HEGEL'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

Giorgi Lebanidze

Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology

Hegel's Transcendental Ontology

Giorgi Lebanidze

LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Name: Lebanidze, Giorgi, 1973–, author.
Title: Hegel's transcendental ontology / Giorgi Lebanidze.
Description: Lanham, MD : Lexington Books, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018046744 (print) | LCCN 2018048341 (ebook) | ISBN 9781498561341 (electronic) | ISBN 9781498561334 (cloth : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. | Concepts. | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. Wissenschaft der Logik.
Classification: LCC B2949.C49 (ebook) | LCC B2949.C49 L42 2018 (print) | DDC 111—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018046744

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

List of Abbreviations vii

Introduction ix

1 Hegel's Critique of Alternative Positions 1
2 Determinations of Reflection and Generation of Conceptual Content 31
3 Hegel's Theory of the Concept and Its Kantian Origins 53
4 The Moments of the Concept 73
5 Failed Forms of Syllogistic Mediation 97
6 The Syllogism of Necessity 119

Bibliography 139

Index 145

About the Author 151

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations for frequently cited primary texts are given below; details for less frequently cited texts are given in full in the notes.

EL Hegel's *The Encyclopaedia Logic*. Excerpts from Hegel's *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science with the Zustz*, translated, with introduction and notes, by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Hackett 1991). Reprinted by permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

SL Hegel's *The Science of Logic*. Edited and translated by George di Giovanni. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *The Science of Logic*, © George di Giovanni 2010, published by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission.

Introduction

The recent debate over Hegel's philosophy is carried out along the lines of the Kantian-epistemological vs. metaphysical interpretations of his position. Those belonging to the first camp understand Hegel as the figure who brought the Kantian epistemological turn in philosophy to its completion, leaving behind the questions of traditional metaphysics regarding the ultimate structure of reality that underlies the mere appearance and true nature of God, soul, and the world. The general line taken by these commentators is that although Hegel does not stop short of using the terminology of traditional metaphysics (such as God, infinite, absolute, etc.), the philosophically significant core of his position is independent of these archaic elements, which therefore can be lifted out of his overall corpus without sustaining any philosophically significant loss. Though not always explicitly acknowledged, these Hegel scholars stand in the long tradition of trying to rescue what is alive in Hegel from what is dead and ought to be left behind. The essential kernel of Hegel's system worth rescuing, according to these commentators, is the Kantian transcendental project brought to its completion.

The central figure among the commentators who consider the completion of Kantian transcendental epistemology central to Hegel's legacy is Robert Pippin, whose groundbreaking *Hegel's Idealism,* published in 1989, set a new stage in Hegel scholarship. In the book, Pippin aims to demonstrate that the issues most important to Hegel's project can be traced back to Kantian critical epistemology. Uncovering the Kantian origins of Hegel's philosophy, according to Pippin and his followers, allows us to interpret Hegel as a post-Kantian epistemologist whose doctrine can be set free of any substantive ontological commitments. This approach invites us to read Hegel's two central works, *Logic* and *Phenomenology,* as investigations within the normative authority of the pure concepts of understanding as the means by which reality

can be cognized, and to do so without ascribing to Hegel any substantive commitments regarding the nature of this reality. The image of Hegel that emerges as a result of this account is that of a transcendental epistemologist who replaces the Kantian formal account of the pure concepts of the understanding with a more robust exposition of the conceptual schemata as the medium of making sense of the world while putting aside questions of metaphysical nature.

Pippin's work brought about two invaluable contributions to Hegel scholarship. First, he left behind the hitherto dominant onto-theological readings of Hegel that construed him as a philosopher of the *world-soul* who had reconstructed the problems and issues of traditional metaphysical systems on historicist grounds, but essentially addressed the very same questions as his rationalist predecessors and offered answers to them from the point of view of God. Second, Pippin made it possible for Hegel to speak to contemporary philosophers by translating his complicated technical vocabulary—such as "in itself vs. for itself," "infinite being immanent to the finite," "freedom as being with itself in its other," etc.—into a language much more accessible to those schooled in the analytic tradition. Hence for a sizable number of professional philosophers Hegel as an obscure thinker of only historical value was transformed into a figure who has much to offer to those engaged in current debates in epistemology and semantics.

The alternative approach that emerged in the years following the publication of Pippin's work aims at reinstating the image of Hegel as a metaphysical thinker. But this is not simply an attempt to go back to any version of the traditional reading that dominated Hegel scholarship prior to the publication of Pippin's work. What sets the commentators like Robert Stern and Brady Bowman apart from the traditional readings of Hegel, which also ascribed to him a metaphysical position, is that they elaborate their positions self-consciously on the background and in contradistinction to Pippin's Hegel. The most vivid evidence of this is that these commentators take distancing Hegel from Kant as the touchstone for ascribing to him any form of metaphysical view. It is because Pippin and his followers take the Kantian dimension of Hegel's project as the grounds for advancing a non-metaphysical reading that the authors of the new metaphysical interpretations see distancing Hegel from Kant as a necessary condition for a successful execution of their project.

Hence, while Rolf-Peter Horstmann in his work that preceded and coincided with the publication of Pippin's book could comfortably present Hegel as upholding a certain ontological theory, while at the same time standing within the tradition of the Kantian critical philosophy, the new interpreters like Robert Stern and Brady Bowman clearly feel the need for decoupling Hegel's project from Kant's in order to ascribe to him any substantive ontological commitments. Bowman, for example, writes, "To be a philosopher

self-consciously working in the wake of Kant's 'fortunate revolution' is [not] necessarily to be engaged in a project that is continuous with transcendental idealism or one that needs to recognize the peculiar limitations Kant sought to impose on thought. Post Kant is not necessarily propter Kant."[1] For Bowman, the path to demonstrating that Hegel is upholding a metaphysical theory lies in showing that his project diverges radically from Kant's. In the same vein, Stern writes,

> Kant may be seen as proposing a dilemma to the traditional ontologist: Either he can proceed by abstracting from the spatio-temporal appearances of things in an attempt to speculate about things as they are in themselves, . . . and get him nowhere with things in themselves; or he can attempt to work with less formal principles, that take into account the spatio-temporal features of things—but then he must accept that he is no longer inquiring into being qua being.[2]

Here Stern is drawing two alternative options that were left to choose from after Kant, and he ends up placing Hegel closer to the traditional camp by describing him as having "much greater sympathy for the traditional approach than the Kantian one, which he often presents as a kind of modern faint-heartedness, a falling back from the admirable confidence in the power of thought and reason to take us to the heart of things that the metaphysical tradition . . . was able to display."[3] Clearly, it is due to the depth and breadth of Pippin's impact on the recent Hegel scholarship that both Bowman and Stern see no other alternative but to decouple Hegel from Kant in order to ascribe to him an ontological theory.

The debate between these two camps rests on a false dilemma, as both sides assume that the Kantian and metaphysical readings mutually exclude each other. I will argue that not only is it possible, but in order to do justice to the complexity of his position we must read Hegel as both (a) continuing the Kantian Transcendental project, and (b) advancing a qualitatively new kind of ontology (I shall use the term ontology, rather than metaphysics, for reasons that will become clear shortly) having left the traditional pre-critical metaphysics fully behind. Elaboration of an alternative approach is the task undertaken in this book. I will present a detailed account of the key features of what I will be referring to as Hegel's Transcendental Ontology.

The project can be described as consisting of three essential facets. First, I will show that the ontological theory Hegel is advancing is fundamentally different from traditional metaphysics, and therefore the recent metaphysical readings advance views that are more misguiding than helpful in understanding Hegel's position. Second, I will demonstrate that this qualitatively new ontological outlook is elaborated against the backdrop of Kant's critical philosophy. Hegel lays out his system while standing on the foundation posited by Kant's Copernican turn and via integration of the key aspects of the

critical philosophy into his basic framework. One way to think of this relation is along the lines of the Kuhnian theory of the establishment of new scientific paradigms that brings along with it new background commitments and assumptions. What sets a paradigm shift apart from an ordinary replacement of one scientific theory with another, is that in it one system of fundamental beliefs and normative assumptions are replaced by another. As Kuhn puts it, "When paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. . . . scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet . . . we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world."[4] Kant's critical philosophy inaugurates something like a paradigm shift that makes the elaboration of Hegelian ontology possible. To use Kuhn's vocabulary, traditional metaphysics and Hegelian ontology are describing different worlds. Although both are views about the ultimate nature of reality and, upon first glance, the Hegelian model might appear as one more theory amongst the many that had been formulated before him, when more carefully examined, it becomes apparent that we are dealing with a radical transformation of the most fundamental aspects of the traditional view. Let us take as an example, the central concept of ontology, *being*. Traditional metaphysics juxtaposes being to thought. Being is what characterizes the things that exist, and exist independently of thought, while thought is there to represent or specify properties of and relations between the things that exist or have being. With Hegel on the other hand we have a theory of being which is construed as grounded on thought. Thought no longer externally represents being, instead it can represent being because thought is the condition of its possibility. *Being* is far from unique in this respect, the most fundamental background commitments and assumption have undergone a radical reformulation. Hence, after Hegel as a result of the paradigm shift, we are responding to a different world and the shift was initiated by Kant's Copernican revolution. Hence, spelling out the Kantian origins of this transformation and taking a close look at its details will be one of the central tasks of my undertaking here.

Finally, the ultimate goal of the project is to present a detailed account of the key element of Hegel's transcendental ontology. As I will argue, it is in the Doctrine of the Concept, and in its Syllogism section, where Hegel presents the most fundamental account of his conception of actuality. Therefore, a close analysis of these parts of the *Logic* will be the central task undertaken in the book. As is, we shall see that the detailed presentation of the basic underpinnings of Hegel's ontology will serve as the most conclusive confirmation of the above two points as well. It is only after a comprehensive account of Hegel's vision of actuality is brought to light that we can

fully appreciate both its indebtedness to Kant and the extent to which it departs from traditional metaphysical theories.

PIPPIN, BRANDOM, AND MY READING

The interpretation that I'll be offering here is inspired by Pippin's Kantian reading of Hegel. I agree with the overall thrust of Pippin's approach regarding the Kantian origins of Hegel's system, as well as the rejection of the traditional metaphysical model that follows from this. To do the contrary and position Hegel close to the pre-Kantian metaphysic means, as I will argue, not only to fail to appreciate the revolutionary nature of his position, but also to radically misinterpret it. Hence, I agree with Pippin's claim that "Hegel's speculative position . . . his theory of the Absolute Idea, his claim that such an Idea alone is 'what truly is' could be interpreted and defended in a way that is not committed to a philosophically problematic theological metaphysics."[5] Indeed, as laying out the detailed picture of Hegel's position will make evident, one has to fundamentally misunderstand the Hegelian basic conceptual framework to see him as pursuing a project similar to traditional metaphysics. But at the same time, to claim that Hegel is not committed to "a philosophically problematic theological metaphysics" is not the same as to claim that he is not upholding any ontological stance at all. To claim that it is the absolute idea that "what truly is," as Hegel does according to Pippin himself, means nothing short of taking up certain ontological commitments. If this claim has any meaning at all, it belongs to the sphere of ontology.

I also agree with Pippin's broad-brush outline of the formula for "getting Hegel from Kant":

> Keep the doctrine of pure concepts and the account of apperception that helps justify the necessary presupposition of pure concepts, keep the critical problem of a proof for the objectivity of these concepts, the question that began critical philosophy, but abandon the doctrine of 'pure sensible intuition,' and the very possibility of a clear distinction between concepts and intuitions, and what is left is much of Hegel's enterprise.[6]

And Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism* indeed presents a comprehensive application of this formula through the detailed analysis of Hegel's two central texts, the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*.

The approach I'm taking in this book is different. Instead of presenting a comprehensive account of Hegel's corpus, I will almost exclusively focus on those few sections of his *Logic* that I consider to be essential for understanding the animating principle of his position. The narrowness of the focus, however, does not mean that here I am offering a commentary on certain sections of the *Logic* and am not interested in Hegel's overall position.

Contrary to this, my goal is to present an interpretation of the cornerstone principles of Hegel's system. And the best strategy for accomplishing this goal, in my view, instead of presenting a chapter-by-chapter reading of his texts, is to set aside the peripheral husk of his corpus and focus exclusively on its essential core. Hence, by a close dissection of the internal structure of Hegel's theory of the Concept and fleshing out the nature of its moments as well as of the relational schema that ties them together, I will be offering a comprehensive account of the kernel of his system. This in turn will enable us to make better sense of the rest of the *Logic* as well as his system in general. Moreover, it is through the identification of the Kantian footprints in this key part of his system that the claim of continuity between the projects of the two philosophers will be advanced.

Another important figure amongst the non-metaphysical interpreters of Hegel is Robert Brandom, who alongside Pippin reads Hegel as pursuing a Kantian project. But Brandom sees him as best understood when projected onto the plane of problems and issues of semantics. In his paper "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel," Brandom suggests to read Hegel as advancing a two-tiered semantic theory that discriminates between the logical vs. empirical (ordinary or non-logical) concepts. Clearly, the move is directly emanating from the Kantian distinction between the logical forms of judgment and the categories on the one hand, and the empirical concepts on the other. According to Brandom, while the ordinary determinate concepts "make explicit how the world is," the logical ones "make explicit the process by which determinate content is conferred on or incorporated in the ground-level empirical and practical concepts."[7] He wants to replace the monistic metaphysics that used to be traditionally ascribed to Hegel with a semantic holism, according to which empirical concepts taken together with the inferential relation between them and the doxastic commitments in which they are employed form an interrelated holistic system. Hence, a judgment or an inferential relation, wherein a single or a few elements of a given constellation of concepts are employed directly, indirectly or mediately involves the systematic whole. An endorsement of a new judgment is mirrored in a modification of the conceptual content of the totality of the system. A modification of the conceptual content of any given element of the system will have its impact on the potential or actual judgment made by means of the other elements that comprise the given system.

I agree with Brandom in his delineation between the logical and the empirical concepts, as well as with his view regarding their relation to one another. The former, instead of serving as the medium through which the world is made manifest to the mind, constitutes the schemata that determine the relation between empirical concepts and guides the process of their formation. Logical concepts, according to Brandom, comprise a set of meta-concepts that, instead of telling us about how the world is, tell us about the

processes of formation of the concepts, which tell us how the world is. Much of the analysis of Hegel's position that follows will be carried out with this Brandomian distinction in mind. The close reading of the *Logic* shows that Hegel presents an account of these key elements of ontological structure grasped on different levels: first, he examines these elements one by one in "The Doctrine of Essence"; and later, in "The Doctrine of the Concept," he present the structural relation within which the process of their application is integrated as its component. The empirical, or ordinary, concepts are different from the system presented in Hegel's ontological account in that they are necessarily unstable and incomplete; they undergo a continuous revision and reformulation of their content. Now according to Brandom, any set of empirical concepts, through the process of their application in empirical judgments and the clarification of the inferential relations between them, will be necessarily driven to contradiction—this is what he calls the *semantic pessimism* of Hegel as he reads him. In chapter 2, I will present a somewhat different reading of the function that contradiction has within the process of generation of empirical content.

Brandom, like Pippin before him, opens up a new dimension in which Hegel's philosophy can be approached, by pointing to the multifaceted framework present within the Hegelian corpus that needs to be further fleshed out and elaborated in greater detail. The discussion that follows will be dedicated to the analysis of the key passages from the *Logic*, in which Hegel presents elements of this framework. One important aspect of the project I'm undertaking here is to present a detailed account of several key elements of what Brandom calls *the system of Hegel's logical concepts*. Besides having a great exegetic value in rendering accessible some of the murkiest parts of Hegel's corpus, this Brandomian approach will also serve as a demonstration of the futility of attempts to tie Hegel's stance with the traditional pre-Kantian metaphysics, as the system of logical concepts uncovered through this analysis obviously corresponds to the logical forms of judgment on which Kant grounded his pure concepts of the understanding. This is one more clear evidence that the Hegelian system is elaborated within the post-Kantian paradigm, and any attempts to reduce its problematic to those dealt by the pre-critical tradition is destined to fail in doing justice to it. At the same time, it will also become evident that the position put forth is not free of a specific kind of ontological claims—ontology not in the traditional sense but in the post-Kantian sense of the word—the doctrine of being qua grounded on thought. In fact, I hope to show that the Brandomian approach best realizes its potential when embedded in the overall context of reading Hegel's project as transcendental ontology.

Pippin's and Brandom's non-metaphysical readings have some clear advantages over the approaches that place Hegel within the pre-critical metaphysical tradition. First, only against the Kantian backdrop is it possible to

make sense of the large part of Hegel's logic that deals with the essential core of his philosophical system—his Doctrine of the Essence and Doctrine of the Concept. Only with the Kantian theory of the logical functions of judgment comprising the transcendental structure that guides the activity of the mind on which the object is grounded does it become possible to make sense of what Hegel is doing in Doctrine of the Essence. It is the Kantian transcendental turn that posits the ground based on which the theory that grants to the determinations of reflection the constitutive role for the actuality as is done in Doctrine of the Essence. Any serious interpretation of Hegel's *Logic* has to acknowledge that what Hegel is doing there is clearly geared to the completion of the project that Kant labeled as the Copernican revolution in philosophy. Secondly, Pippin and Brandom demonstrate how much potential the Kantian readings have when it comes to re-enlivening Hegel's philosophy and making it relevant to contemporary problems and debates in epistemology, semantics, ethics, etc. Once these strengths of the Kantian interpretations are brought to the fore, the backward-looking traditional readings that discard the liveliest aspects of Hegel's thought lose all their appeal.

At the same time, Pippin's and Brandom's attempts to maintain neutrality with respect to ontology contribute very little to the strength of their approach. This resistance to embrace what clearly has plenty of textual evidence is a remnant of the complete rejection of metaphysics that for a long time dominated the Anglophone academic philosophy. One significant current in this overall approach, which probably had influenced Pippin and Brandom, originates in the Quinian privileging of epistemology over ontology. Quine, in his influential paper "On What There Is," argued that it is possible to isolate epistemological and semantic concerns from the ontological commitment and to formulate epistemological theory, i.e., theory about the *cognition* of reality, while having bracketed the question of what this reality is like. But it does not take too much effort to see that Quine, instead of staying neutral regarding ontological commitments, is simply presupposing a basic Cartesian kind of dualistic ontology.

In a similar way, the shadow of the Cartesian type of dualistic ontology is following the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel. By neglecting the issue or attempting to stay neutral regarding ontological commitments and focusing instead on epistemological and semantic problems, a risk emerges of inadvertently enforcing an ontological outlook utterly foreign to Hegel. An ontological backdrop seems to me to be a necessary condition for the elaboration of any epistemological or semantic theory. To put forth, for example, a theory of knowledge, one has to as a minimum answer these questions: What kind of thing is that which is known? What is the nature of that which knows? What form of being does knowledge as such have? By ignoring these questions, we are not obviating the need for providing answers to them. Instead, we are actually answering them but doing this implicitly. Brandom,

for example, claims that "good reasons to endorse a strong holism concerning the senses (*but not referents*) of ordinary determinate concepts do not oblige one to adopt a corresponding thesis concerning the contents expressed by the logical and philosophical meta-vocabulary we use to discuss and explicate those ground-level concepts."[8] His description of the senses of different conceptual sets and the contrast that he draws with their referents has a clear dualistic ontological implication of a Cartesian or Fregean kind. Also, Pippin's claim that Hegel's position "is not an attack on the possibility of an extraconceptual reality 'in itself,' but on the internal coherence of the notion of such an object as an object of thought"[9] has a strong flavor of dualistic ontology to it. The bottom line is that there is no epistemology or semantics possible without corresponding ontological commitments; by merely pretending that we are offering an ontology-neutral interpretation of Hegel, not only are we undermining the force and originality of his system, but also unwittingly ascribing to him a kind of ontology that goes in direct contradiction with the one to which Hegel was himself committed.

KANTIAN ONTOLOGY

The just outlined shortcomings of the Kantian readings of Hegel are particularly regrettable considering that advancing a Kantian reading does not commit us to rejecting Hegel's ontological commitments. When in *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant offers replacing "the proud ontology" by an analytic of the pure understanding, "the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding,"[10] he is not simply rejecting ontology as such. Kant is not denying here that we can have a theory about the inventory of things that are, as the entire "Transcendental Analytic" is nothing else but an exposition of the constitutive factors of the empirical reality. What he is rejecting is the basic ontological assumptions of the tradition preceding him. Kant abandons the idea of the possibility of a priori science of things that are independent of our cognitive constitution. He rejects the possibility of the synthetic a priori knowledge of the noumenal world underlying the phenomenal realm. In other words, not that ontology is not possible, but that it is not possible in the way the pre-critical tradition conceived it; and, therefore, it ought to be replaced by a new type of inquiry into the nature of being for which the analysis of the power of the understanding plays the central role.

The new type of ontology that becomes possible as a result of Kant's Copernican turn puts aside the task of investigating the nature of transcendent being and turns to the examination of the inventory of the phenomenal reality and the faculty of the understanding as its constitutive element. The

fundamental claim of the new Kantian ontology is made in the famous passage from the transcendental deduction—the object is that in the concept of which the manifold of intuitions is united.[11] The spelling out and justification of the structure of the unification and the forms involved with this unity is largely the central task of the Transcendental Analytic of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence, the Kantian approach is the polar opposite of the Quinian one—instead of privileging epistemology over ontology, it is the other way around: empirical objects are cognizable, i.e., we can be epistemological optimists regarding the spatio-temporal objects because they are conditioned by the cognitive structure of the transcendental apperception. It is the transcendental ontology that grounds Kant's epistemology, not vice versa. This point is put succinctly in the well-known claim from the Introduction to *The Critique of Pure Reason* that "reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design."[12]

The two different ways of thinking of ontology correspond to the two senses in which Kant uses the word *metaphysics*. The first one is related to the old tradition that he exposes as the dreams of reason and the other to the contribution that reason makes to the constitution of the realm of experience. According to the former approach, metaphysics is a study of the unconditioned that lies behind the conditioned, or the apparent reality, and is the source of all meaning. This is the conception of metaphysics that Heidegger traced as emerging in Plato's philosophy; with this development, according to him, "the change in the essence of truth, a change that becomes the history of metaphysics" is taking place.[13] Truth becomes correspondence between assertion and being interpreted as idea, and the history of metaphysics as the search of this eternal unchanging truth takes its origins here.

> Plato himself concretely illustrates the basic outline of metaphysics in the story recounted in the "allegory of the cave." In fact, the coining of the word 'metaphysics' is already prefigured in Plato's presentation. In the passage (516) that depicts the adaptation of the gaze to the ideas, Plato says (516 c3): Thinking goes *beyond* those things that are experiences in the form of mere shadows and images, and goes *out towards* these things, namely, the "ideas."[14]

This is the conception of metaphysics that Kant calls "worm-eaten dogmatism,"[15] and he thinks of it as left behind for good by his critical philosophy.

But Kant also talks about "a metaphysics that has been purified through criticism,"[16] the metaphysics that directs its gaze not "beyond those things that are experiences" but investigates the immanent structure and the conditions of the possibility of these very "things or objects that are experienced." One way to describe the effects of Kant's critical philosophy is a transformation of metaphysics into transcendental ontology. In medieval philosophy,

the investigation of the nature and origins of the unconditioned supersensible reality—the heirs of the Platonic Ideas—came to be known as *metaphysica specialis*, to be contrasted with the science of being qua being that was concerned with the basic categories of being (*metaphysica generalis*). As such, the way it was conceived before Kant, metaphysics had to offer a two-tiered ontological account or two kinds of ontology: on the one hand the science of being of the transcendent substances, which we can call transcendent ontology, and on the other hand an account of the nature of ordinary objects of experience that were deemed as "mere shadows" of the underlying true reality. With Kant's Copernican revolution, the entire undertaking of the *metaphysica specialis* is rendered futile, as is the part of *metaphysica generalis* that I described as transcendent ontology. The only viable option for metaphysical investigation post-Kant is the inquiry into the nature of the realm of experience. Considering Kant's definition of the term "transcendental" as "our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori,"[17] and the nature of Hegel's undertaking as the systematic account of the basic determinations of the realm of experience as well as the ontological schema that is immanently structuring it, I shall call his undertaking *transcendental ontology*. In other words, with Kant, two fundamental changes take place: a) the basic categories of being are traced back to the cognitive constitution of the subject, and b) the scope of these categories is confined to experience. Therefore, the domain of metaphysics is reduced to laying out a complete account of the elements immanent to experience but not originating in it, hence available to reason prior to experience via its self-examination. This is the basic framework that Hegel uses as the starting point of his project. Thus, we can say that the metaphysics in his hands is transfigured into transcendental ontology. As we will see, Hegel does not accept every aspect of Kant's project and significantly modifies it. He is particularly keen on overcoming the Kantian psychologism that confines the limits of reason to certain rules of activity of the mind. But essentially, the overall thrust of his transcendental ontology is Kantian through and through.

Hegel's theory of the Concept, which I will be examining closely in what follows, is, on the one hand, the kernel of his ontology and, on the other hand, also his appropriation and radicalization of Kant's notion of the transcendental apperception and possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. We will see that the Concept has the same self-relational structure as the Kantian apperception, and just like the latter it also is the source of the basic determinations of thought that ground empirical objects. Now, where Hegel goes beyond Kant is that he gets rid of the need for any additional elements for the objective purport of these determinations of thought. While Kant maintained that concepts without intuitions are empty and therefore can yield no knowledge, for Hegel there is no need for any additional objectifying element besides concepts themselves. He also transforms the Kantian

transcendental apperception as a self-relational structure into the basic ontological schema. Self-relationality for Hegel is not a feature of an individual consciousness but the fundamental structure of reality that accounts for (a) the process of generation of conceptual content, (b) the nature of the system of these concepts and their interrelation to one another, and (c) the relationship of these two to the entities that are individuated through them. His claim will be that the very same functions that Kant presented in his famous table of the forms of judgment from the metaphysical deduction guide the process of generation of empirical concepts. These concepts form an interconnected whole, and they serve as the conditions of the possibility of individuation of objects of experience.

While for Kant the locus of a priori synthesis is the individual mind, for Hegel the same role is played by the Concept, which functions as the fundamental synthetic structure that generates and grounds the determinations of thought as well as the actuality as we know it. Hence Pippin is both right and wrong when he claims that the most important revision of Kant that we find in Hegel is his revision of Kant's theory of concepts.[18] He is right in the sense that concepts in Hegel no longer need sensible given in order to have objective purport. The determinations of thought that are generated through the synthetic activity of the Hegelian Concept render reality accessible for us without any external element. But Pippin ignores that these concepts are capable of rendering reality accessible for us because they constitute the system of determinations that underlie and ground reality insofar as it can be known by us. This is where my reading differs the most from Pippin's. In my view, because he turns a blind eye to the ontological dimension of Hegel's project, Pippin does not fully appreciate the extent to which the Kantian notion of concept is transformed in Hegel's hand. Concept on the most fundamental level of Hegel's ontology refers not to the determination of thought that allows the mind to grasp reality; instead, it is the basic ontological substructure of reality that includes empirical concepts (as one of its moments) but is not limited to it. The Hegelian Concept instead of representing objective reality is the fundamental structure of objectivity. As Horstmann puts it:

> (1) Ontologische—im Unterschied z. B. zu psychologischer, mathematischer oder physikalischer—Realität oder Wirklichkeit kommt einem Gegenstand für Hegel nur dann zu, wenn er als Gegenstand in Wahrheit betrachtet werden kann. (2) Das, was ein Gegenstand in Wahrheit ist, ist der Begriff dieses Gegenstandes, nicht seine Vorstellung. (1) und (2) zusammen legen fest, dass—unangesehen dessen, was sich denn nun als Gegenstand in Wahrheit oder als wirklicher Gegenstand qualifiziert—das, was dieser Gegenstand in Wahrheit ist, sein Begriff ist.[19]

Hence to approach it exclusively in the epistemological light and ignore its primary, ontological, function, amounts to depriving the Concept of its true significance for Hegel's system.

Hegel makes it very clear that the Concept should not be understood as a mental phenomenon; "the concept is also not to be considered here as the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as subjective understanding, but as the concept in and for itself which constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit."[20] Hegel's *Logic* is a comprehensive ontological account of the implications of Kant's transcendental logic. It is an ontological theory that presents the fundamental schema of actuality that ground both being and thought. The *Logic* commences with the determinations on being, then moves to the stage that reveals thought and its determinations as underlying ground of the categories of being, and finally arrives at the account of the basic structure that is described as the "foundation and truth"[21] of the previous two stages. Hence, the overall structure of the *Logic* reflects the Kantian thesis that concept grounds empirical being. Hegel undertakes a comprehensive inquiry into the question—What should the nature of the concept in order for it to function as the underlying structure of actuality? And consequently, which entities will qualify as the true object grounded on this ontological structure? For example, the Kantian *thing in itself* has no place in Hegel's ontology as it can have no *being.* This becomes apparent at an early stage of the *Logic*. Thing in itself for Kant is by definition unknowable; it stands beyond the domain of applicability of the categories. But as Hegel shows, anything that has being will also necessarily have the other conceptual determinations laid out in The Doctrine of Being (not to mention its substructures from The Doctrine of Essence and The Doctrine of the Concept). Thus Hegel's transcendental ontology is a theory of the world as it is and can be known by us, for anything that has being also necessarily possesses the conceptual structure that is accessible by us: "Logic has nothing to do with a thought about something which stands outside by itself as the base of thought; nor does it have to do with forms meant to provide mere markings of the truth; rather, the necessary forms of thinking, and its specific determinations, are the content and the ultimate truth itself."[22]

TRADITIONALIST READINGS

According to the interpretation I'll be offering in this book, the Kantian readings of Hegel are mostly right, while the opposite side—the traditionalist readings—is mostly misguided. The shared mistaken assumption of Bowman and Stern is that reading Hegel as engaged in some form of traditional metaphysics is a necessary condition for ascribing to him any ontological views. Therefore, in spite of the many insightful and interesting aspects of their

interpretations, they end up advancing a picture of Hegel that is fundamentally misconstrued. Hegel's position cannot be reduced to a form of Aristotelian metaphysics as Stern does, nor can his arguments be illuminated by translating them into the scholastic vocabulary (of formal vs. objective reality) as Bowman ends up doing. The reason for this is that Hegel's ontology is post-Kantian through and through. Once more, the difference between Hegel and traditional metaphysics can be seen as the difference between two scientific theories divided by a paradigm shift. To use the Kuhnian analogy again, just like *mass* before and after the elaboration of the theory of relativity means fundamentally different things (even though on a superficial level it might appear identical), so do the basic elements of the conceptual framework—for example, *being*, *contradiction*, *concept*—have fundamentally different meanings in the Hegelian vs. traditional ontology.

Bowman, in his *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity,* claims that "Hegel is committed to a rationalist tradition in Western philosophy that stretches from Anaxagoras to Leibniz and Wolff and which teaches the unboundedness of scientific knowledge."[23] Contrary to this, Bowman sees Kant as waging an attack on the identity of "being and intelligibility"[24] and therefore undermining the unboundedness of scientific knowledge. Hence, Hegel's philosophical undertaking is framed as aiming to resuscitate the "the chief casualty of this [Kantian] attack on rationalism [which] was traditional metaphysics and its commitments to the knowability of the unconditioned, of being as it is in itself."[25] Kant and Hegel are placed by Bowman on the opposite sides of the divide—Kant as a critic and Hegel as a defender of traditional metaphysics. My analysis of Hegel's relation to both Kant and traditional metaphysics will make clear that this is a mistaken approach.

In Chapter 1, I will explicate Hegel's criticism of the rationalist tradition, which makes it evident that he upheld a fundamentally different model of relation between "being and intelligibility" from that of the pre-Kantian metaphysicians. Moreover, the essential aspect of the difference is what Hegel inherited from Kant: the investigation of the grounds of identity of being and intelligibility. The thread that connects Kant's undertaking with Hegel's is not the issue of unknowability of things-in-themselves as Bowman would have it, but the investigation of the conditions of knowledge of empirical realty, identifying the ground on which the relation between (empirical) being and intelligibility rests. Hegel takes the thing-in-itself and the problems associated with it as a peripheral husk of Kant's philosophy. What he finds to be the most valuable in Kant is his revolutionary insights about the nature of the relation between the cognizing subject, the cognized object, and the structure of relation between them; it is as a result of pursuing this Kantian project that Hegel arrives at the conclusions about "the unboundedness of scientific knowledge" and the "identity of being and intelligible." Therefore, Hegel should be understood not as performing a miracle and bringing back to life

"the chief casualty" of Kant's critical attack as Bowman sees it, but placing the last nail in the coffin and putting it to rest.

As we will see, Hegel describes the confidence of traditional metaphysics in the knowability of reality as naïve and this points to a pivotal difference between traditional metaphysics' and Hegel's positions that Bowman ignores. It is true that Hegel is sympathetic to the commitment of traditional metaphysics to the identity of being and intelligibility. But he sees this strength as resting on its naïveté, and the potential for overcoming of which he sees in the Kantian transcendental project. One way to read Hegel's entire philosophical project is as an undertaking for substituting a rational justification for this naïve, unreflected presupposition. But Bowman ignores this crucial difference, instead focusing on those points of Hegel's criticism of the pre-Kantian metaphysicians that are neutral in relation to Kant's devastating attack on the tradition and can be maintained on the grounds independent of this attack. Thus Bowman writes: "For him [Hegel], pre-critical metaphysics come to signify any attitude towards reality which takes the categories of traditional ontology (a) as the exclusive and irreducible forms of objective cognition and (b) as the basic forms of the substantially real itself."[26] Bowman is right. Hegel does voice criticism along these lines in the introduction to *The Encyclopaedia Logic* as we shall see below. But we will also see that for Hegel these mistakes arise from the more fundamental problem in the stance adopted by traditional metaphysics—its failure to see the need for the justification of identity of being and thought. The root of the problem is not that these commitments of the tradition are *incorrect* assumptions, but that they are *mere assumptions* and problematic not only because they don't present the nature of reality on the most fundamental level, but more because the tradition does not see any need for presenting justification for them. It is this *justification* of the accessibility of being (although of only an empirical nature) by intellect that is offered by Kant, and this is what renders Hegel's project akin to his and miles away from the traditional metaphysics.

Although the insufficient appreciation of the Kantian dimension in Hegel is a weaker side of Bowman's reading, there are many aspects of his work that are undoubtedly important contributions to recent Hegel scholarship. One of these is Bowman's analysis of the dualistic aspect of the Hegelian notion of the *Concept*. Drawing on the influential works of Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Dieter Henrich, Bowman presents an interesting account of the underpinnings of Hegel's ontological theory. The *static* ontological structure that grounds all finite determination is taken up by Bowman from Horstmann's analysis of the Hegelian relational monism in his *Ontologie und Relationen* (1989) and is integrated with the *dynamic* account of the very same structure that he adopts from Henrich's work. These accounts, one static and the other dynamic, are two sides of the same coin according to

Bowman, and only with keeping this dual aspect of the Hegelian understanding of the *concept* can we get an adequate grasp of his ontological theory.

Bowman discusses the relation-to-self that includes as its immanent moment the relation-to-other as the fundamental feature of the relational structure of the Hegelian Concept; and in order to demonstrate how this relational structure underlies the finite thought-determinations, he offers the relation between *identity*, *difference,* and *ground*. Bowman maintains that "the finite thought determinations identity, difference, and ground are . . . perspectives on a single, complex rational structure."[27] He wants to show that the interrelatedness of these determinations—identity, difference, ground—exemplify the immanence of the relation-to-other to the relation-to-self, and ultimately all these determinations are elements of the single complex relational structure. But his account is not very convincing—although the general idea he is developing is correct (the self-relational structure is the basic schema that incorporates other determinations in it), the specific determinations he presents to exemplify this structure are misidentified. While claiming to present the self-relational structure in its entirety, Bowman is actually looking at only a limited subset of the determinations that comprise it. In order to put forward a more comprehensive account, Bowman had to look at *The Doctrine of the Concept* and its relational schemata, which Hegel presents in the syllogism section, but unfortunately Bowman stops on the level of *The Doctrine of Essence*. As my discussion in Chapters 3–6 will demonstrate, Brandom's programmatic sketch can be developed into a more promising direction in laying out the basic relational structure of Hegel's ontology.

Bowman's discussion of the dynamic moment of the Hegelian ontological substructure, *the autonomous negation*, heavily relies on Dieter Henrich's work. He wants to supplement the just outlined static relational structure with an active, creative function that serves "as the unique basic term from which to derive all other logical determinations and indeed his whole system."[28] In order to avoid possible misinterpretations, Bowman explains that the dynamic account presented should not be taken to be anything different from the already outlined static relational structure:

> The Concept and absolute negativity are two sides of a single 'speculative' coin, one structural, one dynamic; and their unity is at the same time the unity of Hegelian metaphysics and methodology. For just as the concept cannot be adequately understood except as the structural expression of absolute negativity, neither can the methodology of Hegelian science be understood except as the finite intellect's recreation of *Nachvollzug* of the same dynamic that constitutes Hegel's monist metaphysics of subjectivity, the concept.[29]

The activity, or *the autonomous negation,* is supposed to be tracing the exact same formal structure of the Concept that was laid out in the static form earlier. Hence, the immanence of the relation-to-other to the relation-to-self

is to be confirmed in terms of autonomous negativity. But Bowman's account of the identity between the two sides again falls short of being convincing, and again the reason is that Bowman only scratches the surface of the problem without descending to the most fundamental level where the identity between the relational structure and active creative power are treated as the identity between the two moments of the *Concept* as exposed in *The Syllogism* section of *The Subjective Logic*. Hence, while I agree with Bowman's overall approach regarding the two aspects reading of the underpinnings of the Hegelian ontology, I do not think his account of this identity does justice to Hegel's position. As my discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 shows, without a detailed exposition of the moments of the Concept and the relations between them that Hegel spells out in *The Syllogism* section, there can't be given an adequate account of the identity of the static and dynamic moments of the Concept.

One more interesting theme that Bowman brings up in his book but does not develop far enough is the relation between the categories and the fundamental ontological substructure. He simply identifies the uncovering of the latter by Hegel with the rejection of the fundamentality of the former:

> In reducing the categories of metaphysica generalis to determinations of the Concept, and thus reformulating their content in terms of a structure that they either fail entirely to exhibit in their ordinary employment or at best succeed in exhibiting only in an inadequate way, Hegel is effectively transforming the ordinary meaning of those categories.[30]

Bowman ultimately renders the categories as dispensable elements of secondary importance that can be spared once the more fundamental account which grounds them is attained: "In principle, we could dispense with such terms and hence with any reference at all to the traditional content associated with those terms, and instead grasp the content of the *Logic* purely as a tightly ordered sequence of iterations of the basic structure of the Concept."[31] In Chapters 5 and 6, I will show that Hegel's position is more complex, as well as more interesting, than a mere rejection of the categories for the sake of the relation between relation-to-self and relation-to-other as Bowman would have it. Here, just as in the above-discussed case, a close analysis of *The Syllogism* section and *The Subjective Logic* in general is the key—without paying sufficient attention to the part of the text where Hegel lays out the most fundamental substructure of his ontological vision, it is not possible to present an adequate account of this substructure.

Robert Stern, in his influential interpretation of Hegel as a metaphysician, tries to be more attentive to the presence of the Kantian current in Hegel's thought. He acknowledges that much of what motivated Hegel's philosophical ambitions in his early years emanated from Kant's critical philosophy,

but ultimately Stern also sees a mature Hegel giving up the transcendental approach and adopting the stance of traditional metaphysics.

> If we do think of Hegel as engaging in 'proud ontology' once more, we do not have to see him doing so forgetfully, as it were, as if deaf to all Kant's concerns and ignorant of the Kantian position; but we don't therefore have to think of him as in some sense taking Kant's transcendental alternative either. Rather, we can see him as engaging with it seriously, but finding it wanting in crucial respects, which in turn led him to see ways in which the traditional picture remains of value.[32]

Stern thinks that Hegel came to find his way out of the Kantian problematic of the formal conditions of the possibility of experience and turned to investigation of the "being qua being" as it was done by the pre-critical metaphysicians. Stern, like Bowman, is right in that Hegel advances an ontological theory, but this does not commit him to returning to the pre-critical metaphysics.

One of the central aims of this book is to demonstrate that instead of rejecting the Kantian route, Hegel develops it further and arrives at a theory of being—but not simply as *being qua being,* but rather as *being qua being as thought* and ultimately being and thought as both grounded in what he calls *the Concept*. In other words, the way I read it, the path toward the Hegelian ontology lies not alongside the traditional problems of the pre-critical metaphysics, but through the Kantian transcendental philosophy. This will be made evident through taking a close look at Hegel's examination of the respective positions of traditional metaphysics and Kant in the Introduction to *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, which I will undertake in Chapter 1. But the most conclusive evidence for the Kantian origins of Hegel's ontology can be provided only with a comprehensive account of its fundamental underpinnings, and as my spelling out of this ontological substructure through the close reading of *The Syllogism* section will reveal, the Hegelian position to its most minute details is a development of the Kantian project. Hence, when we attempt "finding [our] way out of Kantian problematics," (as Hegel does, according to Stern) we also end up finding our way out of the Hegelian solutions to this problematics.

Stern's placing of Hegel closer to traditional metaphysics than to Kant at least in part arises out of his misinterpretation of Kant's position. He sees Kant as advancing what he calls *a bundle theory of the object:* "The Kantian model of the object therefore remains essentially pluralistic in character, as the unity of the object is reducible to a complex of more basic and intrinsically unrelated entities (the manifold of intuitions) out of which the object is constructed."[33] While Hegel, according to Stern, "frees the unity of the object from the synthesizing activity of Kant's transcendental subject; for, on Hegel's account (to put it simply), the object does not need to be organized or

unified by us, because, as the exemplification of a substance-universal, it is no longer treated as reducible to the kind of atomistic manifold that requires this synthesis."[34] For now, I'm putting aside the problems with Stern's interpretation of Hegel's conception of the object, and I shall address it at several critical points throughout the book. Presently I would like to briefly point to the obvious problem with Stern's understanding of the Kantian notion of the object, which stands in clear contradiction to Kant's central thesis from the Transcendental Deduction about the nature of the object: "an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united."[35] Note that Kant is not asserting that the object is the *manifold* of intuitions that are united by the concept, as Stern would have it, but exactly the opposite; it is the concept that is the rule of the synthesis that plays the fundamental role in the constitution of the object. The difficulties with Stern's view will become even more apparent in Chapter 3, in which I take a closer look at the Kantian understanding of the empirical concepts and their objects, and spell out in greater detail the meaning of Kant's claim that the object is grounded on the universal rule of combination and is not reducible to the sensible manifold. On the other hand, the logical functions of judgment that serve as the most basic rules of this combination have their presence in the schemata that we encounter in Hegel's theory of the relational structure immanent to his notion of the Concept—the one he expounds in *The Syllogism* section of *The Subjective Logic.* Hence, Kant and Hegel don't stand as far away in this respect as Stern would like to convince us.

Stern places Hegel not only too far from Kant, but also too close to Aristotle. He wants to ascribe to Hegel a vision of reality where form is posited as the immanent substratum of the individuals that determines their structure and development and expresses what the given individual most truly is: "Hegel argues, along Aristotelian lines, that properly conceived, the individual is an irreducible substance and this irreducibility is explained by virtue of its being of such and such kind . . . the manifestation of a universal substance-form."[36] No doubt there is an Aristotelian current in Hegel's thought, and indeed as we shall see, the reading of Hegel's notion of the *universal* on the Aristotelian backdrop makes it more easily accessible than is often taken to be. However, to simply describe them as upholding the same or even similar views about the role the substance-forms play in the constitution of objective reality is a gross simplification. In Chapters 5 and 6 I shall demonstrate that Hegel's model of the relation between the universal, particular, and individual is very different from Aristotle's. In fact, in *The Syllogism* section Hegel presents an ontological model that is an Aristotelian one; but he rejects it and moves on to articulating his own alternative. Hence, the analysis that follows will demonstrate the nature of similarity, as well as its limits and extent of difference between the Aristotelian and Hegelian ontologies.

In the first chapter I undertake a close analysis of Hegel's criticism of traditional metaphysics, empiricism, and Kant as it is presented in the *Vorbegriff* section (translated as Preliminary Conception) of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia Logic*. The idea behind this strategy is to locate the central points of Hegel's stance in relation to the alternative positions that are more readily accessible for contemporary philosophers. Since the technical vocabularies of the doctrines he considers are more familiar for us, the *Vorbegriff* section offers a helpful entry point in the Hegelian system. By identifying the aspects of the alternative ontological models Hegel finds problematic and the perspective from which he voices his criticism, we can learn much about his own standpoint. In Chapter 2, I look at the determinations of reflection presented by Hegel in the Doctrine of Essence and show that they are the basic functions guiding the empirical concept generating activity, the universal moments of the Hegelian Concept. I demonstrate that the determinations of reflection that include identity, difference, diversity, opposition, and contradiction correspond to the concepts of comparison (or concepts of reflection) from Kant's Amphiboly section of *The Critique of Pure Reason* and in the end to the logical functions of judgment from which the concepts of comparison stem. Hence I show that the modus operandi of the universal moment of the Hegelian Concept is borrowed from Kant's critical system. The subsequent four chapters are dedicated to the close reading of the Doctrine of the Concept itself. First, in Chapter 3, I examine the general features of the Concept and its Kantian origins and then, in Chapter 4, present a detailed account of the three moments of this Hegelian fundamental ontological structure: universality, particularity, and individuality. Chapter 5 looks at the different models of mediation between the three moments of the Concept that Hegel considers and traces the progression toward his own conception of the nature of their relation which will be presented in the final chapter of the book. As we will see, the moments are not merely related to one another, but their relation has the nature of self-relation—one more feature that ties the Hegelian Concept with the Kantian transcendental apperception. Hence my examination of the inner architectonic of the fundamental structure of Hegel's ontological theory demonstrates that its key features have Kantian origins.

NOTES

1. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.
2. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 15.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press; 2nd edition, 1962), 111.

5. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5.
6. Ibid., 9.
7. Robert Brandom, "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts," Journal Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism, Vol. 3 (2005): 144.
8. Ibid., 132.
9. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 200.
10. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A247/B303).
11. Ibid. (B137).
12. Ibid. (B XIII).
13. Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181.
14. Ibid., 180.
15. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A X).
16. Ibid. (B XXIV).
17. Ibid. (A11/B25).
18. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7.
19. Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Ontologie und Relationen (Athenaeum Vlg, 1989), 98. My translation: (1) Ontological reality or actuality (in difference, for example, from psychological, mathematical, or physical one) belongs to an object for Hegel only if the latter can be regarded as an object in truth. (2) That which is an object in truth is the Concept of this object, not its representation. (1) and (2) together amount to the following: regardless of what qualifies as a genuine object—what that object is in truth is its Concept.
20. Hegel, SL (GW 12:20).
21. Ibid. (GW 12:11).
22. Ibid. (GW 21:34).
23. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28.
24. Ibid., 26.
25. Ibid., 28.
26. Ibid., 58.
27. Ibid., 40–41.
28. Ibid., 50.
29. Ibid., 56.
30. Ibid., 42.
31. Ibid., 42.
32. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 29.
33. Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge, 1990), 3.
34. Ibid., 5.
35. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B137).
36. Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge. 1990), 4.

Chapter One

Hegel's Critique of Alternative Positions

Any serious attempt to reconstruct Hegel's ontology faces a formidable challenge to translate his complex technical vocabulary into a language more easily accessible to contemporary philosophers and then to interpret within this idiom such bold and enigmatic-sounding claims as "everything actual contains opposite determinations," "everything actual is rational," "everything is the Concept," "the true is the whole," etc. An attempt to meet this challenge can easily result in either watering down Hegel's bold and original position or inventing a new jargon that is even more difficult to make sense of than Hegel's. It seems to me that the best strategy for avoiding both of these alternatives is to locate the key points of the Hegelian system in relation to the alternative positions that are more readily accessible for us.

The opening section of *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, which Hegel calls *Preliminary Conception* (*Vorbegriff*), offer a unique opportunity for this strategy, for in no other published text does Hegel offer such a comprehensive analysis of the major alternatives to his own position. In the *Vorbegriff*, Hegel presents a systematic criticism of traditional metaphysics, empiricism, Kant, and Jacobi, allowing us to identify not only what he sees as problematic aspects of these positions but more importantly the standpoint from which this criticism is carried out. My aim in this chapter is to decipher the key elements of Hegel's views through a close study of his criticism of the alternative positions. The idea is that by identifying these points, I can establish a helpful entryway into his system, rendering the challenging texts to be analyzed in subsequent chapters more accessible. I will focus on Hegel's critical analysis of traditional metaphysics, empiricism, and Kant, since these three standpoints are more familiar for Anglophone philosophers and therefore instrumental in identifying critical points of Hegel's own position.

While discussing Hegel's criticism of Jacobi would have been an interesting undertaking it would hardly contribute to the purpose of the chapter.

CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS

The first position of thought Hegel examines is rationalism. He describes it as metaphysics "the way [it] was constituted among us before the Kantian philosophy,"[1] making it clear that he has in mind the tradition that stemmed from Leibniz and dominated German academia up until Kant. Hence, I will use Leibniz as the primary point of reference while examining Hegel's critical analysis of the rationalists. Hegel deploys quite a few distinct strategies and a variety of examples to point out what he sees as the problematic aspects of the view under consideration. These various approaches can be categorized into three major groups. The first group focuses on "the old metaphysics" conception of the nature of determinations of thought used as the medium for epistemic access to reality. The second critical strategy concerns Leibnizian rationalists' unjustified projection of a specific formal structure onto the world. The third group takes up an issue with rationalist metaphysics' appropriation of sensible representations and the specific epistemic function it grants to them.

Before examining each one of these charges closely, I will briefly discuss what Hegel sees as a positive aspect of "the old metaphysics." He opens his analysis of the first position of thought with a somewhat paradoxical claim, stating that in certain respects the old, Leibnizian metaphysics was superior to Kantian critical philosophy: "This science regarded the thought-determinations as the *fundamental determinations of things*; and, in virtue of this presupposition that the cognition of things as they are in-themselves results from the thinking of what is, it stood at a higher level than the later critical philosophizing."[2] One should be surprised by this claim, considering that in spite of his occasional critical remarks, Hegel's entire philosophical undertaking is best understood as a continuous effort to complete Kant's project.[3] Moreover, as we will see, Hegel's criticism of rationalist metaphysics has quite a Kantian flavor to it.

Hegel sees the advantage of traditional metaphysics in its "naïve" but correct "conviction" that thought "goes straight to the objects" and therefore it can gain access to the genuine nature of reality. The strength of this position is in postulating identity of the determinations of thought and determinations of things "as they are in-themselves." This confidence of the "old metaphysics" is contrasted with a certain reading of Kant (the one Hegel often draws on when highlighting the differences between Kant's and his own positions), according to which we are "the citizens of two worlds": the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds. The former encompasses the things

we experience or cognize or even can think of through the specific nature of our cognitive constitution—sensible intuitions and their forms on the one hand and empirical concepts and categories on the other. While the latter is the realm of things in themselves as independent from our faculties of receptivity and spontaneity, they are neither in time and space nor comprised of the categories.

Hegel believes that the Kantian two-world picture is an expression of skepticism, or, to be more specific, of the modern skepticism that emerged with Descartes and attained its fully developed form with Hume. But considering that the Kantian distinction between phenomena and thing-in-itself is an heir of Descartes's metaphysical dualism of the mind as the inner realm of thought vs. matter as the outer realm of extension, and the fact that Leibniz clearly shares more with Descartes than does Kant, Hegel's endorsement of Leibniz against Kant does indeed seem very puzzling. The key to solving this apparent paradox lies in the word "naïve" which Hegel uses in characterizing the rationalists' epistemic optimism. He sees both Leibniz and Kant as sharing the same Cartesian background assumptions. But while the former is unaware of the skeptical conclusions they lead to, the latter gains awareness of them while failing to overcome the challenges they pose.

Hence, the superiority of rationalist metaphysics over Kant's critical philosophy for Hegel is its commitment to the thesis that thinking renders reality accessible. Therefore, we can expect that this preference will be reflected in his own position, which is the one that is fully fleshed out in the third and final part of the *Logic*: the Doctrine of the Concept. Indeed, as I will show in this book, in the theory of the Concept we are offered an ontological model according to which the active, spontaneous faculty of generation of concepts and determinations posited by this process constitute the immanent structure of actuality. Hence, Hegel's remark about the superiority of rationalist metaphysics over Kant that anticipates the theory of *being* not foreign to *thought* and a conception of *thought* not external to *being* will be offered in the *Logic*.

At the same time, we should keep in mind that Hegel's endorsement of the epistemic optimism of traditional metaphysics is not unqualified. As already mentioned, he sees it arising not from having successfully dealt with the challenges of the epistemological and ontological nature that critical philosophy has succumbed to, but from a blunder or failure to see through these challenges. Rationalist metaphysics, according to Hegel, was "still unconscious of the antithesis of thinking within and against itself,"[4] and this is what affords it the courage to take the content of thought to be identical to determinations of the world. By "the antithesis of thinking," Hegel means the problem that Kant stumbled upon and inaugurated his entire critical project:

> As I thought through the theoretical part. . . . I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well

> as others, had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call "representation" to the object?[5]

For Hegel the rationalist tradition was "still unconscious of" the problematicity of assuming the identity of thought and being. Leibniz and his followers didn't see that applicability of concept to the world needed justification. Consequently, they were unaware of the whole cascade of the ontological and epistemological problems that emerge from this challenge. In Kant's hands philosophy had lost this naïveté. But as Hegel sees it, Kant succumbed to the challenges brought forth by his discovery. He was not able to realize the potential that the awareness of "the antithesis of thinking" made possible for him and was ultimately driven to skepticism.

ABSTRACT UNIVERSALS AS INADEQUATE MEDIUM OF COGNITION

One of the critical points Hegel advances against rationalist metaphysics concerns the nature of abstract universals and their function as the medium for cognitive access to reality. He claims that "these determinations, in their abstraction, were taken to be valid on their own account," and by doing this, the metaphysics was misinterpreting their nature. The universal determinations that he is concerned with here can be described as *abstract* in two distinct senses. First, they are taken to be independent of the object they are predicated of. The idea is that a universal picks out a specific property (or a set of properties) that a given individual (together with an indefinite number of other individuals) has. But at the same time, they are taken to be independent of these individuals, just as the individuals are taken to be independent of the universals representing their properties. The "old metaphysics" takes the universal determinations as existing in the realm of *representations*, while the individuals as existing in the realm of the *represented.* Universals and individuals are assumed to belong to two distinct ontological domains. Hegel's point is that the *existence* of a given abstract universal that represents a property of an individual entity clearly cannot depend on the *existence* of any specific individual entity that is being represented since the abstract universal represents properties of an indefinite number of other individuals. The universal concepts of *green* or *round,* for example, can represent the properties of an individual green or round entity, but they would not be affected either in the ontological or the semantic sense if this individual entity didn't exist.

Hegel directs his criticism at what he sees as a problematic model of the relation between objects and the universals representing their properties ac-

cording to which they are external to one another. Rationalist metaphysics, claims Hegel, was engaged in the "external reflection about the object, since the determinations (the predicates) are found ready-made in my representation, and are attached to the object in a merely external way."[6] Hegel is critical of this "external reflection" because he sees it stemming from the bifurcated ontological model that rationalist metaphysics rests on, which ultimately undermines its epistemic optimism. If the realm of representations is postulated as the origin of the conceptual content by means of which the mind-independent object is cognized, we end up problematizing cognition. To demonstrate one of the difficulties that rationalist metaphysics runs into, Hegel presents an example: "In the proposition 'God *is* eternal, etc.,' we begin with the representation 'God,' but what he is is not yet *known;* only the predicate states expressly what he is."[7] Hence, on the one hand, the act of determining is taking place through attributing a predicate to the object that has to be completely indeterminate prior to this act (the object is postulated as belonging to the domain of represented and not that of representations). On the other hand, the realm of representation is where the conceptual content of the predicates that are "attached to the object in a merely external way" originate. But these commitments pose serious problems.

First, it is not clear what could play the function of friction (to use John McDowell's vocabulary) between the predicates and the objective reality represented by means of them. On one side we have predicates with conceptual content, and on the other, its opposite: the object completely deprived of such content. Presenting a plausible account of what could serve as truth conditions in the given model seems very problematic, if possible at all. Moreover, not only a comprehensive cognitive grasp but even an ability to pick out the object that is to be cognized is problematic within the given model.

Now, the "solution" that the rationalist metaphysics finds to these challenges is just as indicative of its problems as are the challenges themselves. It pretends to bridge the gap by substituting the objects with representations: "this metaphysics took them [objects] from representations."[8] But the representation that is taken for the object is still conceived as completely indeterminate, and the process of determination is still supposed to be carried out through the attribution of the abstract universals to it. Hence, instead of resolving the problems, the tradition engages in a kind of self-deception. It starts with one kind of representation, and by attributing representations of another kind (universal determinations) to it, claims to cognize the object that is to be external to the realm of representations altogether. If the object of cognition completely lacks conceptual content, how can it be identified as any specific object? Hegel says, "The representation of the soul, of the world, of God, seems at first to provide thinking with a firm hold,"[9] but it merely "seems" to do so. Hegel's point is, how are we to know that it is nature and

not God, for example, that we are attempting to represent by means of abstract universals if there is no conceptual content immanent to it?

Hence, for Hegel, the bifurcated ontological model with its abstract universals that originate in the realm of representations and the illusory grasp of mind-independent objects is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, we can expect that he will offer a different take on the relationship between objects and the determinations of thought. Hegel, in fact, gives some indication of what his alternative looks like: "Genuine cognition of an ob-ject . . . has to be such that the ob-ject determines itself from within itself, and does not acquire its predicates in the external way."[10]

The second sense in which the determinations of thought are *abstract* or "valid on their own account" concerns not their relation to objects of cognition but to one another. The target of Hegel's criticism here is the semantic atomism of Leibniz and his followers. The claim is that the universal determinations by means of which cognition of actuality is to be accomplished were taken by the tradition as semantically independent of one another as well as of the cognitive activity of the mind. Rationalist metaphysics, claims Hegel,

> did not go beyond the thinking of mere *understanding*. It took up the abstract determinations of thought immediately, and let them count in their immediacy as predicates of what is true. When we are discussing thinking we must distinguish *finite* thinking, the thinking of the mere *understanding*, from the *infinite* thinking of *reason*. Taken in isolation, just as they are immediately given, the thought-determinations are finite determinations. But what is true is what is infinite.[11]

Understanding for Hegel is, in general, associated with the operation of fixed determinations while *reason* sublates this rigidity, placing the finite determinations of the understanding within the larger context in which their fixedness is dissolved. The target of his criticism here is rationalist metaphysics' conception of the abstract determinations as a given to the mind in its inner space of representations as a set of fixed determinations of thought that correspond to the determination of the mind-external objects. The basic elements of the conceptual content are taken as kinds of atoms that the mind needs to arrange correctly to represent the world. As such, we are essentially dealing here with a variation of the myth of the given wherein a set of rigidly fixed abstract determinations are posited as given to the mind.

Hegel's alternative is hinted at in the following passage: "Thinking is only finite insofar as it stays within restricted determinations, which it holds to be ultimate. Infinite or speculative thinking, on the contrary, makes determinations likewise, but, in determining, in limiting, it sublates this defect again."[12] Hegel wants to substitute the fixed, "restricted" conception of determinations of thought with an account of malleable conceptual content

contextualized within a larger account of the process that generates these universal determinations. Semantic atomism is criticized in order to pave the way for a holistic theory of conceptual content in which determinations form an interrelated system. The rigidity is to be replaced with plasticity and givenness with an account of the generation of determinations.

According to Hegel, rationalist metaphysics "did not go beyond the thinking of mere *understanding*," which he sees as "finite thinking" and contrasts it with "the infinite thinking of *reason*."[13] The rationalists assume "that thinking is always restricted. . . . But, in fact, thinking is inwardly and essentially infinite." The determinations of thought, according to Hegel, are elements of the self-relational whole that he associates with "the I" which clearly refers to Kantian transcendental apperception:

> "Finite" means whatever comes to an end, what is, but ceases to be where it connects with its other, and is thus restricted by it. Hence, the finite subsists in its relation to its other, which is its negation and presents itself as its limit. But thinking is at home with itself, it relates itself to itself, and its own object. Insofar as my object is a thought, I'm at home with myself. Thus I, or thinking, is infinite because it relates to an object that is itself.[14]

Hence, while Hegel started his discussion of rationalist metaphysics by pointing out its strengths compared to Kant's critical philosophy, once he turns to criticizing the "old metaphysics," it becomes clear that the stance from which he is voicing his critique has much in common with Kant.

Brady Bowman in his *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity* (2013) discusses the Hegelian distinction between finite vs. infinite thought:

> Finitude and untruth was said to consist in the fact that, although they display the form of independently determinate identity and hence an absolute character, in fact they have their determinate content only via their relation-to-other, into which other they therefore pass over and pass away. So finitude is here glossed as relation-to-other, while infinitude and eternity are to be understood as relation-to-self.[15]

The determinations of thought, instead of being fixed and given to the mind as independently determined, have meaning only as part of a systematically interrelated constellation of concepts, which, as Bowman also points out, has a self-relational structure and is understood by Hegel as infinite thought. Bowman also correctly associates the self-relational structure of interrelated systems of concepts with Hegel's theory of the Concept: "Thus it would seem that what distinguishes the Concept from merely finite thought-determinations is its instantiation of pure relation-to-self or, as Hegel also calls it, the relation of infinity."[16] Indeed, as my discussion in the subsequent chapters will show, the self-relational structure is an essential feature of the Hege-

lian Concept, which rejects traditional metaphysics' rigid and atomistic conception of abstract determinations of thought and replaces it with a radically different account of the origins and content of empirical concepts.

While discussing rationalist metaphysics' "position of thought," Hegel indicates that the law of non-contradiction will assume quite a different function in his system from the one it had with the rationalists.

> Dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites. This is just the strict "either-or," according to which (for instance) the world is either finite or infinite, but not both. On the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided determination in it, and is therefore not exhausted by it . . . what is one sided is not fixed and does not subsist on its own account; instead it is contained within the whole as sublated.[17]

As the passage suggests, Hegel's position is not as simplistic as it is often thought to be. He is not offhandedly rejecting the law of non-contradiction. He claims that the one-sidedness of determinations necessitated by the law of non-contradiction will be contained in a sublated form. To sublate something for Hegel does not mean to reject it; rather, it is to reconceive and place it in a more comprehensive account. Rejection of the law of non-contradiction and asserting that everything is self-contradictory would mean not sublating one-sided determinations and moving to a more comprehensive account but simply supplementing them with matching opposite one-sided determinations. Thus, Hegel's criticism of the law of non-contradiction is related to his point that the traditional assumption that abstract universals are an adequate medium for a full comprehension of the world needs to be given up for a better, more comprehensive account.

PROJECTION OF THE SUBSTANCE-PROPERTY FORMAL STRUCTURE

The second critical strategy Hegel deploys concerns the projection of a specific formal structure onto reality. He argues that rationalist metaphysics "presupposes that cognition of the Absolute could come about through attaching of predicates to it." By "the Absolute" Hegel means the traditional objects of cognition of rationalist metaphysics: nature, God, the World, spirit, etc. He is raising a question whether "attaching predicates" is the right method to comprehend these objects. Prima facie it is not clear where exactly Hegel is heading with this point. How else can we comprehend reality if not through attributing predicates to the objects it is made up of? The meaning of the criticism is clarified in another passage: "The form of the proposition, or more precisely that of the judgment, is incapable of expressing what is con-

crete (and what is true is concrete) and speculative; because of its form. The judgment is one-sided and to that extent false."[18] The point is that by assuming that reality can be cognized through the deployment of judgments wherein predicates are attributed of subjects, tradition projects a formal structure onto the world that corresponds to the subject-predicate structure of judgment. In other words, dogmatic metaphysics presupposes that reality on the most fundamental level is made up of substances and the properties that inhere in them, wherein the logical subject of judgments refers to the substance while predicates represent the properties inhering in it.

Hegel's criticism of projecting the formal structure of judgment onto reality offers an interesting perspective on Robert Stern's reading of Hegel's conception of the object. He reads Hegel as providing an alternative to the model according to which the object is a bundle of property-universals:

> It is Hegel's aim in the *Logic* to show that this reductionist ontology rests on the mistaken assumption that all individuals can be analyzed into a plurality-universals. His analysis of the notion, judgment, and syllogism is designed to establish that in fact *substance* universal forms the essential nature of the individual as a *whole,* and that this universal cannot be reduced to a collection of universals of another type.[19]

To some extent Stern is indeed correct: Hegel does reject the bundle theory of the object. In fact his criticism of projecting the form of judgment onto the world commits him to this. Since assuming that the basic fabric of actuality is made of individual objects that are the products of the synthesis of property-universals can be seen as one way in which judgment's formal structure can be projected onto the world.

But the problem with Stern's thesis is that the position he ascribes to Hegel is vulnerable to the same criticism. Moreover, it is vulnerable on two distinct levels. First is a predicating of those universals to substance-universal that are not parts of its definition. For instance, to use Stern's example, "this rose is red" or "this man is Greek." This can be described as a surface-level projection of the formal structure of judgment onto reality. But there is a second, more fundamental level on which the type of projection is taking place. Examples of this would be "roses are flowers" or "men are mortal." In these cases, the judgment-form projection is taking place within the substance-universal itself that, according to Stern, "forms the essential nature of the individual as a whole."[20] Hence, Stern's reading cannot be right as it ascribes to Hegel a position that is open to the same charges he raises against rationalist metaphysics.

While Hegel's point that rationalist metaphysics projects the formal structure of judgment onto reality is correct, it is hard to see where he is heading with this criticism. What other formal structure, if any, could reality have if not the one rationalist metaphysics had presupposed. Moreover, not only the

rationalists but pretty much the entire tradition of Western philosophy can be found guilty of a similar kind of projection. Hegel's alternative to subject-predicate form-based ontology is presented in his theory of the Concept that will be discussed in the later chapters. We will also see that Stern's reading is indeed partially correct: The substance-universals will play an important role in Hegel's ontology, but they need to be contextualized into a more comprehensive account.

Having looked at the two critical points raised by Hegel in the Vorbegriff chapter of the *Encyclopedia Logic*, we can already see some key features of a fundamental shift Hegel is setting a stage for in these opening pages of the work. Robert Brandom describes this transformation as a historic turn regarding "the origin and the justification of our ideas" that replaces *representation* with *inference* as its "master concept."[21] The relative explanatory priority accorded to the concepts of representation in Descartes is replaced by inference, and division of the world into "what is by nature a representing and what by nature can only be represented" is left behind. Our analysis of Hegel's criticism of traditional metaphysics confirms Brandom's thesis. In the Vorbegriff chapter, Hegel is preparing the ground for rejecting the bifurcated ontological model and placing an inferentially related system of empirical concepts at the epicenter of his project. At the same time, by focusing almost exclusively on the semantic aspects of the Hegelian turn, Brandom does not do full justice to its ontological dimension. Hegel's project clearly is not confined to the semantic issues about the origins and justification of ideas or the role of inferential relation in the generation of conceptual content. He is presenting a full-fledged ontology, and this is already evident from his praising rationalist metaphysics' confidence in the unity of thought and being.

SENSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS

The third critical theme Hegel develops against rationalist metaphysics concerns the epistemic function of sensible representations. Hegel claims that rationalist metaphysics tries to "reproduce the content of sense-experience and intuition" and upholds this "as the truth."[22] At first this criticism might seem completely groundless since taking the sense experience as the source of knowledge is traditionally associated not with the rationalists but with their opponents, the empiricists (dealt with by Hegel in the subsequent section of the Vorbegriff chapter). But a closer examination of the view under consideration reveals that Hegel's criticism is indeed well justified.

According to Leibniz, the central figure in the tradition Hegel is considering here, empirical concepts are formed as a result of the mind's operation on the sense perception offered by experience.[23] Sense perceptions, on their

part, are confused perceptions originating from aggregates of monads that are the basic building blocks of reality. Every single monad perceives every other one, and the clarity and distinctness of these perceptions is a function of the perfection of the perceiving monad as well as of its disposition to the perceived one. God, for example, perceives the totality of the world perfectly clearly. But the monads of the most rudimentary sort (Leibniz calls them bare monads, which are associated with inanimate objects although they are not reducible to them) have extremely obscure perceptions. Humans are somewhere in between. Thus, a human mind will have perceptual states that are more or less clear when perceiving monads closely related to it, but very obscure perceptual states of the monads that are not closely related. In addition to the ability to perceive other monads, humans are also endowed with the faculty of apperception—that is, the reflective awareness of their inner states, including of their perceptual states. In other words, if a perception is a state of relation with other monads, apperception is that of self-relation of the monad; it is a state of mind that turns an introspective gaze toward its inner content, towards the perceptual states of other monads.

The sense perceptions on which our cognition of physical objects rests involve both perceptions of other monads and apperception of our inner states. Physical objects, according to Leibniz, are associated not with individual substances but aggregates of monads, that is, a group of monads that form an organized unity. The human mind perceives each one of an indefinite number of individual monads, but these perceptions are not conscious; the mind is merely perceiving them without taking note of the perceptions. Its introspection is not directed at these perceptual states. Leibniz refers to these as small perceptions. They do not merely happen to be unnoticed but in principle cannot become conscious. What we are conscious of instead of these perceptions taken individually are the plurality of them run through and held together; and this act of awareness is sense perception. It is important to note here that sensations are confused perceptions that cannot be disentangled from one another. So, for Leibniz, there exists not even a theoretical possibility of "climbing" from the confused perceptions to the clear and distinct ones that express the true nature of reality. Nevertheless, Leibniz maintains that empirical concepts are generated through the operation of the intellect on the sense perception that experience offers.

As this brief outline demonstrates, the Leibnizian conception of sensible representations renders them an impossible medium for cognitive access of the mind-independent world. Hence, while the rationalist tradition upholds a correct stance regarding accessibility of the world by thought (i.e., the identity of the completely individuated concepts and the monads) when it comes to its theory of human cognition and generation of empirical concepts, it essentially undermines this correct presupposition. Instead of thought being granted the function of the active power that generates determinations of its

own, it is taken as a passive faculty that receives content from sensations. Hence, Hegel's charge that rationalist metaphysics mistakenly took the objects of its cognition from "representation, and when it applied the determinations-of-the-understanding to them, it grounded itself upon them, as ready-made or given objects, and its only criterion of whether the predicates fitted, and were satisfactory or not, was that representation,"[24] demonstrates a clear understanding of Leibnizian positions and its problems.

Wilfrid Sellars makes a similar point when describing the traditional conception of the sense impressions as the prime example of the myth of the given. He sees it as a confused notion that mingles together two distinctly different things with different epistemological and ontological purports:

> Sellars diagnoses "the classical concept of sense datum" as a "mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two ideas": first, an idea of non-concept-involving sensory episodes, such as sensations of red; and, second, an idea of non-inferential knowings that such-and-such is the case. This is a mongrel, a conflation, because attributions of non-concept-involving episodes belong below the line drawn by Sellars's master thought, whereas attributions of knowings belong above it.[25]

The "line" mentioned here is supposed to separate the episodes of our experience that need to be understood in terms of actualization of our conceptual capacities (above the line) from those that do not need to be (below the line). Sellars thus agrees with Hegel and argues the impossibility of grounding conceptual content on sensations. The "classical conception of sense" datum, according to him, is a fantastic transplantation of the element immanent to one ontological domain into its opposite one. Instead of solving the question of the origins of conceptual content, it is merely creating an illusion of such a solution.

Having looked at Hegel's critical analysis of rationalist metaphysics, the following conclusions can be made about Hegel's position:

1. The dualistic ontology and the correspondence theory of cognition that is tied to it cannot be parts of Hegel's system. He has to present an account of actuality and the nature of cognition that offer an alternative model of the relation between thought and being. Determinations of thought and individual objects that they represent in the traditional model will have to be reconceived in such a way that the unbridgeable gap between them is no longer a part of the account.
2. Semantic atomism has to be replaced with an account in which the conceptual content of the closely tied determinations of thought constitute a systematically related whole.
3. The traditional substance–attribute model that Hegel criticizes as a projection of the form of judgment onto the world has to be replaced

with an alternative that cannot be faulted for imposing the structure of judgment onto reality.

4. Sensible intuitions cannot be the source of the conceptual content through which the mind is related to the world. In other words, we should expect that in Hegel's system, sense perceptions will not play any substantive role in the generation of the conceptual content of the determinations of thought.

CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICISM

Hegel's examination of the second position of thought consists of two parts: The first one concerns empiricism, and the second Kant's critical philosophy. Treating Kant and empiricism under the same rubric is a surprising decision, for while Hegel has much in common with Kant, there could hardly be a more antithetical stance to Hegel's than that of the classical empiricists like Locke or Hume. But as the forthcoming analysis will make clear, Hegel's motifs here are to stress the difference between his and Kant's stances and focus attention on the aspects of his system that go beyond Kant. When it comes to the specific critical points Hegel raises against these two views, we find very few commonalities. In fact the criticism of empiricism has a distinctly Kantian flavor to it.

The Mind vs. the World

The fundamental flaw of empiricism in Hegel's eye is its assertion that "the external is the true" while our cognition is "supposed to cling exclusively to what belongs to perception."[26] Empiricists maintain that the mind has immediate access only to its inner content. Locke, for example, describes *ideas* as the objects internal to the mind to be distinguished from the mind-external objects the qualities of which they are to correspond to: "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea."[27] When Locke describes *idea* as "the *immediate* object of perception," he is setting it apart from the mediated relation that the mind stands to the objects as they are in the mind-external world. Ideas are immediate because the mind "perceives [them] in itself"; the mind-external objects, on the other hand, belong by definition in the domain of reality that is external to the mind and are never perceived directly.

One of the problems with this picture, according to Hegel, is that the abyss it inserts between what is available to the mind on the one hand and the world on the other inevitably leads to skepticism, whether acknowledged (as with Hume) or not (as with Locke). Locke's attempt to bridge the gap results in bringing to the fore the gravity of the problem rather than solving it. He privileged certain simple ideas (extension, shape, number, etc., correspond-

ing to the primary qualities) over others (color, taste, pain, etc., corresponding to the secondary qualities) as corresponding to the features of the actual, mind-independent reality. But as Berkley had pointed out, the kinds of arguments Locke offers against the ideas of secondary qualities can also be applied to the ideas of primary qualities. In Hegel's eye Berkley is more consistent than Locke. Instead of creating an illusion of bridging the ontological gap, Berkley is accepting the conclusions that the basic presuppositions of empiricism lead to and is advancing a theory he calls "immaterialism."

Hegel's criticism of empiricism's dualistic ontology builds upon the similar criticism offered against rationalist metaphysics. But if with rationalists the central critical theme was the abstract nature of the relation between the determinations of thought and the objects of experience as such, now the emphasis is made on the problem of the relation between the inner vs. the outer realm. Therefore, we can expect Hegel not only to rework the traditional models of relation between objects and determination of thought, but also to offer a view of relatedness of the mind and the world that overcomes the rigid opposition between one and the other. We can expect that Hegel will attempt to leave behind the bifurcated ontology of the realm of ideas vs. the realm of mind-external entities together with its correspondence theory of truth.

While Hegel clearly rejects the dualistic ontology and the correspondence theory of truth, understanding what he offers in their stead is not a trivial task. Mere attack on the traditional models does not commit him to any specific alternative. Thomas Baldwin, for example, has recently suggested that Hegel's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and his claim that "the truth in the deeper sense . . . consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion"[28] are evidence that he is putting forward a version of the *identity* theory of truth. The identity theory has been upheld by Frege, Bradley, and Russell who saw it as a natural alternative to the correspondence theory. If according to the correspondence theory the truth-bearers like propositions and judgments are made true by their correspondence to facts, according to the identity theory they are identical to facts. But the problem with Baldwin's reading is that it is still based on the dualistic ontological model. The identity theory of truth that attempts to bridge the gap between the mind and the world presupposes the very same gap in the first place. The identity is asserted on the backdrop of difference. As the subsequent chapters will make clear, Hegel leaves behind the dualistic ontology altogether and offers a more radical rejection of the correspondence theory than the identity theory does. Robert Stern correctly points out that Hegel's claim about identity of object and its notion, based on which Baldwin is advancing his thesis, is concerned not with *propositional* but with *material* truth.

> Truth is propositional when it is attributed to statements, judgments, or propositions on the basis of their accordance with the way things are. Truth is material when it is attributed to something on the basis of the accordance of the thing with its essence. . . . Hegel's interest is in material truth: in how far an object can be said to be true, in the sense of conforming to its "concept" (Begriff), where by this he means its nature or essence.[29]

Indeed, the subsequent chapters of this book are dedicated to articulation of the immanent structure of the Hegelian Concept that offers several different schemas of the relationship between the conceptual content and objects, together with the criterion of adequacy of the relationship. These are the elements of Hegel's material conception of truth that Stern is referring to. As I will show, Hegel will be offering a series of schemas beginning with the least adequate relationship between objects of experience and the conceptual content they are grounded on and will be taking us, step by step, to the model of the relationship in which "an object can be said to be true, in the sense of conforming to its 'concept.'"

ABSTRACT UNIVERSAL

Another critical point Hegel raises against empiricism is its misunderstanding of the nature of relation between sense perceptions and the universals. For Locke and his followers, empirical concepts, or the *universal ideas*, are the products of the process of abstraction from sense perceptions or *particular ideas*. Conceptual content hence is extracted from sensible representations, which in turn are thought of as effects that external objects bring about in the mind. But as Hegel points out, this renders the epistemic purport of the conceptual content or the universal determinations spurious.

> Empiricism elevates the content that belongs to perception, feeling, and intuition into the form of universal notions, principles, and laws, etc. This only happens, however, in the sense that these universal determinations (for instance, "force") are not supposed to have any more significance and validity on their own account than that which is taken from perception, and no justification save the connection that can be demonstrated in experience.[30]

Hegel's point is that such a conception of universality fundamentally undermines its epistemic viability as a medium for accessing objective reality. For while it is purported to represent the "outer," mind-independent reality, it is derived via abstraction from the content of the "inner" subjective states that in turn are related to the mind-external objects as the effects to their causes. It is interesting to note here that, while criticizing the empiricist conception of universals, Hegel is striking distinctly Kantian notes: "Since, however, perception is to remain the foundation of what counts as truth, universality and

necessity appear to be something unjustified, a subjective contingency, a mere habit, the content of which may be constituted the way it is or in some other way."[31] Hegel's point here is that the empiricist conception of the relationship between universality and individual perceptions renders "universality and necessity" of the former unwarranted. Universality the way they conceive it is derived from contingency. This argument against the "unwarrantedness" of universality is clearly reminiscent of the well-known passage from the Preface of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, in which Kant maintains that "experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. . . . Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori."[32] So while criticizing empiricists, Hegel appears to help himself to the key aspect of Kant's critical system that he has included in the same position of thought as empiricists. Moreover, as we shall see later, Hegel inherits a great deal of the Kantian approach when it comes to the question of the nature and the origins of the universal determinations. This suggests that Hegel is fully aware of the fundamental differences between Kant and empiricist positions, and the reasons for including them within the same rubric should be looked for elsewhere than the lack of appreciation of the difference between the two stances.

A good starting point for understanding Hegel's view on the relation between sense perceptions and universals is Sellars's position on the same issue as articulated in *Science and Metaphysics*. McDowell sees Sellars as ascribing to sense perceptions a transcendental function. "Sellars's 'sense impression inference' is a piece of transcendental philosophy, in the following sense: it is directed towards showing our entitlement to conceive subjective occurrences as possessing objective purport."[33] Sense perceptions play the function of the conditions of the possibility of the objective purport of conceptual occurrences. Instead of containing the claims about the world, they are the accompanying conditions that render the world accessible to us through them.

> Visual sensations or sense impressions are not simply an extra part of the truth about visual experiences, over and above the part that deals with the distinctive way in which visual experiences "contain" claims . . . it is not that visual experiences "contain" claims in their distinct way, and then there is a simply additional fact about them, that they involve visual sensations. The reason we have to acknowledge the "additional" fact, in Sellars's view, is that only so can we be entitled to have spoken as we did when we gave our above-the-line characterization to visual experiences.[34]

Hence, the claim is that sensations, rather than containing the conceptual content or merely accompanying it in experience, are the transcendental con-

dition of objective purport of the content. While a detailed discussion of the exact nature of the relationship between Hegel's and Sellars's positions should wait until the last two chapters of the book, it is already clear that Sellars is taking Hegel's side in his rejection of the empiricist conception of sensations as the source of conceptual content.

Mere Analysis

Another important critical theme Hegel develops against empiricists concerns their conception of the process of generation of universal determinations. Universals are formed as a result of analysis that separates and abstracts those marks within sensations from which empirical concepts and the ones that don't belong in these determinations. Hegel describes this process as killing of an "alive being," as it moves away from the "concrete" towards abstract: "Empiricism falls into error in analysing objects if it supposes that it leaves them as they are, for, in fact, it transforms what is concrete into something abstract. As a result it also happens that the living thing is killed, for only what is concrete, what is One, is alive."[35] Of note here is that Hegel is not simply rejecting analysis as a moment in the generation of empirical concepts. He is critical of analysis as the only method used in this process. The point is that it is not merely analysis, but first and foremost the synthesis, that plays a key role in furnishing the determinations through which the mind is mediated to the world: "Nevertheless, the division has to happen in order for comprehension to take place, and spirit itself is inward division. But this is only one side, and the main issue is the unification of what has been divided."[36] Hence, for Hegel, synthesis, unification of distinct determinations, plays at least as much importance as analysis or their dissection into component parts.

A clear testimony to the fact that conceptual content is not a mere product of analysis of sensations is the presence of "the metaphysical categories" in them. Hegel here is again clearly following Kant's footsteps and is pointing out that empiricism helps itself to the basic concepts that could have not been derived from sensible given, but it brushes off the question of the nature of their origins and the legitimacy of their application:

> The fundamental illusion in scientific empiricism is always that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, as well as those of one, many, universality, and infinity, etc., and it goes on to draw conclusions, guided by categories of this sort, presupposing and applying the forms of syllogizing in the process. It does all this without knowing that it thereby itself contains a metaphysics and is engaged in it, and that it is using those categories and their connections in a totally uncritical and unconscious manner.[37]

Indeed, Locke introduces a category of simple ideas, like *unity*, *existence*, *power*, *succession*, etc., that originates neither in the senses nor in reflection; instead, these ideas according to him are "suggested" by the ideas of both sensations and reflection. Hegel's point is that clearly Locke is helping himself to the basic determinations of thought that could not have been traced back to sense perceptions, and so he comes up with an obscure explanation of their origins in order to avoid directly contradicting a key thesis of empiricism—that sensations are the source of empirical concepts.

The Doctrine of Unfreedom

Perhaps the most fundamental reason why Hegel rejects empiricism is that he sees it as the "doctrine of unfreedom." Empiricism presupposes that the world is fully determined prior to being given to the mind through the senses. The mind and the world are two distinct entities that stand in a mere external relation to one another. Such an outlook for Hegel is an expression of the thesis that "the external is the true" and that the world is "absolute other" for the mind.

> Since for Empiricism this sensible domain is and remains something given, this is a doctrine of unfreedom, for freedom consists precisely in my not having any absolute other over against me, but in my being dependent upon a content that is just myself.[38]

Here again we can see a clearly Kantian influence on Hegel's position. Freedom as self-determination wherein the subject is related to the content that is not "absolute other" to it is contrasted with the mere receptive mind that passively takes in the content from some external source. Kant distinguished between two pillars on which our cognition rests, spontaneity and receptivity. The former is the faculty of reason (both in theoretical as well as practical reason), the latter—the faculty of sensibility, our capacity to receive sensible representations. Within the practical realm, pure reason alone is capable of determining the will and this is what enables us to be free. Practical reason itself is capable of positing the law that we can follow. Within the theoretical realm, on the other hand, mere spontaneity is not sufficient for empirical cognition and requires contribution from receptivity. But neither can sensibility alone, without contribution of theoretical reason, afford us cognition of empirical objects. Hence for Kant objects of experience as well as their cognition rest on both reason and sensibility; the world the way it manifests itself to us is a product of both faculties of spontaneity and receptivity. Now, what sets Kant's position apart from empiricists is the presence of the faculty of reason within the world the way it is given to us. The very same faculty is what grounds our freedom as self-legislation or autonomy within the practical realm, and this is why Hegel's criticism of empiricism as "the doctrine of

unfreedom" is Kantian through and through. McDowell correctly recognizes the presence of the theme of freedom within Kant's and Sellars's conception of the act of cognition that he ties with the activity of judgment (Kant traced the basic categories of the theoretical reason to the logical functions of judgment) and reason:

> Judging, making up our minds what to think, is something for which we are in principle responsible—something we freely do, as opposed to something that merely happens in our lives . . . this freedom, exemplified in responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism in the light of rationally relevant considerations. So the realm of freedom, at least the realm of freedom of judging, can be identified with the space of reason.[39]

The criticism of the "unfreedom" of the empiricist doctrine suggests that Hegel will be developing an alternative to the empiricist vision of the relation between the mind and the world as "absolute other[s]"; and due to the presence of a strong Kantian current in his criticism, we can expect that Hegel's general strategy will be focused on epigenesis of "the space of reason" as the central element of the relation between the mind and the world.

To summarize my discussion of Hegel's critical analysis of empiricism, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Hegel rejects the dualistic ontology and the correspondence theory of truth according to which representations in the inner realm of the mind are supposed to correspond with the states of affairs in the outer mind-external reality. Hence, we should expect that he will offer an account that avoids both dualistic ontology and the correspondence theory of truth.
2. The strong Kantian influence can be traced in Hegel's attack on the empiricist postulation of sense perception as the source of universal determinations, as well as its exclusive emphasis on *analysis* and abstraction in generation of universals. Hence, we shall expect that Hegel will be further developing the Kantian emphasis on the role of synthetic judgments in empirical cognition as well as the rejection of the sensations as the sole source of conceptual content.
3. Empiricism for Hegel is an expression of the worldview of "unfreedom" according to which the mind is confronted with the world as "absolute other" to itself. Based on the nature of Hegel's criticism we can expect that the alternative relationship between the mind and the world that he will elaborate will overcome this schism, and the key role in it will be played by the logical space of reason.

CRITIQUE OF KANT

After his critical analysis of empiricism, Hegel turns to a lengthier examination of Kant, whom he also includes in the second position of thought. The close proximity of his own stance with the one he is looking at makes studying this part of the *Vorbegriff* particularly fruitful, as each critical point Hegel raises will be an indicator of the pivotal points of difference between the two outlooks with a largely shared background. I will focus on three central themes. The first one concerns Kant's conception of *universality*. As I will argue, instead of rejecting Kant's stance on the issue, Hegel critically appropriates it. He supports the main thrusts of Kant's approach, while at the same time criticizing him for not developing its full potential. Another prominent critical point Hegel deploys against Kant is that his system is fractured into subjective vs. objective moments. Hegel is particularly critical of the notion of *the thing in itself*, which according to him undermines the epistemic purport of the determinations of thought and turns Kant's philosophy into a mere subjective idealism. The claim is that by introducing *the thing in itself* in his system, Kant renders the gap between the determinations of thought and reality unbridgeable. The last line of criticism I will discuss here is that of the role of contradiction in the determination of objective reality. As we shall see, Hegel is critical of Kant's exclusive focus on the negative function of contradiction. The Hegelian alternative that will be indicated in his critical remarks and will be more fully fleshed out in the Doctrine of Essence will grant to contradiction a more important positive role in the process of generation of conceptual content.

Immanence of universals

Hegel opens his critical analysis of Kant by pointing out a similarity between Kant's and the empiricist positions: "Critical Philosophy has in common with Empiricism that it accepts experience as the *only* basis for our cognitions."[40] He does this in order to justify placing Kant within the same position of thought as empiricism. For Hegel is very well aware of the difference between the two positions and points out that even though for Kant all cognition might be based on experience there are elements in it that "does not arise" from experience: "universality and necessity . . . are found to be present in . . . experience," and this aspect of experience "belongs to the spontaneity of thinking, or is a priori."[41] This passage undeniably echoes Kant's well-known thesis from the B-edition Introduction of *The Critique of Pure Reason*: "There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our senses."[42] And right after making this very empiricist-sounding claim Kant qualifies it using the very same

wording that is used by Hegel in the just cited passage: "But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience."[43]

Here we are dealing with a point that sets Kant apart from empiricism—the *internalization* of universals to the empirical reality. Recall that, for Locke, universals don't belong to the actual fabric of the mind-external world; rather, they are products of abstraction and reside only within the inner realm of representations. Contrary to this, Kant not only acknowledges that universals belong to objective reality, but asserts that they "make up *the objectivity* of the cognitions of experience."[44] Hegel is impressed with the step Kant takes toward conceptual realism but also criticizes him for not pursuing this step far enough: "To be cognizant, however, means nothing else but the knowing of object according to its determinate content. A determinate content, however, contains a manifold *connection* within itself and is the basis for connections with many other objects."[45] Kant, according to Hegel, fails to do justice to the extent of interconnectedness of the conceptual content immanent to empirical reality. Kant focused too narrowly on the categories—"Kantian reason has nothing but the categories,"[46] according to Hegel, and missed that if we acknowledge that certain universal determinations make up the basic structure of actuality, we are also committed to the presence of the "manifold of connections" between the complex determinations that are made up of the elements of this basic structure.

To see whether Hegel's criticism is justified we have to look at what Kant means by *universality* and what role it plays in cognition. For Kant universality is the *form* of concepts while their *matter* is the objects of experience. Hence, the issue of the relation between universality and empirical reality is directly tied to the relation between concepts and the empirical realm. Objects for Kant are not entities heterogeneous to the human intellect, but they are conditioned by the determinations of the mind. His Copernican revolution, which turns on the insight that "the objects must conform to our cognition,"[47] internalizes the objects of experience (phenomena) to representations (the determinations of the mind): "an object . . . is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united."[48] A *concept* for Kant means not only "a general and reflected representation" but also a "consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis of a sensible manifold." In other words, a concept is what underlies and guides the process of unification of sensible intuitions as a result of which objects of cognition are formed and the conceptual content is present in the perceptual experience as an integral element of the rule of apprehension of objects of experience. To be sure, the outcome of the act of apprehension is not yet equivalent to full cognition, as the latter implies two additional syntheses: reproduction in imagination and subsumption under a concept (this time not as the rule of synthesis but universal and reflected representation). The former is merely an appearance,

"undetermined objects of empirical intuition," and differs from phenomena that have been subsumed under a concept and thus become "determined objects of empirical intuition." This, however, does not mean that the merely apprehended appearance is free of conceptual content, as a concept qua the unity of an act of synthesis has already been employed in the apprehension of a sensible manifold.

Therefore, for Kant, conceptual content is present on both ends of the cognitive process. Initially, it is present as the schema of the synthesis of apprehension as a result of which the empirical reality as a plurality of appearances manifests itself to the mind. At this level, concept is functioning as the "consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis of a sensible manifold," as a function of unity through which appearances are taken in by the mind. This level of presence of conceptual content corresponds to what Kant in the *Prolegomena* calls *judgment of perception*. There is a second level of application of the concepts, this time at the other end of cognitive activity, wherein these appearances are subsumed under concepts. This corresponds to what Kant in the *Prolegomena* calls *judgments of experience*. The question of the presence of "the manifold of connections" or the lack thereof can thus be addressed on these two different levels. But clearly, while the relations under consideration will be present in different form in the judgments of perception and the judgments of experience, they are without a doubt available on both levels. The concept that is used as the rule of apprehension has "the manifold of connections" within it, as do the universal and reflected representation under which the appearances are subsumed.

As such, Robert Stern misses the point when contrasting Hegel's positions with Kant's regarding the immanence of concepts to objects:

> I will claim that Kant's idealism is subjective for Hegel in employing the activity of the synthesizing subject to explain the genesis and structure of the object, while Hegel's idealism is objective in treating the substance-universal which it exemplifies as constituting the unity of the individual. As a result, whereas Kant's philosophy is idealistic because it treats the unity of the object as dependent on the structure imposed on experience by the transcendental subject, Hegel's philosophy is idealistic because it operates with a realist theory of universals, which have a fundamental place in his ontology.[49]

But "the synthesizing subject" is not combining in a random fashion manifolds of representations. Rather, the object is formed through a *rule-guided synthesis,* and this rule through which "the structure of the object" is formed is nothing else but the concept, or "the substance-universal" as Stern calls it. Therefore, the two positions are much closer than Stern would have it.

Kant's well-known example about a savage perceiving a house for the first time is helpful in clarifying the point here. While analyzing the differences between two cases of apprehension of representations of the very same

object, one guided by a concept qua schema of synthesis of apprehension and the other that is not, Kant explains:

> If, for example, a savage sees a house from a distance whose use he does not know, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who knows it determinately as a dwelling established for human beings. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two cases. In the former it is mere intuition, in the latter it is simultaneously intuition and concept.[50]

For Kant, both *intuition* and *concept* are perceptions or conscious representations, and both are related to an object (unlike mere sensations, which are merely subjective perceptual states). In other words, they are related to something independent of the mind. But they also differ in a significant sense; while intuition is related to the object *immediately*, the concept is related to it *mediately*. Thus, someone who has a concept of house as a result of the act of apprehension of the object ends up with a representation that has both mediated and immediate components. The immediate element is the intuition, whereas the mediated is the rule that guides the synthesis of apprehension of the intuition. On the other hand, for the savage who sees such an object for the first time, the rule that would enable him to apprehend the representation as a house is not available. But once he sees many similar objects and acquires the concept of house, the nature of his subsequent apprehensions will also change and will have no longer merely intuition but "simultaneously intuition and concept."

Since the conceptual content that is guiding the act of apprehension of objects of experience is an integral part of a wider network of determinations, the objects that are conditioned by these determinations are also related to one another. To use Kant's own example, an apprehension of a house involves a concept of a house as a dwelling of human beings, and hence one amongst a manifold of connections we have there is the connection between the concept of a *house* and the concept of a *human*. But this renders any particular house and any particular human being related due to the connection between the conceptual content involved in the processes of synthesis through which they are apprehended is related to any particular human apprehended due to the relation between the concepts that made individuation of these objects possible. Hence for Kant empirical concepts as well as objects of experience are interconnected to one another, and Hegel's criticism of the lack of appreciating the manifold of connections between the conceptual content involved in experience does not do justice to Kant's position. It does, however, point to an important difference between the two philosophers. For Kant, the key question is the origin of the pure a priori concepts and the justification of their applicability to empirical objects. Hegel, on the other hand, stresses the need for a closer attention to the manifold of relations that

obtains between the determinations of thought and the interrelatedness of the objects individuated through these determinations. But even if the criticism of Kant is somewhat misguided, it nevertheless reveals what Hegel sees as the aspect of the Kantian system that is in need of further development. Therefore, we can anticipate that focusing on the manifold of relations between the determinations of thought will be one of the priorities in Hegel's appropriation of the Kantian system.

Kant as a Subjective Idealist

Another critical point Hegel advances against Kant is what he sees as Kant's failure to properly overcome the rigid distinction between the *subjective* and the *objective* moments of actuality. In Hegel's eye, while Kant's Copernican revolution is attempting to leave behind the traditional opposition between subject and object, it ends up advancing the reducing objective side of the dualistic ontology on the subjective one:

> That the categories are to be regarded as belonging only to us (or as "subjective") must seem very bizarre to the ordinary consciousness, and there is certainly something awry here. . . . Now, although the categories (e.g., unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of objects themselves. But, according to Kant's view, this is what is supposed to be the case, and his philosophy is subjective Idealism.[51]

Hegel's criticism in this case is quite on point. If on the one hand Kant wants to maintain that the categories originate in the logical forms of judgment and are the source of the objective purport of our representations, while on the other hand he also introduces the thing-in-itself as a part of his system, then subjective idealism indeed seems to be an inevitable outcome. The "objectivity" that is grounded on the cognitive constitution of the subject will inevitable appear as a watered-down version of the true actuality that the thing-in-itself stands for.

Very often, a solution to this problem is sought in a fundamental misinterpretation of the Kantian stance according to which sense perceptions are taken to be the source conferring objectivity to the representations of the mind. But as Hegel correctly points out, according to Kant, sensible intuitions are also states of the subject: "The categories are empty on their own account and have their application and use only in experience, whose other component, the determinations of feeling and intuition, is equally something merely subjective."[52] Indeed, for Kant all representations, the subspecies of which are sensible intuitions as well as mere sensations, are "inner states of the mind." What is different between mere sensations and intuitions is that while the former belong only to the subject, the latter in addition to that are

also related to the objects of cognitions. But this objectivity, as Hegel points out, arises from another subjective element: the logical forms of judgment and the categories. The point here is that while all components of the Kantian objective realm are of subjective origin, when combined together, according to Kant, they somehow form objective determinations. Therefore, Hegel's charge that the source of objectivity within the Kantian system is a highly problematic issue that is not dealt with in a satisfactory manner is not an unwarranted one.

A possible defense of Kant's position could be offered along the following lines: The knowledge derived from experience is true only with qualification—it is true of the world as it appears to us, but has nothing to do with the things independent of our cognitive constitution, or things in themselves. However, Hegel thinks that this position amounts to nothing but an indirect admitting of skepticism—the impossibility of grasping the ultimate nature of reality. As he puts succinctly, "for Kant . . . what we think is false just because we think it."[53] Therefore, we should expect Hegel in his alternative to Kant to address the problem of the gap between the subjective and objective moments and to offer an account according to which determinations of thought will no longer be "ours alone" but will determine objective reality.

Contradiction

Another critical theme Hegel develops is the epistemic function and the ontological status of *contradiction*. Hegel questions Kant's assumption that reality has to be free of contradiction. Only determinations of thought can and do come to contradict each other, according to Kant. This confining of contradiction to the subjective side is a key feature of his solution to the problems of paralogisms and antinomies: "The solution is that the contradiction does not fall in the object in and for itself, but is only attributable to reason and its cognition of the object."[54] By limiting the scope of contradiction to the realm of thought, Kant is attempting to "save" the objective reality from it. But in Hegel's eye, had Kant been more open to embrace the inner thrust of his own thought, he could have put the difficulties generated through contradictions to his advantage. Hegel is impressed by Kant's uncovering of the necessity of contradiction brought about by cognitive effort. He sees this as an important insight with far-reaching epistemological and ontological consequences.

> What is made explicit here is that it is the content itself, namely, the categories on their own account, that bring about the contradiction. This thought, that the contradiction which is posited by the determinations of the understanding in what is rational is essential and necessary, has to be considered one of the most important and profound advances of the philosophy of modern times. But the solution is as trivial as the viewpoint is profound; it consists merely in a

> tenderness for the things of this world. The stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essence of what is in the world; it has to belong only to thinking reason, to the essence of the spirit.[55]

Clearly, for Hegel the Kantian "solution" to the antinomies and paralogisms does not measure up to the "problems" themselves. It is the "solution" that is the problem, while the "problem" is a key to a superior philosophical perspective that Kant could have brought about but failed to.

While the full account of what Hegel sees as Kant's missed opportunity shall be gradually emerging throughout the remaining chapters of the book, we can already see some of its features hinted at in this passage. To begin with, it is clear that if Hegel is to develop the strategy of groundedness of individuals on the universals, then the confinement of the contradictions to the realm of determinations of thought and thus sheltering the determination of things from it will become problematic. When individuals are construed as grounded on universal determinations of thought are immanent to them, and so are the relations between these determinations. Further, Hegel is explicit that the number of necessary contradictions is not limited to those presented by Kant in the *Transcendental Dialectic*: "The main point that has to be made is that antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmology, but rather all objects of all kinds."[56] Claims like this one made by Hegel have often been used in ascribing to him an utterly confused position, according to which for any true proposition "x is y," there is at the same time corresponding true propositions "x is not y." This, however, is not the most interesting reading of Hegel's thesis, nor the one that best fits his philosophical system as a whole.

Once we recall the conclusions we drew earlier from Hegel's position—first, his critical remarks on semantic atomism and therefore commitment to the strong interrelation between the determinations of thought, and second, his claim regarding the immanence of determinations of thought to "all objects of all kinds," a very interesting perspective on the thesis about ubiquity of contradiction comes to the fore. Robert Brandom points to this alternative by offering to read the contradiction thesis as a claim of necessary inadequacy of any system of empirical concepts wherein contradiction serves as an immanent source of their inevitable instability:

> What we must realize to move to the standpoint of Vernunft is that we will always and necessarily be led to contradict ourselves by applying determinate concepts correctly—no matter how the world happens to be—and that it is in just this fact that the true nature of the immediacy, particularity, and actuality revealed to us in experience consists. . . . When Hegel says of the concrete that "the true, thus inwardly determinate, has the urge to develop," and that "The Understanding, in its pigeon-holing process, keeps the necessity and the Notion of the content to itself—all that constitutes the concreteness, the actuality,

> the living movement of the reality which it arranges," he means that no concepts with fixed, determinate boundaries can capture how things are in a way that will not turn out to require eventual revision.[57]

That is to say, the claim that "everything actual contains opposite determinations"[58] is not an attempt to reject the law of non-contradiction but instead is its integration within the new ontological vision, according to which any system of empirical determinations of thought that immanently structure actuality will require eventual revision due to contradictions between its elements. In other words, when the inferential relations are pursued far enough, any given constellation of empirical concepts and doxastic commitments will inevitably lead to mutually contradicting claims. This in turn calls for a revision of the content of empirical concepts that constitute the basic determinations of actuality. In the following chapter that is dedicated to the determinations of reflection and their role in Hegel's system, I shall give an account of the function *contradiction* has in the process of generation of empirical determinations which will have much in common with Brandom's reading.

Having looked at the key critical themes Hegel develops in his examination of the alternative positions, the following conclusions can be made:

1. Hegel's transcendental ontology shall offer an alternative to the traditional dualistic metaphysics and the representation theory of knowledge. Division of the world into two realms, *represented* vs. *representations*, that takes the mind to be a kind of mirror of the mind-external world has to be replaced with a model that leaves behind this bifurcated picture and the ontological and epistemological problems that arise from it. As the subsequent chapters shall show, the Hegelian alternative will make a turn along the lines of what Brandom describes as substituting *representation* with *expression* as the key concept of epistemological doctrine. The conceptual content in this model is hinged not on the external reality, which it purportedly represents, but on the process of the application of empirical determinations through which the implicit content is made explicit and the individual determinations are given meaning as elements of the systematically related constellation of determinations.
2. The traditional approach of taking sensations as the source of content for universal determinations shall be replaced with an account of the universals as the immanent grounds of individuation of entities. These universals, instead of being self-sufficient atomic determinations, derive their meaning from their relation to other determinations, together with which they make up a systemically interrelated whole. As such, the relations between the concepts serve as the background condition

on which individual determinations are grounded, and as we have seen, one of these relations, *contradiction*, according to Hegel plays a very important role in this respect. I shall look at this issue in the following chapter.

3. The third general strategic line that can be extracted from Hegel's critical analysis of alternative doctrines is his aim to put forth an ontology that will have radical plasticity of actuality as its key feature. This plasticity is what sets his stance apart from the doctrines like that of empiricists that he saw as the philosophy of unfreedom. Concepts, instead of representing pre-existing reality, are the nodes in a network of interrelated and continuously revised systems of universal determinations, which constitute objects. Hegel's master word, *dialectic*, is the movement of self-determination of the interconnected constellation of concepts within which any determination is perpetually subjected to dissolution and re-determination.

NOTES

1. Hegel, EL §27, 65.
2. Ibid., §28, 66.
3. During his formative years in Jena, Hegel described his own effort as lifting the spirit of Kant's transcendental philosophy from its letter (The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, 79), and there is no clear evidence that he had ever given up on that vision.
4. Hegel, EL §26, 65.
5. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 312 (KCR 10:130).
6. Hegel, EL §28, 67.
7. Ibid. §31, 69.
8. Ibid. §30, 68.
9. Ibid. §31, 68.
10. Ibid. §28, 67.
11. Ibid. §28, 66.
12. Ibid. §28, 67.
13. Ibid. §28, 66.
14. Ibid. §28, 66–67.
15. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 39.
16. Ibid., 39.
17. Hegel, EL §32, 70.
18. Ibid. §31, 69.
19. Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge. 1990), 74.
20. Ibid., 74.
21. Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Harvard University Press, 2000), 46.
22. Hegel, EL §26, 65.
23. G. W. von Leibniz. Die philosophischen Schriften, IV (Adamant Media Corporation, 2002), 425.
24. Hegel, EL §30, 68.

25. John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Harvard University Press, 2009), 9.
26. Hegel, EL §38, 79.
27. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Penguin Press, 1998) (VIII §8).
28. Thomas Baldwin, "The Identity Theory of Truth," Mind, 100 (1991), 35–52, at 49.
29. Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge. 1990), 77–78.
30. Hegel, EL §38, 77.
31. Ibid. §39, 80.
32. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B3–4).
33. John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Harvard University Press, 2009), 17.
34. Ibid., 17.
35. Hegel, EL §38, 78.
36. Ibid. §38, 78.
37. Ibid. §38, 77–78.
38. Ibid. §38, 79.
39. John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Harvard University Press, 2009), 6.
40. Hegel, EL §40, 80.
41. Ibid. §40, 81.
42. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B1).
43. Ibid. (B1).
44. Hegel, EL §40, 81.
45. Ibid., §46, 89.
46. Ibid., §46, 89.
47. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B XVI).
48. Ibid. (B137).
49. Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge. 1990), 110.
50. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic (Cambridge University Press, 2004) (V, Ak. IX).
51. Hegel, EL §42, 85.
52. Ibid., §43, 86.
53. Ibid., §60, 107.
54. Ibid., §48, 91.
55. Ibid., §48, 91–92.
56. Ibid., §48, 92.
57. Robert Brandom, "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts," Journal Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism, Vol. 3 (2005): 144.
58. Hegel, EL §48, 93.

Chapter Two

Determinations of Reflection and Generation of Conceptual Content

The theory of the Concept is the centerpiece of Hegel's ontology. It is where we find his account of the basic structure of objective reality: "that the cognition conceptualizing the subject matter is a cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and the concept is its very objectivity";[1] "Being and Essence are so far the moments of its [the Concept's] becoming, but it is their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are submerged and contained";[2] and "Objective logic therefore, which treats of *being* and *essence*, constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the Concept. More precisely, substance is already real essence . . . the Concept is the truth of substance."[3] The Doctrine of the Concept is the second and the final part of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. While the first part of the work that is composed of The Doctrine of Being and The Doctrine of Essence deals with the traditional categories such as quantity, quality, limitation, existence, etc., the third part, The Doctrine of the Concept, is where Hegel breaks new ground, presenting the full extent of his departure from the tradition. Considering that the overall development of the text takes us from the more surface level determinations of the ontological space to their underlying conditions, one should not be surprised by the claim Hegel makes in the just-cited passages; namely that the categories of Being and Essence are grounded in a more fundamental schema and the account of this schema is given in The Doctrine of the Concept. On Hegel's view, then, the Concept is actuality properly comprehended, the basic ontological framework that conditions and makes possible the determinations of being and essence. In this chapter I will offer a detailed dissection of its pivotal component—the *universal* moment that will lead us to a more systematic analysis of the overall structure of the Concept in the subsequent chapters.

Hegel's thesis that the Concept grounds objectivity is one more clear evidence of the Kantian origin of his position. In the transcendental deduction, Kant had argued the applicability of the categories to the objects of experience on the grounds that the concept is the rule of synthesis that serves as a necessary condition of the possibility of objects of experience.[4] Hegel explicitly acknowledges the Kantian origins of this idea: "We cited earlier from Kant's deduction of the categories to the effect that, according to it, the object in which the manifold of intuition is unified. . . . The objectivity of thought is here, therefore, specifically defined: it is an identity of concept and thing which is the truth."[5] As the analysis that follows shall demonstrate, we can identify parallelism with Kant on two distinct levels in Hegel's theory of the Concept: micro and macro. The former concerns the similarity between the basic forms of the activities generative of conceptual content. Kant and Hegel put forward virtually identical sets of basic functions to guide the process that generates empirical concepts. And these functions on the one hand figure in Hegel's Concept as the formal schemata of its key moment, while on the other hand the very same functions make up the structure of Kant's transcendental object.

The similarity on the "higher"-level—or macro-level—concerns the presence of the dynamic and the static moments in both the Kantian and the Hegelian accounts alongside the claim of identity of these moments. Kant's identification of transcendental apperception with the universally shared formal structure of the objects of experience is mirrored in Hegel's identification of two moments of the Concept, one dynamic and the other static. These striking similarities explain why Hegel describes Kant's identification of the unity of the Concept with the synthetic unity of apperception as "one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in *The Critique of Pure Reason* [namely] that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness."[6] Hegel sees the Kantian identification of the synthetic unity of apperception with the Concept as already encapsulating in a nascent form the key features of his theory of the Concept. In what follows, I shall lay out the key characteristics of the Hegelian Concept side by side with the corresponding elements in Kant and see how much of the former can be illuminated by the latter.

THREE MOMENTS OF THE CONCEPT

The Hegelian Concept has a triadic structure consisting of three moments: *universality*, *particularity*, and *individuality*. These moments are not self-sufficient components that can be cleanly decoupled from one another; rather, each one of them is internally related to the other two and embraces the

totality of the Concept.[7] Hegel begins his discussion of the moments with *universality,* which occupies a special place amongst the three moments. He describes *universality* as "the pure Concept" or the moment that stands for "the pure identical self-relation" of the Concept.[8] "Pure" here means having no determinate content. It is pure because it is prior to any determination. The self-relationality, on the other hand, stands for the dynamic nature of the moment; indeed, Hegel describes it as a *process*: "The universal is a process in which it posits the differences."[9] Clearly, the Hegelian *universal* is not to be mistaken for an abstract universal, which would neither be "pure" in the sense just specified, nor have the nature of a process. Rather, the universal moment is an activity or process that "posits the differences." Hegel also describes it as a "free power"—"the informing and creative principle reaching out to its other and embracing it, but without doing violence to it."[10] The process or the activity under consideration is that of applying existing concepts in doxastic claims and relating concepts to one another, whereby their content undergoes transformation and new empirical concepts are formed. Hence to "posit the differences" is to transform the conceptual content of existing concepts and to generate new ones.

While the first moment of the Concept, universality, is a *process*, the second moment, particularity, is described by Hegel as its product, the outcome of the universal moment's self-differentiation:

> The universal determines itself, and so is itself the particular; the determinateness is its difference; it is only differentiated from itself. Its species are therefore only (a) the universal itself and (b) the particular. The universal is as concept itself and its opposite, and this opposite is in turn the universal itself as its posited determinateness; the universal overreaches it and, in it, it is with itself. Thus it is the totality and the principle of its diversity, which is determined wholly and solely through itself.[11]

One way to think of this relation between the universal moment or process, on the one side, and the particular moment or system of empirical concepts generated through that process, on the other, is by analogy with the emergence of a new scientific theory in the period of transformation that Kuhn dubbed *paradigm shifts*. Corresponding to the universal moment is the set of activities including the formulation of hypotheses, the carrying out of experiments in order to confirm them, the introduction of new elements within the theory, and the modification of the meaning of existing elements. While the conceptual vocabulary of the emerging theory that posits the basic entities and relations would correspond to its particular moment. Hence on the one hand, the universal moment of the Concept as a process can be conceived along the lines of scientific practices that bring about a new theory. On the other hand, the particular moment, i.e., the systematically related constellation of empirical determinations, can be understood along the lines of the

basic kinds and relations posited by a newly emerged theory. The third moment of the Concept, individuality, is described by Hegel as the unity of the first two moments. I will turn to it after a detailed discussion of the universal and particular moments in Chapter 4.

THE UNIVERSAL MOMENT OF THE CONCEPT AS THE PROCESS OF REFLECTION

For Hegel the universal moment of the Concept is the process of positing determinations or generation and modification of the content of empirical concepts. The detailed account of the basic functions involved in the process of the generation of conceptual content, or what Hegel also describes as the Concept's "self-differentiation," is presented in The Doctrine of Essence. Hegel describes "essence" as the process of differentiation of determinations: "Absolute essence in this simple unity with itself . . . must pass over into existence, . . . it differentiates the determinations which it holds in itself."[12] This suggests that The Doctrine of Essence is where we should look for the modus operandi of the Concept's universal moment. Indeed the striking claim with which Hegel opens The Doctrine of Essence is a further confirmation of this: "The truth of being is essence."[13] The determinations of Being—such as quantity, quality, determinate being, limitation, and so on—are the basic inventory of concepts that describe the ordinary objects of experience, the world as it confronts us. The claim that *essence* is the truth of *being,* therefore, means that the schema presented in the Doctrine of Essence underlies and grounds the determinations of being or the most general features of the empirical concepts through which we relate to the world. Here is another passage where Hegel makes this point even more directly: "Behind this being there still is something other than being itself, and . . . this background [essence] constitutes the truth of being."[14] In The Doctrine of Essence, thus, we are exposed to the background process on which the determinate features of the ordinary objects of experience rest, the process that Hegel refers to as the universal moment of the Concept.

The title of the opening section of The Doctrine of Essence is "Essence as Reflection Within Itself." This together with numerous other claims of the kind—such as "in its self-movement, essence is reflection"[15] and "essence is reflection. Reflection determines itself; its determinations are a positedness which is immanent reflection at the same time"[16]—makes it clear that Hegel sees essence as a process the mode of operation of which is *reflection*. While discussing the process of reflection Hegel brings up the Kantian distinction between reflective and determinative judgment and focuses on the former as the "process of determination" that advances from the immediate towards the conceptual.

> For the universal, the principle or the rule and law, to which reflection rises in its process of determination is taken to be the essence of the immediate from which the reflection began; the immediate, therefore, to be a nothingness which is posited in its true being only by the turning back of the reflection from it, by the determining of reflection. Therefore, what reflection does to the immediate, and the determinations that derive from it, is not anything external to it but is rather its true being.[17]

Recall that for Kant reflective judgment is the effort geared to coming up with a concept under which the given intuition can be subsumed. It is a process that leads from immediate given to conceptually mediated determination. Thus Hegel sees the process of reflection as the generation of the concepts through which immediate is determined. Reflection is that "self-movement" of essence which in The Doctrine of the Concept is integrated as the universal moment of the Concept. Therefore, a close examination of reflection and the specific functions or forms that guide the process of reflection is the key to unlocking Hegel's vision of how empirical concepts are formed, their conceptual content furnished and modified.

DETERMINATIONS OF REFLECTION AND KANT'S CONCEPTS OF COMPARISON

The functions guiding the process of reflection that generates the conceptual content of empirical determinations include: *identity*, *difference*, *diversity*, *opposition*, and *contradiction*. Hegel calls these functions *the determinations of reflection* or *essentialities* and discussed them in "The Reflection" section of The Doctrine of Essence. Now, it is striking how closely these determinations correspond to *the concepts of comparison* Kant presents in the Amphiboly chapter of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. The Kantian concepts of comparison are *identity* and *difference*, *agreement* and *conflict*, *inner* and *outer*, and *matter* and *form*. As Beatrice Longuenesse has shown in her detailed study of the concepts of comparison, they are, for Kant, the basic forms of operation of thought involved in generating empirical concepts.[18] The first three pairs of the Kantian concepts of comparison exhibit an almost one-to-one correspondence with Hegel's determinations of reflection, while the last pair, dealing with modality of judgment, as I will demonstrate, is also reflected in Hegel's theory of the Concept. I will take a close look at each of the Kantian concepts of reflection, delineate clearly its characteristics, and then draw the parallel between it and the corresponding determination of reflection from Hegel's Doctrine of Essence. While engaged in this parallel analysis, it is important to keep in mind that Kant explicitly associates the concepts of comparison from the Amphiboly with the logical forms of judgment:

> Prior to all objective judgments we compare the concepts, with respect to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of universal judgments, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgments, or opposition, for negative ones, etc.[19]

Hence, the schemata to which I will compare Hegel's universal moment of the Concept are the very same schemata that make up the structure of the Kantian unity of apperception and the transcendental object.

Hegel's discussion of essentialities or determinations of reflection leaves no doubt that he is concerned there with the elementary functions of thought guiding the process by which conceptual content is generated. However, instead of offering a detailed account of the operation of these functions as the basic forms guiding the process of the generation of empirical concepts, he focuses on their deduction. Hegel wants to demonstrate the necessity with which the act of identification is tied with differentiation, differentiation in turn with determination of diversity, and so on. The reason why he focuses merely on their deduction is that he does not consider an exposition of how these interrelated determinations function as the basic forms guiding the process of the generation of conceptual content a task that needs to be undertaken in the *Logic*. It is interesting to note here that, according to Longuenesse, a similar approach is taken by Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason.* He also assumes the familiarity of his readers with the use of the concepts of comparison in the generation of empirical concepts and focuses on the differences between applying these concepts to sensations vs. to concepts. Kant is explicit about it only in his lectures on the *Logic*.[20] Where Kant differs from Hegel is that neither the concepts of comparison nor the logical forms of judgment (with which he explicitly associates the concepts of comparison) are derived in the manner of Hegel's determinations of reflection. Indeed this lack of an explicit deduction of them has been one of the prominent objections raised against Kant by his followers who, while inspired by the spirit of Kant's philosophy, saw him as simply lifting the table of judgments from Logic textbooks of the time.

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

The first pair of concepts Kant considers in the Amphiboly chapter is *identity* and *difference*, which he associates with quantitative judgment. Identity corresponds to the universal, difference to the particular judgment. "Prior to all objective judgments we compare the concepts, with respect to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of universal judgments, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones."[21] The identity we are dealing with in universal judgment is a relation obtaining between deter-

minations falling under the subject-concept and those falling under the predicate-concept. For example, statements such as "All bodies are divisible," or generally: "All As are B," assert the identity not of the concepts of A and B but of those determinations that are thought under A with respect to the concept B. In other words, the statement means: this x-body is divisible, that y-body is also divisible, another z-body is divisible as well, etc. Hence, "All bodies are divisible."

On the other hand, particular judgment, such as "Some divisible things are bodies," or generally: "Some As are B," introduce difference—while this divisible-x (for example, this desk) is a body, but that divisible-y (for example, the time period used to write this sentence) is not. In other words, x and y are different with respect to the concept of "body." In this respect, x and y, both thought under the concept of divisibility, are determined as *different* with respect to their relation to the concept of body. Whereas, in the case of universal judgment, all determinations falling under the concept A were identical in regard to their relation to concept B, in that of particular judgment they are differentiated into groups with different relations to the concept B. Now what this means is that, when applying the concepts of comparison identity and difference, we are engaging in a process of reflection aimed at determining the *extension* of the domains of the two concepts under comparison. It is important to note here that the differentiation presupposes identity. What are differentiated from one another in relation to the concept B are initially unified under the concept A. This internal differentiation of the initial unity is what we shall encounter again when Hegel introduces difference as the second determination of reflection after identity. With Kant, the extension of the one determination is differentiated into two parts, one belonging to another determination and the other excluded from it. As we will see, Hegel makes the same move of internal differentiation of the unity but does it in more general terms. Hence both see identity and difference as the unity and its internal differentiation.

According to Longuenesse, the very same formal structures guide the activity through which we generate conceptual content:

> [I]n order to form concepts, we sift through our sensible representations by means of our concepts of comparison, which thus guide the formation of concepts for judgments. Recognition of the (generic) identity of the "rule of our apprehension" in different representations yields a universal judgment. Recognition of the difference of the "rule of our apprehension" in various representations yields particular judgment.[22]

It is through the identifying and differentiating activities of the mind engaged in the process of apprehending representations that new determinations are generated. As with the comparison of concepts, where the actual processes of apprehension of series of representations are what we compare, here again

the very same functions are applied to these very acts of apprehension but geared to a different end—generation of new concepts. For example, this tree (x), that tree (y), and another tree (z) all have such and such identical types of leaves, trunks, branches, etc., which differentiates them from numerous other representations that are also apprehended as trees. Based on the shared properties that set these trees apart from others, I arrive at a new concept that includes the shared properties, a concept under which falls a certain subcategory of the objects apprehended as trees.

The first determination of reflection that Hegel considers is also *Identity*. He describes it as "the immediacy of reflection. It is not that self-equality which being is, or also nothing, but a self-equality which, in producing itself as unity . . . pure production, from itself and in itself, essential identity."[23] The first thing to notice here is a clear similarity between Identity and Pure Being with which the entire *Science of Logic* commences. Both are pure indeterminate immediacies, as still untouched by the mediation that is about to ensue and bind them with other determinations. Thus, in that sense Identity is the totality of reflection and not merely one among its determination, just as Pure Being is Being as such prior to any differentiation; "in general, therefore, it[identity] is still the same as essence"[24] or "This identity is, in the first instance, essence itself, not yet a determination of it; it is the entire reflection, not a distinct moment of it."[25] But there is also a fundamental difference between the opening determinations of the Doctrine of Being and identity; as Hegel puts it, if the former merely "is," the latter "has brought itself to unity." Identity is essentially activity of self-relation: the "equality-with-self" that is continuously reconstituted, the reflection that "brings itself to unity." This difference shed light on how much Hegel's undertaking is indebted to Kant. Kant proposed to reject the model which "assumed [that] our cognition must conform to the objects" and "let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition."[26] Hence, instead of positing objects as mind-external entities, they were reconceived as grounded on our cognitive constitution. Objective reality was internalized to and grounded on thought. Kant's move corresponds to the transition from indeterminate Being to Identity in Hegel's Logic. The first is "absence of all determination and content—undifferentiatedness in itself"[27] and the second "essence itself, not yet a determination of it, reflection in its entirety, not a distinct moment of it." Moreover, the Essence is the truth of Being according to Hegel.[28] The being is argued to be grounded on essence, the modality of operation of which is reflection. This parallel with Kant's Copernican turn indicates how thoroughly misguided Aristotelian readings of Hegel are. For Aristotle being grounds thought. For Kant it is the other way around and so it is for Hegel.

Clearly identity is not a property of some state of affairs in the world independent of any act of reflection. Instead it is a feature of any activity of

thinking that "brings itself to unity." This dynamic nature of the first determination of reflection is what Hegel wants to bring to the fore when describing it as the "pure movement of reflection."[29] The fact that Hegel does not take identity to be an "unmoved simple" property, but an act of identification is exhibited by the example he offers to demonstrate that the identity implies difference.

> Instead of being the unmoved simple, it surpasses itself into the dissolution of itself. More is entailed, therefore, in the form of the proposition expressing identity than simple, abstract identity; entailed by it is this pure movement of reflection in the course of which there emerges the other, but only as reflective shine, as immediate disappearing; "A is" is a beginning that envisages a something different before it to which the "A is" would proceed; but the "A is" never gets to it. "A is . . . A": the difference is only a disappearing and the movement goes back into itself.[30]

The point here is that identity as a form of reflection, as a function of thought, implies difference because it is not an "unmoved simple" property belonging to an object of thought, but an act of self-relation, which, in order to return to itself, has to introduce difference, but only as "reflective shine." Hence, Hegel's determinations of reflection are not to be understood along the lines of the Aristotelian categories as the most universal characteristics of what is out there in the mind-external world. Instead, they are the features that have to be necessarily present in any process of reflection engaged in determination of content.

The reason why Hegel starts his exposition of the determinations of reflection with *identity* is that *identity* is the dynamic principle of unification present in any act of thought. For even the other determinations that Hegel will derive from it have to be parts of a unified whole in order to be comprehended as difference, diversity, etc. The idea is that only within a unified whole can difference or diversity be thought. If there is no act of relating one determination with another one as distinct from it and taking them up together into a self-identical act of reflection, differentiation cannot be accomplished. This is even clearer in the case of *diversity*, *contradiction*, etc. Hence, identity can be described as the minimal requirement of thought, the principal element of any determination. As with Kant, here too we are carving out a self-identical domain of determination. In the former case, it was the identity of a plurality of apprehended individuals in regard to the presence of certain schema of apprehension in all of them. In the latter case, we have the very same formal structure of act of identification presented in a more minimalistic vocabulary.

Having introduced the first determination of reflection, Hegel begins deriving the remaining elements of the basic schema of operation of reflection through which empirical concepts are applied in doxastic claims, their con-

tent gets modified and new empirical concepts are formed. As we have seen, *identity* with Kant functions as an *act of identification* of plurality of determinations as sharing a schema of apprehension (many individual cognized under one concept). It also guides the process of comparison of one concept to another (for example all As are Bs) as well as the formation of new determinations (coming up with a new concepts on the bases of identification of certain sub-category of the individuals falling under a more general concepts). We have seen, for Kant *identity* is necessarily paired with *difference*; hence, if my thesis about the parallelism between Kant and Hegel is right, we should expect Hegel to take a similar step. Indeed *difference* is the determination of reflection that Hegel derives right after *identity*. While identity is the moment that stands for constitution and reconstitution of unity, difference is the negating element that plays the key role in reshaping existing determinations and generating new ones: "Difference is the negativity that reflection possesses in itself."[31] *Difference* is deduced on the grounds that, in order to constitute unity, reflective activity has to integrate determinations within a whole, thus negating their apparent self-sufficiency and rendering them into the elements grounded of the act of determination. Any process of negation, on the other hand, also implies a drive toward unification as what is negated is taken up within the process of reflection that includes other determinations. This mutual relatedness of *difference* and *identity* according to Hegel is the essential characteristic of any act of reflection.[32]

Here again, just as in the case of identity, Hegel explicitly argues that we should not confuse difference with a feature of the self-sufficient actuality. This is what he is after when juxtaposing and contrasting *difference* with *otherness*. The former stands for a characteristic of the process of reflection, while the latter that of determinate being.

> It is the difference of reflection, not the otherness of existence. One existence and another existence are posited as lying outside each other; each of the two existences thus determined over against each other has an immediate being for itself. The other of essence, by contrast, is the other in and for itself, not the other of some other which is to be found outside it; it is simple determinateness in itself. Also in the sphere of existence did otherness and determinateness prove to be of this nature, simple determinateness, identical opposition; but this identity showed itself only as the transition of a determinateness into the other. Here, in the sphere of reflection, difference comes in as reflected, so posited as it is in itself.[33]

Difference here is the negative moment of thought that deals not with some external, given determination, but instead is the negating act of reflection. This sets it apart from the *otherness* of determinate being. The latter implies givenness of distinct determinations between which reflection can move back and forth. *Difference* on the other hand is an elementary form guiding the

process of reflection that generates empirical determinations and, together with *identity,* constitutes the most fundamental functions on which the radical plasticity of empirical determinations rests. Hence just as in case of Kant, here again with Hegel, identity and difference are the most basic functions through which the process of formation and modification of determinations is taking place. For both of them, identification implies differentiation, one cannot take place without the other.

AGREEMENT AND OPPOSITION

The second pair of the concepts of comparison Kant considers in the Amphiboly chapter is agreement and conflict. "Prior to all objective judgments we compare the concepts, . . . with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgments, or opposition, for negative ones, etc."[34] In relating two determinations to each other, not only do we specify how they are related regarding their extension—whether one is fully or only partially included in the other—we also determine whether this relation of extensions is positive or negative. In other words, we are making the determination of whether the extension of one concept is fully included (agreement) within the domain of the other, or fully excluded (opposition) from it; or whether they are partially included or partially excluded from each other. If identity and difference were related to quantitative judgment, the agreements and opposition are related to qualitative judgments (affirmative vs. negative). Hence, with the two pairs of already-considered concepts of comparison, we can have four different ways of relating determinations: identical agreement, or "all As are B"; identical opposition, or "no As are B"; differentiated agreement, or "some As are B"; and differentiated opposition, or "some As are not B."

Thus, together with identity and difference as the functions that guide the process of application of existing empirical concept, their comparison to one another, and the generation of new empirical concepts are also involved agreement and conflict as integral elements of the very same activity. The process of application of existing and generation of new empirical concepts involves reflection that is searching for instances of apprehension of representations that are in agreement and/or conflict with one another. Identification and differentiation implies discerning agreement and conflict.

Hegel takes a corresponding step by deducing the relations of diversity and opposition from differentiation of self-identical unity. Just as with Kant, *identification* and *differentiation* implies discerning *agreement* and *conflict*, so with Hegel *identification* and *differentiation* implies *diversity* and *opposition*. He sees this development as an application of difference on identity: "Identity internally breaks apart into diversity because, as absolute difference in itself, it posits itself as the negative of itself and these, its two moments

(itself and the negative of itself), are reflections into themselves, are identical with themselves; or precisely because it itself immediately sublates its negating and is in its determination reflected into itself."[35] The differentiated elements are "reflected into" themselves qua self-identical unities. Indeed, clearly, the minimal condition of any differentiation is some form of self-unity of the differentiated determinations. And on the other hand, these determinations can be self-identical only through differentiating from what is not identical to them. *Diversity* is, as such, the first immediate result of the unity of *identity* and *difference*. We see a clear correspondence with the Kantian concepts of reflection. In both cases, the determination of the domain of diverse concepts is accomplished by identification and differentiation.

At the same time with the posited determinations in the picture, we no longer have the complete transparency of reflection that was there with *identity* and *difference*. The posited determinations stand outside of the complete self-transparency of reflection and its positive (identity) and negative (difference) moments: "Diversity constitutes the otherness as such of reflection."[36] But this does not mean that *diversity* is a determination of being, something absolutely external to thought; it instead is the otherness of reflection generated from the process of reflection itself. "The other of existence has immediate being, where negativity resides, for its foundation. But in reflection it is self-identity, the reflected immediacy, that constitutes the subsistence of the negative and its indifference."[37]

With *diversity* in the picture, differentiation and identification acquire new functions, namely, as determining *likeness* and *unlikeness* amongst the posited determinations; "this external identity is likeness, and external difference is unlikeness."[38] What were the positive and the negative moments of activity of reflection in general, now are functions relating the determinations that have been generated through it. Identity and difference operate within the diversified content as *likeness* and *unlikeness*. Just like in their pure form, however, they mutually implied each other. Unlikeness can only be determined on the background of likeness and vice versa—two determinations can be likened to each other as long as they are also unlike, or in some respect different from, each other.

It is not difficult to see the overall correspondence between the Hegelian determinations of *likeness* and *unlikeness* with the Kantian concepts of *agreement* and *opposition*. In both of these pairs we have two mutually excluding functions of relation of plurality of determinations: in likeness and agreements–that of shared characteristics and with unlikeness and opposition with its disjunctive ones. In both systems these pairs are involved in the process of application of existing concepts geared to modification of their content and generation of new empirical determinations. And just like with Kant the agreement and opposition were argued to be necessarily involved with the process of identification and differentiation, so here with Hegel we

have the diversity and its internal components of likeness and unlikeness being directly derived from the first pair of determinations: identity and difference.

INNER AND OUTER

In addition to identity/difference and agreement/opposition, the concepts of reflection involved in the generation of empirical determinations, according to Kant, also include inner and outer. If the previous two pairs of concepts were related to quantitative and qualitative judgments, the present one corresponds to the judgment of relation: "If we reflect merely logically, then we simply compare our concepts with each other in the understanding, seeing whether two of them contain the very same thing, whether they contradict each other or not, whether something is contained in the concept internally or is added to it."[39] The *inner* relation between the determinations being related stands for attributing the predicate-determination to the subject determination without any external condition. In other words, there are no additional conditions that need to obtain in order to predicate the former to the latter. "All trees have branches" or "some trees are evergreen" would be examples of such a relation. This form of relation corresponds to categorical judgment. The *outer* relation, on the other hand, needs some external condition in order to necessitate the attribution of predicate-determination to the subject-determination. An example of this could be "if the sources of water are cut off from a tree, the tree will die." Moreover, this external condition does not have to be related to the subject-determination: The outer relation can have not only the form of "If A is X, then A is Y" but also "If A is X, then B is Y." For example, "If Professor Kant walks by, the clocks will strike four times" or "If the climate dramatically changes, many animal species will perish." One more important thing to note here is that, if with the other concepts of reflection we were relating two determinations, now we are relating two relations. As such, inner/outer formal functions are geared to articulating complex systematic relations between determinations and the relations between determinations. It is the systematizing function immanent to the determination-generating process.

These functions (inner and outer), together with the two above-discussed pairs (identity/difference and agreement/conflict), are not merely used to relate already-existing concepts, but also are guiding the process of reflection through which conceptual content of empirical determinations is generated. In the process of the formation of empirical concepts, we examine appearances with the aim to discern the formal structure of either inner or outer relations between its determinations. For example, we observe that this x, which is a tree, has branches; and that y, which is also cognized as tree, has

branches as well. We repeat this process until we eventually come up with a general rule that states that trees have braches. This is clearly an example of an inner relationship discerned amongst apprehended representations. On the other hand, we can also parse experiences with the aim of identifying external conditions under which new states of affairs will be obtained. For example, if this piece of metal x is heated it melts; if that other piece of metal y is heated, it also will be transformed from solid into fluid state, etc. Thus I arrive at a general rule that if metal is heated, it melts. This is clearly an example of an outer relation between the concepts of metal and fluid, established based on the external condition of an increase in temperature.

The search for the inner and outer relations between the determinations offered through experience is what constitutes the process of looking for regularities in nature and identifying empirical laws. This is what Kant has in mind when claiming in the Transcendental Deduction that understanding is continuously busy with "scrutinizing appearances in search for rules."[40] Empirical laws of nature are nothing but a system of interrelated concepts that articulate rules of inner and outer relation. It is important to note here that with the necessity involved in both the inner and the outer relations corresponding to the hypothetical judgments ("all As are B," which is the same as "all x-s that are A are also B"; "if A is L then A is M"; or "if A is K then B is M") is implied another relational category: *contradiction*. This can be made evident by reformulating the very same relation as a contradiction between two propositions, respectively, between "x is A" and "x is not B," "A is L," and "A is not M," or again between "A is X" and "B is not Y." Here two relations that are perfectly non-problematic when taken on their own cannot be asserted together due to their mutual contradiction flowing from the inner and the outer relations that constitute these concepts. As we shall see, contradiction is the last element in the system of determinations of reflection that Hegel presents in the Essence chapter, and, indeed, here with Kant as well, it completes the portion of the concepts of reflection that is involved in the generation of conceptual content. The last remaining pair, matter and form, as we shall soon see, has a different function.

OPPOSITION

Prior to introducing *contradiction,* Hegel discusses *opposition* as "the determinate reflection" in which *difference* "finds its completion." If with diversity, determinations produced through the process of reflection were related to one another and therefore the question of their groundedness on the activity of thought was set aside, here it occupies the center stage of the discussion. The determinations that are related as opposites to one another are here taken as elements of "the one mediation of opposition as such in which they

simply are only posited moments."[41] Hence, instead of likeness and unlikeness as the modalities of relating diverse determinations, now we are attending to the unified process of mediation through which distinct determinations as such are generated. From a perspective that looks at already formed diversity of determinations as if from an external point of view, we have transitioned to the one that approaches these determinations as the products of the process of reflection. In other words, the generation of determinate conceptual content on the most fundamental level involves the identification and differentiation of the pairs of determinations that are opposed to one another. One element of the pair is positive, the other negative, but at the same time each side can be either positive or negative.

> The two sides are thus merely diverse, and because their determinateness–that they are positive or negative–constitutes their positedness as against each other, each is not specifically so determined internally but is only determinateness in general; to each side, therefore, there belongs indeed one of the two determinacies, the positive or the negative; but the two can be interchanged, and each side is such as can be taken equally as positive or negative.[42]

Negative and positive are the simultaneously posited sides of the act of differentiation of reflection, and neither side is intrinsically positive or negative. They are the basic functions of the process of differentiation, and this is the reason Hegel describes opposition as the completion of difference.

CONTRADICTION

As we have seen, for Hegel the process of reflection that generates conceptual content proceeds with positing a determination and in the same breath excluding its otherness. Not only is the diversity of determinations generated thought this process of reflection, but the determinations as opposing one another are determined through negation of the other, and as such they are only through one another, or are constituted through reciprocal opposition. But having laid out these basic functions involved in the formation of conceptual content, we can also discern one more relation that is necessarily involved within the process that is guided with this constellation of functions, namely–*contradiction*.

Each act of determination has two necessary aspects that correspond to the two main functions of the determinations of reflection, identity, and difference. The first aspect is that it is self-identical, and the second, that it is what it is through differentiation from what it is not. The former can be seen as the positive, and the latter as the negative moment of the determination. When closely analyzed, however, each one of the sides will lead to necessary transition into their opposites.

> The positive is contradiction–in that, as the positing of self-identity by the excluding of the negative, it makes itself into a negative, hence into the other which it excludes from itself. This last, as excluded, is posited free of the one that excludes; hence, as reflected into itself and itself as excluding. The reflection that excludes is thus the positing of the positive as excluding the other, so that this positing immediately is the positing of its other which excludes it.[43]

Hegel's point here is that any *positive* act of determining immediately implies a determination of what it excludes, thus of the *negative*. Thus, when dealing with a system of interrelated determinations, the generation of any new determination is not related merely to the posited content but at the same time to the rest of the system excluded from it. But this is only one side of what Hegel calls "absolute contradiction," its positive aspect. In addition to this, it also has the negative aspect: contradiction discerned from the opposite side of the act of determination, or "the absolute contradiction of the negative."[44] At first, the very same schema as we have seen from the positive side—the determination as simultaneously posited (thus reflected) in what it excludes—can be identified here as well: "Considered in itself as against the positive, the negative is positedness as reflected into unlikeness to itself, the negative as negative."[45] Now however we have an additional aspect that also needs to be factored in, namely, that we are dealing not with positive but negative determination, which immediately implies the negation of the opposite: "But the negative is itself the unlike, the non-being of another; consequently, reflection is in its unlikeness its reference rather to itself."[46] Hence, the relation that we had to explicate in the case of the positive is immediately present on the negative side. Here negation that it immediately is already implies its other, the opposite that is being negated. This is why Hegel describes it as *the posited contradiction*, "This is therefore the same contradiction which the positive is, namely positedness or negation as self-reference. But the positive is only implicitly this contradiction, is contradiction only in itself; the negative, on the contrary, is the posited contradiction."[47] Hence for Hegel *contradiction* is the relational function immanent to the process of the generation of conceptual content that emerges from the opposition between the positive and the negative moments of any act of determination. It is a formal relation that is necessarily generated as part of the process through which determinate conceptual content is furnished. The acts of identification, differentiation, and determination of diversity and opposition also imply the formal relation of contradiction. Like other determinations of reflection, contradiction is also an integral element of the process of generation of empirical concepts. Therefore, it should not be understood along the lines of an Aristotelian category, a feature of entities in the mind-external world. Instead, it is a feature of the process of reflection engaged in determination of content of empirical concepts. I shall return to this point at

the end of this chapter and specify more precisely how this determination figures in the process of application and modification of existing empirical concepts as well as the generation of new ones.

METTER AND FORM

The last pair of concepts of comparison that Kant discusses is *matter* and *form*. He claims: "Matter and form. These are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter its determination."[48] While the previous three pairs of concepts were specific functions that guide reflection in the process of the generation of empirical concepts, matter and form characterize the process of determination as such. The entire process of furnishing empirical determinations that is guided by the concepts of comparison is an application of form onto matter. Kant also calls this "determination of determinable." This helps us to see why the concepts of comparison have to correspond to the logical forms of judgment. The process of determination under consideration is that of generation of empirical concepts, but as we know for Kant *concepts* stand to *judgments* as *matter* to *form* (just like concepts in their turn are related to objects as form to matter). Now since the outcome of the process of generating empirical determinations that we have been considering here (the process that Kant describes as the application of form onto matter) are empirical concepts, the forms involved in the generation of these determinations have to be what stands as the form to them. Hence the functions guiding the process of generating empirical concepts have to be related to the logical functions of judgment, and this is exactly what Kant maintains in the earlier cited passage.[49]

The same relation between form and matter is present also on the most fundamental level of Hegel's ontology—his theory of the Concept, the relation between the universal and the particular moments of the Concept. The universal moment of the concept for Hegel is the activity, or "creative force," through which conceptual content is generated. On the other hand, the particular moment according to him is the system of determinations produced by universality. Hegel explicitly refers to the process of generation of concepts as *form* that is related to the determination produced through it as to its *content*:

> The particular has this universality in it as its essence; but in so far as the determinateness of the difference is posited and thereby has being, the universality is form in it, and the determinateness as such is its content. Universality becomes form inasmuch as the difference is something essential, just as in the

> pure universal it is, on the contrary, only absolute negativity and not a difference posited as such.[50]

The "pure universal" is thus absolute negativity, the activity that aims at the generation of determinations and it is related to its product as the form to the content. Just like Kant's form–matter relation refers to the activity of reflection through which empirical concepts are generated, so here the universal as the form posits differentiated determinations and is related to them as to its content. The Kantian activity of reflection geared to generating empirical concepts and guided by the concepts of comparison is integrated by Hegel within his fundamental ontological substructure, the Concept, as its universal moment.

CONCLUSION

Having explored in detail how the Kantian concepts of reflection guide the process of the generation of empirical concepts and having drawn the correspondence between them and the Hegelian determinations of reflection, we are in a position to make some conclusions about the ontological status of the determinations of reflection as well as ordinary empirical concepts. The determinations of reflection, or essentialities, are not the fundamental elements that make up the ontological landscape like general features of individual self-sufficient pieces that make up a complex mosaic. Instead, they are the *functions* that guide the *process* of the generation of empirical concepts, and therefore also of the entities individuated through these concepts. This allows us to see the nature of the mistake made by Hegel's critics regarding the place of *contradiction* in his system. According to this widespread misreading, Hegel has claimed that everything is self-contradictory and therefore self-contradictoriness is the feature of the objects as we find them in the world. This is a misinterpretation of Hegel's position. Contradiction, just as other determinations of reflection, is a feature not of the self-sufficient independent entities given to the mind, but of the process of generating the conditions of the individuation of these entities. Beatrice Longuenesse in *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics* (2007) and Karin De Boer in "Hegel's Account of Contradiction in the *Science of Logic* Reconsidered" (2010) have offered readings of the contradiction along the lines offered here. Contradiction is a feature that process of thinking inscribes in the system of empirical concepts on which actuality is grounded. Instead of finding contradiction within the world, we inculcate it within the conceptual substructure of actuality. Moreover, it plays a very important role in the process of transformation of these empirical concepts as the factor that necessitating change of their content. As Robert Brandom puts it in his "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel": "The idea is that at every stage in the development of an

autonomous system of empirical concepts there lie ahead doxastic commitments (applications of concepts in judgment) that are correct according to the norms then in play and that are incompatible with various other correct applications of them."[51] Contradiction for Hegel is a feature of the interrelated system of empirical concepts that necessarily arises within any stage of the systems development and induces its further transformation.

The primary focus of this chapter has been a close study of the universal moment of the Concept and the role the determinations of reflection play in the process of generation of empirical concepts. But the results shed light on the other two moments as well. Particularity, as we have already seen, is the system or empirical concepts that are employed in the process described as universality and the content of which is modified through this process. Now Hegel claims that the universal and particular moments form a "self-identical unity."[52] What is meant by this is that there are no determinations of the systematically related constellation of empirical concepts (particularity) that is not produced by and therefore also revisable via the determination-furnishing activity (universality). In other words, the content of the totality of empirical concepts is posited through the universal moment of the Concept. This thesis is what Wilfred Sellars and his followers call rejection of the myth of the given. The claim is that there is no content that is given to the process of reflection, conceptual content is a product of the activity of the mind. But the identification of the universal and the particular moments is a two-way street. It also implies that the universal moment—the activity of the empirical-determinations-generating process—is none other than the application of the very same empirical concepts that make up the particular moment. The universal moment of the concept is not some transcendent source that furnishes empirical determinations. Instead, it is the process of the application of these very concepts, through which their content undergoes continuous modification as the inferential relations between different determinations are drawn and doxastic commitments are adopted. Every new episode of experience that introduces in the systematically related concepts new items of doxastic and inferential commitments does not merely add new elements to the system but also implies the transformation of the whole spectrum of interrelated empirical determinations through an inferential chain of interdependencies. Hence, the universal moment is the continuously evolving process of the application of the empirical concepts through which shaping of their content is taking place. This reciprocal relation between the systematically related empirical determinations on the one hand and the process of their application, generation, and transformation on the other is what Hegel's assertion of identity of the universal and the particular moments of the Concept stands for.

The third moment of the Concept, individuality, is described by Hegel as both determinate universality and also as the moment posited through partic-

ularity: "Individuality, as we have seen, is already posited through particularity; this is determinate universality and hence self-referring determinateness, the determinate determinate;"[53] and again, "The particular, for the same reason that makes it only a determinate universal, is also an individual, and conversely, because the individual is a determinate universal, it is equally a particular."[54] Hegel's point here is that individuality is conditioned by the empirical concepts that make up the particular moment, but these concepts themselves are furnished by the universal moment of the Concept. The individual moment of the Hegelian Concept is the totality of objects that are conditioned by the shared constellation of empirical determinations. Hence when Hegel claims that individuality is posited by determination of universality through particularity, what he means is that instead of an object being given to the reflection from some external sources like sense data, it is individuated by the conceptual-content-generating process that we have explored here in detail. An object enters a given ontological space as a part of a totality of objects with which it shares the basic conceptual content, and it is together with this totality that it gets individuated.

In this chapter I have presented an account of the key features of the Hegelian Concept, which stands for the fundamental schema of his vision of reality. The three moments of this basic ontological structure, I have argued, should be understood as the process of application, transformation, and generation of empirical concepts that is guided by the determinations of reflection—universality (explored in some detail here); the empirical concepts furnished through this process—particularity; and the objects or individuated entities that rests on these concepts as their ground—individuality. This analysis of the fundamental structure of the Hegelian ontology has also made evident that it is Hegel's adaptation of the Kantian notion of the concept, which in the central thesis of the *Transcendental Deduction* is asserted to ground the objects of experience: "object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united."[55] The rest of the book will be dedicated to a more close study of the inner structure of the Concept, its moments and the schemata of their relation.

NOTES

1. Hegel, SL (GW 12:24).
2. Ibid. (GW 12:11).
3. Ibid. (GW 12:11).
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B137).
5. Hegel, SL (GW 12:23).
6. Ibid. (GW 12:18).
7. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
8. Ibid. (GW 12:32). I use "self-relation" instead of Di Giovanni's translation of "Beziehung auf sich selbst" as "self-reference."

9. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
10. Ibid. (GW 12:35).
11. Ibid. (GW 12:38).
12. Ibid. (GW 11:242).
13. Ibid. (GW 11:241).
14. Ibid. (GW 11:241).
15. Ibid. (GW 11:249).
16. Ibid. (GW 11:244).
17. Ibid. (GW 11:254).
18. Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the capacity to judge : sensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the Critique of pure reason (Princeton University Press, 1998).
19. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A262/B318).
20. Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the capacity to judge: sensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the Critique of pure reason (Princeton University Press, 1998), 131-132.
21. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A262/B317).
22. Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the capacity to judge: sensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the Critique of pure reason (Princeton University Press, 1998), 134.
23. Hegel, SL (GW 11:260).
24. Ibid. (GW 11:260).
25. Ibid. (GW 11:261).
26. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B XVI).
27. Hegel, SL (GW 11:69)
28. Ibid. (GW 11:241).
29. Ibid. (GW 11:265).
30. Ibid. (GW 11:265).
31. Ibid. (GW 11:266).
32. Ibid. (GW 11:266).
33. Ibid. (GW 11:266).
34. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A262/B318).
35. Hegel, SL (GW 11:267).
36. Ibid. (GW 11:267).
37. Ibid. (GW 11:267).
38. Ibid. (GW 11: 268).
39. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A279/B335).
40. Ibid. (A126).
41. Hegel, SL (GW 11:273).
42. Ibid. (GW 11:274).
43. Ibid. (GW 11:280).
44. Ibid. (GW 11:280).
45. Ibid. (GW 11:280).
46. Ibid. (GW 11:280).
47. Ibid. (GW 11:280).
48. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A266/B322).
49. Ibid. (A262/B318).
50. Hegel, SL (GW 12:40)
51. Robert Brandom, "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts," Journal Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen dealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism, Vol. 3 (2005): 146.
52. Hegel, SL (GW 12:35).

53. Ibid. (GW 12:49).
54. Ibid. (GW 12:50).
55. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B 137).

Chapter Three

Hegel's Theory of the Concept and Its Kantian Origins

In the previous chapter, I presented a detailed account of the process of generating conceptual content and the meta-concepts involved in it. I argued that the determinations of reflection put forth by Hegel in the Doctrine of Essence were the normative authority-conferring schemata, through the application of which empirical concepts and their determinate content were generated. It has also become apparent that these basic determinations of reflection can be traced back to the Kantian logical functions of judgment, which on their part are elementary forms of the conceptual content generating activity. Therefore for Hegel and Kant the very same functions are guiding the processes of formation of concepts. This Kantian thread, however, does not end on the level of the Doctrine of Essence—as we shall see, it weaves its way to the very foundations of Hegel's system. As I will argue, Hegel in his Doctrine of the Concept appropriates and pursues to its logical completion Kant's key thesis from the transcendental deduction: "an object is that in *the concept* of which the manifold . . . is united."[1]

The animating idea of Hegel's *Logic*, and thus the central thesis of his transcendental ontology, is that reality properly comprehended is *the Concept*—"the cognition conceptualizing the subject matter is a cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and *the concept is its very objectivity*."[2] The present and the following chapters will be dedicated to the task of spelling out what exactly Hegel means by the term *Concept* and what are the assumptions and implications of such a conception of reality. The more deeply we descend in analyzing his theory of the Concept, the more apparent it will become that what Hegel is doing in this crucial part of the *Logic* is laying the ground for a fundamentally new ontological vision that directly emerges from Kant's

transcendental philosophy, putting behind many deeply rooted (and still often encountered) dogmas of the hitherto dominant tradition.

What Hegel means by the *Concept* is very different from the ordinary understanding of the term as a kind of mental representation or abstract universal. The term *Concept* for him stands for a complex ontological structure that consists of three elements (or, in his words, *moments*), *universality, particularity,* and *individuality*, as well as the schema of relations between them. This separation into relations and relata, however, is somewhat artificial, as the moments of the Concept and the schemata of mediation between them are mutually dependent and can be adequately comprehended only in unison. Hence, merely dissecting the Concept into its components and studying them closely cannot give us a comprehensive account of what the Concept means. It is crucial to describe the way in which the moments of the Concept are related to one another. The detailed analysis of the nature of the three moments of the Concept and the schema of their relation is presented by Hegel in the first section of "The Doctrine of the Concept," specifically in its first and third chapters, "*The Concept*" and "*The Syllogism*." While "*The Concept*" chapter focuses on the moments, "*The Syllogism*" presents several different schemata of mediation between them. These schemata, which as I will show constitute different ontological models, are arranged in an ascending degree of proximity to Hegel's ontology. The final element of the set is a fully mediated structure of the Concept that stands for Hegel's own conception of the basic ontological schema of actuality.

Hegel describes the relation between the Concept and the syllogism as follows: "the syllogism is the completely posited concept"[3] and "in the syllogism . . . their [the moments of the concept] determinate *unity* is posited."[4] The term *posited* for Hegel means "made explicit" or "actualized." Therefore, the development from "*The Concept*" to "*The Syllogism*" chapters is a process of self-manifestation or actualization of the Concept. It is therefore of crucial importance to closely examine the entire development, because even though it is only at the end of this process that the successful model of the unified inner structure of the Concept will emerge, an adequate understanding of each new stage of mediation assumes familiarity with what has taken place in previous stages. The three moments of the concept—*universality*, *particularity*, and *individuality*—undergo significant transformation as we move from one stage of mediation to the next one. Each syllogistic mediational model leaves its footprint in the moments of the Concept. Thus by the end of Hegel's "*The Syllogism*" chapter, all three terms will have acquired meaning quite different from what they had at its beginning.

The development that takes place in The Doctrine of the Concept significantly differs from what has been covered in the previous parts of the *Logic*: "The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over or shining into another, but *development*; for the [moments] that are distinguished are

immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another and with the whole, and [each] determinacy is as a free being of the whole Concept."[5] While prior to this point in the text, the development involved changing of the subject matter, or as Hegel puts it, "passing-over" from one area within the ontological space expounded in the *Logic* to another, within The Doctrine of the Concept the different stages of development are "posited . . . as identical with one another." In other words, the last form of syllogistic mediation is describing the very same actuality as the first one but more adequately comprehended. What Hegel calls "development" is a gradual deepening of understanding of the logical structure of the Concept; every new form of mediation between its elements is a more adequate comprehension of the nature of their relation. The third part of the *Logic* therefore can be described as an account of the epigenesis of the Hegelian Concept—the centerpiece of his transcendental ontology.

THE KANTIAN ORIGINS OF HEGEL'S CONCEPT

The Doctrine of the Concept is the most comprehensive evidence of the Kantian origins of Hegel's system. In the previous chapter, we have identified the Kantian footprint in the process of generation of conceptual content. Hegel's theory of the Concept not only integrates that process within a larger ontological account but also brings the structural similarities between the Kantian and Hegelian systems to an entirely new level. We will see that the defining characteristic of this key element of Hegel's ontology, the Concept, is its *self-relationality*. This amounts to nothing short of locating the central thesis of Kant's transcendental idealism in the very heart of Hegel's ontology. Recall that the transcendental apperception is identified by Kant with the logical forms of judgment, and it is on this ground that applicability of the categories to objects of experience is argued.

This Kantian feature in Hegel's theory of the Concept brings to light the limitations of the alternative approaches on the issue of the Kant-Hegel relation. For example, Brady Bowman's reading of the self-relational structure of the Hegelian ontology that focuses on The Doctrine of Essence clearly cannot do justice to the issue under consideration. This is the case because The Doctrine of Essence is not the most fundamental level in Hegel's ontology where we encounter this self-relational structure. If the self-relationality is the central characteristic of Hegel's transcendental ontology, it has to be—and as the discussion to follow will make clear, it indeed is—present at the epicenter of the system, i.e., the theory of the Concept. In fact, this mistake seems to be the main reason for Brady Bowman and Robert Stern reading Hegel as ultimately abandoning the Kantian project. Neither Bowman nor

Stern denies a Kantian influence on Hegel, but they don't appreciate the all-pervasiveness of this influence.

Hegel sees the last part of his *Logic, The Doctrine of the Concept,* as a completion of the project of substituting traditional ontology with the transcendental logic announced of Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Unlike the general (or what we call formal) logic, the transcendental logic for Kant gives us access to the basic formal features of the possible objects of experience. But due to this reason, clearly it is not merely logic but also an ontology, an account of the formal structure of empirical reality. Hence Kant's undertaking is not mere substitution of ontology by transcendental logic but by a new type of ontology. What is implicit in Kant is explicitly acknowledged in Hegel's appropriation of his project. Hegel clearly maintains that the basic relational schema of the *Concept* is of both logical and ontological import as it locates the logical functions of judgment and syllogistic schemata within the basic structure of reality. Instead of merely presupposing correspondence between logic or reason and the structure of reality like Plato, traditional metaphysics, or early Russell did, Hegel gives a detailed account and justification of their unity. The tradition's mere assumption of accessibility of the world by the mind through the determinations of thought is substituted by Hegel with a complex but powerful argument that takes its inspiration from Kant's transcendental logic. The Concept is the systematic structure that underpins both the determination of *being* and *thought*: "Being and essence are therefore the moments of its [the Concept's] becoming; but the concept is their foundation and truth as the identity into which they have sunk and in which they are contained."[6]

Hegel begins *The Doctrine of the Concept* with a lengthy introductory discussion that aims to orient the reader to how much has been covered and what still remains to be done in order to fully flesh out his position. The fact that most of this discussion is dedicated to Kant leaves little doubt as to how essential a role Kant plays in Hegel's project. Moreover, in this discussion we find an explicit acknowledgement of the Kantian origins of The Doctrine of the Concept's central thesis—that concept is the truth of object: "We cited earlier from Kant's deduction of the categories to the effect that, according to it, the object in which the manifold of intuition is unified is this unity only by virtue of the unity of self-consciousness. The objectivity of thought is here, therefore, specifically defined: it is an identity of concept and thing which is the truth."[7] Even if there were no other deeply running currents that tie these two systems together, the open declaration of the Kantian origins of the central thesis of his ontology is a clear evidence that Hegel is tracing Kant's footsteps in what is to follow. But as this and the subsequent chapter will make clear, this is only the tip of an iceberg of both acknowledged and unacknowledged convergences between these two systems.

Hegel sees the Concept as the underlying truth of the determinations of Being and Essence and claims that the Concept is the truth of the *substance* as "real *essence.*"[8] As Klaus Hartmann puts it:

> Der Begriff ist "das Dritte zum Sein und *Wesen*," Sein und Wesen sind "die Momente seines Werdens" (II, 213). Er ist also als Drittes die Zusammenschliessung von Sein (Unmittelbarkeit) und Wesen (Reflexion) in einem "Resultat." . . . Dies Resultat ist als abschliessend zu verstehen, es ist "Grundlage" der vorangegangenen Sphären Sein und Wesen, deren Wahrheit (ebd.).[9]

In other words, the last part of the *Logic*, the theory of the Concept, instead of going beyond the ontological domain of the preceding parts (the doctrines of Being and Essence) remains there and grasps it on a more fundamental level. The theory of the Concept offers an account of the basic ontological schema that grounds the theories of Being and Essence, and Hegel sees this move as a major accomplishment of his system.

The best ontological account that remains on the level of Being and Essence, according to Hegel, has been given by Spinoza: "The philosophy that assumes its position at the standpoint of substance and stops there is the system of Spinoza."[10] The claim here is that Spinoza offered an account of actuality that corresponds to the account offered in the Objective Logic. On the other hand, the first step in a transition to the more fundamental level that presents actuality as grounded on the Concept is taken by Kant: "It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in *The Critique of Pure Reason* that the unity which constitutes the nature of the concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the 'I think,' or of self-consciousness."[11] He further adds that this insight "transcend the mere *representation* of the relation in which . . . concept stands to a thing and its properties and accidents and advances to the thoughts of it."[12] Hence in Hegel's eye, the *Logic* can be divided roughly into two parts: the one that expresses the standpoint that precedes Kant (not merely in a chronological sense of the term)—the traditional metaphysics; and the other part that further develops Kant's "profound and true" insight which left behind the traditional conception of the relationship between concept and its object. In this respect, Kant is a watershed figure setting apart the two sides—the traditional metaphysics, which he brings to the end, and the Hegelian transcendental ontology. Therefore we can claim that Hegel's Kantianism is built into the structure of his *Logic*.

Perhaps the most interesting evidence of the deeply running continuity between the two projects is Hegel's criticism of Kant. A close look at what is supposed to be Hegel's critical analysis of Kant reveals that the genuine Kantian stance is expressed not by the position that is being criticized but by the one from which this criticism is voiced. This is clear from Hegel's attack

on Kant that alleges that Kant sides with empiricism on the issue of reality being composed of the manifold of intuitions as the empirical material from which universals are to be abstracted. What Hegel is criticizing here is not Kant's position but its one possible (and unfortunately quite widespread) misinterpretation. He writes,

> This relation, as assumed in ordinary psychology as well as in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy, of intuition and representation, is at first just there by itself, and that the understanding then comes into it, brings unity to it, and raises it through abstraction to the form of universality. . . . the concept is not the one which is independent, is not what is essential and true about that presupposed material; rather, this material is the reality in and for itself, a reality that cannot be extracted from the concept. [13]

As I showed in Chapter 2, Kant's stance is very far from the position sketched and criticized here by Hegel. He attacks a variation of the view often mistakenly attributed to Kant according to which generation of objects of experience takes place through two main stages. At first the mind is supplied with the sensible input that is conceived as a raw material not yet touched by the operation of the mind. While at the second stage we have the forms of synthesis that the mind applies to the sensible given and generates through them objects of experience.

If this were Kant's view, Hegel's criticism would have been fair as raw material would be conceived as the ultimate content of reality. But Kant actually stands much closer to the position the criticism is voiced from than to the one that is being criticized. Hegel's point here is that the Concept should be acknowledged as the "the essential and true element of the prior given material" instead of postulating the sensible material as "the absolute reality." But for Kant, concept is the rule-guided act of synthesis within which the logical functions of judgment have been ingrained, thereby constituting the grounds for actuality—or its "essential and true element." Sensation, on the other hand and contrary to the above-presented misinterpretation, is a mere subtype of representation, the "inner determination of the mind," which has no objective reference. Hence, what is presented by Hegel as a criticism of Kant would have been better described as an attempt to defend Kant from his "followers" who misinterpret his position.

STERN'S INTERPRETATION AND ITS PROBLEMS

The Hegel commentators who place him within the tradition of pre-critical metaphysics tend to focus on the *Objective Logic* and pay little attention to the theory of the Concept where the Kantian background of Hegel's project becomes particularly apparent. In this respect Robert Stern's Hegel stands

out as clearly superior to other readings of Hegel as a traditional metaphysician. The main advantage of Stern's approach is that rather than turning a blind eye to the Kantian dimension of Hegel's system (which would have rendered his reading simply implausible) he explicitly acknowledges it. But having done that, Stern still maintains that Hegel's philosophy belongs to the category of the pre-critical metaphysical systems. Stern believes that Hegel found the Kantian stance wanting,[14] and concludes that, although Hegel had appropriated some Kantian insights, he came to recognize Kant's limitations and acknowledged the superiority of traditional metaphysics over transcendental philosophy.[15] Hence, Stern on the one hand acknowledges that Hegel had learned from Kant an important lesson about the necessarily mediated nature of all experience, that "there can be no workable distinction between 'immediate' experience and 'mediated' thought,"[16] but he also emphasizes Hegel's disappointment with the Kantian retention of the thing-in-itself as a part of his system.

While both of Stern's points are correct, using them as the central threads that connect Hegel with Kant is misleading. Hegel indeed never tires of criticizing the Kantian thing-in-itself; however, this is a sign of not a gap between the two but the deeply running continuity between them—it is only on the basis of the shared background that the refutation of one of the elements of Kant's system could have become such a pressing issue for Hegel. At the same time, it is important to note that the thing-in-itself is a peripheral aspect of Kant's theoretical philosophy, and the main motivation for Kant to keep it in his system was rooted in his practical philosophy as he needed to retain a conceptual space free of the cause-effect deterministic schema in which the self-legislating free subjectivity could be articulated. Hegel is very well aware of this motive of Kant, and this is the very reason that, together with rejecting the thing-in-itself, he explicitly upheld Kant's theoretical philosophy over the practical one.

Moreover, the thing-in-itself is clearly a remnant of the old metaphysical systems as it postulated a being external to thought. It is an element of the pre-critical thought that survived the Copernican revolution. Hence, when Hegel considers this to be the weakest aspect of Kant's philosophy and attacks it, he is criticizing not Kant's original insight, i.e., his transcendental turn, but the remnants of the traditional metaphysics in his system. As such, notwithstanding the whole array of deeply running themes of continuity between the two philosophers, if one still decides to look at the Kant-Hegel relation through the lens of the latter's criticism of the thing-in-itself, then at least one has to go beyond the surface level and uncover the real motivation of the criticism. But when we do it, it becomes apparent that the ultimate force behind this criticism is not the difference but the shared background between the two. Hegel is attacking the element of Kant's system that is

foreign to the spirit of his critical philosophy and is a remnant of the tradition that Kant tried to leave behind.

"The real lesson" that Hegel learned from Kant, according to Stern, is that "there can be no workable distinction between 'immediate' experience and 'mediated' thought, as conceptualization runs through all cognitive relevant levels,"[17] maintaining that this should be seen as the main thread connecting the two systems. There being no immediately given content that serves as a kind of boundary of conceptualization neither for Kant nor for Hegel is certainly a correct as well as an important observation. But the problem is that Stern focuses exclusively on this issue and disregards the other equally (and perhaps even more) significant points of convergence between the two philosophers.

What sets this point of convergence from others is that Hegel completely assimilates the corresponding Kantian insight into his system at a relatively surface level of his system, namely in The Doctrine of Essence. As I have shown in Chapter 2, in this middle part of the *Logic*, Hegel demonstrates that determinations of reflection are the elementary functions involved in any content-generating process, cutting across the conceptual vs. sensible divide. Hence, in this specific case, the question of continuity between the Kantian and the Hegelian stances is resolved prior to entering the fundamental layer of the Hegelian transcendental ontology—The Doctrine of the Concept. Mediatedness of both sensible and conceptual manifolds is the task carried out by the process of reflection that Hegel looks at in the Doctrine of Essence, the part of the *Logic* that has not left the themes and concerns of traditional metaphysics fully behind. In fact, as I have shown, in that part of the *Logic* Hegel is concerned with integrating Kant's Copernican turn within his system, and until this task is brought to completion and its implications are properly fleshed out (which will take place in the *Subjective Logic*), we cannot appreciate the full extent of Hegel's rejection of traditional metaphysics. Thus, by looking at the issue of convergence between the two thinkers through the prism of overcoming the distinction between 'immediate' experience and 'mediated' thought, we risk to lose sight of how far-reaching Hegel's rejection of the pre-critical tradition is.

Perhaps the weakest aspect of Stern's reading is that it does not do justice to the most fundamental shared commitment between the two systems—the thesis that the Concept is the *ground* of actuality. The reason for this is that Stern wants to describe Kant's project as primarily epistemological, concerned with *appearances* rather than with *being*. He writes, "Kant may therefore be seen as proposing a dilemma to the traditional ontologist: Either he can proceed by abstracting from the spatio-temporal appearances of things in an attempt to speculate about things as they are in themselves . . . ; or he . . . must accept that he is no longer inquiring into being qua being."[18] But if critical philosophy is not inquiring into being, neither can it furnish a thesis

of it being grounded on the Concept. Contrary to Stern, as I have already mentioned and as the forthcoming discussion shall demonstrate, the entire Doctrine of the Concept can be read as an extended analysis of this central thesis from The Transcendental Deduction. Kant's claim that the object is the product of the unifying work of the concept has an ontological import first and foremost. Hegel also understands this as an ontological commitment and makes no secret of his indebtedness to Kant on this matter. In the opening passages of The Doctrine of the Concept, after having introduced the Concept as the "substance raised to freedom" and having briefly outlined its three moments (universality, particularity, and individuality), Hegel directly associates the concept with the "I," or pure self-consciousness: "the concept, when it has progressed to a concrete existence which is itself free, is none other than the "I" or pure self-consciousness."[19] Moreover, as if this was not enough, Hegel continues with a lengthy summary of the argument of the transcendental deduction[20] and concludes it with the following statement: "We find in a fundamental principle of Kantian philosophy the justification for turning to the nature of the "I" in order to learn what the concept is."[21] Such an introduction of his theory of the Concept leaves no doubt that Hegel sees this centerpiece of his ontology as directly emerging from Kant's claim of concept grounding object.

Thus Stern's reading of Hegel as a traditional metaphysician rests on a highly selective reading that does not do justice to the deeply running current of continuity between Kant and Hegel. When Stern claims that "Hegel is closer to Aristotle than Kant" as for him "the categories analyzed in the Logic are all forms or ways of being . . . not merely concepts in terms of which we have to understand what is,"[22] he correctly describes Hegel's position that categories are not merely concepts but also forms of being. But while making a correct observation Stern completely misses the point. Hegel's claim of the identity of concept and being is not a bare assumption (as is the case with Aristotle) but a goal of his entire undertaking in the *Logic*. The key characteristic of his projects is not the assertion of identity of being and concept, but a clear perception of the need for justification of such an assertion and for working out a solution to this challenge. But the need for justification of accessibility of being by concept was first clearly identified by Kant, in his famous letter to Herz:

> What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object? . . . the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object itself into being. In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However,

> I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible.[23]

In Hegel's eye, a preliminary solution to this challenge was offered (although not a satisfactory one) by Kant himself. On the other hand, traditional metaphysics took the identity of the categories and being for granted and didn't even see a need for its justifying as a challenge. Hegel was clearly aware of this gulf dividing him and Kant from the tradition and described its stance as naïve in *The Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Logic*.[24] As such, not only is Hegel closer to Kant, but without the Kantian backdrop his entire undertaking in the Logic would not have been possible. A solution to a problem can be offered only after the problem itself is clearly conceived.

One of the central tasks Hegel undertakes in his system is to identify the grounds of attributing the structure of the determinations of thought to the determinations of being, as well as to come up with a full account of the implications about the nature of reality one can draw from such grounds. He believes that Kant addressed the first prong of this challenge (although not to Hegel's full satisfaction), while almost completely neglecting the second one. Kant's greatest contribution, therefore, was a clear identification of the problem, making it possible to look for a solution to it. Hence, Kant stands at the epicenter of the transformation of the perspective, which Hegel sees as having taken place between his and the traditional approaches as described in the following passage:

> For example, the form of the positive judgment is accepted as something perfectly correct in itself, and whether the judgment is true is made to depend solely on the content. No thought is given to investigating whether this form of judgment is a form of truth in and for itself; whether the proposition it enunciates, "the individual is a universal," is not inherently dialectical. . . . A logic that does not perform this task can at most claim the value of a natural description of the phenomena of thought as they simply occur.[25]

By "a descriptive natural history" Hegel has in mind Aristotle's position. On the other hand, posing the question of "whether this form is in its own self a form of truth" is made possible after Kant's identification of the problem of correspondence between the categories (hence logical forms of judgment) and reality. Therefore to position Hegel closer to Aristotle than to Kant (as Stern does) is to miss one of the most essential dimensions of his project.

THE CONCEPT AS A RELATIONAL SCHEMA AND ITS KANTIAN ORIGINS

The Introduction to *The Subjective Logic* brings forth another important theme binding Hegel to Kant—rejection of the notion of the concept as an

abstract universal and its replacement with a theory of the Concept as a relational schema. While criticizing the tradition for working with a fundamentally flawed understanding of the concept, Hegel argues that "on the superficial view of what the concept is all manifoldness falls outside it, and only the form of abstract universality or of empty reflective identity stays with it. . . . And it does not take much thoughtful reflection on the implication of this requirement to see that differentiation is an equally essential moment of the concept."[26] Differentiation for Hegel means generation of determinations or formation of conceptual content. Hence his claim is that the Concept is not a mere abstract universal, or the determination of the mind that is externally related to and represents the manifold. Instead, the Concept has an immanent capacity for differentiation that is the capacity of positing a content of its own. One of the central tasks of *The Subjective Logic* is to give an account of this self-differentiation of the Concept and the examination of different models of relation between the process of self-differentiation and the system of determinations involved with this process.

Immediately after voicing his criticism of the traditional understanding of the concept and presenting self-differentiation as a key feature of his alternative to it, Hegel points to the source he is drawing from. The just cited passage continues, "Kant introduced this line of reflection with the very important thought that there are synthetic judgments a priori. His original synthesis of apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the concept and is fully opposed to any empty identity or abstract universality which is not internally a synthesis."[27] In other words, the idea of self-differentiation of the Concept is traced back to the Kantian insight about the synthetic a priori judgments. This claim has important implications. First, it points to the deeply running Kantian current at the epicenter of Hegel's transcendental ontology. The key characteristic of the theory of the Concept, generation of the conceptual content, is explicitly acknowledged as originating from Kant's "most profound principles." Second, it confirms the overall thesis of Chapter 2 where the conceptual content generating role of determinations of reflection was fleshed out. By the explicit association of the "nature of the Concept"—and specifically its "self-differentiating" or content-generating aspect—with the "synthetic judgments a priori," Hegel is implicitly acknowledging that the basic forms that guide the conceptual content generating activity are taking their origins in the Kantian logical functions of judgment.

Hegel's theory of the Concept offers us the basic framework of his alternative to the abstract formality of traditional logic. Hegel rejects "the abstract view that the logic is only formal, that it abstracts from all content. What we then have is a one-sided cognition which is not supposed to contain any subject matter, an empty form void of determination which is therefore just

as little an agreement (for it necessarily takes two for an agreement) as it is truth."[28] The gap between the form and content, the abstract universals and the determinateness, renders traditional logic an inadequate medium for accessing reality as it operates only on one of the sides of the bifurcated ontological background structure. If the form of logical relations can be articulated in complete abstraction from the content, no matter whether logic is understood as the thought's form or that of the world's form, it ends up being epistemologically inadequate. Hegel's strategy in overcoming this problem is to reject the traditional conception of logic as merely formal and to advance an alternative within which the form is inseparable from content. But this implies a metamorphosis of logic into ontology.

Advancing an alternative to the traditional conception of logic is one possible way to interpret Hegel's entire philosophical undertaking. But in this respect as well, Hegel is pointing to the Kantian transcendental logic as the origin of his own project of overcoming dualistic ontology: "In the a priori synthesis of the concept, Kant did have a higher principle in which it was possible to recognize a duality [in unity] and therefore what is required for truth."[29] It was Kant's distinction between general logic, which "abstracts from all content of cognition"[30] vs. transcendental logic, "the science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects completely a priori,"[31] which offers a conception of logic that is no longer mere logic but also ontology.

As I have argued in the previous chapter, Hegel appropriates the Kantian transcendental apperception or the transcendental act of synthesis and integrates it in his system as a process or activity through which determinate conceptual content is generated. He gives a detailed account of the basic forms guiding this activity in *The Doctrine of Essence*, while the overall architectonic of the relation between this activity and the system of determinations is presented in *The Doctrine of the Concept.* So Hegel's account is much more complex, extensive, and detailed than Kant's, but they share the same key strategy—the bifurcation is overcome based on tracing the role of the formal principle of logic in the generation of determinations that immanently structure reality. In Kant's case the key element in this regard is "the a priori synthesis of the concept." For Hegel as well, as we will see, it is a "synthesis of the concept"—bifurcated ontology will be overcome in terms of the relation between the universal and the particular moments of the Concept.

Hence we can see how Hegel's transcendental ontology can be conceived as arising out of the Kantian transcendental logic. Once the thesis of the possibility of cognizing the specific determinations of reality based on the principles of logic is in the picture, and a system of such a priori determinations is put forth, it also opens up a whole new horizon of drawing further conclusions about the overall structure of such reality and enriching this a

priori content. Hegel takes up this very task, and in addition to extending the system of a priori determinations, he adds a whole new dimension to the Kantian project—namely, he asks what conclusions can be drawn about the systematic whole of conceptual content, the process of its generation and their interrelation, as well as their relation to empirical reality, granted that we accept the Kantian thesis of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. This new dimension is taken up in the theory of the Concept where universality, particularity, and individuality are presented as the three moments of this fundamental ontological structure. The close study of these moments and the models of their relatedness to one another will allow Hegel to explore not only the question of what are the a priori determinations through which actuality is mediated to us (this was done in the previous parts of the *Logic*), but on a higher level what are the structural features of the world within which the generation of empirical conceptual content is carried out through the application of the given set of a priori functions.

In order to prepare his readers for the upcoming task, Hegel considers a case of ordinary assertoric proposition and points out the presence of implicit ontological assumptions therein. The claim is that when we make assertions of the kind "*the individual is a universal*," we are implicitly presupposing reality as having a certain formal structure. Here is the passage that I'm citing for the second time:

> For example, the form of the positive judgment is accepted as something perfectly correct in itself, and whether the judgment is true is made to depend solely on the content. No thought is given to investigating whether this form of judgment is a form of truth in and for itself; whether the proposition it enunciates, "the individual is a universal," is not inherently dialectical.[32]

Here Hegel makes clear what he is after. He criticizes traditional ontology for overlooking its most essential task and simply importing the formal structure of assertoric proposition as the basic formal schema of reality. The tradition simply assumes that the relational schema expressed in the judgment "the individual is universal" is also to be found within reality; and the only question that it asks is whether the specific content that is placed in this form does justice to reality. But what if the immanent structure of reality is such that the given form cannot do justice to it?—asks Hegel. He believes that the Kantian insight about the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition sets us on the right path for carrying out a critical investigation of the immanent formal structure of actuality. This is the task Hegel takes up in the *Doctrine of the Concept*, where he looks at the different schemas of relation between the universal, particular, and individual moments of the Concept. But this inquiry into the ontological structure of actuality takes its inspiration in the Kantian distinction between the general (or formal) and transcendental logic. The lengthy

analysis of Kant and the criticism of the merely formal nature of traditional logic in the Introduction to The Doctrine of the Concept is an evidence to conclude the we are standing at the threshold not of an ontological theory of a traditional kind, but of the transcendental ontology that takes its roots in Kant's transcendental logic.

SERIES OF SELF-RELATIONAL MODELS

I have been arguing in this chapter that the relational schema laid out by Hegel in The Doctrine of the Concept presents an account of actuality in which the Kantian insight about the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition is brought to its logical conclusion. It presents the ontological space in which the traditional division between the subject and the object, cognition and reality, has been overcome, and hence the promise made in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* about grasping substance as a subject is brought to its fulfillment. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Concept, the basic ontological structure that Hegel presents in this culminating part of the *Logic,* has the essential characteristic of Kant's transcendental apperception: self-relationality.

This self-relationality is a structural feature of the Concept that, just as with Kant here also, stands for the unity of the dynamic and the static moments of the Concept. Moreover, each one of the moments: universality, particularity, and individuality, as I will argue, has its precursors in Kant's system. But the Hegelian account of the Concept, unlike the corresponding aspects of Kant's system, is typically seen as particularly murky, resisting any coherent interpretation. One reason for this is that Hegel presents not one but a series of different models of unity of the moments of the Concept. Granted that these models are arranged in the ascending order of adequacy for the full mediation between the three moments, the natural question to ask is why Hegel does not directly go to the last—the fully mediated—model, but instead picks a torturous road of twists and turns of the other mediational structures. Hegel's well-known claim from the Preface to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* can be helpful in answering this question:

> Truth and falsehood as commonly understood belong to those sharply defined ideas which claim a completely fixed nature of their own, one standing in solid isolation on this side, the other on that, without any community between them. Against that view it must be pointed out, that truth is not like stamped coin that is issued ready from the mint and so can be taken up and used. . . . Just in the interest of their real meaning, precisely because we want to designate the aspect or moment of complete otherness, the terms true and false must no longer be used where their otherness has been cancelled and superseded. Just as the expressions "unity of subject and object," of "finite and infinite," of "being and thought," etc., are clumsy when subject and object, etc., are taken

> to mean what they are outside their unity, and are thus in that unity not meant to be what its very expression conveys.[33]

Considering that the preface was written by Hegel not only for the *Phenomenology* but for his system as a whole, we can apply the thesis stated here to the series of mediational structures from The Doctrine of the Concept. Hence the inadequate models of mediation between the moments of the Concept can still be useful as stepping stones to arriving at the adequate model. Instead of forcing an ontological vision foreign to the readers on them, Hegel's goal is to guide them gradually from their standpoint to his own. Hence, as we shall see, the moments of the Concept—*universality, particularity,* and *individuality*—undergo continuous transformation as we make our way through the stages of mediations in the *Syllogism* chapter. Their final states that render the Concept into a fully mediated structure are products of transformation that each one of the moments has undergone in the previous stages of the *Syllogistic* mediation. This is one reason for offering several mediational models. But there is another angle from which we can look at the issue. As I will argue, each mediational structure presented by Hegel in the *Syllogism* chapter stands for an ontological model representing major alternatives to Hegel's ontology. By presenting them in this specific hierarchical order, starting with the most impoverished model and culminating with his own stance, Hegel wants to demonstrate superiority of his own system over the alternatives.

As I have argued here, the self-relationality that Hegel describes as the defining feature of the Concept is to be traced back to the Kantian transcendental apperception. But it also needs to be noted that in Hegel's hand the role of this self-relationality undergoes a significant reorientation. If for Kant the transcendental apperception is the most fundamental element, the source of the logical functions of judgment and hence of all conceptual content, Hegel substitutes it with the Concept as the grounding principle. This is a turn away from Kant's psychologism and its substitution with the ontological vision, according to which neither the subject nor the object is seen as the grounding principle of reality. Instead, Hegel offers the fundamental ontological schema within which the standard bifurcated model is left behind. For Hegel it is this basic schema, the Concept, that lies at the foundation of the I, not vice versa—"the concept, when it has progressed to a concrete existence which is itself free, is none other than the 'I' or pure self-consciousness."[34] His strategy in the *Logic* is to demonstrate that the fundamental self-relational ontological structure emerges as a necessary ground for the most basic determinations of both Being and Essence.

In light of this, although with Hegel, as with Kant, the identity of the subject, the Concept, and the objectivity is a very important point, he is nevertheless not merely reducing the objectivity to the subject. Hegel is

rather aiming to uncover the basic structure that both sides have in common. While Kant first reduced objectivity to the concept—"an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united"[35]—and ultimately traced the basic conceptual structure back to the subject, Hegel wants to shift the center of gravity from the subject to the Concept. For him it is the subject that is an actualization of the schema immanent to the Concept, the Concept that has "developed into a *concrete existence.*" Thus while Hegel is following Kant's footsteps in maintaining that the ground of the object, its "foundation and truth," is the Concept, he nevertheless wants to avoid the Kantian reduction of the concept to the actualization of the subject's cognitive constitution. Instead, for Hegel the fundamental ontological structure that he calls the Concept underlies and grounds the subject.

For proper understanding of the significance of the shift from the object to the subject (carried out by Kant) and then further from the subject to the Concept (carried out by Hegel) as the central ontological element, it is helpful to look at what Robert Brandom describes as a shift in the "fundamental locus of intentionality." Brandom is looking at the issue of the relation between the mental realms and linguistic practices regarding the question where should we locate the "native and original locus of concept use." According to the traditional approach, the mental realm has the pride of place, as it is in our mind that we form thoughts, generate conceptual content, and then communicate them to others.

> Concepts are applied in the realms of language by the public use of sentences and other linguistic expressions. They are applied in the realm of the mind by the private adoption of any rational reliance on beliefs and other intentional state. The philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant took for granted a mentalistic order of expression that privileged the mind as the native and original locus of concept use, relegating language to a secondary, late-coming, merely instrumental role in communicating to others thoughts already full-formed in a prior mental arena within the individual.[36]

Brandom juxtaposes and contrasts this to two alternative views. One of them belongs to Dummett, who wants to reverse the axis of dependency and argues that it is language that serves as the original locus of the conceptual: "we have opposed throughout the view of assertion as the expression of an interior act of judgment; judgment, rather, is the interiorization of the external act of assertion."[37] The other alternative is advanced by Davidson, for whom "neither language nor thinking can be fully explained in terms of the other, and neither has conceptual priority. The two are, indeed, linked in the sense that each requires the other in order to be understood, but the linkage is not so complete that either suffices, even when reasonably reinforced, to explicate the other."[38]

Both of these alternatives are undermining the traditional assumption of the mental as the unique original locus of the generation of the conceptual content. What needs to be noted is that this assumption is a part of a larger dualistic backdrop that the tradition has been taking for granted—the dualism of the mental vs. physical realm where the former is the locus of thought, representations, concepts, etc., while the latter is that of the extended, inter-subjective, material, etc. This deeply rooted presupposition stems from the Cartesian metaphysics with its clear-cut distinction between the mental vs. physical and their corresponding principle attributes, thought vs. extension. When considered against this background, it becomes clear that while both Dummett and Davidson shift the priorities in the standard picture, they still remain within the scope of the dualistic framework. Neither by inverting the standard picture nor by demonstrating the interdependency between the language and thought are we ultimately rejecting the Cartesian dualism. All we are doing is to explore new possibilities within the conceptual space carved out by it.

Unlike these more recent alternatives, Hegel wants to leave behind the standard dualistic picture altogether. According to him, both ends of the bifurcated model are mere abstractions from the more fundamental background, the articulation of which is undertaken in his Doctrine of the Concept. While the Doctrine of Being and Doctrine of Essence were concerned with the traditional categories and the determinations of thought that grounded them and therefore at that stage the dualistic ontology was not fully left behind, the third part of the *Logic*, the Doctrine of the Concept, presents an account within which the division between the inner and the outer realms taken for granted by "the philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant" is completely overcome. Whether linguistic, mental, or other kinds of activity, like social, political, etc., that involves application of concept and revision of the conceptual content, it is grounded on the schema that Hegel is explicating in the Doctrine of the Concept. Both, the mind and the world, the inner and the outer realms, Hegel claims are best understood not as clearly delineated from one another, nor with grounding one on the other, but through the realization that both are abstractions from the more fundamental structure presented in the theory of the Concept.

As in many other key points, here also we can draw a parallel with Kant. For although Kant didn't fully free himself from dualistic metaphysics, he still in an important sense set up the conditions for overcoming it. The significant step taken in this direction by Kant is his assertion that the very same background conditions underlie the phenomena of both the inner and the outer realm. The claim is that the activity of the mind guided by the logical functions of judgment is the ground of objects both mental as well as physical. For example, the desk that I'm looking at right now and my desire to bring it to order are objects of experience, one outer and the other inner, but

for Kant both are outcomes of the activity of the mind guided by logical functions that constitute the basic structure of what he calls the *transcendental object* or *object in general*. Hence, the objects—whether belonging to the inner realm of the mind, thus occurring only in time but not in space, or to the outer realm that in addition to temporal are also spatial—are conditioned by the same cognitive substructure. By tracing the grounds of both the inner and the outer objects to the same source, Kant is taking a significant step toward overcoming the dualism with respect to objects of experience. But obviously this is only a first step towards, rather than a fully accomplished overcoming of the bifurcated background. While the ontological gap between the realms of the inner and the outer objects was significantly shaken, the same was not done with respect to the activity, as Kant obviously gives the pride of place to the action of the mind.

Thus Kant had overcome the ontological gap on the level of the conditioned, but not on the level of the conditions; and Hegel is bringing the Kantian revolution to its completion. He rejects the dualism not only regarding the objects of experience but also regarding the activity that makes the objects possible, and elaborates a new type of ontology that leaves the traditional dualistic backdrop behind. As such, when we say that *action* for Hegel is an application of concepts, we should not understand this as the mental object in the inner realm that guides action taking place either in the extramental physical world or within the inner space. Neither the inner nor the outer space is the privileged locus of action or of the conceptual. Both mental and non-mental are mere abstractions from the basic substructure of Hegel's transcendental ontology that he articulated in the Doctrine of the Concept. It is not the action of the mind that grounds phenomena but the fundamental schema that conditions the objects as well as the actions both of the mind and in the world.

We can see how much more thorough Hegel's rejection of the traditional assumption of the mental realm as "the native land" of concepts is, compared to Dummett's and Davidson's. Whether one replaces judgment with assertion as the original locus of the concept application, or maintains that neither thought nor language has conceptual priority and each requires the other in order to be understood, one is not questioning the fundamental dualistic background of the traditional theories. The mental and material still remain as the two realms divided by the ontological gap. Contrary to this, Hegel leaves the bifurcated ontology behind by arguing that both sides of the divide are mere abstractions from the more basic schema that grounds them. This is the schema that is presented in The Doctrine of the Concept.

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B137).
2. Hegel, SL (GW 12:24).
3. Ibid. (GW 12:90).
4. Ibid. (GW 12:90).
5. Hegel, EL §161, 237.
6. Hegel, SL (GW 12:11).
7. Ibid. (GW 12:23).
8. Ibid. (GW 12:11).
9. Klaus Hartmann, Hegels Logik (De Gruyter, 1999), 287. My translation: The Concept is "the third following Being and Essence," Being and Essence are "the moments of its becoming" (GW 12:11). Thus, as third, it is the "result" of the unity of being (immediacy) and essence (reflection). . . . To understand this result conclusively, it is the "basis" of the preceding spheres Being and Essence, it is their truth (ibid.).
10. Hegel, SL (GW 12:14).
11. Ibid. (GW 12:17–18).
12. Ibid. (GW 12:18).
13. Ibid. (GW 12:20).
14. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 73.
15. Ibid., 29
16. Ibid., 74.
17. Ibid., 74.
18. Ibid., 15.
19. Hegel, SL (GW 12:17).
20. Ibid. (GW 12:18).
21. Ibid. (GW 12:19).
22. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 50.
23. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 312 (KCR 10:130).
24. Hegel, EL §26, 65.
25. Hegel, SL (GW 12:27–28).
26. Ibid. (GW 12:22).
27. Ibid. (GW 12:22).
28. Ibid. (GW 12:27).
29. Ibid. (GW 12:27).
30. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A55/B79).
31. Ibid. (A57/B81).
32. Hegel, SL (GW 12:27).
33. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), Par. 39.
34. Hegel, SL (GW 12:17).
35. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 137.
36. Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Harvard University Press, 2000), 5.
37. Ibid., 5.
38. Ibid., 6.

Chapter Four

The Moments of the Concept

The Hegelian Concept is comprised of three moments: *universality*, *particularity*, and *individuality*, which are not fully self-sufficient and mutually excluding elements that can be separated from one another. Instead each one of them is internally related to the other two and embraces the totality of the Concept.[1] Hegel begins his presentation of the moments with universality, and he has good reasons for it. While each one of the three moments plays an indispensable role in constituting the Concept, *universality* occupies a special place amongst them. Not only does it encompass the whole concept, "The universal is . . . the totality of the Concept,"[2] but it is also described as "the pure Concept" or the moment that stands for "pure identical self-relation" of the Concept.[3] Moreover, as the discussion that follows will demonstrate, universality is associated by Hegel with the pivotal feature of the Concept—its creative potential. Therefore, universality is the natural place to start exploring the inner structure of the Concept.

UNIVERSALITY

Hegel's understanding of universality is very different from its ordinary conception that he refers to as *abstract* universal. In fact, if this were not the case, his claim about universality comprising the entire structure of the Concept, which also includes particularity and individuality, would be completely incomprehensible. Were the universal a product of abstraction from the individuals, it obviously could not have the determinations that it has been abstracted from present within it. As we shall see, the ordinary notion of the abstract universal has more in common with another moment of the Hegelian Concept, *particularity*. So, what exactly does Hegel mean by *genuine univer-*

sality? And how is it related to the ordinary conception of the term that he calls *abstract* or *impoverished universality*?

He describes universality as a "free power," "the informing and creating principle reaching out to its other and embracing it, but without doing violence to it."[4] Hegel also maintains that it is a *process* that posits differences: "the process . . . , creative power . . . [that] differentiates itself internally. . . . is a [process of] positing differences."[5] These might strike the reader as very puzzling claims, putting forward an utterly extravagant conception of universality that has nothing in common with the way the term is traditionally understood. But this is only a first impression. I will argue that Hegel does not stand as far away neither from Aristotle nor from Kant as it first strikes the eye.

The apparent perplexity of this notion comes from Hegel's effort to emphasize the contrast with the traditional conception—the universal as an *abstract* representation that stands externally to what it represents. One of the central goals Hegel is pursuing in the *Logic* is to overcome the representationalist presuppositions deeply embedded in the tradition he inherited, according to which reality is cut into two parts, the mental (the domain of the representations) and the non-mental (the domain of the represented). The universals belong to the former and refer to the entities in the latter realm. They are also typically thought of as the products of abstraction from the entities in the extra-mental realm. Hegel wants to replace this model with the one that grants to universality the function of meaning-producing activity, a power that gets realized through the process of positing differences, similarities, contrasts, identities, etc., and hence generating the conceptual content that illuminates and internally structures instead of representing the determinations of the world. The change is quite radical, and Hegel justifiably considers it necessary to highlight the difference. But at the same time, due to the effort to emphasize the contrast with the traditional approach, it is easy to overlook the influential precursors that Hegel is drawing on in his conception of universality. Aristotle is one of them, and a good starting point to begin understanding the universal moment of Hegel's Concept is Aristotle's notion of the *form*.

The Aristotelian Connection

For Aristotle, each thing we find in nature, including organisms, their parts, basic elements, etc., has within it *the principle of change and rest* that determines the structure that the given thing has at any stage of its existence. The same principle also functions as the power that drives the course of its change and governs its interaction with other entities. This structuring and development-driving power is what Aristotle calls the *form*. The form is a universal, something that all individuals belonging to the given species have

in common. We can identify different aspects of the way a universal form determines an individual by looking at an example; let's take a willow tree. At every stage of its development—be it a seed, a small sapling, a fully grown willow tree, or an already old, dying plant—the state that the thing finds itself in is a product and an expression of the principle that determines what it means to be a willow tree, its *form*. This principle is what sets willow apart from oak, pine, and more radically from other kinds of things like frog, human, water, etc. Thus, the principle determines the structure of the thing, its composition, and nature of functioning at different stages of its development.

Another perspective from which we can approach the determination of the individual by the universal is related to the latter functioning as a force that guides development of the individual. Let us take a willow tree as an example. The universal principle is present in a given willow tree throughout its entire lifespan and determines transition from one stage to the next. In this respect the form functions as a power propelling development and particularization of the individual. But the form also stands in a third kind of relationship with the individual. Not only is it expressed in each one of the stages in the lifespan of the tree and propels the process of its development, but it also encompasses the entirety of its life. In this respect, not specific stages but the entire life of the tree is an expression of its universal form. Hence, we have identified three distinct and yet interrelated aspects in which the form determines the individual's nature and its development. First, each stage of development is a manifestation of the principle. Second, the principle is in place at each determinate stage qua force that propels its further development; and third, the principle encompasses the totality of the thing's determinations.

We can identify three corresponding aspects of universal determining individual in Hegel's theory of the Concept. When Hegel claims that the universal moment is a *creative power, w*hich "when it posits itself in a determination, *remains* in it what it is,"[6] and that "the universal is . . . substance of its determinations,"[7] he is describing the relation between universality and its particular determinations, which is analogous to the Aristotelian thesis that each determination of the given particular is a manifestation of its form. For both Aristotle and Hegel, the structure that the given determination exhibits reveals the nature of the creative power at work. This claim of the immanence of the universal in its determinations goes beyond the mere assertion of the presence of the characteristics of the genus in its species. Hegel sees the latter relation as characteristic of the abstract universal and describes it as "outwardly directed,"[8] while the genuine universal he considers to be "redirected inwardly."[9] The point is that the conceptual content of the abstract universal is a product of the process of abstraction, throughout which the features that differentiate individuals falling under this universal are left out (hence the abstract universal can be described by him as "lifted

out" of the individuals). The Hegelian notion of universal, on the other hand, is "bent back" in the sense that it is not a product of abstraction from the individual. Contrary to this, it plays a formative role for the individual. If the abstract universal, which Hegel also describes as *impoverished* universal, is stripped of the determinations present in the other moments of the Concept, the Hegelian universal retains them—or rather, as we shall see, retains the principle of their generation. Hence, the spatial metaphor of the immanence of the universal to the particular should be understood as the former playing a role in the generation of the latter. This is quite similar to the Aristotelian universal that functions as a formative principle for particular determinations. The two models are not completely identical. As the analysis undertaken in this and the following two chapters will show, the Aristotelian analogy only scratches the surface of the relationship between the universal and individual moments of the Hegelian Concept.

The same point can be made regarding universality encompassing the totality of its determinations. The Hegelian universality is not only expressed in each and every one of its determinations, but it also encapsulates them all within itself. As he puts it, "It [universality] contains difference and determinateness in itself in the highest degree,"[10] or, again, "The determinateness is not imported to the letter [the universal] from outside. . . . The universal is thus the totality of the concept; it is what is concrete, is not empty but, on the contrary, has content by virtue of its concept—a content in which the universal does not just preserve itself but is rather the universal's own, immanent to it."[11] Here again similarity with Aristotle can be a stepping stone into understanding Hegel's position. A form is not merely the animating principle immanent to different stages of development of an individual, but it also is the totality of the determinations that the individual goes through. For Aristotle, without comprehending the different stages of development of a tree, for example, it is not possible to grasp the *form* of *tree*. But here again, it should be pointed out right away that notwithstanding the similarity, the immanence of the particular determinations and the individuality to the universality for Hegel is not quite identical to the Aristotelian model. As we will see, for Hegel the spatial metaphor of the universality embracing the individuality and particularity should be understood in quite a different sense from the immanence of the different determinations to the Aristotelian notion of the substantial form. This should hardly be surprising, as Hegel's claim is a direct consequence of the reformulated notion of the universality that leaves behind the fundamental assumptions of the traditional metaphysics, while the Aristotelian model stands at the origins of the tradition. As such, when using Aristotle as a stepping stone into the Hegelian system, we should keep in mind that the analogy serves just a heuristic function and ought not to be pushed too far.

Having looked at the two important similarities between the Hegelian and the Aristotelian theories, we can begin to see what Hegel means when describing universality as *free power*. First, *freedom* for Hegel means *being with itself in its other*, and this is exactly the relation that obtains between the moments of the Concept. Particularity and individuality are the products of the self-differentiation of universality; hence, it encounters nothing foreign to itself in them. This is what Hegel has in mind in the already cited passage: "The universal is therefore free power; it is itself while reaching out to its other and embracing it, but without doing violence to it; on the contrary, it is at rest in its other as in its own."[12] Moreover, universality is described by Hegel not merely as *free* but as free *power*. With both Hegel and Aristotle, universality is a power that determines the course of development. It is "the principle of change," to use Aristotle's language. Universality, therefore, not only is expressed by its particular determinations and encompasses all determinations within itself, but it also is the principle that drives the process of formation of these determinations. In Chapter 2, I presented a detailed analysis of the basic determinations that function as the forms guiding the empirical-concept-generation processes. In the following two chapters, I will look at the relation between universality as the process of formation of conceptual content and the empirical determinations formed thereby.

Stern's Aristotelian Reading

Having pointed out the similarities with the Aristotelian theory of the form, we should keep in mind that the analogy is only a useful entry point in understanding Hegel's account of the inner structure of the Concept and ought not to be pushed too far. Robert Stern's interpretation of the Hegelian notion of universal is a good example of positing Hegel too close to Aristotle. In his article "Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal," while looking at the British idealists' appropriation of Hegel's notion of the *concrete universal*, Stern criticizes their claim that the universal embraces the individuals that exemplify it. Instead Stern wants to advance a reading of Hegel's universal that is akin to Aristotle's notion of the substantial form or substance-universal. He argues that Hegel's universal should be understood as nothing else but the "characteristics of the kind to which the individuals belong (men qua men are rational)."[13] According to Stern, then, the British idealists, by offering an obscure and extravagant reading of the universal as the ultimate ground that embraces individuals, misinterpreted Hegel's more modest Aristotelian claim about universal consisting of the essential characteristics belonging to a given genus. While neither of these readings does full justice to Hegel's position (as it will become apparent though the discussion that follows), I would argue that the one upheld by the British idealists is closer to Hegel than Stern's reading is.

Stern summarizes the British idealists' rendering of the Hegelian notion of *universality* in the following words: "'the universal in the form of a world,' as Bosanquet put it, rather than in the form of a class. By 'the universal in the form of a world,' Bosanquet meant that individuals which exemplify this universal are thereby related with one another in a system of mutual interdependence, whereas individuals that merely belong to the same class are not."[14] Using Josiah Royce's words (who was not, of course, a *British* Idealist, but still greatly influenced by them), Stern describes the British Idealists' conception of universality as embracing individuals that exemplify it. The individuals in turn exist "only in relation to one another " and to the universal which "is the vine; they, the individuals, are the branches."[15]

Thus, according to Stern, the universal is seen by the British idealists as the ground of the other two moments of the Concept. The claim of the universal embracing individuals is understood as the universal being involved in the constitution of the determinations of the individuals. This reading clearly resonates well with the above-discussed conception of the Hegelian universal as a creative *force* or the *process* generating conceptual content. It also recognizes a high degree of interdependency between individuals, due to their being the products of the very same process of universalization. The idea is that each individuated entity with its properties is an outcome of the overall process of generation of determinations that includes other entities individuated together with it. This renders individuals not only being "embraced" by the universal but also existing "*only* in relation to one another."

The British idealists' acknowledgment of the robust grounding role that the universal plays in relation to the individuals and their determinations is the strongest aspect of their reading. Stern, however, rejects this reading in favor of an interpretation that reduces Hegel's universal to a set of characteristics of a class. He associates this position with Aristotle. Universal is conceived here as a substance-universal comprised of a set of determinations that makes up the essential qualities of a given genera or a natural kind. What binds the individuals belonging to the given universal together, according to Stern's Aristotelian reading, is their shared instantiation of the properties comprising the universal. For instance, if the universal *man* is defined as *a rational animal*, then the determination of the *rationality* in addition to all other determinations that belong to the universal *animal* will be exhibited in the individuals; and this set of properties will exhaust the sense in which they are related to the universal man as well as to one another. Stern writes, "When Royce writes that 'the universal "man" is thus konkret in two senses, namely in so far as in it all men are together, and in so far as through it all Qualitaten of each man are united,' I would accept only the second of these

senses as being part of Hegel's conception of the concrete universal, and not the first."[16]

Stern's reading stands in an obvious contradiction with the passages cited above, where Hegel is explicit about the universal moment's formative role for particularity as well as individuality, and describes it as a process that grounds and embraces the other moments of the Concept. It does not do justice to the dynamic character of the Hegelian Concept, its essential elements, which are repeatedly described by Hegel as a *process* and a *creative power*. The substance universals as Stern presents them are the static sets of determinations that the mind finds in the world and extracts from it. Contrary to this, the Hegelian universal is the source of dynamism. Instead of being derived from particularity, it functions as the power that furnishes them.

As I have shown above, there is a dynamic moment in Aristotle's conception of form that opens the door to a better version of Aristotle's reading of Hegel, but Stern ignores it, instead focusing on its static aspect. But even if Stern had pursued that option, he could have not gone beyond mere surface resemblance, since the dynamic moment in the Aristotelian conception of universal functions on a different ontological level than the Hegelian one does. For Aristotle, form as an already actualized static set of determinations serves as the propagator of development of individuals, while for Hegel these very sets of determinations are the products of the creative power at work. For Aristotle, the substance universal with its complete set of determinations is out there in the world, immanently structuring reality. Cognitive processes are related to the substance universal externally without playing any role in determination of the elements and the structural relations found in the substance-universal. The Hegelian universal, on the other hand, stands in a very different relationship with the process of reflection. Hegel identifies universal moment of the Concept with the determination-generating processes. Universality qua creative power is the self-relational process of reflection that posits determinations. Aristotle and Hegel therefore see the role of universals very differently. While in the case of the former, thought is external to the already existing universals and its determinations, and all it can do is to grasp and mirror them, in the latter case we have thought as the process identical to universality that furnishes determinations. As such, to identify Hegel's notion of *universal* with Aristotle's *substance-universal* is to fail to appreciate the revolutionary aspect of Hegel's system that fundamentally reworks the relation between thought and reality and leaves behind the dualistic ontology upheld by traditional metaphysics.

Kantian Connection

Aristotle is not the only, or even the most direct precursor, of the Hegelian notion of the Concept and its moments. Hegel's conception of universal can

be more immediately traced to Kant, who maintained that the logical functions of judgment are the basic forms of the activity of the mind on which both pure and empirical concepts are grounded. On the one hand, the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories are the general representations of the synthesis of intuitions carried out by these logical functions, as Kant states in the well-known passage from the Metaphysical deduction:

> The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of *the very same actions* through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.[17]

On the other hand, the very same functions of synthesis are guiding the process of formation of empirical concepts. According to Kant, we form empirical concepts through the operation of the mind that is guided by the *concepts of comparison,* which correspond one to one to the logical functions of judgment (identity and difference to quantitative, agreement and conflict to qualitative, inner and outer to relational). To be more specific, we can apply these concepts of comparison—or, ultimately, logical functions of judgment—to our acts of apprehension of empirical objects. Thus, new empirical concepts are generated from the process of sifting through the rule-guided apprehension of phenomena and forming new determinations through this process. The logical functions are involved on both levels of this activity. They guide the process of comparison of apprehension of empirical phenomena, and they are also already ingrained in the rules of apprehension as the latter are nothing but the previously formed empirical concepts. Thus, for Kant, the activity of the mind guided by the logical functions of judgment is the process through which determinations are furnished.

The first thing to note here is that Kant is rejecting the representationalist model according to which the cognitive purport of conceptual content is a function of its representational adequacy of the mind-external reality. The source of determinations in the traditional model (including the Aristotelian one) is external to the mind, and cognitive success of our concepts depends on their capacity to adequately represent the mind-external world. With Kant, contrary to this, the cognitive purport of the determinations is traced to the objectifying capacities of the mind itself, and more specifically, to the logical functions of judgment. Hence, Hegel is following Kant's footsteps when claiming that the *universal* is a determination-positing creative power: "thinking as activity is the active universal, and indeed the self-activating universal."[18] Hegel further notes,

> It [universal] differentiates itself internally, and this is a determining, because the differentiating is one with the universality. Accordingly, it is a positing of differences that are themselves universals, self-referring. They become thereby fixed, isolated differences. . . . Herein consists the creativity of the concept, a creativity which is to be comprehended only in the concept's innermost core.[19]

Hence, instead of the traditional representational model, according to which a concept and its determinations were supposed to mirror the determinate features of the mind-external world, Hegel takes up the Kantian approach. The mind and not something external to it is asserted as the source of the cognitive purport of determinations. Universal moment of the Concept is that *creative,* cognitive content conferring *power* that is responsible for generating the conceptual content and is described by Hegel as the concept's "innermost core."

Another important point made in the just quoted passage is a description of universality as the *difference positing process.* As I have argued in Chapter 2, the basic functions that guide the process of differentiation are presented in The Doctrine of Essence. I have also claimed that Hegel sees universal moment of the Concept as the activity through which the conceptual content is generated. In the following passage Hegel explains the nature of the relation between the determinations posited by the universal moment of the Concept and the process of reflection he discussed in the Doctrine of Essence:

> Difference, as it presents itself here, is in its concept and therefore in its truth. All previous difference has this unity in the concept. As it is present immediately in being, difference is the limit of an other; as present in reflection, it is relative, posited as referring essentially to its other; here is where the unity of the concept thus begins to be posited; at first, however, the unity is only a reflective shine in an other.—The true significance of the transitoriness and the dissolution of these determinations is just this, that they attain to their concept, to their truth; being, existence, something, or whole and part, and so on, substance and accidents, cause and effect, are thought determinations on their own; as determinate concepts, however, they are grasped in so far as each is cognized in unity with its others or in opposition to them.[20]

Thus according to Hegel the process of difference positing reflection from The *Doctrine of Essence* attains its truth in the Doctrine of the Concept. Hence, in this passage Hegel acknowledges that in the Doctrine of the Concept, he returns to the very same ground that was covered in the Doctrine of Essence, but this time from a more developed standpoint that allows us to locate the role that the activity of reflection and its basic forms have within a more comprehensive ontological account. In other words, if in the Doctrine of Essence the process of generation of conceptual content and the elemen-

tary forms by means of which this content is generated was investigated in greater detail, now Hegel steps back and allows us to see where that process fits in a broader account of his transcendental ontology. The activity of positing differences and identities, diversities, and oppositions that I have discussed in Chapter 2 is now revealed to be one of the three essential aspects of the ontological structure that Hegel calls the Concept—its universal moment.

Moreover, since Hegel claims that each moment of the Concept embraces it fully,[21] in a certain sense, this process is supposed to encompass the totality of the Concept. Therefore, one way we can regard reality, according to Hegel, is through conceiving it as essentially grounded on the conceptual-content-generating process. In other words, he wants to maintain that there is nothing to reality that could claim complete heterogeneousness to this determination-positing process. But obviously, this is only a part of a more comprehensive account, and we still need to look at the other two moments of the Concept, as well as their relation to one another, to gain an adequate picture of Hegel's transcendental ontology. As we will see, Hegel will be presenting different models of relation between the moments of the Concept in the *Syllogism* chapter and will culminate the series with what he takes to be the account of genuine nature in their unity.

Hence, the Kantian insight that the synthetic activity guided by the logical functions of judgment through which all conceptual content is generated is the main precursor of the Hegelian universal moment of the Concept, the creative process that generates and embraces all determination. This is the reason that Hegel hails the transcendental unity of apperception that is identical for Kant to the logical functions of judgment as the highest point of Kant's philosophy. Hegel's description of the universality as the "pure identical self-relation"[22] is a reflection of the Kantian identification of the apperception with the logical functions of judgment. But as at many other critical points, here Hegel also does not merely follow the Kantian footsteps but develops them further and brings them to what he sees as their logical conclusion. The important difference here is that while Hegel picks up the Kantian thread and integrates the activity of the mind guided by the determinations of reflection within his theory of the Concept, he is not confining the universal moment of the Concept to mental processes. The determinations of reflection as the basic functions of the content-generating process of thinking were considered by Hegel at a different stage of development of his system from the one we see in the Doctrine of the Concept. In the Doctrine of Essence, he was still dealing with the issue of grounding *being* on *essence* or developing the notion of *being* qua *thought*; he was in the midst of bringing Kant's Copernican revolution to its completion. Now on the other hand, in the Doctrine of the Concept, that task has already been brought to its completion and the schism between thought and being has been overcome. Thus the

determinations of reflection as the activity-guiding functions no longer belong to reflection exclusively—they are the basic functions of action in general. This is the reason Hegel is claiming that "thinking as *activity* is the active universal" instead of merely asserting that "thinking is active universal, . . . the self-activating universal." In other words, the activity as such is the universal moment of the Concept in action and reflection is only one modality in which this activity can be actualized. The activity that furnishes determinate content—the second moment of the Hegelian Concept that he calls *particularity*—is not limited to the mental but also includes individual actions, inter-subjective activities, social and political processes through which different concepts and institutions get applied, tested, and modified. Concepts get applied and their content modified not only in reflection and thought but also in action. An action is intelligible to us only as anchored in the institutions and social practices that comprise our social reality. The conceptual content of these institutions and practices determines the meaning of the action. Hence, acting means applying concepts just as reflecting or inferring do. The individual, when pursuing his or her own ends, is applying the socially shared conceptual background as the social institutions and practices are the defining features of his/her self-understanding. As Terry Pinkard puts it:

> The agent who identifies with these ethical ends cannot be an already fully formed agent with his own independently identifiable set of interests which would then enable him to make that kind of "decision." Rather, the agent is who he is only by participating in a form of life with its associated practices; the agent's "self" is not some fully formed, fixed entity that then "decide" whether these ends fit his already formed interests. Rather than being a kind of already "fixed entity," the self arises out of a position in "social space."[23]

Throughout our actions we are applying, testing, and ultimately remolding the conceptual content that determines our understanding of the social institutions and practices. Thus actions, whether mental or not, belong to the overall process of generation and modifications of conceptual content. Therefore, the formal schemata that Hegel presents in the theory of the Concept—judgments and syllogisms—are not merely a series of structures involving different kinds of mental representations, but different models of actuality that include the mental activity but are not limited to it.

PARTICULARITY

While Hegel's notion of universality can be traced back to the Kantian understanding of the cognitive activity and hence one of the ways that Kant uses the term concept (i.e., "the consciousness of the unity of the act of

synthesis"), the second moment of the Hegelian Concept, *particularity*, is related to the other meaning that Kant has for the same term, "universal or reflected representation." As such, one can claim that the overall structure of Hegel's Concept has already existed in an incipient form in Kant: the act of synthesis as the universal moment; universal and reflected representation as the particular moment that Hegel describes as the product of self-differentiation of the first moment; and the third moment, individuality, which for Hegel is the unity of the previous two.

The *particular* moment of the Concept is a product of the universal moment's self-differentiation.

> The universal determines itself, and so is itself the particular; the determinateness is its difference; it is only differentiated from itself. Its species are therefore only (a) the universal itself and (b) the particular. The universal is as concept itself and its opposite, and this opposite is in turn the universal itself as its posited determinateness; the universal overreaches it and, in it, it is with itself. Thus it is the totality and the principle of its diversity, which is determined wholly and solely through itself.[24]

Hegel makes three important claims in this passage that I would like to take a close look at. First, he clearly describes particularity as generated from universality and sees it as an outcome of its self-differentiation or positing determinations immanent to itself. Second, he describes the universal as containing the principle of diversity of the content by which it generates the particular moment of the Concept. Third, Hegel claims that universal is the totality of its diversity and it is with itself in it.

Particular as Self-differentiated Universal

I start with the first point. The universal, as we have seen, is the process through which the determinate conceptual content is generated. Hence, granted that Hegel describes the particular moment as generated from universality through its self-differentiation and positing of determinations, the particularity is a system of inferentially interrelated determinations that make up the totality of its conceptual content. It is a constellation of the empirical concepts generated through the process of *thinking*, in Hegel's technical sense of the term, which includes mental activity in the ordinary meaning of the term, as well as the application of the concepts through activity in the inter-subjectively shared space that includes social and political institutions. Hegel describes the determinations that comprise the particular moment of the Concept as *abstract universals*:

> This universality, with which the determinate clothes itself, is abstract universality. The particular has this universality in it as its essence; but in so far as

> the determinateness of the difference is posited and thereby has being, the universality is form in it, and the determinateness as such is its content. Universality becomes form inasmuch as the difference is something essential, just as in the pure universal it is, on the contrary, only absolute negativity and not a difference posited as such.[25]

The particular moment of the Concept is made up of the determinations we call empirical or the ordinary concepts. These are abstract universals that have been generated through the process of discerning differences, similarities, and identities in experience. Universality in Hegel's sense of the term, on the other hand, is described in this passage as the "absolute negation." It is related to the abstract universals as the ground to the grounded.

The claim of the particular moment being a product of the self-differentiation of the universality points to the relationship that this system of empirical concepts stands to the process of thinking in the Hegelian understanding of the term. Thought, for Hegel at the stage of unfolding of his system that we have reached in the Doctrine of the Concept, is no longer confined to merely mental phenomena; universality as the process of thinking that generates determinate conceptual content includes not merely mental activity, but also the activity in the inter-subjectively shared reality. Social and political institutions, the normative landscape that guides our activity, are the conceptual content actualized into the real world. Institutions cannot function without a certain set of empirical concepts, and neither can the subjective states of the mind that have nothing in common with the determination in the inter-subjectively shared sphere qualify as concepts. Application of a concept in judgment and action with its impact in the world are both activities that are included in the process that Hegel calls universal moment. This merger of the concepts and institution is a part of the overall rejection of the traditional dualistic (mental vs. non-mental) ontology.

The chief example of such a concept that is actualized in social and political institutions and plays a crucial role in historical development for Hegel is *Freedom*. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel outlines the basic schema he considers to be the reasonable social institutions culminating in the modern state that he sees as the actualization of concrete freedom.[26] Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history is a close examination of the processes of formation and transformation of the institutions that he sees as actualization of the concept of freedom. This process involves individual reflection, the formation and functioning of political and social institutions, their downfalls and transformations, their revision of the meaning of these determinations, and their application through individual actions.

In the above-cited passage, Hegel describes abstract universality as the *form* of the determinations of the particular: "the universality is form in it, and the determinateness as such is its content. Universality becomes form."[27]

This is one more direct evidence of the Kantian roots of Hegel's ontology, as for Kant, universality is the form of all concepts both empirical and a priori. Moreover, both Kant and Hegel see universality tied to the process of generation of conceptual content. For Kant, "the form of the concept [its universality] as discursive representation is always made."[28] It is an outcome of the process of comparison, reflection, abstraction. Obviously for Hegel, universality is also related to the process of generation of conceptual content. It needs to be noted that, as I have argued in Chapter 2, both Kant and Hegel see this process as guided by the same functions. Kant calls them concepts of comparison, and Hegel determinations of reflection.

The Principle of Difference

The second broader point that I will look at here is Hegel's assertion that the genuine universal is different from the abstract universal due to having the principle of difference within it. He claims that abstract universal is an empty concept: "its determinateness is not the principle of its differentiation; the principle contains the beginning and the essence of its development and realization."[29] What Hegel means here becomes clear when considered together with another important assertion he makes regarding the difference between the two kinds of universals: he describes his own conception of universality as *self-contained* and *turned-towards-itself,* while abstract universal is referred to as *outward-going*.

> But in regard to the other side in which the genus is limited because of its determinate character, we have just said that, as a lower genus, it has its resolution in a higher universal. This universal can also be grasped as a genus but as a more abstract one; it always pertains, however, only to the side of the determinate concept which is outwardly directed. The truly higher universal is the one in which this outwardly directed side is redirected inwardly; this is the second negation in which the determinateness is present simply and solely as something posited, or as reflective shine. Life, the "I," spirit, absolute concept, are not universals only as higher genera, but are rather concretes whose determinacies are also not mere species or lower genera but determinacies which, in their reality, are self-contained and self-complete.[30]

Now, as we have seen, the Hegelian notion of universality is a conceptual content generating process that is guided by determination of reflection—identity, difference, contradiction, etc. This helps us understand how the presence of the principle of differentiation in the genuine universality is directly related to it being "turned toward itself," instead of being "outward-going" as is the case with the abstract universals. The point here is that the process of generation and revision of a set of empirical concepts goes hand in hand with these concepts comprising a holistic system of interrelated deter-

minations. If we are not dealing with a holistic system, but only with an isolated determination or even with a limited subset of a system of determinations, the necessary conditions for the process of revising conceptual content are simply not there.

The key role in the process of revision of a given system of empirical concepts is played by *contradiction* that obtains between its elements tied to one another via the inferential relations, which in turn originate from the conceptual content generating process guided by the determinations of reflection (identity, difference, etc.). But if the given set of determinations does not comprise a self-enclosed holistic system, but is instead "outward-going," then what appears as a contradiction when a given subset of determinations is considered in isolation might not appear as a contradiction when a larger context is factored in. Therefore contradiction within a given set of determinations does not necessitate the process of revision of their conceptual content. In other words, the necessary conditions for the process of revision and generation of the new content are present only within the constellation of empirical concepts that are linked to one another by inferential relations and form a holistic system.

The key point here is that the contradiction and, therefore, the need for revision of the conceptual content have different consequences in the holistic self-enclosed system vs. in a none-self-enclosed set of abstract determinations. When Hegel calls the former "bent inwards" and the latter "pointing outside," he speaks with the language of spatial metaphors about the nature of the inferential relations that will ultimately determine the developments necessitated by the emergence of contradiction. If in the holistic system, the revision of the existing conceptual content is the only way of resolving the contradictory state, with the outward-pointing set of determinations, resolution can be located in the domain external to the given set of determinations.

Thus we can see how the two kinds of systems will handle differently the cases of contradiction. The former will be directed inwardly on the revision of the existing determinations, generating new conceptual content through the process of thinking (in Hegel's technical meaning of the term). With the latter, no such necessity arises. This absence of the condition for the process of generation and revision of the determinate conceptual content is what Hegel has in mind when claiming that the abstract universals lack the principle of difference. In other words, the principle of differentiation is the feature of a holistic system of determinations that stands for the capacity of the system to necessitate transformation of its determinations and generation of new determinations.

The unavailability of the principle of differentiation in abstract universals is closely tied with their "fixity," which Hegel sees as a major reason of their inadequacy. "Here we have the circumstance that explains why the understanding is nowadays held in such a low repute and is so much discredited

when measured against reason; it is the fixity which it imparts to determinacies and consequently to anything finite. This fixity consists in the form of the abstract universality just considered that makes them unalterable."[31] What Hegel is pointing to here is the inadequacy of the perspective that takes the particular moment of the Concept in its isolation without contextualizing it against the backdrop of the other two moments of the Concept. The perspective is inadequate since it abstracts from the conceptual content generating process that we have looked at above and exclusively focuses on its product, i.e., the constellation of the empirical concepts as abstract universals. Not only are we dealing with an incomplete account with the universal moments omitted from it, but the particular moment itself is misconstrued. As a result of removal of all dynamism, empirical concepts are taken as "fixed" or "unalterable" determinations.

The misconstrual of the abstract universals as rigid and unalterable determinations invites the *semantic atomist* perspective, according to which the conceptual content of the empirical concepts are taken to be not an outcome of the process of continuous formation and revision that is taking place through their application in cognition and in action, but antecedent and semantically independent of these processes. This semantic indifference can be of a variety of kinds. It can take the form of the Aristotelian-representationalist model, according to which the world and the minds set apart from one another and the content of the former determines the content of the latter. In other words, the determinations are antecedent in the sense that their content precedes cognitive effort on the part of the mind; the locus of their origin is the mind-independent realm. An alternative form this semantic indifference can take is the rationalist-Leibnizian approach, according to which the determinations are pre-given not in the mind-external world but in the mental realm itself. This is why Hegel compares the Leibnizian approach to the generation of the conceptual content with formation of bubbles in the mind.[32]

What both of these alternatives lack is the appreciation of the role that the process of application of the systematically related empirical concepts plays in furnishing their conceptual content. This is Hegel's point when claiming that once the universal moment of the Concept is included in the picture, the fixity is dissolved and the dynamic character of the transcendental ontological substructure, the Concepts*,* comes to the fore:

> The fixity of the determinacies which the understanding appears to run up against, the form of the imperishable, is that of self-referring universality. But this universality belongs to the concept as its own, and for this reason what is found expressed in it, infinitely close at hand, is the dissolution of the finite. This universality directly contradicts the determinateness of the finite and makes explicit its disproportion with respect to it. . . . The abstract determinate is posited . . . as the unity of itself and the universal, that is, as concept.[33]

The Identity of Content

The third key feature of the particular moment of the Concept that we will be discussing here is the claim of identity of the universal and the particular moments. Hegel makes this point in the above-cited passage by asserting that the universal is the totality of its diversity. By diversity he obviously means the particular moment of the Concept. In the same passage Hegel makes a related claim that universality is with itself in this diversity. With these assertions Hegel makes explicit what has been implied in the earlier claim of each moment of the Concept being not merely a part of the Concept but embracing it in its entirety. But the question is what exactly does Hegel mean by the identity of the dynamic (the universal) and the static (the particular) moments. It certainly cannot be understood as a denial of presence of characteristics in either one of these moments that is absent in the other one. What Hegel has in mind here, rather, is a specific relation between the process through which the determinations are generated, on the one hand, and the conceptual content that we end up with as an outcome of this activity. The claim is that there is nothing to the conceptual content comprising the particular moment that has not originated in the universal moment of the Concept. This is what has been described by Wilfrid Sellars and his followers as the rejection of the myth of the given.

According to the traditional conception, every concept can be analyzed regarding its extensional and intensional aspects. Extension of a concept basically means the domain that is carved out by the concept; thus it includes all other concepts that can be subsumed under it or stand in species-genus relation with the given concept. The intension of a concept, on the other hand, includes the complete set of concepts that are parts of its determination. For example, the extension of the concept of *polygon* includes concepts like triangle, square, rectangle, pentagon, etc. Intension, on the other hand, includes such concepts as line, angle, extension, etc. One way we can think of this distinction is that extension is geared to the ontological import of the concept, while intension to its semantic aspect. Now, when Hegel claims that the universal moment exhausts the totality of determinations that makes up the particular moment of the Concept, what he has in mind is that both the intension and the extension of the conceptual content that make up the particular moment originate from the determination-generating process of reflection that he calls universality.

I start with the intensional aspect. In this respect, it is important to recall that the principle of self-differentiation of the universal into the plurality of determinations of the particularity, according to Hegel, is immanent to the universal itself. The "universality . . . possesses in itself the norm by which this form of its self-identity, in pervading all the moments and comprehending them within."[34] As we have seen, the principle under consideration is the

principle of differentiation that consists of the basic determinations of reflection that guide the process of generation of conceptual content. Hence, when Hegel claims that the universal determines the nature of its diversification into the determinations that comprise the particular, he is pointing to the grounding role of the basic functions of differentiation, identification, diversification, etc. and particularly, as we have seen, of contradiction, in the process of generation of the empirical concepts. Hegel's point here is that no matter at which level of analyzing the given empirical content we start, we will be proceeding with the basic rules of reflection that characterize the universal moment of the Concept and will be arriving at the conceptual content that is a product of the application of these very functions. In other words, no matter how far such spelling out of the intensional content is pursued, the basic forms of relationship between the elements of the conceptual content will be those that guide the process that Hegel called universality. The totality of the particular moment of the Concept is mediated by its universal moment through and through. This is what Hegel has in mind when claiming that "particular has this universality in it as its essence,"[35] or "a principle contains the beginning and the essence of its development and realization."[36] The complete conceptual content of each specific determination and their totality taken together originate from the principle present in universality.

The identity of the extension of the two moments of the Concept is the other side of the same coin: "The diversity of these particulars, because of their identity with the universal, is as such at the same time universal; it is totality.—The particular, therefore, does not only contain the universal but exhibits it also through its determinateness; accordingly the universal constitutes a sphere that the particular must exhaust."[37] Hegel's point is that the process of the generation of the conceptual content carves out the ontological space within which the products of the particularization of the universal are exhibited. In other words, there is no extra-conceptual content that serves as an external boundary to the determination-generating process. The ontological space that is carved out by self-differentiation of the universal is the domain to which the particulars with the totality of their determinations belong. Hence both intension and extension of the two moments are identical. This is consistent with the claim that the totality of the Concept is present in each one of its moments; "each of these moments is just as much the whole concept."[38] Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that Hegel starts his account of the Concept with universality and makes it clear that it is the most pivotal moment of the three. While particularity is the only means by which universality actualizes itself as a creative power and hence an indispensable moment of the Concept, nevertheless as we have already seen, it is universality that has *the principle of particularization* through which it posits

particular determinations. It is also the creative potential of universality that particularity represents, not vice versa.

Bowman on Two Moments of the Concept and the Limitations of His Position

While the complete account of the unified structure of the Concept will be given only in the final chapter of the book, as we have looked at the relation between the universal and the particular moments we can start seeing the overall features of the self-relational unity of the Concept. The key role here will, obviously, be played by the unity between the dynamic and the static moments of the Concept. Brady Bowman in his *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity* advances a somewhat similar claim. Relying on the works of Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, he argues that "Henrich's analysis of the dynamic logic of Hegel's grundoperation turns out to correspond exactly to Horstmann's relational account of the Hegelian Concept and the structure of subjectivity. The two are at bottom one and the same, considered first from the dynamic perspective, then from the static or structural perspective."[39] Henrich's Doctrine of Essence focused analysis of the reflective activity as the autonomous negation is argued by Bowman to have a structure identical to Horstmann's relational account of the Hegelian Concept. Both exhibit the three-partite structure of the relation-to-self—relation-to-other—relation-to-other-as-relation-to-self.[40] Here is Bowman's Logic of Reflection focused account of the dynamic moment:

> Reflection is at first the movement of the nothing to the nothing, and thus negation coinciding with itself. This self-coinciding is in general simple equality with itself, immediacy. But this falling together is not the transition of negation into equality as into a being other than it; . . . This is positedness, immediacy purely as determinateness or as self-reflecting. This immediacy, which is only as the turning back of the negative into itself, is the immediacy which constitutes the determinateness of shine, and from which the previous reflective movement seemed to begin. But, far from being able to begin with this immediacy, the latter first is rather as the turning back or as the reflection itself. Reflection is therefore the movement which, since it is the turning back, only in this turning is that which starts out or returns.[41]

An identical structure is to be found in Hegel's theory of the Concept, argues Bowman, and presents as an example of this the relation between *identity, difference, and ground.*

While Bowman is right in basing the unified structure of the Concept on the relationship between its dynamic and static moments, the specific interpretation of these moments and the nature of their unity he is advancing is clearly misguided. First, the manifestation of the static structure, *relation-to-*

self—relation-to-other—relation-to-other-as-relation-to-self, that Bowman is looking at (*identity, difference, ground)* is taken from the determinations of reflection, not from The Doctrine of the Concept. Hence, what is presented as the static structure of the Concept that corresponds to the identical dynamic structure of the process of "reflection as autonomous negativity" is borrowed from the determinations of reflection or the dynamic moment itself. In other words, Bowman uses the schema borrowed from the dynamic moment, misinterprets it as a static structure, and then by arguing a similarity with other aspects of the dynamic moment claims that he has demonstrated a parallelism between the dynamic and the static moments. Unfortunately, Bowman has not much choice but to turn to this or some other similar tactics as he is hardly going into any close analysis of The Doctrine of the Concept, confining his attention to The Doctrine of Essence. For sure the Doctrine of Essence is a very important part of the *Logic*, and, as I have argued in Chapter 2, it is essential for a proper comprehension of the process of generation of empirical concepts. But at the same time, it is certainly not the place where Hegel offers an account of the self-relational unity between the most basic elements of his ontology (i.e., universality, particularity, individuality).

As I have argued, the dynamic aspect of the system is associated with the *universal* moment. The determinations of reflection that Hegel presents in the Doctrine of Essence, on the other hand, are the basic formal structures that guide this content-generating activity. Discerning identities, differences, diversity, etc., in the experience that is already mediated by the existing empirical concepts are the most basic operations in the process through which revision of the existing and formation of the new empirical determinations are carried out. The *static* aspect of the Concept, on the other hand, is a system of empirical concepts that Hegel calls the *particular*. The identity of the dynamic and the static aspects, that is, the universal and particular moments, will be the topic of my analysis in the following two chapters where I take a close look at the *syllogism* section of The Doctrine of the Concept.

INDIVIDUALITY

Hegel introduces the third moment of the Concept, *individuality*, as posited through determinate universality: "Singularity, as we have seen, is already posited through particularity; this is determinate universality and hence self-referring determinateness, the determinate determinate,"[42] and again, "the particular, for the same reason that makes it only a determinate universal, is also a singular,[43] and, conversely, because the singular is a determinate universal, it is equally a particular."[44] These passages make it clear that what Hegel means by individuality should not be identified with the pre-conceptual, brute given, something that is out there in the world individuated prior to

any reflection. Instead, individuality stands for something "posited through determinate universality." It is, in other words, conditioned by the process of reflection that generates determinate conceptual content. Instead of being a thing given to reflection from some external sources, it is individuated by the conceptual content generating process. Individuality is a fully mediated totality of relations. This is what Hegel means when he claims that through individuality, concept re-asserts its unity by returning to itself after positing diverse determinations.

> In this reflection universality is in and for itself, individuality is essentially the negativity of the determinations of the concept, but not merely as if it stood as a third something distinct from them, but because what is now posited is that positedness is being-in-and-for-itself; that is, what is posited is that each of the distinct determinations is the totality. The turning back of the determinate concept into itself means that its determination is to be in its determinateness the whole concept.[45]

Individuality is the totality of determinations that make up a systematically related whole—not any set of determinate conceptual content will qualify for the term. This is why Hegel introduces the example of the already familiar concrete universals, "Life, spirit, God, as well as the pure Concept,"[46] when describing individuality. What is capable of being individuated is not a singular object confronting consciousness externally, but systematically related determinations with shared conceptual content. Hence, a finite object enters a given ontological space as a part of a system of objects that are tied to one another with shared conceptual content.

In the following, Hegel clearly specifies the problem with the traditional take on individuality:

> Universality, when referred to these individuals as indifferent ones—and it must be referred to them, for they are a moment of the concept of individuality—is only their commonality. If by the universal one understands that which is common to several individuals, the indifferent subsistence of these individuals is then taken as the starting point, thus mixing in the immediacy of being into the determination of the concept. The lowest conception one can have of the universal as connected with the individual is this external relation that it has to the latter as a mere commonality.[47]

The independent subsistence of the individuals is the illusion that is coupled with the matching conception of the abstract universality, which Hegel describes here as its "lowest conception." In other words, the conception of individual objects as existing indifferently from one another and from the universal is fundamentally flawed. Individual objects are interdependent through and through as they are individuated together as comprising a sys-

tematic whole the elements of which share the conceptual content that is a particularized universal.

As such, individuality is inseparable from concrete universality. This is what sets Hegel's conception of universality apart from the abstract universality, which is related to the individuality externally:

> The universal is for itself because it is absolute mediation in itself, self-reference only as absolute negativity. It is an abstract universal inasmuch as this sublating is an external act and so a dropping off of the determinateness. This negativity, therefore, attaches indeed to the abstract universal, but it remains outside it, as a mere condition of it; it is the abstraction itself that holds its universal opposite it, and so the universal does not have singularity in itself and remains void of concept.—Life, spirit, God, as well as the pure concept, are for this reason beyond the grasp of abstraction, for abstraction keeps singularity away from its products, and singularity is the principle of individuality and personality. And so it comes to nothing but lifeless universalities, void of spirit, color, and content.[48]

In other words, what makes the abstract universal "lifeless" is its externality to individuals that is tied to its externality to the totality of determinations, its "dropping off of the determinateness" thereby becoming "void of . . . content."

Hegel associates the stance that approaches the moments of the Concept in isolation from one another with *representational thinking*. The representational model sets apart the concept and the object on the opposite sides of the epistemological and ontological gap, abstract universality on one side and the individuality on the other. Now for Hegel, each one of the three moments of the Concept when taken in isolation from the rest of the Concept is an abstraction. Hence, not only can the universal and the particular be abstract, but so can the individual. Representational thinking works with such abstract conception of individuality when construing it as an entity completely independent of reflection, confronting though as exterior to it.

> [E]ach of the determinations established in the preceding exposition of the concept has immediately dissolved itself and has lost itself in its other. Each distinction is confounded in the course of the very reflection that should isolate it and hold it fixed. Only a way of thinking that is merely representational, for which abstraction has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, the particular, and the singular rigidly apart. Then they can be counted; and for a further distinction this representation relies on one which is entirely external to being, on their quantity, and nowhere is such a distinction as inappropriate as here.[49]

The representationalist stance therefore implies an ontological model that conceives the three moments of the Concept as self-sufficient determinations

persisting in isolation from one another. We shall see that this stands quite close to one of the alternative ontological models that Hegel will consider and reject in the *syllogism* chapter.

Hegel offer two fundamentally opposing paths of "return of the Concept into itself,"[50] that is, relating the two extreme moments of the Concept—universality and individuality. The first option is based on abstraction, "which lets drop the particular and rises to the higher and higher genus." This option uses the impoverished conception of universality that operates within the representationalist framework, widening the gap between the universal on the one hand and the individual on the other. "The lowest conception one can have of the universal as connected with the singular is this external relation that it has to the latter."[51] The alternative option is via "descent" into individuality.[52] This descending of the universal into individuality does not mean putting aside the particular moment and delving into the non-conceptual given. Rather, it means the drive toward exhaustive determination through generation of a holistic system of conceptual content. It is through this drive toward full determination that the content individuates itself or enters actuality: "Singularity is not, however, only the turning back of the concept into itself, but the immediate loss of it. Through singularity, where it is internal to itself, the concept becomes external to itself and steps into actuality."[53] In the following two chapters I will look at the models of mediation between the moments of the Concept offered by Hegel in the syllogism chapter. Each one of them is a step taken away from the first path of relating the universality to individuality and towards the second one.

NOTES

1. Hegel, SL (GW 12:32).
2. Ibid. (GW 12:35).
3. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
4. Ibid. (GW 12:35).
5. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
6. Ibid. (GW 12:34).
7. Ibid. (GW 12:34).
8. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
9. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
10. Ibid. (GW 12:33).
11. Ibid. (GW 12:35).
12. Ibid. (GW 12:35).
13. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 156.
14. Ibid., 150.
15. Ibid., 150.
16. Ibid., 158.
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (A79/B105).
18. Hegel, EL §20, 49.

19. Hegel, SL (GW 12:36–37).
20. Ibid. (GW 12:38).
21. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
22. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
23. Terry Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300.
24. Hegel, SL (GW 12:38).
25. Ibid. (GW 12:39).
26. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §260.
27. Hegel, SL (GW 12:39).
28. Béatrice Longuenesse. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 119.
29. Hegel, SL (GW 12:41).
30. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
31. Ibid. (GW 12:41).
32. Ibid. (GW 11:247).
33. Ibid. (GW 12:42).
34. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
35. Ibid. (GW 12:39).
36. Ibid. (GW 12:41).
37. Ibid. (GW 12:37).
38. Ibid. (GW 12:32).
39. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 54.
40. Ibid., 41.
41. Ibid., 53.
42. Hegel, SL (GW 12:20).
43. Di Giovanni uses "singularity" to translate Hegel's "Einzelheit." But in my view "individuality" is a better translation. Thus, in the rest of the text the citations from the Science of Logic (SL) will have "Einzelheit" translated as "singularity," while I will be using "individuality" for the original "Einzelheit."
44. Hegel, SL (GW 12:50).
45. Ibid. (GW 12:51).
46. Ibid. (GW 12:49).
47. Ibid. (GW 12:51).
48. Ibid. (GW 12:49).
49. Ibid. (GW 12:50).
50. Ibid. (GW 12:51).
51. Ibid. (GW 12:51).
52. Ibid. (GW 12:49).
53. Ibid. (GW 12:51).

Chapter Five

Failed Forms of Syllogistic Mediation

In this and the following chapter, we will address the structural makeup of the Concept. In the previous chapter, we looked at the three moments of this basic substructure of Hegel's ontology: universality, particularity, and individuality. However, for a proper understanding of the Concept, in addition to its moments, we have to elucidate the exact nature of their relationships to one another. When examining the moments in isolation, we tend to regard them as *self-subsistent* and abstract from the overall holistic structure of which the moments are a part and within which they stand in a fully mediated relationship to one another. This tendency inevitably leads to a misinterpretation of this pivotal part of Hegel's ontology. When it comes to Hegel's system, understanding the relationships between its elements is just as important as understanding the elements themselves. One distinctly original characteristic of his position is the following: If in the traditional view, only universals can be considered an abstraction from actuality, in Hegel's view, taking particularity and individuality in isolation are abstractions as well. Thus, regarding actuality as comprised of only individual entities (or any given system of particular determinations) is to uphold just as impoverished a view as ignoring the individuals altogether and focusing only on abstract universals.

The part of the *Logic* where Hegel investigates the structure of the Concept as split into its three moments is the Judgment chapter. He claims that "judgment is the self-diremption of the Concept."[1] The Syllogism chapter, on the other hand, is dedicated to a step-by-step reconstitution of its unity that culminates in the claim that each moment stands in self-identical relation with other moments. This reconstitution of identity between the moment, however, as we shall see, does not cancel the difference between them. It is rather a sublation of the difference, not an abolition of it. What is rejected in

the Syllogism chapter is not the distinct characteristics of the moments but the opposition between their difference and their self-identical unity. Hence, the moments of the Concept will undergo significant transformation throughout the Syllogism chapter. For example, the conception of universality that the chapter commences with is an abstract universality, while at the end of the chapter we have the meaning of the term as the conceptual content-generating process guided by the determinations of reflection, which we looked at in Chapter 2. Universality is not an exception in this respect; each one of the three moments undergoes transformation as we make our way through the stages of mediation presented by Hegel as syllogistic structures.

Each syllogistic model of mediations between the moments of the Concept is distinct from the others not only in the specific manner of the unity of universality, particularity, and individuality but also in the very nature of the moments themselves that are being mediated. We start with the least adequate model and at the end reach Hegel's own vision of the fully mediated structure of the Concept: the fundamental schema of his transcendental ontology. Hegel considers universality, particularity, and individuality to be the three main elements for which any ontological theory should have an account. Each syllogistic model, as we will see, stands for a specific ontological vision. Hence, each model of mediation that we find in the Syllogism chapter represents a certain conception of reality. As we make our way through this chapter, I will be outlining key features of each major ontological model. This gradual approximation toward Hegel's standpoint will help us to gain a clearer picture of the position toward which we are moving. It will also shed light on what Hegel sees as the most significant differences between his ontological view and the major alternatives that he rejects.

The criterion that drives the development in the Syllogism chapter is the self-relational unity of the structure of the Concept. The moments of the Concept, as we shall see, should not merely be related to one another; their relation must have the nature of *self-relation*. This is the norm that Hegel uses to evaluate the ontological models he investigates in the Syllogism chapter, which is the norm that each one of the alternative models will fail to meet. Only his stance will do justice to it. The fact that Hegel is using this criterion reveals how thoroughly Kantian his undertaking is. It is Kant who identified the objective purport-conferring functions with self-relationality when, in the Transcendental Deduction, he identified the logical functions of judgment with the transcendental apperception. Hence, by applying this specific criterion to different ontological models, Hegel asks the following question: What is the nature of reality in which Kant's insight about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is brought to its logical conclusion? The ontology that the Syllogism chapter ends with is Hegel's reply to this question.

Therefore, when Hegel makes claims like "everything actual is syllogism" or "syllogism is the truth of being," he has in mind not the entire Syllogism chapter, where he presents and analyzes a whole series of ontological models, but rather the fully mediated syllogistic schema that the chapter ends with—the ontological model in which the Kantian self-relationality criterion is fulfilled. While emphasizing this deeply running Kantian current at the epicenter of Hegel's project, it is also important to keep in mind that there are significant differences between the two systems as well. While Kant at times appears to shy away from explicitly acknowledging that he is putting forward a metaphysical outlook, in Hegel's case, we are dealing with a full-fledged ontological theory. The Kantian idea of the transcendental unity of apperception as the source of objective purport-conferring determinations is fundamentally reworked and reinstated on a new ontological ground that is free of the psychological implications that Hegel saw as problematic. The self-relational unity is still the source of objective purport, but the primarily epistemological account is replaced by the Hegelian transcendental ontology.

As I argued in the Introduction, the Kantian origins of the project, instead of precluding reading it as an ontological theory, sets us on the path of advancing a new kind of ontology that constitutes a paradigm shift from its traditional precursors. This emphasis on the ontological nature of Hegel's project is what sets my reading apart from that of Robert Pippin's. While discussing The Doctrine of the Concept, Pippin draws a line between the "good" Kantian current in Hegel's position from a "waxing Platonic" theme that he considers to be peripheral to it.

> When he wants to talk like a Kantian, Hegel claims that "the Notion" comprises the major categories of the Logic itself, being and essence (e.g., at EL, 307; EnL, 223). This is, as we have seen, the major line of attack in SL. Following it means that the basic claim is: For there to be any possible judgment about objects, there must be possible an original determinacy, a pure discrimination presupposed prior to any empirical or specific judgmental discrimination. . . . All of this leads to Hegel's basic claim that the originally required qualitative determinacy itself ultimately depends on (in some sense) subjectively projected theories. . . . This is the basic, stripped down version of Hegel's idealist case for the required Notion interdependence of being and essence.[2]

Pippin traces the Kantian thread in Hegel to the need of contextualization of the categories of *being* and *essence* within the theory of the Concept. In making this move, Pippin puts his finger on the central nerve of the Kant-Hegel relation, but I am not sure that this commits Hegel to the thesis of the "subjectively projected" content onto reality. Does not Pippin's thesis assert the dependence of the categories of being on essence and ultimately on the Concept? And if this is the case, does not this thesis contradict his claim

regarding the *subjective projection*? The projection thesis presupposes the bipolar picture of the subject, on the one side, and the actuality onto which the subjective content is being projected, on the other. However, if the Concept grounds the categories of being, then there is no being independent of the Concept onto which the "subjective projection" would have been possible.

Pippin criticizes what he sees as Hegel's occasional slips into Platonic metaphysics:

> But as just noted, Hegel is happy to go far beyond what is, in essence, his own reconstitution of the Kantian categories of quality, quantity, relation, and modality. And he is often also given to waxing Platonic about such Notions. He claims that "man" is a Notion in the relevant technical sense, and he praises Christianity for first treating man in terms of his Notion. . . . It would indeed be odd if the transcendental-logical requirements for a conceptual scheme could develop in a way that would not only have consequences for how man might be defined, or accounted for, but could actually provide the definition.[3]

Pippin is right in drawing the line between Kant and Plato and positing "the good Hegel" on the Kant side of the divide. Where I disagree with him is confining the domain of ontology to the Plato side of the divide. Hegel is indeed advancing an ontology, but he is not concerned with producing definitions of essences along the lines of the Platonic forms. Instead, he rejects the traditional bifurcated metaphysics and offers a theory of transcendental-logical schema (which Pippin so exemplarily outlines in his book) that makes up not the categories to be projected onto reality but instead underlies and grounds reality. Having given up the traditional dualistic picture of the transcendent being vs. the corresponding representation in thought, Hegel is advancing a theory of *being* qua *thought* and *thought* qua *being* that is grounded on the ontological schema elaborated in the theory of the Concept. In other words, "the active universal," as a creative power that Pippin recognizes as the key element of Hegel's position,[4] is not merely a process of reflection with strictly epistemological function, or a meaning-generating power with merely semantic purport, but a determination-furnishing process within which the identity of being and thought is actualized.

THE SYLLOGISM OF EXISTENCE

The First Syllogism of Existence: The Qualitative Syllogism

Hegel presents three groups of mediational models: the Syllogism of Existence, the Syllogism of Reflection, and the Syllogism of Necessity. The first model of the Syllogism of Existence, which he refers to as the Qualitative Syllogism, has the following structure: Individual–Particular–Universal. The

defining feature of this initial form of mediation is that "each [moment] is in its *immediate* determinateness."[5] Immediate determinateness for Hegel means endogenous content—being determined without reference to anything else. But, this is intrinsically problematic because, for Hegel, determination of a content is possible only by the simultaneous exclusion of some other possible content—any determination implies negation. Therefore, immediate determination is a mere illusion of determination and each one of the moments of the present syllogistic structure is fundamentally flawed. "The singular is some immediate concrete subject matter or other; particularity, one of its determinacies, properties or relations; universality, a yet more abstract, more singularized determinateness in the particular."[6] Each one of the three moments is problematic. As we have already seen, *individuality*, conceived as "some immediate concrete subject matter," ignores the role of the universal as the determination-conferring power that makes individuation of entities possible. In the present mediational model, the individuality is conceived as given prior to conceptualization. We are dealing with a paradigm example of the myth of the given.

The *particular* and the *universal* moments of the present syllogism are just as problematic. They are taken to be products of different degrees of abstraction from the *individuality*—the "immediate concrete" object. Hence, Hegel's verdict for the first Syllogism of Existence is a complete failure to mediate between the moments of the Concept, which stems from a misunderstanding of their nature:

> The objective significance of the syllogism is in this first figure only superficially present at first, for the determinations are not as yet posited in it as the unity which constitutes the essence of the syllogistic inference. The syllogism is still something subjective inasmuch as the abstract meaning which its terms have has no being in and for itself but is rather only in a subjective consciousness, and is thus isolated.[7]

Thus, the ontological model presented in the first syllogism fails to fulfill Hegel's Kantian criterion of *self-relational unity*. Not only is each moment of the Concept incapable of relating to itself within the other moments; the very relations between the moments and their ability to form a unified whole is also rendered problematic, requiring an external element—subjective reflection—for it. The crucial role in mediation is performed not within the ontological space of the Concept but through the subjective reflection standing external to it. The first schema of mediation fails as "its ground and seat" is not the determinate middle term "which is replete with content" (and, as we will see, it is the middle term that is supposed to play the central role in mediating the structure of the Concept); rather, it is "only subjective reflection."[8]

The principle that governs the emergence of each new stage in the series of syllogistic mediation after the downfall of the preceding one is *determinate negation*. The idea behind this important element of Hegel's system is that the point of downfall of a model determines the form that its successor model will have. In the specific case of transition from the first to the second Syllogism of Existence, the key role is played by the realization that the individuality is the locus of the mediation between the moments: "The truth of the first qualitative syllogism is that something is not in and for itself united to a qualitative determinateness which is a universal, but is united to it by means of a contingency or in a singularity."[9] Hence, the model of mediation that emerges from the downfall of the first syllogism has to grant the central role in mediation to the individuality: "The subject of the syllogism has not returned in such a quality to its concept but is conceived only in its externality; the immediacy constitutes the basis of the connection and hence the mediation; to this extent, the singular is in truth the middle."[10]

As already noted, the middle terms play a special role in the syllogistic mediational structures: "The essential element of the syllogism is the unity of the extremes, the middle term that unites them and the ground that supports them."[11] The middle term in each mediational model considered in the Syllogism chapter stands for the element through which the purported unity between the moments is attained; it is the ground of mediation. As we make our way through the series of mediational structures, this ground does not remain the same. Each syllogistic model modifies all three terms, including the middle. The middle term is the key element of each stage of mediation where the developments that took place in the preceding mediational models get cemented.

The Second Syllogism of Existence

The shortcomings of the first syllogism revealed the essential role of the individual moment for the mediation of the structure of the Concept. Hence, in the second Syllogism of Existence we have the individuality as the middle term that mediated between the universal and particular moments of the Concept: Universality–Individuality–Particularity. But the actual progress that is made compared to the previous model is quite modest. The reason for this is that both the major and the minor premises of the new syllogistic model are insufficiently mediated. The former (Universality–Individuality) is the outcome of the first Syllogism of Existence that, as we saw, was a failed attempt to mediate the moments of the Concept. Therefore, the universality and the individuality are still abstract determinations posited as independent of each other. The minor premise (Individuality–Particularity), on the other hand, stands on shallower ground than the major premise, since it lacks even that inadequate form of mediation that has been attempted in the latter case.

The *subjective-consciousness*-based, and thus defective, form of mediation that is in place between the terms of the major premise is lacking here. The moments of the Concept, especially individuality and universality, remain abstract. Particularity has already acquired some content as it has served as the middle term of the previous syllogism. However, the content is externally imposed and thus inadequate, since the mediation, as we have seen, was carried out by external subjective reflection. Thus, the second model of the Syllogism of Existence also fails to posit a unified logical structure of the Concept.

While relating the first Syllogism of Existence (the Qualitative Syllogism) to the second one, Hegel writes: "The mediation of the first syllogism was *implicitly* a contingent one; in the second syllogism this contingency is *posited*."[12] This "implicit" contingency is certainly related to the basic ontological assumptions of the first syllogistic model, as all three moments of the Concept are defined there as self-sufficient. This obviously excludes a possibility of any *immanent* mediation between them. The nature of the relationship between the terms of both the major and the minor premises makes obvious why we end up with a contingency of mediation. The particular determination is related to the given individual via external reflection; therefore, it is not immanent to the individual moment itself. Hegel uses the term *indifference* to describe the relationship between two self-sufficient elements. Now, since the universal is defined as "a still more abstract" determination than the particular, the same "indifferent" relation obtains between it and the particular moment. Therefore, we end up with a possibility of mediating the individuality with mutually contradictory determinations, depending on which middle term is used (one externally related particular can be the means of mediating the individual with one universal determination, while another externally related particular can be the means of relating the same individual to the universal that directly contradicts the first one).

It appears that all the elements that render the mediation contingent are already there in the first syllogism. But why, then, is Hegel describing it as only implicitly contingent? What renders this contingency "posited" in the second but not in the first mediational model? The answer lies in the formal structures of the syllogisms. The first mediation, I–P–U, as far as its formal structure is concerned, does not reveal the contingency at hand. Individuality is subsumed under a general determination, which is further subsumed under a determination of an even higher order of generality. In the second syllogism, on the other hand, contingency is already posited in the formal structure of the syllogistic model itself as, in that case, the ground of mediation is individuality. The middle term—individuality—is subsumed in both the major and the minor premises;[13] hence, the two arbitrarily picked determinations, which the external reflection relates to the given individual, will end up being linked to each other. As Hegel laconically puts it, "If the conclusion in

this second figure is correct, . . . then it is correct because it is so on its own, not because it is the conclusion of this syllogism."[14]

Since the middle term is the ground of mediation, it also reflects the level of development achieved at each stage. Here is how Hegel describes the ground of mediation of the present syllogistic model: "mediating middle, the immediate singularity, is an infinitely manifold and external determining. Posited in it, therefore, is rather the self-external mediation."[15] The claim that the immediate individuality relates extreme terms through "self-external" mediation refers to the already-discussed issue of mediation via subjective consciousness. The idea is that the particular moment, on the one hand, and the universal, on the other, are determining the middle term "in an infinitely manifold and external" manner. Both are the abstract determinations under which the subjective reflection subsumes the individual. While individuality is still *immediate,* determination will necessarily be both external and infinitely manifold. Due to the immediate nature of the middle, there are no resources available for a self-mediated relationship with the extremes. Hence, mediation has to be external. This externality, however, brings with it infinite variability of the features that can be ascribed to the individual. Therefore, neither this specific model of mediation nor any other one that is grounded on an inadequately determined middle term can present a successful account of the unified structure of the Concept.

The externality of the mediation that persists in the present model results in its ultimate failure, but, at the same time, just as with the previous stage, the failure shows the way forward. Since the real ground for the mediation in the second syllogism has been revealed to be external to the middle term, and, as Hegel reminds us, at this stage of development "the externality of singularity is universality,"[16] it is the universal moment that comes to the fore as the new ground for mediation. Hegel's point here is that even though formally the individual moment was posited in the mediating ground, the actual mediation was taking place by means of subsuming the individual under abstract determinations. Hence, the real work of mediation was carried not on the level of the indeterminate (or immediately determined) individual but on the level of the abstract universal. This realization of the central role that universality has to play in mediating the structure of the Concept is one of the most important developments that have taken place up to this point in the Syllogism chapter. There is a long way to go before we reach the point where universality, as a "free creative power," successfully establishes unity within the logical structure of the Concept. Nonetheless, the first step in that direction has already been taken. Even though universality itself at this stage is still the abstract universal and, hence, incapable of fulfilling its function, the very fact that it has been posited as the mediating moment is a significant step forward.

The Third Syllogism of Existence

The third Syllogism of Existence, in which individuality is mediated with particularity through universality (I–U–P), has a significant advantage over the previous two forms of mediation. Both premises, Particularity–Universality and Individuality–Universality, have already been mediated in the previous syllogisms. Hence, the third syllogism, in a certain sense, can be regarded as a successful mediational model. Having said this, we should keep in mind that all three moments are still inadequately developed and the unity between them is based on "self-external" and "mere subjective reflection." In other words, in neither the case of the particular nor the case of the individual has universality been mediated in its own right. As Hegel puts it, "the extremes are not contained in it [the middle term] according to their essential determinateness."[17] As such, although formally both premises have already been established, they have not been established on proper grounds as we are still dealing with mere abstractions that require external reflection to be related to one another.

At this point, we can note that the ontological backdrop that frames the entire development of the Syllogism of Existence is the following: Actuality is comprised of two basic kinds. On the one hand, we have individuals or the spatiotemporal objects that can be described as concrete particulars; on the other hand, we have the abstract determinations that include properties, numbers, relations, laws of nature. Moreover, these two kinds of entities are posited as "self-sufficient" and not dependent on each other for their existence. Of course, we have dealt with the third element in these syllogistic models: the subjective or external reflection that plays the key role in mediating the moments of the Concept. However, this third element is extraneous to the system as it does not belong to either one of the two basic kinds. This is, in fact, one of the reasons behind the downfall of all three syllogisms under consideration. Without the subjective reflection, we cannot have the mediation between the moments of the given ontological model; but with the subjective reflection in it, we no longer have the ontological model in its pure form. This is the reason Hegel describes the mediation carried out through it as "self-external."

Clearly, the dualistic ontological model with abstract-universal vs. individual-spatiotemporal entities, which frames the entire development of the Syllogism of Existence, has much in common with Platonic metaphysics. The realm of forms vs. the realm of sensible entities is mirrored in the opposition between the abstract determination, on the one hand, and sensible individuality, on the other. The two domains are juxtaposed and contrasted as existing independently from one another. The model under consideration is not only upholding the one-over-many conception of the relation between the universal and the individual; it also grants to them (universality and individu-

ality) ontological "self-sufficiency." Hegel's conception of universality, as we have seen, rejects both these aspects of the view under consideration. Hence, Robert Stern is right when he claims that for Hegel "the substance universals which constitute the nature of the individual qua individual do not exist in the abstract, but only as particularized through property universals, and thus as instantiated in the form of individuals." I agree with Stern's conclusion that, according to Hegel, "Plato is false,"[18] but he is following Hegel only halfway.

While acknowledging Hegel's rejection of the ontological self-sufficiency of the universals, Stern does not do justice to the extent to which Hegel departs from Plato. He wants to ascribe to Hegel a conception of the universal, which, while no longer ontologically independent from the individuals in which it is instantiated, still stands in a one-to-many relation to them as their substance which constitutes their nature. He ultimately ascribes to Hegel an Aristotelian position by internalizing the Platonic universals within the individuals and reads the latter as manifestations of these "concrete," immanent universals. "A rose is not an individual rose by virtue of exemplifying the abstract universal 'red,' whereas it is an individual rose by virtue of exemplifying the concrete universal 'rose.'"[19] Thus, Stern reduces Hegel's distinction between the abstract and the genuine conception of universality to a trivial distinction between the mere property of a thing vs. its essential nature, which is along the lines of the Aristotelian distinction between accident vs. substantial form. But, as we have seen in the previous chapter and as the further development of the Syllogism chapter will confirm, Hegel works with a much more unorthodox conception of universality. The universal moment of the Concept, instead of being reduced to any fixed determinateness (as is the case with Stern's reading), is the process of generations of determinations. Instead of being conceived as an abstract universal internalized into individual, it is the activity that produces these abstract determinations as the conditions for the individuation of objects through them. Stern even cites the passages in which Hegel is explicit about this: "The universality here is no longer a form external to the content, but the true form which produces the content from itself."[20] However, he succumbs to the temptation to "domesticate" Hegel, to read him as more or less standing within the traditional spectrum of positions. But this leads Stern to ascribe to Hegel a stance that is closer to Aristotle than to Hegel himself.

Rejecting conceptual Platonism does not necessitate committing one to conceptual Aristotelianism. Hegel leaves behind not only Plato but Aristotle as well. Plato and Aristotle share one fundamental commitment: The order of reality is given. In the former case, the order of reality is given as the rational structure of the world that can be grasped directly, independently of experience. In the latter case, it is given both as the immanent structure of the experienced world and the formal logico-rational principles of the mind (and

somehow these two are supposed to be in harmony with each other). Now, Hegel takes a fundamentally different stance from both of them; for him, the order, instead of being given to thought, is generated. This conception of universality is what Hegel has in mind when claiming in the passage cited by Stern that the universality instead of being a form external to the content, is what generated the content from itself.[21]

While the exteriority of the moments to one another modeled after Platonic metaphysics is the defining feature of the Syllogism of Existence, the development that has taken place through the first three forms of mediation is directed toward reduction of the ontological gap between the moments of the Concept. As has been pointed out, the third syllogism offers a flawed (since it is based on external reflection) but still a formally complete mediation of the moments. But the same can be said about the earlier syllogisms. "It [the third syllogism] presupposes both these [the first two] syllogisms; but conversely it is presupposed by them, just as in general each presupposes the other two."[22] Thus, each one of the three syllogisms considered thus far can be regarded as presupposing the other two, and all three together form a full circle of purely formal mediation. Moreover, as we have seen, in all three models we are dealing with the same form of external mediation taking place through subjective consciousness. This brings us to the point where the qualitative differences between the first three mediational models of the Syllogism of Existence and, more importantly, the terms themselves, lose their significance. As long as the other two terms have also been the grounds of mediations (middle terms) and these mediations are presupposed, it does not make much difference which moment of the concept is the middle term in any give mediational model. Hence, we are standing at the threshold of an important new development where the qualitative differences between the moments are put aside (the next model has the form U–U–U), and the first step is taken toward building up their shared content.

The Fourth Syllogism of Existence: The Mathematical Syllogism

The last form of mediation in the Syllogism of Existence is the Mathematical Syllogism: Universal–Universal–Universal. It has a somewhat paradoxical character. On the one hand, abstraction has reached its highest point as the mathematical syllogism abstracts from all qualitative distinctions between the terms. This also transforms the modality of relation between the terms, which, as we shall see, will have far-reaching consequences because it can no longer be inherence or subsumption; instead, it is *equality*.[23] The kind of mediation that the mathematical syllogism offers is possible only on the basis of complete abstraction from the specific determination of each one of the three terms. "Lines, figures, posited as equal to each other, are understood only according to their magnitude. A triangle is posited as equal to a square,

not however as triangle to square but only according to magnitude, etc."[24] Abstractness that has been the main problem of the moments of the Concept in the Syllogism of Existence, when pushed to its limits, breaks down the given framework and takes us to a new stage of mediation. For the first time, shared content is established between the term: "in the abstract determinateness its other has been posited and the determinateness has thereby become *concrete*."[25] The quantitative equality between the three terms is attained through pushing the abstraction from the qualitative elements in the moments to its limit. This allows a minimal but still a genuine unity between the terms of the syllogism for the first time. This equal content is posited internally within each term by means of each term's own resources. For example, the area of a triangle that equals the area of a square has such and such an area independent of what is the specific other shape that it is being mediated with (the shape could have been a circle instead of a square). Hence, the ground of unity between the terms is internal to each term. We have "the positive reflection of one [term] into the other."[26]

In the syllogistic models that follow, the minimal shared content between the terms that has been attained for the first time in the mathematical syllogism will be further developed to embrace the terms completely. If the central principle of the first set of syllogistic models (Syllogisms of Existence) is the self-sufficiency of the moments of the Concept, the second set of syllogisms (Syllogisms of Reflection) is driven by a new principle—generation within each moment of the content identical to that of the other two moments of the Concept. This is a significant development in rejecting the Platonic theory of the origin of conceptual content. The point of equality of the three moments that has been reached in the last syllogism inaugurates a qualitatively new level of mediation between the moments. The key aspect of the Platonic presupposition of the externality of the universal was the immutability of its content, but if now they are equated and made immanent to the other moments of the Concept, their immutability is also undermined. Universal determination is no longer completely external to the individual, and what transpires within the individual is also relevant for the universal. Ultimately, pursuing this strategy will lead us to the incorporation of the conceptual content of the universals within the practices of their application. Hegel rejects the Platonic view of conceptual content and offers a dynamic theory of generation of determinations instead. The medium through which reality is accessed is not derived from some transcendent source. Rather, the medium is a product of the application of existing concepts, drawing inferences from this application, and adding new bits of inferential content through which these concepts get modified.

THE SYLLOGISM OF REFLECTION

The First Syllogism of Reflection: The Syllogism of Allness

The first form of mediation in the Syllogism of Reflection is the Syllogism of Allness. It has the same formal structure as the initial model of the Syllogism of Existence, I–P–U. The formal similarity, however, is overshadowed by the differences found in the content of the terms. While the middle term in the first Syllogism of Existence is a mere abstract determination, now it is a complete set of the individuals falling under the given particular: "The middle contains (1) singularity; (2) but singularity expanded into universality."[27] Hegel presents the following example to demonstrate the ontological model under consideration: "All humans are mortal / Now Gaius is a human / therefore Gaius is mortal."[28] Instead of an arbitrary determination for the middle term of the syllogistic structure, now we have a particular (in this case, "humans") under which all individual humans are subsumed. The externality between the terms is replaced by the inclusion of one moment within another.

This inclusion of the other two moments of the concept within the middle term is a step taken toward the generation of determinate content of the extremes internally to the middle term. Hegel acknowledges the positivity of this development: "The syllogism of allness is the syllogism of the understanding in its perfection, but more than that it is not yet. That the middle in it is not abstract particularity but is developed into its moments and is therefore concrete, is indeed an essential requirement of the Concept."[29] Overcoming abstractness of the middle term is a significant step forward. But Hegel also claims that the present model is not more than "the syllogism of the understanding in its perfection." For him, the difference between *understanding* and *reason* lies along the lines of fixed and mechanical ways of thinking vs. fluid and dynamic power that remolds the fixed determinations to which the understanding confines itself.[30] Hence, in addition to the strengths of the Syllogism of Allness, Hegel also points out its limitations—the rigid and insufficiently dynamic nature of mediation between the moments of the Concept.

While a major advantage of the present syllogism over the previous forms of mediation is that the complete abstractness of the moments of the Concept has been overcome, the determinate content through which mediation takes place is still in its rudimentary form. The power of universal as a fluid, determination-generating force has not yet been integrated into the mediation model. Thus, although the middle term—the particular moment of the Concept—is no longer abstract, it has a content of its own. Through this content, the middle term is related to the individuals, on the one hand, and to the universal (as to a determination of a higher abstraction), on the other. The

immanent content under consideration is based on a mere collectivity of individuals, and the role universality plays in its furnishing is not yet made apparent.

At the same time, even this rudimentary form of determination overcomes the difficulties we have encountered in the Syllogism of Existence. For instance, the problem of attributing contradictory universals to an individual that haunted the Syllogism of Existence is no longer there. In the first model of the Syllogism of Existence, we were dealing with the problem of contingency because the middle term there was a mere abstract quality; hence, mutually contradictory abstract universals could be related to the same individual, depending on which abstract determination was chosen as the mediating term. In the present mediational model, this is no longer possible:

> If from the middle term "green" the conclusion is made to follow that a painting is pleasing, because green is pleasing to the eye, or if a poem, a building, etc., is said to be beautiful because it possesses regularity, the painting, the poem, the building, etc., may nonetheless still be ugly on account of other determinations from which this predicate "ugly" might be deduced. By contrast, when the middle term has the determination of allness, it contains the green, the regularity, as a concreted term which for that very reason is not the abstraction of a mere green, a mere regular, etc.; only predicates commensurate with concrete totality may now be attached to this concreted term.[31]

Now, while in the present ontological model, the process of reciprocal infiltration of the moments of the Concept is well on its way, the nature of mediation between them attained in the middle term is clearly inadequate: "The singular determinations that the universality of reflection holds within still lie, therefore, at the basis of that universality—in other words, allness is not yet the universality of the concept, but the external universality of reflection."[32] The unity present in the middle term is still only an externally imposed unity of a set of abstract individuals and an abstract universal. What is needed is a better-grounded unity between the terms, a unity that stems from within them, rather than one that is forced from without. Therefore, the next form of syllogism will be geared to establishing immanent unity between individuality and universality.

The Second Syllogism of Reflection: The Syllogism of Induction

In the Syllogism of Induction, which has the form of Universality–Individuality–Particularity, the middle term is "individuality as *complete,*" and the individual term is a collectivity of entities that share the given universal in common. The other extreme is "the immediate genus, as it is in the middle term of the preceding syllogism, or in the subject of the universal judgment, and which is exhausted in the collection of singulars or also spe-

cies of the middle term."[33] As the middle term is the essential part of syllogistic mediation in general, it is important to note a significant change that has taken place between this and the previous syllogism's middle terms. If in the Syllogism of Allness we had as the middle term a particular determination conjoining multiplicity of individuals under itself, now we have an individuality thus construed that encapsulates universality within it instead of being merely externally related to it. The relation between the moments of the Concept presented here has significant similarities with Hegel's stance. The universality is made immanent to the individuality; and, as we will see, Hegel further develops this aspect of the relationship between the moments in the syllogistic mediations that follow.

The Syllogism of Induction occupies a special place within the Syllogism of Reflection as it is here that the central role of *reflection* in relating the moments of the Concept is most self-evident. The middle term that unites individuality and universality is an implicit product of reflective activity. The individuality as "completed, that is to say, posited with its opposite determination, that of universality"[34] is an outcome of reflection that combines the individuals. This becomes clear from the way Hegel contrasts the present form of mediation with the corresponding one from the Syllogism of Existence (the one that also has the U–I–P structure). He describes the present model as the "syllogism of *experience*," while the earlier syllogism is referred to as the "syllogism of mere *perception* or contingent existence."[35] By *experience,* Hegel means "subjective gathering together of singulars in the genus, and of the conjoining of the genus with a universal determinateness."[36] In other words, while in the second mediational model of the Syllogism of Existence we had a mere "perception" of a specific abstract universal property of an individual, now we are dealing with a process of reflection aiming to furnish the complete set of individuals related to the universal determination under consideration. Hence, the process of reflection makes the present middle term and, therefore, the entire mediational model under consideration possible. This is the reason that the Syllogism of Induction can be seen as the best exemplification of the Syllogism of Reflection.

Clearly, since the present mediational model is described as the "syllogism of experience" that is grounded on "subjective gathering together of singulars," it has much in common with empiricism. However, it is an empiricist model that is approached from the Hegelian standpoint. On the one hand, we have the middle term that is comprised of externally conjoined individuals "indifferent" to one another. On the other hand, we have the initial steps taken in internalization of the universal moment to the individual. The former binds the present model with empiricism, while the latter points toward Hegel's version of the nature of actuality. Now, the present form of immanence of the universal to the individual has an artificial flavor to it. The reason for this is that the ontological presuppositions that serve as

the backdrop of the model are not Hegelian but empiricist. Instead of being part of the conceptions of individual, universal, and particular determination with which we are working in the present model, the immanence of the universal to the individual moment is a mere indication of the direction in which the Syllogism chapter will develop. The immanence of the universal to the individuals is attained only through a construal of a highly anomalous conception of individuality as a totality of entities falling under the same universal, while each entity by itself is only externally related to the universal as well as to other individuals.

James Kreines's discussion, which contrasts the Hegelian with the empiricist stance, can help us to clarify the nature of the mediational model under consideration. In his *Reason in the World,* the position that Kreines associates with Hume (although acknowledging that it might not do full justice to the complexity of Hume's position, thus referring to it as "humean" with a lower-case "h") and contemporary metaphysician David Lewis is quite similar to the ontological model represented by the Syllogism of Reflection in general and the Syllogism of Induction in particular:

> A "humean" holds that all reality is composed of "loose and separate" particulars or (now in Hegel's terms) mutually "indifferent" particulars. There are no necessary connections, for example. . . . So there are in particular nothing like immanent concepts in virtue of which certain effects must follow. Terminology from David Lewis' more recent humeanism provides a powerful image: "humean supervenience" is "the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another."[37]

The individual moment of the Syllogism of Induction, taken not as a collection of individuals but rather as the individual entities which comprise the middle term, is much like Lewis's humean "local matters . . . just one little thing and then another." In both the humean and the Syllogism of Induction models, inner relations of universal nature between the individuals is lacking: "nothing else is ever a reason in the world for anything else."[38] The reason is externally imposed by "subjective gathering together of the singulars . . . with a universal determinateness."[39] Kreines contrasts this view with Hegel's anti-humean approach:

> What distinguishes anti-humeans, in general, is that they hold that the statement of a law does not refer to a pattern or regularity, and so to a great many particulars; it refers rather to something else that governs those particulars, and that is reason for any pattern or regularity in them. Generally this "something else" will be something like universals, natural kinds, or Hegel's immanent concept.[40]

The immanence of the universal moment to the individual that we find in this syllogistic model is what Kreines correctly identifies as Hegel's response to empiricism. The conception of the universality that internally structures and thus is "the reason for any pattern of regularity" that we observe in individuals, is an important feature of Hegel's transcendental ontology, and it will be further developed in the subsequent syllogisms. At this stage, the immanence of universal to individuals is artificial and externally imposed since it is not the individuals per se that are governed internally by a universal but the very peculiar kind of the middle term that is construed as individuality and is a set of actual individual entities. The reason for this flaw, again, is that the ontological model that the Syllogism of Induction stands for is that of empiricism, and it will have to undergo a fundamental transformation in order to have the immanence of universality to individuals as its feature.

The empiricist nature of the given model is also related to a problematic conception of universality, which Hegel describes as "the universality [that] is only completeness."[41] His point here is similar to Kant's well-known claim from the Introduction to *The Critique of Pure Reason* that universality should not be mistaken for *generality*. The latter can originate from experience but the former cannot:

> Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori.[42]

The middle term of the Syllogism of Induction, aimed at embracing universality within itself through collecting a complete set of individuals, will be capable of furnishing only generality but not universality. This is what Hegel has in mind when claiming that no matter how exhaustive our set of individuals in the middle term is, in relation to universality, it remains "only a perpetual ought."[43] Indeed, the universal moment of the Concept will undergo the most fundamental transformation as we make our way through the syllogistic mediational models.

The Third Syllogism of Reflection: The Syllogism of Analogy

The Syllogism of Analogy is a transitional mediation model that bridges the Syllogisms of Reflection with the Syllogisms of Necessity—the third and the final set of mediational models. It further develops the internalization of the universal to the individual moment of the Concept. The universal moment that serves here as the middle term is described as "a universality which is the immanent reflection of a concreted term."[44] It appears in the form of an

individuality grasped through its essential nature. Hegel's example of the Syllogism of Analogy is "The earth has inhabitants / the moon is an earth / therefore the moon has inhabitants."[45] The middle term "the earth," which is obviously an individual entity, is taken here as a universal, which is the reflected-into-self of earth. In other words, the universal under consideration—*the heavenly body*—is taken here as the essential nature of the earth that has to capture the latter in its full determination for the mediation to be successful.

This internalization of the universal to the individual that has taken place at the point of transition from the empiricist to the Hegelian standpoint is interesting to look at in light of the Kantian origins of Hegel's ontology. The central issue in this respect is the unity of the individual and the universal moments. The middle term of the syllogism is the individuality (the earth) taken as universality (heavenly body), and the success of the mediational structure depends on the nature of the relationship between these two moments. To take Hegel's example: A particular determination—having inhabitants—that belongs to the middle term, is also attributed to the other extreme term—the moon as a result of the inferential mediation. Now, if this particular determination belongs to the earth due to its essential nature (granted that the essential nature is the heavenly body), then the conclusion will be valid. Nonetheless, in our case, the mediation fails since "the earth has inhabitants [not] as a heavenly body in general" but "as this *particular* heavenly body."[46] Clearly, the critical issue at hand in this mediational model is the unity of the universal and the individual moments in the middle term, and how exhaustively the former determines the latter. The theme of the relationship between universality and individuality is also one of the central threads of Hegel's critical appropriation of Kant's insights.

In *The Critique of Judgment*, Kant presents the notion of an *intuitive understanding* in order to highlight the key features of our *discursive* understanding. What makes this distinction relevant for us is that Kant outlines the differences between these two types of intellect in terms of the two distinct ways in which they relate universality, particularity, and individuality:

> Our understanding is a power of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding, so that it must indeed be contingent for it as to what the character and all the variety of the particular may be that can be given to it in nature and that can be brought under its concept. Now all cognition requires not only understanding but also intuition; and a power of *complete spontaneity* [as opposed to *receptivity*] of *intuition* would be a cognitive power different from, and wholly independent of sensibility: thus a power of complete spontaneity of intuition would be an understanding in the most general sense of the term. Hence we can conceive of an intuitive understanding as well (negatively, merely as one that is not discursive), which, [unlike ours,] does not (by means of concepts) proceed from the universal to the particular, and thus to the individual. For

> such an understanding there would not be that contingency in the way nature's products harmonize with the understanding in terms of *particular* laws.[47]

Here, Kant's point is that our understanding, being *discursive*, is capable of cognition only through concepts—universal and reflected representations. In other words, our understanding can only *think,* that is, relate to individuals mediately via concepts (as well as to relate concepts to one another), but not *intuit,* that is, grasp individuals immediately (only our receptive faculty of sensibility affords us immediate relations to individuals). Our discursive understanding is incapable of proceeding from the universal to the particular and the individual with its own resources; it needs receptivity that presents sensible intuitions in order to "proceed from the universal to the particular and thus to the individual."[48]

Here, we are dealing with the same kind of failure as with the mediation between the universal, the particular, and the individual moments in Hegel's Syllogism of Analogy. Just like with Kant's discursive understanding, in the Syllogism of Analogy, we encountered a lack of mediated unity between the universal and the individual. In the middle term of this mediational model, the unity of the universal and the individual moments is a mere "immediate unity"—only postulated, not grounded. Were we able to "proceed" from the universal to the individual via the particular, the syllogistic mediation would have been successful. The nature of the problem is so similar that we can even use Kant's words when describing the failure of the Syllogism of Analogy: "When cognition occurs through our understanding, the particular is not determined by the universal and therefore cannot be derived from it alone."[49] Were the particular determinations of the individual middle term (the earth) fully derivable from the universal immanent to it (the heavenly body), the mediation would have been successful—the property of *having inhabitants* could be validly attributed to the *moon*. But, as in the case with the Kantian discursive understanding, so with the ontological model presented in the Syllogism of Analogy, the nature of the failure is the universal's inability for self-particularization.

Comparing the mediational model of the Syllogism of Analogy with Kant's juxtaposition of the discursive vs. intuitive understanding is also helpful for understanding Hegel's solution for the problem. He thinks that, when discussing the limitations of discursive understanding in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant had the key to overcoming the limitation in front of his eyes but failed to recognize it. The intuitive understanding, which Kant presents only as a negative example, for Hegel holds the potential for solving the problem of contingency in the relation between universality and individuality. As Kant himself suggested in the above-cited passage, the key to the solution is a different conception of universality, not the *analytic* but the *synthetic* universality:

> Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it cognizes . . . it must proceed from the *analytically universal* to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given); consequently, in this process our understanding determines nothing regarding the diversity of the particular. Instead our understanding must wait until the subsumption of the empirical intuition under the concept provides this determination. . . . But we can also conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from *synthetically universal* (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from whole to the parts. . . . Hence such an understanding as well as its presentation of the whole has no *contingency* in the combination of the parts in order to make a determinate form of the whole possible. Our understanding, on the other hand, requires this contingency.[50]

Thus, the discursive understanding has to proceed from parts to the whole, and it is incapable of doing this without external input through sensible intuitions due to the *analytic* nature of its universality. In contrast to this, the intuitive understanding that possesses the *synthetic* universality does not need to combine parts into a systematic whole. This is the case because with intuitions the whole is given prior to its parts. Now, since the intuitive understanding operates with the synthetic *universal* and universality is the form of concept for Kant, its grasp of reality has the features of both concept and intuition, that is, both universality and individuality. Therefore, the synthetic universal of the intuitive understanding offers what is lacking in the Syllogism of Analogy: the self-differentiating universality, and thus successful mediation between the particular and individual moments of the Concept. This is the reason why the idea presented by Kant only as a negative example can be seen as the guiding thread in the development that will take place in the Syllogism of Necessity.

Beatrice Longuenesse points out another idea discussed by Kant in the first Critique that has structural similarities with the intellectual intuition relevant for our discussion: the *Transcendental Ideal*:

> In the first Critique, the Transcendental Ideal or the idea of a whole of reality, which ultimately becomes identified with the idea of an *ens realismum* as the ground of all reality, is described as a concept that has not merely "under it" but "in it" the totality of positive determinations or realities by limitation of which all empirical things could be completely determined. In the third Critique, intellectual intuition is contrasted with our own discursive intellect as thinking (and thus generating by its very act of thought) the whole of reality from a "synthetic universal" . . . both the idea of a whole of reality (CPR) and the "synthetic universal" (KU) combine features of representations that has been carefully distinguished in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique.[51]

The features of the representations that have been distinguished in the *Transcendental Aesthetics* and are re-combined in both the *intuitive under-*

standing and the *Transcendental Ideal* are universality and individuality. When we look at the Transcendental Ideal as a combination of these features, we gain an interesting perspective on the development that will take place in the syllogistic mediational models that follow the Syllogism of Analogy. The Transcendental Ideal as "the ground of all reality" obviously has much in common with the Hegelian notion of the universal moment of the Concept at the full-fledged state of his ontology that he reaches in the last syllogistic model. The Transcendental Ideal contains its own particular determinations instead of being a product of an external abstraction from them. It is synthetic in the sense of generating content, which is not analytically extractable from the original determination, and it contains the system of determinations through which empirical reality is cognized. Hence, the development that we will trace in the next chapter can be seen as bridging the gap between the Kantian discursive understanding, on the one hand, and the intuitive understanding and the Transcendental Ideal, on the other.

NOTES

1. Hegel, SL (GW 12:55).
2. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 241–42.
3. Ibid., 242.
4. Ibid., 237–39.
5. Hegel, SL (GW 12:93).
6. Ibid. (GW 12:95).
7. Ibid. (GW 12:93).
8. Ibid. (GW 12:94).
9. Ibid. (GW 12:99).
10. Ibid. (GW 12:100).
11. Ibid. (GW 12:91).
12. Ibid. (GW 12:102).
13. Ibid. (GW 12:101).
14. Ibid. (GW 12:101).
15. Ibid. (GW 12:102).
16. Ibid. (GW 12:102).
17. Ibid. (GW 12:103).
18. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 157.
19. Ibid., 156.
20. Hegel, SL (GW 10:286–387) / (Stern, 154).
21. Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 154.
22. Hegel, SL (GW 12:103).
23. Ibid. (GW 12:104).
24. Ibid. (GW 12:105).
25. Ibid. (GW 12:105).
26. Ibid. (GW 12:106).
27. Ibid. (GW 12:111).
28. Ibid. (GW 12:112).
29. Ibid. (GW 12:111).

30. Ibid. (GW 12: 28).
31. Ibid. (GW 12:112).
32. Ibid. (GW 12:111).
33. Ibid. (GW 12:113).
34. Ibid. (GW 12:113).
35. Ibid. (GW 12:114).
36. Ibid. (GW 12:114).
37. James Kreines, Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal (Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
38. Ibid., 70.
39. Hegel, SL (GW 12:114).
40. James Kreines, Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal (Oxford University Press, 2015), 72.
41. Hegel, SL (GW 12:114).
42. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (B3–4).
43. Hegel, SL (GW 12:114).
44. Ibid. (GW 12:115).
45. Ibid. (GW 12:115).
46. Ibid. (GW 12:117).
47. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 406.
48. Ibid., 406.
49. Ibid., 406.
50. Ibid., 407.
51. Béatrice Longuenesse. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 261–62.

Chapter Six

The Syllogism of Necessity

THE FIRST SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY: THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

In the Syllogism of Necessity, Hegel presents the final set of mediational models in which all three moments of the Concept are pervaded by the same "essential nature."[1] Therefore, the problems of externality and presupposition of the conclusion that haunted the previous two sets of syllogisms are no longer present. There can be neither fundamental externality between the moments of the Concept nor need for any ungrounded presuppositions to relate the terms to one another. As each one of them is acknowledged to be an expression of the same essence, "the terms, in keeping with the substantial content, stand to one another in a connection of identity that exists in and for itself; we have here one essence running through the three terms."[2] The conceptual content-generating activity, the system of particular determinations, and objects individuated through them are no longer taken as occupying ontologically distinct domains. It is helpful to look at John McDowell's position, which, as McDowell acknowledges, has been inspired by his reading of Hegel to begin understanding some key characteristics of the present syllogistic model.

McDowell sets his position apart from Sellars's position, which we previously looked at, by denying the transcendental function to those aspects of experience that he labels as "below the line." Here is how he defines the term: "Below the line in the Sellarsian picture of a visual experience, there is a complex or manifold of visual sensations, non-concept-involving visual episodes or states."[3] McDowell continues:

> Why does Sellars think the picture has to include this element as well as conceptual episodes of the relevant kind? . . . It is for transcendental reasons

> that we need to acknowledge the below-the-line element in the picture. The idea is that we are entitled to talk of conceptual episodes in which claims are ostensibly visually impressed on subjects—the above-the-line element in the picture—only because we can see the flow of such conceptual representations as guided by manifolds of sensations.[4]

In other words, for Sellars, non-concept-involving sensations have the function of conferring the objective purport to the conceptual content that is "impressed on subjects." McDowell rejects this transcendental function of sensations. He decouples the objective purport of the conceptual episodes from the non-concept-involving states and argues that the perception of the world is always already concept-involving: "An ostensible seeing that there is a red cube in front of one would be an actualization of the same conceptual capacities that would be exercised in judging that there is a red cube in front of one."[5]

Hegel's claim that not only the particular and the universal but also the individual are "invaded by the same essential nature" corresponds to McDowell's rejection of the transcendental function for the "below-the-line" or "non-concept-involving" states. The Syllogism of Necessity leaves behind the assumption that for thought to pass the master of objective purport, its content has to be guided from the without, that is, from the sensible manifold. Hegel explicitly ties the objective purport of the determinations of thought with overcoming the schism between the three moments: "We have here one essence running through the three terms—an essence in which the determinations of singularity, particularity, and universality are only formal moments. To this extent, therefore, the Categorical Syllogism is no longer subjective; in that connection of identity, objectivity begins."[6] The claim that all three moments of the Concept have identical essence implies that the content of the individual moment is not heterogeneous to the other two. It is this aspect of Hegel's position to which McDowell is referring when maintaining that Hegelian reason has no need for an external constraint because it includes as one of its moments the receptivity that Sellars and Kant (according to Sellars's and McDowell's reading) had attributed to sensibility.[7]

Rolf-Peter Horstmann ties the relationship between the determinations of thought and the individuated entities even more directly to Hegel's Concept. Horstmann argues that the Concept, the way Hegel construes it, includes as its constitutive element the individuated objects; without the latter, the former fails to be the Concept in the proper sense of the term: "[Hegel] macht Objektivitat oder den Existenzaspekt des Objekts zu einem konstitutiven Element des Begriffs, indem er dessen sog. Subjektivitat so konzipiert, dag sie ohne das Komplement der Objektivität unvollständig, einseitig, nicht ubergreifend bleibt."[8] Hence, at this stage in the buildup towards Hegel's full-fledged view, one more key feature of his ontology—overcoming the

gap between determinations of thought and their objective purport—gets integrated into the Syllogism of Necessity.

Hegel does not give an example of the Categorical Syllogism, but he describes each one of the three moments in sufficient detail to paint an adequate picture of the ontological model under consideration. The middle term that he introduces as "the genus" stands in relation to one of the extremes—individuality as its "essential *nature* . . . and not just one or other of its determinacies or properties."[9] He also describes it as "the essential nature *as content*" posited as *totality*.[10] The middle term, therefore, stands for the systematically related network of determinations through which the essential characteristics of the individuated entities are conceived. While Hegel describes the middle term as the essential nature of individuals, we should not confuse it with the Aristotelian *substantial form*. The latter retains the elements of accidentality when mediating between an individual with its universal properties. Not all determinations of an individual will be necessitated by its substantial form. Contrary to this, in the Categorical Syllogism, we are dealing with necessity as the mode of relationship between the determinations that make up the conceptual content of the given ontological model:

> Taken in its full import, the categorical syllogism is the first syllogism of necessity, one in which a subject is conjoined with a predicate through its substance. But when elevated to the sphere of the concept, substance is the universal, so posited to be in and for itself that it has for its form or mode of being, not accidentality, as it has in the relation specific to it, but the determination of the concept.[11]

This rejection of accidentality is indicative of difference from the Aristotelian model according to which, in addition to the determinations inhering in the individual through its substantial form, there are others that are merely accidental. For example, to Socrates, being mortal belongs as a part of the genus mankind but being sentenced to death by his fellow citizens does not. The ontological model that the Categorical Syllogism stands for is different from this, which is due to the absence of the accidental element in the relation between individuality and universality. Any determination of an individual is necessarily part of the system of the concepts that have been generated by the universal moment of the Concept and make up the middle term of the given syllogistic structure.

While all three moments of the present form of mediation share content of their "essential nature," Hegel makes it clear that only the *middle term* presents this content in its fully determined form. In this first model of the Syllogism of Necessity, only the middle term is asserted to be "objective universality."[12] This difference is significant, and it sheds light on the ontological model's shortcomings. The systematically related constellation of empirical concepts that make up the middle term is placed at the epicenter of

the present model as the immanent structure of actuality. Both individuated entities that figure in perceptual experiences and the determination-forming process of reflection are grounded on the middle term, which is described as "the immanent reflection of the determinateness of the extremes."[13] In other words, the conceptual content that immanently structures reality is the source of the determinations of the individual entities as well as the content of the process of reflection. This is another point where the proximity of the present position with that of McDowell comes to the fore.

The basic commitment that the ontological model of the Categorical Syllogism has in common with McDowell's position is that the structure of actuality constrains the structure of thought. Paul Redding sees this aspect of McDowell's position as clear evidence of his Aristotelianism. He offers to read McDowell's departure from the predominant paradigm of 20th-century analytic philosophy along the same lines as Aristotle's departure from Plato. Redding sees Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic ontological model of the two separate realms—one of ideas or true being and the other of sensible finite entities or of becoming—as mirrored in the move McDowell makes in relation to the predominant position among contemporary philosophers, which can be traced back to Frege. "The Fregean view involved 'a suspect conception of how thought related to reality, and ultimately suspect conception of mind.' On the Fregean view, the sense of a term is a possession of the mind that is unaffected by the fact that there may be nothing in the world to answer to it."[14] The Fregean position criticized by Redding assumes a "sideway-on" view that only a God could have. It postulates the transcendent perspective from which we can access the content of the mind and juxtapose and contrast this with the direct grasp of the world (entirely bypassing the mind). Both Aristotle and McDowell, according to Redding, reject this "trans-realm" conception of philosophical vision and reject the decoupling of the mind from the world. The mind, for them, is not the "mythical repository" of autonomous content that stands unconstrained from the ultimate structure of experienced reality. Instead, the mind is rationally constrained by the world. This thesis, as we have seen, is the key feature of the ontological model presented in the Categorical Syllogism. The middle term that presents the systematically related conceptual content as objective universality is the ultimate structure of reality that determines the extreme terms—the determination-generating reflective activity and the individual entities that comprise the realm of experience.

This view clearly posits the system of inferentially related concepts as the most fundamental part of the ontological model it puts forth. Hegel makes clear that, unlike the middle term, the other two moments of the present syllogistic structure are not full manifestations of the *determined totality*. The insufficient development of the individual and the universal moments is the main reason behind the failure of attaining a fully mediated state of the

Concept: "there is still a subjective element in this syllogism, for that identity is still the substantial identity or content but is not yet identity of form at the same time."[15] The middle term only possesses "positive identity, but is not equally the negativity of its extremes."[16] As such, while the middle term, at this stage, can already be described as the complete self-determination of the given essence that captures the totality of its content, the same cannot be said of the extremes. Even though both universality and individuality are related to the middle term, these relations are not of a *mediated* but merely an *immediate* nature. In other words, there is a lack of grounding of the relation between the universal and the particular moment, on the one hand, and the individual and the particular, on the other. Drawing comparison with McDowell's position will shed light on this aspect of the present ontological model.

The central thesis advanced by McDowell in his influential work *Mind and World* is the direct perception of the conceptually structured world. He frames this thesis as a successful attempt to sidestep two bad alternatives: the myth of the given (the widespread positions among philosophers, especially those sympathetic to the empiricist tradition) and the frictionless spinning in the void (which he associates with Donald Davidson). Instead of conferring the function of the cause that affects observational judgments in us to an environmental stimulus, McDowell wants to maintain that we have the capacity to procure the *perceptual knowledge* via immediate access of the conceptually structured actuality. In other words, instead of experience standing in a causal relation to our beliefs and affecting conceptually articulated responses in us, it has to serve as a rational constraint. This is the case, according to McDowell, since only such a rational constraint can provide objective purport for our beliefs. The rational "friction" with the world, which allows McDowell to walk the fine line between Scylla of the myth of the given and Charybdis of the Davidsonian spinning in the void, is provided by the direct perception of the conceptually structured world. Hence, individual objects of perception, instead of effecting conceptually structured *observational* beliefs in us, themselves contain conceptual judgments. This perceptual knowledge, according to McDowell, affords us direct access to the world.

Clearly, in this picture, the key element is the differentiation between the perceptual vs. mere observational judgment. The distinction makes it possible for McDowell to set his position apart from that of Davidson. However, it is not clear that the move is free of problems. As Robert Brandom points out, McDowell has difficulties with maintaining a clear distinction between perceptual and observational judgments:

> What sort of a fact is it that in some cases where we non-inferentially acquire a true belief by exercising a reliable disposition non-inferentially to respond to

> the fact in question by acquiring the belief there is a perceptual experience present, while in others there is not? How would we go about settling the question of whether the physicist has genuine perceptual experiences of mu mesons? Is there any way in principle to tell other than asking? And if we do ask, is there any chance that the physicist is wrong, because the physicist has been taught a bad theory? Could I think I was having perceptual experiences of mu mesons or the maleness of chickens when I was not, or vice versa? Do we know just by having a perceptual experience what sensory modality it corresponds to (so that the—supposed—fact that the chicken sexers get this wrong is decisive evidence that they do not have genuine perceptual experiences)? The answers to questions such as these determine just how classically Cartesian McDowell's notion of perceptual experience is—and so, from my point of view, just how suspicious we should be of it.[17]

The difficulty in McDowell's position that Brandom is pointing out here is of the same nature as the one we are dealing with in the Categorical Syllogism. The system of determinate conceptual content is asserted as the ground of actuality by being presented as the middle term of the syllogism. But its relatedness to the perceptual experiences of individuals is a mere presupposition that lacks justification. Just like when McDowell maintains that the conceptually structured world is directly perceived by us, it is not clear on what grounds he can argue that any specific non-inferentially acquired conceptual content does better justice to the world than any other.

Hence, the relation between the particular and the individual moments of the Concept lacks justification not only in the case of the Categorical Syllogism but also in the case of McDowell's position. This is the meaning of Brandom's critical point translated into Hegel's technical vocabulary. Brandom, however, does not merely place his finger on the problematic aspect of the ontological model under consideration; he also wants to offer a solution to it. What appears to be the ultimate ground of objective purport of the given beliefs is not finding oneself in a state of possession of some conceptually articulated beliefs. It is rather through drawing inferences from the given conceptually structured perceptual episodes and deciding how well it squares with other beliefs we hold and withstands the test of the social practice of giving and asking for reasons.

The lack of mediation or a mere postulation of the unity of the moments constitutes the key problem that needs to be addressed in the ontological model of the Categorical Syllogism as well as with the McDowellian version of it. The immediate nature of the relation between the middle term and the extremes has to be replaced by *mediated* unity. This would entail reworking the present conceptions of the individual and the universal moments and putting forth a relational structure in which all three moments are fully mediated with one another. In other words, we need a well-grounded account of how the individuated entities are related to the conceptual framework, on the

one hand, and how both of these are related to the process of generation of determinations, on the other. This will be accomplished through the development that takes place in the remaining part of the Syllogism of Necessity; the very same posited totality found at the present stage only in the middle term will be developed in the extremes as well.

THE SECOND SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY: THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM

The theme of the mediated unity between the individual and the particular moments of the Concept comes to the center of attention in the Hypothetical Syllogism. The mediational model focuses on the relation between the diversity of individuals and the inner substantial identity that underlies them. Hegel's example of the Hypothetical Syllogism is, "If A is, so is B / But A is / Therefore B is." The major premise of the syllogism is the hypothetical judgment described by Hegel in the following words:

> The connection of the hypothetical judgment is the necessity or the inner substantial identity associated with the external diversity of concrete existence—an identical content lying internally as its basis. . . . The two behave, moreover, as sides of the judgment, as universality and singularity; the one, therefore, is the above content as totality of determinations, the other as actuality. Yet it is a matter of indifference which side is taken as universality and which as singularity. That is to say, inasmuch as the conditions are still the inner, abstract element of an actuality, they are the universal, and it is by being held together in one singularity that they step into actuality. Conversely, the conditions are a dismembered and dispersed appearance that gains unity and meaning, and a universally valid existence, only in actuality. [18]

Hegel wants to sublate the rigid contrast between the essential, the more important moment (the condition), on the one hand, and its diverse manifestation (the conditioned), on the other. In the hypothetical judgment (the major premise of the present syllogism), either side can be taken both as the condition and the conditioned. Here, Hegel addresses the central problem of the previous model—the relation between the particular and the individual moments of the Concept. On the one hand, "the inner, abstract" side can be seen as the conditioning that stands behind its manifestation in the multiplicity of individuals. On the other hand, though, the separate, scattered appearances of individuals can be construed as the conditions for the manifestation of the genuine reality that is revealed through them. A comparison with the way we can think of a force (for example, electromagnetic or gravitational force) can be helpful for clarifying the point. We can think of force as the underlying essential reality that manifests itself through a series of appearances, which is the effect it has on the observable object. In this sense, the

interior (the invisible) is the essential, while the exterior (the observable) is the unessential. On the other hand, however, we can also think of the series of appearances as the essential aspect and reduce actuality to what manifests itself to us. In this case, the postulated force is a mere theoretical construct that is posited to explain certain patterns of regularities in the actual observable phenomena. Hence, in the Hypothetical Syllogism and specifically in its major premise, the hypothetical judgment, the mutual "*indifference*" between the individuals and the particularity as determinate "content lying internally as its basis," is put in question. Obviously, this is geared to overcoming the insufficient degree of mediatedness between the particular and the individual moments that marked the previous syllogistic model.

The relation between the condition, the conditioned, and the complexities involved with this is a prominent theme in Hegel's system in general. The relationship between the theoretical vs. practical stance can be helpful in demonstrating this point. As Robert Pippin observes, "In the theoretical attitude, we attempt to 'make' the objective subjective; and in the practical attitude, we attempt to make subjective objective."[19] While the practical attitude can be seen as a translation of the inner, the subjective, into the outer, the objective. Thus, the inner is the condition; the outer is the conditioned. Within the theoretical stance, the objective reality presents the conditions that are being internalized. Hegel's overall position is that the very same schema is in operation in two different guises in these stances: "The distinction between thought and will is simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes, but they are not two separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking."[20] This overcoming of the schism between the two faculties is a move similar to that of the sublation of the distinction between the condition and the conditioned that is taking place in the Hypothetical Syllogism. In the Categorical Syllogism, the particular moment had the key ontological function; it was the condition, while the individuality was the conditioned. In the present model, the distinction between the two is problematized; and the individual, just as much as the particular moment of the Concept, is posited as the foundational layer of actuality. Just like with the theoretical vs. practical stances with the particular and individual moments of the Concept, we also reach the realization of their mediated identity with one another.

The crucial difference between the hypothetical judgment and the Hypothetical Syllogism is that the nexus of relations between the conditions and the conditioned as presented in the former (which also is the major premise of the latter) is a mere potentiality, lacking *actualization.* The schematic content of the nexus is a mere potentiality standing beyond the immediate being still requiring an additional element for actualization. This element is supplanted by the minor premise "A is" in the Hypothetical Syllogism: "The conditions are a dispersed material awaiting and requiring application; this

negativity is the mediating means, the free unity of the concept. It determines itself as activity. . . . This middle term is no longer, therefore, merely inner but existent necessity; the objective universality contains its self-reference as simple immediacy, as being."[21] Hence, to the inner necessity of the major premise, the minor one adds the missing element for its actualization—immediate existence.

Here, Hegel uses an important element of his system without explicitly naming it—the notion of *true infinity*. This should not be confused with what he calls the *spurious infinity*—a mere endless reiteration of the finite. True infinity is not extraneous to the finitude. It is a process of self-relation that is not only immanent to but also constitutive of any concrete finitude. Hegel describes the middle term of the preset syllogism, "A," as a "singularity as self-referring negative unity."[22] Clearly, however, it is not mere individuality, as the middle term is already mediated with the particular moment, and this is what renders it into "*self-referring*." Thus, with the middle term and its "simple immediacy," true infinity enters the picture as the driving force of the actualization or the concretion of the nexus of necessity. The entire syllogistic mediational structure, therefore, acquires the quality of self-related objective universality—the feature that will be further developed in the following model—the Syllogism of Disjunction.

Now, since I have tried to elucidate some critical aspects of the ontological model we are looking at by comparing it to the stances upheld by contemporary philosophers, a valid question to ask is: How does this development map onto these contemporary views? As I have argued above, the problems of the Categorical Syllogism could be illuminated by reading it using Robert Brandom's criticism of John McDowell's position as a backdrop. In a similar vein, the meaning of the development that has taken place in the present stage of mediation—the Hypothetical Syllogism—can be clarified by attending to some important features of Brandom's position, specifically those that set him apart from McDowell.

One of the most fundamental disagreements between the two, as Brandom sees it, is McDowell's insufficient appreciation of the role that our conceptual content-generating activity plays in the individuation of the entities that figure in our perceptual experiences. Brandom claims that McDowell's emphasis on the direct accessibility of the conceptually structured reality ultimately commits him to posit the conception of a world populated by entities individuated prior to any conceptualizing activity on our part. Brandom is skeptical of this commitment by McDowell and wants to reverse the relation. It is not that our mind grasps the conceptually structured worlds. Our conceptual content-generating activity is what conditions both individuation of the entities making up the world as well as the specific conceptual determinations (e.g., the fact that entities appear to be such and such kinds or

having such and such properties) that structure the world as it manifests itself to us.

The difference between Brandom's and McDowell's positions corresponds to the development that takes place in the transition from the Categorical Syllogism to the hypothetical one. The actualization of the relation between the individual and the particular moments is carried out through the universal moment of the Concept. That is to say, the individuation of entities as instances of a given constellation of determinate conceptual content is conditioned by the determination-generating activity—the process through which concepts are applied in judgments, inferences are drawn from doxastic commitments, and the existing content is revised in case an incompatibility between two or more commitments arises. If in the previous model, the particular moment of the Concept—a system of determinate conceptual content-structuring reality—was granted the fundamental ontological role, now the move is made toward emphasizing the centrality of the conceptual content-generating activity—the universal moment of the Concept. The point is that the latter is more fundamental than the former, since—while the system of empirical concepts constitutes the immanent structure of actuality—it is only through the determination-generating activity that these concepts are furnished and modified. Brandom's distance from McDowell's position, which mirrors the differences between the last two syllogisms, can be described as a rejection of the Aristotelian stance regarding the primary locus of conceptual content and its replacement with a form of conceptual pragmatism. For Brandom and for the ontological model that the Hypothetical Syllogism stands for, instead of postulation of the conceptually structured world as the ultimate source of intentional content that is actualized in us as we come into "rational friction" with the world, the sources of conceptual determination are to be sought in the practical activity of application of concepts in judgments, drawing inferences from them, and in general from the functional role of semantic content-generating activities that are carried out in "the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."

The conclusion of the Hypothetical Syllogism is "Therefore B is." Hegel explains that this is a manifestation of the existence of B "through another."[23] Here, the central theme of the Hegelian transcendental ontology, self-relation, is brought to the fore once more. B's existence is grounded on the existence of A, but at the same time, the inner substantial identity that binds the two makes this relation to the other into a self-relation. The identity of the individual and the particular moments of the Concept, "the absolute content of A and B is the same," is not an immediate but a mediated identity, a unity that has been posited through "form-activity": "the difference of A and B is an empty name. The unity is therefore a unity reflected into itself, and hence an identical content, and is this content not only implicitly in itself but,

through this syllogism, it is also posited, for the being of A is also not its own being but that of B and *vice versa.*"[24] As I pointed out earlier, Hegel inherits from Kant the notion of universality as the form of concepts. Hence, when he claims that the self-relation between the moments of the Concept is attained through "form-activity," he has the universal moment in mind. Indeed, as we have seen, the mediation between the individual and the particular moments of the Hypothetical Syllogism is accomplished via the universal moment of the Concept. The emergence of the universal moment as the ground of the self-relational structure of the Concept is an important development which will occupy a prominent place in the next syllogistic model. I will offer a detailed discussion of this key feature of Hegel's transcendental ontology in the following section, where I will provide a more comprehensive account of the self-relational structure of the Concept. At this point, it is important to note that a significant step was taken in the present syllogistic form that sets the stage for the next and final model of mediation in which the self-relational unity of the Concept will be fully actualized.

In the opening passages of the Syllogism of Necessity, Hegel describes all three moments of the Concept as "pervaded" by the same essential nature. However, their content at that stage is not developed to the same degree. Now, we have reached the point at which not only is the clear-cut distinction between the two sides of the major premise (individuality and particularity) overcome, but these two sides are also declared to have the same "absolute content."[25] This means that in the present ontological model, there is no determination found in the individuals that is not a part of the system of empirical concepts that make up the particular moment. Moreover, as we have seen, the universal moment that is the conceptual content-generating activity guided by the determinations of reflection plays the mediating role between the individual and the particular moments. This implies that the mind, instead of passively acquiring determinate conceptual content from perceived individuals, plays an active role in generating determinations through which the individual entities are comprehended.

The relationship of mutual dependency that obtains between the individual and the particular moments of the Concept and the role universality plays in it resemble the relationship between the determinative and the reflective judgment in Kant's system. In the case of determinative judgment, it is the concept that is at hand, and the individual is to be subsumed under it. With reflective judgment, on the other hand, individual intuitions are presented to the mind that searches the concept through which the intuitions can be determined. Here, Kant's position is closer to Hegel's than is often recognized. Commentators typically read Kant as discriminating between two types of judgments, *determinative* and *reflective*, as two different modalities of the operation of the mind. However, as Longuenesse has convincingly shown, these are not two different activities of the mind; instead, they are the very

same activity, although with two different outcomes. In the former, the individual is subsumed under a concept, while in the latter, the very same process of searching for a concept fails: "They [reflective judgments] differ in this regard from other judgments related to the sensible given, which are not *merely* reflective, but determinative *as well.* What makes judgments *merely* reflective is that in them, the effort of the activity of judgment to form concepts *fails*."[26] Thus, just like in Hegel's hypothetical judgment where universality plays the role of mediator between the particular and the individual moments (i.e., between empirical concepts and individual entities), so it is in Kant's critical system where the process of reflection mediates between concepts and individuals. Judgments whether "*merely* reflective" or not are geared to the effort of subsuming individuals under concepts. The activity of reflection, with Kant, plays a role very similar to the universal moment of the Concept in Hypothetical Syllogism—a process that mediated between individuals and concepts.

THE THIRD SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY: THE DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM

The Kantian criterion with which Hegel evaluates the ontological models in the Syllogism chapter requires that the moments of the Concept should not merely be related to one another, but their relation should have the nature of self-relation. This criterion, as we have seen, has not been met by the mediational models discussed so far. Only the last syllogism, the Disjunctive Syllogism, does justice to it. Within this mediational model, the schism between the three moments of the Concept—universality, particularity, and individuality—has been overcome: "the distinction of mediating and mediated [as well as form and content, . . .] has fallen away."[27] Hence, the Disjunctive Syllogism is the culminating point of the development taking place in the Syllogism chapter in which Hegel offers his vision of the basic structure of actuality. In this last syllogistic model, the process of epigenesis of the inner structure of the Concept that we have been tracing in the last two chapters is brought to its completion. As Hegel puts it, the Concept attains "its positedness."[28]

One of the most distinctive features that sets the Disjunctive Syllogism apart from all the others is that it has the middle term not only in the premises but also in the conclusion. The syllogism is presented in two different versions: "A is either B or C or D / But A is B / Therefore A is neither B nor C" and "A is either B or C or D / But A is neither C nor D / Therefore A is B."[29] Either one of these versions presents the middle term, A, as the subject in both the major and the minor premises as well as in the conclusion. The middle term is presented as embodying the totality of the Concept—all three

of its moments. In the major premise, the middle term is universality; in the minor one, it is particularity; in the conclusion, it is presented as individuality.[30] Each one of these components has significant implications and warrants close examination.

The first premise, "A is either B or C or D," presents the universal moment as the ground of particular determinations: "It is a universal in the first premise and in its predicate the universal sphere particularized in the totality of its species."[31] The major premise draws on the result of the previous mediational model—the universal moment as the determinate content-generating process through which the particular ground-level empirical concepts are furnished. Hence, universality, as the middle term of the Disjunctive Syllogism, carves out the ontological space within which the systematically related constellation of empirical concepts is generated: "As universality it is in the first place the substantial identity of the genus; but this identity is secondly one in which particularity is included."[32] Hegel uses the term substance here in a peculiar sense that reflects his ontological vision. The universality is the *substance* in the sense of the underlying ground or the condition that functions like a "creative power"[33] furnishing empirical concepts.

However, we also know from the development that has taken place throughout the Syllogisms of Necessity that the schism between the moments of the Concept has been overcome. Therefore, the universal moment of the Concept, in a certain sense, has to be identical to its product—the system of determinations. The identity of the two moments can be read as the ultimate reducibility of the content of each one of the moments to the other. In other words, on the one hand, there are no particular determinations of the systematically related constellation of empirical concepts that are not produced by and, therefore, also revisable via the determination-furnishing activity. The content of the particular moment is posited through the universal one, which incorporates the immediacy of experience into the mediate system of empirical concept that it continuously forms and revises. On the other hand, the universal moment, the empirical determination-generating process, is nothing else but the application of the very same empirical concepts that make up the particular moment. The universal moment of the Concept is not some transcendent source of the empirical concepts. It is the process of application of these very concepts, the content of which is continuously revised through this application and new determinations formed through it. Every episode of application of existing concepts implies additional doxastic and inferential commitments and, therefore, the transformation of other empirical determinations through an inferential chain of interdependencies. Hence, the universal moment is the continuously evolving process of application of the empirical concepts through which shaping and transformation of their content take place.

It is striking how much similarity we find between the ontological model Hegel presents in the Disjunctive Syllogism, on the one hand, and the Kantian empirical realm, on the other, when it comes to the role that the disjunctive judgment plays in both ontological views. Beatrice Longuenesse, in her illuminating analysis of Kant's third analogy and the role disjunctive judgment plays in individuation of empirical objects of experience, offers an account of the interrelated system of empirical concepts and the objects individuated in space and time as well as the role that disjunctive judgment plays in the generation of both of these, which directly corresponds to the particular and the individual moments of the Concept from Hegel's Disjunctive Syllogism. According to Longuenesse, for Kant, the role that disjunctive judgment plays "is to relate all concept subordination to the unified logical space within which concepts reciprocally delimit each other's sphere and meaning."[34] For Kant, disjunctive judgment generates exactly the kind of system of empirical determinations that we find in the particular moment of the Concept of the Disjunctive Syllogism. In both cases, we have a system of interrelated determinations that "reciprocally delimit each other's sphere and meaning." The same kind of correspondence is found regarding the objects that get individuated through the logical space of the interrelated concept in the Kantian empirical realm, on the one hand, and the individual moment of the Concept in Hegel's Disjunctive Syllogism, on the other. As Longuenesse puts it:

> If we follow the general thrust of his metaphysical deduction of the categories, we should understand his point as being, rather, that the same act of the mind which, by means of analysis, generates the form of disjunctive judgment and eventually, the form of a unified system of such judgments, also generates, by means of the synthesis of spatiotemporal manifolds, the representation of a community of interacting things or parts of things—"for instance" (B112 quoted above) the relations of reciprocal attraction and repulsion of parts in a material body.[35]

The community of entities individuated though the holistic system of interrelated concepts that we find in Kant's account mirrors the individual moments of the Disjunctive Syllogism (wherein Hegel presents his vision of actuality). Hence, in both Kant's and Hegel's cases, we are dealing with three key elements: (a) an empirical conceptual concept-generating activity that is geared to furnishing a system of determinations that reciprocally delimit one another's spheres, (b) a holistic system of empirical concepts, and (c) "a community of interacting things" that is individuated through these systems of empirical concepts.

When introducing the universal moment of the Concept, Hegel describes it not merely as a *creative power* but as a *free* creative power.[36] For Hegel, however, freedom means *being with self in the other*. But since the mediated

identity of the three moments of the Concept is achieved only in the Disjunctive Syllogism, up to that point in the text, *universality* has been only potentially free. Only in the Disjunctive Syllogism is the freedom of the universal moment fully actualized. The gap between form and content (mediated and mediating aspects of the immanent structure of the Concept) is overcome, and universality encompasses the totality of the system of particular determinations and is identical to it. Universality in the present mediational model "contains its total particularity."[37]

The unity between the dynamic and the static aspects of the Hegelian ontology is one of the central claims of Bowman's recent interpretation of Hegel's theory of the *Concept*. As my reading of the unity between the universal and the particular moments of the Concept has demonstrated, the basic idea behind Bowman's project is indeed correct, as the moments of the Concept are two sides of the same coin (one static, the other dynamic). Only by keeping this dual aspect of the Hegelian Concept can we gain a proper understanding of his system. However, while the overall thrust of his interpretation is right, the specific account of the self-relational structure Bowman offers is mistaken. The determinations of reflection—identity, difference, ground—which Bowman describes as the "single complex rational structure" of the Concept—in reality are the basic functions guiding the conceptual content-generating activity. This is the reason why Hegel presents them not in The Doctrine of the Concept but in the Doctrine of Essence. In his discussion of the dynamic moment, Bowman focuses again on the Doctrine of Essence. The account he offers is nothing but a close investigation into the structural elements of the determinate content-generating process, which he earlier misidentified as the static features of the Hegelian notion of the Concept. Hence, his conclusion—the Concept and absolute negativity are two sides of the same coin, the former structural, the latter dynamic[38]—is fundamentally misleading because what he describes as the immanent structure of the Concept is, in reality, the set of the functions guiding "the dynamic" moment of the dualistic picture.

As I have argued in this book, the unity of the dynamic and the static aspects is indeed a fundamental feature of Hegel's transcendental ontology. However, these aspects are not the Concept, on the one hand, and dynamic process, on the other, as Bowman would have it. Instead, the unity is that of the self-relational structure of the Concept itself—the unity between its dynamic and static moments. Indeed, if the self-relational unity is the fundamental feature of the Hegelian ontology, as Bowman claims, it ought to be located on the bottom floor of the ontological theory under consideration. It has to be discerned on the level of the Concept (and not on the level of the *Essence*, according to Bowman). As I have demonstrated, self-relationality is the key feature of the Concept unifying the dynamic element (the universal moment as the process of generation of the system of empirical concepts)

with the static moment (the particular moment as the system of interrelated empirical concepts generated through the dynamic moment). Hegel describes the third moment of the Concept, the individual, as the unity of the other two moments. As we have seen, the attainment of the complete mediation between these three moments of the Concept has been the normative force behind the development that we have traced in the last two chapters. Each new syllogistic model took us one step closer to the fulfillment of this criterion, which is fully met only in the Disjunctive Syllogism.

Having looked at the major premise of the Disjunctive Syllogism and the ontological commitment implied in it, I shall now outline the key aspects of the remaining parts of the mediational model under consideration. If in the major premise, the term "A" is subject, which is universal that in its predicate particularizes itself,[39] in the minor premise, the same term appears as "determinate, or as a species,"[40] which Hegel also describes as "the reciprocal exclusion of the determinations."[41] Here, the very same term that was exhibited as *universality* in the major premise is *particularized* into determinations related by the inferential pathways. The complete system of these interrelated concepts comprises the particular moment of the Concept. If the focus of the major premise is the self-differentiation of the universal moment as the creative power that posits determinations, the minor premise exhibits the nature of the interrelatedness of the empirical concepts and the role that this interrelatedness plays in determining their content. The point is that the determination of the meaning of the concepts is possible only by articulation of the inferential interrelations between them that spells out the relations of necessary implication and incompatibility. The specific meaning of a given determination is constituted by the inferential relations it has with other determinations.

In the conclusion of the Disjunctive Syllogism, the third moment of the Concept, individuality, is tied directly to the particularization of the universal: "This excluding, moreover, is now not just reciprocal, the determination not merely relative, but is also just as much self-referring determination, the particular as singularity to the exclusion of the others."[42] Here, the already-familiar theme of the individuation of entities via particular determination is brought to the fore again. This is the place in his system that Hegel assigns to Kant's thesis that individual objects of experience are conditioned by the conceptual content through which the mind relates to the world, instead of being given to the mind as already individuated out there in the world. Hence, both extreme terms of the Disjunctive Syllogism, particularity and individuality, are grounded on the universal moment that functions as the middle term of the final ontological model presented by Hegel in the Syllogism chapter. The central thesis of Hegel's transcendental ontology states that the conceptual content-generating process is what grounds the particular determination and their semantic content as well as the entities individuated

through them: "The extremes, as distinct from this middle term, are only a positedness to which there no longer accrues any proper determinateness of its own as against the middle term."[43]

By positing the universal moment as the middle term of the last mediational model, the dynamic nature of Hegel's ontology comes to the fore in full force. Not only the system of empirical concepts through which we relate to the world but also the most basic determinations, of which the elements comprising this system are made up and which tie the empirical concepts and their content into a system of interrelated elements, are the products of the determinate content-generating activity. This activity includes the (a) processes of giving and asking for reason, (b) application of existing concepts in doxastic judgments, (c) modification of their content when we end up with mutually contradictory commitments, and (d) actions of individuals and functioning of social institutions.

Hence, Hegel's transcendental ontology is a radicalization of Kant's claim that the mind is the source of the formal structure that grounds reality. The Hegelian Concept is the self-determining movement that generates conceptual content. It is an ontological counterpart of the Kantian synthetic a priori judgment. According to the vision of reality put forth in the theory of the Concept, the entities comprising actuality are individuated through the conceptual determinations that make up the particular moment of the Concept. Hence, in the debate between realists and nominalists, Hegel is on the side of the former. Universals are not only as real as individuals, but they even have an ontological priority over individuals as the condition of their possibility. However, had Hegel stopped at this point, his stance would have been vulnerable to the very same criticism that he voiced against rationalist metaphysics—projection of the structure of judgment onto reality. In fact, if, on the most fundamental level, we have universal kinds and properties, then we are dealing with a twofold projection of subject-predicate structure onto reality. First, universal kinds serve as the projections of subject and their properties as projections of predicates. Second, entities as individuated kinds, on the one hand, and the properties that don't inhere in their kind but still belong to them, on the other, would also comprise a subject-predicate structure projected onto the world. However, as we have seen, Hegel offers an additional facet in his ontology—the universal moment of the Concept: the dynamic self-determining movement that continuously remolds and transforms the conceptual determinations that underlie empirical reality. This dynamic moment of the Concept is what renders Hegel's stance immune to the projection charge and offers an ontological vision marked by radical plasticity.

In the end, I would like to note that the transformation of the ontological models that has taken place throughout the last three syllogisms has important implications for the laws of logic (in the traditional, not the Hegelian

sense of the term). According to the model presented in the Categorical Syllogism, where the particular moment is given the central role, the validity of the laws of logic is ultimately rooted in the structure of the world. By maintaining that the systematically related determinations that make up the particular moment of the Concept constitute the basic structure of actuality, we are also implicitly granting the same status to the formal relations that obtain between these determinations. Hence, according to the model expressed in the Categorical Syllogism, we are bound by the laws of logic because they structure and describe the relations that obtain in the world. Actuality is the source of the normativity of the rules of inference. Contrary to this, in the Hypothetical Syllogism and especially in the Disjunctive Syllogism, the center of gravity has shifted from the particular to the universal moment of the Concept. What this means is that the laws of logic, instead of being anchored in the conceptually structured world that we somehow directly intuit, are an abstract and formalized version of the rules in place in the social practices of applying empirical concepts through which generation and revision of their content take place.

Paul Redding, in his article entitled "Brandom, Sellars and the Myth of the Logical Given," contrasts Robert Brandom's Hegel-inspired stance with that of early Bertrand Russell regarding their respective positions on the question of the sources of the laws of logic. Russell had put forth a position that Redding describes as *the myth of the logical given*: "What we believe, when we believe the law of [non-]contradiction, is not that the mind is so made that it must believe the law of [non-]contradiction. This belief is a subsequent result of psychological reflection, which presupposes the belief in the law of [non-]contradiction. The belief in the law of [non-]contradiction is a belief about things, not only about thoughts."[44]

When it comes to the ontological status of the laws of logic, Russell's position has much in common with the model presented in the Categorical Syllogism. Brandom's alternative, on the other hand, is inspired by Hegel. Just as in the Disjunctive Syllogism for Brandom, the basic laws of inference, rather than being given to us as some form of the transcendent metaphysical substructure of being, reflect the logical structure of the patterns immanent to social practices. This shift from the objective to the subjective side as the fundamental locus of the laws of logic reminds us one more time of the Kantian origin of Hegel's position. As Redding puts it in his comparison of Hegel's Kantian stance with Russell's Aristotelian one:

> With this, then, Russell, following Moore, had reverted to a position closer to Aristotle's representationalist interpretation of the logical categories than to Kant's. For Aristotle, it would seem, the categories reflected in the logical behaviour of our words reflect structures properly belonging to being, while

> for Kant the worldly structures—in the sense of the way that they are for us—reflect the logical structures of our judgements.[45]

At the end of the Syllogism chapter, we are presented with Hegel's version of the Kantian move of tracing these "worldly structures" to the logical forms of our judgment. The key change Hegel introduces in his appropriation of Kant's move is to remove what he sees as the psychologism of the Kantian position. While the Syllogism chapter of the *Logic* is the culmination of the project announced by Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason*—replacing metaphysics with logic, that is, tracing the basic determinations of reality to the unified self-relational structure of thought—the nature of this self-relational structure in Hegel's hand undergoes a radical reinterpretation. Hegel sees the relation between empirical multiplicities of the phenomena we find in the world, the interrelated system of concepts on which our cognitive and practical activities rest, and the continuous process of application and revision of the content of this system as the three moments of the holistic self-relational ontological structure that constitutes the most basic schema of his transcendental ontology. Hence, the thesis that Hegel's system integrates within itself the totality of the world (e.g., from the ordinary mundane objects to the abstract logical forms of inference, from the religious practices of Hindus to Kant's categorical imperative) should not be understood (as it often is) as a claim to present an exhaustive list of the totality of phenomena, an encyclopedia of every single entity making up the furniture of the world. Instead, Hegel presents the schema of the interrelation of the activity (in both theoretical and practical senses of the term or in thought and deed), determinations furnished through it, and entities individuated through these determinations. Hegel's doctrine of the Concept presents an ontology according to which the order that we find in the world is constituted instead of being given.

NOTES

1. Hegel, SL (GW 12:119).
2. Ibid. (GW 12:120).
3. John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Harvard University Press, 2009), 23.
4. Ibid., 23–24.
5. Ibid., 30.
6. Hegel, SL (GW 12:120).
7. John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Harvard University Press, 2009), 39.
8. Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Ontologie und Relationen (Athenaeum Vlg, 1989), 100. My translation: [Hegel] makes objectivity or the existential aspect of the object a constitutive element of the Concept, by conceiving its so-called subjectivity in such a way that, without the objectivity-aspect, it remains incomplete, one-sided, and non-comprehensive.
9. Hegel, SL (GW 12:120).
10. Ibid. (GW 12:119).

11. Ibid. (GW 12:119).
12. Ibid. (GW 12:119).
13. Ibid. (GW 12:119).
14. Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 37.
15. Hegel, SL (GW 12:120).
16. Ibid. (GW 12:120).
17. Robert Brandom, "Non-inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism" in Reading McDowell: On Mind and World (Routledge, 2002), 100.
18. Hegel, SL (GW 12:121–22).
19. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 134.
20. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35.
21. Hegel, SL (GW 12:122).
22. Ibid. (GW 12:122).
23. Ibid. (GW 12:123).
24. Ibid. (GW 12:123).
25. Ibid. (GW 12:123).
26. Béatrice Longuenesse. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 164.
27. Hegel, SL (GW12:125).
28. Ibid. (GW 12:126).
29. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
30. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
31. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
32. Hegel, SL (GW 12:124).
33. Ibid. (GW 12:36).
34. Béatrice Longuenesse: Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 192.
35. Ibid., 196.
36. Hegel, SL (GW 12:35).
37. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
38. Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 56.
39. Hegel, SL (GW 12:124).
40. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
41. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
42. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
43. Ibid. (GW 12:124).
44. Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60–61.
45. Ibid., 61.

Bibliography

1) HEGEL'S WORKS

Hegel, G. W. F. Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. Humanity Books,1969.

———. The Encyclopaedia Logic. Translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Hackett Publishing, 1991.

———. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

———. Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

———. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

———. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. 3 vols. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

———. Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–28. Translated by R. R. Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

———. The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. Translated by H. S. Harris and W. Cerf. SUNY Press, 1977.

2) KANT'S WORKS

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

———. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

———. Correspondence. Translated and edited by A. Zweig. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

3) OTHER WORKS

Adorn, W. Theodor. Hegel: Three Studies. MIT Press. 1993.

Allison, Henry. Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Revised and enlarged edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

———. Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Ameriks, Karl. "Hegel and Idealism." The Monist 74, no. 3 (1991): 386–402.
———. "Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, no. 1 (1992): 177–202.
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Beck, Lewis White. Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors. Harvard University Press, 1969.
Beiser, Frederick. Hegel. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Bett, Richard. The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Bowman, Brady. Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity. Cambridge University Press, 2013
Bradley, Francis Herbert. Principles of Logic, 2nd ed: Oxford University Press, 1922.
Brandom, Robert. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment: Harvard University Press, 1994.
———. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press, 2000.
———. "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's Phenomenology." Hegel Studien 36 (2001): 57–92.
———. Tales of the Mighty Dead. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
———. "Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts." Journal Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism, no. 3 (2005): 131–61.
———. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
Bubner, Rudiger. "Hegel's Science of Logic: The Completion or Sublation of Metaphysics?" In The Innovations of Idealism, 60–83. Translated by Nicholas Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Buchdahl, Gerd. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, 1969.
Curley, Edwin. Spinoza's Metaphysics. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1969.
Davidson, Donald. "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Dieter Henrich (ed.), Kant oder Hegel: Klett–Cotta, 1983.
Della Rocca, Michael. "Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond," in Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed, eds., Spinoza and German Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
———. "Violations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza)," in *Metaphysical Grounding*, edited by F. Correia and B. Schnieder, 139–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 3 vols. Translated and edited by J. Cottingham, J. R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and (for vol. 3) A. Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
———. Philosophical Essays and Correspondence. Edited by R. Ariew. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000.
DeVries, Willem. Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Düsing, K. Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Hegel-Studien supp. 15, Bonn: Bouvier, 1976.
Evans, Gareth. The Varieties of Reference. Clarendon Press, 1982.
Ferrarin, Alfredo. Hegel and Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Fichte, J. G. The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
———. Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo (1796/99), ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Cornell University Press, 1992.
Forster, Michael. 1989. Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit. Univ of Chicago Press, 1998.
Förster, Eckart. Kant's Final Synthesis. Harvard University Press, 2000.

———. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction. Translated by B. Bowman. Harvard University Press, 2017.
Förster, E., & Melamed, Y. Y. Spinoza and German idealism. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Franks, Paul. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Gadamer, Hans Georg. Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Garber, Daniel. Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Gram, Moltke. "Intellectual Intuition: The Continuity Thesis." Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 287–304.
Guyer, Paul. "Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity." Nous 24 (1990): 17–43.
———. "Thought and Being: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, edited by F. Beiser, 171–210. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Habermas, Jurgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Translated by F. G. Lawrence. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985
Hartmann, Klaus, & Müller, O. Hegels Logik. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1999.
Heidegger, Martin. Pathmarks. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Henrich, Dieter. Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion. 1. Aufl. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986.
———. Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism. Edited by D. S. Pacini. Harvard University Press, 2008.
———. Hegel Im Kontext, Suhrkamp, 1971.
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. Ontologie Und Relationen. Königstein: Athenaum/Hain, 1984.
———. Wahrheit aus dem Begriff. Eine Einführung in Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Hain, 1990.
———. Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und Motiven Des Deutschen Idealismus. Frankfurt: Anton Hain, 1991.
———. "Metaphysikkritik bei Hegel und Nietzsche." Hegel-Studien 28 (1993): 285–301.
———. "Hegels Ordnung der Dinge. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes als 'transzendentalistisches' Argument für eine monistische Ontologie und seine erkenntnistheoretischen Implikationen." Hegel-Studien 41 (2006): 9–50.
Houlgate, Stephen. 1999. "Hegel's Critique of Foundationalism in the 'Doctrine of Essence.'" German Philosophy Since Kant, Supplement 44: 24–45.
———. An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth, and History. Blackwell, 2005.
———. The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2006.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd ed. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
———. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd ed. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Hyppolite, Jean. Logic and Existence. Translated by L. Lawlor and A. Sen. SUNY Press, 1997.
Iber, Christian. Metaphysik absoluter Relationalität. DeGruyter, 1990.
Inwood, Michael. Hegel. London: Routledge, 1983.
Jarczyk Gwendoline. System et Liberté dans la Logique de Hegel. Éditions Kimé, 2001.
Koch, Anton Friedrich, & Schick, Fredrike. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002.
Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Assembled by R. Queneau. Translated by H. Nichols. Cornell University Press, 1969.
Kreines, James. Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal. Oxford University Press, 2015.
———. "Hegel: Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism." Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 57 (2008): 48–70.

———. "The Logic of Life: Hegel's Philosophical Defense of Teleological Explanation in Biology." In The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, edited by F. Beiser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
———. "Kant on the Laws of Nature: Laws, Necessitation, and the Limitation of Our Knowledge." European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 4 (2009): 527–58.
Langton, Rae. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical Essays. Translated and edited by R. Ariew and D. Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.
———. New Essays on the Human Understanding, eds. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Lewis, David. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 no. 4 (1983): 343–77.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by R. Woolhouse. London: Penguin, 1997
Longuenesse, Beatrice. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Princeton University Press, 1998.
———. "Point of View of Man or Knowledge of God." In The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, edited by Sally Sedgwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
———. Kant on the Human Standpoint. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
———. Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Malabou, Catherine. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic. Routledge, 2004.
Marcuse, Herbert. Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity. Translated by S. Benhabib. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987.
McDowell, John. Mind and World, second paperback edition with a new introduction. Harvard University Press, 1996.
———. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Harvard University Press, 1998.
McTaggart, John. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896.
———. A Commentary on Hegel's Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.
Melamed, Yitzhak. Spinoza and German Idealism. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
———. Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought/ Oxford University Press, 2013.
———. The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Moyar, Dean. "Embodied Agency and Liberal Institutions: Reframing and Reforming Hegel's Political Theory." Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 35, no. 2 (2007): 200–206.
———. "Hegel's Pluralism: History, Self-Conscious Action, and the Reasonable." History of Philosophy Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2007): 189–206.
———. "Rethinking Autonomy in Hegel's Earliest Writings." Owl of Minerva 42, no. 1/2 (2010): 63-88.
———. Hegel's Conscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
———. "How the Good Obligates in Hegel's Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation." Inquiry 55, no. 6 (2012): 584–605.
———. "The First Person and the Moral Law." Kantian Review 20, no. 2 (2015): 289–300.
Moyar, Dean, & Quante, Michael. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Newlands, Samuel. "Hegel's Idealist Reading of Spinoza." Philosophy Compass 6 no. 2 (2011): 100–08.
Newton, Isaac. Philosophical Writings. Edited by A. Janiak. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Ott, Walter. Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Pahl, Katherine. Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012.

Pinkard, Terry. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
———. Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988.
———. Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
———. "Spirit as the 'Unconditioned.'" In A Companion to Hegel, edited by S. Houlgate and M. Bauer, 91–107. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
———. Hegel's Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
———. "Hegel and Marx: Ethics and Practice." Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Pippin, Robert. 1989. Hegel's Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1991. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European-High Culture. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. "'You Can't Get There From Here': Transition Problems in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." In The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, edited by F. C. Beiser, 52–85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Redding, Paul. Hegel's Hermeneutics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
———. Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press, 1979.
Rosen, Michael. Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Rosen, Stanley. The Idea of Hegel's Science of Logic. University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter, 2nd ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954.
Siep, Ludwig. "Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jenaer Schriften." Hegel-Studien 9 (1974): 155–207.
———. Der Weg der Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000.
Spinoza, Baruch. A Spinoza Reader. Translated and edited by E. Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Stern, Robert. Hegelian Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Theunissen, Michael. Sein und Schein. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980.
Vries, Hent de. Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
———. Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.
Walsh, William Henry. Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975.
Warren, D. Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature. London: Routledge, 2001.
Westphal, Kenneth. Hegel's Epistemological Realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.
———. "Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of 'the' Intuitive Intellect." In The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, edited by S. Sedgwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Williams, Michael. Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
Wood, Allen. Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Index

absolute, ix, 8; content, 129; negativity, xxiv, 48, 85, 94; other, 18, 19
Absolute Idea, xiii
abstract, 4, 6, 63, 106, 125; determinations, 6; representation, 74
abstraction, 15, 94, 95, 97, 105, 108
abstract universal, 15–19, 63, 64, 73, 93–94, 97, 98, 105, 110; doctrine of unfreedom, 18–19; inadequate medium of cognition, as, 4–8; mere analysis, 17–18; particular moment of the concept, 84, 85; principle of difference, lack the, 86, 87–88
accidentality, 121
active power, 12
actuality, xii, xxi, 6, 9, 21, 24, 95, 97, 122, 125
actualization, 126
agreement, 35, 41–43
Anaxagoras, xxii
apperception, 11, 82; transcendental, xix, xxviii, 7, 64, 98–99
apprehension, rule of, 22, 23
Aristotle, 79, 106, 122; Aristotelian connection, 38, 39, 74–77; Aristotelian metaphysics, xxii; Aristotelian model, 80, 88, 121; Aristotelian position, xxvii, 61, 62, 74, 77, 106, 136; Aristotle's notion of the form, 74, 75–76, 79
autonomous negation, xxiv, xxv

Baldwin, Thomas, 14
being, xii, xxi, xxii, 61; essence, and, 31, 34, 38, 57, 67, 82, 99; pure, 38; thought, and, xxvi, 3, 4, 10, 56, 82
Berkeley, Bishop George, 14
Bosanquet, Bernard, 78
Bowman, Brady, x–xi, xxi–xxv, xxvi, 7, 55, 133; two moments of the concept and limitations of his position, on, 91–92
Bradley, F. H., 14
Brandom, Robert, xiv–xvii, 10, 26, 27, 48, 68, 123, 124, 127–128, 136

Cartesian type of dualistic ontology, xvi–xvii, 3
Categorical Syllogism, 119–125
cognition, xvi, 11–12, 18–19, 21, 31; experience, of, 21; objects of, 5, 6, 25
comparison, concepts of, 35–36, 80
concept, 15, 21–22, 23, 47, 48, 49–50; relational schema and its Kantian origins, as a, 62–66; three moments of, 32–34. *See also* moments of the concept
condition, 125–126
conditioned, 125–126
conflict, 35, 41, 43, 80
consciousness, xx, 11, 21–22, 23, 24, 83, 93, 101, 103, 104, 107

contradiction, xxii, 25–28, 35, 39, 44, 45–47, 48, 87
Copernican revolution, xi–xii, xvi, xvii, xix, 21, 24, 38, 59
correspondence theory, 14
creative power, xxv, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 104, 132

Davidson, Donald, 68–69, 70, 123
De Boer, Karin, 48
Descartes, René, 3, 10, 68, 69
determinate negation, 102
determinations of reflection and generation of conceptual content, 31–50; agreement and opposition, 41–43; conclusions on, 48–50; contradiction, 45–47; determinations of reflection and Kant's concepts of comparison, 35–36; identity and difference, 36–41; inner and outer, 43–44; matter and form, 47–48; opposition, 44–45; three moments of the concept, 32–34; universal moment of the concept as the process of reflection, 34–35
determinations of reflection and Kant's concepts of comparison, 35–36
dialectic, 28
difference, principle of, 86–88
differentiation, 41, 45, 46, 63, 90; principle of, 87
Disjunctive Syllogism, 130–137
diverse manifestation, 125
diversification, 90
diversity, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41–42, 45, 46, 82, 84, 89, 90, 92
The Doctrine of the Concept, xii, xv, xvi, xxi, xxiii–xxiv, xxviii, 3, 31, 35, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, 69, 81, 85, 92, 133
The Doctrine of the Essence, xv, xvi, xxi, xxiv, xxviii, 20, 31, 34, 53, 55, 60, 64, 69, 81, 91, 133
doctrine of unfreedom, 18–19
The Doctrine on Being, xxi, 31, 38, 69
dogmatism, 8
dualistic ontology, 12, 14, 19, 24, 64, 69, 79; Cartesian type of, xvi–xvii, 3
Dummett, Michael, 68–69, 70

dynamic: moment, 92, 133–134; structure, 89, 92

empirical: concepts, xiv, xxvii, 11, 15, 17, 34, 48–49, 132; objects, xviii, xix, xxvii, 80
empiricism, critique of, xxviii, 1, 13–15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 58; mind vs. world, 13–15
The Encyclopedia Logic (Hegel), xxiii, xxvi, xxviii, 1, 10, 62
epistemology, ix–x, xviii
equality, 107
essence, 15, 31, 34, 35, 57, 67, 82, 99
essentialities, 35
existence, 4, 18, 31, 40, 68
experience, 20, 111, 113, 124
expression, 27
extensional aspects, 89, 90

falsehood, 66
finite, 8, 127; thought, xxiv, 6, 7
first syllogism of existence—qualitative. *See* syllogism of existence
first syllogism of necessity—categorical. *See* syllogism of necessity
first syllogism of reflection—allness. *See* syllogism of reflection
fixity, 87–88
force, 15, 17, 47, 75, 78
form, 21, 35, 47–48, 75, 85; activity, 128–129; Aristotle's notion of, 74, 76, 79; substantial, 121
fourth syllogism of existence—mathematical. *See* syllogism of existence
freedom, x, 19, 77
free power, 33, 74, 77
Frege, Gottlob, 14, 122

God, ix, x, 4, 6, 8, 11, 93
ground, xxiv, 91, 92

Hartmann, Klaus, 57
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich—critique of alternative positions, 1–28; abstract universal, 15–19; abstract universals as inadequate medium of cognition, 4–8; critique of empiricism, 13–15; critique

of Kant, 20–28; critique of traditional metaphysics, 2–4; projection of the substance-property formal structure, 8–10; sensible representations, 10–13
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich—theory of the concept and its Kantian origins, 53–70; concept as a relational schema and its Kantian origins, 62–66; Kantian origins of Hegel's concept, 55–58; overview, xiv, xix–xx, xxi, xxii, xxiv, xxvi, 7, 10, 31–32; series of self-relational models, 66–70; Stern's interpretation and its problems, 58–62
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich—transcendental ontology: critique of alternative positions, 1–28; determinations of reflection and generation of conceptual content, 31–50; failed forms of syllogistic mediation, 97–117; moments of the concept, 73–95; overview, ix–xxviii; syllogism of necessity, 119–137; theory of the concept and its Kantian origins, 53–70
Heidegger, Martin, xviii
Henrich, Dieter, xxiii, xxiv, 91
Herz, Markus, 61
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, x, xxiii, 91, 120
Hume, David, 3, 13, 112
humean, 112
hypothetical syllogism, 125–130

the I, 7, 61, 67, 86
ideas, xiii, xix, 13, 14, 15
identification, 40, 41, 45, 46, 90
identity, xxiv, xxv, 35, 63, 67; content, of, 89–91; positive, 123; thought and being, of, 4; truth as, 14, 31–32, 56
immanence of universals, 20–24
immaterialism, 14
indifference, 103, 125, 126
individual: moment, 125, 129, 134; nature of, 9; universal, is a, 65
individuality, xxviii, 121, 129, 130, 134; complete, as, 110; forms of syllogistic mediation, 98, 101, 102, 103–104, 105, 114, 117; third moment of the concept, 49–50, 54, 65, 66, 67, 73, 76, 77, 92–95, 97
Individuality-Particularity, 102
Individuality-Particularity-Universality, 100, 103, 109
Individuality-Universality, 105
Individuality-Universality-Particularity, 105
inference, 10, 137
infinite, ix, x, 8; thought, 6, 7
infinity, 8, 17, 127
inner, 35, 43–44, 125
intelligibility, xxii
intensional aspects, 89
intuition, 10, 23, 114

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 1–2
judgment(s), xiv, xix, 15, 47, 65, 68, 97, 128; affirmative, 41, 65; determinative, 129–130; experience, of, xvi, 22; hypothetical, 125–126; logical forms of, 9, 19, 24, 25, 35–36, 53, 56, 58, 67, 69, 82; observational, 22, 123, 129–130; universal, 110

Kant, critique of, 1, 20–28, 113, 132, 136–137; contradiction, 25–28; immanence of universals, 20–24; Kant as a subjective idealist, 24–25
Kant, Immanuel, 69, 74, 79–80, 86, 98, 100, 114–116; connection, 79–83; metaphysics, xv; ontology, xvii–xxi; origins of Hegel's concept, 55–58; overview, x–xi, xiii, xv, xviii, xxii–xxiii, xxv–xxviii; transcendental philosophy, ix, xxvi, 2–4, 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 59; subjective idealist, as a, 24–25
Kreines, James, 112, 113
Kuhn, Thomas, xii
Kuhnian theory, xii

law of non-contradiction, 8, 136
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, xxii, 2, 3, 6, 10–12
Lewis, David, 112
life, 86, 93, 94
likeness, 42, 45
Locke, John, 13–14, 15, 18
logic: Kantian transcendental, 64; laws of, 136; objective, 31; traditional, 64

The Logic (Hegel), ix, xii, xiii–xiv, xv, xvi, xxi, 3, 9, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 66, 74, 97, 137
logical concepts, xiv–xv
Longuenesse, Beatrice, 48, 116, 129, 132

mathematical syllogism, 107–108
matter, 17, 21, 35, 47–48
McDowell, John, 5, 16, 19, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127–128
mediation, 101–104, 109–110, 114, 115; external, 101, 104, 107; self-external, 105; stages of, 98
mediational model, xxviii, 67, 101, 109–110, 111, 119, 129
metaconcepts, xiv, 53
metaphysica generalis, xix
metaphysica specialis, xix
metaphysics, xviii–xix; old, 4, 7; theological, xiii. *See also* rationalist metaphysics; traditional metaphysics
mind, xx, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 69–70; vs. world, 13–15
moments of the concept, xxviii, 54, 65, 73–95; individuality, xxviii, 54, 92–95; particularity, xxviii, 54, 83–92; universality, xxviii, 54, 73–83. *See also* individuality
monads, 11
Moore, George Edward, 136

nature, 6, 8, 15, 121; laws of, 105
necessity, 20
negative, 45–46, 123, 127

objectivity, xx, 14, 21, 24, 25, 32, 53; concept, of the, 67–68
objects, 4–5, 8, 9, 14, 22, 26, 38, 50; empirical, xxvii; experience, of, 15, 18, 21, 23, 32, 69–70, 132; identity of, 14; structure of the, 11, 22
opposition, 35, 44–45, 46, 82, 98; agreement and, 41–43
otherness, 40
outer, 35, 43–44

paradigm shift, xii, xxii, 33
particular: ideas, 15; moment, 101, 125, 129; self-differentiated universal, as, 84–86
particularity, 49–50, 65, 98, 103, 120, 129, 130; Bowman on two moments of the concept and the limitations of his position, 91–92; identity of content, 89–91; particular as self-differentiated universal, 84–86; principle of difference, 86–88; second moment of the concept, xxviii, 54, 66, 67, 76, 77, 83–92, 97
Particularity-Universality, 105
perception(s), 11; object of, 13, 123; syllogism of mere, 111
phenomena, 21–22, 80
The Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel), ix, xiii, 66, 67
Pippin, Robert, ix–x, xi, xiii–xvii, xx, 99–100, 126
plasticity, 28
Plato, xviii, 56, 100, 106, 122
Platonic: ideas, xix; metaphysics, 100, 105, 107
plurality-universals, 9
positive, 45, 46
power, 18; active, 12; creative, xxv, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 104, 132; free, 33, 74, 77
predicate(s), 4–5, 8–9; concept, 37
Preliminary Conception (*Vorbegriff*), 1, 10, 20
principle of difference, 86–88
process, 33, 34, 48, 74, 78, 79; creative, 82
property-universals, 9
propositions, 15

qualitative syllogism, 100–102, 103
Quine, Willard Van Orman, xvi, xviii

rationalism, 2
rationalist-Leibnizian approach, 88
rationalist metaphysics, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10; Hegel's critical analysis of, 12–13, 14. *See also* metaphysics; traditional metaphysics
reality, ix–x, xvi, xxvii, 4, 53, 58, 82, 98, 135; determinations of, 64, 137; empirical, xvii, xxii, 21; nature of, xii, 11; objective, xx, xxii, 5, 20, 31; specific formal structure, 8–10; whole of, 116, 117

reason, 6, 7, 18–19, 109
receptivity, 18, 114
Redding, Paul, 122, 136
reflection, 38, 39, 42, 43, 91, 93, 110; determinations of, 35–36, 53, 63, 83, 86, 87, 90, 98; Kantian activity of, 48–49; process of, 34–35, 40–41, 45, 79, 81; subjective, 39, 101, 105
relation-to-other, xxiv, xxv, 92
relation-to-other-as-relation-to-self, 92
relation-to-self, xxiv, xxv, 7, 91–92
relativity, theory of, xxii
representational thinking, 94
representations, 4, 5, 10, 21, 27, 57; abstract, 74
Royce, Josiah, 78
rule-guided synthesis, 22
rule of apprehension, 22, 23
Russell, Bertrand, 14, 56, 136

Science of Logic (Hegel), 31, 38
second syllogism of existence. *See* syllogism of existence
second syllogism of necessity—hypothetical. *See* syllogism of necessity
second syllogism of reflection—induction. *See* syllogism of reflection
self-consciousness, xxi, 56, 57, 61, 67
self-deception, 5
self-differentiation, 33, 34, 63, 77, 84, 85, 89
self-identity, 45–46, 49
self-relationality, xxviii, 33, 55, 66, 67, 82, 98, 127, 128–129; self-relational models, series of, 66–70; self-relational structure, xx, xxiv, 7–8, 79, 133; self-relational unity, 91, 98–99, 101
self-sufficiency, 105, 106
Sellars, Wilfrid, 12, 16, 17, 19, 49, 89, 119–120, 136
semantics, x, xv, 88
sensations, 11, 12, 16, 58
sense(s), 61; datum, 12; experience, 10; perception, 11, 15, 16, 61
sensibility, 18, 114
sensible representations, 10–13, 15, 18
singularity, 95, 102, 104, 109, 120, 125
soul, ix, 5, 61
Spinoza, Baruch, 57
spirit, 8, 93
spontaneity, 18, 20, 114
statements, 15, 37
static: moment, 133–134; structure, 89, 91–92
Stern, Robert, 9–10, 14, 15, 22, 55, 106; overview, x–xi, xxi–xxii, xxv–xxvii; Stern's Aristotelian reading, 77–79; Stern's interpretation and its problems, 58–62
subject(s), xxii, 9, 18, 22, 24, 43, 66, 67–68; concept, 37; predicate, 9, 121, 136
subjective: consciousness, 103, 107; idealism, 20, 24; projection, 100
The Subjective Logic (Hegel), xxv, xxvii, 62
substance, 57, 131; property formal structure, 8–10; universal, 9, 10, 22, 79
succession, 18
syllogism of allness, 109–110, 111
syllogism of analogy, 113–117
syllogism of existence, 100–108, 110, 111; first—qualitative, 100–102, 103; fourth—mathematical, 107–108; second, 102–104; third, 105–107
syllogism of induction, 110–113
syllogism of necessity, 113, 116, 119–137; first—categorical, 119–125; second—hypothetical, 125–130; third—disjunctive, 130–137
syllogism of reflection, 108–117; first—allness, 109–110, 111; second—induction, 110–113; third—analogy, 113–117
The Syllogism section, xii, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, 9, 54, 67, 92, 98, 102, 137
syllogistic mediation, failed forms of, 97–117; existence, 100–108, 110, 111; reflection, 108–117

theological metaphysics, xiii
theory of relativity, xxii
third syllogism of existence, 105–107
third syllogism of necessity—disjunctive syllogism, 130–137
third syllogism of reflection—syllogism of analogy, 113–117

thought, xii, xix, xxi, 6, 7, 14, 20; being, and, xxvi, 3, 4, 10, 56; determinations, 2, 7, 121; finite, xxiv, 6, 7; infinite, 6, 7; objectivity of, 32, 56
totality, 90, 121, 122, 125, 137
traditionalist readings, xxi–xxviii
traditional metaphysics, 8, 57, 76; critique of, 1–4; overview, ix, xi–xii, xiii, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxviii. *See also* metaphysics; rationalist metaphysics
transcendental: apperception, xix, xxviii, 7, 64, 98–99; deduction, xxvii, 32, 44, 61, 98
truth, xxi, 10, 14, 15, 31–32, 34, 57, 66, 81; conditions, 5; foundation and, 68; material, 14–15; propositional, 14–15

understanding, 6, 7, 109; discursive, 114–115; intuitive, 114, 115, 116–117
unity, 18, 24, 104, 128, 133; immediate, 115; mediated, 124, 125
universal, xxvii, 4, 21, 27, 33, 35, 81; analytically, 116; concrete, 77, 94; determinations, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 17, 21, 27; genuine, 86; ideas, 15; immanence of, 20–24; judgments, 36–37; moment, 48, 49, 83, 90; synthetically, 116
universality, 17, 47, 120, 125, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134; abstract, 74; Aristotelian connection, 74–77; first moment of the concept, xxviii, 49–50, 54, 65, 66, 67, 73–83, 86, 95, 97; forms of syllogistic mediation, 98, 104, 105–106, 109, 110, 113, 114, 117; genuine, 73–74; impoverished, 74, 76; Kantian connection, 20, 21, 58, 79–83; necessity and, 15–16, 20; objective, 121–122; Stern's Aristotelian reading, 77–79
Universality-Individuality, 102
Universality-Individuality-Particularity, 102, 110–111
universal moment, 48, 50, 82, 83, 92, 128, 129, 133; concept as the process of reflection, of the, 34–35; forms of syllogistic mediation, 101, 106, 136; self-identical unity, 49
Universal-Universal-Universal, 107
unlikeness, 42, 45

Vorbegriff, 1, 10, 20

will, 18
Wolff, Christian, xxii
world, ix, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 137; vs. mind, 13–15; soul, x

About the Author

Giorgi Lebanidze teaches Philosophy at Fordham University and Marist College in New York. He holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University.