructed in a way that they have an impact on human life from birth to death, and they basically explain how everything that exists has to be understood and interpreted. Therefore, the Gadaa System is a complex political philosophy.[84]

Religion

Ethiopia has always been perceived as a "Christian island" surrounded by the "Ocean of Islam." This also contributed to Ethiopian "uniqueness" or "exceptionalism" supported by the whole arsenal of literature since at least the nineteenth century. At least since the sixteenth century, Muslim societies lived within the territory now belonging to the modern Ethiopian state, and mutual Christian-Muslim relations began to form especially along trade routes. Several Ethiopian rulers expressed their anti-Islam feelings, as they considered Islam the most serious threat to the national unity.[85]

Islam has been traditionally spread throughout the territories inhabited mainly by the Oromo, Somali and Afar ethnic groups, and especially due to

the expansion of Oromo people has become prevalent also within the Ethiopian highlands. The ethnic factor is an important issue we should keep in mind when talking about Islam in Ethiopia since the Somali people, for instance, at least since the 1960s, struggled for self-determination against all Ethiopian regimes. It is without doubt that the political tensions in Ethiopia have been for decades influenced by external factors. These include ethnic or tribal violence in Somalia as well as Djibouti, where clashes between the ethnic Afars and the Somali clan of Isaaq tend to occur regularly.[86]

At the turn of the eighteenth century Islam witnessed its revitalization especially in the Ethiopian Lowland areas or on the fringe of the Ethiopian Highlands. It was a result of two major factors: (1) growing agricultural production leading to export of goods to the Red Sea area and Egypt; (2) frequent conversions to Islam which was considered a protection against the dominance of Orthodox Christian elites. Sufism gave new impetus to the spread of Islam, mainly among the Oromo people. One of the most prominent Sufi leader was a certain Shaikh Muhammad Sha'fi (1743–1806) who came from the Wällo region. He began his career as a student of law, theology and Arabic in one local school. Shortly after, he gained a good reputation and kept correct relations with local authorities.[87]

Shaikh Muhammad settled on a mountain in a place called Djamma negus (community of a king). There he organized annual celebrations dedicated to Prophet Muhammad's birthday with many Muslims from all regions of Ethiopia taking part in it. He divided a year into three periods: 1) for four months Muslims had to study; 2) for four months they had to spend time spreading Islam; 3) and finally they had to spend time in prayers and Sufi trainings.[88] In the nineteenth century, Islam was not only a part of trade but it also penetrated administrative circles, agriculturalists, pastoralists, etc. Islam was to be seen mainly in what is now Eritrea where there was a strong impact of Egypt, one of the primary Islamic powers.[89]

The Oromo and Islam in Ethiopia

Islam is in today's Ethiopia spread mainly in the Oromo, Somali and Afar inhabited areas, although Oromos are culturally and religiously very diverse. Their traditional religion, Waaqefaana, is a belief in one god, Waaqayoo and in contemporary Ethiopia it is witnessing a period of revitalization.[90] The end of the nineteenth century brought a wave of expansions of the province of Showa and the Ethiopian state into southern parts of what is now Ethiopia. During the times of Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913), before he became an Emperor when he served as a ruler of the Shawa province, massive expansion took place that helped to create the modern borders of Ethiopia.

In the course of centuries, Islam became domesticated among the Oromo people which also means that it was Africanized, i.e., modified by local

African beliefs, practices and customs. When in 1896 to 1898 a Russian soldier named Alexander Bulatovich served under Menelik in Southern Ethiopia, he witnessed a flourishing slave trade around Jimma which he ascribed to Islam. According to his account, the ruling dynasty in Jimma zealously followed Islam for three centuries (i.e., since the sixteenth century).[91]

One of the examples of Islamization of the Oromo are the Arsi who inhabit large parts of Showa and northern Bale provinces. Arabic burial writings revealed infiltration of Islam in Northern Bale already in the thirteenth century. Ulrich Braukämper revealed that a number of Islamic cults practiced in Arsiland related to contemporaries of Ahmad Gragn. Genealogy of Arsi clans show that they lived in this area since the 16th century. However, Braukämper claims that the process of Islamization of local Arsi Oromo took place peacefully and naturally and not so much as a response to Christian Amharas. One of the proofs could lie in a number of cults of saints whose shrines were built in these areas extensively.[92]

Ethiopia has a long history of Oromo revolts especially since the 1920s. Then, during the Italian occupation the Oromo Independence Movement came into being in 1936 when Oromos from Hararghe, Jimma, Ilubabor and Shawa united in the Western Oromo Confederation (WOC). WOC sent a letter to the League of Nations in which they asked for recognition of their right to self-determination as defined by the League of Nations. Especially in the 1960s some of the Oromo used Islam as a nationalist ideology for their "separatist project." In 1974, the Imperial throne ceased to exist, shortly before thousands of Oromo Muslims demonstrated for an agricultural reform that would elevate them from the category of "second-class citizens." Widespread revolts in February 1974 led to the dismissal of unpopular Kaffa governor, *dädjazmach* Tsahayu Enqwa-Selassie. The seed of hatred was, on the other hand, sewn long before and nobody believed in rather cosmetic changes.[93]

Haile Selassie and Islam

The Emperor Haile Selassie I ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974 with a short break during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1936–1941. Haile Selassie's approach to Islam was reflected in the Constitution that rhetorically made all Ethiopians equal, but religiously privileged the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Moreover, many people in Ethiopia up to this day remember Haile Selassie's attitude towards Iyasu which may be interpreted as rather anti-Islamic.

After the Second World War and after the consolidation of Ethiopia Haile Selassie focused on public presentation of the national unity by accenting its Christian tradition. During his speech to the US Congress in 1954, the Emperor emphasized the role of Ethiopia as the biggest Christian state in the

Middle East.[94] While the state officially guaranteed equality of all citizens, the Orthodox Church as a state institution enjoyed various privileges and advantages. Christian clerics gained regular salaries and the state actively supported construction of churches in the Southern part of Ethiopia where the number of Christian was lower than of Muslims.

Incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia played a specific chapter in the history of Ethiopian Islam. First, Eritrea became a part of federal Ethiopia in 1952 on the basis of the UN Resolution and ten years later it lost its autonomy and symbols of statehood and became one of the provinces of the Ethiopian unitary state. This had also an impact on the local Muslim community in Eritrea as Islam was degraded and Arabic substituted by Amharic as the only official language of the state. While the pro-Ethiopian Christians in Eritrea were awarded for their loyalty, Muslims began to be politically, socially and economically marginalized. A number of Eritrean Muslims left the country in exile while others initiated the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Due to the Ethiopian effort to disunite opposition along religious lines, appearance of Christians within ELF was highly selective, at least at the beginning of its existence.[95]

In the 1960s, Ethiopia witnessed waves of student and peasant rebellions of which the most significant were those that took place in Bale in 1963 and 1970. The inability of peasants to pay higher taxes mixed with new land tenure and corruption of government officials triggered antagonism between people and the government as well as Christian-Muslim rivalry. Political-economic dominance and arrogance of Christian settlers reached its peak during the era of *fitawrari* Warqu Enqwa-Selassie who was named governor of the province in 1963. Islam became an ideology of revolt that brought together Oromo and Somali peasants in Bale.[96] For the support of the revolt, Muslim Somalis created the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSFL). Due to problematic relations between center and periphery, a new Amharic term came into being – *yäshïfta ager* (region of rebels). Hatred between local Muslims and Christians reached its peak at the end of Haile Selassie's regime.[97]

The last decade of Haile Selassie's rule not only foreshadowed entrance of revolutionary Marxist ideology and rule, but also fully revealed weaknesses of state-defined national identity. The Ethiopian state, based on the policy of assimilation, was seen by many as an enemy and not protector of their lives and supporter of their needs. On the other hand, Haile Selassie policy in a certain sense reacted on the Italian policy of "divide and rule" that helped to sharpen ethnic and religious differences inside Ethiopia.[98] Benito Mussolini and his alleged support of Islam as well as his support to non-Semitic groups in Ethiopia initiated a period of ethnic self-consciousness among the Oromo and other ethnic groups who felt oppressed and marginalized. The policy of Amharization or Ethiopianization was perhaps meant to

avoid further ethnic fragmentation, but in reality it caused serious socio-economic troubles which helped to trigger ethnic and religious discrepancies and even hatred.

Ethiopian State and the Islamic Challenge

Socialist revolution in 1974 was supposed to bring equality and emancipation in the broadest sense but failed in doing so in many ways. In 1975 the number of Orthodox holy days was reduced, land reform introduced and nationalization became an official program of the new government. Non-Orthodox communities awaited new opportunities and equal treatment. Primarily Muslims, the most significant religious group after Orthodox Christians, experienced first success when the military government began to label them as "Ethiopian Muslims" while before 1974 they were regarded as "Muslims in Ethiopia" which made them feel as strangers in their homeland. But by this success the hopes and expectations of Muslims found their end because the policy of nationalization affected mostly smaller businessmen and traders, the majority of them being Muslims. Muslims were blamed for an increase of prices and were attacked by anti-Islamic propaganda initiated by the government in order to find a "cause" for the deteriorating economic situation. As a response to these events Mengistu Haile Mariam had to face refusal and hesitation of Muslim countries to export oil to Ethiopia.[99] The Derg regime labeled Muslims as followers of "false ideology" and "reactionaries" who were against progress and modernity. As shown by Abbink, faith became a private thing in terms of lacking "traditional" support from the government as it used to be during the Imperial times in the case of Orthodox Christianity. The reality was, however, a bit different as Ethiopia belongs to very religious countries and thus the regime tolerated religion and churches with restraint.[100]

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia declares in its Article 11: Separation of State and Religion, that there shall be no state religion. While Article 27 adds that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to hold or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."[101] Absence of any state religion and lost privileges of the Orthodox clergy were seen within these circles rather negatively, while Muslim authorities welcomed it warmly and with certain hopes.

Although the vast majority of Afars, Somalis as well as Oromos confess Islam, religion has never been a unifying force in Ethiopia. As already mentioned, ethnicity seems to be a more important factor and divisive force that keeps the Ethiopian state in a situation where many authorities representing

various ethnic groups, operate with the term *self-determination* as a basic means for further development of their respective groups or areas. Since the Somali people generally do not feel any major loyalty to the Ethiopian state, and the Oromo are divided along politics as well as religion, it seems unlikely that there would exist anything that we may call a united Islamic front.

As added by Haggai, Ethiopian Islam has never been united, institutionalized, or persistently political.[102] One of the reasons may be seen in ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Ethiopian Muslims, speaking Oromo, Somali, Afar, Tigrinya, Harari, Argobba, Sidama and other languages and mixing the "true Islam" with various local customs, Sufism, etc. While Arabic is used in major centers including Harar or Dire Dawa, in remote areas knowledge of Arabic remains very low. The main trade center for Islamic books and other Arabic written materials remains, of course, Addis Ababa. Many bookstores, especially those at *Mercato*, are full of these materials originally published in Sudan, Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

In Ethiopia, cohabitation between Muslims and Christian is somewhat natural in many regions despite recent trends of separation and radicalization caused by multiple factors that will be examined later. However, many people still practice their own religion, for instance *Waaqefannaa* in the case of Oromos, which only shows the religious complexity of the country.[103] The region of Wällo, for instance, belongs to those with a long history of Islamic presence in Ethiopia but its appearance in the society needs to be understood as a dynamic process of interaction with the surrounding Orthodox Christian community. Wällo was also characterized by the presence of some significant Muslim lineages. Sufism has a long history in Ethiopia as elsewhere in Africa and usually has been associated with peace and tolerance. Mainly in the nineteenth century, local Sufis resisted infiltration of Salafist, Wahhabist practices into their understanding of Islamic practice.[104]

Unlike Wällo, Bale belongs to those regions where Islam is a relatively new phenomenon. Bale in Southeast Ethiopia was also a place of crucial historical events, primarily the anti-Imperial revolts led by local peasants and Muslims. Recently, Salafism has found its way to Bale, threatening traditional worshipping of shrines such as *Sheikh Hussein*. Besides the Sufi traditions, local Islam was also enriched by various Oromo cultural traits and customs. It was a natural phenomenon of cultural interaction in places with a lack of mosques and other "official" sites of Islam where this folk form of Islam gained prominence.[105] In Western Ethiopia, particularly in the Wällagga region where Protestantism dominates, Islam is a very recent and marginal phenomenon together with Catholicism and other minor religions. Despite being a tiny minority in Wällagga, local Muslims practice their religion in a more "traditionalist" or "purist" way while in the regions with long Islamic standing, many cults and intercultural influences can be observed.

In the last decade an inter-religious violence and misunderstanding has increased in some parts of Ethiopia, even in places with centuries-long tradition of religious tolerance and community cooperation. On the other hand, a number of conflicts or minor clashes were interpreted as religious-based while in reality their causes had little or nothing to do with religion itself. Some observers put these trends in association with the rise of Salafist thoughts coming to Ethiopia from Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Salafism presents a serious challenge to nationalist movements as it lessens the importance of ethnic identity and gives preference to religious affiliation.[106] This is the case of the Oromo people, whose nationalist aspirations are among the highest in Ethiopia. Not surprisingly, many Oromos favor their Islamic identity instead of their ethnic identity and thus can be labeled as "traitors" to the nationalist cause. This trend was observable in the first decade of the twenty-first century in bigger centers of Islamic education and intellectualism such as Dire Dawa or Harar. Some of the prominent Sufi lineages deriving their origin from some of the important Sufis from the past (*awliya*, sg. *wali*) live in fear of possible persecution coming from religious zealots trying to suppress local customs regarded as deviations from the "pure" Islam (*bid'a*).[107]

The penetration of the Salafist (Wahhabist) branch of Islam to Ethiopia is eased by a dynamically developing market with modern technologies such as CDs, DVDs, video cassettes and other items. As a side effect, Arabic language finds its way to Ethiopia as these materials are recorded in Arabic. The heterogeneous environment of Islam in Ethiopia is thus facing unifying elements—Arabic language and Salafism. However, the distribution of these cannot be overestimated as the majority of Muslims in Ethiopia still use Somali, Oromo, Afar, Amharic, Sidama and other languages.[108]

Salafist thoughts have an impact not only on inter-community relations but also on an essence of collective identities. Until recently, in many families some people followed Islam while others were Christians. This process of "religious oscillation"[109] is still a rather less studied phenomenon despite its wide presence in Ethiopia where Islamic and Christian practices are usually strongly permeated. It is not an exception to see Christians visiting shrines of Sufi mystiques with their Muslim neighbors or Muslims accepting medical consultations with Christian priests.

One of the direct results of recent changes in Ethiopian society is the decreasing tendency of intermarriages, as mainly Muslim youth identify themselves with reformist thoughts and ideas searching for a place in the sun.[110] Last but not least, a response to Salafist radicalism from the Christian camp is rethinking existing relations between both communities which may lead to a dangerous scenario and can overshadow nationalist or even separatist tendencies. Abbas Haji Gnamo in his study rather downplays the role of Islam in the Oromo society, or, better to say the role of political Islam. As he

puts it, the "Oromo Muslims are not familiar with modern Arab intellectual history, which have influenced militant Islamic resurgence."[111]

LOCAL CONFLICTS AND SEEDS OF TENSIONS

Historiography in general, and Ethiopian in particular, have been focused until relatively recently mainly on history from the perspectives of the centers while the so-called peripheries have been frequently omitted due to their alleged marginal position. While the Ethiopian Highlands usually formed, in the history of Ethiopia, what we may call the center, the Lowlands in the South and West belonged to the periphery. In last couple of decades, enormous change entered Ethiopian studies as historians are more focused on, so far, less explored fields of the discipline, in this case oral histories and traditions combining historical and anthropological research. A number of publications about thus far marginalized regions have increased significantly.[112]

While Menelik II has been traditionally considered a modernizer and unifier of Ethiopia on one hand, other perspectives see him as an oppressor and colonizer. The period of the "Scramble for Africa" at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century is thus an important part of Ethiopian history because of several reasons. First, it was the time of direct confrontation between Ethiopia and European colonialism represented primarily by Italy, and second, it was the process of expansion of Ethiopia into the shape we know today. In 1890, the Italian colony of Eritrea was formed while already in the 1870s, ruler of the Shawa province Menelik II started his expansion to the South and East by incorporating so far autonomous or independent units that existed there.[113] At least part of Ethiopian historiography thus perceives this period of Ethiopian history as expansionist, oppressive, and as a clash between the "center" and "the others."

In Ethiopian historical-political context we can observe several constructs that have developed and been maintained in the discourse for a very long time. First of all, the Oromo people were for long labeled as "barbarians," a discourse that prevailed in literature until almost the second half of the twentieth century. Second, the Ethiopian South meant for a long time something rather intangible, hard to describe, backward, and unclear. The federal constitution of 1994 came up with Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region as the name of the southern federal state, which shows a certain uncertainty how to deal with this multi-lingual social environment.

Center and Periphery

What connects all three consecutive regimes in the last century is that land has never been a matter of private ownership. Free access to land is one of

the main features of peaceful and stable societies. The center of the Ethiopian state, geographically, has traditionally been in the Northern and/or Central part of what is now Ethiopia. As already said, Ethiopia is divided into the Highlands, occupying most of the space, and the Lowlands. While the Highlands are more adequate for agriculture, Lowlands have usually been inhabited by pastoralist societies relying on their herds with occasional farming activities. From these geographical origins we can trace the terms Highlanders and Lowlanders.[114] And while Highlanders are traditionally seen as those acquiring power, technology, script, and military supremacy, Lowlanders have been taken by Ethiopian historiography as those inhabiting the periphery. The tool of Highlanders' rule in Ethiopia was a system called *neft'ennya - gäbbar*, briefly labelling feudal relations between the land owners and land tenants.[115]

Relations between "Southerners" and the Ethiopian Empire were developed along land, administrative and politico-economic lines, and as discussed by Abbink, only with minimal success.[116] The logic of the *gäbbar* system was of feudal nature. A soldier, or newly settled administrator from the "North" gained the land that was used by local people as his *gäbbars*, paying tribute to his lord. Together with this system, there were people delegated as local representatives who were of two kinds, the so-called *balabbat* and *chiqa-shum*.

Balabbat (in Amharic "the one, who has a father") was a legitimate owner of certain territory. It can be, for instance, a clan elder, ritual leader or traditional chief of some ethnic group. Later, this term changed to a "big man." For instance, among the Maji people there were several of these Amhara *balabbats* who assimilated with local society.[117] *Chiqa-shum* (in Amharic a kind of "uncertain chief") was an official named by the government under the level of *balabbat*. Among the Me'en or nomadic Suri people these attempts to develop an administrative system which would integrate these societies into the Ethiopian state failed.[118] In the nineteenth century, this system penetrated into the South together with the expansion of the Ethiopian state.

For this analysis we can use the "insider-outsider" concept both for ethnic and linguistic issues. Smyth in her study shows how labelling certain conflict as "ethnic" puts borders between "insiders" and "outsiders." This means, that the attribute of ethnicity bears with itself in one context aspects of "backwardness," "exotism," or "primitivism."[119] To apply an "insider-outsider" concept on the Ethiopian present times looks at first glance as easy because the history of Ethiopia at least since the thirteenth century was seen as the opposition of at least two groups, those speaking Semetic and Cushitic languages.

The Ethiopian Highlands, seat of the government, center of the power, ruling dynasty, and the main language was characterized by developed agri-

culture, while the Lowlands, due to their climatic conditions, were mostly inhabited by pastoral and nomadic societies.[120] These were perceived from the Highlands as "backward" and "uncivilized." Pastoralism, usually related to the "periphery," is in Ethiopia traditionally considered as "backward." The center was represented by an originally Semitic ruling circle while the so-called periphery was formed by frequently non-state societies that socio-economically were dependent on pastoralism. The term "pastoralists" then gained a meaning of a certain more or less homogeneous community or cultural category.[121] However, it is clear that besides "centers" and "peripheries" there must have been some kind of semi-periphery that was on one hand dependent on the center but at the same time aimed at control and exploitation of "the others," in this case the "periphery." An example of such a "semi-periphery" was shown by Triulzi who examined the role of Nekemte, an important town in Wällaga region, Oromia.[122] Nekemte belongs to crucial centers of Oromia and a recent Wällagga museum proves its historical significance. Still quite neglected in historiography is the issue of slavery that affected, beside others, border regions between BeniShangul/Gumuz and Gambella. As examined by Alexander Meckelburg, slavery helped "forge modern conceptions of the self and the other in modern Ethiopia."[123] Meckelburg studied the Mao and Komo social memory that is influenced by "the violent episodes of marginalization and subjugation brought about by the encroachment of the state into the western frontier."[124]

Migrants and Settlers

The Gambella region belongs to the most distant from the center in Addis Ababa and until the beginning of the twentieth century was not much incorporated into the Ethiopian state. One of the reasons for a certain isolation are surely natural conditions because down from Dembi Dollo town, the last settlement on the Ethiopian Highlands, a malaria zone begins in the directon to Gambella, which is found at sea level between 400 and 500 meters. Gambella is crossed by four rivers, Baro, Giilo, Akobo, and Oboth which form the river Sobat.

The indigenous inhabitants of Gambella are the Anywaa (also Annuaks) and the Nuer. While the majority of Anywaa lives in Ethiopia and only a minority in the neighboring South Sudan, in the Nuer case it is different. However, due to a long-lasting civil war in South Sudan, migration becomes one of the reasons of changing socio-political environment there. Conflicts tend to extend to the Southern Region as well. For these societies, until relatively recently labelled in literature as "tribes," the Highlanders used terms such as *shankalla* ("black" or rather literally "nigger") or *baria* (slave).[125] Until today, most of the people inhabiting the Highlands, or urban centers such as Addis Ababa, do not have any special knowledge about these

areas and societies. From demographic point of view, in Gambella the Nuer dominate, now forming about 40% of the population. Anywaa (27%) are the second-biggest group, followed by Majangir (10%) and minority Opo and Komo. While Anywaa and Opo are farmers, Nuer pastoralists, Majangir are hunters and gatherers. Current numerical disadvantage of the Anywaa people contrasts with the territorial situation as they inhabit only eight out of nine districts while the Nuer live in only two.[126]

Nilotic societies in Gambella were until the 1880s influenced by the slave trade but only after the expansion of Menelik's Ethiopia did they became a part of the so far foreign political entity. In 1902, Great Britain and Ethiopia signed a border treaty delineating borders between Sudan and Ethiopia which put the Nilotes under two different state administrations. While the British acknowledged only total subjugation of local inhabitants, Ethiopians had a more flexible approach despite their rather "Medieval" racial ideological thinking considering local "black" populations as "second class citizens." Expansion of the *gäbbar* system followed together with the expansion of the state.[127]

In the first third of the twentieth century, Gambella became the center of the trade coming from the Sudan. Ivory still remained the main commodity while the slave trade disappeared together with Ethiopia's accession to the League of Nations in 1923. Ivory coming from Gambella was exchanged for weapons which contributed to militarization of Gambella. Arrival of the modern state into Ethiopia then had a twofold impact on Anywaa. First, it helped them to face the Nuer expansion more effectively, second, the modern state limited their regional authority as this was transferred to Addis Ababa. Anywaa leaders thus lost their political powers.[128] Anywaa living on the Sudanese side of the border gained a lot of guns through the Gambella trade which the British witnessed soon in the first decades of the twentieth century due to a number of clashes with rebelling Anywaa.[129]

The Nuer coming from the Sudan formed a similarly marginalized group as Anywaa in Ethiopia. In their historical experience the modern age of "rule" (*kume*, from the Arabic *hukūma*), meant institutionally, coincides with the age of weapons (*mac*). The Nuer were targets of the British tax collectors at the beginning of the twentieth century, and in the 1950s and 1960s by the South Sudanese freedom fighters.[130] Increased numbers of the Nuer in Gambella region led to tensions among Anywaa that during Haile Selassie's regime resulted in a series of rebellions and even separatist tendencies, primarily between 1952 and 1958.[131] Local conflicts in Ethiopia (as well as in other places in Africa) are usually perceived as "ethnic." On one hand, it is true that ethnicity has played a significant role especially in Ethiopia but at the same time it needs to be seen as rather a mobilizing factor and kind of an ex-post factor which serves to explain conflicts while the real causes are usually more complex and multiple. Usually, we can count lack of resources, pover-

ty, religion, lack of *good governance* or socio-economic marginalization among these factors.[132]

At the beginning of the 1990s the clashes between settlers and migrants culminated and resulted in expulsion of about two hundred "Highlanders" from the Ukuna village, inhabited by the Anywaa. In 1992 several hundred "Highlanders" were massacred by the Nuer led by Prophet Wutnyang. The difference between the inhabitants of Gambella and the "Highlanders" is usually constructed on the basis of color of skin rather than historical and cultural disputes. As already stated, in the past the Gambella people were labeled as "blacks" by the Semitic-speaking societies from the Highlands, and also recently some of the attacks of the "Highlanders" against the Nuer were taken as attacks on "the blacks."[133]

Gambella as a "Zone of Conflict"

At the end of the Derg regime, the Nuer established cooperative links with the government which led to the creation of Gambella Peoples' Liberation Movement (GPLM) whose members were mostly the Anywaa opposing the regime. After the EPRDF gained power in 1991, it was clear that GPLM became its only reliable partner in the region who earlier helped in the struggle against the Derg regime.[134]

Here we are getting to the second dimension of conflict in Gambella that is also characterized by a conflict between migrants and settlers but has a more evident ethnic link as it occurs between the Nuer and Anywaa. Conflicts over land rights, however, increased also among different Nuer clans. The guilt was rather on the side of law and pastoralists/farmers discrepancies in terms of access to land that helps to increase tensions and conflicts in some areas. At the same time, a very porous border, such as the Ethio-Sudanese border, makes it easier to penetrate Ethiopia and influence the situation on the ground.[135] With the creation of GPLM the Anywaa ethnicity was used as a mobilizing factor not only in the fight against the Ethiopian state but also against the Nuer, who were more or less collaborating with the state. The fight of Anywaa against the Nuer only strengthened the latter's need to stay under the protection of the state while the Derg labeled the Anywaa as *wonbede* (in Amharic kind of "bandits" or "outlaws"). After the regime change, the GPLM cooperated with the EPRDF, in other words with the "Highlanders" against which they fought during the 1980s.[136]

Although Gambella was not so much affected by agricultural colonization from the Highlands, as for instance Oromia, there existed a problem of rising numbers of the Nuer coming from the Sudan. The atmosphere of the 1990s after the fall of the Derg regime and the new Ethiopian constitution contributed to the situation in which the issue of self-determination became the most frequent term in public discourse. The Anywaa, standing alongside the

EPRDF, felt the necessity to use this situation for "cleaning" Gambella by creation of the Gambella People's National Regional State. Despite the multiethnic character of the region, it was supposed to be the GPLM who should play the primary political role while the Nuer organizations were "discredited" by earlier collaboration with the Derg regime.

EPRDF, however, sought to find peace among local societies and reached a fusion of GPLM under "friendly" (means chosen by EPRDF) leadership with the Nuer Gambella People's Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP). The above-mentioned census from 1994 was in favor of the Nuer (40%) while the Anywaa were put into a position of minority. This only strengthened the Nuer feeling of deprivation because they spent the whole transitional period (1991–1998) in political isolation and social marginalization despite their demographic dominance.[137]

Ethnic federalism takes ethnicity from the primordialist approach which counts ethnicities as fixed identities. Such an approach at the regional and local level activated what, for instance, Hagmann and Mulugeta called "politics of difference" between groups which fight in a limited space for access to water, resources, and "self-determination."[138] Political dominance of Anywaa together with the census and the rising number of the Nuer from the Sudan activated the "politics of difference" which was in one case based on demographic strategy (numerical dominance of the Nuer), and in the other it was based on a principle of rightful claim (Anywaa as settlers vs. Nuer as collaborators with the Marxist regime). The census itself, either that of 1994 or 2007, was surrounded by speculations and suspicions of manipulations. In this regard, a lot of Anywaa representatives tried to point at irrelevant numbers claiming that many Anywaa villages were not even counted due to hardly accessible terrain during the rainy season. On the contrary, the Nuer were blamed of being not indigenous inhabitants of Ethiopia and therefore had no right to access neither citizenship nor the right to vote.[139]

Overpopulation of various regions and local conflicts between the Anywaa and the Nuer lead also to ecological degradation. The environment in Gambella has already been affected by long-lasting droughts, extended swamps, existence of the tse-tse flies, and malaria. Every year, more and more areas are deforested which makes the soil less fertile. People then migrate from exploited territories to areas with abundance of water and fertile land. This trend continues over and over again and contributes to conflicts either between Nuer/Anywaa, or between "indigenous" and "Highlanders." Gambella thus remains a "zone of conflict" in which movement of people is not easy and in some areas restricted or limited under armed protection.

Since the 1950s, we can observe growing tensions between settlers and migrants which coincides with access to land and natural resources. In regard to migration, it is good to stress also the issue of dual citizenship that made

many African governments nervous after independence as there existed a fear of lack of insufficient loyalty to the state. Dual citizenship, moreover, threatened the nation-building concept to which African leaders headed as a necessary step towards prosperity. The process of nation-building and Africanization of state administrative and educational systems correlated with the issue of "indigeneity" and "genuiness" of citizenship.[140] Hundreds of thousands of people on a daily basis appear in hopeless situations in which they have no rights in a country they live in. Political elites of the state derive their support from one part of population while the same rights are prohibited to the second part of population, those marginalized. Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, or Ethiopia share more or less similar fates or scenarios as certain minorities, for instance, cannot register their children for school, they cannot obtain their travel documents, or employment, because they live in a certain juridical vacuum.

The case of Gambella is a bit different because Ethiopia was never colonized but the center of the state found itself among the Amhara-Tigrayan elite that continuously expanded, in the words of some "colonized," the so-called periphery. Primary conflict thus (not only) in Gambella is rooted in the clash between autochthonous population and newly arrived "Highlanders" who gained access to lucrative land while the indigenous Anywaa and the Nuer were destined to play the role of second-class citizens. This has basically remained the same after 1991 despite all the widespread changes within the Ethiopian society. Uncontrolled migration together with political connotations caused inter-ethnic clash which transmitted from ideological struggle to the struggle for access to land and natural resources as well as for political rights related to demographic changes in the region.

However, the conflicting situation in the Gambella region has also another dimension that has been observed by Dereje Feyissa. As he stated, one of the root causes of the conflict lies in the fact that the "Ethiopian state operates along the borders with multiple concerns than merely enacting sovereignty."[141] Both groups, Anywaa and Nuer, as Feyissa says, think of the border in their own specific way, or, they make sense of it through their own "mental script." While the Anywaa understand the border as fixed and non-permeable, for the Nuer the border is not "a point of separation but a space of identification options."[142] While the Nuer consider border-crossing as a natural thing, the Anywaa perceive it as an extension of Kew, territorial boundaries between Anywaa villages. The Anywaa believe that clear "demarcation of a territory is extremely important as it helps to avoid conflicts between people of different territories."[143] The Ethiopian government's approaches to the border has varied through times but mostly have been embracing border-crossing, at times seen as a security threat. On the other hand, the Anywaa have seen this as a conspiracy of the Nuer and EPRDF against them.[144]

ERITREA, OROMIA, AND COLONIAL LEGACIES?

The already mentioned period of the Scramble for Africa represented the most important point of the nation-building process initiated by the Emperors of the Solomonic dynasty in the second half of the nineteenth century. Menelik II led conquering missions and various territories and peoples, including Oromos, Sidamas, as well as scarcely populated semi-desert areas on the frontier had been incorporated under his supremacy, though some of them became a part of Ethiopia only formally without any direct control from the center.[145]

This phase of Ethiopian history is considered by many Oromo scholars as a direct colonial subjugation which they had to face from the side of the Amhara dominance. For some scholars,[146] this colonial period is thus put into context of general Scramble for Africa, during which the European powers divided the African continent among themselves. Expansions led by an attempt to create a modern Ethiopian state whose history is officially being written since 1855 are then perceived as an unprecedented example of brutality and violence committed on the Oromo population and other societies of Southern Ethiopia, i.e., those who were regarded as a subject of the Emperor's reign. The Oromo territories were used as a rich source of natural resources and goods, with coffee in first place. Edmond Keller is of an opinion that this period of Ethiopian colonialism created the roots of the Oromo sense for ethnic identity.[147] Oromo revolts against the Emperor were intensified during the twentieth century, especially under the reign of Haile Sellassie I.

Haile Sellassie established some new elements within Ethiopian politics as Ethiopia became a symbol of purity and African aristocracy as it was perceived among Afro-American and West African intellectuals and political activists. The charisma of the Emperor gave him at least among African politicians a credit of a legitimate representative of the "Ethiopian nation." His reign, legitimized by Ethiopian constitutions of 1931 and 1955 was based on an absolute dominance of Amharic ruling circles centered around the Emperor as the highest point of the Ethiopian social and political hierarchies, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and Amharic language which gained a status of a national language.[148] Scholars usually cannot find agreement on the nature of the regime as some speak about the policy of Amharization while others prefer the term Ethiopianization as a continuing nation-building process. Nevertheless, Amharic language and Amharic cultural values, including the Orthodox Church, gained supremacy while Muslims, for instance, were placed in a position of second-class citizens. It has to be stated that (not only) among Oromos, ethnicity was not the only leading factor of various nationalist and anti-Imperial movements. As stated by Saheed Adejumobi,[149] especially in 1960s the Oromo intellectuals used Islam as a mobilizing factor

for their nationalist and separatist projects. Thousands of Oromo Muslims demonstrated for equal access to land and against better conditions for Orthodox Christians.

The language policy of promoting a single language as a national symbol was an integral part of centralizing ambitions of the Imperial government. Due to increasing educated elites among non-Amhara groups, a demand for emancipation of "minority" languages kept strengthening during the 1960s and early 1970s.[150] Assimilationist policy was a basis of the absolutist state of the Emperor which allowed only state-centered history to be written while "periphery" remained untouched by scholars until at least the 1970s. It is with no surprise that subordinate ethno-regional elites began to seek their own history including specific regional heroes and villains where Amharas usually represented a natural enemy.[151] Recognition of other ethnicities and languages was not the only part of the emancipation movements that spread throughout the country at that time. Marxist orientation and rural demands for better socio-economic conditions resulted in a series of demonstrations and revolutions which brought together leftist intellectuals from towns and farmers from countryside.

The period of the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by a final phase of nation-building process but also a phase of an anti-colonial struggle in Eritrea. It was this colonial perspective which enabled other emancipation movements to develop and prepared the ground for the "Ethiopian synthesis" attempts. Although Levine defined the "Ethiopian synthesis" as a historical process of inter-ethnic contacts, struggles and mixtures, accommodation and acculturation that occurred on the Ethiopian Highlands since the sixteenth century,[152] we may consider the "Ethiopian synthesis" in ethnic terms as a time of ethnic emancipation and later even the politicization of ethnicity. This time had come in 1974 with the fall of the Imperial regime as many Ethiopians wished. The 1960s and 1970s were also based on the struggle between different historical perspectives. As I have already written, Eritrea's struggle for independence which had fully developed in 1962 was the first event that challenged the nation-building perspective. The rise of educated intellectual elites among minor ethnic groups helped to form various platforms for accenting emancipation needs including the right to speak, write and educate children in other languages than Amharic, and the need for equal access to power and sources. Since then new histories were written and new demands were lifted up as especially Oromo studies developed into a scientific discipline with a clear message and support for political activists struggling for ethnic self-determination.[153] We may thus argue that the period of the 1960s and 1970s became a battlefield of all three perspectives mentioned above (colonial, nation-building, national oppression).

Liberation Movements during the Derg

While the reign of Haile Sellassie was characterized by a strong centralization of power and institutions with the Amhara ethnic group playing the leading political and economic role, the Socialist revolution had to bring emancipation of all nationalities in accordance with its Marxist ideological background. It is necessary to emphasize that the Socialist Revolution of 1974 in its very first phase managed to meet the needs of many ethnic minorities to accent self-determination and emancipation as well as socio-economic changes based on rural transformation as a first step towards the "philosophy" of *Itiyopia Teqdam*.[154] Knowing the historical background one may argue that the revolution in 1974 should have resulted in a political system that would respect plurality and diversity with fair access to power and reasonable distribution of socio-economic needs. Of course, there were many international factors that stepped into internal Ethiopian politics but the competing perspectives we are dealing with could not allow any democratic regime to evolve. The major challenge to the Derg regime was certainly the Eritrean struggle for independence. As analyzed by Ruth Iyob, Ethiopian authorities tried to bring the issue under their control and indeed, in 1974, a delegation went to Eritrea with a prospective plan. The Ethiopian proposal included three basic points: a) gaining legitimacy for the Derg in Eritrea; b) to discredit the fronts engaged in a fratricidal war; c) to create compliant Eritrean leadership willing to accept the new regime.[155]

To eliminate the Eritrean struggle for self-determination was a necessary step towards keeping the nation-building process going. But it was not the only one. Shortly after the regime gained control over political and economic life in the country, ethno-regional parties began to evolve on the Ethiopian soil as a response to failed hopes and ambitions of minorities to create an ethnically and socially equal society. The regime could not gain support from ethnic movements and thus oriented itself exclusively on a social basis, especially poor farmers. One of the plans of the new government, for instance, was to mobilize farmers to march into Eritrea "in order to rid it of its rebellious movements."[156] Peasant mobilization was also a basic element of anti-government resistance organizations that rose throughout the 1970s. Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was one such movement that at its beginning accented an independent Tigray. Ethno-regionalism became a factor of Ethiopian politics that every government since then has had to deal with. That these movements did not have an outstanding support from their ethnic background can be illustrated on many examples. TPLF had to fight for its place in the sun against rival Tigrayan rebel movements including the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) or the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which had more "nation-wide" aspirations.[157]

The Derg intended to promote social equality and regional emancipation but failed to do so as the political elites simply inherited a political culture of their predecessors. It continued to implement inherently discriminatory economic and social policy that resulted in series of rebellions throughout the country.[158] Tigray in the north and Oromo in the south are the most well known examples.

Numerous ethno-regional movements struggling against the military regime were inspired mostly by Marxism-Leninism, i.e., by the same ideology officially adopted by the ruling junta. Motives of these movements actually lay in the economic, social, and political needs and demands of their respective regions. One of the main problems of the Derg regime was by no means the Eritrean war for independence, lacking coherence and coordination, but still making troubles for the Ethiopian army and economy.[159] The independence of Eritrea or any expression of its autonomy was a taboo for the military regime of the Derg as it would threaten the seeming homogeneity of Ethiopia.

Oromo Nationalism, Ethiopian Colonialism and Globalization

One of the basic questions of contemporary Oromo nationalism is whether to use the term "secessionism" or "self-determination" or "national liberation." Secessionism means a policy of those people or groups who maintain the right of secession from one state in order to form their own, new, state. In postcolonial Africa, as we have already seen, secessionist movements have been surprisingly unsuccessful. This has been caused by the fact that new, postcolonial states, have desperately needed to prove their viability, with the guidance and help of the Organization of African Unity. It was note a desire to experience any kind of fragmentation of states.

Despite being a part of secessionist movements, as discussed in scholarly literature, some authors tend to avoid this term and substitute it with "people's movement," "national struggle," "anti-colonial struggle."[160] Single words and phrases have their own particular meaning and the use of the above-mentioned terminology gives legitimacy to the whole nationalist movement and makes it understandable in the eyes of readers, supporters and followers. Up to this day, social media and various Facebook pages are full of "colonial" and "anti-colonial" rhetoric, mixed with "ethnic" or even "racial" rhetoric which usually gives little hope for reconciliation.

What is generally quite common for many of these social media opinions is an essentialist or primordialist approach to ethnicity, taking ethnicity as something given and unchangeable, and a rather positivist approach to history. Particularly Facebook has served for a long time as an arena for various groups, particularly in the diaspora, to spread quickly their opinions and blame and accuse the Ethiopian government of genocidal acts against the

Oromo people. Unfortunately, ethnic categories (Oromo, Amhara, etc.) are taken as uniform, homogeneous entities, where any kind of cooperation is strongly criticized, as is the case of those Oromos who served under Menelik at the end of the nineteenth century. These groups are labelled as "collaborators" and are used as an example of how consecutive Abyssinian regimes acted in an evil way. This seems to be changing after the already mentioned inauguration of Abyi Ahmed as the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia and particularly after his visit to the United States where he spoke to the Ethiopian diaspora of various ethnic backgrounds.

In an era of globalization, it has been the Internet which has served as the most effective means of communication. Revolutionary advances in communications have without a doubt changed and had an impact on the development of ethnic nationalist challenges towards the state.[161] Evie Zambeta rightly states that globalization and nationalism are in a certain sense in conflict because globalization is about interconnectedness while nationalism emphasizes difference and diversity.[162] It is definitely too early for any judgments and predictions as to how the new changing political environment in Ethiopia would be able to bring together various opposing groups standing either on the side of interconnectedness or difference/diversity. The issue of the Oromo nationalism is not so unique in a global arena. David Romano analyzed at the beginning of the twenty-first century the impact of modern communications on the Kurds. He states that the communications revolution has provided "many new opportunities for the formation and preservation of identities independent of territoriality, allowing dispossessed and stateless groups to redefine themselves and challenge dominant states."[163] On the other hand, if the Internet and other modern means of communication allow the nationalist movements to change their strategies towards the governments, then the governments, of course, use their own strategies in order to eliminate or at least lessen the access to these technologies. In many non-democratic countries, including Turkmenistan and North Korea, access to the Internet is the prerogative of only a tiny minority of rulers, while the rest of the country stays untouched by it. In African states such as Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea or Ethiopia, access to the Internet or even mobile phones is still limited, mainly due to political reasons because the availability of these resources provides access to information of all kinds, including those regarded as anti-government.

Oromo nationalism, like Kurdish nationalism, has benefitted from the Internet due to several factors. Both the Kurds and the Oromo are known for their diaspora living in the West and thus having easy access to the Internet and the media. The Internet allows two important things which are essential for nationalist movements—anonymity and simplification, since simple phrases can attract more readers than complicated analytical works. On the other hand, the situation in Ethiopia is significantly different because, as in

other non-democratic regimes, the government keeps control over the Internet and the media as well as mobile phones. This makes it difficult for people inside Ethiopia to communicate with the diaspora and vice versa. Moreover, this can be seen as one of the factors which has contributed to the difference between the diaspora and its long-distance nationalism and (in my opinion) other various forms of the Oromo nationalism within Ethiopia.

One of the main voices behind Oromo nationalism, the Oromo Liberation Front, does not actually define its goals as leading to the independence of Oromia, although several statements may indicate that the "aim of the Oromo struggle led by the OLF is only to gain back our country that was taken away from us by force. It is not, in any way, against the rights of any other people. The OLF believes that the Oromo people win the right to self-determination and open up a venue for other peoples to achieve the same rights. After winning the right to self-determination, the Oromo people will live side by side with its neighbors in peace, equality and respect."[164]

Some other sources, however, clearly declare the right of the Oromo people to proclaim the independence of Oromia and call for the dismantling of Ethiopia. Inspiration is taken from the fall of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,[165] though a simple comparison between these entities and Ethiopia is impossible. Such a comparison could be in a certain sense relevant in the case of the independence of Eritrea in 1993[166] but lacks the same legitimacy and consequences in relation to Oromia or other internal units of Ethiopia as these do not have historically given, internationally recognized borders which would be accepted by the international community (see below). Nevertheless, recent developments seem to have resulted in the emergence of new strategies which are available to the struggling parties, as Brigadier General Kamal Galchu, Chairman of OLF, confirmed when he declared that "OLF firmly announces a non-violent removal of the dictatorial regime of Ethiopia led by the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. We urge all interested parties to stand together for a unified action to end Meles Zenawi's regime."[167] In a response to Prime Minister Abyi Ahmed's call for unity and peace, the OLF has published a letter declaring its willingness to form a part of the rule of law but with an obvious goal to establish an independent state of Oromia: "Free Oromia will be the surest way of ensuring the collective security of its people. Living in a safe country, where people can live in peace and are able to bring up their children, is a basic human need. The alternative, continuing to sustain the forced unity of Oromia and Ethiopia, is recipe for disaster. "[168]

In the past two or three decades, sensitive debates and heated discussions have emerged in scholarly works and international conferences. In particular, the Oromo community in the Unites States has begun to work on the development of Oromo consciousness in the diaspora. The rhetoric they use is based on the "racial" differences between the Oromo and Amhara people, as

this is a historically proven fact. At least some part of Oromo studies has gained a strongly political impetus. As John Sorenson puts it: "The process of learning to be Oromo is not only a cultural project but a political one. The (re)discovery of Oromo identity is consistently linked with acceptance of the program of Oromo nationalism. Speakers continuously emphasize the importance of Oromo identity which is linked to the necessity to support the OLF rather than other organizations which claim to represent the Oromo people. No allowance is made for those who value a sense of Oromo ethnicity but do not support the OLF's nationalist program."[169]

Obviously, Sorenson's work has served as an unacceptable demagogy for many Oromo nationalists and it is in this context, not surprisingly, that his work has become the target of heated debates. Martha Kuwee Kumsa, for instance, blames him for having an anti-Oromo approach, favoring Eritrean independence while refusing the idea of Oromo self-determination.[170] On the other hand, nationalism in the diaspora does not only cover ethnic issues but is related to religion, because the Oromo community is divided into at least three parts, Christians (Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox), Muslims, and followers of the traditional Waaqefanna. This means that even the nationalist diaspora voice does not speak with a single voice.[171] The future will tell us if there is a unified voice of the Oromo nationalism or if there is a sharp difference between long-distance diaspora nationalism and various local forms of nationalism in Ethiopia.

Oromia in Regional Context

As already mentioned, the Horn of Africa belongs to a region characterized by a high number of more or less successful separatist movements and is also one of the most fragile regions in Africa. Eritrea and South Sudan are the only successful liberation movements in the modern and recent history of Africa, while the Republic of Somaliland, despite being one of the most stable elements in the Horn of Africa, is not an internationally recognized state.

When we talk about Oromia as one of the potentially secessionist regions, we should put it into a broader comparative perspective. In 1992, Amitai Etzioni, in reaction to the fall of the Soviet Empire and the creation of new states in Eastern Europe, analyzed the relationship between self-determination, nationalism, and colonialism. The article is called *The Evils of Self-Determination*, and one of the main arguments presented is that it is "impossible to sustain the notion that every group can find its expression in a full-blown nation-state, fly its flag at the United Nations, and have its ambassadors accredited by other nation-states; the process of ethnic separation and the breakdown of existing states will then never be exhausted."[172] One crucial aspect arises from Etzioni's article and that is the misleading vision of

many separatist movements that to have their own flag and head of state would definitely solve all the existing problems. If a state declares independence, it does not mean that it is going to exist in a different regional or international climate than it would without full independence. The recent case of Kosovo might be more than illustrative as it still is not recognized by a number of states. When it comes to regional affairs, Eritrean independence was largely welcomed by social scientists and the international community but soon afterwards, the country had to deal with new and old realities, including tense relations with the Sudan, war with Ethiopia, international isolation, Somalia's civil war and the Ethiopian invasion, disputes with Djibouti, etc.[173]

Viewing the problem of Oromia regionally, one may come to the conclusion that there is not enough space for so many states in the broader Horn, including the newly born South Sudan, the internationally unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, and what the recent above-mentioned statement of the OLF called "Free Oromia."[174] Moreover, there are some international obstacles which any new separatist attempt has to face, be it a certain reluctance on the part of international organizations to support such movements with limited degrees of legitimacy, or international charters or laws which make it harder for these movements to become successful. For instance, Article 23 of the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance says State Parties agree that the use, *inter alia,* of the following illegal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the Union:

1. Any putsch or coup d'etat against a democratically elected government.
2. Any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government.
3. Any replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissidents or rebels.
4. Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or
5. Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.[175]

Having said this, in order to create a new state, one should count on the full agreement of all interested parties, as was the case of the Sudan when the Southern Sudanese referendum came about as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Such an idea is almost impossible in Ethiopia, despite the theoretical opportunity for any federal state to proclaim independence, as written in the Federal Constitution of 1995 (The Constitution of the

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). A crucial problem for Oromia, when compared to other regions in the Horn of Africa, is a lack of historical legitimacy in terms of historical borders, its existence as a "pre-colonial" entity, as well as the fact that there exists little cohesion among Oromo political elites inside and outside Ethiopia. In this sense, both the Republic of Somaliland and Eritrea have an "advantage" because these were established by the British and Italians as control areas for further expansion (Italy) or for strategic reasons (Great Britain) during the Scramble for Africa. During the period of civil war Southern Sudan made historical claims similar to those of Senegal's Casamance, stating that the three southern provinces were administered separately by the British rulers and Southern Sudan was even supposed to become a part of British East Africa.[176] Oromia lacks this kind of historical heritage as the territory which is now known as the Oromia federal state was created by the Federal Constitution. No one therefore knows which borders Oromia would possibly have if the OLF's goal is one day going to be fulfilled.

The Republic of Somaliland was best described as a "people's project," and not a project of an elite, terms we have already used before which means that there either exists a broad political community (which in the case of Somaliland rejected the continuation and idea of a unitary state) or there does not.[177] Somaliland was shaped into a single community under the shelter of a British Protectorate, and as a result of subsequent events during the Siad Barré period, which led to Somaliland becoming detached from its southern fellows in Mogadishu. People from Somaliland, no matter from which clan identity, contributed to the process of developing and financing the state, thus providing its government with "a high degree of local legitimacy." Somalia is now reshaping its identity as the identities constructed during the struggle for independence were dismantled after the collapse of the state in 1991. Secularism was replaced by Islamism in the 1990s, military state by federal structure, and clan identities were "recognized and employed as a means of power sharing."[178] Even though a comparison in this case can be tricky, South Sudan witnessed a more or less similar experience as it was excluded from the initial pre-independence talks on self-determination, which together with other historical resentments and grievances led to the early formation of a secessionist movement.[179] Despite internal rivalries between the various ethnic groups in South Sudan (Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, etc.), there has been an overwhelming consensus in relation to the independence of South Sudan, resulting in a referendum in which almost 99% of people voted for independence.

Eritrean independence in 1991 (de facto, and in 1993 de jure) came into existence after thirty years of a liberation struggle. Eritrea, even though religiously, culturally, and linguistically at least partly related to its bigger neighbor (when it comes to the Christian population of the Highlands), was an

Italian colony, with internationally recognized borders. Its existence, as a political entity called Eritrea, was from the very beginning associated with colonial dominance. Under these circumstances, Eritrea was supposed to become an independent state like any other former colony of other European powers.

When compared to other regions in the Horn of Africa, Oromia more resembles South Sudan rather than Eritrea as it has no clearly defined, historically given borders, which is, by the way, one of the reasons why there are so many low-level conflicts in the border areas between North and South Oromia. In the history of Ethiopia, several Oromo states existed, as we have already seen, but there was never an entity called Oromia, with clearly defined, internationally recognized, indisputable borders. Leave alone the fact that Addis Ababa itself can become a major point of disagreements. Getahun Benti, for instance, argues that the Amhara conquest of what is now Addis Ababa was intended to de-urbanize the Oromo population and that "the Amhara created a socio-cultural frontier between themselves and the Oromo."[180] Nowadays, Addis Ababa is a melting pot where, of course, the Amharic language is dominant, but people from various corners of Ethiopia migrate there in order to find a better livelihood and jobs. Any transition of the status of Addis Ababa would be, at a minimum, complicated if not impossible as it stands as the only true metropolis in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the Addis Ababa Master Plan which was opposed and rejected by neighboring Oromo communities showed that even the extension of the capital city has its limits.

From the global context, any kind of international support for an independent Oromia or any other independent entity coming out of Ethiopia, is and will be minimal. Prime Minister Abiy's meeting with the US vice-president Mike Pence, who emphasized "improving respect for human rights, reforming the business environment, and making peace with Eritrea"[181] does not show any willingness to see further fragmentation of the Horn of Africa but rather peaceful democratization and collaboration. Even though the region of Oromia, economically very rich and politically marginalized, can make serious claims for independence when compared to Eritrea or South Sudan, it is not enough. Here, we may refer once again to Etzioni's article, *The Evils of Self-Determination*, because the situation of Oromia, despite all the negative developments which have taken place in Ethiopia, is not much different from dozens of regions or territories throughout the world, e.g., Malaysia (Subah and Sarawak), China (Uyghuristan) through Turkey (Kurdistan) to Mexico (Chiapas), where all groups claiming to be indigenous struggle for self-determination, political and economic emancipation, but rarely for independence. Conflicts and ongoing turbulences in Ethiopia, as we have seen, are a result of a combination of factors that include unresolved historical resentments, inequalities in terms of socio-economic development, political exclusion, ethnic favoritism, and last but not least, global context.

NOTES

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18. See Mario Genoio, "Les Relations Politiques, Economiques et Financiers entre l'Ethiopie, l'Italie et la France au Debut du 20e Siécle d'Aprés les Derniers Documents des Archives Italiennes," in: *Modern Ethiopia. From the Accession of Menelik II to the Present. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, edited by Joseph Tubiana (Valbonne 1980), 243–281.
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Conclusion

From the beginning of this monograph, we have been discussing the development of nationalism in Africa, and subsequent rise of various either separatist, irredentist, emancipation, or anti-governmental movements, forces, or dissatisfied youth organizations in the broader context of socio-economic, political, religious, environmental, as well as international/global affairs. Most of the African continent was, in one way or another, influenced by colonial past. One of the most significant impacts of colonialism was the categorization of ethnic groups and rather absent nation-building process that definitely influenced postcolonial political developments in most African countries. In some cases, such a legacy was so significant that it resulted in "racial" hatred as was the case of Rwanda. Links between local and global affairs, just like interconnectedness between different variables including political system, environment, society, religion, and many others, have had an impact also on Ethiopia, which has no direct experience with European colonialism, at least not in the sense of long-lasting occupation and implementation of European laws, concepts, and paradigms.

What was quite common throughout the continent was a clash between keeping an integration of states against ethnic fragmentation. Ethnic identity, during colonial times, was approached from a primordialist and essentialist point of view. Ethnic identities were seen as fixed, which was true not only in the case of Rwanda, and not permeable. However, in many cases ethnic grievances have been undermining the democratization process and stability due to historical resentments and entitlement to govern on the grounds that "one was a member of a liberation movement and aggrieved by the past regimes."[1] Mamphela Ramphele was writing this in regard to the South African democratization process, but at the same time it can be applied to many other cases and countries in Africa, including Ethiopia. The "right" to

rule, the "right" to govern, and the "right" to implement one's own policies seems to be a widespread phenomenon, not only in South Africa, but can be applied to multiple contexts including Ethiopia.

While the nation-building and state-building process in Europe lasted for centuries and resulted in the two biggest worlds in history of mankind, in Africa most of the states were artificially created by external forces and the nation-building process did not have much time to progress. Moreover, the Cold War context did not help in promotion of democratization, social and ethnic equality, political freedoms, and regional balances. Therefore, only since 1991 after the end of the Cold War has the continent been freed from external contexts, although not fully. However, how does one explain that in Ethiopia, which has never been systematically colonized by any European power, the process of nation-building as well as other processes such as the rise of Marxist movements, ethnic favoritism and centralization gained such a momentum?

One common feature of all previously mentioned conflicts or cases of violence is a lack of decentralization, which coincided with latent or almost absent civil society, undermined by authoritarian regimes unable to resolve the abuse of widespread social, ethnic, and religious inequalities. Whether the state inherited a colonial system based on multiple inequalities in state administration, educational system, access to public goods, social mobility, or citizenship, or was—like Ethiopia—a non-colonized country built on an extremely high level of centralization, the result was more or less similar. The tendency to find a space for an alternative to the regime(s) either in terms of a Marxist movement, rebel guerilla, youth gang, or an armed liberation front usually came up as a result of a series of failures caused by either a weak state or by a strong, omnipresent state. This was true for both Mobutu's Congo in his heyday, as well as for Ethiopia during both Imperial and Marxist eras, as it is true for today's Ethiopia since the 1991. Moreover, identities (ethnic, religious, other), as we have seen, have been largely exploited and abused by the governments as primordial or essentialist concepts, which for a long time were undermining a free and fair political environment based on quality of leadership and not on the level of mass mobilization of particular ethnic or religious groups who benefited from this imbalance.

Lack of capacity, or extreme capacity and omnipresence of state(s) was one dimension of the growing number of tensions and violence in postcolonial Africa. The second was a combination of three unresolved issues that connect Ethiopia with many other African countries and therefore, seem not to be so much related to European colonial legacy, at least not directly. One of the main reasons and root causes of violence is not free access to land. This is particularly true about Ethiopia but can be found in many other states in Africa. When in Ethiopia, we can see that land has never been a matter of private ownership, and very much centralized, state-controlled access to land

has led to numerous cases of dissatisfaction, displacement, and large-scale investment projects that have had direct impact on the lives of thousands of people.

The second aspect of dissatisfaction is social and socio-economic inequality based on an absence of free and fair principles of law and justice that would not discriminate, oppress or abuse law and order. A perfect example could be the existence of the so-called anti-terrorist laws that came to existence shortly after 9/11. One of the countries that came up with this type of law was Ethiopia, which is frequently using this law against bloggers, journalists, civil society members, as well as opposition politicians. The last media example took place at the beginning of 2017 when Dr. Merera Gudina was imprisoned after returning from Brussels where he was invited to deliver a speech concerning the state of emergency and anti-governmental protests in Ethiopia. Such abuse of law and justice is usually a sign of much greater and larger problems. One of the main features of most of the African states in the postcolonial era was their lack of diversification of their economies. Focus on one commodity, lack of political elite, poor access to higher education, and doubtful quality of political leadership in some cases resulted in acts of mass violence. These masses were mobilized either along ethnic, religious, or social lines (members of disadvantaged communities, peasants, urban youth, etc.).

The last factor that usually comes into play and that has been mentioned already several times, is ethnicity. Ethnicity has been so much politicized not only in Ethiopia but in many other countries too, that it has become impossible to base a legitimate rule without having a stable ethnic background. In Ethiopia, it is a Tigrayan political elite that keeps control over military, economic, and political sectors, just like in Congo/Zaïre under Mobutu it was the Ngbandi ethnic group that kept the main powers, and in Gabon Omar Bongo favored his own Bateke ethnic group. Rather than being a "typical" feature of colonial regimes, such ethnic inequalities that go through all spheres of society are a feature of authoritarian, centralized, and poorly economically diversified countries where the struggle for resources (be it oil, gas, cotton, coffee, water, or land) becomes very much ethnicized and regionalized.

Although we may agree with Chabal and Daloz that "Africa works," still there is a potential and space for eliminating risks emanating from dysfunctional, or on the other hand omnipresent states. In the last chapter we discussed the "evils" of self-determination and the fact that the international community is not particularly willing to accept new states emerging from particularly strategic territories such as the Horn of Africa. Although, for instance, Paul Collier does not believe in ethnicity being the main factor of conflicts in Africa,[2] it definitely, just like any other group identity (particularly religion), serves as a mobilizing factor. In the twenty-first century,

people can be mobilized even on social media, as was the case of the so-called Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. Authoritarian governments usually react by blocking the media and coming up with their own propaganda, accusing external threats of disseminating fear and violence. However, the lack of access to information may likely result in people gathering "on the street" to obtain information and such a simple gathering may likely turn into demonstrations against the government.

Therefore, solutions to conflicts, though challenging to find and implement, lie mostly in the continuous process of decentralization, self-rule and shared-rule and de-politicization of ethnicity through building a society based on civil rights, equality, and diversified economy—a process that may likely last for generations but that is necessary and shows its fruits, as is the example of countries such as Botswana or Mauritius. The case of Ethiopia is specific in one more aspect. Ethiopia is a country with about one hundred million inhabitants; it is the most strategic partner in an international community in the "war on terror." Therefore, any kind of destabilization caused by multiple factors such as socio-economic marginalization, ethnic favoritism, as well as absence of free access to land may likely result in serious crisis or even fragmentation that would have disastrous consequences for the whole region. Therefore, one of the main interests of an international community should be to work with the governments in order to promote a social and equality concept that can be beneficial for economic development as well.

NOTES

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About the Author

Jan Záhořík (1979) is an Africanist/historian currently serving as associate professor at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. His research focus includes modern and contemporary history and politics of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, colonial and postcolonial history, relations between former Czechoslovakia and Africa in the Cold War, as well as migration and mobility in Africa. He has lectured at many universities in Europe, Africa, and North America. His recent publications include *Colonialism on the Margins of Africa* (co-edited with Linda Piknerová, 2018), *Beyond the Arab Spring in North Africa* (co-edited with Daniel Křížek, 2017), and *The Horn of Africa since the 1960s. Local and International Politics Intertwined* (co-edited with Aleksi Ylönen, 2017).