Andreas Musolff (ed.)

Language Aggression in Public Debates on Immigration

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Volume 102

Language Aggression in Public Debates on Immigration
Edited by Andreas Musolff

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Language Aggression in Public Debates on Immigration

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"[The immigrant has] been transformed into a terrible fiction. […] Unlike other monsters, the foreign body of the immigrant is unslayable. Resembling a zombie in a video game, he is impossible to kill or finally eliminate not only because he is already silent and dead, but also because there are waves of other similar immigrants just over the border coming right at you." Since the British novelist Hanif Kureishi published this verdict on UK public discourse about immigration in 2014, the world has seen a further increase in aggressive thematisations of migration, migrants and their alleged impact on 'host' societies. Especially in Europe and the USA, xenophobic discourses against immigrants have been elaborated by populist movements, with far-reaching effects on election campaigns, on referenda and on the relationship of the public with governing elites, not least through the use of social media. Such discourses have been linked with claims of 'regained' national, cultural or ethnic identity and 'liberation' on the part of the anti-immigration 'we-group' that have fostered demands, and sometimes near-triumphalist assertions, of 'taking' one's (own) country 'back' from an unspecified alien occupier. The immigrant is thus seen as an aggressor who threatens to take away one's identity, and in a kind of 'identification with the aggressor' by proxy, the projected national Self feels entitled to defend and reconstitute itself through asserting its own supremacy, wholeness and faultlessness. Conversely, it feels entitled to deny such qualities to immigrants (or also to further 'Others', such as current or historical 'enemy' collectives who are implicated in dealing with migration) and to demonize them. To which lengths the phantasmagoric imagination of the 'invading immigrant' can be extended is illustrated by an exchange of postings on the BBC's "Have Your Say" forum (BBC 2010; Musolff 2015, italics by the author):

(1) Illegal immigrants […] are not welcome here. … *If I walked into someones* [*sic*] *home that I didn't know unannounced and said I was moving in I would expect to get filled in.* Obviously I'm not saying do that just deport them to wherever they came from.

(2)   So, what you are saying is that *if you live in a nicer house than I do, it is OK with you that I just move into your house, let you and your family live in one of the rooms while my family and I take over the rest, eat the food that you work and pay for, set the TV to receive only the channels that I want to watch, while forcing you to learn my language and observe only my traditions and customs*? […] you would have a great deal of difficulty finding such a tolerant society that would put your views and needs above the views and needs of their own citizenry. I feel sure that many of us will be only too willing to wish you "Goodbye"!

(3)   OK so I to [*sic*] would like a better life for myself and my family[;] *so on this basis all I have to do is move into a multi millionaires [*sic*] home (with indoor swimming pool of course) expect the owners and servants to allow us to stay there, feed all of us for years, cloth all of us for years, tend to all our medical needs and not say a "Bigoted" word against us and in general give us anything we ask for why we do nothing or give nothing in return*. Sorry it does not work like that!

Far from representing an ironical elaboration 'ad absurdum' of immigrants-as-invaders demonization, as one might presume from reading the italicized 'home invasion' scenarios in isolation, the concluding statements in all postings leave no doubt that the three (different) forum posters compete 'in earnest' for producing the most outrageous, grotesquely exaggerated "fiction" (Kureishi) of the immigrants' impact on the speakers' 'home', complete with details of how they take over control of TV, language, healthcare and the definition of bigotry. The stance and 'footing' (Goffman 1981) of these passages, i.e. the pretended perspective of the speakers assuming the role of the home-invading migrant, underlines how much of their own identity is at stake: they cast themselves in the role of the wrongdoer to convince themselves and their fellow forum-posters that ethical condemnation and, following that, getting rid (if not 'filling in') of the aggressors is justified. The escalation from a 'simple' home-invasion to the wholesale takeover of a multimillionaire's mansion shows how productive the identification with/projection onto the alleged aggressor is: the speakers are evidently fascinated by their own vision of what they could do if they were immigrants!

This volume offers seven case studies of recent debates about migration, with a particular focus on how the foreign 'Other' is stigmatized, dehumanized and demonized. The first four articles concentrate on European reactions to the huge 2015 migration movement into Europe via the so-called "Balkan route". Here the focus is on how reception- and transit-societies in (Greek) Cyprus, Serbia, Croatia and Hungary 'come to terms' with the migration phenomenon in re-adjusting their own collective identities vis-à-vis the migrant Other. The three further articles

all focus on the anti-immigration rhetoric developed by the new US President Donald Trump during his 2016 election campaign and its impact on sections of the American public using social media. The shared methodological framework of these studies is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), with an emphasis on lexis, metaphors, social deixis and discourse history and internet-mediated conversation. It may be almost self-evident that migration and its discursive treatment will remain of central importance for the study of Language Aggression and its socio-political impact, with further waves of 'migrant-as-monster' constructions approaching, as predicted by Kureishi (2014). The present volume offers only a small selection of analyses, which will need to be both methodologically deepened and thematically widened in the future.

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Thinking globally, acting locally

Analyzing the adaptation of mainstream supremacist concepts to a local socio-historical context (ELAM in Cyprus)

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The aim of this study is to show how trans-national right-wing linguistic strategies and global xenophobic attitudes are reworked at national levels, and how, as a result, specialized country- and culture-specific coercion and legitimization strategies arise. Using a detailed, quantitative-qualitative method of analysis, we look at the Greek Cypriot extreme-right party ELAM to see how the party's anti-migration rhetoric construes any foreign presence as threat, by proximizing it linguistically as 'invasion.' This strategy allows the conflation of the current 'Other' (migrants) with archetypical adversaries, such as Turkey. Indeed, anchoring the migration issue in the main national narrative, i.e., the long-standing Cypriot conflict, gives their xenophobic language conceptual coherence and strengthens its textual cohesion. In particular two figures of speech are the basis of this invasion script, the word *metanasteftiko* 'the immigration phenomenon' conceptualized as the *kipriako* (the Cyprus problem, i.e., the political division of the island). This parallelism opens the way for a number of inferences, while it also enables a conceptual shift from the *real* phenomenon known as *globalization* and *multiculturalism* to the imagined idea of a (*white/Western) genocide*. Data include comments responding to ELAM followers' YouTube videos and mainstream press representations. Methodology includes corpus linguistics and discourse analysis focused on the fundamental metaphors found in the data such as MIGRATION AS UNBEARABLE WEIGHT and MIGRATION AS DIRT.

Keywords: extreme-right discourse, Cyprus, ELAM, metaphors, proximization, CMC

The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.   Hannah Arendt
Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil

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1.   Introduction

It was the end of the university year 2015 and I had just advised a graduating student to take her Master degree outside Cyprus, so as to broaden her life experience. Horrified, she answered: 'If I leave, who will defend Cyprus from the Turks?' Eleni (name changed) belongs to the extreme-right Cypriot party ELAM, or *Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο*/ National Popular Front, the Cypriot branch of the Greek party Golden Dawn, and she embodies the party discourse: her past, present and future are moulded by her fear of and anger against a multi-layered Other, typically exemplified by Turkey, but more recently also represented by migrants. This study examines how figures of speech used by ELAM activists become central to evaluations of the Other, immigrants in particular. Considering ideology as a set of meanings that serves to create a group identity (Charteris-Black 2011), we focus on the concept of salience (Giora 2003) as core to these figures of speech, insofar as the audience (readers and listeners) will share inferences, co-create the discourse, and ultimately approve any future preemptive actions associated with the group – here, ELAM ideology referring to the migrant population.

Primarily using postings on YouTube videos related to ELAM, but also looking at representations in the mainstream press, we identify and analyze the most frequent and specific lexico-grammatical language resources employed to proximize the threat to the survival of the Nation and of the Self, temporally, spatially or axiologically (Cap 2013; Chilton 2005). If the recurrent associations within the lexical field of *migration* (migrants, refugees, migration) are overwhelmingly negative, with the use of intensifiers systematically increasing the illocutionary force of potentially discriminatory utterances, we argue that these linguistic strategies have become even more successful because they are anchored in two main metaphors that provide conceptual coherence and strengthen textual cohesion. The first figure of speech includes the word *metanasteftiko* 'the immigration phenomenon' often combined with the word *kipriako* (the Cyprus problem, i.e., the political division of the island), which is the most important social and political issue on the island. This parallelism opens the way for a number of inferences, since all Cypriots have a political view on the division of the island (*rapprochement* or *status quo*), while it also enables a conceptual shift from the *real* phenomenon known as *globalization* and *multiculturalism* to the imagined idea of a (*white/ Western*) *genocide*.

2.   Immigration discourse and the dialectics of threat

Populist discourses have been defined as systematically and exclusively promoting a threefold argument (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Mudde 2010): (1)

Authoritarianism, as embodied by a charismatic leader and characterized by severe punishments for breaching the law; (2) Antagonism, as existing between the people or nation and the corrupted elite (i.e., political opponents, intellectuals, government, media, etc.); and (3) Nativism, as excluding *de facto* specific members of the population (particularly migrants), and, therefore, refusing multiculturalism. Central to these arguments are the emotions of anger and fear, powerful tools of persuasion in argumentative rhetoric and core to nationalistic rhetoric: one way to enhance such emotions is to create, emphasize or generalize the difference between an imagined Self and a multi-layered Other.

2.1 Identity politics and creating an enemy

The concept of a 'unified' nation linked to an anti-immigration stance is based on a symbolic threat such as fear of assimilation (i.e., the anti-multiculturalist positioning of the far-right threat regarding values, morals, etc.) and a realistic threat (i.e., anger over lost jobs presented as the result of immigration, reduction in pay scales, etc., O' Brien 2003, 34–35) giving rise to high anxiety. In turn, such emotions will legitimize preventive measures conducted with the hope of taking control of a situation that is supposedly out of control (Cap 2013, 294; Hart 2010; Stephan et al. 1999). Indeed, fear is very closely related to control, since the more reasons there are for fearing social groups, the greater the rationale for all forms of social control (Charteris-Black 2006, 50 and 2011, 25): and it is this social control that is the aim of extremist parties.

　　Among the most recurrent strategies and specific discursive choices employed to construct the threat posed by a 'created' out-group (see, *inter alia*, Baker et al. 2008; Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Dijk 1987, to name but a few) are: negative *topoi* that use referential strategies such as animal metaphors, predicational strategies, epistemic modalities attributing negative qualities to the out-group, exploitation of existing stereotypes, aggregation (i.e., referring to a unanimous group sharing the same intentions), as well as intensification (i.e., the excessive use of quantifying adverbs or adjectives). Moreover in their study of 'anti-foreigner' discourses in Austria, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) compiled a list of the most significant and widely used *topoi* in xenophobic discursive practices, including the *topos* of danger / threat, burdening / weighing down, and law/right – all of which are also alluded to, created by or supported with metaphors (KhosraviNik 2010; Musolff 2015; Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Furthermore, "understanding the systematic nature of metaphor choices" allows us to understand in turn how "entire belief systems are conceived and communicated" (Charteris-Black 2005, 3).

2.2 Conceptual metaphors and linguistic salience

In this regard, Musolff (2015, 41) aptly remarked that the topic of migration, because of its emotional nature as well as its polemic dimension, has been the subject of much metaphoric usage; for example, immigration as a natural disaster (flood, tsunami), a manmade disaster (pollution or invasion) and a disease/infection, including references to menacing animals, bacteria (Musolff 2000, 2015; KhosraviNik 2010; Reisigl and Wodak 2001) and beasts of burden (O'Brien 2003; Santa Ana 1999). These figures of speech denigrate immigrants and reinforce conscious or subliminal fears related to immigration in society. As socio-cultural practices, they then organize interpersonal relations. In nationalistic discourse, which typically adopts an anti-migration stance, metaphors are also known to be central to the construction of the Self and the Other: they are used by "in-groups to delineate their discursive boundaries, name and expel the Other" (Altman 1990, 504); the dichotomy between the Self and the Other, is, therefore, reinforced or imagined.

In light of the above, the aim of this study is to understand how the Cypriot ultra-right party ELAM (which is affiliated with the Greek neo-Nazi extreme-right party Golden Dawn) uses conceptual *analogies* that are relevant within Cypriot culture and history to endorse their current imagined scenario (Cap 2013, 295). We find that they achieve this by conflating a supposedly growing threat with an actual disastrous event in the past. Adapting a transnational extremist discourse to the socio-historical context of the island restricts their political agenda to emotional arguments, which are marked by chronic repetitions and clichés, with the concept of 'salience' being core to such linguistic choices. Indeed, the chosen lexical units are salient in the topical discourse either because of their frequency and familiarity of use in the public discourse (strong presence in the mainstream media), or because of their proto-typicality and representativeness of the society and history under study (Giora 2003; Hart 2008).

2.3 Scenario and salience

The concept of 'salience' explains why metaphors act as cognitive heuristics (Charteris-Black 2011, 565; Mio 1997, 117–118), and also corresponds to the major functions of metaphor (Mio 1997, 121). These can be summarized as follows:

– to *simplify* and make issues intelligible;
– to *resonate* with underlying symbolic representations; and
– to *stir emotions* and bridge the gap between the logical and the emotional.

Indeed, simplification is quite easily achieved by using well-known patterns of thought, while resonance implicates familiarity with a specific socio-cultural

content; because of this proximity, it becomes easier to stir the emotions. In a parallel fashion, Charteris-Black (2004) noted that figures of speech relate to the *unique* ways in which speakers perceive and construct events and ideas, and these unique ways play a major role in our *appraisal* of such events and ideas:

> Analysis of metaphor is often, then, *an exploration of the inner subjectivity of speakers* – what it is *that is unique to their perception of the world* – and forms the basis for their response to particular situations and to particular ideas. *This is often an underlying system of evaluation.*   (2004, 11, our emphasis)

This uniqueness of our perception of the world may explain why Edelman (1985, quoted by Mio 1997, 119), suggested that using metaphors that resonate with latent opinion is more effective than creating new ones. And indeed, reframing 'old' metaphors, which are salient either because of familiarity or their proto-typicality in a specific culture, is core to our study.

Salience is also core to the notion of 'scenarios' used by Musolff to analyze metaphors, since scenarios have stereotypical status in the sense established by Putnam (1975, 148, cited by Musolff 2006, 27), i.e., they include conventionally required assumptions. Scenario would refer to "any kind of coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings" that can be associated with an *underlying conceptual 'frame'* (Fillmore 1975 cited in Musolff 2006, 27, our emphasis), and that includes a scene with a script and protagonist (Lakoff 1987, 285–286). Adopting Musolff's definition, we can characterize a scenario as a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about 'typical' aspects of a source-situation (for example, its participants and their roles), the 'dramatic' storylines and the conventional evaluations. In the migration scenario, which is the topic of our paper, we examine how the Cypriot ultra-right party ELAM reframes a new social issue (immigration) within a known scenario (the Cyprus problem).

3.   Social and historical context

The European middle classes, unsettled by years of economic crisis and accelerated globalization, are now listening to parties that focus on loss of identity, fear of Islam, and rejection of the EU and Brussels, which they frame as a technocratic and globalist caste. Right-wing extremist discourses, especially those focused on scapegoats (typical populist rhetoric), seem to pander to this growing anxiety. Cyprus is no exception to the recent ultra right-wing popularity now found throughout Europe; these parties/personalities include Le Pen in France, Salvini in Italy, Wilders in The Netherlands, and the most extreme of these, the Golden

Dawn in Greece, a neo-Nazi party, which now has a presence in the country's parliament. The socio-historical context also explains its emergence.

3.1   The Cyprus problem: *Το Κυπριακό*

Cyprus's strategic position in the easternmost part of the Mediterranean has long made it vulnerable to invasion/conquest.[1] The most recent foreign rulers include the Franks, the Venetians and the Ottomans, from which the Turkish-Cypriot community originates, and the British. Even the independence of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 was organized by outside powers (Greece, Turkey, and Britain). In 1963, the constitutional crisis alternated with violent communal clashes perpetrated by militias on both the Greek Cypriot side and the Turkish Cypriot side. Ten years later, in 1974, the Turkish troops disembarked on the island and occupied the north, resulting in the deportation of most of the non-Turkish population to the south and most of the Turkish Cypriots to the north. The north and south division, embodied by the Green Line (sometimes referred to as the Attila line) still divides both communities, although movement between the two regions has been eased considerably since 2004. Negotiations aimed at finding a solution are ongoing at the time of writing this article. However, the political context of divided Cyprus is 'haunted' by the historic ethnic conflict and all social issues are subordinated to national survival (Hadjipavlou 2007; Trimikliniotis and Dimitriou 2014).

   This division, with all its human and financial consequences, as well as endless negotiations, has been referred to in the Greek language by the noun *το κυπριακό* (*to kipriako*), an abbreviation of *το Κυπριακό πρόβλημα*, which literally means 'the Cypriot problem', the adjective *κυπριακό* 'Cypriot' having been nominalized in *το κυπριακό* 'the Cyprus problem' as it is translated in the Cypriot media and conversations. More precisely, this word encompasses three main problems: (1) The loss / destruction of properties in the north[2] and consequent loss of revenue; (2) The loss, disappearance, or displacement of people;[3] and (3) The intensification of bad feelings towards Turkey, who is seen as a likely future predator.[4]

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1. http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/05/13/erdogan-ban-discuss-importance-cyprob/

2. This thorny question is central to any negotiation and is called *το περιουσιακό* ('the property issue').

3. The people from this last category are also called refugees and benefit from a special status; they are awarded more points in bursaries competitions, have access to special loans to acquire property, etc.

4. In 2013–14, during the bank meltdown I was told by a friend who had, as many of us, taken much money out of their bank accounts: 'we will need it if the Turks attack us'.

All Cypriots have a political view on how to solve the political deadlock (a solution including a bi-zonal federation; no solution, i.e., staying with the present deadlock; a giving back of the northern part on the part of Turkey, etc.). The *kipriako*, as the strongest national narrative (Stone 1988), serves, therefore, as the fundamental schema (or preexisting notion) that filters and influences most political and social decisions. ELAM has put forward an anti-settlement position in its political agenda alleging a globalist conspiracy behind the negotiations. However, displacing the historical resentment and real fear allows for the temporal, spatial and axiological proximization of this historical threat onto an imagined danger, the migrants.

3.2 The immigration phenomenon: *το μεταναστευτικό*

Indeed despite the above-described political stalemate, from the early 1990s until the economic crisis (2013) the Republic of Cyprus experienced unprecedented economic growth and quickly became a site of intense immigration from a wide variety of countries and people of many religions and cultures. Most immigrants came (and are still coming) from Asia for employment as domestic workers, or from Eastern Europe to work in the construction industry (King 2000; Trimikliniotis and Dimitriou 2014). By 2009, migrants made up 27% of the Cyprus population. In 2010, the economic crisis hit the Republic, and in 2013, things went from bad to worse economically after the collapse of the banking system, one of the island's most important economic sectors. The country had to accept an EU memorandum that served to severely curtail growth – and it is still in place (as of 2017). This memorandum includes, among other conditions, a recapitalisation of the entire financial sector, closure of one of the biggest banks using some of the money deposited in private accounts which held a sum above 100.000 Euro, and structural reforms to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, which meant a loss of 30% and more in revenues for civil servants.

With such very unpopular measures affecting a great majority of the people living on the island as well as an unemployment rate running as the third highest in Europe contributing to an even harsher economic climate, immigrants are, therefore, increasingly viewed as competitors for ever fewer jobs. The mainstream media has described immigrants as compromising the rights of other (Cypriot) employees or abusing the social system, reinforcing anti-immigrant sentiment (Milioni et al. 2015; Trimikliniotis and Dimitriou 2014). ELAM then appears to be using the *kipriako* scenario to proximize an anti-immigration sentiment. Indeed since the *kipriako* is the basis of the national narrative, it acts as a powerful frame to interpret any foreign presence (immigration) as an invasion. By capitalizing on the emotions mentioned above, which reflect historical events and present reality, ELAM is able to refocus old prejudices and fears onto a new scapegoat, a

well-known strategy of ultra-right discourse (Wodak et al. 2009), implicating an association with the archetypical enemy, Turkey, and a threat to the survival of the nation. As an example, on their website and in their letter to the May 2016 Pan European Congress held in Paris, ELAM asked for the "*mass deportation of all illegal immigrants* from European soil" and described Cyprus as "an Hellenic island *under Turkish occupation*, because of the help of the Turkish Cypriots who with the Turks committed crimes against humanity" (emphasis ours),[5] making a parallel between the occupation of the northern part by the Turkish army with the presence of migrants in the southern part. This strategy seems to be working since the political presence of the party is growing.

3.3   ELAM, the Cypriot extreme-right party

"It's sort of a kindergarten version of Golden Dawn," according to political analyst Hubert Faustmann referring to ELAM, a party forged on "the coat-tails of Greece's neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn, in 2008."[6] Because of their poor showing in previous elections, the party was virtually unknown outside Cyprus until May 2016, when they entered the government. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, they only achieved 1.08% of the vote (Katsourides 2013, 568). Three years later, however, they reached 2.69% in the 2014 European Elections and in the 2016 parliamentary elections succeeded in having two MPs elected with 3.87% of the vote. ELAM shares many commonalities with Golden Dawn (hereinafter GD), with the founder and leader of the party, Christos Christou, being a Cypriot ex-member of GD; Cypriots and Greeks who belonged to GD are also amongst its members. ELAM's rhetoric is based on GD's, and uses the same imagery of common origins (focused on Greece) and references to a common glorious past. They fight the same 'despicable' enemies common to most extreme-right discourses, which include the establishment, the EU and migrants, and a more specific Other common to Cyprus and Greece, Turkey. However, the leader and founder of ELAM, Christos Christou, has not opted for an aggressive rhetoric and demeanour like that of Michaloliakos, leader of Golden Dawn, maybe because locally that style would not take him very far. ELAM's partisans do not exhibit neo-Nazi flags, gestures or artefacts as GD so openly does. This ambiguity may explain the names with which they are referred to in newspapers and on-line comments: a 'terrorist

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5. http://nationalpeoplesfront.blogspot.com.cy/2016/05/paris-forum-de-leurope-intervention-of.html

6. http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/05/22/86036/. See Baider and Constantinou (2017) for a thorough explanation of the rise of the party and its affiliations with the EOKA B fighters.

organization' similar to EOKA B,[7] neo-Nazis, ultra-nationalists, extremists, fascists, and, since being recently elected to the Cypriot parliament, 'nationalists', a much milder terminology.[8] The key words and key concepts of ELAM discourse are typical of extreme-right discourse.

4. ELAM, their key words and key concepts

4.1 The Self and the other in ELAM's discourse

In an earlier study (Baider and Constantinou 2017) we focused on the virtual identities of ELAM followers whose postings contained either symbolic threat (religion and its axiological values such as common religious beliefs and values) or realistic threat (loss of jobs). Indeed, cyber-communication is a popular way for followers of political groups to meet other members and take part in discussions that very often are marked by verbal violence (Derks et al. 2008; Rösner and Krämer 2016; Yus 2011, 179–188). We noted such violence in abusive comments and slurs in the pseudonyms or caricatures in the avatars, features common in the discourse of other European extreme-right parties and communities (Delwit 2012; Ignazi 2006; Mudde 2007).

Moreover, and like most extremist nationalistic parties, ELAM's discourse is polarized as Us versus Them: We-ELAM (good, clean, heroic, and trustworthy) vs. the Other (bad, dirty, cowardly and shameless), an opposition also typical of racist discourses (Van Dijk 1987; Wodak et al. 2009).

4.2 Methodology

For this paper, our data set consists of YouTube postings (35, 820 words, pro-ELAM comments) for the period 2011–2017. Videos focused on speeches made by ELAM leaders and members, party-related debates, interviews and documentaries (cf. Annex1). As is usual with regard to comments, some were posted before the period of our data collection, even one to two years earlier; moreover, there are not many comments for Cypriot online newspapers or YouTube videos in Greek in comparison with articles/videos in English, for example. In addition, working with corpus linguistic tools and Greek writing on social media is labour

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7. http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/05/23/election-outcome-doest-bode-well-settlement-political-observer-says/

8. http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/05/23/election-outcome-doest-bode-well-settlement-political-observer-says/

intensive. Along with the usual spelling mistakes in such postings, many are written in "Greeklish" – i.e., the Greek text is transliterated (letter-mapping) using the Latin alphabet, for example, *θρησκεία* 'religion' will be written "8riskiea" or "thriskeia". This practice is common, since Greek fonts are not always supported by mobile telephones, internet software, etc. Some entries are written without accents or in capital letters, which are not accented (*ΘΡΗΣΚΕΙΑ*) and we kept the original in our quotations.

Our analytical procedure is similar to other studies on media representation of migrants (Baker et al. 2008; KhosraviNik 2010), in that it combines quantitative and qualitative analysis. We used AntConc[9] for the extraction of statistical data, identification of salient lexical information (clusters, collocates, wordlist), as well as the context via concordances. Going back to these concordances allows us to identify and analyze, in context, the most frequent and specific lexico-grammatical resources of language.

Indeed, we have been working with the parameters of frequency, familiarity and proto-typicality as criteria that define the *salience* of lexical meanings or expressions (Giora 2003). A high *frequency* of collocations, for instance, can be a sign of existing salient conceptual associations. These associations are then available to each speaker of that specific speech community, who may, in turn, make the same conceptual associations because of repeated use. Linguistic salience is, therefore, considered to be characteristic of the accessibility of entities in a person's memory, this accessibility affecting the production and interpretation of a word, an expression, etc. (Kecskes 2013, 177).

4.3 Keywords and key concepts

The most frequent words are found in Table 1 and there is an overwhelming emphasis on the lexical items related to the Self, including the words referring to Greece, Golden Dawn, ELAM and Cyprus (777 occurrences,) as well as nationalism (161 occurrences). For example, the commentators defend themselves as not supporting extreme-right, but rather nationalistic parties (1):

(1)   Η Χ.Α. και το Ε.ΛΑ.Μ δεν είναι "ακροδεξιά" κόμματα, είναι Εθνικιστικά. Επίτηδες τα ΜΜΑ αποφεύγουν αυτόν τον όρο.
   'Golden Dawn and ELAM are not 'extreme-right' parties, they are nationalist parties. On purpose the Media avoid this term.'

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9. http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/

The ultra-nationalistic objectives include 'fighting' to save 'their civilization, identity and heritage' against a multi-layered enemy /traitor of the Nation; among the pseudonyms we found *Στρατιώτης της φυλής* 'the soldier (defending) the race'.

Table 1. The Self in ELAM's discourse

ELAM (ΕΛΑΜ)	Golden Dawn* (Χρυσή Αυγή)	Cyprus (Κύπρος)/ Cypriot (Κύπριος, κυπριακός etc.)	Greece (Ελλάς/ Ελλάδα) Greek (Ελληνες, etc.)	Nation (έθνος) motherland (πατρίδα)
188	80	243	238	161

(Categories taken from Baider and Constantinou 2017)

* For Greek words, we included the whole paradigm, i.e., we included the different morphologies when the noun is subject, object, etc. In the same way, under Turkey we restricted the occurrences to linguistic items such as τουρκική κατοχή 'the Turkish occupation'; we did not include implied references.

As for the Other, three main groups can be distinguished: the archetype enemy, Turkey; the migrants referred to by their religions; and political opponents such as AKEL, the largest left-wing party.

Table 2. The Other in ELAM's discourse

Turkey (Τουρκία, etc.) Turkish Cypriot (Τουρκο κύπριος)	Immigration (μεταναστευτικό, μετανάστευση), migrants (Μετανάστες), Foreigners (ξένοι, αλλοδαποί)	Religious others Muslims (Μουσουλμάνοι) Islam	Traitors, treason (Προδότες, προδοσία)	Left wing party, communist, etc. (ΑΚΕΛ, κομμουνιστές, αριστερούς etc.)
140/ 12	79	21	49	104

All the Others are also included in the category of traitors, as for example in the comment (2) below:

(2)   8 ακελικοί εθνοπροδότες πάτησαν dislike![10]
       '8 'akelites' traitors of the nation chose dislike!'

Among the most frequent content words not related to a specific other or the Self (Table 3) were words referring to the Golden Dawn motto 'Blood and Honor' (Αίμα και τιμή), to religion (θρησκεία) and race (φυλή).

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10. The neologism *ακελικοί*, 'members of AKEL', has been used in such postings, which is translated as 'akelites' in comments written in English.

Table 3. Other most frequent content words

Blood (Αίμα)	Honor (τιμή)	religion (θρησκεία)	race (φυλή)
46	54	39	19

The word *φυλή* ('race') is, in most cases, used as part of the motto '*ΕΛΑΜ, φυλή, αίμα και τιμή*' ('ELAM, race, blood and honour'), a reformulation of Golden Dawn's motto '*αίμα και τιμή*' ('blood and honour'), hence the high frequency of these two words in our data. The motto seems quite directly related to the motto of the Hitler Youth (Blut und Ehre/ blood and honour), and prescribes ethnicity as an indisputable prerequisite for being part of the Nation. Most important to the present study is the strong presence, as mentioned above, of the word *θρησκεία* ('religion'), with 39 occurrences; if we add the references to specific religions such as *Μουσουλμάνοι* ('Muslims'), 50 references belong to that lexical field, a number close to the amount found for the ELAM motto.

ELAM's targeted 'enemies' reflect, therefore, the socio-historical specificities of the island, with Turkey or Turkish in 152 occurrences.[11] The lexical field relating to Turkey is consistently the most offensive, including such expressions as *ηλίθιο τουρκόλαγνο παλιο κομμούνι*!! ('stupid Turkish lover, you stupid communist'), *τουρκόσποροι* ('Turkish seeds/sperm'), *Τούρκε πούστη* ('fagot of a Turk'), *Τούρκοι γύφτοι* ('Turkish gypsies').[12] The insults are also found in the pseudonyms used, such as Turkfucker1 (Baider and Constantinou 2017). In fact, a sociolinguistic study on emotions and Cypriot society (Baider 2012) found that for Cypriots aged 50 and above, the most frequent collocates of the word *μίσος* (hatred) were lexical paradigms related to Turkey (*Τουρκία*, *Τούρκοι*). However for those aged 35–50, the enemy was as much the person on the other side of the Green Line as it was foreign workers (assimilated within the generic word *μαύροι* 'black', 'dark'). Immigration is, therefore, resented, and it has been considered a social issue since the early 2000s in the media. That the media helps, therefore, to make the parallel between the two enemies, Turks and foreigners, is prominent in the ELAM political narrative, ELAM's motto including the following: "Every people to its land, every land to its people", a motto which refers as much to the division of the island as to the arrival of non-indigenous populations.

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11. The number of occurrences referring to Turkey is much higher in 2016 because of the renewal of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem, which ELAM opposes.

12. We kept the original spelling.

5.   Immigration as invasion: ELAM's linguistic and conceptual script

As we stated at the beginning of this paper, it is essential to examine the two key arguments in ELAM followers' discourse regarding the enemies of the nation (the paradigm of Turkey and the paradigm of immigration), in the context of the *kipriako* (the 'Cyprus problem'). We argue that ELAM and its members, in their appropriation of the implications associated with the word invasion, have based their rhetoric on the metaphor MIGRATION AS INVASION. We argue further that this metaphor is structured via the schema: SOURCE (migrants, EU workers, etc.) – PATH (invasion) – GOAL (Cypriot genocide). More precisely:

–   through linguistic devices, the SOURCE (any foreign presence) will be constructed so as to imply a conceptual closeness with Turkey; this will serve to proximize fear and anger;
–   the PATH is realized by putting in place well-known *sub-metaphors* related to migration, e.g., MIGRANTS AS DIRT and MIGRANTS AS (UNBEARABLE) BURDEN, commonly used in reference to inhabitants in the North of Cyprus (Hadjipavlou 2004);
–   the GOAL (of the 'Other') is seen as the alienation of the Cypriot nation (represented by Orthodox religion and Hellenic values) and the disappearance of its indigenous population (threat to the Cypriot 'race'). This alienation will be carried out by (an imagined) migration problem via a real phenomenon, multiculturalism. The political aim is to stop negotiations for a solution with the Turkish Cypriots and to encourage the longing for reunification with Greece.

This schema is explicated in our next section through the analysis of the YouTube comments.

5.1   Linguistic proximity and conceptual amalgam

We saw earlier (Table 1) that ELAM views the source of the threat to comprise two main Others: Turkey and migrants. In this section, we look into the linguistic strategies used to create the necessary conceptual affinity between Turkey (as illegal occupier of the northern part) and any non-native (as illegal occupier of the southern part). More precisely, linguistic contiguity creates a conceptual amalgam, implying that any foreign presence is both illegal and lethal, and thus threatening the very survival of the nation. Any type of foreign presence, including EU citizens working in Cyprus, third-country workers, along with Turkish Cypriots, will, therefore, be conceptualised as 'migrants'.

First and foremost in this conceptual amalgam is the idea that any/all foreign presence is dangerous and, therefore, is also considered illegal.

Migrants are referred to as *λαθρομετανάστες*, a more offensive word than that used by most newspapers, *παράνομοι μετανάστες* 'illegal migrants';[13] moreover, this word is also seen as 'legally inappropriate' since it is not used in legal Greek texts.[14] As a matter of fact, in 8 out of 12 references words referring to migrants co-occur with the *topos* of illegality:

(3) lexi metanastes. lathrometanastes i sosti lexi …
     '[you use] the word migrants, *the right word is illegal migrants*'

The same phenomenon was observed in our interviews with ELAM followers, who would correct themselves and add *illegal* when using words referring to migrants if they had not initially included the illegality issue. Even references to EU workers, who have the legal right to work in Cyprus, are juxtaposed against references to illegal immigration. They are regularly mentioned as the reason for high unemployment, i.e., they embody a *realistic* threat (4):

(4) Εγώ έχω πρόβλημα και με τους *λαθρομετανάστες αλλά και με τους ΚΟΙΝΟΤΙΚΟΥΣ*!!! Η ανεργία στην Κύπρο *οφείλεται* κυρίως στους *ΚΟΙΝΟΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΕΡΓΑΤΕΣ*!!!!
     'I have a problem with both *illegal immigrants and EU CITIZENS*!!! Unemployment in Cyprus is *due to EU WORKERS*. […]'

The s*ymbolic* threat is embodied by Muslims since they endanger the Greekness of the island, which is inherently tied to the orthodox religion:

(5) alla oi mousoulmanous, Aftoi oi an8ropoi dn 8eloun kanena pou dn pistefki stn 8riskeia tous, ine fasistes je prp na fioun!!
     'But the Muslims, these people do not want anyone who does not believe in their religion, they are fascists, they have to leave!!'

In fact, any non-native individual is considered to be a danger to the core values of Cypriot society since they are 'anti-Hellenes' (6):

(6) δεν είμαστε φασίστες σαν λαό αλλά όχι να μας *γαμούν και το σπίτι οι αλλοδαποί και ο κάθε ανθέλληνας,* όποιος τους θέλει τους λαθρομετανάστες ας τους βάλει σπίτι του !!
     'We are not fascists as a nation but we can't let ourselves and our home get fucked up *by foreigners and every anti-Hellene,* whoever wants illegal immigrants can let them into their own home!!'

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13. Konstantinidou and Michailidou (2014, 93) explain that this neologism has 'deeply discriminatory overtones'

14. http://www.vice.com/gr/read/den-yparxoun-oute-lathrometanastes-oute-paranomoi-metanastes. The recommended words are 'undocumented migrants' or 'irregular migrants'.

Given that all non-native presence embodies a kind of a threat and is conceptualized as illegal, when the word *κατακτητές* 'occupiers' is used in Example (7) in parallel with the expression *παράνομους μετανάστες* 'illegal immigrants', it is not even clear whether the comment refers to illegal migrants or EU workers, to Turkish settlers in the north or to migrants in the south:

(7) δεν έχεις πρόβλημα με τους παράνομους μετανάστες, δεν έχεις πρόβλημα με τους *κατακτητές*;
'Don't you have a problem with illegal immigrants, don't you have a problem with the occupiers?'

Thus we note a vague commingling of the Cyprus problem and the immigration phenomenon. This ambiguity is also evident in Example (8) where the word *λαθροεισβολείς* 'illegal invaders' can refer to *λαθρομετάναστες* (illegal migrants) or to the Turkish settlers:

(8) και η *κύπρος έχει πρόβλημα με λαθροεισβολείς*?
'and Cyprus does not have a problem with the illegal invaders?'

In the same way the command, *Έξω οι Τούρκοι'* ('Turks Out!'), refers to the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island, and could also apply to the Turkish-Cypriots. The frequent linguistic parallels between foreigners, Turks and illegal migrants reinforce this conceptual equivalence:[15]

(9) ΑΜΕΣΗ ΑΠΕΛΑΣΗ – ΕΞΩ ΟΙ ΞΕΝΟΙ – ΕΞΩ ΟΙ ΛΑΘΡΟΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗ – Ε.ΛΑ.Μ
'IMMEDIATE EXPULSION – OUT WITH FOREIGNERS – OUT WITH ILLEGAL MIGRANTS – E.LA.M'

(10) Το σχέδιο μας όπως αναφέρεις για καθαρισμό απο *λαθρομετανάστες, τούρκους και εθνοπροδώτες* πάντα ήταν ξεκάθαρο.
'Our plan as you mention for the cleansing of *illegal immigrants, Turks and traitors of the* nation has always been quite clear.' (our italics)

Using this equivalence for all manner of non-native peoples, and the argument that anybody who is not a 'native'[16] is a threat to the survival of the Nation, serves to legitimate the same (drastic) solution to rid the country of all non-natives – the survival of the Self and the Nation are at stake.

Not only is the imminent threat implicated by the linguistic devices described above, it is also explicitly communicated through the predicational strategy:

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15. This is also true in social practices, ELAM organizing marches against Turkish Cypriots *and* migrants.

16. And fulfilling the criteria of religion, color etc.

foreigners will take over the island. In ELAM's discourse the metaphor of immigration as invasion gives coherence to the realistic and symbolic threats listed above.

5.2 Migration as INVASION

In Example (10) above, the word *cleansing* implicates a well-known metaphor in racist discourse when referring to the Other, the metaphor of DIRT. Indeed, the most prevalent metaphors when addressing the migration phenomenon are those describing immigrants as DIRT and those referring to immigrants as an UNBEARABLE WEIGHT or BURDEN.

As Douglas (2001, 7) explained, the idea of dirt is composed of two elements, i.e., care for hygiene and 'respect for conventions'. Therefore, the metaphor of DIRT or IMPURITY, a powerful and historically established metaphor, is as much about hygiene as about 'an offence against order'. Therefore, this metaphor denounces both real dirt, such as in Example (11) and symbolic dirt, as we see in (12) including beliefs / values and *religion*.

(11)   empori na paei pion i giagia su me ton papou sou ena peripato agkaze kato sti lidras epidi en gemato skataes je vromismenous? Den ften oi lathrometanastes;
'your grandma with your grandpa can no longer go for a walk together down at lidras [a popular downtown stroll in Nicosia] because it is full of shitty people and stinkers? illegal immigrants are not to blame?'

(12)   Η ξενοφοβία είναι μια απάτη... δουλειά στον Έλληνα εργάτη. ΕΛΑΜ για να *ξεβρομίσει* ο τόπος
'Xenophobia is a scam … work to the Greek worker. ELAM will *clean* up the place'

This metaphor is also found in spontaneous speech: for example, when mentioning immigration to an educated acquaintance, the interviewee used an expression of disgust and said: βρομίζουν την Κύπρο 'they defile Cyprus' or 'they mess Cyprus up'. As mentioned before, a foreign presence is conceptualized as either a realistic threat (jobs) or as a symbolic threat (values), or often as both. This symbolic threat endangers the two most defining characteristics of the Cypriot nation, according to ELAM: *religion* and *race*. The threat lies mainly in mixed marriages (13):

(13)   otan ta pedia mas tha theloun na pantrevtoun avtous tous allodapous kai *tha thelisoun na aspastoun to islam* den tha aresi se kanenan! Pos tolmoun na mas lene ratsistes ? ratsistis ine opios den *theli na diatirisi tin orthodoxia ke tin Elinikotita tou topou*! ratsistis ine opios den theli na diatirisi tin orthodoxia ke tin Elinikotita tou topou.

'When our children will want to marry those foreigners and *wish to convert to Islam*, then nobody will be pleased! How dare they call us racists? *A racist is someone who does not want to keep the Orthodox faith and the Greekness of the country*!'

Yet one can survive a taking over of values. The metaphor of the BURDEN, which here implies an UNBEARABLE WEIGHT, is a more powerful threat since the country and its population could die from the pressure – in other words, the island could sink economically from the burden of the immigrant population. In Example (14) the speaker indicates there is no room for migrants; while in (15) Cyprus is considered to be already crushed economically, and any further weight on the economy would be suicidal:

(14) ΘΑ ΗΘΕΛΑ ΝΑ ΗΞΕΡΑ ΣΕ ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΔΥΣΜΟΙΡΟ ΜΟΙΡΑΣΜΕΝΟ ΝΗΣΙ *ΠΟΣΟΙ ΑΛΛΟΙ ΞΕΝΟΙ* ΧΩΡΟΥΝ
'I would like to know how *any other foreigners* can fit in this hapless divided island.'

(15) Δεν μπορούμε να αντέξουμε *τόσους μετανάστες*. Ασφυκτιά η οικονομία επομένως πρέπει να φύγουν.
'We cannot afford so many migrants. The economy is strangled, therefore they have to leave.'

In (14) above, the verbs *χωρώ* 'to fit, to accommodate' and in (15) the verb *ασφυκτιά* 'choke' recall the CONTAINER metaphor found in Hart's (2008, 101) analysis of the British National Front's discourse and Great Britain being described as 'full up'. However the BURDEN metaphor seems also apt since in (15) above, the verb *αντέξουμε* 'to endure' describes the indigenous population suffering under the pressure imposed on the Nation by unwanted migrants. Indeed, in Example (16), the segment *εις βάρος των ιθαγενών*, which translates as 'at the expense of the natives', includes the word *βάρος,* which means literally 'weight, burden'. This burden will pull down the country economically (*βουλιάξει οικονομικά*):

(16) Η μετανάστευση γίνεται, πολλές φορές, εις βάρος των *ιθαγενών*, οι οποίοι ποτέ δεν ερωτούνται για τον αν θέλουν τους *μετανάστες*.(…). Θα το καταλάβεις όταν η Κύπρος *βουλιάξει οικονομικά*.
'Migration occurs, often, at the expense of the indigenous, who are never asked whether they want the migrants. (…). You will understand this when Cyprus *sinks economically*.'

The suffocation and collapse of Cyprus will take place physically, the islanders crushed by a huge *κύμα* ('wave') of migrants such as described in (17):

(17) Δεν είμαι εγώ στη θέση του μετανάστη αλλά του ανθρώπου που βλάπτεται
      από *το τεράστιο κύμα* λαθρομεταναστών.
      'I am not in the position of an immigrant but of the man *damaged / hurt* by
      the huge wave of illegal immigrants.'

The realistic and symbolic dangers alluded to with the words /metaphors DIRT
and UNBEARABLE BURDEN address deep-seated fears that refer to the (1974)
Turkish invasion and the resulting Cyprus problem, which are often mentioned in
parallel with the migration phenomenon, as in Example (18):

(18) είναι άσχετοι και στο μεταναστευτικό και στο κυπριακό πρόβλημα, απλώς
      αναπαράγει ιδέες του καφενέ
      'They are useless regarding the migrant issue and the Cypriot issue, they just
      reiterate coffee-shop talk'

As with the amalgam between (illegal) migrants, foreigners, and Turkey, these two
metaphors aim at the same conclusion: eliminating dirt is a positive effort to *reorganize the environment* (Douglas 2001) and restore control; eliminating the burden
crushing the body means recovering oxygen and, we may say, recovering *lebensraum*.

5.3 The ultimate goal: Cypriot genocide or population replacement

The concept of losing the living space is reconceptualized as genocide, a notion
that is widespread on extremist forums. Mixing with outsiders means death to
the Nation; it also means strengthening foreign bodies. Indeed multiculturalism,
alluded to in Example (19), becomes a weapon used by unidentified global forces,
which are using migrants to dilute 'Hellenism' and obliterate the Nation (20):

(19) όποιοι δεν θέλουν να μείνουν εκεί στο πολύ 'πολιτισμικό' τους βούρκο!!
      'those who do not want to stay in this very 'multicultural' quagmire'

(20) i *pagkosmia diktatoria pou lalis vasizete stin pagkosmiopiisi*. LATHROMETA
      NASTEFSI=PAGKOSMIOPIISI, MIXI FYLWN. kyrie eleison
      'The worldwide dictatorship you are talking about is based on
      globalization…*ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS =GLOBALIZATION,
      RACEMIXING*! My God!'

As a result of the mixing of races, the native will become a minority in their own
country, as described in Example (21):

(21) Στο δίλημμα να γίνω μια θλιβερή μειονότητα στην ίδια μου την πατρίδα και
      να σφάξω προδότες και ξενόδουλους διαλέγω το δεύτερο!!
      'Faced with the dilemma of becoming a sad minority in my own country or
      killing traitors and/or foreign slaves I choose the second!!'

In fact, five of the eight occurrences with the word *ξένοι* ('foreigners') demand that foreigners leave Cyprus as in the quotations below.

(22)   ΕΞΩ ΟΙ *ΞΕΝΟΙ, ΕΞΩ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ*
'FOREIGNERS OUT, TURKS OUT'

(23)   έξω όλοι οι ξένοι από ελλάδα και κύπρο!!! Ελλας κυπρος ενωσις!!!
'all foreigners out of Greece and Cyprus!!! Greece Cyprus unification!!!'

(24)   ΕΞΩ ΟΙ *ΛΑΘΡΟΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΣ* ΑΠΟ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΠΡΟ!!!!!
'ILLEGAL MIGRANTS OUT OF GREECE AND CYPRUS!!!!'

Indeed, for Cyprus survival, any foreign element and non-natives will be attacked, as noted in (25) or killed as in (26):

(25)   XTIPATE TOUS ATHLIOUS RATSISTES ANTHELLINES
*LATHROMETANASTES, KAI TOUS ATHLIOUS TOURKOSPOROUS
PSEFTOKUPRIOUS* […]
'STRIKE THE DESPICABLE RACIST *ANTI-HELLENE ILLEGAL
MIGRANTS, AND THE DESPICABLE FAKE CYPRIOTS OF TURKISH
SEEDS/SPERMS* […]'

(26)   ΝΑ ΠΕΘΑΝΟΥΝ ΟΙ ΞΕΝΟΙ
'DEATH TO FOREIGNERS'

In Example (27) below, the word *εισβολή* 'invasion' echoes the *kipriako* scenario (Turkish invasion, division of the island) that occurred in 1974. Reframing migration within an invasion and colonization theory is alluding linguistically and cognitively *de facto* to the division of the island. The conceptual metaphor MIGRATION AS INVASION puts in place the transfer of emotions from the (real and historical) national narrative (the *kipriako*) to the (imagined) immigration phenomenon (*metanasteftiko*):

(27)   *1 στους 5 είναι ξένος!! Αυτό δεν είναι μετανάστευση!! Αυτό είναι
ΕΙΣΒΟΛΗ και ΕΠΟΙΚΙΣΜΟΣ!!! Μας ΓΕΝΟΚΤΟΝΟΥΝ και μας
ΑΝΤΙΚΑΘΙΣΤΟΥΝ!!! (…) ΜΑΖΙΚΕΣ ΑΠΕΛΑΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΡΑ ΚΟΙΝΩΤΙΚΩΝ
και ΑΘΡΟΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΩΝ!!!].*
'1 out of 5 is a foreigner!! This is not immigration!! This is an **INVASION**
and COLONIZATION!!! They ARE EXTERMINATING us as a nation and
ARE REPLACING us!!! (…) MASS DEPORTATIONS of EU and ILLEGAL
IMMIGRANTS NOW!!!'

As a matter of fact in mainstream Cypriot newspapers in 2015–2017, the word *το μεταναστευτικό* is a frequent collocate of *το κυπριακό,* as we see in Example (28) in the same way it is used in ELAM's discourse (cf. quotation 18 above):

(28)   Κυπριακό, μεταναστευτικό, προσφυγικό και διμερείς σχέσεις βρέθηκαν στο
επίκεντρο των συναντήσεων που είχε στην Ιταλία ο Πρόεδρος της Βουλής,
Δημήτρης Συλλούρης (*Kathisimerini*, 22.03 2017)[17]
'The Cyprus issue, the immigrant problem, the refugee issue and the bilateral
relationships were the focus of the meetings which the President of the
Parliament, Demetris Syllouris, had in Italy.'

As mentioned before, like the 'adjective *κυπριακό*' used over time as a noun is
now referring to the Cyprus problem' (*to kipriako/κυπριακό*), the adjective
μεταναστευτικό (of migration) was used as a noun (*το μεταναστευτικό*) to refer
to the immigration phenomenon. Actually *το μεταναστευτικό* has replaced in
over 60% the occurrences of *η μετανάστευση*, the usual and neutral term refer-
ring to immigration. This identical grammatical shift goes hand in hand with a
similar shift in axiological value, from neutral to negative since *το μεταναστευτικό*
is nowadays understood as the abbreviation of *το μεταναστευτικό πρόβλημα* 'the
immigration problem' or *το μεταναστευτικό ζήτημα* 'the migration issue', imply-
ing a negative connotation when referring to the immigration phenomenon. The
identical grammatical and semantic shifts, as well as the high frequency of both
words in the press, may reflect the strong anxiety evoked by both phenomena.
However, unlike the *κυπριακό*, the *metanasteftiko* is more an *imagined* threat than
a real one. Indeed there has not been a migrant 'issue' in Cyprus since 2014, when
the financial crisis led many foreigners to leave.[18]

Nor is there a refugee issue either, although the word *το προσφυγικό /pros-
figiko* 'the refugee phenomenon' to which the quotation (28) refers still fills the
news as another shortcut for an apparently big social issue, which exists even less
than the immigration problem on the island. Indeed, only a few (150) refugees fled
from Syria to arrive in 2015 on Cyprus, and most of these landed on the British
bases, i.e., not even on Cypriot *soil.* As a matter of fact, the word *προσφυγικό* is
the second most frequent collocate with *μεταναστευτικό* (after *κυπριακό*), and
it also frequently collocates with strongly negative adjectives. *Το προσφυγικό* is,
therefore, also understood in discourse as the 'refugee issue'. However mixing con-
ceptualizations (a concrete political deadlock and an imaginary wave of refugees)
serves to re-interpret historical encounters, denounce the present ones and build
fear regarding potential new threats.

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17.   http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/mobile.php?modid=2&artid=264699

18.   Emigration is nowadays a more acute phenomenon for Cyprus than immigration. Further,
countries similar in economy and size (e.g., Malta) have been experiencing a high rate of immi-
gration since 2014 while Cyprus has not. See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

6. Conclusion

Studies on the current extremist discourse have pointed out that "culture has become central to the questions of belonging and alterity, that is, the ontology of the social has become *culturalized*" (Yilmaz 2012, 362, our emphasis). Most far-right discourse on globalization and multiculturalism, European integration and mass immigration focuses on the threat to cultural values (Taguieff 2012). In turn, migrants, who may have different cultures and values, have been the focus of the nationalistic fears in Europe, especially since the recent heavy immigration from the Middle East. In this paper, we have shown how the pan-European ultra-nationalistic strategies and rhetoric targeting this threat are reworked to encompass any foreign entity, and strengthened by reviving already extant prejudices (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 117). Indeed, contrary to the usual function of metaphor, that of "representing a novel way of viewing the world that offers some fresh insight" (Charteris-Black 2004, 7), in our study the conceptual metaphor MIGRATION AS INVASION, based on a historical scenario, is more powerful because it reverts to old fears, inscribing a new phenomenon on a well-established and frightening scenario. The semantic shift from *το μεταναστευτικό* ('the 'immigration phenomenon') to 'the immigration crisis', and the parallelization of *το μεταναστευτικό* and *το κυπριακό* may also result in making the Cyprus problem even more emotionally charged and acute, reigniting bad feelings between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots and, therefore, strengthening the political stalemate. These strategies of rhetoric enable, therefore, the renewal of 'traditional' key concepts in the Cypriot discourse within a supremacist ideology and are indeed powerful cognitive shortcuts, which then become the concepts used to make evaluations, to (re)/(de)-construct facts, action, Self and social structures (see Billig 1991; Musolff 2007). Indeed, this fear-mongering strategy may cause people to refuse any solution during the on-going negotiations with the North of Cyprus. This could mean an *emotional dialectic* and *a dynamic relationship* between the different domains involved in a conceptual metaphor: the emotional charge associated with the two concepts, '*metanasteftiko*' and '*kipriako*', is reciprocal. This potential dialectic between source and target domains could explain, at least in part, the results of the May 2016 parliamentary elections in which 40% of the electorate voted for parties refusing a solution to the *κυπριακό* (such as ELAM), whereas the two biggest parties were advocating for a solution. Two ELAM members of Parliament were also elected to the dismay of most commentators. In February 2017, in the midst of new negotiations to solve the Cyprus issue, the two ELAM Members of Parliament sponsored the vote for a compulsory commemoration in public schools of the

1950 plebiscite, on the issue of reunification with Greece, a move sure to exacerbate the *kipriako*[19] and not to solve it. The motion was passed.

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Appendix

	Type/genre	Title of the video, link and a short description	Postings	Published on
1	Talk show	*Η δράση του Ε.ΛΑ.Μ. στη Κύπρο – ΤΟΛΜΩ 19/6/2012* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8hIAYxST0s Talk show about ELAM and GD	112	19.06.2012
2	Interview	*Ε.ΛΑ.Μ. στην εκπομπή Πρωτοσέλιδο* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIags74rUjE ELAM's leader presents his party's positions on Sigma TV	181	29.04.2011
3	Interview	*Ε.ΛΑ.Μ. για περιστατικό με Κανέλλη* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUHl_ASIvLU ELAM's leader intervening in the Sigma TV news bulletin to talk about and justify Kasidiaris' behavior against L. Kanelli.	198	08.06.2012
4	Interview	*Ο πρόεδρος του ΕΛΑΜ, Χρίστος Χρίστου, στο MEGA – 23/9/13* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XECEDdCqAE&spfreload=10 ELAM's leader being interviewed after the murder of P. Fyssas	8	08.06.2012
5	ELAM's video	*Μεγάλη Εθνικιστική Πορεία ΕΛΑΜ* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaOz6iliYNM A nationalist march by ELAM against the Turkish occupation	14	10.08.2011
6	Interview	*Χρίστος Χρίστου για υποψηφιότητα ΕΛΑΜ* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXmtWuykOE8 ELAM's leader presents his party's proposals mainly on immigration etc.	7	15.06.2013
7	Interview	*Παρουσίαση ΕΛΑΜ στο ΡΙΚ 2* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXOt1jHX1zM ELAM's leader presents the party's ideology, their positioning for the Cyprus issue, immigration etc., within Parliamentary pre-election period 2011.	4	18.05.2011
8	Interview	*Παρουσίαση ΕΛΑΜ στο Σίγμα* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPyZKluUBTU ELAM's leader presents the party's position and ideology.	17	17.05.2011
9	Talk show / call-in show	*Παρουσίαση* ΕΛΑΜ στο MEGA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzaGO5VT980 Presentation of ELAM with their Leader's intervention in thepopular call-in show *Exeis Meso* on Mega TV	16	20.05.2011
10	ELAM's members' video	*ΕΛΑΜ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΞΕΒΡΩΜΙΣΕΙ Ο ΤΟΠΟΣ* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cU3JnqRkihg A video presenting EOKA's fighters being in live and EOKA heroes' relatives on ELAM's side	2	04.06.2012

	Type/genre	Title of the video, link and a short description	Postings	Published on
11	Talk show	*Μεσημέρι με την Ελίτα 15-5-2012 (Δ μέρος)* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4v2grdzkpyw A call-in show on Mega TV where a document on GD and ELAM is displayed and a talk with the leader of ELAM's about GD.	1	26.05.2012
12	Documentary	*Η New York Times για το ΕΛΑΜ* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unRr3E077s0 Documentary by New York Times about ELAM	24	**11.04.2013**
13	ELAM's video	*Γιώργος – Μάνος: ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙ! Το ΕΛΑΜ έξω από την Πρεσβεία* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4K6AC8thuc A manifestation in front of the Greek Embassy in memory of GD's assassinated members G. Fountoulis and M. Kapelonis	10	06.11.2013
14	Interview	*Το ΕΛΑΜ απαντά για τα επεισόδια* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_br17q5rGEY The ELAM's leader gives his own explanations about the incident and violent acts against Talat.	17	27.03.2014
15	Speech	*Χρυση Αυγη – ΕΛΑΜ, Ομιλία στην Κύπρο* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=grHgw1ocWkI GD members, Ilias Kasidiaris and Ioannis Lagos talking to ELAM members in Cyprus	32	31.12.2012
16	Pre-election spot	*Ε.ΛΑ.Μ. – Οι θέσεις μας* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAISEJph6dM Pre-election spot advertising the party's positions	38	30.02.2012
17	Spot	*Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο (Ε.ΛΑ.Μ.)* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v8u6W5xYZQw A spot promoting ELAM and inviting people to join them	27	22.02.2011
18	Interview	*Ο πρόεδρος του ΕΛΑΜ, Χρίστος Χρίστου, στο ΣΙΓΜΑ – 28/9/13* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HMc9MXDBqVg ELAM leader's reaction in a news bulleting on Sigma TV to what nationalists had been going through after the arrests of the leader, deputies and other cadres of GD.	34	28.09.2013
19	Radio talk	*Παρέμβαση ΕΛΑΜ στην εκπομπή "Αντιλογία"* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhhpvtS6vFs Geadis Geadis a leading cadre of ELAM intervening in a radio programme on 29 Nov. 12 to talk about their nationalist party while confirming their affiliation with GD and denying any connection with Nazism.	13	06.12.2012
20	Reportage	*Το PIK για την παρέμβαση του ΕΛΑΜ στον Ταλάτ* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_f1VyDMiz8 Reportage on the incident and violent acts against Talat.	4	26.03.2014

	Type/genre	Title of the video, link and a short description	Postings	Published on
21	Debate	*ΚΑΒΓΑΣ ΓΕΑΔΗ (ΕΛΑΜ) – ΤΣΟΥΡΟΥΛΛΗ – ΧΑΡΑΛΑΜΠΙΔΗ* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogLXhArBGrA&spfreload=10 A quarrel on Sigma TV between Geadis, a leading cadre of ELAM, a Tsouroulis (journalist) and Charalambous, after Geadis having claimed that the former had called GD a neo-Nazi party.	7	26.05.2014
22	TV news ant1	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wk7MV258mts Sinthimata 03.03 short video (1.28) showing the arrival of ELAM leaders	25	03.03.2013
23	Interview	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63OTXgu1Cu4 Christos Christou, ELAM leader, interviewed by journalists about attack on the President of the Northern side, Mr Talat	27	28.03 2014
24	Interview	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QzrQPKolfw Discussion related to the position of ELAM during the negotiations about the Cyprus issue.	3	13/01/17
25	Radio show	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2evu8vVhkr-0 The Member of parliament member of ELAM, Linos Papayiannis, in the TV show on MEGA	4	15/12/16
26	Interview	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUmvbBBZdm8 The president of ELAM, Christos Christou answers accusations in the programme Christos Charalambou	18	09.2013
27	Interview	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7d3On-btMQ Interview related to a photography of AKEL in front of Kemal Ataturk, the reaction of the ELAM's president	23	9.06.2016
28	Debate	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRWY8LwRzJc Debate between ΕΛΑΜ on RIK, with the other parties such as DISY and ΑΚΕΛ on the national TV, discussing the Cyprus problem	21	26.10.2016
29	Debate	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVGQShVnVpc Debate between the spokeman for ELAM, Geadis Geadi DISY and AKEL about the photography of AKEL in front of Kemal Ataturk, on the TV channel SIGMA	25	7.06.2016
30	Interview	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsHzVwm7Ryk Candidate for ELAM explaining what he is fighting for	18	17.05.2016

Conditional support for territorial migrations in Serbian national discourse

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After more than a decade of Serbia's investment in the EU integration, its citizens are still imagining their national identities from the externally assigned position of 'flawed' Europeans. To respond to this subject position in the context of ongoing migration trends in Europe, these individuals engage in identity politics that both celebrate elements of otherness, and also locate them in the country's own internal and Eastern Others. This study uses critical discourse analysis to examine the ideological effects of these negotiations in response to the 2010/2011 asylum-seeking crisis, when a number of Serbian citizens applied for asylum in several EU countries, which defined this as an abuse of Schengen system. The analysis of more than 1,000 online comments shows that newsreaders offer conditional support for asylum seekers to (re)inscribe preferred social hierarchies. Represented simultaneously as suffering citizens and immoral internal other, asylum seekers serve as the strategic means by which ethnic discrimination becomes an invisible element of everyday nationalism.

Keywords: asylum seeking, national identity, ideological dilemma, nested orientalism, critical discourse analysis

1. Introduction

On July 16, 2016, the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, announced the implementation of stricter control over the country's Southern borders designed to limit the number of refugees entering Serbia. His explanation for this change in state politics regarding the ongoing European refugee crisis included the following statement:

> Right now, our situation is that individuals from Afghanistan and Pakistan who do not have any chance of being admitted to the EU have come through our territory to the EU border. Serbia is forced to protect its national and state interests

[…] You all know that Serbia led very responsible and serious politics since the beginning; [politics] that exemplified full solidarity and humane face of Serbia. We are one of few countries that never tried to raise fences. Serbia will not do that [raising fences] in the future.[1,2]

Vučić's defense of conditional solidarity with migrants echoes dominant migration discourses in Serbia, in which categories such as immigrant, asylum seeker and refugee have already been employed in particular identity politics: due to the country's decade-long investment in the EU integration and its position as Europe's problem child formed through Balkan discourse and orientalist imaginative geography, migrants had been used as discursive markers of Serbianness and otherness long before the start of 2015 refugee crisis (Todorova 2006; Živković 2011).

In this study, I focus on the meanings of solidarity with migrants that the Serbian public produces to (a) negotiate their cultural and political positions of both inclusion and exclusion in the desired EU community, and (b) eventually separate themselves from those who should be excluded. For that purpose, I conduct a critical discourse analysis of public discussion about migration on major Serbian news sites in response to the 2010/2011 asylum-seeking crisis involving Serbian citizens. The crisis developed as an increasing number of Serbians tried to emigrate to several EU states as asylum seekers, which was a practice that the EU characterized as a violation of its policies and a threat to the Schengen Agreement.[3]

Although the event occurred five years before the 2015 European refugee crisis, it has legitimized a discursive framework for interpreting this type of cross-border movement, namely the idea of conditional solidarity invoked in Vučić's statement above. The argument that some migrants are more desirable and deserving of protection and empathy than others is frequently deployed to reconcile humanitarianism with state violence and everyday discrimination of immigrants (Goodman 2010; Goodman and Speer 2007; van Dijk 1997, 2000; Verkuyten 2005; Wodak

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1. Note on translation and symbols: As a native speaker, I analyzed the texts in their original language to preserve contextual meaning, and I translated to English only the excerpts that are presented in this paper. The original posts are available in the footnotes.

2. "Imamo situaciju u kojoj lica iz Avganistana i Pakisana nemaju nijednu šansu da budu primljeni u EU, a preko naše teritorije su došli do granica EU. Srbija je primorana da zaštiti svoje nacionalne i državne interese […] Znate da je Srbija od početka krize vodila veoma odgovornu i ozbiljnu politiku, koja je pokazala punu solidarnnost i humano lice Srbije, jedna smo od retkih zemalja koja ni jednog trenutka nije pokušavala da podiže ograde. Srbija to neće činiti ni u buduće."

3. The Schengen Agreement regulates cross-border movements in a zone comprising of 26 European countries that have abolished their internal borders for the purpose of facilitating unrestricted movement of people and goods.

2008). In the case of Serbia, those discursive goals are always oriented toward a desire to both legitimize and challenge internal European hierarchy that places Serbia in a subordinated position. Considering this context, I argue that commentators' management of this ideological dilemma through conditional solidarity leads to a kind of language aggression that rationalizes discrimination and dehumanization of those to whom that solidarity is denied. In this paper, I will map arguments that produce these discursive effects, namely ways in which participants in online talks draw lines between themselves as those who can transgress, and threatening non-European others, who should be punished for the same actions.

2.   Context

Although Serbia has historically been shaped by migration (Pavlov 2011), cross-border movements have gained a prominent spot in political and public discourses with the EU's decision to include Serbia in the Schengen white list[4] on December 19, 2009. From the beginning, the visa-free regime was conditional and granted under the premise that the country would continue to implement EU-demanded reforms.[5] Failure to make progress or uphold EU polices also meant that the White Schengen status could be revoked or suspended. The first event that highlighted the conditional nature of this policy was the crisis over increased numbers of asylum-seekers from Serbia to the EU that developed just months after the policy was put into effect.

Within the first year of relaxation of the visa regime, the number of applications to EU states, especially Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Luxemburg, and France, increased by nearly 50%.[6] As a result, Serbia moved from the 6th most important source country of asylum seekers in the 44 industrialized nation-states

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4. White Schengen is a phrase used for an EU policy that places a country on a list of European countries whose citizens do not need visas to travel to Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus or Romania or countries in Schengen area.

5. Some of the demands were for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and extradition of indicted war criminals, adjustments of the legal system to that of EU, and work toward reconciliation with former Yugoslav states and Kosovo. Many of these EU expectations caused controversy in the country as they exposed a tension between EU ideologies, and political and territorial sovereignty that relate to the historical and the traditional roots of the country.

6. All statistics regarding asylum seekers from Serbia is taken from: "Asylum Levels and Trends Industrialized Countries 2011," by UNHCR, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4e9beaa19.pdf; and "Asylum Levels and Trends Industrialized Countries 2009," by UNHCR, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4ba7341a9.html

to the 1st and 4th spot in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The change prompted the aforementioned EU states to demand changes in border regulations citing that those asylum-seeking trends were an abuse of the newly gained freedom to travel without visas by Serbian citizens. By the end of 2010, the news media and the Serbian government followed suit and began marking these migrants not just as economic asylum seekers, but also as a particular group of Serbian citizens, namely Kosovo Serbs, Albanians, and Roma. Consequently, the most vulnerable groups in Serbia in terms of discrimination, difficult economic status and access to social support, employment, and education were perceived as a danger to the White Schengen and national interests (Beogradski Centar za Ljudska Prava 2011; Korićanac, Petronijević and Ćirić 2013; Vukojičić Obradović 2015).

For the first half of 2011, the public fear that Serbia could be removed from the White Schengen list escalated until the EU Council concluded that the visa-free regime for Serbia should not be changed. That EU decision did not end the migration trends in question, as significant number of Serbian citizens continued to seek asylum in the EU even during the current refugee crisis. However, the announcement ended the looming panic over the prospect of losing the White Schengen and effectively shifted the media and public's focus from asylum-seekers from Serbia to asylum-seekers arriving to Serbia on the way to the EU.

Already in 2011, Serbian news media began publishing reports about asylum seekers from other countries who were entering Serbia through its southern border, the pressure they were supposedly placing on state resources and the conflicts with the local population. This was captured in headlines such as "More and more asylum seekers in Serbia," "African immigrants are not a threat to Serbia," and "Foreign citizen raped by asylum seeker in Banja Koviljaca." With the escalation of the current refugee crisis, the focus on those coming to Serbia took center stage, actively moving the stories about asylum-seekers from Serbia to the EU to the background. Despite this, now normalized and uncontested public knowledge about asylum-seekers from Serbia functions as a silent and omnipresent framework for interpreting the presence of non-European refugees in Serbia, the EU's response to the crisis, and the steps Serbia should take to protect its interests. This particularly relates to the overt and subtle marking of deserving/undeserving, and genuine/fraudulent asylum seekers that is present in much of the government's rhetoric as well as public discourses.

The ideas for this classification of asylum seekers as benefit seekers, economic migrants, and illegitimate immigrants were introduced during the 2010/2011 crisis, as Serbian nationals and citizens had to make sense of their collective identity at the intersection of two seemingly contradicting needs: They were pressured to

both denounce a form of border crossing that they may desire for themselves,[7] and also affirm that this kind of migration acts as an ideological code for the country's unpreparedness to rejoin European community.

To a great extent, these contradicting desires and subjectivities are products of ongoing symbolic and material reconfigurations of Europe's internal borders and Serbia's cultural and political relation to Europe as its desired center (Graan 2010; Hall 1993). As Europe's geographic and symbolic Southeastern border, Serbia is often imagined in relation to its position on the periphery of Europe as a not-quite-right European country or as a hybrid of Europeanness and otherness manifested through elements of backwardness, violence, and barbarity (Čolović 2000; Goldsworthy 2002; Herzfeld 2004; Todorova 2006; Živković 2011). Serbian national discourse often reframes this peripheral position as a source of anguish and pride by invoking mythic narratives of a fragile or fallen Europe that is always threatened by the undesirable East (Čolović 2000). In these narratives, Serbia emerges as a trusted gatekeeper of Europe's borders, whose protection is also always a protection of Serbs' Europeanness (Erjavec and Volčić 2007).

In response to this discursive context, people constructed a vision of conditional solidarity with asylum seekers to renegotiate their unfavorable position on the edge of Europe and identify internal others who could be blamed for the existing situation and punished accordingly. To provide a theoretical framework for this argument, I will briefly discuss the production and action-function of a binary 'us' and 'them' in interaction as a productive lens for the study of social exclusion and ethnic discrimination in everyday talk about nation and migration in Serbia.

3.   'Us' and 'them' in national discourses

As people express their sense of national belonging, they actively exploit polysemic meanings of community to mark and regulate positions of themselves and others within this community (Colombo and Senatore 2005; Verkuyten 2005; Wetherell and Potter 1992; Wodak et al. 1999). In that sense, national identity is forged through decentralized, action-oriented, and historically specific discursive practices individuals employ in everyday talk to articulate their intimate knowledge of this identity (de Cillia, Reisgl, and Wodak 1999; Herzfeld 2004; Wodak, et al. 1999). Although national identity is a "signifying system" that prescribes a particular distribution of symbolic and material resources and rights, it is also a form of social relation that is unstable, fragmented, and frequently built on

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7. National statistics shows that high number of people, especially students, want to leave the country (Penev & Predojevic-Despic 2012).

contradicting premises regarding group history, values, character, territory, and origins (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 139; Wodak, et al. 1999). To appear as a coherent, natural, and legitimate expression of people's sameness and difference, national identity depends on constant re-production of an us/them binary.

As van Dijk (2002) notes, categories such as 'us' and 'them' are made meaningful through strategic organization of positive Self- and negative Other-presentations. This is especially the case when national discourse sets ethnicity, religion, knowledge of national history, and language as conditions for granting, limiting, and denying the political, civil, and human rights of individuals on seemingly justifiable and objective criteria (Tileagă 2005; Wetherell and Potter 1992). In everyday interactions oriented toward these kinds of social actions, references to 'us' and 'them' appear as generic, objective, and common sense expressions of difference that are self-evident and as such not products of one's own opinion. This sets the stage for various forms of discrimination, including extreme differentiation that makes undesirable groups (ab)normal and beyond comparison with anything 'we' consider normal, universal, and valuable (Tileagă 2005; Verkuyten 2001).

Constructions and expressions of difference are often accomplished in moral talks that advance a common norm against which this difference can be determined, interpreted, and judged (Drew 1998; Moulinou 2014; Tileagă 2005, 2007; van Dijk 2000; Verkuyten 2001). Specifically, violations of and deviations from this norm are usually perceived as transgressions that invite moral positioning toward their authors and provide acceptable reason for evaluating the rightness or wrongness of their acts. In national discourses, ideal national character, or a single expression of "mentality, character, and behavioral dispositions" of the members of the national group, often serves as such common sense, a collective norm that needs to be upheld and defended (Colombo and Senatore 2005; de Cillia, Reisgl and Wodak 1999, 190).

For those who are identified as members of the desired national community, this character serves as a normative marker of collective identification that prescribes means of correcting failures to perform this character, while it also fosters solidarity through intimate knowledge of those failures (Djerić 2003; Herzfeld 2004, 20). At the same time, ideal national character authoritatively identifies those who are worthy of inclusion in the national community and those who present a threat to the community's well-being, with the latter being a position frequently assigned to immigrants. When invoked in everyday talk about migration, this discursive construct actively re-assigns responsibility for assimilation, acceptance, and incorporation of immigrants in the national community from the host to the immigrants (Verkuyten 2001, 2005). Immigrants' inability to embody or enact a preferred national character marks these individuals as outsiders whose participation in the national group perpetuates their disadvantaged positions in

the social hierarchy (Tileagă 2005). Consequently, immigrants' performance of proper normative behaviors often results in continuous marginalization and exclusion of this group from the national body (Wodak 2008). In other words, even after gaining legal and symbolic access to national community, these "strangers" continue to signify racial, cultural, or ethnic difference, which are discursive effects at the center of this study.

4.   Methods

4.1 Data and procedure

To explore discursive subject making and its effects, I analyzed online comments to news stories about the asylum-seeking crisis published on major Serbian news websites between February 2010 and May 2011. The news stories selected for this study map the key moments in the escalation of the asylum-seeking crisis: from the first reports regarding asylum seekers from Serbia and the implementation of stricter border control of Serbian citizens to the EU announcement that ended the crisis. The stories were published on online versions of *Blic*, *B92*, and *Politika,* all of which are national news outlets that historically have played a role in shaping public opinion and national consciousness (Džihana and Volčić 2011; Matić 2004). For the analysis, I selected only the stories that had the highest number of readers' comments compared to similar stories published on the same news website. The final corpus of texts for this study included 1,045 comments posted to 15 news stories (five most popular articles from each of the three news outlets).

In everyday face-to-face talk, the sense of collective belonging is accomplished through a dynamic process of turn-taking during which subjects sequentially activate discourses and ascribe positions to one another (Antaki, Candor and Levine 1996). Online interactions, especially in audience's news comments, mirror these interactional patterns, except that they (a) promote multi-narrative tendencies, simultaneity of dialogic or polylogic conversations, short conversation sequences, and delayed and asynchronous turn-taking patterns; and (b) promote direct appropriation of institutional (news) discourse they are originally responding to (Howard 2008; Lamerichs and te Molder 2003; Marcoccia 2004; Witschge 2008). To capture this non-linear construction of identities, I treated the temporal ordering of the comments as a source of meaning. Also, I analyzed news commentary as an expression that responds to the selected news story and the comments of other participants and, in the process, incorporates elements of existing texts to assert its own authority. Due to space constraints, in this study I focus only on the meanings produced in the news comments.

4.2 Theoretical framework

In this study, I use the type of critical discourse analysis developed in Fairclough's Social Theory of Discourse to examine the patterns of argumentation that people deploy in interactions to disassociate themselves from socially sanctioned subjectivities and construct rational ground for potentially discriminatory claims about the world, self, and others in relation to specific social structures (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In online talks about the asylum-seeking crisis, participants express their understanding of this cross-border movement, those who engage in it, and the appropriate reaction they should have as members of the Serbian national community. To examine the identities and relations developed in this production of meanings, I start with a premise that subjects activate discourses and ascribe positions to each other as they take speaking turns in ongoing news talk (Wetherell 1998). Yet, as Fairclough (1992, 80) notes, these interactional choices are always constrained by the types of subject positions and resources available in the context of the talk as well as by the "specific nature of the social practice" of which these positions and resources are part.

With this in mind, I specifically examined the references and naming practices that individuals use to establish relationships with those whom they identify as asylum seekers and to advance particular arguments about the emergent situation over others (Wodak et al. 1999; Richardson 2007). For instance, a person may articulate desirable and undesirable identities by switching between personal pronouns ("I," "we," and "they"). In doing so, that person can shift between subject positions that belong to different discourses and advance particular premises as unquestionable evidence of people's morality and transgressions (Antaki, Candor and Levine 1996; Billig et al. 1988; Tileagă 2007; Wetherell 1998).

Presence of these shifts also signals that interactants are encountering ideological dilemmas, or personal investments in potentially conflicting subject positions (Billig et al. 1988). Dilemmas occur when conversation problematizes an identity or viewpoint a person has or desires to have by making them appear out of the ordinary, deviant, prejudiced, discriminatory, or in any way different than what is perceived to be preferred in the context of interaction (Tileagă 2005; Verkuyten 2001, 2005; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell and Potter 1992). When people are faced with ideological dilemmas they try to resolve them by making particular strategic choices on the spot and in relation to constraints of the argumentative context (van Dijk 2000; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell and Potter 1992). Considering that my goal was to analyze talk that emerged in a context that identifies asylum seeking as a marker of Serbia's otherness, I also looked for argumentative elaborations that posters use to challenge their troubled identities or repair negative self-presentations such as detailing circumstances that precede the action, advancing extreme

case formulations and moral evaluations, and introducing common sense knowledge claims without the need for discussion or debate.

Management of experienced ideological dilemmas is a goal-motivated discursive practice individuals engage in to repair perceived errors, contradictions, and inconsistencies in their own standpoints, political and cultural investments, and group memberships, and thus, legitimize particular social orders and boundaries of the national community (Tileagă 2005; Verkuyten 2005; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell and Potter 1992). In the following sections, I discuss three argumentative moves, which run through the selected 1,045 online comments, as strategies online posters use (a) to articulate the meaning of asylum seeking and conditional solidarity; and (b) to turn a weakness or a flaw of the main ideology into an explanation as to how that ideology functions. The news comments I use to illustrate how these strategies are employed in online interactions are representative examples of the whole sample, and italics signal recurring linguistic elements across different readers' comments.

5.   Analysis

5.1 Asylum seekers live in no man's land

When participants in online talks tried to explain why people seek asylum in the EU, they frequently articulated a vision of Serbia as no man's land – a stagnant, isolated country, lost in time, and with no future. This demoralizing image that invokes feelings of resignation is summarized in Katica's post, which also relies on descriptions that are commonly used by other posters in analyzed online threads:

(1)   The last one to come out of this 'so-called state' should turn off the lights![8]
(October 19, 2010 @ 00:55, Blic.rs)

Katica suggests that Serbia is an irredeemable and unfixable place and as such it should be returned to darkness. In fact, the frequency of the phrase "turn off the lights" in the sample of news comments for this study, signals its status as common sense knowledge that is understood, approved, and shared among the participants in these online talks. Besides this metaphor, these online dialogues advance other references to place-based identity and feelings of entrapment such as calling Serbia *hell*, *state without future, fake state, cage*, and *prison*. These hyperboles contribute to extreme case formulations, which individuals use when they are speaking from subordinate positions, admitting involvement in undesirable

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8. Poslednji koji izađe iz ove „nazovi države" nek ugasi svetlo za sobom!

acts, or expecting refutation (Pomerantz 1986). The posters draw legitimacy for their descriptions from Serbian mythic topoi developed around two assumptions: physical location produces backwardness and Serbs are unjustly trapped in this location (Živković 2011).

These naming strategies structure the knowledge of the asylum-seeking crisis by foregrounding some images over others to create an impression of progressive degradation of society that necessitates an urgent response (Fairclough 1992; Richardson 2007). The following exchange between two other commentators illustrates how people employ these apocalyptic-like descriptions to win support for the asylum seeking, and indirectly their own collective identities. The excerpt is from a thread formed in response to a news story about the government's intentions to manage the emergent crisis through surveillance of all Serbian citizens:

(2) Dear Mr. Djelić,[9] you have no idea what it means to be a poor citizen in Serbia, which is why you do not allow us to go and beg in neighboring countries. But if you ever get prosecuted for all your criminal offenses, you will find yourself in the same position as 99% of the population in Serbia.[10]

(financijer, May 18, 2011 @ 15:18, B92.net)

(3) They are wise … everyone who is seeking asylum. What can they do here when even God said goodnight? To be honest, it is difficult everywhere, but this (,) right here, is the rock bottom. I'd ask for it too (,) but did not know how.[11]

(Sasha, May 19, 2011 @ 02:06)

Like Katica, finacijer and Sasha also paint an image of social conditions that do not promise normal life or change, thus suggesting that a better future can be attained only through a physical displacement from Serbia. They also utilize references to groups to develop extreme case proportional formulations ("us," "99% of the population," and "everyone") and indicate that "any individual member of that category is not responsible for the state of affairs" (Pomerantz 1986, 228). In addition, finacijer and Sasha work to protect themselves from the potential stigma of supporting undesirable cross-border movement by constructing an alternative characterization of the asylum seekers through pity-moves and defensive detailing. The detailing, which is frequently used in analyzed news comments, enables

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9. then Serbian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration

10. Dragi gospodine Đeliću, Vi pojma nemate šta znači biti siromašan građanin u Srbiji pa zato ne dozvoljavate da odemo u okolne države da prosimo. Ali ako Vam nekada budu sudili za sva Vaša kriminalna dela i Vi ćete se naći u istom položaju kao 99% stanovnika Srbije.

11. Ma pametni ljudi, svi koji traze azil. Sta ce ovde, kad je bog reko laku noc. Da se ne lazemo, svud je tesko, al ovo ovde, dno dna. I ja bih trazio ali ne znam kako se to radi.

posters to rationalize the circumstances of the undesirable actions, and thus remove their own responsibility for these problematic deeds (Drew 1998). In comments (2) and (3) detailing is combined with place-related topoi that the two commentators reference to describe the situation in Serbia ("it is difficult everywhere, but this right here is the rock bottom"). In the process, finacijer and Sasha invite a moral sensibility thanks to which asylum-seeking can be seen as a legitimate and necessary response to abnormal circumstances that were not of one's own choosing. With this, the posters can re-signify asylum seeking from a legal transgression to a moral right granted not just to asylum seekers, but also to "us."

Although the posters do not identify themselves as current asylum seekers, they recognize that the context of their talk establishes a link between Serbianness and an undesirable, un-European practice such as asylum seeking. Consequently, crafting a positive image of 'them' becomes a stake in the struggle to produce a positive image of 'us.' Redefining asylum seeking as a moral right enables participants in these online talks to accept a degree of backwardness and mark themselves as potential asylum seekers without compromising their own Europeanness. To that end, commentators engage in defensive detailing to delicately degrade their own positions and suggest their support for economic migrants. As Examples (2) and (3) show, the posters' ideological work complicates potential connections between poverty, stigma, and admission of otherness. Specifically, their naming of the situation creates a sense of unjust collective suffering in which using begging or using the asylum system to seek economic benefits are not markers of a person's inability to follow EU rules.

With these goals in mind, the commenters in the online threads under investigation simultaneously moralize and rationalize asylum seeking in a fairly consistent pattern to produce positive self-presentation. They describe daily life in Serbia as stagnant and desperate; they claim that asylum seekers have intimate experience of this degrading life; they switch between personal pronouns to identify with those experiences; and they cite rightfulness of emigration as a reason for collective solidarity with those who are leaving the place that "even God" has abandoned. Yet, as the next two argumentative moves illustrate, support for leaving no man's land at any cost is not extended to all members of the national community. In fact, the commenters communicate these exclusions by re-defining the meaning of transgressions as performed by those who are (a) internal ethnic others and (b) unfairly benefiting from reversed EU hierarchies at the expense of true Serbs.

5.2 Asylum seekers are internal ethnic others

The participants in online talks about the asylum seeking crisis in Serbia often reference the place dimension of collective identity to build group unity and identify

a common enemy. With this rhetorical strategy, they shift the blame for the crisis from the whole nation to specific groups of people, which, according to the posters, are predisposed to engage in illegal, unpatriotic, and immoral behaviors. The shifting is usually accomplished through ethnicization of the category of asylum seeker in relation to particular geographic locations, which commenters use to separate wrongly accused Serbian citizens from true wrongdoers. The following sequence of posts that appeared in response to a news story about potential suspension of the White Schengen is an example of discursive work that the participants typically engage in to name asylum seekers:

(4)   […] They [Shiptars[12] from Kosovo] are citizens of Serbia as much as I am a citizen of Bangladesh, (they) do not recognize the state, do not pay anything to anyone, they just agree that they should cause problems to Serbia. This practice should be stopped, let their quasi-state[13] give them passports, even diplomatic ones if needed, I do not care (,) but I do not want to be a second-class citizen again because of some drug dealers. I do not understand what papers they use to prove they are Serbian citizens (.) I was almost asked to show an x-ray, while you have thousands of Roma in Belgrade and no one knows who they are, where they were in the past, to whom they belong. With the blessing of this country they get passports and go to Europe and destroy the little reputation we have. It is no surprise that our western neighbors call Serbs Gypsies.[14]

(Milan Knežević, February 11, 2011, Politika.rs)

(5)   Why do you say the citizens of Serbia (?), say albanians. There are more and more of them in all countries, they receive assistance first, and then bring their brothers and wives, (then) there are slowly more and more of them and their wives get pregnant right away, and because of the children they receive

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12. Shiptar is a racial slur for ethnic Albanians. The poster uses this slur in the part of the post that was omitted here.

13. The poster is referencing Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008. At the time of writing, Serbia has yet to recognize Kosovo's independence.

14. Oni su građani Srbije kao što sam ja građanin Bangladeša, ne priznaju državu, nikom ništa ne plaćaju, samo su složni oko ideje da Srbiji treba praviti štetu.Treba prestati sa tom praksom, neka im njihova kvazi država omogući pasoše pa ako treba i diplomatske, nije me briga ali neću da zbog nekog narko dilera opet budem građanin drugog reda. Nije mi jasno kojim papirime oni dokazuju da su građani Srbije, meni za pasoš samo što nisu tražili snimak sa skenera a u Beogradu imate na hiljade Roma za koje se ne zna ko su, odakle su,čiji su.Uz blagoslov ove države dobiju pasoš idu Evropom i ruše nam i ovo malo ugleda što imamo. Ona se čudimo što nam zapadne komšije viču Srbi-Cigani

residency, and also later on the rights and so on. SORROWFUL![15]

<div align="right">(ana kefala, March 12, 2010 @ 11:02 am, Politika.rs)</div>

Similar to the commenters in Examples (2) and (3), Milan Knežević and ana kefala respond to the context in which Serbia and its citizens' actions are defined as disturbances for the rest of the EU. Rather than denying these accusations, the posters advance an extreme and explicit interpretation of the transgression in which some victims from Example (3) become perpetrators and threats to "our" well-being. For the two posters, these asylum seekers are the aggressors whose human and civil rights can be suspended or modified despite their legal status as Serbian citizens. Milan Knežević and ana kefala rationalize these views by first stratifying group membership through referential strategies and then reinterpreting the crisis as an outcome of wrongful and intentional personal choices.

The way people refer to themselves and others establishes "the coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and represented" in discourse (Richardson 2007, 50). Although many participants in these online talks identify asylum seekers as Serbian citizens, they also treat them as a special group whose difference is marked by the ethnicity and location of its members (*Shiptars from Kosovo, Roma, Albanians from southern Serbia and Macedonia, citizens who are speaking Albanian or are from Kosovo*). For instance, the two posters define asylum seeking as an activity completed exclusively by those whose status as Serbian citizens can either be questioned because of their location (distinction between Kosovo and Serbia in Example (4)) or subordinated to their ethnic identities (Example (5)). Both posters are simultaneously localizing the problem and defining those who are the cause for it. These kinds of definitions play an important role in talks about migrants as they rationalize subsequent descriptions of who they are and what they do (van Dijk 2000, 104).

For these and other commenters in the analyzed sample of news comments, those who have engaged in problematic conduct are essentially internal others, or national strangers who cannot follow "our" norms or embody the ideal national character because of their cultural collective difference (Tileagă 2005; van Dijk 2000). In the online talks, the contours of those standards and their use to describe asylum seekers become visible in the posters' explicit formulations of transgression in the form of circumstantial accounts that "lend the conduit its impropriety" (Drew 1998, 314). For Milan Knežević and ana kefala, for example, transgression is not as much about asylum seeking as it is about the violation of common norms

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15. Zasto kazete gradjani Srbije, recite albanci. Ima ih sve vise u svim zemljama,dobijaju prvo pomoc,a onda dovode svoju bracu i zene, polako ih je sve vise i vise zene ostaju odmah trudne,tako da zbog deteta dobija boravak,pa posle i svoja prava itd. ZALOSNO!

and the circumstances of the transgression, which they relate to the character of asylum seekers.

Both posters are preoccupied with the nature and motivation for the actions of asylum seekers and invested in offering elaborate explanations for those actions. In particular, their emphasis on the personal choices of asylum seekers as an illustration of group character marks these ethnic groups as internal others who are lacking European essence and refusing or failing to integrate into what is imagined to be the national group (Verkuyten 2005). For instance, Milan Knežević notes that the behaviors of these groups are a perpetual source of disturbances because "they just agree that they should cause problems to Serbia." As Examples (4) and (5) illustrate, these kinds of asylum-seekers are a constant threat; "(they) do not recognize the state, do not pay anything to anyone"; "their wives get pregnant right away" and use children for personal gain; and their status as Serbian citizens is an irregularity. Not only do these assertions and their focus on the problem effectively dismiss the possibility that these groups may be genuine asylum seekers, but they also point to negative effects the posters will endure as a result of others' transgressions ("I do not want to again be a second-class citizen because of some drug dealers").

In this context, the references to personal suffering signal the presence of moral indignation, which turns disagreement with particular actions into condemnation and aggression toward those identified as the main culprits (Drew 1998; Moulinou 2014). As an example, ana kefala expresses this aggression by suggesting that the inherent immorality of Albanians' inner dispositions and the fear that those actions will affect 'us' justifies unequal treatment. Such condemnatory moral work, typical of the analyzed interactions, shifts the meaning of asylum seeking from a moral right to transgress to a purposive, if not deliberate, action intended to disrupt the lives of everyone else. Consequently, the posters who engage in this work invite others to support the ideological assertion that the victim (asylum seekers) should be blamed for their own discrimination (Tileagă 2007; Verkuyten 2001).

5.3   Asylum seekers are benefactors of reversed hierarchies

Shifting responsibility, blame, and victimhood from one group to another through moral work appears in other parts of the analyzed online talks that focus on reversed hierarchies. Like many other posters, evita zivkovic asserts a belief that these hierarchies exist by articulating a negative evaluation of the EU authorities in the following response to a news story *Bogus Asylum Seekers Return from Belgium*:

(6)   Based on my experience, every Belgian deserves a medal for all "asylum seekers" that he has taken in, suffered for (,) and financially supported for the past decade or two, even though a few of them [asylum-seekers]

integrated into their society. As far as their government's policies are concerned, they have largely contributed to the emergent situation, especially with Shiptars because they were treated as poor, oppressed by the Serbs, political refugees, especially from the late 90s on. Now, when it turned out that they mainly deal drugs (they work as "security staff" for clubs, which is very convenient for dealing drugs) and in the same time have Serbian passport, the authorities found it convenient to call them "Serbian citizen," because Serbs have already been promoted as evil.[16]

(March 3, 2010 @ 20:09, Politika.rs)

As is the case with the other two argumentative moves discussed earlier, the post builds on talk about others to advance the talk about 'us' without clearly appearing to do so. In this particular comment, the suffering of the host country (Belgium) is re-interpreted as the collective suffering of the Serbian citizens who are unfairly "promoted as evil." Evita zivkovic deploys these dual meanings of victims and transgressors through a series of naming and referential strategies. In this account, the victim is the third party that presumably aided internal others in the past, thus creating the current crisis. In contrast, "the Serbs" are identified as innocent victims. "Asylum seekers" or "Shiptars" are a problem for both countries: they are unethical and criminal agents who are hiding their true intentions and personalities ("they were treated as poor, oppressed by the Serbs," while "working as 'security' for clubs, which is very handy for dealing drugs"). Unlike Belgians whose transgression is a result of "government's policies," asylum seekers are once again judged based on their character and the deliberateness of their actions.

Evita zivkovic builds on the themes present in the other two argumentative moves, except that in this case the EU politics toward Serbia is interpreted as the major reason for the stigma placed on Serbia: The EU's continuous and unfair support for the groups, whom posters already identify as internal others and violators of the asylum system, fuels the problems in Serbia. Evita zivkovic builds on this assumption to rationalize exclusionary social practices on the premise that the existing power hierarchy enables internal and non-European others to get closer to the desired center, instead of the proper Serbs who have natural and moral rights to be included in the imagined European community and to benefit from it.

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16. Iz mog iskustva, svaki Belgijanac zasluzuje medalju zbog svih "azilanata" koje su u proteklih deceniju-dve primili i koje trpe i finansiraju iako se mali broj njih zaista integrisao u tamosnje drustvo. Sto se njihove drzavne politike tice, ona je u najvecoj meri doprinela nastaloj situaciji, posebno u vezi Siptara jer su oni bili tretirani kao jadni, ugnjetavani od Srba, politicke izbeglice, posebno od kraja 90-tih godina. E sad, kad je ispalo da se oni uglavnom bave drogom (rade kao "obezbedjenje" po diskotekama sto je jako zgodno za dilovanje) a imali su i tada srpske pasose, vlastima je bilo zgodno da kazu "srpski drzavljanin", posto su Srbi vec bili promovisani kao zli.

The underlying premise guiding this view is that Serbs have always been Europeans (Čolović 2000) and that consequently they are entitled to normal lives, privileges, rights, and superior positions over non-Europeans or those viewed as second-rate Europeans (Simic 2010). For evita zivkovic, Belgians, and implicitly the EU, have disrupted this hierarchy by vilifying Serbs and favoring those who are less European compared to 'us.' It is in this irregularity that the common sense belief that Serbian nationals possess European essence most clearly reveals itself, because this belonging is invoked as an evident fact, rather than a quality that Serbs should defend and perform for others. In contrast, the elevated position of these internal others is interpreted as a product of unjust reversed hierarchies and a reward given by powerful entities. As such, the change of the social, political, and economic status of those who are different from common Serbs is devalued and interpreted as a transgression.

However, as is the case with the previous two argumentative moves, participants are advancing common sense representations of themselves and others to achieve a specific social outcome. For example, talk about reversed hierarchies enables these individuals to conceal discrimination based on ethnic difference by invoking a self-explanatory moral code entrenched with the reference to collective suffering and innocence (Herzfeld 2004). Thanks to this, the posters can support personal investment in orientalist discourse, while acknowledging their own position on the periphery of Europe.

Rather than locating the center-periphery relationship strictly on an East-West axis, the posters such as evita zivkovic rely on Balkan discourse, which organizes Europe's periphery around Northwest-Southeast gradients of depreciation and appreciation (Živković 2011). While this choice makes possible the articulation of different degrees of peripheralization and agentive spaces, it also creates conditions for "nested-orientalism" (Bakić-Hayden 1995). More precisely, the spatial layering promotes an ideological assumption that even though a group may be ascribed a position of a European Other, its members can always find comfort in a belief that their southern and eastern European neighbors are less desirable than they are, simply because of their proximity to the immediate outside and the distance to the imagined center (Bakić-Hayden 1995).

These scales of inclusiveness are invoked in a subtle, if not delicate, manner that does not include direct marking of the groups and individuals as non-European or backward or more Eastern than us (Haldrup, Koefoed and Simonsen 2006; Herzfeld 2004). This is particularly the case when participants in an ongoing interaction draw on silent and shared cultural meanings. In that sense, the choice to focus on ethnic identity, location, and slurs is contextual and intentional. The ease with which the authors of analyzed news comments deploy references such as Shiptar, Roma, Albanians, and Kosovo suggests that they function

as commonplace, and thus, an objective rationale for the condemnation of the actions performed by this part of the Serbian population. Yet, in the context of nested orientalism, these naming practices also ensure that the very existence of the periphery remains intact. The reference to ethnic Albanians with the racial slur "Shiptars" marks them in dialogue as backward characters with immoral behaviors despite the EU's preferential treatment. In other words, the otherness of those marked as internal others is permanent even if those at the top of the hierarchy enable their movement upward.

6.   Summary of main findings and closing remarks

The examination of the three argumentative moves, which appeared in the analyzed sample of 1,045 news comments about the asylum crisis in Serbia, shows that conditional solidarity with migrants is an action-oriented, discursive construct through which participants in theses online talks can define asylum seekers as categories that mark both 'our' and 'their' collective identities. Specifically in these online talks, delicate proclamation of solidarity functions as a strategy for reconfiguring the meaning of transgression, so the commenters can create a discursive space in which they can control the discourse and discriminate others from unmotivated positions. Although people may know which identities and actions are undesirable, wrong, and immoral, they eventually construct transgressions in and through interaction (Drew 1998). This is not to say that participants in online talks are not constrained by the argumentative context, but rather that they strategically exploit a range of linguistic and rhetorical choices available to them to carry out a particular action (van Dijk 2000; Wetherell 1998, 2007; Wetherell and Potter 1992). With this context in mind, namely Serbia's position on the periphery of Europe, we can begin to see how commenters use seemingly contradictory calls for solidarity with asylum seekers and condemnation of their acts to rationalize the same ideological ideal – a desire to support discriminatory discourses that run through the EU politics toward non-EU countries, while also protecting one's own identity as a non-EU citizen and a potential asylum seeker.

By combining common sense norms and references to different collective and individual identities, the participants in these talks create an interpretative loop in which they can shift between judging the merit of an action (asylum seeking) and judging those identified as internal others in a fluid and rational manner. In the process, they develop a range of positive self- and negative other-presentations that are based on different understanding of otherness: 'Ours' is unfair, temporary, and situational. 'Theirs' is justifiable, permanent, and a result of group character and behavioral dispositions.

To a great extent, the ideological work engaged in to produce these identity differentiations follows the pattern of moral work that Tileagă (2005) finds in the discourse of extreme prejudice, which places members of undesirable groups beyond moral and social orders. This process unfolds in a series of argumentative claims through which individuals (1) distance themselves from those members of their national group that show prejudice; (2) acknowledge and naturalize the existence of prejudice outside their group; (3) shift the blame for the prejudice to those who are its target; and (4) rationalize prejudiced practices of their group and, implicitly, their own. These moves advance extreme out-group hostility by concealing instances of casual ethnic discrimination and inviting depersonalization, delegitimization, and dehumanization of internal others based on seemingly rational grounds (Tileagă 2007). In the online comments I examined for this study, some asylum seekers are made into usual targets of these kinds of accusations and exclusionary social practices in two distinct ways.

First, the commenters deploy familiar categories of national character and moral indignation to suggest that asylum seekers, who are also internal others, make transgressions simply through their existence and visibility within the preferred national group. Their permanent otherness not only signals a deviation from community norms, but also poses perpetual disruptions and a threat to the well-being and security of others. These assumptions are supported mainly through construction of place-based group identities, not-normal violations of common norms, and extreme difference not just between 'us' and 'them,' but also between 'them' and everyone else (Tileagă 2005; Verkuyten 2005). Conceived as such, these transgressions are permanent and not fixable, which in turn justifies absolute exclusion of these individuals from the national community and even society in general.

To a similar end, the analyzed online talks also produce a restrictive category of collective identification as they subordinate one's membership in the community of Serbian citizens – a membership that internal others can access through state-lead socialization and disciplining – to a membership in the moral community of Serbian nationals. In other words, internal others can never hope to be 'us,' even if their legal status makes them Serbian citizens. For many posters, this assumption serves as an acceptable, if not justifiable, reason to call for purging the nation of undesirable internal others, which they advance with statements such as "I wish everyone could go, so that we have no more problems with them." It seems that, here, posters engage in explicit discrimination as an action that is not just right but common sense in this discourse. Surprisingly, they rarely engage in moral work that would suggest their prejudicial and exclusionary views would be questioned by others, which means that in these online talks such views are not constructed as problematic and in need of delicate handling (Goodman 2010).

Although this statement may suggest the opposite, it would be wrong to say that these kinds of explicit language aggression, xenophobia, and extreme prejudice are the only frameworks commenters use to interpret the escalating asylum-seeking crisis. Anonymity and, thus, lack of accountability, which is afforded in these online spaces, frequently promote these negative examples of everyday talk. In fact, I have found many examples in which posters were critiquing other participants who had these kinds of viewpoints by openly labeling them racist, nationalistic, ethnocentric, and chauvinistic. However, I suggest that the analysis of the discursive function of the construct conditional solidarity in public discussions about migration gives a more nuanced look into the ways language aggression is deployed in interaction than these simple categorizations.

This study invites us to consider the possibilities, limitations, and even negative effects of the empathy for and solidarity with refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in general, when the meanings and stakes of those actions already belong to different discourses. In his statement from the beginning of this study, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić identifies the refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan as unwanted non-Europeans that are pushing the gates of Europe. Yet, his words also communicate a struggle to validate refugees as symbols of Europe's unfair hierarchies without compromising Serbia's own stakes in those discourses. As is the case with other countries on the European periphery that are entrusted with a symbolic task of guarding Europe from its non-European outside, any public proclamation of solidarity with refugees is always oriented to their contested status as European countries (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Herzfeld 2004; Todorova 2006). Consequently, for people trapped in these liminal spaces, solidarity becomes a strategy to delicately negotiate externally ascribed stigma and otherness, restore their agentive capacities, and develop a sense of control over power relations that are beyond their reach. Unfortunately, as this study shows, these practices also lead to disastrous effects for those who are sacrificed in the name of such goals.

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In transit

Representations of migration on the Balkan route. Discourse analysis of Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters (RTS and HRT online)

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This article investigates the representation of migration and migrants in Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters' online portals during the "migrant crisis" in 2015/2016. The study shows that there are similarities in representations in the two portals at both the macro- and micro-linguistic levels. The migrants are generally represented in positive terms congruent with the official policies of Croatia and Serbia. However, this positive representation was frequently used for positive self-evaluation in contrast to negative evaluation of others – in this case, neighboring countries.

Keywords: migrants, refugees, Balkan route, Croatia, Serbia

1. Introduction and background

Migrations[1] within and through the Balkans are not unique in modern times. However, their intensity, type, and direction vary depending on world and regional politics. In the recent past, during and after the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, there were large movements by people, mostly from Croatia and Bosnia toward Serbia, from Bosnia towards Croatia, as well as from Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia towards western countries (Penev 2011, 16).

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[1] We use the term 'migrants' to refer to all people traveling through Serbia and Croatia in 2015/2016 with the aim of reaching Germany and other western countries regardless of their legal status. We have adopted the term "the Balkan route" to refer to the geographical area that stretches from Greece, via Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia, towards Slovenia.

The Balkan route has also been used by the migrants from the Middle East and Africa for some time now, becoming more accessible in 2012 after Schengen visa restrictions were relaxed (Frontex 2016). The number of migrants peaked in 2015 and turned into what is referred to as the "migrant crisis." Even though there is a common EU migration policy (European Commission 2016), solving this migrant crisis proved to be challenging. Some analysts differentiate among three types of political approaches that the EU and its member states apply to the migrants: exclusion, fear, and humanitarianism (Župarić-Iljić 2014, 91). The politics of exclusion is about finding ways of excluding the migrants from the territory of the EU, the politics of fear is reflected in criminalization and stigmatization of the migrants, and the politics of humanitarianism provides measures that are less restrictive, more accepting, and aimed at regulating the status of irregular migrants.[2]

The increase in migration through the Balkans in 2015 caused internal political crises in the region, reflected in closing and opening borders, erecting walls, and mutual accusations. This article focuses on a particular geographic segment of the Balkan route: Croatia and Serbia. We investigate the discursive constructions of the migrants in the online portals of the Serbian and Croatian public broadcasters, RTS and HRT, from August 2015 to March 2016. Croatia and Serbia are important countries on the Balkan route because their shared border is also the border between EU and non-EU countries, and between NATO and non-NATO countries.

The politics of Croatia and Serbia towards migrants have been partially influenced by Croatia being an EU member state and Serbia working towards becoming one, and partially by the fact that Serbia and Croatia were merely transit countries on the migration path to other EU countries, and an insignificant number of migrants decided to stay in these countries. Even though both countries have asylum laws, very few asylum seekers have been granted asylum – a fact criticized by some human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 2016a, 2016b).

Political relations between Croatia and Serbia have oscillated since the end of the war in 1995. Because there are still some open questions related to the war, political relations are easily disturbed. The migrant crisis exacerbated old disputes between Croatia and Serbia, as well as among other countries in the region. Political relations worsened when the migrants started entering Croatia via Serbia, changing their route after Hungary closed its borders in September 2015. Croatia accused Serbia of redirecting the migrants to Croatia on purpose, and Serbia blamed this on Hungary closing its borders and the migrants' own

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2. EU documents use the term "irregular immigration" when referring to people traveling without the necessary documentation and/or using unauthorized border-crossing points (see, e.g., http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554202/EPRS_BRI(2015)554202_EN.pdf).

wish to continue towards Western Europe. The actions by Serbia (transporting the migrants near the Croatian border) were reciprocated by Croatia by blocking freight traffic from Serbia. Croatian and Serbian politicians engaged in a war of words, which was also commented on in the world media (e.g., Bilefskysept 2015). Officially, the Balkan route was closed in March 2016.

Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters followed the crisis closely. Both had journalists reporting live from the field and claimed to be independent, neutral, and free of any political influence.

This article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides remarks on the theory and methodology used, including macro- and micro-linguistic analysis within the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis (Wodak et al. 2009) and multi-modal analysis (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996/2006; van Leuween 2008). We main-ly focus on representations of the migrants, supplementing this with an analysis of the representation of politicians influential in this particular context. The main part of our article is devoted to analyses of social actors and actions, and of the photographs accompanying the news items. These aspects are interwoven; they are separated for analytical purposes only (see Section 3). We complete our interpreta-tion of representations of social actors and actions with some concluding remarks.

2. Methodology and theoretical framework

2.1 Methodology

We employ thematic, temporal, and comparative criteria when limiting our object of analysis. Our material is multimodal "texts" discussing the migrants and a phe-nomenon labeled the "migrant crisis" in Croatia and Serbia from August 2015 to March 2016. We understand "text" in a broad sense to include all available semi-otic resources, such as layout and photographs. The texts we analyze are unified in terms of genre – the majority are news items – and in terms of what they represent.

Our multimodal texts are online journalistic texts that incorporate, refer to, and recontextualize discourse by politicians, humanitarian organizations, the po-lice, and other social actors. They also represent journalists' and editors' voice, and are thus polyvocal.

We analyze two comparable sources: the online portals of the Serbian and Croatian public broadcasters RTS (*Radio-televizija Srbije*) and HRT (*Hrvatska*

radiotelevizija).[3] Table 1 shows the size and structure of the material. Our analysis is qualitative. We use quantitative information to show some tendencies only.

Table 1. Corpora structure and frequencies of key terms

Formal features of the corpora			Frequencies of key terms		
	HRT	**RTS**		**HRT**	**RTS**
No. of words	56,031	100,860	*migrants*	593	502
No. of images	938	284	*refugees*	776	341
No. of texts	150	245	*asylum seekers*	25	38
			people	298	197
			children, babies, little ones	88	47

Although there are obvious differences (e.g., HRT uses significantly more images and somewhat fewer words in relation to the total number of texts), the sources are comparable because they are both internet portals of public broadcasters, they reach comparable audiences, and they are similar in function, if not in their presentation form.

The ideological framework of our material is defined by official state policies represented in the sources and specific features of the genre. The genre is an online condensed version of TV news in which verbal parts are accompanied by images and video clips. HRT items start with three to five still images from the main news program, *Dnevnik*, and include one or more video clips (also from *Dnevnik*), whereas RTS includes fewer still images and one video clip per news item. The video clips start with a still image that we included in the material. However, we did not analyze the videos. The choices of semiotic resources that news portals make reflect their own norms and expectations of how the reader should relate to the migrants.

We focus on: (A) discourse participants or social actors represented in the texts as their main topic, and actions that these actors perform or do not perform in these representations. We pay attention to backgrounded and foregrounded social actors and actions, as well as to those that are excluded. Another category

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3. The internet portal of the Croatian public broadcaster was established in 1994 and was the most important Croatian web portal until 1998. It was somewhat neglected and less widely visited between 2001 and 2012. After a few redesigns, it started gaining in popularity in 2012. In March 2013, it was 19th in terms of its reach. See http://obljetnica.hrt.hr/leksikon/h/hrtweb/; http://www.hrt.hr/uploads/media/Program_restrukturiranja_HRT-a_8.7.2013.pdf. The internet portal of the Serbian public broadcaster was established in 1999. After the redesign in 2008, it started gaining popularity and it is now considered one of the leading online media in Serbia. See http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/ci/internet+portal.html.

of social actors (B) is those that directly or indirectly influence and/or produce representation – that is, the framing of an event. These are medium-external (e.g., politicians, policymakers, any city mayors) and medium-internal (e.g., journalists and editors). Some of them are both internal and external; they not only influence and produce representations, but are also represented in it (e.g., politicians). We do not analyze the site and (technical and other) conditions of discourse production. Thus, our primary concern is the migrants (the social actors that are the main topic of the material) and we also focus on the representation of some social actors and their actions from the (B) category, if they are represented in the material, "visible" in the texts through their voice (e.g., politicians). These are considered in relation to the role they play in the representation of the migrants.

2.2 Theoretical framework

Our understanding of discourse follows van Leeuwen (2008) and Wodak et al. (2009): discourse is conceived of as a recontextualized social practice in which different semiotic means, including language, are used with the aim of representing certain aspects of the social world. According to van Leeuwen (2008, 7), "social practices enter into texts"; however, texts are themselves also social practices.

We assume that discourse is influenced and constrained by various social factors, but it also influences them by either supporting, questioning, or deconstructing (some aspect of) these factors. Discourse is a battlefield of a number of ideological options, although it may be dominated by a single one.

In this analysis, we use the concept of "representation," which implies using different semiotic means, for what Leeuwen terms "recontextualization." In doing so, we follow Wodak et al. (2009): in their framework, recontextualization implies a transfer of, for instance, argumentation lines from one context to another.

Multimodal texts in our material draw on and transform certain social practices. Social practices of, for instance, taking care of the migrants, are represented by semiotic means (e.g., verbal metaphor, or photographs showing children). The choice of certain semiotic means implies that some others are intentionally or unintentionally avoided. These means produce certain effects; for instance, particularization and individuation of certain social actors, or generalization and aggregation (e.g., referring to some actors by using numbers) of these actors (see van Leeuwen 2008). In our material, over-aggregation (extensive use of numbers) is a striking feature.

Using different means of personal reference (e.g., nouns, pronouns, or quantifiers to refer to individuals and groups) and attributions (e.g., positively connoted or pejorative) contributes to certain discursive strategies (e.g., positive or negative Self- or Other-presentation; see Wodak et al. 2009, 35–42).

We also focus on the role of metaphors in representing social actors and actions (see Musolff 2011; Zinken et al. 2008). Metaphors in discourse can be used consciously or subconsciously. Deliberate or non-deliberate, they are shown to produce certain effects and their users can achieve certain communicative purposes (Musolff 2011; Šarić 2014).

A prominent feature of our material is overspatialization (we use "spatialization" to refer to the use of various types of spatial expressions; e.g., spatial adverbials); that is, spatialization is overemphasized. Spatial locations, sources, and goals are an intrinsic part of social actors' and actions' representation. Spatialization is reflected in numerous motion verbs.

The migration crisis as a social practice is linked to specific times and locations, and the texts analyzed are very specific about these: in many cases, the texts' overall topics are the migrants' arrival at certain locations and departure of them, or the texts represent specific events taking place at certain locations (e.g., breaking border fences). Spatial and temporal "landmarks" are thus represented in very specific terms. Compared to their degree of specificity, the representation of social actors differs greatly (see Section 3).

Representation can add evaluations to elements of social practice(s). As a rule, evaluation in texts is connected to legitimation (e.g., explanations or critique of certain actions). Van Leeuwen (2008, 21) emphasizes that evaluation in journalistic reporting is comparably rare; however, evaluation can be direct or indirect. It is indirect, for instance, in the use of metaphors (see Section 3.2).

In the following section, we employ the main categories used by van Leeuwen (2008) in examining the representation of social actors. Van Leeuwen draws upon a socio-semantic inventory of ways of representing social actors.

3. Results and discussion: Representation of social actors

3.1 Naming strategies, determination, and functionalization

Our data contain news items that provide "normative" suggestions for naming strategies and definitions of labels to be used in reference to people that are in transit through the western Balkans (e.g., HRT, September 7, 2015): similar recommendations are also found in foreign media.[4] C/S *migrant* (E 'migrant')[5] is

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4. E.g., BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286.

5. The labels *C* and *S* refer to Croatian and Serbian; *E* refers to English. English glosses are regularly used after the C/S terms. Due to the similarity of standard Croatian and Serbian, the terms used in the material are very similar or identical in most cases, and these are labeled *C/S*.

described as a general term referring to a person moving to a new area or country in order to find work or better living conditions, whereas C/S *izb(j)eglice* 'refugees' is described as a specific term referring to persons in danger that leave certain areas because of armed conflicts. This term is further related to the official status some persons can acquire in countries in which they seek asylum. The official recommendations rely on the UNHCR's definitions and international law.[6] The root of the C/S word *izb(j)eglice* is *b(ij)eg* 'escape'. Its nominal stem already refers to the necessity of leaving, which is not the case with the C/S word *migrant*. The C/S terms *imigrant*(i) 'immigrants' and *emigrant*(i) 'emigrants' were also occasionally used: the former refers to reaching a destination country, and the latter to leaving a country of origin. The route and crisis are qualified in C/S as *migrantska,* 'migrant' *migracijska* 'migration', *izb(j)eglička* 'refugee', and occasionally *imigrantska* 'immigrant'.

Reporting on a large number of people moving through Serbia and Croatia required rethinking the terminology. In some situations, by choosing particular terms, the journalists tried to provide information about the backgrounds and aims of the people passing through: accordingly, in some texts discussing people from European countries that joined Syrians, the term *migrant* was used (e.g., HRT, March 20, 2016). However, we have not generally noticed any careful differentiation between these terms. *Migranti* and *izbjeglice* were by and large used interchangeably in both Croatian and Serbian material (see Table 1). These terms often alternated in article leads, and both terms were used as parts of noun phrases with numerals or with nouns metaphorically implying large numbers (e.g., *oko 5.000 migranata i izbjeglica* 'about five thousand migrants and refugees', HRT, September 25, 2015) in contexts reporting how many people entered Serbia or Croatia. The adjectival qualifiers 'economic' or 'illegal'[7] were occasionally used with the noun corresponding to 'migrant'. As a rule, 'refugees' were referred to with no adjectival qualifiers, but the term appeared infrequently with the appositions S *deca* 'children' and C/S *beba* 'baby' (*deca izbeglice, beba izbjeglica*; see Table 1).

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6. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/refugees.html. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html. E.g., HRT, September 7, 2015 and September 18 (a), 2015; RTS, August 26, 2015 and September 2, 2015.

7. In the Croatian material, the term *ilegalni migrant(i)* 'illegal migrant(s)' is used seventeen times. In addition, there are three occurrences of *nezakoniti* 'illegal' and *neregularni (i) migrant(i)* 'irregular migrant(s)'. A regular pattern was labeling certain actions or locations as illegal (e.g., crossing the border: border crossings). One text (HRT, September 18/09/2015a (a), 2015) explicitly dealt with the terms and suggested that only actions can be illegal, not people. RTS used *ilegalni (i)migrant(i)* thirty-five times. A single occurrence of *ilegalne izbeglice* 'illegal refugees' was found in RTS.

RTS used the term 'migrants' most frequently, followed by 'refugees', whereas HRT used the term 'refugees' most frequently. The terms *azilanti* or *tražioci/tražitelji azila* 'asylum seekers' were rarely used, which is understandable because very few people applied for asylum in Serbia and Croatia (see Table 1).

All of these terms indicate different types of movement and different scenarios that cause it. These scenarios are either "neutral" – such as the one related to the C/S term *migrant* 'migrant', which implied a change of location for some pragmatic reasons – or more compelling – such as the scenario related to C/S *izb(j)eglice* 'refugees', which implied that people must escape war or a life-threatening situation. In addition to these terms, the generic C/S term *ljudi* 'people, humans' was also used (see Table 1). Although implying a highly general categorization (Leeuwen 2008, 42), this term made possible a different approach: humanizing and individuating the migrants. Compare (1), in which *ljudi* is followed by an attributive relative clause:

(1)   *…ljudi koji beže od rata na Bliskom istoku i siromaštva*

(RTS, November 11, 2015)

'people that are running away from the war in the Middle East and poverty.'

In terms of van Leeuwen's (2008) classes of nomination (i.e., naming) and categorization, the social actors that are the main topic of the material analyzed are often simply categorized by the terms *migranti* and *izb(j)eglice*, which mark the identities they share with (many) others. In the great majority of the texts, they are not named. The texts typically report on large groups of people crossing borders, and transporting these groups from one spatial point to another. Migrants are named in only a few cases; for example, a newborn baby in (2):

(2)   *Dječak Abdul Rahman Al Oubeid … šesta je beba izbjeglica rođena u Slavonskom Brodu*
      'The boy Abdul Rahman Al Oubeid … is the sixth baby refugee born in Slavonski Brod'   (HRT, February 24, 2016).

In contrast, the actors that "manage" the migrants – for instance, high-ranking state officials – are "nominated" and "titulated" (to use van Leeuwen's terminology). As a rule, formal titles are used (e.g., *ministar odbrane Bratislav Gašić* 'Minister of Defense Bratislav Gašić', RTS, August 23, 2015) at first mention; if they are mentioned more than once, similar naming is abbreviated (*ministar Gašić* 'Minster Gašić', or *ministar* 'minister' only). Lower-ranking persons are occasionally named (when individuated, e.g., quoted); however, as a rule they are only categorized (*policija, policijski službenici* 'police, police officers'). The same is true for volunteers and humanitarian organization members, who are most frequently

categorized as such (e.g., *volonteri* 'volunteers'), and only occasionally named (e.g., *volonterka Rafaela* 'the volunteer Rafalea', RTS, October 9, 2015).

In terms of functionalization and identification (classification, and relational and physical identification), various state actors are referred to in terms of their occupation or role (e.g., *službenici Odseka za strance, predstavnici ministarstva,* 'officers of the Department for Foreigners, the representatives of the ministry'); that is, they are functionalized.

Relational identification of migrants occasionally occurs (e.g., *majka iz Iraka, majke s decom,* 'a mother from Iraq, mothers with children'). Physical identification is rare in terms of referring to some "permanent" physical characteristics. The adjectives used in occasional physical identification of the migrants – for instance, *iscrpljeni, umorni, povređeni, bolesni* 'exhausted, tired, hurt, sick' – are referring to the present temporary state of the migrants. Using van Leeuwen's term, the social actors referred to by such terms are appraised and relate to pity and compassion.

Regarding (in)determination, as a rule, migrants are represented as unspecified and anonymous. Indetermination overlaps with categorization because simply categorizing people as migrants leaves them anonymous. Other signals of indetermination are pronouns such as *neki* (e.g., *neki migranti kažu* … 'some migrants say'). Social actors are named in some situations and/or determined by their country of origin (e.g., *Lijak Salah iz Iraka* 'Lijak Salah from Iraq', RTS, August 27 (a), 2015; *albanski migrant* 'an Albanian migrant', RTS, September 17, 2015). This is the case in the few texts discussing the situation in the refugee centers in which individuals are given a voice, or in texts reporting on incidents.

In the representation of the migrants, naming, determination, and functionalization occur together only in isolated cases (e.g., *Student tehničkih nauka Muhamed iz Sirije* 'technical sciences student Muhamed from Syria', RTS, September 5, 2015).

The functionalization of the migrants is rare. If the migrants are identified by classification, this is done in terms of a group membership, and the parameters most frequently used are gender, provenance, and age (e.g., *afganistanske devojčice* 'Afghan girls'). Classification by religion is rarely used (e.g., *migrant hrišćanske vere* 'Christian migrants').

The use of, for instance, proper names, functions, and relational identification all include the feature "human" and as such illustrate van Leeuwen's personalization. The opposite category, impersonalization, implies either abstraction – that is, using abstract nouns in reference to humans (e.g., if humans are referred to as problems) – or objectification (e.g., different types of metonymic reference). Impersonalization does not play a significant role in our material. Occasional impersonalization of the migrants is related to some uses of the words *problemi* 'problems' and *izazovi* 'challenges'; however, in most cases these relate to the crisis

(situation) and not to persons (although the two categories are hardly separable; e.g., *problem migrantske krize*; *problem migranata* 'problem with migrant crisis, problem with migrants').

Metonymic reference is widely used for Croatia and Serbia (see 3):

(3) a. *Srbija jedina ozbiljno vodi evidenciju o migrantima*
         'Serbia is the only one that keeps records of the migrants'
                                                    (RTS, November 15, 2015);

     b. *Hrvatska dopušta prolazak migrantima*
         'Croatia allows migrants to pass'   (HRT, September 18 (b), 2015)

Metonymic reference is vague in similar cases because the social actors responsible for certain actions cannot be easily identified. This kind of reference contributes to emphasizing collective responsibility and positioning entire countries as human or less human, as in (4):

(4) a. *Mađarska suzavcem na migrante*
         'Hungary uses tear gas against migrants'   (RTS, August 26, 2015)
     b. *Hrvatska je u migrantskoj krizi već pokazala svoje humano lice*
         'Croatia has already shown its humane face in the migrant crisis'
                                                    (HRT, November 2, 2015)
     c. *Srbija treba da pokaže da je pristojna, dostojanstvena, humana*
         'Serbia ought to show that it is decent, dignified, and humane'
                                                    (RTS, August 27 (b), 2015).

Representations of the "migration crisis" in our corpus are related to immigration policies in Croatia and Serbia, but also to the broader context: social practices in Europe, especially practices of neighboring countries. The crisis involved a set of social actors in each country: the migrants and politicians from various offices directly responsible for immigration and security issues (e.g., ministers of internal affairs and the police). The internal social actors are most frequently included, whereas external (world) social actors (e.g., foreign prime ministers) are less frequently included. Cases of backgrounding (van Leeuwen 2008, 29) were noticed: the social actors responsible for an action were mentioned in the text, but not in each instance describing that action. The migrants are mainly conceptualized as groups. These groups were often implicitly or explicitly evaluated as much larger than expected. This "disproportion" initiated a prominent metaphor of moving water (see Section 3.2).

The assimilation subtype labeled "aggregation" (van Leeuwen 2008, 37) is very frequent in our material. In the majority of texts, readers were confronted with numbers: the migrants were quantified and the readers learned how many people crossed the border on a particular day, or a territory in a certain period:

(5)   *Do juče je oko 260.000 ljudi prešlo preko srpske teritorije*
      'As of yesterday, approximately 260,000 people have passed through Serbian
      territory'   (RTS, October 22, 2015).

High-ranking national actors or elites (ministers, prime ministers, etc.) are individualized, as are some lower-ranking officials. Individualization of the migrants (i.e., focus on individuals) is much less frequent, and seems more frequent in RTS than HRT. This relates to the size of the corpora. The number of words in the HRT material is much smaller, but HRT contains many more images. Voices of various named individuals can occasionally be heard (especially at the beginning of the crisis); for example, the voice of a girl, Aja, who is celebrating her birthday (a culturally important happening, usually connected with parents holding a party for the child) and learning Serbian. Both elements in the story appeal for empathy:

(6)   *Aja će svoj 14. rođendan možda proslaviti u Srbiji. Pre mesec dana je stigla iz Sirije i njen dom je trenutno u jednom Centru za izbeglice. "Ovde mi pomažu da učim srpski. Ako naučim, možda ću ići ovde u školu", kaže Aja.*
      'Aja may celebrate her fourteenth birthday in Serbia. She arrived a month ago from Syria and her home at the moment is in a center for refugees. "Here they are helping me learn Serbian. If I learn it, maybe I'll go to school here," says Aja.'   (RTS, August 18, 2015)

Both HRT and RTS present the migrants primarily in positive terms and as victims (of wars), explicitly claiming empathy. In both corpora, references are present to previous personal experiences of Serbs and Croats as refugees in the wars of Yugoslav succession. The migrants are often presented as people in need of protection, and they are sometimes individualized: their occupations and ethnic backgrounds are specified, and personal stories told. In a typical example, a named person, Muhamed (indexing a Muslim faith), is given a voice. He is a journalist that had to escape because it was forbidden to publish true stories. He is traveling with part of his family because some members are missing.

(7)   *Muhamed je u Siriji radio na televiziji i u novinskoj agenciji. Nije uspevao da prenese, kaže, prave informacije. "Zato što svako ko kaže istinu ubiju ga, svi oni, ili režim ili oni drugi", kaže Muhamed. Muhamed putuje sa porodicom, neke članove familije traže. Razdvojili su se.*
      'Muhamed worked on TV and for a news agency in Syria. He was not able to convey, he says, the right information. "Because everybody who tells the truth is killed, by all of them, either regime or the others," says Muhamed. Muhamed is traveling with his family; they are looking for some of their family members. They have been separated.'   (RTS, October 6, 2015)

Similar passages resemble mini "human interest stories" that are embedded in a larger text. In both corpora, special emphasis is placed on children and their well-being (see Table 1).

As the discussion above shows, both sources analyzed present the migrants primarily in positive terms, as victims. In most cases, the migrants were categorized by the general terms corresponding to *migrants* and *refugees*, which imply the identities shared with many others. Although as a rule they were represented as unspecified and anonymous (in contrast to influential state actors), identification, naming, categorization, determination, and functionalization were also occasionally present.

The migrants were regularly conceptualized as groups much larger than expected. This is related to the moving water metaphors that are examined in the following section.

3.2 (Moving) water metaphors

The *migrant crisis* in our corpora is conceptualized as a flood. The movements of people are conceptualized relatively often as rivers and waves. All of these conceptualizations can be seen as instances of a broader WATER metaphor.

(8)   *slijevale su se rijeke izbjeglica u vojarnu*
       'rivers of refugees flowed into the military barracks'

                                                          (HRT, September 17, 2015).

The source domain of a flood imposes its structure on the target domain, migrants' movement in space. Metaphors that people use are potentially linked to the way they think, and they can influence the way the hearers approach the target domain (the migrants' movement). MOVING WATER and FLOOD metaphors in the corpus are reflected in expressions such as *talas migranata/migrantski talas* 'migrant wave' (five occurrences in RTS)*, val migranata* 'migrant wave' and similar expressions with *val* 'wave' (sixty-six in HRT) *bujica migranata/ljudi* (two in RTS), *rijeka migranata* 'river of migrants' (five in HRT), and *priliv migranata, priljev migranata* 'migrant flow' (sixty-eight occurrences in RTS, sixty-five in HRT). These are often modified by the C/S adjectives *velik, najveći, ogroman, nekontrolisan, pojačan*, 'big, the biggest, enormous, uncontrolled, increased' and are related to the representation of certain actions (see Section 4). The metaphor of MOVING WATER implies a series of mappings, among which are the following: receiving countries are containers, movement of people is dangerous water, and liquids are not easily stopped nor are movements of people.

A flood is a natural disaster that implies danger and damage, usually depriving people of their homes and property. One would expect that the FLOOD metaphor was used to negatively represent the situation and warn the readers of imminent

danger. However, it seems that the metaphor was primarily used for other purposes (see KhosraviNik 2009, 486), in our case indicating logistical problems that both Serbia and Croatia faced and accordingly led to demanding more help from the EU. The contextual framing of the migrants in transit made the effect of the flood metaphor less negative than it could have been.

Flood, waves, influx, and so on in current discussions of migration and migrants worldwide (see, e.g., Neagu and Colipca-Ciobanu 2014) reveal views that are so "normalized" that they do not seem dangerous at all. However, this is precisely why such language and metaphors, and the views they relate to, can be dangerous.[8] Researchers and activists emphasize a need to deconstruct and bring to awareness "the wealth of water metaphors in media discourses on migration" (Kainz 2016). As research emphasizes (e.g., Santa Ana 1997, 221; Schrover and Schinkel 2015), the WATER metaphor is not a necessity, and other representation options also exist.[9]

Both sources have employed moving water metaphors in the context discussing logistical challenges with which both Serbia and Croatia struggled. These challenges are related to a few social actions represented in our material. The following section focuses on mediated representations of actions and reactions by the migrants and the political elites in Croatia and Serbia.

3.3 Representing social actions: Non-agency and conditional agency

Mediation of social actions in our material occurs on several levels: journalists represent themselves as active social actors interviewing other social actors (migrants, politicians, and "ordinary people"). Furthermore, the journalists mediate actions by the politicians and migrants to their readers and viewers. Politicians, in their own right, represent themselves and their own actions.

The migrants' actions and reactions are represented differently depending on the context of the news stories. This varies from the migrants not having agency when they are represented as numbers or objects of actions to the migrants having conditional agency when they are active in a limited way, such as when traveling (see Chouliaraki 2006, 119).

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8. See also: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/08/we-need-change-very-language-we-use-talk-about-immigrants.

9. Metaphors found in other European discourses, such as MIGRANTS ARE INSECTS (see, e.g., http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/10/migration-debate-metaphors-swarms-floods-marauders-migrants) were not found due to the specific nature of our corpus and genre.

When the migrants are represented as objects, they are often goals of transporting and placing processes (e.g., C/S *prevesti, sm(j)estiti* 'transport, place'). Transport and placement verbs are often used in the passive voice. The frequent use of these verbs has a dehumanizing effect because typical objects of transport are goods, not humans.

The migrants are at the receiving end of social actions performed by politicians, the police, humanitarian agencies, and ordinary people. The Croatian and Serbian governments engaged in activities related to helping the migrants continue their journey, such as registering them and offering food and medical help, but they also divided the migrants into groups and stopped some of them from continuing their journey. In the representation of such actions, the main social actors are very often active and named as representatives of some institutions, or are referred to as the Croatian or Serbian government. In such representations, the migrants, on the other hand, are passive receivers of help treated in a humane way (e.g., they are given medical assistance, food and water; they are lodged in tents; see RTS, November 24, 2015).

In situations in which the police or customs officers were exercising control (e.g., detaining people, sending them back across borders, letting them come in, and preventing them from entering the country), their actions were often represented euphemistically. Thus, illegal migrants are C/S *privedeni* 'detained', not arrested, and the migrants are C/S *pod policijskom pažnjom* 'under police care', and not in police custody. Such descriptions possibly expressed the journalists' or other social actors' evaluation that these people should not be treated badly.

Humanitarian organizations, volunteers, and drivers perform practical tasks and are engaged in verbal and material processes: national elites are primarily engaged in verbal processes (announcing, commenting, and emphasizing), whereas police and volunteers are mostly engaged in material processes (e.g., stopping, driving, preventing entry, following, helping, and bringing food).

When active, the migrants perform a social action of purposefully moving from their own countries via the Balkan route toward the explicit goal: Germany or other western countries. However, agency is not a clear-cut category: it often implies acting within certain restrictions on people's conduct (Chouliaraki 2006, 125). Thus, the migrants act as free individuals while moving, but only in the space and time defined by others.

The migrants' movements are represented by a set of verbs of motion: C/S *hodati, prelaziti, prolaziti, dolaziti, ulaziti, nastavljati put, putovati, stizati, pristizati, skretati, okrenuti se ka* 'walk, pass over, pass through, arrive, enter, continue journey, keep on arriving, travel, turn (towards)'. Which verbs of motion are used depends on the deictic position of the reporter (whether the reporter is on the receiving or departing side of a border, or whether the reporter is traveling with

the migrants). Almost all verbs are accompanied by adverbials: the geographical points where the migrants are headed. These points range from general ones, such as 'western Europe', to more specific ones such as 'the Hungarian/Croatian/Serbian border', and names of locations such as Preševo.

Continuity of movement is usually emphasized by the present tense, signaling that actions are taking place at the moment of speaking, and giving the situation a sense of urgency. The sense of urgency is additionally conveyed by the use of verbs such as C/S *žuriti* 'hurry': the migrants are represented as hurrying in order to reach their destination and avoid possible difficulties.

Material actions are actions that can have a material purpose or effect, whereas semiotic actions are actions that do not have such an effect. All the actions of moving could be categorized as material actions because they have a material purpose or effect (van Leeuwen 2008, 59). On the other hand, examples such as "migrants say that they will not return" illustrate semiotic actions that do not necessarily have a material purpose. Semiotic actions are usually signaled by indirect quoting. We noticed several instances in which journalists quote migrants both directly and indirectly. The migrants explain their feelings and intentions, and they provide evaluations of countries they travel through and their wishes and demands. When the migrants perform the semiotic social action of talking to journalists, that action is realized in the present tense of the verbs: C/S *poručuju, navode, kažu, tvrde* 'saying, claiming, giving a message, citing'. This possibly signals to the audience that their opinions matter.

The migrants are represented as subjects waiting for borders to open. This action of waiting could be understood as a type of conditioned agency: it is usually caused by somebody other than the people waiting and there is an absence of immediate action in the nature of the verb *waiting*. However, waiting is described as a strenuous activity because it lasts for an unreasonably long time and because it involves vulnerable actors such as (pregnant) women and children.

The constant waiting at various borders and constant changes in policies towards the migrants often serve as a background for representations of the migrants' aggressive actions and reactions. In this way, the aggressive reactions are justified, and are more understandable and acceptable. The actions and reactions by the migrants that are stopped in their journey are represented dynamically or activated (van Leuween 2008, 63), and the verbs are frequently in the present tense. There are several patterns in reactions: from less aggressive ones such as peaceful S *protestvuju,* C/S *viču, legli su na put* 'protest, yell, lie down on the road' to more aggressive ones such as S *seku ogradu, kamenuju voz,* C/S *sukobili se sa drugim migrantima* 'cut fences, stone trains, fight with other migrants'.

3.4   Representing countries' actions and views: Protecting one's own interests versus competing to be the most humane country

Both Croatian and Serbian leading politicians presented themselves as being the best in treating the migrants by describing their positive actions in dealing with the crisis. The public broadcasters contributed to that presentation by giving much space to these politicians and their own views. There is a sense of competition about which country is the most humane; see (4b), (4c) and (9). The countries compared to Serbia and Croatia are primarily neighboring countries, and then other Balkan and east European countries.

(9) *"Mi smo najorganizovanija država na putu tih migranata", istakao je Vulin, …*
   '"We are the most organized country on those migrants' way," emphasized
   Vulin …'   (RTS, August 25, 2015)

Croatia and Serbia distanced themselves from countries such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Macedonia, which were portrayed as less humane and more violent. They also distanced themselves from each other when the other was represented as inefficient. Violent actions by the country's own police are justified as necessary security measures, and overall reporting seems to downplay the police measures by presenting them in very general terms or euphemistically, as in (10), where the police are presented as calming the situation down and even saving lives by using pepper spray.

(10) *Ministar unutarnjih poslova Ranko Ostojić ističe da je policija ispravno*
   postupila kada je naguravanje izbjeglica riješila koristeći "papreni sprej".
   Štoviše, spasili su život toj djeci u naguravanju
   'Minister of Internal Affairs Ranko Ostojić stresses that the police acted
   correctly when it dispersed the pushing crowds by using "pepper spray."
   Moreover, they saved the lives of those children from the pushing crowds'
                                       (HRT, September 23, 2015)

Representing humane and efficient actions by Croatia and Serbia towards the migrants was constantly followed by addressing one's own interests. Both countries' politicians stressed that they would allow neither their countries to become hotspots nor the migrants to stay. They stressed other countries' responsibility, thus legitimizing migration control.

3.5   Visual presentation of social actors and social actions

The photographs (see Table 2) that accompany various news stories mostly use perceptual realism as a mode of presentation – the photographs show still shots of the migrants performing various activities (e.g., resting or being given food) at the time the crisis was unfolding.

The visual and verbal correspondence in most of the photographs analyzed is tight; the photographs and texts complement one another. This indexical meaning gives readers the impression that they are present out there, following the unfolding tragedy, and it contributes to a sense of objectivity of the news.

We have identified several types of photographs with regard to the social actors represented: (1) photographs of migrants in groups, (2) photographs of children (and their mothers or families), and photographs in which individuals are the focus, (3) photographs of politicians, and (4) photographs with no apparent/visible social actors.

Table 2. Photographs: thematic categorization and percentage

Photographs		
	HRT	**RTS**
No. of photographs	938	284
Photographs showing migrants in groups	25%	44%
Photographs emphasizing individuals (adults)	36%[*]	7%
Photographs showing children	15%	17%[**]
Photographs showing politicians	13%	26%
Photographs with no social actors visible	11%	6%

* Within this category, some photographs also show groups, but the emphasis is clearly put on individuals.
** Some of these photographs show groups of migrants, but children are clearly in focus.

3.5.1   *Photographs of migrants in groups*

The largest group of photographs (RTS) or a significant number (HRT) show people in groups, not looking at the camera. People are represented as active (walking through fields and alongside roads, or waiting in lines in order to board buses and trains) and passive (sleeping or sitting in tents covered from the rain). In many of these photographs, long shots are used. In some, the viewers see the migrants from a bird's eye view; they are "below" the viewer. Photographs of groups convey the idea of assimilation, often expressed through verbal means as well. In a subgroup of photographs, a medium shot is used, but the viewers cannot see the faces clearly and the people are not angled toward the viewer. In addition, many photographs show groups of people with their backs to the viewer, either standing or walking away. The social actors are clearly separated from the viewers; they do not face them and there is no possibility of interaction with the viewers. The large distance in space communicates a lack of interpersonal relationships and social distance (van Leeuwen 2008, 138). If people are depicted from a considerable distance, one cannot perceive their individual characteristics. In the photographs in which the

people do not look at the viewers, no social interaction is realized and the people are simply "offered" to the readers' gaze (van Leeuwen 2008, 140).

Photographs of large groups of people convey the same information as texts regularly mentioning large numbers: if headlines and/or leads use phrases such as "rivers of migrants," a photograph using a long shot and showing large groups of individuals can be expected. The representation strategy in similar images is distancing and objectification. The migrants are not close and are objects for scrutiny. At the same time, large groups of people emphasize the scale of the help needed.

3.5.2 *Photographs of children (and their mothers or families), and photographs in which single individuals are in focus*

These are very often photographs of people that are described in corresponding news items as vulnerable and dependent (children and mothers with small children and babies). Many photographs in which either a medium shot or close-up is used show children (see Table 2) and force individualization. In some photographs with medium shots or close-ups, children do not look at the camera; these are "offer" photographs (in the terminology of van Leeuwen 2008, 140) because the children do not interact with the viewer. However, children (smiling or waving) establish eye contact with the reader in many others. Photographs with children convey the idea of the migrants in need of help. In the majority of photographs, mothers wear headscarves and are passively sitting, whereas men, if portrayed together with women, are standing. There is an interesting exception: in some photographs men are presented as the sole caregivers, carrying and holding children.

Both sources regularly employ images showing individualized adults: they are either alone, or focused on, "singled out" from the group they are part of.

3.5.3 *Photographs of politicians*

A significant number of photographs (see Table 2) show national and international politicians talking either to the press or to each other and visiting migrants (e.g., at reception centers). A close-up is used in almost all of these photographs, focusing on politicians' personalities and functions. The politicians are looking at the viewers and demanding "goods and services" (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006) from them. The most frequently photographed politicians in RTS are Minster of Labor, Employment, and Veteran and Social Policy Vulin, Minister of Internal Affairs Stefanović, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dačić, and in HRT Minister of Internal Affairs Ostojić and Prime Minister Milanović.

3.5.4 *Photographs with no apparent/visible social actors*

A prominent type of photograph in HRT (see Table 2) does not show people, but meadows, plains, or railroads, sometimes with garbage. The contrast of the

photographs showing empty spaces through which the migrants have just passed and the photographs of large groups of people has a powerful effect: the only trace left after so many people have gone through is the garbage on the ground. The problem of large amounts of garbage was discussed in several articles in both sources, and it was presented as a logistical challenge.

There is a sense of artistic tension and melancholy in some of these photographs. In addition, the photographs of nature (meadows, woods, and rivers near the borders) suggest the irregularity of the migrants' movements. The artistic tension possibly emphasizes the lack of state control over the borders and/or the desperation of people that are prepared to go towards their destination at any price.

Important artifacts in many photographs are fences. Fences make control possible and are connected to notions of sorting those that can enter the country from those that cannot. Fences are stable when they are made of concrete and wire (e.g., at the border between Serbia and Hungary) or movable if made of metal or lighter materials and used for creating lines for waiting. As clear symbols of power and control, fences often include barbed wire and razor wire. In some photographs one can see people through the wires at a distance, and in others the razor wire is the element that is foregrounded. Depending on the accompanying text, the photographs with fences could be interpreted either as a plea for humanitarianism or support for the politics of exclusion. Both in Croatian and Serbian official discourse, the plea for humanitarianism is foregrounded during the entire period analyzed.

As mentioned, many of the photographs in both sources show large groups of people, supporting the over-aggregation and over-spatialization expressed by other means. However, individualization through showing children and adults is also present in both sources (see Table 2). Emphasis on adult individuals is more frequent in HRT, and formally indicates a greater individuation. However, the frequency can be related to the presentation format. HRT news items are "more visual": they regularly start (and occasionally finish) with a small "gallery" of several images and, in such a gallery, individualization offers more diversity in presentation. Table 2 indicates that the percentage of photos showing politicians is higher in the Serbian material, whereas the percentage of photos showing no visible social actors is higher in the Croatian material. These differences necessitate further analyses of a broader sample.

4. Concluding remarks

The macrostructural context of transit migration through Serbia and Croatia influenced how the migrants were constructed discursively in RTS and HRT online. There are no significant differences in the representation of the migrants in the

online material from Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters. The migrants were represented in positive terms as people that need help, either because they fled war or because they want a better life. The focus was often on children, mothers, and educated people, in line with what Chouliaraki (2006) terms "the mediation of suffering." As in other European countries, there was a meta-discussion about the appropriate terms in referring to people passing through (e.g., refugees, migrants, or asylum seekers).

The two prominent features of the material analyzed are over-aggregation (extensive use of numbers) and over-spatialization. The first feature relates to Croatia and Serbia having to host large numbers of people – a dominant topic of the material – and to logistical challenges that state elites and humanitarian organizations faced in that context. Over-spatialization relates to another frequent topic represented in our material: physical movement of migrants.

The migrants were often given space in the media to speak for themselves, and their suffering was mediated daily by journalists. Even though they were represented as active, the range of the migrants' activity was nevertheless restricted. They were actors first and foremost in scenarios involving physical movement: the most frequent actions and corresponding verbs were 'enter', 'cross over', 'pass through', and 'walk'. The migrants were also active actors in fewer actions such as protesting, breaking fences, pushing, and beating. However, in almost all of the cases the reactions by migrants were justified by their right to move towards their desired destination.

The photographs analyzed follow the verbal semiotic resources in that they usually present the migrants as groups. When the photographs showed individuals, they were not represented as specific people, but as general categories defined by age, gender, or family relations: "child refugees," "adult migrants," or "mothers with children." Large groups of unnamed people, "the others" that one reads about or sees on TV moving, are ascribed less humanity (Chouliaraki 2006, 125) than an individual that one either reads about or sees in a close-up scene, and who looks at the reader and explains his or her situation. In many cases, although the visuals suggested certain individualization, the verbal parts did not.

We claim that the focus on positive representations of the migrants in both sources relates to political elites' positive positioning; that is, strengthening one's positive self-presentation (e.g., conveying an image of Serbia or Croatia as humane/serious/responsible because they help migrants) in contrast to negative positioning and evaluations of other countries (e.g., Hungary for erecting a wall, Serbia or Croatia for not cooperating in logistics, etc.). This positive representation aligned Serbia and Croatia with the EU: Croatia as a member and Serbia as an aspiring member. The portals mediated politicians' non-aggressive language use when referring to the migrants. However, aggressive language use by the same

politicians was present in references to neighboring countries in connection with solving logistics problems. The intensive war of words between Croatia and Serbia in September 2015 revived the atmosphere of the conflicts of the 1990s and resulted in material actions, such as closing borders and causing many travelers to lose time and money. An elaboration of this issue necessitates more extensive corpora from various sources and is beyond the scope of this analysis.

The main focus of media attention in both sources shifted constantly between the plight of the migrants and the political decisions about their fate. Both transit countries were afraid of becoming hotspots and having to host large numbers of people. Whenever this topic was in focus, the politicians were represented in the media justifying the need for border controls and blaming big powers for causing the crisis.

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"We mustn't fool ourselves"

'Orbánian' discourse in the political battle
over the refugee crisis and European identity

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The historic wave of refugees reaching Europe in 2015 was met with a volatile mixture of ethno-nationalist, anti-Muslim fearmongering and political infighting within the European Union (EU). Perhaps no one was more influential in promulgating fear and anti-refugee sentiment than Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, whose inflammatory rhetoric and uncompromising, illiberal political stance helped escalate the refugee-crisis in a discursive battle of political wills, ideologies, and identity politics within the EU. This paper explores how Orbán employs political discourse practices and strategies to enact his right-wing populist (RWP) ideology and anti-immigrant 'politics of fear' (Wodak 2015) vis-à-vis EU politicians' pro-migration discourses. Adopting a broad critical discourse-analytic approach, we demonstrate Orbán's iterative production of discourses of threat and defense underlying discourses of fear (law and order, cultural/religious difference), and discourses of oppositional political identities and ideologies through *fractal recursion*. We argue that recursive performance of RWP stances creates a recognizable political style characteristic of Orbán's RWP political persona or type.

Keywords: right-wing populism, immigration discourse, discourse of fear, refugee crisis, Orbán, European identity

1. Introduction

The recent rise of the far-right in the European political landscape has ushered in significant concerns among proponents of humanitarian causes and propelled a dynamic form of exclusionary and reactionary discourse regarding immigration into the political sphere. These discourses have centered on the management of a historic influx of refugees fleeing war and persecution in places like Syria,

Afghanistan, and Iraq and seeking asylum in Europe. The increased number of refugees reaching Europe in the Summer/Fall of 2015 was met with a particularly volatile mixture of ethno-nationalist, anti-Muslim fearmongering and political infighting within the European Union (EU). Perhaps no one has been more influential in promulgating anti-refugee sentiment and discourses of fear than Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, whose uncompromising political stance has helped escalate the refugee crisis in a discursive battle of political wills, ideologies, and identity politics. Since the beginning of the crisis, Orbán has held an increasingly vocal platform for promoting a right-wing populist, exclusionary narrative of what it means, individually and collectively, to be European and to 'defend' European values.

Political scientists, including Pelinka (2013, 3), define populism as a political and theoretical construct following Abraham Lincoln's vision of democracy: "government of the people, for the people, and by the people." As we will show, this definition is embraced and exploited by Orbán as a driving ideology and legitimation (van Leeuwen 2007) for his political agenda. For Pelinka (2013, 7), right-wing populism (RWP) targets any ethnically/nationally/religiously-defined 'other,' aiming "primarily at the exclusion of or discrimination against… different social groups." In this paper, these 'other' social groups include both the asylum-seeking refugees and the liberal European political opposition. Contemporary RWP parties, co-opting a populist ideology, "follow a narrow ethno-nationalistic and potentially racist agenda, claiming to speak on behalf of 'the people' – but the people they are speaking for are defined by the exclusion of others" (Pelinka 2013, 7).

While many studies demonstrate that othering and exclusion are integral parts of anti-immigrant political discourse, few studies have shown that the discourse of exclusion is linked to manufactured fear and threat directly targeting migrants and refugees (see Wodak and Boukala 2014; Boukala 2016). Wodak (2015, 4) highlights the importance of explaining why and "*how* right-wing populist parties continuously *construct fear* to address the collective common ground as well as their reasons and (rhetorical and communicative) means" (emphasis in original). Here, we explore the discursive construction of anti-refugee 'politics of fear' (Wodak 2015) and a politics of difference utilized by Orbán, leader of the governing RWP FIDESZ party. We aim to identify the constitutive building blocks and layers of Orbán's anti-immigrant discourses and explain how they are mobilized to reproduce his RWP agenda and underlying ideologies. We examine how these ideologies are constructed through the production of contrasting political identities for self and others, including migrants, liberal politicians, and the EU. Our empirical corpus consists of 18 refugee crisis-related official political texts from Viktor Orbán, representing the ongoing production of Orbánian RWP discourse. All were published on official governmental websites between May 2015 and January 2016.

Our theoretical approach combines a broad critical discourse-analytic framework with linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics. Specifically, we adopt Gal and Irvine's (1995) semiotic processes underlying 'ideologies of differentiation' through *fractal recursivity*, and discourse analytic staples such as *stance* (Bucholtz 2009), *scale* (Blommaert 2007), *positive self- and negative other-representation* (Wodak 2011), *legitimation* (van Leeuwen 2007), and *habitus* (Bourdieu 1991). Following Agha (2005), we argue that the various contrastive political ideologies represented in these texts – ideologies of fear and threat, unity and solidarity – can be constructed in/through different political *voices*, *styles*, and *types*. Consequently, RWP can be conceptualized as both ideology and social practice. Viewing RWP as social practice allows us to explain how the iterative discursive performance of RWP stances leads to the emergence of a recognizable political style, and over time, a sedimented political habitus that becomes emblematic of a RWP political type.

We argue that the propagation of far-right discourses and ideologies in contemporary Europe is not merely indicative of rampant racism, but also of a proxy for the competing discursive and ideological construction of what it means, politically, to be (Western) European and what it means to identify with a nationalistic conservative idea of a (Central European) nation-state like Hungary. We examine the political-ideological identity positioning of Viktor Orbán in this discursive battle over refugees and how he differentially incorporates the *discourse of fear* into his rhetoric, intensifying his political voice within a polarized political landscape.

Our analysis demonstrates the main components of Orbán's RWP style, including various discourses of fear and discourses of differentiation which are interconnected through Gal and Irvine's (1995) semiotic processes of difference, primarily *fractal recursiveness*. It is predominantly through such mechanisms, resulting in multiply-scaled differentiation, that Orbán's RWP strategy of social and political division effectively advances his exclusionary agenda.

2.   Brief overview of political context and refugee crisis

FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, 'Alliance of Young Democrats') emerged in the late 1980's as an anti-communist, liberal student movement that played an active role in the post-communist regime change in Hungary. After becoming a political party in 1990, FIDESZ gradually adopted a center-right orientation with an emphasis on nationalist, conservative, Christian values. Viktor Orbán, as leader of FIDESZ, formed a strategic coalition with the conservative right after winning the 1998 election and becoming Prime Minister. After serving just one term, FIDESZ lost the next two elections but returned to power in 2010 with a new coalition,

commanding a two-thirds majority. Since then, Orbán has strategically moved the party further to the right and turned it into an 'illiberal,' Eurosceptic populist party, fashioning himself as a nationalist, authoritarian leader (Murer 2015). As a governing party leader, Orbán won a platform within the EU Parliament, a platform larger than minority far-right parties elsewhere in Europe, to push his views on immigration and to influence recent debates.

Immigration-oriented policy battles have intensified in Europe since May 2015, when EU member-states began to see a rapid increase in refugee applications. As part of a broader worldwide refugee crisis, Europe-bound immigration was largely caused by territorial gains made by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and the war in Afghanistan. Fueled by popular fears rooted in xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-immigrant scapegoating, right-wing nationalist politicians like Orbán seized upon the humanitarian crisis and the changing demographic landscape in Europe to enact harmful racist policies and discourses.

Orbán's offensive against migration into Hungary – a major transit country at the border of the EU's Schengen Zone of free movement – started in early 2015, shortly after the January terrorist attacks in Paris, when he began to promote xeno-racism and panic through official statements that variably portrayed migration as an economic and terrorist threat to the Hungarian people, and a left-wing conspiracy against nation-states and a Christian Europe. The surge in the number of refugees entering Hungary coincided with a decline (from 45% in 2014 to 37% in 2015) in the approval ratings of FIDESZ, due mostly to extensive state-corruption, escalating poverty, and Orbán's polarizing and authoritarian, illiberal actions. Meanwhile, Jobbik, a far-right nationalist party, gained in the polls (from 20% in 2014 to 28% in 2015) and persistently attacked FIDESZ for being weak on migration. Faced with these simultaneous internal threats to his political standing, Orbán shifted to the far-right and co-opted Jobbik's fierce ethno-nationalist, anti-immigration rhetoric. He strategically exploited national myths seared in Hungarian consciousness (sense of 'loneliness'/'otherness,' Hungary as a 'buffer zone' between East and West, Hungarians as 'victims' in European wars, Hungarian as an isolated cultural/linguistic 'island') to position himself as the savior and protector of Hungary and Europe from both internal and external enemies. In May 2015, Orbán's government launched its National Consultation on Terrorism and Immigration, a populist survey sent to every household "to gather an accurate representation of the public's opinion about how the government should set up its immigration policy."[1] The survey was followed by a nation-wide poster campaign that utilized public billboards as a major platform for Orbán's anti-immigrant, xeno-racist, nationalist discourse of fear and panic (Bolonyai 2016).

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1. http://www.kormany.hu/en

Among the most controversial of his policies in the crisis was the erection of a fence along the Serbian-Hungarian border in July-September 2015, along with detainment and three-year minimum sentencing of anyone breaching it. This categorical exclusion significantly escalated the asylum debate within Europe, with many Western European leaders (including EU and German officials) denouncing the Hungarian government's actions and Orbán's fearmongering, bombastic statements legitimizing his policies.

3.   Literature review

3.1   Immigration discourses

Public discourse on immigrants has been studied primarily in the context of political speeches, parliamentary debates, and media reporting. Following the pioneering work of Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak, scholars have investigated the discursive construction of ideologies in racist and discriminatory political discourse, demonstrating the overwhelmingly negative representation of immigrants as undesirable 'others' in right-wing rhetoric (van Dijk 1992, 2000; Wodak 2011). Following Sivanandan (2001) and Fekete (2001), Delanty, Jones, and Wodak (2008, 2) argue, "[t]he distinctive feature of this 'othering' is a confluence of racism and xenophobia … its outward defensive mode of expression disguises a stronger opposition to migrants and the continuation of racism in a new guise and widened to exclude different groups of people." Right-wing anti-immigration discourse displays common patterns of ideologies, topics, discursive strategies, and linguistic means of positive self- and negative other-representation, including discourses of *(ethno-)nationalism*, *topoi of threat and savior*, *victim-perpetrator reversal*, *anti-elitism*, *antagonism*, and pervasive exclusionary othering (van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2011; Wodak 2015). *Strategies of manipulation* such as the conflation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers figure commonly in the *justification* of exclusionary acts and xeno-racist political discourses, which often appear as discriminatory policies and agendas, buttressed by overt *denial of racism* (van Dijk 1992; 2000; Blackledge 2006).

Hostility and racism against the recent influx of migrants in Europe has been rising, as extensively documented in current news media. Studies of turn of the century immigration debates stress that "the repertoires of justification that are typically employed use social characteristics (for example, protecting jobs, concern about welfare benefits) or cultural incompatibilities or differences (migrants lack 'cultural competencies,' 'they do not want to integrate,' they are not 'tolerant')" (Delanty, Jones, and Wodak 2008, 1–2). Likewise, we show that Orbán

consistently advocates for a culturally/religiously monolithic Christian Europe bolstered by a deep sense of European (and Hungarian) isolationism and xeno-racism towards migrants.

Scholars have also demonstrated the effective use of metaphors to represent immigrants in anti-migration political and media discourses, including the common 'container' metaphor used to draw boundaries and exclude dangerous, alien 'others' (Charteris-Black 2006), along with metaphors of invasion, flood, and disaster (Charteris-Black 2006); parasites (Musolff 2015); animals (Santa Ana 1999); and disease (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; cited in Wodak 2015).

3.2 Discourses of right-wing populism

RWP is a political ideology often, but not always, outside what is thought of as mainstream 'liberal' democracy (Pelinka 2013, 7), with the cult of 'the people' at its core. In contemporary RWP, nation-states are 'imagined' as homogeneous groups of people for whom the purity and safety of the homeland must be protected against demonized others. Employing racist and xenophobic discourses, RWP parties focus their energy "against the enemy who is considered to be foreign" (Pelinka 2013, 8). This foreignness is not limited to national origin, but could include ethnic, cultural, and religious 'others' constructed as 'enemies' of the people. For example, Islamophobia in Austria's RWP FPÖ manifests in anti-immigration discourse that capitalizes on global anti-Muslim sentiments (Krzyżanowski 2013). Hence, the *topoi of danger* and *threat* constitute an integral aspect of RWP politicians' discourses of (in)security. Examining the political-ideological profile of Jobbik, the radical far-right populist party in Hungary, Kovács (2013) highlights Jobbik's boundary-making practices, rooted in a potent mix of anti-Semitic, anti-American, anti-Western, anti-communist, pro-Russian, and pro-Iranian rhetoric, while dividing the political landscape between Global and National rather than right and left. Jobbik positions itself on the National side as a radically ethno-nationalist, neo-pagan, xenophobic protector of the people and the nation-state.

Wodak's extensive work on RWP discourses in Europe (Wodak 2013, 2015; Wodak and Boukala 2014; Wodak and Forchtner 2014) identified characteristic features of RWP political style, including the *politics of fear* and the *arrogance of ignorance*, the rhetoric of exclusion, and construction of new social divides. RWP discourses typically share common *topoi* (of threat, savior, people, burden, etc.) as argumentation strategies, and the strategy of *argumentum ad populum*, to legitimize parties' exclusionary and oppositional politics.

4.   Theoretical framework

Seeking to understand the discursive complexity of Orbán's performance of RWP 'discourses of fear' and to explain the systematic logic that underpins Orbán's dichotomizing political rhetoric, we adopt Gal and Irvine's (1995) framework of semiotic processes of ideological representation of social and linguistic differentiation. Providing evidence for dichotomizing discourses from various politico-historical and linguistic contexts in recent centuries – including the European Union and European nation-states such as Hungary – the authors identify three semiotic processes through which ideologies of differentiation may construct linguistic (and social, ethnic, institutional, disciplinary, etc.) boundaries, binary oppositions, and difference. These processes are: *iconicity*, *fractal recursiveness*, and *erasure*. With respect to language ideologies, *iconicity* renders a perceived relationship between linguistic features and social groups essential or inherent, rather than indexical (e.g., when southerners in the U.S. are assumed to speak slowly and with a southern ' drawl,' which is linked in the mainstream to the display of their defining characteristics and social image as being 'slow,' 'unintelligent,' and 'uneducated' 'rednecks'); *erasure* is a totalizing process through which 'problematic,' complex, unfitting, or inconsistent elements of an 'axis of differentiation' are disregarded, simplified, or explained away (e.g., the essentialist assumption that all African-Americans speak, and speak only, 'Ebonics' erases the linguistic diversity and complexity of this socially, culturally, and linguistically heterogeneous ethnic group); and *fractal recursiveness* is a dichotomizing process in which a binary opposition (e.g., 'East' vs. 'West,' civilized vs. backward) is repeatedly reproduced by projecting it onto narrower or broader categories on each side of the dichotomy, or onto some domain outside it, creating further oppositions. In Irvine and Gal's (2000, 38) words, *fractal recursiveness* involves "some understood opposition … [that] recurs at other levels, creating either subcategories on each side of a contrast or supercategories that include both sides but oppose them to something else." Applying this framework to political discourse, we focus on how *fractal recursiveness* serves as a RWP resource in the discursive construction of exclusionary 'us' vs. 'them' rhetoric through iterative production of dichotomous oppositions.

   We take the social-constructivist view that all processes of identification and social categorization are first and foremost relational, discursive phenomena. When people construct cultural, racial, religious, or political 'others' and ascribe differentiating social meanings and values to them, they also explicitly or implicitly create contrasting images and valuation for the self along 'axes of differentiation.' Thus, the discursive process of othering and racialization "is a dialectical process of signification," where the attribution of a real or alleged cultural or "biological

characteristic with meanings to define the Other necessarily entails defining the self by the same criterion" (Miles 1989, 75).

Contemporary sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological research underscores the centrality of semiotic practices and ideologies in the construction of identities for self and others. Identity performance involves taking momentary subject positions and *stances* (Bucholtz 2009), which through iterative, everyday *practice* (de Certeau 1984) may 'gel' into *style* (Bucholtz 2009) and, over time, into *habitus* (Bourdieu 1991), indexing a locatable *voice* and a recognizable social *type* (Agha 2005). We extend this semiotic practice-based approach to explain how political identities and ideologies such as RWP may emerge through iterative performance of RWP stances and become habituated as a potent, recognizable style of RWP political type.

We explain how Orbán orients his political stance to particular 'norms' and multiple, layered, and hierarchically ranked moral orders, by utilizing the notion of *scale* (Blommaert 2007). Spatial (e.g. nation-state vs. continent) and temporal (e.g. historical) scales are understood as strategic resources and products of political, ideological, and social processes and power struggles, connecting macro-level structures with micro-level actions and discourses.

5.   Methodology

The data for this study, collected between May 2015 and January 2016, consists of a corpus of commentaries on the migrant crisis, comprising 18 official texts that each focus primarily on the Hungarian response to the European influx of refugees: political speeches, press conferences, interviews, and published editorials in Hungarian and English featuring Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary. With the exception of one joint EU Parliament press conference with Viktor Orbán and Martin Schulz, a German politician and then-President of the European Parliament (which was transcribed from a video recording by the second author)[2], these texts/transcripts were taken from the official Hungarian government website, where speeches and other official documents from the Prime Minister are provided in both English and Hungarian.[3] Where the text was not originally in English, official government-sanctioned translations published on this website were used. Here we analyze a representative selection of texts from our larger corpus: four interviews, two speeches, and one editorial written by Orbán, along with the joint press conference of Orbán and Schulz. These texts were chosen for their

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2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wReCIsWXQ9c

3. www.komany.hu/en/the-prime-minister-s-speeches

comprehensive focus on the migrant crisis (to the near exclusion of other topics), as well as their discursive and rhetorical features, as detailed below, that were found to be representative of the features and strategies found in the larger corpus (including characterizations of the actors involved, representations of self and others, various populist exclusionary discourses, etc.). These texts, appearing on the record between May 2015 and January 2016, were constructed during the primary escalation of the migrant crisis in Europe. They also coincide with the time period (early to late Summer 2015) in which the Hungarian government constructed, and later, completed the controversial fence on the Serbian-Hungarian border to prevent migrants from entering the Schengen Zone of free European movement.

The following analysis is borne of a systematic content analysis, including coding for discursive stances regarding various factors involved in the representation of self (as Hungarian, Christian, European, etc.) and others ('liberal' Europeans, migrants, Muslims, 'the people,' etc.) as well as appeals to threat and defense. We then tallied the quantitative findings to identify four main discourses constituting Orbán's anti-immigrant discourse: the *discourses of fear,* separated into (1) the discourse of *law and order* and (2) the discourse of *cultural and religious othering*, as well as (3) the discourse of *self-representation of RWP political identity* and (4) the discourse of *political other-presentation of the EU and 'liberals.'* The sub-discourses, or topoi of *threat* and *defense* were found to be pervasive within these larger categories, and thus were considered separately as underlying strategies. We employed fractal recursiveness as our main analytic concept in assessing these discourses, while also drawing on notions of scale, practice, stance, style, type, and habitus to explain the construction of positive self- and negative other-presentation, difference, and legitimation (van Leeuwen 2007) in political debates over the refugee crisis.

Below, we present our qualitative results, starting with the two main discourses of fear (*law and order* and *cultural and religious othering*) and followed by the two main discourses representing political identities (*political other-presentation of the EU/'liberals'* and *self-representation of RWP political identity*) as presented in Viktor Orbán's official texts on the migrant crisis.

6.   Qualitative results on discourses of fear

In this section, we discuss the two main discourses Orbán employs to create an atmosphere or 'politics' of fear in his characterizations of refugees, which may be labeled the discourse of *law and order*, and the discourse of *cultural and religious othering*, respectively.

6.1 Law and order

Our first excerpt comes from a state-run radio interview with Viktor Orbán, as the refugee crisis started to escalate with migrants reaching Hungary in large numbers.

(1)   Today [refugees] quickly transit through Hungary; but we should not think of the Germans or the Austrians as simpletons or losers. It is wise to pay attention to the debates which are taking place in those countries and which warn us that the current situation will soon come to an end. If they prevent *illegal crossings* at their own borders, all asylum-seekers arriving in Hungary *illegally* will be *stuck in Hungary, as if in a giant sack*, and this will *jeopardise our very livelihoods, our jobs, and everything which we have built over the last few years*. Hungary must therefore *have its wits about it*, and must listen both to its heart and to the *voice of reason*.
(Interview, '180 minutes,' *Kossuth Radio* 5/10/15; government translation from Hungarian)

Here, the discourse of *law and order* intersects considerably with the discourse of *threat*, with the implication that the migrants' violation of law and order ('arriving…illegally') constitutes a threat to the people of Hungary ('jeopardise our very livelihoods,' etc.). This threat is amplified through negative affective stance ('jeopardise') and scaled as both existential ('everything that we have built,' 'our very livelihoods') and economic ('our jobs') in nature. Orbán's emotionally-appealing folksy language ('stuck in Hungary, as if in a giant sack') employs a container metaphor evoking irrevocable, existential change to the composition of Hungary from a homogenous mass of migrants. In addition to building a contrast between law-violating migrants and 'us,' Orbán creates a further opposition between 'us' and the irrational, irresponsible Germans/Austrians, who, unlike him, are not upholding border laws. Both contrasts serve to create a negative identity for migrants and for Germans/Austrians. For himself, Orbán constructs a positive identity as rational ('the voice of reason'), alert, and focused ('Hungary must therefore have its wits about it'), allowing him to claim the identity of 'savior' or 'protector' of the nation-state. This excerpt demonstrates three levels of fractal recursion: (1) a division between Europeans and non-European migrants; (2) an intra-Europe division between the governments of Germany and Austria versus the government of Hungary; and on an individual scale, (3) a division between illegal migrants and the people of Hungary.

These common discursive patterns of *law and order* and *threat and defense* re-occur throughout Orbán's speeches. In (2), Orbán again presents himself as a champion of law and order and the defender of European values and borders,

legitimizing this position through the impersonal authority (van Leeuwen 2007) of European regulations, registration, and border control.

> (2) [W]e *register* at the *border control*… they must be *registered*. This is the *European value* and the *European regulation*.
>
> (EU Parliament press conference, 9/3/15; original English)

The discourse of *cultural and religious othering* is strongly related to that of *law and order*, in that both tend to rely on the creation of an atmosphere of fear (as well as *threat* and *defense*) in order to justify its rationale and existence in the rhetoric.

6.2 Cultural and religious othering

The following excerpt draws from Orbán's published editorial in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* as widespread migrant protests in Budapest rallied against austere new Hungarian policies of travel (including closing the Keleti railway station to migrants) and forced registration for refugees; many responded by traveling on foot to the Austrian border.

> (3) Let us not forget, however, that those arriving have been *raised in another religion*, and represent a *radically different culture*. Most of them are *not Christians, but Muslims*. This is an important question, because Europe and *European identity is rooted in Christianity*. Is it not *worrying* in itself that European Christianity is now *barely able to keep Europe Christian*? If we lose sight of this, the *idea of Europe* could become a *minority* interest in its own continent.
>
> (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/3/15; government translation from German)

Here, Orbán constructs threat through religious ('raised in another religion,' 'not Christians, but Muslims') and cultural ('radically different culture') othering, evoking negative moral evaluations (van Leeuwen 2007). The threat posed by migrant others is conveyed through lexical choices, such as '*another* religion,' '*radically* different,' '*worrying*,' and '*barely able* to keep Europe Christian,' which frame the situation through heightened emotions that exaggerate the sense of fear in addition to cultural and religious difference. Orbán homogenizes European identity by evoking an iconic 'idea of Europe' built around Christianity as a foundational value being threatened at its 'roots.' This essentialized European identity is common in RWP anti-immigrant discourses, defining "Europe as a distinctive cultural identity united by shared values, culture and identity" (Stråth 2008, 32). Moreover, the homogenization of the migrants assumes that they all share the same religion (Islam) and the same culture, erasing any difference among these individuals.

For Stråth (2008, 32), this European perspective of differentiation connotes "subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when confronted with Islam. Europe acquires distinction and salience when pitted against the Other. … Religious differences… are seen … as essentially underlying the major historical and contemporary ethnic cleavages and conflicts in Europe." Similar discourses of common European culture and definition, juxtaposed with those of *threat* (toward Muslim 'others'), have been shown to be utilized by other RWP politicians, including Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party and Jörg Haider, the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (Wodak and Boukala 2014; Wodak and Forchtner 2014).

This first level of distinction between Christian Europeans and Muslim migrants is followed by another level of fractal recursion: a division between religious Christian Europeans (Orbán) and secular Europeans who have 'lost sight' of the European Christian ideal, resulting in the more religious being 'barely able to keep Europe Christian.' Thus, European Christianity is under threat from within and from without (i.e., from Muslim immigration). Orbán positions himself as the only European Christian leader who is alert and vigilant (who has not 'lost sight' of the importance of the matter), implying his role as the 'savior' (Wodak and Boukala 2014) or defender of European Christianity in the battle to retain dominance against both internal and external threats. Orbán uses this role to give a warning ('the idea of Europe could become a minority interest in its own continent'), evoking the discourse of *threat,* while scaling Europe temporally and spatially ('rooted,' 'continent').

The recurring representation of a threat to culture is also illustrated by (4), where Orbán appeals to the authority of tradition (van Leeuwen 2007) ('our customs, the way we have lived up to now') and stresses the external threat to cultural identity posed by migrant others. By claiming 'our identity' is 'at stake,' Orbán draws a recursive opposition between 'us' and 'them.'

(4)   [O]f course what we do with migrants is a *difficult social issue*, and a *tough security issue*, but first and foremost it is a *cultural issue*. *Our identity* and *way of life, our customs, the way we have lived up to now, are all at stake.* Can we continue to live in the way we have up to now? This is a *matter of identity, a question of culture*, and this is what *an increasing number of people see being threatened.*
(Interview, "180 minutes," *Kossuth Radio* 10/30/15; government translation from Hungarian)

7.   Political identity discourses

The following two sub-sections deal primarily with the overt political dimensions of the migrant crisis as seen by Viktor Orbán. These may be divided into the discourses of *self-representation of RWP political identity* and the *political other-representation of the EU and 'liberals.'* The most prominent feature of the former, the populist 'appeal to the people', is explored Section 7.1, while the nested identity politics of 'Europeans' is explored in Section 7.2.

7.1   Self-representation of RWP political identity: Appeal to the people

Populist discourse is grounded in an understanding of the people's right to govern themselves, however problematic that may be (Pelinka 2013). In conjunction with the discourse of *threat*, Orbán systematically evokes the will of the people in his exclusionary RWP rhetoric in opposition to European political 'others.'

> (5)   In Europe immigration is also, of course, *a question of democracy* – if it were not, we would not be Europeans. Above all, democracy means *listening to what people want*, and this is why we Hungarians initiated a *consultation process* on the issue of immigration. *One million* members of our *eight million strong electorate* returned completed questionnaires, and *eighty-five per cent* of them said that the *EU has failed* in its attempts to manage immigration. To those Europeans who believe in a United States of Europe, I recommend the words of a great president of the United States: "*government of the people, by the people, for the people.*
> (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9/3/15; government translation from German)

In his editorial (5), Orbán constructs a reductionist notion of democracy hinging on the purported will and interest of a homogenous group of 'people' by defining 'democracy' as 'listening to what people want,' erasing the legitimacy of any opposing voices among the almost 90% who disagreed or did not return the survey, and he ties this process to immigration ('a question of democracy'). Orbán performs this 'democracy' via national survey ('consultation process'), using the topos of numbers ('one million… of our eight million… eighty-five percent') to legitimize his authoritarian policies with the illusion of populism. Strategically voicing an iconic populist quote, Orbán facetiously derides EU-supporters and sets up an opposition between his own successful policies and 'failed' EU immigration management. These strategies indicate that populism "incorporates a distancing dynamic" (Reisigl 2013, 159, cited in Wodak 2015, 26), constructing an "otherizing dichotomy" (Pelinka 2013, 7) and an "antagonistic relationship between 'the

people', 'the elite(s)', and 'the (dangerous) others,'" while simultaneously creating proximity to 'the people' (Reisigl 2013, 141–2, Reisigl and Wodak 2001; cited in Wodak 2015, 26).

(6)   Additionally, an important element of European politics is that *democratic politics is based on the opinion and will of the people; we must speak to the people about everything*. I am not saying that all opinions should be accepted, but *we must listen to those opinions*, and we cannot disregard the fact that in most European countries today… *people want more stringent regulations*. Our *National Consultation* made this perfectly clear. We cannot have a situation in which the *European elite and European governments speak, think and act in opposition to the wishes of the people who have elected them*. In a democracy this tension cannot be sustained for long. *We must serve the people*, and the people are *worried – they are filled with fears*… There are risks of *infectious disease*, and a *mass of migrants* who are *unwilling to cooperate* and are *increasingly aggressive*. People are *worried and concerned* – not only in Hungary, but in the whole of Europe. They feel that the *leaders they have elected are not in control of the situation*; but it is the *duty of a leader* – once they have accepted *a mandate from the people* to govern – to represent the *interests of the people*, to *make decisions* (at times difficult ones), and to *ensure* above all that their electors continue to live in *safety*. (Interview, '180 minutes,' *Kossuth Radio* 9/4/15; government translation from Hungarian)

In (6), Orbán repetitively takes strong epistemic stances ('we must speak,' 'we must listen,' etc.) that reinforce his populist persona vis-à-vis 'the people' in order to justify his soon-to-be implemented, authoritative anti-immigrant policies ('stringent regulations'). He exploits and projects the presumed will of the people – the basis of democracy in populism – to create multiple *axes of differentiation* between himself and threatening others, including the migrants ('infectious disease,' 'mass of migrants,' unwilling to cooperate,' 'increasingly aggressive') and the presumably 'undemocratic,' 'incompetent' European elites and governments who 'speak, think, and act in opposition to the wishes of the people,' 'are not in control of the situation' – all characteristic tropes of RWP discourse. Vis-à-vis the elites, Orbán legitimizes his self-image as a strong, responsible leader ('duty of a leader') who makes difficult decisions and privileges the 'interests of the people' as their savior ('ensure… safety').

(7)   Do not misunderstand me when I put it like this: *everyday patriotism*. This is not something of an intellectual nature, but a *vital instinct*, a *daily routine*: going into a shop and *buying Hungarian products*; when I want to employ someone, *employing a Hungarian*. It will not work if we cannot make this

an *everyday instinct*… But then it must be implemented on a *daily basis*, as I said: in workplaces, in shops, in conversations, and so on… I do not know where, instead of *healthy patriotism*, some *unrestrained, liberal, confused babble has taken over* … But we cannot avoid this *battlefield*, and if we do not *rally to the call*, it will be decided on the *battlefield* anyway.

(14th Kötcse civil picnic 9/5/15; government translation from Hungarian)

Excerpt (7) demonstrates another Orbánian strategy of populist appeal: the social and discursive construction of patriotism as practice. Speaking before his own FIDESZ party, Orbán calls for the collective performance of iterative daily practices ('buying Hungarian products,' 'employing a Hungarian') that habituate a naturalized nativist RWP ideology ('vital instinct,' 'daily routine,' 'daily basis,' 'everyday instinct'). These naturalized performances and practices act as a resource to create an in-group identity among the people ('in workplaces, in shops, in conversations') as well as a recognizable social, political type – the RWP 'patriotic Hungarian' that FIDESZ seeks to embody. The discourse of practiced patriotism is combined with the recursive othering of liberal politicians who, unlike Orbán, reject 'healthy patriotism' and instead engage in 'unrestrained, liberal, confused babble,' thereby delegitimizing them as irrational and unhealthy. Orbán elevates his cause to a battle, again on two fronts (vs. the liberals and the migrants), deploying everyday patriotism as a weapon against the migrants who, as we have seen in (1), he fears have come to take 'our very livelihoods, our jobs.' The practice of patriotism is Orbán's defense against both nonsensical liberals and threatening migrant others.

While the representation of one's own populist credentials is clearly important to Orbán's RWP style, his political brand is equally defined by specifying what it is *not* – in other words, by differentiating and labeling his opposition.

7.2 Political other-representation of the EU and 'liberals'

A core characteristic of Orbán's RWP discourse of fear is its nested discursive layering, whereby his xeno-racist rhetoric directed at the refugees becomes embedded in the larger frame of identity politics that he engages in to iteratively perform, reproduce, and reinforce his RWP political persona. He accomplishes this through recursive negative other-representation of his main political-ideological opponents: liberal Europeans and the EU.

(8) Viewed from the right perspective, the whole issue of asylum and mass migration, the whole problem of economic migration is nothing more than the *identity crisis of liberalism* … People in general – not only Europeans, but definitely Europeans – *want to see themselves as good* … Liberals also want

to *see themselves as good*… And *liberals can only live with themselves if they see themselves as good people.* However, the *liberal notion of what is "good"*… only exists at the level of phenomena*: freedom of movement, universal human rights, and so on.* Now this is producing *disastrous consequences*… The point is that today *liberals dominate Europe*; make no mistake, the *conservatives in Europe today are also liberals*: not willingly, but by *yielding to coercion*… A liberal person who does something in order to present themselves in a good light knows full well that *they are in fact a hypocrite… Good-for-nothing liberal European immigration policy*! Let us boldly state that liberal foreign policy at the world political level is *nothing more or less than organized hypocrisy.*

> (14th Kötcse civil picnic, 9/5/15; government translation from Hungarian)

In (8), Orbán directly links the migration crisis with the alleged liberal political identity crisis, mockingly positioning liberals as hypocrites ('in fact a hypocrite') who believe in 'universal human rights' and 'freedom of movement' in order to 'see themselves as good.' According to Pelinka (2013, 13), the RWP rejection of human rights signifies "a link between a more general xenophobic or racist attitude and a specific direction: the anger… is directed against social groups defined as 'foreign.'" This is apparent in Orbán's negative affective stance towards this principle ('disastrous consequences'), and the delegitimizing moral evaluation (van Leeuwen 2007) of his political-ideological opponents who subscribe to it. On a second level of fractal distinction, Orbán differentiates true conservatives/'us' from liberal-conservatives/'them' ('conservatives in Europe today are also liberals') who have capitulated ('not willingly, but yielding to coercion') to the dominant liberals in the European Union, here metonymically referenced as 'Europe' ('liberals dominate Europe'). By oppositionally constructing liberal-conservatives as weak, Orbán simultaneously constructs his own identity as strong and bold. In his emphatic negative other-representation of liberal European immigration policy ('good-for-nothing'), Orbán upscales European liberal hypocrisy into a worldwide political conspiracy ('liberal foreign policy at the world level is… organized hypocrisy'), a typical strategy of racist discourse (Sotiris 2015).

In contrast to the broadly-scaled outward-looking liberals ('responsible for the whole world'), Orbán's Christian identity is narrowly scaled and inward-looking, with the most intimate group (Hungarian children/parents) ranked highest in the moral order:

(9)   We know that the liberal feels *responsible for the whole world*…I think that the *Christian identity*… reveals to us a completely *clear order of importance or priority.* First of all, we are *responsible for our children, then for our parents.* This comes before all else. Then come those with whom we live in our *village or town.* Then comes *our country*, and then *everyone else* may come.

> (14th Kötcse civil picnic, 9/5/15; government translation from Hungarian)

The last excerpt from Orbán (10) again creates a two-pronged contrast between himself and both Muslim migrants and European politicians:

(10)   *We mustn't fool ourselves*. None of them want to go home. They will all remain here, I'm afraid… But once again, *we mustn't fool ourselves*: immigration would lead to a *majority Muslim population in Europe* within the *foreseeable future*. If *Europe allows cultures to compete*, then the *Christians will find themselves on the losing side*. *These are facts*. The only way out for those who want to *preserve Europe as a Christian culture* is *not to allow more and more Muslims into Europe*. But this is something that *Europe's leading politicians are unwilling to talk about*.
        (Interview, *BILD Zeitung*, 9/13/15; government translation from German)

The division between Orbán and migrants is a cultural and religious one based on a time-scaled threat ('majority Muslim population,' 'foreseeable future,' 'Christians will find themselves on the losing side,' 'preserve Europe as a Christian culture'), as seen in excerpts (3–4), whereas the opposition between Orbán and the European politicians is again defined and delegitimized through negative traits of irresponsibility ('If Europe allows cultures to compete') and foolishness ('we mustn't fool ourselves') on behalf of his opponents. Additionally, Orbán constructs the political-ideological axis of differentiation between European liberalism and RWP in terms of 'political correctness' on the one hand ('something [they] are unwilling to talk about'), and his RWP 'freedom of speech' on the other, which entails discrimination and xeno-racism ('not allow more and more Muslims'). Through strategies of rationalization (van Leeuwen 2007) ('these are facts,' 'would lead to,' 'will find themselves'), Orbán legitimates his exclusionary immigration policies against the irresponsibility of Europe's.

8.   Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we have examined Viktor Orbán's representations of the refugee crisis and European identity. We have demonstrated how Orbán, as embodiment of a particular political type, deploys RWP discursive practices of *fear*, *threat, defense*, *law and order*, and a variety of positive self- and negative other-representations (cultural, religious, and political) to enact his exclusionary, anti-immigrant political agenda. One of the main defining features of what we collectively term an Orbánian discourse of difference, embedded in debates over the refugee crisis, is his multi-faceted antagonistic practice towards created enemies. Figure 1 illustrates the directionality of Orbán's positioning of both migrants and the EU as oppositional 'others' in the co-construction of his own political identity as part of, and the legitimate, authoritative voice for, an imagined Hungarian populus.

Figure 1. Orbán's antagonistic out-group positioning and in-group identity construction

Furthermore, our analysis has identified two main types of discourses of differentiation in Orbán's self- and other-representation (see Figure 2). First, Orbán strategically employs the *discourse of differentiation through exclusion* in constructing migrants/'them' as cultural and religious others (in relation to a self-ascribed European-Hungarian Christian identity/'us'). These exclusionary discourses are often co-articulated with iterative use of the pervasive discourses of *threat* and *defense* (see multiple examples above), which manufacture strict lines of alignment/division and work beneath the surface to make his discourses of fear 'stick' and to cement his RWP ideology. Second, Orbán deploys the *discourse of differentiation through difference* to construct oppositional political identities between his own RWP persona and EU and liberal 'others' through the repetitive use of binary stances and attributes, e.g. strong vs. weak, rational vs. irrational. Using the refugee crisis as a proxy, Orbán instigates a larger, oversimplified political-ideological battle to reinforce his RWP authoritarian identity/type and to undermine his political opponents. Similar patterns have been well-documented in the literature on RWP discourse (e.g. Wodak 2015), providing evidence for our argument that these practices can be linked to a RWP style or habitus, particularly in European contexts.

Figure 2. Orbán's representation of the refugee crisis through discourses of differentiation and identity politics

We hope to have contributed to the study of migration discourses by adding a new explanatory perspective grounded in the semiotic framework of ideological differentiation (Gal and Irvine 1995). We have suggested that the notion of *fractal recursion* is a useful tool to explain the complex layers of Orbán's identity politics and discourses of fear. By conceptualizing RWP as both ideology and social practice, we aimed to better explain how the recursive performance of a RWP voice, position, and stance in discourse brings about a recognizable political style, which, through circulation over time, becomes enregistered as a political habitus characteristic of a RWP political type (Agha 2005). Figure 3 sketches the predominant fractal oppositions in/through strategic dichotomous self- and other-representation that were evident in Orbán's discourses.

Figure 3. Predominant fractal divisions in Orbán's representation of the migrant crisis
The dotted lines suggest that the nested identity category may be constructed as either difference or sameness. For example, Orbán sometimes distances the Hungarian nation-state from European identity and sometimes creates an alignment between the two.

We have also highlighted the way Orbán strategically employs scales as he engages in political-ideological battles over the placement of refugees in the social order and what it means to be Hungarian or European, respectively. The ideologies and values held by Orbán, as a RWP politician, are reflexively tied to the type of scales that are hierarchically constructed as moral orders, in this case, inwardly and locally oriented (see [8–10]). In contrast, future research should specifically focus on the counter-narratives of these exclusionary discourses within the EU, and whether the presumed global orientation of their moral orders can be discursively verified in their own texts (e.g. commentary from Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany; Martin Schulz, Former President of the European Parliament; and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council; among others). In making the claims above, however, we remain conscious that more studies are needed to fully uncover the complex workings of RWP anti-immigrant discourses.

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"A great and beautiful wall"

Donald Trump's populist discourse on immigration

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This paper focuses on Trump's aggressive language on immigration. By analyzing a data set made of public speeches, interviews, and statements from Trump's official website, the paper will look at how certain lexico-grammatical and intertextual choices in Trump's representation of immigration display all the typical features of a populist agenda. Trump's texts will be analyzed according to Wodak's Discourse-Historical approach: Trump's own "politics of fear" and language on immigration are evidence of the strong currency held by values associated with right-wing, ethno-nationalist populism, once the core ideological tenets only of certain fringe movements such as the Tea Party, but now firmly established in mainstream politics.

Keywords: Trump, immigration, racism, populism, discourse analysis

1. Introduction

This paper focuses on Donald Trump's language on immigration, one of the most important and most controversial topics in the successful presidential campaign of the Republican candidate. His proposed construction of "a great and beautiful wall" at the US-Mexico border, his idea of repatriating 11 million illegal Mexican immigrants, and his constant association of immigration with crime and terrorism have all been considered evidence of Trump's overt racism and of certain populist feelings that have resonated strongly among large conservative and right-wing segments of the American electorate. During the first few weeks of his mandate, it became very clear that the newly-elected President of the United States of America intended to keep his electoral pledges on immigration, in line with his controversial populist agenda. But how has Trump's own populism developed? What are the ideological roots of his immigration policies, and how has he articulated his set of controversial discourse topics in his campaign?

In the analysis of Trump's discourse, elaborated through a set of sources made of public speeches, interviews, and official statements, I will apply the methodology and the analytical categorization proposed by the Discourse-Historical Approach to answer these questions: the focus of my analysis will be on discourse, as the data source and the findings of the micro linguistic analysis will be linked to the socio-political context level, i.e. to ideologies and social macro structures. I will address those components of discourse which are most relevant in constructing ideology, that is, the "ideological structures of discourse", which are those structures of discourse "that are specifically involved in the (re) production of power abuse" (van Dijk 2016, 73). By looking at how Trump characterizes social actors, their actions and the argumentation sustaining his discourse, it will become clear that most of his repository of *topoi* is ideologically anchored in populism. Trump's own "politics of fear" and language on immigration are evidence of the strong currency held by values associated with right-wing, ethno-nationalist populism, once the core ideological tenets only of certain fringe movements such as the Tea Party, but now firmly established in mainstream American politics (Wodak 2015b). More specifically, his emphasis on border control as a discourse topic and on situating the identity of the "other" in relationship with national borders can be explained in terms of recent debates on bordering identities and on the process of alienization connected to the narratives generated by the power exercised by means of borders.

2.   The Discourse-Historical approach and populism

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), as developed by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2016; Wodak 2001, 2015a; Wodak et al. 2009), provide a set of analytical tools to analyse discourses and their links to the level of social structures. As an interdisciplinary methodology based on *critical* discourse analysis, the DHA has been used to analyse the founding elements of contemporary forms of racism, to unmask and underline the incongruences and contradictions of racist discourse and to locate them in specific historical. The DHA has been particularly effective in assessing discursive representations of social groups, specifically minority "outgroups": Wodak's "case studies" include the discourses of racism and antisemitism of European populist right-wing parties and movements (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2015a). The DHA has proven to be particularly accurate in delineating the strategies behind these discourses and the links between ideologies, discourses, and texts.

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2016, 32, emphasis in the original), the DHA has three dimensions of analysis: the identification of "the specific *content or topic(s)* of a specific discourse", the investigation of "*discursive strategies*", and

the examination of "*linguistic means* (as types) and context-dependent *linguistic realizations* (as tokens)". As discourse, in Wodak's formulation, is constituted by a set of textual practices that are context-dependent, it is necessary to account for those elements constituting context itself. At the same time, as in all formulations of CDA, in the DHA the micro level of language and the social and ideological macro structures always have dialogic relations (KhosraviNik 2010).

According to Wodak (2001, 66–67) and Reisigl and Wodak (2016, 27–28), there are three key dimensions of analysis which account for the contextual collocations of texts: intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and field of action. The analysis of the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships among different texts, genres and discourses contribute to an understanding of the textual and discursive circulation and influence between different texts and discourses which occur in a given discourse. Fields of action, on the other hand, are areas of social reality which have specific functions within discourse, and in them specific discursive practices are embedded. Each field of action is realised through a set of distinct genres or subgenres. Wodak (2001, 68) and Reisigl and Wodak (2016, 29) identify several fields of political action (e.g. Lawmaking procedure; Formation of public attitudes, inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions and will; Political advertising), and each field has its own genres (e.g. typical subgenres of political advertising include election programs, election slogans, election speech, and election brochures). Different topics are addressed by texts belonging to one or more genres. In turn, a discourse about a certain topic can initially find its realization in a certain field of action and then move into another one.

A key dimension of the DHA is the identification of discursive strategies, which are a set of practices, including discursive practices, that are used in order to achieve certain aims. Discursive strategies are "systematic ways of using language" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 44) and as such they have to be explored when undertaking the analysis of discourses and texts. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2016) identify five discursive strategies in their analysis of racist discourse: nomination (the linguistic identity of the persons involved), predication (the qualities and characteristics attributed to them), argumentation (the argumentative schemes used to discriminate against the excluded persons), perspectivization (the perspective from which such attributions and nominations are expressed) and intensification or mitigation (that is, of the judgements expressed on them). Central to Wodak's analysis of argumentation is the concept of *topos*. *Topoi* are strategies of argumentation that are used to persuade people of the validity of some claim and are displayed in language through conditional or causal paraphrases. The analysis of *topoi* is therefore crucial in understanding the nature of the (seemingly) rational and convincing discriminatory practices at the basis of racist discourse.

The analysis of Trump's discourse of immigration will employ some of the analytical strategies of DHA outlined here and used by Wodak (2015) herself in her work on racism and antisemitism. Indeed, not unlike the discourses of the European racist movements analysed by Wodak, Trump's discourse on immigration is elaborated following certain discursive strategies which are quite typical of populism. The ideological basis of populism, together with racism itself, constitutes an important set of discursive elements which Trump draws from in elaborating his own picture of immigration. The "higher" level of analysis in this paper localizes Trump's discourse on immigration in the context of populism as its main ideological and socio-political macrostructure.

The single aspect which the different studies of populism (e.g. Canovan 1981, 1984; Taggart 2000; Laclau 2005) agree on is that populism, by its own definition and in all its declinations, is a celebration of "the people". Populist leaders, whether right-wing, centre or left-wing, always claim to speak and act on behalf of the people, and it is from the people that populism draws its rhetorical strength. The people are seen as a unified whole, an undifferentiated mass which, by virtue of their supposed numerosity and homogeneity, constitute the majority of the state and represent the will of the nation. The populist speaks and acts on behalf of the people, who are therefore projected as the factor conferring authority and legitimacy to the populist leader in his or her struggle against the supposed enemies of the nation.

Populism and populist leaders usually emerge in moments of crisis caused by threats, whether real or imaginary, to the existence of the "heartland" (Taggart 2000). As a matter of fact, a key populist strategy is the identification of certain groups as enemies of the nation. This strategy is used to rally against a visible enemy as well as to construct an identity for the "people", who can thus define themselves on the basis of their enemies (Taggart 2000, 93–94). Populists usually attack those social groups who they see as working against the interests and the welfare of the people. There are usually two segments of society who are singled out by populist leaders: elites and minority groups. These are groups who do not fit into the populist picture of a supposedly homogeneous nation: they are portrayed as threatening the interests of the people and the nation and are therefore demonized. In the United States in particular, the rhetoric of anti-elitism has a long and successful history (Canovan 1984). The elite is seen as undifferentiated and shifting groups, for example industrialists, bankers, politicians and the establishment as a whole, or the highly educated, liberal-leaning oligarchy from New England, and these two, often overlapping, "groups" are seen as corrupt and distant from the real needs of "the people". American populism, and especially right-wing American populism, has also attacked those minority groups which, by virtue of their small number, make claims for special status: immigrants, feminists or the unemployed

appear as privileged, imposing their special rights on the majority. The populist rhetoric is therefore based on the construction of oppositional roles: elites, just like immigrants, function as "others", one of the poles of a "relational concept" (Wodak 2015a, 26), from which populism takes its force and legitimacy, the other pole being "the people" and the "heartland". And the creation of dichotomies (e.g. the people vs the elites or the immigrants), as argued by Laclau (2005, 18), is a consequence of the simplification of the political space which is at the basis of populism itself.

3.   Data

The analysis will be carried out by delving into a heterogeneous dataset which includes one official speech, the transcripts of two TV interviews, the first GOP debate, a video message, three statements from Trump's official website, one Facebook post, and one of Trump's own books. Most of these written or spoken texts have appeared between June 2015 and March 2016, that is, the period when Trump's immigration policies gradually became the ideological core of his campaign.

The texts analysed here belong to different textual genres and "fields of action", as they fulfil different functions within discourse. Following Wodak's categories, Trump's TV interviews on talk shows as well as the Facebook post belong to the field of "Formation of public attitudes, opinions and will", his election programme and video message fulfils the field of "Political advertising", while his book and speeches at rallies are part of the field of "Party-Internal formation of attitudes, opinions and will". The diversity of the textual genres of the texts analysed in this essay is accounted for by the fact that they share the same discourse topic, i.e. immigration, and they do so through their dialogic qualities: a topic addressed in a single text is often quoted, summarised or referred to in one or more other texts belonging to different genres, using necessarily different generic strategies, thus establishing chains of texts spreading to different or overlapping segments of the public through different media. This is a phenomenon that has intensified since the appearance of social media, which naturally foster the elaboration of political discourse across different media and different genres. Texts belonging to different genres establish intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, for example Facebook posts or Tweets echoing TV interviews or public statements.

3.1   Theoretical framework

The analysis of Trump's discourse on immigration will focus, in line with Reisigl and Wodak's own analysis of racism, on those discursive strategies which realize positive and negative presentation of the "other" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001,

45–90), specifically nomination, predication and argumentation. Indeed, Trump's discourse on immigration overlaps with and includes elements that distinctively belong to discursive strategies that are often associated with those of racism (Reisgl and Wodak 2001).

4.   Analysis and discussion

4.1 Nomination and predication of social actors

The construction and representation of social actors in discourse is done through referential or nomination strategies (i.e. how persons are referred to linguistically), which co-occur with predicational strategies (i.e. the characteristics and qualities attributed to social actors on the basis of the evaluative attributions of positive or negative traits) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2015a). When certain social actors are the object of attack from a hegemonic group, negative other-description and the negative activities attributed to them are the key ideological structures of discourse which are instrumental to the discursive representation (and marginalization) of the "other": the outgroup is ascribed lexical attributes and actions which define it as outside the moral and social norms of the "majority". Indeed, following a typical populist strategy, Trump identifies immigrants crossing borders as the outgroup by constantly attaching to them the labels of "criminals" and "illegal". The association between immigration and crime is made repeatedly by Trump, who considers Mexican immigrants to be mainly murderers, rapists or drug traffickers. The collocation "illegal immigrants" (or, alternately, a depersonalized "illegal immigration") occurs almost every time Trump speaks of immigration, for example in the GOP debate on 6 August 2015:

(1)   If it weren't for me, you wouldn't even be talking about *illegal immigration*.[1]
(Trump 2015e)

or in a televised campaign ad:

(2)   We will build a wall. It will be a great wall. It will do what it's supposed to do
Keep *illegal immigrants* out.   (Trump 2016a)

The predication associated with "illegal immigrants" or "illegal immigration" is of two, often overlapping, kinds. Immigrants "come in" illegally, some of them already have a criminal record, and some or most of them are bound to commit

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1. Emphasis in quotations is added by the author.

crimes while in the USA, hence the necessity to keep them out, emphasized by Trump in speeches and interviews:

(3)   The military is standing there holding guns and *people* are just walking right in front, *coming into our country…* You've got these people coming, *half of them are criminals.*   (Trump 2015b)

(4)   I am extremely, extremely tough on illegal immigration. I'm extremely tough on *people coming into this country.*   (Trump 2015g)

(5)   We have to stop the inflow of illegals coming into our country.

(Trump 2016a)

The association of immigration and crime is given substance through official data. In the section of his programme called "Immigration Reform that will Make America Great Again", published on his official website in August 2015, Trump mentions two instances of crimes, supported by media reports and statistics:

(6)   The impact [of illegal immigration from Mexico] in terms of crime has been tragic. In recent weeks, the headlines have been covered with cases of *criminals who crossed our border illegally* only to go on *to commit horrific crimes against Americans.* Most recently, *an illegal immigrant* from Mexico, with a long arrest record, is charged with breaking into a 64 year-old woman's home, crushing her skull and eye sockets with a hammer, raping her, and murdering her. The Police Chief in Santa Maria says the "blood trail" leads straight to Washington. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office found that *there were a shocking 3 million arrests attached to the incarcerated alien population, including tens of thousands of violent beatings, rapes and murders.*   (Trump 2015d)

News items, real stories and statistics have an argumentative function: they provide empirical evidence of the danger posed by illegal immigrants as a whole. The inclusion of official figures coming from government offices ("a shocking 3 million arrests attached to the incarcerated alien population") follows a key category of ideological discourse analysis called "the number game" (van Dijk 2000, 2005): official figures display objectivity, thus lending credibility to the danger Trump projects onto the immigrants.

There are two other groups of social actors who are routinely evoked by Trump in his discourse on immigrants and immigration: terrorists, specifically Muslim terrorists, and refugees, especially from Syria. These two groups are often quoted by Trump in the context of illegal immigration. An example is Trump's interview with Fox on 18 October 2015, when he was asked about 9/11 and what he would

have done to prevent the terrorist attacks had he been president at the time. His answer immediately links terrorism to illegal immigration:

> (7)   Well, I would have been much different, I must tell you. Somebody said, well, it wouldn't have been any different. Well, it would have been. *I am extremely, extremely tough on illegal immigration. I'm extremely tough on people coming into this country.* I believe that if I were running things, I doubt those families would have – I doubt that those people would have been in the country. So there's a good chance that those people would not have been in our country. (Trump 2015g)

Trump continually projects the image of existing, lax border security and advocates the necessity of being "extremely tough on illegal immigration" and "on people coming into this country", and in doing so the image of illegal immigrants inevitably merges with that of terrorists and Syrian refugees, as was evident in his speech in Des Moines, Iowa, on 24 January 2016:

> (8)   They're walking. The military is standing there holding guns and people are just walking right in front, coming into our country. It is so terrible. It is so unfair. It is so incompetent. And we don't have the best coming in. We have *people that are criminals*, we have *people that are crooks. You can certainly have terrorists. You can certainly have Islamic terrorists.* You can have anything coming across the border. We don't do anything about it. (Trump 2015b)

As categories of social actors, illegal immigrants, Syrian refugees and terrorists share the same categories of predication: they come across the border illegally to threaten American security.

The distance that Trump ascribes to immigrants through certain instances of nomination and predication is strengthened by his use of the pronoun *they*. In discussing immigration, Trump uses *they* as part of his negative representation of the enemies of America. The plural pronoun does not always identify a concrete, recognizable group of individuals, but rather undistinguished, generalized Mexicans who are attributed negative identities and actions. As declared on 16 June 2015, in the Presidential announcement speech:

> (9)   When Mexico sends its people, *they're not sending their best.* They're not sending you. They're not sending you. *They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists.* And some, I assume, are good people. (Trump 2015c)

Interestingly, in the same passage the identity of *they* switches from a collectivised Mexico ("they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems…") to immigrants themselves ("and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists"), thus attacking at the same time Mexico as a nation and those Mexicans who cross the border. In Trump's formulation, *they* indicates distance from the "deontic centre" in discourse and suitably points to geographical as well as moral distance from the self, highlighting exclusion, separation and distance from self, the speaker and his/her audience. (Chilton 2004, 57–61). Indeed, *they* is connected with material processes ("bringing problems with us", "bring drugs", "bring crime") and relational processes of identification ("They're rapists") which emphasize the vicious nature of the "stranger", while the final disclaimer ("And some, I assume, are good people") is so short, marginal and hedged ("I assume") that it does little or nothing to defuse the violent rhetoric of the whole passage.

Metaphors, which can also be analysed as part of predication, assign certain values to the social actors involved. Trump often uses the "flood" metaphor, a metaphor which is frequently used in discourse against immigration (Hart 2010, 153–54) and which reinforces the sense of danger and otherness associated with immigrants as social actors:

(10)   The first thing we need to do is secure our southern border – and we need to do it now. *We have to stop that flood*, and the best way to do that is *to build a wall*. (Trump 2015a)

(11)   We have to *stop the inflow* of illegals coming in to our country. (Trump 2016a)

(12)   Pew polling shows 83 percent of all voters – Democrats, Republicans and Independents – think immigration should be *frozen* or reduced. The biggest beneficiaries of allowing fewer foreign workers into our country would be minority workers, including all immigrants now living here, who are competing for jobs, benefits and community resources against record *waves* of foreign workers. (Trump 2016b)

(13)   The fact is, since then, many killings, murders, crime, drugs are *pouring* across the border, our money going out and the drugs coming in. (Trump 2015e)

By associating immigrants with a source domain with such sinister implications, Trump implies that their entrance into the nation is akin to a natural catastrophe, thus directing his supporters' moral judgement. The metaphorical image of immigration as a flood or a dangerous liquid threatening to disrupt the order of a

nation is well-established in right-wing discourse both in the UK and the USA (Charteris-Black 2006; Semino 2008, 95–97), and its ideological implication is to de-humanize immigrants, to deprive them of individual identity (Santa Ana 1999). These types of metaphors are recurrent in political discourse because of their ideological significance, for example when dominant groups use them as instruments of social control, as marginal groups are portrayed as a threat to society (Fairclough 2001, 99–100).

4.2 "But we need… to build a wall, we need to keep illegals out." Argumentation in Trump's discourse

The discourse topic emerging most clearly from Trump's texts addressing immigration is border control, and specifically his proposal of building a wall between the USA and Mexico to prevent illegal immigrants from coming into the USA. The idea of the wall has become a centrepiece of Trump's 2016 presidential bid. However outrageous, impractical and, to many, even ridiculous this proposal might sound, it helped Trump achieve widespread consensus among vast sections of the electorate and eventually win the Republican nomination. With his wall proposal, Trump touched an issue which resonated strongly with the Republican electorate. An August 2015 Rasmussen poll found that 70% of likely Republican voters supported the wall, with 51% of total voters agreeing with it (Rasmussen Reports 2015). A similar picture was revealed by a poll conducted a month later: while the American public still seemed generally divided on the issue of the wall (48% opposed it, while 43% were in favour of it), the figures for each party told a different story: 73% of Republicans supported the wall, while only 31% of Democrats did (Monmouth University Poll 2015). As of March 2016, the idea of the wall remained the single most popular issue regarding immigration among Trump's supporters, with 79% of them backing his idea of building a wall, while other issues regarding immigration had far lesser appeal (Doherty 2016).[2] In securing the Republican nomination in July 2016, Trump managed to reap political profits from the general Republican mood on immigration, and the support to his wall proposal was so strong that he long appeared like a single-issue candidate.

The popularity of the wall can be accounted for by certain argumentation strategies employed by Trump in his discourse on immigration, namely, the need for a physical barrier to stop illegal immigrants from entering the country and, therefore,

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2. To put things in perspective, in the same survey only 52% of Trump's supporters backed the deportation of illegal immigrants, while 48% said they should be allowed to stay in the USA legally. 48% of Trump's supporters asked for stronger law enforcement and better border security (Doherty 2016).

to prevent crime and social danger. The discourse topic of the wall, separating the USA and Mexico and thus guaranteeing the security of American citizens, is the basis for an argumentative scheme which justifies the exclusion of "illegal immigrants". This scheme is fulfilled by a (formal) *topos* of cause, within a causal scheme whereby a cause (open borders) results in an effect (crime, loss of jobs):

Argument:	our borders are open
Conclusion rule:	illegal Mexican immigrants who come to the USA steal our jobs and commit crimes because our borders are open.
Truth claim:	illegal Mexican immigrants who come to the USA steal our jobs and commit crimes.

This (formal) *topos* of cause is connected to the (content-related) *topos* of threat or danger, whereby if there are threats or dangers, then an action should be taken to counteract them.

Argument:	illegal Mexican immigrants who come to the USA steal our jobs and commit crimes
Conclusion rule:	if we build a wall, illegal immigrants from Mexico will be stopped
Truth claim:	illegal immigrants from Mexico will be stopped

However, the wall is presented by Trump as a necessary instrument to put an end not just to the crimes committed by illegal immigrants, but also to the potential danger coming from Islamic terrorists. Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric resonated with contemporary events linked to terrorism, such as the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the San Bernardino shootings in early December 2015, which involved a Muslim couple, and the stream of news of atrocities committed by ISIS. The above *topoi* of cause and of threat of danger should therefore be expanded as such:

Argument:	our borders are open
Conclusion rule:	illegal Mexican immigrants *and Islamic terrorists* who come to the USA commit crimes because our borders are open.
Truth claim:	illegal Mexican immigrants *and Islamic terrorists* who come to the USA commit crimes.

Argument:	illegal Mexican immigrants *and Islamic terrorists* who come to the USA commit crimes
Conclusion rule:	if we build a wall, illegal immigrants from Mexico *and Islamic terrorists* will be stopped
Truth claim:	illegal immigrants from Mexico *and Islamic terrorists* will be stopped

The *topoi* of cause and of threat/danger emphasize the role of the wall as the key discourse topic which, together with the nominations and predications associated with "illegal immigrants" and Islamic terrorists, lends internal coherence to Trump's discourse on immigration and make it credible.

Trump made his proposal of building a wall in June 2015, early in the nomination season, but the clamour and controversy of his proposal obfuscated the fact that he had already proposed this idea in the past. In his 2011 book, *Time to Get Tough*, his early political manifesto, Trump praised the 20-foot wall built on the US-Mexico border in Yuma, Arizona, a wall which, he claims, helped reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering the country, stressing that "properly built walls work" (Trump 2011, 147). Other Republicans were no less explicit about the usefulness of building a wall as a barrier to illegal immigration. Conservative pundit Ann Coulter was herself one of the most influential advocates of restrictive measures for immigration. In *Adios America*, her 2015 best-selling book, Coulter looks at how Israel and China strengthened their borders (with Palestine and North Korea respectively) by building fences, preventing the intrusion of unwanted illegal aliens as well as potential terrorists and advocating the same policy for the US-Mexican border.[3]

Trump elaborates on the function of the wall to prevent illegal immigration in several of his speeches, statements and texts appearing on social media. During his official Presidential announcement speech, on 16 June 2015, he declared:

(14)   I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I'll build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall.

(Trump 2015c)

Trump's business success merges with his political career, as his words point to an interdiscursive connection to a commonly shared knowledge of Trump the real estate developer. Building a wall between the USA and Mexico is necessary to keep illegal immigrants, who are accused of being the main cause of crime, out of the country.

During the first GOP debate, aired by Fox on 6 August 2015, Trump answered a specific question on the crimes allegedly coming from Mexico, stressing the need to build a wall but this time introducing a new element, the presence of "a big beautiful door" regulating entrance to the USA:

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3. Coulter influenced Trump in some of his key proposals about immigration, something that she would proudly boast about and that Trump himself was ready to acknowledge (Beinart 2015; Hananoki 2015).

(15) Q: You say that the Mexican government is sending criminals –
                  rapists, drug dealers – across the border.
      TRUMP: So, if it weren't for me, you wouldn't even be talking about
                  illegal immigration. You wouldn't even be talking about it. This
                  was not a subject that was on anybody's mind until I brought
                  it up at my announcement. (…) The fact is, since then, many
                  killings, murders, crime, drugs pouring across the border, are
                  money going out and the drugs coming in. And I said we need
                  to build a wall, and it has to be built quickly. And I don't mind
                  having a big beautiful door in that wall so that people can come
                  into this country legally. But we need, Jeb (Bush), to build a
                  wall, we need to keep illegals out.   (Trump 2015e)

The same points were again given resonance when he discussed them on 22
September 2015 in an interview during CBS's comedy programme "The Late Show
with Stephen Colbert":

(16) TRUMP: (…) We have to have a wall. We have to have a border. And
                  in that wall we're going to have a beautiful big fat door where
                  people can – they come into the country, and they come – listen
                  to me.
      COLBERT: A beautiful big fat door?
      TRUMP: A beautiful door where people can come into the country, but
                  they have to come in legally. That's what a country is all about.
                                                                        (2015f)

While the wall would keep criminals out of the country, people can still come to
the USA legally through "a beautiful big fat door", which means an institutional
entrance to the nation, regulated by the state.

The wall, preventing unwanted people from entering the USA, and the
"beautiful big fat door", regulating physical access to the nation, are key topics
in Trump's construction of national borders, which are conceived as shapers of
identity. A border is a discriminating structure, separating "legal" from "illegal"
incomers, and is a state institution which has the power to regulate access to the
motherland. Trump considers borders to be the primary instrument for what
DeChaine (2009) calls alienization, that is, a project that makes certain individu-
als and groups unassimilable and excluded from the national body. Alienization is
effected in narratives, verbal and non-verbal, through a bordering rhetoric, which
is the convergence of nationalist, capitalist and racist thought, whereby borders are
instruments of power, in that they determine racial and legal identities (DeChaine
2009, 47–52).

Trump's wall addresses another important aspect of alienization, that is, the insecurity generated by the perception of dangers, real or projected, represented as coming from outside the nation, to the point that the very existence of the nation is under threat. The lack of border integrity produces narratives of insecurity and danger associated with "aliens" who cross the border. This can be seen in Trump's obsessive connection between illegal immigration, borders and the integrity of the nation state itself. In the section on immigration of his manifesto, "Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again", Trump connects the supposedly fallen state of the USA with the current policies on immigration. According to the three "core principles of real immigration reform", a border coincides with a wall, and the absence of borders pre-empts the very existence of a nation:

(17) 1. **A nation without borders is not a nation.** There must be a wall across the southern border.
2. **A nation without laws is not a nation.** Laws passed in accordance with our Constitutional system of government must be enforced.
3. **A nation that does not serve its own citizens is not a nation.** Any immigration plan must improve jobs, wages and security for all Americans. (Trump 2015d)

In Trump's construction of alienization, borders produce spaces of identity and difference: the identity of the individuals outside the border is measured against the laws of the country. In later speeches and public statements, Trump makes the same identification of borders and nation over and over again:

(18) Look, we have a country, we have borders. We have no border right now; we don't have a country (…) We can have a great and beautiful wall. When it will be up, it will stop. We'll have our border. And guess what? Nobody comes in unless they have their papers, and they come in legally. And we stop crime, and we stop problems, and we stop drug trade which is massive. You know, we have so much drug trade, the cartels, are pouring through, just like there's nothing, pouring through… Chicago, New York, Los Angeles… the money goes out, the drugs come in… we're gonna stop it. (Trump 2015f)

(19) We don't have a country if we don't have borders. We will build a wall. It will be a great wall. It will do what it's supposed to do. Keep illegal immigrants out. (Trump 2016a)

The assumption here is that the USA is no longer a proper nation because of the lack of a border keeping "illegal immigrants out", with all the dangers caused by the arrival of unwanted aliens, and this is because there cannot be a country without borders, as the former is identified because of the existence of the latter.

As has been observed in the above discussion on social actors, Trump often talks about issues of security by merging representations of illegal immigrants, terrorists and Syrian refugees in the same discourse. Accordingly, the topic of the wall was continually discussed by Trump during the nomination campaign in either the context of immigration, the context of terrorism, or the context of both immigration and terrorism. He makes the connection between the wall, secure borders and terrorism very explicitly in his own book *Crippled America*:

(20)   Walls work. The Israelis spent $2 million per kilometre to build a wall –
which has been largely successful in stopping terrorists from getting into the
country. (…) While obviously we don't face the same level of terrorist threat
as our closest Middle East ally, there is no question about the value of a wall
in the fight against terrorism.   (Trump 2015a, 24)

Visual materials on social media make the connection between the wall and the threat of terrorism even more explicitly. In an update appearing on his Facebook page on 22 November 2015, Trump published an image consisting of two photos (see Figure 1). The update read:

Figure 1.

(21)   13 Syrian refugees were caught trying to get into the U.S. through the
Southern Border. How many made it? WE NEED THE WALL!

(Trump 2015h)

Trump here refers to the news of 13 Syrians who arrived in the USA illegally by
crossing the US-Mexico border, that is, the same gateway to the USA as the one
used by illegal immigrants. With this image Trump highlights the porous nature
of the southern border, which is crossed not just by Mexicans, but also by people
coming from places usually associated with Islamic terrorism. The photo on top
showed the wall between Israel and the Palestinian territories, while the one at the
bottom was arguably taken at the USA-Mexico border and showed a fence, separat-
ing the two nations. The contrast between the two photos is between security and
vulnerability, between the wall defending Israeli territories from the Palestinian
ones and the weak fences between Mexico and the USA. The strength and the secu-
rity displayed by the image of the Israeli wall clearly reinforced the sense of weak-
ness associated with the US' southern border, the assumption being that the Israeli-
Palestinian wall is working well and keeps terrorists away, while there is basically
no barrier between the USA and Mexico, and the USA is therefore vulnerable and
open to attacks from rapists, thieves as well as terrorists coming from Mexico. By
showing the photos of the two borders, Trump is appealing to certain intertextual
and interdiscursive features and to the collective knowledge of a country where, as
far as Middle East policy is concerned, most people side with Israel and associate
Palestinians with terrorism. Thus, the Israeli wall induces Trump's electorate to in-
terpret the crossing of the US-Mexico border as a category of threat similar to that
of terrorism, with the wall being the discourse topic shared by the two discourses,
while reinforcing the issue of security in terms of both immigration and terrorism.

5.   Borders, walls and nations

In his arguments in favour of the wall and against "illegal immigration", Trump
draws from a populist and nationalistic ethos, which is strictly connected with the
existence of borders. Indeed, borders are one of the most tangible experiences of
the state, because it is in borders that citizenship and the sense of belonging to a
nation are most powerfully enforced. Anderson (1991) highlights the importance
of borders in his definition of nation as an "imagined community", in which the
mental image of the nation is shared by all members of that nation:

> The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing
> perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond
> which lie other nations.   (Anderson 1991, 7)

Borders are not just a political or institutional entity defining the physical limits of nations, but are also part of our national consciousness. They transcend the physical limits of the state as they are "meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities" and "both structures and *symbols* of a state's security and sovereignty" (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 15, my emphasis), as they constitute a cultural construct which plays a key role in the definition of a nationally shared identity. Our national identity is a "boundary consciousness" (Billig 1995, 22), a consciousness as "nationals", belonging to one (and only one) national entity separated from other nations by borders.

The sense of national belonging attached to the concept of borders is always accompanied by a parallel but opposite set of discursive strategies based on the exclusion of the "other". A nation manages processes of identity and otherness (Wodak 2014), and this is the essence of the narratives of populism, which construct opposite (and artificially constructed) roles, fulfilled by those who belong to the nation and those who are (represented as) excluded from it. Walls, of course, include and exclude, protect and separate. And borders are the place where the sense of national identity is constructed in terms of difference from others and where differences in terms of national identity overlap with other differences, such as religion or race, and where, as a consequence, otherness is constructed (Lamont and Molnár 2002). In this sense, Trump gives visible shape to spatial and national boundaries on the basis of class and ethnic differences; in order to do that, borders are supposed to be "very, very powerful" (Trump 2015b) so that they will divide – and protect – "us" from the "other".

Trump's proposal of building a wall to secure the US-Mexico border was not created out of a vacuum. In attacking illegal immigrants, in associating crime with immigration, and in advocating the construction of a physical barrier to provide security and protection from outside enemies, Trump exploits certain popular understandings and experiences of citizenship, identity and national integrity that have existed for a long time in the United States. At the level of popular imagination, the US-Mexico border has long been projected as an unruly place, escaping control from the authority of the state (DeChaine 2012, 8). In this sense, Trump's campaign on illegal immigration follows the evolution of the discourse of border militarization. For the past three decades, immigration and drug trafficking have been the main motivations behind an increase in military presence at the US-Mexico border aimed at preventing the influx of migrants. Border militarization was at the centre of a political discourse which saw the US-Mexico border in connection with immigration and the intensification of the "War on Drugs" in the early part of George HW Bush's presidency and, after 9/11, the "War on Terror". For this reason, borders have become a source of insecurity in the national imagery, as border rhetoric has increasingly displayed the merging of the potential dangers coming from undocumented immigrants and those coming from terrorists

(Chavez 2012). In general terms, then, the alienization of the migrant is a response to the border anxieties produced by globalization and the post-9/11 climate, and it is a form of othering, a construction of narratives that describes the migrant as different or inferior. It also provides the national community with a set of symbolic resources for naming and evaluating the "alien" in negative terms as compared to the "native" – it is, in other words, a set of hegemonic narratives, including economic and crime-related arguments, which claims to distinguish the American (majority) from the un-American (minorities) (DeChaine 2009, 48) and in so doing it claims to forge and maintain shared American civic values.

Trump's wall is an essential element of the symbolic enactment of alienization. In Trump's conception, the border is a regulatory element: by regulating the modality of entrance into the country, it discriminates between legal guests and illegal aliens, between those who follow US law and those who transgress it. The border is "a rhetorical mode of enactment" (DeChaine 2002, 2), in which the meanings of "citizen" and "alien" are played out. Borders are given certain important rhetorical and regulatory powers: borders determine the nature of inclusion in or exclusion from the national political community and act as instruments for social action.

6. Conclusions

This paper has highlighted the nature of Trump's discursive strategies in the context of the contemporary immigration discourse in the USA, a discourse which is dominated by the border rhetoric of national security and which affirms certain typical populist ideas. In Trump's populist narrative, the "illegal" in "illegal immigrant" or "illegal immigration" is a premodifier which has become a constitutive element of the identity of the migrant. Crucially, while "illegal" is a quality attached to the migrant, its conceptualization and use derive from the role played by the bordering practices and by the power wielded through them. Trump's anti-immigration rhetoric reinforces a vision of the nation and of its borders which is based on a power which is realized through the legitimization of the identity of some subjects and the alienization or exclusion of others: in Trump's nationalist narrative the alienized subject is marginalized and kept out of the space of the US homeland. Through his wall proposal, which is instrumental in providing social actors with certain (negative) roles, Trump exploits a prevalent narrative which views the US-Mexico border as a gateway to the nation from unwanted and threatening enemies. Trump wants to "make America great again" through immigration reform because, by demarcating borders, both geographically, physically and socially, and by excluding the "alien" element, he can draw the rhetorical outlines of group identity, and specifically of who should be, and who should not be, American.

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Xenophobic Trumpeters

A corpus-assisted discourse study
of Donald Trump's Facebook conversations

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Immigration has been and remains a conspicuous topic in American political debate, and the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, exasperated by the Syrian conflict, has brought the issue of Muslim immigration into focus. The topic has been exploited, among others, by the presidential candidate Donald J. Trump. His proposal to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. achieved great resonance and stimulated passionate discussion. This discussion, which displayed a high degree of xenophobia and verbal aggression, is the target of this paper's investigation. Material was collected from Trump's official Facebook page and was analyzed using Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistic methods. The results highlight the strategies employed in discourse that aims to posit Muslims as "Others" and as incompatible with American society, as well as dangerous, aggressive, and inferior, through the choice of semantic, syntactic, and rhetorical discursive structures.

Keywords: social media, xenophobia, immigration, Muslims, Critical Discourse Analysis, Corpus Linguistics

1. Introduction

Immigration has been a hot topic in the American political and social sphere for quite some time. It was present and prominent in the latest election cycle, as well. The notion that the majority of the U.S. population is not experiencing the lifestyle and prosperity they feel entitled to forced them to look for someone to blame for their problems. One of the groups indicated as the source of the economic and social troubles of the U.S. was immigrants, especially the "illegal immigrants" or "illegals", and President Donald Trump (presidential candidate at the time of data collection) became the voice of this sector of the population that called for keeping new immigrants out (by building a wall) and for deporting undocumented

immigrants already in the country. Taking into consideration that this candidate has won the election, it is reasonable to assume that a significant portion of the U.S. electorate shares these views, making them worthy of investigation.

What makes Trump's popularity particularly interesting is that it is often attributed to his tendency to "say it like it is", without obscuring the ideas with political correctness. Many American citizens have praised him as a man who thinks "just like them" and is not afraid to articulate opinions they were unwilling to communicate themselves. His dicey statements, in turn, have emboldened his supporters to speak their minds, providing us with access to discourse that normally would have been kept private as politically incorrect, unacceptable in the public sphere, and embarrassing. It seems that the "cultural norm against 'prejudice'" (Billig 1988, 94), the phenomenon of speakers going to lengths to avoid sounding racist, has been put aside by a noticeable portion of the U.S. population. As a result, the xenophobic ideology that has always been present in the U.S. public mentality, but hidden from the public eye (with the exception of a few extreme right-wing pundits), is now coming to the surface and becoming more visible and accessible for analysis.

The material for this study was gathered from Donald Trump's official Facebook page. His proposal to ban all Muslims from entering the United States, announced at a campaign rally, and posted on his Facebook page, attracted well over 17 thousand responses, some of them prompting hundreds of replies in turn, within mere days. Collecting the responses to that post supplied us with a small specialized corpus of the anti-Islam, anti-immigration discourse of Trump's supporters. Coming from social media, this collection provides access to current, unscripted, and spontaneous speech produced without concerns about appropriateness of verbal behavior.

2.   Theoretical framework

The issue of immigration was extensively covered by numerous media outlets around the world and was the subject of investigation by scholars of various fields. Immigration discourse (and anti-immigration discourse) has been studied, among others, by Hart (2013), Gattino and Tartaglia (2015), Baider and Constantinou (2014), Cisneros (2008), Lirola (2014), Musolff (2015), Rojo and van Dijk (1997), Mamadouh (2012), and van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999).

Representation of Islam has also been the focus of research, and the examination of the treatment of Islam in the western news media has generally found evidence of negative bias (Akbarzadeh and Smith 2005; Awass 1996; Baker et al. 2013; Dunn 2001; Hafez 2000; Kassimeris and Jackson 2015; Lewis, Mason and Moore 2011; Mårtensson 2014; Richardson 2004a, 2004b). Dunn (2001) notes that

Muslims were constructed negatively by Australian newspapers: they were posited as "fanatic, intolerant, fundamentalist, misogynist [and] alien" 75% of the time, whereas positive accounts represented 25% of cases (296). Tracing the evidence of fixation on problems diachronically, from 2000 to 2008, Moore et al. (2008) found that stories that focused on extremism or on differences between Islamic and Western cultures increased over time while reports about attacks on Muslims or problems they faced decreased. Such negative media portrayals, as Richardson (2004b) argues, push Muslims to the margins of society.

While the representation of Muslims and Islam has been relatively well-studied on materials from traditional media, such as newspapers, there are fewer studies that focus on these issues on social media. This situation is unfortunate since social media is becoming an important vehicle of production and reproduction of influential discursive techniques, and as such, is worthy of researchers' attention.

2.1 Critical discourse analysis

This project falls within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an established framework for research into the relationship between language and society (e.g., Fairclough 1989, 1995; Reisigl and Wodak 2005; van Dijk 1991, 1993, 2006; Wodak 1989; for an overview see Wodak and Meyer 2015). CDA sees discourse as an embodiment of social practices and interprets social phenomena based on the analysis of discourse. It underscores the conscious and strategic character of linguistic acts, emphasizes the idea that texts are based upon choices, and that alternative choices might always be made (Fairclough 1995), and stresses that verbal interaction may be used to produce and legitimize "social power abuse, dominance, and inequality" (van Dijk 2001, 352). CDA has been effective in uncovering prejudiced representations of minorities – especially in privileged media and in the public arena – victimization, racism, and xenophobia (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van der Valk 2000; van Dijk 2000a, 2000b; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak and van Dijk 2000). This manipulative discourse is often structured along the Us versus Them (Friend vs. Foe, In-group vs. Out-group) divide and fits into the Ideological Square of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (van Dijk 2006, 374).

This article applies the CDA approach to the representation of Islam and Muslims in the discourse community of Trump supporters, and it answers the agenda-setting call by Wodak and Meyer (2015) for CDA to engage in "[a]nalysing, understanding and explaining the use of digitally mediated communication" (17) and the emphasis on incorporating Corpus Linguistics in CDA (Hart and Cap 2014). Employing corpus linguistic tools in Critical Discourse Analysis proved useful for the present study since social media presents certain difficulties in collecting representative data samples.

2.2 Corpus linguistics tools

There has been a development over the past decade or so toward joining CDA and Corpus Linguistics (CL). Several authors propose that corpus linguistic methods can effectively support quantitative and qualitative research in discourse analysis and should be further explored by future CDA studies (Baker et al. 2008; Brigadir, Greene and Cunningham 2015; Mautner 2009). Studies that led the way in combining CDA and CL examined grammatical or lexical choice, such as pronoun use related to sexism in language (Stubbs 1992); lexical choice while representing women in the news (Caldas-Coulthard 1993); the words *ethnic*, *racial* and *tribal* (Krishnamurthy 1996); and representations of the European Union in the press (Hardt-Mautner 1995). More recent studies are applying corpus linguistic tools and examining statistically significant collocations to reveal ideological information about the groups they are studying (Baker and McEnery 2005; Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Perren and Dannreuther 2013; Salama 2011; Orpin 2005; Prentice and Hardie 2009). Such studies benefit from both the rigor of the computational analysis and the richness of subsequent qualitative analysis (Baker et al. 2008) and have demonstrated several advantages of applying corpus-driven methods in critical discourse studies, including the reduction of research subjectivity as well as the improvement of research validity through focusing on quantifiable elements of discourse. This project falls within the Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (Baker and McEnery 2005; Baker et al. 2008; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2012; Mautner 2009; Partington 2006) where the computer processing of text is supplemented by its "manual" examination by the researcher. Such a combination was necessary since the material under study contained multiple instances of non-standard grammar and numerous typos and spelling errors that complicated computer analysis. Besides, a study concentrating on semantics and pragmatics cannot always delegate text processing to the machine and requires some human input on various factors.

3. Research questions

The current project aims to investigate the attitude toward Muslims among Donald Trump supporters and the discourse strategies they use to frame Muslims as "Other" and to demean and stereotype them as inferior and dangerous. Utilizing a CDA approach and CL techniques, this article studies the discursive constructs of *Muslim* as the externalization of the xenophobic ideological base of the U.S. population whose opinions are voiced by the (at the time) presidential candidate Trump.

The following research questions were posed in the current study:

1. What are the collocation patterns of the lexeme *Muslim* in the corpus under analysis?
2. What are the semantics of the collocates of *Muslim* in the corpus?
3. What are the syntactic patterns observed in the discourse of Trump supporters showing their attitude to Muslims?
4. What can the metaphors employed in the discourse under analysis reveal about the attitude of the speakers toward followers of Islam?

4.   Methodology

4.1 The corpus

For our analysis, a small corpus with a total of 856,769 tokens/ 674,277 words was compiled. A corpus this size is notably smaller than popular general corpora, such as the British National Corpus, Corpus of Contemporary American English, or comparable corpora. However, specialized corpora do not need to be as large as general corpora to yield reliable results because the important factor is what the corpus contains and what is being investigated (Flowerdew 2004; Koester 2010; O'Keeffe et al. 2007). Conversely, the small size can even be advantageous since smaller, more specialized corpora allow a closer link between the corpus and the context in which the texts were produced. In this respect, the present study works with material suitable to give insights into the ideology of the anti-immigration, anti-Muslims sector of the U.S. population since it consists of unscripted, unedited, and spontaneous interactions on Facebook prompted by Donald Trump's proposal to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. "until we figure out what is going on."

Over 17,000 replies to the December, 17th, 2015 post were collected for this project which is why the corpus was named *Ban the Muslims* (BTM). It is necessary to mention that the corpus analyzed in the present article reflects the state of the conversation in January of 2016, when the comments were collected. Even though the original post was still present on Facebook at the time of publication, the comments to it could be different since it is possible to add replies as long as the original post is in place, and it is also possible to delete a comment, thus eliminating an entire thread.

To ensure representativeness of the data and validity of conclusions, it was necessary to separate the utterances of the commenters who visited Trump's page to express their admiration and support for his proposal from those who left critical comments. However, it was not possible to sort them out by machine tools, and the manual separation of the two sets would have been prohibitively time-consuming. A compromise decision was to manually check the concordance

lines including all tokens of *muslim** and to delete the comments that included this keyword if they expressed a critical attitude toward Trump or his proposal. Even though the resulting corpus, almost definitely, still contains many comments made by people who joined the discussion to express their indignation about the ban proposed by Mr. Trump and to argue with his supporters, those comments should not affect the concordances and collostructions of *muslim** discussed in this paper since such "anti-ban" comments are farther away from the keyword and should not be picked up by the computer analysis tools.

Finally, some more adjustments were made to the corpus. For example, words in foreign scripts were sought and eliminated since the discussion apparently attracted speakers of Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Korean, Russian, and other languages, and for reasons of statistics, those comments had to be deleted. Also, to reduce the influence of the activists who posted identical texts multiple times and to concentrate on the more spontaneous discussion, frequency lists and collocates were manually scanned for such instances. If multiple postings of identical texts were detected, such re-posts were deleted from the corpus and only one occurrence of the post was retained.

4.2 Frequency

Frequency of particular words in corpora can provide important insights about salience of certain terms and topics for the genres, modes of communication, or particular groups whose discourse is being analyzed. Therefore, frequency results can be used to draw conclusions about the correlation between the structures of the text and social and political phenomena. Typically, frequencies are normalized; that is, they are calculated in the number of occurrences per million of words. For the purposes of this article, the analysis focuses on the word *Muslim*, which was frequent in the corpus and also highly salient in terms of referring to the identity associated with the xenophobic attitudes expressed in the BTM corpus. Therefore, in terms of understanding how refugees and other immigrants are viewed by the xenophobic sector of the U.S. population, *Muslim* is the most relevant word to analyze.

4.3 Concordance

Current corpus linguistic methods used in Critical Discourse Studies often involve keyword extraction and analyzing concordance lines or key-words-in-context (KWICs). A concordance presents the key word or cluster in its immediate co-text. The number of words on either side of the key word or cluster in focus can be modified, and concordance lines can be expanded up to the whole text.

Concordance lines can also be manipulated in different ways to check for different aspects and patterns of the word or cluster. Concordance analysis allows for bringing together the study of language features in co-text, while taking into account the context of the discourse.

4.4 Collocation

In addition to word frequency and concordance analysis, a prominent corpus linguistic technique is identifying collocations. Collocation is the above-chance, frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the node) (Sinclair 1991). The likelihood or the prominence of co-occurrence of words in a corpus reveals vital insights into the connection between certain concepts in real life or in the minds of the speakers. This information can be obtained from manual scanning of concordance lines, but modern corpus linguistic tools do it automatically, reducing reliance on researchers' attention and intuition.

While analyzing collocations, an important decision is whether to include or eliminate functional words from the results because the measures of frequency alone may not be helpful. To address this question, the statistical calculation of collocations is based on three measures: the frequency of the node, the frequency of the collocates, and the frequency of the collocation. For this study, the Sketch Engine, a corpus management system designed by the British corpus linguist Adam Kilgarriff, was used, and its collocation tool was applied to identify the significant collocates of the keywords with the help of the the Mutual Information (MI) score. The higher the MI score, the stronger the link between two items: an MI score of 3.0 or higher is usually taken as evidence that two items are collocates (Hunston 2002, 71). The closer to 0 the MI score gets, the more likely it is that the two items co-occur by chance, and a negative MI score indicates that the two items are not likely to co-occur.

The collocational data obtained from the BTM corpus were subsequently compared to the data from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies 2008). COCA was chosen because it is arguably the largest, well-balanced, and up-to-date corpus freely available for research. Considering that COCA accumulates a very large sample of texts (approximately 20 million words) a year, evenly divided between several genres, it serves as a good reference point of the national view on the issue discussed in the BTM. Because Trump's proposal came in November of 2015, this project limited the COCA data utilized in this study to the year 2015.

4.5 Collostruction

Besides lexical collocation, it is possible to draw meaningful conclusions from observing which grammatical structures containing the keywords are used: "Collostructional analysis always starts with a particular construction and investigates which lexemes are strongly attracted or repelled by a particular slot in the construction" (Stefanowitsch and Gries 2003, 214). To conduct collostructional analysis, it is important to identify the lexemes in a given slot by item-by-item inspection and manual coding (215). The process is complicated because "[a]ny actual utterance larger than a word is a simultaneous manifestation of several constructions" (213). Since grammatical information is important for the understanding of how certain words are used, the Word Sketch tool developed by Kilgarriff was applied. Word sketches are a step beyond the general collocation analysis as they take grammar into consideration and group collocations according to particular grammatical relation, such as subject, object, modifier, etc. The collocation candidates in a word sketch are sorted either by their frequency or by using a lexicographic association score like Dice, T-score or MI-score (Kilgarriff et al. 2004; Kilgarriff et al. 2014).

4.6 Procedure

The research proceeded as follows: in the first stage, the word frequency list was created and checked to identify the most frequent and salient lemmas. The lemma *Muslim* was thoroughly investigated in the BTM corpus by inspecting the collocations, which were compared to the collocations of *Muslim* in the COCA corpus, and the collostructions identified by the Sketch Engine program. Based on the information gained from that, the patterns of xenophobic discourse were described and discussed.

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Frequency

The Sketch Engine Word List tool, that counts all the words in a corpus and presents them as an ordered list, was used to find the words that were the most frequent in the corpus. Unsurprisingly, the most frequent content/open class lemma was *trump* which was used 7,928 times (9,253 words per million or wpm). The twenty most frequent lemmas are show in Table 1 in Appendix A.

These most frequent lemmas seem to draw a triangle of three main agents (see Figure 1): Mr. Trump, the U.S. and its citizens, and Muslims. After that, the high-frequency words describe the needs, intentions, or actions of those agents.


Figure 1. Triangle of three main agents in BTM corpus.

Interestingly, the word *Muslim* as a singular noun occurred in the corpus 784 times (1,060 per million), while the plural form, *Muslims*, was used 2,119 times (2,866 per million). These numbers are in line with the previous findings that Muslims are often discussed as a homogeneous group, and their individual differences are overlooked or ignored. The fact that *Muslim* as an adjective was predominantly used in such phrases as *Muslim community(ies)* or *Muslim country(ies)*, concurs with the same tendency.

5.2 KWIC analysis

The next step in the analysis was manual examination of the concordance of the word *Muslim* as it was used by the communicators in the Facebook discussion of banning Muslims from entering the U.S.

The 3,683 concordance lines were scanned and sorted into semantic categories to capture the linguistic discursive landscape surrounding Muslims and Islam in the corpus under analysis. Not all of those lines were possible to group because some of the comments, approximately 15% of them, were either unintelligible or impossible to classify. Those that allowed categorization revealed a strong negative bias and fell into five main groups. The first four were: Muslims are dangerous (31.6%), their influx must be stopped (19%), they threaten our culture/way of life (18.6%), and they are disgusting or morally deficient (9.6%). There was also a rather small but distinct group that did not blend with the others and constituted about 6.4% of the uses: Obama is an evil Muslim.

The **danger** group labeled Muslims as murderers and rapists. The lexis used by the commenters was related to violence and bears extremely negative connotations:

(1)   … As a white woman, I do not want to be raped by some smelly **Muslim**, then get killed. I am better then that, the religion that preaches hate…

Many commenters are sincerely afraid of all Muslims:

(2)   …they know how to blend in and use us, in our own country. When I see a **Muslim**, manmor woman with family or babies I fear they are layered with bombs, they have no reguard to killing…

One of the phrases that was repeated by several commenters was "not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim", and the label was applied to everyone who practices that religion indiscriminately:

(3)   … This is a national security issue. Not all **Muslims** are terrorists but all terrorists are Muslim. There needs to be a reformation…

Some of the comments tried to soften this stance by hedging:

(4)   …now in this country the U.S.A. Not all Muslims are terrorist, but it seems almost all terrorist are **Muslims**. Let's make America great again. Let's vote for Donald Trump. …

However, the others confidently equate the Muslim faith and terrorist activity:

(5)   … your a dork! Lets see what you say when these terrorist that are 99.9999999999999% **muslim**, Kill a loved one of yours! Your an idiot Trump is right Islam is a…

According to the commenters, it is impossible to differentiate between the followers of Islam ("we can't tell good ones from bad ones"), and, therefore, all of them must be receive the same negative treatment and must be kept out of the U.S.:

(6)   …If you can pick through the **Muslims** and find the radical from the non radical by all means GET ON IT. If you not stop drinking the Obama…

This attitude fits with the tendency to see Muslims as a homogenous group rather than individuals who bear individual responsibility for their own actions. According to Trump's supporters discussing the proposed ban, Muslims cannot be trusted and need to be treated as dangerous and prone to terrorism even if they give no indications of evil intentions.

   To strengthen their point, some posters added lists of terrorist attacks not only in the U.S. but from around the globe in which the perpetrators were Muslim:

(7)   …U.S.S. Cole Bombers were Muslims The Madrid Train Bombers were Muslims The Bali Nightclub Bombers were **Muslims** The London Subway Bombers were Muslims The Moscow Theatre Attackers were Muslims The Boston Marathon…

This tendency is in line with Cap's argument that a discursive strategy of "presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs … as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee" is used to legitimize the aggressive or xenophobic actions and policies the speaker proposes (Cap 2014, 17).

The next large group of comments demands that **Muslim "influx" be stopped** outright. They request Muslims to be "banned", "shut down", or "stopped":

(8)   …well with others. That is right Mr. Trump – we have no choice but to shut down **Muslims** entering our country. We don't know who is who yet and even if they answer that they are not coming…

While many commenters stressed that neither Trump nor themselves are anti-Muslim, and that the proposed ban was temporary until a better vetting system is implemented, the others demanded that all those professing Islam are indiscriminately and indefinitely prohibited from entering the U.S. Some went on to suggest that the Muslims already living in the country should be deported:

(9)   … or toll free….. BY LAW, ISLAM IS FORBIDDEN IN AMERICA!…….. DEPORT ALL **MUSLIMS** FROM AMERICA!……….THOSE SAVAGE MURDERERS SHARE NO VALUES WITH AMERICA!………. OBAMA FORGOT…

The most radical proponents of solving the "Muslim problem" expressed support for a Muslim registry, surveillance, internment camps, and even waterboarding.

(10)   …ban Muslims but I never saw him actually say it Yeah! We should then round up all the **Muslims** and send them to Concentrations Camps with the Hispanics and get rid of the filth! #TRUMP2016…

The third prominent thematic group announces that **Muslim culture is incompatible** with the U.S./Western culture and will threaten to eradicate the U.S. culture. Many commenters express fear of the evil plan of Muslims to take over their country and to impose their way of life on everyone:

(11)   …they will get Sharia law state by state and then we will live in a **Muslim** world, do you have any idea what that means??? Any idea at all?? Our culture will change in every aspect…

Many posters point out that Muslims refuse to assimilate, which indicates their expectation that everyone living in the U.S. conforms to their view of the proper way to live, and reflects the underlying assumption that the speakers' culture is superior or at least more legitimate than that of Muslims:

(12)   … of Muslims into America. The other immigrants assimilated. They saw America as their new home. The **Muslims** that come here do not change, do not assimilate, do not integrate. No they are trying to convert America…

Another common belief that the U.S. is a Christian country and is supposed to remain a Christian country "as established by our Founding Fathers". Some people fear that Muslims will force them to change their faith or face persecution:

(13)   … want Shariah law and I am a woman who does not intend to stand by and let this happen or watch **Muslims** and their terrorists persecute my children for being Christian. I will support Donald Trump on this…

The portion of concordance lines that label Muslims as **morally deficient** consists largely of comments evoking the collective guilt concept according to which individual members of a group are responsible for other members' actions by ignoring or tolerating them:

(14)   …Bull tell me when was the last time any **Muslim** condemned terrorism ? I have never herd one ever say a thing and to me silence means guilty by association…

This reasoning often follows the commenters' assertions that Muslims are dangerous and calls for immigration bans or deportations. It seems to justify extending such bans on people who never committed any crimes themselves.

Although not very large comparatively, a still-significant number of comments contain statements accusing **President Obama of being a Muslim** or a Muslim sympathizer. The commenters see this "fact" as the reason he appointed several Muslims to leading positions in the government and for his "anti-American" policies.

(15)   …everything without investigating!?! This is why all the proof is out there and showing he is indeed a **muslim** himself he has been deceiving everyone you idiots! So before pointing fingers why don't you start…

5.3   Metaphors

Interestingly, unlike the other studies that found that political discourse about immigration displays a large number of metaphors (e.g., Cisneros 2008; Musolff 2015; Steuter and Wills 2010), the discourse of the BTM corpus utilized few metaphors. Those that were present fell mostly into the "Islam is a disease" or "immigrants are a flood" categories, and several metaphors treated Muslims as animals or cargo. However, even those metaphors were not very numerous. For example, the BTM corpus contains only six occurrences of the **disease** metaphor:

(16)   … The situation now days is look like there is epidemic disease (terrorism) in the group (**Muslim**). What we must do when there is a epidemic disease we close the border and be more consider until destroy…

There was only one instance of the word *flood* used in connection with the issue of Muslim immigration, four uses of *flow* (or *inflow*), and five uses of the verb *pour* in a corpus of over 800,000 tokens:

(17)   …so knowing that if you still want to keep letting **muslims** pour into the united states at record numbers you better be ready to denounce your Catholic faith or…

A little more common is the metaphorical treatment of Muslims with the words *shutdown*, *shut/shutting down* with *Muslim(s)* being the object (19 cases). It is possible that this expression was used by the commenters because it was used by Trump during his speech:

(18)   …The time for assisting others is when we are whole. Shutting down the **Muslims** sounds good to me. … You people are ridiculous supporting this monster…

There are a few cases when Muslims are described through words normally associated with animals, such as *breed* (seven cases) or *round up* (five cases):

(19)   … Muslims into this country and all the thousand and thousands of **Muslim** refugees that Obama is bringing here is just the start, they will breed to American women and before…

And, finally, on several occasions, the commenters talked about Muslims as if they were goods or livestock imported (eight cases) or shipped (four) into the country. They are discussed as being brought in that way by President Obama with the intention to destroy America:

(20)   ….leave **Muslim** Males alone lest we be guilty of profiling. (rolling eyes) And now Obama wants us to import 10,000 more "refugees" even with Homeland Security telling us that ISIS has …

The use of vocabulary normally associated with animals or inanimate objects while discussing Muslims reveals the commenters' attitude to that religious group. Muslim immigrants and even U.S citizens are viewed as less human than the speakers, which justifies the refusal to recognize their rights and excuses the calls for their unfair treatment.

5.4 Collocational data

Having examined the frequency list of the corpus and studied the concordance of the word *Muslim*, the next step of the analysis involved compiling a list of collocations of the lemma *Muslim*. The words were arranged according to their overall frequency in the corpus, but they had to have an MI score of 3 or higher to ensure collocational significance, and they had to be lexical rather than functional. The results were compared to the list of collocations of the lemma *Muslim* from the COCA collection of texts from the year 2015, in order to gain a better understanding of the unique properties of the BTM corpus. This comparison provided a contrast between the discourse of Trump's supporters and the background discourse (and ideology) of the general American public.

Table 2 in Appendix A shows the list of 50 most frequent collocates of the lemma *Muslim* in the BTM corpus. Several of the frequent collocates on this list have a negative connotation. The third most common one, the verb *to ban*, shows the attitude of the speakers who want to keep Muslims out and away from their country. If the verb *to ban* and the noun *ban* (with a co-occurrence count of 74 and an MI score of 6.001) were counted together, the frequency of this collocation would have been even higher. The fourth most common collocate is *terrorist* and the tenth is *to kill*. Lower on the list, one encounters the words *radical*, *problem*, *hate*, and *bad*, and the list of the 50 most frequent collocated words finishes with *sharia* (which carries an extremely negative connotation in the discourse community under analysis), *bombers*, and *attack*. Several of the words normally carry a positive connotation, such as good or peaceful; however, the examination of the concordance lines shows that they are mostly used in the sentences stating that all Muslims need to be banned because it is difficult to determine which ones are good and peaceful and which ones are not. Some collocates, such as Koran or Islam, refer to Muslims' religion. A prominent group of verbs frame Muslims as an outgroup by focusing on their perceived desire to enter the U.S. (come, want) and the need to prevent them from doing that (ban, stop, let, allow, keep).

Looking at the 50 most frequent collocates of the word Muslim obtained from the COCA collection of texts from the year 2015 (see Table 3 in Appendix A), it is easy to see that the discussions mentioning Muslims were largely neutral and did not carry as much negativity toward Muslims. Many of the collocates are related to geographical or ethnic concepts (France, French, Bosnian, countries, British, Arab, European, Western, Hindu, Hindus, German, Roma, Turkish) or religion (Christians, Christian, Jews, Sunni, Muslims, Islam, Muslim, religious, religion, Jewish, prayers, faith, Islamic, non-Muslims, Shiite, cleric, devout). The only troubling collocate that was frequently accompanying the words *Muslim* or *Muslims* was brotherhood, undoubtedly referring to the Muslim Brotherhood organization

considered a terrorist group by the U.S. However, the lemmas Christian and community, are more frequent than brotherhood: the two religious groups, Christians and Muslims, are mentioned together twice as often as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the community and communities are used together with Muslims almost 1.5 times as often as Muslim Brotherhood.

The most frequent word on the list with a clear negative connotation is radical, and there are only 11 instances in the 20-million-word corpus when Muslim and radical were used within five words from each other. The other negative words, such as fatalism, extremist and slave are even less frequent (at ten uses each).

The contrastive analysis of the collocate lists from the BTM and COCA shows that the group discussing the proposal to ban Muslims had a substantially more negative stance toward them than the general American public. The negative collocates of *Muslim* (*problem, ban, terrorist, bad, brotherhood, kill, radical, sharia, bombers, attack, isis*) in the BTM corpus constitute 18.5% of the 3,695 total uses of the 50 most frequent collocations. If the collocations with the word *ban* are included, the rate goes even higher, to 23.2%. At the same time, in COCA negative collocate uses (with *fatalism, brotherhood, extremist, slave, extremism,* and *radical*) represent only 9.2% of the 1,017 total uses of collocations. Thus, the comparison of the collocate lists from the BTM and COCA corpora shows that the discussion of banning the Muslims on Trump's Facebook page deviated from the all-American tone at the time of the speech, being substantially more negative.

5.5 Collostructures

The next stage of the analysis involved using the online corpus analysis program Sketch Engine and its Word Sketch tool. Checking all possible part-of-speech choices of *Muslim,* Sketch Engine used the grammatical tags of the tokens in the corpus to identify grammatical relationships between collocates to get a much more nuanced picture of the way the word is used. Once the collocates of the node are sorted according to their grammatical relations with the target word, their frequency numbers reveal more information about the speakers' use of the target word. Table 4 in Appendix A shows the Word Sketch of all the 2,455 uses of *Muslim* in the BTM corpus. One of the tendencies revealed by the word sketch of Muslim, is that its modifiers are largely negative. The most frequent one is *radical* (and thus dangerous). Manual checking of the concordances of the modifiers showed that even words that are normally neutral, such as *more*, are used in sentences that show objection to allowing more Muslims into the U.S., implying that they are undesirable.

(21)   …All you idiots that want **more Muslims** in this country should have to take one or two of them in for a year! …

The words that can be considered positive, such as *good* or *peaceful*, are mostly used in a sarcastic sense:

(22)   …We must always remember the lessons from 911 and how terrorists were such great neighbors and how friends of terrorists were in shock that these **peaceful Muslims** could do such a terrible act…

Some of them are even marked with quotation marks to show the dissociative attitude to the words being repeated after someone else:

(23)   …The "peaceful **Muslims**" are like pawns in a game of chess…

Alternatively, they are used in negative sentences or refuted in a sentence next to it:

(24)   …*Is there a **good Muslim**? Theologically – no, because his allegiance is to Allah…*

Among the nouns modified by Muslim, the majority are words that denote different groups, from family to country and related to immigration, such as *immigration* and *refugee*. The most frequent combination, *Muslim country,* is often used while making the argument that Muslims should not move to the U.S.:

(25)   …Stop all immigration and visas from **MUSLIM countries** until the Congress comes up with a SOLUTION that can work…

One of the common arguments made by the commenters in relation to Muslim migrants is that other Muslim countries should take them in:

(26)   …My comment on Syrian refugees – why hasn't anyone asked why no **Muslim countries** are taking in any refugees? …

There are also multiple comments on how bad those countries are:

(27)   …Try being a catholic in a **Muslim** majority **country** smart guy. See how long your head remains where it is…

The verb *to be* is the most frequent collocate in both the group where *Muslim* is the subject and where it is the object. *To be* was also identified by the Word Sketch program as the only salient candidate for the group of verbs before *Muslim*. This might be an indicator that the speakers focus more on the definition, description, or evaluation of Muslims as a group than on their actions. Their evaluation becomes clearer after a look at the tokens that fill the slots of nominal predicates in the sentences containing *Muslim(s) is/are*:

(28)   …radical Islam.: Radical **Muslims** are evil and that's a fact Japheth …

(29)   …Homeland Security can not differentiate which **muslim** is radical wanting to cause harm and which…

The examination of the concordance lines makes it obvious that Trump supporters talk about Muslims as radical and dangerous. The frequent subjects in the construction "X. is a Muslim" and subject of "be Muslim" are related to terrorism: *bombers, attackers, hijackers, bomber, shooter, sniper,* and *terrorist.*

The majority of the higher-frequency verbs that have *Muslim* as the object, with the exception of the most frequent verb *to be*, treat them as a group that is at the mercy of the Americans' decision whether or not to allow them into the U.S., such as *ban, stop, allow,* and *let*:

(30)   …Not just **ban Muslims**!!! BAN ALL IMMIGRATION!! until someone figures out what's going on. THEN FIX IT!!!! Or, I suppose you would **allow** every **Muslim** that wants to come here and kill Americans? …

5.6 Agency and semantics

Manual re-checking of the concordances and collocations to confirm and verify the conclusions drawn from the review of the Word Sketch by Sketch Engine showed a noticeable trend: the uses of *Muslim* as the subject were semantically different from the uses of *Muslim* as the object of a sentence.

When *Muslim* is the subject of the sentence, the verbs that are used are of markedly negative semantics, related to danger, aggression, and violence: *destroy, blow up, kill, terrorize, behead*, etc. Simple statistics show a large number of verbs that are ordinarily neutral or even positive, such as *want* or *come*; however, a read-through of those concordance lines shows that those verbs are only a part of a compound verbal predicate, and taken together with the other members of the unit carry a potent negative connotation: *come to rape and kill, want to kill, want to blow us up* etc. Alternatively, the verbs are linked to objects that make the whole compound negative still (*support Hamas or Hezbolla*), or the sentences criticize Muslims for alleged failure to do the right thing: *they don't condemn terrorism / acts of terror*, *don't denounce terrorism* etc.

However, when *Muslim* is the object, and thus the recipient of an action, the sentences reflect the speakers' feeling of superiority and attitude to Muslims as a group that is at mercy of the speakers who have the power to decide their fate. The speakers use such verbs as *ban* (302), *stop* (181), *shut down/shut out* (51), *deport/get deported* (39 times), *allow* (38), *let them/Muslims (in)* (27), *screen* (26), *halt* (23), *get rid of* (16), *get the Muslims out* (11), *kick out* (8), *block* (7), *prohibit*

(7), *restrict* (7), *bar* (6), *reject* (5), *exclude* (4), *close the border to* (3), *banish* (2), *segregate out* (2), *pause* (1), and *disallow* (1). The sentences with these verbs represent a substantial portion of the concordance lines where *muslim** is the recipient of the action.

Thus, the analysis of sentences where *muslim** fills the object position demonstrates that the current (largely Christian) population of the U.S. is in a different power position compared to the potential Muslim immigrants and even to the Muslims currently residing in the U.S. Van Dijk (2001) defines power in terms of control: "groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control the acts and minds or (members of) other groups" (354–355). This applies to the discourse under analysis since the speakers demonstrate the belief that they can and should decide the fate of those who want to move and escape the war in their country. The verbs used in sentences with *muslim** as the object present the speakers as having the power over the people they discuss.

Therefore, examining the grammatical patterns of collocations helped unveil another discursive strategy of Trump supporters: identifying agency of Muslims in posing a threat while, at the same time, positioning themselves above Muslims on the power scale since they feel they are in control of allowing or prohibiting Muslims from certain actions.

Overall, a manual check and a close look at the text after the Word Sketch analysis reveals that the whole discussion could be described as exceptionally vile and even the instances that could have been considered neutral and level-headed, are, in fact, hateful and aggressive.

6. Conclusions

The analysis of the Ban-the-Muslims corpus revealed that the topic of immigration in general, and Muslim immigration in particular, provokes heated discussion. Conversations on Donald Trump's Facebook page devoted to this topic exhibit a high level of animosity toward Muslims and concern for the safety of the U.S. Muslims are framed as a dangerous, violent group, who are unable or unwilling to integrate in a democratic society and who threaten peaceful Americans and need to be kept out.

The discursive constructs of *muslim** reveal the prejudiced ideological base of the U.S. population whose opinions are voiced by the billionaire presidential candidate Donald J. Trump. They discuss them as a distinct and uniform group and use the noun *Muslim* in the plural much more often than in the singular. They tend to discuss Muslims as a homogenous social group possessing certain qualities shared by all representatives. Many assertions take the form of sweeping

generalizations; the idiosyncrasies, individual qualities, unique traits, or talents of Muslims are ignored as if they are of no interest to the people commenting on the proposal to ban the followers of Islam.

Muslims in the BTM corpus are described as dangerous, aggressive, untrustworthy, and predisposed to terrorism. They are positioned as the "Other" in relation to the population of the U.S. Being a Muslim disqualifies a person from being a proper citizen of the United States, and even those currently living there are treated with suspicion and animosity. Their difference and adherence to their faith and traditions are seen as defiant and threatening. Their culture and religion are described as backward and incompatible with the U.S. society and its Christian and democratic values. Their failure or refusal to assimilate is presented as evidence that they should be kept out of the country. They are contrasted with the in-group (born in the U.S. and Christian) who are shown as superior to Muslims in every respect, threatened by the influx of Muslims, and in need of protection. Christianity is described as the default religion of U.S. citizens, and thus the only acceptable religion.

This particular group appears to believe in their superiority, and their discourse reflects their privileged position compared to that of Muslims'. They talk about banning, stopping, screening, or allowing, etc. Muslims, thus showing control over that group. They also demand protection from the perceived threat to their health, lives, and welfare as they believe themselves entitled to keep their advantaged situation. According to Trump's supporters, the current citizens' access to power, rights, and resources needs to be protected from Muslims who want to attain those privileges.

Sadly, even though the origin of the conversation and the proposal by Trump to ban Muslims is related to Syrian refugees who are trying to escape fighting in their country and have been spilling over to the neighboring countries and flooding Europe, the debate prompted by that proposal largely moved to the discussion (and bashing) of Muslims in general. The situation in Syria, which could have stirred sympathy, was largely absent from the discussion, and such feelings as empathy or compassion toward refugees were not mentioned in the comments. Instead, Muslims' religious views, their traditions, and their culture were the targets of verbal attacks by the participants of the discussion. The examination of key word frequency, combined with collocational and collostructional analysis, allows us to describe the conversation as hateful, paranoid, and chauvinistic.

The discourse under analysis can be qualified as hate speech, that is, "the use of speech attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion and sexual orientation or preference" (Smolla 1992, 152). The serious harm such discourse can cause is the reinforcement of the negative stereotypes of Muslims, legitimization of their unequal position, strengthening of discriminatory attitudes toward them, and possible

influence of official policies such as denying refugee visas to those who need them to escape civil war in their country.

7.   Limitations and future research

The study's merit is limited by the fact that the corpus under analysis is relatively small by corpus-linguistic standards, and there is a possibility that the statistical tools effective in large corpora are less reliable here. Furthermore, the BTM corpus originally contained both the comments of people who supported Trump and agreed with his proposal to ban Muslims from the U.S., and the commenters who joined the conversation out of shock and repulsion at such suggestions. Even though the remarks of the latter group were identified in the concordances containing the word *Muslim* and deleted, there were likely many of them in the corpus that did not contain that keyword. They may have skewed the frequency numbers for the overall counts of keywords in the corpus. This, no doubt, limits the value of the research. The study could also benefit from replication on a larger scale, and it would be interesting to compare the patterns observed in the discourse of the demographic under analysis with other social and political groups of the U.S.

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Appendix A

Table 1. Twenty Most Frequent Lemmas in the BTM Corpus

1. *trump* 7,928 (9,253 wpm)	8. *muslims* 1,790 (2,089 wpm)	15. *think* 1,428 (1,667 wpm)
2. *people* 3,678 (4,293 wpm)	9. *want* 1745 (2,037 wpm)	16. *islam* 1,427 (1,665 wpm)
3. *muslim* 3,289 (3,839 wpm)	10. *law* 1,691 (1,974 wpm)	17. *come* 1,414 (1,650 wpm)
4. *country* 3,175 (3,706 wpm)	11. *president* 1,668 (1,947 wpm)	18. *religion* 1,405 (1,640 wpm)
5. *america* 2,272 (2,652 wpm)	12. *know* 1,524 (1,779 wpm)	19. *good* 1,379 (1,610 wpm)
6. *donald* 2,190 (2,556 wpm)	13. *right* 1,518 (1,772 wpm)	20. *take* 1,214 (1,417 wpm)
7. *make* 1,790 (2,089 wpm)	14. *american* 1,469 (1,715 wpm)	

Note. The numbers included are total numbers of tokens in the corpus; wpm = words per million. All data taken from BTM corpus using Sketch Engine Word List tool.

Table 2. 50 Most Frequent Collocates of the Lemma muslim in the BTM Corpus

1. *country*	287	(4.338)	18. *obama*	72	(3.793)	35. *states*	44	(3.124)
2. *say*	177	(8.854)	19. *problem*	71	(4.766)	36. *must*	43	(4.133)
3. *ban*	174	(5.878)	20. *islam*	70	(3.500)	37. *usa*	43	(4.414)
4. *terrorist*	137	(5.003)	21. *live*	69	(4.510)	38. *living*	42	(6.702)
5. *come*	131	(4.411)	22. *americans*	68	(4.031)	39. *believe*	42	(3.825)
6. *american*	115	(4.145)	23. *need*	67	(3.082)	40. *hate*	41	(3.914)
7. *enter*	107	(5.545)	24. *think*	60	(3.255)	41. *peaceful*	41	(6.213)
8. *koran*	105	(5.860)	25. *immigration*	59	(3.532)	42. *bad*	41	(4.269)
9. *good*	105	(4.104)	26. *world*	59	(3.797)	43. *brotherhood*	40	(7.480)
10. *kill*	103	(4.498)	27. *take*	58	(3.368)	44. *understand*	40	(4.488)
11. *america*	103	(3.316)	28. *allow*	56	(4.682)	45. *tell*	40	(3.735)
12. *radical*	96	(5.796)	29. *united*	50	(3.270)	46. *community*	39	(6.525)
13. *attest*	92	(7.618)	30. *government*	49	(3.417)	47. *u.s.*	39	(4.847)
14. *republic*	90	(7.483)	31. *christian*	48	(4.092)	48. *sharia*	38	(4.688)
15. *muslims*	82	(3.668)	32. *refugee*	48	(4.877)	49. *bombers*	36	(7.732)
16. *know*	77	(3.530)	33. *support*	45	(3.551)	50. *attack*	36	(4.088)
17. *religion*	75	(3.745)	34. *isis*	45	(4.025)			

Note. Words are ranked by frequency (highest to lowest). (#) = raw frequency; number in parenthesis = MI score.

Table 3. 50 Most Frequent Collocates of the Lemma Muslim in the COCA Corpus

1. *christian*	104	(5.29)	18. *prayer*	18	(4.38)	35. roma	10	(7.31)
2. *community*	67	(3.09)	19. *religious*	18	(3.13)	36. *cleric*	10	(7.23)
3. *muslim*	46	(4.66)	20. *british*	17	(3.28)	37. *fatalism*	10	(6.96)
4. *brotherhood*	45	(8.40)	21. *jewish*	16	(4.12)	38. *orthodox*	10	(5.67)
5. *leader*	44	(3.36)	22. *faith*	16	(4.12)	39. *extremist*	10	(4.88)
6. *population*	43	(3.80)	23. *moderate*	15	(4.36)	40. *slave*	10	(3.75)
7. *jew*	42	(5.57)	24. *immigrant*	15	(4.17)	41. *predominately*	9	(5.83)
8. *majority*	32	(4.19)	25. *dialogue*	15	(4.10)	42. *shiite*	9	(4.94)
9. *sunni*	27	(5.85)	26. *scholar*	14	(4.19)	43. *turkish*	9	(4.60)
10. *islam*	27	(4.96)	27. *german*	14	(3.49)	44. *vast*	9	(3.45)
11. *bosnian*	24	(8.26)	28. *european*	14	(3.09)	45. *advocate*	9	(3.04)
12. *france*	23	(3.96)	29. *western*	14	(3.07)	46. *devout*	8	(7.21)
13. *french*	22	(3.50)	30. *conservative*	14	(3.01)	47. *extremism*	8	(5.04)
14. *non-muslim*	20	(8.50)	31. *minority*	13	(4.09)	48. *convert*	8	(3.93)
15. *hindu*	20	(7.27)	32. *african*	13	(3.26)	49. *interreligious*	7	(5.53)
16. *religion*	20	(3.90)	33. *islamic*	13	(3.06)	50. *ruler*	7	(5.48)
17. *arab*	18	(3.13)	34. *radical*	11	(3.84)			

Note. Words are ranked by frequency (highest to lowest). (#) = raw frequency; number in parenthesis = MI score.

Table 4. The Collostructural Analysis of Muslim in the BTM Corpus

Modifiers of *Muslim* (489 total)								
radical	35	(10.77)	most	7	(8.66)	word	4	(8.03)
more	29	(10.02)	iranian	6	(8.41)	christian	4	(7.91)
good	26	(9.43)	real	6	(8.13)	other	4	(6.60)
peaceful	24	(10.54)	moderate	5	(8.44)	fanatic	3	(7.75)
many	19	(9.30)	former	5	(8.43)	being	3	(7.72)
not	16	(5.78)	anti	5	(8.40)	sudden	3	(7.70)
American	15	(8.84)	bad	5	(8.00)	radicalized	3	(7.70)
non	10	(9.31)	new	5	(8.00)	peace	3	(7.68)
true	9	(8.94)	only	5	(7.81)	local	3	(7.63)
closet	8	(9.15)	devout	4	(8.16)	young	3	(7.57)
ban	8	(9.02)	incoming	4	(8.15)	american	3	(7.26)
all	7	(8.78)	m	4	(8.03)	i	3	(7.23)

Nouns and Verbs Modified by *Muslim* (915)

country	84	(10.30)	iranian	14	(9.50)	problem	5	(7.86)
brotherhood	34	(11.29)	world	14	(8.71)	attack	4	(7.34)
immigration	34	(9.73)	leader	13	(8.75)	cleric	3	(8.22)
community	34	(10.49)	americans	12	(8.81)	interloper	3	(8.21)
terrorist	32	(9.63)	population	11	(9.15)	movement	3	(8.13)
refugee	27	(9.98)	council	10	(9.80)	compound	3	(7.40)
government	25	(9.92)	friend	7	(8.49)	association	3	(7.37)
people	24	(8.50)	army	6	(9.08)	believer	3	(7.36)
religion	20	(9.12)	nation	6	(7.64)	area	3	(7.33)
immigrant	19	(9.41)	citizen	6	(7.76)	culture	3	(7.31)
male	19	(10.00)	american	5	(8.35)	look	3	(7.31)
faith	18	(9.50)	extremist	5	(8.05)	belief	3	(7.26)
woman	17	(9.42)	entry	5	(8.05)	student	3	(7.20)
group	16	(8.76)	ban	5	(8.00)	living	3	(7.18)
man	15	(9.07)	family	5	(7.96)	law	3	(6.19)

Verbs with Muslim as the Object (636)

be	281	(9.98)	include	8	(8.41)	know	4	(7.15)
ban	52	(10.84)	kill	8	(7.99)	see	4	(6.97)
stop	29	(9.96)	hate	6	(8.01)	get	4	(6.59)
allow	26	(9.91)	say	6	(7.42)	radicalize	3	(7.26)
let	14	(8.99)	practice	5	(7.94)	screen	3	(7.25)
have	11	(6.88)	tell	5	(7.66)	bar	3	(7.20)
bear	10	(8.87)	become	5	(7.44)	call	3	(6.88)
keep	9	(8.39)	admit	4	(7.66)	put	3	(6.77)
offend	8	(8.59)	want	4	(7.16)	think	3	(6.73)

Verb with *Muslim* as Subject (427)

be	170	(9.06)	follow	6	(8.68)	sue	3	(7.87)
do	23	(8.92)	kill	6	(8.44)	practice	3	(7.85)
come	20	(9.72)	try	5	(8.24)	commit	3	(7.76)
live	14	(9.64)	go	5	(7.47)	hate	3	(7.64)
have	14	(7.72)	say	5	(7.31)	support	3	(7.59)
take	13	(9.50)	claim	4	(8.17)	think	3	(7.22)
enter	12	(9.64)	speak	4	(8.02)	get	3	(7.01)
want	7	(8.14)	attest	4	(8.01)			

Muslim and/or… (263)

americans	17	(11.19)	non-mus-lim	5	(10.09)	sudden	3	(9.67)
other	12	(9.56)	refugee	4	(9.43)	arab	3	(9.64)
radical	12	(11.05)	many	4	(9.17)	new	3	(9.48)
american	11	(10.68)	nation	3	(8.99)	non	3	(9.45)
christian	9	(10.13)	immigrant	3	(8.76)	good	3	(8.89)
iranian	8	(10.75)	religion	3	(8.33)			
muslim	6	(9.43)	people	3	(8.20)			
terrorist	6	(10.21)	islam	3	(7.99)			

Verbs before Muslim (60)

be	56	(8.56)

Muslim is a… (65)

American	16	(12.52)	race	8	(11.50)	terrorist	7	(11.10)
religion	9	(10.35)						

Adjective Predicates of Muslim (36)

terrorist	5	(11.64)	peaceful	2	(10.32)	dangerous	2	(10.04)
radical	3	(10.88)	due	2	(10.14)			
irrelevant	2	(10.60)						

… is a Muslim (129)

bombers	30	(12.57)	trump	7	(8.71)	snipers	3	(9.53)
attackers	13	(11.55)	law	5	(10.14)	terrorist	3	(9.34)
hijackers	9	(11.06)	shooter	4	(9.92)	friend	2	(8.92)
bomber	9	(11.04)	obama	4	(9.55)	time	2	(8.90)

Subject of be Muslim (28)

terrorist	6	(12.16)	person	2	(10.64)	someone	2	(10.41)
obama	3	(11.12)						

Note. First number = frequency of collocate used in connection with the lemma; the number in parenthesis = MI score.

Donald Trump supporters and the denial of racism

An analysis of online discourse in a pro-Trump community

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Donald Trump's campaign to become president of the United States was shocking for many people. His negative representations of racialized immigrant groups were one of the most controversial aspects of the campaign, leading to frequent accusations of racism. This study explores how his supporters responded to such accusations. Discussions of racism within a pro-Trump reddit community, called "The_Donald", were analyzed. The_Donald users adamantly denied that Trump's statements or proposed policies were racist. Their dismissal of these accusations drew on and extended the logic of color-blind racism. They argued that such accusations were merely cynical political tactics and advocated that Trump supporters respond to them as such. Their favored response strategies superficially resembled genuine debate but were apparently intended to incite emotional responses from accusers and to compel them to disengage from conversations. The article discusses these strategies in light of the ongoing polarization of political debate around immigration.

Keywords: Donald Trump, color-blind racism, reddit, polarization, right-wing social movements, discourse analysis

1. Introduction

Donald Trump's candidacy for President of the United States and eventual electoral victory shocked many people for many reasons. Despite his decisive lead in Republican primary polls starting in Summer 2015, many people, including influential figures in media and politics, did not anticipate his political success.

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In May 2016, when I wrote this article,[1] he was the presumptive nominee for the Republican party and was expected to face Democrat Hillary Clinton in the general election in Fall 2016.

One of the most controversial aspects of Trump's campaign was his discourse on immigration. Trump framed the movement of certain groups of people into the United States as a threat both to national security and economic prosperity. His comments on these groups and the policies he proposed to deal with the alleged threat apparently helped garner support, but such comments also made him the subject of criticism from across the political spectrum. I focus on two incidents in particular that sparked condemnation of Trump's campaign.

First, Trump announced his campaign on June 16, 2015. In a speech[2] that emphasized immigration, national security, and trade, he spoke about undocumented immigration from Mexico.

> The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems… When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best… They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're

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1. The research that informs this article was completed in the first half of 2016. The historical moment at which I gathered and analyzed the data undoubtedly shaped what I have written in this article. Although this is true of any piece of research, it has had a particularly noticeable impact on this work.

For example, the Trump supporters I discuss in this paper backed Trump during the primary season. For these people, Trump was their first pick from among a large field of major candidates for the presidency (seventeen candidates sought the Republican nomination). As I revisit this work in March 2017 in preparation for the article's publication, it is now apparent that the group of people supporting Trump has expanded and diversified since the early primaries. After his primary victory, a broader coalition of voters and politicians, most of whom previously supported one of the other unsuccessful candidates, showed their support for Trump, the Republican nominee, ultimately helping him to secure the presidency in November 2016. However, these groups' support for Trump is likely to be qualitatively different from that of his early primary backers, and, thus, it is unclear whether they would rely on the same discourses and strategies as those I document in this article.

Furthermore, some of what I wrote about in May 2016 as examples of Trump the candidate's promotional discourse has already, only after several weeks in office (March 2017), been acted upon by Trump the president. For example, he signed an executive order on January 27, 2017 that, among other things, attempted to temporarily bar entry into the United States for "Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern", a group that consisted of people originating from majority Muslim nations such as Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Importantly, it has thus become clear that the racist discourse of Trump's campaign was not "mere rhetoric" and that it largely heralded the racism behind his administration's policy efforts.

2. Full text of the speech available here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/

> bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we're getting.

The National Hispanic Leadership Agenda swiftly condemned Trump's comments and pressed corporations like the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) to cut ties with Trump (National Hispanic Leadership Agenda 2015). In their press release, the NHLA called Trump's comments "hateful" and "anti-Mexican" and quoted leaders within the organization who described his remarks as "bigoted", "disgusting", and "venomous". Furthermore, Trump's portrayal of undocumented Mexican immigrants as more prone to crime stands in contrast to decades of social scientific research that demonstrates that immigrants, regardless of legal status or country of origin, are less likely to commit serious crimes than their US-born counterparts (Zatz and Smith 2012; Ewing et al. 2015).

The second example occurred shortly after the mass shooting in San Bernadino, California on December 2, 2015, in which fourteen people were killed and twenty-two more were seriously injured. Federal authorities pursued the attack as an act of terrorism in light of the perpetrators' expressed allegiance to Islamic terrorist organizations. In a statement[3] published to his campaign website on December 7, Trump called "for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on". His statement also cited a poll that purports to show US Muslims' support for violence against the United States and its citizens and warned of "people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life".

Trump's overtly discriminatory statement was met by outrage and condemnation from across the political spectrum in the United States and around the world. In a press release, the US Council of Muslim Organizations condemned Trump, accusing him of inspiring "suspicion and hate in the minds of fearful, misinformed people while making American Muslims vulnerable to hate crimes and harassment". Trump was also criticized by elected officials, including many from his own party. For example, Senator Lindsey Graham, another candidate for the Republican party's nomination, said that Trump "has taken xenophobia and religious bigotry to a new level" (Sullivan and Weigel 2015). Senator Bernie Sanders, a candidate for the Democratic party's nomination, issued the following statement:

> Demagogues throughout our history have attempted to divide us based on race, gender, sexual orientation or country of origin. Now, Trump and others want us to hate all Muslims. The United States is a great nation when we stand together. We are a weak nation when we allow racism and xenophobia to divide us.
>
> (Sullivan and Weigel 2015)

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3. Full text of the statement is available here: http://www.vox.com/2015/12/7/9867900/donald-trump-muslims

These two incidents are two of the best-known examples of the controversy that surrounded Trump's campaign. In particular, they highlight why and how Trump was repeatedly accused of racism,[4] even by prominent members of his own party. What shocked many people was the fact that Trump was able to say such things, be criticized so harshly, and yet maintain a sizable lead in the race for the Republican nomination. To some extent, their shock reflects a broader commitment to the prevailing racial ideology, color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2013). This shock also suggests deep divisions in the way that people in the US perceived Trump and the ideas he espoused. While many people viewed Trump's discourse as racist and were predictably appalled, clearly many Republican voters responded very differently.

The present study is an attempt to explore the differences in perspective that enabled Trump to maintain popularity despite accusations of racism. In particular, I explore the role of an online community that resisted framings of Trump as racist. In doing so, I draw on past research exploring how racism is understood, transmitted, and denied, particularly among White people in the US.

2.   Color blind racism and the discourse of immigration

As my analysis below will suggest, knowing how people conceptualize or define racism is crucial to understanding how they orient to statements and ideas as racist or not racist (Augoustinos and Every 2007). The struggle over whether some person, idea, policy, or statement is or is not racist is often a struggle over what constitutes racism as well as a dispute over representations of the historic, social, and political contexts in which racial domination occurs.

In order to understand how hegemonic discourses about race and racism in the US operate, I draw on the work of Eduardo Bonilla-Silva who describes a racial ideology of color-blindness that is common in the United States, especially among Whites (Bonilla-Silva 2013). Bonilla-Silva argues that overtly racist discourse more typical of the Jim Crow era fell out of favor in the decades following the Civil Rights Movement. The use of racial slurs, overt appeals to racial stereotypes, or bald proclamations of racial superiority became taboo and took on new social significance, indexing ignorance and maliciousness.

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4. Trump's views have been described using numerous words besides "racist", including "xenophobic", "nativist", "religious bigotry", "Islamophobic", "ethnocentric" and so on. I do not consider these labels meaningfully different for my purposes. Any conception of racism is surely incomplete if it does not consider how markers of social difference other than physical appearance are implicated in the construction of racial difference (e.g., religion, Meer 2013). Indeed, contemporary racism is frequently enacted through appeal to cultural difference (van Dijk 1993; Bonilla-Silva 2013).

Nonetheless, decades after the Civil Rights Movement, racial domination and inequality have not disappeared from the United States, and support for and acceptance of racial domination and inequality remain prevalent especially among US Whites, although their willingness to make bald, overt proclamations of support for racism has declined. For example, Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) explore White college students' attitudes toward issues like affirmative action in college admissions or in employment. During in-depth interviews, eighty-five percent of participants in their study spoke in opposition of affirmative action, although they usually did so indirectly and with great hesitance suggesting that they were highly concerned with presenting themselves as "not racist". For example, one participant, Brian, initially described his opinion about affirmative action in the following manner "I kind of support and oppose it" (pp. 62–63). Later in the interview, when pressed by the interviewer to describe an affirmative action program that he would support, Brian was unable to describe any such effort and stated "I don't think race should come into like the picture at all, like I don't think they should be given unique opportunities" (p. 63). Apparently ambivalent, contradictory, and uncomfortable responses such as Brian's suggest that US Whites go to great lengths to avoid being perceived as racist.

Bonilla-Silva argues that color-blind racism mostly avoids direct reference to race, instead preferring to couch support for racial domination in superficial adaptations of principles of liberalism. In other words, color-blind racism allows people to avoid the stigma of appearing to be "a racist" while espousing support for (or at least indifference toward) racial inequality and domination. For example, Whites, such as Brian in the example above, commonly oppose affirmative action on the grounds that hiring and college or university admissions should not give preference to anyone based on their race. Bonilla-Silva, however, describes such arguments as superficial or decontextualized applications of liberal principles, since they fail to acknowledge or account for the context of racial inequality that affirmative action is intended to address.

Color-blind racism also operates by narrowly defining what race and racism are. Hill (2008) describes what she terms "the folk theory of race and racism" that circulates among White people in the United States. Most importantly for my purposes, Hill argues that Whites tend to define racism as primarily a matter of individual beliefs, intentions, and actions. The folk theory holds that "a racist is a person who believes that people of color are biologically inferior to Whites" (p. 6). This narrow understanding allows Whites to believe that racism is a marginal problem, mostly perpetuated by avowedly White nationalist groups like the Ku Klux Klan. The folk theory and the color-blind racism it supports permit many possible avenues for denying racism (van Dijk 1992).

In the context of debates on immigration, research suggests that color-blind racism aids in the denial of racism by erasing connections between policy and race, connections that are often rather obvious in the disparate effects immigration policies have on racialized groups. The discourse around "illegal immigration" is particularly emblematic of color-blind racism. Douglas et al. (2015, 1448) argue that "while laws that have criminalized immigrants since the 1990s have been completely color-blind, they have targeted primarily Mexican and other Latino immigrants and since 9–11 Middle Eastern immigrants". These policies do so by, for example, setting priorities for granting authorized entry into the US that, without mentioning any particular group by name, disadvantage those wishing to enter from Mexico, Central America, and, more recently, so-called Muslim nations (see also Ngai 2004).

Bloch (2014, 50) shows how the presence of a legal category for discussing those immigrants who are unwanted allows anti-immigrant groups to appear "race neutral" by claiming to be opposed to the violation of US law, not to particular groups of people (and others have made similar points, e.g., Brettell and Nibbs 2011). However, laws are social and political formations, and are not, therefore, immune from being used to create or perpetuate racial dominance or inequality. Hence, insisting on the enforcement of laws that have a demonstrable effect in reproducing racial inequality provides only a superficial defense against charges of racism. Nonetheless, like other instances of color-blind racism, the defense may be effective in advancing racist causes by allowing speakers or writers to successfully present themselves as "not racist" despite their apparent support of racism.

3. Political debate online

Social media enables its users to share content like online articles and videos. It also allows those users to engage in discussion and debate. For years, the internet has provided an important way for social movements to disseminate information about themselves and control their own representations, which is particularly important for right-wing groups that encounter accusations of racism in mass media (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Sohoni 2006).

According to one Pew study, social media had a prominent role in the 2016 election for US president with approximately forty-four percent of US adults reporting using social media to learn about the election (Gottfried et al. 2016). Furthermore, about fourteen percent of all US adults reported that they considered social media to be the most helpful source for learning about the election. Of course, such views differed greatly by age with thirty-five percent of 18–29 year

olds preferring social media in comparison to only one percent of those sixty-five or older.

Trump's campaign benefited extensively from social media. For example, Trump notoriously used his Twitter account to lash out at and insult his critics (Burns and Haberman 2016). According to Cooper (2016), Trump supporters took "their cue" from Trump's online actions and carried his attacks even further engaging in sustained online abuse of those who were critical of their favored candidate. The reverse was also true; Trump's own messaging was influenced by content created by his supporters online. For example, Herrman (2016) describes how a video created by members of a pro-Trump reddit (a social media platform) community called The_Donald ended up being temporarily shared by Trump himself.

During the primary season, The_Donald was one of the most popular pages on reddit. In March 2016, it was the most popular subreddit (user-created communities within reddit) dedicated to a political candidate and received approximately fifty two million page views (Sarlin 2016). Sarlin interviewed moderators of The_Donald. They credited the subreddit's popularity to efforts to raise awareness of the "natural appeal" Donald Trump would have among reddit users, many of whom, the moderators reported, are critical of left wing causes and movements (e.g., feminism and anti-racism) and engage in "trolling" of these people whom they refer to mockingly as "social justice warriors".

However, The_Donald moderators also attempted to create an air of legitimacy by distancing themselves from avowedly White nationalist groups. For example, Sarlin reports that one of the moderators "banned white supremacist and neo-Nazi users from r/The_Donald early on". Furthermore, one of the The_Donald's community rules was "No Racism/Anti-Semitism".

It appears then that The_Donald users distanced themselves from racism while simultaneously advocating for the election of Donald Trump, a candidate who has been repeatedly accused of racism. In order to understand how Trump supporters contend with accusations of Trump's racism, I examined The_Donald users' discourse. In particular, I was interested in the following questions:

1. How do The_Donald users understand accusations of racism levelled against the candidate they support and themselves?
2. How do they advocate that supporters of Donald Trump respond to such accusations?

4. Methods

I undertook a qualitative analysis of discourse about racism on The_Donald in-
formed by past research that attends to the linguistic, rhetorical, discursive, and
ideological features of talk about race and racism in the United States and else-
where (e.g., van Dijk 1992, 1993; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Bonilla-Silva
2002; Augoustinos and Every 2007; Hill 2008). I have given an overview of this
research in Section 2 above. In summary, color blind racism describes a set of
ideological stances and discursive practices that individuals draw on to express
support for or indifference to racial domination while simultaneously dispelling,
avoiding, or pre-empting accusations of racism. In my analysis, I explored how
The_Donald users drew on and extended color blind racism in order to resist ac-
cusations that they and their favored presidential candidate were racist.

I began my research in December 2015 reading The_Donald discussion threads
to get a sense of the topics that were being discussed and how Trump supporters in
the subreddit portrayed themselves and their political opponents. I later chose spe-
cific threads for inclusion in this project by searching for the term "racist" in early
March 2016. Of the threads that this search produced, I determined that five were
directly concerned with accusations of racism toward Trump, and I included these
in my data. Although other threads mentioned racism, they were not specifically
focused on such accusations. The degree to which accusations of racism are central
to the threads I analyzed is evident in their titles as shown in Table 1. Table 1 also
contains a basic numerical overview of the data that I collected which consisted
of 429 individual comments (approximately 25,000 words) by The_Donald users.

Table 1. Description of the subreddit threads analyzed in this study

Thread title	Start date	Comments[a]	Users[b]
How should I respond when someone says Trump is racist?	27 Dec 2015	46	26
Trump a racist? Oh really?	27 Dec 2015	18	8
Donald Trump isn't racist. In fact, it is the Liberal Agenda which is racist.	10 Feb 2016	48	32
We have to destroy the notion that Trump is racist(serious)	23 Feb 2016	20	16
Donald Trump is a perfect example of how the left will accuse anyone they don't like of being racist	2 Mar 2016	297	111

a. Number of comments that I collected for analysis. The_Donald moderators regularly delete comments
deemed in violation of the subreddit's rules. I was able to collect some of these before they were deleted;
others I was never able to see.
b. Number of unique usernames that contributed to each discussion

To perform my analysis, I read over all the comments in these five threads. I marked up each of them with notes, based in part on my reading of past work on color-blind racism. I then re-read over the texts again consolidating my notes into codes that functioned to indicate sections of the data that were relevant to different aspects of my emerging analysis. In particular, I focused on instances in the data where users argued against accusations of racism and where they described strategies for resisting such accusations. These codes allowed me to gain a sense of the frequency of topics and to refine my analysis to be sensitive to more frequently occurring ideas in the texts. I used ideas that occurred repeatedly across users to draw inferences about the group's ideology regarding race and racism as well as to identify the tactics they most frequently promoted for resisting accusations of racism. For example, by observing what users claimed was or was not racism, it was possible to infer a definition of racism that was implicit to their arguments.

5.   Findings

In this section, I outline how The_Donald users[5] contend with accusations of racism directed at Donald Trump and themselves. It is important to note that the subreddit's moderators policed any posts that were openly critical of Trump and often banned those who made such posts. Thus, the vast majority of messages were pro-Trump, and most The_Donald users appeared to be as well. As a result, accusations of racism were not usually made directly but were reported and recontextualized by The_Donald users, who almost exclusively denied the accusations, often adamantly. Occasionally, some supporters offered mitigated understanding or agreement with accusations of racism against Trump. As I will show below, such statements were usually met with disagreement from other Trump supporters who attempted to persuade these users that they had fallen victim to false ideas propagated by political opponents.

In contrast to some portrayals of The_Donald users as unconcerned with the opinions of those accusing them of racism (e.g., Sarlin 2016), I found that the discourse of users who contributed to these threads suggested strongly that they were concerned with (even at times apparently hurt by) these accusations even though they viewed them as unwarranted. The titles of the threads I analyzed suggest the degree to which accusations of racism were viewed as threats to Trump's and their credibility (see Table 1). Discussion in these threads then centered on how to go about countering these harmful accusations.

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5. Throughout this work, I present users' comments withholding identifying information so as not to draw undue attention to any particular reddit user.

The_Donald users' dismissal of accusations of racism rested on color-blind racism, although, as I will show, their mobilization of color-blind racism was decidedly different from that used, for example, by US college students in Bonilla-Silva and Forman's (2000) study (see the description of Brian above in the section titled "Color blind racism and the discourse of immigration"). The_Donald users argued that accusations of racism were a political tactic for ensuring support from minority voters, smearing conservative politicians, or preventing debate on immigration. This led many users to advocate that accusations of racism must be responded to with aggressive tactics that often resembled political debate but which were apparently intended to incite emotion in accusers and get them to disengage from discussion. In the threads I analyzed, The_Donald users discussed and swapped tactics for countering accusations of racism. I first elaborate on The_Donald users' view of accusations of racism as a political tactic and then focus on their preferred strategies for responding.

5.1 Weaponizing accusations of racism

As is often noted in descriptions of color-blind racism, the notion that race and racism are connected to legitimate political or social problems was summarily dismissed by The_Donald users, or, on occasion, Whites were identified as the actual victims of contemporary racism. Since The_Donald users asserted that racism is largely an issue of the past, they argued that recent focus on these topics in the media and among candidates during the presidential primary process was not motivated by attempts to discuss relevant political issues; instead, they asserted that accusations of racism were merely used as an insincere yet potentially effective political tactic. One user, who identified as a former liberal,[6] posted the following:

> I used to be a liberal until this past year watching this election.
> Liberals use race as a way of manipulating people into voting for them. They have you believe racism is still rampant in society and it's "us" vs "them." I'm not sure if they do this consciously but it's very effective – had me fooled.

The_Donald users repeatedly asserted that accusations of racism against Donald Trump or his supporters served a purpose other than the one they appeared to be intended for (i.e., the identification of racist ideas, statements, positions, or policies). Accusations of racism, as one The_Donald user put it, had been "weaponized".

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6. Political views in the United States are often discussed as falling along a continuum of "conservative" to "liberal" views. Conservatives tend to lean more to the right of the political spectrum and favor the Republican party. Liberals tend to lean more to the left and favor the Democratic party.

Thus, they ascribed two purposes to accusations of racism, both of which had to do with the political gains that accusers accrued.

The first had to do with political campaigning, the idea that accusations of racism are effective at getting people to vote for the more liberal candidate rather than the more conservative one, as the user quoted above asserted. One user wrote "Democrats rely on minorities", so "they *have* to paint us as racist" in order to ensure that minorities continue to vote for them. Another user wrote "Accusations of racism is the KKKrazy Glue that holds the Democrat coalition together" with an embedded link to a similarly titled article (Sailer 2013). Sailer's article argues that the racially diverse Democratic party "can stay together only by stoking resentment – and, indeed, hatred – of straight white men".

According to both Sailer and many The_Donald users, the media was also complicit in portraying Trump and other Republicans as racist for political gain. One user wrote:

> It's outrageous to believe left leaning media will ever not accuse Republican Presidential Candidates of bigotry.
> Romney and McCain were the darlings of the liberal media until their nominations. They then rolled over to die as the kafka trapping[7] began.

Finally, since Trump had attracted critics even amongst conservatives and Republicans, The_Donald users also portrayed other conservatives or Republicans as using accusations of racism for political gain. One user wrote that Mark Levin, a conservative radio show host who criticized Trump, "is using left-wing smear tactics because he supports another candidate". Another wrote that criticism of Trump among Republicans shows "that 'conservative' elites will join the left's smear campaign to stop anyone posing a threat to their donors' cheap labor mass immigration plans".

The second purpose that The_Donald users ascribed to accusations of racism had to do with left-wing political groups' alleged attempts to silence political debate about immigration. Some users asserted that Trump is commendable for discussing immigration, a topic they claimed was avoided due to fear of accusations of racism. After claiming that undocumented immigration is a major source of violent crime and other social ills in areas along the US-Mexico border, one The_Donald user wrote that these problems had not been addressed "because people with power are afraid of being called racist by others". Another user posted

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7. "Kafka trapping" was discussed at length in this thread. According to an article that was referenced early in the thread (McElroy 2014), "kafkatrapping" (a reference to Kafka's novel *The Trial*) is "a logical fallacy" popular among left wing political groups in which someone who is "accused of a thought crime", like racism, denies the accusation only to have their denial used as evidence of guilt.

a link to a video[8] of Ann Coulter (conservative author, who had recently published the book *Adios, America* at the time of the video) appearing on BBC Newsnight. The user describes what occurs in the video in the following manner:

> [Coulter] kept trying to bring up the real problems so that we can discuss the problem and come to a solution, and pointed out that they would immediately and reflexively (without even thinking about it) try to derail any such debate by screaming "RACIST!" BIGOT!" in order to stop the conversation … and sure enough, they kept doing the same, even on the interview.

Many The_Donald users wrote about accusations of racism and "political correctness" as tactics for making it impossible to talk about what they represented as "the real problems" (for example, in the quotation above), in particular, decreased wages, criminal activity, and terrorism that allegedly arose due to insufficient enforcement of US immigration law. Importantly, The_Donald users did not represent accusations of racism as being a direct response to their framing of "the real problems". For example, Coulter's, Trump's, and The_Donald users' representations of violent crime among immigrants as a problem in need of greater discussion and regulation rest on the racist (and incorrect, see Ewing et al. 2015) assumption that undocumented immigrants, most of whom are members of racialized minority groups, are more likely to commit crime than native-born populations. The_Donald users were either not aware of or refrained from acknowledging this criticism of the alleged problems they constructed. They instead presented accusations of racism in response to their and Trump's discussion of "the real problems" as driven by emotion rather than logic or reason.

The_Donald users represented accusations of racism as connected to the incitement of emotion that, in their view, makes such accusations an effective political tactic. Thus, Trump supporters represented accusations of racism either as stemming from emotional responses or as cynically manipulating others' emotions. They contrasted this with their representations of themselves, as impartial, logical, and informed thinkers. An example of this can be found in one telling exchange,

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8. The interview occurred on the episode from December 15, 2015, and the link the user posted was https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Azhrojr938. In the video, host Evan Davis asks Coulter about her own and Trump's use of racist speech. Davis asks Coulter whether she believes that Trump would be more successful if he used "more overtly racist language" like, he states, Coulter does. Coulter responds by denying that she uses racist language and claiming that such accusations are merely a way of avoiding discussion of immigration and the problems it poses to the United States. However, her framing of these problems are a rather clear example of racism framed as cultural difference. For example, she says "A lot of the cultures that are coming into the country have all kinds of criminal habits, in addition to child rape, gang rape, massive Medicare frauds, insurance frauds, and we have no immunity to it" since, according to Coulter, such activity is unprecedented in the United States.

part of which I present in Figure 1. The exchange began with one Trump supporter (User 1 in Figure 1) suggesting that Trump has said "a few things that can be considered racist" and then seeking advice on how to respond to accusations of Trump's racism especially from his peers "at a ridiculously liberal and PC"[9] university (not shown in the excerpt in Figure 1). In Figure 1, I present an extended excerpt from the exchange this user had with another following these comments. In it, User 1 points to Trump's comments about Mexicans as a potential vulnerability (lines 1–2). User 2 provides an excerpt from an article that quotes Trump's comments (lines 4–10) and proceeds to deny the presence of racism in them (I discuss most of the arguments User 2 puts forth in the next section that focuses on strategies for dismissing accusations of racism). In the end, User 2 contrasts a logical reading of these comments (i.e., his/her own reading) with critics' emotional reading, which, according to User 2, creates racist meanings that are not truly present (lines 32-39).

Many The_Donald users portrayed accusers' interpretations of Trump's discourse as racist as emotionally- and not logically-driven. As I will show in the next section, the unmasking of this emotional response was an important aspect of the way these users advocated that accusations of racism should be responded to.

5.2 Strategies for responding to accusations of racism

One frequent topic of discussion in The_Donald threads regarding accusations of racism is the solicitation and exchange of strategies for responding to them. For example, this was the original post in the thread titled "How should I respond when someone says that Trump is racist?":

> My little sister called Trump a racist today. All I said was, "he doesn't have a racist bone in his body." All I thought was "Et tu Brute?"
> So anyways I need a good one line response for when someone says this. For the record my sister is attending a liberal university and is being taught about white guilt and also has a Muslim friend. She thinks he would be deported. I have never been able to reason someone into changing their mind that's why I think some sort of one line response would be good.

The advice this user received and that was doled out in other threads includes both general advice about how to deal with accusations of racism as well as specific arguments about aspects of Trump's statements.

In general, since, as I have shown above, The_Donald users tended to argue that accusations of racism are merely a cynical political tactic, many advocated

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9. "PC" stands for politically correct. The term refers to efforts made to socially police racism, sexism, and other discriminatory discourses. It carries negative connotations particularly when used by conservatives, who often express resentment at having their speech policed.

1	**User 1:**	What about the stuff he's said about mexicans? I think
2		that's the most damning case against him; everything
3		else is pretty flimsy.

4	**User 2:**	"When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending the
5		best," he said during the announcement. "They're not
6		sending you, they're sending people that have lots of
7		problems and they're bringing those problems. They're
8		bringing drugs, they're bringing crime. They're rapists
9		and some, I assume, are good people, but I speak to
10		border guards and they're telling us what we're getting."

| 11 | | In the context of Illegal immigrants and building the |
| 12 | | wall. |

13		How is that "Damning"? First off, he's talking about the
14		people immigrating illegally to the US from Mexico. Not
15		all Mexicans, Not Latinos, not Latino Americans.

16		Secondly, he's not wrong. Coyotes smuggle more than
17		just your average Dick and Jane from Mexico looking for
18		a better life. Speaking of Jane, something to the degree
19		of **80%** of women trying to cross the border from
20		central America are getting raped in the process.

21		Who's doing the raping? Do you think they're sticking to
22		the border? So speaking of dick, not only do we have a
23		have a number of rapists, we have a massive drug trade
24		and violent criminal cartels operating along the border
25		as well, smuggling and selling product to the US.

26		And further, he's expressed on not a few occasions that
27		he is happy to welcome Mexicans **legally** entering the
28		country. But if you're here illegally, you have to go back.

| 29 | | There's nothing "Damning" about it. |

| 30 | **User 1:** | Eh, it's relative. This is probably the thing I see most |
| 31 | | talked about by anti-trumpers. |

| 32 | **User 2:** | Sure it's relative. Anyone can logically look at the |
| 33 | | statement and see he said nothing "damning". |

34		Anyone who hates Trump and is willing to believe
35		anything negative they're told about him can easily twist
36		it into something it's not.

37		One side is operating via logic, the other is operating off
38		feefees. You'll notice that a lot when you see "anti-
39		Trumpers" talking about trump.

Figure 1.

against engaging in meaningful discussion or debate about them. They instead recommended that Trump supporters strive to elicit emotional responses from those making accusations of racism and to compel them to disengage from discussion. For example, in Figure 2, I present one user's extended discussion of how to respond to what users in the thread describe as "kafkatrapping", a fallacious argument, reportedly employed by those who make accusations of racism, in which the accused's denials are used as confirmation of racism (see also footnote 7 above). User 2 provides a sample scenario in which an imagined kafkatrapper (represented as KT, e.g., line 5) makes an accusation of racism, and User 2 models

1	**User 2:**	One thing that I've also found that works to a degree is
2		demanding for them to prove it and keep pressing them
3		to provide evidence.
4		Usually it's something like:
5		KT: "Wow, You're so racist!"
6		U: "How"
7		KT: "Uh, it's obvious."
8		U: "Not really. How."
9		And then they either take their ball and go home with "I
10		won't even waste my time explaining it to you!"
11		In which case: U "So you can't."
12		Where they usually do leave, or they go to option 2.
13		KT: "Well you're racist because of X!"
14		X usually being something that isn't racist, or the
15		definition for institutional racism rather than personal
16		racism.
17		In which case, you can simply point either of these out.
18		At which point they defer to trying to Kafkatrap again
19		but with a far weaker position, or taking their ball and
20		going home.
21		To the casual observer, they look like the lunatic they
22		are at this point (Often at this point they're so frustrated
23		they've started spewing insults as well) and you look like
24		a calm, rational human being.

Figure 2.

a recommended response that is intended to evade the kafkatrapping tactics and instead continually press the accuser for evidence of racism (lines 1–3), ultimately inciting emotion in the accuser and making them appear irrational (lines 21–24).

The type of argumentation recommended in Figure 2 and by other The_Donald users superficially resembled a genuine inquiry into an opponent's position and the evidence that supports it. At times, The_Donald users discussed their strategies using terms like "burden of proof", suggesting that they were merely expecting those making accusations of racism to support their claims. For example, one user provides this suggestion for dealing with accusations of racism:

> Ask them to explain. It reverts the burden of proof back onto them. If they refuse, then they're exposed. If they do provide an explanation, it's highly likely to be very tortured logic to arrive at that conclusion. If they do that, you shoot a hole in it, and keep them on the defense.
> Eventually they'll just either go away or get drowned in down votes.[10]

As is suggested by the comment above, the continual demand for evidence advocated by The_Donald users was not necessarily intended as a way to arrive at greater understanding of the accuser's position. Rather, it appeared to be motivated in part by an attempt to compel accusers to disengage from debate or to discredit them in front of others. Since the recipient of the evidence is the one judging its adequacy, it can always in principle be deemed insufficient, and The_Donald users discussed various strategies for judging such evidence inadequate.

The_Donald users' confidence in their denial of Trump's racism and the effectiveness of their strategies for dismissing accusations of his racism seemed to be bolstered by the narrow range of what they entertained as constituting genuine evidence of racism. Statements claiming the biological superiority of one race over another, which might have satisfied The_Donald users' definition of racism, are systematically avoided in the contemporary United States, especially by politicians. Indeed, neither of the incidents involving Trump's representations of immigrants that I discussed in the introduction above made any overt claim about undocumented Mexican immigrants' or Muslim immigrants' biological worthiness.

The_Donald users routinely discussed these incidents since they are commonly brought up as evidence of Trump's racism (e.g., Figure 1, lines 1–3, 30–31). In doing so, they shared and suggested responses to accusers' arguments about these incidents. Their rebuttals mostly dismissed accusations of racism because accusers failed to provide evidence of how Trump's statements demonstrate a

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10. Reddit employs a system of down-voting and up-voting to allow users to rate the quality of each other's posts. The system moves highly rated posts to prominent parts of the page or the website, and it also hides highly unpopular posts.

belief in the biological superiority of one race over another, the definition of racism The_Donald users apparently operated with.

The_Donald users' most commonly repeated defense of Trump's representations of immigrants was that none of the groups Trump discussed (i.e., Mexicans, undocumented Mexican immigrants, Muslims, or Muslim immigrants) constitute a biological race. I counted fourteen instances in my data where The_Donald users explicitly stated that some group was not "a race" or that the groups Trump referred to are "not races". For example, one user wrote that Trump's comments on undocumented Mexican immigrants and his proposal to bar Muslims from entering the United States were "literally" not racist, because "neither of those groups are races". Another user more explicitly argued that the biological conception of race was not relevant to Trump's ideas:

1. Mexican is not a race, its a nationality.
   There are blonde hair blue eyed Mexicans, and illegal-aliens come in all shapes, colors, and creeds.
2. Islam, like Scientology, is a belief system, not a race.

Although The_Donald users insisted that there was no biological reason to consider the concept of race relevant to the groups they discuss, this point is true of all alleged "races" in the United States. It is well established in the social and biological sciences that race is a social construct not a scientifically legitimate explanation of human biological variation. Furthermore, the argument fails to address the more concerning aspect of the accusation, namely that Trump unfairly and arbitrarily discriminates against minority groups or that his discourse promotes fear and hatred of particular groups, whatever the basis for membership in these groups might be (see also footnote 4 above).

Similarly, The_Donald users commonly denied that Trump's comments are racist on the grounds that they were not meant to apply to all members of any particular group, presumably implying that any negativity directed toward these individuals was targeted at some other relevant aspect shared by members of the sub-group rather than those characteristics shared by the whole. For example, it was common for The_Donald users to discuss Islamic terrorists as a subgroup of Muslims, and they commonly argued that this was not intended to be commentary on all Muslims (see also User's 2 comments in Figure 1 about "people immigrating illegally", lines 13–15). For example, one user discussed the need to keep out "psychos" who are alleged to commit mass rape, behead people, and attempt to impose Sharia law in non-Muslim countries. When another user asked whether it was fair to label "an entire race as psychos", the user responded in the following manner:

> For starters, Islam is not a race. Second, I did not label all Muslims as psychos. The majority of Muslims are probably fine. But there exist many violent Muslims and they are terrorizing the Middle East and Europe. If keeping those psycho killers out of our country means slowing or halting Muslim immigration into the U.S., then so be it.

The_Donald users' dismissal of accusations of racism requires a narrow understanding of what constitutes racism, including an inability to see or an unwillingness to acknowledge that statements like the "psychos" comment imply a greater tendency toward negative characteristics, like violence, within the group population. In other words, even if the negative characteristic does not apply to all members, the implication that something about the group (whether biological or cultural) leads to an alleged greater incidence of the negative characteristic can still be taken as a negative (racist) statement about the group as a whole, an implication that was not raised in The_Donald users' discourse.

Furthermore, dismissals like the one above also relied on another related feature of Trump supporters' narrow definition of what constitutes racism, namely that it pertains only to intention and not to effect. Thus, when the user quoted directly above alluded to the idea that under Trump's proposal all Muslims would be kept from immigrating to the United States, s/he did not seem to recognize the exclusionary and discriminatory impact on Muslims as evidence of racism. The stated intention of "keeping those psycho killers out of our country" was presented as the only relevant concern. Another relevant example occurred in an exchange between two other users. The first stated that calling Trump "racist is a stretch at best" but then wrote that "he is genuinely Islamaphobic", because of his plans "to ban the entire religion from entering the country". A second user responded to this by writing "not because he hates Muslims, though. You've fallen into the trap". In addition, The_Donald users focused on the intention of enforcing immigration law in order to defend Trump's comments about undocumented immigrants. For example, one user wrote:

> Same thing with the whole illegal immigration issue. It's not persecuting a particular race, it's prosecuting criminals. Even illegal immigrants who come here and don't commit violent crimes are still criminals because they are here illegally. So suddenly it's racist to punish people for violating a country's laws?
> Insanity!

The_Donald users' discourse then suggests that the only legitimate evidence of racism is found in people's intentions, not in the effects of their statements or policies. Such a conception led them to direct attention away from the effects of Trump's discourse (e.g., the fear it might create for those groups who are targeted) and the disparate impact of his policy proposals (e.g., Muslims as a group would obviously

face much greater restriction in travel to the US under Trump's proposal). Instead, they insisted on focusing on Trump's personal dispositions, such as whether he "hates Muslims". They also offered counter-evidence by pointing to instances in which Trump has said positive things about minority groups or has shown tolerance toward them. For example, comments like the one below,[11] in which Trump praises certain Mexicans were commonly quoted by The_Donald users as a way of demonstrating Trump's apparent positive feelings toward Mexicans who have entered the United States with proper authorization.

> Many fabulous people come in from Mexico and our country is better for it. But these people are here legally, and are severely hurt by those coming in illegally… I am proud to say that I know many hard working Mexicans – many of them are working for and with me… and just like our country, my organization is better for it

The_Donald users' conception of racism is conveniently narrow. As has commonly been observed of color blind racism (see Section 2 above), it erases the arguably more pertinent concerns of whether Trump's policies would have a negative impact on minority groups. Instead it focused on the question of whether Trump personally displays animosity toward racialized immigrant groups or whether he expresses a belief in the biological superiority of Whites over such groups. By insisting on a particular form of evidence for accusations of racism, The_Donald users asked accusers to accomplish something that is nearly impossible: demonstrating a personal disposition of racial hatred in a context where people carefully avoid language and actions that might raise suspicions of such hatred or allegiances to long discredited doctrines of biological White supremacy. In restricting discussion to the personal dispositions and intentions of those accused of racism, they also attempted to remove the effects of racism on marginalized groups from consideration.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of findings

I have argued that The_Donald users, drawing on color-blind racism, orient to accusations of racism as a cynical, political tactic used by the political left. In their view, such accusations are not meant to identify racist statements, ideas, or policies. Rather, they are intended to damage the reputations of conservative politicians, to

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11. One The_Donald user cited the following article as the source of these comments: http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-epic-statement-on-mexico-2015-7

shore up support from minority voters, and to silence debate on particular topics, especially immigration. According to The_Donald users, such tactics are successful because of the emotional manipulation they entail, not because of the merits of the accusations.

As a result, The_Donald users advocate responding to accusations of racism not through genuine attempts at dialogue aimed at understanding the accuser's point of view, but rather through inciting emotion in accusers and compelling them to disengage from the discussion. Ideally, for The_Donald users, such disengagement would also be accompanied by an unmasking of the accuser's emotionality, helping to cement the apparent perception that those making accusations of racism are acting on emotional impulses and not logic or reason. Their favored strategy for inciting such emotion superficially resembles genuine debate, but The_Donald users' statements suggest that the aim is not to confront opposing viewpoints so much as to frustrate those with opposing opinions. In doing so, The_Donald users suggest combining a continual demand for evidence of racism with an insistence on a narrow conception of what counts as racism and legitimate evidence of it. Unable to provide the type of evidence The_Donald users would apparently accept as evidence of racism, accusers are expected to leave the conversation, perhaps after becoming upset, confirming, at least in the eyes of The_Donald users, that they have no viable evidence for their accusations and are merely acting on emotion.

6.2 A new or resurrected form of racial discourse?

The shock that many people felt at Trump's statements during his campaign have led to claims that Trump represents a shift in the way race is discussed in political debates in the US. The extreme reaction to Trump's statements suggested that they were not expected of a presidential candidate in this era. In that regard, Trump, as an extremely successful politician, is clearly something new or, rather, something that has not been seen for decades in the US.

However, my analysis of how Trump supporters understand his and their own discourse on race and immigration suggests that their views and strategies for dealing with race talk are merely an adaptation of highly prevalent ways of talking about these issues. The_Donald users do not openly support racism (nor does Trump); in fact, they invest quite a bit of time and effort in presenting themselves and their favored candidate as "not racist". In doing so, they draw on color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2013) and a folk theory of race and racism (Hill 2008) that are anything but new.

I argue then that it is a mistake to think of the shock that Trump has caused as solely about his discourse. Rather, I argue that the context of reception is key,

in particular, the ongoing polarization of US politics along lines of race, ideology, and political party (e.g., Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

Polarization around immigration can be illustrated by a recent Pew study of US attitudes toward immigrants (Pew Research Center 2016, 73). One survey item asked which of two statements on "immigrants today" comes closer to the respondents' view: (1) immigrants "are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care" or (2) immigrants "strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents". Fifty-six percent of respondents who favor the Republican party chose the first option. A negative view of immigrants was even more prevalent among Trump supporters, sixty-nine percent of whom reported feeling that immigrants were a burden on the United States. In contrast, seventy-eight percent of respondents who favor the Democratic party chose the second option. Jones (2016) shows that the figure for those leaning toward the Democratic party represents a massive increase over the past two decades. In 1994, only thirty-two percent of those favoring the Democratic party reported feeling that immigrants strengthened the United States, placing their opinions at that time much closer to those of their Republican contemporaries.

Such data suggests that Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric may appeal to a particular group within the Republican party who are even more likely to view immigrants negatively than the rest of their party. However, I believe that to explain The_Donald users' discourse around accusations of racism, it is important also to attend to the changing nature of the US political left which now consists of greater numbers of people of color (including immigrant groups) and expresses more positive attitudes toward immigrants than it once did. Thus, I argue that The_Donald users' concerns about and hostility toward accusations of racism, which I documented above, reflect not only right-wing antipathy toward immigrants but also left-wing resistance to immigrant threat narratives that are increasingly recognized and called out as racist. These developments may also be a contributing factor to The_Donald users' adoption of more aggressive tactics to resisting accusations of racism than those often documented in the US (e.g., by Bonilla-Silva and Forman, 2000).

The continuing debate over the place of racialized immigrant groups within US society will undoubtedly take place to a large extent over the internet, and it will likely continue to feature intense disagreement over the racist nature of Trump, his statements or policies, and those of other anti-immigrant politicians and policies. This is certainly an area where continued research would be valuable. For example, past research has suggested that color-blind racism is effective at derailing conversations about racism in online spaces (Kettrey and Laster 2014). Future research might explore whether the strategies of imposing color-blind racism that The_Donald users advocate are truly effective at influencing the opinions

of others especially people who intend to use social media for social interaction (not political engagement) but nonetheless end up being influenced by political discussion on other platforms like Facebook (Diehl et al. 2015), where The_ Donald users might conceivably attempt to apply their strategies for dealing with accusations of racism in order to discredit perceptions of Trump's racism within their social networks. Surrounded by their fellow Trump supporters, The_Donald users appear confident that their strategies portray their political opponents as emotional and irrational while constructing identities of logical, informed thinkers for themselves. Research around the questions of whether these strategies are effective, with what audiences, and how any effective strategies might be countered are of particular importance to future anti-racist political action in online spaces.

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Subject index

The global rise in the number, size and complexity of migration flows has not only resulted in an unprecedented flurry of debates and negotiations about how to deal with it through economic, social, and military policies but also in a huge increase in racist and xenophobic language use and discriminatory discourse. The expression of aggression and hatred in (anti-)immigration debates and its relationship to racism and its pseudo-justification lie at the center of this volume.

Its seven main contributions provide exemplary analyses of European and US debates that instrumentalize anti-immigrant attitudes: on the one hand among far-right populists in Cyprus, in Serbian and Croatian nationalism, and in the Hungarian government's attempts at legitimizing immigration exclusion, and on the other hand in discourses associated with US-president Trump and his followers, including racists' tactical denial of racism. Methodologically, all studies pursue corpus-based Critical Discourse Analysis, with foci on lexical, figurative, argumentative and discourse-historical patterns. Together, they show the convergence of populist polemic strategies. Originally published as special issue of the *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict* 5:2 (2017).

"Musolff's collection offers a high-resolution and frightfully accurate image of how discriminatory and xenophobic discourses are used to further political goals in the contemporary world. Placing its sharp critical linguistic lens on the urgent issues of mass migration and refugee crisis on both sides of the Atlantic, it provides a complex and insightful account of the power of language to prompt momentous developments that affect us all."

Piotr Cap, *University of Lodz*

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