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Causation and Reasoning Constructions

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by Masaru Kanetani

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Acknowledgments

This monograph has grown out of my doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Tsukuba in 2008, entitled *Causation and Reasoning: A Construction Grammar Approach to Conjunctions of Reason*. While the basic ideas laid out in this book remain the same, substantial modifications and new insights have been added during the last decade after the defense. Even the concepts and terminologies used in the main claim are not entirely the same. I am deeply indebted to many people for their support and encouragement.

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Tsukuba, August 2018
M. K.

List of abbreviations

1SG	first person singular
ACC	accusative case marker
$ARG_{1\text{-}n}$	arguments selected by PRED
ASP	aspect operator / marker
CNG	connegative form of a noun
COP	copula
DAT	dative case marker
D-MOD	discourse modality
INT	interrogative marker
NMLZ	nominalizer
NEG	negation marker
NOM	nominative case marker
PH	performative honorific
PROP1–4	propositions1–4
POL	polarity operator
PRED	predicate
SA	speech act
S-MOD	sentential modality
TNS	tense operator
TOP	topic marker

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Causation, reasoning, and construction grammar

Causation and *reasoning* refer to different but related types of relationships between two situations.[1] These relationships are expressed in similar forms of clause linkage. Sentences (1a, b), respectively, express a causal relation and a reasoning process:

(1) a. The ground is wet because it has rained.
b. It has rained, because the ground is wet.

The forms of the sentences are very similar: Two clauses are connected by the conjunction *because*. Their meanings are not so much alike. The situation described in the *because*-clause in (1a) is understood as the cause of the other situation, namely, the situation where the ground is wet. Hence, this sentence expresses a causal relation. The *because*-clause in (1b) is understood as providing the premise from which to draw the conclusion that it must have rained. I call such a relationship a reasoning process.[2] Although these sentences are different in meaning, they look alike. Given the contrast in (1a, b), the conjunction *because* has been considered polysemous between a causal sense and a reasoning sense (e.g., Jespersen (1949), Rutherford (1970), Sweetser (1990), Hirose (1991, 1992), Nakau (1994), Dancygier and Sweetser (2000), among many others). The basic idea I propose for the interpretational difference between (1a) and (1b) is that the conjunction is not itself polysemous but instead is used in two different constructions. That is, sentences (1a, b) are specific instances, i.e. constructs, of two distinct constructions in which the same conjunction *because* appears. With this basic idea in mind, I will attribute to the constructional difference various phenomena that have been said to be sensitive to the different readings of the conjunction. It is fair to note here that, as we will see later on, the idea that the conjunction *because* itself is

1. The word "situation" is used as a cover term for both event and state of affairs (cf. Lyons (1977: 483)).

2. The reasons that I avoid using *inference*, a well-established term, will be discussed later, inter alia, in Section 3.4.

not polysemous is not at all new (e.g., Hirose (1998, 1999)). My main concern is to elucidate the properties of the constructions, which account for other relevant constructions with *because*.

The framework to be proposed is also applicable to other conjunctions of reason such as *since* and *for*. Observe the following examples:

(2) a. He is called Mitch, *because* his name is Mitchell.
b. I'm forever on a diet, *since* I put on weight easily.
c. He had a great desire to have a home of his own *for* he had always lived with my grandmother.
(*Collins COBUILD English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (4th edition) [COBUILD]; italics are mine)

Superficially, these conjunctions seem to be interchangeable. In fact, some dictionaries paraphrase *since* and *for* with *because*. Take the following dictionary definitions as examples:

(3) a. since: conjunction *because*
b. for: conjunction dated or literally *because*
(*Cambridge International Dictionary of English* [CIDE])

As shown in (3), the meanings of *since* and *for* are defined as *because* in *CIDE*. However, there are several differences between them, of which I simply point out three here as a first step to our argument (while details will be discussed in Chapter 3). First, unlike *because*, *since* and *for*, though their definitions vary, are said to have only a reasoning use (e.g. Kanbayashi (1989), Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c)).[3]

Second, reasoning *because*-clauses may not occur in sentence-initial position as in (4a), but the *since*-clause in (4b) may, even though it provides a premise for an inference.

(4) a. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained. (Hirose (1991: 27))
b. Since he isn't here, he has (evidently) gone home. (Sweetser (1990: 78))

3. One may be skeptical of this view of *since* and *for*, given sentences like (ia, b) in which the *since*- and *for*-clauses seem to represent the cause of the situations expressed in the main clauses, but I argue for this view in Chapter 3 (details will be discussed there).

(i) a. Since John wasn't there, we decided to leave a note for him.
(Sweetser (1990: 78))
b. John came back, for he loved her.

Third, *for*-clauses, unlike *because*- and *since*-clauses, cannot occur in sentence-initial position, as shown in (5):

(5) *For he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred.
(cf. He asked to be transferred, for he was unhappy.)
(Quirk et al. (1985: 922))

Thus far, we have seen that *because*, *since* and *for* all invite reasons of some kind, but their syntactic and semantic behaviors are not the same. As mentioned above, the framework I propose attributes these similarities and differences to the constructions that they are used in, and can comprehensively account for both similarities and differences.

What then is meant by constructions? I use the term "constructions" in the sense of construction grammar theory, but I do not limit myself to a specific subtype of construction grammar (Berkeley Construction Grammar (Fillmore and Kay (1993)), radical construction grammar (Croft (2001)), sign-based construction grammar (Boas and Sag (2012)), etc.; for details of various constructionist approaches, see Hoffman and Trousdale (2013)). Rather, taking it in a somewhat broader sense and using notions and concepts employed in the construction grammar literature, I will make use of much of its philosophy and principles to describe relevant grammatical phenomena. Now, let us see what construction grammar approaches in general should be like. Croft and Cruse (2004: 265) point out that all constructionist approaches conform to the following basic principles:

(6) a. The independent existence of constructions as symbolic units
b. The uniform representation of grammatical structures
c. The taxonomic organization of constructions in a grammar.

Following these principles, we can take a construction as a uniform representation of formal and functional structures that are stored in our mind with relation to other constructions existing independently.

Östman and Fried (2005) also list as in (7a)–(7d) the original tenets of construction grammar that all constructionist approaches should conform to:

(7) a. it should be generative grammar and should be formalizable;
b. it should integrate different domains of 'components' of grammar (phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics);
c. it should be a grammar with universal impact; and
d. should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction

(Östman and Fried (2005: 1))

First, a construction should be taken not only as an integrated representation of formal and functional structures, but also as a (partially filled) schema that generates specific constructs, e.g. sentences, as elaborations of the constructional frame. In this sense, a construction can be considered as a formal, generative engine. Proposals will also be made in accordance with tenet (7c). More specifically, I will apply what I propose for English to the corresponding constructions in Japanese to show that the proposal to be made for one language is cross-linguistically valid. Of course, not all specific constructions in a particular language occur in other languages, but what I take to be basic constructions in English are commonly found in Japanese. Intriguingly, the behavior of these constructions, which I will claim reflects the constructions' characteristics, overlaps cross-linguistically. This fact, though the details will be discussed later, conforms to the last tenet in (7d), which can be regarded as an outcome of the history of Construction Grammar. This specific tenet is related to the history of construction grammar. Construction grammar was originally developed from Frame Semantics theory (e.g., Fillmore (1975, 1982, 1985), Fillmore and Atkins (1992)). Fillmore and Atkins (1992: 76f.) describe a word's meaning as being "understood only with reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a kind of conceptual prerequisite for understanding the meaning." That is, meanings are defined relative to some particular background frame, and not according to simple truth-conditional checklists. In short, understanding word meanings requires understanding the frame in which the word is used. Such a view of meaning is reflected in construction grammar, and therefore it is considered that the grammar should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction. Therefore, the construction that exemplifies construct (1a) above should be consistent with what we know about causal relations, while the construction for (1b) should be consistent with our general knowledge about reasoning processes; and I will show that they indeed are.

Up to this point, I have focused on what I mean by "constructions" and what my approach is like. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that causation and reasoning are "different but related" relationships. Getting closer to the constructions of causation and reasoning, I would like to briefly explain how they are related to each other. Since the same conjunction *because* appears in the two distinct constructions, as in (1a, b) above, these constructions must be related in some way. I will argue for a metaphorical relation between the causal relation and a reasoning process (cf. Sweetser (1990)). Generally, metaphors make it possible for us to use expressions of one domain to talk about corresponding concepts in another domain (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 52)). Thus, the metaphorical relation between the two constructions accounts for the occurrence of the same conjunction *because* in the different constructions. In later chapters, through close examination of the constructions, I will describe how they are related to

each other and to other relevant constructions. I will also show the validity of the basic proposals by applying it to a wide range of phenomena that will be given an overview shortly. Therefore, the aims of this book are (i) to give an integrated and comprehensive account of the conjunctions of reason within the framework of construction grammar, (ii) to elucidate the nature of causal relation and the reasoning process, and (iii) to show the validity of the proposed analysis.

1.2 Organization

To achieve the above aims, this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews how these conjunctions have been treated in the literature and points out problems with their analyses. Specifically, I overview (i) Talmy's (1978b) Gestalt psychological view of subordination, (ii) Chafe's (1984) observation of the relation between clause position, i.e. sentence-initial or sentence-final, and boundedness, i.e. the presence or absence of a comma intonation, (iii) Sweetser's (1990) analysis of pragmatic ambiguity in *because* and *since*, (iv) Nakau's (1994) view of *because* and *since* as either a propositional element or a marker of modality, (v) Pander Maart and Sanders's (2000) speaker-involvement scaler approach and related subsequent studies, and (vi) Hirose's (1998, 1999) construction grammar approach to the subject *because*-clause construction (e.g., *just because he's a linguist doesn't mean he speaks many languages*). Following the overview of these previous studies, I briefly introduce some basic notions and theoretical tools of construction grammar, based on which arguments will be built in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 3 makes the main proposal in the book: I postulate and examine in detail constructions in which the conjunctions *because*, *since*, and *for* are used. They will be called the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction.[4] The former construction expresses a causal relation between the two situations described, and the latter the speaker's reasoning process. These meanings pair with certain syntactic forms to realize the form-meaning correspondences, or constructions. Crucially, *because* participates in both constructions, while *since* and *for* appear only in the REASONING construction. Strictly speaking, the CAUSAL construction is divided into two types in terms of the different arrangements of clauses (either the [Q *because* P] configuration or the [*Because* P, Q] configuration); and the REASONING construction into four types based on the conjunction used (either *because*, *since*, or *for*) and/or different configurations of the two clauses. Although they are independent constructions, they are also related in some ways. It is the notion of

4. Throughout this book, I use SMALL CAPITALS to indicate the names of constructions.

inheritance links, proposed by Goldberg (1995), that helps capture the relations. By postulating the constructions and describing their relations, I will claim that both similarities and differences between the conjunctions, such as those observed in Section 1.1 and other facts to be discussed later on, are best accounted for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves but by considering what constructions the conjunctions are used in.

Chapters 4 through 8 provide descriptive applications of the analysis proposed in Chapter 3, i.e., these chapters offer support for the proposal to be made in Chapter 3. First, Chapter 4 examines the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses. In contrast to the description of previous studies that *because*-clauses, but not *since*-clauses, can be focalized by focusing adverbs (e.g., Schourup and Waida (1988)), there are many cases in which certain focusing adverbs focalize *since*-clauses, as exemplified in (8):

(8) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, *particularly since* a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress … (BYU-BNC;[5] italics are mine)

Chapter 4 explains the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses in terms of (i) the characteristics of constructions that these conjunctions participate in and (ii) the types of focusing adverbs.

Chapter 5 extends the arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 to Japanese, comparing *because* constructions in English with *kara* constructions in Japanese. Like *because*, the Japanese conjunction (or conjunctive particle) *kara* has causal and reasoning uses:

(9) a. Taroo wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita
Taro TOP Hanako ACC love KARA came.back
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako.'

b. Taroo wa modottekita kara, Hanako o aishiteiru no daroo
Taro TOP came.back KARA Hanako ACC love NMLZ I.guess
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.'
(Higashiizumi (2006: 117f.))

Just like a causal *because*-clause, the situation mentioned in the *kara*-clause in (9a), *Taroo wa Hanako o aishiteiru* 'Taro loves Hanako', is understood as the cause of

5. Davies, Mark (2004-) BYU-BNC. (Based on the British National Corpus from Oxford University Press). Available online at https://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/.

Taro's coming back, while that in (9b), *Taroo wa modottekita* 'Taro came back', like an inferential *because*-clause, is understood as providing the premise from which to draw the conclusion that Taro loved Hanako. Pointing out similarities between these Japanese constructions and their English counterparts, I will show that the analysis to be proposed in Chapter 3 is valid not only language-specifically but also cross-linguistically.

Chapter 6 investigates a certain metalinguistic use of *because*, which is exemplified by the second sentence in (10):

(10) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. ***Reputed*, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it**. (Hirose (1992: 82))

In the second sentence, the speaker explains why he used the word *reputed* in the preceding context. This construction is marked in the following two senses: (i) although the conjunction *because* canonically connects two clauses (e.g., (11)), its main clause is only a word or phrase used in the preceding context,[6] and (ii) as we shall see in Chapter 6, the use of sentence (10) is more restricted than the use of a canonical semantic equivalent, as in (11):

(11) I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it.

To explain both generalities and specifics of constructions of metalinguistic reasons like (10), Chapter 6 compares them with other constructions in which *because* is used.

Chapter 7 presents an argument for what I will call the *just because of* X *doesn't mean* Y construction (or the JBo-X DM-Y construction). An example of this construction is given in (12):

(12) I mean, what happened is he signed a bill. It was a bad bill … I mean, **just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan**. (adapted from CNN transcripts)

The emphasized part in (12) is, in essence, equivalent in meaning to sentence (13):

(13) Just because he made a dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan.

---

6. The term "main clause" may not be proper to refer to the expression *reputed*, because such a simple word or phrase is not technically a clause. I simply use the term to refer to the syntactic position equivalent to the main clause.

In (13), the *because*-clause, instead of a *because of* phrase, occupies the subject position. Occasionally, sentences like (12) are considered ungrammatical (cf. Matsuyama (2001)), while sentences like (13) are well entrenched and in fact studied in some depth (e.g., Hirose (1991, 1999), Bender and Kathol (2001), Matsuyama (2001), Hilpert (2005)).[7] Nevertheless, instances of the JBo-X DM-Y construction do exist. In Chapter 7, I will claim that the existence of the construction at issue is accounted for in terms of analogy. Not only does the analysis to be presented account for the existence of the construction, but it can also successfully predict that the construction is still not perfectly accepted.

Chapter 8 investigates a new usage of *because*, selected as the 2013 Word of the Year by the American Dialect Society, exemplified in (14):[8]

(14) I cannot go out with you today because homework.

In (14), the noun *homework* directly follows *because*. Notably, not only nouns but also various other kinds of words, such as adjectives and interjections, may follow *because* in this construction. The sentence in (14) is, in essence, the same in meaning as a sentence like *I cannot go out with you today because I have a lot of homework*. I will claim that the new usage is similar to the CAUSAL construction while having its own characteristics; hence, I will treat the new usage as an independent construction (called the *BECAUSE* X construction). In particular, I will consider the *BECAUSE* X construction to be a more schematic construction than a construction with a *because*-clause. I will also point out that the hearers play an important role in understanding the *BECAUSE* X construction and its relation to the more basic construction with a *because*-clause.

Lastly, Chapter 9 concludes the book.

7. Some informants whom I consulted also take constructions like (12) unacceptable, while they accept clausal-subject counterparts like (13).

8. http://www.americandialect.org/because-is-the-2013-word-of-the-year

CHAPTER 2

Previous studies

From gestalt to construction

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I set the goals of the present work as follows: To elucidate the nature of causal and inferential relations, to give an integrated account of conjunctions of reason, and to show its validity. In this chapter, to see how the conjunctions or complex sentences that include the conjunctions in question have been treated in previous studies, I review (i) a Gestalt psychological view of subordination (Section 2.2), (ii) Chafe's (1984) observation of the relation between clause position, i.e. sentence-initial or sentence-final, and boundedness, i.e. the presence or absence of comma intonation (Section 2.3), (iii) Sweetser's (1990) analysis of pragmatic ambiguity in *because*- and *since*-clauses (Section 2.4), (iv) Nakau's (1994) view of *because* and *since* as either propositional elements or markers of modality (Section 2.5), (v) analyses based on subjectivity (Section 2.6), and (vi) certain construction grammar approaches to the constructions with *because* (Section 2.7). Finally, in Section 2.8, I briefly introduce some important notions as to how constructions and their networks are described.

Although I speak of "conjunctions of reason," the works that I review in this chapter are mostly concerned with the conjunction *because*. As I see it, a great deal of research has dealt with *because*, whereas far less attention has been paid to other conjunctions such as *since* and *for*.[9] To my knowledge, no in-depth research has examined *for*, and so while examining the previous studies in this chapter, I will refer to *for* in the context of their analyses.

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9. It is well known that the conjunction *because* has two (or more) readings, the causal and inferential readings, and that it behaves differently according to the reading (e.g., Jespersen (1949), Rutherford (1970), Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994), Hirose (1998, 1999), among many others; see Sections 2.4–2.6 and Chapter 3). The sense of the conjunction *since* has been argued in relation to its temporal meaning from various perspectives (e.g., Traugott and König (1991), Wickboldt (1997)), but in its meaning of reason, it does not show such various behavior as *because*. It may be for these reasons that *because* has attracted more attention from linguists.

2.2 Subordinate clauses as ground

Talmy (1978b) points out the importance and relevance of the Gestalt psychological categories of Figure and Ground in cognitive semantics (for those Gestalt psychological categories, see, for example, Koffka (1935: Chapter 5)). Talmy attempts to account for subordination in terms of this distinction (cf. Talmy (1978a, 2000), Ohori (1991, 1992)). As used in cognitive semantics, Figure and Ground objects are defined as follows:

(1) a. The Figure object is a moving or *conceptually* mov*able* point whose path or site is conceived as a variable, the particular value of which is the salient issue.

b. The Ground object is a reference-point, having a stationary setting within a reference-frame, with respect to which the Figure's path or site receives characterization.

(Talmy (1978b: 627))

The Figure-Ground distinction can account for contrasts like the one below:

(2) a. The bike is near the house.

b. ??The house is near the bike.[10]

(Talmy (1978b: 628))

The two sentences above represent the same logical relation, spatial approximation of the two objects. However, Talmy observes that these two sentences do not convey the same "meaning" (cf. Ohori (1992)). In (2a), *the house* is used as a reference-point by which to characterize the location of *the bike*. That is, *the house* is construed as the Ground object. In (2b), the relations are completely inverted, i.e., *the bike* is used as a reference-point by which *the house*'s location is characterized. Given the definitions of Figure and Ground objects as in (1a, b), we may account for the anomaly of sentence (2b) as follows. While sentence (2a) follows the general tendency or principle of our construal, sentence (2b) does not: *The bike*, which is (potentially) a moving object, is more readily construed as the Figure than *the house*, which is a static object. That is, the assignment of the Figure and Ground objects in sentence (2b) is unnatural.

Based on the observation that the Figure-Ground distinction plays an important role in cognitive semantics, Talmy further argues that the same distinction is observed not only in the relation between two objects, e.g., *the bike* and *the house* in (2a, b), but also in the relations between two events. According to Talmy, the

10. The judgment is Ohori's (1992: 82) (cf. Croft (2001: Chapter 9)).

Figure and Ground objects that are defined in terms of the relative location of objects in space as per the definitions in (1a, b) are extended to the relative location of events in time. Observe the following examples:

(3) a. The explosion took place during the performance.
b. The performance went on for three hours.

(Talmy (1978b: 632))

In (3a), the event of the explosion is considered as the Figure with respect to the reference point set in the temporal reference-frame, *during the performance*. Likewise, in (3b), *the performance* is construed as the Figure and the temporal expression *for three hours* as the Ground. That is, the temporal adverbials introduced by *during* and *for* are reference points with respect to which the events of the explosion and the performance going on receive their respective characterizations.

Interestingly, just as with the relations between two objects, e.g., (2a, b), there exist favored patterns of Figure-Ground assignments to events. To see this, compare the following examples:

(4) a. He exploded after he touched the button.
b. He touched the button before he exploded.

(Talmy (1978b: 632f.))

In (4a), the Ground interpretation is assigned to the event of touching the button, the Figure interpretation to the event of the explosion. The Figure-Ground assignment in sentence (4b) is completely opposite. Talmy says, "since either asymmetric relation in an 'inverse-pair' equally well specifies the same relational information, the advantage to a language in having lexification for both [e.g., *after* and *before*] is precisely that either of the related events can be specified as functioning as the Figure" (p. 633). That is, since English has both *before* and *after* to specify temporal relations between the two events expressed, either the event of explosion or the event of button-touching can be construed as the Figure object. Nevertheless, Talmy observes that sentence (4b) sounds unnatural even though it is "conceptually synonymous" with sentence (4a).[11] This unnaturalness, Talmy argues, stems from the Figure and Ground objects being very close to (if not the same as) the notions of assertion and presupposition. That is, sentences (4a, b) convey the same logical meaning, but the event of the explosion should be asserted, or more readily construed as the Figure object. Thus, Talmy observes that even if sentence (4b) is

11. Although Talmy does not place a symbol such as "?" or "*" in front of sentence (4b), he observes that the sentence *does* sound "comical" (p. 633).

grammatical, it sounds natural only in a special context, such as an official searching into the possible causes of a known death.

Likewise, such Figure-Ground distinctions and the favored pattern of their assignments may be applied to causal relations as well. According to Talmy, sentence (5a) below represents the favored or unmarked relation between the two events, and hence can be indicated by the simple expression *because of*, while the inverted relation in (5b), describing a marked relation, can be indicated only by a "devised phrase" such as *to-the-occasioning-of- (the-decision-of)*.

(5) a. We stayed home because of his arrival (= because he had arrived).
b. He arrived to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of) our staying home.
(Talmy (1978b: 637))

Sentence (5a) expresses a causal relation between the event of their staying home and that of a man's arrival, that is, his arrival has caused them to stay home. In sentence (5b), the reversed causal relation holds and the devised English phrase *to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of)* connects the two events expressed. Thus, Talmy takes the causal relation represented in (5a) as being more natural than that in (5b). From these arguments, Talmy presents the following generalization:

(6) The unmarked (or only possible) linguistic expression for a causal relation between two events treats the causing event as Ground and the resulting event as Figure. Where the complete surface is a full complex sentence, the two events are in the subordinate and main clause, respectively.
(Talmy (1978b: 639))

As Ohori (1992) points out, without the Figure-Ground distinction, contrasts like the one in (2a, b) above could not be explained. Thus, Talmy's work is important to the extent that his research makes it possible to account systematically for many contrasts resulting from certain pragmatic factors, and that it is because of his study that linguists have recognized the importance of the Figure-Ground distinctions.

Yet there are serious problems with Talmy's analysis. First, his analysis cannot capture the difference between the reasons introduced by *because* and *since*. Even if Talmy's observation is correct that subordinate clauses are understood as the Ground, how *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses (and other subordinate clauses) differ is still not clear. We need a grammatical system that makes it possible to capture both their similarities and their differences. Thus, just saying that *because*- and *since*-clauses are equally understood as Ground is not adequate.

Second, *because*-clauses (and some other types of subordinate clauses) are not always treated as Ground, but may be asserted as if they were independent clauses (e.g., Hooper and Thompson (1973), Lakoff (1987), Haegeman (2002), among others). Consider the following examples:

(7) a. I'm leaving, because here comes my bus. (Lakoff (1987: 473))
b. I'd better leave, since here comes my bus! (Lakoff (1987: 479))

In (7a) and (7b), the DEICTIC *THERE* construction *here comes my bus* occurs respectively in the *because-* and *since*-clauses. Hooper and Thompson (1973) observe that it is only in an asserted clause that such constructions ("speech act constructions" that convey statements in Lakoff's (1987) terms) occur. Crucially, as seen above, Talmy notes that Figure and Ground are very nearly, if not the same as, assertion and presupposition for propositions. If, as Talmy argues, subordinate clauses were always understood as the Ground object, or as presupposed, how could the asserted *because-* and *since*-clauses be accounted for? Talmy notes that generalization (6) is true for "the *unmarked* … linguistic expression for a causal relation" [italics are mine]. Thus, he does not say that this generalization always holds. One may then argue that the causal relations described in sentences (7a, b) are marked, and the Figure-Ground relation may be inverted. Even if they are, it is not clear what determines the "unmarked" or "marked" causal relation.

Some *because*-clauses, even without speech act constructions like the DEICTIC *THERE* construction in (7a), need to be construed as Figure objects. For example, a *because*-clause can be a focus of the answer to a *why*-question with its main clause being backgrounded. Consider the following dialogue:

(8) A: Why is the ground wet?
B: (The ground is wet) because it has rained.

In this dialogue, speaker B needs to assert the reason why the ground is wet. He can start the answer either with the main clause or with the *because*-clause. What is important is that the information conveyed by the main clause (whether it is repeated or not) is not asserted but presupposed, or backgrounded, because it has already been given by speaker A (cf. Lambrecht (1994)). In contrast, the *because*-clause, which introduces new information to the discourse, is asserted as the focus of the answer. Talmy's generalization cannot correctly predict such asserted *because*-clauses.

These two problems result from the view of subordinate clauses as a natural class, i.e., as the Ground object. There is another problem of a different kind. He argues in (6) that a causal relation treats the causing event as Ground and the resulting event as Figure and that only a devised phrase such as *to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of)* can connect the inverted causal relation, as in (9):

(9) He arrived to-the-occasioning-of-(the-decision-of) our staying home.
(= (5b))

However, the conjunction *because* does connect two events expressing not only a causal relation, as in (10a), but also an inferential relation, or an inverted causal relation, as in (10b):

(10) a. The ground is wet because it has rained.
b. It has rained, because the ground is wet.

Jespersen (1949) argues that an inference can be drawn either from cause to result or from result to cause; the latter pattern is exemplified by a sentence like (10b). In this sentence, contradictory to Talmy's generalization, the cause event would be treated as Figure, and the resulting event as Ground. Nevertheless, no devised phrases are necessary. Whereas the simple prepositional phrase *because of* cannot connect the inverted causal relation, as in (9), the simple conjunction *because* can, as in (10b). This stems not from the unnatural assignment of Figure and Ground, but from the nature of inference and the difference between *because* and *because of*. I will argue this point in Chapter 3.

2.3 Clause positions and boundedness

Chafe (1984) treats some adverbial subordinate clauses as "a single, undifferentiated category," of which I focus on reason subordinate clauses in this section. He observes them from the viewpoints of (i) their positions with respect to their main clauses, i.e., sentence-initial or sentence-final position, and (ii) how tightly they are bound to their main clauses, i.e., the presence or absence of a comma intonation between the main clause and the subordinate clause. All these patterns are exemplified in (11a)–(11d):[12]

(11) a. sentence-initial/bound [Type A]
Because it has such a big memory I decided to buy it.
b. sentence-final/bound [Type B]
I decided to buy it because it has such a big memory.
c. sentence-initial/free [Type C]
Because it has such a big memory, I decided to buy it.
d. sentence-final/free [Type D]
I decided to buy it, because it has such a big memory.
(Chafe (1984: 439))

12. The bound-free distinction here is simply a stylistic one. That is, if a comma intonation is not present between the main clause and the subordinate clause, the subordinate clause is bound; with a comma intonation between them, on the other hand, the subordinate clause is free.

Chafe surveys both spoken and written English and discusses the relationship between the combination of clause ordering and clause boundedness, on the one hand, and the information structure, on the other. In addition to these notions, what Chafe calls "intonation units" play an important role in his analysis. Intonation units are spurts of words that have a single coherent intonation contour.[13] As Chafe notes, intonation units range from one word to a clause or multiple clauses. For the purpose of the present argument, it is meant to refer to a single bound clause or group of bound clauses.

Let us now take a closer look at his arguments. First, both in spoken and in written English, adverbial clauses of Type A, sentence-initial bound adverbial clauses, are not so likely to be used as the other patterns. That is, if a *because*-clause appears in the same intonation or punctuation unit with its main clause, the *because*-clause almost always follows the main clause. Chafe observes that this is related to information structures or information flows, pointing out that main clauses but not adverbial clauses may very well express familiar information, and thus the normal progression is one that moves from a main clause to an adverbial clause.[14] He notes that English speakers usually create information/punctuation units which begin with familiar information (cf. Halliday (1967)).

Second, using adverbial clauses of Type B, or sentence-final bound adverbial clauses, signals that sentence-initial main clauses convey familiar information and the adverbial clauses that follow convey unfamiliar information. Consider the following example:

(12) He causes the death of many people …He has the right to destroy precisely because he is the creator himself. (Chafe (1984: 441f.))

In (12), the proposition expressed in the main clause *he has the right to destroy* may be regarded as conveying familiar information on the basis of the preceding statement *he causes the death of many people*. According to Chafe, sentence-final bound *because*-clauses, on the other hand, present unfamiliar information. Thus, Chafe's arguments about bound adverbial clauses can be summarized as follows: (i) When two clauses occur within the same intonation or punctuation unit, only

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13. As Chafe notes, the term "intonation units" corresponds to his earlier term "idea units" (cf. Chafe (1982)).

14. Notice that this observation seems opposite to Talmy's (1978b) (see Section 2.2). Talmy argues that subordinate clauses are construed as Ground objects, which are typically presupposed. As I have argued in Section 2.2, this is not always true, however. If so, one may argue that Chafe's observation has an advantage over Talmy's, but crucially, Chafe does not give any positive evidence for main clauses conveying familiar information and subordinate clauses unfamiliar. Thus, we cannot immediately decide on which clause conveys familiar or given information and which conveys unfamiliar or new information.

one of them is likely to express unfamiliar information, (ii) unfamiliar information typically comes at the end of an intonation or punctuation unit, and (iii) the relatively rare use of Type A suggests that adverbial clauses typically express unfamiliar information.

Let us turn to considering free adverbial clauses, those of Types C and D. Chafe argues that adverbial clauses of Type C (or sentence-initial free adverbial clauses) serve as "guideposts" to information flow (p. 444). That is, they signal paths or orientations in terms of how the following information should be understood. Consider sentence (11c), repeated here as (13):

(13) Because it has such a big memory, I decided to buy it. (= (11c))

In this sentence, the *because*-clause provides a cause of the speaker's decision and indicates that the proposition expressed by the main clause that follows should be understood as its result. Chafe also observes that in this type, both the *because*-clause and the main clause convey unfamiliar information.

Adverbial clauses of Type D, that is, sentence-final free adverbial clauses, are similar to those of Type C to the extent that both the adverbial and main clauses convey unfamiliar information. In Type D, however, adverbial clauses do not serve as guideposts. Rather, they convey additional information after the sentence-initial main clauses are expressed, i.e., the reason is given as something like an afterthought. Thus, as Chafe suggests, sentence (14a) can be paraphrased as sentence (14b):

(14) a. That in itself was scary, cause I never fainted before.
b. That in itself was scary, and the reason was that I had never fainted before.

(Chafe (1984: 445f.))

He observes that in sentences like (14a), both the main clause and the adverbial clause are focused. More precisely, the speaker focuses first on the information in the main clause and subsequently on the cause represented in the *because*-clause. Hence, a sentence like (14a) can be paraphrased as a coordinate sentence like (14b).

As noted at the beginning of this section, Chafe, like Talmy (1978b), treats adverbial subordinate clauses as a single, undifferentiated category. However, Chafe's analysis has certain advantages over Talmy's. First, unlike Talmy's, Chafe's analysis correctly predicts the naturalness of the following dialogue:

(15) A: Why is the ground wet?
B: The ground is wet because it has rained.

(= (8))

As I have pointed out in the previous section, this cannot be expected under Talmy's (1978b) analysis. In Chafe's terms, speaker B uses a sentence of Type B, in which the main clause conveys familiar information, and the adverbial clause that follows is unfamiliar. The naturalness of the dialogue is thus straightforwardly accounted for. In a dialogue like (15), the information in the main clause is assumed to be familiar to both speakers A and B, on the ground of A's utterance, while the reason for the ground being wet is newly introduced by B′s utterance. That is, it is considered as conveying unfamiliar information. Hence, B′s utterance is natural.

Furthermore, Chafe's analysis will expect the use of a sentence of Type C, e.g., (16), to be inappropriate as an answer to speaker A's question in (15), and this expectation is borne out:

(16) A: Why is the ground wet?
C: #Because it has rained, the ground is wet.

Following Chafe's observation, we may say that the main clause of speaker C's utterance in (16) conveys unfamiliar information, which is contradictory.

Another advantage is that Chafe's analysis implies a difference between *because* and *since*. Crucially, while *because*-clauses follow the four types in (11a)–(11d), *since*-clauses (in the sense of reason), whether sentence-initial or sentence-final, are always used with comma intonation (e.g., Schourup and Waida (1988), Sweetser (1990), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c), among others).[15] Consider the following sentence:

(17) *Do you like him since he speaks fluent Danish?
(Schourup and Waida (1988: 97))

This unacceptable sentence belongs to Type B, in which comma intonation is not present between the main clause and the *since*-clause. Thus, a *since*-clause and its main clause cannot occur in the same intonation unit. As seen above, Chafe claims that sentence-final bound adverbial clauses present unfamiliar information. If so, *since*-clauses cannot present unfamiliar information. Indeed, some linguists observe that *since*-clauses typically convey familiar information (e.g., Schourup and Waida (1988), Swan (2005)). It seems that Chafe's observation also correctly explains the grammar of *since*, though Chafe himself does not consider *since*.

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15. This is not true for a temporal use of *since*. Temporal *since*-clauses even in sentence-final position, do not require a comma intonation, as in (i):

(i) So much has changed in the sport since I was a teenager. (COBUILD)

However, when treating subordinate clauses as a single, undifferentiated category, Chafe's analysis has a similar problem to Talmy's (1978b). That is, while Chafe's analysis, as mentioned above, does imply the information-structural difference between *because* and *since*, it is still not clear precisely where the difference comes from. More specifically, if *because* and *since* are treated as the single, undifferentiated category of subordinators, why does *since* not fit Types A and B while *because* does? Once again, we need a grammatical system that makes it possible to clearly account for both the similarities and differences between *because* and *since*.[16]

2.4 Domains of use

The approaches overviewed in the previous sections (Talmy (1978b) and Chafe (1984)) both take subordinate clauses (or subordinators) as a unitary class, assuming that all subordinate clauses behave alike. This assumption is not borne out, however. Sweetser (1990) points out that we also use the same vocabulary in many cases to express relationships in the speech act and epistemic (reasoning) worlds that we use to express parallel relationships in real-world, or sociophysical, events and entities. For example, the same modal auxiliary *must* is used either to denote real-world obligations (i.e., *must* as root modality), as in (18a), or to denote logical necessity (i.e., *must* as epistemic modality), as in (18b):

(18) a. John must be home by ten; Mother won't let him stay out any later.
b. John must be home already; I see his coat.

(Sweetser (1990: 49))

Sweetser argues from historical, sociolinguistic, and psycholinguistic perspectives that the epistemic use of modals is an extension of a more basic root meaning, not vice versa (for more details, see Sweetser (1990: 49ff.)).

Sweetser argues that the conjunctions *because* and *since* are also used in what she calls "content," "epistemic," and "speech-act" domains. When used in the content domain, these conjunctions connect two real-world situations and the sentence denotes a causal relation between them. In the epistemic domain, the

16. It should be noted, however, that the notions of clause ordering and clause boundedness that Chafe proposes play important roles in constructing my proposals later on. Thus, I do not argue against Chafe's observation. Rather, his observation is fundamental for my analysis to be proposed in Chapter 3, which will also account for why a comma intonation is required between a *since*-clause and its main clause.

sentence expresses an inferential process whereby the speaker draws the conclusion expressed by the main clause from the premise expressed in the subordinate clause. Used in the speech-act domain, the conjunctions introduce a reason why a certain speech act in the main clause is performed. Examples of *because* and *since* as used in these three domains are given below:

(19) *because*

a. content: John came back because he loved her.

b. epistemic: John loved her, because he came back.

c. speech-act: What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on.

(Sweetser (1990: 77))

(20) *since*

a. content: Since John wasn't there, we decided to leave a note for him.

b. epistemic: Since John isn't here, he has (evidently) gone home.

c. speech-act: Since you are so smart, when was George Washington born?

(Sweetser (1990: 78))

Sentence (19a) denotes the causal relation between his love and his coming back. In (19b), *because* does not introduce a cause of his love, but rather introduces a premise from which to draw the conclusion that he loved her. In (19c), the *because*-clause conveys the reason for asking what the addressee is doing that night. Likewise, in (20a)–(20c), the *since*-clauses are understood as the reason for our decision, a premise from which to conclude that he has gone home, and the reason for asking the addressee when George Washington was born, respectively.

Another important point that Sweetser makes is the correlation between the readings and the presence or non-presence of a comma intonation between the main clause and the subordinate clause. She argues that in the epistemic and the speech-act readings, a comma intonation is required between the main clause and the subordinate clause, whereas in the content domain, a comma intonation is optional. This is because, Sweetser argues, without a comma intonation, sentence-initial main clauses tend to be understood as being presupposed (cf. Chafe (1984)). The main clauses in the epistemic and speech-act readings represent the speaker's logical conclusion and the speech-act being performed by the very utterance, respectively. These elements are unlikely to be taken as being presupposed. Hence, a comma intonation is required so that sentence-initial main clauses are asserted. Sweetser further notes that although *because* is triply ambiguous, *since* already has a strong tendency towards an epistemic or a speech-act reading, rather

than towards a content reading. This, according to Sweetser, leads to the non-occurrence of *since* in a commaless context.

So far, we have seen Sweetser's analysis of *because* and *since*. Note in passing that although Sweetser does not deal with *for*, it seems that *for* is also usable in all these three domains, as exemplified below:

(21) *for*

a. content: John came back, for he loved her.

b. epistemic: John must have loved her, for he came back.

c. speech-act: What are you doing tonight, for there's a good movie on.

In (21a), the *for*-clause denotes the reason why John came back. The *for*-clause in (21b) gives a premise from which to draw the conclusion that John must have loved her. In (21c), the reason for asking the addressee what she is doing tonight is expressed by the *for*-clause. However, Kanbayashi (1989: 48) notes that *for* has only an inferential use. This may not be surprising if we assume that *for*, like *since*, has a strong tendency towards an epistemic or speech-act reading.[17] Crucially, Sweetser argues that the conjunctions themselves are not polysemous but rather pragmatically ambiguous, i.e., one single meaning of the conjunction is pragmatically applied in different ways according to the context. That is, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the meaning of *for* to be applied so as to express real-world causation.

It is predictable then that *for* should be used with a comma intonation, and indeed, it must be used with a comma intonation. In this sense, Sweetser's observation of the correlation between a comma intonation and the reading of the sentence seems correct. Thus, Sweetser argues that when applied to different domains, an essentially unitary semantic entity, e.g., *because*, not only can be ambiguous but can even have different grammatical behaviors, e.g., the presence or absence of a comma intonation.

It is true that Sweetser's arguments, especially on the correlation between the readings and the presence or absence of comma intonation, are insightful, but there are several problems that need to be solved. First, if, as Sweetser argues, the conjunction *because* itself is pragmatically ambiguous, that is, if *because* may be freely used in all of the three domains, why can sentence-initial *because*-clauses

17. For the reasons to be discussed in Chapter 3, I will eliminate the distinction between the epistemic and speech-act domains and treat them as a natural class. Thus, if, as Kanbayashi observes, *for* has such a strong tendency towards an epistemic reading, it then easily takes a speech-act reading, as well.

not be understood as an epistemic or a speech-act conjunction? Consider the following examples:

(22) a. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained. (Hirose (1991: 27))
b. *Because you are a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky? (cf. Because it has rained, the ground is wet.)

Sentence (22a) is intended to describe the inferential process, in which the speaker draws the conclusion that it has rained from the premise that the ground is wet. In (22b), the speaker means to ask about Chomsky based on his knowledge that linguists in general are knowledgeable about him. In these cases, as opposed to the parenthesized example of the content domain, sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed. As seen above, Sweetser argues that when applied to different domains, the conjunction not only can be ambiguous but can even show different grammatical behaviors. If so, we may say that the unacceptability of sentences (22a, b) is also pragmatically conditioned. That is, some "pragmatic factors" may prevent *because*-clauses from occurring in sentence-initial position. However, Sweetser does not clearly mention what, if any, factors are relevant. Therefore, we need to explain the reason for the unacceptability of sentences (22a, b).

Second, why is it possible for *since*, unlike *because*, to be interpreted as an epistemic or speech-act conjunction even in sentence-initial position? The relevant examples are reproduced below:

(23) a. Since John isn't here, he has (evidently) gone home. (= (20b))
b. Since you are so smart, when was George Washington born? (= (20c))

The *since*-clause in (23a) provides the premise from which to draw the conclusion that John is not there, and that in (23b) the reason for asking when George Washington was born. Thus, they are understood as an epistemic conjunction and a speech-act conjunction, respectively. Notice that the *since*-clauses in these sentences appear in sentence-initial position with no problem (cf. (22a, b)). If the position of *because*-clauses is pragmatically conditioned, the same condition might equally well prevent sentence-initial *since*-clauses in the epistemic and speech-act domains. Unlike *because*, however, *since* may appear in sentence-initial position in these readings. Why should this be so?

Third, while Sweetser acknowledges that *since* already has a strong tendency towards an epistemic or a speech-act reading, she still asserts that it may express content causal relations as well. Why then can *since*, as well as *because*, be used as a content conjunction? Sweetser paraphrases sentences (19b, c) as follows:

(24) a. The speaker's knowledge of John's return causes the conclusion that John loved her. (cf. John loved her, because he came back. (= (19b)))

b. I want to know what you are doing tonight because I want to suggest that we go see this good movie. (cf. What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on. (= (19c))) (Sweetser (1990: 77))

The above paraphrases suggest that even in the epistemic and speech-act domains, certain causal relations hold. This is plausible, because the conjunction *because* lexically introduces a cause.[18] That is, while in the content domain, such as (19a), sentences express literal causal relations, sentences in the other domains, such as (19b), (19c), can be taken as expressing "metaphorical" causal relations (cf. Hirose (1999)). Thus, following Sweetser, we may say that in the epistemic and speech-act domains, *because*-clauses give a "cause" of drawing a certain conclusion and a "cause" of performing a certain speech act, respectively. Such causal relations may be guaranteed by the conjunction *because*, a conjunction of causation. It is then mysterious why *since* can also be used in the three domains. *Since*, unlike *because*, does not lexically express a cause (at least in the etymological sense). I will argue in Chapter 3 that *since*-clauses do *not* express a cause of an event but provide the premise of an inference, and explain the reason.

2.5 Propositional vs. modality subordinate-clauses

Nakau (1994) argues that a full sentence meaning consists of a modal component and a propositional component (cf. Lyons (1977)). The former is defined as "a mental attitude on the part of the speaker only accessible at the time of utterance (Nakau (1994: 42))," and the rest of the elements in a given sentence are propositional elements. His bi-structural model of sentence meaning can be schematized as in (25), where D-MOD indicates discourse modality, S-MOD sentence modality, and PROP a proposition:

(25) [D-MOD [S-MOD [PROP]]][19]

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18. It is worth noting here that the conjunction *because* was originally a prepositional phrase that introduced a cause; the prepositional phrase has been grammaticalized to the conjunction: *by cause* > *because*.

19. In Nakau's terms, PROP does not have a monolayer structure, as in (25), but a quaternary layer structure. Here, I simply represent PROP to cover all the layers of the propositional elements because the detailed internal structure of PROP is not necessary for the present discussion. For the detailed internal structure of PROP, see Nakau (1994: 15).

As in (25), Nakau divides the modal expressions into D-MOD and S-MOD: the former is a mental attitude towards the utterance, and the latter a mental attitude towards the proposition (Nakau (1994: 21)).

From this viewpoint of sentence meaning, Nakau analyzes the mechanism of modifications by adverbial subordinate clauses, including *because*- and *since*-clauses. Crucially, Nakau (1994: 101ff.) argues that *because* can be either a propositional element or a marker of D-MOD, while *since* is always a marker of D-MOD. Conjunctions as propositional elements roughly correspond to Sweetser's content conjunctions, while those as markers of D-MOD roughly correspond to Sweetser's epistemic/speech-act conjunctions (Nakau (1994: 453)). Thus, in Nakau's terms, the semantic structures of sentences (19) and (20) above may be represented as follows:[20]

(26) a. [$_{\text{PROP}}$ John came back *because* he loved her].

b. [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ[$_{\text{PROP}}$ John loved her]], [$_{\text{D-MOD}}$ *because* [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ he came back]]].

c. [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ[$_{\text{PROP}}$ What are you doing tonight]], [$_{\text{D-MOD}}$ *because* [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ there's a good movie on]]].

(27) a. [$_{\text{D-MOD}}$ *Since* [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ John wasn't there]]], [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ we decided to leave a note for him]].

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20. Sentences with *for*-clauses, e.g., (21a)–(21c), cannot be described in the same way as (26) and (27), because, as I will argue in Chapter 3, *for* is not a subordinator but a coordinator (cf. Quirk et al. (1985)). This, however, does not mean that Nakau's bi-structural model of sentence meaning cannot describe the structure of the meaning of sentences with *for*. It should be noted that coordinated conjuncts should be parallel both in their structure and in their meaning (e.g. Quirk et al. (1985: 947)). Consider the following example:

(i) *a student [$_{\text{ARGUMENT PP}}$ of physics] and [$_{\text{ADJUNCT PP}}$ with long hair]
(Radford (1981: 99))

In (i), the coordinator *and* connects two elements that are structurally but not functionally parallel. The first prepositional phrase serves as an "argument", whereas the second an "adjunct" to the head noun *student*. Hence, the whole NP is not grammatical.
As a coordinator, *for* should follow this general principle. If, as Kanbayashi (1989) notes, *for* has only an inferential use, it must connect S-MOD expressions, and the meaning of sentence (iia), for instance, may thus be represented as (iib):

(ii) a. John must have loved her, for he came back. (= (21b))
b. [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ must [$_{\text{PROP}}$ John have loved her]], for [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ he came back]].

In (iib), *for* connects two S-MOD elements. What is important for now is that Nakau's bi-structural model can represent the sentence meanings of coordinate structures as well. I will discuss *for* in more detail in Chapter 3.

b. [$_{\text{D-MOD}}$ *Since* [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ John isn't here]]], [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ he has (evidently) gone home]].

c. [$_{\text{D-MOD}}$ *Since* [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ you are so smart]]], [$_{\text{S-MOD}}$ Φ [$_{\text{PROP}}$ when was George Washington born]]?

In the above structures, the subordinate clauses introduced by the italicized conjunctions modify the underlined expressions. In (26a), the *because*-clause is a propositional element that modifies another element in the same propositional component. In (26b), (26c) and (27a)–(27c), the *because*- and *since*-clauses are D-MOD elements that by definition restrict S-MOD elements. In the b-examples, the null elements in the S-MOD slots of the main clause Φ could be filled with what Nakau calls modality of truth judgments, e.g., *I think*, *must*, and the like, while in the c-examples and (27a), the slot could be filled with certain performative expressions, e.g., *I ask you*, *I say*, and the like. All of these expressions are, of course, markers of S-MOD (cf. Nakau (1994: 54ff.)).

Notice that the S-MOD slots in the modal *because*- and *since*-clauses in (26b), (26c) and (27a)–(27c) are also empty. Nakau argues that some explicit S-MOD expressions may appear in such slots. In contrast, as is easily predictable from the structure in (26a), propositional *because*-clauses do not allow S-MOD expressions to appear in them. To see this, consider the following examples that Nakau cites from Ross (1973):

(28) a. Since I {take it/gather} that you and Miss Pecan are acquainted, I will be happy.
b. *Because I {take it/gather} that you and Miss Pecan are acquainted, I will be happy. (Ross (1973: 162))

Expressions like *I take it* and *I gather* are S-MOD expressions. According to Nakau, modal *because*-clauses must appear in sentence-final position with a comma intonation (cf. Sweetser (1990)). That is, the sentence-initial *because*-clause in (28b) cannot be a D-MOD element but must be a propositional element. Hence, the sentence is unacceptable. By contrast, as Nakau observes, such S-MOD expressions may appear in sentence-final, free *because*-clauses, as exemplified in (29):

(29) I will be happy, because I {take it/gather} that you and Miss Pecan are acquainted. (Nakau (1994: 107))

This *because*-clause, according to Nakau, is a D-MOD element, and therefore sentence (29) is no less grammatical than sentence (28a) is.

Another argument for the bi-structural model that Nakau presents is concerned with contrasts in clefting. Consider the following examples:

(30) a. It's because he's sick that he's not coming to class.
b. *It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class.
c. *It was since they wanted to save lives that they retreated.
(Nakau (1994: 162))

The *because*-clause in (30a) is a propositional element, while that in (30b) and the *since*-clause in (30c) are modal elements. The above contrast ((30a) vs. (30b), (30c)) shows that subordinate clauses introduced by a modal subordinator cannot be clefted. According to Nakau, it is only propositional elements that may be focalized. Thus, sentences (30b, c) are not acceptable, whereas sentence (30a) is.

Nakau's observations above are thoughtful and indeed are of great help in developing my proposals in later chapters, but it is unclear why *because* can be either a propositional element, as in (26a), or a marker of D-MOD, as in (26b), (26c), while *since* is always a marker of D-MOD, as in (27a)–(27c). This is, in essence, the same problem as with Sweetser's (1990) analysis: As pointed out in the previous section, Sweetser does not discuss why *since* already has a strong tendency towards an epistemic or a speech-act reading. Similarly, explanation is needed of Nakau's claim that *because* is either a propositional element or a marker of D-MOD, while *since* is always a marker of D-MOD.

There is another problem with Nakau's argument. As seen above, Nakau explains that modal *because*- and *since*-clauses may not be clefted based on the generalization he proposes that only propositional elements can be focalized. This generalization, however, is not always valid. Consider the following attested sentences:

(31) a. Normally they were military officers, *partly because* the army provided a supply of trained talent, … and *mainly because* the organization of defence was the crucial part of their work. (BNC; italics are mine)
b. Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, *particularly since* a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress … (BNC; italics are mine)

In (31a), the *because*-clauses provide the premise from which to draw the conclusion that they were military officers. In Nakau's terms, they are modal *because*-clauses. Nevertheless, they are focalized by focusing adverbs. Likewise, the *since*-clause in (31b) is focalized by the focusing adverb *particularly*. Nakau is correct, of course, in saying that these subordinate clauses may not be clefted. However, the grammaticality of the focalized subordinate clauses in (31a), (31b) is left unexplained. Thus, simply saying that propositional elements can be focalized is inadequate. As I will argue in later chapters, focalizations by clefting and by using focusing adverbs are allowed or not allowed for different reasons. I will discuss the

clefting of *because*- and *since*-clauses in Chapter 3 and their focalization by focusing adverbs in Chapter 4.

2.6 Subjectivity of causal relations

Pander Maat and Sanders (2000) propose an analysis of the connectives in terms of subjectivity that complements Sweetser's (1990) argument for the three domains of use. As a parameter to account for the distribution of causal connectives, they insist on the need to take "volitionality" into consideration as well as the three domains of use proposed by Sweetser (1990). Volitionality is concerned with whether a relation involves a reason for an intentional action. In other words, a certain subject of consciousness responsible for the causal relation described is involved in a volitional relation. Observe the following Dutch examples, where *daadoor* in (32a) corresponds to 'as a result', *daarom* in (32b) to 'that's why', and *dus* in (32c) to 'so' in English:

(32) a. Een camagne in de VS duurt in de eerste plaats zeer lang.Een kandidaat dient eerst de voorverkiezingen te winnen voordat hij officieel wordt gekandideerd. Een presidentiële campagne drrut daadoor al gauw anderhalf jaar.
'In the first place, a campaign in the US takes a very long time. A candidate has to win the pre-elections before he is officially nominated. Daardoor 'as a result' a presidential campaign easily takes one and a half years.'

b. Vaste klanten zijn voor de Bijenkorf van vital belang: zij besteden per jaar twee maal zoveel in de Bijenkorfwinkels als andere klanten. Daarom heft de Bijienkorf aan de Vaste Klantkaart een aantal voordelen verbonden[.]
'Regular customers are of vital interest to the Bijenkorf: in a year they spend twice as much as other customers do. Daarom 'that's why' the Bijkorf has added a number of advantages to the Regular Customer-Card.'

c. Er blijkt weer een toename van het aantal besmenttingen met het HIV-virus te zijn. Als AIDS-verpleegkundige zie ik de vevolgen ervan. AIDS-preventie, daar komt het dus op aan.
'There appears to be an increase of infections with the HIV-virus. As an AIDS-nurse, I see the consequences. Dus 'so' prevention of AIDS, that's what it's all about.'

(Pander Maat and Sanders (2000: 62))

According to Pander Maat and Sanders, these connectives are used as follows. *Daardoor* can only express content non-volitional relations. *Daarom* can express

content and epistemic, most often content volitional, relations. *Dus* expresses content volitional and epistemic, most often epistemic, relations, but not content non-volitional relations. Thus, they divide Sweetser's content domain into two classes with or without volitionality. Volitional content and epistemic relations are similar in that they both involve a person "whose intentionality is conceptualized as the ultimate source of the causal event" (p. 64). If the causal event originates from an act of reasoning, it is an epistemic relation; if it is from a real-world activity, it is a volitional content relation. They argue that what differentiates *dus* from *daarom* is the distance between the subject of consciousness and the present speaker (p. 68). More specifically, the distance between them is smaller when *dus* is used than when *daarom* is used. In other words, they are different in the degree of subjectivity.

Based on the volitionality above, Pander Maat and Degand (2001) propose a speaker-involvement scaler approach to these Dutch connectives. This approach postulates the following scale from the least subjective nonvolitional causal relation in (33a) to the most subjective speech-act relations in (33e, f):[21]

(33) a. Nonvolitional causal relations
b. volitional causal relations
c. causality-based epistemic relations
d. Noncausal epistemic relations
e. speech-act relations (motivating a speech-act)
f. speech-act relations (paraphrasing and summarizing)

As is clear from the scale in (33), Pander Maat and Degand subdivide each of Sweetser's three domains into two groups. This approach could be said to supplement rather than constitute an alternative approach to Sweetser's (1990) analysis. To see how volitionality, or speaker involvement, works, I would like to compare (33a) with (33b), content-domain causalities with or without volitionality; (33c) with (33d), epistemic-domain relations of different types; and (33e) with (33f), different types of speech-act domain relations. First, nonvolitional and volitional causal relations are exemplified by sentences (33a, b), respectively:

(34) a. Monday his train to Amsterdam arrived at another platform. He got on the train to The Hague. (Pander Maat and Degand (2001: 217))
b. It was 12 p.m. She/I went home. (ibid.: 218)

21. As shown later, Pander Maat and Degand (2001) do not consider the relations in (33e) and (33f) different in terms of subjectivity.

According to Pander Maat and Degand, the causal relation in (34a), i.e., the train's arrival at a different platform caused the relevant person to get on a different train, appear as an entirely objective phenomenon, outside the domain of the speaker's intention. In contrast, the causality in (34b), which holds in the real world, involves the actor's (the speaker's or her) decision making.

Next, epistemic causal relations in Sweetser's terms may be decomposed into the causality-based one, as in (35a), and the noncausal one, as in (35b):

(35) a. It has rained continuously for two days. The tennis court will probably be unplayable. (Pander Maat and Degand (2001: 222))

b. The snow is melting. The temperature must be above zero. (ibid.: 224)

In (35a), the constant rainfall in the real world gives a reason for drawing a conclusion regarding the unplayable condition of the tennis court. In this case, according to Pander Maat and Degand, the reasoning is based on the belief that rainfall generally causes tennis courts to become unplayable in the real world. The relation described in (35b), on the other hand, involves abductive reasoning, in which "the real-world effect [the melting snow] is taken as an argument supporting a conclusion concerning the real-world cause [the temperature being above zero degrees]" (p. 224). Cases as in (35b) are the prototypical instance of causality in Sweetser's epistemic domain. Pander Maat and Degard (2001), however, points out the insufficiency of the analysis of abductive relations as the prototypical epistemic relation for the following reasons. The majority of epistemic relations are causality based, and there are also reasoning processes that are not based on real world causality, as in (36):

(36) It's 10 o'clock. Everyone has probably left for work. (ibid.: 224)

In (36), the fact that it is 10 o'clock does not cause them to have left; nor does the opposite causal relation hold. What differentiates the non-causal epistemic relation from the causality-based epistemic relation is that the former involves a larger degree of speaker involvement than the latter, according to Pander Maat and Degand. That is, the latter simply "transpose[s] a real-world link into the inferential domain", while the former is "no longer modeled on real-world causal link" (p. 244).

Lastly, in speech-act relations, an expression is used either to prepare an upcoming speech act, as in (37a), or to rephrase another expression, as in (37b):

(37) a. There is a good movie on. Did you already have plans for tonight? (ibid.: 225)

b. To win the elections an absolute majority (more than half of the votes) is required. (ibid.: 226)

In (37a), the first sentence, *there is a good movie on*, justifies the speaker's asking the subsequent question. This relation corresponds to Sweetser's (1990) speech-act domain. In (37b), the speaker re-expresses *an absolute majority* with a different expression, *more than half of the votes*. This type of speech-act relation is not discussed in Sweetser's (1990) domain theory.[22] Crucially, Pander Maat and Degand do not assume a difference in speaker involvement, or degree of subjectivity, between the two types of speech-act relations. They argue that the relations in (33e, f) are differentiated from those in (33c, d), because the speech-act relations "embody a specific hearer-directness" (p. 227) while reasoning (i.e. epistemic) patterns "exist independently of their expression in discourse" (p. 225).[23]

So far, we have reviewed Pander Maat and Sanders (2000) and Pander Maat and Degand (2001). This line of studies of causal categories in terms of subjectivity is further developed in Sanders et al. (2009). Integrating subjectivity with Mental Space Theoretic approaches (cf. Fauconnier (1985)), they propose the Basic Communicative Spaces Network (also cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)). According to Sanders et al. (2009), this approach has the advantage of being able to take the notion of discourse perspective into consideration. They also mention three reasons for referring to mental spaces (pp. 22–24): (i) The Mental Spaces Theory is compatible with the conceptualization of connectives that instruct the interlocutor to relate the content of the connected segments in a specific type of relationship; (ii) the Mental Spaces Theory has proven to be descriptively adequate for linguistic items that are related to causal connectives; and (iii) the Mental Spaces Theory can account for the difference between *daarom* and *dus*, which is difficult to treat relying only on the notion of subjectivity.

Like Sweetser's (1990) approach, the analyses introduced in this section focus more on the way two situations are connected and the kind of connectives suitable to certain relations, rather than the meanings of conjunctions themselves. Fruitful discussions have been made by integrating various mutually compatible insights. However, these approaches seem to overemphasize semantico-pragmatic factors, paying little attention to relations with the form of the constructions. Since a construction is a form-meaning pairing (see Chapter 1; also cf. Section 2.8), in order to give an integrated account and achieve the aim of the present study, we need

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22. While Pander Maat and Degand (2001: 227) state that the speaker's and hearer's interpretation of more than half of the votes causes their interpretation of an absolute majority, this could be a causative relation rather than a causal relation in the sense that I am concerned with. For example, more than half of the votes can *make* an absolute majority. Causal and causative relations both involve some sort of causation, but I am not sure how these notions are related and will not treat this kind of metalinguistic causation in the remainder of the book.

23. I do not distinguish speech-act relations from epistemic relations. For details, see Section 3.4.

to consider the form poles as well as meaning poles of constructions, and how they correspond. I do not say that the analyses observed in the present section are wrong or that I will provide a possible counterargument. Indeed, my proposals owe much to their findings. For the purpose of the present study, the notion of subjectivity is particularly helpful; nevertheless, such a fine-grained distinction as that in (33a)–(33f) above is not necessary.

As well as the distinction pertaining to subjectivity, I will take into consideration how speech act units are formed. That is, as far as the constructions with *because* and other relevant constructions the present volume deals with are concerned, it must suffice to consider whether or not the situations are connected subjectively and how the speech act is performed to express the connected situations, that is, whether it is expressed in one unit of speech act or two. These two parameters are intimately related and motivate one another. As I will emphasize from the next chapter on, reasoning is a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two situations existing independently of each other in the real world, and such situations, expressed in two clauses, correspond to separate units of speech act. On the other hand, causation is an objective causal relation between two situations that holds in the real world. In such a relation, the cause situation and the result situation, though expressed in separate clauses, are combined tightly enough to fall in one unit of speech act. One may be skeptical of the notion of tightness of clause combination, as it sounds vague. However, this semantic feature is realized in various syntactic phenomena; that is, various syntactic phenomena, as we will see, demonstrate the tightness of the clause combination and thus make it "visible". It is this syntactic and semantic correlation that makes the constructional analysis more plausible.

2.7 Constructional approaches

Hirose (1998, 1999),[24] following Hirose (1991), fully discusses semantic peculiarities of the SUBJECT *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as exemplified by a sentence like (38) and describes in terms of inheritance links (cf. Goldberg (1995)) how it is related with other relevant constructions:

(38) Just because I'm a linguist doesn't mean that I speak many languages.
(Hirose (1999: 596))

In the course of his analysis, Hirose suggests the existence of what he calls the CAUSAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction.

24. As Hirose (1999) is an extended version of Hirose (1998), the discussion of the former subsumes that of the latter. Thus, I refer only to Hirose (1999) hereafter.

Hirose's observation of the CAUSAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is summarized as follows. The CAUSAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction has the form of [P(,) *because* Q], paired with the meaning that "situation Q causes situation P as a result". When the cause situation is contextually presupposed, the *because*-clause may precede the main clause; that is, the form [*Because* P, Q] is possible. As for the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction, the form [Q, *because* P] corresponds to the function of presenting the premise P from which to draw the conclusion Q. Since the situation expressed in the *because*-clause is newly presented by uttering the sentence, the *because*-clause cannot be contextually presupposed in the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction. Hence, sentence-initial *because*-clauses are incompatible with the (pragmatic) function of the construction.

However, Hirose does not investigate these constructions in detail, since his main interests are in discussing semantic/pragmatic peculiarities of the SUBJECT *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as in (38) and describing how it is related to the CAUSAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction. In Chapter 3, I will closely examine Hirose's observations of the CAUSAL and INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE constructions, and propose an analysis based on it.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) also refer to the notion of construction and treat constructions with *because* and *since* in the context of their argument concerning constructions with *if*-clauses. They claim that "not only morphemes and words but also grammatical constructions at the syntactic level are conventionally tied to semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning" (pp. 10–11), and argue for "the need to abandon modularity (especially the strict syntax-semantics-pragmatics boundaries)" (p. 15).

Although Dancygier and Sweetser are concerned mainly with conditional constructions, they examine the relationships between conditional meanings and causal meanings conveyed by the constructions with *because* and *since*. Let us first briefly observe relevant parts of their discussion of the form-meaning correspondences of *if*-sentences. While the *if P, Q* configuration "first build[s] a space defined by P, then adding the assertion of Q specifically to the structure of that space" (p. 174),[25] the *Q if P* pattern asserts "the identification of the conditional relation" (p. 175) under which the event described in the main clause would happen. Hence, the main clause content of the latter pattern "is already 'on the floor'" (p. 175). For example, a sentence like *I'll work in my office if the home computer breaks down*

25. By "space" they mean mental spaces in Mental Spaces Theory (cf. Fauconnier (1985)). I do not discuss the details of this theory, for which see Dancygier and Sweetser (2000, 2005) and Fauconnier (1985).

will be an appropriate answer to a question like *when will you work at your office?* To answer the question *what will you do if your home computer breaks down?*, an *if* sentence of the first pattern, namely, *if the home computer breaks down, I will work at my office* will be used. The *Q, if P* pattern, preferred with conditions on speech-act or comments on linguistic appropriateness, "puts forward an assertion of Q, without first specifying in what space Q applies … The Q-clause is then followed by P, which further restricts the context in which the assertion of Q applies" (p. 175) (cf. also Dancygier (1998)).

Turning to *because* and *since*, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005, inter alia Section 7.4) note the relations between their interpretations, clause orders, and boundedness, and compare these with those of the *if*-conditionals. Their argument largely overlaps with but is clearer than Sweetser's (1990). They observe that when *because* is used to introduce a reason, the standard clause order is *Q because P*, as in (39a), while *because P, Q* is possible, as in (39b), to give additional focus to the content of Q.

(39) a. These people can't pass through the door because they haven't been invited. (Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 180))

b. Now, because you screwed up, Uncle Enzo doesn't get his wish. (ibid.: 181)

When *since* is used, *since P, Q* is the typical order, as in (40a), and *Q since P* is unacceptable, as shown in (40b):

(40) a. Now, since you screwed up, Uncle Enzo doesn't get his wish.

b. #I'll marry you since you're so sweet. (ibid.: 182)

According to Dancygier and Sweetser, unlike *because*, *since* does not foreground the causal relation described and the causality present in the meaning of *since* is presuppositional. For example, the causal relation described in (39b) can be asserted, but the one in (40a) cannot. In this connection, they point out that the commaless intonation pattern, as with *Q if P*, only asserts the causal connection between the clauses. Hence, as *because* asserts the causal relation between the two situations, the conjunction most typically appears in the configuration of *Q because P*, whereas *since,* whose causal meaning is presuppositional, prefers the *since P, Q* pattern.

It should be noted that comma intonation "demands an interpretation involving the assertion of the causal connection between the clauses and a Q-clause which is not presupposed but asserted or used as another independent speech act" (p. 180). Recall that the commaless pattern is unlikely to occur in epistemic and speech-act conjunctions (Sweetser (1990)). In such cases, according to Dancygier

and Sweetser, the main clauses cannot be presupposed as they are the very speech act being performed or the new conclusion being drawn, which would sound odd if presupposed. This is also comparable with *Q, if P*, the conditionals typically used for speech act conditions or comments on metalinguistic appropriateness.

In short, Dancygier and Sweetser's investigation states that formal properties such as the clause order and boundedness of a given sentence correspond to its interpretation. This integrated view solves the first question concerning Sweetser's (1990) approach: Why sentence-initial *because*-clauses cannot be understood as an epistemic or a speech-act conjunction. There still remain some problems. For example, they observe that *because*-clauses may be contrasted and clefted, as in (41a, c), but *since*-clauses may not, as in (41b, d), claiming that "the causality present in the meaning of *since* is … presuppositional, while it is genuinely asserted in the case of *because*" (p. 182).

(41) a. I love you because you're sweet, not because you're rich.
b. #He invited me since I live next door, not since I'm his boss.
c. It's because you're sweet that I love you, not because you're rich.
d. #It's since I live next door that he invited me, but not since I'm his boss.
(Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 182–183))

The choice between *because* and *since* is not dependent only upon such, if any, information-structural differences. There are indeed many facts that such an information-structural account cannot explain. First, it is only content *because*-causes that can be contrasted and clefted. As we saw in Section 2.5, Nakau (1994) observes epistemic (and speech-act) *because*-clause cannot be clefted.

(42) *It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class. (= (30b))

If the contrast in (41) above resulted from the choice of the conjunction, the sentence in (42), in which the same conjunction is used as in (41c), would be grammatical, but it is not. Hence, we cannot attribute the contrasts in (41) only to the choice of conjunction, which is said to differentiate the information structures.

Second, as we will investigate closely in Chapter 3, speech act constructions that convey statements (e.g., the DEICTIC *THERE* construction in (43) and the NEGATIVE PREPOSING construction in (44)) can appear in a *since*-clause (cf. Lakoff (1987)).

(43) I'd better leave, since here comes my bus! (Lakoff (1987: 479))

Lakoff calls subordinate clauses in which such speech act constructions occur performative subordinate clauses. He claims that they are not presuppositional, as "it is impossible to both state and presuppose something simultaneously" (p. 478). Likewise, Hooper and Thompson (1973) argue that this kind of subordinate clause

is asserted.[26] If their observations are on the right track, the *since*-clause in (43) cannot be presupposed. Interestingly enough, even in the *since P, Q* configuration, the clause order allegedly typical for the presupposed subordinate clause, a performative *since*-clause may appear, as in (44):

(44) As the previous chapter shows, the development officers were rarely involved at all with those clients if they were in the action samples; **since in no real sense could they be said to have had the opportunity of availing themselves of the action project, they are omitted** (in both action and control samples) from most of the following analysis. (BNC [emphasis is mine])

This example shows that a sentence-initial subordinate clause is not always presupposed.

Third, as we will discuss in Chapter 4, *since*-clauses may be focalized by a certain group of focusing adverbs such as *particularly*, *especially*, and the like.

(45) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, **particularly since** a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress … (BNC [emphasis is mine])

If a *since*-clause were always presupposed, such focalization would be ruled out (cf. Schourup and Waida (1988)).

To conclude this section, I note that both Hirose (1999) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) introduce the notion of constructions. Hirose suggests the existence of the CAUSAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and the INFERENTIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and describes their basic syntactic and semantic characteristics. Dancygier and Sweetser also point out certain correspondences of the form (clause order and boundedness) and meaning (content, epistemic, and speech-act) of *because*- and *since*-sentences. Neither of them investigates the constructions in depth simply because that is not their main interest. In Chapter 3, therefore, I will analyze the constructions in more detail, focusing in particular on the correlations of the constructional forms, meanings, and our knowledge about the causal relation and reasoning process. Specifically, I will claim that the forms of the constructions reflect the constructional meanings as representations of our knowledge about the world. Postulating two schematic constructions while taking these correlations into consideration, we can solve the problems pointed out in this chapter and account for various syntactic phenomena by attributing them to characteristics of the constructions. Before that, however, I will lay out in the following section what my constructional approach entails.

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26. Hooper and Thompson (1973) treat such speech act constructions as root transformations following Emonds' (1970) terminology.

2.8 Constructions and their networks

As a preliminary to the arguments from the next chapter on, let us clarify how we will represent constructions and constructional networks.

2.8.1 Constructions in construction grammar

In constructionist approaches, syntactic and semantic properties are not placed in separate components. Rather, they are paired together and their pairings are regarded as constructions. Thus, the symbolic structure of a construction may be represented as in Figure 2.1, and representations of this kind are stored as such.



Figure 2.1 The symbolic structure of a construction (Croft and Cruse (2004: 258))

That is, constructionist approaches make it possible to describe the formal (syntactic, morphological, and phonological) and functional (semantic, pragmatic, and discourse-functional) aspects of given expressions in an integrated way. This is nicely reflected in the following quote:

(46) To adopt a constructional approach is to undertake a commitment in principle to account for the entirety of each language.
(Kay and Fillmore (1999: 1))

More recently, Hilpert (2014: 2) puts it in somewhat simpler terms: What a speaker has to know when s/he knows a language is constructions. That is, all that the speakers of a given language need is knowledge of constructions of the language.

Note that I will not assume a hierarchical sentence structure for the form pole of a construction even in a complex sentence, but postulate a monostratal structure.[27] That is, the distinction as to which is subordinate to which is not crucial.

27. The term "complex sentence" may be misleading, because it is used to indicate a sentence structure with subordination. I will nevertheless use the terms "subordinate clause" and "main clause" as being widely accepted.

What is important is the linear order of the elements; as I will claim in Chapter 3, differences in clause order and boundedness are crucial to differentiate meanings (cf. also Chafe (1984), Hirose (1991, 1999), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)). Therefore, following the symbolic structure of a construction in (46) above, I will represent a construction as in Figure 2.2:



Figure 2.2 The simplified symbolic structure of a construction

In Figure 2.2, the sequence of the elements X, Y, and Z arranged in this order is paired with the specified meaning by the vertical line, a symbolic correspondence.

2.8.2 Constructional networks: Inheritance Links

It is widely accepted that constructions are stored in our mind not as a merely unstructured list but as a structured inventory. Haiman (1985) argues that making generalizations is a necessary function of language, because human languages recognize a limited inventory of phonemes and sememes (i.e., concepts), rather than recognizing an infinity of sounds and of concepts. The same holds for the knowledge of constructions, given that construction grammar treats all levels of grammatical units equally, from words and idioms to fully general phrasal patterns. Therefore, the taxonomic organization of constructions in the grammar, known as the constructicon, is particularly important to understand the knowledge of language (cf. (6c) in Chapter 1). Goldberg (2003: 219) puts it, "the totality of our knowledge of language is captured by a network of constructions: a 'construct-i-con'".

In order to explain relations among constructions, I will employ Goldberg's (1995) inheritance links and claim that networks of this kind play important roles in understanding constructions. Goldberg (1995: 72) notes, "by postulating abstraction hierarchies in which lower levels inherit information from higher levels, information is stored effectively and made easily modifiable". This can be illustrated as follows:

The arrow in Figure 2.3 indicates an inheritance link, through which Construction$_2$ inherits its information from Construction$_1$. Note that inheritance links are asymmetric, and as noted above, the direction is determined by abstraction hierarchies, which require Construction$_1$ to be more abstract or general than Construction$_2$. Thus, the notion of an inheritance link accounts for the taxonomic

organization mentioned above in that it presupposes the existence of hierarchies of constructions from abstract or general to concrete or specific. Note also that this model allows the same information to be stored redundantly both in Construction$_1$ and in Construction$_2$, taking them as static objects, not as on-line products. She says, "instead of stating the specifications twice, aspects of the patterns that are inherited are shared by two overlapping patterns" (p. 74). This follows from the fact that Goldberg's construction grammar adopts the usage-based model, which considers the frequencies of occurrence as affecting the grammatical representation (Croft and Cruse (2004: 292)).



Figure 2.3 The inheritance link

In order for an inheritance link to be posited between Construction$_1$ and Construction$_2$, the former needs to "motivate" the latter. More accurately, if construction$_2$ is related to construction$_1$ syntactically, the system of Construction$_2$ is motivated to the degree that it is related to Construction$_1$ semantically. According to the ways the more general Construction (i.e., Construction$_2$ in Figure 2.3) is motivated, Goldberg distinguishes four major types of inheritance links, of which the following three are relevant for the present work: instance links (I_I-links, for short), metaphorical extension links (I_M-links, for short), and subpart links (I_S-links, for short). They are defined as follows (adapted from Goldberg (1995: 78ff.)):

(47) a. An I_I-link is posited when a particular construction is a special case of another construction.

b. An I_M-link is posited when two constructions are found to be related by a metaphorical mapping.

c. An I_S-link is posited when one construction is a proper subpart of another construction and exists independently.

Another noteworthy property of the notion of inheritance is that multiple inheritance links are allowed, by which a construction inherits information from two or more constructions existing independently. Goldberg (1995: 97f.) cites Bolinger's (1971) observation of the RESULTATIVE construction that patterns like the VERB-PARTICLE construction. Observe the following examples:

(48) a. He cut short the speech.

b. He cut the speech short.

(Goldberg (1995: 97))

In sentences (48a), (48b), the resultative phrase *short* can occur either before or after the postverbal NP *the speech*, as with the VERB-PARTICLE construction (e.g. *He put the light on*/*He put on the light*); i.e., these sentences are instances of the RESULTATIVE construction and at the same time can be considered instances of the VERB-PARTICLE construction. Goldberg argues for multiple inheritance links to account for the bilateral characteristics of sentences like (48a, b). That is, these sentences are understood to inherit information both from the VERB-PARTICLE construction and from the RESULTATIVE construction, as shown in Figure 2.4:



Figure 2.4 The multiple inheritance links (adapted from Goldberg (1995: 98))

Thus, allowing multiple inheritance makes it possible to account for instances that can be motivated simultaneously by two distinct constructions.

CHAPTER 3

Constructions of causation and reasoning

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I reviewed certain previous studies and how they treated conjunctions of reason, in particular *because*, and pointed out some problems with them. In particular, in Section 2.7 I suggested that a construction grammar approach (cf. Hirose (1999)) can deal with these problems in an integrated way, and to this end, in Section 2.8 I introduced basic notions of how constructions and their networks are represented.

Now that these basic ideas are given, this chapter presents a detailed construction grammar analysis of *because*, *since*, and *for*. Specifically, based on differences in how people understand a causal relation and a reasoning process, I propose schematic constructions of causation and of reasoning:[28] The former is called the CAUSAL construction, and the latter the REASONING construction. Crucially, the conjunction *because* participates both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction, whereas *since* and *for* are used in the REASONING construction but not in the CAUSAL construction (for reasons to be discussed in Section 3.4). Through an investigation of these constructions, I will show that the proposed analysis is not only consistent with the facts pointed out in the literature but also capable of handling the potentially difficult matters that previous studies could not adequately explain.

The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 observes how we understand a causal relation and a reasoning process in general. Based on these observations, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 propose and analyze the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction in detail. Section 3.4.1 observes the REASONING construction in which *because* is used and compares it with the CAUSAL construction to underscore how the REASONING construction differs from the CAUSAL construction. Section 3.4.2 points out both similarities and dissimilarities between the REASONING construction in which *because* is used, on one hand, and

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28. I use the term "reasoning" rather than "inferential" for reasons to be discussed in Section 3.4.

the REASONING constructions in which *since* or *for* is used, on the other. That is, Section 3.4.1 draws clear distinctions between what have traditionally been called causal *because*-clauses and inferential *because*-clauses; Section 3.4.2 clarifies the difference between reason clauses introduced by *because*, *since*, and *for*. After describing relations between constructions and the conjunctions used in them (Section 3.5), Section 3.6 observes cases where form-meaning mismatch occurs. Section 3.7 discusses some related issues pointed out in the literature, and shows how the proposed analysis handles them. Section 3.8 describes relations among constructions in terms of inheritance links (cf. Goldberg (1995), Hirose (1999)), and wraps up the discussion.

3.2 Causal relations and reasoning processes

In this section, I am concerned with how we understand a causal relation and a reasoning process. As we saw in Chapter 1, (construction) grammar should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction (see (7d) in Chapter 1). That is, the CAUSAL construction needs to be consistent with what we know about a causal relation; the REASONING construction should be consistent with what we know about a reasoning process. Thus, before starting the analysis of these constructions, it is helpful to consider how we understand a causal relation and a reasoning process.

First, in order to see how a causal relation is understood, observe the following example:

(1) It has rained and the ground is wet.

This sentence may be interpreted as expressing a causal relation, among many possible readings (cf. Lakoff (1971), Blakemore and Carston (1999)). In the causal reading, the first conjunct *it has rained* is understood as the cause of the second conjunct *the ground is wet*. Thus, the sentence can convey a similar meaning to a sentence like *the ground is wet because it has rained*.

The two situations described in *and*-conjunctions, like (1), generally compose one unit of speech act (cf. Blakemore and Carston (1999); also cf. what Quirk et al. (1972) call *combined process*). To see this, observe the following example:

(2) Did Peter [[tell a lie] and [hurt his friend]]? (Quirk et al. (1972: 592))

The two processes in (2), i.e. *Peter told a lie* and *Peter hurt his friend*, are in the scope of a question. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, answering *yes* to

this question indicates that both propositions are true, while saying *no* indicates that at least one of them is false. This fact supports the claim that the conjoined proposition consists of a unit of speech act. In general, a conjoined proposition (P&Q) is true only if its component propositions (P and Q) are both true; if one of them is false, the conjoined proposition is also false (Cruse (2011: 27)). The meaning of the *yes*- or *no*-answer to sentence (2) indicates that what the speaker asks is whether the conjoined proposition as a whole is true, and not whether one of the propositions within the conjoined proposition is true.

Consider now the following contrast:

(3) a. John broke his leg. He tripped and fell.
b. John broke his leg and tripped and fell.

(Blakemore and Carston (1999))

Two sentences are simply juxtaposed in (3a), while in (3b) these two sentences are coordinated by *and*. Blakemore and Carston observe that the sentences in (3a) may express a reasoning process, in which the speaker concludes that John broke his leg from the premise that he tripped and fell, while sentence (3b) may not. A possible interpretation for sentence (3b) is, for example, that John broke his leg (for some reason) *and then* he tripped and fell, i.e., the described situations occur in a temporal sequence. The two juxtaposed sentences in (3a) fall into different intonation units. The fact that such two juxtaposed sentences can describe a reasoning process shows that in contrast to a causal relation, a reasoning process has two units of speech act. This is not an outrageous claim, if we – and indeed we will – understand reasoning as a process in which the speaker takes two situations separately and relates them based on his/her knowledge. For example, given the two situations *John broke his leg* and *he tripped and fell* (separately), the speaker restores a relation based on his/her knowledge that tripping and falling can cause someone to have a broken bone. In other words, the "restored" causal relation does not have to hold in the real world, because the two situations are merely related subjectively by the speaker in his/her mind. This claim is supported by the fact that *and*-conjunctions, e.g. (3b), cannot describe a reasoning process, since, as seen above, two situations coordinated by *and* typically fall into a single unit of speech act.

I assumed above that two situations described in a reasoning process do not necessarily have a relationship of any kind but are merely related by the speaker based on his/her knowledge. As a result, it looks as if they have some relationship that they may in fact not have. Thus, on the hearer's side, an extra effort or task is necessary to restore the alleged causal relation between the two situations. Traxler et al. (1997) demonstrate that a reasoning sentence is more difficult to understand than a causal sentence. They time a person understanding a sentence with

a causal *because*-clause (e.g., (4a)) and a sentence with a reasoning *because*-clause (e.g. (4b)) and observe that the latter takes longer to understand than the former.

(4) a. The streets are wet because it is raining.
b. It is raining because the streets are wet.

(Traxler et al. (1997: 88))

I consider the relative difficulty in interpreting (4b) as a reflection of the extra effort that the hearer must make to restore a causal relation like that in (4a), which is a prerequisite for understanding sentence (4b). That is, one takes longer to understand, or restore, the relation between the two situations in (4b) than to understand the causal relation described in (4a), in which the relation described is directly understandable and hence requires no such extra effort on the hearer.

In sum, a causal relation requires the cause and result situations to have a strong cohesion so that they fall into a single unit of speech act, whereas reasoning is a process in which the speaker relates two situations perceived separately, resulting in two distinct units of speech act. Again, the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction (which I will propose in the subsequent sections) should be consistent with these facts.

Thus far, I have distinguished a causal relation from a reasoning process based merely on the difference in form of speech act units. What then brings about this difference? To answer this fundamental question, the remainder of this section reviews Hasegawa's (1996, 2015) observations and the works cited therein of how the notions of "cause" and "causal relation" have been treated in the literature. Hasegawa extensively observes how these notions have been analyzed not only in the linguistic but also in the philosophical, psychological, and judicial literature (1996: 184–188); she also argues in depth how the notion of cause contrasts with that of reason (1996: 191–194) (cf. also (2015: 212–213)). According to Hasegawa, causation does not "exist as part of objective reality" but "in relation to our *interpretation* of reality" (1996: 187 [italics are original]). When speaking of causal relations, we consider both a cause situation and a result situation. If it rains, for example, the ground can become wet as a result. We perceive the raining event as a cause and the state of the ground being wet as a result. Crucially, as Bullock et al. (1982: 210) point out, "by imposing a causal connection, we efficiently collapse a series of temporally successive motions into a single event". That is, it is us humans who draw a line between the raining event and the resultant state of the ground; there is no necessary boundary between these two situations in the real world. In this sense, as Hasegawa points out, it is impossible to detach a causal relation from human reasoning processes.

As noted above, we normally take a raining event as a cause of the ground to be wet, even though the conceptualizer's reasoning process is involved. Let us consider another case from Hasegawa (2015: 213):

> [I]f arsenic is found in a corpse, this is likely the cause of the person's death. However, further explanation is usually sought, and if it is discovered that someone deliberately put the poison in the victim's food, then the poisoner's action becomes the cause of this death. The presence of arsenic in the body is now perceived simply as the way in which the poisoner produced the effect. Once this point is reached, a sense of finality is achieved as regards the causal relation. Greed or the desire for revenge may have motivated the poisoner to place arsenic in the victim's food.

According to Hasegawa, the poison can be considered as a cause, while the poisoner's greed or desire, or motivation, cannot. Such motivation is a "reason" (cf. Hart and Honoré (1959: 39–40)).[29] The causal chains observed in the above examples may be illustrated as follows:

(5) a. rain → wet ground

b. motivation (greed/desire) → poison-placement → poison → death

Nothing needs to be added to the straightforward causal chain in (5a). In (5b), a causal relation holds in the head of the chain, the relation between "poison" and "death". We can also see a sequence from the "poison-placement" by the poisoner to the victim's "death" as a causal relation, but the cause can be traced up to this point (Hart and Honoré (1959: 39)). Given that, Hasegawa (2015: 212) characterizes a *reason* (as opposed to *cause*) as a concept that "concern[s] human actions and intentions (i.e. motivation or justification for an action)".[30]

It is therefore the traceability of the cause in a sequence of situations that makes it possible to speak of a causal relation in one unit. In other words, the sequence from the poison-placement to death in (5b), for example, is directly perceivable so that the speaker may express the relation interpreted as a causal relation in a single speech event. Thus, the notion of being perceivable is compatible with Hasegawa's

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29. I thank an anonymous reviewer for referring me to Hasegawa (2015) and Hart and Honoré (1959).

30. Another characteristic that Hasegawa (2015) attributes to the notion of *reason* to distinguish it from *cause* is that the chronological order of the situations described is not fixed, as in (i).

(i) I've renewed my passport because I'm going to Japan this summer.
(Hasegawa (2015: 213))

In (i), the situation described in the main clause, the renewal of the speaker's passport, chronologically precedes that described in the *because*-clause, the speaker's plan to go to Japan after the passport renewal. Unlike a reason, a cause situation must chronologically precede the result situation.

view of causation as "our *interpretation* of reality". That is, we interpret the relation between the situations we perceive and convey it as causation. In contrast, reasons in Hasegawa's sense (e.g., "motivation (greed/desire)" in (5b)) are not directly perceivable but require the speaker's or conceptualizer's inferences to identify it. Thus, only separately can the reason part and the rest of the causal chain be expressed.

3.3 CAUSAL construction

In this section, I propose the CAUSAL construction, a schematic construction that expresses a causal relation. The CAUSAL construction is defined as follows: the causal relation between P(roposition)$_1$ and P_2 is mapped onto either [C_2 *because* C_1] or [*Because* C_1, C_2], where C(lause)$_1$ and C_2 convey P_1 and P_2, respectively. As a first approximation, their form and meaning correspondences are represented as in Figure 3.1. The meaning associated directly with the CAUSAL construction is "P_1 is a cause of P_2." The construction specifies that the *because*-clause (i.e. *because* C_1), regardless of the position, represents a cause situation and the main clause (i.e. C_2) the result situation.

At this point, one may wonder why I count such basic strings as "C_2 *because* C_1" or "*Because* C_1, C_2" as constructions; they could be compositional syntactic complexes. According to Goldberg (2006: 5), in order for a linguistic pattern to be recognized as a construction, "some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts" or "[it] occur[s] with sufficient frequency" (cf. Hilpert (2014: 12–14)). The latter criterion does not apply here: Those patterns in Figure 3.1 cannot occur frequently enough to be stored as they are, since their forms and meanings are specified only partially. If we consider the former criterion, what aspect cannot be predictable from their component parts (C_1, C_2, *because*, and component parts of the two C's)? The forms do not deviate from the canonical English patterns; nor does the meaning seem non-compositional. Recall that a causal relation comprises one unit of speech act. This propriety, which is not strictly predictable from the component parts listed above, is what I attribute to the CAUSAL construction.



Figure 3.1 The CAUSAL construction (first approximation)

A closer look at Figure 3.1 reveals that the representation is not sufficient in that one schematic meaning corresponds to two distinct forms. What I mean by this representation is that the syntactic forms [C_2 *because* C_1] and [*Because* C_1, C_2], with which the same semantic meaning is associated, are two distinct constructions. The two constructions, being syntactically distinct and semantically identical, should be distinct pragmatically. Goldberg (1995: 67) notes that if two constructions are syntactically distinct and semantically synonymous, then they must not be pragmatically synonymous (cf. Haiman (1985)). In fact, the two forms in Figure 3.1 are pragmatically distinct. When the *because*-clause appears in sentence-initial position, the *because*-clause is contextually presupposed (cf. Lakoff (1987), Hirose (1991, 1999)). Thus, an additional information structural specification is required. The representation in Figure 3.1 can be divided into the representations in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.[31]



Figure 3.2 The CAUSAL construction: C_2 *because* C_1



Figure 3.3 The CAUSAL construction: *Because* C_1, C_2

"I-S" in Figure 3.3 stands for the information-structural, or pragmatic specification: The content of a sentence-initial *because*-clause is contextually presupposed. That is, the difference in syntactic configuration is attributed to the information-structural distinction.

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31. In my earlier works (e.g., Kanetani (2008)), I postulated a more highly schematic CAUSAL construction as an instantiation of the "lower level" representations in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, in which the syntactic representation does not specify the clause-order and the information-structure is underspecified. However, it is questionable whether people generalize the construction to that extent and thus whether such a representation is necessary in the constructicon, or the network of constructions. Rather than postulating such a questionable schematic construction, the present work considers the two constructions simply as members of a CAUSAL construction family.

In what follows, I show that the proposed CAUSAL constructions hold the general property of causal relations discussed in the previous section. As argued in the previous section, for a causal relation to hold, the cause situation and the result situation need to fall into a single unit of speech act. Let us first consider the construction in which the *because*-clause follows its main clause, namely, the one represented in Figure 3.2. In sentences of this kind, sentence-final *because*-clauses are inside the scope of matrix question or negation. Consider the following example:

(6) Is the ground wet because it has rained? ↗

The arrow here indicates that the rising intonation is used at the end of the sentence. This suggests that both the main clause and *because*-clause are inside the scope of the matrix question. By uttering this sentence, the speaker does not simply ask whether the ground is wet or not, but asks whether the rain has caused the ground to become wet or not. Thus, sentence (6) performs one speech act of question as a whole.[32]

Let us now turn to the construction with a sentence-initial *because*-clause, the one in Figure 3.3. As defined above, sentence-initial *because*-clauses generally convey old information or are contextually presupposed. To see this, take the dialogue in (7) as an example:

(7) A: Why is the ground wet?
B: #Because it has rained, the ground is wet.
B′: The ground is wet because it has rained.

This dialogue shows that using a sentence-initial *because*-clause is not appropriate as an answer to a *why*-question, whereas using the sentence-final counterpart is appropriate. The answer given by speaker B′, which asserts a causal relation between the rain and the wet ground, is informative to speaker A, even if speaker B′ repeats a given piece of information, i.e. the ground is wet (cf. Lambrecht (1994)). In contrast, the utterance of speaker B is not appropriate. The inappropriateness

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32. My informants suggest that this is also the case for even a longer, more complicated, interrogative sentence of a causal oncstruction:

(i) Was he arrested because when he was a government official ten years ago he embezzled public funds?

Even if the causal *because*-clause in (i) itself is a complex clause, the rising intonation appears at the end of the sentence. As with (6), the *because*-clause, as well as the main clause, is in the scope of the matrix question.

stems from sentence-initial *because*-clauses being presupposed. Although speaker A asks the reason why the ground is wet, the answer given by speaker B, using the sentence-initial *because*-clause, indicates that the reason is already known to speaker A; hence, the contradiction.

In addition to being presupposed, sentence-initial *because*-clauses cannot perform speech acts on their own. Lakoff (1987) observes that speech act constructions that convey statements do not occur in sentence-initial *because*-clauses.[33] Consider the following sentence:

(8) *Because here comes my bus, I'm leaving. (Lakoff (1987:474))

In (8), the DEICTIC *THERE* construction *here comes my bus*, a kind of speech act construction of statement, cannot occur in the sentence-initial *because*-clause. As the very name indicates, a speech act construction performs a speech act on its own. Thus, the unacceptability of sentence (8) suggests that a sentence-initial *because*-clause cannot perform a speech act on its own. Given that, it is only after the main clause follows that the complex sentence as a whole performs a speech act.

When a *because*-clause appears in sentence-initial position, not only the *because*-clause, but also the main clause that follows it cannot perform its own speech act. As we observed in Section 2.4, sentence-initial *because*-clauses cannot be understood as a speech-act conjunction (cf. Sweetser (1990)). Observe the following example:

(9) *Because you are a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky?

In short, given a sentence configuration with sentence-initial *because*-clause, although the whole sentence performs a speech act, neither the *because*-clause (*Because* C_1) nor the main clause that follows (C_2) independently performs a speech act. Chafe (1984) argues that a sentence-initial *because*-clause serves as something like a "guidepost" to information flow (see Section 2.3): It provides a cause of a certain situation, and indicates that the proposition expressed by the main clause that follows should be understood as its result. That is, the information of the main clause may be understood only in relation to the information of the sentence-initial *because*-clause. Thus, the information that the sentence-initial *because*-clause conveys and the one that the sentence-final main clause conveys

33. As we shall see in Section 3.4, speech act constructions *do* occur in inferential *because*-clauses. That is, just because *because*-clauses are subordinate clauses does not mean that speech act constructions, a.k.a. root transformations (Emonds (1970)) or main clause phenomena (Green (1976)), do not occur in them (cf. Hooper and Thompson (1973), Lakoff (1987), Haegeman (2002, 2003, 2004), etc.).

are interdependent. The interdependently combined information is conveyed in one speech act unit.

In sum, there are two types of CAUSAL construction, as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. While they are information-structurally distinct, the cause situation and the result situation, regardless of configuration, are understood as consisting of one unit of speech act. This is compatible with what we know about causal relations in general.

3.4 REASONING constructions

In this section, I analyze the REASONING constructions. Before that, however, I make clear the reason for using the term "reasoning" rather than "inferential." As seen in Section 2.4, Sweetser (1990) argues that conjunctions of reason are used in the three domains. As seen in Section 2.6, Pander Maat and Degand (2001) propose a finer-grained speaker-involvement scale. However, as far as the discussion of English conjunctions of reason is concerned, the distinction between the epistemic and speech-act domains (and any finer-grained distinction), I believe, is not crucial for the four reasons mentioned below. Hence, integrating relations that hold in Sweeter's epistemic and speech-act domains, I use the term "reasoning process" as a cover term. It seems that the term "inference" has already been preempted; i.e., it seems to refer only to causal relations that hold in the epistemic domain, and therefore sounds misleading. Thus, I constantly use the word "reasoning," rather than "inference" in the present volume.

A first reason to eliminate the distinction between the epistemic and speech-act domains is that sentences in these two domains behave so similarly, as listed in (10a)–(10d), that their distinction seems not to be crucial:

(10) a. Sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed.
(e.g., Schourup and Waida (1988), Hirose (1991, 1999))

b. The main clause and the subordinate clause form two separate intonation units. (Sections 3.4.1–3.4.2)

c. What Lakoff (1987) calls speech act constructions may occur within *because*-clauses used in these domains and *since*-clauses.
(Sections 3.4.1–3.4.2)

d. *Because*-clauses are not nominalized into *because of* NP. (Section 3.7.2)

Of the four properties or behaviors listed above, I have already mentioned the first one; the others will be discussed in the sections specified in the parentheses. What is important is that none of them is observed in *because*-clauses used in the content domain. Thus, it is true that the distinction between the content domain, on

one hand, and the epistemic and speech-act domains, on the other, is important, but there seems to be no positive reason to distinguish the epistemic domain from the speech-act domain.

Secondly, in both the epistemic and the speech-act domains, a mental attitude on the part of the speaker is involved, and it is such a mental attitude that relates the two situations described in the two clauses. In other words, what is important is whether such a mental attitude is present (cf. Nakau (1994); for the gist of Nakau's argument, see Section 2.5). In the epistemic domain, for example, the speaker draws a conclusion from the premise expressed by the subordinate clause. Consider the following sentence:

(11) John is not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego.

In (11), the speaker arrives at the conclusion that John *cannot* come to class from the premise that he is in San Diego, a city far away from their school. The modal auxiliary *cannot* represents a mental attitude on the part of the speaker; i.e., the speaker is sure that "John's coming" is not true. Likewise, in the speech-act domain, such a mental attitude needs to be present, because it is the speaker of the sentence that performs the speech act. Take the following sentence as an example:

(12) What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on.
(Sweetser (1990: 77))

Suppose the speaker utters this sentence to ask the addressee out that night. The speech act of question in the main clause may be performed according to a scenario like the following:

(13) a. The speaker *knows* that there is a good movie on tonight.
b. The speaker *wants* to ask the addressee out for the movie if she is not busy tonight.
c. The appropriate way to do that *must* be asking what she is doing tonight.
d. The speaker *says*, "What are you doing tonight?"

In the above scenario, expressions of mental attitudes on the part of the speaker are italicized. Thus, causal relations that hold in the epistemic and speech act domains have the following properties in common: Mental attitudes on the part of the speaker are present and sentences express a process in which a certain conclusion is drawn from the premise in these domains. This is similar to Sanders et al.'s (2009) Basic Communication Space Network model (see Section 2.6). They distinguish a linguistic level from a conceptual level. At the former level, an explicit linguistic expression is made; the latter level is the knowledge base, which "contains the adult language user's representation of encyclopedic knowledge, pragmatic

knowledge and human reasoning" (p. 28). It is this latter level that makes the causal relation between the mental attitudes italicized in (13a) through (13d); the actual utterance in the quotes in (13d) is done at the linguistic level.

Thirdly, the distinction of the epistemic causal relation from the speech act one can be reduced to the difference in *kind* of speech act; the two domains are essentially the same in that two units of speech acts are connected. The main clause of an epistemic causal relation can be seen as performing a speech act of statement, while the main clause of a speech act causal relation performs a speech act of other kinds, such as interrogative, imperative, etc. The difference is therefore whether the main clause makes a statement (in the epistemic domain) or question, command, etc. (in the speech-act domain). Interrogative sentences and imperative sentences (i.e. forms of the main clause in the speech act domain) syntactically encode their unmarked illocutionary forces. For example, an interrogative sentence by default conveys a question as its illocutionary force, and hence performs a speech act of question. Likewise, a declarative sentence (i.e. the form of the main clause in the epistemic domain) conveys a statement as its unmarked illocutionary force. Therefore, the difference between the epistemic and speech act causal relations is whether the conclusion that the speaker makes is expressed either as a declarative sentence (conveying a statement) or as another type of sentence (conveying a question, order, etc.), depending on the purpose of communication at the time of utterance.

The last reason for eliminating the distinction of the speech-act and epistemic domains is that, as Sweetser (1990) observes, *since* has a strong tendency towards these two readings. In this regard as well, the distinction between the epistemic and the speech-act domains is less important than the distinction between the content domain and the epistemic/speech-act domains.

For the above reasons, I integrate what Sweetser (1990) calls epistemic causal relations and speech-act causal relations, and treat them both as a reasoning process. Now that the reasons for grouping Sweetser's epistemic and speech-act domains are clear, let us turn to defining the REASONING constructions. There are four types of REASONING constructions defined as follows: The meaning of a reasoning process is mapped onto either [C_2, *because* C_1], [*Since* C_1, C_2], [C_2, *since* C_1], or [C_2, *for* C_1]. In the reasoning process to be mapped onto these forms, the speaker connects two speech acts (one serving as a premise and the other motivated by the premise). Crucially, it is speech acts, not propositions, that are connected by the conjunctions; even so, the presence of an addressee is not a necessary condition for the speech act to be performed. Hirose (2000) decomposes a speaker into "public self", or the speaker who faces an addressee or has one in mind, and "private self", or the speaker as the subject of thinking or consciousness. His subsequent works reveal that in English, a public-self-centered language, the situation

construal is normally unified with situation-reporting, and that a simple declarative sentence of English *per se* normally has a function for the speaker as the public self to report or communicate his/her construed situation to the addressee (for details, see Hirose (2000, 2015) among others; also cf. Ross (1970)). To put it the other way around, in English, what appears as a single declarative sentence with an illocutionary force is equal to a situation construal expression, which bears no intention to communicate with the addressee. In sum, the form of a simple declarative sentence itself may serve either as a public expression or as a private expression.[34] If used with an intention of communication, a declarative sentence is equivalent to the main clause of Sweetser's speech act causal relation, because the declarative sentence has a certain illocutionary force. On the other hand, if it is used simply as a situation construal expression, the declarative sentence in the main clause functions as a conclusion drawn by the speaker (which may or may not be communicated to one or more addressees). It is only in this latter case that a reasoning sentence may be called what has been traditionally treated as an inferential or epistemic causal sentence.

The form-meaning correspondences of the REASONING constructions thus can be represented as follows, in which "SA" stands for a speech act (for conve-

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34. Meanwhile, in Japanese, a public expression is formally distinguished from a private expression (Hirose (2015)). Sentence (i) may correspond, at least, either to (iia) or to (iib):

(i) Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.

(ii) a. Taroo wa modottekita kara Hanako o aishiteiru *nodaroo*.
Taro TOP came.back because Hanako ACC love I.guess
'I guess Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.'

b. Taroo wa modottekita kara Hanako o aishiteiru
Taro TOP came.back because Hanako ACC love
nodayo.
I.tell.you
'(lit.)I tell you Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.'

These two sentences both function as public expressions. The sentence final expression in (iia) *nodaroo* 'I guess' serves as an evidential marker, while that in (iib) *nodayo* 'I tell you' functions as an information-telling marker. In a language like Japanese, where the situation construal is normally detached from the situation-reporting, such evidential or interpersonal expressions are required in order for a situation construal expression to be converted to a situation reporting expression (e.g., Shizawa (2011), Ikarashi (2013), Hirose (2015)). In Chapter 5, I will discuss in detail the corresponding CAUSAL and REASONING constructions in Japanese including sentences (iia), (iib).

nience of reference, I refer to the REASONING construction in which *because*, *since* and *for* are used as the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, the REASONING *SINCE* constructions, and the REASONING *FOR* construction, respectively):[35]



Figure 3.4 The REASONING *BECAUSE* construction



Figure 3.5 The REASONING *SINCE* constructions[36]



Figure 3.6 The REASONING *FOR* construction

As one may notice, *since* and *for* are used in the REASONING construction, but not in the CAUSAL construction. A question then immediately arises: How do we deal with examples of *since* and *for* (seemingly) used in Sweetser's content domain, that is, in sentences that (seem to) express causal relations? The relevant examples are given below:

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35. The semantic representation of each construction is different from that presented in my earlier works (e.g., Kanetani (2006c, 2008)). The present version seems more plausible in that it clearly represents the fact that speech acts are connected.

36. The two distinct forms of the REASONING *SINCE* construction should be pragmatically differentiated for the same reason that I pointed out for the two distinct forms of the CAUSAL constructions in Section 3.3. At this point, however, how they are differentiated is not clear. Some linguists observe that sentence-initial *since*-clauses are preferred to the sentence-final equivalents (e.g., Ford (1993), Swan (2005)). It is also well known that *since*-clauses generally convey given or old information (e.g., Schourup and Waida (1988), Swan (2005)). These observations could be a key to the question. At any rate, I leave this for future research, and here I simply represent the REASONING *SINCE* constructions as in Figure 3.5.

(14) a. Since John wasn't there, we decided to leave a note for him.
(Sweetser (1990: 78))

b. John came back, for he loved her.

According to Sweetser, sentence (14a) describes the causal relations in the real world and is an example of *since* being used in the content domain. Similarly, *for* might be used in the content domain, as in (14b).[37] Here, I assume following Nakau (1994) that *since*-clauses are always modal expressions. That is, although sentence (14) seems to represent real world causation, it does not express the simple causal relation but expresses the reasoning process. Assuming further that *for* has only a reasoning use (cf. Kanbayashi (1989)), we can explain in the same way why *for* seemingly can express real world causation. That is, even if John's loving Mary has indeed caused him to come back in the real world, sentence (14b) does not express the causal relation between the two propositions but expresses the speaker's reasoning process.

To see the validity of these assumptions, consider the following contrast:

(15) John died {because/?since/?for} the bullet hit him in the head.

Sentence (15) describes the direct causal relation between the bullet hitting John's head and his death. Notice also that unlike (14a, b), no human action or interaction is involved in (15). The relation described here is such a direct and physical one that it is almost impossible to think of a context where the speaker's inference, a process to infer a reason, to lie between the two situations, i.e., only a causal reading is possible. In such a context, *since* and *for* are less acceptable than *because*.

It should be noted that the directness is not the only factor to eliminate a possibility of reasoning interpretation. Consider the following example, which is similar to (15):

(16) John died since a needle hit him in the head.[38]

Suppose that the needle is coated with a fatal chemical. Then, the needle is not the direct cause of John's death but it is the chemical coated on the needle that directly causes his death. An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that although the needle is understood as an indirect cause in (16), the acceptability is not enhanced. As discussed in Section 3.2, the crucial factor to distinguish a cause from a reason is whether it can be directly traced or perceived so that one can

37. Although, as mentioned in Section 2.4, Sweetser (1990) does not discuss *for*, I take sentence (14b) as an example of *for* used in the seeming content domain, because the sentence has the same logical meaning as the sentence *John came back because he loved her*.

38. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for providing me with this example.

interpret it as a cause (cf. Hart and Honoré (1959), Hasegawa (1996, 2015)). The grammaticality judgments of (15) and (16) suggest that a cause (either a direct one or an indirect one) cannot be introduced by *since* and *for*. Thus, even if a given sentence seems to express a causal relation in the real world, *since*- and *for*-clauses should be understood as providing a reason, or a premise based on which to state something.

As discussed in Section 3.2, in a reasoning process, two situations or propositions are perceived separately and are related based on the speaker's knowledge. The REASONING construction, which expresses reasoning processes, should be consistent with this knowledge about a reasoning process.[39] Keeping this in mind, I will closely investigate the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction in Section 3.4.1, and the REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions in Section 3.4.2.

3.4.1 REASONING *BECAUSE* construction

As described in Figures 3.4–3.6, there are four types of the REASONING construction, of which I investigate the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction in this subsection. Since *because* is used both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction, comparing the behavior of the *because*-clauses used in these two constructions makes clear the differences between them.

If the premise situation and the conclusion situation in a reasoning process form separate speech act units, the main clause and the *because*-clause of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction should behave as such. This general expectation is indeed borne out. First, the interrogated REASONING *BECAUSE* construction shows a different intonation pattern from the corresponding CAUSAL construction (e.g., (6) above). Observe the following interrogative sentence of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction:

(17)

Has it rained, because the ground is wet.↘

(cf. Is the ground wet because it has rained?↗ (= (6)))

As indicated by the arrows, the rising intonation is used at the end of the main clause and the sentence-final *because*-clause is pronounced with falling intonation. Note also that the sentence-final punctuation is a period, not a question

39. Note here that no matter what conjunction is used, the main clause and the subordinate clause of the REASONING construction are separated by a comma intonation (see Figures 3.4–3.6). The presence of a comma intonation symbolically reflects this characteristic of a reasoning process in general, i.e., the two situations described are understood separately (Section 3.2).

mark (though a question mark may be optionally used). These facts show that the *because*-clause is not inside the scope of the matrix question. This means that sentence (17) performs two speech acts, the question in the main clause and the statement in the *because*-clause. Thus, the main clause and the *because*-clause belong to different speech act units. One more note needs to be made regarding sentence (17). Sweetser's (1990) trichotomy system would treat sentence (17) as describing a speech act causal relation, rather than an (interrogated) epistemic causal relation. The present framework, however, does not draw a line between the epistemic and speech act domains; it does not matter whether the sentence expresses an epistemic causal relation or a speech act causal relation. As I repeatedly emphasized, what is important is that the main clause performs a speech act independent of the *because*-clause.

Another piece of evidence for the *because*-clause performing a speech act independently of the main clause comes from Lakoff's (1987) observation that speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in sentence-final *because*-clauses, as in (18):

(18) I'm leaving, because here comes my bus! (Lakoff (1987: 473))

In (18), the DEICTIC *THERE* construction occurs in the *because*-clause. As the very name suggests, speech act constructions perform speech acts on their own. This means that the *because*-clause in (18) performs a speech act on its own (hence, Lakoff calls such a subordinate clause a performative subordinate clause).

Note in passing that a *because*-clause being in sentence-final position is not sufficient for a speech act construction that conveys a statement to occur therein. Consider the following contrast:

(19) a. He's not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking.

b. He's not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson (1973: 494))

In (19a), even if the *because*-clause is in sentence-final position, the TOPICALIZATION, a kind of speech act construction conveying a statement, cannot occur in the *because*-clause. The original counterpart (19b), in which the *because*-clause is inside the scope of matrix negation, is an instance of the CAUSAL construction (cf. Rutherford (1970)). That is, even in sentence-final position, a causal *because*-clause does not go with a speech act construction, like the TOPICALIZATION in (19a). Hence, in order to give an appropriate description of the occurrence of speech act constructions in *because*-clauses, simply saying that *because*-clauses should be in sentence-final position is not sufficient: What provides the sufficient

condition is the *because*-clause of the REASONING construction.[40] It is quite natural that speech act constructions can occur in reasoning *because*-clauses if they form an information unit independent of the main clauses. At the same time, we may straightforwardly explain why speech act constructions are not allowed in causal *because*-clauses, as in (19a). In the CAUSAL construction, the cause situation and the result situation consist of a single unit of speech act (see Section 3.3). Its *because*-clause cannot perform a speech act on its own, and therefore, speech act constructions cannot occur in causal *because*-clauses.

Thus, as expected, in the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, the main clause and the *because*-clause form speech act units independent of each other.

3.4.2 REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions

In the previous subsection, I analyzed the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction and showed that the main clause and the *because*-clause are understood as forming separate speech act units. This subsection investigates the REASONING *SINCE* and REASONING *FOR* constructions. First, in Section 3.4.2.1, I argue that they both behave similarly to the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. By comparing the REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions with the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, I

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40. This does not conflict with Lakoff's (1987) observation, since a reasoning *because*-clause is always placed in sentence-final position. What I would like to say is that in order to capture the fact more accurately, it is necessary to take into consideration the constructional distinction as proposed in this chapter. In fact, providing a sentence like (i) below, Lakoff (1987: 478f.) says, "it is not the preposed position of the *because*-clause that rules out speech act constructions; rather it is the presuppositional character of the [sentence-initial] position that rules out the speech act constructions."

(i) I want to stay, but because here comes my bus, I'd better leave. (Lakoff (1987: 478))

As I will argue in Section 3.6, sentence (i), with the sentence-initial *because*-clause followed by the main clause containing the explicit expression of the speaker's thought (i.e. *'d better*), should be considered an instance of the CAUSAL construction. One may then argue that sentence (i) would be a counterexample to my generalization that the speech act constructions cannot occur in the CAUSAL construction. I assume here that the speech act construction found in this *because*-clause is licensed by the context within which the construction is embedded (cf. Lakoff (1987)), i.e. by a construction-external factor. It has been pointed out that some constructions are considered unacceptable on their own but are actually used in certain contexts or discourses (e.g., Osawa (2009), Östman (2004)). Treating sentences like (i) as such, we will further need to consider what functional differences there are between these special cases and more typical instances of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions, exactly what factor exceptionally allows the causal *because*-clause to form an independent information unit, etc. For now, I leave these questions open.

show that not only are the REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions similar to each other but also they are similar to the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.[41] Next, I point out in Section 3.4.2.2 that whereas they are both under the umbrella of the REASONING construction, the REASONING *SINCE* construction and the REASONING *FOR* construction have a dissimilarity as well. This is not surprising, however. Rather, this is a natural corollary of the use of the different conjunction.

3.4.2.1 *Similarities*

The REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions are similar to the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction in two respects. First, a rising intonation of interrogative sentences is used at the end of the main clause, not at the end of the sentence. Consider the following examples:

(20) a. Is the ground wet, {since/for} it has rained.

b. * Is the ground wet, {since/for} it has rained?

The sentence should be read with the intonation pattern indicated in (20a), but not with that in (20b). This suggests that the *since*- and *for*-clauses are not inside the scope of matrix question, which is parallel to the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction (cf. (17)), and opposite to the CAUSAL construction (cf. (6)).

Recall that a reasoning *because*-clause cannot appear in sentence-initial position (e.g., (9)). In contrast, a *since*-clause can appear in sentence-initial position. Even preceded by a *since*-clause, the main clause performs a speech act independently of the *since*-clause. Observe the following example:

(21) Since you're so smart, when was George Washington born?
(Sweetser (1990: 78))

41. My earlier works postulated a schematic construction by abstracting similarities of these constructions, namely, the REASONING construction, whose syntactic specification is [C_1, conjunction C_2] (e.g., Kanetani (2008)). However, this specification is too abstract, abstract enough to (logically) allow every complex or compound sentence with a comma intonation to be an instance of the REASONING construction, which is not plausible. In addition, it is questionable whether such an abstract form is really paired with a reasoning sense. Therefore, the present work does not postulate any higher level of generalization than those in (16a)–(16c). Rather, the constructions in (16a)–(16c) should be best analyzed as individual constructions, forming a family of constructions that shares similarities while differentiated from each other (cf. Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004)). Thus, the term "reasoning construction" is used to refer to a family of constructions, rather than an individual schematic construction.

The main clause in (21) by itself asks when George Washington was born; the *since*-clause is not inside the scope of the question, but provides the reason for asking the question.

Another similarity is that *since*- and *for*-clauses, like the reasoning *because*-clauses, allow speech act constructions of statement to occur in them, as exemplified below:

(22) a. I'm going to cheat on my taxes, since who will ever find out? (Lakoff (1987: 479))

b. …since in no real sense could they be said to have had the opportunity of availing themselves of the action project, they are omitted …from most of the following analysis. (BNC)

c. Gay, she knew, must be desperate to write a letter like that, for never before had she lowered her flag to such an extent. (BNC)

In (22a), the RHETORICAL QUESTION occurs in the sentence-final *since*-clause. In (22b), the subject-auxiliary inversion occurs in the sentence-initial *since*-clause, and the same construction occurs in the *for*-clause in (22c). They are all speech act constructions that convey statements (Lakoff (1987)), and therefore, these *since*- and *for*-clauses perform speech acts of statement independently of the main clauses. This is also parallel to reasoning *because*-clauses. Thus, like reasoning *because*-clauses, *since*-clauses and *for*-clauses perform speech acts on their own.

In sum, the REASONING *SINCE*/*FOR* constructions behave alike. They also behave just like the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction: The main clause and the subordinate clause perform speech acts independent of each other, and therefore consist of separate units of speech act. These similarities allow us to group the REASONING *BECAUSE*/*SINCE*/*FOR* constructions into a constructional family (see fn. 41).

3.4.2.2 *Dissimilarity*

In the previous subsection, we observed similarities between the REASONING *SINCE* construction and the REASONING *FOR* construction. However, they do not always behave alike. Consider the following contrast:

(23) a. *For he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred. (Quirk et al. (1985: 922))

b. Since he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred.

The above contrast shows that *for*-clauses cannot take place in sentence-initial position, while *since*-clauses can.

Quirk et al. (1985) note that *for* is a "semi-coordinator," which has properties of both a coordinator and a subordinator. They argue that *for* is like a subordinator in that it does not allow subject ellipsis, as exemplified in (24a); otherwise it behaves like a coordinator.

(24) a. He did not want it, for *(he) was obstinate.

b. I may see you tomorrow or (I) may phone later in the day.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 923f.))

c. John is happy, since *(he) is rich.

As shown in (24b), coordinators in general can connect either clauses or clause constituents, e.g. verb phrases, while, as in (24c), subordinators cannot connect clause constituents. In this respect, Quirk et al. argue, *for* is distinct from other coordinators and is somewhat similar to subordinators. However, given the property of the REASONING construction, we can explain why *for*-clauses cannot connect clause constituents without postulating such a fuzzy category as semi-coordinator: We have only to say that *for* is a *coordinator* used in the REASONING construction.

If it is a coordinator, why then can *for* not connect clause constituents? Taking into consideration the fact that the main clause and the subordinate clause of the REASONING construction form separate speech act units, we may account for the reason as follows. When providing a premise for a reasoning process, a *for*-clause has to count as performing an independent speech act. If subject ellipses were allowed in *for*-clauses, as in other coordinated structures, they would not perform speech acts on their own. For example, if sentence (24a) were acceptable without the parenthesized *he*, the *for*-clause (i.e. *was obstinate*) would have to be interpreted depending upon the main clause, i.e., it would be *he* in the main clause that *was obstinate*. In other words, despite belonging to the category that can essentially connect clause constituents (i.e. coordinator), *for* has to connect two clauses that serve as speech acts because of the property of the construction that it is used in.

Thus, the reason that *for*-clauses do not appear in sentence-initial position is very simple: *For* is a coordinator. That is, sentence (25a) is no more grammatical than sentence (25b) is:

(25) a. *For he was unhappy, he asked to be transferred. (= (23a))

b. *Or they are spending a vacation there, they are living in England.
(Quirk et al. (1985: 921))
(cf. They are living in England, or they are spending a vacation there.)

3.5 Status of the conjunctions

To sum up, the categories of the conjunctions in question and the constructions that these conjunctions are used in can be summarized as follows:

(26) a. *Because* is a subordinator used in the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction.

b. *Since* is a subordinator used in the REASONING construction.
c. *For* is a coordinator used in the REASONING construction.

Given the summary in (26), both similarities and differences between the conjunctions are clear. First, while *because* and *since* are similar in that they are both subordinators, the range of constructions that they appear in is not the same. Second, the range of the constructions in which *since* and *for* are used is the same, but they belong to different categories. Third, *for* is categorially distinct from *because* and *since*, while it is similar to *since* in that the two conjunctions are used only in the REASONING construction.

3.6 Form-meaning mismatches and coercion

As summarized in (26a) above, *because* is used both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction. I have also observed that reasoning *because*-clauses have to occur in sentence-final position, and explained why sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed in the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction (cf. Schourup and Waida (1988), Hirose (1991, 1999), Nakau (1994)). Observe the following sentences:

(27) a. It has rained, because the ground is wet.
b. What do you think of Chomsky, because you are a linguist.

In (27a), the main clause, *it has rained*, represents the speaker's conclusion drawn from the premise that the ground is wet; in (27b), the speaker asks about Noam Chomsky based on his knowledge that linguists in general have good knowledge of Chomsky. To express these meanings, the *because*-clause cannot precede the main clauses; hence, the following sentences are ruled out:

(28) a. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained
b. *Because you are a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky?

As described in Figure 3.4 above, therefore, the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction consists of a main clause followed by a *because*-clause with a comma intonation between the two clauses.

Interestingly, however, with explicit expressions of the speaker's thought, request for information, or the like (i.e. those printed in *italics* in (29a) and (29b)), some speakers accept sentence-initial *because*-clauses, even if the sentences seem to express the reasoning process. Examples are given below:

(29) a. Because the ground is wet, {*I think* it has rained/it *must* have rained}.
b. Because you are a linguist, *I want to know* what you think of Chomsky.

Sentences (29a, b) are acceptable with sentence-initial *because*-clauses, while they respectively have the same functions as sentences (27a, b). Hence, the form-meaning mismatch is observed. What makes sentences (29a, b) different from the ill-formed sentences (28a, b) is the existence of the italicized expressions in (29a, b). How then are the sentences interpreted?

To answer this question, the notion of "coercion" is helpful. De Swart (1998) and Michaelis (2004, 2005), for instance, discuss mismatch phenomena and coercion, or type-shifting, observed in some constructions (cf. Pustejovsky (1996)). To see how coercion works, consider the following simple examples cited from Michaelis (2005):

(30) a. She read *a book*. [lexical match]
b. Did you eat *a pudding*? [lexical mismatch]
(Michaelis (2005: 53))

In (30a) and (30b), the italicized phrases represent the INDEFINITE DETERMINATION construction, in which the indefinite article *a* requires a singular countable noun as its complement. In (30a), *a book* transparently reflects the semantics of the construction: The input lexical item *a* shares semantic value with the right daughter of the construction *book*, because *book* is a singular countable noun. By contrast, *a pudding* in (30b) shows a lexical mismatch: The noun *pudding* is a mass noun, and therefore fails to unify with the construction's right daughter. Michaelis (2005: 53f.) explains this mismatch phenomenon as follows:

> …the relevant feature of the input noun will switch to those required by the construction. This means that mass nouns like *pudding* will receive the value [count +] in combination with the Indefinite Determination construction.

That is, upon the request from the construction that the lexical item is used in, the semantic feature of the mass noun *pudding* [count -] is canceled and switched into countable. This is generalized as follows:

(31) The Override Principle: If a lexical item is semantically incompatible with its syntactic context, the meaning of the lexical item conforms to the meaning of the structure in which it is embedded. (Michaelis (2005: 51))

The form-meaning mismatch in (29a, b) above may be explained in accordance with the Override Principle. In (29a), for example, despite the reasoning sense of *I think* or *must*, because of the syntactic context in which it appears, the whole sentence expresses a causal relation. That is, those who recognize a causal relation between the ground being wet and the speaker concluding that it has rained

may accept this sentence.[42] The acceptability of sentence (29b) may be explained in the same way. In other words, sentences (29a, b) may be accepted not as irregular instances of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, but as instances of the CAUSAL construction. Without those italicized expressions in (29a, b), that is, if a causal relation cannot be recognized at all, the sentences are not acceptable. Therefore, even if the italicized expressions in these examples denote the speaker's thought or request of information, such semantic features are overridden by the sentence forms; the interpretations of the sentences are coerced into the causal ones.

3.7 Further issues

In the previous sections, I have investigated the CAUSAL construction and the family of REASONING constructions, showing that the constructional approach provides a clear explanation of both similarities and differences of the conjunctions of reason. In this section, I show that the proposed analysis gives answers to the questions raised in Chapter 2, as well as explaining the facts observed in the literature. The issues to be discussed in this section are listed below:

(32) a. Why can *since* not be used in the CAUSAL construction?
(Nakau (1994); cf. Sweetser (1990))

b. In the REASONING construction, while *because*-clauses cannot be in sentence-initial position, *since*-clauses can. The reason for *because*-clauses not being in sentence-initial position has already been explained (e.g. Hirose (1991, 1999)). Why then can *since*-clauses be in sentence-initial position?

c. Why can causal *because*-clauses be nominalized into *because of* {NP/Gerund}, while reasoning *because*-clauses cannot?
(cf. Rutherford (1970))

d. Why can *since*-clauses not be nominalized into *since* {NP/Gerund}?
(cf. Wickboldt (1997))

e. Why can reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses not clefted?
(cf. Nakau (1994))

The answers to questions (32a) and (32b) are intimately related, as are the answers to questions (32c) and (32d). I will first give answers to questions (32a, b) in Section 3.7.1, and then to questions (32c, d) in Section 3.7.2. Lastly, I will answer question (32e) in Section 3.7.3.

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42. Of course, those who do not recognize such a causal relation are not expected to accept sentence (29a).

3.7.1 *Since* as a reasoning subordinator

As summarized in (26) in Section 3.5, while *because* is used both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction, *since* is used only in the REASONING construction. Importantly, it is metaphorical extensions that make it possible for both *because* and *since* to be used in the REASONING construction. To answer question (32a), we need to consider two types of metaphorical extensions, each of which has a different source domain, i.e., what the reasoning process is compared to.

Recall first that Sweetser sees a reasoning process as a metaphorical causal relation (see Section 2.4; cf. Hirose (1999)). Thus, when *because*, i.e. the conjunction that introduces a cause of another situation, is used, a reasoning process may be compared to a causal relation: Along with the REASONING IS CAUSATION metaphor, *because* may be used to introduce the premise from which to draw a conclusion.

As for *since*, it is often pointed out that its reasoning sense has developed from its temporal meaning (e.g. Traugott and König (1991)). That is, when *since* is used, a reasoning process is compared to a period of time, and not to a causal relation. Thus, postulating the REASONING IS TEMPORAL SEQUENCE metaphor, we may view a reasoning process as a process that begins at the time of giving the premise (designated by the *since*-clause) and ends by performing a speech act in the main clause.[43]

Crucially, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 56ff.) argue that metaphorical mappings occur unidirectionally: Abstract concepts are compared to concrete ones, and not vice versa. Note also that, as Sweetser (1990: 23ff.) discusses at length, we conceptualize our internal mental world by mapping it onto the external world. Thus, we may say that reasoning processes can be compared to causal relations, but not vice versa. This is because causal relations which occur in the real world are more concrete than reasoning processes, which occur inside the speaker's internal mental world. As a result, *because* can be used in both the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction by the metaphorical mapping of a reasoning process onto a causal relation, while *since* cannot be used in the CAUSAL construction,

43. The question remains open as to why the temporal meaning of since is extended to the reasoning one, not to the causal one. Compared with a reasoning process, a causal relation can be considered as concrete as a temporal sequence. From early on, we observe in the real world both the causal relation, in which something causes something else, and the temporal sequence, along which something occurs after something else, and hence they are intuitive. Given the general tendency that metaphors use a more abstract concept as a target and a more concrete concept as its source (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980)), I speculatively say that a temporal sequence and causal relation are equally concrete, so that the temporal sense serves as a source of the reasoning sense, but not of the causal sense.

because a causal relation cannot be compared to a reasoning process, i.e., it is not plausible to compare the less abstract concept to the more abstract one.

In sum, the reasoning sense of *because* is compared to its causal sense, and therefore *because* may be used both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction. In contrast, the reasoning sense of *since* is compared to its temporal sense, and crucially, we cannot compare a causal relation to a reasoning process. Therefore, *since* is used in the REASONING construction but not in the CAUSAL construction.

Let us now turn to question (32b): Why can *since*-clauses occur in sentence-initial position while reasoning *because*-clauses cannot? As mentioned above, *since* is used only in the REASONING construction. Therefore, regardless of its position, a *since*-clause is understood with no ambiguity as providing the premise by which to perform another speech act. Unlike *since*, *because* is ambiguous: It can be understood as introducing either a cause or a premise. These two readings are disambiguated by the position of the *because*-clause (and the presence or absence of a comma intonation). That is, a reasoning *because*-clause must appear in sentence-final position with a comma intonation; otherwise it is a causal one.

3.7.2 Nominalization of *because*- and *since*-clauses

This subsection gives answers to questions (32c, d): Why can reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses not be nominalized? Rutherford (1970) observes that causal *because*-clauses can be nominalized into *because of* {NP/Gerund}, while reasoning *because*-clauses cannot.[44] Observe the following examples, in which the causal *because*-clauses are nominalized into *because of* NP:

(33) a. John is not coming to class because of his sickness. (Hirose (1992: 85))
(cf. He's not coming to class because he was sick.)

b. Because of the law in Ireland, we had to work out a way of getting her over to Britain. (COBUILD)

Sentences (33a, b) indicate that the nominalization of *because*-clauses is allowed in the CAUSAL construction, whether they are in the sentence-initial or sentence-final position. Now, consider the following ill-formed sentence:

(34) *He's not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego.
(Rutherford (1970: 105))
(cf. He's not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego.)

44. Rutherford does not explicitly distinguish the causal and reasoning *because*-clauses. He argues that "bound" *because*-clauses may be nominalized, while "free" *because*-clauses may not.

The ill-formed sentence is meant to express the reasoning process by which to draw the conclusion that he is not coming to class from the premise that he just called from San Diego. The unacceptability suggests that reasoning *because*-clauses, unlike their causal counterparts, may not be nominalized into *because of* {NP/Gerund P}.

The contrast can be explained based on the different properties of each construction discussed in Sections 3.2 through 3.4. That is, the main clause and the subordinate clause in the CAUSAL construction are understood as forming one speech act unit as a whole, whereas those in the REASONING construction are understood as forming two separate units of speech act. If a *because*-clause is nominalized, it cannot perform a speech act on its own. As a result, the information conveyed by such a nominalized *because*-clause has to be regarded as part of a larger unit of speech act that includes it.

As one might notice, this is the same reason as the one that *for*-clauses do not allow subject ellipsis (see Section 3.4.2.2). The relevant example is repeated in (35):

(35) He did not want it, for *(he) was obstinate. (= (24a))

Since sentence (35) is a reasoning sentence, the *for*-clause has to perform a speech act independently of its main clause. If subject ellipsis were allowed in the *for*-clause, it would not perform a speech act on its own.

For essentially the same reason, the nominalized *because*-clause in (34) above, *because of his just having called from San Diego*, is not allowed: The nominalization also forces such a dependent interpretation on the *because*-clause. In this case, we can identify who the person is that called from San Diego independently of the main clause, because it is explicitly mentioned in the subordinate clause. However, when the phone-call takes place needs to be interpreted depending upon the tense of the main clause, because it is expressed by the nonfinite form, *having (just) called* (cf. Wada (2001: 34ff.)).[45] That is, the nominalized *because*-clause cannot be seen as forming an independent speech act unit. Such a dependent interpretation is not problematic to the CAUSAL construction, in which the cause situation and the result situation are understood as forming a single unit of speech act. Hence, while the nominalization of a *because*-clause is compatible with the CAUSAL construction, it is incompatible with the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.

45. For detailed arguments of how the tense of the gerund is defined at the base time, i.e. the tense of the main clause, see Wada (2001).

Given this answer to question (32c), the answer to question (32d) is straightforward. Wickboldt (1997), among others, observes that *since*-clauses cannot be nominalized. Consider the following example:

(36) *Since having written the book, Mary was writing the blurb.
(cf. Since Mary has written the book, she was writing the blurb.)
(Wickboldt (1997: 92))

We can account for the unacceptability of sentence (36) in exactly the same way as the unacceptability of the nominalization of reasoning *because*-clauses (e.g., (34)). If a *since*-clause were nominalized, it could not form an independent unit of speech act. Considering that *since* is used only in the REASONING construction, it is quite natural that the nominalization of *since*-clauses is not allowed. The nominalization forces *since*-clauses to be interpreted depending upon the main clause; this is incompatible with the property of the REASONING construction. That is, *since*-clauses are not nominalized for the same reason that reasoning *because*-clauses cannot be nominalized.

The nominalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses might not be accounted for in such an integrated way if one focuses only on the differences of these conjunctions. In this sense, it may be said that the arguments in this subsection have demonstrated the importance of considering the type of construction in which they occur.

3.7.3 On clefting

In this subsection, I answer the final question (= (32e)): Why can reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses not be clefted? Recall Nakau's (1994) argument about clefting of *because*- and *since*-clauses (Section 2.5). He claims that *because* can be either a propositional element or a marker of modality (a marker of D-MOD in his terms). He observes that a *because*-clause as a propositional element may be clefted, while one as a D-MOD element may not, as the following contrast shows:

(37) a. It's because he's sick that he's not coming to class.
b. *It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class.
(Nakau (1994: 162))

Nakau also observes that *since* is always a marker of D-MOD and that *since*-clauses cannot be clefted, as shown in (38):

(38) *It was since they wanted to save lives that they retreated.
(Nakau (1994: 162))

Nakau generalizes these facts as follows: Only propositional elements can be focalized.

However, the *reason* is not clear. That is, why is it only propositional elements that may be focalized? Besides, as I shall point out in Chapter 4, reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses may be focalized by certain focusing adverbs; it is not correct to generalize that reasoning subordinate clauses cannot be focalized. The proposed analysis explains why reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses may not be clefted (while they may be focalized by certain focusing adverbs). First, recall the properties of the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING constructions. The main clause and the subordinate clause in the CAUSAL construction are understood as one unit of speech act, while those in the REASONING constructions fall into two separate speech act units. This is illustrated in (39):

(39) a. [He's not coming to class because he's sick].
b. [He's not coming to class], [because his wife told me].
c. [They retreated], [since they wanted to save lives].

In (39), a pair of brackets represents a unit of speech act. Sentences (39a)–(39c) are examples of the CAUSAL construction, the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, and the REASONING *SINCE* construction, respectively.

Let us now consider the general structure of the CLEFT construction. A cleft sentence generally focalizes the element in the matrix clause while making the remnant (i.e. the element in the *that*-clause) relatively presupposed. As such, the reason for the unacceptability of sentences (37b) and (38) may be explained as follows. As the brackets in (39b, c) indicate, the main clause and subordinate clause in the REASONING construction are understood as performing separate speech acts, each of which should be asserted independently, and neither of which can be placed in a presupposed position. Given that the element in the *that*-clause of the CLEFT construction is understood as being backgrounded, clefting a reasoning subordinate clause backgrounds the main clause. Hence, the contradiction. By contrast, a causal *because*-clause, which *per se* does not constitute a unit of speech act, may be clefted with no contradiction. A cleft sentence as a whole performs a speech act (e.g., (37a)).

3.8 Relations among constructions

So far, I have thoroughly discussed the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction, showing that the proposed analysis provides reasonable answers to questions raised in Chapter 2. In this section, I describe in terms of inheritance links (e.g. Goldberg (1995), Hirose (1999)) how the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions are related to each other and to other constructions.

In order to capture the relations among constructions, Goldberg (1995) proposes the notion of inheritance links. Recall that there are several types of inher-

itance links, among which instance links (I_I-links) and metaphorical extension links (I_M-links) are helpful to describe relations among the constructions under discussion (see Section 2.8.2 for detail). Their definitions are repeated as in (40):

(40) a. An I_I-link is posited when a particular construction is a special case of another construction. (= (47a) of Chapter 2)

b. An I_M-link is posited when two constructions are found to be related by a metaphorical mapping. (= (47b) of Chapter 2)

With these notions, relations among the relevant constructions can be represented as in Figure 3.7.



Figure 3.7 The inheritance relations among the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions

Figure 3.7 is read as follows. Each box represents constructions or constructional families. The boxes with the thick lines should not be understood as individual constructions, but rather as constructional families. The names of the constructions or constructional families are printed in small capitals. Some of them have

semantic and/or syntactic specifications as well as their names. The meaning pole in the CAUSAL construction can be schematically specified as [$P_1 \rightarrow P_2$]: The arrow represents the causal relation between P_1 and P_2, of which P_1 is understood as a cause situation and P_2 a result situation; the brackets mean that the causal relation described therein is understood as forming one unit of speech act. Likewise, the schematic meaning of the REASONING construction may be represented as [SA_1]$\leftrightarrow$[SA_2]: The two speech acts (indicated by the two separate brackets) are related by a reasoning process (indicated by the left-right arrow) such that SA_1 is understood as a premise by which to motivate SA_2. In the REASONING constructions, the speech act type of the unit [SA_1] is restricted to the statement (cf. Lakoff (1987)), while the speech act type of the unit [SA_2] might vary from a statement to a question, order, etc.

In what follows, I summarize the gist of the arguments through the present chapter along with Figure 3.7. Firstly, as I argued in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the terms CAUSAL construction and REASONING construction are best understood as families of constructions, rather than individual constructions. For example, the meaning [$P_1 \rightarrow P_2$] is mapped onto either the form [C_2 *because* C_1] or the form [*Because* C_1, C_2]; these two form-meaning pairings, or constructions, comprise the CAUSAL construction as a constructional family. Generally speaking, two constructions that are syntactically distinct and semantically synonymous must be pragmatically distinct (Goldberg (1995: 67)). Indeed, the two members of the CAUSAL construction are information-structurally distinct, i.e., sentence-initial *because*-clauses are contextually presupposed (e.g., Lakoff (1987), Hirose (1991)). Likewise, the REASONING *SINCE* constructions of different clause-orders must also be pragmatically distinct. At present, however, how they are differentiated cannot be answered (see fn. 36) and is left for future research.

Secondly, the four members of the family of the REASONING construction must be different from each other in some sense. To begin with, the difference between the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction and the REASONING *SINCE* construction can be accounted for by the difference in metaphorical mapping. The reasoning processes expressed by the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction may be understood as metaphorical causal relations due to the causal meaning of *because* (cf. Sweetser (1990), Hirose (1999)). Thus, an I_M-link is posited between the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. In the REASONING *SINCE* constructions, due to the meaning of *since*, a reasoning process is compared to a period of time (Section 3.7.1). Therefore, an I_M-link is posited between the REASONING *SINCE* constructions and TEMPORAL *SINCE* construction. That is, although in Figure 3.7, their reasoning senses are represented in the same way by simplifying them as [SA_1]$\leftrightarrow$[SA_2], details of how their meanings are construed are not exactly the same; these constructions are semantically distinct. It is in this way that the

difference between the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction and the REASONING *SINCE* construction is captured.

Next, the difference between the REASONING *FOR* construction and the other types of constructions in the REASONING construction family can be captured by considering what syntactic categories the conjunctions belong to (Section 3.4.2.2): *Because* and *since* are subordinators; *for* is a coordinator. In terms of inheritance, the REASONING *SINCE* construction is an instance of SUBORDINATE STRUCTURE constructions, while the REASONING *FOR* construction is an instance of COORDINATE STRUCTURE constructions.[46] Therefore, I_I-links are posited between them.

Thus, in this chapter, I first proposed two families of constructions in English that express a causal relation and a reasoning process, i.e. the families of the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction. The conjunction *because* is used in both of them, whereas *since* and *for* participate only in the REASONING construction. Analyzing these constructions in detail, I claimed that both the similar and different behaviors of the conjunctions are best accounted for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves but by considering what constructions they are used in. In the chapters to come, I will demonstrate the validity of the analysis proposed in this chapter by applying it to various phenomena or other constructions with *because*.

46. Needless to say, the CAUSAL construction with *because* is an instance of the SUBORDINATE STRUCTURE construction. For the sake of simplification, however, the arrow that indicates the inheritance relation is not represented in Figure 3.7

CHAPTER 4

Focalizations of *because*- and *since*-clauses

4.1 Introduction

It has often been pointed out that while *because*-clauses can be focalized by adverbs such as *just*, *only*, and *simply*, *since*-clauses cannot (e.g. Quirk et al. (1985), Schourup and Waida (1988), Wickboldt (1997), among others):

(1) a. He went to college just {because/*since} his parents asked him to.
b. Don't expect me to marry you simply {because/*since} you're rich.
(Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

According to Schourup and Waida (1988), for example, the above grammaticality contrasts stem from the fact that the reason introduced by *because* conveys new information, while the reason introduced by *since* represents old information.

This claim, however, is not plausible for the following reasons. First, there are cases in which *since*-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs, as shown in (2):

(2) Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, **particularly since** a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress … (BNC [emphasis is mine])

Secondly, just because the reason is introduced by *because* does not always make it possible for the *because*-clause to be modified by focusing adverbs. Observe the following example:

(3) *It has rained, just because the ground is wet.
(cf. It has rained, because the ground is wet.)

Furthermore, the contrasts between old and new information do not seem relevant in accounting for the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses by focusing adverbs, for reasons to be explored later.

In this chapter, based on the argument in the previous chapter, I propose a generalization that accounts for when *because*- and *since*-clauses can or cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs. In particular, I argue that the focalizability of *because* and *since* is best explained by considering the interaction between the characteristics of the constructions that these conjunctions are used in and the

types of focusing adverbs. In Chapter 3, I postulated the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction, as two families of constructions, arguing that *because* participates in both of them while *since* is used only in the latter. The present chapter demonstrates the validity of the argument by applying it to the analysis of the focalizability of *because* and *since*.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 makes a brief argument against information-structural accounts of the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses. Section 4.3 reviews the discussion in Chapter 3 of characteristics of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions. Following Quirk et al. (1985), Section 4.4 classifies focusing adverbs into two groups and shows how they focalize their targets. Based on the discussion in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, Section 4.5 presents an alternative account of the grammaticality of sentences (1)–(3) above and other examples to be given later on, and proposes a generalization about the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses by focusing adverbs. Section 4.6 summarizes the argument in this chapter.

4.2 Against information-structural accounts

As seen in the previous section, Schourup and Waida (1988) attempt to account for the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses in terms of a distinction in their information-structures, claiming that the reason introduced by *because* conveys new information, while that introduced by *since* presents old information.[47] As shown in (2) and (3) above, however, there are many counterexamples to Schourup and Waida's generalization about the focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses. Thus, their descriptive generalization is not true. Furthermore, the premise on which the generalization is based is inadequate. That is, as seen in the remainder of this section, a reason introduced by *because* does not always convey new information, nor does a reason introduced by *since* necessarily present old information.

First, although the generalization states that *because*-clauses convey new information, this is not always true. Hirose (1991: 31) notes that sentence-initial *because*-clauses generally convey old information (cf. Chapter 3). To see this, consider the following dialogue:

(4) A: Why is the ground wet?
B: #Because it has rained, the ground is wet.
(cf. The ground is wet because it has rained.)

47. Such an information-structural distinction has also been observed by other researchers (e.g., Poutsma (1904), Swan (2005), among others).

The above dialogue shows that using a sentence-initial *because*-clause is not appropriate to answer a *why*-question. The inappropriateness of speaker B′s utterance stems from the sentence-initial *because*-clause being presupposed. Although speaker A asks the reason why the ground is wet, the answer given by speaker B, with the sentence-initial *because*-clause, indicates that the reason is already known to speaker A, hence the incompatibility between the speakers. That is, the reason introduced by *because* does not necessarily convey new information.

Likewise, *since*-clauses do not always convey old information. They may present new information and be asserted as if they were independent clauses (cf. Hirose (1991: fn.13)). Observe the following sentence:

(5) I'm going to cheat on my taxes, since who will ever find out?
(Lakoff (1987: 479))

In (5), the RHETORICAL QUESTION *who will ever find out?* occurs in the *since*-clause. Lakoff observes that speech act constructions that convey statements, such as the RHETORICAL QUESTION in (5), may occur in *since*-clauses as well as in *because*-clauses. Crucially, Hooper and Thompson (1973) argue that it is only in asserted clauses that speech act constructions ("root transformations" in their terms) can occur. Thus, *since*-clauses may be asserted as if they were independent clauses: At least the *since*-clause in (5) is asserted. Therefore, it is not likely that the reason introduced by *since* always presents old information.

In brief, just because the reason is introduced by *because* does not mean that it always conveys new information. Likewise, just because the reason is introduced by *since* does not necessarily mean that it conveys old information. It then follows that Schourup and Waida's (1988) account of the focalizability of *because* and *since* based on the information-structural distinction is not plausible. I will present an alternative account in Section 4.5 that does not depend upon the information-structural distinction. Before that, however, we need to consider (i) the characteristics of the constructions that *because* and *since* are used in (cf. Chapter 3), and (ii) the meanings of relevant focusing adverbs (cf. Quirk et al. (1985)), which are the two main factors that the analysis to be proposed is dependent upon.

4.3 CAUSAL construction vs. REASONING construction

In Chapter 3, I proposed families of constructions for the causal meaning and for the reasoning meaning. The causal relation between situation$_1$ and situation$_2$ is mapped onto either [C_2 *because* C_1] or [*Because* C_1, C_2], in which C_1 and C_2 denote situation$_1$ and situation$_2$, respectively. These form-meaning correspondences are

understood as grammatical units, which I call the CAUSAL constructions.[48] Likewise, a reasoning process in which the speaker performs a speech-act (SA_2) motivated by another speech act serving as a premise (SA_1) is mapped onto either [C_2, *because* C_1], [C_2, *since* C_1], or [*Since* C_1, C_2]. Each form-meaning correspondence is a member of the family of the REASONING construction.

In Chapter 3, I also maintained that various syntactic phenomena observed in previous studies may be reduced to the constructional differences, summarized in (6):

(6) **Table 4.1** Summary of behavioral differences between the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions

	causal	**reasoning**
a. sentence-initial *because*-clause	OK	*
b. nominalization	OK	*
c. wide scope of matrix negation	OK	*
d. clefting	OK	*
e. speech-act constructions	*	OK

In other words, these five diagnostic tests are available to distinguish the CAUSAL construction from the REASONING construction. Notably, while *because* appears both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction, *since* is used exclusively in the REASONING construction (cf. Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994), Dancygier and Sweetser (2000, 2005), and Pander Maart and Sanders (2000)). It is worthwhile repeating here that the term "reasoning" is used in a broad sense. That is, even in the situations that might seem to have a causal relation, some kind of speaker's reasoning process must be involved when the situations are connected by *since*. This can be demonstrated by the following example:

(7) John died {because/?since } the bullet hit him in the head.

This sentence describes the causal relation between the bullet hitting John in the head and his death. As discussed in Section 3.4, it is difficult for the speaker's subjective reasoning process to lie between the two situations. In such a context, *since* can only marginally connect the two situations.

48. I use the plural form "constructions" to mean both members of the CAUSAL construction family. As mentioned in Chapter 3, they are information-structurally different, but their difference is not relevant here.

Given that those differences listed in (6a)–(6e) are attributed to the characteristics of each construction, we can expect a *since*-clause to behave like a reasoning *because*-clause and unlike a causal *because*-clause. Let us briefly review relevant examples in the order of (6b) to (6e). First, as Rutherford (1970) observes, causal *because*-clauses can be nominalized as *because of* NP, while reasoning ones cannot. Like reasoning *because*-clauses, and unlike causal *because*-clauses, *since*-clauses cannot be nominalized, as shown in (8):

(8) a. He's not coming to class because of his sickness.
b. *He's not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 105))
c. *Since John's death, Mary remarried. (Wickboldt (1997: 85))

Second, when a negation occurs in the main clause, causal *because*-clauses can be inside the scope of the negation, as in (9b, c), whereas reasoning *because*-clauses cannot, as shown in (10b, c) (e.g., Rutherford (1970), Hirose (1991), among others):

(9) a. He doesn't beat his wife because he loves her. (Rutherford (1970: 100))
b. NEG [he beats his wife] because he loves her
c. NEG [he beats his wife because he loves her]

(10) a. He's not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego.
b. NEG [He's coming to class] because he just called from San Diego
c. *NEG [He's coming to class because he just called from San Diego]

As with reasoning *because*-clauses, *since*-clauses cannot appear inside the matrix negation (cf. Hirose (1991)). Consider the following:

(11) a. John is not happy, since he's rich.
b. NEG [John is happy] since he's rich
c. *NEG [John is happy since he's rich]
(Hirose (1991: 29))

Third, as Nakau (1994) observes, a causal *because*-clause can be clefted, as in (12a), whereas a reasoning *because*-clause and *since*-clause cannot, as in (12b, c):

(12) a. It's because he's sick that he's not coming to class.
b. *It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class.
c. *It was since they wanted to save lives that they retreated.
(Nakau (1994: 162))

Fourth, Lakoff (1987) observes that speech act constructions that convey statements can occur in sentence-final *because*-clauses, as the following contrast shows:

(13) a. We should go on a picnic, because isn't it a beautiful day!
b. *Because isn't it a beautiful day, we should go on a picnic.
(Lakoff (1987: 474))

I rephrased this in Section 3.4.1 as follows: It is in reasoning *because*-clauses and not in causal ones that speech act constructions can occur. To see the validity of this analysis, recall the following examples:

(14) a. Sam is not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson (1973: 494))
b. *Sam is not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking.

Since the sentence in (14a) allows a wide-scope reading of the matrix negation, the *because*-clause is a causal one. Thus, if the *because*-clause is a causal one, speech act constructions like the TOPICALIZATION in (14b) are not allowed even in sentence-final position. The sentence-final topicalized clause that follows *because*, *Japanese food, his wife is cooking* conveys a statement like *his wife is cooking Japanese food*. As is expected from the argument so far, such speech act constructions are allowed to occur in *since*-clauses, as in (15):

(15) I'm going to cheat on my taxes, since who will ever find out? (= (5))

Here, the RHETORICAL QUESTION, *who will ever find out*, occurs in the *since*-clause and the sentence is grammatical. Interestingly, sentence-initial *since*-clauses behave in the same way. Observe the following example:

(16) …since in no real sense could they be said to have had the opportunity of availing themselves of the action project, they are omitted … from most of the following analysis. (BNC)

The NEGATIVE INVERSION, a kind of speech act construction expressing a statement, occurs in the sentence-initial *since*-clause in this sentence. It is not surprising that this type of speech act construction occurs in a sentence-initial *since*-clause if we consider the occurrence of such a speech act construction in a subordinate clause as a characteristic of the REASONING construction. The syntactic configuration [*since* C_1, C_2] is no less a form of the REASONING construction than [C_2, *since* C_1] is.

Up to this point, we have reviewed that *since*-clauses and reasoning *because*-clauses, but not causal *because*-clauses, behave alike. What is important for the present discussion is that a causal sentence performs one speech act as a whole, while a reasoning sentence consists of two speech acts. As discussed in Chapter 3,

the difference reflects how we conceptualize causal relations and reasoning processes. In Section 3.2, assuming with Hart and Honoré (1959) and Hasegawa (1996, 2015) that causes are directly perceivable and hence interpretable, I argued that this direct interpretability of a cause makes it possible for the speaker to express a causal relation, a sequence from a cause situation to a result situation, in a single speech event. On the other hand, a reason (an intention or motivation) is not directly perceivable but requires the speaker's or conceptualizer's inference to detect it. As a result, the speaker (subjectively) connects two situations that may not necessarily be related in the real world; they are realized as two distinct speech acts. To see this, take sentence (17) as an example:

(17) It has rained, because the ground is wet.

In the real-world, a wet piece of ground cannot cause it to rain; rather, rain causes ground to become wet. Crucially, however, the real cause of the wet ground in (17) does not have to be the rain, either. In this sentence, the speaker or the conceptualizer sees the ground wet and then concludes that it must have rained based on his or her general knowledge of the world. In other words, it may not have rained, and even if it has, there need not be a necessary causal relation between the rain and the wet ground. Besides, there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has rained, such as say, seeing a rainbow in the sky, seeing someone get home wet, hearing the news about the rain, etc. It should also be noted that the main clause of a reasoning sentence is understood as a speech act (see Section 3.4; see also Section 5.4 for detail). The main clause in (17), for example, should not be understood as merely representing the proposition, but rather as stating that it has rained. What is important is that even though the speaker can directly perceives the ground being wet, he or she does not interpret it as a cause, or a situation in a causal chain, but uses it as a motivation based on which to perform the speech act. Crucially, the motivation based on which to perform that speech act is not directly perceivable and has to be stated in a separate speech act unit. Incidentally, the comma intonation between the main clause and the subordinate clause required in the REASONING construction (e.g., Rutherford (1970), Sweetser (1990), Nakau (1994), Hirose (1999), Kanetani (2005c, 2006c)) symbolically functions to separate speech acts between the main clause and the subordinate clause.

To wrap up this section, I would like to emphasize that the type of constructions, not the type of conjunctions, accounts for the focalizability of subordinate clauses by certain focusing adverbs.[49]

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49. Haegeman (2002), who mainly focuses on interpretations of conditional *if*-clauses and the applicability of TOPICALIZATION to them, presents a similar observation from a generative

4.4 Two types of focusing adverbs: Exclusives and Particularizers

In the previous section, I discussed the characteristics of the constructions in which *because* and *since* are used. In this section, I investigate how focusing adverbs focalize the elements that follow them.

Quirk et al. (1985) draw a line between two types of focusing adverbs. One group, including *just*, *simply*, *only*, *precisely*, and the like, is called exclusives. The other group, called particularizers, includes *especially*, *particularly*, *largely*, and the like. According to Quirk et al., these adverbs indicate that the utterance concerned is true in respect of the part which is focused on, and the adverbs in each group restrict the utterance in different ways. Specifically, exclusives restrict the application of the utterance exclusively to the focal point; particularizers restrict the application of the utterance predominantly to the part focused.

Keeping the basic characteristics of each group of focusing adverbs in mind, let us observe the meanings of some adverbs more closely and investigate how they restrict the utterances. First, observe the dictionary definitions of some exclusives and particularizers listed in (18)–(19):

(18) exclusives

a. only: as a single fact or instance and nothing more or different (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary [WEBSTER])

b. just: *simply* (WEBSTER)

c. simply: without ambiguity (WEBSTER)

d. merely: used meaning 'only' or 'simply' to emphasize a fact or s[ome] th[ing] that you are saying (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (6th edition) [OALD])

e. solely: only; not involving s[ome]b[ody] /s[ome]th[ing] else (OALD)

f. precisely: emphasize that a reason or fact is the only important one there is … (COBUILD)

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perspective using minimalist terminology. Haegeman distinguishes central and peripheral adverbial clauses in terms of the different timings of their merger with the main clause, and points out that while the central adverbial clause (our *because*-clause in the CAUSAL construction) is part of the speech act of the matrix clause, the peripheral adverbial clause (our subordinate clause in the REASONING construction) has independent illocutionary force. Haegeman's analysis thus supports our view. For the purpose of the present discussion, however, the detailed internal structures of adverbial clauses such as those that Haegeman presents in the latter part of her paper are, presumably, not necessary. Therefore, I will not consider their internal syntactic structures in detail.

(19) particularizers
  a. particularly: distinctive among other examples or cases of the same general category (WEBSTER)
  b. especially: in particular (WEBSTER)
  c. largely: in a large manner; *especially* (WEBSTER)
  d. mainly: used to show that a statement is true to a large degree (OALD)
  e. mostly: indicate that the statement is generally true … in most respects (COBUILD)
  f. principally: more than anything else (COBUILD)

The dictionary definitions of the exclusives in (18) show that adverbs in this group exclude other possibilities than those described. Exclusives thus single out the particular components that follow them, thereby denying other possibilities. Considering the definitions of the particularizers in (19), on the other hand, we can see that they do not exclude other possibilities. Rather, they imply that there are possibilities other than the one described. Particularizers thus highlight what follows them by comparing the modified element with other similar examples or cases.

Now, I would like to observe how focalizations by exclusives and particularizers work. First, consider the following example:

(20) You can tell just by looking at me that I am all right … (COBUILD)

In (20), the *by*-phrase is focalized by the exclusive *just*. The sentence indicates that all the addressee needs to do to tell that the speaker is all right is to look at him or her; no more effort needs to be made.[50]

Next, to see how particularizers focalize what follows them, observe the following sentence, which involves the focalization by the particularizer *especially*:

(21) Millions of wild flowers color the valleys, especially in April and May … (COBUILD)

In this sentence, the period during which the valleys are colored by wild flowers is not limited to April and May. Rather, the focalization of the period by the particularizer implies that there are other months when people can enjoy the valleys colored with wild flowers, say, March, June, etc.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002) divide focusing adverbs into two groups from a similar point of view. They refer to adverbs such as *only*, *just*, *precisely*, *simply*, and the like, as total restrictive focusing modifiers; adverbs such as *especially*, *mainly*, *particularly*, *mostly*, and the like, they call partial restrictive focusing modifiers.

50. For his interpretation of this example, I thank an editor at Editage.

The former group corresponds to Quirk et al.'s (1985) exclusives and the latter to their particularizers. Henceforth, in order to avoid confusion, I use Quirk et al.'s (1985) terms. Consider the following sentence, where the particularizer *mainly* focalizes the prepositional phrase that follows:

(22) I was concerned mainly about the cost.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 592))

Huddleston and Pullum say that this sentence "do[es] not say (as [it] would with *only*) that I wasn't concerned with anything except the cost, but rather that I wasn't concerned with anything else to the same extent: *any other concerns* are relatively minor" (p. 592 [emphasis is mine]). As the italicized phrase "any other concerns" suggests, focalization by a particularizer implies that there are other possibilities that are not explicitly mentioned in the given sentence. Furthermore, as indicated by the parenthetical phrase "as [it] would with *only*," Huddleston and Pullum also acknowledge that when an exclusive like *only* is used, such an implication is not present.

In sum, if exclusives restrict utterances, there are no other possibilities than those described. If particularizers are used, there are other implicit possibilities than those described.[51]

4.5 Analysis

The last two sections investigated characteristics of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions and the ways exclusives and particularizers restrict utterances. Based on those observations, I propose in this section a generalization about the

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51. Note that Biber et al. (1999: 780–781) do *not* distinguish exclusives and particularizers, classifying them all as restrictive adverbials. They say that "restrictive adverbials [*only* and *especially* in (ia, b)] emphasize that the proposition is true in a way which *expressly excludes some other possibilities* [italics are mine]."

(i) a. The villagers say jokingly that *only* a sick man would choose such a remote place to build.
b. A heart born *especially* for me, Jackie used to tease. (ibid.)

As far as (ia) is concerned, their observation is true. However, as I have argued so far, the adverb *especially* in (ib) does not exclude other possibilities than *for me*, but rather implies the presence of some other possibilities. In this respect, their observation seems inappropriate. The distinction of exclusives from particularizers (Quirk et al. (1985), Huddleston and Pullum (2002)) is crucial (especially for the present discussion), and therefore, I do not follow Biber et al.'s (1999) claim.

focalizability of *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses with focusing adverbs. Before that, however, let us observe what type of focusing adverb can focalize what type of conjunction and consider why.

First, causal *because*-clauses can be focalized by exclusives, as illustrated in (23):

(23) He went to college just because his parents asked him to. (= (1a))

In this sentence, the situation of his parents' asking him a favor has caused another situation, his going to college. The exclusive *just* in front of the *because*-clause restricts the cause to the one expressed in the sentence. Thus, the sentence in (23) denotes that the fact that his parents asked him to go to college serves as the only cause of his going to college. Recall that in the CAUSAL construction, the cause situation and the result situation are not taken independently, but taken as a kind of combined process so that the whole sentence falls into one speech act unit, hence the inseparability of cause from result. That is, if there is a certain result, its cause must exist. Focalizations of *because*-clauses by exclusives assert that there are no other causes or reasons than the one expressed, and at the same time presuppose that the situation described in the reason clause exists (cf. Horn (1969)). Therefore, exclusives may focalize causal *because*-clauses, restricting the cause situation exclusively to the one described.

Second, causal *because*-clauses may be focalized by particularizers as well as exclusives. One such example is given in (24):

(24) It was largely because of you that he failed.
(*Kenkyusha's New College Japanese-English Dictionary*)

The *because*-clause in (24) is nominalized and clefted, which means that the *because*-clause is a causal one, according to our diagnosis in (6) above. In fact, the sentence denotes the causal relation between the addressee's action and the failure of the person referred to as *he*. The *because*-clause is focalized by *largely*, a particularizer. Again, the important characteristic of the CAUSAL construction is that the cause and result are inseparably linked. This, however, does not necessarily mean that there is only one cause for one result; there may be more than one cause for one result as far as they are inseparably linked. Consider the following example:

(25) Above all, it is because I can distinguish the narrating from the narrated and because I can (re)constitute the latter with the former that I can begin to talk about the world represented.[52] (Prince, G., *Narratology*, 1982: 60)

52. I thank Naoaki Wada for providing me with this example.

The *because*-clauses in this sentence are clefted; that is, they are causal ones. What is important here is that there are two *because*-clauses and that the two situations therein (that the speaker can distinguish the narrating from the narrated and that the speaker can (re)constitute the latter with the former) jointly cause another situation that the speaker can begin to talk about the world represented (cf. Rutherford (1970)).[53] Thus, there may be multiple causes for one result. If so, focalizations of causal *because*-clauses by particularizers, like the one involved in (21), do not cause any problem. Such focalizations imply that there are situations other than the one expressed in the *because*-clause, which jointly cause the result expressed in the main clause. In (24), for example, "his failure" has been caused not only by the addressee's action but also by other additional factors, but the addressee's action was the most noteworthy or the most important. Therefore, not only exclusives but also particularizers may focalize causal *because*-clauses, implying that there are other possible situations that, together with the situation described in the sentence, cause the one result.

Third, reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses cannot be focalized by exclusives. The relevant examples are repeated below:

(26) a. *It has rained, just because the ground is wet. (= (3))
b. *He went to college just since his parents asked him to. (= (1a))

In (26a, b), the reasoning *because*-clause and the *since*-clause are focalized by the exclusive *just*, and the sentences are not acceptable. Since exclusives exclude other possibilities than the one described, using them in front of subordinators excludes other reasons than those described. For example, in (26a), if the sentence were grammatical, the focalization of the *because*-clause by the exclusive *just* would exclude other reasons to conclude that it has rained. This, however, is not plausible. As I mentioned in Section 4.3, there may be other reasons to conclude that it has rained, since reasoning is a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two situations that need not have a necessary causal relation in the real world. Hence, it is not possible to restrict the reason for the inference only to the one expressed. A similar explanation holds for the ungrammaticality of (26b). Therefore, subordinators in the REASONING construction cannot be focalized by exclusives.

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53. Rutherford (1970) provides the following example:

(i) He's not coming to class because he's sick and because he doesn't like school anyway. (Rutherford (1970: 98))

This sentence also expresses two causes for one result; his sickness and his dislike of school cause him not to come to class.

Fourthly, and as might be expected, reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses may be focalized by particularizers, as exemplified in (27):

(27) a. Normally they were military officers, *partly because* the army provided a supply of trained talent, … and *mainly because* the organization of defence was the crucial part of their work. (BNC [italics are mine])
b. Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, *particularly since* a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress … (= (2))

In (27a), the *because*-clauses are used to express the premises from which to draw the conclusion that they were military officers. Those *because*-clauses are focalized by such particularizers as *partly* and *mainly*. In (27b), the *since*-clause is focalized by the particularizer *particularly*. As I have repeatedly mentioned, in reasoning processes, there is no necessary causal relation between the two situations described. Rather, the two situations happen to be related to each other by the speaker. To see this, consider sentence (17), repeated here as (28):

(28) It has rained, because the ground is wet. (= (17))

In this sentence, the situation of the ground being wet happens to be used as the premise to conclude that it has rained, but at the same time there are other possible situations that may be used as premises from which to draw the conclusion. Reasons described in the reasoning subordinate clauses are thus chosen from many other possible candidates. Since particularizers highlight one among several other examples or cases of the same general category, they can focalize the subordinate clause in the REASONING construction without denying other possible reasons. Hence, there is no reason to ban the focalization of reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses by particularizers.

The above discussion is summarized in Table 4.2:

(29) **Table 4.2** The focalizability of *because*- and *since*-clauses

	causal	**reasoning**
exclusives	OK	*
particularizers	OK	OK

That is, the following generalization is made about the focalizability of *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses by focusing adverbs:

(30) Causal *because*-clauses can be focalized by both exclusives and particularizers; reasoning *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses can be focalized by particularizers, but not by exclusives.

Given the above generalization, despite the widely accepted view that *since*-clauses cannot be focalized by focusing adverbs (e.g., Quirk et al. (1985), Schourup and Waida (1988), Wickboldt (1997)), one may predict that there are many examples like (27b) in which *since*-clauses are focalized by particularizers. This prediction is borne out:

(31) a. ….since I've just sworn an oath to this effect, it might seem pointless to offer further assurances, **particularly since** I can't back them up. (BNC)

b. **Specifically since** you're from Midwest City, are you aware of any around Interstate 40 between Oklahoma City and Midwest City?
(edition.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/051497.am.html?eref=sitesearch)

c. Measuring biomass in vegetation monitoring is used infrequently **mostly since** it involves some degree of destructive sampling.
(www.nps.gov/plants/restore/pubs/intronatplant/caring.htm)

d. Spring is generally a calm, cool and dry season, **principally since** the Atlantic has lost much of its heat throughout the autumn and winter.
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_of_the_United_Kingdom) ((38a)–(38d): emphases are mine)

In (31a)–(31d), the *since*-clauses are focalized by *particularly*, *specifically*, *mostly*, and *principally*, all of which belong to the class of particularizers. These findings are not surprising at all; rather, they are predictable. If, as Schourup and Waida (1988) claim, *since*-clauses conveyed old information and were not focalized, how would the grammaticality of these examples be explained?[54] Under the proposed analysis, their grammaticality can be explained in the same way as that of sentence (27b), and no problem arises. There are so many examples of *since*-clauses being focalized by

54. The examples of ungrammatical since-clauses given by Schourup and Waida (1988) are focalized by the exclusives *just* and *simply*, as in (ia) and (ib). (It should also be noted that Quirk et al.'s (1985) and Wickboldt's (1997) examples of unacceptable since-clauses are focalized by the exclusive only with no explanation about their unacceptability.)

(i) a. He went to college just {because/*since} his parents asked him to. (= (1a))

b. Don't expect me to marry you simply {because/*since} you're rich. (= (1b))
(Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

As far as these examples are concerned, their observation is correct. What I would like to emphasize is that information-structural accounts would wrongly rule out even grammatical sentences such as (27b), (31a)–(31d), and (32); in this respect, their account is inadequate.

focusing adverbs as in (31a)–(31d) that we may say that the focalized *since*-clause in (2) (= (27b)) is not exceptional but is just one example of a wider phenomenon.

I conclude this section by considering the following attested example:

(32) Carl's Jr. has done it again.
I mean, showing us a half-clad, car-washing Paris Hilton was one thing, but they may have gone too far this time. **Especially since, who really cares about Paris Hilton**, anyway?
(www.newsreview.info/section/BLOG08 [emphasis is mine])

In this example, the speaker criticizes the content of a commercial for the burger restaurant chain, Carl's Jr., whose broadcast was prohibited because of its extreme content. Its content aside, the sentence represents all the points that I have argued so far. First, the *since*-clause is focalized by the particularizer *especially*. Second, the RHETORICAL QUESTION *who really cares about Paris Hilton* occurs in it. In addition, the *since*-clause in (32) is no longer syntactically subordinate to the main clause, i.e., the *since*-clause behaves as an independent clause, though it still provides the premise from which to draw the conclusion that Carl's Jr. may have gone too far. That is, the *since*-clause is focalized and asserted as an independent clause at the same time. These facts are exactly what is predicted by the proposed analysis; they will be difficult to account for merely in terms of information structures. Therefore, the proposed analysis is both empirically and theoretically more convincing than the analysis based on the information-structural distinction.

4.6 Summary

In this chapter, I argued that conjunctions used in the CAUSAL construction may be focused by exclusives and particularizers, while those in the REASONING construction can be focalized only by particularizers. This generalization is obtained by considering the characteristics of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions (see Section 4.3; cf. also Chapter 3) and the ways focusing adverbs focalize what follows them (see Section 4.4). As is clear from the discussion in Section 4.2, information-structural differences of *because*- and *since*-clauses, if any, are not relevant to accounting for the focalizability of *because*-clauses and *since*-clauses. Rather, the construction that *because*- and *since*-clauses are used in is important. The argument in this chapter thus shows the validity of the construction grammar analysis of *because* and *since* proposed in Chapter 3. The present argument also suggests that we can add a sixth diagnostic (printed in **bold**) to the table in (6). The enriched diagnostic table is given in (33):

(33) **Table 4.3** The diagnostic table for the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions

	causal	**reasoning**
a. sentence-initial *because*-clause	OK	*
b. nominalization	OK	*
c. wide scope of matrix negation	OK	*
d. clefting	OK	*
e. speech-act constructions	*	OK
f. focalization by an exclusive	**OK**	*

CHAPTER 5

Causal construction and reasoning construction in Japanese

5.1 Introduction: Cross-linguistic validity

In Chapter 3, I proposed a constructional framework for conjunctions of reason in English. As we saw in Chapter 1, Östman and Fried (2005: 1) point out that Construction Grammar "should be a grammar with universal impact." They also point out that "a great amount of detailed and cross-linguistically oriented work needs to be carried out to determine what, if any, types of meaning-form patterns may have universal validity" (Östman and Fried (2005: 9); also cf. papers in Boas (2010)). In response to the need for cross-linguistic research in construction grammar, this chapter applies the proposed framework to Japanese data and argues that similar mechanisms reflected in their grammar work to understand causal relations and reasoning processes in English and Japanese. Examples of constructions in Japanese to be investigated in this chapter are given in (1a, b):[55]

(1) a. Taroo wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita.
Taro TOP Hanako ACC love KARA came.back
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako.' (Higashiizumi (2006: 117))

b. Taroo wa modottekita kara Hanako o
Taro TOP came.back KARA Hanako ACC
aishiteiru nodaroo.
love I.guess
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.' (Higashiizumi (2006: 118))

55. In Japanese, the subject need not overtly appear if it is contextually understood. For example the main clauses in (1a, b) do not have a subject, but the one who came back in (1a) and the one who loved Hanako in (1b) are both understood as Taro, the same person as the subject of the *kara*-clause.

The Japanese counterpart of *because* can be the conjunctive particle *kara*.[56] Like *because*-clauses, *kara*-clauses may be used to express reasons in all of the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains (cf. Higashiizumi (2006), Uno (2009), Hasegawa (2015: 214ff.)). In (1a), the *kara*-clause (*Taroo wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara*) introduces the reason why Taro came back; in (1b), the *kara*-clause (*Taroo wa modottekita kara*) is used as the premise for drawing the conclusion or saying that Taro loved Hanako.

As cited in Chapter 1, Östman and Fried (2005: 1) point out that "Construction Grammar should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction." In this respect, not only will the comparative study presented in the present chapter account for Japanese data but it will also elucidate that English speakers and Japanese speakers both understand such relations or processes based on the same principle and that this is reflected in the grammar of both languages.

5.2 *Because* constructions in English

In order to account for typological variation in the construction grammar framework, Croft (2001: 51) notes that "constructions may be compared across languages according to their function." The functions of the Japanese constructions to be investigated in this chapter are equivalent to those of their English counterparts. As discussed in Chapter 3, *because* participates both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. Likewise, as demonstrated by sentences (1a, b) above, *kara*-clauses may express a cause of another situation or provide the premise for drawing a conclusion. Hence, constructions with *because* and constructions with *kara* are considered comparable items.

Before investigating Japanese data, let us briefly review what we saw in the preceding chapters about the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* and REASONING *BECAUSE* constructions in English. What is important is that in a causal relation, the cause situation and the result situation need to be understood as forming a single unit of

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56. The Japanese language has two major conjunctive particles: *kara* and *node* (Uno (2009: 3), Hasegawa (2015: 214)). Although they may be interchangeable in many cases, their differences have also been discussed (e.g. Nagano (1952, 1988), Tio (1988), Iwasaki (1995), Uno (2009), Higashiizumi (2015)). The present argument does not discuss their differences. I assume here that the conjunctive particle *kara* in Japanese is a comparable item to *because* in English (cf. Higashiizumi (2006) and Uno (2009)). One reason I take up *kara*, rather than *node*, as a comparable item to *because* is that the use of *node*-clauses is said to be more restricted than *kara*-clauses in the epistemic and speech act domains (e.g., Hasegawa (2015: 214–219)).

speech act, while in a reasoning process, the premise and the conclusion situations form separate speech act units. This general knowledge about causal relations and reasoning processes is reflected in the CAUSAL construction and REASONING construction and the constructional properties account for different behaviors of causal *because*-clauses and reasoning *because*-clauses. They involve (i) scope of matrix question or negation, (ii) nominalizability of a *because*-clause, (iii) clefting, (iv) focalizability of a *because*-clause by exclusives, and (v) (non-)occurrence of a speech act construction of a statement inside a *because*-clause.[57] Relevant examples are repeated here as in (2)–(6), for convenience:

(2) [wide scope reading]

a. Is the ground wet because it has rained?

b. Has it rained, because the ground is wet.

(3) [nominalization of *because*-clause]

a. John is not coming to class because of his sickness.

b. *He's not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego.

(4) [clefting]

a. It's because he's sick that he's not coming to class.

b. *It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class.

(5) [exclusives]

a. He went to college simply because his parents asked him to.

(Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

b. *It has rained, just because the ground is wet.

(6) [occurrence of speech act construction]

a. *He's not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking.

b. I think we have more or less solved the problem for donkeys here, because those we haven't got, we know about.

(Guardian [online])

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57. I omit the argument about the position of the *because*-clause, because it is not relevant to the Japanese constructions discussed in the following section. In Japanese, *kara*-clauses precede the main clause both in the CAUSAL and the REASONING constructions, and unlike in English, [C_1 *kara* C_2] is the most unmarked configuration in Japanese. The reason may be the different syntactic status of *because* and *kara*. The former is a subordinate conjunction, which introduces a subordinate clause that follows, while the latter is a conjunctive particle, which appears to the right of the clause to which it attaches. In short, the position of *kara*-clause may not be used for diagnosis.

In each pair of sentences above, the a-sentences represent the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* construction and the b-sentences the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.[58] In short, five diagnoses are available to tell the CAUSAL construction from the REASONING construction.

5.3 *Kara* constructions in Japanese

The previous section reviewed the properties of the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* construction and the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction in English and five diagnoses to distinguish them from one another. In what follows, I apply such diagnoses to *kara* constructions in Japanese and examine the constructions. I refer to sentences like (7a) (= (1a)) as the CAUSAL *KARA* construction, and sentences like (7b) (= (1b)) as the REASONING *KARA* construction. Their form-meaning correspondences may be formalized as in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.

(7) a. Taroo wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita.
Taro TOP Hanako ACC love KARA came.back
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako.' (= (1a))

b. Taroo wa modottekita kara Hanako o
Taro TOP came.back KARA Hanako ACC
aishiteiru nodaroo.
love I.guess
'Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.' (= (1b))



Figure 5.1 The CAUSAL *KARA* construction



Figure 5.2 The REASONING *KARA* construction

58. In what follows, I refer to the causal construction where *because* is used as the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* construction, if needed to distinguish it from the causal construction where *kara* is used, which will be called the CAUSAL *KARA* construction.

In the CAUSAL *KARA* construction, a causal relation between P_1 and P_2 is paired with the syntactic form [C_1 *kara* C_2]. In the REASONING *KARA* construction, the reasoning process in which the speaker draws the conclusion from the premise is mapped onto [C_1 *kara*, C_2].

Thus, postulating the bi-clausal constructions where the conjunctive particle *kara* is used, as in Figures 5.1. and 5.2, I will investigate them in the rest of this section. Other clause-linkage constructions in Japanese have been investigated in detail from constructional points of view (e.g. Fujii (1993) and Hasegawa (1996)).[59] Fujii deals with Japanese conditional constructions with special reference to the *to*-linkage '*when/while*', *temo*-linkage '*even if* ', and *tara*-/*nara*-/*eba*-linkages '*if*'. Hasegawa, on the other hand, investigates *te*-linkage '*and*' by integrating the construction grammar framework and the role and reference grammar framework. Crucially, both of them assume constructions as grammatical units. For example, the *TO*-LINKAGE construction in Fujii's work (inter alia Section 2.3) is schematized as [C_1 *to* C_2], where C_1 establishes "the setting for a cognitive change [and C_2] describes a discovery" (ibid.: 66). The structure as a whole is associated with highly idiomatic meanings, such as noncontrollablity of C_2 (her Section 2.3.3.1) and aspectual constraints (her Section 2.3.3.2). To see these, consider the following contrasts:

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59. Ohori (1995, 1997) observes what he calls the SUSPENDED CLAUSE construction in Japanese, the phenomenon in which "non-final clauses can stand by themselves in discourse, without being followed by the main clause" (Ohori (1997: 471)). He investigates the construction with various conjunctive particles, including *kara*, as in (i):

(i) A: Kyoo hima?
today free
'Are (you) free today?'
B: Ee, demo, tsukare-teru kara.
yes but tired-STATE KARA
'Yes, but (I)'m tired, so…[I can't make it].'

(Ohori (1995: 210))

In (i),the *kara*-clause stands alone and the message of the consequent clause "I can't make it" is not expressed but "inferable" (Ohori (1995: 210)). While it seems intriguing to discuss the SUSPENDED CLAUSE construction in the context of the *kara* constructions in the present volume, I focus only on analyzing the bi-clausal *kara* constructions, as in (7a, b), by comparing them with their English counterparts. See, for example, Higashiizumi (2006, 2015), who thoroughly investigates the developments of the construction from bi-clausal structure over time.

(8) a. Kinoo Teregurafu o aruite-iru to Satoo-sensei
yesterday Telegraph(Ave.) ACC walk-ASP(PROG) TO Sato-Prof.
ni aimashita
DAT meet-PAST
'While/When I was walking along Telegraph, I met/ran into Prof. Sato.'

b. ?*Kinoo Teregurafu o aruite-iru to
yesterday Telegraph(Ave.) ACC walk-ASP(PROG) TO
Satoo-sensei o mimashita
Sato-Prof. ACC see-PAST/
'While/When I was walking along Telegraph, I saw Prof. Sato.'

(Fujii (1993: 49))

(9) a. Kinoo Teregurafu o aruite-iru to ame ga
yesterday Telegraph(Ave.) ACC walk-ASP(PROG) TO rain NOM
furi-hajime-mashita
fall-start-PAST
'When/While I was walking along Telegraph Avenue, it started raining'

b. *Kinoo Teregurafu o aruite-iru to ame ga
yesterday Telegraph(Ave.) ACC walk-ASP(PROG) TO rain NOM
futte-imashita
fall- ASP(PROG)
'intended: While I was walking along Telegraph A venue, it was raining.'

(Fujii (1993: 50))

Fujii observes that only an unintentional event like *aimashita* 'ran into [somebody]' is appropriate in the second clause, as in (8a); an intentional event like *Satoo-sensei o mimashita* 'looked at Prof. Sato', as in (8b), is incompatible with the meaning of the sentence. Thus, the event described in C_2 is restricted to a noncontrollable one. As for the aspectual constraints, Fujii proposes that the aspectual combination of C_1 and C_2 both exhibiting durativity, as in (9b), is not acceptable; the other combinations (i.e. punctual + durative, punctual + punctual, and durative + punctual, as in (9a)) are all possible. She points out that "it is too much to attribute all of these characteristics to the connective particle TO alone. Rather it is the whole bi-clausal construction marked by the function word TO that bears the above characteristics…" (Fujii (1993: 66)).

Another thing I should note before investigating the constructions is that the data in this section might sound a little awkward or artificial, if not ungrammatical, because most of them are my own compositions checked with native speakers of Japanese (unless otherwise specified). I composed them mainly by translating

and manipulating the English sentences that we have observed in Chapters 3 and 4 and whose acceptability has been fully discussed. One may wonder why I take this "classical" approach rather than collecting data from corpora, texts, or discourse. It is true that investigating naturally-occurring sentences collected from text or discourse is one common method. However, I rely on the native speakers' intuitions here from the need to keep the examples in the present chapter as comparable as possible. The main purpose of this chapter is not to describe actual Japanese use, but to show that the constructional analysis of conjunctions of reason in English presented in the previous chapters is valid by applying it to the Japanese counterparts. By demonstrating how similar they are in the different languages, I will also claim that speakers in these two different languages both understand causal relations and reasoning processes based on the same principle. To this end, as a native speaker of Japanese, I conduct what Chomsky (1986: 36) calls the "experiments" (or informant judgments) whose results are checked with other native speakers of the language to ensure the reliability of the results.

Let us now closely observe the causal *kara* and reasoning *kara* constructions in the five respects mentioned above for their *because* counterparts. First, the causal *kara*-clauses can fall within the scope of matrix question, while the reasoning *kara*-clauses cannot. Consider the following dialogue:

(10) A: Taroo wa kaze o hiita kara jugyoo ni konai no?
Taro top cold acc got kara class to not.come int
'Isn't Taro coming to class because he got cold?'

B: Uun, Taroo wa kaze o hiita kara jugyoo ni konai
No Taro top cold acc got kara class to not.come
nodewanaku, infuruenza ni kakatta kara jugyoo ni konai
not.but flu dat got kara class to not.come
noda yo.
it.is.that I.tell.you
'No, it's not because Taro got a cold but because he got the flu that he's not coming to class.'

Speaker B′s answer negates the causal relation between Taro's cold and his not coming to class. This suggests that speaker A asks whether the causal relation holds or not, rather than merely whether Taro is not coming to class, as shown in (11):

(11) Q [Taroo wa kaze o hiita kara jugyoo ni konai]

In addition, the scope of the sentence-final particle *yo* 'I tell you' in speaker B′s response extends over the causal relation as a whole. If the scope extended merely over the main clause *jugyoo ni konai* '(Taro) is not coming to class,' the utterance would make no sense because speaker A already knows that Taro is not coming to

class. It would also be impossible to get a reasoning reading, or to regard the *kara*-clause as giving a reason for *telling* that he is not coming to class. Thus, the causal relation *infuruenza ni kakatta kara jugyoo ni konai* '(Taro) is not coming to class because he got the flu' is understood as one speech act.

By contrast, as indicated by the unacceptable answer by speaker D in (12) below, this kind of relational negation is an inappropriate answer to a question of the REASONING *KARA* construction. The answer by speaker D', which only negates the statement that Taro is not coming to class, is appropriate.

(12) C: Taroo wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa
Taro TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone
o kaketekita kara, jugyoo ni konai no (kanaa)?[60]
ACC called KARA class to not.come INT (I.wonder)
'Isn't Taro coming to class, because he has just called from Osaka.'

D: *Uun, Taroo wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa o
No Taro TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone ACC
kaketekita kara dewanaku, kareno okaasan ga soo itteita
called KARA not.but his mother NOM so was.saying
kara jugyoo ni konai noda yo
KARA class to not.come it.is.that I.tell.you
'(Lit.) No, it's not because Taro has just called from Osaka but because his mother told me so that (I conclude that) he's not coming to class.'

D': Uun, Taroo wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa o
No Taro TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone ACC
kaketekita kedo, jugyoo ni wa kuru yo.
called but class to CONT come I.tell.you
'No, though Taro has just called from Osaka, he's coming to class.'

Thus, speaker C simply asks whether Taro is not coming to class, judging from the fact that Taro has called from Osaka; he cannot ask whether the reason for asking the question is Taro's phone-call from Osaka or not, as illustrated below:

(13) a. *Q [Taroo wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara jugyoo ni konai]
b. Taroo wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara, Q [Jugyoo ni konai]

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60. Notice that there are two types of *kara* in Japanese, one corresponding to *from* in English (as in *Oosaka kara* 'from Osaka'), and the other corresponding to *because* in English (as in *denwa o kaketekita kara* 'because [he] called'). The former *kara* is glossed as 'from'; the latter as 'KARA'. The conjunctive particle of reason *kara* (the counterpart to *because*) is said to have developed from the postposition *kara* (the counterpart to *from*) (cf. Higashiizumi (2006: Section 4.3 and the references cited therein)), but this is beyond the scope of the present argument.

The contrast of the scope of question is parallel to that observed in English: The causal subordinate clauses may fall inside the scope of the matrix question, while the reasoning ones may not.

As for the second diagnostic, the content of a causal *kara*-clause can be nominalized into NPs with the *notame* 'because of', while that of a reasoning *kara*-clause cannot.[61] Observe the following examples:

(14) a. Taroo wa kaze o hiita kara jugyoo ni konai.
Taro TOP cold ACC got KARA class to not.come
'Taro is not coming to class because he got a cold.'

b. Taroo wa kaze notame jugyoo ni konai.
Taro TOP cold because.of class to not.come
'Taro is not coming to class because of cold.'

(15) a. Taroo wa Oosaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara Tookyoo
Taro TOP Osaka from phone ACC called KARA Tokyo
deno jugyoo ni konai daroo.
in class to not.come I.guess
'Taro is not coming to class in Tokyo, because he just called from Osaka.'

b. ??Taroo wa Oosaka kara no denwa notame, Tookyoo deno
Taro TOP Osaka from GEN phone because.of Tokyo in
jugyoo ni konai daroo.
class to not.come I.think
'Taro is not coming to class in Tokyo because of the phone call from Osaka.'

The causal *kara*-clause in (14a) can be nominalized into *kaze notame* 'because of cold' as in (14b), while such nominalization is not acceptable for a reasoning

61. I use the term "nominalization" not to mean that the whole phrase, e.g., *kaze notame* 'because of cold' in (14b), is a noun phrase, but to mean that the phrase that precedes *notame*, or *kaze* 'cold', is nominal. In other words, the content expressed by the clause that precedes *kara* in (14a) is represented by the noun *kaze* 'cold' in (14b). Hasegawa (2015: 214) suggests that *okage de* 'thanks to' and *sei de* 'as a consequence of' are other causal connectors, which may also be preceded by a noun phrase (cf. also fn. 62). As Hasegawa observes, *no okage de* is "used when the speaker is appreciative" of the thing expressed by the NP that precedes the connector, while *no sei de* is "used when the speaker is annoyed" by that thing. Replacing *notame* with *no okage de* or *no sei de* in (14b) and (15b) does not affect the grammatical judgements; therefore, I use *notame* as the most neutral connector of the three in this book.

kara-clause, as shown in (15b) (see also Hasegawa (2015: 219–220)).[62] Thus, both in English and in Japanese, causal subordinate clauses may be nominalized, whereas reasoning ones may not.

Third, causal *kara*-clauses can be clefted, as in (16a), while reasoning *kara*-clauses cannot, as in (16b):

(16) a. Taroo ga jugyoo ni konai no wa kaze o hiita
Taro NOM class to not.come NOMI TOP cold ACC got
kara da.
KARA COP
'It's because he got cold that Taro is not coming to class.'
(cf. Taroo wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo ni konai. (= (15a)))

b. ??Taroo ga Tookyoo deno jugyoo ni konai no
1Taro NOM Tokyo in class to not.come NOMI
wa sakki Oosaka kara denwa o kaketekita
TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone ACC called
kara da.
KARA COP
'It's because he just called from Osaka that Taro is not coming to class in Tokyo.' (cf. Taroo wa Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara Tookyoo deno jugyoo ni konai daroo. (= (16a)))

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62. Hasegawa analytically views *notame* as *tame* 'sake' with the genitive particle *no* preceding it, since *tame* is also preceded by a clause, as in (i), and the genitive particle is necessary only when it is preceded by a noun (phrase).

(i) Yuki ga hageshiku futta {kara/tame ni} Shinkansen ga tomatta
snow NOM heavily fell {KARA/TAME NI} Shinkansen NOM stopped
'Because the snow fell heavily, the Shinkansen bullet train stopped.'
(Hasegawa (2015: 219))

Interestingly, Hasegawa observes that *tame* is not used in a reasoning environment even if it is preceded by a clause, as in (ii):

(ii) Tenki ga ii {kara/*tame ni}, dokoka ni ikimasen ka?
weather NOM good {KARA/TAME NI} somewhere to not.go INT
'Because the weather is good, shall we go somewhere?'
(Hasegawa (2015: 219))

Based on these, one may view the ungrammaticality of (15b) is due to the use of *tame*, and not due to the nominalization of the *kara*-clause. What is important is that the element preceding *(no)tame*, either clausal or nominal, cannot constitute a speech-act unit. Later in this section, I will demonstrate that the clause *hageshiku yuki ga futta* in (i) cannot be seen as performing a speech act even if it is used in a reasoning sentence.

Again, this contrast is parallel to the clefting of causal/reasoning *because*-clauses in English.

Fourth, the adverb *tada* can focalize causal *kara*-clauses, as in (17a), while it cannot focalize reasoning *kara*-clauses, as in (17b):

(17) a. Taroo wa tada Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita.
Taro top only Hanako acc love kara came.back
'Taro came back only because he loved Hanako.'

b. *Taroo wa tada modottekita kara, Hanako o aishiteiru
Taro top only came.back kara Hanako acc love
nodaroo.
I.guess
'(Lit.) Taro loves Hanako, only because he came back.'

Here, I assume that the adverb *tada* is an exclusive in Japanese. *Kenkyusha's New College Japanese-English Dictionary* (5th edition) provides the following translations for *tada*:

(18) *tada*: merely, simply, only, solely

It may be said that *tada* covers the same range of meaning as English exclusives, because the English words listed in (18) all belong to exclusives (see Chapter 4 for details). Then, the focalizability of causal/reasoning *kara*-clauses shows the same contrast as the focalizability pattern of causal/reasoning *because*-clauses in English.

Lastly, topicalization, a kind of speech act construction of statement, cannot occur in causal *kara*-clauses, whereas it may occur in reasoning *kara*-clauses (cf. Tomioka (2015)). Consider the following contrast:[63]

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63. An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that sentence (19a) is not so bad. I checked the sentence again with four native speakers of Japanese. All of them confirmed that the sentence does not sound natural, or at least sounds worse than (19b) and (21), both of which are perfectly acceptable.

Note also that the particle *wa* has a contrastive as well as a topic function (cf. Kuno (1972)). In (i), *ame* 'rain' is marked with *wa* and is contrasted with *yuki* 'snow':

(i) Ame wa futte imasu ga, yuki wa futte imasen.
Rain wa falling is but snow wa falling is-not
'(Lit.) Rain is falling, but snow is not falling.' (Kuno (1972: 271))

Such a sequence may appear in a causal *kara*-clause without making the sentence ill-formed, as in (ii) (cf. Akaso and Haraguchi (2011) for a discussion of the differences in acceptability of nouns marked by the different *wa* in a relative clause).

(19) a. ?? *Taroo no shukudai wa*$_i$ Hanako ga t_i yatta kara Taroo
Taro GEN homework TOP Hanako NOM did KARA Taro
wa sensei ni okorareta.
TOP teacher by was.scolded
'(Lit.) Taro was scolded by the teacher because Taro's home worki, Hanako did ti.'

b. *Kimino shukudai wa*$_i$ boku ga t_i yatta kara, isshoni
your homework TOP 1SG NOM did KARA together
asoboo yo.
let's.hang.out I.tell.you
'Let's hang out together, because your homework, I have done for you.'

In Japanese, the canonical word order is SOV and sentence-initial topics are marked by the particle *wa*. Thus, in (19a), (19b), *Taroo no shukudai* 'Taro's homework' and *kimino shukudai* 'your homework' are topicalized, respectively. As indicated by the oddity of (19a), a causal *kara*-clause does not allow the TOPICALIZATION in it, while a reasoning *kara*-clause does, as in (19b).[64] Tomioka (2015) provides an observation in the same line from a different perspective. Observe the following contrast:

(ii) Ame wa futte iru ga, yuki wa futte inai kara cheen
rain WA falling is but snow WA falling is-not KARA snow-chain
wa iranai
TOP not.necessary
'Snow chain is not necessary because rain is falling, but snow is not falling.'

Incidentally, I changed the verbs *futteimasu* 'is falling' and *futte imasen* 'is not falling' in (i) to *futteiru* and *futte inai*, respectively, in (ii). The corresponding verbs convey the same truth-conditional meanings, but the former form, with the honorific ending, is not appropriate here, for a reason I will discuss below. I thank Masatoshi Honda for drawing my attention to Tomioka (2015) and Akaso and Haraguchi (2011).

64. Likewise, Hasegawa (2015: 110) observes that "subordinate clauses cannot contain a topic", since "a sentence asserts the content of the main clause, but not that of a subordinate clause". For example, within a *toki* 'when'-clause, TOPICALIZATION is not allowed, as shown in (i):

(i) Midori ga/#wa kabu o katta toki, kaisha wa toosan
Midori NOM/#TOP stock ACC bought when company TOP bankruptcy
sunzen datta
right.before was
'When Midori bought the stocks, the company was about to go bankrupt.'
(Hasegawa (2015: 110))

(20) a. Mari wa ryoori ga suki nanode Kei wa furaipan o
Mari top cooking nom like because Kei top frying.pan acc
okutta.
sent
'Because Mari likes cooking, Kei sent (her) a frying pan.'

b. *Mari wa node, mae o aruiteita Ken mo
Mari top because, front acc was.walking Ken also
koronda
fell
'Because Mari fell, Ken, who was walking in front of her, also fell.'
(Tomioka (2015: 270))

Although *(na)node*, another conjunctive particle of reason, is used to introduce the reason clauses in these examples, Tomioka observes that a *wa*-marked subject is possible only in a reasoning *(na)node*-clause, as in (20a), but not in a causal *(na)node*-clause, as in (20b). If we change the conjunctive particle *(na)node* to *kara*, the results remain the same. This further supports my claim that it is due neither to the subordinate clause nor to the different conjunctive particles used, but to the difference in construction, that the different acceptability comes about in terms of topicalization within the reason clause.

Note that the unacceptability of sentence (19a) does not result from the anomalous OSV word-order, but from the topicalization. To see this, observe the following sentence:

(21) *Taroo no shukudai* o_i Hanako ga t_i yatta kara
Taro gen homework acc Hanako nom did kara
Taroo wa sensei ni okorareta.
Taro top teacher by was.scolded
'Taro was scolded by the teacher because Hanako did his homework.'

In (21), the sentence-initial object *Taroo no shukudai* 'Taro's homework' is marked by the accusative case marker *-o*, not by the topic marker-*wa*, and the sentence is acceptable. That is, the OSV word-order in this causal *kara*-clause is the result of scrambling, not topicalization. Saito (1989) claims that scrambling does not change the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, it is not prevented from occurring in causal *kara*-clauses. By contrast, as shown in (20a, b) above, topicalization is compatible only with a reasoning *kara*-clause.

In fact, a *wa*-marked topic may appear in a reasoning *kara*-clause, as in (19b). Thus, it is the causal (or content) characteristic that conditions the non-occurrence of a topic in the subordinate clause.

An argument against my generalization may arise in the case of a sentence like that in (22):

(22) Koko wa umi ni chikai kara, kuruma ga
this.place TOP ocean to close KARA car NOM
suguni sabiru.
quickly rust
'Because it's close to the ocean here, cars rust quickly.'
(Hasegawa (2015: 214))

An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that sentence (22) is seen as an instance of the CAUSAL *KARA* construction, describing a causal relation between the place's proximity to the ocean and the quickness of the cars' rusting, and yet the sentence-initial word *koko* 'this place' is marked by *wa*, and functions as a topic, which seems contradictory to the present argument.[65] Superficially, it appears as if a TOPICALIZATION occurred in a causal *kara*-clause, but the *wa*-marked word *koko* 'this place' in (22) serves as the topic of the whole sentence. That is, the word *koko* does not originate in the *kara*-clause, whereas the *wa*-marked phrase in the ill-formed sentence (19a), *Taroo no shukudai* 'Taro's homework' is genuinely topicalized within the causal *kara*-clause. The structural difference between (19a) and (22) is represented as follows:

(23) a. [[$_{\text{Top}}$ Taroo no shukudai wa] [Hanako ga yatta]] kara, Taroo wa sensei ni okorareta.
'Taro was scolded by the teacher because his homework, Hanako did.'

b. [[$_{\text{Top}}$ koko wa] [umi ni chikai kara, kuruma ga sugu ni sabiru]].
'Here, cars rust quickly because [it is] close to the ocean.'

To see that *koko* does not function as a topic of the *kara*-clause but as a topic of the whole sentence, let us consider the following example:

(24) Koko wa umi ni chikai kara kuruma ga suguni sabiru
this.place TOP ocean to close KARA car NOM quickly rust
basho desu.
place COP
'This is a place where cars rust quickly because it's close to the ocean.'

This sentence may be used as an answer to a question like *what is this place like?* The word *koko* 'this place' is introduced to the discourse by the preceding question; the speaker has to comment on the place. The speaker's comment to the topic in (24) is the causal relation between the place's proximity to the ocean and the

65. I thank the reviewer for pointing this out.

quickness of the cars' rusting, which is described by sentence (22). Therefore, *koko wa* in (22) serves as the topic of the whole sentence. After all, comparing (19a) with (19b), we can say that TOPICALIZATION within a subordinate clause is compatible with the REASONING *KARA* construction but not with the CAUSAL *KARA* construction (cf. also (20a), (20b)). This is parallel to the corresponding constructions with *because* in English.

Like the TOPICALIZATION discussed so far, the Japanese language has another strategy to make a clause an independent unit of speech act; namely, so-called performative honorifics (PH, for short), i.e. the *mas-* or *des-* forms of verbs (cf. Harada (1976)). As the name suggests, a PH-marked clause performs a speech act; i.e., if a PH-marked predicate occurs in a *kara*-clause, it counts as a performative subordinate clause in Lakoff's (1987) terms. Matsumoto (2009) investigates some subordinate clauses where PH occurs. For example, comparing sentence (25a) with sentence (25b), she claims that the former *kara*-clause, with the PH form of the verb *yomimashita* 'read' is "more independent from the main clause" (p. 290) than the latter *kara*-clause, with the plain form of the same verb *yonda* (PH-markers are italicized).[66]

(25) a. Kore wa moo yomi*mashita* kara toshokan e kaeshi*masu*[67]
This TOP already read(PH) KARA library to return(PH)
'(I) will return this to the library because (I) already read it.'

b. Kore wa moo yonda kara toshokan e kaeshi*masu*
This TOP already read KARA library to return(PH)
'(I) will return this to the library because (I) already read it.'
(Matsumoto (2009: 290))

If, as Matsumoto observes, a PH in a *kara*-clause makes the *kara*-clause independent of the main clause (cf. also Harada (1976)), we can expect that a PH occurs in a reasoning *kara*-clause, but not in a causal *kara*-clause. This expectation is borne out. Compare the following examples:

(26) a. ??Taroo wa Hanako o aishitei*masu*
Taro TOP Hanako ACC love(PH)
kara modotteki*mashita*
KARA came.back(PH)
'Taro came back because he loved Hanako.'

66. The acceptability or interpretation of (25a) is different from that of (25b). I will come back to this issue shortly.

67. Although Matsumoto glosses *wa* as TOP, this *wa* can bare a contrastive function, since the book referred to by *kore* 'this' is contrasted with other books that are unread (see fn. 63 for the discussion of the contrastive function of *wa*). If this *wa*-marked word is construed as a topic, it serves as the topic of the whole sentence, as is the case with (23).

b. Kao mo daibun hareteimashita kara kitto,
face also terribly was.swollen(PH) KARA probably
dokuga ni kamareta nda to watashi
poisonous.moth by was.bitten it.is.that COMP 1SG
wa omoimashita
TOP thought(PH)
'He must have been bitten by a poisonous moth, I thought, because his face was also terribly swollen.'
((26b), Kenji Miyazawa, *Dokuga* [www.aozora.gr.jp])

In the causal *kara*-clause in (26a), the PH form *aishiteimasu* 'love(PH)' sounds odd, while its corresponding plain form *aishiteiru* 'love' does not, as observed in (1a) above. In contrast, a PH form, like *hareteimashita* 'was swollen(PH)' in (26b), naturally appears in a reasoning *kara*-clause. Thus, as with a speech act construction of statement, a PH is compatible with a reasoning *kara*-clause but not with a causal *kara*-clause.

In this relation, it should be noted that sentences (25a, b) above, both cited from Matsumoto (2009), have differences in acceptability or interpretation (see fn. 66). While sentence (26b) is perfectly acceptable, sentence (25a) sounds odd (or at least, worse than (25b)) to me. I checked these sentences with four native speakers of Japanese (three linguists and a lay person) and they all share this intuition. The *kara*-clause in (25a) seems to restrict the speech act performed by the PH-marked main verb *kaeshimasu* 'return(PH)', rather than the event of book returning itself. That is, sentence (25a) may be accepted – if it is – as an instance of the REASONING *KARA* construction; trying to interpret the sentence as a causal *kara* sentence may make it odd. This sentence becomes more acceptable by adding the addressee-oriented sentence-final particle *yo* 'I tell you', *ne* 'you know', or the like, as in (27):

(27) Kore wa moo yomimashia kara toshokan e kaeshimasu
this TOP already read(PH) KARA library to return(PH)
yo/ne
I.tell.you/you.know
'(I) will return this to the library because (I) al already read it.'

These italicized sentence final particles indicate the presence of one or more addressee(s), which disambiguates the interpretation: A reasoning process, or a speech act causal relation in Sweetser's (1990) terms, is the only possible interpretation, and as a result the acceptability improves. Sentence (25b), on the other hand, is accepted as an instance of the CAUSAL *KARA* construction without ambiguity, and so replacing the final verb *kaeshimasu* 'return(PH)' with its plain form *kaesu* 'return', as in (28), does not affect the acceptability.

(28) Kore wa moo yonda kara toshokan e kaesu
this TOP already read KARA library to return
'(I) will return this to the library because (I) al already read it.'

Assuming that a performative honorific marks the boundary of speech act units, we can describe the different structures of speech act units in (25a, b) as in (29), where "SA" stands for a unit of speech act:

(29) a. [$_{SA1}$ kore wa moo yomima*shita*] kara [$_{SA2}$ toshokan e kaeshi*masu*]
b. [$_{SA1}$ [kore wa moo yonda kara toshokan e kaes-] *masu*][68]

In (29a), the two speech act units are connected by *kara*, which yields a reasoning interpretation: Saying that the speaker has finished the book in question is a premise from which to draw a conclusion (to be uttered) that s/he should return it to the library. In (29b), on the other hand, the honorific marker *masu* is added to the causal relation between the finishing the book and returning it to the library, and the causal relation as a whole is reported in one unit of speech act.

As a final remark about performative honorifics, let us consider *tame*-clauses, or clauses followed by *tame (ni)* 'sake'. As noted in fn. 62, while a causal *kara*-clause can be replaced with a *tame*-clause, as in (30a), a reasoning *kara*-clause cannot, as in (30b) (Hasegawa (2015: 219–220)).

(30) a. Yuki ga hageshiku futta {kara/tame ni} Shinkansen ga
snow NOM heavily fell {KARA/TAME NI} Shinkansen NOM
tomatta
stopped
'Because the snow fell heavily, the Shinkansen bullet train stopped.'

b. Tenki ga ii {kara/*tame ni}, dokoka ni ikimasen
weather NOM good {KARA/TAME NI} somewhere to not.go
ka?
INT
'Because the weather is good, shall we go somewhere?'
(Hasegawa (2015: 219))

Recall also that the nominalized reason phrase NP *notame* 'because of NP' can be replaced only with a causal *kara*-clause (cf. (14b) and (15b)). In short, the element preceding *tame*, either clausal or nominal, denote a cause situation, which cannot be construed as an independent unit of speech act. As such, we can expect that

68. The form of *kaes-* in the inner brackets indicates the verb stem, which is conjugated either in the plain form *kaesu,* as in (28), or in the polite form *kaeshimasu*, as in (27).

performative honorifics are not allowed to occur in *tame*-clauses, and this expectation is borne out. Replacing the predicate in the causal *kara*- and *tame*-clauses in (30a) with a PH-marked one results in ungrammatical sentences, as in (31):

(31) *Yuki ga hageshiku furi*mashita* {kara/tame ni} Shinkansen ga
snow NOM heavily fell(PH) {KARA/TAME NI} Shinkansen NOM
tomari*mashita*
stopped(PH)
'Because the snow fell heavily, the Shinkansen bullet train stopped.'

That is, either a *kara*-clause or a *tame*-clause, the CAUSAL construction is incompatible with a PH-marked reason clause. Even in the REASONING construction, a *tame*-clause is incompatible with a PH-marked predicate, as in (32):

(32) Yuki ga hageshiku furi*mashita* {kara/*tame ni}, unten ni wa
snow NOM heavily fell(PH) {KARA/TAME NI} driving to TOP
kiotsukete kudasai
be.careful please
'Please be careful in driving, because the snow fell heavily.'

From these contrasts, we can generalize that an element preceding *tame* across-the-board does not constitute an independent unit of speech act. It then follows from this generalization that a nominalized reason phrase with *notame* and *tame*-clause is compatible with the CAUSAL construction but not with the REASONING construction.

In sum, either TOPICALIZATION or performative honorifics make the clause to which they are applied an independent speech act unit. The fact that their applicability is limited to reasoning *kara*-clauses indicates that a reasoning *kara*-clause performs a speech act independently of the main clause.

5.4 Comparison

Our observations so far can be summarized in Table 5.1. From Table 5.1, we see that causal *because*- and *kara*-clauses behave just alike, and so do reasoning *because*- and *kara*-clauses. I have repeatedly maintained that these behaviors of *because*-clauses are reflections of the following properties of the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* and REASONING *BECAUSE* constructions: The causal *because*-clause and its main clause form one unit of speech act as a whole, whereas the reasoning *because*-clause and its main clause are understood as forming separate speech act units. Thus, we may say that the CAUSAL *KARA* and REASONING *KARA* constructions also have the same properties as their English counterparts.

Table 5.1 Cross-linguistic comparability of the causal/reasoning subordinate clauses in English and Japanese

	Causal ***because/kara***	**Reasoning** ***because/kara***
wide scope reading	OK	*
nominalization	OK	*
clefting	OK	*
focalization	OK	*
speech-act constructions	*	OK

So far, I have emphasized similarities between the causal *because* construction and the causal *kara* construction, on the one hand, and between the reasoning *because* construction and the reasoning *kara* construction, on the other. Here, I would like to point out a difference between the reasoning *because* construction and the reasoning *kara* construction. The reasoning *kara* construction, but not the reasoning *because* construction, requires its main clause to be marked with an explicit epistemic marker or performative expression. Compare the reasoning *kara* construction in (33a) and the corresponding reasoning *because* construction in (33b):

(33) a. Taroo wa modottekita kara Hanako o
Taro top came.back kara Hanako acc
aishiteiru nodaroo
love I.guess
'I guess Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.'

b. John loved Mary, because he came back.

The main clause in (33a) is marked with the epistemic marker *nodaroo* 'I guess', without which the sentence would be odd (cf. Shizawa (2011, 2015)). Notice that all the examples of the reasoning *kara* construction that appeared in this chapter also include either an expression of this kind, an addressee-oriented sentence-final particle (e.g., *yo* 'I tell you'), a performative honorific, or their combinations. In contrast, sentence (33b) is acceptable even though the speaker's epistemic stance is not explicitly marked in this way. This fact about reasoning sentences in English supports the present argument attributing the reasoning sense of a sentence like (33b) to the construction, since its reasoning sense would not be worked out simply by summing up the meanings of its constituents. This does not mean that the Japanese reasoning sentences are thoroughly compositional. It is true that the reasoning sense of sentence (33a) may be accounted for by summing up the

meanings of the constituents thanks to the epistemic marker *nodaroo*, but as I have argued in this chapter, the differences between the CAUSAL *KARA* construction and the REASONING *KARA* construction cannot be reduced to the properties of the constituents. That is, even if the reasoning sense of (33a) is compositionally gained, the fact that the sentence comprises two units of speech act, indicated by the grammatical phenomena listed in Table 5.1, will not be predictable; it is the REASONING construction that bears this unpredictable property.

The question that has yet to be answered is why such an explicit epistemic or performative expression is required of the main clause in the REASONING *KARA* construction. To answer this question, I would like to consider a pragmatic-typological difference between English and Japanese. Hirose (2015) contrasts the modes of expression normally assumed to be conveyed by simple declarative sentences in English and Japanese. By the term *mode of expression*, he means the mode of either "private expression" (expression with no intention to communicate with the addressee) or "public expression" (expression with an intention to communicate with the addressee) (see also fn. 34). Following Ross's (1970) Performative Analysis, Hirose observes that "every declarative sentence of English has in its underlying structure a higher performative clause of the form I SAY TO YOU or I TELL YOU, which guarantees that the speaker is talking to the addressee" (p. 128). Along with the theory he proposes as "the three-tier model of language use", Hirose further develops this argument and makes clear the difference in the unmarked mode of expression between English and Japanese.

According to Hirose, in English, whose unmarked mode of expression is public expression, the situation construal and situation report parts are usually integrated, so that a declarative sentence, which expresses the speaker's construal of the situation, also functions to report the construed situation to the addressee. Let us consider the simple declarative sentence *Today is Saturday*, for example. Without any performative clause such as *I say to you*, "the speaker with the intention to communicate with the addressee" (p. 129) may use this plain declarative sentence to convey the information to the addressee. This is compatible with Ross's (1970) claim. It should be noted that sentences without such an explicit performative clause are rather usual in the English language (Ikarashi (2013)).

By contrast, the unmarked mode of expression in Japanese is private expression; a simple declarative sentence itself is not used as a public expression. Thus, Hirose notes that "no communicative intention is assumed" (p. 129) in sentence (34a); "Japanese speakers rarely use [this] sentence in conversation" (ibid.). On the other hand, sentence (34b), marked with the addressee-oriented sentence-final particle *yo* or the performative honorific form of the copula *desu*, naturally appears in conversation.

(34) a. Kyoo wa doyoobi da.
today top Saturday cop
‘ Today is Saturday.’

b. Kyoo wa doyoobi {da yo / desu}
today top Saturday {cop I.tell.you / cop.PH}
‘Today is Saturday.’

According to the three-tier model of language use, Japanese is a language in which the situation reporting part is not integrated with the situation construal part, but is integrated with the interpersonal relationship part. This means that when the speaker intends to communicate with the addressee, or intends to report the construed situation, the speaker needs to mark the intention explicitly by adding an explicit expression to indicate such an intention.

With this typological difference in mind, let us consider the contrast in (33a, b). We have observed that the reasoning *kara* construction requires its main clause to be marked with an explicit epistemic or performative marker, while the corresponding reasoning constructions in English do not. Crucially, the main clause of the reasoning construction (in either language) needs to be understood as an independent unit of speech act. The main clause of (33b) *John loved Mary* served as a public expression by itself (or following Ross's analysis, one could say that it has an implicit performative clause modified by the subordinate clause). In contrast, if we eliminate the epistemic marker *nodaroo* ‘I guess’ in (33a), the remaining element *Hanako o aishiteiru* ‘love Hanako’ at best may function as a private expression. In this regard, Shizawa (2015: 173) puts it as follows:

> Since the purpose of marking evidentiality is to inform the addressee of the speaker's source of information, *evidential markers are generally accompanied with addressee-orientedness*. As such, they not only mark information sources but also *turn private expressions into public expressions*.

In short, unlike in English, a declarative sentence in Japanese serves by default as a private expression; it is not until a linguistic marker indicating the existence of the addressee (e.g., an epistemic marker or performative marker) is added that it may serve as a public expression, i.e., as a form compatible with the main clause of the reasoning *kara* construction.

I stated earlier in this section my intention to point out a difference between the reasoning *because* construction and the reasoning *kara* construction. Strictly speaking, the difference is not that between the reasoning *because* construction and the reasoning *kara* construction, but between the two languages. Furthermore, this difference enhances the present argument for the similarity

between the REASONING constructions in the two languages in that their main clause needs to count as a unit of speech act independent of the *because-* or *kara-* clause as another unit of speech act.

CHAPTER 6

Constructions of metalinguistic reasons

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3, I investigated the causal and reasoning uses of *because*. In addition to these uses, *because* has a certain metalinguistic use, as in (1):

(1) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. ***Reputed*, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it**. (Hirose (1992: 82))

In the second sentence printed in bold face in (1), the *because*-clause justifies the speaker's use of the word *reputed* in the preceding sentence. I am concerned with this kind of metalinguistic use of *because* in the present chapter.[69] Little attention has been paid to this use of *because*: As far as my knowledge goes, Hirose (1992) is the only author to pay attention to this use of *because* and give an account of it. Following Hirose, I refer to expressions of this kind as the E-*BECAUSE* construction (where *E* stands for *expression*).

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69. Leech (1974) argues that *since*, but not *because*, can introduce a metalinguistic reason, pointing out that sentence (ib) is "abnormal" while sentence (ia) is "normal":

(i) a. What's the answer to this problem – since you're so clever.
b. What's the answer to this problem – because you're so clever.
(Leech (1974: 359))

However, these sentences are instances of what we call the REASONING constructions, or involve conjunctions used in the speech-act domain in Sweetser's (1990) terms (for details, see Section 2.4 and Chapter 3). In addition, in contrast to Leech's observation, Sweetser observes that there *do* exist sentences like (ib). At any rate, what I call metalinguistic reasons in the present chapter are different from what Leech so calls. Leech's metalinguistic analysis is based on a performative analysis (e.g., Ross (1970)), and "metalinguistic reasons" in Leech's terms seem to include the reasons for performing any speech act. As I pointed out above, this definition encompasses what I call reasoning conjunctions as well (cf. Schourup and Waida (1988)), and thus is misleading. In this work, the expression "metalinguistic reasons" is restricted to referring to the reasons for the use of a certain expression.

As Hirose points out, the E-*BECAUSE* construction in (1) is semantically equivalent to (2):

(2) I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it.

The main clause of (2) is a finite clause, while the corresponding part of (1) consists only of the expression used in the preceding context. In order to distinguish the E-*BECAUSE* construction from the construction exemplified by (2), I tentatively call the latter construction the *I say* E *because* construction. "Tentatively", because it is not clear at this point whether we can treat sentences like (2) as an independently existing construction or not. For this reason, I also avoid using small capitals to indicate its name in the present argument. For now, I use the term metalinguistic reason constructions as a term to cover the E-*BECAUSE* construction and *I say* E *because* construction, when the distinction is not necessary.[70]

In the present chapter, I discuss how the properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions can be accounted for in the proposed framework. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 observes general properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions, comparing them with the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions. In the course of the observation in Section 6.2, two questions arise, which are answered in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Section 6.3 and Section 6.4, respectively, deal with clefting and speech act constructions conveying statements in metalinguistic *because*-clauses. After briefly summarizing the argument up to this point in Section 6.5, Sections 6.6 and 6.7 discuss differences between the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the *I say* E *because* construction, highlighting the specificity of the former while accounting for the periphrastic form of the latter. Lastly, Section 6.8 wraps up the discussion.

6.2 Facts

In this section, I observe properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions. Note that the term "metalinguistic reason constructions" is printed in lowercase and used in the plural form, as this term is simply meant to cover the E-*BECAUSE* construction (e.g., (1)) and its periphrastic counterpart (e.g., (2)), not to refer to a specific form-meaning correspondence. Recall also that the periphrastic version is not considered a grammatical construction. Thus, only the E-*BECAUSE*

70. As a working hypothesis, I take these constructions as semantic equivalents, i.e. (semantically) synonymous constructions. As I will discuss later, they are pragmatically distinct.

construction is what I have recognized as a grammatical construction so far. The form-meaning correspondence of the E-*BECAUSE* construction may be represented in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1 The E-*BECAUSE* construction

The form of the construction is peculiar, and hence is not predictable from the norm of the grammar of English, in that the *because*-clause is attached to a word, not a clause. The meaning of the construction is not fully predictable either. The word in question that appears in the construction (represented as E) means that the speaker has used that expression in the preceding context and its lexical meaning does not contribute to the constructional meaning.

Now that the E-*BECAUSE* construction has been defined, the rest of this section observes its behavior along with the diagnostics in Table 4.3, which is reproduced as Table 6.1. I will also compare the E-*BECAUSE* construction with the *I say* E *because* construction. Notice that the diagnosis in (3c) is not applicable, since the E-*BECAUSE* construction does not have a main clause, which is a prerequisite for the matrix negation.

(3) **Table 6.1** The diagnostic table for the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions

	causal	**reasoning**
a. sentence-initial *because*-clause	OK	*
b. nominalization	OK	*
c. wide scope of matrix negation	OK	*
d. clefting	OK	*
e. speech-act constructions	*	OK
f. focalization by an exclusive	OK	*

First, a metalinguistic *because*-clause does not appear in sentence-initial position. Consider the following examples:

(4) a. *Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. Because no one outside of the invited guests was permitted to see it, *Reputed*.

b. *Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. Because no one outside of the invited guests was permitted to see it, I say *reputed*. (cf. (1)–(2))

Sentence-initial *because*-clauses generally express the reason that is presupposed (see Chapter 3). Metalinguistic reasons cannot be presupposed because the speaker needs to assert the reason to justify his/her use of the expression in question. Therefore, it is natural that sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not used in these constructions.

Second, as Hirose (1992) observes, the *because*-clause in the E-*BECAUSE* construction can be nominalized into *because of* NP, as exemplified in (5):

(5) Talking about verbal defensiveness has proven to be a particularly effective way of making *linguists* defensive: "defensive" because of wide-scale disagreement concerning the validity of speech act interpretations which must be necessarily be highly context dependent, intuitive, and, in addition, must confront the controversial problem of discerning a speaker's intention. (Hirose (1992: 85))

In this example, the reason why the speaker used the word *defensive* is expressed by the *because of* phrase *because of wide-scale disagreement*. Likewise, a *because*-clause preceded by the *I say* E clause may be nominalized, as exemplified in (6):

(6) This is an historic session for a number of reasons. This is the 26th special session in our special state's special history …. And, finally, I say historic because of the subjects at hand. (mt.gov/racicot/spch/SpecSess99.htm)

Third, clefting of the *because*-clause or the *because of* phrase of *I say* E *because* sentences is attested, as in (7a, b), while the corresponding E-*because* sentences do not allow for clefting, as in (8a, b):[71]

(7) a. …It is because of this "gripping," this "holding onto," that I say "behold!" (www.toltec-foundation.org/extracts/qfm.pdf)

b. I currently live in Hanover Pennsylvania and why I say currently is because I have lived in 5 different places around the US mostly on the east coast though. (students.juniata.edu/mclelnm2/)

71. The difference between cleft constructions, as in (7a), and pseudo-cleft constructions, as in (7b), is not crucial for the purpose of this paper. Henceforth, I will use the term "cleft constructions" as a cover term.

(8) a. *…It is because of this "gripping," this "holding onto," that "behold!" (cf. (7a))

b. *I currently live in Hanover Pennsylvania and why *currently* is because I have lived in 5 different places around the US mostly on the east coast though. (cf. (7b))

The contrast shows that it is not metalinguistic *because*-clauses in general but those of the E-*BECAUSE* construction that cannot be clefted. I will come back to this issue in Section 6.3.

Fourth, speech act constructions that convey statements (cf. Lakoff (1987)) can occur in a metalinguistic *because*-clause, as shown in (9a, b):

(9) a. …they serve for lunch the surprisingly delicious cucumber salad. I say surprisingly, because who would think one could turn the big, fat American (instead of the slim, English variety) into anything one would want a lot more of.
(www.sfexaminer.com/templates/print.cfm?storyname=010704e_tower)

b. Surprisingly, because who would think one could turn the big, fat American (instead of the slim, English variety) into anything one would want a lot more of.

In (9a, b), the RHETORICAL QUESTION, a kind of speech act construction that conveys a statement, appears in the metalinguistic *because*-clause.

Lastly, a metalinguistic *because*-clause can be focalized by exclusives, as exemplified in (10):

(10) a. Figure 6.2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. I say "theoretical", simply because it is unrealistic to expect any signal to be over 200dB down from the passband level. (sound.westhost.com/project99.htm)

b. Figure 6.2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. "Theoretical", simply because it is unrealistic to expect any signal to be over 200dB down from the passband level.

The *because*-clauses in (10a, b) are focalized by *simply*, which belongs to exclusives.

From the observations so far, the properties of the metalinguistic *because*-clause may be summarized as follows:

(11) a. Sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed.

b. The *because*-clause is nominalized into *because of* NP.

c. The *because*-clause can be clefted if it is preceded by the *I say* E clause; if simply preceded by E, it cannot.

d. Speech act constructions can occur in the *because*-clause.
e. The *because*-clause can be focalized by exclusives.

We may say that the metalinguistic *because*-clause is similar to the causal *because*-clause in terms of its nominalization (= (11b)) and its focalization by exclusives (= (11e)). Indeed, the metalinguistic reason construction conveys a certain kind of causal meaning, rather than a reasoning one, i.e., the reason why the speaker has used a certain expression in the preceding context. Thus, the main clause and the subordinate clause of these constructions should be understood as forming one speech act unit as a whole. Once again, the property mentioned in (11a) can be ignored, as the metalinguistic *because*-clause cannot be contextually presupposed and appearing in sentence-initial position is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a causal *because*-clause. In this relation, Hirose (1992) notes that the element that precedes the *because*-clause of the E-*BECAUSE* construction, as a word or phrase that is contextually presupposed, cannot perform a speech act on its own: The construction performs one speech act as a whole, from which its similarities to the CAUSAL construction naturally follow. Assuming that the *I say* E *because* construction is the semantically equivalent expression to the E-*BECAUSE* construction (see fn. 70), we can say that metalinguistic *because*-clauses in general behave in similar ways to causal *because*-clauses.

If the metalinguistic reason constructions are similar to the CAUSAL construction, however, the following two questions immediately arise: (i) Why can the *because*-clause of the E-*BECAUSE* construction not be clefted (cf. (11c))? (ii) Why can metalinguistic *because*-clauses be performative (cf. (11e))? In addition, we need to consider whether there are any functional differences between the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the *I say* E *because* construction. In Sections 6.3 through 6.5, I will provide answers to these questions.

6.3 On clefting

Let us consider the first question raised in the previous section. The relevant examples are repeated in (12a, b):

(12) a. *…It is because of this "gripping," this "holding onto," that "behold!" (= (8a))
b. *I currently live in Hanover Pennsylvania and why *currently* is because I have lived in 5 different places around the US mostly on the east coast though. (= (8b))

Since this is counter to the typical behavior of the CAUSAL construction, one may be skeptical of viewing the E-*BECAUSE* construction as being similar to the

CAUSAL construction. However, just because these sentences are not acceptable does not necessarily mean that the E-*BECAUSE* construction is not similar to the CAUSAL construction. The unacceptability of sentences (12a, b) is simply due to the idiosyncratic form of the E-*BECAUSE* construction, not due to its semantic/pragmatic factors. That is, the complementizers *that* and *why* used in the above examples must be followed by a finite clause, not a word or phrase.[72] Nevertheless, in (12a, b), the simple words *behold* and *currently* follow *that* and *why*, respectively. Hence, the sentences are not acceptable. As shown in (7a, b) above the *because*-clause of the corresponding *I say* E *because* construction can be clefted with no problem because *that* and *why* are correctly followed by finite clauses. Thus, the unacceptability of sentences (12a, b) is not problematic for asserting the similarity between the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the CAUSAL construction.

6.4 On performative *because*-clauses

So far, we have observed that the metalinguistic reason constructions are similar to the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* construction in meaning and that they behave alike in terms of the nominalizability and focalizability of the *because*-clause. The occurrence of the speech act construction of statement (= (11d)) seems contradictory to the present observation. This section provides an answer to this puzzling question of why speech act constructions may occur in metalinguistic *because*-clauses. To answer this question, I have proposed several analyses (e.g., Kanetani (2006a, 2009, 2012)), none of which is adopted in the present volume. In the following subsection, I review the gist of my earlier analyses and briefly point out the problems with them.

6.4.1 Earlier analyses

First, Kanetani (2006a) proposed a solution by postulating two types of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* constructions. In this view, the constructions are seen as grammatical units (and hence they are printed in small capitals here). Seeing these constructions as special cases of the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* and REASONING *BECAUSE* constructions, whose main clauses are filled by the (partially) fixed expression *I say* E, respectively, I posited instance links (I_I-links) between the relevant constructions. Thus,

72. In terms of generative grammar, a finite clause also counts as a phrase whose head is assumed to be the category "tense," i.e. a tense phrase. In the present context, the word "phrase" is meant to exclude tense phrases (and complementizer phrases). Tense phrases are called "clauses."

one type inherits information from the CAUSAL *BECAUSE* construction, and the other type from the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. The E-*BECAUSE* construction inherits its information from the causal type *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction (because of the reasons mentioned in Section 6.2). Between these constructions is the subpart link (I_S-link), because the E-*BECAUSE* construction is subsumed under the (causal type) *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction (syntactically and information-structurally):[73] Crucially, the two types of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* constructions have such similar syntactic representations that it is difficult to distinguish them from one another. As a result, due the "confusion" caused by the formal similarity between the two types of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, what is not expected in the E-*BECAUSE* construction in fact occurs therein. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2.



Figure 6.2 Kanetani's (2006a) inheritance model (adapted from Kanetani (2006a: 68))

The arrows between the constructions represent the inheritance links and the dashed line between the two types of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* constructions represents the formal similarity between them, which causes the confusion leading to the occurrence of the speech act construction of a statement in the E-*BECAUSE* construction.

This analysis has at least two problems. The first problem concerns relating a metalinguistic reason construction to the REASONING construction. The form of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction may be comparable with that of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, but the metalinguistic meaning is not comparable with the reasoning sense. Thus, relating it to the REASONING construction just to explain the occurrence of speech act constructions of a statement in the *because*-clause is not plausible. It also seems problematic to posit two types of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE*

73. I will discuss in Section 6.6 how the E-*BECAUSE* construction is pragmatically distinct from the *I say* E *because* construction.

constructions and to treat them as CONSTRUCTIONS in the sense of construction grammar, i.e. form-meaning pairings memorized as such. One reason for rejecting the string as a grammatical construction is that various phrases or constructions as well as *I say*, appear in the main clause, conveying similar meanings, as in (13a)–(13d):[74]

(13) a. This Thursday, I watched a pseudo-theater based on William Shakespeare's Twelfth night. **I said "pseudo" because** the theater was actually done at National Theater in London …
(http://blogs.cornell.edu/rosescholarsspring17/)

b. In our other relationships, theoretically no such fear exists. **I used theoretically because** most life theories are BS (probably this article too).
(https://insightchandra.wordpress.com/2016/11/11/desperate-quest-to-be-liked/)

c. Smelling, like the operation of the senses previously examined, takes place through a medium, i.e. through air or water -**I add water, because** water-animals too (both sanguineous and non-sanguineous) seem to smell just as much as land-animals …
(http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.2.ii.html)

d. The observations are measurements of certain characteristics which we call "variables". **The word "variable" is used because** the pieces of information, the observations, vary from one person to the next.
(https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat100/book/export/html/6)

In (13a), the verb *say* is used in the past form. Examples (13b, c) show that the verb is not limited to *say* but various other verbs may be used, such as *use* and *add*. In (13d), even a different construction, the PASSIVE construction, appears in the main clause. It seems implausible to assume that speakers take each of them as different constructions. For these reasons, I have to reject this analysis, which I had proposed myself.

Second, Kanetani (2009) attempted to solve the question by postulating two levels of speakers. The speaker connects the content being discussed with a proper linguistic form available within the context of the speech referring to that content (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (2000)). The mapping of the content onto the linguistic form is not an objective causal relation such as that observed in a sentence like

74. Crucially, as I will argue in Section 6.7, the clause introduced by the phrase *I say/said* should be distinguished from other variables of the main clause. Even so, there is no good reason for taking the string of *I say* E *because* as a grammatical construction to the extent of being independent of the CAUSAL construction.

the ground is wet because it has rained, but rather a subjective process, in which the speaker chooses a particular linguistic form from a set of possible linguistic forms. This process may be illustrated as in Figure 6.3.



Figure 6.3 The speaker's mapping of a content onto a linguistic form (Kanetani (2009: 36))

Figure 6.3 illustrates a process in which the speaker connects the content being discussed with linguistic form F_1, an element of the set defined as {linguistic forms | F_1, F_2, F_3, … F_n}. Here, it is the speaker that relates the linguistic form with its content. Therefore, like a reasoning process, the reason for the choice of the word does not have any necessary causal relation in the real world. Thus, it follows that speech act constructions may occur in the *because*-clause of the metalinguistic reason constructions. On the other hand, considering the nature of metacognition in general, we may say that expressing metalinguistic reasons is somewhat more "objective" in a sense to be discussed below. Metacognition is a second or higher level of cognitive process, i.e. a level of cognition which enables the speaker (who may be called a "metacognitive agent") to monitor, control, and/or regulate his cognitive processes (cf. Flavell (1971), Brown (1978)). That is, the speaker (as a metacognitive agent) sees him or herself mapping the content onto a certain linguistic form as if another person observed him doing it. This is illustrated in Figure 6.4.



Figure 6.4 The decomposition of a speaker into the user of an expression and the metacognitive agent (Kanetani 2009: 37))

In short, whereas the mapping process, which occurs inside the speaker's mind, is arbitrary and lacks a necessary causal relation, the higher-level speaker objectively monitors the mapping as if he or she saw it happening outside of him or herself.

Thus, postulating the two levels of speakers accounts for the bilateral characteristics of the metalinguistic reason constructions. That is, which characteristic the construction shows depends on which viewpoint of the two-tiered speaker is taken.

This approach has a problem of the same kind as the second problem with Kanetani (2006a). Consider the following example:

(14) Their [Ross and Lakoff's] famous example was "Floyd broke the glass", of which they said the deep structure was "It happened that Floyd did Floyd caused that the glass became broken." "Did" because all action verbs have embedded in them the verb "do". (Hirose (1992: 83f.))

In this example, it is Ross and Lakoff who used the word *did*, not the speaker of the sentence. Thus, the E-*BECAUSE* construction in (14) corresponds to a sentence like the following:

(15) They say "did" because all action verbs have embedded in them the verb "do".

To account for sentences like (15), I postulated the *X SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, where X is a variable of any person. In Figure 6.4 above, the "speaker" as the metacognitive agent is coincidentally identical with the "speaker" as the user of the expression. In the cases of (14) and (15), the two tiers of speakers are not identical; the former speaker corresponds to the speaker of the sentence, and the latter to Ross and Lakoff. Seeing the construction as an instantiation of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, both of which subsume the E-*BECAUSE* construction as their subparts, I postulated the inheritance relations in Figure 6.5.



Figure 6.5 Kanetani's (2009) inheritance model (adapted from Kanetani 2009: 41))

By postulating the X *SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction in addition to the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, this analysis might have a problem. The taxonomic relation may be clear between the X *SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction and the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, but it is questionable whether these levels of generalizations are necessary as constructions. To begin with, the reason for giving a special status to *I say* by taking it as a special case of *X say* is not clear. Besides, for the same reason that I rejected Kanetani's (2006a) analysis, postulating the X *SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction is also questionable. Even if the generalization of the X *SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction were possible at all, the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction would be integrated into the X *SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction without giving the former a special status. Hence, I must also reject this analysis.

Lastly, Kanetani (2012) compared the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction with the *IT IS BECAUSE* construction, as in (16):

(16) Stephanie is regularly offered geriatric roles and thinks **it is because she was brought up surrounded by archetypal elderly Englishwomen** …
(Sawada (2004: 175))

Following Sawada's (2004) observation that the construction is most naturally used when a certain skepticism arises from the preceding statement, I argued that the construction's discourse function is "[to give] an account to the skepticism that is assumed to exist in the hearer, expressing the reason that is subjectively singled out by the speaker" (Kanetani (2012: 12)). Interestingly, just like the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction, the *IT IS BECAUSE* construction, which is an alleged instance of the CAUSAL construction, allows a speech act construction in its *because*-clause, as in (17):

(17) Why is stretching so important to fitness? It is because not only does stretching decrease the chance of injury, it can help to recover from injury.
(Kanetani (2012: 13))

I attributed this fact to the construction's discourse function mentioned above. Then, pointing out the discourse-functional similarity of the *I SAY* E *BECAUSE* construction to the *IT IS BECAUSE* construction, I accounted for the occurrence of speech act constructions in the metalinguistic *because*-clauses. However, a closer investigation of the *IT IS BECAUSE* construction is necessary to conclude that it is an independent construction and is certainly a comparable item. In addition, if it were an independent grammatical construction at all, what kind of relation could be established is not clear at this point. In the present work, therefore, simply suggesting their possible comparability, I will not go any further into this approach.

6.4.2 Alternative analysis

In the previous subsection, I rejected my previous analyses. Crucially, Kanetani (2006a, 2009, 2012) treated the string of *I say* E *because* as a grammatical

construction (and hence it is printed in small capitals in the previous subsection). This view is problematic for the reasons mentioned above. In the present volume, which does not treat the string as a grammatical construction, I provide an alternative account of the question why metalinguistic *because*-clauses may be performative while their meanings are essentially causal ones.

Recall that the CAUSAL construction consists of one unit of speech act as a whole. As argued in Chapter 3, since the CAUSAL construction needs to state a causal relation, neither the *because*-clause nor the main clause can perform its own speech act. The E-*BECAUSE* construction, on the other hand, is used to express the reason that the speaker uses the expression in question (see Figure 6.1). That is, the speech act that the construction performs is a statement of the reason. The crucial difference, therefore, is whether it is a causal relation or a reason that is stated in the speech act unit of a given construction. If this is the case, the occurrence of a speech act construction that conveys a statement in the E-*BECAUSE* construction is not surprising.

At this point, one may wonder how a speech act is performed if a *because of* phrase is used instead of a *because*-clause, since a *because of* phrase cannot perform a speech act by itself. The relevant example is repeated as (18):

(18) Talking about verbal defensiveness has proven to be a particularly effective way of making *linguists* defensive: "defensive" because of wide-scale disagreement concerning the validity of speech act interpretations which must be necessarily be highly context dependent, intuitive, and, in addition, must confront the controversial problem of discerning a speaker's intention. (= (5))

The E-*because* sentence in (18) has no clausal element, i.e., the word *defensive* is combined with the prepositional phrase *because of wide-scale disagreement*, and could be considered a sentence fragment, which cannot perform a speech act. However, with the definition of the E-*BECAUSE* construction in Figure 6.1 in mind, we may understand the meaning of sentence (18) as "the reason that I say defensive is wide-scale disagreement concerning the validity of speech act". Thus, even if the *because of* phrase alone cannot perform a speech act that conveys the statement of the reason, the constructional meaning may guarantee that such a speech act is performed.

Another question that may arise is why the metalinguistic *because*-clause may be performative even when it is preceded by the full clause *I say* E, as in (9a), repeated here as (19):

(19) …they serve for lunch the surprisingly delicious cucumber salad. I say surprisingly, because who would think one could turn the big, fat American (instead of the slim, English variety) into anything one would want a lot more of. (= (9a))

The second sentence in (19) is a complex sentence that *superficially* resembles the CAUSAL construction with the same meaning as the corresponding E-*BECAUSE* construction (see fn. 70).[75] Thus, as with the E-*BECAUSE* construction, the second sentence in (19) only states the reason, not the causal relation, in its speech act unit. Therefore, even when preceded by a full clause, a metalinguistic *because*-clause may be performative, as in (19).

Throughout Section 6.4, I have considered the question why a metalinguistic *because*-clause can be performative while it is in essence a causal one in meaning. This question can be answered based on the difference in the kind of statement in the speech act unit of each construction. As for the CAUSAL construction, its unit of speech act states the *causal relation* between the cause situation and result situation, expressed respectively in the *because*-clause and main clause. The speech act unit of the metalinguistic reason constructions, either with or without *I say* in the main clause, states the *reason* justifying the speaker's use of the expression in question.

6.5 Interim summary

Let us summarize the discussion so far. First, we observed the properties of the metalinguistic *because*-clause in Section 6.2, as in (20):

(20) a. Sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed.
b. The *because*-clause is nominalized into *because of* NP.
c. The *because*-clause can be clefted if it is preceded by the *I say* E clause; if simply preceded by E, it cannot.
d. A speech act construction that conveys a statements can occur in the *because*-clause.
e. The *because*-clause can be focalized by exclusives.

(= (11))

I have accounted for all the properties listed here. Those properties described in (20b, e) and in the front half of (20c) are identical with those of, and can be considered to be inherited from, the CAUSAL construction. The latter half of (20c) is unique to the E-*BECAUSE* construction, as we discussed in Section 6.3. Those in (20a, d) follow directly from the characteristic of metalinguistic reason. Therefore, just because metalinguistic *because*-clauses behave in the same way as reasoning *because*-clauses in some respects (e.g., (20a, d)) does not mean that these properties are inherited from the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. I will describe the

75. The reason I use the word "superficially" will be explained in Section 6.7.

inheritance relations in Section 6.8. Before that, I will discuss how the *I say* E *because* construction is differentiated from the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the CAUSAL construction in the following sections.

6.6 Functional restriction on E-*BECAUSE* construction

So far, I have ignored functional differences between the E-*BECAUSE* construction and what I have called the *I say* E *because* construction, treating them simply as semantic equivalents. Generally, if two constructions are syntactically distinct, their (semantic/pragmatic) functions are also distinct, and each construction is considered as existing independently (cf. Bolinger (1977), Haiman (1985), Lakoff (1987), Goldberg (1995)). Thus, the question is not whether a difference exists between them – for it does – but rather, what it is.

Despite being semantically equivalent, the E-*BECAUSE* construction is more restricted in its use than the corresponding *I say* E *because* construction. Compare the following examples:

(21) a. Unfortunately, a person in some cases can be HIV positive for several years without having AIDS. (I say) unfortunately only because those diseases that are readily visible get treatment quicker.

b. Unfortunately, perhaps, a person in some cases can be HIV positive for several years without having AIDS. When they finally get AIDS they are often able to work for some time, and with treatment live a fairly normal life for several years. *(I say) unfortunately only because those diseases that are readily visible get treatment quicker.
(enzi.senate.gov/aidsaf2.htm)

In the context of (21a), the metalinguistic *because*-clause is legitimate either with or without *I say* in the main clause. In (21b), on the other hand, the use of the E-*BECAUSE* construction is restricted in (21b). In the latter context, a sentence (the one beginning with *when they finally get AIDS*) exists between the speaker's use of the word *unfortunately* and his or her justification of the use. Since the only difference between (21a) and (21b) is the existence of the intervened sentence in the latter, we may assume that the E-*BECAUSE* construction has to follow immediately after the use of the expression in question.

In this relation, consider the following quote from Lambrecht (1994: 93):

> In order for an addressee to be able to process the presupposition evoked by an utterance it is not only necessary that she be aware of the relevant set of presupposed propositions but that she have easy access to these propositions and to the elements of which they are composed.

Along this line, we may say that even though the expression in question is presupposed, the speaker needs to activate it in the hearer if it is assumed not to be active. It is the phrase *I say* in the main clause that helps the hearer activate the expression in question; without it, the hearer may not be able to process the expression, as it is assumed not to be active in the hearer. To see how this works, take (26b) for example. While the speaker states the sentence *when they finally get AIDS* …, the hearer's attention is focused on the proposition of the sentence being stated, to which he or she has the easiest access. If he or she hears the word *unfortunately* while processing this sentence, the hearer has difficulty processing it because the word is no longer active in the hearer. Adding *I say* to *unfortunately*, however, makes explicit the connection of the word *unfortunately* with the discourse (viz., the word is one that the speaker said in the previous context), which accordingly activates the word in the hearer and makes it easier for him or her to process it.

Thus, when the speaker needs to activate the expression in the hearer's mind, as in (21b), the E-*BECAUSE* construction cannot be used. In contrast, when such activation is not necessary, as in (21a), either metalinguistic reason construction (with or without *I say* in the main clause) may be used. To put it in a slightly different way, *I say* is used merely for this pragmatic reason and does not play a semantically crucial role in the sentence. Therefore, the following pragmatic restriction should be added to the E-*BECAUSE* construction so as to distinguish it from the semantically equivalent *I say* E *because* sentences: The E-*BECAUSE* construction may be used only when the expression in question is assumed to be active in the hearer. Along with this pragmatic restriction, the representation of the E-*BECAUSE* construction should be revised as that in Figure 6.6.



Figure 6.6 The E-*BECAUSE* construction with the pragmatic specification

6.7 Periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences

So far, I have not been concerned with where in the constructional network periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences with *I say* and other variations in the main clause are positioned. In Section 6.4.2, I attributed to the meaning

of the construction the acceptability of a speech act construction conveying a statement in the E-*BECAUSE* construction. That is, the reason that the *because*-clause may be performative is that the speech act unit of the E-*BECAUSE* construction states a reason. I also assumed that the *I say* E *because* construction is semantically equivalent to the E-*BECAUSE* construction so that its *because*-clause may be performative as well. However, periphrastic metalinguistic reason clauses do not always allow speech act constructions. Compare the following examples:[76]

(22) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world.

a. **I say "reputed"** because who has ever been permitted to see it?

b. ?? **I used the word "reputed"** because who has ever been permitted to see it?

When the main clause is introduced by *I say*, as in (22a), the performative *because*-clause, containing a RHETORICAL QUESTION, is acceptable. With the main clause introduced by the phrase *I used the word*, on the hand, the sentence is less acceptable, as shown in (22b). That is, while the periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentence introduced by *I say* in (22a) is semantically (but not pragmatically) the same as the corresponding E-*because* sentence in (1), the sentence in (22b), which is introduced by the phrase *I used the word "reputed"* is not. Besides, based on his research with informants, Shotaro Namiki (p.c. in 2017) has suggested to me that *I say* is the phrase that most frequently appears in the main clause and that periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences with *I say* should be distinguished functionally from those with other phrases or constructions in the main clause. That is, although the phrase *I say* superficially seems to be replaced with phrases or constructions of various types, such as those in (13a)–(13d), while retaining the same function, they are not functionally equivalent. From these facts, I take the phrase *I say* used in the metalinguistic reason construction as a pragmatic marker that indicates the relation between the expression and the context in which it is used. Periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences whose main clause is introduced by expressions other than *I say* (and some of its variants to be defined below) should be considered constructs of the CAUSAL construction.

Fillmore et al. (1988: 510) recognize idioms with familiar pieces familiarly arranged, i.e. lexically and syntactically regular but semantically irregular idioms. For example, in the RHETORICAL QUESTION *am I invisible?*, regular words are arranged based on regular syntax, while the sentence conveys an unexpected

76. I owe these examples to Shotaro Namiki.

meaning, i.e. the negative statement that *I'm not invisible*. The phrase *I say* also falls under an idiom of this category.[77] That is, used in conjunction with the E-*BECAUSE* construction, the phrase *I say*, a combination of the regular words arranged regularly, functions as the pragmatic marker.

The pragmaticalized nature of *I say* may be indicated by the following example:

(23) We were fortunate enough to find one cottonwood tree, just below the entrance of Portage Creek, that was large enough to make our carriage wheels about 22 inches in diameter. **Fortunate I say, because** I do not believe that we could find another of the same size, perfectly sound, within 20 miles of us (http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/journals/lewis5.html)

In this example, the phrase *I say* is parenthetical between the word *fortunate* and the *because*-clause. Thompson and Mulac (1991) regard the parenthetical use of a phrase like *I think* as evidence of grammaticalization.[78] In the same line of reasoning, we may say that *I say* is a grammaticalized (or pragmaticalized) element used specifically with the E-*BECAUSE* construction.

The phrase *I say* may be treated as a grammaticalized (or pragmaticalized) marker used specifically with the E-*BECAUSE* construction so as to indicate the connection of the expression and the discourse context, but it is not yet lexicalized for the following reasons. First, the subject is not necessarily the first person singular, i.e., the speaker of the sentence may be different from the speaker of the expression. Recall Example (15), repeated here as (24):

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77. I do not mean that the phrase *I say* across the board is an idiom of this sort; what I mean here is that the phrase used with the E-*BECAUSE* construction is idiomatic with the special function.

78. Thompson and Mulac (1991) call the phrase *I think* in (ia) an "epistemic phrase" and the one in (ib) an "epistemic parenthetical", both of which are grammaticalized forms of the combination of the subject and verb introducing a complement *that*-clause. According to them, the use of the former as the latter is evidence of this grammaticalization process.

(i) a. *I think* exercise is really beneficial, to anybody.
b. It's just your point of view you know what you like to do in your spare time *I think*.
(Thompson and Mulac (1991: 313))

Note also that terms such as "grammaticalization" and "pragmaticalization" are used very loosely without being defined (for their distinctions and definitions, see Diewald (2011), for example). What is important is that the phrase *I say* may be used parenthetically with the E-*BECAUSE* construction, and that this indicates the status of *I say* as the pragmatic marker.

(24) They say "did" because all action verbs have embedded in them the verb "do". (= (15))

In this case, by saying *they say*, the speaker of the sentence expresses the context in which the word *did* appears, i.e., it is *they* (= Ross and Lakoff) who used the word. Second, the verb *say* may be used in the past tense. As with those listed in (13b)–(13d), sentences with these variations could be considered constructs of the CAUSAL construction, but the following examples suggest that they are not: [79]

(25) a. Thank goodness a large portion of this is covered - as it appears now we are responsible for $6,859.00 … I said "appears" because who can read this bill? (http://skippymom.blogspot.jp/2010/06/)

b. They were all saying "no way". (They said) "no way" because who in their right mind would do such a thing!

In these sentences, the RHETORICAL QUESTION appears in the *because*-clause. Thus, the second sentence with *I said* (for (25a)) or *they said* (for (25b)) should not be regarded as a causal sentence, but as an E-*because* sentence preceded by these phrases, variants of the pragmatic marker. Thus, the pragmatic marker *I say* shows variation to the extent of changing its subject and verb form.

In sum, periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences may be broken down into two categories. One is the E-*BECAUSE* construction with the pragmatic marker *I say* or its variant. The pragmatic marker activates the expression in question in the hearer, indicating the connection between the expression and the discourse context. Sentences in the other category, i.e. those in (15b)–(15d), merely instantiate the CAUSAL construction.

6.8 Summary

In this chapter, following a comparison of metalinguistic reason constructions with the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions, I mainly argued two issues. First, we may characterize the metalinguistic reason constructions as bearing "bilateral" characteristics in the sense that they behave like the CAUSAL construction in some respects, while they are at the same time similar to the REASONING construction in other. However, just because they behave like the REASONING construction in some respects does not mean that they inherit information from the REASONING construction. Their *because*-clause essentially conveys a causal sense,

79. I thank Shotaro Namiki for providing me with Example (25a), and Patrick Farrell for Example (25b).

i.e. the reason for the speaker's use of a particular expression, and their apparent similarities to the REASONING construction are all accounted for by considering the nature of metalinguistic reason that the construction conveys. It is worth noting that metalinguistic reason constructions are also distinguished from the CAUSAL construction. Their difference is the content conveyed by the statement in their units of speech act. While the CAUSAL construction states the *causal relation*, the metalinguistic reason constructions state the *reason* to justify the speaker's use of the expression.

Second, the E-*BECAUSE* construction, with a marked grammatical form, is restricted in its use. The construction can be used only when the word in question is assumed to be active in the hearer's mind; if it is not so assumed, the speaker has to activate it in the hearer. To this end, he or she uses the pragmatic marker *I say*, which allows its subject pronoun and verb tense to be differentiated according to the context. Thus, as discussed in Section 6.4.2, I do not take the string *I say* (or its variant) E *because* as a grammatical construction, but rather as two constructions combined, i.e., the E-*BECAUSE* construction together with the pragmatic marker *I say* is realized as the string. The speaker may use other phrases or constructions, such as those in (13b)–(13d), to indicate the connection of the expression and the discourse context, but such sentences – albeit superficially similar to the E-*BECAUSE* construction with the pragmatic marker *I say* – count as constructs of the CAUSAL construction.

Let us finally consider the inheritance relation. From the argument in this chapter, we can conclude that the E-*BECAUSE* construction is a syntactic and semantic subpart of the CAUSAL construction (the one with sentence-final *because*-clause). Semantically, the E-*BECAUSE* construction conveys the causal relation between the speaker's use of a particular expression and its reason, of which the reason part is stated in its speech act unit. Syntactically, the E-*BECAUSE* construction does not have a main clause but is composed only of the expression in question followed by the *because*-clause. To conclude the discussion, I posit a subpart link (I_S-link) between the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the CAUSAL construction, as shown in Figure 6.7.

It should be noted that periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentences do not appear in the inheritance relation. They are classified into two categories, neither of which are independent grammatical constructions. One is the E-*BECAUSE* construction with the pragmatic marker *I say* (and its variants), which is used specifically with the construction serving to indicate the expression and the discourse context, and accordingly to activate the expression in the hearer. The other is specific instances of the CAUSAL construction, which states the causal relation between the situations described in the *because*-clause and the main clause. Because of the meanings of the expressions that appear in the main clause, (e.g., *I used the*



Figure 6.7 The inheritance link between the CAUSAL construction and the E-*BECAUSE* construction

word theoretically ((13b)), *the word "variables" is used* ((13d)), etc.), sentences of this latter category have a superficial difficulty in distinguishing themselves from sentences of the former category (i.e. E-*because* sentences preceded by the pragmatic marker *I say*). That is, the logical meanings of the two types are close to each other. However, their constructional meanings, i.e. what are stated in their speech act units, are distinct in the way that I discussed above.

CHAPTER 7

Analogy in construction grammar

The case of *just because of* X *doesn't mean* Y

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines sentences like the emphasized part in (1) below and aims to present a discussion of a role of analogy in construction grammar theory, as well as to show the validity of the framework proposed in Chapter 3.

(1) I mean, what happened is he signed a bill. It was a bad bill … I mean, **just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan**. (adapted from CNN transcripts)

The emphasized part in (1), in essence, conveys the same meaning as sentence (2):

(2) Just because he made a dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan.

That is, these sentences have the meaning of inference denial (the conclusion that you are going to have lights out in Manhattan is not automatically drawn from the premise that the man referred to as *he* made a dumb mistake). They differ from each other, however, in their syntactic forms. That is, the subject of sentence (1) is a *because of* phrase, while that of sentence (2) is a *because*-clause.[80] I will call a form-meaning pairing like (1) the *just because of* X *doesn't mean* Y (JBo-X DM-Y) construction, and one like (2) the *just because* X *doesn't mean* Y (JB-X DM-Y) construction, respectively.

Before starting the argument of this chapter, it should be noted that the JBo-X DM-Y construction is considered not perfectly acceptable, while the JB-X DM-Y

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80. Although it is controversial whether the *just because* in sentence (2) is a subject (Hirose (1991)) or an adjunct (Bender and Kathol (2001)), I am not concerned with this issue. For the sake of simplicity, I use the term "subject" to refer to the position preceding the negated verb phrase *doesn't men*; but for neutrality, I use Bender and Kathol's terms, the JB-X DM-Y construction, rather than Hirose's SUBJECT *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction (see Section 2.7).

construction is fully acceptable (cf. Matsuyama (2001)). In part for this reason, little attention has been paid to the JBo-X DM-Y construction while the JB-X DM-Y construction has been analyzed in depth in the literature (e.g., Hirose (1991, 1999), Bender and Kathol (2001), Matsuyama (2001), Hilpert (2005)). As far as my knowledge goes, only Matsuyama (2001) mentions this construction, saying that the construction is ungrammatical. In contrast to his observation, however, a considerable number of attested examples *do* exist (particularly in spoken registers). With a number of actual sentences, I argue for the existence of this construction.

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, I review Matsuyama's (2001) generative approach to the JB-X DM-Y and JBo-X DM-Y constructions, which rules out the latter. In Section 7.3, I will critically review Hirose's (1999) constructional analysis of the JB-X DM-Y. In Section 7.4, slightly modifying Hirose's analysis, I will propose a revised analysis of the JB-X DM-Y construction, based on which I will explain in Section 7.5 how the JBo-X DM-Y construction comes into use. In Section 7.6, I will make a brief and speculative discussion about the instability of the JBo-X DM-Y construction, and lastly in Section 7.7, I will summarize the chapter.

7.2 Matsuyama (2001): *JBo-X DM-Y

Matsuyama (2001) presents a minimalist approach to the JB-X DM-Y construction, which predicts the JBo-X DM-Y construction to be ungrammatical and in fact he rules out the construction. In this section, I review his analysis, focusing on how he rules out the JBo-X DM-Y construction.

Matsuyama argues that the JB-X DM-Y construction has a subject *because*-clause merged in [Spec, T] and a null subject, i.e. *pro*, in [Spec, *v*] whose ϕ-features delete the uninterpretable ϕ-features of T. Specifically, as shown in (3) below, *pro* merges in [Spec, *v*], where T deletes its ϕ-features against the ϕ-features of *pro* and its Case is deleted. After the subject *because*-clause, which bears [N-] feature, merges in [Spec, T], T deletes its strong EPP feature against the [N-] feature of the subject *because*-clause.[81]

(3) [$_{TP}$ [just because I'm here now]$_i$ T-doesn't [$_{vP}$ *pro*$_i$ mean that
{~~N~~} {~~EPP~~, ϕ} {ϕ, ~~CASE~~}
I didn't go]]

(Matsuyama (2001: 344))

81. For details as to why a *because*-clause, an adverbial clause, has an [N-] feature when it appears in the subject position and how *pro* is licensed, see Matsuyama (2001).

In (3), all the uninterpretable features are deleted and the derivation converges.

Matsuyama also argues that the *because of* is a compound preposition. This category status is established by William's (1981) righthand head rule, which requires the righthand head of a compound to determine its syntactic category (cf. also Emonds (1985)). That is, the righthand head of *because of* is the preposition *of*, and therefore must itself become the syntactic category of *because of*, and hence *because of*, a preposition, does not have an [N-] feature. Following Rizzi (1986), Matsuyama (2001: 343) formalizes the relation between *pro* and its binder as follows: The binder and bindee must agree in categorial feature values. Given that the *because of* phrase is a PP, it cannot bind the *pro* in [Spec, *v*], since *pro* is nominal and therefore has a different category feature from its binder.

Matsuyama thus claims that the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not grammatical based on his analysis of the licensing system of the subject *because*-clause. In contrast to his observation, however, as Example (1), repeated here as (4), shows, JBo-X DM-Y construction *does* exist.

(4) I mean, what happened is he signed a bill. It was a bad bill … I mean, just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan. (= (1))

In order to solve the paradox, I will propose a construction grammar analysis in Section 7.5. Before that, in the following section, I will observe Hirose's (1999) constructional analysis of the JB-X DM-Y construction on the basis of which my proposal will be made in the sections that follow.

7.3 Hirose (1999)

7.3.1 Inheritance relations

As we observed in Section 2.7, Hirose (1999) presents a construction grammar analysis of the JB-X DM-Y construction and describes inheritance relations (cf. Goldberg (1995)) between the relevant constructions. Hirose (1999) considers the *because*-clause of the JB-X DM-Y construction as the subject of a sentence, and points out that the occurrence of a *because*-clause, an adverbial clause, in the subject position cannot be explained compositionally for the following reasons. First, unlike *that*-clauses, *because*-clauses can occur in the subject position only when the verb of inference (and a limited range of other verbs) that follows is negated.[82] Consider the following:

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82. See Hirose (1999) and Bender and Kathol (2001) for details of the range of verbs that may appear in this construction.

(5) a. {That/(Just) because} John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy.
b. {That/*(Just) because} John is liked by all the students means that he is a good teacher.

(Hirose (1999: 598))

In (5a), either the *that*-clause or the *because*-clause can be the subject of the negated verb of inference. By contrast, example (5b) shows that in an affirmative sentence, only *that*-clauses may be used. Based on the contrast, Hirose argues that the occurrence of the subject *because*-clause cannot be attributed to the semantics of the verb, i.e., we cannot say that verbs of inference can take a *because*-clause as its subject, since the polarity of a sentence is independent of the lexical semantics of the verb used in the sentence.

Another reason is that not only verbs of inference but also *make* (a causative verb) and *be* (a copula verb) may follow the subject *because*-clause as shown in (6):[83]

(6) a. Just because you donate a sperm and an egg doesn't make you a parent.
b. Just because U.S. taxes are lower is no reason to increase them.

(Hirose (1999: 598))

Once again, the occurrence of a *because*-clause in the subject position, Hirose argues, is not predictable from the lexical meanings of such verbs.

For these reasons, Hirose refuses a lexical semantic approach to the construction at issue and takes a constructional approach, claiming that the JB-X DM-Y construction and some of its variants with verbs of different kinds (e.g. (6a, b)) inherit their information from more general constructions. For the present discussion, I_I-links, I_M-links, and I_S-links are relevant (see (47) of Chapter 2 for their definitions; see also Goldberg (1995)). The inheritance relations that Hirose (1999) describes are shown in Figure 7.1.[84]

By describing inheritance relations between the constructions as in Figure 7.1, Hirose claims that the JB-X DM-Y construction inherits its information multiply

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83. Hirose (1999) refers to constructions (6a, b) as "the causative verb version of subject *because*-clause construction" and "the *be* verb version of subject *because*-clause construction," respectively. For a simplicity reason, as far as such a distinction is not necessary, I do not distinguish these types and I will treat all the types equally as the JB-X DM-Y construction regardless of types of the verbs used in the construction. Each "version" may be taken as each "mini-construction" with a specific sense of a verb, in terms of Boas (2003).

84. Our CAUSAL construction corresponds to Hirose's (1999) causal *because*-clause construction; our REASONING construction to his inferential *because*-clause construction. In order to keep the argument consistent, I use our terms, instead of Hirose's, in Figure 7.1 and the same is true in the rest of this chapter unless otherwise mentioned.



Figure 7.1 Hirose's (1999) inheritance model (adapted from Hirose (1999: 603))

from the more general constructions, i.e. the INFERENCE-DENIAL BECAUSE-CLAUSE construction (e.g., (7b)), where the *because*-clause is used adverbially, and the *THAT*-CLAUSAL SUBJECT construction (e.g., (7c)), where the nominal *that*-clause occupies the subject position.

(7) a. Just because John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy.
b. Just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he is happy.
c. That John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy.

(Hirose (1991: 25))

The subject *that*-clause in (7c) describes the premise from which to draw a conclusion and its content is contextually presupposed. This is the same function as an inference-denial *because*-clause, and based on this functional similarity, Hirose views the JB-X DM-Y construction, in which a *because*-clause appears in the subject position, as a special case of the *THAT*-CLAUSE SUBJECT construction. Hence, an instance link (I_I-link) is posited between them. However, as Hirose (1991, 1999) observes, the *THAT*-CLAUSE SUBJECT construction may be an affirmative, as well as negative, sentence, whereas the JB-X DM-Y construction must be negative. Recall the contrast in (5b) repeated here as in (8):

(8) {That/*(Just) because} John is liked by all the students means that he is a good teacher. (= (5b))

According to Hirose, the fact that the JB-X DM-Y construction must be negative follows from the fact that the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction, i.e. the other source of the inheritance, must be a negative sentence (e.g.,

**Because John is liked by all the students, it means that he is a good teacher* (Hirose (1991: 26))). That is, because the JB-X DM-Y construction has an inference-denial *because*-clause as its part, the former is always a negative sentence. Hence, a subpart link (I_S-link) is posited between the JB-X DM-Y and INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE constructions, and it is this I_S-link that guarantees that the JB-X DM-Y construction must be negative.

Hirose, in turn, relates the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction with the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction via I_S-link. He argues that in the sense that the former denies an inferential relation, it contains the meaning of inference. Lastly, the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction is considered as a metaphorical extension of the CAUSAL construction (as maintained also in the present book). That is, an inferential relation is construed as a metaphorical causal relation (see the arguments in Chapter 3 for details; cf. also Sweetser (1990)). Hence, a metaphorical extension link (I_M-link) is posited between them.

7.3.2 Problem

As observed in the previous subsection, Hirose (1999) relates the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction with the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction (see Figure 7.1). However, I claim here that the former should be related directly with the CAUSAL construction, not via the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, for the following reasons. First, as we closely observed in Chapter 4, like inference-denial *because*-clauses, which are typically focalized by *just*, causal *because*-clauses can also be focalized by *just*, while inferential ones cannot. Consider the following examples:

(9) a. He went to college just because his parents asked him to.
(Schourup and Waida (1988: 95))

b. *It has rained, just because the ground is wet. (Kanetani (2007b: 342))

Sentence (9a) is an instance of the CAUSAL construction with its *because*-clause modified by *just*, and the sentence is grammatical. Sentence (9b), where the reasoning *because*-clause is focalized by *just*, is not acceptable. I argued in Chapter 4 that causal *because*-clauses, but not reasoning ones, can be focalized by what Quirk et al. (1985) call exclusives (e.g. *just*, *simply*, *merely*, etc.). In this relation, it is noteworthy that an inferential-denial *because*-clause may be modified by another exclusive such as *simply* or *merely*. It should also be noted that not only *just* but also other exclusives may be used in the JB-X DM-Y construction and the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction. Examples of *simply* and *merely* used in these constructions are given in (10a)–(10d):

(10) a. …simply because a couple are gay, it doesn't mean that they'll not make good parents! (news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/406041.stm)

b. Simply because one person is yelling "It's the shots," doesn't mean it works for EVERYONE on the spectrum.
(edition.cnn.com/HEALTH/blogs/paging.dr.gupta/2008/03/myths-of-autism.html)

c. Well, merely because the number changed, it doesn't necessarily mean that a thing itself changed. (www.geneepstein.net/?p=98)

d. And merely because you've done it well once doesn't mean you can do it well again.
(www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/sep/20/robertharris.writing.fiction)

The focalizability of the *because*-clause by exclusives shows that the inference-denial *because*-clauses are more similar to causal *because*-clauses than to reasoning *because*-clauses.

Second, inference-denial *because*-clauses fall within the scope of matrix negation. Hirose (1991) describes the meaning of sentence (11a) as (11b):

(11) a. Just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he is happy.

b. NEG [John is happy, because he is rich]

(Hirose (1991: 25))

In (11a), according to Hirose, the negative *doesn't mean* negates the inferential process of drawing the conclusion that he is not happy from the premise described in the *because*-clause. In this respect, the INFERENCE-DENIAL BECAUSE-CLAUSE construction is similar to the CAUSAL construction and different from the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. Like inference-denial ones, causal *because*-clauses may be inside the matrix negation, while reasoning ones may not (cf. Rutherford (1970)). Observe the following contrast:

(12) a. He doesn't beat his wife because he likes her. (Rutherford (1970: 100))

b. He's not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego.
(Rutherford (1970: 97))

As we saw in Chapter 3, Rutherford points out that sentence (12a) can be understood as either "it's because he likes his wife that he doesn't beat his wife" (p. 100), where *not* in the matrix clause merely negates the proposition expressed in the main clause (i.e. narrow scope interpretation), or "it's not because he likes her that he beats his wife" (p. 100), where it negates the causal relation between what is mentioned in the main clause and what is mentioned in the *because*-clause (i.e. wide scope interpretation). In the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction (12b), by contrast, Rutherford observes that only narrow scope interpretation is possible. Thus, we may

say that the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction should be related to the CAUSAL construction rather than to the REASONING BECAUSE construction.

Lastly, the inference-denial *because*-clauses may precede the main clause. This is also similar to causal *because*-clauses, and is different from reasoning *because*-clauses. Observe the following contrast:

(13) a. Because it has rained, the ground is wet.
b. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained.

As the contrast shows, while causal *because*-clauses may precede the main clause, reasoning ones may not. This fact, again, suggests the similarity of the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction to the CAUSAL construction and its difference from the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.

The three facts observed in this subsection, i.e. (i) the focalizability of the *because*-clause by an exclusive, (ii) the wide scope interpretation of the matrix negation, and (iii) the position of the *because*-clause, all suggest that the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction should be related directly to the CAUSAL construction, not by way of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.

7.4 Revised inheritance model

In the previous section, I reviewed Hirose's (1999) analysis and pointed out that the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction should be related directly to the CAUSAL construction. That is, the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction is not relevant in discussing the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and constructions that are subsequently related to it. More precisely, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction inherits no information from the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction.

I would like to start this section by considering in what way the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction should be related to the CAUSAL *because*-clause construction. Since the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction has both syntactic and semantic properties of the CAUSAL construction, it seems reasonable to see the former as an instance of the latter with its main clause substituted for a limited range of partially lexically filled expressions, e.g. *it doesn't mean* Y, *it doesn't make* Y, *it is not* Y. In other words, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is a partially lexically filled instance of the CAUSAL construction. Hence, an I_I-link is posited between them, and this relation may be illustrated as follows:

(14) causal: *(Just) because* $\underline{C}_1$, $\underline{C}_2$
$\downarrow$
inference-denial: *Just because* $\underline{C}_1$, *it doesn't mean* Y

In (14), the arrow represents a lexical substitution; the main clause of the CAUSAL construction C_2 is substituted for the partially lexically filled expression *it doesn't mean* Y. In this way, the main clause of the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction can be seen as a special case, or instance, of the main clause of the CAUSAL construction.

If the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is treated as an instance of the CAUSAL construction, a question may arise as to how the construction obtains the meaning of "inference" denial.[85] To give an answer to the question, let us review the argument in Section 3.6. Consider the sentence in (15):

(15) Because the ground is wet, I think it has rained.

We have repeatedly observed that a reasoning *because*-clause cannot be in sentence-initial position, as shown in (16a):

(16) a. *Because the ground is wet, it has rained. (= (13b))
b. It has rained, because the ground is wet.

Despite its sentence-initial *because*-clause, with the expression of the speaker's thought in the main clause, *I think*, sentence (15) is accepted to some speakers as a sentence with the virtually same meaning as that of (16b), or the inferential meaning. In Section 3.6, I explained this mismatch phenomenon in accordance with the Override Principle, repeated here as in (17):

(17) The Override Principle: If a lexical item is semantically incompatible with its syntactic context, the meaning of the lexical item conforms to the meaning of the structure in which it is embedded. (Michaelis (2005: 51))

Because of the syntactic representation of sentence (15) in which the *because*-clause precedes the main clause, its interpretation is coerced into a causal one, and hence the whole sentence may be understood as expressing the causal relation between the ground being wet and the speaker concluding that it has rained.

Our view of the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as an instance of the CAUSAL construction is explained in the same line. The meaning of inference-denial can be conveyed by lexical expressions such as *doesn't mean*, while the whole sentence expresses a causal relation. Indeed, Bender and Kathol

85. As seen in Section 7.3.1, Hirose (1999) treats the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as a subpart of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction (see Figure 7.1), and argues that the former contains the meaning of inference. Thus, he attributes to the meaning of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction the inferential meaning that the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction has.

(2001) observe that the meaning of a sentence like *Just because* X *doesn't mean* Y is directly encoded by the lexical expression *doesn't mean*.

At this point, one may be skeptical about treating the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as an independent grammatical construction, since this construction looks like a product of simple lexical substitution. That is, a sentence like *just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he is happy* (= (7b)) might be considered a construct of the CAUSAL construction. In the present argument, however, following Hirose's (1999) basic idea, I advocate this intermediate level of generalization between the JB-X DM-Y construction and the CAUSAL construction, because unlike a causal *because*-clause, an inference-denial *because*-clause bears some nominal properties (Hirose (1991, 1999), Matsuyama (2001)). Notably, "the sentence anaphor *it* refers to the content of the *because*-clause in a left-peripheral position" (Matsuyama (2001: 343)). Thus, while inheriting from the CAUSAL construction the information about the complex sentence structure and the causal meaning, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction attributes to itself the nominal properties of the *because*-clause used in the construction.

In sum, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is a special case of the CAUSAL construction whose main clause is substituted for a limited range of expressions that denote inference-denial. In order to maintain this idea, the inheritance relations should be represented as in Figure 7.2.



Figure 7.2 The revised inheritance relations

Unlike the constructional network described in Figure 7.1, the one in Figure 7.2 does not include the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction, since it is not relevant. Instead, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE and CAUSAL construction are connected directly by an I_I-link in Figure 7.2.

7.5 The JBO-X DM-Y construction as an analogical construction

In this section I consider how the JBO-X DM-Y construction, a syntactically anomalous construction, comes into use. My claim is that the construction at issue is not

a static construction but emerges on-line via analogies from the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE and JB-X DM-Y constructions. The notion of analogy employed here is a four-part analogy, which may be formulated as follows:

(18) A : B = C : D

The formula provided in (18) reads, "A is to B as C is to D." Let us call the left-hand member of the formula the source, and the right-hand member the target. Blevins and Blevins (2009: 2) note, "[in an analogy like (18)], the relation R between a pair of items A:B provides a basis for identifying an unknown item, given an item that matches A or B. Knowing R and knowing that C is similar to A permits one to identify D as the counterpart of B." In this section, I show that inference-denial uses of a *because of* phrase may be accounted for by this notion.

Before the JBO-X DM-Y construction, consider a sentence like (19):

(19) In my point of view the class sizes have been very large in many classes, but **just because of that it doesn't mean the school can start kicking out students**. (www.student-voices.org/SpeakOutDiscussion.aspx?Id=846)

In this sentence, the main clause is introduced by *it*, which is bound by the *because of* phrase. Henceforth, I will call sentences of this kind the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction. In this construction, a PP binds a pronoun, and it seems to violate Matsuyama's (2001) generalization that the binder and bindee must be identical in category features.[86] That is, Matsuyama's (2001) account predicts the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction to be ungrammatical. This prediction is not borne out, however, as attested examples like sentence (19) shows. Why then is the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction acceptable?

In Section 7.3.2, in accordance with the diagnoses formulated in Chapters 3 and 4, I compared inference-denial *because*-clauses with causal and reasoning *because*-clauses in terms of (i) their focalizability by exclusives, (ii) their scope relations with matrix negation, and (iii) their positions. There is yet another diagnosis to distinguish causal *because*-clauses from reasoning *because*-clauses: A causal one may be replaced with a *because of* phrase, whereas a reasoning one may not, as exemplified by the following contrast:

(20) a. He's not coming to class because of his sickness.
b. *He's not coming to class because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 105)))

86. Matsuyama (2001) provides the generalization only for *pro*, but since *it*, another nominal and an explicit counterpart of *pro*, appears in (19), this generalization should apply to the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as well, whose main clause is introduced by the bound pronoun *it*.

If, as maintained in Section 7.4, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is an instance of the CAUSAL construction, one may expect it possible to replace an inference denial *because*-clause with a *because of* phrase. Here, the following analogy works: What holds in the CAUSAL construction should also hold in the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction. This may be illustrated as in Figure 7.3.



Figure 7.3 The analogy yielding the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction

In Figure 7.3, the upper line represents the source of the analogy, the lower line its target, and the underlined part a product via the analogy. More specifically, the analogical deduction works as follows: If a causal *because*-clause is replaceable with a *because of* phrase, then an inference-denial *because*-clause should also be replaceable with a *because of* phrase. Thus, the knowledge of the similarity of the CAUSAL construction to the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction permits the speaker to fill the gap (i.e. the underlined part in Figure 7.3) with the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction as the counterpart of the CAUSAL *because of* construction. It is this analogy that makes the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction acceptable, as in (19), even though such a sentence does not meet syntactic conditions.

Let us now turn to the JBo-X DM-Y construction, e.g. *just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan* (= (1)). Comparing the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction with the JB-X DM-Y construction, we may find their difference either the presence or absence of the pronoun *it*. In this regard, Hirose (1991, 1999) points out that the two constructions are identical in their meanings, and Matsuyama (2001) considers the pronoun *it* used in the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction an overt counterpart of the null subject *pro* (see Section 7.2 for details of his *pro* analysis). From their observations, we may say that their difference is so subtle that another analogy as formulated in Figure 7.4 is invoked.[87]

87. Although it may be indisputable that their similarity invokes analogies of this kind, closer investigations are necessary of exactly which aspect(s) in their similarity invoke(s) the



Figure 7.4 The analogy yielding the JBo-X DM-Y construction

This analogy makes one expect that what holds in the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction should also hold in the JB-X DM-Y construction. As discussed above, an inference-denial *because*-clause could be replaced with a *because of* phrase, and so a subject *because*-clause is expected to be replaceable with a *because of* phrase as well. Notice that the source (represented in the upper line) in Figure 7.4 is identical with the target (represented in the lower line) in Figure 7.3. This suggests that once we obtain the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction analogically, we may also use it as a source of another analogy. As a result, one may use the JBo-X DM-Y construction by the analogy formulated in Figure 7.4, which uses the analogical INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction as its source.

By combining the arguments in this section with the revised inheritance model in Figure 7.2, we can thus illustrate the relations between the relevant constructions as in Figure 7.5, where the dashed arrows represent analogies that work on the basis of the similarities between the constructions connected by the broken lines.

The similarity of the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction to the CAUSAL construction invokes the analogy in Figure 7.3, by which to produce the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction. The analogically emergent construction, in turn, along with the analogy based on the similarity of the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction to the JB-X DM-Y construction, as shown in Figure 7.4, produces the JBo-X DM-Y construction. Note that since the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* and JBo-X DM-Y constructions may not be stored in our mind as "grammatical constructions," inheritance links are not posited. Rather, such constructions should be considered to be produced on-line. This idea helps us account for the JBo-X DM-Y construction's unstable nature that we will briefly discuss in the following section.

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analogy. Leaving it an open question for a future research, I do not discuss this issue further in the present work, however.



Figure 7.5 The inheritance and analogical relations among the constructions

7.6 Instability of the JBo-X DM-Y construction

As I noted in Section 7.1, the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not perfectly admitted. In fact, some native speakers do not accept the sentences, and even after being shown attested examples, they would be doubtful about accepting the sentences. As I have shown in this chapter, it is also true that actual examples of the construction nevertheless *do* exist.

In this connection, Lambrecht (1988: 320) comments in his analysis of the *THERE* AMALGAM construction (e.g. *there was a farmer had a dog*) that such substandard sentences may be "uttered spontaneously" even if the speaker is "convinced that the constructions do not exist in his dialect or speech pattern." Likewise, the speaker may spontaneously utter the JBo-X DM-Y construction, even though he or she may be aware that the construction is syntactically anomalous if time is given to reflect on its grammaticality. This may in part account for the reason why the construction is found particularly in informal registers.

Presumably, facing a dilemma between syntactic rules or principles such as those reviewed in Section 7.2 (cf. Matsuyama (2001)), on one hand, and analogies such as those proposed in Section 7.5, on the other, the speaker may feel

uncertain whether a given sentence is acceptable or not. As a result, the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not entrenched as well as the JB-X DM-Y construction, and therefore is not a stable construction.

7.7 Summary

In this chapter, I showed how the JBo-X DM-Y construction, which is predicted to be ungrammatical, is actually used. Slightly modifying Hirose's (1999) inheritance model, I claimed that the construction at issue emerges on-line via analogies based primarily on the similarity of the CAUSAL construction to the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction. By seeing the latter construction as an instance of the former, the analogy works that what holds in the latter should also hold in the former. Since a causal *because*-clause may be replaced by a *because of* phrase, one may expect that an inference-denial *because*-clause may be replaced with a *because of* phrase as well. This analogical deduction yields the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction and the JBo-X DM-Y construction.

This conclusion leads to another argument that while the JB-X DM-Y construction is well entrenched (cf. Hilpert (2005)), the JBo-X DM-Y construction is not. As I mentioned in Section 7.5, the latter is a product of analogical deduction and therefore is not established as a "grammatical construction," or not stored in our mind. This straightforwardly accounts for the latter's substandard nature and supports the usage-based model of grammar. Analogies do not only yield constructions that people may consider unacceptable but also account for the unstable nature of constructions that emerge in such ways. It is an advantage of construction grammar that we can take the notion of analogy naturally into the theory and account for a dilemma between the grammaticality and the actual use of a given expression.

CHAPTER 8

Innovative use of *because*

8.1 Introduction

In the history of the word *because* (whose first attested use in *OED* dates back to 1305, about 700 years ago), the last few years have seen an innovative use of the word whose "commemoration" was marked in the year 2013. On January 3, 2014, the American Dialect Society (ADS) announced that they selected *because* as the Word of the Year for 2013. Although the word itself has long been used, a new usage of the word, as exemplified in (1), is emerging.

(1) I cannot go out today **because homework**.

Sentence (1) conveys a similar meaning to sentence (2):

(2) I cannot go out today because I have a lot of homework.

In the release from the ADS, Ben Zimmer, the chair of the Society's New Words Committee, says, "this past year, the very old word *because* exploded with new grammatical possibilities in informal online use, … No longer does *because* have to be followed by *of* or a full clause".[88] Canonically, however, *because* should (still) be followed either by a finite clause (as in (2)) or by an *of*-phrase (e.g., *because of homework*). As argued in Chapter 3, a *because*-clause participates both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction; a *because of* phrase is used only in the CAUSAL construction. How then can the present framework treat the new usage of *because* as in (1), in which the word *homework* directly follows *because*? This chapter investigates this new usage of *because* and discusses how it is related to other constructions containing the word that we have observed so far.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 investigates the syntactic and semantic characteristics of the new usage of *because*, based on which relations of the target construction with more canonical, existing *because*-clause constructions are described in terms of inheritance links (Goldberg (1995)) in Section 8.3. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 make clear the divisions of labor between the speaker and

88. http://www.americandialect.org/because-is-the-2013-word-of-the-year

hearer of the target construction, and argue that it is the hearer that posits the inheritance links proposed in Section 8.3. Section 8.6 applies the analysis in the preceding sections to the construction in which the new usage of *because* appears in the subject position to the verb phrase *doesn't mean* (e.g., *just because summer doesn't mean you've always got to be wearing short sleeved tops*), and makes a case for the analysis in this and the last chapter. With the notion of constructionalization (Traugott and Trousdale (2013)), Section 8.7 examines whether the BECAUSE X construction is actually constructionalized or not, that is, whether we can treat it as a grammatical construction that exists in the constructicon. Section 8.8 summarizes the discussion in the present chapter.

8.2 Grammar of the new usage

In this section, I investigate syntactic and semantic characteristics of the new usage of *because*. The syntactic representation of the relevant part of sentence (1), *because homework*, may be illustrated as follows:

(3) *because* N

Given this representation, one could assume that the conjunction *because* has been converted into a preposition. The story is not so simple, however. First, not only nouns but words of a variety of syntactic categories may follow *because*, as exemplified in (4):

(4) a. [T]he hypothesis is not a scientific fact, **because unproven**. (GloWbE)[89]

b. That feeling you get when you finish an essay and you just want to cry **because yay**[.] (tweet cited in Carey (2013))

In (4a, b), the adjective *unproven* and the interjection *yay*, respectively, appear right after *because*. Such elements do not follow a preposition.[90]

Another argument against *because* as a preposition comes from the fact that, as McCulloch (2014) observes, pronouns do not or only rarely follow *because*,

89. Davies, Mark (2013) *Corpus of Global Web-Based English: 1.9 billion words from speakers in 20 countries (GloWbE)*. Available online at https://corpus.byu.edu/glowbe/.

90. See, however, Pullum (2014), who claims that *because*, regardless of the syntactic category following the word, is a preposition.

although other prepositions do not have such a restriction. Compare the following contrast:

(5) a. I can't go to the party with you. (McCulloch (2014))
b. ??I can't go to the party because you. (McCulloch (2014))

McCulloch considers the combination of a pronoun with prepositions in general fine (e.g., (5a)), but its combination with *because* "rather weird" (e.g., (5b)). The statistics that Schnoebelen (2014) provides supports McCulloch's intuition. Schnoebelen counts tweets involving this construction and groups all of the items that have 50 occurrences or more according to their parts of speech. The result is summarized in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 The grammatical categories that frequently appear in the BECAUSE X construction (Schnoebelen (2014))

Part of speech	Example	Rate
Noun	*homework*	32.02%
compressed clause	*yolo*	21.78%
adjective	*tired*	16.04%
interjection	*omg*	14.71%
agreement expression	*yeah*	12.97%
Pronoun	*you*	2.45%

Although pronouns may be used, the count is far lower than the counts for the other categories. Thus, *because* may be followed by words of various, but limited, syntactic categories, and it should be distinguished from other prepositions. Therefore, the syntactic representation in (3) should be revised as follows:

(6) *because* X (where X is a variable)

Let us now consider semantic aspects of the construction. As we saw in Section 2.4, Sweetser (1990) argues that the meaning of *because*, as well as other conjunctions, applies to the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains. The relevant examples of *because* used in these domains are repeated in (7a)–(7c):

(7) a. John came back because he loved her.
b. John loved her, because he came back.
c. What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on.
(Sweetser (1990: 77))

Interestingly, the survey I conducted suggests that *because* in the new usage seems not to be triply polysemous.[91] Observe the following examples:

(8) a. He came back because love. (1.71/3.00)[92]
b. I'm going to bed early because tired. (1.86/3.00)
c. He loved her, because back. (0.71/3.00)
d. [Looking at a wet ground] It's rained, because ground. (0.00/3.00)
e. What do you wanna do on our first evening, because Paris? (0.57/3.00)

Sentences (8a, b) are examples of content *because* X; (8c, d) are examples of epistemic *because* X; and (8e) is an example of speech-act *because* X. The low scores given to examples (8c)–(8e) in comparison with examples (8a, b) suggest that the construction cannot or can hardly be used in the epistemic and speech-act domains. In other words, the new usage of *because* is skewed toward the CAUSAL construction in meaning.[93]

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91. The survey was conducted in January 2014. I thank Black Grant, Jamie Grefe, and 22 anonymous respondents for kindly cooperating the survey. Special thanks are due to Ayako Ohara for distributing and collecting the questionnaire sheets.

92. Seven native speakers out of the 24 surveyed (ca. 30%) accept the usage with different degrees of acceptability. The scores at the end of the examples are average scores on a scale of 0 to 3 of acceptability by the seven respondents; the scores of those who do not accept the usage at all are eliminated from the calculation. Note also that whereas the construction is in use, it is not entrenched, or after introspection, many people still think it unnatural. In passing, we should note that the survey was conducted shortly after the announcement of the Word of the Year for 2013 from the ADS. The result might be different if a survey is conducted in future. Since, as Bohmann (2016: 161) observes, the construction is a "rapidly diffusing innovation", the use and usage of the construction may expand rapidly and accordingly the acceptability might vary in another survey.

93. Note that it is the subordinate conjunction *because* that is (equally) applicable to the three domains (Sweetser (1990); see Section 2.4). As we observed in Chapter 3, the preposition *because of* cannot be used in the epistemic and speech-act domains (e.g. Rutherford (1970)). Observe the following contrast:

(i) a. He's not coming to class because of his sickness. (Hirose (1992: 85))
b. *He's not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 105))
cf. He's not coming to class, because he has just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970: 97))

Unlike the subordinate conjunction *because*, the preposition *because of* is limited to the content domain in its use. Thus, it is not surprising the new usage of *because* is possible only

From the acceptability squish shown in (8a)–(8e), we may assume that the meaning of a *because* X expression is similar to that of the CAUSAL construction, but not to that of the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction. Thus, the form-meaning correspondence of the new usage of *because*, which I will henceforth call the *BECAUSE* X construction, may be illustrated as in Figure 8.1.



Figure 8.1 The *BECAUSE* X construction[94]

As defined in Figure 8.1, the *BECAUSE* X construction is the pairing of the form of C_2 *because* X (where X is a word of various categories) with the causal meaning. Therefore, the construction seems in essence the same as the CAUSAL construction, except the categories of the elements that follow *because*.

Recall that there are some grammatical phenomena sensitive to the difference between the CAUSAL and REASONING *BECAUSE* constructions. If the *BECAUSE* X construction is similar to the CAUSAL construction in meaning, the two constructions should behave alike. Two such construction-sensitive phenomena are available to assess the similarity. First, as with a causal *because*-clause, a *because* X phrase may appear in the sentence-initial position. Observe the following examples:

(9) a. **Because hurricane**, the city is a mess. (1.71/3.00)

b. **Because distance**, since we know how fast light travels, if we know how far away a star is, we can also tell how old it is by knowing how long it would have taken to get there. (COCA)[95]

The other diagnosis available here is the focalizablity of a *because*-clause by exclusives subjunctives such as *just*, *only*, *simply* (see Chapter 4). Observe the following examples:

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in the content domain; after all, it is a syntactically distinct element from the subordinate conjunction *because*.

94. The semantic representation "P_X" does not necessarily mean a proposition conveyed by the element X. A proposition is typically conveyed by a clause, not by a word. This semantic representation should be read as "a proposition conveyed by a clause invoked by the word represented as X". Relations between the clause and word will be discussed in Section 8.3.

95. Davies, Mark (2008-) *The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 560 million words, 1990-present*. Available online at https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/.

(10) a. He went to college just because his parents asked him to.
(adapted from Schorup and Waida (1988: 95))

b. *It has rained, just because the ground is wet. (Kanetani (2007b: 342))

As we argued in Chapter 4, a causal *because*-clause may be modified by exclusives, as in (10a), while a reasoning *because*-clause may not, as shown in (10b). Such exclusive subjunctives can focalize *because* X phrases. Observe the following attested examples:

(11) a. Living people bother you because angry. Ghost make trouble **only because sad, lost, contused**. (COCA)

b. If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then there is something gravely wrong with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so many refuse to follow the rules, or follow them **only because forced**. (GLoWbE)

The *because* X phrases in (11a), (11b) are focalized by the exclusive *only*. Thus, *because* X phrases are similar to causal *because*-clauses.

Now that it is clear that the *BECAUSE* X construction is comparable with the CAUSAL construction both in meaning and in syntactic behavior, these two constructions may well be related to each other by inheritance links. The next section will consider what kind of inheritance relations may be observed between them.

8.3 Inheritance relations

In this section, I claim that the *BECAUSE* X construction is a schematic construction and that the canonical *because*-clauses are specific instances of the elaboration of a word in the X-slot of the *BECAUSE* X construction. To describe the relationship of the *BECAUSE* X construction with the CAUSAL construction, an I_I-link and I_S-link are helpful. For ease of reference, I repeat their definitions in (12):

(12) a. An I_I-link is posited when a particular construction is a special case of another construction. (= (47a) of Chapter 2).

b. An I_S-link is posited when one construction is a proper subpart of another construction. (= (47c) of Chapter 2)

(N.B.: an I_I-link always entails an inverse I_S-link. (Goldberg 1995: 81))

With these notions, we may illustrate the inheritance relations between the *BECAUSE* X construction and the CAUSAL construction in Figure 8.2.



Figure 8.2 The inheritance relations between the *BECAUSE* X construction and the CAUSAL construction

The boxes in the upper part of Figure 8.2 represent the *BECAUSE* X constructions, differentiated from each other in terms of the configuration of the main clause and the *because* X phrase. By the same token, the lower left box represents the CAUSAL construction with a sentence-final *because*-clause; the lower right box that with a sentence-initial *because*-clause. The variable X in the *BECAUSE* X construction can be filled with a word of various kinds, such as a noun (e.g., *because homework*), an adjective (e.g. *because tired*), an interjection (e.g., *because yay*), etc. As indicated by the arrows between the upper and the lower boxes, the CAUSAL construction is an instance of the *BECAUSE* X construction; the latter construction is a proper subpart of the former. In the following subsections, I will take a closer look at the inheritance relations between these constructions.

8.3.1 Causal *because*-clauses as instances of *because* X

To see first that the CAUSAL construction instantiates the *BECAUSE* X construction, consider Example (1), repeated here as (13):

(13) I can't go out with you today **because homework**. (= (1))

In Section 8.1, I mentioned that this sentence is semantically similar to sentence (2), repeated here as (14):

(14) I can't go out with you today because I have a lot of homework. (= (2))

Note that in addition to (14), there are other potential clausal counterparts that may semantically correspond to the *because* X phrase in (13), such as those in (15a)–(15c):[96]

96. Of course, it is impossible to make an exhaustive list of the elaborated *because*-clauses; those listed in (15a)–(15c) are just a few examples of the huge number of elaborations of *because homework*.

(15) a. I can't go out with you today because my math homework is so hard that I'll take a lot of time.
b. I can't go out with you today because our teacher assigned a lot of homework.
c. I can't go out with you today because I have to finish my homework first.

In short, causal *because*-clauses, like *because I have a lot of homework*, elaborate what *because homework* tells; those clauses that follow *because* in (14) and (15a)–(15c) are all instances of the actual use of the word *homework* in (13). In this sense, we may consider the CAUSAL construction to be a special case of the *BECAUSE* X construction.

8.3.2 *Because* X as a proper subpart of causal *because*-clauses

In the previous subsection, I claimed that the *BECAUSE* X construction is an abstract and schematic construction, which the CAUSAL *because*-clause construction instantiates. As noted in (12) above, the Goldbergian instance link entails an inverse subpart link. Thus, the argument in the previous subsection entails that the *BECAUSE* X construction is a proper subpart of the CAUSAL construction. In this subsection, I support this claim.

To see that the *BECAUSE* X construction is a proper subpart of the CAUSAL construction, let us observe once again the sentences in (13) and (14). The formal subsumption of the former under the latter is fairly straightforward, as the same lexical item *homework* is shared in both constructs. Not only formally (morpho-syntactically) but also functionally (semantically), the former construction is subsumed under the latter. By saying *because homework* in (13), the speakers indicate that *homework* plays the most salient role in the proposition that they have a lot of homework, i.e., the speakers use the word to represent the whole clause that it is used in. In this sense, PART FOR WHOLE metonymy is at work; the word *homework* in (13) metonymically evokes the propositional contents that the clausal counterparts in (14) and (15a)–(15c) may convey. Likewise, by saying *because unproven* in (4a) above, the speaker evokes a clausal counterpart that contains the adjective as a subpart like *because it's unproven*. As well as those categories that appear in Table 8.1, Bohmann (2016: 160f.) also counts tweets with the *BECAUSE* X construction and observes that "finite reduced clauses (14%), often with a deleted subject" also frequently appear in the X-slot. The relation of a reduced clause and a non-reduced finite clause may be accounted for in the same way as above. Thus, as a first approximation, the *BECAUSE* X construction is both formally and functionally a proper subpart of the CAUSAL construction.

Thus far, I have claimed that the *BECAUSE* X construction is subsumed under the CAUSAL construction and the former instantiates the latter. These relations are

straightforward when it is a content word, such as a noun or adjective, that follows *because*. However, when an interjection or agreement word – another type of element that also frequently appears in the construction (see Table 8.1) – appears in the X-slot, it is not so easy to observe such relations. Unlike content words like *homework* or *unproven*, interjections like *yay* and agreement words like *yeah*, do not seem to be part of a proposition. Consider sentence (4b), repeated here as (16), for example:

(16) That feeling you get when you finish an essay and you just want to cry **because yay**[.] (= (4b))

It is difficult to imagine a specific clause that contains the interjection *yay* as its elaboration; and the same is true of another attested example with an interjection following *because* in (17):

(17) Admittedly, not in the UK yet, **because aargh**! (Twitter)

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary [8th edition] (OALD) gives the following definition of the word *yay*: "used to show that you are very pleased about something". The word *aargh* is "used to express fear, anger, or other strong emotion" (*OALD*). These dictionary definitions suggest that interjections merely express or show certain feelings on the part of the speaker. In fact, some reference grammar books treat interjections as such. Observe the descriptions in (18a)–(18c):

(18) Interjections are:

a. "purely emotive words" (Quirk et al. (1985: 853))

b. "serve to express emotion" (Trask (1993: 144))

c. "have expressive rather than propositional meaning" (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1361))

Based on the dictionary definitions and descriptions in (18a)–(18c), we can characterize interjections as words that merely "express" the speaker's emotion rather than "convey" propositional meanings. If the interjections are not part of a proposition, as I believe they are not, how then can we maintain the view of the *BECAUSE* X construction as a proper subpart of the CAUSAL construction? In what follows, I will argue that it is the hearer that interprets the *BECAUSE* X construction in this way.

8.4 Reconstruction of the message as the hearer's business

In this section, I propose that it is the hearer, not the speaker, who takes the word in the X-slot as a subpart of a corresponding clausal counterpart. To see this, let us first consider Padilla Cruz (2009), who investigates examples like (19):

(19) She is so beautiful that … oh!

In (19), the speaker replaces a subordinate clause by the interjection *oh*. He argues that "the hearer could recover the missing clause using contextual and/or encyclopedic information" (ibid.: 190–191). If one hears sentence (19) uttered, one will understand its meaning as something like (20a)–(20c), according to the context where the sentence is uttered or knowledge about when people generally use "oh".

(20) a. She is so beautiful that I like/love her.
b. She is so beautiful that I have fallen in love with her.
c. She is so beautiful that I would very much like to marry her.
(Padilla Cruz (2009: 190))

Crucially, it is hearers who understand the utterance in question based on such knowledge. Speakers do not consider such a thing; they only express their emotion. After all, as mentioned in the previous subsection, interjections merely express or show the speaker's emotion or feeling.

Just as the hearer of sentence (19) above recovers the missing clause, so the hearer of the BECAUSE X construction can reconstruct the proposition that the speaker has in mind. It is, therefore, the hearer who views a *because* X phrase as a subpart of a corresponding *because*-clause, and posits the inheritance links discussed in Section 8.3.[97] A question arises here: What then does the speaker do by simply saying, for example, *because homework* (in (1)), *because aargh* (in (4b)), etc.? In the following subsection, drawing on the notion of "private expression" proposed by Hirose (2000), I will give an answer to this question.

8.5 The X-Element as the speaker's thought-expression

To answer the question raised in the last subsection and to give an integrated account of the elements that can and cannot occur in the X-slot, I propose that a word in the X-slot functions as a private expression in Hirose's (2000) terms. Hirose distinguishes private expression acts from public expression acts. The former is "an act of linguistic expression with no intention of communication" (Hirose (2000: 1625)) while the latter is "an act of linguistic expression with the

97. Needless to say, the hearer and speaker change their roles as a conversation progresses. What I am suggesting here is that one posits the inheritance links while participating in a conversation as a hearer and that the network thus established may be stored as part of one's linguistic knowledge available for use when one is a speaker in turn.

intention of communication" (ibid.). Due to the lack of the speaker's intention of communication, private expressions correspond to "the non-communicative, thought-expressing, function of language" (ibid.: 1624). As an illustration, observe the following examples cited from Konno (2012):

(21) Hearing from Tom that Bronsky went to the party in a tuxedo,
a. Mary said "Him wear a tuxedo?!"
b. ??Mary told him "Him wear a tuxedo?!"
(Konno (2012: 28))

Konno (2015: 146) observes that "the Mad Magazine utterance *Him wear a tuxedo?!* can function as a direct speech complement to *say*, but not to *tell*", and this contrast shows that "the Mad Magazine construction functions exclusively as a private expression" (ibid.) (also cf. Akmajian (1984), Konno (2012)). Private expressions are thus used to express, rather than communicate, the speaker's thoughts.

With this distinction in mind, we can give an answer to the question of what the speaker does when he/she uses the BECAUSE X construction. The speaker embeds a private expression in a public expression. More specifically, the word in the X-slot functions as a private expression, while the construction as a whole may serve as a public expression, as illustrated in (22):

(22) $[_{\text{Pub}}$ *because* $<_{\text{Priv}}$ X$>]$[98]

Crucially, just because the expression in the X-slot is a private expression does not mean that the whole construction that contains it is not necessarily a public expression. Schnoebelen (2014) reports that 36% of the tweets involving the BECAUSE X construction are intended to interact with one or more other users, suggesting that "the construction skews towards 'interpersonal'".[99] That is, speakers of the BECAUSE X construction can have addressees in mind, even though the word in the X-slot (part of the whole construction) functions as a private expression. In the subsections that follow, I will discuss the mechanism of the frequent occurrence of interjections, nouns, adjectives, agreement words, and reduced clauses in the X-slot in accordance with the assumption that the word slotted in X functions as private expression.

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98. I use Hirose's (2000) notations of private expression represented in angle brackets with the subscript 'Priv' $<_{\text{Priv}}$ …> and public expression represented in square brackets with the subscript 'Pub' $[_{\text{Pub}}$ …].

99. Specifically, Schnoebelen thus considers those tweets involving @-signs "interpersonal", because this symbol is used when the tweet is aimed at a specific person or persons as a reply.

8.5.1 Interjections

As summarized in Table 8.1, Schnoebelen (2014) observes that interjections appear the third most frequently after nouns and adjectives (except compressed clauses) in the X-slot. Moreover, in Section 8.3, we characterized interjections as words that merely express the speaker's emotion rather than convey propositional meanings, and in this sense, they function as private expressions. The answer to the question as to why interjections are used frequently is thus as follows: Being private expressions, interjections fit the frame of the *BECAUSE* X construction.

Given that interjections are elements outside propositions conveyed by clauses, we can say that they do not constitute clauses in the way that nouns and adjectives do. The next question then to ask is how the hearer can reconstruct the message from the utterance as in (17), repeated here as in (23):

(23) Admittedly, not in the UK yet, **because aargh**! (= (17))

As with the cases observed in (19) above, upon hearing sentence (23) uttered, one will understand its meaning according to one's knowledge of when people generally use "aargh".

Thus, when using an interjection, speakers simply express their emotion; on the part of the hearer, the utterance may be reconstructed with aid of general knowledge of the word, such as when it is used. Therefore, the process from the speaker's utterance of the word *aargh* to the hearer's reconstruction of the hidden proposition may be described as in (24):

(24) The speaker's utterance: *aargh*
↓
The hearer's knowledge about *aargh*: "used to express fear, anger, or other strong emotion" (OALD)
↓
A proposition evoked on the part of the hearer: "The speaker is fearful of or angry at something."

What the speaker is fearful of or angry at is understood through the contextual information. In short, all the speaker has to do is to express his/her emotion or feeling; the hearer only has to understand what kind of emotion the original speaker expressed.

8.5.2 Nouns and adjectives

Let us turn to nouns and adjectives used in the *BECAUSE* X construction. As discussed in Section 8.3, a word in the X-slot is a proper subpart of a clause; the clause that follows *because* is understood as an elaboration of the word. According

to Cruse (2011: 267f.), the primary function of open-set items such as nouns and adjectives is "to carry the meaning of a sentence", and hence, they "typically carry the burden of the semantic content of utterances". Hence, nouns and adjectives constitute a clause in the way that we observed in Section 8.3.1.

Assuming that the word slotted in X serves as private expression, we can say that speakers subjectively choose from the proposition a word that is most salient to them at the time of the utterance. To support the idea that the nouns slotted in X are private expressions, let us consider restrictions on the nominal category that appears in the X-slot (cf. McCulloch (2012)). McCulloch (2012) observes that the *BECAUSE* X construction "really must consist of a bare noun, not a noun with a determiner or an adjective", so she considers the following examples ungrammatical:

(25) *I can't come out tonight because essay[sic.]/my essay/an essay/this essay.[100] (McCulloch (2012))

This fact is related to another restriction on the nominal category in the X-slot. As we saw in Section 8.2, McCulloch (2014) observes that *because* cannot be followed by a pronoun, as shown in (5b), repeated here as (26):

(26) ??I can't go to the party because you. (= (5b))

That is, pronouns are not (cf. McCulloch (2014)), or at most rarely (cf. Schnoebelen (2014)), used in the construction.[101]

These two restrictions on the nominals follow from the fact that the element in the X-slot is a private expression. Let us first consider why determiners are not compatible with the construction. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 253), "when used in discourse, noun phrases refer to the linguistic or situational context. The kind of reference a particular noun phrase has depends on its determinative element, i.e. the item which 'determines' it". The nominal that appears in the X-slot is a private expression, which has no intention of communication. Therefore, as

100. McCulloch's (2012) example contains the bare noun *essay*, which is, presumably, mistakenly included; otherwise she has misplaced *. What is important is that she *does* comment as quoted above.

101. Schnoebelen (2014) observes that pronouns do appear in the X-slot (see Table 8.1). For example, he counts 167 tokens of *because you* out of 23583 tweets (ca. 0.7%). Since the pronoun is a closed class category with a few members, the total number of occurrence may well be small. However, the category's closed status cannot solely account for the low frequency in the use of pronouns in the X-slot. Agreement word (e.g., *yeah*, *no*; see Section 8.5.3) also form a closed class with a few members, but words of this category appear far more frequently than the pronoun.

long as its intended reference is known to the speaker, it does not need determination in the sense of Quirk et al.

Next, why are pronouns incompatible with the construction? In terms of Hirose's (2000) dichotomy between private and public expressions, (English) personal pronouns are primarily defined as public expressions, which may be diverted to represent the private self (cf. Hirose (2000, 2015)). It is worthwhile quoting Benveniste (1971:224f.), who says, "consciousness of self is only possible when it is experienced by contrast. **I use *I* when I am speaking to someone who will be a *you* in my address**. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally *I* becomes *you* in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as *I*" (emphasis mine). In short, only relative to the others can a personal pronoun be defined and used. This makes personal pronouns not suitable to the X-slot, the slot that requires a private expression.

Another supporting argument for the view of personal pronouns as public expressions comes from inappropriate uses of personal pronouns by autistic children. Jordan (1989) reports that autistic children use proper names for self-reference, where the personal pronoun *I* should be used. Those with autism are known to have difficulties in social interaction and communication, and children with autism in particular, according to NICE (2013), frequently experience a range of cognitive and language problems, including difficulty in understanding other people.

In sum, among nominals, a bare noun, which is a constituent of a clause, appears in the X-slot as a private expression, but nominal categories considered public expressions, i.e., noun phrases with a determiner and pronouns, are not used in the construction.

To conclude this subsection, the content word in the X-slot is the most salient word to the speakers, who choose it subjectively at the time of utterance from the proposition that they have in mind. In this sense, those content words may be considered the speaker's subjective thought expressions. The hearers can reconstruct a full clause containing the word that they hear, which represents a proposition that the speaker may have in mind.

8.5.3 Agreement words

The third category that appears at a relatively high frequency, according to Schnoebelen (2014), is agreement words, e.g., *yeah*, *no*. Behind these words lie certain propositions. Agreement words such as *yes* or *yeah* endorse their truth, while disagreement words such as *no* assert their falsity. With these words, only the polarity of a propositional content is expressed with other details underspecified.

To support this claim, let us consider Nakau's (1994) hierarchical semantic model and observe the internal structure of a proposition. Nakau describes the structure of a proposition as follows:

(27) $[_{PROP4}$ POL $[_{PROP3}$ TNS $[_{PROP2}$ ASP $[_{PROP1}$ PRED (ARG_1, ARG_2, ….ARG_n)]]]] (adapted from Nakau (1994: 15))

As shown in (27), according to Nakau, there are four strata of propositions (PROP1-PROP4) (see also Section 2.5 for Nakau's proposals). The innermost level (PROP1), which Nakau calls "the core proposition," consists only of the combination of the predicate and its argument(s), over which propositional operators such as aspect, tense, and polarity, are added, yielding more complex, composite propositions (PROP2-PROP4). This model places the polarity operator, which defines the polarity of the proposition, in the outermost stratum. Thus, a proposition with polarity entails the existence of the rest of the structure, since it operates over PROP3, which is the composition of the core proposition and the propositional operators in the lower strata.

The word in the X-slot is a subjective, thought-expressing expression, so much so that the details of the proposition can be left unspecified as long as they are known to the speaker. In this sense, the agreement word that appears in the *BECAUSE* X construction may be understood as a semantic subpart of the proposition that the speaker has in mind. With the help of the contextual information, the hearer can reconstruct the underspecified proposition. Thus, the mechanism that works between the speaker's expressing and the hearer's construing the utterance is similar to that observed in Section 8.5.1 in some sense, and similar to the one observed in Section 8.5.2 in another. Like content words, the agreement word that appears in the X-slot of the construction is itself part of the proposition that the speaker has in mind. In the case of agreement words, however, the word slotted in X is a semantic subpart. As with interjections, contextual information is crucial for the hearer to understand a detailed proposition including the predicate and its arguments, since no content word to indicate them is specified.

8.5.4 Reduced clauses

Finally, let us consider what Bohmann (2016) calls reduced clauses, which also frequently appear in the X-slot of the *BECAUSE* X construction. Sentences of this type are exemplified in (28a), (28b):

(28) a. stomach ache **because laughing** lol

b. Those moments when you choose to eat a salad not because you want salad … but **because want croutons**.

(Twitter)

Hirose and Hasegawa (2010) observe that sentences of this type in English, which they call subject-less sentences, are frequently found in specific genres like diaries (cf. also Haegman and Ihsane (1999)).

(29) a. Ugh. ( ) completely exhausted.
b. ( ) V. pleased with self.
(Fielding (1996) *Bridget Jones's Diary*, cited in Hirose and Hasegawa (2010: 59))

In (29a), (29b), the subject pronoun *I* and the verb is deleted, represented by the parentheses. In addition, the reflexive pronoun in (29b), which should be *myself*, appears as *self*. Hirose and Hasegawa (2010: 67) point out that in special registers such as diaries which are not intended for communication to others, the speaker need not represent what he or she understands about him- or herself, and hence subjectification occurs. That is, subject-less sentences such as those in (29a, b) function as private expressions, sanctioned only in in special registers such as diaries. Given that, those reduced clauses in (28a, b) that follow *because* may also be considered to be private expression.

8.6 SUBJECT *BECAUSE* X construction

In Section 8.3, I posited the inheritance links between the *BECAUSE* X construction and the CAUSAL construction, viewing the latter construction as a special case of the former. Recall that the *because*-clause in the JB-X DM-Y construction, as in (30), is a causal one (see Chapter 7).

(30) Just because John is rich doesn't mean that he is happy (Hirose (1999: 598))

That is, *because* X phrases and subject *because*-clauses are both causal in meaning. This section considers the relation of the *BECAUSE* X construction with the JB-X DM-Y construction. Crucially, as discussed in Chapter 7, even though the construction conveys the meaning of inference denial, the meaning is directly encoded by the negated verbs of inference (e.g., *doesn't mean*) and the *because*-clause is a causal one.[102] The *because*-clause used in this construction is modified by an exclusive such as *just* and *simply* and precedes the main clause in the complex sentence structure with no semantic difference, as in (31):

(31) Just because John is rich, it doesn't mean that he's happy. (Hirose (1991: 25))

The focalization of a *because*-clause by *just* and its appearance in sentence-initial position both indicate that the *because*-clause in question is a causal one.

---

102. As Hirose (1991, 1999) notes, the verb is not restricted to *mean*, although it is used most frequently. He observes that other verbs of inference, such as *prove*, *guarantee*, the causative verb *make*, and the copula verb *be*, can also take a *because*-clause subject. For this, see Section 7.3.1.

In Chapter 7, I pointed out that the subject *because*-clause may be replaced by the prepositional phrase *because of* NP, and postulated the JBO-X DM-Y construction (e.g., (32)) as a product of an analogy.

(32) Just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan. (adapted from CNN trasncript)

The replicability of a *because*-clause and a *because of* phrase also indicates that the subject *because*-clause is a causal one. To account for the existence of the JBO-X DM-Y construction, I argued for the following analogy: What holds in the CAUSAL construction should also hold in the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction, and subsequently in the JB-X DM-Y construction.

In the present chapter, I have argued that the *BECAUSE* X construction instantiates the CAUSAL construction. In other words, the former is the schematic CAUSAL construction. Thus, the argument so far predicts that the subject position may be occupied by a *because* X phrase as well as a *because*-clause. This prediction is borne out:

(33) a. To what extent will court choose to apply its own laws? **Just because can doesn't mean** they will …don't have to.
(Bryan Sawyers, Workers' Compensation: Fall 2010. "Helping Injured Workers Help Themselves" [online document])

b. **Just because summer doesn't mean** you've always got to be wearing short sleeved tops.
(www.grabonestore.co.nz/fitted-sleeve-top-with-belt)

c. **Just because rich doesn't mean** that we don't have …
(simpsons.wikia.com/wiki/The_Mansion_Family/Quotes)

To distinguish it from the more prototypical JB-X DM-Y construction (e.g., (30)), I call the construction that exemplifies the constructs in (33a)–(33c) the SUBJECT *BECAUSE* X construction.

Given that a subject *because*-clause is a specific instance of a causal *because*-clause, we can, or should, expect sentences with a *because* X subject, as in (33a)–(33c), since the *BECAUSE* X construction is the schematic CAUSAL construction, as maintained in Section 8.3. The relevant part of the inheritance relations among the constructions may thus be illustrated as in Figure 8.3.[103]

As was discussed in Chapter 7, between the JB-X DM-Y construction and the CAUSAL construction is the INFERENCE DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction,

103. Details of inheritance relations from the CAUSAL construction to the JB-X DM-Y construction are omitted for the sake of simplicity of the argument. For the detailed inheritance relations, see Figure 7.2. See also Hirose (1999), based largely on which my argument is developed.



Figure 8.3 The inheritance relations from the *BECAUSE* X construction to the JB-X DM-Y construction via the SUBJECT *BECAUSE* X construction

a construction with the same meaning as the JB-X DM-Y construction but has a complex sentence structure (e.g., (31)). As indicated in Figure 8.3, the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction is a special case of the CAUSAL construction and subsumes under it the JB-X DM-Y construction (cf. also Hirose (1999)). By the same token, there should be a construction which may be called "the inference-denial *because* X construction" (i.e., a construction with the same semantic meaning as the subject *because* X construction and the configuration of [*Just because* X_{word}, *it doesn't mean* Y]). However, no attested example has been found, and therefore the alleged construction is parenthesized in Figure 8.3. This could be an accidental gap; or possibly I have not conducted a thorough enough search. Apart from this, significant findings indicated therein are (i) that the SUBJECT *BECAUSE* X construction *does* exist, and (ii) that the JB-X DM-Y construction is also treated as a special case of the SUBJECT *BECAUSE* X construction. These findings motivate the argument regarding the *BECAUSE* X construction in the present chapter and further supports the argument regarding the JB-X DM-Y construction in Chapter 7.

8.7 Toward constructionalization

8.7.1 Constructionalization and constructional changes

Up to this point, I have treated the *BECAUSE* X construction as a grammatical construction and thus printed its name in small capitals following the conventions

of the present volume. However, it is still questionable whether the construction has become a conventionalized form-meaning pairing, or a genuine construction in the system of English grammar. According to the survey I conducted in January 2014, about 30% of those studied accepted the use. Considering the fact that the word had just been selected the Word of the Year for 2013, we can see its use as a phenomenon that spread in the preceding few years and was still entering common recognition at the time of the survey (see fn. 92). To see whether the *BECAUSE* X construction has been conventionalized as a grammatical construction in the English language, this section examines the construction along with the notion of constructionalization (henceforth, cxzn) proposed by Traugott and Trousdale (2013).

Traugott and Trousdale define cxzn as "the creation of form_{new}-$\text{meaning}_{\text{new}}$ (combinations of) signs" (p. 22), which is distinguished from "a change affecting one internal dimension of a construction" (p. 26), or a constructional change (henceforth, CC). Crucially, cxzn is preceded by CCs, which they call "pre-cxzn CCs" and is also followed by another stage of CCs, called "post-cxzn CCs". Thus, a series of changes that constructions may undergo is summarized in (34), where the arrows "↓↓" stand for the feeding relationship:

(34) pre-cxzn CC
↓↓
cxzn
↓↓
post-cxzn CC (Traugott and Trousdale (2013: 28))

The stage of "pre-cxzn CC" involves pragmatic expansion, its semanticization, and/or form-meaning mismatches; after being constructionalized, a construction may undergo its collocational expansion, and/or morpho-phonological reduction, as "post-cxzn CCs" (Traugott and Trousdale (2013: 27f.)). These changes do not occur abruptly; they propose four micro-steps starting from (35a) toward cxzn, which occurs only at stage (35d):

(35) a. The hearer interprets a construct and analyzes it in a way that does not match the speaker's analysis. In this process a best fit to some feature of a node that is different from the speaker's is made.

b. The hearer who has created a tenuous link between the construct and a different part of the constructional network than was intended becomes a speaker and reuses the construct with the new link. At this stage, there is no new micro-construction because there is no conventionalized use.

c. Another hearer goes through a similar (but not necessarily the same) process. Such processes typically involve i) loosely associating an

> invited inference from a construct with the semantics of a construction that already exists in the constructional network, ii) preferring to use parts of the construct in a particular distributional niche, or iii) repeating part of a construct as a chunk. As a result, populations of speakers tacitly agree on a conventional relationship between the original form and a newly analyzed meaning. This leads to mismatch between the morphosyntax of the original construction and the new constructs. Because of the conventionalization we can say a constructional change has occurred, but there is still no new node in the network ….
>
> d. When morphosyntactic and semantic neoanalyses arising at step [(35c)] have been shared in population of speakers and a new conventional symbolic unit, hence a new micro construction (a new type-node), has been created.
>
> (Traugott and Trousdale (2013: 91f.))

8.7.2 Meaning pole revisited

Given the definitions of cxzn and CCs and steps toward cxzn, let us review the relevant arguments in Sections 8.2, 8.4, and 8.5, summarized in (36):

(36) a. The word *because* is directly followed by a word of certain grammatical categories.

b. The construction expresses a causal but not reasoning meaning.

c. The word in the X-slot serves as the speaker's private expression; it is the hearer who reconstructs the proposition denoting the cause situation that the speaker has in mind.

From (36a, b), we can say that the construction is a formally new construction, but semantically it is not new in that the construction expresses the same meaning as the CAUSAL construction with a *because*-clause or *because of* phrase. The finding in (36c) suggests that the construction is pragmatically distinct from the existing construction. As a functional piece of information, the pragmatic information in (36c) is considered to be represented somewhere in the meaning pole of the construction. How then should we treat the "meaning" of the *BECAUSE* X construction in relation with cxzn? Is the meaning new or not, since the pragmatic meaning is new while the semantic meaning is not?

Cappelle (2017) proposes the view of a construction as a tripartite structural unit. He points out that since "[certain] pragmatic information is conventionalized and therefore has to be learned and stored" (p. 143), "semantics and pragmatics should be treated as distinct levels of functional information" (p. 115) in such a way that they "can live peacefully side by side in a construction" (p. 145).

The BECAUSE X construction conveys pragmatic information that is considered conventionalized. As argued in Sections 8.4. and 8.5, the word slotted in X of this construction serves as a private expression (see (22)); the construction is considered as a speaker-oriented construction in that it violates the first part of the Maxim of Quantity, "make your contribution as informative as is required" (Grice (1975)). Thus, we may represent the structure of the form and meaning of the construction as follows:

(37) <form$_{new}$-semantics$_{not\text{-}new}$-pragmatics$_{new}$>

This representation makes it difficult to decisively conclude whether the meaning is a "new" one, which is paired with the new form to constructionalize the BECAUSE X construction.

8.7.3 Step-by-step changes

This subsection examines the BECAUSE X construction along with the steps in (35a)–(35d), in which, according to Traugott and Trousdale, cxzn occurs only at the final stage, (35d). I then argue that the BECAUSE X construction is undergoing pre-cxzn CCs (Kanetani (2018)).[104] At the first stage, called "innovation" (= (35a)), "the hearer interprets a construct and analyzes it in a way that does not match the speaker's analysis". As noted in (36c), the element in the X-slot of the BECAUSE X construction represents the speaker's private expression, from which the hearer reconstructs the proposition that the speaker has in mind. That is, the interpretation of the message conveyed by the construction is left to the hearer; in this sense, the hearer's interpretation and analysis of the construct may well be different than the speaker's. The speaker of (1), for instance, may intend to mean that *I have a lot of homework*, while the hearer may interpret it as *his homework is so hard*. However, this kind of interpretational difference is a trivial one, since the hearer still interprets the phrase *because homework* as a cause of the speaker not being able to go out with the hearer, as was originally intended. Thus, such an interpretational difference involves no neoanalysis in the way that, for instance, the Middle English phrase *a hep of stonys* 'a heap [= mound] of stones' does when it was interpreted in the unintended way as 'a large quantity of stones' and hence is associated with the QUANTIFIER construction, or "a different part of the constructional network" (= (35b)) (Traugott and Trousdale (2013: 52)). At this stage, therefore, the BECAUSE

104. If this is the case, *because* X sentences should be treated as constructs, and should not be generalized to the BECAUSE X construction, as I have done. Just to make the representation consistent, however, I use the term "BECAUSE X construction" to refer to the target sentences, printing it in small capitals.

X construction seems to be (correctly) associated with the CAUSAL construction, even though this correct or intended link is a tenuous one.

From the above discussion, the question arises of how the hearer can associate the novel type of expression with the construction that exists in his or her grammar. The interpretation of the *because* X phrase as a cause may be made possible by making use of the knowledge of a construction that exists, namely, the CAUSAL construction with *because of*. A sentence like (38) is entrenched in English:

(38) I cannot go out with you **because of my homework**.

The *because of* phrase in (38) is functionally comparable to *because homework* in (1). As discussed in the present volume, a *because of* phrase is used with the CAUSAL construction but not with the REASONING construction (also cf. Rutherford (1970) and Hirose (1992)). The phrase *my homework* in (38) brings to the hearer's mind a certain situation in which the speaker's homework prevents him or her from going out. In this way, a noun phrase that follows *because of* metonymically represents the cause situation. This is essentially the same as what the X-element does in the *BECAUSE* X construction when it is a noun. However, as the *because of* phrase has been constructionalized and hence is linked firmly with the CAUSAL construction, the hearer has no difficulty interpreting the meaning. Thus, I assume that as a first step, a hearer who hears "*because* N" creates a tenuous link to the CAUSAL construction with *because of*.

Notice that this assumption presupposes that the innovation first occurs with nouns. Although it is virtually impossible to identify the very first attested example of this construct, this possibility of development path is also suggested by McCulloch (2013), who also considers the origin of *because* X to be the *because of* phrase and provides a possible more specific source of the construction. She says, "a better explanation comes from an evolution of the meme 'because of reasons', which is derived from the final panel of Three Word Phrase comic #139", as shown in Figure 8.4.

Figure 8.4 Three Word Phrase comic #139 (http://threewordphrase.com/pardonme.htm)

McCulloch continues, "the phrase 'I want this because of reasons' became shortened to 'because of reasons' which could have been the source of 'because reasons'". Although the motivation of the phrase-shortening process is not clear,[105] this is exactly what is observed at stage (35c) of the pre-cxzn CC, in which people prefer to use parts of the construct or repeat part of a construct as a chunk. Thus, I assume the first stage of the development of the construction as follows:

(39) *because of* NP > *because* N

This assumption is also supported by the statistical preemptation or type frequency (Schnoebelen (2014) and Bohmann (2016)), which indicates that a noun is the most unmarked or prototypical element that appears in the X-slot.

Incidentally, this tendency is observed cross-linguistically. For example, Wessman (2017) observes that a similar use is emerging in Finnish, whose counterpart of *because* is the conjunction *koska*. She calls the use the KOSKA X construction and concludes that "the prototype of the *koska X* construction is *koska* + bare NP" exemplified in (40):

(40) En muista, koska kalja-Ø
NEG.1SG remember:CNG because beer-NOM
'I don't remember, because beer.' (Wessman (2017))

According to Wessman, the word *koska* requires a finite complement clause in standard Finnish, as with English *because*. Thus, just as in English, the innovative use of *koska* began with nouns in Finnish. It should be noted that the Finnish words corresponding to *because of* are *takia* and *vuoksi* (*The Standard Finnish-English English-Finnish Dictionary*), neither of which, unlike its English counterpart, seems to have any morphosyntactic relation with *koska*. In addition, they are not prepositions but postpositions. Given these facts, it is difficult to postulate a development path for the KOSKA X construction similar to that in (39). While leaving

105. It might be related to the phonological reduction that commonly accompanies the process of cxzn, or more generally grammaticalization (e.g., *be going to* > *be gonna* (cf. Hopper and Traugott (2003)). According to Traugott and Trousdale (2013: 92), however, the formal reduction may occur much later, after cxzn has completed. Besides this, there is no attested intermediate form such as *becausa homework*, which might be expected if *because* is a shortened form of *because of* (cf. *lot of* > *lotta*, *kind of* > *kinda*, etc.). This latter problem may not be so critical, if we do not assume this change from *because of* to *because* is a gradual one but actually is a "rapidly diffusing innovation", as Bohmann (2016: 161) notes. Even if, as McCulloch (2013) considers, *because* results from shortening of *because of*, we need to examine whether this is the same kind of reduction as is observed for *lotta* or *kinda*.

open the question of how the construction has developed in Finnish, we can see a cross-linguistic tendency of the innovation to begin with nouns.[106]

Returning to the *BECAUSE* X construction in English, the earliest stage of the development illustrated in (39) involves a crucial structural reanalysis, which allows the construction to accommodate a wide range of elements in its X-slot. As a complex preposition (cf. Williams (1981), Matsuyama (2001)), *because of* must be followed by a nominal category. However, once it has undergone the formal change in (39), the "novel" item *because* comes into existence in the language, whose category may be unspecified or unknown (e.g., Hopper and Traugott (2003: 16)). Put differently, the category status of the new item, that is, whether it is a preposition, subordinator, or something else, is not shared in the speech community of English. With no categorial restriction on its complement, therefore, the new form *because*

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106. As Wessman calls the phenomenon an "internet meme construction", this construction could have been brought into Finnish by borrowing the structure of the English *BECAUSE* X construction or similar constructions in other languages through the Internet, irrespective of their lexical and morphosyntactic structures. At present, however, I cannot conclusively identify the roots of the construction in Finnish.

Similar patterns have been observed in other languages, including Dutch as in (i) and German as in (ii):

(i) A: Ah! Was het leuk?
'Ah! Was it [= beach] fun?'
B: Wel OK, maar superdruk. **Want weekend**.
'Quite OK, but [it was] super busy, for weekend.'
(Bert Capplle (p.c.); cited from *Onze Taal* issue 83(9), September 2014, p. 232)

(ii) Und erst recht bei einem Verein wie dem Hamburger SV, der natürlich meint, für ihn gelten anderen Gesetze, **weil Geschichte und so**.
'And especially with a club like the Hamburg SV [a soccer team from Hamburg], that certainly believes that different rules apply for them, **because history and so on**.'
(Christoph Petermann (p.c.); cited from https://de.eurosport.yahoo.com/blogs/sigi-heinrich/oh--hamburg--zwischen-weltklasse-und-kreisklasse-062744962.html)

Bert Cappelle (p.c. in 2014) has suggested that the word *want* in Dutch is a coordinator, which corresponds to the English reason coordinator *for* rather than *because*. (Note also that *want* is not the Dutch counterpart of the English preposition *for*.) Cappelle also reported that *omdat*, which is a more comparable item to *because*, does not have this innovative use. Christoph Petermann (p.c. in 2015) considers the combination with *und so* 'and so on', as in (ii), to be common in this construction in German. Whereas innovations of similar kind *do* occur in other languages, details vary: The innovation may be observed in very limited contexts in German, and Dutch has selected *want* rather than *omdat* as the subject to the innovation. At this point, however, with no any statistical or descriptive evidence, it is not clear whether the innovative uses in these languages also started with the conjunctions subordinting a noun (phrase).

may be followed by a word of various categories to the extent that it can evoke a certain cause situation. Thus, the innovation begins with nouns, followed by the constructional extensions that sanction other categories, as illustrated in (41):

(41) *because of* NP > *because* N → *because* {A / Interjection / etc.}

The first part of (41) is identical to (39), showing the development of *because of* to *because*; the latter part shows the extension. Through this series of changes, a mismatch arises between the morphosyntax of the original construction, *because of* (NP), and the new constructs, *because* (X). Hence, by this phase, a CC has occurred, as mentioned in (35c).

At this stage, no matter what category appears in the X-slot, the hearer may connect the utterance he or she hears to the CAUSAL construction. However, the link is still a tenuous one and the *BECAUSE* X construction is not shared with large populations of people as a conventionalized form-meaning correspondence (as suggested by the result of the survey I conducted in January 2014 (see fn. 92; also cf. Kanetani (2015, 2018)). Hence, I conclude that the *BECAUSE* X construction is not constructionalized yet but is undergoing pre-constructionalization constructional changes around stage (35c).

A final comment about this conclusion concerns the inheritance links illustrated in Figure 8.2. Since inheritance links are by definition posited between *constructions*, the postulated inheritance links will be invalid if the new use of *because* is not constructionalized. It is true that the use is not shared completely across the speech community of English, and in this sense, it is not constructionalized, since by definition it is not until cxzn occurs that the newly created conventional symbolic unit is "shared in population of speakers" (cf. (35d)). At the same time, it is also true that there are a certain number of individuals who actually use this construction in certain contexts. Since those individuals can speak or write as well as understand the construction, they are assumed to have good knowledge of the construction. In fact, the grammaticality judgments presented in Section 8.2 are based on the intuitions of those who accept the construction (either McCulloch (2012, 2014) or the respondents to my survey). In other words, the *BECAUSE* X construction is represented in "small capitals" in these individuals. Therefore, the inheritance links in Figure 8.2 (also those in Figure 8.3) should be taken as representations of the knowledge of such individuals; they do not contradict the present conclusion.

8.8 Summary

In this chapter, I have investigated the new usage of *because*. First, I compared the new usage of *because* with its canonical usage and claimed that it conveys a

causal meaning. The investigation of the syntactic and semantic characteristics of the new usage of *because* lead to postulate the *BECAUSE* X construction, or the correspondence of the form of [*because* X (where X is a variable)] with the causal meaning. With this in mind, I also described how the *BECAUSE* X construction is related to the CAUSAL construction. The *BECAUSE* X construction is an abstract, schematic, construction compared to the CAUSAL (*because*-clause) construction, and the former construction exemplifies the latter as a set of possible elaborations of the word slotted in X in the former. As a natural consequence, the *BECAUSE* X construction is a proper subpart of the CAUSAL construction (cf. Goldberg (1995)). The view of the *BECAUSE* X construction as a schema of the CAUSAL construction is further enhanced by the fact that, as we observed in Section 8.6, the *BECAUSE* X construction may be used at the subject position, since as we argued in Chapter 7, the subject headed by *(just) because* is in general a causal one.

I also argued that the word in the X-slot of the *BECAUSE* X construction is either speaker's expressions of feelings (interjections) or part of a proposition that the speaker has in mind at the time of utterance (nouns, adjectives, agreement words, or reduced clauses). It is the speaker's thought-expressing intent that generalizes these elements slotted in X. As pointed out in Section 8.4, the hearer reconstructs and understands the speaker's private expression, and it is the hearer who first establishes the constructional network between the *BECAUSE* X construction and the CAUSAL construction in the way shown in Section 8.3. By repeating this process, the pattern is in the process of being conventionalized, but is not established as a grammatical construction, as argued in Section 8.7. Based on McCulloch's (2013) observation, I showed a possible path for this usage: The phrase *because of* NP first develops to *because* N, which further extends its use to *because* X. The first development is made possible by the use of parts of the construct (in this case, *because of reasons* (McCulloch (2013))) or the repetition of part of the construct as a chunk (see (35c)). This first development involves the word's morphosyntactic reanalysis, which allows for further extensions. At this point, however, it remains to be seen whether the development will continue and the *BECAUSE* X construction will finally become constructionalized in the English language.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

We are now in a position to conclude the overall argument. I started the discussion by setting the aims of the present volume as follows:

(1) a. to give an integrated account of conjunctions of reason within the framework of construction grammar;
b. to elucidate the nature of causal relation and reasoning process; and
c. to show the validity of the proposed analysis.

The first and second aims are intimately related, because in order to give an integrated (i.e. constructional) account, it is necessary to make clear what a causal relation and a reasoning process are like. In Chapter 3, postulating the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction, I analyzed the conjunctions of reason – *because*, *since*, and *for* – within the framework of construction grammar. First and foremost, I emphasized that the lexical item *because* is not itself polysemous, but that it is the different constructions in which it appears that makes it possible to intepret the word as semantically polysemous. That is, the conjunction *because* appears both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction, whereas *since* and *for* are used in the REASONING construction, but not in the CAUSAL construction. I thus put forward that both similarities and differences of the conjunctions at issue are best accounted for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves but by considering what constructions they participate in.

To generalize a causal relation and a reasoning process as constructions, we need to consider how we construe these meanings, since it is generally assumed that a construction grammar approach is required to be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction (e.g., Fillmore (1988), Fillmore et al. (1988), Goldberg (1995), Östman and Fried (2005), among many others). The most significant difference between the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions is the way in which each construction maps onto the units of speech act. Specifically, I put forward the idea that causal relation between a cause situation and result situation is stated in one speech act, while reasoning is a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two speech acts. As we discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.4, the difference in form of speech act units reflects the way we conceptualize the notions of cause and reason (cf. Hart and Honoré (1959), Bullock et al. (1982), and

Hasegawa (1996, 2015)). Crucially, a cause is directly perceivable and hence traceable in a causal chain so that a speaker can speak of a causal relation in a speech act unit. In contrast, since a reason (a motivation or intention) is not directly perceivable but requires the conceptualizer's inferences to identify it, the reason needs to be expressed separately. Hence, the causal meaning and the reasoning meaning may be represented schematically as follows:

(2) a. causal meaning: $[P_1 \rightarrow P_2]$
b. reasoning meaning: $[SA_1] \leftrightarrow [SA_2]$

The arrow in (2a) represents the causal relation between the propositions P_1 and P_2; the pair of brackets enclosing the causal relation indicates that it is understood as forming one unit of speech act as a whole. In (2b), on the other hand, the two speech acts SA_1 and SA_2 are put in separate sets of brackets, which means that they form independent speech act units; the left-right arrow indicates that such separate speech act units are related subjectively by the speaker. This general knowledge about causation and reasoning is reflected in our grammar, accounting for various phenomena such as the nominalization of causal *because*-clauses, the (non-)occurrence of speech act constructions of statement in subordinate clauses, etc. That is, the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction are not merely the unifications of the syntactic form and semantic meaning. The constructions also convey information as to what a causal relation and a reasoning process are like. Crucially, it is speech acts, not propositions, that are connected in the REASONING construction; hence, no element that does not count as performing a speech act appears either in the main clause or in the subordinate clause. Thus, prepositional phrases (e.g. **it has rained, {because of / since} the wet ground*), or *because* X expressions (e.g. **it has rained, because ground*) are ruled out in the REASONING construction.

The aim in (1c) above was achieved by applying the proposal to various phenomena. In what follows, I briefly summarize what we discussed in Chapters 4 through 8 and how we achieved the third aim of the book. First, Chapter 4 discussed the focalizability of *because* and *since*. Contrary to the description of previous studies that *because*-clauses can be focalized by focusing adverbs while *since*-clauses cannot, there are many counterexamples, as in (3a, b):

(3) a. It has rained, just because the ground is wet.
b. Wearing a different one every time she went out would be only natural, particularly since a sari does not have to be washed as frequently as a dress. (BNC)

I observed that causal *because*-clauses can be focalized both by exclusives (e.g., *just*, *simply*, *only*, and the like) and by particularizers (e.g., *especially*, *particularly*,

partly, and the like), whereas reasoning subordinating clauses, i.e. either *because*-clauses or *since*-clauses, can be focalized by particularizers but not by exclusives.[107] Thus, the following generalization can be gained: The CAUSAL construction allows both exclusives and particularizers to focalize its subordinate clause, while the REASONING construction allows only particularizers to do so. To gain this generalization, it is important to consider (i) the characteristics of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions mentioned above and (ii) the meanings of relevant focusing adverbs. Thus, the distinction between the CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction, as outlined in Chapter 3, plays a particularly important role in explaining the focalizability of reason subordinate clauses.

Next, Chapter 5 applies the proposed analysis to the corresponding constructions in Japanese. Contrasting the *because* constructions in English with the *kara* constructions in Japanese, this chapter showed that the construction grammar analysis of conjunctions of reason is valid not only in English but also in other languages (at least in Japanese). Causal and reasoning subordinate clauses in English and Japanese behave alike with respect to (i) the effect of the matrix question or negation on them, (ii) their performativity, (iii) their nominalizability, (iv) clefting, and (v) their focalizability by exclusives. In Chapters 3 and 4, their interactions with *because*-clauses are accounted for in terms of the characteristics of the CAUSAL and REASONING constructions. From the fact that *kara* constructions show similar behaviors to their English counterparts, I argued that similar mechanisms are involved in understanding and expressing causal relations and reasoning processes in these languages. Thus, I pointed out that CAUSAL constructions and REASONING constructions may be generalized across languages, showing the cross-linguistic validity of the proposed analysis. Generally, however, even comparable constructions vary in their specifics cross-linguistically, and language-specific specifications and restrictions are necessary (cf. Croft (2001), Boas (2010)). While emphasizing the similarities, I also pointed out a difference between the REASONING *KARA* construction and the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction based on the pragmatic-typological difference between the two languages proposed by Hirose (2015). Other language-specific pieces of information are also necessary to determine, for example, what lexical items are used (e.g., *because* vs. *kara*), how the constituents are aligned (e.g., *because* preceding the reason clause vs. *kara* following the reason clause), etc.

Chapter 6 dealt with the peculiarity of metalinguistic reason constructions in English. The E-*BECAUSE* construction, as in (4) , is similar to the CAUSAL

107. In discussing focalizations, *for* is not relevant and thus was excluded from the analysis, since, as I argued in Chapter 3, it is not a subordinator (cf. Haspelmath (1995)).

construction in one sense, while it is *superficially* similar to the REASONING construction in another:

(4) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. *Reputed*, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it. (Hirose (1992: 82))

I say "superficially" because the construction is related to the CAUSAL construction, but not to the REASONING construction. The E-*BECAUSE* construction, subsumed under the CAUSAL construction, inherits information from the CAUSAL construction, while bearing its own (i.e. non-inherited) information. The superficial similarity to the REASONING construction results from the fact that information of the latter type is incidentally reflected in the same behavior of a reasoning *because*-clause. A periphrastic metalinguistic reason sentence, like that in (5), is semantically the same as the corresponding E-*because* sentence in (4) .

(5) I say "reputed," because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it.

Viewing the phrase *I say* as a pragmatic marker that serves to activate the expression in the hearer, I treated the sentences in (4) and (5) as semantic equivalents that are pragmatically distinct. Two constructions are relevant for construct (5), namely, the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the *I SAY* construction (i.e. the pragmatic marker *I say* used specifically with the E-*BECAUSE* construction). The pragmatic marker *I say* allows for variants to the extent that the person and the tense may be altered, i.e., followed by the E-*BECAUSE* construction, phrases like *they say* or *I said* are considered the variants of the *I SAY* construction. Otherwise, sentences like (6) are causal sentences even though they are both syntactically and semantically similar to the E-*BECAUSE* construction preceded by the *I SAY* construction.

(6) The word "variable" is used because the pieces of information, the observations, vary from one person to the next.

In short, in considering metalinguistic reason sentences, the REASONING construction is not relevant. The E-*BECAUSE* construction, which may appear with the *I SAY* construction, is a subpart of the CAUSAL construction. Sentences like (6) are merely constructs of the CAUSAL construction.

In Chapter 7, I also demonstrated that the REASONING construction is not relevant in discussing the JB-X DM-Y construction, even though its meaning is inferential denial (Hirose (1991, 1999), Bender and Kathole (2001), Matsuyma (2001)). Based on the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, I argued that the JB-X DM-Y construction, exemplified in (7), is a proper subpart of a special instance of

the CAUSAL construction (cf. Hirose (1999)). That is, an inference-denial *because*-clause instantiates a causal *because*-clause.

(7) Just because he made a dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan.

A similar pattern, the JBO-X DM-Y construction, exemplified in (8), is not established as a grammatical construction in the system of English grammar but is nevertheless occasionally used. This contradicting status may be accounted for by analogy that what holds for the CAUSAL construction also holds for the JB-X DM-Y construction.[108]

(8) I mean, what happened is he signed a bill. It was a bad bill … I mean, **just because of his dumb mistake doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan**. (adapted from CNN transcripts)

Crucially, causal *because*-clauses, but not reasoning ones, may be replaced with *because of* NP (as discussed in Chapter 3). Based on this fact, one may consider an inference-denial *because*-clause replaceable with a *because of* phrase. In sum, unlike the JB-X DM-Y construction (e.g., (7)), which is entrenched and hence is listed in the English grammar (cf. Hirose (1991, 1999), Bender and Kathole (2001), Matsuyama (2001), Hilpert (2005)), the pattern exemplified in (8) is not a grammatical construction but a product of analogy.

From these discussions particularly those in Chapters 3, 6 and 7, it is clear that although *because* and *since* are both subordinators that introduce a reason clause, the conjunction *because* participates in a wider range of constructions than *since* does. For example, the conjunction used in the JB-X DM-Y construction and the E-*BECAUSE* construction is restricted to *because* and cannot be replaced with *since*, as shown in (9a, b):

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108. I compare the JB-X DM-Y construction with the CAUSAL construction here for the sake of simplicity. Strictly speaking, however, they are not directly comparable. The item comparable to the CAUSAL construction is the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction, as in (ia) below. In Chapter 7, I first compared these constructions, which accounts for the existence of the INFERENCE DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction, as in (ib). Then, the comparability of the JB-X DM-Y construction, on one hand, to the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction and the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE OF* construction, on the other, accounted for the existence of the JBO-X DM-Y construction. See Chapter 7, for details.

(i) a. Just because he made a dumb mistake, it doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan.
b. Just because of his dumb mistake, it doesn't mean you're going to have lights out in Manhattan.

(9) a. *Just since I am a linguist doesn't mean I speak many languages.
b. …assuming he's not getting that extension. **Assuming* since Burke isn't talking, except for his statement that Purdue will honor the final year of Keady's contract.

(adapted from Kanetani (2006a: 41))

Why are these patterns ruled out? Recall first that *because* participates both in the CAUSAL construction and in the REASONING construction while *since* is used only in the latter construction. Recall also that the JB-X DM-Y construction and the E-*BECAUSE* construction require their *because*-clauses to be causal ones, and that this information is inherited from the CAUSAL construction (cf. Chapters 6 and 7). The ungrammaticality of (9a, b) comes from the fact that the JB-X DM-Y construction and the E-*BECAUSE* construction are not connected with the REASONING construction family.

To the line-up of constructions with *because*, a new member has recently been added, namely, the *BECAUSE* X construction (e.g. (10a)). Chapter 8 observed that this new construction with *because* is a schematic construction which exemplifies the CAUSAL (*because*-clause) construction, as in (10b):

(10) a. I cannot go out with you today because homework.
b. I cannot go out with you today because I have a lot of homework.

The CAUSAL construction is thus considered a special case of the *BECAUSE* X construction, while the latter construction is regarded as a proper subpart of the former. The treatment of the *BECAUSE* X construction as a schematic CAUSAL construction, along with the discussion in Chapter 7, predicts the existence of the construction with a *because* X phrase appearing in the subject position of a verb of inference denial. It has been shown that this prediction is borne out:

(11) **Just because summer doesn't mean** you've always got to be wearing short sleeved tops. (www.grabonestore.co.nz/fitted-sleeve-top-with-belt)

In Chapter 7, I argued that the *because*-clause that appears in the JB-X DM-Y construction (e.g., *just because he's rich doesn't mean he is happy*) is a causal one. Therefore, we naturally expect that the *because*-clause in the JB-X DM-Y construction may be replaced with a *because* X phrase, which instantiates causal *because*-clauses; and indeed this is so, as shown in (11) . This also supports the idea that the *BECAUSE* X construction is a schematic construction over the CAUSAL construction, under which the JB-X DM-Y construction is subsumed. Another important claim regarding the *BECAUSE* X construction is that the word or phrase in the X-slot is characterized as the speaker's private expression to be transmitted to the hearer. It is the hearer who posits the inheritance links between the *BECAUSE* X construction and the CAUSAL construction.

In the belief that to elucidate the nature of a causal relation and a reasoning process is to know the constructions of such relations, I repeat the following claim: in a causal relation, a situation causes another outcome and people express it in a single speech act unit; in a reasoning process, the speaker (subjectively) connects two situations that may not necessarily be related in the real world, each of which is expressed as a separate speech act. This is compatible and mutually complementary with the view of the previous studies reviewed in Sections 2.4 (based on the domains of use) and 2.6 (based on the subjectivity of causal relations). For example, I have integrated into the reasoning process what Sweetser (1990) calls epistemic and speech-act causal relations; the notion of volitionality in terms of Pander Maat and Degand (2001) is concerned with the subjectivity (cf. also Pander Maat and Sanders (2000)). In their speaker-involvement scaler approach, Pander Maat and Degand postulate the following scale from the least subjective nonvolitional causal relation in (12a) to the most subjective speech-act relations in (12e, f):

(12) a. Nonvolitional causal relations
b. volitional causal relations
c. causality-based epistemic relations
d. Noncausal epistemic relations
e. speech-act relations (motivating a speech-act)
f. speech-act relations (paraphrasing and summarizing)

As Pander Maat and Degand show, the degree of subjectivity or volitionality may be so gradable, and we may be sensitive to such distinctions, but when it comes to the constructions with *because*, *since*, and *for*, what is important is whether the connection of the situations described is subjective (a reasoning process) or not (a causal relation). This general knowledge of causation and reasoning is paired with the form of each construction.

One may be skeptical of this simplified, dichotomous view because this looks rather "classical". The fine-grained distinction in terms of volitionality, as in (12), is a pragmatic alignment after the semantic distinction between the causal meaning and reasoning meaning is provided. That is, it is not necessarily stored in long-term memory but rather is something to be worked out (cf. Cappelle (2017)). The CAUSAL construction and the REASONING construction, as proposed in the present volume, are too abstract for such information to be attributed to. More specifically, the constructional forms available for each subordinating conjunction (except *for*, as a coordinator) are restricted to three patterns: sentence-final bound reason clauses, sentence-final free reason clauses, and sentence-initial bound reason clauses. It is impossible for each of the six patterns (two subordinators by three patterns) to correspond to one of the six different meanings in the

volitionality scale in (12) . Furthermore, since *since* is restricted to free configurations (cf. Sweetser (1990)), the possible patterns reduce to five. As argued in the present volume, such restrictions or parameters (free vs. bound, sentence-initial vs. sentence-final) are required naturally due to the meanings of each construction; hence, they are attributed to the syntactic specifications of the constructions. Thus, as far as relations connected by *because* and *since* are concerned, I take the different levels of speaker involvement as an issue of pragmatic adjustment, which is operationalized outside the constructions. One may argue that pragmatic information can and should be included in constructions (e.g., Cappelle (2017)). In fact, I did so in speaking of the difference of the sentence-initial *because*-clause from sentence-final (bound) *because*-clause. For now, I simply suggest that some pragmatic specifications can be included in constructions but others cannot. In particular, as generative engines, schematic constructions such as those in the thick boxes should be specified as little and as generally as possible.

In the first chapter, I mentioned that the present study makes much use of the constructionists' "philosophy" and introduced the principles and theoretical tenets that a constructionist approach should conform to (cf. Croft and Cruse (2004), Östman and Fried (2005)). Constructionist approaches in general assume that form-meaning pairings stored as such organize a network, and it is the network that constitutes our linguistic knowledge (e.g. Goldberg (2003), Hilpert (2014)). With these points in mind, we can describe the network of the constructions discussed in the book as in Figure 9.1 (with some minor details omitted).



Figure 9.1 Summary of the relations among the constructions

Within this network, the CAUSAL construction, REASONING construction, and *BECAUSE* X construction have more than one form, and they are best generalized as families of constructions, as represented by the dashed squares (cf. Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004)). Of the three constructional families, the REASONING construction accommodates various conjunctions. Crucially, the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction is a metaphorical extension of the CAUSAL construction, i.e., the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction is also a kind of peripheral construction. In Fillmore et al.'s (1988) terms, we can treat the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction as an idiom made up of familiar pieces familiarly arranged. Thus, unlike the standard view of the reasoning use of *because* being as basic as its causal use within the English grammar (e.g., Jespersen (1949)), the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction is not such a basic, but rather is actually an idiomatic, construction. This is not so outrageous a claim given the lexical meaning and the etymology of *because* (< ME *bi cause* 'by cause'). In sum, just because two finite clauses are connected by the typical subordinating conjunction *because*, that is, just because familiar pieces are arranged in a familiar way, does not mean that it meets the norms of the grammar. In other words, the reasoning sense cannot be worked out simply by summing the meanings of the constructional constituents, but rather, such a meaning is paired with the arrangement of the constituents (including the comma intonation).

It is more obvious that the E-*BECAUSE* construction and the JB-X DM-Y construction, as familiar pieces unfamiliarly arranged, are idiomatic constructions in the English language. Because of their idiomaticity, these constructions have attracted the attention of many researchers and they have been discussed in depth (e.g., Hirose (1991, 1992, 1999), Bender and Kathol (2001), Matsuyama (2001), Hilpert (2005), McCulloch (2012, 2014), Bohmann (2016), etc.). In fact, Fillmore (2013: 111) reminiscently puts it, "in courses taught by Paul Kay, George Lakoff, and Charles Fillmore, student research papers tended to examine selected 'noncompositional' grammatical patterns and explore their constraints and range of variation". Among such "'noncompositional' grammatical patterns" is the JB-X DM-Y construction. The noncompositionality of the E-*BECAUSE* construction was also discussed in Chapter 6. However, what is more important is that such idiomatic constructions and more familiar constructions may be accounted for on the same ground. Fillmore notes as follows:

> A course taught by Kay and Fillmore tried to correct an emerging view that what constructionists studied were randomly collected linguistic marginalia independent of, or at best parasitic on, the real grammar. We tried to show that the same analytic tools account for both most basic structures and these 'special' cases. (p. 112).

The importance of accounting for the "core" as well as "peripheral" part of the grammar had already been pointed out as early as the dawn of construction grammar theory. On the Berkeley Construction Grammar website, it is noted that "studying what is idiomatic in a given language is the other side of the coin of studying what is general in that language". Likewise, in their seminal study, Fillmore et al. (1988) put special emphasis on the importance of generalizing explanations, saying that "the machinery needed for describing the so-called minor or peripheral constructions … will have to be powerful enough to be generalized to more familiar structures …" (p. 534). These arguments confirm our treatment of even a regular syntactic and semantic pattern in the English language, e.g., the CAUSAL construction, as a grammatical construction.

The discussion throughout the present volume suggests that the generalization of the regular pattern is necessary to account for the more peripheral constructions. As I reviewed above, *because*-clauses used in these "peripheral" constructions with *because* are causal ones; this fact is represented in the diagram in Figure 9.1. Viewed from the most basic CAUSAL construction, we can treat the REASONING *BECAUSE* construction as a metaphorical extension; the E-*BECAUSE* construction as its subpart; and the INFERENCE-DENIAL *BECAUSE*-CLAUSE construction as its special instance. Thus, by describing specific constructions, I have emphasized the relationship between our general knowledge about causation and reasoning, on the one hand, and the grammatical patterns as its reflection, on the other. Also returning to the original philosophy of construction grammar theory, I put forward the advantage of construction grammar that it can treat both peripheral and core phenomena on the same ground.

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Construction index

Subject index

Causation and reasoning are different but related types of relationships. Both causal relations and reasoning processes may be expressed with one and the same connective word in some languages: English speakers use *because* and Japanese speakers use *kara*. How then are causation and reasoning processes related to and different from each other? How do we construe and encode them? How is *because* different from other conjunctions with similar meanings?

To account for these and related empirical questions, this book presents an integrated analysis in accordance with the original principles of Construction Grammar. In particular, the book shows that the analysis proposed is compatible with our general knowledge about causation and reasoning and that it is valid for English and Japanese. The proposed analysis is also comprehensively applicable to a variety of related phenomena, ranging from the *just because* X *doesn't mean* Y construction to the innovative and less known *because* X construction.

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