

# Diachrony of Personal Pronouns in Japanese

Osamu Ishiyama

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# DIACHRONY OF PERSONAL PRONOUNS IN JAPANESE

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## **Volume 344**

Osamu Ishiyama

*Diachrony of Personal Pronouns in Japanese.  
A functional and cross-linguistic perspective*

# DIACHRONY OF PERSONAL PRONOUNS IN JAPANESE

A FUNCTIONAL AND  
CROSS-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE

OSAMU ISHIYAMA  
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AMSTERDAM & PHILADELPHIA



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## Preface and acknowledgements

This book is a functional and cross-linguistic investigation of the diachrony of personal pronouns in Japanese. Factors such as the large inventory size, morpho-syntactic similarities to nouns, sociolinguistic implicatures that they carry, and multi-syllabicity characterize the pronominal inventory of Japanese. In other words, personal pronouns in Japanese form a heterogeneous category with fuzzy boundaries with nouns and closely associated classes of expressions, including social epithets, demonstratives, and reflexives. Although Japanese employed a variety of items for person reference throughout its history, the focus of this study is the development of personal pronouns used in Modern Japanese. The Benvenistean view of personal pronouns draws a clear boundary between the first/second person on the one hand and third person on the other, since the latter is a non-person. Diachronically, the close relationship between third person and demonstrative pronouns are well known in previous studies. Based on the examinations of historical texts, this book will shed light on the nature of the tenuous diachronic link between first/second person pronouns and demonstratives in Japanese. Furthermore, I argue that nouns are the major source of personal pronouns, but that items of non-nominal origins are generally unlikely to give rise to personal pronouns because their use for person referents can be resolved within (the extension of) their original functions.

Functionally, personal pronouns are grammatical items, but the processes in which they arise historically are far from straightforward. Grammaticalization is largely consistent only with the change from nouns to personal pronouns. The ways in which personal pronouns arise from forms of non-nominal origins, on the other hand, are diverse and each process must be dealt with separately. Cross-linguistically, demonstratives and reflexives are often used for person referents based on spatial and empathetic perspectives, e.g. the use of speaker-proximal demonstratives and reflexives for the speaker. Speaker-proximal forms may also be used for the addressee if the speaker considers the addressee to be in his/her proximal area. Similarly, reflexives are often used for the addressee, especially in interrogatives and imperatives for epistemological reasons. Crucially, however, these usages can be predicted on the basis of the demonstrative and reflexive functions. Therefore, this book casts some doubt on the cross-linguistic generalization that demonstratives and reflexives constitute the major source of personal pronouns.



Besides nouns, the use of already established personal pronouns for a referent for which they are not originally intended by displacing semantic features such as number and person may contribute to the emergence of new pronoun function. In all of these, politeness emerges as a primary motivation. This book explores how politeness explains the cross-linguistically common source nouns as well as how it affects the formation of new pronoun usage.

Because of the long textual tradition and diversity of source items, Japanese offers a valuable opportunity to examine the development of personal pronouns under a cross-linguistic light. The Japanese Text Initiative housed in the University of Virginia Library deserves special acknowledgement for digitizing classical and modern Japanese literature and making them available online. Parts of Chapter 3 are based on my article, “The diachronic relationship between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns,” that appeared in *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* (2012). I thank the publisher for permission to include revised material from this publication in the present monograph.

Though evolved significantly, many of the ideas explored in this book originated in my doctoral dissertation, *Diachronic perspectives on personal pronouns in Japanese*, written at the State University of New York at Buffalo. I would like to thank my dissertation committee members, David Fertig, David Zubin, and Mitsuaki Shimojo whose guidance and intellectual stimulation were indispensable when this project first started. Over the years, I have benefitted from comments received from fellow linguists at various conferences, though it would be impossible to list them. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and members of the editorial board whose insightful and constructive feedback helped make this a better book than it would have been otherwise. I am especially thankful to the general editor of this book series, Joe Salmons, for his guidance and encouragement throughout the lengthy process of revising this work. My thanks also go to Anke de Looper of John Benjamins who helped me navigate the final production stages of this book.

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Irvine, California, June 2018  
Osamu Ishiyama

# List of abbreviations

1st	first person	IMP	imperative
2nd	second person	INJ	interjection
3rd	third person	LOC	locative
ACC	accusative	MOD	modality
AD-PROX	addressee-proximal	NEG	negative
ADV	adverbializer	NMLZ	nominalizer
ASP	aspect	NOM	nominative
COMP	complementizer	PERF	perfect
COND	conditional	PL	plural
CONN	connective	POL	polite
CONJ	conjunction	POT	potential
COP	copula	PST	past
DAT	dative	QUOT	quotative
DEC	declarative	REQ	request
END	ending	RESP	respectful
EMPH	emphatic	S/AD-DIST	speaker and addressee distal
EVID	evidential	S-DIST	speaker distal
EXCL	exclamative	SLP	speech level particle
FP	final particle	S-PROX	speaker proximal
GEN	genitive	TOP	topic
HON	honorifics	Q	question
HP	honorific prefix	VOC	vocative
HUBL	humble		



# Introduction

## 1.1 Preliminary remarks

In many languages, grammatical person manifests itself linguistically through such expressions as independent personal pronouns, verb inflections, or evidential-related expressions. This book examines the diachrony of personal pronouns in Japanese from a functional and cross-linguistic perspective. Japanese pronouns have been studied extensively in the synchronic domains of syntax, discourse, and sociolinguistics. Many have observed their unique properties in such areas as binding conditions in syntax and coding properties in discourse (e.g. Noguchi 1997; Hinds 1983). The large inventory and sociolinguistic stylistics have also been the object of intense studies (e.g. Sugamoto 1989). Diachronically, the lexical origins of Japanese pronouns and their formal resemblance to and relationship with demonstratives are often pointed out in the literature (e.g. Ikegami & Kato 1972; Tsujimura 1968).

However, in Japanese, despite the wealth of historical documentation, works that attempt to elucidate the mechanisms of the development of personal pronouns have been unsystematic and sporadic. This study aims to fill that gap by investigating cross-linguistic as well as language-specific characteristics of the diachronic development of personal pronouns. It demonstrates that, while nouns are the major source of personal pronouns, demonstratives and location expressions give rise to personal pronouns only in limited circumstances. It also shows that the synchronic distinction between the first/second person on the one hand and the third person on the other (Benveniste 1971) has an important bearing in the diachronic development of personal pronouns. More specifically, by examining historical texts, this study investigates: (i) the nature of nominal source and the process of development into personal pronouns, (ii) the relationship between demonstrative and personal pronouns, and (iii) the nature of person shift (e.g. a first person form used as a second person form) and its mechanisms. I then address the above-mentioned issues from a functional and cross-linguistic point of view, examining the processes associated with the emergence of personal pronouns in Asian languages and beyond.

This chapter starts with a brief definition of personal pronouns employed in this study. It then provides a synchronic and diachronic overview of personal pronouns in Japanese, discussing various approaches to the study of Japanese pronouns. I end the chapter with an outline of the rest of the book.

## 1.2 Towards a definition of personal pronouns (in Japanese)

Cross-linguistically, personal pronouns are a quite diverse category. Some languages form a highly grammaticalized paradigm to which only a limited number of items belong, while in others, various forms participate in the paradigm loosely, blurring the formal boundary with nouns. Individual items may also be realized as independent or bound forms. Therefore, it is useful as an overarching principle to take the standpoint that the division between nouns and pronouns is gradual rather than discrete and that there is a noun-pronoun continuum (Sugamoto 1989). Three functional criteria are central to the notion of personal pronouns that I employ in this study.

First, personal pronouns are deictic expressions whose interpretation crucially depends on the speech situation. They are ‘shifters’ (Jakobson 1971; Silverstein 1976a). They are only or primarily used to index grammatical person. This is important in languages like Japanese where there is little morphosyntactic difference between nouns and pronouns. Second, personal pronouns belong to the paradigm organized by a limited set of semantic features such as person, number, and gender, though a certain feature may be exploited pragmatically for non-original purposes (e.g. the use of a plural form for a singular referent for the sake of politeness, as in French *vous*). Third, personal pronouns often have pragmatic functions such as politeness and formality vis-à-vis the conversation participants and speech situation. Personal pronouns, especially first person singular forms, may have other non-referential functions such as what Ono & Thompson (2003) call ‘emotive’ and ‘frame setting’, but they seem to illustrate further grammaticalized functions of personal pronouns.

With respect to the relationship among the three persons, there have been at least three positions (Heath 2004: 998–999). The first position is based on the notion of speech roles, which distinguishes the first/second person on the one hand and the third person on the other (i.e. 1st/2nd vs. 3rd). This approach is attributed most notably to Benveniste (1971), who points out that person is present only in ‘I’ and ‘you’ and the third person expresses the ‘non-person’ (1971), but also supported by a number of researchers such as Forchheimer (1953) and Lyons (1977). The second position places an emphasis on the speaker’s unique access to his/her consciousness and internal feelings, which results in an interaction between the nature of subject/agent and evidentials/certain classes of adjectives (1st vs. 2nd/3rd). This can be exemplified by Japanese adjectives of internal feelings such as ‘hot’, ‘lonely’, and ‘want’, where an additional marker of indirectness is required for the third person subject (Kuroda 1973). The third position takes the three persons as the ordered set (1st > 2nd > 3rd). This clinal approach can incorporate the case of obviative (or

the fourth person) and may to some extent support a pronominal word order rule of some Australian languages (Wurm 1969: 59, cited in Heath 2004: 999).

It is clear that all three positions have some grammatical support, but I employ the speech roles model because the concept of speech roles shows the aspects of the first and second persons on the one hand and the third person on the other that do not come from particular constructions such as the predicates of internal feelings. Thus it can accommodate first/second person pronouns of some languages whose morphosyntactic behavior is similar to that of nouns but which clearly function as shifters. The third person can be defined derivatively, using the elements of the speech situation: the first person is (+Speaker, –Addressee), second person (–S, +A), and third person (–S, –A). This position has additional diachronic support in that first/second person pronouns generally have historical sources that are different from those of third person pronouns, as we will see in later chapters.

With regards to personal pronouns as one of the linguistic manifestations of grammatical person, one can say that the first and second persons are predominantly designated by shifters (i.e. first and second person pronouns are inherently deictic), whereas there is nothing inherently deictic about designation of the third person (i.e. third person pronouns), and third person reference can easily be achieved by lexical items as well. Though of course third person pronouns can be used deictically (e.g. *He is my father* said of a man entering the room where the speaker and addressee are), it is not a necessity. Third person pronouns are primarily anaphoric in that their interpretation depends on the linguistic context, while first and second person pronouns are never anaphoric in that their identity always depends on information of the speech event rather than the linguistic context. Unlike first/second person pronouns, third person pronouns serve a pragmatic function of regulating information flow in discourse (e.g. *I know the man standing over there – he is my uncle*). This is one of the many functional similarities between demonstratives and third person pronouns (Diessel 1999). For this reason, many languages do not have dedicated third person pronouns: third person pronouns are often morphologically related to demonstratives or formally indistinguishable from them. Also, semantic features such as number and gender, which are often characteristically involved in the pronominal paradigm, support the same distinction. If languages mark grammatical gender or number, gender is most likely marked in the third person first, and number least likely (Croft 1990).

This Benvenistean speech roles model is essentially the position adopted by modern typological works such as Bhat (2004) and Siewierska (2004). It is generally assumed that a first person pronoun refers to the speaker of an utterance, a second person pronoun to the addressee of an utterance, and a third person pronoun to the party that is neither the speaker nor the addressee. However, as has been

pointed out in these typological studies, a close look reveals that this view needs to be amended to include the notion of the speech role marker in the discourse.<sup>1</sup> The following examples illustrate the point.

- (1) a. *Mummy will do it for Donny.*  
 b. *I will do it for you.*

While the kinship term and the personal name in (1a) can directly refer to an individual who may or may not be the speaker and the addressee in the speech situation, the personal pronouns in (1b) must always designate the speech roles of the speaker and the addressee whose identity shifts constantly from one context to another. Again, third person pronouns function differently: they are typically used anaphorically and their referent is relatively stable. I do not, however, exclude third person pronouns from consideration of personal pronouns because it is not uncommon for third person pronouns to function as second person pronouns and because the analysis of third person pronouns offers an important insight into the relationship between personal and demonstrative pronouns.

Although the characteristics above have both synchronic and diachronic applicability, when it comes to the diachronic development of personal pronouns in Japanese, additional semantic and pragmatic parameters such as (in)consistency with the original meaning/function must be considered, depending on the nature of source items. For example, for the noun-based second person form *kimi* ‘(lit.) emperor/lord’, it is a strong indication of pronominality if the item is used mainly for socially lower addressees (Chapter 2). Similarly, in considering demonstrative-based forms, it strongly suggests that one has personal pronouns rather than demonstratives if the location of their intended referent is consistently contradictory to the spatial semantics of demonstratives or if demonstratives are solely used to refer to a person referent (Chapter 3). These criteria are important because personal pronouns in Japanese behave like nouns morphosyntactically, but semantically they are clearly distinct from nouns in that they function as shifters. Therefore, I treat items whose only or primary function is to index the speech roles of the speaker and addressee as first and second person pronouns, respectively. Third person pronouns are defined derivatively in relation to them. This position allows examinations of personal pronouns in languages like Japanese and makes their cross-linguistic comparisons of source items viable.

---

1. The issue of the generic second person is not considered here.

### 1.3 Synchronic overview

Japanese has quite a large pronominal inventory compared to English and some other European languages where a limited number of forms are used for the first, second, and third persons. Table 1 summarizes the personal pronouns commonly used in Modern Japanese. I have adopted this presentation because it captures well the difference in formality when the same item is used by both male and female speakers. For example, the first person form *watashi* is used by both male and female speakers, but it sounds more formal when used by male speakers. In this sense, the form is not truly gender-biased. The only forms whose usage is affected by gender are the first person *boku* and *ore* ‘I’. The use of both forms is limited to male speakers, at least in Standard Japanese. Also, ‘neutral’ in this context means that the form is used in the widest range of context.

Table 1. Pronominal inventory of Modern Japanese

	Formal	Neutral	Informal	Derogatory
<b>1st person</b>				
Male speaker	<i>watakushi/watashi</i>	<i>boku</i>	<i>ore</i>	
Female speaker	<i>watakushi</i>	<i>watashi</i>		
<b>2nd person</b>				
Male speaker	<i>anata</i>	<i>kimi</i>	<i>omae</i>	<i>temee/kisama</i>
Female speaker	<i>anata</i>		<i>kimi</i>	<i>omae</i>
<b>3rd person</b>				
		<i>kare</i> ‘he’		
		<i>kanojo</i> ‘she’		

For first person forms, *watakushi* ‘I’ is the most formal first person pronoun used in such contexts as a business setting or when talking to someone who holds a significantly higher social position than the speaker. Its phonologically reduced version *watashi* is used more frequently by female speakers. The further reduced form *atashi* which indicates the more decreasing level of formality may occasionally be used by female speakers. Both *boku* and *ore* ‘I’ are used by male speakers in informal situations such as when talking to someone of equal or lower social status. The latter is more informal than the former.

*Anata* is the most formal second person pronoun used by both male and female speakers, but its use toward a higher status addressee is generally avoided: instead, occupational names such as *sensee* ‘teacher’ and positional names such as *kachoo* ‘section-chief’ are used. There is also a phonologically reduced form *anta* that indicates a lower degree of formality. *Kimi* and *omae* ‘you’ are informal forms used



when talking to someone of equal or lower social status. Female speakers tend to use the former more often than the latter, whereas male speakers use both forms. This pair illustrates well the difference in formality when it is used by male or female speakers. The derogatory forms *temee* and *kisama* express the strong sense of contempt and are used only in an emotional fight.

The third person pronouns *kare* ‘he’ and *kanojo* ‘she’ are generally used to refer to someone of equal or lower social status and avoided with one’s social superiors. They are also commonly used in the meaning of ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend’, respectively.

The forms presented in Table 1 are all singular. Plural forms are derived by adding suffixes such as *-domo*, *-tachi*, *-ra*, and *-gata* to singular forms. The same plural formations apply to nouns as well. Plural forms differ in the degree of politeness that the speaker pays to the addressee or referent, which can be arranged in the following way.

(2) *-gata* > *-tachi* > *-ra* > *-domo*

Since *-gata* is the most polite form, it is compatible only with second person forms as in *anata-gata* ‘you-PL’ and with nouns denoting a high social status as in *sensee-gata* ‘teacher-PL’. It is not compatible with any first person forms (e.g. *#watakushi-gata* ‘I-PL’), derogatory second person forms (e.g. *#temee-gata* ‘you-PL’), or nouns denoting a low social status (e.g. *#seeto-gata* ‘student-PL’). On the other hand, *-domo* is a humble form. Therefore, it is compatible with only formal first person forms as in *watakushi-domo* ‘I-PL’, derogatory second person forms as in *temee-domo* ‘you-PL’, and derogatory nouns as in *yatsu-domo* ‘guy-PL’. It is not compatible with informal first person forms (e.g. *#ore-domo* ‘I-PL’), formal second person forms (e.g. *#anata-domo* ‘you-PL’), or nouns denoting a higher social status (e.g. *#sensee-domo* ‘teacher-PL’). The suffixes *-tachi* and *-ra* fall somewhere in between. They can take all forms presented in Table 1. The third person pronouns, *kare* ‘he’ and *kanojo* ‘she’, take only *-tachi*, *-ra*, and *-domo*. It seems that they occur more frequently with the first two suffixes than with the last one. Its incompatibility with *-gata*, the most polite plural suffix, is consistent with the fact that third person pronouns are avoided when referring to one’s social superiors.

Cross-linguistically, some languages are claimed to lack personal pronouns because they often refer to the speaker and addressee, using nominal elements whose original meanings are often still discernible. Malay is an example of such languages in that open-class items (i.e. nouns) are used in place of personal pronouns for reasons such as politeness. Schachter (1985), citing Winstedt (1914) and Robins (1964), points out that in Malay nouns like *hamba* ‘slave’ are often used for the first person and *tuan* ‘master’ for the second person, but Schachter also mentions that,

although they are infrequent, there are undeniable personal pronouns such as first person *aku* and second person *kamu*. A similar situation holds in some Asian languages such as Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese (Cooke 1968) as well as Japanese, in which first person forms come from nouns such as ‘servant/slave’ and second person forms from ‘master/lord/king’.

Japanese shares these areal typological features, as the lexical origins of the so-called personal pronouns can be traced relatively easily, e.g. first person *boku* ‘(lit.) slave’ and second person *kimi* ‘(lit.) lord’. However, most Japanese grammars and linguistics textbooks (e.g. Hasegawa 2015; Hinds 1986; Iwasaki 2013; Kuno 1973; Martin 1975; Shibatani 1990; Tsujimura 1996), regardless of their theoretical orientation, agree that there are elements of grammar that should be called personal pronouns. On the other hand, the attempts to prove that Japanese does not have personal pronouns seem controversial. For example, Kanaya (2002) argues that Japanese grammar offers no place for pronouns because their syntactic and morphological behavior does not differ from that of nouns, citing (i) (pro)noun modifications, (ii) pronominal inventory and its sociolinguistic functions, and (iii) word order. While these points make some sense in idealized contexts, they face difficulties from functional perspectives. First, Shibasaki (2005) shows a rarity of phrasal and clausal modification with personal pronouns. This is functionally motivated because referents of pronouns are ‘activated’, ‘presupposed’, or ‘old’ in discourse (e.g. Chafe 1994; Lambrecht 1994), thus making clausal or phrasal modifications on pronominal referents less necessary or informative than the nominal counterparts. In other words, personal pronouns serve very different functions from nouns in terms of information structure in discourse. Second, although it is true that the pronominal inventory of Japanese is quite large, sociolinguistic meanings associated with personal pronouns are not so uncommon cross-linguistically, including European languages (Brown & Levinson 1987; Head 1978). Third, the difference in word order is often motivated by their different functions in discourse, e.g. clitics or unstressed pronouns are often subject to special positioning in a sentence (Comrie 1989). In fact, some regard French clitics that Kanaya cites as agreement markers rather than pronouns (e.g. Lambrecht 1981). It is also pointed out in the studies of topic continuity that Japanese pronouns assume distinct functions from nouns in discourse (Hinds 1983).

## 1.4 Diachronic overview

Unlike languages in which personal pronouns form a highly grammaticalized paradigm and their etymological origins are not clear, the original meanings of Japanese pronouns are still traceable. A brief look at the literal meaning and original function of personal pronouns in Modern Japanese reveals a number of issues that require further investigation and explication. Table 2 summarizes their original meaning and function.

**Table 2.** Literal meaning and original/current use of Japanese personal pronouns

	Form	Literal meaning	Original		Current	
			Category	Pragmatic use	Category	Pragmatic use
i	<i>watakushi</i>	private	1st	formal	1st	formal
ii	<i>boku</i>	servant	1st	humble	1st	neutral
iii	<i>ore</i>	self?	2nd	contemptuous	1st	informal
iv	<i>kimi</i>	lord	2nd	respectful	2nd	neutral/informal
v	<i>kisama</i>	nobility	2nd	respectful	2nd	derogatory
vi	<i>omae</i>	honorable front	2nd	respectful	2nd	informal/derogatory
vii	<i>temae</i>	in front of (hand)	1st	respectful	2nd	derogatory
viii	<i>anata</i>	that direction	3rd	neutral	2nd	formal
ix	<i>kare</i>	that	3rd	neutral	3rd	neutral
x	<i>kanojo</i>	that woman	3rd	neutral	3rd	neutral

What is particularly surprising compared to English and some European languages is the large size of the pronominal inventory. In fact, in his historical study of honorifics, Tsujimura (1968) lists 51 forms for the first person and 81 for the second person. Japanese pronouns are also polysyllabic as opposed to monosyllabic, which tends to be the case in many Indo-European languages.

Despite the long textual tradition, the process of development of Japanese pronouns has not been investigated systematically. Shibasaki (2005) is a notable exception in that he argues in favor of incorporating pronouns into the grammar of Japanese from a diachronic point of view. Based on cross-linguistic tendencies such as the person hierarchy (cf. Silverstein 1976b) and the grammatical relations hierarchy (cf. Givón 1976), he shows that Japanese personal pronouns increasingly exhibit the discourse distribution of a transitive subject (A) or an intransitive subject (S) rather than a transitive object (O), to use Dixon's (1979) terms. It is well known from typological studies that personal pronouns often have the case-marking of a nominative-accusative pattern (i.e. A and S on the one hand, and O on the other), whereas nouns have the ergative-absolutive pattern (i.e. A on the one hand, and S and O on the other); see for example Payne (1997) and Du Bois (1987).

However, the question of how well an approach based on discourse distribution of alignment patterns works for languages like Japanese remains unclear, because Japanese regularly uses numerous kinship terms and occupational/positional names (e.g. *sensee* ‘teacher’, *kachoo* ‘section-chief’) for the speaker and addressee (cf. Suzuki 1978; Niyekawa 1991). Shibasaki’s approach seems to predict that kinship terms and occupational/positional names are also pronouns since they are used for the speaker and addressee, which are likely to be realized as A or S.

Table 2 raises three major issues regarding the diachronic development of personal pronouns in Japanese. First, as has been long noted by researchers, personal pronouns in Japanese come from lexical and grammatical sources, the latter primarily being demonstratives (e.g. Sansom 1928; Sakuma 1936, 1959; Tsujimura 1968). Forms in (i–ii) and (iv–v) in Table 2 have lexical origins, whereas those in (viii–x) are of demonstrative origins. The demonstrative stem *a-* in (viii) functions as speaker-and-addressee-distal in Modern Japanese, and *ka-* in (ix–x) is an archaic distal that has dropped out of the demonstrative paradigm. Demonstratives often give rise to third person pronouns, but it is noteworthy that *anata* is a second person pronoun in Modern Japanese. The case of *omae* in (vi) and *temae* in (vii) falls in between in that they were combinations of lexical and spatial expressions. The origin of *ore* in (iii) is controversial and there does not seem to be a consensus among scholars. Second, many forms underwent a semantic-pragmatic change whereby the politeness level toward the addressee decreased. For example, *kimi*, which originally meant ‘emperor’ or ‘lord’, gradually lost its politeness and it is now used somewhat informally and almost never used for one’s social superiors.<sup>2</sup> However, the usage of *watakushi* ‘I’ and *anata* ‘you’ remained relatively stable as formal forms. Third, some forms such as *temae* shifted their person categories. *Temae* was originally used for the first person, but its use was later extended to the second person. Its phonologically weakened form *temee* is now considered a second person form (cf. Table 1). This directionality of shift is unique given that shift frequently observed cross-linguistically is one from the third to second person (e.g. German *Sie*).

Table 3 presents a summary of the historical usage of Japanese pronouns. Note that the person category in the table simply indicates whether the form is mainly used for the speaker, addressee, or neither. The question of when they are established as personal pronouns is addressed in detail in later chapters. As for demonstrative-based forms in (viii) and (ix), their demonstrative function is also provided, i.e. S-DIST=speaker distal and S/AD-DIST=speaker and addressee distal. *Kanojo* in (x) is also demonstrative-based, but it is not attested until the Modern Japanese period.

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2. The pragmatic use under the current use in Table 2 is taken from the description in Table 1 which shows the variable politeness level depending on the gender of the speaker.

Table 3. Historical usage of Japanese pronouns

Forms		Historical periods				
		700–800	800–1200	1200–1600	1600–1870	1870–
i	<i>watakushi</i>	–	–	1st	1st	1st
ii	<i>boku</i>	–	1st	1st	1st	1st
iii	<i>ore</i>	2nd	2nd	1st	1st	1st
iv	<i>kimi</i>	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
v	<i>kisama</i>	–	–	–	2nd	2nd
vi	<i>omae</i>	–	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
vii	<i>temae</i>	–	–	1st	2nd	2nd
viii	<i>anata</i>	–	–	3rd	3rd/2nd	2nd
		–	S-DIST	S-DIST	S-DIST	–
					S/AD-DIST	
ix	<i>kare</i>	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd
		S-DIST	S-DIST	S-DIST	S-DIST	–
x	<i>kanojo</i>	–	–	–	–	3rd

One of the noteworthy things that will be discussed later is the fact that *anata* is used for the second person even though its demonstrative function is speaker-and-addressee distal.

### 1.5 Periodization and data

As outlined in Table 3, I employ the following five historical stages presented in Table 4, following the convention in Japanese historical linguistics. The dates for historical periods are only approximate.

Table 4. Historical stages of Japanese

	Approximate date	Corresponding historical period
Stage I	700–800	Nara Period
Stage II	800–1200	Heian Period
Stage III	1200–1600	Kamakura/Muromachi Period
Stage IV	1600–1870	Edo Period
Stage V	1870–Present	Meiji Period

A full description of historical characteristics of the language is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, often said that important changes in the language happened during Stage II (phonology) and Stage III (morphology, syntax). Iwasaki (2013: 6–11) provides a concise summary and a more detailed account of each

period can be found in Frellesvig (2010). In Stage I, where substantial written records are available for the first time, it is generally assumed that there were eight vowels (*a*, *u*, and two varieties each of *i*, *e*, and *o*) but that the loss of distinction in the last three vowels resulted in the five vowel system toward the end of Stage II, essentially the system found in Modern Japanese (Stage V). Other characteristic phonological developments during this period include the appearance of moraic nasals which occur in the coda position, affrication of some plosives triggered by following high vowels, and geminate consonants. Stage III witnessed some significant morphological changes. For example, there was simplification of the verbal and auxiliary paradigms, where only little survived, namely the perfective *-tari* and desiderative *-tashi* that later became the past tense *-ta* and desiderative *-tai* in Modern Japanese. The language also lost some focus constructions called *kakari-musubi*. Another notable change is the division of labor concerning the use of the particles *ga* and *no*. They were used for both the nominative and genitive case in Stage I and II, but *ga* started assuming the function of nominative and *no* genitive. The examples provided so far involve simplification and reduction, but Stage III also saw increased complication and expansion in certain domains. Many honorific expressions, including addressee honorifics, and many Sino-Japanese words (i.e. Chinese loans) were added to the language. This trend continues in Stage IV, where little radical grammatical restructuring occurred.

The digitized Japanese Text Initiative is the major source of data for Pre-Modern Japanese (Stage I–IV) and Aozora Bunko for Modern Japanese (Stage V), supplemented with comprehensive dictionaries and annotated editions of literature. My data collection was mainly driven by the availability of personal pronouns and person-referring expressions in the texts. This is because (i) personal pronouns are often left unexpressed in Japanese when recoverable from the context and (ii) one has to find instances of personal pronouns ideally in direct quotes rather than in running text. For this reason, the approach of this book is qualitative, but there is a reasonable amount of agreement among scholars and in the descriptions of comprehensive dictionaries regarding when the forms investigated in this study are attested.<sup>3</sup> For example, both Tsujimura (1968) and Ikegami & Kato (1972) agree that first person *watakushi* ‘(lit.) private’ is used for the speaker since the second half of Stage III and second person *kimi* ‘(lit.) lord’ for the addressee since Stage I. Similarly, both Ri (2002) and Nihon Kokugo Daijiten (Nihon Daijiten Kankokai 1972–1976) state that the distal directional demonstrative *anata* ‘that way’ came to be used as a second person pronoun at the second half of Stage IV. These works form a descriptive basis for which the present study attempts to offer explanations.

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3. The case of *ore* whose origin and development remains controversial will be discussed in the appendix.

The data from Stage I (700–800), when the capital was located in Nara (Western Japan near Kyoto), comes from *Kojiki* ‘Records of ancient matters’ (712), *Nihon shoki* ‘The chronicles of Japan’ (760), and *Manyōshū* ‘Ten-thousand leaves’ (760), the first two of which are used only occasionally. Only Chinese characters were used in these texts, as the Japanese *kana* syllabary had not yet been invented. *Manyōshū* is the oldest collection of Japanese poetry, consisting of more than 4500 songs in 20 books. Songs included in the anthology are mostly *tanka*, a poetry that takes the form of the 5-7-5-7-7 mora phrases. *Kojiki* is concerned with the creation of deities and *Nihon shoki* is said to be the most complete record of ancient Japan.

In Stage II (800–1200), the capital was moved from Nara to Kyoto. Stage II is most noted for its art, particularly for the works of sophisticated female writers such as Murasaki Shikibu which would be influential for many subsequent centuries. Stage II is also known for the start of the social rise of the warrior class. The main text used for Stage II is *Genji monogatari* ‘The tale of Genji’ (1002) by Murasaki Shikibu. It is written in Japanese *kana*, as the syllabary was invented in this stage. *Genji monogatari* is a monumental work of romantic literature consisting of 54 books.

During the first part of Stage III (1200–1340), the capital was established in Kamakura in Eastern Japan, but it was later moved back to Kyoto again (1340–1600). This stage is characterized by the reign of the warrior class (the *Minamoto* and the *Ashikaga* shogunate) and by the wars that occurred continuously. The main texts that I use for this stage are *Izayoi nikki* ‘The diary of the waning moon’ (1283) and *Taiheiki* ‘Chronicle of grand pacification’ (14C). Various *Noh* plays attributed to Kanami (1333–1384) and Zeami (1363–1444) will also be used. *Izayoi nikki* is a travel diary which depicts the author’s trip from Kyoto to Kamakura, where she wishes to resolve a land dispute. *Taiheiki* is a grand historical recount of the epic battle between Ashikaga Takauji and the Emperor Go-Daigo, consisting of 40 books.

Stage IV (1600–1870) stands in sharp contrast to previous stages in that it enjoyed exceptional social stability free from major wars. Although Kyoto remained the formal capital of Japan, Edo (modern Tokyo) was the *de facto* capital of the country under the reign of the *Tokugawa* shogunate. I mainly use *Ugetsu monogatari* ‘Tales of moonlight and rain’ (1776) and *Tokaido Yotsuya kaidan* ‘The ghost stories at Yotsuya at the Tokaido’ (1825). The former is a collection of 9 ghost/mystery stories that gained many readers due to its entertainment value and the spread of printing. The latter is a story of murder, ghosts, revenge, and betrayal. It is one of the best-known ghost stories of Japan.

The data on Stage V (1870–present) comes from introspection as well as novels by Natsume Soseki. The two primary texts are *Wagahai wa neko dearu* ‘I am a cat’ (1905) which is a social satire on the lives of Japanese and the Japanese society, narrated from the perspective of a house cat, and *Botchan* ‘Master darling’ (1906)

which is based on the author's personal experience of being transferred to Western Japan as a school teacher.

## 1.6 Outline

I have just presented background information on personal pronouns and various approaches to them, along with a synchronic and diachronic overview of personal pronouns in Japanese. This has revealed a number of important issues that merit closer examination. However, I have not offered any theoretical background through which the diachrony of personal pronouns is investigated. This is because the developments of personal pronouns differ significantly from one another, depending on the nature of their historical source, thus requiring different frameworks for each. In fact, one of the main claims of this study is that the diachronic development of personal pronouns cannot be analyzed under a single framework. Therefore, each chapter introduces a framework and concepts that are necessary to analyze a particular group of personal pronouns.

Chapter 2 analyzes the development of noun-based forms such as the first person *watakushi* '(lit.) private' and the second person *kimi* '(lit.) lord' based on the framework of grammaticalization. The way nominal forms give rise to personal pronouns illustrates well the processes of grammaticalization and conforms to its directional tendencies in terms of phonetics, morphology, and semantics (Lehmann 1995; Hopper & Traugott 2003; Traugott & Dasher 2002). Some of them exhibit natural or internal change, while others are affected by extra-linguistic factors. Unidirectionality concerning pragmatics (i.e. loss of politeness value toward the addressee) is largely due to the fact that speakers generally introduce humble and polite nouns as new terms of self-reference and address, respectively, which explains the common source of first and second person pronouns as well (i.e. humble nouns such as 'servant/slave' for the former and respectful nouns such as 'lord/king/master' for the latter). In addition, innovation at the polite end of the spectrum is more likely to be retained and successfully propagated. I also argue that the semantic bleaching often observed in grammaticalization plays a role but is insufficient to fully account for the development of personal pronouns in Japanese. I make a distinction between semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation: the former is a loss of semantic content, whereas the latter is a positive or negative social evaluation of a linguistic item by the speech community.

In Chapter 3, I investigate the development of location-based forms, in particular the historical relationship between demonstratives and personal pronouns. The close relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns is well known in previous studies (Bhat 2004; Diessel 1999; Siewierska 2004), but the tenuous



diachronic relation of demonstratives to first/second person pronouns has received little attention. After giving a historical overview of the demonstrative system in Japanese, I present three reasons that demonstratives generally do not give rise to first and second person pronouns. An exception to this tendency is the case of second person *anata* '(lit.) that way distant both from the speaker and the addressee'. I argue that this development can be attributed to strategic distancing politeness in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987). I also show that the story of location-based forms of non-demonstrative origin such as the second person *omae* '(lit.) honorable front' and *temae* '(lit.) in front of hand', which started out as the first person but later became the second person, parallels that of demonstrative-based forms.

Chapter 4 presents a diachronic account of person shift, a process where an item normally reserved for a particular person category is used for a different person category. The shift from the third person to first/second person (which includes the development of first/second person pronouns from nouns) is common cross-linguistically, but some have argued that Japanese exhibits the shift between the first and second person as well (Shibasaki 2005; Whitman 1999). Building on their work, I show that there are at least three independent principles that may lead to person shift: (i) extravagant politeness, (ii) spatial perspectives, and (iii) empathetic perspectives. Since the same directionality of shift can take place as a result of different principles, my approach to person shift phenomena revolves around the principles involved rather than the directionality of shift. I also make a clear distinction between semanticized shift and pragmatic shift. The former refers to a shift whose post-shift meaning is coded in semantics, whereas the latter shift is not (though it may potentially be in the future). The focus of Chapter 4 is semanticized shift because pragmatic shift is ubiquitous in linguistic communication, including but not limited to nominal forms used for self-reference and address.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the diachronic development of personal pronouns from a functional and cross-linguistic point of view based on Heine & Song (2010, 2011) who proposed the five conceptual sources of personal pronouns: (i) nominal concepts, (ii) spatial deixis, (iii) reflexives/intensifiers, (iv) plurification, and (v) shift in deixis. I examine cross-linguistically common candidates for personal pronouns in each category and argue that, while nouns are the major source of personal pronouns, forms of non-nominal origin are less likely to develop into personal pronouns, especially first/second person pronouns. I also argue that the development of noun-based personal pronouns is consistent with grammaticalization, but that of non-nominal origin is not. The way in which personal pronouns come into existence is diverse, and there is little need to treat the development of all personal pronouns under grammaticalization.

Chapter 6 concludes the book by summarizing the findings of this study and discussing directions for future research.

## Noun-based forms

This chapter investigates the development of personal pronouns that arose from nouns, e.g. first person *boku* ‘servant’ and second person *kimi* ‘emperor, lord’ and *kisama* ‘nobility’ or ‘noble person’. Etymologies of these forms show a similar pathway to those found in other Asian languages such as Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese (Cooke 1968; Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005), namely humble nouns for the speaker and respectful nouns for the addressee. The latter pattern is also attested in a number of European languages (e.g. Spanish *usted* from *Vuestra Merced* ‘your honor’). However, the analysis of historical texts also shows language-specific developments such as the case of first person *watakushi* ‘(lit.) private’ in Japanese: *watakushi* was often used with the notion of *ooyake* ‘public’ to express the contrast between one’s private matters and those of public nature such as one’s social obligations, which led to the interpretation of the former as ‘personal’, ‘individual’, and eventually the speaker.

I first discuss the relevant aspects of mechanisms of change, drawing particularly on works of grammaticalization and semantic change, as they fit particularly well with the development of pronouns from nouns. Then, I examine the diachronic development of noun-based forms in light of those mechanisms. Lastly, I offer a solution to the semantic-pragmatic issues involved in the development of noun-based forms in Japanese.

### 2.1 Introduction

The pioneers of grammaticalization research such as Meillet (1912) and Kuryłowicz (1965) view grammaticalization as the process of change that leads from lexical to grammatical categories or from less grammatical to more grammatical categories (cf. Heine 2003; Heine et al. 1991; Lehman 2002 [1995]; Hopper & Traugott 2003). In earlier studies, emphasis is placed on the change at the word level from a lexical item to a grammatical item, but recent studies came to recognize increasingly the role of constructions and that of the linguistic and pragmatic context in grammaticalization (e.g. Hopper & Traugott 2003; Traugott 2003). Oftentimes, reanalysis and analogy are considered to be the major mechanisms of language change. The former has to do with restructuring or reinterpretation of linguistic units, whereas the latter

relates to the extension of existing items to new constructions based on analogical rules. Reanalysis operates on the syntagmatic axis and is often associated with metonymy, whereas analogical extension operates on the paradigmatic axis and is compared to metaphor. A number of linguists maintain that reanalysis is more important than analogy because they claim only reanalysis is capable of creating new linguistic structures (cf. Heine et al. 1991; Hopper & Traugott 2003; Traugott & Dasher 2002). The role of frequency has also been investigated, most notably by Bybee and associates (e.g. Bybee et al. 1994; Bybee & Hopper 2001; Bybee 2003), though the question of whether the frequency effect is simply epiphenomenal is still debatable given the nature of grammatical items in general.

Grammaticalization is generally accompanied by desemanticization (loss of semantic content), extension (use in new contexts), decategorialization (loss of morphosyntactic properties), and erosion (loss of phonetic substance) (Heine 2003: 579).<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the most explicit and comprehensive attempt thus far to operationalize the criteria of grammaticalization can be found in Lehmann (2002 [1995]). He sets up six parameters, three of which operate on the paradigmatic axis (integrity, paradigmaticity, paradigmatic variability) and the other three on the syntagmatic axis (structural scope, bondedness, syntagmatic variability). Lehmann argues that the degree of grammaticalization can be measured by where the item stands in terms of the six parameters. He views grammaticalization as the process whereby linguistic signs lose their autonomy (thus the processes that apply to each parameter are said to be autonomy-decreasing).

Lehmann's paradigmatic parameters are particularly relevant to the diachronic development of noun-based personal pronouns (see Chapter 5 for problems of applying grammaticalization parameters to pronouns of non-lexical origins). Integrity, which is substance that allows an item to maintain its distinctness from other signs, is affected by desemanticization and phonological attrition. Paradigmaticity refers to formal and semantic integration of an item into a paradigm whose members are defined with each other by opposition or complementarity. Paradigmatic variability is the flexibility with which the speakers choose a particular item from the paradigm. The relevance of paradigmatic parameters over syntagmatic ones in the development of personal pronouns is not surprising given that the latter is more likely to affect signs that co-occur frequently in the syntagm than the former. Lehmann points out that the correlation among paradigmatic parameters is, to some extent, a logical necessity: "if more meaning is to be conveyed (semanticity), either the choice must be expanded (paradigmaticity), or it must be

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4. Heine calls these 'mechanisms', but some disagree with this choice of word as they believe that the term is best reserved for reanalysis/analogy and metonymy/metaphor.

relieved from constraints (paradigmatic variability) (2002 [1995]: 146). In other words, a semantically rich sign (high semanticity) tends to participate loosely in the semantic field (low paradigmaticity) and enjoys a relative freedom of selection according to various communicative intentions (high paradigmatic variability). Conversely, a semantically light sign (low semanticity) tends to be a member of a small paradigm (high paradigmaticity) and restricted by an obligatory selection (low paradigmatic variability).

Now what would these parameters mean for the development of noun-based personal pronouns? Oftentimes, the loss of semantic content and phonological substance (integrity) are considered a hallmark of the development of nouns into pronouns. The former is essential because pronouns assume less stability of referents than nouns. The latter is the result of their high frequency compared to lexical nouns. One important manifestation of low semanticity of pronouns is their ability to shift their referents freely in a short stretch of discourse. This is especially clear in the use of second person forms, e.g. *kimi to kimi* 'you and you', where each instance of *kimi* is intended for a different individual. Nominal equivalents of this type of expression are possible, but its applicability is significantly limited compared to pronouns.

In terms of paradigmaticity, pronouns exhibit higher paradigmaticity because they belong to a paradigm, whereas nouns generally participate in a particular semantic field such as kinship terms or social titles. While this is especially clear in languages like English, where a limited number of forms are neatly organized by a limited number of grammatical features such as person, number, and gender, it is less clear in languages like Thai and Japanese, whose pronominal paradigm is quite loosely knit (though clearly not looser than for nouns). One possible way to operationalize paradigmaticity in the analysis of Japanese pronouns is to see how frequently an item is contrasted with other members in the same paradigm (e.g. *you and I*). Of course, there are a number of nouns that can be used as a pair (e.g. *father and son*), but nominal pairs are made possible by virtue of their lexical meanings. For semantically general items such as pronouns to be contrasted in this way is usually an indication of semantic opposition or complementarity in a paradigm.

It is generally the case that nouns exhibit higher paradigmatic variability than pronouns, because nouns offer more choices for use in a particular paradigmatic slot, say the subject position for self-reference. Pronouns are quite limited in this regard because there is usually a limited number of forms for self-reference (e.g. English *I*). Japanese pronouns offer more choices as multiple forms exist for each person category, but it is clearly limited compared to the range of potentially available nouns. All of these can be summarized in Table 5.

**Table 5.** Lehmann's paradigmatic parameters as applied to change from nouns to pronouns

Parameter	Before	Change	After
Integrity	ability to name a referent, with a bundle of semantic features	semantic integrity of signs is lost (desemanticization, possibly with phonological attrition)	referential dependency on context; less stability of reference (e.g. <i>you and you</i> for different referents)
Paradigmaticity	member of a loose paradigm or semantic field (e.g. social rank names)	signs come to belong to a tighter paradigm (paradigmaticization)	member of a tighter paradigm; can be defined by opposition and/or complementarity (e.g. contrast such as <i>you and I</i> )
Paradigmatic variability	ability to be used freely and interchangeably in a given paradigmatic position	use of signs become constrained by communicative context (obligatorification)	limited number of forms used in a given paradigmatic position

In addition to Lehmann's parameters, where structural properties tend to be highlighted, semantic-pragmatic aspects are also important, especially when investigating a language like Japanese. There are two particularly relevant studies of grammaticalization and semantic change in Japanese, Dasher (1995) and Traugott & Dasher (2002). The former investigates grammaticalization of predicate honorifics, whereas the latter is a more general study of semantic change in which one of the primary languages of the investigation is Japanese. Dasher (1995) argues that referential and non-referential functions can be used to describe and explain the development of Japanese predicate honorifics. Forms with referential functions refer to the referenced event (or the event spoken about), whereas those with non-referential functions express information related to the speech event. Examples of the former include referent honorifics (which are also referred to by various terms such as 'respectful/humiliative honorifics' and 'subject/object honorifics') and those of the latter include addressee honorifics and discourse particles. Dasher claims that the more a given form encodes information about the speech event (i.e. non-referential), the more grammaticalized it is and that a linguistic item shifts from referential to non-referential functions, but not the other way round. This is in accordance with what has been pointed out by earlier works such as Tsujimura (1968) – that Japanese had only referent honorifics at earlier stages of its history (until the 7–8th century) and the emergence of addressee honorifics is a later development (around the 8–9th century). It is also consistent with what is proposed

in the theory of linguistic politeness, that is, the development from non-honorifics to referent honorifics and then to addressee honorifics (Brown & Levinson 1987).<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, Traugott & Dasher (2002: Chapter 6) argue that the development of social deictics generally conforms to the following: (i) reference to the described event > reference to the speech event and (ii) nonsubjective > subjective > intersubjective. The former is a direct equivalent of Dasher's referential and non-referential. These two directionalities often go hand-in-hand in that subjectivity refers to elements that express the speaker's perception or attitude such as modality often in the described event, whereas intersubjectivity has to do with the speaker's attention to the addressee's image needs such as politeness in the speech situation. Traugott & Dasher's claim is based on a more far-reaching principle which they call 'Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change'.<sup>6</sup> This framework explains certain types of semantic change as the conventionalization (and possible eventual semanticization) of pragmatic meanings. Under this model, the speaker first employs a certain linguistic item/construction to invoke an invited inference which is specific to a context. Second, invited inferences become more predictable when they are conventionalized and become independent of a context, subsequently acquiring generalized invited inferences. Lastly, generalized invited inferences are reanalyzed as new coded meanings (semanticization).

Traugott & Dasher's (2002) study offers a number of insights into the development of noun-based personal pronouns in Japanese. Nouns belong to the described event in that they do not necessarily refer to participants of the speech event (i.e. the category of first/second person), whereas personal pronouns clearly refer to

5. Brown & Levinson claim that the development of addressee honorifics is the result of stabilization of reference to the addressee where the addressee is the honoree; thus their claim predicts that addressee-elevating referent honorifics, rather than speaker/self-humbling ones, are the source of addressee honorifics. Traugott & Dasher disagree with Brown & Levinson, citing that most addressee honorifics in Japanese developed from humble honorifics (contra Brown & Levinson). However, I find Traugott & Dasher's remark not particularly relevant because, regardless of whether humble or respectful honorifics are the source, their common denominator is to signify the elevated status of the addressee relative to others. The fact that addressee honorifics are derived from humble honorifics seems to be epiphenomenal in that reference to the speaker's own action is more frequent than reference to the addressee's actions.

6. Precursors of this model can be found in a number of studies such as Geis & Zwicky (1971), from which the term 'invited inference' is adopted, and Levinson (1995), whose equivalent of invited inferences and generalized invited inferences are 'utterance-token meanings' and 'utterance-type meanings', respectively. See also Levinson (1983, 2000) who, based on Grice (1975), makes a distinction between a particularized conversational implicature and generalized conversational implicature, which also parallel invited inferences and generalized invited inferences.

someone who participates in the speech event, thus they are markers of the speech roles (see § 1.2). Similarly, nouns are generally non-subjective in that they do not necessarily convey a subjective judgment about a referent (at least not in the sense of subjectivity of pronouns described below), whereas pronouns are subjective (the speaker assuming the role of the speaker and assigning the role of the addressee) and intersubjective (attending to the image needs of the addressee), though of course this is done by including the addressee in the proposition or the described event. The development of noun-based Japanese pronouns essentially parallels that of addressee honorifics from referent honorifics investigated by Traugott & Dasher and suggested by Brown & Levinson (1987). The development from referent to addressee honorifics originates in the situation where there is an overlap between the described event and the speech event, e.g. a respected element who is a participant in the described event is also a participant in the speech situation. Similarly, personal pronouns often arise from nouns in the situation where nouns such as social titles which do not have inherent relations to the speech situation come to be interpreted as personal pronouns as they are used in the situation where the referent of a noun is the same as the participant in the speech situation. There is one more particularly important issue on the semantic-pragmatic side. In the process of development, many Japanese pronouns lost humble or respectful meanings, which looks very similar to the semantic bleaching observed over and over in grammaticalization studies. However, I argue that semantic bleaching alone is insufficient because it does not explain why many Japanese pronouns became derogatory, not just semantically neutral or empty (see § 2.4).

An additional criterion for differentiating nouns from pronouns is the timing when the item's original lexical meaning starts contradicting its new usage. For example, the humble *boku* '(lit.) servant' and the respectful *kimi* '(lit.) lord' can be considered to be functioning as or at least are well on the way to becoming pronouns when they are used to refer to someone who is socially close and/or lower. The observations above show that what have been proposed in the studies of grammaticalization and semantic-pragmatic change are to a large extent consistent with the development of personal pronouns from nouns.

## 2.2 First person forms

### 2.2.1 *Watakushi* ‘private’

*Watakushi* is attested since Stage II, and it is used as a noun meaning ‘private (matters)’, as shown in the following examples.<sup>7</sup>

- (3) a. *Nihudau ha, kano kuni no tokui nite, tosigoro*  
 Nihudau TOP that country GEN good.friend being several.years  
*ahi-katarahi haberi ture do, watakushi ni, isasaka*  
 each.other-talk HON PST but watakushi at a.little  
*ahi-uramuru koto haberi-te, kotonaruseusoku wo*  
 each.other-hold.a.grudge thing COP-CONN correspondence ACC  
*dani kayohasa de, hisasiu nari haberi nuru wo, nami*  
 even exchange NEG long.time become HON PST CONJ wave  
*no magire ni, ika naru koto ka aram?*  
 GEN problem in how become thing Q exist  
 ‘I knew the Akashi Novice well when I was in his province, and I talked to him often over the years, but then he and I fell out a little on some private matters (*watakushi*) and have not corresponded for ages. What could have brought him here through such seas?’  
 (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Akashi)
- b. *Tosigoro, ohoyake watakushi ohom-itoma naku te,*  
 several.years public watakushi HP-free.time not.exist CONN to.  
*sasimo kiki-oki tamaha nu yo no huru-koto-domo*  
 such.an.extent hear-put RESP NEG world GEN old-thing-etc  
*kudusi-ide te, “Kakaru tokoro wo mo hito*  
 talk.little.by.little-come CONN like place ACC EMPH person  
*wo mo mi zara masika ba, sauzausiku ya!” to made*  
 ACC EMPH see NEG MOD if pity INJ COMP until  
*kyouari to obosu koto mo maziru.*  
 interesting COMP think thing EMPH get.mixed  
 ‘Little by little the Akashi Novice treated Genji to tales of bygone days, ones that Genji had never really heard, having been taken up by his own affairs (*watakushi*) or those of the court, until Genji was sufficiently intrigued to feel at times as though it might have been a shame never to have come and met the man.’  
 (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Akashi)

7. The Hepburn system of Romanization is used except in the following cases: (i) long vowels are represented as a sequence of two vowels and (ii) the moraic nasal is represented as *n*. Roman letters in the original source, however, are preserved in order to facilitate a search in cases where the texts are available through the online database.



As you can see in (3a), *watakushi* is used to describe things of personal and private nature. It is often contrasted with the notion of ‘public’, which usually indicates one’s work, duty, and social service. This is especially clear in (3b), where the protagonist’s (Genji’s) public matters (i.e. his work) and private matters are juxtaposed and contrasted in the phrase *ohoyake watakusi* ‘public-private’. The lexical meaning of ‘private’ is seen as the opposite of ‘public’ in much the same way that *high* is seen as the opposite of *low*. When there is such an opposition, there is a good chance for ‘private’ to be equated with ‘personal’, which has a strong connection to the speaker. This may eventually lead to conventionalization as a marker of the speaker role. Similarly, *watakushi* in (3a) means that the speaker and the *Akashi* Novice know each other in the public domain (i.e. work), but they became estranged since they had some disagreement over some private matters. In terms of Traugott & Dasher’s distinction between the described event and speech event, *watakushi* in Stage II clearly belongs to the described event, having no inherent relations with elements of the speech event, but importantly it has an association to the speaker through an invited inference.

*Watakushi* continues to be used as a noun in Stage III, but its usage is extended from private matters (as opposed to public matters) so as to include the notion of individual or self (as opposed to the general public), thus invoking the first person interpretation. This can be seen in the following examples.

- (4) a. *Makotoni watakushi o wasurete chuu o sonzuru hito*  
truly watakushi ACC forget loyalty ACC think person  
*wa kayooni koso aru beki ni,*  
TOP like.this EMPH exist MOD but  
‘Truly, this is the way the person who disregards personal interests  
(*watakushi*) and has high regards for loyalty should be, but...’  
(Stage III: 14C, *Taiheiki*, Book 26)
- b. *Tada kami ichijin o afugi-tatematsutte, chuuteeni watakushi*  
only emperor alone ACC revere-RESP loyal watakushi  
*naku, shimo wa hakusee o nadete*  
without general.public TOP peasants ACC love  
*jinsee ni hodokoshiaru yue nari.*  
benevolent.politics DAT cherish reason DEC  
‘It is because they have revered the emperor with loyalty and without sense  
of self (*watakushi*), and have cherished the common folk with benevolent  
government.’  
(Stage III: 14C, *Taiheiki*, Book 2)
- c. *Iro koso sonjite-soorae domo imada watakushi ni sooroo*  
color EMPH damage-HUBL but still watakushi LOC exist  
‘Although the color is damaged, it is still by me (*watakushi*).’  
(Stage III: 14C, *Taiheiki*, Book 18)

- d. *Konya wa meegetsu no yo nite soorae ba, osore*  
 tonight TOP bright.moon GEN night CONN COP because awe  
*nagara watakushi no boooku e on-iri-soorahite, kusa*  
 while watakushi GEN dilapidated.house to HP-enter-RESP grass  
*fakuaki niwa no tsuki womo go-ran-soorae kashi.*  
 deep garden GEN moon ACC HP-watch-RESP EMPH  
 ‘Because tonight is a bright moonlit night, please come to my (*watakushi*)  
 dilapidated house and watch the moon in the garden with deep grass.’  
 (Stage III: 14C, Taiheiki, Book 33)

In (4a–b), *watakushi* means ‘private matters’ and is contrasted with ‘public matters’ in much the same way as Stage II, namely personal interests as opposed to public interests or the greater good. In (4c–d), on the other hand, although *watakushi* is still interpretable as ‘private’, its private nature is closely associated with the speaker rather than being contrasted with ‘public’. In (4c), one can literally interpret *watakushi* as something like ‘private property’ (i.e. the item is in my house), but clearly it is pragmatically associated with the speaker (i.e. the item is in my possession). Similarly, *watakushi* in (4d) can be interpreted as ‘a privately owned dilapidated house’, but it is clear in the context of the utterance that the house belongs to the speaker. Therefore, the link of *watakushi* to the speaker is much more apparent in (4c–d) than in (4a–b). Although whether *watakushi* has semanticized as a person marker is not clear, its association started shifting from the described event to the speech event. This semantic-pragmatic extension seems to be quite natural in the obvious resemblance of private (as opposed to public) matters to personal matters, that is, a generalized invited inference. Additionally, personal matters tend to be equated with the first person perspective because one empathizes with the first person most (see, for example, Kuno 1987, and Chapter 4). Another characteristic of *watakushi* in (4c–d) is that it is considered formal and polite because it still assumes the contrast between trivial and unimportant private and important public matters.

*Watakushi*’s association with the speaker continues to grow in Stage IV, as can be seen in the following example.

- (5) *Watakushi wa wakai toki ni Harima no kuni Akashi ni arishiga*  
 watakushi TOP young time at Harima GEN country Akashi in live  
 ‘When I (*watakushi*) was young, I lived in Akashi in the Province of Harima.’  
 (Stage IV: 1686, Koushoku Ichidai Onna, Book 3: Chapter 2)

*Watakushi* in (5) refers to the speaker, a lady-in-waiting, talking in a meeting. Although the meeting itself is an informal one, the utterance carries a somewhat formal tone given the presence of higher ranking women. The following examples are possible indications of new coded meaning as a first person form, exhibiting paradigmaticity.

- (6) a. *Ore wa yoba nu ga to oose-keru hodoni. Satewa*  
 I TOP call NEG but COMP say.RESP-MOD situation then  
*watakushi no kikichigae-mashi-ta nado mooshite.*  
 watakushi NOM mishear-HON-PST etc say.HUBL  
 ‘Because he said, “I did not call you”, I said, “I (*watakushi*) must have then made a mistake.”’  
 (Stage IV: 1686, Koushoku Ichidai Onna, Book 3: Chapter 4)
- b. *Korya, omae, nande maa, watakushi o.*  
 INJ you why INJ watakushi ACC  
 ‘Oh, no, why are you doing this to me (*watakushi*)!’  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 3)
- c. *Omae mo watakushi mo, nekki no jikoku. Hie-nai*  
 you also watakushi also fever GEN time get.cold-NEG  
*yooni nasaremase.*  
 appearance do.RESP  
 ‘It’s that time of the day when both you and I (*watakushi*) suffer from fever. Please stay warm.’  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 5)

In (6a), *watakushi* is contrasted with another first person form, *ore*. *Watakushi* is uttered by a socially lower person (heroine) and *ore* by a socially higher person (husband of the heroine’s mistress). Similarly, (6b–c) show the contrast between *watakushi*, a first person form, and a second person form, *omae*. At this stage, it may be safely said that *watakushi* is an element of the speech event rather than the described event, as it is used to refer to the speaker, often in contrast with and in juxtaposition to other participants in the speech situation.

The association of *watakushi* with the speaker in the speech event is fully conventionalized in Stage V. We also see the phonological reduction from *watakushi* to *watashi* (i.e. loss of phonetic integrity), which is not found prior to this stage. In both (7a) and (7b), *watakushi* refers to the speaker of the utterance.

- (7) a. *Watashi mo korede edokko desu to itta.*  
 watakushi also this Edo.native COP COMP said  
 ‘He said, “I (*watashi*) am also a native of Edo.”’  
 (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 2)
- b. *Watakushi wa kyootoo oyobi sonota shokun no*  
 watakushi TOP vice-principal and other gentlemen GEN  
*osetsu ni wa zenzen fudooi dearimasu.*  
 idea DAT TOP utterly disagreement COP  
 ‘I (*watakushi*) utterly disagree with the idea of the vice-principal and others.’  
 (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 6)

It should be noted that, while phonetically unreduced *watakushi* is primarily used as a first person pronoun in Stage V, it can still be used as a noun meaning private or self, as the following examples from the Daijirin dictionary (Muramatsu 1999) show.

- (8) a. *ooyake to watakushi no kubetsu*  
 public and watakushi GEN distinction  
 ‘distinction between public and private (*watakushi*)’
- b. *watakushi no nai seejitsuna hito*  
 watashi GEN not.exist sincere person  
 ‘person without the sense of self (*watakushi*)’
- c. *kono koto wa watakushi ni negaimasu*  
 this thing TOP watashi DAT wish  
 ‘please keep this matter a secret (*watakushi*)’

The availability of both old and new usages side by side is often found in grammaticalization. Take, for example, the case of English *since*; the older temporal sense is still available along with the newer causal sense. In the case of *watakushi*, the newer function (i.e. first person pronoun) coexists with the older function (i.e. nominal meaning ‘private’). It is also important to note that as a noun *watakushi* tends to be phonetically unreduced, whereas there are a number of phonetic variants of *watakushi* in the first person sense. When used as a first person pronoun, *watakushi* has at least the following variants: (i) *watakushi* > (ii) *watashi* > (iii) *atashi* > (iv) *atai*. The leftmost form is the most formal, and the rightmost form is the least formal and typically associated with female speakers. The noun interpretation is generally available only for the unreduced version in (i). It is very rare with (ii), if not impossible. In fact, the Nihon Kokugo Daijiten (Nihon Daijiten Kankokai 1972–1976) does not have a noun entry under *watashi* (ii). As far as (iii) and (iv) are concerned, the noun interpretation is completely impossible. The difference in phonetic size between nouns and pronouns is consistent with the tendency that grammatical items such as personal pronouns generally have reduced phonological size relative to nouns.

### 2.2.2 *Boku* ‘servant’

The story of *boku* is somewhat different from that of *watakushi*. *Watakushi* developed a pronoun function by gradually strengthening the tie with the speech situation and its participant, namely the speaker. This was primarily due to the lexical meaning of *watakushi* and its invited inference in the speech situation, i.e. the contrast such as ‘private vs. public’ and ‘self vs. others’ used in the speech situation tends to yield inferences in which private and self are equated with the speaker. In

other words, the case of *watakushi* exemplifies the natural and gradual development from a noun into a personal pronoun in that its change is primarily internal (i.e. a change is not motivated by, say, a change in the social structure). On the other hand, the case of first person *boku* involves extra-linguistic factors, such as the abolishment of feudalism, to a considerable degree.

The Chinese character used for Modern Japanese *boku* [僕] is found since Stage I primarily in texts that employ Chinese writing (i.e. texts consisting solely of Chinese characters and no Japanese *kana* letters). The major difficulty in analyzing the development of *boku* in Chinese writing is the choice of Chinese characters and their readings. According to comprehensive dictionaries such as *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten* (*Nihon Daijiten Kankokai* 1972–1976), the Chinese character used for *boku* in Modern Japanese (i.e. Stage V) [僕] has only been read that way since the beginning of Stage V. Although the same character was used in the earliest texts of Stage I, the dictionaries and the historical texts suggest that the character was not read as *boku*. In addition, there does not seem to be a complete consensus and consistency with respect to the exact reading of the character prior to Stage V as well as the way Chinese characters are assigned to various pronunciations. Therefore, it is possible that the same character is read differently and that the same reading is given to different characters depending on the source text or even different versions of the same work. For example:

- (9) a. *Mata yatsukare mo urehe tatematsureru tokoro nari.*  
 similarly yatsukare also worry RESP place COP  
 ‘I (*yatsukare*) am also worried about that.’  
 (State I: 720, *Nihon Shoki*, Emperor Ankan)
- b. *Shimobe ni sake nomasuru koto wa kokoro su-beki koto nari.*  
 menial DAT sake make.drink thing TOP mind do-MOD thing COP  
 ‘One should be careful about giving drink to menials (*shimobe*).’  
 (Stage III: ca. 1330, *Tsurezuregusa*, § 87)

In (9a), the word translated as a first person pronoun is read as *yatsukare*, but different sources assign different Chinese characters to it: the *Daijirin Dictionary* (Matsumura 1999) assigns the character that is used for Modern Japanese first person *boku* (i.e. [僕]), whereas *Shogakkan’s Nihon Shoki* (Kojima et al. 1994–1998) gives it a different character [臣]. Similarly, in the text of *Tsurezuregusa* in (9b), the word *shimobe* [下部], which means ‘servant’, has a different character from the one assigned to Modern Japanese *boku*, but this reading is often given the same character as Modern Japanese *boku* [僕] as well. Thus, it is quite difficult to make a positive argument about the natural and continuous development of *boku* from the nominal usage ‘servant’ to the pronominal one ‘I’, at least in the Pre-Modern Japanese periods.

This trend clearly and suddenly changes in Stage V. *Boku* starts being used by male speakers to designate themselves when they are talking to someone of equal or lower social status, and the Chinese character [僕] is always used unless *kana* letters are used. Consider the following examples.

- (10) a. *Suruto Nonomiya-kun wa “Boku mo urusai” to itta.*  
 then Nonomiya-Mr. TOP boku also noisy COMP said  
 ‘Then Nonomiya said “I (*boku*) also think that trains are noisy.”’  
 (Stage V: 1908, Sanshiro, Chapter 2)
- b. *Boku wa shashoo ni osowara-nai to, hitoride norikae*  
 boku TOP conductor DAT be.taught-NEG if alone transfer  
*ga jiyuuni dekinai.*  
 NOM freely cannot.do  
 ‘I (*boku*) can’t transfer trains by myself without asking a train conductor.’  
 (Stage V: 1908, Sanshiro, Chapter 2)
- c. *Genni Satomi ga boku ni kimi ga yaru nara yatteremoii*  
 in.fact Satomi NOM boku DAT kimi NOM do if will.do  
*to itta kurai damono.*  
 COMP said extent COP  
 ‘In fact, Satomi said to me (*boku*), “I would do it if you (*kimi*) would.”’  
 (Stage V: 1908, Sanshiro, Chapter 7)

In (10a) and (10b), *boku* is uttered by a male student to his younger college friend, a context where the original lexical meaning of ‘servant’ is entirely irrelevant. The status as a marker of the speech role of speaker is clearer in (10c). Both first person *boku* and second person *kimi* refer to the same person, the speaker of the whole utterance of (10c), because they belong to two different speech events. *Boku* in the matrix clause is anchored in the current situation, namely it designates the speaker as opposed to the addressee of the whole utterance. Similarly, *kimi* in the embedded discourse designates its addressee who is the speaker of (10c). This shiftability of referents or the perspectivized use of semantically empty forms for the same referent in a small stretch of discourse is characteristic of the deictic nature of personal pronouns.

Considering the clear demarcation between the pre- and post-Stage V use of *boku*, its birth as a first person pronoun is largely due to extra-linguistic forces. Dictionaries such as the *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten* (*Nihon Daijiten Kankokai* 1972–1976) and *Daijirin* dictionary (Muramatsu 1999) mention that *boku* was artificially adopted as a first person form by students at the beginning of Stage V. The cases of *watakushi* and that of *boku* illustrate well the difficulty in analyzing the development of personal pronouns. Based on its semantics and pragmatics, *boku* appears to be a good candidate to undergo the same type of process in which *watakushi* was involved. It is equally plausible that the meaning of ‘servant’ is used as a humble term of speaker-reference much like the polite second person forms in many

Romance languages, strengthening its relation to the speaker in the speech situation. However, examinations of historical texts suggest that the case of *watakushi* is motivated both semantically (i.e. by lexical meaning) and pragmatically (i.e. by inferences made by language users), whereas the case of *boku* is an example of change caused by an extra-linguistic force (i.e. loss of its literal meaning due to the abolition of feudalism, drastic restructuring of Japanese society, and its subsequent adoption by students as a first person form). This observation is consistent with the claim that linguistic change involving nouns is more susceptible than verbs to extra-linguistic and socio-cultural factors such as a change in the social structure (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 3–4). This stands in sharp contrast with Traugott & Dasher’s analysis of the development of predicate honorifics, which exhibit striking regularity across items. Therefore, one must be cautious in making generalizations about the development of nouns into personal pronouns. Explaining the general tendency is without a doubt an important task, but an item-by-item analysis is essential in investigating the development of nouns into personal pronouns.

## 2.3 Second person forms

### 2.3.1 *Kimi* ‘lord’

The use of *kimi* is attested since the earliest recorded history of the language. There, *kimi* is clearly used with its nominal meaning of ‘emperor’ or ‘lord’ to a person of a significantly high social rank, often to members of the imperial family, as in (11). This type of usage is arguably non-subjective in that the emperor or a particular member of the imperial family is the one and only person regardless of one’s perspective.

- (11) *utsuso wo, omi no oo-kimi, ama nare ya, Irago ga*  
 hemp ACC Omi GEN great-kimi fisherman become EXCL Irago GEN  
*shima no, tamamo karimasu*  
 isle GEN sea.weed gather  
 ‘Is the Prince (*kimi*) of Omi a fisherman? Alas, he gathers the seaweed at the  
 isle of Irago.’ (Stage I: 8C, Manyoshu, Book 1: Song 23)

(11) is a song read in sympathy for Prince Omi when he was exiled to the remote Isle of Irago. The presence of a modifier *oo-* ‘great-’ is indicative of its nominal nature, that is to say, it should technically be considered a third person form in the sense that it does not inherently designate a speech act participant, though Japanese verbal morphology does not mark person categories except in special cases, such as predicates of internal feelings (cf. Kuroda 1973). In other words, *kimi*

here refers to an element in the described event. However, there are cases in which *kimi*'s referent is ambiguous between the element of the speech event and that of the described event. Consider the following song read for Emperor Nintoku by his wife, Empress Iwano Hime.

- (12) *kimi ga yuki, ke nagaku narinu, yama tazune, mukae ka*  
*kimi NOM go day long became mountain seek meet Q*  
*yukan, machi nika matan*  
 should.go wait CONJ should.wait

'Since you, my Lord (*kimi*), were gone, many days have passed, now to the mountains should I go to meet you, or should I wait and wait for you?'

(Stage I: 8C, Manyoshu, Book 2: Song 85)

Although *kimi* in (12) can be interpreted as having a third person referent (i.e. the referent is not participating in the speech situation), it is most likely to be addressed to Emperor Nintoku directly. The use of the vocative in the English translation is suggestive of this. In addition, considering the fact that this is a poem, it is quite plausible that at least the intended referential status of *kimi* is the addressee or second person even if the recipient of the song is actually not present in the speech situation to receive the message directly. There is nothing unusual about using a second person form for an intended recipient of the message not present in the speech situation. Overall, *kimi* in this stage primarily refers to the element of the described situation in that it has no inherent relation with the speech act participants, thus the referent of *kimi* is not restricted to a particular person category. This tendency for *kimi* to be used for both the second and third person continues for quite some time.

Its primary use for the imperial family has been gradually extended to a person of high social rank in general. *Kimi* was often used for someone of a considerably high social status such as the members of the imperial family in Stage I, as we saw in (11) and (12). However, *kimi* is also used for someone for whom one wishes to show respect, love, and intimacy, as in (13). The use of *kimi* is extended even further as time progresses so that it can refer not only to the emperor/imperial family, but also to someone who is socially higher than the speaker in general or someone who the speaker admires and loves. The following examples from Stages II through IV illustrate this.

- (13) *a ga kimi, iki-ide tamahe! Ito imiziki me na mise*  
 I GEN kimi live-come RESP very horrible experience NEG show  
*tamahi so*  
 RESP EXCL

'My dear lady (*kimi*), wake up! Please don't let me go through this horrible experience!'

(Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Yugao)



- (14) *Kimi o koso asahi to tanome furusato ni, nokoru*  
 kimi ACC EMPH morning.sun COMP rely.on home at remain  
*nadeshiko shimo ni karasu na*  
 fringed.pink(plant) frost DAT wither NEG  
 ‘It is on you, my lord (*kimi*), that I rely as on the morning sun. Let not the  
 fringed pinks left behind at my old home be withered by the frost.’  
 (Stage III: 1277, Izayoi Nikki)

- (15) *kimi ga kashizuki-tamau oogon no shooryoo nari*  
 kimi NOM take.care.of-HON gold GEN apparition COP  
 ‘(I am) the apparition of the gold that you (*kimi*) have accumulated.’  
 (Stage IV: 1776, Ugetsu Monogatari, Himpukuron)

(13) shows that the use of *kimi* is no longer constrained by its literal meaning ‘emperor’ or ‘lord’, since *kimi* is uttered by the protagonist Genji to his lover Yugao. Their relationship is clearly different from a typical master-and-servant one (particularly considering that the speaker is a male in this case), but it is used to show respect and admiration. *Kimi* is reserved for someone who holds a high social position and for whom the speaker wishes to convey respect, as can be seen in the examples from Stage III and IV presented in (14) and (15), respectively. *Kimi* in (14) is addressed from the writer to her child with love and admiration, whereas (15) is where the apparition of the gold is talking to a renowned warrior. This shows that the meaning of *kimi* has changed from its original meaning of ‘emperor/sovereign’ to ‘social superiors’ in general. This may very well be caused by extravagance (e.g. Haspelmath 1999). That is to say, the speaker extends the use of *kimi* to someone who is not his/her lord out of a desire to be noticed. As extravagance wears off, the item can now be used for a broader range of referents. It often designates the addressee who is present in the speech situation as in (15), and this serves as the ‘bridging context’ (Heine 2002) that strengthens the relation of *kimi* to the addressee and the speech situation. At Stage IV, *kimi* has the generalized invited inference of ‘social superiors’ or ‘someone who the speaker respects and admires’ and is clearly subjective. However, it is not entirely obvious if *kimi* has semanticized as a marker of the speech role of the addressee at this point, since it is usually used for one’s master or someone who holds a socially higher status vis-à-vis the speaker. Instances where *kimi* is clearly used as a noun meaning ‘lord’ or ‘sovereign’ are not hard to find either even in Stage IV, as in the following example.

- (16) *mi wa matamono nagara fuki wa rekkoku no kimi*  
 self TOP vassal though nobility TOP great.nation GEN kimi  
*ni masareri*  
 DAT exceed  
 ‘though he was only a court minister himself, his wealth exceeded that of the  
 ruler (*kimi*) of a great state’ (Stage IV: 1776, Ugetsu Monogatari, Himpukuron)

(16) is uttered by the same speaker as (15), the apparition of the gold, but the context clearly shows that *kimi* in (16) refers not to the addressee, but to the ‘ruler of a great nation’ in general; thus it should be interpreted as a noun. Examples like (16) make it hard to make a positive argument that *kimi* is a semanticized second person pronoun.

However, the usage of *kimi* clearly changes in Stage V. It is now used for a socially lower or equal addressee rather than to a socially higher addressee. Consider the following examples.

- (17) a. *kimi mo kurumaya no neko dakeni daibu tsuyosooda.*  
*kimi* also rickshawman GEN cat EMPH very looks.strong  
 ‘No wonder you (*kimi*) look very strong, because you are a rickshawman’s cat.’  
 (Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 1)
- b. *boku wa kimi no yoona horafuki towa chigausa.*  
 I TOP *kimi* GEN like prankster with different  
 ‘I’m not a prankster like you (*kimi*).’  
 (Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 2)

The utterances in (17) are directed toward the addressee of equal social status: (17a) from the protagonist cat to another cat who lives in the neighborhood and (17b) from the master of the protagonist cat to his friend. The relationship between the speaker and addressee as well as the content of the utterance make it obvious that the literal meaning of *kimi* ‘lord’ has been completely lost, and it can now be used for any addressee of equal or lower social status. In fact, it is unusual to use *kimi* for one’s social superiors at this stage. Also, it is rarely used as a noun meaning ‘lord’. Additionally, the following type of example indicates assumption of less stability of reference, which generally results from the loss of semantic integrity.

- (18) “*Kimi shitteru ka*” to *shujin wa kitsunetuski no*  
*kimi* know Q COMP master TOP possessed.by.fox GEN  
*yoona kao o shite Meitei ni kiku. Meitei mo bakageta*  
 appearance face ACC do Meitei DAT ask Meitei also silly  
*chooshide “Boku wa shiran, shitteirya kimi da”*  
 tone I TOP not.know know.if *kimi* COP  
 “‘Do you (*kimi*) know?’”, the master asked Meitei with a wondering look. Meitei replies “I (*boku*) don’t know. If anyone knows, it’s you (*kimi*).”  
 (Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 3)

In (18), there are two instances of *kimi*, each intended for different referents, in a relatively short stretch of discourse. The first *kimi* is uttered by the master of the house and intended for his friend, Meitei, whereas the second one is uttered by Meitei and intended for the house master. Also, considering their relationship, it is clearly not used as a noun meaning ‘lord’. This illustrates *kimi*’s ability to shift reference freely from one utterance to another. *Kimi* in Stage V assumes less stability

of reference; thus phrases like *kimi to kimi* ‘you and you’ where each *kimi* refers to different entities (low semantic integrity) is possible. Not surprisingly, it is not easy to find the context in which the same holds true for the nominal meaning of ‘emperor’, ‘lord’, or ‘sovereign’, especially in the second person interpretation, because such a context literally requires the presence of multiple emperors, lords, or sovereigns as addressees in the speech situation. Also, that *kimi* came to designate the addressee in the speech situation rather than the emperor or lord in the described event shows the development of restriction on the range of reference to which *kimi* can refer: *kimi* can now refer to the second person only (but not to the third person).<sup>8</sup> All of these suggest that *kimi* no longer participates loosely in the semantic field of, say, social rank names or epithets and that it is a member of a tighter paradigm of personal pronouns. At this point, it is safe to say that *kimi* has become an element of the speech event because its primary usage is to designate the entity present in the speech situation.

This clear change in the use of *kimi* seems to coincide with the drastic change in the social structure of Japan at that time: the Meiji reform where the political power was returned from the *Tokugawa* shogunate to the emperor and the feudal system was abolished. The meaning of *kimi* ‘lord’ has become socially insignificant with the abolishment of the feudal system, which naturally leads to its loss of semantic content. The loss of semantic content is necessary in the transition of *kimi* from a lexical noun to a person marker, as it allows the item to function as a marker of the speech role. However, this does not mean that only extra-linguistic factors determined the developmental path of *kimi*, as its reference was already extended for social superiors in general based most likely on extravagance.

### 2.3.2 *Kisama* ‘nobility’

The story of *kisama* ‘noble person’ starts very differently from that of *kimi* ‘lord’. We saw in the previous section that *kimi* was used as a noun since Stage I. *Kisama*, on the other hand, was created deliberately at the end of Stage III, and its usage started primarily in Stage IV. Tsujimura (1968) notes that *kisama* was originally used as a term of address in formal letters of the Samurai class and rarely found in colloquial language. It is also pointed out that the etymology of *kisama* is somewhat controversial. Comprehensive dictionaries generally list three possible sources: (i) shortened form of *kimisama* < *kimi* ‘lord’ + *-sama*, a respectful suffix that originally meant ‘appearance’, (ii) shortened form of *kishosama* < *kisho* ‘your honorable

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8. Except in the case where the noun is used in the archaic sense, as in the national anthem of Japan *Kimi ga Yo* ‘Emperor’s reign’.

residence' + *-sama*, and (iii) combination of *ki* 'graceful' + *-sama*. The uncontracted forms in (i) and (ii) are actual forms that are used in the history of Japanese. There are a couple of reasons to favor the explanation in (iii). First, *kimisama* in (i) is less likely to be the source in that Chinese characters used for the *kimi* portion of *kimisama* (which is the same character as the second person *kimi* examined above [君]) and the *ki* portion of *kisama* [貴] are different from each other. Second, it is hard to imagine the presence of a contracted form because both *kimisama* and *kishosama* were used at approximately the same time as *kisama* first appeared, namely Stage III. In addition, if *kisama* is a shortened form of *kimisama* (i) or *kishosama* (ii), it goes against the general tendency that phonological reduction in the development of Japanese pronouns often coincides with the loss or weakening of semantic content and politeness value (cf. *watakushi* > *watashi* > *atashi* > *atai*). If *kisama* resulted from contraction of *kimisama* or *kishosama*, it is expected to be less polite, as its literal meaning is expected to be stripped away, but as pointed out above, *kisama* was a polite term of address used in formal writings. All of these suggest that the possibility in (iii) is the most plausible explanation. *Kisama* was intentionally created as a term of address mainly for use in writing and did not go through the 'natural' process that the first person *watakushi* had gone through (i.e. the change from a noun used originally in the described event to a marker of the speech role via conventionalization of the relation between the referent and the speech act participants in the bridging context).

Beginning Stage IV, *kisama* starts being used frequently in the colloquial language. In the first half of Stage IV, it is already used for the addressee in the speech situation instead of the recipient of formal writing. This is not necessarily surprising since it was created as a respectful term of address. Consider the following examples.

- (19) a. *kisama mo yorozuni kinotsuki soo naru okatasama to*  
*kisama* also variously be.sensible EVID COP gentleman COMP  
*miete hitoshio oitooshuu omou.*  
 seem all.the.more adorable think  
 'You (*kisama*) also seem like someone who is sensible and smart about many matters, so I adore you all the more.' (Stage IV, first half: 1682, Koushoku Ichidai Otoko, Book 1) (Tsujimura 1968: 176)
- b. *oridashi no shimachirimen kisama ni kise taraba*  
 newly.woven GEN crepe *kisama* DAT dress if  
*nukeru hodo yoki haori naran*  
 ecstatic extent good coat MOD  
 'If you (*kisama*) dress in a kimono coat made from newly woven crepe, it must look ecstatically beautiful.' (Stage IV, first half: 1682, Koushoku Ichidai Otoko, Book 6) (Tsujimura 1968: 186)

Both instances of *kisama* in (19) are uttered to the same person, namely the protagonist, who is present in the speech situation. The utterance contents, as well as the fact that the speaker of *kisama* was a woman at the tea shop in (19a) and a prostitute in (19b) who both hold a lower social status than the protagonist, show that *kisama* is a respectful term. At first glance, it appears that *kisama* is functioning as a pronoun in (19), but it is not clear if it has semanticized as a marker of the speech role of the addressee because the use as a term of address does not guarantee the status of the speech role marker. Many forms such as kinship terms can be used as terms of address, especially if used vocatively, but that does not necessarily mean that they are markers of the speech roles. However, one can easily imagine that *kisama* in examples like (19) is a very good candidate to become a personal pronoun, as its use for the addressee in the speech situation gets conventionalized. In fact, this will become clearer in the examples from the second half of Stage IV.

- (20) *kasa doko ka kisama wa kisama wa kisama wa*  
 umbrella where Q kisama TOP kisama TOP kisama TOP  
 ‘Where is my umbrella? Do you (*kisama*) know? Do you (*kisama*) know? How about you (*kisama*)?’

(Stage IV, second half: 1806, Yanagidaru) (Tsumijima 1968: 194)

In (20), a drunken man at a cherry blossom viewing site is hastily asking one man after another if they know where his lost umbrella is. Therefore, each instance of *kisama* refers to a different individual. This is a clear indication of pronominality in that the example shows that *kisama*’s ability to shift its referent freely in a short stretch of both temporal and discourse distance. The correct identification of referents would require, for example, recognition of the pointing gesture made by the speaker or the direction of his/her eye gaze. *Kisama* exhibits low semantic integrity, because the identity of a referent is dependent on the judgment made in the speech situation (i.e. it assumes less stability of reference). The next example is suggestive of paradigmaticity.

- (21) A: *anata-gata wa otomari degozari-masu ka*  
 you-PL TOP lodging COP.RESP-HON Q  
 ‘Are you (*anata-gata*) looking for lodging?’  
 B: *kisama wa Odawara ka. Oira Koshimizu ka Shirokoya ni*  
 kisama TOP Odawara Q I Koshimizu or Shirokoya at  
*tomaru tsumori da.*  
 lodge intention COP  
 ‘Are you (*kisama*) from the post town of Odawara? I intend to stay at the Koshimizu or Shirokoya Inn.’

- A: *Konban wa ryooke tomo, otomari ga*  
 tonight TOP both.inns together daimyo's.staying NOM  
*gozari-masu kara, doozo watakushi kata e otomari*  
 exist-HON because please I place to lodging  
*kudasari-mase.*  
 give-HON  
 'A daimyo is staying at both inns, so please stay at our (*watakushi*) inn.'
- B: *kisama no tokoro wa kirei ka.*  
 kisama GEN place TOP clean Q  
 'Is your (*kisama*) inn clean?' (Stage IV, second half: 1805,  
 Tokaidochu Hizakurige) (Tsujimura 1968: 194)

(21) is a conversation between a hotel barker (A) and one of the protagonists, Yajirobe (B). There are two utterances of *kisama*, both by the protagonist, and each instance is contrasted with other person forms. The first *kisama* stands in clear contrast with the first person *oira* in B's first utterance, whereas the second one is in contrast with the first person *watakushi* in the immediately preceding utterance by A. In addition, given the nature of this conversation, one can also see that *kisama* does not carry much respect in this example.

The loss of politeness toward the addressee becomes clearer and clearer in the second half of Stage IV, and *kisama* is predominantly used for someone of equal or lower social status. This is unlike the first half of Stage IV, when it was used as a respectful term of address. Consider the following examples.

- (22) a. *Anmari akirete mono ga iware nu wai no. haa kisama*  
 too.much be.amazed thing NOM say NEG INJ FP oh kisama  
*korya kagami mita koto wa nai no*  
 this mirror saw NMLZ TOP not.exist FP  
 'I'm utterly amazed. Oh, well, I assume you (*kisama*) have never seen yourself in the mirror.' (Stage IV, second half: 1790,  
 Mebokukasane Monogatari) (Tsujimura 1968: 192)
- b. *kisama no senzo wa Momotaro ni kibidango*  
 kisama GEN ancestor TOP Momotaro DAT millet.dumpling  
*hitotsu moratte onigashima made tomo o*  
 one receive Onigashima.Island until accompaniment ACC  
*shita sore kara mire ba itsutsu demo takai mono da*  
 did that from judge if five EMPH expensive thing COP  
 'Your (*kisama*) ancestor accompanied Momotaro to the Onigashima just for one millet dumpling. Judging from that, even five is too many.'  
 (Stage IV, second half: 1791, Yononaka Shareken no Ezu)  
 (Tsujimura 1968: 192–193)

The content of utterances in (22a–b) makes it clear that the addressee is not someone who is respected. (22a) is uttered by someone from the brothel toward a woman at the *tofu* shop. Even more clearly, the utterance in (22b) is said by a thief to a dog. That *kisama* does not carry much politeness in the second half of Stage IV can be seen in examples presented earlier as well. For example, *kisama* is somewhat casual, if not rude, in (20) where a drunken man at the cherry blossom viewing site is asking where his umbrella is. Similarly, in (21), which is a conversation between a hotel barker and his potential customer, the hotel barker uses a polite second person form *anata* (see Chapter 3), whereas the potential customers use *kisama* and no predicate honorifics. This reflects the power relationship between them at the time of the conversation.

The same trend continues in Stage V, i.e. *kisama* can refer to different entities in a small stretch of discourse. It is frequently contrasted with other person forms, and its referent is restricted to the second person, as in the following examples.

- (23) *ore no mae e kita hitori no geisha ga, anta, nanzo,*  
 I GEN front to came one GEN geisha NOM you something  
*utai-nahare, to shamisen o kakaeta kara, ore wa*  
 sing-REQ COMP shamisen ACC held because I TOP  
*utawa-nai, kisama utat-temir-o to it-tara...*  
 sing-NEG kisama sing-see-IMP COMP say-if  
 ‘One of the geishas came over to me with her shamisen ready and said “You there, come on, give us a song”, but when I said to her, “I won’t sing. You (*kisama*) can sing something yourself instead, ...”

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 9)

As noted above, *kisama* was used for a socially higher person in the first half of Stage IV and for a social equal and lower person in the second half. In Stage V, on the other hand, its politeness is completely lost, and it is used derogatorily and carries the sense of contempt, as can be seen in the following examples.

- (24) a. *Hito no kao sae mire ba kisama wa dame da*  
 person GEN face EMPH see if kisama TOP no.good COP  
*dame da to kuchiguse noyooni it-tei-ta.*  
 no.good COP COMP favorite.phrase like say-ASP-PST  
 ‘Whenever my father sees me, he’d say “you (*kisama*) are no good” as if it were his favorite phrase.’ (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 1)
- b. *hayakuse-n to kisama kara kui-korosu zo to it-tara, Meitei*  
 hurry-NEG if kisama from eat-kill FP COMP say-if Meitei  
*wa shiri o hashotte kake-dashita.*  
 TOP end ACC fold run-started  
 ‘Meitei folded the end of his kimono and rushed out, when I said “I’m going to eat you (*kisama*) first if you don’t hurry.”’

(Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 8)

In (24a), the speaker is remembering what his father used to say. The content of the utterance makes it clear that *kisama* is used as a rather rude term, if not contemptuous. *Kisama*'s derogatory use is also evident in (24b), where the protagonist cat (now a tiger in his dream) is intimidating his master's friend, and *kisama* co-occurs with the final particle that indicates 'coarseness' (Ochs 1993). This trend is even clearer in Present-Day Japanese, where the term is no longer used in a normal conversation because of the strong contemptuous sense that it carries.

Although *kisama* was purposely created by the Samurai class as a term of address in formal writing, its subsequent semantic-pragmatic development is regular and parallels that of other forms. When its use was first extended to a conversation, *kisama* was a respectful form for the socially higher addressee. As the form lost its semantic content, it developed the ability to refer to the addressee of equal and lower social status. Finally, examples like (24a) and (24b) show that the nominal and original meaning of *kisama* (i.e. 'nobility') is completely bleached, an important characteristic of being a shifter. However, the issue of semantic bleaching regarding the development of personal pronouns in Japanese is not as clear-cut as it may seem, as they often become not just empty, but derogatory. We now turn to this issue.

## 2.4 Semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation

Although some forms of nominal origin exhibit the 'natural' or 'internal' development into pronouns (i.e. a change based on invited inferences) and others are influenced by extra-linguistic factors such as restructuring of the social system, the etymologies of the items examined in this chapter suggest a similar path of semantic-pragmatic development, that is, both humble forms for the speaker and respectful forms for the addressee gradually lost their meanings over time in the process of becoming first and second person pronouns. This loss of politeness value toward the addressee looks very similar to semantic bleaching, a process observed repeatedly in grammaticalization, but I argue that semantic bleaching alone cannot tell the whole story and that we need to distinguish it from pragmatic depreciation, where a linguistic item comes to be evaluated in socially negative terms.

Semantic bleaching plays an important role in most, if not all, studies of grammaticalization. For example, based on Keller (1994), Haspelmath (1999) attempts to explain the unidirectionality of grammaticalization, using the concept of the 'invisible-hand process', which is taken from the field of economics. Applied to linguistics, it means that language change is a consequence of ordinary language use by individual speakers. This model seems to work well with the developmental path of Japanese personal pronouns. A speaker first employs a linguistic item in an innovative manner (extravagance), e.g. the use of *kimi* 'lord' to someone who does not fill that role in the society. The frequency of the item increases as this



innovation is accepted by other members of the speech community, and eventually its association with the original function or meaning becomes opaque, e.g. *kimi* ‘lord’ becoming a second person pronoun. Dahl’s (2001) ‘inflationary effects’ can also be applied to explain the loss of the humble/respectful meaning. It can explain why the item gets dissociated from its original function or meaning, when the pragmatic salience associated with the usage is lost. As more and more people accept the usage, the rhetorical effects are bound to fade just like excessive issuance of money will depreciate the value of the currency. The obvious parallel to personal pronouns is that the frequent use of *kimi* ‘lord’ would depreciate its social value or affect its extravagant effect. However, while inflation seems to explain why an item becomes semantically empty or pragmatically neutral, it is not clear how it explains the case where an item becomes derogatory or contemptuous, as in the case of many personal pronouns in Japanese.

Traditional concepts about lexical semantic change such as pejoration or melioration do not satisfactorily account for the semantic-pragmatic development of Japanese personal pronouns either. Pejoration and melioration are the processes whereby linguistic items acquire more negative or positive meanings, respectively, as was the case with English *silly* originally meaning ‘blessed’ (pejoration) and *nice* originally meaning ‘simple, ignorant’ (melioration) (cf. Fortson 2003; Urban 2014). Japanese forms did not acquire new lexical semantic meanings in the process of losing their original semantic content. For example, *kimi* did not acquire pejorative meanings (e.g. ‘beggar’), when it lost its original socially favorable meaning ‘emperor/lord’. Similarly, *boku* did not acquire a new meaning in the process of losing its original meaning of ‘servant’.

I argue that, in addition to semantic bleaching in the traditional sense, what I call ‘pragmatic depreciation’ is involved in the development of personal pronouns in Japanese. Pragmatic depreciation refers to the decrease in politeness value toward the addressee. Although neither process belongs solely to the domain of semantics or pragmatics, in describing the development of personal pronouns, I use ‘semantic bleaching’ for loss of semantic content and ‘pragmatic depreciation’ for further decrease in the degree of politeness toward the addressee. This distinction is important because it is possible for a linguistic item to be pragmatically depreciated while its semantics remains intact, as in the case of the demonstrative *sonata* used for the second person, whose politeness value decreased over time but whose demonstrative function remained the same (cf. Chapter 3). Similarly, it is possible for a linguistic item to be semantically reduced without the obvious impact on its pragmatics, e.g. indefinite pronouns such as German *man* or English *one*. Semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation need to be kept apart because the former relates to the loss of semantic content of an item, whereas the latter concerns the social evaluation of an item by the speech community regardless of whether it is semantically full

or empty, e.g. the term ‘privacy’ can be evaluated differently from one culture to another or even in the same culture depending on the historical periods.

Although the two processes are to be distinguished, they can appear very similar in the analysis of Japanese pronouns. For example, for an item like *kimi* ‘lord’ to lose its respectful semantic content (semantic bleaching) looks very similar to the process where it loses its politeness value toward the addressee (pragmatic depreciation). This of course is because respect toward the addressee is built in the lexical meaning. For this reason, the two concepts are often not kept apart in the domain of pronominal and nominal address. For example, Dahl (2001) illustrates ‘inflationary effects’ using social titles as examples: “...if the number of Grand Dukes in the country doubles, the value of that title is bound to decrease” (2001: 471). It is difficult to decide if this change is pragmatic depreciation or semantic bleaching since the process of losing a socially favorable lexical meaning such as ‘lord’ has a very similar effect to pragmatic depreciation. The same can be said about the history of many nominal forms of address such as English *sir* (cf. Mazzon 2010). Despite its explanatory potential, one thing remains unclear about inflationary effects, as pointed out above. While it seems to be able to explain the process where respectful terms become neutral (again, this looks very similar to semantic bleaching in the case of personal pronouns), it is not clear how it accounts for the case in which linguistic items change from pragmatically neutral to derogatory (cf. in monetary inflation, the value of the currency can get closer to zero, but it cannot be negative). These suggest that pragmatic depreciation is more relevant at a later stage of change than semantic bleaching. That is to say, in the case of personal pronouns, possibly both semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation (since it is almost impossible to distinguish the two at early stages) are at work for the change from humble/respectful to neutral, but pragmatic depreciation, not semantic bleaching, is responsible for the change from neutral to derogatory. More will be said about this later in this section.

What then is responsible for pragmatic depreciation? As mentioned above, some Japanese pronouns went through pragmatic depreciation to the extent that they can no longer be used under normal circumstances. For example, *kisama* originally meant ‘noble person’, but now it is associated with a strong sense of contempt and its use is restricted to a special context such as an emotional fight or a curse in Present-Day Japanese. There are at least three possible approaches to this question: (i) irony, (ii) taboo, and (iii) a Japanese culture-specific norm of ‘relation-acknowledging’ (Yoshiko Matsumoto 1988). I discuss each in turn and point out a number of reasons that (iii) should be favored.

In the first approach, linguistic items become associated with unfavorable meanings through ironic uses. For example, the socially positive meaning of *kimi* ‘lord’ can be affected negatively when the speaker uses it deliberately for someone

who does not deserve such an act in order to achieve sarcasm (e.g. for someone who acts arrogantly as if he/she were a king/queen). However, this scenario is unlikely (at least for Japanese pronouns) for the following reasons. First, it is hard to find evidence of ironic uses that have the above-mentioned effect in historical texts. Second, while it is clear how irony works for second person forms in that both irony and the form are intended for the addressee, it is not immediately clear for the case of first person forms or self-reference when irony is still intended for the addressee but the form is intended for the speaker. Third, it is not obvious why irony should lead to pragmatic depreciation and not stay as irony in the minds of the addressee.

The second approach is based on work by Suzuki (1978) and Hock (1986). Barke & Uehara (2005) argue that the loss of humble/respectful meanings of Japanese personal pronouns can be attributed to the concept of taboo. Many languages and cultures have taboo concepts that are often referred to via euphemistic expressions to avoid direct reference. They argue that address terms are susceptible to pragmatic depreciation because pointing out an individual in an explicit manner is taboo in Japanese society. According to their claim, even the respectful terms become associated with a taboo once they are used as terms of address. This approach seems to be intuitively plausible. However, it is not apparent why referring to the emperor as 'emperor' or one's lord as 'lord' is a social taboo because by doing so the speaker is positively acknowledging the addressee's prestigious social position. The same can be said about numerous polite second person pronouns in European languages that developed from 'your mercy/grace'. Also, similar to irony, the entity with which a taboo is associated is the addressee in this account, and it is not clear how it works for first person forms which are also subject to pragmatic depreciation. Is it a taboo to a lesser degree to single out a speaker or is it equally a taboo?

The last and most promising approach is what is called the principle of 'relation-acknowledging' (Yoshiko Matsumoto 1988). While relation-acknowledging is not proposed to account for pragmatic depreciation, it offers solutions to the problems faced by approaches based on irony and taboo. Matsumoto points out that, in a hierarchical society such as Japan, the explicit acknowledgment or expression of asymmetric interpersonal relations is paramount. One of the obvious ways in which relation-acknowledging can manifest itself linguistically is through the use of terms of address. For example, it is well known that only terms denoting a higher social status are used as terms of address (cf. Suzuki 1978), i.e. kinship terms such as *onee-chan* 'older sister' and occupational/positional names such as *sensee* 'teacher' can be used as address terms, whereas terms such as *imooto* 'younger sister' and *setto* 'student' generally cannot. Similarly, only terms denoting a higher social status can be used in self-reference, e.g. in speaking to her younger sister, an older sister can call herself *onee-chan* 'older sister', but her younger sister cannot use *imooto* 'younger sister' as a term of self-reference. In other words, the system

of address terms and self-reference in Japanese is organized in such a way that the socially privileged status of a conversation participant is highlighted. This stands in sharp contrast with what the taboo account predicts (i.e. avoidance of direct reference). In such a system, it makes a great deal of sense that the use of a neutral item as a term of address is perceived as disrespectful because it obscures the social relationship between the speaker and the addressee. For example, using a second person pronoun (which does not explicitly acknowledge the social relationship among conversation participants)<sup>9</sup> to address one's boss can sound arrogant because such a use can be interpreted as the speaker's attempt to ignore or neglect the social relationship that he/she holds with the addressee. They fail to positively acknowledge (often asymmetric) interpersonal relations, which is an important social norm in Japanese culture. I propose that this disregard for acknowledgement of interpersonal relations is the mechanism that is responsible for pragmatic depreciation of Japanese pronouns from neutral to derogatory. For this reason, pronouns in Present-Day Japanese are generally used in conversation with social equals and inferiors. The account based on relation-acknowledging is biased toward neither the speaker nor the addressee, since severing social ties is the key.

Although relation-acknowledging seems to operate on a culture-specific basis, the mechanism through which it leads to pragmatic depreciation is not. I argue that the reason relation-acknowledging gives rise to pragmatic depreciation is the violation of principle of informativeness/relevance in the Gricean sense (Grice 1975), especially 'be as informative as possible given the needs of the situation' (e.g. Atlas & Levinson 1981). This principle illustrates a counteracting force between economy (i.e. 'say no more than you must') and the addressee's tendency/ability to select the interpretation that makes most sense at the time of utterance, and it is said to be responsible for the semantic-pragmatic processes associated with linguistic change (see Traugott & König 1991: 189–192). This relates to relation-acknowledging and pragmatic depreciation of personal pronouns in Japanese because the violation of relation-acknowledging is essentially the breach of informativeness/relevance. In the communication context where one is supposed to acknowledge one's (hierarchical) interpersonal relations, using a term that obscures and does not clearly state such relations equates to not providing enough relevant information, causing the addressee to look for an alternative interpretation (i.e. there must be a reason that the speaker chose not to acknowledge the social relation explicitly). The principle of informativeness/relevance also motivates the speakers to opt for and introduce more unambiguous terms rather than vague ones, inviting the addressee to choose

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9. Needless to say, Japanese pronouns carry more sociolinguistic implicatures than, say, English pronouns, but it clearly has less social information compared to nouns such as 'president' or 'teacher'.

the most informative interpretation. This explains why new terms for person reference are generally introduced at the polite side for the addressee (see also Simon 2003: 87), whether it is a humble form for the first person or respectful one for the second person. This essentially illustrates the unidirectionality of grammaticalization from nouns to personal pronouns since, in the domain of person reference, being informative/relevant is highly congruous with being extravagant which most likely achieves success in communication.

As already noted, it is hard to draw a clear line between semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation for the change of Japanese personal pronouns from respectful/humble to neutral. However, it is clear that pragmatic depreciation is involved in their change from neutral to derogatory, as semantic bleaching does not tell us much about the change after the item becomes semantically empty. In this scenario, forms like 'lord' for the second person extends its meaning from 'emperor, lord' to any social superiors, as it strengthens the tie with the speech situation and the addressee. As the item becomes more and more frequent, it induces inflation, which leads to the loss of its original socially favorable meaning. The loss of the original meaning often leads to further pragmatic depreciation because of the violation of relation-acknowledging. In principle, this line of explication applies to other forms regardless of whether they are humble forms for the first person or respectful forms for the second person.

Interestingly, it appears that items that did not develop from humble or respectful terms are less susceptible to pragmatic depreciation than those that did. The first person *watakushi* 'private' is a case in point. *Watakushi* started out as a noun meaning 'private (matters)' in Stage II, and since Stage III it has come to be used for the speaker as a metonymy based on the opposition between private and public things (i.e. things that relate to the speaker's private life vs. things that belong to the public domain of the society such as one's work and duties). Forms that arose from humble or respectful terms make the contrast between the socially higher addressee and the socially lower speaker, whereas *watakushi* makes the contrast between the private (self) and the public (others). Based on this observation, it seems plausible to assume that pragmatic depreciation affects forms that directly concern the social axis of the speaker and the addressee more than those that do not make a direct reference to it. This is in accordance with an approach based on relation-acknowledging in that, unlike those that address the axis of the (lower) speaker and the (higher) addressee, *watakushi* provides information about the speaker and the addressee/others, but not about the hierarchical relationship between them. Although the phonologically unreduced *watakushi* seems to be unaffected by pragmatic depreciation, it is worth mentioning that its phonologically reduced versions are subjected to pragmatic depreciation. As a noun, *watakushi* can mean 'private' even in Modern Japanese, and as a first person pronoun it is still a polite form. On the other hand,

its phonologically reduced versions such as *watashi*, *atashi*, and *atai* are seldom used as nouns (the noun interpretation is marginally possible only for *watashi*), and they are pragmatically depreciated compared to *watakushi*.

Pragmatic depreciation does not play a prominent role in most studies of language change, including grammaticalization studies, nor is it clearly distinguished from semantic bleaching. However, examinations of noun-based personal pronouns in Japanese show that it has to be recognized because semantic bleaching alone cannot fully account for their development. Though it is hard to make a distinction between semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation in the development of noun-based personal pronouns, particularly from humble/respectful to neutral, it is clear that semantic bleaching cannot explain the change from neutral to derogatory, as nothing is bleached in the process. Semantic bleaching is generally thought to occur in the later stages of grammaticalization (Traugott & König 1991: 190), and it appears that pragmatic depreciation takes place even later. This suggests that in the case of semantic-pragmatic change from humble/respectful to neutral to derogatory, semantic bleaching is primarily responsible for the first part (i.e. from humble/respectful to neutral) and pragmatic depreciation solely for the second (i.e. from neutral to derogatory). Motivated by the principle of informativeness/relevance or extravagance, the speaker first chooses to address someone as 'lord' (note that this also satisfies the culture-specific norm of relation-acknowledging), but the lexical meaning is bound to be bleached as the frequency of the usage increases (inflationary effects). Once the item is semantically bleached and becomes neutral, it no longer functions as relation-acknowledging, resulting in pragmatic depreciation.

One possible benefit of recognizing pragmatic depreciation in language change is its relation to a particular type of phonetic reduction. Phonetic reduction can happen for a number of reasons. In some contexts, it may be motivated by the principle of economy or least effort. In others, phonetic reduction is simply a reflection of some other linguistic change. Semantic bleaching is often considered to go hand in hand with phonetic reduction, which is probably true in some instances. However, it appears that, when the principle of economy/least effort is involved, phonetic reduction has more to do with pragmatic depreciation rather than semantic bleaching. Take for example the case of Japanese first person *watakushi* 'lit.) private', which has at least the following reduced variants: *watashi* > *atashi* > *atai*. Each reductive step illustrates pragmatic depreciation, but it does not concern semantic bleaching in that its semantics (i.e. first person) remains constant, unless one treats the meanings such as 'super polite' and 'polite' as part of the semantics that gets bleached. The relationship between pragmatic depreciation and phonetic reduction of least effort may be intuitive enough, but it has substantial implications for studies of language change. For example, consider the well-known reduction of (*be*) *going to* > *gonna*. This reduction does not seem to have any impact on its

semantics. In fact, bleaching is complete at this stage since it usually refers to the loss of motion component of the construction. The form is, however, pragmatically depreciated in that it became more casual: generally, one would not use the latter in a formal situation where the former is more appropriate, just like informal personal pronouns are avoided in a formal setting. This reasoning can be extended to numerous other reductions such as *want to* > *wanna*.

In this section, I have argued that the distinction between semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation is necessary in studying the semantic-pragmatic side of language change, though it is hard in some contexts to separate the two clearly. One notable difference between them is that semantic bleaching seems much more regular than pragmatic depreciation. This is because semantic bleaching is generally tied to frequency and habituation (Bybee 2003), whereas pragmatic depreciation is situated in an intersection of the cultural components and the principle of informativeness/relevance.

## 2.5 Summary and conclusion

This chapter has discussed pronouns that arose from lexical nouns. Two first person forms, *watakushi* and *boku*, have been examined. *Watakushi* started out as a noun meaning ‘private (matters)’ and was often contrasted with public matters such as one’s social obligations. The meaning ‘private’ gradually came to be interpreted metonymically as ‘personal’ or ‘individual’, which is natural given the first person interpretation in the speech situation. As for *boku* ‘(lit.) servant’, although the same Chinese character used for the Modern Japanese *boku* is attested since Stage I, its reading was variable, which suggests that its development was qualitatively different from that of *watakushi*. I examined two forms, *kimi* and *kisama*, for the second person. *Kimi* was originally used as a noun which meant ‘emperor’, but its usage was gradually extended to mean ‘master’ and ‘social superiors’ as it became conventionally associated with the addressee in the speech situation. The story of *kisama* ‘noble person’ is somewhat akin to that of first person *boku* in that extra-linguistic force was an important factor in its development. *Kisama* was created as a respectful term of address, originally used in formal letters of the Samurai class. However, once it started being used in colloquial language, it quickly semanticized as a pronoun in the second half of Stage IV. As discussed again in Chapter 5, many cases of the development of personal pronouns from nouns closely mirror the processes laid out in grammaticalization studies.

Regardless of the difference in their developmental paths, all forms underwent decrease in the politeness value toward the addressee. I have argued that, although semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation look very similar to one

another, they need to be kept apart because only the latter can account for the semantic-pragmatic change of Japanese personal pronouns from neutral to derogatory. I have also suggested that the principle of relation-acknowledging, which is prominent in Japanese communication, is responsible for the change: the use of a neutral term is evaluated negatively in the system where the acknowledgement of asymmetrical social relations is the norm. This accounts for why forms that do not make a direct reference to the speaker-addressee social axis are less susceptible to pragmatic depreciation than those that make a direct reference to it. While pragmatic depreciation is not inherently tied to grammaticalization and can occur at any level (e.g. negative evaluation of a particular pronunciation or a word), it has a number of advantages in examining the semantic-pragmatic side of the story.

Diachronic examinations of nominal concepts offer some implications for the nature of personal pronouns in Japanese. Japanese has a large pronominal inventory both synchronically and diachronically. As we saw in Chapter 1, there are at least three first person forms (*watashi*, *boku*, *ore*), three second person forms (*anata*, *kimi*, *omae*), and two third person forms (*kare*, *kanojo*). The inventory multiplies if one takes a diachronic point of view. For example, Tsujimura (1968) lists 52 forms for the first person and 81 forms for the second person. Similarly, Barke & Uehara (2005) list 71 second person forms. However, the analysis presented in this chapter shows that one needs to be careful in analyzing the diachronic pronominal inventory. *Watakushi* and *kisama* became pronouns in Stage IV, whereas *boku* and *kimi* did not become pronouns until the beginning of Stage V (i.e. Modern Japanese). This suggests that, at a given historical stage, a given diachronic pronominal inventory may be exaggerated in that it probably includes items that are not semanticized pronouns but are used only pragmatically to refer to the speaker and addressee, as Tsujimura (1968) notes. Modern Japanese will probably not see the large inventory that it used to have because of the more egalitarian nature of the present society, and there does not seem to be a form that is clearly on its way to becoming a personal pronoun at this point.

The size of the diachronic pronominal inventory is also relevant for demonstrative-based forms and those that arose from spatial expressions, which will be taken up in the next chapter. The story of noun-based forms in this chapter shows that the development of nominal forms into pronouns can be ‘messy’ and is often subject to extra-linguistic factors. This point is in contrast to the development of demonstrative- and location-based forms that exhibit a remarkable regularity. We now turn to these forms.





## Demonstrative-based forms

Chapter 3 investigates the development of forms that are said to have evolved from demonstratives. Examples include the distal demonstrative *anata* ‘that way’, which is a second person form in Modern Japanese. It is well known that demonstratives are a cross-linguistically common source of third person pronouns due to their functional similarity (Diessel 1999; Bhat 2004; Siewierska 2004). For this reason, they are morphologically related to or formally indistinguishable from one another in many languages. First and second person pronouns, on the other hand, typically have historical sources other than demonstratives (Lehmann 1995). However, unlike the close relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns, the fact that demonstratives and first/second person pronouns have a very tenuous diachronic relationship has not attracted much attention in previous studies (Ishiyama 2012). This chapter demonstrates that there are at least three functional reasons why demonstratives do not usually give rise to first/second person pronouns. This chapter also discusses a context in which a demonstrative did develop into a second person pronoun as well as the case of location-based forms which shows a similar pattern of development to demonstrative-based forms.

After providing an overview of the Japanese demonstrative system, I investigate the relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns, and that between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns. I then show a parallel development between the demonstrative-based first/second person forms and location-based forms.

### 3.1 Demonstratives in Japanese

#### 3.1.1 Demonstratives and Japanese personal pronouns

Demonstratives are expressions such as English *this* and *that* whose reference is dependent on the elements of the speech situation. Demonstratives serve a variety of functions, but according to Levinson (2004: 107–111) their usage can be, at the highest level, divided into deictic and non-deictic. Levinson’s examples of the former include exophoric (*Give me **that** book*) and discourse deictic (*It sounded like **this**: whoosh*), whereas those of the latter are anaphoric (*The cowboy entered. **This***

*man was not someone to mess with*), empathetic (*He went and hit that bastard*), and recognitional (*Do you remember that holiday we spent in the rain in Devon?*). Diessel (1999) points out that the exophoric use, which is usually accompanied by a gesture, is the basic function of demonstratives, because it is acquired by children earliest, it is the least marked morphologically, and it contributes to various grammaticalization pathways.

The nature of personal pronouns in Japanese has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars (see for example Okamura 1972). While most agree that one of the crucial features of personal pronouns is their deicticity, there is a tremendous amount of variation in their approach to personal pronouns (cf. § 1.3 and § 1.4). Since this chapter is concerned with the relationship between demonstratives and personal pronouns, in particular the tenuous diachronic relation between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns, I do not attempt to review all that has been said about Japanese pronouns and nouns. Rather, this chapter explains the fact that demonstratives generally do not give rise to first/second person pronouns, by examining the case of the so-called demonstrative- and location-based personal pronouns, that is, erstwhile demonstratives and location expressions that have come to be used for the speaker and addressee, independent of their original functions. Those forms whose reference to the speaker and addressee cannot be predicted by the original demonstrative functions (i.e. spatial semantics of speaker-proximal, etc.) are considered personal pronouns. In this sense, Modern Japanese second person *anata*, which originally meant ‘that way’, is considered a semanticized second person pronoun in that its use for the addressee is not predictable from its spatial semantics of speaker-and-addressee-distal (see § 3.3.4). Throughout its history, Japanese used demonstratives and other expressions for the speaker and addressee metonymically as a way of indirect reference. However, the great majority of the use of demonstratives for the speaker and addressee are consistent with their spatial semantics; thus their reference should be analyzed as a pragmatic extension of the original demonstrative function. I consider that demonstratives have developed into personal pronouns if their reference to a person referent is not predictable from their original demonstrative function or if the demonstrative forms in question are no longer used except when their referent is a person. To put it differently, the main aim of this chapter is to explain why demonstratives do not go beyond their demonstrative functions and develop into independent first/second person pronouns even though they have been constantly used for the speaker and addressee throughout the history of Japanese.

### 3.1.2 Overview of Japanese demonstratives

This section gives a brief synchronic and diachronic overview of Japanese demonstratives. Modern Japanese exhibits the three-way distinction based on the spatial relationship between the speaker, the addressee, and a referent. Synchronically, since the pioneering works of Sakuma (1936, 1959), it is generally accepted that the demonstrative stem *ko-* is used for referents proximal to the speaker (S-PROX), *so-* for referents proximal to the addressee (AD-PROX), and *a-* for referents proximal to neither the speaker nor addressee (S/AD-DIST).<sup>10</sup> The demonstrative stems are combined with a variety of category identifiers. For example, the category identifier *-chira* indicating ‘direction’ combines with the stems to yield *kochira* ‘this way (proximal to the speaker)’, *sochira* ‘that way (proximal to the addressee)’, and *achira* ‘that way (proximal to neither the speaker nor addressee)’. Table 6 shows a list of demonstrative forms found in Modern Japanese.

Table 6. Demonstrative forms in Modern Japanese

	Thing	Place	Direction	Condition	Manner	Determiner
<i>ko</i> -series (S-PROX)	<i>kore</i>	<i>koko</i>	<i>kochira</i>	<i>konna</i>	<i>koo</i>	<i>kono</i>
<i>so</i> -series (AD-PROX)	<i>sore</i>	<i>soko</i>	<i>sochira</i>	<i>sonna</i>	<i>soo</i>	<i>sono</i>
<i>a</i> -series (S/AD-DIST)	<i>are</i>	<i>asoko</i>	<i>achira</i>	<i>anna</i>	<i>aa</i>	<i>ano</i>

Diachronically, it has been pointed out that the Japanese demonstrative system did not start out as the three-term system familiar to contemporary speakers (see for example Hashimoto 1982; Ri 2002). Earliest records from Stage I show that *ko-* was primarily used exophorically for speaker-proximal referents, whereas *so-* was reserved for anaphoric use, suggesting a distinction based on the function (i.e. exophoric and anaphoric) rather than the one based on distance found in Modern Japanese (Hashimoto 1982; Ri 2002).<sup>11</sup> The limited use of now archaic *ka-* was also observed as speaker-distal functions. The *a*-series is not attested in Stage I. A

10. In this sense, Japanese is an example of what Anderson & Keenan (1985) call a ‘person-oriented’ system, where the second term indicates ‘near addressee’, rather than a ‘distance-oriented’ system, where the second term refers to ‘medial distance from speaker’. However, the ‘medial distance’ use appears when the perspective of the speaker and addressee is identical (e.g. speaker and addressee standing side by side and looking together at a referent some distance away).

11. Hashimoto (1982) points out that the *so*-series also has what is called *kannenteki shiji* ‘notional reference’ which refers to a referent in one’s mind that is present neither in the speech situation nor in the linguistic context. This resembles the so-called recognitional use of demonstratives (cf. Himmelmann 1996; Diessel 1999; Levinson 2004). However, Hashimoto states that the anaphoric use seems to be the main function of *so-* at this stage.

distinction between *ko-* (speaker-proximal) on the one hand and *so-*, *ka-*, and *a-* (speaker-distal) on the other emerged in Stage II. *So-* was somewhat biased toward the addressee (i.e. precursor of the addressee-proximal function). *Ka-*, which was originally more frequent than *a-*, is gradually taken over by *a-* and eventually drops out of the demonstrative paradigm. The question of when the three-term system observed in Modern Japanese was established is an issue of some debate. Some argue that the three-term system observed in Modern Japanese (Stage V) is a relatively recent development established in the second half of Stage IV, when *so-* became addressee-proximal and *a-* speaker-and-addressee-distal (e.g. Hashimoto 1982; Ri 2002). Others claim that the three-term system was already in place toward the end of Stage III (e.g. Kinsui et al. 2002; Okazaki 2002, 2006, 2010). I do not attempt to resolve this controversy because it does not affect the main aim of this chapter, which is to propose reasons that demonstratives give rise to first and second person pronouns only in limited contexts. Based on previous studies such as Hashimoto (1982) and Ri (2002), the history of demonstratives can be summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. Diachronic overview of the demonstrative system

Stage	Summary of demonstrative usage
Stage I 700–800	exophoric ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. anaphoric use ( <i>so-</i> ) – <i>ko-</i> as S-PROX – limited use of <i>ka-</i> (S-DIST)
Stage II 800–1200	S-PROX ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. S-DIST ( <i>so-</i> , <i>ka-</i> ) – <i>so-</i> biased toward ‘near addressee’ – exophoric use of <i>so-</i> – limited use of <i>a-</i> (S-DIST)
Stage III 1200–1600	S-PROX ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. S-DIST ( <i>so-</i> , <i>ka-</i> , <i>a-</i> ) – <i>so-</i> biased toward ‘near addressee’ – <i>a-</i> outnumbers <i>ka-</i> in the second half
Stage IV (1st half) 1600–1750	S-PROX ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. S-DIST ( <i>so-</i> , <i>a-</i> , <i>ka-</i> ) – <i>so-</i> biased toward ‘near addressee’ – <i>ka-</i> declining further and becoming idiomatic (e.g. <i>karekore</i> ‘this and that’)
Stage IV (2nd half) 1750–1870	S-PROX ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. AD-PROX ( <i>so-</i> ) vs. S/AD-DIST ( <i>a-</i> ) – system observed in Modern Japanese established – limited use of <i>ka-</i>
Stage V 1870–	S-PROX ( <i>ko-</i> ) vs. AD-PROX ( <i>so-</i> ) vs. S/AD-DIST ( <i>a-</i> ) – Modern Japanese three-term system – <i>ka-</i> no longer in use except in archaic expressions and as third person pronouns

Being influenced by the traditional assumption of Sakuma (1936, 1959), where *ko-* is associated with the first person sphere, *so-* with the second person, and *a-* with the third person, Ri (2002) claims that the *so-*, *a-*, and *ka-* series were ‘non-first person’ forms because they were used for both second and third person referents until the *so-* series established the addressee-proximal function at the second half of Stage IV. Consider the following examples.

(25) a. *ta so kare to, ware wo na tohiso, nagatsuki no*  
 who EMPH kare COMP me ACC NEG ask September GEN  
*tsuyu ni nure tsutsu, kimi matsu ware wo*  
 dew in wet while kimi wait me EMPH  
 ‘Please do not say “Who are you (*kare*)?”, say neither this nor that of me,  
 who drenched in September’s chilling dew, waiting my dear love’s coming!’  
 (Stage I: 8C, Manyoshu, Book 10: Song 2240)

b. *ta so kare to, towa ba kotahe-mu, sube wo*  
 who EMPH kare COMP ask if answer-MOD means ACC  
*na-mi, kimi ga tsukahi wo, kaheshiyari-tsu mo*  
 NEG-CONJ kimi GEN messenger ACC send.back-PST EMPH  
 ‘I do not know what to say if asked “whose messenger is he (*kare*)?”, so in  
 tears I sent him back to thee.’  
 (Stage I: 8C, Manyoshu, Book 11: Song 2545)

(26) A: ...*Are ha ta so* ...  
 that TOP who EMPH  
 ‘Who are you (*are*)?’ [‘(lit.) Who is that?’]

B: ...*Maro zo* ...  
 I EMPH  
 ‘It is I.’  
 (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Utsusemi)

(27) A: *Are ta so ya* ...  
 that who EMPH INJ  
 ‘Who is that (*are*)?’

B: *Shonagon ga mono yukashigari-te haberu naran* ...  
 Shonagon NOM thing be.curious-CONN COP MOD  
 ‘Probably, Shonagon is there, being curious.’

(Stage II: late 10C, Makura no Soshi, § 100)

(25a) depicts the composer’s heartrending sorrow (i.e. ‘Please do not say “Who are you?” when I am longing for you so dearly’); thus *kare* refers to the composer, who is the addressee of the question ‘Who are you?’, whereas that in (25b) is to be interpreted to refer to someone who is neither the speaker nor addressee (i.e. third person). The same thing goes for (26) and (27). *Are* in (26) refers to the addressee, whereas in (27) it refers to someone who is not participating in the conversation.

This exclusion of first person reference led Ri (2002) to claim that these forms are associated with the non-first person sphere.

However, it is not necessary to characterize examples in (25)–(27) as ‘person phenomena’. Being demonstratives, *kare* in (25a–b) and *are* in (26)–(27) can naturally refer to any entity via metonymy in their spatial domain, that is, any entity that is not proximal to the speaker who would be referred to by *ko-*. This suggests that the alleged ‘non-first person’ is actually a reflection of speaker-distal: they are simply referring metonymically to speaker-distal entities that happen to be the addressee in one occasion and non-addressee in another. Demonstratives are of course related to grammatical person because the speaker (in most instances) serves as the deictic center. However, the fact that a given demonstrative form can refer to both second and third person referents does not entail the inherent connection between the systems of demonstrative and person beyond the spatial semantics.

There is another somewhat comparable phenomenon in Japanese which points to the fact that the conceptualization of demonstrative forms as non-first person is misguided. Japanese uses kinship terms such as *okaasan* ‘mother’ and occupational names such as *sensee* ‘teacher’ for the speaker and addressee (see for example Suzuki 1978). Unlike English, where kinship terms and occupational names are usually used for the addressees only as vocatives, these Japanese terms can function as the argument of the predicate: *Okaasan ga iku no?* ‘Is mother going (there)?’ said by a daughter to her mother.<sup>12</sup> In this situation, *okaasan* ‘mother’ clearly refers to the second person, but needless to say it can also refer to the third person in a different situation (e.g. when the same utterance is made in a conversation with a friend to talk about his/her mother). Though the ability of *okaasan* ‘mother’ to refer to both the second and third person is parallel to that of demonstratives in (25)–(27), one clearly does not want to say *okaasan* ‘mother’ is non-first person because the term can be used by a higher status speaker to refer to herself when talking to a lower status addressee (e.g. a mother calling herself ‘mother’ when talking to her children). Since *okaasan* ‘mother’ has no inherent relation to the system of person, it can be used for any person categories given the right context.

The contexts in which it would make sense to talk about the distinction between the first person and second/third person (i.e. non-first person) include inferential expressions (e.g. evidentials and the predicates of internal feelings) and empathy-related expressions (e.g. verbs of giving and receiving) (cf. Kinsui 2004; Ikegami 2004). In these areas the direct form or the bare predicate suffices for a first person subject, but not for second and third person subjects in declarative sentences where linguistic marking of ‘indirectness’ is necessary.

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12. English allows this type of utterance in a limited context such as ‘baby talk’.

### 3.2 Third person forms

Demonstratives and third person pronouns have a close relationship with each other due to their functional similarities. Both of them can be used anaphorically (Bhat 2004; Siewierska 2004), and their use will result in a search for information either in the speech situation or in the discourse context (Diessel 2003). For that reason, third person pronouns are often morphologically related to demonstratives or formally indistinguishable from them. This section discusses the development of *kare* ‘that’ into a third person pronoun. Traditionally, this development is attributed to the translation of third person pronouns in Western literature into Japanese that occurred during the literary movement called *genbun-itchi* ‘unification of written and spoken language’. Although there is no doubt that the literary movement played an important role in the development of *kare*, I argue that there is also a good functional reason for this development, which is consistent with cross-linguistic tendencies pointed out in typological studies, that is, the presence/absence of deictic force.

As mentioned in the previous section, the *ka*-series is used exophorically on a limited scale for speaker-distal referents in Stage I. Although the *a*-series appears in Stage II and functions as speaker-distal forms, *ka*- is the dominant speaker-distal form. However, starting in Stage III, the *a*-series begins to take over the speaker-distal function of the *ka*-series, and eventually the *a*-series becomes dominant by the end of Stage IV. In Modern Japanese (Stage V), the *ka*-series is not used anymore except in fixed and often archaic expressions such as *kare kore* ‘that and this’. There are only three instances of *kare* in Manyoshu, the anthology compiled in the 8th century (Stage I) with over 4500 poems. This is not surprising because the *ka*-series developed later than the *ko*- and *so*-series. We saw two examples in (25a) and (25b) in which *kare* refers to human referents. The third example where *kare* is used for an inanimate entity is presented in (28).

- (28) *okibe yori, michi kuru shio no, iyamashini, a ga mofu kimi*  
 offing from rise come tide NOM increasingly I NOM think kimi  
*ga, mi-fune kamo kare*  
 GEN HP-boat Q kare  
 ‘My lord for whom I long more and more like the tide coming up from the  
 offing, could that (*kare*) be your boat?’

(Stage I: 8C, Manyoshu, Book 18: Song 4045)

Regardless of the nature of its referents, what is shared by *kare* in (25) and (28) is the fact that it refers to the elements present in the speech situation. In other words, it is used exophorically, a clear indication of its deictic force.

Although the *a*-series came into use in Stage II, the *ka*-series remains dominant. *Kare* continues to be used as speaker-distal in much the same way except that



it can now be used anaphorically as well. Examples in (29a–b) show the representative usage in Stage II.

- (29) a. “*Kare, kiki tamahe. Kono yo to nomi ha omoha zari keru.*”  
 kare listen RESP this world COMP only TOP think NEG ASP  
 ‘Listen to that (*kare*). He too is thinking beyond just this life.’  
 (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Yugao)
- b. *Kare ha, tada ito setini namamekasiu aigyauduki-te, miru*  
 kare TOP just very sincerely charming be.likable-CONN look  
*ni wemasiku, yononaka wasururu kokoti zo si tamahu.*  
 CONJ pleasing world forget feeling EMPH do RESP  
 ‘His grace (*kare*) has the most extraordinarily engaging charm, and merely to look at him is to smile and forget the world cares.’  
 (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Fuji no Uraba)

In (29a), *kare* refers to the voice of an old man who is making a pilgrimage to the Holy Mountain, audible at a distance from the speaker and the addressee (i.e. deictic). The translation of *kare* as ‘that’ instead of ‘him’ is more appropriate here in that Japanese strongly prefers expressions such as ‘listen to what he says’ or ‘listen to his story’ to expressions like ‘listen to him’. The referent of *kare* in (29b), on the other hand, is a person. In (29b), *To no Chujo* (his excellency) compares Yugiri’s (the protagonist Genji’s son) charm to that of the protagonist Genji (his grace), who is referred to by *kare* (i.e. anaphoric). Unlike Modern Japanese, in which *kare* is used as a third person masculine form, *kare* in this stage can refer to both male and female referents as well as inanimate objects. This is understandable because *kare* is simply functioning as a demonstrative: it can naturally be used for any referent that is within the scope of the demonstrative functions. The demonstrative and third person pronoun functions are indistinguishable at this stage.

The use of *kare*, especially its exophoric use, starts to decline in Stage III, as the *a*-series assumes the function of the *ka*-series. *Kare* declines further in Stage IV and is used primarily anaphorically. This can be seen in the following examples.

- (30) a. *kare wa teki no kakomi o tokasen tameni*  
 kare TOP enemy GEN encirclement ACC break in.order.to  
*itsuwari, kore wa teki no tsuwamono o segiran*  
 deceive this TOP enemy GEN warrior ACC hold.back  
*tameni hakareri.*  
 in.order.to plot  
 ‘That man (*kare*) practiced a deception to break an enemy encirclement, while this man sought to hold back enemy warriors.’  
 (Stage III: 14C, Taiheiki, Chapter 2)

- b. *Izawa Kasada no hito kare o nikumi kore o*  
 Izawa Kasada GEN person kare ACC hate this ACC  
*kanashimi te.*  
 pity CONN  
 ‘The Izawas and Kasadas, denouncing him (*kare*) for his act of betrayal,  
 pitied his wife’s misfortune.’

(Stage IV: 1776, Ugetsu Monogatari, Kibitsu no Kama)

Features indicative of *kare*’s demonstrative nature are apparent in (30a), where the speaker-distal *kare* is placed in opposition to the speaker-proximal *kore*. The sentence compares the strategy of two great warriors; thus *kare* and *kore* refer to each warrior that has been introduced in the previous discourse. Although the use of *kare* declines further, the same trend (i.e. anaphoric) can be seen in examples from Stage IV as well. In (30b) *kare* anaphorically refers to a male referent that is introduced in the previous linguistic context.

In Stage V, *kare* has dropped out of the demonstrative paradigm except for sporadic uses in fixed expressions. It has been established as a dedicated third person masculine form used anaphorically for the most part. (31) is a quote from a newspaper article that appears in a novel, and *kare-ra* ‘*kare*-PL’ refers to the group of school teachers who got involved in a fight.

- (31) ...*tookyokusha wa sootoono shobun o kono buraikan no*  
 authorities TOP appropriate punishment ACC this scoundrel GEN  
*ue ni kuwae te, kare-ra o shite futatabi kyooikukai*  
 top on impose CONN *kare*-PL ACC do again world.of.education  
*ni ashi o iruru yochi nakarashimuru koto o.*  
 into foot ACC enter room not.exist thng ACC  
 ‘...the competent authorities will adopt appropriate punitive measures with  
 regard to the involved individuals and ensure that they (*kare-ra*) will never  
 again be afforded the opportunity to participate in educational activities.’

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 11)

As noted above, it is generally assumed that the birth of *kare* as a dedicated third person masculine pronoun independent of the demonstrative system is due to the influence from third person pronouns in English and European languages. For example, the entry in *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten* (*Nihon Daijiten Kankokai* 1972–1976) states that *kare* has established its status as a third person masculine form as a result of translation from Western European languages. It seems clear that the influence from English and European languages played an important role in the establishment of *kare* as a third person masculine form in Stage V. The beginning of Stage V (Meiji period, 1868–1912) is known for the above-mentioned literary movement called *genbun-itchi* ‘unification of written and spoken language’, in which

translations of Western literature such as Turgenev was a part (cf. Noguchi 1994). However, this artificial movement in the literary world does not appear to be the sole factor responsible for the development of *kare* into a third person pronoun in light of the well-attested pattern of cross-linguistic change, namely development of demonstratives into third person pronouns. Many languages use demonstratives in place of third person pronouns, and they are functionally very similar to each other because what separates them is only the presence or absence of deictic force. In other words, all that is required for a demonstrative to become a third person pronoun is to lose deictic force (Bhat 2004; Siewierska 2004).

I argue that the development of *kare* cannot be attributed solely to the literary movement of *genbun-itchi*, because it is evident in the history of *kare* that it gradually lost its deictic force, particularly as a result of losing competition with *a*-series forms such as *are*. Recall that *kare* is used since Stage I and that only exophoric use is attested at that time. This indicates that exophoric use was its primary use and that it clearly had deictic force in its original usage. Stage II sees a mixture of exophoric and anaphoric use, that is to say, deictic and non-deictic use. Starting in Stage III when the *a*-series begins to take over the *ka*-series, *kare*'s primary usage shifts from exophoric to anaphoric. In Stage IV the usage of *kare* declined further, and it became almost completely non-deictic, being used predominantly in anaphoric and idiomatic expressions. It is not a coincidence that the weakening of *kare*'s deictic force started at the time of the appearance of *a*-series forms, which eventually resulted in the *a*-series overtaking the full function of the *ka*-series. Finally, in Stage V *kare* establishes its status as a third person masculine form, with the extra help of the literary movement.

It is important to note that this account of *kare* based on the loss of deictic force does not contradict the traditional account based on *genbun-itchi*. Rather it is complementary to it, because the loss of deictic force is probably the prime reason for the writers of the *genbun-itchi* style to choose *kare* as the translation of third person pronouns in English and European languages. In other words, *kare*, which has lost its deictic force and is primarily being used anaphorically by the beginning of Stage V, was an obvious candidate for a third person pronoun, because there is nothing inherently deictic about third person pronouns in general. This claim is supported by Okumura's (1954) work. He shows that *kare*, as well as the female form *kanojo* and plural *kare-ra*, predominantly occurs in running text or the narrative portion of the text that excludes direct quotes, whereas expressions such as *kono/sono/ano hito* 'this/that (addressee-proximal)/that (speaker-and-addressee-distal) person' are used in the conversational context (i.e. direct quote). Okumura argues that this is because deictic elements do not adapt well to running text, which is written without the assumption of spatially and conceptually opposing speakers/writers,

addressees/readers, or the third person. In other words, deictic force conveyed by demonstratives such as *kore*, *sore*, and *are* is hard to realize without the support of the deictic axis of the speaker, addressee, and others. The conversational context, on the other hand, provides a foundation for deictic force, thus rendering the appearance of demonstratives more natural. Therefore, it makes sense that *kare* has acquired status as a third person pronoun because, being primarily anaphoric (i.e. non-deictic) in Stage V, it can adapt itself well for use in running text (which is also probably quantitatively more substantial than the conversational context). All of these make *kare* a very good candidate for a third person pronoun in narrative discourse as well as the translation of third person forms in English and European languages. Thus, the loss of deictic force by the *ka*-series, which occurred as a result of losing competition with the *a*-series, is also an important factor in the development of *kare* to a third person pronoun.

Let us briefly discuss the case of the third person feminine form *kanojo*. Literally, *kanojo* is a combination of the speaker-distal demonstrative adjective (i.e. *kano*) and the noun meaning ‘woman’ (i.e. *jo*), both of which can be written in Chinese characters. The same combination of Chinese characters is attested since Stage II, but the reading of the second Chinese character (i.e. the ‘woman’ portion) was different. The reading of *kanojo* appears only after Stage V, that is to say, Modern Japanese, whereas the same word was read as *kano onna* ‘that woman’ in prior stages. The former reading is called the Sino-Japanese reading or *on*-reading, which came with characters when Japanese adopted Chinese characters. The latter reading is called the Japanese-reading or *kun*-reading, which is the Japanese original pronunciation assigned to characters. An example from Stage V is presented below.

- (32) ...Ningen wa orokana mono dearu kara naderare goe de  
 human TOP stupid thing COP because be.stroked voice with  
 hiza no soba e yotte kuru to, taitee no baai nioite kare  
 knee GEN near to approach come if usual GEN case in kare  
 moshikuwa kanojo o aisuru mono to gokaishite, wa ga  
 or kanojo ACC love thing COMP mistake I NOM  
 nasu mamani makaseru nomi ka oriori wa atama sae  
 do as.it.is trust only Q occasionally TOP head even  
 nadete kureru mono da.  
 stroke give thing COP

‘...because humans are rather stupid, in most cases they will misjudge that I love him (*kare*) or her (*kanojo*) when I approach their knees asking for attention, and they just let me do as I please or occasionally they even stroke me on my head.’  
 (Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 7)

(32) is an utterance made by the protagonist cat. The status of *kanojo* as a third person feminine form is evident here because it is clearly used for an unspecified female referent together with the masculine form *kare*. The author of the novel, Natsume Soseki, is also a prominent scholar of English literature and an English teacher who is aware of the difference in the use of third person pronouns between English and Japanese. The adaptation of *kanojo* as a third person feminine form in Stage V seems to be similar to that of *kare*. The development of both forms involves some element of deliberate manipulation on the part of language users (i.e. literary movement). In the case of *kare*, the linguistic form of demonstrative is used without any change, but its functional change (i.e. change from deictic to non-deictic) made it a good candidate for a dedicated third person form. The loss of deictic force applies to *kano* as well, but there is clearly a conscious and deliberate manipulation here because the pronunciation of *kanojo* is not attested prior to Stage V.

The development of *kare* and *kanojo* is consistent with the cross-linguistically well-attested diachronic relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns. In Bhat's (2013) data, 125 out of 225 languages show a complete or partial relationship between them. However, what is interesting is the fact that Japanese is coded as a language in which third person pronouns and demonstratives are unrelated to demonstratives. This is probably because the *ka*-series is no longer used productively in Modern Japanese, but the examination of historical texts indicates that third person pronouns are diachronically related to the *ka*-series. Therefore, the classification of Japanese above is problematic in some sense. This is an issue many typological studies face due to the lack of detailed description in the grammar of a given language. In Japanese, this issue is relevant not only to *kare/kanojo*, but also to other forms, as we will see in Chapter 5.

### 3.3 First/second person forms

Unlike third person pronouns which often arise from demonstratives, first/second person pronouns are often derived from lexical nouns for cultural reasons such as politeness (Lehmann 1995). This is especially clear in Asian languages such as Thai and Vietnamese, in which nouns meaning 'servant' or 'slave' are used for the first person and those meaning 'lord' or 'king' for the second person (cf. Cooke 1968). Japanese is no exception in this regard, as we saw in Chapter 2. Outside those Asian languages, a similar pattern is observed for the so-called second person polite forms in some European languages such as Spanish *usted* from *Vuestra Merced* 'your mercy' and Italian *Lei* from *La Vostra Signoria* 'your lord' (Head 1978; Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990). However, the fact that demonstratives do not generally develop into first/second person pronouns has not received the attention it

deserves in most previous studies. In this section, based primarily on data from the demonstrative paradigm *konata* ‘this way’, *sonata* ‘that way’, and *anata* ‘that way’, I present three reasons why first/second person pronouns generally do not arise from demonstratives:<sup>13</sup> (i) reference to the speaker and addressee can be achieved with a metonymic extension of the original demonstrative functions of demonstratives, (ii) speaker innovation or extravagance, one of the main principles of language change, does not apply to the use of demonstratives for the speaker and addressee, and (iii) functions of demonstratives and first/second person are dissimilar to one another. I then discuss a context in which a demonstrative has developed into a second person form and show what motivated the change.

### 3.3.1 Metonymic use of demonstratives for person referents

The first reason first/second person pronouns do not generally arise from demonstratives is the fact that demonstratives can already refer to the speaker/addressee productively via metonymy without becoming independent personal pronouns (i.e. reference to a particular location/direction interpreted as reference to a person in that location/direction). As was the case with many other location nouns in Japanese such as second person *omae* ‘honorable front’ (see § 3.4), demonstratives were often used for the speaker and addressee as a way of indirect reference. This seems to result in interpretational ambiguity which is usually necessary, if not sufficient, for reanalysis to occur (Hopper & Traugott 2003): demonstratives used to refer to the speaker and addressee can be interpreted either as demonstratives metonymically used for an element which happens to serve the speech role of the speaker/addressee or as dedicated personal pronouns which index the speech roles in their own right. However, we do not have to see the use of demonstratives for the speaker/addressee as a case of ambiguity, since the interpretation of the so-called personal pronoun use can be resolved within the scope of metonymic use of demonstrative functions, a clear pragmatic extension of the original function.

Consider the following examples where demonstrative forms *konata* ‘this way’ and *sonata* ‘that way’ are used for the speaker and addressee, respectively.

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13. Yamaguchi (2015) treats demonstrative-based forms as person markers citing ‘subjectivity’ such as the speaker’s psychology. I disagree with this characterization because, while no one denies the relevance of subjectivity to person reference, it appears that under her approach one would have to treat any elements used pronominally as person makers. That is an outcome that I wish to avoid in the analysis of the development of personal pronouns. Through examinations of the Japanese data, this chapter explains the cross-linguistic tendency that there is a tenuous diachronic relationship between demonstrative and first/second person pronouns.

- (33) a. *Kore mo tabi no uta niwa, konata o omohi-te*  
 this also trip GEN poem for konata ACC think-CONN  
*yomi-keri to miyu.*  
 compose-PST COMP appear  
 ‘(He,) too, appeared to have composed his travel poems, thinking of me  
 (*konata*).’ (Stage III: 1277, Izayoi Nikki)
- b. *Sonata o koso toi-mairasu-bekere.*  
 sonata ACC EMPH ask-HUBL-MOD  
 ‘(It would be more appropriate if) I asked who you (*sonata*) are.’  
 (Stage III: late 14th/early 15th century, Nonomiya)

These forms can be argued to be either demonstratives used metonymically in place of a pronoun or else semanticized personal pronouns. Although it is difficult to tease apart the two usages because the speaker is naturally speaker-proximal (use of *konata* for the speaker) and the addressee is addressee-proximal or speaker-distal (use of *sonata* for the addressee), there are a number of reasons to favor the former view.

While *sonata* continued to be used for the addressee, *konata*, which had been used for the speaker, started being used also for the addressee as shown in the following example.

- (34) *Kore, Iemon-dono konata wa ookina ryoken chigahi.*  
 this Iemon-Mr. konata TOP big judgment wrong  
 ‘Look, Iemon, you (*konata*) are awfully mistaken.’  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 2)

The approach in which these forms are considered as demonstratives simply used in place of pronouns metonymically provides us with a straightforward explanation for the use of *konata* for the first person, then later for the second person, and it is also consistent with the continued use of *sonata* for the second person. *Sonata* for the addressee, whether it is speaker-distal or addressee-proximal, can be preempted by the speaker-proximal *konata* when the addressee is judged to be in the speaker’s proximal area. However, no such preemption is possible in the reverse direction. That is to say, the addressee can be designated by speaker-proximal forms when he/she is located near the speaker, but the speaker cannot designate himself/herself by speaker-distal or by addressee-proximal forms because the speaker serves as the deictic center and is always speaker-proximal. This account based on the spatial semantics of demonstratives has the advantage of explaining why the speaker-proximal *konata* is used for both the first and second person.<sup>14</sup>

14. Similarly, non-speaker-proximal forms such as speaker-distal and addressee-proximal can be used for the addressee as well as for the third person, which led Ri (2002) to term them ‘non-first

What counts as speaker-proximal and so forth, of course, depends on the subjective judgment of the speaker. Therefore, it is possible for the same referent to be referred to by speaker-proximal forms on one occasion and by speaker-distal or addressee-proximal forms on another.

A parallel situation holds with regard to the Modern Japanese equivalents of *konata* and *sonata*, namely *kochira* ‘this direction’ and *sochira* ‘that direction near you’. *Kochira* can be used in place of first and second person pronouns,<sup>15</sup> and *sochira* can be used in place of second person pronouns but not first person. Therefore, the pronoun use of *konata* and *sonata* should be viewed as a reflection of their demonstrative function, which means that there is little need for language users to reanalyze them as independent personal pronouns. In addition, reference to the speaker/addressee by *konata* and *sonata* disappears at the same time as they drop out of the demonstrative paradigm around 1870 (the end of Stage IV). This strongly suggests that the one function is a derivative of the other. It is much more plausible that the personal pronoun use is a reflection of the demonstrative function than the other way round.

Why the speaker starts using *konata* for the addressee when *sonata* is already available is an interesting question that requires separate attention. Yamaguchi (2015) says that Ishiyama’s (2012) account is solely based on space (i.e. the speaker’s and the addressee’s spatial positions) without considering other aspects such as subjectivity or politeness. While it is true that that analysis is based on the spatial semantics of demonstratives, the point made there is that spatial semantics provides the ground for the metonymic use. It is quite clear that there is something more than space when it comes to the selection of a person-referring expression in a particular situation. One possible explanation is a chain reaction motivated by politeness factors. Historically, various social relational terms such as titles have been recruited for first and second person reference in Japanese. Examples include Modern Japanese first person *boku* ‘(lit.) servant’ and second person *kimi* ‘(lit.) emperor’.<sup>16</sup> As we saw in § 2.4, most personal pronouns in Japanese are subject to semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation, which may lead to a chain reaction in which speakers have to constantly introduce new forms for politeness purposes.

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person’. This aspect of Ri’s approach to analyze demonstratives in terms of the grammatical category of person has been criticized by Kinsui (2004).

15. *Kochira* is generally used for the first (and third) person form, but it is possible to be intended for the addressee given the right context as in *Kochira (no kata) wa doo desu ka?* ‘What do you think?’ [‘(lit.) How is the person here?’].

16. The question of when all of these social relational terms have actually grammaticalized as first/second person pronouns is also an issue that requires examination on an item-by-item basis.



Under this model, *konata* started being used for the addressee, as the politeness effect of *sonata* for the addressee wore out. This is at least consistent with the historical facts: when first recruited for second person reference at the beginning of Stage III, *konata* conveyed greater politeness than *sonata*. It is possible that the case of *anata*, which developed into a second person pronoun (see § 3.1.4), is part of this chain reaction. However, the crucial difference between *konata* for the second person and *anata* for the second person is that the former change can be resolved within the extension of the demonstrative function, but the latter cannot.

Another factor consistent with the demonstrative analysis is the entire distributional pattern of the demonstrative-based forms. Demonstrative-based forms are the forms that are morphologically entirely or partially based on demonstratives and used for person referents. For example, in Tsujimura's (1968) historical study of honorifics, 10 of 52 forms (19%) for the first person, 20 of 81 second person forms (25%), and 24 of 27 third person forms (89%) are demonstrative-based. Similarly, among the 71 second person forms listed in Barke & Uehara's (2005) study of diachronic politeness of address, 22 forms (31%) are demonstrative-based. When one examines how these forms are distributed across the three person categories, it is clear that their distribution is consistent with the demonstrative analysis. I have rearranged demonstrative-based forms given in Tsujimura (1968) based on the referential category of each form, that is, the first, second, or third person. The result is summarized in Table 8.

**Table 8.** Distribution of demonstrative-based forms

1st person			2nd person			3rd person			
<i>ko-</i>	<i>so-</i>	<i>a-</i>	<i>ko-</i>	<i>so-</i>	<i>a-</i>	<i>ko-</i>	<i>so-</i>	<i>a-</i>	<i>ka-</i>
<i>koko</i>	–	–	<i>konasama</i>	<i>soko</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>kore</i>	<i>sore</i>	<i>anata</i>	<i>kare</i>
<i>kokomoto</i>			<i>konata</i>	<i>sochi</i>	<i>areni</i>	<i>koitsu</i>	<i>shatsu</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>kayatsu</i>
<i>konata</i>			<i>konasan</i>	<i>sore</i>	<i>anata</i>	<i>koyatsu</i>	<i>soitsu</i>	<i>ayatsu</i>	<i>karegashi</i>
<i>kore</i>			<i>konan</i>	<i>sokomoto</i>	<i>anta</i>	<i>kochira</i>	<i>sochira</i>	<i>aitsu</i>	<i>kyatsu</i>
<i>kochi</i>			<i>konta</i>	<i>sonata</i>		<i>konokata</i>	<i>sonokata</i>	<i>anosan</i>	<i>katsu</i>
<i>konohoo</i>				<i>sonohoo</i>				<i>achira</i>	<i>kanosama</i>
<i>kochito</i>				<i>somoji</i>				<i>anokata</i>	<i>kanojo</i>
<i>kochitora</i>				<i>soresama</i>					
<i>kochira</i>				<i>sosama</i>					
<i>kocchi</i>				<i>sochitora</i>					
				<i>sonomoto</i>					
10	–	–	5	11	4	5	5	7	7

It should be noted that I am not contesting Tsujimura's inclusion of various forms that are used metonymically for person referents as 'personal pronouns'. I am simply concerned with their distribution across the first, second, and third person category based on the spatial semantics. The distribution of the *ko-*, *so-*, *a-*, and *ka-* series (archaic speaker-distal forms whose function was taken over by the *a-* series) across person categories is completely in accordance with their demonstrative functions. Only *ko-* series forms are listed for first person, which is predicted by their spatial semantics of speaker-proximal. Similarly, the majority of second person forms are *so-* series forms, which were speaker-distal with bias toward the addressee and later became addressee-proximal. Some *ko-* series forms are used for the second person, but this can also be accounted for by their spatial semantics because speaker-distal and addressee-proximal forms can be preempted by speaker-proximal forms. What counts as speaker-proximal is the speaker's subjective judgment. But what about the *a-* series forms used for the second person? It is counterintuitive for speaker-and-addressee-distal forms to be used for the addressee.

There are four *a-* series forms listed for the second person in Table 8 namely *are*, *areni*, *anata*, and *anta*. The use of these forms is not entirely inconsistent with the line of explication pursued here. As far as the latter two are concerned, *anta* is a phonologically reduced form of *anata* which semanticized as a second person pronoun as conventionalization of a distancing politeness strategy (cf. § 3.3.4). The use of the first two for the second person in Stage III, on the other hand, is potentially problematic for the demonstrative analysis, since scholars disagree with respect to when the three-term system observed in Modern Japanese was established: some argue that the three-term system was established in the second half of Stage IV, whereas others claim that the system was already in place toward the end of Stage III (cf. § 3.1.2). The approach of this study is consistent with the first view, as that would mean the two forms were speaker-distal forms rather than speaker-and-addressee-distal forms when they were used for the second person. The use of speaker-distal forms for the addressee is hardly surprising in terms of spatial semantics. However, even if the second view turns out to be correct, the main argument of this study remains intact given the proportion of the forms whose usage is consistent with the demonstrative analysis.

Third person forms involve forms from all series in an approximately equal proportion. This is also expected if one takes the standpoint that these forms are not dedicated third person pronouns but demonstratives. In this sense, the forms provided by Tsujimura (1968) are consistent with the argument of this study that the use of the so-called demonstrative-based pronouns is a reflection of their demonstrative function. The same can be said for Barke & Uehara's (2005) list of second person forms presented in Table 9.

Table 9. List of demonstrative-based forms from Barke &amp; Uehara (2005)

2nd person		
<i>ko-</i>	<i>so-</i>	<i>a-</i>
<i>konata</i>	<i>soko</i>	<i>are</i>
<i>konan</i>	<i>sore</i>	<i>anata</i>
<i>konasa</i>	<i>sochi</i>	<i>anta</i>
<i>konasama</i>	<i>somoji</i>	
<i>konasan</i>	<i>sonata</i>	
<i>konatasama</i>	<i>sonohoo</i>	
	<i>sochira</i>	
	<i>sochitora</i>	
	<i>sokomoto</i>	
	<i>sonatasama</i>	
	<i>soresama</i>	
	<i>sosama</i>	
	<i>socchi</i>	
6	13	3

The majority of second person forms come from the *so*-series, with some *ko*-series and a few *a*-series forms mentioned above. This distribution is also expected if one takes the standpoint that the use of the demonstrative-based forms is a reflection of their demonstrative function.

In terms of the diachronic relationship between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns, the reason that forms like *konata* (near speaker) and *sonata* (near addressee) did not develop into pronouns lies in the fact that their reference to the speaker and the addressee is a natural pragmatic expression of their demonstrative function provided by the spatial semantics, offering little functional motivation for demonstratives to become semanticized as the markers of the speech roles (i.e. first and second person). When demonstratives refer to an entity which happens to occupy the role of the speaker/addressee in the speech situation metonymically, there is little need for one to reanalyze demonstratives as personal pronouns unless that is the only context in which those demonstrative forms are used. The fact that one does not have to treat demonstratives as person markers when the original demonstrative interpretation is available applies to all demonstrative-based forms used for a person referent. Consider *soko* ‘that place (near you)’ used for the addressee in Example (35).

- (35) *Soko ni koso ohoku tudohe tamahu rame.*  
*soko* LOC EMPH many collect HON MOD  
 ‘You (*soko*) are the one who must have a collection.’

(Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Hahakigi)

*Soko* is usually used to refer to a location near the addressee, but in (35) it is used to refer to the addressee of the utterance metonymically. This use can also be resolved within the scope of the metonymic use of demonstratives. The same goes for Modern Japanese *kochira* ‘this way’ and *sochira* ‘that way’. To sum up, the first reason that demonstratives do not give rise to first/second person pronouns is the fact that demonstratives can already refer to the speaker and addressee metonymically with a simple pragmatic extension of their original demonstrative function. This view is supported by the historical fact that distribution of the demonstrative-based forms across the three person categories is consistent with their spatial semantics.

### 3.3.2 Inapplicability of speaker innovation

Some argue that speaker innovation, the use of a linguistic item which is not consistent with its original meaning, plays a crucial role in grammaticalization and semantic change (e.g. Lehmann 1995; Haspelmath 1999). Speaker innovation has been given a variety of names such as ‘expressivity’ (Hopper & Traugott 2003), ‘extravagance’ (Haspelmath 1999), and ‘innovative use’ (Traugott & Dasher 2002). The emphases of these terms differ from each other to a certain degree, but they are alike in that they all describe a situation where speakers use linguistic forms in a way that is not predictable in a straightforward manner from their original meanings and functions, e.g. use of nouns such as Japanese *kimi* ‘lord’ and social epithets such as Portuguese *você* from *Você Mercê* ‘your grace’ to someone who does not hold such a social position in society. In an attempt to explain the unidirectionality of grammaticalization based on Keller’s (1994) model of the ‘invisible-hand process’, Haspelmath (1999) employs the notion of extravagance, which is speakers’ use of unusually explicit information in order to attract attention. Applied to linguistics, this well-known concept in economics means that language change is a consequence of ordinary language use by an individual speaker. In the invisible-hand process, a speaker first employs a linguistic item in an innovative manner (extravagance). The frequency of the new usage increases as this innovation is accepted by other members of the speech community, and eventually its association with the original function or meaning becomes opaque, e.g. *kimi* ‘lord’ becoming a second person pronoun. Haspelmath argues that grammaticalization is a side effect of extravagance, because the communicative goal of speakers is not just to be understood with minimum linguistic effort, but to be socially successful with their speech. He even claims that otherwise “it would not be possible to explain the introduction of pragmatically salient innovations (e.g. the use of German *Kopf*, originally ‘cup’, for *Haupt* ‘head’, or the development of polite terms like Spanish *Vuestra Merced* ‘your grace’ into *usted*)” (Haspelmath 1999: 1056).

Although the question of how much of grammaticalization phenomena can be explained by extravagance can be debated, the notion of extravagance or speaker innovation seems to account well for the development of some items such as personal pronouns and those that are scalar in nature, e.g. the Chinese adverbial intensifier *hen* ‘very’, which developed into an obligatory modifier (Dahl 2001), and the development of the polite second person pronouns in languages like Spanish and Portuguese (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990). According to Dahl, saying something is *very good* is more interesting and noteworthy (i.e. more extravagant) than simply saying something is *good*. This intensifier may become obligatory, as more and more speakers employ this innovation out of a desire to be socially successful speakers. However, the innovation is bound to lose its effect as more and more speakers adopt the usage, yielding an obligatory modifier with little intensifying effect.

It is hard, on the other hand, to see how a similar scenario can be applied to the development of demonstratives into first/second person pronouns. Using demonstratives for the speaker and addressee in a way that is not consistent with their original meaning and function is quite difficult, if not impossible, because their semantics gets in the way. For example, the innovative use of speaker-and-addressee-distal forms for the addressee is not likely to happen unless there is another motivating reason such as the desire to express politeness, as will be seen later. Similarly, it is almost impossible to find a motivation for innovative use of a speaker-distal form for the speaker because there would be no point in showing distance as a politeness strategy to oneself. In this sense, demonstratives stand in sharp contrast to noun-based forms such as Japanese *kimi* ‘lord’, *kisama* ‘nobility’, and some European polite second person forms in that one can easily imagine the innovative use of noun-based forms, e.g. the use of *kisama* to someone whose social status does not warrant deference and respect. In other words, the lexical meaning of ‘lord’ is more readily exploited for extravagance than the semantic features of demonstratives such as proximal or distal. Almost all the usages of demonstrative-based pronouns presented in Tables 8 and 9 are not innovative, at least in the sense that their distribution across the person categories is consistent with the typical spatial configuration of the speaker, addressee, and others, showing that speaker innovation plays a marginal role at best in the case of demonstratives used for the speaker and addressee.<sup>17</sup>

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17. Traugott & Dasher (2002: 30), citing Harris (1978), mention the change in Vulgar Latin demonstratives where addressee-proximal *iste* ‘that near you’ and identitive *ipse* ‘self’ have come to mean ‘this near me’ and ‘that near you’, respectively. However, this seems to be a rare example, a ‘striking’ example as they call it. In addition, implications of this change for this study are not clear, as the use of these demonstrative forms for the speaker/addressee is not discussed.

In a sense, inapplicability of speaker innovation is an extension of the first reason (the metonymic reference to the speaker and addressee through demonstratives) because the lack of speaker innovation is based on the fact that there is nothing innovative if the use of demonstrative-based forms is predictable from their spatial semantics. In this sense, one can say that the development of speaker-and-addressee-distal *anata* into a second person pronoun is innovative and extravagant, as the development is not consistent with its spatial semantics. I return to this issue in § 3.3.4.

### 3.3.3 Functional dissimilarity between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns

Typological studies show that the close relation between demonstratives and third person pronouns stems from their functional similarities (cf. Bhat 2004; Siewierska 2004). Both demonstratives and third person pronouns are used anaphorically, thus assuming the relative stability of their referents, and what separates them is only the presence of deictic force in the former and its absence in the latter. Therefore, third person pronouns are often formally related to demonstratives in many languages. As mentioned earlier, 125 of 225 languages surveyed in the *World atlas of language structures* show partial or complete morphological relation between demonstratives and third person pronouns (Bhat 2013). The relation between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns, on the other hand, is quite different. Being used for shifting referents of the speaker and addressee, first/second person pronouns are never anaphoric; that is, they are inherently deictic. It may be plausibly argued that first and second person pronouns are implicit pointing reference (Dixon 2003). Third person pronouns can be used deictically, but there is nothing inherently deictic about them. For this reason, it has been argued by a number of researchers such as Forchheimer (1953), Benveniste (1971), and Lyons (1977) that there is a fundamental difference between the first/second persons on the one hand and the third person on the other.

I just pointed out above that the close relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns is based on their functional similarities (i.e. they are mainly used anaphorically and their referents stay relatively stable) and that there is a fundamental difference between first/second person pronouns and third person pronouns (i.e. the former are deictic by definition and the latter primarily anaphoric). However, at first glance, this does not seem to explain the lack of relationship between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns, because demonstratives, in their basic use (i.e. exophoric), are deictic in nature and first/second person pronouns are also deictic. Despite this similarity, there remains

a crucial difference between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns. Diessel (2003) demonstrates that the basic and main function of demonstratives is to direct the addressee's attention to cognitively unactivated entities in the speech situation. Demonstratives have a similar function in textual discourse, which is considered an extension of the more basic exophoric function (Diessel 1999). For this reason, demonstratives and interrogatives have a number of syntactic, semantic, and morphological similarities in many languages. Diessel (2003) argues that similarities between demonstratives and interrogatives are due to the similar pragmatic functions they serve in linguistic communication: demonstratives focus the addressee's attention on unactivated entities, and interrogatives direct the addressee to look for a new piece of information in his/her knowledge store. In other words, both instruct the addressee to initiate a search for information.

Although both demonstratives and first/second person pronouns are deictic, they are crucially different in terms of the nature of the referent that they designate. The main function of demonstratives is to direct the addressee's focus to entities in the surrounding situation and crucially to something or someone previously unactivated in the addressee's cognitive state. The referent of first/second person pronouns (i.e. speaker/addressee), on the other hand, is in most instances presupposed in the speech situation. That is to say, first/second person pronouns are almost never used to initiate a search for information. I argue that this difference in the cognitive status of the referent of demonstratives and first/second person pronouns is one of the main reasons that there is little diachronic relationship between them. The lack of relationship between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns is based on their dissimilar pragmatic functions and the nature of the referents they refer to. Note that demonstratives and third person pronouns are similar in this regard too because the anaphoric use of third person pronouns results in the addressee's search for the appropriate antecedent in discourse.

### 3.3.4 From a demonstrative to a second person pronoun

Although I have argued above that there are some good reasons that demonstratives do not generally give rise to first/second person pronouns, it does not necessarily mean that such a development is not possible. In fact, the case of Modern Japanese *anata* '(lit.) that way' exemplifies the development from a demonstrative to a second person pronoun. It was pointed out earlier that the use of *anata*'s paradigm mates, namely *konata* and *sonata*, is consistent with their spatial semantics. The shift of *konata* from the first to second person can be explained by preemption of addressee-proximal forms by speaker-proximal forms, and the continued use of *sonata* for the second person is in accordance with the lack of preemption in the

reverse direction. However, the case of *anata*, which shifted from the third to second person between the first and second half of Stage IV, cannot be attributed to its spatial semantics regardless of one's view on the diachronic development of the demonstrative system: despite the disagreement among scholars as to when the three-term system was established, it is clear that the *a*-series was speaker-and-addressee-distal at the second half of Stage IV. It is hard to see how a speaker-and-addressee-distal form could be used to designate the addressee if it is considered an extension of its demonstrative function, especially when there are dedicated addressee-proximal forms (i.e. *so*-series). The use of speaker-and-addressee-distal forms for the addressee would also be unmotivated because a conversation generally involves a short distance between the speaker and addressee. Interestingly, however, with the use of *anata* for the second person, which started around 1750, all forms belonging to this paradigm, namely *konata/sonata/anata*, are used for the addressee.

- (36) *Kore, Iemon-dono konata wa ookina ryoken chigahi.*  
 this Iemon-Mr. konata TOP big judgment different  
 'Look, Iemon, you (*konata*) are awfully mistaken.'  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 2)

- (37) *Kore, sonata wa maa, bushi no nyoofoo ni, nande sono*  
 this sonata TOP INJ Samurai GEN wife DAT why that  
*yooni midara senban.*  
 like lewd various  
 'Hey, how can you (*sonata*) treat a Samurai's wife in such a lewd way!'  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 2)

- (38) a. *Maa maa, anata-gata, osomatsu nagara.*  
 INJ INJ anata-PL plain though  
 'Well, well, would you (*anata-gata*) (please have some soup) though it is  
 nothing luxury.' (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 2)
- b. *Anata-gata wa otomari degozari-masu ka.*  
 anata-PL TOP lodging exist.RESP-HON Q  
 'Are you (*anata-gata*) looking for a lodging?'  
 (Stage IV: 1805, Tokaidochu Hizakurige)

As can be seen above, all the forms are used for the addressee in this stage. *Konata* was originally used for the speaker, but it came to be used for the addressee later, and *sonata* was always used for the addressee. Both usages are consistent with their spatial semantics. However, spatial semantics cannot explain the use of *anata* for the addressee, because it was a speaker-and-addressee-distal form when these texts were written. Given that only *anata* carries respectful meanings, as pointed out by researchers such as Ri (2002), I argue that its use for the second person is an instance of a distancing politeness strategy. It is strategic in that its use for the addressee is



not predictable from the spatial semantics of speaker-and-addressee-distal. It is well known that, cross-linguistically, displacing oneself from the current situation serves as a token of politeness or redressing of face-threat (Brown & Levinson 1987), e.g. distancing in time (English *I'm wondering if you can do me a favor* vs. *I was wondering if you could do me a favor*), number (French *tu* vs. *vous*), and person (and number) category (German *du* vs. *Sie*). *Anata* involves distancing in terms of space in that a speaker-and-addressee-distal form is used for the addressee. In other words, *anata* functions as a politeness strategy precisely because it is part of spatial semantics unlike Yamaguchi's (2015: 251) claim. However, it should be noted that indirect reference itself (e.g. metonymic use of demonstratives for person referents) can be regarded as a form of distancing, but in the simple sense of euphemism (which is quite different from conceptual distancing, as we will see below), because it indicates the speaker's reluctance to single out a particular referent. In this sense, one can consider the use of demonstratives for the speaker and addressee (when their reference is consistent with spatial semantics) as an indirect form of reference. This is what made the use of *konata* and *sonata* for the addressee prior to Stage IV polite (cf. Yamazaki 1963). The same applies to Modern Japanese *kochira* 'this way' as opposed to *kono hito* 'this person', where the former refers to a referent more indirectly than the latter.

However, the difference between *konata/sonata* on the one hand and *anata* on the other, which is not discussed in the previous studies, is the fact that the second person use of the former can be resolved by the extension of the demonstrative function, whereas that is not the case with the latter. The case involving *anata* is conceptual distancing (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987) and is not identical to spatial distance. That explains why the strategy has been used for a number of parameters/features in various domains (e.g. number and person in personal pronouns, and tense in verbal inflections). The strategic politeness of distancing, which plays a crucial role in the development of *anata* into a second person pronoun, is conceptual distancing that happens to be based on spatial distance. Other examples of distancing from Modern Japanese include *no hoo* 'to the direction of', e.g. *Gakkoo no hoo wa doo?* 'How's school?' [(lit.) How's the direction of school?'] As shown in Examples (36) to (38), only *anata* in (38a–b) is respectful in that it occurs with politeness elements such as the polite plural marker *-gata*. In (38b), *anata* also occurs with the referent honorific *gozaru* as well as the addressee honorific *masu*. On the other hand, it is clear in the utterance content that *konata* in (36) and *sonata* in (37) do not carry respect for the addressee, and they do not occur with any honorific elements.

Strictly speaking, it is not clear whether *anata* has already semanticized its personal pronoun usage at this stage since its original demonstrative third person use is still found, as in Example (39). The intended referent of *anata* is a person, but

it is not entirely apparent whether the reference is achieved by virtue of pragmatics or semantics. Although the translation given here is the third person pronoun *he*, *anata* can also be interpreted in its literal sense, namely ‘that way’ pragmatically used for ‘(person) in that direction’.

- (39) *Anata futofuto koobe o hiki-te mokushi-keru.*  
 anata suddenly head ACC lower-CONN be.silent-PST  
 ‘He (*anata*) lowered his head and stood there in silence.’

(Stage IV: 1778, Ugetsu Monogatari, Aozukin)

At the first half of Stage IV (until around 1750), *anata* was used for the third person (for both human and non-human referents) often paired with other demonstrative forms, yielding expressions such as *anata-konata* ‘that and this’. Its use for the second person became increasingly popular in the second half of Stage IV. However, it is still not entirely obvious whether *anata* has semanticized its second person usage. The status of *anata* as a second person becomes clear in Stage V because its original demonstrative function has died out. In fact, in Natsume Soeki’s four novels, *Kairoko* (1905), *Sanshiro* (1908), *Kokoro* (1914), and *Michikusa* (1915), at least 262 instances of *anata* are found and only three of them are demonstratives meaning ‘that way’, the rest being used as second person pronouns. As far as *konata* and *sonata* are concerned, I find no instances of either pronoun or demonstrative usages. This strongly suggests that (i) the so-called pronoun use of *konata*, *sonata*, and *anata* (for the third person) is simply a reflection of the metonymic use of demonstratives and (ii) *anata* has semanticized its second person function. Being independent of its original demonstrative functions, its reference is no longer restricted by the spatial semantics of speaker-and-addressee-distal. In other words, it is now able to designate the addressee regardless of where he/she is located, as shown in Example (40), in which a wife is trying to wake up her husband lying in front of her.

- (40) *Anata, moo shichiji desu yo.*  
 anata already seven.o’clock COP.POL FP  
 ‘Honey (*anata*), it’s already seven o’clock.’

(Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 10)

Although *anata* in (40) might have lost politeness value to some degree compared to (38a–b), the fact that it is usually used respectfully with some degree of intimacy from a wife to a husband, but not the other way round, shows that it still carried some sense of politeness at least at the beginning of Stage V.

To sum up, the development of *anata* differs from other demonstrative-based forms because it has reached the stage where the pronoun function has become independent of the original demonstrative function. That is why it was possible for *anata* to survive even after the disappearance of its demonstrative function. In

this sense, the development of *anata* is somewhat akin to forms such as German *Sie* in that conceptual distancing is employed for politeness purposes. The former involves conceptual distance instantiated by spatial distance, whereas the latter involves conceptual distance realized by person (and number) categories (i.e. a third person form for a second person referent).

### 3.4 Location nouns

#### 3.4.1 *Omae* ‘honorable front’

*Omae* ‘honorable front’ is attested since Stage II as a location noun. Its use is generally reserved for a socially prestigious physical location such as in front of the altar or someone of a high social rank. Morphologically, *omae* is composed of an honorific prefix *o-* and a spatial noun *mae* ‘front’. Its sinicized version *gozen* (*go-* is an honorific prefix, and *zen* is a spatial noun) is also observed. *Omae* represents *kunyomi* (native Japanese pronunciation semantically associated with Chinese characters), whereas *gozen* is Sino-Japanese reading or *onyomi* (a way of pronunciation that approximated the original Chinese reading). Here I focus on the use of *omae* as it is the pronunciation used in Modern Japanese. In (41), *omae* serves as a locative noun, indicating the general area around Genji (the protagonist) which is too ‘awe-inspiring’ for his serviceman to approach.

- (41) *Rei-nara-nu koto nite, o-mahe tikaku mo e-mawira-nu,*  
 example-COP-NEG thing with omae near EMPH POT-COME.HUBL-NEG  
*tutumasisa ni, nagesi ni mo e-nobora-zu*  
 reserved with wooden.materials to EMPH POT-go.up-NEG  
 ‘Reluctant to approach where his lord is (*omae*) in this crisis, the man had stopped short of entering the room.’ (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Yugao)

*Omae* in (41) refers to the place where the serviceman is trying to approach with a torch as requested by his master. *Omae* was largely used in this way in Stage II and III. Not surprisingly, however, it is soon exploited to refer to a person referent in that location metonymically. The examples in (42) show the case where *omae* is used to refer to a third person referent.

- (42) a. *Ito utate, midarigokoti no asiu habere ba, utubusihusi-te*  
 very terrible sickness GEN bad COP as lie.down-CONN  
*haberu ya! O-mahe ni koso warinaku obosaru-rame.*  
 COP INJ omae in EMPH terrible feel.HON-CONN  
 ‘I was only lying that way because I feel so ill. My poor lady (*omae*) must be quite terrified.’ (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Yugao)

- b. *Kore ha, o-mahe ni mawirase tamahe. Midai nado*  
 this TOP omae DAT give.HUBL HON meal.stand etc  
*utiaha de, ito kataharaitasi ya!*  
 complete NEG very sorry INJ  
 ‘Please give this to my lady (*omae*). I am extremely sorry, but there is no  
 meal stand for her.’ (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Tamakazura)

(42a) is an utterance directed toward the protagonist Genji from Ukon, a nurse who takes care of a young woman named Yugao. Ukon uses *omae* to refer to Yugao who is unconscious and being attended by Genji, because Yugao lies in front of Genji who holds a socially higher position (captain in the palace guards) than either of them. Thus, this *omae* is used for the third person because its referent (i.e. Yugao) is not the addressee (i.e. Genji).<sup>18</sup> In (42a), it is clear that the speaker’s intended pragmatic reference is not a place, but Yugao, since a place cannot be terrified. This is an exploitation of an invited inference, that is, a locative noun being used metonymically to refer to a person in that location. Similarly, in (42b) *omae* refers to the third person because this is a situation where a male attendant of a lady hands over a meal to her gentlewoman so that she can give it to the lady, though the place interpretation is available in the background (i.e. ‘bring this to where she is’).

In terms of the distinction between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and that between the described and speech event, one can say that *omae* in both (41) and (42) are subjective because it includes an honorific prefix *o-* which encodes the speaker’s perspective toward a referent. (41) is subjective in the spatial sense as well (i.e. the location is seen from the speaker’s perspective). It should also be noted that *omae* in (42) concerns the described event more than it concerns the speech event in that it refers to third person referents. Although *omae* can be said to be subjective to begin with since the use of the honorific prefix concerns speaker’s assessment of his/her social relationship with a referent, the use of *omae* in (43) below is arguably

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18. Shibasaki (2005: 72), who cites the same example, claims that *omae* in this example refers to Yugao and that the lord is not present in the situation. However, if he means Genji by ‘lord’, it is clear that Genji is present in the speech situation because he is attending to Yugao. As can be seen in the excerpt from Tyler’s (2001: 68) translation below, not only is he present in the situation, but the utterance is directed at him.

“My lord (Genji), I (Ukon) was only lying that way because I feel so ill. My poor lady (Yugao) must be quite terrified.”

“Yes, but why should she ... ?” He felt her: she was not breathing. He shook her, but she was limp and obviously unconscious, and he saw helplessly that, childlike as she was, a spirit had taken her.

Elsewhere, Shibaskai (2010: 231) states that *omae* in this example refers to the lord. Again, I agree with Tyler’s translation that it refers to Yugao.

nonsubjective in that it means ‘before the altar’, which refers to the same location regardless of who the speaker is, that is, ‘in front of Buddha’, at least in the spatial sense (comparable to Langacker’s 1990 ‘objective’).

- (43) *Miya ha, Hotoke no o-mahe nite, kyau wo zo*  
 her.highness TOP Buddha GEN omae LOC scripture ACC EMPH  
*yomi tamahi keru.*  
 read RESP PST  
 ‘Her highness was chanting a scripture before the altar (*omae*).’

(Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Maboroshi)

However, one could also argue that *omae* in the sense of ‘in front of Buddha’ is still subjective in the social sense because Buddha is higher than anyone, that is, a subjective judgment of speakers: it can generally be considered subjective in the first place because an honorific prefix *o-* is a reflection of speakers’ attitude toward a particular referent (i.e. social-deictic).

So far we have seen examples of *omae* that refer to places and third person referents, thus concerning the described event more than the speech event, but there are also examples in Stage II in which *omae* is somewhat associated with the addressee and the speech situation.

- (44) *O-mahe ni dani tutumase tamaham koto wo, masite, koto-bito*  
 omae DAT even hesitant HON thing ACC much.less others  
*ha ika de ka.*  
 TOP how COP Q  
 ‘But, your majesty, how could I bring up with him something of which even you (*omae*) hesitate to speak?’ (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Tenarai)

In (44), a gentlewoman in the service of the princess is talking to the Empress, and *omae* clearly refers to the Empress. It cannot be said to have become a personal pronoun yet because it primarily occurs as a locative noun in this stage, but one can see that this type of metonymic usage serves to strengthen its connection with the addressee in the speech situation. The connection with the addressee and the speech situation are also observed in the following example from Stage III.

- (45) A: *Ikani Kiyotsura.*  
 VOC Kiyotsura  
 ‘Kiyotsura!’  
 B: *Onmae ni soroo.*  
 omae LOC COP  
 ‘I am before you (*omae*).’ (Stage III: 14/15C, Semimaru)

In (45), an imperial envoy, Kiyotsura (B), responds to Prince Semimaru's (A) call. Being used to refer to where the addressee is, *omae* in Kiyotsura's utterance gives rise to locative interpretation as well as metonymic reference to the second person. Its literal interpretation would be something like 'I am in the honorable front'. However, *omae* in an utterance like (45), which is directed at the addressee, is open to being interpreted as an expression for the second person, i.e. 'I am at you'. Similarly, *omae* is often used as a goal of motion as in *omae ni agaru* 'go up to *omae* (i.e. go to the place where a socially higher person resides)'. It is not hard to imagine that these phrases give rise to a generalized invited inference where *omae* is equated with the addressee (i.e. 'I go to you'). It is likely that utterances like (44) and (45) have served an important role in the development of the second person pronoun function of *omae*.<sup>19</sup>

Although the locative use of *omae* still exists, the connection with the addressee in the speech situation seems to have been semanticized in Stage IV, and it has acquired a function as a marker of the speech role of the addressee.

- (46) a. *Makotoni syusyoona omae degozaru.*  
 truly awesome omae COP.POL  
 'It is truly an awesome holy place (*omae*).'  
 (Stage IV: early 17C, Kyoogen, Fuku no Kami) (Dasher 1995: 255–256)
- b. *Ore wa agura kaki-masi-ta da ga, omee wa*  
 I TOP legs cross-POL-PST cop but omae TOP  
*ne-korobari-masi-ta da no.*  
 sleep-fall.down-POL-PST COP FP  
 'I crossed my leg, but you (*omae*) threw yourself down.'  
 (Stage IV: 1808, Ukiyoburo) (Dasher 1995: 258)

(46a) is uttered from one worshipper at a shrine to another. The use of *omae* is analogous to that of (43) in that it refers to the precincts of a shrine for both of them. On the other hand, *omae* in (46b) is used as a second person pronoun. It should be noted that the pronoun use in (46b) does not carry much respect for the addressee. Notice also the phonetic reduction: *omae* vs. *omee*. The latter is more informal than the former. It is also intersubjective in that it shows an expression of speaker's evaluation of the social status of the addressee. (46b) is also suggestive of high paradigmaticity in that *omae* is contrasted with *ore* 'I' (i.e. *I* did this ... *you* did that ...).

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19. Shibasaki (2005) talks about the development of *omae* as a second person pronoun based on the change of its distribution pattern: change from oblique to A/S (agent of a transitive verb/argument of an intransitive verb). While I fully agree with this point, it appears that the change in its distributional pattern is epiphenomenal rather than a cause. This account is also problematic in that almost all nouns that are regularly used for person referents are expected to have the A/S pattern.

*Omae* is used predominantly as a second person pronoun in Stage V (i.e. Modern Japanese) as can be seen in the following example, and the locative use is rare.

- (47) *Haha ga taisoo okotte-te omae no yoona mono no*  
 mother NOM very get.angry-CONN omae GEN like person GEN  
*kao wa mi-taku-nai to iu kara shinrui e tomari ni it-teita.*  
 face TOP see-want-NEG QUOT say because relatives to stay to go-ASP  
 ‘My mother was very angry and she said “she never wanted to see a face of  
 someone like you (*omae*) again”, so I was staying with my relatives.’

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 1)

*Omae* in (47) can be interpreted only as designating the addressee, because it is linked to nouns such as *mono* ‘person’ and *kao* ‘face’ with genitive particles. As the content of utterance makes it clear, *omae* in (47) does not carry respect at all. By this time, the original semantic content has been lost, and what started as a metonymic reference has fully semanticized. Stage V provides additional evidence regarding the status of *omae* as a second person pronoun. First, *omae*, like any other second person pronouns, can shift its referent freely in a very short interval. For example, speakers can designate different referents consecutively, e.g. *omae to omae kocchi ni koi* ‘you (*omae*) and you (*omae*), come here’. The ability to shift its referent freely in a small stretch of discourse is indicative of person-deictic nature. Second, first and second person pronouns are paired with each other and used idiomatically: *omae to ore*, *kimi to boku*, and *anata to watashi*, all of which mean ‘you and I’.

In a sense, *omae* functions like the *so*-series demonstratives in that it refers to the socially privileged area associated with the addressee. It is also like demonstratives in the sense that it is used for both the second and third person referent. If that is the case, one might wonder why *omae* became a second person pronoun, while demonstrative-based forms did not. Although there is no sure answer to this question, there is a reason why inferences invoked by the metonymic use of demonstratives are less likely to semanticize. Demonstrative forms participate in the well-defined demonstrative paradigm and they achieve metonymic reference by virtue of being a member of the paradigm. *Omae*, on the other hand, is strongly biased toward the socially higher person referent to begin with, particularly the addressee, because of its original meaning.

### 3.4.2 *temae* ‘in front of hand’

Morphologically, *temae* consists of *te* ‘hand’ and *mae* ‘front’, and according to comprehensive dictionaries such as *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten* (*Nihon Daijiten Kankokai* 1972–1976) various nominal uses of *temae* are attested since Stage III. In a literal sense, it was used with the meaning of ‘in front of the speaker’ or ‘the area that is

close to the speaker', but the extended uses such as 'one's skill (especially in the context of martial arts and tea-making)' and 'one's economic situation' are also found.

Its use for person referents, on the other hand, is not found until Stage IV. The metonymic use of *temae* for a person referent, particularly for the speaker, is not surprising in that it refers to the areas around the speaker. Consider the following examples.

- (48) *Sate sate fuugana jyuukyo ja na. Iya, temae koto wa, kono*  
 well well elegant house COP FP um temae thing TOP this  
*atari ni jyuukyo itasu mono ja ga, konnichi*  
 neighborhood in reside do.HUBL person.HUBL COP but today  
*kotorigari ni makari ide, tegahi no taka ga soreta ja.*  
 bird.hunting to came go.out, keeping GEN hawk NOM veer.away COP  
 'Well, well, it is an elegant house. I (*temae*) also reside in the neighborhood, but my hawk missed its course when we were hunting birds today.'  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 5)

As is clear in this example, *temae* is used for the first person in (48). The speaker, in search of his missing hawk, refers to himself as *temae* in conversation with a woman at her house. Although *temae* is often used for the first person in this stage, use for the second person is also attested. In (49), Speaker B calls the addressee (i.e. Speaker A) *temae* when responding to the remark of Speaker A who indirectly asks for money from Speaker B, knowing Speaker B's secret, namely the murder he committed.

- (49) A: ...*Menmen mihare to omofu kara, suguni koko kara*  
 each come.clean COMP think because soon here from  
*nanotte dete, ano hitogoroshi wa Iemon to,*  
 identify.oneself come.forward that murder TOP Iemon COMP  
*kisama no kyuuaku ichiichini ihi agete oira ga*  
 kisama GEN past.crimes each say list I NOM  
*minuke.*  
 clear.the.charge  
 'Each of us is thinking about coming clean about the crimes. In fact, I will clear myself of the charge by reporting your past crimes to the authority and saying those murders are your doings.'
- B: ...*Sorya o-temae, kore made nengoroni shita kahi ga*  
 then HP-temae this untii closely did worth NOM  
*nai to iu mono.*  
 not.exist COMP say thing  
 'Well, if you (*o-temae*) say so, that would make our close relations up until now useless.'  
 (Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 3)



The fact that *temae* is used for both the first and second person does not seem to change at the beginning of Stage V, namely Modern Japanese, where the form is considered a second person pronoun. However, the status of its semanticization as a second person form is still hard to determine. Examples like the following, where *temae* is juxtaposed and contrasted with the item that signifies another person category, are potentially suggestive of its membership in the pronominal paradigm.

- (50) ...ore wa *temae* ja nai zo to furete aruku kawarini  
 ore TOP *temae* COP NEG FP COMP tell walk instead.of  
*kabutteiru nodearu.*  
 put.on COP  
 ‘These absurd costumes are now worn to show what and who the possessor is.’ [(lit.) Humans wear clothes so that they don’t have to say “I am not you (*temae*).”] (Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 7)

The opposition is clear in the contrast between *ore* ‘I’ and *temae* ‘you’ in the utterance above, but again the issue of semanticization is not obvious since it can be used for the first person as well. In addition, its original spatial meaning of ‘in front of the speaker’ or ‘area that is close to the speaker’ is still available in Stage V.

- (51) *Hakone no saki desu ka temae desu ka.*  
 Hakone GEN past COP Q *temae* COP Q  
 ‘Is it past or before (*temae*) Hakone?’ (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 1)

In (51), the speaker is talking about Ehime, a place in Western Japan. She is in Tokyo (Eastern Japan) at the time of the utterance and is asking whether Ehime is past Hakone (a place located on the way from Tokyo to Ehime) or on the side that is closer to the speaker and Tokyo. Given these observations, it appears that it is difficult to make a positive argument for the semanticization of *temae* as a second person form, because it can be used for the first person as well as the spatial sense.

Where then, does the intuition of contemporary speakers that *temae* is a derogatory second person pronoun come from?<sup>20</sup> The intuition of contemporary speakers most likely comes from more recent usage of *temae* in Stage V, where the form is used derogatorily for the addressee and is usually pronounced as *temee* with some phonological weakening. It is not usually pronounced in this way when *temae* is given the first person interpretation and certainly not when it has a spatial interpretation. This opens the possibility that at least *temee*, not *temae*, has semanticized as a derogatory second person pronoun.

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20. Most Japanese grammars and language textbooks (e.g. Shibatani 1990) do not include *temae* in their pronoun list because it is used only in limited contexts where emotions run high, and its use should be avoided whenever and wherever possible.

The original meaning and function of *temae* resemble those of speaker-proximal demonstratives in that it designates the area close to and in front of the speaker. It then naturally follows that *temae* can be used for the addressee as long as the addressee is in the speaker's proximal area, just like speaker-proximal forms can be used for the addressee (cf. 49). This is in contrast with *omae* 'honorable front' or 'in front of someone honorable' examined in the previous section which was consistently used for the second person. *Temae* and *omae* make a particularly interesting comparison because only the former is used for both the first and second person, although they have a parallel morphological structure: *temae* consists of *te* 'hand' and *mae* 'front' and *omae* of the honorific prefix *o-* and *mae* 'front'. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact they resemble demonstrative forms functionally in terms of spatial anchoring. Even though they are morphologically parallel, *temae* is closely linked to the speaker and functions like a speaker-proximal form. On the other hand, *omae* has a close association with the addressee (especially high status addressee, as the original meaning indicates) and behave like an addressee-proximal form.

### 3.5 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the close relationship between demonstratives and third person pronouns on the one hand and the tenuous link between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns on the other. I have presented three functional reasons that demonstratives generally do not give rise to first/second person pronouns: (i) reference to the speaker/addressee can be achieved by a metonymic extension of the demonstrative function, (ii) speaker innovation does not apply to the use of demonstratives for the speaker/addressee, and (iii) function of demonstratives and first/second person pronouns are dissimilar to one another. It has also been pointed out that the development of location nouns parallels that of demonstratives. The case of Modern Japanese second person *anata* is an exception in that its spatial semantics is not compatible with its use as a second person pronoun. I have argued that this development is a conventionalization of a distancing politeness strategy.

The findings of this chapter have some cross-linguistic implications. First, the development of *anata* 'that way' seems to suggest universality of the politeness strategy of displacement. Displacement for politeness purposes in the domain of personal pronouns is widely observed in the world languages (cf. Head 1978; Brown & Levinson 1987). Some languages employ displacement in terms of number (use of plural for singular, e.g. French *tu* vs. *vous*), while others use person categories (use of third person for second person, e.g. German *du* vs. *Sie*). The case of *anata* involves

displacement in terms of space, that is, the use of speaker-and-addressee-distal form for the addressee.

Second, a reexamination of first/second person pronouns in other languages that are said to be morphologically related to or to have developed from demonstratives is in order. Some languages are suggested to have developed a systematic relation between demonstratives and personal pronouns. For example, Greenberg (1985) mentions that the Armenian articles *-s*, *-d*, and *-n*, which parallel the three demonstratives *ays*, *ayd*, and *ayn*, respectively, have become possessive pronouns of the first, second, and third person, respectively. Other examples of the person-demonstrative connection cited in the literature include the Chinese dialect of Huojia and Vietnamese, where the Chinese form *zher* 'here' is used as first person plural 'we, us', and the Vietnamese *đây* 'here' and *đó* 'there' are used as first and second person pronouns (cf. Hagège 1993; Heine & Kuteva 2002). However, it is necessary to reexamine these cases carefully to see if they exemplify semanticization or simply the pragmatic or metonymic link between demonstratives and person, especially since these scholars cite Japanese forms like *sore* 'that', *soko* 'there', *sonata* 'that way', and *sochira* 'that way' as items that developed into first/second pronouns. The present study has not found any evidence for this semanticization because their use is completely predictable from their spatial semantics. In fact, some of the examples that Greenberg cites seem to illustrate cases where demonstratives are simply used metonymically in place of pronouns. He mentions that Classical Greek *hó-de* 'this' is clearly associated with the first person since the phrase *hód' anēr* 'this man' is used in place of first person pronouns. This seems analogous to the case of *konata* and Modern Japanese *kochira*, where the reference can be resolved within the scope of the metonymic use of demonstratives. The association with the first person is quite natural in both Classical Greek and Japanese since that is what their semantics indicates (i.e. speaker-proximal), but the question of whether they are semanticized as personal pronouns requires separate treatment. Greenberg (1985: 278) also states that the relation between person and demonstrative exists in a clear form only in a limited number of languages and the relation is historically unstable, which appears to suggest that their association is more likely to be pragmatic than a semanticized one. The issue of semanticization of demonstratives as personal pronouns can be resolved only by in-depth item-by-item analyses, which are hard to find in most grammars of language.

The final point this chapter makes concerns the functional (dis)similarity between demonstratives and personal pronouns. It was pointed out in § 3.3.3 that one of the reasons why demonstratives do not generally give rise to first and second person pronouns is their functional dissimilarity. The basic and main function of demonstratives is to direct the addressee's attention to previously unactivated entities in the speech situation, that is, to initiate a search for information. The

referent of first and second person pronouns, on the other hand, is presupposed in the speech situation, and they are almost never used for cognitively unactivated entities. When we turn to demonstratives and third person pronouns, it is well known in typological studies such as Siewierska (2004) that their close relationship is due to their functional similarity: both are often used anaphorically (i.e. non-deictic), and what separates them is only the presence of deictic force in demonstratives and the absence of it in third person pronouns. But how exactly does the fact that demonstratives and third person pronouns are both used anaphorically explain their close relationship? From the perspective of the above point, namely the nature of their referents, demonstratives and third person pronouns initiate a search for information. The anaphoric use of demonstratives and third person pronouns in both written and spoken discourse instruct the reader/addressee to initiate a search for information, namely an appropriate antecedent. This differentiates the relationship of demonstratives to third person pronouns from that to first/second person pronouns, creating a close link for the former and a very tenuous one for the latter.



## Principles of person shift

This chapter examines forms that underwent the shift of person categories. Besides the cross-linguistically common shift from the third person to first/second person, some have claimed that the shift between the first and second person occurred in Japanese pronouns (e.g. Whitman 1999; Shibasaki 2005). The former is most typically a shift from nouns to first/second person pronouns (Chapter 2), and the latter is often (but not exclusively) found in demonstrative-based forms (Chapter 3). I show that at least three independent principles are responsible for person shift phenomena. Extravagance accounts for most changes from nouns to first/second person pronouns (Haspelmith 1999), and empathetic as well as spatial perspectives are involved in the shift between the first and second person. I argue that spatial/empathetic perspectives explain why the first person shifts to the second person more often than the other way round. This makes person shift essentially ‘speaker-centered’ phenomena.

I begin with a description of person shift phenomena. I then explain the principles of person shift, focusing on the shift from nouns to the first/second person pronouns on the one hand and that between the first and second person on the other. I also discuss the relationship between the person shift and pragmatic depreciation.

### 4.1 Introduction

Despite a long textual tradition in Japanese, works that attempt to elucidate the process of person shift have been sporadic. Whitman (1999) is a notable exception to this. Whitman argues that two distinct processes are observed in the development of personal pronouns in Japanese: the first is called ‘personalization’ and the second ‘intrapersonal pronoun shift’. Whitman characterizes the former as the development of first/second person markers from third person markers (often nouns), following Benveniste’s (1971) distinction between the first/second person and third person. The latter, on the other hand, is a shift between first and second person markers. For example, both the development of the first person *boku* from the lexical item meaning ‘servant’ and that of the second person *anata* from the distal demonstrative are instances of personalization because they were originally third person elements. On the other hand, the second person use of *temae* in Modern

Japanese is the result of intrapersonal pronoun shift, because it was also used as a first person marker.

Personalization is found in a wide array of language families, but Whitman (1999) suggests that it is particularly common in Asian languages (e.g. Japanese, Korean, Thai) because they lack morphological person agreement on the verb. He claims that a complete process of personalization involves first the shift from a mere discourse entity (i.e. third person) to a speech act participant and then a change in verbal agreement. Therefore, the process of personalization is more costly in languages with overt morphological agreement than in those without it. As for intrapersonal pronoun shift, Whitman argues that it originates in the ‘reflexive’ function of pronouns in so-called logophoric contexts. Reflexives in logophoric contexts are represented as first or second person pronouns in a direct discourse representation. For example, the Japanese reflexive *jibun* as the subject of the complement clause in the Modern Japanese equivalent of *John said that he is a genius* will be replaced by a first person pronoun in its direct discourse representation. Whitman argues that this provides the context for intrapersonal pronoun shift and proposes that intrapersonal pronoun shift is always mediated by the reflexive function.

A shift of person categories that is especially common in the languages of the world is one where third person forms have come to be used as second person forms for the purpose of politeness. For example, German uses third person plural *Sie* as a polite second person pronoun. Similarly, the Spanish polite second person pronoun *usted* comes from the nominal form *Vuestra Merced* ‘your grace’, which is formally a third person form. The same type of development is observed in other languages such as Portuguese *você* (from *Você Mercê* ‘your grace’) and Italian *Lei* (from *La Vostra Signoria* ‘your lord’) (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990).

In Japanese, on the other hand, the shift of person categories is more widespread, including the shift from the first person to second person. Consider the following examples from Whitman (1999: 358).

- (52) a. *koto-na-gusi we-gusi ni ware weφinikeri*  
 matter-none-sake laugh-sake on ware got.drunk  
 ‘On that blameless sake, that laughing sake, I (*ware*) got drunk.’  
 (Stage I: 712, Kojiki)
- b. *ware φa miyako no φito ka. iduko φe oφasuru zo.*  
 ware TOP capital GEN person Q where to go.HON EMPH  
 ‘Are you (*ware*) from the capital? Where are you going?’  
 (Stage II: 1218, Uji Shui Monogatari)

(52) shows the first person use of *ware* in Stage I and its second person usage in Stage II (*ware* is used for the first person on a limited basis in Modern Standard Japanese). Besides *ware*, Whitman (1999) cites *onore* and *konata* as forms that

shifted from the first to second person. Similarly, Shibasaki (2005) lists *temae*, *boku*, and *konata* among others (see also Shibasaki 2014: 154). While the shift concerning some items, especially social titles that shifted from the third to first/second person, is uncontroversial, I argue that the shift involving demonstrative-based forms (e.g. *konata*) and items used reflexively (e.g. *temae*) requires independent principles and different treatment from noun-based personal pronouns.

In previous studies, at least three approaches have been suggested as a cause for the shift from the first to second person. First, Whitman (1999) suggests what Suzuki (1978) calls ‘empathetic identification’ as a possible explanation for the shift.<sup>21</sup> Empathetic identification refers to the change of perspective in the use of kinship terms where an older member of the family takes the perspective of the youngest member of the family. For example, parents can call their older son ‘older brother’ because he is an older brother from the perspective of the youngest member of the family (i.e. their youngest child). Similarly, a grandmother can call her own daughter ‘mother’, taking the perspective of her grandchild. This shift of perspective goes beyond family members; thus an adult speaker can call an unrelated boy ‘older brother’, assuming he is old enough to have a younger sibling. Interestingly, when the older speaker decides that the boy is not old enough to have younger siblings, that is to say, he is the youngest member in the ‘imagined’ family, the speaker can use the first person pronoun *boku* to refer to the boy as in *boku dooshita no?* ‘What happened to you (*boku*)?’ In other words, the speaker is using a first person pronoun to refer to the addressee, because he is *boku* ‘I’ seen from his own perspective (i.e. that is the term the boy would use to designate himself). It is not hard to see why this is seen as a source of the shift of person categories. However, Whitman (1999) notes that empathetic identification is unlikely to serve as a cause for the shift of person categories because the change of perspective occurs only in a limited context, namely only when the addressees are very young so that they are considered not old enough to have younger siblings. In addition, empathetic identification is much more common with male addressees and rare with female counterparts, if not impossible.<sup>22</sup> Empathetic identification is somewhat akin to the so-called ‘medical-*we*’ in English where doctors and nurses address patients with the first person plural as in *How are we doing today?* even though the utterance is clearly intended for the patient only. They are what Brown & Levinson (1987) call positive politeness (i.e. the speaker indicates that he/she

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21. The purpose of Suzuki (1978) is not to explain the shift of person categories, but to examine the address term system in Japanese and its cultural implications.

22. Whitman (1999: 366) states that the first person pronoun *watashi* can be used for a little girl in much the same way as *boku* for a boy, but my intuition is that the use of *watashi* in this way is much less common than that of *boku*.



treats the addressee as ‘the same kind’ and he/she wants what the addressee wants as well).<sup>23</sup> Although its potential explanatory power for the shift of person categories cannot be denied completely, I agree with Whitman that, given the limited contexts in which it occurs, empathetic identification does not seem to account for the wide range of shift observed in Japanese.

Second, Whitman (1999) discusses an explanation based on the notion of empathy and direct discourse perspectives formulated in the works of Kuno (see for example Kuno 1972, 1987, 2004; Kuno & Kaburaki 1977). As already noted, Whitman distinguishes personalization and intrapersonal pronoun shift. The former is particularly common in Japanese and other Asian languages because of their lack of morphological person agreement on the verb. While the latter is motivated by the reflexive function in the so-called logophoric context. Whitman suggests that this line of explanation may extend beyond the logophoric context and argues for the directionality of shift from pronouns to reflexives as well as from reflexives to pronouns. He argues that this is how reflexives have come to be reanalyzed as first or second person pronouns. Although Whitman illustrates his argument of logophoric reflexives mainly with Modern Japanese examples, the application to historical texts can be seen in the following example of *ware*, which is said to have shifted its referent from the first to second person (Whitman 1999: 373).

- (53) *Kimi mo e taþe-tamaþa-de, ware þitori sakasi-gari*  
 lord too POT bear-HON-NEG ware one strong-show.signs.of  
*idaki-mo-tamaþeru ni, kono þito ni iki wo*  
 embrace-hold-HON although this person to breath ACC  
*nobe-tamaþite zo, kanasiki koto obosarekeru, tobakari, ito*  
 let.out-HON EMPH sad thing think.HON awhile very  
*itaku e mo todome-zu naki-tamaþu.*  
 exceedingly POT even stop-NEG cry-HON

‘The lord too could not bear it; although he (*ware*) alone had showed strength and embraced (*her*), to this person he let out his breath, the sad things came to mind, and for a while he cried very hard, without being remotely able to stop.’

(Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Yugao)

*Ware* in (53) exemplifies what Whitman calls the reflexive function, and it is long-distance bound by *kimi* ‘lord’. This example is structurally comparable to the Modern Japanese example mentioned above, i.e. *John said that he* (jibun) *is a genius*. In fact, the Modern Japanese translation of the Japanese Text Initiative has

23. The use of kinship terms in Thai is similar to Japanese in that they are regularly used pronominally for multiple person categories within and outside one’s family structure, and it creates a more informal and friendlier atmosphere (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005: 57–59).

the reflexive *jibun* in the same slot. If the clause containing *ware* was given a direct discourse perspective, *ware* would be replaced by or interpreted as a first person form. According to Whitman, this mediation in the logophoric context is crucial for intrapersonal pronoun shift to occur. Although the notion of reflexivity and empathy is, as we will see below, important in this study too, it is not clear if reflexives in the long-distance binding context explain the whole range of phenomena associated with shift of person categories. The following issues pose problems for his approach: (i) the fact that the shift from the first to second person is more common than the shift from the second to first person is left unexplained, (ii) not all instances of the shift involve the long-distance binding context even in the stage when the shift supposedly started, and (iii) he notes that it is difficult to decide whether the first person or reflexive use was the original function of the item.

Third, Shibasaki (2005) suggests that the shift of person categories (or ‘referential shifting’ as he calls it) can be accounted for by extending and reinterpreting Traugott & Dasher’s (2002) intersubjectification. For Shibasaki (2005: 181), intersubjectification is the process by which “the first person is involved in either assimilating other-reference to the first person” or “accommodating first person reference to other-reference”. There are a few questions that need to be raised regarding this approach. First, his definition or reinterpretation of intersubjectification seems like a description of the phenomenon rather than an explanation. For example, the process of shift from the first to second person, namely a ‘strategy of accommodating first person reference to second person’, does not seem very informative unless how the mechanism of ‘accommodating’ is clearly demonstrated. Also, although Shibasaki claims that his definition of intersubjectification is based on that of Traugott & Dasher (2002), it appears that the two versions differ in an important way. For Traugott & Dasher, intersubjectification is the speaker’s attitude toward the addressee or attention to the addressee’s image need. This, for example, manifests itself as the development from referent honorifics (respect is achieved in reference to the action of a participant in the described event) to addressee honorifics (respect is paid to the addressee in the speech situation who may or may not be a participant in the described event). Attention to the addressee’s image need may result in lowering of the speaker status or elevating of the addressee status, but there is no reason that it has to involve the shift of person categories. One can argue that intersubjectification applies in the case where the result of shift is the second person, but again the shift is not a necessary condition for the speaker to express his/her attitude toward the addressee. Elsewhere, Shibasaki uses similar descriptions to account for particular directionality of shift. He argues that the referential shifting from the third to second person results from either indirectly addressing or speaking about a person, whereas the referential shifting from the first to second person is a “strategy of accommodating first person reference to second person” (2014: 144).

This approach does not capture the fact that different principles/motivations can give rise to the same directionality of shift, as we will see later. It also looks like it overgeneralizes possible reasons for the shift. For example, Shibasaki states that the shift from the third to second person is the result of indirect address or reference, which implies the shift is motivated by politeness. While politeness plays a major role in the development of personal pronouns, indirect address or reference cannot be reduced to politeness since there are other reasons such as sarcasm (which is not necessarily associated with politeness) for the speaker to resort to indirect address/reference, making his description generic, as mentioned above. It is also not clear in what sense referring to one's lord as 'lord' is indirect. While it is true that 'lord' is not a personal pronoun when first used for the addressee, it conveys more information about the addressee than a mere marker of the speech role.

To pursue this, in the following sections, I investigate person shift phenomena in terms of principles involved rather than examine it on its directionality.

## 4.2 Extravagant politeness

As discussed in § 3.3.2, some have argued that speaker innovation, the use of a linguistic item which is not consistent with its original meaning, plays a crucial role in grammaticalization and semantic change (e.g. Lehmann 1995; Haspelmath 1999). A number of terms such as 'expressivity' (Hopper & Traugott 2003), 'extravagance' (Haspelmath 1999, based on Keller 1994), and 'innovative use' (Traugott & Dasher 2002) have been proposed. They are similar in that they describe a situation where speakers use linguistic forms in a way that is not predictable in a straightforward manner from their original meanings and functions. For example, Haspelmath (1999) employs the notion of extravagance, which is speakers' use of unusually explicit information in order to attract attention. Haspelmath argues that grammaticalization is a side effect of extravagance, because the communicative goal of speakers is not just to be understood with minimum linguistic effort, but to be socially successful with their speech. This accounts for the introduction of pragmatically salient innovations (e.g. the already-noted use of German *Kopf*, originally 'cup', for *Haupt* 'head', or the development of polite terms like Spanish *Vuestra Merced* 'your grace' into *usted*) (Haspelmath 1999: 1056).<sup>24</sup>

Although extravagance cannot be completely reduced to politeness, the concept is particularly useful in the analyses of personal pronouns, as the speaker's

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24. Extravagance plays a crucial role for Haspelmath's model, because the lack of counteracting principle, 'anti-extravagance', explains why one does not usually find the true and complete reversal of grammaticalization, which he calls 'antigrammaticalization' (Haspelmath 2004).

extravagant behavior is often motivated by his/her politeness concern. I argue that extravagant politeness accounts for the development of many personal pronouns that arose from nouns. Extravagant politeness is a politeness strategy that actively appeals to the addressee in order to achieve social success, usually by highlighting his/her positive social attributes, e.g. the use of unusually polite terms for someone whose social position does not necessitate it. What is considered normal or extravagant is contextually determined by the principle of informativeness/relevance against the larger socio-pragmatic backdrop. This is quite different from other strategies that are considered part of politeness such as the use of hedges and down-toners which are associated with understatement.<sup>25</sup> The development motivated by extravagant politeness includes the second person *kimi* ‘emperor’ and *kisama* ‘noble person’ as well as the first person *boku* ‘servant’ examined in Chapter 2.

The development of personal pronouns of nominal origins involves extravagant politeness in that extension of the original usage (e.g. members of the imperial family to someone who does not hold such a position) is almost certainly motivated by politeness to attract the addressee’s attention and be socially successful in communication. In the extravagance model, then, the frequency of the new usage increases as this innovation is accepted by other members of the speech community, and eventually its association with the original function or meaning becomes opaque. This is a particularly common pattern in Asian languages, but the well-known second person polite forms in many European languages arose in a similar way (e.g. Spanish *usted*, Portuguese *você*). Most likely, this type of usage started in the situation where the nouns/social titles which are formally the third person are intended for the second person referent as in “Would his highness prefer tea in the pink or the lavender room?”, as pointed out by Brown & Levinson (1987: 201).

The use of humble nouns for the first person and respectful nouns for the second person provides the most straightforward channel for extravagant politeness, making it an especially strong functional pressure for the shift from the third person to first/second person. Sometimes extravagant politeness also explains the development of forms that does not seem to have a direct link to it. For example, the Thai first person pronouns *phǒm* and *kramǒm* come from ‘hair’ and ‘crown (of the head)’ and the second person pronouns *tâajtháaw* and *fàabàad* from ‘underneath foot’ and ‘sole of foot’, respectively (Cooke 1968). This is because the socially inferior speaker places the sole of the addressee on a par with his/her own head/hair (i.e. I place my head at the same level as your feet). This could be motivated by or invoke a scene where a socially higher person is seated in an elevated position and a socially lower person is bowing in front of him/her. It is natural to see

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25. See also Ishiyama (2014), where I distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak extravagance’.

that this kind of interaction and conceptualization of human relations is originally motivated by extravagant politeness. Although the question of whether they are going to semanticize as personal pronouns or not is of course an issue that requires separate attention, a similar scenario is potentially applicable to many nouns such as kinship terms (e.g. 'uncle'), social ranks/titles (e.g. 'chief'), and occupational/positional names (e.g. 'teacher'). This is because metaphor and metonymy are not just universal cognitive mechanisms but most successful strategies for conveying novel meaning, which may carry extravagance (Nerlich 2010). In other words, it is frequently exploited to achieve 'rhetorical effect' in communication.

Extravagant politeness is also applicable to the cases where members of the pronominal paradigm are used for a referent that falls outside of their usual reference. Common examples include the use of a second person plural form for the second person singular (e.g. French *vous*) and the use of a third person (plural) form for the second person singular (e.g. German *Sie*). The case of French *vous* and German *Sie* needs to be distinguished from cases like Japanese *kimi* or Spanish *usted* where nouns became second person pronouns, because the former illustrates the shift within the pronominal paradigm. Although it may not be as obvious as the use of 'lord' for the second person and 'servant' for the first person, the fact that these shifts within the pronominal paradigm are a politeness strategy is apparent from the fact that the new second person use functions as the polite form. Exploitation of a semantic feature within the pronominal paradigm is not an isolated phenomenon confined to Europe, as demonstrated by Head (1978) and Brown & Levinson (1987). It is also well known that English, which no longer exhibits the familiar-polite second person distinction, used to have one between the familiar *thou* and the polite *you* (e.g. Mazzon 2010).

These examples essentially involve a politeness strategy of distancing in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987), in that manipulation of semantic features results in their displacement, creating a mismatch between morphology and reference. In this sense, Whitman's (1999) argument about the correlation between the occurrence of shift from the third person to the first/second person on the one hand and the presence/absence of morphological agreement on the other needs to be reconsidered. He claims that the complete shift, which involves the shift of person categories and colligation of agreement, is not common in languages with agreement because it requires completing the two steps. However, the reason that personal pronouns clearly used for a second person singular do not necessarily conjugate as such in many languages (e.g. German, French, Spanish) must be examined in more depth. In fact, this very morphological mismatch seems to serve as the central reason why they function as polite forms. Therefore, it appears that a change in morphological agreement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for personalization. I argue that the morphological mismatch that results

from exploitation of semantic features is the only requirement for a shift that gives rise to new polite forms, though of course the mismatch may be lost eventually. Displacement is also at play even in languages without morphological agreement, like Japanese. Consider the case of *anata*, which was a speaker-and-addressee-distal demonstrative ‘that way’, discussed in Chapter 3. Its development involves displacement because a speaker-and-addressee-distal form is used for the addressee. Extravagant politeness recruits particular nouns by exploiting their nominal meanings and also allows pronominal features to be repurposed for a function for which it is originally not intended for the purpose of politeness.

### 4.3 Spatial perspectives

We discussed the development of demonstrative-based forms in Chapter 3, where it was shown that some forms shifted person reference in the course of their development, e.g. *konata* ‘this way’ shifted from the first to second person and *anata* ‘that way’ from the third to second person. I argued that the so-called demonstrative-based personal pronouns should be treated simply as demonstratives used metonymically. In other words, I argued that *konata* was used for both the first and second person because as a speaker-proximal form, it can be used for both the speaker and the addressee as long as the speaker conceptualizes the addressee as located in his/her proximity. As for *anata*, I argued that it was a case of conventionalization of a distancing politeness strategy, namely using a speaker-and-addressee-distal form for the addressee has the effect of displacing one from the current situation, creating the politeness effect as a result (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987).

Previous studies such as Whitman (1999) and Shibasaki (2005) include a number of demonstrative-based forms as the items that underwent the shift of person categories. For example, Whitman lists directional demonstratives *konata*, *sonata*, and *anata* whose diachronic development we discussed in Chapter 3. With the exception of *anata* for the second person, I have provided three reasons to treat these forms not as semanticized personal pronouns, but simply as demonstratives used metonymically: (i) *konata*’s shift from the first to second person, which is explained by preemption of an addressee-proximal form by a speaker-proximal one (note also that the continued use of *sonata* for the second person is consistent with this view: in designating the speaker, preemption of a speaker-proximal form by an addressee-proximal form is not possible), (ii) the survival of *anata* as a second person form only (as conventionalization of a politeness strategy) and the disappearance of *konata* and *sonata*’s personal pronoun usage as they drop out of the demonstrative paradigm, and (iii) notions such as extravagance or expressivity, which are claimed to be crucial at earlier stages of grammaticalization by some do

not apply to the semanticized personal pronoun analysis of demonstratives. These observations offer little support for treating demonstratives and personal pronouns alike and suggest that there is no shift for demonstrative-based forms, at least in the sense of Whitman's intrapersonal pronoun shift. The shift of *konata* from the third to first person and that of *sonata* from the third to second person is a case of demonstratives used for the speaker and addressee within the scope of pragmatic extensions of demonstrative functions, as Whitman hints in the appendix of his paper regarding *konata* (1999: 382).

Shibasaki's (2005) list includes *konata* 'this way', *kochira* 'this way', *kare* 'that', and *kanojo* 'that woman' (*kochira* is a Modern Japanese version of *konata*). The first two are said to have shifted from the third to first person and the second two from the third to second person. The case of *konata* and *kochira* from the third to first person should be viewed as a reflection of metonymic use of demonstratives for the same reasons discussed above. It also indicates that Shibasaki does not distinguish items that pragmatically refer to person referents from semanticized pronouns. *Kochira* in Modern Japanese is a demonstrative that can be used for referents of any person category regardless of whether they are speech act participants or not, as long as the referent is speaker-proximal. This can also be seen in his inclusion of third person *kare* and *kanojo* as a case of shift from the third to second person as well as the first person *boku* as a case of shift from the first to second person. This type of shift occurs only in a very specific context. For example, as Suzuki (1978) points out, *boku* can be used for the second person only when the addressee is a small boy who is not old enough (in the older speaker's eye) to have younger siblings. Similarly, the third person masculine *kare* and feminine *kanojo* (which also have the meaning of 'boyfriend' and 'girlfriend') can be used for the addressee in limited situations. For example, the latter may be used when a young male speaker is casually trying to find a date, as in *Kanojo ocha demo doo?* 'Hey, do you (*kanojo*) want to have tea or something with me?'. Examples involving the former include *Soko no kare doo omou?* 'What do you (*kare*) over there think?' The underlying assumption seems comparable to the case of *boku*: the male and female addressee in the above scenarios may be someone's boyfriend and girlfriend, respectively. In addition, the utterance is directed toward someone younger than the speaker. It is at least theoretically possible for this type of shift to semanticize, but there is little, if any, evidence for that in Modern Japanese.

The observations above indicate that we need a distinction between pragmatic and semanticized shift. The latter is the case where the post-shift usage has become a part of the semantic meaning of an item, e.g. Japanese *kimi* 'emperor' as a second person form and German *Sie* as a second person polite form. It is clear that both *kimi* and *Sie* have been conventionalized as a second person form (see Simon 2003 for German *Sie*). The former, on the other hand, is restricted by the context of

occurrence and used to yield a particular sociolinguistic effect in a given situation, e.g. Japanese *boku* ‘I’ used for a young boy with the meaning of ‘you’ and the so-called English medical-*we* discussed above. These examples may, of course, potentially lead to semanticization, as in the case of second person polite forms in some European languages. In other words, pragmatic shift works on inferences, but semanticized shift is coded in semantics. One can argue that the case of demonstrative-based forms such as *konata* ‘this way’ in Japanese involves a shift. However, I argue that it is crucially a pragmatic shift licensed by the metonymic use of demonstratives, not a semanticized shift. This is supported by the historical distribution of demonstratives presented in Chapter 3, which ultimately explains why demonstrative-based forms rarely give rise to first/second person pronouns in Japanese.

The applicability of spatial perspectives is not limited to the case of demonstrative-based forms. Recall the development of *omae* ‘honorable front’ and *temae* ‘in front of hand’. The former referred to the socially privileged areas such as in front of the altar or someone of high social rank, and it came to be used as a second person pronoun. The latter, on the other hand, designates the area in front of the speaker, thus metonymically exploiting for the first person first but later for the second person as well. This shift of *temae* and the lack of shift with *omae* can be largely attributed to the spatial perspectives associated with each form: *temae* is speaker-anchored and *omae* addressee-anchored (specifically the socially higher addressee, at least originally). The use of speaker-anchored forms can be extended naturally for the addressee as long as the addressee is close to the speaker, whereas there is no a priori reason as to why forms anchored and biased toward the (socially higher) addressee should be used for the speaker.

Spatial perspectives contribute to the person shift, though of course the question of whether it leads to semanticization or not is an issue that requires separate attention. The history of Japanese offers little evidence for semanticized person shift with respect to demonstrative-based forms.

#### 4.4 Empathetic perspectives and self-objectification

As we saw in § 4.1, Whitman (1999) claims that direct discourse representations and high empathy status of reflexives are responsible for person shift, in particular what he calls intrapersonal pronoun shift (i.e. shift between the first and second person category). While reflexives or forms used reflexively play an important role in person shift, there are also discourse behaviors of reflexives, such as the self-objectification function, that go beyond the scope of direct discourse representations. I show that self-objectification is crucial in accounting for the perception of reflexive forms in Japanese as personal pronouns.



Some researchers have pointed out that there is no need to treat the so-called personal pronouns and reflexives separately, at least in Pre-Modern Japanese. For example, in his grammar of classical Japanese (Stage II), Vovin (2003: 97) classifies personal pronouns and reflexives as a single category, using the term “personal-reflexive pronouns” because “in the language of Classical Japanese prose most of them can be used in both functions” (see also Yamaguchi 1985 for a similar suggestion). While what is considered the exhaustive list of personal-reflexive pronouns is debateable, his analysis shows that the discrete boundary between personal pronouns and reflexive pronouns does not make much sense in classical Japanese. Some of the so-called personal pronouns such as *ware* have reflexive-like ambivalence or indeterminacy and are used for the first/second person as well as in self-designating function. Previous studies have also observed that the shift from the first to second person is much more common than the one in the opposite direction, but this issue is not given a systematic account. I argue that the bias toward the shift from the first to second person is perspectival, be it spatial or empathetic. Whitman (1999) also utilizes empathy and reflexives: he argues that pronouns develop into reflexives or reflexives develop into pronouns based mainly on the logophoric and long-distance binding context. This study differs from Whitman’s in that it argues that self-objectification, which is one of the reflexive functions, plays an important role in the shift from the first to second person. Self-objectification is in principle distinct from empathy in that objectification is a process whereby a referent is externalized as if it were another entity, hence the cross-linguistically common etymological origin of reflexives such as ‘body’ and ‘head’ (Heine & Kuteva 2002), while empathy refers to (a change of) the perspectival center. Self-objectification also offers a possible mechanism as to why the post-shift second person usage is often pragmatically depreciated.

In my approach, since most forms that are said to have shifted the person category are viewed as demonstratives and reflexive-like elements, the question is better phrased as ‘why are reflexives and forms used reflexively given the first person interpretation more often than the second person?’ than ‘why is the shift from the first to second person more common than the shift from the second to first person?’ In a series of influential works (see Kuno 2004 for a concise summary), Kuno proposes the notion of empathy as a functional tool to explain a variety of linguistic phenomena and develops a number of what he calls ‘empathy hierarchies’. Particularly relevant to this study is the speech act empathy hierarchy which states that the speaker cannot empathize with someone else more than with himself/herself. The notion of empathy is proposed for the problems that are hard to deal with within formal or structural linguistic theories. For example, the pragmatic oddity of a passive sentence with a first person pronoun in a *by*-agentive phrase such as *Bill was hit by me* is explained by the clash between the speech act empathy hierarchy

and the surface structure empathy hierarchy (which says that it is easier for the speaker to empathize with the referent of the subject than with that of any other noun phrase in the sentence): the former hierarchy designates *me* as the empathy focus, whereas the latter hierarchy states that *Bill* is. The speech act empathy hierarchy clearly gives prominence to the speaker or first person as an empathy focus. This has an important implication to answer the question raised above, namely ‘why do reflexives get pragmatic interpretation of the first person more often than the second person?’

As Kuno’s works demonstrate, reflexives have a high empathy status and often serve as an empathy focus in the sentence. The speech act empathy hierarchy places the first person at the top of the hierarchy. This establishes an affinity between reflexives and the first person, leading to the tendency in which reflexives are often used for the first person. Precedence of the first person over others is also clear in a more basic linguistic fact: speakers talk more about themselves than they talk about others. Recall the development of addressee honorifics in Japanese (cf. footnote 5). Unlike what Brown & Levinson (1987) claim, Traugott & Dasher (2002) point out that addressee honorifics arose from humble referent honorifics intended for the speaker, not respectful referent honorifics intended for the addressee. I have argued that this was because speakers refer to their own actions (which often manifests itself as humble honorifics) more often than those of others. On the other hand, the situation under which reflexives (especially syntactically unbound ones in the subject position) are given the second person interpretation are usually limited to such circumstances as questions and orders as in (54) for epistemological reasons. It is natural that reflexives used in questions and orders are intended for the second person, since it is much more common to ask questions for or give orders to the addressee than anyone else (see Helmbrecht 2014 for an argument that person hierarchies with regard to the clause type/illocutionary function where the second person ranks the highest in questions and commands). Reflexives used for the second person in a declarative sentence often have a special connotation such as inducing self-reflection as in *you take care of yourself* and *you have to ask yourself*.

- (54) a. *Jibun ga Ken ni hon o ageta no.*  
 jibun NOM Ken DAT book ACC ageru Q  
 ‘Did self (you) give the book to Ken?’  
 b. *Jibun ga yare.*  
 jibun NOM do.IMP  
 ‘Self (you) do it!’

This study does not consider a particular syntactic context as a source of the phenomenon in question, since Japanese reflexives can be used in a wide range of contexts. In addition to the canonical locally bound reflexives and the ones in

the logophoric context (i.e. long-distance binding context), syntactically unbound reflexives are common in discourse. Consider the following example, where the syntactically unbound reflexive is given a first person interpretation.

- (55) a. *Gakkoo no shokuin ya seeto ni kashitsu no aruno wa,*  
 school GEN staff and student LOC mistake GEN exist TOP
- b. *minna jibun no katoku no itasu tokorode, nanika*  
 all self GEN lack.of.virtue NOM do CONJ some  
*jiken ga aru tabini,*  
 incident NOM exist every.time
- c. *jibun wa yoku korede koochoo ga tsutomaru kato hisokani*  
 self TOP well this principal NOM can.serve COMP secretly  
*zanki no nen ni taen ga,*  
 shame GEN feeling DAT cannot.stand but
- d. *fukoonishite konkai mo mata kakaru soodoo o*  
 unfortunately this.time also again like.this disturbance ACC  
*hikiokoshitano wa,*  
 cause TOP
- e. *fukaku shokun nimukatte shazai shinakerebanaran.*  
 deeply gentlemen facing apology must.do  
 ... '(a) As for the mistakes of school staff and students, (b) (they) are all the result of self's (*jibun*=my) lack of virtue, and every time there are some troubles, (c) self (*jibun*=I) secretly cannot help feeling the sense of shame, how can (I) serve as a principal like this, and (d) unfortunately, for the fact that (students) have again caused a trouble like this, (e) (I) must apologize to you sincerely. ...'
- (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 6)

(55) is uttered by the principal of a school (where the protagonist has just started working) at a teachers' meeting. The teachers are discussing mischief that some students have engaged in in order to harass their newly arrived teacher from Tokyo (the protagonist). There are two instances of syntactically unbound *jibun*, one in (55b) and the other in (55c). It should be noted that in both instances, although the principal is speaking in front of other teachers, it gives the impression that the utterance is addressed not to them, but to himself. The entire utterance is in a self-reflective state and sounds like a monologue. This is shown by the striking fact that the speaker uses an expression of self-reference only twice and it is realized as a reflexive both times. The use of first person pronouns here would eliminate the nuance of a monologue, making it sound like a normal speech directed at the audience (i.e. other teachers). Personal pronouns are deictic and are markers of the speech role of the speaker and the addressee, whereas reflexives are not and are more third-person-like. This exemplifies the use of reflexives for self-objectification or a self-reflective state in discourse that Zubin et al. (1990) and Li (1991) have

demonstrated with regards to Mandarin and Korean. This is because the function of personal pronouns is to locate a referent as an entity that is present in the speech situation, whereas reflexives refer to an element that belongs to the discourse world. Similar observations were made for Japanese *jibun* that is used to project the internal self whose consciousness is represented in discourse (Maynard 2007: 272–279; Iwasaki 2013: 276–278).<sup>26</sup>

Generally speaking, if the events are told from the perspective of someone, it is most likely to be from that of the speaker since the speaker is most accessible to himself/herself. However, taking the perspective of and objectifying others through the use of syntactically unbound reflexives is also possible, albeit to a more limited extent. Li (1991: 143–145) shows that the syntactically unbound Mandarin reflexive *ziji* in interactional discourse can function as an indication that the speaker is ‘thinking for the addressee’ or ‘leading the addressee’s thought’. This is illustrated in the following example.

- (56) a. *Ni xiangxiang kan, zai zher gan xiaqu you shenmo*  
 you think see at here work continue there.is what  
*yisi ne?*  
 meaning FP
- b. *Zhe huor you lei, gongzi you di,*  
 this job also tire salary also low
- c. *ziji nianling you zhemo da le,*  
 self age also so old FP
- d. *zaodiar tuixiu zai jia bao sunzi duo hao a!*  
 early a.little at home hold grandson so.much good FP  
 ‘(a) Think about it, what’s there (to you) to continue working there? (b) The work load is heavy, and the pay is low, (c) and self (*ziji*=you) is already so old; (d) how much more fun it would be to retire a little early and play with (self’s) grandson at home! ...’ (Li 1991: 143–144)

In the above example, the speaker is trying to persuade the addressee to retire from work. In doing so, the speaker empathizes with or takes the perspective of the addressee with the use of a reflexive rather than a second person pronoun in (c). Li (1991: 144) points out that this use of reflexives is the speaker’s attempt to think in the way the addressee should think or in the way the speaker hopes the addressee would think. In addition to empathizing with the addressee, the speaker objectifies the addressee, giving the effect where the addressee is directed to contemplate his/her retirement objectively and carefully. This gives the impression

<sup>26</sup> Maynard makes a distinction between the inner self/reflexively projected self and the self-identifying objectified self. What I mean by self-objectification is close to the former, and personal pronouns or the markers of the speech roles to the latter.

that the speaker is thinking in a self-reflective mode for others/addressee, which in turn induces them to self-reflect. This usage is not necessarily impolite. However, in interactional discourse, self-objectification for others may be exploited and expanded to perform a very different function, namely sarcasm or criticism. By leading the addressee's thought, the speaker induces the addressee to evaluate his/her thought/action objectively, which is susceptible to perception as criticism/sarcasm by the addressee. Empathy explains the change of perspective and thus potentially involves change of referential category, while self-objectification may potentially lead to pragmatic depreciation. Japanese reflexives are often used in a similar manner, which may explain the tendency where the shift from the first and second person results in the loss of politeness value toward the addressee. We turn to this issue in the next section.

#### 4.4.1 Pragmatic depreciation and person shift

It is generally (though not always) the case that the use of reflexives for a second person referent is derogatory, while that for the first person is not necessarily so.<sup>27</sup> Based on this, some have suggested that there is a necessary connection between person shift and pragmatic depreciation. For example, Miwa (2000, 2005) proposes that pragmatic depreciation comes from using a first person form which is associated with the speaker's self-belittlement or self-assertion for a second person referent. However, since he does not give a detailed account of this suggestion, it is not immediately clear how things of the opposite nature, namely self-belittlement and self-assertion, can yield the same effect of pragmatic depreciation. Shibasaki (2005) also claims that there is a connection between the shift of person categories and pragmatic depreciation. In particular, Shibasaki argues that first person forms never shift to second person forms without pragmatic depreciation. His argument can be illustrated in the following example, in which *ware* is used for both the first and second person.

- (57) *Isopo ga iu ni wa "Ware wa ningen de gozaru". Shanto*  
 Isopo NOM say to TOP ware TOP human COP POL Shanto  
*ayasiu iwa-ruru wa "Ware ni sore woba towa nu..."*  
 suspiciously say-HON TOP ware to that ACC ask NEG  
 'Isopo said that, "I (*ware*) am mankind." Shanto suspiciously said, "I don't ask  
 you (*ware*) such an obvious thing."  
 (Stage III: 16C, Amakusa Isopo Monogatari) (Shibasaki 2005: 172)

27. With respect to first person reference, Maynard (2007: 278) describes a situation in which *jibun* presents "diminished self", which conveys politeness toward the addressee.

The first *ware* is used for the first person, and, since it occurs with the polite marker *gozaru*, its use is not disrespectful for the addressee. The second *ware*, on the other hand, is used for the second person, and its use is impolite, if not disrespectful, as can be seen in the lack of polite forms. Shibasaki presents (57) as a transitional example that captures the shift from first person to second person and the pragmatic depreciation that accompanies it. At first glance, it looks like the example conforms to his argument. However, it is not clear how his version of intersubjectification handles the shift from the first to second person here, as it appears that ‘accommodation’ is usually a positive and favorable treatment for the affected parties. The relevant part of his definition of intersubjectification states that “intersubjectification is the process by which the first person is involved in ... accommodating first person reference to other-reference (i.e. making first person reference more like, or the same as, reference to other persons), resulting in a change in the meaning of the affected form, for example, referential or semantic shifting” (Shibasaki 2005: 181). Perhaps more convincing evidence against the claim that there is a necessary relation between the shift of person categories and pragmatic depreciation comes from examples like the following where *ware* is used for the second person without pragmatic depreciation.

- (58) a. *koto-na-gusi we-gusi ni ware weφinikeri*  
 matter-none-sake laugh-sake on ware got.drunk  
 ‘On that blameless sake, that laughing sake, I (*ware*) got drunk.’  
 (Stage I: 712, Kojiki) (Whitman 1999: 358)
- b. *ware ni mo tuge mausi ni φito wo tukaφasi-tari-sika-ba*  
 ware DAT also tell say DAT person ACC send-PERF-PST-COND  
 ‘I had sent someone to inform you (*ware*) as well...’  
 (Stage II: 12C, Konjaku Monogatari) (Whitman 1999: 358)

*Ware* in (58b) is not derogatory or ‘lowering’ because it is addressed to a social equal’s wife and the humble form of the verb ‘to say’ is used, even though it is used for the second person (cf. Whitman 1999). The above example shows that the so-called shift does not always have to be accompanied by pragmatic depreciation.

Another possible approach to the shift and pragmatic depreciation is the speech act empathy hierarchy: the derogatory effect is explained by the use of a high empathy item generally reserved for the speaker for the addressee. Although he does not mention the notion of empathy, this is essentially the suggestion of Miwa (2000). Consider, for example, the use of humble referent honorifics for the second/third person. Normally, humble honorifics are reserved for the speaker or someone close to him/her who is coded as the grammatical subject. It is then conceivable that the use of humble referent honorifics for the second/third person subject is perceived as impolite, possibly leading to pragmatic depreciation. However, it appears that this approach also predicts that there is a necessary relation between the shift and

pragmatic depreciation since the second person is always lower in the speech act empathy hierarchy than the first person.

Empathy explains why reflexives and forms that can be used reflexively are often given the first person interpretation rather than the second person interpretation (i.e. high empathy status and epistemological reasons). In this regard, it is noteworthy that Vovin's (2003) list of personal-reflexive pronouns mainly consists of first person forms. However, it does not necessarily explain why the second person use is often, but crucially not always, derogatory. I argue that the self-objectification function employed for the second/(third) person is responsible for pragmatic depreciation. This approach has an advantage over others in that it is able to offer an explanation as to why the second person use can be or come to be perceived as derogatory. Yet it does not require one to posit a necessary or inherent link between the second person use of reflexives and pragmatic depreciation. The derogatory status of the second person interpretation is due to the use of reflexives and forms used reflexively for 'leading the addressee's thought'. Recall that we have seen in the Mandarin example above that reflexives can be used in interactional discourse to take the perspective of the addressee or to induce the addressee's self-reflection, which can be interpreted as criticism or sarcasm depending on the context. Similar examples can be found in Japanese as well. Consider the following utterances that involve the reflexive *jibun*.

- (59) a. *Kechina yatsura da.*  
 cheap guys COP  
 b. *Jibun de jibun no shita koto ga ienai kurai nara,*  
 self by self NOM did thing NOM cannot.say extent if  
*tende shi-nai ga ii.*  
 at.all do-NEG NOM good  
 '(a) What cheap guys. (b) If self (*jibun*=they) can't say what self (*jibun*=they) did, it is better not to do it in the first place.'

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 4)

- (60) a. *Tooya no shukuchokuin wa shukuchoku chuu*  
 the.night GEN person.on.duty TOP duty druing  
*gaishutsushite onsen ni ikareta yoo dearu ga, are wa*  
 went.out spa LOC went EVID COP but that TOP  
*mottenohoka no koto to kangaemasu.*  
 out.of.question GEN thing COMP think  
 b. *Iyashikumo jibun ga ikkou no rusuban o*  
 humbly self NOM whole.school GEN staying ACC  
*hikiuke nagara,*  
 accept while

- c. *togameru mono no i-naino o saiwaini,*  
blame person GEN exist-NEG ACC fortunately
- d. *bashomoarooni onsen nado e nyuutou ni iku nado*  
of.all.places spa the.like to take.a.bath to go of.all.things  
*toiuno wa ookina shittai dearu.*  
EVID TOP big mistake COP

‘(a) I hear that the person on duty that night went to a spa during the duty, but (I) think that’s out of the question. (b) While self (*jibun*=you) humbly accepts the responsibility of staying at and taking care of the school, (c) taking the fact that there’s nobody watching you favorably, (d) going, of all the places, to a spa is a big blunder.’

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 6)

In (59) – the remark by the protagonist teacher who has just finished interrogating the students who might have done mischief to him – *jibun* is intended for the students, who are not present in the situation. (60) is a comment made by one of the teachers about the protagonist at the teachers’ meeting. He is criticizing the protagonist’s irresponsible behavior when he was on night-duty. Although the speaker has just said things in favor of the protagonist before uttering (60), he also adds things which he thinks the protagonist could have done better. In both cases, the speaker takes the perspective of and objectifies the referents of *jibun* and tries to lead their thought, inducing the students and the protagonist to self-reflect on their behavior. In (60), the speaker’s attempt to induce self-reflection can also be seen in the avoidance of second personal pronoun as well as the use of the lexical noun *shukuchokuin* ‘person on duty’ in (60a). The speaker does not use a personal name or pronoun to refer to the protagonist directly, since that would place the protagonist right in the speech situation. Instead, by highlighting the protagonist’s duty, he presents him as a person who should be seen and evaluated objectively. This use of the reflexive can be interpreted as a second person pronoun quite naturally. In fact, in (60) the reflexive can be replaced by a second person pronoun, which would render the utterance directly aimed at the protagonist. This is largely due to the fact that *jibun* does not inflect for person, number, or gender, which makes it possible to be interpreted as any person categories given the right context. Sometimes, however, reflexives used for self-objectification cannot be replaced by personal pronouns. For example, third person pronouns cannot take the place of *jibun* in (59) despite the intended interpretation. This is because the expression *jibun de jibun no* functions semi-idiomatically and is usually not used with personal pronouns, but note that, if the expression was simply *jibun no* ‘*jibun* NOM’, the utterance is still well-formed and that *jibun* can be replaced by a third person



pronoun.<sup>28</sup> Regardless of the replicability/irreplaceability, reflexives in these cases are used for self-objectification.

While objectification is not inherently derogatory, when used for the second/third person, there is a natural reason that it may lead to criticism or sarcasm because the speaker is often trying to make the referents realize something that the speaker thinks they are not aware of (i.e. leading one's thought). In (59), the protagonist is criticizing the students by projecting them as someone whose actions should be evaluated objectively. (60) is sarcastic because the speaker refers to the intended addressee (i.e. the protagonist) who is present in the speech situation, not by a second person pronoun, but by a reflexive (and a lexical item). By using a reflexive for someone who is present at the time of utterance, the speaker successfully displaces him from the speech situation and makes him self-reflect on his behavior. The account based on self-objectification of reflexives does not need an inherent link between the second person use and pragmatic depreciation, since objectifying a referent in itself is not derogatory. For example, in (56) and (58), Chinese *ziji* and Japanese *ware* are used for the second person in a non-derogatory way. At the same time, the approach of this study is also able to offer an explanation as to why some instances of reflexives and forms used reflexively for the second person may carry a derogatory tone. It comes from their discourse use of leading the addressee's thought. Therefore, unlike previous studies such as Miwa (2000, 2005) and Shibasaki (2005) who argue for an inherent relation between the shift and pragmatic depreciation, the self-objectification function is consistent with both the derogatory and non-derogatory usage. In the next section, I examine one more case in which self-objectification is involved in pragmatic depreciation.

#### 4.4.2 Self-objectification and pragmatic depreciation of *temae* 'in front of hand'

In Modern Japanese, *temae* is a contemptuous second person pronoun that is no longer used in an ordinary conversation. I argue that the development of this derogatory sense can be attributed to the self-objectification function of *temae*. This form was discussed in § 3.4.2 under spatial perspectives. Here it will be discussed in connection with objectification since forms with reflexive-like person category indeterminacy (often with a bias toward the first person interpretation) are frequently used for self-designating functions.

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28. The fact that *jibun de jibun no* functions like an idiom is probably no accident because the expression emphatically calls for self-reflection by double reflexives (i.e. think about what self did by self). Also, the utterance might be a little unnatural if a third person pronoun were actually used in a short and modified version, but that is because the use of third person pronouns is generally avoided in the first place.

*temae* was originally used for the first person, but later it developed second person use. Consider (48) and (49) repeated below as (61) and (62), respectively.

- (61) *Sate sate fuugana jyuukyo ja na. Iya, temae koto wa, kono*  
 well well elegant house COP FP um temae thing TOP this  
*atari ni jyuukyo itasu mono ja ga, konnichi*  
 neighborhood in reside do.HUBL person.HUBL COP but today  
*kotorigari ni makari ide, tegahi no taka ga soreta ja.*  
 bird.hunting to came go.out, keeping GEN hawk NOM veer.away COP  
 ‘Well, well, it is an elegant house. I (*temae*) also reside in the neighborhood, but my hawk missed its course when we were hunting birds today.’

(Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya kaidan, Act 5)

- (62) ...*Sorya o-temae, kore made nengoroni shita kahi ga nai*  
 then HP-temae this untill closely did worth NOM not.exist  
*to iu mono.*  
 COMP say thing  
 ‘Well, if you (*o-temae*) say so, that would make our close relations up until now useless.’

(Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 3)

As is clear in the above examples, *temae* is used for the first person in (61), but for the second person in (62). In (61) the speaker refers to himself as *temae* in conversation with a woman whose house he visited to find his missing hawk. In (62), on the other hand, the speaker calls the addressee *temae* when responding to the remark made earlier by the addressee, who indirectly extorted the speaker. Unlike the first person use, the second person use in (62) has a hint of self-objectification in that the speaker is trying to make the addressee rethink his future course of action.

This trend continues in Modern Japanese, where the form is generally considered as a second person pronoun. Consider the following examples.

- (63) a. *Doomo soo, go-kenson de wa osoreiru. Kaette*  
 well such HP-modesty COP TOP sorry on.the.contrary  
*temae ga itamiiru.*  
 temae NOM be.embarrassed  
 ‘Well, I feel sorry if you are being modest like that. That would make me (*temae*) feel embarrassed.’

(Stage V: 1905, Wagahai Wa Neko Dearu, Chapter 9)

- b. *Temae no warui koto wa warukatta to*  
 temae NOM wrong thing TOP was.wrong COMP  
*it-teshimawa-nai-uchi wa tsumi wa kie-nai mon da.*  
 say-ASP-NEG-until TOP guilt TOP vanish-NEG thing COP  
 ‘You guys, I thought to myself... Until you acknowledge that what you (*temae*) did was wrong, you’re still guilty in my eyes.’

(Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 4)

In (63a) the speaker designates himself as *temae* when he tries to persuade his friend's uncle to sit in the better part of the room (close to *tokonoma* 'alcove'). In (64b), thinking about the prank his students pulled on him, the protagonist teacher refers to his students as *temae*. Both examples involve a use of *temae* that is syntactically unbound. The second person use of *temae* can be interpreted as sarcastic because it induces self-reflection by objectifying the intended addressee, thus potentially leading to pragmatic depreciation. The intuition of *temae* being a derogatory second person pronoun comes from the use where *temae* is usually pronounced as *temee* with phonological weakening. *Temee* can be interpreted only in the derogatory sense. It is not pronounced this way when the form is given the first person or spatial interpretation, which suggests that at least the phonologically reduced *temee* has conventionalized as a contemptuous second person pronoun.

That self-objectification function may potentially and pragmatically be perceived as criticism or sarcasm can be clearly seen in the following example.

- (64) *Ima dekosu, konata no orisuke ni natte danna danna to*  
 now EMPH you GEN servant DAT become master master QUOT  
*iu ga, izen wa ore mo, houbai no Akiyama Chobei. Inu*  
 say but before TOP I also fellow GEN Akiyama Chobei dog  
*mo houbai, taka mo houbai, hiite kaera ba, saa kisama ga*  
 also fellow hawk also fellow pull return if EXCL you NOM  
*hik-e. Iya temae hiite ik-e.*  
 pull-IMP no temae pull go-IMP

'Now, I serve you and call you "master", but we were once fellow workers. Dogs and hawks are also fellow workers. If we are going to take (them) back, you (*kisama*) pull the leash. No, you (*temae*) pull it and go!'

(Stage IV: 1825, Tokaido Yotsuya Kaidan, Act 5)

In (64), the addressee has more senior status than the speaker. This can be seen in the fact that, in the earlier portion of the utterance, the speaker mentions that he usually addresses the addressee as *danna* 'master'. Here, the speaker is clearly upset and bellicose, as can be seen in his use of imperatives. In this utterance, however, he throws the leash at the addressee after the utterance. This example is particularly interesting in that the speaker first refers to the addressee by a second person pronoun *kisama* (it was originally a respectful term of address, though it was losing its politeness value at the time this text was written) and later by *temae*. Note also that the speaker refers to the same addressee as *kisama* in (49). This means that the speaker is appealing to the addressee directly in the first half of the utterance by using the marker of the speech role of the addressee, and in the second half he is trying to lead the addressee's thought or action by speaking of the way he wants the addressee to act by the use of the reflexive. Or more appropriately, since he is

angry, the speaker is pushing the addressee to think and act in the way he wants, thus the utterance is interpreted as a strong criticism. This switch of an address term from a pronoun to a form used reflexively is drastic and dramatic. It somewhat resembles the use of a first person pronoun for a second person referent in that the speaker is referring to others by a high empathy item normally reserved for him/her (cf. the use of the first person *boku* for a small boy). That could produce a very noticeable effect if it were done to social superiors. It is also interesting to see that the addressee of (64) constantly refers to the speaker of (64) using the reflexive *onore*, which carries a strong sense of contempt. In Modern Japanese also, *onore* can be found in now archaic expressions that involve self-objectification (e.g. *onore o shire* 'know thyself') and strong contempt (e.g. *onore!* 'you bastard').

The account based on the self-objectification function of reflexives does not assume that there is a necessary relation between the post-shift second person use and pragmatic depreciation, since there is nothing inherently derogatory about taking the perspective of and objectifying the addressee. In fact, *temae* in (62) is used vocatively in conjunction with the polite prefix *o-*. However, the approach of this study is also able to offer an explanation as to why many instances of reflexives and forms used reflexively for the second person may carry the derogatory sense.

#### 4.5 Summary and conclusion

This chapter has discussed the nature of person shift, especially the one between the first and second person. Whitman (1999) suggests that the shift or what he calls 'intrapersonal pronoun shift' is mediated by the reflexive function in the long-distance binding context: the embedded subject in a sentence like *Tom said that he is a genius*, where *he* is represented by a reflexive, can manifest itself as a first or second person pronoun in its direct discourse representation. Shibasaki (2005) argues that his version of intersubjectivity which is assimilation of other-reference to the first person or accommodation of first person reference to other-reference is responsible for the shift.

I have identified three principles that may contribute to person shift: (i) extravagant politeness, (ii) spatial perspectives, and (iii) empathetic perspectives. (i) primarily involves the pattern where respectful nouns are used for the second person and humble ones for the first person (i.e. shift from nouns, which are formally third person, to first/second person pronouns), but it also includes strategic displacement of semantic features such as the use of the third person pronoun for the second person referent. On the other hand, (ii) and (iii) often result in a shift from the first person to the second person. The former is a change in the speaker's spatial perspectives, and the latter is the speaker's perspectival identification with

the addressee and others; both of them are strongly biased toward the shift from the first to second person. The speaker has a choice to use speaker-proximal forms for himself/herself as well as the addressee, but speaker-distal or addressee-proximal forms cannot be used for the speaker. Similarly, the speaker can take the perspective of the addressee, but the addressee is unable to take the perspective of the speaker. Thus, this is essentially a speaker-centered phenomenon, making the directionality from the first to second person much more common than the one in the reverse direction.<sup>29</sup> The following summarizes the principles of person shift with their representative changes.

- (65) a. Extravagant politeness: nouns that refer directly to the asymmetric speaker-addressee relation such as ‘servant’ for the first person and ‘master’ for the second person; displacement of semantic features (e.g. the use of a plural form and third person form for the second person singular)
- b. Spatial perspectives: preemption of non-speaker-proximal forms (e.g. speaker-distal, addressee-proximal) by speaker-proximal forms
- c. Empathetic perspectives: the speaker’s empathizing with others, often the addressee, by using reflexive forms

This study has also raised doubt about the claim that there is an inherent link between person shift and pragmatic depreciation (Miwa 2000, 2005; Shibasaki 2005). We have seen that the second person use that is suggested to have undergone the shift from the first to second person is not necessarily derogatory. I have shown that the derogatory post-shift second person usage comes from the self-objectification function of reflexive forms, that is, the speaker’s attempt to lead the addressee’s thought or to take the addressee’s perspective. This can often be interpreted as criticism, leading to pragmatic depreciation. However, there is nothing inherently derogatory and depreciating about taking the perspective of and objectifying the addressee, and thus the post-shift second person use is not always derogatory.<sup>30</sup>

Here I have approached the issue from the perspective of principles involved in the shift instead of dealing with each directionality of shift. However, there may

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29. The history of *ore* possibly exemplifies the shift from the second to first person. However, since there is much controversy surrounding its development, it will be discussed in the appendix.

30. In principle, the use of a reflexive, a high empathy item, for the addressee can be interpreted either as impolite or as a sign of closeness (essentially what Brown & Levinson (1987) call ‘positive politeness’). Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom (2005: 51) point out that Thai reflexive *tua* and *tua eey*, when used for the second person, function as an affectionate term used by women addressing a female friend. This is probably related to the fact that the use of a first person form for the addressee often yields an affectionate or friendly tone to a socially lower addressee, e.g. Japanese first person *boku* by an adult to a small boy and Thai first person *raw* by a teacher to young students.

be some link between particular principles of shift and certain directionalities. For example, what Whitman (1999) calls personalization (i.e. shift of non-person-designators, often lexical nouns such as social titles and humble nouns, into first and second person pronouns) falls under extravagant politeness. So do the cases that involve displacement of semantic features. Most if not all of Whitman's interpersonal pronoun shift (i.e. shift between the first and second person) is motivated by spatial and empathetic perspectives. Both phenomena are essentially speaker-centered, thus accounting for the fact that shift from the first to second person is more natural.

Another issue that deserves future research is the relationship between the nature of person shift and its semanticization. Are there kinds of change that are more or less likely to semanticize than others? To this end, the distinction between semanticized shift and pragmatic shift becomes important again. The former is the case in which the post-shift usage of a linguistic item has been conventionalized and became a part of its semantics, though there may be morphological disconcord. It is clear that Japanese *kimi* '(lit.) lord/emperor' has become a second person pronoun. It is equally clear that German *Sie* has been conventionalized as a second person polite form despite its morphology: see Simon (2003) who shows that the *du-Sie* opposition in Modern German is grammaticalized, whereas the *du-ir* distinction in Middle High German is not. All shifts start out as a pragmatic shift or an invited inference. All of them can potentially semanticize, but some changes are more commonly observed across languages. For example, the pattern where humble nouns and respectful nouns develop into first and second person pronouns, respectively, seems to be particularly common. This is presumably because most of the time, if not always, the speaker is motivated to elevate the status of the addressee out of desire to be socially successful. The same goes for displacement of semantic features: the speaker benefits socially from exploiting the referent-morphology mismatch, and thus the original verb inflection is often retained even after the referential shift.

On the other hand, the shift that is unlikely to semanticize is often a sociolinguistic strategy that has limited contextual applicability. For example, we have seen the use of the Japanese *boku* 'I' for the second person. This use is very unlikely to be conventionalized because it is applicable only when the speaker decides that the addressee who is a small boy is not old enough to have younger siblings. The same thing can be said about the use of *watashi* 'I' for a small girl and that of *kare/kanojo* 'he/she' for a young male/female addressee, respectively. Essentially, this is also why usages such as the English medical-*we* and kinship terms in care-taker speech do not give rise to semanticization. In these usages, the speaker's sociolinguistic choice is heavily restricted by the context, and it does not have general applicability. I argue that demonstrative-based forms, though they may be used frequently for person referents, are also unlikely to semanticize because their reference to person referents can be understood based on the scope of the demonstrative functions and

its metonymic extension. Reflexive forms seem unlikely to semanticize – at least, in Japanese – as, being morphologically invariant, Japanese reflexives can be used for any person categories. Their use for person referents and tendency to be used for the first person along with the self-objectification function do not go beyond the normal reflexive functions, giving little motivation for language users to reanalyze it as an independent personal pronoun. More will be said about demonstratives and reflexives as the source of personal pronouns in the next chapter.

## Diachrony of personal pronouns in functional and cross-linguistic perspectives

This chapter discusses the findings of this study from functional and cross-linguistic perspectives. It focuses on the following two broad issues: (i) the cross-linguistically and areal-typologically common source of personal pronouns and (ii) the relationship between the development of personal pronouns and grammaticalization, including applications of grammaticalization parameters.

Most previous studies agree that demonstratives are the major source of third person pronouns (Diessel 1999; Bhat 2004; Siewierska 2004). However, the origin of first and second person pronouns is more diverse, suggesting a possibility of areal-typological and cultural factors. Personal pronouns are often considered to belong to the most conservative part of grammar and regarded as historically stable closed-class items. For this reason, diachronic aspects of personal pronouns are significantly under-researched compared to their synchronic domains. For example, an early study by Blake lists the following as possible sources of personal pronouns (1934: 244–245).

- (66) a. proper names of persons speaking or spoken to
- b. common nouns meaning ‘person’ or ‘human being’
- c. common nouns meaning ‘servant’ or ‘master’
- d. demonstrative pronouns

Blake suggests that first and second person forms, regardless of the types of their source in (66a–d), arise from the pragmatic use of third person forms for the speaker and addressee, which resembles Whitman’s (1999) personalization. More recent typologically-oriented studies such as Heine & Song (2010, 2011) have argued that the conceptual sources of personal pronouns as well as the processes in which they arise are more diverse than previously thought. They list five main conceptual sources.

- (67) a. nominal concepts
- b. spatial deixis
- c. reflexives/intensifiers
- d. plurification
- e. shift in deixis



As argued by Blake, the development of proper names to personal pronouns is highly unlikely (and unattested to the best of my knowledge) in that they achieve reference to unique individuals, while personal pronouns are shifters that index the speech roles of speaker and addressee. Thus, in the following sections, I examine nominal sources, displacement of semantic features (i.e. plurification and shift in deixis), demonstratives and location expressions, and reflexives/intensifiers as the conceptual sources of personal pronouns, drawing on synchronic and diachronic data from Japanese and other languages. Although nouns are the major source of personal pronouns, I show that (i) based primarily on languages which Heine & Song cite as examples where demonstratives and reflexives gave rise to personal pronouns, there is little functional reason to treat them as grammaticalized personal pronouns and (ii) while plurification and shift in deixis contribute to the emergence of new pronoun usage, their development is distinct from grammaticalization. Furthermore, reconsideration of forms of non-lexical origins raises important questions about the relationship between their development and grammaticalization in that grammaticalization parameters fail to apply, suggesting that their development should be accounted for in different ways.

I begin with examinations of common conceptual sources of personal pronouns cited in previous studies. I then discuss problems that arise from applying grammaticalization parameters adopted in recent works such as Heine & Song (2010, 2011) to the diachronic development of personal pronouns.

## 5.1 Nominal sources

Common nouns such as ‘person’ and ‘human’ tend to develop into impersonal pronouns as in German *man* and French *on*, though they may also be used, among other functions, as third person pronouns (e.g. third person singular masculine *kó* from \**ko* ‘man, male’ in Zande, a Niger-Congo language of the Ubangi group spoken mainly in the Sudan (Heine & Reh 1984: 222–224, cited in Siewierska 2004: 248). The use of impersonal pronouns and generic nouns such as ‘person’ for the first person seems to be also cross-linguistically common: consider French *on* (Winter-Froemel 2014: 527–542) and Chinese *renjia* for the first person, which literally means ‘other people’. Japanese *hito* ‘person’ works in a similar way in that it can be used for the first person as well as for the third person, e.g. *hito no ki mo shiranaide* ‘(you) don’t understand what I (=hito) am feeling’ and *hito wa hito* ‘others (=hito) are others (=hito) (i.e. mind your own business)’. Further, Heine & Song (2011: 612–617) point out that nouns such as ‘person’ or ‘people’ commonly give rise to first person plural pronouns in African languages. Examples include (i) *dju* ‘person’, which has become a first person plural exclusive pronoun in the northern and western dialects of !Xun of the North Khoisan family, spoken in South Angola and North Namibia, (ii) *móó* ‘man/person/people’ which has given

rise to a first person plural inclusive pronoun *mô* in the Mande language of Kono of Sierra Leone, and (iii) *mikhi* ‘man’ which became a first person plural exclusive pronoun *mukhu* ‘we, us, our’ in Susu, another Mande language of Guinea. Similar processes are found in a variety of language groups in Africa such as the Cangin languages of Senegal and Labwor languages of northeastern Uganda. But it is also found outside of Africa. In fact, the often cited French *on*, whose use as a first person plural form is becoming increasingly popular in colloquial French, comes from Latin *homo* ‘person, man’. Other examples include *a gente* ‘the people’ as ‘we’ in European and Brazilian Portuguese, and Romanian *lumea* ‘people/the people/human beings’. Heine & Song suggest the directionality of development: noun (‘person’ or ‘people’) > indefinite pronoun (‘people in general’) > first person plural pronoun (2011: 617). The proposed pathway appears to be common cross-linguistically, though Japanese *hito* and Chinese *renjia* are often used for the first person singular instead of plural.

In examining nominal sources of personal pronouns, I focus on forms that are primarily reserved for a specific person category. In many languages, items which are used for multiple person categories behave, in terms of person reference, much like common nouns such as kinship terms and occupational names that are frequently used pronominally for multiple person categories. This is especially clear in Asian languages such as Japanese and Vietnamese, which lack agreement. Common nouns meaning ‘servant’ and ‘master’ exhibit a cross-linguistically robust development pattern in which the former gives rise to first person pronouns and the latter to second person pronouns. This development can be most clearly seen in Asian languages, e.g. Malay *sahaya/tuan* (Blake 1934; Siewierska 2004) (also *hamba* ‘slave’; cf. Schachter 1985) and Thai *khâá* and *naaj*’ (Cooke 1968). We also saw in Chapter 2 that Japanese *boku* ‘servant’ became a first person pronoun and *kimi* ‘lord’ and *kisama* ‘nobility’ became second person pronouns. Other languages that exhibit a similar pattern include Achenese, Burmese, Khmer, and Vietnamese. The following table presents a summary.

**Table 10.** Common nominal sources of first and second person pronouns in Asian languages

Language	1st person ‘servant, slave’	2nd person ‘master, lord, king’
Achenese (Durie 1985)	<i>ulon</i>	<i>tuwan</i>
Burmese (Cooke 1968)	(various variations of) <i>tyunv</i>	<i>hynv, minx</i>
Japanese	<i>boku</i>	<i>kimi, kisama</i>
Khmer (Siewierska 2004)	<i>khjum</i>	
Standard Malay	<i>saya, sahaya</i>	<i>tuan</i>
Jakarta Malay	<i>sayè, ayè</i>	
Banjarese Malay (Blake 1934; Siewierska 2004)	<i>ulun</i>	
Thai (Cooke 1968)	<i>khâá</i>	<i>naaj</i>
Vietnamese (Cooke 1968)	<i>tôi, tớ</i>	<i>thầy</i>

Although the issue of whether the forms in the table above are semanticized and fully grammaticalized personal pronouns is not always clear in the descriptions in the source,<sup>31</sup> these Asian languages seem to form an areal-typological pattern, largely motivated cultural factors. This pattern appears to be particularly common among the culturally prestigious major languages in the region. More research is needed.

It is plausible that this prevailing tendency is based on the principle of extravagant politeness, namely the lowering of the speaker and elevating of the addressee, which is probably at work more or less in all societies. It appears that cross-linguistically the latter strategy seems to be more common than the former, resulting in a politeness hierarchy where the second person ranks the highest (Croft 1990). The well-known second person polite forms in European languages also belong to the latter type. Consider, for example, Spanish *usted* from *Vuestra Merced* ‘your honor’, Italian *Lei* from *La Vostra Signoria* ‘your lord’ and Portuguese *você* from *Você Mercê* ‘your grace’ (cf. Head 1978; Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990). Other examples include Dutch *u* from *Uwe Edeheid* ‘your nobility’, and Romanian *dumneata* from *Domnia Ta* ‘your grace’ and *dumneavoastră* from *Domnia Voastră* (Head 1978: 185–187; Heine & Song 2010: 606, based on Merlan 2006: 222–226). These changes are likely to be motivated by extravagant politeness and triggered by utterances in which the respectful nominal form is pragmatically used for the addressee (Brown & Levinson 1987: 201).

There are of course variations in nominal sources among Asian languages. For example, Thai has a number of first and second person forms whose literal meanings concern ‘hair/crown’ and ‘(sole of) foot’: first person *phǒm* ‘hair’ and *kramǒm* ‘crown (of the head)’, and second person *tâajtháaw* ‘underneath foot’ and *fâabàad* ‘sole of foot’ (Cooke 1968). This is because socially lower speakers place the soles of socially higher addressees’ feet on a par with their own head/hair; thus this is also essentially politeness-related. However, not all languages in the area work in this way. For example, the pronominal inventory in Chinese is quite small and resembles that of major Western European languages such as French.

Besides nouns that designate asymmetrical speaker-addressee relations, other nouns that are mentioned as common sources of personal pronouns in previous

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31. For example, Cooke (1968) is concerned with the items used pronominally, which means that they may not necessarily be semanticized as personal pronouns. Other forms that are commonly used pronominally include social titles and kinship terms, which may or may not be reserved for a particular person category. Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom (2005: 49–55) mention that some Thai personal pronouns can be used for multiple person categories and call them “versatile pronouns”, e.g. the first person *raw* also used for the second person. They state that versatility comes from the fact that Thai personal pronouns are noun-like.

studies include kinship terms and occupational names. For example, Heine & Song (2011: 607), citing Sohn (1999: 208), mention that in Korean terms such as *apeci* ‘father’, *sensayng-nim* ‘teacher’, and *sacang-nim* ‘company president’ are used pronominally. Similarly, in Thai, terms like *phǎw* ‘father’ and *mĕe* ‘mother’ are used pronominally for the speaker and the addressee (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005: 57–59). Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom also point out that occupational names such as *mǎw* ‘doctor’, *aacann* ‘professor/teacher’, and *khruu* ‘teacher’ are commonly used pronominally for the addressee (2005: 59). The situation is similar in Japanese, where terms like *otoosan* ‘father’, *okaasan* ‘mother’, and *sensee* ‘teacher’ are frequently used pronominally for the speaker and the addressee. As will be discussed later, very little, if any, evidence of grammaticalization can be found for these usages. It also appears that the use of these terms is motivated by their specific lexical meaning in addition to the speaker’s desire to indicate the superior social status of the addressee, as was the case in the ‘servant/lord’ type development. When the speaker calls someone ‘mother’ or ‘teacher’, he/she is elevating the addressee, but more importantly the speaker is acknowledging the social relationship that he/she holds with the addressee. For that reason, kinship terms and occupational names are used asymmetrically in most instances as terms of self-reference and address (Suzuki 1978). For example, ‘uncle’ is used by a socially higher speaker as a term of self-reference in speaking to a socially lower addressee and as a term of address when a socially lower person is speaking to a socially higher person.

So far we have focused on cross-linguistically common nominal forms that gave rise to personal pronouns, but oftentimes they also share the same developmental path once they become personal pronouns. Many nouns whose original and literal meanings are ‘servant’ and ‘master’ used for the first and second person in Asian languages have lost their politeness value, i.e. they underwent pragmatic depreciation.<sup>32</sup> We have seen the case of Japanese *boku* ‘servant’ and *kimi* ‘lord’ in Chapter 2. They were used as a humble form for the speaker and a respectful form for the addressee to elevate the addressee. The same trend can be observed in many forms that share the same original lexical meaning. Table 11 illustrates pragmatic depreciation for first and second person forms of Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese based on Cooke (1968). It is clear in the table (the key words are underlined>) that almost all forms underwent pragmatic depreciation, although the degree of depreciation may vary from one item to another.

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32. In § 2.4, I argued for the distinction between semantic bleaching and pragmatic depreciation. In this section, however, I will use the term ‘pragmatic depreciation’ for ease of presentation. This issue will be taken up again in § 5.2.

Table 11. Pragmatic depreciation of pronouns in Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese

Language	Form	Literal meaning	Current usage
Thai	<i>khâá</i>	servant, slave	(i) speaking to <u>inferior</u> , (ii) <u>assertive</u> and nonrestraint term, male speaking to <u>intimate</u> male; used especially in <u>arguing</u> , <u>contending</u> , <u>expressing annoyance</u> – often good-natured, (iii) literary and archaic general term speaking to superior, <u>equal</u> , or <u>inferior</u>
	<i>naajʰ</i>	master, mistress	(i) general <u>friendly term</u> used by males especially to male <u>equals</u> , but also male to female, (ii) more <u>intimate</u> and slightly <u>tomboyish term</u> used by females, chiefly to female <u>equals</u>
Burmese	<i>tyunv</i>	slave	used in a number of words, e.g. (i) <i>tyamaq</i> ( <i>tyunv</i> ‘slave’ + <i>-maq</i> ‘female’), general deferential term, female speaking to <u>equal</u> or superior, (ii) <i>tyunvdov</i> ( <i>tyunv</i> ‘slave’ + <i>tov</i> ‘royal’), general deferential term, male speaking to <u>equal</u> or superior, (iii) <i>tyanowq</i> , general socially acceptable mild nonrestraint term, male speaking <u>equal</u> or <u>inferior</u> , often used in a <u>arguing</u> or when a speaker is annoyed but does not wish to be disrespectful
	<i>hynv</i>	lord, master	general deferential term, female speaking to <u>equal</u> or superior
	<i>minx</i>	king	speaking to male <u>intimate equal</u> or male <u>inferior</u>
Vietnamese	<i>tôi</i>	servant	general and fairly <u>neutral</u> term used <u>between friends</u> , acquaintances, people in general; ordinarily not used between adults and children or between close blood kin, unless somewhat distantly or formally
	<i>tớ</i>	servant	term formerly used especially in North Vietnam speaking to one’s <u>schoolmates</u>
	<i>thầy</i>	master	(i) term used by or to master (speaking with servant), or male teacher (especially speaking with students of high school age or younger), (ii) formal and respectful term addressing males including older persons, teachers, policemen, oriental doctors, fortunetellers, et al.

The current use of all first person forms is not predictable from their original meaning of ‘servant/slave’. In particular, Thai *khâá* and some Burmese *tyunv* forms are used in an almost opposite manner from their original meanings in that they are generally used in speaking to one’s social equals and inferiors with a variety of connotations such as ‘arguing’ and ‘annoyance’. Pragmatic depreciation seems a little weaker for Vietnamese *tôi*, and it somewhat resembles the situation of Modern Japanese *boku* (though it is used only by male speakers) in that *boku* is also used as

a neutral term among friends, but other forms tend to be opted between adults and children. There is of course individual variation, but *boku* also sounds somewhat distant when used among close family members such as brothers, where a more informal *ore* tends to be used. Pragmatic depreciation is also observed for the second person forms, though it is less visible in Vietnamese *thầy* ‘master’, whose use is to some extent consistent with its original meaning. This form is also used as a general polite form, which is somewhat analogous to the situation of polite second person pronouns in European languages that arose from ‘your honor’ and the like. However, other forms clearly indicate that they are affected by pragmatic depreciation. While it is a deferential form, Burmese *hynv* ‘lord/master’ are also used for intimate equals. Similarly, Thai *naaj* ‘master/mistress’ is a casual friendly term used mostly among social equals. Pragmatic depreciation is clearest in Burmese *minx* ‘king’ which is used for male intimate equals and inferiors. Japanese *kimi* ‘emperor/lord’ seems to be similar to this in that it is mostly used for social equals and inferiors, though it can be used for female addressees as well. Brown & Levinson (1987: 230), citing *kisama* ‘nobility’, *kimi* ‘emperor/king’, and *omae* ‘honorable front’, suggest that this pragmatic depreciation come from ‘ironic politeness’, the exploitive use of respectful forms to convey insult. However, examples of ironic politeness seem uncommon in the texts I examined, which favors the account based on inflationary effects and relation-acknowledging presented in § 2.4.

Besides the cross-linguistically common pattern, there are of course culture/language-specific items that develop into personal pronouns. For example, as we have seen in § 2.2.1, Japanese first person *watakushi* comes from a noun meaning ‘private’. It should also be noted again that, while the nominal source of first and second person pronouns tends to come from terms that express the social relationship between the speaker and the addressee, that of third person pronouns tends to denote ‘thing’, ‘human’, ‘man’, or ‘body’ (Siewierska 2004).

## 5.2 Displacement of semantic features

By ‘displacement’, I mean a conscious or unconscious act of using semantic features in a way that is different from their original function. Therefore, it includes both plurification and shift in deixis in that the former refers to the case where the semantic feature of plural is used for a singular referent, and in the latter, for example, the feature of third person is used for the second person. Perhaps, the most well-discussed examples where plurification and shift in deixis lead to a new pronoun are French *vous* and German *Sie*, respectively. Both illustrate displacement of semantic features because in the former case the erstwhile second person plural form is used for a singular referent, whereas in the latter the originally third person plural

form shifts to a second person singular form. Although both examples come from fairly closely related languages that are used in close geographical proximity, these processes are commonly found in languages throughout the world and are by no means restricted to language of a particular genetic affiliation or geographical area.

Cross-linguistically, number seems to be the most widely used semantic feature to express degrees of respect and distance (Head 1978). The pioneering work by Brown & Gilman (1960) identified the use of a second person plural form for a singular referent to express politeness as a characteristic found in European languages.<sup>33</sup> Besides the common link between second person singular and plural such as French (*tu/vous*) and Russian (*ty/vy*) as mentioned above, there are examples like German *du/Sie*, where the third person plural form is used for the second person singular. It is also well known that English used to have a distinction between singular *thou* and plural *you*: the latter took over the singular function as the former dropped out of usage. While this phenomenon is often discussed in the context of European languages, it is also found in other parts of the world (see Head 1978: 157 for a more comprehensive list), though plurification is rare in languages of the Americas (cf. Head 1978: 130; Siewierska 2004: 216–221; Heine & Song 2010: 130). For example, in Tamil, second person plural *niinka* is used as a polite form for a singular addressee (Brown & Levinson 1987: 201). Similarly, the second person polite form in Mandarin *nin* probably comes from the combination of second person singular form *ni* and the plural marker *men* (Head 1978: 162–163, based on Chao 1956: 219). Prominence of this process can be seen in the fact that one can even observe the process in which the distinction is emerging in some languages. Heine & Song (2010: 133–134), based on Samarin (2002), cites Sango, a Ubangian language of the Niger-Congo family spoken in the Central African Republic. In Sango, the second person plural *álà* can be used instead of the second person singular *mò* in some contexts. The groups most likely to receive *álà* are the older generations (grandparents and parents), suggesting that it is politeness-related and a parallel development to the cases of plurification mentioned above, though it is not entirely clear how much of this process is influenced by French (another official language of the country). Although the examples given above concern the second person, plurification can involve the first person, as we will see below.

Shift in deixis illustrates a case where a person deictic feature is used in a way that is not originally intended for. Heine & Song (2010: 134–138) point out two major paths: a shift from nouns to second person pronouns<sup>34</sup> and the development of

33. In the Roman Empire, the emperor used the first person plural *nos* to refer to himself, which in turn led others to address him with the second person plural *vos* (Heine & Song 2010: 131, based on Lockwood 1968: 61).

34. It is not clear why they do not talk about the cases of first person pronouns arising from nouns such as ‘servant/slave’.

first person plural pronouns from generic human nouns and impersonal pronouns. The former is exemplified by numerous second person polite forms in European languages that arose from nominal expressions such as Spanish *usted* from *Vuestra Merced* ‘your grace’, while the latter concerns cases like the French impersonal pronoun *on* (which comes from a Latin generic noun *homo* ‘person, man’), which is replacing the traditional first person plural form *nous* in certain contexts. One can say that the development of nouns into personal pronouns like Spanish *usted* is a shift in deixis in that originally third person forms, at least formally, have come to be used for the second person. Other examples where nominal social titles gave rise to second person pronouns include Dutch *u* from *Uwe Edelheid* ‘your nobility’, Italian *Lei* from *La Vostra Signoria* ‘your lordship’, and Portuguese *você* from *Vossa Mercê* ‘your grace’ (Head 1978: 168–169, 185). This development is, of course, not limited to second person pronouns. We have seen above that first person pronouns in many Asian languages have a nominal source that means ‘servant/slave’.

Another way in which shift in deixis can give rise to a new personal pronoun is the development of a second person pronoun from a ‘dedicated’ third person pronoun. That is to say, forms that have already been established as third person pronouns turn into second person pronouns. This can be illustrated with the following example from German (Heine & Song 2011: 602).

- (68) *Was wünscht der Herr?*  
 what wants the gentleman  
*Hat er sich schon entschieden?*  
 has he himself already decided  
 ‘What would you like, Sir? Have you decided already?’

Though it is becoming archaic, a server at some upper middle class restaurants may utter (68), in which the customer is addressed with the nominal form *der Herr* ‘sir’ that antecedes the pronoun *er* ‘he’. It is clear in the context of the utterance that the nominal form, as well as the third person pronoun, is intended for the addressee. A similar example and argument based on Middle High German can be found in Simon (2003: 95). This basically seems to be what happened in some European languages such as Italian, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish (Head 1978: 167–171; Heine & Song 2011: 602). It is, however, unclear how common this process is in languages in which anaphoric pronouns are mostly left unexpressed (e.g. East Asian languages). More research is also needed on why a similar development is not found for first person pronouns. The anaphoric use of third person pronouns is equally conceivable for humble nominal expressions of self-reference.

The development of second person pronouns via the anaphoric use of third person pronouns for nominal expressions of address is to be distinguished from the case where nominal forms give rise to second person pronouns directly. In



the former, an item that belongs to the class of personal pronouns is ‘reused’ for a purpose that is not originally intended for, while the latter involves recruiting a new item from outside the pronominal paradigm that often results in varying degrees of phonetic erosion. Although respectful nominal expressions are involved in the development of second person pronouns in both scenarios, it appears that the non-anaphoric route (i.e. direct development of personal pronouns from nouns) played a more important role in Asian languages in which pronominal reference is often left unexpressed, because one finds the development of not only ‘lord/master/king’ for the second person and but also ‘servant/slave’ for the first person.

Although displacement of number and person can occur independently, both features are often involved at the same time in creating a new usage (Head 1978). Tamil, for example, shows an extensive interaction between number and person in all three persons. Consider the following examples intended for a singular referent that are arranged in increasing order of respect (Brown & Levinson 1978: 201).<sup>35</sup>

- (69) a. for first person singular: *naan* ‘I’ < *atu* ‘it’ < *naanka* ‘we (exclusive)’ < *naam* ‘we (inclusive)’  
 b. for second person singular: *nii* ‘you (singular)’ < *atu* ‘it’ < *niir* ‘(archaic) you (plural)’, now ‘you (singular with connotations of respectful equality)’ < *niinka* ‘you (plural)’ < *naam* ‘we (inclusive)’ < *taanka* ‘themselves’  
 c. for third person singular masculine: *avaan* ‘he (singular)’ < *atu* ‘it’ < *avaar* ‘(archaic) they’, now ‘he (singular plus respect)’  
 d. for third person singular feminine: *ava* ‘she (singular)’ < *atu* ‘it’ < *avaanka/aviika* ‘they’

One can observe from these examples that, within each person category, plural forms generally indicate greater respect than singular forms. Additionally, to refer to the second person, the use of non-singular first and third person forms serves as an additional marker of respect.

There are also impersonal forms such as French *on*, German *man*, and English *one*, which may be used for any person category. Heine & Song (2010: 136–138) point out that generic human nouns and impersonal pronouns often give rise to first person plural pronouns. However, since they can refer to multiple person categories given the right context, many of them do not seem to have fully developed into a personal pronoun of a particular person category. For this reason, I do not focus on them in this study, but it appears that there is some affinity between generic human nouns or impersonal forms on the one hand and first person reference on the other,

35. The use of *atu* (third person neuter) for the speaker and addressee is not relevant to plurality, but concerns the feature of person as it functions to impersonalize the referent. Brown & Levinson mention that the use of *atu* for the speaker is relatively rare.

as Heine & Song argue. As mentioned above, in Mandarin, the nominal expression *renjia* ‘(lit.) other people’ is often used for the first person by young female speakers in an informal conversation among their peers or with their boyfriend. Japanese *hito* ‘person’ can also be used for the first person as in *hito no ki mo shiranide* ‘you don’t know what a person (=I) feels’. More research is needed on the relationship between generic human nouns/impersonal forms and first person reference, but there are at least two possible links. The first is empathy and epistemological stance. The first person is high in empathy compared to the second/third person, which also makes it natural for speakers to talk more about themselves than others. The fact that the first person is the highest in empathy (thus making it unable for others to take the perspective of the speaker) is probably the reason that mostly first person forms are used in the Tamil examples in (69a). On the other hand, it is in principle possible for the speaker to take the perspective of the addressee and others, which enables the use of first person forms for them. Empathy will be taken up in more detail in § 5.1.4. The second reason is what Brown & Levinson (1987) call the ‘off record’ politeness strategy. When one carries out a communicative act off record, he/she cannot be held responsible for one particular intent, e.g. *It’s cold in here* can mean either ‘it’s cold in here’ (statement) or ‘please shut the door’ (command/request). Using a generic noun when the intended referent is the first person achieves a similar effect. For example, consider the Japanese example just mentioned above. If a first person pronoun were used in the sentence, it would be a more direct criticism toward the addressee.

It is clear that displacement of semantic features, whether it is plurification or shift in deixis, functions as a marker of politeness (Head 1978). However, the mechanism by which it achieves politeness is far from clear. For plurification, some suggest that plurality is a natural metaphor of power (cf. Brown 1965: 54; Siewierska 2004: 217): consider Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) well-known conceptual metaphor ‘more is better’. This explanation seems to fit well with the European model, which may be symbolized by the pronominal practice of the Roman Empire, where the Emperor refers to himself with the first person plural and receives the second person plural in return (see footnote 33). However, plurification is also found in a variety of genetically unrelated languages, which suggests that something universal is at play. Metaphor (and metonymy) fit the bill in that they are not only universal mechanisms but also the most successful way of conveying novel meaning (Nerlich 2010). The use of plural forms is respectful in the majority of cases, but there is an exception. In Bemba, a Bantu language spoken primarily in Zambia, the paramount chiefs are addressed with ‘you (singular)’, but all other adults are addressed in the plural (Head 1978: 159, citing Gregersen 1974: 53). This is presumably to highlight the special and unique position held by the chiefs, which does not apply to others (thus everyone else is addressed as a ‘group’).

Another reason that contributes to plural politeness is provided by Brown & Levinson (1987: 198–204). They argue that plural forms yield a politeness effect because they provide a conventional ‘out’ for the addressee by not pinpointing him/her. The notion of distance is presupposed in plurality in that it conceptually involves multiple participants, whereas its lack is prominent in singularity because it highlights the dyadic relation between the speaker and addressee (Head 1978: 159, based on Bean 1970: 564). This seems natural in that not singling out a referent creates a sense of indirectness, which is likely to give rise to politeness. Under Brown & Levinson’s model, this serves as negative politeness because, by allowing the addressee to interpret the utterance as possibly directed to others as well, the speaker satisfies the addressee’s desire to be free from imposition (i.e. negative face). This strategy weakens the assumption that the addressee’s response is obligatory (see also Simon 2003: 93; Helmbrecht 2014: 324–326). Brown & Levinson point out that conventional indirectness works in the same way: though the speaker’s intended meaning is clear, it shows that the speaker wishes to respect the addressee’s territory. For example, the utterance *Can you pass the salt?* is not ambiguous between a request and a question, but it implies that the speaker does not take the addressee’s cooperation for granted. Similarly, when the French speaker addresses someone with *vous*, there is no misunderstanding as to who is addressed, but it diffuses directness by implying that the utterance may be applicable to others as well. Brown & Levinson demonstrate that the respectful plural could also be culturally motivated. In some societies where individuals are always representatives and linked to membership in a group, addressing one equals to addressing the group. For example, in Tamil, to refer to a small boy’s father in conversation with the boy, one would use *onka appaa* ‘your (plural) father’ even though the boy himself would be addressed with the familiar second person form. Similarly, to refer to the same boy’s father in conversation with someone else, one would use *avaanka appa* ‘their father’. These two scenarios are similar in that they treat an individual as embedded in the group.

Both approaches (i.e. plurality as a metaphor for power and as a redressive device for face threat) account for the polite plural well, but I employ Brown & Levinson’s general notion of distancing, as it is applicable to plurification as well as other types of displacement of semantic features. Distancing is at the heart of negative politeness in that the objective of negative politeness is to satisfy the addressee’s negative face wants, that is, the desire to maintain his/her personal territory and be free from imposition. Therefore, negative politeness is avoidance-based, characterized by such acts as self-effacement (Brown & Levinson 1987: 70). Distancing may be achieved by a variety of strategies. For example, the use of past tense, when not required, serves as a token of politeness as in *I was wondering if I could ask you a favor* vs. *I am wondering if can ask you a favor*. As this example shows, distancing involves conceptual distance and is not physical distance. There are also a number

of ways in which distancing can be realized with respect to person reference, including impersonalization, e.g. *Someone is grumpy* where *someone* is intended for the addressee.<sup>36</sup> In this sense, displacement of semantic features, whether it is plurification or shift in deixis, is an example of distancing. They achieve distancing via the grammatical features of number and person, respectively. Note also that displacement of the person feature for the purpose of politeness is not easily captured by the conceptual metaphor discussed above. Distancing can also capture the case of *anata*, as discussed in § 3.3.4. Before becoming a second person pronoun around 1750, *anata* was a speaker-and-addressee-distal demonstrative that meant ‘that way distant from both the speaker and addressee’. Its development into a second person pronoun can be considered distancing because there is no immediate motivation for the speaker to address someone with a speaker-and-addressee-distal form. In other words, the addressee-distal component of the form is displaced in much the same way as number and person are in the examples cited above.

Although the use of plural forms for a singular addressee mostly results in a greater degree of respect and distance, plurification is not a simple phenomenon, especially when it comes to first person reference, in that it can sometimes yield opposite effects (cf. a plural of majesty and a plural of modesty; see Head 1978: 165; Heine & Song 2010: 132). Head points out that the use of the first person exclusive generally shows greater respect or social distance, while inclusive forms normally indicate proximity between the speaker and the other referent(s). Similarly, in Tamil, ‘my father’ is rendered *enka appaa* ‘our (exclusive) father’, which serves as negative politeness by distancing, while *namma appaa* ‘our (inclusive) father’ indicates high solidarity by including the addressee (i.e. Brown & Levinson’s positive politeness; see Brown & Levinson 1987: 199). The same applies to non-person reference such as *enka uuru* ‘our (exclusive) place (i.e. hometown)’.


The use of first person forms for the third person seems rare, but they are often used for the addressee. Head (1978: 172–174) mentions that the use of first person forms for the addressee usually denotes speaker superiority. It is often non-singular forms that are involved, and they indicate less social distance. The use of first person pronouns to refer to the addressee often shows similarity of interests between the speaker and the addressee, e.g. the English medical-*we*. This can be treated as

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36. The use of indefinites in place of first and second person pronouns may not always be perceived as polite, but it functions to redress face threat to the addressee (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 197–198). Brown & Levinson also point out that essentially the same effect is achieved by verbal inflection in some languages which permit subject to be left unexpressed because of the presence of agreement on most verbs. This suggests that verbal inflection is an integral part of politeness rather than a hindrance to the development of nouns into pronouns (cf. Whitman’s 1999 claim discussed in § 4.1).

Brown & Levinson's positive politeness: it includes both S and A in the activity (Brown & Levinson 1987: 127–128). Similar examples include *Let's have a cookie, then* (when only the speaker eats it), *We gotta change the bulb* (said by a wife to her husband), and *Let's get on with dinner, eh?* (said by a parent to his/her child to encourage participation or show interest). Although the first person plural form is intended for the speaker in the first example and for the addressee in the second and third example, they are similar in that the speaker talks as if his/her action is also that of the addressee's and vice-versa. The use of first person forms for the addressee is often found in forms of language intended for small children (i.e. care-taker speech or child-directed speech, and 'baby talk'); thus it can be perceived as "downward directed" (Head 1978: 173). We have seen the case of Japanese first person *boku* which is used by an adult speaker to a small boy. The adult speaker takes the perspective of the small boy, thus indicating less social distance. The usage is empathy-based, which is at the heart of care-taker speech or 'baby talk' (cf. reflexives in the next section as well). The motivation behind the use of the first person plural for the addressee such as the medical-*we* is essentially the same in that its primary purpose is for the speaker to express his/her involvement and interest with the addressee, which generally requires the portrayal of the close relationship between the speaker and the addressee. Of course, it does not always have to be downward directed or patronizing because there is nothing inherently non-respectful about treating the speaker and the addressee alike (i.e. positive politeness): consider British tag questions with falling intonation *I had a really hard time learning to drive, didn't I?* and *you know in I really had a hard time learning to drive, you know?* (Brown & Levinson 1987: 119–120). In both examples, the speaker speaks as if the addressee has access to the speaker's knowledge, which is not possible, strictly speaking.

How can one capture various cases of negative and positive politeness discussed above in a more coherent way? Although previous studies mention only negative politeness (Simon 2003; Helmbrecht 2014), I argue that negative and positive politeness in reference to a second person singular can be incorporated together into the continuum of increasing and decreasing conceptual distance, as shown in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Negative and positive politeness in reference to a second person singular

Concerning displacement of semantic features (i.e. plurification and shift in deixis), I argue that Brown & Levinson's (1987) negative and positive politeness can account for two forces that are seemingly opposite in nature regarding a second person singular referent: plurification for distancing (e.g. French *vous*) as negative politeness and plurification for closeness (e.g. English medical-*we*) as positive politeness. This is ultimately based on the conceptual distance between particular referents and a second person singular. Since the speaker is the deictic center, the conceptual distance increases as one moves from the first to second to third person. Plurality also generally indicates increasing distance in each person category. The speaker's displacement of semantic features symbolically manipulates conceptual distance toward the second person, yielding opposite politeness effects with respect to the addressee. On the one hand, the use of second person plural forms and third person (singular and plural) forms for the addressee signifies increasing conceptual distance between the form and the target, creating negative politeness. On the other hand, the use of first person (singular and plural) forms for the addressee decreases conceptual distance, which produces positive politeness. This explains why the use of first person forms such as Japanese *boku* and English *we* produce different politeness effects from that of second/third person forms like French *vous* and German *Sie*. Note also that this approach can also handle Heine & Song's (2010, 2011) plurification and shift in deixis under the same rubric of manipulation (i.e. displacement) of conceptual distance.

It is clear that displacement of semantic features can give rise to new pronoun usage. French *vous* and German *Sie* are undoubtedly conventionalized as polite forms for the second person singular. At the same time, however, there are examples such as English medical-*we* and Japanese *boku* (though clearly part of politeness phenomena) which are better treated as highly context-dependent communication strategies than as formal members in a pronominal paradigm. The contexts that often shows a greater degree of respect and contributes to the development of already established pronouns into new personal pronouns seem to be (i) the use of the second person plural for the second person singular, (ii) the use of the third person for the second person, and (iii) the combination of (i) and (ii). There seem to be functional reasons why (i) and (ii) often result in new personal pronouns. Distancing is easily achieved in both instances: it is achieved without shift in person deixis for polite plural. In the case of third person pronouns giving rise to second person pronouns, person deixis is involved, and it is achieved via the anaphoric use of third person pronouns for nominal expressions of address. On the other hand, the use of first person (usually non-singular) forms for the second person is less likely to yield new personal pronouns because of their very limited applicability (the addressee is mostly someone who is young). The anaphoric route is also not possible in that unlike third person pronouns, first person pronouns are never anaphoric and always deictic.

### 5.3 Demonstratives

A number of languages use demonstratives for person reference, especially for the third person. Languages surveyed in Head's (1978: 182–183) study also shows that demonstratives are usually not used for person reference other than for the third person. As we saw in § 3.2, in Bhat's (2013) data, 125 out of 225 languages show a complete or partial relationship between third person pronouns and demonstratives: unrelated (100 languages including Ainu), related for all demonstratives (52 including Basque), related to remote demonstratives (18 including Eastern Armenian), related to non-remote demonstratives (14 including Lezgian, Nakh-Daghestanian; eastern Caucasus), related by gender markers (24 including Venda, Bantu; South Africa), and related for non-human reference (17 including Jaqaru, Aymaran; Peru). This number may be conservative in that third person pronouns and demonstratives are considered to be related to each other only if the relation is obvious or if the authors of the grammar suggest a historical relation between them. As Bhat points out, however, some languages that are classified as 'unrelated' are potentially classifiable as languages showing some degree of relation between third person pronouns and demonstratives. For example, in Serbo-Croatian, third person pronouns *ôn* 'he', *òna* 'she', and *òno* 'it' may be related to the demonstrative stem of *ovaj* 'near 1', *taj* 'near 2', or *onaj* 'distal', the last one being the most likely candidate. Similar situations hold for Mundari (Munda; northwestern India) and Eastern Pomo (Hokan; northern California). Third person pronouns and demonstratives may have an even closer relationship in that there are also languages like Japanese and Korean (which are included in the unrelated category) that use demonstratives for third person reference regularly. For example, Japanese demonstrative forms such as *kochira/sochira/achira* (contemporary equivalents of *konata/sonata/anata*; see § 3.3) are frequently used for third person referents. In addition, we have seen in § 3.2 that third person pronouns in Modern Japanese (*kare* 'he' and *kanojo* 'she') have historical origins in the archaic demonstrative stem *ka-*. In Korean, demonstrative phrases generally function as third person pronouns, because there are no dedicated third person forms, but expressions like *i pwun* 'this person' are pronominal substitutes rather than full-fledged third person pronouns (Sohn 1994: 281; Lee & Ramsey 2000: 90).

First and second person pronouns, on the other hand, tend to have historical origins in nominal expressions of social relations for cultural reasons (Lehmann 2002 [1995]: 35), and they have a tenuous diachronic link with demonstratives (cf. Chapter 3). Nevertheless, demonstratives in some languages are said to have developed a close relationship between demonstratives and first/second person pronouns. For example, based on Hagège (1993: 216–217), Heine & Song (2011: 610) cite Japanese *kochira* as a first person pronoun and Vietnamese *Hây* 'here' and *Hây*

(or *Hó* ‘there’) as first and second persons, respectively. Heine & Song (2011: 607, 609–610) also mention Korean which uses forms like *i jjog/pyon* ‘this side’, *i gos* ‘this place’, and *yeogi* ‘here’ as first person forms and *jeogi* ‘there’ as second person forms. Sohn (1994: 287) also mentions that *i salam* ‘this person’ and *i nom* ‘this bastard’ are used for the first person. Heine & Song (2011: 607) treat these cases as instances of “incipient grammaticalization”, that is, they are contextually available alternatives and not full-fledged personal pronouns that formally belong to the pronominal paradigm. Although they do not consider these forms as fully conventionalized forms of person deixis, they treat spatial deixis as one of the major sources of personal pronouns. Spatial deixis, particularly demonstratives, are now given a more prominent role in the grammaticalization of personal pronouns than in earlier works such as Heine & Kuteva (2002: 204, 173–174) who maintained a more cautious stance on the development of spatial expressions into personal pronouns. Other examples cited by Heine & Song (2011) include Thai, which uses *níi* ‘this (one)’ as a first person singular pronoun. They go on to mention the use of English *here* for the first person in spoken English as in *Same here!* Of course, Heine & Song are not suggesting that *here* has become a first personal pronoun, but they are demonstrating the affinity between spatial deixis and personal pronouns.

It is not surprising for demonstratives to show an affinity to person reference in that demonstratives naturally provide the speaker with a ground for metonymic reference to a person referent (i.e. person in that location). However, that alone does not lead us to treat the use of demonstratives for person reference as an incipient stage of grammaticalization, contrary to what Heine & Song claim. There are many classes of words that have a clear and consistent relation with person reference in some languages. These include kinship terms such as ‘mother’ and ‘uncle’, occupational names such as ‘teacher’ and ‘doctor’, and positional names such as ‘president’ and ‘section-chief’. All of these are productively used for all persons in languages like Japanese, Korean, and Thai. General demonstrative pronouns like French *ce* are also used for multiple person categories. They simply function as contextually available alternatives and seldom give rise to personal pronouns (while it is theoretically possible), offering little evidence that suggests they are at an incipient stage of grammaticalization.

In § 3.3, reasons that demonstratives are unlikely to become full-fledged first/second person pronouns are presented based on Japanese. The metonymic use of demonstratives for person referents is within the extended use of demonstratives that is both frequent and productive, thus lacking innovative/extravagant value compared to nominal forms such as ‘servant’ and ‘lord’. This is supported by the historical distribution of Japanese demonstrative forms across the three persons. With respect to the first/second person usage, speaker-proximal forms are primarily used for the first person, but also for the second person to some extent, while



speaker-distal and addressee-proximal forms are used for the second person only. It was pointed out that this is because reference to the second person by speaker-distal and addressee-proximal forms can be preempted by speaker-proximal forms, but preemption of speaker-proximal forms for the first person by other demonstrative forms is not possible. Also consistent with this analysis is the fact that demonstrative forms from all series (speaker-proximal, speaker-distal, addressee-proximal, and speaker-and-addressee-distal forms) are used for the third person. It was also shown that the personal pronoun usage of some demonstratives such as *konata* ‘this way’ and *sonata* ‘that way’ disappeared exactly when they dropped out of the demonstrative paradigm, which strongly suggests that the personal pronoun usage is just a reflection of more basic demonstrative function. Additionally, demonstrative and first/second person pronouns are functionally dissimilar to each other. The basic function of the former is to direct the addressee’s attention to a cognitively unactivated entity, whereas the referent of the latter is presupposed in most instances. For example, reference to the addressee by an addressee-proximal demonstrative depends on the most basic function of demonstratives (i.e. spatial semantics) which serves to establish the metonymic link. However, the information status of the referent of first/second person pronouns is very different from the one that is canonically associated with the demonstrative. All of these point to the fact that there is little functional reason for language users to reanalyze demonstratives as personal pronouns. The observations here cast doubt on the typological and diachronic characterizations such as ‘here > personal pronouns’ and ‘locative > personal pronouns’ made by Heine & Kuteva (2002), especially since they also cite Japanese examples to support their argument.

In all the languages cited above which Heine & Song (2010, 2011) treat as languages whose demonstratives gave rise to personal pronouns, the relationship between demonstratives and personal reference is natural in that the affinity is due to the metonymic use of the basic demonstrative function, i.e. the use of speaker-proximal forms for the speaker and that of non-speaker-proximal forms for the addressee. That, however, is not a reason to assume that demonstratives have become personal pronouns or that they are at an incipient stage of grammaticalization. As we saw above, many examples that involve demonstratives for person reference give us little reason to conclude that they are functioning as personal pronouns instead of demonstratives metonymically used for a person referent. See for example the following Korean example from Song (2002: 14) cited in Heine & Song (2010: 126; 2011: 610).

- (70) *i* *jjog-eun* *gwaenchan-eunde* *geu* *jjog-eun* *otteo-seyo?*  
 this side-NOM good-CONN that side-NOM how-END  
 ‘I am OK, and how about you?’

In (70), the speaker-proximal *i* is used for the speaker and the addressee-proximal *geu* for the addressee. While it is true that demonstratives are intended for person referents in this example, their status as a marker of person deixis is far from clear. The exactly parallel example is possible in Modern Japanese *kochira/sochira* and also in their pre-Modern equivalent, *konata/sonata*, but there is little evidence that suggests the grammaticalization of these forms. Parameters of grammaticalization employed by Heine & Song (2010, 2011) hardly apply to these forms (cf. § 5.2). In a sense, it is even difficult to distinguish examples like (70) from numerous other items such as kinship terms and occupational names used metonymically (including the famous *ham sandwich* example by Nunberg 1978). These observations are consistent with Head's (1978: 182–183) cross-linguistic generalization which says that except for third person pronouns, the use of demonstratives for person reference is uncommon cross-linguistically.<sup>37</sup>

The case of *anata* discussed in § 3.3.4 is an exception in that there is a discrepancy between its demonstrative and personal pronoun function: the use of speaker-and-addressee-distal form for the addressee cannot be motivated by the metonymic use of demonstratives. It should also be noted that the personal pronoun function of *anata* survived even after the disappearance of its demonstrative function, which was not the case with its paradigm mates *konata* and *sonata*, whose demonstrative and personal pronoun usage disappeared at the same time. I have argued that the use of a speaker-and-addressee-distal form for the addressee is motivated by distancing, much the same way as the use of a plural form for a singular referent and that of a third person form for a second person referent. It should be emphasized again that distancing in this sense involves the conceptual distance rather than the physical distance. It is also known that the use of proximal demonstratives can convey empathy, and the use of distal demonstratives social distance (Brown & Levinson 1987: 205; Fillmore 1997). The fact that this relates to a more abstract conceptual or symbolic distance and not a strictly physical distance can be seen in the fact that it is applicable to other semantic features such as tense and person. (See also Head 1978: 194–195, who talks about the analogy between the physical and social distance: the third person pronouns/demonstratives are

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37. Iraya and a number of other Philippine languages in which a proximal demonstrative is used for the first person are possible exceptions. For example, in Iraya, *naʔay ~ nay* 'I, my' is based on a demonstrative 'this one' (Reid 2017: 26). Although the expected connection between the speaker-proximal form and the speaker hold true here too, it appears that the form is more well-integrated into the pronominal system of the language than the demonstrative-based forms in other languages like Japanese. According to Reid, this form functions as one of the 'Set 2' forms whose functions include the genitive and oblique (in which case the form is preceded by the form *sa* 'locative, oblique'). It is interesting that they function as oblique-like elements instead of the cross-linguistically common A/S pattern. More research is needed.

notionally more distant than the second person. As a result, they can indicate a greater degree of social distance.)

However, as pointed out in § 3.5, a few languages are suggested to have developed a systematic relation between demonstratives and personal pronouns: the Armenian articles *-s*, *-d*, and *-n*, which parallel the three demonstratives *ays*, *ayd*, and *ayn*, which have become possessive pronouns of the first, second, and third person, respectively (Greenberg 1985). Greenberg also mentions Classical Greek *hó-de* ‘this’, which is associated with the first person since the phrase like *hód’ anér* ‘this man’ is used in place of first person pronouns. This is analogous to situations in many languages where demonstratives are used metonymically, including Modern Japanese *kochira*. Greenberg also talks about how Japanese *sore* ‘that near you’, *soko* ‘there near you’, and *sonata* ‘that way near you’ are used as second person pronouns, citing Sansom (1928). However, examinations of demonstrative forms in the present study offer little support for treating those demonstratives as personal pronouns. In fact, some examples that Greenberg cites seem to illustrate the case where demonstratives are simply used pronominally, that is, contextually available alternatives. The association of these forms with the first person is quite natural in both Classical Greek and Japanese since that is the metonymic use of speaker-proximal forms, but the question of whether they are full-fledged personal pronouns is an issue that requires separate investigation. In fact, Greenberg (1985: 278) also states that the relation between person and demonstrative exists only in a limited number of languages and the relation is historically unstable, suggesting that their association is more likely to be a pragmatic one than a semanticized one.

This of course is a tendency cross-linguistically, and location expressions are sometimes incorporated into the pronominal paradigm. We have seen in § 3.4 the case of Japanese *omae* ‘honorable front’ and *temae* ‘in front of hand’. The former has become a second person pronoun, and the latter was used for the first person and later for the second person, which is parallel to the use of addressee-proximal forms for the addressee and that of speaker-proximal forms for the speaker and addressee, respectively. It is, however, not clear if location expressions are more likely than demonstratives to become personal pronouns, since there are forms such as Japanese *otaku* ‘(lit.) your (honorable) residence’ and Korean *tayk* ‘(lit.) your house’, which clearly function as one of the contextually available alternatives rather than members of the pronominal paradigm (see Sohn 1994: 280 for Korean). If location expressions are more likely to become full-fledged personal pronouns than demonstratives, the difference might come from the fact that demonstratives already belong to the tightly organized paradigm, making reanalysis as personal pronouns more unlikely. More research is required on this issue.

## 5.4 Reflexives

Cross-linguistically, reflexives commonly come from nominal concepts, particularly those relating to body part such as person, body, and head, e.g. Thai *tua* 'body' and *ton* 'person' (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005: 55). A more complete list can be seen in, for example, Schladt (2000) and Heine & Kuteva (2002). Reflexives are often used in place of personal pronouns, and in some languages it is said that they have developed into personal pronouns. Heine & Song claim that reflexives developed into person markers in a number of languages including Bengali, Hindi, Imbabura Quechua, Japanese, Kannada, Kashmiri, Khmer, Korean, Malayalam, Marathi, Tetelcingo Nahuatl, and Turkish (2010: 128). To be more precise, they claim that it is more likely to be intensifiers than reflexives that develop into personal pronouns. Some languages make a distinction between intensifiers and reflexives, e.g. German *selbst* vs. *sich*, Latin *ipse* vs. *se*, and Russian *sam* vs. *sebjä* (König & Siemund 2000: 41). They point out that intensifiers evoke alternatives and give prominence to the main referent over the alternatives: *The chancellor himself was surprised at the results*, where *the chancellor* receives the emphasis. Henie & Song argue that this is why intensifiers tend to develop into personal pronouns, especially respectful second person pronouns: they evoke alternatives that are 'lower' than the main noun (2010: 128). Head (1978: 181) has also offered a similar explanation previously: *It's John himself* is more emphatic than *It's John* which may stress importance of the referent. While the relationship between intensifiers and reflexives certainly deserves more attention in future studies, this study employs the terminology reflexives to mean both intensifier and reflexive functions because they are not formally distinguished in many languages, making their derivational relation opaque. Also, one of the main reasons why previous studies advocate intensifiers rather than reflexives as the source of personal pronouns is the characteristic of intensifiers that places more emphasis on a main referent than contextually understood alternatives; thus intensifiers are often said to develop into polite forms. However, as we will see, reflexives/intensifiers do not always become respectful forms. In fact, they are used in a derogatory way in a number of languages.

Japanese reflexive *jibun* is often utilized for referents of all three person categories, and some have argued that it has become a personal pronoun. Based on Hinds (1986), Heine & Song claim that it has become a first person pronoun, especially in the Osaka area (2011: 612). Similarly, Shibasaki (2014) argues that *jibun* has acquired the function of first and second person pronouns (2014: 138). Being formally invariant, *jibun* can naturally be used for any person category, but it does not necessarily mean that it has become a full-fledged personal pronoun, as in the case of demonstratives discussed in the previous section. This is clear in interactional/narrative discourse where *jibun* is used to objectify a referent, which induces self-reflection. Consider (59) repeated here as (71).

- (71) *Jibun de jibun no shita koto ga ienai kurai nara, tende*  
 self by self GEN did thing NOM cannot.say extent if at.all  
*shi-nai ga ii.*  
 do-NEG NOM good  
 ‘If self (*jibun*=you/they) can’t say what self (=you/they) did, it is better not to  
 do it in the first place.’ (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 4)

*Jibun* is often used in interactional and narrative discourse to objectify a person referent, which induces him/her to self-reflect (see Hirose 2000, who makes a distinction between public self and private self, to the latter of which *jibun* belongs; see also Hirose 2002, which describes *jibun*’s ‘viewpoint use’). In (71), *jibun* can be given the second person (or third person) interpretation. The use of a reflexive instead of a second person pronoun gives readers the impression that the speaker is trying to cause the addressees to self-reflect on their misdeed (a prank a number of students pulled in order to harass their new teacher), thus yielding a critical tone. The objectification function seems to be a natural extension of reflexives, which is to externalize the self as if it were another entity, hence the cross-linguistically common etymologies such as head and body.

Although reflexive-based forms in some languages show a greater degree of politeness and social distance (Head 1978; Siewierska 2004), it appears that reflexives used for the second person are not always polite and can be blunt at times. I argued in § 4.4 that this lowering of the addressee is due to the interpretation of the objectification function of reflexives, which suggests that the form is functioning as a reflexive rather than a personal pronoun. Compared to (71), which is ambiguous between the second and third person interpretation, the interpretation of (72), originally (60), is clearer in that the intended addressee is present in the speech situation.

- (72) a. *Tooya no shukuchokuin wa shukuchoku chuu*  
 the.night GEN person.on.duty TOP duty druing  
*gaishutsushite onsen ni ikareta yoo dearu ga, are wa*  
 went.out spa LOC went EVID COP but that TOP  
*mottenohoka no koto to kangaemasu.*  
 out.of.question GEN thing COMP think
- b. *Iyashikumo jibun ga ikkou no rusuban o*  
 humbly self NOM whole.school GEN staying ACC  
*hikiuke nagara,*  
 accept while
- c. *togameru mono no i-naino o saiwaini,*  
 blame person GEN exist-NEG ACC fortunately

- d. *bashomoarooni onsen nado e nyuutou ni iku nado*  
of.all.places places spa the.like to take.a.bath to go of.all.things  
*toiuno wa ookina shittai dearu.*  
EVID TOP big mistake COP  
‘(a) I hear that the person on duty that night went to a spa during the duty,  
but (I) think that’s out of the question. (b) Despite self (*jibun*=you) humbly  
accepts the responsibility of staying at and taking care of the school, (c) tak-  
ing the fact that there’s nobody watching you favorably, (d) going, of all the  
places, to a spa is a big blunder.’ (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 6)

As we saw in § 4.4, the critical tone associated with *jibun* in (72) comes from self-reflection induced by objectification of the referent. The choice of the reflexive over second person pronouns is deliberate in that the writer successfully depicts the speaker’s attempt at appealing to the inner conscience of the intended addressee (i.e. the protagonist). It appears that examples like (71) and (72) are the reasons why *jibun* is thought to be a personal pronoun by some. What is more directly relevant to the topic of this section, however, is the fact that the reason for the second person use of *jibun* (objectification/self-reflection in this case, including the critical tone that carries) is the characteristic discourse function of a reflexive. This suggests that there is little reason to treat them as semanticized personal pronouns, even though they are often used for the addressee pragmatically. The same type of usage is reported for the Mandarin reflexive *ziji* (Li 1991), and it appears that an analogous situation (i.e. objective self and the critical tone often but not necessarily associated with it) is observed in a number of reflexives in Asian languages such as Thai *tua*, Vietnamese *minh*, and Korean *caki*.

According to Cooke (1968), both Thai *tua* and Vietnamese *minh* mean ‘body’ and ‘self’, a cross-linguistically common sources of reflexives (e.g. Heine & Kuteva 2002: 57). Table 12 summarizes the use of each item, as described in Cooke (1968).<sup>38</sup>

**Table 12.** Usage of Thai *tua* and Vietnamese *minh*

<i>tua</i>	(i) <u>affectionate or intimate term</u> , speaking to <u>equal or inferior</u> not older than the speaker, especially female friends or to one’s spouse, or older to younger beloved ones, (ii) child or young woman speaking to intimate (sibling, friend, fiancé, husband) <u>in anger</u> , <u>expressing a sense of injury</u> , and probably implying a disavowal or <u>Impersonalization of the close relationship</u> ; in this sense <i>/tua/</i> sometimes replaces some other habitual nonambiguous intimate term such as kin term or nickname
<i>minh</i>	(i) as first person: chiefly used by females speaking to close intimate equals of either sex, (ii) as second person: used chiefly speaking to spouse, or occasionally to fiancé(e) or <u>very close intimate of the opposite sex</u> , (iii) <u>impersonal term</u> used much like English ‘one, you’

38. Burmese also has *kowv* which means ‘body’ and ‘self’, but only the first person usage is listed in Cooke (1968).

The second person use of Thai *tua* and Vietnamese *minh* seems to be analogous with that of Japanese *jibun*. Cooke describes how one of the functions of both *tua* and *minh* is to ‘impersonalize’ the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, which appears to be an exact parallel of *jibun*’s objectification and self-reflection function in discourse. It is also interesting to see that both forms function as informal (and at times derogatory) forms rather than respectful forms. This is also similar to *jibun*’s second person use, contra Heine & Song’s (2011) claim that reflexives/intensifiers become polite second person pronouns. In Korean, the so-called third person reflexives such as *tangsin* and *caki* are often used for multiple person categories (Song 2002). Interestingly, when used for the addressee, both forms are informal forms used commonly among couples as an affectionate term. Sohn (1994: 280, 286) points out that *tangsin*, which originally meant ‘one’s body’, is blunt and impolite if used for one’s out-group members as a second person form, but is often used among couples as an affectionate term. Similarly, *caki* is used as an affectionate term for the among young couples, and the use of *caki* is replacing *tangsin*, which is used primarily by older generation couples (see also Song 2002). This is presumably because assuming another’s perspective is not permissible when interacting with strangers, but it is permissible and natural to some extent among couples that by definition have a close relationship.

However, the use of reflexives for a person referent is not necessarily derogatory because there is nothing inherently deprecatory about objectifying a referent and inducing self-reflection. This is particularly clear when reflexives are used for the first person. This is the use of reflexives in narrative discourse often referred to as the objective self in the represented thought context (see for example Zubin et al. 1990 for Korean and Mandarin; Hirose 2000, 2002 for Japanese). Consider the use of *jibun* in (73), originally presented as (55).

- (73) a. *Gakkoo no shokuin ya seeto ni kashitsu no aruno wa,*  
 school GEN staff and student LOC mistake GEN exist TOP
- b. *minna jibun no katoku no itasu tokorode, nanika*  
 all self GEN lack.of.virtue NOM do CONJ some  
*jiken ga aru tabini,*  
 incident NOM exist every.time
- c. *jibun wa yoku korede koochoo ga tsutomaru kato hisokani*  
 self TOP well this principal NOM can.serve COMP secretly  
*zanki no nen ni taen ga,*  
 shame GEN feeling DAT cannot.stand but
- d. *fukoonishite konkai mo mata kakaru soodoo o*  
 unfortunately this.time also again like.this trouble ACC  
*hikiokoshitano wa,*  
 cause TOP

- e. *fukaku shokun nimukatte shazai shinakerebanaran.*  
 deeply gentlemen facing apology must.do  
 ... '(a) As for the mistakes of school staff and students, (b) (they) are all the result of self's (*jibun*=my) lack of virtue, and every time there are some troubles, (c) self (*jibun*=I) secretly cannot help feeling the sense of shame, how can (I) serve as a principal like this, and (d) unfortunately, for the fact that (students) have again caused a trouble like this, (e) (I) must apologize to you sincerely. ...' (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 6)

As discussed in § 4.4, a school principal talks in front of other teachers about the incident that involved some teachers and students from the school. The use of reflexives for the first person in (b) and (c) renders the utterance self-reflective, making it sound like a monologue. If first person pronouns are used there, the utterance would lose this rhetorical effect of 'monologue'. This is because the indexical system of personal pronouns is grounded in the speech situation, whereas that of reflexives is perspectival and not grounded in the speech situation, which creates the contrast between self and others (Zubin et al. 1990: 338–341).

The perception of *jibun* as a first person pronoun by some comes from this discourse behavior, prototypically exemplified by utterances like (73). For example, Hinds (1986: 262–263) mention that *jibun* may be used as a first person pronoun and give the following examples.

- (74) a. *dakedo soo ne, jibun ga kyoodai motsu-n dat-tara toshi*  
 but so FP *jibun* NOM sibling have-NMLZ COP-if age  
*no hanareta oniisan ka oneesan ga ita hoo ga*  
 GEN separated older.brother or older.sister NOM was side NOM  
*ii to omou.*  
 good COMP think  
 'If I self (*jibun*=I) has siblings, a brother or sister who is much older than me would be good.'
- b. *isshookenmei jibun ga mooshikomi kaite mootekite-ta yaroo.*  
 diligently self NOM application write bring-PST COP  
 'I (*jibun*=I) wrote out the application diligently and brought (it there).'

(74a) is an example from the Tokyo dialect, and (74b) from the Kansai dialect. Hinds points out that the use of *jibun* for the first person is more common in the Kansai area than in Tokyo. While it is true that reflexives in (74) are intended for the speaker, this usage can be resolved within the discourse behavior of reflexives (i.e. self-reflection through objectification). Both utterances give the impression that the speaker is observing the event from a distance even though he/she is part of it, a direct consequence of the objective-self interpretation. (74a) sounds as if the speaker is somewhat detached from the imagined world in which he/she has



siblings because he/she designates himself/herself as the objective self by the use of reflexives. This does not necessarily come from the use of hypothetical construction, since the use of a first person pronoun such as *watashi* and *boku* would cancel this nuance. (74b) is quite short and difficult to contextualize without the preceding and following linguistic materials, but it seems that the same interpretation can be easily applied, i.e. the speaker sees the event somewhat distantly and reflectively and the use of first pronoun would defeat this effect. These interpretational differences between personal pronouns and reflexives show once again that the former is grounded in the speech situation and the latter belongs to the discourse world where self and others are perspectively contrasted.

In addition, although Heine & Song (2011: 612) treat *jibun* as a first person pronoun based on Hinds, Hinds actually does not seem to treat it as a member of the pronominal paradigm given that (i) *jibun* is not listed in his personal pronoun list (e.g. 1986: 239, 251) and (ii) he also talks about other forms such as titles, kinship terms, and occupational names. In other words, it appears that he is simply talking about contextually available options when he says *jibun* can be used as a first person pronoun, which would naturally include other categories of expressions just mentioned above. Therefore, it is problematic to interpret the use of *jibun* for the first person as (an incipient stage of) grammaticalization. Analogous situations hold true for various languages of South and East Asia that provides an ostensible link between personal pronouns and reflexives. Consider the following example from Thai (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005: 56).

- (75) *phrǎ-wâa tua-eeŋ mây kin mây ... mây thaan khǎwŋ praphêet nûi*  
 because self NEG eat NEG NEG eat thing kind this  
*nà hà*  
 PP SLP  
 ‘Because I myself don’t eat that kind of food, you know.’

In (75), the reflexive expression *tua-eeŋ* which is the combination of ‘body’ and the emphatic word is used in place of a first person pronoun. However, Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom do not seem to treat it as a member of the pronominal paradigm. Similar to the case of *jibun*, they simply mention it as one of the options available, including personal names, kinship terms, and occupational titles. In fact, they subsume all those expressions (i.e. personal pronouns, personal names, occupational titles, and kin terms) under “personal reference terms” (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005: 49).

So far we have mainly looked at languages in which reflexives have a possible lowering effect when used as a contextually available alternative to personal pronouns, particularly when used for the second/third person. I have argued that notions such as objectification and self-reflection play a crucial role in that they

frequently give the impression of observing a given event from a distance, thus often (but not necessarily) susceptible to interpretation as criticism. As we saw in § 4.4, empathy plays an important role in that the speaker has to take the perspective of non-first person referents in order to induce self-reflection for others. This is in turn related to the fact that the use of first person forms, high empathy items, for the addressee often indicates lack of respect or social distance. Recall, for example, the use of first person *boku* as a term of address employed for a small boy and the use of first person plural forms intended for the second person in many languages (e.g. *we need to change the bulb* said by a wife to her husband). Whitman (1999: 375) terms this “familiarity breeds contempt” relationship in that empathy status is inversely related to deferential status.

The cases where reflexives show a greater degree of respect and social distance, on the other hand, are primarily found in languages of India (Head 1978: 180–181). In Hindi and Urdu, a reflexive form *ap* is used for the addressee as a polite form. This trend has spread to Bengali, where *apnara* based on the reflexive *apni* is considered the most respectful pronoun. The same applies to Kannada, Marathi, Punjabi, and Kashmiri, but also to some outside the Indian subcontinent such as Hungarian, Turkish, and Tetelcingo Nahuatl (Siewierska 2004: 224–228). Regarding the reason that reflexives give rise to a greater degree of respect and social distance, citing Shibatani (1985), Siewierska mentions the link between agent defocusing and honorification as a possible cause (2004: 227). The defocusing of an agent is characteristic of medio-passives, including spontaneous constructions, which are often marked by reflexive morphology. As Siewierska points out, this line of explanation seems to work well with languages which use verbal reflexives like Tetelcingo Nahuatl, but it is not clear how it works for pronominal reflexives in languages of India. Perhaps for this reason, Head (1978) and Heine & Song (2010; 2011) suggest that the use of reflexives as emphatic reflexives or intensifier are responsible for respectful meanings. Intensifiers give prominence to the main noun relative to contextually supplied alternatives.

The examinations above show that, when reflexives are used for the second person, they can show either a greater degree of respect/social distance or lack of it. However, both scenarios can be explained within the scope of reflexive behavior in discourse. Recall languages like Thai and Vietnamese (Table 12), in which reflexive forms are used for both intimacy and impersonalization. The former is the result of reflexives being a high empathy item. Using a form most closely associated with the first person for the second person is ‘intimate’; this seems to be the case with Korean examples where reflexives function almost like terms of endearment among couples. The latter, on the other hand, comes from objectification of the referent (in this case the addressee). By referring to the addressee by a reflexive which projects him/her as the external self, the speaker creates a world in which the addressee is seen from a

detached angle. This can end up being either derogatory by inducing self-reflection or respectful by maintaining a distance from the addressee (cf. Languages of India). Ultimately, empathy and objectification are two sides of the same coin.

Therefore, there is little to no reason to treat reflexives as full-fledged members of the pronominal paradigm in many languages. In the absence of change observable by the grammaticalization parameters, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify semanticization of reflexives as personal pronouns, just like it was for the case of demonstratives since there are many other classes of expressions that are used in the same way. These behavioral characteristics of reflexives in discourse are exploited for person reference, which allows reflexives to function along other categories of expressions as a contextually available alternative to personal pronouns. In this sense, Zubin et al. (1990: 339) correctly point out that unlike personal pronouns the contrast between self and others is perspectival and not grounded in the speech situation. They further claim that reflexives in discourse are interpreted as the speaker or addressee by the Maxim of Relevance (Grice 1975). In other words, the use of reflexives for person referents in discourse is to be dealt with pragmatically and contextually. In addition to all of these, the statement by Head (1978: 181) that alternation between reflexives and personal pronouns is not common cross-linguistically and primarily a feature of respectful forms in languages of India cast doubt on the generalization in Heine & Song (2010, 2011) regarding the reflexive-personal pronoun link.

## 5.5 Grammaticalization and the emergence of personal pronouns

### 5.5.1 Controversies surrounding grammaticalization and related phenomena

Grammaticalization studies have enjoyed widespread popularity in historical linguistics since the 1980s. They have refined and advanced our knowledge of language change significantly since Meillet's (1912) classic formulation of grammaticalization as a change from lexical to grammatical and that of Kuryłowicz (1965), which includes a change from less grammatical to more grammatical. Work on grammaticalization has identified a number of important tendency or regularity observed in the development of grammatical items, some of which are listed below.

- (76) a. lexical verb > auxiliary > affix (Givón 1979)  
 b. relational noun > secondary adposition > primary adposition > agglutinative case affix > fusional case affix (Lehmann 1985)  
 c. discourse > syntax > morphology > morphophonemics > zero (Givón 1979)

- d. PERSON > OBJECT > ACTIVITY > SPACE > TIME > QUALITY (Heine et al. 1991)
- e. propositional (> textual) > expressive meaning (Traugott 1982)

More recent studies have made further refinements. For example, grammaticalization is often talked about in terms of morphosyntactic reduction such as the development of auxiliaries, but it also involves functional extension. The perspective of the speaker as well as the hearer is important in grammaticalization: models based on invited inferencing such as Traugott & Dasher's (2002) are speaker-oriented, while the context-induced reinterpretation by Heine et al. (1991) is hearer-oriented (Traugott 2010a). The former often revolves around the concept of (inter)subjectivity (see Traugott 2010b for a concise summary). Traugott also points out that subjectification, which is a subtype of semantic reanalysis, is more likely to occur in primary grammaticalization (from lexical/constructional to grammatical) than in secondary grammaticalization (from less grammatical to more grammatical). A hearer/perception model, on the other hand, has little to offer about subjectification.

The status of grammaticalization as an independent category of change, as well as its key concepts, have been heavily criticized by some. Critics argue that grammaticalization is simply epiphenomenal because its associated changes are not exclusive to grammaticalization and because there are numerous counterexamples to unidirectionality that lead from grammatical to lexical ('degrammaticalization')<sup>39</sup> (see particularly Newmeyer 1998; see also Campbell 2001; Janda 2001; Newmeyer 2001; among others in the special issue of *Language Sciences*). Proponents of grammaticalization and unidirectionality, on the other hand, claim that the criticisms stem from misunderstanding or that they are simply invalid. In particular, Haspelmath (2004) argues that most of what critics call degrammaticalization is actually not the reversal of grammaticalization, and thus it does not constitute evidence against grammaticalization and unidirectionality (but see also Norde 2009 who describes degrammaticalization in more details). Examples of degrammaticalization that Haspelmath takes issue with include the French *tutoyer* 'address by *tu*' from *tu* '(familiar) you', the English *burger* backformed from *hamburger*, and the English *but*s (nouns) from *but* (conjunction). He points out that this type of change occurs instantaneously by analogy and reanalysis, whereas grammaticalization is gradual (see also Haspelmath 1999; Lehmann 2002 [1995], 2004). Therefore, these changes simply cannot be compared to grammaticalization, though he cites some

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39. Lexicalization, which is sometimes given the opposite status of grammaticalization, is a much broader concept and may or may not co-occur with grammaticalization: consider *blackboard* from *black board* (not grammaticalization) and *gonna* from *going* to (grammaticalization) (see Brinton & Traugott 2005).

examples of the true reversal of grammaticalization which he calls ‘antigrammaticalization’ (e.g. Japanese free linker *-ga* ‘however’ from clause-internal *-ga* ‘but’ described in Yo Matsumoto 1988). For Haspelmath, only antigrammaticalization constitutes a valid counterexample to grammaticalization and unidirectionality.

Another noteworthy attempt to refine grammaticalization was recently made in the special issue of *Folia Linguistica* published in 2014. This special issue points out the aspects of grammaticalization that are taken for granted in previous studies, but in fact are controversial. It also tackles a number of problematic areas in the current conceptualization of grammaticalization. For example, in their opening article, Mengden & Simon (2014) mention that the difference or similarity between primary and secondary grammaticalization is taken for granted in most grammaticalization studies. This conceptualization assumes that a change from lexical to grammatical can be analyzed in the same way as a change from less grammatical to more grammatical, and that there is indeed a degree of ‘grammaticality’ which can be measured in some way. As a result, grammaticalization is applied to a great variety of change that involves grammatical elements in one way or another. This inevitably leads to inflation of the concept, making it difficult to make untrivial statements about grammaticalization. They state that, when researchers say things like ‘tense is a grammaticalized expression of a location in time’, grammaticalization includes almost anything that is somehow associated with grammar, that is, as they point out, anything except lexical semantic change and sound change.

We saw above that some researchers reject grammaticalization as an independent form of change and regard it as an epiphenomenon. While they do not deny the type of changes discussed in grammaticalization studies, they claim that it is not necessary to invoke a special theory or mechanism of grammaticalization to investigate and account for those changes. Instead, they claim that what we need is a theory of how semantic content is bleached, phonetic substance is reduced, syntagmatic collocations are reanalyzed as a single linguistic unit, and so forth (see for example Newmeyer 2001; Anderson 2015). Joseph (2005, 2014) discusses the difficulty in defining what really counts as grammaticalization because, for example, there are a number of changes whose result is neither more nor less grammatical. There are also related phenomena such as the development of discourse markers that are often discussed under the rubric of pragmatization (see for example Winter-Froemel 2014: 509–514). Examples of pragmatization such as *I think* and *you know* in English are somewhat akin to grammaticalization in that it is a change from lexical to non-lexical (i.e. grammatical or text structuring), but there are clearly some notable differences as well: grammaticalization involves scope decrease, while pragmatization is accompanied by increased syntactic scope (Claridge & Arnovick 2010). In response to these criticisms and questions, Norde & Beijering (2014) propose what they call a ‘clustering approach’ to

grammaticalization in which grammaticalization is seen as a bundle of small-scale changes that tend to co-occur.

Settling these controversies is clearly beyond the scope of this study. In what follows, I examine what applications of the grammaticalization parameters employed in previous studies can reveal about the development of personal pronouns as well as the nature of grammaticalization.

### 5.5.2 What grammaticalization and the development of personal pronouns suggest about each other

The diachronic aspects of personal pronouns are significantly under-researched compared to their synchronic domains, making explicit applications of grammaticalization parameters somewhat uncommon even though personal pronouns are usually considered typical grammatical items. By applying the grammaticalization parameters employed by Lehmann (1995) and Heine & Song (2010, 2011), I argue that, while the development of noun-based personal pronouns can be considered the canonical case of grammaticalization, forms that arose from other sources fall outside the scope of grammaticalization proper. This suggests that personal pronouns form a heterogeneous category and that treating the development of all personal pronouns under the same rubric of grammaticalization is problematic.

Though influential, the parametric approach to grammaticalization is not without criticism. For example, Mengden & Simon (2014: 349–351) point out the problems associated with Lehmann's (1995) parameters, perhaps the most explicit and comprehensive work of grammaticalization to date. For example, semantic bleaching and phonetic attrition are housed under the same parameter of integrity, though it is not entirely clear what the commonality between the two is beside the fact that they both involve some type of reduction. Also, semantic bleaching and phonetic attrition seem to receive more attention in many studies, giving more prominence to the parameter of integrity than others. This begs the question about the relationship among the parameters. Does one need all parameters to talk about grammaticalization? If not, are some parameters more important than others? Although Heine & Song (2010, 2011) separate desemanticization from erosion, the same questions can be raised about their studies which employ four parameters (extension, desemanticization, decategorialization, and erosion) to investigate grammaticalization of personal pronouns.

Despite these problems, parameters are used as diagnostic tools in one way or another in most grammaticalization studies because they are revealing regarding the nature of personal pronouns as well as grammaticalization. As we saw in § 2.1, Lehmann (2002 [1995]) sets up three paradigmatic parameters (integrity,

paradigmaticity, and paradigmatic variability) and three syntagmatic ones (structural scope, bondedness, and syntagmatic variability). Their brief definitions are presented in (77).

- (77) a. *integrity*: substance which allows a sign to maintain its distinctness from other signs and grants it a certain prominence in contrast to other signs; e.g. the loss of semantic integrity is desemanticization and that of phonological integrity is phonological attrition
- b. *paradigmaticity*: formal and semantic integration of a sign into the paradigm where members of a paradigm are linked with each other by opposition or complementarity; e.g. locative prepositions such as *in*, *on*, and *at* form a tighter paradigm than local relational nouns such as *back*, *top*, and *front*
- c. *paradigmatic variability*: freedom with which the language user chooses a sign from the paradigm; e.g. nominal classifiers whose co-occurrence is strictly restricted to nouns with which they have inherent relation with have a lower degree of paradigmatic variability than those whose usage is not limited by the inherent semantic connections
- d. *structural scope*: structural size of the construction which a sign helps to form; e.g. an agglutinative case marker has a wider structural scope (noun phrase) than a fusional case marker (noun)
- e. *bondedness*: structural intimacy with which a sign is connected with another sign to which it bears a syntagmatic relation; e.g. bondedness increases in the following order: juxtaposition > cliticization > agglutination > merger/fusion
- f. *syntagmatic variability*: ease with which a sign can be shifted around in its context; e.g. a verb enjoys much more positional flexibility before it becomes an auxiliary (Lehmann 2002 [1995]: Chapter 4)

While syntagmatic parameters appear more relevant once the item has become a personal pronoun (cf. development from a pronoun to a clitic), paradigmatic parameters are particularly important in analyzing the diachronic development into personal pronouns as it relates to incorporation of other items into the pronominal paradigm. As discussed in Chapter 2, paradigmatic parameters are often correlated with each other logically. A semantically rich sign (high semanticity) tends to participate loosely in the semantic field (low paradigmaticity) and enjoy a relative freedom of selection according to communicative intentions (high paradigmatic variability). Conversely, a semantically light sign (low semanticity) tends to be a member of a small paradigm (high paradigmaticity) and restricted by an obligatory selection (low paradigmatic variability). In what follows, I discuss implications of applying Lehmann's paradigmatic parameters to the development of (so-called) personal pronouns.

In § 2.1, I discussed how applications of paradigmatic parameters to the development of nouns into personal pronouns would look like. For ease of presentation, an abridged version of Table 5 is presented here as Table 13.

**Table 13.** Paradigmatic parameters as applied to change from nouns to pronouns

Parameter	Before	Change	After
integrity	ability to name a referent, with a bundle of semantic features	semantic integrity of signs is lost, possibly with phonological attrition	referential dependency on context; less stability of reference
paradigmaticity	member of a loose paradigm or semantic field	signs come to belong to a tighter paradigm	member of a tighter paradigm
paradigmatic variability	ability to be used freely and interchangeably in a given paradigmatic position	use of signs become constrained by communicative context	limited number of forms used in a given paradigmatic position

It is clear that the processes described in Table 13 are generally consistent with a change from nouns to pronouns. First, with integrity, nouns involve high semanticity and pronouns low semanticity; thus pronouns, especially first and second person pronouns, assume less stability of reference than nouns. In fact, semantic generality or low semanticity seems to be an essential, though not a sufficient, feature for an item to function as a pronoun or as a shifter. Phonological attrition typically seems to follow desemantization which also goes hand in hand with increased frequency. Second, nouns are lower in paradigmaticity than pronouns in that the pronominal paradigm is more tightly organized than a particular semantic field of nouns such as kinship terms or social titles. This is especially clear in languages like English where a limited number of pronouns are neatly organized by a limited number of grammatical features such as person, number, and gender. This characteristic is less obvious in some languages (e.g. languages of South Asia) because they have a rather loose pronominal paradigm (though clearly not looser than for nouns commonly used pronominally). Third, it is generally the case that nouns and the so-called pronominal items such as personal names, kinship terms, and occupational names exhibit higher paradigmatic variability than pronouns, because nouns clearly offer more choices than personal pronouns for use in a particular paradigmatic slot, (e.g. the subject position for self-reference).

Similarly, Heine & Song's (2010, 2011) grammaticalization parameters, to a large extent, apply to the development of nouns into pronouns. Unlike Lehmann, they make a distinction between semantic bleaching and phonetic reduction, and



they set up four parameters – extension, desemanticization, decategorialization, and erosion – which are often observed in that order. One can see this clearly in the development of the often talked-about polite second person forms in many European languages that historically come from nominal forms like ‘your honor’ (e.g. Spanish *usted* from *Vuestra Merced*). The item’s use is first extended for contexts where its straightforward nominal meaning does not make sense, resulting in backgrounding of its lexical meaning and foregrounding of an indexing function. It also loses its morphosyntactic properties such as the ability to take modifiers. Phonetic reduction is also observed, although it is more obvious in some languages (e.g. Spanish) than others (e.g. Romanian). Recall also the case of ‘servant/slave’ for the first person and ‘lord/master’ for the second person in many Asian languages, which tend to be phonetically unreduced. At first glance, decategorialization does not seem to apply to those Asian forms as they can take modifiers, but despite its theoretical availability pronominal modification is uncommon in actual discourse (Shibasaki 2005).

These examples show that the development of personal pronouns from nouns is a good instance of grammaticalization, or at least that almost everything that grammaticalization scholars cite as the criterion of grammaticalization is present, often in the order they are suggested. However, in previous studies, a variety of forms such as displacement of semantic features, spatial deixis, and reflexives are suggested to give rise to personal pronouns. Their diachronic development seems to exhibit different characteristics from those of the noun-pronoun path. For example, it is not clear what grammaticalization parameters mean for displacement of semantic features, which include Heine & Song’s (2010, 2011) plurification and shift in deixis. When the second person plural French *vous* and third person plural German *Sie* are used for a second person singular referent, desemanticization and erosion do not apply because the earlier usage and form are unaffected. Similarly, it is not clear if there is a change in terms of morphosyntactic characteristics such as the ability to take modifiers (decategorialization). Its effect is equally not clear with respect to Lehmann’s paradigmaticity and paradigmatic variability: has the pronominal paradigm become tighter, and has the choice decreased for a particular paradigmatic slot? If anything, the pronominal paradigm has become looser and the choice has expanded with the addition of a new item. The parameters do not seem to capture this development well or at least not as a good example of grammaticalization.

The reason that parameters do not work well for displacement is that semantic features ordinarily reserved for a certain member of the paradigm are repurposed for a new usage. This is what Joseph (2005, 2014) calls ‘lateral shift’. The example that Joseph gives is verbal inflection in Ancient and Modern Greek, where inflectional endings change in various ways based on analogy and the resultant verbal

endings are neither less nor more grammatical, e.g. Modern Greek second person singular past non-active ending *-sun* from earlier *-so* based on first person singular past non-active *-mun* (Joseph 2005: 2). Heine & Song (2011) try to deal with this problem by proposing what they call ‘grammaticalization in a wide sense’, where only the parameter of extension and the principle of unidirectionality are relevant, and they claim that lateral shift falls within the domain of grammaticalization in a wide sense. However, this position is problematic in that extension is involved in most, if not all, cases of language change (perhaps except for ‘pure’ phonetic change). The presence of unidirectionality is also questionable given that there does not seem to be any discernible directionality in Joseph’s examples of verbal inflections in Ancient and Modern Greek.

With respect to the relationship between personal and impersonal pronouns, Winter-Froemel (2014: 535) argues that evolutions from indefinite to personal meaning are less frequent and less directional than those from nouns (e.g. ‘man’, ‘people’) to indefinite pronouns. She also points out that first person singular and second person singular/plural pronouns frequently function as indefinite expressions and that, if the development from indefinite pronouns to personal pronouns is an instance of grammaticalization, the change from personal to indefinite meaning has to be seen as degrammaticalization. This runs counter to the fact that the frequent use of those personal pronouns for indefinite as well as the fact that degrammaticalization is much less frequent than grammaticalization. Therefore, the directionality proposed by Heine & Song (2011: 617), namely noun (‘person’ or ‘people’) > indefinite pronoun (‘people in general’) > first person plural pronoun is problematic if it is proposed as grammaticalization.

Even if we accept that Heine & Song’s (2011) grammaticalization in a wide sense accounts for lateral shift, that is a radical departure from grammaticalization proper (or ‘grammaticalization in a narrow sense’ in their terminology) in that, as pointed out above, there is no clear directionality in the examples Joseph (2005) uses to illustrate lateral shift. Heine & Song mention that their proposal of grammaticalization in a wide sense is based on the distinction between referential and non-referential. The result of grammaticalization is usually non-referential (e.g. a verb becoming a case marker), but this does not apply to the development of personal pronouns that are referential. However, their ultimate motivation for postulating grammaticalization in a wide sense seems to be based on their desire to include plurification and shift in deixis in grammaticalization: the development of personal pronouns must be grammaticalization since they belong to a grammatical category. However, not everything that involves a new usage of grammatical items has to be grammaticalization, and I argue that the case of Ancient and Modern Greek verbal inflectional endings and displacement of semantic features in the personal pronoun paradigm are good examples of that. Once one accepts this, there is no

need to postulate grammaticalization in a wide sense, which extends the boundary of grammaticalization, thereby overinflating its explanatory power. The motivations behind lateral shift are probably diverse, and coming up with an exhaustive list is clearly beyond the scope of this book. However, displacement in pronoun usage is largely a cognitive sociolinguistic strategy motivated by politeness, and it is frequently observed in the languages of the world, not just in well-known European languages (Brown & Levinson 1987). The same goes for the manipulation of tense for politeness purposes. Displacement in pronoun usage includes socio-pragmatic strategies that are not conventionalized such as the English medical-*we*.

Except for extension, which is present for all the changes discussed in this book, grammaticalization parameters face difficulty when applied to the case of demonstratives and reflexives as well. Erosion hardly applies to many demonstrative-based forms such as Japanese *kochira* which can be used for the speaker (Hagège 1993: 216–217; Heine & Kuteva 2002: 173–174; Heine & Song 2011: 610). Other problematic examples include the Chinese dialect of Huojia and Vietnamese, where the Chinese form *zher* ‘here’ is used as first person plural ‘we, us’ and the Vietnamese *đây* ‘here’ and *đó* ‘there’ are used as first and second person pronouns, respectively (Hagège 1993: 216–217). It is highly doubtful that desemanticization has occurred to these forms in that the usage is based on their spatial semantics: speaker-proximal forms such as ‘here’ and speaker-distal forms such as ‘there’ are naturally exploited metonymically for a person referent in that location. Recall the case of Japanese demonstrative-based forms discussed in Chapter 3, where the use of speaker-proximal, speaker-distal, addressee-proximal, and speaker-and-addressee-distal is completely consistent with the metonymic use of demonstratives: speaker-proximal for the speaker, speaker-proximal, speaker-distal, and addressee-proximal for the addressee, and the use of all demonstrative forms for third person referents. Since the spatial semantics, the core meaning and function of demonstratives, plays a crucial role in achieving person reference via metonymy, it is unlikely to go through desemanticization that leads to the loss of its core function. In this sense, the use of demonstratives for a person referent is not much different from that of other forms such as ‘teacher’ and ‘mother’ in terms of ‘pronounness’. A similar situation holds true for Korean examples cited in Heine & Song (2011: 607). In Korean, demonstrative forms such as *jeo jjog/pyo* ‘that side’ and *jeo gos* ‘that place’ are used for the third person, which is expected given the nature of demonstratives and third person. There is also a form like *jeogi* ‘there’ that is used for the third and second person: the second person usage makes sense given its spatial semantics.

To be fair, Heine & Song say that they are “instances of incipient grammaticalization, not having incorporated into the paradigm of personal pronouns” (2011: 607). However, it is not clear why it is necessary to consider it to be at the

beginning stage of grammaticalization, as similar usage in which various terms are pragmatically used for person reference is abundant. Though these usages are at least consistent with Heine & Song's bridging context, which can trigger a new meaning that is foregrounded, are they all suggestive of incipient grammaticalization? It seems counterintuitive in that the source meaning is very much in the focus when one addresses someone with 'uncle' or 'teacher'. In terms of the parameters, it is not clear whether the demonstrative-based forms in the various languages mentioned above went through any morphosyntactic change when they were used for person reference. The application of paradigmaticity and paradigmatic variability is also questionable in that the pronominal paradigm would become looser and the choice would expand with the addition of new items.

These parameters also face difficulty when applied to reflexives and reflexive-based forms. Desemanticization and erosion clearly do not apply to forms such as Japanese *jibun* 'self', which Heine & Song treat as a first person pronoun based on Hinds (1986). A similar situation holds true for reflexives in other Asian languages such as Thai *tua* (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom 2005) and Vietnamese *minh* (Cooke 1968), which can be used for both the speaker and the addressee. The status of decategorialization, paradigmaticity, and paradigmatic variability does not point to the direction of increased grammaticality for the same reasons mentioned above for displacement of semantic features and demonstrative-based forms. Song also argues that Korean reflexive forms like *dansin*, *caki*, and *jane* became second person pronouns (2002: 351). While it is true that they are used like personal pronouns, the problem with reflexive forms is that it is hard and sometimes impossible to determine whether one is talking about semanticized personal pronouns or items simply used pronominally. Because the parameters hardly apply to many of them, one cannot in principle distinguish them from various items such as kinship terms and occupational names which are also frequently used pronominally in many languages. This is the case for reflexives in languages where they are uninflected for person and used in the subject position.

## 5.6 Summary and conclusion

The analysis above has shown two things. First, nouns are the major source of personal pronouns and displacement of semantic features contributes to the emergence of new pronoun usage. On the other hand, the status of demonstratives and reflexives as the cross-linguistically common source of personal pronouns is questionable. While the argument above does not refute Heine & Song's (2010, 2011) claim completely given the relatively limited number of languages examined, it clearly raises doubt in that they cite those languages as examples where demonstratives and

reflexives gave rise to personal pronouns. Second, grammaticalization proper can handle only noun-based forms, and other conceptual sources pose difficulty even for Heine & Song's (2011) grammaticalization in a wide sense in terms of the degree of grammaticality and thus essentially unidirectionality as well. In fact, it appears that the primary motivation behind grammaticalization in a wide sense is their desire to account for the development of all personal pronouns under the rubric of grammaticalization since personal pronouns are grammatical items. However, there is no a priori reason to treat every instance of the development of personal pronouns as grammaticalization (i.e. displacement, demonstratives, and reflexives, as argued above). This casts some doubt on the range of phenomena that grammaticalization is supposed to account for with regards to personal pronouns, and it suggests that person referring expressions form a heterogeneous category. In this sense, Henie & Song correctly say that "personal pronouns are not primitives of grammatical evolution" (2010: 143) and that "personal deixis is not necessarily a crosslinguistically neat and stable conceptual domain" (2011: 625). Therefore, one needs to study the development of personal pronouns from each source individually rather than conflating all of them under grammaticalization.

I have argued above that, while they are frequently used for person referents, the status of demonstratives and reflexives as the cross-linguistically common source of personal pronouns needs to be reexamined. How then should one account for the case of Japanese *anata*, a speaker-and-addressee-distal demonstrative that became a second person pronoun? Should the development of a demonstrative (which already exhibits a high degree of grammaticality on various accounts and to which most parameters do not apply) into a first/second personal pronoun be treated as an instance of grammaticalization? The way in which *anata* gave rise to a second person pronoun is analogous to that of lateral shift in that, being a demonstrative, *anata* was used for a third person referent to begin with. Even the motivation behind the change is essentially the same as other examples of lateral shift of personal pronouns (e.g. French *vous*): manipulation of semantic features for the purpose of politeness.

Although languages that code politeness distinctions in personal pronouns (specifically second person pronouns, where politeness distinctions are most common) do not seem to constitute the majority of the world's languages (Helmbrecht 2008), politeness emerged as a major factor that motivates the change from nouns to pronouns as well as displacement of semantic features. This is not particularly surprising in that person reference, whether it is direct or indirect, is at the heart of politeness phenomena. Recall the common nominal source of 'servant/slave' for the first person and 'master/lord/king' (including the 'your grace' type of development discussed above) for the second person. This is clearly motivated by the speaker's desire to lower himself/herself and elevate his/her addressee, which is quite possibly

universal. Displacement also has an arguably universal basis in that distancing, whether it is physical or conceptual, serves as a token of politeness (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987). Among the 207 languages surveyed by Helmbrecht, 136 languages do not make politeness distinctions in second person pronouns (e.g. English). The rest are classified into the following groups: (i) languages with binary politeness distinctions (e.g. German; 49 languages), (ii) languages with multiple politeness distinctions (e.g. Tamil; 15 languages), and (iii) languages that avoid pronouns for politeness (e.g. Thai; 7 languages). Many languages utilize existent features such as person and number for the purpose of politeness rather than employ a new and independent expression of politeness (e.g. French). Japanese is included in the last group, namely languages that avoid pronouns for politeness, because kinship terms and occupational names are often used in place of pronouns. However, it is important to note that in the last group pronouns are avoided because they carry various sociolinguistic implicatures, that is to say, they do encode politeness distinctions.

Finally, although there is a striking pattern in the nominal source, politeness can of course be language/culture-specific. We have seen examples of Japanese *watakushi* which originally meant ‘private’: private (as opposed to one’s social obligation) > personal > speaker designation. We have also seen examples in Thai where first person *phǒm* and *kramɔm* come from ‘hair’ and ‘crown (of the head)’ and second person *tâajtháaw* and *fâabàad* from ‘underneath food’ and ‘sole of foot’, respectively (Cooke 1968). This is motivated by the fact that the socially inferior speaker places the sole of the addressee on a par with his/her own head/hair. However, even in these culture-specific cases, the ultimate motivation seems to lie in politeness. The Thai examples directly indicate the socially lower status of the speaker and the higher status of the addressee. Japanese *watakushi* is more subtle, but it implies the contrast between important social obligations/duties and trifle/trivial personal matters.



## Conclusion

This study has investigated the diachrony of personal pronouns in Japanese from a functional and cross-linguistic perspective. In this final chapter, I summarize the major findings of this study and discuss directions for future research.

### 6.1 Summary of the major findings

In Chapter 2, the development of personal pronouns from nouns was examined. It was pointed out that first person forms tend to come from humble nouns and second person forms from respectful social titles: Japanese *boku* ‘servant’ is an instance of the former, and *kimi* ‘emperor/lord’ and *kisama* ‘nobility’ of the latter. Although changes that involve nouns are often subject to extra-linguistic factors, one common path can be exemplified by the case of *kimi*. *Kimi* was originally used as a noun which meant ‘emperor’, but its usage was gradually extended to mean ‘social superiors’ as it became conventionally associated with the addressee in the speech situation. This conventionalization occurs in the context where the referent of *kimi* is a participant in both the described event (i.e. an element in the proposition) and the speech event (i.e. present in the speech situation as a speaker or addressee). The story of *kisama* ‘noble person’ is somewhat akin to that of the first person *boku* in that extra-linguistic forces were an important factor in its development. We also examined a Japanese culture-specific development of *watakushi* ‘private’ that falls outside the servant-lord axis. *Watakushi* started out as a noun meaning ‘private (matters)’, and it was often contrasted with public matters such as one’s social obligations. The meaning ‘private’ has gradually come to be interpreted metonymically as ‘personal’, which is naturally given the first person interpretation in the speech situation. This connection leads to conventionalization of *watakushi* as a first person pronoun. The change from nouns to pronouns is a prototypical instance of grammaticalization in that all or most of the grammaticalization parameters apply. For example, phonetically reduced versions of *watakushi* generally cannot be interpreted as a noun ‘private’, whereas the pronoun interpretation is possible for both reduced and unreduced versions.

On the semantic-pragmatic side, all forms that belonged to the servant/speaker-lord/addressee axis underwent a loss of semantic content (semantic bleaching) and



a decrease in the politeness value toward the addressee (pragmatic depreciation). I argued that inflationary effects and relation-acknowledging are responsible for the processes. An item will gradually lose its semantic content as it strengthens the tie with the speech situation and one of the participants, and the more frequent the item becomes, the more semantically neutral it will be. However, frequency cannot sufficiently account for pragmatic depreciation. The change from neutral to informal or derogatory can be explained by the principle of relation-acknowledging, where the norm of self-reference and address is to acknowledge the asymmetrical relation between the speaker and the addressee. In such a system, using a semantically general or neutral item can be construed as a sign of disregarding the status difference between the conversation participants, thereby leading to devaluation of the item. For this reason, forms that directly refer to the speaker-addressee axis are more susceptible to pragmatic depreciation than those that do not make a direct reference to it (cf. second person *kimi* 'lord' vs. first person *watakushi* 'private').

Chapter 3 investigated the development of demonstratives into personal pronouns. Demonstratives are the major source of third person pronouns, as shown by previous studies (Bhat 2004; Diessel 1999; Siewierska 2004), but examinations show that demonstrative and first/second person pronouns have a tenuous diachronic link. I argued that there are at least three functional reasons as to why demonstratives are unlikely to give rise to first/second person pronouns. The first reason is the fact that demonstratives can be used to refer to person referents with a simple pragmatic extension based on their spatial semantics. This is why their diachronic and synchronic distribution across the person categories is consistent with their spatial semantics. Reference to the first person is achieved only by speaker-proximal forms, and second person reference is achieved by speaker-proximal as well as speaker-distal and addressee-proximal forms. The use of non-speaker-proximal forms for the addressee is not surprising, and their use can be preempted by speaker-proximal forms when the speaker perceives the addressee to be in his/her proximal area. The second reason is closely related to the first: since the metonymic use of demonstratives for a person referent is a simple pragmatic extension of their spatial semantics, there is little reason for language users to reanalyze them as personal pronouns. Third, demonstratives and first/second person pronouns are functionally dissimilar to one another in that the basic function of demonstratives is to direct the addressee's attention to a cognitively unactivated entity, whereas the referent of first/second person is presupposed in most instances.

Although it has been argued that demonstratives are unlikely to develop into first/second person pronouns, we examined the case of *anata*, a speaker-and-addressee-distal demonstrative that became a second person pronoun. The case of *anata* cannot be explained based on its spatial semantics, and it should be viewed as conventionalization of a distancing politeness strategy. Its development suggests

the universality of politeness strategy of displacement: displacement for politeness purposes in the domain of personal pronouns is widely observed in the languages of the world (cf. Head 1978; Brown & Levinson 1987). Some languages employ displacement in terms of number (the use of plural for singular, e.g. French *tu* vs. *vous*), while others use person categories (the use of third person for second person, e.g. German *du* vs. *Sie*). The case of *anata* involves displacement in terms of space, that is, the use of speaker-and-addressee-distal form for the addressee. Another strong indication that *anata*, but not its paradigm mates *konata* and *sonata*, has become a personal pronoun is the fact that the so-called pronoun usage of the latter two disappeared at the same time they dropped out of the demonstrative paradigm. The second person use of the former, on the other hand, survived even though it is no longer part of the demonstrative paradigm. This adds to the body of evidence that the complete and systematic morphological relation between the system of person and demonstratives is cross-linguistically uncommon (cf. Head 1978; Greenberg 1985).

Chapter 4 was concerned with the development of items that were said to have undergone the shift of person categories. I argued that there are three principles that may contribute to person shift: extravagant politeness, spatial perspectives, and empathetic perspectives. Extravagant politeness involves the asymmetrical speaker-addressee social axis (i.e. 'servant/slave' for the first person and 'lord/master/king' for the second person), and it also includes the strategic displacement of semantic features. The development of asymmetrical social terms can be considered as the shift from the third person to first/second person in that they are nouns, whereas displacement of semantic features may include features other than person. In most instances, spatial and empathetic perspectives involve the shift from the first person to the second person. The former simply reflects a change in the speaker's spatial perspectives. The latter is the speaker's identification with the addressee and others. Also included in the latter are many cases of socio-pragmatic use of first person pronouns for the second person such as English medical-*we*. Both of them are strongly biased toward the shift from the first to the second person because the speaker serves as the perspectival center. The speaker has a choice to use speaker-proximal forms for himself/herself as well as for the addressee, but speaker-distal or addressee-proximal forms cannot be used for the speaker. Similarly, the speaker can take the perspective of the addressee, but the addressee is unable to take the perspective of the speaker. I also argued against the claim that there is an inherent link between person shift and pragmatic depreciation. The forms that supposedly shifted from the first to the second person are often, but not necessarily, derogatory. This is ultimately because the speaker's change of spatial perspectives in the immediate speech situation and of empathetic perspectives in his/her subjective discourse world can be (but not inherently) derogatory.

In Chapter 5, I examined the major sources of personal pronouns from a functional and cross-linguistic perspective: nominal sources, displacement of semantic features, demonstratives, and reflexives. In many languages, generic nouns such as ‘man’ and ‘person’ become impersonal pronouns, but, out of politeness concerns, the asymmetric model of ‘servant’ for the first person and ‘lord’ for the second person is particularly common. Displacement of semantic features is also commonly found in the languages of the world. The most prevalent types are the use of plural for singular and third person for second person. The common denominator between the two here is conceptual distancing that yields the sense of politeness. The use of first person for second person yields the opposite effect because it indicates the speaker’s involvement in the addressee’s matters. Demonstratives are the major source of third person pronouns, but they are unlikely to give rise to first/second person pronouns, because their use for person referents is consistent with the metonymic extension of their spatial semantics, which is especially clear in languages like Japanese, Korean, and Thai. This is in accordance with Head’s (1987: 182–183) cross-linguistic generalization that the use of demonstratives for person reference is uncommon. Reflexives uninflected for person can naturally be used for any person category. They also serve the self-objectification function in discourse which is a characteristic reflexive behavior, making them unlikely sources of personal pronouns.

I also discussed what the diachronic development of personal pronouns and grammaticalization suggest about each other. I argued that treating all development of personal pronouns as grammaticalization is problematic because grammaticalization can only properly account for the development of nouns into personal pronouns, and other sources pose serious difficulty. Displacement of semantic features contributes to the emergence of new pronoun usage, but there is no clear evidence indicating that the process results in increased grammaticality. Along with displacement, in many instances, grammaticalization parameters hardly apply to demonstratives and reflexives, which in itself is not necessarily problematic, especially erosion. However, parameters other than extension do not apply to forms like Japanese *jibun*, and it appears that the same can be said about reflexives in a number of other languages. The fact that grammaticalization can only explain the development of personal pronouns from nouns properly urges us to: (i) look at each development individually without conflating all under the rubric of grammaticalization and (ii) carefully examine whether we are dealing with semanticized personal pronouns or simply with items that are used pronominally.

## 6.2 Directions for future research

My findings suggest a number of areas and issues that deserve further research. I outline below some steps that should be taken in the future in order to better understand the development of personal pronouns in Japanese as well as cross-linguistically.

At the end of Chapter 2, I suggested that Japanese is unlikely to see any more of the proliferation of personal pronouns that it saw in the Pre-Modern periods because of the increasingly egalitarian nature of the contemporary society, but I was unable to explore the question of what will happen to the items once they have become personal pronouns. Do they stay as personal pronouns, maintaining the relatively well-defined pronominal paradigm, or do they develop a new function and possibly drop out of the paradigm? Some have suggested that oftentimes (but not always) first person pronouns develop what is called ‘emotive’ use, in which the predicate expresses the speaker’s emotion and the form is unmarked by particles as in *Sugoi warukute watashi* ‘I feel terrible’ (Ono & Thompson 2003: 330). They point out that this could be a common developmental path for Japanese pronouns in that the same development is observed in various dialects (Fujiwara 1982, 1985, 1986). Ono & Thompson also list some other functions that first person pronouns in Japanese could develop, such as ‘frame setting’, which deserve further investigation, especially in relation to phenomena termed ‘pragmaticalization’ by some (see for example Degand & Evers-Vermeul 2015). Also, it is often observed in typological works that free forms become bound forms (e.g. Givón 1979): in the case of pronouns, from independent forms to agreement markers. It is worthwhile to investigate Ono & Thompson’s claim from a cross-linguistic perspective in that there may be typologically distinct developmental pathways that pronouns take. Free personal pronouns in languages that lack agreement and use various other terms pronominally may develop into discourse markers of some sort, as in Japanese. On the other hand, the often cited development from personal pronouns into agreement markers and eventually a zero (e.g. Givón 1979) may primarily be a feature in those languages with agreement.<sup>40</sup>

It was pointed out in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that there is little functional reason to treat Japanese demonstratives and reflexives, respectively, as personal pronouns, which I argued has some cross-linguistic relevance (Chapter 5). Clearly, more large-scale cross-linguistic investigation is necessary. In languages in which demonstratives are said to have given rise to (first/second person) pronouns, is their distribution across person categories consistent with the metonymic extension of

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40. In this regard, Bhat’s (2004: 15–30) proposal about the distinction between free-pronoun languages and bound-pronoun language is interesting and may be relevant for future studies.

the spatial semantics, as was the case with Japanese? Recall that speaker-proximal forms are used for the speaker and the addressee, and speaker-distal (or addressee-proximal) forms are used for the addressee in a number of languages, e.g. Korean (*i jjog/pyon* ‘this side’, *i gos* ‘this place’, and *yeogi* ‘here’ for the first person; *jeogi* ‘there’ for the second person), Vietnamese (*hây* ‘here’ for the first person; *đó* ‘there’ for the second person), Thai (*nîi* ‘this (one)’ for the first person), and a Chinese dialect (*zher* ‘here’ for the first person plural). The fact that these forms are used for person referents does not reliably show that they are personal pronouns, as their use is consistent with the spatial semantics and the grammaticalization parameters do not apply. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine cross-linguistic tendencies such as ‘here > personal pronouns’ and ‘locative > personal pronouns’ proposed by Heine & Kuteva (2002).

Reflexives also deserve further cross-linguistic investigation. Reflexives in Chinese (*ziji*), Korean (*caki*), Thai (*tua*), and Vietnamese (*minh*) show a similar behavior to that of Japanese *jibun* in discourse. They are often used for impersonalization, objectification, and self-reflection in much the same way as the Japanese examples presented in Chapter 5 (cf. Cooke 1968; Zubin et al. 1990). In addition, their use for the second person is often described as casual, if not derogatory. Another question that must be examined in the future is the issue concerning reflexives and intensifiers. I argued that reflexives are not the major source of personal pronouns without drawing a clear boundary between reflexives and intensifiers. However, in languages where such a development is attested, it is left for future research to determine whether it is reflexives or intensifiers that are likely to become personal pronouns. Heine & Song (2010, 2011) suggest that intensifiers are the more likely source because of the prominence that intensifiers give to the main noun phrase in a sentence, which they claim is responsible for the politeness level of reflexive-based pronouns (but recall Head 1978, who argues that polite reflexive-based forms are an areal feature found primarily in languages of India). It is, however, noteworthy that, in some of the languages that Heine & Song cite as languages where reflexives/intensifiers developed into personal pronouns (e.g. Japanese, Korean), the form that is said to have become a personal pronoun is the reflexive even though those languages arguably make a formal distinction between reflexives and intensifiers. Although the cross-linguistic nature of the problem is highlighted above, the obvious need exists for detailed item-by-item analyses of individual items. Only through detailed textual analysis can we claim that a given item should be considered as a semanticized personal pronoun or simply as an item used pronominally.

In Chapter 5, I argued that, while the development from nouns to personal pronouns can be considered grammaticalization, development from other sources does not constitute grammaticalization. It is worthwhile to investigate further the nature of the diachronic process involving non-nominal sources. For example, concerning

displacement of semantic features (i.e. plurification and shift in deixis), I argued for Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory as a possible mechanism as it can handle two forces that are seemingly opposite in nature, at least concerning the addressee: plurification for distancing politeness (e.g. French *vous*) as negative politeness and plurification for closeness (e.g. English medical-*we*) as positive politeness. The speaker's displacement of semantic features symbolically manipulates conceptual distance toward the second person, yielding the opposite politeness effect with respect to the addressee. This model works well for languages where a limited number of pronominal features are displaced, but it is not clear how it applies to languages in which multiple forms are used in a more complicated way, e.g. Tamil in (69). Also, how does one incorporate the use of first person plural for first person singular? It appears that, even when the target reference is the first person, the politeness effect is measured in response to the second person. The inclusive interpretation yields positive politeness, and the exclusive reading creates negative politeness, because the former decreases the distance to the addressee by including him/her, whereas the latter increases the distance by excluding him/her. It is also necessary to conduct a large-scale cross-linguistic examination into the source of personal pronouns, particularly first/second person pronouns. How often do we actually find the five conceptual sources discussed in the previous studies in the languages of the world?

The final thought is the relationship between the typology of the pronominal system and person reference in general. It is natural that languages like Japanese, whose pronominal system lacks neutral forms, have more elaborate ways of achieving person reference, at least as an argument of the predicate (i.e. non-vocatives), than languages like Present-Day English, whose pronominal system does not code politeness. This is also reflected in Helmbrecht's (2008) classification of politeness distinctions in personal pronouns. Languages that avoid pronouns for politeness purposes use other forms such as kinship terms and occupational names, as is the case with Burmese, Thai, Vietnamese, and Japanese. However, it appears that the reverse is not necessarily true: languages with neutral pronouns could also utilize a variety of address terms. To put it differently, languages with no politeness distinctions (thus having little to no need for pronoun avoidance) can employ elaborate address terms, especially as vocatives. This seems to be the case with Mandarin which frequently uses a kinship term vocatively in addition to personal pronouns (which have binary distinction in the second person) as part of the argument structure of the predicate. It is worthwhile to investigate whether there is a correlation between a certain type of pronominal system and the system of person reference in general. Although we do not know the exact origin of personal pronouns in quite a few languages of the world, they do not appear to be grammatical primitives in many languages in which their historical sources are clear. Therefore, in order

to account for the development of personal pronouns, we need to treat personal pronouns as a highly specialized part of the person reference system in general, as, from the options available in the general person referring expressions, some come to be used exclusively to index the speech roles of the speaker and the addressee.

## Appendix

Here I briefly discuss the case of *ore*, which I was not able to address in the main part of this book (see footnote 3 in § 1.5; footnote 29 in § 4.5). *Ore* is attested since Stage I. It is used as a derogatory second person form in Stage I and II, whereas it functions as a first person form from Stage III on. The etymology of *ore* is controversial, and there does not seem to be a consensus among scholars. For examples, previous studies such as Yamaguchi (1985) and Whitman (1999) suggest that *ore* developed from the reflexive form *onore*, whereas others such as Tsujimura (1968) doubt the etymological relation between *onore* and *ore*. To make matters more complicated, comprehensive dictionaries seem to disagree with respect to the relationship between *ore* for the first and second person. While some dictionaries such as Kojien (Shinmura 1991) treat the first person and second person uses as coming from the same word, others such as Nihon Kokugo Daijiten (Nihon Daijiten Kankokai 1972–1976) mention the possibility that the first person *ore* and the second person *ore* are etymologically unrelated. Having noted the lack of an accepted history, Nihon Kokugo Daijiten suggests that the second person *ore* might have come from the demonstrative *uli* of Ryukyuan (a language spoken mainly in Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefecture in Japan) or from the Korean first person form *uli*,<sup>41</sup> whereas the first person *ore* is a phonological reduction of the reflexive *onore* or a phonological variation of the first person form *are*. Therefore, the dictionary has separate entries for each and assigns different Chinese characters ([爾] for the former, and [俺] and [己] for the latter). With this level of disagreement on the subject, telling the whole story of *ore* is clearly beyond the scope of this book. However, it is still useful and interesting to examine the development of *ore* within the approach adopted in this book, following the assumption of some previous studies that the first person and second person *ore* come from the same form. Therefore, what follows is a brief historical description of *ore* based on the premise that the first person *ore* and the second person *ore* share the same etymology.

In Stage I and II, *ore* is used derogatorily for a second person referent, as shown in the following examples.

- (i) a. *Ore Kumasotakeru futari, matsuroha zu rei nashi*  
ore Kumasotekeru.brothers two obey NEG politeness not.exist  
to *kikoshimeshite, ore wo tore to noritamahite tsukawaseri.*  
COMP hear.POL ore ACC kill COP say.RESP send  
‘The emperor heard that you (*ore*) two do not obey his reign and lack proper  
courtesy, so he sent me to kill you (*ore*).’ (State I: 712, Kojiki, Emperor Keikou)

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41. It is not clear in the description as to how the second person *ore* arises from the Korean first person *uli*. However, the fact that the second person *ore* is contemptuous is at least theoretically consistent with the first person source scenario.



- b. *Ore wa nani goto ihu zo. Toneri datsuru. Ore bakari no ore TOP what thing say EMPH petty.officer look.like ore merely GEN ohoyake bito wo, wa ga uchi-tara-n ni, nani goto no aru public person INJ I NOM hit-ASP-MOD ADV what thing NOM exist beki zo.*  
MOD EMPH

“What did you (*ore*) say?” snarled the steward. “A petty officer like you (*ore*), a paltry Imperial Attendant, I could knock you down and there isn’t a thing you could do about it.” (Stage II: early 13C, Uji Shui Monogatari, Book 10: Chapter 1)

In (ia) the speaker confronts the brothers who the emperor sent him to kill and addresses them as *ore*, whereas in (ib) the excited speaker is arguing with another man after their sons’ fight, referring to the addressee as *ore*. In the examples above, it is clear that *ore* is a derogatory form. However, it is not immediately clear if it is a semanticized second person form, since one can find examples from Stage II where *ore* is used for the first person as well, as in the following.

- (ii) *Naisi-no-Kami ni, ore wo, mausinasi tamahe.*  
mistress.of.staff DAT ore ACC put.up RESP  
‘Put me (*ore*) up for Mistress of Staff.’ (Stage II: 1002, Genji Monogatari, Miyuki)

The speaker in (ii) designates herself as *ore* when she asks for the addressee’s recommendation for the position she desires. The difference between *ore* in (ii) and that in Modern Japanese is that, unlike its Modern Japanese counterpart, *ore* in the above example does not give the impression of arrogance. It is also used by a female speaker which is extremely rare, if not impossible, in Modern Japanese (particularly in Standard Tokyo Japanese). Under the approach of this study, this type of indeterminacy with respect to person categories suggests that the item in question does not belong to a particular person category, but it is an item that is functioning reflexively.<sup>42</sup> The indeterminacy continues in Stage III when, according to the previous studies such as Whitman (1999), *ore* is a first person form. Consider the following example.

- (iii) *Hooshi wa mono o e-kaka-nu zo, saraba ore-ra kake.*  
monk TOP thing ACC POT-write-NEG EMPH then ore-PL write.IMP  
‘I cannot write. You (*ore*) will write for me.’ (Stage III: 1371, Heike Monogatari, Book 5)

(iii) is uttered by a monk who is being exiled to the province of Izu and is addressing the officials escorting him. As we can see from the use of the emphatic particle *zo* and the imperative verb form, *ore* here is used in the derogatory sense like (ia–b). The distribution of the form does not follow the pattern exemplified in this study since it is more often used for the second person than for the first person at earlier stages. Forms used for both the first and second person (e.g. *konata*, *temae*) are generally used for the first person first, then the second person. However, the pragmatics of *ore* conform to the approach of this study in that, while first person *ore* is not derogatory, the second person *ore* is almost always used derogatorily in the context of criticizing the addressee. This can be the result of the discourse function of items used reflexively, namely leading the thought of the addressee.

In Stage IV, it appears that *ore* has semanticized as a first person form because the second person use is extremely rare. Consider the following examples, which potentially suggest paradigmaticity.

42. This is possibly a reason to advocate the argument that *ore* arose from the reflexive *onore*.

- (iv) a. *Ore wa yoba nu ga to oose-keru hodoni. Satewa watakushi*  
 ore TOP call NEG but COMP say.RESP-MOD situation then watashi  
*no kikichigae-mashi-ta nado mooshite.*  
 NOM mishear-HON-PST etc say.HUBL  
 ‘Because he said, “I (*ore*) did not call you”, I said, “I (*watashi*) must have then made a mistake”’ (Stage IV: 1686, Koushoku Ichidai Onna, Book 3: Chapter 4)
- b. *Ore wa agura kaki-masi-ta da ga, omee wa*  
 ore TOP legs cross-POL-PST cop but omae TOP  
*ne-korobari-masi-ta da no.*  
 sleep-fall.down-POL-PST COP FP  
 ‘I (*ore*) crossed my legs, but you (*omae*) threw yourself down.’  
 (Stage IV: 1808, Ukiyoburo) (Dasher 1995: 258)

In both examples, *ore* stands in contrast with other person forms, with first person *watakushi* in (iva) and with second person *omae* in (ivb). Unlike examples like (ii) from Stage II where the speaker asks for the addressee’s recommendation for the job she is interested in, pragmatic depreciation of *ore* is apparent in (iv). In (iva) *watakushi* is uttered by the heroine and *ore* by her mistress’s husband. Similarly, casualness of (ivb) can be seen in the use of the phonologically reduced form of *omae*, *omee*, which is contrasted with *ore*. At this stage, *ore* exhibits little to no indeterminacy with respect to the person category it designates.

The status of *ore* as a first person pronoun is clear in Stage V, as it can be used by any male speaker only as a first person form in an informal situation, as can be seen in the following examples.

- (v) *ore no mae e kita hitori no geisha ga, anta, nanzo, utai-nahare,*  
 ore GEN front to came one GEN geisha NOM anta something sing-REQ  
*to shamisen o kakaeta kara, ore wa utawa-nai, kisama*  
 COMP shamisen ACC held because ore TOP sing-NEG kisama  
*utat-temir-o to it-tara...*  
 sing-see-IMP COMP say-if  
 ‘One of the geishas came over to me (*ore*) with her shamisen ready and said “You there, come on, give us a song”, but when I said to her, “I (*ore*) won’t sing. You (*kisama*) can sing something yourself instead, ...”’ (Stage V: 1906, Botchan, Chapter 9)

In (v), there are four instances of personal pronouns, *ore*, *anta*, *ore*, and *kisama*, in that order. *Anta* is a contracted form of *anata* (originally speaker-and-addressee-distal directional demonstrative), and *kisama* was originally a respectful term of address meaning ‘nobility’. Again, this is potentially suggestive of high paradigmaticity in that the last three forms are contrasted with each other: you (*anta*) sing... I (*ore*) won’t sing... you (*kisama*) sing instead.

The etymological origin of *ore* and the historical relation between the first person *ore* and second person *ore* remain controversial, as we discussed above. However, the approach of this study that takes account the discourse behavior of high empathy items into consideration can offer a possible explanation to some aspects of the development (e.g. derogatory second person vs. non-derogatory first person) albeit on the premise that the first person and second person use of *ore* are historically related.



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Personal pronouns in Japanese form a heterogeneous category. This book investigates their historical development from a functional perspective. It shows that while nouns give rise to personal pronouns through semanticization of pragmatic inferences, the use of non-nominal forms such as demonstratives and reflexives for person referents can be resolved within their original functions, offering little reason to treat them as personal pronouns. The cross-linguistic investigation into the common sources of personal pronouns reveals that the development of personal pronouns from nouns is largely consistent with grammaticalization, but that of forms of non-nominal origins requires separate mechanisms such as spatial/empathetic perspectives and displacement of semantic features for politeness, showing that a one-size-fits-all approach to diachrony of personal pronouns is not sufficient. This book will be of special interest to researchers and students in historical linguistics, pragmatics, and Japanese linguistics, who take a functional view of language.

“The Japanese pronoun system can be characterized by its large inventory of forms with various sociolinguistic meanings. Using rich Japanese historical written documents and current theories of grammaticalization, this book offers functionally and typologically oriented perspectives on pronouns in Japanese and pronouns in general. The book will serve as an important resource for both scholars of Japanese linguistics and general researchers of grammaticalization.”

**Shoichi Iwasaki**, Ph.D., *UCLA*

“Osamu Ishiyama’s book provides a wealth of data on the historical development of Japanese personal pronouns and promises to be an invaluable source of information for researchers of historical linguistics and functional-typological linguistics.”

**Kaoru Horie**, *Nagoya University*

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