Mervyn J. Bain

Moscow and Havana 1917 to the Present

An Enduring Friendship in an Ever-Changing Global Context

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For my parents and Karen

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Chapter 1

The Changing Nature of Moscow and Havana's Foreign Policies

In April 2018 Cuba underwent historic change with Miguel Díaz-Canel replacing Raúl Castro as the president of Cuba; but during Raúl Castro's presidency both the Cuban and Russian governments have made increasing reference to the permanency of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, which was apparent in January 2009 when during his first visit to Moscow since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations in December 1991, Raúl Castro told the Russian journal *America Latina* that Russia and Cuba are "inextricably" linked.[1] Moreover, in July 2012 when the Cuban premier returned to Moscow, Vladimir Putin commented, "All that we have achieved during these past years, it's our common treasure."[2]

The return of visits such as Raúl Castro's and the sentiments expressed in these comments evidence both the perpetuity of bilateral relations between Moscow and Havana and its remaining importance for both countries.[3] Notwithstanding this, the traditional assumption is that the relationship between Moscow and Havana began with the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 and ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991. This book will challenge this established supposition, with its focus being a much longer time period, as it will argue that a bilateral relationship began soon after the Russian Revolution in November 1917 and that it continues to be of great significance for Moscow and Havana in the contemporary situation.

Consequently, since November 1917 three distinct periods have existed in the relationship: from the time of the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution, January 1959 to December 1991, and the post-1992 period. Throughout this monograph four key thematic issues within the relationship will be the prime focus of scrutiny with each being awarded its own chapter: (1) foreign policy, (2) ideology, (3) diplomacy and statecraft, and (4) economics and culture. Subsequently, each individual chapter is divided into the

three chronological eras detailed above, resulting in each of the four thematic issues being examined within the three disparate eras. In short, the book's structure will comprise a grid formation.

The central argument postulated for the existence of the enduring relationship between Moscow and Havana since November 1917 will be that in each of the three separate eras of the relationship both countries have had rationale to engage with the other, and not, as previously noted, this being exclusive to the 1959 to 1991 period. Key for these rationale was that a number of consistencies have continually impacted the relationship since the Russian Revolution. This is despite both countries, and global politics in general, having undergone fundamental change in the period, which is the focus of this study, and each of the three distinct periods of the bilateral relationship having their own idiosyncrasies and nuances. The primary commonality was the relationship between Moscow, Havana, and Washington which, although mostly contentious, was at times, most noticeably during the Second World War, also collaborative.

Two differing paradigms in international relations, realism, or more specifically defensive realism, and constructivism (defensive realism, offensive realism, and constructivism will be analyzed more fully throughout this chapter), will be utilized to examine the four key thematic issues that are the focus of the subsequent chapters. The use of two contrasting concepts may appear unconventional due to their apparent incompatibility,[4] but they will permit two divergent elucidations of the relationship's long-standing nature to be posited, thus deepening our understanding of it.

Realism has been the principal theory within international relations with realist thinking dominating geopolitics during the Cold War. Concerning realism, Stephen Walt has written,

> It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.[5]

Consequently, due to the importance of the relationships between Moscow, Havana, and Washington for the thesis of this monograph, which as detailed were antagonistic for much of the focus of this study, realism will be significant throughout. This is despite the end of the Cold War, which could suppose that realism's significance has waned. However, writing about the post–Cold War era, Walt has continued, "Although many academics (and more than a few policy makers) are loathe to admit it, realism remains the

most compelling general framework for understanding international relations. States continue to pay close attention to the balance of power and worry about the possibility of major conflict."[6] Moreover, defensive realism, despite apparent assertiveness that could suggest a preeminence of offensive realist thinking, underpins the "Putin doctrine" which emerged in the Kremlin's foreign policy in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, defensive realism also remains fundamental to understanding revolutionary Cuban foreign policy in the post-1992 era.

In addition to defensive realism, constructivism will also be important, because it is "especially attentive to the source of change"[7] and although, as noted previously, a number of commonalities exist between the three disparate periods which are the focus of this work, considerable change has also occurred within both the Soviet Union/Russia, Cuba, and the international system. The use of constructivism will allow these changes to be addressed. Furthermore, writing about Russian foreign policy in general, Andrei Tsygankov has stated that "both realism and liberalism are ethnocentric in the sense that they view Russia's foreign policy through similar Western cultural lenses and do not pay sufficient attention to Russia's indigenous history and system of perceptions."[8] The sentiments of Tsygankov's statement could also apply to Cuba and its foreign policy, and the use of constructivism will prevent insufficient focus being given to the two countries' aboriginal histories and sensitivities. In sum, as noted, an enhanced cognation of the bilateral relationship's enduring nature will be provided by the use of realism and constructivism. Liberalism, referred to in Tsygankov's above quote, is examined below, as are other key theories within international relations, a number of which are also pertinent to the bilateral relationship at various points since November 1917. Furthermore, the importance of domestic issues for foreign policy will also be given due attention.

The academic discipline of international relations has undergone tectonic shifts during the period which is the focus of this study, with the discipline emerging in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the First World War. Liberalism, underpinned by the ideas of "collective security," originally dominated international relations thinking, but it became increasingly marginalized as the events of the 1930s led to the onset of the Second World War.[9]

The Twenty Year Crisis is one of most prominent critiques of liberalism, but the ideas of realism contained within this book were not new to E. H. Carr's work as they originate from Thucydides's writings on the Peloponnesian War.[10] As noted, realism dominated international relations thinking during the Cold War. At realism's core are the ideas that states are the preeminent actors in international relations, that the international system is inherently anarchic, that states are unitary rational actors who concentrate on their own fixed self-interests, and that due to states' principal aim being their

own survival they strive to maximize their power. On this Hans Morgenthau has written, "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."[11] Therefore, realism is materialist in nature and concentrates on the diffusion of material power within a self-help system with the structure of the international system determining states' actions.

Over time a number of different incarnations of realism materialized with Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* elucidating the central tenets of defensive realism.[12] In this, Waltz posits that the product of the anarchic nature of the international system is that states regard all other states as possible threats and consequently security is their principal goal resulting in states being security maximizers rather than power maximizers, or as Waltz has written, "The ultimate concern of states is not power, rather security."[13] Concerning the impact of the anarchic state of international relations on states, Waltz has written that states

> are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation as long as each fears the other will use its increased capabilities.[14]

This fundamental challenge often results in zero-sum thinking, which defensive realists believe can be solved by the conception of alliances in an attempt to create a balance of power. Furthermore, defensive realism supposes that the status quo within the international system will persist due to states acquiring only sufficient power to safeguard their own security.

The question of Soviet/Russian and Cuban security is central to understanding the relationship between Moscow and Havana in all three eras of the relationship since November 1917, and it will be argued throughout this study that both Moscow and Havana utilized the bilateral relationship to counter, or balance, what they perceived as Washington's anti-Soviet/Russian and anti-Cuban policies. In sum, Moscow and Havana strove to counteract the United States rather than gain power at the expense of Washington: in short, defensive realism. Moreover, Waltz's assertion that due to the anarchic state of the international system that "self-help is necessarily the principal of action"[15] would be crucial for Soviet interest in Cuba in the period from November 1917 to January 1959 and will be given appropriate attention at various junctures of this work.

The principles of offensive realism were elucidated in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* by John Mearsheimer. Security remains the principal concern of states, but offensive realists believe this is achieved by a different

means when compared to defensive realists.[16] On this Mearsheimer has written, "Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want."[17] The principal method for achieving state security remains self-help, but Mearsheimer believes states strive to maximize their power at the expense of other states. Concerning this, he has written that the "best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense."[18] Consequently, offensive realists suppose that states will pursue expansionist and aggressive policies in the belief that this will increase their security. In sum, states focus on absolute gains, with a state's wish to have hegemonic power being the extreme example of this desire.[19] Offensive realists would posit that both the World Wars were underpinned by the failed endeavors of Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany to secure regional hegemony. Consequently, due to Kremlin's interest in Cuba since November 1917, not least in the twenty-first century, resulting from the "Putin doctrine," it could be assumed that offensive realism would be important for Soviet/Russian attention in the Caribbean island as it would appear to be expansionist in nature. However, as noted previously, it will be theorized that this focus on Cuba was not underscored by offensive realism, but rather partly by defensive realism.

In addition to realism's significance during the Cold War, Marxism was also at the forefront of the ideological standoff between the Soviet Union and United States that dominated geopolitics in the second half of the twentieth century. Unlike realists who, as stated, believed that the nation state was the key actor in international relations, Marxists theorized that class was the key determinant. Consequently, Marxists posited that economics underpinned many global issues and that the emancipation of the working classes was a universal world project.[20] Due to the significance of Marxism for both Soviet and Revolutionary Cuba's foreign policies it will be examined more fully in the next section of this chapter and returned to throughout this monograph.

Since the time of the Russian Revolution a number of other theories have emerged, and subsequently will be important for this work, with Dependency Theory appearing in Latin America during the 1960s. As with Marxism, economics was fundamental for Dependency Theory as it attempted to find answers to questions focusing on why countries in the Global South remained underdeveloped when compared to those in the Global North. Dependency theorists posit that it is advantageous for the countries of the North for those in the South to remain underdeveloped, with this being perpetuated by the workings of the international financial system which benefits the Global North. Dependency theorists also believe that a "comprador" class materializes in the poorer countries who act to safeguard their favored position within their own particular society. Fulgencio Batista in 1950s Cuba is often perceived in this manner with issues of dependency being an underlying theme

in Cuba since the time of the Spanish conquest in the late fifteenth century.[21] Moreover, dependency has impacted bilateral relations between Moscow and Havana in all three periods of the relationship since November 1917 and will be crucial for their subsequent analysis.

Throughout history various examples exist of an individual who has been able to dominate the political process of their respective country, with Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin often being perceived in this manner. This phenomenon gave rise to the Great Man Theory, which rather than focusing on each country's unique political decision-making process instead concentrates on the vagaries of the specific individual's character. Since January 1959 a unique Cuban version of the Great Man Theory, *Fidel personalismo*, emerged due to Fidel Castro's apparent domination of the Cuban political system for almost fifty years.[22] We will return to *Fidel personalismo* in the last section of this chapter.

In addition to *Fidel personalismo* being important, so will be the concept of soft power. Soft power is not a new concept with Joseph Nye having written,

> A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather coerces them.[23]

Traditionally United States' soft power has attracted much attention, but during the Cold War Soviet soft power also existed, despite the German author Josef Joffe positing that it stopped at the Soviet "military border."[24] With relation to Soviet soft power Nye has stated, "The Soviet Union also spent billions on an active public diplomacy program that included promoting its high culture, broadcasting, disseminating disinformation about the West, and sponsoring antinuclear protests, peace movements, and youth organisations."[25] This was most apparent in Soviet-Cuban relations in the years from 1959 to 1991, but it also impacted the relationship in the period before this, particularly in the years from 1945 to 1952, with Russian soft power also being important in the twenty-first century.

As detailed, constructivism excels in explaining why change occurs in international relations. Key to this assertion is, as Walt has written,

> Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive,

> constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes. They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behaviour.[26]

Consequently, constructivism also theorizes that the preeminent actors in international relations are states, but contrary to realism they do not possess latent national interests and their behaviour is not predetermined by the structure of global politics. In sum, it is not the anarchic state of the international system that explains if states are hostile or friendly, or as Wendt has famously stated, "Anarchy is what you make of it."[27] Subsequently, it is not the nature of the international system per se which presupposes the actions of states, but rather their perception of the international system and other states within it. On this Tsygankov has noted, "Actions and interests are not rationally uniform, and they differ depending on individual state experiences with the international system and its parts."[28] Concerning this, in 1992 Wendt wrote,

> A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar "structural" positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles.[29]

Therefore, as Wendt has theorized, "Identities are the basis of interests,"[30] but a diverse variety of identities can exist for the same actor. Specifically, Wendt has written,

> Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Similarly, a state may have multiple identities as "sovereign," "leader of the free world," "imperial power," and so on. The commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another which constitute the structure of the social world.[31]

Culture, history, religion, and the interaction of states are all fundamental to these identities, as are the ideas held by ruling elites. As noted, both interests and identities are "not set in stone," can change, or, as Wendt has written in the above cited quote, are "highly malleable."[32] For Walt, "Constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can

change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in the behaviours of states and occasionally triggering far-reaching but unexpected shifts in international relations."[33] This is applicable to Mikhail Gorbachev's implementation of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union in the mid- to late 1980s, which had unforeseen consequences not only for international relations in general but also for Soviet-Cuban relations specifically. Moreover, concerning the end of the Cold War, Walt has stated that constructivism postulated it concluded because "Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as 'common security,' whereupon the constructed tension between the Soviet Union and United States faded."[34]

The outcome is that ideas (1) are important in the creation of states' interests and identities, (2) can also change, and (3) can be used to explain change in international relations as with Walt's above assertion for the end of the Cold War. Simply, an alteration in regnant elite ideas can result in significant and far-reaching outcomes which may have been unanticipated. The general principle of Walt's contention for the end of Soviet-U.S. rivalry, shifting elite ideas, will be important throughout this study of Moscow-Havana relations since November 1917 due to the significant changes which occurred in the international system and within the Soviet Union/Russia and Cuba during this period. In addition to this, Tsygankov and Walt's afore cited arguments of the importance of states' perception of the international system, and the role of history in creating these perceptions, will also be significant for explaining the enduring relationship that exists between Moscow and Havana in the protracted period of study, which is addressed in this book.

As noted, appropriate consideration will also be given to the impact of domestic policies on foreign policy. A burgeoning literature on this has emerged with Graham Allison's seminal work on the Cuban Missile Crisis *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* being important.[35] A number of these works concentrate on the importance of public opinion for foreign policy. However, for long periods, which are the focus of this book, the differences in the political systems in the Soviet Union and Cuba compared to the West, this would not appear to be applicable.[36] However, it would be remiss to ignore the internal political situations in the Soviet Union/Russia and Cuba for this study. In the mid- to late 1980s *glasnost* would introduce a new dynamic to Soviet-Cuban relations as Soviet public opinion would affect the relationship as never previously, and it will also be theorized that the changing composition of the Russian State Duma in the mid-1990s (resulting predominantly from internal dissatisfaction) was also highly significant. Additionally, as will be examined below, the Cuban political system was not, and is not, a monolithic structure with Antoni Kapcia writing about the various different key internal debates that have taken place throughout the revolutionary period.[37]

The outcome is that a number of the different theories detailed in the previous pages will be important for this study, but as stated, particularly defensive realism and constructivism. The next section of this chapter will concentrate on Moscow's global outlook, with the final section focusing on Cuban foreign policy. Attention in both sections will be given to issues which have been common to a number of eras in both countries' histories.

MOSCOW'S GLOBAL OUTLOOK

Throughout its history Russia's relationship with the outside world has been dominated by a variety of factors, with the outcome being that a number of commonalities bestride different eras. Tsygankov believes that Russian national identity with regard to Western Europe has been a constant theme in Russian foreign policy since the time of Peter the Great, and he has also written that three 'schools of thought' have competed for primacy within Russian foreign policy from the tsarist era: the ideas of Westernists, statists, and civilizationists. Tsygankov believes Westernists wanted to demonstrate Russian membership of the "family of European monarchies" with this constituting part of Peter the Great's modernization process. In contrast, civilizationists suppose that Russian values are more consummate than Western ones and subsequently Russian values should be expanded. Tsygankov dates this belief to the time of Ivan the Terrible.[38] Regarding statists, Tsygankov has written, "Ever since the two-centuries long conquest by the Mongols, Russians have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty."[39] Within Russian foreign policy, this has transcended tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet times. Ronald Grigor Suny has also written of the importance of Russia's unique history and the ensuing impact that this has had on Moscow's foreign policy, which he also believes has been the case since the czarist era.[40]

Stephen White has also detailed issues within Russian history that are common to a number of different eras, chiefly a wish for warm-water harbors and Russia's place in the international system. John Ledonne and Laurence Caldwell have also written of the Russian desire for warm-water ports, but contrary to ideas of civilizationists elucidated by Tsygankov, Caldwell also believes that frailty on its borders and an inferiority complex due a perceived backwardness have underpinned both Russian national security and also its foreign policy.[41]

These consistencies and common issues from different historical eras have been key in forming predominant opinions within the ruling elite in Moscow, and their subsequent perception of the international system; central to a constructivist analysis of Moscow's foreign policy,[42] because, as noted,

constructivism is not ethnocentric and consequently takes into account countries' indigenous histories and subsequent perceptions of the international system. Further increasing the importance of constructivism for this study is its ability to explain change in global politics.

Tsarist Russia may not have been a colonial power in the manner of other European powers such as France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom but Ledonne has written, "To reach its periphery was the ultimate goal of Russian foreign policy."[43] Under Ivan the Terrible Russia expanded to the east and became a Europe-Asian power, with Russell Bartley stating that from the time of Peter the Great, Russia showed tentative interest in both the Pacific and also Latin America.[44] However, Grigor Suny has written,

> The great paradox of Russia's twentieth century evolution was that a self-proclaimed empire fell in 1917 to be replaced by what became a neo-imperial state that not only refused to see itself as an empire, not only considered itself to be the major anti-imperial power on the globe, but became the unwitting incubator of new states.[45]

Central to this irony was the tectonic change in Russia's relationship with the West which took place after November 1917 because the Russian Revolution signalled

> a wholesale rejection of an entire way of life and its economic underpinnings increasingly dominant since the seventeenth century, and the substitution of something new and entirely alien in terms of culture and experience. That revolt began with the October Revolution in 1917.[46]

The creation of the Third International, or Comintern, in March 1919 was fundamental to this apparent rejection of traditional practices, with unsurprisingly this organization being highly radical on its formation as many Bolsheviks believed that the Russian Revolution was the starting point for world revolution. At its founding Congress, Vladimir Lenin stated, "It becomes clear, if we take into account that the course of events since the imperialist war is inevitably facilitating the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, that the international world revolution is beginning and increasing in all countries."[47]

Although this was the case, the developing world caused ideological problems, most notably due to a lack of a proletariat in this part of the world, not only for the Comintern but also for Soviet theorists throughout the Soviet period. This, however, did not mean that the Comintern ignored the developing world, but what most interested the organization was the potential effect that any revolutionary activity in these countries could have for the colonial

powers. This was evident at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, when the Mexican delegate Gómez is reported to have said about a discussion with Lenin that "he was interested in the masses of people in Mexico, in their relation to the United States, whether there was a strong movement in the United States."[48] Due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations at this time, this was also applicable to Comintern interest in Cuba, which will be more fully examined in chapter 2, with it also being apparent in Lenin's brief writings on Cuba.[49]

During the Comintern's existence, various apparent contradictory policies were followed. The principles of "temporary stabilisation," that permitted more flexibility for communist parties to collaborate with socialist movements and trade unions, were pursued from time of the Third Congress of the Comintern in March 1921, primarily due to a waning of the original revolutionary fervour. This revolutionary verve had receded for both internal reasons, Russia had been required to rebuild after the Civil War with subsequently the New Economic Policy materializing, and also external ones evidenced by the defeat of the Red Army in the Polish War in November 1920.[50]

However, by the Ninth Congress in February 1928 a policy of "class against class" was initiated due to the Soviet belief that "temporary stabilisation" was nearing its end, with the Comintern believing that "class against class" would inevitably result in capitalist wars and consequently the victory of revolutionary socialism.[51] The Soviet internal situation was also important for this tactical change and emergence of the so-called "third period" of the Comintern with Julius Brownthal having stated, "From 1928 onwards the Communist International had been nothing more than an instrument of Stalin's internal policy."[52] This was particularly important in the power struggle which had raged in the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Lenin's death in January 1924; as Kevin McDermott has written, Stalin used these changes in Comintern policies to "define and defeat his opponents" within the Russian party. Moreover, McDermott has also written that Stalin thought "that long-term Soviet security interests would be best served by a monolithic, strictly disciplined international Communist movement dedicated to the defence of the USSR."[53] This will be returned to later in this chapter.

Writing on the "third period" of the Comintern era and its radicalism, Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe have stated, "Class against class has usually been seen as a disaster."[54] The advent of fascism in Europe in the 1930s, and particularly Nazi Germany, evidenced the "disaster" of the "third period" as it had failed to both spark other revolutions and also in making the socialist movement attractive to workers. Although this was the case, the "third period" is highly significant for Comintern interest in Cuba during the 1930s and will be examined in the next chapter.

The events in 1930s Europe detailed above resulted in the "popular front" strategy being introduced at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935. On this Duncan Hallas has stated,

> For Stalin to consolidate his power internationally, it was essential that the Comintern parties be immunized against criticism from the revolutionary left. For the Comintern was now to be swung, by Stalin's agents, to a position well to the right of the social democratic parties, to a position of class collaboration precisely the position taken by the social democrats during and after the First World War and against which the founders of the Comintern had revolted.[55]

Local communist parties working with other local parties within the political system was central to the "popular front" strategy. In Cuba in 1942 the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) members Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez became ministers within Batista's government, their appointments being an example of the "popular front" tactics.[56] Consequently, the "popular front" strategy was highly significant for Soviet-Cuban relations in the era between the Russian and Cuban revolutions, with its importance continuing even after the disbandment of the Comintern in the summer of 1943. In October 1947 the much more European-focused Communist International Bureau (Cominform) replaced the Comintern,[57] but the ideas of the "popular front" will be examined at various times throughout this book.

Officially the Comintern did not constitute part of the Russian government as it was instead under the control of the Bolshevik party, but Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch have written, "Though officially Soviet Russia remained the avant-garde country of the Communist world revolution, in truth the international Communist movement became the tail of the Russian dog."[58] This distinction is fundamental in understanding the actions of the Comintern, because, as stated, it was highly radical in March 1919, with Leon Trotsky having been quoted as having said, "We are putting all our hope on this, that our revolution will solve the European revolution. If the peoples of Europe do not arise and crush imperialism, we shall be crushed—that is beyond doubt."[59] This fear was only exacerbated by U.S. troops being deployed to Russia in 1918 to aid stranded Czech troops in Russia's far-east. The consequence of this Western action was that it fuelled Russia's historic fear of aggression from other powers resulting in the Bolshevik perception of the West as antagonistic and unfriendly. Consequently, this permits a constructivist argument to be made for why the relationship between the fledgling regime in Soviet Russia and the West was contentions. Moreover, the new ruling elite in Moscow had vastly different primary ideas from the predecessors as their basis for a new society in Russia was founded on a belief in economic equality and state ownership of property. This further impacted their assessment of the international system.

In addition, what can also be assumed is that the Bolsheviks believed that for the Russian Revolution to survive, other revolutions had to emerge with the actions of the Comintern being fundamental to this desire. Simply, Comintern activities were driven by a Bolshevik desire to safeguard their own survival, thus evidencing the key characteristics of realism. Moreover, Rees and Thorpe have written,

> It was believed that revolution, having taken place in Russia, would soon be followed by Communist conquests of power in Western Europe. For Lenin and his followers, it was axiomatic that the revolution could not survive in 'backward' Russia alone: the Russian Soviet republic could only survive so long as it was buttressed by a Soviet regime in Germany, in particular.[60]

On the prevalence of realist thinking within the Soviet political elite, Grigor Suny has written,

> Lenin, Stalin, and their successors saw the world through a realist lens, calculating how to preserve their power and the system they ruled, how to weaken their opponents, and how to win friends and influence people around the world.[61]

This could suppose that this organization's actions were underpinned by offensive realism, because it appeared that this organization was attempting to increase Bolshevik security by reducing the power of its adversaries.

Although this is the case, defensive realism was evident in the traditional forms of diplomacy which the Bolsheviks conducted from soon after coming to power. This is despite these traditional forms of diplomacy, which will be examined below, appearing contradictory to the above detailed activities of the Comintern because this organization's ultimate aim appeared to be to depose governments and dismantle the traditional system of international relations within which formal diplomacy operated. This apparent inconsistency between formal diplomacy and the activities of the Comintern complicated Moscow's interactions on the global stage, but both were important for Soviet-Cuban relations prior to January 1959.

However, the activities of the Comintern and the traditional forms of diplomacy pursued by the Bolsheviks cannot be taken in isolation, they were not mutually exclusive, but instead constituted important elements of the foreign policy practiced by Lenin's government. Both shared the same ultimate aim, to safeguard the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik administration. Piero Melograni writing about Lenin has not just stated, "He was a realist, that was how he held on to power," but he has even questioned Lenin's wish for world revolution.[62] Instead Melograni has argued that the survival of the Russian Revolution, rather than the world revolution, was always Lenin's primary objective, and crucially he has contended that the two parts of Moscow's

foreign policy worked in tandem. Peter Shearman has also made this point,[63] with Melograni having written,

> Lenin saw that the Comintern would serve him very well in pursuing his objectives in foreign politics. The policy of coexistence with the West did not imply any kind of immediate "ideological disarmament." In various messages sent to the Allies, Chicherin and Litvinov promised to stop revolutionary propaganda only after a peace settlement had been singed. Until peace was concluded, the fact that the Third International existed, even if only on paper, strengthened the Bolsheviks' diplomatic position.[64]

In short, the Comintern could be utilized to intensify pressure on foreign governments (concerned at the possibility of further revolutions in their own country), while the Bolshevik's conducted formal diplomatic interactions with the same governments. This 'dual track' strategy only increased the possibility of the Bolsheviks being ultimately successful in their discussions with foreign governments. This strategy would persist throughout the organization's existence.

The Bolsheviks conducting traditional forms of diplomacy was evident as early as the talks with Germany which led to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in March 1918. This was very different from the ideas of the world revolution and caused consternation within the Bolshevik party. However, in the *Thesis on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace*, Lenin wrote,

> For victory of socialism in Russia, a certain interval of time, no less than several months, during which the socialist government must have complete free hands for the victory over the bourgeoisie first in its own country and for setting up broad and extensive mass organizational work.[65]

Central to this is the idea that the Bolsheviks required "breathing space" in the immediate aftermath of November 1917 in order to buttress their rule of Russia.[66] Simply, the survival of the revolution was at stake and regarding Brest-Litovsk, Richard Pipes has written, "Lenin was prepared to make peace with the Central Powers on any terms as long as they left him a power base."[67] Additionally, Margot Light has written, "And his cause after the Revolution was preeminently the survival of the Bolshevik state. It was to ensure this survival that he advanced the idea of peaceful coexistence."[68] In sum, the Bolsheviks had acted to safeguard the Russian Revolution, and consequently their own survival.

In signing the Brest-Litovsk agreement the Bolsheviks were attempting to countervail Germany supremacy from a position of great weakness rather than try to increase their power vis-à-vis Germany as offensive realism would

suppose: in short, defensive realism. When this is combined with the way in which the Comintern could be used to achieve this outcome (intensifying pressure on governments while the Bolsheviks conducted formal diplomatic interactions with the same governments) the result is that both the Bolsheviks formal diplomacy and the activities of the Comintern were ultimately underpinned by defensive realism. In relation to this, and concerning Moscow's foreign policy throughout the Soviet era, Shearman has written,

> From a realist perspective the international systems of anarchy and the security dilemma this creates inevitably led to Soviet Russia seeking security through military means and alliances. Despite the rhetoric, . . . to a certain extent the practice of seeking to spread communism overseas, the logic of international politics always pulled the Soviet leadership back, using whatever means were required, to defending the "national interest" (for which read state interest) as the first priority.[69]

These principles continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s with the Soviet Union requiring further "breathing space" in the late 1920s as the Soviet Union underwent a process of collectivization and industrialization. Moreover, the Soviet Union was formally recognized by a number of countries and participated in international conferences such as the Rapallo Treaty in April 1922.[70] Furthermore, in September 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, partly resulting from the appearance of fascism in Germany.[71]

A form of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the West appeared to have materialized. However, it was the Soviet belief that this did not negate confrontation with the capitalist world, with peaceful coexistence providing the Soviet Union with the opportunity to be better prepared for when the inescapable confrontation with the West began. Additionally, peaceful coexistence also benefited the "third period" of the Comintern as it presented local communist parties with the opportunity to undermine Western governments. Again this would benefit Moscow in its battle with the capitalist West.

The advent of Nazism in the 1930s may have caused ideological problems for the Comintern, but this did not prevent the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. However, the Soviet rationale for signing this agreement returns to the need for "breathing space" which had also underpinned Lenin's decision to sign the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in 1918.[72] Molotov signing the Nazi-Soviet pact provided Moscow with invaluable time to prepare for war and also further evidenced the Soviet Union pursuing formal traditional diplomatic practices.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact spectacularly imploded on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa. The outcome was a bloody war that would last for over four years, but it also

resulted in a form of détente between the Soviet Union and the Western powers with the advent of a wartime alliance against Nazi Germany. As detailed in the opening section of this chapter, the creation of alliances is central to the principles of defensive realism as states endeavor to protect their security, with this wartime alliance (which put aside previous tensions in Soviet-Western relations noted previously) further evidencing the prevalence of defensive realism within the Soviet elite because the survival of the Soviet state and Russian Revolution were being questioned by Nazi aggression. Simply, this alliance aided Moscow in safeguarding Soviet security and counteracting Nazi Germany. Furthermore, this wartime alliance would considerably impact Soviet-Cuban relations and will be further examined in later chapters.

The alliance between Moscow, Washington, and London ceased with the end of the hostilities of the Second World War, with relations between the Soviet Union and the West quickly and dramatically deteriorating. Jonathan Haslan has theorized that the Cold War between Moscow and the West began from soon after November 1917, but in the mid- to late 1940s the Cold War greatly intensified.[73] Disagreement over the composition of the post-war world was important for this breakdown in relations with Shearman arguing that restabilizing the balance of power in Europe was key to the heightened geopolitical situation. As noted above, the balance of power and creation of alliances are central to defensive realism with this underpinning Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Simply, Moscow desired the creation of "buffer states" to safeguard its own security to counterbalance the West.[74] Notwithstanding this, the clash of conflicting ideologies between Moscow and Washington would dominate global politics for forty years.

Nigel Gould-Davies has written that "the Cold War was, in essence, a struggle between ideas," with the battle for "hearts and minds" being a crucial part of this.[75] Gould-Davies believes that culture was significant for this process, which returns to the ideas of soft power.[76] Soviet soft power would be key for Soviet interest in Cuba in the years from 1945 to 1952 and also for the two periods of the relationship after 1959.

Notwithstanding this, forms of "peaceful coexistence" persisted with subtle changes to "peaceful coexistence" beginning to appear in the 1950s with Light having written,

> That the new version of peaceful coexistence was intended to involve more than just the absence of war and expansion of trade relations soon became clear. While international economic links were said to be an objective need of all countries, determined by the international division of labour, political and cultural cooperation was also envisaged.[77]

This would be key for Soviet-Cuban relations, with the changes made to Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of Stalin's death in March 1953 also

being pivotal. After Stalin's death the Kremlin became much more interested in the Global South, this change in Soviet foreign policy coincided with the height of the decolonization process in this part of the world. In February 1956 Nikhita Khrushchev demonstrated Moscow's increased interest in the developing world when during his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) he stated, "The awakening of the African peoples has begun. The national liberation movement has gained strength in Brazil, Chile and other Latin American countries."[78]

In the mid-1950s the lack of a proletariat in the developing world continued to cause theoretical problems for Moscow. However, the Kremlin hoped that by backing national liberation movements, Soviet influence in the developing world would increase, as once independent, these countries would ally with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's lack of a traditional colonial heritage was significant as was the financial backing which Moscow provided for these newly independent countries. This led Shearman to write that Moscow was trying "to buy influence in the Third World at the expense of the United States and the former colonial powers in Europe."[79] Increasing Soviet influence in the Global South would appear to have resonance with the aforementioned ideas of Mearsheimer and offensive realism due to its apparent assertiveness and desire to increase Soviet power at the expense of the West. However, contrary to these principles, Moscow's increased attention in the developing world can be seen to be driven by defensive realism. In the bipolar international system of the time, if countries in the Global South aligned themselves with Moscow this would strengthen a Soviet global alliance which could subsequently be utilized to counteract U.S. anti-Soviet policies across the globe, including by the 1950s on the Korean peninsular.

The Kremlin's foreign policy continued to evolve with Soviet leaders linking all alterations to the writings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Lenin and the inevitability of an international socialist society that opposed colonialism and imperialism.[80] However, as argued, defensive realism was pivotal within Moscow's foreign policy. Defensive realism was once again apparent with the events in Hungary in the autumn of 1956, the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and the subsequent emergence of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," as the Kremlin's wish to preserve the status quo in global politics with the existence of "buffer states" to bolster Soviet security and counterbalance the United States appearing more important than Marxist-Leninist ideology.[81] The principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" would once again be invoked in December 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[82]

However, a number of traditionally held assumptions regarding Soviet foreign policy, including the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the Soviet desire for nuclear parity and the inevitability of world revolution were challenged by the reforms instigated in the mid- to late 1980s in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev. Writing about becoming General Secretary of

the CPSU in March 1985, Gorbachev would later write, "On taking office as General Secretary in 1985 I was immediately faced with an avalanche of problems. . . . The Soviet Union faced tremendous internal problems."[83] This included a Soviet leadership that had become a gerontocracy evident by Gorbachev being the fourth person to assume the position of General Secretary of the CPSU in a three-year period which in itself was destabilizing, Soviet science and technology was becoming increasingly antiquated in comparison to the West and the country's economy was stagnating. Large levels of military spending only exacerbated the dire Soviet economic situation. Concerning the Soviet economy Yegor Ligachev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, would later state, "Our country's economy approached the year 1985 very short of breath."[84]

Gorbachev's solution was the implementation of *perestroika*, a drive for increased economic efficiency, technological progress, and a decrease in state subsidies, which he introduced in April 1985 in a speech to the Central Committee plenum.[85] Other reforms quickly followed, which included "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy that, as noted, challenged a number of principles of Soviet foreign policy and consequently appeared to reduce the significance of Marxist-Leninist ideology within the Kremlin's foreign policy. "New thinking" in Soviet foreign policy was designed not only to sustain *perestroika* but also to try and address both the "bleeding wound" of Afghanistan and also the worsening of Soviet-U.S. relations that had taken place in the late 1970 and early 1980s with the advent of Ronald Reagan's Presidency. Consequently, a number of traditional Soviet assumptions concerning both the United States and its population were also questioned.[86] Moreover, *glasnost* would also be implemented which aimed to reenergize the Soviet population as it strove to end secrecy which had traditionally been prevalent in Soviet society.[87] The interconnected nature of these reforms perfectly demonstrated the synergy of domestic and foreign policies.

Gorbachev hoped that these reforms would alleviate the plethora of problems which the Soviet Union faced in the mid-1980, but "new thinking" fundamentally altered the Kremlin's foreign policy and also reduced Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and United States. This de-escalation in superpower hostility would eventually culminate in the end of the Cold War, with as previously detailed, the Soviet leader's engagement with new ideas resulting in the constructed tension between Moscow and Washington evaporating. Consequently his embrace of new ideas resulted in a change in regnant Soviet elite ideas and were not merely cosmetic as sometimes has been thought.[88] The outcome, as noted, is a constructivist interpretation for the end of the Cold War to be posited. Furthermore, these changes to Soviet foreign policy and reduction in superpower tension would have a number of consequences, many of which were unexpected and unforeseen while

also introducing new "explosive" pressures in Moscow-Havana relations. Therefore these Soviet reforms will be returned to at various points in this manuscript, as will the above subsequent constructivist elucidation for the end of the Cold War.[89]

Gorbachev may have encountered a challenging situation while he was general secretary of the CPSU, but after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 the Russian government faced a multitude of questions not least the return to the traditional question of Moscow's role in the world. Regarding this, White has written, "The new Russia had to accommodate itself to a world in which it was no longer a superpower, and in which its economic weakness mattered more than a stockpile of rusting missiles."[90]

Simply, Russia had to find its place in the world, with this being further complicated by both a multiple of internal problems and also having to establish relations with the newly independent former Soviet states or Russia's "near abroad." Regarding this, Light has written, "The loss of the empire led to confusion about Russia's role in the world."[91] Russia became the legal successor to the Soviet Union, which gave Russia the appearance of remaining a global player, most notably with the Russian Federation obtaining the Soviet Union's place in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. However, Russia also inherited the debt accrued by a number of developing world countries during the Soviet era, including Cuba.[92] Until a final resolution on this issue was achieved in July 2014 it would impact hugely on Russian-Cuban relations in the post-1992 period and will be returned to in subsequent chapters.

Although this was the case, the key relationship for Moscow in the early to mid-1990s was with Washington. On this Bobo Lo has written, "During the Yeltsin period, America represented the single greatest external influence on Russian foreign policy."[93] Not only had Cold War tension been removed from this relationship, but the Yeltsin government hoped it could receive assistance from the United States in the Russian economic transition.[94]

In sum, it appeared as if the Liberal Westernizers had defeated both the Pragmatic Nationalists and Fundamental Nationalists in the domestic debate which had raged regarding Russian foreign policy. The internal Russian situation, particularly the Yeltsin government's desire to move as quickly as possible to a market economy, was also closely associated with this foreign policy debate. These economic reforms also had political goals with White writing that they were designed to create "millions of owners, not hundreds of millionaires" which it was hoped would prevent a return to communism, or as Lilia Shevtsova has written, big business "was used by the Yeltsin regime to crush the 'red' directors of enterprises."[95] The outcome was a much more pro-Western looking foreign policy than Moscow had previously pursued with constructivism also appearing to be significant because similarly to

Gorbachev, Yeltsin had also been willing to embrace new ideas, the principles of neoliberal economic thinking. The result of engaging with these new values was that the West and the United States appeared much friendlier than had been the case during the Cold War. This returns to Wendt's famous quote of "anarchy is what you make of it,"[96] and in the early to mid-1990s the perception of the United States within the Moscow ruling elite was of an ally in their economic transition rather than as an enemy trying to destroy the Soviet Union as had been the case previously. Consequently, Moscow-Washington relations improved.[97]

Contrary to this, the above listed change in Russian government principal ideas was that at this time Moscow and Havana no longer understood the international system similarly, and subsequently perceived each other in a less friendly manner than had previously been the case. This change in both the Kremlin's foreign and internal policies, evidencing objectives in domestic and foreign policies coinciding, would have considerable repercussions for Russian-Cuban relations, some of which were unforeseen, and consequently they will be examined throughout this work.

Further change in Russian foreign policy took place in the mid-1990s, evidenced by Yevgeny Primakov replacing Andrei Kozyrev as Russian foreign minister in December 1995. Kozyrev had been very closely associated with the Western-looking foreign policy of the early 1990s whereas Primakov believed in "spheres of influence" and perceived the world in much more multipolar terms.[98] Writing about Kozyrev's resignation White has written, "In the end he became a 'virtual sacrifice' to the new Duma."[99] Again, domestic and foreign policy issues were aligning.

The precursor for this "new Duma" was a surge in Russian nationalism, resulting from grave dissatisfaction with both the pro-Western foreign policy of the initial post-Soviet period and also Russian treatment by the West. Many Russians blamed the country's economic problems of the early to mid-1990s on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, with U.S. assistance in the Russian economic transition not being of the level that Moscow had hoped.[100] Additionally, Russians disliked both the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the east, this returns to the traditional Russian fear of invasion, and this organization's treatment of their fellow Serbs in the former Yugoslavia. Regarding NATO bombing of Belgrade in March 1999 Yeltsin has called this "undisguised aggression" and he also commented that "the Kosovo crisis increased the anti-Western sentiment in society."[101] This Russian perception of NATO action and expansion to the east has connotations with Wendt's aforementioned quote of the way in which U.S. military power is perceived in Canada when compared to Cuba. Simply, the Kremlin's perception of the role of the West in the international system had changed with Moscow once

again perceiving the West as a threat. Moreover, primary ruling elite ideas in Moscow changed to a more nationalistic macro-level orientation. The consequence of these alterations in both the Russian assessment of the international system and also ruling elite ideas in Moscow is that a constructivist argument can be formed for this change in Moscow's relations with the West which began to sour when compared to the immediate post-Soviet era that were outlined above. Moreover, this also resulted in Russia and Cuba having a similar perspicacity of the international system and the role of the United States within it. The Cuban perception is detailed below.

The result was that the Kremlin wished to reaffirm its global standing after being marginalized in the early to mid-1990s. Relations with the "near abroad" became of more significance than with the West as the Kremlin desired a much more multipolar world than the one which had emerged from the Cold War era.[102] It appeared that the Liberal Westernizers had been defeated by nationalistic tendencies. Moscow refocusing on its relationships with countries that it bordered, and a desire for a multipolar world, returns to the central ideas of defensive realism, because these endeavors were an attempt to balance the near omnipotent power of the United States in the international arena in the final decade of the twentieth century rather than increase Russian power at the expense of Washington. If the Kremlin was successful in these efforts, Russian security would consequently increase. This change in Russian foreign policy would have a number of acute consequences for Russian-Cuban relations and will be examined at various stages of this book. Moreover, Primakov, who as stated was integral to this alteration in Russian foreign policy, also personally impacted Moscow's relationship with Havana and therefore his individual contribution will also be more fully scrutinized in chapter 3.

At the advent of the twenty-first century, Vladimir Putin became the president of the Russia Federation with great uncertainty surrounding his appointment because, apart from his KGB past, little was known about him.[103] Confusion concerning Putin's foreign policy intensified with the Russian Premier's actions in the opening months of his presidency. In the year 2000 he visited both North Korea and Cuba, with consequently, Andrei Grachev writing, "In those first few months in office, Putin seemed to be much more at ease with the leaders of former client states of the Soviet Union . . . than with his Western counterparts."[104] Notwithstanding this, others believed that Putin had somewhat of a pro-European outlook due to his having spent time living in the German Democratic Republic from 1985 to 1990.[105]

Appearing at odds with the desire to increase ties with "former client states of the Soviet Union," in the very early stages of his presidency, Putin also seemed to cultivate more cordial ties with the United States. In June 2001 Putin met George W. Bush in Slovenia and in the aftermath of the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, he provided backing for the United States and also gave the United States permission to use air bases in Central Asia. Furthermore, in October 2001 Russia announced the closure of the Lourdes electronic listening post on the outskirts of Havana.[106] Throughout the 1990s the U.S. administration had continually attempted to pressurize Moscow into terminating its use of this facility as it could not understand why it remained open in the post–Cold War era. Lourdes eventually shut in January 2002, appearing to evidence more cordial Russian-U.S. relations, but its closure caused consternation within the Cuban government and tension in Russian-Cuban relations. This friction would not persist, but the issues surrounding the shutting of Lourdes and its aftermath will be more fully examined in chapter 3. Although this was the case, closer Russian-U.S. ties did not materialize with subsequently Putin aligning Russia with Germany and France with regard to U.S. and UK action in Iraq in 2003. On this Richard Pipes has written, "With the Germans and the French, the Russians can balance the United States. Russia would not be a superpower, but it would be part of a superpower complex. They can only be a junior partner with the United States."[107]

This "rapprochement" with the West and the aforementioned trips to North Korea and Cuba may have added to the confusion surrounding Putin's presidency in its infancy, but this "rapprochement" with the West did not persist, with Putin's foreign policy ultimately having similarities to the foreign policy pursued by Moscow from the mid-1990s onwards, detailed above. The Kremlin continues to project itself on the world arena and desires a multipolar world, and due to its closer relations with the "near abroad" a degree of a Soviet legacy exists.[108] The outcome was the emergence of what some have classed as a "Putin doctrine."[109] Due to its apparent assertiveness, offensive realism could be seen to be important for the "Putin doctrine," but it is what Leon Aron has called the "besieged fortress" mentality or what Shevtsova has termed the "Weimar syndrome," that are key for this doctrine. At their core is the idea that Russia is surrounded by steadily encroaching enemies.[110] Russian attempts to counter the indignity resulting from both the "besieged fortress" mentality and "Weimar syndrome" have under Putin's presidency been utilized by the Russian government to amass support for itself and subsequently is fundamental to its survival.[111] The result is that defensive realism is central to understanding the "Putin doctrine." Tsygankov's ideas regarding statists, historically Russians have a psychological inferiority complex but are willing to fight for their independence and sovereignty, detailed previously also have resonance, with Igor Zevlev believing that the ideas of realist-statists and the nationalist school of Russian foreign policy have merged since the year 2000. The nationalist school of Russian foreign policy, which Zevlev has divided into neo-imperialists and ethnic nationalists, wishes the creation of a "buffer zone of post-Soviet protectorates along Russia's borders," while

realist-statists desire increased Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, reduction in U.S. global power and creation of a multipolar world.[112]

The "Putin doctrine" has been vital for Russian-Cuban relations in the twenty-first century as has Moscow's increased interest in Latin America as whole. Key for this regional interest has been the economic aspect of Russian foreign policy. The sale of Russian military hardware to Latin America first illustrated this interest.[113] However, since the year 2014 as tension between Russia and the West has intensified due to the Ukrainian situation, increased Russian links with Latin America are part of a process to counter Western sanctions against Russia.[114] Again, this returns to the central principles of defensive realism of why states create alliances to protect their own security because Moscow has not been trying to increase its power vis-à-vis the West, but rather counteract Western actions toward Russia. The importance for Moscow-Havana relations of the "Putin doctrine," increased Russian interest in Latin America as a whole and economics will all be scrutinized in the following chapters.

As detailed, a number of issues common to different eras in Russian/Soviet history have consistently affected Moscow's foreign policy, including the country's place in the world and a fear of external hostility. Both of these constant factors are significant for the central arguments of this book: (1) both Moscow and Havana have had rationale to engage with one another continuously since the time of the Russian Revolution, and not just in the years from 1959 to 1991, (2) as theorized, the pervasiveness of defensive realism existed within the thinking of the Soviet ruling elite, and (3) the unique nature of Soviet/Russian history detailed above is also important for a constructivist interpretation of Moscow's foreign policy.

HAVANA AND THE WORLD

Since 1959 revolutionary Cuba's foreign policy has attracted much attention, primarily due to Havana having much greater global influence than would be expected of a Caribbean island. This led Piero Gleijeses to write,

> Cuba's role in international politics during the Cold War was unique. No other Third World country projected its military power beyond its immediate neighborhood. Extracontinental military interventions during the Cold War were the preserve of the two superpowers, a few West European countries, and Cuba.[115]

The various different theories evident within post-1959 Cuban foreign policy will be examined, but what has received much less attention is Cuba's pre-revolutionary foreign policy.

The island's relationship with the United States from the time of Cuban independence in 1898 until the Cuban Revolution explains this lack of attention in pre-1959 Cuban foreign policy, because Cuban independence did not mark a new free stage of Cuban history as the United States dominated the island both politically and economically. This led Samuel Farber to write, "The situation essentially represented de facto if not fully de jure colonialism."[116] The addition of the Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution in 1901 formalized this situation with Louis Pérez writing, "It served to transform the substance of Cuban sovereignty into an extension of the United States national system,"[117] with the first article of the amendment reading, "Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers, which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba."[118]

U.S. economic domination of Cuba was illustrated by the reciprocity agreement signed between the United States and Cuba in December 1903. Select Cuban exports were awarded a 20 percent reduction in price with a 25–40 percent reduction on U.S. imports being implemented. This heralded a rush of U.S. investment in Cuba, but Hugh Thomas has stated that this investment was primarily in the sugar industry.[119] The result was a lack of diversification in the Cuban economy with Pérez writing, "It delivered still another setback to Cuban enterprise and local entrepreneurs."[120]

The United States never formally annexed Cuba, but Washington did deploy soldiers to the island to restore order at various times, most visibly in 1906 and 1917 when U.S. troops were sent to Cuba to curb protests over the re-elections of Presidents Tomas Estrada Palma and President Mario G. Menocal, respectively. The first of these deployments lasted until 1909 and in 1917 the U.S. military remained in the provinces of Camaguey and Oriente until 1922.[121]

Washington's power over Cuba was not exerted solely by military or economic means but by political measures as well. In 1920 General Enoch H. Crowder was dispatched to Havana as the "Special Representative of the President" to resolve the disputed nature of the 1920 Cuban presidential elections. Moreover, the U.S. ambassador, Summer Welles, was overtly involved in restoring order to Cuba after the general strike of August 1933 and the subsequent "Sergeants Revolt" of September 1933.[122]

The "boom and bust" nature of the Cuban economy had been central to the political unrest of the summer of 1933, with the island's economic prosperity being directly linked to the world sugar price. Cuba had economically benefited from the First World War, due to the increase in the world sugar price, but had suffered as it fell in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of October 1929.[123] Regarding Welles's role in restoring order in 1933, Jules Benjamin has written, "Wholly abandoning the pretence of non-interference, Welles arranged a succession of a provisional President acceptable to Washington."[124] The United States non-recognition of Ramón Grau San Martín's

government was pivotal to this process, but once Fulgencio Batista aligned the Cuban military with Carlos Mendieta instead of with Grau, the United States recognized the Cuban government within five days.[125]

Grau's decision to unilaterally repeal the Platt Amendment was fundamental to Washington's non-recognition of his government. Notwithstanding this, the United States continued to economically dominate the island with Farber having written, "The post-1933 period could be described as a transition for a de facto colonialism to a neocolonial arrangement."[126] A new reciprocity act, involving concessions for 35 U.S. products and 400 Cuban ones, was signed in 1934, further hindering diversification of the island's economy.[127] Politically Cuba and the United States remained interlinked despite the island's liberal 1940 constitution and as stated, the island having a communist presence in its government in 1942.[128] Cuba entering the Second World War on December 9, 1941, two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, further illustrated the close political relationship between Havana and Washington. As with the First World War, Cuba benefited from the rise in the world sugar price during the Second World War, with Cuba also subsequently increasing sugar production. Additionally, Batista, who by the 1940s had assumed the Cuban presidency, permitted the U.S. military to train on the island.[129] Aiding the U.S. war effort in these ways won Batista favor in Washington, evident when Washington quickly recognized his government when he returned to power after the April 1952 military coup.

During Batista's second presidency of Cuba, Washington remained the "power behind the throne," with the importance of this being illustrated in the aftermath of the March 1958 fraudulent Cuban presidential election when the United States imposed an arms embargo on Batista's government. On this Pérez has written that this "move was tantamount to a withdrawal of support."[130] This would be key for victory of Fidel Castro and his guerrilla army.

In the period from Cuban independence in 1898 and the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 the United States dominated Cuba both politically and economically. On this U.S. domination of Cuba Pérez has written, "The restrictions imposed upon the conduct of foreign relations, specifically the denial of treaty authority and debt restrictions, as well as the prohibition against the cession of national territory, were designed to minimize the possibility of Cuban international entanglements."[131] This quote was originally written about the Platt Amendment, but it could also be applied to Soviet-Cuban relations in the years from November 1917 to January 1959. Consequently, U.S.-Soviet relations are key for understanding Moscow's relationship with Havana prior to the Cuban Revolution.

A number of authors believe that U.S. foreign policy from the late 1890s contained a distinct economic aspect.[132] This both brought the United States into confrontation with the traditional colonial powers, who disliked

Washington's "open door" economic policy, and underpinned U.S. entrance into the First World War in April 1917. The Zimmerman letter (raising alarm in Washington over a possible German-Mexican alliance, with the U.S. decision to enter the war being partly driven by a desire to prevent this alliance materializing) and a number of U.S. citizens being killed by German U-boats were also important, but the concern that money loaned to London would remain unpaid was key for Washington entering the war.[133]

At the end of hostilities Thomas Paterson et al. have claimed, "To Americans, World War 1 bequeathed an unassailable legacy: the United States became the world's leading economic power."[134] However, the Russian Revolution of November 1917 would also affect U.S. foreign policy for much of the reminder of the twentieth century. Regarding the situation which President Wilson encountered in 1917 to 1918, Walter LaFeber has written,

> Wilson moved to control the revolutionary outbreak by demanding that the new nations be governed by American-style democracy, not by Leninist-style communism. In doing so, the President set in motion the U.S. challenge to Russian communism—a challenge which characterised American-Russian relations for nearly the whole of the twentieth century.[135]

Consequently, for the remainder of the time period which is the focus of this book U.S. foreign policy would be underpinned by a desire to both confront communism and also a wish for free trade. Moreover, these beliefs would continue to impact Cuban-U.S. relations in the post–Cold War period. U.S. attempts to maximize its power at the expense of other states and subsequently offensive realist thinking were key to these beliefs. As previously detailed, liberalism and the ideas of "collective security" emerged at the end of the First World War with Woodrow Wilson being synonymous with them, but realist thinking was paramount. On this LaFeber has written,

> There was idealism here, certainly, but also realism. Indeed, Wilson has become he most influential architect of twentieth century United States foreign policy in part because he so eloquently clothed the bleak skeleton of U.S. self-interest in the attractive garb of idealism.[136]

The deployment of U.S. troops to Russia in 1918, as previously noted in this chapter, chiefly to aid stranded Czech troops in Russia's far east, evidenced this because Paterson et al. have written that a U.S. desire to protect "open door" trade with Japan was also significant for these U.S. troops being sent to Russia.[137] Additionally, it demonstrated Wilson's anti-Bolshevik intent.

U.S. anti-Bolshevik feeling persisted after Wilson's presidency and throughout the 1920s with Washington only officially recognizing the Soviet regime in November 1933. The Bolshevik regime's continuing existence was

important in this U.S. decision, because by the 1930s it had become apparent that the Soviet Union was not going to simply implode, with this being augmented by both the necessity of new markets for the U.S. economy as it struggled in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash and also a wish to counter China in the far east.[138] Franklin Roosevelt's decision to recognize the Soviet government was not universally popular in the United States with many in the U.S. State Department disagreeing with it. La Farber writing about Robert Kelly, head of the U.S. State Department Eastern European Desk, has stated, "Kelly warned his superiors that if recognised, the Soviet Union would never keep agreements, but instead ferment revolution—as he argued, they were doing in Cuba."[139] This topic will be returned to in subsequent chapters.

These differences in opinion about U.S. recognition of the Soviet government were indicative of the debate between isolationalists and internationalists which endured in 1930s America. Isolationalists desired that the United States should remain disparate from the problems which were engulfing Europe during this decade while internationalists believed that Washington should remain a preeminent global power. The influence of isolationalists began to recede as the Roosevelt administration became increasingly worried about strained U.S.-Japanese relations.[140] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought these to a dramatic conclusion.

As detailed above, a subsequent wartime alliance between the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom emerged, with previous tensions being sidelined in the fight against the evil of fascism. As outlined, this coalition was underpinned by defensive realism as this coalition was designed to counterpoise the Axis Powers. Paterson et al. have called the wartime alliance between Washington and Moscow a "marriage of convenience," but as stated it would impact Soviet-Cuban relations.[141] However, as noted above, disharmony existed within this wartime alliance regarding the postwar world. The United States desired a world underpinned by democracy and free trade; the UK wished to protect its colonial trade with an economic tariff system while the Soviet Union wished to increase its security with the creation of "buffer states" in Eastern Europe.[142]

The situation between the Allies was further complicated by the fact that the Second World War had a similar economic boost for the U.S. economy as the First World War had. LaFeber has subsequently stated,

> The United States was beyond question becoming the world's greatest power. British, Russian, Japanese and western European industries and cities were largely reduced to smoking ashes between 1941 and 1945. But untainted U.S. industrial production shot up by 90%.[143]

Additionally, Paterson et al. have written, "The United States emerged from World War 2 a global power for the first time in its history. American

diplomats were self-conscious about their supreme power and attempted to use it to shape an American orientated post-war world."[144] In July 1944 this heralded the creation of the IMF and World Bank at the Bretton Woods conference.[145] Moreover, at the end of the Second World War, the United States was the world's sole nuclear power.

As the Cold War intensified in the mid- to late 1940s, economics and politics became increasingly interconnected within U.S. foreign policy, as Washington attempted to stop the spread of socialism and Soviet power. The basis of this policy is often perceived to have been George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of February 1946. The content of this telegram was vehemently anti-Soviet with Kennan writing, "To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after the example of the recent war, is sheerest nonsense."[146] In Europe capitalism was in direct confrontation with socialism and to prevent socialism spreading into Western Europe, Washington implemented the Marshall Plan. In addition to stopping creeping socialism, the $13.2 billion that the Marshall Plan awarded Western Europe also benefited the U.S. economy as this money helped rebuild Western Europe after the Second World War, subsequently fostering a Western European desire for U.S. products.[147] Additionally, the "Truman Doctrine" was implemented providing U.S. economic and military support to Greece and Turkey, again preventing the spread of socialism.[148]

A new era in global politics began on August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, ending the U.S. hegemonic position as the sole global nuclear power. Washington's response was the National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC-68) of January 1950, which stated that it was highly likely that global tension would persist for a prolonged period of time due to the Kremlin continually attempting to expand its power and influence.[149] This Paper believed this resulted from the inevitably of relentless socialist aggression, which could only be challenged by increased military spending. The result LaFeber believes was the nuclear arms race, with the commencement of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 being perceived as a further illustration of socialism's continuous hostility. The NSC-68 paper adhered to the ideas of containment evident within Kennan's "Long Telegram," but from 1950 onward military power was at the forefront of these efforts. This would predominantly remain the case until the late 1980s when, as detailed, Cold War tension between the United States and Soviet Union waned. As noted in LaFeber's previously citied quote, U.S. actions throughout the Cold War can be recognized as being driven by realist thinking as not only did successive U.S. administrations wish to safeguard the United States against their perception of creeping socialism but they were also acting to safeguard power for its own sake. Although this was the case, Cold War tension persisted between Washington and Havana into the twenty-first century.

In the years from November 1917 to January 1959, the events listed above were key to understanding the relationship between Moscow and Havana due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations. Moreover, the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations prior to January 1959 also constitutes one specific time element of one of the key consistencies (the relationships between Moscow, Havana, and Washington) that have impacted bilateral Moscow-Havana relations since the Russian Revolution. As detailed at the start of this chapter, the existence of these commonalities are integral to this book's argument; both countries have had rationale to engage with the other continuously since November 1917, and not as previously noted only in the years from 1959 to 1991. Additionally, the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations in the years prior to January 1959 are significant for both the primacy of nationalism within the Cuban Revolution and also the constructed history of this era, crucial for shaping regnant ideas in the Cuban revolutionary ruling elite. Both are not just central to the constructivist analysis of the hostility that materialized between Cuba and the United States post-1959, evidenced by Wendt's aforemenioned quote on how Cuba perceives the United States within the international system (as hostile) in comparison to Canada as well as continues to impact contemporary Cuban-U.S. relations.

As detailed, revolutionary Cuban foreign policy has attracted much attention with Michael Erisman in *Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World* detailing five concepts that have been prevalent in Cuba's foreign policy since January 1959. These are the idea of the revolutionary crusade, *Fidelista peronalismo*, the superclient/surrogate thesis, dependency and counter dependency and realist pragmatism.[150] At times since 1959 each has received attention.

The first of these concepts is that of a revolutionary crusade, with the 1960s Cuban foreign policy being highly radical. In a similar manner to the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, the new government in Havana believed that the Cuban Revolution would herald other revolutions. In the case of Cuban radicalism it was believed that these revolutions would predominantly be in the Global South, with the island's internationalism being key for this Cuban desire.[151]

Similarly to the activities of the Comintern detailed previously, Cuban radicalism failed to be the precursor for other revolutions, graphically illustrated by Ernesto Guevara's death in October 1967. Consequently Cuba attempted to cultivate state-to-state relations, despite U.S. attempts to politically and economically isolate the island. The cultivation of state-to-state relations is vastly different from the ideas of revolutionary crusade, which receded still further in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the island was impacted by unforeseen consequences of the Soviet reforms of the mid- to late 1980s. However, the significance of internationalism can be seen to have remained, evidenced by the number of Cuban doctors and teachers who work abroad

and the emergence at the start of the twenty-first century of a number of left-leaning governments in Latin America that heralded the creation of both the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas and an apparent anti-U.S. bloc within the region.[152]

As outlined previously in this chapter, a country's political system is sometimes subjugated by a single person with the examples often provided being Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. From January 1959 until his waning health, which in August 2006 forced him to step aside as Cuban president, Fidel Castro was able to bestride Cuba's internal and external policies. This gave rise to the ideas of *Fidelista peronalismo*, the specific Cuban version of the Great Man Theory.[153]

Notwithstanding this, Erisman believes that the Cuban political system was never the subject of Fidel Castro's personal whim with the Revolution becoming increasingly institutionalized from the 1970s onward. Not only did this institutionalization process commence partly due to the improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations, which will be more fully examined throughout this book, but it also safeguarded the Revolution's future if Castro was removed from the Cuban political system. Erisman has argued that organizations such as the PCC, the National Assembly, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR), and the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) have all become significant players in the Cuban political system. Writing in 1976 Edward González wrote, "In sum, Fidel and his brother remain solidly entrenched in the Cuban political system. Nevertheless, it is evident that Cuba's ruling coalition has been significantly broadened in recent years."[154]

The success of this institutionalization process can be seen in events since the summer of 2006. At first due to the receding role that Fidel Castro played in Cuban politics after his deteriorating health, which culminated in Raúl Castro becoming the permanent president of Cuba in February 2008; secondly how the Cuban political system has continued after Fidel Castro's passing in November 2016; and thirdly with Miguel Díaz-Canel replacing Raúl Castro as Cuban President in April 2018.

The surrogate/superclient thesis attracted much academic attention from the time of joint Cuban and Soviet action in Africa in the mid-1970s, leading the U.S. senator Daniel Moynihan to describe the FAR as the "Ghurkhas of the Russian Empire."[155] The surrogate thesis posits that the Soviet Union controlled both Cuba's internal and foreign policies, whereas the superclient thesis theorizes that although Havana had more power in the relationship, ultimately the Kremlin could veto any of Cuba's actions.[156]

From January 1959 to December 1991 Soviet-Cuban relations were undoubtedly of crucial importance for the Cuban Revolution due to the levels of economic and political security which it provided. However, the surrogate/

superclient thesis ignores the importance and strength of Cuban nationalism which has been ubiquitous throughout the revolutionary period, evident in both speeches by the Cuban elite and also documents that have recently become available.[157] The significance of Cuban nationalism challenges the ideas of the surrogate/superclient thesis, but any possible semblance of it completely disappeared with the implosion of Soviet-Cuban relations in December 1991.

Erisman has also written of the importance of dependency and counter dependency within Cuban foreign policy. As detailed, since the Spanish conquest in the late fifteenth century, Cuba has been dominated by outside powers. First Spain and then from 1898 until 1959 the United States, with some arguing that from the time of the Cuban Revolution until late 1991, dependency moved from the United States to the Soviet Union.[158] Moreover, it has also been posited that a degree of Cuban economic reliance on Venezuela appeared in the twenty-first century.[159]

However, due to the aforementioned prevalence of nationalism within the Cuban Revolution, Erisman has written that Havana continually strove to reduce its economic and political dependence on Moscow in the period from 1959 to 1991. The result, Erisman believes is counter dependency, the antithesis of the surrogate thesis. Counter dependency provided the Castro government with bargaining power, or leverage, in its relationship with Moscow, with Havana continually attempting to show its independence and therefore reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union.[160] Any level of dependence on the Soviet Union disappeared with the end of Soviet-Cuban relations on December 25, 1991, but as stated, a degree of economic reliance on Venezuela can be detected in the twenty-first century.[161] However, Cuban attempts to avoid any form of possible dependence on Caracas have been key in the political will for Russian-Cuban trade to increase. Therefore issues of dependency and counter dependence will be returned to at various times throughout this work.

As outlined, during the Cold War both Soviet and U.S. foreign policies were grounded in realist thinking with as theorized earlier in this chapter defensive realism underpinning Soviet/Russian foreign policy since November 1917. Moreover, as argued, defensive realism continues to have resonance within the "Putin doctrine" in twenty-first Russian foreign policy. Since January 1959 realism can also be perceived in revolutionary Cuba's decision-making process. Simply all decisions made by the Cuban ruling elite are ultimately underpinned by a desire to safeguard the Revolution's security and therefore survival. Havana's actions have been endeavors to offset U.S. aggression against the island rather than attempts to increase Cuban power at the expense of the United States: in short, the universality of defensive realism. It has been theorized that defensive realism was even fundamental for the radicalism of the early 1960s with Havana's desire to spark

other revolutions being an attempt to move U.S. focus from the Caribbean to other parts of the world, thus helping to safeguard the Cuban Revolution. Moreover, if Cuban radicalism succeeded in producing further revolutions, a pro-Cuban anti-U.S. alliance would emerge thus bolstering Cuban security, one of the central tenets of defensive realism.[162]

However, it has been argued that it was not defensive realism per se, but rather realist pragmatism that has been evident in Cuban foreign policy. The desire to safeguard the Revolution's survival is of primary importance with the result being that decisions are sometimes at odds with world opinion. This was infamously evidenced in August 1968 when Fidel Castro backed the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended the "Prague spring," but in doing this the Cuban leader had hoped that he may have been able to leverage increased security guarantees from the Kremlin.[163] This will be more fully examined in chapter 2. González has also written that realist pragmatism was evident in the 1970s, despite the aforementioned institutionalization process which began in this decade, with one of the principle adherents to realist pragmatism being the island's leading economist and member of the politburo of the PCC Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. Moreover, Raúl Castro is also often being perceived in a similar light.[164]

Nevertheless, the universality of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite's decision-making was further evident in the early 1990s when Cuba faced the emerging New World Order bereft of its socialist trading partners while continuing to face a hostile United States. On the loss of the socialist bloc, Fidel Castro has later commented, "When the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp disappeared, no one would have waged one cent on the survival of the Cuban Revolution."[165] Regarding U.S. aggression, John Kirk has written, "The greatest single task in terms of foreign policy facing the Cuban government in the early 1990s, however, was how to keep the traditional (self-declared) enemy at bay."[166] Erisman believes that this was achieved by a diversification of Cuban foreign policy which created greater economic and political space.[167] Furthermore, Julie Feinsilver has written

> that Cuba's foreign policy initiatives have been geared toward ensuring Cuba's security in an adverse geopolitical situation through support of progressive governments and the creation of a Third World constituency, to gain not just diplomatic support in international organisations but also economic or trade benefits.[168]

Jorge Domínguez has written that a four-part strategy was employed by Havana to achieve this; due to a neo-realist thinking attempts to balance the United States were made; economic policy was diversified to prevent the possibility of economic dependence appearing, on specific issues: common

security collaboration with Washington was sought and the creation of a "constituency abroad," particularly in the global South, was desired.[169] The desire to balance continuing U.S. aggression against the island with a "constituency abroad," or alliance, perfectly adhere to the principles of defensive realism, because it was designed to counter the United States rather than increase Cuban power at the expense of the United States as offensive realism would suppose. Consequently, defensive realism and realist pragmatism are key to the changes in Cuban foreign policy detailed above as they aided the survival of the Cuban Revolution in the post-Soviet era. Moreover, both defensive realism and realist pragmatism would also be of fundamental importance to the relationship that developed between Moscow and Havana in the 1990s from the ashes of Soviet-Cuban relations, with at times their impact being in unintended ways. Consequently the evolution of Cuban foreign policy in the final decade of the twentieth century, driven by realist pragmatism and defensive realism, will be returned to a various points of this study.

As has been argued, the enduring U.S. aggression toward the Cuban Revolution has been vital for the relationship between Havana and Moscow. However, since December 17, 2014, historic change has taken place in Cuban-U.S. relations, with both the re-creation of diplomatic relations and President Barack Obama visiting Cuba in March 2016.[170] The impact of this historical change in Cuban-U.S. relations for Moscow's relationship with Havana will be more fully examined in chapter 3. Notwithstanding this, an improvement in Cuban-U.S. relations does not mean that realist pragmatism will recede in significance in Cuban foreign policy, or rapprochement with the United States would be at the expense of Russian-Cuban relations. If closer relations between Havana and Washington did materialize, realist pragmatism would suppose that it is highly unlikely that Havana would concentrate exclusively on its relationship with the United States and "turn its back" on Moscow. Simply such a scenario would be contrary to the assumptions of realist pragmatism evident within the Cuban ruling elite since January 1959, because as detailed, they have continually endeavored to avoid potential issues of dependency arising and have consequently attempted to cultivate relations with a number of countries.[171] Furthermore, the principles of realist pragmatism and defensive realism would also theorize that if in the future Havana's relationship with Washington soured—under the presidency of Donald Trump some of the changes made to the relationship since December 2014 have been reversed—Cuba would attempt to pursue closer relations with Moscow.

In sum, Kirk has surmised that in its dealings with the outside world revolutionary Cuba has, "an approach that is totally sui generis, following its own blend of principles and pragmatism, self-interest and selflessness, and fuelled by a volatile blend of nationalism and pride in being distinctive."[172]

This will be important for this manuscript as it examines the relationship between Moscow and Havana from the time of the Russian Revolution to the present.

As has been stated, the central argument of this study will be that in each of the three disparate eras of the relationship (from the time of the Russian Revolution until the Cuban Revolution, from January 1959 to December 1991, and the post-1992 period) that exist since November 1917, both countries have had rationale to engage with the other, and not as previously noted this being exclusive to the 1959 to 1991 period. Consequently, the idea that Moscow suffered "geographical fatalism" prior to January 1959 will be contested.[173] On this lack of Soviet interest Nicola Miller in *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959-1987* has written,

> Moscow's early view of Latin America was governed by what became known as the law of "geographical fatalism." Soviet officials saw little hope either of establishing formal political ties or of promoting revolution in countries forced to live within the shadow of the United States and its 1823 Monroe Doctrine.[174]

This is partly challenged by the aforementioned Comintern interest in Cuba which is evident in the works of Mervyn J. Bain, George Boughton, Kiva Maydanik, Manuel Caballero, Barry Carr, and Steven Clissold, with a number of these being scrutinized in chapter 2 of this work.[175]

However, Soviet-Cuban relations in the years from 1959 to 1991 received much academic focus, with a number of these works displaying the themes in Cuban foreign policy elucidated by Erisman that were detailed above.[176] However, this is not repeated with the bilateral relationship that developed between Moscow and Havana in the 1990s from the ashes of Soviet-Cuban relations. Simply, Russian-Cuban relations in the post-1992 period became the almost "forgotten" relationship of international relations as academic attention moved elsewhere, primarily the survival of the Cuban Revolution.[177]

Although each of the three periods of the relationship has received varying levels of academic interest, the relationship in its entirety from November 1917 to the present has not. However, Bain's "Moscow, Havana and Asymmetry in International Relations" and "Havana, Moscow and Washington: A Triangular Relationship at a Time of Change?" do examine the bilateral relationship in its totality from November 1917 to the present. Neither of these works is as long as this book or offers the complexity which this book will bring to the understanding of the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Havana over this extended period of time. Instead these two articles focus on very specific aspects of the relationship. The first offers an analysis of the effect of distance on an asymmetric relationship and challenges the traditional perception that as distance between two countries increases, the intensity of

the relationship decreases. The focus of the second article is exclusively the impact of the U.S.-Cuban relationship on Moscow-Havana relations, which is undoubtedly highly significant. This work will also examine the impact of U.S.-Cuban relations, but it will also scrutinize other aspects of Moscow-Havana relations, including the role of ideology and impact of "soft power" amongst others, to provide a full account of the bilateral relationship over this prolonged period of time from the Russian Revolution onward.

In addition, neither article nor any of the other academic literature, utilizes previously unseen documents from the Archivo Europa—Rusia—Ordinario housed in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive on the Avenida de los Presidentes in Havana, which the researcher has been able to access. This permits this book to elucidate a new and significant Cuban perspective on the bilateral relationship. The opportunity to gain access to the MINREX archive first arose during a research trip to the Cuban National Archive in Havana in late 2010 when the researcher was informed that the Cuban documents which referred to Soviet-Cuban relations after 1959 were exclusively retained in the MINREX archive. A number of Cuban colleagues thought a possibility to access these archives may exist and in October 2013 the author was able to meet MINREX officials who specialize in Russian-Cuban relations while participating in the conference "Rethinking a World in Crisis and Transformation" organized by Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI) in Havana. This opportunity was confirmed by these MINREX Russian specialists with Gleijeses, Kirk, and McKenna all having highlighted the importance of personal contacts for gaining access to MINREX archives.[178] Once a research proposal had been approved by MINREX officials, the author was granted unparalleled access to the MINREX Archivo Europa—Russia—Ordinario in the autumn of 2014. This experience mirrors those of Gleijeses, Kirk, and McKenna with all three authors experiencing the unique and somewhat irregular way in which MINREX officials permit access to their archives.[179] In sum, an institutionalized process through which researchers can apply for access to the MINREX archive does not exist.

In general the MINREX Archivo Europa—Russia—Ordinario remains prohibited to both Cuban and foreign researchers, with it comprising one or two file boxes for each year of the bilateral relationship. The correspondence includes reports of meetings between Cuban and Soviet officials, draft reports, official memos sent to various Cuban foreign ministers and instructions to Cuban ambassadors to the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia. The author was permitted access to documents in this archive for a protracted period of time ending in 2003.[180] As stated, this book will therefore be able to advance a new and significant Cuban interpretation on bilateral Moscow-Havana relations.

Additionally, this book will also utilize sources from the Cuban National Archive, the José Marti National Library, the University of Havana library, and the libraries in Centro de Estudios Sobre America, the Centro de Estudios Europeos, Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Internacional, and CIPI all of which are in Havana. Moreover, documents in the Wilson Center's Digital Archive, the book *Rossiia-Kuba, 1902–2002, dokumenty i materially*, published jointly by the Russian and Cuban Foreign Ministries, and the Soviet published documents entitled, "Fond 89: Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Trial" will also be utilized.[181] Documents from the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) Collections at the Tamiment Library at New York University are also important due to the role that the CPUSA played in Cuba in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, previously underused sources from the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History, the National State Library of Russia, and the Russian National Historical Library, which are all located in Moscow will also be utilized. Moreover, speeches, official statistics from both countries, and third-party organizations and media reports will also be used throughout this work.

Chapter 2 will explore the importance of ideology in the bilateral relationship. After Fidel Castro's announcement in December 1961 that he, and thus also the Cuban Revolution, was Marxist-Leninist, Marxist-Leninism formed a cornerstone of Soviet-Cuban relations until the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, but this chapter will argue that ideology has been of fundamental importance in the bilateral relationship both before Castro's 1961 announcement and after 1992 and the end of Soviet-Cuban relations.

Chapter 3 will examine state-to-state relations. It will scrutinize the dynamics which explain the existence of diplomatic relations for a ten-year period from April 1942 and also why they were subsequently severed in March 1952. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations on May 8, 1960, will also be analyzed before the importance in the 1990s of Russia becoming the legal successor to the Soviet Union will be examined as this was a vital component in bilateral discussions which took place throughout this decade, evident on reading MINREX documents. Additionally, this also evidences the significance of a Soviet legacy in the post-1992 relationship.

Chapter 4 will analyze commercial links and trade which have taken place during the period of this study. Traditionally it has been thought that Soviet-Cuban trade commenced after the Cuban Revolution, and although it increased exponentially in the 1959 to 1991 era during which Cuba became the Soviet Union's sixth largest trading partner, bilateral trade had taken place before Fidel Castro came to power and has continued in the post-Soviet era. The reasons underpinning trade in all three eras will be examined. Chapter 4 will conclude with an examination of bilateral cultural exchanges,

or the importance of "soft power," which took place in all three disparate eras of the relationship since November 1917.

Chapter 5 will bring together material from the previous chapters before final conclusions on Moscow-Havana relations in the years since the Russian Revolution are given. This will include that a relationship between the two countries did not start in January 1959 with the Cuban Revolution or end with the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, as has traditionally been thought. Rather a relationship between Moscow and Havana commenced soon after the Russian Revolution with a century later the contemporary relationship remaining important for both countries. It will be postulated that key to the longevity of the relationship is that in each of the three disparate periods of the relationship that exist since the Russian Revolution, both countries have had rationale to engage with the other. Fundamental to these rationale are that a number of consistencies persist throughout the period which is addressed in this work, with the chief consistency being the impact of the United States. Moreover, two contrasting paradigms in international relations, defensive realism and constructivism, will offer two alternative explanations for the enduring nature of Moscow-Havana relations, despite being formulated by different means, thus further deepening our understanding of the relationship. Additionally, chapter 5 will offer some thoughts on the future of the bilateral relationship, which is important due to the generational change in the Cuban leadership which has occurred due to Fidel Castro's passing in November 2016 and Raúl Castro's retirement in April 2018, with Miguel Díaz-Canel assuming the position of Cuban president.

NOTES

1. Raúl Castro, "Hoy las relaciones entre Rusia y Cuba son excelente. Entrevista al Presidente del Consejo de Estado de Cuba," *América Latina*, no. 3 (2009): 6.

2. Yaima Meneses Puig,"Mañana de homenaje y recordación," *Juventud Rebelde*, July 12, 2012, www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2012/07/-12.

3. Raúl Castro has also visited Moscow in 2015 and since 2008 Dmitry Medvedev has travelled to Cuba three times and Vladimir Putin once.

4. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425. Nicholas Onuf and Frank Klink, "Activity, Authority, Rule," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 149–74.

5. Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998): 41.

6. Ibid., 43.

7. Ibid., 41.

8. Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 14.

9. Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

10. E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Palgrave, 2001).

11. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1955), 25.

12. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: Random House, 1979).

13. Ibid., 4.

14. Ibid., 105.

15. Ibid., 25–26.

16. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010).

17. Ibid., 21.

18. Ibid., 23.

19. Ibid., 2.

20. Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982). Andrew Gamble, *Timewalkers: The Prehistory of Global Colonisation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

21. Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development and Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). Michael Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 43–45.

22. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 30–33. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men. Bringing the Statesmen Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107–46.

23. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 6.

24. Quoted in Nye, *Soft Power*, 11.

25. Ibid., 73.

26. Walt, "International Relations, Many Theories," 40–41.

27. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 395.

28. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 15.

29. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 396–97.

30. Ibid., 398.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 41.

33. Walt, "One World, Many Theories," 44.

34. Ibid., 41. For other interpretations for the end of the Cold War and Soviet Union please see Archie Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World. Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 191–212. Mark Galeotti, *Gorbachev and His Revolution* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 105–24. G. Lundestad, "Imperial Overstretch, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War," *Cold War History*, Issue 1 (2000): 1–20. Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the*

Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (London: Fontana Press, 1992), 446–501. Peter Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism* (London: Palgrave, 2015), 246–74. Stephen White, *Gorbachev and After* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214–52.

35. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of a Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

36. For example please see, James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 289–313. Robert D. Putman, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 42 (July 1991): 479–512.

37. Antoni Kapcia, "Political Change in Cuba: The Domestic Context for Foreign Policy," in *Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy. The Impact of the "Special Period,"* eds. Michael Erisman and John H. Kirk (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 24–27. Antoni Kapcia, "Raúl's Decade? Or the First Swing of the Pendulum?" in *Cuba's Forgotten Decade. How the 1970s Shaped the Revolution*, eds. Emily J. Kirk, Anna Clayfield and Isabel Story (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 8–21.

38. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 1–29.

39. Ibid., 6.

40. Ronald Grigor Suny, "Living in the Hood: Russia, Empire, and Old and New Neighbours," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past*, ed. Robert Legvold (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), 35–76.

41. White, *Gorbachev and After*, 179–80. John P. Ledonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700–1917. The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 347. Laurence T. Caldwell, "Russian Concepts of National Security," in *Russian Foreign Policy*, 280–83.

42. Grigor Suny, "Living in the Hood," 35–76. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 4–8. Joan DeBardelebena, "Applying Constructivism to Understanding EU–Russian Relations," *International Politics* 49 (2012): 418–33.

43. Ledonne, *The Russian Empire*, 347. Caldwell, "Russian Concepts of National Security," 280–83.

44. Russell H. Bartley, *Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence 1808–1828* (Austin: The University of Texas, 1978), 16–23.

45. Grigor Suny, "Living in the Hood," 41.

46. Jonathan Haslan, *Russia's Cold War. From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 1.

47. Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern: Vol. 1* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972), 529–30.

48. Quoted in S. Clissold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1918–1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 2. Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 80–81.

49. Lenin had only written specifically about Cuba on four occasions, and each time with regard to the impact of the island's relationship with the United States. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Tom 27 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), 299–426.

50. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, 532.

51. Duncan Hallas, *The Comintern. A History of the Third International* (Chicago: Haymarket Book, 1985), 130–34.

52. Julius Brownthal, *History of the International 1914–1943* (Camden, NJ: Nelson, 1963), 528.

53. Kevin McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern during the 'Third Period', 1928–1933" *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995): 418.

54. Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, "Introduction," in *International Communism and the Communist International 1919–43*, eds. Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 3.

55. Hallas, *The Comintern*, 145. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew have written that this change in Comintern tactics resulted from a "triple interaction" of reasons, which were "national factors, internal dynamics in the Comintern leadership and the shifting requirements of Soviet diplomacy." Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, *The Comintern. A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 120.

56. Julia E. Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 126. Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) changed its name to the Cuban Socialist Party (PSP).

57. Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominform* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).

58. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, 529–30.

59. Ibid., 20.

60. Rees and Thorpe, "Introduction," 5. McDermott has also made this point. McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern," 409. Edmé Domínguez has also written of the strategic reasons for the Comintern's creation being "to defend the Soviet Union and to contribute to its support." Edmé Domínguez, "The Mystification of a Policy or the Policy of Mystification," in *The Soviet Union's Latin American Policy. A Retrospective Analysis*, ed. Edmé Domínguez (Gotebrogs: Goteborgs Universitet, 1995), 72.

61. Grigor Suny, "Living in the Hood," 57.

62. Piero Melograni, *Lenin and the Myth of World Revolution: Ideology and Reasons of State, 1917–1920* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), xii.

63. Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 213.

64. Ibid., 57.

65. Vladimir Lenin, "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," in *A Documentary History of Communism. Vol. 2: Communism and the World*, ed. Robert V. Daniels (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1984), 22–23.

66. R. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution 1899–1919* (London: Fontana Press, 1990), 602. Michael T. Florinsky, "Soviet Foreign Policy. The Paradox of Soviet Foreign Relations," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12, no. 36 (April 1934): 536. Light, *The Soviet Theory*, 28.

67. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, 603.

68. Light, *The Soviet Theory*, 28.

69. Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 213.

70. *Diplomaticheskii slovar' A-U*, Tom 1 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1984), 314–25.

71. During the maiden Soviet speech to this organization Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, stated, "Throughout the seventeen years of its existence, its efforts for the establishment of the best possible relations with its own neighbours, on the most solid foundations, for rapprochement with all States desiring this, thus making itself a powerful factor for international peace." Maxim Litvinov, "Speech to Assembly of League of Nations," in *The Communist International 1919–1943 Documents*, ed. Jane Degras, vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1971), 94. Litvinov's comments are a concise summation of formal diplomatic practices, evidencing this aspect to Moscow's "dual track" diplomacy of the time.

72. John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 10–11. Martin McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008), 106.

73. Haslan, *Russia's Cold War*, 1. Joseph Nye has detailed three different "schools of thought" for the causes of the outbreak of the Cold War. These are traditionalists who believe Stalin and the Soviet Union are responsible, revisionists who think that the United States were culpable and postrevisionists who believe that it was a systemic problem. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation. An Introduction to Theory and History* (Boston: Longman, 2011), 134–36.

74. Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 225–31. On the creation of these "buffer states". William Keylor has written, "The unwavering determination of the Soviet government to establish a ring of subservient client states in Eastern Europe along the broad invasion route stretching from the western shore of the Black Sea to the eastern shore of the Baltic that had brought marauding armies to the heart of Russia twice within the memory of most of its citizens still alive in 1945." William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World. An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 253.

75. Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 2 (April 2003): 195. On the basis of the Cold War Shearman has written, "The Cold War was in essence an ideological conflict between two socio-economic and political systems, in addition to being a traditional Great Power competition reflecting the global balance of power." Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 61.

76. Ibid.

77. Light, *The Soviet Theory*, 35 and 37.

78. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, 7.

79. Peter Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 5.

80. Light, *The Soviet Theory*, 1–2 and 319.

81. This doctrine was based on the premise that it was not theoretically possible for a country to return to capitalism once it had become socialist. The doctrine may have been given this name in 1968, but this principal had also underpinned Warsaw Pact action in Hungary in 1956. In August 1968 Brezhnev wrote, "Defence of Socialism in the Highest International Duty" which was published in Pravda. In this he wrote, "The defence of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not only the internal affair of that country's people but is also a problem of defending the positions of world socialism." *Pravda*, August 22, 1968, 1. Consequently, the "Brezhnev doctrine" questioned country's independence and sovereignty. However, some believe it was the Soviet desire for "buffer states" and therefore realism that really drove these actions. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War. The Deals. The Spies. The Lies. The Truth* (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 185. Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 108–09.

82. *Pravda*, December 26, 1979, 1.

83. *Pravda*, April 24, 1985, 1.

84. Yegor Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 313.

85. *Pravda*, February 26, 1986, 5. Yegor Ligachev has posited that the result of many of these reforms being formulated on an adhoc basis were that many of outcomes were unanticipated. Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin*, 357–58.

86. Boris Yopo has also written of the importance of the Soviet internal situation and subsequent debate for the foreign policy changes implement by Gorbachev. Boris Yopo, *América del Sur en los nuevos lineamientos de la política exterior soviética* (Santiago de Chile: Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, 1988), 37. Additionally, these changes to Moscow's foreign policy were aided by the immense turnover within the Soviet foreign policy-making apparatus, the highest profile example being Andrei Gromyko being replaced as the minister of foreign affairs by Eduard Shevardnadze. *Pravda*, February 26, 1986, 6. For more analysis on the reforms to Soviet foreign policy please see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 158, 197–267. White, *Gorbachev and After*, 174–214. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Novosti," 1995), 312. S. F. Akhromeev and G. M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: Kriticheskii vzgliad na vneshniu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 55. Eduard Shevardnadze, *Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svobody* (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 47. Andrei Grachev, *Gorbachev's Gamble. Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (London: Polity Press, 2008), 70–75. Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 220–25. Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 2010, 284–94. Light, *The Soviet Theory*, 294–315.

87. The impact of *glasnost* took some time to be felt, but the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, it had taken Moscow three weeks to admit this accident had occurred, accelerated this process. For further analysis of this see White, *Gorbachev and After*, 70–73.

88. For this type of thinking please see Brown's account in Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 236–37.

89. A. Lynch, "Does Gorbachev Matter Anymore?" *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Summer 1990): 25. White, *Gorbachev and After*, 12–14. Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms 1985–1990* (New York: Philip Allan, 1990), 20–25. Mervyn J. Bain, *Soviet-Cuban Relations 1985 to 1991. Changing Perceptions in Moscow and Havana* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).

90. Stephen White, *Russia's New Politics. The Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 215.

91. Margot Light, "Foreign Policy," in *Developments in Russian Politics*, eds. Stephen Hite, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 225.

92. Some believe that in general the Soviet legacy has had a negative effect for Russia. On Russia becoming the legal successor of the Soviet Union Martin Malia has written, "The Yeltsin government inherited only rubble from the past." Martin Malia, "Martin Malia. History Lessons," in *Conversations on Russia. Reform from Yeltsin to Putin*, ed. Padma Desai (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 346.

93. Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 8.

94. White, *Russia's New Politics*, 222–29.

95. Ibid., 125. Lilia Shevtsova, *Russia Lost in Translation. The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2007), 107.

96. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 395.

97. For this debate see Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," in *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. Alex Pravda, Roy Alison and Margot Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33–100. Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, "Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 537–52. Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Journal*, 114, no. 4 (1999–2000): 547–50.

98. White, *Russia's New Politics*, 230. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," 9–12.

99. White, *Russia's New Politics*, 229.

100. Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," 82–83.

101. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, March 26, 1999, 2. B.H. Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 271.

102. White, *Russia's New Politics*, 231–39.

103. This was not only in the West but also in Cuba because in preparation for Putin's trip to Cuba in December 2000 MINREX prepared a twenty-nine-page book entitled "Quién es Putin?" which chartered his career and relations with the Duma etc. "Quién es Putin?" December 2000, MINREX. All the documents referenced are from MINREX Archivo Europa—Russia—Ordinario. The documents in the MINREX archive have been referenced as fully as possible. The documents in this archive contain only core information that includes, but not always, the author, title, date, and more.

104. Andrei Grachev, "Putin's Foreign Policy Choices," in *Leading Russia. Putin in Perspective. Essays in Honour of Archie Brown*, ed. Alex Pravda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 256. Furthermore, Andrew Jack has written that during his

first year in office Putin's foreign policy "offered ambiguous signals." Andrew Jack, *Inside Putin's Russia. Can There Be Reform without Democracy*?" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 258.

105. Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 16.

106. *Pravda*, October 29, 2001, 3.

107. Richard Pipes, "Richard Pipes. The Past in the Present," in *Conversations on Russia*, 363. Jack has also stated that Putin was disappointed with the U.S. reaction to his offers after September 11, 2001. Jack, *Inside Putin's Russia*, 289.

108. Skak has described the Kremlin's policies toward its near abroad as Moscow's the Kremlin's "Monroe Doctrine." Metter Skak, "Russia's New 'Monroe Doctrine,'" in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Roger Kanet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 138–54. Since the year 2000 the Russian Foreign Policy concept has included this desire, and the "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," approved by Putin on November 30, 2016, states, "The world is currently going through fundamental changes related to the emergence of a multipolar international system. 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'" (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.

109. Leon Aron, "The Putin Doctrine. Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State," *Foreign Affairs*, March 8, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/136255. Grachev, "Putin's Foreign Policy Choices," 262–64.

110. Lilia Shevtsova, *The Kremlin is Winning*, February 12, 2015, 2, Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/02/12-kremlin-is-winning-shevtsova. Aron, "The Putin Doctrine," 2–3.

111. Ibid.

112. Igor Zevlev, "The Russian World Boundaries. Russia's National Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine," *Global Affairs*, June 7, 2014, http://www.eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-1607.

113. The sale of Russian military goods to Latin America has been an important aspect of Russia's increased interest in the region in the twenty-first century. This was evidenced in April 2007 when Rosoboronexport participated in the Latin America Aero and Defense arms exhibition to be held in Rió de Janeiro. http://www.rian.ru/russia/20070417, April 25, 2007. Furthermore in June 2007 Venezuela bought 100.00 Kalshnikov machine guns from Russia. *Miami Herald*, June 29, 2007, http://www.miamiherlad.com.

114. Benedict Mander, "Russia is Looking for Allies, Not Deals, in Latin America," *Financial Times*, April 26, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ca9fb9c-ea86-11e4-a701-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ZC2o8ry5.

115. Piero Gleijses, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 3.

116. Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 71. Benjamin has described Cuba as having "semi-sovereignty." Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the*

Origins of the Cuban Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 71. Gott has termed it a "pseudo democracy." Richard Gott, *Cuba. A New History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 113. Soviet authors have termed Cuba as an "anglo-American protectorate," and a "monopoly of the 'United States.'" E. A. Larin, *Kuba kontsa XVIII—pervoĭ treti XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 17. A. D. Bekarevich and V. A. Borodaev, *Velikii Oktiabr i kubinskaia revoliutsiia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 17.

117. Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 143.

118. Quoted in Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 109.

119. Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), 469.

120. Pérez, *Between Reform and Revolution*, 152. Thomas, *Cuba*, 469. The effect of the 1903 reciprocity act can be seen in the fact that Cuban-U.S. trade increased from $27 million in 1898 to $300 million in 1917. Walter LaFeber, *The American Age. United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 197.

121. Pérez, *Between Reform and Revolution*, 169. Thomas, *Cuba*, 474–78.

122. Pérez, *Between Reform and Revolution*, 171–73. Thomas, *Cuba*, 615–25. Gott, *Cuba*, 135–41.

123. For the effects of the First World War on Cuba please see Thomas, *Cuba*, 531–32 and 537–38. Concerning the impact of the Wall Street Crash please see Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 180–93.

124. Benjmin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 87.

125. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 193–99. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 87–89. Thomas, *Cuba*, 615–25. On the downfall of Grau's government Thomas has written, "The reluctance of the United States to recognize the government caused its downfall—an act which cast long shadows over events in the 1950s a generation later." Thomas, *Cuba*, 635.

126. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 72.

127. Pérez, *Between Reform and Revolution*, 213.

128. Gott, *Cuba*, 140. Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution*, 126.

129. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 100–02.

130. Pérez, *Between Reform and Revolution*, 235.

131. Ibid., 143.

132. Walter LaFeber, "The U.S. Rise to World Power, 1776–1945," in *United States Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51.

133. Thomas G. Paterson, J. Gary Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy. A History since 1900* (Lexington: DC Heath & Co., 1983), 263, 310–14. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 394–95. William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 60–64. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 251. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 279–80.

134. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 295. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 272.

135. LaFeber, "The U.S. Rise," 53.

136. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 84.

137. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 291.

138. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 301.

139. Ibid., 361–62.

140. Ibid., 363–70.

141. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 389.

142. For wartime discussions that took place between the Allied side please see Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 172–78.

143. LaFeber, "The U.S. Rise," 57.

144. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 435.

145. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 245–46.

146. 861.00/2-2246, "The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 449–52. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 451–52.

147. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 243–44. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 437. Concerning the Marshall Plan LaFeber has written, "Marshall warned that American prosperity depended on European recovery." LaFeber, *The American Age*, 456.

148. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 41 and 251.

149. LaFeber, *The American Age*, 479–82 and 505. Paterson et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 457.

150. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 33–47.

151. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 26–30. Edward González, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* XXVI (November–December 1977): 3. On Cuban foreign policy John Kirk and Michael Erisman have written, "Indeed, there was another key element to these internationalist initiatives that, although more low-profile than Havana's military campaign, proved to be much more significant in the long run. This often overlooked dimension entailed Cuba's extensive developmental aid efforts, at the centre of which were its health care programs." John M. Kirk and H. Michael Erisman, *Cuban Medical Internationalism: Origins, Evolution, and Goals* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 2.

152. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 29–30. Kirk and Erisman, *Cuban Medical Internationalism*. Julie M. Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses. Cuban Health Politics at Home and Abroad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

153. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 30–33. Carlos Alberto Montaner, *Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution: Age, Position, Character, Destiny, Personality and Ambition* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

154. González, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," 1–15. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 32–33. Domínguez also repeats this point. Jorge Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution. Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 248. Kapcia, "Political Change in Cuba," 24–27.

155. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 34.

156. Ibid., 33–36.

157. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 35–36. González, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," 10–13. Fidel Castro, "Angola: African Giron," in *Fidel Castro Speeches. Cuba's Internationalist Foreign Policy* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1981), 91–92. "Transcript of Meeting between US Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, México City, November 23, 1981," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issues 8–9, 210.

158. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 36–48. Concerning a level of Cuban economic dependence on the Soviet Union that materialized Max Azicri has written that for Cuba the Soviet Union became "the lifeline of the economy." Max Azicri, *Cuba Today and Tomorrow. Reinventing Socialism* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 21.

159. Mervyn J. Bain, "'Back to the Future.'" Cuban-Russian Relations under Raúl Castro?" *Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 2–3 (September 2015): 164.

160. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 43–47.

161. Bain, "'Back to the Future,'" 164–65.

162. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 23–26. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents on covert operations against Cuba evidence Washington's desire to destroy the Cuban Revolution at this time. http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp.

163. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 35.

164. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relation*s, 25–26. J. Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution Ideological and Strategic Perspectives* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 147–49. González, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," 3. Furthermore, in the book, *Raúl Castro and Cuba. A Military Story*, Hal Klepak has written, "Raúl has been found to be a reformer when he believes that it is time for reform of the Revolution in order to move forward, and has been found to be a conservative when it is time to dig in and hold the line in the face of threats to the survival of the Revolution." Hal Klepak, *Raúl Castro and Cuba. A Military Story* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 104.

165. Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, *My Life* (London: Penguin, 2008), 365.

166. John M. Kirk, "Defying the Odds: Five Conclusions about Cuban Foreign Policy," in *Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy*, 334. In 2007, the publication *Cuba Foreign Trade* estimated that the U.S. embargo had cost the Cuban economy $86 billion. "Situación actual y perspectiva," *Cuba Foreign Trade. Publicación Oficial de la Cámara de Comercio de la Republica de Cuba*, no. 3 (2007): 78.

167. H. Michael Erisman, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Survival Strategy in Cuba's New Foreign Policy," in *Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy*, 3–5.

168. Feinsilver, *Healing the Masses*, 13.

169. Jorge Domínguez, "Cuba and the Pax Americana," in *A Contemporary Cuba Reader. Reinventing the Revolution*, eds. Philip Brenner, Marguerite Jiménez, John. H. Kirk and William M. LeoGrande (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 203.

170. White House, "Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference," March 21, 2016, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press.

171. William LeoGrande has described this phenomenon as Cuba not putting "all of Cuba's eggs in one international basket." William M. LeoGrande, "Cuba Reaches Out to Partners Far and Wide to Hedge against U.S. Engagement," *World Politics Review*, October 11, 2016 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20145/cubareachesouttopartnersfarandwidetohedgeagainstusengagement.

172. Kirk, "Defying the Odds," 333.

173. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way. The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 27. Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 2. Edmé Domínguez has also written of the idea of Moscow suffering from "geographical fatalism" prior to the Cuban Revolution. Edmé Dominguez, "Introduction. USSR-Latin America: A Relationship That Never Took Off?" in *The Soviet Union's Latin American Policy. A Retrospective Analysis*, 1.

174. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is perceived as the United States exerting hegemonic power over Latin America as it opposed European colonialism in the region. Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5–6.

175. Mervyn J. Bain, *From Lenin to Castro, 1917 to 1959. Early Encounters between Moscow and Havana* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). George J. Boughton, "Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1956–1960," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 16, no. 4 (November 1974): 436–53. Kiva Maydanik, "The Ideological Aspects of Soviet Relations with Latin America," in *The Soviet Union's Latin American Policy. A Retrospective Analysis*, 13–20. Barry Carr, "Mill Occupations and Soviets: The Mobilisation of Sugar Workers in Cuba 1917–1933," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28 (1996): 129–58. M. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Barry Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity: Cuba's Evolving Relationship with the Comintern, 1925–34," in *International Communism and the Communist International 1919–43*, 234–51. Clissold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1918–1968*.

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177. Nicola Miller, "Trying to Stay Friends: Cuba's Relations with Russia and Eastern Europe in the Age of U.S. Supremacy," in *Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Soviet Cold War World. The International Dimensions of the Washington-Havana Relationship*, eds. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 59–96. Mervyn J. Bain, "Gorbachev's Legacy for Russian/Cuban Relations Post 1991," in *Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy*, 212–32. W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto, "Cuba and Russia: Love is Better the Second Time Around," *Cuban Affairs* 2, no. 2 (2007). Mervyn J. Bain, *Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992. Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). Bain, "Back to the Future," 159–68.

178. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 9–10. John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, *Canada-Cuban Relations. The Other Good Neighbor Policy* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), xii.

179. Ibid.

180. The author was also permitted to photograph the documents consulted and using the same principle as Gleijeses utilized in his own work (due to the documents he cited not being readily accessible to his readers Gleijeses only referenced documents which he had photocopies of). Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, *Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 10. I will only reference documents which I have photographs of.

181. G.E. Mamedov and A. Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba, 1902–2002, dokumenty i materially* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2004).

Chapter 2

The Role of Ideology

In the previous chapter of this book the importance of Fidel Castro's announcement in December 1961 that he, and thus also the Cuban Revolution, was Marxist-Leninist was highlighted, as from the time of this announcement until the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991 Marxist-Leninism formed a cornerstone of Soviet-Cuban relations. Consequently, this thirty-year period was the only era since the Russian Revolution when a bilateral relationship existed between two socialist governments. However, this chapter will argue that ideology in general, and not just Marxist-Leninist ideology, has been of fundamental importance in the bilateral relationship since November 1917 and continues to have resonance for the post–Soviet era relationship.[1] This chapter will commence with an analysis of the years from November 1917 to January 1959; the two later periods of the bilateral relationship are then examined in turn.

As detailed in chapter 1, the Russian Revolution sent a seismic shock through the established international order, with consequently the Third International, or Comintern, being created in March 1919 under the proviso of creating global revolutions. However, as theorized, this organization could also be used by the Bolshevik government to strengthen its diplomatic position and was utilized to facilitate its foreign policy objectives in general. As noted in the previous chapter, traditionally it has been thought that the Comitern showed little interest in Cuba, or Latin America in general, due to Moscow suffering from "geographical fatalism," or that the region was in the U.S. "sphere of influence."[2] Nonetheless, the first section of this chapter will argue that contrary to this assumption, this organization took a significant degree of interest in Cuba from soon after November 1917, with the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations being central to this attention.

In addition to this, within Cuba considerable interest was taken in the events unfolding in Russia in late 1917 and its aftermath, evident from Cuban newspaper reporting at the time.[3] The historical nature of the Russian Revolution partly explains this attention, but interest within Cuba concerning the Soviet Union would continue throughout the period before the Cuban Revolution. This is evidenced by documents in the archive of the Secretary to the President of Cuba housed in the Cuban National Archive.[4] Moreover, reports also exist of food parcels being sent from Cuba to the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Cuban National Antifascist League presenting Maxim Litvinov, Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba, with a gift of 25,000 pesos when Litvinov travelled to Cuba in April 1943.[5] Additionally, on November 6, 1943, 6,000 people attended a rally at the Capitol Building in Havana to commemorate the Russian Revolution, and 5,000 people attended a rally in support of the Red Army on February 22, 1945.[6] The effect of the Second World War, and the existence of bilateral diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana from October 1942 to March 1952, appears to be hugely important in these events, and both will be examined more fully in later chapters. Further interest within Cuba in the Soviet Union was evidenced with the creation of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana with offices at Number 7 Bernaza Street. Fernando Ortiz, the renowned Cuban anthropologist and intellectual, was the Institute's first president, this institute also attracting a number of other progressive-thinking Cubans. Moreover, from August 1945 until February 1952 it published the monthly journal *Cuba y la URSS*.[7] Again this institute and journal will be more fully examined in chapter 4, but it further evidences that sympathy for the Soviet Union and its ideas existed in parts of Cuban society.

Attention in the fledgling Bolshevik government also occurred both throughout the rest of Latin America and on a global scale with the Russian Revolution heralding the appearance of a number of organizations that were sympathetic to the Bolsheviks' ideals. However, despite the Cuban interest in the Soviet Union detailed above, Manuel Caballero has written, "In the plan for fostering world revolution proposed by the Third International from its foundation in 1919, Latin America occupied the last place."[8] Notwithstanding this, in 1919 the Comintern sent its agent Michael Borodin to Mexico, and Latin America was represented at the Comintern's Second Congress convened in Moscow in August 1920 by the Mexican delegates Gómez and M. N. Roy.[9] Moreover, as the 1920s progressed, Latin American countries began to have increasing representation in Comintern committees with a Latin American Secretariat being created in 1925, which in 1928 was expanded to the Caribbean Bureau and a South American Bureau.[10] This increased Latin American influence in the Comintern was evidenced at the organization's Sixth Congress held in the summer of 1928 when Grigory Zinoviev, the

organization's leader, stated in his opening speech that Latin America had been "discovered."[11]

Additionally, at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, for the first time, Latin America gained full membership to the organization's Central Bureau with R. Carrillo from Mexico, R. Ghioldi from Argentina, Ledo from Brazil, E. Gómez from Uruguay, and Fermun-Araea from Chile. Moreover, D. Reacko representing Colombia and Ecuador and notably Cuba with López became candidate members. Furthermore, Roco became the South American representative in the presidium with Kodovela moving from this position to the International Committee of the Comintern.[12]

The magnitude of the year 1928 for Soviet interest in Latin America was further enhanced when in April 1928 the First Congress of the Latin American communist parties was convened in Montevideo. The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) was among fifteen parties to attend this congress. Furthermore, a Soviet trading company, Yuzantong, was also created in this year in Buenos Aires. Some believe that this company's "real" purpose was covert Soviet behavior rather than fostering of bilateral trade between Latin America and the Soviet Union. Regardless of the company's aim, its creation did evidence growing Soviet interest in the region. Additionally, the newspaper *El Trabajador Latinoamericano* went into circulation, which Caballero believes was partially underwritten by funds from Moscow. Moreover, in June 1929, the Second Congress of Latin American Communist Parties was held in the Argentine capital, further illustrating the increased activities of left-wing parties in Latin America supportive of the Soviet cause.[13]

This Soviet interest in Latin America appears to be at odds with Caballero's afore-cited quote on the apparent lack of importance of the region for Moscow. The language of Marxist-Leninism with its objective of the creation of an international communist society was paramount for both the Comintern and Latin American parties loyal to its cause. Consequently ideology, or ideas and ideals, impacted relations between the Latin American communist parties and the Comintern. However, what is vital for Comintern attention in the region is the quote from the Mexican delegate at the Second Congress of the Comintern cited in the previous chapter. In this Gómez states that what really interested Lenin was not Latin America or Mexico explicitly, but rather these countries relationships with the United States.[14] Moreover, this corresponds with Light's writings detailed in chapter 1 regarding Soviet policies toward the developing world in general; Moscow's real interest was in the impact on the metropolitan states of revolutionary behaviour in the less well-developed countries rather than in the developing world countries specifically. It was this, in conjunction with Soviet security, that is key in explaining Soviet interest in Latin America. Again, as elucidated in chapter 1, Soviet security ultimately underpinned Comintern activities, and due to the intertwined nature of

Latin American economies with the U.S. economy, any revolutionary activity in Latin America could have adverse repercussions for the United States. Subsequently, Moscow could utilize potential left-wing radicalism in Latin America to counter anti-Soviet U.S. policies elsewhere in the world; including Washington's repeated attempts to crush the Bolshevik Revolution since its infancy and the non-recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933. In sum, the Bolsheviks were not trying to increase their power vis-à-vis Washington, but were rather endeavoring to enhance their security.

Furthermore, the ideas specified in Melograni's quote in chapter 1 of how the Comintern activities were an integral part of the Bolshevik's "dual track" diplomacy (they could be used to intensify pressure on governments due to these governments' fear of the potential for the appearance of revolutions within their own countries while the Bolsheviks conducted formal diplomatic communications with these same governments) were also important. As Melograni has iterated, the organization's existence strengthened the Bolshevik diplomatic position and was utilized in facilitating Bolshevik foreign policy objectives.[15] Diplomatic interactions between Moscow and Washington may not have been taking place at this time, but revolutionary activity in Latin America could be used to both demonstrate to the United States the permanency of the Bolshevik administration and simultaneously heighten pressure on the United States due to its economic relationship with the region to officially recognize the Bolshevik government. If Washington recognized the Soviet Union this would suggest a reduction in U.S. hostility, thus helping to safeguard Soviet security: in sum, defensive realism. Additionally, this is in accordance with Melograni's quote that the Bolsheviks would cease revolutionary propaganda once peace treaties had been signed.[16] As noted, this strategy would endure throughout the Comintern's existence.

In addition to this, anti-Soviet U.S. policies intensified the historical Russian fear of insecurity. As detailed in the previous chapter, this is crucial for Andrei Tsygankov's hypothesis on the role of statists (who due to the historic Russian psychological inferiority complex are prepared to fight for their independence and sovereignty) in Russian foreign policy. Moreover, this role of Russia's unique history, and uniformities that bestride different eras of the country's history, are central to Grigor Suny's assertion of the role of constructivism within the Kremlin's foreign policy, because these constant factors are fundamental to shaping regnant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite, and their subsequent perception of the international system. As noted in chapter 1, Alexander Wendt has memorably stated, "Anarchy is what you make of it,"[17] with consequently the Bolsheviks perceiving the United States as hostile. The result is that these anti-Bolshevik U.S. policies are significant for both a constructivist interpretation for why hostility existed between the Soviet Union and United States, as well as for why Latin America was important for Moscow.

CUBA AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

In general, Cuba would appear to follow the conventional trend of other Latin American communist parties so that after the creation of the PCC in August 1925 it became increasingly important within the Comintern structure. Carr may have written that the PCC was "established relatively late," but in contrast to this, by the mid-1920s Cuba had a tradition of labor radicalism that originated from the first years of the twentieth century.[18] The Cuban Socialist Workers' Party was formed as early as 1905 and subsequently gained membership of the Second International.[19] Moreover, in 1917 a mill workers strike in Santa Clara and Camaguey provinces took place regarding an eight-hour working day and union recognition.[20]

Labour radicalism was further evident with the founding in Havana of the Asociación de Buen Gobierno in 1922 and both the Agrupacion Comunista de la Habana and the Junta Cubana de Renovación in 1923.[21] Concerning the last organization Pérez has written that it

> called for protection of national industry and commerce, agrarian reform, a new trade treaty with the United States, educational reform, and expansion of health services, women's rights, and end to U.S. intermeddling in Cuban internal affairs.[22]

Additionally, reports exist of similar organizations being created across the island, including in Manzanillo and Oriente provinces.[23]

The result was that when the PCC was created in August 1925, eight years after the Russian Revolution, Cuba already had a history of labor militancy and organization. This was hugely important because the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) and its emissary Enrique Flores Magón played a significant role in the founding of the PCC, with this being facilitated by the contact that already existed between the Agrupacion Comunista de la Habana and the PCM.[24] In the Comintern archive in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History a document entitled "Report on Cuba" exists which was sent to this organization in 1926. It states,

> In August 1925 at the time of the anti-fascist league organisation, Comrade Flores Magón, envoy of the Mexican Communist Party, helped with the formation of the Cuban Communist Party. At the congress from 16 to 18 August, the communist group accepted the 21 points for membership to the Third International and also the organisation statutes, directives and tactics, and demands for unity for this section of the Comintern.[25]

The existence of labor militancy and creation of the PCC demonstrate a number of Cubans desiring a change to the island's societal structures. Moreover, the PCC accepting the twenty-one points for membership to the Comintern

evidences its support for the Soviet ideals and desire for an international socialist community. This highlights the importance of Marxist-Leninism for the sympathy that existed in Cuba at this time for the Bolshevik government.

Although this was the case, the PCC faced a number of problems on its creation. This included being heavily reliant on a small group of mainly migrant members who took a leading role in the party and had to explain many basic concepts to fellow members, and a strong reaction from the Machado government that resulted in Julio Antonio Mella, one of the founders of the party, having to leave the island in 1926.[26] Moreover, and at odds with the role of the PCM in the creation of the PCC, detailed above, Carr believes that the PCC had poor links to other communist parties in Latin America. The consequence Carr supposes was "a product of infrequent communications which led to an almost total ignorance in Moscow of Cuban conditions."[27]

However, documents exist in the Comintern archive that would suggest something different. As early as December 6, 1919, Cuba asked for membership to the Comintern in the form of a letter sent by Marselo Salinas, who declared himself to be the secretary of the Communist Section of Cuba.[28] Additionally, this letter was on paper headed by the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), which evidences the importance of the CPUSA and the aforementioned Caribbean Bureau in facilitating interaction between the Comintern and Cuba. Membership was not granted but an anonymously authored document entitled "Report on the Cuban Section of Cuba" dated January 21, 1920, does exist. In this the author states that while in transit in Havana from Spain to Mexico, that the author of this report had met Salinas, and also that the conditions in Havana appeared similar to those in Mexico. Furthermore, the report continues,

> At any rate there was no real Socialist Party in Cuba. There were some middle-class reformers who referred to their organisation as socialist, but nothing more.
>
> That is virtually all that I know about the movement in Cuba. I have heard that the Cuban unions are very radical in that they have negotiated very well-organised general strikes. Comrade Salinas was to send me a report on the whole economic, political situation in Cuba, but, up to present, it has not arrived.[29]

Moreover, other documents from the early 1920s exist in the Comintern archive which detail the conditions on the island. Two letters were sent to the Cominten in 1923 entitled "Federation of Students. Commission of Foreign Relations, University of Havana" which outlined student protests that had occurred in Havana against the Venezuelan and Peruvian governments. These letters were signed by P de Entenza, director of Commission of

Foreign Relations, and Mella.[30] In sum, one of the founders of the PCC had been in correspondence with Moscow two years prior to the Cuban party's creation. Moreover, these documents also demonstrate both that the Comintern did have a degree of knowledge of Cuba, and also the involvement of the CPUSA and Caribbean Bureau in Cuba prior to the creation of the PCC in August 1925.

In 1925 other documents were sent to the Comintern which detailed the Cuban situation and the afore-cited "Report on Cuba" was sent in 1926.[31] Also in 1926 Mella sent the report "Información para la Prensa Obrea y Revolución," which provided a succinct history of Cuba from 1898 and stated, "A regime of terror underpinned by Yanqui imperialism exists in Cuba, with its victims being the proletariat."[32] Also in 1926 a second "Report on Cuba" was dispatched to the Comintern that detailed the structure of Cuban society; 48 percent were detailed as agricultural, 21 percent as industrial, 16 percent as in transport, 12 percent as in domestic labor, and 3 percent as intellectual. The report stated that in 1923 Cuba purchased $181,717,272 worth of manufactured goods from the United States and it also termed the island as being "semi-colonial."[33]

Also in 1926 the Comintern received a report on both the first Conference of the PCC held in May 1926 and also a transcript of Mella's trial.[34] Moscow was also made aware of the repression which both the labor movement and PCC endured from the Machado government, with this being outlined in the report "Save the Lives of Vivo and Ordoqui." This report concluded,

> The Machado government in Cuba has recently put into jail hundreds of strikers on the sugar plantations controlled by Wall Street, including of the National Confederation of Labour of Cuba and the Communist Party, two of them Jorge A. Vivo and Joaquin Ordoqui having been taken from their cells in the Principle Castle during the middle of the night, their whereabouts being unknown and in view of the systematic murder of other workers by the brutal Machado regime, we fear their death.[35]

Neither Vivo nor Ordoqui were killed with consequently Ordoqui becoming the editor of *Hoy*, the PCC's newspaper, and he also participated in the discussions with the Batista government in 1938 that resulted in the PCC gaining legal status. Moreover, Vivo would fight for the Red Army during the Second World War, this being commemorated with a permanent exhibition in the Museum of the Great Fatherland War.[36] We will return to the significance of this permanent exhibition later in this book.

The frequency of these reports may have been irregular, but what these documents in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History in Moscow evidence is that the Comintern did possess information on Cuba

from as early as 1919 and about the PCC from its inception in the late summer of 1925. When this is coupled with both the CPUSA and Caribbean Bureau's involvement with Cuba as early as 1919, and also the Comintern agent Fabio Grobart being sent to Cuba, it would appear that the Third International did show interest in Cuba in this era.[37] Additionally, these documents also demonstrate the PCC's adherence to the rules of membership to the Comintern and subsequently the desire for the creation of an alternative international system that this organization pursued. The theoretical underpinnings of this alternative international system was Marxist-Leninism, with theory remaining central to both the attention which the Comintern awarded Cuba and also the attention which certain sections within Cuban society gave to the Comintern and the Soviet Union.

The idea of the importance of Cuba for the Comintern is partly challenged by the fact that all information and reports detailed above had been sent in one direction, from Cuba to Moscow and not from the Comintern headquarters in the Soviet Union to the Caribbean island. However, the role of the Caribbean Bureau and the CPUSA was important and partially explains the apparent lack of flow of information from Moscow to Cuba, due to the significance of both in coordinating activities of communist parties in the Caribbean. In short, the Comintern could be communicating with the PCC via the CPUSA and Caribbean Bureau. However, documents exist in the Comintern archive that demonstrate that at key dates in labor radicalism in Cuba, the Comintern were sending information and instructions directly to the PCC.

In accordance with the Comintern "discovering" Latin America in 1928 the organization's Secretariat sent two highly important letters to the PCC in this year. These letters demonstrate not only the level of knowledge which the organization had of Cuba but also that the Comintern was "instructing" the PCC on the tactics that it should follow. Additionally, these letters also exhibit the general trends of the Comintern and in particular the ultra-left position of the "third period" that was instigated at the Comintern's Sixth Congress in the summer of 1928. The first letter is dated January 5, 1928, and begins,

> Dear Comrades, on the strength of documents in the possession of the Communist International and of information supplied by the delegates of the PCC concerning the political activity of the Cuban party during the last year, the Communist International confirms the correctness of the general policy lines laid down in its resolution in January which was borne out by facts. For this reason it confirms once more its contents and asks the Party to apply it to the full. The Communist International is also of the opinion that the changes which have taken place since in the political and economic situation of the country

> make it necessary to lay more stress on certain points in the present activity and the future tasks of the PCC.[38]

The letter continues,

> In order to accelerate the revolutionary process, it is essential for the Communist Party to take an active part in the struggle, and in the course of action, to unmask the national leaders, showing up their weak points and their incapacity to lead the struggle to an end, which it has succeeded to get away the masses from their influence and to become its sole leader.[39]

Toward its conclusion the letter states, "It goes without saying that the task will not be accomplished peacefully simply by through the ballot-box—it will be accomplished by revolutionary methods."[40] The letter closes by indicating a "splendid opportunity of intensifying its political activity."[41] The second letter was dispatched on January 13, 1928, and urged the PCC to both work more with the trade unions and play an increasingly prominent role in the National Confederation of Cuba (CNOC).[42]

This is in accordance with Caballero's assertion that Cuba received most attention from the Comintern during the organization's "third period." Consequently, Caballero has written that after these tactics were implemented there was "the strong accent put on Brazil and Cuba (and to a lesser extent, Peru,) as perhaps the leading areas of Latin America revolution in the near future."[43]

It therefore appears that Moscow, via the Comintern, did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" in the period before the Cuban Revolution, but this gives rise to the subsequent question of what drew the attention of the Comintern to Cuba. The vernacular of Marxist-Leninism with its central goal being the creation of an international communist society resulted in ideology having resonance for the relationship, but key to this Comintern interest was the labor radicalism that was evident on the island which gave Cuba the appearance as a "hotbed" of worker militancy. But why did this labor militancy materialize? This returns to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations detailed in the previous chapter and the level of Cuban economic dependence on the United States. On this Pérez has written,

> Low wages and weak labor organisations, persisting legacies of the colonial system, offered additional inducements to North American investment. These were not preferred conditions for foreign investors—they were requisite ones, and as such they formed part of the economic environment which the United States was committed to creating and maintaining. It was not sufficient to have preferential access to local markets and local resources. It was necessary also as a corollary condition to depress wages, prevent strikes, and discourage labour organizing.[44]

The result of an unanticipated outcome of U.S. economic domination of Cuba in the early twentieth century was labor militancy on the island, with subsequently this increasing the interest within Cuba in the Russian Revolution, its ideas and ideology and desire for an alternative economic and political model. Additionally, this Cuban labor radicalism also drew the attention of the Comintern as labor activism appeared greater in Cuba than elsewhere in the region. The island's geographical proximity to the United States only further intensified the Comintern's interest in Cuba. In sum, Havana's relationship with Washington was fundamental for both the attention which sections of Cuban society awarded the Soviet Union and its ideals, and also Soviet interest in Cuba.

In turn, this returns to the underlying goals of the Comintern and the arguments made at the end of the previous section of this chapter concerning this organization's attention in Latin America as whole. This attention was driven by Moscow's interest in the negative impact that revolutionary activity in Latin American could have for the United States, which was in accordance with Moscow's attention in the developing world in general; this revolutionary behaviour could be used by the Kremlin to offset U.S. anti-Soviet policies elsewhere in the world and that Comintern activities were central to the Soviet's "dual track" diplomacy as they fortified the Soviet diplomatic position that was underpinned by defensive realism. These arguments are not just repeated for Cuba, but due to the geographical proximity of Cuba to the United States, the intimate nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, and the island's subsequent appearance as a "hotbed" of labor militancy, they are amplified.

The Kremlin's "geographical fatalism" is further questioned by the Comitern's involvement in the events of the 1933 on the island with Carr writing

> The Comintern did realise the significance for the prospects of an anti-imperialist revolution of events in Cuba—and the unique conjecture of the anti-Machado insurrection and the worker-peasant insurgency of August-December 1933 . . . was the most substantial Comintern presence seen in Latin America.[45]

Moreover, writing in 1934 about these events the Russian-born journalist M. J. Olgin, a prominent member of the CPUSA, wrote,

> The revolutionary movement in India, Arabia and a number of other colonies, the victories of the Chinese Soviets, the revolution in Cuba, the revolution in Spain, the revolutionary uprising in Austria, the growing revolutionary movement in France and the U.S. are a few of the many upheavals marking the Third Period.[46]

On August 3, 1933, the PCC may have called for the creation of "Soviets," but their decision to form a short-term alliance with the Machado government

due to a fear of possible U.S. intervention has been described as a mistake. Moreover, Carr and Goldenberg both blame Comintern decrees for this decision, with Carr even detailing that envoys of the Caribbean Bureau were present at the meetings which discussed this issue.[47] However, this judgement to join an alliance with the government did result in the PCC gaining temporary legal status. Although this was the case, the Comintern made further errors with a failed brief attempt to implement a version of Stalin's nationalities policy at this time in eastern Cuba with the creation of an Afro-Cuban territory[48]: further evidence of the Comintern incorrectly instructing the PCC.

In the 1930s the labor radicalism on the island had intensified as the economic situation deteriorated from the mid-1920s onward, firstly resulting from a fall in the world sugar price and secondly due to the impact of the Wall Street Crash. This labor militancy underscored Comintern interest as simply it seemed higher than elsewhere in the region.[49] In short, Cuba appeared to be a "hotbed" of labor radicalism, primarily resulting from the nature of Cuban-U.S. economic relations.

Notwithstanding this, the events of 1933 were quickly suppressed by the Machado government with the PCC consequently facing repression. A PCC report was sent to the Comintern detailing this repression, which included 120 deaths and 215 detentions at Mella's funeral, held on September 29, 1933.[50] However, the ultimate failure of the PCC in 1933 to oust the Cuban government was systematic of the "third period" of the Comintern in general. As detailed in chapter 1, Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe have described the "third period" as having "usually been seen as a disaster," with many blaming the PCC's adherence to these radical tactics as preventing the Cuban party from being able to form alliances with other parties in the Cuban political system which may have led to more success.[51]

The events in Cuba in 1933 may have embodied the Comintern's "third period," but in the early 1940s the PCC once again provided a perfect example of the organization's tactics, which by the 1940s had evolved into the "popular front" strategy. As noted in chapter 1, this entailed communist parties working with other local parties with the PCC demonstrating the "success" of this tactic when in 1942 Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez were appointed to Batista's cabinet. Julia Sweig has described these appointments as "the height of Communist political participation in Cuban political policy."[52] K. S. Karol believes that in 1942 the PCC had 87,000 members and, in conjunction with Cuba's "progressive" Constitution of 1940, which Marinello has described as "one of the most advanced, in terms of labor and social provisions, of any in the hemisphere," the PCC appeared to be achieving notable accomplishments.[53] Consequently Karol has described the PCC as "the most important Communist Party in Latin America."[54] Moreover, Robert Alexander wrote, "Cuba, the 'Pearl of the Antilles,' has been the scene of

operations of one of the most important and powerful of the Latin American Communist Parties."[55]

Central to these PCC "successes" was that the Second World War had created an opportunity for the PCC to play a more prominent part in Cuban society, not least because the "fear" of socialism had receded somewhat with the wartime alliance between the United States and Soviet Union. Furthermore, Batista had required political allies and the PCC took advantage of this situation.

At the end of the hostilities of the Second World War the PCC was once again the focus of Moscow's attention, but this time much more negatively. This resulted from the Cuban Socialist Party's (PSP) association with Earl Browder and the CPUSA.[56] Browder had called for the CPUSA to be renamed and work within the U.S. political system, which he had concluded from incorrectly supposing that after the events of the Tehran conference in December 1943 when Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevet had met, peaceful coexistence would continue after the Second Word War.[57] The result of this supposition was that Browder was "purged" by the Kremlin with this being conducted by the French communist Jacques Duclos whose critique of Browder's policies in the journal *Political Affairs* was withering. In this article Duclos wrote,

> However, while justly stressing the importance of the Teheran Conference for victory in the war against fascist Germany, Earl Browder drew from the Conference decisions erroneous conclusions in no ways flowing from a Marxist analysis of the situation. Earl Browder made himself the protagonist of a false concept of the ways of social evolution in general, and in the first place, the social evolution of the United States.[58]

Critically Duclos continued, "While the Communist Parties of several South American countries (Cuba, Colombia) regarded the position of the American Communists as correct and in general followed the same path."[59]

Blas Roca has argued against the idea that this had a negative impact on Moscow's perception of the PSP by stating in an interview conducted in 1984, "In the decade of the 1940s Browderism did not have great repercussions, although some people thought it had, but it had no practical effect; simply the Party continued on the principles of Marxist-Leninism."[60] The PSP may have continued both to have had a large membership and to participate in the Cuban political system, with, as detailed, the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana opening in the summer of 1945, demonstrating both Soviet attention in Cuba and interest within Cuba in the Soviet Union, but a degree of heterodoxy may exist in Roca's statement as it was made over forty years after the events. Additionally, no documents on Cuba exist in the

archive for the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for this time, further positing that the PSP's relationship with Moscow soured. Simply, if the Kremlin had continued to show interest in the Cuban party it could be presumed that documents on it would have been authored by the Soviet foreign ministry as had been the case previously.

"Browderism" may have resulted in a degree of tension between the PSP and Moscow, but this did not end Soviet interest in the party in the period before the Cuban Revolution. Significantly, in February 1946, Blas Roca appeared to admit the PSP's mistake concerning "Browderism" and purged the party when he published the pamphlet *Al Combate* in which he "pointed to the Party's 'error' in the recent past, which it blamed on the nefarious influence of the now deposed Earl Browder."[61] Moreover, in the 1948 Cuban presidential election the PSP won 140,000 votes or about 7.5 percent of the entire ballot.[62] Not only did the PSP provide legitimacy for an increasingly corrupt and violent Cuban political system, which would have been lost if the party had been outlawed, but Cuba also appeared to be bucking the regional political trend of becoming ever more right wing in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. This was important for Soviet focus remaining on the PSP, because with the advent of the Cold War any "success" of the Cuban party could be used as a counterbalance to U.S. policies elsewhere in the world, but by the mid- to late 1940s particularly Europe.[63] In sum, Moscow could not ignore such a thriving party, with this heightened by both the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations and the island's geographical location.

The attention which Moscow awarded the PSP is evidenced by a report written by V. Grigorian, Chairman of the International Department of the Central Committee, for Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dated November 25, 1950. This report provides a concise history of the PSP dating from 1925, lists its membership as of January 1, 1950, as comprising 40,000 "active" members and 100,000 "nonactive" members, and that the PSP's newspaper *Noticias de Hoy* had a readership of 20,000. The report also details various activities which the party have undertaken and the general situation in Cuba.[64]

As the information contained in the report appears fairly rudimentary, it could suggest that Molotov had little knowledge of the Cuban party. However, the report is significant for a number of reasons; primarily its existence demonstrates Soviet interest in the PSP because simply the report would not have been created if there had been no Soviet awareness of the PSP. Moreover, the report also reveals that by 1950 no negative legacy of "Browderism" persisted, which notably is not mentioned in the report. The report concludes, "The Peoples' Socialist Party of Cuba appears to be one of the strongest and most influential communist parties in Latin America. They show effective assistance to the other Latin American communist parties."[65] Significantly,

bilateral diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana existed at the time of this report, and these will be more fully examined in chapter 3, but the existence of diplomatic relations increased the likelihood of such reports being authored as Soviet personnel were stationed in Cuba as part of the Soviet diplomatic delegation to the island. However, further increasing the importance of Grigorian's report is that one week later on December 2, 1950, it was sent to Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan, Leventi Beria, Lazar Kaganovich, Nikolai Bulganin, Nikhita Khrushchev, and Stalin. The result was that Soviet ruling elite were receiving information regarding Cuba and the PSP, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in both.

On November 25, 1950, Grigorian sent a report to Stalin detailing Juan Marinello's trip to Moscow when Marinello had been part of a delegation of Latin American communist party members to travel to the Soviet Union. This report was also sent to Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Khrushchev.[66] Marinello has spoken of this trip and although he did not meet Stalin,[67] Grigorian's report to Stalin is hugely significant as it demonstrates the focus which the Soviet leader, and top echelons of the Soviet leadership, were showing in the PSP and Cuba. The importance of the report is only increased due to the domination which Stalin had over the Soviet political system at this time, which is accordance with the Great Man Theory detailed in the previous chapter.

Continuing Soviet interest was further evidenced when Stalin and the other members of the Soviet ruling elite received further reports from Grigorian about the PSP and its newspaper *The Final Hour*.[68] Highly interestingly on February 11, 1951, Molotov received an appeal for 300 tons of paper for this newspaper, which he not only granted but increased to 500 tons.[69] This evidences both a Soviet interest in the PSP and Cuba and the fact that the Kremlin appeared to be partly "funding" the Cuban party in a similar manner to the way it had other Latin American communist parties in the 1920s and the newspaper *El Trabajador Latinoamericano*, outlined earlier in this chapter.

The final document in the archive of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History that refers to Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution is dated April 2, 1952, and notes the break in diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba that took place in April 1952, a matter of weeks after a military coup had returned Batista to power in Havana.[70] This is hugely symbolic as is the fact that the reports which exist in this archive concentrate on the PSP rather than the Cuban government. Moscow appeared to have more attention in the party than in the island's government. Significantly, Batista's return to the Cuban presidency not only marked a sharp shift to the political right in Cuba, which may have been in accordance with the rest of the region, but also resulted in the PSP being outlawed. The lack of documents referring to the PSP or Cuba after

this would appear to signal that the Kremlin believed that the opportunity for successful labor militancy on the island had receded with this political move to the right.

This was somewhat ironic as Cold War tension had intensified still further with the onset of the Korean War, and after Stalin's death the Soviet Union took greater interest in the developing world. Moreover, from 1957 onwards, the PSP would become increasingly involved with Fidel Castro's 26 July Movement, with this climaxing in the "unity pact" signed between Castro's 26 July Movement and the PSP signed on July 20, 1958.[71] Moreover, Blas Roca had represented the PSP at the 19th and 20th Congresses of the CPSU held in Moscow in October 1952 and February 1956, respectively.[72] Both Rollie Poppino and Jorge Garcia and Antonio Alonso have posited that Soviet attention in Latin America was demonstrated by invitations to Latin American communists to travel to Moscow for these congresses, with Blas Roca's attendance at these congresses consequently demonstrating a continuing Soviet interest in the Cuban party.[73] The PSP's loyalty to the Soviet Union was further evidenced in 1950 when Blas Roca wrote, "The people of Cuba have fiercely protested against U.S. imperialist intervention in Korea and hailed with enthusiasm the attitude of the Soviet Union—the great socialist state—which opposes interference in the internal affairs of other countries."[74] The Soviet ruling elite may have stopped receiving reports regarding the PSP and Cuba from April 1952 onwards, but this did not mean a complete end to Soviet interest in the region or island, nor the PSP's continuing loyalty to the Soviet Union.

The outcome was that as long as the PSP continued to play an important role within the Cuban political system, the Kremlin believed that the opportunity for revolutionary activity existed on the island with this underpinning its attention on Cuba. The PSP may have felt the wrath of Moscow in 1945 over the events that brought "Browderism" to an end within the CPUSA, but the Cuban party's "successes" also meant the Soviet Union could not ignore the PSP. The upshot was that in the period from the Russian Revolution until the Cuban Revolution the Soviet desire for an international socialist community in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist system of ideas and ideals persisted, and consequently, ideology was crucial for both the interest which the Soviet Union took in Cuba and the attention which a section of Cuban society took in the Soviet Union. Key to Soviet interest was the Comintern, but as has been theorized in the opening chapter of this book, and throughout this chapter, Soviet security and defensive realism ultimately buttressed this organization's actions because they could be utilized by the Soviet government to fortify their diplomatic position which was of primary interest to them.

Consequently, events far removed from the Caribbean were also important because as a result of Cuba's geographical location and relationship

with the United States, any revolutionary activity on the island could have negative repercussions for U.S. capital and therefore counteract U.S. policies elsewhere which Moscow perceived as being anti-Soviet. This included not only Europe but also after 1950 the Korean peninsular due to the onset of the Korean War. What can subsequently be concluded is that prior to January 1959, the Soviet leadership most certainly did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" with regards Cuba. This is contrary to traditional thinking regarding Soviet policies toward Cuba specifically and Latin America in general at this time. Additionally, the role which the United States played in stimulating Moscow's interest in Cuba is crucial, because the influence of the United States in general comprises one of the key consistencies which have impacted bilateral Moscow-Havana relations since November 1917 that are fundamental to the central argument of this book; in each of the three disparate eras of the relationship that have existed since the time of the Russian Revolution, both Russia/Soviet Union and Cuba have had rationale to engage with the other.

THE ERA OF TWO SOCIALIST STATES

Ideology, Soviet security, and defensive realism in general would also be important for the relationship that would develop between Moscow and Havana after the Cuban Revolution, but uncertainty surrounded both what type of revolution had taken place on the Caribbean island and also the political leanings of the new regime in Havana. This ambiguity extended to the Soviet leadership, which is surprising due to the aforementioned attention which Moscow had awarded Cuba in the period from the Russian Revolution, that diplomatic relations had existed for a ten-year period until March 1952 and as detailed in the middle of 1958 Castro's 26 July Movement had signed a "unity pact" with the PSP. As noted above, at the time of this agreement the Cuban party was still associated with the Kremlin. Moreover, reports on Cuba had sporadically been printed in the Soviet press in the late 1950s. These reports had contained a degree of analysis of the island's internal situation, making the Soviet leadership's lack of knowledge of the situation unfolding in Cuba more surprising.[75]

Notwithstanding this, in his memoirs, Nikhita Khrushchev has written,

> At the time that Fidel Castro led his revolution to victory and entered Havana with his troops, we had no idea what political course his regime would follow. We knew there were individual Communists participating in the movement which Castro led.[76]

However, Khrushchev continued, "Raul Castro was a good Communist, but it appeared that he kept his true convictions hidden from his brother Fidel. Che Guevara was a Communist, too, and so were some of the others—or so we thought."[77] The situation was further complicated by the fact that the younger Cuban brother was known to the Soviet authorities, had been a member of Juventud Socialista while at university, and had even visited Eastern Europe.[78]

Aleksandr Alekseev, the first Soviet citizen to be granted a visa to travel to Cuba after January 1959, has also stated that he had no idea of what type of revolution had taken place on the Caribbean island. Alekseev's uncertainty was not helped by the nature of the Cuban press, which during his October 1959 trip to Cuba Alekseev observed as being both anti-Soviet and disdainful of U.S. imperialism.[79] This lack of clarity and apparent absence of Soviet knowledge of the Cuban Revolution had a number of effects on Moscow's initial reaction to the Cuban Revolution and slowed the flourishing of Soviet-Cuban relations during 1959. Kiva Maydanik has suggested that in 1959 this led the Kremlin to view the Cuban Revolution as being merely another national liberation movement, with Yuri Pavlov, former head of Latin American department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, stating that the outcome was that Moscow were unsure that any Soviet overtures toward Havana would be reciprocated by the Cuban government. Moreover, Peter Shearman has written that Soviet uncertainty concerning the permanency of the Cuban Revolution existed due to the island's geographical proximity to, and relationship with, the United States, the Kremlin anticipated a response from Washington that would question the Cuban Revolution's long-term survival.[80] Furthermore, Nikolai Leonov has also written of how the Kremlin was unsure of the Cuban situation in 1959 due to the importance which Leonov attached to Mikoyan's report to the Politburo of the CPSU in the aftermath of his February 1960 trip to Cuba for increasing Moscow's knowledge of the intentions of the Cuban Revolution and that Mikoyan "recommended maximum Soviet support in all areas."[81]

Further complicating the situation was the aforementioned ambiguity surrounding the revolution that was increased by a number of statements which Fidel Castro has made at various times over a fifty-year period. In *My Life* Castro has stated that at the time of Batista's coup in March 1952, "I recall that many people sat down to read Lenin's 'What is to be done?' trying to find a kind of prescription for what to do under these circumstances."[82] This corresponds with what Castro said in April 1970 during a speech in the Charlie Chaplain Theatre in Havana to mark the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth. In this he stated,

> We recall how in the months preceding 26 July 1953 most of the small group of comrades who were dedicated to those tasks were always going around with the works of Marx and Lenin, and we remember how some of Lenin's books, because they were Lenin's books, fell into the hands of the police during searches made after the Moncada attack. . . . Naturally, due to the great amount of prejudice, of lies, of mental conditioning they produced in broad sectors of the populace, they wanted to brand the 26 July movement a communist movement. And it could not be said that it was a communist movement. What could be said was that a group of those of us who organized that movement was heavily impregnated with Marxist-Leninist thought.[83]

Moreover, speaking about the 1950s, Castro has also said,

> I began to acquire a more radical political awareness, and I was learning more and more about Marx and Lenin. I was also reading Engels and other authors and works on economics and philosophy, but mainly political works—the political ideas, the political theories of Marx.[84]

Castro has also iterated that he had read the Communist Manifesto by this time and describes himself as a utopian Communist which he details as "someone whose ideas don't have any basis in science or history, but who sees that things are very bad, who sees poverty, injustice, inequality, an insuperable contradiction between society and true development."[85] Moreover, as noted, Castro's 26 July Movement had signed a "unity pact" with the PSP in mid-1958, further adding to the uncertainty surrounding his links to socialism and communism. Additionally, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have stated that throughout 1959 Castro was hesitant of formalizing closer links to the Soviet Union due to concern at the Cuban populations' reaction to such an agreement. Fursenko and Naftali have even suggested that this Cuban resonance was exacerbated by a fear of drawing a potential negative U.S. reaction to any fledgling relationship between Moscow and Havana, explaining the delay in Alekseev receiving a visa to travel to Cuba that prevented him arriving in the Cuban capital until October 1, 1959.[86] Due to the aforementioned importance of Alekseev's trip for the Kremlin assimilating information on the Cuban Revolution, this partly explains the cautious development of Soviet-Cuban relations during the first year of the Cuban Revolution.

These pronouncements by Castro may have increased the uncertainty surrounding his, and the Cuban Revolution's, association with socialism in January 1959, but a disconnect appears to exist between the interest which the Kremlin took in Cuba and the PSP prior to the Cuban Revolution that was detailed in the previous section of this chapter, and what is contained in both Khrushchev's memoirs and also what Alekseev has iterated about

his trip to Cuba in 1959. As noted, both of these accounts suggest very little Soviet knowledge of the Cuban situation in January 1959. However, a degree of revisionism appears to exist in both Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1971, and Alekseev's account, when Alekseev was interviewed over thirty-five years after his trip to Cuba.[87]

This apparent revisionism resulted from the fact that as the Kremlin took increasing interest in the Cuban Revolution, it also made Moscow's pre-1959 relationship with Cuba and the PSP highly politically sensitive. This occurred because the new revolutionary government in Havana desired to radically change the political system in Cuba that the PSP had helped provide legitimacy for in the 1940s by adhering to the Kremlin's tactics. Furthermore, the PSP's close association with Batitsta's government in the years prior to Cuban Revolution, again resulting from the Cuban party following Moscow's tactics, also had to be "removed" from the post-1959 relationship, because Batista was symbolic of the pro-U.S. "pseudo republic" which the victory of the Revolution had ended. The "removal" of the pre-1959 Soviet interest in Cuba is evident in a number of books published in the Soviet Union; but it does also partly explain the lack of knowledge which appeared to exist within the Soviet Union concerning the Cuban Revolution at the time of its inception.[88] As noted, this apparent absence of Soviet knowledge, uncertainty surrounding what type of revolution had taken place in Cuba and Cuba's guarded approach to the Soviet Union all explain the cautious development of the bilateral relationship during 1959.

Ambiguity may have surrounded both the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro's association with communism and the Soviet Union in January 1959, but what was clearer was the anti-American sentiment that underlined the Cuban Revolution. Alekseev has said that this was crucial for Moscow's interest in events in Cuba.[89] Subsequently this gives rise to the question of what type of revolution had taken place in Cuba? In *Revolutionary Trends in Latin America* Roberto Munck has written that the Cuban Revolution evolved from a revolution based on a "radical nationalist current" before adopting "revolutionary socialist principles."[90] Samuel Farber has also written about the specific trends apparent in Castro's movement as it came to power, with Farber highlighting the importance of its own heritage and populism.[91] In *Cuba Libre: Breaking the Chains?* Peter Marshall has stated that at the time of its victory the revolution was "humanist, democratic and libertarian."[92] What can be concluded is that in January 1959, the Cuban Revolution was anti-American, anti-hegemonic, antiauthoritarian, and nationalistic in nature. The consequence was that the Cuban Revolutionary government wanted to fundamentally change the dynamic of the island's relationship with Washington. Moreover, these sentiments are also crucial in elucidating the formation of regnant ideas in the Cuban ruling elite (after January 1959

a vehemently independent nationalist Cuba that not only featured increased social justice that was no longer subservient to the United States but also comprised a global viewpoint) and their assessment of the United States within the international system. This perception was of an adversary attempting to destroy them, very different from the dominant Cuban ruling elite ideas of pre-1959. This supposition, as noted in chapter 1, Wendt has detailed it in terms of the vast discrepancy between the Cuban and Canadian opinions of U.S. military power, is important for permitting a constructivist interpretation of Cuban-U.S. relations to be made. Subsequently, a constructivist argument can be made for why both Moscow and Havana had contentious relationship with Washington at this time. Simply, both perceived Washington as antagonistic, but significantly, each other as friendly. We will therefore return to this at various points in this book.

However, the nature of Soviet-Cuban relations changed when in April 1961 Fidel Castro declared the revolution as socialist, before, as detailed, in early December 1961, he proclaimed himself, and thus the Cuban Revolution, as Marxist-Leninist.[93] Debate surrounds the reasons for Castro's announcements, because as noted a level of ambiguity had surrounded both Castro and the Cuban Revolution's relationships with Marxist-Leninism prior to this announcement. The outcome, was, as detailed on the opening page of this chapter, that from Castro's December 1961 pronouncement until December 1991 the bilateral relationship existed between two socialist countries, the only period since November 1917 that this was the case. Consequently ideology, or more specifically Marxist-Leninism, was crucial for the bilateral relationship in this period.

Nevertheless, due to the timing of these statements both made in the aftermath of growing U.S. hostility toward the Revolution and attempts to topple it, most infamously with the aforementioned Bay of Pigs invasion, defensive realism also appears paramount. Castro's 1961 proclamations about the nature of the Cuban Revolution can be perceived as an attempt to gain security guarantees from Moscow, essential due to the U.S. aggression toward the Cuban administration. This returns to the central tenets of defensive realism because Cuba was attempting to form an alliance with the Soviet Union to offset U.S. antagonism against the island rather than increase Cuban power at the expense of Washington.[94] Furthermore, Castro's pronouncements also evidences attempts at Cuban leverage in its relationship with Moscow. The Cuban leader would have been acutely aware that the Kremlin could not allow a Marxist-Leninist government to fail for theoretical reasons, with this only being magnified due to the geostrategic significance of a Marxist-Leninist country for Moscow, Cuba being a mere ninety miles from the United States. Cuban leverage is a topic that we will discuss consistently throughout this book.

Additionally, Castro's proclamation, and the reasons that subsequently emerged in the relationship that are detailed above, radically changed the dynamic of the relationship for Moscow. The fledgling relationship between Moscow and Havana not only seemed to challenge U.S. hegemony in Latin America but also appeared to affirm Moscow's policy toward the developing world in general, detailed in the previous chapter. That is, the Kremlin hoped newly independent countries would align themselves with the Soviet Union if Moscow had previously backed the appropriate national liberation movements. This would appear to have resonance with offensive realism. Concerning this, Caballero has written, "The transformation of Fidel Castro's national-democratic uprising into a Marxist-Leninist revolution in the 1960s, came for them, as the fall of tsarism in February 1917 came for the Russian revolutionaries, as a 'divine surprise.'"[95]

The importance of this process within Cuba was strengthened for the Kremlin as it also addressed Chinese accusations of revisionism, which were becoming ever more vociferous in the late 1950s and early 1960s.[96] Moreover, the Cuban Revolution occurred at the height of the Cold War with consequently Moscow being able to utilize its relationship with Havana to counter anti-Soviet U.S. policies elsewhere in the world, including Berlin by the early 1960s. In relation to this, if Cuba became part of a global Soviet alliance this would further aid Moscow in balancing the United States. Moscow was not attempting to increase its power at the expense of Washington, but rather offset US hostility. In short, an alliance with Cuba would benefit Soviet security; the central tenets of defensive realism.

Additionally, the tension that existed between Moscow and Washington exacerbated the traditional Russian fear of insecurity. As previously noted, this historic Russian fear of outside aggression is key to Grigor Suny's thesis of the importance of constructivism within the Kremlin's foreign policy because it is one of the constant factors that are fundamental to shaping dominant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite, and their subsequent assessment of the international system, and in this case their perception of a hostile United States within it. Additionally, Russian anxiety concerning insecurity is fundamental for Tsygnkov's contention on the significance of statists (due to this inferiority complex statists were prepared to die in an attempt to preserve Russian sovereignty and independence) in Soviet foreign policy. The outcomes of Castro proclaiming the Cuban Revolution as Marxist-Leninist were as follows: (1) an intensification of the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Havana that was mutually beneficial in preserving both countries' security vis-à-vis the United States with this being underpinned by defensive realism, (2) a degree of similarity in the regnant ruling elite ideas in both countries (a desire for societies based on social economic equality, state owned property and a consequent aversion to traditional economic structures)

and subsequently perception of the international system, and (3) that Marxist-Leninism, and therefore ideology, or a system of ideas and beliefs, would form a cornerstone of Soviet-Cuban relations for the next thirty years.

Although this was the case, offensive realism appeared to come to prominence in October 1962 and the Cuban Missile Crisis with Moscow seeming to challenge U.S. hegemony in the region. However, crucially during Mikoyan's trip to Cuba in November 1962 Mikoyan told his Cuban hosts that both the Monroe Doctrine was no longer applicable to Cuba and also that "the prestige of the socialist camp has strengthened."[97] In short, the Kremlin believed that the outcome of the missile crisis had been that in relation to Cuba, U.S. power had been countervailed, rather than either Cuban or Soviet power being increased at the expense of the United States. As in the years from November 1917 to January 1959, ideology appeared key to the relationship between Moscow and Havana, but the importance of ideology was underpinned by defensive realism. In the period after the Cuban Revolution this was the case for both the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Throughout the rest of the Soviet period of the bilateral relationship, continual reference was made to socialism and Marxist-Leninism within both countries when discussing the relationship. This was evident in the article entitled "La Revolución de Octubre y su Influencia en Cuba" written by Erasmo Dumpierre, published in *Bohemia* on April 21, 1967, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Interestingly, in this Dumpierre charts the bilateral relationship from the time of the Russian Revolution and writes,

> The influence of the October Revolution reverberated in the subsequent revolutionary fight of the Cuban people, which culminated in the victory of the ideas of Marxist-Leninism in the first socialist country in Latin America.[98]

In his afore-cited speech to mark the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth Castro said "that without the October Revolution of 1917, Cuba could not have become the first socialist country in Latin America."[99]

Although this was the case, this did not prevent theoretical problems appearing between Moscow and Havana, most notable in the mid- to late 1960s over the correct path to socialism in Latin America, as well as with Cuba's desire to create the "new man" for the betterment of Cuban society. Havana's policies were much more militant than Moscow's, with the Kremlin preferring local communist parties to work within their respective political system. Salvador Allende's September 1970 electoral victory in Chile exemplified this policy, whereas Cuba pursued the highly radical ideas of the "guerrilla foco," which believed that the conditions for a successful revolution could be created by a small band of guerrilla fighters. These ideological

differences between the two countries had become abundantly clear in February 1965 when Che Guevara accused the Soviet Union of degeneration and of displaying imperialist tendencies toward the developing world.[100] The Soviet Union and Cuba's divergent policies were further evident both in February 1966 at the First Tricontinental Conference in Havana as this congress was extremely radical, and also in April 1966 during the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow. The speech given by the Cuban representative at this congress, Armando Hart, a member of the politburo and secretary of the Central Committee for the PCC, focused on both this recent conference in Havana and the situation in Vietnam and how national liberation movements would help accelerate the revolutionary process in the developing world. This was very different from Moscow's more cautious policies and Hart's speech was met with complete silence by the delegates.[101] Further Cuban radicalism was evident at the First Congress of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity held in Havana in August 1967 and attended by some 160 delegates from across Latin America.[102] We will return in chapter 3 to the tension that existed in the bilateral relationship at this time, but Cuba's radicalism began to wane in the late 1960s with the failure of both its internal and external policies, most graphically evidenced with Guevara's death in Bolivia in October 1967. Subsequently Havana began to move much more back into the Soviet fold.

As previously noted, Castro achieved this by backing the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that had ended the "Prague Spring," with this support being contrary to world opinion. As posited in chapter 1, on the surface, ideology seemed key to both the Warsaw Pact action and Castro's pronouncement as Marxist-Leninism believed that once a country had become socialist it was not theoretically possible for it to move back to capitalism, with the reforms implemented in Czechoslovakia throughout 1968 appearing to challenge this assumption. Notwithstanding this, defensive realism appeared to underpin both Soviet and Cuban behavior. With regards the Warsaw Pact action, this returns to the hypothesis that Soviet foreign policy was ultimately motivated by defensive realism, with the events in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the subsequent appearance of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," all being driven by the Kremlin's endeavor to preserve the status quo in global politics with the existence of "buffer states" to bolster Soviet security by counterbalancing the West appearing more significant than Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Concerning Cuba, crucially when Castro had backed the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia, he had asked the pointed question of whether similar action would be taken in Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba to safeguard socialism. As Cuban-U.S. relations remained strained in the late 1960s, the basis of the question was very clear; for theoretical reasons could the Kremlin permit socialist Cuba to be overthrown by the United States? The Cuban

leader was attempting to bring pressure to bear, or exert leverage, on Moscow to provide increased security guarantees. As detailed previously, the Cuban desire for enhanced Soviet security guarantees adhered to the principles of defensive realism because Havana hoped that they would counter U.S. aggression against the island rather than increase Cuban power at the expense of the United States as offensive realism would suppose. Furthermore, Peter Shearman has written that Castro believed that the "Prague spring" could have potential negative effects for socialism, making Castro's statement less surprising than it may first appear.[103]

As detailed, Castro's backing of the Warsaw Pact action in August 1968 marked an end to Cuban radicalism and a move toward Soviet orthodoxy and ideology. This is apparent in the above-cited quotes on the significance of the Russian Revolution and its ideology for the Cuban Revolution. However, even as the Cuban leader backed the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia, he demonstrated to Moscow the unique nature of the Cuban Revolution. He achieved this partly via of a "secret speech" he gave in January 1968 during which he was highly critical of Mikoyan's behavior in November 1962 during the talks in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis.[104] Moreover, Castro stated that the Warsaw Pact had violated Czech sovereignty, even if he did ultimately back this organization's action.[105]

Additionally, Cuban foreign policy and domestic politics appeared to become intertwined at this time due to Aníbal Escalante and his associates being "purged." They were found guilty of operating a dissident "microfaction" within the Cuban political system, who had been championing anti-revolutionary ideas concerning both domestic and foreign policies among old PSP members, making contact with Soviet officials and other personnel on the island and consequently trying to influence Soviet Cuban policy. This included implementing economic sanctions against the Cuban Revolution.[106] The accusation of the Soviet bloc trying to implant a pro-Soviet faction within the Cuban government that could influence its policies has always existed,[107] but Edward González has written,

> The arrest, trial, and public sentencing of this pro-Soviet "microfaction" nevertheless appeared to be a preemptive warning to Moscow. In effect the *fidelistas* had signalled their determination to oppose increased Soviet influence in Cuban affairs and their readiness to retaliate against reductions in Soviet assistance by their ability to carry out additional acts of defiance that would be embarrassing to the Soviet Union.[108]

The Escalante affair graphically illustrated to Moscow the Cuban Revolution's distinct character. Moreover, this incident also permitted the Cuban government to both remove the source of a potential alternative, pro-Soviet,

position within its ranks, while also emphasizing the parameters of the Cuban political system which could not be exceeded.[109]

The Cuban Revolution's uniqueness was further evidenced to the Kremlin when Cuban representatives were absent from a Consultative Meeting of all Communist Parties that was held in February 1968 in Budapest.[110] Moreover, in Castro's previously cited speech in April 1970 on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth the Cuban leader said,

> It can be said that concept that inspired the revolutionary strategy which led to the triumph in 1959 was, in fact, the union, the hybridization of a tradition, of an experience peculiar to our nation with the essential ideas of Marxism and Leninism. A nation without Cuba's traditions and without Cuba's history would not have been able to reach a victory of this nature, an advance of this nature. But, a nation with Cuba's traditions without the essential Marxist-Leninism concepts, above all in a number of fundamental matters, would not have been able to reach such as advanced stage. That is why when we observe the many processes that are taking place in many parts of the world in a lesser or higher degree, we always think that ignoring Marxism and Leninism is a disadvantage for any revolutionary.[111]

Even on this most historic day in the socialist world, Castro once again demonstrated the exceptionality of the Cuban Revolution to the Kremlin. He did this once more at the First Congress of the PCC in December 1975, when Castro iterated that the heritage of the Cuban Revolution began in the nineteenth century and not in November 1917 with the Russian Revolution.[112]

Tensions and differences in the bilateral relationship may have sporadically emerged, not least due to the correct path to socialism in Latin America but Cuba was an integral part of the socialist movement. The language of Marxist-Leninism remained with its central goal being the creation of an international communist society, with subsequently ideology, or a system of beliefs and ideas, continuing to have resonance for the relationship. However, other forces and pressures also impacted the relationship, not least defensive realist thinking evident within both political leaderships, which remained significant with the heightened Cold War tension of the late 1970s and early 1980s resulting from the Warsaw Pact invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. President.

As noted in the opening chapter of this book, the Soviet domestic situation would considerably impact its foreign policy as it underwent significant change in the mid- to late 1980s once Mikhail Gorbachev implemented a series of reforms within the Soviet Union to help sustain *perestroika*, which aimed to improve both Soviet economic efficiency and also the dire general Soviet situation of the mid-1980s. Subsequently this would give rise to *glasnost* in Soviet society and "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy which

had its foundations in the debate that had originated in the 1970s regarding the inevitability of the world revolution, but came to prominence under Gorbachev, with, as previously detailed, many questioning long-held Soviet beliefs on foreign policy.[113]

However, concurrently Cuba also faced a number of internal problems. This included an economic slowdown, but Fidel Castro also believed that since the early 1980s the revolution had been eroded by increased levels of bureaucracy, overstaffing, and the negative consequences of forms of private enterprises existing on the island, including profiteering and the "disappearance" of state property through legal and semi-legal means. The Cuban situation was exacerbated by the island's young population who were not "tied" to the revolution's principles in the same manner as their elders who had witnessed Batista's Cuba. Castro addressed these concerns in his speech in April 1986 to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion. His solution was the "campaign of rectification of errors" which was a retrenchment of the system, a request for more voluntary work and a drive for an idealistic resolution of Cuba's problems.[114]

In addition, some believe that by implementing the "campaign of rectification of errors" the Cuban leader returned power to the original revolutionary elite of the 1950s Sierra Maestra. It is thought that their power had been challenged by Soviet trained technocrats and other members of the party, particularly the Central Planning Board and its head Humberto Pérez, who were perceived as being increasingly powerful throughout the 1980s.[115] Moreover, the campaign of rectification of errors constituted part of the process of the Cuban Revolution's willingness to embrace new ideas. However, the increase in Cuban-U.S. tension resulting from Reagan's Presidency that was detailed above made an opening of the Cuban system less likely.[116]

The upshot was that the Soviet Union and Cuba may have faced similar problems in the mid-1980s, but the two countries' solutions appeared very different. The Soviet Union appeared to being opening its system while Cuba was doing the very opposite. As the 1980s progressed this would cause ideological problems in the bilateral relationship, which will be examined throughout this book. Pavlov has very succinctly summarized the ideological differences between the two countries, and their leaders, when writing about Castro he has stated that the Cuban leader believed that "one could not treat the ills of socialism with capitalist medicines."[117] Simply, Cuba did not want to divert from a socialist planned economy with Castro supposing that Gorbachev was willing to experiment with aspects of a very different model within the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding this, at first Cuba appeared to back the Soviet reforms and "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. In *My Life* Castro has commented,

> Listen, at one point of his leadership I had a terrible opinion of everything Gorbachev was doing. I liked him at first when he talked about applying science to production, making progress on the basis of intensive production that would be brought about by [increased] productivity in the workplace and not on the basis of more and more factories—that path had been tried; it had seen its day; you had to move ahead on the basis of intensive production. Greater and greater productivity, the intensive application of technology—nobody could disagree with that. He also talked about being against income that didn't derive from labour. Those were the words of a true Socialist revolutionary.[118]

Furthermore, in 1988 Eloy Ortega González, a researcher at the Centro de Estudios Europeos (CEE) in Havana, wrote in an article, "Nobody could dispute the existence of profound changes to Soviet Foreign Policy since Gorbachev's ascension. The 'new thinking' is ingrained in the Soviet Foreign policy philosophy; it is very flexible, active and dynamic. This has been used in regional conflicts."[119]

However, by the following year the Cuban position had changed considerably. In 1989 *Revista de Estudios Europeos* published a special edition in which the Cuban academic Eloy Ortega González published an article on the international effects of the Soviet reforms. In this he stated that the difference between socialism and capitalism had been reduced throughout the world due to "new thinking" in Moscow's foreign policy.[120]

Moreover, in 1989 Castro gave two speeches that highlighted his dislike of the events taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The first was on April 4, 1989, when he introduced Gorbachev to the National Congress of People's Power in Havana when the Soviet leader visited Cuba. During this forty-five-minute introduction, Castro detailed the reasons why Soviet-style reforms would not be implemented in Cuba, while on July 26, 1989, to mark the thirty-sixth anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks, the Cuban leader was scathing of the events in Eastern Europe.[121] On changes occurring in Poland and Hungary Castro commented,

> I think many errors have been made which have led to these problems. At times, I even wonder if it would not be better for those new generations that were born under socialism in Poland and in Hungary to take a little trip to capitalism so that they can find out how egoistic, brutal, and dehumanizing a capitalist society is.[122]

The above quotes from Castro evidence the Cuban government's dislike of the direction of travel in the Soviet Union, with events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union resulting in an ideological difference on the correct path to socialism materializing, not least over the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 which signalled the "death knell" of the "Brezhnev

doctrine." Notwithstanding this, what is key to the bilateral relationship was that Gorbachev did not want to end socialism, rather improve it. As detailed in chapter 1, the reform processes which he instigated all had the purpose of reinvigorating both the Soviet economy and its society. Subsequently they challenged a number of traditional assumptions concerning Marxist-Leninism (including the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the Soviet desire for nuclear parity and the inevitability of world revolution), with these reform processes not merely being cosmetic and consequently altered regnant ideas within the Soviet ruling elite. Although this was the case, a number of these reforms had unforeseen consequences for both global politics and Soviet-Cuban relations and are also significant for the constructivist interpretation for the end of the Cold War elucidated in chapter 1. However, of imperative importance was that Gorbachev did not want to create a Soviet Union devoid of Marxist-Leninism. This was crucial for Soviet-Cuban relations, because, as noted, the Cuban reforms did not open the Cuban system, and concerning changes in the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev in general, Fidel Castro has commented,

> As long as he held power in the Soviet Union he did everything he could to respect Cuba's interests and not to damage those good relations. A man of great ability, with good intentions, because I have no doubt that Gorbachev intended to fight to perfect Socialism—I have no doubt about that.[123]

In sum, despite the different reform processes within each country, the bilateral relationship continued between two socialist countries, with consequently Marxist-Leninist ideology remaining central to the relationship as both governments sought to improve socialism within their respective societies. The relationship had undoubtedly changed, with areas of Marxist-Leninist thinking being questioned not least by the end of the "Brezhnev doctrine," but ideology continued to impact the relationship even as events in the Soviet Union took an unforeseen path which resulted in the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Subsequently, ideology has affected the bilateral relationship in both the period from the time of the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution and also in the years from 1959 to 1991. Similarly, defensive realism had also been central to the relationship in both eras, not least due to the impact of Washington's relationships with Moscow and Havana, both individually and also together. The nature of Soviet-U.S. relations also exacerbated the historic Russian fear of insecurity, which underpins both Grigor Suny's assertion of the role of constructivism in Russian/Soviet foreign policy (this Russian anxiety concerning security is one of the constant factors in the country's history that is fundamental in shaping predominant opinions within

the Moscow ruling elite, and their subsequent perception of the international system) and also Tsygankov's thesis on the importance of statists, who are prepared to sacrifice themselves in the pursuit of Russian independence and sovereignty, for Moscow's interactions with the world. Moreover, the constructed history of Havana-Washington relations by the Cuban revolutionary elite, and both their subsequent perception of the international system and desire to fundamentally change Cuban-U.S. relations, was also crucial for Soviet-Cuban relations in the era from January 1959 to December 1991. Furthermore, the ruling elites in both the Soviet Union and Cuba had a shared perception of the role of the United States within this international system, which they perceived as antagonistic, but each other as friendly. This shared perception was aided, after December 1961, and the Cuban embrace of Marxist-Leninism, by a level of synergization occurring in their regnant elite ideas (societies founded on economic equality and state ownership of property). In sum, both Moscow and Havana had rationale to engage with the other in the years from the appearance of the Cuban Revolution until the implosion of the Soviet Union.

A POST-IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP?

As detailed in chapter 1, Gorbachev's engagement with new ideas in the mid- to late 1980s, which were outlined in both the opening chapter of this book and the previous section of this chapter, resulted in an alteration in the regnant Soviet elite principles, and subsequently their perception of the hostile role of the United States in the international community. This de-escalation in superpower rivalry ultimately heralded the end of the Cold War.[124] A similar hypothesis has also been postulated previously for Yeltsin's government in the post-Soviet era as Yeltsin's administration also engaged with ideas that were very different from those of their predecessors in the Kremlin. The outcome of their embrace of new ideas was that the West and the United States appeared much friendlier than had been the case during the Cold War. This points to Wendt's famous quote of "anarchy is what you make of it"; in the early to mid-1990s the perception of the United States within the new Russian ruling elite was of a partner in their economic transition rather than as an adversary endeavoring to destroy the Soviet Union, as had been the case previously. Consequently, Moscow-Washington relations improved. Contrary to this was that at this time the Russian and Cuban governments viewed the international system very differently and subsequently each other as less friendly.

The Yeltsin government's engagement with new concepts was evident in both its foreign and internal polices, which were intertwined with both

impacting on Moscow's relationship with Havana. As detailed in the previous chapter, the Liberal Westernizers defeated the Pragmatic Nationalists and Fundamental Nationalists in the debate which had raged with regards Russian foreign policy.[125] The result was that Moscow became much more Western looking as Moscow hoped that this could lead to aid and assistance in its economic transition; as noted in chapter 1, the Russian government wished to move from a Soviet-planned economy to one based on neoliberal economics as quickly as possible.[126] Consequently, as noted, Russia's relationship with the United States improved, but as it did, it negated cordial relations with Cuba due to the continued tension in Havana-Washington relations. Concerning this, Professor Eugenio Larin, Director of Latin American Studies at the Institute of Cold War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has written, "In order to improve political ties Washington demanded of B.H. Yeltsin that he must cut ties with Cuba. This course of action dominated the 1990s."[127] Subsequently, the Kremlin's desire for western, and particularly U.S. assistance in creating an economy based on very different ideological foundations from the Soviet economy, resulted at this time in ideology continuing to affect relations between Moscow and Havana. However, unlike the two previous periods which are the focus of the book, in the immediate aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union this consequence was negative. Moreover, the spectre of the United States which has continued to impact relations between Moscow and Havana in the post-Soviet era will be examined more fully in the next chapter.

The reforms instigated to the Russian economy by Yeltsin's government coincided with the system of ideals associated with neoliberal economics becoming the global orthodoxy, in part due to a lack of an alternative economic model with the disappearance of the socialist economic model. On the ubiquitous nature of neoliberal economic thinking Donald Richards has written that "it has become a virtual article of faith . . . that trade liberalization, cuts in social spending, privatization of state enterprises and inflation control provide the recipe for economic stabilization and long term economic growth."[128] However, a multifaceted academic debate on neoliberal economics, or the omnipresent nature of the globalization process, continued throughout the 1990s.[129] This debate focused on a number of different issues, including states' sovereignty, the emergence of new security dilemmas, and how globalization has affected many different parts of society including politics. Neoliberal economics and globalization did not have a universal impact on countries even within the same region, but what is beyond question is the increase in interdependence between various world economies resulting from the preeminence of international capitalism, evidenced by the growth of transnational investment.[130] In short, neoliberal economics and globalization were the antithesis of Marxist-Leninist thinking which had impacted

Soviet-Cuban relations prior to 1991 and were detailed in the previous section of this chapter. However, in the post-Soviet era, "a greater reliance on markets" has occurred, with this being of primary importance for Russian-Cuban relations in the period after 1991.

"Shock therapy" was applied to the Russian economy to satiate the Yeltsin government's desire to achieve an economy based on neoliberal economic thinking. However, the result was that the Russian economy endured a painful transition with its virtual failure occurring. Concerning this, Michael Ellman has written, "It mutated into a 'market with Russian characteristics'. Significant features of this system were kleptocracy, criminalisation, subsistence agriculture, non-payment and barter and reciprocity."[131] The socioeconomic impact of these reforms on the Russian population were extreme, with in 1998 Russian gross domestic product (GDP) being 57 percent of its 1990 level. This led Stephen White to write,

> The fall in national income that had taken place over the four years of Yeltsin-Gaidar reform was unprecedented, greater than the Great Depression in the West in the early 1930s and greater than the country had suffered in the course of the First World War, the civil war, or even the Second World war.[132]

These socioeconomic effects were not lost on Fidel Castro and will be detailed. However, by 1998, 87 percent of all industrial enterprises were privatized, but this also led to the emergence of a number of powerful oligarchs due to the manner of the Russia privatization process.[133]

The outcome of the above changes was that Marxist-Leninism, which as stated had been a cornerstone of bilateral relations between Moscow and Havana for the previous thirty years, simply disappeared from the post-1992 bilateral relationship. The desire for an international socialist community based on Marxist-Leninism vanished within the "new" Russia of the 1990s. Regarding this, Pavlov has stated that Yeltsin completed the de-ideologization process begun by Gorbachev; A. Ermakov, head of the Department on Cuba in the Russian Latin American Department, said in a February 1992 interview that ideology no longer impacted relations between Moscow and Havana. Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev was more explicit when he wrote that

> it is necessary to create normal links between our two countries, after an abnormal fragile stereotype, which was based on "revolutionary romanticism" which was politically and economically onerous for the USSR.[134]

On this Nadya Plankton, co-organizer of the cinema, video, and graphic arts project entitled "Days of the Russian contemporary culture in Havana,"

believes the outcome was that for Russia, "Cuba was the first country that has been stroked off the friends' list, it was wiped out from the world's map."[135]

This changed perception of the Cuban Revolution within Russia was evident with both the publication of the book *On Eve of Collapse*, which was highly disparaging of the Cuban government, and the birth of a Cuban dissident group, Cuba Union, established in Russia, neither of which would have occurred during the Soviet era.[136] Moreover, in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive in Havana a memo dated May 10, 1996, exists in which Isabel Allende, MINREX expert on Eastern Europe and future deputy foreign minister, replied to Carlos Palmarola's, Cuban Ambassador to Russia, report that had outlined the editorial "Palieia" published in Russia which had stated that Fidel Castro was continuing the intellectual work of Stalin.[137] Such sentiments had most certainly not been evident during the Soviet era of the bilateral relationship, and in her reply Allende pointedly stated, "Many of Fidel's writings and speeches have been translated into Russian. They need to be checked and verified by suitable translators."[138]

Furthermore, in the MINREX archive a transcript exists of Roberto Robaina's, Cuban Foreign Minister, appearance on the Russian television show "Hero of the Day" in January 1999. On this Robaina was asked a series of probing and "aggressive" questions relating to Cuba and Soviet-Cuban relations. This included if the relationship had been excessive, why the situation within Cuba in the 1990s was so difficult for Cubans and why Fidel Castro had declined the television company's request for an interview.[139] Robaina refutes all of the insinuations contained within these questions and pointedly spoke about the longevity of relations between Havana and Moscow, rebutted the idea that Soviet-Cuban relations had been excessive, defends the situation within Cuba while attacking the U.S. embargo, and dismissed the idea that for some Cuba "looked like a satellite" of the Soviet Union.[140] The "assertive" nature of the questions displayed the dramatic change in Moscow-Havana relations in the post-Soviet era when compared to the Soviet one, but they are surprising as Cuban-Russian relations had improved by the time of the interview. However, the downturn in relations in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations had been both political and economic and was so dramatic that by the end of 1992 it appeared that little of its previous incarnation continued to function.

Politically the downturn in relations was evident in September 1992 when the Kremlin declared that the final 1,500 Russian troops would leave Cuba by mid-1993, because their presence on the island "no longer makes sense" with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.[141] Furthermore, Moscow's voting behavior in various United Nations (UN) fora was very different in comparison to the Soviet era. In November 1992, Moscow abstained in the UN vote which denounced the Cuban Democracy Act, or Torricelli Bill, that further

tightened the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba.[142] Moreover, from 1992 to 1994 the Kremlin ceased voting with Cuba at the UN Convention on Human Rights in Geneva.[143] Concerning this Russian voting behavior, D Cobaliev, head of the Russian delegation in Geneva, commented, "The moment has come for Russia to pay its debt to the international community of human rights."[144] Additionally, in May 1992, *Izvestia* reported that Russian authorities had provided the West with information concerning political prisoners in Cuba.[145]

The deterioration in bilateral economic relations was evident when Russian companies, no longer "tied" to Cuba for political reasons, wished to introduce new terms for bilateral trade. Simply, Moscow wished to foster a new relationship with Havana that had very different foundations to Soviet-Cuban relations. Cuba being required to pay in hard currency for Russian experts working on the Juragua nuclear power plant project exemplified this change, or the "new realities" of bilateral relationship in the post-Soviet era.[146] Furthermore, the "shock therapy" that was applied to the Russian economy resulted in many companies simply not being in a position to be able to trade with Cuba.

This fundamental change to Moscow-Havana relations is further evident in MINREX documents that have become available on the relationship in the 1990s. In May 1995, Robaina travelled to Moscow which was hugely significant as such visits had been absent since December 1991. However, during this trip Robaina met Russian businessmen, and in a letter dated September 9, 1996, to Yevgeny Primakov, Russian foreign minister, Robaiana refers to the involvement of the company ALFO-ECO in agreements regarding sugar for oil swaps.[147] The involvement of private business in the bilateral relationship was a very different scenario to the Soviet era of the relationship, but yet further evidences the "new realities" of the relationship in the post-Soviet era. Consequently in January 2006, Sergey Lavrov, the then Russian foreign minister, wrote, "Our ties survived various stages: from growth in the middle of the last century to an open decline of the 1990s, partly due to Russia's shift to a market model of development."[148]

The political and economic effects of the removal of Marxist-Leninism from the bilateral relations will be more fully examined in later chapters. However, this did not mean that the relationship was not continuing to be impacted by a system of idea and ideals, or ideology, as neoliberal economics, the antithesis of a planned economy, had, and would, continue to influence the relationship throughout the post-Soviet period. As noted, the affect of neoliberal economic thinking had been most evident in the "new realities" of Moscow's relationship with Havana that had a very different base when compared to Soviet-Cuban relations. Furthermore, linked to the "new realities" was the Kremlin's desire for Western and particularly U.S. assistance

in creating an economy whose basis was ideologically radically different, adhering to the principles of neoliberal economic thinking, from the Soviet economy. The upshot was that in the early to mid-1990s ideology persisted to affect bilateral Russian-Cuban relations. However, as noted, unlike the two previous periods of the relationship that were examined in the previous sections of this chapter, this impact was negative.

In the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations, in public the Cuban response to the changed situation with Moscow was somewhat mooted, which may not have been expected as the government in Havana remained steadfast to its socialist principles. Simply, neoliberal economic thinking and the globalization process were the polar opposite of these socialist values, but they underpinned the "new" Russia of the post-Soviet era. *Granma* printed a number of articles which did not criticize the Russian reforms, but instead focused on the socioeconomic difficulties that many people in the former Soviet Union faced. Castro also did this, most noticeably in his report to the 5th Congress of the PCC in October 1997 when he highlighted the socioeconomic problems that had engulfed Russia in the 1990s. Furthermore, Castro highlighted the gravity of this situation due to Russia being a nuclear power, but conversely to what may be expected, the Cuban leader blamed the situation on the effect of forces external to Russia, in particular the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and increased mafia influence.[149] However, in August 1994, in a speech to Cuban solidarity groups in Colombia, Castro said, "When we are subjected to a double blockade, because we practically do not have any commerce with former socialist countries and with Russia."[150] In comparing the effect of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations to the U.S. embargo against the island graphically highlights the gravity of the situation which the Caribbean island faced in the early to mid-1990s. In the years from 1991 to 1993 Cuba's GDP fell by over 10 percent annually, power shortages were commonplace on the island and the calorie consumption of Cubans fell drastically.[151] This situation would lead to the *balsero* crisis of 1994.[152]

Cuban academia was more forthright in their criticism of the changes taking place within Russia with Sofía Hernández Marmal, a researcher at the CEE in Havana, writing that most Russians had suffered from the "economic Darwinism" that resulted from neoliberal economics.[153] Additionally, Cuban academia believed that a "Kozyrev Doctrine," which emphasized good relations with the West and Washington in particular had materialized. This doctrine had emerged due to Kozyrev having fallen "in love with the United States and the U.S way of life."[154]

An ideological dislike of the reforms implemented in Russia in the 1990s, neoliberal economics and globalization in general may have underpinned these comments and articles, but Cuban aversion to these changes are

palatable in MINREX documents that have become available on this era of the bilateral relationship. On April 24, 1994, Rogelio Montenegro, Cuban ambassador to Russia, sent a detailed analysis of Russian energy production to Allende. The report begins by iterating that "a contraction in the Russian economy began in 1990 and was exacerbated by the reforms which commenced in 1992."[155] Additionally, in a MINREX document dated May 20, 1998, this was described as a "paralysis" of the Russian economy.[156] A MINREX report dated May 1996 exists which details,

> With regards commercial-economic Cuban-Russian relations there are difficulties and uncertainties arising, first of all, from the acute economic crisis in that country, the change of economic model which they were not prepared for, as well as the disorder and lack of government authority in fulfilling the commitments of the bilateral agreements that have been agreed.[157]

Furthermore, a thirteen-page document entitled "Danos y perjuicios a la economía Cubana como consecuencia de la abrupta y unilateral interrupción de los vínculos económica-comerciales con la extinta URSS" dated May 20, 1998, exists in the MINREX archive. The use of the words "damages," "abrupt," and "unilateral" in the title are emotive with the document stating that a total failure of the Cuban economy almost occurred, due to the loss of trade with the Soviet Union and the U.S. embargo.[158]

Further evidencing Cuban aversion to Russian policies of the 1990s was the April 2007 *Juventud Rebelde* report of Boris Yeltsin's death. The article pointedly reminded *Juventud Rebelde* readers that Yeltsin dissolved both the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Council of Russia, both having been significant institutions in the Soviet Union.[159] Yeltsin had embraced new ideas throughout the 1990s which resulted in Marxist-Leninism evaporating from the relationship overnight, but this did not herald the end of the bilateral relationship being impacted by ideology as the principles of neoliberal economic thinking came to the fore throughout the final decade of the twentieth century. A Cuban aversion to this type of thinking may have existed, but neoliberal economics would impact the relationship still further and not just negatively as noted above, but in ways which had not been expected or foreseen.

The gravity of the economic situation which faced Cuba resulting from the end of Soviet-Cuban relations has been detailed with this resulting in the aforementioned *balsero* crisis of late summer 1994. This situation was so severe that the Cuban government could not allow it to persist as the revolution's very survival was at stake. Consequently, the Castro administration implemented a number of economic reforms. In 1992, the National Assembly amended the Cuban constitution, permitting state property to be transferred to joint ventures with foreign money. Three years later in September 1995

further change occurred with a new foreign investment law that allowed both foreign companies to move their entire profits made on the island abroad, and also 100 percent foreign ownership of investments in Cuba. Due to the prominence of nationalism within the Cuban Revolution this was truly historic. It was believed that the island's tourist industry in particular would attract foreign investment, with significantly the Revolutionary Armed Forces and Raúl Castro being highly prominent in the changes to the tourist sector.[160] Additionally, in January 1995 joint Cuban and foreign ventures in both oil and mineral exploration and production became legal. Subsequently, to help facilitate foreign investment a number of new Cuban organizations were created, including in 1992 Consulting Associates and in 1994 the Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation. In a further attempt to attract increased levels of foreign investment, free trade zones were created in 1997. Moreover, a number of internal reforms were also instigated, which legalized both agricultural and artisan markets in an attempt to curb food shortages, and also from 1994 to 2004 the possession of U.S. dollars.[161]

In short, by implementing these policies the Cuban government started to open the island's economy to the world market. These Cuban attempts were assisted by, as detailed, neoliberal economics becoming the global economic orthodoxy. Outside investment in Cuba specifically, or Latin America in general, before 1959 was not a new process, but what was different in the 1990s was that this investment was global and not predominantly from the United States, as had previously been the case.

These changes listed above, and the Cuban economy being tentatively opened to the world economy have been perfectly detailed by the Cuban academic José Bell Lara who wrote,

> In a world in which wealth dictates power, alliances must be formed with the wealthy in order to beat to the wealthy. The strategy could be approximately formulated as follows: a policy of alliance with some sectors or factions of the international bourgeoisie as to successfully resist and overcome imperialist harassment and to achieve paths towards development.[162]

The outcome of these reforms have been numerous, diverse, and some even unforeseen, with accusations appearing that the Revolution has been eroded as not only does the basis of these reforms appear very different from Cuba's previous economic model but also Cuban citizens' experiences of them have been very varied.[163]

This not only makes Cuba's engagement with these reforms very much appear a "marriage of convenience," but they perfectly detail the prevalence of realist pragmatism, or defensive realism, within the Cuban ruling elite; the reforms were not designed to increase their power per se, but rather aid

the Revolution's survival by countervailing both the continuing anti-Cuban economic policies emanating from the United States and also the economic effects of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations. Additionally, these reforms were also in harmony with the ideas posited in the previous chapter by Jorge Domínguez, Michael Erisman, Julie Feinsilver and John Kirk concerning alterations in Cuba in the 1990s due to the extreme situation which the island faced. Moreover, the Cuban government have persisted with this policy of engaging with the global market, demonstrated in September 2013 when the Special Development Zone Mariel was created, which had the specific purpose of attracting further foreign investment to the island.[164]

These Cuban changes would be key to the island's relationship with Moscow, as an unforeseen consequence of these reforms would underpin a Russian desire to invest in the Cuban economy. In December 2000, during his first visit to the island, Vladimir Putin commented, "We lost a lot of positions which were a top priority for both countries, and our Russian companies in Cuba have been replaced by Western competitors."[165] Russian-Cuban bilateral trade will be scrutinized in chapter 4, but the Russian wish to readdress this unanticipated result of the Cuban economic reforms results in ideology, or more specifically the effects of neoliberal economic thinking, continuing to impact the relationship in the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSIONS

Fidel Castro's pronouncement in December 1961 that he, and thus also the Cuban Revolution, was Marxist-Leninist was crucial for bilateral relations between Moscow and Havana. From this point until December 1991, and the implosion of the Soviet Union, a bilateral relationship existed between two socialist states, the only period since November 1917 that this occurred. Central to this relationship was the principles of Marxist-Leninism, or ideology.

However, this chapter has contested that the period from 1961 to 1991 is not the only era of the relationship that has been impacted by ideology, or a system of beliefs and ideas. In the period prior to the Cuban Revolution an unexpected effect of Cuban economic dependence on the United States was that the island had an appearance as a "hotbed" of labor militancy. Subsequently this drew the attention of the Comintern which was based on the ideological principles of Marxist-Leninism and the vernacular of world revolution. This evidenced that prior to the Cuban Revolution Moscow did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" concerning Cuba, or subsequently Latin America. Theoretical differences may have sporadically appeared between Moscow and Havana in the years from 1961 to 1991, not least over the correct path to socialism in Latin America in the 1960s, but, as noted,

Marxist-Leninism remained key to the relationship until its demise with the implosion of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

Although this was the case, ideology continued to impact the relationship in the post-Soviet era. Marxist-Leninism may have vanished, but the principles of neoliberal economic thinking came to prominence. This was somewhat ironic due to it being the antithesis of the socialist planned economy and underscored by a very different beliefs system to Marxist-Leninism. At first its influences were negative due to effects of the Russian economic transition to a market economy and the Kremlin's desire for a "new" relationship with Cuba based on vastly different foundations from its previous incarnation. However, over time the relationship would be impacted positively by neoliberal economic thinking because an unexpected outcome of the Cuban economy being opened to the world market, in order to help safeguard its survival in a post-Soviet world, was that Russian companies lost their preeminent place in the island's economy. A desire to readdress this loss underpins a Russian hope for increased trade with Cuba. Consequently ideology has affected bilateral Moscow-Havana relations in each of the three disparate eras of the relationship that exist since November 1917.

Notwithstanding this, there have been other constancies in the relationship since the time of the Russian Revolution, not least the role of the United States, and the nature of Washington's relationships with Moscow and Havana both individually and collectively. This continuous impact of the United States is key to the central argument of this book; both Moscow and Havana have had the rationale to engage with each other consistently since November 1917, and not only in the 1959 to 1991 era.

Moreover, two different elucidations for the relationship have been offered: defensive realism and constructivism. These two diverse paradigms may have vastly different understandings of the international system, but crucially they come to similar conclusions. Defensive realism posits that the bilateral relationship is mutually beneficial for both Moscow and Havana, allowing each country to countervail the United States, with this including in the years when the Comintern took interest in the island. As noted, Moscow could use any potential labor militancy in Cuba, orchestrated by the Comintern, to intensify pressure on the United States (this resulted from U.S. economic domination of the island) to moderate its anti-Soviet policies, including as noted, western attempts to crush the fledgling Bolshevik administration and non-recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933.

Nevertheless, the Soviet/Russian and Cuban unique histories have been significant in shaping predominant ruling elite ideas in both Moscow and Havana which is crucial to the subsequent perception which both have formed of the international system in general, the United States role within it and also of each other. The importance of constructivism is deepened by

the fact that it can also explain change in dominant ruling elite ideas which have further impacted global politics and the bilateral relationship, with the emergence of the Russian and Cuban Revolutions fundamentally altering the dominant ideas of the governments in Moscow and Havana. For Russia, a society constructed on the premise of a state-owned economy, while in Cuba after January 1959, a passionately nationalistic independent island that contained improved social justice which was no longer acquiescent to Washington, but included a global outlook. Furthermore, in the years from 1961 to 1991 a synergization in elite ideas in Moscow and Havana occurred; a belief in increased social justice and state ownership of property. As Wendt has written, "Anarchy is what you make of it"[166] with both Moscow and Havana perceiving Washington as a threat, but each other as friends. The result is that Moscow and Havana have had rationale to engage with each other consistently since 1917. Fundamental for this is that a number of constancies have persisted, with this chapter theorizing that although its impact has varied over time, this has included the role of ideology.

NOTES

1. For this work, "ideology" will be taken as a system of ideas, ideals, or beliefs which a certain group of people, or institution, credit in explaining how society functions with this system of ideas, ideals, and beliefs also providing a framework for the creation of this society. Concerning ideology, Peter Shearman has written, "Ideologies are not philosophies. Ideologies are ideas and principles *designed to be implemented*." Peter Shearman, *Rethinking Soviet Communism*, 60.

2. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 27. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991*, 2. Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987*, 5–6.

3. For example please see "Russian Revolutionaries for Immediate Peace," *Havana Post*, November 8, 1917, 1, with various articles published in the Cuban newspaper *Cuba Contemporánea* also demonstrating this interest. This includes in August 1919 "Evolución del Socialismo Moscovita" by P. Rodríguez which studied the Russian system from the nineteenth century and tried to explain the advent of Bolshevism in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. P. Rodríguez, "Evolución del Socialismo Moscovita," *Cuba Contemporánea* XX (August 1919): 481–99.

4. In October 1941, the Workers Centre in Regla, "Máximo Gómez 81" and Nicolas Guillen, the famed Cuban poet who would become prominent within the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange once it had been created in the summer of 1945 wrote to Batista detailing the nature of the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Secretaria de la Presidencia Caja 51, Numero 75, Archive of the Secretary to the President of Cuba, Cuban National Archive (CAN). Support for the Soviet Union was exposited in a note to Batista dated October 8, 1941 from Soviet emigres in Cuba. October 8, 1941, Secretaria de la Presidencia Caja 51, Numero 75,

CAN. The impact of the Second World War appears important for this support, but this is not to downplay the significance of the existence of these documents, evidencing interest in the Soviet Union from parts of Cuban society.

5. Ángel García and Piotr Mironchuk, *Esbozo Histórica de las Relaciones entre Cuba-Rusia y Cuba-URSS* (Havana: Academia de Ciencias de Cuba, 1976), 182–84. E. A. Larin, *Politicheskaia istorii Kuba XX Veka* (Moscow: Visshaya shkola, 2007), 88–90. M. A. Okuneva, *The Working Class in the Cuban Revolution* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 80–81.

6. Garcia and Mironchuk, Raíces de las relaciones Cubano Soviéticas (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988), 126. D. Zaikan to Molotov, November 8, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 57–58. D. Zaikan to S.A. Lozovskomu, "Deputy Commissar of Foreign Relations," February 23, 1945. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 64.

7. *Cuba y la URSS*, no. 1 (August 1945): 1.

8. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 149.

9. Rollie E. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America. A History of the Movement 1917–1963* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1964), 153. A.D. Faleroni, "Soviet Relations in Latin America," in *The Soviet Union and Latin America*, eds. J.G. Oswald, J.G. and and A.J. Strover (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 10. G.M. Adibekov, E.E. Shakhnazarova and K.K. Shirinia, *Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna 1919–1943* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 21. Roy was Bengali by birth which has resulted in the accusation that his real interest was Indian independence and he was merely using Mexico as a vehicle to gain access to the Comintern. M.N. Roy, *M.N. Roy's Memoirs* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964).

10. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America*, 153. A degree of mystery surrounds the Caribbean Bureau, but Caballero iterates its importance in coordinating the activities of the communist parties in the Caribbean and Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 30–31. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, "Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945–8 Conjuncture," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (1988): 167–89. Angelina Rojas Blaquier, *El primer Partido Comunista de Cuba: Sus tácticas y estrategias, 1925–1935* (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 2005–06), 196–97.

11. J. Degras, *The Communist International 1919–1943 Documents: Vol. 2* (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1971), 526–48.

12. Adibekov et al., *Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna*, 140–46.

13. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 117. Poppino has also made this point, Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America*, 158–61.

14. Quoted in Clissold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1918–1968*, 2.

15. Melograni, *Lenin and the Myth of World Revolution*, xii, 57.

16. Ibid., 57.

17. Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 395.

18. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 236.

19. Boris Goldenberg, "The Rise and Fall of a Party: The Cuban CP (1925–59)," *Problems of Communism* (July–August 1970): 63.

20. Carr, "Mill Occupations and Soviets," 134.
21. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 173.
22. Ibid.
23. Thomas, *Cuba*, 576.
24. Ibid. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America*, 81.
25. "Report on Cuba," 1926. Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RSA) 495/105/1. This is in accordance with Thomas writing that from its creation the PCC "formally accepted the leadership of the Comintern." Thomas, *Cuba*, 577. Capote has also made this point. Orlando Cruz Capote, *The Comintern and Problems of the Cuban Revolution (1925–1935)* (Moscow: Academia de Ciencias Sociales, 1989), 4. Additionally, Gott has stated that from its inception the PCC was "beholden to Moscow." Gott, *Cuba. A New History*, 132.
26. A reliance on migrant members was not an uncommon phenomenon amongst other Latin American Communist Parties. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 236–37. Thomas, *Cuba*, 577.
27. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 237.
28. Letter from Marselo Salinas, Secretary of the Communist Section of Cuba, December 6, 1919, RSA 495/105/2.
29. "Report on the Cuban Section of Cuba," January 21, 1920, RSA 495/105/2.
30. "El Sembrado. Periódico Quince rial Ideas, Critica y Combate," RSA/495/105/1. Thomas has also written of Mella meeting the first Soviet ship to dock in a Cuban port with this occurring at Cárdenas as the Cuban authorities had prohibited the Soviet ship entry to Havana harbour. Mella has described the time he spent on this Soviet vessel as having spent "four hours under the Red Flag." Thomas, *Cuba*, 576.
31. Letter from PCC to Communist International, RSA/495/105/1. "Report on Cuba," 1926, RSA495/105/1.
32. Julio Antonio Mella, "Información para la Prensa Obrea y Revolución," RSA/495/105/1.
33. Mella, "Información para la Prensa Obrea y Revolución," RSA/495/105/1.
34. Letter from PCC to Comintern International, May 31, 1926, RSA495/105/2. Mella had been arrested and put on trial in the aftermath of a series of strikes which had taken place across Cuba from the autumn of 1925 onwards. Thomas, *Cuba*, 579–80.
35. "Save the Lives of Vivo and Ordoqui," RSA/495/105/2.
36. "65 Aniversario de la Gran Victoria," *Edicion de la Embajada de la Federación de Rusia en Cuba*, Numero 4 (2010): 28.
37. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 237. Goldenberg, "The Rise and Fall of a Party," 64. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 33–36. Poppino has stated, "The Pole, who used the name Abraham or Fabio Grobart, may have been the least obtrusive of the Comintern agents. He went to Cuba in 1927 to organize the Communist underground and spent much of the next two decades as an adviser to the party there." Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America*, 155.

38. Letter from Secretariat of the Communist International to PCC, January 5, 1928, 1, RSA495/105/10.

39. Ibid., 2–3.

40. Ibid., 6.

41. Ibid., 7.

42. Letter from Secretariat of the Communist International to PCC, January 5, 1928, 7, RSA495/105/10.

43. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 60–61.

44. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 160.

45. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 234.

46. M.J. Olgin, "X-The Third Period," in *A Documentary History of the CPUSA. Vol. 3: United and Fight*, ed. John K. Beranrd (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 615.

47. Goldenberg, "The Rise and Fall of a Party," 66–67. Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 274–75. Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 241–47. These soviets continued to function throughout the island until October 1933, but Carr believes that their importance may have been overstated and in reality more closely resembled "self-defence groups." Carr, "From Caribbean Backwater to Revolutionary Opportunity," 241–47.

48. Barry Carr, "Identity, Class and Nation: Black Immigrant Workers, Cuban Communism, and the Sugar Insurgency, 1925–1934," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 78, no. 1 (1998): 83–116.

49. For the impact of the fall in the world sugar price which would take over 10 years to recover, and the Wall Street crash, please see Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 190–94.

50. "Report from PCC to Secretary of Comintern International," November 4, 1933, RSA495/105/76.

51. Rees and Thorpe, "Introduction," 5. McDermott also states this. McDermott, "Stalin and the Comintern," 409.

52. Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution*, 126. For further analysis of the PSP and the "popular front" tactics please see Rojas Blaquier, *El primer Partido Comunista de Cuba*, 248–61.

53. K.S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power, The Course of the Cuban Revolution* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), 87. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, 281.

54. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power*, 60.

55. Ibid., 270.

56. As noted in chapter 1, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) changed its name to the Cuban Socialist Party (PSP) in the summer of 1944.

57. Jacques Duclos, "On the Dissoluion of the Communist Party of the United States," *Political Affairs* XXIV, no. 7 (July 1945): 656–72.

58. Ibid., 656.

59. Ibid., 670.

60. Lucillo Batlle, *Blas Roca. Continuador de la Obrara de Balino y Mella* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2005), 144. For a fuller analysis of the

impact of "Browderism" on the PSP please see Angelina Rojas Blaquier, *El primer Partido Comunista de Cuba: Pensamiento político y experiencia practica, 1935–1952* (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 2005–06), 103–04, 115–19, 139–55.

61. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, 291.

62. Goldenberg, "The Rise and Fall of a Party," 77.

63. In the Cuban political system of the mid- to late 1940s, PSP members were perceived as being disciplined, hardworking, and honest, which was different from how many other politicians were viewed. Concerning this Pérez-Stable has written, "PSP effectiveness within the political process strengthened constitutional democracy as the emergent logic of Cuban Politics." Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution. Origins, Course, and Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 49. William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 41 and 251.

64. "Report prepared for Vyacheslav Molotov by V. Grigorian, Chairman of the International Department of the Central Committee," November 25, 1950, RSA25/C/2163.

65. Ibid.

66. "Report prepared for Joseph Stalin by Grigorian," November 25, 1950, RSA25/C/2177.

67. "Entre vista con Juan Marinello," *América Latina*, no. 4 (1977): 88–92. Luis Báez, *Conversaciones con Juan Marinello* (Havana: Casa Editora Abril, 1995), 5.

68. RSA 82/2/1797.

69. RSA 82/2/1867.

70. RSA 27/11/1952.

71. Thomas, *Cuba*, 980–81.

72. *Pravda*, October 15, 1952, 1–7. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, 1–11.

73. Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America*, 168–69. Jorge Garcia Montes and Antonio Alonso Ávila, *Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba* (Miami: Ream Press, 1970), 444–45.

74. Blas Roca, "People of Cuba Fighting against War, for Democratic Liberties!" *For a Lasting Peace. For a People's Democracy*, May 18, 1950, 3.

75. In the autumn of 1958, *New Times* in the section entitled "People in the News" published an article about Fidel Castro and the situation in Cuba. This article chartered the history of the 26 July Movement, contained a photograph of Castro, and stated, "Fidel Castro, a prominent leader of the insurgent force in Oriente Province, was born in 1927. His father was a wealthy planter and he was educated at the Jesuit Dolores College in Santiago de Cuba and the Belen College in Havana. He studied law and social science at the University of Havana. Even in those university years Castro was active in the revolutionary movement." "Fidel Castro," *New Times* 34 (1958): 31–32. For further Soviet reporting on Cuba please see V. Vasilchikov, "Bloody Atrocities in Cuba," *Pravda*, February 5, 1957, 4. V. Tikhmenev, "Sweeping the Dirt under the Rug," *New Times*, Num 40 (1957): 18. A. Burlakin, "Cuba Aflame," *International Affairs*, Num 11 (1957): 113. "The People and Dictator," *New Times*, no. 15 (1958): 22. "Cuba in Flames," *New Times*, no. 50 (1957): 21–22. "Tottering Dictator," *New Times*, Num 10 (1958): 21–22. Vasilchikov, "Bloody Atrocities in Cuba." Furthermore on January 3, 1959 *Pravda* printed the 1,400 word article

"Cuba is Fighting, Cuba Will Win!" by V. Levin that detailed the Batista's flight from Cuba and the victory of the Cuban Revolution. V. Levin, "Cuba is Fighting, Cuba Will Win!" *Pravda*, January 3, 1959, 3. However, many of these Soviet media reports on Cuba appeared to be a summation of U.S. press reporting on the island, with the increase in Soviet media attention occurring after Herbert Matthews article "Cuban Rebel Is Visited in Hideout" was published in the *New York Times* on February 24, 1957. Herbert Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," *New York Times*, February 24, 1957, 1.

76. Evidencing the lack of knowledge the Soviet leadership had regarding the Cuban Revolution was that surprisingly due to the Soviet media coverage of Cuba detailed earlier, Khrushchev in his memoirs has written, "When Castro's men captured Havana, we had to rely completely on newspaper and radio reports, from Cuba itself and for other countries, about what was happening." Nikhita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), 488–89.

77. Ibid., 489.

78. Raúl Castro had both travelled to Eastern Europe and also spent significant time with the KGB officer Nikolai Leonov as they travelled from Europe to Latin America on the ship Andrea Gritti in 1953. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 489. Thomas, *Cuba*, 826. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble"*: *The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: John Murray, 1997), 33–34. N.S. Leonov, *Lixoletye* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 29–37. Moreover, Leonov has recounted the exact moment he met Raúl Castro beside the small swimming pool on the Andrea Gritti and that Castro introduced himself by saying, "I am Raúl Castro and I am a second year student in the Faculty of Law at the University of Havana." Leonov has detailed that during the rest of the voyage Castro asked questions on the workings of the socialist system, including concerning the Leninist Komsomol. Leonov has also stated that a lifelong friendship between Raúl Castro and himself ensued from the time they spent on the Andrea Gritti. Nikolai S. Leonov, *Raúl Castro. Un Hombre en Revolución* (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2015), 8–18.

79. Fursenko and Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble,"* 27. The importance of the Cuban press for Alekseev drawing conclusions on the Cuban Revolution was highlighted by the fact that he bought Cuban newspapers on his arrival at Havana airport on October 1, 1959. Aleksandr Alekseev, "Cuba después del triunfo de la revolución. Primera parte," *América Latina*, no. 10 (1984): 57. The first contact between the Cuban ruling elite and Soviet officials after the Cuban Revolution is noted in a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (hereafter MINREX), chronology of Cuban-Soviet relations prepared for Gorbachev's proposed visit to Cuba in December 1988, postponed due to the Armenian earthquake, as being when Che Guevara met members of the Soviet trade mission at an official reception on June 2, 1959. *Cronología de la Relaciones Cuba-URSS 1959–1988*, MINREX.

80. Maydanik, "The Ideological Aspects of Soviet Relations," 22. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 3–6. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 5–8.

81. Leonov has also detailed how Raúl Castro's conversations with Marshal Rodion Malinovski, Soviet defense minister, Marshal Matcei Zakharov, chief of the

General Staff, and Alexander Shelepin, president of the Committee of State Security, during Mikoyan's trip to Cuba were important for Mikoyan's recommendation to the CPSU politburo. Leonov, *Raúl Castro*, 151.

82. Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 90.

83. Fidel Castro, "Lenin Centennial Ceremony," April 23, 1970, Fidel Castro Speech Data Base, Latin American Network Information Center, http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1970/19700423-2.html.

84. Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 89.

85. Ibid., 99–100.

86. Fursenko and Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble,"* 26, 33–34. For an account of the interaction between Moscow and Havana in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Revolution please see Alekseev, "Cuba. Primera parte,"56–60 and Aleksandr Alekseev, "Cuba después del triunfo de la revolución. 2nd parte," *América Latina*, no. 11 (1984): 54–56.

87. Fursenko and Naftali detail this interview as having taking place in 1994. "*One Hell of a Gamble*," 27.

88. In his memoirs Andrei Gromyko has written about being the Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba and even his December 1943 trip to the island, but he makes no mention of his meeting with Batista. Andrei Gromyko, *Pamiatnoe Kniga Pervaya* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), 389–98. In 1971 the definitive Soviet history of the Comintern *Outline History of the Communist International* was published. Cuba is only referenced three times in this book, the creation of the PCC in 1925, with relation to the policy changes in 1934 and concerning the Cuban party gaining legal status in the late 1930s. On this it is stated, "A popular-revolutionary bloc was formed in Cuba in 1937 on the initiative of the Communists. It consisted of the Communist Party, trade union organizations and peasant leagues. This bloc compelled the government to make certain concessions to the workers and to give legal status to the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions." This is historically accurate, but it omits to mention that Batista had granted the PCC legal status. A.I. Sobolev, *Outline History of the Communist International* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 232, 368, and 430. For further examples of a 'refined' history of Moscow's interest in Cuba and the PSP prior to the Cuban Revolution that were published in the Soviet Union please see V. V. Volskii, *SSSR i Latinskaia Amerika 1917–1967* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1967), 70. Cruz, *The Comintern and Problems of the Cuban Revolution. Cuba-URSS Crónica* (Moscow: Progreso, 1990). A. Aleksandropov, "Sovetskia-Kuba otnosheniya i 20-40-e godi," in *Rossiia-Kuba i Sovetskia-Kuba svjazi XVIII. XX vekov* (Moscow: Nayka, 1975), 132–46.

89. Ibid., 27.

90. Roberto Munck, *Revolutionary Trends in Latin America* (Monograph Series, No. 17, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, 1984), 48–49.

91. Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 34–68.

92. Peter Marshall, *Cuba Libre: Breaking the Chains?* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1987), 57.

93. *Revolución*, December 2, 1961, 1.

94. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 10–11. Moreover, in a letter sent to Mikhail Gorbachev on April 10, 1985, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reestablishment of bilateral diplomatic relations Fidel Castro wrote about the importance of the economic security which the Soviet Union provided for Cuba in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, highlighting the significance of defensive realism within the Cuban ruling elite. Letter form Fidel Castro to Mikhail Gorbachev, April 10, 1985, 2, MINREX.

95. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern*, 69. Moreover, Cole Blasier has written, "Moscow regarded Cuba as one of its post-World War II political triumphs." Cole Blasier, "The End of the Cuban-Soviet Partnership," in *Cuba after the Cold War*, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 59.

96. White, *Gorbachev and After*, 200–01.

97. Document 1, "Cuban Record of Conversation, Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership, Havana November 4, 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issues 8–9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996/97), 339–42. Moreover, in his memoirs Khrushchev has written that deploying nuclear weapons to Cuba was an attempt to both avert U.S. aggression against the island, buttress the socialist camp and also "having to decide on a course of action which would answer the American threat but avoid war." Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 493, The "American threat" was U.S. missiles in Turkey. This further increases the argument that defensive realism underscored Moscow's decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba as the Soviet leader was attempting to balance the U.S. missiles in Turkey with Soviet missiles in Cuba.

98. Erasmo Dumpierre, "La Revolución de Octubre y su Influencia en Cuba," *Bohemia*, April 21, 1967, 9.

99. Castro, "Lenin Centennial Ceremony." Moreover, in a letter dated November 4, 1977, that Fidel Castro sent to Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, first deputy premier, on the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Castro wrote, "We Cubans say that the 'Granma' followed in the wake of the 'Aurora' in the sea of class struggle and the fight for national and social liberation." Letter from Fidel Castro to Leonid Brezhnev, November 4, 1977, MINRERX. On the night of October 25–26, 1917, the Russian naval ship "Aurora" firing a blank shot at the Winter Palace in St Petersburg had signalled the start of the November Revolution.

100. Ernesto Guevara, "Discurso en el Segundo Seminario Económico de Solidaridad Afroasiática," in *Ernesto Che Guevara escritos y discursos*, vol. 7 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1985), 341–54.

101. *Granma*, February 7, 1966, 1. *Pravda*, April 2, 1966, 7.

102. For an account of Cuban militancy at this time please see Edward González, *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 133–39.

103. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 35. Moreover, with relation to Cuban security Erisman has written that Havana was reassured by Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia as it evidenced Moscow's willingness to use military power to defend socialism, which after the Cuban Missile Crisis the Cuban government had been uncertain of. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 76.

104. Blight and Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days*, 33–76.

105. Ibid. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 90–92.

106. González, *Cuba under Castro*, 139–40. At the "microfaction's" trial Raúl Castro is quoted as having said, "They even went so far as to aspire to the application of political and economic pressure by the Soviet Union to force the Revolution to draw closer to that country." Quoted in Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 20. For an account of the trial please see Karol, *Guerrillas in Power*, 468–75. Please also see Leonov, *Raúl Castro*, 167–70. Kapcia, "Raúl's Decade?" 18.

107. Concerning the involvement of socialist bloc countries, Jorge Domínguez has written, "The Soviet, Czech, and East German governments and parties encouraged this infighting as a means of indicating the limits of legitimate behaviour that the Cubans were not expected to trespass." Jorge Domínguez, *Cuba. Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), 162.

108. González, *Cuba under Castro*, 140.

109. Ibid., 140–41.

110. Cuba was not on the list of participating communist parties at this conference. *Pravda*, February 28, 1968, 1.

111. Castro, "Lenin Centennial Ceremony."

112. *Granma*, December 19, 1975, 2–7.

113. White, *Gorbachev and After*, 197–203.

114. Castro spoke about the situation facing Cuba on various occasions, see Supplement to *Granma*, April 21, 1986, *Granma Weekly Review*, August 2, 1986, 3 and at the 3rd Congress of the PCC. Fidel Castro, *Fidel Castro: Ideologia, conciencia y trabajo politico* (Havana: Editora Política, 1986). Andrew Zimbalist, "Cuban Political Economy and Cubanology: An Overview," in *Cuban Political Economy. Controversies in Cubanology*, ed. Andrew Zimbalist (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). Max Azicri, "The Rectification Process Revisited: Cuba's Defense of traditional Marxist-Leninism," in *Cuba in Transition. Crisis and Transformation*, eds. Sandor Haleksy and John Kirk (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 43. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in *Cuba after the Cold War*, 135–38. Kapcia, "Political Change in Cuba," 27–28.

115. Antoni Kapcia, *The Cuban Revolution in Crisis* (Research Institute for Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies, 1992), 256. Antoni Kapcia, *Political Change in Cuba: Before and after the Exodus* (Institute of Latin American Studies, Occasional Papers, No. 19, University of London). Kapcia, "Political Change in Cuba," 27–28. Jorge Domínguez, "The Political Impact on Cuba of the Reform and Collapse of Communist Regimes," in *Cuba after the Cold War*, 104–17.

116. Supplement to *Granma*, April 21, 1986.

117. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 111.

118. Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 360.

119. Eloy Ortega González, "El conflicto Kampucheano en La Política Asiática de la URSS" *Revista de Estudios Europeos*, Ano 1988, no. 7–8 (julio–diciembre 1988): 97.

120. Eloy Ortega González, "Continuidad y Cambio en la Política Latinoamérica de la Perestroika," *Revista de Estudios Europeos*, no. 11 Especial (julio–septiembre

1989): 178 and 186. It is apparent that the Cuban Foreign Ministry were acutely aware of how the Soviet reforms were negatively impacting the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology. MINREX Memorandum, November 12, 1987, MINREX.

121. *Granma*, April 5, 1989, 2. *Granma*, July 28, 1989, 4. Despite these differences Gorbachev's trip to Cuba was perceived in general as a success with a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the only such agreement that Gorbachev signed while General Secretary of the CPSU. Valery Boldin, Gorbachev's Chief of Staff, writing about the trip, "It was quite a successful trip, despite some slight friction over *perestroika*, whose outer limits were not fully understood, either in the Soviet Union or in Cuba." Valery Boldin, *Ten Years That Shook the World. The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chef of Staff* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 222.

122. *Granma*, July 28, 1989, 5. Moreover, in December 1989 the pro-reform Soviet publications *Moscow News* and *Sputnik* were banned from sale in Cuba, further evidencing the Cuban government's dislike of events in the Soviet Union. Concerning these publications Fidel Castro would comment, "We could not hesitate to prevent the circulation of certain Soviet publications which have been against the policies of the USSR and socialism. They are for the ideas of imperialism, change and the counterrevolution." *Granma*, December 8, 1989, 4.

123. Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 364. Further evidencing the level of respect that existed between the two leaders was that in July 2000 Gorbachev personally wrote to Fidel Castro inviting him to participate in a television show on great twentieth century leaders that was due to include amongst others Yasser Arafat, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl. In this Gorbachev wrote, "It is difficult to imagine this project coming to fruition without your participation." Letter from Mikhail Gorbachev to Fidel Castro, July 14, 2000, MINREX.

124. Walt, "One World, Many Theories."

125. For this debate see: Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," 33–100. Malcolm and Pravda, "Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy." Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West."

126. White, *Russia's New Politics*, 125.

127. Larin, *Politicheskaia istorii Kuba*, 164.

128. Donald G. Richards, "The Political Economy of Neo-Liberal Reform in Latin America: A Critical Appraisal," *Capital and Class* (1997): 19.

129. M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000). Richard Gilprin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). R.N. Gwayne and C. Kay, *Latin America Transformed. Globalization and Modernity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999). R.N. Gwynne, "Views from the periphery: Futures of neoliberalism in Latin America," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2000): 141–56. R. Robertson, *The Three Waves of Globalisation. A History of Developing Global Conscousiness* (Nova Scotia: Zed Books, 2003).

130. R. Munck, "Neoliberalism, Necessitarianism and Alternatives in Latin America: There is No Alternative (TINA)?" *Third World Quaterly* 24, no. 3 (2003): 495–511. R.L. Harris, "Resistance and Alternatives to Globalization in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Perspectives* 29, no. 6 (Issue 127; November

2002): 136–51. Robert C. Dash, "Globalization. For Whom and for What," *Latin American Perspectives* 25, no. 6 (Issue 103; November 1998): 52–54. *Ley de le Inversión Extranjera* (Havana: Editora Política, 1995). C. Arceneaux and D. Pion-Berlin, *Transforming Latin America. The International and Domestic Origins of Change* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).

131. Michael Ellman, "The Russian Economy under El'tsin," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 8 (2000): 1429.

132. For further detail on the impact on Russian society please see White, *Russia's New Politics*, 144–81. Regarding the widening gap between rich and poor in Russian society White has written, "By 1997 the poorest fifth earned half as much in relative terms as they had earned six years earlier, but the richest fifth earned as much again—nearly half, in fact, of all earned income, and just 1.5% had acquired 65% of the national wealth." White, *Russia's New Politics*, 145.

133. For a more detailed analysis of the Russian privatization process please see White, *Russia's New Politics*, 122–30. Concerning this privatization process White has written, "Indeed, it was described not as a privatisation process at all, but as a 'nomenklatura collectivisation of enterprises' that was simply another stage in the 'economic civil war' between the Yeltsin administration and the rest of society." White, *Russia's New Politics*, 127.

134. A. Ermakov, "Cuba desde la nueva perspectiva de Moscú," *Hispano Americano*, Numero 2599 (February 21, 1992): 33. Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* (Moscow: 'Mezhdunov otnoshenii,' 1995), 269–70. Moreover, in a December 2000 interview while in Cuba Putin commented, "Cuba is our old traditional partner. Our relations with Cuba were highly ideological. Ideology constituted the basis of interactions with the USSR and to some extent Russia, but this ideological basis of relations has been lost." Interview with Putin, December 2000, MINREX.

135. Nadya Plankton, "Inferiority Complex of Post-Pioneers," in *Paper presented at the Symposium Cuba, Russia and the Post-Soviet Experience*, The University of Connecticut, February 2007, 3.

136. *Izvestia*, January 11, 1993, 3. Additionally, Pavlov has stated that Havana requested that the PhD degree of a Cuban student at a Russian university be withheld as he had applied for an exit visa for the United States while studying in Russia. Yuri Pavlov, "Russian Policy toward Latin America and Cuba," in *Russian Foreign Policy since 1990*, ed. Peter Shearman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 250.

137. Isabel Allende to Carlos Palmarola, May 10, 1996, MINREX, 2.

138. Ibid.

139. Versión integral de la entrevista que concedida el canciller Cubano Roberto Robaina González al programa "Hero de Día" (Canal 'NTV,') January 20, 1999, MINREX, 6 and 8.

140. Ibid.

141. *Izvestia*, September 17, 1992, 5.

142. *Izvestia*, November 25, 1992, 5.

143. *Granma*, September 8, 1992, 3–6, *Izvestia*, March 9, 1992, 7, *Izvestia*, March 12, 1993.

144. Radio Rabelede Network in Spanish 1255 GMT February 29, 1992 (FBIS-LAT-92-041, 9–10, FL2902181292).

145. *Izvestia*, May 4, 1992, 5.

146. *Granma*, September 8, 1992, 3–6. Interestingly a Russian Foreign Ministry memo contained in the MINREX archive describes the situation concerning Juragua as a "temporary halt" insinuating that Moscow anticipated this project would ultimately be completed. Russian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, September 10, 1992, MINREX.

147. Roberto Robaina to Evgeny Primakov, September 9, 1996, MINREX.

148. Ibid.

149. For these types of article please see *Granma*, January 2, 1992, 4 and *Granma*, January 3, 1992, 4. Moreover, on July 31, 1992, *Bohemia* published the article "Especulación callejera" by F. Laguera which detailed the economic problems Russians faced in their struggle with ever increasing prices. F. Laguera, "Especulación callejera," *Bohemia*, July 31, 1992, 15–17. Fidel Castro, "Main Report to the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba," *Main Report. Speech at the Closing the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba* (Havana: Editora Política, 1998), 32–33.

150. Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0027 GMT August 11, 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-155, FL1108133194).

151. Cuba's GDP fell in 1991 by 10.1 percent, 1992 by 10.2 percent, and 1993 by 13 percent. "1990–2005: Depresión, crisis, reanimación," *IPS*, Ano 18, no. 22 (November 30, 2005): 20. Delai Luisa López García,"Economic Crisis, Adjustments and Democracy in Cuba," in *Cuba in the 1990s*, ed. José Bell Lara (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 1999), 23.

152. In August 1994, 25,000 people fled Cuba in the main part due to the dire socioeconomic situation which Cubans faced at this time. On the 1994 *balsero* crisis Fidel Castro has commented, "The exodus of 1994 was brought on by the Soviet crisis, the fall of the USSR, the beginning of the special period in Cuba." Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 341.

153. Sofía Hernández Marmal, "El conflicto de pobres en Rusia: Herencia y desafío," *Revista de Estudios Europeos*, no. 25–26 (January–June 1993): 7.

154. Dr. Rodolfo Humpierre of Centro de Estudios Europeos (CEE) in Havana made this point during an interview conducted in Havana on February 14, 2008, in Havana.

155. Rogelio Montenegro, "Memo sobre la situación y las perspectivas del complejo energético Ruso," April 21, 1994, MINREX 1.

156. "Danos y perjuicios a la economía Cubana como consecuencia de la abrupta y unilateral interrupción de los vínculos económica-comerciales con la extinta URSS," May 20, 1994, MINREX, 6.

157. "Consideraciones sobre las relaciones económica-comerciales entre Cuba y Rusia y la Federación de Rusia," May 1996, MINREX.

158. "Danos y perjuicios a la economía Cubana como consecuencia de la abrupta y unilateral interrupción de los vínculos económica-comerciales con la extinta URSS," May 20, 1998, MINREX, 8.

159. "Murió el ex mandatario ruso Boris Yeltsin," *Juventud Rebelde*, April 24, 2007, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2007-04-24/murio-el-ex-mandatario-ruso-boris-yeltsin.

160. *Ley de le Inversión Extranjera*. J. Pérez-López, "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 39, no. 3 (1997): 15–22.

161. Pérez-López, "The Cuban Economy," 3–47. The Cuban reforms have been compared to a wide variety of other countries. See Álvaro Taboada Terán, "Nicaragua: Political Processes and Democratic Transition—Possible Lessons for Cuba's Future," 2003, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/ATaboadaTeran.pdf. Michael Radu, "The Cuban Transition: Lessons from the Romanian Experience," 2003, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/MRadu.pdf (accessed November 10, 2005). Carlos Alberto Montaner, "The Spanish Transition and the Case of Cuba," 2002, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/CAMontaner.pdf. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, *Cuba's Aborted Reform. Socioeconomic Effects, International Comparisons, and Transition Policies* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 131–54.

162. José Bell Lara, *Globalization and the Cuban Revolution* (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 2002), 114.

163. Azicri, *Cuba Today and Tomorrow*, 74. Maribel Aponte-García, "Foreign Investment and Trade in Cuban Development: A 50-Year Reassessment with Emphasis on the Post-1990 Period," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 28, no. 4 (2009): 487–96.

164. "Special Development Zone Mariel," Cámara de Comercio de la República de Cuba, http://www.camaracuba.cu/index.php/en/business/special-development-zone-mariel.

165. L. Newman, "Putin, Castro Talk on Trade, Debt Issues," *CNN*, September 14, 2000, http://www.cnn.com.

166. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 395.

Chapter 3

Diplomacy and Statecraft

In the previous chapter it was argued that ideology has constantly impacted relations between Moscow and Havana from the time of the Russian Revolution until the contemporary situation; it was elucidated that Moscow took interest in Cuba not only prior to the Cuban Revolution, but from soon after November 1917. This Soviet attention took place via the Third International, or Comintern, and questions the idea that the Soviet Union suffered from "geographical fatalism" prior to January 1959. This chapter will examine bilateral diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the first section further questioning the existence of Soviet "geographical fatalism" before the Cuban Revolution. Subsequently, the following sections will examine diplomatic relations in the 1959-to-1991 period and then the post-Soviet era, respectively.

The first official contact between Russia and Cuba is dated as having taken place on May 26, 1902, when the Cuban president, Tomas Estrada Palma, sent a short telegram to Tsar Nicholas II.[1] However, it would be another forty years before bilateral diplomatic relations were created when on October 5, 1942, the Cuban foreign minister, José Agustín Martínez, requested the creation of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba.[2] On October 10, 1942, the Cuban newspaper *The Havana Post* reported,

> The Cuban Government has decided to recognise Russia and establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Ramon Zaydin revealed yesterday in a speech delivered at the National Theatre during ceremonies feting the anniversary of the Grito de Yara.[3]

On the establishment of diplomatic relations Maxim Litvinov, the former Soviet commissar of foreign affairs and in 1942 the Soviet ambassador in

Washington, became the first Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba. The significance of Litvinov holding these two positions simultaneously will be discussed later in this chapter, but as Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba Litvinov did not live in Havana. However, after October 1942, Litvinov quickly requested a meeting with Aurelio Concheso, who would become the first Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, with the reports that exist of these meetings demonstrating Litvinov's interest in the Cuban political system.[4] Additionally, in April 1943, Litvinov visited Cuba for the first time, when he met the Cuban president Fulgencio Batista, and interestingly also a number of Cuban intellectuals at the Hotel Nacional in Havana. The significance of the Cuban intelligentsia being interested in the Soviet Union was touched upon in chapter 2 and will be more fully examined in the next chapter. Moreover, during Litvinov's trip the Cuban periodical *Bohemia* published the article "El Embajador Litvinoff en la Habana," written by José Luis Martín, in which it is reported that Litvinov expressed Soviet interest in trade with Cuba.[5] The disruption which the Second World War caused for global trade may partly explain this interest, but bilateral trade will also be examined in detail in the following chapter.

As noted, Aurelio Concheso was the first Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, arriving in the Soviet capital in mid-May 1943. In his first report to Cuban foreign minister Emeterio Santovenia, Concheso somewhat flamboyantly stated that "the Cuban flag is flying over the capital of the socialist world."[6] He also reported that he had met Mikhail Kalinin, Soviet head of state, on May 21, 1943, when Kalinin had shown affinity for relations with Cuba, while Concheso had iterated the Cuban desire to fight Nazism.[7] Three days after his meeting with Kalinin, Concheso presented his credentials as Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union to Joseph Stalin, with Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet foreign minister, also being present at the meeting on May 24, 1943. On May 29, 1943, *Pravda* published a very concise report of this meeting.[8]

However, in the archive for the Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History in Moscow a transcript of this meeting exists. The meeting commenced with a Cuban government statement read by Concheso, which paid homage to the efforts of the Red Army in its battle with Nazi Germany. The statement continued,

> The President wishes me to convey to you, the keen interest with which Cuba has followed the course of your Government during the period preceding the war in the effort to create for the People of the Soviet Union a prosperous and happy destiny at peace with all the nations of the world and the horror with which it saw how when these events were achieving success through the collective will and sacrifice of all, the barbarous nazi-fascist aggression in violation

> of sacred conventions, compelled the Soviet Union to mobilize all its national resources and energies in order to save, together with the achievement of your great and human revolution, the very independence of the Soviet Union and the freedom of the world.[9]

The end of this report may refer to Nazism, but due to the U.S. influence in the Cuban political system, and to the fact that before the wartime alliance Soviet-U.S. relations had been somewhat strained, the sentiments at the start of this statement are unexpected. Diplomatic protocol may underpin these sentiments, but they are surprising.

However, the seven questions that Stalin asked Concheso after he had read this Cuban government statement were much more illuminating, as they evidence the level of knowledge that the Soviet leader had of Cuba. Stalin asked, "How many people live in Cuba?" "How many are of Spanish descent?" "How many soldiers are there in the army?" and "What are Cuba's main exports?"[10] The opening questions are somewhat rudimentary, but due to the impact of the Second World War on the Soviet Union, including continuing food shortages, the Soviet leader's last two questions are understandable.

Notwithstanding this, Stalin's first two questions were, "Tell me, Cuba appears an independent country; is it not dependent on the United States?" and "Are there Cubans in the American army?"[11] These questions suggest that Stalin did not possess the most sophisticated and nuanced knowledge and understanding of Cuba, but they do evidence the fact that he did comprehend the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations. The role of Washington in the creation of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations, to which we will return, may partly explain the nature of these questions, but they could also suggest that Stalin's real interest was the United States rather than Cuba itself. This would be in accordance with the ideas posited by Light, detailed in chapter 1, that interest in the colonial power or metropolitan state rather than in the developing world country per se underpinned Soviet focus on the developing world. Light's ideas are still applicable to Cuba due to the nature of Havana's relationship with Washington.

Stalin's interest was vital for Soviet-Cuban relations due to the subordination of the Soviet political system to its leader, which is in harmony with the Great Man Theory. The attention which the Comintern afforded Cuba, detailed in the previous chapter, and the "successes" of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) prior to this meeting which had been achieved in part due to adhering to this organizations' "popular front" strategy, which included Juan Marinnello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez being appointed to Batista's cabinet in the year prior to Concheso's meeting with Stalin could also explain the Soviet leader's interest. The significance of Marinnello and Rodríguez's appointments in 1942, and their impact on Cuban political life, for piquing

Stalin's interest in Cuba are given more credence by Concheso's report of this meeting, sent to Santovenia. In this report Concheso wrote that Stalin "also had an interest in the activities, which President Batista, had engaged in the social sphere, especially rural schools and the increase in citizen's rights last year."[12] Additionally, it appears that the Kremlin attached more significance to its relationship with Cuba than with other Latin American countries. On April 20, 1943, Stalin met the Mexican ambassador to the Soviet Union, and he asked a similar number of questions to his meeting with Concheso, but the Soviet leader also asked about Argentina and Chile.[13] Soviet-Mexican relations may have been complicated by the break in diplomatic relations which took place in 1930 and Leon Trotsky residing in Mexico City in the late 1930s, but by asking Concheso questions focusing only on Cuba it appears that Moscow had a greater interest in Cuba than in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. Stalin behaving in this manner is all the more intriguing since Cuba is the smallest country, both geographically and economically, of these four Latin American countries. Moreover, on June 24, 1945, Concheso, along with the Chilean, Mexican, and Uruguayan ambassadors, attended the celebrations in Red Square to mark victory in the Second World War.[14] The outcome is that Cuba was represented at one of the most historic and important celebrations in Soviet history.

The creation of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations was part of a process which saw Moscow create diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American countries in the early to mid-1940s. Key to this was U.S. influence in the region, world events, and defensive realism. In chapter 1, it was noted that Washington did not officially recognize the Soviet Union until 1933, but the onset of the Second World War had resulted in the Soviet Union and United States becoming wartime allies in the fight against the Axis powers. This wartime alliance between Washington and Moscow has been described as a "marriage of convenience," as noted in chapter 1, this alliance demonstrating the central principles of defensive realism (the formation of alliances is pivotal as states endeavor to protect their security by counterbalancing their enemies) as the security of both the Soviet Union and Russian Revolution was being challenged by Nazi Germany. Consequently, this Soviet action is in accordance with Ronald Grigor Suny's idea that realism was apparent in the Soviet leadership from soon after November 1917. However, due the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations that were detailed in the opening chapter, a subsidiary result of this wartime alliance between Moscow and Washington was that a number of Latin American countries created diplomatic relations with Moscow. Cuba was no different with the significance of the island's relationship with Washington being further evidenced by the fact that Litvinov presented his credentials as Soviet charge d'affaires to the island not in Havana to Batista, but rather at the Cuban embassy in Washington.[15]

In August 1943, Andrei Gromyko succeeded Litvinov as Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba. Gromyko too did not live on the island and similarly to Litvinov he too presented his credentials in Washington rather than Havana. Further demonstrating U.S. influence in Cuba was that Gromyko presented his credentials to President Roosevelt of the United States.[16] In December 1943, Gromyko visited Cuba, when he met Batista, and on December 22, 1943, Gromyko sent a report of his meeting with Batista to Molotov in which Gromyko stated that Batista "spoke of the Cuban populations support for the Soviet people."[17]

While in Havana, Gromyko also met Santovenía with Dmitri Zaikan accompanying Gromyko to this meeting with the Cuban Foreign Minister. By the time of this meeting it is apparent that Zaikan had been in Cuba for some time because he sent a report to Molotov on November 8, 1943, regarding the commemorative celebrations for the Russian Revolution held in Havana.[18] Additionally, Zaikan was the future Soviet representative of the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) in Cuba. The outcome was that before assuming this position, Zaikan had met members of the Cuban political elite. A more detailed analysis of VOKS will take place in the next chapter due to its considerable significance for Soviet-Cuban relations.

Furthermore, another consequence of Gromyko's appointment as Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba was that after the Cuban Revolution, a member of the Soviet ruling elite had personal experience of the island. This resulted from the progression of Gromyko's career, which would culminate in him becoming the Soviet minister of foreign affairs. Moreover, this also made the apparent lack of Soviet knowledge in the Cuban Revolution in 1959, detailed previously, more surprising.

In the period when diplomatic relations existed, a number of telegrams were exchanged between the two governments, with many of these comprising formal greetings being expressed on significant dates for the respective countries.[19] Such exchanges followed normal diplomatic protocol and would be expected. Notably on August 27, 1948, Moscow was informed that Carlos Prio Socarras was to become Cuban president, with, on October 4, 1948, Molotov accepting the Cuban government's invitation for a Soviet representative to be present at Prio's inauguration.[20] The significance of this exchange was that it occurred after the the Second World War alliance between Moscow and Washington had been confined to history and the appearance of the Cold War. Additionally, as previously detailed, a political move to the right occurred in Latin America in the mid- to late 1940s, but these diplomatic interactions between Moscow and Havana would suppose that Cuba was not following this regional trend.

However, the Cuban political system did move to the right in the mid- to late 1940s, but to a lesser degree than the rest of the region. Intimidation of

the Cuban Socialist Party (PSP) evidenced this political swing with Soviet-Cuban relations also being impacted.[21] In June 1945, an issue arose over Soviet couriers entering Cuba and in June 1949 Soviet citizens were arrested for dispersing pro-Soviet literature in Cuba. In the aftermath of this second incident *Pravda* published the article "Anti-Soviet Statement by the President of Cuba," which stated,

> Fawning before his masters, the American reactionaries, Socarras permitted himself a number of absurd slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union. He declared that the Soviet Union has a part in the activity of Communist parties in other countries. The Cuban President's anti-Soviet statements merely testify to the pathetic role played by the Cuba's present rulers, who are betraying the interests of their country to American monopolists. It is not surprising that in a country where such statements by the President are possible the police bait and persecute progressive figures and organise police pogroms. At the end of May the police raided the building belonging to a cultural and educational organization of Byelorussians and Ukrainians living in Havana.[22]

This report leaves no doubt concerning the level of Soviet unhappiness at this event, but it did not herald a break in diplomatic relations which could have been expected. Moreover, a number of Latin American countries severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the mid- to late 1940s, but Cuba did not repeat this process with Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations continuing until April 1952. Neither Moscow nor Havana breaking relations at this time would suggest that the relationship retained significance for both countries.

Documents concerning both incidents detailed above exist in the archive for the Commissar for Foreign Relations in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History. These documents include a report dated May 3, 1949, authored by the KGB officer Abakomov, that was sent to Molotov regarding the arrest of these Soviet citizens and the subsequent meeting which took place between KGB personnel and the Cuban secret police. Stalin, Mikoyan, and Beria were also in receipt of this report.[23] Again this shows that the pinnacle of the Soviet ruling elite were receiving documents and information concerning Cuba. Moreover, this document also illuminates a KGB presence in Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution, as does the document dated November 8, 1945, that Zaikan sent to the KGB detailing the celebrations in Havana for the Russian Revolution. In this report Zaikan criticizes the article "Socialism versus Capitalism" that had been printed in the Cuban newspaper *Marina*, which Zaikan described as "falangist."[24] With a Soviet embassy in Cuba and consequently Soviet personnel working on the island, a KGB presence may have been expected, the KGB had certainly operated in Mexico in the 1920s when Soviet-Mexican diplomatic relations existed, but these documents evidence KGB activity in Cuba prior to January 1959.[25]

However, despite the intimidation suffered by the PSP outlined above, the PSP continued to play an important role in the Cuban political system, with, as detailed in the previous chapter, the PSP providing it with legitimacy as Cuban politics became increasingly violent and corrupt in the aftermath of the Second World War. Quite simply, this legitimacy would have been lost if the PSP had been outlawed and this was something which the Ramón Grau and Prio governments were not prepared to do. The PSP would only be outlawed in early 1952 after Batista returned to power via a military coup.

In 1947 the Cuban embassy in Moscow was closed, further demonstrating the changed nature of Soviet-Cuban relations in the late 1940s. Subsequently, from this point until 1952, Cuban diplomatic affairs were conducted by the Mexican embassy in Moscow.[26] Documents exist which demonstrate Soviet and Cuban disagreement over the unfolding Cold War and particularly the division of Germany. It appears that Cuban displeasure existed regarding Soviet action at the Council of Foreign Ministers held in the Moscow in March 1947, which had failed to find an agreement between the former Allied partners on how a divided Germany should be ruled, with on March 27, 1947, the Cuban minister of state Rafael González Muñoz contacting the Soviet embassy in Havana concerning this meeting.[27] On April 8, 1947, Yakov Malik, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Relations, in his meeting with Alberto Espinosa, Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, recognized the tension which existed in Soviet-Cuban relations due to events in Eastern Europe.[28]

Once again global events had impacted Soviet-Cuban relations, with the island's relationship with the United States also affecting Moscow-Havana relations because the United States certainly disliked events in Eastern Europe. The closure of the Cuban embassy in Moscow demonstrated the Cuban government's pro-U.S. leanings. As detailed, diplomatic relations were not broken at this time as this would have been inconsistent with the role which the PSP played in the Cuban political system at this time, as noted above. Subsequently, this increased Soviet attention in the island due to the "successes" of the PSP, which continued to perform well in elections and, as detailed in the previous chapter, after 1942 had representation in Batista's cabinet. The perception of Cuba as a "hotbed" of labor militancy which had existed since the 1920s persisted. As outlined, this had materialized partly from a Cuban economic dependence on the United States, but was vital for sparking Soviet focus in Cuba. Moreover, Soviet interest in Cuba materializing due to the negative affect which labor radicalism could have for the United States was in harmony with Soviet policies toward the developing world in general that were outlined in chapter 1.

As detailed in chapter 2, this Soviet interest remained despite the PSP's close association with "Browderism" in the Communist Party of the United

States in 1945, but Cuba's geographical location and relationship with Washington only further strengthened Soviet attention in Cuba. Any communist success in Cuba could negatively impact the United States due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations. Simply, any PSP successes, in accordance with the "popular front" strategy of this organization, could be used by Moscow to offset U.S. anti-Soviet policies elsewhere in the world. As iterated in the previous chapters, Comintern activities were an integral part of Moscow's "dual track" diplomacy with the organization's existence strengthening the Kremlin's diplomatic position and was utilized in facilitating Bolshevik overall foreign policy objectives. The Comintern may have been disbanded in 1943, but this Soviet rationale for interest in Cuba remained due to the importance of Moscow's soft power for this attention, which will be examined in chapter 4. As theorized, defensive realism underscored both elements of Moscow's "dual track" diplomacy as it was designed to countervail Washington rather that increase its power at the expense of the United States.

The onset of the Cold War only increased the significance of this for Moscow, with the Marshall Plan in Western Europe that comprised part of Washington's plan to contain the Soviet Union and the U.S. desire to check Soviet expansion founded on George Kennan's "long telegram" of February 1946, goading the traditional Russian fear of outside aggression. As posited, this fear of external hostility comprises an important constant element of Russia's unique history, with these constant factors being fundamental to Grigor Suny's contention of the role of constructivism within Moscow's foreign policy. These constancies are key to shaping regnant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite, and their subsequent perception of the international system and the role of the United States within it, which they perceived as hostile. Additionally, Russian anxiety concerning insecurity is fundamental for Andrei Tsygnkov's assertion on the significance of statists (due to this inferiority complex statists were prepared to die in an attempt to preserve Russian sovereignty and independence) in Soviet foreign policy.

Bilateral Soviet-Cuban relations were severed on April 3, 1952, by Moscow over an incident concerning Soviet couriers being denied entry to Cuba. G. E. Formin, Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba, sent a letter to the Cuban deputy minister of foreign affairs terminating diplomatic relations and it stated,

> The USSR Legation in Cuba, on instructions of the Soviet government, considers it necessary to state the following.
>
> In view of the fact that on March 21, 1952, the Cuban government refused to allow diplomatic couriers of the Soviet Union to enter Cuba and thereby deprived the USSR Legation in Cuba of normal diplomatic contact with the government of the USSR, violating generally accepted diplomatic standards, the Soviet government is withdrawing the USSR charge d'affaires in Cuba and terminating relations with the government of Cuba.[29]

Crucially this took place in the immediate aftermath of the military coup that returned Batista to the Cuban presidency with the journalist Yu. Yarstev writing about this in the article "A Soviet View of Cuba," published *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on April 8, 1952. In this Yarstev wrote,

> And so one President has taken over the place of another. What, it may be asked, has changed? Cuba remains as before a colony of the American monopolists, and both Presidents, the old one and the new, are only obedient puppets in their hands. The boss pulls the string—there is a coup in Havana; he pulls again—there is another coup and the next President turns up. There is almost no difference between the Presidents—it is a question of a struggle inside the Cuban ruling elite.[30]

The abrupt and swift nature of the termination in diplomatic relations was demonstrated by the fact that the final edition of *Cuba y la URSS*, the journal published by the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana, occurred in February 1952.[31] Both the Institute and this journal will be examined more thoroughly in the next chapter.

The timing of the break in diplomatic relations and the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations appeared key to Moscow's decision. As detailed the incident which led to their termination occurred in the immediate aftermath of Bastista becoming Cuban president for the second time. The result was that at this time he would have still been attempting to build his power base within the Cuban political system. Crucial for this was the support of the United States, with Batista wishing to demonstrate his pro-U.S. credentials to Washington. The denial of entry to Cuba of Soviet couriers at the height of the Cold War perfectly evidenced these credentials. Concerning this Hugh Thomas has noted, "He realized that the circumstances of the Cold War gave him new opportunities for ingratiation with the United States."[32]

In the archive for the Commissar for Foreign Relations in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History in Moscow, there is a communiqué dated March 27, 1952, sent to Stalin and other members of the Soviet political elite by A. Vishnevsky, secretary to the Central Committee. Vishnevsky provides a concise history of bilateral diplomatic relations for the previous ten years, which he believes had been friendly, but writes that just prior to Batista's return to power "General Batista reported the situation to the United States, which opened up his return to power thus ending the power of Prío Socarrás."[33] Vishnevsky then concludes that Batista's objectives were to foster good relations with the United States, Europe, and Latin America.[34] This would suggest Moscow believed that the United States had been complicit in Bastista's return to the Cuban presidency, thus strengthening the above argument for Batista to demonstrate his pro-U.S. credentials to Washington which he could achieve by denying Soviet couriers access to Cuba.

The emergence of such a pro-U.S. Cuban president appeared to mark the end of the PSP's "successes" and subsequently the "popular front" strategy which had been fundamental in the PSP achieving these "successes." This resulted in the Soviet leadership reassessing its relationship with Cuba. Moreover, in the Cold War setting of the time the continuation of Soviet-Cuban relations would have appeared somewhat incongruous due to the island being governed by such a pro-United States administration. The result was the termination of bilateral diplomatic relations.

Key to the existence of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations for a ten-year period from 1942 to 1952 was the island's relationship with the United States. It is this, in combination with defensive realism and events elsewhere in the world, that explains their creation. As detailed, Moscow and Washington had become allies during the Second World War, with defensive realism underpinning the Soviet decision to join this alliance as the survival of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Revolution were being challenged by Nazi aggression. Due to the nature of Havana's relationship with Washington at this time, a secondary result of the wartime alliance had been the creation of bilateral Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations, which continued to exist even after the end of hostilities and the increase in tension between Moscow and Washington with the advent of the Cold War. Additionally, Soviet-Cuban relations persisted for a much longer period than Moscow's bilateral relations with other Latin American countries. This was the result of the PSP providing the Cuban political system with legitimacy which the Grau and Prio governments were unwilling to lose by outlawing the Cuban party. Subsequently this only intensified Moscow's interest in Cuba as the perception of the island as a "hotbed" of labor militancy endured. Simply, any revolutionary successes in Cuba could be used by the Kremlin to counter anti-Soviet U.S. policy elsewhere in the world. This situation dramatically changed in April 1952 as Batista "created" a break in relations with Moscow to demonstrate to Washington his pro-U.S. credentials which were key in Batista cementing his power base on his return to the Cuban presidency.

SOCIALIST DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The timing of the break in diplomatic relations was somewhat ironic as within twelve months Stalin would be dead; as detailed in the previous chapters, this resulted in Soviet foreign policy evolving and consequently Moscow taking greater interest in the developing world. Moreover, Soviet-Cuban relations appeared to simply vanish with again, as noted in chapter 2 in January 1959 the Kremlin having little or no knowledge of events on the Caribbean island that led Fidel Castro to power. This was despite both the July 26 Movement

and the PSP singing a "unity pact" in mid-1958 or that Gromyko had been Soviet charge d'affaires to the Caribbean island.

Although this was the case, the change in Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of Stalin's death was fundamental for both the interest which Moscow took in the Cuban Revolution and after a cautious approach throughout 1959 diplomatic relations were re-established on May 8, 1960.[35] The lack of a Soviet colonial heritage aided this process, with the rapid Soviet modernization and industrialization of the late 1920s and early 1930s making the Soviet model look even more appealing to newly independent countries. As noted in the previous chapter, Cuba's move to the left in the period from January 1959 to December 1961 culminating in Castro's pronouncement that he and thus the Cuban Revolution were Marxist-Leninist perfectly illustrated this Soviet desire for influence in the developing world.

As detailed throughout this book, the nature of Cuba's relationship with the United States and the island's geographical location made a relationship with Havana enticing for the Kremlin. This was only intensified both with the timing of the Cuban Revolution, at the height of the Cold War and also due to the deterioration in Cuban-U.S. relations in the aftermath of January 1959. The significance of worsening Cuban-U.S. relations for Soviet interest in the Cuban Revolution was evident on July 9, 1960, when Moscow decided to purchase the 700,000 tons of Cuban sugar that the United States refused to purchase. On this Nikhita Khrushchev said, "Let Americans refuse to buy Cuban sugar. We shall be glad to buy it. . . . If the Americans don't want to eat Cuban sugar, it will be a pleasure for Soviet people to eat it."[36] Moscow-Havana bilateral trade links will be more fully examined in chapter 4, with deteriorating Cuban-U.S. relations being further scrutinized below. Simply, Soviet-Cuban relations could be utilized by Moscow in a number of ways as it not only exhibited the Soviet belief that the Cold War was turning in its favor, but demonstrated that the Soviet Union could challenge U.S. hegemony both in Latin America but also even in Cuba, a mere 90 miles from the United States. For propaganda purposes this was invaluable for Moscow. It appeared that offensive realism underpinned this Soviet interest in Cuba. However, as posited in chapter 1, similarly to the period from November 1917 to January 1959, Moscow could use its relationship with Cuba to counteract anti-Soviet U.S. policies elsewhere in the world. A flourishing relationship between Moscow and Havana augmented a Soviet global alliance which could balance the United States. Again, this evidences the importance of defensive realist thinking in the Soviet political elite and consequently for Soviet-Cuban relations. Additionally, for the reasons detailed above, a burgeoning relationship with Cuba appealed to Khrushchev's risk-taking personality.

As noted in chapter 2, the importance of the timing of the Cuban Revolution was increased for the Kremlin as it occurred as the Sino-Chinese split

was becoming even more vitriolic. Peking was not only challenging Moscow as the center of the world revolution, but China was even accusing the Soviet Union of revisionism. Soviet-Cuban relations silenced these Chinese accusations, with the result being that the bilateral relationship with Havana was important for Moscow for a variety of reasons, explaining the Soviet perspective for the re-creation of diplomatic relations in May 1960.[37]

The strong personality affinity that quickly developed between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro was also important for the relationship that materialized between Moscow and Havana after January 1959.[38] Moreover, the appearance of the Cuban Revolution reinvigorated the Soviet leadership who by 1959 were middle-aged career politicians rather than heroes of the Russian Revolution. On the impact of the Cuban Revolution for the Soviet leadership, Anastas Mikoyan, member of the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) commented, "You Americans must realize what Cuba means to us old Bolsheviks. We have been waiting all our lives for a country to go communist without the Red Army. It has happened in Cuba, and it makes us feel like boys again."[39] Mikoyan would quickly become one of Havana's chief promoters within the Soviet leadership and can be perceived as one of the first members of the "Cuban lobby" in Moscow.

This lobby evolved very quickly after the inception of Soviet-Cuban relations and comprised people who advocated on Cuba's behalf among the Soviet political elite. People were drawn to this lobby for a variety of reasons, some like Mikoyan as detailed above, others for ideological reasons but many after being stationed in Cuba. Due to the nature of the relationship that would develop between the two countries, members of the lobby came from a variety of different Soviet specialities including politics, the military, diplomatic circles, academia, and media (Sergo Mikoyan, editor of the journal *Latinskaia Amerika*, and son of Anastas would become a prominent member of this lobby in the 1980s). While in Cuba a number of these people formed close ties with the Cuban Revolution, with some simply being "seduced" by the "island of freedom." Their experiences on a Caribbean island would have been vastly different from many of the other foreign missions which Moscow could have sent them on. This was important once they returned to the Soviet Union as they were strongly pro-Cuban, pursued the island's cause among the Soviet ruling elite, and in conjunction with the powerful positions they held, were able to influence Moscow's Cuban policy. This lobby was of particular significance during the Gorbachev period when the bilateral relationship was greatly affected by the Soviet reform processes. We will return to this.

As detailed in the previous chapter, great uncertainty surrounded the exact nature of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, with it being argued that Castro's pronouncement that he and thus the Cuban Revolution were Marxist-Leninist in December 1961 was partly driven by a desire to acquire

increased security guarantees from the Soviet Union, crucial due to repeated U.S. attempts to crush the Cuban Revolution. Consequently, defensive realism was the key. Also noted in chapter 2 was the nationalistic and anti-American nature of the new administration in Havana with Castro later commenting, "We would not in any event have ended up as close friends. The U.S. had dominated us for too long."[40] In the Cold War setting of the time, and the subsequent bilateral nature of global politics, if Cuba did not side with the United States it was logical that it would side with the Soviet Union. In sum, a burgeoning relationship with Moscow would help end U.S. hegemony in Cuba, which the above quote from Castro demonstrates was imperative for the Cuban Revolution.

Additionally, the revolutionary Cuban elite's desire to fundamentally alter its relationship with Washington, primarily due to their constructed history of Havana-Washington relations which the above quote illuminates, permits constructivism to provide both an elucidation of why animosity materialized between Havana and Washington, and also why a burgeoning relationship between Moscow and Havana emerged. The Cuban Revolution profoundly altered dominant ruling elite ideas in Havana (after January 1959 a fervently nationalistic independent Cuba that contained improved social justice, was no longer subordinated to the United States but contained a global perspective) and consequently the Cuban opinion of the international system. As Wendt has famously written, "Anarchy is what you make of it,"[41] with both Moscow and Havana perceiving Washington as a threat (Wendt has also written of how U.S. power is perceived as antagonistic by Cuba in comparison to Canada with this being repeated for the Soviet Union),[42] but each other as friends. This perception of each other as friends was bolstered by, over time, a level of synergization occurring in the regnant Soviet and Cuban elite ideas (societies founded on economic equality and state ownership of property). Furthermore, the Soviet political and economic models were appealing to the new Cuban ruling elite in their desire to create a new society on the Caribbean island.

The re-creation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana after the Cuban Revolution occurred for a variety of reasons with the Cold War setting and the nature of both Moscow and Havana's relationships with Washington being key. Moreover, these pressures and influences would continue to impact the bilateral relationship until Soviet-Cuban relations disappeared with the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

The significance of these pressures and influences would become most apparent in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which as detailed in the previous chapter brought tension to the relationship due to Cuban displeasure at both the content, and also exclusion, from the talks that culminated in the agreement of October 28, 1962, between Moscow and Washington that brought an end to this crisis.[43] The Kremlin had not just miscalculated the

importance of nationalism to the Cuban Revolution, but Castro also believed that Khrushchev had capitulated in making this agreement with President John Kennedy as the Cuban leader thought that pressure could have been brought to bear on the United States to remove its military presence at the U.S. Guantanamo Naval Base. Furthermore, Yuri Pavlov has written, "Castro had to face the abrupt withdrawal of a possible foolproof guarantee of security for his regime that the Soviet missiles and support would have provided."[44]

As noted, Cuban displeasure was highly evident during Anastas Mikoyan's November 1962 trip to Havana. Not only did Mikoyan receive a frosty reception from his Cuba hosts, but Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, president of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform and as noted a member of the PSP prior to January 1959, told Mikoyan that Cuba believed secret communication between Moscow and Washington had taken place during the crisis which Havana had not been informed of.[45] This was despite, as previously detailed, Mikoyan telling the Cuban leadership that the outcome of the missile crisis was that the Monroe Doctrine was dead. Concerning the aftermath of the missile crisis Khrushchev would later write in his memoirs, "Our relations with Cuba, on the other hand, took a sudden turn for the worse."[46]

However, this idea of contention being evident within the relationship at this time could be partly challenged by Fidel Castro making two trips to the Soviet Union in May 1963 and January 1964. During both trips he received a hero's welcome from both the Soviet leadership and millions of Soviet citizens, and in January 1964 the first five-year bilateral trade agreement was signed between Moscow and Havana. Notwithstanding this, it was during these trips that Castro learnt of the agreement between Moscow and Washington regarding the U.S. missiles in Turkey made at the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Khrushchev accidentally let the details of this agreement slip to the Cuban leader.[47] This only further offended Cuban nationalism.

Moreover, the signing of the first five-year trade agreement did not counter the idea of tension existing in the relationship, but rather it was an attempt by Moscow to contain the impact of the disagreement and mitigate its effects. Castro may have believed that militarily Moscow had surrendered "a possible foolproof guarantee of security" at the end of the missile crisis, but on signing this five-year economic agreement the Kremlin had assured Cuban economic security. This agreement guaranteed both the amount and price of goods that the Soviet Union bought from Cuba.[48] In the face of the U.S. embargo this was crucial for the Cuban Revolution.

However, if Moscow hoped this would placate the Cuban leadership they were very much mistaken as it was from the point of the signing of this agreement that an increase in Cuban radicalism can be detected.[49] As detailed in chapter 2, Cuban militancy was both internal, evidenced by efforts to produce the "new man," and with regards the island's foreign policy, which became

ever more apparent as the 1960s progressed. Again, as previously noted, theoretical discrepancies between Moscow and Havana appeared over the correct path to socialism, especially in Latin America, but as specified the belief also existed in Cuba that the Soviet Union was suffering from degeneration in general. As outlined in chapter 2, Cuban radicalism was evident not only in its policies but also at various international conferences. Furthermore, the Cuban government wanted to demonstrate its uniqueness and independence from the Soviet Union, but this Cuban radicalism was also partly underpinned by Havana's desire to move capitalism's attention from the Caribbean island to other parts of the world, thus helping to safeguard the survival of the Cuban Revolution. This is in accordance not only with the ideas of the revolutionary crusade in Cuban foreign policy, detailed in chapter 1, but also with defensive realism.

This tension within the relationship, and divergent policies being pursued by Moscow and Havana, gives rise to the question of why a permanent schism did not occur at this time. For the Kremlin, if a break in relations had occurred, Moscow's global prestige, which had already suffered with the very public removal of the nuclear missiles from Cuba, would have been further damaged. This is something which the Kremlin wished to avoid. Additionally, the economic investment which the Soviet Union had already made in Cuba would have been lost if a schism in the bilateral relationship materialized. Moreover, if this scenario developed, Moscow would have faced increased Chinese accusations of revisionism. For Cuba, it was imperative that friction with Moscow did not result in a break in diplomatic relations due to the economic security which Moscow provided for the Cuban Revolution in the face of U.S. hostility, something which the government in Havana was not willing to jeopardize.[50] This points to the ideas of realist pragmatism, which as noted is underscored by defensive realism.

The pressures listed above reduced the likelihood of diplomatic relations being broken as did the abovementioned waning of Cuban radicalism in general, with the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967 and lack of other global revolutions emerging evidence of this with regards the island's foreign policy. In 1968, Cuban political isolation in the region receded with the emergence of a left-leaning military government in Peru with, as previously detailed, this process continuing in 1970 with the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970. Consequently, it was theorized in the previous chapter that Castro backing the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to end the "Prague spring," contrary to world opinion, signalled the termination of Cuban radicalism and move toward Soviet ideology and orthodoxy.

The perception has existed that Soviet coercion was important in the Cuban decision to back the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August

1968. However, as also detailed in chapter 2, Castro used his backing of the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia and a "secret speech" which he gave in January 1968 to demonstrate the uniqueness and own distinct revolutionary heritage of the Cuban Revolution while also attempting to gain a degree of leverage over Moscow within the parameters of Soviet-Cuban relations. Additionally, as detailed in chapter 2, Cuban distinctiveness was further illustrated to the Kremlin when Anibal Escalante and his associates within a "microfaction" were "purged," removing a potential pro-Soviet element within the Cuban government, while also establishing the boundaries of the Cuban political system. Domestic and foreign policy had aligned.

Moreover, due to the failure of the ideas of the revolutionary crusade in the island's radical foreign policy to help safeguard Cuban security, defensive realism was also significant in Castro's speech to back Warsaw Pact action in August 1968. This was evidenced by the rhetorical questions which the Cuban leader had posed in asking if similar action would have been taken with regards Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba, with the implications being clear due to the continued strained nature of Cuban-U.S. relations.

Defensive realism concerning Havana's relationship with Moscow would become even more important for Cuba after the failure of the much vaunted 1970 10m-ton sugar harvest. Its failure marked the end of Cuba's radical internal policies as the rest of the island's economy had been ignored in attempts to produce this record harvest. Bilateral Soviet-Cuban relations provided not only economic security for the Cuban Revolution but also accusations of economic dependence on the Soviet Union.[51] This, and the economic relationship in general, will be explored at length in chapter 4.

Significantly, from the late 1960s, visits by the Soviet and Cuban elites to each other's country resumed, with the absence of such visits from the mid-1960s being indicative of the strained nature of the bilateral relationship. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Gretchko's November 1969 trip to Cuba was one of the first of these high-profile visits, with highly significantly Raúl Castro visiting Moscow at the end of October 1970, when he met Brezhnev. Moreover, the speech to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in April 1971 of Osvaldo Dorticos, member of the politburo and secretariat of the PCC, did not contain the radicalism of Hart's speech at the previous congress in 1966 which, as detailed, had been so radical it was met with stony silence.[52] Moreover, in June 1972, Castro visited the Soviet Union for the first time since 1964 and during his visit stated

> We are deeply satisfied with the present state of our friendship and the present state of our fraternal relations, sincere relations based on mutual respect, the type of relations that should exist between the revolutionary parties and

> revolutionary peoples. We shall continue to work tirelessly for sake of this friendship and its strengthening.[53]

It was not just the return of such visits which demonstrated the improvement in bilateral relations but in 1971 both JUCEPAN, the Cuban version of the Soviet planning board GOSPLAN, and the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation were created, with in June 1972 Cuba gaining membership to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). On this Peter Shearman has written that this was the "logical" conclusion of Cuba's move back into the Soviet fold.[54]

Membership of the CMEA was highly prestigious for Cuba, but the accusation exists that Castro had desired much more and even membership to the Warsaw Pact and its increased military security guarantees. Castro leaving Moscow a matter of days before Cuba joined the CMEA had led to this supposition.[55] Soviet-Cuban relations may have improved, but Cuban membership of the Warsaw Pact appeared "a step too far" for the Kremlin as the upshot of Cuban Warsaw Pact membership could have been the deployment of large numbers of Soviet troops to the Caribbean to offset possible U.S. aggression. After October 1962, this was something that Moscow was not prepared to do.[56]

Notwithstanding this, Cuban membership of the CMEA was prestigious for Cuba and evidenced the fact that the tension that had existed in Soviet-Cuban relations toward the end of the previous decade had receded and consequently established Cuba's further integration into the socialist bloc. The economic impact of CMEA membership will be scrutinized in the next chapter, but Cuban membership to this organization was also perceived as part of a "Sovietization" process, or institutionalization of the Cuban Revolution, which permitted the Kremlin to have more direction over the Cuban economy.[57]

Moreover, in January 1974, Leonid Brezhnev visited Cuba which not only demonstrated the robust nature of the bilateral relationship, but on making this trip Brezhnev became the first Soviet leader to visit Latin America. While in Cuba Brezhnev was granted Cuba's highest honour, the Order of José Marti, and gave a speech on the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana to one million Cubans. In this speech he stated,

> We are linked by bonds that are completely different from those that are customary in the capitalist world. For the Soviet Union, Cuba is not an object of exploitation and capital investment, not a strategic base or a so-called sphere of influence. Our friendship, our closeness, is an expression of the socialist

> nature of our countries, a living embodiment of the lofty principles of socialist internationalism.[58]

The "Sovietization" of the Cuban Revolution culminated in the First Congress of the PCC in December 1975 when a new Cuban constitution that closely resembled the Soviet constitution was ratified. Regarding this, Shearman has written, "Concomitant with CMEA membership came domestic Sovietization of the economy and the polity."[59] This process was aided by people in the Cuban ruling elite who were favorable to Soviet policies coming to more prominence, many of whom, despite the Escalante affair detailed in the previous chapter, were ex-PSP members. Most notably Blas Roca and Arnaldo Milián became members of an enlarged Politburo, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez became the island's chairman of the Intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Science and Technological Cooperation. The result of the emergence of a more pro-Soviet faction in the Cuban political system was that Edward González wrote that it appeared a "slippage in Fidel's position" had occurred.[60] Moreover, in February 1976, the 25th Congress of the CPSU was convened in Moscow, when Brezhnev stated, "The Congress of Cuban Communists, the party's programmatic platform and the country's new constitution show that the Western hemisphere's first socialist state is making steady progress."[61]

However, even as the Cuban Revolution began to more resemble the Soviet Union, both its own uniqueness and distinct revolutionary heritage was demonstrated to the Kremlin. Castro did this repeatedly throughout the decade. In January 1974, on Plaza de la Revolución in Havana to celebrate Brezhnev's abovementioned historic trip to Cuba, Castro said,

> In Cuba, 90 miles from the United States, one could not mention the word communism 20 years ago. The Soviet Union was ferociously reviled by the reaction and its coryphaeus at the service of the exploiters. And today, in this square, presided over by the red flags of proletarian internationalism, the heroic and immortal flag of the USSR with the hammer and sickle of the workers and our glorious flag with the single star—which shines with more pride and dignity than ever before, under the venerated likeness of Marti and before the loved images of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Maceo, Gomez, Che and Camilo—1 million Cubans express their indestructible friendship, their deep love and their eternal gratitude to the Soviet people through you.[62]

In front of the Soviet leader Castro had purposely specified Cuba's revolutionary heritage dated from the nineteenth century and not just the Russian Revolution.[63] In his speech to the First Congress of the PCC Castro again highlighted Cuba's own unique revolutionary heritage with the congress also ratifying the Organs of People Power (OPP), which Lurdes Casal believes

comprised part of the revolutionary transformation of Cuban society. The foundations of the OPP may have connotations of Lenin's ideas for soviets, but due to their flexibility "are also innovative as they do not duplicate any similar structure in other socialist countries."[64] Again, this was systematic of Cuba's wish to demonstrate its independence from Moscow.

Consequently, a number of authors have written that the "Sovietization" of the Cuban Revolution was conducted in a unique Cuban way, or as Jorge Domínguez has written, "When Cuba adopted, though in modified ways, many of the formal institutions of mature socialist regimes."[65] Moreover, González has written that the situation was somewhat nuanced and

> Fidel employed three stratagems to turn the institutionalised process to his advantage prior to the PCC Congress in December 1975 and to refashion a new broader coalition of political, technological, managerial and military elites dominated once again by Fidelistas and Raulistas associated with the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR).[66]

The three stratagems were as follows: (1) by embracing reform, Fidel Castro won favor with the military, polity, and population, (2) nine senior military officers loyal to Fidel and Raúl Castro were positioned in the expanded PCC Secretariat, Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, or key ministries, and (3) Fidel and Raúl Castro made a number of personal appearances before the military to garner their support.[67] As theorized above, the "Sovietization" process had begun in part due to consequences of Cuba's failed radical foreign policy of the mid- to late 1960s. However, the Castro brothers had used these ramifications to both remove tension from Soviet-Cuban relations and also renovate the Cuban political system. Once again, domestic and foreign policy objectives had concurred.

Furthermore, the consistent importance of counter dependency for Cuban revolutionary foreign policy since January 1959 explicated by Michael Erisman in chapter 1 also challenges the idea of the "Sovietization" of the Cuban Revolution.[68] It would be incongruous for Havana to be continually striving to reduce its dependence on Moscow if decisions concerning the island's internal and external policies were made in the Kremlin, as the "Sovietization" process would suppose. Moreover, in his seminal work on Cuban activism in Africa, Piero Gleijeses repeatedly stresses that the decision to engage militarily with Angola in November 1975 was made in Havana and without prior consultation with Moscow.[69] Again, further contesting the extent of the "Sovietization" of the Cuban Revolution.

Cuban engagement with Africa from the mid-1970s onward perfectly evidences the juxtaposition of Cuban counter dependency and acting without prior consultation with Moscow and the "Sovietization" process of the

Cuban Revolution. Moreover, Cuban action in Africa led to the ideas of the superclient/surrogate thesis in Cuban foreign policy that were detailed in chapter 1 coming more to prominence. Cuban involvement in first Africa in the mid-1970s and then toward the end of the decade Central America not only intensified the principles of the superclient/surrogate thesis but also led Gleijeses to write,

> Cuba's role in international politics during the Cold War was unique. No other Third World country projected its military power beyond its immediate neighborhood. Extracontinental military interventions during the Cold War were the preserve of the two superpowers, a few West European countries, and Cuba.[70]

Cuban engagement with Africa was even more remarkable when the level of this involvement is considered. Thirty-six thousand Cuban troops were dispatched to Angola between November 1975 and April 1976 (this figure reached 52,000 in 1988) with a further 16,000 troops being deployed in Ethiopia in 1977. Gleijeses has calculated that just under 2,500 Cubans died fighting in Africa from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. However, Cuban commitment to Africa at the time was not just military as aid and assistance were also sent. In this capacity, some 70,000 Cuban aid workers were posted to Africa, with Isaac Saney detailing that in total some 330,000 Cubans had been involved in Cuba's "African adventure."[71]

In addition to this extraordinary number of Cubans being sent to Africa, the Cuban military also played a pivotal role in a number of key military encounters. This included in November 1975 preventing Luanda, Angola falling under the control of South African forces as the resistance of the Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) crumbled, preserving Ethiopian sovereignty from Somalian invasion in 1977 and deploying elite Cuban troops and the island's most modern military hardware to fight and defeat the South African Defense Forces (SADF) at Cuito Cuanavale in late 1987 and early 1988.[72] On the SADF defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, Gleijses has quoted a 1991 interview with Nelson Mandela in which Mandela said that Cuito Cuanavale "destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor . . . [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa. . . . Cuito Cuanavale was the turning point for the liberation of our continent—and of my people—from the scourge of apartheid."[73] The sentiments of this quote are significant for the level of goodwill, or friendship, that the Cuban Revolution has in certain parts of Africa. Although not an underlying reason for Cuban engagement with Africa, this goodwill would be particularly important in the post-Soviet era as the island strove to develop a "constituency abroad." As detailed throughout this book this desire was underscored by realist pragmatism and the principles of defensive realism.

The rationale for Mandela's quote are succinctly summarized by Saney when he wrote, "As the survival of the racist South African State depended on establishing its domination of all southern Africa, the region was terraformed into a vast arena in which, for more than a decade, the forces for and against apartheid clashed."[74] This is integral to providing an explanation for Cuban involvement in Africa detailed above, and we will return to this.

Due to the expansionist nature of this Cuban action, offensive realism would appear to be important. Moreover, as noted, a consequence of these Cuban missions was that the superclient/surrogate thesis came to more prominence with the Cuban Revolutionary Army (FAR) also facing claims that they were acting as the "Ghurkas of the Russian Empire" due Moscow's simultaneous involvement in Africa. In short, Cuba was acting as Moscow's proxy in Africa.[75] As Soviet involvement in Africa was often perceived as simply Moscow attempting to spread its power in accordance with offensive realism, this would appear to reinforce the significance of offensive realism.

However, the ideas of Cuba acting as Moscow's proxy have been discredited. On the Cuban decision to deploy troops to Angola, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, told Alexander Haig, the United States Secretary of State, in December 1981 during secret talks held in México City that "I can assure unequivocally, in as much as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made, we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union."[76] A number of authors have also written of Cuba acting without Moscow's prior knowledge, and even of disagreements between Moscow and Havana over certain military tactics.[77] Notwithstanding this, over time Soviet and Cuban goals in Africa began to align with importantly Gleijeses writing, "The Soviet Union enabled Castro to pursue a policy in Africa that was motivated, above all, by his revolutionary idealism."[78] Castro's revolutionary idealism will be examined below, but this enabling aspect of Soviet-Cuban relations was confined not only to mere Soviet logistics in Africa but also to Cuban membership to the CMEA, as it provided economic security for the island thus allowing the Cuban government to pursue an expansive foreign policy. The situation in Ethiopia was different from Angola with Moscow and Havana working more in tandem, with Shearman writing, "in direct contrast to Angola, the Soviet Union, and Cuba acted in concert."[79]

It has sometimes been suggested that Cuba gained leverage over the Kremlin due to the island's action in Africa. This would be in accordance with the ideas of counter dependency detailed in chapter 1, with this argument being strengthened by the fact that modern Soviet military hardware was shipped to Cuba in early 1976.[80] Increasing leverage over Moscow cannot be considered the primary reason for Cuba's decision to deploy troops to Africa, because as detailed, Fidel Castro had at various times been acutely adept at exerting

political leverage over the Kremlin. Gleijeses has written that Cuba's "African adventure" put considerable strain on the Cuban economy and adversely affected Havana's relationship with the United States (in the mid-1970s Gleijeses has stated that a degree of rapprochement between Havana and Washington was possible).[81] This would seem a high price to pay for an increased level of leverage with Moscow, which the Cuban leader has shown he could achieve via different means.

This adverse effect on potential rapprochement with Washington has led Gleijeses to write that "after the 1960s, self-defence cannot be considered a key motivation for Cuba's activism in Africa."[82] Consequently, this would appear to negate the idea that due to the apparent assertive nature of deploying troops abroad, offensive realism underscored Cuban engagement with Africa.

The principles of *Fidelista peronalismo*, and the Cuban leader's "goal to become leader of the Third World," could appear to have resonance for Cuban involvement in Africa.[83] As detailed in chapter 1, *Fidelista peronalismo* is the specific Cuban version of the Great Man Theory. However, as noted, by the mid-1970s the Revolution was becoming increasingly institutionalized. Castro may have taken great interest in the Cuban missions in Africa, but the Cuban system prevented him being able to unilaterally decide on this course of action.

Notwithstanding this, what is imperative for the Cuban revolutionary's elite decision to become involved in Africa was the setting in which the events were played out: a complicated mix of the decolonization processes (the fall of the Salazar dynasty in Portugal in 1974 had ignited the war in Angola) and the Cold War and as noted above by Saney this all occurred in the southern part of the continent where "forces for and against apartheid clashed."[84] On Cuban involvement in this potent mix Gleijeses has written that Castro

> saw Cuba as a special hybrid: a Communist country with a Third World sensibility in a world dominated by the conflict between privileged and underprivileged—humanity against imperialism—and in which the major faultline was not between Communist and capitalist states but between developed and underdeveloped countries. For Castro, the fight against imperialism was more than a fight against the United States: it was a fight against poverty and oppression in the Third World.[85]

Moreover, the idea of the "Black Atlantic" which Saney has detailed as "a space created by the histories of the transatlantic slave system, colonialism, and anticolonial struggles,"[86] increased the Cuban resolve to engage with Africa at this time. Cuban internationalism and revolutionary idealism

appeared significant with the Cuban Revolution also having links to African national liberation movements and the MPLA in Angola in particular from the early 1960s. On the fifteenth anniversary of the victory of the Bay of Pigs, Castro addressed the decision to send troops to Angola. He said, "On November 5, 1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to send with great urgency a battalion of regular troops with anti-tank weapons to help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South African racists."[87] Again, this further disproves the idea of the superclient/surrogate thesis and Havana acting as Moscow's proxy in Africa.

Furthermore, the concept of the "Black Atlantic," detailed above, allows a constructivist elucidation for why Cuba and certain African governments would ally with each other. Revolutionary Cuba and these movements shared a perception of the international system and the role of the Western forces (including South Africa) within it. Subsequently, they perceived each other as friendly, but the West as hostile.

This Cuban action in Africa also created new markets for the sale of Cuban goods and purchase of key commodities, despite Cuban claims to the contrary. Furthermore, these Cuban engagements also acted as a safety valve to relieve internal pressure. By the mid-1970s, the Cuban Revolution had produced a highly educated population, but the supply of jobs on the island had not increased at an equivalent rate to the levels of education. Cuba's internationalist foreign policy helped counter this situation, as it resulted in many of these educated professionals, especially doctors and teachers, working abroad. Additionally, González believes that a number of competing factions had appeared within the Cuban political system. (Some had promoted a pragmatic approach, others adhered to the original revolutionary zeal while yet another faction desired military missions in the island's foreign policy.) Cuban involvement in Africa helped to resolve potential tension between them. Once again, domestic and foreign policies had become intertwined.[88]

Cuban activism in Africa from the mid-1970s onwards, and its outcomes, were remarkable, but, as outlined above, the motivation for this engagement was not driven by one overarching reason or principle. Instead it was a complicated combination of a number, with this returning to Kirk's quote in chapter 1 that concerning foreign policy Cuba has "an approach that is totally sui generis, following its own blend of principles and pragmatism, self-interest and selflessness, and fuelled by a volatile blend of nationalism and pride in being distinctive."[89]

As detailed, from the mid-1970s the FAR were accused of acting as the "Ghurkas of the Russian Empire," but after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which once again invoked the "Brezhnev doctrine," Cuba faced allegations of acting as the Kremlin's "mouthpiece" in the Nonaligned Movement due to voting with the Soviet bloc in the United

Nations (UN) vote that had denounced the Afghan invasion.[90] Cuba may have been prominent within the Nonaligned Movement from the early 1960s onwards, but at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Castro was president of the organization. Subsequently, Castro was in the somewhat assiduous position of being president of the Nonaligned Movement while publicly backing the socialist bloc's military action. However, Castro's support did demonstrate the importance of relations with the socialist countries for Cuba, with as in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Cuba's support of this action increasing the pressure on Moscow to take similar action in the Caribbean if the survival of Cuban socialism was challenged, as the "Brezhnev doctrine" had once again been incited by the Warsaw Pact. This further evidenced Cuban attempted leverage within the bilateral relationship.[91]

However, Raúl Castro has also reported that in the early 1980s the Soviet leadership told him, "We have cannot fight in Cuba because you are 11,000 kilometres away from us. Do you think we're going to go all that way to stick our necks out for you?"[92] Quite simply, the Kremlin would not deploy Soviet troops to the Caribbean to defend Cuba in the face of U.S. aggression. As noted throughout this book, Cuban security has been of paramount importance for understanding the drivers within Soviet-Cuban relations since January 1959, with consequently this announcement appearing historic. Nikolai Leonov has described the meeting in which Raúl Castro was informed of this decision as a "dramatic encounter in Moscow which started a new stage in the Revolution's history," with its significance being increased due to increased hostility from the United States in the early 1980s.[93]

Although this was the case, this announcement did not mean that Moscow did not continue to help safeguard the Cuban Revolution's survival, or that Cuba was no longer an integral part of the socialist system. The island's prominence in the socialist bloc was demonstrated in December 1980 when the Soviet representative at Second Congress of the PCC was Konstantin Chernenko, member of the politburo and future General Secretary of the CPSU.[94] Additionally, at this time a considerable amount of the most modern Soviet military hardware was shipped to Cuba, which Pavlov has argued was, "by way of compensation" for Havana being told that Moscow would no longer engage the Soviet military to defend the Cuban Revolution.[95] Furthermore, writing in the January 1984 edition of *América Latina* that celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Sergo Mikoyan wrote,

> The result of these 25 years in the first free territory of the Americas have been political, economic and social advances of such magnitude that they are unthinkable and impossible for the capitalist countries of the continent. These conquests were achieved due to the guiding light of the Cuban Revolution being the ideas of Marxist-Leninism.[96]

Moreover, on November 10, 1984, Nikolai Tikhonov, politburo member and chairman of the Council of Ministers, visited Havana and signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation which was to last for twenty-five years.[97] On signing this agreement the Kremlin had obligated itself to Cuba into a new millennium. Additionally, by the mid-1980s, some 8,000 Cubans per year studied in the Soviet Union, and 140 educational centers were completed on the island with Soviet help.[98] Furthermore, Moscow and Havana had shared positions on a number of international issues, including events in Central America and Africa in the mid-1980s and also the role of the United States in the international arena. This becomes evident in a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) report created for Cuban foreign minister Isidoro Malmierca's visit to Moscow in May 1984.[99]

Cuba obtaining a degree of leverage was important for the dynamics of the bilateral relationship, but a number of pressures which had brought the two countries together in the early 1960s were still significant in the 1980s, not least that the Caribbean island continued to have geostrategic consequence for the Kremlin. Ronald Reagan's election as U.S. president, and the onset of the second Cold War, only intensified this geostrategic significance. Moreover, Cuban-U.S. tension increased with Reagan's presidency as during his election campaign he had promised to "rollback" creeping communism. Reagan believed that Cuban involvement in Africa and Central America resulted from the failure of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, with significantly Cuba remaining both a domestic and foreign policy issue due to the influence of the powerful Cuban-American exile community.[100] In turn this heightened the importance of Soviet-Cuban relations for Havana due to the security guarantees, including economic ones, that it provided in the face of a progressively hostile United States.

Other pressures had also come to the fore since the re-creation of bilateral diplomatic relations in May 1960, which augmented these original ones. This included the enormous Soviet economic investment, Moscow and Havana's shared ideology and by the 1980s a twenty-year history. The result was that the tensions of the mid- to late 1960s had been confined to history with Soviet-Cuban relations having robust foundations and remained mutually beneficial for both countries. However, both would be questioned by the reforms instigated in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid- to late 1980s, as detailed in the opening chapter of this book.

Moreover, as detailed in chapter 2, Cuba instigated its own reform process, the "campaign of rectification of errors," that appeared very different from the Soviet reforms, despite both the Soviet and Cuban reforms ultimately being designed to improve socialism within their respective systems. Again, as previously noted, these differences were not at first clear in public, because both governments concentrated on the similarities between the reform processes

and "veiled" criticisms only began to appear over time.[101] The most notable "veiled" criticisms were the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev's speech to the 3rd PCC held in February 1986 when he reinforced both the reasons for the Soviet reforms and also the need for modernization in science and technology was required in all CMEA countries, and Castro's address to the 27th Congress of the CPSU held in Moscow during the same month when he spoke of national liberation movements when Gorbachev's earlier speech to the same congress had not, illustrating the differences in opinions.[102]

However, Soviet disapproval of the Cuban situation increased from 1987 onwards, with Cuban economic inefficiency attracting particular Soviet attention. Due to the goals of *perestroika* this was unsurprising as it would have appeared somewhat incongruous if the Kremlin strove for economic efficiency within the Soviet Union and CMEA while continuing to subsidize an inefficient Cuban economy. Consequently, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov's candid appraisal of Cuban economic inefficiency in July 1988 at the forty-fourth session of the CMEA held in Prague was underpinned by these concerns.[103] The full economic effects of *perestroika* on the bilateral relationship will be examined more fully in the next chapter, but this brought a new pressure to bear on Soviet-Cuban relations.

This pressure was only intensified by the effects of g*lasnost*, which introduced a new dynamic to the relationship because previously it had not been impacted by Soviet public opinion. This would only increase as the 1980s progressed, but Soviet economic investment in Cuba began to be increasingly questioned within the Soviet Union. This was in light of both the effects of *perestroika* detailed above and the falling geostrategic significance of Cuba for Moscow as superpower tensions receded due to the impact of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy.[104] Additionally, as *glasnost* intensified, it resulted in previous Soviet administrations becoming increasingly discredited which only increased the criticism of the Cuban government within the Soviet Union due to its close association with these administrations. Soviet domestic and foreign policies had synergized, because a number of Soviet citizens could not understand why an inefficient Cuban economy was subsidized while they economically suffered as *perestroika* struggled to reinvigorate the Soviet economy; due to the nature of Soviet-Cuban relations, criticism of an unreformed Cuban political system was in reality a critique of the Soviet system prior to Gorbachev's reforms.

This criticism reached the Soviet press and at times was so forthright that subsequent Cuban responses were published. This occurred with Vladislav Chirkov's "An Uphill Task" that was printed in *New Times* in August 1987 with a Cuban rebuttal written by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the island's leading economist and member of the politburo of the PCC, subsequently being

published.[105] In October 1990, *Pravda* printed an article by José Ramón Balaguer, the Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, that strongly criticized an earlier article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* that had derided the Castro brothers' personal lives.[106] In June 1989, the Soviet Union paying above the world market price for Cuban sugar was condemned in the Congress of People's Deputies, despite in the late 1980s the terms of trade in this period turning against Cuba.[107] Soviet-Cuban trade in general, and the the terms of trade specifically will be examined in the next chapter.

The impact of *glasnost* on the relationship was not lost on the Cuban government with MINREX officials regularly analyzing Soviet media reporting on Cuba. On February 14, 1991, Balaguer sent a report classified as "secret" on the internal situation in the Soviet Union to Malmierca that was also sent to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Carlos Aldana, Head of the Department of Ideology and the Department of International Relations. The report incorporated seven pages detailing the Soviet media, both television and radio, reporting on Cuba, including how the publications *Sovietskaya Rossia* and *Rabochaya Tribuna* had reported the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. The report states,

> *Konsomolskaya Pravda* has entered a new stage that is critical of our Revolution, with on this occasion the work of a group of counterrevolutionaries working against our country headed by the Managua correspondent A. Teplink.[108]

Notwithstanding this, at first in public the Cuban government did not augment the growing pressure on Gorbachev concerning Soviet-Cuban relations, perhaps as they had not expected such reforms to be instigated,[109] and also that Havana desired that the bilateral relationship remained unreformed. This resulted from economic and security guarantees that the relationship with the Soviet Union could provide for the Cuban Revolution. Consequently the Castro government displayed realist pragmatism toward the bilateral relationship despite a dislike of the Soviet reforms processes, with this manifesting itself in a "wait and see" policy. Simply, Havana made minimal comment on the Soviet situation in fear of potentially negatively affecting Soviet-Cuban relations, and comment was only made when it was absolutely necessary.[110] Moreover, détente between the two superpowers in the 1970s had run its course and the Cuban government may have hoped that a similar fate would befall the Soviet reforms of a decade later, and subsequently Soviet-Cuban relations could then return to "normal."

Gorbachev's visit to Cuba in April 1989 was perceived by many as being a pivotal moment in the bilateral relationship as they believed that the Soviet leader would "instruct" Castro to implement reforms similar to the Soviet ones on the Caribbean island. Gorbachev's trip was important, but for very

different reasons. First, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed which may have even strengthened the relationship, and second, as detailed in the previous chapter, Castro made his dislike of the Soviet reforms explicitly clear on April 4, 1989, when introducing Gorbachev to the National Congress of People's Power.[111]

Castro's speech signalled a new era in the bilateral relationship because from this point onward, Cuban aversion to the Soviet reforms and their effects on Eastern Europe became ever more vitriolic, specifically the afore cited speech Castro gave on July 26, 1989, to mark the anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Barracks.[112] In addition to this, the Cuban government appeared to enter a period of retrenchment. In the summer of 1989, General Arnaldo Ochoa, head of the Cuban military in Angola, was placed on trial and subsequently executed with many believing that due to his popularity among veterans from the wars in Africa, this both removed a potential challenge to the Castro leadership and also ended any possible support within the Cuban ruling elite for Soviet style reforms. This had included Carlos Aldana, a member of the politburo of the PCC, and even Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.[113] The Ochoa affair had connotations of the events of the late 1960s concerning Anibal Escalante and the "microfaction" that were detailed earlier and in chapter 2. The two situations demonstrated both that foreign policy and domestic issues had become synergized with the Cuban government using both to set the parameters of the Cuban political system which could not be exceeded. Moreover, as noted in late 1989, the pro-reform Soviet periodicals *Russian News* and *Sputnik* were banned in Cuba and new policies focusing on food production and attempts to attract foreign investment, most noticeably in tourism, which could provide much needed hard currency, were implemented. These policies were designed to try and reduce Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union by making the island more self-sufficient, demonstrating the prevalence of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite. These policies would also eventually lead to the "special period in peacetime."[114]

Cuba may have been endeavoring to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union, but for some within the Soviet Union these Cuban policies appeared to be contrary to global processes that had seen democracy sweep across Eastern Europe and Latin America. Subsequently their perception of the Cuban government was of an anachronistic administration that was swimming against world opinion. This increased the pressure on Gorbachev as many Soviet citizens did not understand why Moscow continued to support a government that was pursuing such policies.

As noted, Soviet-U.S. tension receded as the 1980s progressed, reducing Cuba's geostrategic significance for Moscow. This only intensified calls within the Soviet Union for the bilateral relationship with Havana to be terminated. Moreover, the United States utilized the improvement in

superpower relations to increase the pressure on Gorbachev to end Soviet-Cuban relations. Cold War tension between Washington and Moscow may have been decreasing, but this had not tempered Washington's dislike of the Cuban Revolution. George H. W. Bush repeatedly told Gorbachev that Moscow-Havana relations were preventing further progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. Additionally, in late 1991, the Cuban exile community appeared to be attempting to influence Soviet-Cuban relations when in August 1991 Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban America National Foundation (CANF), made a historic trip to Moscow.[115]

Cuban displeasure at this visit is evident in MINREX documents, which not only demonstrate Havana's dismay at Mas Canosa's trip but also iterated the importance of Cuban journalists asking questions about the visit of the "Mas Canosa group" to the Soviet Union.[116] The outcome was the rather unusual situation of the Cuban government being able to use the new openness in Soviet society resulting from *glasnost* to increase the pressure on the Kremlin regarding Soviet-Cuban relations. This furthers the debate on the impact of *glasnost* on bilateral relations as previously this intensification of pressure on Gorbachev was thought to have originated from within the Soviet Union and not Cuba.

With pressure, from both within and outside the Soviet Union, mounting on Gorbachev regarding Moscow's relationship with Havana, this gives rise to the questions of why the relationship was not further reformed or even terminated. Part of the answer lies in the fact that despite different policies being pursued by the Soviet and Cuban governments, the relationship provided a degree of stability for Moscow in a fast changing global environment, not least as a source of much needed sugar. Importantly, dislike of the Cuban Revolution was not uniform in either the Soviet Union or the Soviet ruling elite with the "Cuban lobby" still having a degree of influence. The 1991 trade agreement will be examined more fully in chapter 4, but it was very different from previous agreements due to both its duration being a single year and not five years as had been the case since 1964, and also that trade was to be conducted at world market prices. However, Konstantin Katushev, former Soviet ambassador to Cuba and member of this lobby, was crucially at the time when this agreement was signed Head of Foreign Economic Relations in Moscow. If Katushev had not held such a prominent position the 1991 trade agreement may have borne even less resemblance to previous agreements.[117]

Further evidencing the significance of the "Cuban lobby" was Sergo Mikoyan's editorship of *Latinskaia Amerika*. As detailed earlier, Mikoyan was a notable member of the lobby, with this explaining the number of pro-Cuban articles, particularly in *Latinskaia Amerika* that contained no criticism of the Cuban Revolution, that continued to be published in the Soviet Union despite the overriding impact of *glasnost* on the relationship noted previously.[118]

Notwithstanding this, in many ways the bilateral relationship continued as it had for the previous three decades even once it was impacted further by increasing pressures and strains that will be detailed below. Negotiations concerning both celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of the reestablishment of bilateral relationship and comprehensive plans for the publication of a book of documents celebrating the bilateral relationship continued throughout 1990.[119] Also in the summer of 1991 Cuban plans for a school in the Soviet capital for children of Cuban personnel were progressing and on September 4, 1991, the outline plan for joint collaboration in science and education for the years 1991 to 1993 was completed.[120] Additionally, a report dated September 12, 1991, delineates Cuba's plans for both commerce with the Soviet Union in 1992 and the construction of the joint project to build a nuclear power station at Juragua.[121]

These documents and plans demonstrate perfectly the fast changing and complex nature of Cuban-Soviet relations as it juxtaposes the way that the bilateral relationship had operated for the previous thirty years with further sweeping reform. However, this contrast underscores the aforementioned "wait and see" policy employed by the Cuban government with comment on events only being made when it was absolutely necessary. Moreover, what was also crucial was that, as detailed in chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, what underplayed both the Soviet and Cuban reforms was the desire to improve the socialist system, not end it.

This desire to advance socialism also explains why normal diplomatic protocol also continued to function until the final days of the relationship. On November 30, 1991, Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, sent a telegram to Malmierca detailing the continuing robust nature of Soviet-Cuban relations and how collaboration between the two countries benefited both the Soviet Union and Cuba, and also the international community in general.[122]

However, throughout 1991 MINREX received a number of documents on the Soviet internal situation and the possible impact on both the bilateral relationship and the Cuban Revolution. These documents permit the "wait and see" policy of the Cuban government to be confirmed as a strategic choice to safeguard the Cuban Revolution taken from a position of considerable insight into the Soviet events and not a retroactive action once the outcome of events had become clear. Furthermore, these documents also evidence that the "wait and see" policy also extended to the Russian Federation, which has not previously been thought.

In March 1991, a referendum on the Soviet Union's future took place with a number of reports examining its outcome existing in the MINREX archive. MINREX's conclusion on the referendum is that the Soviet Union would be preserved, but that problems would persist due to the boycott which took place in a number of republics including the Baltic States and their subsequent calls for independence.[123] Moreover the report states, "It is evident that

Gorbachev faces a great challenge regarding his low approval rating among Russian citizens especially with regard the Presidential election."[124]

Moreover, throughout 1991 a number of MINREX reports exist which analyze the Soviet internal situation, including a series entitled "Sobre La Situación en la Unión Soviética" with the first arriving in the Cuban capital on April 18, 1991.[125] This first report commences by stating that "paralysis of central power" had occurred in the Soviet Union due to the deteriorating internal situation, and that it had even been rumoured that the position of the general secretary of the CPSU could be abolished. The report also notes both Boris Yeltsin's role in these events and how he agitated for change; we will return to this later in this chapter.[126]

The frequency of these reports increased at the time of the August 1991 coup in Moscow, with the first memo after the coup reporting that the preservation of the Soviet Union underpinned the behaviour of those involved in the coup with Yeltsin's reaction to it also being noted. It reported,

> The reaction of Yeltsin was to start civil disobedience and declare insubordination against the new authorities, and to contact the Lithuanian leader Lamberguis to indicate that a decision was required on their proposals.[127]

This referred to the Lithuanian call for independence. On the impact of the coup the report concludes,

> For Cuba these events should not lead to a change in the political situation, and in the future stabilize relations since the forces which have taken control are in favour of the traditional position with our country.[128]

However, the report does acknowledge both that Soviet-Cuban bilateral trade could be negatively affected and also that increased aggression from the United States toward Cuba may materialize.[129] Moreover, the report also listed the members of the junta, their political position and if they had visited Cuba in the months preceding the coup, which could suggest a possible degree of empathy with the Cuban Revolution. Regarding C. D. Baklanov, first vice president of defence, the report described him as,

> First Vice-President of Defence, former member of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the military industrial complex, who had travelled to Cuba last winter as part of the Soviet delegation celebrating the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations.[130]

The junta in Moscow may have comprised conservative elements in Soviet society, but also a number of prominent members of the "Cuba lobby," as the above quote evidences.[131]

A second confidential report dated August 19, 1991, was also received which provided more reporting of events in Moscow and how order was being restored in the Soviet capital by the Emergency Committee. The report concludes,

> In the current situation two possible scenarios are possible.
>
> 1. Due to the seriousness of the situation and public opinion we have to be prepared for the subsequent disappearance, either physically or in reality, of the current political scene.
> 2. That if this situation continues, a legitimate figure with commitments to the principles of the Emergency Committee will emerge, with this hypothesis being the most likely but it is not impossible that they will have elements contrary to the ideas of the Committee.[132]

Further reports on the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet which met as a result of the August coup were received by MINREX. The first concentrated on the changes which Gorbachev wanted to make within the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the coup including allowing the rouble to float, and concludes,

> However, it appears that the session of the Soviet was not examining core issues of the country, those which are contrary to those perceived by Yeltsin, whose absence from the debates in the Soviet complicated the decisions made.[133]

The following day further analysis of this meeting was received with the supposition drawn being that the change which had commenced with the coup would continue unabated and reports how various institutions in the Russian Federation would work with relation to Soviet institutions, including the national bank, the bank for foreign relations, the foreign ministry, and the ministries of finance, trade, foreign trade, and planning.[134] The report states,

> The highlight of the events in the parliament was the intervention of M.S. Gorbachev, who in the dissonant language of the previous days, went to great lengths to try and save the integrity of the country and signed the new Federal Treaty.[135]

It was believed that Gorbachev had agreed to the independence of the Soviet republics in order to save the Treaty of Union; this document underpinned the Soviet Union's existence, simply quite astounding historical change.[136] However, the report notes, "Meanwhile a strong reaction against the military participants of the 19 August actions have taken place. In this way a new Head of Army, General Vladimir Lobov has called for more change."[137]

On August 28, 1991, Part 11 of these reports arrived in Havana. As it contained quite simply astonishing information, it will be quoted at some length. The report began,

> Events of the most important nature occurred as the work of the extraordinary session of the Soviet parliament continued with a resolution which contained the following seven points.
>
> 1. A radical restructuring of the state was required.
> 2. All activities of the CPSU should be suspended.
> 3. The special powers of President Gorbachev should be abolished.
> 4. The constitution of the URSS should be amended as requested.
> 5. The Congress takes action to renovate Parliament.
> 6. A commission of the parliament is created to examine the coup against the state.
> 7. Express the dissatisfaction against the Prosecution of the URSS.
>
> It is feasible that all these points will be approved by the next Congress of Deputies of the URSS. These proposals, but particularly the renovation of the parliament have serious implications and the potential to produce new [political] figures in a distinctly reconfigured political situation. Moreover, the abolition of the special powers, granted against the President of the country, we do not rule out this was the action of the Russian President, Yeltsin, reduced Gorbachev's power.
>
> The approval of the suspension of the activities of the CPSU ratifies the actual situation in the country. All will depend on how the matter of the constitution is presented and analysed.[138]

The report continues,

> In the final hours the process of the disintegration of the USSR was accelerated by the official announcement of independence by the Moldovan parliament, which was immediately recognised by Romania.[139]

Moreover, it reports that the Kazak President was attempting to use Gorbachev and Yeltin's different positions to call for further reform.[140] The report continues,

> Meanwhile, Ukraine's declaration of independence has provoked a great reaction amongst political circles in the country. However Gorbachev has tried to play down its importance and has expressed the opinion that such an act will not prevent the Ukraine signing the Treaty of the Union.[141]

The report then details both Ukrainian plans to create its own armed forces and also due to a restructuring in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Ministry of

Interior were "ordering the KGB to disarm."[142] The memo states that in general "the anti-communist hysteria has continued" and then details television news programmes in which interviewees criticized not only the participants in the August coup but also Yeltsin's actions.[143]

These documents demonstrate the considerable knowledge and insight which the Cuban government had concerning events in the Soviet Union in 1991 in general, and also the August coup and its immediate aftermath, specifically. A disconnect between the information that the Cuban government possessed and their public announcements concerning the August coup became apparent with their initial statement published in *Granma* on August 19, 1991, was a terse thirty-three-word statement, which stated,

> The declaration stated that due to the ill-health of M. Gorbachev to perform the functions of the President of the Soviet Union all functions of the President of the USSR have been transferred.[144]

Ten days later a second Cuban government statement was published which was not just much longer, but was scathing of the events in the Soviet Union and made their aversion to the events in Moscow very clear.[145] Quite simply, in public the Castro administration had waited until events had played out in Moscow before elucidating their true feelings and considerable knowledge on the Soviet events, evident in the above cited MINREX documents, in fear of supporting the "wrong" side and the potential negative impact this could have on the relationship. Consequently, this unequivocally evidences the "wait and see" policy employed by Cuba at the time of the August coup was a strategic choice made to safeguard Cuba's interests rather than a retroactive response. Again this evidences the importance of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite.

The Cuban reaction to the August 1991 coup in Moscow perfectly displays not only this "wait and see" policy pursued by the Cuban government in the mid- to late 1980s but also domestic and foreign policies impacting one another. The underlying motive of the junta may have been to preserve the Soviet Union, but due to a number of the members of the junta also being part of the "Cuba lobby," the outcome of the coup was that this lobby had been dismembered. Subsequently, change in Soviet-Cuban relations dramatically accelerated, demonstrating the power which they had been able to exert over Moscow's Cuba policy, because on September 11, 1991, less than one month after the lobby's defeat, Gorbachev announced that the final Soviet troops would be removed from Cuba. Havana was incandescent at Gorbachev's statement as not only was it given without prior warning or discussion but was made in Moscow during a joint press conference with the U.S. secretary of state James Baker. Subsequently, accusations arose that the United States

had been able to influence this decision.[146] The Cuban government certainly believed this to be the case as a MINREX statement on the same day notably made reference to the continuing U.S. presence at Guantanamo Bay, but concluded by stating,

> The public statement made by President Gorbachev was made with no prior consultation, this constitutes unreasonable behaviour and is contrary to the international standards of agreements signed between states.[147]

Due to both the momentous nature of the announcement regarding Soviet troops and also the way in which it had been done, this criticism is understandable, but significantly this is one of few times that Gorbachev was criticized in the MINREX documents of this period. Although this was the case, this announcement was a graphic illustration to the Cuban government that its relationship with Moscow had fundamentally changed; as superpower tension receded the island's geostrategic significance for the Kremlin fell with change accelerating due to the "brake" that the "Cuban lobby" had been able to provide being removed after the August 1991 coup in Moscow. However dramatic this announcement was, Gorbachev had not called for an end to the relationship.

Notwithstanding this, Cuban rancour at Gorbachev's decision to remove the final Soviet troops from Cuba statement is further evident in Part 17 of the reports on the Soviet internal situation, dated September 16, 1991. Soviet media reporting on the Cuban reaction to this decision constituted much of this report with the report stating that the Soviet media thought Havana's response had "shown the best of Cuba's propaganda 'enemies search' policy, referring to the allusion of North American power for Cuban security."[148] This both explicitly directly criticized Cuba's fear of a potential U.S. threat to its national security, and also that this fear was constructed by the Cuban government for their own political purposes. Subsequently, this report further verifies both Cuba's acrimony at Gorbachev's September 11, 1991, statement, and also the continuing significance of Soviet media reporting for the Cuban government who were completely cognisant of the pressures it could bring to the relationship. In sum, this report shows the continuing effect of *glasnost* on the bilateral relationship. Significantly, Havana could be more forthright in their criticism of the decision to remove the final Soviet troops from Cuba as it had been made and consequently they had little to lose in their condemnation of it.

On October 8, 1991, Balaguer sent a twelve-page report classed as "confidential," to Raúl Castro which summarized the changed situation in the Soviet Union resulting from the August coup and its effect on the bilateral relationship. Due to its content and the status within the Cuban government

of its recipient, again it will be quoted at length. It began, "The intention of the senior members of the CPSU, Armed Forces and KGB was to attempt to 'democratise' these institutions but in reality they eliminated or neutralized these institutions."[149] Balaguer states that the August coup had accelerated the Soviet reform process and they mirrored those which had taken place in Eastern Europe, before describing Yeltsin as the real victor of the August coup and Gorbachev as the "victim."[150]

In this report Balaguer also focused on the Soviet press and writes,

> Unfavourable steps have occurred in the contemporary Soviet press reporting regarding our country and the events of 19 August, which has evolved to show our sympathy for those involved in the coup and its sympathisers, given the close relations between Cuba and members of the ex-Emergency Committee.[151]

Balaguer concludes his report by stating,

> Finally we conclude that it is evident that the outcome of the events of August were to serve the reactionary elements in society, and consequently the possibility exists that a country will emerge that bears no resemblance to the previous Soviet state.[152]

Again, Gorbachev is absolved of the blame for the direction of travel in the Soviet Union with Balaguer highlighting that the actual outcome of the coup had been divergently opposite to the goals of the conspirators.

Moreover, on October 7, 1991, Raúl Castro received a memo which detailed the recent meeting which MINREX officials had had with Boris Kolomiakov, the KGB's representative in Cuba. The report focused on the changing Soviet political situation and Yeltsin's role within it and notes the increasing influence of capitalist tendencies within Soviet politics. The report also describes Yeltsin as a politician of the "West." In short, the very different political positions of the Cuban government and Yeltsin.[153]

With the exception of the MINREX documents dated September 11 and 16, when decisions had already been made in Moscow that would fundamentally alter the bilateral relationship regardless of any Cuban response, the documents that MINREX received throughout 1991 may not have criticized Gorbachev, but the same most certainly cannot be said about Boris Yeltsin. What is striking on reading the documents from 1991 is the difference in the way in which Gorbachev and Yeltsin are described within them. A disconnect exists in the language which was used toward the two men. Concerning Yeltsin, the vitriolic nature of the language used to outline him and his actions is remarkable whereas on the whole Gorbachev continues to be supported. Gorbachev may have been the architect of the reform processes which had

caused fundamental change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but the Cuban government realized that his motivation had been to improve socialism rather than destroy it. As detailed in chapter 2, since 1992 Fidel Castro has commented on Gorbachev's goals to advance socialism, but conversely the Cuban perception of Yeltsin's motivating factors was very different as he simply wanted to destroy the socialist system in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union itself.

Ideological differences between the Cuban government and Yeltsin underpinned this Cuban opinion of Yeltsin, but such negative comments concerning the Russian leader were not apparent in Cuban government statements or Cuban media reporting. Instead the Cuban media printed negative foreign media reports of Yeltsin. Consequently, the Cuban government perception of Yeltsin can be surmised, but it is not explicitly elucidated. In sum, the "wait and see" policy that Havana had utilized in the late 1980s and early 1990s toward the reforms in the Soviet Union had been extended to Russian-Cuban relations. As noted, the "wait and see" policy adheres to realist pragmatism. Moreover, it has also become clear that even while the Soviet Union was still in existence the Cuban government were trying to facilitate a meeting with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister.[154] With much uncertainty surrounding unfolding, and future, events in Russia this desire for a meeting with Kozyrev again displays the prevalence of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite.

On November 15, 1991, Hidalgo received a report from Carlos Trejo Sosa, MINREX personnel, on the meeting which had taken place on the previous day with Guerman Belevitin, minister counsel in the Soviet embassy in Havana. This report details that a discussion concerning the content of Fidel Castro's speech to the 4th Congress PCC position had taken place. Castro's position had been clarified, because the Cuban leader had detailed both the Soviet internal problems and subsequent issues within bilateral trade links. These will be examined in the next chapter, but writing about Belevitin's comments on Castro's speech the report states,

> He then added that he had told his ambassador that Cuba's position had been expressed very clearly by Fidel at the 4th Congress of the PCC, by stating that what happened in the USSR is an internal matter that only affected their people. This could be corroborated—he said—when examining the Cuban press about the events in the USSR, which only presents the facts and does not comment or evaluate them.[155]

This would appear to perfectly surmise the "wait and see" policy employed by the Cuban government.

Moreover, on December 23, 1991, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez received a letter from Hidalgo, which was also sent to Aldana, that detailed the discussions which Hidalgo had conducted with Mikhail Kalinin, the Soviet ambassador, on proposed changes in the Soviet diplomatic arrangements in Havana after the Alma Ata Protocols, which had created the Commonwealth of Independent States. The letter concludes that some within the Soviet Union "were still looking for formulas to solve Cuban commercial demands, especially oil and that the situation in Moscow, some parts of Siberia and the Urals, is critical."[156] Havana would have been delighted at these sentiments, as it evidences that even in its final days the relationship was continuing to function in some form, therefore explaining Havana's continued use of the "wait and see" policy in late 1991.

While Mikhail Gorbachev was General Secretary of the CPSU, a number of new pressures had come to bear on Soviet-Cuban relations, resulting in the relationship being very different in December 1991, when compared to March 1985, when he had assumed this position. The Soviet reforms had impacted the relationship in a number of ways which had not been expected or foreseen with the significance of both Marxist-Leninism and the island's geostrategic importance waning. This results from Gorbachev's willingness to embrace new ideas (which questioned traditional held Soviet beliefs including the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the Soviet desire for nuclear parity and the inevitability of world revolution) that as detailed in chapter 1 permits a constructivist interpretation for the end of the Cold War to be posited. In sum, regnant elite ideas in Moscow changed with, as noted, a number of unexpected consequences for Soviet-Cuban relations, not least a de-escalation in superpower tension. Moreover, Cuba appeared to have lost its privileged position within the Soviet ruling elite, and it had been announced that the final Soviet troops were to be removed from Cuba. In this fast changing situation the importance of realist pragmatism within the Cuban government was apparent as in public they employed a "wait and see" policy in fear of jeopardizing the relationship. This remained a critical consideration for the Castro administration due to the continuing hostility emanating from Washington toward the Cuban Revolution. Moreover, it has become apparent that in 1991 the "wait and see" policy extended to the Russian Federation, despite an aversion to Yeltsin's policies. However, the Cuban dislike of the Soviet reforms became ever more vocal from 1989 onward, with MINREX documents demonstrating the level of this aversion and that Cuba attempted to use *glasnost* to further increase the pressure on Gorbachev. However, what is key is that the relationship may have been drastically different, but it continued be impacted by the United States and also to exist. At no time did Gorbachev call for it to be terminated and it was only with the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991 that Soviet-Cuban relations came to an unexpected and sudden end.

POST-SOVIET RELATIONS

As detailed in the previous chapters, the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Havana suffered a dramatic and sudden downturn after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with this waning being both political and economic. In the opening chapter of this book, the changes in Russia's internal and foreign policies were detailed with this being fundamental for this downturn, again evidencing domestic and foreign policy concurring. As argued in chapter 2, this subsequently resulted in Marxist-Leninist ideology being removed from bilateral relations which had "tied" the two countries together for the previous three decades. The removal of Marxist-Leninism from the relationship resulted in a changed perception of the Cuban Revolution within the "new" Russia of the 1990s with this perception being further diminished by the Cuban administration's close association with former discredited Soviet governments. This all reduced the possibility of a cordial relationship developing between Moscow and Havana in the post-Soviet era as did the Cuban antipathy to the Russian reforms and Yeltsin himself, detailed earlier.

Further impacting Russian-Cuban relations in the post-Soviet era was the United States. As outlined in the previous chapters, this had affected Russian foreign policy which had become more Western looking in the hope of obtaining aid and assistance in its economic transition, but this had abrogated friendly Moscow-Havana relations due to the continuing animosity that emanated from Washington toward the Cuban Revolution in the final decade of the twentieth century, despite the end of the Cold War. Regarding this, William LeoGrande has written,

> Before 1991, Cuba's partnership with the Soviet Union and ideological antagonism towards the United States made it a serious issue for Washington. Aiding revolutionaries in Latin America sending troops to Africa, denouncing global capitalism in the Non-Aligned Movement—at every juncture Cuba stood opposed to U.S. foreign policy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, any plausible Cuban threat evaporated.[157]

The previous noted history of bilateral Cuban-U.S. relations was important for this continuing U.S. hostility, as was the fact that the original revolutionary elite remained in power in Havana and that the powerful Cuban American exile community had since the early 1960s been able to sustain the "Cuban issue" as part of the U.S. political dialogue, resulting in Cuba and the United States' relationship with the island being both a domestic and foreign policy issue.[158]

A New World order may have emerged from the Cold War era, but this did not temper Washington's Cuba policy, with the reality being very different because many in the U.S. believed that after the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the Cuban Revolution would be the next domino to fall, or

as John Kirk has written, "Washington could smell blood."[159] It was both the U.S. government and CANF who smelt blood with both trying to influence Moscow's policy toward Havana. Jorge Mas Canosa returned to Moscow in May 1992 when he sought to acquire 300 exit visas for Cubans living in Russia to relocate to the United States. Additionally, CANF members participated in a conference held in Moscow regarding Cuba which was highly disparaging about the Cuban Revolution and its leadership. At this conference A. Tsipko of the Gorbachev Foundation both compared Fidel Castro to Adolf Hitler and also ridiculed Castro's phrase "socialism or death" which the Cuban leader had begun finishing his speeches with when he said, "Today Fidel says 'socialism or death.'" This phrase should really be "My power or your death."[160] Not only had such a conference never taken place during the Soviet era of the relationship but such sentiments had never been aired.

Additionally, V. A. Borodaev, a Russian academic, believes Mas Canosa had been able to shape Russian thinking toward the Cuban Democracy Act, or Toricelli Bill, which as noted in the previous chapter Moscow had historically abstained in the UN vote concerning this bill.[161] Relating to the U.S government, Richard Dello has written,

> Cuba was almost immediately subjected to a wave of hostile measures on the part of the United States as Washington sought to exploit the opportunities afforded by the moment. Intense diplomatic pressure was placed on the tenuous Yeltsin regime, demanding that Moscow cease all commerce with Cuba. Washington even succeeded in winning a series of sharp criticisms of the Cuban government from its newfound Russian ally.[162]

This was graphically illustrated, because as detailed in chapter 1, Washington repeatedly attempted to exert pressure on Moscow to close the Lourdes listening post on the outskirts of Havana. Lourdes was the most high-profile component of the Soviet legacy in Russian-Cuban relations in the 1990s. However, with the Cold War confined to history and more cordial U.S.-Russian relations existing, Washington could not understand why the Kremlin did not close this facility which with the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations Washington could not understand remained open. Key to this facility remaining open was the Russian military who had forcefully lobbied the Russian government for it to continue functioning as it illustrated a more glorious past when compared to their situation of the immediate post-Soviet years.[163] Moreover, as Russia paid $200 million per year for the use of Lourdes, this facility provided the Castro government with much needed revenue, which Washington disliked as it attempted to economically "strangle" the Cuban Revolution.

Washington's aspiration to see Russia close Lourdes, and its attempts to bring further pressure to bear on the Kremlin regarding this facility, was

seen in 1996 when the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, or Helms-Burton Act, passed into law in the aftermath of the Cuban air force shooting down two planes belonging to the "Brothers in Arms" exile group on February 24, 1996, for violating Cuban airspace. This act yet further tightened the U.S. embargo against Cuba, the February 1996 incident will be examined more fully below, but this law not only attempted to curb third-party countries in general trading with Cuba but even contained a section that focused solely on Russia. The act read,

> The President shall withhold from assistance provided, . . . , for an independent state of the former Soviet Union under this Act an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, if any, provided on or after such a date by such state in support of intelligence facilities in Cuba, including the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.[164]

Moreover, in March 2000, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, one of three Cuban-American representatives from Florida in the U.S. Congress, endeavored to get the money that Moscow paid Havana for the use of this facility linked to Russia's debt with the Paris Club of creditors, a collection of major creditor states that attempt to find resolutions for unresolved payments of debtor states. Moreover, in July 2000, the United States Congress stated that the Russian debt would not be rescheduled until Lourdes was closed.[165]

Washington and the CANF's attempts to influence Moscow's Cuba policy demonstrated the continuing influence of the United States on bilateral Moscow-Havana relations, and also appeared to be bearing fruit, because, as previously detailed, Russian-Cuban relations endured a downturn in the early to mid-1990s. As specified in the previous chapter, Russia had voted against Cuba in the UN Convention on Human Rights from 1992 to 1995, but by 1995 Russia had become embroiled in the Chechen War with consequently reports materializing of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian military. This was something which Fidel Castro did not miss and he commented,

> This made me think of Chechnya. Strange things happen in this world. Let me be clear: I am against the disintegration of any country. . . . However, the dispatches carried news of who knows how many thousands of cannons shelling the region, hundreds of planes and helicopters bombing the region, tens of thousands of soldiers fighting, and civilian casualties. Yet, they voted against Cuba at the Human Rights Commission, against a country that has never had a single missing person, where never in 36 years of Revolution has there been a political crime, where no one is tortured.[166]

Not only were these comments highly critical of the Kremlin's actions with regards both events in Chechnya and also its voting behaviour in Geneva

but they also demonstrated the political downturn in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Castro's commentary constituted part of the very forthright Cuban government criticism of the Russian reforms of the early to mid-1990s that was outlined in chapter 2, with this Cuban aversion also being evident in MINREX documents. Relations between Moscow and Havana had deteriorated so quickly, and to such a level, that in October 1995 observers were uncertain if Yeltsin and Castro would shake hands when the two leaders attended the celebrations at the UN headquarters in New York City to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the organization's creation.

Although this was the case, what is clear from the MINREX documents that have become available on the relationship in the period when Yeltsin was president of Russia was that the two governments continued to meet and discuss the relationship throughout this period. Cuban aversion to the Russian reforms of the early to mid-1990s is highly evident in these documents, but due to the deterioration in the relationship it could have been thought that bilateral diplomatic interactions would have ceased.

The conundrum that faced the two governments in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations is perfectly demonstrated in a letter dated January 6, 1993, which Dmitry Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister, wrote to Ricardo Alarcón, minister of foreign affairs. The letter acknowledged that problems existed in the relationship, but states,

> We share the evolution of Russian-Cuban agreements signed lately as those that correspond with the mutual interests of Russia and Cuba, and contribute to the development of the bilateral relationship. This will contribute to the development of the technical-military area.
>
> However, there are a number of complicated and interrelated questions, which require the coordination and cooperation of ministries and pertinent organisations within Russia, and also the importance that we attached to the agreements reached in Moscow, these will need serious and profound consideration.
>
> We hope that in the near future all the pending problems can be solved, which will not affect the continued use of the Russian radio-electronic base in Cuba or the use of Cuban naval ports and aerodromes by the Russian Navy, according to the expectations of the concrete bilateral discussions.[167]

Problems existed in the relationship, primarily because Russia wanted to develop a new relationship with Cuba, but a legacy from the past continued to cast a long shadow over the post-Soviet relationship.

In addition to the level of detail of information that MINREX officials had amassed on the Russian internal situation, what is also noticeable from the MINREX documents was that from very soon after December 1991 MINREX officials persistently raised the Soviet heritage of Russian-Cuban relations. This Soviet heritage would impact bilateral trade considerably and

will be examined in the next chapter, with it previously being supposed that a degree of serendipity was involved in the existence of this legacy, but it appears MINREX personnel attempted to deliberately cultivate a legacy in the relationship. This legacy was unmistakably illuminated to Moscow on January 20, 1992, when Isidoro Malmierca, Cuban foreign minister, sent a telegram to Kozyrev, which stated,

> It is not enough to tell you that the Government of Cuba has recognised the Russian Federation's independence and sovereignty, but we express our warmest congratulations.
>
> On this significant occasion I am pleased to reiterate the feelings of friendship, respect and admiration which existed between our two peoples for three decades and hope that the relationship will develop and become consolidated in all fields.[168]

Havana recognizing the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union's legal successor was imperative for Russian-Cuban relations in the 1990s. Furthermore, on April 12, 1994, Isabel Allende, MINREX expert on Eastern Europe and future deputy foreign minister, wrote to Lionel Soto, vice president of the Council of Ministers, and stated, "A renovation of bilateral relations is necessary, particularly in light of the historic, political, economic, social, religious and cultural links between the two peoples."[169] Moreover, a communication dated July 11, 1997, exists that specifies bilateral discussions throughout 1997 in which Havana continually referenced the credits which Cuba had been given by the Soviet Union and that these should be honoured despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union.[170] Cuban Foreign Ministry personnel repeatedly detailing the relationship's history in discussions with their Russian counterparts signals both the importance of, and deliberate cultivation of, this legacy for Cuba in these bilateral discussions.

This Cuban focus on creating a legacy from the Soviet era could suggest that MINREX officials were somewhat "tied" to the past even as the post–Cold War era developed in the 1990s. Notwithstanding this, this Cuban practice also reminded Russia of its moral and legal duty to honour previously signed agreements. Russia was the legal successor to the Soviet Union and could not simply overlook parts of this. Additionally, the conception of this legacy also expressed a Cuban wish for the bilateral relationship in the 1990s to function with a number of features from the Soviet era of the relationship, contrary to Moscow's desire for the relationship to have a number of "new realities" as detailed in chapter 2.

In addition to deliberately fostering a legacy from the Soviet era in the post-1992 period, what is also noticeable is that MINREX officials lobbied certain figures within the Russian political system. On May 24, 1994,

Allende received a letter from Roberto Cabrisas, minister of foreign trade, that detailed how Rogelio Montenegro, Cuban ambassador to Russia, had lobbied parts of the Russian Duma concerning the U.S. embargo against the island. It appears that Montenegro's lobbying had been effective because a document dated October 18, 1994, exists which outlines Moscow's support for Havana, demands an end to the embargo, and calls it a "relic of the Cold War."[171] Cuban lobbying would be hugely important for the bilateral relationship in the 1990s, to which we will return later in this chapter, but MINREX officials acting in this manner evidences both the significance of the bilateral relationship for Cuba and Havana's desire for the relationship to continue despite their dislike of Russian policies of the early 1990s. Vitally this lobbying took place when Kozyrev was Russian foreign minister, because Cuba very much had an aversion to Moscow's pro-Western foreign policy to which Kozyrev had been central.

Crucial for this Cuban behavior, and desire for relations with Russia to continue, is the situation which Cuba faced in the early to mid-1990s. As noted above, aggression toward the Cuban Revolution continued to emanate from the United States which questioned its very survival. Simply, Havana had few viable alternative options with Cuban lobbying certain figures within the Russian political system being part of its endeavors to create a "constituency abroad." This is in accord with the ideas of Jorge Domínguez, Michel Erisman, Julie Feinsilver, and Kirk detailed in chapter 1 concerning the changes in Cuban foreign policy instigated as the island struggled to cope with the New World order of the 1990s bereft of its socialist allies. Moreover, these authors' ideas evidence the primacy of the principles of defensive realism within the Cuban ruling elite, because, as noted, these Cuban reforms were designed to counter the United States rather than increase Cuban power at the expense of the United States as offensive realism would suppose.

As summarized in the previous chapters, bilateral Moscow-Havana relations began to improve from the mid-1990s onward with, as noted in chapter 2, this partly resulting from unforeseen consequences of the Cuban economic reforms of the early to mid-1990s. However, a further alteration to Moscow's foreign policy was also important. This change occurred for a variety of reasons as detailed in chapter 1, with Russian unhappiness at its treatment by the West in general, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion to the east and a subsequent surge in nationalism being significant. Also as previously noted, this Russian displeasure was crucial for Grigor Suny's assertation of a constructivist approach in Russian/Soviet foreign policy. As detailed, constant factors in Russian history are central in forming regnant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite (including a desire to repel outside aggression), and their subsequent perception of the international system. These principal elite ideas began to change in the mid-1990s

and away from its pro-Western leanings of the initial post-Soviet years toward a more nationalistic macro-level orientation, but as noted the fear of outside aggression remained. Consequently, the Kremlin perceived both Havana and Washington differently within global politics; Cuba was seen as more friendly while conversely the United States was seen as being more aggressive due to the earlier noted Western action. This provides a different understanding of alterations in both Russian-U.S. and Russian-Cuban relations. Furthermore, the reasons, noted earlier, were also significant for Tsygankov's hypothesis on the role of statists (who due to the historic Russian psychological inferiority complex are prepared to fight for their independence and sovereignty) returning to prominence in Soviet foreign policy.The upshot was that Moscow wanted to reassert itself in international politics and no longer be marginalized as it had been in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Soviet Union.

This Russian desire had a direct and fundamental impact on Russian-Cuban relations, because once again Cuba had geostrategic significance for the Kremlin. This is not to suggest that it had returned to the level of the Cold War, but closer relations with Cuba permitted Moscow to demonstrate to Washington its reassertion into global politics and increased global influence, or as the Russia journalist A. Sosnovsky wrote to "tickle the Americans' underbelly."[172] This assertiveness would appear to evidence the significance of offensive realism within Moscow's foreign policy. However, as previously noted, closer relations with Cuba were part of a Russian desire for a multipolar world, as Moscow strove to counteract, or balance, the United States in the international arena: the central tenets of defensive realism. Moreover, the geostrategic importance of Cuba for the Russian government was not just with regard to Moscow's relationship with Washington, but it also permitted the Kremlin to partially sate rising Russian nationalism. Over time, this geostrategic significance would increase further as the Kremlin became increasingly interested in Latin America as a whole, as Cuba could act as a conduit for this Russian desire.

This rise in the island's geopolitical significance for Russia was not lost on MINREX officials. On March 30, 1995, a MINREX report assessed the article printed in *Pravda* on February 27, 1995, that for "Russian national security" Yeltsin had instructed Kozyrev and Viktor Chernomyrdin, deputy prime minister, to improve relations with Cuba.[173] Furthermore, on April 10, 1996, Rosa Elena Simeón, minister of science and technology, received a letter regarding a recent meeting with V. G. Kadishervsky of the Russia Nuclear Institute concerning the building of an institute in Cuba that would help expedite work of this nature with the region.[174] Moreover, in November 1998 Luis García, MINREX personnel and European expert, stated, "Russia is starting an offensive in the region."[175] Additionally, on February 4, 1999, Marcelino

Medina, MINREX official and future first deputy of foreign affairs, wrote to Allende detailing his meeting Mijail Kaminin, the new Russian ambassador to Cuba. Medina quotes Kaminin as saying it is a " magnificent moment for relations between the two countries and . . . . Cuba is the number one priority for Russia in Latin America and is a strategic worldwide ally."[176]

As noted in chapter 1, Primakov replacing Kozyrev as Russian foreign minister in early 1996 was symbolic of this change in Russian foreign policy, with, crucially for Russian-Cuban relations, Primakov having an alternative approach to Kozyrev concerning foreign policy as he believed much more in "spheres of influence" than his predecessor. MINREX officials were quick in theorizing that Kozyrev's resignation may result in an alteration in Moscow's foreign policy away from the pro-Western position pursued by Kozyrev, but it was not just a shift in Moscow's foreign policy that would impact Russian-Cuban relations, but Primakov himself.[177]

Primakov's career had been built in the Soviet era, and it both appeared that he had a number of shared beliefs with the Cuban leadership and also an affinity for the island that had developed after visiting Cuba in April 1981.[178] The importance of Primakov's appointment was not lost on the Cuban government when in a letter dated February 12, 1996, Carlos Fernández de Cossio, director of Instituto Norteamericano in Havana, which he sent to Roberto Robaina, Cuban foreign minister, and also sent to Allende, he detailed his meeting with Mihail Orlovetz, charge de'affaires in the Russian embassy. The letter finishes,

> Chancellor Primakov conducts the work of the Russian Ministry with great dignity, and that every word of the Russian Minister has great meaning and weight, not as it had previously that things were said without meaning and significance. Furthermore Primakov believes that relations between Cuba and Russia should be strengthened.[179]

The high standing in which Primakov was held within the Cuban ruling circles was further demonstrated when on his resignation as Russian foreign minister, Castro personally invited Primakov to vacation in Cuba.[180] Moreover, in a note of congratulations on being elected Russian prime minister that Castro sent Primakov on September 14, 1998, the Cuban leader wrote, "For all those who know him in Cuba, his election is a source of satisfaction, because it renews our confidence in the future of Cuban-Russian relations."[181]

This change in Russian foreign policy with which Primakov was closely associated, as stated, resulted in an upturn in bilateral Moscow-Havana relations. This first manifested itself in the return of visits by members of the two countries' ruling elites to each other's other country. The absence of such visits in the early to mid-1990s had been indicative of the downturn in the

relationship. As previously noted, the first such visit was when Robaina travelled to Moscow in May 1995, with Primakov reciprocating this visit when he travelled to Havana in June 1996.[182] During Primakov's trip, Fidel Castro spoke about Russian-Cuban relations and said, "Recently, relations have been improving little by little. There have been good moments, there have been critical moments and now there's an upswing."[183] Moreover, in a letter of thanks to Pérez Roque in the aftermath of his visit to Cuba in the summer of 1996, Primakov wrote that "a new and higher level of interaction" between Cuba and Russia had begun.[184]

Various documents in the MINREX archive also evidence this upturn in the relationship. On December 12, 1995, Pérez Roque received a letter from Robaina concerning the ceremony that had bestowed membership to the Academy of Sciences and Art "Petrovskaya" in St Petersburg to Fidel Castro. Additionally, on March 27, 1996, Robaina wrote to Carlos Lage, secretary of the Council of Ministers, stating that Castro had accepted the invitation to attend the Third International Conference "Medicine for All" which was due to take place in Moscow from June 3 to June 9, 1996.[185] The Cuban leader accepting this invitation is highly noteworthy as he had not visited Moscow since the late 1980s, which, as with visits by members of the two countries' ruling circles, was indicative of the deterioration in the relationship. Moreover, Castro receiving such an invitation is a very different scenario to the editorial detailed in the previous chapter that had compared the Cuban leader to Stalin.

This improvement in bilateral relations was evident in Russian voting behavior at various UN fora, because unlike in the years from 1992 to 1995, Moscow once again voted with Havana. This was particularly important for the Cuban government with regards its strained relationship with the United States, detailed earlier. On July 26, 1996, a meeting was held at the UN in New York City to discuss the aforementioned "Brothers to the Rescue" incident, at which Russia was one of only two countries to abstain in the UN vote that condemned Cuba over the shooting down of the organization's two planes. Moreover, Moscow was also very critical of both the UN resolution and also the actions of the exile group, with Alexandre Gorelik, the Russia representative at the UN, stating,

> And yet it is common knowledge that the nature of the flights undertaken by Brothers to the Rescue, as well as the aims pursued through them, are hardly compatible with the aims laid down for the use of civil aviation by the Chicago Convention.[186]

Concerning the aforementioned section of the Helms-Burton Act that focused solely on Russia's continued use of the Lourdes listening post in the 1990s, it

appeared that Moscow was simply going to ignore it. In April 1996, a Russian Foreign Ministry declaration stated, "We confirm our intention to develop and broaden mutually beneficial cooperation with Cuba as well as sectors of mutual interest, particularly in the commercial and economic sphere."[187] Bilateral Russian-Cuban trade will be examined in the next chapter.

This Russian support becomes even more apparent in MINREX documents as in the afore-cited letter dated February 12, 1996, from Fernández de Cossio to Robaina, it is stated that Orlovetz had said that Russia believed that Helms-Burton was anti-Cuban and subsequently Moscow will lobby on Cuba's behalf in Washington regarding it.[188] Furthermore, in March 1996, Pérez Roque thanked Primakov for the support that Moscow had provided Havana in the UN in the aftermath of the "Brothers to Rescue" and in particular Sergey Lavrov, Russian ambassador to the UN and future Russian Foreign Minister.[189]

As detailed, an upsurge in Russian nationalism in the mid-1990s was key to the change in Russian foreign policy that aided the upturn in bilateral Russian-Cuban relations. As noted in chapter 1, this increase in nationalism was evident in the composition of the Russian Duma, again domestic and foreign policy appeared to be synergizing. As with the alteration in Russian foreign policy in general, the potential positive effect on bilateral Russian-Cuban relations of a reshaped Duma was not lost on the Cuban government. On January 25, 1996, Robaina received a report from Allende concerning the reconfiguration of the Russian Duma. The Duma was now led by Gennady Selezinov, former *Pravda* journalist, with Allende theorizing that Russian foreign policy could consequently change and become more sympathetic to Cuba.[190] As previously elucidated, Russian foreign policy was modified in the mid-1990s resulting in Russia no longer voting against Cuba at the UN Convention on Human Rights as it had since 1992. The importance of the "new Duma" in this foreign policy alteration was noted in a June 1996 MINREX report on Primkov's visit to Cuba.[191] This was repeated in a letter Robaina sent to Alarcón on February 21, 1997. In this letter Robaina commented that the result of the reconfigured Russian Duma was that it displayed more understanding toward Cuba, evident, as outlined, both in Russia supporting Cuba at the UN in July 1996 regarding the discussions on the "Brothers to the Rescue" incident and denouncing the Helms-Burton Act.[192]

On November 4, 1997, Luis García informed Allende that two significant Duma members Alexey Podberezkin, co-president of the Patriotic and Popular Russian Union, and Mikhail Kalashnikov, Commission of Political Social, were due to privately travel to Cuba in late November 1997.[193] Both Duma members had empathy for Russia's Soviet past. Kalashnikov was a famous former Soviet general and Podberezkin later became general secretary of the United Party of Russia, which had sympathy for Russia's Soviet history and

wished a restoration of Moscow's global influence. While in Cuba, Luis García planned for José Ramón Balaguer, former Cuban ambassador to Moscow, to meet them. This evidences the significance of the "new Duma" for Cuba, and for the island having good relations with central figures within it, as it appeared that MINREX were lobbying these key figures while on the island.

As noted, evidence of Cuban lobbying was hugely important as it demonstrates that the relationship with Moscow remained important for Havana throughout the 1990s, both politically and economically, despite a Cuban dislike of the Russian reforms of the early to mid-1990s. Moreover, documents exist in the MINREX archive which demonstrate the success of Cuban lobbying due to the consequent support Russia provided for Cuba in various UN fora. Havana desired a relationship with Moscow that contained a number of features of the relationship from the 1959 to 1991 period, with this being very different from the wishes of the Kremlin in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations. Havana attempted to achieve its aims by continuously referencing the relationship's history and by lobbying Russian personnel who had empathy for the country's Soviet past. This could make it appear that in the 1990s Cuban thinking was "tied" to the past, but, as detailed, it also reminded Russian officials of their legal and moral duty to respect previously signed agreements and Moscow could not simply pick and choose which aspects of its Soviet legacy it wished to honor. Furthermore, this Cuban behavior demonstrated Havana's attempts to create a "constituency abroad," underpinned by the prevalence of realist pragmatism and defensive realism within the Cuban ruling elite, as Havana attempted to countervail the continuing hostility that the island faced from the United States throughout the final decade of the twentieth century. Moreover, these Cuban actions and aims were in accordance with the ideas of Domínguez, Erisman, Feinsilver and Kirk noted in the opening chapter of this book.

Further evidence of the changed nature of Russian politics in the mid-to late 1990s when compared to the start of the decade, and how this could be beneficial for Cuba, is apparent in a letter dated June 23, 1998, that Robaina wrote to Pérez Roque, Lage, and Balaguer. In this letter Robaina outlines that Anatoly Chubais had been "purged" or forced to resign over the Russian economic problems, and intriguingly Robaina wrote, "The resignation of Chubais has given rise to the increased possibility that we can access the 350 million U.S. dollar credit, which they continue to link to our debt to the former USSR, which would allow the restart of work on the CEN Juragua."[194] This not only indicates that even in the late 1990s Cuba hoped that the joint project to construct the nuclear reactor at Juragua could be completed which would help alleviate Cuban economic security issues; it also indicates that Chubais had been a problem in the relationship and that his resignation could be advantageous for Cuba.

Chubais's resignation was symbolic of the changed nature of Russian politics which was important for the upturn in the relationship, but the result of this improvement in relations was that it became mutually beneficial for both Russia and Cuba. For Moscow an improved relationship with Havana demonstrated to Washington the Kremlin's reassertion into global politics as it endeavored to counterbalance the United States while helping to dampen the rise in Russian nationalism, while for Havana, Moscow could provide support in various international fora as the island continued to face aggression from the United States. This was evidenced in a letter dated November 18, 1998, which Robaina wrote to General Antonio Concepción, head secretary of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR), on future deputy foreign minister Georgy Mamedov's proposed visit to Cuba. In this Robaina wrote, "Russia is a faithful friend of Cuba," and that the Kremlin's support was vital in Cuban-United States relations.[195] Furthermore, the afore referenced MINREX report written about Primakov's 1996 visit to Cuba details the key reasons for "rejuvenated" relationship being,

> Cuba's willingness to resist, its solidarity and authority in the international arena, in combination with the Russian priority to defend its national interests and resurrect times with former allies, are the factors that have had the greatest impact in the reactivation of the political ties between the two countries.[196]

The relationship being mutually beneficial for both countries for the reasons detailed above would remain fundamental for bilateral relations in the twenty-first century, but this was not immediately apparent on Vladimir Putin becoming Russian president in early 2000. As detailed in the opening chapter of this book not only did great uncertainty surround Putin as little was known about him with this including MINREX officials, but a degree of ambiguity also existed over the policies he originally pursued. This uncertainty partly resulted from it appearing that Putin was following a pro-Western foreign policy in the first months of his presidency, which could directly impact Russian-Cuban relations.

In October 2001, Russia announced the closure of Lourdes, citing the cost that Moscow paid Havana for the use of this facility for their decision.[197] As previously outlined, this decision was something that Washington had been trying to influence throughout the 1990s, and it very much appeared that the United States had ultimately been able to achieve its aim. As noted in chapter 1, in June 2001, Putin met George W. Bush in Slovenia, and many believed that Bush had been able to exert pressure on Putin concerning this announcement. In the immediate aftermath of this announcement Igor Rodionov, former Russian defense minister stated during an interview,

> The intelligence-gathering center on Cuba is a defensive installation that enabled Russia to monitor the airwaves throughout the Western Hemisphere and

> make appropriate domestic and foreign policy decisions based on reliable information. Closing the center strikes another blow to the security of Russia and its allies, a blow inflicted by our own hand in the interests of the U.S. and NATO.[198]

In *Vremya novestei* the journalists Fydor Lukyanov and Aeksei Slobodin wrote,

> The Russian President is heading to his meeting with George W. Bush in Shanghai tomorrow with a gift that no one expected of him at this particular juncture. Mosocow's decision . . . to close the Lourdes electronic tracking and intercept center in Cuba . . . seems like going overboard to accommodate our erstwhile adversary.[199]

In *Vremya* Alexander Karmen wrote, "Russia may be mistaken when it cooperates with the United States and neglects small states like Cuba."[200] Interestingly, in February 2008, once Russian-U.S. relations had become increasingly strained, Putin returned to the topic of the closure of Lourdes during a speech, when he said, "We pulled out of bases in Cuba and Vietnam. And what did we get? New American bases in Bulgaria and Romania."[201] This gives credibility to the proposition that Washington had been able to influence Moscow's decision concerning Lourdes, but the outcome had not been what the Kremlin hoped.

Since the improvement in Russian-Cuban relations in the mid-1990s, the decision to close Lourdes has been one of the very few times that tension materialized within the bilateral relationship. On the decision to close Lourdes, a Cuban government statement in *Granma* stated that the $200 million "was not an extraordinary figure if one considers that it is barely 3% of the damage to our country's economy by the disintegration of the Socialist bloc and the USSR."[202] In *My Life* Fidel Castro drew comparisons between Soviet action at the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Moscow's decision to close Lourdes when he said of the agreement over Lourdes, "It was a fait accompli—they informed us, hoping we'd go along."[203]

This challenged the idea of a "Putin doctrine" in Russian foreign policy that was examined in chapter 1, due to its perceived assertiveness and desire to project Russian power on the global stage, but it was also problematic in itself for Cuba. The closure of Lourdes could suggest closer Moscow-Washington relations, which was challenging for Havana due to continuing hostility which the Caribbean island faced from the United States. This aggression increased with Bush's inauguration as U.S. president in January 2001. In January 2002, Cuba was placed on the "axis of evil."[204] In October 2003, the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was created, this organization's mandate being "to focus United States government efforts on achieving this objective," and in 2004 TV Marti, the more high-tech successor to Radio

Marti, began broadcasting to the island.[205] In October 2007, George Bush announced the initiative Freed Fund for Cuba which would "give Cubans—especially Cuban entrepreneurs—access to grants, and loans and debt relief to help rebuild their country."[206] However, Cubans could only gain access to these opportunities once a number of reforms, including freedom of the press and multiparty elections, had been instigated in Cuba.[207]

Due to the significance of nationalism within the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban leadership's constructed history of Cuban-U.S. relations since 1959, Havana was highly critical of these U.S. actions. Castro described the "Transition Plan" as "loathsome,"[208] while in the aftermath of the 2003 crackdown on dissidents on the island, the Cuban leader stated, "The US Interests Section offices and residence in Cuba, protected by diplomatic immunity, have become the venues for meetings to organise provocations, facilitate communications and openly give orders to mercenaries inside the country."[209]

Cuban-U.S. relations may have remained strained at the start of the twenty-first century, but the tension which appeared between Moscow and Havana over the decision to close Lourdes can very much be seen as a "one-off," as generally the bilateral relationship has continued to trend in an upward direction from the mid-1990s onward. This upward trajectory has resulted from the relationship being mutually beneficial for the reasons detailed above. Moreover, as Moscow's relationship with Washington soured, Cuba has been able to provide support for Russia in various international fora, thus reciprocating the backing that Russia has given Cuban in many of the same meetings. This will be more fully detailed below.

The robust nature of Russian-Cuban relations was demonstrated in December 2000 when Putin became the first resident of the Kremlin to visit Latin America since Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1989, when he travelled to Havana. Putin's visit may have caused consternation in the West, but the *Granma* statement that announced his arrival stated, "The visit of excelentismo Mr Vladimir Putin and his important delegation is met with the great joy of our people and is of great importance for relations between Cuban and the Russian Federation."[210] Furthermore, on December 15, 2000, *Izvestia* reported that "Putin began his visit to Cuba by declaring that the breaking off of relations with Havana after the Soviet collapse had been a historical mistake. This was music to the ears of Fidel Castro (who welcomed Putin at Jose Marti Airport in person)."[211] Concerning this visit, Professor Eugenio Larin, director of Latin American Studies at the Institute of Cold War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has written, "A new stage in Russian-Cuban Relations officially opened with the visit of the President of the Russian President V.V. Putin between 13 and 16 December 2000."[212] The economic aspect of the bilateral relationship was prominent in the discussions which took place during Putin's visit and will be scrutinized in the next

chapter, but this trip was hugely symbolic for Russian-Cuban relations and was very different from when Castro and Yeltsin had met a mere five years previously at the UN, as detailed earlier.

In addition to this, due to the changes in Russian foreign policy previously elucidated, Moscow and Havana began to have a common outlook on a number of global issues, not least a dislike of the end of the bipolar nature of international relations in the post–Cold War era. This was evident while Putin visited Cuba in December 2000 when he said, "The unipolarity that we oppose is an attempt to monopolize and dominate world affairs. History has seen several such attempts. And what came of these is well known. There is no place for monopolism in today's world."[213] Also during Putin's trip Fidel Castro commented, "Cuba is not alone in feeling alarm at the domination of a single country: This alarm is shared by such countries as Russia, China and the states of Europe."[214]

Similar sentiments would be repeated at various times by both governments. In the joint memorandum that was issued at the end of Raúl Castro's January 2009 trip to Moscow, his first since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations, it was stated,

> Raúl Castro and Dimitri A. Medvedev noted with satisfaction the need for a multipolar and stable system, which will ensure sustainable development and ways to achieve peace and welfare for the global community.[215]

Moreover, in July 2014, when Putin returned to Cuba the Russian president stated,

> Today, Cuba is one of Russia's leading partners in the region. Our cooperation is strategic and long-term oriented. We closely coordinate our foreign policy, including within multilateral organisations. Our positions coincide on many global and regional issues.[216]

This shared global outlook evidences the continued robust bilateral political relationship that had existed since the mid-1990s. The tension which had existed between Moscow and Havana in the aftermath of the closure of the Lourdes listening post had quickly dissipated, evidenced by the support which Russia provided for Cuba in its persisting contentious relationship with Washington, detailed later, and the signing of various bilateral trade agreements. These trade agreements will be more fully examined in chapter 4. Further demonstrating the robust nature of the relationship was that in November 2008 Dmitry Medvedev visited Cuba.[217] As noted, Moscow has continued to vote with Havana at UN Human Rights Convention in Geneva, especially important after the aforementioned 2003 crackdown on dissidents in Cuba. In May 2003, Andrei Dmitriyev, the Russian Ambassador to Cuba, stated, "As

far as accusations connected with violation of human rights in Cuba are concerned, this is the only pretext for imposing the embargo on the republic. This is another relic from the Cold War."[218] Additionally, in Geneva the Kremlin both voted for the 2005 Cuban resolution denouncing the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and in 2006 also supported Cuban membership to UN Human Rights Council which the United States had attempted to block.[219]

In Dmitriyev's May 2003 interview with *Vremya novostei* detailed above, the Russian ambassador to Cuba addressed the island being placed on the "axis of evil" and U.S. accusations that Cuba had both conducted biological warfare research and supplied "dual-use biotechnology" to other rogue states. Dmitriyev stated, "Such statements are unfounded. No one, including the U.S., has convincing evidence."[220] Moreover, in September 2004, Lavrov, by then Russian foreign minister, commented, "I think that I will not exceed my powers if I say that I have never seen any hostility toward the United States on the part of Cuba during my contacts with Cuban friends."[221] Concerning the continuing U.S. embargo against Cuba Yuri Isakov, Russian deputy representative to the UN, in November 2003 stated,

> Russia thinks that further American blockade of Cuba contradicts the modern realities and international relations. It is Cold War residue, which artificially brakes formation of a world order based on the UN Charter, international law and justice.[222]

Significantly this backing would continue after December 17, 2014, and the historical improvement in Cuban-U.S. relations, both of which will be examined below.[223]

This Russian support for Cuba was vital as Russia could provide a counterbalance to the United States in a variety of international fora, the significance of which was increased due to Russia being a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As detailed, this constituted part of Havana's wish to create a "constituency abroad" with this desire evidencing the prevalence of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite that was underpinned by defensive realism. With regards the continued strained nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, this was highly significant for Havana.

For the Kremlin, its bilateral relationship with Havana also had resonance concerning Russian-U.S relations. At first it demonstrated to Washington that Russia once again had global influence, a key component of the "Putin doctrine," which, as outlined in the opening chapter of this manuscript, is ultimately underscored by defensive realism as the Russian government endeavors to counterbalance the U.S. position within global politics. The importance of this has intensified as over time Russia's relationship with the West and United States deteriorated, consequently, Havana was able to provide support

in international fora. Thus Havana reciprocated the aforementioned Russian support for Cuba. This was apparent in 2008 over the Georgian war, during which Havana labelled Georgia as the "aggressor." Furthermore, Raúl Castro stated,

> A disturbing crisis has erupted originated in the news of the combats unleashed in the Caucasus, at the Russian south border.
>
> Following the disintegration of the USSR, South Ossetia was forcibly annexed to Georgia, a country with which it shared neither nationality nor culture, but it preserved its status as an autonomous republic with its local authorities and its capital Tskhinvali. At dawn on August 8, Georgia, in complicity with the US administration launched its forces on South Ossetia in an attempt to occupy the capital.[224]

Havana also acted in a similar manner with the situation which unfolded in Syria since 2013. In September 2013, *Granma* published a Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, which stated,

> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba has learned of, with profound concern, the statement made on August 31 by Barack Obama, President of the United States, in which he announced his decision to launch a military action against the Syrian Arab Republic.
>
> Without leaving any margin whatsoever for attempts underway to reach a political solution to the conflict, or presenting any kind of evidence, and with total disrespect for the opinions of many countries—including some of its principal allies—and the United Nations, the President of the United States has announced his intention to engage in actions in violation of international law and the UN Charter. These will inevitably provoke more death and destruction and will unavoidably lead to an intensification of the existing conflict in this Arab nation.[225]

Cuba also sided with Moscow over the situation in the Ukraine that extended through 2014. Significantly on March 27, 2014, Cuba was one of eleven countries to vote against the UN resolution that condemned the Russian referendum held in the Crimea.[226] Moreover, and highly interestingly, during his speech to the 7th Congress of the PCC in April 2016, Raúl Castro criticized the expansion of NATO to the edge of Russia's borders.[227] As noted throughout this book, this NATO expansion has been a key component in the change to Russian foreign policy in the mid-1990s which has been crucial for the upturn in Russian-Cuban relations.

It was not only with regard to Moscow's relationship with Washington that Cuba has importance for the Kremlin but also for Russia's increased interest in Latin America as a whole. This Russian interest has a distinct economic

aspect to it and will be examined in the next chapter. However, Moscow's attention in the region is not exclusively economic, evident in an article written by Lavrov that was printed in *Latinskaia America* in January 2006. In this Lavrov wrote,

> In recent years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin (LACB) occupy an increasingly noticeable place in the system of contemporary international relations. Our contacts with them, representing a separate thrust in Russian foreign policy, integrally blend into the fabric of global and interregional cooperation and are an important component of the international efforts of Russia in tackling the problems common to the entire world community, in combating new challenges and threats, in maintaining strategic stability and reinforcing security.[228]

The "pink tide" that swept across parts of Latin America at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century aided Russia's desire for improved relations with the region as a number of these progressive governments turned toward Moscow as an alternative to Washington. At the forefront of this was Venezuela, and in July 2007, after his second visit to Moscow, the Cuban newspaper *Juventud Rebelede* quoted Hugo Chávez as having told the Russian State Duma leader Boris Grizlov, "Venezuela is ready to increase the new wave of relations and bilateral cooperation."[229]

The "pink tide" may have receded, but this has not sated Russian interest in Latin America, as it has since continued and even increased in importance, with some believing that improved Russian-Latin American relations can help mitigate Russian political isolation as Moscow's relationship with the West deteriorates (as noted in chapter 1, the formation of alliances is central to the ideas of defensive realism), made worse by allegations of Russian cyber-attacks against the West, the events throughout 2018 surrounding both the illnesses of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, and also events in Syria.[230] Moscow's attention in Latin America was further evident in May 2013 when the ambassadors of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States to Russia met the Russian and Cuban foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov and Bruno Rodríguez, respectively, in Moscow during Rodríguez's visit to the Russian capital.[231] As noted, the result of Cuban regional influence is that Cuba can act as the conduit to Moscow's efforts to gain political allies in Latin America.

Moreover, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, a dynamic from the relationship's 1959 to 1991 period began to reemerge as joint collaborations between Russia and Cuba began to appear in military cooperation. This was demonstrated in May 2013 when Russian Army General Valeri Guerasimov confirmed that joint military cooperation would continue.

Cuba possessing Soviet era hardware appears to underpin this statement with Alexandr Fomín, vice president of the Russian Federal Service of Military and Technological Cooperation, stating, "We will not supply Cuba with the most modern armaments, but rather it will be of level to maintain Cuban defense."[232] In August 2013, a Russian naval task force led by the Moskva missile cruiser arrived in the Cuban capital, further evidencing joint military cooperation.[233] Moreover, on January 20, 2015, the Russian spy ship Viktor Leonov docked in the Cuban capital, significantly this was the day before bilateral Cuban-U.S. talks commenced after the beginning of a normalization process in December 2014.[234] Furthermore, in February 2015 Army General Serguey Shoigu, Russian defense minister, travelled to Cuba and during this visit he thanked the island for "the warm welcome the Russian navy receives in the port of Havana" which Shoigu said was characteristic of the bilateral relationship in general.[235] Further demonstrating this re-appearance of an old dynamic, although at a massively reduced level in comparison to the Cold War, was that in October 2016 the Russian deputy defence minister Nikolai Pankov confirmed that Russia was "rethinking" the decision to close Lourdes in 2002.[236]

A more global Russian presence is, as detailed, an important part of the "Putin doctrine" as the Kremlin strives to create a multipolar world to counterpoise the United States within global politics. Havana permitting the Russian navy access to Cuban harbors helps facilitate this desire as it allowed these Russian ships to refuel and restock. Moreover, this further increased the geostrategic significance of Cuba for the Kremlin, although again not to the level of the Cold War.

Furthermore, in the post-1992 period constructivism appears to have continued resonance for the bilateral relationship. In the mid-1990s a change in dominant Russian ruling elite ideas away from its pro-Western inclinations of the initial post-Soviet era to a more nationalistic macro-level orientation occurred. Consequently, a number of primary Russian and Cuban elite ideas began to align (both in terms of nationalism and global viewpoints) with consequentially Moscow and Havana having a common perception of the international system. Both Moscow and Havana identify the United States as unfriendly, but each other as friends. This points to Wendt's ideas that both "anarchy is what you make of it" and how Cuba perceives U.S. military power in a more threatening manner than does Canada.[237] After NATO expansion to the east, parallels can be made between this Cuban perception of Washington's military might and Moscow's view of the West. Consequently, alterations in principle elite ideas can offer an exposition for cordial Russian-Cuban relations and not purely reactions to changed geopolitical power configurations.

Notwithstanding this, defensive realism can provide an alternative understanding of the bilateral relationship, as both Moscow and Havana have endeavored to counterbalance the power of the United Sates. As detailed throughout this book, defensive realism has been the key for the Cuban ruling elite since January 1959 due to U.S. hostility toward the island with this persisting after 1992. Russian-Cuban relations attempt to offset this U.S. aggression and help safeguard Cuban security. Moreover, the bilateral relationship retained importance for Moscow after the changes to the Kremlin's foreign policy from the mid-1990s onwards that would eventual herald the "Putin doctrine." As noted, the "Putin doctrine" is underpinned by defensive realism, as the Kremlin strives to create a multipolar world to countervail the United Sates rather than increase its power at the expense of the United States.

As noted, the central argument postulated in this book for the existence of the enduring relationship between Moscow and Havana since November 1917 is that in each of the three separate eras of the relationship both countries have had rationale to engage with the other, and not as previously thought this being exclusive to the 1959 to 1991 period. Key to these rationale was that a number of consistencies have continually impacted the relationship since the Russian Revolution, chief among which has been Washington's relationship with Moscow and Havana both individually and in unison, which for the most part has been contentious. However, what impact would a fundamental change in this key norm have for Moscow-Havana relations? As touched upon at various points in this chapter historic change has occurred to Cuban-U.S. relations since December 17, 2014, with both the restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015 and President Barack Obama visiting Cuba in March 2016.[238] A number of reasons underpin this historic change. For Havana this would be a reduction in tension with its historic enemy which as detailed throughout this book has repeatedly attempted to destroy the Cuban Revolution for over fifty years. Consequently, this would be in accordance with the ideas of realist pragmatism and defensive realism that have been preeminent within the Cuban revolutionary elite since January 1959, as improved Cuban-U.S. relations would help safeguard the Cuban Revolution. For Washington improved relations with Havana includes Obama in his December 17, 2014, speech calling for the contested history of U.S.-Cuban relations to be cast aside, the Cuban exile community's influence within U.S. politics receding, which allowed Obama to address the relationship, and Washington attempting to end its political isolation in Latin America concerning the issue of Cuba.[239]

Even before President Donald Trump's partial rollback of some of the changes made to Cuban-U.S. relations since December 2014, and the friction that arose in the summer of 2017 regarding U.S. diplomatic personnel

in Havana, a level of mistrust remained in the relationship.[240] After over fifty years of tension this is understandable, but in April 2016 Raúl Castro spoke about U.S. Cuban policy since December 2014 and commented, "The goals remain the same, only the means are being modified."[241] This accusation appears to be based on the idea that U.S. policy since December 2014 can be perceived similarly to parts of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and its Track II diplomacy, which was designed to end the Cuban Revolution by increasing people-to-people links.[242] Even in his historic December 17, 2014, speech Obama said, "But I am convinced that through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban people help themselves as they move into the twenty-first century."[243] Moreover, Obama again spoke of the importance of people-to-people ties while in Cuba in March 2016.[244]

Regardless of the U.S.'s motives, the impact of this historic change to the island's relationship with Washington for Russian-Cuban relations, even before the advent of Trump's presidency, has been minimal. As detailed, Russia has persisted in criticizing the U.S. embargo against Cuba, trade agreements between Moscow and Havana that will be examined in the next chapter have continued to be signed, and as noted above, the Viktor Leonov spy ship arrived in Havana the day before the commencement of Cuban-U.S. talks in January 2015. The docking of this ship in the Cuban capital permitted Havana to send a very clear message to Washington that even as Cuban-U.S. relations were improving, Cuba was not going to "turn its back" on old friends, or as LeoGrande has written Havana, was not putting "all of Cuba's eggs in one international basket."[245] Moreover, Cuba throwing "all its eggs in one basket" would be completely contrary to the ideas of realist pragmatism and defensive realism which, as detailed throughout this book, have underpinned the Cuban ruling elite's thinking since January 1959. Simply, throughout the revolutionary period Cuba has continually attempted to mitigate forms of dependency arising and Havana suddenly focusing on one relationship to the detriment of all others would be in conflict to this long held desire. Additionally, the ideas of realist pragmatism would suppose that if Cuban-U.S. relations deteriorated, as specified a partial rollback has occurred under President Trump, Havana would turn to Moscow.

For Russia, Cuba retains importance for the reasons detailed earlier in this chapter, not least the support which Cuba can offer Russia in various international fora, because Moscow's relationship with the West remains strained. In sum, Russian-Cuban relations continue to have importance for both countries despite the historic change that has occurred to Havana's relationship with Washington since December 2014, which as detailed throughout this book, has been a constant determinant in Moscow-Havana relations since November 1917.

CONCLUSIONS

Diplomatic relations existed during all three distinct periods of the bilateral relationship since November 1917, but it was only in the years from December 1961 to December 1991 that this was between two socialist states. Their existence between 1942 and 1952 further challenges the idea that Moscow suffered from "geographical fatalism" prior to the Cuban Revolution, but each period of the relationship had its own idiosyncrasies and nuances. This included the impact of the Second World War, the Cuban government attempting to use *glasnost* to increase the pressure on Gorbachev in the late Soviet period, and the fact that in the early to mid-1990s Moscow desired a relationship with Havana that was vastly different from its carnation of the thirty years prior to this. This situation was further complicated by the adverse Cuban perception of Yeltsin which becomes evident in MINREX documents from throughout 1991. However, a reading of these documents confirm both that the "wait and see" policy was a strategic decision by the Cuban government and not a retroactive response to events once their outcome had become clear, and also that in 1991 this "wait and see" policy extended to the Russian Federation. Moreover, relations were constantly affected by alterations in Moscow and Havana's foreign policy and also world events.

As noted, the existence of a number of commonalities in all three eras of the relationship are fundamental to the central argument of this book; in each of these disparate periods both countries have had rationale to engage with the other, and not as previously noted this being exclusive to the 1959 to 1991 period. Chief among these was Washington's relationships with Moscow and Havana individually and together. Moreover, two alternative interpretations for the relationship have been offered: defensive realism and constructivism. These two paradigms may have divergently different understandings of the international system, but significantly both provide expositions for the cordial nature of Moscow-Havana relations.

For a defensive realist elucidation the Kremlin could utilize its relationship with Havana to counter anti-Soviet policies elsewhere in the world with this continuing to have resonance for Moscow's interest in Cuba in the twenty-first century with the advent of the "Putin doctrine." Additionally, defensive realism underlayed the Second World War alliance between Moscow and Washington with a bi-product being the creation of diplomatic relations in October 1942. Concerning Cuba, since 1959 defensive realism was key to relations with Moscow due to repeated U.S. attempts to crush the Cuban Revolution. Furthermore, revolutionary Cuba has displayed counter dependency in its relations with Moscow with this explaining why the Caribbean island has continued to attach importance to its relations with Russia even since the historic change in Cuban-U.S. relations since December 2014. It

is highly unlikely Havana would "turn its back" on an old friend and risk a degree of dependency appearing with the United States, as this would be completely contrary to the revolutionary elite's wish to avoid levels of dependency materializing.

Anti-Russian/Soviet U.S. policies have deepened the traditional Russian fear of insecurity, vital to Grigor Suny's assertion of the role of constructivism within the Kremlin's foreign policy. As detailed by Grigor Suny, constant factors in Russian history are central in forming predominant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite, and their subsequent perception of the international system. This provides a different understanding of why hostility existed between Moscow and Washington, because simply for long periods of time since November 1917 Moscow perceived the United States as unfriendly. However, in the early to mid-1990s, due a change in regnant elite ideas in Moscow (this included a belief in the universality of neoliberal economic thinking), the perception of the United States was of an ally in the Russian economic transition, thus Russian-U.S. relations improved. Notwithstanding this, in the mid-1990s, primary elite ideas in Moscow altered to a more nationalistic macro-level orientation with consequently the Russian assessment of the international system and the United States changing.

Furthermore, the revolutionary Cuban elite's constructed history of Havana-Washington relations is central to their principal ideas (passionately nationalistic, independent with a desire for increased social justice, no longer beholden to the United States but with a global viewpoint) and subsequently both their ensuing perception of the international system and desire to fundamentally change Cuban-U.S. relations. In turn, this points to Wendt's supposition of how Cuba perceives U.S. military power as a threat in comparison to Canada.[246] The upshot is that this allows constructivism to provide an explication of why animosity materialized between Havana and Washington but also why relations between Moscow and Havana were cordial. Simply, for the most part of the time period which is the focus of this book, both Moscow and Havana perceived Washington as a threat, but each other as friends. The perception of friendship between Moscow and Havana has been aided by at different times an alignment in the two countries' regnant elite ideas occurring. In the years from 1961 to 1991, this was with regards societies founded on economic equality and state ownership of property, and from the mid-1990s onwards in terms of nationalism and global viewpoints.

As noted, each era also had its own distinct elements with, in the post-1992 period, it becoming evident that a Soviet legacy affected bilateral Russian-Cuban relations. Furthermore, MINREX documents evidence MINREX personnel both wilfully cultivating this legacy in their interactions with their Russian counterparts and also lobbying people within the Russian political system who had sympathy for the country's Soviet past. This may have been

divergent from Moscow's desires for the relationship in the early to mid-1990s, but both the Soviet legacy and MINREX personnel lobbying Russian politicians in this manner would also be vital for bilateral economic links in the post-Soviet era. Bilateral economic ties in general will be the focus of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 13.
2. José Agustín Martínez to Vyacheslav Molotov, October 5, 1942, Ibid., 37.
3. "Cuban Government to Recognize Russia, Zaydin Announces," *Havana Post*, October 11, 1942, 1.
4. The first meeting between Litvinov and Concheso took place on October 14, 1942, with on October 26, 1942, Concheso sending a report of this meeting to the Cuban President Fulgencio Batista. Concheso reported that Litvinov had inquired about the Antifascist League in Cuba, and that Concheso had "thought it necessary to explain the political organization on the island," including the socio-democratic coalition and the role of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). Aurelio Concheso to Fulgencio Batista, October 26, 1942. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 37–39.
5. José Luis Martín, "El Embajador Litvinoff en la Habana," *Bohemia*, April 18, 1943, 46–48 and 50.
6. Aurelio Concheso to Emeterio Santovenia, Cuban foreign minister, Moscow, May 21, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 46.
7. Ibid., 46–47.
8. *Pravda*, May 29, 1943, 3.
9. Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RSA) 4558/111/349.
10. RSA 4558/111/349. Moreover, Concheso highlighted Stalin's interest in the Cuban economy, trading partners and the nature of its exports in the report which he sent to Santovenia on May 29, 1943. Concheso to Santovenia, Moscow, May 29, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 52–53.
11. Aurelio Concheso to Emeterio Santovenia, May 29, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 52–53.
12. Ibid.
13. RSA 558/11/350.
14. A. Sizonenko, "USSR-Latin America: Diplomatic-Technical Aspects of the War Years Relationship," *América Latina*, no. 5 (May 2010): 20.
15. *Havana Post*, December 18, 1943, 1.
16. "Visito Gromyko al Ministro de Estado," *El Mundo*, December 21, 1943, 2.
17. *Havana Post*, December 18, 1943, 1. A. Gromyko to V. Molotov, December 22, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 60.
18. "Visito Gromyko al Ministro de Estado." D. Zaikan to V. Molotov, Havana, November 8, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 57–58.
19. For example, Batista sent greetings to Kalinin on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution in 1942 and 1943. F. Batista to Kalinin, Havana, November 8,

1942, and November 7, 1943. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 40 and 57. On August 17, 1945, Cuban President Ramón Grau San Martín congratulated Kalinin on the Allies victory over Japan in the Second World War. R. Grau to Kalinin, August 17, 1945. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 63 and 66. In 1949, N.M. Shvernik, Chairman of Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, sent greetings to Prio on May 19, 1949, to mark Cuba's national holiday. This was reciprocated on November 7, 1949, when Prio sent a telegram to Shvernik on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Prio would repeat this in 1951. N.M. Shvernik to Prio, May 19, 1949. Prio to Shvernik, November 7, 1949, Prio to Shvernik, November 8, 1951. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 77, 83.

20. Raúl González to Vyacheslav Molotov, August 27, 1948, Ibid., 75. V. Molotov to Raúl Gonzalez, Moscow, October 4, 1948, Ibid., 76.

21. In April 1947, the Cuban Ministry of Communication forcibly took over the PSP's radio station *Mil Diez*. Thomas, *Cuba*, 752–54 and 757.

22. *Pravda*, June 15, 1949, 3.

23. RSA 82/2/1275.

24. D. Zaikan to KGB, November 8, 1945. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 67.

25. Daniela Spenser, *The Impossible Triangle. Mexico, Soviet Russia and the United States in the 1920s* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 187.

26. Ángel García and Piotr Mironchuk, *Raíces de las relaciones Cubano Soviéticas* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988), 131–32.

27. Telegram from Rafael González to Soviet embassy in Havana, March 27, 1947. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 69–70. William Keylor, *A World of Nations. The International Order since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 32–33.

28. Report of meeting between Yakov Malik and Alberto Espinosa. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 72–73.

29. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 84–85.

30. Yu. Yartsev, "A Soviet View of Cuba," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, April 8, 1952, 37.

31. The final edition of the journal was *Cuba y la URSS*, 76, February 1952. In this final edition an article entitled "Valiosa iniciativa: Llamamiento en favour de la amistad cubano-sovietica" was published which was signed by sixty-five different people including Dr. Antonio Núñez Jiménez, the future minister of agrarian reform in the Revolutionary Government, who at the time of publication of this article was the president of the Cuban Caving Society. This article stated, The grave international tension, which each day makes relations between the great powers more dangerous, could cause a new and terrible war, that will affect all men and women and annihilate peace and increases from day to day the chances of our the friendship between our peoples being severed. But we are convinced that far from being a threat to our country, the Soviet Union is a force for peace because its politics and actions illustrating the friendship with our people and our collective efforts can reduce the chance of war; because we are convinced that the advantages and possibilities for the Cuban people resulting from these exchanges will help our development, but the decision to cut these which begun approximately on February 15 will have consequences for

the Cuban people. This is not just propaganda, as many are against Soviet ideology. However, we know that without the selfless actions of the Soviet government that the situation regarding sciences, art and culture, but also changes in industry, has helped the lives of workers, farmers, students and professors; this is the basis of social security and the basis of Soviet foreign policy. (*Cuba y la URSS* 76 (February 1952): 35–36).

32. Thomas, *Cuba*, 779.

33. RSA 27/11/1952.

34. Ibid.

35. *Pravda*, May 8, 1960, 1.

36. *Izvestia*, July 10, 1960, 10.

37. G.J. Boughton, *Soviet-Cuban Relations 1956–1962* (Michigan State University, Ph.D. Thesis, 1972), 10. Thomas, *Cuba*, 1216–17.

38. This was highlighted in an interview given by Nina Khrushcheva, Khrushchev's daughter, in December 2000 which was sent to Pérez Roque from the Cuban embassy in Moscow. Interview Nina Khrushcheva, December 14, 2000, MINREX. Moreover, Edmé Domínguez has also written of the significance of Khrushchev personally for the bilateral relationship that developed between Moscow and Havana after the Cuban Revolution. Domínguez, "The Mystification of a Policy," 72.

39. Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 147.

40. Wayne Smith, *The Closest of Enemies. A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations since 1957* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1987), 144.

41. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 395.

42. Ibid., 396–97.

43. Cuba being excluded from these talks at the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis had connotations with their exclusion from the talks which took place at the end of the Spanish–American War that culminated in the Treaty of Paris in December 1898. Thomas, *Cuba*, 450–451. This only further insulted Cuban nationalism.

44. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991*, 48.

45. Document 1, "Cuban Record of Conversation, Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership."

46. Nikhita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), 461.

47. Blight and Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days*, 35–85.

48. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991*, 48. The 1964 agreement set both the amount of sugar and the price which Moscow would pay until 1970. These levels were 2.1 million tons in 1965, 3 million tons in 1966, 4 million tons in 1967, and 5 million tons in both 1968 and 1969. This price included the cost of delivery. *Pravda*, January 23, 1964, 1.

49. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991*, 45–60.

50. Blight and Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days*, 99–104. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 80–82.

51. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the island leading's economist and member of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) politburo would later comment, "There is not a single sector of our national economy which is to any degree important in which this cooperation (with the USSR) does not already exist or is not planned." Edward

González, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism* XXV (January–February 1976): 11. Moreover, in 1970 the *zafra* totalled over eight million tonnes of sugar, a record, but this still felt short of the desired 10 million ton target. *Granma*, August 10, 1970, 1–2.

52. *Cronología de la Relaciones Cuba-URSS 1959–1988*, 1989, MINREX, 30. *Pravda*, November 18, 1969, 5. *Pravda*, April 3, 1971, 6–7.

53. *Pravda*, June 28, 1972, 1–2.

54. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 35.

55. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s, Pragmatism and Institutionalization* (Albuquerque: University of New México Press, 1974), 16–17.

56. In 1970 the Soviet government had quickly backed down in the face of the U.S. pressure over the "mini-crisis" of Soviet nuclear submarines being moored at Cienfuegos. Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987*, 92. Raúl Castro has also reported that he had been told in the early 1980s by Brezhnev, "We cannot fight in Cuba because you are 11,000 kilometres away from us. Do you think we're going to go all that way to stick our necks out for you?" "Entrevista e Raúl al periódico El Sol de México (III)," *El Sol de México*, April 23, 1993, 6.

57. Carmelo Mesa-Lago has outlined five stages which the Cuban passed through in its first twenty years and for a more detailed information on the fifth stage please see Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s*, 2–4 and 9–10. Frank T. Fitzgerald, "A Critique of the 'Sovietization of Cuba,' Thesis," *Science & Society* 42, no. 1 (Spring 1978): 1–32.

58. *Pravda*, January 31, 1974, 5.

59. Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Cuba," 170. *Granma*, July 25, 1976, 1–4. Moreover, writing in *América Latina* the Soviet academic Vladimir Bondarchuk has written, "Understanding the great historical importance of the First Congress of the Party, the workers and all the Cuban people participate actively in the discussion of the draft constitution, the thesis of the main documents of the congress and the project of the first 5-year plan for the national economy. The country hosts the congress with new enthusiasm for the country's economic development." Vladimir Bondarchuk, "La económica Cubana en los días del 1 Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba," *América Latina*, no. 4 (1975): 26.

60. Edward González, "Institutionalization, Political Elites and Foreign Affairs," in *Cuba in the World*, eds. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Cole Blasier (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 6–7.

61. *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, 3.

62. Fidel Castro, "Discurso del comandante en jefe Fidel Castro en el acto de masas en la Plaza de la Revolución," January 29, 1974, *En estrecha y eterna amistad. Visita a Cuba del campanero Leonid I. Brezhnev, secretario general del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética. 28 de enero a 3 de febrero de 1974* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1974).

63. *Granma*, December 19, 1975, 2–7.

64. Lurdes Casal, "On Popular Power: The Organisation of the Cuban Sate during the period of Transition," *Latin American Perspectives* 2, no. 4 (1975): 79. Munck, *Revolutionary Trends in Latin America*, 53–57.

65. Domínguez, "The Political Impact on Cuba," 100. Other authors to make similar elucidations are Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Relations*, 96–97. Munck, *Revolutionary Trends in Latin America*, 53–57. Kapcia, "Raúl's Decade?" 7–21.

66. González, "Institutionalization, Political Elites and Foreign Affairs," 7.

67. Ibid.

68. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 43–47.

69. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 392. Gleijses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 47–48.

70. Gleijses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 3.

71. Further evidencing the Cuban engagement with Africa was that some 40,000 Africans studied in Cuba on fully funded Cuban government scholarships. Ibid., 3, 43. Isaac Saney, "Cuba and Africa: Recasting Old Relations in New but Familiar Ways," in *Cuban Foreign Policy. Transformation under Raúl Castro*, eds. H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 97.

72. For a more detailed account of Cuban military action in Africa please see Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*. Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" Saney, "Cuba and Africa," 95–100. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 33–56.

73. Quoted in Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 50.

74. Saney, "Cuba and Africa," 98.

75. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 34.

76. "Transcript of Meeting between US Secretary of state Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, México City, November 23, 1981."

77. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 392. Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 47–48. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 101–02. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 33, 37 and 40–41.

78. Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 49.

79. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 56.

80. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 376.

81. Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 46–47.

82. Ibid., 47.

83. Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Cuba," 172.

84. Saney, "Cuba and Africa," 98.

85. Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy?" 48–49.

86. Saney, "Cuba and Africa," 95.

87. Castro, "Angola."

88. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations*, 68–70. González, "Institutionalization, Political Elites and Foreign Affairs," 17 and 23. Jorge Domínguez, "To Make a World Safe for Revolution," 151.

89. Kirk, "Defying the Odds," 333.

90. Michael Kaufman, "Out of One Frying pan, Nonaligned Gather Anew," *New York Times*, February 8, 1982.

91. Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, 35.

92. Castro, "Entrevista e Raúl."

93. Leonov has also written of the subsequent increase in importance of civil defence units in Cuba for the island's security. Leonov, *Raúl Castro*, 201–03. Heraldo

Muñoz and Boris Yopo have written of the difficulty of the situation for Cuba in the 1980s due to the impact of Reagan's Presidency on relations with the other Latin American countries. Heraldo Muñoz and Boris Yopo, *Cuba y las Democracias Latinoamericanas en los Ochenta* (Santiago: PROSPEL, 1987), 26.

94. K.U. Chernenko, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), 424–28.

95. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 60–61. The increased shipments of Soviet military hardware (in 1981 and 1982 this was 66,000 and 69,000 tonnes, respectively, when compared to 30,000 tonnes per year from 1976 to 1980) included SAM-3 surface to air missiles, T-62 tanks, MIG-23 fighter planes and M1-24 helicopters. Boris Yopo, *La Unió n Sovié tica y la crisis centroamericana: La asistencia militar a Cuba y Nicaragua* (Santiago de Chile: Documento de trabajo PROSPEL; no. 6, 1986), 29–34.

96. Sergo Mikoyan, "Veinticinco años de firmeza y edificación," *América Latina*, no. 1 (1984): 5–7. Evidencing the high regard which Fidel Castro was held within the Soviet Union, the Soviet academic M. Lazarev wrote, "It is no exaggeration to say that, because of its significance, not only the Moncada attack, but also the self-defense of Fidel Castro, are factors for all of Latin America, since it contains a fundamental theses of a general nature." M. Lazarev, "La Historia me absolverá," *América Latina*, no. 10 (1984): 10.

97. *Pravda*, November 11, 1984, 1 and 4.

98. V. Lavrentyev, "USSR-Cuban Brotherhood and Cooperation" (FBIS LD182341, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0615 April 18, 1985).

99. "Proyecto de comunidad Soviético-Cubano para a la visita campanero Isidoro Malmierca a la URSS," May 1984, MINREX.

100. For the alteration in U.S. foreign policy and the importance of the Cuban American National Foundation lobbying in Washington please see Morris Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution. The United States and Cuba 1952–1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 366. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, *Unfinished Business. America and Cuba after the Cold War*, 1989–2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12–13. Moreover, concerning the increase in tension in the early 1980s in Cuban-U.S. relations and also the changes listed above in Soviet-Cuban relations regarding Soviet defence of the Cuban Revolution, Boris Yopo has written, "The Soviet response to the policy of confrontation implemented by the Reagan administration was a substantial increase in the transfer of military resources to Cuba, at the same time as the deployment of a series of symbolic solutions designed to prove the importance of the links between the USSR and the regime in Havana." Yopo, *La Unió n Sovié tica y la crisis centroamericana*, 26.

101. For examples please see Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 0244 GMT September 27, 1987 (FBIS-SOV October 6, 1987, 33, PA021650). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "La Oportunidad Que No Podernos Rehusar," *América Latina* 8 (1986): 4–8.

102. Gorbachev, *Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2*, 418–22. *Pravda*, February 27, 1986, 7. These "veiled" criticisms continued throughout the Soviet era as evidenced by the note that Castro sent to Gorbachev on the Soviet leader's sixtieth birthday on March 2, 1991. In the MINREX archive a draft of this note exists containing a paragraph that was not approved in the final version. This paragraph states, "On this date, we want to

highlight our recognition of the arduous effort you have personally made in the process of renovating your country, we take this opportunity to wish you every success in your outstanding management and are convinced that the great country of Lenin will continue to be the vanguard in the fight for peace and progress of all mankind, in this context the URSS continues to be an example in support and solidarity with the peoples struggling for their sovereignty and independence." Fidel Castro, "Telegram from Castro to Gorbachev," March 2, 1991, MINREX. This paragraph may not have been contained in the note that was sent, but is symbolic of these "veiled" criticisms, with a "reminder" of both Lenin and also the Soviet Union's continuing importance in global politics.

103. In his speech to this meeting Ryzhkov stated, "It is of paramount importance to make economic assistance significantly more effective and to improve the use that Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia make of their own resources, as well as of outside resources, to resolve key problems in these countries" social and economic development and ensue their participation in the international division of labour." *Pravda*, July 6, 1988, 4.

104. For this type of article see: *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, October 21, 1987, 14. P. Bogomolov, "Plans by the Ocean. Journalist Raises Problem," *Pravda*, June 1, 1987, 5.

105. Vladislav Chirkov, "An Uphill Task," *New Times* 33 (August 17, 1987): 16–17. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "A Difficult but Steady Ascent," *New Times* 41 (October 19, 1987): 16–21.

106. This article criticized the number of houses that the Castro brothers" owned and even questioned the number of children that each had fathered. *Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda*, August 28, 1990, 2 (FBIS-SOV September 4, 1990, 44–45, PM3108115990). For the Cuban response to this see José Ramón Balaguer, "Lies and Insults," *Pravda*, October 26, 1990, 5.

107. In his speech to this congress the economist, N.P. Shmelyev had challenged Moscow paying 400% of the world market price for Cuban sugar. *Izvestia*, June 9, 1989, 10.

108. José Ramón Balaguer, "Report to Isidoro Malmierca," February 14, 1991, 108/1590, MINREX, 13. Further evidence of Cuban unhappiness at Soviet media reporting on the island was evident on January 29, 1991, when Fraga sent a letter marked "secret" to Malmierca in which he described the meeting that had taken place the previous day with Nikolai Paltychev, president of the Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Education, Ianenko Petrovich, director of the Institute of Construction, and V. Grigorivich, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences of Education. In this meeting the Cuban participants raised the issue of "the hostile reporting on Cuba amongst various publications with the participants insisting that the position of the joint governments should be followed." Alfonso Fraga Pérez, Letter to Isidoro Malmierca, January 29, 1991, 1.3.14.754, MINREX. Moreover, in the aftermath of Gorbachev's decision to remove the final Soviet troops from Cuba MINREX conducted an analysis of not just Soviet media reporting on this announcement, but also of the world media. "Las declaraciones de Mijaíl Gorbachov respecto a Cuba repercusión de decisión Soviética," September 1991, MINREX.

109. In *My Life* Fidel Castro has stated, "There were good relations with Gorbachev, Raúl had known him for years; he'd met him during a trip to the Soviet Union, and he had very friendly relations with him." Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, *My Life* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 364. This insinuates that the Cuban leadership were not expecting any great change in the bilateral relationship resulting from Gorbachev becoming the General Secretary to the CPSU. Moreover, normal diplomatic protocol continued to be followed, evident in the letters sent to Fidel Castro from the Central Committee of the CPSU on May 7, 1985, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reestablishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, and Castro to Gorbachev on the occasion of the celebrations of the Russian Revolution in October 1986 with Castro praising the achievements of the Soviet people and the virtues of the bilateral relationship. Letter for Central Committee of the CPSU to Fidel Castro, May 7, 1985, MINREX. Letter from Fidel Castro to Mikhail Gorbachev, October 16, 1986, MINREX. Similar sentiments were also evident in the draft MINREX note sent to Vladimir Kiseliov of the Soviet embassy in Havana for the seventieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Interestingly this note also details the creation of bilateral diplomatic relations in October 1942, Zaikan being on the island in July 1943 and that Gromyko had been the Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba, but Litvinov is not mentioned. Memo to Vladimir Kiseliov, October 22, 1987, MINREX. Litvinov had later fallen out of favour with the Soviet leadership and had been "removed" from this history of Soviet-Cuban relations in a similar manner to pre-1959 bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution due to the PSP's involvement with the Batista government, which was detailed in chapter 2. For an account of the end of Litvinov's political career Hugh D. Phillips, *Between the Revolution and the West. A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 153–80.

110. For this type of statements see: *Granma*, February 25, 1988, 6, *Granma*, July 14, 1988, 5, *Granma*, July 19, 1988, 6 and *Granma*, November 25, 1988, 4.

111. *Granma*, April 5, 1989, 3. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 134. Sergo Mikoyan has written that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, as simply due to the level of work that had been expended on it prior to Gorbachev's visit and the functioning of Soviet bureaucracy it was not possible to prevent it being signed. This provided a different understanding of why it was signed. Sergo Mikoyan, "The Soviet Union and Latin America: The Political and Strategic Domain," in *The Soviet Union's Latin American Policy. A Retrospective Analysis*, 51, 70. *Granma*, April 5, 1989, 2.

112. *Granma*, July 28, 1989, 4. Cuban aversion to the Soviet reform processes was also apparent in the draft of topics for discussion for Gorbachev's proposed 1988 visit to Cuba. The first two topics were the importance of Marxist–Leninism in the Soviet foreign policy plans iterated at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and the impact of *perestroika* on the party. "Problemas actuales del desarrollo socio-económico URSS, cuestiones de la colaboración de los países de la comunidad socialista," February 17, 1987, MINREX.

113. Kapcia, *The Cuban Revolution in Crisis*, Kapcia, *Political Change in Cuba*. Andreas Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 91. Please also see Leonov, *Raúl Castro*, 222–29.

114. *Granma*, December 8, 1989, 4. Castro announced the "special period in peacetime" on March 10, 1990, at the Cuban Federation of Women (FMC) 5th Congress. Supplement to *Granma*, March 10, 1990, IV.

115. Gorbachev has detailed Bush's attempts to influence Soviet–Cuban relations. Gorbachev, *Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2*, 425–29. While in Moscow Mas Canosa met both Boris Yeltsin and Boris Pankin. Moscow Central Television First Programme Network 2055 GMT September 6, 1991 (FBIS-SOV September 10, 1991, 13, LD0609223691).

116. Balaguer, "Report to Isidoro Malmierca."

117. Gorbachev, *Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2*, 417–29. *Granma*, December 31, 1990, 1. Katushev's close ties to the Cuban leadership were evidenced by Castro awarding him the Cuban Order of Solidarity on leaving his post as Soviet ambassador to Cuba. *Granma*, November 23, 1985, 1.

118. For examples please see K. Khachaturov, "Latin America and Us," *International Affairs* (10) (1992): 32–39. M.A. Belya, "Cuba: How Distant?" *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 9 (1991): 9. P. Bogomolov, "Switching Spigots," *Pravda*, October 24, 1991, 4.

119. Note from Linares to Armando Hart, October 24, 1990, MINREX. Note from Isidoro Malmierca to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, July 5, 1991, MINREX.

120. Instructions to Cuban Ambassador to Soviet Union, July 10, 1991, MINREX. "Plan de Colaboración en las esferas la Cultura la Educación y la Ciencia entre las Gobierno de la Republica Cuba y el Gobierno de La Unión de Republicas Socialista s Soviéticos Para 1991 to 1993," September 4, 1991, MINREX.

121. "Sobre La Continuidad de la Colaboración en Algunos Objetivas," September 12, 1991, 125/989, MINREX.

122. Telegram from Eduard Shevardnadze to Isidoro Malmierca, November 30, 1991, MINREX.

123. Alfonso Fraga, "Acerca del Referéndum Nacional en la URSS," March 12, 1991, 1.2.38, 1889, MINREX.

124. Alfonso Fraga, Director of the Europe Del Este, to Alcibíades Hidalgo, "En Relación con el Referéndum en la URSS. Parte No. 4," 1.2.51, 2119, MINREX, 1.

125. These reports do not list their respective authors, and consequently it must be assumed that they were authored by personnel in the Cuban embassy in Moscow.

126. "Parte No. 1 Sobre la Situación en la Unión Soviética" (semana del 10 al 17 Abril) 1.1.090, 3077, MINREX, 1–3.

127. "Parte No. 1 Sobre la Situación en la Unión Soviética," August 19, 1991, RDI 1.1.242, 7526, MINREX, 2–3.

128. Ibid., 4.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., 2.

131. Other members of the coup with close links to Cuba included, Vladimir Kryuchkov (Chairman of the KGB had made an unofficial visit in 1991), Konstantin Katushev (a former Soviet ambassador to Cuba and in 1991 Head of Foreign Economic Relations in Moscow), General Mikhail Moiseyev (first deputy defence minister of the USSR) and Marshal Dmitrii Yazov (Defence Minister of the USSR), both of whom had links with Cuba originating from the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

132. "Parte No. 1 Sobre la Situación en la Unión Soviética," August 19, 1991, 1.1.24, RS7528, MINREX, 2.

133. "Parte No. 9 Sobre la Situación en la Unión Soviética. Sesión extraordinaria del Soviet Supéreme de la URSS. Breve Resume," August 26, 1991, 1.1.251, 7701, MINREX. For more analysis on this meeting please see White, *Russia's New Politics*, 28–33. Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 208–10. Galeotti, *Gorbachev and His Revolution*, 115–19.

134. "Parte No. 10 Sobre la Situación en la Unión Soviética. Sesión extraordinaria del Soviet Supéreme de la URSS. Breve Resume," August 27, 1991, 1.1.254, 7804, MINREX, 10.

135. Ibid., 2.

136. Ibid., 1.

137. Ibid., 2–3.

138. "Parte No. 11 Sobre la Situación el la Unión Socialista," August 27, 1991, 1.1.256, 7806, MINREX, 2.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid., 3.

142. Ibid., 3–4.

143. Ibid., 4.

144. *Granma*, August 19, 1991, 1.

145. This Cuban government statement was very similar in content to Castro's speech on July 26, 1989, as it blamed the problems facing the Soviet Union on the policies implemented at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986. *Granma*, August 29, 1991, 1.

146. Boris Pankin, *The Last One Hundred Days of the Soviet Union* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), 71.

147. "Declaración del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores," September 11, 1991, MINREX, 1. Cuban acrimony at this decision was further evident in Parte No. 17 "Sobre la Situación el la Unión Socialista," that was both critical of Gorbachev's decision and also the Soviet media reporting of the Cuban reaction to this announcement. Parte No. 17 Sobre la Situación el la Unión Socialista," September 16, 1991, 1.1.287, 8221, MINREX, 1.

148. Parte No. 17 Sobre la Situación el la Unión Socialista," 1.

149. José Ramón Balaguer, "Los Consideraciones sobre La Evolucion de los Acontecimientos en la URSS partir de los sucesos del 19 Agosto de 1991," RS/8711. RDI.344, MINREX, 1.

150. Ibid. Similar sentiments to Balaguer's report were evident in a memo sent to Aldana on August 29, 1991, authored by Bárbara Sarabia Martínez and Sofia Hernández Marmo, researchers at the Centro de Estudios Europeos in Havana. The report was entitled "La URSS entre Dos Golpes: Trágica Realidad y Futuro Incierto" and focuses on the origin of the events in Moscow in August 1991 being the reforms implemented in the mid-1980s which subsequently ignited nationalism within the Soviet Union. It then concentrates on Yeltsin's actions and states "Yeltsin used the situation to emit truly anti-constitutional directives which exceeded the Republics (Russian Federation) remit to arrogate federal powers which usurped Gorbachev's

power, who as the solitary person on the committee had no option but to secede power to Yeltsin. We are therefore in the presence of another coup against the state, but one which did not require the use of force." Bárbara Sarabia Martínez and Sofia Hernández Marmo, "La URSS entre Dos Golpes: Trágica Realidad y Futuro Incierto," August 29, 1991, 7987/378, MINREX, 2–4.

151. Ibid., 10.

152. Ibid., 12.

153. Letter from Alcibíades Hidalgo to Raúl Castro, October 7, 1991, MINREX, 1.

154. Report from Carlos Trejo Sosa to Alcibíades Hidalgo, November 14, 1991, MINREX, 1.

155. Ibid.

156. Letter from Alcibíades Hidalgo to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, December 23, 1991, MINREX, 1–2.

157. William M. LeoGrande, "The United States and Cuba. Strained Engagement," in *Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World*, 13.

158. Ibid. Philip Brenner, "Overcoming Asymmetry: Is a Normal U.S.-Cuban Relationship Possible?" in *Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy*, 280–304.

159. Kirk, "Defying the Odds," 336.

160. A. Tsipko, "Extract from Speech at International Conference. Russia-Cuba: From Totalitarianism to Democracy," *Latinskaia Amerika* 10–11 (1992): 32. Castro's phrase "Socialism or Death," was both an adaption of José Marti's "Fatherland or Death," and also evidenced his determination not to alter Cuba's political model.

161. V.A. Borodaev, "Russia-Cuba: Prospective Relations in a New Era," *Latinskaia Amerika*, 10–11 (1992): 48.

162. Richard A. Dello, "The Hostile Tides of Cuban-U.S. Relations," in *Cuba in the Twenty-First Century: Realities and Perspectives*, eds. José Bell Lara and Richard A. Dello (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 2005), 235–36.

163. *Izvestia*, November 30, 1993, 3. Leonov, *Raúl Castro*, 285–88.

164. US: Cuban Liberty and Democratic (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act).

165. "Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act," March 2000. Morely and McGillon, *Unfinished Business*, 190–93.

166. Castro Gives 5th FEU Congress Address (Havana Tele Rebelde in Spa 2200 GMT March 26, 1995, FBIS-LAT-95-061, FL3003014895).

167. Dmitry Kozyrev to Ricardo Alarcón, January 6, 1993, MINREX.

168. Isidoro Malmierca to Dmitry Kozirev, January 20, 1992, MINREX, 1.

169. "Análisis proyecto Ruso declaración sobre los principios de la Relaciones entre la Federación de Rusia y la Republica de Cuba," April 11, 1994, MINREX, 1.

170. "Informe Sobre Reunión de Homólogos Efectuada el 10-7-97 en el Minvec en Relación con el Proyecto de Convenio Intergubernamental tal con Rusia Para Terminación y Puesta en exploración CEN "Jaragua,'" July 11, 1997, MINREX.

171. "Comunicado en la conferencia de prensa de MINREX de Rusia acerca del levatiemento del embargo contra Cuba," October 18, 1994, MINREX.

172. Vladimir Borodaev, "Perspectives for the Development of International Ties with Cuba," *Latinskaia Amerika* 1 (2001): 25. A. Sosnovsky, "On the Benefit of Routine Professionalism," *Moskovskiye novosti*, no. 21 (May 26–June 2, 1996): 5.

173. "Ordena Eltsin intensificar relaciones de Cuba," March 30, 1995, MINREX.

174. Carlos Palmarola to Rosa Elena Simeón, April 10, 1996, MINREX.

175. Luis García to Isable Allende, November 27, 1998, MINREX.

176. Marcelino Medina to Isabel Allende, February 4, 1999, MINREX. In June 2018 Mijail Kaminin was presented with the Cuban Medal of Friendship by Bruno Rodríguez, Cuban Foreign Minister, for his work in Russian-Cuban relations. "Confiere Cuba Medalla de la Amistad a Embajador de Rusia," June 28, 2018, http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/node/44427.

177. Roberto Robaina, "Sobre la renuncia del canciller Kozirev," January 6, 1996, MINREX. This document also detailed that since October 1995 Kozirev had come under mounting pressure from a resurgent nationalistic Duma.

178. Yevgeny M. Primakov, *Minnoe pole politiki* (Moscow: Molodai gvardii, 2006), 149–52.

179. Carlos Fernández de Cossio to Roberto Robaina, February 12, 1996, MINREX.

180. Primakov, *Minnoe pole politiki*, 152.

181. Fidel Castro to Evgeny Primakov, September 14, 1998, MINREX.

182. ""Tienen conversaciones oficiales Robaina y Kozyrev," May 23, 1995, Prensa Latina, MINREX. *Granma International*, June 5, 1996, 3.

183. *Granma International*, June 5, 1996, 3.

184. Yevgeny Primakov to Felipe Pérez Roque, June 3, 1996, MINREX.

185. Roberto Robaina to Carlos Lage, March 27, 1996, MINREX.

186. United Nations, 3683ed Meeting of United Nations Security Council, July 26, 1996, http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_3683 (accessed July 15, 2011).

187. *Granma International*, April 17, 1996, 13, http://www.ddcuba.com/cuba/3293-canciller-cubano-dice-la-UE-que-elimine-la-posicion-comun-para-normalizar-relaciones.

188. Carlos Fernández de Cossio to Roberto Robaina, February 12, 1996, MINREX.

189. Felipe Pérez Roque to Evegeny Primalov, March 8, 1996, MINREX.

190. Isabel Allende, "La conformación de la nueva duma y la estrategia Eltsin," January 25, 1996, MINREX.

191. "Relaciones bilaterales," May 1996, MINREX.

192. Roberto Robaina to Ricardo Alarcón, February 21, 1997, MINREX. The strategic alterations in Russian foreign policy were also noted in a MINREX briefing document for Putin's December 2000 visit to Cuba. MINREX Breifing Document, November 2000, MINREX.

193. Luis García to Isabel Allende, November 4, 1997, MINREX.

194. Roberto Robaina to Felipe Pérez Roque, Carlos Lage and José Ramón Balaguer, June 23, 1998, MINREX.

195. Roberto Robaina to Antonio Concepción, November 18, 1998, MINREX.

196. "Vista del Canciller Ruso Evgueni Primakov," Parte No. 4, May 22, 1996, MINREX.

197. *Pravda*, October 29, 2001, 3.

198. *Vremya novostei*, October 19, 2001, 3.

199. Fydor Lukyanov and Aeksei Slobodin, "Sharp Turn," *Vremya novostei* (October 19, 2001): 3.

200. *Vremya*, October 24, 2001, 5.

201. Shaun Walker, "A New Phase in the Arms Race is Unfolding," *The Independent*, February 9, 2008, 2.

202. *Granma*, October 18, 2001, 1.

203. Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 287.

204. "Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Fact Sheet," July 30, 2003, www.state.gov. J. Miller, "Washington Accuses Cuba of Germ-Warfare Research," *New York Times*, May 7, 2002, 6. Further increasing the significance of the exile community was that Bush had had very close ties to the exile community through his brother, Jeb, former State Governor of Florida.

205. "Fact Sheet: Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba," December 8, 2003, http://www.whithouse.gov/news/releases (accessed August 18, 2005). Jorge Domínguez, "U.S.–Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 58. Morely and McGillon, *Unfinished Business*, 59–60.

206. "Remarks by the President on Cuba Policy," October 24, 2007, http://www.whithouse.gov/news/releases (accessed October 26, 2007).

207. Ibid.

208. www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2005. April 17, 2006.

209. Ibid. Concerning the involvement of the U.S. Interests Section Castro has stated, "All the leaders and all the ringleaders of all the counter-revolutionary groups, groups against the Revolution, are organised by the American Interests Section." Castro and Ramonet, *My Life*, 426.

210. *Granma*, December 13, 2000, 1.

211. Gregory Bovt, "Visit to a "Lennonist"—Vladimir Putin Visits Fidel Castro," *Izvestia*, December 15, 2000, 3.

212. Larin, *Politicheskaia istorii Kuba*, 164. Interestingly when in Cuba Putin spoke of his memories of the victory of the Cuban Revolution while he was at school. Interview with Putin, December 2000, MINREX, 4.

213. Dmitry Gornostayev, "Putin and Castro Jointly Criticise the United States," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 16, 2000, 1.

214. Ibid.

215. *Granma*, January 31, 2009, 1.

216. *Granma*, July 12, 2014, 5.

217. Elson Concepción Pérez, "Califica Raúl de excelente la visita del Presidente de Rusia," *Granma International*, Novermber 28, 2008, http://www.granma.cu/espanol/2008/noviembre/vier28/vista-e.html.

218. Andrei Zlobin, "'Security.'" A Threat from Cuba is Science Fiction," *Vremya novostei*, May 15, 2003, 5.

219. "Cuba 9 USA 0," *Pravda*, March 24, 2005, http://pravda.ru/printed.html (July 4, 2007). W. Hoge, "New U.N. Rights Group Includes Six Nations with Poor Records," *New York Times*, May 10, 2006.

220. Zlobin, "Security," 5.

221. Interfax, Russia, September 29, 2004.

222. Itar-Tass Weekly News, November 4, 2003.

223. Sergey Lavrov, "Statement by H.E. Mr Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda," September 2015, http://www.rexfeatures.com/livefeed/2015/09/28/united_nations_sustainable_development_summit,_new_york?celeb=Sergey%20Lavrov.

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225. *Granma*, September 2, 2013.

226. "Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid," March 27, 2014, http://www.un.org.

227. Raúl Castro, "The Development of the National Economy, along with the Struggle for Peace, and Our Ideological Resolve, Constitute the Party's Principal Missions. 7th PCC Congress Central Report, presented by First Secretary Raúl Castro Ruz," *Granma*, April 18, 2016, http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-struggle-for-peace-and-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-partys-principal-missions.

228. Sergei Lavrov, *Latinskaia Amerika* 1 (January 2006): 2.

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242. Jorge Domínguez, "Reshaping the Relations between the United States and Cuba," in *Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations. Shall We Play Ball?* eds. Jorge Domínguez, Rafael Hernández and Lorena G. Barberia (New York: Routledge, 2012), 33–51.

243. White House, December 17, 2014.

244. White House, March 21, 2016.

245. LeoGrande, "Cuba Reaches Out to Partners," 2. Moreover, Woody has even reported that Ben Rhodes, White House Deputy National Security Adviser, has written that Russia covertly tried to indicate to Washington that it was aware of Cuban–U.S. talks that would eventually culminate in the announcements of December 14, 2014. Woody, "Russian Sent Obama a Blunt Message about Cuba."

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Chapter 4

The Economic Factor and "Soft Power"

As detailed, the central argument of this book is that Moscow and Havana have had rationale to engage with one another consistently since November 1917 and in each of the three disparate eras of the relationship that have existed since the Russian Revolution. Factors that have consistently affected the relationship have been fundamental to this argument. The previous chapter has theorized that this was the case regarding bilateral Moscow-Havana diplomatic relations with the impact of the United States being key. Consequently, it was argued in both chapters 2 and 3 that Moscow did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" prior to the Cuban Revolution. Similar arguments will be made in this chapter concerning both cultural links, and also firstly bilateral trade between the two countries in all three periods of the relationship. Moreover, in 1996, the Russian Federation was Cuba's largest trading partner, something which experts had not expected or predicted in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations in December 1991.[1] This chapter will commence with an examination of bilateral trade in each of the three distinctive periods before investigating cultural links between the two countries since November 1917.

Bolshevik commercial interest in Cuba commenced from soon after the Russian Revolution, but effects of the Second World War intensified this attention, not least the creation of bilateral diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana in October 1942. Furthermore, reports of food packages being sent from Cuba to the Soviet Union during the Second World War also exist, with Hugh Thomas having written that in 1941, "Russia by this time also required Cuban sugar, since the Ukrainian beet fields had fallen to Germany: 70,000 tons a month were sent via the Allies."[2]

The Second World War was highly significant for both Soviet-Cuban relations in general and also for bilateral trade specifically, but Soviet commercial

interest in Cuba, and Latin America as a whole, had begun before the onset of hostilities in Europe. Moreover, as previously noted, the Soviet trading company Yuzantong had been created in Montevideo in the late 1920s, and although the accusation exists that this company engaged in more clandestine activities than commerce, it does demonstrate Soviet interest in trade with Latin America. Moreover, in 1929 and 1930, 25.2 million roubles and 16.5 million roubles of trade took place between the Soviet Union and Argentina, respectively; this marked the highpoint in trade between Moscow and the region prior to the Second World War.[3] Additionally, the earlier-cited quote by Thomas also explains both why Maxim Litvinov, Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba, had spoken about increasing bilateral trade while he was in Cuba in April 1943, and also as detailed in the chapter 3, Joseph Stalin's final two questions to Aurelio Concheso, Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, in May 1943 about what Moscow could "acquire" from Cuba. Simply, Cuban agricultural produce had been shipped to the Soviet Union prior to both of these two meetings. Furthermore, it was not only Soviet security in general that had been challenged by Nazi Germany but also its food security, as noted in Thomas' quote earlier. Moscow had to act to safeguard its universal security and also find alternative sources of important food commodities, with Cuban sugar being able to replace the sugar that had been produced in the Ukraine.

The Second World War and its subsequent implications were key for Soviet-Cuban relations because this necessitated the creation of the alliance between Moscow and Washington, which, as noted previously, was underscored by the principles of defensive realism as it endeavored to countervail, or offset, Nazi aggression. Bi-products of this alliance had been the establishment of both diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, and also bilateral trade links between Moscow and Havana.

However, the geopolitical situation was very different in 1955, when the Soviet Union bought 32.2 million roubles of sugar from Cuba.[4] Not only had the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba been consigned to history but the Cold War was at its height. Furthermore, bilateral Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations also no longer existed. Notwithstanding this, Angel Garcia and Piotr Mironchuk have written that the nature of Havana-Washington relations remained pivotal to Cuban sugar being sold to the Soviet Union. An issue of overproduction in Cuban sugar appeared in the early 1950s with the United States believing that this could be resolved by selling Cuban sugar to third-party countries, which despite superpower tension included the Soviet Union.[5]

The Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar also aligns with reports in the Soviet press that Moscow had begun to pay increasing attention to trade with Latin

America in general in the early 1950s.[6] On February 22, 1953, *Pravda* printed a letter from Cuba written by Rojelio del Campo which stated,

> The groundlessness of the assertion that there are no markets for our basic food product besides the United States of America and its satellites became completely evident after a report was widely disseminated in the country about the readiness of the Chinese People's Republic and the European people's democracies to buy a large quantity of sugar from us.[7]

Furthermore, on January 22, 1956, *Pravda* printed the article "For Expansion of Cooperation between USSR and Latin American Countries," which was the publication of the transcript of Nikolai Bulganin's, Soviet prime minister, interview with U.S. magazine *Vision*. In this, Bulganin said,

> American monopolies are opposing the attempts of Latin American countries to expand their trade relations, particularly with the countries of the socialist camp. As a result, a vast amount of coffee has accumulated in Brazil, sugar in Cuba, lead and zinc in Mexico and tin in Bolivia. By the end of 1955 there were about 200,000 tons of unsold saltpetre in Chile.[8]

Bulganin's criticism of Washington's Latin American economic policy may have been ideologically based, but his comments also demonstrate Moscow's apparent interest in the region's raw materials. This would challenge the idea of the Kremlin suffering from "geographical fatalism" prior to the Cuban Revolution.

In the 1950s, in a similar manner to the Second World War, Soviet food security was once again being questioned, requiring the Kremlin to find alternative sources for important foodstuffs, including sugar. At the time of Bulganin's interview with *Vision* this did not result from military invasion, but rather poor Soviet agricultural production that would eventually herald the Virgin Lands Campaign. At this time Cuba was one of the largest producers of sugar in the world, and when this is combined with the issue of overproduction in the island's sugar harvest in the early 1950s, Soviet interest in trade with Cuba was well grounded.

However, this situation did not persist with the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar in 1955 appearing to be an exception with trade soon returning to previous low levels. Again, the nature of Cuba's relationship with the United States was central, because not only had Washington "authorised" the 1955 sale of Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union but the international reaction to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Hungary in October 1956 was also significant. More specifically Washington was greatly troubled by this action and, in November 1956, Cuba proposed a draft resolution at the UN which focused on this invasion. It appeared that Cuba had aligned itself with Washington over events

in Hungary, demonstrating the close character of Cuban-U.S. relations. Concerning this draft resolution, D. T. Shepikov, the Soviet representative at the 11th Session of the UN General Assembly, stated in a speech on November 19, 1956, to a plenary session of the General Assembly,

> In attempting to give some credibility to their slanderous allegations, the authors of the Cuban draft resolution glibly refer to mythical "information of official Radio Budapest." However, verification of this charge has shown that Radio Budapest has not broadcast any such information. For this reason the Cuban representative no longer refers to this source today. On what, then, are the provocative fabrications of the Cuban delegate based? On nothing.[9]

In such a heightened political situation the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar would have been astonishing. Again, Cuba's relationship with the United States and global events in general had impacted Moscow-Havana relations. Notwithstanding this, Jorge Garcia and Antonio Alonso have reported a meeting in late 1957 in Mexico City between the Soviet and Cuban ambassadors to Mexico at which the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar was discussed.[10] No purchase materialized, but this further evidences Soviet interest in Cuban sugar.

Further sporadic Soviet interest in Cuban sugar had occurred prior to the Cuban Revolution. In the archive of the commissar for foreign affairs in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History there is a document entitled "What opinion of the Cuban Government," dated August 1939, written by Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet commissar of foreign affairs. Importantly, this report was written before either the Soviet Union or United States had entered the Second World War, and the subsequent appearance of both the wartime alliance between Moscow and Washington and also bilateral Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations. In this document Molotov analyzes the impact of the Second World War on global trade in general, and he believes that consequently Cuba will become a more important source of sugar. The Caribbean island being one of the world's largest producers of sugar is the key for this observation, but it does demonstrate Soviet attention in Cuban sugar prior to January 1959.[11] Moreover, in July 1949, the Soviet periodical *New Times* printed the article "In Cuba" by the journalist G. Rubtsov in which he examined Cuba's internal situation. The article began by focusing on the significance of sugar for the island, specifies the level of the Cuban sugar harvest and continues,

> The virtues of Cuban sugar are extolled at every step by huge electric signs and streamers on the streets of the capital. In the cinema, the latest Hollywood hit is preceded by impassioned appeals from sugar and tobacco firms to buy sugar and smoke cigars.[12]

Much of the rest of the article was an uncompromising critique of the U.S. role in Cuba, but this does not diminish the importance of this article's focus on Cuban society or the role of sugar within it.

Both Cuba's position as one of the world's largest sugar producers and also the existence of bilateral Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations at the time of Rubtsov's article are also significant for its publication, but Bolshevik interest in Cuban sugar existed from as early as December 1921. In this month the Council of Labour and Defence discussed both purchasing Cuban sugar and also the price to be paid.[13] A purchase did not actually materialize, but the impact of the Russian Civil War underpinned this interest.

In 1921, the Russian Civil War had devastated agricultural production to such a level that this would not only eventually lead to the implementation of the New Economic Policy, but even questioned the survival of the Revolution. In sum, the Bolshevik government urgently required agricultural products and as Cuba was one of the world's largest sugar producers it would be cogent that discussions would take place concerning the purchase of this important commodity from Cuba. Subsequently, similarities exist between this Bolshevik interest and the 1955 Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar detailed earlier due to poor agricultural production.

In the era from the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution, Moscow showed sporadic commercial interest in Cuba, especially the purchase of sugar, but on each occasion this attention was stimulated by poor Soviet agricultural production. Poor production, particularly in the early 1920s, during the Second World War and the early 1950s had necessitated Moscow acquire important agricultural products including sugar from alternative sources, and it was logical that this would include Cuba as one of the world's largest sugar producers. An internal issue had underscored Moscow's international interactions, further highlighting the impact of domestic policies on foreign policy. On each of these occasions Soviet food security had been challenged resulting in this Soviet attention being underpinned by the ideas of defensive realism, because Moscow had acted to safeguard the Soviet Union rather than try to increase its power and influence to the detriment of another actor in the international system. The nature of Cuban-U.S. relations was also important, specifically during the Second World War, but also in 1955 when Washington had "approved" the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar. However, this does not diminish the importance of the Soviet interest, and purchase, of Cuban sugar prior to the Cuban Revolution.

SOCIALIST BILATERAL TRADE

As detailed throughout this book, despite an initial hesitant start, Soviet-Cuban relations would flourish after the Cuban Revolution in January 1959

with a variety of reasons for this being posited, but chief was the Cold War setting of the time. Moreover, an economic aspect to the bilateral relationship also quickly materialized. This was evidenced in February 1960 when Anastas Mikoyan, vice prime minister of the Soviet Union, and Fidel Castro signed an agreement for the sale of Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union. Additionally, Cuba also received credits for the purchase of Soviet goods.[14] This increase in bilateral commercial links would appear to be in accordance with Moscow's general developing world policy of providing aid and assistance to newly independent countries in the hope that these countries would side with the Soviet Union, important due to the bipolarity of the international setting of the Cold War. This was still applicable to the new government in Havana due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations of the early twentieth century, with Cuba's geostrategic significance in the Cold War further intensifying the importance of the island for the Kremlin.

Bilateral Soviet-Cuban trade rapidly increased, evidenced in January 1964, with the signing of the first five-year economic plan.[15] Subsequently, Havana imported over fifty different goods, which included goods as diverse as oil, bulldozers, and condensed milk, and affected all parts of Cuban society, evidencing the significance of trade with the Soviet Union to Havana. As argued in previous chapters, the Kremlin may have hoped that the signing of this five-year agreement would help mitigate the adverse impact on Soviet-Cuban relations of the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the bilateral relationship providing a degree of economic security for the Cuban Revolution which was vital due to the implementation of the U.S. embargo in the early 1960s. Consequently, Cuban motivations for signing this agreement return to realist pragmatism and defensive realism, with Havana attempting to offset, or counterbalance, this U.S. economic hostility against the island.

For Moscow, it was not just Cold War geopolitics that underpinned Soviet economic interest in Cuba, but the island was also a source of primary products, including nickel, citrus fruit, tobacco, and sugar. As detailed in the previous section, sugar had been important for Bolshevik and subsequent Soviet interest in Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution. Moreover, after December 1961, ideology, or more specifically Marxist-Leninism, also underpinned bilateral trade as trade was now conducted between two socialist states.

The sharp upward trajectory of Figure 4.1 demonstrates the exponential rise in bilateral trade. Moreover, if 1965, the first year of the original five-year plan, is used as a base year, it allows all five-year plans to be compared to the original one, further evidencing the increasing levels of trade.

As Table 4.1 demonstrates, Soviet-Cuban trade had continued to expand throughout this period but accelerated in the 1980s. By 1985, bilateral trade had increased thirteen-fold when compared to the first five-year plan, or more than doubled over the previous five years. Consequently, the percentage of



Figure 4.1 Soviet-Cuban Trade 1965–1991 (trade in millions of pesos). Data analyzed from Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1965, 1975, 1985 and Vneshiaia Torgovliia v 1989–1990, 5. *Source*: Graph created by Mervyn J. Bain.

Cuba's global turnover composed of trade with the Soviet Union increased over the same time period. In 1965, Soviet-Cuban trade represented 48.2 percent of Cuba's global turnover with the figure for 1970 being 51.7 percent, 48 percent in 1975, 59 percent in 1980, and 70.5 percent in 1985. Additionally, in 1988 Soviet-Cuban trade represented 7 percent of Soviet global trade, making Cuba the Soviet Union's sixth largest trading partner.[16] Considering the geographical size of Cuba, this was remarkable.

Furthermore, the level of Soviet-Cuban trade in this period dwarfed Moscow's trade with other Latin American countries. In 1980, Soviet-Argentinean trade exceeded one billion U.S. dollars, the first time that Moscow had conducted trade in excess of one U.S. billion dollars with a Latin American country with the exception of Cuba, and more than double that conducted with any other Latin American country. However, Soviet-Cuban trade by 1980 exceeded Soviet-Argentinean trade by 600 percent.[17]

The significance of bilateral trade with Moscow for Havana is further demonstrated by the composition of trade that was conducted as it was dominated by Soviet exports to Cuba. Soviet exports included not only important foodstuffs such as fish, maize, barley, rice, peas, and condensed milk but also much of the island's machinery and, highly significantly, a large percentage of its oil and oil related products. Concerning economic links with Moscow, in the 1970s Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, a member of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the island's leading economist, commented, "There is not a single sector of our national economy which is to any degree important

Table 4.1 Comparisons of Five-Year Plans

1965	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*	*1990*
100	387.7	674.4	1312	1125

in which this cooperation (with the USSR) does not already exist or is not planned."[18] As noted previously, Max Azicri has described Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union as "the lifeline of the economy."[19] The level and nature of bilateral trade has led some to believe that a degree of Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union materialized with Brian Pollitt having written, "An economy that might once have been regarded as a 'dependent appendage' of that of the United States broke the relationship, only to enter a new condition of 'dependency' vis-à-vis the Soviet Union."[20] The idea of a Cuban level of economic reliance on the Soviet Union was increased due the island selling most of its sugar crop to Moscow. In 1980, Cuba sold 61.8 percent of its sugar exports to the Soviet Union, with this figure rising to 82.9 percent in 1986 before falling to 76.8 percent in 1988.[21]

Bilateral trade was undoubtedly significant for both countries, and it also helped Havana mitigate elements of the U.S. economic embargo, thus providing a degree of economic security, but bilateral trade also integrated the Cuban economy into the socialist trading system. Cuba's integration was further increased after the summer of 1972 with, as previously noted, the island gaining membership to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[22]

A consequence of this Cuba integration into the CMEA and bilateral trade with Moscow was, as detailed in the previous chapters, the Soviet reforms of the mid- to late 1980s negatively impacting the Soviet Union's economic links with Cuba. The result of *glasnost* was that bilateral trade became an ever more contentious issue within Soviet society. Many Soviet citizens could not understand why Moscow continued to pay above the world market price for Cuban goods with, as detailed, it also appearing incongruous if the Kremlin persisted in supporting the Cuban economy as *perestroika* struggled to reform the Soviet economy.

Moreover, in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive a letter from Luis Felipe Vásquez, MINREX official, to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, dated October 19, 1987, details a meeting which MINREX officials had had with Alexandr Kapto, Soviet ambassador to Cuba. In this letter Vásquez wrote, "The Soviet ambassador to Cuba instructed Castro's Foreign Affairs Officials in Havana, regarding Gorbachev's so-called *perestroika* and said that the era of order and command of socialism in the economy had finished."[23] This letter not only demonstrates that the changes to the Soviet economy had been made very clear to the Cuban government but also insinuates Havana's displeasure at the Soviet reforms due to the manner in which *perestroika* is detailed.

Notwithstanding this, bilateral trade in the 1980s was further complicated due to the differential that materialized between the price Moscow paid for sugar, as noted this was Cuba's primary export to the Soviet Union, and the

world market price for sugar. In 1985, Moscow bought 61 percent of the Cuban sugar harvest at 45.00 U.S. cents per pound when the world market price was 4.05 U.S. cents per pound. In comparison the Soviet Union historically "only" paid 1.5 to 2 times the world price.[24] In the late 1980s the difference between the price Moscow paid and the world market price began to fall. Simply, the terms of trade concerning the sale of sugar to the Soviet Union began to turn against Cuba, partially explaining the fall in the level of trade in the late 1980s when compared to the early to mid-1980s.

However, a number of authors have argued that a more nuanced comparison of Soviet-Cuban trade and the world price (i.e., comparing preferential rates to non-preferential rates) is required. Subsequently, bilateral Moscow-Havana trade has been compared hypothetically to Cuba selling equivalent levels of sugar to others buyers that used preferential rates (the United States and European Union countries) as it did to the Soviet Union.[25] When these adjustments are made and comparisons conducted, a subsidy in favor of Cuba still existed, but at a reduced level than when bilateral trade with Moscow is only evaluated to the world price.[26] Despite this change in the terms of trade and the use of different comparators, as illustrated in Table 4.1 earlier, the 1990 level of trade remained in excess of eleven times that conducted during the original five-year plan in 1965.

Although this is the case, the subtleties of bilateral Soviet-Cuban trade extended beyond the mere figures of the level of trade conducted. In the 1959 to 1991 era the claim exists that Moscow sold inferior quality manufactured products to Cuba that it could not sell to alternative markets, or as Jorge Pérez-López has written, "technologically obsolete goods."[27] This practice produced a material incentive for such trade, but an unforeseen consequence would be that in the post-Soviet era the emergence of the Cuban need for spare parts for these Soviet era goods that continued to be used on the island. This would form an important part of the Soviet legacy which has substantially impacted the relationship in the years since 1992 and consequently has been examined at various junctures throughout this book.

As noted, the Soviet reforms instigated by Gorbachev began to negatively impact bilateral trade, consequently necessitating the introduction of the "special period in peacetime" in Cuba, with, as previously detailed, the trade agreement signed in late December 1990 further evidencing the impact of the Soviet reforms on bilateral trade. This 1990 trade agreement was truly historic as not only was it due to last for one year and not the traditional five but trade was also to be conducted at world market prices.[28] Notwithstanding this, it has been posited in the previous chapter that this trade agreement may have looked even more different from previous agreements if Konstantin Katushev, former Soviet ambassador to Cuba and member of the "Cuba lobby" had not been head of Foreign Economic Relations in Moscow at the

time when this agreement was signed. As noted, this lobby had been able to influence the Kremlin's Cuba policy with their power most vividly demonstrated after their defeat as part of the August 1991 coup in Moscow when less than one month later Gorbachev had announced the removal of the final Soviet troops from Cuba.

The changed nature of bilateral trade due to the effect of the Soviet reforms was further acknowledged in a conversation between Yuri Petrov, Soviet ambassador to Cuba, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in August 1990. The report of this conversation states, "The preferential reservation of tourist trips and holidays for the most active (Soviet) commercial partners, as well as the dispatch of Cuban doctors to work in the enterprises and republics with whom close relations are established, can act as incentives for Soviet suppliers."[29] This proposition was in accordance with report of a meeting between Petrov and Fidel Castro in June 1990. This report states, "The position stated by F. Castro, on the whole, came down to strengthening our cooperation by every means possible."[30] These suggestions demonstrated not only the importance of Soviet-Cuban trade for Havana but also the primacy of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite due to these "alternative" policies for attempting to bolster bilateral trade.

Despite these Cuban attempts to facilitate the continuation of bilateral trade, its changed nature was again acknowledged on October 8, 1991, when José Ramón Balaguer, Cuban ambassador to the Soviet Union, sent a twelve-page report classed as "confidential," to Raúl Castro summarizing the situation in the Soviet Union and the effect of the August 1991 coup in Moscow. It did not just contain information on the political situation in the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the coup, but also how the coup could impact the Soviet economy and consequently Soviet-Cuban trade. Balaguer outlines the changes in the Soviet economy which had taken place before focusing on Havana's relationship with Moscow and states:

> Bilateral Cuban-Soviet relations have already endured subtle changes that have unilaterally removed definitive forms and nuanced political-ideology. The special treatment given to our country as the only socialist country in Latin America is rapidly changing with this reducing the possibility of preferential prices in the economy, all of which stemmed from the specific situation in the URSS.
>
> This proposes that going forward our bilateral relations will be based on a commercial footing, be mutually beneficial, but will be prone to the vagaries of the world economy, which will be advantageous for the Soviet Union.[31]

What is striking about this report is that Balaguer acknowledges both that further change in the bilateral relationship is imminent, regardless of how events unfolded in the Soviet Union, and also his "admission" that previously Cuba had benefited from preferential trading rates. Such an "admission" did

not only evidence the changed nature of the relationship by late 1991, but was also absent from both other MINREX documents of the time and Cuban government statements. The result of these changes was that in 1991 bilateral trade fell to 3.3 billion pesos, with both delivery problems for Soviet goods and the Soviet internal situation also being blamed.[32]

Although this was the case, the situation was to deteriorate rapidly after the end of the Soviet-Cuban relations with the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The next section of this chapter will examine the subsequent bilateral trade relationship that developed between Moscow and Havana in the post-Soviet era, but when trade was conducted between two socialist countries it was not just Marxist-Leninism that underscored trade as it was also mutually beneficial for both countries. For Cuba, bilateral trade helped the island mitigate the effects of the U.S. embargo, thus evidencing the prominence of realist pragmatism (underscored by the central tenets of defensive realism as Havana was trying to offset U.S. aggression rather than increase its own power), within the Cuban ruling elite. For Moscow, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Cold War geopolitical considerations may have been receding, but trade with Cuba allowed the Soviet Union to acquire important primary products and particularly sugar, despite bilateral trade with Cuba becoming a highly contentious internal topic in the final years of the Soviet Union. Contrary to this consternation, the significance of Cuban sugar for Moscow would quickly return to prominence in the post-Soviet period.

POST-SOVIET TRADE

As detailed in chapter 2, bilateral Russian-Cuban trade crashed in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban trade resulting in grave consequences for the Cuban economy. In 1992, bilateral trade fell to a mere 823 million pesos, a figure less than 25 percent of the 1991 level, or below 9 percent of trade conducted in 1988.[33] In a four-year period bilateral trade had fallen by over 90 percent. This downward trajectory continued in the years from 1993 to 1995 and a comparison to trade in 1965, as noted earlier the first year of the original five-year plan between the Soviet Union and Cuba, graphically demonstrates the haemorrhaging of Moscow-Havana trade in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations.

As highlighted by Table 4.2, the outcome was thirty years after the first five-year agreement, trade was less than half of the 1965 level. Moreover, the 1992 level of bilateral trade represented 0.1 percent of Russian global trade turnover, the 1993 figure was 0.07 percent of Russia's global trade turnover, in 1994 trade represented 0.03 percent of Russian global trade turnover in that year, and in 1995 it was 0.02 percent.[34]

Table 4.2 Comparison of Trade

1965	*1992*	*1993*	*1994*	*1995*
100	110	71	43	34

Figure 4.2 further evidences both this dramatic fall in trade between Havana and Moscow detailed earlier, and also the changing composition of bilateral trade which also had grave consequences for Cuba. In the years from 1992 to 1994, Russian exports to Cuba ranged from 13 to 23 percent of total bilateral trade. The result of this change in the composition of bilateral trade, as detailed in the previous section of this chapter, Soviet-Cuban trade had predominantly comprised the Soviet export of goods to Cuba, was that many foodstuffs and also virtually all consumer goods disappeared from Cuban shops. This had grave repercussions for both Cubans' standard of living and also, as noted in chapter 2, the island's gross domestic product (GDP). This would result not only in the aforementioned *balsero* crisis of August 1994 but also in 1993 led Raúl Castro to describe the effect of the end of Soviet-Cuban trade on the Cuban economy "as if a nuclear bomb had exploded."[35]

A MINREX report dated May 20, 1995, further evidences the fall in bilateral trade in the period immediately after the end of Soviet-Cuban relations. The report starts by detailing Soviet-Cuban trade in the years from 1960 to 1991, before noting that in the period from 1991 to 1995 Cuba sold 51,451 tons of sugar, 1,025 tons of nickel, and 190 tons of citrus fruit to Russia. In



Figure 4.2 Trade between Moscow and Havana (trade in millions of pesos). Data analyzed from Vneshiaia Torgovliia v 1989–1990, 5 and Vneshiaia Torgovliia v 1986, 259 and 265. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) 1991, 135. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2000, VI-5-VI-7. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1999, 392. *Source*: Graph created by Mervyn J. Bain.

comparison, in the period 1986 to 1990, Cuba sold about 1,000 tons of nickel per year to the Soviet Union and 1,075 tons of citrus fruit for the entire five-year period.[36]

This dramatic fall in bilateral trade has permitted Mervyn J. Bain to argue that the decrease in Moscow-Havana bilateral trade in the immediate post-Soviet period was greater than that which has historically taken place between former colonies and their metropoles in the aftermath of the decolonization process.[37] This is of course not to suggest that Cuba had been part of a Soviet empire, but Bain has noted that in one year, trade between Moscow and Havana fell to a level that traditionally has taken twenty-four years to reach between newly independent countries and their former metropoles.[38]

As argued in chapter 2, the removal of Marxist-Leninism from the relationship was a key reason for the downturn in bilateral trade as it had "tied" the two countries together for the previous thirty years. Moreover, as the Cuban socialist model persisted, this had made the end of Soviet-Cuban relations acrimonious which Bain has posited permitted other parallels to the decolonization process to be drawn and how trade decreases more quickly if the "break" in relations is caustic.[39] Moreover, as also detailed in chapter 2, Russia embraced neoliberal economics in the early to mid-1990s, which not only produced the aforementioned "market with Russian characteristics" that gravely affected the living standards of many Russian citizens but also left numerous Russian companies struggling to survive this economic transition.

This situation was not lost on MINREX personnel with on October 12, 1994, Roberto Robaina, Cuban foreign minister, receiving a letter from Rogelio Montenegro, Cuban ambassador to Russia, which contained a detailed analysis of the Russian, which stated,

> The Russian economy is in a dangerously exacerbated stage, with the crisis threatening to make irreversible damage to industry, which is only possible to overcome with a modification of the political economy ideas of the Russian government and massive financial support for production and the support of the internal financial market using a variety of different methods—regulation of the internal market, including indicative planning.[40]

Yegor Gaidar, Russian prime minister, is criticized for this situation and then Montenegro outlines that in the period from January to August 1994 industrial production fell by 24 percent, GDP by 16 percent, energy production by 12 percent, metallurgy by 15 percent, and food production by 23 percent.[41] A decrease in liquidity and a downturn in the level of imports, but particularly consumer goods are all blamed for these staggering figures.[42] The outcome was, as argued in chapter 2, that many Russian companies were in no position to trade with Cuba and consequently this negatively impacted Russian-Cuban

trade, explaining the downward trajectory of bilateral trade detailed earlier. The result was that neoliberal economics had affected bilateral trade between Moscow and Havana.

As detailed in chapter 3, the upshot of Moscow's embrace of neoliberal economics was the appearance of "new realities" in the bilateral relationship with Moscow desiring Havana pay world market price for goods. When this wish is coupled with Cuba being unable to pay these prices, bilateral trade fell. Difficulties concerning agreement on the price of goods persisted throughout the 1990s and was evidenced on October 28, 1996, when Jose Luis Rodríguez, vice president of the Council of Ministers and Economic and Planning Minister, sent a letter to I. Materov, vice minister of economics, outlining problems with the financial frameworks and coefficient in calculating the price of goods in trade with Russia and how this was negatively impacting bilateral trade.[43]

However, Moscow's requiring hard currency payments from Cuba did not only affect bilateral trade but also, as previously detailed, in September 1992, Fidel Castro announced that the joint collaboration project to build a nuclear reactor at Juragua had been halted as Cuba could not afford to pay the $300,000 a month payment of the wages of the Russian specialists.[44] Traditionally Cuba's inability to pay for its construction has been perceived as being one of the most high profile examples of the "new realities" of the post-Soviet relationship. Moreover, a similar fate befell the joint Soviet-Cuban construction of the nickel ore processing plant at Las Camariocas in Holguin province.[45] Again, simply, Havana could not afford to pay for its completion.

The disconnect between the two countries regarding the "new realities" was further highlighted in a MINREX memo dated July 11, 1997, that detailed bilateral discussions in 1997, and how Cuba persisted in speaking about the credits which the Soviet Union had provided Cuba prior to its disintegration should be honoured.[46] Additionally, on January 10, 1998, Robaina wrote to Ibrahim Ferradaz, minister in the Ministerio de Inversión Extranjera y Cooperación Económica (MINVEC) and the future Cuban tourist minister, about the upcoming meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission. Robaina wrote, "In spite of the fact that the financial problems remain, in the first place the subject of "mutual obligations" which can become a real impasse to improving relations."[47] The admission of problems existing is important as is the insinuation that Russia is reneging on agreements, evidencing the "new realities" of the post-Soviet relationship.

Despite the existence of these "new realities" and the tension which existed between Moscow and Havana concerning them, as noted some level of trade continued, which may have been unexpected due to the changed political situation between the two countries and the various negative economic effects

listed earlier. This gives rise to the question of why trade, although at a massively reduced level, persisted.

As examined in chapter 3, throughout the 1990s MINREX officials wilfully attempted to cultivate a Soviet legacy in interactions with their Russian counterparts. However, this multifaceted legacy was not only political but also economic, and, as noted earlier, included the Cuban need for spare parts for Soviet era machinery that continued to "power" the island's economy at this time. As detailed, this partly resulted from the Soviet Union selling goods to Cuba in the 1959 to 1991 era that it could not sell to alternative markets. However, the economic legacy was particularly pronounced concerning Russia's need for sugar and Cuba's for oil. This was somewhat ironic due to Moscow's embrace of neoliberal economics, desire to see "new realities" emerge in Russian-Cuban relations and that the price which Moscow paid for Cuban sugar had become a highly contentious issue within the Soviet Union in the final years of the Soviet era.

Moreover, what also becomes apparent from reading MINREX documents is that the starting point for Russian-Cuba trade discussions were those which had taken place in the final months of Soviet-Cuban relations.[48] Furthermore, on December 22, 1992, a joint memorandum for bilateral trade for the period 1993 to 1996 was signed. This document focuses mainly on science and technical collaborations between the two countries, especially in the areas of energy and nickel, but discussions regarding completion of the nickel plant at Las Camariorcas, the Russian government offered Cuba a state credit which could be repaid over ten years to pay for it, also took place.[49] The signing of this memorandum is hugely significant as it would help ease the grave impact which the end of Cuban-Soviet relations had had for the Cuban economy, and it also evidences the protraction of the relationship between Havana and Moscow in the post-Soviet era. Additionally, it also displays a joint willingness to complete projects which had begun in the Soviet period. This would appear to be very different from the "new realities" of the relationship detailed previously, but due to the dire economic situation, and lack of alternative trading partners, would have delighted Havana.

A report in the MINREX archive outlines Cuban-Russian trade at the end of 1992. It not only details how trade has fallen but also notes Russian interest in Cuba's biotechnological products and the fact that talks for the completion of the nuclear plant at Juragua had occurred.[50] The inclusion of Juragua in these discussions is intriguing because, as noted, traditionally Cuba's inability to pay for its construction has been perceived as being one of the most high profile examples of the "new realities" of the post-Soviet relationship. Furthermore, the report also contains figures for the export of Cuban sugar to Russia for the period from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, the figure is 2.8 million

tonnes projected to fall to 1.9 million in 1996.[51] Sugar-for-oil swaps would dominate bilateral trade discussions throughout the 1990s.

It becomes apparent on reading the MINREX documents that discussions regarding sugar-for-oil exchanges remained problematic throughout the 1990s. A MINREX report, dated March 5, 1994, outlines the complete negotiating process and the causes for the shortfalls in the exchanges. It appears as if Cuba was not just trying to absolve itself of accountability for the shortfall in Cuban sugar exports, but even blamed Russia. The report states,

> The Government of Cuba believes that the excessive delay in the start of bilateral talks between Cuba and Russia for 1994 with the Government of Cuba believing that this delay is also detrimental to Russia and the supply of sugar and creates disadvantage situation where in the future it will be difficult to create a sustainable source of this important food product.[52]

These MINREX reports may display areas of consternation within the relationship, Cuban unhappiness at the situation and a delay in the start of talks, but importantly solutions were being sought. Moreover, these documents evidence both the importance of sugar-for-oil swaps for both countries and also that issues from the relationship's Soviet past continued to impact Russian-Cuban relations. This was further evident on September 2, 1996, when Ricardo Cabrisas, Cuban foreign trade minister, wrote to Robaina, the letter was also sent to Allende, regarding Russian-Cuban trade. It suggested that a solution to the issue of sugar-for-oil swaps should be constructed and sent to Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister.[53] Subsequently, Robaina wrote to Primakov on September 9, 1996, requesting the Russian foreign minister's personal help in finding a solution, displaying the importance of Cuba securing a reliable source of oil, because both country's foreign ministers had become involved in this issue.[54]

As noted in the previous chapter, what also becomes apparent from reading the MINREX documents is the involvement in the bilateral relationship of Russian companies and private banks. The afore-citied report on Robaina's trip to Moscow in May 1995 refers to Robaina meeting with Russian businessmen. Moreover, in Robaina's letter of September 9, 1996, to Primakov he refers to problems with the company ALFO-ECO and how it had breached agreements regarding sugar-for-oil swaps.[55]

Cuba having to negotiate with private banks and Russian companies was indicative of the changed nature of the relationship in the 1990s when compared to the Soviet era. Moreover, ALFO-ECO was the focus of the previously referenced report "Consideraciones sobre las relaciones económica-comerciales entre Cuba y Rusia y la Federación de Rusia." This report states, "The Cuban side has at all times expressed its willingness to respect the

agreed agreements. The firm ALFO-ECO has only insisted on breaking these agreements."[56]

The issue of sugar-for-oil swaps remained at the forefront of bilateral trade discussions with Luis García, MINREX personnel, writing to Allende on June 24, 1997, detailing the discussions which had taken place between Cuba and various Russian banks, including Sberbank, about the possibility of Russian banks helping to both underwrite sugar–for-oil exchanges and also the completion of the Cuban sugar harvest.[57] Furthermore, on October 14, 1997, Robaina once again wrote to Primakov about sugar-for-oil swaps and despite Cuban efforts there remained no resolution, which Robaina says is "regretful." Robaina concludes by pointedly highlighting that if issues concerning sugar-for-oil exchanges are successfully resolved it would benefit both Cuba and Russia.[58]

Additionally, on February 16, 1998, Primakov wrote to Robaina about the issues regarding sugar-for-oil swaps and how they have not been resolved despite their own personal involvement. Significantly, Primakov states that Russia wanted to complete these transactions, apologizes for the problems and blames the economic situation in Russia.[59] Moreover, on December 15, 1998, Robaina wrote to Sergey Ivanov, Russian foreign minister, about the agreement dated October 15, 1995, which stated that 4.7 million tons of sugar would be exchanged for 14.2 million tons of oil and was due to expire on December 31, 1998. However, this agreement had not been met, causing problems for Cuba. Robaina states that Russia's internal situation had been the cause of the failure to fulfil this arrangement and Robaina also asks for help in finding a solution.[60]

Sugar-for-oil exchanges remained a prominent issue in bilateral relations even once Robaina and Primakov had been replaced as Cuban and Russian foreign ministers by Felipe Pérez Roque and Ivanov, respectively. In the MINREX archive there is a transcript of a telephone conversation between Pérez Roque and Ivanov dated November 23, 1999. The conversation is predominantly Ivanov explaining the Chechen situation, but at its end, sugar-for-oil swaps are returned to with Pérez Roque admitting that problems exist and he asks if Cuba can use its credits as a guarantee for the supply of oil.[61]

The MINREX documents demonstrate the continuing significance of sugar-for-oil exchanges within Russian-Cuban relations throughout the 1990s, evidenced by the fact that both foreign ministers took personal interest in trying to find a positive outcome for these exchanges to continue to function. This was both during the downturn in the relationship in the early to mid-1990s and then during the subsequent upturn. However, a degree of tension existed between the two countries over these exchanges. Moscow and Havana's commitment to finding a solution for these problems may further highlight the importance of the issue to both countries, but it gives rise to the question of why both countries were so intent on finding a resolution?

For Cuba, it was the need for a reliable source of much needed oil resulting from a lack of viable alternative sources due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo against the island. Again this returns to the ideas of realist pragmatism and defensive realism due to the consequences for the Cuban economy and the Revolution's survival if a stable source of this vital commodity could not be secured. However, what was also imperative was the Soviet era legacy. On October 26, 1992, Yevgeny Bai, the *Izvestia* Cuban correspondent wrote, "Cuba sold the sugar that it had produced last year anyway . . . while we were forced to buy sugar on the world market through middlemen and at higher prices."[62] Moreover, during the Soviet era, 15 to 20 percent of the price for Cuban sugar had been paid in hard currency with the rest being paid in kind. In March 1993, the journalist Nikolai Vlasov restated the economic benefits for Russia of continuing to buy sugar from Cuba when he wrote,

> If Russia enters . . . the so-called free market where the produce is sold without preliminary agreements (up to 10 million tons a year) a sharp rise in prices will occur there. It will be impossible to compensate it by additional incomes in hard currency from sales of withdrawn goods meant for Cuba. . . . Besides, sugar is bought in Cuba without mediators."[63]

Additionally, the Russian and Cuban sugar harvests are out of sync with each other, but during the Soviet era the purchase of Cuban sugar had permitted Soviet sugar refineries to work on a constant twelve-month cycle. This practice had stopped in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations as Moscow did not purchase Cuban sugar, with this only making a poor Russian agricultural position worse.[64] However, it increased the importance of the Russian acquisition of Cuban sugar in the post-Soviet era. In sum, it appeared that the sugar-for-oil exchanges were mutually beneficial for both countries, which was somewhat ironic as the price which Moscow paid for Cuban sugar had been so vehemently criticized in the late Soviet period.

However, a legacy from the Soviet era was not the only determinant in Russian-Cuban trade in the post-Soviet era, because the changes detailed in chapter 2 which were implemented to the Cuban economic model in the early to mid-1990s were also highly significant. As noted, this limited embrace of neoliberal economics was very much a "marriage of convenience" resulting from necessity, and, as argued, consequently underpinned by realist pragmatism and defensive realism. The results of the economic reforms have been numerous, varied and some even unforeseen, but at the forefront of these results was a partial reassertion of the island's economy into the world economy. The outcome was that Cuba's trading partners changed considerably from the Soviet era when over 70 percent of the island's trade was conducted solely with the Soviet Union and over 80 percent with the socialist bloc. This

change in the composition of Cuba's trading partners is further evidenced by the fact that by mid-1995, 212 joint ventures had come to fruition with over nine different countries from around the world, and in the period from 1998 to 2001 a further 190 joint enterprises, in conjunction with twenty-eight countries, were created. In comparison, in 1991 there were only eleven joint ventures excluding those with socialist bloc countries.[65]

In sum, an unexpected outcome of the Cuban economic reforms of the early to mid-1990s was that the preeminent place which Soviet, and after 1992 Russian, companies had in the Cuban economy had been usurped. As noted in chapter 2, Vladimir Putin commented upon this while in Cuba in December 2000. Moreover, in March 1993, the journalist Nikolai Vlasov wrote in *Moscow News*,

> As last year's experience has shown the Canadian, Spanish and Mexican companies started immediately to fill the vacuum formed after the curtailment of Russian-Cuban investment cooperation. They become firmly established in the most promising branches, using with great benefit the industrial infrastructure created with our country's assistance.[66]

Additionally, Stanislav Kondrashov, another Russian journalist, wrote, "In Cuba's nickel industry, Canadian capital now reigns supreme. And the Chinese dominate the consumer goods market. The Spanish, the British and the Mexicans are investing in Cuba."[67] Furthermore, in the two-year period from 1995 to 1997, 260 joint projects with Cuban and foreign money were opened but only two of these were with Cuban and Russian money.[68]

A desire to try and readdress the loss of their preeminent place in the Cuban economy underpinned a Russian wish to increase trade with Cuba. Moreover, by the mid-1990s a number of Russian companies that had survived the country's economic transition were in a position to invest in Cuba and compete against companies from other countries. In July 1994, RosKuba, an umbrella organization comprising twenty-five Russian companies, was created to help expedite bilateral trade, and, in 1995, S. Batchikov, co-chairman of the Russian Foreign Economic Policy Fund, commented, "Any country, including Russia, that is building a market economy is interested in expanding the assortment of goods in its consumer market. And this means that high-quality Cuban tropical produce is of considerable interest to us, especially considering Russia's natural and climatic conditions."[69] This comprised not only both traditional Cuban exports of sugar and tropical fruit but also high quality Cuban rum and tobacco. Moreover, this helped mitigate the effects of the poor Russian economic performance in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the implementation of neoliberal economics also resulting in a decrease in Russian tobacco production which necessitated the

need to purchase Cuban tobacco. Subsequently, in May 1999, La Casa del Habano, a Cuban cigar emporium that focused on high end Cuban tobacco opened in Moscow.[70]

Further evidencing the significance of bilateral trade for both countries was that in late 1995 when Oleg Soskovets, first deputy prime minister of Russia, visited Havana he signed a raft of economic agreements with Cuba, and in May 1996 the Russian Duma ratified the decision to develop commercial relations with Cuba.[71] This was indicative of a Duma that was more friendly toward Cuba, which was detailed in the previous chapter as was the fact that it also evidenced the affect which the changed Russian internal political situation had had on Moscow's international relationships. This is further demonstrated by the letter sent from Luis Garica to Allende, dated August 5, 1996, outlining the meeting that had recently taken place with Mikhail Kalinin, Russian ambassador to Cuba, at which the changes in the Russian government were discussed. Kalinin iterated that change will occur in Russian government institutions which focus on international trade and that trade will decrease with countries which Moscow believes are not important. Significantly the report stated, "In the case of Cuba it is clear that a small economic-commercial office will be maintained by specialists from the field."[72] Moreover, in 1997, the Russian-Cuba Commission on Commercial, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was created.[73]

For Cuba, the island simply needed economic trading partners, and the upshot of the earlier detailed changes was that in 1996 Russia was Cuba's single largest trading partner, something which had not been expected or predicted in 1992. Cuban exports to Russia were highly significant for this rise in trade levels and in 1997 Cabrisas even suggested that by 1999 or the year 2000 trade between Havana and Moscow could return to the 1991 level.[74]

However, not only has Cabrisas's hope not materialized, but as Figure 4.3 demonstrates, bilateral Russian-Cuban trade has since dropped from this 1996 "high" and for a number of years has been between 200 and 300 million pesos. The 1998 Russian economic crisis was important for this decrease, but since the year 2000 Russian trade with the rest of Latin America has grown considerably with this now dwarfing Russian-Cuban trade. In 2012, Russian-Cuban trade was 341,228,000 pesos, before falling to 223,458,000 pesos in 2016, which represented 0.04 percent and 0.05 percent of Russian global turnover, respectively. In comparison Russian trade with Latin America exceeded US $15 billion.[75] The Cuban economy may be much smaller than many of the larger Latin American economies, but this does give rise to the question of why trade between Moscow and Havana is at such a decreased level?

The answer to this question does not appear to be a tightening of the U.S. economic embargo with the Helms-Burton Act, despite the extraterritorial nature of this act in general, or as detailed in the previous chapter, the specific focus which it had on Russia's continued use of the Lourdes listening post. As



Figure 4.3 Russian-Cuban Trade 1995–2015 (trade in millions of pesos). Data analyzed from Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2000, 2008, 2017, VI-5-VI-7. *Source*: Graph created by Mervyn J. Bain.

noted in chapter 3, Moscow appeared to be content to ignore Helms-Burton as the Lourdes listening post remained open until 2002 and Russia also continued to trade with the island, even at a reduced level. Moreover, it has also become clear that Moscow never intended to permit Helms-Burton to negatively affect trade with Cuba, because in a letter sent to Carlos Lage detailing his visit to Moscow in May 1995, Cabrisas wrote that O. D. Davidov, Russian minister for foreign trade, had reassured him that Helms-Burton would not adversely affect Cuban-Russian trade. Significantly, the year before Helms-Burton became law.[76]

Bain has argued that similarities between the end of Soviet-Cuban relations and the decolonization process may partly explain the decreased level of trade, but the island's Soviet era debt may have acted as a "block" to bilateral Russian-Cuban trade, because until a solution was found in July 2014 it had remained a contentious issue in the relationship throughout the post-Soviet era.[77] The controversy concerning Cuba's Soviet era debt becomes even more apparent on reading MINREX documents.

The contentious nature of the debt became apparent very quickly in the post-Soviet era. On July 14, 1992, Amado-Blanco sent a memo to Cabrisas about the talks which had taken place with Kalinin, with the memo stating that Kalinin acknowledged problems existed within the relationship, or more specifically,

> It is the opinion of Kalinin that Cuba's refusal to discuss the debt problem is not helping talks about the future of commercial links between the two countries, and that a more flexible position would benefit the talks and give the parliament a more understanding of the situation.[78]

Furthermore, it also appears that at various times throughout the 1990s private Russian banks were willing to re-finance or liquidate part of Cuba's Soviet era debt.[79] Russian banks being willing to do this was indicative of the changed nature of Cuban-Russian relations in the 1990s when compared to the Soviet period of the relationship, but significantly it evidenced attempts to find a solution to this issue.

Furthermore, on August 10, 1999, Allende wrote to Lage about a meeting which had taken place with Kalinin over Vadim Volkov's, vice minister of finance, forthcoming trip to Cuba. Regarding this Allende wrote,

> I add that the objective of this trip is to seek mutually acceptable formulas with Cuba on the subject of its debt. He says that they must fulfil their obligations as members of the Paris Club, of which they depend greatly, but which also do not wish to affect other interests and is a juxtaposition in that context and we must wait for the Volokov's trip.
>
> I note that they want to demonstrate to this institution, regardless of whether there are still outstanding problems, that they converse and negotiate with Cuba, and that both countries are trying to find solutions.[80]

It appeared that Russia's own economic difficulties and need for good relations with the Paris Club were complicating the situation with Cuba. However, on August 17, 1999, Cabrisas wrote to Sergey Shoigu, president of Intergovernment Commission, about the Soviet era debt with the proposal that 7,380 million dollars of this debt be repaid in biotechnological goods, but in particular a vaccine against Hepatitis B.[81] This offer was not accepted, but demonstrates that further endeavors to find a solution were being sought.

Although this was the case, Moscow attempting to link Cuba's Soviet era debt to its Paris Club commitments unquestionably complicated an already problematical situation. On October 5, 1999, Francisco Soberon, president of the Cuban National Bank, wrote to Kaisanov, Russian finance minister, about Cuba's Soviet era debt. Soberon admits that finding a solution to this issue has been difficult, but "more recently we discovered that Russia has the intention of moving the discussion of Cuba's debt to the Paris Club. From the beginning we have explained that this procedure is absolutely unacceptable."[82] Soberon then details the reasons why Cuba believes this to be the case which includes that the debt was never underwritten by the Paris Club and that the Paris Club had denounced the characteristics of Cuban-Soviet relations as they had unfolded. Soberon then states that Cuba has been negotiating with the Paris Club to renegotiate its own debt to this organization and this Russian proposal would complicate these negotiations. Soberon concludes that bilateral talks between Moscow and Havana are their preferred method to find a solution to Cuba's Soviet era debt.[83] Furthermore, four days later Pérez Roque wrote to Soberon about Kaisanov's visit to Cuba. In this

Pérez Roque refers to "mutual obligations" and writing about the involvement of the Paris Club, "Consequently their intervention in this subject would be serious, a source of confusion and procrastination."[84] Pérez Roque then reminds Soberon that during his recent visit to Cuba, Ivanov had stated that it was for the two countries to decide this matter.[85] Simply, Havana did not want third-party involvement in this matter. Moreover, this also demonstrates how the issue of Cuba's debt accrued during the Soviet era remained an area of consternation for a number of years after the end of Soviet-Cuban relations and consequently, due to the low level of bilateral trade, could be perceived to have "blocked" trade increasing. However, a resolution to the issue of Cuba's debt began to appear in February 2013 when during his visit to Cuba Dmitry Medvedev, Russian prime minister, agreed to Russia partially forgiving the debt with the remainder being re-financed over a ten-year period, before as detailed, Putin signed a final agreement in July 2014. This agreement forgave 90 percent of the debt with the remaining 10 percent being paid by Russian investment in the Cuban economy, demonstrating Moscow's interest in the island's economy.[86] At one stroke this July 2014 agreement removed this contentious issue from the bilateral relationship.

Russian interest in the Cuban economy will be returned to, but another possible reason for the low level of Russian-Cuban trade could be the appearance of a degree of Cuban reliance on trade with other countries which reduced the importance of trade with Russia for Cuba. Since the year 2000, Cuban trade with particularly China and Venezuela has increased considerably, which has helped mitigate the negative impact of the continuing U.S. embargo. By 2007, Cuban-Chinese trade exceeded two billion pesos, with the 2016 level of bilateral trade being 2.6 billion pesos, or 20.5 percent of the island's total global trade, making China Cuba's largest trading partner.[87] Cuban-Chinese trade comprises Cuba exporting nickel and also primary and biotechnological goods while importing a variety of consumer goods, including refrigerators and televisions. Additionally, the island has also imported 1,000 Yutong buses, which not only are the most visible demonstration of Cuban-Chinese bilateral trade, but subsequently led Carlos Alzugaray to state that the word "Yutong" has become part of the Cuban vocabulary for "public bus."[88]

Notwithstanding this, until 2016, Cuban-Chinese trade was dwarfed by the level of trade the island has conducted with Venezuela, aided by the close political affinity that emerged between Havana and Caracas in the twenty-first century. In 2006, Cuban-Venezuelan trade comprised 21.3 percent of the island's total global trade, in 2008 this increased to 27.3 percent, 41.7 percent in 2011, and in 2014 it was 40.5 percent. The importance of trade with Caracas for Havana was further demonstrated by both the fact that the level of bilateral trade in 2008 was the first time that the 1991 level of Soviet-Cuban trade had been exceeded, and also in 2014 Cuban-Venezuelan bilateral trade

was over 400 percent greater than Cuba's trade with its second largest trading partner: China.[89] Subsequently, a level of Cuban economic reliance on Venezuela emerged, further evidenced by the fact that bilateral trade consisted of mainly the Cuban import of Venezuelan goods, and particularly oil. In 2006, 84.5 percent of Cuban-Venezuelan trade was the Cuban imports of Venezuelan goods, with the figures for 2008, 2011, and 2014 being 91.5, 70.8, and 71.5 percent, respectively.[90]

Although this is the case, the political will for bilateral Russian-Cuban trade to increase exists within the government in Havana. If trade with Moscow increased, it would help mitigate a level of Cuban economic reliance on China and Venezuela as it would diversify the island's trading partners. This Cuban political will has been evident for some time and returns to the ideas of Jorge Domínguez, Michael Erisman, Julie Feinsilver, and John Kirk noted in the opening chapter of this book, since January 1959 the revolutionary Cuban government wished to avoid potential dependency due to the principles of realist pragmatism and defensive realism. Moreover, after the deterioration in the internal Venezuelan economic position after Hugo Chavez's death in January 2013, this Cuban political will to increase trade with Russia appears somewhat astute. In 2016, Cuban-Venezuelan trade fell to 2.2 billion pesos, or 31 percent of the level of bilateral trade in 2012, necessitating that Havana finds alternative trading partners to offset the decrease in trade with Venezuela. As detailed, in 2016 China became Cuba's largest trading partner, and in December 2017 Raúl Castro met Igor Sechin, president of the Russian oil company Rosneft, while Sechin was in Havana.[91] This could suggest that Cuba is hoping to mitigate the decrease in oil supplies from Venezuela with Russian oil.

As noted, the political will for bilateral Russian-Cuban trade has been evident for some time, with the Russian motivations being underpinned by the reasons outlined above; effects of a Soviet legacy including that it was easier and cheaper to continue buying some goods from Cuba and a Russian wish to reassert itself in the Cuban economy. In December 2010, Ricardo Alarcon, president of the National Assembly, and Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian State Duma signed an inter-parliamentary agreement to enhance bilateral trade.[92] Additionally, in February 2013, Medvedev stated, "Regrettably, trade between Russia and Cuba is not high as it should be… There are good investment plans, and investment is developing despite its small volume. I am sure it will grow and our cooperation will expand to many new areas."[93] Moreover, in May 2013, during an interview with *Granma*, Valentina Matvienko, president of the Council of Federations of the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly, stated,

> Despite the fact that trade relations have grown recently, they still do not reflect the potential and possibilities of our two countries. The value of our trade

> exchange is approaching $270 million, according to 2012 figures, which is insufficient. We are currently negotiating a broad range of projects relating to energy, and Russian companies such as Zarubezhneft are actively involved in oil prospecting in Cuban waters, and this work is going to continue.[94]

Furthermore, in December 2014, when Dmitry Rogozin, Russian vice president, visited Cuba the topic of trade dominated his talks with Raúl Castro.[95] This was repeated in May 2015 when the Cuban premier was in Moscow for the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Great Fatherland War, and Raúl Castro met both Putin and Medvedev.[96]

However, the number of agreements that have been signed between Russia and Cuba also evidence the existence of this political will for trade to increase. In April 2013, a joint project for the construction of a new international airport at San Antonio de los Baños, 30 kilometres from Havana, to be completed by the year 2020 was signed between Russia and Cuba.[97] In July 2014, when in Havana, Putin spoke about the importance of both the building of this airport and the construction of the aforementioned deep water maritime facilities at Mariel when he said,

> The construction of a major transport hub is another large-scale project currently under development with Russia's and Cuba's involvement, as well as the possibility of attracting investment from third countries. It involves upgrading the port of Mariel and building a modern international airport with a cargo terminal in San Antonio de los Banos.[98]

Also while in Cuba, in July 2014, Putin signed ten new cooperation accords with Cuba which focused on areas including scientific links, biotechnology, energy, transportation, and industry.[99] Additionally, in 2015, a collaborative project for the construction of four 200-megawatt power units on the island was signed. Moreover, Mikhail Kamynin, Russian ambassador to Cuba, has spoken of the Russian oil companies Zarubezhneft and Rosneft's interest in Cuba, while Russia companies, such as KAMAZ, Helicopters de Rusia, Grupo GAZ, and Zarubezhneft, were present at the 33rd International Trade Fair "FIHAV-2015" held in Havana in November 2015.[100] Additionally, in early 2018, Cuba bought over 300 Lada cars from AvtoVaz to update the fleet of cars used by Cubataxi, and three automated sugar locomotives were bought from Russia to be used in the Holguin province.[101] Moreover, in late May 2018, Cabrisas travelled to Russia where he not only met Lavrov but also participated in 23rd International Economic Forum held in St Petersburg that was opened by Putin. At this forum it was reported that Cabrias met various Russian businesspersons, including Alexei Tyupanov, Director General of EXIAR, the Russian state institute of exports, further evidencing both countries desire for bilateral trade to increase.[102]

As posited, since the early 1960s, trade with Moscow has helped Havana endure the U.S. embargo which in the twenty-first century is still ongoing. Even as historic change occurred to the relationship under the presidency of Barack Obama, as noted these changes have been partially rolled back by President Trump, the embargo has remained in place. As detailed in chapter 3, Russia has continued to criticize the embargo, but the embargo's continuance requires Cuba to seek alternative trading partners. As Cuban-Venezuelan trade has fallen, this intensifies the significance of improving trade with Russia for Cuba. In short, the underlying principles of realist pragmatism and defensive realism. Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, diplomatic relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated throughout the 2010s. Subsequently, the West have implemented economic sanctions against the Kremlin, with the Russian political will to increase trade with Cuba only intensifying as it could help Moscow mitigate the impact of these sanctions.[103] As with Cuba, this desire to alleviate economic sanctions is underpinned by the ideas of defensive realism.

Bilateral trade fell dramatically in the immediate post-Soviet era, with both the effects of the Russian economic transition and Russia desiring a relationship built on very different foundations from the Soviet era of the relationship being important for this decrease. Notwithstanding this, trade persisted in no small part due to not only the effects of a Soviet legacy but also unforeseen consequences of the Cuban economic reforms that provoked a Russian desire to reestablish itself in the Cuban economy. For Cuba, realist pragmatism and defensive realism were crucial as the island required trading partners in the face of the ongoing U.S. embargo. Oil-for-sugar swaps and Cuba's Soviet era debt remained contentious issues throughout the post-1992 period, but resolutions have been found and although contemporary Russian-Cuban trade remains at a low level, the political will in both countries exists for trade to grow. For Russia, this is to increase its prominence within the Cuban economy and help mitigate the impact of Western sanctions imposed in 2010s. For Cuba it is to offset potential reliance on China and Venezuela, and as Cuban-Venezuelan trade has diminished, the acquisition of alternative trading. Additionally, Cuba's Soviet era debt acting as a "block" to increased bilateral trade was removed in July 2014. Moreover, the U.S. embargo continues to cast a long shadow over the Cuban economy.

CULTURAL LINKS

Extensive cultural links existed between the Soviet Union and Cuba in the period from 1959 to 1991, with these taking various different forms. Performers from both countries regularly travelled to the other country including

sportspersons who routinely competed against each other.[104] Moreover, as stated, by the mid-1980s, some 8,000 Cubans per year were studying in the Soviet Union, with this consequently producing a unique Russian language ability in Cuba that was not present in other Latin American countries. This would be vital for the post-Soviet relationship and will be returned to.

Although not strictly cultural connections, instances of citizens of one country being in the other was increased with the number of Soviet citizens visiting Cuba in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 as a number of affected people, and particularly children, travelled to Cuba for a period of convalescence. Soviet citizens began arriving from soon after the disaster and would continue to travel to Cuba until the year 2000, at the expense of the Cuban government, even after Soviet-Cuban relations had disappeared.[105]

The prevalence of bilateral cultural connections in the period from 1959 to 1991 demonstrates the importance of Soviet "soft power" that was detailed in the opening chapter of this book. Moreover, it appears to question Joseph Joffe's idea that Soviet "soft power" stopped at its "military border" and is more in harmony with Joseph Nye's preposition that Moscow spent billions of roubles on such endeavors.[106] However, the allegation has always existed that these cultural links between the Soviet Union and Cuba were "engineered" as simply the two peoples were so vastly different. On bilateral cultural links Yuri Pavlov, former head of the Latin American Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, has written,

> Culturally, Russian, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and other nations of the USSR were too different and far from the Cubans to develop a strong affinity and kinship during the long period of their political friendship. Common ideology was a poor substitute to its growth. . . . Soviet-Cuban cultural ties were superficial.[107]

Pavlov's claim was made about the 1959 to 1991 era of the relationship and consequently would suggest that cultural links were highly unlikely to exist in the period either between the Russian and Cuban Revolution or the post-Soviet era. Furthermore, as detailed, it has traditionally been thought that Moscow suffered from "geographical fatalism" prior to January 1959. This may have been challenged by the arguments made in chapter 2 with the interest which the Third International, or Comintern, had in Cuba, in chapter 3 concerning the existence of diplomatic relations from 1942 to 1952 and in the opening section of this chapter regarding Soviet interest in commercial links with Cuba. However, did the idea of "geographical fatalism" being a contested subject extend to bilateral cultural links?

As with both formal diplomatic relations and also bilateral trade, reports exist that cultural links between Russia and Cuba predate the Russian

Revolution. The first report of a Russian performing in Cuba was the ballerina Anna Pavlova in March in 1915. Subsequently, Pavlova returned to Cuba in March 1917 and would also spend the whole of the 1918 to 1919 season performing in both in Havana and Santiago.[108] Furthermore, in the 1930s, a ballet school was opened in the Cuban capital by the Russian Nikolai Yavorski, a former male soloist in Paris, which the future famed Cuban ballerina Alicia Alonso would attend.[109]

These reports would question the sentiments of Pavlov's quote detailed above as they would suppose that cultural links were not "engineered" by the Soviet and Cuban governments, but had a considerable heritage that originated prior to not just the Cuban Revolution, but even the Russian Revolution. Two reasons appeared to underpin these early performances. The first was again the island's relationship with the United States as many Russian performers travelled to Cuba from the United States with their performances being underwritten by U.S. promoters. Consequently, Pavlova's performances and those by Russian soprano Maria Kuznechova, who in May 1923 travelled from Key West to perform Carmen in Havana, and was organized by the U.S. impresario Fortena Gallo, can be perceived as part of a "U.S. tour," with these dates in Cuba being added to those that had already taken place in the United States.[110]

The second reason was that a number of the Russians who performed in Cuba were exiles from the Russian Revolution. This included Aleksandra Koshetsa who had left the Ukraine in 1919 and on February 16, 1924, performed at the theatre Capitolio in Havana. Moreover, prior to arriving in Cuba in the late 1920s via Belgrade and Paris, Yavorski had been a former artillery general in the tsarist army.[111]

However, the opening in the summer of 1945 of the aforementioned Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana with offices at Number 7 Bernaza Street significantly changed the cultural links between the two countries, as they became much more systematic from this point onward. This institute's first president was the distinguished Cuban anthropologist and intellectual Fernando Ortiz, with the institute evolving from the Institute of Hispanic Cuban Culture which had been created in 1926. As previously detailed, the journal *Cuba y la URSS* was published monthly by the institute from August 1945 to February 1952. Quickly the institute attracted Cubans interested in "dissenting" politics, with by its closure, as previously detailed, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, who would both fight in the guerrilla war of the late 1950s and become the minister of agrarian reform in the Revolutionary Government of the 1960s, being active within it.

In the first edition of *Cuba y la URSS*, Ortiz wrote that due to the effects of the Second World War, Soviet global prestige had increased at an "extraordinary rate." This opening edition of *Cuba y la URSS* also contained a letter

dated August 12, 1945, written by Vladimir Kemenov, the Soviet art historian and chairman of the Board of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In this Kemenov wrote, "The Soviet intellectuals, who are in agreement with the foreign cultural relations of the Soviet Union, are delighted with the creation of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange and the journal *Cuba y la URSS*."[112] Kemenov believed that the fields of science and art would be particularly significant for these bilateral interactions. Such glowing sentiments in the opening issue of *Cuba y la URSS* may have been expected, but the existence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana at the time, detailed previously, would appear to be important for the creation of both the institute and subsequently *Cuba y la URSS*.[113]

Subsequent articles in *Cuba y la URSS* attempted to demonstrate the longevity of cultural links between the two countries including an article that focused on the Russian chess Grandmaster Miguel Chigoin's participation in a competition at the Chess Club of Havana in January 1899.[114] The longevity of relations is something that is important in contemporary Russian-Cuban relations and will be returned to later in this chapter.

In general a reading of *Cuba y la URSS* supposes that while in circulation, this journal on the whole published two types of articles: those that concentrated on Soviet cultural exhibitions within Cuba and others that focused on the Soviet Union and its achievements. Both types of articles will be examined.

In December 1946, the Seventh Cuban Book Festival was held in Parque Central in Havana. The institute sponsored a pavilion at this festival which was visited by Nikolai Ludomviski, second secretary of the Soviet embassy. Additionally, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, member of the politburo of the Cuban Socialist Party (PSP), spoke at the event "La URSS y la Cultura," which had been organized to coincide with the book fair.[115]

Moreover, the institute conducted a number of activities throughout Havana to showcase the Soviet Union and its accomplishments. This included the periodic screenings of Soviet films throughout the Cuban capital.[116] On November 5, 1949, the Institute used the Valdés Rodríguez Municipal Theatre in Havana to host a gala for the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. At this celebration Enrique González Mantici, the famed Cuban musician, organized the music.[117] Moreover, a number of photographic exhibitions were also staged. Interestingly, from January 16 to 27, 1947, in the Salón de los Pasos Periodos in the Cuban Capital Building a photograph exhibition entitled "Exposición de Moscú" was held, demonstrating the significance of relations with Moscow for the Cuban government as this exhibition had been held in one of the most important buildings in Havana.[118]

For the fifth anniversary of the institute's creation, it organized a number of different events including in May 1950 the conference "La URSS, Socialismo

y Cultura" at which Nicolas Guillen, the Cuban poet, spoke.[119] On June 21, 1950, a conference was held in the Patriotic Club in Havana that focused on Soviet theatre, cinema, and dance, which was addressed by Juan Marinello, former PCC Presidential candidate. The celebrations for the Institute's fifth anniversary culminated with a cocktail party, attended by Serafin Durin, Cultural Attaché of the Soviet embassy in Havana.[120]

As detailed, *Cuba y la URSS* also published articles acclaiming Soviet successes. These articles focused on all aspects of Soviet life, demonstrated with the summer 1947 edition of the journal which included both an interview with Y. Kogan, vice minister of the Soviet car industry, and also an article that concentrated on the paediatric hospital in Leningrad.[121] In August 1950, the Kazakhstan State University received attention from *Cuba y la URSS* while articles were also published which focused on such diverse topics as literature written by Soviet children, and Soviet television and radio.[122] Furthermore, in January 1951, particular focus was given to the Lenin Museum in Moscow with a number of photographs of it being printed, while in November 1951 the article "El Pació de Cultura de los Mineros de Karaganda" was published which drew attention to Soviet cultural achievements. The October 1950 edition of *Cuba y la URSS* focused on Soviet sport with a twenty-eight-page special edition.[123]

The content of the articles published appeared remarkable as they focused on all aspects of Soviet life, but the authors who contributed to *Cuba y la URSS* were also noteworthy. Kogan was the vice minister of the Soviet car industry, Sergei Vavilov, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, wrote the article "Nuestro Aporte a la Ciencia Mundial" published in August 1948 while the article "J.V. Stalin creado del Estado Socialista Soviética multinacional" was authored by I. A. Vlasov, president of the Presidium of the Soviet Union. A number of articles that appeared in *Cuba y la URSS* may have been reprints of articles originally published in Soviet outlets, but leading figures within Soviet society were contributing to *Cuba y la URSS*.

The activities of the institute and the publication of *Cuba y al URSS* certainly challenge the idea that in the period prior to January 1959 the Soviet Union suffered from "geographical fatalism" with regards cultural links with Cuba, but the key question which arises is how had the Institute obtained the material it was publishing in *Cuba y la URSS* and films and photographs it used in its exhibitions?

Soviet soft power and Nigel Gould-Davies' idea that "The Cold War was, in essence, a struggle between ideas," outlined in chapter 1 are of primary importance.[124] Moreover, this returns to the ideas of Nye also noted in the opening chapter of this book when he wrote, "The Soviet Union also spent billions on an active public diplomacy program that included promoting its high culture, broadcasting, disseminating disinformation about the West,

and sponsoring antinuclear protests, peace movements, and youth organisations."[125] Frederick Barghoon has written that propaganda was important for Soviet foreign policy from soon after the Russian Revolution with the Kremlin employing it "as a political instrument . . . for the survival and advancement of Soviet power."[126] Andrei Tsygankov's ideas of the significance of civilizationists in Russian foreign policy, who believed in the superiority of Russian cultures and ideas in comparison to Western ones, would also appear to have resonance. What is also important is that in the mid- to late 1940s Soviet and U.S. propaganda both increased with Gould-Davies having written "each side sought to penetrate the other's polity while denying access to its own."[127]

The result was that simply the institute would never have been created if the Soviet leadership did not believe that Cuban society was ripe for political penetration. In sum, many of the reasons which had drawn the Comintern's interest to Cuba, detailed in chapter 2, and in particular the island's appearance as a "hot bed" of labor militancy, also underpinned the creation of the Institute and subsequent Soviet activities. The importance of this left-wing activism is further heightened, because as previously noted, the institute closed in April 1952 with the termination of bilateral Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations. If the institute had remained open after this break in relations it would have appeared somewhat incongruous, but as argued the military coup which returned Batista to the Cuban presidency marked a sharp shift to the right in Cuban politics thus dissipating Cuban labor activism. Consequently, the Cuban polity were no longer rife for Soviet political penetration.

Notwithstanding this, when the Institute was open, as with the Comintern, if this Soviet activity conducted via the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange successfully penetrated the Cuban polity, it would heighten pressure on Washington due to the consequence of left-wing activism for the U.S. economic and political domination of the island at this time. This pressure was an important element of the Kremlin's "dual track" diplomacy as it could be used to further Bolshevik foreign policy objectives. When this institute opened, the Second World War alliance between Moscow and Washington was drawing to a close with tension subsequently increasing, and this pressure in Cuba could be utilized by the Kremlin to advance its objectives in Eastern Europe by strengthening Moscow's bargaining position due to a fear of Soviet inspired left-wing radicalism in U.S. dominated Cuba. As detailed, defensive realism underscored Moscow's desire to create "buffer states" in Eastern Europe as they were designed to countervail Washington rather than increase its power at the expense of the United States. Furthermore, left-wing militancy in Cuba could be used to counterbalance Western and U.S. influence closer to Soviet controlled Eastern Europe and in particular over a divided Berlin. Subsequently, defensive realism was important for the institute's activities as

Cuba had geostrategic relevance for the Kremlin, with Soviet soft power most certainly appearing to extend beyond its military borders.

Further evidencing the interest which Moscow had in Cuba was both that Radio Moscow broadcast programmes to Cuba and also the involvement of the aforementioned Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) on the island.[128] This organization had been created in August 1925 with its objective being "to cooperate in the establishment and development of scientific and cultural relations between institutions, public organisations and individual scientific and cultural workers in the U.S.S.R. and those of other countries."[129] However, Ludmila Stern has written, "From its creation, VOKS began to manifest an underlying political agenda—that of promoting the Soviet system in the West by means of cultural cover."[130] The organization's representative in Cuba was, as noted previously, Dmitri Zaikan. The May 1946 edition of *Cuba y la URSS* stated that at a celebration in the Lonchamp suite of the Hotel Sevilla in Havana, Ortiz had met with Zaikan and his wife and that the discussions had been fruitful, thus evidencing links between the Institute and VOKS.[131]

As previously detailed, intriguingly Zaikan had accompanied Andrei Gromyko, Soviet charge d'affaires to Cuba to his December 1943 meeting with the Cuban Foreign Minister Emeterio Santovenía held during Gromyko's trip to the island. This is important as it resulted in Zaikin having met a number of the Cuban ruling elite before he took up his position as the head of VOKS on the island. In addition, Zaikan had been in Cuba for some time before taking up this appointment. This was illustrated by the reports he had sent on the situation in Cuba to the top echelons of the Soviet government, including Molotov, which even predate this December 1943 meeting with Santovenia. These reports highlight both the fact that the Soviet elite were in receipt of information regarding Cuba, and also that it appeared that Zaikan was the Kremlin's trusted "man in Havana." This resulted from both his presence on the island from soon after the creation of diplomatic relations in October 1942 and the nature of the reports he had sent to the Soviet Union, which focused on much more that merely bilateral cultural relations. It could also suggest that the Soviet Union's interest in cultivating cultural ties with Cuba did not start with the creation of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in the summer of 1945, but from soon after bilateral diplomatic relations had been formalized due to Zaikin's presence in Cuba and position within VOKS.

The upshot of Zaikan's involvement with the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange is that it can be ascertained that Zaikan and his associates in VOKS were providing the material that was published in *Cuba y la URSS* and also the films and documentaries that the institute were screening at various cinemas throughout the Cuban capital. Moreover, at the start of 1950, Eugenio Mitskevich, the director of VOKS, sent "warm greetings" to the

Institute and its members, further showing both this organization's involvement and also the importance which was attached to this work in Cuba.[132]

As argued, the PSP's "successes" in Cuba, achieved by adhering to the Comintern's "popular front" strategy, were integral for both Comintern interest in the island and for the creation of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange. However, it was not until January 1947 that *Cuba y la URSS* reported any involvement of leading members of the PSP in the activities of the Institute with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez's aforementioned address to the event "La URSS y la Cultura" in December 1946. The lack of such reporting by *Cuba y la URSS* would appear somewhat incongruous due to the importance of the PSP in stimulating Soviet interest in Cuba and the consequent anticipated involvement of PSP members in the Institute's activities. Although conjecture, this absence may be a legacy of the previously mentioned PSP's association with "Browderism" in the Communist Party of the United States which ended in 1945; this coincided with the opening of the institute in Havana and the first edition of *Cuba y la URSS* being published.

Cuba y la URSS also published articles that focused on Cuban cultural exhibitions in the Soviet Union, although the vast majority of cultural links between the two countries were Soviet expositions in Cuba. However, this is not to downplay the significance of Cuban exhibitions such as the one of Cuban art, which included paintings by Esteban Valderrama and Ramón Loy, held in the Cuban embassy in Moscow in the late summer of 1945. Moreover, V. Kamenev, the Soviet minister for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, visited this exhibition.[133] In the summer of 1948 works by among others Carlos Enríquez, Wilfredo Lam, Felipe Orlando, and Domingo Ravenet and sculptures by Teodoro Rames Blanco, Manuel Rodolfo Tardo, and Marta Arjoria left Havana for an exhibition to be held in the Moscow Museum of Western Art. *Cuba y la URSS* had proudly stated that VOKS had sent the invitation for this exhibition to take place.[134] In addition to this, the Soviet vice president of the Academy of Architecture, Alabain, and the vice president of the Committee for Architecture and member of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Rubanenkov attended an exhibition in Moscow in 1946 that had focused on the urbanization of Havana from the seventeenth century onward.[135]

Invitations to the Soviet Union also extended to individual Cuban citizens with the Soviet Union of Writers inviting Nicolas Guillen to the Soviet Union in 1949, and, on August 11, 1951, Molotov signed the papers for VOKS to invite González Mantici, president of Cuban National Institute of Music, and his wife to Moscow.[136] Molotov authorizing this invitation is hugely important as it evidences both that the Soviet political elite in the form of the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs were cognisant of VOKS work in Cuba, and also subsequently the significance which Moscow attached to these endeavors.

While in Moscow Mantici met Tijon Jrennikov, secretary of the Union of Soviet Composers, visited various museums and libraries and also the Moscow Opera Theatre. Moreover, Mantici was also asked to conduct the Moscow Radio Orchestra with the performance being broadcast to Latin America and throughout the Soviet Union. The journal *Soviet Music* printed a report of this performance which was subsequently reprinted in *Cuba y la URSS* in February 1952. The outcome was that seven years before the Cuban Revolution a Cuban had performed on Soviet radio.[137]

Visits such as Mantici's and Cuban exhibitions being held in the Soviet Union are significant as they demonstrate that the "cultural flows" between the two countries were taking place in both directions and not just from the Soviet Union to Cuba. Moreover, a number of these exhibitions and visits, including Mantici's, took place after 1947 and the closure of the Cuban embassy in Moscow. It appears this closure had not affected cultural links between the two countries. Moreover, they also evidence the level of Soviet interest in Cuba taking place while Stalin was the Soviet leader. Traditionally it has been thought that the changes to Moscow's foreign policy made in the aftermath of his death in March 1953 had sparked Soviet interest in the developing world. However, these cultural interactions with Cuba questions both this, and also that concerning culture Moscow had suffered from "geographical fatalism" prior to the Cuban Revolution.

A degree of serendipity may have impacted the first cultural contacts between the two countries that predate both the Cuban and even Russian Revolution as they resulted from the nature of Cuba-U.S. relations and Russian performers fleeing the Russian Revolution. However, cultural links were much more systematic after the creation of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana. This institute would remain open until the break in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana in early 1952, but in this time a number of prominent Cubans attracted to "dissenting" politics were drawn to the institute and its activities. These activities included organizing Cuban exhibitions in the Soviet Union with leading Cuban performers also being invited to Moscow. Key for the functioning of this institute was the involvement of VOKS, demonstrating both Soviet soft power and consequently the interest which Moscow took in Cuba. This interest was underpinned by the perception of Cuba as a "hot bed" of labor militancy resulting from both the effects of Cuban-U.S. relations and "successes" of the PSP. Significantly, if Soviet cultural influence increased in Cuba, Moscow could subsequently use any revolutionary success on the island to counter anti-Soviet U.S. policy elsewhere in the world, with left-wing activism in Cuba able to both buttress the Soviet bargaining position concerning Eastern Europe and counterbalance Western and U.S. influence in a divided Berlin. The result was that cultural links with Cuba were important for the Kremlin

not only further challenging the assumption that the Soviet Union suffered from "geographical fatalism" prior to January 1959, but this interest was also underpinned by the principle ideas of defensive realism.

Although this was the case, in the aftermath of the disintegration of Soviet-Cuban relations in December 1991 it could be thought that with regards cultural links between the two countries, "geographical fatalism" had materialized within the relationship. Simply in the early to mid-1990s bilateral cultural links disappeared as the relationship suffered a dramatic downturn in general. As detailed throughout this book, this was not a phenomenon that was exclusive to culture, but it would appear to have resonance with the idea that cultural links between the two peoples had been "engineered" for political reasons in the 1959 to 1991 period, adding credence to Pavlov's opinions detailed above.

Key for this disappearance of cultural links was that as Nadya Plankton, joint organizer of the cinema, video, and graphic arts project entitled "Days of the Russian contemporary culture in Havana," held in November 2005, has stated that in the early 1990s Cuba remained a controversial topic in Russia, thus further reducing cultural connections. Moreover, this also made securing funding for possible cultural events problematic, evidenced by Plankton's own personal experience for finding backing for her own venture.[138]

Notwithstanding this, some "one-off" cultural events did take place such as in June 1999 when the Cuban Ministry of Culture, Institute of Language and Literature of the University of Havana and the Jose Marti Library staged a reading of Alexander Pushkin's work to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Russian writer's birth. Furthermore, in 2002 the punk rock group "Porno para Ricardo" used images in their video to symbolize and reflect aspects of Soviet-Cuban relations.[139]

What is key for the above events was the multifaceted legacy from the Soviet era that exists in Russian-Cuban relations in the post-Soviet era. As theorized throughout this book, this legacy impacted both the political and economic relationship, but without the existence of Soviet-Cuban relations in the years from 1959 to 1991 neither of the above two cultural events would have taken place. What also formed part of this legacy was the aforementioned Russian language ability that prevailed in Cuba, but it is also evident in others ways, including as outlined by Jacqueline Loss, the prevalence of Russian names among Cubans belonging to "Generation Y," children born on the island during the 1970s when the Soviet influence on Cuba was at its most intense.[140] Also important were the number of personal relationships that developed between Soviet and Cuban citizens due to the earlier noted movement of peoples between the two countries, predominantly in the 1959 to 1991 era of the relationship. A number of interracial relationships developed between white female Soviet citizens and black male Cubans, with personal

relationships between the two peoples subsequently giving rise to the appearance of a number of *polovinos*, the Cuban term for children born on the island of Soviet/Russian and Cuban parents. It has been estimated that the number of *polovinos* numbers about 1,500 with 500 grandchildren of mixed Soviet/Cuban personal relationships also living in Cuba. This would also give rise to the project entitled "Proyecto mir_xxi_cu" which aimed to promote these citizens individual rights within Cuba.[141] It is not just the existence of *polovinos* that evidences this personal aspect to the Soviet legacy, but over twenty years after the end of Soviet-Cuban relations it has been estimated that some 3,000–10,000 former Soviet citizens live in Cuba permanently. The number of Cubans living in Russia is smaller.[142]

This Soviet era legacy, the fact that as time has passed since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations Cuba has become a less emotive subject within Russian society and a reconceptualization process that is taking place, examined below, are all fundamental in explaining why toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, cultural links between the two countries rematerialized. This has been particularly apparent after Raúl Castro became president of Cuba in 2008. Russia was the "guest of honor" at the 2010 Havana International Book Fair which Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, visited during a trip to Cuba. In the aftermath of this, and with the assistance of the Russian "Mir" Fund, a permanent Russian exhibition was opened in the José Marti National Library in Havana.[143] In October 2012, the Moscow theatre company "Et Cetera" performed in the Cuban capital during a four-day stay in Havana. On June 15, 2015, Lavrov addressed the book launch of Nikolay Leonov's manuscript on Raúl Castro that was published to commemorate the fifty-fifth anniversary of the reestablishment of bilateral diplomatic relations.[144] Additionally, from September 21 to 27, 2015, the "Charles Chaplin" cinema in Havana staged "Russian Cinema Week in Cuba." Moreover, on March 6, 2016, the orchestra of the Mariinski Theatre in St Petersburg directed by Valery Gergiev played in the Cuban capital, while in September 2017 the Contemporary Dance of Cuba performed at an international dance festival in Moscow.[145]

Interestingly, in particular due to Russia and Cuba's agnostic pasts for parts of the twentieth century, in early 2008, the Our Lady of Kazan Russian Orthodox Cathedral was opened in Havana. Medvedev visited this church during his November 2008 trip to Cuba, while Fidel and Raúl Castro have both received honors from the Russian Orthodox Church.[146] Moreover, during his May 2015 trip to Moscow, Raúl Castro met Patriarch Kirill, the Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church. Patriarch Kirill reciprocated this visit when he travelled to Havana in February 2016, during which he visited the Russian Orthodox Church and met Raúl Castro.[147]

Further evidencing cultural connections between the two countries has been the recent opening of two Russian restaurants in the Cuban capital.[148] Nostalgia may play a part in these openings, but since 2008 both governments have begun to make increasing reference to the longevity of the relationship between Moscow and Havana. In May 2018, an exhibition of paintings which focused on Fidel Castro's trip to the Soviet Union in 1963 was opened at the headquarters of the Moscow City Duma.[149] Moreover, crucially this reference to the longevity of the relationship has been not only to the 1959 to 1991 era of the relationship but also to the one that existed prior to the Cuban Revolution. This was most visible during Raúl Castro's January 2009 trip to Moscow when the Cuban leader visited the permanent exhibition at the Museum of the Great Patriotic War to Jorge and Aldo Vivo and Enrique Vilar who had fought for the Red Army during the Second World War.[150] Furthermore, on August 7, 2015, Mikhail Kamynin, Russian ambassador to Cuba, visited the new permanent exhibition in the Museo de la Revolución in Havana to Marina de Gontich, the Russia ballerina who had lived in Havana in the early twentieth century.[151]

Additionally, in January 2009, while in Moscow, Raúl Castro was interviewed by the Russian journal *America Latina,* during which he termed Russian-Cuban relations as "magnificent" and that the two countries are "inextricably" linked.[152] In July 2012, Raúl Castro returned to Moscow and Putin commented, "Cuba is not only an old ally, but remains a great friend." He continued, "All that we have achieved during these past years, it's our common treasure."[153] In February 2013, when he was in Havana, Medvedev reiterated these sentiments during an interview with *Prensa Latina* when he commented, "Our relations with Cuba rest on a formidable basis that had been laid previously. I think it is essential not to squander our past achievements but to build on them."[154]

The Soviet legacy is important for this reconceptualization process, but so is the fact that it is now over twenty-five years since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations and a whole generation of Russian and Cuban citizens have been born since its implosion and cannot remember the halcyon days of its existence during the Cold War period. The two governments making these references to the longevity of the relationship is highlighting to their populaces the interconnected nature of the bilateral relationship and therefore the close nature of the relationship that may otherwise be unexpected due to the geographical distance between the two countries. Moreover, this shared history, and the Russian and Cuban governments' emphasis on the historical memory of it, increases the importance of the constructed history of bilateral relations between Moscow and Havana. This constructed history is important in forming dominant ideas within the ruling elites in both capitals, a number of which

have begun to align (in terms of both nationalism and global viewpoints), and their subsequent identities and interests. At the forefront of these identities and interests has been the advancement of multipolarity. Accordingly, this is also fundamental for their assessment of the international system and their subsequent perception of each other which has been predominantly friendly, but the United States as being hostile.

A level of nostalgia may again be apparent in the number of Russians who now vacation in Cuba which has grown from the year 2000 onwards. Also important for these growing numbers is that a number of Russians possess the wealth to make this trip and Russians do not require entry visas to visit Cuba. In 2003, 10,653 Russians vacationed in Cuba increasing to 78,472 in 2011, 87,518 in 2012 before falling to 71,200 in 2014, 44,208 in 2015, and 65,386 in 2016, before rising to 105,946 in 2017.[155] This 2017 figure may be dwarfed by the in excess of one million Canadians who travel to Cuba each year, but it still makes Russia the eleventh largest source of visitors to Cuba. The result is that presently the number of Russians travelling to Cuba each year is at its highest since the end of Cuban-Soviet relations. The importance which the Cuban government attaches to these Russian tourists is that Russian is one of four language options on the Official Portal of Tourism, Cubatravel.cu. Additionally, Cuba had a presence at both the Seventh International Tourist fair held in March 2012 in Moscow, and also at the twenty-fifth international tourist fair, MITT, held in Moscow in March 2018.[156]

Moreover, Cuba trying to attract Russian tourists can be perceived as an attempt to mitigate the island's reliance on Canadian tourists. In 2016, in excess of one million Canadian tourists vacationed in Cuba. This represented 31 percent of the total number of visitors to the island, with 400 percent more Canadians visiting Cuba than U.S. citizens, the second highest number of citizens from one country who travel to Cuba.[157] In sum, this Cuban attempt to find alternative sources of tourists avoids issues of dependence on Canadian tourists, and subsequently returns to the ideas of realist pragmatism and defensive realism.

As noted in chapter 2, in the second decade of the twenty-first century joint military collaborations have reemerged. These may not be to the level of the Cold War era, but they are highly symbolic, being part of an increase in symbolism within the relationship in general. This was evident during Raúl Castro's January 2009 trip to the Russian capital, which in itself was highly significant as it was the first official visit he had made to Moscow since the end of Cuban-Soviet relations in late 1991. Furthermore, on April 19, 2011, during his closing address to the 6th Congress of the PCC, the fifty-first anniversary of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Raúl Castro thanked Moscow for the assistance and support which the Kremlin had provided in the Revolution's infancy when he said,

> It is appropriate on a day like today to remember that without the help of the peoples who made up that immense country, especially the Russian people, the Revolution would not have been able to survive in those initial years facing growing and continuous imperialist attacks and for this reason we are eternally grateful to them.[158]

Additionally, when Raúl Castro returned to Moscow in July 2012 he visited both the Lenin Mausoleum, something which he had not done during his 2009 trip to the Russian capital, and also placed a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Red Square.[159] Moreover, in May 2016, the "Cuban Five" attended the celebrations in Moscow for the anniversary of the end of the Second World War.[160] Due to the importance of both the "Cuban Five" and the Great Fatherland War in contemporary Cuban and Russian societies respectively, the symbolic significance of their attendance at this celebration is hard to overestimate. Consequently, this symbolism can be perceived as part of the reconceptualization process outlined earlier.

It is not just military collaborations that have rematerialized, because in May 2017 Russia considered becoming involved with the restoration project on the Capitol Building in Havana and collaborations between Russian and Cuban universities, media, and cooperation concerning digital television have all been proposed or agreed.[161] Additionally, in November 2017, Russia also provided Cuba with aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma.[162] The return of bilateral cultural links in the post-Soviet era further questions the concept that cultural links in the 1959 to 1991 period had been "engineered." Notwithstanding this, the Soviet legacy has been key for the cultural links that exist in the years since 1991.

CONCLUSIONS

Both bilateral trade and cultural links existed between Russia and Cuba in all three distinct eras of the relationship that endure since November 1917. Each period has its own distinctions and peculiarities, (e.g., the impact of the Second World War in the 1917 to 1959 period, the increased role of Marxist-Leninism in the 1959 to 1991 era and a Soviet legacy in the post-Soviet period), but a number of commonalities exist between all three. Chief among these is the continuous impact which the United States has had on the relationship.

Moreover, Moscow did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" in the period before the Cuban Revolution, and the reemergence of cultural links in the twenty-first century challenges the idea that cultural links had been "engineered" for political reasons in the 1959 to 1991 era. A degree of

serendipity may have been significant in the first cultural contacts between the two countries that even predate the Russian Revolution, but this was certainly not the case in the years from 1945 to 1952 with the opening of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana. The island's appearance as a "hot bed" of labor militancy, in part due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, was key for this institute being opened because if Moscow did not think that the Cuban polity were ripe for penetration, the institute would never have been commissioned. As with Comintern actions detailed in chapter 2, this institute's activities could be used to further Moscow's foreign policy objectives by increasing pressure on the United States, and strengthening the Kremlin's bargaining position over Eastern Europe, due to a fear of the impact of Soviet inspired left-wing radicalism in U.S. dominated Cuba. As noted, defensive realism underpinned the Kremlin's wish for "buffer states" in Eastern Europe as they endeavored to countervail the United States rather than increase its power vis-à-vis Washington. Additionally, left-wing activism in Cuba could be used to counterbalance Western and U.S. influence closer to Soviet controlled Eastern Europe, and specifically over a divided Berlin. Moreover, the ideas of Tsygankov's and the significance of civilizationists in Russian foreign policy, who believed in the superiority of Russian cultures and ideas in comparison to Western ones, would also appear to have resonance. Furthermore, this Soviet attention occurred before Stalin's death with Moscow's interest in the developing world traditionally having been perceived to have increased from this point onward.

Similarly to cultural links, Moscow showed periodic interest in trade with Cuba prior to January 1959 with poor Soviet agricultural production being key for this interest. Poor production in particularly the early 1920s, during the Second World War and the early 1950s had questioned Soviet food security. Consequently this had necessitated Moscow acquire this important agriculture product from alternative sources with it being logical this would be Cuba due to the island's standing as one of the world's leading sugar producers. Furthermore, this also evidences both the impact of the Soviet internal situation on its international interactions and defensive realism as this Soviet interest was predicated by the desire to safeguard its own security rather than increase its power. The nature of Cuban-U.S. relations was also important, specifically during the Second World War as well as in 1955 when Washington had "approved" the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar.

A reading of the MINREX documents demonstrate the "new realities," vastly different from the foundations of Soviet-Cuban relations due to the prevalence of private Russian banks and businesses, of the early to mid-1990s in bilateral trade relations. Bilateral trade haemorrhaged in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban levels, but these "new realities," however, did not prevent Russia from being Cuba's largest trading partner in

1996. Additionally, the MINREX documents also illustrate the contentious nature of both oil-for-sugar swaps and Cuba's Soviet era debt throughout the 1990s. The importance of these issues was demonstrated by the involvement of both countries' foreign ministers in the discussions over oil-for-sugar exchanges and Cuba's offer to pay its debt in kind. A final resolution to the debt was achieved in July 2014 thereby removing a potential "block" to an increase in Russian-Cuban trade. Although this is the case, contemporary Russian-Cuban trade remains at a low level, but the political will is present in both countries for it to increase. For Russia, a Soviet legacy is important, which is ironic due to the negative perception of bilateral trade that existed in the Soviet Union in the late Soviet period, but so is a desire to try and reestablish the Russian position within the Cuban economy; something which had been lost in the post-Soviet era, resulting from both the impact of the Russian economic transition of the early 1990s and unforeseen consequences of Cuban economic reforms. Additionally, increased trade with Cuba could help mitigate the effects of Western sanctions implemented in the 2010s. For Cuba, realist pragmatism and defensive realism remain central to this wish for trade with Russia to increase. This is the result of the continuing U.S. embargo, an endeavor to avoid potential issues of economic reliance with China and Venezuela appearing, but as Cuban-Venezuelan trade has diminished, to try and acquire alternative trading partners to Venezuela. Similar arguments exist with the Cuban wish to increase the number of Russians vacationing on the island as this would reduce a dependence on Canadian tourists.

Further demonstrating the close nature of the bilateral relationship is that there has been both an increase in symbolism perpetrated by both governments since Raúl Castro became president of Cuba, and also a reconceptualization process of the relationship's heritage. This reconceptualization is to both the 1959 to 1991 period of the relationship and also the era between the Russian and Cuban revolutions, which is important as a complete generation has now been born in both countries since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations in 1991. The significance of this reconceptualization is that it demonstrates the relationship's continuation which could be questioned due to the geographical distance between the two countries. Moreover, this reconceptualization is significant for shaping regnant ruling elite ideas in Moscow and Havana and their consequent perception of the international system. As outlined, for long periods, which is the focus of this book, these perceptions have been as of each other being friendly, but the United States as being hostile.

As with diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana which were the focus of the previous chapter, both bilateral trade and culture links persist between Russia and Cuba in each of the three distinct eras of the relationship since the Russian Revolution. This deepens the central argument of this book; both Moscow and Havana have had rationale to engage with the other

continuously since November 1917, and not as previously noted this being exclusive to the 1959 to 1991 period.

NOTES

1. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2000*, http://www.camaracuba.cu/TPHabana/Estadisticas2000/estadisticas2000.htm. VI-5-VI-7.

2. Thomas, *Cuba*, 728.

3. *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR statisticheskii sbornik 1918–1966* (Moscow: "Mezdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1967), 13.

4. Ibid., 68–69.

5. Garcia and Mironchuk, *Esbozo Histórica de las Relaciones*, 141–42.

6. For reporting on trade with Latin America please see: M. Mikhailov, "Soviet-Argentine Trade Agreement," *Izvestia*, August 15, 1953, 4. O. Ignatiev, "A Movement Prompted by Reality," Komsomolskaya Pravda, January 17, 1954, 4. "Demands in Latin America for Expansion of Trade with USSR and People's Democracies," *Pravda*, March 12, 1955, 4.

7. Rojelio del Campo, "Fruits of an Antinational Policy," *Pravda*, February 22, 1953, 4.

8. "For Expansion of Cooperation between USSR and Latin American Countries," *Pravda*, January 22, 1956, 5.

9. *Pravda*, November 20, 1956, 4.

10. Montes and Alonso Ávila, *Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba*, 518–19.

11. Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RSA), 82/2/1275.

12. G. Rubtsov, "In Cuba," *New Times*, no. 7 (1949): 23–26.

13. "Protocol Number 275 of the Council of Labour and Defence," December 9, 1921. Mamedov and Dalmau, *Rossiia-Kuba*, 29.

14. J. Canton Navarro and M. Duarte Hurtado, *Cuba: 42 anos de Revolución. Cronología historia 1959–1982* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006), 59.

15. *Pravda*, January 23, 1964, 1.

16. *Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)* (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1990), 321.

17. *Vneshiaia Torgovliia SSSR statisticheskii sbornik v 1922–1991* (Moscow: "Mezdunarodnye otnoshenniia," 1992).

18. González, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," 11.

19. Azicri, *Cuba Today and Tomorrow*, 21.

20. Brian H. Pollitt, "Sugar, "Dependency" and the Cuban Revolution," *Development and Change* 17 (1986): 196. Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago have also made similar points. Blasier, "The End of the Cuban-Soviet Partnership," 60. Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba," 138.

21. *Vneshiaia Torgovliia SSSR statisticheskii sbornik v 1989–1990*,", 5. Bilateral trade may have risen exponentially, but this did not mean that problems within the bilateral trade relationship did not exist. In the MINREX archive a book entitled *URSS 1983 negociones comerciales* exists which contains a number of bilateral

correspondences which illuminate issues within the trade relationship. This book details problems in 1978 with the Cuban export of citrus fruit, cigarettes and rum and in 1980 with sugar, citrus fruit and rum. *URSS 1983 negociones comerciales*, MINREX, 4. Moreover, in a letter dated April 21, 1983, V.I. Vorortnikov, Soviet ambassador to Cuba wrote to Ricardo Cabrisas concerning a meeting that had taken place between German Amado-Blanco and V.N. Burmistrov, SU Commercial Representative in Cuba when Burmistrov had admitted problems with Soviet deliveries to Cuba. Vorotnikov wrote, "He acknowledges enormous difficulties in supplying the foodstuffs of the Soviet people in 1982 due to the extremely unfavourable conditions for agriculture during the last three years." V.I. Vorortnikov to Ricardo Cabrisas, April 21, 1983, MINREX.

22. On gaining membership to the CMEA Cuban trade with CMEA countries increased, but consequently fell with the Soviet Union. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba*, 1975 (Havana: Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, 1976), 159. Concerning this, and writing about the Soviet reasons for wanting Cuba to join the CMEA, Pavlov has written, "Another important consideration, namely, the desire to share the burden of sustaining the Cuban economy with Eastern European socialist countries, was also present." Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959–1991*, 94. For further analysis of the impact of Cuban membership to the CMEA please see Serguei Volkov, "Acerca de la elección de la estructura de la economía nacional: La experiencia de Cuba," *América Latina*, no. 2 (1977): 55–72. "Carlos Rafael Rodríguez sobre la cooperación de Cuba con la URSS y los países del Came," *América Latina*, no. 1 (1983): 38–43.

23. Luis Felipe Vásquez to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, October 19, 1987, MINREX.

24. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba*, 1975, 1980 (Havana: Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, 1981), 168 and 184–205. For analysis of Soviet–Cuban economic relations after Cuba's membership of the CMEA please see amongst others: Julio Diaz Vázquez, *Cuba y el CAME* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988). A.D. Bekareich, "USSR-Cuba. Collaboration of Experience and Perspectives," in *USSR-Latin America. Collaboration of Writings and Perspectives* (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 41–53. Rodríguez, "Las Relaciones Económicas Cuba-URSS."

25. Jorge Pérez-López, "Cuban-Soviet Sugar Trade: Price and Subsidy Issues," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 7, no. 1 (1988): 134–47. Domínguez, *Cuba. Order and Revolution*, 155–58.

26. Pérez-López, "Cuban-Soviet Sugar Trade," 143–45.

27. Ibid., 135. Carmelo Mesa-Lago has also spoken of this trend with the CMEA in general. Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba," 154.

28. *Granma*, December 31, 1990, 1. Concerning these changes Cole Blasier has written, "The new principle underlying Soviet aid to Cuba was mutual or reciprocal interest—a polite way of saying that the relationship should no longer mainly benefit Cuba." Blasier, "The End of the Cuban-Soviet Partnership," 88. This Soviet desire was further evident in a memo sent from Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to Yuri Petrov, Soviet ambassador to Cuba, in June 1990 stating that Moscow wanted to try and reduce its commitment of 70 tonnes of tactical technology that was due to be shipped to Cuba in the years from 1990 to 1992. Nikolai Ryzhkov

to Yuri Petrov, June 1990, Fond 89: Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Trial, Finding Aid 10, Dello 62, 1. Moreover, in a conversation between Yuri Petrov, Soviet ambassador to Cuba, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in late August 1990, the Cuban leadership is acknowledged as, "developing an understanding of the unavoidable need for changes in the character of our commercial-economic ties, and that the necessary steps to transfer our cooperation onto a new basis in connection with the move to paying the USSR in SKV [freely convertible currency]." From the Diary of Yu. V. Petrov, Record of a Conversation with the Deputy Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of Cuba, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, August 31, 1990, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F.89, op, d.61, I, 1.

29. From the Diary of Yu. V. Petrov, August 31, 1990.

30. From the Diary of Yu. V. Petrov, "Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro," June 20, 1990, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F.89, op, d.62, I, 2.

31. José Ramón Balaguer, "Los Consideraciones sobre La Evolucion de los Acontecimientos en la URSS partir de los sucesos del 19 Agosto de 1991," RS/8711. RDI.344, MINREX, 10.

32. *Granma*, October 23, 1991, 2–3. Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba," 133–96. Bain, *Soviet-Cuban Relations 1985–1991*, 58–67. Mervyn J. Bain, "Cuban-Soviet Relations in the Gorbachev Era," *The Journal of Latin American Studies* 27, Part 4 (November 2005): 777.

33. *Vneshiaia Torgovliia v 1989–1990*, 1991, 5 and *Vneshiaia Torgovliia v 1986*, 1987, 259 and 265. *Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)* (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1991), 135. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2000*, VI-5-VI-7. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1999* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999), 392.

34. Trade in 1992 was 825,977 million pesos, 533,131 million in 1993 and just 322,882 million in 1994. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2000*, VI-5-VI-7. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1999*, 392.

35. Raúl Castro, "Raúl Castro: Reasons and Revelations," *Latinskaia Amerika*, no. 9 (1993): 22.

36. "Danos y perjuicios a la economía Cubana como consecuencia de la abrupta y unilateral interrupción de los vínculos económica-comerciales con la extinta URSS," May 20, 1998, MINREX, 8–9.

37. Mervyn J. Bain, "Russia, Cuba and Colonial Legacies in the Twenty-First Century," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15, no. 1 (March 2017): 1–17.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Rogelio Montenegro, "La Economía Rusa en el verano 1994: Nuevo punto de inflexión en la Crisis economía?" October 12, 1994, MINREX, 1.

41. Ibid., 1–2.

42. Ibid., 2–3.

43. Jose Luis Rodríguez to I. Materov, October 28, 1996, MINREX.

44. *Granma*, September 8, 1992, 3–6.

45. Pascal Fletcher, "Russian Norilsk Looking at Cuban Plant—Sources," *Cubanet*, November 4, 1999, https://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/CNews/y99/nov99/05e6.htm.

46. "Informe Sobre Reunión de Homólogos Efectuada el 10-7-97 en el Minvec en Relación con el Proyecto de Convenio Intergubernamental tal con Rusia Para Terminación y Puesta en exploración CEN 'Jaragua," July 11, 1997, MINREX.

47. Roberto Robaina to Ibrahim Ferradaz, January 10, 1998, MINREX.

48. On July 21, 1992 Cabrisas sent a memo to Alarcón that detailed these discussions between Cuba and Russia. This included that Balaguer, Cuban ambassador in Moscow, had met officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations and had discussed the talks which had been taking place between the two countries in September 1991 regarding trade. Ricardo Cabrisas to Ricardo Alarcón, July 21, 1992, MINREX, 1.

49. "Memoria de las conversaciones de expertos de cuba y Rusia sobre la colaboración en objetivos de inversionistas para el periodo 1993–1996," December 22, 1992, MINREX.

50. "Síntesis de la relaciones económico-comercial entre Cuba y Federación de Rusia a partir 1992," December 1992, MINREX, 3, 6–7.

51. Ibid., 1–2.

52. Memo from the Government of Cuba to the Government of Russia, March 5, 1994, MINREX, 2.

53. Ricardo Cabrisas to Roberto Robaina, September 2, 1996, MINREX.

54. Roberto Robaina to Evgeny Primakov, September 9, 1996, MINREX.

55. Ibid.

56. "Consideraciones sobre las relaciones económica-comerciales entre Cuba y Rusia y la Federación de Rusia," May 1996, MINREX.

57. Luis García to Isabel Allende, June 24, 1997, MINREX.

58. Roberto Robaina to Evengeny Primakov, October 14, 1997, MINREX.

59. Evgeny Primakov to Roberto Robaina, February 16, 1998, MINREX.

60. Roberto Robaina to Sergey Ivanov, December 15, 1998, MINREX.

61. Transcript of Telephone conversation Felipe Pérez Roque and Igor Ivanov, November 23, 1999, MINREX.

62. Yevgeny Bai, "Toricelli Bill also Affects Russia. U.S. Toughens Sanctions against Cuba," *Izvestia*, October 26, 1992, 7.

63. Nikolai Vlasov, "Economic Cooperation with Cuba is in Russia's Interests," *Moscow News*, Num 12, March 19, 1993, 5.

64. I. Glasov, G. Kara-Murza and A. Batchikov, *El Libro Blanco. Las reformas neoliberales en Rusia, 1991–2004* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2007), 111. Interestingly in late August 1990, a report of a conversation between Petrov and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, states, "C.R. Rodríguez tried to found his proposals (on the assertion) that the Soviet Union will not be able to get by without Cuban sugar, insofar as, in his words, in the near term, a significant increase in production of this product will probably not be possible in the USSR." From the Diary of Yu. V. Petrov, August 31, 1990.

65. Pérez-López, "The Cuban Economy," 33–34.

66. Vlasov, "Economic cooperation with Cuba," 5.

67. Stanislav Kondrashov, "Language of Gestures in Putin's Diplomacy," *Vremya*, December 22, 2000, 3.

68. S. Batchikov, "The Cuba That We are Loosing and Everyone Else is Finding," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 14, 1997, 2.

69. S. Batchikov, "Rossiisko-Kubinskie otnosheniia: Retropektiva, nastoiashchee, perspektiva," *Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurna*l, no. 11 (1994): 38, 45.

70. *Izvestia*, May 19, 1999, 4.

71. *Cronología de Cuba 1996*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX), 32.

72. Luis García to Isabel Allende, August 5, 1996, MINREX.

73. Batchikov, "The Cuba That We are Loosing," 2.

74. Interfax in English 1753 GMT June 6, 1997.

75. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2008*, http://www.one.cu/aec2008.htm, 8.4–8.6. *International Trade Statistics Year Books*, 2013, https://comtrade.un.org/ITSY2013VolI.pdf. *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2017*, http://www.one.cu/aec2016/08 percent20Sector percent20Externo.pdf, 8.3–8.4. *International Trade Statistics Year Books*, 2016, https://comtrade.un.org/ITSY2016VolI.pdf.

76. "Resumen sobre los resultados de la visita del compañero Ricardo Cabrisas, Ministerio del Exterior Económico, al la Federación de Rusia," May 8, 1995, MINREX, 5.

77. The level of Cuba's debt accrued to the Kremlin in the years from 1959 to 1991 have varied, but the Russian State Duma estimated it to be 17 billion roubles. Leonid Velekhov, "Full Circle: Fidel Castro is State Duma's New Friend. Deputies Eager to 'Revive Cuban Economy," *Sevodnya*, January 13, 1995, 3.

78. German Amado-Blanco memo to Ricardo Cabrisas, July 14, 1992, MINREX, 1.

79. On August 5, 1997 Jesús Montana, MINREX official, sent a report to Fidel Castro stating that the Bank of Russia may be interested in financing the completion of Juragua and refinancing part of the Soviet era Cuban debt. Jesus Montana to Fidel Castro, August 5, 1997, MINREX. On March 19, 1998 Cabrisas wrote to Sergey Shoigu, President of Intergovernment Commission, regarding the meeting of this commission which had taken place on February 19–20, 1998 in Havana. At this it was agreed that the National Bank of Russia and Vnesheconombank would in principle liquidate Cuba's debt. Ricardo Cabrisas to Sergey Shoigu, March 19, 1998, MINREX.

80. Isabel Allende to Carlos Lage, August 10, 1999, MINREX.

81. Ricardo Cabrisas to Sergey Shoigu, August 17, 1999, MINREX, 2. Cuban paying part of its Soviet era debt "in kind" to Moscow was returned to in August 2001 when Felipe Pérez Roque wrote to Igor Ivanov. Felipe Pérez Roque to Igor Ivanov, August 27, 2001, MINREX.

82. Francisco Soberon to Kaisanov, October 5, 1999, MINREX, 1.

83. Ibid., 1–3.

84. Felipe Pérez Roque to Francisco Soberon, October 9, 1991, MINREX.

85. Ibid.

86. Dimitri Medvedev, "Interview with *Prensa Latina*, Russian Foreign Ministry," February 23, 2013, http://www.government.ru/docs/22956. "Putin anuncia incremento de la colaboración con Cuba," *Granma*, July 12, 2014, 5. An earlier agreement regarding Cuba's Soviet era debt had been signed in September 2005, which deferred its payment. ITARR-TASS News Agency, September 15, 2005.

87. *Anuario Estadístico 2017*, 8–10.

88. Carlos Alzugaray Treto, "Cuban-Chinese Relations after the End of the Cold War," in *Cuba in a Global Context. International Relations, Internationalism, and Transnationalism*, ed. Catherine Krull (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014), 98.

89. *Anuario Estadístico 2014*, 8.3–8.4.

90. Ibid., 8.6. On July 8, 2016, in his address to the National Assembly of People's Power Raúl Castro evidenced possible Cuban economic reliance on Venezuela when he said, "…is a certain reduction in the supply of fuel contracted with Venezuela, despite the intention of President Nicolás Maduro and his government to fulfill this commitment. Of course, this has caused additional tensions in the functioning of the Cuban economy." Raúl Castro Ruz, "The Revolutionary Cuban People Will again Rise to the Occasion," *Granma*, July 13, 2016, http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-07-13/the-revolutionary-cuban-people-will-again-rise-to-the-occasion.

91. "Raúl Castro Receives the President of Russian Oil Company Rosneft," *Prensa Latina*, December 17, 2017, http://plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=22342&SEO=raul-castro-receives-th-president-of-russian-oil-compnay-rosneft.

92. "Russia, Cuba Sign Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Pact, 2010," *RIA Novosti*, December 31, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101231/162003225.html.

93. Medvedev, "Interview with *Prensa Latina*." Moreover, on June 30, 2000 Ricardo Cabrisas wrote to Carlos Lage concerning a recent meeting with Shoigu when continuing Russian interest in the completion of the Juragua nuclear plant was shown. This interest even included possible Chinese assistance, which had been discussed when Putin had been in Peking. Ricardo Cabrisas to Carlos Lage, June 30, 2000, MINREX. This further evidences Russian attention in the Cuban economy.

94. Valentina Matvienko, "Interview with Granma," *Granma*, May 22, 2013, http://www.granma.cu/idiomas/ingles/international-i/30may-Valentina.html.

95. "Recibió Raúl al Vicepresidente del Gobierno ruso," *Juventud Rebelde*, December 20, 2014, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2014-12-20/recibio-raul-al-vicepresidente-del-gobierno-ruso.

96. "Raúl se reúne hoy con Putin," *Cubadebate*, May 7, 2015, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2015/05/07/raul-se-reune-hoy-con-putin/#.VUzrHHNwYdW.

97. "Rusia y Cuba construirán un aeropuerto internacional en La Habana," *Correo del Orinoco*, April 19, 2013, http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/multipolaridad/rusia-y-cuba-construiran-un-aeropuerto-internacional-habana/.

98. Vladimir Putin, "Putin por una Amerika Latina India, sostenible e independiente," *Granma*, July 11, 2014, 8.

99. "Putin anuncia incremento de la colaboración con Cuba."

100. Taras Litvinenko, "Russia Ready to Invest $1.35Bln in Cuba's Thermal Power Plants," *Sputnik News*, March 29, 2016, http://sputniknews.co/business/20160329/1037170966/russia-cuba-power-investments.html. "El Embajador de la Federación de Rusia en Cuba: Los cubanos continua siendo aliados leales de Rusia," *Edición de la Embajada*, 14. "Rusia en la Internacional de la Habana 'FIHAV-2015.'" *Edición de la Embajada*, 25.

101. "Llega a Cuba primer cargamento de Lasas Vesta y Largus proveniented de Rusia," *Cubadebate*, January 19, 2018, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/01/19/llega-a-cuba-primer-cargamento-de-la. "Locomotoras rusas impulsaran

desarrollo de la industria azucarera en Holguín," *Cubadebate*, March 22, 2018, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/03/22/locomotoras-rusas-impulsaran-desarro….

102. "Rusia y Cuba analizan cooperación en esferas de industria y comercio," May 25, 2018, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/05/25/rusia-y-cuba-analizan-cooperacion-en-esferas-de-industria-y-comerico/.

103. As previously noted, on August 9, 2018 further U.S. sanctions against Russia were announced. Philp, "US to Sanction Russia."

104. "Días de la cultura cubano en la URSS," *América Latina*, no. 6 (1984): 47–53. Jacqueline Loss, *Dreaming in Russian, The Cuban Soviet Imaginary* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013).

105. From the Diary of Yu. V. Petrov, June 20, 1990. Moscow ITAR-TASS in Eng 2051 GMT December 15, 00 (FBIS LAT 20001216, CEP20001216000078).

106. Quoted in Nye, *Soft Power*, 11 and 73.

107. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance*, 249. Further evidencing the difference between the two peoples was the Cuban term *bolos* to describe Soviet citizens on the island, and that during Putin's trip to Cuba in December 2000, one Cuba was quoted as saying, "…we don't dance like Russians, we don't eat like Russians, and we don't even drink vodka." Loss, *Dreaming in Russian*, 2 and 4.

108. M.A. Rossiiskii, *Rossiia zarbezh'e na Kuba. Strancy istorii* (Moscow: Veche, 2002), 8–13.

109. Ibid., 22. For a more comprehensive catalogue of performances by Russians in Cuba in this period please see I.U.V. Pogosov, *Vmeste na vse vremena* (Moscow: Molodaiaa Gvardiia, 1988).

110. *Rossiiskii, Rossiia zarbezh'e na Kuba*, 8–13, 33 and 142. For the cultural links between Cuba and the United States please see Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 202–36.

111. *Rossiiskii, Rossiia zarbezh'e na Kuba*, 24 and 166–67.

112. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 1 (August 1945): 2–3.

113. The cost of membership to the institute was $1 per year, for which members received monthly copies of *Cuba y la URSS*, were able to attend functions organised by the Institute which included film screenings and recitals of Russian music, could utilize the institute's library of Russian music and could participate in Russian language courses. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 38 (November 1948): 53 and *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 56 (May 1950): 53.

114. Anatoli Kafman, "La amistadad de los Ajedreasitas Rusos y Cubanos," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 2 (September 1945): 5–6.

115. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 19 (February 1947): 30–32 and *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 18 (January 1947): 31.

116. For various film screenings please see *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 1 (August 1945): 24. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 5 (May 1946): 30. *Cuba y la URSS*, Nums 22–23 (May–June 1947): 35–36 and *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 39 (December 1948): 53. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 44 (May 1949): 51.

117. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 51 (December 1949): 51.

118. "Exposición de Moscú," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 20 (March 1947): 16–18. For further photographic exhibitions please see, "La Mujer en la URSS," *Cuba y la*

URSS, Num 39 (December): 53. "Enseñanza para Ejercer los Derretíos Democracia en la URSS," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 40 (January 1949): 53. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 49 (October 1949): 53 and *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 55 (April 1950): 53.

119. "La URSS, Socialismo y Cultura," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 56 (May 1950): 53.

120. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 57 (June 1950): 53.

121. *Cuba y la URSS*, Nums 22–23 (May–June 1947): 40–41 and 16–17.

122. Tuelgeun Tazhibaiev, "La Universidad del Estado de Kazajstan," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 59 (August 1950): 42. Liudmila Dubrovina, "Las Publicanes para nina,"*Cuba y la URSS*, Num 59 (August 1950): 21–22. V. Renard, "La Television Sovietica," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 62 (November 1950): 14–16. Nikolai Sabetski, "Alexandr Popov, Inventor de la Radion," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 69 (July 1951): 8–10.

123. "El Pació de Cultura de los Mineros de Karaganda," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 73 (November 1951): 26–30. "El Museu V.I. Lenin," Cuba y la URSS, Num 75 (January 1952): 25. Valentin Durov, "50 anos de rusos boxeo," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 35 (August 1948): 49. *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 61 (October 1950): 1–28.

124. Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," 10.

125. Nye, *Soft Power*, 6.

126. Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 32.

127. Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," 196.

128. "Emisiones de Moscu para La América Latina," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 21 (April 1947): 29.

129. Quoted in O.D. Kameneva, "Cultural Raprochment: The USSR Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries," *Pacific Affairs* 1, no. 5 (October 1928): 6.

130. Ludmila Stern, "The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and French Intellectuals, 1925–29," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 45, no. 1 (1999): 109.

131. "Homenaje al encargado de negocios de la URSS, SR Dimitri Zaikin," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 5 (May 1945): 30.

132. "Felicitación de los Intelectuales Soviéticos con motive deal an Nuevo," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 53 (February 1950): 53.

133. N. Yaborskaia, "Pintura Cubana en Moscú," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 1 (August 1945): 2.

134. "Obras cubanos Expuestas en Moscú," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 38 (November 1948): 53.

135. "Exposiciones Cubana de Arquitectura y Urbanismo en la URSS," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 4 (April 1946): 28.

136. *Cuba-URSS Crónica*, 520.

137. "Un Músico Cubano Visita La Unión Soviética," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 75 (January 1952): 3–5. "En la Sección de Música de la VOKS," *Cuba y la URSS*, Num 11 (November 1951): 51.

138. Plankton, "Inferiority Complex of Post-Pioneers."

139. Loss, *Dreaming in Russian*.

140. Ibid., 4.

141. Ibid., 22–24. Additionally, the author Piotr Mironchuk who has been referenced at various times throughout this book, had a Soviet and Cuban parent.

142. Ibid., 23.

143. The MIR Fund was created in 2007 with the goal of promoting Russian culture, and in particular Russian language around the world. http://www.russkimir.ru.

144. "Le Semana de Teatro Ruso en La Habana," *Edicion de la Embajada de la Federación de Rusia en Cuba*, no. 11 (2012): 20. "Participación del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Rusia Serguey Lavrov en la presentación del Libro de Nikolay Leonov, 'Raúl Castro,'" *Edición de la Embajada*, 22. As noted in chapter 2, Leonov and Raúl Castro had spent time with each other as they travelled from Europe to Latin America on the same ship in 1953.

145. "Semana de Cine Ruso en Cuba," *Edición de la Embajada*, 29. "Danza Contemporánea de Cuba asistirá a importante festival en Rusia," *Cubadebate*, September 19, 2017, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/09/18/danza-contemporanea-de-cuba-asistira….

146. "65 Aniversario de la Gran Victoria," 2010, *Edicion de la Embajada de la Federación de Rusia en Cuba*, no. 4 (2010): 28.

147. "Patriarch Kirill meets with President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers of Cuba Raul Castro Ruz," The Russian Orthodox Church, May 8, 2015, https://mospat.ru/en/2015/05/08/news118856/.

148. Loss, *Dreaming in Russian*.

149. "Russia Stresses Importance of Exhibition on Fidel Castro," *Prensa Latina*, May 15, 2018, http://plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=28203&SEO=russia-stresses-importance-of-exhibition-on-fidel-castro-photos.

150. "65 Aniversario de la Gran Victoria," *Edicion de la Embajada de la Federación de Rusia en Cuba*, no. 4 (2010): 28.

151. "A la Memoria de la Cantante Rusa de Opera Marina de Gonitch," *Edición de la Embajada*, 28.

152. Raúl Castro, "Hoy las relaciones entre Rusia y Cuba son excelente. Entrevista al Presidente del Consejo de Estado de Cuba," *América Latina*, no. 3 (2009): 6.

153. Yaima Meneses Puig, "Intensa y muy útil visita de trabajo," *Juventud Rebelde*, July 12, 2012, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu.

154. Medvedev, "Interview with Prensa Latina."

155. *Anuario Estadístico 2017*, 15.6, http://www.one.cu/aec2016/15 percent-20Turismo.pdf. "Cuba Attends Noteworthy Russian Tourism Fair," *Prensa Latina*, March 13, 2018, http://plenglish.com/index.php?0=rn&id=25523&SEO=cuba-attends-noteworthy-russiian-tourism-fair/.

156. Antonio Rondón García, "Cuba presente en feria de turismo rusa Inturmarket-2012," *Prensa Latina*, March 19, 2012, http://www.prensalatina.cu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=488940. "Cuba Attends Noteworthy Russian Tourism Fair."

157. *Anuario Estadístico 2014*, 15.3. Travel to Cuba for U.S. citizens remains prohibited, but under the changes instigated President Barack Obama 12 categories for travel to the island now exist, explaining the upsurge in the number of U.S. citizens now traveling to Cuba. For the 12 categories please see: U.S. Embassy in Cuba. https

://cu.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/traveling-to-cuba/.

158. Raúl Castro, "Central Report to the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba," *Granma*, April 16, 2011, http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba-i/16-abril-central.html.

159. Yaima Meneses Puig, "Mañana de homenaje y recordación," *Juventud Rebelde*, July 12, 2012, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2012/07/-12.

160. "Triunfo soviético contra el fascismo inspiro a antiterroristas cubanos," *Juventud Rebelde*, May 9, 2016, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu.internacionales/2016-05-09/triunfo soviético contra el fascismo inspiro a antiterroristas cubanos.

161. "Rusia podría participar en reparación de cúpula del Capitolio habanero," *Cubadebate*, May 15, 2017, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/05/15/rusia-podria-participar-en-reparacion-de-cupula-del-capitolio-habanero/. "Universidades de Cuba y Rusia consideran creación de observatorio de geoinformática," *Cubadebate*, February 13, 2018, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/02/13/universidades-de-cuba-y-rusia-consideran-crwacion-de-observatorio-de-geoinformatica/. "Cuba, Russia Foreign Ministries Discuss Press Cooperation," *Prensa Latina*, November 25, 2017, http://plenglish.com/index.php?0=rn&id=21525&SEO=cuba-russia-foreign-ministries-discss-press-cooperation. "Cuba y Rusia firman acuerdo de cooperación tecnológica para impulsar la televisión digital," *Cubadebate*, March 24, 2018, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/03/24/cuba-y-rusia-firman-acuerdo-de-cooperacion-tecnologica-para-impulsar-la-television-digital/.

162. "Rusia entrega a Cuba donativo para damnificados por el huracán Irma," *Cubadebate*, November 20, 2017, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/11/20.rusia-entrega-a-cuba-donativo-para-damnificados-por-el-huracan-irma-fotos/.

Chapter 5

Final Thoughts on an Enduring Friendship

This book has focused on Moscow and Havana bilateral relations from the time of the Russian Revolution to the contemporary situation. In this period geopolitics, Russia and Cuba, both individually and also the relationship between to the two countries have all undergone fundamental change. Although this is the case, it has been argued that both countries have had rationale to engage with the other in each of the three disparate eras that have persisted since November 1917 (from the time of the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution, from 1959 to 1991 and in the post-1992 era), and not only in the thirty-year period from the Cuban Revolution until the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 as has traditionally been thought.

In order to form this supposition, it has also been concluded that although each period of the relationship has its own peculiarities and nuances, a number of conjoint themes, or commonalities, exist between the three eras. The key commonality has been Washington's relationships with Moscow and Havana individually, and in combination. For the most part these relationships have been contentious (for Moscow this included attempts to crush the Russian Revolution in its infancy, the non-recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933 and the tension of the Cold War era; for Revolutionary Cuba, this has been near continuous aggression since 1959 that has been both political and economic). Even outwith these periods detailed, concerning Moscow most notably during the Second World War and in the early to mid-1990s and for Cuba in the years prior to 1959, the United States relationships with Moscow and Havana, respectively, continued to impact Soviet/Russian-Cuban relations.

Two contrasting paradigms—realism and constructivism—have been used to provide two divergent elucidations for the enduring nature of Moscow-Havana relations. Due to the apparent assertiveness of Moscow's foreign

policy at various times since November 1917, it could be assumed that offensive realism was paramount for understanding the Kremlin's motives for engaging with Cuba. However, it has been theorized throughout this book that defensive realism has underpinned Soviet/Russian and Cuban engagement with one another.

The Kremlin has been able to use its relationship with Havana to counter U.S. anti-Soviet policies elsewhere in the world and create a global Soviet alliance to countervail the United States. In the post-Soviet era this has taken the form of Moscow's desire for a multipolar world, with defensive realism continuing to have resonance for Moscow's interest in Cuba in the twenty-first century with the advent of the "Putin doctrine" that is ultimately designed to garner support for the Russian government rather than increase Russian power at the expense of the United States. Defensive realism has been key for Cuba's relations with Moscow since January 1959 due to repeated U.S. attempts to crush the Cuban Revolution, noted earlier. Again, Havana was not endeavoring to reduce U.S. power as its own increased, as offensive realism would suppose, but rather offset Washington's hostility.

However, even during the Second World War, when Moscow-Washington relations were not contentious, defensive realism continued to impact Soviet-Cuban relations. This resulted from the Kremlin entering a wartime alliance with Washington and London. Previous animosity was set aside with the Allies endeavoring to curb Nazi expansionism. With relation to the Soviet Union, Nazi aggression challenged not only Soviet security but also the very survival of the Russian Revolution. In short, defensive realism underpinned this wartime alliance. However, due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations at this time, a bi-product of the alliance was the appearance of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana. The importance of the United States in the creation of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations was evidenced by not only that successive Soviet charge d'affaires did not live on the island, but rather in Washington, and also that in December 1943 Andrei Gromyko presented his credentials as the Soviet representative to Cuba to President Roosevelt of the United States.

The importance of Soviet/Russian and Cuba's unique histories are increased as they also underscore the selection of constructivism with which to examine the relationship. Unlike defensive realism, constructivism is not ethnocentric. Furthermore, constructivism also excels at explaining change within international relations. As posited, a number of constant norms may have affected Moscow-Havana relations since November 1917, but there has also been great change within both countries and the international system.

Moreover, Washington's anti-Russian/Soviet U.S. policies have intensified the traditional Russian fear of insecurity, vital to Ronald Grigor Suny's contention of the role of constructivism within the Kremlin's foreign policy. As

theorized by Grigor Suny, constant factors in Russian history are fundamental in shaping regnant opinions within the Moscow ruling elite, and their ensuing perception of the international system. As Alexander Wendt has stated, "Anarchy is what you make of it,"[1] with subsequently for long periods of time Moscow perceiving Washington as unfriendly. This offers an alternative understanding of the animosity that existed between Moscow and Washington. However, as detailed in chapter 1, in the mid- to late 1980s, an alteration in predominant elite ideas in Moscow (the new ideas questioned traditional held Soviet beliefs including the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the Soviet desire for nuclear parity, and the inevitability of world revolution) permits a constructivist interpretation for the reduction in superpower tension in the mid- to late 1980s and eventual end of the Cold War to be posited. Additionally, in the immediate post-Soviet years a further change occurred in primary Russian ruling elite ideas (a belief in the universality of neoliberal economic thinking), resulting in the perception of the United States as an ally in the Russian economic transition, thus Russian-U.S. relations further improved. However, in the mid-1990s, Russian principal elite ideas altered again and away from its pro-Western leanings of the initial post-Soviet years toward a more nationalistic macro-level orientation. Subsequently, Moscow perceived Washington differently within global politics, and much more antagonistically.

Furthermore, the revolutionary Cuban elite's constructed history of Havana-Washington relations and U.S. aggression against the island has helped to shape their predominant ideas (after January 1959 a vehemently independent nationalist Cuba that featured increased social justice that was no longer subservient to the United States, but also comprised a global viewpoint). Consequently, these primary beliefs are central to both their consequent perception of the international system and desire to fundamentally change Cuban-U.S. relations. This returns to Wendt's hypothesis that U.S. military power is perceived very differently (and as a threat) in Cuba when compared to Canada.[2] Subsequently, constructivism provides both an explanation for the hostile nature of relations between Havana and Washington, and also for cordial Moscow-Havana relations. Simply, for the most part of the time period which is the focus of this book, both Moscow and Havana perceived Washington as a threat, but each other as friends. The perception of friendship between Moscow and Havana has been augmented by at various times the two countries' regnant elite ideas concurring. In the years from 1961 to 1991 this was with regards societies founded on economic equality and state ownership of property, and from the mid-1990s onwards in terms of nationalism and global viewpoints.

Defensive realism and constructivism may view the international system very differently, and consequently offer two divergent explanations for

Moscow-Havana relations, but at various times the relationship has been affected by other theories and concepts. This includes the Great Man Theory, the superclient/surrogate thesis, and from January 1959 onward Cuban counter-dependency. Moreover, at other junctures, concepts in Soviet/Russian foreign policy such as Andrei Tsygankov's premise on the significance of the role of statists, due to the historic fear of outside aggression statists are prepared to die for sovereignty and independence, have also been significant. Additionally, the relationship has also been affected by a synergy of domestic and foreign policy issues in both countries, vividly demonstrated with the defeat of the "Cuba lobby" in the Soviet Union with the failure of the August 1991 coup. Members of the coup may have acted to curb further reform within the Soviet Union, but many of them were also prominent within the "Cuba lobby" which had been able to influence Moscow's Cuba policy. The lobby's power was evident after their defeat as change in the relationship rapidly accelerated, evidenced by Gorbachev's announcement on September 11, 1991, to remove the final Soviet troops from Cuba, less than one month after the coup had been defeated.

Four key thematic issues (foreign policy, ideology, diplomacy and statecraft, and economics and culture) have individually been scrutinized with each awarded its own chapter. In each chapter the importance of defensive realism and constructivism has been given due attention. Chapter 2 theorized that ideology, or a system of ideas and beliefs, has constantly influenced the bilateral relationship since November 1917. Bilateral relations existed between two socialist states only during one period; from the time of Fidel Castro's pronouncement in December 1961 that he, and thus also the Cuban Revolution, was Marxist-Leninist, until December 1991 and the implosion of the Soviet Union.

As posited, an unforeseen effect of Cuban economic dependence on the United States in the era prior to the Cuban Revolution was that the island had an appearance as a "hot bed" of labor radicalism. Consequently this drew the focus of the Third International, or Comintern, particularly during the organization's "third period," especially at the time of the island's general strike in the summer of 1933, and the era of its "popular front" strategy from the mid-1930 until the mid-1940s, respectively. This attention was driven not only by the language of world revolution but also by the Comintern's realist foundations. The Kremlin could utilize any potential labor radicalism in Cuba, orchestrated by this organization, to intensify pressure on the United States (this resulted from U.S. economic domination of the island) to moderate its anti-Soviet policies, including as noted, western attempts to crush the fledgling Bolshevik administration and non-recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933. Furthermore, Comintern inspired labor militancy in Cuba evidenced the permanency of the Bolshevik administration, also important for

U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, because by the 1930s it had become apparent that the Bolshevik government was not going to simply implode. Consequently, Comintern activities in Cuba were in accordance with the Third International being an integral part of the Kremlin's "dual track" diplomacy as it could be used to bolster Bolshevik foreign policy objectives. This strategy persisted throughout the Comintern's existence, and even after Washington had diplomatically recognized the Soviet Union. As elucidated, defensive realism underscored both elements of Moscow's "dual track" diplomacy as it was designed to countervail Washington rather that increase its power at the expense of the United States. Furthermore, Comintern interest in Cuba was in accordance with Moscow's policies toward the developing world in general, with the Kremlin having more interest in the impact of revolutionary actions on the metropolitan states rather than the developing country per se. This was still applicable to Cuba due to its relationship with the United States.

After the appearance of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, despite the pre-1959 relationship appearing to have "disappeared" due to the Cuban Socialist Party's involvement with Fulgencio Batista's government, the vernacular of Marxist-Leninism, and desire for an international socialist community persisted. However, in a similar manner to the period from November 1917 to January 1959, Moscow could use its relationship with Cuba to counteract anti-Soviet U.S. policies elsewhere in the world. A flourishing relationship between Moscow and Havana augmented a Soviet global alliance which could balance the United States. Furthermore, Soviet-Cuban relations countered Chinese accusations of Soviet revisionism. The burgeoning relationship was also aided by the close personal affinity that quickly developed between Nikhita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro. Additionally, the security guarantees, both military and economic, which Moscow could provide for the new revolutionary government in Havana, critical due to the U.S. aggression against the island, were important for Cuba coveting a relationship with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet political and economic models were appealing to the new Cuban ruling elite in their desire to create a new society on the Caribbean island.

From December 1961 Marxist-Leninism would underpin the relationship until the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, despite intermittent theoretical variances occurring between the two countries, not least over the correct path to socialism in Latin America in the 1960s, and tension appearing between the two countries in the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, the shared ideology of Marxist-Leninism in this era was important for the creation of dominant ideas in the Soviet and Cuban leaderships (a common desire for societies based on socioeconomic equality, state ownership of property, and a subsequent dislike of traditional economic structures).

Consequently, this impacted on their perception of the international system, which in this thirty-year period were similar. They viewed each other as friends, but the United States as a threat. Nevertheless, ideology would continue to influence the relationship in the post-Soviet era. However, it would no longer be Marxist-Leninism, which instantaneously disappeared with the disintegration of Soviet-Cuban relations in December 1991, but instead neoliberal economic thinking.

Initially, neoliberal economics negatively affected bilateral Russian-Cuban relations as Moscow desired a relationship with Havana built on very different foundations in comparison to the 1959 to 1991 era of the relationship. These "new realities" of the relationship materialized in part due to the radical reconstruction of the Russian economy in accordance with neoliberal economic thinking which took place under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. This rendered a number of Russian companies struggling to survive, and therefore unable to trade with Cuba. Moreover, the Kremlin's desire for an improved relationship with the United States, in the hope of obtaining assistance in the Russian economic transition, also adversely affected Russian-Cuban relations. Domestic politics had impacted Moscow's international interactions.

Notwithstanding this, defensive realism was also significant because an unexpected result of a limited Cuban embrace of neoliberal economics, as the island's economy was opened to the world market, was that Russian companies lost their preeminent place in the Cuban economy. The survival of the Cuban Revolution in a post-Soviet world necessitated this partial adoption of neoliberal economic thinking and is in accordance with the ideas of Jorge Domínguez, Michael Erisman, Julie Feinsilver, and John Kirk that were detailed in the opening chapter of this book. However, a Russian wish to readdress the loss of their supremacy in the Cuban economy underlies the desire for increased bilateral trade. The outcome is that ideology, in combination with other theories and concepts, has constantly impacted the bilateral relationship since November 1917.

Chapter 3 contended that a number of these commonalities were important for the existence of diplomatic relations in all three distinct periods of the bilateral relationship since November 1917. As outlined, the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations was fundamental to the creation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana in October 1942 as they were a bi-product of the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and United States. After January 1959, the importance of countervailing the United States for both Moscow and Havana has been provided earlier. Subsequently, it has been theorized that defensive realism underpinned Moscow's interest in the Cuban Revolution and not offensive realism, due to apparent Soviet assertiveness. As noted, defensive realism has been key for Cuba due to near constant

hostility from the United States for much of the time which is the focus of this book.

Moreover, defensive realism remained crucial for both Moscow and Havana in the post–Cold War era. Again this is despite since the year 2000 the apparent aggressiveness of the "Putin doctrine," but crucially its ultimate goal is to garner support for the Russian government. Furthermore, the importance of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Latin America (Havana can act as a conduit for Moscow's enhanced relationship with the region) has increased as Russian relations with the West have deteriorated. For Moscow, friendly relations with both Havana and Latin America can offset this worsening in relations with the West since 2013 and 2014 and the events in Syria and the Ukraine, respectively, which were not alleviated by the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Finland in July 2018.[3] The result is that diplomatically Cuba had geostrategic significance for the Kremlin in both the 1959 to 1991 era and post-1992 period, although at a reduced level in the post-Soviet situation. For Cuba, cordial diplomatic relations with Russia constitutes part of its strategy to create a "constituency abroad." This desire was designed to help the Revolution survive the loss of its socialist allies while countervailing U.S. aggression. The upshot is that, crucially, Russia and Cuba provide each other with support in various international fora.

As detailed earlier, constructivism can provide an alternative elucidation for Soviet/Russian-Cuban relations and both countries' relationships with the United States due to the perception which Moscow and Havana have of each other, and the role of the United States within the international system. As noted previously, both countries' indigenous histories are important for these perceptions with the significance of constructivism being increased, as detailed, by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin's willingness to embrace new ideas and the consequent change in regnant ruling elite ideas in Moscow, which had unforeseen knock-on effects for Moscow-Havana relations.

Again, both bilateral trade and cultural links existed between Russia and Cuba in all three distinct eras of the relationship that endure since the Russian Revolution. The accusation that cultural links had been "engineered" for political reasons in the 1959 to 1991 era exists, but their reemergence in the twenty-first century is part of the reconceptualization process, that is further examined later. Notwithstanding this, a degree of serendipity may have been important for the first cultural contacts between the two countries that even predate the Russian Revolution, but this was certainly not the case in the years from 1945 to 1952 with the functioning of the Institute of Cuban-Soviet Cultural Exchange in Havana. The perception of Cuba as a "hot bed" of labor militancy, as detailed in part due to the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, was fundamental for Moscow's decision to open this institute. If the Kremlin

did not believe that the Cuban polity were ripe for political penetration, the institute would never have been commissioned. In sum, Soviet soft power.

As with the Comintern, any left-wing radicalism in Cuba could be used by the Kremlin to further its foreign policy objectives elsewhere in the world, but particularly when this institute opened in Eastern Europe, by strengthening Moscow's bargaining position due to a fear of Soviet inspired left-wing militancy in U.S. dominated Cuba. As detailed, defensive realism was key for the Kremlin's creation of "buffer states" in Eastern Europe as they were designed to countervail U.S. power rather that increase Soviet power at the expense of the United States. Furthermore, left-wing activism in Cuba could be utilized to counterbalance Western and U.S. influence closer to Soviet dominated Eastern Europe, particularly in a divided Berlin. Additionally, Tsygankov's assertion of the importance of civilizationists in Russian foreign policy also have resonance. As noted, civilizationists believed that Russian cultures and ideas were superior in comparison to Western ones.

The sporadic attention that Moscow showed in trade with Cuba prior to January 1959 was underpinned by poor Soviet agricultural production, evidencing the significance of internal issues in Moscow's international relations. This was particularly the case in the early 1920s, during the Second World War and the early 1950s when Soviet food security had been questioned. Consequently this had necessitated Moscow acquire sugar from alternative sources with the attention that Moscow paid in Cuba being both in accordance with defensive realism and also logical due to the island's standing as one of the world's leading sugar producers. The nature of Cuban-U.S. relations was also important, specifically during the Second World War, but also in 1955 when Washington had "approved" the Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar due to an issue of overproduction in the island's sugar harvest.

The principles of Marxist-Leninist underlayed bilateral trade in the era from the early 1960s to late 1991, which increased exponentially during this period with, remarkably due to the size of the Cuban economy, the island becoming the Soviet Union's sixth largest trading partner. Cuba gaining membership to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in the summer of 1972 aided this process. Moreover, Soviet-Cuban trade assisted Havana in mitigating, or offsetting, the impact of the U.S. economic embargo, further highlighting the importance of defensive realism as the U.S embargo is designed to destroy the Cuban Revolution. However, as detailed, Russia's embrace of neoliberal economics in the early to mid-1990s gravely impacted the bilateral relationship with trade hemorrhaging in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban levels. However the emergence of "new realities" in the relationship did not prevent Russia from being Cuba's largest trading partner in 1996. This had not been expected or foreseen by experts in the immediate aftermath of the end of Soviet-Cuban relations in late 1991.

Notwithstanding this, both oil-for-sugar swaps and Cuba's Soviet era debt remained contentious throughout the 1990s. The importance of these issues was demonstrated by the involvement of both country's foreign ministers in the discussions over oil-for-sugar exchanges, and Cuba's offer to pay its debt in kind. A final resolution to the debt was achieved in July 2014 with this removing a potential "block" to an increase in Russian-Cuban trade.

Although this is the case, since 1996 Russian-Cuban trade remains at a low level, but the political will is present in both countries for trade to increase. For Russia, a Soviet legacy is important. This is ironic due to the negative perception of bilateral trade that existed in the Soviet Union in the late Soviet period, but as detailed, a desire to try and reestablish the Russian position within the Cuban economy; something which had been lost in the post-Soviet era due to the impact of neoliberal economic thinking on both the Russian economic transition of the early 1990s and unforeseen consequences of Cuba's partial embrace of these ideas as the island struggled to survive is also significant. Further increasing the Russian political will for trade to increase is an attempt to offset the effects of Western sanctions against the country imposed in the 2010s. For Cuba, realist pragmatism and defensive realism remain central to this wish for trade with Russia to increase. This results from the continuing U.S. embargo, attempts to mitigate potential issues of economic reliance on China and Venezuela materializing, but as Cuban-Venezuelan trade has diminished to endeavor to acquire alternative trading partners to Venezuela. This desire to increase trade has underlayed discussions concerning Cuba acquiring Russian oil, thus reducing a reliance on Venezuelan oil. Similar arguments are repeated with Havana's wish to increase the number of Russians vacationing in Cuba as this would alleviate a reliance on Canadian tourists.

Chapter 4 also documented that both a reconceptualization process has been undertaken by both governments concerning the longevity of bilateral relations, and also there has been an increase in symbolism within the relationship. The reconceptualization is to both the 1959 to 1991 period of the relationship and also the era between the Russian and Cuban Revolutions. As noted, a whole generation of citizens have now been born in both Russia and Cuba since the end of Soviet-Cuban relations in 1991, with the reconceptualization process exhibiting the relationship's heritage and continuance that may be questioned due to the geographical distance between the two countries. Moreover, this reconceptualization process is likely to only become ever more important in the future.

Furthermore, this shared history, and the Russian and Cuban governments' emphasis on the historical memory of it, increases the importance of the constructed history of the bilateral relationship. This constructed history is important in shaping primary ideas within the ruling elites in both Moscow

and Havana, a number of which have begun to concur (both in terms of nationalism and global viewpoints), and their subsequent identities and interests. Fundamental to these identities and interests has been the advancement of multipolarity. Accordingly, this is also key for their perception of the international system and their subsequent appraisal of each other which, as detailed for long periods which is the focus of this book, has principally been friendly, but conversely the United States has been perceived as being unfriendly.

The suppositions detailed above have been concluded by examining the impact of, as stated, conjoint themes that have persisted in each of the three disparate eras of the relationship. The key commonality is Washington's relationship with Moscow and Havana, both individually and together. Additionally, this book has also been able to challenge a number of traditionally held perceptions concerning the bilateral relationship, and by using various documents including from the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive in Havana confirm others while also offering greater empirical delineation on these previous summations. In addition to this greater granular detail, these documents also permit new insights to be given, with both enhancing our understanding of Moscow-Havana relations. Most basically, as detailed, this includes that a multifaceted relationship between Moscow and Havana existed in all three distinct periods since November 1917 and not just in the 1959 to 1991 period. Consequently, prior to the Cuban Revolution, Moscow did not suffer from "geographical fatalism" with the attention which it awarded Cuba commencing while Joseph Stalin was still alive. Historically, Stalin's death has been perceived as sparking Soviet interest in the developing world. Moreover, this focus was economic, diplomatic, and cultural, with, as noted, this questioning the idea that cultural links in the 1959 to 1991 era had been "engineered" for political purposes. Additionally, despite in the early to mid-1990s Russia desiring a relationship with Havana built on very different foundations to the 1959 to 1991 era of the relationship, and Cuban aversion to the political and economic models of the "new" Russia of this time, the bilateral relationship continued to function at a greater level than previously thought. This included ongoing discussions to complete the nuclear plant at Juragua that has previously been perceived as being a vivid illustration of the "new realities" of the post-Soviet relationship.

Moreover, the MINREX documents have highlighted that in the late 1970s problems existed in bilateral trade, and particularly with the delivery of goods. Additionally, these Cuban documents also evidence that pressure on Gorbachev in the late Soviet period regarding the bilateral relationship due to *glasnost* was not only internal to the Soviet Union, but was intensified by Cuban government endeavors to use *glasnost* to further its own agenda. Furthermore, a reading of the MINREX documents confirm that the "wait and

see" policy, waiting for events to play out in the Soviet Union before passing any comment on them for fear of jeopardizing the bilateral relationship, was a strategic decision by the Cuban government to keep the island's interests safe, was formulated from a position of great knowledge and insight into the unfolding events in the Soviet Union, and was not a retroactive response once the outcome of these events had become clear. Additionally, in 1991, this "wait and see" policy extended to the Russian Federation, which was somewhat surprising due to the adverse Cuban perception of Yeltsin which becomes evident in MINREX documents from throughout 1991. Furthermore, it has also become clear that even while the Soviet Union was still in existence, the Cuban government attempted to facilitate a meeting with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister. With much uncertainty surrounding unfolding, and future, events in Russia this desire for a meeting with Kozyrev again displays the prevalence of realist pragmatism within the Cuban ruling elite. The level of detail contained within the MINREX documents has illuminated both problematic issues within Soviet-Cuban relations, and also provided greater insight into the workings and rationale of the relationship from a Cuban perspective.

As argued throughout this book, a multidimensional legacy from the Soviet era has been vital for the relationship that developed between Russia and Cuba in the post-1992 era. Traditionally, this has been thought to have been mainly economic with a degree of serendipity involved in its existence. However, MINREX documents demonstrate that MINREX personnel both purposely fostered this legacy in their interactions with their Russian counterparts (in part by continually referring to Russia's position as the legal successor to the Soviet Union) and also lobbied people within the Russian political system who had sympathy for the country's Soviet past. Importantly, this Cuban lobbying commenced before the upturn in relations from the mid-1990s onwards, evidencing the importance of the relationship for Havana. As posited, this was part of Havana's endeavor to create a "constituency abroad." The MINREX documents demonstrate the multi-vector approach which Cuban Foreign Ministry personnel employed as they strove to achieve this key foreign policy goal. These interfaces with Russia which the documents evidence, highlight the level of Cuba's diplomatic prudence, and expertise and provides granular detail of the methods Cuba employed as the island adjusted to the post-Soviet world. Additionally, these documents also illustrate that the Cuban government desired a relationship with Moscow that contained a number of features of the 1959 to 1991 era relationship. Very different from Moscow's hopes for the relationship in the early to mid-1990s.

As detailed, a key norm in Moscow-Havana relations since November 1917 has been the impact of the United States. However, historic change has taken place in Cuban-U.S. relations since December 2014, which has been

partially rolled back under the presidency of Donald Trump, but in the future what would be the impact for Russian-Cuban relations if relations between Havana and Washington completely normalize? However, even if Cuban-U.S. relations normalize, Russian-Cuban relations are unlikely to revert to those which might be expected to exist between a large Europe Asian power and a Caribbean island even as the significance of this key element in the relationship wanes. As posited throughout the book, since 1959 Cuba has constantly exhibited counter-dependency in its relations with Moscow with consequently this theorizing that Havana is highly unlikely to "turn its back" on an old friend and risk a degree of dependency appearing with the United States, as this would be completely contrary to the revolutionary elite's wish to avoid levels of dependency materializing. Moreover, the intertwined nature of the two countries resulting from the longevity of the relationship between Havana and Moscow further reduces the likelihood of a dramatic deterioration in Russian-Cuban relations in favor of an improved relationship between Havana and Washington. It will be problematic to disentangle Russia and Cuba from one another, illustrated by the enduring impact of the Soviet legacy throughout the post-Soviet era, which has been scrutinized at various points in this manuscript. Ironically the United States has been central to both the creation of Moscow-Havana relations and its continuing existence in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In addition, due to the shared history and geographical proximity of Cuba and the United States, the United States will always have some impact on Russian-Cuban relations.

Furthermore, uncertainty could surround Russian-Cuban relations as historic change has occurred in Cuba since December 2014. Diplomatic relations with the United States have been restored, Fidel Castro passed in November 2016 and Raúl Castro retired in April 2018, with Miguel Díaz-Canel becoming the Cuban president. For the first time since the early 1960s neither Fidel nor Raúl Castro is the president of Cuba, and Díaz-Canel was born after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. In sum, a generational change in the Cuban leadership. Importantly, due to their longevity, Russian-Cuban relations can provide a degree of stability in a fast changing environment for the new Cuban administration, significantly Vladimir Putin was reelected as Russian president in March 2018 for a further six years.[4] Furthermore, Putin held a telephone conversation with Díaz-Canel on the day of his appointment as Cuban president. The Russian government account of this conversations stated,

> The President of Russia warmly congratulated Miguel Díaz-Canel on his election to Cuba's highest office and on his birthday. He wished him good health and success in his important work. Miguel Diaz-Canel emphasised his commitment to the policy of deepening multifaceted ties with Russia in all respects. The shared commitment to consistent implementation of bilateral projects, especially in the fields of energy and transport infrastructure, was underscored.

> Vladimir Putin also expressed his sincere gratitude to Raúl Castro for many years of joint work and his great personal contribution to strengthening the strategic partnership between Russia and Cuba.[5]

This statement evidences the continuing importance of the bilateral relationship for both countries. Additionally, Raúl Castro remains General Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and Head of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces providing further constancy. Moreover, Díaz-Canel has constructed his political career within a system where realist pragmatism and defensive realism have been central to all decision-making processes, making it highly probable that realist pragmatism and defensive realism will remain central to post-2018 Cuban foreign policy. The result is that in the short to medium term, Russian-Cuban relations are likely to continue in their present form due to both the primacy of realist pragmatism and defensive realism within the Cuban government and also the continuing impact of the commonalities that have been present in the three distinct periods which have been the focus of this book. Contemporary international relations may be fundamentally different from November 1917, but the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Havana that has prevailed through the vagaries of the changed geopolitical situation, is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. A true example of an enduring friendship.

NOTES

1. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 395.
2. Ibid., 396–97.
3. As previously noted, on August 9, 2018, further U.S. sanctions against Russia were announced. Philp, "US to Sanction Russia."
4. Since becoming president, Díaz-Canel has reconfigured the Council of Ministers, a new constitution has been debated by the National Assembly and further reforms have been instigated to the island's economy. For analysis of this please see William LeoGrande, "Is Cuba's Vision of Market Socialism Sustainable?" *World Politics Review*, July 31, 2018, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25312/is-cuba-s-vision-of-market-socialism-sustainable.
5. "Telephone conversation with First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba Raúl Castro and President of the State Council and Council of Ministers of Cuba Miguel Diaz-Canel," President of Russia, April 20, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57312. Additionally, before becoming Cuban President Diaz-Canel had met Putin and Dmitry Medvedev when he had visited Moscow in May 2016. "Presidente Putin recibe a vicepresidente Miguel Díaz-Canel," *Juventud Rebelde*, May 25, 2016, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu.internacionales/2015-05-25/president-putin-recibe-a-vicepresidente-miguel-diaz-canel.

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