GANDHI'S THOUGHT AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

SANJAY LAL

Gandhi's Thought and Liberal Democracy

Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion

Series Editor: Douglas Allen, University of Maine

This series explores important intersections within and between the disciplines of religious studies and philosophy. These original studies will emphasize, in particular, aspects of contemporary and classical Asian philosophy and its relationship to Western thought. We welcome a wide variety of manuscript submissions, especially works exhibiting highly focused research and theoretical innovation.

Recent Titles in This Series

Gandhi's Thought and Liberal Democracy, by Sanjay Lal
Plantingian Religious Epistemology and World Religions: Prospects and Problems, by Erik Baldwin and Tyler Dalton McNabb
Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa, by Ethan Mills
Dharma and Halacha: Comparative Studies in Hindu-Jewish Philosophy and Religion, edited by Ithamar Theodor and Yudit Kornberg Greenberg
Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time, by Alexus McLeod
Making Space for Knowing: A Capacious Approach to Comparative Epistemology, by Aaron B. Creller
Postmodern Ethics, Emptiness, Literature: Encounter between East and West, by Jaeseong Lee
The Metaphysics of Kindness: Comparative Studies in Religious Meta-Ethics, by Asher Walden
Fortune and the Dao: A Comparative Study of Machiavelli, the Daodejing, and the Han Feizi, by Jason P. Blahuta
Metaphor and Metaphilosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play, and Aesthetic Experience, by Sarah A. Mattice

Gandhi's Thought and Liberal Democracy

Sanjay Lal

LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Includes bibliographic references and index.
ISBN 9781498586528 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 9781498586535 (electronic)

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Introduction

Given the multitudes of voluminous writings that Gandhi's life and thought have continually inspired since he began his fateful experiments with truth and nonviolence, it is not unfair to ask what purpose can be served by another book on the Mahatma's philosophy. As one who is convinced, however, that we can never finish saying all that can be said on Gandhian thought I hold that our world is in need of even more works in this rich and always timely field. Indeed, after more than seven decades since his assassination my research on Gandhi has convinced me that we have largely only scratched the surface on grasping the Mahatma's vital insights for humanity.

So much of the Gandhi literature leaves the reader with the impression that though these insights are profound and relevant they cannot realistically be pursued in the present world (at least to much effect). Underscoring this impression is the reality of present day India—a place which clearly exists as a pale reflection of what Gandhi envisioned. In this regard, given Gandhi's own philosophical anarchist tendencies a project like mine may seem all the more challenging since I seek to explicate the Mahatma's political philosophy in ways that can flesh out its relevance for our world today.

Furthermore, much of the available literature on Gandhi has tended to discount the philosophical depth of his thought. Thus, reading it can easily engender the impression that Gandhi should be classified as hopelessly naïve and even wildly romantic.

It is my hope that this work can do much to advance the notion that Gandhi's insights are ultimately neither impractical nor simplistic. It is true that the Mahatma's every day practices typically exemplified both ascetic and saintly qualities that can be said to be beyond the reach of most of us. Likewise, there is no doubt that Gandhi had little patience for abstract theorizing that is divorced from everyday life and that cannot be understood by the

masses. For me these are facts however that are indicative of just how genuinely valuable Gandhi's contributions are for the world. The ideals exemplified by the Mahatma's life are guides by which our own social progress can be more clearly measured. What's more is that Gandhi's demonstrated ability to effectively communicate profound ideas to great masses of humanity can be seen as a model by which professional academics can better pursue endeavors to advance public philosophy.

In what follows, I will specifically discuss Gandhi's ideas within the context of their relevance for liberal democracy. In recent times the challenges posed to western societies in regard to the pursuit of liberal values have become well known. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that world events over the last few years (e.g., seriously unexpected election results, the rise of right wing nationalism, the strains produced by economic inequality), should lead us to wonder about the future prospects for liberalism. Though it can be questioned whether Gandhi as a political thinker can be accurately classified among liberals, it is clear that he shares many central concerns with them. As we will see in greater detail fundamental liberal values like equality, liberty for the individual, and the right of conscience are at the heart of Gandhi's social reform efforts. Furthermore, his attempts to unify India amid the caste and community conflicts of his time clearly involved efforts that can be seen as congruent with political liberalism. Thus, his proposals for society have direct relevance for the successful realization of certain core liberal values (specifically those related to honoring the place of the individual). Additionally, it can be said that within the world as we presently find it liberal societies come closest to embodying Gandhian principles within their structures and institutions in a way that impacts the most people. Compared to earlier periods of history, it is indeed noteworthy that violence has largely and dramatically decreased among and within the populations of those societies formed since the Enlightenment period (which gave rise to liberalism). Thus, we can plausibly think that it is by working to enable these societies to better reach their professed ideals we are doing what, in current times, is most practically viable for bringing about a world that is truly in line with the values Gandhi promoted. Above all, I maintain that even if Gandhi cannot really be thought of as a political liberal his affirmation of and understanding of certain core liberal values is worthy of serious consideration by all who concerned about liberalism's future prospects.

Liberal states are often associated by many of us with violence. Indeed, Gandhi's own criticisms of modern governments seemingly underscore this association. I, however, do not see any reason to suppose liberalism (as a political theory), is necessarily tied to violence. Instead, I maintain (and interpret Gandhi to hold), it is more accurate to think that the lack of proactive steps taken by modern societies to advance nonviolence has enabled a kind of social void to form that we have allowed to be filled by institutions

connected with violence. Let us consider, for example, that in liberal societies the state does not actively promote a common and universal religious identity among the citizenry. Thus, in such places war becomes a common means for engendering a shared sense of community and for providing a mechanism by which certain moral virtues (which are also integral to developing a nonviolent populace) can be developed. It is my hope that the arguments in this work will better illuminate these points.

In chapter 1, I give an overview of Gandhi's thought—particularly the philosophical presuppositions that I see to be implicit in his conclusions. This chapter is meant to provide a contextual framework for the remainder of this work and is largely addressed to those with no previous background in Gandhian studies. In chapter 2, I relate Gandhi's well-known critiques of modern society to matters pertinent to the present state of liberalism. I specifically aim to clarify the unique challenges Gandhi's emphasis on nonviolence presents to liberals. I show that it is by explicitly emphasizing nonviolence as essential to democracy can we see what is perhaps Gandhi's most provocative recommendation to liberals—that religious belief must be included in government activities. As we will see, Gandhi regards ethics and religion to ultimately be inseparable from one another. This conclusion has serious implications for the development of nonviolent qualities within the citizenry. Without citizens who have such qualities Gandhi sees little hope for the liberal project. Furthermore, since Gandhi considers engagement with the world to be integral to true spiritual growth I argue that to the Mahatma inclusion of religion within government activities is ultimately to the benefit of religious communities, and not just the State, by enabling these communities to themselves better affirm liberal values.

In chapter 3, I directly focus on exploring modern day understandings of individual freedom from a Gandhian perspective. This discussion will help to clarify Gandhi's notion of religion since for him developing the nonviolent qualities that he sees all the great religious traditions to emphasize at their core is necessary for the individual to genuinely be free.

My discussion in chapter 3 sets the stage for better illuminating just how Gandhi understands religion. In chapter 4 not only do I focus on this issue but I also show how Gandhian religion is both compatible with and conducive to the aims of liberalism. In this chapter, I address some well-known liberal concerns regarding mixing religion and government and show that not only is Gandhi's conception of religion able to overcome these concerns but that inclusion of such a religious understanding (when publicly incorporated) can better enable the realization of liberal values than standard attempts to maintain government neutrality toward religious beliefs.

In chapter 5, I draw out some of the practical implications that follow from Gandhi's recommendations. Given how present day realities sharply contrast with Gandhi's lofty visions and ideals, in this chapter I specifically

place my attention on concrete steps that can be taken now by present day members of those societies deemed liberal. As we will see, inclusion of religion in state attempts to advance multi-culturalism and within the educational curriculum will be central to this discussion.

My final chapter is devoted to explicating how the vaunted liberal notion of rights should be understood by one who takes a Gandhian perspective. In this chapter I elaborate on the ways Gandhi relates rights to duties and how we can see this connection is further tied to the practice of nonviolence—which, to reiterate, he sees as essential for successful fulfillment of anything like the liberal project. Since it is plausible to think that an emphasis on the rights of the individual is the distinguishing feature of liberalism and since many of Gandhi's recommendations that I will discuss are directly relevant to particular understandings of what our rights are, chapter 6 will help to better situate my arguments within the context of broader discussions within political philosophy. Moreover, given the apparent tension between certain positions and practices adopted by Gandhi and those that are taken to be implied by liberal freedoms my final chapter seeks to further resolve concerns over whether Gandhian thought is the right place for liberals to seek guidance.

CARVING THIS PROJECT'S PLACE IN THE LITERATURE

Ultimately, I seek to show the resources Gandhi offers by which political liberals can more successfully realize their aims. Thus, my work here, in some clear ways at least, can be seen to offer a counter point to Anuradha Veeravalli[1] and others who cast the modern age as inherently antithetical to Gandhi's philosophy. Additionally, the thrust of my arguments here differ from other attempts[2] to show consistency between Gandhian philosophy and dominant Western thought insofar as I will seek to demonstrate such consistency in a way that is free of assumptions that can plausibly be criticized as culturally relative. I hope to supplement important work done by Vinit Haksar[3] and Nicholas Gier[4] by considering Gandhi's political thought in relation to liberalism. It is my intention however to offer an analysis with a scope that is significantly broader than one focused primarily on matters of civil disobedience. Furthermore, even though Gier directly explores Gandhian thought within the broader context of modern liberalism, unlike Gier, I aim to show how Gandhi's recommendations need not be thought to clash with what is taken to be standard Hindu (Vedanta) philosophy. Additionally, I will openly consider liberalism from a critical lens (one Gandhi provides) rather than write from a standpoint which assumes that modern liberal societies are largely in line with Gandhian understandings. What's more, unlike other

explications of Gandhi's religious ethics,[5] I will explicitly seek to show how the system of ethics the Mahatma advocates can be successfully adopted by modern liberal societies.

Roughly over the last 120 years (since the time his life and works first began to significantly impact the world) there has really been no slowdown on the vast production of writings on Mahatma Gandhi. It is hoped that this work can stand out within such a literary plethora both by its overt focus on problems distinctly relevant to present times (and thus the subsequent course of history) and by its strong emphasis on the practical aspects of Gandhian thought. Ultimately, I aim to give a unique validation to the claim that Gandhi never stops speaking to us.

NOTES

1. Anuradha Veeravalli, *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2014).
2. Richard Sorabji, *Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
3. Vinit Haksar, *Rights, Communities, and Civil Disobedience: Liberalism and Gandhi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
4. Nicholas Gier, "Nonviolence as a Civic Virtue" in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2008), 121–ff.
5. Anthony Parel, *Gandhi's Philosophy and the Quest for Harmony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also Joseph Prabhu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics" in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2008), 163–ff.

Chapter One

Overview of Gandhian Thought

In this chapter I will provide a general overview of Gandhi's thought. This discussion is intended to provide a contextual background by which we can better understand the basis for Gandhi's recommendations as they relate to social and political philosophy. More specifically, I will define what I take to be the most significant elements of the Mahatma's philosophy and show their relation to one another. This chapter is primarily meant to give philosophically minded readers who are not already familiar with Gandhian thought a framework by which to make better sense of my arguments in subsequent chapters.

TRUTH: THE ULTIMATE END

The ultimate aim of all Gandhi's action was the realization of truth, as he indicates by the title of his autobiography—*The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Gandhi stated in 1936, "I was not so much a votary of ahimsa (nonviolence) as I was of truth, and I put the latter in the first place and the former in the second."[1] It is abundantly clear from his words and actions that the Mahatma saw all of his life activities (be they political, social, personal, or economic) to be centered around the goal of truth. Everything, in other words, served as a means to truth. Understanding this will help us to detect a unity and consistency in Gandhi's thought.

TRUTH IS GOD

In the introduction to Gandhi's autobiography we read:

> What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain Moksha. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end.[2]

Gandhi's identification of truth with God implies that seeing God face to face is the same as realizing truth: "For me, truth is the sovereign principle which includes numerous other principles. This truth is not only truthfulness in word, but truthfulness in thought also, and not only the relative truth of our conception, but the Absolute Truth, the Eternal Principle, that is God."[3] Gandhi discusses, in *My Religion*,[4] the transformation that led him from his early view that God is truth to his famous conclusion that truth is God. He is drawn to the latter view on the grounds that while the objective validity of the concept of God may be doubted and denied, the objective validity of the concept of truth cannot be denied without, at the very least, acknowledging it.[5] How some realists understand truth is quantitatively identical to Gandhi's idea of God. For the Mahatma, truth is identical with (as opposed to a kind of correspondence with) reality (sat). Indeed it is the only reality and thus God is synonymous with ultimate (objective) reality (an idea similar to those of prominent Christian thinkers like Paul Tillich and St. Augustine). It is the truth concept, not the God one, which is given the most prominence by the Mahatma. Thus we can see a distinctive quality in Gandhi's religious thought that went beyond simply making the God concept palatable to atheists.

For Gandhi, God is affirmed even in the unbelief of the atheist. For in denying the reality of God, the atheist is affirming how things appear to him and thereby affirming (at least a relative) truth. We will soon see that for the Mahatma a relative truth is what one believes to be true at the moment. Gandhi stated in a 1931 lecture to atheists in Lausanne:

> (Not) even atheists have denied the necessity or power of Truth. Not only so. In their passion for discovering the truth they have not hesitated even to deny the very existence of God—from their own point of view rightly. And it was because of their reasoning that I saw that I was not going to say "God is Truth" but "Truth is God."[6]

Elsewhere we read, "God is the Denial of the atheist. . . . He is even the atheism of the atheist."[7] By denying the objective validity of truth, the skeptic, after all and if nothing else, is conceiving an objective reality that truth claims are measured against. We are able to tell whether a truth claim can be doubted or denied because a criterion and conception of objectivity exists (independently of our wishes). As some moral realists have argued,[8] skepticism is self-refuting not so much because it asserts a truth when attempting to deny all truth but because it appeals to external standards and conceptions of

which we must have knowledge before we can feel its force. We can, for example, criticize a mother's defense of her child's behavior for being clouded with subjective emotion because we can imagine a mother in a similar situation not allowing such subjectivity to influence her judgment. We know (if only intuitively) what would have to be the case in order for a completely subjective judgment to be objectively valid. Such knowledge itself qualifies as objectively valid and thus acknowledges the objective reality of truth.

Moreover, that Gandhi equates truth with reality (sat) bolsters his views.[9] Only the most committed anti-realists deny the existence of anything. Gandhi's identification of truth with reality is indicated by his contention that truth is the only reality.

As noted above, Gandhi seems to understand relative truth as that which is believed by the individual. "The definition of Truth is deposited in every human heart. Truth is that which you believe to be true at this moment, and that is your God."[10] Gandhi's words here indicate a relativistic mindset toward truth. However, the Mahatma steadfastly affirms, throughout his writings, the objective reality of absolute truth. "(W)hat appear to be different truths are like the countless and apparently different leaves of the same tree."[11] Divergence of understanding results from differences in perception, not opinion, given the many aspects of truth.[12] Differences of opinion arise as a part of divergences of understanding and as a result of differences in perception. While Gandhi obviously thinks that some opinions are wrong, for him the real problem with wrong opinions is related to our common tendency of mistaking relative truth for the absolute (a form of dogmatism) and from departing from the only path (nonviolence) by which he claims fuller understandings of truth can be realized. Later I will flesh out the implications these points have for the justifications liberals commonly offer for their understanding of freedom.

To Gandhi, we perceive different aspects of the same ultimate reality, not different realities. It is when we erroneously regard the aspects of reality we perceive as being complete and proceed to coercively impose those perceptions on others (a form of violence) that untruth arises (e.g., others are compelled to act in ways that go against their own perceptions [truths]). Such is indicated by Gandhi's claim that "Where there is honest effort"[13] the seemingly different truths will be seen as analogous to the leaves of the same tree referred to above. Ultimately, the relativity of our perceptions of the Absolute shows the way to conflict resolution. An astute understanding of the different, fragmentary perceptions of truth reveals a united whole. Hence Gandhi's statements, "I very much like this doctrine of the manyness of reality. It is this doctrine which has taught me to judge a Musalman from his own standpoint and a Christian from his."[14]

Absolute truth, for Gandhi, is ultimately indefinable and cannot be fully realized while existing in a body:

> It is impossible for us to realize perfect Truth so long as we are imprisoned in the mortal frame. We cannot, through the instrumentality of this ephemeral body, see face to face Truth which is eternal.[15]

Gandhi seemingly accepts the traditional eastern view (which has included Socratic thinkers, among other westerns, as its subscribers) that the body always distorts and limits one's perceptions (to whatever extent) as one with bodily existence cannot be completely free of attachments. Indeed, as we will see, this aspect of Gandhian philosophy is implicit in his criticisms of modern civilization (the civilization that present day liberal societies clearly exemplify). Particularly, in chapter 3, I will discuss Gandhi's laments of a civilization that makes the acquisition of material comforts its main priority as well as one which institutionally perpetuates the fear of death. We can understand Gandhi's philosophical advocacy of detachment from bodily existence to underlie these laments.

The above statements from *My Religion* indicate, however, the relative truths (what we perceive and understand in everyday life) are incorporated by the sovereign principle which is Absolute truth. To Gandhi this is the case since the former truths presuppose, and can only be understood in light of, the latter.[16]

While one with bodily existence cannot fully realize truth, it dwells in all completely. Gandhi finds evidence of this in what he sees to be a universal moral conscience. "There is an inmost center of us all, where Truth abides in fullness. Every wrong-doer knows within himself that he is doing wrong."[17] By asserting this, Gandhi does not so much mean that within all of us knowledge of all facts are contained, but that the active, cosmic spirit which is truth (God) dwells fully in all as (among other things) a detached observer of our actions. The existence of psychopaths notwithstanding, the presence of moral sentiments among normally functioning humans lends credence to Gandhi's view here. Minds without a moral conscience are defective, for whatever reason, (and those possessing such minds may be all the more alienated from the Ultimate truth within). Gandhi's abiding faith in humanity which led him to see even the hardest of hearts as capable of conversion underscores his belief that truth dwells within all. Remembering these points will be particularly helpful later when we consider Gandhian thought as it relates to handling value conflicts within society.

Since one cannot realize Absolute truth in this life, for Gandhi the relative truths of everyday life are our only guides for advancing on the path to God-realization. Such realization entails experiencing (not just becoming aware of) an absolute oneness with all that exists. "If a man worships this relative

truth, he is sure to attain the Absolute Truth, (i.e., God) in the course of time."[18] The virtues of identification and detachment become paramount in order to be guided properly by (to properly worship) relative truths. This is the case given the two conditions which Gandhi thinks must be met for relative truth to lead us appropriately: (1) we must keep our minds open and be willing to correct ourselves should the situation arise; (2) we must be willing to continually undergo necessary self-purification.[19]

In regards to the first requirement, Gandhi calls on the seeker of Truth to be of utter humility:

> The seeker of the truth should be humbler than the dust. The world crushes the dust under its feet, but the seeker after Truth should so humble himself that even the dust could crush him. Only then, and not until then, will he have a glimpse of truth.[20]

The connection of the first condition to identification and nonviolence, and not just humility, is made clear by both the inevitable relativity of our grasp of truth and the diverse, seemingly incompatible views people have of what is true in everyday life. For one's own understanding of truth to become fuller and for those with differing understandings (relative truths) to reach greater mutual understandings one must, in Rex Ambler's words, "pass over"[21] from one view to another and one situation to another and come back to one's own view and situation with greater insights. This kind of identification requires the practice of nonviolence as we cannot embark on the quest of understanding the views of others if we are harming them. Instead, we are regarding our views as being so inerrant and complete that we coercively impose them on others which, in turn, creates untruth since it causes the others to act in ways that is at variance with what they believe to be the case. Thus we are kept from more fully understanding those whose perceptions are different from ours. This is a problem clearly evident in the value conflicts that so commonly stigmatize liberal societies. Identification ultimately leads the way for realizing the absolute oneness of truth. The oneness of reality is the backdrop Gandhi adopts in determining whether what passes for truth can meet what he sees to be the only proper criterion: it makes for wholeness in practice—"'The Inner Voice' may mean a message from God or the Devil for both are wrestling in the human breast. Acts determine the nature of the voice."[22] As we shall see in greater detail later, the right acts for Gandhi are those which are wholly beneficial and unifying to us. "In judging the actions of men, we should always apply the test, whether it conduces to the welfare of the world or not."[23]

While some, like Nietzsche, would deny a relation between truth and welfare, Gandhi's view that the benefits of pursuing the right action cannot always be immediately noticed is helpful here. As long as actions conduce to

the welfare of the world in the long run (after some reasonable length of time), they can pass the test Gandhi puts forth. Furthermore, according to the Mahatma the discovery and pursuit of truth is not always pleasant (e.g., when it undermines the majority's sense of superiority over the minority) or easy (since it requires conquering the passions). What's more is that advancing the welfare of the world is neither the conscious objective nor even the standard for determining the right action. Thus Gandhi is not committed to a relation between truth and welfare that undermines the centrality he gives to truth. Instead, Gandhi seems merely to hold that the right action (which reveals Truth) is more valuable than the correct conclusion, by itself, and that such action is manifest in one who sincerely seeks Truth.

Although these statements may indicate that Gandhi advocates a pragmatic and/or utilitarian criterion of truth, that understanding does not do his view proper justice. To the Mahatma, acts that benefit others are the natural by-products and not the aim of following truth—the only inherent good. "(Once) we adhere to truth, the law comes to our aid naturally."[24]

The requirement for continual self-purification in order to more clearly see Truth is obviously related to the necessity of detachment. Self-purification for Gandhi involves becoming detached from the sense pleasures which are the objects of desire and such purification helps extinguish subjectivity in one's perceptions of truth. While truth is ultimately self-evident, its reflections get distorted by subjectivity, and self-purification can overcome such distortions. J. N. Mohanty explains:

> We may indeed distinguish between two different attitudes towards truth: the attitude which expresses itself in the spontaneity of thought in the constructions of theories and models and in gradual approximation of one's constructions toward truth; and the attitude which expresses itself in total receptivity, in gradual elimination of theoretical constructions, in purifying the mind—as one cleanses a mirror—so that it may reflect truth. Gandhi's attitude is the second one.[25]

It should be noted that, for Gandhi, the explicit task in realizing truth is to eliminate not theoretical constructions but fear and desire. Mohanty's clean mirror metaphor is nonetheless applicable to Gandhi's thought, since the Mahatma clearly seeks a pure reflection of reality. Some epistemologists, however deny that such a pure reflection can exist.[26] Even though Gandhi agrees with such philosophers by holding that a concept free (pure) perception of things is not possible while we have bodily existence, Gandhi, unlike anti-realist philosophers, maintains we can get closer to having such a perception in this life by embarking on identification and self-purification.

GANDHI'S EPISTEMIC METHOD

For a defense of a Gandhi-like approach to knowledge of God (i.e., Truth).[27] Experience is for Gandhi an essential aspect of knowledge of God [and he made no greater appeal than to experiences (both his own and those of others who sought self-purification) in affirming the reality of Truth and God]. Gandhi states:

> (For) an experienced person to ask another to believe without being able to prove that there is God is humbly to confess his limitations and to ask another to accept in faith the statement of his experience. It is merely a question of that person's credibility. In ordinary matters of life we accept in faith the word of persons on whom we choose to rely although we are often cheated. Why may we not then in matters of life and death accept the testimony of sages all the world over that there is God and that He is to be seen by following Truth and Innocence (non-violence)? . . . True faith is appropriation of the reasoned experience of people whom we believe to have lived a life purified by prayer and penance.[28]

Alston shows that "a person can become justified in holding certain kinds of beliefs about [the existence, attributes, and actions of] God by virtue of perceiving God as being or doing so-and-so"[29] On this view, as on Gandhi's, putative experiences of God justify one in believing, say, that Truth exists and is God provided that the beliefs, given the circumstances under which they were formed and the nature of the experiences that led to them, are probably true.[30]

The kind of epistemic justification Alston has in mind is, what he calls, the "strong position" conception of justification.[31] According to that conception, belief p is justified only if the objective probability of p, given one's grounds for believing that p and the circumstances under which one formed the belief, exceed one-half.[32] Thus experience justifies believing in the existence of God and that God is Truth provided that the nature of the experience and its role in forming one's belief make it objectively likely that God exists and is Truth. Thus we can embark on purifying ourselves in the quest for more fully attaining a reflection (experiencing) pure, concept free ultimate reality (God). A putative perception of God as Truth justifies one's belief that God is Truth if the belief is, given the experiences, at least probably true. Such justification is akin to the justification one has in accepting, based on sense experience, the existence of an external reality. As Alston shows in his third chapter, we cannot non-circularly show that sense perception (among other "doxastic practices") generates beliefs that are likely to be true.

Like Gandhi, Alston too holds that the act of forming beliefs about God based on putative perceptions is firmly established in the religious communities that employ it. Thus practitioners of self-purification can reasonably

regard their experienced based beliefs as prima facie justified. Alston concludes that since there is no good reason to regard religious experience as unreliable, we cannot blame practitioners for continuing to rely on such experiences. The act is practically rational.[33] Alston states, "It is a reasonable supposition that a practice would not have persisted over large segments of the population unless it was putting people into effective touch with some aspects of reality."[34]

One must practice nonviolence in meeting each of the two conditions Gandhi sees as necessary for realizing Truth, given that the engagement in violence brings with it attachment to desire and passion (which undermines self-purification)—"Ahimsa (non-violence) being the necessary and indispensable means for Truth's discovery."[35] The acknowledgement that one's perception of truth is always partial and can be enriched by the different yet similarly partial perception of another yields a humility and dialogue that is contrary to the dogmatism and oppression violence typically brings. Inflicting violence on others, moreover, impedes identification, as such infliction tends to entail justifying the violent behavior (since the one inflicting the violence is usually treating others in a way he does not want to be treated). This inevitably entails assuming a distinction between oneself and those on the receiving end of one's violence.

Even in cases in which the realization of Truth seems to result from excessive violence (e.g., Holocaust survivors who saw that beauty can be found in even the most horrendous of situations) it is those on the receiving end of the violence (the sufferers) who tend to have the greatest (untainted) realization. Whatever truth may be gained and accessed by inflicting violence is usually offset by the decline in virtue (e.g., moral regression) that comes with engaging in violence. Thus to Gandhi nonviolence is the only means for making genuine progress on the quest for truth.

The method Gandhi advocates for revealing Truth to others (particularly opponents) is satyagraha (a term created by Gandhi from the Sanskrit words "satya"—"truth" and "agraha"—"holding firm to" [translated by Gandhi to mean "force"]). Ultimately, according to Gandhi, it is neither coercion nor solely rational argumentation that can bring about change in the other's perception of truth and enable a more complete mutually shared understanding to emerge. What is required is a willingness to suffer for and advance one's convictions by nonviolent means. Such moral suasion evokes a change of the other's perception of truth that ultimately arises within them and thus is more likely to last. Gandhi states:

> I have come to this fundamental conclusion that if you want something really important to be done, you must not merely satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also. The appeal of reason is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding in man.[36]

While suffering may be seen as rousing passions and thus be incompatible with the detachment necessary to see truth, if the point of suffering is seen as forcing an opponent to examine the justifications of his actions and not to elicit sympathy or disdain for the satyagrahi, we can see the role suffering can play in revealing truth. By not cooperating with the laws imposed on them by imperial rulers and by willingly suffering the consequences, Indian satyagrahis, for example, forced the British to examine the basis of their imperialistic rule. This ultimately led the British to see the unjustness of imperialism.

HINDU THOUGHT AND THE IDEAL OF DETACHMENT

Some background on the division in Hindu thought between self and atman as well as between nature and spirit can help clarify the issues before us. Gandhi always and primarily identified as a Hindu and I maintain, in contrast to other scholarly interpretations, that central concepts in the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism provide the best framework for understanding the Mahatma's overall philosophy. It is in line with traditional Vedantic understanding that each living being is made up of both a unique psychological self ("jivan" consisting of such distinctive traits as an individual's temperaments, dispositions, and propensities) and a soul-like, transcendental ego, known as atman—the ultimate reality or cosmic spirit manifested in all living beings. Atman is the same (full and uninterrupted) in all such beings. Atman is fully manifested (though not always fully apparent) in the sense that it is the only reality and undifferentiated (so it is not broken down into separate, limited parts). Therefore, it is not accurate (in the strict sense) to think of atman as being the same as that which western theology typically calls soul. Soul, typically if not exclusively, is regarded in western thought as being a particle or part of divinity (if it is regarded as being divine at all) and is thought to be different for each being that possesses one. The soul is personal. Atman is impersonal.

Ultimate Reality (for which "atman" and "God" are synonymous terms) is pure being, consciousness, detachment, and bliss. Since atman is impersonal so too, Gandhi thinks is truth. It is only in the everyday world of relative truth, personal gods, and particularity that atman, God, being, and truth seem distinct.

Ultimately, God (or truth) is not for Gandhi a personal being but a principle manifest as an active cosmic spirit—a reality that provides and serves. Our everyday experiences (particularly in religion and the arts) lend credence to this view of truth.[37] Enjoyment by and large comes naturally (without conscious effort) to humans. This indicates that reality, which Gandhi desig-

nates by the word "sat" (the same word in Sanskrit which designates truth), provides us with that which becomes enjoyable and fulfilling once we perceive it. Thus truth (reality) is active. It is only when we strip such experiences of their immediate, informative, and supposedly subjective elements that we retain the view of truth as cold and unconcerned. We will see that by conceiving of truth in a way that notably differs from dominant modern understandings of the concept Gandhi's recommendations for liberal society (particularly in regard how we should think of the value of freedom) are unique and indeed downright revolutionary.

"That Law which governs all life . . . is God. Law and Law-giver are one."[38] Gandhi understands that for humans it is difficult to avoid personalizing any concept of God, and concedes the necessity of recognizing God as possessing form.[39] "He is a personal God to those who need His personal presence. He is embodied to those who need His personal presence. He is the purest essence."[40] However, Gandhi always gave a higher place to the impersonal conception of God (as pure essence or being). I will show that his tendency to employ language and formulate traditional concepts in a way that can be acceptable to a pluralistic world community speaks to the valuable insights Gandhi offers present day liberals.

In addition to the nature traditionally attributed to atman, Gandhi regards love to be a part of its nature. Gandhi holds that the practice of nonviolence (ahimsa) is required of everyone, not just those who are inclined toward it. "I am certain that non-violence is meant for all time. It is an attribute of the atman and is, therefore, universal since the atman belongs to all."[41] Nonviolence is the same as the "law of love" for Gandhi. Thus making nonviolence an attribute of atman would be the same for the Mahatma as making love such an attribute. Gandhi seems to base his conclusion that atman has the attribute of love on the notion that it is the ultimate provider and source of truth and life.

For Gandhi, "Our own atman is beyond reason."[42] While Gandhi affirms reason as a "useful tool" at one stage of understanding in such matters he is convinced that one, "who knows . . . atman with his intellect only does not know (it) at all." Just as "intellectual knowledge of the benefits of eating food does not by itself help one to enjoy those benefits" one who is knowledgeable of atman (a.k.a., God, Truth) without direct experience with it can never satisfactorily comprehend it as ultimate reality. Like the eye that does the seeing but is not seen itself and the underlying self that observes changing perceptions but does not itself change, atman is ultimately the Knower but "not an object of knowledge."[43] Absolute truth is, moreover, the standard by which all else is judged even though it, itself, cannot be fully known while we exist in bodies. The first-hand experience necessary for satisfactorily comprehending atman, is made possible by faith. Faith and the first-hand experience "to which faith leads" are the two stages of satisfactory knowl-

edge of God.[44] Gandhi's emphasis on both faith and experience in enunciating the means for realizing truth will prove to have significant implications for understanding his recommendations to modern society.

Gandhi is insistent on a type of faith that is compatible with reason. The conclusions of faith cannot be at variance with what one learns from reason. Bhiku Parekh characterizes the role of reason in Gandhi's religious thought: "Every belief must 'pass the test' of reason, but that did not mean that it could not transcend or go beyond it. Reason laid down the minimum not the maximum, and specified what we may not but not what we must belief."[45]

This characterization is in keeping with Gandhi's rejection of the religious justification, offered by Hindu teachers, of untouchability—that members of lower castes deserve to be mistreated given their own misdeeds in previous lives. In 1925, Gandhi debated Vaikam pundits who appealed to the authority of sacred scripture to bolster this claim. Insisting that any writing that could justify such injustice is not sacred, Gandhi tried to show the pundits the evils of untouchability in ways that went beyond simply putting forth a different interpretation of religious teachings. The Mahatma recounts, "I appealed to their reason. I appealed to their humanity. And I appealed to the Hinduism in them."[46] Elsewhere Gandhi states, "I decline to be bound by any interpretation, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason or moral sense."[47]

The goal in Hinduism is, of course, to attain liberation from the cycles of birth and death (moksha). It is the psychological self from which Hindus seek liberation as that is the product of each being's actions (be they actions from this life or previous ones) according to dominant (Vedanta) Hindu thought. This is the case even though atman is the only reality. The psychological self reincarnates from life to life and it is the atman that accumulates karma (the force by which the consequences of actions are determined) by subsuming the psychological self. The empirical, psychological self (which, like our bodies, results from causal processes that extend over many lifetimes) dwells in the atman.[48] The psychological self, which is what differentiates beings from one another in the natural world, is a part of nature (prakriti) while the atman or pure transcendental ego comprises spirit (purusha) that lies beyond the natural world in the dualistic nature/spirit Hindu scheme. The Bhagavad-Gita chapter 7: 13–17[49] illustrates this division between nature and spirit by analogy with the division between field (nature) and the knower of the field (spirit). Just as the field is the place where events like growth, decline, and other changes take place, it is the psychological self (which includes the body) that experiences transitions. The knower of the field insofar as the knower is inactive and detached, is said to resemble the pure transcendental ego known as atman.

Since it is the psychological self that is the product of each being's actions and since it is that same self which differentiates beings from one

another, Hindu thinkers regard letting go of the psychological self and thereby realizing atman (in all its uninterrupted form) as the means for attaining moksha. This clearly seems to be Gandhi's idea when he states, "I do believe that complete annihilation of one's self—individuality, sensuality, personality—whatever you call it, is an absolute condition of perfect joy and peace."[50] As noted earlier, pure bliss is an attribute of atman. Thus for Gandhi realizing the bliss of perfect joy and peace would be the same as realizing atman.

AGAPE (CHARITY) AND EROS

Now brief discussion about how love has been understood philosophically is of relevance since it can enrich the background offered here (given that for Gandhi love and nonviolence are equivalent terms). In the Western tradition, agape is the term most typically used to refer to the kind of love Gandhi advocates. Agape, commonly defined as unselfish love for all,[51] has been contrasted in the history of Western philosophy since at least the time of Democritus with eros. Eros was regarded—in pre-Socratic discussions—as love associated with eroticism (sensual pleasures) and with forms in general and beauty in particular in more sophisticated discussions (like those of Plato and the neo-Platonists).[52] Instances of Gandhian thought and commentary cited below indicate clearly that Gandhi advocates something like agape,[53] or unselfish love for all. Gandhi states, "Perhaps 'love' does not express my meaning fully. The nearest word is 'charity.'"[54] Given that charity (in the sense of the Latin word 'caritas') is typically identified in Christian thought with agape, we can see a basis for maintaining that Gandhi does, in fact, advocate something like agape. Gandhi asserts that Paul's understanding of love in the New Testament is—for all practical purposes—identical to his own. "Ahimsa means love in the Pauline sense, and yet something more than the love defined by St. Paul, although I know St. Paul's beautiful definition is good enough for all practical purposes."[55] We cannot overemphasize the significance of Gandhi's use of religious language in a way that intentionally affirms insights that are acceptable to members of all communities. This is integral to the social reform efforts he calls for and that for him are essential for the true realization of liberal ideals.

For Gandhi, genuine love requires truth as its goal. "Without truth there is no love; without truth, it may be affection as for one's country to the injury of others: or infatuation, as of a young girl: or love may be unreasoning or blind; as of ignorant parents for their children."[56] While love is commonly understood entirely in terms of its subjective dimensions it is clear that for Gandhi that it includes cognitive elements which make it distinct from the passions so prevalent in everyday life. Later, I will show that Gandhi's broad

conception of truth as well as his insistence that the seeking of it cannot be relegated to the methods and settings of science also have rich implications for the liberal project.

Furthermore, for my purposes it is significant that (as we see above) Gandhi uses the word ahimsa as a synonym for love. Ahimsa is conventionally understood to mean nonviolence so it follows that for Gandhi nonviolence is equivalent to love. Additionally, Gandhi declares, "(To) identify ourselves with every human being without exception . . . is called cohesion or attraction in scientific language. In the popular language it is called love."[57] Thus, we can conclude that for Gandhi nonviolence, love, and identification are interchangeable concepts. Gandhi's uses the term "identification" to refer (among other things) to a state of taking on the needs of others as one's own. Taking on the needs of all is entailed by the conscious willingness to practice nonviolence since such practice leads to the eradication of self/other distinctions (insofar as such practice perpetuates a mentality in which bringing harm to others is seen to be indistinguishable from bringing harm to oneself). In what follows I largely seek to flesh out the implications these points have for developing nonviolent character traits among a citizenry. For Gandhi, it is only when such a citizenry is in place can any real progress be reached in realizing liberal ideals.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have offered an introductory overview of Gandhi's central ideas. The background provided by this chapter will prove useful during the rest of this book. As I explicate Gandhi's recommendations for liberal society, key concepts put forth in this chapter will aide in better understanding his reasoning and the significance of many major conclusions that I reach.

NOTES

1. S. Radha, "The Concept of Truth in Gandhian Philosophy," *Darshana International* 16, no. 4 (1976): 60.
2. M. K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 5.
3. M. K. Gandhi, *My Philosophy of Life* (Bombay: Pearl Publications Private Limited, 1961), 11.
4. M. K. Gandhi, *My Religion* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1955), 40.
5. J. N. Mohanty, "Gandhi's Concept of Man," *Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy* 7 (1970): 12.
6. M. K. Gandhi, in *Select Speeches*, ed. B. K. Ahluwalia (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1969), 272.
7. M. K. Gandhi, *Selected Speeches*, 15.
8. Renford Bambrough, *Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge* (Cambridge: Atlantic Highlands Press, 1979).

9. Glyn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
10. M. K. Gandhi, *All Men Are Brothers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 72.
11. M. K. Gandhi in *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* Vol. II, ed. Raghavan Iyer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 163.
12. Rex Ambler, "Gandhi's concept of truth" in *Gandhi's Significance for Today*, ed. John Hick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 90–109.
13. M. K. Gandhi, *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* Vol. II, 163.
14. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. I (Ahemebad: Navajivan Trust, 1961), 340.
15. M. K. Gandhi, *Yeravda Mandir* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1968), 4.
16. Radha, "The Concept of Truth in Gandhian Philosophy," 61.
17. M. K. *Gandhi in Young India*, July 1931.
18. Gandhi, M. K. *All Men Are Brothers*, 72.
19. Mohanty, "Gandhi's Concept of Man,"14.
20. Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, xi.
21. Ambler, "Gandhi's Concept of Truth," 102.
22. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. I, 257.
23. M. K. Gandhi, *Ethical Religion*. (Madras: Ganesan Press, 1968), 63.
24. M. K. Gandhi in *Selected Speeches*, 99.
25. Mohanty, "Gandhi's Concept of Man," 14.
26. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
27. William Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
28. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. I, 101-102.
29. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 1.
30. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 74.
31. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 73.
32. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 74.
33. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 168.
34. Alston, *Perceiving God*, 170.
35. M. K. Gandhi, *Collected Works of Ma hatma Gandhi* vol. xxxvii, no. 296 (New Delhi: Government Publications Division), 254.
36. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* vol. 48, 189.
37. J. N. Mohatany, *The Self and Its Other: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
38. M. K. *Gandhi in Young India*, October 11, 1928.
39. Radha, p. 62.
40. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. I, 572.
41. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. I, 430.
42. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. I, 588.
43. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. I, 588.
44. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. I, 588.
45. Bhiku Parekh, *Gandhi* (Oxford: University Press, 1997), 29.
46. B. R. Ambedkar, Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar *Writings and Speeches* (Bombay: Government of Maharastra, 1989), 223.
47. M. K. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1987), 31.
48. Mahadev Desai, *The Gita According to Gandhi: The Gospel of Selfless Action* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1946), 16.
49. Desai, *The Gita According to Gandhi*, 16.
50. *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. II p. 20.
51. Robert Audi, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* 2nd Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14.
52. Audi, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 280.

53. Joan Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).
54. D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, *Life of Mohandas K. Gandhi* Vol. I (Bombay: Bora and Co., 1951), 5.
55. M. K. Gandhi, *My Philosophy of Life*, 32.
56. Radha, 64.
57. M. K. Gandhi, *Truth is God* (Ahemedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1955), 18.

Chapter Two

Gandhi's Thought and Liberal Democracy

Conventional understanding so closely associates the image of Mahatma Gandhi with the cause of Indian Independence that Gandhi's endorsement of modern day political liberalism seems (by those who are not Gandhian scholars at least) taken for granted. To the popular mind it is as if Gandhi's concerns went no further than ensuring formal British withdrawal from India. This impression stands in contrast to Gandhi's declaration in 1919 that "The peoples of Europe have no doubt political power but no Swaraj (self-rule)."[1]

The Mahatma's efforts to challenge and reform those on "his side" (e.g., members of Indian society) is no less pivotal to the overall significance of his place in history than his role in India's independence movement. In contrasting Gandhi's approach to social reform with that of Lenin's his contemporary N. K. Bose wrote, "Gandhi believes that the root of the problem does not lie in the authority of the State, but in the character of the individual which has made the existence of the State possible."[2] I maintain that this kind of contrast similarly separates Gandhi from most present day liberal advocates of social reform. Whereas liberalism has commonly focused on instituting systemic reform for bringing about the best conditions for the individual in society, Gandhi emphasizes development of the individual's character above all else. For him it is futile and ultimately counterproductive to seek realization of liberal ideals without regard for the development of individual moral character. To Gandhi, as I hope to make more clear, once the citizenry is comprised of the right kind of people systemic reform will naturally take care of itself. The Mahatma's unyielding efforts to extend his reform work to even those who were not considered his opponents is clearly noticeable in the lack of exuberance he showed concerning the official British withdrawal from India. Indeed it is commonly acknowledged that present day, "independent"

India exists as a far cry from what Gandhi envisioned. This point underscores the fact that if Gandhi lived today he would again clearly devote no shortage of energy to challenging Indian society.

In what follows, I will explore what these points indicate for Gandhi's views regarding commonly accepted understandings of political liberalism. I will aim to go beyond consideration of whether Gandhi can be classified as a liberal and seek to explicate the ways in which Gandhian philosophy challenges modern day liberals to improve their societies. Thus, for my purposes, Emmanuela Ceva's minimal characterization of the liberal project is sufficient (and most likely preferable). Ceva writes:

> (The) basic idea I take to be un-controversially essential to the liberal project (is) of public justification. This idea concerns the standard liberal rationale for the public order as consisting of the establishment of a stable framework within which individuals, understood as the holders of rights and the bearers of the corresponding duties, can jointly pursue their possibly diverging life plans (and related interests and conceptions of the good). The public order is, therefore, justified to limit the arbitrary power of individuals and to secure cooperation among them, as free and equal persons, in the pursuit of their different and possibly conflicting life plans on terms they can accept on moral grounds. All participants in the public order hold a moral claim right against the institutions constitutive of that order (the state's institutions) that all social and political rules be justified to them.[3]

At the most basic level, Gandhi's affirmation of core liberal values (those that are plausibly entailed by the above characterization) can hardly be denied. This point is reflected in the cherished place he gives to the individual (which is something that clearly underlies Ceva's above characterization). Gandhi's deep commitment to a multi-religious Indian state as well as the great pains he undertook to include members of diverse communities within the movements he led indicates as much. For him, however, nothing like a liberal state can come into existence without explicit affirmation of nonviolent principles. It is thus clear to me that regardless of whether Gandhi can be "officially" placed within the ranks of political liberals, he offers valuable insights and resources for all who are concerned about liberalism's future prospects. Recent political events in liberal societies make clear that such concern is hardly misplaced.

ON HOW I WILL PROCEED

In what follows, I will largely employ Gandhi's well-known critiques of modern civilization as a kind of springboard for gaining insight on his thoughts concerning political liberalism. Present day societies classified as liberal clearly manifest the very characteristics Gandhi derides in his com-

mentaries on modern civilization. It is also clear that Gandhi's derisions in these works cannot simply by reduced to some antipathy he felt toward modernism. As we will see in greater detail later, his rejection of traditional religious beliefs that clash with commonly held liberal values is sufficient to show that for Gandhi it is not so much modernism that's problematic but rather the tendency of those in the modern age to ignore the great teachings and experiences bequeathed by their predecessors. Consistent with this interpretation he states, "my resistance to Western Civilization is really a resistance to its indiscriminate and thoughtless imitation based on the assumption that Asians are fit only to copy everything that comes from the West."[4] Furthermore, it is not problematic to suppose that the social characteristics that are the focus of Gandhi's criticisms (e.g., emphasis on increasing material comforts) are taken to be essential to those who comprise politically liberal communities. My arguments here will largely be predicated on these suppositions.

I will however not be content with merely explicating Gandhi's criticisms of modern civilization. I hope to better flesh out the underlying philosophical bases and implications of these criticisms in order to shine a light (so to speak) on what they tell us about both the ethical legitimacy and overall viability of the liberal project (as it is commonly conceived). Additionally, I will focus on detailing solutions available in the vast corpus of Gandhi's writings to problems presently confronting liberal societies. As we will see, clarification and analysis of values deemed central to liberalism like equality, individual liberty, respect for differences, and government neutrality toward religion will be key parts of this discussion. Overall, I aim to show the distinctive understanding Gandhi has of such values merit serious consideration by those who affirm their social indispensability and seek to understand how they can be better realized in a social context.

Let us take, for example, Gandhi's lament in *Hind Swaraj* that modern civilization has made bodily welfare "the object of life."[5] For Gandhi this central emphasis, as we will see, undermines genuine realization of social equality since (among other reasons) it gives a greater value to the use of physical force (considered essential for preserving corporeal existence) than to nonviolent soul-force. Unlike the latter, not everyone in society is equally capable of effectively yielding physical force. It is therefore not surprising that Gandhi concludes the quest for material comfort "takes note neither of morality nor of religion."[6]

Likewise, Gandhi's insistence that it is nonsensical to talk about universal rights in a way that is free from considerations of the duties we should uphold conflicts with standard liberal attempts to promote individual liberty (since they are narrowly focused on achieving formal recognition of citizen rights). This aspect of Gandhi's thought, in turn, has serious implications for standard liberal understandings of religion's place in society. This follows

since Gandhi thinks religion (understood in a way that is non-sectarian and universal) is necessary for instilling in citizens a proper sense of duty by which, in turn, they can realize the rights and freedoms liberals maintain all of us possess. Thus he proclaims, "Religion must either occupy the highways as well as the by-ways, the whole of life or abdicate."[7] On this point it is notable that a significant part of Gandhi's indictment of modern civilization consists of his claim that it is irreligious.[8] Thus, for Gandhi seeking the advancement of human rights without referring to central religious concepts is ultimately misguided. From these points a basic outline of Gandhi's criticism of modern liberal societies emerges: for these societies to truly live up to their promises it is essential for the citizens who make them up to properly exercise their formal rights. However, citizens will be incapable of this responsibility if societies do not take active steps to develop their moral characters. Related to this point, to Gandhi it would indeed be notable that Mill defends individual liberty largely on the grounds that it is essential for a greater collective understanding of truth. Gandhi is insistent that such understanding is impossible without moral development. For him this fact alone is adequate reason for social institutions to centrally emphasize moral development. To the Mahatma there is no greater goal to pursue than the realization of truth (which, as we've seen, he holds to be equivalent with realizing God).

When the liberal project is conceived in terms of public justification as well as in the context of affirming the well-known liberal value of pluralism an inherent and serious difficulty for that project can be noticed—specifically, how a society can be successful in being both pluralist and justifying political and social rules to the satisfaction of those with diverging life plans, interests, and conceptions of the good. A cursory survey of the social and political issues that have polarized modern-day liberal societies (to the point of creating institutional paralysis) in recent times reveals this problem. These social divisions can plausibly be seen as a natural result of attempts to seriously realize a genuinely pluralist society. In spite of court rulings that have supposedly settled questions regarding the legality of abortion and of prayer in public school intense disagreements among various social communities on such matters have seriously hampered attempts of the members of liberal societies to harmoniously coexist. The reverberations of such value conflicts is clearly evident in the seemingly never ending political gridlock commonly bemoaned in liberal states. This has been the case in spite of the overt emphasis liberal societies place on the individual's right to conscience and freedom of expression. These values are thought to go hand in hand with the affirmation of pluralism and citizens typically consider the freedom of expression in particular to be essential to their attempts to persuade others and thus to resolve conflicts. Value conflicts like those mentioned above underscore that on some very real level the significance of a universally acknowledged procedure and basis by which the policies of a liberal society can be

justified to its members is ultimately indispensable. As we will see though for Gandhi social harmony is better served by seeking many such procedures and basis provided they can all be understood to be part of a singular and coherent whole.

More than that however for Gandhi the kinds of value conflicts referred to above show the importance the explicit development of a nonviolent citizenry has for anything like the liberal project to be successful. Indeed, it is clear, for him the violence that has so often correlated with (and is counterproductive to) the pursuit of liberalism is directly attributable to the absence of such a concerted effort. Bose explicates the significance of nonviolent resolution to social disagreements:

> It is true, one can or should live in term of one's own opinions. And the most decent way of convincing others of the rightness of one's position is by an attempt to live according to one's own light. This may entail the duty of opposing what appears to be wrong in one's neighbor or the institution for which he stands. If the opposition is in terms of nonviolence, and the aim conversion, then no harm is done. The determination to bear the consequences of one's truth with no hatred against the personality of those who differ and even inflict suffering, is the surest guarantee of the sincerity of one's own conviction.
>
> If suffering is restricted to one's own side, one does not rush to propagate half-tested truths. Such suffering, when cheerfully borne, burns up the sources of personal error which may warp opinions. At the same time, there is the additional satisfaction that no one else has been injured for an opinion held by oneself. This helps in preserving a comradely feeling towards other individuals, as well as a respect for partial views of truth other than one's own.
>
> The nonviolent way is thus the way of democracy. Self-suffering also brings the power of spreading one's own opinions by actually living it.[9]

No less significant to the liberal project (given its emphasis on pluralism) is the connection Bose draws between the self-suffering discussed above and the holders of different but partial understandings of truth realizing a very real kind of social harmony with each other:

> A recognition of the right of holding different views of truth did not however mean passive acquiescence in their continued existence. An insistence upon the plurality of truth was not to lead a person or group into a neutral attitude; it was bound to lead him to oppose what he held to be wrong by non-violently non-cooperating with it. . . . The duty of one who tried to order life in terms of truth thus clearly lay in opposing wrongs by means of tapasya or self-suffering.
>
> When a man was ready to pay this price for his particular view of truth, Gandhi held, even if he were wrong in the beginning, his self-suffering would chasten him and help him in recognizing any truth which lay on the other side. Gandhi was of (the) opinion that the opposition of satyagraha (nonviolent

> resistance) never led to the defeat of one view by another, but to the recognition in the end of a common view to which both contending parties could truthfully subscribe.
>
> This was clearly based on the ancient Indian philosophical view that truth can be most closely approximated only when we try to discover the unopposed within apparent opposites, and that truth comes to one who performs tapasya for its sake.[10]

In the context of understanding his recommendations for liberal society we should note Gandhi's emphasis on converting (not defeating) opponents. Such an approach can better enable social harmony as it eschews efforts that ultimately perpetuate conflict and division. Additionally, in keeping with dominant liberal political theory, Gandhi's insistence that grievances should only be pursued nonviolently indicate the importance he places on morally acceptable procedural devices for reaching correct outcomes. Clearly, this aspect of Gandhi's philosophy is in line with the "acceptability test" Ceva puts forth in her attempt to provide liberals with a basis for justifying procedural equality. As described by Ceva this test "consists of asking anyone how they should be treated were they to adopt the perspective of a party to an intractable value conflict at an impasse in politics for the terms of their interaction to be morally acceptable to them."[11] Since it is obvious that people, by and large, do not wish to be treated violently the Gandhian method of self-suffering seems to clearly meet Ceva's test. Additionally, as Ceva points out, a significant advantage of her test is that it can provide a broader constituency of justification than that implied by other liberal views.[12] What's more is that the method prescribed by Gandhi for handling seemingly intractable social and political conflicts affirms the equality of opponents in ways that go beyond simply ensuring everyone has equal chance to have their say. This follows since the Gandhian method seeks to allow everyone to live in the way that seems right to them. Furthermore, satyagraha is meant to promote understanding of a given conflict in ways that it make it clear to all parties that they have a joint problem—which, in turn, helps to produce the conditions that will allow for a greater sense of identification to emerge. These points are underscored by Gandhi when, in discussing the place of fasting to protestors who campaigned against temple caste discrimination, he declares "A satyagraha fast should be against the lover and for his reform, not for extorting rights from him."[13] Thus Gandhi holds one who authentically employs the method of satyagraha is not only driven by the desire to preserve her own moral integrity but to show the harm opponents do to themselves by pursuing practices that are inconsistent with truth. Ultimately, given just how strong the impetus for realizing peaceful outcomes that do not conflict with the demands of justice is for liberalism the Gandhian satyagraha method for resolving conflict is particularly relevant to liberals.

It also should not be lost on us here that, as Bose notes, the means Gandhi advocates for greater realization of pluralistic harmony (something so integral to liberal objectives) contrasts significantly with the ubiquitous recommendations liberals make for on-going discussion and dialogue. Clearly, Gandhi was aware of the limitations of discursive reason for producing the kinds of social outcomes liberals cherish. As we will see in greater detail later, though he affirms reason as a useful tool on the path to truth Gandhi is insistent that the more significant truths (both for the individual and the collective) can only be realized by adopting ways championed by the great exemplars of religious teachings. Tapasya, after all, is a traditional Indian religious practice (which Gandhi saw paralleled in all the great faith traditions) and developing the ability to see truth in the position of one's opponents entails becoming loving and free of hostility in ways called for by the world's sacred scriptures.

Bose's statements, moreover, indicate that the preservation and maintenance of a genuinely democratic system requires active steps by a government toward the development of citizens who are capable of self-suffering in the ways he describes. Indeed, from the standpoint of promoting a liberal social order the rich implications of Bose's words are undeniable. Proactive measures undertaken to instill nonviolent qualities within the citizenry will better enable members of a diverse population to respect one another in spite of disagreements. This follows since citizens who exhibit strong moral virtue when protesting grievances will inevitably command respect even from those who are not initially "on their side." Furthermore, when protestors consciously seek to find what's true even in what their opponents believe it is more likely that they will be able arrive upon resolutions that will be mutually agreeable to diverse individuals. Such individuals can then better maintain a social harmony despite their differences.

Ultimately, the government function of developing nonviolent qualities within the public is not unlike the already recognized role of the liberal state in preserving and maintaining an informed citizenry insofar as doing so is seen as necessary for both reforming the state as well as keeping it in check. As S. P. Verma argues:

> From a pragmatic angle, one major weakness of democracy, as Gandhi might have put it, is that it has not evolved suitable means of change or even adequate techniques of action to bring it about, its emphasis being more on the structure of the political machinery. The widely accepted method or technique for bringing about change in a liberal democratic system is through discussion and debate, which helps to some extent in assuring an adaption of the machinery of the state to the changing will of the citizens, but does not go far enough. Gandhi believed that even the best democratic systems could go wrong if it was not kept in perpetual restraint by a widely awakened society, which was possible only if there was within the society a strong group of selfless, even

> self-effacing, people who could challenge the "democratic government" whenever it went wrong.[14]

Verma's statements dovetail nicely with Anuradha Veeravalli's explication of Gandhian thought regarding state sovereignty:

> (For) Gandhi, the problem of sovereignty in the modern nation state is one of putting in place institutions that awaken "the masses to a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority." In other words, to provide space for dissent in the face of the abuse of authority rather than to advocate subjection to it is the principle that determines the relation between the individual and the state. It therefore intrinsically rejects any interpretation of sovereignty in terms of a theory of power or the capacity of enforcement.[15]

These points are affirmed by Gandhi's statement that "Swaraj (self-rule) is to be attained by educating the masses into a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority."[16] Additionally, the Mahatma declares "An awakened and intelligent public opinion is the most potent weapon of a satyagrahi."[17] Since the satyagrahi seeks to reveal truth in such a way that it will be grasped collectively and since for Gandhi the realization of truth is our highest good it follows to him that the state has a basic interest in ensuring the reality of an awakened and intelligent public. In the following pages I will largely seek to clarify actions (specifically in regard to religion) that I maintain Gandhi calls on government to undertake for producing this kind of outcome.

It should also not go unnoticed here that Bose's above statements are predicated on a particular conception of truth (one which emphasizes that humans can only have a fragmentary and tentative grasp of it) that Gandhi derived from his exposure to Jain religious thought.[18] Notably, Margaret Chatterjee argues this conception provides Gandhi with "the metaphysical basis both of his conception of ahimsa (nonviolence) and of democracy." In keeping with John Stuart Mill's famous liberty principle Chatterjee sees Gandhi's understanding of truth to imply "if all we have is a fragmentary view, we have no right to impose our fragment on others." Gandhi, in fact, would take Mill's conclusion that our limited and fallible perspectives imply the necessity of freedom of expression in society further than Mill seemed to. Whereas Mill emphasized things like the right to freely publish and the liberty to follow one's own life pursuits for Gandhi a society that more ideally affirms everyone's freedom would permit each individual to follow truth as it appears to him/her even if doing so clearly brings about suffering to others. To the Mahatma when the state has actively taken steps to develop qualities of nonviolence within the citizenry (and is thus made up of those who are better able to suffer at the highest levels for their convictions) such a scenario becomes much less troubling than it appears. Indeed, for him it just this kind of state that can most fully realize core liberal ideals.

For my purposes, in fact, perhaps the biggest take away here is that for Gandhi successful realization of the liberal project entails the development of a citizenry that is willing to and capable of suffering for their sincerely held convictions. In contrast to the commonly noticed present day tendency of special interest groups to pursue political power as the ultimate means by which they can settle value disagreements, citizens in the ideal Gandhian state will primarily focus on inwardly becoming the type of people who can cheerfully bear hardships in order to advance the truth as it appears to them. Given Gandhi's famous assertion that suffering (not reason) opens the "inner understanding in man."[19] This point suggests a more promising method than the one most commonly applied in liberal societies for dealing with paralyzing social and political conflicts—simply positioning for and courting always precarious electoral dominance. Indeed, it is clear from Gandhi's own words that a primary focus on electoral success (as opposed to the development of the latent potentialities of the individual) is actually antithetical to realizing any kind of society that can truly be deemed "of the people." We read:

> We have been accustomed to think that power comes through Legislative Assemblies. I have regarded this belief as a grave error brought about by inertia or hypnotism. A superficial study of British History has made us think all power percolates to the people from parliaments. The truth is that power resides in the people and it is entrusted for the time being to those whom they may choose as their representatives. Parliaments have no power or even existence independently of the people . . . Civil Disobedience is the storehouse of power. Imagine a whole people unwilling to conform to the laws of the legislature and prepared to suffer the consequences of non-compliance! They will bring the whole legislative and executive machinery to a standstill. The police and military are of use to coerce minorities, however powerful they may be. But no police or military coercion can bend the resolute will of a people, out for suffering to the utmost.[20]

Gandhi's sentiments here are nicely captured by Bhikhu Parekh's characterization of liberal democracies as being such that they abstract "power from the people, concentrate it in the state and then return it to them in their (abstract) roles as citizens."[21] Indeed, we can see the Mahatma's words above to conform with Antonio Gramsci's notion of "hegemony."[22] This notion is used by Gramsci to explain how social hierarchies are created and maintained by first acquiring the consent of the so-called lower classes. Gandhi's remarks above moreover are clearly in line with the interpretation of him as a philosophical anarchist. Though (as we will see in the next chapter) Gandhi does hold a negative view of the state, it cannot be denied that he (at the very least) takes the ideals of democracy seriously. This is clearly indicated when, during World War II, Gandhi offers a stark elabora-

tion, to an American interviewer, on his claim that "Democracy can only be saved through non-violence," We read:

> So long as (democracy) is sustained by violence, it cannot provide for or protect the weak. My notion of democracy is that under it the weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest. That can never happen except through non-violence. No country in the world today shows any but patronizing regard for the weak . . . Western democracy, as it functions today, is diluted Nazism or Fascism. At best it is merely a cloak to hide the Nazi and the Fascist tendencies of imperialism . . . It was not through democratic methods that Britain bagged India. What is the meaning of South African democracy? Its very constitution has been drawn to protect the white man against the colored man, the natural occupant. Your own history is perhaps blacker still, in spite of what the Northern States did for the abolition of slavery. The way you have treated the Negro (sic) presents a discreditable record. And it is to save such democracies that the war is being fought.[23]

Among other things, Gandhi's statements above convey the explicit impression that he is (at the very least) sympathetic toward, what is commonly referred to as, democratic ideals. It is also worth noting that the aforementioned connection Gandhi saw between nonviolent soul force and social equality underlie the above statements. Since my concern here is primarily to explicate the recommendations Gandhi has for liberal democracy I will forego discussion related to how best we can label the Mahatma's own political school of thought.

That the Gandhian method holds greater promise for ending political stalemates can be seen by considering that this method entails the willingness to openly allow others to do as they desire when they pursue what appears true to them. Any systemic gridlock or paralysis then brought about by the nonviolent method (to use Bose's term) would naturally involve protests undertaken by those who have seriously reflected on the genuine basis of their grievances and (given their strength of convictions) are prepared to suffer at the highest levels for acceptable resolutions to be reached. Thus, it is not likely such protestors would frivolously impede the functioning of their society out of, say, ego driven motivations but instead carefully reflect upon whether a given situation truly justifies a response that may bring about social disruption. These kinds of protestors would also go to great lengths to ensure whatever hardships their actions cause will be primarily endured by them and thus overtly avoid bringing harm to others.

Furthermore, as historical examples of successful nonviolent movements show, the method Gandhi calls for in dealing with social and political grievances seems to have the added advantage of being most effective in successfully converting opponents and thus bringing about institutional change that better secures whatever gains are reached. Hence Gandhi, as was indicat-

ed earlier, concludes that the method of suffering he advocates is what's required for "getting something really important . . . done."[24] It would follow then that to Gandhi discursive reason should be seen as no more than an important adjunct to the ability to live according to one's own light in regard to the task of convincing others of the rightness of one's cause and thus advancing pluralistic harmony. This contrasts notably with the dominant tendency in liberal societies to regard such reason as the primary tool by which rules and policies should be publicly justified to diverse groups. After arguing that "reason does not educate, it simply regulates" Ramashray Roy nicely explicates this contrast between dominant liberal tendencies and Gandhian thought:

> The foundation of modern civilization was laid on the supposedly unparalleled efficacy of reason to effectively curb the excesses of human passions. Reason (in the modern sense) as the basis of order has proved quite unreliable. It is therefore to look for some other basis of order. But the basis for a durable, benign order is not something objectively given which can be possessed like an object and then used to design the structure of order. Also, the basis of order does not inhere in anything outside man himself, for example, in social institutions. Thus a continued process of changing social institutions to find an institutional arrangement appropriate for man's purposes proves unavailing because the source of disorder does not, in Gandhi's view, lie in social institutional arrangements; it lies in the disorder of the soul itself which then manifests itself in the disorder of society which, in turn, afflicts the soul of the individual. The search for order therefore must begin at the level of the soul itself.
>
> The ordering of the soul as the basis of social order must begin with the attunement of the soul to the ground of divine being which, for Gandhi, is nothing else than Truth as God.[25]

My arguments largely seek to fully unpack these points particularly in regard to what practical implications they have for liberal political philosophy.

Gandhi's recommendations above regarding allowing others to live according to truth as it appears to them are more clearly in line with affirming cherished liberal values like individual freedom and the right of conscience than the more commonly applied methods used in liberal societies for resolving conflicts.

IN CONSIDERATION OF A CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE

At this point, it is helpful to apply the insights elaborated upon above to the contemporary world. Doing so is vital for keeping this discussion from becoming needlessly abstract and thus contrary to the spirit of the Mahatma's

teachings. Unlike the situation in Gandhi's time, liberal societies today are confronted with evidence that definitively establishes the reality of man-made climate change. For my purposes, consideration of an example related to environmental ethics is particularly helpful since such examples are indicative of the limitations of reason for producing desirable action. By itself after all, scientific knowledge of environmental destruction can never move us to take action that is conducive to preserving eco-systems. As indicated already (and will be discussed more fully in chapter 5) Gandhi—in keeping with David Hume before him—sees all ethical behavior to necessarily include an affective dimension.

Given the institutional and structural settings present in liberal societies it has been particularly difficult for them to respond in a truly effective manner to the challenges posed by climate change. Specifically, it is clear that the upholding of freedoms deemed by liberals to be fundamental (e.g., those of speech, of the press) have ultimately hampered efforts to initiate formal policies that scientists say can mitigate the worst effects of climate change.

It is significant, however, that in modern liberal societies progress on confronting climate change has occurred in a way that underscores Gandhi's insights discussed above. In spite of the seemingly never ending focus environmental activists place on national electoral politics, important reductions in carbon emissions as well as behavioral changes conducive to sustainability have been initiated at the community level and within civil society. For Gandhi, to reiterate, these are the places where real political power can be yielded. Moreover, given the commonly lamented lack of regulatory authority those concerned about the environment have at their disposal it makes sense to think polluters in modern liberal societies have largely been allowed to live in a way that is line with the truth as it appears to them. This is the case even as it is plausible to think that polluters violate the rights of others by engaging in their pursuits. It is also worth noting here that, in keeping with the methodology referred to above by Bose, some aspects of what appears true to polluters (e.g., we should live primarily in the here and now, we should trust that we will be provided for in the future) can be acceptable even to environmentalists.

Ultimately, it seems that by placing their attention all the more strongly on what happens at the local level and to the development of morally desirable characteristics among individual members of society environmentalists will engage in work that holds greater promise than efforts that seek to ensure the right candidates take national office. In a 2018 interview with *USA Today* Al Gore underscored this point.[26] Though he bemoans a "democracy crisis" and concludes "we need a new president," Gore optimistically declares "the U.S. is now going to" exceed its commitments under the Paris agreement" (in spite of formal American withdrawal from the treaty).

It is not incidental that, as I will show in the next chapter, if all developed the qualities Gandhi identifies with nonviolence (which he also sees to be central to the teachings of the world's great religions) greater degrees of environmentally sustainable practices will emerge within human populations. What's more, in India the Gandhian inspired Chipko movement has demonstrated that incorporating the methods of satyagraha enables those who protest environmental wrongs a potent means for changing hearts and minds.

Not incidentally, a core message of deep ecologist philosophers—who, like the Chipko activists, have openly professed allegiance to Gandhi's teachings—is also relevant here. Deep ecology tells us that our efforts to protect the environment will inevitably be inadequate if they do not entail concomitant and profound character transformations on the part of the individuals who make up our societies. Such transformations are necessarily central to the process of developing the individual in the way Gandhi called for. Clearly, given the realities of resource limitations as well as the demands of justice, it is only when a society lives in an environmentally sustainable fashion will its members most fully realize the core liberal ideal of equality.

The above discussion helps to illuminate Gandhi's rationale for calling for economic reform (khadi) in a way that is both decentralized and free from overt political concerns. In advising the khadi worker the Mahatma stated:

> For the sake of efficiency also, he should not mix up constructive work with political propaganda. The growth of initiative and self-confidence, through Khadi organization, will in its own time bear political consequences. There need not be any hurry for achieving quick results, in the usual sense of the term "political." When the masses have gained so much in self-development that they can see a wrong, and are able to remedy it principally by their own non-violent effort, then their resistance becomes natural and of the right type.[27]

It is clear that developing citizens capable of yielding the kinds of power and freedom described above requires them to have the ability to turn their focus internally on themselves so as to advance their own spiritual growth. For Gandhi this ability has infinitely more value than, say, being capable of yielding great influence at the ballot box. Thus, in his reply to a question from a South African regarding the process of social change Gandhi states, "Our public workers must set about the reforming of society by reforming themselves first."[28] For Gandhi the great religious traditions of the world provide the most accessible and clearest guides by which such growth can be pursued. Thus to Gandhi explicit state affirmation of religious teachings would be an essential aspect of a genuinely free society. This conclusion is underscored by Gandhi's bold declarations "I cannot conceive politics as divorced from religion. Indeed religion should pervade every one of our actions."[29]

To summarize Gandhi's reasoning into the form of a hypothetical syllogism: If a liberal society is to flourish it must have a strong moral foundation. If a liberal society will have a strong moral foundation it must give a revered place to religion. Thus, if a liberal society is to flourish it must give a revered place to religion. Much of this work can be seen as my attempt to show why Gandhi not only thought that this argument does not clash with the ideals of political liberalism but needs to be accepted for liberal systems of government to flourish. Among scholars it is well known that Gandhi regarded his political aims to be inseparable from his spiritual goals. Accordingly, much has been written concerning Gandhi's conception of religion to necessarily include an active social and political dimension. I will discuss why he sees politics to necessarily include an essential religious element and what insights this understanding provides for the prospects of liberalism in the present age.

Here it is worthwhile to consider Gandhi's response to a correspondent who acknowledged perplexity by the Mahatma's attempts to incorporate within his political activities the values exemplified by the Sannyasin (or ideal renouncer in the Hindu tradition).[30] The correspondent writes:

> On the one hand you place before man the ideal of a Sannyasin which necessarily implies the renunciation of worldly things and devotion to God. On the other hand, you are striving to win Swaraj (self-rule) for India which is not at all necessary for a Sannyasin. I cannot understand how these two ideals are to be reconciled. Why should a Sannyasin care for the political conditions of his country? On the contrary, if he fixes his mind on such a low end, as even Swaraj should be for a Sannyasin, he is no true Sannyasin in as much as he has lost detachment for worldly gains . . . Even if he were to achieve it for others, even then he errs because their minds are not fully developed. What is the good of leading people to a false goal?

Gandhi responds as follows:

> I do not for one moment grant that a Sannyasin need be a recluse caring not for the world. A Sannyasin is one who cares not for himself but cares all his time for others. He has renounced all selfishness. But he is full of selfless activity even as God is full of sleepless and selfless activity. A Sannyasin, therefore, to be true to his creed of renunciation, must care for Swaraj, not for his own sake (he has it), but for the sake of others. He has no worldly ambition for himself. That does not mean that he may not help others to understand their place in the world. If the Sannyasins of old did not seem to bother their heads about the political life of society, it was because society was differently constructed. But politics properly so-called rule every detail of our lives today. We come in touch . . . with the State, on hundreds of occasions whether we will or no (sic). The State affects our moral being. A Sannyasin, therefore, being well-wisher and servant par excellence of society, must concern himself with the relations of the people with the State . . . he must show the way to the people to attain

> Swaraj. A Sannyasin having attained Swaraj in his own person is the fittest to show us the way. A Sannyasin is in the world, but he is not of the world. In all the most important functions of life he does exactly as we the common people do. Only his outlook upon them is different. He does without attachment the things we do with attachment . . . It is given to every one of us to cultivate detachment.

In much of what follows, I will seek to flesh out the social implications inherent in Gandhi's view (implied above) that political freedom is found by developing qualities associated with a figure revered by one of the world's great religious traditions. It is clearly the case for Gandhi that a society cannot be free until the individuals who comprise it exhibit such qualities.

As we will see, a large part of my efforts here will also consist of explicating why Gandhian thought holds that religion is in need of politics for realizing its true aims no less than politics is in need of religion for the right political systems to succeed. Gandhi hoped, Joseph Prabhu states, "to achieve a dual transformation: on the one hand, he wished to purify politics by making moral and religious norms central to it, and, on the other, he hoped to purify religion by saving it from the dangers of self-absorption and narcissism."[31] I will seek to show why to Gandhi religious communities benefit when they identify with and promote something like the liberal project as well as indicate the implications this has for such communities. Indeed, Gandhi's insights suggest that religion's loss of favor in the modern age can be largely attributed to the conspicuous absence of liberal values within the proclamations of its most public adherents. The lack of a religious basis evident in attempts to justify public policies has, in turn, seemingly engendered within the citizenry a mindset of moral relativism that ultimately undermines the prospects for liberalism.

What's more, as will become more clear later, for Gandhi it is reasonable to think that religious conflicts ultimately stem from the insistence of adherents that their cherished stories be understood as literal historical occurrences. Gandhi holds that at their core all the great religious systems uniquely emphasize universal principles whose truths are not contingent on specific historical findings and that do not clash with one another. Political liberals, it should be noted, are typically characterized by their call for privileging science to the status of social arbitrator among diverse populations that have accepted conflicting truth claims. Thus, Gandhi's points regarding how religious teachings should be understood also has implications for how the liberal project should be pursued. This follows since religious individuals, it seems, are also heeding the liberal call for privileging science by conceding that a literal basis for their faith is essential. For Gandhi it follows modern day liberal demands that religious truth claims necessarily conform to the methods of science and when they don't they should be kept separate from the

public sphere actually hinder attempts to give reverence for truth a central place in society. Gandhi thinks of truth, after all, in a way that is much broader than prevailing scientific notions of the concept. Indeed, it can be said that the liberal emphasis on secularism has paradoxically led to an undermining of pluralism insofar as this emphasis has perpetuated a narrow understanding of how religion should conform to truth. This perpetuation has actually made faith communities less receptive to the truths advanced by others.

As has been noted, for Gandhi the word "Truth" is interchangeable with the word "God" as well as with the word "Reality" (Sat). Instead of accepting the commonly held view that truth is that which corresponds to reality, Gandhi holds truth is reality. We read:

> Instead of saying that God is Truth, I say that Truth is God . . . I have known God only as Truth. There was a time when I had doubts about the existence of God, but I never doubted the existence of Truth. . . . It rules over the universe. . . . This is for one almost a matter of experience.[32]

We can infer that Gandhi's understanding of truth is equivalent with his notion of reality given that he argues that not even an atheist would deny the existence of a God defined as that "certain unmistakable sameness behind all that variety of definitions which there would be if we could all give our own definitions of God."[33] Furthermore, Gandhi also states "Man can only conceive God within the limitations of his own mind. If God is vast and boundless as the ocean, how can a tiny drop like man imagine what He is? He can only experience what the ocean is like, if he falls into and is merged in it."[34]

Since for Gandhi truth is reality (and not simply a representation of it) and can ultimately only be known through direct experience certain implications follow regarding the access religious traditions provide to truth. More specifically, it would follow to him that social endeavors which aim to bring about a better collective realization of truth should involve insights traditionally thought of as religious given that the broad and dynamic nature of truth cannot be captured so adequately only by applying the methods of science (which modern society typically sees as the sole means of pursuing truth in a way that can enable public justification). Ragahvan Iyer explicates Gandhi's conception of truth:

> Gandhi could not regard truth either as solely the object of reason or as simply the product of human decision. For him . . . truth is nothing less than the splendor of reality and cannot be gained without an understanding of the Eternal Law of Nature, but when it is perceived and seized it must be acted upon. In this sense truth must be both discovered and created, found and enacted . . . In this activist view of truth . . . it is not enough for thought to be

> based upon truth; the life of the thinker must express it, must represent it visibly in his actions.[35]

Science, as it is commonly understood, endeavors above all to arrive upon true statements (or propositions that can be said to be correct representations of reality) and is ultimately indifferent in regard to issues of how one should go about seeking to directly experience this reality (or even the question if one ever can). It should be noted here that Gandhi advocates not so much a religion of ideology but, in the words of Joseph Prabhu, of "transformative experience" that "implies a radical openness to truth, both human and divine, that induces us to negate . . . the ego and root our consciousness in a deeper reality."[36] For Gandhi, the examples and testimonies of the great practitioners of the world's religious traditions is too compelling to ignore when constructing a social framework for advancing understandings of truth.

Furthermore, modern understandings have enabled citizens to make a compelling case against dogmatic religions. However, the neglect liberal societies have shown toward the socially embedded aspects of the individual virtually ensures that significant segments of their populations will be drawn to anti-democratic religious groups that can (at the very least) be said to affirm such aspects but that also undermine prospects for liberalism. I will seek to show the significance Gandhi's use of universalistic religious language has for realizing the core liberal values of pluralism and public justification. I will argue that for liberals this kind of language should be preferable to the narrow, secular language they have traditionally emphasized when engaging in public deliberation. Additionally, I will aim to further explicate the ramifications of these points concerning equality and the privileging of a broad conception of truth have for readily noticed problems in liberal societies that stem from value disagreements. However, given the centrality the value of freedom has for liberals it is worthwhile to specifically consider, as I will in the next chapter, Gandhi's take on the question of what it means for a people to genuinely be free. As we will see, individuals developing the qualities the Mahatma associates with nonviolence is for him indispensable for realizing a society that can accurately be described as free. Since Gandhi sees these qualities to be at the heart of the world's great religious traditions, my arguments in chapter 3 will further substantiate my conclusion that for him overt government incorporation of religious language is required for liberalism's prospects.

CONCLUSION

When asked his thoughts on Western civilization Gandhi famously replied "I think it would be a good idea."[37] In this chapter I have considered that presumed paragon of Western civilization—the liberal political order from

the standpoint of Gandhian philosophy. We have to a great extent seen why (particularly in regard to the affirmation of pluralism and the realization of social harmony) Gandhi would say the liberal state has largely remained a concept and not a lived reality. In subsequent chapters I will strive to shed greater light on Gandhi's thought by filling in what he sees the details are for creating such a reality.

NOTES

1. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 39.
2. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 301.
3. Emmanuela Ceva, *Interactive Justice: A Procedural Approach to Value Conflict in Politics* (London: Routledge Publishers, 2016), 16.
4. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi vol. 14*, (New Delhi: Indian Government Publications Division), 260.
5. M. K. Gandhi in *The Gandhi Reader* ed. Jack Homer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956), 105.
6. M. K. Gandhi in *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol IV* ed. Narayan Shriman (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1969), 121.
7. M. K. Gandhi in *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa*, *vol. III* ed. N. Shriman (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1968).
8. M. K. Gandhi in *The Gandhi Reader*, 107.
9. M. K. Gandhi in *Studies in Gandhism*, 11–12.
10. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 84.
11. Ceva, *Interactive Justice*, 124.
12. Ceva, *Interactive Justice*, 120.
13. Gandhi in *Young India* January 5, 1924.
14. S. P. Verma, "Satyagraha and Democracy," in *Non-Violence and Saytagraha*, eds. Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998), 147.
15. Anuradha Veeravalli, *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2014), 55.
16. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 44.
17. Gandhi in *Young India* August 8, 1929.
18. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), 32–33.
19. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi vol. 48* (New Delhi: Indian government publications division), 189.
20. M. K. Gandhi, quoted in *Studies in Gandhism*, 44.
21. Bhikhu Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy* (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), 115–16.
22. Antonio Gramsci, ed., *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
23. M. K. Gandhi *My Non-Violence*, ed. Sailesh Bandopadhaya, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1966), 115.
24. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* vol. 48, 189.
25. Ramashray Roy, "Modernity, Violence and Gandhi" in *Non-Violence and Saytagraha,* eds. Subrata Mukherjee, Sushila Ramaswamy (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998), 292.
26. Sammy Roth, "After a Year of Disasters, Al Gore still has hope on Climate Change," *USA Today*, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2018/01/09/after-year-disasters-al-gore-still-has-hope-climate-change/1014605001/.
27. M. K. Gandhi, quoted in *Studies in Gandhism*, 59–60.

28. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol II* (Ahemebad: Navajivan Trust, 1961), 332.
29. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. II*, 308.
30. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. I,* 268–69.
31. Joseph Prabhu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics" in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century,* ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2008), 174.
32. M .K. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing, 1987), 48.
33. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism*, 43.
34. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism*, 54.
35. M. K. Gandhi, in *The Moral Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi.* ed. Raghavaan Iyer (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1986), 154.
36. Prabhu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics," 175.
37. "'What Do You Think of Western Civilization?' 'I Think It Would Be a Good Idea,'" Quote Investigator, last modified April 23, 2013, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/23/good-idea/.

Chapter Three

Modern Day Freedom from Gandhi's Perspective

Gandhi's indictment of modern civilization has been well noted and chronicled by many over the century plus since the publication of his seminal *Hind Swaraj*. In this chapter, I will seek to draw out what the implications are of the Mahatma's criticisms of modern society for making sense of his prescriptions for liberal democracy. Gandhi's profound criticisms are indicated by his remarks that "The science of war leads one to dictatorship pure and simple. The science of nonviolence can alone lead one to pure democracy."[1]

In particular, I will explicitly connect Gandhi's conclusions about the ills of centralization with his thoughts about individual freedom. I will then show why Gandhi holds the development of nonviolent qualities among the citizenry is essential for avoiding the heavy centralization of state functions that he sees as inherently antithetical to individual liberty (a core liberal value). This discussion will, in turn, provide a segue for better exploring the strong role Gandhi believes religion should have in public life. The implications that this view has for standard liberal understandings will then be explicated.

I will argue that though it is unrealistic to believe that all members of society can be persuaded to accept a Gandhian view of religion, such a view can nonetheless be thought of as a much more promising alternative to the view of religious neutrality liberals have advocated as the official state position. Indeed, I maintain that there exists no prima facie basis to suppose that calling for this kind of alternative to be taken up by the state is any less realistic than standard liberal expectations that religious considerations should be absent from the public sphere altogether. Thus, I will argue that official promotion of religion in the way called for Gandhi can actually enable greater overall realization of liberal ideals. My main argument here can be summarized as follows:

1. Decentralized control is essential for an ideal Gandhian society to flourish.
2. Genuine decentralized control requires the development of nonviolent qualities among the populace.
3. Religious teachings are necessary for the adequate and widespread development of nonviolent qualities among the populace.
4. Thus, an official pro-active religious approach by the state is essential for a Gandhian liberal society to flourish.

It is notable that for Gandhi a pro-active (indeed nonviolent) approach toward religion on the part of the state is conducive to religious communities themselves existing in a way that is in line with core liberal principles. Thus, even with regard to religion (and not just the state) Gandhi saw nonviolent practices to be key for the proper development of democratic structures. Ultimately, I will aim to show that if the Gandhian religious understanding were adopted as a kind of official and procedural "background" position that comprises a broader context the state can refer to when doing things like educating children and adjudicating between conflicting religious claims realization of an ideal liberal society can be more realistically pursued. I'm mindful of complications that have ensued from state attempts to determine what is and is not essential to a religion.[2] However, above all such instances show that attempts by the liberal state to clarify the true nature of religion are ultimately unavoidable given the common tendency religious groups have shown to engage in practices that clash with standard liberal values (particularly John Stuart Mill's personal liberty principle). Indeed, this point underscores Gandhi's insight that true religion is inseparable from true politics. For him, our modern day insistence on a strict, hierarchal separation between the two serves to hamper their mutual development (and thus that of the citizenry). I will seek to explicate the ways in which for Gandhi overt promotion by the state of a religious perspective is actually required for liberal values (i.e., based as they are on reverence for the individual) to flourish.

ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CENTRALIZATION AND THE LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

While theoretical points regarding the evils of "Big Government" are often heard in popular political discussions within liberal societies, Gandhi exhibited a truly unique awareness of problems centralization pose for the prospects of liberalism. This point is indicated by the serious unease Gandhi's recommendations for the present age evokes from conventionally labeled conservatives and liberals alike. These recommendations however are steeped in a still common negative understanding of government:

> The State represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The individual has a soul, but as the State is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence . . . I look upon an increase of the power of the State with the greatest fear, because all the while apparently doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress.[3]

Though his words seem to echo often heard libertarian sentiments, unlike popular critics of "Big Government" Gandhi is insistent that the kinds of problems alluded to above require leeriness toward the concentration of economic and military power. For him the liberal reverence for individual freedom demands no less. Indeed, to Gandhi that liberals have intended for their economic systems to be organized in such a way that individuals make the greatest possible number of decisions is a fact lamentable in its irony. What's more is that from Gandhi's perspective the liberal tendency to discuss national wealth within a context that is free from any considerations of what capacities and dispositions humans must first have to find value in that which is said to comprise a nation's wealth only perpetuates obstacles for realizing liberal economic ideals. Such is the basis for his conclusion, "We must search for wealth not in the bowels of the earth, but the hearts of men . . . the true law of economics is that men should be maintained in the best possible health, both of mind and body, and in the highest honor."[4]

In keeping with conventional liberal understandings, for Gandhi the place of the individual is sacrosanct to a society. This can be seen most clearly in the approach he favored for pursuing social change. As Gandhi associate and biographer N. R. Malkani noted:

> (Gandhi) insisted that real change is inner and of mental attitudes. Without such a basic change no tensions could be eased and no human problems could be solved. Therefore, he gave the most concentrated and personal attention to individuals.[5]

Elsewhere Malkani observed:

> According to (Gandhi) human progress is generally due to the individual and not to a group. It is the individual who knows the good, realizes it in himself and relates it consciously or unconsciously to the good of others. In fact the good of man is not a political or social question but a philosophical question, which only individuals can understand.[6]

Thus, we can conclude for Gandhi it follows that in stifling the individual, modern society inevitably stifles human progress. This is the case to him regardless of how many material comforts and technological advancements can be attributed to this society.

Gandhi holds that as long as members of a society are at the mercy of what faraway, behemoth and impersonal institutions do for their most basic needs to get met they can never enjoy meaningful freedom. As Bose states:

> Instead of producing quickly and in great bulk by centralized technology, and then taking a roundabout way of expensive distribution, Gandhi's idea was to organize both production and consumption as close to one another as possible. This is the essence of his theory of (a) decentralized economy through which men and women can attain a measure of economic freedom never guaranteed to them under opposite conditions.[7]

Gandhi extols the economic system he envisions:

> When production and consumption both become localized, the temptation to speed up production, indefinitely and at any price, disappears. All the endless difficulties and problems that our present-day economic system presents, too, would then come to an end. There would be no unnatural accumulation of hoards in the pockets of the few, and want in the midst of plenty in regard to the rest. You see that these nations are able to exploit the so-called weaker or unorganized races of the world. Once these races gain this elementary knowledge, and decide that they are no more going to be exploited, they will be satisfied with what they can provide themselves. Mass-production, then, at least where the vital necessities are concerned, will disappear.[8]

Though Gandhi here is specifically discussing his theory in the context of colonial practices toward entire nations, it is clear that his points are applicable to relationships that hold among different economic classes within the same country. As recent political events have underscored unnatural accumulation of hoards in the pockets of the few, and want in the midst of plenty in regard to the rest are undeniable aspects of life in the most commonly revered liberal societies (which also happen to be the most industrialized ones). These aspects are also antithetical to the widespread attainment of individual liberty. Here it is pertinent that Gandhi's criticisms of the British Empire included the charge that it deliberately centralized political authority to serve England's commercial interests.[9] That Indian society has not decentralized in the ways he proposed makes it all the more likely that Gandhi would not consider present day India to be an independent nation. For him it seems that any country living under a heavily centralized economic system is essentially occupied by an imperial power regardless of what formal declarations of freedom the world believes apply to it. As Niranjan Ramakrishnan puts it:

> Ultimately, the roots of Gandhi's suspicion of industrialism lay in his central preoccupation, the liberation of the human being. . . . Outsourcing one's daily needs to others, and soon to unseen hands far away, meant the inevitable rise of dependency and erosion of self-determination.[10]

Gandhi's proclamation that "The sum and substance of what I want to say is that the individual person should have control over the things that are necessary for the sustenance of life."[11] underscores Ramakrishnan's conclusion.

For my purposes, it is particularly notable that to Gandhi the development of nonviolent characteristics (which he sees the quality of detachment to underlie) among a population is essential for its members to be satisfied with what they themselves can produce and therefore to be more genuinely free and powerful decision makers. As Gandhi puts it, "When we find there are many things that we cannot get in India, we must try to do without them. We have to do without many things which we may consider necessary . . . so you will feel freer men than you are now."[12] We need only think about the massive levels of debt amassed by those in the present age to grasp the relevance of Gandhi's words here. The drive to acquire greater material comforts has corresponded with (and is largely responsible for) individuals existing in a virtual state of servility to the centralized financial institutions of our time.

The connection between the development of nonviolent characteristics and a people being free is clearly evident to anyone who simply considers both the direct and indirect violence we can attribute to the demands of supporting and maintaining the centralized economic institutions of our times. As we saw in the last chapter, Gandhi criticizes modern civilization for making bodily welfare "the object of life." For him the link between this kind of focus on bodily concerns and violence is clear:

> If people try, they can reduce their wants and, as the latter diminish, they become happier, more peaceful and healthier. From the standpoint of pure truth, the body, too, is a possession. It has been truly said that desire for enjoyment creates bodies for the soul and sustains them. When this desire vanishes, there remains no further need for the body and man is free from the vicious cycle of births and deaths. The soul is omnipresent; why should she care to be confined within the cage-like body, or do evil and even kill for the sake of that cage? We thus arrive at the ideal of total renunciation and learn the use of the body for the purposes of service so long as it exists, so much so that service, and not bread, becomes for us the stuff of life. We eat and drink, sleep and wake, for service alone. Such an attitude of mind brings us real happiness and the beatific vision in the fullness of time. Let us all examine ourselves from this standpoint.[13]

As has been readily evident with regard to American society and oil, when people demand goods in quantities that are much greater than what is actually necessary for their basic well-being they are more inclined to think that violence is an acceptable means for securing and protecting these goods. Hence, such examples help to illustrate the connection Gandhi notes between

the development of nonviolent characteristics and a people being free (which to him involves the willingness to go without).

Accordingly, for Gandhi genuine nonviolence on the part of individuals requires them to possess a high degree of detachment—something entailed by the willing establishment of the kind of economic system Gandhi calls for. In addition, Gandhi steadfastly holds that at their core the central message of all the great religious traditions is the same—renouncement (detachment) is the proper path for humans to follow.

We can see then that since the development of nonviolent characteristics among a population is essential to Gandhi for its members to truly be free, it would follow to him that overt promotion of religious ideas by the state is necessary for individual freedom to be realized. Such is implied in *Hind Swaraj*:

> Civilization is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path to duty. Performance of duty and observance of morality are convertible terms. To observe morality is to attain mastery over our mind and our passions. So doing, we know ourselves. The Gujarati equivalent for civilization means "good conduct."[14]

Undeniably, Gandhi incorporates religious language in the above passage given his advocacy of mastering mind and passions (common themes in Indian religion). The inseparable connection in his mind between religion and morality is underscored elsewhere by his remark "morals, ethics, and religion are convertible terms."[15] Of course to Gandhi it is also imperative that the religious ideas advanced by the state do not themselves perpetuate mentalities of violence (which he associates with the "religion of the prison house").[16] Thus, we can begin to see the distinctive Gandhian understanding of religion here given that he deemed it essential for the development of civic virtues but did not consider it to be inherently divisive.

The connections in Gandhi's philosophy between individual liberty, nonviolence, and religion become perhaps more apparent when we consider matters of national security. Though the maxim (typically attributed to Ben Franklin) that "those who would sacrifice their liberty for a little bit of security are deserving neither of liberty nor security" is well known in liberal societies, the degree to which Gandhi affirms this insight, especially in comparison to modern day liberals, is unprecedented. This point can be noticed when we consider key aspects of Gandhian nonviolence. So strong is the Mahatma's commitment to the practice of nonviolence that he is unwilling to concede that the prospect of dying gives one adequate reason for foregoing this commitment. Thus he asserts, "Just as one must learn the art of killing in the training for violence, so one must learn the art of dying in the training for nonviolence. Violence does not mean emancipation from fear, but discover-

ing the means of combating the cause of fear. Nonviolence, on the other hand, has no cause of fear."[17] Given (among other conspicuous realities) the enormous resources modern liberal societies devote to their defense Gandhi's words here clearly depart from attitudes common among modern liberals.

Notably, however, Matthew Rukgaber provides a Kantian basis to criticize commonly heard arguments made within American society—the society that is perhaps (historically) most closely associated with political liberalism. Given Kant's standing within the liberal philosophical tradition, Rukgaber's insights are quite pertinent to this discussion. Regarding the claim that guns are necessary to securing one's life and thus her rights and happiness Rukgaber argues:

> Kant would see such an idea as "opposed to *liberality* of the mind . . . that is, opposed to the principle of independence from everything except the law." According to Kant this is a way of defrauding ourselves. If in fact we live in a society in which moral impurity and depravity, along with easy access to guns, make us fundamentally unsafe, then Kant's response is not to then grant us more power to take the law into our own hands or to revolt or to continually deceive to survive. Instead, we are faced with a failure in the arranging of society according to laws of equality.[18]

In response to the notion that when imperfections of government policing endanger one's so-called natural rights that individual must take up violent means to protect those rights, Rukgaber states "Such a view refuses to recognize that accepting just such a risk is a part of what is required in entering the domain of 'public right' or 'civil society.'"[19] What's more is that Rukgar maintains that Kant would agree with the conclusion that widespread availability of firearms works to make a society less free insofar as it perpetuates the desire for force over others as well as to use people for one's own purposes.[20]

Given the focus of this chapter, it is particularly significant that the prioritizing of moral worth and the willingness to fearlessly accept an increased likelihood of dying as part of one's commitment to greater philosophical truths are essential aspects of Gandhi's recommendations to the individual. Thus, Rukgaber shows a basis for thinking that moral qualities affirmed by Gandhi as indispensable for the practice of nonviolence must ultimately be promulgated among the citizenry in a genuinely liberal state. To Gandhi publicly incorporating so-called "religious" language is acceptable (and most likely necessary) for this kind of promulgation to happen.

For the Mahatma freedom from fear (particularly from the fear of death) is essential for a person to not only become fully nonviolent but for her to be genuinely liberated. We can see why he would think this given that the fear of death has been central to the process by which a centralized military complex has been able to dominate in liberal states. Gandhi clearly implies as

much when he states: "I suggest that, if India is to evolve along nonviolent lines, it will have to decentralize many things. Centralization cannot be sustained and defended without adequate force . . . Rurally organized India will run less risk of foreign invasion than urbanized India, well equipped with military forces."[21] It does not stretch credulity to think that by allowing themselves to be overtaken by this fear, citizens in liberal states have (however consciously) undermined their own liberty. For further indication of this point one need only consider the endangered state of civil liberties that so many have lamented in these places. Thus, a clear connection emerges between nonviolent qualities among a population and that population's freedom. The prevalence of talk of individual liberties in the modern age notwithstanding, Gandhi sees de-centralization (whether in regard to a society's economic or political system or its defense) to be essential for genuinely upholding the place of the individual. He states further:

> Society based on non-violence can only consist of groups settled in villages in which voluntary co-operation is the condition of dignified and peaceful existence. A society which anticipates and provides for meeting violence with violence will either lead a precarious life or create big cities and magazines for defense purposes. It is not unreasonable to presume from the state of Europe that its cities, its monster factories and huge armaments are so intimately interrelated that the one cannot exist without the other.[22]

In chapter 5, I will elaborate in greater detail upon the actual nature of the village communities Gandhi has in mind above. For now, the important takeaway is that present day societies that are classified as liberal are not decentralized in the ways Gandhi envisioned. Additionally, very little state action that is conducive for realizing Gandhian de-centralization is evident in these places. As we see above, Gandhi holds that a centralized system can only be maintained by violence. Such systems, we can also see, undermine prospects for achieving social equality insofar as they entail the unequal concentration of power and resources. Thus, it follows for Gandhi that the so-called modern democratic states are not really all that liberal. His comments below indicate as much:

> Asian and African races are exploited for their partial benefit, and they, on their part, are being exploited by the ruling class or caste under the sacred name of democracy. At the root, therefore, the disease appears to be the same as in India. The same remedy is, therefore, likely to be applicable. Shorn of all the camouflage, the exploitation of the masses of Europe is sustained by violence.[23]

Given these statements we can more clearly see the basis for Gandhi's insistence that genuine democracy requires the explicit development of nonvio-

lent qualities among the citizenry. Such character development is the remedy he is referring to above. Ultimately, Gandhi holds that when a civilization makes the acquisition of material comforts its main priority its members will inevitably fail to be content with what they can produce and develop on their own. Thus he concludes that such a society will not be able to organize itself in an autonomous, de-centralized manner that does not require violence and exploitation of individuals both within and outside of its borders. Indira and Balaji summarize Gandhi's objections to centralization, "Centralization as a system is inconsistent with the nonviolent structure of society."[24]

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATE

Since it is not controversial to hold that the state has legitimate reason to be involved in both economic and military matters the connections Gandhi draws between these matters and personal liberty are clearly relevant to those, like self-professed liberals, who prioritize the freedom of the individual when considering the ideal state. Moreover, as Vinit Haksar puts it "The job of the state is to create conditions (through education, and other such means) under which we have to make fewer . . . compromises (between considerations of justice and pragmatic ones)."[25] In other words, state action is needed to allow for liberal values to flourish. For Gandhi such action necessarily entails a particular view of religion that has been notably absent from modern society. Underscoring Gandhi's view is the undeniable role religious teachings have played in instilling attitudes of detachment and fearlessness regarding death.

A likely liberal response here would emphasize both the undesirability of the state favoring one religious community over others as well as the viability of the notion that the state can advance civic virtues in a way that makes no reference to specific theological beliefs. Notably, at times Gandhi seems to even share common liberal understandings of the value of church state separation. He spoke approvingly, for example, of the disdain members of the Indian National Congress had for India becoming a theocratic state and was rather unequivocal in opposing state funded religious education.[26] Writing in *Harijan* Gandhi declares, "I do not believe that the State can concern itself or cope with religious education. I believe that religious education must be the sole concern of religious associations." I will now consider likely liberal responses to my conclusions. In the process, I will show the compatibility these conclusions have with Gandhi's positions noted above.

GANDHIAN RELIGION UNDERSTOOD AS A VIABLE STATE POSITION

As has been well noted by others (see Haksar 2001), and as pleasant as it may be to think otherwise, taking sides on particular religious matters is ultimately unavoidable even for liberal governments. Commonly thought of examples of laws that prohibit so-called "honor killings" and denying medical treatment to gravely ill children adequately substantiate this point. When religious practices clash with the honoring of liberal ideals official state decisions about what is and is not essential to a religion are both necessary and justified. Since the liberal state must inevitably arrive upon and promote a particular understanding of religion and since for Gandhi it the conspicuous absence of such an understanding that has hampered genuine realization of the liberal state he would hold that it is incumbent on the state to engage in the overt advancement of a particular religious understanding. It is the specific details of this understanding, not that it is religious nature, that is most crucial to the Mahatma. In other words, does the "official, state religion" bring us closer to creating a nonviolent society? Thus, Gandhi states:

> For me there is no politics without religion—not the religion of the superstitious and the blind, religion that hates and fights, but the universal Religion of Toleration. Politics without morality is a thing to be avoided.[27]

It should not be lost here that Gandhi identifies the standard liberal value of tolerance to be essential to his understanding of religion (which in turn he sees to be essential to politics). In the next chapter, I will show that for the Mahatma appeal to religious concepts is ultimately indispensable for advancing the liberal project insofar as they provide a basis by which core liberal values can be genuinely understood and accepted.

Since the liberal state must inevitably draw conclusions regarding what is essential to a given religion Gandhi's conception of religion can viably serve as a procedural device given that this conception is line with what deliberators could be expected to agree with when in a Rawlsian kind of original position. Such individuals, after all, would not know whether they will belong to a religious minority or whether religious practices they personally find abhorrent would become dominant without state involvement. Thus, especially given its necessity for realizing liberal ideals, it does not seem problematic to think that a Gandhian religious understanding should actively be promoted and advanced by the state.

Consider the characteristics Parekh identifies as being essential to Gandhi for classifying a group as religious:[28]

1. Emphasis on the quality of adherents lives.

2. Openness to transformative dialogue with others.
3. Respect for adherents own interpretations of core doctrines as well as their willingness to make use of what they find valuable in other traditions.
4. Affirmation of living nonviolently with the outside world.

In addition to the above characteristics, it is clear that to Gandhi genuine religion must include an active dimension by which adherents feel motivated to engage in and seek to improve the outside world. It is this last feature that is particularly relevant to questions relating to the liberal project. Finding examples of particular faith communities that fail to uphold and even openly disregard these characteristics (that are so central to Gandhi's approach to religion) is not difficult. However, for my purposes it is sufficient to think of the above characteristics as plausibly providing a framework by which public deliberation on religious matters can proceed.

After all, affirmation of those characteristics is clearly entailed by core liberal values such as tolerance, respect for the individual, freedom from dogma, and the peaceful resolving of conflicts. What's more (and to reiterate) it is unavoidable for liberal states to take a stand on what is and is not essential to a religion. Additionally, given the necessity he sees for such an inclusive understanding of religion to flourish in a genuinely liberal society for Gandhi the state should actively work to promote and advance this kind of understanding and not just refer to it when adjudicating conflicts. Such an undertaking seems no more problematic than the already prevalent liberal state efforts to promote and advance multicultural tolerance and can indeed be regarded as a subspecies of such efforts. Moreover, as Joseph Raz has shown[29] realization of multicultural tolerance in a society requires going beyond establishing basic policies of nondiscrimination and the recognition of formal rights and must involve the active promotion of certain attitudes—a point I will explore more fully in chapter 5. I maintain that a Gandhian understanding of religion is ideal for promoting such attitudes within a state and can thus enable a population to better develop virtues necessary for liberalism to flourish.

Significantly, in the above cited passage, when Gandhi asserts his opposition to state funded religious education he also writes, "Do not mix up religion and ethics. I believe that fundamental ethics is common to all religions. Teaching of fundamental ethics is undoubtedly a function of the State." It is the active government promotion of religious teachings that are consistent with and that underscore this essential commonality Gandhi sees in all religions that, I hold, he takes to be necessary for anything like the liberal state to prosper. After all, if (as we saw in the last chapter) Gandhi thinks modern civilization has gone wrong by becoming irreligious and if it is true that fundamental ethics is both common and essential to all religions and if, in

addition, teaching such ethics is a legitimate state function there is no prima facie reason to suppose Gandhi would find state promotion of religion (in and of itself) to be objectionable. On the contrary, given that (for many of us at least) when ethical teachings are couched in religious terminology they inspire our greatest devotion we can see why for Gandhi the active promotion of religion is necessary for realization of a more ideal state. In spite of long running liberal attempts to completely secularize the public sphere Gandhi's declaration "So long as the seed of morality is not watered by religion, it cannot sprout"[30] holds for so many in society. Thus, it would not be incidental, from Gandhi's standpoint, that many of the great reform movements our world has seen (like the American civil rights movement and Dorothy Day's Catholic worker one) have been characterized by the devout adherence of their members to cherished religious principles. Veeravalli discusses the essential role individual conscience has in Gandhian democracy. In her discussion she indicates the integral place of religion to this democracy:

> In the history of civilizations, it is the discourse of the community of saints and martyrs that has constituted the genealogy of witnesses to the call of conscience. Gandhi's attempt . . . is to make the social and political experiment in the affirmation of conscience possible.[31]

Later I will discuss why for Gandhi it is the religious interpretations of the saints and martyrs mentioned above that should guide public policy regarding religion. For now, it is sufficient to note that if we can think of individual conscience as an indispensable source by which collective understanding can be advanced the relation between religion and individual conscience (and thus advancements in collective understanding) is evident. Indeed, by the state more fully incorporating religious language in public deliberations and the promotion of activities as well as by it actively advancing ideas classified under the rubric of religion members of a liberal society can go beyond narrow conceptions of truth that have had the effect of leading to them to reject religious insights altogether. They will, in other words, better grasp the diverse ways truth can be noticed. It should not be lost that, for Gandhi, when our understanding of truth is broadened we are better able to develop to our fullness and thus as citizens.

Furthermore, by actively incorporating Gandhian religious language when it deliberates and pursues policy the state will clearly have a broadened ability to justify its actions to members of a diverse society. This point significantly relates to the prospects for realizing a liberal society that is in line with Ceva's earlier noted characterization (which emphasizes the essentiality of public justification). This reasoning is nicely illustrated (as well as related to a central liberal concern) by Joseph Prabhu:

> It is a feature of some moral statements that they can be differently interpreted and justified and yet be shown to have validity at different levels of understanding. Thus, the precept of honesty can be justified on the grounds of prudence ("honest is the best policy"), or of promoting trust and social harmony in society (utilitarian), safeguarding one's own integrity and righteousness before the law (Kant), as duty owed to others as autonomous moral agents (Kant and some versions of Christianity), as a cosmic obligation (a dharmic justification), to mention only some possibilities. Likewise, people may agree on certain human rights, even though they ground those rights quite differently. In a similar spirit, Gandhi wanted his teaching of nonviolence to have the widest possible adherence.[32]

Gandhi recognizes and is sensitive to the fact that many need a personal, rather than impersonal, conception of God to develop spiritually. Likewise, he also sees that many need for the great ethical truths which enable social progress to occur to be couched in religious language before they can be grasped.

Additionally, given his view that the great world religions complement one another, it is plausible to think Gandhi is calling for a pooling of religious insights that is entailed by the social trustee model he advocates for controlling resources.[33] Central to such a model, after all, is the pooling of human talents from those who comprise a society's different groups. By explicitly incorporating religious concepts in its activities it would seem that a government can better implement this kind of model given the different ways in which citizens are motivated by their religious beliefs and values.

What's more is that an approach which seeks to justify state policy on universalistic religious grounds (and is thus in keeping with a Gandhian understanding of religion) would help enable the development among the citizenry of a mind-set which regards religious beliefs neither as more important than or subordinate to civil matters. Such an approach, in other words, would keep the public from assuming (as it so commonly does in liberal societies) that religion and politics must necessarily have an antithetical relationship. Instead both spheres can more easily be thought of as complimenting one another when the state no longer avoids discussing and promoting political objectives within a religious framework that is conducive to those objectives. It would seem that such a result would ultimately benefit both church and state and be in line with Gandhi's assertion that "Each (nationalism and religion) was equal to the other in its own place."[34] Thus, he concludes "No man who values his religion as also his nationalism can barter away the one for the other."

Notably, in the above passage concerning state supported religious instruction, Gandhi also declares "By religion I have not in mind fundamental ethics but what goes by the name of denominationalism. We have suffered enough from State-aided religion and a State Church." Thus, Gandhi clearly

implies a distinction between permissible and impermissible state religious promotion.

A consideration of Gandhi's understanding of the relationship between religion and politics within the context of the famous "Lemon test" further illuminates this discussion. This three-part test resulted from the 1971 *Lemon v. Kurtzman* U.S. Supreme Court ruling which held that a law that required the state of Rhode Island to pay the salary of parochial school teachers was unconstitutional. In American society, officials have used the Lemon test as a guide for determining what the proper level of government involvement with religion should be.[35] One paragraph of the *Lemon v. Kurtzman* ruling provides the basis for this test:

> Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

For Gandhi it is problematic to assume (as the Court does above) that secular legislative purposes can be clearly demarcated from spiritual ones. It is widely accepted, in fact, that legislative bodies should advance moral purposes (which many can only understand using categories of religion). What's more, is that to Gandhi (as we've seen above) fundamental ethics is common to all religions. Given that for him the philosophical commitments entailed in our basic ethical judgments are no more controversial than those implied by accepting the understanding of religion he puts forth, Gandhi's point that religion and politics are ultimately inseparable cannot be so easily dismissed. Furthermore, we can understand the promotion of a society that is more in line with core liberal values to be an acceptable legislative purpose (even if it means that society will be, by the standards of conventional thinking, less secular). Therefore, it follows to Gandhi that advancing religion and thus furthering government entanglement with it should not be a cause for concern provided that doing so will serve this purpose.

In place of the Lemon test, Gandhi can be understood as offering something like the following guide for determining the appropriate limits for interaction between religion and government (as those institutions are commonly conceived by liberals): Government endorsement of religious perspectives should be encouraged given that doing so not only promotes clear liberal objectives but is more broadly in line with the demands of fundamental ethics and does not reasonably conflict with how the adherents of the great world religions understand their own respective faith traditions. I will now turn to further clarifying the precise nature of the distinction Gandhi sees between acceptable and un-acceptable government endorsement of re-

ligion as well as exploring the concrete prescriptions it entails for pursuit of the liberal project.

CONCLUSION

The self-image of the modern age notwithstanding, the institutional realities of this period are such that (from Gandhi's standpoint anyway) those who live in it cannot genuinely know freedom. For him these realities are merely the natural outgrowth however of individuals lacking qualities that he associates with the mind-set and practices of nonviolence. Thus, he concludes realization of freedom requires the development of nonviolent qualities among the general populace. Clearly, Gandhi does not think such a prospect is realizable unless religion is formally incorporated in political (government) activity. Given the value of freedom to the liberal project, it now becomes crucial to show how religion and politics can be combined in the ways Gandhi envisions without undermining individual freedom. Doing so, after all, will make it clear that Gandhian philosophy is of great relevance to liberals. So begins the focus of chapter 4.

NOTES

1. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. 74* (New Delhi: Indian Government Publications Division), 89.
2. Vinit Haksar, *Rights, Communities, and Civil Disobedience: Liberalism and Gandhi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 76–ff.
3. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol 65* (New Delhi: Indian Government Publications Division), 318.
4. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. 8*, (New Delhi: Indian Government Publications Division), 325.
5. N. R. Malkani, *Ramblings and Reminiscences of Gandhiji* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1972), 120.
6. Malkani, *Ramblings and Reminiscences of Gandhiji*, 116.
7. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 24–25.
8. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 24–25.
9. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 101.
10. Niranjan Ramakrishan, *Reading Gandhi in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), 105.
11. M. K. Gandhi, quoted in quoted in Richard Sorabji, *Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 123.
12. Gandhi, M. K. *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi,* ed. G.A. Natesan (Madras: Natesan & Co, 1933), 336 and 138.
13. M. K. Gandhi in *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. III*, ed. Raghavan Iyer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 474.
14. M. K. Gandhi in *The Gandhi Reader*, 108.
15. M. K. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1999), 148.
16. Glynn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education*. (Oxford: University Press, 2001), 60.
17. Gandhi, writing in *Harijan* September 1st 1940.

18. Matthew Rukgaber, "Guns and Lies: A Kantian Criticism of the Supposed Right to Bear Arms" *The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence* 17, no. 2. (Fall 2017): 135.

19. Matthew Rukgaber, "Guns and Lies: A Kantian Criticism of the Supposed Right to Bear Arms," 131.

20. Matthew Rukgaber, "Guns and Lies: A Kantian Criticism of the Supposed Right to Bear Arms," 132.

21. M. K. Gandhi, writing in *Harijan* December 30, 1939.

22. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 39.

23. M. K. Gandhi, writing in *Harijan*, January 18, 1942.

24. Indira, S. and Balaji M, "Gandhian political decentralization—A contribution to democratic development," https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/politics1.htm .

25. Vinit Haksar, *Rights, Communities, and Civil Disobedience: Liberalism and Gandhi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 100.

26. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. II*, 326–327.

27. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. II*, 308.

28. Douglas Allen, ed. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the 21st Century* (Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield Publishing 2008), 10–11.

29. Joseph Raz, *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics* (Oxford: University Press, 1995).

30. M. K. Gandhi quoted in Joseph Prabu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics," 174.

31. Anuradha Veeravalli, *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* (London: Ashgate Publishers 2014), 68.

32. Joseph Prabhu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics," 165.

33. Chatterjee, Margaret. *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press (1983), 116.

34. *In Search of the Supreme.* Vol. II p. 328.

35. U.S. Constitution, "Lemon Test," accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.usconstitution.net/lemon.html.

Chapter Four

Gandhi's Religious Thought as Compatible with and Conducive to Liberalism

In this chapter I will discuss Gandhi's understandings of religion specifically within the context of commonly expressed liberal concerns regarding state promotion of religion. I will show that the particular conception of religion advanced by Gandhi is not only capable of adequately addressing concerns liberals have raised about mixing church and state but that active state advancement of a Gandhian kind of religion would better enable the realization of core liberal objectives. My points have particular relevance for the objectives of adequately justifying policies to all members of society (which we've seen can be thought of as an essential feature of liberalism), of creating the social conditions by which a greater shared understanding of truth can attained, of the establishment of a social structure that is both pluralistic and ideologically unified, and of bolstering the common liberal view that the main purpose of government is to secure human rights. I will give special emphasis to the sense of equality and feelings of social camaraderie that I see naturally engendered by the promotion of something like a Gandhian religion.

ON LIBERAL PREFERENCES FOR SUPPOSED NEUTRALITY

Before more fully elaborating on these points it is necessary to consider immediate objections that liberals raise to proposals to include the advancement of religion within the functions of a government. It is commonly sup-

posed that any such advancement would, contrary to Gandhi's apparent preferences, ultimately undermine the prospects for liberalism. I hope to show here that Gandhi's ability to seriously challenge such deeply embedded assumptions is significant to his overall remarkability as a political thinker.

In considering objections raised to proposals involving government advancement of religion some of the same basic concerns can be noticed. First, it is commonly claimed that if government actively promotes religion it will inevitably and unjustly exclude from society those with religious persuasions that differ from the beliefs that are actually promoted. Also, in criticizing the kinds of religious based proposals I take Gandhi to advance it is argued that government promotion of religion naturally fuels sectarian conflicts brought about by the grabs for power that have commonly followed state establishment of a religion. Related to this concern, it is supposed that government promotion of religion necessarily entails unacceptable coercion regarding a matter that is private to each citizen. Such concerns contrast sharply, it seems, with the Mahatma's famous declaration that "I can say without the slightest hesitation . . . that those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means."[1] Elsewhere, Gandhi states "My politics and all other activities of mine, are derived from my religion. I go further and say that every activity of a man of religion must be derived from his religion."[2] I maintain that a thorough clarification of Gandhi's conception of religion shows that his support of mixing religion and politics is no more controversial than, say, widely engaged in government efforts to "de-radicalize" so-called Muslim fundamentalists. Indeed, for Gandhi the kind of government promotion of religion he calls for is essential to prevent a moral decay among the citizenry that is no less troublesome than what is perpetuated by Muslim "radicals."

A serious consideration of what he means in the above quotes indicate that Gandhi regards genuine religion to be inherently incompatible with the kinds of exclusionary and coercive practices liberals fear. This point is underscored by Gandhi's attempt to define "God" in such a way that honors the value he sees in even the atheist's position. As alluded to earlier, in speaking to atheists in Lausanne the Mahatma stated,

> (Not) even atheists have denied the necessity or power of Truth. Not only so. In their passion for discovering the truth they have not hesitated even to deny the very existence of God—from their own point of view rightly. And it was because of their reasoning that I saw that I was not going to say "God is Truth" but "Truth is God."[3]

Thus, Chatterjee concludes, "Even in the . . . no-man's land of unbelief he finds, as he did (at) Lausanne, a quest for truth, a healthy impatience with shibboleths."[4] Clearly, Gandhi understands genuine religion to not only be

inseparable from politics but also as all inclusive. Therefore, for him it would be a mistake to suppose that government promotion of religion necessarily entails exclusion of some from the public sphere on the basis of their religious beliefs (or, in other words, departure from the affirmation of pluralism). Gandhi calls for government promotion of religion in a way that is, above all, pluralistic—in a way, in other words, that strives to publicly accommodate all the great religions and not favor one over others. As noted by Robert Baird, this understanding is in line with the politicized version of Hinduism that was influential during Gandhi's time; according to which the state should be secular, not in the sense of being Godless, but in the sense of no one religion being privileged.[5] In a similar vein, Chatterjee concludes:

> Secularism for (Gandhi) . . . does not mean an aseptic allegiance to the rational and the scientific, a careful avoidance of the sacred, but respect for all men and all faiths . . . The secularist function of religion was none other than the activism of religion when it had been purged of obscurantism, and doctrinal barriers. The religious instinct could be harnessed to bring about conflict resolution, for this instinct bore within itself the seed of sensitivity to social injustice.[6]

Thus, we can understand Gandhi's declaration "(The) great world religions other than Christianity professed in India were no less true than Christianity."[7]

Furthermore, (as we saw in the last chapter) we must remember that Gandhi sees the affirmation of living nonviolently with the world to be an essential quality of any religion. Coercion is central to violence and violence need not be physical—as Gandhi notes in expressing his misgivings toward socialism.[8] Thus, it is clear that the nature of the kind of religion he calls for government to involve itself with would naturally preclude the coercion of citizens (at least in ways that are any less acceptable than already common government practices which involve affirmation of value judgments).

Given these conclusions, for Gandhi it would follow that it is a mistake to conclude that government promotion of religion must inevitably lead to the power struggles, sectarian conflicts or acts of coercion that have historically seemed to go hand in hand with such promotion. On the contrary, for Gandhi it is only when government functions are infused with a true religious sense (in other words they seek activism of the religious spirit) can anything like a genuine liberal society be realized.

STATE AFFIRMATION OF GANDHIAN RELIGION AND LIBERAL OBJECTIVES

Specific examples of how Gandhi handled social conflicts in his time and in which (at least at a superficial level) religious beliefs were central is instructive for understanding how state promotion of a Gandhian kind of religion would actually better enable fulfillment of core liberal objectives. For my purposes, two such examples are particularly notable—Gandhi's campaign against untouchability and his opposition to child marriages. On both the issue of untouchability and that of child marriage not only does Gandhi take a position in line with common liberal notions but he does so in a way that affirms (and does not undermine) religious understandings. Regarding the former issue Gandhi states "Suppose . . . I discovered that untouchability was really an integral part of Hinduism, I should have to wander in the wilderness because the other creeds as I know them . . . would not satisfy my highest aspirations."[9] However, he also declares "I am here to tell you that there is no warrant in the Shastras (Vedic rules) for untouchability . . . therefore, it is sinful to deny entrance into our temples to Harijans (untouchables)."[10] Thus we can see that Gandhi is able to justify his position on this divisive social issue in a way that is more acceptable to broader segments of society than if he relied solely on either discursive reason or sacred texts to make his case. Again, we should note in summarizing his efforts to respond to certain Hindu priests who, in justifying untouchability, appealed to the authority of sacred scripture Gandhi remarked "I appealed to their reason. I appealed to their humanity. And I appealed to the Hinduism in them."[11]

On the matter of untouchability as well as on that of child marriages Gandhi demonstrates how incorporating religious understandings in attempts to decide a public policy allows for greater fulfillment of the liberal project insofar as public justification is integral to that project. It is not insignificant for Gandhi that in India today support of untouchability (like that of child marriages) is not a conventional part of either the religious or political realms. This situation is indeed parallel to how conventional understanding has changed in both the American political arena as well as within its religious communities regarding segregation after civil rights activists overtly incorporated religious elements within their campaigns. As with the practice of untouchability in Indian society the level of resolution reached on the issue of segregation in America is clearly not evident in regard to other divisive matters that disputants have continually sought to resolve in either purely secular or religious terms.

Related to enhancing the prospects for better fulfillment of the objective of public justification is the consideration that state affirmation of a Gandhian kind of religion better allows for a more complete collective realization of truth. At least since John Stuart Mill's famous defense of his liberty

principle[12] liberal political philosophy has emphasized the value of enabling greater overall pursuit of truth and understanding. Historically, liberals have thought of religion as an obstacle to this pursuit since they have seen it as incompatible with reason. That Gandhi thinks of genuine religion as not antithetical to reason and that he has a much broader and comprehensive conception of truth than popularly accepted understandings of the concept is very relevant here. These aspects of Gandhian thought further underscore that his philosophy not only can overcome common liberal objections but that it offers constructive insights by which liberals can more successfully fulfill their social objectives.

It is worth reiterating that in regard to the importance he sees of religious beliefs not clashing with reason Gandhi states, "I decline to be bound by any interpretation, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason or moral sense."[13] Additionally, he remarks "Every formula of religion has . . . to submit to the acid of reason and universal justice if it is to ask for universal consent. Error can claim no exemption even if it can be supported by the world's religious scriptures."[14] Thus, commenting on the place of reason in Gandhi's religious thought Chatterjee writes:

> He was by no means unaware of the tussle between reason and unexamined belief . . . But he often found that there were very good reasons for what simple people did by instinct, and in such cases he acted as a mediator in the task of persuading others . . . of the sound sense behind popular belief or practice. Where a practice was found to be against reason and in defiance of man's (sic) moral sense, he had no hesitation in denouncing it.[15]

Parekh, we should remember, similarly concludes that for Gandhi, "Every belief must 'pass the test' of reason, but that did not mean that it could not transcend or go beyond it. Reason laid down the minimum not the maximum, and specified what we may not but not what we must belief."[16] Within the corpus of Gandhi's writings many passages add a greater context to this interpretation. On the matter, for example, of whether reason should be the ultimate judge in deciding what to believe Gandhi writes:

> Reason has its place, only it must not usurp the heart. If you will go through any twenty-four hours of the life of the most reasoning man you know, you will find that most of his acts done during that time are done by feeling, not by reasoning. The moral is that reason once developed acts automatically and rejects what is superstitious or immoral if the heart is sound. Reason is a corrective and is in its place when it remains at the door ever watchful, never moving . . . . Life is duty, i.e. action. When this is reasoned away, reason has become a usurper and must be dethroned.[17]
>
> Everything has to submit to the acid test of reason . . . There are undoubtedly things in the world which transcend reason. We do not refuse to bring them on the anvil of reason but they will not come themselves. By their nature

> they defy reason. Such is the mystery of the Deity. It is not inconsistent with reason, it is beyond it.[18]

The above quotations indicate that Gandhi understands religion is such a way that his recommendations for including it in the political sphere are indeed capable of assuaging liberal concerns that doing so would undermine reason's place in society.

In this context, Hindu reform movements witnessed in India which predate Gandhi's campaigns (e.g., Ram Mohan Roy's Brahmo Samaj, Ramkrishna's Mission) are both relevant and instructive. Given that several of these movements have been characterized by the affirmation of reason and plurality as well as the eschewal of traditional practices that can accurately be described as oppressive it is not problematic to think of some of them at least as examples of liberalizing currents found within Indian history. In commenting on the contributions of the Brahmo Samaj to Indian society, Gandhi states:

> Brahmo Samaj . . . has rescued the educated classes of India . . . from unbelief . . . The service of the Brahmo Samaj lies in its liberalizing and rationalizing Hinduism. It has always cultivated a toleration of other faiths and other movements, and it has tried to keep the fountain source of religion pure and to hold up the ideal of pure worship of the Supreme Being.[19]

Gandhi's above assessment starkly contrasts with the one he offers of the fundamentalist Arya Samaj reform movement (founded by Dayanand Saraswati). Notably, this movement has commanded more widespread adherence among the Indian masses than the one founded by Ram Mohan Roy. Regarding Saraswati's work *Satyartha Prakash* (called the Arya Samaj Bible) as well as the movement's popularity the Mahatma writes:

> I have not read a more disappointing book from a reformer so great. He has claimed to stand for truth and nothing less. But he has unconsciously misrepresented Jainism, Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism itself. One having even a cursory acquaintance with these faiths could easily discover the errors in which the great reformer was betrayed. He has tried to make narrow one of the most tolerant and liberal of the faiths on the face of the earth. And an iconoclast though he was, he has succeeded in enthroning idolatry in the subtlest form. For he has idolized the letter of the Vedas and tried to prove the existence in the Vedas of everything known to science. The Arya Samaj flourishes in my humble opinion not because of the inherent merit of the teachings of Satyartha Prakash but because of the grand and lofty character of the founder.[20]

More than possibly revealing Gandhi's overall liberal bona fides, his statements above (when contrasted with what he wrote about the Brahmo Samaj)

indicate that he does not see genuine faith to be in conflict with reason. Indeed, it is clear that Gandhi would think a person of true faith should never be fearful of what reason may find. Ram Mohan Roy, after all, was known to practice a kind of Hinduism that welcomed external influences which did not contradict the spirit of reason.[21] Furthermore, Gandhi acknowledges that the Bramhos "are indeed few"[22] yet (as we also see above) explains the flourishing of the Arya Samaj movement in terms of the concrete qualities exhibited in the life of its founder. We should note that Saraswati upheld traditional Hindu practices and rituals that have typically been anathema to the educated classes. Since Gandhi never stopped affirming the value of traditional religious practices, we can see a likely stumbling block that Gandhian religion presented like-minded reformers of his time. Thus, the fact that this kind of religion has never been particularly well received by the learned segments of Indian society should not be so surprising. Indeed, these points, provide a useful context in which to better understand Rabindranth Tagore's claim that the religiously inspired ascetic practices Gandhi famously engaged in and championed were ultimately a kind of self-inflicted violence.[23] It is clear that neither a purely intellectual religion (one that is basically unable to give any real practical guidance for everyday life) nor one that is overtly narrow and exclusivist will do for Gandhi. This point can help explain the overall repudiation of Gandhi's religious thought within Indian society.

Gandhi agrees that those religious beliefs that fail, in Parekh's words, to "pass the test of reason" should be excluded from politics. Given that some shared conception of reason is crucial to publicly justifying policies in the way called for by liberalism this point is significant for understanding Gandhi's recommendations for liberal society. Nicholas Gier provides an argument for thinking that what Gandhi recommends here is, despite liberal protests regarding the influence of religion in public life, most in line with American social reality:

> The Religious Right keeps up its campaigns despite liberal protest, but their ideas are being tested in the liberal domain of public justification. The reason why Gandhi and King were not widely criticized for injecting religion into politics is because their message was always religiously and culturally inclusive. Fundamentalists usually divide and exclude, and we must trust ourselves and our democratic institutions to moderate such views or ban the worst as unconstitutional.[24]

Gandhi's own words make it clear that, though he is insistent that genuine religion cannot be divorced from proper political activity, if the right kind of system is in place we need not assume that intertwining religion with government will bring about sectarian conflict:

> It has been said that Indian Swaraj will be the rule of the majority community, i.e. the Hindus. There could not be a greater mistake than that. If it were to be true, I for one would refuse to call it Swaraj and would fight it will all the strength at my command, for to me Hind Swaraj is the rule of all the people, is the rule of justice. Whether under that rule the ministers were Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs, and whether the legislatures were exclusively filled by the Hindus or Muslims or any other community, they would have to do even-handed justice. And just as no community in India need have any fear of Swaraj being monopolized by any other, even so the English should have no fear. The question of safeguards should not arise at all. Swaraj would be real Swaraj only when there would be no occasion for safeguarding any such rights.[25]

To Gandhi although it is clear that reason is a crucial tool for ruling out the kinds of religious beliefs and practices that should be promoted by the state, he would insist that it is a mistake to conclude that giving the use of reason prominence in determining government policy precludes any state advancement of religion. Ultimately, Gandhi would say that it is a mistake to adopt the common tendency of those in liberal societies to think of reason as giving us any kind of all-encompassing access to truth. Thus, in addressing the place of reason in relation to faith he states:

> That which is beyond reason is surely not unreasonable. Unreasonable belief is blind faith and is often superstition. To ask anybody to believe without proof what is capable of proof would be unreasonable, as for instance asking an intelligent person to believe without proof that the sum of angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. But, for an experienced person to ask another to believe without being able to prove that there is God is humbly to confess his limitations and to ask another to accept in faith the statement of his experience. It is merely a question of that person's credibility. In ordinary matters of life we accept in faith the word of persons on whom we choose to rely although we are often cheated. Why may we not then in matters of life and death accept the testimony of sages all the world over that there is God and that He is to be seen by following Truth and Innocence (non-violence)? . . . True faith is appropriation of the reasoned experience of people whom we believe to have lived a life purified by prayer and penance.[26]

In the next chapter, I will discuss the significance that Gandhi's emphasis on a commonality of spiritual experience (evident in the above passage) has for overcoming concerns that his scheme, in spite of his best intentions, inevitably privileges one belief system over others. More importantly for my purposes here, however, is that for Gandhi incorporating religion into the affairs of the state would better enable creation of the social conditions through which citizens will be more conducive to realizing truths that religious systems can be thought to provide us with unique access to. Douglas Allen gives a nice illustration of this point:

> Gandhi has a view of ultimate reality formulated in terms of satya or Absolute Truth. Such truth, often formulated in terms similar to key passages in the Upanishads, is experienced as a spiritual "Power" or force that is infinite, unconditioned, and beyond language and rational conceptualization. It manifests itself in terms of permanence underlying change, unity underlying diversity, and the most profound ethical and spiritual realization of the indivisible oneness and interconnectedness of all reality . . . Our educational approach must analyze how we are socialized and educated, really miseducated, in ways that prevent us from realizing the reality or truth of the unity and interrelatedness of life.[27]

In the above passage, Allen succinctly reveals the strong connections Gandhi sees between the realization of truth (a traditional liberal value that the Mahatma thinks of in a way that is much broader than liberals are accustomed to) to a specific but non-exclusionary religious insight and the active role of government in bringing the two together. In further describing his understanding of truth Gandhi states it is "that indefinable something which we all feel but which we do not know."[28] As we will see in the next chapter, Gandhi does not think the experience of truth he refers to here is particular to those who identify with a specific religious tradition. Furthermore, his describing this experience "as something we all feel" indicates that he thinks of the concept of reality he is referring to above can be adequately justified to all (in a manner that is consistent with liberalism). It is clear to him, however, that adopting some of the formal language of specific religious traditions is (also for a government) ultimately indispensable for more widely illuminating to the public the true nature of reality. As Allen implies in the passage above, Gandhi maintains a people having consciously grasped this reality has profound social implications.

Regarding the connection Gandhi sees between truth (conceived of in the way Allen describes) and religion Glynn Richards writes:

> Religion is that which underlies all religions; it harmonizes them and gives them reality; it is that element in human nature which seeks to realize the oneness of the Soul and Truth, or God.[29]

Richards's words nicely parallel Chatterjee's statements:

> In religious matters (Gandhi's) own special gift was the ability to see a common human striving, a common human response to a power beyond all understanding, in people bearing diverse religious labels. In refusing to be intimidated by the latter, he was all the more ready to recognize and, even more, to welcome the different ways in which the spirit becomes articulate in men and moves them.[30]

Ultimately, Allen's description indicates that state promotion of religion in the way called for by Gandhi is more in line with the traditional liberal reverence for the pursuit of truth than the practices that have more commonly characterized the ways in which modern governments have treated religious beliefs. Gandhi's recommendations, as they relate to the pursuit of truth, seem to fit nicely with the standard specified by Phillip Kitcher for democratic societies to follow in determining the kinds of scientific endeavors to undertake.[31] Whereas Kitcher emphasizes collective well-being in a way that avoids the pitfalls of what he calls "vulgar democracy" Gandhi can be seen to focus on the comprehensive well-being of the individual (given his total physical, intellectual, and spiritual nature). The Mahatma asserts, "Man is neither intellect nor the gross animal body, nor the heart or soul alone. A proper and harmonious combination of all three is required for the making of the whole man."[32] A government, for example, that properly incorporates religious instruction into its educational system would, according to Gandhi, engender the wholeness he refers to here. Furthermore, he maintains that in doing so, such a government would necessarily advance the prospects for the widespread realization of truth within society.

It is widely acknowledged (certainly by political liberals) that the methods of science are, by themselves, insufficient for establishing ethical truths. Liberalism is, of course, a political philosophy and thus entails the unequivocal acceptance of certain ethical truth claims. When liberals, however, extol values like free inquiry they invariably make reference only to goods brought about by scientific achievements. We can thus better see how a circumscribed and narrow conception of truth seriously limits the liberal project. By not seeking truth in a way that goes beyond what science can establish, members of society are impeded from a deeper experiential grasp of the concept. For Gandhi it is only this kind of grasp—that is facilitated by the insights religion provides—that can underlie successful realization of the social values that are central to liberal political philosophy.

Notably the affirmation of a broad, all-encompassing conception of truth which all have some limited hold on and that requires direct individual experience to be grasped would help to assuage commonly expressed concerns in liberal societies—specifically those which relate to matters concerning how inquiry should be constrained. As exemplified by Gandhi's life, seeking this kind of truth entails empathically taking on the perspectives of others which, in turn, implies nonviolent practice. Such an approach to realizing truth would therefore preclude, say, unethical lab research since research of this kind is not congruent with having empathy toward those test subjects who are harmed. Thus we can notice the practical significance of conceiving truth in a way that does not merely relegate the quest for it to scientific activity. Gandhi declares:

> It is clear . . . that without Ahimsa (nonviolence) it is not possible to seek and find Truth. Ahimsa and Truth are so interwined, that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They are like the two sides of a coin, or rather of a smooth unstamped metallic disc. Who can say, which is the obverse, and which is the reverse? Nevertheless Ahimsa is the means; Truth is the end.[33]

Notwithstanding whatever information may be produced by ethically questionable scientific experiments, the plausibility of Gandhi's words above is not so hard to notice. We can take the Mahatma to mean that nonviolence is required for genuine progress to be had in the quest for truth. Though it may seem that valuable knowledge has been gained by (for example) performing lab tests that cause great suffering to nonhumans, such gains are more than offset by the loss of and threats to moral advancement entailed by unethical research. For Gandhi it follows, in fact, that when research endeavors move us away from realizing the unity and interrelatedness of life that Allen refers to above they are actually hampering the advancement of our grasp of truth (regardless of how things may appear at a superficial level).

When considered within the context of Kitcher's inquiry the richly distinct nature of Gandhi's recommendations for the liberal project become evident. Gandhi calls on us to resist, for example, becoming content with a state of affairs in which scientific advancement is allowed to displace valuable human labor. For him it is only after we have consciously committed to doing so can we be assured that our scientific endeavors are in line with our collective well-being or with, what Gandhi calls, "sarvodaya" (the uplift of all). Development of core virtues that the great religious traditions have historically emphasized is essential to such a commitment. Thus, Gandhi sees the interdependence of science and religion for enabling genuine democracy. Chatterjee nicely summaries these connections:

> If the Hindu and Jain ideas of purification are given full play . . . if the idea of the interdependence of the economic, social, political, and religious factors in a society are thought through, we begin to see that Gandhi's approach was on a very different wavelength from that of those who see the main religious problem of (the modern age) as that of coming to terms with secularism.[34]

What's more, as is entailed by its emphasis on unity, the understanding of truth Gandhi calls for the state to play an active role in enabling the realization of is one that engenders a sense of equality among all. Thus, what Gandhi is calling for can be said to go to the core of the liberal project (insofar as liberalism is said to go hand in hand with affirmation of social equality). Significantly, the Gandhian notion of sarvodaya is distinct from common utilitarian understandings (which are widely seen to also emphasize social equality). For the Mahatma, bringing about the uplift of all should not

be taken to imply a reduction of anyone's happiness but rather the development of everyone's character in such a way that no one's contentedness will be lessened by doing without certain material comforts. Furthermore, by incorporating something very much like John Rawls's "difference principle" into his thinking Gandhi can be understood to supplement concern for the general welfare of all with considerations of justice. This point further underscores the compatibility of Gandhian thought with political liberalism. He advances a procedural test which implies that differences are acceptable only when they are to the benefit of the least well-off in society:

> I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man [woman] whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it restore him [her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to swaraj [freedom] for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then you will find your doubts and your self melt away.[35]

Notably, decades before the publication of *A Theory of Justice*, Gandhi enunciates a principle helpful to John Rawls's project:

> Every individual must have the fullest liberty to use his talents consistently with equal use by his neighbors, but no one is entitled to the arbitrary use of the gains from the talents. He is part of . . . the social structure surrounding him. Therefore he can use his talents not for self only but for the social structure of which he is but a part and on whose sufferance he lives.[36]

Gandhi incorporates the concept of a trusteeship in his discussion of what political liberty in regard to the use of personal talents should entail. In so doing he can be said to provide a resource to Rawls whose procedural device (the original position) aims to nullify the effects of special contingencies.[37] Gandhi's approach can be said to not only place overt emphasis on equality but to provide an accessible framework by which citizens can be given a clear basis for accepting this value. Therefore, it seems this approach entails constructively working to instill a sense of equality among the citizenry at large and is thus more in tune with creating a genuinely liberal society than one that expects the state to do no more than simply enforce codes of nondiscrimination to bring about social equality.

Furthermore, since Gandhi takes nonviolence (and not justice) to be the first social virtue his scheme is not vulnerable to a particularly serious charge leveled against Rawls's theory—that it is incapable of ensuring the presence of healthy community life. As Annette Baier has argued, the justice perspective cannot give citizens a basis for going beyond what is minimally required

for social institutions to stay in place when they interact with one another.[38] As we saw in chapter 1, Gandhi holds nonviolent practice to entail identification with others. It follows (perhaps analytically) that identification is a kind of relationship (clearly for Gandhi it is exemplified in serving the other) in addition to a state that enables the realization of genuine equality. Thus, in taking steps to develop nonviolent qualities among its citizenry (which for Gandhi implies actively promoting certain religious understandings) the state will naturally facilitate relationships that preclude the social isolation that is often taken to be part and parcel of liberal social structures.

The relation Gandhi sees his broad, encompassing notion of truth to have to the practice of nonviolence (which, to reiterate, for him entails identification with others) is worth considering further here. As Allen notes further:

> (Gandhi insists) we cannot use violent means to achieve ethical and spiritual ends. In the means-ends analysis, immoral violent means lead to immoral violent ends. However, Gandhi is also making a major ontological claim . . . that goes beyond this ethical analysis. Nonviolence is a powerful bonding and unifying force that brings us together in caring, loving, cooperative relations; that allow us to realize and act consistent with the interconnectedness and unity of all life. Violence, by way of contrast, maximizes ontological separateness and divisiveness, and is based on the fundamental belief that the other . . . is essentially different from me or us. In other words, in Gandhi's education, violence and hatred are not only unethical, but are also inconsistent with the absolute truth of reality, whereas nonviolence and love are the ethical means for realizing the truth of reality.[39]

It bears further noting that Martin Luther King makes similar points in his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail"—a work widely revered in the liberal tradition. In explaining the unjustness of segregation laws, King writes:

> All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound; it is morally wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich has said that sin is separation. Is not segregation an existential expression of man's tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness?[40]

It is significant that we can plausibly see in this section the repudiation of separateness (which is seen as an obstacle to achieving genuine social equality) to be key to Hindu, Christian, as well as Jewish thought. This in itself underscores Gandhi's conclusions (noted earlier) that at their core all the

great religious systems emphasize universal principles that do not clash with one another and thus state promotion of religion need not necessarily entail divisiveness. Furthermore, the kind of relations Allen describes above most clearly exemplify the value of equality and the eschewal of dominating oppressive systems that liberals are so well known for. Thus, promotion of nonviolence by the state can again be seen as necessary for realization of the liberal project.

It is worth noting that liberal attempts to promote religious pluralism have generally emphasized its centrality for achieving social harmony but not for realizing truth (which for Gandhi entails realization of a fundamental unity with all that exists). This point underscores the differences between how Gandhi postulates truth and how the concept has been understood traditionally within the liberal tradition and may therefore, at least partially, explain why a Gandhian understanding of religion has not flourished within liberal societies. Though liberals affirm the value of realizing truth what they are referring to when, say, extolling the virtues of free enquiry is not the unifying, experiential Gandhian conception of truth. Underlying this conception is a sense of interconnectedness that is alien to liberal discourse. For Gandhi, to reiterate, genuine promotion of truth necessarily involves promotion of nonviolence and must overtly include religious language to be most effective. Ultimately, there is no reason to suppose that truth must be conceived of in the comparatively narrow terms presupposed by Enlightenment thinkers before liberalism can promote the pursuit of it as an essential social good.

Finally, when nonviolence (like truth) is understood in a broad and comprehensive manner we can see that active state promotion of nonviolence can also better enable citizens to become the kinds of people for whom talk of liberal freedoms is genuinely meaningful. Let us recall Bose's words from chapter 2 "Gandhi believes that the root of the problem does not lie in the authority of the State, but in the character of the individual which has made the existence of the State possible." As we saw in the last chapter, for Gandhi heavy centralization by the state (particularly in regard to economic and military matters) is actually antithetical to the creation of a system in which individual liberties can flourish. It is when the individual has developed character traits that to Gandhi are essential for living nonviolently that she can forego the enticements and comforts offered by the centralized state (e.g., a feeling of protection from a violent death, the fulfilling of artificial desires). These traits include fearlessness, simplicity, and selflessness as it is the individual who has acquired these to a significant degree who can not only resist external domination but will most clearly demonstrate nonviolence in her actions. As Gandhi told Morehouse College president, Benjamin Mays "Non-violence . . . is three-fourths invisible, and so the effect (of it) is in the inverse ratio to its invisibility."[41] That these are the kinds of traits that are commonly celebrated within the world's great religious traditions under-

scores that for Gandhi active state promotion of religion is vital for the realization of a genuinely liberal society. Ultimately, it is the world's great religious traditions that can best inspire large masses of the population to develop the kinds of traits that are necessary for living nonviolently and thus for truly being free.

It is from this context that Gandhi's remarks concerning the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be most clearly understood:

> All rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done . . . From this fundamental statement perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of man and woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.[42]

In chapter 6, I will explore in greater detail the implications Gandhi's statements here have for his views on how we should think of honoring rights—a matter with obvious relevance to liberal political philosophy. For now it is important to remember that, we saw in the last chapter, Gandhi holds that the "performance of duty and observance of morality are convertible terms" and that "fundamental ethics is common to all religions." Thus, it is clear that for Gandhi the place of religion is ultimately indispensable for creating a world in which the rights of all can truly flourish—a world, in other words, that is in line with the core aspirations of the liberal project.

CONCLUSION

The directive to "keep your religion out of our politics" is one liberals feel a seemingly natural affinity with. Indeed, it seems that such a directive necessarily follows from the precepts of liberalism. There is perhaps no better indication of Gandhi's uniqueness as a political thinker however than his ability to not only successfully intertwine religion and politics but to conceive of religion in a way that demonstrates its indispensability to the liberal project. Far from concluding it is an obstacle to genuine social progress, Gandhi insightfully shows that it is both necessary for such progress and that we should not take its inclusion in public life to entail the unsavory outcomes liberals fear. In the next chapter, I will consider specific ways such inclusion can be pursued. Thus, I will seek to better substantiate Gandhi's unique insights.

NOTES

1. M. K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 454.
2. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2002), 179.
3. M. K. Gandhi, in *Select Speeches*, ed. B. K. Ahluwalia (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1969), 272.
4. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 179.
5. R. D. Baird, *Religion in modern India* Vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1981)
6. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought*. Notre Dame: University Press, 1983), 120.
7. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, 71.
8. N. R. Malkani, *Ramblings and Reminiscences of Gandhiji* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1972), 98.
9. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, 154.
10. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, 180.
11. B. R. Ambedkar, *Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar Writings and Speeches* (Bombay: Government of Maharastra, 1989), 223.
12. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.utilitarianism.com/ol/one.html.
13. M. K. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1987), 31.
14. M. K. Gandhi, writing in *Young India* February 26th 1925, 74.
15. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 8.
16. Bhiku Parekh, *Gandhi* (Oxford: University Press 1997), 29.
17. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. I, 94.
18. M. K. Gandhi, writing *Young India* March 26th 1925,110.
19. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, 276–ff.
20. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, p. 279.
21. Percival Spear, *A History of India (Vol II.) from the 16th- to the 20th Century* (New Delhi: Pelican Books 1965), 164.
22. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. III, 278.
23. Predgrag Cicovacki, "Author Meets Critics: Gandhi's Footprints," *The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence* 16, nos. 1–2. (Fall/Winter 2016–2017): 51.
24. Nicolas F. Gier, "Nonviolence as a Civic Virtue," 124.
25. M. K. Gandhi quoted in N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 43.
26. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme* Vol. I, 101–2.
27. Douglas Allen, "Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Violence, Nonviolence, and Education," in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2008), 50.
28. M. K. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing 1987), v.
29. Glynn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56.
30. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 115.
31. Phillip Kitcher, *Science, Truth, and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), Ch. 10–ff.
32. M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* Vol 65 (New Delhi: Indian Government Publications Division), 74.
33. M. K. Gandhi, *Yeravda Mandir* (Ahemedbad: Navajivan Press 1957), 8.
34. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),120.

35. M. K. Gandhi, "Gandhi's Talisman," accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.mkgandhi.org/gquots1.htm.
36. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*. (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 54.
37. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*. (Oxford: University Press, 1973), 136.
38. Annette Baier, "The Need for More Than Justice" in *Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory*, eds Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), 41–ff.
39. Douglas Allen, "Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Violence, Nonviolence, and Education," 50.
40. Martin Luther King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 563.
41. M. K. Gandhi in *The Gandhi Reader*, ed. Jack Homer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956), 311.
42. M. K. Gandhi, "Gandhi On Corresponding Duties/Rights," accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/gondutiesrights.htm.

Chapter Five

On Practical Aspects

I have elaborated upon and argued for the plausibility of Gandhi's recommendations to proponents of the liberal project. I have particularly focused on the essential role Gandhi sees for religion in politics. My discussion so far has largely been theoretical. It remains to be seen what concrete, practical implications follow from the Mahatma's recommendations. Clearly, liberal unease with mixing religion and politics rests on fears regarding the supposed unsavory consequences such intermingling would necessarily bring. These consequences are often conceived in terms of sectarian conflicts that would disrupt social harmony. In this chapter, I will discuss more fully the everyday practical import of Gandhi's recommendations. Specifically, I will consider some actual policies that are implied by these recommendations as well as the overall effects for everyday life which should be sought by their implementation.

It may seem that this discussion is only relevant to volunteer and civic groups (and not the State *per se*). We should remember, however, that legislative action taken by the State can enhance or diminish the prospects for volunteer groups to successfully realize their proper aims. Thus, the acceptability of proactive efforts on the part of the State to, for example, make public funds and spaces available to communities that overtly identify as religious is one clear implication of my points in this chapter. Ultimately, the points advanced here should not be understood as only being germane to civil society. It is my contention that the arguments developed below can offer some guidance by which decisions can be reached regarding what the actual limits should be of particular official State action toward religion.

Before turning to more concrete matters, it is necessary to briefly address some more theoretical concerns. As we've seen in the last chapter, Gandhi's conception of ultimate reality (which for him is synonymous with truth) is

that of an absolute unity or oneness of all that is. Though this metaphysical picture is central to many Indian traditions (particularly the Vedanta one) it is by no means universal to all religious traditions. Thus, it seems that in spite of his best intentions Gandhi's scheme also privileges one faith tradition over others. This problem is ultimately a variation of the one raised by Johan Galtung that peace movements unwittingly impose a kind of violence by imposing a particular conceptual understanding which will unjustifiably exclude some.[1]

Notably, Gier concludes that given the revered place Gandhian philosophy gives to individuality we should not even place Gandhi's political thought within the Vedanta tradition:

> The affirmation of the integrity and reality of the individual is the principle reason why Gandhi cannot be related to pre-modern forms of thought such as Advaita Vedanta. If individuals are ultimately illusory or even derivatively real, the very foundations of Gandhi's engaged ethics and political activism are undermined.[2]

If Gier is correct it would seem that the entire Advaita Vedanta tradition lacks a basis for the kind of engaged ethics and political activism Gandhi championed. Such a conclusion is clearly not congruent with either the dominant tendencies of the Mahatma's religious thought (which we've seen emphasizes realization of an indivisible oneness underlying diversity) or his own professed identifications. Furthermore, as Veeravalli shows it is because the individual is the locus of the voice of conscience that she is so valued in Gandhian political thought. She argues that "(This voice) precludes by definition, any use of force, and any imposition of one's conscience on another. The very nature of conscience is constituted . . . in the non-dualism of self and other and this is the basis of its objectivity."[3] Thus, it is reasonable to think—especially given the importance he places on identification—that only something like the Advaita conception of the self can provide Gandhi with a suitable basis for the overall philosophical system he champions.

Gier's mistake, I think, lies in assuming that Gandhi regards individuality as an inherent rather than instrumental value. Gandhi however declares:

> Individuality is and is not even as a drop in the ocean is an individual and is not. It is not because apart from the ocean it has no existence. It is because the ocean has no existence, if the drop has not, i.e. has no individuality. They are beautifully interdependent. And if this is true of the physical, how much more so of the spiritual world.[4]

By regarding individuality as a starting place (not a final stopping one) by which aspects of a greater, unified reality can be revealed Gandhi is able to affirm its value for an engaged system of ethics in a way that does not clash

with traditional Vedanta thought. I hope to show in this chapter a proper Gandhian resolution to the problem of whether, in his political philosophy, he actually privileges a particular religious understanding over others. This can help to reveal the practical implications of Gandhi's ideas as they relate to the liberal project.

We should keep in mind that even though Gandhi holds reality to be a unified whole he also distinguishes between relative and absolute truth. For him religious teachings that are useful for everyday living can be valued as relative truths even if they seem to conflict with the belief of the oneness of ultimate reality. Furthermore, when these teachings are promoted in a way that is consistent with the characteristics (laid out in chapter 3) that Gandhi sees to be essential for a religious group there is no reason to suppose that he would think such promotion would detract from establishing the kind of society he thinks of as ideal (one which most fully enables liberation of the individual). On the contrary, it seems clear that promoting religious teachings in this way would naturally help bring about such a society even if the teachings themselves may appear to be wrong at an ultimate level. Gandhi states, "If a man worships relative truth, he is sure to attain the Absolute Truth (i.e., God) in the course of time."[5] Furthermore, we should consider the deep reverence Gandhi showed for faiths that seem to explicitly deny the standard monist picture of reality offered by the Vedanta system (specifically Buddhism). Thus, it is clear that he does not think conscious affirmation of a notion of truth that is similar to the one he holds is required for one to be on a path by which such truth (and therefore liberation) will be realized. Such is indicated by his words below:

> Spiritual experiences are shared by us whether we wish it or not—by our lives, not by our speech which is a most imperfect vehicle of experience. Spiritual experiences are deeper even than thought.[6]

For Gandhi, sincere and genuine practice of the tenets associated with any great religious tradition puts one on the path of truth. Such insights are clearly central to his conclusion that instead of seeking greater numbers of converts the followers of the world's great religions should strive to enable their counterparts in other faiths to be better practitioners of those faiths. Furthermore, since to him there is no more important state function than enabling pursuit of truth state activity that is geared toward this end is not only acceptable but crucial for developing the right kind of society. Ultimately, these points concerning his religious thought show that (consistent with dominant liberal tendencies) Gandhi can be thought of as a value pluralist in the sense that he affirms an irreducible plurality of non-conflicting values that can be properly ordered.

It may seem that Gandhi is vulnerable to the charge that his attempts to promote religious harmony unjustifiably exclude certain perspectives. Additionally, it may be claimed that the Mahatma is insistent that others conform to a certain spiritual understanding that he is comfortable with before he will include them in the inter-faith community he envisions. We should remember though that for him it is ultimately a person's actions that determine the legitimacy of her faith and that genuine religious practice demands maintaining a sense humility (and thus an attitude of nonviolence) about what one believes to be true. Such is the case even though Gandhi expressed a seemingly indubitable certainty about the existence of a reality that can only be described as monist. For him this reality, like the truths declared by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, is self-evident. Furthermore, among and within human cultures the world over Gandhi notices a universal acknowledgement of and receptiveness to this reality however conscious we may be of it. Ultimately, the caveats he places on assessing and pursuing religious insight precludes the possibility that philosophical criticisms that may be leveled against his religious thought indicate serious problems for state advancement of religion in the ways he envisioned.

When considering the possible practical import of Gandhi's recommendations for liberal society it is helpful to further clarify his understanding of a free (sovereign) society. As we saw in chapter 2, Gandhi regards the belief that power comes through Legislative Assemblies to be "a grave error brought about by inertia or hypnotism." Instead he maintains "that power resides in the people and it is entrusted for the time being to those whom they may choose as their representatives." What's more, Gandhi states:

> It must be remembered that only an infinitesimal proportion of the people can hold positions of responsibility and power in a country's government. Experience all the world over shows that the real power and wealth are possessed by people outside the group that holds the rein of Government. [7]

Clearly Gandhi seems overly dismissive of the significant role national leaders play in the State. Ultimately, the lack of an adequate account of the place of a federal system is a notable deficiency in Gandhian political thought. We should, however, keep the above statements in mind when considering the obvious fact that present day political leaders are unlikely to be swayed to include Gandhian principles of truth and nonviolence when implementing public policies. Furthermore, though it is likewise not realistic to think that great segments of the citizenry can become Gandhi like exemplars of nonviolent practice it does not follow that public policies that are intentionally geared toward promoting such practice are without value. Bose, in explicating Gandhi's reasoning on this point, further shows his unique contributions to political thought:

> He held that non-violence, in order to be a practical ideal, could not afford to wait *until* every individual had become perfect (emphasis in original). According to him, it was open to common men and women, in combination, to try and become progressively more perfect even while they carried on the battle against wrong and injustice. They were initially to place themselves voluntarily under the discipline of nonviolence; and as their practice became more intelligent and more vitalized by a growing consideration of the opponent less as an enemy and more as a human being and equal, they would also discover that their nonviolence was becoming more and more effective.
>
> Gandhi's originality lay in fashioning a tool of collective non-violence out of what had hitherto lain in the private armory of singularly great individuals.[8]

Ultimately, for Gandhi a truly free nation can be identified not by the sovereignty of its government but by the sovereignty of the people who comprise its civil society. As Veeravalli remarks:

> Gandhi attempts to demonstrate the principles of the sovereignty of the people not only with experiments in civil disobedience or movements in response to specific demands and against unjust laws of the state but, more importantly, through the "constructive program" for the establishment, reform and rejuvenation of social, economic, and political institutions of civil society. This then does not leave the issue of sovereignty only to individual conscience and initiative, such as that of Socrates, but establishes, at the same time, conditions that formulate public opinion and initiate voluntary, collective, civil and nonviolent action constituted by a unity of individual consciences . . . Gandhi's theory of swaraj (self-rule) then presents conditions for the possibility of the sovereignty of civil society as independent of state authority whether native or foreign.[9]

Fred Dallmayr notes that because of Gandhi's suspicion of centralized state power (discussed in chapter 3) he wished to supplement state authority with associations based in civil society that would be "entrusted with the task of moral and political awakening and ethical transformation."[10] Gandhi envisaged the independent, self-sustaining village republic (led by the Panchayat Raj—"elected council of five") to serve this purpose by working at the local "grass roots" level and building freedom from the ground up (so to speak). Above all, in keeping with a broad understanding of nonviolent philosophy as well as the valued place of the individual the voluntary (not coercive) dimension of life under such a council is to be emphasized. Regarding this system Gandhi, in keeping with the discussion from chapter 2 on local efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, states:

> Any village can become such a republic today without much interference, even from the present Government whose sole effective connection with the villages is the execution of village revenue . . . My purpose is to present an

> outline of village government. Here there is perfect democracy based upon individual freedom. The individual is the architect of his own government. [11]

> The nearest approach to civilization based upon non-violence is the erstwhile village republic of India. I admit that it was very crude. I know that there was in it no non-violence of my definition and conception. But the germ was there. [12]

Bose describes further the place of the Panchayat Raj in Gandhian thought:

> It was in (the) insistence upon the human aspect of a question, upon his determined endeavor to reduce abstract conflict of ideas or interests into negotiable human proportions that Gandhi was most typically Indian. In the Panchayat system of rural India, it was possible to bring in human considerations easily, because the problems were usually on a small scale, and the parties or judges worked under the advantage of personal intimacy. [13]

We should note the implicit implications Bose's description has for issues that liberalism continually struggles with (particularly in regard to the place of religion in public life). When such issues rise to a particular level of contention liberal societies have typically sought to resolve them from "on high" by seeking the counsel and guidance of the robed judiciary. The decisions of a small segment of judges are believed to be worthy of the allegiance of an entire population of diverse individuals even though it is never likely that these kinds of deciding bodies can ever command the moral respect of such a large scale group. This problem is noticeable even when decisions are made by so-called lower courts that are meant to apply to smaller jurisdictions. The panchayat alternative Gandhi advocates for handling social conflicts avoids commitment to this kind of unrealistic scenario. The panchayat raj would not pursue abstract resolutions that are divorced from the particular settings and experiences of most who will be effected by them. Such a body requires the establishment of a flourishing civil society and would seek its authority in the moral, not legal, realm. Thus it would be able to adjudicate disagreements in a way that is sensitive to the actual situations of the parties involved and thereby agreeable to them. It would follow then that this system can engender greater degrees of social harmony than what is currently evident in modern liberal societies.

Many examples (particularly in regard to resolving religious conflicts) from Indian history have been cited to show the viability of supplementing state authority with these kinds of associations. [14] Thus, from Gandhi's standpoint it is hardly relevant whether public office holders can be persuaded to accept the principles he enunciates. As long as enough members of civil society can be so persuaded he sees the advancement of these principles to be practically realistic. It is should be remembered however that the Panchayat

Raj system is, from the standpoint of Gandhian thought, meant to supplement and not replace state authority. Therefore, for Gandhi it follows that a genuinely liberal society cannot come into existence in any kind of ideal manner when state action is openly hostile (or even contrary) to either the promotion of individual moral development or the flourishing of civil society.

GANDHI'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND SPECIFIC STATE ACTIONS

It is in regard to state activity that pertains to the promotion of multi-cultural tolerance and the educating of children that the practical importance of Gandhi's recommendations for liberal society can be most clearly noticed. For Gandhi, these endeavors are an integral part of producing an authentic sense of community within a diverse society and thus for also realizing the liberal value of tolerance. What's more, by actively advancing a multi-cultural mind-set and properly including religious instruction within its educational curriculum the state can help to bring about a heartfelt sense of empathy among the diverse members of society. It is certainly beyond implausible to think any state activity can, by itself, be sufficient for producing the ideal Gandhian citizen (one who can exist contently in the decentralized communities described earlier). It stretches credulity no less to believe that present day political leaders would willingly put aside their own self-interests and promote the Gandhian recommendations I've discussed. It is clear however that government action can help to move people closer to realizing the kind of ideals Gandhi draws attention to. There is indeed no reason to suppose that expecting social pursuit of Gandhian ideals is any more unrealistic than the seeking of well-known liberal ideals pertaining to, say, a market driven economy or individual liberties.

Furthermore, I'm aware that complications arise from mere use of the term "multiculturalism." However, given the practical realities that ultimately circumscribe which concrete state actions are feasible in regard to Gandhi's teachings I find the term to be non-problematic for my purposes here. Since there is already basic awareness of as well as notable state efforts to promote multiculturalism in modern day societies discussing specific proposals under the "multicultural" rubric seems to hold the greatest promise for the actual establishment of these proposals.

When citizens share deep feelings of fellowship with one another Gandhi would say that the essential element of an ethical society is in place; that, in other words, the groundwork has been completed for this kind of society to flourish. Thus, it follows for him that by actively taking steps to instill such feelings the state can play a part in significantly moving a people along the path to genuine liberation. Joseph Raz calls for multiculturalism to be pri-

marily thought of "as a way of marking a renewed sensitivity, a heightened awareness of certain issues and certain needs people encounter in today's political reality."[15] Raz states further that "multiculturalism involves more than specific policies. It involves a change in attitudes, and in the ways we understand our societies and think of them."[16] Significantly, when elaborating on the specific policies that he sees to follow from his understanding of multiculturalism Raz does not directly discuss the place religion should have in public life. I will argue in this chapter that when religion is understood in a way similar to how Gandhi thinks of it, it can be included within Raz's proposals and thus not only fill a conspicuous void in Raz's work but also better establish the overall viability of it. Gandhi's religious thought provides resources by which we can better illuminate Raz's claim that "At the heart of multiculturalism lies the recognition that universal values are realized in a variety of different ways in different cultures, and that they are all worthy of respect."[17] This characterization nicely fits with Richards's claim that Gandhi would agree with the conclusion (attributed to Ernst Troeltsch) that "the Divine Life is not One but Many."[18]

Given the explicit nature of religious values as well as the integral place of religion in forming cultural identity, it makes sense to include discussion of religion within Raz's proposals. Additionally, by including religious communities within the proposals Raz puts forward we are more likely to realize a state in which adherents of different faiths naturally interact with one another as well as join collectively to engage in constructive tasks. Such a state would clearly be conducive with Gandhi's vision of diverse people gaining greater insights on truth by learning about the insights offered by others.

MERGING GANDHIAN RELIGION WITH RAZ'S PROPOSALS

Let us now consider four of the concrete policies Raz puts forth:

1. The young of all cultural groups of significant size should be educated, if their parents so desire, in the culture of their groups. But all of them should also be educated to be familiar with the history and traditions of all the main cultures in the country and an attitude of respect for them should be cultivated.
2. The different customs and practices of the different groups should, within the limits of permissible tolerance, be recognized in law and by all public bodies in society, as well as by private companies and organizations that serve the public.

3. There should be a generous policy of public support for autonomous cultural institutions.
4. Public space, streets, squares, parks, shopping arcades, and so on . . . should accommodate all cultural groups.[19]

Within the vast corpus of Gandhi's writings nothing can be found to indicate that the Mahatma would find any of these prescriptions to be objectionable. On the contrary, it seems clear that Gandhi would call for the explicit inclusion of religious groups within Raz's recommendations and (as we will see) would significantly add to those recommendations in his own unique way.

Notably, Raz mentions what he sees to be "significant limits" to promoting the value of tolerance (which for him is the central aim of each of the above policies): Regarding these limits we read further:

> First, all cultural communities should be denied the right to repress their own members . . . Second, no community has a right to be intolerant of those who do not belong to it. All forms of racism or other manifestations of lack of respect should be discouraged by public policy, though not necessarily outlawed or criminalized. Third, the opportunity to leave one's community must be a viable option for its members. There should be a public recognition of a right of exit from one's community. Finally, liberal multiculturalism will require all groups to allow their members access to adequate opportunities for self-expression and for participation in the economic life of the country, and the cultivation of the attitudes and skills required for effective participation in the political culture of the state.[20]

As we saw in chapter 3, for Gandhi essential aspects of a genuine religion include respect for adherents own interpretations of core doctrines and the affirmation of living nonviolently with the outside world. Thus, we can find significant agreement between Raz and Gandhi on what the appropriate limits should be to promoting the standard liberal value of tolerance.

Furthermore, if we understand cultural communities to include religious ones then it would seemingly follow for both Raz and Gandhi that in liberal societies public support should be granted for only those religious communities that themselves affirm liberal values. The ashrams Gandhi established, given the publicly open prayer meetings they hosted as well as their institutional transparency, clearly embodied such values.[21] Applying the standard of affirming liberal values to determine which religious groups get government aid would serve state interests both by advancing liberalism (in a way in which particular policies and decisions can be more broadly justified to a diverse public) and by enabling the inclusion of religious language within the public sphere. We have seen that for Gandhi such inclusion is crucial to realization of the liberal project given the importance he places on religious values.

Significantly, these points also show a legitimate basis for state support of some religious groups (i.e., those whose values are congruent with state functions) over others. When considered in light of the discussions of the last three chapters, it becomes clear that for Gandhi this practice is no more outlandish than the already accepted state enforcement of laws which prohibit religious practices that clash with affirming core liberal values (e.g., honor killings). Indeed, from the standpoint of promoting a nonviolent society it would seem that a government actively supporting groups that promote human flourishing is actually morally preferable to that same government impeding the attempts of others to do what appears correct to them (something present day liberals already accept).

Regarding the marking of a renewed sensitivity that for Raz goes to the heart of multiculturalism, Gandhi's central belief that the world's different religious systems all have a very real but partial grasp of ultimate truth that their adherents can enhance by exposure to the beliefs of others is particularly significant (as it is in regard to fostering a shared sense of equality). This view implies that there exists a real value in the followers of a given religion actively working with their counterparts in other faiths to bring about the right kind of society since by doing so they will develop in their own faith. Such scenarios are in keeping with Gandhi's wish that instead of seeking more converts the followers of the world's religions should do all they can to help those of other faiths become better adherents of those faiths. Thus he advises "Our prayers for others ought never to be: 'God give them the light Thou hast given to me.' But 'Give them all the light and truth they need for their higher development.'"[22] In this vein, Gandhi when remarking on the diversity of religious followers represented in the Ashrams he established states:

> It is with pleasure that I can recall instances of men and women, boys and girls having been induced to know and love their faiths better than they did before if they were also encouraged to study the other faiths with sympathy and respect.[23]

The state can work to facilitate mutually engaged in activities by diverse religious groups and therefore play a crucial role in developing feelings of mutual empathy among its citizens. We can see such facilitating to be one significant way in which Gandhi would add to the specific policies Raz calls for. When discussing the value Gandhi saw of different religious communities working on a common task Chatterjee states:

> One does not sweep differences under the carpet by engaging in common tasks, but prevents them from serving as obstacles to nearness, to that community of spirit which Gandhi himself experienced in his friendships with so

> many different kinds of people and which foreshadowed what a transformed society would be like.[24]

This seems to be a much more promising way for achieving social harmony within a diverse populace than simply seeking enforcement of rights to non-discrimination and publicly emphasizing the importance of tolerance.

It is in regard to the specific kind of religious education that Gandhi advocates that we can more readily notice how his recommendations for liberal society would engender a true sense of tolerance among diverse members of a society. Clearly, Gandhi sees religious instruction to be essential to a proper education. In responding to concerns related to teaching religion in the pluralistic Indian society he states, "if India is not to declare spiritual bankruptcy, religious instruction of its youth must be held to be at least as necessary as secular instruction."[25] What's more Gandhi also insists that "A curriculum of religious instruction should include a study of the tenets of faiths other than one's own."[26] Additionally, many have noted that Gandhi calls on us to study the world's great religions always empathically from the viewpoints of the adherents of those religions.[27] By considering these points in conjunction with Gandhi's aforementioned declaration "I decline to be bound by any interpretation, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason or moral sense." an interesting problem emerges.

If the viewpoints of religious adherents should be our guide in studying the world's scriptures and if we should reject those teachings that are repugnant to our reason or moral sense, then it would seem to follow that there is ample basis for rejecting religious teachings altogether. After all, as Gandhi's own campaigns against untouchability indicates, many of the world's great religious adherents interpret their scriptures in ways that conflict with both reason and moral sense. Clearly then Gandhi would agree that it is not just any viewpoint professed by an adherent (no matter how sincerely held) that should guide us in religious instruction. Nonetheless, as we see above, he maintains that religious instruction is needed for a society to avoid "spiritual bankruptcy." Thus, the particular character of the religious adherent Gandhi thinks we should be guided by when we study another religion becomes important here. Consideration of this issue has broader implications regarding Gandhi's recommendations for the liberal project.

B. R. Ambedkar quotes Hindu scripture in his indictment of the religion.[28] A large part of this indictment consists of his claim that the sacred scriptures of Hinduism justify "inhuman" conduct (e.g., untouchability). Gandhi's reply to Ambedkar goes to the heart of this discussion. We read:

> (Many) of the texts that Dr. Ambedkar quotes . . . cannot be accepted as authentic. The scriptures properly so-called can only be concerned with eternal verities and must appeal to any conscience, i.e. any heart whose eyes of understanding are opened. Nothing can be accepted as the word of God which

> cannot be tested by reason or be capable of being spiritually experienced. And even when you have an expurgated edition of the scriptures, you will need their interpretation. Who is the best interpreter? No learned men surely. Learning there must be. But religion does not live by it. It lives in the experiences of its saints and seers, in their lives and sayings. When all the most learned commentators of the scriptures are utterly forgotten, the accumulated experience of the sages and saints will abide and be an inspiration for ages to come.

Notably, Gandhi's reply—as seen by his reference to that which can appeal to any conscience—emphasizes a very real kind of public justification. Thus, his words above are relevant to liberalism. Furthermore, in keeping with his earlier noted affirmation of the human as an integrated being who is "neither intellect nor the gross animal body, nor the heart or soul alone" Gandhi refuses to separate a genuine understanding of religious scripture from the living of a morally exemplary life. For him the rational acceptance of sacred teachings can be seen as a kind of minimal threshold that must be reached. However, the genuine entirety of one's assent to religious scriptures cannot be accounted for by her intellectual understanding. This point is in keeping with David Hume's famous conclusion that reason is incapable of producing action[29] as well Roy's point (mentioned in chapter 2) that reason cannot reveal the correct basis for social order. Additionally, Gandhi's point here underscores his view that right action is indispensable for proper understanding. Thus he declares, "I concern myself not with belief but with asking to do the right thing. As soon as (we) do it . . . belief rights itself."[30] Ultimately, it is sensible to think that for Gandhi the liberal project has been significantly stigmatized by its attempts to justify policies and procedures to individuals as if they are both ideally and entirely rational persons who will inevitably be persuaded of the merits of state action solely by considerations of logic.

For Gandhi genuine assent to religious teachings necessarily manifests itself in exemplary actions that all members of a diverse society should revere. Thus he holds that we should approach our study of different religions from the perspectives of their own practitioners who have demonstrated such actions. The presence of such individuals can be found in all the great faith traditions. For Gandhi they, and not exclusionary, fundamentalist religious adherents are worthy of guiding us in our study since the later fail to meet the minimal threshold of propounding ideas that do not conflict with reason and moral sense.

It is unproblematic then to glean, from the above discussion, that for Gandhi not only is religious instruction essential to a liberal education but that such instruction should be based on study of the non-contradicting insights and experiences of the great "saints and seers." We all should be able to agree such exemplary figures, who have been deeply inspired by their respective faiths, are present within the entire panoply of diverse religious traditions our world has seen. In maintaining this, Gandhi affirms his com-

mitment to an understanding of truth that is much more dynamic and comprehensive than seemingly can be accommodated by those who assume that a lack of historical or literal basis for scriptural proclamations is sufficient for discounting altogether the value of religion to public life. This commitment is upheld in the distinction Gandhi draws between the "two aspects of Hinduism":

> There are two aspects of Hinduism. There is on the one hand the historical Hinduism with its untouchability, superstitious worship of stocks and stones, animal sacrifice and so on. On the other, we have the Hinduism of the Bhagavad-Gita, the Upanishads and Patanjali's Yogasutras which is the acme of Ahimsa (nonviolence) and the oneness of all creation, pure worship of one immanent, formless, imperishable God. Ahimsa . . . to me is the chief glory of Hinduism.[31]

Clearly, for Gandhi this kind of distinction, which is predicated on moving beyond a narrow and confining conception of truth, is applicable to all the world's great religious traditions. Thus, it seems that the Gandhian conception of truth is better suited than more commonly supposed understandings of the notion for enabling a society to realize core liberal values—adequately justifying policies to diverse segments of a population, establishing an overall sense of social equality, honoring tolerance and pluralistic harmony (among other values).

What's more is that actively promulgating the broad and encompassing conception of truth that Gandhi sees at the heart of all genuine religiosity clearly would enable modern liberal societies to undergo a needed transformation as it would move the members of these societies to go beyond understanding human activity primarily in terms of egoistic drives (e.g., the profit motive). We saw in chapter 3, for example, that centralized economic systems are anathema to Gandhian thought insofar as they undermine social equality and perpetuate violence. Gandhi saw centralized systems to ultimately belie the pursuit of liberal ideals. Following Thomas Hobbes, in the modern world it is assumed that such systems are the inevitable result of "selfish" human nature. Gandhi, it should be noted, understands truth to be synonymous with the core, universal human self. This understanding is implied by the characterization given, in chapter 4, of Gandhian truth as manifested in a spiritual realization of the interconnectedness of all. The implications of conceiving the human self in this way (which for Gandhi follows from broadly seeking truth by including the world's great religious insights in our quest) are rich for the prospects of realizing core liberal values insofar as it can allow for alternatives to the commonly accepted conception of humans as inherently selfish to take hold. In other words, the understanding of the true self that Gandhi sees to follow from an examination of the world's religions lies in sharp contrast with the view (so implicitly prevalent in the

modern world) of a separate, atomized self—a notion that can be seen as a genuine obstacle to realization of liberal ideals. Indeed, it is significant that for Gandhi the process of realizing the self as non-separate and interconnected is prone to begin when formal steps are taken to approach learning of the world's religions in the ways he calls for. One who follows the Gandhian model of religious study would be less likely after all to regard those of other communities as competitors who should be defeated.

In conceiving of truth the way he does Gandhi ultimately puts forth before society an ideal which entails much more than collective acceptance of core personal liberties for all or an agreed upon scientific method. When public policy is advanced in liberal societies with the goal of bringing about a better overall realization of truth it is notable that such policies are typically justified only in terms individual freedoms (à la Mill) or the value of science. By invoking religious thought in his consideration of this goal, Gandhi can be seen to broaden the means by which public policies can be justified and thus receive more support by diverse members of a society.

It can be readily agreed that it is unrealistic in the extreme to suppose that by simply incorporating religious concepts within its activities a government can bring about the kind of society envisioned by Gandhi (one whose members possess virtues like fearlessness and detachment to such a degree that he would say they are really free). However, we have seen in this chapter that there are nonetheless specific concrete steps that even the political leaders in modern societies can pursue to bring people closer to realizing the ideal state of swaraj (self-rule) that so occupied the Mahatma. A lack of general awareness of such possibilities can surely be seen as problematic for the overall prospects of liberalism.

CONCLUSION

When stripped of the external trappings of their dogmas and rituals, religion can be seen as a profound source of insight by which both personal and social transformation can be properly pursued. I have argued that such an understanding of religion—integral to Gandhi's political thought—is necessary for a more successful realization of liberal ideals. It is notable that, as Gandhi shows (specifically by his wish that believers become better followers of their own faiths), this view of religion need not entail the undermining of distinctiveness that is so valuable to the identity of religious adherents. After all, the dogmas and rituals can be understood to be useful tools even though they are not essential elements. Indeed, this conclusion seems to naturally follow from the distinction Gandhi draws between relative and absolute truth. Reflection on the exact nature of this religious conception shows it to be quite capable of overcoming liberal concerns about mixing church and

state in addition to having a capability of filling a necessary role currently absent in modern societies. Furthermore, reflection shows that advancement of such a conception of religion by the liberal state is ultimately no more problematic than the performance of already commonly accepted state functions. Thus, for liberal states to proactively advance a Gandhian understanding of religion is not just acceptable but downright urgent.

NOTES

1. Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *The Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291.
2. Nicholas F. Gier, "Nonviolence as a Civic Virtue," *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2008), 126.
3. Anuradha Veeravalli, *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2014), 68.
4. M. K. Ghandi, *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. II*, ed. Raghavan Iyer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 27.
5. Gandhi, M. K., *All Men Are Brothers* (Ahmadabad: Navajivan Trust, 1960), 78.
6. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 136.
7. M. K. Gandhi writing in *Young India* April 24, 1930.
8. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 113–14.
9. Anuradha Veeravalli, *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2014), 50.
10. Fred Dallmayr, "Gandhi and Islam: A Heart and Mind Unity?" in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century,* ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2008), 157.
11. Gandhi writing in *The Harijan* July 26, 1942.
12. Gandhi writing in *The Harijan* January 13, 1940.
13. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 103–4.
14. Bose *Studies in Gandhism*, 66–ff.
15. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 588.
16. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 591.
17. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 595.
18. Glynn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education* (Oxford: University Press 2001), 62.
19. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 590.
20. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism" in *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Donald C. Abel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 591.
21. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 145.
22. M. K. Gandhi quoted Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 129.
23. M. K. Gandhi, *What is Hinduism?* (New Delhi: Navajivan Trust 1994), 102.
24. Margaret Chatterjee, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 134.
25. Glynn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education* (Oxford: University Press 2001), 59.

26. M. K. Gandhi in *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol VI* ed. Narayan Shriman (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1969), 519.
27. Glynn Richards, *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education* (Oxford: University Press 2001), 59.
28. M. K. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing, 1987), 11.
29. David Hume quoted *in Morality and the Good Life: A Text with Readings,* ed. Robert Solomon (New York: McGraw-Hill 2009), 7–8.
30. M. K. Gandhi, *Truth is God* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust 1955), 145.
31. Gandhi, *The Essence of Hinduism*, 4.

Chapter Six

Gandhi and Liberal Rights

A critique of liberalism would surely not be complete without discussion on the notion of human rights. A distinguishing characteristic (indeed the distinguishing characteristic) of liberal political philosophy for many is its emphasis on this notion. The great paragons of liberal thought (e.g., Kant, Locke, Mill, and Rawls) are both united and emphatic in asserting that individuals have certain fundamental claims against others and that (at the very least) a chief government function lies in protecting and honoring these claims. Furthermore, the characterization of liberalism I have relied upon throughout this work (based as it is on specific understanding of public justification) can be understood as inextricably tied to the notion that above all else citizens have a fundamental right to have the government policies and decisions which effect their lives justified to them. Thus, even though I have made the decision to explicitly include discussion of human rights in this last chapter, it is undeniable that such discussion goes to the core of many of the issues explored here so far.

As we saw in chapter 4, for Gandhi it is misguided (and probably incoherent) to discuss rights without first specifying duties that can be said to correspond with these rights. The Mahatma asserts "All rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done." Going beyond the micro-level, we can interpret Gandhi's statement to instantiate the traditional Hindu teaching that dharma (duty) is required for realizing moksha (freedom). Notably, Gandhi holds that it is only as members of local communities with social ties to particular others that we can understand and carry out our duties.[1] This point additionally bolsters the conclusion that to the Mahatma state support of religion is necessary in establishing an acceptable society since a relational conception of the self can be seen as central to belonging to religious communities.

It is clear that for Gandhi abusing the rights one has received by belonging to a political community is no less problematic than denying individuals rights in the first place. Thus, Gandhi's focus is away from questions like whether rights should be thought of primarily in a negative or positive manner or whether we naturally possess them and is instead on the issue of whether the holder of said rights can be said to have done her part to merit having those rights recognized by others. Furthermore, Gandhi's position on rights contrasts in notable ways from commonly heard conclusions advanced by virtue theorists. Gandhi does not think of rights as unimportant but instead as having such great value that possessing them can only really have worth after someone has become the right kind of person.

From this basic analysis however a seemingly serious problem emerges regarding Gandhi's political philosophy. If for any rights to be in place the holder of said rights must first successfully perform some duty then it would seem to follow that it is acceptable to deny those who have (for whatever reason) failed in this performance the rights liberals commonly deem to be basic human ones. After all such individuals, on Gandhi's analysis, have not done the necessary work to be deserving of any rights in spite of the standard liberal understanding that certain rights are inalienable to humans. Thus, we can see an apparent and basic conflict between Gandhian thought and liberalism.

For the purposes of this chapter discussion related to the often asserted "right to privacy" is quite relevant. In liberal societies this alleged right has been taken to entail the moral acceptability of artificial methods of birth control. The apparent conflict between Gandhian thought and liberalism can be felt at a most visceral level when we contrast the so-called "liberal freedoms" hailed by those in Western societies with the specific values, like simplicity and sexual restraint, that Gandhi most overtly exemplified. To Gandhi separating between public and private spheres is, of course, problematic. This view largely underlies his insistence that religion and politics cannot be separated from one another. Ultimately, Gandhi's opposition to advocating birth control as morally acceptable to the Indian masses is a stark reminder of the basic dichotomy between his values and those of contemporary liberals. As non-liberals have regularly pointed out, "liberal freedoms" can be taken as synonymous with licentiousness and Gandhi's stand on birth control gives ample indication that he is not wholly unsympathetic to such a view. Much of Gandhi's aforementioned opposition was, in fact, based on his concern that widespread use of contraceptives would make it easier for individuals to avoid the moral consequences of their own self-indulgent behavior.[2] Additionally, for Gandhi the distinction between public life and private life that is typically assumed to underlie a supposed right to privacy is nonexistent. Specifically, in regard to sexual behavior Gandhi's eschewal of such

a distinction becomes evident when, in substantiating his conclusions regarding birth control he cites the following passage from M. Paul Bureau:

> The truth is that of all the attitudes which a man adopts, of all the decisions at which he arrives, of all the habits which he contracts, there is none which exerts over his personal and social life an influence comparable to that exerted by his attitudes, his decisions, and his habits with regard to the appeals of the sexual appetite. Whether he resists and controls them, or whether he yields and allows himself to be controlled by them, the remote regions of social life will experience the echo of his action, since nature has ordained that the most hidden and intimate action should produce infinite repercussions.[3]

Liberals, following Mill, commonly base rights claims on the principle that individuals should be allowed to do as they please provided they harm no one else. Gandhi's citation of the above passage suggests that (at least in regard to sexual ethics) he does not think licentiousness can ever truly be confined to some completely private sphere. Therefore, his disagreement with liberals on an issue like birth control should not be taken to imply a rejection per se of liberal principles. Gandhi, in other words, is not denying in this instance that people should be allowed to do as they please as long as they do not harm anyone else. Instead he is denying that a person's wanton sexual activity (and indeed, for him, any activity for that matter) can ever truly be private (and thus not impact the greater society). It is relevant here that the popular "live and let live" ethos of liberalism can be seen as crucial to the philosophy of nonviolence (which for Gandhi, as we've seen in chapter 3, must underlie the liberal project). After all, at its core this philosophy calls on us to live according to our own opinions and be willing to suffer the consequences of doing so. Moreover, consistently living in this way necessarily entails allowing others to do as they please even when what they do causes us to suffer. The religious significance of even this aspect of the Mahatma's philosophy should not go unnoticed. Steven A. Smith illuminates it when discussing, what he refers to, as the "moral non-attachment" inherent in Gandhian thought:

> Benign forbearance—the willingness to allow events to unfold according to their own imperative, in the belief that the process may be trusted—may be termed moral non-attachment, to distinguish it from a normative moral stance that seeks to force compliance through various sanctions . . . In its more heightened forms, moral non-attachment merges into a loving acceptance of all that exists, the mystic's blissful embrace with the universe.[4]

For Gandhi it is sensible to think that society should seek to progressively develop—by the policies adopted within its institutional structures—the quality of moral non-attachment among its members. Promoting certain religious insights would clearly be helpful for this purpose.

Ultimately, Gandhi's apparent rejection of a right to privacy (predicated as it is on a presumed separation between the public and private) should not be taken to imply an antipathy toward granting personal freedoms. It is indeed notable here that, in keeping with the spirit of nonviolence, Gandhi never calls for legislation to prevent others from using contraception. This is consistent with his unwillingness to advocate for censorship to stop advertisements he considered obscene.[5] Laws, we should remember, clearly have a coercive dimension.

I will try and show in this chapter that Gandhi's positions on matters like birth control should be interpreted as compatible with core liberal values and thus they all the more confirm the unique nature of the recommendations he offers for the liberal project. Before proceeding further however some conceptual groundwork is necessary.

NONVIOLENCE AS A BASIC CIVIC VIRTUE

As Gier has so nicely explicated[6] and as so much of this work argues, Gandhian nonviolence can be plausibly understood not only in terms of a personal morality but also as a civic virtue to be promoted by society. Such understanding has rich implications for liberal conceptions of rights.

We should remember that for Gandhi the practice of nonviolence (broadly understood) applies to all and is the only way we can realize truth (what he sees as everyone's ultimate aim). When we deny freedoms to others (and thus not uphold core liberal values), we are invariably inflicting violence (however, directly) on them. Thus, for Gandhi we are ultimately harming ourselves. Given these points, it seems that Gandhi would hold that we are duty bound to honor core liberal values in our treatment of others when they are entailed by the practice of nonviolence (which to him is equivalent with ethical practice). This is clearly implied by the attitude he calls on Hindus to adopt when honoring the right of temple entry to the so-called untouchables (who he affectionately referred to as Harijans; "children of God"):

> If you open your temples to Harijans because they demand that they shall be so opened, you will not be doing any great thing. But if you open the temples to them because of a sense of sin for which you should atone, it becomes a religious act. I should insist on Hindu temples being thrown open to Harijans even if the Harijans in India were converted to another religion and there was only one Harijan left in the Hindu fold. It is this religious attitude that isolates the Harijan question from all other questions, and give it a special importance.[7]

For Gandhi, adopting nonviolent (ethical) practices necessarily involves upholding certain liberal values as a by-product. The duty to honor such values

in our relations, however, is different from what we can expect from others (e.g., liberally conceived rights we believe we are entitled to). Gandhi believes we must first properly perform our duties before we can legitimately receive these. It then seems reasonable to conclude Gandhi draws a distinction between our duty to respect the rights of others (regardless of how worthy they may be of them) and the rights which we can properly demand others recognize in their dealings with us. Such a distinction is clearly in line with the willingness Gandhi says a nonviolent activist (satyagrahi) should have to endure but never inflict suffering.[8] Though Gandhi would say we have a general duty not to act violently toward others it is problematic to believe that he holds us to have a corresponding right (that others should honor) to be free of suffering brought about by the violence of those around us. Furthermore, the dichotomy between what attitude one should have toward his own situation and what actions he should pursue in regard to others is also manifest when Gandhi calls on us to disavow death as a harm (discussed in chapter 3). While it is clear that he sees the fearlessness toward one's own death as a virtue conducive to acting nonviolently he obviously does not think killing others is morally acceptable since death is not a harm to anyone. Thus, just as Gandhi holds our duty to be nonviolent to others does not mean we have a duty to avoid the violent behavior of others, he would say our duty to respect certain rights of others does not, in itself, mean we are entitled to others respecting those rights when interacting with us. We can see here that a basis emerges, in Gandhian thought, for granting at least some core freedoms to those religious groups who messages are ultimately antithetical to the liberal project.

Ultimately, it is plausible to read Gandhi as implying a distinction between rights asserted from a subjective first person standpoint and those we should recognize from an "outside" third-person point of view in our dealings with the world. This understanding is also in keeping with his adamant insistence that India must not assume that liberation consists solely in British withdrawal as well as his view (discussed in chapter 2) that the reformers of society must begin by reforming themselves first. Gandhi calls on us to humbly seek to perform our duties and thereby better internally affirm to ourselves that we are worthy of the rights emphasized by liberalism. On his philosophy, doing so would place us in a more ideal position for realizing genuine freedom than demanding others acknowledge our rights while we give no real thought toward our own duties. After all, living in this way would more clearly underscore that our own independence is (in the ultimate sense) not contingent on what others may do.

Of course, for Gandhi, being mistreated by others (which can often be thought of as equivalent to having one's basic rights denied) is cause for protest. However, it is clear that to him the protesting of such mistreatment should entail doing that which he believes enables a person to be deserving

of having her rights preserved—specifically nonviolently affirming her deepest commitments. Since for Gandhi the very act of demanding respect for one's rights has to include demonstrating one's worthiness of such rights it follows to him that seeking to have one's rights honored can never be separated from the performance of certain core duties. Thus, it is not at all clear that Gandhi would find the question (explored by Haksar among others) of whether constitutional democracies should incorporate the right to civil disobedience as all that worthwhile. Furthermore, while it is certainly coherent to think of an entity as possessing rights without, at the same time, having corresponding duties (e.g., a child) for Gandhi it is clear that once it can be said that certain duties reasonably apply to someone considerations of these duties should always be present when attempts are made to clarify her rights. Indeed Gandhi would say that such considerations should be of primary importance to the individual herself. It is therefore likely that for him the liberal tradition of exclusively focusing on preserving and protecting natural rights (i.e., rights we are born with) will never allow us to develop past what is ultimately just a childlike state.

I have tried to show that for Gandhi it is legitimate for governments to proactively implement policies (specifically those that involve promotion of ideas deemed religious) that can help enable citizens to achieve the kind of freedom described above. The preceding discussion indicates that for Gandhi (in contrast to common liberal understandings) rights and freedom should not be regarded as concepts that are equivalent with one another. Rather than regarding freedom to be one and the same as a condition in which one's rights are respected Gandhi sees rights to be instrumentally valuable for the realization of genuine freedom. For him when we can make ourselves worthy of rights (through diligently performing our duties) we will truly be free.

Given these points, we should think of Gandhi's stance on birth control not as a case of him clashing with liberal values but rather as an indication that attainment of genuine freedom is a far more complex matter than liberals have led us to think. For Gandhi, genuine political freedom is inherently incompatible with the perpetuation of conditions that ultimately serve to bind a people all the more to their inner passions. This point again underscores the absence of any dichotomy between political and religious considerations in his thought. Indeed, Gandhi's attitude on birth control is parallel to the one he exhibits toward industrialization insofar as it is based on the view that society should not mindlessly allow the advent of new things to undermine significant goods that have preexisted them (e.g., human labor, self-restraint). Furthermore, the Mahatma's qualms with birth control can largely be understood as an argument that the use of contraceptives interferes with the quality of an individual's life experiments by enabling him to avoid some of the natural consequences of those experiments. Not unlike modern day libertarians, on this issue, Gandhi is affirming the importance of each individual

person being allowed to engage in his own life experiments (like Gandhi famously declared himself to have done) to the point of being allowed to accept the consequences of his free choices. On the matter of birth control then we can notice the Mahatma's receptiveness toward the partial grasp of truth he would affirm in even the libertarian's philosophy. However, as we saw earlier (and in apparent contrast to libertarian thought), for Gandhi development of the individual's character is integral for the emergence of a truly acceptable society. We can see this point underscored in Gandhi's response to the conclusion that widespread use of contraception is necessary to prevent famines:

> Increase in population is not and ought not to be regarded as a calamity to be avoided. Its regulation or restriction by artificial methods is a calamity of the first grade whether we know it or not. It is bound to degrade the (human) race . . . Pestilence, wars, and famines are cursed antidotes against cursed lust which is responsible for unwanted children. If we would avoid this three-fold curse we avoid too the curse of unwanted children by the sovereign remedy of self-control . . . let me say that propagation of the race rabbit-wise must undoubtedly be stopped; but not so as to bring greater evils in in its train. It should be stopped by methods which in themselves ennoble the race. In other words, it is all a matter of proper education which would embrace every department of life; and dealing in one curse will take in its orbit all the others. A way is not to be avoided because it is upward and therefore uphill. Man's upward progress necessarily means ever increasing difficulty, which is to be welcomed.[9]

It is, of course, not problematic to suppose that when famines occur people are denied their rights to basic necessities. For Gandhi, however, we see that such considerations should not exhaust our moral reasoning when we think of why we should work to eradicate famine. Just as most of us would find forcibly sterilizing individuals (even if it were done in a way that keeps them of ever learning what's happened to them) to be an unacceptable response to famines Gandhi maintains that promoting the use of artificial birth control methods is also an unacceptable response to dealing with the issue. Indeed, from a moral standpoint even the acceptability of giving those who live in famine prone areas the option (i.e., freedom) to be sterilized is questionable as an approach to dealing with the problem of hunger. Again, Gandhi is showing that for him only an approach to world problems that regards humans in a holistic and integrated manner can truly be acceptable. Obviously, from the moral perspective, in dealing with famines, working to more fully develop autonomous citizens who are capable of prudentially approaching the issues before them is acceptable whereas forcibly sterilizing a population is not (even if it is more likely to bring an end to famines). Similarly, for Gandhi it follows that if we are to deal with the pressing issues facing our

world in a manner that it is morally acceptable we will eschew promoting policies that ultimately impede individuals from more fully realizing their potential as integrated beings. After all, to him people are truly free only to the extent that they have realized this potential. Thus he thinks social policies should go beyond honoring the rights of individuals but also focus on developing their characters.

In developing the character of the individual, we can see that Gandhi seemed to think it preferable to emphasize the highest moral ideals over what looks to be more feasible when considering popular sentiment. Accordingly, he states:

> My ideal may be for one man and not millions. But even if millions of years pass before that one man realizes that ideal, I would wait for him and provide for him. I have great patience. I am in no hurry to transform the world. But I cannot allow the advertisement of what is vice as virtue. [10]

It is difficult for many of us to not find such fierce moral commitment moving as Gandhi's ethical challenge to the world is indeed remarkable. It bears mentioning, however, that Gandhi's above noted emphasis on moral ideals clearly takes away from the practical viability of his political philosophy. It is not, after all, irrational to deny that humans have the luxury of waiting a million years before individuals can develop morally and thereby bring about significant reform in the world. As we saw in the last chapter, in regard to his notion of nonviolence as a practical ideal, Gandhi himself seemingly acknowledges this point. Here we can see the value of supplementing Gandhi's thought with certain dominant liberal beliefs (specifically, those regarding the equal standing of all members of society to effect change). Though Gandhi's own history of including diverse segments of society within his campaigns indicates his affirmation of this belief, such is not so apparent from a study of the Mahatma's recommendations for social reform. It seems that, in his writings at least, Gandhi could have more clearly indicated the indispensable place of civic participation (which is an essential aspect of social reform) to the overall moral development of the general masses. Undeniably, liberal thought offers resources by which this link can be illuminated.

Regarding, however, the traditional liberal emphasis on rights Gandhi's words above are instructive. We can take his refusal to advocate the use of birth control to the Indian masses in a way that does not necessarily clash with liberal values. This conclusion follows provided that it does not clash with liberal values to either allow individuals to engage in their own life experiments in as full a way as possible or to emphasize only the highest moral ideals in developing the character of the citizen.

LIBERAL SHORTCOMINGS IN REGARD TO RIGHTS

Though emphasis on certain perceived inalienable rights is often taken as essential to the liberal project we can see that for Gandhi this project is ultimately doomed when rights are emphasized without regard for developing the characters of those who are thought of as the bearers of these rights. Here we should further consider how Gandhi's philosophy contrasts with those moral systems that have dominated liberal political thought. In discussing utilitarianism the Mahatma states:

> A votary of Ahimsa (nonviolence) cannot subscribe to the utilitarian formula (of the greatest good of the greatest number). He will strive for the greatest good of all and die in the attempt to realize the ideal. He will, therefore, be willing to die, so that others may live. He will serve himself with the rest, by himself dying. The greatest good of all inevitably includes the good of the greatest number, and therefore, he and the utilitarian will converge in many points in their career, but there does come a time when they must part company, and even work in opposite directions. The utilitarian, to be logical will never sacrifice himself. The absolutist will even sacrifice himself.[11]

As we saw in chapter 4, the Gandhian notion of sarvodaya calls for the uplift of all. The passage above indicates that Gandhi was aware that sarvodaya is not completely compatible with utilitarian thought. Given its explicit egalitarian emphasis and the writings of its most famous advocate the revered place of utilitarianism in the liberal tradition is beyond question. Thus, the above statements can be understood as helpful to understanding Gandhi's thoughts on liberalism.

It is notable that Gandhi claims above that "The utilitarian, to be logical will never sacrifice himself." Though many would dispute this characterization, it cannot be denied that given the central prominence liberalism gives to rights consistently being both a liberal and utilitarian is (at the very least) quite difficult. This is the case in spite of attempts to advance rule based utilitarianism since, as Gandhi indicates, even the utilitarian tends to agree with the notion that self-sacrifice defeats the entire purpose of morality. Such is the strength of the demand individuals feel for asserting their own rights above all other considerations. It is typical for liberals to think of the kind of self-sacrifice that Gandhi calls for to go above and beyond what can reasonably be required from any moral system—that is that it should be classified not as obligatory but "supererogatory." Regarding such so-called actions John Rawls states, "Supererogatory acts are not required, though normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself. A person who does a supererogatory act does not invoke the exemption which the natural duties allow."[12] Thus we can see that for Rawls, like

liberals generally, the individual is justified in asserting certain rights that should be understood to take precedence over performance of even the most morally laudatory action. For Gandhi, on the other hand, society should seek to develop citizens who are like the military soldiers they aim to have insofar as they are people who are willing to give their very lives in the service of others. For such individuals, in fact, dying (or foregoing self-interest more broadly) would never be thought of as a harm that should, above all, be avoided even if doing so undermines one's own sense of moral integrity. In other words, these are people who would not think that their own individual right to survival should ever take absolute precedence over moral considerations. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, Gandhi holds that it is only when citizens have become selfless to this extent can a genuinely nonviolent (and thus free) society be established. Furthermore, as Paul Kahn has argued, liberal societies must present the values they embody as worthy of sacrifice.[13] Indeed, it is clear that the willingness (by at least some) to self-sacrifice is necessary for any kind of desirable society to exist. Unless efforts are made to develop all the members of such societies to become willing embodiments of sacrifice it is difficult to see how genuine social equality can ever be achieved.

I have argued that Gandhi sees the active incorporation of religious language in government activities to be a necessary part of such character development. Emphasis on certain core duties can be said to be essential to the great religious traditions of the world. It is in keeping with his emphatic refusal to separate the aspects of human life into their own distinct compartments that Gandhi sees neither the recognition of the rights of others nor the affirmation of human communities (like religious ones) to be more basic to establishing the correct society. Instead for him the state should do both simultaneously. Such synthesizing is characteristic of Gandhi's overall uniqueness as a political thinker.

In this regard consider, for instance, Gandhi's reply to a correspondent critical of his "continually harping on conscience."[14] The correspondent writes:

> I find youngsters and grown-up people talking utter nonsense under the cover of conscience. What is more, youngsters have become imprudent and grownup people unscrupulous; can you not prevent this mischief? If you cannot, please withdraw the word from use and stop the drivel that is being said in the name of that sacred but much abused word. Pray tell us who has a conscience? Do all have it? Do cats have a conscience, when they hunt to death poor mice.

We can see here the correspondent put forth, what amounts to, a version of the earlier "liberty equals license" criticism that has often been brought up against liberal political philosophy. Ultimately, critics have charged that granting freedom to form and pursue one's own life plans (as Mill famously

proscribes) ultimately leads to morally negligible results. The point here is that freedom to do as one pleases (and thus act in a way that is aligned with one's conscience) inevitably implies freedom from appropriate moral restraint (a concern that is notably part of Gandhi's concerns regarding accessibility to birth control).

In Gandhi's informative reply he states:

> I must confess the (correspondent's) charge is not without substance . . . Every virtue has been known to be abused by the wicked. But we do not on that account do away with virtue. We can but erect safeguards against abuse. When people cease to think for themselves and have everything regulated for them, it becomes necessary at times to assert the right of individuals to act in defiance of public opinion. When individuals so act, they claim to have acted in obedience to their conscience. I entirely agree with the correspondent that youngsters as a rule must not pretend to have a conscience. It is a quality or state acquired by laborious training. Willfullness is not conscience.

The above declarations that "Willfulness is not conscience" and that conscience "is a quality or state acquired by laborious training." are both indicative of Gandhi's aforementioned and unique synthetizing tendencies. Clearly, Gandhi stands in affirmation of the right of conscience. However, for him this a right that can only be genuinely possessed by those who have undergone the requisite training—which he would say entails exposure to the world's great religious traditions. Unless those exercising the right of conscience have developed the proper characters, Gandhi would see the presence of this right to actually be detrimental to social well-being (and hence to the prospects of liberalism). Indeed, as is indicated above in regard to assertions of the right to privacy, to the Mahatma there is no reason to promote and preserve rights at all when doing so ultimately serves to prevent the moral development of the individual. We've seen throughout this work that if the latter objective is not successfully pursued Gandhi sees little hope for the liberal project.

On this point, Gandhi's thoughts as they relate to the ownership of property are quite instructive. From Locke onwards, liberals have hailed the right to property as sacrosanct. Traditionally, this right has been interpreted to mean that all have the right to the fruits of their own labors. As a result, liberals have felt serious misgivings toward policies that have aimed to truly bring about the uplift of all (e.g., those involving transfers of wealth). As indicated by the presence of wanton levels of consumption in the midst so much preventable suffering it can be said that by strongly emphasizing the right to property the moral development of those in liberal societies has suffered. Thus, Gandhi comments:

> The greatest obstacle in the path of non-violence is the presence in our midst of the indigenous interests that have sprung up from British rule, the interests of monied (sic) men, speculators, scrip-holders, land-holders, factory owners and the like. All these do not always realize that they are living on the blood of the masses, and when they do, they become as callous as the British principles whose tools and agents they are. If . . . they could but realize that they must give up their blood-stained gains, the battle is won for non-violence. It must not be difficult for them to see that the holding of millions is a crime when millions of their own kith and kin are starving and therefore they must give up their agency.[15]

In seeming lockstep with the socialists, Gandhi explained social equality and distributive justice to imply "that each man shall have the wherewithal to supply all his natural needs and no more."[16] He, in fact, calls for those who possess wealth beyond what is required to supply their own natural needs to become trustees of these excess riches in a way that serves all.[17] Unlike socialists, however, Gandhi opposes the forcible removal of excess wealth from the owners of property. Regarding and in place of such a scenario he states:

> This violent action cannot benefit society. Society will be the poorer, for it will lose the gifts of a man who knows how to accumulate wealth. Therefore the non-violent way is evidently superior. The rich man will be left in possession of his wealth, of which he will use what he reasonably requires for his personal needs and will act as a trustee for the remainder to be used for the society. In this argument, honesty on the part of the trustee is assumed.
>
> If, however, in spite of the utmost effort, the rich do not become guardians of the poor in the true sense of the term and the latter are more and more crushed and die of hunger, what is to be done? In trying to find out the solution to this riddle I have lighted on non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience as the right and infallible means. The rich cannot accumulate wealth without the co-operation of the poor in society. If this knowledge were to penetrate to and spread amongst the poor, they would become strong and would learn how to free themselves by means of non-violence from the crushing inequalities which have brought them to the verge of starvation.[18]

It is notable that instead of countering right to property claims with different rights claims on behalf of the poor, Gandhi predicates his entire solution to the problem of social inequality on the indispensable value character development has both for the rich and the poor. It is clear to him that attempts to implement policies based on the understanding that the poor have something like a right to a just share of things undermines character development insofar as such attempts would entail the use of violence. Gandhi's alternative however can be seen to focus on the duty of the poor to become strong enough to nonviolently eradicate unjust social structures in a way that does not directly interfere with the freedoms of the well-off. Thus, in regard to

dealing with social inequality we can see that for Gandhi primarily emphasizing the rights of either the rich or the poor ultimately works against genuine realization of core liberal values within society.

What's more is that we can say for Gandhi since it is a duty to act in a way that aligns with one's conscience it follows that he holds one has a duty to undergo the laborious training he refers to before that person's right of conscience can truly be in place. Thus, we can more clearly see the connection that Gandhi insists holds between the performance of duties and being deserving of rights.

Liberals have traditionally given a central emphasis to the rights of the individual. For Gandhi, as we have seen, the character of the individual has primary importance in the establishment of an acceptable society. To him it is clear that without the moral development of the citizenry there can be no meaningful sense in which a society can be free. Therefore, the preceding discussion goes beyond showing why Gandhi sees the performance of duty to be inextricably tied with whether one is deserving of rights. We can also see from the above analysis that for Gandhi it is only by developing the character of the individual can individual liberty ever truly be realized. From Gandhi's perspective it follows that by seeking the advancement and the securing of rights as if individual freedom is equivalent to the attainment of rights and by ignoring the question of how worthy rights holders have made themselves of actually possessing freedom societies classified as liberal have failed in enabling individual liberty. The heavy centralization present in such societies (discussed in chapter 3) and the lack of autonomy of the poor in these places is then hardly surprising. Thus, since realization of individual liberty is taken to be an essential feature of liberal society, for Gandhi it follows societies classified as liberal have actually failed in really being liberal.

CONCLUSION

Protecting and preserving individual rights seems to be regarded not only as a distinguishing feature of the liberal state but, given notable aspects of the contemporary world, its key feature. Thus, it is not surprising that signage of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights is, in and of itself, taken to be a great sign of moral progress. We have seen that for Gandhi moral development within a society entails significantly more. To him rights have little value for the individual if she is not capable of exercising them in a way that will help bring about her ultimate liberation. Only one who has performed certain requisite duties will have this capability. Developing a sense of duty among the citizenry is therefore integral to realizing a genuinely free society. It follows then for Gandhi that there is no social worth (and indeed much harm)

in pursuing individual rights within a context that is free from this consideration. The common engaging in such a pursuit is to him a clear indication of the failures of "the liberal society" and indeed modern civilization more generally.

NOTES

1. Joseph Prabu, "Gandhi's Religious Ethics," 170–71.
2. M. K. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1999).
3. M. Paul Bureau, quoted in M.K. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence*, 13.
4. Steven A. Smith "Gandhi's Moral Philosophy" in *Gandhi's Significance for Today*, ed. John Hick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 109–ff.
5. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence*, 174.
6. Nicolas F. Gier, "Non-Violence as a Civic Virtue: Gandhi and Reformed Liberalism" in *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century,* ed. Douglas Allen (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2008), 121–ff.
7. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. III* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2002), 184.
8. M. K. Gandhi writing in *Harajin*, April 14, 1947, 85.
9. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence*, 175–76.
10. N. R. Malkani, *Ramblings and Reminiscences of Gandhiji* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1972), 85–86.
11. M. K. Gandhi writing in *Young India* September 12, 1926.
12. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 117.
13. Paul Kahn, *Putting Liberalism in Its Place*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
14. M. K. Gandhi, *In Search of the Supreme Vol. I*, 262.
15. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012), 45.
16. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 47.
17. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 45.
18. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 48.

Epilogue

Anyone with even the most passing familiarity of Mahatma Gandhi's life and legacy is aware of the essential place the value of nonviolence has in his message. Gandhi's broad and comprehensive conception of nonviolence is far less known. Thus, it is not so easy for many to understand the specific nature of his recommendations for the world given his core conviction that society must be based on nonviolence.

We have seen indications throughout this work that overt, physical acts of violence were never Gandhi's primary concern. Clearly, he sees such acts as manifestations of a deeper more problematic kind of violence residing within the individual. It follows that for him establishing a nonviolent foundation on which an acceptable society can be built necessitates enabling the flourishing of the nonviolent nature within the individuals who make up society. Gandhi is insistent that it is only after this has been done on a mass scale can genuine political freedom be realized.

Such a prospect immediately strikes us, given the cultural assumptions that we've been conditioned by, as daunting and even unrealistic. We can all agree that Gandhi was, at the very least, a living embodiment of ideals that most of us would not find very easy to live up to. I have tried to show however that significant progress can be made in realizing a more ideal Gandhian society even in the present world.

My arguments are largely predicated on the idea (that I take Gandhi to advance) that active state promotion of a specific religious attitude is required for genuine social progress—progress, in other words, that more is more fully in line with the aims of the liberal project—to take place. In keeping with points discussed in chapter 5, readily available opportunities can be noticed within contemporary American society for the government to

promote the kind of religious mindset that Gandhi finds indispensable for social progress.

Consider the work of the Atlanta, Georgia–based Interfaith Community Initiatives group. In describing the "World Pilgrims" programs that it organizes the group's website states:

> The ICI World Pilgrims program is based on the principle that before people of different religions can constructively discuss their differences they need to develop personal relationships with each other. An atmosphere of friendship and trust must be established, before honest and productive dialogue can take place about areas of disagreement. In the end, the goals are not to "convert" one's religious or political beliefs, but rather to increase empathy and understanding, reduce conflict, and ultimately create opportunities for cooperative action.[1]

Clearly, the group's work in developing empathy and understanding exemplifies (to a large extent) Gandhi's calls to identify with others. We should remember, as discussed in chapter 4, that Gandhian identification entails affirming the sense of equality toward others in society that is so significant to liberals. What's more is that becoming the kind of individual who seeks involvement in a program like World Pilgrims will entail becoming receptive to truth in a way that is broader and more comprehensive than liberals have envisioned. Ultimately, it would be difficult for even the most liberal minded members of society to sympathize with objections to public support for the kind of religious initiative described above.

Like the World Pilgrims program, implementation within the public schools of a religious studies curriculum that primarily emphasizes the perspectives of the great moral exemplars of the world's faiths should not be objectionable to liberals. This kind of curriculum would go hand in hand with a lesson plan for teaching world religions that has been made available on the Education World website.[2] The plan calls on religion teachers to make sure the classroom experience they bring about "is comfortable for students of any faith, as well as those who do not have a religious affiliation." Additionally, it is not contrary to the liberal social order for the state to facilitate public service endeavors (e.g., those that seek to end poverty, that help foster children) that are purposefully inter-religious in nature.

To Gandhi, I maintain, it is a mistake to think fundamentalist objections that state support for such initiatives unfairly favor a "false religious view" are plausible. I have argued that Gandhi's way of mixing religion and politics is not only compatible with but called for by liberal political philosophy. Moreover, as we've seen, it is inevitable that even liberal states must make decisions about what is and is not essential to religion. Thus that a particular view of religion is deemed false by certain segments of the citizenry cannot be reason enough to think that it is unacceptable for the state to promote that

view (as otherwise certain decisions necessary for preserving a liberal social order could not be made).

In genuinely liberal societies, after all, the need for social harmony must be balanced with the honoring of differences. By actively incorporating religious language (that helps advance the aims of liberalism) within its official functions the liberal state can bolster prospects for social harmony. This follows given that the use of religious language will broaden the state's ability to justify its policies and decisions (which all citizens are expected to follow) to diverse communities.

The need for liberal societies to honor differences is underscored by the necessity of multicultural initiatives in these societies. Multiculturalism is best sought by fostering attitudes of sensitivity not by passing legislation that seeks to enforce rules of nondiscrimination. Furthermore, efforts to advance multiculturalism are needlessly limited when considerations of religious identity (which is usually undeniably linked to cultural identity) are absent from them. It is worth mentioning that conventional multicultural initiatives promoted by the liberal state are not seen to clash with proper government functions even though such initiatives do not privilege one ethnicity over others. On the contrary, it is *because* no ethnic group is seen as favored when government efforts to promote a multicultural society are implemented that such efforts are deemed acceptable (and even integral) to liberals. Likewise, we have good reason to consider government multicultural initiatives that will acknowledge the significance of religion to be acceptable (and indeed crucial) in the liberal state as long as they will not favor one religion over others.

More importantly, for Gandhi when the state openly intertwines political with religious activity in the ways he calls for it can better inculcate within its citizens the nonviolent characteristics that he insists are required for anything like the liberal project to succeed. Specifically, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, virtues like selflessness, simplicity, and fearlessness are essential to the practice of Gandhian nonviolence and can be seen at the heart of the world's sacred traditions. When such virtues have been inculcated within the public body the emergence of a genuinely healthy civil society becomes possible. As discussed in chapter 5, for Gandhi this kind of civil society is necessary for the moral and political awakening that will enable social progress.

It is clear that on the Gandhian model this kind of progress can never take place so long as the social reformer is focused exclusively (or even primarily) on securing rights for those who have been denied their proper place in society. To Gandhi, if our efforts to improve society are to be truly successful they must give ultimate importance to the development of character. Thus he concludes the performance of duties should have priority over the exercising of rights. Furthermore, it is also clear that to him genuine character develop-

ment can only occur when the individual is treated in an integrated and holistic fashion.

All of these elaborated upon points further indicate that whether Gandhi, as a theorist, can actually be placed among political liberals hardly seems relevant (or even interesting). Within the vast corpus of his works liberals can find many helpful resources by which to pursue their political objectives. The challenges he presents to the modern world merit serious consideration by all who are sympathetic to the liberal project. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that given the social roadmap he provides, liberalism's success can ultimately be measured by how well it reaches the great ideals extolled by Mahatma Gandhi.

NOTES

1. Interfaith Community Initiatives, accessed December 16, 2018, http://www.interfaithci.org/world-pilgrims.html.
2. Education World, "Lesson Planning Ideas: The World's Religions," accessed December 16, 2018, https://www.educationworld.com/a_lesson/world-religions-multicultural-diversity.shtml.

Bibliography

Abel, Donald C. (ed.) *50 Readings Plus: An Introduction to Philosophy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011.

Allen, Douglas (ed.) *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman &Littlefield Publishing, 2008.

Alston, William. *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Ambedkar, B. R. *Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar Writings and Speeches*. Bombay: Government of Maharastra, 1989.

Audi, Robert ed. *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition*. Cambridge: University Press, 1999.

Baird, R. D. *Religion in modern India Vol. I*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1981

Bambrough, Renford. *Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge* Cambridge: Atlantic Highlands Press, 1979.

Bondurant, Joan. *Conquest of Violence*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958.

Bose, N. K. *Studies in Gandhism*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 2012.

Ceva, Emmanuela. *Interactive Justice: A Procedural Approach to Value Conflict in Politics.* London: Routledge Publishers, 2016.

Chatterjee, Margaret. *Gandhi's Religious Thought*. Notre Dame: University Press, 1983.

Desai, Mahadev (ed.). *The Gita According to Gandhi: The Gospel of Selfless Action.* Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1946.

Galtung, Johan. "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 291–305.

Gandhi, M. K. *All Men Are Brothers;* New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

Gandhi, M. K. Gandhi: *An Autobiography. The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

Gandhi, M. K. *Collected Works of* M*ahatma Gandhi* (97 vols.) New Delhi: Government Publications Division, 1960.

Gandhi, M. K. *Ethical Religion*. Madras: Ganesan Press, 1968.

Gandhi, M. K. *Harijan* columns. https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/journals-by-gandhiji/harijan.

Gandhi, M. K. *In Search of the Supreme*, vols. I-III Ahemebad: Navajivan Trust, 1961.

Gandhi, M. K. *My Non-Violence.* Bandopadhaya, Sailesh (ed.) Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1966.

Gandhi, M. K. *My Philosophy of Life*. Bombay: Pearl Publications Private Limited, 1961.

Gandhi, M. K. *My Religion*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1955.

Gandhi, M. K. *Select Speeches*, ed. B. K. Ahluwalia. New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1969.

Gandhi, M. K. *Self-Restraint v. Self-Indulgence*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1999.
Gandhi, M. K. *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* Madras: Natesan & Co., 1933.
Gandhi, M. K. *The Essence of Hinduism.* Amedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1987.
Gandhi, M. K. *Truth is God* Ahemedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1955.
Gandhi, M. K. *Yeravda Mandir*, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1968.
Gandhi, M. K. *Young India* columns (1919-1931) https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/journals-by-gandhiji/young-india.
Gandhi, Shriman. N. (ed.) *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa*, vol. III Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1968.
Gramsci, Antonio (ed.). *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
Haksar, Vinit. *Rights, Communities, and Civil Disobedience: Liberalism and Gandhi* Oxford: University Press, 2001.
Hanen, Marsha and Nielsen, Kai. (eds.) *Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory*. Calgary: University Press, 1987.
Hick, John and Hempel, Lamont. (eds.) *Gandhi's Significance for Today.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
Homer, Jack. (ed.) *The Gandhi Reader*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1956.
Iyer, Raghavan. (ed.) *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi Vols. I-III.* Claredon Press, 1986.
Kahn, Paul. *Putting Liberalism in Its Place.* Princeton: University Press, 2008.
Kitcher, Phillip. *Science, Truth, and Democracy*. Oxford: University Press, 2001.
Malkani, N. R. *Ramblings and Reminiscences of Gandhiji*, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1972.
Mohanty, J. N. "Gandhi's Concept of Man." *Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 7 (1970): 12-ff.
Mohatany, J. N. *The Self and its Other: Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: University Press, 2000.
Mukherjee, S. and Ramaswamy, S. (eds.) *Non-violence and Satyagraha.* New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998.
Narayan, Shriman. (ed.) *Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. VI.* Madras: Natesan & Co., 1933.
Parekh, Bhiku. *Gandhi*. Oxford: University Press, 1997.
Parekh, Bhikhu. *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*. London: Macmillan Press, 1989.
Prabhu, R. K. (ed.) *Industrialize-and Perish*, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1966.
Radha, S. "The Concept of Truth in Gandhian Philosophy" *Darshana International* Vol. 16, 4 (1976): 60-ff.
Ramakrishnan, Niranjan. *Reading Gandhi in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.
Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: University Press, 1973.
Raz, Joseph. *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*. Oxford: University Press, 1995.
Richards, Glyn. *Gandhi's Philosophy of Education*, Oxford: University Press, 2001.
Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: University Press, 1979.
Rukgaber, M. "Guns and Lies: A Kantian Criticism of the Supposed Right to Bear Arms" *The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence* Vol. 17, 2. (Fall 2017): 119–141.
Solomon, Robert C. and Martin, Clancy W. (eds.) *Morality and the Good Life: A Text with Readings.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009.
Sorabji, Richard. *Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments with Ancient Values.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Spear, Percival. *A History of India (Vol II.) from the 16th- to the 20th Century*. New Delhi: Pelican Books, 1965.
Tendulkar, D.G. *Mahatma, Life of Mohandas K. Gandhi Vol I.* Bombay: Bora and Co., 1951.
Veeravalli, Anuradha *Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment* London: Ashgate Publishers 2014.

APPENDIX: FURTHER READING

(WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO PATRICK S. O'DONNELL)

I. Gandhi: Life and Work

Adams, Jad. Gandhi: *The True Man Behind Modern India*, New York: Pegasus Books, 2011.

Allen, Douglas. *Mahatma Gandhi,* London: Reaktion Books, 2011.

Alter, Joseph S. *Gandhi's Body: Sex, Diet, and the Politics of Nationalism,* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.

Bilgrami, Akeel. "Gandhi, the Philosopher," and "Gandhi (and Marx)," *Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment,* edited by Bilgrami, 101–121 and 122–174. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Borman, William. *Gandhi and Nonviolence*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915–1922.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928–1934,* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

Brown, Judith M. *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1994.

Brown, Judith M. and Anthony Parel. (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Chadha, Yogesh. *Gandhi: A Life.* New York: John Wiley, 1997.

Chakrabarty, Bidyu. *Confluence of Thought: Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Chatterji, Rakhahari. *Gandhi and the Ali Brothers: A Biography of a Friendship.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2013.

Cicovacki, Predrag. *Gandhi's Footprints.* London: Transactions Publishers, 2015.

Coward, Harold (ed.) *Indian Critiques of Gandhi.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003.

Dalton, Dennis. *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action.* New York Columbia University Press, 1993.

Dasgupta, Ajit K. *Gandhi's Economic Thought*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Deats, Richard. *Mahatma Gandhi Nonviolent Liberator: A Biography.* New York: New City Press, 2005.

Desai, Ashwin and Goolem Vahed. *The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Devji, Faisal. *The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence.* London: C. Hurst & Co, 2012.

Dhiman, Satindar. *Gandhi and Leadership: New Horizons in Exemplary Leadership.* Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.

DiSalvo, Charles R. M. K. *Gandhi, Attorney at Law: The Man before the Mahatma.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013.

Diwan, Romesh and Mark Lutz (eds.) *Essays in Gandhian Economics.* New Delhi: Gandhian Peace Foundation, 1985.

Easwaran, Eknath. *Gandhi, the Man.* Petaluma: Nilgari Press, 1978.

Erikson, Erik H. *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969.

Finkelstein, Norman G. *What Gandhi Says…about Nonviolence, Resistance and Courage.* New York: OR Books, 2012.

Fischer, Louis. *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.

Fox, Richard G. *Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1989.

Gandhi, Gopalkrishna. (ed.) *Gandhi is Gone: Who Will Guide Us Now?* New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007.
Gandhi, Gopalkrishna (ed.) *The Oxford India, Gandhi: Essential Writings.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Gandhi, M. K. (Louis Fischer, ed.). *The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology.* New York: Random House, 1962.
Gandhi, M. K. *Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha).* Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001.
Gandhi, M. K. *Satyagraha in South Africa.* Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950.
Gandhi, Rajmohan. *Gandhi: The Man, His People, and the Empire.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008.
Ghosh, B. N. *Gandhian Political Economy: Principles, Practices, and Policy.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
Ghosh, B. N. *Beyond Gandhian Economics: Towards a Creative Deconstruction.* New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2012.
Green, Martin. *The Challenge of the Mahatmas*. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
Guha, Ramachandra. *Gandhi Before India.* London: Allen Lane, 2013.
Guha, Ramachandra. *Gandhi: The Years that Changed the World 1914–1948.* Random House of Canada, 2019.
Hardiman, David. *Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of His Ideas*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Helfenstein, Josef and Newland, Joseph. *Experiments with Truth: Gandhi and Images of Nonviolence.* Houston: The Menil Collection, 2014.
Herman, Arthur. *Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry That Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age.* New York: Bantam Dell, 2008.
Hofmeyr, Isabel. *Gandhi's Printing Press: Experiments in Slow Reading.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
Howard, Veena R. *Gandhi's Ascetic Activism: Renunciation and Social Action.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2013.
Huttenback, Robert. *Gandhi in South Africa, British Imperialism, and The Indian Question 1860–1914*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971.
Iyer, Raghavan. *The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi*. Santa Barbara, CA: Concord Grove Press, 1983 ed. (1st ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Iyer, Raghavan. *Gandhian Trusteeship in Theory and Practice.* Santa Barbara, CA: Concord Grove Press, 1985.
Iyer, Raghavan (ed.). *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Jordens, J. T. F. *Gandhi's Religion: A Homespun Shawl*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
Johnson, Richard. (ed.) *Gandhi's Experiments with Truth: Essential Writings by and about Mahatma Gandhi*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006.
Kapur, Sudarshan. *Raising Up a Prophet: The African-American Encounter with Gandhi*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1992.
Kumar, Aishwary. *Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the Risk of Democracy.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Kumar, R. *Essays on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919.* London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Lelyveld, Joseph. *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.
Nanda, B. R. *Gandhi and His Critics.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Nanda, B. R. *Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Nanda, B. R. *In Search of Gandhi: Essays and Reflections.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Pandikattu, Kuruvilla. *Gandhi: The Meaning of the Mahatma for the Millennium.* Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values in Philosophy, 2001.
Panter-Brick, Simone. *Gandhi and Nationalism: The Path to Indian Independence.* London: Tauris Press, 2012.

Panter-Brick, Simone. *Gandhi and the Middle East: Jews, Arabs, and Imperial Interests*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008.
Paranjape, Makarand. *The Death and Afterlife of Mahatma Gandhi.* New York: Routledge Press, 2014.
Parekh, Bhikhu. *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse.* New Delhi: Sage, 1989.
Parel, Anthony J. *Gandhi, Freedom, and Self-Rule.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000.
Parel, Anthony J. *Gandhi's Philosophy and the Quest for Humanity.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Pfost, Eva. *Between Ethics and Politics: Gandhi Today.* New Delhi: Routledge Press, 2014.
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber and Rudolph, Lloyd I. *Gandhi: The Traditional Roots of Charisma.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. *Postmodern Gandhi and Other Essays.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Sethi, J. D. (ed.) *Trusteeship: The Gandhian Alternative.* New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1986.
Sharp, Gene. *Gandhi as a Political Strategist*. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, 1979.
Terchek, Ronald J. *Gandhi: Struggling for Autonomy.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.
Trivedi, Lisa. *Clothing Gandhi's Nation: Homespun and Modern India.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
Verma, Surendra. *Metaphysical Foundations of Mahatma Gandhi's Thought*. New Delhi: Orient Longmans Press, 1970.
Weber, Thomas. *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor. New York: Cambridge University Press,* 2004.
Weber, Thomas. *Gandhi, Gandhism and the Gandhians.* New Delhi: Roli Books, 2006.
Weber, Thomas. *On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi's March to Dandi.* New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009.
Weber, Thomas. *Going Native: Gandhi's Relationship with Western Women.* New Delhi: Lotus, 2011.
Wolpert. Stanley. *Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

II. The Theory and Praxis of Nonviolence after Gandhi

Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Palgrave, 2000.
Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the 20th Century.* Westport, CT: Praeger, l993.
Ariyaratne, Dr. A. T. *A Struggle to Awaken. Moratuwa*, Sri Lanka: Sarvodaya Press, 1982.
Asher, Sarah Beth, Lester R. Kurtz, and Stephen Zunes, eds. *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective.* Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999.
Aung San Suu Kyi. *Freedom from Fear & Other Writings*. London: Penguin, revised ed. 1995.
Awad, Mubarak. *Nonviolent Resistance in the Middle East.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1985.
Awad, Mubarak E. and R. Scott Kennedy. *Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1985.
Barbé, Dominique. *Grace and Power: Base Communities and Nonviolence in Brazil.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987.
Barbé, Dominique. *A Theology of Conflict and Other Writings on Nonviolence.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989.
Bedau, Hugo A., ed. *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice.* New York: Pegasus, 1969.
Bell, Inge Powell. CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence. New York: Random House, 1968.
Berryman, Phillip. *Our Unfinished Business: The U.S. Catholics Bishops' Letters on Peace and the Economy.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1989.

Bhave, Vinoba. *Swarajya Śastra: The Principles of Nonviolent Political Order.* Bombay: Padma, 1945.
Bhave, Vinoba. *School of Nonviolence.* London: Housemans, 1969.
Boulding, Elise. *New Agendas for Peace Research.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
Branch, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
Branch, Taylor. *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-65.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
Brock, Peter and Nigel Young. *Pacifism in the Twentieth Century.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999.
Brownlee, Kimberley. *Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Burrow, Rufus. *Extremist for Love: Martin Luther King, Jr., Man of Ideas and Nonviolent Social Action.* Minneapolis: Forrest Press, 2014.
Burrowes, Robert J. *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.
Bussy, Gertrude and Margaret Tims. *The WILPF, 1915-1965: A Record of Fifty Years Work.* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965.
Cady Duane L. *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
Capps, Donald. *Erik Erikson's Verbal Portraits: Luther, Gandhi, Einstein, and Jesus.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.
Carson, Clayborne. *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Chappell, David W. (ed.) *Buddhist Peacework: Creating Cultures of Peace.* Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publ., 1999.
Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Chernus, Ira. *American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea.* Danvers, MA: Orbis Books, 2004.
Cicovacki, Predrag, Hess, Kendy (eds.) *Nonviolence As a Way of Life: History, Theory, and Practice (Vols. I-II).* New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2017.
Coles, Robert. *A Spectacle Unto the World: The Catholic Worker Movement.* New York: Viking, 1973.
Coles, Robert. *Dorothy Day: A Radical Devotion.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1987.
Cooney, Robert and Helen Michalowski, eds. *The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence in the United States.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1987.
Coover, Virginia, et al. *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1978.
Cortright, David. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Coy, Patrick, ed. *A Revolution of the Heart: Essays on the Catholic Worker.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988.
Crow, Ralph E. Philip Grant and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.) *Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
Day, Mark. *Forty Acres: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers.* New York: Praegar, 1971.
del Vasto, Lanza. *Gandhi to Vinoba: The New Pilgrimage.* New York: Schocken, 1974.
del Vasto, Lanza. *Warriors of Peace: Writings on the Technique of Nonviolence.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
Dolci, Danilo. *The Man Who Plays Alone.* New York: Pantheon, 1968.
Dolci, Danilo. *Report from Palermo.* New York: Viking, 1970.
Dombrowski, Daniel. *Christian Pacifism.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
Douglass, James W. *The Nonviolent Cross: A Theology of Revolution and Peace.* New York: Macmillan, 1968.
Easwaran, Eknath. *A Man to Match His Mountains: Badshah Kahn, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam.* Petaluma, CA: Nilgiri Press, 1984.

Ellsberg, Robert (ed.) *By Little and By Little: The Selected Writings of Dorothy Day.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.
Eppsteiner, Fred (ed.) *The Path of Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged Buddhism.* Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988.
Epstein, Barbara. *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991.
Fiala, Andrew. *Practical Pacifism.* New York: Algora Press, 2004.
Fiala, Andrew. *The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
Fitz-Gibbon, Andrew (ed.). *Positive Peace: Reflections on Peace Education, Nonviolence, and Social Change.* Amsterdam: Brill/Rodopi, 2010.
Fitz-Gibbon, Andrew. *Talking to Terrorists, Nonviolence, and Counter-Terrorism.* London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016.
Galtung, Johan. *Essays in Peace Research. 5 Vols.* Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975-1980.
Galtung, Johan. *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective.* New York: Free Press, 1981.
Galtung, Johan. *There are Alternatives! Four Roads to Peace and Security.* Nottingham, England: Spokesman, 1984.
Galtung, Johan. *Solving Conflicts: A Peace Research Perspective.* Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.
Galtung, Johan. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization.* London: Sage, 1996.
Gan, Barry. *Violence and Non-violence: An Introduction.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013.
Garrow, David J. *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.* New York: William Morrow, 1986.
Gregg, Richard. *The Power of Nonviolence.* Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1959.
Gursozlu, Fuat (ed.). *Peace, Culture, and Violence.* Leiden: Brill/Rodopi, 2018.
Hauerwas, Stanley. *Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence.* Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2004.
Havel, Václav (Jan Vladislav, ed.). *Václav Havel: Or Living in Truth.* London: Faber and Faber, 1987.
Havel, Vaclav. *The Power of the Powerless.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990.
Haynes, Jeffrey. *Politics in the developing world: A Concise Introduction.* Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002.
Hentoff, Nat. *Peace Agitator: The Story of A. J. Muste.* New York: A. J. Muste Memorial Institute, 1982.
Hiltermann, Joost R. *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Holmes, Robert L. *On War and Morality.* Princeton: University Press, 1989.
Holmes, Robert L., Gan, Barry. *Nonviolence in Theory and Practice.* Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 1990.
Ingram, Catherine (ed.) *In the Footsteps of Gandhi: Conversations with Spiritual Social Activists.* Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1990.
Jones, Ken. *The Social Face of Buddhism: An Approach to Social and Political Activism.* London: Wisdom, 1989.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Gandhi's Way: A Handbook of Conflict Resolution.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002.
King, Jr., Martin Luther. *Stride Toward Freedom.* New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1958.
King, Jr., Martin Luther. *Strength to Love.* New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1963.
King, Jr., Martin Luther. *Where Do We Go From Here? Chaos or Community.* New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1967.
King, Mary Elizabeth. *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance.* New York: Nation Books, 2007.
Klenk, Rebecca. *Educating Activists: Development and Gender in the Making of Modern Gandhians.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.

Kraft, Kenneth. *The Wheel of Engaged Buddhism: A New Map of the Path.* New York: Weatherhill, 2000.
Kraft, Kenneth (ed.) *Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Kurtz, Lester R and Jennifer E. Turpin (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, *3 Vols.* San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1999.
Lakey, George. *Powerful Peacemaking: A Strategy for a Living Revolution.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1987.
Levy, Jacques. *Cesar Chavez: Autobiography of La Causa.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1975.
Lipski, Jan Jozef. *KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976–1981.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.
Loffland, John, Mary Ann Colwell and Victoria Johnson. *Peace-Seeking: The American Peace Movement in the Eighties.* Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991.
Lynd, Staughton (ed.) *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History.* Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.
McAllister, Pam (ed) *Reweaving the Web: Feminism and Nonviolence.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1983.
McCarthy, Colman. *All of One Peace: Essays on Nonviolence.* Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994.
McCarthy, Ronald M. and Gene Sharp. *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide.* New York: Garland Publishing, 1997.
McManus, Philip and Gerald Schlabach (eds.) *Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1991.
Mabee, Carlton. *Black Freedom: The Nonviolent Abolitionists from 1830 through the Civil War.* New York: Macmillan, 1970.
Macy, Joanna. *Dharma and Development: Religion as Resource in the Sarvodaya SelfHelp Movement.* West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1985.
Marks, Susan Collin. *Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution during South Africa's Transition to Democracy.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000.
Matthiessen, Peter. *Sal Si Puedes: Cesar Chavez and the New American Revolution.* New York: Random House, 1970.
McManus, Philip, and Gerald Schlabach (eds) *Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Press, 1991.
Mejer, August and Elliot Rudwick. *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Mercado, Monina Allarey (ed.) *People Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986.* Manila, Philippines: James B. Reuter, S. J. Foundation, 1986.
Merton, Thomas. *The Nonviolent Alternative.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980.
Merton, Thomas. *Faith and Violence.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986.
Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999.
Milligan, Tony. *Civil Disobedience: Protest, Justification, and the Law.* New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Morris, Aldon D. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change.* New York: Free Press, 1984.
Moyer, William. *A Nonviolent Action Manual: How to Organize Nonviolent Demonstrations and Campaigns.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Press, 1977.
Muste, A.J. *Nonviolence in an Aggressive World.* New York: Harper and Row, 1940.
Musto, Ronald G. *The Catholic Peace Tradition.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986.
Naess, Arne. *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age.* Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1965.
Nagler, Michael N. *Is There No Other Way? The Search for a Nonviolent Future.* Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Hills Books, 2001.
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. *Religion and War Resistance in the Plowshares Movement.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Nhat Hanh, Thich. *Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent Social Change.* Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1993.
Nusseibeh, Sari. *What is a Palestinian State Worth?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Orosco, José-Antonio. *Cesar Chavez and the Common Sense of Nonviolence.* Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2008.
Ostergaard, Geoffrey and Melville Currell. *The Gentle Anarchists: A Study of the Leaders of the Sarvodaya Movement for Nonviolent Revolution in India.* Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1971.
Payne, Charles M. *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
Pelton, Leroy H. *The Psychology of Nonviolence.* Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1974.
Piehl, Mel. *Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker Movement and the Origins of Catholic Radicalism in America.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1982.
Powers, R. S. and W. B. Vogele (eds.) *Protest, Power, and Change: Encyclopedia of Nonviolence from ACT-UP to Women's Suffrage.* New York, NY: Garland, 1997.
Queen, Christopher S. (ed.) *Engaged Buddhism in the West.* Boston, MA: Wisdom, 2000.
Queen, Christopher S. and Sallie B. King (ed.) *Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.
Randle, Michael. *Civil Resistance.* London: Fontana, 1994.
Roberts, Adam. (ed.) *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969.
Roberts, Adam and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.) *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Roberts, Nancy L. *Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984.
Ruddick, Sara. *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995.
Scalmer, Sean. *Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011
Schell, Jonathan. *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.* New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2003.
Schellenberg, James A. *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.
Schock, Kurt. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2004.
Semelin, Jacques. *Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939–1943.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.
Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 Vols.* Boston, MA: Extending Horizons Books/Porter Sargent, 1973–1985.
Sharp, Gene. *Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal.* New York: World Policy Institute, 1980.
Sharp, Gene. *Social Power and Political Freedom.* Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, 1980.
Sharp, Gene. *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and Defense.* Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985.
Sharp, Gene. *National Security through Civilian-Based Defense.* Omaha, NE: Association for Transarmament Studies, 1985.
Sharp, Gene. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential.* Manchester, NH: Extending Horizons Books/Porter Sargent, 2005.
Shephard, Mark. *Gandhi Today: The Story of Mahatma Gandhi's Successors.* Washington, D.C./Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1987.
Sivaraksa, Sulak. *Seeds of Peace: A Buddhist Vision for Renewing Society.* Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1992.
Smuts, Dene, and Shauna Westcott. *The Purple Shall Govern: A South African A to Z of Nonviolent Action.* Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Steger, Manfred B. *Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Taylor, Ronald B. *Chavez and the Farmworkers.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1975.
Teichman, Jenny. *Pacifism and the Just War.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Thoreau, Henry David. *Walden and Civil Disobedience*. New York: Penguin, 1986.
Tillett, Gregory. *Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach.* New York: Oxford University Press 2nd ed., 2000.
Tolstoy, Leo. *The Law of Violence and the Law of Love.* Santa Barbara, CA: Concord Grove Press, 1984.
Tolstoy, Leo. *Writings on Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1987.
van Kessel, Ineke. *"Beyond Our Wildest Dreams": The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 2000.
Wallis, Jim. *Peacemakers: Christian Voices from the New Abolitionist Movement.* New York: Harper & Row, 1983.
Washington, James Melvin (ed.) *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1986.
Weber, David R.(ed.) *Civil Disobedience in America: A Documentary History.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
Weber, Thomas. *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
Wehr, Paul, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess (eds.) *Justice Without Violence.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994.
Wink, Walter. *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way.* Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publ., 1987.
Wink, Walter (ed.) *Peace is the Way: Writings on Nonviolence from the Fellowship of Reconciliation.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000.
Wittner, Lawrence S. *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933–1983.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1984.
Zinn, Howard. *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1965.
Zinn, Howard (ed.) *The Power of Nonviolence: Writings by Advocates of Peace.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002.

Index

About the Author

Sanjay Lal is senior lecturer of philosophy at Clayton State University in Morrow, Georgia. He has published many scholarly articles and presented numerous professional talks on the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. He currently serves as associate editor of *The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence* and is an executive committee member of Concerned Philosophers for Peace. He lives in Stockbridge, Georgia, with his wife Bhawna Sinha and their son Shrey.