THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

Challenges and Threats in an Uncertain World

Edited by J. L. BLACK, MICHAEL JOHNS, and ALANDA D. THERIAULT

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATO	Anti-Terrorist Operation (Ukrainian)
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CASD	Continuous at Sea Deterrence
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Association
DDR	Demobilization, disarmament & reintegration
DNC	Democratic National Committee (USA)
DOI	Democratic Order Initiative
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEC	European Economic Community
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSB	Federal Security Service (Russia)
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
GFA	Good Friday Accords
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ICTY	International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Front
KOF	Switzerland-based Globalization Index
LPR	Luhansk People's Republic
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHS	National Health Service (UK)
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State
NSA	National Security Agency (USA)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of Europe
PJAK	Kurdistan Free Life Party
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
PYD	Democratic Union Party (Kurds)
RUSI	Royal United Service Institute (UK)
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement (Balkans)
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process (Balkans)
SBU	Security Services of Ukraine
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SNB	National Security Service (Uzbekistan)
SNP	Scottish National Party
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
SSBN	Submersible, Ship, Ballistic, Nuclear submarines
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TURKSOY	International Organization of Turkic Culture
UDAR	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nation Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

When Francis Fukuyama published his essay titled "The End of History?" in 1989, many readers in the West already believed that the Cold War was winding down and the confrontation between unbending ideologies for supremacy was won—by them. The essay, later turned into a book, celebrated that feeling of relief and foresaw the global free market economy as a final stage in the world's socioeconomic evolution. It also hailed the advent of Liberal Democracy as the final form in the evolution of human governance.[1]

Fukuyama was hardly the first to proclaim final answers to human political and economic development. In previous centuries Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* (Capital, 1867) set out various stages in human political and economic development based on shifts in ownership of the means of production and predicted that communal ownership, communism, would eventually prevail and be permanent. Like Fukuyama's, his was a linear vision of history. At about the same time Nikolai Danilevsky produced *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe, 1869), in which human progress was perceived as a matter of unique maturing civilizations replacing each other sequentially, usually as the result of wars. In his scheme, the next reigning civilization would be a united Slavic one with its capital at Constantinople. Whereas his civilizations might last for centuries, they were not expected to be permanent; rather they all eventually would wither and die. This was a circular interpretation of societal evolution.

In 1918 Oswald Spengler provided us with somewhat similar prospects for history. With the horrors of the First World War in mind, his *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Decline of the West, 1918, 1922) presumed that all civilizations ("high cultures") reach a certain peak of near perfection only to collapse in ruin. Spengler's hypotheses are sometimes referred to as the Sisyphus version of history.

Needless to say, the positions put forward by these famous writers were much more nuanced and complex than the way they are presented here—but our simplistic adaptations express the way in which their opinions were popularly explained. Marx, Danilevsky, and Spengler had long-lasting audiences and adherents. Communist theorists still abound, though Marx might not recognize them; Danilevsky's ideas have resurfaced in Russia's Eurasianists; and Spengler's notions were corroborated, some say, in the "Caesarism" of Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and even some forms of neo-Nazism today.

Fukuyama's tenure as leading interpreter of human political and economic evolution was much more fleeting, in part because he ignored the resilience and powerful draw of nationalism.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the Arab Spring that began in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010, with color revolutions (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005) in between, had granted Fukuyama's position some credence. The latter events were all aided and abetted with Western encouragement and money, but the chest pounding went too far. Trying to speed up the process by using direct force for regime change (Iraq, Libya), the West opened a Pandora's Box that shattered what had come to be called the New World Order. The Arab Spring and color revolutions all soon collapsed of their own internal flaws and unforthcoming "great expectations" from abroad.

All outward appearances to the contrary, the USSR had not faded away peacefully either. The fifteen former Soviet Republics went off in a variety of directions: the Baltic States joined the West; the Central Asian states remained in the hands of former First Party Secretaries; while Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova were left in limbo. Beset by public humiliation and economic catastrophe throughout the 1990s and civil war in the North Caucasus, the newly independent Russian Federation was officially the successor state to the USSR but was unable to fill the gaping hole left at the top of the world's pecking order after its predecessor's dissolution.

As the West congratulated itself for its bloodless victory in the Cold War, government forces in the newly sovereign republics stifled movements for independence on the part of internal administrative territories even though those entities were granted an equal right to secede by the Law on Secession adopted in the USSR in 1990.[2] Most of them were nominal homelands of a specific people. In some cases, this led to bloody civil war: unsuccessfully for Chechnya in Russia; semisuccessfully for Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transdniestria in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In other cases, blossoming independence movements were cut off by central governments before they erupted in mass violence, such as Crimea in Ukraine, Gagauzia in Moldova, and Tatarstan in Russia.

Indeed, demands for self-determination around the globe or, as one analyst put it, the "tide of devolution," have led to power vacuums unheard of during the bipolar Cold War and even the unipolar immediate post–Cold War. Neither the US nor China, or lesser lights such as Russia and the European Union, are capable of containing current international crises by themselves.[3]

Far too many other conflicts have been neither frozen nor resolved, and civilians are still collateral targets everywhere, often in conjunction with the "war on terrorism." While Russian jets were dropping bombs on terrorists and civilians in Aleppo, Syria, US jets were dropping bombs on terrorists and civilians on Mosul, Iraq. Afghanistan remains a never-ending war zone. Everyone acquiesces while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates slaughter civilians in Yemen, ethnic violence rages in South Sudan and Myanmar, and the Boko Haram insurgency kills and kidnaps thousands in other parts of Africa. Murderous campaigns led by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIL continue mostly unabated. Even the indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets in eastern Ukraine by the Ukrainian Armed Forces was rationalized in Kyiv as an Anti-Terrorist Operation. Some of the ongoing international tensions are almost ancient in their origin, such as the Kashmir's desire to leave India and join Pakistan or the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation; some of them are much more recent; some of them are conflicts by proxy. Armed conflict seems to be the order of the day almost everywhere.

The Skripal poisoning case in the UK and yet another chemical attack in Syria roiled the international waters still further in the spring of 2018, their ripple effects touching almost every country negatively in the West and the Middle East.

So, what does that leave us?

A troubled world riddled with international terrorism; refugees from North Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine; famines; hot and cold local wars; and hot spots that could burst into flame at any moment. The new conflicts feature economic sanctions, cyber warfare, and rampant propaganda. Domestic scenes reveal serious division over climate change, and increasingly disruptive national elections and referenda such as those in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States. Endemic large-scale corruption and unrestrained xenophobia threaten the stability of countless countries. Successful coups d'état (for example in Egypt, Mali, Thailand, and Yemen) and attempted coups (such as those in Turkey, Montenegro, and regularly in Libya) have become de rigueur. Internal strains have been exacerbated by calls for independence in Québec, Scotland, Catalonia, and Kurdistan. Separating "fake news" from reality was difficult enough a century ago when Sir Arthur Ponsonby wrote that "when war is declared the first casualty is the truth," but now is the most daunting task faced by analysts of international and domestic affairs.[4]

Semantics are wielded to hide the obvious. For example, the ouster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych in 2014 is labeled a popular revolution by those who support the action and a coup d'état by those who don't. There is an important difference. Although some analysts may start the current international disorder either at the expansion of NATO eastward in the 1990s or the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, events in Ukraine served as launching pad for its most dangerous stage. Whatever one might prefer to cite as a starting point for the downslide, conflict in Ukraine was a major signpost in the current disruption, and that is why we start with it here.

Even the much-touted New World Order's global economy has been shaken. The Brexit referendum in 2016 left both the UK and the European Union (EU) struggling to reshape their economic futures; the long-discussed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was undermined by America's abrupt withdrawal in January 2017, the quarter-century-old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was suddenly in jeopardy, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) began losing credibility because of the increasingly widespread use of economic sanctions and tariffs as preferred political levers in international affairs.

The gulf between rich and poor nations, and rich and poor within nations, is widening exponentially, and this too breeds anger, frustration, and—dare we say it—revolution.

Popular support for isolationism and dissatisfaction with unrestricted border crossings and mass immigration is an understandable reaction for populations already losing jobs to automation and cheaper labor overseas. Once touted as a panacea, economic globalism appears to have resulted in fewer manufacturing jobs in the West and much greater income inequality. Even the globalization represented by the Internet and various forms of the social media carried with it cyberattacks, cyber bullying, and unrestrained hacking.[5]

As the WTO weakened, trade patterns became more regional. In that connection Russia's post-2014 "pivot to the East," the official inauguration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015, and the launching of China's extraordinary trillion dollar One Belt, One Road project in 2017 all signaled a potential shift in the world's economic power centers. While Chinese and Russian commentators spoke of a new world trade order linking the One Belt, One Road initiative to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—which now encompasses half the world's population—others wrote of a new world oil order as Saudi Arabia and Russia formed a partnership to shape the oil market.[6]

China was already playing a part in dismantling the post–Cold War order by challenging its neighbors and the US on the China Sea, where rising voices in Beijing, Tokyo, Hanoi, Seoul, Taipei, and Manila threaten the peace and

have set American, Japanese, and Chinese fleets in motion. Moreover, in May 2018 the Chinese envoy for Syria promised further support for Russia in Syria, while Turkey broke with its NATO partners' stance over the US opening its embassy in Jerusalem and the concomitant slaughter of Palestinian protesters by Israeli troops. Even Israel's ally Egypt condemned the killing of protesters. Power brokers in the Middle East changed hats almost overnight, and existing peace plans faded from sight.

Adding to the international diplomatic and economic disarray, the sporadic but spreading outbreak of terrorist acts in Europe, the need for greater attention to civil defense everywhere and, after the American presidential election campaign of 2016, a recognition of the dangers posed by cyber warfare (hacking), all expose change for the worst worldwide.

Donald Trump's behavior in the same election set new standards for a lack of civility in presidential politics, echoed elsewhere by Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro, Turkey's Recep Erdogan, Poland's Andrzej Duda, Hungary's Viktor Orban, Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, the Philippines's Rodrigo Duterte, Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro, and other populist winners; and some prominent losers, such as France's Marine Le Pen. Although he avoids political campaigning and has held office longer than anyone else, Vladimir Putin can also be deemed a populist willing to stoke nationalist and xenophobic sentiments for political gain. Indeed, political parties have ridden the nationalist wave into office, for example, in Poland (Law and Justice Party) and Ukraine (Fatherland Party), leaving Liberal Democratic tenets floundering in their wake. In Italy, two populist Eurosceptic parties, the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League, formed a coalition government in May 2018, and almost immediately told migrants to prepare to leave.

There is too little room here to list countries in which human rights abuses are commonly committed. Indeed, no country, even those who complain regularly about such abuses elsewhere, can plead fully innocent in this regard. Populist backlash proponents in apparently democratic countries seize on vituperative charges of "fake news" from threatened elites and join attacks on independent judicial bodies and minority groups, often in the name of "democracy."

It is now fair to say that we are entering a period characterized neither by a victorious Liberal Democracy nor by a definable new world order; rather we are entering an era, a short one we hope, of a new world disorder. That is what this collection of essays is all about.

This is hardly the first time that the world we now live in has been defined as disordered; indeed, a B-level series of ten films appeared under the general title New World Disorder in 2000 and continued to 2009 before fading from theaters and TV screens. The term has been used subsequently

to attribute the modern disarray to national leaderships; oil merchants; the ripple effects of local wars; the rise of nationalism, isolationism, populism, xenophobia, and, in the heat of the moment, Donald Trump. In the latter case, American withdrawal from international climate change protocols, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and threatening NAFTA), and the UN Human Rights Council, while withholding funding from the UN's Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) and Counterterrorism Office, and adopting a "zero tolerance" policy for illegal border crossings at home all had wide-ranging global ripple effects. Whatever the reasons for present-day disorder, we do see that the stick has replaced the carrot when it comes to the resolution of international crises.[7]

We attempt here to bring some clarity into what we see as an unravelling world by examining select events and phenomena, analysing international shifts, and placing deviations in national policies in context.

J. L. Black
Michael Johns
Alanda Theriault

NOTES

1. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18. The book was titled *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

2. The Russian Law on Secession was explicit in granting the right to secede to both the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, see "Art. 2. [Secession] is made by a free expression of will of the Union republic's Supreme Soviet [or autonomous republics] on its own initiative . . . people by means of a referendum . . .; Art. 3. The peoples of the autonomous republics and autonomous formations retain the right to independently decide the question of remaining . . . within the seceding Union republic," ("Zakon o poriadke resheniia voprosy sviazannykh s vykhodom soiuznei respubliki iz SSSR," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 6, 1990). For an English translation, see J. L. Black, ed., *USSR Documents Annual. 1990: Restructuring Perestroika*, Vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991), 197–201.

3. For a discussion, see Barry Gewen, "American Power in an Age of Disorder," *The National Interest*, August 20, 2016.

4. See Sir Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War Time: Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War* (London: Garland, 1928).

5. On this generally, see Fred Hu and Michael Spence, "Why Globalization Stalled and How to Restart It," *Foreign Affairs*. Essay, July/August 2017.

6. See, for example, "'Axis of Love': Saudi-Russia Détente Heralds New Oil Order," *New York Times*, June 1, 2017; "Putin Aligns with XI in Crafting a New World (trade) Order," *RT*, May 15, 2017; Will Kennedy, Elena Mazneva, and Wael Mahdi, "Russia-Saudi Plans for Super-OPEC Could Reshape Global Oil Order," *World Oil*, June 22, 2018.

7. See Ronan Farrow, *War on Peace. The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018). For the "disorder" prescriptive, see Nicolas Checa, et al., "The New World Disorder," *Harvard Business Review*, August 2003; Victor Davis Hanson, "The New World Disorder," *The National Review*, September 2, 2014; Michael Ignatieff, "The New World Disorder," *The New York Review of Books*, September 25, 2014; Philip Gourevitch, "Syria and the New World Disorder," *The New Yorker*, October 12, 2015; Stephen Collison, "Trump's New World Disorder," *CNN Politics*, January 18, 2017; John Cassidy, "Donald Trump's New World Disorder," *The New Yorker*, January 24, 2017; Michael W. Doyle, "New World Disorder," *Dissent*, Winter 2017; Dr. Adil Najam, "The New World Disorder," *Newsline Magazine*, March 2017. See also the special issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "Is Democracy Dying? A Global Report," May/June 2018; Ivan Krastev, "Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution. The Long Road to Democratic Decline," *Foreign Affairs This Week*, April 20, 2018; Rafael Salazar, "Welcome to the New Age of the Strongman," *Geopolitical Monitor*, October 25, 2018; Roberto Simon and Brian Winter, "Trumpism Comes to Brazil," *Foreign Affairs*. Snapshot, October 28, 2018; Max Fisher, "Democracy Falters. Populist Backlashes Are Fuelled by Corruption and Elites Who Failed," *New York Times Interna*tional, November 10–11, 2018.

Part I

NATIONAL ISSUES

Chapter One

Crisis in Ukraine 2013–2015

A Paradigm for the New World Disorder

J. L. Black

Less than a year after civil conflict broke out in eastern Ukraine, the *New York Review of Books* published a lecture titled "The Post-Ukraine World Order" delivered to the Ditchley Foundation in July 2014 by Michael Ignatieff. The printed version appeared in September as "The New World Disorder."[1] Accusing Putin of turning localized clashes in Ukraine into a global confrontation, Ignatieff said that "what matters . . . is to understand, without illusions but without alarm, the new world that the annexation of Crimea and the downing of MH17 have pitched us into." Later in the essay he placed the onus for defusing the crisis entirely on Russia and China, who faced a choice "whether to stop defying the West or risk fracturing globalization itself."

That extraordinary pronouncement laid bare the all-too-commonly-held assumption of the West's absolute rightness and its corollary that "others" are always the source of international dysfunction. Real and alleged aggressions by Moscow and Beijing certainly have contributed to the disorder we now face in the international arena, but so too have the inexorable expansion of NATO and the EU eastward, Washington's turn to regime change as a first rather than last act of conflict resolution, and the concomitant spread of international terrorism.

Whatever the case may be, the crisis in Ukraine marked a stunning turning point for the worse in post–Cold War international relations, and it is to that complex of events that we may turn to find a paradigm for the new world disorder.

STARTING POINTS

Hyperbole from all the actors involved in the crisis that has overwhelmed Ukraine since late 2013 dimmed then and hides now certain realities of that sad tale. These include the fact that confrontation in Ukraine pits Ukrainians against Ukrainians, Ukrainians brought on the breakdown in Ukrainian governance in 2013–2014, and the oft-cited meddling from outside was a practice of which every foreign protagonist was guilty. Governments, politicians, interest groups, and media in Washington, Brussels, Ottawa, and Moscow all intervened in Ukrainian affairs enthusiastically, hoping to channel the crisis to their own advantage at home.

Civil strife in Ukraine quickly became a gold mine for publishing houses, and the flood gates opened to let loose a torrent of books on the subject.[2] Periodical and newspaper articles, blogs from experts, observers, and partisans covered every conceivable dimension of the struggle—from a narrow focus on its internal manifestations to sweeping projections about renewed Cold War and even Third World War.

In addition to shattering the Moscow-Kyiv relationship, the long and tragic affair accelerated an already widening gulf between Russia on the one hand, the EU and the US on the other. It handed NATO a resuscitating raison d'être, and most of Ukraine moved westward into the welcoming, if hesitant, arms of Europe. These consequences were accompanied by a burst of ethnic nationalism on both sides of the Russian and Ukrainian borders, manifested in crude propaganda, slogans, and blatant lies.

While recognizing that there is no universally accepted starting point for the conflict in Ukraine, this investigation will open with the competing packages presented to Ukraine in 2013 as its leaders struggled to resolve their country's dismal economic future. The EU offered an economic Partnership Agreement; Moscow offered a financial aid parcel. Both propositions had strings attached. When it came time to make a decision between the two in late November that year, President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the EU partnership, temporarily he said, and chose instead the financial bailout tendered by Putin.

All hell then broke loose. Ukrainian protesters numbering in the tens of thousands flocked into the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv[3] demanding that Yanukovych ignore Russia's blandishment and "join" Western Europe instead. They built barricades, occupied government buildings, and eventually began agitating in the name of political change rather than specifically for the economic association with the EU. From this beginning, the confrontation between Ukraine's executive and the Euromaidans, as the demonstrators came to be called, devolved into a direct collision with Russia over Crimea, civil war in eastern Ukraine, and

a renewal of Cold War between Russia and Western Powers. The story is carried here to late summer 2015 by which time the competing narratives were set in stone.[4]

To understand the heedless and needless escalation in Ukraine that also epitomizes the new international disorder, comprehension of both context and sequence are necessary.

Even though disputes over gas supply and prices were sources of friction between Moscow and Kyiv for more than a decade, there had been some encouraging trends in Russian-Ukrainian relations a few years prior to the eruption of armed struggle. Ukraine signed on to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Free Trade Zone in 2011, and Russia was by far the leading consumer of Ukrainian exports. In August 2012, the Ukrainian president expressed an interest in acquiring observer status with the Russia-China–dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and a few months later Yanukovych agreed on several substantial trade protocols with Russia. But he was by no means in the thrall of Vladimir Putin, making it clear at every meeting that Russian gas was too expensive and that his country would seek other sources of energy. He consistently refused to join Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in their Customs Union.

Economic cooperation with Russia was one thing, but language and interethnic divides within Ukraine foreshadowed troubles to come. The Ukrainian presidential election in 2010 saw eastern and southern Ukraine, where most of the ethnic Russians lived and the Russian language was widely used, overwhelmingly choose Yanukovych over Yulia Tymoshenko. These two leaders were styled "pro-Russian" and "pro-Western" respectively by Western writers and politicians who were rarely interested in the larger Ukrainian setting.

Subsequent disputes over a draft language law led to fist fights in the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) and protests in the streets as the country prepared for the general election in 2012. Cultural animosities simmered after the new Rada approved a law granting Russian the status of a regional language—for example, allowing its use in courts, schools, and other government institutions in parts of Ukraine where Russian and speakers of other native tongues exceeded 10 percent of the total population. Ukrainian remained the only official language of the state. At that time about 30 percent of Ukraine's overall population spoke Russian at home, 3 percent spoke other native languages, and voting patterns in Ukraine tended to follow language and ethnicity patterns.[5]

The parliamentary election in Ukraine on October 31, 2012 suggested that a majority of Ukrainians were not concerned about the pro-Russian label attached to Yanukovych. The language law had the support of the Party of Regions, of which Yanukovych had been a cofounder, and the Communists. It

was bitterly opposed by Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) and Svoboda (Liberty). The official results are shown in table 1.1:[6]

Table 1.1. Official Results of Ukrainian Parliamentary Election 2012

Party	*Votes*	*Percent*	*Seats**
Party of Regions	6,105,089	30.00	185
Batkivshchyna	5,190,531	25.54	101
UDAR	2,837,608	13.96	40
Communist Party	2,681,531	13.18	32
Svoboda	2,124,797	10.44	37
Independents	43		
Others	7		

*The number of seats includes commitments from single constituency deputies.
Source: Ukrainian Electoral Committee "Vibor-2012. Rezul'tati golosuvannia"

Half of the Rada's 450 deputies were chosen from Party lists and half from first-past-the-post constituencies. With backing from the Communist Party and many of the independents, the Party of Regions controlled the House. More important for later consideration was the reaction of the European Parliament (PACE) to the relative success of the ultranationalist Svoboda. Almost immediately after the election PACE adopted a resolution calling that party "racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic" and urged all other parties never to form coalitions with it. The next year the World Jewish Congress labeled Svoboda "neo-Nazi."[7] Yet members of Svoboda were to play a key role in the events of 2014 with the full support of the EU, the United States, and Canada.

Yanukovych's economic options were clear early on. In February 2013, the EU gave him three months to meet wide-ranging conditions that would make Ukraine eligible to accede to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Association (DCFTA) agreement scheduled for signatures at a meeting in Vilnius set for November 29. These conditions required Ukraine to adapt all its technical regulations and standards to those of the EU, eliminate subsidies that affect competition, allow market prices on domestic use of gas and electricity, and cede dispute settlements to bodies under EU control.[8] The question of Kyiv's huge debt would not be resolved, and Ukraine would lose its existing free trade status with Russia and the CIS.

Russia's proposal had fewer strings attached. After three head-to-head meetings between them in November and December, Putin offered to purchase €15 billion of Ukraine's debt in Eurobonds, thereby providing Yanukovych with a way out of an impending foreign debt default, and a 30 percent

break on its gas bills for 2013. The main stumbling block here was that the Russian bailout required Ukraine to join the Customs Union.

Doubtless, the majority of Ukrainians would have preferred to "join" Europe, even if that was not what was actually offered, but the president had pressing economic problems that the DCFTA did not resolve. The Russian offer did.

EUROMAIDANS

When police attempted to remove the increasingly restless Euromaidans on November 30, activists seized Kyiv City Hall and established even larger tent camps. Soon the Square was home to two hundred thousand milling people who occupied more government facilities, blocked the entrance to the Council of Ministers building, and organized round-the-clock demonstrations. Ukraine's capital city came to a standstill.

Shock waves from these events quickly spread through Ukraine, and from there to Russia, Europe, and North America. Contradictory theories about what was going on prodded governments into action either to protect their own national interests related to Ukraine or to gain political advantage at home—or both. While complaining vigorously that Russia "bribed" Yanukovych, Western politicians and interest groups openly meddled in Ukrainian affairs. The EU's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton arrived in Kyiv on December 8, followed shortly thereafter by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, Canada's Foreign Minister John Baird, and US Senator John McCain. The latter three roamed around among the Euromaidans proclaiming that they supported the "Ukrainian people," never defining who those "people" may have been.

THE TERRIBLE YEAR, 2014

After weeks of standoff, street battles erupted between police and protesters in mid-January 2014. Police deployed water cannons, tear gas, and stun guns; Euromaidans threw rocks and other projectiles. Dozens were injured on both sides. On January 16, the Party of Regions pushed a series of antiprotest laws through Ukraine's parliament without discussion, sparking renewed protests. Over the next week anti-Yanukovych activists broke down doors and occupied government buildings in Lviv, Rivne, Cherkasy, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, and elsewhere.

Confrontation became the order of the day, and in a foretaste of what was to come, the same outsiders who harshly condemned violence on the part of the government cheered violence on the part of militants.

It was at this point that prolific writer on the Cold War and editor of the *Economist,* Edward Lucas, set the tone abroad by publishing a bizarre allegation that Putin ordered Yanukovych to "dip his hands in blood" so as to create a breach with the West.[9] Lucas never verified this bit of fake news, but that didn't prevent his denunciation of Putin from making the rounds. Conspiracy theorists stuck with it because it was what they wanted to hear, and it fit the temper of the times as demonizing the enemy became standard practice for the new world disorder.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced Russia's perspective at the annual Munich Security Conference on February 1, 2014: "Why don't we hear condemning voices addressed to those who have occupied and still hold administrative buildings, attack policemen, set them on fire, use racist, anti-Semitic, and Nazi slogans? Why do many prominent European leaders actually support such actions." even though they would never allow them at home?[10] His queries fell on deaf ears.

BROKERING REGIME CHANGE

Then came one of the defining incidents of this sorry saga. The degree to which Washington hoped to direct Ukrainian affairs was revealed in a secretly recorded and leaked telephone conversation between Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt. This astonishing exchange took place on February 4. In Nuland's own words, Washington already saw house leader of Batkivshchyna, Arseniy Yatsenyuk ("Yats" to Nuland), as the US State Department's choice for a new head of government. Hoping to get the UN involved and fretting that the EU was not helping much, Nuland continued "and, you know, fuck the EU."[11] A year later Obama let the cat out of the bag when he remarked during a televised interview that the United States had "brokered a deal to transition of power in Ukraine."[12]

COUP D'ÉTAT IN KYIV

When the Euromaidans failed to leave government structures on February 17 in return for a general amnesty, Yanukovych sent in law enforcement to clear the packed square and occupied buildings. The situation exploded into violence again as police used stun grenades and wielded batons while Euromaidans threw Molotov cocktails and rocks, burned tires, and set their own large building HQ on fire. Police used megaphones to urge women and children to leave, and called their action an antiterrorist operation. Random sniper

fire added to the chaos. At the time the Ministry of Interior's special force, the Berkut, was accused of rifle fire, but later evidence suggested that the indiscriminate shooting into the crowd may well have been the work of provocateurs such as the neofascist Right Sector (Praviy sektor) who hoped to spark a general revolution.[13] In two days of accelerating violence about one hundred people were killed, including fifteen police officers, and hundreds were hurt.

Startled by the level of violence, on February 21, leaders of the parliamentary opposition and Yanukovych met and arranged a truce. They all signed an accord in which the president's powers were reduced. They agreed that he stay in office until an early election could be held. Both sides were to lay down arms while the Rada formed a conciliatory "government of national unity." Representatives from the Russian, French, German, and Polish embassies witnessed the negotiation, and the signing ceremony was televised. Police officers withdrew from government-held parts of the Square, and the Rada granted a general amnesty for antigovernment protesters.

The truce and political accommodations accepted by leaders of parliamentary parties met with stiff resistance both in the Rada and on the streets of Kyiv. Within hours of the settlement a brawl broke out in parliament where Yatsenyuk was shouted down. On the Maidan, Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh told the crowd that he would lead an armed insurrection if Yanukovych did not resign immediately.[14] Armed protesters took control of government buildings again. Perhaps fearing for his life, Yanukovych bolted the city on February 22 and, speaking from Kharkiv, claimed there was a coup d'état underway in Kyiv. The Rada resolved that he "removed himself" from office and called for a new presidential election to be held on May 15. Yatsenyuk headed up an interim government that took shape on February 22 as a coalition of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, and the UDAR. Nuland had her way.

This was in no way a government of national unity. The important executive cabinet posts were taken up entirely by Batkivshchyna (7) and Svoboda (5). The south and east of the country, where Yanukovych's support was strongest and Russian speakers dominated, were not represented.[15] Washington, Brussels, and Ottawa rushed to legitimize the very coalition dreaded by PACE in 2012.

The interim government then embarked on what Richard Sakwa called "perhaps the worst of all possible moves" by trying to repeal the recently adopted law protecting the use of the Russian language in certain parts of Ukraine.[16] Poisonous anti-Russian rhetoric accompanied the parliamentary debate on the bill, infuriating ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Although Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the bill, the damage was done.

Churning up the waters still further, on February 26 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen proclaimed that the door was still open for

Ukraine to join the Alliance—a red flag waved in front of Moscow and the Black Sea Fleet. Russia's surreptitious armed takeover of Crimea began the very next day. Whether the interim government planned to take Ukraine into NATO or not, Putin had good reason to believe it did. Yatsenyuk was a leading proponent of Ukraine joining NATO when he served as Speaker of the Rada under President Viktor Yushchenko, who also had called for Ukrainian membership in NATO. In 2008 US presidential nominees Obama and McCain supported the idea. Yushchenko was long gone in 2014, but Yatsenyuk was now in charge, McCain was one of his patrons, and Obama was in the Oval Office—so how could anyone expect NATO membership not to be in the cards?

John Kerry arrived in Kyiv on March 4. EU leaders arrived two days later. Yatsenyuk was invited to Washington, making the coronation complete and unquestioned in the West. In the meantime, Yanukovych was still portrayed in Moscow as the legitimate president of Ukraine.[17] Another great divide dawned in Europe.

Although the government in Kyiv and Western leaders now present the events in Kyiv as a "people's revolution," it is hard to see them as anything other than a coup d'état.

A COUP OF THEIR OWN

Crimea

Responding to the events in Kyiv, Russian speakers in Crimea stole a page from the Euromaidan game plan and began occupying government buildings themselves. Crimea's parliament at that time had been elected in 2010. Of the twelve parties contesting that election the Party of Regions took eighty of the one hundred seats. Batkivshchyna (2.7% of votes) and Svoboda (0.19% of votes) failed to win any seats—yet these two latter-named parties now controlled the interim government in Kyiv.

The Kyiv-appointed prime minister (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of Crimea was driven out by mob pressure and soon afterward replaced by an ethnic Russian Ukrainian citizen. Masked gunmen seized the Crimean parliament and other buildings in Simferopol on February 27; the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol went on unofficial alert; Russian troops without insignia ("little green men") took over key strategic posts, such as two airports and a Russian-language TV station; Tatars rallied against Russians; Russian helicopters and transport planes landed on the seized airstrips in what the new government in Kyiv rightly called an "armed invasion"; Obama warned of great "costs" if there was proven Russian interference; Putin and the Russian

Duma spoke of protecting Russian citizens; Gazprom warned again about gas debts; and so on. Crimea's new self-styled prime minister Sergei Aksyonov appealed to Moscow for help and called for a referendum on the status of Crimea in Ukraine.

The dichotomy between those who believed in the integrity of existing national borders and those who believed in the right of people to self-determination—both guaranteed in the United Nations Charter—became even more pronounced when the interim government in Kyiv bizarrely claimed that ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine were not indigenous to Ukraine and so had no right to self-determination (March 1), and appealed to NATO for help (March 2). On March 6 the Crimean Parliament and Sevastopol's City Council formally seceded from Ukraine and adopted resolutions to join Russia. They then called for a referendum with but two choices on the ballot: a) join Russia, or b) return to the Crimean Constitution of 1992, within Ukraine. It was also on March 6 that the United States and the EU imposed the first of a series of economic sanctions and visa bans against select Russian entities and individuals. On March 16 over 90 percent of respondents to the referendum said yes to "a."

Because neither the OSCE nor Western governments recognized the legitimacy of the referendum, or sent observers, its results were suspect in the West. Yet since 1992 an urge for independence or greater autonomy from Ukraine on the part of the 2.3 million Crimeans, their overwhelming use of the Russian language, and their electoral support for Yanukovych made such results more than likely.

Lost in the furor over Russia's takeover of Crimea was the fact that the law on secession adopted in the former Soviet Union in 1990 that gave its Union Republics, like Ukraine, the right and means to separate legally from the USSR, granted the same right to its autonomous republics and formations, such as Crimea.[18] In this case Crimea's right to separate had been stifled by Kyiv. A separatist candidate for the Crimean presidency won more than 70 percent of the votes cast in 1994, and a referendum on Crimean autonomy in March that year saw 1.3 million voters turn out—78.4 percent supported greater autonomy for Crimea; 83 percent supported dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenships; and 78 percent were in favor of giving the Crimean presidential decrees the force of law. There was no option for independence allowed on the ballot. In response, Kyiv abolished the Crimean presidency.[19] According to the Ukrainian National Census of 2001, Crimea's population of a little over two million was made up of nearly 59 percent ethnic Russian, 24 percent Ukrainian, and 12 percent Tatar. More significantly, some 77 percent of Crimeans named Russian as the language they spoke at home, and only 10 percent claimed to speak

Ukrainian even at home.[20] Even though it had been part of the Ukrainian SSR since 1954—a gift from Nikita Khrushchev—and of Ukraine since 1991, Crimea stayed Russian in its makeup, as it had been for nearly two centuries and as the elections of 2010 made plain.

For the Kremlin, Crimea was the red line at which the inexorable expansion of NATO since the early 1990s had to be stopped. From the "out-of-zone" policy adopted by NATO in the early 1990s to its pronouncement in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members, NATO continued to ignore and therefore threaten Russia's legitimate national security interests. Mesmerized by "we won" triumphalism since the end of the Cold War, NATO members never took Russia's strategic concerns seriously. They should have.

Whereas Ukraine's declaration of nonalignment in 1990 had been a saving grace for Russia, accession to the Alliance would void that *de facto* neutral stance and enable NATO to surround Russia in the West.[21] Visions of NATO in Sevastopol were a last straw that left Putin with few viable choices. He had stated explicitly at a NATO-Russia Council meeting in 2008 that Russia would annex Crimea if Ukraine were admitted to NATO.[22] He reiterated that position in April 2014: "When the infrastructure of a military bloc is moving toward our borders, it causes us some concerns and questions. We needed to take some steps in response. . . . NATO ships would have ended up in the city of Russian navy glory—Sevastopol."[23]

The Crimean Peninsula was lost to Kyiv, probably permanently. The Donbass (Donbas in Ukrainian) was a separate matter.

The Donbass

The turmoil in western Ukraine spread quickly to the country's eastern provinces, especially Donetsk and Lugansk (Luhansk), where Russian flags sprouted up everywhere and citizens calling for federalization or even separation from Ukraine seized government and municipal buildings. The interim government in Kyiv labeled all supporters of these Euromaidan-like actions "Russian separatists." To be sure, the militants were mostly ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking, but they were also Ukrainian citizens who had been left voiceless and disenfranchised, they assumed, by a mob in Kyiv.

There is little doubt that Moscow encouraged the various separatists and federalization movements verbally, and in December 2015 Putin acknowledged that Russian citizens were sent to Ukraine to perform "certain" tasks, including military ones. Yet blaming Russia for all the country's ills hid the realities of both the root and immediate causes of the federalization and separatist movements.

Civil war began officially in early April when Turchynov announced the start of an Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in the Donbass and deployed a large Ukrainian army to the region. Accompanied by volunteer battalions and the National Guard, the ATO force launched a five-month semisiege of rebel-populated territories. The self-proclaimed Donbass republics quickly established their own militias and fought back. By labeling the uprising in eastern Ukraine a terrorist activity, the government in Kyiv appealed to the international abhorrence of terrorism, granted itself impunity for any military action it might take against its own people, and absolved itself of any blame for the origins of the fighting. Three years later Kyiv was to shift the designation to a "war against Russian aggression," taking advantage of the growing Western hostility against Putin.

Rebel authorities in Donetsk and Lugansk held referenda on May 11 with results that claimed 89 and 96 percent supported independence with turnouts of 70 to 81 percent respectively. No Western country recognized these numbers. Newly elected (May 25) Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko took advantage of international condemnation to accelerate open war against an opposition in the Donbass that he and his parliament now also labeled traitors.

Ukrainian citizens began killing Ukrainian citizens without mercy. The conflict featured indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets by fighter jets and artillery, the use of cluster bombs, and battalions on both sides behaving with little concern for the rules of engagement. By the end of the summer thousands had been killed and many more wounded; schools, hospitals, bridges, and residences were damaged or destroyed—all in the Donbass.[24] Unexpectedly, the rebels held their own and even won some major victories. Western countries poured money and military expertise into the Kyiv side; Russia did the same for the Donbass.

At the end of August Putin addressed the militia of Novorossiia (New Russia) and congratulated them on their military successes. This was his first direct public message to the separatists and first open use of the term Novorossiia, the Imperial Russian term for much of the same area.[25] Western commentators interpreted the reference to mean that Moscow planned to annex the entire Donbass, not believing Putin who repeatedly said that he would prefer that the area remain in a "federated" Ukraine.[26]

MH17

Whatever the extent of Russia's intervention in the Ukrainian civil war, it was greatly complicated by the shooting down of a Malaysian passenger airline over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. All 298 people on board were killed.

Kyiv and the West instantly threw all initial investigative caution to the wind and censured Putin. Yatsenyuk denounced Moscow for turning the fight in Ukraine into "a global conflict and a global threat" by "Russia-led terrorists." He insisted that Kyiv had information proving that Russia "supplied the weapons, provided financial support and trained these bastards and supported and even orchestrated this kind of despicable crime."[27] No corroborative information was released. The long lineup of Western politicians who promptly held Putin personally responsible provided a template for TV talking heads and print media to exploit with wild abandon. In its turn, the Russian government charged the Ukrainian military with the deed.

By the time the Dutch Safety Board released its first Report in September minds were long since made up. The Dutch team announced that evidence revealed that the plane was downed by exploding shrapnel "probably" from a surface-to-air missile, likely a BUK SA-11. BUKs are missile-launching anti-aircraft systems deployed by both the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces.

The spreading but nonetheless nonsensical notion that a rebel unit shot down a plane knowing that it was a commercial airliner epitomized the demonization of Putin by Western politicians. A few saner heads pointed out that even if the Russian MoD provided the weapon, the shoot-down could only have been a terrible mistake. The fact that the Donbass civilian population had been targeted by Ukrainian military aircraft for weeks and that over a dozen such warplanes had already been shot down, including a large Antonov An-26 transport aircraft—which looks like an airliner on radar—and a Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jet on the 16th, begs the question as to why the MH17 was allowed to fly over a war zone in the first place.[28] Surely, if purposeful guilt is to be found, a major portion of it should be attributed to the responsible air traffic controllers.

By the end of the summer of 2014 European diplomats realized that the discord could not be settled by force of arms. In preparation for an August 26 summit between the leaders of Ukraine, the European Union, and the Customs Union, Angela Merkel made it plain that she believed a military solution was impossible. At the annual Alpbach Economic Conference the EU's Catherine Ashton and Austrian President Heinz Fischer urged that tensions between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine cool down, and OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier tried to persuade the government in Kyiv not to discriminate against Russian speakers in its country. All these diplomatic niceties from Western Europe were overshadowed by Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland calling on fellow NATO members to target Russia with the US-constructed European missile shield. Everyone was suddenly on war footing.

FAKE NEWS

Spin-doctoring on all sides quickly overwhelmed realities, and a pattern of purposeful lies was set for the duration, lending credence to the declaration made by Sir Arthur Ponsonby in 1928: "When war is declared, Truth is the first casualty."[29] The term most used in our new disordered world is "fake news."

The mainstream media everywhere quickly became shills for their respective governments. While indiscriminate shelling from both sides saw the number of dead and injured rise daily in eastern Ukraine over the spring and summer, and the destruction of bridges, buildings, and residences continued relentlessly, over a million people escaped the war zone for places of safety inside Ukraine or in Russia. In these days of embedded war correspondents and cell phone photography, it remains a mystery why these tragic realities were so rarely reported in the West. Although the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported deaths, injuries, and material destruction regularly, Western news services provided few details about them, perhaps because they almost all occurred in the Donbass.[30] In short, the media accepted by default the Ukrainian government's repeated denials that their army was bombarding civilians in spite of overwhelming visual and physical evidence that they were.

Analysts and officials in the West also shrugged off the fact that a clear majority of refugees from Ukraine fled to Russia. For example, in response to a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report released in late June 2014 showing that up to 110,000 Ukrainian citizens had gone to Russia, US State Department spokesperson Marie Harf rejected the number outright and mused on TV that the "so-called refugees" were probably just visiting relatives and then would return home to Ukraine.[31] This sadly callous and unthinking attitude prevailed.

Bad reporting was hardly unique to the West. Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean newspapers and television channels lied by omission and by exaggeration. They blocked opposition TV programming wherever possible, forbade access to opposing journalists, and funded new websites specifically to carry official messages. Propaganda became the central chore of news broadcasters who dehumanized their respective enemies and presented rumor, opinion, and speculation as facts.

Ukrainian TV, the Interior Ministry, and the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) in Kyiv broadcast such fictions as the mayor of Slavyansk ordering militants to seize all kindergartens, separatists planning to blow up a water reservoir that provides for Donetsk, and a group of rebels constructing a dirty nuclear bomb in Transdniestria to use in Ukraine. These

nonsensical tales caused panic among large segments of the population in eastern Ukraine—as did warnings from rebels to small towns that the Right Sector was advancing upon them. Russian-sponsored myths about "fascist detention camps" disguised as refugee camps in Western Ukraine had a similar consequence.[32]

CRYING WOLF

The constant drumbeat out of Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels about Russian regular troops crossing into Ukraine led the "cry-wolf" pack, yet the numbers varied so much that they had little meaning beyond their propaganda value. A claim from the interim government early on that 122,000 Russian troops were gathering on the Ukrainian border was quickly discounted after Moscow invited Kyiv to send surveillance planes across the border to check. The ever-changing official line in Kyiv about Russian troops in eastern Ukraine started in March and April 2014 with 40,000, then 12,000 in July and back up to 20,000 in August. In late August and during the first week of September, officials from NATO, the United States, and the EU insisted that there were 1,000 Russian regular troops in Ukraine, though sometimes they said it was 3,000—definitely, absolutely.[33]

Speaking to a joint session of the US Congress in September 2014, Poroshenko asked for weapons to help in what he called a "war for the free world" and told congressmen that their choice was between "civilization and barbarism." Richard Sakwa writes that Poroshenko's appeal was greeted with "rapturous applause."[34] Canadian parliamentarians had cheered him with equal gusto a few days earlier, which suggests that there was very little questioning underway among North America's elected representatives.

DECOMMUNIZATION

When the Rada adopted Decommunization laws on April 9, 2015 history became a weapon in the civil war.[35] Laws banning Communist and Nazi symbols (exempting the currently active Azov Battalion, which American congressman John Conyers (D) termed a "repulsive neo-Nazi" unit[36]),also provided veterans of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with protection from criticism.[37] It became a crime to publicly question the actions of the OUN, UPA, or controversial nationalist Stepan Bandera no matter the savageries they committed against tens of thousands of Jewish and Polish civilians during the Second World War.

Whereas officials in Washington and Brussels remained mute about the Decommunization protocols, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media wrote Poroshenko: "It is discouraging for freedom of expression and media freedom advocates that the law has gone into effect, despite various calls to safeguard these basic rights."[38] The irony of these laws is that they provided Russian propagandists with fodder for their simplistic references to the leadership in Kyiv as fascist.

By the end of July 2014 the Communist Party was banned from participation in Ukrainian elections. The UkCP's crime was to appear "pro-Russian" or "separatist" to the nationalists in the Rada, who thereby deprived millions of Ukrainian voters from representation in parliament. The Communists had earned well over two million votes in the 2012 election (see table 1). A few weeks later Poroshenko called for an early election to be held in October, justifying it in part by claiming that the Rada was riddled with "fifth column" supporters of the separatists, meaning elected Party of Regions deputies, who needed weeding out. Western governments remained silent on this matter too. It seemed that once again the most aggressive promoters of worldwide Liberal Democracy turned a blind eye when it suited their political interests to do so.

MINSK

In spite of unbending statements from the protagonists themselves diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis never ceased. A second cease-fire was agreed at Minsk on February 12, 2015. Brokered by Germany's Merkel, France's Hollande, and Russia's Putin, and signed by representatives from the OSCE (Heidi Tagliavini), Ukraine (Leonid Kuchma), Russia (Mikhail Zurabov), and leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, the agreement called for "immediate and full" cease-fire in parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts. Monitored by the OSCE, the sides were given two days to pull their heavy weapons an equal distance away from a defined security zone. Further clauses provided for local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk and legislation in Kyiv on a special regime for those areas, amnesties, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian aid, provisions for pensions, border control, foreign "formation" withdrawal, and constitutional reform in Ukraine.[39] Crimea was not mentioned, nor was the heavy fighting then underway at Debaltseve (Debaltsevo) and not over until February 18 when Ukrainian troops were forced to withdraw.[40]

Although Washington was the main foreign player in regime change in Kyiv, resolution of the ongoing conflict had become a European responsibility at a time when Europe was facing major problems of its own.

Map 1.1. Areas under rebel control, September 19, 2014 and April 22, 2015. Ukraine National Security & Defence Council, a Ukrainian and NATO source in public domain; the map was later included in the BBC's "Ukraine Crisis in Maps," www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526.

INFLUX OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

One of the oddities of the new Ukrainian government was the number of foreigners in it. These included an entire bloc from Georgia. In February 2015 Poroshenko solidified his Washington connections by choosing former president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili to head Ukraine's International Advisory Council on Reform, with John McCain as an active member. A few months later Poroshenko named Saakashvili governor of Ukraine's Odesa region and made him a citizen of Ukraine.

The Georgian team in Ukraine quickly expanded. Former Georgian Deputy Minister of the Interior Giorgi Lortkipanidze became head of the MVD in the Odesa Oblast; Davit Sakvarelidze, Georgia's first deputy prosecutor general from 2009 to 2012, took over as the Oblast's chief prosecutor. Earlier, former Georgian Minister of Health Alexander Kvitashvili was appointed Ukraine's Minister of Health. A Georgian became director of Ukraine's national police force and another was named Deputy Minister of the Interior. Poroshenko

granted them all Ukrainian citizenship. Russian strategists worried that Saakashvili and his Georgian cronies had an anti-Russian agenda that had little to do with governance in Ukraine.

Georgians were not the only foreigners now governing Ukraine: an American-born US citizen, Natalie Jaresko, was handed the post of Minister of Finance, and Lithuanian Aivaras Abromavicius took over the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. Previously Jaresko worked for the US Department of State and was an American colleague of Yatsenyuk in the Open Ukraine Foundation.

It goes without saying that Ukraine's foreign-born highly-placed new citizens turned the Kyivan government into a wellspring of international anti-Russian lobby groups.

COMING WAR?

An unhealthy warlike atmosphere quickly emerged in Europe. The United States, Canada, and the UK deployed soldiers to help train Ukrainian troops. They also offered millions in economic and nonlethal military aid.

The Russian Ministry of Defense contributed to the rising temperature by launching large-scale exercises in its Southern and North Caucasus Federal Districts that included Russian military bases in Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea; and air defense drills in the Kaliningrad region. Paradoxically, then, as the Minsk II cease-fire gradually took hold, foreign governments and their armed forces expanded the military theater. Yatsenyuk added to the explosive mix in March 2015 by insisting to *The Sunday Times* that Putin hoped to "eliminate Ukraine" altogether, split up the EU, and destroy the close ties between the EU and the United States. "Today," Yatsenyuk intoned, "Ukraine is defending Europe."[41]

Poroshenko did his bit to keep the war fever pitched high, vowing in public to retake Crimea and the Donbass, no matter the terms of the Minsk Agreement. This served as a brief wake-up call and drew a warning from John Kerry that Poroshenko should "think twice" about such an agenda. The Ukrainian president denied having said it and accused the Russians of fabricating the statement. Unfortunately for him the statement was on the record, published by his own press service on May 11, 2015, and, in fact, he repeated it regularly.[42] Denial of the obvious was another characteristic of the conflict in Ukraine that now has a universally familiar ring to it.

In June Poroshenko returned to his scorecard about regular Russian troops in Ukraine, proclaiming now there were 9,000 of them deployed inside the Donbass.[43] Apparently, he forgot that only three weeks earlier he

had set the number at 12,000. Yatsenyuk got into the act a few days later, telling Wolf Blitzer on CNN that there were 10,000 regular Russian troops in Ukraine along with 30,000 "Russian-led terrorists trained" by the FSB and the Russian military. He was in the US hoping to persuade the government to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons. The day before Yatsenyuk's statement on CNN, Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak told the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council in Kyiv that there were 42,500 "separatist and Russian soldiers" stationed in eastern Ukraine;[44] and on June 21, an ATO commander said there were 54,000.[45] On June 30, Poroshenko upped the number beyond reach, insisting to the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* that "on Putin's orders 200,000 Russian troops have amassed on our territory along with an arsenal of tanks, sophisticated missile-launching systems and surface-to-air rockets."[46] Although no intelligence operators, surveillance services, or the OSCE spotted any such Russian presence, believers abounded.

The number of Russian boots on the ground in Ukraine was certainly important and there can be no doubt that some were there; unquestionably, too, Russia provided weaponry and funds to the rebels.[47] Indeed, in late December 2015 Putin admitted obliquely, "We never said that there are no [Russian] personnel engaged in the solution of certain problems there [Ukraine], including in the military sphere, but this did not mean that regular Russian troops were present."[48]

The fact is, the rebels were always greatly outnumbered by Ukrainian regular and volunteer forces, and the fighting was limited almost entirely to their home domain. The Ukrainian army counted over two hundred thousand in 2014. It had planes, attack jets, helicopters, tanks, armored vehicles, missile launchers (including BUK SA-11s), plus heavy and light artillery. Granted, much of the materiel was outdated and the army was underfunded and poorly trained. Because Ukraine had a system of conscription until October 2013, both sides had a reservoir of semitrained soldiers. Ukraine also had about seventy thousand reservists and a national guard of some forty thousand under the MVD.[49] More importantly for the actual fighting and policing, perhaps, were about fifty Volunteer (Territorial Defense) Battalions.[50] Technically these were at first under the umbrella of the MVD or the National Guard, but some of them operated autonomously and were funded privately. Of note were the Azov, Aidar, Tornado, and Dnipro Battalions, all of which were active on the front lines and were accused of atrocities by the OSCE monitoring missions. Little was said about these cruelties in the West, where atrocities committed by the rebels made better news.[51]

By mid-2015 the rebel army, officially the United Armed Forces of Novorossiia, encompassed people's militias from the self-styled DPR and

LPR, together numbering about forty thousand. The great majority of these were ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine. A Republican Guard and a Cossack National Guard, perhaps up to five thousand between them, completed their formal forces. The rebels had the same antipersonnel weapons as the Ukrainian army, mostly taken from military depots located in their regions, but no air force, and whatever they could get from Russia. The rebels had about twelve volunteer battalions.

Foreign volunteers and mercenaries contributed to the internationalization of the conflict. Early on, two battalions of Chechens formed for the Kyiv side. The Sheik Mansour and Dzhokar Dudayev Battalions were there to fight Russians and likely not much interested in Ukraine *per se*.[52] Other than the Chechens, most of the recruits for the battalions were patriotic young Ukrainians, but volunteers or mercenaries from Russia, Italy, Sweden, Britain, the United States, France, and elsewhere showed up as well.[53] The rebel battalions also included mostly Ukrainian citizens, along with Russians, Ossets, Abkhaz, Poles, and a Chechen Battalion named *Smert'* (Death), made up of Kadyrovtsy. The largest single rebel body of volunteers was the Vostok (East) Battalion, compromising about four thousand ethnic Russians and Ossets. A Women's Battalion served at border checkpoints.[54]

It is important to note that in the face of constant charges that they were fighting "Russians," every demographic source available, even from Kyiv, made it clear that the great majority of the armed rebels were Ukrainian citizens.[55]

QUESTIONS ASKED, HESITANTLY

It was in January 2015 that independent Western surveys began to acknowledge that by far the greater part of the Crimean population approved the act of joining Russia. A poll taken in April 2014 by Gallup showed 73.9 percent of the Crimean population believing that union with Russia "would make life better" for them and their families, and 82 percent of respondents in Crimea believed that the March 2014 referendum reflected the opinion of the population accurately. This number included nearly 70 percent of the ethnic Ukrainian population of Crimea.[56] An extensive PEW Research Center survey conducted in the spring, noted that while 90 percent of the Western Ukrainians and 70 percent of Eastern Ukrainians wanted their country to remain united, 91 percent of the Crimeans polled believed their referendum was fair and free, and 88 percent thought the government in Kyiv should respect its results.[57] A poll released by Germany's GfK in February 2015 showed

mostly the same results.[58] The only exceptions came from the Tatar part of the population.

In the meantime, the government in Kyiv hoped to whitewash, or forget, the barbaric slaughter of forty-eight "federalists" who were trapped in a Trade Union building in Odesa and killed by fire, smoke, or clubs wielded by mobs led by the Right Sector. On the first anniversary of that tragedy the OSCE and Amnesty International urged the Kyivan government to conduct an objective investigation into its causes and punish the guilty ones. The Council of Europe made it clear in a report released in November 2015 that Kyiv failed to comply with the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention.[59] The investigation remained in limbo, and no Western government objected.

The European Council also began to query the narrative that blamed all the shooting of Maidan demonstrators on Yanukovych and his Berkut. As evidence emerged suggesting that the Right Sector might have been responsible for the sniper fire, the Council of Europe complained in a report released on March 31, 2015, "that substantial progress has not been made in the investigations into the violent incidents during the Maidan demonstrations."[60] By 2017 a completely new narrative had emerged in which several Georgians admitted that they were hired to organize the random shooting on the Maidan. Whom to believe?[61]

Questions arose about the murder of Russian journalists in Ukraine,[62] and also about the mysterious death of pro-Russian or anti-Maidan Ukrainian political figures from the Party of Regions and Communists parties: hanged, shot, jumped (or pushed) out of windows. Several of the dead were scheduled witnesses in investigations of the Maidan killings. The silence with which such deaths were met to that date by Western commentators was suddenly broken when, in April 2015, Amnesty International called for a "credible investigation" into what it called the "spate of suspicious deaths" in Ukraine. There was no sign in Kyiv that that would ever happen.[63] For Russia the important thing was that previously unquestioned story lines were beginning to unravel, if only slightly.

Meanwhile, the quality of life in the Donbass reached a new low. In late August, the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) announced that southeastern Ukraine was desperately in need of humanitarian aid.[64] Nothing much came of their concerns. Only Russia and, to a lesser extent, Germany provided substantial humanitarian aid to the Donbass. Washington, Ottawa, and the EU remained hypocritically and immorally silent about both the human factor in this crisis and the ethnic-cleansing mood among some of the people whom they supported.

WIND DOWN, OF SORTS

Recognizing the possibility of wider conflict, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France continued to urge compliance with their contradictory interpretations of Minsk II—while offering nothing constructive to help make that happen.

Poroshenko was caught in a Catch-22 situation. When the Rada ratified constitutional amendments to grant separatists areas in Donetsk and Lugansk greater autonomy within Ukraine, demonstrations orchestrated by members of Svoboda and its military arm, the Sych, Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party, the Right Sector and Ihor Kolomoyskiy's UKROP (Ukrainian Association of Patriots) battled the Ukrainian National Guard. Someone among the protesters threw a grenade; three national guardsmen were killed and up to 140 people were injured. Although his first reaction was to accuse "outside provocateurs" for the confrontation, Poroshenko later acknowledged that the culprits were "not agents of Moscow"; rather they were unnamed "egotistical politicians" who stabbed Ukraine in the back. But the nationalists had won their point: Poroshenko now said he did not "foresee special status for particular districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions."[65]

The likelihood of any true compromise was dispelled anyway by Poroshenko when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, 2015. Taking almost his entire time at the podium to harshly denounce Russia, he blamed the Kremlin for every death and every refugee:

> During this period, more than 8,000 Ukrainians, of whom about 6,000 were civilians, died at the hands of the Russian backed terrorists and occupiers in Donbas. More than 1.5 million residents of Donbas were forced to flee their homes and became internally displaced persons moving to other safer regions in Ukraine.[66]

In this fantasy version, the majority of refugees that actually fled to Russia was lost on Poroshenko, but maybe not to the audience who would know that UN reports in April 2015 said that over 660,000 Ukrainian citizens had already escaped to Russia.[67] By ignoring this reality and also the probability that the majority of deaths were civilians killed in the Donbass by the Ukrainian army's artillery and airplane fire, Poroshenko provided the UN with alternate facts that no one bothered to dispute.

By the end of 2015 UN data counted more than nine thousand dead and nearly twenty-one thousand injured in the eastern Ukrainian conflict. Reports from the UNHRC revealed "serious human rights abuses" committed by both sides, that areas controlled by "armed groups" everywhere were not restrained

by the rule of law, and that civilians in the "conflict-afflicted eastern parts of Ukraine . . . [are] in a very difficult humanitarian and human rights situation."[68] Neither side could claim the moral high ground after two nearly years of bitter conflict and foreign proxy battles.

EPILOGUE OR EPITAPH?

Having reached an impasse in its internal conflict by the end of the end of 2015, Ukraine settled in to its partnership with the EU as of January 1, 2016. In that year, Yatsenyuk's coalition crumbled as revelations about corruption overtook the promise generated by the Euromaidan movement. Foreign-born officials, including Saakashvili, were either fired or left the sinking ship, and international agencies began to worry more openly about corruption and extreme nationalists in Ukraine.

In the years after 2015, Russia and Ukraine severed trade relations with each other, sanctions imposed against Russia by over thirty Western and some Asian countries remained firmly entrenched, and both 'sides' in eastern Ukraine violated the Minsk accord with impunity.[69] Expanding Armed Forces representing NATO and Russia growled at each other across borders in East and East Central Europe.

The only new variable in the conflict was the inconsistent stance taken by the new president of the United States, Donald Trump. After a muddled explanation of events in Ukraine to an interviewer for ABC News in July 2016, in

Figure 1.1. Popular Russian caricature "Crimea is Yours!", July 28, 2016. VK.com/13studiya (28 July 2016).

which Trump implied that Crimeans "would rather be with Russia than where they were,"[70] his administration was bedeviled by the desire of Congress to send lethal weapons to Ukraine and the overarching manifestations of "Russiagate," that is, formal inquiries into allegations that Russia meddled in the US presidential elections of 2016 and that there was collusion between Trump's campaign and Moscow. No matter how those concluded, the next stage would mark a radical rearrangement of the short-lived post–Cold War world order.

CONCLUSION

Russia's annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of civil war in eastern Ukraine was the last straw that broke the back of the post–Cold War world order. In addition to the obvious part played by the territory of Ukraine as an arena for Russia, the United States, and the EU to test their wills in a struggle to shape international realignments, several stark features of the conflict itself symbolize the new world muddle.

The crisis resuscitated the Cold War and shifted it directly to Russia's borders; it produced a proxy war between Russia and the United States in eastern Ukraine, and spawned a routine of toxic political rhetoric likely to leave festering psychological sores for decades ahead. The inability or unwillingness of either side, at home in Ukraine or in Moscow, Washington, and Brussels, to compromise will keep the concert of nations unsettled.

Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea was a clear defining point, but the cynicism exhibited by the failure of Western governments to insist that the Ukrainian opposition keep to the agreement it signed on February 21, 2014, and their joyful recognition of an interim government with the neo-Nazi Svoboda prominent in it were at fault as well.

Calls for diplomatic negotiations mouthed by protagonists were taken hostage by domestic politics and media ratings. This was especially true of the Russia-America relationship. Whereas extreme ethnic nationalism, hyperbolic blame casting, indifference to rules of engagement, and the dominance of government narratives in mainstream national medias were certainly nothing new, their overwhelming presence in connection with this new episode of human cynicism make it clear that the "end of history" as Frances Fukuyama foresaw it in 1989 came and went in a blink of the eye.

NOTES

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3. Although they both use the Cyrillic alphabet, the Russian and Ukrainian languages have different spelling for the same names and places, such as Kyiv (Ukrainian) and Kiev (Russian), Donbass (Russian) and Donbas (Ukrainian), or Lugansk (Russian) and Luhansk (Ukrainian). Transliteration adopted here is that used most commonly by inhabitants of the area/town/region; in quotes, as in original.

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11. Julian Pecquet, "Obama Official: 'F—k' the EU," *The Hill*, February 6, 2014. For the full transcript, *BBC News. Europe*, February 7, 2014.

12. Obama interview with Fareed Zakaria in New Delhi, on CNN, September 1, 2015.

13. Ivan Katchanovski, "The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings," in Black and Johns, *Return of the Cold War*, 220–24; and Chris Kaspar De Ploeg, *Ukraine in the Crossfire* (Atlanta, GA: Clarity, 2017), 37–38. See also a speech by Poroshenko on the third anniversary of the Maidan massacre that inadvertently acknowledged that the snipers fired from a Maidan-controlled building: http://www.president.gov.ua/news/vistup-prezidenta-petra-poroshenka-na-ceremoniyi-vshanuvanny-40034, February 16, 2017.

14. http://euromaidan.rbc.ua/rus/news/-pravy-sektor-nazval-soglashenie-s-Yanukovychem-ocherednym-21022014160600.

15. Sergei M. Plekhanov, "Assisted Suicide: Internal and External Causes of the Ukrainian Crisis," in Black and Johns, *The Return of the Cold War*, 18.

16. Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 96.

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Chapter Two

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do

Brexit and Its Aftermath

Michael Johns

On June 23, 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom were asked to make a profound decision on their future. They were asked to decide on the country's continued membership in the European Union (EU). For those wanting a "Leave" vote, this was an opportunity to break away from the unnecessary bureaucracy of the EU, to reestablish national sovereignty over British interests, control its borders, and keep British money at home instead of propping up other failing European economies. For those in the "Remain" camp, the idea of leaving the largest common market in the world was economic suicide. Moreover, Remainers argued that while the citizens of the United Kingdom paid into the EU, they also received societal benefits for this money. The ability to move and work freely across twenty-seven other countries, access to scientific research funds, security information, and global clout it was argued were all bought and paid for with the UK's membership dues. While most of the pundits and pollsters believed that the vote would result in a small but comfortable win for Remain, when the ballots were counted the results stood at Leave 51.9 percent, Remain 48.1 percent. To the amazement of most people, including many on the Leave side, the United Kingdom became the first country to start the process of removing itself from the European Union. This became official when, in April 2017, the UK government triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, starting the clock on the withdrawal. The negotiations surrounding both the UK's exit from the EU and the shape of the future relationship between the EU and the UK are to be concluded by March 2019. At the time of writing, there remained much uncertainty with no agreement between the two sides as to how this exit will occur; nor how to move forward together but now apart. This chapter will briefly discuss the lead up to the referendum vote, the nature of the campaign, and what issues remain to be negotiated. Particular attention will be given to two of the most

difficult negotiations, the nature of the Northern Ireland/Irish border and the rights of EU citizens currently living in the UK and vice versa. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of what Brexit means for both the United Kingdom and the EU. For both, the future is cloudy and the ramifications of the 2016 vote will be felt for decades.

THE UK AND EU—AN UNHAPPY MARRIAGE

If one were to wager which of the member states was to be the first to vote to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom would have made for a safe bet. The UK has always had a difficult relationship with the continent. As Gowland explains, the United Kingdom has always attempted to define itself against the "otherness" of the continent while at the same time "Britain has long featured as a leading actor on the European stage."[1] Spiering goes further in saying "more often than not in British discourse Europe and the Europeans stand for something negative, alien and even dangerous."[2] The situation in which the United Kingdom has had one foot in and one foot out of Europe has existed for centuries and continued after it was finally able to gain membership into what would become the EU in the 1970s. This was after two failed attempts at joining in the 1960s when its membership was vetoed by French president Charles de Gaulle, in part due to the various exemptions the British government was demanding. Only after de Gaulle's death and British negotiators changed tactics to join and then try to influence change from within was Britain successful in joining what was then the European Economic Community along with Denmark and Ireland. Almost immediately after joining, the new British government, unhappy with the rest of the member's unwillingness to negotiate, held a referendum on whether or not to leave the European Economic Community. The remain side won the referendum, but Britain had firmly established itself as the organization's most difficult member. As Friedman accurately described it, the British role in Europe from the point of the first referendum on was "the cold-blooded pursuit of their self-interest without regard to promises and commitments."[3] It was the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht which cemented the UK's unique and troublesome relationship with the EU. While initially in favor of the treaty, the John Major Conservative government soon faced a currency crisis due to the discussions of a common currency. Under pressure from Eurosceptics in his party and the looming collapse of the pound, Major was forced to withdraw the UK from the common currency, as well as carve out other special assurances for the country moving forward.[4] The pro-EU Labour government of Tony Blair saw an opportunity for the UK to

take a leading role in the union and attempted to bring the country into the Eurozone and harmonize the country with the other members. He was never able to marshal enough public support or enthusiasm within his own party to move as quickly as the other members wanted, and the plan was eventually abandoned, meaning that the UK remained on the outside looking in at the Eurozone.[5] While Blair was unable to move the UK closer to the rest of Europe economically, the David Cameron Conservative government was simply unwilling to do so. Moreover, Cameron and his party grew increasingly Eurosceptic and at times openly hostile toward the institution. Facing a more organized threat on the far right from the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and sensing a further public shift away from the policies of the EU, Cameron's Conservatives began to demand a new deal for the UK. This corresponded with another Cameron policy—a demand for net negative migration for the country. For the Cameron government this included immigrants from inside the EU and out. By 2014 Cameron went further in the lead up to the General Election and called for changes to the nature of the free movement of people in the EU to restrict the benefits intra-EU migrants could receive, how long they could stay in the country without a job, and to place a cap or, as he called it, an "emergency brake" on the movement of people from across the EU.[6] Still facing an electoral threat from UKIP on their right, the Conservative government made the campaign promise that if reelected they would hold a referendum on leaving the European Union. With the Conservatives winning a majority government in the 2015 General Election Cameron began his attempts at negotiating a new deal for the UK before he went to the people with the referendum question—the hope being that with newly negotiated concessions from Brussels a Remain victory would be assured. Despite initial resistance, not surprisingly mostly from the leaders of Central and East European states where the majority of intra-EU migration to the UK originated, an agreement was found. Cameron was able to secure a variety of concessions for the United Kingdom to secure it a special status with the EU. These concessions included an acknowledgment that the UK was not tied to the concept of the "ever closer union" as a way of protecting European sovereignty and protections for the British pound. The bulk of the agreement focused on the rights of EU citizens to move freely across the union. Cameron was able to secure the British use of the "emergency brake" to restrict benefits for intra-EU migrants for the first four years of their time in the country if the numbers of migrants got too high. Once pulled, the brake could be used for seven years.[7] Cameron was also able to secure restrictions on automatic free movement of non-EU migrants who married an EU-migrant (as a way to curb sham marriages for immigration) and changes to child benefits for children not living in the UK.[8] With

these concessions secured, Cameron felt confident that he would be able to present them to the British people and win a referendum on EU membership.

THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN

Obviously, David Cameron's confidence was misplaced. He started at a disadvantage, as he had the difficult task of selling the British public on the merits of the EU after having campaigned in the previous election as a Eurosceptic.[9] He misjudged the growing anger at both EU policies, such as the free movement of people, and the Conservative government's austerity policies which led to many voting against Cameron rather than against the EU itself. Due to space it is not possible to provide a day-by-day and in-depth account of the campaign, but it is important to highlight a few issues. As Armstrong makes clear, the campaign itself boiled down to issues of control over several aspects of British life, namely migration, money, laws, and democratic structures.[10] The Leave campaign, led ostensibly by UKIP leader Nigel Farage as well as Conservative cabinet ministers such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson and others, argued throughout that EU membership was limiting Britain's global reach, affecting its ability to control its borders, and costing a lot of money. One of the iconic symbols of the campaign was a Brexit bus with the slogan "We send the EU £350 million a week, lets fund the NHS instead—Vote Leave." While most economists challenged this claim as being inaccurate, the Leave side initially opted to focus its attention on the economic costs of membership. This was designed to drive home their central economic argument that the UK paid more into the EU than it received and that, freed from the organization, it would be better able to compete in the world economy and to provide services at home. For the Remain side there was a conscious effort to also focus on economics. The central themes from Downing Street were on the transactional nature of the EU rather than an argument for the benefits of membership.[11] The Remain side opted to discuss the economic consequences of leaving the European Union. This tactic, quickly labeled "Project Fear" from the Leave side, was an attempt at convincing soft Eurosceptics that the benefits of staying outweighed the problems associated with leaving. Cameron and the Remain side argued that with the changes that had been negotiated Britain was protected from the most unpalatable aspects of the EU, but could benefit from it as long as it remained a member. While this tactic worked on many people, it had two important flaws. First, many citizens were skeptical of the EU and the government promoting it, no longer believing the economists, politicians, and experts. The Leave side effectively channelled the frustra-

tion of many British citizens who felt that they were being lectured to by the rich while they were not benefiting. They were able to use this frustration and turn it into what Flinders calls anti-politics.[12] The Leave side chose to rely on populist, anti-intellectual arguments to convince the voters that they knew their own lives better than economists or other experts. This attempt to override experts was best illustrated by Conservative cabinet member and Leave supporter Michael Gove, who in response to another doomsday prediction by economists on the impact of a leave vote announced "people in this country have had enough of experts." The tactic worked in that the more dire the predictions became during the campaign, the less people chose to believe them. By the end of the campaign, the Remain side was seen by voters as less reliable, more negative, and less clear about the impact of Brexit.[13]

The second reason the Remain economic argument failed to convince a majority of voters was that for many Leave voters, economics was not the deciding factor for their vote. It was immigration.[14] The ability of the UK to control its borders and prevent immigration from inside the EU (and from elsewhere) had become a defining issue for many British voters. As Portes correctly notes, few "would have predicted the centrality of free movement in the Brexit debate; its importance was certainly not anticipated by either supporters or opponents of the EU even a decade ago, let alone at the time of British entry."[15] The free movement of people was one of the founding freedoms on which the EU was built. Over time the right had been expanded from its initial limited interpretation of one person moving across borders to do a specific job to the ability for EU citizens to move freely from one member state to another to look for work and bring their families with them. These intra-EU migrants could then, after a waiting period, access local services. While this right was not largely used in the first decades of the union, after the 2004 expansion into Central and Eastern Europe the number of intra-EU migrants spiked. Due to a variety of reasons, including having the most liberal entry requirements immediately after expansion, the UK was the country that saw the largest influx of people. These migrants became a point of fixation of the tabloid newspapers who would run article after article on how they were overwhelming the services of towns across England and Wales. They also became a key campaign issue for UKIP where they would target ridings with large numbers of intra-EU migrants. It is maybe not surprising then that curbing their movement into the UK and limiting their rights to access services were some of the main concessions Cameron negotiated with the other members ahead of the referendum. It is apparent that the concessions were not enough to satisfy many Leave voters. Their lack of trust in experts rendered arguments surrounding the lack of impact of intra-EU migrants on social services moot. Even the murder of pro-immigrant Labour Member of

Parliament Jo Cox by an anti-EU xenophobe in the waning days of the campaign was not enough to change the results.

Beyond the obvious 52-48 percent victory for the Leave side, the results represent a fascinating look into a fractured society. At a macrolevel Scotland voted 62-38 to Remain, Northern Ireland 56-44. Wales voted 52.5-47.5 to Leave, while England voted almost 53-47 to Leave. Within England London voted 60-40 to Remain while Northern England had the highest Leave vote totals. While Leave and Remain voters could be found anywhere and across demographics, certain patterns emerged. The typical Leave voter was male, older, with less education, and earning less than £1200 per month. Moreover, the typical Leave voters believed that their life had gotten worse in the past ten years compared to others, lived in social housing, saw themselves as working class, and read the tabloid newspapers such as the *Daily Mail* or the *Sun*.[16] A closer look at the results yields another interesting result. Despite the typical Leave voter's economic precariousness, it was Remain voters who indicated the economy was their main issue in choosing how to vote. For Leave voters the most important issues were immigration and to a lesser extent sovereignty. Specifically, in regions where there were large influxes of intra-EU migration since 2004 (Central and East Europeans) the Leave vote was considerably higher than in regions with less migration.[17]

Brexit highlights the divisions in modern Britain. The young and more educated were much more likely to use and benefit from the advantages of the European Union and vote Remain. Those who felt that they were being left behind include the old and the less educated who face challenges in a globalized economy. For Leave voters, threats to the national economy fell on deaf ears since they were already struggling. These voters were more interested in looking for someone to blame for their already difficult situation. Rather than be concerned about an economy that already had passed them by, they were concerned with curbing the immigration that they blamed for increased competition for their jobs. In the end the majority of voters in the referendum viewed the EU and its policies as having adversely affected their lives, so regardless of the consequences of doing so, leaving was the obvious choice.

ISSUES MOVING FORWARD

Of all of the issues that still need to be addressed before Brexit can be finalized, the question of Northern Ireland may be the most difficult. Northern Ireland has long been the "odd man" out of the United Kingdom, often forgotten or considered in national affairs. The very term Brexit is proof of the lack of thought many in the country give to Northern Ireland. Great Britain is

the island consisting of Wales, England, and Scotland—not Northern Ireland. While Brexit will affect Northern Ireland as much or more than any other region in the country, it is not considered in the term most often used to describe the event. For many in the country Northern Ireland is most associated with the troubles, the seventy-year struggle between Unionists (Protestants) who wished to remain a part of the UK and Republicans (Catholics) who wished to reunite the island as a unified Ireland. The conflict cost thousands of lives, crippled the region's economy, and the sight of the British military patrolling their own streets was an embarrassment for the country. After decades of death, destruction, and political inertia a breakthrough was made in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Accord (GFA). This agreement, facilitated by the United States and signed by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and agreed to by the major political parties of Northern Ireland, set out the conditions for what was hoped to be a lasting peace. The GFA included agreements on power-sharing in the Northern Ireland parliament, agreements on human rights, equality, prisoner exchanges, and cross-border cooperation to allow both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to collectively benefit.[18] The agreement also allowed for all citizens of Northern Ireland to have both British and Irish citizenship. With the signing of the GFA (or Belfast Agreement as it is also called) there was for the first time in decades the opportunity for an end to conflict, economic restructuring, and a sense of normalcy to be felt on both sides of the border.

Importantly, much of the language of the GFA was rooted in the language of the European Union. As the European Parliament describes Strand Two of the agreement:

> This Strand assumes continuing joint UK-Irish membership of the EU and this shared belonging forms part of the background to institutional arrangements. Strand Two pledges that the North-South Ministerial Council, designed to promote and oversee all-island cooperation, will 'consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework' (para. 17). The same paragraph also requires '*arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the [North-South Ministerial] Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings*'.[19]

Moreover, much of the funding for the peace process, over 2.3 Billion Euros, has come from European Union programs, including most notably the Special European Union Programme Bodies' EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Clearly, after Brexit the aspects of the GFA that include the European Union will need to be removed and replaced. Where the replacement of funds will come from is not clear at the time of

writing. Where the danger lies is in opening up the agreement at all. In order to amend the GFA to conform to the new reality and eliminate any mention of the European Union, it will need to be renegotiated and the changes agreed to by all signatories. With the heightened political rhetoric that has accompanied the Brexit negotiations, this may prove difficult. In particular, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and its hard Brexit stance currently propping up the Conservative minority government, negotiations with other Republican parties (most notably Sinn Fein) in Northern Ireland or the government of Ireland itself may not be possible.[20] If the GFA collapses and there is a return to mistrust, violence, and instability, then all of the progress and improvements to the lives of the Northern Irish would have been lost.

While the challenges of reworking the Good Friday Accord is of paramount importance to many on the island of Ireland, both North and South, there is a second problem that threatens the very nature of the Brexit negotiations and will determine how "hard" or "soft" the final exit agreement will be. If the United Kingdom is to leave all aspects of the European Union, it will need to fully withdraw from the customs union.[21] The customs union is the free trade zone agreed to by its members which determines the levels of tariffs for each good that is entering the market. Within the union all goods are regulated, their safety is ensured by all members, and certain standards are agreed to. The customs union is the basis on which the entire economic model of the European Union operates. It is what ensures that the EU operates as a single, common market with each state being responsible for the goods that cross its borders for all of the other member states. Within the UK government there is currently no agreement on whether Brexit will require a full exit from the custom union as well as the organization as a whole. For most "Leavers," out means out, and that incorporates all aspects of the EU including the customs union. This would create an enormous problem, however, in Northern Ireland. If the UK was to fully exit the customs union, it is the opinion of the Irish government, EU negotiators, and most experts on EU trade law that a physical border would be required between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The argument contends that a border that has the ability to examine all goods that are leaving the United Kingdom (which would be outside the custom union) and entering Ireland would be required to ensure standards, tariffs, and safety. Therefore, if the goal is to not have a border, the UK would have to agree to a "backstop" of a customs union agreement and comply with EU standards and regulations. A hard physical border between Northern Ireland and the Republic would violate many aspects of the Good Friday Accord as well as slow down trade and cripple the Northern Irish and to a lesser extent the Irish economy.[22] The British government is therefore between a rock and a hard place. If it acquiesces to staying in the customs union for the sake of protecting

the British economy and maintaining peace in Northern Ireland, it will be held to all of the same standards it was before Brexit, but without a vote on shaping those policies. For many who advocate a clean break with the EU after Brexit this is completely unacceptable. However, there does not appear to be a way to protect the EU's customs union along the Northern Irish border without a physical presence. At the time of writing this chapter the British government has been unable to formally agree amongst its members or with Ireland and the EU negotiators on a resolution to this problem. Various solutions have been floated but none solves the basic dilemma that Brexit appears to mean either having a full break from the customs union or having a borderless island of Ireland, but not both. Adding to the difficulties is that the UK government is not operating in a vacuum, and there are other players involved that would be required to sign off on any agreement. For example, the government of Ireland has been clear in its view that whatever solution is found, it cannot involve a hard border between it and Northern Ireland. Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar described the creation of a hard border as a "red line" and that the lack of a customs union backstop in Northern Ireland would lead to an end to negotiations and prevent an orderly exit from the union.[23]

To get out of this dilemma, the UK government has proposed a variety of solutions. Initially, there was a discussion of a seamless border similar, it was argued, to the Canadian-United States border. The British government argued that despite not belonging to a customs union (only NAFTA the free trade agreement) thousands of trucks carrying goods cross between the two countries quickly and efficiently everyday and therefore there was nothing stopping the UK/Irish border from replicating this. This proposal was rejected out of hand by the Irish prime minister who after visiting the US/Canadian border reported on Twitter that, while efficient, it was a hard border that included "armed guards, dogs, flags and checkpoints."[24] After this was rejected, the Conservative cabinet seemed to be fixated on two other possible solutions. The first was to withdraw from the customs union but agree to a "customs partnership." This would mean that the United Kingdom would act on behalf of the European Union by collecting tariffs on goods coming into Britain from around the world but destined for the EU. The UK would then pay the EU the money it collected. This would mean that "the UK would apply EU duties at its borders on those goods destined for the 27, while applying its own rates for products intended to remain within the UK."[25] Menon and Bevington identify the critical fault in this plan stating:

> It would create endless opportunities to undermine the tariff systems of both the UK and the EU. There would be little to stop importers who wanted to avoid high tariffs on either side from sending them to the other first and passing them

> back over the border. The only way to prevent this would be to track the movement of every good imported into the UK, which at last count amounted to some 280 million tonnes.[26]

Not surprisingly the EU negotiators have rejected this bureaucratic nightmare as a possible replacement for a physical border. Not only would the concept potentially violate existing trade laws, the costs would be enormous for both the UK and the EU member states to implement. The negotiators have also rejected the other proposal coming from the UK cabinet—the concept of maximum facilitation, or "max fac." This is the idea that through the development of technology, the use of best practices, and the development of trusted trader programs there can be a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and Ireland to ensure the free movement of trade while not threatening the peace accords or ensuring an Irish veto. While the max fac plan may have been popular within the British cabinet, it was rejected by the EU for two important reasons. The first was that no matter what example was cited as proof that it was possible it either required membership in a customs union (Sweden-Norway, for example) or some form of physical border (US-Canada), making the entire discussion moot. The second problem was that the underpinnings of a max fac solution were based on technology that currently does not exist. With the deadline to withdrawal coming closer by the day and a lack of trust in the British government's ability to invent new technology in time, it was an easy decision for the EU to reject this idea as well.

In May 2018, after failing to convince the European Union negotiators that the previous options were viable, the UK cabinet agreed to champion a new way forward. Rather than attempt to create a special condition for Northern Ireland, the new plan would be for the UK to accept the EU's tariff structure and standards across the country as a whole until a time when a new agreement could be agreed to.[27] This would provide a short-term solution that does not separate Northern Ireland out of the process and would prevent a physical border. At the time of this writing, this plan has not been approved by the government as a whole or by the European Union. It is difficult to imagine that those in favor of a hard Brexit where out means out would be amenable to a plan that ties the entire UK into a de facto customs union indefinitely (without a vote on its development), but it may be the only option left that does not trigger either a constitutional crisis in the country or a crashing out of the EU without a withdraw bill in place. As with most of Brexit, only time will tell how this is eventually resolved.

While the Northern Irish border remains an ongoing unresolved problem, other issues that most thought resolved still linger. The most obvious example is the fate of the millions of EU citizens currently living in the UK and the British citizens living in other EU member states. Once Article 50 was trig-

gered and formal talks began, both sides acknowledged that the fate of intra-EU migrants would need to be addressed. By some estimation there were three million EU citizens living in the UK and over one million UK citizens living in other member states. These citizens have used the rights provided by their country's membership in the EU to establish their lives. They have jobs or are going to school, many have families. For Central and Eastern European members, the need to resolve this issue was most acute as their citizens represented the majority of those who would be affected. With so much uncertainty and so many lives affected, the remaining member states took a hard line on these negotiations. On May 5, 2017, the European Council (the remaining twenty-seven members) released a document outlining the Brexit negotiation directives that they would be using during the Article 50 talks. The free movement of people, as part of the rights of citizens was paramount. The directive stated:

> The first priority for the negotiations is to agree on guarantees to protect the rights of EU and UK citizens, and their family members, that are affected by Brexit. The EU27 insist that such guarantees should be reciprocal and based on equal treatment among EU27 citizens and compared to UK citizens. This should cover, among others, the right to permanent residence after five years of legal residence, including if this period is incomplete on the date of withdrawal but is completed afterwards.[28]

With the EU holding to its red line on equality, the shape of the negotiations was set. In December 2017 the EU and UK announced that they had reached a general agreement on resolving this issue and further outlined the agreement in February 2018. The two sides have agreed on the rules for "settled status" with an agreement based on the terms set out by the EU above and the criteria for gaining permanent residence status currently in the EU. Generally, these criteria are: "5 years of continuous residence exercising treaty rights as an employee, self-employed person, student, jobseeker or self-sufficient person."[29] More specifically, the agreement covers both those who are in their current country of residence and those who arrive during the transition period through to 2020. For family reunification, who qualifies as immediate family would be liberally interpreted to include grandparents and children. Finally, there was an agreement to make the application process streamlined with effective monitoring and to include access to social security.[30]

With this agreement it would appear that the UK had generally acquiesced to the EU's demands and that this was one of very few issues that could be considered resolved through negotiations. Unfortunately for the millions of people affected there are still many issues that will require further agreements and monitoring to ensure people's rights are protected. Sumption and Kone have identified numerous groups who will need to be informed that

they will need to apply to stay, including children, long-term residents, and people who have already applied for permanent status. They also identify the problems associated with people in abusive relationships who may have a difficult time applying without the aid of their partners, the elderly, and those with language barriers or who lack proper documentation.[31] If specific help is not provided to these marginalized citizens, they may not be able to fully participate in the program and risk being expelled from the country. Benton et al. also examine the problems with the agreement, with their focus being on UK citizens living in the EU. They identify issues with unequal preparedness across the EU to register the UK citizens who wish to stay. They also note that it has not been determined if a UK citizen who has permanent residency in one EU country has the right to move to another. Most importantly, they acknowledge that while an agreement is currently in place, it would need to be part of a final exit agreement, so it is still subject to change.[32]

It may not be surprising that the group that appears to have catalogued the most unanswered questions surrounding the future of the intra-EU migrants is the advocacy group of the migrants themselves. The group, The3Million, currently has 150 questions that they believe they do not have answers to based on the agreement. Many have been discussed above, but others include: will permanent residents have the same path to citizenship, is there a right to leave and return during the process, how will aid for migrants going through the process be funded, what is the right to appeal a rejected application, and many more.[33]

The case of intra-EU migrants illustrates how much work is left to be done. Even when common agreement is found on large issues, there are devils in the details. For the millions of EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU their lives, families, and careers hang on such details. Uncertainty about their future will remain until all of these questions are agreed to on paper and not just in principle.

BRITAIN AFTER BREXIT

Due to space restrictions this chapter has only highlighted two of the larger issues that need to be resolved before Brexit is complete and a withdrawal agreement can be signed. In reality there are thousands of agreements that must be hammered out, and the United Kingdom and the EU are going to have to decide how much they will continue to cooperate on a variety of issues moving forward. Each of these issues will have an impact on the British public and the UK government's ability to interact on the global stage. The most obvious issue that has yet to be discussed is What will a future trade

agreement between the EU and the UK look like. While there have been many UK politicians trumpeting the possibilities of new free trade agreements with everyone from China to the Commonwealth to the United States and Theresa May, has discussed a post-Brexit "Global Britain," the reality is that the most important trade relationship will continue to be with the United Kingdom's closest neighbors in Europe.[34] A discussion of a future trade deal is in all likelihood something on which both sides would be eager to engage; yet, as with almost all of the aspects of Brexit, it is conditional on many other factors. Most notably when it comes to trade, the issue of the UK and the potential participation in some form of customs union needs to be agreed. If the UK, either as a whole or in part belongs to the customs union, or a de facto customs union under another name, the ease in which a new free trade agreement could be reached is considerably higher than if a deal cannot be reached and the UK and EU agree on a hard Brexit or if the UK crashes out of the union entirely.

Issues of human rights and equality will also need to be addressed by the UK after Brexit. While the European Union started as a trade organization, it quickly increased political and social influence on its members and over time has passed numerous directives and regulations to protect EU citizens and ensure their rights. There were concerns that many of those rights would be affected as part of the process of Brexit. In the short term this does not appear to be the case. For now there is no serious discussion of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights, and most of the regulations that the EU has developed on equality and human rights (for example, those on the trafficking of people) needed to be incorporated into national law so that they will remain on the books.[35] According to the 2017 British government white paper on the "Great Repeal," however, there will be some changes, and these could have a long-term effect. The white paper acknowledges that as part of Brexit, the UK will remove the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights from its laws.[36] This charter goes farther than other aspects of British law on the rights of children as well as aspects of equality in employment and other areas of British life. Moreover, while the previous rulings of the European Court of Justice on human rights will continue to be enforced, the resulting Brexit negotiations may see the UK leaving its jurisdiction. Without the charter, the future case law of the ECJ and, without the external assurances of the EU regulations over time, the UK, its citizens, and particularly those living in the country without citizenship may see a degradation of their rights.

After so many years as part of the EU, the UK has come to rely on many of its shared institutions as part of daily life. With Brexit, the British government will need to decide which to try to stay in and how to replace those that will

be lost. For example, one of the first issues that was raised post-referendum involved the UK's continued unrestricted access to European airspace. The European Union has an internal Open Skies agreement that states that all companies that are over 50 percent European-owned can fly within the union relatively unrestricted under free market conditions. All air carriers that do not meet that requirement face restrictions and increased costs unless the country where they are flagged has signed an Open Skies agreement with the EU. For example, the European Union and the United States have a mutually beneficial open skies agreement that allows US carriers access to the EU and vice versa. Without an agreement to allow British carriers to access the EU or the US markets ahead of the withdraw date there are concerns that much of the British fleet could be grounded, unable to access their largest markets.[37] While some non-EU states operate under the EU open skies umbrella, such as Norway and Switzerland, they have had to agree to operate under EU rules to do so. To protect the British tourism industry and allow for the national airlines to keep flying, the UK may have to agree to the EU rules but, as with the potential customs partnership, have no say in how those rules develop.

The Open Skies problem is replicated in many other areas. Without a formal agreement between the UK and the rest of the European Union, British students and researchers could be shut out of the Erasmus+ programming which provides exchange opportunities and research funding for its member organization once the current funding period expires in 2020. It is unclear if the United Kingdom Space Agency will continue to be associated with the European Space Agency. In early 2018 the EU announced that British aerospace companies would be shut out of contracts for the ten-billion-pound Galileo satellite program because it goes against its policy of sharing sensitive information with outside countries.[38] At the time of this writing, the negotiations over the Galileo project continue, but they illustrate the difficulty in separating from institutions that rely on sensitive material and pose questions about the future of military cooperation and information-sharing on issues of crime. While long-term solutions to these issues may be possible, the United Kingdom is going to have to negotiate each of them (and hundreds more) with the EU, and they will not be in a position of strength. For each of them the UK government will need to decide how much control they will be willing to hand over to the EU in exchange for access. In short, how much are they willing to still act like an EU member without any say in the development of the EU policies?

Beyond the questions surrounding how the United Kingdom replaces the institutions of the European Union, there is a larger, more fundamental issue the UK may need to address moving forward: the Scottish question. As mentioned above, Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in the European

Union. This result should not have been surprising. In the opinion of many Scots access to the European Union and its market was an important factor in their decision to remain in the United Kingdom during the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.[39] Now, many Scots face the worst-case scenario of being outside the EU but inside the UK. The Scottish government since the Brexit vote has attempted to carve out a space either within the EU separate from the rest of the UK or to have a greater say or veto over the withdrawal agreement. In December 2016 the government released a white paper on Scotland's goals after Brexit. In it, the government outlined a plan that if Brexit occurred Scotland should remain inside the common market and to operate in a manner similar to Norway. This would mean that while Scotland would not be a member it would comply with EU policies and therefore could access many of the advantages of membership.[40] Throughout the white paper the Scottish government recommends to the UK government that it should continue to work within the EU structures as much as possible, but if it chooses not to, then Scotland should retain the right to govern itself as it currently does within the EU and to choose a future associated as closely as possible with the EU. This divide between the British government and the most ardently pro-EU government in the UK has continued. In early 2018 Theresa May's government put forward draft legislation to deal with post-Brexit power sharing within the UK. The Scottish parliament rejected this legislation. While the Scottish vote is not binding, the disagreement on how best to distribute the twenty-four separate powers being returned to the UK after Brexit presents a real threat to British unity.[41] If the British government chooses to impose on Scotland a new power-sharing agreement that it has already rejected, it risks the possibility of a second referendum on Scottish independence. If a second referendum were held, the UK would not be able to hold out the threat of losing EU membership and in fact the pull of rejoining the EU may be popular in Scotland. If a deal cannot be reached, then Brexit may cause a constitutional crisis that threatens the union itself.

While the potential of a second Scottish referendum on independence and the breakup of the United Kingdom may be an unlikely worst-case, there has been damage done to British society. In a country that was already divided by region, class, ideology, race and along many other spectrums, the Brexit vote has added another bitter divide. The Brexit result has divided families, ended friendships, and cost people their jobs. It continues to tear the two largest political parties apart and has brought parliament to a standstill. There is early evidence that Brexit has damaged the UK economy, and depending on how the trade issues are settled, things could get worse. Most of all, the United Kingdom's international reputation has suffered post-Brexit. Many leaders of European states, such as Macron in France and Merkel in Germany, have

quietly moved on with their international agendas with little concern for British input or cooperation. Outside of the United Kingdom there is disbelief that a government could fail to have a workable plan on so many issues this far into negotiations, and many are wondering how a public could vote to make their lives potentially worse without fully understanding the consequences. Outside of the European Union, without trade deals in place and seemingly coming apart at the seams, the United Kingdom appears to be a shell of its former glory. As Matt Kelly asks: "Have we ever looked so weak, so daft, such an irrelevant, if amusing, sideshow on the fringes of the international stage?"[42] While there is still time to right the ship, that time is running out and there is much work to be done.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER BREXIT

While much of the attention of this chapter has been focussed on the ramifications of Brexit on the United Kingdom, the European Union has not come out unscathed. For much of the EU's existence it was predicated on unending successes. Countries ravaged by war rebuilt quickly, struggling economies grew, former communist countries integrated into the West, and countries were desperate to join. Ahead of the Brexit vote there were cracks in this narrative, but the Brexit discussion has broken them open for all to see. From the beginning of the European Union experiment there have been those in opposition of it. For some the loss of sovereignty was too great, for others the EU was too bureaucratic, or specific legislation was unacceptable. Over time, and particularly after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which greatly enhanced the power of the EU, the number of people around Europe who classified themselves as Eurosceptics grew. As more people have become disillusioned with the EU, the ability for political parties to find electoral success appealing to them also grew. Where once the EU was overwhelmingly seen as an organization that helped Europe, more and more people have begun to see it as an obstacle. As these anti-EU parties experienced electoral success, the union has had a more difficult time keeping the member states united on a variety of issues. The European parliament now has a wing of anti-EU politicians that make both the internal and external environment challenging. After years of success, the EU has had the embarrassment of pulling its original proposed constitution after failed referendums in France and the Netherlands and saw the 2008 economic collapse lead to crises in Greece, Cyprus, and elsewhere. Now with Brexit, some Eurosceptics see a weakened EU that is primed to collapse. Critics hoping for proof that the EU has more problems on the horizon are now watching Italy. At the time of this writing, it is unclear how the cur-

rent constitutional crisis in Italy will resolve itself. However, it would appear that the governing coalition of the populist 5-Star Movement and far-right Lega was altered before taking office after the country's president vetoed the proposed (Lega) Minister of Finance due to his views on withdrawing Italy from the Euro. How this move affects public opinion on the Euro specifically and the EU generally is not known at this moment, but it is yet another headache for those who believe in the European experiment.

There will be other challenges for the EU and its member states post-Brexit. As discussed above, Brexit may have a severe effect on the Irish economy and society. As Armstrong notes, British allies in the EU such as Denmark may feel more isolated and unable to keep the unique opt-outs they have secured in the past.[43] Populist governments in Poland and Hungary challenge the EU's ability to ensure standards on rights and equality. The EU will need to restructure its budgets to account for the hole left by the UK, and it will need to restructure its institutions.[44] There will be questions surrounding the free movement of people and the growing uneasiness with immigration generally across the member states. It will be imperative for the leaders of the member states and for the EU's bureaucracy to work to curb the far-right and populist movements that are creeping across Europe if they want to maintain the EU. Brexit is not absolute proof that the EU is doomed, but it is proof that it is far less stable than it once was thought.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

At the time of this writing, there were less than three hundred days left until the United Kingdom was to formally withdraw from the European Union. This was not a lot of time to resolve all of the outstanding issues. With the divisions in the two largest political parties in the UK, and a gulf between the EU and UK on many questions still wide, the chances of meeting the deadline seem remote. This will mean that either the United Kingdom will face the possibility of having to request a delay in leaving, which will anger many, or risk crashing out of the EU without a transition deal in place, which could be catastrophic. For the remaining member states and the EU bureaucracy, ongoing Brexit talks serve as a distraction for the other problems they face both inside and outside of the union. Brexit must serve as a cautionary tale for everyone involved, but no matter how it is ultimately resolved, the damage has been done. If there is a takeaway from the entire Brexit affair, it is how so many institutions, politicians, bureaucrats, and others failed. When the complete history of Brexit is written, it will be a story of failure and disorder. The European Union and its institutions failed to convince the majority of the British people of the benefits

of membership. David Cameron and many previous Prime Ministers failed to acknowledge the advantages of the EU and often chose to pass local blame onto the union. The Remain side of the referendum failed to reach voters and convince them of the value of membership beyond economic arguments that many felt did not concern them. The Leave side failed to tell the truth about the costs of both membership and of leaving. Since the referendum the UK government has failed to provide a workable path forward to a post-Brexit UK, and the EU has failed to contain growing Euroscepticism across Europe. Lastly, many voters failed to fully educate themselves about what the EU is and what the consequences of a Leave vote meant.[45]

Whether Brexit will be remembered as the beginning of the end of the EU or simply the end of the EU's most difficult member's participation will not be known for some time. In the short term there is much work to be done, millions of lives will be affected, and there is no clear path to take. The clock is ticking.

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Chapter Three

The Presidency Is What Trump Makes of It

The Trump Test and the New World Disorder

Christopher J. Fettweis

Summit meetings between leaders, according to the conventional wisdom, are the climax of international diplomacy. They occur at the end of long processes of negotiations, after the details of complex agreements have been worked out by underlings, and are designed to add only final touches. Months of meticulous planning precede the smiles, handshakes, and photo ops that are the true essence of summitry.

President Trump disagreed. When the opportunity to meet with Kim Jong Un presented itself through the intervention of South Korea, the president agreed immediately, without consulting advisors or insisting on preconditions. Many in the foreign policy community reacted quickly and negatively, suggesting that this is simply not how things are done. Normal presidents do not make rash, impulsive, spur-of-the-moment decisions with potentially enormous implications. Trump, however, is not a normal president.

Trump has no interest in precedent or received wisdom. He trusts his instincts, and in the process demands that everyone else adjust to his new ways of acting. He forces analysts and observers to question much of what they thought was true, about presidential behavior and leadership itself.

In other words, Donald Trump is America's first constructivist president. He does not know this, of course—he does not read, and even if he did it seems unlikely that Alexander Wendt's work would find a place on his nightstand—but he is living proof of the wisdom of the constructivist approach to foreign policy.[1] Every day Trump forces longtime watchers of the presidency to rethink what they had previously accepted as true and inevitable, to question the rules, and to wonder just what has to be.

The great contribution of constructivism in the 1990s was to ask International Relations to examine the corpus of knowledge, that which was always believed to be true, in the hope of separating the eternal from the ephemeral.

Much of what scholars have long accepted is in reality socially constructed, dependent not upon law or rule but convention and shared belief. Even the most basic, ubiquitous concepts—like the balance of power and anarchy—were constructed by international society, not inherited from human nature.

If so many of the major, guiding concepts were constructed, the obvious implication went, so too could they be deconstructed. What is does not have to be. The characteristics of the system, once thought eternal and immutable, are as malleable as the people who devised and maintained them. Fundamental change is not only possible but inevitable, alongside evolutions in society and in the dominant patterns of thought and behavior. Constructivists insist that ideas, rather than abstract notions of power or justice, provide the system its structure.[2]

Trump brought a similar philosophy into the White House. Perhaps vaguely aware of how his predecessors behaved (and perhaps not), Trump was determined to run the government his own way. He was unimpressed with the stodgy, boring, Coolidge-esque dignity that had come to be associated with the office and uninterested in acting "presidential." He was going to entertain as well as lead, replacing "no drama Obama" with constant headline-grabbing crises.

Sacrosanct conventional political wisdoms collapsed one after another. Presidential candidates needed to release tax returns; no more. Presidential candidates could not openly mock the handicapped or POWs, or discuss their genitals during debates. They did not contend that the women accusing them of molestation and assault are liars because they are simply too ugly to molest and assault. They did not leer at their daughters. They read.

In office, Trump continues to rewrite the rules. He refused to separate himself from his business interests or set up a blind trust. He ignored nepotism conventions, putting his daughter and son-in-law on the payroll and trusting them with the kind of major assignments previously given to people with qualifications and experience. He carries on quite public feuds with members of his own administration, castigating them on Twitter or mocking them at campaign-style rallies. He gets to the office at 11 a.m. and retires to his bedroom at 6 p.m. He ends the day binge-watching cable television, surrounded by hamburger wrappers and magazines with his photo on the cover. Throughout, the political class looks on aghast, as would a butler in a fine Edwardian household whose occupant began cavorting with hookers or Labor MPs. Some things are simply not done.

By overturning many of the norms and shibboleths previously associated with the presidency, Trump demands that observers look at the office with new eyes. What is actually important in a presidency, and what has been accepted as such merely because of precedent and habit? What does it mean to be presidential?

Trump has utterly remade the process of policymaking as well. No longer does the CIA stay aloof from policy matters, nor do security clearances matter, nor are meetings held before major decisions are reached. Notes are not regularly kept at meetings, nor are policy proposals written down. "There are no minutes, no work product, no materials," according to one observer, and reports emerge as if they are the "product of immaculate conception."[3] The president has suggested that he does not need a chief of staff, and may soon be without one. Large portions of the American political system, especially within his party, have bent to Trump's will. No one has been able to presidentialize him, if such a word exists, and most have proven content to watch him deconstruct the office in exchange for Supreme Court justices, tax cuts, and/or a war with Iran.

Nowhere is Trump more constructivist than in his rhetoric. Whereas most observers believed that demonstrable mendacity could sink a campaign, he proved that reality could instead be constructed by force of personality. Though fact checkers number his false or misleading claims in the thousands, no amount of lying has any effect on Trump's popularity. His supporters know he is a consummate bullshitter, but are unbothered.[4] They would rather live in the world constructed by Trump, whether or not it bears any resemblance to reality. Somehow his lies seem to make him *more* popular, and large sections of the public are willing to believe Trump over their own lying eyes and ears.

The Trump presidency is a multiyear example of what political scientists call a *systemic shock*. It will inject chaos into both domestic and international politics, and whatever is left in its wake will be the system's enduring features, those likely to persist. Many of our most sacred institutions, theories, laws, norms, assumptions, beliefs, and behaviors will not survive; we soon will be able to separate the venerable from the vulnerable. What aspects of international politics are consistent and enduring, and which are ephemeral and change with the whim of the president?

This chapter will not attempt to identify the fundamentals of the emerging Trump foreign policy, because to do so would imply that some exist. It will not participate in that most banal of preoccupations of the armchair analyst, the rush to identify his "doctrine." Instead it will try to offer a take on the deeper, perhaps enduring implications of having the world's unipolar power being led by an unconventional constructivist. Although it might not always seem so to those who suffer through his daily vulgarities and inanities, there will come a day when Trump exits the White House. What will the international system look like then? Should there be wreckage, how long will it take to clean it up?

For the curious and the impatient: the first section expands a bit more on the Trump test, and explains why it is likely to be important; those that follow examine different aspects of politics that will bear the brunt of the Trump

shock. They will be the dependent variables in the coming presidential experiment, the theories and concepts and features that may or may not emerge unscathed. The chapter then concludes with some reasons for optimism for the Trump era. Despite widespread expectations of impending doom, there will be much to learn from the coming years, if analysts can avert their gaze from the circus geekery long enough to take note.

THE TRUMP TEST

Over the course of the next few years, Donald Trump will unwittingly be testing some of the most well-established theories, concepts, and assumptions of political science. This test will be an interesting and important one, for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, it will be an unprecedented opportunity, one unlikely to be repeated. Trump is a unique, utterly *sui generis* character; other leaders may have approached either his level of inexperience, narcissism, or utter contempt for governance, but none have combined the three in one package. He is a perfect storm of psychopathology combined with innate political instincts and talent, unforeseeable and still unbelievable to political establishments everywhere. His test will be simultaneously accidental and rigorous, and will allow observers to learn a great deal about which parts of the canon are socially constructed and open to fundamental alteration.

Second, structural factors ensure the significance of the coming Trump tests. The United States is the strongest country in the world, and powerful members of any system determine its basic norms and rules. Power realities prevent other countries from changing the system in fundamental ways. The barriers to President Trump will be much lower; if any single leader can affect the international order, it is the American president. If he tries and fails, then it is hard to imagine what would succeed. Should some of these ideas, institutions, norms, and theories survive the Trump era, then their validity, legitimacy, and/or staying power will have received substantial confirmation. In other words, changes to the United States are unlikely to remain in the United States. The implications, and lessons, are going to be global, not merely national, even if the first returns are likely to involve American politics.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

Much has been made of the various challenges that the Trump presidency poses to American democracy. This section will be brief, therefore, since

many good reviews of the ongoing test of U.S. domestic institutions exist elsewhere.[5] The most basic rethinking that Trump is demanding of our political understanding and assumptions is to the idea of America itself. Most Americans have long assumed that a commitment to democratic practice is deeply ingrained in their political culture, but until now the strength of that commitment has rarely been tested. How strong are America's democratic norms and beliefs? Can they withstand an assault from a president with clear authoritarian instincts?

Make no mistake: Trump is no democrat. Like all would-be tyrants before him, Trump has attacked the independent judiciary and called for the prosecution of his political enemies. He has responded to all unfavorable press coverage, not with explanations or clarifications but attacks, and often personal ones, on the messengers. His administration produces "alternative facts" as part of the sustained "counterpunching" of which he is so proud. His goal is not to win debates but fundamentally undermine those on the other side, hoping to convince his base that they too are under assault. The president has adopted not only the attitudes and tactics of prior authoritarians, but sometimes their precise phraseology as well. He shows no favoritism in his choices, borrowing equally from Stalin (the press is the "enemy of the people") and Hitler (changing "lying press" [*Lügenpresse*] only slightly, to "fake news"). All good constructivists know that rhetoric matters and that word choice shapes debate.

Early returns are encouraging for this, the most basic of the Trump tests. Domestic political institutions have, for the most part, held firm in the face of his relentless assaults. The press remains unintimidated, for the most part, and the judiciary overruled a number of Trump's initial moves. Law enforcement has also been able to maintain its independence, as the appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller makes clear. Antidemocratic behavior has been mostly contained inside the White House.

As every nervous flyer can tell you, however, past performance is no guarantee of future success. Revolutionary political behavior always seems impossible until it happens. While it is true that, up until now, the various checks and balances built into the U.S. system have done their job checking and balancing Trump's authoritarian tendencies, pessimists could point to two reasons for concern. First, the primary countervailing power on the executive branch has been mostly supine over the course of the initial stages of this presidency. Those Republican members of Congress who object to Trump's substance or style have been cowed by watching Trump's GOP critics pay with their careers. While pronouncements of Trump's party takeover have perhaps been a bit premature, it remains true that few in his party are willing to stand up to him on-the-record. Second, Trump's political base has

not waivered at all through the first months of his term. A solid third of the American electorate has proven willing to follow him wherever he leads, and is apt to believe the Trump version of events over those provided by the lying media or their Deep State allies.

Thus far the greatest check on Trump's authoritarian instincts has been his incompetence. Any danger of him scheming behind the scenes to subvert American democracy has been alleviated by his inability to scheme about anything without immediate leaks, usually from multiple sources. He has run into a problem common among dictators: Unwilling to share the limelight with talented advisors, Trump surrounded himself instead with mediocrities, sycophants, and those willing to feign sycophantism. Fortunately for fans of the American democratic experiment, Trump is not a Hitler-esque evil genius seeking to seize power. He is instead a Barnum-esque evil incompetent who lives in a dystopian fantasy world of his own creation, throwing tantrums when reality does not conform.

If the first year is any indication, the American political institutions may prove sufficiently robust to survive the test Trump is putting them through. If that test extends beyond 2020—if the first year is not a quarter but an eighth of the total—they may have sufficient time to weaken. Those who follow Trump in the White House may well be playing by different rules, and might not share his limiting incompetence. Trump's successors will probably eschew his vulgarity, boorishness, and unique grammar, but they are unlikely to repudiate completely the expanded executive powers that Trump endeavors to create. American democracy might survive the short-term challenge from Trump, but he has cleared the way for more concerted efforts to undermine it down the road. He has shown how U.S. democracy can end, even if he is incapable of bringing it down himself.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Trump's rise is part of a worldwide populist movement that has swept a number of unsavory characters into office in recent years. Trump is the U.S. version of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi or Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, but more consequential than either because of America's power and status.

The election of these and other leaders should effectively put to rest some issues that scholars used to debate. Democracy does not produce better leaders than other systems, for one.[6] It turns out that pathological narcissists can ride waves of voter anger, fear, and resentment right into statehouses even in the world's oldest of democracies. Indeed, it is hard to imagine Trump coming to power in anything other than a democracy: he has not shown the

strategic aptitude needed to lead a coup plot, and would never win followers among the various selectorates that control the top positions in autocracies. Trumpian blowhards need systems where the voice of the "poorly educated" masses, to use the president's phrase, is as important as any other.[7] Only a democracy fits that bill.

Answers to a variety of other questions have yet to materialize. The Trump presidency is demanding reconsideration of, at the very least, the "New Peace," alliances, institutions, the liberal world order (and the U.S. role therein), as well as norms of diplomacy and negotiation. By its end we will have a deeper understanding of all these, and a better sense of when what we thought was knowledge was in fact merely belief.

THE "NEW PEACE"

Unbeknownst to Trump and many professional observers of international politics, the world is substantially less violent than it was even a generation ago. The impression, however widespread, that we live in a complex and chaotic era, one more dangerous than the past, is simply unsupportable. All forms of armed conflict, including major and minor international conflicts, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts are all at record-low levels.[8] Large swaths of the globe are at peace, including Europe, the Pacific Rim, and the entire Western Hemisphere. Sub-Saharan Africa has quietly just experienced its most peaceful decade in recorded history.[9] Warfare is an endangered species today, confined mostly to a broad arc that runs from the Sahel through the Middle East into Pakistan.

Harvard psychologist Stephen Pinker labeled this remarkable (and remarkably underappreciated) trend in international security the "New Peace."[10] Raw conflict numbers tell only part of its story: by almost any measure the world has become significantly more peaceful, with measurable declines in coups, repression, the chances of dying in battle, territorial and border wars, conquest, genocide, and violence against civilians.[11] Whether these broad pacific trends represent a fundamental change in the rules that govern state behavior or a temporary respite between cataclysms is not yet clear, but there is no doubt that, thus far at least, the post–Cold War era has been far more stable and peaceful than any that preceded it.

The New Peace is not without its skeptics and critics. Popular (and political) perceptions about warfare certainly do not match empirical reality. Anxiety and unease about the state of the world remain high. The bloody mess in Syria in particular has blinded many observers to the broader security trends, which remain essentially unchanged. Security is after all relative; absolute

safety is an illusion, something promised by leaders but unattainable in a world of imperfect actors. Stability has meaning only in comparison to other times. When the current era—as dangerous as it may seem—is compared to any other, the verdict is clear: this is a golden age of peace and security, one in which the odds of dying in warfare are lower than ever before.

Why is this happening? How long will this New Peace last? While conclusive proof will remain elusive, scholars have over the years pointed to a number of major and minor factors that might help account for the phenomenon. Nuclear weapons, democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions have all received credit for the increased peace.[12] Two other proposed explanations—a broad irenic shift in ideas and norms and hegemonic stability provided by the United States—could be affected by choices made by Trump and his advisors.[13]

The strongest member of any system plays the largest role in determining its basic structure and norms. To many people—mostly American people—U.S. power has been a stabilizing force, a pacifying presence for those sections in the world open to its extension. It has also been the case that the main outlier during the era of the New Peace has been the United States. A disproportionate number of the post–Cold War wars and interventions have been caused or led by the United States; by any reasonable measure, the United States is currently the system's most violent member. What will happen if Trump further increases the U.S. willingness to resort to violence? Will the norms holding the New Peace together survive a potential rise in American belligerence?

At the very least, Team Trump seems determined to give other states reason to fear for their own security. Those defense budgets that had been shrinking since the Cold War—which includes nearly all of them—may have to be readjusted if other leaders lose confidence in the U.S. commitment to at least try to do the right thing. Perceptions of a malicious United States will test the bonds of the New Peace.

Will the current era of stability outlast the shocks that an unprepared, unteachable U.S. president will bring? If it does, if the global order maintains its generally peaceful structure until 2020 or 2024 and beyond, then it will have passed a test more rigorous than any that could be designed in a laboratory, one that cannot but have significant implications for its potential staying power. If countries are not fighting each other with a bit more frequency at the end of Trump's tenure than they were at the beginning, then we will have one more reason to believe that they might never do so again. If the dislocation and distrust generated by the Trump administration does not shake up the New Peace, what will? If levels of armed conflict do not show signs of rising, it will provide yet another sign that the post–Cold War changes have more staying power than many thought.

MULTILATERALISM, ALLIES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The extent to which Trump will withdraw the United States from the broader international community is not yet clear. His is a foreign policy based on instinct and spite, not vision or strategy. As a result, he may do lasting damage to the image of the United States abroad, and the trust that other countries place in its judgment. "Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing," Winston Churchill is supposed to have said, on behalf of many, "after they have exhausted all other alternatives."[14] If early polls are any indication, that confidence may be short-lived. How will the rest of the world react to a more selfish, less cooperative United States? Will putting America first and the international community a distant, distant second (at best) encourage the latter to increase its activism, spending, and/or involvement in world political and military affairs? Can multilateralism survive without a leader? Is there such a thing as an "international community"?

Neoconservative analysts in the United States seem doubtful. The ranks of "never-Trumpers" have been filled with their ranks from the beginning, largely because of Trump's evident distaste for internationalism. The United States is the "benevolent empire," to use Robert Kagan's phrase, responsible for most of the stability and peace and good in the world.[15] According to the neoconservative telling, without the stabilizing presence of U.S. military power, anarchy would descend upon the world. "The present world order," according to Kagan, "is as fragile as it is unique," and would collapse without sustained U.S. efforts.[16] "In many instances," add Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol on behalf of neocons everywhere, "all that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem, is American power."[17] An American retreat, according to British economic historian and expert-on-everything Niall Ferguson, would bring about an international "dark age" in which "plunderers and pirates" target the big coastal cities, terrorists attack cruise liners and aircraft carriers alike, and the "wretchedly poor citizens" of Latin America prove unable to resist the Protestantism thrust upon them by U.S. evangelicals. Following multiple nuclear wars and plagues, the few remaining airlines would be forced to suspend service to all but the very richest cities.[18]

The Trump administration might yet prove able to spare Latin Americans from the horror of Protestantism. Indeed, the president has a decidedly mixed record when it comes to international intervention. On the one hand, the administration has pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement on climate change; on the other, it has increased the pace and magnitude of intervention in the world's remaining trouble areas. To the

people in the Sahel, Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere, the Trump administration cannot seem introverted nor isolationist.

What this administration is not, however, is multilateral. Thus far, Trump has been just as eager to intervene in foreign affairs as any of his predecessors, just far less likely to consult others before doing so. Generally speaking, the Trump administration is uninterested in its alliance and institutional inheritance. The president argues that nearly every other country, including many traditionally quite close to the United States, has been taking economic advantage of the American worker thanks to a series of terrible deals negotiated by Trump's poltroon predecessors. The Chinese and the Mexicans have been the biggest offenders, apparently, but the United States also has "very unfair," one-sided trade deals with Japan, South Korea, Canada, Western Europe, and probably elsewhere.

Israel looks to be the lone ally able to escape Trump's protectionist wrath. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is winning the competition for Most Obsequious World Leader, and as a result Trump has endeavored to remove whatever slight daylight existed between the two countries. Netanyahu has achieved virtually all of his goals, many of which were denied to him by earlier presidents: the U.S. embassy moved to Jerusalem, in exchange for precisely nothing; the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations walked out rather than listen to Palestinians complain about the scores killed in the violence that followed; and most of all, the agreement that had been the source of so much Likud frustration (unshared, it deserves emphasizing, by many senior Israeli defense and intelligence officials),[19] the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran Deal, is no more. The ramifications of these and other moves are not yet clear, but there is no doubt that any pretense of honest brokerage on part of the United States is a thing of the past.

Other U.S. allies have not been so fortunate. The Western allies, according to Trump, do not "pay their fair share" for U.S. protection, despite the fact that NATO has neither dues nor payments. Japanese and German producers unfairly sell cars to American consumers, even though their automotive plants are almost all in the United States. Even the Australians unfairly expect Washington to live up to its commitments concerning refugee resettlement.[20] Although these and other complaints are factually misguided and betray a fundamental misunderstanding of how alliances work, they are instructive about Trumpian politics. Details matter little to him or his base; the overall message and attitude are all that matter, and in this case the message is that NATO and other U.S. allies are free riding in various ways on Uncle Sam's largesse. In this way Trump is echoing the complaints of previous presidents, just louder, with his trademark inaccuracy and stubborn unwillingness to learn.[21]

Since Trump's very first act as a declared candidate was to define his campaign in opposition to Mexican immigration, perhaps it is unsurprising

that the U.S. relationship with its southern neighbor has deteriorated. Trump made it clear that high walls were necessary to make America great again; Mexican leaders have proven stubbornly unwilling to pay for such walls, even as Trump explained to them that they had to help him fulfill his campaign promise. Pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and an insistence on renegotiating NAFTA have not helped. Other bilateral relationships have been similarly imperiled by Trump's aggressive America Firstism. Trade wars loom, most obviously with China but really with any country that sells more to the United States than it buys.

The Trump administration also looks to be an implacable enemy of international institutions. His third national security advisor once argued that if ten floors were sheared off the UN headquarters in New York, "it wouldn't make a bit of difference."[22] Trump's protectionist trade policies fly in the face of the liberal economic order once primarily championed by the United States. Free trade in general is imperiled by Trump, who constantly threatens NAFTA and deploys economic sanctions as his first-strike diplomatic tool. Economists around the world, many of whom had been convinced that the international trading order was nigh irreversible, have been reminded by this president that its rules have been socially constructed. There is no particular reason why protectionism cannot return, or why the world cannot revert to an earlier, atavistic economic order.

Thus, the Trump years will test the strength of the alliance and institutional bonds that currently hold the world together (at least according to liberal internationalists). Perhaps these relationships and regimes will prove stronger than any amount of doubt and discord Trump can sew; perhaps he will force people around the world to reexamine the importance of these ties to the extent that they will never be the same. Either way, we should know much more about the power of the international liberal order, and perhaps about its importance to stability and cooperation, when Trump exits Washington for the friendly confines of his various towers and golf courses.

After a few years of ceaseless America-first rhetoric, perceptions of U.S. unilateralism may harden. Perception, after a while, becomes reality. On the other hand, if the liberal international order so painstakingly constructed under U.S. leadership survives the Trump years, it is hard to imagine what could bring it to an end.[23]

NORMS OF DIPLOMACY

Trump is also testing our understanding of negotiation and bargaining. The president is the master dealmaker, according to his legend and his supporters; the first book that he wrote—or, more accurately, had written for him—was

The Art of the Deal, after all. His negotiating style has certainly been different than that of his predecessors. Trump's strategy appears to rely on toughness at the outset followed by a willingness to talk. That toughness is mostly rhetorical, relayed through tweets and campaign-style rallies, and repetitive. He sprays around nicknames and threats, leaving observers wondering whether his intended audience was international or domestic. "Little Rocket Man" was warned that if he misbehaved, he would face "fire, fury and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before." Should the Iranians restart their nuclear program, "they will have bigger problems than they ever had before."[24] Such belligerent rhetoric is common among the world's various authoritarians, but rare for democratically elected presidents.

One of the most basic truisms about international politics is that there is more to be learned from what countries *do* rather than what their leaders *say*. Thus far Trump's tough talk has not been matched by tough action. Observers have been on the lookout for unusual troop movements or other signs that war is imminent on the Korean peninsula, but none have surfaced. The pace of U.S. involvement in Syria increased somewhat under the Trump administration, but not in a substantively different way. The most consequential actions Trump has taken in support of his hardline negotiating position have been through appointments to top positions. It is unlikely that the replacement of the problematically dovish Secretary of State Rex Tillerson with CIA director Mike Pompeo, and the installation of uberhawk John Bolton as National Security Advisor, went unnoticed in Tehran and Pyongyang.

By the end of his term, we should be able to pass judgment on this shift in diplomatic tone. Thus far, there is reason to believe that Trump's belligerence may be achieving some of its goals. Although as of this writing it is far too early to pronounce the problem solved, the Koreas have displayed renewed urgency in the face of Trump's apparent erraticism. Trump may have constructed a credible good-cop/bad-cop negotiating strategy for the South Koreans and Europeans, which they may be able to use to extract concessions.

Such a strategy comes with substantial risk. If at some point it does not work, if the targets do not back down and decide to call Trump's bluff, then he will be faced with a set of very unpleasant options. It is a high-risk approach he is taking to diplomacy; in other words, one that could very well end poorly, especially for America's regional allies (and innocents caught in-between). The potential rewards are also high, however, and if he succeeds where his predecessors failed, Trump will force us to reexamine some conventional wisdoms about how diplomacy is most productively conducted.

IMPLICATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS

While most of the questions raised in the preceding paragraphs are unanswerable without the passage of time, some initial speculations and provocations can be made now regarding the effect of the Trump years on domestic and international politics. Despite hand-wringing across the temporarily united foreign-policy community, the long-term implications of the Trump presidency are not uniformly negative, for a number of reasons.

First of all, if history is any guide, Trump's behavioral and procedural innovations will not necessarily outlast his term. Few acts of any president prove entirely irreversible. Many of President Trump's signature foreign policy decisions—themselves part of a sustained effort to reverse acts of his predecessor—could be undone by the next occupant of the White House. The Paris Climate-Change Pact could be renewed; remnants of the Trans-Pacific Partnership could be cobbled together and made whole; the Iran Deal might also prove salvageable, since its terms were valued by all other parties. The U.S. embassy can even be moved back to Tel Aviv, and the garish sign giving Trump credit sent to the inevitable garish Trump Library.

People cannot be brought back to life. By the time this chapter meets the reader's eye, quite a few people might have been sent to meet their makers because of decisions made by the Trump White House, but at the very least the United States did not embark upon new wars between January 2017 and June 2018. Many of the same characters who brought us the invasion of Iraq have returned to misinform and mislead this president, which is an ominous development for fans of peace and diplomacy, but so far at least they have not convinced him to make the same kind of catastrophic, irreversible blunders of which George W. Bush proved so fond.

Trump is historically unpopular at home and abroad, but international public opinion of the United States is fickle. The war in Iraq and general impressions of cowboyishness sent public sentiments abroad diving during the George W. Bush administration, but the negativity proved temporary in many places. There was no more popular leader on Earth than Barack Obama, who enjoyed high approval numbers in many of those same places that abhorred Bush 43. The pendulum has swung back, however, as President Trump is setting records for unpopularity and loathing.[25] Anti- or pro-American sentiment, therefore, is more a function of the resident of the White House, not necessarily the actions or policies that emanate from it. Approval ratings usually swing with electoral results.

Voters tend to overadjust. Just as fatigue with the lack of drama in the Obama administration produced the Trump opposite, so too will the next leadership likely be substantially different from what we have now. In four to

eight years (or fewer, depending on what Mr. Mueller has to say) the public will be exhausted by the fire-hose presidency, and will crave a return to the kind of leadership they had previously come to expect. Pundits and analysts will announce a return of the rules of presidential decorum and "normalcy," but it is unlikely that the institution will ever be quite the same. The changes that ensue will be helpful reminders that the rules governing presidential behavior and action are not set in stone, and that ideas and norms evolve. As Trump the constructivist might say, were he a bit more self-aware and literate, what is need not be.

How disconcerting it must be for other countries to deal with a unipolar power simultaneously capable of producing a president like Barack Obama, an intellectual with soaring rhetoric whose administration prided itself on the absence of drama, and a vulgarian showman like Trump, who (quite consciously) embodied the opposite of everything for which his predecessor stood. Close observers from abroad must have known the extraordinary range of views in the American electorate, and just hoped that an extreme Jacksonian administration would never come to power.[26] But come it has.

This variance in the whims of the American electorate leads to the second potential reason for optimism. The current administration may strengthen the hand of future U.S. negotiators, because the potential for a Trump 2.0, and perhaps one not quite so remarkably incompetent, will always exist. Trump is proof that a next populist-nationalist underbelly lurks right under the surface of American politics, which could conceivably do even more damage to the system if run by a sophisticated operator. Future U.S. diplomats will have the distinct advantage of raising the specter of another Trump during their interactions with other countries, in other words, warning that concessions here or capitulation there would stoke the kind of backlash that resulted in the Trump victory. In order to avoid the second coming of Trump, they will be able to credibly claim, they must be allowed to get their way.

Former Pakistani leader Pervez Mussharaf played a similar card adroitly throughout the immediate post-9/11 years. He could not be pushed hard, he warned the Bush administration, because his support was thin and his domestic enemies were perpetually gathering. If seen to be aiding the United States, he would soon topple, and what came next would be infinitely worse. The Islamists in his midst would surely gain from any U.S. attempt to pressure him, or any diminution of the annual aid payments, or any such insult. *Après moi, le déluge*, he probably never said, but the meaning was nonetheless clearly communicated: after me, the flood.

Visions of Trump will haunt all interaction with the United States as long as there are people who remember him. So too, however, will memories of Barack Obama, who left office as easily the most popular leader in the world.

An entire generation of diplomats will need to consider how their actions affect the likelihood of future American presidencies, and avoiding giving any aid or rhetorical ammunition to the wannabe future Trumps—the inevitable copycats who will try to appeal to the same voters who brought Trump to power—will be among their highest priorities.

So, in the long run Trump may indeed help his country receive better treatment, and even achieve more cooperation toward its initiatives, even if he does so inadvertently. Fear of a repeat may well be a tool that sagacious U.S. negotiators can use to their advantage, because everyone will know that, even in the best of times, the American people might choose the worst among them to lead.

Trump came into office with an entertainer's sensibility, knowing that if he was bored with the presidency, so too was the country. He vowed to make things fun again and govern by his rules, criticism be damned. His administration has indeed been entertaining, in the manner of a school bus accident perhaps, but entertaining nonetheless. What kind of country will he leave in his wake? What will the United States—and the world—look like after Trump is gone? It is too early to tell just how the Trump test will turn out, but perhaps the outlook is not uniformly bleak. Thus far U.S. domestic institutions have proven sufficiently robust to parry his authoritarian blows. No permanent damage has been done to any of the major alliances or relationships the United States brought into the Trump era. Perhaps most importantly, armed conflict remains at all-time low levels.

By their end, the Trump years will help scholars understand the true nature of the international and domestic political systems. The results of the Trump test should be in fairly soon. It will not be long before we know just how robust are our theories, institutions, structures, norms, and concepts, even some we have long assumed to be sacrosanct. Donald Trump, our first constructivist president, is unwittingly moving our understanding of the fundamental nature of the international system forward, for better or worse.

NOTES

1. Then again, were Wendt to put Trump's picture on the cover of the next edition, the president might add *Social Theory of International Relations* to his unread piles. The title of this piece refers to Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 391–425.

2. In addition to the Wendt work, good introductions to constructivist IR include John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn

1998): 855–85; Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 171–200; and the essays in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

3. Quoted by Evan Osnos in "Trump vs. the Deep State," *The New Yorker*, May 21, 2008, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state.

4. The term in this case is a philosophical one, meaning rhetoric that creates its own reality, irrespective of its relationship to the truth. See Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

5. Some of the first entries in what promises to be a robust literature include Timothy Snyder, *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin, 2017); Madeleine Albright, *Fascism: A Warning* (New York: Harper Collins, 2018); and Steven Livitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018).

6. For interesting additions to this rather large literature, see Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 567–76; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

7. After winning the Nevada Republican caucus in February 2016, Trump said, "We won with young. We won with old. We won with highly educated. We won with poorly educated. I love the poorly educated." See Josh Hafner, "Donald Trump Loves the 'Poorly Educated'—and They Love Him," *USA Today*, February 24, 2016, available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/02/24/donald-trump-nevada-poorly-educated/80860078/.

8. Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence* (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2013); Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014); and David A. Backer, Ravi Bhavnani, and Paul K. Huth, eds., *Peace and Conflict 2016* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

9. Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Washington: Polity, 2011), chapter 2; Scott Straus, "Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa," *African Affairs* 111, no. 443 (March 2012): 179–201; and David Burbach and Christopher J. Fettweis, "The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and the Implications for International Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 421–45.

10. Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011). The phrase "Long Peace" is also occasionally used, but that can also refer to the period of great power stability following World War II. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 99–142.

11. For reviews, see Steven Pinker, *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress* (New York: Viking, 2018); John Mueller, *The Remnants of War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Joshua Goldstein,

Winning the War on War (New York: Dutton, 2011). For a longer review of this literature, see Christopher J. Fettweis, *Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), ch. 1.

12. Nuclear Weapons: Lawrence Freedman, "Stephen Pinker and the Long Peace: Alliance, Deterrence and Decline," *Journal of Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 657–72; and Robert A. Rauchhaus, "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 258–77. Democracy: Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1985): 1151–70. Interdependence and other economic explanations: Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); and Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (January 2007): 166–91. International Institutions: Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*; Virginia Page Fortna, "Is Peacekeeping 'Winning the War on War?'" *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 566–70.

13. Norms: Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*; and John Mueller, "War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment," *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 297–321. Hegemonic Stability: Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

14. I have been unable to find evidence that Churchill ever actually uttered this oft-quoted remark. I am not alone in my failure: https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/11/11/exhaust-alternatives/. There probably comes a point that the factual origin of famous quotations becomes less important as universal perceptions of their origin. This represents one of those cases.

15. Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy* 111 (Summer 1998): 24–35.

16. Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 134.

17. Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), 118.

18. All these and more can be found in Niall Ferguson, "A World without Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 143 (July–August 2004), 32–39. The most frightening page is 39.

19. The tension between Netanyahu and his military and intelligence leaders on this issue is summarized by Allison Kaplan Sommer, "Top Brass vs. Netanyahu's Government: Where Israel Stands on Nixing Nuke Iran Deal," *Haaretz*, May 8, 2018, available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-where-israel-s-leaders-stand-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1.6070237.

20. This was the topic that led to acrimony on the first phone call Trump conducted with the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull on January 27, 2017. The transcript is available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/04/full-transcript-of-trumps-phone-call-with-australian-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull.

21. President Obama was speaking of the Europeans when he told *The Atlantic*'s Jeffrey Goldberg that "free riders aggravate me" ["The Obama Doctrine," *The Atlantic*, 317, no. 3 (April 2016): 78].

22. This oft-quoted quotation is quoted by Matthew Haag in "Three Examples of John Bolton's Longtime Hard-Line Views," *New York Times*, March 22, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/john-bolton-national-security-adv.html.

23. For two takes on that order, and the threat that Trump poses to it, see G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 7–23.

24. Trump made the fire-and-fury comment on August 9, 2017. All the insults he has hurled toward North Korea are collected in this handy website: https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-insults-timeline/index.html. The warning to Iran was issued via tweet on April 24, 2018.

25. Gallup, *Rating World Leaders, 2018: The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia* (2018), available at http://news.gallup.com/reports/225587/rating-world-leaders-2018.aspx.

26. Walter Russel Mead identified four traditions of U.S. foreign policy thought—Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian, Wilsonian and Jacksonian—in *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

Chapter Four

Springtime for Central Asia?

Belts and Roads, Partnerships, and Risks amid Global Realignment

Jeff Sahadeo

Eyebrows were raised when Uzbekistan, Central Asia's most populous country, issued a presidential order on December 2, 2016, to abolish visa requirements for fifteen countries, including much of Europe, and curtail restrictions for several others. Might Uzbekistan's new leader, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, open this closed, authoritarian country to the world? Analysts exchanged knowing smiles when the decree signed three weeks later postponed these changes until 2021. Conservatives, led by those in the National Security Service (SNB), appeared to have won an early power struggle to determine the country's future. Uzbekistan was most likely to follow the pattern of neighboring Turkmenistan, where the death of the first post-Soviet leader hardly altered a state marked by a closed economy, human rights violations, and lack of engagement with the outside world.

Mirzoyiyev's subsequent actions, however, went far beyond a decree designed to raise revenue through tourism. The Uzbek government essentially floated its currency as it sought to rein in a massive black market and facilitate international financial transactions. Mirzoyiyev sacked several leading state actors, including SNB head Rustam Inoyatov, and released thousands of political prisoners.[1] The new Uzbek president began a round of intense diplomacy with regional neighbors and courted opportunities in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. Economic reforms received positive reviews from the International Monetary Fund and other Western actors. Uzbekistan chased investment in China, Turkey, and elsewhere as it worked to place itself as an active, responsible global citizen at the heart of Eurasia.

Uzbekistan's opening to the world coincided with intensified global interest in Central Asia's geopolitical position and economic resources. The region will play a critical role in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), designed to power the Chinese economy and represent the state's global aspirations for the

next decade-plus. Hundreds of millions of dollars are pouring into infrastructure development and other economic investments across Central Asia. Russia has used carrot-and-stick methods to encourage—with only partial success—Central Asian states to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), its most recent vehicle to ensure regional supremacy and, as with China, challenge US and Western global hegemony. Western financial institutions are returning, after the financial crises of 2008 and 2014, to the economic potential of a region rich in resources and now likely to become a Eurasian transit hub, with burgeoning, young populations. Ironically, Uzbekistan's—and perhaps, to follow, the rest of Central Asia's—revitalization has come in the absence of substantive Western political engagement, casting doubt over longtime maxims that foreign commitments can increase the likelihood of liberalizing developing states.

Central Asian leaders have welcomed the investment and purchasing power, at the least, of these regional and global powers. China's and Russia's combined attention facilitate one component of multivector foreign policies that have become fundamental tools for the weaker states to maintain sovereignty vis-à-vis powerful neighbors with hegemonic inclinations. Europe and the United States continue to be important: the European Union is Kazakhstan's most important trading partner, and Uzbekistan's Mirzoyiyev has courted President Donald Trump, whose lack of interest in human rights and so-called good governance has gained him significant popularity among Central Asian state elites. The BRI's potential has drawn in other important neighbors and potential trading partners, including Turkey and Iran. Risks abound, however. The BRI and EEU are loose structures dominated by Beijing and Moscow and could entrap as well as energize Central Asian states. Global interaction brings other threats, primarily through Islamic extremism, whose regional trajectory remains unclear.

Central Asia is a pivot point in the global economy, and is at its own pivot point. The first generation of post-Soviet leaders and administrators is fading from the scene, and the region enjoys unprecedented international attention, offering huge potential but few significant results outside of natural resource extraction. Will this "Uzbek spring" portend a broader regional opening, especially as Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev, the last remaining leader from the Soviet era, prepares for his own succession? Can these states use new global linkages to address challenges of poverty and young, growing populations lacking economic opportunities? Can political openness and improved prospects address internal threats of nationalism, as well as Islamic extremism? The interaction between the BRI, the EEU and a new Central Asian generation will pave the path for the region's future—with the West largely, by design or not, on the sidelines.

CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA: FROM BACKWATER TO BEHEMOTH

Upon gaining independence in 1992, Central Asia's leaders and populations regarded China as an economic backwater and second-tier regional power. Eyes turned toward the Euro-Atlantic world to balance Russia, with a token nod to Chinese security interests by increasing surveillance on ethnic Uighur diasporas, Turkic peoples, and fellow Muslims considered to be a potential revolutionary force against a state dominated by ethnic Han Chinese. China's roaring economy in the 1990s presaged growing influence, first through trade in soft goods and then security, sealed with the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. The SCO brought China, Russia, and a changing number of Central Asian states together in a body that acts in turn as an expression of support for existing illiberal regimes, an "anti-western club," and a shared desire to combat potential security threats, primarily revolving around Islamic extremism.[2] China's ascent has only continued as it looked to Central Asia to fulfill strategies of energy-supply diversification. Twenty-first-century pipelines bring Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to China, and substantial infrastructure and other investment projects preceded the BRI's formal launch. Chinese government and business leaders have found willing partners in Central Asian governments—popular resistance, however, might put a break on one of the most ambitious global projects of the new century.

Chinese President Xi Jenping has placed the Belt and Road Initiative at the center of China's domestic and foreign policy agendas. Consisting of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) that will cross Central Asia toward Europe and the Middle East, and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) that will traverse South East Asia and beyond, including Africa and the Mediterranean, the BRI has been labeled the "project of the century," which, President Xi asserts, will "benefit people across the world."[3] The BRI would see the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invest up to one trillion USD in transport and trade infrastructure worldwide.[4] The Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund were established to bankroll this ever-expanding project in 2015, though many BRI initiatives are repackaging and consolidating existing projects. Chinese investors and projects are intensifying worldwide, from the Caucasus to Africa and Southeast Asia, with a particular eye cast toward its Central Asian jumping-off point. The various arms of the BRI will enforce Chinese "soft power" worldwide, with some of the more fantastical visions including high-speed rail between Harbin and San Francisco.[5]

China lauds the BRI's flexibility, which locks neither it nor its partners into supranational treaties, weighty bureaucracy, or political conditionality. Government coordination will be limited to basic trade deals, as well as regulatory

and financial alignment.[6] China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs classifies this as "soft infrastructure" to accompany improvements and development of hard infrastructure of roads and rail, pipelines and power grids, all to ostensibly spark global economic coordination and growth. The Chinese Communist Party has placed massive financial reserves into organizations like the Chinese Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China to fund this massive spending and development plan.[7] Marlène Laruelle has noted, however, that this Chinese money comes with clear expectations. Recipient countries are expected to support the "One China" policy and assist in Chinese government actions against what it labels as the "three evils:" terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The Chinese government also tacitly ties this money to their ability to access mineral resources in states that accept significant investment.[8] Above all, the BRI seeks to resolve internal Chinese economic woes. Substantial external investment of capital resources is designed to stimulate demand for goods—such as aluminum and steel—and services that can no longer be met domestically.[9]

Chinese investment over the last decade has transformed Central Asia. In addition to pipeline investment and energy purchases, China has financed power plants, electricity grids, cement factories, and other significant modernization projects across the region. President Xi announced the BRI initiative—then known as "One Belt, One Road"—at Nazarbaev University in Astana, Kazakhstan, in 2013. Signature projects focused on transport infrastructure followed, as China seeks to reduce dependence on maritime routes through Southeast Asia. The "Khorgos Gateway," a massive dry port and free trade project on the border between Kazakhstan and China, sits at the heart of trans-Eurasian rail lines, existing and planned.[10] BRI envisions a "New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor" that will provide high-speed rail between Beijing and Moscow, with the eventual goal of being able to ship goods from London to China in forty-eight hours.[11] BRI also recognizes the importance of stimulating demand for goods and services through smaller-scale transport investments. In 2016, after making a speech to Uzbekistan's parliament, President Xi joined then president Islam Karimov to inaugurate a new, Chinese-built Angren-Pap electrified rail line that connected Uzbekistan's Ferghana valley directly to the capital, Tashkent, replacing the Soviet line that required Uzbek citizens to traverse Tajikistan.[12] Other major investments include the Datka-Kamin power line in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan's former president, Almazbek Atambaev, actively advocated for a "digital silk road" and the use of Kyrgyzstan's technological sector as a logistics hub for major Chinese companies. Shavkat Mirzoyiyev brought home twenty billion dollars in pledged contracts in the energy and infrastructure sectors after a trip to Beijing for a One Belt, One Road Summit in 2017; shortly thereafter China

and Tajikistan signed an agreement to establish a comprehensive strategic and economic partnership.[13]

China also sees the SREB as enforcing government control over its own Central Asia—the restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Republic. The strategy of using economic development to calm ethnic, religious, and political tensions is not new, and has had mixed results at best. Modern Chinese insecurity over its northwestern borderlands dates to the 1950s, since the region was incorporated into the People's Republic of China after a complicated series of conflicts that implicated the Soviet Union and various local nationalist forces. Uighurs, who share ethnic ties to cross-border Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, remained isolated from central power. Disaffection mounted as late-twentieth-century economic development and modernization focused on China's more populated east. To remedy this, as well as to tap Xinjiang's vast natural resources, the Chinese Communist Party began a "Great Western Development" project of investment, modernization, and urbanization in 1999. Economic development ensued, but was engineered by hundreds of thousands of ethnic (Han) Chinese migrants, who assumed managerial power and skilled worker positions as they came to populate major urban spaces. China's government sought to enforce integration through the mandatory teaching of the Chinese language and crackdowns on Islamic observance, which fueled Uighur opposition.[14] Large-scale violence erupted in the capital, Urumqi; ethnic riots resulted in over two hundred deaths of Uighurs and Han Chinese in 2009. Lower-level violence continued in the region and has spread beyond it. Uighur migrant workers were blamed for stabbings in Yunnan province in 2013. Chinese repression has intensified. Some policies aim at Uighur culture; in 2014, government workers were prohibited from fasting during Ramadan. Others aim more directly at security. A mass police presence has descended on the region, characterized in the 2010s by intense surveillance through drones and mandatory GPS tracking and DNA samples of citizens, virtually all nonethnic Chinese, of Xinjiang.[15]

Chinese policies towards Xinjiang are replete with contradictions. Even as SREB brings another massive dose of investment, the Chinese government remains intent on ever-increasing repression that might produce a docile population. Reports grew in 2018 of mass "re-education camps" across Xinjiang, forcibly holding hundreds of thousands of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities.[16] Beijing has not admitted to these camps' existence, but first-person accounts have attested to their presence. One detainee, Kairat Samarkand, reports to have spent three months in a reeducation camp as penalty for a visit to Kazakhstan. He spent hours each day studying Communist propaganda and praising President Xi. Torture, including waterboarding, met those considered disobedient.[17] Loyal Communist Party administrators, meanwhile, are

occupying Uighur homes, demanding information about family members and conducting propaganda while eating and sleeping with them.[18] This initiative, officially named "Visit for the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People" aims to "safeguard social stability."[19] Officials teach residents to speak Mandarin and sing the national anthem and other songs that demonstrate loyalty to the state.

The Chinese government believes that Xinjiang's critical importance to BRI requires wrapping a mass security presence around it. It can do so with relative impunity; the Uighur population has no significant international support or sponsors. One reason for continued Chinese anxiety may be the lack of apparent benefits that SREB has delivered in its initial phase. Trade volumes have remained largely static from 2014 to 2017 even after twenty-five billion dollars of investment in road and rail projects.[20]

The SREB confronts considerable roadblocks in Central Asia and beyond. Chinese investment plans operate with no overall guiding strategy. It is unclear whether these major infrastructure and power projects will deliver economic growth or profit in the medium to long term. Chinese banks do not have endless resources, and the more grandiose visions of BRI are as likely to stall as to be completed. Corruption remains embedded in regional bidding and procurement processes; many of the projects built in Central Asia are done without competitive tenders, and with investment money liberally sprinkled in the purchase of political loyalty.[21] The Kazakh head of the Khorgos project was one of many charged with bribe-taking or other forms of corruption. Immediate infrastructure improvements produce shiny initial results, but have yet to bear the weight of a major global good, as evoked by President Xi.

Central Asian populations have not received Chinese investment with the same enthusiasm as their leaders. Disinterest, or opposition, marks everyday reactions to a growing Chinese presence. In Uzbekistan, internet search engines have not registered increases in queries on China even as the country's visibility has intensified from 2013 to 2016.[22] Cultural exchange programs remain poorly developed. Earlier conceptions of China as an economic backwater have been supplanted by fears that growth and overpopulation will lead to efforts to seize Central Asian land and resources. In 2011 to 2012, protests and attacks in Kyrgyzstan targeted Chinese workers and managers, who were seen either to treat local labor poorly or to take jobs from ethnic Kyrgyz. Protests in Kazakhstan against Chinese land purchases in 2016 turned violent. A degree of racism underlies these views and demonstrations. Central Asians, in part due to the Soviet legacy, consider themselves more modern, worldly and European or Eurasian than the East Asian Chinese. Even as Central Asian states remain unwilling to acknowledge popular prejudice, Chinese compa-

nies have begun to hire more local labor instead of importing workers from China, to insulate themselves against demonstrations.[23] China's place in Central Asia is based on its ability to deliver money to politicians and state coffers and signature projects to its citizens—even then, whether the country's munificence will be recognized among local populations remains unclear.

RUSSIA AND THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

Russia, despite, or perhaps due to, its imperial past in Central Asia receives overall a more popular reception that China. The Russian government has eyed Chinese expansion into Central Asia cautiously, but has focused in the 2010s more on its own signature project for the region: the Eurasian Economic Union. President Vladimir Putin lent his support in 2011 to a design floated by Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbaev several years earlier, to counter the continued gravitational pull of the European Union (EU). The EEU would encompass as well as broaden and deepen cooperation signaled by an existing customs union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and the somewhat moribund Eurasian Economic Community of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The EEU, however, never made it off the ground as designed. It failed to lure Ukraine, which defied Moscow in choosing, after a forced change in government in 2014, a Western path through an eventual association agreement with the EU. Final arrangements for the EEU continued amid an economic crisis that led to a plunge in the region's GDP and the value of the natural-resource–driven Russian ruble and Kazakh tenge. Without Ukraine, a weakened Russia assumed a dominant position among the EEU's original members—Belarus, Armenia, and Kazakhstan—who entered on January 1, 2015, and Kyrgyzstan, which joined months later.

The EEU mirrors the BRI in its surface effort to exercise a soft hegemony over the region—or, at the least, act as a brake on Chinese dominance. The customs union and unified external tariff signify centerpieces of an organization that has a legal personality and institutional structure. Even so, the union and unified tariff remain works in progress, and member states maintain privilege flexibility over supranational commitments. The EEU's prioritization in Russian foreign policy diverges from that of the BRI in China. Rilka Dragneza and Kataryna Wolczuk write: "Satisfied with having a union, Russia is not preoccupied with making it work."[24] Ukraine's absence—and the potential to grow the EEU to include states outside the former Soviet Union, such as Serbia—has downgraded the organization's place in Moscow's domestic and foreign policy vision. Russia constitutes 84 percent of the GDP

of today's EEU, even as it only relies on member states for 5 percent of its trade.[25] Still, like the BRI, Central Asian leaders can see significant—albeit sectoral—economic gains, even as the potential for another underwhelming, Moscow-led international organization remains. The EEU remains unable, with its principals unwilling, to break through the desire to deal bilaterally, now under the shell of a somewhat pale EU imitator.

Kazakhstan was a moving force behind the EEU. Like Russia, Nazarbaev sees the EEU, despite its name, primarily through a political and security lens. Fifty-three percent of Kazakhstan's overwhelmingly resource-based exports go to the European Union, with China in a distant second place, only then followed by Russia. The Kazakh president has always worried about the intentions of a powerful neighbor that can claim a significant diaspora and continued after the Soviet collapse to seek to exercise influence over natural resource flows via pipeline politics. The EEU places Russia and Kazakhstan together in a rules-based organization, which adds to common membership in the SCO and the Russian-led military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[26] Nazarbaev also values the EEU as an identity-based project. He has cast Kazakhstan as a meeting point between Europe and Asia, an ethnically diverse, economically successful—at least until the 2014 oil price crash—state with the ability to serve as a model for the Eurasian landmass.

The crash ended what the Kazakhs called a "golden decade" of growth, when GDP per capita rose sixfold from 2002 to 2013 on the strength of hydrocarbons and other natural resources.[27] The measure slowed dramatically to 1 percent in 2015 and 2016 with forecasts for only a slow rise, after the tenge devalued 100 percent after the crash. The EEU offers no easy path to growth—the volume of Kazakhstan's trade to its EEU partners has not risen in the past two years. Oil can no longer be considered an economic panacea. The world's most expensive energy project—the Kashagan oil field, in the Caspian Sea—has struggled to find investors. The Kazakh government is struggling to diversify its economy with limited resources. The recent slump has political implications—Nazarbaev has staked the legitimacy of his regime, based increasingly on his own persona, on ever-rising living standards.[28] Economic challenges accompany political uncertainty as Kazakhs—including Nazarbaev himself—consider a future after the 78-year-old leader, the only one an independent Kazakhstan has known. The Kazakh president has taken steps to return some of the power he has accumulated to parliament, but in a system where the president and his family preside over a web of unofficial networks that distribute wealth, the effect of formal changes to the structure of power will remain unclear. The EEU will likely become an afterthought when the inevitable succession occurs.

Kyrgyzstan's leaders and population viewed the Eurasian Economic Union with a more skeptical eye. Fears that the poor, small republic would be flooded with tariff-free goods, especially from neighboring Kazakhstan, led the government to approach negotiations cautiously, and it only joined the union in mid-2015. Kyrgyz negotiators were able to gain Russian credits of around one billion dollars to ease the transition. EEU membership also offered other benefits that tempted Kyrgyz leaders. It could provide a balance against China, which had replaced Russia as the country's largest trading partner.[29] Closer ties might also give Moscow a greater stake in Kyrgyzstan's stability—uprisings have toppled established regimes in 2005 and 2010. Political calculations, in Bishkek and Astana as well as in Moscow, drive the union as much as economic ones.

Labor migration also provided a strong stimulus for Kyrgyzstan's entry. An estimated 600,000 Kyrgyz—10 percent of the entire population—work in Russia, and their remittances add 33 percent to the country's GDP, marking it as one of the top five remittance-dependent countries in the world.[30] Kyrgyz labor migrants, and those from other Central Asia and Caucasus regions of the former Soviet Union, referred to by the host population as "Blacks" (*chernye*), have faced significant obstacles living and working in Russia. Racism and xenophobia peaked in the late 2000s, with over one hundred racially based murders, affecting especially Central Asian workers.[31] These numbers have declined drastically over the 2010s as the Russian government has cracked down on nationalist groups, but harassment remains a part of migrant life. Although citizens of countries from the former Soviet Union do not need a visa to enter Russia, they must register themselves with the authorities in places of residence, and gain a permit to work. Constant shifts in Russia's visa policy—the Russia visa code changed thirty times since 2014 alone—renders migrants in a constant state of semilegality, subject to harassment and bribe-taking by Russian police and officials.[32] These challenges also confront even higher labor migrant numbers from Uzbekistan (estimated two million-plus) and Tajikistan (estimated one million). The Uzbek and Tajik government have paid less attention to labor migration and remittances, which they tend to see as an embarrassing admission of their countries' inability to find employment for working-age populations. Since the 2014 crash, remittances have declined significantly—60 percent to Uzbekistan and 50 percent to Tajikistan. The Kyrgyz decline has been smaller—17 percent—and remittances appear to be rising as the Russian economy slowly recovers. EEU membership has conferred important benefits for Kyrgyz labor migrants.[33] They are no longer subject to a test on Russian language, history, and culture that had been required for work permission—and remains a requirement for citizens of former Soviet countries not in the EEU. Kyrgyz and EEU citizens can now

live in Russian cities for up to one month before being required to register, and they no longer need to pay for work permits.

Challenges remain for Kyrgyzstan in the EEU, however. A two-year transition period that allowed the country time to adapt to regulatory standards on food and other goods has expired. Kyrgyzstan still struggles to meet EEU standards, sorely lacking in the needed veterinary and laboratory facilities required to export food. Kazakhstan has used this issue to restrict access to its market, even as it pours its own goods into Kyrgyzstan.[34] Unlike the EU, the EEU lacks any provision for structural funds to assist less developed regions within the zone. Even though the EEU has its own institutions—in particular, the Eurasian Economic Commission—leaders of member states remain far more comfortable negotiating nontariff and other barriers to trade, among other matters, bilaterally—with Moscow potentially acting as an arbiter, just as in Soviet times.[35] The political will to ensure the EEU functions as a technocratic, regulatory body in imitation of the EU is missing, as leaders view its purpose as primarily to support their own political and security agendas.

Unlike China, Russia remains a popular partner in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Cultural, historical, and linguistic ties remain from the Soviet era, even as the Russian diaspora slowly fades.[36] Many Kazakhs and Kyrgyz—where EEU membership remains popular—still credit Moscow for the political births of their republics. In the Kyrgyz case, labor migration as well as common media, family, and travel connections enforce linkages. Russia remains a security guarantor for the two countries, both of which hold far more powerful neighbors or an internal Islamist threat. EEU membership never figured as an issue in the 2017 Kyrgyz election. Even as labor remittances slowly rise and some increase in foreign investment has been noted, the Kyrgyz trade deficit remains stubbornly high. EEU membership with its associated external tariffs has strangled the once-lucrative Kyrgyz practice of reselling cheap goods from China across the former Soviet space.

Russian attitudes toward Central Asia remain ambivalent. The region has waxed and waned in the Kremlin's foreign policy vision. The Putin government sees Central Asia—beyond the EEU—as an investment market as well as a security bulwark against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan and Islamist movements region-wide. Russian companies continue to work on projects large and small, including through agencies such as the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund, which shepherds hundreds of millions of dollars in investment.[37] Imperial and Soviet legacies still condition labor migrant flows and views of Central Asia as Russia's backyard. The EEU represents an expression of Russia's continued presence, without the obligations to commit resources to basic services in these countries. Russia at the same time is willing to devote targeted funds to ensure the loyalty and survival of these

relatively friendly regimes, against any potential Ukraine or Georgia scenario underwritten by Western involvement—although this would seem almost impossible under the Trump administration.

Antipathy toward a strong Western presence in Central Asia, and fear of Islamist and other antigovernment forces, facilitate Russia's and China's coexistence in Central Asia. The SCO has allowed the two countries to develop a level of trust, given their relatively compatible motives.[38] China is not seeking to challenge Russia's strategic position or military leadership expressed through the CSTO and its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia remains confident in its cultural supremacy in the region, and continued labor migration allows them a powerful tool of influence. Russia and China are equally comfortable dealing with current Central Asian regimes and political classes. Even as external tariff barriers enacted by the EEU might serve as a potential irritant, the body's uneven start has left it off China's radar in the larger BRI initiative, which it sees as ultimately benefiting all EEU states, including Russia. The SREB could indeed position Russia, as well as Kazakhstan, as a vital Eurasian transit country. Cooperation remains minimal, however—each country has essentially worked in parallel over the past years, looking for investment opportunities and ways to expand soft power. Russia and China see Central Asia's hydrocarbons as vital to diversification strategies—in the Chinese case for domestic consumption, and in the Russian case to use domestically, so its own oil and gas can be exported westward, where they can be employed as foreign policy tools. The cooling of both these countries' economies and ample global market supply has nonetheless reduced the potential for competition in the late 2010s. Russia has watched silently as China has taken over as the main trading partner for these countries, including Uzbekistan in 2015. Investment dollars and trade flows, more than supranational bodies or initiatives, dictate economic power in the region. Russia for now views the shift toward China pragmatically, as it looks to rebuild its economy and with its eye cast more toward involvement with a weakened Europe and United States than Central Asia.

Central Asian leaders have effectively exploited China's and Russia's mutual interest in the region. Contracts come with sweeteners to select politicians and bureaucrats, or regime coffers as a whole. These relatively new countries, surrounded by powerful neighbors, have relied—with the possible exception of Turkmenistan—on a multivector foreign policy. Tacking between Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union has allowed a degree of latitude in asserting sovereignty on the world stage: choosing to join or not join supranational institutions, to accept or reject outside military presence, or to steer their prized natural resources to the highest bidder.

The United States has maintained an important though somewhat sporadic interest in Central Asia, focused in the 1990s on countering Russia strategically and gaining access to the region's resources, and then, after the events of 9/11, centering on Afghanistan. US interest in promoting human rights and democracy-building has produced occasional rough spots in relations, most notably when Uzbekistan closed the American Kharshi-Khanabad air base that supported Afghan operations following criticism of the Andijon attacks on unarmed civilians in 2005. Later efforts at cooperation—including the Northern Distribution Network (2009–2015), when the US contracted with Russia, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states to help move troops and equipment in and out of Afghanistan—sputtered over regional corruption and lack of logistical capacity. Only nine thousand US troops remain in Afghanistan in 2018, down from over one hundred thousand. The US, however, will not cede its interest in this geopolitically critical region, and President Trump's election removed any concern that human rights or anticorruption agendas might cast a pall over relations. Deals between US businesses and Uzbekistan worth 4.8 billion dollars were announced at a May 2018 visit of Shavkat Mirzoyiyev to Washington, where he and Trump held a joint press conference.[39] The US provides a useful foil, another potential great power patron, even as China, Russia, and the Central Asian states have found a regional equilibrium in the late 2010s.

European Union engagement with Central Asia, outside of certain education and rural development programs, has focused most recently on Kazakhstan and its energy resources. Kazakhstan singed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 2017, which recognizes its status as a "special partner" in the region and gives it access to more EU development assistance.[40] Europe's voice across Central Asia is primarily heard through its main funding agency, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which works alongside the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to examine, and support, projects across the region. The EBRD is active in sixty-nine projects in Uzbekistan as of 2018, with a cumulative investment of 897 million euros.[41]

THE "TASHKENT SPRING"

Shavkat Mirziyoyev's reforms in Uzbekistan represent one of the least expected, and broadest, openings of an authoritarian regime since the USSR's collapse. As prime minister during the bloody Andijon protests in 2005, Mirzoyiyev hardly seemed like a natural reformer when he emerged as the favored successor to Islam Karimov. The durability and the future of his

reform plan remain open questions in 2018. Casting back, however, these transformations did not appear from nowhere. Uzbek leaders had increasingly worked in the 2010s toward economic diversification and attraction of foreign investment, mainly through the introduction of special trading zones. Noises, and some actions, were taken to end child labor and reduce unpaid labor toiling in cotton fields, after international campaigns convinced several companies to boycott products linked to Uzbekistan.[42] Uzbek leaders had toned down their heated rhetoric against neighboring republics over water and energy issues over the 2010s. Political harassment, imprisonment, and torture remained regime tools, however, and corruption festered in closed economic and political systems. What, then, prompted Mirzoyiyev's moves? Are the anticorruption and openness drives primarily political tools to rid himself of opposition and blunt future challenges to power? He has sacked several hundred politicians and bureaucrats, focusing on the Ministry of Finance and the National Security Service. Does the crushing of independent political life under the Karimov regime allow Mirzoyiyev to gain virtue as a reformer, when he can feel confident that antigovernment forces are, at best, in disarray and regime loyalty is deeply embedded in the population?

Tests for this newfound openness will come. Mirzoyiyev could hardly doubt his prospects when he opened the Uzbek media, allowing coverage of opposition candidates during the 2017 presidential elections. Local politicians now appear on television to discuss issues of concern to citizens. Promised elections for regional governors (*hokims*) and mayors will hold signs of the regime's openness, or perhaps the willingness of candidates to offer new policies or directions. How much leash will the government give the hundreds of civil society organizations it has allowed to register and operate officially? Once the dust settles on this round of reforms and sectoral winners and losers emerge, how will political networks and the sprawling bureaucracy adapt?[43]

Early reforms to mid-2018 have yet to require complex policy-making or fundamental structural changes.[44] Since the initial delay of a looser visa regime, Mirziyoyev has carried out his reforms without any apparent internal resistance. This may be the beginning of a generational change. In my own recent trips to Uzbekistan, I have met with younger, well-educated bureaucrats and scholars, who have a vision for the country as a regional leader in Central Asia and a responsible global citizen. Yet, reforming the Uzbek economy will take time and pain. The agricultural sector, although somewhat decentralized in recent years, remains a command-and-control system, with rent-seeking by local officials draining significant resources from the local population.[45] Farmers lack the ability to grow crops of their choice; even if freed, they lack the equipment and training to compete in regional and global markets. Water infrastructure and management requires serious attention and money. These

problems are main drivers behind the millions of young Uzbeks who feel they must leave their country in order to make a living for themselves and to support their families.[46] The age structure of Uzbekistan—with 42 percent of the population under twenty-five years of age—makes economic reform imperative, especially as remittances fall and the Russian economy is unlikely to return to its lustrous state underpinned by high oil prices.[47] The depth of these issues will challenge reforms called for by Mirziyoyev's 2017 "Action Plan," or Development Strategy, which advocates economic liberalization, streamlining state structures and ensuring the rule of law.[48] The SREB and foreign investment might buy Uzbekistan some breathing room while more fundamental structural reform is undertaken.[49]

The new Uzbek president has perhaps made his greatest mark at transforming regional cooperation. Central Asia has avoided significant interstate military confrontations in the post-Soviet era, as leaders have focused on their own nation-state–building projects. Cooperation, however, has been grudging; outside of the SCO, leaders rarely meet each other and continue Soviet-era patterns of looking to Moscow—or sometimes, now, Beijing—as arbiters, instead of each other for multilateral engagement. Mirziyoyev has emphasized more cooperative approaches on the region's most sensitive multilateral issues.

Borders between Central Asian states have produced significant tension and deadly violence over past years. International frontiers and exclaves bedevil life in the Ferghana Valley, shared between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The valley has the richest agricultural land and highest population density in Central Asia. Border tensions heightened after the 2005 Rose Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijon massacre in Uzbekistan, when Uzbekistan sealed its borders and destroyed bridges across rivers dividing it from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Everyday border crossings, before and after 2005, involve tension and bribery. The USSR's collapse divided families and disrupted relations in the valley, where licit reasons for border crossings, without a cumbersome visa process, can be limited to a family member's death. Each country has sought to enforce its sovereignty and young, heavily armed conscripts staff border posts.[50] The securitization of the Ferghana Valley has stunted growth in what should be the engine of Central Asia's economy. Agriculture, from animal husbandry to the apricot industry, requires cross-border cooperation, which often must be done illicitly.[51] One of Mirzoyiyev's first outreach efforts involved working with Kyrgyzstan's government to delimit hundreds of kilometers where the states have not agreed on the actual border line. Unclear borders, which may (or may not) transverse villages, and sometimes even homes, have sparked local violence. Over 2014–2015, sixteen valley residents died and twelve were wounded in skirmishes with border guards or cross-border village disputes over water

and land.[52] Economic confrontations in the valley can quickly gain an ethnic character, with young, underemployed or unemployed men receptive to calls to violence.

In September 2017, Mirziyoyev made the first trip in seventeen years of an Uzbek president to Bishkek; alongside Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambaev, he negotiated an accord that demarcated 85 percent of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, with the final 208 km scheduled to be resolved in 2018.[53] The border agreement also thawed relations in other spheres, with accords signed in the realms of education and taxation. Work has begun to demarcate Uzbekistan's frontier with Tajikistan, but disputes over cross-border trade have hampered efforts. Border issues remain a challenge as villages jockey over scarce resources and states seek to protect their economic interests and enforce their military presence.

Water has been another regional flashpoint that the Uzbek regime has sought to temper. As a downstream state, Uzbekistan is dependent on water supplies from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A mutual dependence exists—Uzbekistan supplies power to these countries—but jockeying over control over this resource intensified as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which lack the natural resource wealth of other Central Asian states, envisioned large, power-producing projects that would divert water supplies now entering Uzbekistan.

Tajik president Emomali Rahmon's legacy project—the Rogun Dam, planned to be the world's largest—has irritated relations with Uzbekistan throughout the 2010s. Islam Karimov had threatened military intervention against Tajikistan if substantial water supplies were diverted away from Uzbekistan.[54] Nevertheless, Rahmon's project has remained at the center of Tajik political life, portrayed as a nation-building effort that will power not only the country, but serve also as an economic engine through hydroelectricity exports. Efforts to force Tajik citizens to purchase stock in the dam failed, and the government has been selling—with success—high-risk bonds on the international market to raise the nearly four billion USD cost.[55] Tajikistan remains an extremely poor country, hurt by a decline in remittances from Russia and suffering from a kleptocracy, much of which focuses on illicit goods such as narcotics. The Rogun Dam has economic potential, envisioned as producing thirteen billion kilowatt hours of energy annually, but external buyers remain unclear—perhaps Afghanistan and Pakistan, but there are no guarantees as the first turbine is set to come online in late 2018. Tajikistan has placed a huge wager on one project to invigorate a country.[56]

Shavkat Mirziyoyev has ended Uzbekistan's opposition to the dam project, asking only that Tajikistan uphold international agreements on cross-border water-sharing rights. He also ended long-standing Uzbek opposition to a Kyrgyz hydroelectric project at Kamabarata. Instead, Mirziyoyev's

proposed a joint project—the Kyrgyz have found challenges with financing Kambarata—with the electricity benefits shared.[57] These strategies smack of efforts to gain regional and international status as leader in Central Asia, accumulating political prestige as a responsible global citizen as well as better economic relationships.

Mirziyoyev has increased engagement in the broader international arena, gaining International Monetary Fund plaudits for Uzbekistan's reforms, and seeking greater investment among other regional actors including Turkey and South Korea—trade with South Korea already exceeds one billion dollars. Uzbekistan has also initiated unprecedented contacts with Afghanistan's government in efforts to build regional stability, through signed economic agreements and joint conferences on regional security.[58] Russia also continues as an important economic partner, with a joint agreement signed in 2018 to build a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan seeks to modernize its military along Russian lines, reducing the number of active soldiers and purchasing better technology.[59] One legacy of Islam Karimov's regime unlikely to change is a reluctance to send troops outside the country's borders—for peacekeeping or international missions, above and beyond potential conflicts—as well as the foundation of a multivector policy that has allowed Uzbekistan to shift direction with minimal foreign interference.[60] The EEU may prove an eventual stumbling block to regional integration under Uzbek leadership, and Uzbek goods exported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan now face tariffs. China's regional ascent, however, gives the untethered Uzbeks more cards to play.

ISLAM AND SOCIETY

Islam's foundational place in Central Asia's cultural and social life challenges secular, post-Soviet regimes. As across the world, Islam has been used as a rallying cry against political orders considered corrupt or too closely tied to non-Muslim precepts or states. Islamism—a desire to reorder government and society according to the laws of Islam—appeals to a small minority in Central Asia who believe in the formation of a caliphate that would unite all Muslims, regionally or globally, in one social and political unit. In Central Asia, those attracted to Islamist teachings and movements possess a strong sense of justice or martyrdom and an antipathy toward Western capitalism and consumerism.[61] Islamists tend to be social conservatives, willing to use violence to pursue their cause. Masculinity and ideas of heroism also attract Islamist followers.

Islam's potential for overturning an established Central Asian order remains a subject of intense debate within local states and societies, as well

as among foreign analysts. Even as Central Asia maintains a low level of internal political violence, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks have been tied to high-profile Islamist attacks in St. Petersburg and as far away as Stockholm and New York.[62] Since 2014, the Islamic State (IS, or Daesh) has attracted the most attention in Central Asia, for its ability to mobilize fighters internationally to its home territory in Syria and Iraq. Most famously, in 2015 a leader of Tajikistan's paramilitary police "defected" to IS.[63] The numbers of those who traveled from Central Asia are gross estimates but report relatively consistent numbers—from the mid-hundreds to one thousand fighters from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with somewhat smaller numbers for Uzbekistan and hardly any from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Recruitment is initially accomplished through social or workplace connections, rather than closely surveyed mosques. Established adherents seek to direct potential fighters to online videos—in Russian, which is the language of recruitment—and then to fight for IS, generally in its home territory before the group's military defeat in 2016–2017. Many new IS supporters were recruited in Russia, where they worked as labor migrants.

Edward Lemon has argued that Islamism remains a relatively weak threat to Central Asia's stability and its secular order. Efforts to recruit labor migrants in Russia, especially among Kyrgyz, have produced minimal results as these new arrivals cluster and work together closely to gain housing, connections, and employment, which makes them less vulnerable to outside propaganda.[64] In Central Asia, the main threat to social stability involves state campaigns against everyday forms of observance, from beards to religious clothing on women. Tajikistan has enforced such measures aggressively, though selectively, and often against poor rural inhabitants, who have an extremely small likelihood to join Islamist groups. Formal religious leaders, distrusted by state authorities unless they can be completely co-opted, often act as a counter to more violent ideas that might be instilled by recruiting peers or online publicity. Lemon and Anna Matveeva, who sees IS and other radical groups as a far greater threat to Central Asian stability, agree that adherents come most often from those with a middle to higher level of education, in their low- to mid-twenties, from medium to large cities—those who often lack a support group among family and friends. Radicalization is individual and difficult to predict.[65]

Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi credit state security services for their vigilance over local populations. Their research indicates significant, if not substantial, numbers who seek belonging in Islamist circles. IS faces competition for Central Asian recruits, who will travel abroad, from al Qaeda as well as smaller, local cells and the region-wide Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Islamist recruiters have found success with the Uzbek population

in Kyrgyzstan, which, since the 2010 riots in the country's south, have seen their position marginalized. The Kyrgyz state has shown no interest in investigating the hundreds of Uzbeks who were murdered, and Kyrgyz nationalism has gained a distinctive anti-Uzbek tone.[66] Matveeva and Giustozzi consider late-2010s Central Asia "a dynamic and growing part of global jihadism."[67]

Uzbekistan, among other states, watched warily as IS territory in the Middle East disappeared, sending potentially hundreds of radicalized and militarily trained radicals into their midst. Mirziyoyev seems so far to be following Russia's success in counterinsurgency measures in its Caucasus region—thousands of low-threat citizens have been removed from state watch lists, and state agents focused more tightly on profiling a small number of individuals and their associates and families. Uzbekistan also hopes that some of the liberalization measures might open the economy and growth will constrain the potential for radicalism within its borders.

The link between poverty and radicalization is assumed more than proven in Central Asia, though anger at income inequality certainly fuels Islamist propaganda videos. In fact, poverty and inequality remain Central Asia's greatest challenges twenty-five years after independence. These states struggle to deliver basic social services—power, water, and sustainable employment—to large swathes of the population. Kazakhstan remains by far the wealthiest, but also the most unequal. Strict residence laws challenge the rights of citizens to take advantage of opportunities in the privileged cities of Astana and Almaty. Oil and gas wealth—in the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—and remittances—in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—have failed to do more than sustain states powered by a combination of kleptocracy and rent-seeking officials. Corruption has survived Kyrgyzstan's democratic revolutions. Will Uzbekistan's reforms produce a more open society, or stall once Mirziyoyev either cleanses the apparatus of potential opposition or feels a threat from a society that seems tame or tamed?

CONCLUSION

Central Asia remains an environment fraught with significant risks and instabilities—from nationalism and corruption to poverty, inequality, closed political systems, and potential religious extremism. But China and Russia see great benefits from the region, given its geopolitical—and, with BRI, geoeconomic—importance and its abundant natural and human resources. Trade, investment and enhanced cooperation can help all these players, helping to advance political stability as well as produce economic gains. The Central Asian states will continue their multivector game of looking carefully at the

advantages that relationships with all major powers can produce, so long as their own political control remains firm.

The Tashkent Spring's fate, and the trajectory of Kazakhstan after Nazarbaev, will define Central Asia in the 2020s. We will see a generational shift, as those with little or no connection to the Soviet Union come to power. These younger elites have been raised in a more cosmopolitan environment, often studying abroad and more comfortable with global cultures than their predecessors. But they have also become integrated into a system that privileges rent-seeking from the state and informal networks' role in sustaining power. Good governance remains a distant dream for Central Asia's citizens, especially those who lack connections to the corridors of central, or even local, power.

If the Uzbek Spring endures, it could rewrite the book on Western ideas of "regime change." Until now, conventional wisdom has assumed that the West should engage with closed regimes, to offer signals of hope and support to potential reformers, primarily those outside government circles. In the Uzbek case, however, the very personnel who engineered much of Islam Karimov's authoritarian agenda have now implemented potentially game-changing reforms that will open the country politically and economically. Edward Schatz wonders if Western disinterest, as Uzbekistan faded as a target region for human rights, democracy, and development, might now be considered a model to encourage more open regimes intent on liberal economics and global engagement.[68]

The West may have an important, if secondary, role to play in assisting Central Asia's average, relatively poor population and nurturing good governance. Moralizing is not helpful, but technical support would be. Central Asians do not see the West as a model: in a 2014 opinion poll in Kazakhstan, only 18 percent agreed that the country should follow a Western path, whereas 43 percent preferred a unique direction for Kazakhstan. Sixty-nine percent believed that Kazakhstan needed to retain a distinct culture.[69] Know-how and financial support are the strongest tools. Central Asians appreciate Western models of public administration and sound governance, which could be used to combat corruption.[70] Such joint efforts, alongside, especially, Chinese investment, could chart a path for growth for regimes with young populations and unstable economies.

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Chapter Five

Turkey

The Missed Opportunity

Aurélie Lacassagne

Turkey is—and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, was—a fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic actor in the fragile balance of the world order. If one takes a traditional geopolitical perspective, where geography matters, then Turkey is at the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East. If one looks at civilizational spaces, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism overlap; the Turkič, Arabic, and Persian cultures meet. Turkey embodies the encounter between the sociohistorically constructed West and East. For all these reasons, Turkey is as much a fascinating country as it is a much-desired stakeholder in international relations. In today's turbulent world (to echo James Rosenau[1]) and the increasingly disordered world in which we live, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping in its foreign relations. Yet, anyone can agree upon the necessity of a strong and stable Turkey for the peaceful future of our world. It is therefore imperative to study the processes that have led to the illegibility and ever-changing positions of Turkey. Many analyses tend to position Turkey as a vulnerable and sensitive actor;[2] yet such a view misperceives the important role played by intertwined external and internal dynamics. My starting point is that the current strategic alliance made by Turkey with Russia (and Iran) has indeed to do with geostrategic interests in the Syrian war and the Kurds and with the new Saudi foreign policy (seeking unchallenged leadership in the Sunni world), as it has to do with domestic policy shifts, particularly following the European failure to integrate Turkey into its We-identity. This chapter is theoretically informed by figurational sociology.[3] First, I discuss the recent shifts in Turkish politics by tracing them back to Westernization processes and Turkish resistance to such processes and by analyzing the politics of the AKP (Justice and Development Party/ *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) since 2002. Second, I examine how the exclusion

of Turkey from membership in the European Union led to changes in both foreign and domestic policies. Third, I analyze the shifts in Turkey's foreign policy before and after the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011 in light of the changes on the Turkish political scene.

TRACING PROCESSES: WESTERNIZATION AND RESISTANCE

The history of Turkey must be approached, both nationally and internationally, as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire, its predecessor. Because of space constraints, it is impossible to dig far back, but a few elements and events of the nineteenth century must be underlined to fully appreciate the domestic and foreign policies of contemporary Turkey. First, if the Ottoman Empire personified, through the figure of the "Turk," the Orient, the Other, the mirror necessary for Europe to build its identity, this Empire was nevertheless a European power.[4] Not only did its territory extend into the European continent for a long period of time, but it was also an integral player in European diplomatic and political games (e.g., the alliance between Francis I of France and Suleiman the Magnificent against Charles V). Capitulations—the extraterritorial rights "given" to European powers on Ottoman territory—also illustrated the entanglements of both spaces as well as continuous interference by European powers in Ottoman politics. In the long term, this weakened and undermined the Empire to the point where it was called, in the nineteenth century, the "sick man" of Europe.

But the century also marked an important administrative, social, and political period of reform known as the Tanzimat (1839–1976), which constituted the first attempt at Westernization.[5] The apex of that reform program was the promulgation of the first Constitution in 1876, a short-lived experience as Sultan Abdul Hamid II suspended it two years later. This Westernization from the top was resisted by a group known as the Young Ottomans. As Kayali describes it, "A literary and political group that coalesced in the capital under the name of New Ottomans (better known as Young Ottomans) in 1867 embodied the main organized opposition to the Tanzimat regime. . . . Its grievances centered on the personal rule of a small bureaucratic elite, excessive foreign interference in the political and economic affairs of the empire, and European cultural domination."[6] At that time, the line of argumentation already focused on the compatibility of Islam and Westernization.[7]

The second constitutional period (1908–1918) saw the reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908. This period is often described as one of strong

Turkish nationalism. But, as Kayali reminds us, "The Young Turks, in fact, included in their ranks many Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and in the early stages of the movement, Armenians and Greeks."[8] The Ottoman intellectual field was very diverse, not only in the origins of the thinkers but also in opinions they put forth. Moreover, what fundamentally characterized the political ideas and changes of that era (roughly from 1839 to the installment of the Kemalist regime) was a willingness to synthesize. On a spectrum that would be badly termed "modernist-traditional" or "Westernized-Oriental," groups occupied different locations according to how much and what they wanted to "borrow" from Europe, and how much and what they wanted to change in Ottoman society. In that respect, Çağlıyan-Içener underlines that "the mentality of Tanzimat can be summarized as 'being devoted to the East in relation to faith but adopting the instruments of technique and life from the West.'"[9] He further notes that the Islamists of the time were not opposed to change but that these changes should be introduced slowly and without destroying the cultural foundations that connected all the peoples of the Empire.

> As familiarity with the sources of Western civilization increased, lifestyles were also modified. For these Islamists, Westernization was not a degenerating development but rather a renovation and refreshing process. As such, these conservatives had no direct problems with the new regime's modernization project or with Westernization. That said, they resisted the total eradication of relations with the past that would alienate the masses from the modernization project of the new regime. Without harming the friendly nature of relations the synthesis-oriented conservatives did warn the republican elites, albeit courteously, not to become extremists in making abrupt changes.[10]

Importantly, this viewpoint never disappeared and continued to circulate quietly among certain elites. But Mustafa Kemal, thanks to his aura of victory, undertook a civilizational *Blitzkrieg*, if I may use that analogy. Not only did it create a resistance, but it also had the effect of not giving the Turks adequate time to fully internalize these changes. In other words, it did not eradicate the old Ottoman habitus; it just superposed it with a Kemalist habitus. More precisely, some individuals did transform their individual habitus, but the social habitus of the Turks as a collective is marked by a mix of the old and the new emotional and behavioral dispositions of the Ottoman and Kemalist periods.[11]

This distinction between individual habitus and social habitus is important as it is linked to the social position one has in the society. The elite that benefited from Kemalism—comprising secular intellectuals, the urban middle classes, and the army—internalized the Kemalist habitus, while the

rural segments of the society and the peripheral conservative bourgeoisie remained more attached to the Ottoman habitus. Yet, the internalization of habiti is, by nature, a process (the habitus is not a substance but a set of social and psychological dispositions). Thus, habiti coexist in the individual and in the society at large. Otherwise said, to understand Turkey, one should avoid strong dichotomies between Islam and modernity, or between the elite and the masses. As Turkish academic Cizre Sakallioğlu writes, "Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, there has been a dialectical interplay between the state and Islam, causing each to trigger responses in the other so as to preclude the possibility of Islam becoming a simple reaction against Westernization, operating independently from political and social determiners. Understanding this relationship requires an appreciation for history."[12] This means that to be successful in the political arena, one needs to synthesize, to rely on this "dialectical interplay." In the next section, I discuss how Erdogan's electoral successes can be explained by his understanding of the necessity for synthesis.

ERDOGAN'S THIRD WAY

The evolution of Turkish national politics in the last couple of decades has been difficult to decipher. This is mainly due to the changing policies undertaken by the AKP. According to Marcou, three scenarios and four periods can be distinguished.[13] First, the AKP is a party quite similar to the Christian-Democratic parties that can be found in Germany or Italy, for instance in the sense that it is a party sold to the ideal of representative democracy; a party which has turned the page of its predecessors; a party that, while defending Turkey's Muslim identity, would continue its anchorage to the West.[14] Second, the AKP is playing a game and has, in fact, "a hidden Islamist agenda."[15] The third hypothesis favors a sort of syncretism: Turkey has reaffirmed its Muslim identity, undertaken a "cultural revolution,"[16] while at the same time relying on the old tenets of Kemalism—nationalism and authoritarianism. This Turkish "third way" or *via media* can be traced to four distinct periods that follow the electoral successes of the AKP. Thus, according to Marcou,[17] the initial period (2002–2007) matched the first scenario with an active policy to comply with the European Union (EU) membership requirements.[18] The second period (2007–2011) was marked by "the antagonism between the Kemalist establishment and the new AKP leaders."[19] The third period (2011–2014) saw an acceleration of this polarization;[20] the AKP focused its policies and reforms on the national stage with profound transformations in the economic, social, and political makeup of Turkey. The current and fourth period is characterized by what Marcou calls a

"rigidification of the regime" and a "personalization of power that gives to the current regime a 'sultanic' character."[21]

If we take stock of these developments, then we can explain why Erdogan has been, to the surprise of many, particularly in the West, so successful. He uses different levels of discourses. He plays different cards to react to domestic and/or international pressures. He realizes different syntheses between various ideologies. Indeed, the AKP embodies the heterogeneity of Muslim practices and identities—be they traditional, modern, or radical—that characterize the religious field of Turkey.[22] Many observers were surprised by the AKP's ability to successfully return Islam to the political scene. But this surprise can only be explained by the denial of the fact that Islam has always remained a force in Turkish politics. If Kemalism marginalized Islam, it did not erase or destroy it. Within the margins, Islam survived and actually became a space of resistance. This situation is not specific to Turkey and is true of several other Muslim countries which underwent forms of Westernization, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Maybe more important is that this exclusion was felt by some as a humiliation. Kentel explains: "For many years the republican regime fueled a cultural superiority over the traditional society and created feelings of resentment and revenge among the Muslim popular masses. The AKP is the result, more than the origin, of this situation."[23] But Kentel also rightly underlines that Islam should not be considered in this instance as a religion but instead as an identity.[24] The AKP has constructed a "totalizing ideology" by synthesizing nationalism and religion in order to mobilize the masses. Therefore, one should not be confused. The AKP has not so much to do with Islam, as it has to do with a totalizing ideology "that was built through the instrumentalization of Islam." Interestingly, the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs), a cornerstone of Kemalism, not only remained active but also became a key political instrument of the AKP in order to impose on Turks its "cultural revolution."[25] Again this situation is not unique to contemporary Turkey. Putin, for instance, has been utilizing the Orthodox Church to build a totalizing, if not totalitarian, ideology. But where the comparison is important is in its historical roots. Putin's ideology is nothing new; it is actually strikingly the same as Sergey Uvarov's doctrine "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality" put forth in the 1830s. In the same fashion, Erdogan's ideology borrows from the nineteenth-century debates between the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. Erdogan's regime is the heir of the Ottoman Empire as much as the Kemalist nationalism.[26]

To conclude this discussion of the idea that Erdogan's success is due to a synthesis between different elements of both Ottoman and Turkish political life, it is worth examining the analytical arguments put forth by Monnier.[27] Indeed, Monnier's exploration of Erdogan's policies in light of the six Kemalist

principles demonstrates that the AKP has not yet fundamentally modified or inverted the Kemalist principles. We are, in fact, witnessing a continuation of older historical trends that include the following:

Republicanism

Monnier underlines that a return to the old imperial rule is absolutely out of order and that the republican system is here to stay.[28] In his pursuit of Ottoman-like *grandeur*, he can merely settle for "Ottoman kitsch"[29] as illustrated by the many grandiose celebrations of old battles and leaders and a rewriting of the past.[30]

Nationalism

The trauma of the independence war and the efficient nationalist machinery set up by Mustafa Kemal have indeed created a "vast Turkish melting pot."[31] If Erdogan, in the early years of his rule, sought actively, through political reforms, to finally integrate the Kurds into that melting pot, recent events show that the territorial integrity of the republic is the overarching principle on which Erdogan relies. Moreover, even in Europe, people are split on the definition of a nation, and thus nationalism is torn between civic and ethnic conceptions. Whereas Kemalism prefers to defend a civic national identity, Erdogan chose to put the emphasis on cultural markers such as Islam.[32] The Europeans would be at a loss to reproach such an emphasis, as all European states are undergoing a similar process of shifting the balance in favor of a more ethnic conception of the nation.

Populism

If populism as conceived by Kemal aimed at erasing social classes to promote a single nation, and at imposing an equality *de façade*, under Erdogan we have witnessed a change of guard, but certainly not the end of the many divides between rich and poor, the rural and the urban. In the 1990s, "new, popular social classes began to replace older ones as the center of economic activity gradually shifted from Istanbul to Anatolia. Growing economic power on the part of the Anatolian bourgeoisie resulted in demands for the redistribution of political privileges."[33] It is the great revenge of the humiliated, of this conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie, which has made the AKP's success.[34] This new bourgeoisie in power demands that foreign policy serves its economic interests.

Statism

The economy is the field where the AKP regime has most impressed the world. There has been a general enrichment of the population. But if previous Kemalist-inclined governments failed to implement significant economic reforms, the very idea of economic modernization and state intervention is a key element of Kemalism. Monnier notes that "despite the declared liberalism and support to private initiatives, the Turkish state still plays today a leadership role in the economic development, in particular in Anatolian East, of a true Turkish Mezzogiorno."[35]

Secularism

Monnier reminds us that in contrast to France, where religion and state are completely separate, Turkish secularism means "a close subordination of the religious to the political."[36] As discussed previously, the *Diyanet* has proven a useful tool for the AKP to control religious practices and discourses. Moreover, it is pointed out that the presence of religious signs dramatically increased under the AKP's rule; but it may not be so much a "re-Islamization" as it is an investment in public space by once-upon-a-time marginalized people. As Kentel recalls, "The young 'revolutionary' Islamists of the 1980s transformed into businessmen. And their children are living quite differently. Their social relations, ways of life, even if they are marked by traces of a certain 'Islamic varnish,' are totally secular."[37] Moreover, as explained, there has always been a dialectical interplay between the state and Islam: "The recent tide of political Islam in Turkey cannot be understood in terms of the Westernization project having gone bankrupt but only as a contingent relationship existing between secular nationalist politics and Islam."[38]

Progressivism

The Kemalist model was a top-down approach. It failed to go deeper and to really transform rural communities; its effects were limited to the big cities. What changed with Erdogan is that the traditionalist and conservative way of life was more visible. Women wearing the hijab are more numerous in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara; but "what is important is that today Turkish women study, work, travel freely."[39] Some signs are worrisome; in particular, "the multiplication of religious schools (*imam hatip*) normalizes non-mixity between girls and boys and imposes clothing codes and Islamic methodologies."[40] But women's social movements are also very strong and resilient.

THE HISTORICAL MISTAKE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKISH POLITICS

In 1963, the Ankara Agreement created an association between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC), thus establishing a framework for a future of full Turkish membership through different steps, including a Custom Union signed in 1995. Turkey applied for full EU membership in 1987 (at that time the EU was still the EEC); this application was denied two years later. Following the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, and membership applications from former Warsaw Pact countries at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the EU defined new criteria for membership. The package of conditions is very extensive. Concretely for Turkey, it meant the following: "For the political criteria, the stakes are: reducing the political influence of the army; harmonizing human rights with European standards; respecting minority rights and in particular the Kurds. At the economic level, it means curbing inflation; stabilizing the financial sector; restructuring the banking sector; and privatizing the public companies."[41] At the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey gained formal candidate status and started to undertake reforms required by the EU. Interestingly, and perhaps to the surprise of many, the pace of the reforms accelerated once the AKP was in power. During its first mandate, Erdogan devoted most of his government's efforts toward the goal of "amending the 1982 Constitution (October 2011, 2004) and [passing] a series of 'nine legislative harmonization packages' (in 2002, 2003 and 2006)."[42] The AKP willingness to reform led to the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005.[43] Such negotiations show that the AKP was of a different nature, or had changed its mind, from its predecessors like Erbakan and more generally the MG movement[44] (National Outlook/*Milli Görüs*, MG), which was anti-European. Debates are ongoing about the true nature of this ideological shift, but what appears certain is the willingness of Erdogan to realize a synthesis (for tactical reasons or not). As Kirdiş explains:

> The rapid passing of multiple reform packages and alteration of laws to meet the Copenhagen criteria further emphasized this pro-EU foreign policy stance. Hence, the AKP, by showing its willingness to join an organization the leaders of the AKP previously had termed to be a "Western/Christian club," painted itself as having gone through an "ideological moderation" process moving away "from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives." Hence, by affiliating itself with the EU, the AKP was aiming to construct confidence in domestic politics, especially amongst liberal and secular

segments and institutions, by showing that it had "changed" and that it now was a "centrist" party on the path of traditional Turkish foreign policy identity.[45]

A good illustration of this synthesis can be found in the treatment of the Kurds. It seemed an impossible task to reconcile the requirement of minority protection and the Kemalist tenet that the Kurds are just Turks. The recognition or at least the possible use of the Kurdish language in the public sphere was a real stumbling block. Yet, the AKP, without modifying the 1982 Constitution, managed to allow the Kurdish language to be taught in private institutions in 2003 and the (very restrictive) diffusion of Kurdish shows on TV public channels in 2004.[46] The AKP (governments 1 and 2) was more accommodating to the Kurds and tried to improve the relationship between the state and its largest minority. Such efforts were largely due to the fact that, for Erdogan, religion matters; he sees the Kurds as part of the broader Muslim society. Indeed, Kirdiş points out that "Erdogan argued that through situating Turkey within the Western world yet also by preserving the country's cultural identity 'Turkey [would] be a symbol of harmony of cultures and civilizations in the 21st century.'"[47]

The Kurdish question was already used in the 1990s by the EU to drag its feet on Turkey's candidacy status.[48] Yet, one might be puzzled by the existence of this question, as the EU was astonishingly silent about the treatment of the Roma minority by Central and Eastern European states.

Even more controversial than the Kurdish question was the recognition of the Armenian genocide. This recognition exemplifies many of the issues surrounding EU-Turkey relations. First, the recognition of the Armenian genocide does not appear among the Copenhagen criteria. Yet it was used over and over again by European politicians to oppose Turkish membership, particularly in France (which has a sizable Armenian-origin population). The lobbying on this question reached unexpected levels and made it politically impossible for Turkey to join the EU. This is perhaps the most striking and saddest example of the doubled-standard used against Turkey. The Eastern and Central European countries joined the EU without being asked to recognize the Holocaust, although such recognition would have been a good idea considering the recent political evolution of states such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. The United Kingdom, still an EU member at the time of this writing, does not recognize the Armenian genocide as a genocide[49], nor do twelve other members-states. Yet, despite this blatant double standard, the AKP government has made progress, certainly slow and not necessarily successful, but progress nevertheless; first by improving Turkish-Armenian relations through the famous "football diplomacy" of 2008–2009;[50] and second by allowing discussion about the fate of Armenians to enter the public

space.[51] Nevertheless, this fallacious argument has had a long-lasting effect on European thought and seems to represent an insurmountable obstacle.

Despite the efforts provided by Turkey to Europeanize its legal, political, and economic systems, the EU found them insufficient and continued to add extra measures in order to pursue the negotiations. Finally, the EU partially suspended the accession talks in December 2006 over eight chapters.[52] Various actions from some EU member-states, in particular France, where the Constitution was modified to require a referendum on such an accession and which used its veto power several times to block the opening of negotiations on various chapters, has in effect stalled the talks. Moreover, Cyprus, which became a full EU member in 2004 (in quite a striking move by the EU considering that the Greek Cypriots ruling Cyprus have no intention to recognize some of their wrongs, nor to find a definite solution to the partition of the island—an issue caused by both parties[53]) has been very active in blocking the Turkish accession. The crackdown on popular demonstrations in June 2013, together with the authoritarian turn of Erdogan's regime in the last few years, especially after the failed coup in 2016, was the last nail in the coffin. In any case, the rising levels of Islamophobia, the presence of populist governments, and the rise of fascism in many European countries make it impossible to envision Turkish membership in the foreseeable future. The EU treatment of Turkey illustrates particularly well the importance of ideational factors in international relations. Indeed, if the EU were acting from a purely materialist and rationalist (i.e., realist) perspective, it would take into account the paramount importance of Turkey for its energy policy. Turkey "has become an essential part of the 'Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia' program, conceived to link Europe to China by a terrestrial 'bridge' thus avoiding Russia and the Trans-Siberian."[54] Considering the EU's heavy reliance on Russia's gas supply, it seems evident that a diversification of the supply chain is in order, and therefore Turkey should be a centerpiece of this policy. The EU and the United States supported the linkage of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline to the European corridor through the Nabucco project (Turkey-Bulgarian border to Austria), which was in direct competition with the South Stream project supported by Russia's Gazprom. The latter pipeline was planned to go under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, but both the Nabucco project (2013) and the South Stream (2014) have been cancelled, replaced in 2014 by the Turk Stream that, if completed, will make Turkey the hub for Russian gas flow into southern Europe (see Map 5.1). The oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) (connected to the pipelines coming from Erbil and Kirkuk) is also a cornerstone of the EU's oil policy. These energy considerations aside, Turkey has impressive economic indicators and a well-trained workforce; it would certainly be foolish to ignore such a growing economic power. In 2016, the EU also became

Map 5.1. Turk Stream (dotted line)

aware of the pivotal role that Turkey plays in refugee crises, as it was obliged to sign an agreement in March 2016 to that effect.

To conclude, beyond these materialistic considerations, the EU's rejection of Turkey's membership represents a unique missed opportunity to build a new form of identity; an identity not based on a geographical Other but an historical Other. By behaving as a "Christian club,"[55] the EU demonstrated it is not a modern, enlightened, postnational polity, but more a neomedieval endeavor. The EU failed to accommodate a Muslim country, which had worked hard to become democratic, and therefore to show that Islam and democracy are not incompatible at a time when the world desperately needs such an example. The EU failed to repair the mistakes of its past. For centuries, Europe constructed, produced, and reproduced the "Orient" (and in most instances this Orient equated the "Turk" until the nineteenth century) as its Other. A "civilized' Europe was built on nothing else but the construction of a "barbaric" Orient. This, in turn, unleashed the European imperialism that plagued the whole world; it deeply divided the world along binary and Manichean *Weltanschauungen*. There was hope, after the complete moral collapse of Europe following the horrors of the Second World War, that there would be a shift in this worldview, that Europe would try to build a Kantian world.[56] But for fundamental civilizational change to happen, Turkey must be accepted as an essential part of Europe. For the Turks themselves, there is a sense of terrible abandonment, even if, as Yilmaz notes, there is still "Europeanization 'from below,'"[57] despite the tremendous deception and disenchantment felt by many Turks about the European mind-set.[58] At the top, Turkish foreign policy

develops according to changes in the balance of power between established and outsiders.[59] Thus, when the AKP arrived in power in 2002, it changed its former Islamist discourse, rooted in anti-Western rhetoric, to adopt a pro-EU stance in order to be included in the established elite in the international as well as domestic realm.[60] The European snub was a clear signal: the Turks will remain outsiders. This is the reason why the AKP reframed its foreign policy to adopt a neo-Ottomanist policy.

HOW DOMESTIC POLICY CHANGES HAVE INFLUENCED FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS AND VICE VERSA

In recent years, Turkish foreign policies have been influenced by centripetal and centrifugal forces. Among these are changes on the domestic scene, with an increasingly authoritarian government and profound transformations regionally: namely the disintegration of Iraq, the Syrian war, the resurgence of the Kurdish problem, the reinforcement of a Shia crescent, and a more interventionist Saudi foreign policy. In the same way that there were three periods with specific policies during the AKP rule in domestic politics, three periods mark AKP foreign policy options.[61] The first period (2002–2005) focused on EU membership and thus a pro-EU foreign policy, as was examined in the previous section. The second period (2005–2011) illustrated a neo-Ottomanist approach with an emphasis by the regime on its immediate neighbors. The third and current period (2011–today) stemmed from the Syrian war and relies on a logic that prioritizes national interests, rather similar to Manichean logic (with us or against us, internally and externally), which has two immediate consequences: a lack of coherence and ever-changing alliances.

2005–2011: Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy

The failed promises of the EU as well as the Cypriot quagmire seemed to have convinced the AKP to refocus its foreign policy.[62] Less emphasis will be put on constitutional changes and reform packages to respect the Copenhagen criteria, and more efforts will be made to entertain good relations with Turkey's neighbors. At the same time, Turkey took note of the lack of EU commitment. The EU was also appearing less appealing, entangled in a constitutional crisis, a legitimacy crisis, and a chronic democratic deficit (cf. the rejection of the EU Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the suspension of ratification processes in many countries). Turkey understood the growing marginalization of Europe in international affairs

and the many changes affecting the world order. The failure of the West to properly manage international relations after the Cold War had many effects, including: the resurgence of Russia as a world power; the emergence of new regional powers (India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa, for instance); and the growing influence of China on all continents. Moreover, the American-led interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) meant that the militarization of the region was increasing and that the Middle East and Central Asia became key regions in global geopolitics. Turkey had a card to play in these developments. First, it needed to protect itself against these turbulences, thus the development of a policy of good neighborliness. Second, it could become a regional power, independent from its NATO member status. In order to achieve this, Turkey implemented a multidirectional foreign policy aimed at the Arab world and the Turkič world while continuing to entertain good relations with its Western allies and Israel.

Ahmet Davutoglu, with his refined rhetoric, was the man behind these changes. For most people, he is known as a diplomatic and special adviser to Erdogan and as his Foreign Affairs minister from 2009 to 2014. Fewer people might be aware that Ahmet Davutoglu is an exceptional scholar who published a seminal book in 2001, entitled *Strategic Depth* (Stratejin Derinlik).[63] Since 2003, he has worked tirelessly to implement his doctrine. A comparison can be drawn between Ahmet Davutoglu and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter administration, who was also a well-respected IR theorist and scholar, and whose book *The Grand Chessboard* (1997)[64] proposed a fundamental renewal of US foreign policy. Both framed their thoughts through an Eurasianist lens. Interestingly, in the same decade, the 2000s, Eurasianism was revitalized theory, especially by the Russian Aleksandr Dugin, and deeply influenced Putin's foreign policy. Yet, as we shall see, Ahmet Davutoglu's Eurasianist vision is one of bridge building (a natural fit for Turkey) rather than division. For that reason, although it makes perfect sense to speak of a specific Turkish Eurasianism, we shall use the terminology of neo-Ottomanism.

Basically, neo-Ottomanism defines a foreign policy that conceptualizes the traditional space of the Ottoman Empire as a special zone of influence and interest. Therefore, this foreign policy deploys itself in several directions: the Arab world, the Turkič area (the Caucasus region and Central Asia, and, in the 1990s, the Balkans[65]), and northeastern Africa. As mentioned, this new orientation does not challenge Turkish membership in NATO, but aims at diversifying Turkey's allies and friends. It is mainly constituted by a soft power strategy[66] emphasizing economic, diplomatic, and cultural/religious ties. It takes as its point of departure the current border divisions in the region that owe much to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the artificial

borders drawn by European powers. Therefore, a foreign policy promoting commerce, free trade, and free movement of people (with the lifting of visa requirements) offers a way to refashion a new sort of Ottoman Empire, to reunify that space as it once was, and to increase economic interdependence[67] between independent political units in the hope of promoting stability and ultimately peace. Otherwise said, neo-Ottomanism relies on liberal theoretical assumptions. Le Moulec points out that "Turkish diplomacy in the Arab world is commercial as much as political."[68] Indeed, one of the key features of Davutoglu's vision is the entanglement of the economic, the political, the symbolic, and the military sphere. In other words, it is a civilizational project that fits perfectly in the renewed discourses on security. In a post–Cold War world, security is no longer defined solely in military terms.[69] As mentioned, the AKP regime is supported by a new conservative entrepreneurial class looking for foreign markets. The competitive industrial sector needs the support of a policy environment conducive to exports as much as it needs energy to continue its development. Indeed, as Han notes, "the country's refineries imported 87 percent of its total oil supply in 2010, and 98 percent of its natural gas supply in 2009."[70] This need for new markets and energy explains why the economy is so central to Turkish foreign policy. "The importance of business in foreign policy was made clear by Davutoglu in a 2004 interview, during which he outlined how the business community became one of the driving forces of Turkish foreign policy."[71]

In this context, the Arab world, which has oil but a weak and nondiversified industrial base, appears as a natural zone in which to invest. It is worth noting that the bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria, and to a lesser extent near-eastern states, were the cornerstones of this good neighbors policy. As Le Moulec notes, "Following a free trade agreement, signed in 2004, [the Arab region] is a free-trade zone that must be created between Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, according to a 2010 protocol."[72] This zone refers to the project "East Mediterranean Four: Levant Business Forum" implemented by the four states and covering a vast array of sectors.[73]

According to Tür, the Middle East part of Turkey's trade rose from 8.49 percent in 2003 to 17.16 percent in 2010.[74] Moreover, economic penetration and relations can be framed in terms of an economic Islamist discourse, which nicely aligns with Erdogan's rhetoric. The renewed presence and activity of Turkey in the Arab world, the willingness to rebuild the ties destroyed by previous Kemalist-inclined governments (although the deterioration of Arab-Turkish relations started during the Tanzimat[75]), embodies the very image of neo-Ottomanism. It expresses a sort of nostalgia for a time when the Ottoman Empire was ruled by a sultan who was also the caliph. For Erdogan, knitting of ties with the Arab nations is not only about having influence in

Turkey's backyard, not only about finding new markets and guaranteeing oil supplies; it is also about appearing as a new caliph, as someone toward whom the *ummah* will turn and whom the leaders will ask for advice. In that respect, this pro-Arab policy should not hide the power struggle between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Muslim world. The signing of military agreements with Qatar, the opening of a Turkish military base in that country, as well as the Turkish support for Qatar in its clash with Saudi Arabia in 2017,[76] exemplify that power struggle.[77] This, and the Saudi support for some Salafist activities in the world, resulted in a better alignment between Turkish, Iranian, and Russian interests[78] before the Syrian war even started. Finally, Erdogan's regime played a paramount diplomatic role in the various crises affecting the Near and Middle East. "Ankara has mediated between Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, Syria and Iraq, within the broader Sunni and Arab world, as well as between the USA and Iran."[79] Needless to say that the Arab Spring's uprisings and revolutions badly hurt these efforts to reestablish good relations with Arab neighbors. This is particularly the case when we examine a second direction of this neo-Ottomanist policy regarding Northeastern Africa.

Ankara has paid particular attention to three African states: Libya, Egypt, and Somalia. In the aftermath of the Somali civil wars, the security of transportation ships in the Gulf of Aden was increasingly threatened. It is an issue Turkey can well appreciate considering the role that the straights have played in Turkish history; but it is also a major concern for Turkish export and import. Linked to these concerns (but not exclusively) is increased militarization of the African Horn. The Americans opened a military base in Djibouti in 2002, their only permanent base on the African continent. France has been militarily present in the region since 1890. A Japanese regiment arrived in the small republic in 2011 and the Italians the following year. Finally in 2017, China inaugurated its first military base on foreign soil, in Djibouti. Turkey has traditionally entertained good relations with Somalia and thus decided to open its largest military base outside its borders in this country (inaugurated in 2017). Here again, although the move is outside of our defined period (which ends in 2011), an illustration of neo-Ottomanism can be seen, as it is not just military and economic concerns that lie behind this decision; it is also a matter of cultural/religious influence. Indeed, that base has as its mission the training of Somali soldiers; thus Turkey is playing the helper, the guide of a Muslim country in desperate need of support. The relations between Cairo and Ankara have had their ups and downs, but Egypt was seen as a key actor in the development of the new Turkish "zero problems with neighbors" policy. An economic approach to these renewed relations was taken with the signing in 2005 of a free trade agreement. Then talks started about gas. Egypt

(like its neighbors Cyprus and Israel) has major gas reserves in the Mediterranean Sea. Egyptian gas is exported through the Arab gas pipeline that runs from Arish to Jordan (Aqaba and El-Rehab), Syria (Homs and Baniyas), with a branch to Lebanon (Tripoli)[80] The Arish-Ashkelon (Israel) extension of the pipeline has suffered from the political situation, but as of February 2018, a deal was completed.[81] Turkey could do with some more gas supply and less dependence on Russian gas, and has the infrastructure to transport this gas.[82] These talks have been halted for many reasons, including the Cypriot issue and the deterioration of the relations between Israel and Turkey, and between Ankara and Cairo since the coup against President Morsi (who was supported by Erdogan). So far it seems that Turkey missed the boat and Israel, Egypt, Cyprus and Europe are going ahead with plans to exploit and transport this gas.[83] Finally Libya was a major economic partner for Ankara. "Turkish investments account for about 20 billion dollars,"[84] and many Turkish workers were living in Libya. The collapse of the Gaddafi regime badly hurt the economic relationships patiently established during the first decade of the AKP regime.

The final direction of neo-Ottomanism goes east into the Turkič areas that are constituted by the Caucasus (chiefly Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—Tajikistan, being a Persian-speaking country, is of less interest here). This constitutes a civilizational space in which languages and cultures share many similarities. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a vacuum in these newly independent countries that Turkey could "naturally" fill. That space stretches into China, in East Turkestan, the Xinjiang for the Chinese authorities, the home of the Uyghurs. Interest in this region was particularly acute in the 1990s under the presidency of Turgut Özal and the prime ministership of Suleyman Demirel. Behind this interest was the "Great Game" played around the gas and oil resources of the Caspian Sea. Turkey, with the support of the United States, got its major pipeline, the BTC. The ambitions of Iran and Russia in the region had to wait. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh (between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1988) joined the long list of frozen conflicts. Once the big contracts were signed and awarded, the problems of the small southern Caucasian states were forgotten (but could be reactivated if needed—that is the advantage of "freezing" a conflict). It was then easy for Ankara to play the Turkič card in defense of Azerbaijan—much easier than it was for Iran to support Armenia, a Christian state, against its Shiite cousins, the Azeri. Nevertheless, it did happen—evidence that all the actors were positioning themselves according to egoistic interests rather than anything else. By the end of the 1990s, we were back to realism. The 1990s were marked by three main elements in Turkish-Turkič relations. The first element dealt with politics: Turkey was keen, and encouraged by its Western allies, to serve as

a model for the newly independent states and their transformation into post-Soviet states.[85] Turkey also helped them to make their way into some regional and international organizations. The second element concerned the economy: Turkey was keen on using the Turkič brotherhood discourse to engage in profitable economic relations; it set up to that effect, in 1992, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). The third and last element was the reinforcement of cultural relations through TURKSOY, the International Organization of Turkic Culture, created in 1993.

Considering that both Central Asia and Southern Caucasus are part of Russia's Near Abroad (*blizhneye zarubezhye*), Turkey had to be cautious, and thus Turkey's foreign policy toward the Turkič republics remained based on a soft power approach.[86] Furthermore, the newly independent republics were just enjoying a recovered independence and did not want to be drawn back into constraining regional organizations,[87] especially as they already had to deal with Russian reengineering of regional cooperation. Interestingly, interest in the Turkič republics did not disappear with the arrival of the AKP in power. Although it attracts less attention from the specialists, this Turkič vector of the AKP policy does exist. Köstem notes that successive AKP governments "have worked steadily to institutionalize cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic states of Eurasia."[88] In other words, Turkish-Turkič relations entered a new phase: institutionalization. Summits are held regularly, and a Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states was established in 2009 by the Nakhichevan Treaty.[89] Interest in the Turkič republics also fits nicely into Erdogan's ideology as it allows him to distance himself from Kemalism at a low cost, because "transnational Turkič identity"[90] does not represent a threat to Turkish national identity. Indeed, any sort of pan-Turkism was prohibited under Ataturk as his conception of the nation was civic, and his goal was a strong nation-state and not the re-creation of an empire. Finally, the development of this foreign policy axis toward the Orient permits Turkey to be connected to important developments in the region under the influence of China, which is emerging as the leading world power of the twenty-first century. The Chinese initiative, New Silk Road, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, includes a Silk Road Economic Belt that is supposed to be connected to Turkey's Silk Road project.[91] Another illustration of engagement can be seen in the status granted to Turkey as a dialogue partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[92]

THE DILEMMA OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN A TURBULENT REGION AFTER 2011

The war in Syria that broke in 2011 transformed the AKP's foreign policy. The complex war, with its many actors on the ground, has considerably affected

Turkey, whose actions seem increasingly determined according to hazardous evolutions of relations of power between fighting insurgents. Thus, Turkish foreign policy is far less coherent than it used to be. This brief discussion will focus on changing relations with Russia, the United States, and Iran in the context of the resurgence of the Kurdish question.

Historically, the relationships between the Russian and Ottoman empires were divisive. The zones of contact were zones of friction, if not open war, in Caucasus, in the Balkans, and in the Turkish Straights. This peculiar geopolitical situation explains why Turkey was such an important player in the NATO defense system during the Cold War. Relations between the Ottoman and Persian empires were less tumultuous; the borders agreed upon, although porous. They were rivals rather than enemies. Both sustained a rather similar fate: they were subject to European interference, which considerably weakened them in the nineteenth century. In that century, they both began periods of modernization (under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar in Persia), which led to a constitutional and parliamentary experience (with the election of the first Majlis in 1906 in Persia). Both were in shambles after the First World War. Reza Shah Pahlavi transformed Persia into Iran, following Kemal's model. Turkey and Iran, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, signed the 1937 Saadabad Pact, which affirmed the principle of "non-interference in each others' internal affairs."[93] After the Second World War, under Soviet pressure, Iran aligned with the United States, without formally joining NATO. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the two neighboring countries experienced diplomatic crises in 1989 and 1997.[94] But economic relations have tremendously improved under the AKP governments, in particular with the signing of a gas deal in 2007.[95]

In the 1990s, the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea and their transportation were the main stumbling block in the relations between Turkey, the United States, Russia, and Iran. The first two supported Azerbaijan, while the last two supported Armenia during the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project changed the regional balance of power, diminishing Russian influence for the first time."[96] In this regard, it is important to note that "with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Georgia as a buffer state between Russia and Turkey, the most significant and immediate threat for Turkey disappeared."[97] Thus, more harmonious Russian-Turkish relations could be envisioned. Indeed in the 2000s, with the continuation of economic liberalization by the AKP, relations improved tremendously at the economic level; and by the end of the decade "Russia had become Turkey's number one trade partner."[98] The Syrian war changed the rules of the game. Up until 2016, Ankara and Moscow disagreed strongly on the course of action. Putin decided to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad without any reservations, while Erdogan reluctantly gave up providing any support to the Syrian regime

by the end of 2012. In the initial phase of the conflict, Erdogan tried to convince al-Assad, unsuccessfully, to engage in reforms;[99] it henceforward became impossible to support a regime refusing to engage in constructive dialogue. Then "several incidents at the border leading to the death of Turkish citizens" pressed Turkey to review its strategy.[100] The spiral of violence in Syria led to a reactivation of Kurdish forces and the movement of Kurdish populations. As happened with the conflicts in Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey put its national interests—namely territorial integrity—first. Some analysts also point out that Erdogan's support of the Free Syrian Army could also be explained by his neo-Ottomanist policy and sectarian perspective—that is, his support of Sunni opposition against a regime backed by Shiite Iran. As Demirtas-Bagdonas notes, "while one can find support for both rationalist and ideationalist accounts of Turkey's policy shift against Damascus, it is not possible to determine whether Turkey's policy is driven exclusively by rational calculations or ideological considerations."[101] In any case, the two explanations are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are complementary and characterized by the pragmatism required of the evolution of the war on the ground. The strong resistance put forth by the Kurdish forces, especially the YPG/YPJ (People's Protection Units and Women's Defense Units), which won the battle of Kobani in June 2015 against Daesh, as well as the establishment of the self-proclaimed Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (the new name since 2016 of the Democratic Federation of Rojava controlled by the PYD [Democratic Union Party] since 2012), created an unbearable situation for Ankara. It meant the establishment of another *de facto* "autonomous Kurdistan" in northern Syria (there is already one in Iraq), thus reviving autonomist/independence motivations for the Kurdish Turks. It is that very specific context that motivated Erdogan to flip-flop: an alliance with Russia and with Iran.

The Syrian opposition forces, due to the lack of real Western military commitment and many internal divisions, underwent severe blows from government forces and as well as from Daesh. But the Kurdish forces within the opposition forces have done quite well for several reasons. First, Turkey actually let them act until the battle of Kobani. Second, Assad supported them, in the hope, initially, of getting the Kurds to support his regime, and then to punish Turkey for its support of the Free Syrian Army.[102] Third, the forces concentrated their military actions in the three Kurdish-populated cantons in the north, so they did not have to stretch their resources. Actually the north was abandoned by Assad's army, which needed to concentrate its efforts in other regions. Fourth, they are experienced fighters and received help from even more experienced fighters, the Peshmerga, their cousins from Iraqi Kurdistan. Fifth, Russia did not oppose them fiercely. All these reasons explain the success of the Kurdish forces in northern Syria, which culminated in their victory at Kobani, a city essential in

linking all three cantons, to a point that became unbearable and threatening for Ankara. Thus, as of 2016, the PYD and its military branch of the YPG/YPJ became Turkey's main enemy. The situation escalated even more in January 2018 with the direct and successful military intervention of the Turkish army in the region of Afrin, ruled by the PYD.

This means not only a rapprochement with Damascus and Moscow but also with Iran. Indeed, in this specific Kurdish context, with two autonomous Kurdistans now in Iraq and Syria, the situation poses a threat not only to Turkey but also to Iran, which has a sizable Kurdish population and a Kurdish autonomist party, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), closely associated with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and the PYD.[103] This invalidates the hypothesis that Erdogan's policy relies on religious motivations in designing foreign policy; or more precisely that realism and national interest come first. Therefore, in the last couple of years, the world has witnessed the development of a new triangle: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In December 2016, the countries initiated the Astana Peace talks,[104] which led to a short-lived ceasefire in some Syrian regions. It was not very successful, but it demonstrated that these three actors are part of the solution (as much as they are part of the problem). It also demonstrated that Russia is willing to be more politically and diplomatically involved, therefore filling the gap created by the failure of the UN- and US-led Geneva framework.[105]

The new tripartite alliance raises the question of the place of NATO and the United States in Turkish foreign policy. The policy shifts undertaken by the AKP since 2002 have never been about challenging or questioning Turkey's role in NATO. In fact, Turkey has tried to maintain an equilibrium: being part of NATO and maintaining good relations with the United States and Europe while developing an autonomous policy toward the Middle East, the East, and Northern Africa in order to become a regional power that could serve the interests of Turkey itself as well as its Western allies. The Turkish military structure is too integrated with NATO to envision a withdrawal.[106] Turkey has, in fact, faced three issues. The first one is the inability of the so-called West to read Turkish foreign policy correctly and to appreciate the country's will for autonomy. The second is the US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen after the failed coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. At that moment the Turkish government might have remembered that once upon a time Russia refused to welcome Abdullah Öcalan after he had to leave Syria in 1998.[107] The third is the support the Americans brought to the YPG/YPJ, without any consideration of the threat it might represent for Turkey's territorial integrity. This support explains the flip-flopping of the alliance and the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia.[108]

It sounds very much as if an old story is being endlessly repeated. The Americans are using the Kurds to serve their interests—in this instance, crushing the al-Assad regime—as they did in the 1990–1991 Gulf War and during the War in Iraq in 2003. Every time, it was a thorn in Turkey's side, as it reinforced the Kurds' aspiration for autonomy, if not independence. Moreover, the apparent empowerment of the Kurds never leads to a resolution of the "Kurdish problem" in the sense of an independent Kurdistan. This unresolved issue has poisoned the region since the failure of Britain and France to respect their engagement with the Kurds during the First World War. It seems as if the Kurds are doomed to be used, as they were by the Ottoman Empire, by the Young Turks' regime during the Great War and the Armenian genocide,[109] by the USSR during the Cold War to destabilize Iraq (the 1961–1975 Kurdish guerilla led by Mustafa Barzani) and Iran (the 1946 Republic of Mahabad), and by the Americans. The future could look even bleaker as the Trump administration seems eager to reisolate and destabilize Iran. The United States could well use the Kurdish Iranians to achieve this aim, as the Soviets did in 1946. American-Turkish relations have also deteriorated because they have divergent views on the democratization of the region; Turkey warned that imposed democratization would give rise to radical Islamism, and it supports fair and respectful relations and negotiations with Iran.[110] Above all, American foreign policy led to instability and uncertainty in the region, which represent direct threats to Turkish national security.

The Syrian war obviously had many aftermaths, including a rapid change of alliances in the region. But perhaps more importantly for the future of Turkey, it annihilated the commendable efforts made by the AKP to finally find peace with the PKK. Indeed the peace process initiated by Ankara with the PKK in 2013 was halted in summer 2015 because the events in Syria led to a resumption of the guerilla war between the PKK and the Turkish army. But there is hope, even in this dreadful context. In September 2016, the Turkish Prime Minister announced a massive investment plan—forty billion euros over ten years—to foster the economic development of the southeast of Turkey where the Kurds live.[111] This policy contrasts with the usual critiques of Erdogan's authoritarianism. Indeed, there is repression used against the PKK, violence, and human rights violations. But Erdogan also made a smart move by coupling this militaristic approach with an economic one. Otherwise said, he seems to understand what a lot of Western states fail to recognize—that is, that to get rid of terrorism, the state must stop producing terrorists and that means creating economic opportunities for youth and bettering people's lives. Yet, it is worth pointing out that Erdogan has had selfish interests. That economic development as much as the good relationships Erdogan has entertained since 2008 with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KGR), con-

trolled by the KDP (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) of Barzani,[112] a rival of the PKK, were directed at satisfying the entrepreneurial class on which Erdogan relies for his electoral success. The independence referendum organized by the KGR in September 2017 was a blow to Erdogan's policy.[113] In the same fashion, the economic development plan Erdogan has for Turkish Kurdistan, if successful, may weaken the PKK, but also contribute to an increase of autonomist and/or independence demands. Moreover, it appears quite obvious that the United State's (and Europe's) cavalier attitude to Turkey pushed it into Putin's arms as of spring 2016. Despite Turkey shooting down a Russian aircraft in November 2015 and the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Ankara in December 2016, Ankara and Moscow managed to come to terms quickly, which may be a sign of deeper convergent interests than are generally assumed in Western chancelleries. The relative success of this bilateral relationship relies on good and regular communication and consultation; for instance, Turkey consulted Russia prior to launching Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016.[114] Turkish-Russian relations have their limits, as demonstrated by the Operation's end after a successful operation launched by al-Assad with the support of Russia.[115] But those relations are still in better shape than American-Turkish ones after the United State's open and full show of support for the PYD. All recent developments in the region show an inescapable interweaving of foreign and domestic policy. World conflicts and regional turbulences are deeply affecting Turkey's position and efforts.

CONCLUSION

Turkey is a geopolitical and geostrategic pivot in a region that is crucial to the stability and peace of the world.[116] In the current state of global affairs, the region that Mackinder once described as the "marginal crescent" may well be more central for whoever wants to control the heartland, for example, Russia. In other words, we may be back to Spykman's warning that the rimland (the marginal crescent) is the key: "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world,"[117] and Turkey happens to be located at the center of the rimland.

Despite the questions that have been and should continue to be raised about the so-called "democratization" of Turkey, the foreign policy principle of "zero problems with neighbors" initiated by the AKP and more precisely by Ahmet Davutoglu was very promising before the Arab Spring and the Syrian war put an end to it. We will ultimately need a peace agreement to end the Syrian nightmare. Who is better placed than Turkey to bring the United States, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to the table? We will need at some

point to find long-lasting peace resolutions to the frozen conflicts in Georgia, in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Ukraine. Naturally, Turkey is a strategic actor in this Baltic Sea-Black Sea isthmus.[118] Moreover, the "Turkish model," if far from perfect, was certainly more appealing for the future of the Sunni world, a world in deep crisis, than the Saudi model. The vacuum in the despairing region makes it even more important to support Turkish stability, a stability that is threatened by uncertainties at its borders.[119] Considering the astronomical levels of Islamophobia on the old continent, the EU can no longer grant Turkey membership, but it can partly redress its phenomenal historical mistake by helping Turkey to ensure its stability. In his *Essay On Time*[120] Norbert Elias made a compelling argument in favor of duration over time. Any understanding of Turkey's past, present, and future requires a precise analysis of the unfolding processes over a long duration. Policies should not be determined by circumstantial events.

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Chapter Six

Russia, Trump, and the United States

The Uses of the Other in a Political Crisis

Ivan Kurilla

One of the features of the new world disorder is the revival of a Cold War rhetoric at a time when no ideological rivalries exist. Since the election of President Donald Trump in November 2016, his political opponents and US media have attacked him relentlessly for an alleged collusion with Russia. Russia is demonized, and its influence on the US elections is overblown in the American worldview. President Trump, in turn, seems to be teasing his opponents by demonstrating a willingness to befriend Russia despite multiple accusations toward its current regime. In fact, this fixation on the Russian theme can be seen as just a new example of the use of the Other to solve domestic problems, the pattern repeatedly appearing in the history of the US-Russian relationship. This chapter is devoted to the constructivist explanation of the emergence of a "Russian theme" in the US media, relying on an historical background and focusing on the "Russian meddling" scandal.

Donald Trump's triumph in the 2016 presidential election discharged an unprecedented political and media movement linking his victory to Russian interference in the US political system. The president's defenders call this a "witch hunt," but they are frequently cornered by the significant amount of US public and Congressional opinion that wants Washington to curtail any possible amelioration of American relations with Russia. Just recently, for example, the Democratic Party filed a lawsuit against Trump, Russia, and WikiLeaks for allegedly conspiring in the 2016 campaign.[1]

There are two major explanations for this anti-Russia phenomenon. The first is that Americans were shocked to discover that the US political system can be vulnerable to foreign interference. This led to coordinated attempts to fix election-related security holes, with one of these being, in the eyes of many, the president himself and his administration. The second explanation sees that regardless of what Russia did in the 2016 election,

the anti-Russia movement is essentially an anti-Trump campaign. This explanation involves the use of a "foreign threat" narrative as a tool to limit the political capacity of an unpopular president. Examining the history of US-Russian relations from a "constructivist" perspective lends more credence to the second explanation than to the first, with the implication that US-Russian relations fell victim to American domestic politics. My hypothesis is not intended to counter the assessments of US intelligence experts on Russia's "meddling," but rather to deconstruct the reasons for the public's intense reaction to the situation.

SUSPICIONS AND ACCUSATIONS

Wikipedia now has an entry titled "Timeline of Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Elections" that lists a multitude of events directly or indirectly linked to the alleged Russian interference. Among the major accusations is a US Department of Homeland Security report that says Russian hackers penetrated American voter-registration systems and were responsible for the DNC email leaks. There is also the joint claim by the FBI, CIA, and NSA that states: "President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency." The claim continues: "We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump."[2] This line echoes Hillary Clinton, who during the third presidential debate on October 19, 2016, blamed Russia for the DNC email leaks and accused Trump of being a "puppet" of Putin.[3] Public interest began to focus on any possible links between Trump's team and Russian citizens, with suspicions cast, for example, on meetings between Trump associates and Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. At the peak of the movement (which has ongoing peaks), some journalists and politicians even wondered aloud whether Trump was an actual Russian agent.

The official investigations into the matter were still underway when this text was being written. It had already produced some proof of Russian meddling and a list of suspects involved. However, the nature of parts of the investigations, the gravity of charges, and judgments on the sufficiency of evidence was heavily linked to party affiliations. A segment of the American public tends to believe intelligence agency claims that Russia influenced the election results, and that there was probable collusion between Trump's team and Moscow's officials. Another segment tends to downplay the significance of Russia's interference and rejects any hint of collusion. For example, in March 2018, House Republicans "prematurely closed" their Trump-Russia

probe without interviewing key witnesses such as Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates.[4] Because hard facts are hard to come by, I suggest looking at several examples from the past to better understand the current US domestic perceptions.

RUSSIA AS A TRADITIONAL "CONSTITUTIVE OTHER" OF THE UNITED STATES

The core of constructivism, as a theory of international relations, is the notion that any given society needs an external peer, a "Constitutive Other," in its domestic struggle for self-identification. This foreign nation becomes an indispensable part of domestic political identity discourses. Often, and for different purposes, this Other is portrayed as a model, a threat, or a pupil. For more than a century, Russia and the United States were "Constitutive Others" of each other.[5]

The Russian theme rears its head in American society only amid domestic crises; Russia is portrayed either as a menacing source of trouble on the home front or as some inferior power that deserves lectures from superior Americans. Both have been central to maintaining American trust in its historical mission as the world leader of democracy.

In fact, the first known debate in the United States that directly involved Russia is dated two centuries back; it took place in 1813 when critics of President James Madison, who signed the declaration of war against England, framed their antiwar demonstrations as banquets to celebrate Russian victories over Napoleon.[6] This led politicians and pundits from multiple US political camps at the time to immerse themselves in a debate about the "real values" of Russia. Those who organized the banquets praised Russia for liberating Europe from Napoleonic tyranny, while others demonized Russia as a barbaric country whose victories should not be celebrated. Napoleon was, after all, America's indirect ally in the war against England. Their discussions were not really about the merits of Russia—Americans in 1813 had very little interest in the distant Russian empire—rather they were a vehicle through which to dispute the policies of the Madison administration. These debates caused by a domestic political crisis laid the foundation for US domestic discussions about Russia.[7]

Americans lived through another identity crisis in the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction, when trust in American moral leadership had been undermined by the return of the same white elites to power in the South, emergence of Jim Crow laws, and corruption in Washington. The publication of a famous book in 1891 by the explorer George Kennan (not to be confused with the later Cold War diplomat George F. Kennan, a distant cousin) on the

Siberian exile system under the czars provided an opportunity for Americans troubled by their own recent history to condemn Russian despotism and thus appear better in comparison.

Later, the Bolshevik revolution triggered the first "Red Scare" in the United States. The rise of Communism during and after World War II generated the second Red Scare. During the second one, a fake pamphlet titled "Communist Rules for Revolution" that listed threats to the American way of life was widely circulated. The pamphlet was first published in 1946 at the peak of McCarthyism and was declared a genuine document by Florida Chief Attorney George Brautigam. Its short list of "rules" generated huge conspiracy theories. It had points such as: "Corrupt the young, get them away from religion. Get them interested in sex. Make them superficial. Destroy their ruggedness" and "Cause the registration of all firearms on some pretext, with a view to confiscating them and leaving the populace helpless." During that time, everything that American conservatives considered dangerous was attributed to communist influences (the pamphlet probably originated from a conservative flank of US society). Even though *The New York Times* published an article in 1970 proving the pamphlet was not authentic, many members of Congress continued to receive copies of it from alarmed constituents and it was even inserted into the Congressional Record.[8] Fake claims of Soviet ploys were constantly trotted out during the Cold War by American conservatives to prove that everything they despised in the US—whether it be civil rights or the anti-Vietnam War movement—was instigated by the Soviets. Of note, during the *Perestroika* era, the 1980s, Russian conservatives produced their own variant of a demonic Western plot against Russia called the "Dulles' plan."[9]

The Cold War was a period when deep ideological differences between the United States and the USSR acquired the dimension of state-to-state competition. From the late 1940s to the late 1980s, both countries enriched and propagandized their repertoires of mutual demonization. However, the two superpowers avoided direct collisions; thus, the Cold War can be considered more as a discursive phenomenon than a direct military confrontation. Battles were waged by proxies in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, but they did not alter bilateral relations (the Vietnam War even overlapped with the détente era).

The Cold War had its own ups and downs. After the period of détente and lessening tensions in the first half of the 1970s, new conflicts arose in the second half of the decade. Well before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Jimmy Carter started to severely criticize Moscow on human rights violations. He invoked America's moral superiority to attack an old rival at a moment when America's luster in the world had been severely damaged by the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Carter's (and later

President Ronald Reagan's) major goal was to revive American pride by using Russia as a foil.[10]

The 1990s seemingly put an end to the Cold War's narratives, but the rhetorical repertoire used to describe the Other as "the enemy to blame" was only on standby.

In 2011–2012, a new freezing rain began in the bilateral American-Russian relationship (on top of domestic cracks opening up in both countries). In Russia, a wave of antigovernment protests reactivated the Kremlin's struggle to identify an enemy. The Russian government needed to alienate antiregime groups and individuals, and did so by portraying them as Washington's pawns. The rhetoric demonized the United States for meddling in Russian politics, for planning regime change, and for using oppositionists as puppets.[11]

On the US side, Russia again became a point of contention. For instance, in 2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney told voters that Russia was America's number one geopolitical foe.[12] He was not trying to degrade Russia per se, but rather undermine and cast doubt on his rival's policies, namely President Barack Obama's "reset" with Moscow. Romney's aim was to undermine Obama's foreign policy achievements by playing on the stigma of any association with Russia.

From late 2016, this narrative format—a familiar scenario of linking political opponents to a foreign country while simultaneously demonizing that country—came back into play. Trump's victory caught Americans, especially the US establishment and the Democratic Party electorate, by surprise. His very appearance, his biography, and his beliefs looked so alien to the American political elite and much of the public that their immediate temptation was to label him "un-American." In the Cold War years, "un-American" was partially synonymous with being "Russian" or "communist." To many anti-Trumpers, including US propagandists, he was seen as "Russia's president," a "Russian implant," or "Putin's puppet." During the Women's Marches on January 21, 2017, the day after Trump's inauguration, many posters and slogans satirized old-fashioned masculinity and depicted Trump as a sinister stooge of Putin.[13] The broader scenario was a habitual cultural turn that uses a foreign Other as a scapegoat for domestic disorder.

The Trump election was a critical juncture in US history, with the American identity again put to question. Who are Americans? Are we liberal democrats or, as Clinton said about Trump's base, a "basket of deplorables?"[14]

Many Americans clearly despise Trump. They think of him as somehow un-American, as his positions and his very appearance contradicts their understanding of what it should mean to be an American leader. The collusion scandal provides a convenient confirmation of their suspicions. Other Americans just see it as a good tool to keep an unpredictable president under

constant pressure. Trump's team's meetings with Russians, be they innocent or malicious, have made it possible for critics to link the president to the traditional "Other" of American identity, thereby reinforcing the demonic image of Russia and its intentions.

There is another side to these controversies—that is, Donald Trump himself, who continues to irritate his critics by calling for Russia's return to the G-8 group of the world's leading nations and advocating rapprochement with President Putin. To understand Trump's determination to improve US-Russian relations despite the accusations and suspicions, we should look at his policy toward Russia as part of the same identity battle he wages within the United States. Indeed, Russia as a constitutive Other of Americans continues to play an important role in their self-concept, in their understanding of themselves. Thus, debate on Russia is a part of broader "culture wars" that took an acute form in the United States in the second half of the 2010s and that include clashes about race, women's rights, Confederative legacy, and, not the least, the "traditional threat" from Russia.

One of the Donald Trump's models as presidents, Ronald Reagan (Trump even borrowed his campaign slogan "Make America Great Again!"), faced the task of re-establishing American self-esteem and confidence after the disastrous 1970s, the decade that featured an economic crisis over oil prices, the wind down of the Vietnam war, and the Watergate scandal. Reagan's major policies were turned inward, not abroad, and his attitude toward the USSR was determined by his wish to influence the domestic mood. From the very beginning of his presidency, Reagan was "optimistic that we can build a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union."[15] Indeed, President Reagan proved ready to change his mind: after calling the Soviet Union "an evil empire," he signed unprecedented arms cuts with Mikhail Gorbachev just a few years later despite objections raised by many of his own advisers, including Vice President George Bush. Jack F. Matlock, US Ambassador to Moscow during *Perestroika*, writes that Reagan had not just reacted to Gorbachev's emergence as Soviet leader in 1985, but had discussed ways to improve relations with the USSR as early as in 1983 ("from early 1983, Reagan began to press his staff to prepare for serious business with Moscow").[16] The change in their perception of the Cold War archrival also altered the American image of themselves: if the Soviet Union was no longer "an evil Empire," then America was no longer a country of jedi. In the final judgment, Reagan's approach was successful in restoring American confidence and earned the "Great Communicator" a place on the pantheon of the country's best presidents.

Trump also needs a breakthrough with Russia if he hopes to win his "culture wars" within American society. The same way Reagan was able to neglect the Soviet war in Afghanistan and human rights violations in the

USSR so as to change the image of a "Constitutive Other" and, by so doing, change American self-perception, Trump can close his eyes to Russian actions in Syria and Ukraine if it helps him to influence contemporary Americans' image of themselves. If he succeeds in turning Russia from a threat to a friend in the minds of Americans, his domestic status will be improved, and his critics defeated. However, internationally that would mean that such acts as the annexation of territory belonging to a neighboring country could go unpunished, and that the system of international law and norms might not be maintained.

If Trump critics prevail, that too will have long-term consequences, including revitalizing the image of a demonic Russia threatening the American political system and an increase in a sense of vulnerability and weakness of American democracy vis-à-vis authoritarian challengers. The image of Russia as a threat will spoil the future of bilateral relations long after both Trump and Putin become history. Just as the ghosts of the Cold War have been resurrected in the current controversies, the ghosts of this present hostility toward Russia will reappear the next time a crisis in America calls for a scapegoat.

On Russia's side, an important result of escalated tensions between Russia and the United States is a further weakening in the position of Russia's liberals. Historically, the periods of US–Russian cooperation were also times of domestic liberalization in Russia, while periods of hostility coincided with the Kremlin's clampdown on liberal elements in society. The ongoing "Russiagate" in the United States helps the Russian government label its opponents as pro-American figures working for the interests of a threatening foreign power. By excessively paralleling the comportment of the Trump and Putin regimes and by replicating Russia's obsession over its "Constitutive Other," the United States is not helping those in Russia who see the West and democracy as models to emulate.

To sum up, over the last few years the international order has been sacrificed for the purpose of achieving domestic political goals. That has been true with both Putin's Russia, and with Trump's America. Neither side seems concerned about any long-term consequences of their policies, nor do they cherish the world order that has maintained a certain balance over the previous decades.

NOTES

1. "Democratic Party Sues Russia, Trump Campaign and WikiLeaks Alleging 2016 Campaign Conspiracy," *Washington Post*, April 20, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-party-files-lawsuit-alleging-russia-the-trump

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2. Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

3. See, for example, "Social Media Revives 'No puppet, no puppet' Trump Debate Line after Russia Allegations," *Miami Herald*, January 10, 2017.

4. Alex Ward, "House intel Republicans end their Trump-Russia probe, claiming there was no collusion. They also dispute the US intel community finding that Russia preferred Trump in the 2016 presidential election," *Vox*, March 12, 2018.

5. See, for the debate on this claim, David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the 'Evil Empire'—The Crusade for a 'Free Russia' since 1881* (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Victoria I. Zhuravleva, *Ponimanie Rossii v SShA: Obrazy i mify. 1881–1914* [Understanding Russia in the United States: Images and Myths. 1881–1914] (Moscow, RGGU, 2011).

6. US politicians opposed to US involvement in the War of 1812 deridingly called it "Mr. Madison's war." Technically, the Americans who fought against Great Britain were on the same side as Napoleonic France and, indeed, US forces invaded Canada in 1812 at the same time that Napoleon invaded Russia, forcing England to fight on two fronts.

7. See, for more details, Ivan Kurilla, "'Russian Celebrations' and American debates about Russia in 1813," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 44, no. 1 (2016): 114–23.

8. "*Communist Rules for Revolution*. A list of 'Communist Rules for Revolution' supposedly discovered by Allied forces in Germany in 1919," *Snopes* fact-check. https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/communist-rules-for-revolution.

9. See Serghei Golunov and Vera Smirnova, "Proliferation of Conspiracy Narratives in Post-Soviet Russia: The 'Dulles' Plan' in Social and Political Discourses," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Tomus 37 (2016): 21–45.

10. See Foglesong, *The American Mission*, chapters 7–8.

11. See, for example, "Vladimir Putin Accuses Hillary Clinton of Encouraging Russian Protests," *The Guardian*, December 8, 2011.

12. See CNN's, "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer," March 23, 2012, http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/26/romney-russia-is-our-number-one-geopolitical-foe.

13. See, for some instances, the PONARS Eurasia blog with images, "PONARS Eurasia Discusses: The Depiction of Russia at the Women's Marches," http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/ponars-eurasia-discusses-depiction-russia-womens-marches-photos.

14. http://time.com/4486502/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables-transcript.

15. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The End of Détente and the Reformulation of American Strategy: 1980–1983," in Kiron K. Skinner, ed., *Turning Points in Ending the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008, 18.

16. Ibid., 26.

Chapter Seven

Are We There Yet?

The Quest for Stability and Democracy in the Western Balkans

Robert C. Austin

A convenient starting point for a chapter looking at the on and off again transition in the Western Balkans would be 1989 if only to remind readers that a year that meant so much in Berlin, Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw meant something entirely different in Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, and Tirana.[1] The varied legacies of 1989 left an undeniable impact, especially since the early years were not marked by the triumph of liberalism or even democracy in the Balkans. Central Europe had negotiated revolutions, much to the disappointment of the likes of Hungary's Viktor Orban and Poland's Jaroslav Kaczynski today. Round tables popped up, and the communists quickly turned into democrats. Free elections came, and communists-turned-socialists generally lost badly. The Balkans, more or less, got undisguised coups or faux transfers of power. In neither free nor fair elections, the region's communists-turned-socialists generally won. This was especially true in Bulgaria and Romania where nearly unreformed communists, in league with the security services, held on to power well into the late 1990s. Yugoslavia, heralded by some as a potential postcommunist success story given its unique form of state socialism, ended up in a series of devastating wars largely initiated by policies in Belgrade but aided by nationalists elsewhere, particular in Zagreb. The nationalist pattern of political change, which prevailed in Belgrade, Ljubljana, Podgorica, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Zagreb, spared only Slovenia from prolonged conflict. Today, while no longer a powder keg capable of provoking a major geopolitical catastrophe as the region did in 1914, the Balkans is a zone of low-level crisis. The region is stagnant, governed largely by corrupt and incompetent elites who always choose power over reform. The result is unemployment, bad government, corruption, and outward migration, as the region's youth opt for a better life elsewhere.

Slovenia made a hasty exit from the Balkans literally and figuratively by joining the European Union (EU) in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU in 2007. The decision to admit them has since been judged premature. At the time, hoping to send a signal to the rest of the region, the decision made total sense. For the first time in the history of EU enlargement, these new members were saddled with additional postaccession burdens for the most part aimed at improving big picture rule-of-law issues. Croatia joined in 2013 without membership restrictions. Now, six countries, the so-called Western Balkans, are vying for membership in the European Union: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. All six want in desperately, as the EU promises the only hope for prosperity and stability. There are no viable plan "Bs". Trouble is, despite governing what are decidedly pro-EU populations, the governing elites across the board have yet to prove themselves up to the demanding job of EU integration.

Emboldened by failures laid bare by the wars in Bosnia in the early 1990s and later in Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001, the EU intensified its commitment to the region with the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, where eventual membership was made explicit. The foundations of the EU's intervention in the Western Balkans was based on Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), which was a vast package to "Europeanize" the region in all aspects based on contractual relationships between an aspirant state and the EU. In essence, it was only then that even the prospect of membership in the EU was put on the table. Now, almost twenty years later, one can take stock of the successes and failures of the SAP and the role of individual states in making EU membership a reality.

Some regional analysts got so optimistic in their outlooks, they looked to the anniversary of the start of World War One in the Balkans, 2014, as the ideal date for entry for everyone. However, despite the EU's pledge that the question of membership is not about if but when, only tiny Montenegro, which joined Albania and Croatia in NATO in 2017, has a clear path. Some analysts speak of 2025 as a possible entry date. Serbia, in some ways the key to regional stability given its size and traditional role as destabilizer, is mentioned as another member in 2025. For the rest, membership in a now distracted EU seems too far away to act as a catalyst for change. The EU, most pundits concur, has decided to prioritize stability over democracy, which amounts to allowing some of the worst people to remain in power. Tolerance for authoritarian leaders who are sometimes criminals is the norm. Local activists speak of massive state capture often enabled by a stability obsessed EU. Finally, as we shall see, the EU has always had a certain ambivalence about the region, while member states' populations seem less and less inter-

ested in further enlargement. While a more decisive EU would be welcome, and the EU has indeed tried to breathe more life into the accession process, it would also miss the point: the problems are still largely local because the elites prefer the benefits of a system that is enriching them and their patrons.

ALBANIA

As a result of the deeply entrenched national communism and isolation imposed by its rulers, Albania exited the communism world last. In essence, Albania had a revolution because everyone else was having one, as there were few domestic sources of dissent that one could point to. With its first mostly free and fair elections coming only in 1992, Albania experienced an often fraught on-and-off again transition made difficult by an additional legacy of extreme poverty and a political system that nurtured polarization between its two main political forces (Democrats and Socialists). More disappointingly, Albanians, who with Romanians suffered the most repressive systems, were denied a meaningful reckoning with their communist past, which still weighs heavily on them. Moreover, despite a relatively homogenous population, Albania has endured tremendous internal strife that required regular intercession by the international community. Particularly illustrative of this was the collapse of fraudulent pyramid schemes in 1997 that led to the disintegration of state order and country-wide violence. Given the perpetual weakness of state institutions, the traditional push for reforms has come mainly from outside actors; both the EU and the United States stepped up their interventions in Albania to calm the political atmosphere by encouraging dialogue between the two main parties. Albania's 2013 and 2017 elections, the country's eighth and ninth national polls, were the freest and fairest of its modern history. Given that the preceding seven polls were presumed to be fraudulent, with contested results, this was an important achievement.

Transition life in Albania was dominated by a number of very strong personalities who often placed the settling of personal scores ahead of a poorly defined national interest. The leader of the anticommunist opposition fell to the cardiologist Sali Berisha, while the communists-turned-socialists were led by the economist Fatos Nano, a former senior communist. Later, Nano stepped out of political life and was replaced by the flamboyant then mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama. Rama was unique for many reasons, but with his dramatic makeover of Tirana, which made it a livable city, he was the only Albanian politician to receive positive press in the West. In 2014, under Rama's leadership, Albania finally became an official candidate for the EU after three failed applications based on shortcomings in its electoral processes and failure to

implement a reform strategy for the judiciary. The 2017 win by Rama's Socialist Party was so decisive that it no longer needed a coalition partner. Berisha finally resigned after nearly thirty years of politics. Albania began a period of political calm that had hitherto eluded them.

Albania still had problems though. According to the EU and the United States, its biggest problem was big-picture rule-of-law issues particularly in the obvious "justice for sale" process in its courts. The real push for change came from the United States, which led the charge for dramatic judicial reform alongside a serious war on corruption and organized crime. This was the only way ahead for Albania. The US ambassador to Albania openly chastised judges for their expensive watches and cars, noting that Albanian courts were politicized and that known organized-crime figures and corrupt senior officials walk Tirana's streets. One analyst commented that some 20 percent of Albanian parliamentarians were known to have ties to organized crime.

Organized crime in Albania is deeply linked with the traffic of people, money laundering, weapons, and drugs. These phenomena became part of Albanian life in the 1990s largely as a response to the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia during the wars. Albania's location between east and west; between producers of drugs and the market for drugs; its relatively porous borders; ill-trained, ill-paid, and ill-equipped border personnel; and weak judiciary made it an ideal transfer country. Albanian criminal groups acted as facilitators as goods moved east to west. Long associated with turning a blind eye to marijuana growing and exporting, Albania is now awash in drug money, having become Europe's largest producer of outdoor cannabis. Possibly the clearest example of this is the village of Lazarat in southern Albania, where the depth of the marijuana business in Albania and its links to official state structures are embodied. The tiny village played an outsized role in marijuana growing, which is illegal in Albania. Despite the fact that everyone knew what was going on there, the government was never able to shut it down for a variety of reasons—the villagers were heavily armed for one thing. According to press reports, Lazarat produced nine hundred tons per year with a value of almost five billion USD—almost half of Albania's GDP. But, owing to EU and US pressure, in June 2014, eight hundred armed police moved in and burned everything. But the growing continued. In fact, in 2015–2016 cannabis production increased, and at the same time no major drug traffickers were arrested or prosecuted.

The crackdown on the drug trade, which has been uneven at best, was part of Rama's wider strategy to get Albania closer to the EU. What the EU and United States want is to see big fish in jail, as Albania has the lowest rate of serious crime prosecution in Europe, even worse than Bulgaria. Rama as prime minister, unlike any of his predecessors, seemed willing to deliver serious judicial

reform and strengthening anticorruption forces in 2016 and 2017. A sweeping set of constitutional changes in 2016 went further than any reform to date.

MONTENEGRO

If Albania presented the case of extreme polarization and delayed democratic consolidation, Montenegro was its exact opposite in many ways, owing to the near total dominance of the political scene by a single person: Milo Djukanovic. With Yugoslavia enduring a slow disintegration, the Montenegrin branch of the League of Communists morphed into the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) in 1991 and have been in power since then, making it the longest ruling party in the region. There was nothing to distinguish the state from the ruling party. Critics inside and out of Montenegro noted that Montenegrin democracy was deeply flawed, but its internal stability won it support from the EU and the United States. Its success was mostly owed to Djukanovic, who ran the country with only two brief interruptions in 2006 and 2010, since 1991. He only stepped down in October 2016 because of external pressure. But he returned to run and win the ceremonial presidency in the April 2018 elections. His mastery of the whole country made Montenegro a preferred destination for foreign investors. Even as part of Yugoslavia or the subsequent State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Montenegrin economy was far more open than Serbia's, it had different and lower customs duties, and it even abandoned the national currency of Yugoslavia (the dinar) in 1999 and adopted the German Mark (and later the euro) as its official currency.

Djukanovic started out as an ally of then Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, the bureaucrat turned nationalist who wrested control of the Serbian branch of the Yugoslav League of Communists from his former friend and mentor, Ivan Stambolic. Taking advantage of the immense possibilities that international sanctions provided, Djukanovic earned a reputation as active in international cigarette smuggling during the Yugoslav wars. Italian authorities built a huge case against him later that was subsequently shelved for reasons of geopolitical stability. He was pro-Russian at one time, welcoming suspicious Russian money into the country with open arms from the likes of aluminum magnate and oligarch Oleg Deripaska, now high on the list of Russians subject to crippling US sanctions. Deripaska took over the failing aluminum mill outside of Podgorica because no one else was willing to buy it, got the Montenegrin taxpayer to pay the mill's electricity bills, and ran it into the ground. Djukanovic would later become the darling of countering Russian influence in the Balkans. He shifted to the West just before the Kosovo war

in 1999, provided refuge for ethnic Albanians fleeing Serb aggression, and later led the charge for Montenegrin independence in 2006. He never lost an election. On the other hand, in 2015 he was named "Person of the Year" by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) "for his work in creating an oppressive political atmosphere and an economy choked by corruption and money laundering." Analysts refer to Montenegro as a Djukanovic family business. In 2011 he authorized a bailout of a bank owned by his brothers. His sister, who runs a small law firm in Podgorica, was named in the 2017 Paradise Papers. The EU's (and the United States's) love affair with Djukanovic is the most telling example of the triumph of stability over democracy in the region. If the EU (and the United States for that matter) had been really serious about democracy, then it is highly unlikely Djukanovic would have lasted so long.

The source of his success was his ability to sense where things were going. For the purposes of this chapter it makes sense to examine the evolution of the independence project in greater detail and the later path toward EU and NATO membership. Fearing the threat of further disintegration on the international protectorates in Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU and the United States forced Serbia and Montenegro to remain together. The so-called State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 was a sham from the start. Montenegro never even pretended that it was prepared to stay and devoted all its energy to getting a referendum on the calendar. Even the state's website was permanently under construction, and Montenegro had its own foreign minister who campaigned for independence.

The EU emerged as the main broker of the Montenegrin referendum. But they had to tread carefully as Montenegro was divided almost evenly between pro- and anti-independence forces conjuring up images of violence and renewed war. As noted, the EU forced the Montenegrins on both sides to accept a deal that meant a successful referendum would be different than all the referendums in Yugoslavia that came before. It would only be deemed legitimate if there was a 50 percent voter turnout and 55 percent support threshold, not 50 percent. The Albanian community, numbering roughly 5 percent and wanting nothing to do with Serbia, enthusiastically endorsed independence. In fact, the pro-independence coalition included the other national minorities (Bosniaks, Roma, Muslims, and Croats), and Montenegrins who were roughly 43 percent of the population. They were opposed by the main opposition/pro-Serbian parties who blamed the EU for creating independent Montenegro. The result of the free and fair vote was 55.5 percent in favor of independence. Serbia's reaction was civil, there was no violence between Montenegrins and Serbs and life went on. The whole thing was an undeniable success in a country that people forget was quite multiethnic.

Given the almost frightening uniformity of opinion among Djukanovic supporters and their uncanny ability to control public opinion, EU and NATO aspirations were destined to be realized quicker than any other state in the Western Balkans. Shortly after adopting a new constitution, Montenegro signed an SAA in October 2007. In 2010, Montenegro was declared a candidate for membership and in 2012 it started accession negotiations which are moving ahead, albeit extremely slowly. The process for NATO membership, which is far more contentious in Montenegro than EU membership, also went well. Montenegro became the alliance's twenty-ninth member in June 2017. Russian meddling sped up the NATO process in the Balkans. Russia, always eager to delay the integration process and sow discord where corruption is rife and institutions are weak, happily used the Serbs in Montenegro to foment instability just as they do with the Serbs in Bosnia. In the wake of Montenegro's fall 2016 elections, which was the first one the DPS nearly lost, the government alleged that they uncovered a plot to assassinate Djukanovic, bring the opposition to power, and prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. The Montenegrin government and the West charged that the coup plotters—allegedly there were five hundred of them—were backed by Russia; Russia called the accusation absurd. The Kremlin had made it plain, however, they saw Montenegrin membership in NATO as a "provocation." Montenegro joined NATO anyway in June 2017. The whole coup remains an extremely murky affair.

Preparing for EU membership continues to prove more complicated even though Montenegro (alongside Serbia) is the front-runner to join in 2025. The fact that it has been governed by the same party and same person more or less since 1990 and that some analysts describe it as a mafia state undermines its case for entry. International pressure forced Djukanovic to step down in October 2016, but, as noted, he easily won the presidency in April 2018. Although internal political stability is important, Montenegro is plagued by the same rule-of-law and judicial issues that trouble the rest of the region. Djukanovic's family and inner circle grew extremely wealthy and everyone knew that. The whiff of organized crime always lingered, there were loads of unsolved mafia style hits, and crime lords roamed freely around Montenegro's garish seaside resorts. The October 2016 elections saw widespread and legitimate accusations of fraud, intimidation, and vote buying. The EU called for a thorough investigation, but not much more. To be fair to Djukanovic, he was uncannily lucky and most of his decisions were the right ones. In the EU and the US quest to get the geopolitics right and work on the other things later, Djukanovic was the man who always delivered and, unlike many of his counterparts in the region, always kept his word. Montenegro stayed stable and decisively pro-West.

SERBIA

Serbia witnessed the same on-again, off-again transition and deep party polarization that took hold in Albania. Like Albania, the past weighed heavily but not the communist past. It was the legacy of series of failed wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and finally Kosovo; intolerant nationalism; and incomplete attempts to make amends for bringing so much harm to the region. Serbia, some argued, had its 1989 moment in 2000 when street demonstrations forced Milosevic from power. Milosevic's first electoral defeat came at the hands of the presidential candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), Vojislav Kostunica, an austere constitutional lawyer with deeply held principles and a strong nationalist who at least believed in democracy. The DOS is a coalition of eighteen opposition parties with very different outlooks. Almost 80 percent of eligible voters turned out. Kostunica became the country's new president and the young reformist, Zoran Djinjdic of the Democratic Party, its new prime minister after parliamentary elections in December 2000. Milosevic's ouster was perceived as a turning point, both ending Serbia's isolation and beginning the EU integration process. This would prove to be tough, as Milosevic's Serbia was criminalized top to bottom and the military-security forces mafia complex stood to lose with Djindjic's plans.

The West loved Djindjic for obvious reasons. He was educated and totally transparent, or so it seemed at the time. In Kosovo, living under a UN protectorate waiting for statehood, there was unease: independence would get a lot harder with a democratic Serbia. The taciturn and gloomy Kostunica, who sounded like Milosevic in many ways, at least to the Albanians in Kosovo, was something different, and at least Milosevic was gone. Djindjic wanted to move very fast and promised a European Serbia. After all, there was huge urgency. Serbia had lost more than ten years of development because of Milosevic. Djundjic decided to tackle the big problems first that revolved around Kosovo and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Kosovo affair, as he understood it, had to be put behind Serbia quickly, and he was willing to open talks with the Kosovars on a partition deal that would have given Serbia control over key northern municipalities there in exchange for recognition. Controversially, and contrary to President Kostunica's wishes, to get the EU and the United States on side, Djindjic agreed to Milosevic's transfer to the ICTY in The Hague in June 2001 for charges that included genocide and crimes against humanity. This was a dangerous but brave decision as most Serbs harbored ill feelings toward the ICTY. They saw it as both foreign, which it was, and anti-Serb. For many, it was as though all Serbia was on trial. Djindjic and Kostunica agreed that Serbia needed to be

integrated into Europe, yet they failed, and support for them steadily declined. Even Djindjic, who seemed so earnest, allowed himself to be taken in by the lures of wealth that came with his office. The war on corruption, the mainstay of the empty rhetoric of all Balkan political parties, was merely theatrics. Despite their internal failures, the West did their best to save them fearing a return of Milosevic's Socialists or the radical nationalists. As we shall see later, the West feared for a Weimar syndrome in Serbia where genuine democrats lose out and war would return.

The West lamented that Djindjic could not do more to arrest members of the powerful mafia clans that still dominated Serbia. Instead of making the war on crime a real one, he ramped up the Kosovo rhetoric in classic nationalist style, even suggesting that if Kosovo was made independent, Serbia would be looking for a new conference to redetermine all the borders in the Balkans. Worse still, Djindjic was assassinated on March 12, 2003 in front of his government offices. A state of emergency followed with an aggressive round-up of thousands of real and perceived criminals. The fragmented government could not regroup, and the DOS coalition died. Ordinary Serbs had to accept that they still lived in a criminal state that was also stridently nationalistic. Several top military commanders in the "Red Berets" gone over to organized crime were sentenced to long prison sentences for the assassination. Their goals, according to the verdict, were to prevent any more people being sent to The Hague and bring extremists to power—precisely the Weimar syndrome the West hoped to avoid.

During the nearly twenty years since Milosevic's ouster, Serbia engaged in an on-again off-again dance with the EU and played its Russia card too. As we have seen, Montenegro gained its independence in 2006 and Kosovo followed suit in 2008. Serbia, supported by Russia, took an unsurprisingly uncompromising stand on the legitimacy of Kosovo's statehood, leaving successive governments to navigate a fragile political landscape. The EU and the United States delivered the same message: if you want Europe, you need to forget about Kosovo. The Serbs were not willing to do that, although most accepted that Kosovo's independence was irreversible. Territorial swaps always seemed on the table. Serbia used Kosovo to draw as many concessions from the EU as possible. Not surprisingly, analysts in Kosovo speak of secret meetings between the Belgrade and Prishtina leaderships.

The year 2008 saw also the emergence of a new and what would prove to be decisive force in Serbian politics embodied in the Serbian Progressive Party of Aleksandar Vucic. The party was a breakaway group from the Radical Party that had decided that maybe Europe was the way to go after all. Not everyone believes their sincerity. Prior to that, Vucic had served as Milosevic's information minister where he presided over some really ugly

behavior toward the media and was later the main spokesperson for all the nasty policies of the Radicals. But he had been converted, shown the error of his ways, and emerged as a down-to-earth populist with the common touch who simply loved power. His nationalist credentials gave him the credibility to make some bold decisions.

With the arrest of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in 2008 and Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic in 2011, and with some important EU-sponsored agreements with Kosovo, Serbia finally seemed to be taking its EU integration agenda seriously. Some important regional reconciliation projects took place too between Serbia and Croatia and Serbia and Bosnia. There was no apology for Kosovo. However, Serbia's EU integration dreams are far more complicated than anywhere else in the region. Serbia's population does not show the same level of enthusiasm for the EU that people do elsewhere in the Balkans. If Albanians (in Albania and Kosovo) are 80 percent behind EU membership, Serbs are evenly split. Many Serbs have an affinity for Russia that some find hard to explain. Beyond support of Serbia against Kosovo's independence, the love affair with Russia is often inexplicable given that the EU (and the United States) make serious contributions to the betterment of Serbia—roads, bridges, hospitals, scholarships—Russia more or less focuses on buying strategic assets. Plus, in terms of exports and imports, the relationship between Belgrade and Moscow is slight. On the other hand, the deep cultural and historical links between Serbs and Russians go back centuries and remain ingrained in both popular cultures.

In 2014, Vucic's party won a decisive victory and could govern alone. It won again in early elections in 2016, and in 2017 Vucic switched from prime minister to the presidency, originally a ceremonial post that he transformed into the center of all power. He pledged to maintain Serbia's EU path along with its special relationship with Russia and military neutrality. The EU and the United States have encouraged Serbia's leaders to choose between the EU and Russia. Until they absolutely have to, when membership in the EU becomes obvious, it is likely they will keep the ties with Russia alive. Like everywhere else, Vucic launched the usual war on corruption, which so far has yielded few tangible results. Serbia now looks somewhat like the Hungary of Viktor Orban—an openly nationalist party in power, a weak opposition, brazenly populist, nationalist, and antipluralist—as it heads down the path of "illiberal democracy." Serb voters, who never again came out in the numbers they did since Milosevic's fall in 2000, are apathetic and exhausted. Moreover, Serbian society has never really confronted the past and come to grips with the crimes committed in the 1990s, preferring instead to play the victim.

BOSNIA

Bosnia competes with Kosovo as the weakest state in the region, faced with a variety of challenges that are the result of the US-inspired Dayton Peace accords that ended the war in 1995. On the plus side, war did not return to Bosnia. However, it remained stuck at a point in time and by any measure, after nearly three post-war decades, recovery is still painfully slow. Bosnia is saddled with special international oversight embodied in the all-powerful Office of the High Representative (OHR), whose special "Bonn" powers could shape a new future by ensuring that nobody violates Dayton's imposed harmony. What is interesting is that all kinds of people, including one of the key architects of the peace, the late Richard Holbrooke and former High Representative Paddy Ashdown, have pronounced Bosnia dead or dying countless times and have assumed that renewed war is just around the corner. Somehow Bosnia survives. When the United States decided to intervene decisively to end the war, the facts on-the-ground ensured that while Bosnia would survive as a state, it would be partitioned along ethnic lines. The constitutional structure that emerged, a federation with two entities, the canton-structured Bosniak-Croat Federation with 51 percent of the territory and Republika Srbska (RS) with 49 percent, sought to provide security for the three principal ethnicities: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Each ethnicity fears the dominance of one group, and the road to Europe has not served to eliminate these very basic fears. Ethnic vetoes serve to block much of the legislative process. In the end, multiple attempts at much-needed constitutional reform have failed.

The main political parties fought the same narrowly defined ethnic issues as they had in the war, but without guns. A big change came when Milorad Dodik became the prime minister for the Serb entity in 1998. Dodik did not come from the traditional governing party and was, like Nikola Gruevski in Macedonia, seen by the West as someone who was a moderate and not a nationalist. Dodik was so emboldened by the Montenegrin referendum in 2006 and Kosovo's independence in 2008 that he suggested, contrary to the very fundamentals of Bosnia's made-in-Dayton constitution, that the RS could have a referendum on independence too. At that time, he said that the referendum was not meant to begin the process of secession but was needed instead to make sure that the RS's status as an entity would never be altered within the Bosnian federation.

Dodik's rhetoric revealed that Bosnia's problems are structural in essence and that Dayton, put there to end the war, needs to be revised or replaced if Bosnia is to engage in a serious way with the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Given the permanent crisis in Bosnia, there emerged a

renewed interest in partition. Pro-partition articles in the West, often written by analysts hoping to restart their careers and get back to the Balkans where at least they could get some recognition and free drinks, were refuted by local actors with good reason. The partition argument for Bosnia generally suggests that the EU process is too slow to act as a catalyst for reform, that European populations are too disinterested in further enlargement to the Balkans anyway, and that something new must be done to end the gridlock which is blamed on the triumph of ethnic politics. Multi-ethnicity, some argue, has failed, and new borders are required. As we shall see, new borders do not solve the problems. Plus, they bring back the problem raised in 1990s in that new borders for Bosnia would give rise to a weak Muslim republic in central Bosnia surrounded by hostile neighbors run by nationalists. As it stands now, ordinary Bosnians can easily believe that what goes on at the national level is mere theatrics and that the three ethnic leaders meet socially to agree on divvying up the pie and compare bank balances in Swiss accounts. It is undeniable that the elite maintains the tension purposely and ramps it up to win elections and get rich too. That also means that Bosnia is not on the verge of collapse as some analysts suggest. With one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world, Bosnia limps along and more and more of its young people vote with their feet.

KOSOVO

After the NATO intervention in 1999, Kosovo spent nine years as a United Nations protectorate. Kosovo's proved to be the UN's (and NATO's) largest mission to date. Set up as an interim authority, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) should have paved the way for a functioning democracy. They did not. With a controversial independence declaration in 2008, Kosovo has wavered between failed and failing state since then. Kosovo got its own peace agreement of sorts with the Ahtisaari Plan which paved the way for statehood. It ultimately had to create the basis for reintegrating the minority Serb community into the new state. On paper it did that, but it also opened the way for further incentives to the minority Serb community and the erosion of Kosovo's sovereignty. Second, the Kosovo elite is not up to the job and pursued state capture ahead of national interests. Bold and visionary leadership is hard to find. Third, a number of states in the EU (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) did not recognize Kosovo, which hindered the EU and the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) mission, sent to Kosovo after independence for aid in fostering rule of law, making it what was called "status neutral." Serbia, along with Bosnia, refused to recognize Kosovo but still

held the strongest hand in subsequent negotiations with Kosovo. Finally, the EU and the United States did little to empower more democratic alternatives.

In the decade that followed independence in 2008, Kosovo has seen few successes despite the fact that an enormous amount of foreign cash has been spent there. In fact, the EU spends more in Kosovo than anywhere else except Palestine. The economy remained extremely fragile. Imports were usually ten times the exports in volume. Kosovo lost a number of opportunities to build a modern education and health care system, failed to capitalize on the vast potential of the diaspora, and invested the state budget almost exclusively in building costly new highways where huge amounts of cash were diverted to loyalists. Remittances, which are vital for all of the Western Balkans, were the most critical in Kosovo where they sometimes reached 20 percent of GDP. Ranked as the most corrupt country in the region, foreign investors stayed away. The internal political milieu was similar in some ways to what went on in neighboring Albania—intense polarization between the main political parties, obstructionism, massive corruption, and out-migration by the country's best and brightest. Although new parties came and went, the scene was largely dominated by the Democratic League of Kosovo, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo. The latter two parties were war parties led by key figures in the Kosovo Liberation Army—Hashim Thaci for the Democratic Party and Ramush Haradinaj for the Alliance. Both had been prime minister, and Thaci became president in 2016. The two men are exceptional for their survival skills, yet Haradinaj is a special case. He was sent to The Hague twice to face war crimes charges and acquitted twice. Prosecutors blamed witness intimidation for the verdicts. In the fall of 2017, he became prime minister for the second time. One of his first decisive acts was to double his salary, saying he needed to purchase better clothes. For Albanians who came of age in 1999 and after, the sight of the same people still running Kosovo is depressing.

Only one group proved capable of shaking up Kosovo's moribund political landscape and challenging both the capture of state by the ruling elite and the willingness of the international community to tolerate the intolerable. The movement Vetevendojse (Self-Determination), emerged as an often violent protest movement that captured the hearts and minds of thousands of marginalized youth. It was led by the charismatic Albin Kurti, who had spent time in Serbian prison. He called for a new approach to everything, especially in negotiations with Serbia and the Serb community in Kosovo. Kurti also proposed unification with Albania. For Vetevendosje's civic activists, the UN and EULEX represented "unaccountable," "colonial," and "undemocratic" governance. But EULEX did have some successes. It built on the UN's success in establishing a professional police corps, by far the

most trusted institution among Albanians, and custom services. It failed to tackle organized crime and corruption and to establish an independent and multiethnic judiciary. Political interference in Kosovo's judiciary remained a major problem. Citizens generally hoped that EULEX would put corrupt people in jail. That never happened.

Their ability to get out voters for the June 2017 national elections helped Vetevendosje become the largest party in parliament. The internationals who still rule over Kosovo have marginalized them as much as possible. Fearing instability and the fake bogeymen of nationalism and unification with Albania, they do everything they can to keep them away from power, preferring to deal with the elite in the traditional ruling parties whom they can cajole with threats of indictment by special courts. The establishment parties, the preferred interlocutors of the international community, block Vetevendosje at every turn. Sadly for Kosovo's youth, who saw in the party a chance for a better future, the movement split in March 2018. Some members sought to pull it from leftist-nationalism to a more liberal orientation. Kosovo's traditional ruling parties did not hide their excitement.

Relations with Serbia have proven to be a huge challenge as well. Two key agreements between Kosovo and Serbia improved Serbia's EU prospects and Kosovo's regional integration. Plus, they edged Serbia just a little closer to recognizing Kosovo. With these made-in-Brussels agreements, the Kosovo Serbs seamlessly avoided being a minority in Kosovo and completed the territorialization of their rights â la Bosnia. But not everyone was happy. In January 2018, Oliver Ivanovic, the most important leader of the Serbs in the north, was gunned down outside his office in Mitrovica. In light of the sensitive state of talks between Belgrade and Prishtina, Ivanovic's murder could spell problems, for he was a key proponent of engagement with the government in Kosovo. In March 2018, a much-despised border deal that handed eight thousand hectares of land to Montenegro passed narrowly in the Kosovo parliament, primarily because the EU tied the deal to providing Kosovo with long-awaited visa liberalization. Locals know that their leaders agreed to a series of really bad deals because they had no idea how to negotiate, and are aware that the EU and the United States have enough dirt on them all that they always cave to international pressure. In 2018, media were reporting that partition was coming, with the Serbs getting the north in exchange for normalization of relations. If true, meaning that the international community had abandoned the mantra of "no territorial solutions to ethnic problems," it would spell disaster, and not just for Kosovo.

If Kosovo's sovereignty was undermined by deals with Serbia, there is one more element worth examining. In 2010, Dick Marty, a Swiss senator at the Council of Europe, published a damning and lurid report of human rights vio-

lations by KLA fighters during the war and after. He pointed the finger at then Kosovo prime minister and now President Hashim Thaci. Without any evidence, Thaci blamed the Russians for the fake news in a bid to sow discord. The most gruesome accusation was the charge that the KLA had abducted Albanian and Serbs alike and transferred them to a "yellow house" near Burrel, in northern Albania, where their organs were removed and sold. Marty's report also established a strong and identifiable link between the KLA and organized crime. The EU took Marty's report seriously and followed up with its own Special Investigative Task Force which documented human rights violations by senior KLA officials. In the end, knowing that Kosovo's courts were not up to the job of prosecuting these crimes by a constitutional amendment, Kosovo was given a special war crimes court in early 2017 that would try the cases that spanned January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000. Given the legacy of blotched trials and widespread witness intimidation in the past, many argue that the Court is a required step if Kosovo is to ever obtain legitimacy. Others see the Court as just another foreign imposed restriction on Kosovo's sovereignty. Still others condemn it as an agency for maligning a just war of liberation and as one that seeks to indict only the KLA, and is therefore by definition anti-Albanian. Regardless, across all aspects of Kosovo society, the Court is perceived negatively. Calling it an "injustice," some of the leadership have tried to block it. They received stern warnings from the EU and United States to behave. If the Court adheres to its mandate, the so-called war parties of Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj are doomed.

MACEDONIA

In addition to a long-standing dispute with neighboring Greece over its name, because Greece argues that the very name Macedonia is part of Greek cultural heritage, Macedonia faced a series of domestic crises in 2016 and 2017. Macedonia's emergence from the crisis meant that it may end up providing an alternative for other Balkan states caught in the same trap of pseudodemocracy and state capture. The long-running control of Macedonia by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and its longtime leader Nikola Gruevski, who was prime minister between 2006 and 2016—came to an end in a series of scandals. It became clear that the government was waging a clandestine war against its opponents and was engaged in wholesale plundering of the state. A wiretapping scandal in which some twenty thousand people were allegedly under surveillance caught government officials in all kinds of illegal acts. In the aftermath of the December 2016 elections, the country's president refused to

allow the Social Democratic coalition with the Albanian Union for Democratic Integration to take office, claiming they were set to dismantle the country over demands for more rights from the Albanian community. The United States, not the EU, intervened decisively to get things back on track. Gruevksi's party was defeated decisively again in the fall 2017 local elections. What stood out about the Macedonian case in 2016 was the level of engagement from the population, Albanians and Macedonians. It was largely citizen activists determined to prevent the emergence of a one-party nationalist authoritarian state who forced change. The coalition of Social Democrats and the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration did its best to revitalize the flagging EU and NATO integration projects and mend fences with Greece. The courts and the public prosecutor's office were purged of Gruevski's appointees.

In February 2018, in an attempt to pave the way to a long-awaited agreement with Greece on the name issue, the Alexander the Great Airport became Skopje International Airport and the Alexander the Great Highway became Friendship Highway. There was talk of taking down some of the statues installed as part of a massive and garish nation-building campaign in Skopje, and even of a name change to Upper Macedonia, along with a series of internal constitutional changes and international agreements. But this turned out to be not enough. Whereas the majority of Macedonians appeared ready for a compromise, Greek public opinion hardened. Massive demonstrations in Athens and Thessalonika opposed accommodation with Macedonia. For Greeks, already having sold out economic sovereignty to the EU and the IMF, selling national sovereignty was too much. In any case, in Greece compromise is usually associated with defeat and failure. While Macedonians may be ready for a new name, most Greeks remained opposed to the use of the term Macedonia in any way. The Albanians, who are hardly vested in the name issue at all, have seen their own dreams of Euro-Atlantic sidelined for the sake of an often-tedious historical argument about just who—Greece or Macedonia—owns the past.

Part of the crisis in 2016 and 2017 related to the minority Albanians who are stuck in a state that goes nowhere because of an issue that has close to zero relevance to them. VMRO-DMPNE had whipped up the usual nationalist fervor about expanding Albanian demands that would, if implemented they said, destroy Macedonia. It is true that the Albanians were asking for more and most of their demands clustered around a platform formulated for the most part in Tirana with some help from Edi Rama. Its main goal was to gain greater equality for the Albanian language in Macedonia, which would entail making Macedonia a bilingual state. Macedonia's leaders do need to take some bold steps to make things work better, as most Macedonians are a long way from seeing Albanians as equals. Since Albanians are still deni-

grated in textbooks and underrepresented in national history, education needs massive reform. Bilingualism could help unity too, as it would deprive the ethnic Albanian parties of their only issue.

CONCLUSION

The EU hoped that the lure of membership would be enough to drive reform after membership was promised at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. But this was conditioned on ensuring that the Balkan states and their peoples could see some light at the end of the tunnel. The challenge was to maintain the European perspective. Economic crisis in 2007 and 2008 revealed serious shortcomings in the overall EU project, particularly in the Eurozone. Bulgaria and Romania, admitted hastily in 2007 with some restrictions, were still fulfilling accession conditions more than ten years later. The fate of those two countries plus what happened in Greece after 2008 confirmed assumptions that the Balkans share more than geography. They have a number of negative characteristics in common: predatory political parties, corruption, state capture, and clientelism. Some, like Serbia and the RS in Bosnia, were especially prone to Russian influence. To the EU, the Balkans looked more and more like the same cultural, political, and economic space. Hungary and Poland pushed a faster track for West Balkan membership, but probably for the wrong reasons. But nobody in Brussels wanted to see the Hungarian or Polish models find more allies in the Balkans, the biggest problem being the failure of the domestic elite to take reform seriously and build real democracies. The EU, and the United States too, got diverted elsewhere, and the notion of stability first, democracy later took hold. The main outcome of this policy was massive brain drain throughout the region as the young and educated left. Regional elites tended to blame external factors for their failures, and, as one analyst noted, EU norms and values were applied to the Balkans using Balkan standards.

The Western Balkans has an advantage over other regions facing similar challenges. The first advantage is size: it is a small space with a relatively small population. As well, the end destination is clear: the EU, and the EU enlargement process is an undeniable success elsewhere in post-communist Europe. For the most part, there is a consensus among the people of the Balkans that the EU is the right destination because it alone can make their politicians behave while guaranteeing security and prosperity. That Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia will join has never been taken off the table, and there is no Plan B, even for Serbia. One could conclude that the EU (rightly or wrongly) prioritized stability and sought to fix the region's geopolitics first, hoping that other things would fall into place. That

job is barely even half done. But there are some encouraging signs. Russia's malignant interference needed to be countered, and the refugee crisis of 2015 put the region front and center, as that issue could not be solved without the Balkan states represented at the table.

In 2014, the EU finally breathed some new life into the enlargement process. Enlargement fatigue, it was feared in the region, was not just about Turkey but the Western Balkans too. Moreover, stomach for new member states among European publics was no longer there. The Greek crisis, Balkan criminal groups, especially Albanian ones, plus an extraordinary influx of Roma from Romania, had pretty much turned public opinion against the Balkans. EU Commission head Jean Claude Juncker had already stated in July 2014 that there would be no new member states added for the next five years. He blamed the Balkan states for that when he stated that none of them could come close to qualifying by 2019. At least for Montenegro and Serbia, 2025 seemed a bit more likely he added, but even they needed to work much harder. Juncker, not shy of clichés and also a prisoner of the past, added that the "tragic European region" needs a European perspective, otherwise "the demons of the past will reawaken." That ship sailed even in EU member states. After all, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban loved awakening the demons of the past: anti-Semitism, violence, and exclusive nationalism.

Instead of imminent membership, German chancellor Angela Merkel launched the Berlin Process in 2014. Hoping to replicate some of the early successes of beginnings of European integration in the 1950s with the success of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Berlin process envisioned regular summits and support for locally driven and conceived regional cooperation projects. No longer would external forces drive the agenda. If coal and steel could help mend fences between French and Germans after World War Two, then the same could be done in the Balkans with energy, transport, and people, particularly the youth. It was not naïve to think this would help, for the region is decidedly unintegrated on a number of levels. An important example of the type of project is the joint Kosovo–Serbia highway between Nis and Prishtina. While regional mobility had increased dramatically, new transport links can only improve the relations among the Western Balkan states and its peoples, especially the youth, who to date have been the biggest victims of the transition.

In February 2018, fearful of Russian meddling of the type made obvious in Montenegro, the EU again offered up new ideas. Above all, it recognized that much more needed to be done to render the West Balkan states ready for accession. Not surprisingly, the rule of law in general was singled out with emphasis on the need for serious judicial reform and real attempts to root out corruption and organized crime. Mindful of the Hungarian and Polish drift

away from EU values, the new strategy made it clear that an enlarged EU will have better means to tackle member states that break the rules. Moreover, the EU needs to ensure that if Montenegro and Serbia enter in 2025, they will not be able to block future enlargement to the Western Balkans, and this also means that all existing regional border and recognition issues need to be resolved. Plus, the five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo will need to do so in the long run. Looking at the new strategy and its expectations, prospects for the region joining the EU any time soon are remote.

NOTES

1. The author provided a reflective essay based on his experiences and expertise in the region rather than a more traditional research paper.

Chapter Eight

Brexit—Implications of an Independent Nuclear-Weapons-Free Scotland

Preventing the Sinking of Britain's Nuclear Submarine Program

Tolan M. Pica

On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a historic referendum on whether to remain part of the European Union (EU). In a much-debated outcome, a majority (52 percent to 48 percent) of UK voters chose to leave the EU.[1] Brexit, as Britain's impending departure from the EU has come to be called, raises a number of questions; many of which are addressed in this book, such as,

- What effect will the transition have on the UK's economy and that of the rest of EU?
- How to address immigration—everything from passports to illegal immigration—when restrictions are placed on traffic between Britain and the rest of the EU?
- What impact will Britain's withdrawal from the EU have on treaties and alliances?

Such issues pale, however, when compared to what the UK will do with its nuclear weapons if Scotland's eventual decision toward Brexit is secession from its union with the UK.

While Scottish independence is no longer an immediate concern for Theresa May, UK's Prime Minister, it is reckless to consider an independent Scottish State a thing of the past. Secessionists may have lost their bid for independence in 2014 and their strongest government representation at Westminster after May's ill-fated attempt to strengthen her party's majority. Regardless of the state of Nicola Surgeon's Scottish National Party (SNP), many Scots have not lost their determination to sever ties with Great Britain, to remain part of the EU, and demand removal of what many people living north of Hadrian's Wall refer to as (rUK)'s[2] nuclear arsenal.

If Scotland pursues secession from its union with Britain, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the disposition of the UK's Nuclear Weapons Enterprise will be central to the terms of a nuclear-weapons-free independent Scotland. Such potential decisions include whether: (1) the UK decides to become a nuclear-weapons-free state, (2) the UK moves its nuclear weapons enterprise to the rUK, or (3) the UK declares Faslane and Coulport (the current location of the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise) sovereign territory, but at what cost? While each of the aforementioned scenarios at first glance is a legitimate and supportable pursuit, the cost of any could cripple a nation staring into the abyss of Brexit unknowns.

UK'S NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

The UK has been a nuclear power since 1952[3] and recognized as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) since 1968 upon signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[4] As a signatory of the NPT, the UK is recognized as one of the original five NWS—accompanied by the United States, present-day Russia, China, and France.

What is unique about the UK as an NWS is that Scotland is the primary location for the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise. In interest of clarity, the UK's nuclear weapon's enterprise refers to the following: the nuclear weapons submarine base—Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde (HMNB Clyde or Clyde) in Faslane, Scotland; the nearby ammunition depot at Coulport, Scotland; the supporting UK industrial nuclear defense structure in Scotland proper; and the four *Vanguard* nuclear, ballistic-missile-carrying submarines (see figure 8.1.).[5]

Currently, the UK possesses a nuclear monad or single nuclear strike capability of Submersible, Ship, Ballistic, Nuclear (SSBN) submarines. While these submarines are capable of carrying and deploying conventional munitions, the sole purpose of the UK's SSBNs are to deploy with nuclear tipped ballistic missiles. These submarines are the strike-arm of the UK's SSBN nuclear weapons program, more commonly referred to as *Trident*—taking its name from the Trident II D5 ballistic missiles that the program's four *Vanguard*-class SSBN submarines carry.

The true lethality and effectiveness of the program is in the combination of the Trident missile system and continuous deployment of one *Vanguard* submarine. Each submarine deploys with up to sixteen Trident missiles, each missile carrying between eight to twelve nuclear warheads, costing nearly £16.8 million ($19.4 million) apiece.[6] The Trident II D5 ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets up to 7,500 miles away with a destructive power



Figure 8.1. UK's nuclear submarine sites

estimated to be eight times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.[7] A Trident missile fired from a UK *Vanguard* submarine in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean can strike anywhere within nearly two-thirds of the land mass of the globe (see figure 8.2).[8] However, while the sheer destructive power of the Trident missile is daunting and the ability to range potential targets and devastate opponents is important, the effective deterrence of the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise is found in the program's continuous deployment and unknown positioning of its submarines.

The unbroken deployment cycle or Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) of the UK's Trident submarines serves as the very strength and legitimacy of the program's forty-seven-year history.[9] At any given moment, at least one UK *Vanguard* submarine is operationally deployed, while the three remaining submarines are going through either repair or training cycles, or are being held in reserve.[10] The continuous patrolling cycle shared by the four submarines is a long-term, sustainable rotation that provides an optimal balance between deployments, maintenance, training, and time off for the crews. The deterrent strength of CASD forces would-be aggressors to calculate the potential costs of a UK retaliatory nuclear strike from one of its elusively deployed, strategically positioned SSBNs. With such an effective and deadly deterrent based in Scotland, the question of whether the UK can remain a nuclear power in the event of a nuclear-weapons-free independent Scotland poses a dilemma for which the answer is far from clear.



Figure 8.2. UK Submarine missile range

In the post–Cold War era, moving a nuclear weapons infrastructure or enterprise presents fiscal, logistical, and political hurdles. All nuclear nations—the UK included—have had to wrestle with enormous fiscal challenges associated with maintaining a nuclear capability. However, relocating an entire nuclear weapons enterprise may bring to reality the fiscal, logistical, and political hurdles that maybe are too high to overcome. Not to mention doing so during a time when the country is on the cusp of departing the status-quo economic stability of the European Union (EU) partnership. The political dynamics of Brexit alone are staggering, but the added complexity of Scotland seeking its independence would inject exponential challenges for Theresa May and her patchwork government.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2007, the Scottish National Party (SNP) took control of the Scottish Parliament in Edinburg in a landslide victory after fifty years of Scottish Labour

Party dominance.[11] From its birth in 1934, the SNP gradually gained power. In the early 1970s, the finding of oil rich resources in the North Sea ignited the party's campaign for independence. The deep-water reserves created an economic frenzy among the Scots, on which the SNP capitalized with campaign slogans like, "It's Scotland's Oil." The SNP took 30 percent of the Scottish vote and eleven seats in the next parliamentary elections.[12]

In 1997, with increasing political inertia, the Scots voted-in a referendum to devolve powers from Westminster and transfer them to the Scottish parliament, a strong move toward independence and self-governance. This was the first time since its union of over three hundred years that issues like education and health care were controlled by the Scottish government and not Westminster. The increased authorities in Edinburgh further fueled the independent fervor of the Scots. The SNP would once again capitalize on its independence platform securing the party's 2007 victory and subsequent appointment of Alex Salmond as Scotland's first minister.[13] Finally, in 2011 the SNP won a majority in the Scottish parliament and established itself as the third largest political party (by representation, in the House of Commons) in the UK, closely behind the UK Labour and Conservative parties.[14]

Emboldened to finally and decisively pursue its independence for the first time since 1707 when James VI of Scotland was declared King of England, the Scottish leadership sought and secured a 2014 independence referendum to secede from its centuries-old union.[15] On September 18, 2014, Scots and eligible UK, Commonwealth, and EU residents of Scotland voted on the nation's future. The Scottish Independence Referendum was narrowly defeated—Scotland would remain in the union. Of the 3.6 million votes that were cast (the highest voter turnout since the UK's introduction of universal suffrage),[16] a mere 55.3 percent opposed independence.[17]

However remarkably, the narrow margin of defeat did little to quell the ambitions of the Scottish people, whose aspirations for independence promoted an underlying political turbulence. This political turbulence created so much disharmony in the UK political arena that members of the British Parliament (MPs) complained to then prime minister David Cameron about the continued rhetoric related to the prospect of Scottish independence. Attempting to put an end to Scottish independence ambition, Cameron—referring to the failed referendum—declared: "Now the debate has been settled for a generation . . . so there can be no disputes, no re-runs; we have heard the will of the Scottish People."[18] In an ironic twist of fate, some twenty-one months later Cameron's comments, meant to quash the turbulence of continued calls for Scottish independence, were upended by the Brexit outcome.

Although a majority of voters in England and Wales supported Brexit, their enthusiasm was not shared by voters in the UK's other two protectorates, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Fifty-six percent of Northern Ireland's

voters voted to stay in the EU, a twelve-point margin over those who wished to depart. Likewise, sixty-two percent of Scots voted to remain in the EU, a number doubling the margin who opposed.[19] The decisiveness of Scotland's rejection of Brexit represented an ever-increasing divide between the real-politik that governs England and the idealism that appears to be driving the drumbeat for independence in Edinburgh.

UK POLITICAL TURMOIL AND SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE

Since the Brexit vote, UK policy critics and media pundits have had plenty to report. But, a successful Scottish independence referendum remains a consistent backdrop to political analysis. Now the first minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, has cautiously approached the future Brexit and potential Scottish independence with measured strategy. Unfortunately, the SNP majority was lost during the June 2017 snap elections held by Prime Minister Theresa May. May attempted to increase her majority rule decisively, but political missteps, demographic shift, and increased voter turnout created a perfect storm—a storm that delivered a loss of her majority.[20]

During this ill-fated election, May's Tory party won 42 percent of the vote, but lost thirteen seats, while the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn capitalized by gaining thirty seats. May's majority was saved by the Scottish Tories under the charge of Ruth Davidson, who captured twelve seats, replacing over half of the twenty-one seats lost by the SNP; a significant blow to First Minister Sturgeon's aspirations for independence.[21]

Regardless of the June 2017 outcome, Sturgeon remains clearly focused on the challenges and opportunities of the impending Brexit negotiations. She is also keenly focused on May's political maneuvering and has not forgotten May's refusal of her request for a second independence referendum while the Brexit negotiations were ongoing. May's snap election after refusal of Sturgeon's referendum request remains a hypocrisy and political lancing Sturgeon will not soon forget.[22] Many consider a future Scottish independence referendum a forgone conclusion as long as Sturgeon remains in power. As such, assuming Scotland does secede and become an independent, non-nuclear-weapons state, the rUK faces an unavoidable question: "Should the rUK remain a nuclear power?"

SHOULD THE UK REMAIN A NUCLEAR POWER?

"Today the submarine fleet has come to the forefront as the chief naval weapon, and the chief aerial weapon is the missile, which can hit targets

at great distances, and in the future the distance will be unlimited." Nikita Khrushchev's comments resounded among the 1956 Naval College class at Greenwich, England, where he further professed that future wars would not be decided by naval cruisers or heavy bombers, but rather by the underwater strike capabilities of submarines with conventional and ballistic missile payloads. Khrushchev's foreshadowing was echoed by a British Admiralty Paper the following year. It warned that if the UK did not obtain nuclear submarines, the nation would cease to count as a naval force in world affairs.

The UK's decision to become a nuclear power was deeply rooted in its antagonistic relationship with the post-WWII Soviet Union. Winston Churchill clearly demonstrated his hatred for communism and his distrust of Josef Stalin, and twice he went to the aid of Greece to prevent Soviet expansionism.[23] By the late 1930s, Churchill began warning US President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the spread of communism. Before the start of WWII, Britain became one the first countries to begin research on the development of nuclear weapons. Shortly after WWII commenced, the UK teamed with the United States as part of the Manhattan Project that resulted in the development of the world's first nuclear weapon.[24] Subsequently, the UK became the third nation to independently test a nuclear weapon—after the United States and USSR—securing its place as a global nuclear power. More importantly, the UK's distinction as a NWS, strategically aligned with the United States, served as a much-overlooked, but incalculable, deterrent to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

After WWII and the rise of NATO, the Soviet Union faced an alliance of loosely organized conventional armies, but armies led by three nuclear-armed nations—the United States, the UK, and France. Although the USSR's nuclear arms race was myopically focused on the United States, Stalin had a clear understanding of US nuclear capabilities and those found in the United States's European allies of the UK and France. The UK and France's possession of nuclear weapons, undoubtedly contributed to the United States's extended nuclear deterrence during and after the Cold War. Today, the mere presence of UK's nuclear-weapons-capable SSBNs serves as a counterweight to a bellicose and nuclear armed Russia. This strategic deterrence demonstrates the UK's enduring relevance and influence in the region and around the globe. As such, for the UK to divest itself of its nuclear capability would come at great cost—the tangible expense of denuclearization and the intangible impact on NATO, the EU, and the United States.

COST OF DENUCLEARIZATION

A decision to scrap the UK's Trident nuclear weapons program would cost the UK billions of pounds to decommission the submarines and warheads and dismantle the nuclear infrastructure at Faslane and Coulport; destroy the

nuclear fissile material; as well as eliminate countless jobs directly and indirectly supporting the nuclear enterprise. A *Hansard* report to the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2006 estimated the government's nuclear decommissioning liabilities at £9.6 billion ($14 billion).[25] It detailed:

- £3.4 billion pounds ($5 billion) to decommission the warhead factories at Burghfield and Aldermaston.
- £333 million ($480 million) to decommission and store the current fleet of nuclear submarines.
- £146 million ($213 million) to dismantle the actual warheads.
- £150 million ($219 million) to decommission the nuclear shipyards and refueling facilities of Devonport and Rosyth.
- £20 million ($30 million) to decommission two remaining nuclear test reactors and any remaining decommissioning costs.

A subsequent assessment by the UK Public Finance News in 2007 estimated the decommissioning of the fleet of four Trident submarines *alone* at £1.75 billion ($2.5 billion), a stark contrast to the *Hansard* report's estimate of £333 million ($480 million) per submarine—a difference of £890 million ($1.3 billion) between the two reports.[26] Which report is correct?

Such disparities are common for an enterprise with countless cost variables, many of which are classified. It is extremely difficult for the UK government to accurately gauge an overall fiscal cost to relocate or abandon altogether its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, regardless of whether one accepts the lower number of the *Commons Hansard* report or the higher number of the UK *Public Finance News*, the decommissioning costs alone would be staggering. Additionally, a project of this magnitude is certain to include many hidden costs which are neither foreseen nor foreseeable; and the expected immediate savings advertised by special interests' groups and uninformed lawmakers would prove elusive just as the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) observed in its *Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023 Report.*

> CBO's estimates should not be used directly to calculate the savings that might be realized if those forces were reduced: Because the nuclear enterprise has large fixed costs for infrastructure and other factors, a partial reduction in the size of any segment of those forces would be likely to result in savings that were proportionally smaller than the relative reduction in force.[27]

Despite the fact the CBO report is based on US nuclear forces, it highlights that fixed costs are common to every nuclear enterprise. It further illuminates the fact that direct, attributable savings are not always achieved by simply cutting or removing a system, component, or program. The cost estimates for

decommissioning the UK's nuclear weapons program, for example, do not take into consideration multiple twenty-five year contracts with companies like Serco, Lockheed Martin, Rolls Royce, and Jacobs Engineering Group to build and maintain the Trident missiles, to maintain the nuclear facilities, and to monitor the operational integrity of the reactors. Early withdrawal from such contracts would result in substantial monetary penalties and cost millions of pounds.[28]

Additionally, the economic impact of decommissioning the UK's nuclear weapons program in Scotland or moving it elsewhere would severely challenge the economies of Scotland and England. Scotland stands to lose 6,700 jobs—and perhaps more importantly, both Scotland and the UK stand to lose the technical nuclear engineering expertise of the people doing those jobs; a situation it found itself in in the 1950s when its ship building industry struggled over the development of the country's first ballistic submarine—the *HMS Dreadnought.*[29]

The construction of the *HMS Dreadnought* was wrought with engineering challenges until the Royal Navy elicited assistance from the US Navy and the American company Westinghouse to intervene and provide the needed technical expertise to recover the languishing program. This marked the beginning of the UK's dependence on American technology. While an exact estimate of the fiscal cost of dismantling the UK's, nuclear weapons enterprise is unclear, what is clear is that the UK will face significant economic challenges to either relocate or divest itself of its program.

BEYOND DETERRENCE

Arguably, the UK's greatest expense in divesting itself of its nuclear weapons program would be its diminishing role on the world stage. As a NWS, the UK has served a critical role in Western strategic defense and counterproliferation and has sought a prominent role in influencing historic arms control and nonproliferation negotiations. But divestiture of its nuclear weapons enterprise would not just reduce the prestige, authority, and confidence of the UK government, it would in all likelihood undermine the pride the British people have in their nation's heritage, strength, and self-reliance. "The existence of the [UK's] nuclear deterrence has an emotional appeal to the man in the pub."[30] Sir Harold Wilson keenly observed this phenomenon during the construction of the UK's first two Polaris Submarines.

Years later, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher further espoused the importance of UK's nuclear weapons capability during a nuclear debate. Thatcher opined, "We [Britain] would not have grown into an empire if we were just

another European country. . . . [I]t was Britain that stood when everyone else surrendered and if Britain pulls out of that [nuclear] commitment, it is as if one of the pillars of the temple has collapsed."[31] The prime minister understood a Britain that no longer possessed nuclear weapons would be reliant upon other nations to defend it against nuclear aggression—a protection it formerly provided for others (i.e., NATO)—a position for which the nation would never recover. In sum, the price of divesting the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise would be significant in both tangible and intangible ways that portend unanticipatable second- and third-order effects. However, the same can be said about relocating and operationalizing a new program. But are there alternatives?

ALTERNATIVES TO TRIDENT

Several options exist for the replacement, extension, or scrapping of the UK's nuclear weapons program. In 2012, a UK government review conducted by a representative number of MP's from each party researched several key elements to determine the future of the UK nuclear weapons program. This pre-Brexit review, the "Trident Alternatives Review," researched and reported on seven key topics for consideration:[32]

1. Deterrence: role and credibility
2. Alternate systems and performance
3. Alternate postures
   a. Alternatives to Continuous at Sea Deterrence (CASD)
   b. Land-based ballistic missile silos
   c. Maritime surface launched cruise missiles
4. Delivering alternative capabilities
5. Costs
6. International reaction
7. Legal position

The review concluded, "None of these alternative systems and postures offers the same degree of resilience as the current posture of Continuous at Sea Deterrence, nor could they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances."[33] The report further suggested replacement of the UK's finely tuned nuclear weapons enterprise at HMNB Clyde would be "highly problematic, very expensive, and fraught with political difficulties."[34] This conclusion even considered the possibility of relocating the enterprise to locations inside of England and on foreign soil. These sights included: Milford Haven, Plym-

outh, and Barrow-in-Furness, England; Ile Longue, France; and the US Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia.

HOW MIGHT THE UK RELOCATE AND OPERATIONALIZE A PROGRAM?

If the UK decided to remain a NWS even under the strain of a potential independent, nonnuclear Scotland, one question comes to the fore: How would the rUK maintain its nuclear capability without HMNB Clyde in Faslane, Scotland? A recent study by Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that a relocation of the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise would cost UK tax payers an additional £3.5 billion ($4.5 billion) on top of the current (£4 billion) ($5.1 billion) operating cost of retaining its nuclear capability.[35] Additionally, replacement of the four aging *Vanguard* submarines is estimated to cost between £31 to £34.2 billion over ten years.[36]

Regardless of the past nuclear debate, on July 19, 2016, members of the UK's parliament voted unanimously to replace Trident with the new *Dreadnought*-class SSBN at a cost of £15 billion ($18.8 billion).[37] With replacement costs of Trident estimated at over £15 billion ($18.8 billion), and while alternatives for maintaining a similar nuclear capability exist, they are comparably expensive given the required research and development costs.[38]

Location, Location, Location

Should the rUK decide to remain a nuclear power and relocate its Trident nuclear submarine program, operationalizing the program in a new location will have monumental financial and political costs, as it is almost impossible to imagine a post–Cold War community anywhere welcoming a nuclear submarine base in its backyard.

HER MAJESTY'S NAVAL BASE (HMNB) CLYDE, FASLANE, SCOTLAND

A future United Kingdom without Scotland has few suitable locations to relocate its only nuclear submarine base from HMNB Clyde. The topographic features surrounding HMNB Clyde and low population density of Faslane and nearby villages make the current location ideal with respect to safety restrictions and operational effectiveness. The layout of the maintenance facilities, piers, explosive-handling jetties, and alert facilities were

built with strict adherence to the UK's independent nuclear security safety within the Ministry of Defense and other operational readiness standards. Additionally, safe and easy passage to the North Atlantic is one of HMNB Clyde's most valuable strategic qualities. Conversely, none of the potential locations in England proper come without challenging topographic characteristics, issues with safe standoff from populations centers, considerable fiscal expense, and anticipated political frictions with local governments or industrial corporations.

The UK's nuclear submarine program at HMNB Clyde is made up of two parts: Faslane and Coulport. The small village of Faslane on the Garloc, where the submarines dock for refit, rearming, and repairs, along with the nuclear weapons storage facility at Coulport, eight miles away on Loch Long, is the operational home for the entire UK nuclear weapons enterprise. Any new location would require a similar layout with a deep-water docking and maintenance facilities and a separate ammunition storage location. More challenging for the rUK would be finding a location with safe standoff range from dense population centers.

POTENTIAL LOCATIONS

Milford Haven

Many geographical features of Milford Haven are suitable for the relocation of the UK's nuclear submarines. The deep-water port and immediate access to the Atlantic Ocean makes the location an attractive alternative. However, major petroleum and natural gas industries adjacent to the water make Milford Haven incompatible with the UK's nuclear weapons safety and security standards. The danger of handling nuclear weapons in close proximity to gas and oil refineries is an unacceptable risk, not to mention the explosive dangers and environmental hazards of a nuclear submarine and oil tanker colliding in the congested waters. Moreover, the oil refinery and two liquefied natural gas facilities account for 30 percent of the UK's current gas supply.[39] Closing the oil and natural gas facilities would come with significant economic impact to a Brexiting England.

Plymouth

The Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth—the UK Royal Navy's nuclear repair and refueling facility—would be a natural option for relocating the Trident program from Faslane, because of its status as a deep-water port. Devonport

is the largest naval base in Western Europe and is currently home to the *Trafalgar*-class submarines, which themselves were scheduled to and began their move to Faslane by 2017 in an effort to consolidate the UK's submarine fleet in Scotland.[40] Regardless of the dockyard's ability to easily incorporate the Trident or future *Dreadnought*-class submarines into its deep-water port, one remaining issue prevents Devonport from being summarily excluded from consideration, namely the presence of an ammunition depot at Falmouth, seventy kilometers away.

The combination of Devonport and Falmouth was originally considered in the 1960s when the UK was searching for a place to locate its nuclear submarines. However, Devonport and Falmouth were dismissed because the UK MOD wanted the ammunition depot to be less than a one-hour sail from the submarines.[41] Problematic too are the booming tourist economy in Falmouth and standoff safety considerations, that is, population centers, near Devonport. Between Plymouth and Devonport, nearly four hundred thousand people live within a five-mile radius of the docks and naval base. Devonport and Falmouth could be a possible relocation site, but both would require considerable investment of time, money, and political will.

Barrow-in-Furness

Currently, Barrow-in-Furness in Cumbria is where British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) is building the Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines. The site currently has many of the required support facilities and shiplifts.[42] However, the shallow depth of the Walney Channel, inadequate docking infrastructure for the much larger *Vanguard*- and *Dreadnought*-class submarines, close proximity of dense population centers, and the absence of a location for a future ammunition depot are strong disqualifiers. Even with extensive dredging of the channel, infrastructure improvements through populated areas, waivers for the location's proximity to population centers, and separate and distinct ammunition depot requirements, make the transformation of Barrow-in-Furness a monumental effort.

The last two sites considered feasible would be on foreign soil: the French Nuclear Submarine Base Ile Longue in Brittany, France, and the US Naval Base in Kings Bay, Georgia. No matter how radical the idea may seem, historical precedence is a natural guide for consideration of such sites. In the late 1940s, the 570th US Army Artillery Group and the 59th US Army Ordinance Brigade was colocated with and supported the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) with nuclear-armed artillery munitions.[43] The US, UK, and subordinate Canadian Army units shared ammunition depots on several bases, including Dortmund, Nienburg, Sennelager, Menden, and Iserlohn,

Germany.[44] This arrangement of British bunkers on US sovereign military bases in Germany was accepted between allies without incident or disagreement for the better part of forty years, from 1945 to 1989.[45] Even more compelling, the UK currently leases Trident II D5 missiles located in ammunition magazines on the US Naval Base, Kings Bay, Georgia.

Ile Longue, Brittany, France

Besides the unsettling feelings it might give many British about basing their entire nuclear deterrent abroad, Ile Longue nuclear submarine base would be possible if the UK were unable to find a suitable location in the rUK. Currently, the UK and France have increased their security cooperation, conducting joint maritime patrols, exchanging military staff members for combat deployments, and sharing operational responsibility for areas of shared strategic interest. Recently, the UK and France signed two new defense agreements. One of the agreements specified the sharing of a joint nuclear weapons research establishment. The two countries currently coshare hydrodynamic testing facilities in France under the name of Project *Teutates*. This agreement alone indicates a strengthening relationship between the two European nuclear allies.

Relocation to France would not be without significant challenges. Currently, UK and French nuclear safety regulatory authorities have different requirements.[46] Additionally, the reality of expanding Ile Longue's nuclear footprint—a small man-made peninsula—and adding more facilities along the Brittany coast would require France to address the expansion, both politically in Paris and publicly with the citizens of coastal Brittany. Lastly, France's acceptance of the UK nuclear program cannot be assumed, nor can it be expected without considerable internal and external debate or potential UK concessions.

US Naval Base Kings Bay, Georgia

The United States and the UK already share close nuclear cooperation, partnership, shared basing, and storage at the US Naval Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. This close relationship dates back to 1962 when the United States. cancelled the *Skybolt* project—an air-launched missile program, which the UK was planning to purchase.[47] In a compensatory act, President Kennedy agreed to the *Polaris Sales Agreement* in 1963,[48] committing the United States to supplying the Polaris missiles, launch tubes, and fire control systems to the UK. Even then, the final brokered deal gave control of the missiles to NATO with the UK retaining the right to launch the missiles independently in situations where "Her Majesty's

Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake."[49] Those twelve words would become the mantel on which the UK Government would hang its nuclear weapons independence, and critics would use to question Britain's true freedom of nuclear action.

Years later, the Trident II D5 missile program, the successor to *Polaris*, illustrates the close cooperation between the United States and the UK. Today, the US Navy and the UK Royal Navy continue to work closely together in many areas including carrier enhanced power projection (CEPP)[50] and the development of a common missile compartment (CMC)[51] for future SSBN replacements—the *Columbia*-class[52] for the United States and the *Dreadnought*-class for the UK.

The CEPP is a bilateral exchange of ideas, research, development, and engineering designs to enhance interoperability between the U.S. and UK navies with a technical focus primarily on aircraft carrier and carrier strike group employment. This close cooperation is responsible for much of the shared designs that went into the UK's newest fifth-generation aircraft carrier the HMS *Queen Elizabeth* (HMS R08).

The current shared research and development of the CMC for the *Columbia*- and *Dreadnought*-class SSBNs is by far one of the most important bilateral cooperations the United States has with the UK. The current production timeline of the respective SSBNs, in which the UK SSBN will be completed first, will see the UK absorb the research-and-development burdens of the CMC. This will provide the United States many of the solutions for the final design specifications of the US *Columbia*-class SSBNs. Such partnership represents cost and burden sharing, as well as an inherent materiel and close working interoperability. Ultimately, this well-established relationship and burden-sharing would inevitably factor into a future UK decision to possibly relocate its nuclear SSBN program to the United States.

While basing of the UK's entire nuclear submarine enterprise in the United States may be a viable option, such a decision comes with considerable strategic concerns, enormous political hurdles, and substantial costs to the UK. Currently, the UK leases seventeen Trident missiles located at the US Naval Base in Kings Bay, Georgia.[53] Additionally, British *Vanguard* submarines of the UK Trident program frequent the Georgia naval base for regularly scheduled and ad-hoc maintenance. The UK contributes £12 million ($17.5 million) per year toward the operating cost of the US naval base to use its facilities.[54]

Naturally, the UK's reliance on the US naval base is a target for critics of the UK's nuclear independence from the United States Critics continue to suggest that the UK is reliant upon the United States to give the British overall authority to launch a nuclear strike. In reality, the UK's nuclear program, regardless

of its ties to the United States, is completely independent and is able to fire its Trident missiles without US permissions, satellites, or launch codes.[55] Ultimately, the UK's challenge to convince critics of its independence from the United States pales in comparison to the daunting cost of possibly relocating its entire nuclear enterprise to King's Bay.

BUILDING NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FACILITIES—A US CASE STUDY

Relocating an entire nuclear enterprise like the UK's Trident nuclear submarine program will be a monumental task. While many of the expenses are only estimates, historical comparisons provide some sense of what financial hurdles await the Brexiting UK government. Therefore, foreign basing of the UK's nuclear deterrent may be a viable option if the British find themselves in a political grudge-match with local governments or confronted with an insurmountable public outcry in locating this enterprise on English soil.

The cost of building the US nuclear support facilities at the naval base in Kings Bay, Georgia, while dated, can provide initial indications of what kind of budget would be required to relocate the UK's Trident nuclear program. The cost of nuclear weapons infrastructure at Kings Bay was realized in three separate projects and expansions.

The first project was the acquisition and construction of a military ocean terminal originally established to serve as a maritime ammunition point in the event of a national emergency. This two-year construction project was completed in 1956 at the cost of $11 million.[56]

In 1982, the base and waterfront was configured to support the *Ohio*-class nuclear submarines. The support facilities, docking and berthing areas, explosive-handling jetties, and requisite security measures cost US taxpayers an additional $125 million dollars.[57] Immediately following completion of the main SSBN support infrastructure, the Trident Program required expansion and upgrades to the newly constructed facilities. The US Navy spent over $1.7 billion over the next decade on military construction projects alone. When complete, the US nuclear enterprise at Kings Bay cost over $5.2 billion in 2017 dollars.[58]

While the construction of US nuclear facilities at the US Naval Base, Kings Bay, Georgia, serves as a good model to determine the potential expenses of relocating the UK's nuclear weapons program, two distinct differences arise:

1. The US Navy built its facilities on undeveloped land it already owned.
2. The US Navy built its nuclear facilities without the need for duplicate facilities to maintain an established operational status like CASD of the UK nuclear weapons program.

When the United States decided to build the nuclear weapons facilities at the Naval Base, Kings Bay, Georgia, the US Army Corps of Engineers began work with an undeveloped waterfront. The United States did not face the challenges of relocating private homes, private businesses, or commercial industries. The UK government, on the other hand, faces the challenges of a present-day, well-developed coastline full of commercial industries, private property and businesses, nature preserves, and protected watersheds. The current lists of potential UK sites all possess either some or all the aforementioned challenges. Thus, the fiscal obligation to dismantle and relocate government, private, or commercial businesses, as well as to compensate private land- or home owners would further add to the complexity of such a relocation. If perhaps, the UK government were to choose to relocate its nuclear weapons enterprise to the rUK, it would face the challenges of the US equivalent of *eminent domain*, a quagmire of legal, financial, and political contests between (state, local, and federal) government, private industries, and British citizens.

Another decision the UK government would face is how best to maintain the true efficacy of deterrence from its nuclear weapons program's Continuous at Sea Deterrence (CASD) mission. In order to maintain CASD, any relocation of its nuclear weapons submarines, facilities, or support capabilities will require a period in which duplicate support infrastructure must exist to ensure that end. Therefore, it is realistic to envision two UK nuclear weapons enterprises, one in Faslane, Scotland, and the other located somewhere in England, Wales, or on foreign soil. This dual enterprise scenario could span as many as ten years by some estimates, effectively doubling the expense of the program's operational bottom line and potentially bankrupting the current UK military budget.

The 2015 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)[59] is considered a viable pathway of defense planning assumptions to successfully deliver future defense requirements, aptly named "UK Force 2020."[60] Currently, the UK's defense consists of two fifth-generation aircraft carriers (HMS *Queen Elizabeth* and HMS *Prince of Wales*), future deliveries of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, maritime patrol aircraft, and other high-price, high-value weapon systems and programs. The UK spends nearly 10 percent of its yearly defense budget on the Trident nuclear program at HMNB Clyde with an operating budget of £3.4–4 billion ($5.1–5.8 billion) a year.[61] The unanticipated requirement to duplicate and relocate the entire UK nuclear enterprise would effectively negate the successful 2015 SDSR's planning assumptions and force the reprioritization of its defense requirements. Ultimately, such a duplication and relocation effort would derail funding for current and future programs, effectively crippling the UK's conventional and nuclear capability.[62]

UK CLAIM TO HMNB CLYDE AS SOVEREIGN UK TERRITORY

Recognizing the monumental expense of both denuclearization and relocation of the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise from Faslane, many in the UK MOD feel the easiest solution is to simply declare HMNB Clyde and the corresponding support facilities, British sovereign territories. After all, the UK still possesses fourteen British Overseas Territories (BOT), two of which are the Sovereign Base Areas—Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the Island of Cyprus.[63] The British sovereignty of these bases was part of a negotiated independence much like that of the Chagos archipelago when Britain granted Mauritius its independence. The sovereign bases of Cyprus and Diego Garcia—the largest of the Chagos Islands—have become strategic military basing stations for the UK and the United States.[64]

However, the comparison of Cyprus's Akrotiri and Dhekelia and Chagos's Diego Garcia to Scotland's Faslane is oversimplification and reckless at best. The substantial challenge of Brexit's legal unknowns, coupled with Scotland's status as a sister protectorate to Britain and not a former subjugated colony, makes a similar quest complicated—twisted with fiscal, social, political, and emotional consequences. Ultimately, in light of Brexit, it is inconceivable that Her Majesties' Government (HMG) will be able to force an independent Scotland to accept HMNB Clyde as a British sovereign territory as part of any future Brexit negotiation.

There are three distinct reasons why comparison of Cyprus's Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia to a future Faslane is one wrought with inherent dissimilarities and challenges brought on by Brexit. First, Cyprus was a former British colony before Britain recognized its independence in 1960. The sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia were part of an independence agreement after a bitter five-year war, which Britain conducted from a position of power.[65] Scotland on the other hand, is *not* a former colony, but rather a sovereign state of equal status to Britain. British leverage in any future negotiation will rely on compromise and influence, not coercion.

Second, the legal status of the Akrotiri and Dhekelia Bases are today under heavy scrutiny as a result of the impending Brexit. Currently, the locations of the British bases on Cyprus constitute the "de facto external border of the EU," a strategic geopolitical location.[66] The UK has had the responsibility of monitoring the transit of personnel between the borders of the Republic of Cyprus and the Bases, thus—literally and figuratively—securing the furthest edge of the EU frontier. With a Brexiting UK, the external border of the EU will soon be guarded by a non-EU State, an unacceptable condition for EU.

Today, Cyprus is an independent sovereign nation-state and EU member capable of protecting its residents and the farthest extremes of the EU border. Similarly, an independent Scotland will immediately seek EU membership. Scottish EU boundaries will exist—boundaries with significant strategic value—like Scotland's northern most land mass. The Scottish territories in the north jut out into the North Atlantic and serve as a plug in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap (GIUK), a linchpin of Cold War strategy and chokepoint where Soviet submarines had to pass to access America's eastern seaboard. Additionally, access to Faslane through the Scottish territorial waters is also noteworthy, a challenge to trespassers of its territorial waters. Ultimately, the value of Scotland's strategic positioning will play strongly in their favor in future independence negotiations.

Lastly, in 2013, with the impending Scottish independence referendum, British lawmakers, professional economists, and defense experts commenced in spirited debates to understand the impact of an independent, nuclear-weapons-free Scotland. In the churn of analogies and hypothetical outcomes, *The Guardian* reported that UK MOD officials were developing plans to designate HMNB Clyde at Faslane and its corresponding support facilities a "Sovereign Base Area along the lines of its military bases in Cyprus."[67] The report drew a swift response from the SNP, furious with the absurdity of the suggestion, drawing parallels with "Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait."[68] Number 10 Downing Street (No 10)—the recognized headquarters of the government of the United Kingdom and the working office of the prime minister—disowned the proposal, calling it "neither credible or sensible."[69]

The SNP further accused Westminster of attempting to bully Scotland. While No 10 vehemently denied a whole-of-government approach to prepare for a future disposition of the UK's nuclear enterprise, the MOD confirmed that "no contingency plans were being made to move Trident out of Scotland," lending credence to the initial report and further suggesting fissures in the messaging and intentions of HMG's interagency.[70] The media flap played out for several days, appearing to be a sneak peak into the internal decision-making of HMG, while creating an indelible imprint on the minds of an already defensive Scottish Government.

Ultimately, Brexit's ill-conceived or -understood second- and third-order effects have, since its inception, exposed legal opportunities for many, if not all, of the UK's BOTs. These opportunities have created unforeseen challenges for HMG in connection with its current relationships, agreements, and alliances. The UK's departure from the EU will redraw EU frontiers, redefine EU equities among its member nations, and reforge the EU's determination to protect Europe's dedicated union. As such, no legal binding agreement between HMG and each of its former colonies,

Sovereign Base Areas, or Crown Dependencies is safe from review under a newly anticipated legal status. While topically, the idea of HMG simply claiming the UK's nuclear enterprise at Faslane as a sovereign base area is enticing, the spoiler will be a mature, independent, Scottish nation-state determined to make that quest a troubled one . . . unless it decidedly works to their advantage.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RUK'S NEW NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, EU, AND THE UNITED STATES

It is difficult to envision the UK addressing the divestiture or relocation of its nuclear program from Scotland to the rUK without considerable consultation and assistance from the United States, NATO, or European partners. Regardless of the tangible and intangible costs for the UK of scrapping its entire nuclear enterprise, the physical loss of such a capability would also impact other regional and global partners. Other partner nations, especially those in Europe, would equally fear the loss of the UK's nuclear weapons capability and the UK's contribution to the NATO nuclear alliance. The loss of a nuclear UK would fundamentally weaken NATO as the European Union's viable security apparatus, bastion of Western idealism, and defender against any conceivable aggression on the part of nuclear-armed Russia.

NATO: A NUCLEAR ALLIANCE

In NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the Alliance affirms "that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."[71] Today, NATO is a nuclear alliance comprised of the nuclear weapons capabilities provided by the United States and the UK. While NATO is a committed nuclear alliance, it remains dedicated to working toward a world without nuclear weapons. Regardless, the strength of the alliance is firmly anchored to the asymmetric nuclear deterrence its nuclear alliance wields and will remain so for as long as there are nuclear-capable adversaries.

Currently, the United States, the UK, and France are the only nuclear-weapons states in NATO, and the UK's nuclear weapons commitment—colocated on the European continent—serves as a substantial part of NATO's current nuclear deterrent capability. Although France is a NWS, it chooses not to be part of the NATO nuclear alliance. Instead, France chooses to keep its nuclear

weapons free from commitment to NATO. Therefore, France is not a member of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which determines the Alliance's nuclear policy and posture.[72] France contributes to the NATO nuclear alliance by the very presence of its nuclear capability, and with the UK and the United States, strategically positions a mix of nuclear capabilities, including: submarines, land-based silos, and dual-use, nuclear-weapons-capable aircraft on or near the European continent. The collective nuclear weapons commitment of the United States, the UK, and to a degree France, provides the nations of the alliance and most of the European continent a combined nuclear weapons umbrella.

UK'S ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

The UK's economic contribution to NATO is also significant and would generate considerable concern if the island nation became a "divided kingdom" with Scotland choosing to break away from the union. Members of NATO are required to commit to spending 2 percent of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) toward the readiness of the alliance. Currently, the UK is the second largest contributor to NATO, second only to the United States, with respect to financial and military support. If Scotland secedes from the union, the fiscal and Scottish troop contribution of the UK to NATO will decrease, with reverberating effects across NATO and the allied countries.

In light of Putin's expressed willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons against a NATO assault, to bring a quick end to any future conflict, the absence of the UK's nuclear weapons and commitment would compromise NATO's nuclear deterrent capabilities. It would have devastating consequences for the Alliance's strategic nuclear resolve against a strengthening and assertive Russia and other emerging nuclear powers. While the effective deterrent value of NATO's nuclear alliance is unknown—as it is impossible to prove that the presence of nuclear weapons prevents a nuclear exchange—it is reasonable to expect that the removal of the UK nuclear support from the NATO nuclear alliance would reduce the effectiveness of the alliance's nuclear deterrent.

AN INDEPENDENT SCOTLAND

Although an independent, nuclear-weapons-free Scotland is certainly possible with another independence referendum, many argue the reality of such a situation is improbable. Many aspects of a future independent Scotland are much more complex than the simple leap of faith into an ideological state of

independence. For example, the government of an independent Scottish state would be required to create a free and independent governing body, develop a standing armed military force, substantially expand its current national security apparatus, establish a new economy, and negotiate or renegotiate numerous treaties, alliances, and trade agreements as an independent nation.

A new Scottish government would need to make important decisions on foreign defense and economic security policies in an increasingly complex global security environment. The transition for such independence would take several years, unlike the two-year leap Scotland's Brexiting cousin is executing. Like England, the new Scottish nation should expect many second- and third-order effects—some financially expensive, others politically charged.

What Scotland will gain in a nuclear-weapons-free independence, it will lose in thousands of jobs directly and indirectly supporting the UK nuclear weapons program at Faslane. According to the Scottish Development International, over eight hundred aerospace, defense, and maritime industries in Scotland alone support UK defense infrastructure.[73] These companies employ nearly 40,000 staff, while the UK defense establishment employs over 12,600 in Scotland, nearly 6,700 in support of the UK nuclear weapons enterprise by itself. Additionally, the UK's 2015 SDSR declared that by 2020, Scotland would be home to all of the Royal Navy's submarines. This is also true for the basing of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and aviation fighter squadrons.

At present, the UK is committed to the commercial, economic, and critical infrastructure investment in Scotland with continued development of military basing. Therefore, a future secession before 2020 would derail a large economic growth potential based upon the UK government's planned defense spending.

Lastly, if Scotland sought independence and demanded the relocation of the UK nuclear weapons program, the nation would also lose the technical expertise of nuclear weapons support consortiums that ensure that the current nuclear weapons program remains functional, viable, and effective. These nuclear support industries represent the deeper "hidden costs" of such a decision.

In light of the Brexit decision, Scotland can be expected to take a much more deliberate approach to a future independence and base its transition to single-nation status after careful observation of England's Brexit. Ultimately, there is little advantage for Scotland to aggressively seek independence until it observes the resulting impacts of the UK's Brexit from the European Union.

Regardless of the numerous implications weighing against Scotland's secession, the independent will of the Scottish people should not be discounted, nor should their quest for a nuclear-weapons-free Scotland, irrespective of the

costs. Whether the decision to secede from the union is decided this year or five years from now, a well-prepared UK government is better served in light of the monumental implications of such a move.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

In 2016, the United Kingdom experienced one of the most politically tumultuous years in its long and illustrious history. The British people cast a majority vote to depart the EU, a decision that shocked lawmakers, economists, and defense experts alike. After the surprise of the Brexit decision had subsided, the Scottish independence movement and its divisive undercurrents began to strengthen. These themes of dissent and dissatisfaction continue to serve as a political backdrop to the shaken union as it aligns itself to transition from the EU and stave off a Scottish move toward independence. Nevertheless, the Brexit decision created countless unknown second- and third-order effects which now reverberate across all functions of the UK government, British socioeconomic forums, and among partners and allies of the island nation. However, the totality of the challenges associated with the Brexit decision may collectively be of the same magnitude as the problem of what to do with the UK's only nuclear weapons program if the Scottish polity decides to seek a nuclear-weapons-free independence. The UK must prepare to answer the question: Should the UK retain its nuclear deterrent capability, and if yes, how?

Today, the UK has nuclear-powered submarines and also SSBNs. Historically and collectively, this capability gave the Union of Crowns access to the world stage and influence as an officially recognized NWS. Nuclear weapons legitimized and strengthened a country that ranks seventy-ninth in land mass, but seventh in GDP. The UK and the United States constitute NATO's nuclear capability, which serves as a counterbalance to the recent aggressions of a nuclear-armed Russia and as an extension of the Western (US) nuclear deterrence umbrella. The prospect of losing this power, prestige, and role of protector is more than enough to discourage the UK from forfeiting its nuclear deterrent.

While the rUK might hope to retain its nuclear weapons capability in the event of Scottish independence, the tangible and intangible costs of doing so is monumental. Moreover, the alternatives likewise involve potentially insurmountable costs and trade-offs. While the long-term gains are attractive, the short-term expenses will have debilitating effects on the rUK, even if program costs could be amortized over years. Worse yet, if HMG approaches Scotland with the ultimatum of seizing Faslane as a Sovereign Base Area like Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Scotland's reaction would have far greater conse-

quences than a well-designed compromise benefiting both nations. In the end, economics and principles (of a nuclear-weapons-free nation) will determine Scotland's path of independence, neither of which are absolute determinates.

Finally, relocating a working nuclear weapons enterprise without compromising operational readiness would inevitably consume much of the UK's defense budget. The duplicative efforts would strain an already understrength Royal Navy, effectively double the operating cost of the nuclear enterprise for the foreseeable future, and further challenge an expertise-limited domestic ship-building industry. At the very least, the price tag to relocate the capability would come at the cost of other smaller programs outlined in the current and future SDSRs. Alternative solutions to replace the SSBN are cost prohibitive, less responsive, and less effective than the current SSBN fleet. The government has NOT, however, studied the same alternatives, relocation efforts, temporary duplicity of operations, or dismantling of the current nuclear weapons enterprise against the backdrop of Brexit.

US INTERESTS—US ACTIONS

In light of the political upheaval of the Brexit decision, one of the most talked-about outcomes of Brexit is the potential for a future Scottish independence referendum and the possibility of Scottish secession from the union. Based upon the dynamics of the last Scottish independence vote, the pervasive call for another, and the strength of will of the SNP and the Scottish people, the possibility of an independent Scotland is a referendum away. Well-prepared US and UK governments are best served by combining planning efforts for the potential relocation of the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise, *now*.

Ultimately, the United States must intervene to secure its own interests with regard to the UK's contributions to US extended nuclear deterrence; not to mention the UK's influence as the United State's strongest, most loyal ally in the fight against global terrorism and world security. The United States must prepare to support UK research and planning for a potential Scottish independence and relocation efforts of its nuclear weapons enterprise. Most importantly however, the United States must prepare to extend an offer to house—temporarily or permanently—the UK SSBN fleet at the US nuclear weapons facilities in Kings Bay, Georgia. This offer is possibly the easiest and most practical short-term or long-term solution to the most complex problem the Brexiting UK may face.

At its merits, offering to host the UK's nuclear weapons enterprise at US Naval Base Kings Bay would effectively allow the UK to first and foremost keep its nuclear weapons capability, maintain the vital CASD rotational mission, and avoid duplication of operations while the nuclear weapons enter-

prise at Clyde is dismantled and another is being built. The most important consideration is that a US–based option would provide the UK government the decision-space required during a tumultuous move to single-nation status and step into the abyss of still more Brexit unknowns.

* US DOD disclaimer: "The thoughts and opinions in this article are the author's alone and not those of the U.S. Government."

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Part II

GLOBAL ISSUES

Chapter Nine

The Challenges of Terrorism in a Globalized World

Amy Pate

Multiple scholars have debated if and to what degree terrorist actors of the "fourth wave"[1] constitute a "new terrorism."[2] While authors have focused on a variety of characteristics as defining new terrorism, many focus on the nature of the goals, tactics, and organizational forms prevalent in terrorist groups—and most especially jihadist groups—at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries.[3]

Critics of the "new terrorism" concept argue that emphasis on potential novelty elides the degree to which there is continuity in how terrorist actors believe and behave.[4] Many (and perhaps even the majority of) terrorist groups and actors do not necessarily differ from those of previous waves identified by Rapoport; in fact, a not insignificant number of actors and movements have persisted across waves.

The modal terrorist group, based on analysis of perpetrators identified in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), is short-lived (at least, in terms of its terrorist activity) and launches only a small number of attacks that kill few people, if any.[5] Many of these actors pass virtually unnoticed by the public outside the immediate vicinity and time period of their activity, unlike the referents frequently invoked by both proponents and critics of "new terrorism." However, while the modal and median terrorist group may look similar over different time periods, it may be that the outliers (the exceptionally lethal, the exceptionally active) have an outsized influence on public perceptions of terrorism and policymakers' responses to the phenomenon.

The modal actor aside, there have been shifts in the goals and organization of the most active terrorist groups. Since the rise of al-Qa'ida in the late 1990s, policymakers have grappled with how to frame and respond to what has become known as the global jihadist movement. This problem-set has only intensified with the evolution of the Islamic State. In some ways,

these groups and the movement they represent are distinct from the dominant groups of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

In this chapter, I argue that current policy challenges, particularly for governments of Western democracies, stem from the confluence of three distinct factors, which have not coexisted previously in the post–World War II period. These include enhanced forms of network and virtual organization, changes in the execution and consequences of attacks, and in public perceptions of the threat.

In terms of actor characteristics, the dominant terrorist actors currently on the world stage are characterized by a high degree of transnational connectivity, with a mix of network characteristics, but also with well-defined organizational structures within key organizations "anchoring" the global jihadist movement. Furthermore, many of the groups associated with the global jihadist movement have evolved (at least in part) in the context of insurgencies and civil wars. The nature of attacks has also shifted. While guns and bombs are still the weapons of choice for most terrorists, the average lethality of attacks has seen increases in recent years. More mass lethality attacks are occurring as well as coordinated attacks.

The nature of connectivity between terrorist actors and changes in attack modalities and outcomes contribute to heightened public perceptions of threat, perceptions that have been stubbornly persistent in the years following the September 11 attacks in the United States. Publics in North America and Europe routinely overestimate the threat of terrorism in public opinion polls. Furthermore, some research has demonstrated that the fear and anxiety induced by heightened threat perceptions shifts the policy preferences of individuals to more coercive and militaristic (and, usually, costlier) options.

Taken together, policy makers in Western democracies are constrained in their options by the nature of terrorist actors and attacks and by public opinion. I will now explicate more fully on each of these points.

CROWDSOURCING THE CAUSE

The global jihadist movement is not the first movement seeking radical change to the international system through transnationally connected actors dedicated to spectacular attacks using novel means. Indeed, several authors give the anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that honor,[6] even situating al-Qa'ida and other actors within an anarchist framework.[7] However, the two primary pillars of the global jihadist movement, al-Qa'ida and (more recently) the Islamic State, have used transnational networks as a primary and intentional means of expansion.

Both groups have been successful in co-opting previously existing groups and movements with primarily local grievances into their networks; both have also used their own memberships to establish new organizations in territories of interest. For example, al-Qa'ida co-opted the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which emerged out of the Algerian civil war of the early 1990s with primary grievances against the Algerian military. GSPC, renamed al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), adapted the rhetoric of global jihad, launching attacks against Western actors in the region. The focus of AQIM also expanded beyond being almost solely on the Algerian government to other governments in the Sahel, including Mali and Mauritania.[8] In contrast, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula was established by fighters directly trained by al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan.[9]

The Islamic State has taken the franchise model from al-Qa'ida (which had relatively high barriers to entry)[10] and expanded it. While formal organizational affiliations between al-Qa'ida's central leadership and regional organizations never surpassed a dozen,[11] the Islamic State has actively sought and received pledges of allegiance from more than two dozen groups since 2013.[12] Furthermore, the Islamic State has aggressively promoted the value of individual action, resulting in a wave of "inspired" attacks.[13] The Islamic State has successfully used social media and other digital means to increase its reach, including linking individual fighters in places like Syria with potential recruits in Western countries while also launching more coordinated publicity campaigns.[14] Authors such as Atran argue that it is this dispersed constituency of alienated Muslims (especially young Muslim men) that serves as the most challenging terrorist threats in developed democracies, especially in Europe.[15]

Exploring data from the ancillary dataset on Islamic State–related attacks from the GTD (see table 9.1) demonstrates how both the franchise model as well as efforts to inspire attacks has borne fruit. Not only have attacks carried out by the core Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria grown substantially since 2013, so have attacks carried out by its affiliate organizations and by individuals inspired by the Islamic State (although not formally part of the group or one of its affiliates).[16]

However, while the Islamic State has taken full advantage of networked forms of organization and expansion, it retains at its core a highly cohesive leadership cohort under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with clear lines of communication and chains of command.[17] Thus, it combines the advantages of a diversified network with a strong central organization.

The degree to which al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State have been able to build—both in reality but more importantly in public perceptions—global networks of violent extremists (along with financial and other support networks) for the purpose of global jihad is remarkable. Even though the rivalry

Table 9.1. Islamic State-Related Terrorist Attacks

Year	*Islamic State*	*IS Affiliate*	*IS Inspired*
2013	372	4	0
2014	1263	109	12
2015	1220	1089	14
2016	1430	957	35

Source: Erin Miller and Sheehan Kane (2016), "Global Terrorism Database ISIL Auxiliary Dataset," (November 2017).

between these two core groups can be intense and the degree to which more localized jihadist movements truly embrace global jihad as a goal is sometimes questionable, the impression given is one of pervasive presence.

Jihadist groups are also increasingly embedded within insurgencies and civil wars—by one estimate, 40 percent of civil conflicts feature a jihadist actor as of 2014, compared to only 5 percent in 1990.[18] Kalyvas identifies thirty-nine jihadi groups active in eighteen civil wars, including in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, and other countries.[19] The current global jihadist movement could even be said to have been birthed in insurgency, with roots in the Afghan resistance to Soviet intervention.[20] The Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was also a mechanism for the transnationalization of the movement, as fighters from across the Muslim world joined the fight. In reality, in the years immediately following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, some of these fighters moved on to support other groups engaged in civil conflicts (such as in Bosnia) prior to the development of a movement committed to terrorism as a core tactic.[21] The grounding of global jihadism in civil conflict and insurgency results in cohorts of fighters who are combat hardened from engagements with major powers and modern militaries.[22]

ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS

Multiple authors have argued that the consequences of terrorist attacks have increased in terms of fatalities and/or casualties.[23] The explanations for why lethality has increased include the rise of religious motivations[24] and the transnational nature of groups.[25]

However, the spike in lethality (which was originally noted in the early 2000s) seems to have abated in recent years, both globally and specifically in Western democracies. Figure 9.1 shows average lethality per terrorist attack, based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[26]

Figure 9.1 shows that after an increase in the average numbers of deaths per attack in the early 2000s, by around 2008–2009, average deaths globally



Figure 9.1. Islamic State-Related Terrorist Attacks

returned to levels seen in the 1980s and 1990s. Within North America and Europe, average lethality had returned to earlier levels by 2006. Further, the spikes in lethality in 2001 and 2004 in North America and Europe are driven by a handful of incidents, namely the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the Madrid train bombings in 2004. Without these incidents, the trend line for North American and European fatalities would be relatively flat throughout the time period.

However, the picture is different when one narrows the focus to attacks related to the Islamic State, the terrorist organization that has dominated media coverage since its emergence in 2013 from al-Qa'ida in Iraq. Figure 9.2 displays the average lethality for attacks associated with the Islamic State, including those carried out by the core organization (in Iraq and Syria), other affiliated movements (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria), and "inspired" actors (such as Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, the San Bernandino shooters).[27] Figure 9.2 shows that the average fatalities in attacks carried out by the core IS organization are considerably higher than the global average, an attribute that—in the popular imagination—seems to be passed on to its affiliates and those actors "inspired" by the organization. However, the average lethality for attacks undertaken by these two actors is actually below the global average. It should be noted that the context in which many core IS attacks occur are in conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, which may explain the relatively high number of deaths associated with them.

There have also been noticeable increases in the number of mass fatality attacks. Using data from the GTD, Figure 9.3 shows trends in attacks with more than twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred documented fatalities from 1980 through 2017.[28] The increases in mass fatality attacks in recent years may be



Figure 9.2. Average Fatalities in IS-Related Attacks

why publics continue to rank terrorism in general as such an important threat. It also highlights the degree to which terrorism is currently embedded in insurgency. (Notably, the surge of mass fatality attacks in the 1980s is also linked to insurgencies and civil wars.) The adoption of terrorist tactics by insurgent groups (or, in some cases, the adoption of insurgency by terrorist groups) has several implications. First, long-running civil conflicts tend to produce large cohorts of individuals specialized in the application of violence. The degree to which current terrorist organizations have combat-hardened soldiers at their disposal today is much higher than the average terrorist group in the 1970s or 1980s. To the extent that conflict zones are also awash in weaponry, these groups also have access to military-grade weaponry, which increases their potential to inflict large numbers of casualties. The contingencies of conflict zones may also force terrorist organizations to be more adaptive and to learn more complex tactics.

Terrorist attacks are also increasingly sophisticated, although not in the ways that have frequently been the area of concern for many policy makers. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many policy makers and members of the general public were certain that al-Qa'ida and related groups might adopt unconventional weapons, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.[29] This has not happened to any significant degree to date (although the Islamic State has resorted to chemical weapons at times). Instead, even the most sophisticated groups still rely on similar weapons as the earliest modern terrorists: bombs and guns. However, the means by which they deploy these very conventional weapons has grown more sophisticated.



Figure 9.3. Mass Fatalities Attacks

One exemplar of this is the growth of coordinated attacks, in which a group hits multiple targets at close to the same time. Figure 9.4 demonstrates this phenomenon between 1997 (the first year for which GTD systematically provides the information) and 2017. Furthermore, the top five perpetrators of related attacks are all associated with the global jihadist movement: the Islamic State (1,849 related attacks), the Taliban (1,300), Boko Haram (965), Al Shabaab (475), and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (the predecessor to IS, 402). Also notable, again, is the degree to which these actors are embedded within civil wars or engaging in insurgency.



Figure 9.4. Related Attacks by Year

Despite average lethality of individual terrorist attacks having again returned to historical levels (after increasing in the mid-2000s), the growth in mass fatality and coordinated attacks poses challenges to policy makers, because of how they influence public perceptions around the threat of terrorism and how they increase the costs of failing to prevent attacks.

THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Only a minority of the world's population faces a significant risk of being the victim of a terrorist attack. Numerous memes have floated through social media highlighting the rarity of the risk, especially for populations in Western democracies. Lists of things "more likely to kill you than terrorism" included threats such as stairs, texting while driving, deer, and (ironically) police.[30] UNESCO even launched a campaign to counter threat inflation by the media, including social media-friendly graphics (see figure 9.5 for an example), complete with the hashtag #factsnotfear.[31]

Despite the extremely low actual risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack, members of the public report fears of such. Mueller and Stewart find that the percentage of US respondents reporting that they are somewhat or very worried that they or a family member will become a terrorist victim is routinely



Figure 9.5. Social Media Graphic Produced by UNESCO

above 40 percent post-2001 and rarely falls below 30 percent. Furthermore, in 2017, more than 50 percent respondents reported this fear.[32] Large majorities report that they believe a high-casualty attack in the United States is likely to occur in the near future, with totals answering such not dropping below 60 percent since 2001.[33]

These public perceptions of the threat in the United States also color its perceived policy importance. Pew Research Center has consistently found that approximately 70 percent of respondents name terrorism as a top priority for the US president and Congress across three administrations. As of early 2018, 73 percent of Americans adults polled identified terrorism as a top policy concern. Additionally, in the fall of 2016, 49 percent of Americans polled said the government's antiterrorism policies have not gone "far enough" while approximately a third was concerned about restrictions on civil liberties due to antiterrorism policies.[34] These numbers (which are similar to the responses as far back as 2004) reflect a willingness—at least among a segment of the population—to perhaps compromise on issues of personal liberties and privacy in the name of physical security from terrorism.

Worries about violent Islamist extremism are even more acute than those about terrorism in general. Polling data in the United States, Canada, and various European countries reflect high levels of concern. In a spring 2017 survey, Pew found that 72 percent of US respondents were somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism. In Europe, Italians reported the highest levels of concern, with 89 percent of respondents either somewhat or very concerned. Swedes reported the lowest levels, with only 55 percent saying they were somewhat or very concerned. The EU median was 79 percent reporting they were somewhat or very concerned.[35]

Few studies explore the relationship between attack characteristics and the public perception of threat. However, one recent study by Avdan and Webb finds that coordinated attacks (which, as noted above, are increasingly common) increase threat perception.[36]

These public perceptions are likely influenced by media coverage of terrorism. Multiple studies have found that exposure to media coverage of terrorist attacks increases fear and anxiety.[37] Television coverage with "scary" visuals of attacks are particularly likely to invoke fear.[38] Furthermore, individuals reporting higher levels of anxiety about terrorism are more likely to support more coercive counterterrorism responses, including military responses.[39] Researchers have also found that fear and anxiety increase perceptions of risk and threat.[40]

Public policies meant to mitigate risks and allay public fears of terrorism may also inadvertently increase the public's perceptions of the threat. For example, implementing national threat levels related to terrorism and increased

security in public spaces (including airport screenings and bomb barriers around government buildings) keeps terrorism—as an active threat —at the forefront of the public mind. Rather than making people feel safer, by heightening awareness, they may instead increase threat perception.[41]

Many of the public narratives around jihadist terrorism portray it as a global conspiracy of clandestine actors driven by an irrational hatred of the West.[42] The reification of conflict between Islam and the West in such black-and-white terms is more similar to narratives about the Soviet "menace" during the Cold War than it is to narratives about terrorism in previous periods.[43] However, unlike the fear of Communism—which largely dissipated with the fall of the Soviet Union—the fear of violent jihadism does not necessarily attach to such an easily defined target.

Interestingly, Communist terror groups are still prolific perpetrators in the 2010s, with the Filipino New People's Army and Maoist groups in India accounting for approximately 5 percent of all terror attacks. The Kurdistan Workers Party—which has a Leninist orientation—also accounts for around 1 percent of all terror attacks in this period.[44] However, there is no narrative around the dangers of a global Communist terror movement since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet use of nonstate actors—including insurgencies and terrorist campaigns—was, however, a narrative seen in the post–World War II period. With the disappearance from the world stage of the state seen as the global sponsor of Communist movements, they are properly viewed (if they are even acknowledged) as responding to local grievances and conditions rather than being part of a global anticapitalist conspiracy.

In contrast, groups with jihadist ideologies are viewed as linked, even when evidence of shared resources above rhetoric and ideology are scarce. So, Boko Haram, although a product of local grievances and conditions in Nigeria's northeast, is conceived as part of the global jihad, even as it attacks primarily Nigerian targets and its goals are primarily about the establishment of an Islamist state in Nigeria.[45]

PROBLEMS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Both the nature of terrorism in the twenty-first century and the evolution of narratives and public perceptions of terrorism pose challenges for policy makers, particularly those in Western democracies.

The transnational nature of the global jihadist movement necessitates multilateral cooperation and coordination. While Western democracies have a number of mechanisms to facilitate this coordination among themselves (including NATO and institutions of the European Union), there are still

barriers. Governments are naturally more reticent to share information on national security issues. In the case of Europe, the freedom of movement among countries in the Schengen area makes tracking suspected members of, or sympathizers with, jihadist groups a challenge. Western democracies may encounter greater challenges in cooperating with nondemocratic states. For example, the United States must balance near-peer competition with actors such as Russia or China with a desire for counterterrorism cooperation. They may also face uncomfortable compromises—for example, sacrificing preferences for democratic governance in countries such as Egypt for perceived counterterrorism gains.[46]

However, policy makers should be careful to not overstate the transnational significance of many groups allegedly part of the global jihadist movements. Many of these organizations—despite claims of affiliation and allegiance—remain firmly rooted in local populations and conditions. For example, Boko Haram is almost entirely ethnic Kanuri and rarely ventures beyond Kanuri territory. Al Shabaab is more focused on Somalia and its near neighbors than it is carrying out global jihad. Abu Sayyaf remains limited to Mindanao and Moros independence. To the extent that these nodes within the network can be treated as largely the responsibility of regional governments, it becomes easier for Western powers to focus on more complex conflicts with greater direct effects on their populations (such as the Islamic State, foreign fighters, and refugee flows related to the Syrian civil war).

The networked nature of the global jihadist movement also poses challenges. Unlike Communism, where the threat was linked to a specific regime and the demise of that regime removed the threat (at least at a global scale and in popular perceptions), the locus of the global jihadist threat is much more amorphous. While anchored by organizations like al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State, the threat is not wholly dependent on their continued existence in their current form. The core organization of al-Qai'da is now operationally defunct. However, the evolution of some of its affiliates (such as AQAP and al Shabaab) maintain elements of threat. The Islamic State has lost considerable ground in Syria and Iraq. Regardless, its ability to continue inspiring individuals within Western democracies means the threat continues. The multifocal nature of global jihadism means that governments can end up playing the counterterrorism version of whack-a-mole.

The heightened consequences and sophistication of a subset of attacks also impose costs on policy makers. It is impossible for leaders of Western democracies to provide complete security from terrorist attacks and maintain any semblance of the open societies upon which their polities and economies depend. Yet, politicians face high electoral and public opinion costs for failing to prevent consequential attacks, especially by actors seen as "foreign,"

such as violent jihadists.[47] While governments in terms of public opinion cannot afford to fail, terrorists can fail almost continuously so long as they launch successful attacks on occasion.

Unrealistic public perceptions of the threat of terrorism may be particularly problematic for policy makers in Western democracies. As discussed previously, individuals with strong fear responses to terrorism tend to favor more coercive and militaristic responses to terrorism. However, this may be precisely the policy response that exacerbates the threat rather than mitigating it. One study, by Piazza and Choi, finds that when countries engage in military interventions, they experience increased terrorism, especially if that intervention involves the use of force for political or strategic purposes (e.g., to tip the balance in another country's domestic disputes or in ways that alter local politics). Military interventions for humanitarian purposes or the protection of civilians does not seem to engender such backlash.[48]

Similarly, individuals who perceive a high risk of terrorism also tend to favor coercive policies domestically toward individuals they associate with terrorist movements (such as Arabs in the United States or Palestinians in Israel).[49] A large body of research on radicalization, however, suggests that such policies could alienate members of these groups in a way that increases the risk of them radicalizing to the point of undertaking violent attacks.[50] Once again, public preferences for domestic counterterrorism select counterproductive policies.

Despite constraints and challenges, policy makers do have options, both at home and abroad. Despite consistently ranking concerns about terrorism as a top priority, there is little evidence that voters have detailed knowledge about counterterrorism policies. This provides policy makers and politicians some room to maneuver, especially in terms of multilateral cooperation.[51]

Internationally, to date, efforts to counter terrorism abroad have been overwhelmingly kinetic. It is a truism that terrorism cannot be killed in a literal sense. While kinetic action may be necessary, the most it can do is buy time and space for more positive efforts to invest in more stable societies. There has been far less emphasis on policies to inculcate preferences for nonviolent change and to incubate institutions that can accommodate nonviolent change. Given the societies in which jihadists are most active, policy makers may have to get more comfortable with the idea of Islamists winning elections.

NOTES

1. David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy,* eds. A. K. Cronin and J. M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.

2. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 2 (1993): 12–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559308427205; Mark Juergensmeyer, "Understanding the New Terrorism," *Current History* 99, no. 636 (April 2000): 158–63; David Tucker, "What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550109609688; Ersun N. Kurtulus, "The 'New Terrorism' and Its Critics," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 6 (2011): 476–500, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.571194.

3. Lynch and Ryder surveyed the use of the term "new terrorism" in articles published in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. They find the most common concepts associated with the term are increased violence and lethality, new organizational structures, religious motivations, weapons of mass destruction, transnationality, internet and cyber terrorism, and suicide bombings. See Orla Lynch and Christopher Ryder, "Deadliness, Organizational Change and Suicide Attacks: Understanding the Assumptions Inherent in the Use of the Term 'New Terrorism,'" *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 52, no. 2 (2012): 264, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.692512.

4. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "How New Is the New Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27, no. 5 (2004): 439–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100490483750; Alexander Spencer, "Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism,'" *Peace, Conflict and Development*, no. 8 (February 2006), https://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-conflict-and-development/issue-8/Questioning-the-Concept.pdf; Antony Field, "The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?" *Political Studies Review* vol. 7 (2009): 195–207, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2009.00179.x.

5. Erin Miller, "Patterns of Onset and Decline among Terrorist Organizations," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28, no. 1 (March 2012): 77–101, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-011-9154-6; Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2014): 2–23, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297133.

6. Richard Jensen, "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 116–53; Lynch and Ryder, "Deadliness, Organizational Change and Suicide Attacks," 257–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.692512.

7. James L. Gelvin, "Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 4 (October 2008): 563–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802257291.

8. Stephen Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and Its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region," *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin* 85 (Spring 2010): 12–29. http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf.

9. "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)," Council on Foreign Relations (June 2015). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap.

10. Clayton Thomas, "Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa," Congressional Research Service (February 2018). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf.

11. Al-Qa'ida has maintained alliances with a much larger set of organizations, particularly in Central and South Asia. However, most of these groups have not become franchises or branches of al-Qa'ida.

12. Erin Miller, "Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015," START Background Report (August 2016). http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf.

13. For some unaffiliated actors, commitment to jihadism is questionable. Claims of allegiance to the Islamic State may be driven as much by a desire for notoriety as sincere belief or commitment. Olivier Roy refers to this as the "Islamization of radicalization" (see Olivier Roy, "Who Are the New Jihadis?" *The Guardian* [April 13, 2017]) As violent jihadism retains the stature as the primary terrorism threat, some actors will be drawn to claim it due to this status rather than because of its substance. Regardless of the sincerity of belief (and one could argue that the military might of the Islamic State in part derives from a cohort of former Iraqi Ba'athists), the effect is to reinforce the status of jihadism and reinforces the narrative of groups such as the Islamic State about its global reach and power.

14. James P. Farwell, "The Media Strategy of ISIS," *Survival* 56, no. 6 (2014): 49–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.985436.

15. Scott Atran, "A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs, and 'Virtual Jihad')," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600564166.

16. Erin Miller and Sheehan Kane (2016), "Global Terrorism Database ISIL Auxiliary Dataset" (November 2017), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KNERY9, Harvard Dataverse, V4, UNF:6:NZKpt0ABU0BeIRZlBVnbpw== [fileUNF].

17. Gina S. Ligon, Mackenzie Harms, John Crowe, Leif Lundmark, and Pete Simi, "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture and Lethal Attraction," Final Report prepared for the Department of Homeland Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs, University of Maryland (November 2014). https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ISIL%20Branding%20Leadership%20Culture%20and%20Lethal%20Attraction_Ligon_Nov2014.pdf.

18. James D. Fearon, "Civil Wars and the Current International System," *Daedulus* 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017).

19. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Jihadi Rebels in Civil War," *Daedalu*s 147, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 36–47.

20. Martha Crenshaw, "Transnational Jihadism and Civil Wars," *Daedulus* 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 59–70. https://doi-org.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/10.1162/DAED_a_00459.

21. Ibid.

22. Marxist movements in Latin America, such as the Colombian FARC and the Peruvian Shining Path, are similar in their grounding in civil conflicts and insurgency. However, these conflicts—despite efforts by some activists—never transnationalized to any significant degree, in terms of their combat personnel.

23. David Tucker, "What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550109609688; Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization

and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002): 30–58; Graig R. Klein, "Ideology Isn't Everything: Transnational Terrorism, Recruitment Incentives, and Attack Casualties," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28, no. 5 (2016): 868–87.

24. Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, no. 4 (1995): 271–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576109508435985; Jennifer Varriale Carson and Matthew Suppenbach, "The Global Jihadist Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?" *Homicide Studies* 22, no. 1 (2018): 8–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767917733783.

25. Graig R. Klein, "Ideology Isn't Everything," 868–87.

26. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Fatality figures should be taken conservatively. Accurate counts of individuals killed in terrorist attacks—especially in zones of high conflict—are difficult to obtain. The GTD relies primarily on open source media to collect information. Media sources may be censored (or self-censored) in their reporting of fatalities, especially in more authoritarian countries. Even when reporters are relaying the best information available at the time of the event, those numbers may later prove to be inaccurate. However, the GTD remains to date the best available dataset on terrorist incidents with the most rigorous quality controls possible.

27. Miller and Kane (2016), "Global Terrorism Database ISIL Auxiliary Dataset." Harvard Dataverse, V4, UNF:6:NZKpt0ABU0BeIRZlBVnbpw== [fileUNF]. For more information on the categorization of attacks as related to the core Islamic State organization versus affiliates versus "inspired" attacks, see Erin Miller, "Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015," START Background Report (August 2016). http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf.

28. Very few mass fatality attacks are recorded in the 1970s within the GTD.

29. As an example of this concern, see "Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment," US Army TRADOC, TRADOC G2, Handbook No. 1.04, (2007). https://fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup4.pdf. For discussion of perceived threats of unconventional attacks among the public, see Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman, "Americans Respond Politically to 9/11: Understanding the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath," *American Psychologist* (September 2011): 456–67.

30. Patrick Smith, "World View: US Needs to Get Terrorism Threat into Perspective," *Irish Times* (December 12, 2015). https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/world-view-us-needs-to-get-terrorism-threat-into-perspective-1.2463560.

31. "Correcting Media Myths about Terrorism," UNESCO (April 12, 2017). https://en.unesco.org/news/correcting-media-myths-about-terrorism.

32. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, "Public Opinion and Counterterrorism Policy," Cato Institute (2018): 30.

33. Ibid., 31.

34. John Gramlich, "Defending against Terrorism Has Remained Top Policy Priority for Americans since 9/11," Pew Research Center (September 11, 2018).

35. Jacob Poushter, "Majorities in Europe, North America Worried about Islamic Extremism," Pew Research Center (May 24, 2017).

36. Nazli Avdan and Clayton Webb, "The Big, the Bad, and the Dangerous: Public Perceptions and Terrorism," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 11, no. 1 (March 2018). https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2017.1414276.

37. See James Igoe Walsh, "Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks: Causes and Consequences," Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (December 2010) for a useful review.

38. Shana Kushner Gadarian, "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 2010): 469–83.

39. Ifat Maoz and Clark McCauley, "Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 1 (February 2008): 93–116; Gadarian, "The Politics of Threat." Walsh, "Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks" provides a useful review of major studies.

40. Gadarian, "The Politics of Threat."

41. Kevin R. Grosskopf, "Evaluating the Societal Response to Antiterrorism Measures," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 3, no. 2 (June 2006): 76–86; Mueller and Stewart, "Public Opinion and Counterterrorism Policy."

42. Sadly, these narratives do some of the work of terrorist organizations by greatly exaggerating their presence and reach into Western democracies, thus creating the emotional impact of terrorism without terrorist organizations having to expend scarce resources to launch a large number of attacks in North America or Europe.

43. Mueller and Stewart, "Public Opinion and Counterterrorism Policy." The closest terrorist analog to the portrayal of Islamist terror is the portrayal of anarchist terror and violence at the turn of the century. In this case as well, public perceptions of the threat were inflated, and the popular portrayal was of a global conspiracy of actors determined to bring down modern governments. See Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

44. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

45. Amy Pate, "Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options," Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START (January 2014).

46. These trade-offs are not dissimilar to trade-offs during the Cold War, in which the United States and Western European governments would support authoritarian regimes as a bulwark against Communist (and specifically Soviet) influence in developing countries.

47. A dramatic and frequently cited example of this is the effect of the 2005 Madrid bombings on the outcomes of the national elections just days later, in which the incumbent conservative party lost to the opposition socialists. See Jose G. Montalvo, "Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist At-

tacks on Democratic Elections," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93, no. 4 (November 2011): 1146–54. Additionally, other studies that include a larger number of cases also find that terrorist attacks impact election outcomes in meaningful ways. See Martin Gassebner, Richard Jong-A-Pin, and Jochen O Mierau, "Terrorism and Electoral Accountability: One Strike, You're Out!" *Economics Letters,* 100 (2008): 126–29, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.011; Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 3 (August 2008): 279–301, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080246.

48. James A. Piazza and Seung-Whan Choi, "International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (September 2018): 686–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy026.

49. Huddy and Feldman, "Americans Respond Politically to 9/11"; Maoz and McCauley, "Threat, Dehumanization, and Support."

50. See, for example, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33; Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Belanger, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna, "The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism," *Advances in Political Psychology* 35, no. 1 (2014): 69–92, doi: 10.1111/pops.12163.

51. This assumes that politicians are seeking to inflame fears for electoral gains, which has not held in several recent elections in the United States and European countries. Multiple strands of research suggest that anxiety about terrorism moves individuals to prefer more conservative candidates. For a useful review, see Huddy and Feldman, "Americans Respond Politically to 9/11." Thus, conservative parties and candidates have electoral incentives to inflate threat perceptions and not to insulate policy-making around counterterrorism issues from electoral pressures.

Chapter Ten

The Globalization/ Deglobalization Dialectic

A Fragmented World Order on the Road to Globalization 2.0?

Yann Breault and Michèle Rioux

Since Brexit and Donald Trump's election in 2016, the issue of "deglobalization" or withdrawal at the national level is at the center of concerns about world order. The threat of new trade barriers and economic sanctions is palpable. Voices are raised to applaud or denounce it,[1] but others downplay it, even doubting the very existence of the phenomenon.[2] It is generally postulated that globalization and deglobalization are antithetical processes, but in this chapter we argue that they are two multidimensional, synchronic phenomena that interact with each other. Our ambition is to capture their momentum and document their regional manifestations, in order to analyze their overall impact on the interstate system.

To clarify the basis of our analysis, we will briefly discuss the concepts of globalization and deglobalization in the first part of this chapter. In the second part, we will analyze recent empirical data that reflects the dialectical relationship between global interconnections and the national/international system. A third part evaluates the risk of fracturing between major economic regions posed by the recent intensification of the globalization/deglobalization dialectic.

MATERIAL AND CONCEPTUAL DIALECTIC: GLOBALIZATION VS. DEGLOBALIZATION

In its broadest sense, globalization amounts to an intensification of flows and interconnections between societies; a process by which events in one place are more likely to influence what is happening elsewhere.[3] We are referring here to the intensification of flows of various kinds that cross territories and transform both communities and their relationships. Many analysts have

pointed out how globalization is made possible and is constantly accelerated by technological innovations. If the invention of writing and printing has shattered the spatial boundaries of trade and cultural exchange, it is the new electronic interdependence, captured by Marshall McLuhan's concept of "global village," which gives the phenomenon the common sense that it has nowadays. With the end of the Cold War and the economic opening of Communist China, the popular use of the term became widespread, becoming more often than not synonymous with "triumphant neoliberalism."[4] But today the ideological dimension seems overcome by the technological aspect. The image of drones delivering goods ordered by cell phones by the inhabitants of the most remote areas captures best the essence of the radical contraction of the planetary space.[5]

According to the official definition given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), flows relate simultaneously to trade in goods and services, capital movements, human migration, and more broadly the dissemination of knowledge.[6] The literature thus discriminates between an economic globalization (increased volume of trade, international investment, the abolition of tariff and nontariff barriers), social and cultural globalization (displacement of populations, circulation of digital data, global multiplication of company branches offering the same standardized products, and the emergence of global businesses and transnational economic networks structuring global value chains), and a political globalization (signature of international treaties, development of intergovernmental organizations, recourse to various supranational tribunals, etc.).[7]

Based mainly on national statistics, the indicators associated with each of these dimensions are useful for tracking changes in the degree of openness (or closure) of state borders. But it must be kept in mind that they do not make it possible to account for globalization in a broader sense, not reflecting the evolution of flows at the substate level, and thus not specifically measuring which are observed between the interconnected cities and the rural populations peripheral to the world economy. It would certainly be appropriate to examine the collective identities and political ideologies that are developing at the local level, to compare urban and rural realities, and to assess from this angle the risks of social divide posed by globalization, but this is not our goal. What interests us more specifically is the future of the political globalization or the mechanisms of regulation of the world economy, that is to say the process by which the global rules emerge through institutions beyond the control of nation-states.

It is precisely in this sense that the concept of "deglobalization" has gained popularity since the end of the 2000s through popular essays like those of Georges Corm,[8] Jacques Sapir,[9] or Arnaud Montebourg,[10] who advocate for a democratic reappropriation of the economy, a reappropria-

tion which necessarily involves the mobilization of state institutions. These books are a continuation of the work of Filipino Walden Bello, a leading figure of the World Social Forums, who published in 2002 a book eloquently titled *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy*. The oxymoron reveals that the point is not to call for the end of the globalized economy. What needs to be downsized is the place occupied by certain governance bodies such as the G7, the IMF, and the World Bank. The common good could be threatened by the neoliberalism that these institutions convey to the benefit of big business. There is a demand for governance with a greater diversity of social actors. The deglobalization is here a call for a different regulation of international trade.

Until the turn of the 2010s, we would still have talked about alterglobalism,[11] a term itself intended to replace the notion of antiglobalism that had emerged in the 1990s. In a text published in 2011, Bernard Cassen affirmed that deglobalization was a "strategic orientation aimed, through both political (elections, institutions and governments) and citizens actions (social movements in particular), to concretely take back from the economic and financial sphere the enormous powers that the authority (state) policy has deliberately abandoned to it."[12] The idea of a new organization of the economy is found, as for Bello and Sapir, at the center of this deglobalization project. Their resolutely statocentrist and multipolar positions regarding the international system are consistent with the vision prevailing in emerging economies, especially among Russian and Chinese experts, who see globalization as a tool of Western and more specifically American hegemony over the world economy.[13] The mode of governance of the Bretton Woods institutions does not make them all wrong on this matter.[14] They might rightly criticize the role of the US dollar in financial flows,[15] because it gives US banks a disproportionate power relative to their declining relative economic weight, hence the multiplication of official calls to de-dollarized international trade. It can be seen that these calls come not only from Beijing and Moscow, but from several regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, or Egypt, for whom deglobalization would mean nothing less than the "de-Westernization" of the international system.[16]

The historically recent character of the concept of deglobalization has not prevented some researchers from finding ancient manifestations, just as variable as the dimensions of globalization themselves.[17] One can think of the erection of walls designed to curb migratory flows during Roman Antiquity, the breakdown of communication between the press agencies operating after the First World War,[18] or even more radically to the construction of "socialism in one country" led by the USSR under Stalin as the supreme bulwark to a sprawling world capitalism. However, we must be cautious of the image of

successive passages of a phase of globalization to a phase of deglobalization that would characterize history, an image that could falsely lead us to believe that the period of slowdowns of interstate flows following the crisis of 2008 would bear similarities with the economic downturn of the interwar period. Analyses that go beyond the Euro-Atlantic institutional trajectory conclude that integration processes have historically been multicentered, that globalization has not been a phenomenon limited to the West.[19] We may indeed identify cycles of intensification of trade followed by periods of slowdown that coincide with economic crises, but it must be emphasized that these processes are not global, but geographically circumscribed.

Some authors have spoken of a deglobalization that would be synonymous with protectionism and state interventions in the economic sphere.[20] But again, we must be cautious before seeing such trends as an antithetical phenomenon to globalization. Sebastian Garmann's illuminating analysis of the links between globalization and protectionism shows that in some areas—in this case the agricultural sector—the first directly leads to the second. His study which covers seventy-seven countries between 1991 and 2010 illustrates that for each point of increase in the KOF index on interstate flows, there is also an increase in subsidies granted and tariff and/or nontariff barriers. It demonstrates how the adoption of protectionist measures can be seen as a by-product of an increasingly large insertion in the global economy.[21]

Today's globalization means more than international interdependence; it is a global process that unfolds through multiple systemic dynamics that affect the relations between the many actors of globalization, a process that determines new power relationships.[22] The latter are deployed in value chains that cross an increasing number of borders. In the absence of a self-destructive conflict or a generalized environmental cataclysm, it is hard to imagine how this process could be reversed. In this sense, let's put it bluntly, deglobalization is a fantasy. But so would globalization if we consider it as the culmination of a process of global integration that would make nations disappear and the hierarchy of national systems. Current globalization does not challenge nations and the power of states; it forces them to respond, change, and cope with competitive and cooperative processes that are inherent in the logic of advanced capitalism. National spaces have to fit into the networks in a competitive way.

This dialectic between globalization and deglobalization is observed just as much in terms of the ever-increasing circulation of information and ideas that they convey. The intensification of flows has always raised fears, resistance, and often the erection of physical barriers, especially in authoritarian states, which derive their legitimacy from a particular ideology. For seven consecutive years, Freedom House's annual study has seen an increase in state control

measures that limit free access to the Internet.[23] North Korea or Myanmar, which limits access to the vast majority of the population by prohibitive tariffs, could be mentioned here as examples. There are also important barriers in China, Iran, and Russia, where social media must submit to state control. Those who refuse to comply with censorship requirements or provide access to metadata for national security purposes are blocked. Even in Western countries committed to the freedom of the press, the free flow of ideas on the Net is called into question. This is no longer only a matter of banning racial hatred and calls for jihad. It is framed as necessary for the defense of democracy against harmful use that some States could make of the media in the pursuit of their own foreign policy objectives.

In the digital age, the issue of big-data collection becomes a global governance issue that confronts governments and international organizations. Faced with the growing market power of transnational corporations like Google, Apple, or Microsoft, whose business models now focus on the analysis of massive information collected on the Internet, public powers remain effectively unresponsive to new problems that challenge the contours of state intervention and forms of international cooperation. The EU has indeed taken steps to protect privacy and taxation, but much remains to be done to create frameworks for a globalization that fuels the flow of e-commerce data.

Whatever the measurable effects associated with each of these manifestations of forces opposed to the unregulated intensification of cross-border flows, it cannot be ignored that these have influenced the identity constructions of societies and the quality of the relationships they maintain with each other. It has been pointed out, not without reason, that national-state social formations have been weakened by globalization, subject to increasing asymmetry vis-à-vis multinational firms.[24] At the same time, some have pointed out that the nation-state itself is historically a by-product of globalization, at least to the extent that it is a standardized legal-political category which has progressively imposed itself on all human societies, so that becoming a subject of public international law makes it possible to take part in shaping the rules of global governance that are increasingly subject to multistakeholder processes.[25] We are faced with a paradox: on the one hand, globalization can stimulate the emergence of panregional or global and even cosmopolitan social identifications, but on the other hand, it increases the desire to protect diversity and to preserve threatened identities.[26]

It is not clear that, despite technological innovations, states are better equipped than ever before to fight against forms of cultural or informational "contamination." In the years 1960–1970, despite a policy of censorship, Soviet power had to capitulate to the spread of Anglo-Saxon rock on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Today, in the digital age, the United States itself

appears to be incapable of stopping the flows, in particular by preventing the dissemination of information allowing the whole planet to know about the functioning of their intelligence services, as demonstrated by Edward Snowden's revelations in 2013 on the secret activities of the US National Security Agency.

While state barriers to information flows cannot reverse globalization, they remain, like protectionist measures, likely to influence the construction of national identities. At the national level, they fuel the division between supporters and opponents of the free flow of goods, services, and ideas from either abroad or from a particular allegedly bad-intended state. At the international level, by presupposing that truth lies on one side and false propaganda on the other, these barriers generate antithetical representational orders whose effects are significant for the interstate system and the future of political globalization.

THE OBSERVED FACTS: DIVERSE SPATIOTEMPORAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE GLOBAL INTERCONNECTIONS PROCESS

Mass immigration into the Euro-Atlantic space has generated national identity insecurities, giving impetus to populist parties. More recently, ultra-publicized religious terrorism has accentuated the phenomenon and given these insecurities a particularly hostile configuration with regard to Islam. Europe is taking extreme measures to limit the number of illegal immigrants infiltrating the Schengen area. An impression is emerging that a border closure movement is under way. The outburst of "xenophobic deglobalization" movements in Western countries traditionally most open to multiculturalism is not a global trend.[27] Worldwide, the number of migrants has continued to increase in recent years to reach 258 million in 2017, up from 2010 (220 million) and 2000 (173 million).[28] Asia absorbs the largest volume (80 million), compared with 77 million in Europe and 58 million in the United States.[29] Regardless of the variations in the number of refugees admitted to Europe and the United States, the flow of well-off or highly skilled migrants continues to be a major contributor to advanced economies—and a damaging drain on developing economies.[30]

Despite the proliferation of trade agreements and efforts to boost the interconnections between regional economic areas, there is a certain slowdown in economic globalization. The annual growth rates of imports and exports from 2008 to 2017 have fallen by half compared to the previous decade

(1998–2007).[31] The WTO points to a shift in global demand to explain this slower pace of growth rate in trade flows. Many countries, such as China, are putting more emphasis on domestic consumption as a driver of their growth. Thus, the increase of trade flows would not exceed that of world GDP in the coming years. This does not mean, however, the decline of economic globalization, at least according to the WTO, which is still banking on trade growth in the coming years;[32] the slowdown of the last decade simply shows that the relationship between trade and production is changing.[33]

At the heart of this transformation is an overhaul of global value chains that tend to locate themselves geographically, on a regional basis. Richard Baldwin demonstrated how the modern economy relies on the ability to move goods quickly and at low cost.[34] In the context of the deployment of increasingly complex value chains, long-distance transport becomes problematic. Sebastian Mallay explains the desire to bring together production and consumption areas.[35] We could witness a new type of regionalization, which, while moving away from the identity and normative model developed in the European area, would strengthen the interconnection between the members on the basis of geographical proximity.[36] Over the past ten years, the overall situation in international direct investment has also shown significant fluctuations. The period following the 2007 crisis was marked by a slowdown in flows, hence the announcement by some of a beginning of deglobalization. But we must avoid hasty conclusions here; the global volume of foreign direct investment returned in 2011 to the precrisis level. In 2015, investments even grew by 38 percent to more than 1.77 trillion USD.

The driver of this growth is mainly in developed countries and can be largely explained by the increase in mergers and acquisitions. UNCTAD rightly emphasizes the weakness of productive investment. The growth of these flows is not evenly distributed between the economic regions. In contrast to developed countries, foreign investment flows to developing countries have generally declined in recent years. The countries of South and East Asia (first and foremost China) are still making good progress, but Africa and South America are down sharply. From 2014 to 2016, investments dropped from $71 to $59 billion in Africa, and from $170 to $142 billion in South America. Last year, these two large regions, which together make up more than a quarter of the world's population, accounted for only 11.5 percent of global investment.

The recent decline may look like a cyclical trend resulting from the low commodity prices. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of the difficulties that these regions are experiencing in sustainably integrating into large global value chains. The digital shift in the world economy, which is a central variable in the transformation of globalization and on which UNCTAD devotes a

chapter in its last report,[37] could deepen the technological divide and further marginalize these regions.

At the time of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and during the subsequent decade when we dreamed of a free trade area in the Americas, many believed that regional integration would stimulate the growth of developing economies and reduce the gap with developed countries.[38] It was the same reasoning used to justify the integration of the former communist countries into the European Union, which was promised a gradual catching-up of differences in standards of living. However, it is clear that the results have not lived up to expectations. The intensification of trade and financial flows has not changed the asymmetry of relations between North and South in the Americas, nor between West and East in Europe, but rather increased inequalities within these states.[39] At the socioeconomic level, the main risk of social gap remains, again and again, the opposition between the center and the periphery of the world economy.

States with the highest concentrations of rural populations are lagging behind and seem increasingly unable to overcome this situation. These countries will probably remain the source of a migratory flow toward prosperous economies, a flow that will continue to feed the identity insecurities of host communities. This is an important dimension of the motivations that led the British to vote for Brexit and to seek a new link with the European Union, inspired by the Norwegian experience. Noah Toly rightfully underlined that the results of the referendum in Britain and the US presidential election show that a fracture is emerging between large urban centers, global cities, and peripheral regions that surround them. If the former are in favor of a more open economy and greater global interconnection, the latter would be in favor of closing the borders and returning to protectionism. These global cities would be at the heart of the current debate between globalization and deglobalization and would play a key role in shaping a new world order.[40]

THE SPECTER OF A NORMATIVE SCHISM

In the aftermath of the Cold War, it seemed clear that the processes of integration and globalization would be the result of a better interconnection between liberal democracies, and that the rules of governance in this space would reflect its core values. What was feared, then, was the risk of competition between the major planetary economic poles formed by North America, Europe, and Asia. Since the strategic objective of intensifying regional trade flows was to improve the competitive advantage of members vis-à-vis nonmember states, there was certainly a risk that competing integration processes

would emerge. It was rightly said that the challenge would be to tie financial and commercial rules to prevent the development of a competitive zero-sum contest between the major regions. It was necessary to avoid a resumption of trade hostilities, like the one between Japan and the United States in the 1980s[41] and the transatlantic rivalries between the United States and Europe in the 1970s.

However, we neglected to consider the worst: to face a new vector of competitive integration that will become the engine of global growth, multinationals whose organizational principle reverses the nature of the relationship between politics and economics. Drahos is right to distinguish market globalization from corporate globalization, and to outline another process: the globalization of regulation that interacts with both market and corporate globalization.[42] The risks of competition between regions of the world are then exacerbated by the risks of division resulting from competition between economic systems and political systems. Transnational economic structures and networks deployed by multinational, or even global, companies reverse the relations of authority with national political entities. This situation revives in a good way the rivalry between national or regional spaces that seek to pull themselves together while having lost important levers of economic regulation.

As far as the globalization of regulation is concerned, there is a terrain that favors more and more companies or that places them at the center of new regulatory schemes, leaving states to take up norms and rules emanating from the private sector and of civil society. This is why the new processes of dialogue and deliberation referring to "multiple stakeholders" take on new importance. But there is also another component of the fracturing of the global space. Indeed, some emerging countries have understood the importance of defining and regulating new trade routes that take their interests into account. With the great return of China, and secondarily that of Russia, the globalized space must deal with actors who wish to retain a much greater margin of maneuver in the governance of the economy. Their strategy is to maintain political control over a wide range of state-owned enterprises, particularly in strategic sectors. These are necessary levers to influence prices, wages, and especially the conditions of access to credit.[43]

This strategy complicates more and more China's relations with Washington, which has repeatedly denounced Beijing's control over exchange rates. In the case of Russia, whether it is the expropriation of owners of hydrocarbon deposits of the Yukos Company, the huge fines for environmental crimes imposed on Shell, or the manipulation of energy tariffs in neighboring states by Gazprom, political intervention in the economy complicates relations with Western governments. Uncomfortable with the lack of guarantees of state

measures, the issue of human rights has necessarily been raised in the international courts. The latest national security policy adopted by Washington in January 2018 did not skimp on terms, explicitly calling China and Russia "revisionists" and "defiant of American power."[44]

The development of transatlantic and transpacific partnerships desired by the United States under the Obama administration was certainly aimed at harmonizing regulatory frameworks with European and Asian allies, promising to pacify a megazone of intercontinental trade over the long term. But it was just as much a strategy to put pressure on China and Russia, facing them with the reality of an economic space capable of dictating the rules of the game. At least that is how Beijing and Moscow saw it. While China has been restrained in its criticism of the configuration of the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic partnership projects, Russia has not shied away from denouncing its noninclusive nature. In the fall of 2015, President Putin denounced a WTO circumvention strategy that threatened to disintegrate the world economy in front of the General Assembly of United Nations-Unions: "It seems that we are about to be faced with an accomplished fact that the rules of the game have been changed in favor of a narrow group of the privileged, with the WTO having no say. This could unbalance the trade system completely and disintegrate the global economic space."[45]

This strong position was expressed at a time when the international crisis in Ukraine was creating an unstable legal environment for economic sanctions and countersanctions. Clearly, the relationship between the G7 countries and Russia (which was therefore excluded) has been severely affected by the freezing of assets owned by individuals and public and private companies, the limitations on investment in the energy and defense sectors, as well as embargoes on agricultural products. Considering that Russia accounts for less than 4 percent of the global economy, one might be tempted to see it as a peripheral problem scarcely more serious than that posed by the Iranian nuclear program and the international sanctions that followed. However, in a geopolitically tense context, the size of Russia's nuclear arsenal should be enough to remind those who still see things under the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian state had completely collapsed. The scale and the major impact of its military intervention in Syria shows that Moscow is capable of regaining a place at the negotiating table. Nobody can ignore this anymore.

The construction of a strategic partnership with China, materialized by the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2000, gives Russian power a new meaning. It is a multilateral framework where neighboring regional powers of Central Asia collaborate to push the rules of a game based on the principle of state sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.

The emerging scenario is no longer that of an interregional rivalry within a homogeneous system, to use Raymond Aron's concepts,[46] but rather of a negotiation of power relations within a quasi-heterogeneous system, with states claiming contradictory values.[47]

There is no longer any ideological cleavage between communism and capitalism, but there is something left in terms of the relationship between the state on the one hand and the economy and society on the other. Russia, for instance, is clearly opposed to American exceptionalism, whose self-proclaimed mission is to support a model of universal electoral democracy,[48] a model that gives large corporations considerable influence over governments. Moscow no longer rejects private property and the market economy, but leaders in the Kremlin are still worried about the erosion of state institutions to the benefit of firms, which they say are pulling more than ever the strings of electoral democracies in the United States. Above all, they reject the normative asymmetry that stems from a "Western conception of democracy," which suggests that their system of authoritarian governance should be condemned and reformed.[49]

The emergence of a confrontation between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces that Zbigniew Brzezinsky had been discussing in the 1990s was a distant risk against which the United States and its allies had to protect themselves, while trying to maintain the levers of influence in the great Eurasia. Twenty years later, this task seems herculean, if not impossible. Considering American failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and more recently in Syria, some believe, both in Beijing and Moscow, that it is time to rebuild a posthegemonic order. The vacuum left by the relative decline of the weight of the US economy is synonymous with uncertainties,[50] but it is from their point of view a fertile soil for the reconstruction of a multipolar globalization 2.0.

Needless to say, this critical view of US-centric globalization is far from unanimous, nor is the underlying thesis of an American decline. There are still many proponents of a perennial globalization under American dominance in the twenty-first century.[51] If the WTO figures show a decline in the North American continent's place in world trade, the latest available data from UNCTAD on foreign direct investments (FDI) will go in the opposite direction. The United States remains the country that both invests the most and receives the most FDI. Deglobalization, understood as a decrease in the interdependence and economic integration of the United States, remains at this stage a hypothesis. It is an important subject for future inquiries, but is not yet backed by empirical evidence.[52]

Nevertheless, the challenge of the United States's central place in international financial flows is real and has intensified over the past five years. One of the important manifestations of this is the increased coordination that has

developed between emerging economies grouped under the BRICS acronym. The forum founded in the wake of the US subprime crisis of 2007–2008 has not eliminated internal divisions and differences of opinion among members on a wide range of topics.[53] Yet, it is a significant step in formulating a call for global governance that takes into account the rebalancing of the economic (and military) forces that is currently taking place. The challenge to the US financial hegemony was affirmed more concretely in 2016 by the setting up of two major new international banks, the new BRICS development bank and the Asian Investment Bank for Infrastructure (AIIB). Together, they are expected to manage $200 billion in capital, which equates to more than two-thirds of the World Bank's capitalization. Conditions attached to loans are flexible in terms of worker protection, human rights, and environmental precautions. This is a way to prevent emerging economies from being penalized for the benefit of developed economies under such pretexts. It is this same logic that pushes China to support the Global Regional Free Trade Partnership (RCEP) initiated by ASEAN, a free trade agreement much less restrictive than that provided by the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TTP).[54]

These initiatives, which promise an increased circulation of flows in Asia, do not fit well with the hypothesis that deglobalization has already begun. It is probably more accurate to talk about a "reglobalization" process, a term recently used by an ex-deputy minister at the Chinese Ministry of International Affairs.[55] However, the competition between different normative spaces in the sphere of environment, labor law, human rights, and, more broadly, the relationship between politics and economics poses a colossal challenge to the stability of the relation between China and the United States. It is doubtful that the leading military power will be willing to be "reglobalized" under Chinese conditions.[56]

That said, it cannot be presumed either that the attachment to democratic and liberal values is an obstacle to greater fluidity between large rival normative spaces. The participation of Australia and Japan in the RCEP shows that liberal democracies can consider ambitious trade agreements with states where the issue of human rights is problematic. Faced with the prospect of being excluded from potentially lucrative investment projects funded by the AIIB, several allies of the United States, including Britain, have agreed to participate, demonstrating once again the flexibility that can be shown by the major financial players.

Despite the intensification of what has been called a "hybrid guerrilla war"[57] between Russia and the United States, the economic boundaries between the two camps will likely remain porous and fluid. The ongoing digital revolution continues to facilitate trade by increasing the channels of trade. While nation-states can undertake to censor the media and continue escalat-

ing sanctions to test their balance of power in order to establish new rules of the game, they remain limited in their ability to prevent their companies and citizens from trade. At the time of global real-time interconnection, everyone understands that it would be a long-term suicidal development strategy.

LIMITED NATIONAL-STATE RETREAT?

It is therefore not for the intensification of financial and commercial flows, but more specifically for the future of political globalization that the Brexit and especially the election of Donald Trump are particularly significant. These phenomena could change the situation by announcing a new era of national withdrawals from the globalization process. If they were to be the starting point of a strong trend, the British disengagement from Europe and the White House's mercantilist-oriented protectionist rhetoric would threaten, in the long run, to generate new rivalries, and an increasingly unpredictable normative environment. Several experts suggest that these recent changes could undermine the international system put in place by Washington and supported by London since 1945.[58]

Critics from the IMF and the World Bank will argue that this evolution is the consequence of an insoluble trilemma between sovereignty, globalization, and democracy; antinomic values that cannot coexist.[59] The underlying hypothetico-deductive reasoning could hold out if it were to explain the case of less influential states that are subject to rules contrary to the aspirations of their population. One could thus conceive that opposition to the neoliberal order traditionally dominated by leftist groups could be taken over by a populist right movement that combines xenophobia and reappropriation of state sovereignty. Such a trend has been apparent for a long time in the "new Europe," especially in Poland and Hungary, where a conservative identity discourse is dominated by a frustration of the marginalized economic elites in the European space. On the other hand, no one had commented on the possibility that this trend might manifest itself in the heart of America and its closest European ally, Great Britain. In an extraordinary turn of events, the liberal or neoliberal globalization process is called into question by the very nations it was supposed to benefit most. This is an evolution that requires a rereading of things.

It is possible that this is only a more or less short-lived moment, reflecting an "antiestablishment" mood of those left out of globalization in the domestic economic backwaters of these powerful states. However, there are reasons to suspect another cause of these changes, a cause that would explain why a certain economic elite—which includes company shareholders such as

Exxon and Boeing—supports the new populist-protectionism that President Trump professes. This situation is characterized by the rise of a competitive economic pole that operates in a less restrictive normative environment in which global value chains are currently deployed. Some US big companies may want state intervention to adapt to China's growing role and new way of doing things.

Beijing's massive one trillion USD investment in infrastructure projects in sixty foreign countries is intended to consolidate its land and sea transport network, and accelerate the gradual reversal of the economic balance of power. In this "One Belt, One Road initiative," projects are negotiated piecemeal on a bilateral basis with the states concerned, in an opaque manner. Seeking to defend its positions before such a competitor, everything works as if the United States wanted to give itself free rein by withdrawing from trade agreements that include commitments to transparency or nondiscrimination in public contracting procedures. The potential for normative confrontation between the United States and the China-Russia duo remains the same, but the strategy is different. In an increasingly tense global context, a context where the rules of the game are being renegotiated more and more fiercely—from Ukraine to Syria, from Iran to North Korea—the United States wants more flexibility. They no longer wish to get bogged down in complex multilateral commitments to make common cause with weaker partners, who in addition are not especially loyal, especially when it comes to limiting the expansion of the AIIB or to contain the growing influence of Russia in the European energy sector. This is perhaps the common spirit of Brexit and the slogan "America First," some traces of which were already present at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As soon as the consensus around US leadership reaches a breaking point, multilateralism ceases to be seen as a useful tool in Washington.

For now, the most immediate consequences of the new American and British policies are mainly located in the regional, North American, and European theaters, whose commercial regimes are the most legally binding. In North America, there has been considerable tension over the negotiation of NAFTA, which is under constant threat of US withdrawal. The introduction of new tariff barriers in sensitive areas like the lumber industry or aeronautics puts pressure on long-term trade partners. Relations are also strained in Europe around the terms of the divorce initiated by Britain, which Germany and France do not want accomplished without pain, for fear that others would be tempted to follow the same path of exit. Nothing is played out yet, but the future of regional integration currently seems actually gloomy.

For a middle power like Canada, which hoped to join forces with the United States and the European Union to implement more socially responsible trade

agreements with Asia, this is certainly a worrying development. With the announcement of Washington's withdrawal from the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic partnership agreements, the plan for a deep interconnection between North America, Europe, and Asia has been postponed until an unknown and likely distant future. Ottawa can boast of its Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the EU, a true "bridge over the Atlantic."[60] Canada may even be pleased with the recent signing of an agreement in principle to save what could still be the former TTP, kept alive under the impetus of Japan. But in either case, these agreements will not be a great help in the face of the threat of unilateral measures imposed by Washington, which seems to want to take advantage of a very strong economic asymmetry to renegotiate more favorable arrangements.

In the context of tensions with North Korea, Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia now doubt the United States's willingness to guarantee peace in the region. Faced with the resurgence of Russia, Europeans feel a similar anxiety. By questioning NATO's relevance, the message of Washington to the Europeans has been clear that they will now have to bear the cost of their own security. "The time we could totally count on one another is over," said Chancellor Angela Merkel after the NATO summit in Brussels.[61] Whether it is the withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, the pressure to revise the nuclear agreement with Iran, the recognition of the status of the capital in Jerusalem, Washington expresses a desire to act in a nontransparent manner, with a vision of the world that does not correspond collectively to a brutal arena in which states and companies are fighting fiercely for comparative advantages.[62] Whereas this does not mark the beginning of a great deglobalization, it certainly signals the end of a happy globalization. It continues at various speeds on a per capita basis, with important exclusion zones in Africa and Latin America, which become the grounds for a mercantile rivalry between hegemonic powers and counterpowers.

In all cases, we are far removed from the alterglobalist aspirations of Seattle, where the return of the nation-state promised a democratic reappropriation of global governance issues. The decline of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization, and major regional integration agreements such as the EU and NAFTA is not to the benefit of social groups. For now, the return of the nation-state is a phenomenon limited to the Great Powers that are preparing to survive in an increasingly Hobbesian anarchy, in a world culture that gives back to the military the power of influence it has not enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. There is no sign that this will translate into better democratic control over the behavior of large multinational firms.

For smaller players, being left behind is not a viable option. To ensure their security and promote their socioeconomic values and interests to the Great

Powers, they will need to join forces and solidify the mechanisms of multilateral governance. For this reason, despite all its imperfections, the European Union will probably continue to be a crucial institution for member countries, at least those whose commercial and financial policies are aligned with those of Germany. For Canada, given the level of continental economic integration and its heavy reliance on the US market, the challenge is more complex. Medium powers must diversify their exports by stimulating trade with major emerging economies like China and India, but how could it do it alone without abandoning the idea of including strong social clauses in future agreements? As things stand, the ongoing negotiations with Beijing and New Delhi are unlikely to meet the objectives announced by the Canadian government.

CONCLUSION

Walden Bello puts forward the idea of combining the deconstruction of the current economic system with the reconstruction of a new one. To deglobalize the system dominated by the neoliberal paradigm, the objectives of economic development must be reconsidered, and states must be empowered to tame the forces of the market.[63] Sapir puts forward a similar argument, which calls for a return of state interventionism to a preponderant role, notably in terms of capital control and of the states' financial autonomy. As Harold James points out, in the postwar international order: "Economic and political issues have been separated, making them more difficult, if not impossible, to solve." This is perhaps the whole problem of the regulation of globalization. With the current opposing views on the links and interactions between these issues, we are still far from a consensus that can ensure the path of reglobalization and especially far from being able to reorganize collective action while taking into account an improved analysis of the changes in the world.[64] To intervene and act on the world stage, one must first have data that provide the basis for an analysis of contemporary issues.

The globalization/deglobalization dialectic transforms the world in a new direction whose outcome is not predetermined. We are witnessing the end of the postwar order based on liberal institutionalism and the economic supremacy of the West, and this signals an unstable and dangerous transition era.[65] There is no certainty that the United States will be able to count on Europe to contain the expansion of the Greater Eurasia, especially in the developing economies of Africa and Latin America. As long as the power balances will not stabilize, it will be difficult to overcome the challenges of global regulation, and the risk of growing tensions between the major powers will remain unresolved.

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Chapter Eleven

Internally Displaced Persons

Norm Emergence and Strain in a Disordered World

David Andersen-Rodgers

The shocks of the new world disorder have created multiple ongoing crises for civilian populations. One group of particular concern are internally displaced persons (IDPs).[1] The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDPs as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border."[2] According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there were forty million people internally displaced due to armed conflict at the end of 2017.[3] Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Congo (DRC), Iraq, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Philippines, and Central African Republic, among others, have generated large numbers of IDPs. The magnitude and variety of those experiencing internal displacement presents a tremendous challenge for countries trying to end and recover from civil war.

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of how global norms around IDPs emerged and then evaluates the prospects for applying these norms in a fractured world with weakening global institutions. To do so, it first examines the scope of the problem, including the dynamics by which displacement occurs. Second, it discusses the international instruments that create the framework by which peacebuilding activities around IDP issues are prioritized and implemented. Third, the chapter examines the challenges of integrating IDPs into postconflict peacebuilding activities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the gaps that exist between norms and practice. While displacement also occurs due to natural disasters, economic projects, and the effects

of climate change, the focus of this chapter is primarily on displacement caused by conflict. Even so, many of the mechanisms of IDP protection, justice, and compensation discussed here apply to these other displacement situations as well.

THE SCOPE AND DYNAMICS OF DISPLACEMENT

Displacement creates large populations that have experienced the physical, emotional, and psychological effects of loss. IDPs face numerous challenges to their physical security, as well as difficulties accessing education, employment, sanitation, and health care.[4] Furthermore, scholarship in public health has found a strong link between displacement and mental health issues, including posttraumatic stress disorder.[5] Displacement also disproportionately affects women, children, and other vulnerable groups and puts them at greater risk to be victims of sexual violence.[6] A joint World Bank and UNHCR study of three urban areas in Afghanistan found that IDPs have higher levels of deprivation and were more likely to be unemployed; to lack access to housing, electricity and sanitation; and to suffer from food insecurity than nondisplaced urban poor living in the same area.[7]

IDP issues have also been linked to more traditional security concerns, often described as the "refugee warrior" problem, in which the displaced populations become a fertile breeding ground for recruitment into violent groups.[8] For example, a study by Choi and Piazza found that the presence of a large IDP population correlated positively with suicide attacks.[9] Although Choi and Piazza's study does not provide a convincing causal link, they contend that their finding could be due to a higher pool of individuals who, because of their displacement, are vulnerable to recruitment into extremist groups. Furthermore, Muggah argues that IDPs can be both victims and agents in a conflict, assisting combatants both directly and indirectly.[10] In a large empirical study, Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug find that in areas with large IDP populations there is a greater risk of ethnic conflict.[11] That said, these possible security concerns associated with displacement should not be used to justify the greater security threat that displaced populations face on a day-to-day basis.

Although displacement is a phenomenon that has always accompanied armed conflict, internal displacement as a term has relatively recent origins. Its common usage did not emerge until the 1980s with the crises in Central America, Angola, and Sudan, among other locations. The scope of the issue was not fully assessed until 1982, when it was estimated by the Commission on Human Rights that there were 1.2 million IDPs in a total of eleven countries.[12] Following the end of the Cold War, the number of IDPs began to quickly outpace the number of refugees in the world (figure 11.1). Fur-



Figure 11.1. Total Number of IDPs (in millions) and Total Number of Refugees (in millions), 1989–2014

thermore, the ratio between the number of IDPs as compared to the number of refugees has shifted dramatically. In 1989 there was an equal distribution between the number of refugees and IDPs, whereas in 2014 there were nearly twice as many IDPs to refugees.[13]

Two common explanations have been given for why this shift has occurred. First, the policies of potential refugee-receiving states have changed to be less hospitable toward people seeking asylum. In an effort to release themselves from their legal obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers, there has been an ongoing effort by states, particularly in the West, to limit the flow of refugees into their territory.[14] This has forced more displaced persons to remain within their state of origin's borders. Second, the dynamics of the communal and sectarian conflicts that have dominated the post–Cold War system are more prone to policies of deliberate forced displacement of large ethnonationalist populations, as was seen in the ethnic cleansing that took place in the former Yugoslavia and in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria.[15]

Reasons for displacement are not uniform. The "choice" to move (or not move) is often strategic to the context and intensity of the violence.[16] Forced mass civilian displacement is a common strategy when a violent actor cannot identify its armed opponent within a population, resulting in policies of collective punishment.[17] Furthermore, the likelihood that people become IDPs rather than refugees is largely predicted by the targeting strategies of the state. When state violence is high, there will be a higher proportion of refugees to IDPs; while civil wars with lower levels of state violence will produce more IDPs.[18]

Not everyone, when faced with direct or potential violence, will choose to abandon their homes or communities. Violence and threat of violence are important predictors of flight, but other factors such as wealth, economic opportunity, and social networks also affect displacement decisions. Those with larger social networks are less likely to be displaced, while those who face economic vulnerability are more likely.[19] Unsurprisingly, displaced persons first seek safety, food and shelter, and then proceed to rebuild their social networks. However, the awareness that displacement may again occur in the future leads vulnerable populations to be perpetually prepared for displacement. This preparation includes storing supplies that can be taken with them, planning safe passages to their destinations, and creating information networks. In addition, extended social networks, specifically the family, are particularly important in mitigating the effects of displacement.[20]

One should not oversimplify the needs, motivations, and interests of a large, diverse, and complex population. Turton, for example, identifies four ways that the designation of IDP creates potentially undesirable consequences. First, the label could have a homogenizing effect on what is a socially, economically, and demographically diverse population. Second, it can stigmatize IDPs as people who do not belong in the place they are within the borders of their own country. Third, it has a localizing effect that perpetuates a simplistic understanding of the meaning of "home." People move for any number of reasons, and home is not a static concept. Fourth, it can privilege those who are given the label of IDP over other potentially more vulnerable populations that are not designated as such.[21] This, too, can have a stigmatizing effect on the IDPs themselves. Following the 2007 postelection violence in Kenya, for instance, kinsmen who did not flee their homes criticized those that did for "having 'abandoned' their community and for having 'suffered less.'"[22]

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND FRAMEWORK

One of the key problems in both the academic study of internal displacement and advocacy efforts aimed at creating a global normative framework on IDPs is the definitional distinction between IDPs and refugees. Much of the literature on forced displacement conflates the two groups.[23] Definitionally, however, IDPs are distinct from refugees, who are displaced persons that cross an international border. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol only provide a legal definition for what constitutes a refugee and codifies a set of protections afforded to them under international law. Because the purpose of the Refugee Convention was to designate how

receiver states treat their refugee populations and does not address the obligations of the refugee-generating state, forcibly displaced persons that do not cross an international border fell out of the purview of the Convention.[24] This emphasis on the obligation of receiver countries in the Refugee Convention resulted in many refugee advocates overlooking state-of-origin issues, which otherwise may have brought more attention to the plight of IDPs.[25] This oversight, it should be noted, is not unique to IDPs. Even in the case of humanitarian law more broadly, there has been a greater focus on protecting civilians from outside parties or occupying powers and less concern with how civilians are treated by their own state.[26] It should be noted that combining both refugees and IDPs into a broader category of forced displacement is not without controversy. Hathaway, for instance, argues that this conflation of refugees and IDPs has contributed to the undermining of refugee rights that are unique to their status of being outside their country of origin.[27]

The primary emphasis by international actors has been on creating a robust and effective IDP protection regime.[28] Protection constitutes "all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, namely human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law."[29] Following the end of the Cold War, challenges to pluralist sovereign norms, in which the internal affairs of the state are seen as solely the domain of that state's government, led to increased advocacy for what was deemed "sovereignty as responsibility." Under this interpretation, a sovereign state is considered responsible for protecting certain rights for its own citizens, and should be held to account when it is unable to do so.[30] A group of global advocates for IDPs—including a group of NGOs that included the Friends World Committee for Consultation, the Refugee Policy Group, and the World Council of Churches—used the language of sovereign responsibility to encourage the UN to develop an international framework for responding to these crises.[31] While these attempts to transform the meaning of sovereignty have been questioned by those that see it as a mechanism for further justification of Western intervention into the developing world, particularly as they relate to the forthcoming Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the framing was important for developing a set of norms around IDP protection.[32]

Prior to these efforts there was virtually no global framework for addressing IDP issues. The UNHCR, for example, was mandated with responding to refugees and faced several hurdles associated with state sovereignty when addressing issues of internal displacement. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for instance, had experience working with IDPs, but they often did not have access when the level of conflict was below the threshold of civil war—a period in which many become displaced.[33] To address this

gap, the United Nations began to take a series of steps to more clearly define what constitutes an IDP and to develop better mechanisms within its bureaucracy for responding to internal displacement. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Francis M. Deng as a special representative on internally displaced persons. Deng's work laid the groundwork for providing a clearer definition of what constitutes an internally displaced person and for establishing a set of options for responding to IDP crises.[34] In addition, the new position helped create an advocate for international action toward IDPs.[35]

These efforts resulted in a broad international framework of articulated norms for how states should address their IDP issues.[36] This has happened in two phases. The first phase created a clearer articulation of the rights of IDPs and the obligations of states toward them. Rather than pursuing a new treaty on IDPs, Deng's strategy was to use already existing international law to develop a set of legal norms governing IDP issues during all phases of displacement.[37] These were codified within two sets of guiding principles—the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property for Refugees and Displaced Persons.[38]

The set of norms articulated in both the Guiding Principles and the Pinheiro Principles have received broad acceptance. Quickly following their adoption, the Guiding Principles were frequently cited and applied by governments, NGOs, international organizations, and regional bodies.[39] For example, Colombia's Constitutional Court cited the Guiding Principles when drafting the Victim's Law.[40] In December 2006 the eleven members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Regions—including Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—signed the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development, which committed them to adopt and implement the Guiding Principles on the national level.[41] These efforts eventually led to the signing of the African Union's 2009 Convention for the Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention), the only multilateral treaty overseeing IDP issues.[42] Additionally, Angola's Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons was explicitly based on the Guiding Principles.[43] Security Council resolutions now routinely mention displaced persons and their rights as articulated within the Guiding Principles.[44] Additionally, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure asserts that states should use the Pinheiro Principles as a framework for resolving conflicts to do with land, fishery, and forest issues.[45]

The second phase has attempted to integrate and coordinate the principles identified during the first phase into the work of UN institutions, regional organizations, NGOs, and state government agencies most likely to encounter IDP populations in their work. This effort has experienced numerous shortfalls. Different agencies would frequently confront IDP issues in the field;

however, no single UN agency was tasked with overseeing IDP concerns. This often led to disjointed and overlapping policy approaches, creating confusing divisions of labor between multiple NGOs, UN agencies, and local governments. Attempts to resolve these conflicts have resulted in several reconceptualizations and reorganizations within the UN system on IDP issues.[46] Currently, these efforts are coordinated through the Global Protection Cluster Working Group and involves various governmental and nongovernmental actors, including an increased role for the UNHCR.[47]

The broad acceptance of IDP rights in principle, however, has not always been achievable in practice. The fact that there are currently more people internally displaced than at any other time previously recorded gives clear indication that much of what is articulated within the Guiding Principles on the right to not be displaced in the first place (Principles 6, 7, and 8) has fallen short. In addition, the number of people who find themselves in protracted displacement, even when the violence that initially caused the displacement has long been resolved, also clearly indicates that postconflict attention to IDP issues has also been insufficient. These shortcomings are linked to the types of peacebuilding activities that take place after conflict. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, examines how IDP issues have been approached via common peacebuilding activities.

ADDRESSING IDP ISSUES POSTCONFLICT

The effort to develop best practices on IDP issues during and after conflict has been largely driven by a collaboration of NGOs, IGOs, and governments. The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, which formally ended in October 2015, generated an immense amount of research on how IDP issues should be addressed at both the international and the local levels. Additionally, the United Nations' Global Protection Cluster Group developed a handbook on IDP protection meant to serve as a comprehensive resource for all actors engaged with IDPs both during and after conflict.[48] In addition, many NGOs do peacebuilding work with IDPs both during and after conflict.[49] However, with few exceptions, independent scholarly evaluation of the overall effectiveness of these approaches has been lacking, mostly limited to single case studies.

How IDP issues are managed both during and after a conflict is partly contingent on the underlying reasons for the displacement and the experiences of IDPs following their displacement. In some cases, IDPs will be able to return home soon after the fighting has stopped with little need for assistance. In more severe cases of displacement, in which IDPs may have been displaced

for years, the displaced persons' homes have been occupied by others, or their property has been destroyed, there is greater need for well-coordinated responses. However, the quicker displacement issues are addressed, the more likely they are to succeed, as prolonging increases the odds that resolutions could create secondary displacements of people who occupied properties or land after the initial displacement took place.[50]

Another important concern is the question of who oversees displacement issues. The ability of international actors, including the UN, to adequately resolve local problems has come under increased scrutiny.[51] On the other hand, local authorities are often connected in some way to the violence that caused the displacement, which may bias their ability to arbitrate the complicated land disputes frequently associated with IDPs.[52] Thus, effective resolution requires the difficult combination of implementing international legal standards on the rights of the internally displaced through international, national, and local institutional mechanisms.

DURABLE SOLUTIONS

The first challenge is the immediate question of when displacement issues can be considered resolved. The standard by which solutions for displacement have been judged is whether they satisfy the requirements of a durable solution. According to the Interagency Standing Committee (ISAC) Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced persons, "A durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement."[53] There are three forms that a durable solution can take: a return to the location from which the IDP population was displaced, local integration into the communities they were displaced into, or settlement in another part of the country. One requirement for a durable solution is that it is a solution that is agreed upon by the displaced population with full knowledge of alternative options.[54] In addition, the solutions should be reached with the participation of the displaced community and be sustainable, in that the displaced person enjoys long-term security and freedom of movement; an adequate standard of living, including access to clean water, food, housing, health care, and education; access to employment; and an effective legal system and other mechanisms that either help restore land, property, and housing or provides adequate compensation.[55]

However, achieving durable solutions in practice is difficult.[56] By definition a durable solution requires a secure environment for safe return. This

does not just include physical security, but also legal protections, economic opportunities, and political access. Because IDPs likely fled a location due to insecurity, resolving those insecurities becomes an integral part of making each of the possible three outcomes available.[57] In a conflict in which one or more of the armed actors were deliberately displacing populations, this task becomes particularly difficult. For example, in a survey of Colombian IDPs conducted by the Commission to Monitor Public Policy on Forced Displacement, only 3 percent expressed an intention to return. This number may be a reflection of Colombian IDPs' pessimism that security would be adequately guaranteed if they were to return to their original communities.[58] The security of those environments, therefore, is predicated on the types of peacebuilding activities that take place and how they prioritize IDP rights.

Thus, even when an IDP has had his or her housing needs satisfied, inadequate attention to these broader societal issues in postconflict peacebuilding can leave that outcome short of what would be considered an ideal durable solution.[59] Lynch's examination of Kenya, for instance, shows that displaced persons that either returned to their original homes, integrated into their new communities, or relocated into new communities continued to face economic depravations and to still be in need of assistance. Furthermore, IDPs from the Kalenjin ethnic group perceived that aid was provided differently for Kikuyu IDPs, fueling additional grievances.[60]

PEACE PROCESSES

Peace processes often provide the initial articulation of how postconflict states will incorporate IDP issues into their peacebuilding activities. While it is rare that IDPs will be included in the negotiation itself, many comprehensive peace accords include provisions that either directly or indirectly address IDP issues.[61] The increased advocacy toward IDPs by international actors has resulted in greater attention to IDP issues in contemporary peace accords, including an emphasis on achieving durable solutions.[62]

IDP provisions within peace accords typically focus on six areas: (1) the right to restitution of property lost, (2) right of return guarantees, (3) political and social rights, (4) security guarantees, (5) the creation or tasking of domestic institutional processes to oversee IDP concerns, and (6) the role of the United Nations, particularly the UNHCR, in overseeing the implementation of these provisions.[63] There are a number of ways in which peace accords fall short when addressing IDP issues. First, there is often very little differentiation between IDPs and refugees. Because refugees are a familiar legal category, humanitarian actors often feel more comfortable working with refugee populations.[64] In

Cambodia, for example, aid workers at first prioritized refugees over IDPs when implementing resettlement provisions within the Paris Peace Accord, only later applying them toward IDPs. Second, there is often very little specificity concerning the mechanisms for return and little consideration given for alternative methods of restoration and compensation for lost property. In many agreements the language is exceptionally vague on how these processes will be achieved. A third consideration is the question concerning the cost of compliance and how IDP provisions will be funded. Rarely will a peace accord include such provisions. This can be particularly problematic when IDPs are promised monetary compensation for their loss with it being rare that any compensation matches the actual value of the loss.[65]

Discouragingly, including IDP provisions within peace accords does not always translate into successful resolution of that country's internal displacement. In fact, the accords whose language most closely matched the requirements of a durable solution have been the least likely to see IDP issues resolved. However, the involvement of the United Nations, as well as the creation of domestic laws related to IDPs outside of the peace process itself, did contribute to higher rates of success. Perhaps most tellingly, those countries that fully implemented their peace accord's IDP provisions saw their IDP issues resolved within five years of signing the accord.[66] This indicates that both political will and adequate resources can go a long way toward helping resolve a country's displacement crisis.

PROPERTY RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF RETURN, COMPENSATION, AND RESTORATION

The question of property rights and the rights of return for IDPs remains one of the more vexing roadblocks for achieving durable solutions. The international framework overseeing IDPs has adopted a rights-based approach that includes the principle that IDPs are entitled to receive restitution for property lost.[67] One advantage of a rights-based approach is that it puts the needs of the most vulnerable and weak actors outside of the bargaining mechanisms that accompany a peace process. However, there are practical questions to the extent to which these reparations can take. Juridical reparations represent full restitution to the victims, restoring them to the condition they were in prior to the violations taking place. The process for juridical reparations, however, is both resource and time consuming and faces practical limitations when applied to large numbers of people where human rights violations were the rule rather than the exception, particularly when the legal institutions of postconflict states are weak.[68] While the UNHCR has become increasingly involved

in helping support the mechanisms by which housing and property restitution issues get resolved, there are institutional limits on what can be achieved by an outside actor.[69] This has often resulted in long waiting periods for IDPs to see their cases judged, which further distances them from being able to achieve their desired durable solution.[70]

While a durable solution can include integration or resettlement, return is often considered the ideal outcome. That said, an overemphasis on rights of return can result in outcomes that undermine the ability to reach a durable solution. Many displacement patterns see people moved from rural to urban areas and, particularly during long displacements, effectively urbanized. For many, a return to a rural area is not sustainable as returnees often face discrimination and bleak economic conditions. As a result, they may find themselves once again uprooted back to a city for economic reasons where they become a part of the urban poor with few services or protections.[71] Even in cases where return is relatively successful, such as Timor-Leste, a number of other provisions that would presumably lead to a decreased risk of future displacements, such as land title reform, can be more difficult to achieve.[72]

Importantly, not all IDPs desire to return to their place of origin and instead prefer local integration in a new community or geographic space. Many civil wars last decades, and displaced persons may be two to three generations removed from their traditional homes. As Van der Auweraert observes, internally displaced populations are "as diverse in its opinions and views, including those about the specifics of reparations and transitional justice, as the wider population in the society."[73]

An additional stumbling block for adjudicating property restitution and rights of return is the designation of who constitutes an IDP. Except in the case of the African Union's Kampala Convention, IDPs lack an international legal definition that can be applied across IDP cases. Therefore, the courts have to determine whether the label should apply to those who were forcibly removed from their homes by one of the armed actors or whether it should also include those who were displaced by deteriorating economic conditions due to war or those that preemptively moved out of fear of future violence. Guatemala, for example, avoided resolving many IDP issues by simply classifying their IDP populations as economic migrants.[74] There is also a question of justice for those that chose to stay in their communities. Should persons who did not flee, but suffered losses due to the conflict, also be compensated? If restitution is based on the principle of what was lost should be restored, what fair and just compensation should exist for IDPs who were already desperately poor?[75] These questions have not been adequately answered and the practical problems associated with them has led to a call by many advocates

for a process that is not simply focused on issues of restoration, but which also create a more fair and just postdisplacement society.[76]

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations, particularly through the UNHCR, has provided many countries with formal help for resolving IDP issues. This assistance has often been couched within the auspices of multidimensional United Nations Peacekeeping missions. In its early conceptualization, peacekeeping did not include provisions for civilian protection within its mandates, but instead was designed as a buffer, generally in the form of lightly equipped neutral military units, between previously warring parties. The peacekeeping crises of the early 1990s, including the Rwandan genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica, led to increased calls for the inclusion of civilian protection within the mandates of UN field operations.[77] Beginning in 1999, with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Security council has regularly mandated that peacekeeping missions protect civilians.[78] This greater focus on civilian protection explicitly includes IDPs. UN Security Council resolutions calling for the protection of civilians, including Resolution 1264 which was the impetus of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, emphasize IDPs as a specific category of concern.[79]

IDPs are now featured in the mandates of most United Nations peacekeeping missions. These mandates go well beyond calls for humanitarian assistance or the physical protection of civilians, of which IDPs would be included, but now call for UN Peacekeeping forces to assist in helping displaced communities find durable solutions. The mandate for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), for example, places the protection of civilians, including "the voluntary safe, dignified and sustainable return to one's home or local integration or resettlement" of IDPs as its first priority.[80] In the case of Liberia, the presence of external security forces and other interveners were critical in its postconflict peacebuilding efforts.[81] Even in countries without a peacekeeping mission in place, the United Nations has helped work with governments and humanitarian NGOs to better address their IDP crises. In Iraq, for example, the United Nations Office on Project Services coordinates the Iraq IDP Information Center, which includes a toll-free number that helps IDPs learn how and where to access humanitarian aid.

However, the inclusion of IDP issues within peacekeeping mandates has not necessarily translated to successful or coherent policy. Durable solutions for IDPs require improved governance structures, including security sector

reform, the establishment of the rule of law, and an impartial judiciary. These go well beyond the capabilities of peacekeeping forces drawn primarily from military personnel. As stated previously, it has not always been clear which UN agencies oversee the different issues affecting IDPs. This has been addressed to some extent through the coordinating activities through the Global Protection Cluster Working Group. Nevertheless, there remain many gaps, and local capacity in many instances remains weak.

The main institutional vehicle by which the United Nations addresses IDP issues is through the UNHCR. However, the UNHCR's main mandate remains with the protection of refugees and, because of national sovereignty, is constrained in the amount of assistance it can give.

In fact, the expansion of UNHCR activities to include IDPs has been heavily criticized by those who believe it distracts from its core mission of protecting refugees.[82] The UNHCR's main role, therefore, has been to work with governments to oversee camp coordination and management for IDPs and advocating that domestic laws overseeing the management of IDPs meet the standards for durable solutions.[83]

International actors are limited in their capacities to address these issues and with recent cuts to the United Nations' budget there is little reason to believe that these capacities will expand in the near future. The United Nations is more suited for responding to immediate protection concerns and to offer assistance in the short term. When able to work directly with governments, it has been able to provide valuable assistance in overseeing the return and compensation process. However, it has less capacity to play a useful role in long-term protracted conflict. Thus, solutions that overly rely on UN interventions can fall short when displacement issues are more complex. Thus, IDP advocates have placed more attention on national and local capacity building, emphasizing every state's obligations to protect the rights of IDPs as articulated in the Guiding Principles.

ELECTIONS

Elections are often one of the first steps postconflict countries use to build legitimate and representative governing institutions. Because displacement is often accompanied with a loss of documents and permanent residency, participation in elections becomes another challenge facing IDPs.[84] The right of IDPs to have access to all the rights enjoyed by any other citizen of the state is strongly emphasized within principles 1 and 22 of the Guiding Principles.[85] Thus, creating the mechanisms by which IDPs can participate within the electoral process is a key concern of peacebuilding efforts.

There are a number of areas of concern when creating postconflict electoral systems. These include voter registration and eligibility requirements, providing security during elections, the organization of absentee ballots, and determining whether displaced voters' votes should be in the area they were displaced from or displaced to, voter education, and election monitoring.[86] However, these efforts often fall short. A study by Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta used these indicators to evaluate how elections in Ukraine, which experienced large displacements after Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and fighting broke out in its eastern provinces, stood up to global standards on IDP participation in elections. They found that Ukraine belatedly introduced a unified system for registering IDPs. However, after IDPs' voting rights were adopted into national law in October 2014, little was done by Ukrainian authorities to enfranchise IDPs.[87]

Displacement is sometimes driven by electoral motivations—the mass movement of people out of a district improves the electoral chances of the nondisplaced group. When armed actors can identify local political preferences, they have an incentive to displace populations that would vote against them prior to any upcoming election.[88] In Kenya, for example, some politicians encouraged violence to displace voters in a way that favored them electorally.[89] Thus, an IDP may want to retain his or her rights within that district, even if not living there. However, maintaining voting rights in the community they were displaced from prevents them from being represented in the region they were displaced to, which might be more immediately important to an IDP. Under such circumstances, electoral reforms could be problematic for reaching a just solution if those reforms perpetuate the weakening of the displaced population's voting rights. How these questions are resolved could have implications for the types of durable solutions available to IDPs. Thus, elections and voting rights are strongly connected to questions of postconflict justice.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND DDR

The issues surrounding IDPs during and after conflict are strongly connected to questions of transitional justice.[90] While the Guiding Principles and the Pinheiro Principles attempt to address questions of compensatory justice, there remain questions of whether other forms of justice, particularly retributive justice, should be applied as well. While displacing populations from their homes and communities is a clear violation of humanitarian law, there is little within the IDP protection regime that articulates what forms of retributive

justice, if any, should be applied against those who ordered and carried out the displacements.[91]

This problem is particularly manifest in security-sector reform and the role that security forces play in society following conflict. The security sector consists not just of the police, intelligence agencies, and armed forces, but also includes the justice and other governance sectors to which security forces report.[92] Because security forces are often made up of persons who were involved in the war and thus potentially linked to the displacement, it is often the case that IDPs remain mistrustful. This mistrust could be even further exacerbated if the security sectors' protection efforts during displacement were also seen as inadequate. IDPs will, therefore, weigh future security considerations when deciding which durable solution to pursue.

Thus, how a country carries out its postconflict demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of fighting forces has important ramifications for IDP decision-making. These processes are highly complex, with diverse populations who often have contradictory perceptions of the conflict. One obstacle, identified by Bradley, is that there are few to no mechanisms of accountability in place for states or other armed actors that are responsible for displacement.[93] DDR processes often afford blanket amnesties to low-level fighters who participated in displacement activities in the communities to which they are returning. Such amnesties, while seen as necessary for bringing about a resolution to a conflict, can appear unjust to those who were affected by the violence and then must live in their communities.[94] These feelings of injustice can be further exacerbated if DDR processes appear to reward the perpetrators of violence more than victims are compensated for their loss.

CONCLUSIONS: NORMS VERSUS PRACTICE

The world has become increasingly aware of the plight facing IDPs and the expected responsibility of states toward displaced populations. This emphasis on state responsibility was reiterated in Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's report preceding the World Humanitarian Summit, which took place in May 2016. In it he advocates for states to take on a broader set of responsibilities connected to humanitarian assistance, including the responsibility to "leave no one behind," and setting a goal to not only limit future displacements but to reduce the total number of internal displacement by half by 2030.[95] While the Summit ended with no formal commitment from states, the increased attention by leaders at the highest level to addressing IDP issues is encouraging.

Today a broad international framework of norms exists around a broad range of IDP issues. Nevertheless, it is less clear how successful that framework has been at adequately addressing internal displacement. That the world is currently experiencing the highest number of IDPs ever recorded indicates that the clearer articulation of these norms has not prevented armed actors from displacing populations. Nor is it obvious that these norms have facilitated a quicker solution for ongoing displacements. While, some IDPs are able to find durable solutions for their displacements, many more remain stuck in protracted displacement or forgotten. Even when durable solutions are found, many of those once displaced continue to suffer from the psychological, physical, and economical toll caused by their displacement.

The prospect of weakening global institutions and accompanying deterioration of international norms focused on durable solutions raises the prospect that many currently displaced persons are facing the prospects of protracted displacements, and with that the mental anguish as well as economic depravity that results from their displacement. Ultimately, however, IDP solutions are contingent on the state itself. States with the institutional and judicial structures in place to respond to both ongoing and potentially future displacements will be more capable of finding durable solutions. Of course, it is exactly during times of mass displacement that these institutions are most strained. The inherent difficulty of tasking weak state institutions to adhere to specific global standards will have to be reconciled if the world is to reach the UN's stated targets for IDP reduction.

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Chapter Twelve

New Environmentalisms

The Anthropocene and Other Climate Stories

Brett Buchanan

In 2013, nearly three kilometers beneath the Earth's surface, miners in a small northern Ontario city discovered the world's oldest water source at over two billion years old. The ancient water, which, until its discovery, had been sealed off from the Earth's atmosphere, and thus from further oxygenation, was detected flowing from rock that was being mined for copper, zinc, and silver. Though this discovery was certainly newsworthy, the next one was even more so: that this ancient water contained traces of what has been called "alien," unidentified microbial life that has sustained itself for two billion years on water, sulphur, and radioactive elements alone.[1] It is a remarkable story that is still unfolding in a part of northern Ontario that is dominated by one of the world's largest concentration of mines that serve global needs for aluminium, gold, platinum, and more. While it might not seem like it at first glance, this ancient, alien microbial life is just one small account in the remarkable overall picture of climate change. For the practices of mining, and its impact on local animal and plant species, regional and indigenous peoples, economics, health, and community, provide some insight into the consequences of global capital and the effects of the Anthropocene. Part of climate change may very well mean the resurrection of deep time and ancient life in the present, with untold repercussions.

It is often difficult to know where to begin when discussing climate change. In many ways it comes down to a question of framing: how can one frame an event or phenomenon that is so large as to be virtually boundless? Can any description adequately describe the events unfolding worldwide, over more than a century, and across all species and ecosystems? There are various ways that climate change has been described, each about as helpful and disappointing as the other: as a "hyperobject,"[2] as the "Anthropocene,"[3] as "Gaia,"[4] as "sublime,"[5] or simply the innocuous phrase "climate change" itself.

"Anthropocene" has undoubtedly become the most common and consistent term to highlight the reality that the Earth is being irrevocably altered, at a *geological* scale, by human technology (examples include the impact of the industrial revolution on the environment, the exponential growth of human population in the last two hundred years, the escalation of anthropogenic CO_2 in the atmosphere, creation of plastics, nuclear isotopes in the artic, and more). The Anthropocene has been coined, and not unproblematically, to nominally state that we have left the Holocene, and entered a thoroughly human-manipulated geological epoch.[6]

The trouble with each is that no one name or term adequately captures the multiheaded chimerical beast of climate change, and so every term is doomed to be somewhat meaningless as each fails to reflect the particular nuances of our respective human and other-than-human lives. It is also one of the reasons why climate skeptics and deniers have had traction within such discussions, for in the overwhelming assembly of data on climate—including research on permafrost, ocean tides, melting ice sheets, coral bleaching, species extinctions, solastalgia, droughts, wildfires, famines, and much more—it has been relatively easy, and frustratingly so, to introduce a little bit of doubt.

This failure to adequately frame climate change has recently been described by Amitav Ghosh as "the great derangement": that in our age of selfies and heightened self-awareness, we have created a mode of concealment around climate change.[7] As a crisis in culture, Ghosh suggests that the arts and literature, and Western culture more broadly, fail to address the realities of climate change in meaningful, relatable ways, and in doing so ethically disadvantage ourselves and our futures. While sci-fi, cli-fi, speculative fiction, magical realism, and others often carry strong climate narratives, and in many ways best anticipate and address our futures, they rob climate change of its pressing urgency in the here and now. As he states, we need "a new task: that of finding other ways in which to imagine the unthinkable beings and events of this era."[8] Ghosh's thesis is provocative, and it's not simply rhetorical: how well are we noticing and storying our worlds with the implications of climate change? This isn't simply a clarion call for novelists and artists; it's a reflection on our collective ability to frame climate change in meaningful and interesting ways, ways that deepen and enrich the relations we create, and increasingly lose, in these unpredictable times.

In this chapter I wish to present a couple of approaches to environmentalism that I believe do some of the work of imagining our responsibilities and obligations in the face of climate change, and that do so from rather different vantage points. First, I will describe the ecomodernist imagining of future environmentalism that proposes an explicitly anthropocentric vision of a thoroughly managed Anthropocene. Secondly, I will turn to some critiques of this

outlook, including movements in the environmental humanities that cultivate, in the words of Anna Tsing, "arts of living on a damaged planet," particularly the art of noticing how living beings resist, refuse, and haunt our attempts to manage them in this age of climate change.

DEATHS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

Climate change is being confronted on many fronts: scientifically, politically, economically, medically, aesthetically, ethically, and more. One of the areas that has emerged as a key battleground within climate change narratives is the future of conservation and, more broadly, the future of environmentalism itself. The argument is now familiar: that with the rise of the Anthropocene, and the reluctant acceptance that nowhere on Earth is no longer unaffected by human technology, then the previously held belief that nature is separate from human culture, and thus worth defending, has become untenable. This argument was popularized through books articulating the position that nature and wilderness is dead, and that we ourselves are the ones who killed it.[9] Evidence to support this position comes from the exponential rise of the human population, the similar rise of atmospheric carbon dioxide since the industrial revolution, in the existence of nuclear isotopes in polar ice caps, and the worldwide proliferation of plastic, concrete, and other human-made materials. Nature is dead, that is, *if* it ever existed as we conceived of it in the first place.[10]

Claims that nature is dead were soon met in kind by environmentalists who responded that if nature is dead then so too is environmentalism as we knew it. In an essay that has now become infamous for introducing a contentious new approach to environmentalism, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger propose that the question is not whether humans should or shouldn't control nature (a false question for them, for they suggest that human control is inevitable) but rather *how* we should control and manage nature.[11] Their thesis is simple: environmentalism is dead, at least as traditionally understood as a form of protecting nature through preservationist, hands-off means. The federal park-system approach of early environmental activism has succeeded to a degree (e.g., consider the early forms of nature preservation with Yellowstone National Park in the United States or Banff National Park in Canada), but with climate change, it is argued, the playing field is changing to the extent that maintaining the status quo is a losing affair.

Consider, for instance, this assessment by Peter Kareiva, the past Chief Scientist for The Nature Conservancy, one of the largest nature protection nongovernmental organizations:

> By its own measures, conservation is failing. Biodiversity on Earth continues its rapid decline. We continue to lose forests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There are so few wild tigers and apes that they will be lost forever if current trends continue. Simply put, we are losing many more special places and species than we're saving. Ironically, conservation is losing the war to protect nature despite winning one of its hardest fought battles – the fight to create parks, game preserves, and wilderness areas. Even as we are losing species and wild places at an accelerating rate, the worldwide number of protected areas has risen dramatically, from under 10,000 in 1950 to over 100,000 by 2009. Around the world, nations have set aside beautiful, biodiverse areas where human development is restricted. By some estimates, 13 percent of the world's land mass is protected, an area larger than all of South America.[12]

Climate change is forcing the hand of our ethical-political responsibilities, and as one might suspect, it is doing so in ways that are not always agreeable. While environmentalism has its roots in critiques of Western human exceptionalism and anthropocentric policies, what we discover here is an explicit reintroduction of the human. As Steven Vogel asks in his important book, *Thinking Like a Mall*, "Would we rather not want to say, in such a case, that an environmentalism *after the end of nature*—which here would mean nothing other than an environmentalism for a world of humans, a *human environmentalism*—would be exactly what needs to be developed?"[13]

Admittedly, this refocusing of a human-oriented environmentalism is not all of the same kind. There are many different factions, and just as many names as a result: postenvironmentalism, ecomodernism, ecopragmatism, new conservationism, neo-green environmentalism, and Anthropocene boosters, have all been suggested. Though I think they are right in claiming that humans must be a part of the picture—and thus neither naïve about our past actions nor misanthropic about the future—there is an open question of just how far we ought to go in our management of nature. As one extreme indication of the renewed embrace of the human at the heart of the Anthropocene, one can look no further than the defining statement of the ecomodernist manifesto, wherein a collective signatory is unapologetic about an anthropocentric future:

> To say that the Earth is a human planet becomes truer every day. Humans are made from the Earth, and the Earth is remade by human hands. Many earth scientists express this by stating that the Earth has entered a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene, the Age of Humans. As scholars, scientists, campaigners, and citizens, we write with the conviction that knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, Anthropocene. A good Anthropocene demands that humans use their growing social, economic, and

> technological powers to make life better for people, stabilize the climate, and protect the natural world.[14]

To say that this supports human exceptionalism is an understatement. The outlook is certainly hopeful, even gleefully so, about an Anthropocene that is ours to make as we like, and we just need to submit to and harness our technological prowess. As the futurist, entrepreneur Stewart Brand has famously put it, "We are as good as gods and might as well become good at it."[15] The hubris and conceit may well be rhetorical and performative, but it nevertheless highlights one of the prevailing attitudes that underscores the defense of many current technofixes like geo-engineering, de-extinction biology, genetically modified organisms, and terraforming. Constant ecomanagement is the new normal.

ACCELERATED ANTHROPOCENE

Part of what frightens me about this picture is not only the reoccupation of the human at the heart of the Anthropocene, but the rapid and future-oriented pace at which the ecomodernists wish to proceed. To be sure, climate change is indeed a crisis, and adaptation is increasingly necessary, but this new form of environmentalism seems all too eager to leave behind the present for the sake of some better, messianic vision of the future. On the one hand, there is the death of nature, the death of environmentalism, and ultimately the death of civilization as we know it, and on the other hand, there is an acceleration toward this great unknown at the expense of the past. There is a nihilistic bent through and through, and hope is the phoenix rising from the ashes.

To provide one indication of this heightened nihilism, one can look toward the fringe political theory of "accelerationism" that has received some popular attention of late. Concerned with the unending prolongation of late capitalism, the accelerationist doctrine argues that the political left should no longer fight capitalism, but rather radicalize it, that is, rev it up in order to speed up its own demise so as to begin society again. In the introduction to the accelerationist reader, Robin MacKay and Armen Avanessian state that

> the term has been adopted to name a convergent group of new theoretical enterprises that aim to conceptualise the future outside of traditional critiques and regressive, decelerative or restorative 'solutions'. In the wake of the new philosophical realisms of recent years, they do so through a recusal of the rhetoric of human finitude in favour of a renewed Prometheanism and rationalism, an affirmation that the increasing immanence of the social and technical is irreversible

> and indeed desirable, and a commitment to developing new understandings of the complexity this brings to contemporary politics.[16]

Even though accelerationism is primarily an economic-political doctrine, it applies equally well to the current environmental discourse, from its idea of a future free from backward-looking visions of nature, to its affirmation of the inevitability of technofixes, to its explicit avowal of Prometheanism, itself a position in political ecology that espouses Earth as a resource for human needs and interests.[17] Rather than reversing the tide, slowing down, or simply hesitating, accelerationism rushes headlong toward a civilizational reboot, admitting that it has a nihilistic alignment for the sake of a new beginning. The problem for new environmentalism is that even if nihilism isn't being actively recruited, it is, according to the new conservationists, occurring regardless. Karieva et al. again stipulate that this is "the paradox at the heart of contemporary conservation. . . . We may protect places of particular beauty or those places with large numbers of species, but even as we do, the pace of destruction will likely continue to accelerate."[18] But even if destruction is inevitable, and this is a big "if" that I'm not willing to accept, "[w]here does this strange way of leaping headlong into an adventure with one's eyes closed come from?" as Bruno Latour has asked.[19]

Part of it certainly has something to do with the apocalyptic discourses surrounding climate change. We are either in the midst of death, already dead, or on the way toward death, all of which suggest a reconsideration of how to assess our collective existence and how to continue on. But not all of these eco-thanatological positions look to push forward without reflective, critical assessment. In his book *Learning to Die in the Anthropocene*, Roy Scranton argues that with climate change, civilization as we knew it is already dead. It's a sobering thought, but we're already witnessing examples of this worldwide, especially in more susceptible areas, for instance with the mourning of traditional indigenous ways of life in northern Canada, and in widespread climate migration brought about by drought, rising sea levels, and wars. In learning to die as a civilization, however, Scranton asks us to witness, remember, and learn from our past, and not simply speed ahead into the great unknown. As he puts it, "If being human is to mean anything at all in the Anthropocene, if we are going to refuse to let ourselves sink into the futility of life without memory, then we must not lose our few thousand years of hard-won knowledge, accumulated at great cost and against great odds. We must not abandon the memory of the dead."[20]

Even if Scranton is more circumspect than the ecomodernists and accelerationists in his assessment of the present moment, preferring a reflective and preparatory mourning to an intentionally celebratory death spiral, he still sees the end of current civilization as a fait accompli. Others are not as

convinced that the current era is already lost, and they are unwilling to let it go without a fight. This resistance takes many forms, and many of them are found in critiques of the dominant narratives surrounding climate change and in experimental, and sometimes speculative, stories about life in the Anthropocene. One of the ways that I'm most taken by is how this resistance finds support in the stories about other-than-human agency in beings—animals, plants, minerals, ghosts—who refuse the totalizing framework imposed by the new anthropocentrism discussed above. It's with a few of these forms of resistance that I now turn to conclude.

STORYING THE ANTHROPOCENE

One of the recurrent motifs found in ecomodernist discourses is that we cannot turn back the clocks, that we cannot return to some pristine form of nature, and thus, they conclude, we might as well dedicate ourselves to plowing forward. But as many have suggested, this idea that an Edenic vision guides environmental action is a red herring, for most if not all claim that the current predicament is a messy, troubled, affair, and that the vision of a hopeful Anthropocene does not so much rejuvenate environmentalism, as it "comes to bury it."[21] It is not a sense of purism that motivates environmental action on climate change, in other words, but rather a desire to live ethically, with other species, on a planet acknowledged as damaged. Writing on this point, Alexis Shotwell states:

> I argue against purism because it is one bad but common approach to devastation in all its forms. It is a common approach for anyone who attempts to meet and control a complex situation that is fundamentally outside our control. It is a bad approach because it shuts down precisely the field of possibility that might allow us to take better collective action against the destruction of the world in all its strange, delightful, impure frolic. Purism is a de-collectivizing, de-mobilizing, paradoxical politics of despair. This world deserves better.[22]

In today's world, purity is marketed and fetishized in all kinds of ways, from pure water drinks, detox body cleanses, pure yoga, anti-immunization discourses, ecotours of pristine wilderness, and on and on. In some ways, these are maybe a natural reaction to the realization that we live in an always already contaminated world. Shotwell's analysis of purity politics helps focus the matter of conservation work away from the exclusionary and divisive tracts of protecting nature from human interference and keeping human settlements free from unwanted intruders, and instead adopts a position sympathetic to the claims that rather than eradicating difference, contamination, and

cross-pollination, we would do better to learn how to live more productively *with* disturbance, even if it means recognizing and owning our own vulnerability. Purity is not the goal of environmentalism, and neither restorative nor accelerationist doctrines will change this.

A good part of the work of imagining life in the midst of climate change, therefore, involves the possibility of critically reimagining counterdiscourses to the term Anthropocene itself. From the moment it was proposed to mark a new geological epoch, it has been met with both an acknowledgment of our unsurpassed intrusion on earth and with the critique that the name simply monumentalizes, validates, and legitimates the "Anthropos" and "Man" with an entire epoch named after itself. Nature is dead, long live humans! Eileen Crist has been one of the earliest and most vocal proponents for reevaluating the sense of this anthropocentric appellation, claiming that we ought "to consider the shadowy repercussions of naming an epoch after ourselves: to consider that this name is neither a useful conceptual move nor an empirical no-brainer, but instead a reflection and reinforcement of the anthropocentric actionable worldview that generated 'the Anthropocene'—with all its looming emergencies—in the first place."[23] On a similar note, the promotion of the Earth as a "gardened planet," as is often found with new environmentalists who espouse a manicured and engineered nature culture, is, as Crist puts it, just a "euphemism for colonized Earth."[24]

Similar to Crist, other thinkers have sought alternative propositions to capture the spoils of our time. Donna Haraway, for instance, develops this critique, stating that:

> I am aligned with feminist environmentalist Eileen Crist when she writes against the managerial, technocratic, market-and-profit besotted, modernizing, and human-exceptionalist business-as-usual commitments of so much Anthropocene discourse. This discourse is not simply wrong-headed and wrong-hearted in itself; it also saps our capacity for imagining and caring for other words, both those that exist now (including those called wilderness, for all the contaminated history of that term in racist settler colonialism) and those we need to bring into being in alliance with other critters, for still possible recuperating pasts, presents, and futures.[25]

In contrast to the repetition of human exceptionalism, Haraway instead proposes the term "chthulucine," from the ancient Greek *chthonios*, which "means 'of, in, or under the earth and the seas,'" of the soil, mulch, and water.

> The chthonic ones are not confined to a vanished past. They are a buzzing, stinging, sucking swarm now, and human beings are not in a separate compost pile. We are humus, not Homo, not anthropos; we are compost, not posthuman. . . . [T]he Chthulucene is made up of ongoing multispecies stories and practices of

> becoming-with in times that remain at stake, in precarious times, in which the world is not finished and the sky has not fallen—yet. We are at stake to each other.[26]

In a similar spirit, Natasha Myers suggests the term Planthropocene because, she argues, our existence is owed to plants, and if we can help make a world for plants—Myers reimagines the word garden in this instance to mean an activity that sees agency in the plants just as much as with animals or humans—then we are also making a world for all others.[27]

There are, no doubt, many more names that might similarly capture our uncertain times: androcene, capitalocene, biocene, technocene, thanatocene, or terraformocene also come to mind. Far from wishing to multiply the names, however, my intent is merely to recognize the counternarratives that have been proposed to disrupt and resist the hegemony of human dominion in the Anthropocene, and further, to demonstrate how they shed light on how we might understand and care differently for multispecies relationships in more complicated and compassionate terms. One of the reasons I find hope in these discourses is that they hold open an environmental ethic that does not advocate strong categorical imperatives on how we ought to act to achieve a preconceived vision of the world—that is, we must not eat animals, we ought to eliminate invasive species—but rather remain open to the possibilities of what Shotwell calls a hypothetical imperative—"*if* we want a world with less suffering and more flourishing, it would be useful to perceive complexity and complicity as the constitutive situation of our lives, rather than as things we should avoid."[28] A hypothetical imperative is speculative and stays with the trouble, in Haraway's words, by acknowledging that our compromised and vulnerable world can be different, hopefully even better, even if it can never be made perfect.

In the same way that alternative terms are being introduced to offset the Anthropocene, we are also witnessing the rise of more and more stories informing us of our entangled, multispecies worlds that unsettle any thought of managerial mastery. For this is what I find exciting and promising in continental approaches to climate change. It isn't so much a blueprint for how to cure the world, or how to assert our further dominion, but rather that we bear witness and cultivate responsibility through our unpredictable encounters with other-than-human beings who refuse, and often actively resist, our attempts to control them. Climate change therefore becomes an event of negotiation, of responding to the exigencies of other beings who are sometimes suffering, but also sometimes thriving, in the midst of our environmental crisis.

Returning to Ghosh and his plea for new stories to adequately reflect climate change, the environmental humanities are responding with stories of their own that capture some of the vulnerability with which we live, whether

this be the persecuted flying foxes in Australia, experimental conservation parks in the Netherlands, functionally extinct crows in Hawai'i, or, perhaps even the discovery of two-billion-year-old alien microbial life discovered three kilometers underground. I'm not sure what an accelerationist or eco-modernist response to the discovery of new alien life on Earth would be, but I do think that these other-than-human life-forms invite us to think about our responsibilities to the world we live in now, no matter how troubled and unclear it might be. Part of what we need to learn to do better is to ask the right questions, as Vinciane Despret puts it, questions that allow humans and the other-than-human to show themselves in ways that allow for new possibilities and ways of thinking to present themselves.[29] Side-stepping our anthropocentric frameworks reveals that nature has other things in store than what we are capable of controlling. Animals "bite back," as it were, to say nothing of more widespread natural recalcitrance, and we have much to learn from what our negotiations with the more-than-human world might look like amidst climate change.

That forces of nature wreak havoc on both human imagination and human exceptionalism is not a new idea; examples demonstrating a sense of agency that surpasses any of our willful attempts to control and dominate have been with us as long as stories have. We see this in our daily twitter feeds and news reports of hurricanes, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, forest fires, earthquakes, and more. Such natural events, what some companies still sometimes call "acts of god," are rightly associated with ideas of the sublime, as that which surpasses our ability to comprehend. For Edmund Burke, the sublime was that which produces terror within us, and for Immanuel Kant, it was what exceeds reason in its dynamic power. But even if natural disasters are becoming more common, and thus more impactful in our daily lives, it is arguably the case that they are not yet generating the sort of respect or awe for nature that they ought to, but rather, as Kant would have it, a deeper appreciation for our own human superiority. As described in his *Critique of Judgement*, Kant clearly states that the sublime has no place in empirical reality itself, but instead in our inability to comprehend or rationalize the magnitude or power of what we perceive.[30] The sublime literally exceeds reason, and in our attempt to understand what surpasses understanding, we ground our own subjectivity—Kant will even say our superiority—and become moral subjects. The point I wish to emphasize is that the greater nature's power is, the greater our own sense of subjectivity becomes. The sublime is not an awe of nature, but ultimately an awe of our own humanity. It is in part for this reason that I am drawn not so much to the awesome acts of nature that climate change may well be causing in an increasingly prevalent way, but rather for the other-than-human relationships that we have within our worlds. Admittedly our relationships

with animals, plants, minerals, and more are less romantic. They do not carry the terror of the sublime. But they are all the more real, more tangible, and more meaningful for it.

This is what Ghosh demands of literature: that it provide new ways of imagining the unthinkable via the everyday relations that inform our lives. Climate change as discoverable in and through the minutiae of our negotiations with a changing world. I think too that this is the demand of philosophy: to think our relations with the more-than-human world with care and to bear witness to them through the stories we create with them. Scranton similarly argues for the necessity of new ideas and new stories:

> In order for us to adapt to this strange new world, we're going to need more than scientific reports and military policy. We're going to need new ideas. We're going to need new myths and new stories, a new conceptual understanding of reality, and a new relationship to the deep polyglot traditions of human culture that carbon-based capitalism has vitiated through commodification and assimilation. Over and against capitalism, we will need a new way of thinking our collective existence. We need a new vision of who 'we' are. We need a new humanism . . ."[31]

I am with him up until the new vision of who "we" are. It isn't so much a new humanism that we need, but a more expansive sense of who this "we" includes. Although the place of humans is certainly necessary, including especially decolonizing work, it is a more robust, multispecies sense of our collective existence that is needed, and that, I think, climate change demands.

NOTES

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2. Timothy Morton, *Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).

3. See, for example, Paul Crutzen, "Geology of Mankind: The Anthropocene," *Nature* 415 (2002): 23.

4. Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climate Regime*, trans. Catherine Porter (Harvard University Press, 2017). See also James Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* (Oxford University Press, 1982).

5. There are many who have made the connection between climate change and the sublime.

6. It is the Nobel Prize–winning chemist, Paul Crutzen, who is often claimed to be the one who popularized the term "Anthopocene." There is a great deal of literature

on the Anthropocene now, but see in particular Paul Crutzen, "Geology of Mankind;" Will Steffen et al., "The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship," *AMBIO* 40 (2011): 739–61; and Colin N. Waters et al., "The Anthropocene is Functionally and Stratigraphically Distinct from the Holocene," *Science* 351:6269 (2016): 137–47.

7. Amitav Ghosh, *The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 11.

8. Ibid., 33.

9. See Bill McKibben, *The End of Nature* (New York: Random House, 1989); and Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).

10. On the latter points, see Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and William Cronon (ed.), *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).

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14. John Asafu-Adjaye et al., *An Ecomodernist Manifesto* (April 2015). Accessed January 10, 2016. http://www.ecomodernism.org.

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17. See John Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

18. Kareiva et al., "Conservation in the Anthropocene."

19. Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime*, trans. Catherine Porter (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 192.

20. Roy Scranton, *Learning to Die in the Anthropocene* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2015), 109.

21. Paul Kingsnorth, "Rise of the Neo-Greens," in *Keeping the Wild: Against the Domestication of Earth*, edited by George Wuerthner, Eileen Crist, and Tom Butler (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2015).

22. Alexis Shotwell, *Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 8–9.

23. Eileen Crist, "On the Poverty of Our Nomenclature," *Environmental Humanities* 3 (2013): 129–30.

24. Eileen Crist, "Ptolomaic Environmentalism," in *Keeping the Wild: Against the Domestication of Earth*, eds. George Wuerthner, Eileen Crist, and Tom Butler (Island Press, 2014), 23.

25. Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 49–50.

26. Ibid., 55.

27. Natasha Myers, "Decolonizing the Ecological Sensorium." Presentation delivered in Paris, April 25, 2017.

28. Alexis Shotwell, *Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 8.

29. Vinciane Despret, *What Would Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions?*, trans. Brett Buchanan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

30. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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Concluding Remarks

As our chapters reveal, illiberal phenomena have continued to spread throughout the international political landscape.[1] The prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* took the matter in hand in the spring of 2018 with a special issue titled "Letting Go. Trump, America, and the World" (March/April issue). Individual "Snapshot" essays under such headings as "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony," "The World After Trump," and special issues on reforming the nuclear launch process, China's new leadership in Asia, and manifestations of the "Holocaust Law" in Poland appeared next.

Talk of a new Cold War became commonplace in 2014 after the political crisis in Ukraine saw the overthrow of a government, civil war in its eastern provinces, and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Such talk intensified immediately after the Skripal affair in March 2018. These and multiple other peace-shattering events almost everywhere forced political leaders to feign toughness in international affairs so as to sustain support at home. In Europe, although the "iron curtain" of the postwar Cold War, when NATO faced off versus the Warsaw Pact, no longer existed by the 2000s, a line took shape further east to separate an expanding NATO with global ambitions on the one hand, and post-Soviet Russia with regional ambitions on the other. A new Cold War that resembles the old one only by dint of an attending new arms race has taken shape. This time the ideological frameworks and tacitly accepted rules of engagement have been replaced by open and rules-free competing geopolitical visions.[2]

There have been some encouraging signs for the better in the international arena since these chapters went to press: Greece and Macedonia agreed on an official name for the latter country, which is now The Republic of Northern Macedonia; Ireland voted to allow abortions; Saudi Arabia began issuing driving licenses to women; the World Cup ran its course in Russia without

major incident; and Donald Trump signed an understanding with North Korea's Kim Jong-un. None of these breakthroughs was a global game-changer, and the most important geostrategic of them, the US-North Korean accord, faded from view in a matter of months. At the same time, President Trump broke with his G-7 allies, refusing to sign a joint communiqué issued after a summit in Québec, and launching an invective-filled trade war against the United States's long-standing ally, friend, and leading trade partner, Canada. In fact, the disarray generated by that summit made the G-7, which doesn't include China, India, or Russia, appear increasingly less relevant than the G-20, which does include them. Tired of exclusion, members of the BRICS mooted expansion and created their own Development Bank to avoid reliance on the IMF and World Bank. The ASEAN and the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union negotiated closer integration as the TPP faltered.

Trade wars expanded when the United States imposed tariffs valued at billions against goods from China, and raised them again a few weeks later. China retaliated. Indeed, the American embrace of sweeping unilateral tariffs demonstrated clearly that Viscount Lord Palmerston's diplomatic axiom that countries have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, rather they have only permanent interests, still held true.[3] As arbiter of these disputes, the WTO was faced with the possibility of becoming irrelevant.

The weaponization of tariffs was in itself a threat to international instability. The world of US-imposed sanctioning regimes kept expanding: against Iran after the United States withdrew unilaterally from the nuclear-control deal agreed to in 2015 by Iran, the United States, the UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany; and against Russia for meddling in the American electoral system. The UK initiated the next wave of embargoes when it blamed Moscow for the Skripal poisoning affair. While the United States and the EU joined the UK in the latter wave of economic penalties against Russia, the EU, the UK, and Russia struggled to avoid sanctioning Iran, against whom the United States renewed the stiff sanctions lifted in 2015. The entire post-war notion of global economics was turned on its head.

Western embargoes against North Korea continued to stand, though China and Russia wavered in their support. As they lost valuable markets, several European countries—among them Austria, Italy, Hungary, Moldova, and Bulgaria—began openly to challenge the efficacy of the sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, while Germany and the Netherlands upgraded their support for, and financial participation in, the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project over Washington's objections. This latter project may well turn out to be the basis for the next great East-West divide, especially in Europe.[4] When, in September 2018, the US State Department levied further bans against China for buying fighter jets and missile systems from Russia, it was its sixtieth

package of sanctions since 2011. This act threw Russia and China closer together and made it appear that enacting embargoes had become Washington's new national sport. The giant web of international economic restrictions, which at first seemed to draw European, North American, and G-7 countries together, morphed into yet another source of division.

Existing tensions in Gaza were greatly exacerbated in May when Israeli soldiers shot and killed 55 Palestinians and wounded more than 1,200 along the Gaza-Israeli border, while the Israeli and American governments celebrated the inauguration ceremony for the controversial new American Embassy in Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter the Israeli parliament adopted legislation declaring that the principle of national self-determination was "unique to the Jewish people" in Israel, thereby placing potential limitations on the democratic rights of non-Jewish citizens in the country. Whatever the rights or wrongs of these initiatives, they exacerbated existing bitter rifts throughout the Middle East. So, too, did Saudi Arabia's brutal murder of one of its citizens, journalist and US resident Jamal Khashoggi, in its embassy in Turkey. Eyes previously closed in the West to Saudi activities in Yemen suddenly opened.

Tensions heightened in Ukraine in the spring of 2018. Russia opened the 19 km (12 mile) long Kerch Strait bridge linking mainland Russia to the Crimean Peninsula, and both NATO and Russia ramped up their war games in or close to the Baltics, Scandinavia, the Caucasus, east and east central Europe. Fighting intensified in the Donbass when both sides launched missiles and fired heavy artillery and mortar fire, always charging the other side with violations of the Minsk-2 agreement. Carved-in-stone assumptions about Ukraine began to shift slightly, as even the very conservative American Freedom House warned that unfettered nationalist groups and endemic corruption were threats to democracy in Ukraine.[5]

Al-Assad's position in Syria grew stronger with Russian, Iranian, and Turkish help. Russian and Iranian troops were invited to Syria by the Assad regime, Turkey's were not; and Ankara's obsession with the "Kurdish problem" posed problems for both Moscow and Washington.

The migrant issue continued to trouble Europe and the United States, as Italy's new populist government and Malta turned back a shipload of over 600 migrants, including about 140 unaccompanied minors in mid-June. They were carried on a ship operated by the charity SOS Mediterranée. The prime minister of Spain agreed to take them in. At about the same time the anti-immigration Slovenian Democratic Party, headed by Janez Jansa, won the most seats in a Slovenian parliamentary election in Slovenia. The upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe was made starkly obvious when Denmark's largest political party, the Social Democrats, broke with the "soft" Social

Liberals to adopt the populist Danish People's Party's anti–asylum-seeker platform in preparation for the country's June 2019 election.

An especially bizarre tune was played in the anti-immigrant movement in the United States when, in June, Attorney General Jeff Sessions invoked the Bible (Romans 13) to justify his policy of separating undocumented parents from their children at the US border. The implications of that unblushing, and misused, reference reach far beyond the particular issue at hand. President Trump's fear-mongering about an "invasion" by immigrant caravans trekking from Honduras and San Salvador toward the US border made anti-immigrant fever part of his country's mid-term elections in November.

Climate change suffered a setback in the United States as the administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, Scott Pruitt, worked hard to overthrow environmental regulations in favor of business, and denied that carbon dioxide emissions have impacted the climate.[6] Although Pruitt resigned amid scandal in July 2018, the deregulation initiatives he launched in the EPA remain in place. A new government in Canada's most populace province, Ontario, is following a similar path downward by canceling its predecessor's greening projects.[7] In the meantime, record-setting fires raged in California and British Columbia and heat waves caused deaths in Europe, Russia, and North America. Tornadoes and typhoons proliferated, floods grew more common and more dangerous in some parts of the world, as did drought in other parts. The one hundred-year storms now seem to occur each year. Worried about the obvious, 194 countries stuck with their commitment to the Paris Accord on climate change, hoping that Trump's America would eventually rejoin them.

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital monopoly (Google, Amazon) in the new world scheme of things also came under scrutiny, as large-scale data-gathering of all kinds challenged liberal democratic notions on privacy with near impunity—and Washington set out to establish "American dominance in space," thereby making it likely that space could serve as the next arena in which the United States, Russia, and China will compete.[8]

Dangers accompanying the rapidly expanding digital and social media milieu (Twitter, Facebook) were made obvious by charges that foreign countries meddled in domestic politics, dramatically in the United States, but not uncommon elsewhere. The ability of terrorist groups to utilize the same mediums for planning and recruiting raised the levels of risk everywhere, even as Major Powers claimed that their bombs and troops were driving ISIL and other such international terrorist organizations to ground. In the meantime, domestic mass shootings—especially, but not exclusively, in the United States—easily outnumbered violent acts instigated by international terrorism.

As scholars and commentators struggled to find both an explanation for and a definition of the new reality phenomena, Donald Trump's name figured

prominently in the discourse, as it does in this book. His headlining withdrawals from international trade, climate and arms control agreements, and apparent indifference to the concerns of America's long-time allies made him a constant presence in the world's media. Yet Trump's actions at home and abroad might well be a symptom and not a cause of global change.[9] The long-held but myopic notion that a "liberal" order maintained peace on earth between the major powers after WWII ignored the fact that two messianic superpowers, the United States and the USSR, controlled the destinies of most other countries. Fear of mutually assured destruction kept the peace until the end of the first Cold War opened a Pandora's box of previously muted antagonisms and ambitions. The post-WWII assumption that nationalism and democracy could exist side-by-side comfortably had already begun to shift in favor of a more aggressive nationalism in domestic affairs almost everywhere. In the international arena, the rise of China to economic Great Power status, the re-emergence of Russia as a player in global affairs, and the growing irrelevance of the United Nations Organization as a conflict resolution agency were but a few of the signs that the old order had lost its way.

One author sees the greatest change in the way diplomacy itself now operates. Instead of turning to the old balance-of-power tools—that is, military and political alliances and treaties—major powers have turned to international institutions, informal alignments, and, of course, economic sanctions in their attempts to forestall direct conflict.[10] To date, this approach is plainly unproven as a conflict-resolution mechanism.

By 2018, and probably earlier, Fukuyama's vision of the new world order had changed dramatically. Blaming policies crafted by the economic elites in the United States and the EU that produced devastating "recessions, high unemployment, and falling incomes for millions of ordinary workers," he recognized that Liberal Democracy's reputation was badly damaged. Consequently, he wrote, "democracy has retreated in virtually all regions of the world."[11] Reality had jumped up and bitten him.

There have been attempts to alter the spiral downward. At least one political thinker believes that liberalism should co-opt and sedate current populist lines of thinking because the two approaches hold a number of assumptions in common.[12] Others take a more tactical approach. In June 2018, a Democratic Order Initiative (DOI) launched a campaign to mobilize public and official backing for a rules-based world order. Sponsored by the Atlantic Council, it met first in Berlin under the leadership of Madeleine Albright (United States), Carl Bildt (Sweden), and Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) and joined with Anders Fogh Rasmussen's Alliance of Democracies Foundation in its campaign to raise the global profile of democracy and electoral integrity.[13] These top-heavy, mostly Western, lobbies and various peace forums called by France's

Emmanuel Macron and others are themselves the target of groundswell movements spearheaded by people like the United States's Steve Bannon, former head of the alt-right Breitbart News, and the movement led by Belgian right-wing politician Mischaël Modrikamen. Advocates of unfettered nationalism and populism such as these are gaining support from political groups across Europe, Asia, and Australia, leaving the DOI in the dust.

In the meantime, however, as Western alliances frayed, Russia and China grew closer together, NATO-member Turkey asked to join the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization grew to encompass about half of the world's population, and China's Belt and Road Initiative proposed to turn Eurasia into a Chinese economic playground. It was as if the global chessboard so eloquently described by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the 1990s suddenly tilted sideways and all its pieces began sliding eastward.[14]

Dysfunction in democratic institutions at home has led too many national leaders to fall back on risky adventures abroad and false scapegoating at home. This trend is edging us perilously closer and closer to the brink of war.[15] If there is light at the end of this tunnel of darkness, we need to see it soon.

NOTES

1. For a chart of perceived global illiberal developments, see Freedom House, "Confronting Illiberalism," *Nations in Transit 2018*. freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2018.

2. See, for example, Pavel Felgenhauer, "The New 'Cold War' with the West Heats Up," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 40 (March 15, 2018); William H. Hill, *No Place for Russia. European Security Institutions since 1989* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

3. Palmerston, Queen Victoria's foreign secretary and twice prime minister, was referring to Great Britain. See David Brown, *Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846–1855* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 82–83.

4. For details on the Nord Stream-2 project, see Roland Götz, "The Nord Stream 2 Dispute: Legal, Economic, Environmental and Political Arguments," *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 221 (June 11, 2018).

5. Vyacheslav Likhachev, "Far-Right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy," Freedom House, *Nations in Transit/Brief* (May 2018); Lev Golinsky, "Violent Anti-Semitism Is Gripping Ukraine—And the Government Is Standing Idly By," *Forward* (May 20, 2018); Josh Cohen, "Ukraine's Got a Real Problem with Far-Right Violence (And No, RT Didn't Write This Headline)," *Atlantic Council* (June 20, 2018).

6. Lisa Friedman and Coral Davenport, "Pruitt's Plan for Climate Change Debates: Ask Conservative Think Tanks," *New York Times*, May 8, 2018; Brian Kahn,

"Scott Pruitt Was Never Going to Bring Back the EPA Climate Change Website," *Earther,* April 27, 2018.

7. On this, see the independent Environmental Commissioner of Ontario's *2018 Greenhouse Gas Progress Report*, "Climate Action in Ontario. What's Next?" eco.on.ca/reports/2018-climate-action-in-ontario.

8. Sarah Lewin, "Trump Orders Space Force for 'American Dominance,' Signs Space-Traffic Policy," *Space* (June 1, 2018). www.space.com/40921-trump-space-traffic-policy-american-leadership.html; Nicholas Wright, "How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Snapshot (July 10, 2018).

9. For a general discussion, see Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 4 (July/August 2018): 124–33; reprinted in the leading Russian magazine of foreign affairs as "Mif o liberal'noi poriadke," *Rossiia v global'noi politike*, July 11, 2018.

10. See especially T.V. Paul, *Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018); Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, "The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft. How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December, 2018): 141–49.

11. Francis Fukuyama, "Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 5 (September/October, 2018): 90–115.

12. See, for example, Clifford Orwin, "Why Can't Liberalism Be Populist, Too?" *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), September 22, 2018.

13. Ash Jain, "Is the Democratic Order Doomed?" *The Atlantic Council* (February 15, 2018).

14. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997) and "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1997): 50–64. In his *The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), Bruno Macaes sees the future in an emerging Eurasian supercontinent that includes China, Russia, and Europe, shaped by China's Belt and Road initiative.

15. For general discussion, see Edward Lozansky, "U.S.-Russia-China Big Three—or WW III? Trump in Paris, 'Russia Is Preparing for War,' China is 'Preparation for War,'" *The Washington Times*, November 9, 2018; "'Prepare for war.' XI Jinping Tells Military Region That Monitors South China Sea, Taiwan," *South China Morning Post*, October 27, 2018; Tyler Durden, "Russian Diplomat: 'Yes, Russia Is Preparing for War, I Can Confirm It,'" *Zero Hedge*, October 27, 2018.

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