

Metaphor, Nation and Discourse

EDITED BY
LJILJANA ŠARIĆ AND MATEUSZ-MILAN STANOJEVIĆ

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Metaphor, Nation and Discourse

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Table of contents

Acknowledgments	VII
Metaphors in the discursive construction of nations <i>Mateusz-Milan Stanojević & Ljiljana Šarić</i>	1
Part I. Discourses and voices of the powerful elites	
CHAPTER 1	
The desire for shelter: Nation- and state-building and the metaphorical discourse of fragile and collapsed states <i>Michael P. Marks</i>	35
CHAPTER 2	
<i>Barbed wire around Serbia</i> : Migrant metaphors as a means of constructing national identity <i>Tatjana Đurović & Nadežda Silaški</i>	59
CHAPTER 3	
Godly Poland in godless Europe: Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland after 2004 <i>Aleksander Gomola</i>	75
CHAPTER 4	
“Let’s work on our Serbian!”: Standard language ideology, metaphors and discourses about Serbian national identity in the newspaper <i>Politika</i> in 2015 <i>Stijn Vervaeet</i>	101
CHAPTER 5	
Metaphors for language contact and change: Croatian language and national identity <i>Višnja Čičin-Šain</i>	127
CHAPTER 6	
Metaphors of plant cultivation and flowing liquid in German colonialist discourse (1871–1914) <i>Felicity Rash</i>	155

CHAPTER 7	
The meaning of state created through symbols and metaphors: German <i>Heimat</i> and Russian Motherland	177
<i>Agne Cepinskyte</i>	
CHAPTER 8	
“The state of our Union is strong.” Metaphors of the nation in State of the Union addresses	201
<i>Massimiliano Demata</i>	
Part II. Semi-official and mixed discourses	
CHAPTER 9	
The role of metonymy and metaphor in the conceptualization of the NATION: An emergent ontological analysis of syntactic-semantic constructions	227
<i>Benedikt Perak</i>	
CHAPTER 10	
Metaphorical and non-metaphorical dimensions of the term <i>nacija</i> in Croatian online discourse	259
<i>Mateusz-Milan Stanojević</i>	
CHAPTER 11	
How to do things with metaphors: The <i>prison of nations</i> metaphor in South Slavic online sources	287
<i>Ljiljana Šarić</i>	
CHAPTER 12	
Guidelines on how to construct a nation: Metaphors in the first episode of the Catalan series <i>Gran Nord</i>	321
<i>Silvia Grassi</i>	
Afterword: Nations need (new?) metaphors	347
<i>Andreas Musolff</i>	
Notes on contributors	349
Index	353

Acknowledgments

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The project workshop *Metaphors in the Discourse of the National*, held on September 8th–9th, 2016, was dedicated to a systematic understanding of the levels at which metaphors are relevant in the study of “the national.” The contributions to the workshop offered insightful perspectives on the importance of metaphors for constructing nations and national identity. The chapters in this volume evolved from selected workshop presentations.

We are grateful to the Department of Literature, Area Studies, and European Languages (ILOS) for funding the project and the workshop, as well as various activities related to this book. We would also like to thank our colleagues, Anita Peti-Stantić, Nihada Delibegović Džanić, Sanja Berberović, and Tanja Gradečak-Erdeljić for providing us with valuable feedback on the texts and the structure of the volume. Our thanks go to Felicity Rash for copyediting, Jelena Parizoska and Dario Lečić for their assistance in formatting the book chapters, and Izabela Weber for preparing the index. Finally, we would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, as well as the series editors and the entire John Benjamins team for their support and making the process an enjoyable one.

Metaphors in the discursive construction of nations

Mateusz-Milan Stanojević & Ljiljana Šarić

University of Zagreb/University of Oslo

1. Introduction

The aim of this volume is to examine the intersecting fields of metaphor research and research on nations and national identity, and the levels at which metaphor is relevant to the study of these concepts. The underlying idea is that the use of metaphors in constructing the national must be questioned in order to lay bare the processes and the discursive power behind them. If metaphors contribute to the construction of sameness and difference (e.g. to negotiating distinct national identities), they do not do so alone. This is why the volume also examines the broader (discursive) context that metaphors are part of. Special attention is given to their interaction with symbols and myths, cultural models, and stereotypes, and to the role of that interaction in specific discourse types (e.g. colonialist discourse, foreign policy discourse, migration discourse).

On the macro-level, the volume examines the role of metaphors in the formation and dissolution of nations, and/or the negotiation of national values, national borders, national belonging and national identity. This means that throughout the volume metaphors are seen as a means of promoting an agenda, i.e. as framing devices. Such a view goes hand-in-hand with a broadly-conceived cognitive-linguistic tradition, which is applied in the majority of the chapters. On the micro-level, individual chapters trace the motivation for using metaphors, the limits of metaphors, and the abuse of metaphors in various contexts. This brings to the fore the role of metaphors in establishing and weakening the emotional attachment and the sense of belonging to national communities, to their languages, or to other national symbols, and the role of metaphors in instrumentalizing the emotional attachment to national communities for specific policies (e.g. creating loyal members of a group).

Seeing metaphors and other related devices as a way to constitute discourse goes hand-in-hand with a Foucauldian view of discourse as constitutive of reality rather than only descriptive of it. The role of metaphors is explored on various levels of public discourse (everyday/grassroots discourse, semi-official discourse, and official discourse by political elites) and meta-discourse (scholarly discourse

concerned with nations and nationalism, and in international relations theory). Discourse is viewed synchronically and diachronically, as a purely textual, multi-modal and performative phenomenon.

In the remainder of this chapter we discuss how metaphors, nations and discourses work together. We view metaphors as framing devices with a crucial role in “normalizing” or “naturalizing” particular aspects of the nation-related reality which they may create or reflect. Normalization and naturalization in discourse hinges on the metaphors’ emotional potential. Section 2 reflects on previous research and provides an overview of the intersections between the notions of the nation, discourse and metaphor. It hinges on seeing all three notions from a non-essentialist perspective, and shows how metaphorical framing works in both expert and naïve theories of the nation. Section 3 discusses how two metaphors frequently examined in previous research – the family and the body metaphor – frame the notion of the nation, and how their interaction with personification and container conceptualizations brings about (de)legitimization of various practices. Section 4 presents the chapters that appear in the volume, and relates them to the issues of framing and emotionality. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

2. Nation, discourse, metaphor and their intersections

Not surprisingly, in the clash of the expert and folk definitions of nations, metaphors thrive. The vague concept of the nation reflected in dictionary descriptions (“a sense of common identity, a history, a language, ethnic or racial origins, religion, a common economic life, a geographical location and a political base” (Evans & Newnham 1998, s.v. *nation*)) may be conceptualized as a person, a body (politic), a family, and so on (see, for example, Eriksen 1997; Rigney 2001; Oakley 2005; Musolff 2010a, 2010b; Tsakona 2012). These conceptualizations may span centuries (Musolff 2010a), and may, to some extent, be instrumental in constructing a national discourse at a particular point in time and for particular purposes.

In this section we show why metaphors seem to be so naturally connected with nations. On the one hand, the reasons for this are conceptual (because of the very concept of the nation and its expert and naïve definitions), and on the other discursive (the need to emotionally frame conceptualizations of the nation to achieve particular discursive aims). We start with a definition of the nation, and its connection to discourse, and then move on to conceptual and discursive metaphors.

2.1 Are nations imagined or real, and what are they made of?

There is no generally accepted definition of a “nation” at the expert level. Different expert models provide rather different definitions, some of which tend to rely on

more objectivist criteria (nations as appearing out there in the world) and end up with more essentialist definitions (e.g. *Kulturnation*), and others rely on criteria which are less essentialist, and clearly focused on nation as a constructed phenomenon (e.g. Benedict Anderson's definition). Where experts disagree, folk models seem less divergent: our intuitive use of the term *nation* seems unproblematic and ubiquitous, and tends to be more clearly related to relying on essentialist elements, which apparently leads to fewer problems. It is clear, however, that naïve models of the concept, as reflected in its everyday use, and expert models influence one another.

Some of the "objective criteria" mentioned in expert definitions of nations include a common language, culture, and territory. They are central to defining nations as *Kulturnationen*, i.e. using an "objective" (or at least "objectively defined") set of elements belonging to the common denominator of culture. The notion of the *Kulturnation* has been problematized at least since Renan's (1990) influential essay, and today essentialist views of the nation, which define it as an objective concept "out there in the world," are highly unusual (for a short overview, see Šarić 2015: 58).

Somewhat less essentialist definitions of nations are not based on shared objective, real-world characteristics, but, rather, define nations as being based on common features which reside within people's desires, memories, and views of the world. For instance, according to Ernest Renan, a nation (*Willensnation*) is determined by "present-day consent" and "the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage" (Renan 1990: 19), as well as by the "possession in common of a rich legacy of memories." Jürgen Habermas (1993) developed the concept of constitutional patriotism, emphasizing the relation of a nation to a state and citizenship. In his view, the basis of the unity of a nation lies in a common state and in the rights and obligations of its citizens. Similar views are espoused by Anthony Smith, who considers a nation to be a "named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991: 14). In Smith's ethnosymbolism, nations are formed around a dominant *ethnie*, without problematizing how what they have in common is shared. In this sense, the ethnosymbolist approach is relatively essentialist. Still, it does include constructivism, because the dominant *ethnie* is seen as the determinant of common myths and memories that become the centre of the nation (e.g. Smith 1991: 39). Hence, according to Smith, emotionality plays a significant role: the conviction of common ancestry is a feeling rather than a fact (Smith 2010: 75), which increases the symbolic power of the construct. Overall, Smith's description of nations as ideal types (Smith 2007: 18) departs from a "classical" category interpretation of nation as an entity with clearly distinct necessary and sufficient characteristics, moving

towards a prototypical category (in the sense of Lakoff 1987b), with an idealized core and exemplars coinciding with the core in varying degrees.

For Benedict Anderson, who assumes a rather different perspective, nations are large imagined communities that differ from one another “by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 2006: 6). These communities are imagined:

... because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community. (Anderson 2006: 6)

Anderson’s influential theory falls within the non-essentialist realm, because the characteristics which result in the construction of the imagined community may be different from community to community, and because the process behind their construction (what makes them communities) is non-essentialist by definition, being imagined rather than “real.” The cline from more essentialist to non-essentialist definitions is, predictably perhaps, paralleled in the remaining two notions crucial for this book: discourse and metaphor.

2.2 Discourses, nations and the construction of reality

As is frequently the case with broad theoretical notions, the notion of discourse is defined differently by various theorists and in various research fields. Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton (2015: 1) provide a useful categorization into three large-scale (although overlapping) definitions: discourse as anything beyond the sentence, discourse as language use, and discourse as linguistic and non-linguistic social practices. The first of these – discourse as anything beyond the sentence – relates to a traditional linguistic view, whereby language is studied as organized into (more or less autonomous) levels, such as the phonological, morphological or syntactic level. According to this definition, the discursive level is concerned with, for instance, the structure of conversations (see e.g. Stubbs 1983 for an overview and a list of topics). The second definition – the view of discourse as (a particular) language use – is central to all traditions (Jaworski & Coupland 2006: 12); broadly-conceived contextual factors are essential, and the principal question is *how* language is used. Finally, seeing discourse as a set of social practices moves the focus from *how* to a more integrated set of issues: “*who* uses language, *how*, *why* and *when*” (van Dijk 1997: 2; emphasis in the original). The third definition is the broadest one, and opens the possibility of a *critical* approach, because the positioning (of the theorist and the material analysed) is a “natural” consequence of taking a social perspective on the questions asked.

It is the third view that is represented by the chapters in this volume. We see discourse as a cluster of semiotic practices in their socio-historical contexts and linked to argumentation about validity claims (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 89). Discourse is

socially constituted and socially constitutive: it shapes social practice, and is shaped by it in return (e.g. Fairclough 1992: 62). In this volume, discourse is treated textually as well as multimodally, through a multidisciplinary lens (linguistics, literature, political science) and in its historical development. The chapters within the volume explain discourse structures, particularly metaphor use, within social interaction in terms of power relations. These are some of the central properties of a broadly-defined critical discourse analysis (for an overview see van Dijk 2015).

Vital in this respect is the issue of power and the construction of knowledge. In critical discourse analysis, power is generally seen through the prism of powerful groups, and discourse is defined as reproducing the dominant view of powerful groups, institutions, and symbolic elites. Discourses form a type of mind control, as aptly put by van Dijk (2015: 472). However, power may also be regarded as a distributed entity, which appears both from below and above, and cannot be seized by someone (Foucault 1978: 94). Thus, regardless of which type of discourse is analysed, both power and resistance to power are inscribed within it.

Discourses are also involved in the creation of knowledge structures. For Foucault, power creates knowledge, and “knowledge induces effects of power” (Foucault 1980: 52), all of which happens in discourses. As we shall see below, because of their broadly constructivist perspective on metaphor, the chapters in this volume present metaphors as knowledge structures themselves, or as constitutive of knowledge structures.

Such a relationship between discourses, knowledge and power provides a natural connection to the constructedness of the nation. In fact, Anderson’s definition of nations as imagined communities depends on the discourse-knowledge-power triad. Specifically, to enable people to conceive of a nation, a decisive role was played by the rise of printing in the sixteenth century, which is linked to the increased significance of local languages. Written languages disseminated by printing “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” (Anderson 2006: 37). It can thus be argued that the written language – as a (power-related) social discursive practice – invented nationalism (Anderson 2006: 122). Parallels to this view are evident in Uri Ram’s reference to nationality as a narration or a story (Ram 1994: 153) and Stuart Hall’s description of a nation as “systems of cultural representations” and a “symbolic community” (Hall 1996: 612), where a national culture is defined as a discourse:

... a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves. ... National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about “the nation” with which we can *identify*; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it. (Hall 1996: 613)

In the present volume, we follow Anderson's approach to nations as imagined communities, Hall's idea of national culture as a discourse, and Ram's idea of national narrations. We assume that national cultures and national narrations (or narratives) are reproduced and disseminated in discourse by influential social actors (voices in power) in institutional contexts, but also in less official and unofficial contexts by less influential social actors – that is, ordinary people. In other words, “nationhood”¹ discourse unfolds at the “top” or elite level in, for instance, constitutions, legal texts, political speeches, and policy statements by national leaders. It also unfolds at the “grassroots” level among the general population. Various discourses from above and below interact with and influence each other in intricate ways (see e.g. Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008; Polese 2011), which is why they should be studied together. As reflected in the chapters in this volume, in addition to the expected reproduction of hegemony in the official discourses of powerful groups and symbolic elites (e.g. the Church, as demonstrated in Gomola's chapter, US presidents, as shown in Demata's chapter, or language policy authorities in Čičin-Šain and Vervae't's chapters), power struggles are inscribed in the semi-official and “open” discourses of online communication (cf. the chapters by Stanojević, Šarić and Perak).

2.3 Nations as constructed complexes: Banal nationalism and nation-building

The nation is a concept that requires constant imagining and inventing. Shared images, symbols, rituals, myths, language, and discourse play an essential role in reproducing social groups, including nations. The members of a nation must construct their national memory and common past, as well as their national future, through discourse. They reconcile the distinct features of the different regions and ethnic groups that constitute a nation through various “nationhood projects” or “national identity projects,” which include, for example, introducing national holidays and establishing museums and sites of memories. Most of these processes are initiated and carried out in discourse by various social actors. An important role in the imagining of national communities is played by print and electronic media, which make various public activities (e.g. singing the national anthem during sports events) available to large audiences.

Two related theoretical ideas that focus on enactment and reenactment of nationhood are banal nationalism and nation-building. The concept of “banal

1. The term encompasses discursive practices that express a shared understanding in a population that its members constitute “a nation” (Wodak 2009: 22).

nationalism,”² introduced by the social psychologist Michael Billig (1995), is based on the hypothesis that nationalism is enacted and reenacted on a daily basis. Reenacting can be a process from above if it relates to political elites’ actions and strategies, or from below if it relates to everyday practices by ordinary people. Reenactment is done through daily-life ideological habits, in which the nation is “indicated, or ‘flagged,’³ in the lives of its citizenry” (Billig 1995: 6), as a continual reminder of nationhood. These banal, unnoticed practices are often related to language, or are realized in language and lead people to identify with a nation. Flagging may be achieved by using a language in general (e.g. Catalan in Catalonia), or using specific rhetorical devices (e.g. *we*, *this*, *here*, and *the people* in news discourse referring to a country’s population) (Billig 1995: 94). Banal nationalism can thus be traced in discourse by political elites (see Demata; Đurović and Silaški, this volume) and in the mass media with their omnipresent deixis of the homeland. Political discourse from above reproduced in the media can be taken up by, for example, forum discussants (non-state actors) (as seen, for instance, in Stanojević, this volume, and Šarić, this volume) and become interconnected with a number of other discourses that at first glance might not seem connected to official discourses of the nation at all (e.g. discourses about tasty food).

A significant aspect of the linguistic devices used to flag the nation is their non-explicit, hidden nature. For instance, using a deictic element such as *we* evokes identity between the speaker and the audience, although it is not clear who the audience is (Billig 1995: 106). Similarly, using the definite article (in English) flags the nation when used in references to a specific country and its inhabitants (e.g. *the country* and *the people*), and it is a subtle means because it neither mentions nor names the nation. In this sense, banal nationalism is a discourse in its own right (if we conceive of a discourse as a social practice), with an emotional dimension: the production of discourses of banal nationalism can be a result of emotions, can create emotional attachment, and can stir emotions and cause emotional reactions.⁴ Therefore, the discourse of banal nationalism is parallel to the

2. In this term, “banal” is a synonym for “unnoticed” and does not evaluate nationalism in a negative manner, and “nationalism” is not synonymous with extremism or chauvinism: it does not refer to any extreme forms of national projects (e.g. those leading to disintegration of existing states), but to the endemic condition of established nation-states.

3. Billig (1995) uses the metonymy of “flagging” for all the practices of reminding, whether they involve flags or not.

4. See, for example, internet comments in response to national anthems: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wy-Tfhcx-2k>, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOAtz8xWM0w>.

role that we claim for metaphor: in it, flagging is a means of legitimization that is meant to achieve a framing purpose and (possibly) an emotional result.

Similar to Billig's idea of banal nationalism is the concept of nation-building. Itself a metaphor (Kolstø 2000), the term *nation-building* has been used in many ways; for example, for the processes of identity consolidation among ethnic groups with no state of their own (Connor 1994) and for institutional (re)construction in failed states in the wake of war (see, for example, Fukuyama 2006 for a discussion; also see Marks, this volume). In one of the understandings relevant to the topic of this book (and in which it strongly relies on symbols, discourse, and, as we claim, metaphors), nation-building refers to strategies of identity consolidation within states (Kolstø 2014: 3): it applies to strategies for creating nationhood and linking nationhood to the state, and "soft" aspects of state consolidation.⁵ The aim of such strategies is the construction of a shared identity and a sense of unity within the population.⁶

In symbolic nation-building, various symbols (official ones, such as flags, but also less official ones, such as sports) play a crucial role in creating (and maintaining) a nation, that is, creating a sense of unity in a population and delineating the nation's boundaries. In contrast to other kinds of sign (such as signals), symbols do not have any fixed meaning: they only have value and meaning for those that recognize them (A. P. Cohen 1976: 23; Guibernau 2013: 37). According to A. P. Cohen (2001: 15), the inherently ambiguous character of symbols makes them eminently usable for nation-building purposes, a point taken up by Cepinskyte (this volume). The range of meanings in concepts such as patriotism, duty, love, and peace "can be glossed over in a commonly accepted symbol – precisely because it allows its adherents to attach their own meanings to it. They share the symbol, but do not necessarily share the meaning" (A. P. Cohen 2001: 15).

In this section we have shown that nations have been conceived of as constructed complexes, which may be reenacted through various discursive practices, including deictic elements, symbols, flags and others. Next, we turn to metaphors and their role in this process.

2.4 From conceptual to discursive metaphors

On a very broad level, metaphor theories may be divided into constructivist and non-constructivist. The cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor, first advanced by

5. "State-building," in Kolstø's understanding, pertains to the administrative, economic, and military groundwork of functional states (Kolstø 2014: 3).

6. The aim of nation-maintenance is to sustain viable nation-states (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2005).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980), although it has various predecessors (as Jäkel 1999 shows), is a constructivist, non-objectivist theory. It views metaphor as a cognitive mechanism that may construct a person's view of the world, and, in its most radical Lakoffian form, constructs thinking processes. In contrast, non-constructivist theories of metaphor define metaphor primarily as a matter of language, a case in point being the theories of Davidson (1979) or Searle (1993). There are theories which fall somewhere in between the constructivist–non-constructivist cline, and these include, for instance, Black's (1962) interactionist theory and Ricoeur's (1975) metaphor *vive*. They stop short of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) claim of a direct connection between language and thought, but do include various constructivist claims. For example, according to Ricoeur, a live metaphor is a heuristic fiction that redescribes reality on the basis of fiction (Ricoeur 1991: 84–85). It will come as no surprise that the chapters in this volume take a constructivist view of metaphor, where metaphor is a device that creates (at least some aspects of) reality. Such a view goes together with the critical view of discourse described above, where discourse and reality co-construct one another. The crucial issue in metaphor theory in this sense, however, is how metaphors are grounded: as cognitive abilities residing in the brain, or as sociocultural and discursive entities residing in social practice. In the remaining part of this section, we will trace this development.

In conceptual metaphor theory, a conceptual metaphor is a mapping (or a set of mappings) between a source domain and a target domain, where the two domains are defined as (idealized) knowledge structures (see, for example, Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Kövecses 2010). These mappings are conceptual, but are most readily evident in language. When Bush refers to “building a nation” (see Demata, this volume), he is using the conceptual metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING, where some elements of the BUILDING source domain are mapped onto some elements of the NATION target domain. Which elements these are, and how they are determined is a matter of great debate among cognitive linguists. In Lakoffian conceptual metaphor theory, one subtype of conceptual metaphors (correlational metaphors, see Grady 1999) are based on directly embodied experience, whereby the mappings between the source and the target domain are a natural consequence of neural or physical correlates. For instance, we experience warmth when we are held by our parents, which leads to the AFFECTION IS WARMTH metaphor. Such metaphors are considered primary, and other correlational metaphors are hierarchically based on these primary metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). The other subtype of metaphor are resemblance metaphors (Grady 1999), which are based on drawing similarities between two imagistic or behaviour-based depictions of the world. This includes expressions such as André Breton's oft-quoted example *My wife ... whose waist is like an hourglass* (image metaphor, Lakoff 1987a: 221)

or Searle's (1993: 105) *Richard is a gorilla* (where Richard's behaviour is likened to that of a gorilla).

The conceptual metaphor framework concentrates on how metaphors arise as products of our cognitive abilities. As a cognitive mechanism, metaphor enables us to construe one thing in terms of another. Because the source and the target are never one and the same (a nation is *not* a literal building), a linguistic expression of a conceptual metaphor in a particular context will highlight certain aspects of the target domain, while hiding others (see, for example, Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 157). Thus, when we refer to "building a nation" we may be highlighting the aspects of strength which provide security to the nation's citizens, and hiding the differences between the nation-building process as an internal process (within a nation-state) and a process that takes place externally, as when the USA is "helping" other nations (see Demata, this volume, and Marks, this volume).

Although the source and the target are not one and the same, we may integrate elements of both into a novel space, which works according to the logic inherited from both the source and the target. This results in a metaphorical blend, and is described by conceptual integration theory, also referred to as blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner 2003). For instance, Čičin-Šain (this volume) analyses the Croatian expression *anglokrobotski* 'Anglocrobotian.' This is a conceptual integration of three elements (English, Croatian and robotic). The blend has the moral implication of the dehumanization of Croatian by English and robotic elements, which are not present in any of the input spaces alone, but are a result of the conceptual integration process.

Highlighting, hiding and blending have clear consequences for how we construe the world. Construing the world need not be only a cognitive activity, but may take place in social interaction, between social actors, as a socioculturally situated activity (Frank 2008). If seen in this light, theorists frequently remain neutral as to the *conceptual* nature of metaphors, choosing to see them as generalizations across a single discourse event or multiple discourse events. For instance, Cameron's systematic metaphors are defined as emergent between interlocutors within a single discourse event (Cameron 2008). This means that systematic metaphors are co-constructed online. One part of Stanojević's study (this volume) takes a local perspective akin to Cameron's.

Metaphors may also be defined across many discourse events. In this vein, Zinken, Hellsten and Nerlich (2008: 363) define discourse metaphor as "a relatively stable metaphorical projection that functions as a key framing device within a particular discourse over a certain period of time." Three aspects of metaphors are crucial for the discussion of nations: their role as framing devices, their development over a period of time, and their sociocultural situatedness.

Characterizing discourse metaphors as framing devices means that they function as “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1986: 21), i.e. metanarrative devices that may influence the interpretation of a content. This type of definition bears a resemblance to the notion of conceptual metaphor, inasmuch as it too is seen as a knowledge structuring device that highlights or hides particular aspects of experience. This is yet another reason why conceptual and discourse metaphors form a natural alliance. The crucial difference, as noted above, is the sociocultural aspect that frames (generally) presuppose (cf. Musolff 2012 for some specific issues). The relationship between cognitive linguistics and critical discourse analysis has been explored by Hart (2008), and, in relation to metaphor, forms the basis of critical metaphor analysis (Charteris-Black 2004). Framing aspects of metaphors are seen throughout all the chapters in the volume.

Discourse metaphors develop over a period of time, and may have a long discursive history. A case in point is the discourse metaphors of the nation (e.g. A NATION IS A BODY), which go back centuries (Musolff 2010a). Historical development is a characteristic that emphasizes the sociocultural situatedness of metaphors, as it presupposes that metaphors may change significantly, based on, for example, the framing needs of a social group. Such a view of discourse metaphor is presented by Rash (this volume), and appears in Šarić (this volume) and Cepinskyte (this volume).

Rather than being embodied in the narrow sense, discourse metaphors are socioculturally situated (Zinken, Hellsten & Nerlich 2008). This means that, unlike conceptual metaphors, they are grounded in a broader set of elements that include an individualist view (the body, cognition) as well as a sociocultural view. Thus, cultural changes through time may lead to a change in discourse metaphors (see Rash, this volume), and different cultures may construct their nation metaphors in different ways (see Cepinskyte, this volume).

To this, we would like to add yet another significant element: emotion. A frequently mentioned characteristic of discourse metaphors (whether in individual discourse or across discourse events) is their capacity to evoke feelings by framing an experience in (hidden) emotional terms. Cameron (2003) found that systematic metaphors have an affective function, for example to achieve speaker alignment (Cameron 2003: 139). Similarly, discursive metaphors referring to refugees in terms of water have been claimed to have a negative, dehumanizing effect (e.g. Baker et al. 2008: 287). Addressing the role of metaphors in politics, Vertessen and De Landtsheer (2008) approach metaphors as a “pre-eminent type of emotive language” that politicians turn to in their attempts to trigger emotions. This has been confirmed by neural research, whereby metaphorical sentences have been shown to be more emotionally engaging than literal expressions (Citron & Goldberg 2014). In this

volume we see evaluation and emotion broadly, as part of the same system. We take over from systemic functional linguistics the view that emotionality (as part of the so-called interpersonal, i.e. sociocultural system) is on a par with ideational and textual resources (cf. Martin & White 2005). The three systems work simultaneously and cannot be divorced from each other, which also means that attitude – a point of view that an author takes when s/he speaks – is part and parcel of any utterance (Martin & White 2005: 92). Metaphor is thus grounded in the broadest of terms: its cognitive and sociocultural situatedness is not limited to purely propositional ideational content, but enables us to express our emotional experience, in this way enabling our alignment (or distancing) from other members of a discourse community. In this way, metaphor is a way to achieve what Gammerl (2012) refers to as emotional styles, which encompass “the experience, fostering, and display of emotions, and oscillate between discursive patterns and embodied practices as well as between common scripts and specific appropriations” (Gammerl 2012: 163). Evaluativity and emotionality are a significant element of discourse metaphors, as shown or commented on in the chapters by Šarić (this volume), Stanojević (this volume), Marks (this volume), and Đurović and Silaški (this volume).

The move from the nation as an objectivist entity “out there in the world” to its non-essentialist definitions goes together with seeing discourses as constituted of and constituting power and knowledge, and with socioculturally situated metaphor as a way to frame them. If we assume that a nation is “an imagined community and a mental construct” (Wodak et al. 2009: 22), this in no way implies that it is not “real”: it “is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally” (Wodak et al. 2009: 22). This, however, means that what constitutes the nation’s reality is subject to (metaphorical) construal and/or (emotional) framing through discursive practices.

3. What and how do metaphors frame in nation construction?

The discursive construction of nations is a matter of metaphors because the *nation* is a constructed metaphorical complex (at least to some extent), as shown in the previous section. Moreover, scholarship regarding nations also relies on metaphorical models, as is expected of any scholarly activity (Brown 2003). Scholars of nations and nationalism use metaphors in their theoretical considerations at both the micro and macro levels. Although the micro level deserves attention in its own right,⁷ we concentrate on the macro level pertaining to the general idea of what

7. At the micro level, metaphors are used, for instance, in numerous examples explaining what nations do (or do not do): for instance, according to Benedict Anderson (2006: 7) “nations

nations *are*. For instance, Ernest Renan (1990: 19) relates a nation's existence to "a daily plebiscite." Through its source domain, the metaphor Renan utilizes suggests the relativity of nations: nations rely on choices, conscious will, and clearly expressed desires (of individuals) to continue a common life; that is, to belong to a nation.⁸ When Anderson (2006: 6) defines nation as an imagined community that is limited by its (finite, if elastic) boundaries, and linked to a sovereign state (the gauge and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state), he does not explicitly use metaphor in the same way as Renan (1990) does with his NATION IS A PLEBISCITE metaphor. However, there is a metaphorical dimension to nations in Anderson's view and his definition. In the phrase *imagined community*, the adjective *imagined* means formed as a mental image of (something not present) – it links nations to mental images – and indicates that there is nothing *concrete/tangible* about nations. This opens the possibility of imagining – construing – nations in a variety of metaphorical ways, i.e. linking them to well-known domains of experience, as is done in conceptual metaphor theory.

Unlike such meta-theoretical metaphors in expert models, many widespread metaphorical conceptualizations of the nation seem to offer "natural" connections between the nation as the target domain and a certain source domain. For instance, mapping families onto nations is one such link; calling two nations *sister nations* seems completely ordinary. Feeling "natural" and "ordinary," and being used in both expert and naïve models worldwide, means that such a metaphor has great potential for discursively framing nations (and events surrounding them) by creating, reinforcing or severing emotional ties. The fact that the metaphor feels "natural" means that what it highlights or hides remains below the radar. In the subsections that follow we will comment on the framing potential of two such metaphors, NATIONS AS FAMILIES and NATIONS AS BODIES, both of which are widespread and frequently studied in discourses of the nation, and their mutual interactions and interactions with other metaphors.

3.1 Nations as families

Metaphors that link societies to living things are among the oldest and most enduring ones, with family metaphors being "the most ancient of biological metaphors"

dream of being free." Dreaming is a process pertaining to humans, and for that reason nations can be conceptualized as humans capable of dreaming (the NATION IS A PERSON metaphor).

8. Still, as Billig (1995: 95) observes, the citizens of an established nation do not decide about their national belonging on a daily basis. Instead, in established nation-states, the reproduction of a nation occurs on a daily basis in banal practices: the nation is "put to daily use" (see above).

and commonplace in contemporary culture (see Rigney 2001: 13–14, who emphasizes that families are not only biological, but also a product of cultural construction). Herzfeld (1997: 5) argues that people everywhere use the building blocks of family, body, and kinship in order to make sense of larger entities, and Watson (2010) indicates that metaphors of the nation as a family can be found across cultures (see, for example, Komulainen 2003, discussing the Finnish context; Posel 2011, discussing South Africa; and Jing-Schmidt 2016, discussing China). Billig (1995: 71) notes that a sense of “our national” uniqueness and integrity is frequently conveyed by metaphors of kinship and gender. Kinship metaphors make it possible to conceptualize human communities as extended families. This implies bonds between different group members, as well as vertical connections (parents and children) and horizontal connections (siblings) between family members. They often relate to a romanticized view of family life, and to concepts such as safety, loyalty, care, stability, and protection. There is also a literal dimension to this: it has been frequently argued that humans are members of an extended family by a common ancestral lineage (Rigney 2001: 14).

In what follows we provide an overview of the ways in which the *NATION IS A FAMILY* metaphor works in theoretical discussions of the nation, as well as in conceptualizations of the nation in various national discourses. The most significant aspect of this metaphor is its strong sociocultural grounding and the clear emotionality linked with it. Because of this, it is used to legitimize in-group vs. out-group divisions as well as models of social functioning, both meta-theoretically (in scholarly discourse about the nation) and in public discourse.

3.1.1 *Nations as families in scholarly discourse*

Both Anderson’s and Smith’s theoretical discussions of the nation hinge on metaphorical definitions based on family conceptualizations. For instance, Anderson’s “deep horizontal comradeship” and “fraternity” (Anderson 2006: 7) utilizes basic relations between humans (friends and family) as the source domain for the imagined community. People’s primary experience with the specific communities they are part of is mapped onto abstract communities. By invoking close friends and brothers, Anderson’s definition additionally implies that the existence, maintenance, and survival of nations rely on an emotional attachment between the members of these nations. Anderson also indirectly asserts the importance of linguistic metaphors when he claims that the nature of the “political love” of a nation:

... can be deciphered from the ways in which languages describe its objects: either in the vocabulary of kinship (motherland, *Vaterland*, *patria*) or that of home (*heimat* or *tanah air*) ... Both idioms denote something to which one is naturally tied. (Anderson 2006: 147)

Metaphorical dimensions of nations are thus visible in the general terms used as (near) synonyms for a particular nation – *motherland*, *fatherland*, and their equivalents in different languages – that refer to a country regarded as a place of origin. Because the country of origin is often a country of one’s mother, father, or parents, the terms *motherland*, *fatherland*, and their equivalents are also metonymic. The same is true for *homeland*, which refers to a native country, but it metonymically implies concrete homes for people whose homeland it is (see Cepinskyte, this volume).

Family metaphors are also inherent in Anthony Smith’s myth of ancestry. According to Smith (1999), nationalisms base their ideals and programs on ethnic myths of origins and descent. The family metaphor comes into the picture here because the chief assumption of these myths is the idea of shared birth and ancestry. That idea gives rise to the metaphorical kinship connotations of nationality. The myth of ancestry with its “comforting metaphor of family”:

... provides a means of rooting and classifying ... and thereby of identifying one’s friends as ‘kinsmen’ in opposition to unfriendly outsiders, who are excluded from belonging by the absence of roots and kinship ties. (Smith 1999: 65)

Overall, in Smith’s and Anderson’s views, reinforcing relations between members of the nation and excluding others are crucially related to family metaphors.

3.1.2 *Nations as families in public discourse*

When used in public discourse, family metaphors usually form part of rhetorical and political strategy. They are based on the everyday experience of people having fathers, mothers and (possibly) siblings. Different types of knowledge about the FAMILY source domain may be employed to highlight aspects of the NATION target domain. These include the treatment of children in the family, distinguishing between family and non-family members, and gendered roles of the family members.

Family metaphors may also be used on a general level, as ideologically charged conceptual models for political conceptualizations, based on the way in which children in the family are treated. For instance, LeBlanc (2013) shows how François Hollande in the French presidential election of 2012 employed the metaphor THE NATION IS A PARENT and THE FRENCH PEOPLE ARE CHILDREN, both implying FRANCE IS A FAMILY, as a common metaphorical conception of nationality in order to create a sense of universal community that transcends sub-national divisions. Defining France as a mother that cares for her children allowed the speaker to infuse his ideas with specific emotions, emphasize the welcoming, protective, nurturing, and parental characteristics of the country.

Lakoff (1996) distinguishes two types of parental attitudes: the “strict father” and “nurturant parent” model, which he sees as producing two opposing moral frames for understanding government and nation. The first relates to the traditional patriarchal, vertical family form, and the second to a more horizontal family model. These opposing models explain the values that underlie American conservatism and American progressivism. Both are experienced in the personal life of many individuals and are parts of the American culture (Watson 2010). These and similar family-based models have been used for other cultures as well: Blake (2014) argues that they were used in Spain during the Inquisition, and Gradečak-Erdeljić and Babić (2016) that they are visible in the contemporary Croatian political situation.

Family metaphors may also be used to legitimize various distinctions between social actors, including some of them in the in-group but excluding others. For instance, Harder (2014) uses large-scale family-based metaphorical models, and shows how Britishness was conceptualized in different time periods, claiming that the changes in conceptualization were in line with macro-social and intersubjective factors. In all the family-based models proposed by Harder, family metaphors were used to legitimize a point of view, reinforcing emotional links with social actors defined as “us,” and disassociating “us” from “others” (e.g. “lesser breeds” in colonial Britain).

The us-them distinction may be legitimized by family metaphors when they are used in a manner that implies a “pure” family bound together by “blood.” This can justify exploitation and rationalize domination (see, for example, May (2008), and Rigney (2001: 16), who points toward some instances in which these metaphors “are wielded rhetorically to confer privilege on one group while pointedly excluding others”). Examining British identity and the New Right ideology, Brah (1993) also discusses the use of the metaphors of family, kinship, and gender in the context of exclusions of various national Others: family metaphors are linked to a long history of racialized exclusions. According to the author, these made it possible to construct African-Caribbean and Asian cultures as the Other of the British character, and a serious threat to the “British way of life.”

Family metaphors, because of their sociocultural grounding, may have such a hold on us that their target domains shift, without a shift in the source domain. This is what happens with the “sibship metaphor” in Chinese, which was central in calling for national unity and national resistance when used by the Chinese Communist Party under the threat of Japanese invasion. It has undergone shifts in the target domain in the contemporary Chinese context, in which *ETHNIC AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IS SIBSHIP* is used to refer to the non-mainland Chinese population, whereas *NATIONAL IDENTITY IS SIBSHIP* is used to refer to ethnic minorities in China (Jing-Schmidt 2016).

Feminist research has emphasized that imagined communities, including family metaphors that help in their imaginings, are gendered (see, for example, Mostov 2000; Einhorn 2006; Ahrens 2009). Racioppi and O'Sullivan (2000: 33) argue that:

... the development of national identity, like all forms of identity formation, is itself a gendered process ... The historical myths and the imagined communities are deeply gendered; the processes by which myths are constructed and purveyed tell us something about gender relations in any particular nation. They present normative images of what it means to be a male or female member of the nation, and they will therefore affect members of the nation differently.

Peterson has repeatedly (e.g. 1994, 2013) scrutinized gendered nationalism and the metaphor A NATION IS A WOMAN, which relates to a patriarchal concept of the nation (see, for example, Burgoyne 1994, discussing the US context). This metaphor enables a cluster of other metaphors to emerge; for instance, rape as a metaphor of national humiliation (see Peterson 2013). However, rape is not only a metaphor, but a strategy practised in countless wars.⁹ Jager (2016) discusses the metaphor of rape in a study of Korean nationalism, showing how the literal dimension relates to the metaphorical conceptualization, in this particular case the conceptualization of a nation's division. The metaphors A NATION IS A WOMAN and NATIONAL HUMILIATION IS RAPE have been employed in various national contexts (see, for example, Duara 1993, discussing the Chinese nation).

Peterson's studies examine nationalism not simply as gendered, but as heterosexist. Posel (2011) also argues that family and body metaphors of the nation relate to the idea of life-giving sexuality. Aspirations to nationhood are linked to the "productive disciplining of sexuality as a force of order" (Posel 2011: 139). Posel demonstrates that the use of images of birth and new life was central to South African politicians' role as nation-builders (for instance, it was central in Mbeki's African Renaissance discourse). The heterosexist dimension of nationalism can have consequences for minorities: examining this issue, Waitt (2005) shows how Latvian mainstream political parties, to sustain political promises of social stability and order in the post-Soviet context, have heterosexed the Latvian nation. Using the metaphor A NATION IS A WOMAN (which implies that men are protectors) "provided politicians with 'Latvian traditional heterosexual family values'" (Waitt 2005: 177).

9. Thus, imagining the beloved country as a female child, lesbian, prostitute, or post-menopausal wise woman generates quite different understandings of a community (Peterson 2013: 69).

In conclusion, family metaphors are frequently used in nation scholarship (as a meta-theoretical strategy) as well as in discourses which involve the nation. In both cases, the emotional attachment invoked by the metaphor is crucial, either to conceptualize the emotional attachment (in theoretical views) or to exploit it for discursive purposes (in discourse usage).

3.2 Nations as human bodies

The metaphor A NATION/STATE IS A HUMAN BODY is frequently employed in public discourse today and has a long history in philosophy, poetry, and juristic thought. It is present in English in a special lexicalized form: *the body politic*¹⁰ (for a historical overview and changes in the epistemological, conceptual and argumentative-rhetorical status of the body-state metaphor, see Musolff 2010a, and Musolff 2016b, especially Chapter 5). Ordinary language users have non-scholarly access to body-based knowledge, which is why the semantics of physiological and pathological body imagery can easily be employed and understood. Important elements of the source domain knowledge that are transferred to the target domain nation are as follows:

A healthy body is preferable to a sick body.

Bodily integrity is essential for the self's wellbeing.

All parts of the body must work together for optimal functioning.

Some body parts are more important for the self's survival than others.

(Musolff 2016a: 64)

Based on this and similar knowledge, the logic of the source domain of the body is imposed on the target domain of the nation, which makes conclusions about the target domain of the nation seem “natural.” Legitimization strategies of this type have been examined by different scholars, particularly by linking the source domains of the body, and the related domains of health and illness.

Analysing the rhetoric of the sovereignists and federalists during the Quebec referendum of 1995, Sawchuk (1999) shows how both used the image of the human body and discourses of pain “to substantiate” their ideology: the language of pain was used to threaten and attach blame, as well as to establish the reality of potential hurt and the right solution. Musolff (2010b) examines “body politic” metaphors from a historical perspective and looks at their role as a tool of Nazi propaganda – specifically, how body imagery provided a cognitive framework for the legitimization of genocide. The Nazis used body imagery and deep-rooted conceptual metaphors from the domains of the body, its health, and illness. The

10. This refers to the entire sociopolitical organization of the nation (Musolff 2016a: 52).

conceptual framework that appeared commonsensical to the audience implied illness-cure metaphorical scenarios, and the idea of a necessary “therapy” for the body of the German nation. In the Nazis’ racist ideology, “the Jew-parasite” blend was made “real” as a central alien body that was about to destroy the unity and health of the national body politic (Musolff 2010a: 36). A cleansing of the “German body” of alien bodies, or parasites, was presented as essential.

Body imagery has been employed for legitimization of various aspects of political life in different non-Western and Western national contexts. For instance, Underhill mentions legitimization of the Algerian Nationalist Revolutionary Movement by means of the cancer metaphor (Underhill 2011: 72). Maksić (2017) discusses the use of body metaphors for ethnic mobilization. A NATION IS A BODY is also utilized in the context of international trade (see Bertram 2009) and conceptions of social welfare (see Dean 2000). The use of the metaphor is also observed in anti-immigrant discourse (see, for example, Santa Ana 1999, 2002, who has analysed public discourse metaphors depicting Latinos in the United States). Lawton (2013: 111) argues that the NATION IS A BODY metaphor helps delegitimize immigrants by portraying them as a danger to the health or life of the nation.

The “naturalness” of body metaphors for the nation is, of course, an illusion: their use in discourse is determined by sociocognitive and discursive factors. For instance, Musolff (2016a: 51–53) demonstrates that there is culture-specific variation of the NATION IS A BODY metaphor in English, French, and German, although these language communities all include aspects of the life cycle, anatomy-physiology, state of health, injury, and therapy in the source domain. In addition to cultural variation, discursive factors may also influence metaphor use. Thus, the source domain of parasites used by the Nazis in their JEWS ARE PARASITES metaphor has a continuation in some modern metaphors based on the biologically grounded parasite concept (for example IMMIGRANTS ARE PARASITES, which is used by some extreme right-wing groups in contemporary Europe). However, as Musolff (2016b) indicates, in contemporary discourse similar metaphors are in “competition” with other metaphors, which is why their contemporary usage is different from the use in the totalitarian Nazi system, making their legitimization and delegitimization potential different. A similar point about plant metaphors is made by Rash (this volume).

3.3 Nations as bodies, persons, containers: Metaphor interactions and legitimization

Metaphors are frequently combined in various ways in the discourse. These combinations are used for various discursive effects (see, for example, Kimmel 2010). In the case of the portrayal of nations, the interplay concerns body metaphors, family

metaphors, container conceptualizations and person conceptualizations (in addition to others, as shown in various chapters in this volume).

A container has an inside, an outside, and a boundary that divides it from the outside world. The container conceptualization arises as an embodied non-propositional image schema (for an overview of image schemas see Lakoff & Johnson 1999), and because of its flexibility, it has great appeal as a source domain for a variety of metaphors. It is frequently used in a variety of metaphors with the target domain related to the nation or the state (see Đurović and Silaški, this volume, for an overview). When combined with the NATION IS A BODY metaphor, various implications may arise, and one of them is that the nation as a body/container may be violated by “foreign elements.” This is in line with the definition of nations as limited: “the nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them ... has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 2006: 7), which necessarily implies real or symbolic borders, the inclusion of some elements (seen as “national”), and the exclusion of some others (“non-national” ones).

Territorial conceptualizations of the nation are easily connected with the family metaphor, resulting in the “homeland” concept (and its equivalents in other languages), as well as the container conceptualization, which allows for conceptualizing borders as dividing “us” from “others.”¹¹ The homeland concept is based on metonymic imagination:¹² a country is in reality a place of people’s individual homes, but, when imagined in its entirety, it is “a home of homes”: this is a concrete and abstract image of integral unity. This type of homeland can be portrayed as a person (or a member of the family), as shown by Cepinskyte (this volume). Nations as homelands are separated physically by borders (which is in line with the container conceptualizations). This implies that different nations’ “others” are on the other side of the border (also see Đurović and Silaški, this volume).¹³ They are also metaphorically separated from each other in the discursive construction of “our nation” versus “their nations.”

Both the family metaphor and the body metaphor are in line with a conceptualization whereby a nation is personified. Nations are routinely conceptualized as *living* bodies; that is, persons (for a brief overview of personifications and metonymies, see Šarić 2015: 51–53). Generally speaking, personification is difficult to

11. The metaphor of border-crossing stands for negotiating multiple identities (see Ewing Pratt 1998).

12. Cepinskyte (this volume) follows Rätzl (1994: 84), who suggests that the German word *Heimat* expresses “a prime symbol of the nation.”

13. Even with non-contested borders, “the world is too small to bear two homelands with the name ‘Macedonia’” (Billig 1995: 75).

operationalize in metaphor studies, and its scope depends on the linguistic level of analysis (Dorst 2011). In practical terms, any specific conceptualization such as the nation being seen as a particular family member may be considered personification on a more general level. This means that the family metaphor may be considered a specification of the person metaphor. Moreover, it is connected with the body conceptualization through health. For example, Lakoff (2004: 118–19) claims that the notion of “national interest” is grounded in the healthy body/person conceptualization: “Just as it is in the interest of a person to be healthy and strong, so it is in the interest of a nation-person to be economically healthy and militarily strong” (Lakoff 2004: 118–19).

3.4 What metaphors highlight and hide

In Section 3.3 we discussed a number of metaphors which have been frequently used in the conceptualization of nations in discourse.¹⁴ All of them are socioculturally grounded in source domains that seem natural and everyday, of which we have rich experience. This is why they seem to be quite natural, seemingly unproblematic in their framing of the target domain of the nation. However, as has been shown by the material referenced in this section, the “naturalness” of the source domain yields a framing power that highlights and hides nearly invisibly. Overall, this shows that nation metaphors straddle two factors: conceptual sociocultural motivation that brings about their “naturalness,” legitimization and emotional potential, and their use in discourse where this potential is exploited in bringing about framing that seems natural and legitimate, and causes (strong) positive or negative emotions.

4. Metaphors framing nation discourses through emotions: Overview of the chapters

In line with what has been said thus far, the chapters in this volume examine the role of metaphor or its consequences in discourses and voices of the powerful

14. Other metaphors for nations occasionally studied include those with animals (Santa Ana 2003), music (Biddle & Knights 2007) and food (López-Rodríguez 2014) as the source domains. These are employed in contexts criticizing people’s attitudes, or to convey racist views. A frequent source domain is also a physical structure or organism that makes it possible to conceive of a crisis of the nation as its “breakdown” or “collapse” (see, for example, Brosius 2005). The present book does not directly address metaphors in conceiving supranational entities (e.g. the EU), which is an enormous topic deserving a separate study.

elites (Part I) and in semi-official and mixed discourses (Part II). Rather than going for comprehensive geographical coverage of various nations, the volume seeks to include a range of metaphor-related discourses, from general political discourse and presidential speeches to newspapers, TV series, Catholic homilies, colonialist discourse, and various online sources. Most of the material analysed has been compiled for the particular studies, whereas two chapters use existing language corpora (Stanojević and Perak).

Methodologically speaking, qualitative methods are used, with additional quantification offered in the chapters by Demata, Perak, Stanojević and Šarić. Most authors analyse textual sources, whereas multimodal elements are taken into account by Cepinskyte and Grassi. The approaches taken include political science, literary studies and linguistics. In line with the respective research approach, discourse metaphors were identified intuitively (in chapters by Marks, Gomola, Vervaet, Čičin-Šain, Rash, Cepinskyte, Demata, Šarić and Grassi), by using an established metaphor identification procedure (Đurović and Silaški, Stanojević) or by developing an identification procedure (Perak). All the chapters feature discursive constructivist views of metaphor, with clear sociocultural grounding, and the notion of metaphor as a framing device. All the authors agree that metaphor plays a more or less central role in conceptualizing nations, but disagree as to where its hegemony stems from and how far its consequences may go.

Part I opens with the study by Michael Marks which analyses the figurative bases of the expert-model metaphor of nation- and state-building in relation to the notions of fragile and collapsed states used in political discourse. The chapter is based on conceptual metaphor theory, and argues that the metaphors of nation- and state-building, which are grounded in the physical experience of safety, have lost their connection with the literal domain from which they stem, and hence lose their significance for people who need literal shelters and homes. In this way, political models – which should be there to serve people – lose their connection with the very people they are supposed to serve.

In a counterpoint to Marks' chapter, Tatjana Đurović and Nadežda Silaški explore how metaphors are exploited and eventually reified through discursive political practices. Đurović and Silaški focus on the Serbian officials' construal of Serbia during the 2015 and 2016 migrant "crisis" using the CONTAINER image schema and the WALL scenario. Because of their evaluative properties, the two metaphorical entities allowed Serbian officials to present the migrant "crisis"¹⁵ as

15. Note that the term "the migrant crisis" or "the refugee crisis" is itself a discursive framing that "puts a frame around a complex social process and effectively separates it historically, socially, and politically from other social processes, non-crises" (Rajaram 2015). The term

an obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU, and to portray Serbia as not being part of the EU space. Thus, the examined metaphorical conceptualizations served a framing and evaluative function. Finally, in an act of reification, the metaphors resulted in the literal building of a barbed wire fence around Serbia, providing literal grounding (and reinforcement) to the othering function of the CONTAINER image schema and the WALL metaphor.

Aleksander Gomola combines critical metaphor analysis with the discourse historical approach to analyse the Catholic nationalist discourse in Poland after 2004. Specifically, Gomola shows that the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor is used in Catholic discourse to express Polish national identity, as a way of presenting the EU as both a threat and a challenge for Poland as a chosen nation charged with the mission of defending the Christian faith in a godless Europe. On the theoretical level, the author claims that the persuasive power of the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor is due to its conceptual nature, particularly its ability to achieve the human scale in Fauconnier and Turner's terms.

The following two chapters deal with prescriptive language ideology and nationalism in Serbian and Croatian discourse. Stijn Vervaeet examines the use of conceptual metaphors and metonymies in a Serbian newspaper column offering advice on "correct" language usage. Vervaeet shows that some metaphors and metonymies used in the column feature a direct conceptual link between prescriptivism and nationalism (e.g. the metonymy LANGUAGE FOR TERRITORY), whereas others do not (e.g. the metaphor LANGUAGE RULES ARE (TRAFFIC) LAWS). He claims that regardless of their conceptual links, the analysed metaphors and metonymies feature the same ideological strength, which is a result of how the metaphors/metonymies are used in discourse. Thus, he calls for the investigation of the discursive histories of metaphors to discover where their ideology lies.

In her paper on metaphors of language contact and change in Croatian discourse produced by influential social actors, Višnja Čičin-Šain proposes a metaphorical LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario (in the sense used by Musolf 2006, 2015) as a schematic organizational unit which brings a variety of metaphors together. The LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario is claimed to be an identity-affirming discursive structure with evaluative negative implications for the members of the out-group and positive ones for in-group members, through its connection with the LANGUAGE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY metonymy.

"reflects the frantic attempt by the EU and European nation-states to control, contain, and govern people's ("unauthorized") transnational and inter-continental movements." (De Genoa et al. 2016).

Two chapters that follow look into late 19th and early 20th century sources discussing the role of metaphors and symbols in Germany and Russia. Felicity Rash's chapter examines the use of metaphors of flowing and cultivation in German nationalist discourse in texts produced between 1871 and 1914. The paper is set within the framework of critical metaphor analysis and the discourse historical approach. It provides an analysis of the history of each group of metaphors, and a qualitative analysis of their use. The metaphors discussed were used to legitimize German colonization during the period in question, but the author notes that the same metaphors are now used to present migration in a negative light.

Agne Cepinskyte analyses the German and Russian political discourse of the late 19th and early 20th century with regard to how the relationship between the state and the nation is constructed. In both cases, a single pivotal concept is used to engender a feeling of loyalty among the state's citizens, but by different means. The German *Heimat* 'homeland' works as a spatial symbol which is associated with nature, landscape and nostalgia for home, whereas the Russian Motherland is analysed as a metaphor, basing its potential on its role as a central figure holding the nation/family together. Basing its theoretical claims on Ricoeur's model, Cepinskyte claims that metaphors create a rigid interpretative structure, which means that their constructive potential is based on the content of the metaphor itself, whereas symbols include a non-semantic (emotional) element, which allows for making individual bottom-up connections.

The first part of the volume closes with Massimiliano Demata's study of the role of the conceptual metaphors A NATION IS A PERSON and A NATION IS A BUILDING in State of the Union addresses by four United States presidents, two Democrat and two Republican. The analysis shows that the metaphors are frequently used throughout the speeches, with very limited variety in metaphorical mappings between the presidents, irrespective of party, and irrespective of whether they refer to the US or to other countries. Demata argues that the restricted use is a way of providing the national community with a vocabulary that enables political participation on the one hand, and on the other limits alternative interpretations of reality, thus constituting a hegemonic discursive model.

Part II of the volume draws on material that does not reflect powerful actors, but rather discourses which are unofficial or mixed, either because it largely uses corpora of online communication, or audiovisual material that to some extent resists the actors in power.

Benedikt Perak's study explores the status of metaphors in the conceptualization of the nation from a conceptual point of view. With this aim, Perak builds a theoretical model which consists of an ontology of concepts. In the model, a metaphorical conceptualization is produced when the collocated lexemes referring to the source and target domains produce "an ontological violation of prototypical

relations of the constituents.” When applied to the NATION concept, metaphors that appear in the hrWaC corpus of Croatian impose reification on the concept, personify the concept, and identify it socioculturally. These metaphors are seen as pragmatic functions that reinforce the status of the NATION, including the creation of collective identity.

Mateusz-Milan Stanojević takes the view that metaphors are a local phenomenon with the capacity to provide framing rather than a global conceptual occurrence that results from a natural predisposition of a source concept for metaphorization. Specifically, Stanojević uses corpus concordances of the Croatian lexical item *nacija* ‘nation’ and data from online forums to show that linguistic metaphors can be motivated based on discursive, grammatical, or lexical ambiguity factors rather than purely conceptual ones. He claims that global conceptual generalizations are a sum of local conceptualizations.

In her chapter on the *prison of nations* metaphor in South Slavic online sources, Ljiljana Šarić examines the evaluative force of the metaphor and its strategic use. Focusing on the local uses of the metaphor in online communication, Šarić shows that the discourse participants recycle the metaphor rather than recontextualizing it creatively. The metaphor proves to be stable in its negative evaluation and in being linked with negative emotions, and is used to enact everyday nationalism, particularly in the discourse of the political right.

Silvia Grassi explores how visual and audiovisual metaphors in a Catalan television series relate to the construction of the sense of identity of the series protagonist. Using the theoretical framework of conceptual metaphor analysis combined with a cognitive approach to audiovisual metaphor, Grassi analyses a number of visual and textual elements in the first episode of the series, and interprets their specific metaphorical significance against the backdrop of the entire episode. She goes on to claim that the protagonist’s individual experience should be regarded as an allegory for the imagined national communities in Catalonia.

The volume ends with an afterword by Andreas Musolf, which provides an answer to the general question of whether nations need new metaphors.

All the chapters in the book examine how metaphors lead to the discursive construal of a common element that brings the nation together. In doing so, they reflect the view that metaphors are a building block of a discursive definition of the nation, as presented in this introductory chapter. The most frequent common element is emotionality, whereby metaphors are used to frame a portion of experience in a way that leads to emotional responses that bring about identification or disidentification. The views on how exactly this happens vary between chapters, but can be subsumed under two general trends. On the one hand, some authors see this as a result of the conceptual nature of metaphor.

In these chapters the various discursive characteristics of metaphors are in line with their overall make-up as metaphors. This view is strongly held by Gomola and Perak. Some chapters which do not necessarily take an explicit stance on the issue work better with a conceptual-first view. This is the case with Marks's claims of loss of grounding, Đurović and Silaški's description of metaphor reification, Cepinskyte's ideas of a rigid interpretative structure of metaphors, and Grassi's analyses of audiovisual material based on primary metaphors. On the other hand, some authors claim that the emotionality of metaphors is mainly due to their use in discourse. In other words, their ability to bring an emotional community together is primarily discursive (based on their use) and secondarily (if at all) conceptual. Such a claim, graduated to varying degrees, is reflected in the chapters by Vervaeet, Stanojević and Rash. The ideas of some other authors, although not explicit, point towards a discursive-first view. This includes Šarić's evaluative force, Čičin-Šain's LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario, and Demata's conceptual restrictions as a result of discourse.

The chapters in the volume show that metaphor is certainly an important building block of various textual and multimodal, contemporary and historical, naïve and expert discourses on the nation. This claim, however helpful, cannot do justice to the wealth of analyses and theoretical discussions presented in the chapters. We hope that the reader will find them as thought-provoking as we have, enjoying the tensions and the commonalities between them.

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PART I

Discourses and voices of the powerful elites

CHAPTER 1

The desire for shelter

Nation- and state-building and the metaphorical discourse of fragile and collapsed states

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Among scholars and practitioners of politics, a common way of thinking about insecure political systems is to conceptualize the lack of political order in terms of metaphorically fragile and collapsed states. The suggested solution to state fragility and collapse is often the policy of nation- and state-building. This chapter uses the theory of conceptual metaphor to understand the discursive and policy relationships between the metaphorical concepts of nation- and state-building and their counterparts in the conceptual metaphors of fragile and collapsed states. The chapter finds that fear of exposure and vulnerability in a world without shelter provides a logic for the physical protection supplied by the state and the remedy that nation- and state-building provide when that structure is in jeopardy.

Keywords: metaphors, Critical Metaphor Analysis, nation- and state-building, fragile and collapsed states

1. Introduction

On 22nd June 2011, in a speech delivered from the White House, United States President Barack Obama declared: “America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home” (Obama 2011). The metaphorical juxtaposition of the phrase “nation building” with the United States imagined as a “home” succinctly captures the conceptualization of territorially defined political entities as places of security in a dangerous world. To drive the point home that the purpose of formal governance is to provide protection, and to indicate that the United States had not completely given up hope of nation building abroad (specifically with reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan), Obama stated in his speech that “there should be no doubt

that so long as I am President, the United States will never tolerate a safe haven for those who aim to kill us.” Five years later, in his campaign for the presidency, Obama’s eventual successor Donald Trump delivered a speech in Youngstown, Ohio which began with the sentence: “Today we begin a conversation about how to Make America Safe Again” (Trump 2016). Citing a list of foreign policy failures of the Obama administration that had created instability abroad, Trump went on to assert: “Our current strategy of nation-building and regime change is a proven failure,” following up with the promise: “If I become president, the era of nation-building will be brought to a very swift and decisive end” (Read 2016).

While seemingly at odds over a host of foreign policy issues, the forty-fourth and forty-fifth presidents of the United States put forth remarkably similar visions of the function of the state as a political entity. Like Obama before him, Trump called for renewed attention to promoting the safety and security of Americans in the United States by setting limits on U.S. commitments abroad. Though the two men cast themselves as representing contrasting philosophies of the role states play in the world, and in an irony not lost on those who observed the acrimonious presidential campaign of 2016, Obama and Trump advanced a theory of politics that is shared by a wide range of policymakers and scholars alike. By advocating “nation building here at home” (from Obama’s speech) and by promising to “Make America Great Again” (Trump’s 2016 campaign slogan), what Obama and Trump articulated were ironically similar projects of erecting institutions for political and economic stability in the United States. Obama and Trump, though political rivals, both intuited that, despite differences of opinion on the specifics of how best to bring about human security, the consensus among political thinkers is that the state is that system of government which is best suited to shelter people from danger.

In this chapter I will argue that metaphorical conceptions of states and nations as places built to provide protection serve as powerful framing devices which shape foreign policy responses to the perceived failings of so-called fragile and collapsed states. To be sure, depending on context, “nation” and “state” can have different meanings and some of the literature on nation-building and state-building has made distinctions between the two processes. However, in contemporary discourse the terms “nation-building” and “state-building” are increasingly used interchangeably. This is particularly the case in the responses to current debates such as the one engaged in the rhetoric of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. In a counter-intuitive way, the reactions of Barack Obama and Donald Trump against what they see as the perceived shortcomings of nation-building abroad reinforce a theory of the state as a protective shelter against danger. The failure of many nation-building efforts notwithstanding, and in large part *because* these efforts have not consistently produced the desired results, there is nonetheless agreement

that when states have become “fragile” or “collapsed,” at least in theory, they can be re-built. In other words, and with still more irony, for many scholars and policymakers, the problem is not with the concept of nation-building itself, but with the disastrous results when it does not work.

The dilemmas of nation-building are not new. Writing in the mid-1960s, Nina Heathcoate (1964/1965: 32) lamented that “perhaps the term nation-building is somewhat too affirmative and dramatic, considering how limited is its scope.” Championed by United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld as a means of “building up of the national state” (Heathcoate 1964/1965: 24), nation-building was promoted as a solution to the disappearance of colonial empires that created countries lacking in economic and political resources. In the absence of resources to establish effective governance, newly created states abandoned in the wake of colonial retreat were often more damaged than aided by efforts to build nations. Heathcoate (1964/1965: 30) writes: “The hurried attempts at building up new states have often endowed them with no more than the paraphernalia of government.” To put it another way, preoccupation with the metaphorical building of nations and states can often ignore the literal safety of the very individuals whom political institutions are designed to protect.

The shortcomings of nation-building efforts aside, the persistence of the metaphor of nation-building can be seen in both scholarly debates and policymaking circles, for example, the press release for a 2004 United Nations effort to limit political violence in the Ivory Coast entitled “UN recommends nation-building programme for Côte d’Ivoire” (United Nations 2004). Regardless of individuals’ awareness of the limitations of nation-building, the metaphorical concept of “building,” and its subsequent linking of politics with physical structures, continues to exert a powerful influence over foreign policy initiatives around the globe. Reflecting on the processes of nation-building, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan opined: “nation-building is a long-term proposition. It does take time, it is hard, it is difficult and it requires everyone to play his or her part” (United Nations 2006).

Where the metaphor of building nations and states comes from, how it influences the affairs of states, and why it is significant for understanding the discourse of international relations are the focal points of this chapter. The chapter finds that fear of exposure and vulnerability in a world without shelter provides a logic for the physical protection supplied by the state and the remedy nation and state-building provide when that structure is in jeopardy. It applies the theory of conceptual metaphor to understand the discursive and policy relationships between the metaphorical concepts of nation and state-building and their counterparts in the conceptual metaphors of fragile and collapsed states. The metaphors of buildings and homes figure prominently throughout several of the chapters in this

volume, for example, in metaphors which “construct” nations and identities (see Đurović and Silaški; Grassi; Perak, and Vervaet in this volume), delineate the contours of a national “home” (see Cepinskyte in this volume), and condemn nations to “prisons” (see Šarić in this volume). The propensity to conceptualize politics in terms of physical structures is a manifestation of humans’ physical experiences of insecurity which produces a desire for shelter against a dangerous world. Where the metaphorical structure of the state has become fragile or collapsed, projects of nation- and state-building are offered as viable solutions to a perceived problem of human insecurity. Ironically, such projects often overlook or even exacerbate the literal physical harm that perhaps is more readily solved by means not suggested by dominant metaphorical frames.

This chapter proceeds first by laying out the theoretical bases for its analysis and its grounding in the theory of conceptual metaphor. It then identifies the desire for shelter as the master metaphor by which scholars and policymakers approach the problem of fragile and collapsed states and the solution posed by nation- and state-building. What is meant by state fragility and collapse is analysed in the context of nation- and state-building as political projects. The chapter also analyses how the metaphorical building of political institutions, even those involving building peace, can inadvertently jeopardize the security of the very individuals these initiatives presumably are designed to serve. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the difference between metaphorical and literal safety as framed by the metaphor of building political institutions.

2. Theoretical considerations

Cognitive linguists maintain that conceptual metaphors are mental manifestations of physical and sensory experiences. Many of the current debates over the role of metaphors centre on the contributions of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis is that metaphors are part of an ongoing process in which humans interact with the physical environment. Human thinking is understood as a process whereby physical experiences shape the way we comprehend the world. The most basic sensory perceptions gathered through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch give meaning to abstract ideas by transferring meaning from one domain to another. Lakoff and Johnson have coined the term the “embodied mind,” which refers to human learning as a function of its biological bases, especially the neural functioning of the body and the brain. Mental interpretations of the physical world, combined with cultural contexts, thus form the basis for concepts expressed as linguistic metaphors (Gibbs 1999).

This chapter applies a method of political discourse analysis to highlight conceptual metaphors as cognitive manifestations of physical and sensory experiences. Political science, the disciplinary tradition from which this chapter derives its perspective, has a tenuous relationship with metaphors despite the efforts of several scholars to give attention to how metaphors shape political discourse. For example, Eugene Miller (1979) has observed that metaphors can be used by political leaders deliberately to advance policy, can manifest themselves without specific intent in political speech and action, and are constitutive of political thought. Similarly, Murray Edelman (1971) points out that embodied metaphors are pervasive in political speech which are part of what Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Laughlin, and Laura Roselle (2013) refer to as the larger “strategic narratives” that political leaders use to advance political objectives. Although there is no coherent method for studying metaphors in political science, what does bind together the various analyses of metaphors in political discourse is an acknowledgment that conceptual metaphors constitute political realities.

While there have been some efforts to give explicit attention to metaphors in political discourse in the field of political science, they do not amount to a cohesive theoretical approach in the same way that Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) guides research in cognitive linguistics. Research on metaphors using CMA can be instructive to political scientists seeking to understand political discourse, particularly that involving interstate relations. In the area of European integration, for example, Andreas Musolff (2001, 2004) has noted how metaphors of direction and speed enter into discussions over the pace of European integration. Additionally, Musolff (2001, 2004) shows that the metaphor of the common European “home” has had an impact on member states’ efforts to foster closer cooperation, particularly in the area of common foreign and security policy (the “home” metaphor is a theme pursued by Cepinskyte in this volume). The concept of the state as a body also has figured into debates over the relationship between European member states and processes of European integration (see Gomola’s chapter in this volume). Speaking more broadly, Musolff (2016) expands on the many ways in which political conflict is frequently thought of metaphorically as “war.” Musolff (2010) has elaborated at length on the very tangible effects that conceptual metaphors can have on political outcomes, chronicling in grisly detail the way metaphors of “disease” contributed to German efforts to “cleanse” the “body” politic resulting in the horrors of the Holocaust.

Even more relevant for the present study, Paul Chilton (1996) has identified a variety of metaphors which constitute the realm of international security. Among the significant metaphorical concepts which influence the course of international relations is the metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER which conceptualizes countries as hermetically sealed entities with insides that must be defended against

hostile threats emanating from without. Chilton notes that the very concept of international “security” is itself an elaborate metaphor which imagines international relations as a potentially unstable structure which must be secured against unrest and disturbance.

Among scholars of international politics who take seriously the role played by metaphors is Nicholas Onuf, whose work focuses on constructivist theory and methods. Onuf’s view is that “all metaphors are concepts and all concepts metaphors” (Onuf 2010: 68). As facile as this statement may sound to cognitive linguists, Onuf’s aim is to provide a starting point for political scientists and other scholars of international relations to identify concepts that are metaphorical in origin and whose importance for understanding international relations can be determined by examining those metaphorical roots. Onuf suggests looking for what is sedimented in the structure of international politics metaphors. He concludes that scholars of international relations should focus on “middle-range” theory, or what he metaphorically refers to as “moderate-sized goods” (Onuf 2016: 124–126), that is, political practices that lie somewhere between large-scaled structures and small-sized individual discrete acts of political activity. Specifically, as it applies to the subject of this chapter, what lies in the middle between the conceptual metaphor of the aforementioned *A STATE IS A CONTAINER* and discrete political acts of the state are the moderate-size practices of states conceived of as fragile or collapsed and which are subject to nation- and state-building.

Following the lead of Sabine Maassen (2000), the method employed in this chapter takes political and scholarly discourse as self-evidently revealing metaphorical concepts. As Maassen (2000: 209) states, “metaphors perform their task on the surface of discourses.” For both scholars and political leaders alike, the discourse of states as physical structures that can house political institutions and which are subject to varying degrees of structural integrity are linguistic manifestations of the underlying conceptual metaphor of *A STATE IS A CONTAINER*. I therefore take the metaphors of state fragility and collapse, and nation- and state-building, and interpret how they relay underlying physical experiences which then lead to policy responses. Metaphorical representations of safety or danger are relevant to this study. When individuals are suspicious that danger is imminent, they might express this instinct using metaphors of smell, saying, for instance, that such a situation “smells bad,” or when the presence of malice is suspected people say “it stinks,” or a claim that is dubious “smells fishy” (Lakoff 2014). Any number of linguistic expressions of danger draw on this conceptual metaphor of vulnerability understood in terms of sensory indications of imminent threat. The metaphorical discourse of the scholarly and policymaking community is analysed to uncover the cognitive frames by which nation- and state-building are seen as solutions to

the problem of state fragility and collapse within the larger metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER. The implications of conceptual metaphors for the literal safety and security of individuals are then discussed.

3. Conceptual metaphors, state insecurity and the desire for shelter

Focusing on the relationship between the notion of nation- and state-building as solutions to fragile and collapsed states within the context of the larger metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER allows us to overcome some of the shortcomings of other formulations, in particular, the concept of so-called “failed” states. “Failed” states are typically understood as countries in which governments are not capable of exercising political authority due to a variety of causes such as civil unrest, ethnic conflict, or low levels of economic activity. For many scholars, policymakers, and world leaders, solving the problem of “failed states” has been one of the main priorities associated with alleviating the plight of individuals living in situations of political and economic turmoil (Helman & Ratner 1992–93; Rotberg 2003, 2004; Bates 2008). Yet the idea of failed states has met with resistance owing to its association with Western conceptions of legitimate government. For instance, Mojúbàolú Okome (2013: 2) characterizes the failed state concept as “a bleak, jaundiced, and dystopic post-Cold War perspective” with dire policy implications in which “the recommended corrective is tantamount to putting the state in receivership – as evidenced by the more sober, but still patronizing validation of a world order by the West and its other allies.” Given these sorts of biases, the concept of a “failed state” has been hurled around as a political epithet (Woodward 2017: 20–24). Additionally, the notion of state “failure” is not as consistent with the concept of A STATE IS A CONTAINER as is the language of what are now more commonly referred to as “fragile” and “collapsed” states.

3.1 Fragile and collapsed states

Empirically, there is disagreement about what constitutes a so-called “fragile” state. In 2014 the Fund For Peace replaced its annual “Failed States Index” (originated in 2007) with the newly named “Fragile States Index,” which ostensibly quantifies aspects of state fragility.¹ In addition to the Fragile States Index, scholars have come up with any number of methods for creating an index of states along a spectrum of fragility. Stewart Patrick (2011: 28), for example, advances an “Index of

1. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>. Accessed 13 September 2017.

State Weakness” as a measure of state fragility, while David Carment and Yiaga-deesen Samy (2014: 4) use a Venn diagram to map the overlapping relationship among “failing and failed” states, “collapsed” states, “fragile” states, “weak” states, “developing” states, and “democratizing” states as a way of indicating the range of categories that could be created to classify countries in terms of the extent of their formal governance. Meanwhile, Charles Call (2011) suggests universalizing conceptions of “failed” and “fragile” states by creating a typology of countries in terms of three forms of metaphorical “gaps” that exist in a state’s ability to project authority: capacity gaps, security gaps and legitimacy gaps. The metaphorical space (gaps) that exist between a state’s capabilities and its ability to project political authority thus becomes a measure of its fragility.

Still more “broken” than “fragile” states are those that are said to be metaphorically “collapsed.” “Collapsed” states typically are identified as those at the extreme end of the spectrum of state weakness, moving from weak to failed to collapsed states or, as Robert Rotberg (2004: 9) puts it, “a *collapsed* state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state” (emphasis in the original). As defined by William Zartman (1995: 1), state “collapse” “refers to a situation where the *structure*, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have *fallen apart* and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new” (emphasis added). I have emphasized the words “structure” and “fallen apart” in this passage to highlight how, as with the metaphor of state “fragility,” metaphorical state “collapse” frames political authority in terms of a structural edifice that can be broken.

What the concepts of state “fragility,” “collapse,” and “failure” have in common is that they extend a metaphor of the conceptual existence of an arrangement of political authority known as “the state.” The reification of the state as a political entity involves an ironic linguistic take on the Latin root *status* which conveys the meaning of “temporary being” – a thing in its current “state” (Marks 2011: 44). Political authority is by nature transient – it has an ongoing “status” – yet conceived of in its reified sense it is afforded a structural existence that, when undergoing what might otherwise be understood as organic change, is said to become “fragile” or to “collapse.” Such a state of being is conceivable in large part because of the metaphorical existence afforded to political authority understood as *the* state.

Inasmuch as scholars consider state collapse as a condition that does not necessarily have to be complete, and, furthermore, situate it along a spectrum from weakness to failure to collapse (Rotberg 2004: 11–13, 43) we are left with the question not so much of state weakness as how to conceptualize governance embodied metaphorically in “the state.” Along the spectrum from weak to failed to collapsed states are any number of processes involving informal governance and formal government organization. What the categories of “failed,” “fragile,” and

“collapsed” states do is provide classification systems for what is understood as formal government as opposed to informal governance. Since both are present along the spectrum from weak to collapsed states, it is not so much the metaphors of state “failure,” “fragility,” or “collapse” that are telling, but rather that these metaphors are attached to the metaphor of “the state.” The aforementioned metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER transfers qualities of physical structure from the domain of hermetically sealed objects to the domain of political authority. Without this metaphor, the division between informal governance and formal government in settings in which political organization is varied and multiform becomes tenuous and imprecise.

3.2 Nation- and state-“building”

If the problem of governance is the danger of “failure,” “fragility,” or “collapse” of the state, then it stands to reason that from the perspective of academics and political officials alike the solution is to engage in state- and nation-“building” (Woodward 2017). Conceived of metaphorically as a physical structure, the restoration of governance in fragile and collapsed states would seem to necessitate a process of “re-building.” While the scholarly literature treats nations and states as analytically distinct, and while there are separate studies of nation- and state-building, understanding the significance of conceptual metaphors is essential for analysing nation- and state-building as political projects formed in reaction to the perception that nations and states, conceived of as physical structures, are necessary for providing governance where states have become “fragile” or “collapsed.” In his aptly titled book *Political Construction Sites*, Pål Kolstø (2000: 16) observes that “‘nation-building’ is an architectural metaphor which, strictly speaking, implies the existence of consciously acting agents such as architects, engineers, carpenters, and the like.” Kolstø (2016: 10–14) acknowledges that nation-building in its practice involves symbolic representation and therefore only metaphorically involves a physical structure for identities, but it also invokes the metaphorical properties of such a structure referring to, for example, “containers of symbolism” which invokes the metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER.

The idea that political systems can be constructed or built is an old one. The first English language reference to state-building is from the early twentieth century: the *Oxford English Dictionary* (online) gives as its first reference for state-building a 1913 article in *The English Review* in which it is said that “the Mongols are not state-builders.” Although in the opinion of the article’s author the Mongols in question could not be considered state-builders, the notion was mooted that the state and the nation, while analytically distinct, are together conceived of as political and social abstractions subject metaphorically to physical construction.

In fact, the state conceived of metaphorically as a structural edifice can be traced back to ancient times. As David Cowling (1998: 85) notes: “The state-as-building metaphor was one among a number of metaphorical designations of the state and its inhabitants inherited from the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions. Rome transmitted the metaphors of the ship of state, the body politic, and the state as a building, all of which are found, with varying levels of frequency, in fifteenth-century French and Burgundian texts.”

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (online) the first use of the term “nation-building” (as opposed to “state-building”) is in an 1862 abolitionist tome by the Reverend Reuben Hatch titled *Bible Servitude Re-examined*. Here Hatch associated “nation-building” (or what is frequently referred to in modern times as “state-building”) not with human progress as it might commonly be understood in the present context – i.e., with the creation of government institutions that provide safety and the rule of law – but with political authority that has the pernicious effect of promoting government rule for the purpose of domination. Hatch’s thesis stands in stark contrast to modern views (Fukuyama 2004; Brazinsky 2007; Porter 2010; Grotenhuis 2016) which almost universally equate nation-building with the erection of political safeguards *against* the arbitrary and capricious exercise of political domination. That nation-building in contemporary times should be associated with a certain *freeing* from political domination is especially ironic inasmuch as in the present day, “building” nations often involves the creation and maintenance of political authority.

Although the terms “state” and “nation” often are defined in distinct ways, the expressions “state-building” and “nation-building” are frequently used in conjunction with each other, a view consistent with the thesis advanced in this chapter. Thus, for example, in his book *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Francis Fukuyama (2004) relates “state-building” and “nation-building” to similar political processes involving the creation of democratic political institutions. Hence the key term in the expressions “state-building” and “nation-building” for our purposes is the metaphor “to build.” “Building” something in human society typically carries with it positive connotations. It invokes the notion of human diligence, of man the maker – *homo faber*. The construction aspect of the “building” metaphor is highlighted by the fact that several authors (Dobbins et al. 2007) have written a “how-to” manual entitled *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-building*, which instructs would-be nation-builders how to undertake a nation-building mission. This construction metaphor is carried through in the title and theme of Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (2008), in which the notion that states are edifices that can be built, broken, and fixed is elaborated in detail.

Once the “building” metaphor has been established, it can be embellished with other construction-related images that elaborate themes associated with desirable elements of constructing something. Thus, for example, for Don Eberly (2008: front cover), the process of “*building* communities and nations” metaphorically “from the *bottom up*” results in the metaphorical “*rise* of civil society” (emphasis added). Politicians, too, have grasped the political implications of the state-“building” metaphor so that, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invoked building imagery when talking about “restoring” the Russian state after it was damaged by previous governments (Koteyko & Ryazanova-Clarke 2009). In a very different context, but with similar meanings attached, a variety of scholars and international aid workers have referred to the “total *fragility*” in South Sudan and the failure of the “international *state-building* project” in that country which nonetheless requires bringing down “the *edifice* of the current leadership” so that “a new government [can] be *built* with new people” (*The New York Times* 24 January 2017: A1; emphasis added). The European Union also has referred explicitly to its state- and nation-building initiatives in developing regions of the world such as South Sudan.²

Thus in the narrative of security, the terms “state-building” and “nation-building” provide metaphorical ways of conceptualizing politics as an intentional, purposeful, and deliberate act of “constructing” something to provide a “structure” for human use. It is also significant that the accepted usage of the word “building” implies habitation. The metaphorical notion of “domestic” politics conveys a similar sense that politics within countries or other political entities involves the conception of a “home” that must be defended from outside danger, a notion that has been conveyed, for example, in the concept of the European Union housing a “common European home” (Chilton & Ilyin 1993; Chilton 1996; Schäffner 1996; Shore 1997). A “domestic structure” is thus part of what is purposefully “constructed” as a habitation, home, or shelter from the outside world. The narrative of “state-building” and “nation-building” therefore engages notions of politics and governance not necessarily as organically evolving or ongoing processes, but as a deliberate process of creating man-made “structures” for the purpose of providing a “home” to defend its occupants from what lies outside.

2. Concerning the EU’s efforts in that country, its delegation to South Sudan sums up the EU’s approach as follows: “South Sudan gained independence in July 2011, and with it came ambitious plans to build the foundations of the world’s newest state. The EU rallied behind the country’s state- and nation-building efforts through significant diplomatic, political, humanitarian and developmental support” (Delegation of the European Union to South Sudan 2016).

3.3 Nation- and state-building as a solution to “fragile” and “collapsed” states

It is through the logic of conceptual metaphors and political discourse analysis that we can comprehend the relationship between the preoccupation with fragile and collapsed states and the projects of nation- and state-building. Specifically, scholars have noted that as conveyed, for example, through the metaphor of A STATE IS A CONTAINER, states can be seen as expressive of humans’ desire for shelter and security in a dangerous world (Walker 1993; Chilton 1996; Campbell 1998; Reus-Smit 1999). The conceptual theory of metaphor understands human thought as a manifestation of physical experiences. Linguistic expressions such as “I smell danger” are metaphorical manifestations of the association the human brain makes between primal sensory inputs and the abstract cognitive processes associated with them. Obviously danger as an abstract idea does not literally possess a smell. Danger is something humans are alert to (Lakoff 2014).

Just as conceptual metaphors of danger correspond to a reliance on humans’ primal sense of smell, conceptual metaphors of insecurity derive from the sensory experience of danger expressed as a lack of and therefore desire for shelter from potential threats of bodily harm. From this realization we can grasp the significance of nation- and state-building as motivating factors in international affairs. Fundamentally, the impulse to engage in nation- and state-building is to try and solve what political leaders and others see as the danger to human security posed by fragile and collapsed states. To reinforce this point, the cover of the book *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction* (Milliken 2003) features a visual metaphor of a collapsed building symbolizing the need for state-building in the wake of state collapse. The metaphorical concept of nation- and state-building expresses humans’ physical desire for shelter and security in a dangerous world. Regarding the connection between danger, the role of the state, and the state’s role of providing protection against collapse, George Lakoff (1999: 16) notes that metaphors relating to the maintenance of an international balance of power include DANGER OF WAR IS INSTABILITY, and LOSING SOVEREIGNTY IS FALLING. Fear of exposure and vulnerability in a world without shelter thus frame the problems of state fragility and collapse.

To put things in stark relief, the title of the 2015 United Nations Population Fund’s annual State of World Population report was *Shelter from the Storm*, with its first chapter entitled “A Fragile World” (Kollodge 2015). In a similar turn of a phrase, the title of René Grotenhuis’s 2016 book, *Nation-building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States*, highlights how a focus on building political communities is often viewed as essential to solving the problem of fragility and collapse. To be fair, like Kolstø (2016), Grotenhuis makes a distinction between the political structures

of the state and the cultural identity of nations, arguing that the latter is necessary for the former to succeed. Grotenhuis concedes, however, that nation and state are intertwined, and thus from a metaphorical point of view the inclination to see the building project as a solution to fragility and collapse is inherent in the approaches adopted by policymaking individuals and organizations.³ Weaknesses in the metaphorical physical structure of the state create a desire to metaphorically build a secure sheltering place in terms of nation *and* state.

What “fragility” and “collapse” reflect are the underlying experiential concepts of security. For scholars and policymakers this is often expressed in terms of “strong” and “weak.” Specifically, for many scholars and policymakers, “strong” and “weak” actors are those who possess large or small amounts of material resources as expressed in terms of their “power.” Power of this nature is thought by some to be reducible to elements that can be measured and quantified in a relatively unambiguous way, much as one would weigh boxers. Presumably a boxer who weighs 115 kilograms has more inherent strength than one who weighs 80 kilograms and thus those fighters should be separated into different competitive groups. For other scholars, however, “strong” and “weak” involve other forms of influence that can render an individual more or less secure relative to others. This conceptualization of implied force has spawned metaphors such as Joseph Nye’s notion of “soft” power (Nye 1990a, 1990b).

Yet expansive formulations of what qualifies as “strong” and “weak” reflect scholars’ theoretical perspectives and policymakers’ policy objectives: notions of security inevitably are subjective. Consequently, definitions of “fragile” and “collapsed” as they apply to states also reflect scholars’ and policymakers’ sense of what *should* be. Lothar Brock et al. (2012: 7) observe as much when they note that:

The terminology of failed, weak or fragile states is not only descriptive, but also has a *normative* connotation: states are not functioning as they *should* ... Speaking in terms of state failure, weakness or fragility may reflect more *our* image of a well-functioning state than the realities on the ground. (emphasis added)

Efforts to create a scale or index of literal measures of state fragility notwithstanding (Rotberg 2004; Balianoune-Lutz & McGillivray 2011; Carment, Prest & Samy 2011; Patrick 2011), for Brock et al. (2012), views of fragile states are subjective and do not reflect an ideal type of the state (something acknowledged by scholars who attempt to create indexes of state fragility). This subjectivity opens up

3. Grotenhuis (2016: 29) writes that in one approach to the relationship between nation and state, “nationhood is necessary for the state to *build* its authority over the people (and its territory) *on solid ground*” (emphasis added).

multiple interpretations of the relationship between fragility and state-building. For example, Katarzyna Kaczmarska (2016) argues that state-building to repair “fragile” states is designed to reinforce not so much the state, but rather the myth of an international community which sees individual state collapse and fragility as a threat to the collective whole.

The concepts of nation and state-building thus also reflect solutions to insecurity that rely on subjective notions of shelter. In politics it is common to refer to the political sphere “inside” the state as the realm of “domestic politics.” The assertion of a distinct area of political activity that takes place in the internal affairs of states is framed by the image of a realm of safety “housed” within the “domestic” confines of a territorially intact entity. The chapter in this volume by Massimiliano Demata astutely observes that the metaphor of NATION IS A BUILDING relies heavily on politicians creating a feeling of “we” by differentiating citizens housed inside a political entity. This location of “domestic” politics relative to the international system is an inevitable consequence of thinking of political activity divided into the domestic and the foreign. Otherwise characterized as the “inside–outside” relationship by R. B. J. Walker (1993), the theoretical establishment of a separate zone of political activity protected from external dangers is an inherent aspect of thinking about separate worlds of politics, with the ordered world of “domestic” politics safely “housed” within the state.

The “inside–outside” view of domestic and foreign policy is a metaphorical concept with deep historical roots that can be traced back to their linguistic origins in Latin. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (online) verifies that “foreign” derives from the Latin *forās* and *foris* meaning ‘outside’, and the first appearance of the word in English was in the years 1292 and 1297 in the forms of *foreyns* and *forene*, respectively, which were an almost direct translation of the Latin cognate. Much more than linguistic images, however, “domestic” and “foreign” represent human conceptual understandings of safety and danger; so, for example, damage can be done to a nation’s language through the introduction of foreign linguistic influence (see Čičin-Šain in this volume). “Inside” – the “domestic” realm – is safe and secure; “outside” – that which is “foreign” – is fraught with insecurity and danger. Theories of “domestic policy” are thus taken up with the politics of order and rule so as to keep safe that which is inside a sheltered area. Such theories problematize the outside world and thus are preoccupied with explaining and thereby solving threats to states’ security.

It is in this sense that the positions adopted by Barack Obama and Donald Trump, highlighted in Section 1 take on poignant significance. By advocating “nation building here at home” (Obama) and declaring a “swift and decisive end” to the “era of nation-building” (Trump), two leaders with otherwise seemingly very different views were expressing a singular idea, that is, that in a dangerous

world the United States should step back from its commitments abroad and work on building structures of security “at home.” While a superficial reading of Trump’s comments suggest a wholesale end to the notion of nation-building in its totality, the wider context of his speech puts the specific comments into perspective. Both Trump and Obama, and other world leaders for that matter, associate political security with the construction of strong political “structures.” The main issue separating Obama and Trump from previous U.S. administrations as well as other governments and organizations around the world is their idea of where nation- and state-building should take place. For organizations such as the Fund for Peace, nation- and state-building projects are solutions for “fragile” and “collapsed” states in developing regions of the world. For Obama and Trump, nation-building is to take place “at home” lest the United States suffer its own fragility and collapse.

In reality, the distinction between the “international” and the “domestic,” the “outside” and the “inside,” is not as neat as Obama and Trump would have it. The “domestic” is as much an idea as it is a territorial reality. In his analysis of armed conflicts over territory, Nadav Shelef (2016: 40) points out that “the sacralization of some territory as the ‘homeland’ by nationalists and the imperative to rhetorically delineate its boundaries means that nationalists speak of their *homeland* in different terms than they speak about *nonhomeland territory*” (emphasis added). Furthermore, as Felicia Pratto et al. (2014: 127) observe, international relations and “domestic” politics often are “intermeshed.” To put it another way, the clear line separating the danger of the outside world from the relative safety of “domestic” politics is a luxury afforded only to the state as a reified concept. In an interdependent world, in which actions often bypass the theoretical boundaries of the state and in which danger and safety are both ever-present, the division between “inside” and “outside” is blurred if perhaps even non-existent. In this world, nation- and state-building are no guarantee of safety and shelter.

3.4 Is “peace-building” the answer?

If the building of nations and states represents the creation of a false barrier between the so-called dangers to the inside from outside of the state, is the answer instead to “build” peace? This would seemingly be the solution favoured by an increasing number of scholars and practitioners. For example, the title of Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis’ 2006 book on United Nations peacekeeping operations is divided into two parts: *making* war which is contrasted with *building* peace, as well as the similarly-titled book *Building States to Build Peace* (Call 2008) and article “Building Democracy While Building Peace” (Zürcher 2011). A quick search of new titles on a popular online retailing website reveals that at least thirty books have been published in recent years devoted to some formulation of

“peace-building” or “building peace,” including a volume specifically focused on peace-building as a solution to fragile states (Ponzio 2011).⁴ The United Nations contains its own agency dedicated to peace-building, the Peacebuilding Commission, described as “an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, and is a key addition to the capacity of the International Community in the broad peace agenda,” as well as the UN Peacebuilding Fund.⁵

This recent emphasis on building peace as opposed to building nations and states would appear to be a positive development if the purpose is to promote greater safety and security against violent threats. The abstractions of nation and state often bring about less shelter than more. Some of the largest human migrations in history, mass movements of individuals that displaced millions of human beings from their homes, for example in Europe after World War II and as part of the partition of the Indian subcontinent during British decolonization, were brought about by efforts to engage in nation- and state-building. These mass migrations *removed* people from the shelter of their homes and forced them to encounter great threats to their physical security all in the name of building nations or states. Political projects that were informed by conceptual metaphors of building nations and states often *deprived* humans of physical shelter and exposed them to danger by forcing them to migrate away from their homes. So perhaps “building” peace is more consistent with the desire for shelter than building nations and states.

But are those individuals preoccupied with being peace-builders succumbing to the same impulse to allow a conceptual metaphor to guide policies which ultimately do not end up helping people? Does peace-building involve different strategies from nation- and state-building, or does it work in conjunction with them? Despite the positive results that have been brought about by the efforts inherent in initiatives variously referred to as nation-, state-, and peace-building, the concept of “building” associated with these policy initiatives merits critical inquiry. The notion of “building” political structures metaphorically conceptualizes an innate human desire for shelter from danger. Assuming that danger is physical violence brought about by political authority, then building yet more political structures, even those constructed in the name of peace, may very well overlook if not exacerbate the very political problems that put real people at risk. Consistent with the peace-“building” metaphor, the Centre for International Governance Innovation held a conference in 2013 entitled “Vertical Integration and the United Nations

4. https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=peace+building. Accessed 13 September 2017.

5. <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> Accessed 13 September 2017.

Peacebuilding Architecture.” It is significant that in the so-called “architecture” of peace-building, Norrin Ripsman (2016) asserts that “peace-making” originates from leaders, that is to say, “from above,” while peace itself is maintained by societal actors building “from below.”

Of course, the strategies involved in peace-building are as varied as they are in nation- and state-building. What nation- and state-building seek to solve is the absence of political “structures” that order and rule a physical space. They are responses to the perceived failure of “fragile” and “collapsed” states to provide a political framework to govern people’s lives. What this entails, however, is subject to dispute. As a metaphor, the concept of “building” is as imprecise as it is evocative of the desire for shelter. The numerous recent books on peace-building likewise focus as much on an end as they do on the means by which that end can be achieved. Moreover, the record on peace-building has been, in the words of several scholars, “mixed and full of disappointments” (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009: 17), “questionable” (Futamura, Newman & Tadjbakhsh 2010: 1), “disappointing” (Paris 2010: 337), “not been too effective” (Sandole 2010: 77), and “needing improvement” (Muggah 2014: 3). Whilst always well-meaning, international peace-building efforts have had to contend with many of the similar challenges of nation- and state-building that are the product of imposing a conceptual frame which draws on the metaphor of building physical spaces to protect individuals from harm. Inasmuch as the state is associated with such physically built spaces, the range of political options thought possible is inherently limited.

What remains constant is the idea that fragility and collapse can be repaired through a political project of building a sheltered place, in this instance, with the building supplies provided by peace. To emphasize this idea, the premise of United Nations official Michael von der Schulenburg’s book is that to build peace it is necessary to rescue the nation-state (Schulenburg 2017). Yet peace is as much a political frame as is the nation and the state. The absence of violence is not necessarily equated with the absence of politics, that is, rule. Whether it is the nation, the state, or peace, we should not lose sight of the constant theme that humans’ well-being ostensibly depends on politics to protect people from danger through the restorative project of building a political place.

4. Conclusion: The desire for shelter – metaphorical and literal

The irony is that those individuals – politicians, world leaders, academics, human rights activists, officials in international institutions and organizations, bureaucrats, and the like – who are most interested in “building” nations and states are preoccupied with providing *metaphorical* structures of protection and safety while

those people they ostensibly seek to help – regular, everyday people who simply are trying to survive and prosper – are more interested in *literal* homes and places of safety that furnish them with physical shelter. They are less interested in the trappings of the state than in the literal shelter of a secure place to live. For them, “building” a nation or state is a metaphorical abstraction. The state is a concept, one that frequently affords them less, not more protection from threats to their existence. In addition to the aforementioned forced migrations brought about by nation- and state-building, any number of countries have been created in the name of nation- and state-building that have forced people to live with others from whom they perceive a threat. The list of countries created and maintained in the name of nation- and state-building that create greater danger to their inhabitants due to misguided efforts to forge a unity among groups hostile to each other – the countries eventually created as a product of the Sykes-Picot Agreement come to mind, e.g., Iraq, Lebanon and Syria – is too long to enumerate here. Suffice it to say that nation- and state-building as conceptual ideals perhaps more often than not fail in their efforts.

Often, very little of what is used as the basis of international policy is based on the actual physical experiences of ordinary people. The reification of states and other corporate actors that gives them a “physical structure” in international relations directs the gaze of political leaders and even academics away from the experiences of ordinary individuals. “Bracketing” the actions of individuals, as Alexander Wendt (1999: 13–14) calls it, may be a necessary epistemological tool to limit the scope of analysis in academic theory, but it also has the net effect of transferring the notion of personhood from flesh-and-blood persons to corporate actors, the interests of which do not necessarily coincide with the individuals who comprise them. International relations as a field of study and foreign policy practice thus are restricted to the actions of a limited range of international actors, leaving out the vast majority of the world’s population who both influence world affairs by their actions and are affected by those actors who are accorded analytical or official status in theory and practice, namely, states and other corporate actors.

On the whole, with some exceptions, international relations theory in general is unconcerned with people, aside from those individuals in positions of political authority. This is because in large part international relations theory and foreign policy practice are preoccupied with metaphorical concepts. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to highlight how much politics and foreign policy emanate from narratives that centre on conceptual themes as frames of reference as opposed to the concerns of the very people politics and policy are ostensibly designed to serve. The preoccupation with building political institutions to protect humans from harm is not entirely monolithic and there are promising trends. As Futamura, Newman, and Tadjbakhsh (2010: 4) note, a “human security approach

to peacebuilding can offer some solutions” when public policy is “directed above all at enhancing the personal security, welfare and dignity of individuals and communities” thus making peacebuilding efforts “more oriented around local needs and conditions.” Such human security approaches which eschew metaphors of political building are more attentive to the literal needs of human beings.

Despite even the best intentions of, for example, nation-, state-, and peace-builders, nation-, state-, and peace-building often pointedly exclude the human and the social and emphasize the political. The reason behind this is the influence of metaphors as the primary tool of academic analysis and public policy. Thus for example, the same authors who seemingly stress the importance of human security in state-building by declaring that “the first-order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance” nonetheless include in the priorities for nation-building projects not only “humanitarian relief” and “development,” but also political structures and institutions representing “security,” “governance,” “economic stabilization,” and “democratization” (Dobbins et al. 2007: xxiii). This is in no way meant to imply that humanitarian relief and political institutions are incompatible. On the other hand, it is possible to provide humanitarian relief without insisting on specific forms of political organization typically associated with the modern state. It is in this sense that the connections between the state seen metaphorically as a physical structure and the impulse to “build” states where they have become “fragile” or “collapsed” are both obvious yet difficult to avoid.

The literal building of homes all too often can give way to building metaphorical abstractions of nation, state, and even peace. While President Obama called in 2011 for a “focus on nation building here at home,” the state-affiliated *China Daily* editorialized disingenuously in its online edition of 9th September 2016 that “peace building should be in Obama’s ‘pivot’ legacy.”⁶ In perhaps the greatest irony of the tension between the metaphorical and the literal, at the same time that Donald Trump called for a “swift and decisive” end to “the era of nation-building,” he was best known in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign for his intention to build a *literal* wall on the southern border of the United States. Trump’s wall and Serbia’s barbed wire fence (Đurović & Silaški this volume) are literal barriers supported by metaphors which emphasize building and protecting the political abstractions of state and nation at home. Yet, what people really want are the literal building blocks of a place to find home and shelter. What provides safety and security is not the building-places of politics but literal homes – structures made

6. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-09/09/content_26745240.htm Accessed 13 September 2017.

of literal building supplies that give people protected places to live. What perhaps is needed is less emphasis on projects building *political* spaces and more projects building *literal* places to live, be sheltered, to feel safe and secure.

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Barbed wire around Serbia

Migrant metaphors as a means of constructing national identity

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Using a theoretical framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004; Musolff 2004, 2006) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Hart 2010; Hart & Cap 2014; Šarić et al. 2010) the chapter investigates the role of metaphors in the construction of *the national*, viewed here through the prism of migrant discourse, and how this reflects on Serbia's EU accession process. We analyse a data collection compiled from texts published in Serbian print and electronic news media in 2015–2016, focusing on verbal instantiations of the CONTAINMENT image schema and the WALL metaphor scenario to show how Serbian officials exploit metaphors in order to present the migrant crisis as a new obstacle to Serbia's becoming part of the EU inner space.

Keywords: metaphor, metaphor scenario, Critical Discourse Analysis, Critical Metaphor Analysis, migrant crisis, EU, Serbia, WALL metaphor, CONTAINMENT image schema

1. Introduction

In September 2015, in order to prevent further illegal entries of migrants into their territory, Hungary and Croatia planned to construct a barrier in the form of a razor-wire fence or a wall on their borders with Serbia, which would leave hundreds of refugees stuck in camps in “no man's land.” The two countries thus intended not only to protect their national borders from increasing migration, but also to protect the EU's external borders. This inevitably had a serious impact on Serbia's migrant policy, this being one of the transit countries for migrants from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Syria. There are several

reasons why Serbia has become a favourite transit route for people who have had to flee their countries: Serbia's favourable geographical position; its border with Hungary from which migrants try to reach other, wealthier EU member countries; and lax, unclear and ineffective Serbian legislation in this field. However, the construction of the barrier, contemplated both in Hungary and Croatia, also had an impact on the perception of Europe's migrant crisis by Serbian citizens, which started to be closely modelled around the concept of a wall that was eventually actually constructed by the Hungarian authorities.

From a cognitive-linguistic point of view, the topic of the migrant crisis seems to be a fertile ground for research "due to its rich potential for polemical and emotional language as well as its socio-political and historical significance" (Musolff 2011: 7). Therefore, our chapter is based on a wide theoretical framework of both Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004; Musolff 2004, 2006; Silaški & Đurović 2014) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Hart 2010; Hart & Cap 2014; Šarić et al. 2010). Additionally, we employ the notion of the "metaphor scenario" (Musolff 2006: 28; described in Section 2).

In this chapter we investigate the role of metaphors, embedded in the discourse about the migrant crisis in Serbian, in constructing national identity and how this impacts on the conceptualization of Serbian citizens in Serbia's EU accession process. We will attempt to show how the pervasive CONTAINER image schema (for the role of this image schema in the construction of national identity, see Cepinskyte; Marks; Šarić this volume), and the WALL metaphor scenario, used in Serbian public discourse to conceptualize the migrant crisis and the protection of the external borders of the EU "house," become instrumental in communicating the notion of not belonging to the EU inner space. This is supported by metaphorical expressions of the WALL scenario and their evaluative properties whereby Serbian officials tend to present the migrant crisis as a new obstacle to Serbia's joining the EU and becoming one of the integral parts of the EU space.

More specifically, we focus on the verbal instantiations of the CONTAINER image schema, and the WALL metaphor scenario in particular, the former devolving into several types of sub-scenarios such as *the prisoner of war camp*, *the buffer zone*, *a parking space*, which all stem from the constructed image of migrants and the Serbian nation both belonging to the same outer CONTAINER. Therefore, the metaphorical images of migrants and Serbian citizens are intertwined in political media discourse, since apparently both remain within the outer container of non-EU space, behind the wall which prevents access to the EU inner space. We aim: (a) to show how the symbiosis of language, cognition and social reality contributes to the framing of discourse participants, and (b) to establish how the highlighting of one component of a conceptual structure may contribute to the construction of national identity through the apparent use of migrant discourse.

2. Theoretical framework

The topic of migration has previously been examined from a cognitive perspective in a number of studies (e.g., Charteris-Black 2006; El Refaie 2001; Gabrielatos & Baker 2008; Hart 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Musolff 2011, 2015; Neagu & Colipcă-Ciobanu 2014; Santa Ana 2002), which have mostly researched the metaphorical underpinnings in migration discourse. Thus, the typical figurative characterizations of migration are “a natural disaster (hence the pervasive FLOOD imagery), and invasion of enemies, an epidemic, or the spread of disease-carrying, parasitic organisms” (Musolff 2011: 12), some of which have also been evidenced in Serbian media discourse on migrants (see Đurović 2015). On the other hand, a number of studies which research media and institutional discourse both inside and outside the EU (e.g., Chaban, Bain & Stats 2007; Musolff 2000, 2004, 2006; Silaški, Đurović & Radić-Bojanić 2009; Šarić 2005; Šarić et al. 2010; Zbierska-Sawala 2004) convincingly show that the highly abstract processes of joining and integration with the EU are effectuated by the linkages between language, cognition, and reality, while metaphors, as a product of our conceptual system evidenced in language, become the most pervasive cognitive and linguistic devices for shaping and communicating conceptualizations of the given reality. Furthermore, in several earlier studies (e.g., Đurović & Silaški 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014; Silaški & Đurović 2014; Silaški, Đurović & Radić-Bojanić 2009) it has been shown that Serbian public discourse utilizes similar or the same metaphors and metaphor scenarios for the conceptualization of Serbia’s EU accession as those used in English (as attested by the studies that researched the English data, see, e.g., Chaban, Bain & Stats 2007; Drulák 2004; Musolff 2000; Šarić 2005; Šarić et al. 2010). Still, these same metaphors may possess different evaluative content and rhetorical impact in different national discourses. Specifically, different discourse communities may use identical metaphors in order to fit their respective communicative and political purposes and interests (see Silaški & Đurović 2014).

Charteris-Black (2005: 13) suggests that metaphor activates “unconscious emotional associations and it influences the value that we place on ideas and beliefs on the scale of goodness and badness.” Consequently, metaphors play an essential role in political and media discourses, stemming from their cognitive potential to become powerful markers of both group and national identities (Šarić et al. 2010). Here we aim to demonstrate how the combination of two or more theories may provide a synergetic effect, enabling the researcher to establish whether metaphors carry ideological meaning in real discourse. “Since metaphor is a way of creating cognitive and affective meaning, by changing the metaphor we may change the way that we think and feel about something,” and “having the right to select our metaphors gives us the right to present alternative ways of thinking and

feeling about the world” (Charteris-Black 2004: 251–252). Lakoff and Johnson’s claim (1980: 159) that metaphor’s “central role (is) in the construction of social and political reality” can be related to the primary concern of Critical Metaphor Analysis: Charteris-Black (2004: 253) states that “(i)f language is a prime means of gaining control of people, metaphor is a prime means by which people can regain control of language and create discourse.” Thus, metaphors in this chapter are regarded as discursive means which aid in understanding certain social processes, more specifically the topic of Europe’s migrant crisis and Serbia’s EU accession, as well as the underlying notions of power differences. Such metaphors can be labelled *discourse metaphors*, i.e., “metaphors that are conceptually grounded but whose meaning is also shaped by their use at a given time and in the context of a debate about a certain topic,” highlighting “salient aspects of a socially, culturally or politically relevant topic” (Koteyko & Ryazanova-Clarke 2009: 114). Therefore, “while conceptual metaphors are considered universal, independent of time, discourse metaphors change with the ongoing discourses and are used for specific purposes” (Koteyko & Ryazanova-Clarke 2009: 114).

Our analysis of Serbian media discourse largely focuses on the organization of what Musolff (2006: 28) calls a “metaphor scenario,” which draws on Fillmore’s notion of a conceptual “scene” (Fillmore 1975) as well as on Lakoff’s (1987) definition of “scenario” as a subtype of an idealized cognitive model. Musolff (2010: 158) connects discourse metaphors and metaphor scenario and states that discourse metaphors “not only transfer individual items and abstract (topo-)logical relations between source and target domains, but also transport evaluative and narrative elements that draw a seemingly self-explanatory conclusion from a mini-story or ‘scenario.’” Scenarios seem to be very frequent and “constitute an essential feature of metaphor use in public discourse registers” and they “help to shape the course of public debates and conceptualizations of political target topics by framing the attitudinal and evaluative preferences in the respective discourse communities” (Musolff 2006: 28).

3. Data and methodology

The data for the analysis have been extracted from online editions of several political daily and weekly newspapers and magazines (*Politika*, *Večernje novosti*, *Blic*, *Novi magazin*, *Kurir*, *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Danas*) as well as from various news portals (B92, N1, RTS, Beta, Vesti onlajn, Tanjug, Mondo, Dnevnik) published in Serbian during the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016, pertaining to the migrant crisis in general and the events following the construction of the Hungarian border barrier. The data were gathered by conducting a Google search in which the queries were

based on the combination of the following key words: *migrant* ‘migrant’, *Evropska unija* ‘European Union’, *zid* ‘wall’, *Mađarska* ‘Hungary’, *migrantska kriza* ‘migrant crisis’, *Vučić* (the surname of the then Serbian Prime Minister), which enabled us to extract topically relevant texts for the analysis. The texts were then compiled into a Word file, totalling around 60,000 words. The data were divided into two structurally different parts. The first relates to Serbian high officials commenting on the migrant crisis and more particularly the erection of the Hungarian wall in press statements and interviews (the discourse of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is especially highlighted here). The second part of the data contains statements by Prime Ministers of Serbia’s neighbouring countries as well as statements by EU officials on the erection of the Hungarian wall. In order to verify the validity of our intuitive judgement regarding the metaphoricity of linguistic expressions relating to the CONTAINER and WALL domains, we applied the method for metaphor identification proposed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007), which we also used to establish their basic and contextual meaning. After establishing the presence of metaphoricity, we extracted the parts containing those expressions which we judged to be metaphorical, some of which are used to illustrate our points. Only those expressions which both of us deemed metaphorical were included in the data collection used for the analysis. We emphasize that the goal of this study is not to offer a corpus-based analysis of the metaphors pertaining to Europe’s migrant crisis, nor to establish metaphor density or relative or absolute frequency of metaphorical expressions in the data collection (for such efforts see, e.g., Perak this volume, and Stanojević this volume). We focus instead on the qualitative analysis of the examples of the main metaphor scenarios so as to investigate how these scenarios, originally dealing with migration, are used by Serbian high officials to present the migrant crisis as an obstacle to Serbia’s joining the EU.

4. Results

According to Musolf (2015: 45), the CONTAINER scenario rests on a firmly established conceptualization of the state:

... as a *container* with distinct *boundaries*, which distinguish those *on the outside* from those *inside*: immigrants are *outsiders* that want to *come/move into the container*. The *container* has *doors* or other openings that can be *closed, open* or *half-open* and it is seen as having a *limited capacity* to include people; if too many immigrants come in, this increases the *pressure* inside to *bursting point* and necessitates the erection of new *barriers*. (italics in the original text)

The italicized words in this quotation not only mark the recurrent metaphorical expressions in migrant discourse but also bear highly evaluative implications.

One of the most prolific metaphor scenarios belonging to the CONTAINMENT domain used to conceptualize the European integration process in public discourse is that of the HOUSE (Chaban, Bain & Stats 2007; Chilton & Ilyin 1993; Musolff 2000, 2004; Schäffner 1996; Šarić 2005, etc.), which has also been identified in the Serbian data (Đurović 2013; Silaški, Đurović & Radić-Bojanić 2009). The results have shown that irrespective of whether the EU is conceptualized as a HOUSE or as a BUILDING SITE/UNFINISHED BUILDING (which produces somewhat different mappings), there are some common factors involved such as “*structural elements* of the house/building site, *people* somehow connected with the house/building site and *processes* related to the house/building site” (Šarić 2005: 157–158, italics in the original text). The HOUSE metaphor itself, with the EU member states living in the same house and following clearly set rules and norms, unequivocally underlines the difference between *us* and *them*, that is, those *inside the house* and those *outside the house*. The most highlighted structural element in our data on Europe’s migrant crisis is the *wall* which, together with doors and windows, functions as the dividing line between what exists inside the house and what exists outside of it in the real world. In cognitive terms, similarly to the house, the wall is a symbol of protection and security, a clear demarcation between *us* and *the external and hostile unknown*. This is in line with Marks (this volume) who argues that “(t)he propensity to conceptualize politics in terms of physical structures is a manifestation of humans’ physical experiences of insecurity which produces a desire for shelter against a dangerous world.”

The wall is implicitly present in the two scenarios identified by Musolff (2004: 126) in EU-debates, THE EXISTING EU NATIONS ARE *IN THE BUILDING* and NON-EU NATIONS (AND THEIR CITIZENS) ARE *OUTSIDE THE BUILDING*. More specifically, in what follows we attempt to show how the WALL metaphor scenario, consistent with the CONTAINER image schema and rendered by varied metaphorical expressions in the Serbian press about Europe’s migrant crisis, can contribute to the notions of self-image and national identity. Overall, the WALL metaphor and other CONTAINMENT metaphors used to construct, via the migrant discourse in Serbian media, non-EU space with Serbia belonging to it, add to the creation of the two types of identities: self-identity of the EU as civilization, culture, and the known versus identity of the non-EU countries as barbarism, non-culture, and the unknown, i.e., “as not being part of the ‘proper’ national society” (Musolff 2015: 50; cf. Gomola this volume). Trading on the imposed “OUTSIDER scenario” (Musolff 2010: 160), stemming from the salient WALL metaphor whereby both migrants and Serbian citizens are perceived as belonging to the same non-EU space, Serbian politicians appear to be presenting Europe’s migrant crisis as yet another hurdle Serbia needs to overcome to eventually *go through the EU door and enter the EU house*.

The WALL metaphor, cognitively relying on the literal wall built on the Hungarian border with Serbia, is shown to be realized in language by means of a host of linguistic metaphors which all conceptualize this wall as a literal and metaphorical obstacle to entering EU-space. This space is in turn structured as a container within a wider container, the one which presents the whole of the European continent, thus viewed geographically, not politically. Cognitively speaking, the wall divides the container of the whole of the European continent into two parts, EU-space and Non-EU space (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The European continent as a container divided by the wall into EU-space and Non-EU space

Non-EU space is, according to Serbian officials, filled with both migrants and Serbian citizens, equally forbidden to enter EU-space, whereas this space, after the construction of the Hungarian wall, is conceptualized as other types of containers such as a *concentration camp*, *Auschwitz*, a *buffer zone* and *parking space*, as the examples (1–6) show:

- (1) „Vreme je da se Evropa izjasni da li je Evropa *zidova* prošlost ili budućnost ...,” poručio je Dačić. Evropa bi, kako je rekao, trebalo da pokaže da li Balkan tretira kao deo EU ili kao prostor omeđen *zidovima*.
(*Politika*, 25 June 2015)
“It’s time Europe determines whether the Europe of *walls* is the past or the future ...,” said Dačić. Europe, he said, should show whether it treats the Balkans as part of EU space or as a space surrounded with *walls*.
- (2) Vučić: Srbija neće biti *tampon zona* za izbeglice
(headline, *Tanjug*, 25 October 2015)
Vučić: Serbia is not going to be the *buffer zone* for migrants
- (3) On (Vučić) je istakao da ne razume najavu podizanja zida i istakao da Srbija neće podizati zidove prema drugima, zatvarati se i „živeti u *Aušvicu*.”
(*Mondo*, 17 June 2016)
He (Vučić) pointed out that he doesn’t understand the purpose of erecting a wall and emphasized that Serbia will not be constructing any walls against others, nor confine itself and “live in *Auschwitz*.”

- (4) Premijer Aleksandar Vučić izjavio je danas da Srbija neće biti biti „*parking*” ili „*sabirni centar*” za izbeglice, i da će se „prema minimalnom broju izbeglica” koje su ostale u Srbiji posle zatvaranja balkanske rute ponašati humano i u skladu sa zakonom. (Tanjug, 9 March 2016)
Prime Minister Vučić said today that Serbia is not going to be a *parking lot* or a *detention centre* for migrants and that it will treat “the minimal number of migrants” remaining in Serbia after the closure of the Balkans route in a humane way and according to law.
- (5) „Nećemo da podizemo bodljikave žice. Ne dobijamo ništa ako bismo podizali bodljikavu žicu, sami bismo sebe *ogradili*,” rekao je Vučić danas na Fakultetu političkih nauka u Beogradu, gde se obratio studentima, zajedno sa generalnim sekretarom NATO Jensom Stoltenbergom. (Tanjug, 20 November 2015)
“We are not going to put up any barbed wire. We don’t get anything in return if we put up a barbed wire fence, we *would just be confining ourselves*,” said Vučić today at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade where he spoke to students together with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.
- (6) „Ta žica bodljikava, postala je eufemizam. Niko nije podizao *zid*, ili *ogradu*, svi su samo nameštali bodljikavu žicu. Mi nećemo podizati žicu, Srbija neće biti *logor*,” rekao je on (Vučić). (Tanjug, 20 November 2015)
This barbed wire, it has become a euphemism. No-one was erecting a *wall* or putting up a *fence*, everyone was just installing barbed wire. We will not put up a barbed wire fence, Serbia will not be a *concentration camp*, he (Vučić) said.

Conceptualizing EU-space as “a bounded area protecting what is within from external danger” (Charteris-Black 2006: 563) contributes to perceiving not only migrants but also Serbian citizens, as the above examples (1–6) show, as a social threat which necessitates and legitimizes the erection of the wall simultaneously as a literal and metaphorical division between EU-space and non-EU space, and as a persuasive vehicle for shaping the notion of national identity. This is particularly striking in the examples (2–4), where the literal concrete walls and barbed wire fences erected on the Hungarian border with Serbia, viewed by both the European and Serbian discourse participants as a barrier which protects EU-space against anything (and anybody) considered non-European, alien, and foreign, turn Serbia’s (non-EU) CONTAINER space, as conceived of by the Serbian officials in the same discourse, into the *buffer zone*, *parking space*, *detention centre*, *concentration camp*, *Auschwitz*. These linguistic metaphors, although apparently conceptualizing non-EU space as different types of containers for migrants, actually help to perpetuate the position Serbia takes in its relationship with the EU – that

of a country which is still waiting to be let into EU-space. Highly loaded terms used by the Serbian officials such as the *detention centre* (example (4)), *concentration camp* (example (6)) or *Auschwitz* (example (3)), triggered by the situation regarding the migrant crisis, strongly capture the attitude of non-Europeanness and exclusion.

The other type of conceptualization also relies on the CONTAINER image schema, where within the European continent there is a secluded EU-space, closely guarded and surrounded by walls and fences (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. A secluded EU-space within the European continent surrounded by walls

This type of conceptualization is closely related to another metaphor scenario used for structuring Serbia's EU accession – that of the HOUSE (Đurović 2013; Silaški, Đurović & Radić-Bojanić 2009), which, as already mentioned, also brings to the fore the aspects of enclosing and dividing (cf. Marks this volume). As manifested by the linguistic instantiations of the WALL metaphor in examples (7–14) below, which implicitly evoke the image of the EU-as-a-house sheltered from the rest of Europe by the “Schengen wall” (Silaški, Đurović & Radić-Bojanić 2009: 133; see also examples (12) and (13)), this conceptualization also underlies the self-perception of the EU as an exclusive space.

- (7) *Barikada za migrante* (headline, *Kurir*, 19 June 2015)
A barricade for migrants
- (8) *Austrija odustaje od „velike” ograde na zahtev Slovenije* (headline, *Politika*, 13 November 2015)
Austria gives up on the “great” fence at the request of Slovenia
- (9) *Mađari dižu „kineski zid” zbog azilanata* (headline, *Večernje novosti*, 17 June 2015)
The Hungarians are erecting a “Chinese wall” because of migrants
- (10) *Na koji način će Brisel sprečiti desničarsku vladu Viktora Orbana da usred Evrope podiže novi Berlinski zid ostaje nejasno.* (*Vesti onlajn*, 19 June 2015)
How Brussels will prevent Viktor Orban's right-wing government from erecting a new Berlin Wall in the middle of Europe remains unclear.

- (11) Zašto onda Mađari podižu *ogradu*? Da li je mađarski zid u stvari „*evropski zid*“? (Politika, 10 September 2015)
Why are the Hungarians erecting a *wall* then? Is the Hungarian wall in fact a “*European wall*”?
- (12) I Austrija i Slovenija su članice Šengena. Austrijska ministarka unutrašnjih poslova Johana Mikl Lajtner izjavila je da predlog o podizanju ograde ne znači „zatvaranje granica,” već da se radi o pokušaju da se obezbedi „uređen, kontrolisan ulazak u zemlju.” Takođe, *ograda* ima *kapiju*, dodala je ona. (Dnevnik, 27 October 2015)
Both Austria and Slovenia are members of the Schengen area. Austrian Minister of Internal Affairs Johanna Mikl Leitner said that the proposal to build a fence is not about “shutting down the border,” but about ensuring an orderly, controlled entry into the country. “Also, every *fence* has a *gate*,” she added.
- (13) Fajman je na taj način reagovao na nalog ministarke unutrašnjih poslova Austrije Johane Mikl-Lajtner za izradu plana „*građevinskih mera*” na granici prema Sloveniji, za koje je rekla da se „naravno radi o *ogradi*,” ali uz objašnjenje da svaka *ograda* ima i *kapiju*. (Novi magazin, 29 October 2015)
Faymann has thus reacted to Austrian Internal Affairs Johanna Mikl-Leitner’s order to produce “a plan of *building measures*” on the border with Slovenia, which she said was “of course a *fence*,” but explained that “each *fence* also has a *gate*.”
- (14) „Nadam se da će na ovom sastanku biti okončana politika *otvorenih vrata* i pozivanja migranata da dođu u EU, jer se time krši Šengenski sporazum,” kazao je Orban. (Danas, 25 October 2015)
“I hope the *open door policy* and inviting migrants to come to EU will end in this meeting, since this violates the Schengen Agreement,” said Orban.

Similarly to the first type of conceptualization – dividing EU-space from non-EU space – the WALL metaphor and the pervasive CONTAINER image schema (STATE AS A HOUSE) used to delineate EU-space within a broader space of the European continent, have dual rhetorical functions of persuasion and evaluation. *Fences*, *barriers*, and *gates* are viewed by the EU officials as the legitimate means of protecting the EU “house” against the massive influx of migrants, non-EU citizens, perceived as a threat to the stability of the foundations of the EU house. Thus, the selected linguistic instantiations should add to the EU (supra)national identity based on solidarity, belonging to the same space and sharing the same values. They should also strengthen the aspect of power and taking control which, viewed from the perspective of the EU officials, imparts positive connotations to the WALL metaphor. The sense of control is also evidenced in examples (12) and (13): every “fence” has “a gate” (which will serve to separate legal from illegal migrants). This implies

not only that the entry of migrants into the EU house is strictly controlled and, if need be, forbidden, but also in a wider sense, that the accession and enlargement processes can run out of control if not indefinitely suspended.

Particularly evocative are the expressions *the Chinese wall*, *the Berlin wall* and *the European wall* (examples (9–11)), which provide further evidence that the conceptualization of the EU is founded on the profoundly embodied CONTAINER schema and its structural elements – the interior, the exterior, and the boundaries, where the misunderstanding of other cultures and xenophobia are linguistically rendered using expressions involving the raising of mental barriers. Even though the reasons for the building of the Great Wall of China or the Berlin Wall are essentially different from those which induced the governments of Hungary and Croatia to contemplate erecting a wall on their respective borders with Serbia, the conceptual likening of the latter wall, via *the Chinese wall*, *the Berlin wall*, *the Hungarian wall*, *the European wall*, to the former ones rests on the physical aspect of the wall as something which separates space into two parts. On an abstract level, the wall thus becomes the symbol of dividing the two opposing containers and is used in Serbian public discourse to conceptualize the protection of external borders of the EU “house,” and, instigated by the migrant crisis, as a new obstacle to Serbia’s joining the EU and becoming part of the EU inner space. The literal building of the wall thus results in “building metaphorical abstractions of nation,” an idea discussed by Marks (this volume) as well. The external walls of the EU “house,” similarly to those walls dividing EU-space from Non-EU space, are thus the boundary that keeps the self and others apart, viewed by the Serbian top officials as another impediment which will make Serbia still “knock on the EU door” and prevent it from becoming part of the European self.

5. Discussion

In this chapter, set within the context of Europe’s migrant crisis, we have investigated diverse metaphorical expressions related to the CONTAINER image schema and the WALL metaphor scenario in particular with the aim of showing how the identified cognitive devices aid in shaping both group and national identities and actually help perpetuate a particular construal of reality which appears to be based on “group control” (Musolff 2000: 105) and inequality in power relations. This particularly pertains to the WALL metaphor which once again stresses the perspectivization function of metaphor. Thus, the literal barbed wire fence becomes a metaphorical one and at the same time activates other, equally evaluatively loaded, linguistic metaphors (e.g., *the concentration camp*, *the buffer zone*, *Auschwitz*, *the Berlin Wall*). The role of these metaphors is not only to pinpoint the ingrained

attitudes about the collective division into “us” (the entities inside the EU space) and “them” (the entities outside the EU space), but also to reinforce the perception of some Serbian discourse participants that the future relations between Serbia and the EU will be based on similar, more or less covert, divisions, inequalities, and the setting of (mental) boundaries. This is convincingly mirrored in Vučić’s comments on Serbia’s overall position in relation to the EU migrant crisis, where he underlines that “(t)he problem of Serbia is that our neighbours have put up a wall, a barbed wire fence, and now we are part of the problem, *although we have behaved the European way*,” and that “*we (Serbia) have done everything according to European rules and in line with European values*, and we are a kind of victim now” (Blic, 17 September 2015, our italics). The italicized words serve to highlight that even though the Serbian side has adopted an EU-like approach to coping with the migrant crisis, the literal and metaphorical erection of walls, fences, and gates on the EU’s external borders has contributed to the Serbian identity discourse of isolation and exclusion. The conceptualization of the EU and its space as a “house” protected by a “solid wall” and Serbia as a “concentration camp” or any of the selected expressions relating to the CONTAINER schema, buttresses a positive cognitive construction of the EU’s Self and a negative cognitive construction of Serbia (in the light of the migrant discourse) as the EU’s Other. This also shows how the more powerful EU’s perception of the Other, reinforced by the WALL metaphor, shapes “reality for both Self and Other” (Sandikcioglu 2001: 180), reflected here in Serbia’s EU accession process.

6. Conclusion

By adopting the scenario-oriented approach of metaphor analysis to the data compiled from Serbian media discourse thematically linked to Europe’s migrant crisis, this chapter has explored how linguistic instantiations of the CONTAINMENT image schema and the WALL metaphor scenario in particular can provide powerful framing tools for discourse participants and for building “the national.” The two types of framing available through the CONTAINER metaphor and the WALL metaphor scenario have been discussed: the one which conceptualizes the division of the European continent as a container into EU-space and Non-EU space, and the other where the EU is construed as a secluded space within the European continent, or as a stronghold – a small valuable container that needs to be guarded by walls and fences against the hostile outside world. We have shown how the WALL metaphor, when set against a particular socio-political context, may develop specific pragmatic-discursive effects which differ from the connotations embedded in the default version of the metaphor. Varied expressions and collocations collected

from real (migration) discourse and gathered around the CONTAINER image schema and the WALL scenario inform the conceptualization of both migrants and the Serbian nation as belonging to the same outer CONTAINER which, when related to political tendencies and some previous discourse traditions, add to the feeling of isolation, marginalization, and otherness. On the other hand, such conceptualization implies that the EU's (supra)national identity of exclusivity, belonging, trust, and solidarity is unquestionable and inevitable. Hence the metaphorical expressions like *concentration camp*, *Auschwitz*, *the Chinese wall*, and *the Berlin wall* not only reveal the function of metaphor in reducing the complexity of concepts, events and situations by making them more comprehensible via comparison to more accessible and concrete things, but they also always carry ideological strings attached to their meaning which should be checked and contested in the respective discourse communities. As "(m)etaphor is either an integral part of, or interacts with" all of the dimensions of collective identities, "such as discourse, memory, symbols, and myth," researching metaphor "thus expands the understanding of collective identity" (Šarić 2015: 61). This, as we have tried to show, becomes even more apparent when investigating metaphor via the narrative and ideological patterns of a specific metaphor scenario.

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Godly Poland in godless Europe

Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland after 2004

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This chapter investigates Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland after 2004 when the country joined the European Union, combining elements of the Discourse Historical Approach with a Cognitive Linguistics perspective. It focuses on conceptual metaphors for the Polish nation to demonstrate how they serve the Catholic Church in shaping Polish national identity in opposition to the common European project, and how the discourse in question is able to absorb the most significant national trauma in post-war Polish history – the Smoleńsk plane crash. Discursive practices aimed at shaping Polish national identity as a part of a broader European identity were examined by Krzyżanowski (2009) and Grimstad (2012). The discourse discussed in this chapter depicts these identities as incompatible and thus is “the other side of the coin” of the processes of conceptualizing Polish nationality after 2004.

Keywords: Poland, Polish nationality, Discourse Historical Approach, conceptual metaphor, Critical Metaphor Analysis, Catholic-nationalist discourse, European Union, the Catholic Church in Poland

1. Introduction

In recent decades, united Europe has witnessed the rebirth of nationalism. It is now at its strongest since 1945 (Hosking 2016: 210) and poses a threat to the political unity of the European Union. Various forms of nationalist discourse appear to be responding to worsening economic conditions, the influx of immigrants, or the inadequacy of a common European identity. This discourse draws upon historical experiences, national pride, or the cultural or economic achievements of a given nation.

In this chapter I investigate Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland after 2004, when the country joined the EU. Discursive practices aimed at shaping Polish national identity in the EU were examined by Grimstad (2012), who investigated how *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the most popular liberal daily newspaper in Poland, was engaged in the project of creating what he called a Euro-Polish identity between 1989 and 2009. This Euro-Polish identity was based on values fundamental to the European Union, primarily the principles of liberal democracy, and on the presumption that Poland's membership of the EU would not threaten Polish national identity. My analysis presents another discourse and I will demonstrate how the POLAND IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor is used in various topoi invoked in the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland to depict the EU as a threat, but also as a missionary challenge to the Polish nation. I will also show how the discourse absorbs and interprets the Smoleńsk plane crash in 2010 – the biggest trauma in Poland's post-war history – and how it is used to shape anti-immigration attitudes in Poland. In conclusion, I will argue that the main reason why the Catholic Church in Poland fosters nationalist discourse is to maintain its *status quo* as an institution of authority and control in Poland.

First, I briefly present the theoretical-methodological framework of my analysis, which is Critical Metaphor Analysis with selected elements of the Discourse Historical Approach. I also briefly discuss the relationships between religious discourse and political discourse. In Section 3 I examine the major features of Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland, with homily as its most characteristic genre, focusing on its social, intertextual and historical levels. Finally, the main part of my analysis (Section 4) concentrates on the textual level of the discourse. I examine selected conceptual metaphors for the Polish nation and their role as a means of realizing a number of topoi identified in the discourse.

The linguistic material analysed below is necessarily limited and comprises excerpts from the two most important types of texts representative of Catholic-nationalist discourse: church homilies (four samples) and press publications from the daily newspaper *Nasz Dziennik* and the weekly *Niedziela* (four samples). *Nasz Dziennik*, with an estimated circulation of 250,000–300,000 (Starnawski 2003: 67) and *Niedziela* with an estimated circulation of 150,000 (Jachimowski 2010: 190) may be regarded as two significant disseminators of a Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland (Starnawski 2003: 67; Ramet 2017: 215). Both titles are available not only online or at a newsstand but also in Catholic parishes, which suggests a strong presence of ideas propagated by them in the minds of many Polish Catholics. I also briefly discuss two Internet

sources¹ and two quotations from books representing the so-called “theology of the Polish nation.” All of the texts examined (with the exception of Bartnik 1999) were published/preached between 2004 and 2016 and may be regarded as representative of Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland.

2. Theoretical and methodological remarks

My study of the Catholic-nationalist discourse employs an approach informed by Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA). Following Anderson (2006), I assume that the “nation” is an “imagined” community, which implies that it is an abstract notion and as such is often conceptualized in language by source-target conceptual metaphors as defined by Lakoff and Johnson (2003) and classified as single-scope networks by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 127–32). I also refer briefly to the concept of a “chosen nation” as defined by Smith (2003).² Since the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland is rooted in specific interpretations of history, the most suitable methodological basis for its analysis seems to be the Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 2009). I also argue, following van Dijk (1997), that although the discourse in question is produced by the religious community of the Catholic Church, it should be understood as political discourse.

2.1 Conceptual metaphors for nations

Depictions of Poland in the Catholic-nationalist discourse are linguistic realizations of the A NATION IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 2003), which is a culturally stable variant of a specific single-scope network (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 127–132). Many studies in CMA (Musolff 2004, 2006, 2010; Neagu 2013) reveal a systematic presence of the STATE/NATION IS A PERSON metaphor in various types of discourse. In addition, by means of compressions of vital relations (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 89–113), primarily those of time and representation, nations are presented in a discourse as entities with their own individual histories that define them as capable of making decisions or as moral agents. Presenting

1. By “Internet content” I mean content published and available only online. All of the homilies and press publications analysed in this chapter, although published/preached in a traditional way, are also available online.

2. For other studies discussing the Catholic-nationalist narrative in Poland using different methodologies and perspectives, see Flis (1999), Starnawski (2003), Zubrzycki (2009), Porter-Szucs (2011) and Vermeersch (2013).

abstract, imagined national communities on such a “human scale” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 8) allows the authors of a given discourse to convey their intended meanings, and to shape recipients’ opinions and attitudes. What is more, the notion of a person presupposes embodiment: thus, in political discourse, there are metaphors for the nation referring to bodily experiences, constituting what Musolff calls the “body politic” (Musolff 2004, 2010).

This human scale of conceptual metaphors means that we are often unaware of their presence in discourse, which makes them powerful instruments of persuasion, since they refer to “external or internal experience and calculation conforming to previously admitted rules” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1991: 8).

2.2 The Discourse Historical Approach: Levels of discourse, macro-strategies, topoi/fallacies, means of realization

The other research perspective of this study is the Discourse Historical Approach that Wodak and her colleagues adopt in their investigation of the national identity of Austrians (Wodak 2006; Wodak et al. 2009). They combine different kinds of analysis in their approach and distinguish four levels of discourse: textual, intertextual, social, and historical (Wodak 2001: 67). At the textual level, they emphasize the role of the macro-strategies that underlie discourses of the national, and schemes of argumentation or topoi/fallacies and their linguistic realization. Macro-strategies define the aims of the discourse, and they include strategies of dissimilation that construct differences between the members of a given nation and “others,” strategies of assimilation aimed at creating a feeling of similarity and homogeneity among members of a national community, and strategies of perpetuation that attempt to maintain and support a national identity that is perceived to be under threat (Wodak 2006: 112–113; Wodak et al. 2009: 33–35). Topoi are elements of the lower order, and they logically combine arguments put forward in the discourse with the intended conclusions. The most common topoi are the topoi/fallacy of external threat, of appeal to authority, of history as a teacher, of comparison, and so on (for a more exhaustive list of strategies and topoi, see Wodak et al. 2009: 36–42). Topoi/fallacies are forms of reasoning that have to be filled in with some linguistic content or “means of realizations” (Wodak et al. 2009: 36–42): with derogatory denotations, positive or pejorative attributions, vagueness, and with metaphors. Seen from this perspective, the linguistic manifestations of the POLAND IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor discussed above are the means of realization of specific topoi in my analysis.

The intertextual level of the discourse concerns the relationships between utterances, texts, and genres of the discourse. At this level, we can observe how texts representing a given discourse interact with one another and affect one

another. The social level of the discourse manifests itself through social variables that include social events where the discourse may be disseminated, which is exemplified in Catholic-nationalist discourse by holy masses celebrated on various patriotic occasions. The highest level of the discourse comprises its historical context. The historical context plays a key role in the discourse in question, since certain events from the distant past as well as from more recent Polish history are regularly invoked in texts and in the form of historical re-enactments.

I take into account all levels of the discourse in question, yet the main focus of my analysis is the textual level and I demonstrate how linguistic manifestations of the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor are employed to shape the attitudes of recipients of the discourse in question towards the European Union.

2.3 Catholic-nationalist discourse as political discourse

Even though the separation of church and state is a fundamental principle of liberal Western democracies, political and religious discourses frequently co-occur in the public sphere of Western countries, from Christmas messages delivered by heads of state (Sauer 2007) to religious references in political speeches (Chilton 2004: 173–194). This connection between the political and religious realms is stressed by van Dijk who argues that political discourse cannot be confined to the discursive practices of professional politicians, because organizations and institutions whose main functions and tasks are not political *per se* may also construct political discourse (van Dijk 1997: 13). In Poland, where the Catholic Church is the most important institution after the state, with its own discourse community comprised of a majority of Polish society that are both church members and citizens, it is quite natural that the church should create its own discourse pertaining to political issues that concern its members as citizens of a secular state. This is also due to the close connection between the construction of a Polish national identity and the Catholic religion.

3. Major features of the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland

Due to Poland's turbulent history, Polish national identity is closely intertwined with Catholicism. For almost two hundred years – with a short break between 1918 and 1939 – the Catholic Church was the only lasting institution interpreted as being intrinsically Polish. To put it briefly, “without the Catholic church [Poland] might simply have ceased to exist” (Berger, Davie & Fokas 2008: 37). What is more, Maria Janion demonstrates that since the 19th century until today a prominent concept in Polish national identity is the metaphor of Poland

as the “Christ of nations” created by a romantic Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz and vividly present in Polish literature and visual arts (Janion 2006: 275–280). According to this metaphor, Poland’s partition between Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Monarchy at the end of the 18th century reflected the passion of Christ: “Poland was scourged, crucified, and buried, but it would rise in glory from the dead” (Johnson 1996: 130).

The symbiosis of Catholic and national identity is also a central element of the self-identity of a large part of Polish society to this day, and this is clearly evident to outsiders. As Porter-Szucs (2011: 358–359) observes, “for even the most liberal Catholics in Poland, patriotism and faith are intimately linked” and the aim of the conservative Catholic hierarchy in Poland is not only to maintain this bond but to use it to shape the attitudes of Poles towards the EU. Catholic-nationalist discourse, constructed by the hierarchy with the help of the Catholic media, grounded in a particular interpretation of Polish history, and legitimized by references to the mystical writings of Sister Faustina, as I will explain later on, is a bulwark against anything that the hierarchy regards as a threat to traditionalist Polish Catholicism. In the next sections, I will focus on the different levels of discourse, social, inter-textual, and historical, to show how they interact with and strengthen one another.

3.1 Homily as the main genre of Catholic-nationalist discourse:

The social level of the discourse

The Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland is produced primarily by members of the clergy and addressed to the laity, and its characteristic discursive practice is preaching. For that reason, the main genre of the discourse is homily. Wodak (2001: 66) defines a genre as “the conventionalized, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a particular activity” and a church homily fits well into this definition. It is a highly conventionalized type of text associated with a particular religious activity, which strengthens the authority of what is preached.

Preaching homilies is a very effective discursive practice in Poland, for three reasons. First, church attendance is still relatively high in this country, with around 40 percent of Poles going to church every Sunday.³ Second, participants in the Catholic liturgy, because of its very nature, are a kind of “captive audience” forced to listen to the preacher. Moreover, preaching is by definition a clerical activity directed at the laity, which results in a one-directional discursive strategy with a relatively small number of authors of the discourse and a large number of recipients. Additionally, since the authors represent religious authority, it is difficult to

3. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/chapter-11-religiosity-and-the-role-of-religion>
All websites accessed on 22 March 2017.

challenge or question their claims unlike, for example, in a typical political discourse where debates and conflicting opinions are taken for granted or are welcome. Third, many homilies with clear nationalist overtones, especially those preached by Polish bishops, are spread by the Catholic media and are accessible online. Thus, they exert an influence far beyond the congregations who hear them in the churches.

Given the relatively high level of church attendance, and the traditional bond between patriotism and faith mentioned above, there are many occasions in Poland for celebrating masses with homilies alluding to national issues, thus situating the Catholic-nationalist discourse in a broader social context. This social level of the discourse includes, for example, masses for the Fatherland celebrated on public holidays, some of which are also church festivities. A public holiday on May 3, commemorating the proclamation of the first Polish constitution on that day in 1791, coincides with the day on which Catholics in Poland venerate the Holy Virgin as the Queen of Poland (for more on how these two symbolical perspectives merge and interact, see Hałas 2012). Other socio-religious ceremonies typical of Polish Catholicism take place regularly at Jasna Góra, the most popular Marian shrine in Poland and to which various social or professional groups in Polish society go on a pilgrimage on a regular basis. These ceremonies are also attended by representatives of local or state authorities including members of the Polish Parliament and government, thus reaffirming the connection between religious and political power in Poland.

3.2 The Catholic media: The intertextual level of the discourse

The Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland would not be possible without conservative Catholic media, comprising the Radio Maryja radio station, the Telewizja Trwam TV station, and the *Nasz Dziennik* daily. These media are responsible for the intertextual level of the discourse: the radio station and the TV station broadcast the same masses with homilies that foster the Catholic-nationalist perspective that are printed the following day in *Nasz Dziennik*, and articles published in *Nasz Dziennik* are often read on the Radio Maryja radio station or quoted in homilies. In short, recipients of the discourse have easy access to homilies and other texts as part of the Catholic-nationalist narrative, and the texts themselves often interact with and justify one another.

3.3 The concept of Poland as chosen nation: the historical level of the discourse

The image of Poland as the Christian defender of Western civilization is not an accidental element of the Catholic discourse in Poland. On the contrary, Poland's

history is systematically presented in the discourse as a part of God's plan for the world, one in which Poland has played an important role for centuries. Poland's value to Europe is frequently illustrated by recourse to two events: the Battle of Vienna (1683) and the Battle of Warsaw (1920). In the battle of Vienna, John III Sobieski, having defeated the Ottoman forces, wrote to Pope Innocent XI: "Venimus, vidimus, Deus vicit" 'We came, we saw, God conquered' (Dabrowski 2004: 52), thus declaring that he was merely an instrument in God's hands. According to the proponents of the Catholic-nationalist discourse, Poland, through the Polish monarch, synecdochically saved Europe from Islamic conquest. In the Battle of Warsaw Polish forces halted the Soviet Red Army that was pushing westwards with the aim of invading Western Europe, and in this way Poland again saved European civilization. These two events are key elements in the historical context of the Catholic-nationalist discourse, as they form a part of the collective memory (Halbwachs 1992) of its recipients and cultivate the image of Poland as always faithful to God: "Polonia semper fidelis" (Davies 1984: 160).

Seen in the broader perspective of nationalism studies, the image of "Polonia semper fidelis" corresponds with the concept of the chosen nation as defined by Smith (2003). The chosen nation is:

... singled out for special purposes by, and hence to stand in a unique relation to the divine. Persons or groups who are chosen are marked off from the multitude, often at first by divine promise, to enable them to obey and perform God's will. ... By doing so, they become God's elect, saved and privileged through their obedience to His will and their identification with His plan. (Smith 2003: 48–49)

Thus the events presented above illustrate Poland's "unique role in the moral economy of global salvation" (Smith 2003: 48) or in the conflict between good and evil. According to the Catholic-nationalist discourse, John III Sobieski and the Polish army in 1920 were Christian protagonists squaring up to impious antagonists – Muslims and Bolsheviks respectively. This gives Poland moral superiority as the defender of Christian values that are now threatened by the attacks of liberal ideology coming from the secular and post-Christian Western European countries.

One of the strongest arguments put forward in presenting Poland as the chosen nation are quotations from the writings of a Polish saint and mystic, Sister Faustina Kowalska (1905–1938), that are regularly invoked in the discourse. In Sister Faustina's *Diary* we read:

- (1) As I was praying for Poland, I heard [Jesus's] words: I bear a special love for Poland, and if she will be obedient to My will, I will exalt her in might and holiness. From her will come forth the spark that will prepare the world for My final coming. (Kowalska 2005: 377)

Note obedience as a category of national chosenness as mentioned by Smith. Note also the ambiguity of “the spark” that allows authors of the discourse to interpret this term according to their rhetorical needs. “The spark” is most often identified with the Polish Pope, John Paul II, as another sign of Poland’s chosenness. In another passage in Sister Faustina’s *Diary*, Poland’s importance is presented even more explicitly, since God “lifts it up” and “singles it out”:

- (2) My beloved native land, Poland, if you only knew how many sacrifices and prayers I offer to God for you! But be watchful and give glory to God, who lifts you up and singles you out in a special way. (Kowalska 2005: 248)

The aforementioned historical events and quotations are employed in two topoi recurring at the textual level of the discourse: the topos of history as teacher and the topos of appeal to authority. In the former, Poland’s glorious past as the defender of Christianity imposes a moral obligation on recipients of the discourse to defend the Christian faith today, not against Turks or Bolsheviks but against liberal European ideologies. In the topos of appeal to authority, Jesus’s words addressed to Sister Faustina assure the recipients of the discourse of Poland’s special status in the eyes of God.

4. The POLAND IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor in Catholic-nationalist discourse: An analysis of the textual level of the discourse

As mentioned in Section 2.1, nations tend to be conceptualized in various discourses by means of A NATION IS A PERSON, and the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland is no exception. Indeed, as I demonstrate in the following subsections, this metaphor, with its varied linguistic manifestations, is capable of conveying a wide range of meanings and may be regarded as the cornerstone of the Catholic narrative of the Polish nation.

4.1 Essentialist understanding, moral agency, and the inner “self” of the Polish nation

Before I examine excerpts from homilies and newspaper articles taken to be the most representative genres of Catholic-nationalist discourse, it is important to recognize that the category of the Polish nation occupies a prominent place in Catholic theology in Poland in the form of the so-called “theology of the Polish nation” (see, for example, Buczek 2014). This theology is the basis for the discourse in question and one of its tenets is to perceive the Polish nation as a quasi-personal entity with its own ontological status – a vision radically different from

the concept of nation as “an imagined community.” This essentialist perspective is clearly visible in the following quotation from Czesław Bartnik:

- (3) [Wspólnota narodowa stanowi] jakąś niezwykłą rzeczywistość quasi-personalną. Naród posiada swoją wewnętrzną bytowość, świadomość, mechanizmy decyzyjne, wewnętrzne zapodmiotowanie, zdolność autoidentyfikacji. (Bartnik 1999: 122)
 [A national community] is an unusual quasi-personal reality. A nation has its own inner ontological status, consciousness, decision mechanisms, inner agency, a capacity for self-identification.⁴

Elsewhere the same author argues that:

- (4) ... [naród] jako pewien rodzaj organizmu posiada swoją sferę materialno-cielesną oraz duchową. Dysponuje w pewnym sensie wspólną świadomością, wolą, uczuciami i czynem. Można nawet powiedzieć, że ma także jakieś w szerszym znaczeniu swoje “ja.” (Bartnik 2005: 35)
 ... [a nation] has its material-bodily dimension as well as its spiritual dimension. It has at its disposal, in a sense, a common awareness, a will, emotions and action. One may even say that it also has, in a broader sense, its own “self.”

Czesław Bartnik is a priest and a professor of theology, as well as being one of the most prominent proponents of the theology of the Polish nation. His books and articles are addressed primarily to other clergymen, which means that the Catholic-nationalist discourse is ultimately perpetuated not only by producing texts addressed to the laity but also by educating new ranks of churchmen who will write such texts themselves in the future and cultivate discursive practices by celebrating masses for Poland, preaching homilies, organizing patriotic pilgrimages, and so on.

Bartnik’s conceptualization is, in some respects, a typical metaphor for nation. After all, the metaphor of A NATION IS A PERSON is widely used in many languages and cultures (Musolff 2014). Stanojević (this volume) shows that nearly 80% of all metaphorical conceptualizations of the nation in Croatian are derived from the PERSON/PEOPLE source domain. Yet at the same time, Bartnik’s essentialist approach allows him (as well as other authors of the Polish Catholic-nationalist discourse) to create a much more convincing image of the Polish nation as a person, a moral agent or even a missionary (see below). For example, the concept of a continuous national “self” stressed by Bartnik enables proponents of the discourse in question to see disparate and temporally separated episodes of Poland’s past as

4. Unless otherwise noted, all Polish-English translations are the author’s own.

neighbouring elements in the collective memory of the Poles (Wodak et al. 2009: 25). The distance in time between the Battle of Vienna (1683) and the Battle of Warsaw (1920) disappears in the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor and both events are close to each other as well as close to John Paul II's pontificate. Such "time scaling" (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 92–93) implies that the Battle of Vienna and the Battle of Warsaw will often be invoked simultaneously in the discourse whenever it will be necessary to present Poland as a defender of Christian Europe (see Section 5.3 below). Another conceptual compression noticeable in the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor is that of change compressed into uniqueness (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 93–94): the changes Poland underwent in history, being first a kingdom, then a republic, then a Soviet satellite state, and not becoming a homogeneous country or a nation state until 1945 (Snyder 2003: 24), are ignored in the discourse. This continuous national "self" also suggests that we may speak here of the narrative identity or identity of the character (Ricoeur 1992: 141–143, quoted in Wodak et al. 2009: 14) of Poland. This character manifests itself and is tested through events that are presented as a coherent narrative in the discourse. At the same time, this narrative identity serves a strategy of assimilation, allowing Poles who lived in past centuries and contemporary Poles to be presented as united by the same ideals and aims, and threatened by the same dangers.

By mapping "decision mechanisms" and "a will" from the PERSON source domain on to the POLAND target domain, the Polish national community may be conceptualized as a collective moral agent, able to act in a reasoned way and morally responsible for its deeds, as example (3) shows. This is also reflected by God's words addressed to Sister Faustina, that Poland must be "obedient" to his will (see example (1)). The category of obedience presupposes that Poland as a person is constantly present before God to give an account of its deeds, and at the same time introduces the topos of appeal to authority, in this case to God's authority. More importantly, the moral agency of Poland is often equated with its moral superiority to other European nations, and in this way the metaphor may be used in the topos of moral superiority in the discourse.

Below I discuss the linguistic manifestations of three selected metonymic elaborations of the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor and show their role in topoi and macro-strategies in the Catholic-nationalist discourse.

4.2 POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF THE FAITH

Poland as a metonymy for the Polish nation is often presented in the discourse as a defender of the Catholic faith. Poland's defence of the faith is not regarded merely as "a local conflict" but as a part of a broader global confrontation between the church and atheism, as Fr. Marian Polak clearly demonstrates:

- (5) Coraz bardziej dostrzegamy zarysowujący się w świecie podział na dwa obozy: Kościół, który w czasie prowadzi misję zbawczą Chrystusa, a naprzeciw niego obóz niewierzących, którzy, odrzucając Boga, sami się nim czynią. ... Dlatego zlaicyzowane i odchodzące od Boga narody, także UE, zaczynają zajadle atakować Polskę, nasze obyczaje i ustawy, które się sprzeciwiają ich stylowi życia. (Polak 2016)

We are increasingly aware of the division into two camps in the world: one is the Church carrying out the temporal salvatory mission of Christ, and opposite it there is the camp of unbelievers who, rejecting God, make themselves God. ... That is why secularized nations that are abandoning God, including EU nations, are beginning to fiercely attack Poland, our customs and laws that oppose their lifestyle.

Note that atheism is presented here not as a simple rejection of God but as a force “fiercely” attacking Catholic Poland. This passage also implies that the only alternative to Catholicism is moral nihilism, which is yet another reason why the Polish nation must defend its Catholic identity. The same opinion has been expressed by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party speaking to the pilgrims (sic!) gathered in Jasna Góra in 2015 and declaring that “there is no other moral teaching in Poland other than that proclaimed by the church.”⁵ This declaration is a telling example of the intermingling of Catholic-nationalist discourse with the political discourse.

The conflict between Poland and the EU may also be embedded in the historical context of the discourse mentioned above, and presented as a continuation of real military conflicts against godless forces in which Poland was involved in the past:

- (6) Poza tą wojną przeciw Polsce stoi odwieczny wróg Chrystusa – szatan. To on nie chce się zgodzić, aby Polska była Polską, aby była Narodem poddanym Prawu Bożemu i miłującej władzy Chrystusa Króla. To już się ciągnie nie od dziś. Nie od dziś Polska jest atakowana ze wszystkich stron – ze wschodu i zachodu – za to, że ma dość ścisły związek z Chrystusem i Jego Kościołem oraz z Matką Najświętszą... Nie od dziś Polska musiała stawiać czoła wrogom Boga i człowieka. Z tych samych powodów Polska jest dziś niewygodna w Europie. (Bajda 2005)

Behind this war against Poland stands the eternal enemy of Christ – Satan. It is he who does not want to accept that Poland will be Poland, that it will be a Nation subject to the Law of God and the cherished authority of Christ the King. This did not start happening today. For a long time, Poland has

5. <http://telewizjarepublika.pl/kaczynski-na-jasnej-gorze-nie-ma-polski-bez-kosciola,21503.html>

been attacked from all sides – from the east and the west – because it has such a tight bond with Christ and His Church as well as with the Most Holy Mother... For a long time, Poland had to stand up to the enemies of God and man. For these same reasons, Poland is uncomfortable in Europe today. (Porter-Szucs 2011: 269)

The passage strongly suggests that a war is now being waged against Poland, which in turn presupposes the image of the Polish nation as a Christian soldier (since it is *subject to the Law of God* and attacked by Satan). This image is followed by a reference to real wars in Polish history (*Poland has been attacked from all sides*). By equating the moral war with military conflicts from the past, the latter become in a sense “holy wars” or at least wars in which Poland defended both its territory and Christian values. This corresponds with the continuous “self” of Poland as a person discussed above. In the last sentence, both perspectives merge: the “Poland” that is uncomfortable in Europe signifies both the Polish nation as a defender of Catholic values and Poland as a member-state of the EU.

In another passage the image of Catholic Poland as an “odd man out” in the European Union is even stronger:

- (7) Ateizujące ośrodki zagraniczne prą całą siłą w tym kierunku, żeby w “nowoczesnym organizmie” UE nie było “wrzodu” w postaci Polski w pełni polskiej, a co gorsza, żywo katolickiej. Owych misjonarzy nowego ładu w świecie bardziej bolą polskie media dalekosiężne niż ich własne kryzysy i trudności gospodarczo-społeczne. Dyrygenci nowej pieśni europejskiej chcą uciszyć głos katolicki, który zakłóca harmonię chórów laickich. (Bartnik 2006)

Atheist centres abroad are pushing towards a situation where the “modern organism” of the EU no longer contains the “ulcer” in the form of a completely Polish Poland, in which, what is worse, Catholicism lives. These missionaries of the new world order are more upset by the far-reaching Polish media than by their own crises and socio-economic difficulties. The conductors of the new European hymn wish to silence the Catholic voice that disrupts the harmony of secular choirs.

In the first sentence of the passage, the conceptual perspective of the “body politic” (Musolf 2010) appears with Poland depicted as an ulcer in the EU organism. In the last sentence, THE EU IS A BODY conceptual metaphor is replaced by a conceptualization of the EU as a choir with the Catholic voice of Poland being silenced by European conductors. Note that *atheist centres* are a metonym for “liberal secular societies” to the preacher, and that he conflates “atheism” and “secular liberalism.” As in the passages examined above, the preacher reminds his audience that Catholicism and atheism (identified here with secular liberalism) are mutually exclusive.

The image of Poland attacked by evil forces embodied by or connected with the European Union indicates the presence of the topos of threat. Apart from the conceptual metaphor of Poland as a person whose very existence is threatened by attackers, we can observe here verbal constructions with strong connotations of conflict and confrontation (*EU nations are beginning to fiercely attack Poland; Poland has been attacked; atheist centres are pushing; conductors ... wish to silence the Catholic voice*, etc.) and a synecdoche (individuals that are critical of traditional Polish Catholicism – as some people undoubtedly are – are presented as all nations). We can also notice here the topos of the moral superiority of Poland, as it is “a Nation subject to the Law of God [that has] a tight bond with Christ and His Church as well as with the Most Holy Mother,” while the EU is an embodiment or at least an instrument of Satan. This apparent moral superiority, combined with a biased image of the EU as an “amoral set of institutions” (Stadtmüller 2002: 36) and a hotbed of ideologies and lifestyles hostile to God and Christianity, results in an image of godly Poland attacked by Europe.

The dominant strategy underlying the passages discussed above is the strategy of dissimulation. Its aim is to contrast the Polish nation with the EU, which manifests itself first of all through a binary opposition between European atheism (or more precisely secular liberalism) and Polish Catholicism, from which the other differences stem – those concerning lifestyles or customs, for instance. The strategy is closely related to the strategy of perpetuation. Since Polish identity is threatened, the necessary precondition of its preservation and protection is to emphasize the differences between Poland and the EU.

Interestingly, the strategy of dissimulation may be the point of departure for another topic in the discourse, in which the atheist European Union is presented not as a threat but as a challenge to the Polish nation. Consequently, Poland is not attacked by Europe, but is in fact being sent to reconvert Europe, and the conceptual framework of such an interpretation is the POLAND IS A MISSIONARY conceptual metaphor.

4.3 POLAND IS A MISSIONARY FOR EUROPE

According to surveys, more than 90 per cent of Poles declare themselves as Catholic; and although the number of regular churchgoers has been decreasing steadily in the last twenty years, Poland is the least secularized European country.⁶ This fact is often interpreted in the discourse as evidence that God has preserved the Catholic faith of the Polish nation largely intact so that it may now re-Christianize Europe.

6. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_026_15.PDF

In the POLAND IS A MISSIONARY FOR EUROPE metaphor, elements of the (Christian) MISSIONARY source domain are mapped on to the Polish nation as the target domain. These include God's mandate to evangelize, and the possible opposition and hostility on the part of the "heathens." The metaphor is related to the topos of moral superiority, which is the most important argumentation scheme in the following passages.

On the eve of Poland's accession to the EU, the conservative Catholic weekly *Niedziela* saw this missionary role of godly Poland as the main justification for the accession:

- (8) Nadszedł dla naszego narodu czas wielkiego egzaminu: wejście do Unii Europejskiej. Wobec tego faktu nie tylko nie wolno nam utracić naszych najistotniejszych wartości narodowych i chrześcijańskich, ale musimy je pogłębić i uczynić naszym osobistym narodowym i państwowym życiem, aby móc nimi obdarowywać inne narody i kraje. Polska ma wypełniać wielką dziejową misję: nieść wiarę w Chrystusa innym narodom, całej Europie, a nawet światu. Z tej misji nie wolno nam zrezygnować, bo zdradzilibyśmy nasze posłannictwo narodowe. ... Mamy wspaniałe skarby i wartości: wiarę w Boga, cnotę miłowania człowieka, serdeczność i życzliwość dla ludzi, pragnienie czynienia dobra dla innych. Dlatego jako naród musimy być duchowo silni, aby nie pozwolić sobie wydrzeć tych wartości. (Okońska 2004: 13)

The time of our nation's great examination has come: joining the European Union. In view of this fact, not only must we not lose our most essential national and Christian values, but we must deepen them and make them our personal, national, and state life, so as to be able to bestow them upon other nations and countries. Poland must fulfil a great historical mission: to carry the faith in Christ to other nations, to all of Europe, and even to the world. We must not give up this mission, lest we betray our national mission. ... We have great treasures and values: faith in God, the virtue of loving man, cordiality and kindness to people, the desire to do good for others. Therefore, as a nation we must be spiritually strong so as not to let others rob us of these values.

Note that in presenting Poland as a missionary, Okońska warns against the danger of losing national and Christian values, which was a constant theme of the passages quoted above and reflects the strategy of dissimulation and the topos of threat. This shows that these two variations of the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor (Poland as a defender of faith and Poland as a missionary) are closely linked in the discourse. Okońska also makes reference to the topos of superiority when she states in another passage: "We have great treasure and values." As in the above texts, Poland's accession to the EU is not a "local event" but a part of God's global plan, since Poland is supposed to carry the Christian faith to the whole world.

The topos of superiority presupposes that being a Christian believer is morally superior to being an atheist. Consider the following homily preached by Bishop Dec:

- (9) Europa potrzebuje naszego świadectwa wiary, wbrew niektórym ateistycznym mentorom. Oprócz silnej wiary, przywiązania do Pana Boga i Kościoła, do tradycji chrześcijańskiej, możemy także ofiarować Europie ważne idee naszej narodowej kultury z zasadą zdrowej tolerancji oraz z zasadą personalizmu chrześcijańskiego, opartego na prawdzie i dobru. ... Mamy świadomość, że te pierwiastki personalistycznej kultury wniósł już do kultury europejskiej Jan Paweł II, największy syn naszej Ojczyzny. Musimy mówić do Europy i świata Jego głosem. W tym możemy odnaleźć naszą wielkość. Nie dajmy się zakrzyczeć bezbożnym utopistom, którzy na nasz kraj nalegają i rozpowszechniają swoje przewrotne idee przez niektóre opłacane przez siebie media. Europa naprawdę czeka na nasze chrześcijańskie świadectwo.⁷

Despite what some atheist mentors are saying, Europe needs our testimony of faith. In addition to strong faith, attachment to God and the Church, to the Christian tradition, we can also offer Europe important ideas from our national culture, including the principle of healthy tolerance and the principle of Christian personalism, based on truth and goodness. ... We are aware that these elements of personalist culture have already been brought into the European culture by John Paul II, the greatest son of our Fatherland. We need to speak to Europe and the world with his voice. In this we find our greatness. Let us not allow ourselves to be shouted down by godless utopians who press upon our country and spread their perfidious ideas through certain media financed by these people. Europe is truly waiting for our Christian witness.

According to Bishop Dec, Poland's mission is urgent and not without difficulty. Europe "needs" and is "really waiting" for its Christian witness even though "godless utopians" or "atheistic mentors" wish to silence the Polish nation. Urgency and obstacles are commonplace elements of missionary activity in numerous Christian narratives and they strengthen the image of Poland as a missionary. Poland is morally superior to Europe, offering it values and ideas that Europe supposedly does not have, including *healthy* tolerance that is the opposite of *unhealthy* European tolerance. Poland is also superior by virtue of the Polish pope, and the proclamation of his message is the reason for its greatness. The last sentence reintroduces the image examined above of Poland as being attacked by godless forces, proving

7. <http://www.radiomaryja.pl/bez-kategorii/mowmy-do-europy-i-swiata-glosem-jana-pawla-ii/>

once again that the notion of Poland as a defender of the faith and as a missionary are closely linked. This image is also invoked in the next excerpt:

- (10) Polacy powinni natchnąć na nowo germańsko-romańską Europę Zachodnią, popadającą coraz głębiej w ateistyczny nihilizm i pesymizm. To nic, że wielu ludzi u nas i na świecie taka polskość, zwłaszcza męczeńska i posłannicza, bardzo irytuje. Dobry człowiek zawsze złości siły demoniczne. (Bartnik 2008)

Poles should reinvigorate Germanic-Romance Western Europe that is falling deeper and deeper into atheistic nihilism and pessimism. It does not matter that such Polishness, especially when it is martyr-like and missionary, intensely irritates a lot of people in Poland and worldwide. A good man always angers demonic forces.

Note once more the topos of moral superiority: the European Union is depicted as devoid of any values or perspectives: pessimistic, atheistic and nihilistic, while Poland is understood to be vigorous and alive since its mission is to “reinvigorate” Europe. At the same time the topos of threat does not disappear from the discourse as Poland, compared here to a “good man,” is in conflict with “demonic forces.”

Poland’s missionary duty in Europe may also be justified by the topos of history as a teacher with reference to the Battle of Vienna and the Battle of Warsaw:

- (11) Wydaje mi się, że właśnie od nas oczekuje się, byśmy byli świadkami chrześcijaństwa w Europie. ... Mamy więc swoją rolę do wypełnienia. Mamy być dla Europy światłem. Historia pokazuje, że na ogół dobrze sprawdzaliśmy się w tej roli, tak jak pod Wiedniem czy w Bitwie Warszawskiej. Dziś nie trzeba chwycić lancy w dłoń. Wystarczy – tylko tyle lub aż tyle – być chrześcijaninem.⁸

It seems to me that it is expected of us to be witnesses to Christianity in Europe. ... So we have our role to fulfil. We are to be a light for Europe. History shows that we generally did well in this role, as in the case of [the Battle of] Vienna and the Battle of Warsaw. Today we do not need to take up our lances. A single thing suffices – as much as that or as little as that – to be a Christian.

Since both battles are depicted in the Catholic-nationalist narrative as victories over enemies threatening the Christian world order, they legitimize the current mission of Poland as the country that should restore this order because – unlike secularized Europe – it has remained truly Christian.

8. <http://www.fronda.pl/a/prof-jan-zaryn-dla-frondapl-polska-nie-musi-wprowadzac-w-swiat-postmarksistowskich-ideologii-lecz-niesc-mu-swiatlo-chrzescijanstwa,75992.html>.

4.4 POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF EUROPE ATTACKED BY ISLAM

The topos of history as a teacher has gained a new role in the discourse in question in the wake of the immigration “crisis” in Europe. The “crisis” has been depicted differently in different European countries. For example, the Serbian media (Đurović and Silaški this volume) employ metaphors based on the CONTAINER and WALL domains that might be labelled as “passive” conceptualizations. In the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland one finds a much more dynamic, militaristic image, namely the conceptual metaphor of POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF EUROPE ATTACKED BY ISLAM, where the topos of history as a teacher is employed by reference to the Battle of Vienna, and where all immigrants are perceived as Muslims inimical to Christianity. I will discuss in this section how this metaphor is used in two texts, with radically different effects in the discourse.

In a homily preached during the mass on Kahlenberg in September 2013, commemorating the 330th anniversary of the battle of Vienna, Bishop Zawitkowski told the audience that “gdyby nie zwycięstwo armii polskiej pod wodzą Sobieskiego, byłibyśmy w tureckich jasyrach, a dżihad ogaręłaby stary kontynent Europy” ‘but for the victory of the Polish army led by Sobieski, we would have been enslaved by the Turks and the old continent of Europe would be engulfed by jihad’ (Zawitkowski 2013).

As mentioned above, King Jan Sobieski is a metonym for the Polish nation in the Catholic-nationalist narrative, which means that it is Poland that saved Europe’s Christian identity. This in turn indicates the presence of the POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF EUROPE ATTACKED BY ISLAM metaphor. But there is more to it than this, since Zawitkowski’s counter-factual statement draws our attention to the hypothetical present consequences of the defeat of the Europeans in the battle of Vienna. By doing so, he implicitly suggests that the battle with Islam is still going on and that Europe is losing it. There are two reasons to think so. First, Zawitkowski uses, no doubt deliberately, the term *jihad*, which connotes Islamic extremism and acts of terrorism. Second, since Polish speakers tend to distinguish between the old (i.e. Western) Europe and the new (i.e. Central and Eastern) Europe, Zawitkowski’s conclusion that jihad would have affected “the old continent of Europe” may suggest that the current problem with Islamic extremism stems – according to the discourse in question – from the influx of Muslims to Western European countries, but not to Poland.

Zawitkowski’s argumentation, based on the topos of history as a teacher, presents the Islam of the 21st century as a threat. Zawitkowski is not a warmonger; but in another context the same topos with the same conceptual metaphor may be exploited to justify violence against Muslims, as exemplified by a film uploaded to YouTube by the extremist-nationalist Polish Defence League:

- (12) Chcę przekazać wiadomość dla muzułmanów w Polsce i Europie. My Polacy nie życzymy sobie tego, co reprezentujecie w krajach Europy Zachodniej, a mianowicie żadnego prawa według waszego Koranu. ... Jeżeli będziecie chcieli przyjść do naszego kraju i robić demonstracje ... to my wyjdziemy na ulice i pokażemy wam naprawdę, jak należy się zachowywać. ... Będziecie mieli w kraju taki dżihad, jaki zrobił Jan III Sobieski pod Wiedniem.⁹

To Muslims in Poland and in Europe. We Poles do not want what you represent in the countries of Western Europe, namely any law according to your Quran. ... If you want to come to our country to organize demonstrations ... we will take to the streets and show you how to behave. ... You will have the same type of jihad here that Jan III Sobieski made at Vienna.

This declaration shows two things. First, that conceptual metaphors as means of realization of *topoi* may be powerful instruments of persuasion. Since King Jan III Sobieski saved Europe from Islam in the past through the application of violence, “we Poles”, as his compatriots, are also entitled to resort to violence when the enemy that Sobieski fought against attacks us once more. Second, it shows how the Catholic-nationalist discourse has been feeding into the extremist nationalism which has been increasingly noticeable in Poland in recent years. The evidence of a natural alliance between these two forms of nationalism is given by the mass celebrated in Białystok Cathedral in April 2016 during which members of the National Radical Camp – an extremist nationalist organization – displayed its flags along the nave of the cathedral, and shouted the following slogans in a street demonstration after the mass: *Precz z Unią Europejską* and *Wielka Polska katolicka*; ‘Out with the EU’; ‘Great Catholic Poland.’¹⁰ Although the Polish episcopate condemned this incident, it cannot be denied that the National Radical Camp’s slogans are identical in content with what one may often hear in Catholic-nationalist homilies.

4.5 Interpretation of the Smoleńsk plane crash in Catholic-nationalist discourse

The Smoleńsk plane crash, in which President Lech Kaczyński and 95 other people died, was the most tragic event in post-war Polish history. It comes as little surprise that it was to their religion that most Poles turned in order to cope with the ensuing trauma. What is surprising, however, is that the Catholic-nationalist

9. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=he-ycVqxQPM>.

10. <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19940404,onr-sprofanowal-katedre-jak-nacjonalisciswietowali-w-bialymstoku.html>.

discourse quickly absorbed this event, interpreting it as a part of God's agenda for Poland. The narrative of Poland as the nation chosen by God has "crystallized, consolidated and erupted with an unexpected force as a result of the Smolensk crash" (Przylipiak 2016: 83).

In a homily preached after the Smoleńsk crash, Fr. Posacki drew a parallel between the crash and Christ's crucifixion:

- (13) Tak wielka tragedia – największa w pewnym sensie w skali światowej – nie może nie mieć bezpośredniego i radykalnego odniesienia do Ofiary Chrystusa. Więcej, może posiadać ukryty sens i bezgranicznie głębokie znaczenie jedynie w tym świetle. Ten sens dotyczy jednostek, narodu, ale może mieć też znaczenie międzynarodowe czy ponadnarodowe.

(Posacki 2010)

Such a tragedy – in a certain sense the greatest one on the global scale – cannot be unrelated directly and radically to Christ's sacrifice. More than that, it is only in this light that it can have a hidden meaning and a profoundly deep import. This meaning does not concern only individuals or the [Polish] nation, but may be of international or supranational significance.

This time the argumentative basis underpinning Poland's special status is the topos of comparison with the POLAND IS CHRIST metaphor mentioned earlier and utilized by the preacher to persuade his audience that the deaths in Smoleńsk of these representatives of the Polish nation should be seen as a Christ-like sacrifice for other nations or even for the world. In this way the Smoleńsk crash has been embedded even more firmly in the historical context of the discourse.

Finally, another homily on the Smoleńsk crash presents the Polish nation as different from other nations:

- (14) Bóg kocha Polskę. Dlatego nie pozwala nam upodobnić się do innych narodów europejskich. Ta miłość jest trudna do wytłumaczenia, bo po wyjściu z komunizmu zasadniczo odwróciliśmy się od Stwórcy, postanowiliśmy żyć po swojemu, odrzucając przygotowaną dla nas historię. A jednak Bóg widzi w nas potencjał, co wyjawiał św. Faustynie Kowalskiej: "Polskę szczególnie umiłowalem, a jeżeli posłuszna będzie woli Mojej, wywyższę ją w potęgę i świętości. Z niej wyjdzie iskra, która przygotowuje świat na ostateczne moje przyjście."¹¹

God loves Poland. That is why he does not allow us to become similar to other European nations. His love is difficult to explain because after communism we basically turned away from the Creator, decided to live in

11. <http://www.radiomaryja.pl/bez-kategorii/homilia-wyglaszona-w-archikatedrze-sw-jana-podczas-miesiecznej-mszy-sw-za-ofiary-katastrofy-smolenskiej/>

our own way, rejecting the history that was prepared for us. Still, God can see potential in us, since he said to Sister Faustina: “I bear a special love for Poland, and if she will be obedient to My will, I will exalt her in might and holiness. From her will come forth the spark that will prepare the world for My final coming.”

The words opening the passage – “God loves Poland and that is why he does not allow us to become similar to other European nations” – indicate the topos of difference being a part of the strategy of dissimulation that paradoxically serves to strengthen Polish identity through – as it were – a masochistic interpretation of a national trauma (cf. *his love is difficult* above). Of equal importance, these words are a quotation from an interview published in *Nasz Dziennik* with a contemporary Polish poet, Wojciech Wencel, who identifies strongly with the Catholic-nationalist narrative (Wencel 2011), and they thus exemplify the intertextuality of the discourse.¹² In the latter part of the passage, the preacher employs the topos of appeal to authority: Poland’s special status is guaranteed by God himself, as evidenced by Jesus’s words to Sister Faustina – a “mystical cliché” of the Polish Catholic-nationalist discourse.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, we may say that the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland is a prolific and vigorously fostered project of national identity that has been stronger and more visible since 2015 when the overtly Catholic Law and Justice Party came to power. Preached from the pulpit and disseminated through conservative Catholic media and the Internet, it may easily reach many Poles, shaping their way of thinking about the relationship between Poland and the EU and the current immigration situation in Europe. It is also capable of absorbing the most recent events in Polish history, turning them into yet another strand in its narrative.

Polish national identity is expressed and perpetuated in the discourse by means of the POLAND IS A PERSON metaphor employed in a number of topoi: the topos of history as a teacher, with the Battle of Vienna and the Battle of Warsaw exemplifying Poland’s unique role as the defender of Western Civilization; the topos of appeal to authority, with quotations from Sister Faustina’s diary put

12. Wencel’s poems have recently become obligatory reading in secondary schools in Poland, which shows how the Catholic-nationalist discourse has infiltrated the state educational system: <http://kultura.gazeta.pl/kultura/7,114528,22257707,poeta-smolenski-trafil-na-liste-lektur-obowiazkowych-wencel.html>.

forward as evidence of God's agenda for Poland; the topos of threat, presenting Poland as being attacked by the EU on the one hand or threatened by Islam on the other; and the topos of superiority, in which Poland is presented as morally superior to atheistic Europe. The main macro-strategies identified in the discourse are constructive strategies of dissimulation and perpetuation. The former stresses the special character of the Catholic Polish nation in comparison with secular and liberal Europe; the latter focuses on the preservation of the Catholic identity of Poles threatened by secular and liberal ideologies. In short, the Catholic-nationalist discourse presents a radically different image of Poland's presence in the EU from the concept of the Euro-Polish identity proposed by the liberal *Gazeta Wyborcza* discussed by Grimstad (2012), or from the "Europeanization" of Polish identity promoted by many Polish politicians after 1989 (Krzyżanowski 2009).

The samples analysed in this chapter prove the crucial role of conceptual metaphors in the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland. Conceptualizing the Polish nation as a person, that is, as an entity endowed with a national "self" and decision mechanisms, enables the presentation of Poland's history as a personal history, and its current relationship with the EU or the immigration "crisis" in terms of personal interactions. Therefore, abstract issues like the conflicting ideologies of Catholicism and liberalism, or distant historical or socio-political issues, achieve "a human scale." In this sense POLAND IS A PERSON must be viewed as the indispensable conceptual tool in the discourse in question and as the one that explains its persuasive power.

Given the fact that the Catholic Church – as the original Greek term *Katholikos* suggests – transcends the national, we are bound to ask why the Catholic Church in Poland fosters nationalist discourse so enthusiastically. The answer is simple. As the main social actor behind the discourse, the church is also its main beneficiary, and indeed one may argue that the discourse analysed here seems to be the *raison d'être* of the Catholic Church in Poland in the new, democratic milieu. Between 1945 and 1989 the Catholic Church was regarded by the majority of Poles as the true representative of the Polish nation, a nation enslaved by the communist regime; a "good" Pole was a Catholic and a "bad one" was a communist (Vermeersch 2013: 143). Yet since 1989:

... the Polish church ... has had to come to terms with a very different situation and to find its place in a modern democracy where a monolithic, semi-political presence (even one that could take pride in its resistance to communism) is, quite clearly, no longer sustainable. Paradoxically the most powerful church in Central Europe is, it seems, the one least able to trust itself to the democratic process.

(Davie 2002: 28)

It may be argued, therefore, that the Catholic-nationalist discourse remains an important way for the Polish church to recover at least some of the power lost through the democratic transformation of Poland after 1989. According to Norman Davies:

... this new, free Poland was supposed to be one big theocratic parish in which the mayor drinks tea with the parson and everything is done in the rectory. Yet instead of that the bishops got a secular state in which they were assigned merely a role of one of the players. This is definitely not enough for the ambition of the clergy. (Davies 2017: 17)

Although in many respects unique, the Catholic-nationalist discourse in Poland discloses national fears shared by many European nations, and, as is discussed in this volume, concerning the preservation of the national culture or language (Vervaet, Čičin-Šain this volume), or the danger of uncontrolled immigration (Đurović & Silaški this volume). Nevertheless, in the context of the rebirth of nationalisms in Europe mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Polish Catholic-nationalist discourse should not be seen as empty rhetoric but as an important indicator of the general political climate in Europe in the first decades of the 21st century.

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CHAPTER 4

“Let’s work on our Serbian!”

Standard language ideology, metaphors and discourses about Serbian national identity in the newspaper *Politika* in 2015

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This chapter explores the use of metaphors in the column “Let’s Safeguard Serbian” in the Serbian newspaper *Politika* in 2015. In this column, adherents of the standard language ideology offered advice about spelling, loanwords, and syntax as well as regarding the name of the language and preferred alphabet. Drawing on critical discourse analysis and metaphor analysis, I examine the link between prescriptivism and contemporary discourses on Serbian national identity. I argue that most metaphors appearing in texts that fall into “the complaint tradition” (Milroy and Milroy) do not reveal a clear-cut link between prescriptivism and nationalism. However, the complaint tradition also reactivates a rich repository of conventional(ized) metaphors and metonymies that reach back to Romanticism and have much more far-reaching implications ideologically.

Keywords: metaphors, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Critical Metaphor Analysis, discourse metaphors, standard language ideology, Serbian standard language, Serbian national identity, Romanticism, discursive history of metaphors

1. Introduction

In April 2015, the Serbian Department at the Faculty of Philology of the University of Belgrade, with the support of the National Library of Serbia, the National Broadcasting Service (RTS), and the newspaper *Politika*, started a campaign under the title *Negujmo srpski jezik* ‘Let’s Work on our Serbian.’ The campaign consisted

of short video clips and posters displayed in public transport in which actors, TV announcers, and other local celebrities point out and correct frequent so-called linguistic errors.¹ While the organizers declared the campaign to be a huge success (Brborić 2015), some voices in the non-mainstream media, such as the daily newspaper *Danas* and the online forum *Peščanik*, criticized it as patronizing. In the wake of this critique, *Politika* opened its pages to a special daily column somewhat dramatically titled *Sačuvajmo srpski jezik* ‘Let’s Safeguard Serbian.’ In this column, which ran for roughly three months (September to December 2015, with some occasional additions in 2016), proponents of the standard language ideology from Serbian universities and research institutes expressed their opinions about specific aspects of Serbian language use, ranging from advice about loanwords and the use of certain grammatical constructions to the question of the alphabet and the preferred name of the language. Because the campaign was limited in time and space (and organized top-down), it offers a well-delineated sample of representative texts that show how adherents of the standard language ideology in Serbia conceive of the link between national identity and language. Standard language ideology has been well-researched up until now; but how do discussions about language contribute to the ideology of nationalism? And how are claims about the importance of the standard language for national identity made and presented to non-specialist speakers of a language?

Contemporary theories of metaphor have pointed out that metaphor is one of the hidden mechanisms of (any) ideology (Goatly 2011) and is used to persuade the reader/hearer (e.g. Charteris-Black 2004; Hidalgo-Dowing & Kraljevic-Mujic 2017; Musolff 2017). As language is by its very nature abstract, it comes as no surprise that metaphors will be frequently used to think and talk about it. Moreover, ever since the pre-Romantic era (or even before that, see Bonfiglio 2010: 83–94), philosophers of language and linguists have used metaphors to describe language. Drawing on Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), I will explore how and to what effect the *Politika* columnists use metaphors – about language, language politics, language use, and language users.

In contrast to traditional studies of rhetoric, in which metaphor is nothing more than a decorative figure of speech, metaphors are perceived in cognitive linguistics as operating on the level of human conceptualization. The basic claim of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) is that people think in metaphors

1. What started as a campaign in Belgrade has in the meantime been exported to the Republika Srpska (in 2016) and is, with the support of the Minister of Education, planned to be carried out on the whole territory of Serbia. See <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/374951/Pocinje-akcija-Negujmo-sccpski-jezik>. Accessed 6 October 2017.

and that abstract thought is possible only through metaphors (see, for example, Lakoff & Johnson 1980a; Kövecses 2002). Metaphor is, in other words, present everywhere. According to CMT, metaphors work by mapping well-understood source domains (which are assumed to originate in our bodily infant experiences) onto more abstract target domains. A classic example of a conceptual metaphor would be UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING,² in which an idea is conceptualized as an object that can be seized and held, as in *Do you grasp it?/Do you get what I mean?*

However, the claim of conceptual embodiment is one of the main reasons why CMT is difficult to combine with discourse analysis: if metaphor use is unconscious, it leaves no room for speaker intention (Charteris-Black 2004: 11; Hart 2008: 94). Therefore, Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004) has argued for the need to combine a cognitive with a pragmatic approach. Whereas CMT does a good job of explaining "how metaphors are *interpreted* by individuals," it does not explain "why particular metaphors are chosen in specific discourse contexts" (Charteris-Black 2004: 243; original emphasis). For that reason, Charteris-Black argued that the complexity of metaphor and the different roles it plays in language require an approach that incorporates the linguistic, cognitive, and pragmatic dimensions of metaphor (Charteris-Black 2004: 7–24, 243–253).³

Other scholars have also increasingly devoted attention to the ways in which metaphors "extend beyond individual cognition, into the realm of society and culture" and build upon and interact with existing cultural knowledge and discourses circulating in society over a certain period of time (Zinken, Hellsten & Nerlich 2007: 365; Šarić 2015: 53). In addition, Andreas Musolff and Jörg Zinken have pointed out that this broader discursive context can extend over a long period of time, arguing for the need for a "'historically situated' understanding that includes awareness of discourse traditions 'revived' in topical uses" (Musolff & Zinken 2009b: 6); Musolff's diachronic analysis of the evolution of the metaphor of the "body politic" is a case in point (Musolff 2009, 2010).

Analysing metaphors used in the texts under consideration as well as the discourse in which they are embedded can give us an insight into the link between normative linguistics and nationalist views on identity in Serbia today. On a general level, such an analysis can shed light on the interaction of metaphors with culture and society, and show *how* the language ideological debate is

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2. In line with the conventions of CMT, conceptual metaphors are indicated by small capitals.
 3. Hart (2008) argues along similar lines but pushes the argument even further by claiming that CMT and CDA are incompatible, proposing instead to combine Blending Theory (BT) with CDA.

actually conducted in Serbia (for the notion and importance of language ideological debates, see Blommaert 1999). More specifically, I hope to demonstrate how discourses about “the need to preserve and safeguard Serbian” actually tend to promote or even insist on a “nationally correct” attitude towards language both from state actors and language users. Moreover, some of the metaphors and metonymies under consideration have far-reaching implications for the way in which the language rights of (South Slavic) national minorities in Serbia are discussed as well as for the representation of speakers of Bosnian, Montenegrin, or Croatian in adjacent states. Taking my cue from scholars who combine CMA with CDA (Charteris-Black 2004; Hart 2008; Musolff 2009, 2010, 2012; Musolff & Zinken 2009a; Šarić 2015), the theoretical point I want to make is that whereas CMT can tell us something about the general entailments of a specific metaphor, the ideological or political implications of the metaphors can only be fully grasped when taking into account the broader discursive context in which the metaphors are used as well as the historical tradition of which they are part.

In what follows, I will first briefly discuss the campaign “Let’s Work on our Serbian” (Section 2) and situate it briefly against the backdrop of standard language ideology and linguistic purism in Serbia. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, I explore some interesting examples of metaphorical language use in the *Politika* columns and point out the implications of these metaphors. Section 3 explores metaphors in the *Politika* columns about standard language and language norms and demonstrates how they relate to what Milroy and Milroy dubbed “the complaint tradition” ([1985] 2012) and to standard language ideology. Section 4 examines metaphors that present language as an organism, or as an organic expression of the people’s character, ideas that can be traced back to the discursive tradition of Romanticism. Section 5 looks into the ideological consequences of conventional metaphors and metonymies in columns that suggest a strong link between territory and language.

I argue that many examples are telling of the way in which prescriptivists and language nationalists in Serbia think about the Serbian standard language (including its relationship with neighbouring or minority speakers of Bosnian, Croatian, and Montenegrin as well as its relationship to the language previously called Serbo-Croatian). My analysis also shows how prescriptivists conceive of their own role in society and, not unimportantly, of their relationship with the addressees of their message – the users of Serbian (and, to a lesser extent, speakers of Bosnian, Croatian, or Montenegrin). I suggest that the trajectory from the “complaint tradition” to overtly nationalist discourses about identity and language is not a linear one but one that is made possible by Serbian linguists drawing on a much older Romantic metaphor complex. For that reason, I conclude by suggesting the

need to investigate the discursive history of metaphors about (Serbian and related South-Slavic) standard language(s).

2. “Let’s work on our Serbian”: The campaign and its reception and relationship to the ideology of the standard language in Serbia

The campaign’s title – *Negujmo srpski jezik* – translates literally as ‘Let’s Cultivate Serbian,’ but given the informal setting, it could also be translated as ‘Let’s Work on our Serbian’ or ‘Brush up your Serbian’ and suggests a view of language as something that should be cultivated, looked after, nurtured, or polished. The title of *Politika*’s column series *Sačuvajmo srpski jezik* is set in two colours, dividing the perfectivizing prefix *sa-* from the imperfective *čuvajmo*. The visual highlighting of the perfective and imperfective aspect implies a double meaning: the imperfective imperative *čuvajmo*, set in red, suggests that Serbian should be taken good care of, guarded, looked after, whereas the perfective *sačuvajmo* implies a greater intensity: Serbian should also be protected from harm, kept from decay, saved.

The posters and video clips of the campaign “Let’s Work on our Serbian” staged well-known celebrities (ranging from international stars such as Emir Kusturica and Monica Bellucci to famous local actors, news anchors, folk singers, and TV presenters) who all stress the need to speak and write “correctly.”⁴ Most examples concern spelling, such as **Europa/Evropa* ‘Europe’; **euro/evro* ‘euro’⁵ and, to a lesser extent, grammar/syntax: **s kolima/kolima* ‘by car’⁶ **trebam/treba da*

4. Most of the posters can be retrieved by search in Google Images (“Negujmo srpski jezik” https://www.google.com/search?q=%22negujmo+srpski+jezik%22&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7st3VrY_TAhVBnRoKHapQBtsQ_AUICCGb&biw=1321&bih=743; accessed 6 October 2017); the videos are available on *YouTube* through a channel operated by the City Library of Belgrade <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCx21nKdrlPAXUrj8-NT3Hfg>; accessed 6 October 2017.

5. Borrowings from Greek such as *Europe* and words derived from it are in standard Serbian usually rendered and pronounced as *ev-*: *Evropa*, *evro* and in standard Croatian as *eu-*: *Europa*, *euro*. The explanation is that Greek loanwords entered Serbian directly from Greek, but Croatian through Latin.

6. According to Serbian and Croatian prescriptive grammars, if used with the meaning “by means of,” the instrumental case does not take the preposition *s(a)*, for example *kolima* ‘by car’; if referring to “with someone,” i.e. “in the company of,” then the preposition *s(a)* is used, e.g. *sa Slavkom* ‘with Slavko.’ However, in colloquial language, speakers use *s biciklom* ‘by bike,’ *s avionom* ‘by plane,’ etc.

‘I have to’⁷ and phonology/regionalisms: **sumljam/sumnjam* ‘I doubt’,⁸ **višlji/viši* ‘higher’.⁹ What these “errors” have in common is that both forms are (more or less widely) used but only one form is accepted by normative linguists. Non-accepted forms are considered ungrammatical (**s kolima*; **trebam*) or dialectal (**sumljam*, **višlji*). Not unimportantly, some of these forms, such as *Europa* or *trebam* are also perceived as belonging to the Croatian standard and for that reason seem to be unacceptable, even though this is not explicitly stated. However, on a more general level, the goal of the campaign seems to have been to “remind” users of Serbian of these “errors” and convince them to give up the “wrong” forms once and for all.

Interestingly, most of the “errors” that are singled out fall into a level of language competence that any native speaker of Serbian should be able to acquire in primary school without too much effort. This indeed seems to suggest, as most critics have pointed out, that the linguists involved in the campaign have an extremely patronizing attitude towards language users, to the point that they imply that language users are stupid (Arsenijević 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d; Simonović 2015a, 2015b; Ćosić 2015). To a certain extent, the campaign presents “correct language use” not so much as proof of good education but (particularly if we take into account *who* is sending the message: popular actors, film directors, news anchors) as a sign of being successful and belonging to the elite. Moreover, because the campaign lacks any references to the role of education in acquiring the standard language, it also seems to underwrite a logic of meritocracy – you can become as successful as these actors or news anchors, regardless of your background, as long as you use standard language. The condescending tone of the campaign vis-à-vis language users that went hand in glove with this type of meritocratic logic led Marko Simonović

7. According to Serbian prescriptivists, the verb *trebati* ‘have to, ought, should, need’ should only be used as an impersonal verb (*treba* + infinitive or *treba* + *da* + present tense) and should not be used as a personal verb (*trebam*, *trebaš* with a grammatical subject in the nominative case) except in cases where it has the meaning ‘need/be needed, e.g. *Trebaju mi te knjige* ‘I need those books’ or *Trebaš mi ti* ‘I need you.’ Tanasić (2015a) gives a concise explanation of this rule in his column, “Treba li nam glagol trebati?” ‘Do we need the verb *trebati*?’ Even though he touches briefly upon the grammatical incongruences that follow from using the verb *trebati* as an impersonal verb, he nevertheless concludes that “as long as the norm does not change, we have to find ways of making correct sentences with this verb,” because “the worst solution is not respecting the norm.”

8. The form *sumnjam* is the present tense (1st person singular) of the verb *sumnjati* ‘to doubt’ and is etymologically derived from the verb *mniti* ‘to think’; the form *sumljati*, *sumljam* is considered incorrect in both standard Croatian and Serbian.

9. *Viši* is the comparative of *visok* ‘high,’ the colloquially attested *višlji* is considered incorrect.

(2015a) to conclude that rather than telling people that they do not know how to use their mother tongue correctly, the organizers of the campaign would do better to lobby for a more up-to-date and inclusive education system.

Whereas most of the posters do not make clear in which context the “errors” in question should be avoided, many of the *YouTube* videos, such as those focusing on language use in text messages or at the market, suggest that even in their private lives and in informal communicative settings, speakers of Serbian are supposed to use “correct language,” that is, standard Serbian.¹⁰ It is, therefore, not without reason that Boban Arsenijević called the campaign “a proof of the authoritarianism and small-town normativity of our mentality and of the theoretical and methodological backwardness of the Serbian linguistic scene” (Arsenijević 2015d).¹¹ In other words, speaking from a linguistic point of view, the campaign denies the heterogeneity of language and presents language instead as a homogenous entity.¹²

The campaign’s obsession with “errors” and “correct Serbian” could be seen as yet another symptom of what Ranko Bugarski, using a metaphor from development psychology, called the “mild identity crisis that Serbian [has been] undergoing” (Bugarski 2004: 32) since the 1990s.¹³ With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian ceased to function as the official language and was gradually replaced by separate standard languages in the successor states of Yugoslavia: Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Montenegrin.¹⁴ As it is not possible to discuss this process at length within the scope of this chapter, suffice it to say that all four standard languages kept the same Neo-Štokavian dialectic basis that was also the basis for Serbo-Croatian. As a result of this – however intensive the efforts by normativist linguists and certain groups of language users to create separate standards

10. See footnote 4.

11. All translations are mine, unless indicated differently.

12. Lyons (1981: 24–27) defines this as “the fiction of homogeneity,” i.e. “the belief or assumption that all members of the same language-community speak exactly the same language.”

13. Here we should perhaps add that the campaign is not the first and only expression of standard language ideology; see, for example, the so-called “language advice books” (e.g. *Srpski jezički priručnik* by Pavle Ivić, Ivan Klajn, Branislav Brborić and Mitar Pešikan) and columns about “language doubts” (*jezičke nedoumice*) by Ivan Klajn in several Serbian newspapers, or the radio programme *Srpski na srpskom* ‘Serbian in Serbian.’ See <http://www.rts.rs/page/radio/sr/series/23/radio-beograd-1/3666/srpski-na-srpskom.html>. Accessed 6 October 2017.

14. On the disintegration of Serbo-Croatian, see Bugarski (2004, 2012); for an overview of the history of the standardization of Serbo-Croatian as a common language and of the four standard languages that were constructed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, see also Greenberg (2008).

might be – the standard languages are mutually intelligible and the differences relate to a limited number of items on the level of lexical choices, certain syntactic structures, and the spelling of foreign names.¹⁵

Given the campaign's strong purist impulse, a note on the standard language ideology in Serbia and the various ways in which it manifests purism and other forms of prescriptivism (as well as some of the paradoxes they entail) is in order here. According to Marija Ilić (2012: 308–310) three forms of purism can be distinguished in contemporary Serbian: (1) national/ethnic, (2) dialectological, and (3) purism in terms of standard language ideology. As for the first, “national purism,” Ilić points out that the Serbian standard was traditionally more open to foreign borrowings than the Croatian one (on different attitudes to loanwords in Serbian versus Croatian, see also Greenberg 2008: 47–54). As mentioned above, the Serbian norm still accepts both the Latin and Cyrillic script and ekavian and ijekavian pronunciation, which Ilić sees as an indication of an inclusive norm.¹⁶ However, with the growth of nationalism during and after the wars of the 1990s, this “inclusive” norm has come under pressure, both by normativist linguists and by language users. In 1997, the *Odbor za standardizaciju srpskog jezika* ‘Committee for the Standardization of Serbian’ was established, which kept both the ijekavian/ekavian pronunciation and the Cyrillic/Latin script. It needs to be pointed out that the acceptance of ijekavian in itself is not a guarantee of a “tolerant” or “less purist norm” (as Ilić maintains, 2012: 310), let alone of other forms of “linguistic tolerance”; that is, an inclusive ekavian/ijekavian norm does not automatically mean a tolerant language policy. This inclusive norm manifests itself often as an unambiguous gesture of *appropriation* of all Neo-Štokavian dialects (the previously called variants of Serbo-Croatian) as “Serbian” (for an example of this in academic writing, see Radić & Miloradović 2009) – a sign that the true pluricentric logic of Serbo-Croatian has been totally abandoned by Serbian normativists.

Other examples of an increasingly rigid normative attitude include the insistence on the use of the Cyrillic script, illustrated by the blossoming of “organizations for the defense of the Cyrillic script,” and by the stipulation in the 2006 constitution that “in the Republic of Serbia, the Serbian language and the Cyrillic

15. An interesting initiative that counters the frenzy of language segregation is the *Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku* ‘Declaration about a Common Language’; see <http://jezicinacionalizmi.com/deklaracija/>, accessed 6 October 2017.

16. Ijekavian/ekavian refer to the way in which the vowel *jat* from Medieval Slavic is pronounced in contemporary Štokavian: in ekavian, the *jat* is reflected as *e*, in ijekavian as (*i*)*je*, for example *reka/rijeka* ‘river’ or *pesma/pjesma* ‘song’. Ekavian is mostly spoken on the territory of contemporary Serbia, whereas ijekavian is spoken in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.

script are in official use."¹⁷ Interestingly, the webpages of the Constitutional Court and the Government of Serbia can both be consulted in the Cyrillic as well as in the Latin alphabet. A more extreme example is the (failed) attempt during the 1990s by government officials of the Republika Srpska (a part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), backed by certain linguists from Serbia, to impose the ekavian pronunciation in a region where traditionally ijekavian is spoken (Greenberg 2008: 77–83). As Bugarski explains, the rationale behind the whole operation was, of course, "to divorce the local Serbs from their traditional Croat and Muslim neighbours and draw them closer to their ethnic mainstream in Serbia, thus contributing to the goal of creating Greater Serbia on the ruins of Yugoslavia" (Bugarski 2012: 228).

In Serbia proper, sociolinguistic studies documented a significant degree of intolerance towards the ijekavian and (parts of) the vocabulary of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia that were perceived as "Croatian" by speakers of the local ekavian standard variety (Petrović 2006). In the campaign, the above-mentioned marking of the words *Europa* and *euro* (instead of *Evropa* and *evro*) and *trebam* (instead of the impersonal *treba da*) as "incorrect" are examples of this "national purism," as the forms *Europa* and *euro* are associated with the Croatian standard.

The "dialectological purism" that Ilić distinguishes goes back to the nineteenth-century efforts of language reformer Vuk Karadžić and consists of privileging supposedly "authentic," rural speech over the speech of urban centres that has been allegedly "spoiled" by contact with foreign languages. Serbian dialectologists took over Karadžić's bias and developed an almost fetishist inclination towards (re-constructing) "authentic" rural dialects and migration flows and a dislike for influences of contact languages (or non-standard dialects) on the standard language. However, Karadžić's favouring of specific rural dialects, in particular the Eastern Herzegovinian dialect, in turn informs the next form of purism, which Ilić calls the "purism characteristic of standard language ideology" (Ilić 2012: 309–310) and which characterizes both campaigns. To put it succinctly, the standard language ideology boils down to the promoting of uniformity in language structure, which results in a set of beliefs about "correctness" and a firm belief in a single, best variety and a rejection of all other non-standard varieties (cf. Milroy 2001). As James Milroy points out, "varieties of language do not actually have prestige in themselves," but prestige is attributed to the language varieties by metonymy (Milroy 2001: 532). In the case of contemporary Serbian, the identification of the Eastern-Herzegovinian dialect – which is the basis of the Vukovian norm but in

17. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Section I, Article X. See: <http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/view/sr-Latn-CS/70-100028/ustav-republike-srbije>, accessed 6 October 2017.

terms of prosody (accentuation patterns) quite remote from the actual speech of the majority of speakers in Serbia, e.g. in Belgrade, and even more so in Central and Southern Serbia – *as* the idealized variety is actually a case in point. Whereas we find all types of purism in the *Politika* columns (with fewest examples of the second), which are very often closely interrelated, most of them fall into the “purism of the standard language ideology.” In the next section, I will examine how support for the standard language ideology in the *Politika* columns is to a large extent framed in terms of “the complaint tradition” (Milroy & Milroy [1985] 2012), and voiced through a set of more or less predictable conceptual metaphors.

3. What’s in a metaphor?: The “complaint tradition” remixed

Very much in line with the obsession of the campaign “Let’s work on our Serbian,” the bulk of the *Politika* articles falls into what James Milroy and Lesley Milroy have called “the complaint tradition” in their seminal work *Authority in Language* (Milroy & Milroy [1985] 2012). Even though both linguists arrived at their conclusions based on an analysis of the way in which writers, public intellectuals, and linguists over the course of several centuries had thought about the use of English, their insights are certainly not limited to English but apply to prescriptivist discourse and standard language ideology in general. According to Milroy and Milroy, “the complaint tradition” assumes:

1. That there is only one correct way of speaking/writing the English language.
2. That deviations from this norm are illiteracies, or barbarisms, and that non-standard forms are irregular and perversely deviant.
3. That people *ought* to use the standard language and that it is quite right to discriminate against non-standard users, as such usage is a sign of stupidity, ignorance, perversity, moral degeneracy, etc. (Milroy & Milroy [1985] 2012: 33; italics in the original).

Most of the authors used the column in *Politika* to stipulate what is correct or incorrect language usage and what is grammatical or ungrammatical language, making a clear value judgement of what they describe as the “incorrect” forms. Because most columns voice “complaints” about the deterioration of Serbian speakers’ knowledge of their native language, it comes as no surprise that most metaphors tend to convey rather pessimistic views about the current state and status of standard Serbian.

Some of the recurrent metaphors about what is or should be standard language draw on basic conceptual metaphors, such as GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN.

Primary conceptual metaphors like these are not in themselves connected to views that support standard language ideology. That is, certain metaphors become part of the complaint tradition because of the way they are used in discourse. In a text about the popularity of the local idiom in Southern Serbia, Sofija Miloradović (Serbian Academy of Sciences and University of Niš) deplores the tendency of students from central and southern Serbia to "fall down" to the local dialect once they return to their home region: "Padanje' na lokalnu normu urbanog dijalekta neophodan je preduslov (ponovnog) uklapanja u sredinu u kojoj se živi i radi" 'Descending to the local norm of the urban dialect is a precondition for their (renewed) integration in the environment in which they live and work' (Miloradović 2015). The dialects spoken in Southern and South-Eastern Serbia (Kosovsko-Resavski, Timočko-Prizrenski and Old Štokavian or Torlak) are not considered as a basis of the Serbian standard language by normative linguists but are, particularly in terms of accent and prosody and partly in terms of morphology (Old Štokavian or Torlak), perceived as "deviant" from the ideal(ized) Vukovian Eastern-Herzegovinian norm. The metaphor of "falling down" in Miloradović's account of students' attitude towards their local southern or central Serbian dialect clearly suggests the view that STANDARD LANGUAGE IS UP, DIALECT IS DOWN. According to Lakoff and Johnson, high status is perceived as up and low status down; the social and physical basis for this is that "status is correlated with power (social) and power is UP (physical)" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980b: 463). As Tanja Petrović (2015) has shown, the views about "southern dialects" held by the proponents of standard language ideology are connected with and feed into a wide range of orientaling stereotypes that present speakers of those dialects as less civilized and culturally backward. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that Miloradović not only connects the popularity of the southern urban idiom to those speakers' need to again "fit in" with the cultural and communicative patterns of their region but also to "the loss of norms in many areas of life" (Miloradović 2015).

One of the consequences of this perceived loss of norms, according to Miloradović, is "the suppression of the awareness of the need for a certain cultural hierarchy and of the place and status of the standard language" (Miloradović 2015). If language norms and moral norms are conflated, that is, if language conventions are equated with ethical rules, then it is a small step to the idea that CULTIVATING LANGUAGE IS A WAR because these conventions are perceived as having an intrinsic moral value that should be "defended." As Rajna Dragičević of the Serbian Department at the University of Belgrade warns in an interview for *Politika*, "komunikacija na internetu [je] izazvala talas otpora nepismenih prema pismenima i tihi rat među njima" 'internet communication provoked a wave of opposition of the illiterate against the literate and a silent war amongst them'

(Dragičević 2015a). Moreover, “sve je više boraca za nepismenost” ‘there are more and more warriors of illiteracy’ (Dragičević 2015a). From the context, it is clear that Dragičević implies that in this *war*, normativist linguists are the heroes, and *the warriors for illiteracy*, the villains.

Interestingly, the BATTLE OR WAR metaphors can also be deployed for a different (ideological) goal, for example to describe the dispute among linguists about the question of whether the use of specific nouns indicating female professionals (such as *profesorka*, *doktorka*, etc. for a female professor/teacher, doctor, etc.) is desirable or not. In this context, Jovanka Radić (from the Serbian Language Institute), who vehemently opposes the use of feminine derivatives for occupations, writes that “Na meti lingvisti-feminista našli su se nazivi lica po zvanju, zanimanju, ulozi ili delatnosti” ‘Feminist linguists have targeted terms for people’s callings, occupations, roles, or activities’ (Radić 2015). This SHOOTING metaphor implies that “feminist linguists” are executing an attack or assault on language itself.¹⁸

In the *war* between the literate and the illiterate, language emerges as AN ENVIRONMENT that can be polluted or flooded and that needs to be kept clean: “u opštem rastakanju svih socijalnih i kulturnih vrednosti napadno se zagađuju i naš pisani i govorni jezik” ‘in the general erosion of all social and cultural norms, our spoken and written language is being aggressively polluted,’ or language can be subject to *poplav[a] nepotrebnih tuđica* ‘a flood of unnecessary foreign words’ (Radovanović 2015). The metaphor LOANWORDS ARE A FLOOD suggests that Serbian is confronted with a large quantity of loanwords, and it also carries connotations of threat, suggesting that Serbian is in danger (for similar reactions to loanwords in Croatian, see Čičin-Šain, this volume). In this context, the role and importance of normative linguists does not seem to be limited to fighting “the warriors for illiteracy”; “cleaning” the language of polluting foreign influence, or erecting a dyke against loanwords that threaten to flood it are also necessary. One of the linguists’ main tasks seems to be to take care that “the rules” are respected, or at least to sound an alarm when language users do not respect them.

Authors who support such an understanding of the standard language tend to project language onto the domain of law in order to convey ideas about what language users are expected to do. This attitude results in metaphors such as

18. Whereas the English translation ‘target’ is not a vivid military SHOOTING metaphor, the lexeme *meta* is. Serbian and Croatian dictionaries list as its first meaning ‘an artificial or natural object, a place marked for shooting.’ See, for example, http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=e1pnWhE%3D.

LANGUAGE NORMS ARE LAWS (entailment: laws are binding for all citizens; therefore, language laws should be obeyed by all). But what are the implications of such metaphors for the role of the linguist and what kind of people are those who do not stick to the rules? As Veljko Brborić, the head of the Serbian Department at the University of Belgrade, exclaimed at a press conference a few months before the column series in *Politika* started, when the campaign *Neguimo srpski jezik* was already at its height: *Potrebna nam je jezička policija* 'We need a language police' (Radisavljević 2015b). Interestingly, *Politika*'s illustrator Dragan Stojanović seems to have understood (or thought through) the implications of such a statement better than Brborić himself: he drew a pair of handcuffs, with one cuff open, eagerly awaiting its first language criminal. If "the vividness of good metaphors," as Ricoeur reminds us in his reading of Aristotle, "consists in their ability to 'set before the eyes' the sense that they display" (Ricoeur 1978: 144), then the illustrator indeed visualized some of the mappings of Brborić's metaphor and the implications they entail. For if someone is to play language police, this unavoidably entails that there should be language offenders – people who should be taken to court and punished.

In an interview for the news portal N1, Brborić drew on the LANGUAGE RULES ARE TRAFFIC RULES metaphor when he claimed: "Ako poštujemo normu u saobraćaju, zašto je ne bismo poštovali u jeziku" 'If we respect the traffic rules, why wouldn't we also respect language rules' (Đurić 2015). Sreto Tanasić, Director of the Serbian Language Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, seems to rely on the same metaphor when he concludes: "Poštovanje norme književnog jezika je obaveza svih koji se služe srpskim jezikom, kao što je obavezno poštovanje pravila koja važe za druge vidove života" 'Respecting the norm of the literary language is the duty of anyone who uses Serbian, just as it is our obligation to respect those rules that apply to other aspects of life' (Tanasić 2015b). Claims like this bring to mind point three of Milroy and Milroy's definition of the complaint tradition: the assumption that "people *ought* to use the standard language and that it is quite right to discriminate against non-standard users" (Milroy & Milroy [1985] 2012: 33). However, such a view inevitably raises questions about the "poetic freedom" of writers and whether *language rules* also apply to the use of language in private life.

The request to "respect" language norms as a kind of higher law leads to some even more absurd claims, such as in Aleksandar Milanović's polemic letter to the American linguist Robert Greenberg. Greenberg's book *Language and Identity in the Balkans* (Greenberg [2004] 2008) caused quite a stir among nationalist linguists both in Croatia and Serbia, in the former because it describes Serbo-Croatian as a unified standard language that existed and was experienced as such by many linguists and speakers before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and in the

latter because it “recognizes” Bosnian (*bosanski*) as a new standard language.¹⁹ Milanović’s polemic text revolves around the idea that it is (grammatically) incorrect to use the word *bosanski* for the current name of the standard language used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but which Serbian (and Croatian) prescriptivists perceive as the “Bosniak” standard, that is, the standard language used and spoken by Bosniaks, in contrast to the Serbian and Croatian standard. According to this logic, *bosanski* is the adjective derived from the noun *Bosna* (Bosnia, the country) but not from *Bošnjak* (Bosniak, the nationality previously known as Bosnian Muslim), of which the derived adjective would be *bošnjački*.²⁰ At first sight, Milanović’s position seems to be that in Bosnia, there are three different (ethnonational) standards, one of which should be called Bosniak rather than Bosnian. In his letter, Milanović asks rhetorically:

- (1) Zašto [Greenberg] ne ističe da se *prema tvorbenim pravilima srpskog jezika* ovaj politički jezik može nazvati samo bošnjačkim, tj. jezik Bošnjaka, nego nam, na račun „smirivanja situacije”, diskretno savetuje *da svesno kršimo normu?* (Milanović 2015; emphasis added)
Why doesn’t [Greenberg] point out that *according to the Serbian rules of word formation*, this political language can be called only Bosniak, that is, the language of the Bosniaks, but, under the pretext of “appeasing the situation,” discretely advises us [the Serbs] *to consciously violate* the rules of Serbian?

On the surface, Milanović’s complaint seems to revolve around the “inviolability” of the norm – as if the norm were God-given and not subject to consensus. However, Milanović’s claim concerns morphology only superficially (incidentally, the morphological rule he mentions would result in exactly the same word, *bošnjački*, in all four standards originating from Serbo-Croatian, including Bosnian). His main point comes at the end of the article:

- (2) U Bosni i Hercegovini se odvajkada govorilo srpskim jezikom, za šta dokaze imamo od Povelje Kulina bana iz 1189. godine. Na ovome prostoru Srbi i danas ... upotrebljavaju srpski narodni jezik ... normiran u 19. veku.

19. For the reception of Greenberg’s work *Language and Identity in the Balkans* in Croatia, see the essays in Peti-Stantić (2008).

20. Because *bosanski* ‘Bosnian’ does not specify religion or ethnicity, using this term for the standard language used by the Bosniaks is perceived by language nationalists and by certain speakers of Serbian and Croatian in Bosnia as a hegemonic gesture that would “denationalize” Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as “Bosnians.” This argument is in its most aggressive form made by Kovačević (2015, 2016), who in turn argues that all those languages came into existence by an act of *preimenovanje* ‘renaming’ Serbian (Kovačević 2015).

Bošnjaci krajem 20. i početkom 21. veka pokušavaju da normiraju bošnjački standardni jezik, kroz teške i neuspešne pokušaje da pronađu ključne, a to su fonološke i gramatičke diferencijalne crte u odnosu na srpski jezički standard. (Milanović 2015)

Since time immemorial, people have spoken Serbian in Bosnia and Hercegovina, for which we have proofs since the Charter of Ban Kulin from the year 1189. Until today the Serbs in this area use ... the Serbian standard language ... which was standardized in the 19th century. At the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, the Bosniaks attempt to standardize the Bosniak standard language, trying hard but unsuccessfully to find crucial, namely phonological and grammatical characteristics that would distinguish it from the Serbian standard.

Phrasings such as 'this political language' (example 1) and 'attempt to standardize' (example 2) imply that, by contrast, the only "authentic language" or "non-fake standard language" (to be) used in Bosnia would be Serbian.²¹ Implicitly, Milanović's claim points to the widely-held assumption that language is necessarily linked to a specific nationality, moreover, that language can be *owned* by a specific national group and, following an either/or logic, *cannot* be shared by different nations, religious, or ethnic groups.

Milanović was not the only one to voice such ideas on the pages of the *Politika* newspaper. In an interview with the telling title "A Croat Language Instructor Teaches Serbian," Brborić laments the state of the study of Serbian outside Serbia, deploring the fact that at certain universities, Serbian is most often not taught as a separate language but "for functional or financial reasons," taught as Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian or taught not by someone who has an ethnic Serbian background but, for example, by a Croat (Brborić, quoted in Vulićević 2015a). To be sure, the anxiety that Brborić showcases here has nothing to do with the idea that a native speaker is better suited to teach his or her language to foreign students, but with the idea that languages can be "owned" by a national or ethnic group and with the idea that the future of a language is closely related to or even dependent on

21. Milanović is certainly not the only one to dispute the right of the Bosniaks to call their new standard *bosanski jezik*, Bosnian. Rada Stijović (2015) and Miloš Kovačević (2015, 2016) argue along similar lines. In this context, it is difficult not to agree with Bugarski (2015), who, in a polemic against Kovačević, pointed out that absurdities such as translating in Serbian courtrooms from Serbian to Bosnian are not due to Serbia's signing of the *European Charter of Minority and Regional Languages* but the consequence of the disintegration of Serbo-Croatian as an overarching standard that imploded with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

the politics of the nation-state.²² To the question of the journalist “How does a language become richer and how does it grow?”, Brborić answers with a whole range of metaphors that perceive language as a living being or organism: “Jezik je *živa materija*, bogati se novim rečima, pa i stranim. ... *Jezik raste* i ako se povećava broj govornika ...” ‘A language is a living thing, it grows richer through new words, including foreign ones. ... A language also grows if the number of speakers increases ...’ (Brborić, quoted in Vulićević 2015a; emphasis added).

He concludes with the view that “Budućnost jezika zavisi i od budućnosti nacije i države” ‘The future of a language also depends on the future of the nation and the state’ (Brborić, quoted in Vulićević 2015a). Brborić’s jump from organicist metaphors to the idea that the future of language depends on the nation-state is not at all accidental but echoes nineteenth-century views on language.²³ The organicist metaphors he uses draw specifically on German pre-Romantic and Romantic thinking about language as the true expression of the character of people or nation, as I will show in the following section. This leads us from conceptual metaphors in the spirit of the “complaint tradition” to discourse metaphors that are deeply anchored in the Romantic metaphor complex.

4. Language as the organic expression of the nation’s character

The link between metaphors about language as an organism and language as shorthand for the people is made explicitly by Marija Knežević, one of the few poets who wrote a column for *Politika*’s series. Knežević writes: “Jezik jeste najjači mišić u organizmu, ali šta mu to vredi kada telo klone?” ‘The tongue/language is the strongest muscle in the organism, but what good is it if the body succumbs?’ (Knežević 2015).²⁴ Other authors take this a step further, taking recourse to the metaphor LANGUAGE IS (THE CHARACTER OF) A NATION to point out that language is the embodiment of a collective. According to Gradimir Aničić (2015), *Politika*’s copyeditor and the initiator of the column series, “Jezik i narod su jedno. Ili bi trebalo da budu. Izraz težnji i misli naroda. Dok ima jezika, ima i naroda.” ‘A language and a people/nation [*narod*] are one. Or they should be one; the expression

22. For the way in which ideas about “the mother tongue,” “the native speaker,” and ethno-linguistic nationalism are interconnected and historically evolved together, see Bonfiglio (2010).

23. On organicist metaphors in nineteenth-century thinking about language, see Morpurgo Davies (1987, 1998).

24. The pun on language/tongue is possible because the word *jezik* refers to both.

of the aspirations and thoughts of a people/nation. As long as there is a language, there will be a nation.’ (Aničić 2015). Ideas like these sound like an almost literal paraphrase of Friedrich Schlegel’s²⁵ ideas about the link between language and the identity and fate of a people:

A nation which allows herself to be deprived of her language loses her last hold on her inner, spiritual independence, and actually ceases to exist.

(Butler 1970: 7)

Along similar lines, Rajna Dragičević (2015b) writes that “leksika ... je zahvaljujući Vuku, zadržala svoju esenciju koja se ogleda u onome što je Belić zvao narodnim duhom” ‘thanks to Vuk, the vocabulary ... kept its essence, an essence that is reflected in what Belić called the national genius.’ These are clearly examples of the recycling of older metaphors from German (pre-)Romanticism about language as the emanation of the *Volksgeist* or “national genius” (*narodni duh*) that entered South-Slavic narratives of identity through the brothers Grimm, Schlegel, and Herder. Over time, they seem to have acquired a familiarity and conventionality that makes them sound almost unsuspecting; that is, many language users of Serbian (Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin) probably will no longer perceive them as a metaphor.

If language can be perceived as a living being or as the expression of the thoughts of a collective, it comes as no surprise that language is presented as having a unique identity. In one of his texts for *Politika*, Miloš Kovačević posits that “in linguistics, there are three criteria to *measure the identity of a language*: the genetic, the structural, and the communicative” (Kovačević 2015). In this text, Kovačević plays with the different meanings of the word *jednakost* – which can mean ‘equality’ as well as ‘equivalence’ or ‘identicalness’ – deploring that even though Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin are “derived” from Vukovian Serbian, none of these linguistic communities wants to *acknowledge* this. Along the same lines, there are quite a few other texts that discuss the status of the current Serbian standard against the backdrop of the “death” of Serbo-Croatian, all concluding that the Serbo-Croatian standard was a fraud that *obscured* the truly Serbian character of the language.²⁶

Similar ideas to those of Kovačević are developed in more metaphorical terms by poet Gojko Đogo in the text *Srpski jezik se umnožava deljenjem*

25. Friedrich Schlegel, *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur*, translated and quoted in Butler (1970).

26. See, for example, <http://www.politika.rs/scclanak/340746/Srpski-jezik-kroz-istoriju>, as well as Petrović (2015a).

‘Serbian Multiplies Itself by Dividing Itself’ (Radisavljević 2015a). The metaphor in the title is used to refer to the emergence of new standard languages after the disintegration of Serbo-Croatian. According to the author, “od srpskog [su] jezičkog stabla odlomljena tri ogranka: hrvatski, bosanski i crnogorski, kao tri posebna politička jezika” ‘from the Serbian linguistic tree three branches were broken: Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin, as three separate political languages’ (Radisavljević 2015b). On the one hand, this seems like a metaphor from biology, the well-known metaphor LANGUAGE IS A PLANT.²⁷ This is another metaphor that goes back to the Romantic period, to Jacob Grimm and to Indo-Europeanists such as August Schleicher (see Koerner 1987) and Franz Bopp (see Morpurgo Davies 1987), but given the tone of the whole text and the discourse of suffering that pervades it, it resonates with and builds upon a Christological discourse of sacrifice developing around the metaphor “I am the bread of life.” Not unimportantly, the passage in Corinthians reads: “For I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus *on the night when he was betrayed* took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it, and said, “This is my body, which is for you. Do this in remembrance of me” (1 Corinth. 11:23–24 (English Standard Version); emphasis added). Đogo’s conclusion that “To političko deljenje istog srpskog jezika dovelo je do gubljenja identitetskog prepoznavanja samog srpskog jezika” ‘this political division of one and the same Serbian language led to the loss of the recognizable identity features of Serbian’ (Đogo 2015) seems also to point in that direction: it is only by *sacrificing* Serbian that the other new standards could come into being. This means that this text both rehearses and revises one of the favourite tropes of Serbian nationalism – that Bosnian Muslims were historically actually Serbs who, by converting to Islam, *betrayed* the religion of their forefathers (see Aleksov 2005). Thus, the circle has been closed: what centuries ago started as religious betrayal, ends as betrayal of linguistic kinship.

A text by Dragoljub Petrović that, strictly speaking, falls outside of the column series but appears in the same time span and perhaps capitalizes on the popularity of the column, pushes the claim of the betrayal of kinship that happened with the emerging of a “new” Bosnian standard language even further (Petrović 2015b). Using the metaphor LANGUAGE IS A VALUABLE OBJECT/A TREASURE (that can be stolen), he talks about *the theft* of Serbian by the Bosniaks: “If they [Bosniaks] don’t

27. These metaphors are not only characteristic of the Serbian case but are also recurrent in other standard language ideology debates: for Czech, see Bermel 2007; for Croatian, see Čičin-Šain, this volume. For the importance of plant metaphors for discourses of the national in general, see Rash, this volume.

want to change the particularities of the [Serbian] language but just rename it, then this is called theft in the civilized world" (Petrović 2015b). As Ilić (2014) has shown, the idea of "the theft of Serbian [by Croats, Bosniaks, Montenegrins]" is a recurrent trope in Serbian nationalist discourse about the neighbouring Bosnian, Croatian, or Montenegrin standard whose use can be traced back in time and that clearly borders on hate speech. Petrović's argument operates through what Goatly (2011: 263) calls a "false metaphoric logic," which gives way to a whole range of implications that portray language not only as a valuable object but neighbouring people as thieves.

5. Language and territory: The ideological implications of metonymy

Whereas metaphors inherited from the Romantic tradition are used to represent the link between language and its speakers (language is an organism, a plant, a treasure) or to represent the betrayal of linguistic kinship, metonymy is used to deal with spatiality, i.e. to explain to the reader *where* Serbian is spoken. Several authors who talk about *celokupn[i] srpsk[i] jezičk[i] prostor* 'the whole Serbian linguistic space' (Tanasić, quoted in Vulićević 2015b) actually use (a combination of) metonymy (and metaphor) when they ask *Gde su granice srpskog jezika* 'Where are the borders of Serbian' (Simić 2015) or when they long for the time when "the Serbian linguistic space was parcelled only by borders between republics, not by national borders" and regret that "as a consequence of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia a large part of the Serbian linguistic space [*velik[i] de[o] srpskog jezičkog prostora*] stayed outside the borders of Serbia" (Miloradović 2015).

According to Zoltán Kövecses (2002: 145), "metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or idealized cognitive model (ICM)." Keeping in mind Kövecses's idea that metonymy points to a process of contiguity rather than similarity and that "the elements in a metonymic relationship form a single domain (ICM)" (Kövecses 2002: 146–147), then it appears that formulae such as *na teritoriji srpskog jezika* 'on the territory of Serbian' (Simić 2015) and *granice srpskog jezika* 'the borders of Serbian' (Simić 2015) or *srpski jezički prostor* 'Serbian linguistic space' (Tanasić, quoted in Vulićević 2015b; Miloradović 2015) are metonymies for the language of a specific nation or group of speakers who live on a specific territory. At first sight, the only metonymic relationship that occurs seems to be LANGUAGE FOR (NATIONAL) TERRITORY; however, it builds further upon another metonymy, that of "national

territory.”²⁸ The idea of “national territory” is itself a metonymy (NATION FOR TERRITORY) that goes back to one of the key premises of nationalism, namely that the nation is “a significant group occupying a bounded territory which does or should enjoy political autonomy and with a common identity across the ‘whole’ society” (Breuilly 2008). This view is at the heart of what Ernest Gellner (1983) called the nationalist principle and which requires that in the nation-state, there should ideally be a convergence of the political and the national.

However, in multiethnic regions such as the former Yugoslavia, the convergence of the national and the political was (and is) by definition impossible. The use of such metonymy combinations invites conversational implicatures that, in turn, lead to metaphor (see Radden 2003: 418–419). The conversational implicatures of these metonymic combinations and the problematic metaphors they generate become clear if we take a closer look at the space that Simić, Miloradović, and Tanasić are talking about: the area they have in mind corresponds to the region in which all Štokavian dialects are spoken. Simić (2015) additionally specifies that the ikavian subdialects are characteristic of “Croats and Bosniaks only” and that those

28. As these examples show, it is difficult to decide which part would be the vehicle and which the target. Contrary to traditional cognitive views of metonymy which presuppose a clearly distinguishable directionality, recent radial models such as that by Barcelona or Handl show that metonymy can to different degrees integrate the vehicle and the target. Handl distinguishes between “‘typical metonymies,’ [which] involve completely distinct sub-domains, [...] ‘underspecified metonymies,’ [which] involve both the target and the vehicle in their meaning, [and] ‘domain highlighting’ metonymies, [which] have no distinct sub-domains whatsoever, just differences in construal or viewpoint resulting from the juxtaposition of from the juxtaposition of the different words” (Littlemore 2015: 56–59; quote p. 58). Following Handl’s insights, it would perhaps be most precise to consider the above-mentioned metonymies as having an “underspecified” meaning. In “the Serbian linguistic space” (*srpski jezički prostor*) metonymy, both the language and its speakers are “part of the intended meaning” (Littlemore 2015: 57); i.e. the space “does not simply provide ‘mental access’” to the language: both the territory on which the language is spoken and the speakers of the language are being referred to at the same time. Likewise, in “the borders of Serbian” (*granice srpskog jezika*), the borders refer both to the territory on which Serbian is spoken and to the physical boundaries of this territory. Moreover, Handl “found that underspecified metonymies tend to involve some sort of containment relation. She argues that this is because people rarely need to differentiate between a container and its contents and that they tend to perceive them in a unified way because they operate as a ‘functional unit’ (2012: 4)” (Littlemore 2015: 58). Importantly, Handl has also shown that “many metonymies are in fact often *understood* in an underspecified manner” (Littlemore 2015: 59, original emphasis). In relation to our discussion, this could mean that, since the advent of nationalism (or, again: as a legacy of Romanticism), in speakers’ use and understanding of such metonymies, territory, language and nation are integrated to such an extent that it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between the target and the vehicle.

Bosniaks and Croats who nevertheless speak ijekavian are the result of processes of "de-Serbization," specifically by the "mohamedanization" (*muhamediziranje*) and "catholicization" (*katoličenje*) of Serbs (metaphor: IJEKAVIAN-SPEAKING BOSNIAKS ARE MOHAMEDIZED SERBS, ŠTOKAVIAN-SPEAKING CROATS ARE CATHOLICIZED SERBS). The conversational implicature here is, quite clearly, that Štokavian, ijekavian-speaking Bosniaks and Croats are actually Serbs who betrayed or forgot their "true" origins and that they, moreover, live on "Serbian territory." To sum up, combined or clustered metonymies such as those above are not only telling of the way in which the speaker/writer conceives of the link between language, territory, and national identity. They also have far-reaching implications for the relationship between "Serbs" and Štokavian speakers who live on the so-called "territory of Serbian" but might not wish to identify their language as Serbian, let alone to be themselves called a "catholicized" or "mohamedized" Serb. To use a metaphor from mathematics, this relationship is conceived as a zero-sum game, in which whatever is gained by one side is lost by the other.

6. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I would like to point out that there seem to be different degrees, or levels, on which metaphors in texts by advocates of the standard language ideology are connected to nationalism. Many of the *Politika* columns abound in metaphors that fall into what Milroy and Milroy called "the complaint tradition" ([1985] 2012). Those metaphors are mostly used to increase a sense of urgency, and stress the need to act felt by the author. Even though they often reveal a patronizing attitude towards language users, the metaphors in themselves (LANGUAGE CULTIVATION IS WAR; STANDARD LANGUAGE IS UP, DIALECT IS DOWN; LANGUAGE RULES ARE (TRAFFIC) LAWS) are, at least on the surface, not directly connected to nationalism.

In his analysis of the HOUSE metaphor in British and German discourse about the European Union, Musolff (2000: 228) has demonstrated that the metaphors at stake show a certain "argumentative flexibility," a "semantic openness" that allows them to be used for different, sometimes contradictory political evaluations of the same situation. Given the semantic openness of metaphors, the ideological implications of those metaphors depend entirely on their discursive context. Some metaphors that fall into the complaint tradition, such as LANGUAGE RULES ARE (TRAFFIC) LAWS, suggest a very authoritarian view of language regulation and usage, particularly when used in a discourse that argues for strong state intervention in the field of language (to the point of requesting a "language police").

Texts that present language as an organism (LANGUAGE IS A LIVING BEING), as expressing the character of the national collective (LANGUAGE FOR NATIONAL GENIUS), or as a metonymy for a territory or a (non-realized) nation-state (LANGUAGE FOR TERRITORY) make the link between nationalism, standard language ideology, and metaphor or metonymy much clearer. Moreover, this way of thinking about language also affects (the relationships with) neighbouring peoples and minority groups: some of these metaphors (in particular LANGUAGE IS A VALUABLE OBJECT, leading to claims about “the theft of Serbian” by neighbouring nations) signal a discourse bordering on hate speech (see Ilić 2014). Importantly, some metaphors function as chains of interlocking metonymies (LANGUAGE FOR SPEAKERS + SPEAKERS FOR NATIONAL TERRITORY, leading to blends such as “the territory of Serbian” or “the borders of Serbian”). Such metaphor/metonymy combinations gain and reinforce their ideological strength either by recycling older conventional metaphors or metonymies (e.g. those borrowed or inherited from German Romanticism such as “language is the emanation of the national genius” or “national territory”) or by building on a broader platform. In our case, this platform is a metaphor complex (Musolff 2010: 74) consisting of “innocent” conventional metaphors that underpin the complaint tradition and its cry for the need to cultivate and nurture the national standard language. This constellation, in turn, also underlines the need to further investigate the discursive history of metaphors.

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Metaphors for language contact and change

Croatian language and national identity

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This chapter analyses the discursive construction of Croatian language identity and demonstrates that figurative language plays a crucial role in the process of national and linguistic (dis)identification. The ideological nature and complexity of nations and languages make both concepts highly susceptible to figuration. Based on an analysis of ninety-seven sociolinguistic texts authored by influential social actors, published from 1995 up to the present day, I propose a schematic scenario – AN UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO THE NATION – that both underlies puristic language ideology and indirectly sustains the status of the Croatian language as a national emblem. Conceptualizations of language contact and change in terms of *drowning*, *colonization*, *illness*, and *poisoning* constitute the core of the metaphor-based scenario, discursively construing danger to the language and nation.

Keywords: metaphor-based scenario, purism, language ideology, national language, Croatian, Conceptual Blending Theory

1. Introduction

Language is one of the most important factors in shaping a speech or political community and, arguably, in the socialization of a human being. This is probably why language debates rarely leave anyone impartial, be they linguists or ordinary people without much formal knowledge of linguistic matters. What is more, it often seems that facts and the privileged knowledge of experts are irrelevant in the eyes of the disputants, especially when one's (national) identity and social position are mediated and constructed via discussions of one's language status. This

seems to be especially true for the Balkan area, where language issues seem to be perpetually debated.¹

Naturally, because they are ideological, discussions about national languages also necessarily rely on figurative and metaphorical language for the expression of attitudes and/or the legitimization of ideas and beliefs, as well as the delegitimization of competing ideologies. For instance, in an article on Croatian language identity and status, an influential linguist says:

- (1) Kao što smo nekad bili *otporni prema germanizmima*, tako smo poslije svoj *otpor okrenuli prema srbizmima* jer su nas donedavno Srbi i srpski jezik ugrožavali kao nekad Austrijanci i njemački jezik.
(Babić 2004: 243; emphasis added)

As we were once *resistant towards Germanisms*, in the same manner, we later *turned our resistance towards Serbisms* because, until recently, Serbs and the Serbian language endangered us, just as once Austrians and the German language did.

The quotation suggests not only the inseparability of language and nation, but the impact of language change, deriving from foreign influence, on national identity and the nation itself. Changes in language are placed on an equal footing with physical danger. The connection between language and nation is deemed so strong that a symbolic danger, one presumably coming from language, acquires a physical dimension. Other examples that I analyse in detail here include language being conceptualized as an environment or nature that can be polluted by internationalisms, as being susceptible to illness, and so on.

Drawing on the studies inquiring into the relevance and function of metaphorical language in language ideologies in the service of the national (Bermel 2006; Spitzmüller 2007; Hosokawa 2015), this chapter demonstrates that the negotiation of the identity of the Croatian language has also to a great extent relied on metaphorical language. More specifically, based on twenty-four discursive examples taken from ninety-seven relevant sociolinguistic sources (such as language advice articles, academic papers, and newspaper articles debating language issues), I will demonstrate that a metaphorical scenario underlies and gives coherence to patterns of argument appearing in the debates on language and nation. In its most schematic form, the scenario can be defined as AN UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO THE NATION. Within the scenario,

1. Indeed, we were in 2016 witnesses of yet another wave of debates on the status of Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Serbian that gave birth to the Declaration on the Common Language (see the Declaration here: <http://jezicinacionalizmi.com/deklaracija/>).

the dynamics of communication is assumed to be consequential to the nationhood and, sometimes, even to the sovereignty of the nation. Contextualizing culturally powerful and symbolic notions of purity (cf. Douglas 1970), hybridity, and normality in the domain of language, influential social actors, such as linguists, writers, and politicians, verbalize and promote their conceptions of a desirable language identity for Croatian. I will show that the metaphorically-supported scenario strengthens the symbolic link between the nation and the standard language as its emblem. Consequently, instantiations of the scenario produce and consolidate the pre-existing linguistic (and national) boundaries and differentiate both the Croatian nation and its standard from other similar language standards (e.g., Bosnian, Serbian), as well as their respective users/nations. In that sense, the scenario *AN UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO THE NATION* sustains a discursive project of creating a countable, unitary, discrete, and bounded language.

The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an outline of the theoretical background and addresses the relevant key terms: metaphor, discourse, national language ideology, and scenarios. Methods and data are presented in Section 3, followed by the analysis in Section 4. Section 5 is the discussion and Section 6 is the conclusion.

2. Theoretical background

In this section, I give a brief overview of the theoretical background. Section 2.1 deals with the role of language in national ideologies, Section 2.2 places the issue in the Croatian context. In Section 2.3, the function of metaphors and scenarios in the relevant discourse is discussed.

2.1 Language – constructing and delineating nations

The symbolism of linguistic choices in the acts of identification and disidentification with socially (un)desirable groups and speakers is a well-known phenomenon and stands at the core of sociolinguistic inquiry. From the very beginnings of the creation of nations in the nineteenth century, language has been recognized as a fundamental component of national ideologies. Indeed, the majority of studies on nations and nationalism emphasize the importance of language for the nation-building process (see, for example, Anderson 2006; Smith 2010). The present-day conceptions of what languages are and should be like, incorporated in official language policies, originate from the period of the attempts at homogenization of the written and spoken language. They are rooted in the ideal of a single code being

emblematic of a single nation-state. The contemporary national language ideologies, therefore, rely on a combination of romanticist elements traceable back to Herder and the Grimm brothers, who admired the folk and oral tradition, and the rationalist, Lockean tradition that required an ideal language to be decontextualized and purified (Blommaert 2006: 241–243).² The search for a “good” or “ideal” language that would reflect and embody a nation’s spirit has often led to the contesting and rejection of linguistic forms and elements on the grounds that they do not belong to a certain speech community, not being authentic or national enough. In linguistics, this phenomenon has traditionally been known as linguistic purism. This kind of link between nation and language rests on a “strong contiguity relationship” between language and its speakers – a strong interchangeable metonymy LANGUAGE FOR IDENTITY and IDENTITY FOR LANGUAGE (Polzenhagen and Dirven 2008: 243). Such a relation conceptually connects speakers and their code directly to the category of nation (LANGUAGE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY), often suppressing other group categories or an individual’s more particular identities (e.g., professional, gender, regional). Although the relationship is not “organic” or synecdochic, as in, for instance, finger-hand, it is assumed to be such, and therefore felt and/or represented as highly consequential: modifications in language can be understood to affect in a certain manner the identity of the group and the group itself. Once this organic relationship has been established among its users, concepts such as a national language seem to become highly sensitive and can easily become a source of conflict. Indeed, “a nation that identifies with its language will feel endangered if you say that its language is in danger” (Vlašić 2010: 22; my translation).

2.2 Croatian extra-linguistic context

From the time of the independence of the Republic of Croatia in the early 1990s, Croatian language identity has been shaped and constructed in relation to two major historical events.³ One of them is globalization, a process to which many

2. I follow the understanding of language ideologies closely linked to Woolard’s (1998) partial and emotionally laden, politically imbued ideas and beliefs about what a language is, how it functions and how it should function, which are widely accepted as a norm in a particular speech community. The rationale behind the conceptions promoted by a particular language ideology need not be *consciously* held by every member of the community. They influence how we use language, how we treat other language users and can therefore affect the entire dynamics of a society.

3. “Language identity” is a term that appears increasingly in sociolinguistic discussions about language. In essence, it refers to the pursuit of a proper or true “shape” of a particular

countries in the world have been exposed. This political and economic phenomenon has long been recognized as a less-than-welcome extra-linguistic influence on the majority of present-day languages, particularly “small” ones. Speakers of so-called “small” languages are often intimidated by the idea of their mother tongue and culture being displaced by “big” influential languages, especially English (Blommaert 2010). The more pessimistic linguists and intellectuals envisage gloomy outcomes and are often suspicious of linguistic changes taking place within the recipient language. Language endangerment, loss of its beauty, tarnishing of its purity, decay of its expressive capacities, and even the demise of a whole culture or a nation are common concerns frequently expressed in discourses addressing language change due to foreign influence (see, for example, van der Horst 2008: 45–48).

Another decisive factor in shaping language policy and planning in Croatia was the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Croatian War of Independence. The war marked the emancipation and further cultural and linguistic distancing of the Croatian nation from other nations and/or ethnic groups that had shared the Yugoslav territory.⁴ Serbo-Croatian, as a concept of a common language, also known under a variety of other names (Croato-Serbian, Serbian or Croatian, Croatian or Serbian), was officially abandoned in the early 1990s (Greenberg 2008; Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014). In the Yugoslav era, Croatian had the official status of the western variant of Serbo-Croatian, whereas in the newborn Republic of Croatia, it acquired the status of a separate, fully-fledged language. Ever since, official language institutions in Croatia and many influential linguists have worked towards diversification and deepening of the differences between Serbian and Croatian to consolidate its acquired status.

The above-mentioned social upheaval and changes in political paradigms have led to a renegotiation of Croatian language identity to accommodate new political realities. The ideologies that have shaped the Croatian language were

language: its forms, orthography, pronunciation and so on. To speak about the identity of a language also entails an attempt at reification of a massively complex phenomenon of symbolic behaviour and is ultimately inherently ideological. The term is often used as a springboard for discussions about peoples’ identities and is rarely encountered in works that employ a descriptive approach to language.

4. The history of Croatian is a rather complex one and does not begin with the dissolution of Yugoslavia; but it is important to mention here that “establishing Croatian’s existence as a completely independent language in its own right was seen by some as a crucial part of the struggle for political independence and for the strengthening of Croatian group identity in the face of military attacks” (Langston and Peti-Stantić 2011: 346).

promoted and contested in discourse, and have been much debated in (socio)linguistic circles.

2.3 Discourse, metaphor, blending, and scenarios

As every deliberation on one's identity entails symbolic representation, the identity of a language is inevitably negotiated and constructed in discourse and is thus susceptible to discourse analysis. Discourse is understood as "the use of language" (Langacker 2008: 457). One can talk about discourse as long as some kind of meaningful representation is discernible from the way symbols, visual material, objects, or any other semiotic elements, are arranged and combined. Discourse is taken here as both language in use and, specifically, as a series of texts that form a topically self-contained unit. Importantly, discourse stands at a junction, as it were, between the society and cognition in that it generates, mediates and sustains knowledge among discourse participants in a society (cf. Van Dijk 1997).⁵ In that sense, discourse has an important role in shaping beliefs and attitudes, and ultimately behaviour.

This chapter uses a framework that examines the evaluative and ideological potential of metaphors in discourse (e.g., Charteris-Black 2011). Metaphors have long been recognized as persuasive, rhetorical tools because of their capacity to present, or to frame, one concept (usually referred to as the target domain) in terms of another, conceptually relatively distant concept (the source domain).⁶ For instance, politics is often talked about in terms of a chess game, politics are presented as houses or clubs, and nations are seen as friends or family members (see, for example, Musolff and Zinken 2009). This chapter follows the understanding of metaphor closely aligned with Fauconnier and Turner's (2003) Conceptual Integration or Blending Theory. The theory is sufficiently flexible to account for metaphorization in combination with other closely related and co-occurring cognitive and linguistic mechanisms like comparison or metonymy. The major advantage in their approach is the idea that there are four spaces operating during metaphor processing: there are at least two input spaces that form the basis for the process, a generic space where their similarities are picked out, and finally, the blended space that contains elements of both input and output spaces, but also an emergent quality which cannot be found in either of the input spaces. This

5. For more on the relevance of discourse in shaping and representing identities, see Stanojević and Šarić (this volume).

6. For the purposes of this paper, the large body of metaphor theory available will not be exhaustively outlined. For more on approaches to metaphor, other than Conceptual Blending Theory (e.g., Critical Metaphor Analysis), see Demata, and Rash (this volume).

“surplus” that is created in the blended space is what, possibly, gives us expansion of our knowledge or worldviews and is what I consider to be a moment of cognition. For instance, when LANGUAGE is paralleled with MOTHER as in “Čovjek koji ne poštuje svoj jezik, ... ne cijeni ni svoju mater” (A man who does not respect his language, ... does not value his mother either) (Bagdasarov 2013), one draws on all the knowledge (both conceptual and emotional) one has about the concept of MOTHER (being a progenitor of, nurturing, unconditional love, affection, respect, etc.). Depending on the context, but also on individual attitudes and feelings, one partially projects some of the knowledge about MOTHER into the blended space. It seems that the fact of being a progenitor is not crucial for the blend in this particular case where the author calls for reverence to be shown to the Croatian language. Rather, emotional aspects of MOTHER are more likely to be projected: unconditional love, respect, some sort of emotionally dependent authority, and so on. In the blended space, we get a new quality that did not initially exist prior to the blending: the qualities of MOTHER(HOOD) merged with LANGUAGE. If one starts to identify, at least partly, LANGUAGE with (some aspects of) MOTHER, then the meaning of LANGUAGE has changed its structure in some manner due to blending (Fauconnier & Turner 2003: 142–143). Also, conceptual blending is not limited to only two input spaces, so the organic metonymy discussed in Section 2.1, LANGUAGE FOR (NATIONAL) IDENTITY, also makes part of the blended space, thus creating a kind of merger between the MOTHER, LANGUAGE, and NATION concepts. This merging of different concepts, some of which are highly emotion-laden, may have repercussions on our world views (since novel framing may bring about novel attitudes to the framed concepts) or may cause the rejection of the proposed framing models. An analysis of “sociolinguistic” metaphors is thus an examination of the modalities of a representational, symbolic practice that both creates and sustains certain social and linguistic relations. In the light of this, metaphors, as well as similes and metonymies, do not seem to be just ornate, superfluous elements of discourse, but are essential symbolic means of representing feelings, creating knowledge and attitudes, as well as negotiating group belonging, as will be shown in Section 4.

Moving away from words and expressions, one can identify meaningful units at a more complex level of discourse. Figurative language makes up only a part of a more multi-layered discursive network wrought with diverse argumentation strategies (for a list of possible strategies see, for example, Wodak et al. 2009: 30–48). For the purposes of analysing my corpus, I adopt the concept of a scenario (Musolff 2006, 2015). Scenarios offer a coherent view of a phenomenon, or a broader frame as it were, uniting single instances of figurative language. Scenarios serve as “an analytical construction to capture clusters of conceptually related metaphor formulations in a corpus, which add up to

mini-narratives, with default participants, schemas, outcomes, and attached ‘standard’ evaluations” (Musolff 2015: 44). For example, Musolff (2006: 28–30) identifies the PARENT(S)-CHILD(REN) RELATIONSHIP scenario (instantiated in *the problem child of the European family* metaphor) as a common scenario found in discourse on European politics. Importantly, conclusions that are drawn on the basis of metaphors and scenarios are default ones and are deeply dependent on our expectations and knowledge about the source domain. For instance, based on the PARENT-CHILD scenario, one might conclude that “children are not equally legitimate participants in a serious (political) debate,” so *a priori* disqualifying a *country-child* from being an equal participant in a political process.

Common sense experience and knowledge about the world in the broadest sense are embedded in a scenario. Knowledge of what reactions dangerous or potentially physically harmful events produce in an everyday situation would be one of the sub-scenarios employed within a more complex scenario like the one proposed in this chapter: AN UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO THE NATION. For instance, a fight-or-flight response activated when one is faced with a physically harmful threat may be evoked through discursive constructions of threats, implicitly calling for a defensive (re)action. Similarly, an illness sub-scenario calls for an action of healing. Scenarios therefore give conceptual coherence to a phenomenon, partly on the basis of “logic” or common knowledge pertaining to its constituent sub-scenarios, and they can suggest what world view one should assume and what conclusions one should draw about the framed concept or phenomenon. All the elements of a scenario may but need not appear sequentially in a text. As far as the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario is concerned, the assumptions and beliefs are about the mutually dependent relationship between LANGUAGE and NATION – more specifically, about the presumed effects of language change on the status and “condition” of a nation. To the extent that it offers suggestions for action and a certain worldview, the scenario is comparable to, or can be classified as, language ideology.

3. Method and data

The corpus analysed in the chapter forms part of a larger project on language identity construction in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The corpus was collected by various methods and consists of newspaper articles, interviews with linguists, and the opinions of politicians, writers, and philologists. It was collected online by a Google search between March and August 2016 and complemented by relevant material not found online. The following key words were used in the

online search: *hrvatski jezik* ‘the Croatian language’, *identitet hrvatskog jezika* ‘Croatian language identity’, *srpskohrvatski* ‘Serbo-Croatian’, *srpski i hrvatski* ‘Serbian and Croatian’, *srpski ili hrvatski* ‘Serbian or Croatian’, *jezični purizam* ‘language purism’.⁷ The majority of examples analysed in this chapter have been taken from the pieces of language advice written by Stjepan Babić, an influential Croatian linguist, published during a span of ten years (1995 and 2005) and collected in a book.⁸

Overall, since many of its authors are language experts, politicians and other public figures, and the texts were published in either popular linguistic or non-expert publications, the corpus represents influential voices, and rather conservative ones. The dominance of “stakeholders” in the discourse relies on their authoritativeness, and less so on the pervasiveness of the ideas they propose among the language users themselves. Dominance in discourse is understood in terms of possible effects a piece of discourse may have on a wider audience. It is primarily measured against the symbolic power the authors hold in the discourse arena, as well as their expert status. Alternatively, dominance can be grounded rather loosely in wider public approval. The audience need not necessarily regard a participant as an “expert” in linguistic or philological matters in order to agree with his or her opinion. From the perspective of the man in the street, the medium of the dissemination of ideas may also play a decisive role in the acceptance of a proposed world view.

The collected corpus contains around 100,000 words (ninety-seven texts) and has been selected according to the following parameters: socially-recognized expertise (linguists and philologists), institution-related, or traditionally influential publications (*Vijenac*, *Jezik*, *Glas Koncila*), and newspapers with a high circulation (such as *Večernji list*, *Jutarnji list*) featuring language-related topics (see Table 1).

7. The Google search carried out for the nominative case yielded enough material (texts) for the subsequent qualitative analysis, so searches in other cases were not pursued.

8. Babić’s book was not found online. Reading through the online material, I learned about this book and assumed that this collection of language advice articles could be highly relevant in the context of sociolinguistic discussions about Croatian, as well as fruitful regarding figurative representations of linguistic phenomena. Already the title was suggestive of abundant figurativeness as it contained an interesting sociolinguistic metaphor: *Hrvanja hrvatskoga: Hrvatski u koštacu sa srpskim i klinču s engleskim* [The Wrestlings of Croatian: Croatian in the Grip of Serbian and in the Grasp of English] (my translation).

Table 1. Sources

Name/Source	Period	Documents	Words*
<i>Jezik, Hrvatski fokus</i> published in <i>Hrvanja</i> <i>hrvatskoga</i> (Babić 2004)	1995–2005	26 +12	21,750
<i>Vijenac</i>	2013–2016	7	4,900
<i>HKV (Portal Hrvatskog</i> <i>kulturnog vijeća)</i>	2011–2016	8	13,100
<i>Glas Koncila</i>	2012–2015	4	3,250
<i>Feral Tribune</i>	1995–1998	4	3,000
Other (<i>Jutarnji list,</i> <i>Večernji list...</i>)	2005–2016	36	65,450
Total	1995–2016	97	ca. 100,000

*The number of words is approximate for some sources given that some of them were digitized and converted to a Word file. Due to conversion flaws, it is not possible to ascertain the exact number of words.

4. Analysis

I have conducted a qualitative analysis of all the sources. Based on the general themes that I found in the data, I propose the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario as a conceptual heuristic underlying the discursive examples and argumentative patterns. This section outlines the scenario breaking it down into its constitutive components.

Based on the interchangeable metonymy LANGUAGE FOR IDENTITY/IDENTITY FOR LANGUAGE (discussed in Section 2.1), the most schematic level of the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario can be summarized as: AN UNACCEPTABLE LINGUISTIC PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO A NATION. This very schematic summary of the scenario does not do justice to all the nuances observable in textual examples. The type and magnitude of “danger” are conceptualized in different ways, depending on the metaphorical source domains that flesh out the elements of the scenario. For instance, targeted linguistic elements can be positioned on an attitudinal range from “unacceptable” or “better not used” to those that are, for one reason or another, overtly labelled as “dangerous.” The constituent elements listed below are schematizations that were not postulated in advance, but were distilled, as it were, through close reading of the relevant discourse. Textual examples demonstrate that the elements and their implications combine and intertwine with one another. Implications following from the metaphorical language can be read as recommendations for action or the application of principles sketched in the elements.

The elements of the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario are as follows:

1. Language change and/or undesirable elements in a language are *dirtying, violation, corruption, a loss of integrity or essence* of language.
2. Unacceptable elements *damage, pollute* language, therefore posing a *threat*. Following the logic of the *language-nation* blend, the nation and the culture are affected by linguistic changes and are in danger (*under attack, colonized, etc.*).
3. Once *dangerous* elements have been identified, they have to be *removed* or *eliminated*. Language requires *purification, reverting* to a state prior to the changes. This process is usually accompanied by introduction of new elements (neologisms), or ones that fell out of use (archaisms).
4. Further negative effects have to be prevented: language needs *protection*.

In the rest of this section, in Subsections 4.1–4.4, I provide discursive instantiations of the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario. The examples used were selected based on: (a) the frequency of use and relevance of a particular conceptualization for the discourse (e.g., LIQUID FORCE for foreign language elements); (b) their representativeness for common, folk beliefs about the functioning of language (e.g., the indivisibility and fixed nature of languages); and (c) creativity.

4.1 Undesirable elements taint and corrupt language

The first scenario element addresses metaphorical conceptualizations of single undesirable language elements. It consists of picking out a “troublesome” linguistic occurrence and encoding one’s negative attitude in a metaphorical representation of that element. The negative attitude towards the targeted linguistic elements encoded in metaphors is as a rule motivated by elements perceived as nationally “hybrid.” Conceptualizations employ notions such as *dirtying, violation, corruption, tainting* of language. Targeted linguistic elements are seen as a certain FORCE or AGENT trying to perform an action on the language of the in-group and consequently on the in-group itself. Alternatively, if agentless, they are conceptualized as instruments for performing an action on language.

For instance, addressing the use of an Anglicism, *rendžer* ‘ranger’, by a member of the Croatian Forest Association, a Croatian linguist says:

- (2) *I jezik je naš okoliš* i [B. K.] *umjesto da ga čisti, on ga onečišćuje. Language is our environment, too, and rather than cleaning it, [B. K.] is polluting it.* (Babić 2004: 244; emphasis added)

The conceptualization of loanwords as *pollutants* is a metaphorical manifestation of the classical idea of language purity, which gave name to the phenomenon of purism. In her groundbreaking anthropological work on purity and danger, Douglas (1970: 48) refers to the concept of social pollution as “matter out of place”. Douglas notices that, when divorced from matters of hygiene, the domain of pollution refers to “a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order” (1970: 48), which is precisely the case with flouting some real or presumed norms of language. In the *language-environment* blend, *purity* is taken in its original sense as cleanliness, but with an unconventional framing where language is reified as physical surroundings. In addition, the *language-environment* conceptualization disembodies language from man and turns it into an OBJECT, disregarding its processual nature as a human capacity. The *pollution-of-the-environment* blend leads addressees from a linguistic, symbolic level to the physical one solely. A language-user employing a *word-pollutant* therefore, wittingly or unwittingly, does harm to the *language-environment*, diminishing its quality. The blend evokes an ideologically powerful natural-unnatural divide (*okoliš* ‘environment’ vs. *onečišćenje* ‘pollution’).⁹ The semantic field of the noun *okoliš* ‘environment’ covers mainly pristine places unaffected by human activities. Against this ecological background, foreign linguistic elements are debased and placed “outside of” an idealized *language-nature*. Crucially, *tainting* “our” *language-environment* implies that one inflicts certain harm on the entire community. The blend suggests non-conformity to an allegedly common (national) vision by a speaker or writer who uses *word-pollutants*.

Similar to the conceptualization of *pollution* is that of *unnaturalness* instantiated in a metaphor of physical deformity. Discussing the relative merits of two competing orthographic manuals available in Croatian, a writer states the following:

- (3) ... inače su nepoželjne u književnom jeziku, tim prije u školskim pravopisnim priručnicima. U školskom udžbeniku iz biologije *mačka ne može imati i četiri i pet noga, a ako ih ima pet, onda se radi o mutaciji*. Isto je i u književnom jeziku, ako možemo npr. pisati i čitat ću i čitaću, onda govorimo o srpskohrvatskom, a ne o hrvatskom jeziku.

(Bagdasarov 2012; emphasis added)

9. Hrvatski jezični portal (HJP) [The Croatian Language Portal], s.v. “okoliš” defines *čovjekov okoliš* ‘human environment’ as the totality of nature surrounding man, including those areas transformed by his life and action. The collocation is however frequent in ecological discourses where nature is put in opposition to man and his hazardous environmental impact.

... doublets are undesirable in the literary language, even more so in orthographic manuals for schools. In a biology textbook, *a cat cannot have four or five legs, and if it has got five legs, then it is a mutation*. The same goes for the standard language, if we can, for instance, write both *čitat ću* and *čitaću*, then it is Serbo-Croatian we are talking about here, not Croatian.

The romanticist ideal of one language being an emblem of a single nation has also found its representatives in the discourse on the Croatian language. The “organic” metaphor playing on the notion of scientificity and the natural-unnatural divide conceptualizes variance in language as a biological anomaly: *a mutation, a cat with five legs*. In likening an orthographic manual to a biology textbook, the author compares a set of social conventions for the written language to a collection of scientific facts describing nature and natural phenomena, presumably trying to gain authority for his claims. Consequently, variety in the so-called “visible language” (van der Horst 2008: 73) is qualified as unnatural and anomalous. As the urge for “homogeneity” in the written language has been one of the predominant language ideologies in Europe ever since the Renaissance era, usually signalling “poor education” (van der Horst 2008: 73–91), it does not present a unique trait of the Croatian discourse. However, variance in representing the future tense form in writing, one of the typical differences between Croatian and Serbian standards, is interpreted as an indicator of collectivity and a point of disidentification with Serbian. Employing emotionally-laden concepts of “normality” and “naturalness,” the author calls for uniformity in writing conventions, suggesting that one convention should belong to one standard only. Using both in one’s repertoire would allegedly be a feature of Serbo-Croatian and, therefore, *anomalous*. Ultimately, orthographical norms, already a traditional point of dispute for linguists and non-linguists, are taken as a platform for drawing the line between two competing conceptions of language – Croatian as an independent language and Serbo-Croatian as a concept encompassing a wider territory than that of Croatia (see similar remarks about Serbian in Vervaeke, this volume).

In another stretch of discourse, a mix of metaphors from various domains is used in the conceptualization of language contact between Croatian and German, and Croatian and Serbian:

- (4) *I prema srbizmima je postojao jak otpor, ali on nije bio tako uspješan kao filter prema germanizmima zbog velike bliskosti tih dvaju jezika, ali je ipak bio tako uspješan da se hrvatski nije utopio u srpskome.*

(Babić 2004: 207; emphasis added)

There was a strong resistance to Serbisms, too, but not as successful as the filter against Germanisms, due to great proximity between the two languages, but still it was successful enough to keep Croatian from drowning in Serbian.

Foreignisms, Germanisms and Serbisms, are an undesirable strong FORCE with agency that exerts its power on both language and its users: “There was a strong resistance to...” LANGUAGE is conceptualized as AN ENTITY, AN OBJECT that can be immersed in water. If the acceptance of foreignisms is widespread enough, it can gradually lead to the *drowning* of language. One of the basic meanings of the verb *utopiti (se)* ‘drown’ is to kill someone by drowning or to drown oneself. The selection of the metaphor makes the image highly suggestive of a presumed fatality that awaits language under foreign influence, if the resistance to a particular linguistic usage is not strong and/or widespread enough. Following the logic of the *language-nation* blend, where language is a reflection of the national “spirit” or, indeed, the nation itself, the conceptualization of a *drowned* language seems particularly alarming. The nation is *in danger of being drowned*, due to the impossibility of staving off and resisting the force of foreign semiotic elements. Extralinguistic physical danger is discursively mapped onto matters of the selection of vocabulary. As a consequence, the totality of the nation (its physicality, non-semiotic action) is compressed (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner (2003)) in communication. Users are urged to “set up filters,” i.e., to reject usage of foreign forms, as only this will supposedly ensure the survival of Croatian.

An alternative explanation concerns the name of the language proper and its official status. *Utopiti* ‘to drown’, according to the Croatian Language Portal, in its figurative sense means “to make something disappear, to become invisible in a multitude or a greater community.”¹⁰ Rather than being simply a discussion about local words being “drowned” or replaced by foreign words, Babić might have feared that, if not officially recognized as a language in its own right, “Croatian” could have disappeared as an ethnic label, making the group’s status less politically stable. This has been an especially sensitive issue in the context of the relationship between Croatian and Serbian (as well as Bosnian and Montenegrin) due to great structural proximity and a shared Serbo-Croatian language history. The fear of “drowning” was most probably partly motivated by proposals articulated by some members of the Serbian intelligentsia, who have championed the label “Serbian” for all the currently existing standard languages, thereby implicitly attempting to challenge the right of neighbouring groups to self-determination.¹¹ In the light of this, the “drowning” of Croatian, as in the disappearance of the language name

10. Hrvatski jezični portal (HJP) [The Croatian Language Portal], http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=f19gURB0&keyword=utopiti (Accessed 1 October 2017).

11. For a discussion on the tendencies towards (symbolic) appropriation of the former Serbo-Croatian language area by some members of the Serbian academia, see Vervaet (this volume).

under another nation's ethnic label, would not only signify a symbolic act, but also a real and serious limitation of the freedom of expression.

Examples (5–11) instantiate additional conceptualizations of unwanted foreign elements, targeting mainly vocabulary. A conceptualization similar to the one of *pollution*, but more emotionally intense and hyperbolic, is *poisoning*. In example (5), an Anglicized name of a Croatian festival is conceptualized as a toxic substance, carrying a *colonial mentality* as its essential ingredient:

- (5) ... i tako su gledatelji ... hrleći na taj festival, *trovani kolonijalnim mentalitetom njegova naziva*. (Babić 2004: 220; emphasis added)
 ... and so the spectators ... rushing to that festival, were *poisoned with the colonial mentality of its name*.¹²

Foreign elements are POISONOUS SUBSTANCES, and integration of a foreign element into one's linguistic repertoire is understood both as *poisoning* and *colonization* of one's thoughts and mind. *Colonization* is one of the commonly used metaphors in the context of Anglo-Croatian language contact, presumably due to the pervasiveness of American loanwords integrated in Croatian and the current global impact of American culture.

Anglo-American loanwords are conceptualized as an unrestrainable fluid-like FORCE (A LIQUID) entering the language:

- (6) Sasvim je očito da *oni danas u hrvatski jezik neprestano naviru ...*
 (Babić 2004: 225; emphasis added)

It is quite obvious that today, *they are incessantly spurting into* Croatian ...

- (7) ... *Anglizmi nam danas naviru sa svih strana*.
 (Babić 2004: 243; emphasis added)
 ... nowadays, *Anglicisms are welling out of* everywhere.

- (8) ... i tako je nastala *prava poplava tih veza ...*
 (Babić 2004: 223; emphasis added)
 ... so a *real flood of* these constructions appeared ...

Conceptualizations of language contact in examples (6–8) rest on a typical folk idea of language as a limited, rather inflexible, bounded unit (LANGUAGE IS A CONTAINER). Words that *spurt into* the language and *well out of* everywhere (the verb *navirati* in (6) and (7)) add to the idea of force and the inevitability of negative effects on the *language-container* if the phenomenon persists. Interestingly,

12. Zagreb Film Festival is the name of the festival in question. The construction is allegedly contentious since it is not made according to common Slavic morpho-syntactic principles.

forceful liquid and water-related metaphors attested in the corpus were all framed negatively.

Unwanted language contact and its effects are often conceptualized as AN ILLNESS. In contrast, acceptable language use is a *healthy* use of language. The illness metaphors are largely dramatic as their conceptualizations and involve fatality or “cruel” diseases (AIDS in example (9) and imminent death in (11)), or the force of the disease in (10):

- (9) *Bolest amerikanizacije hrvatskog jezika širi se kao kopnica (sida) ...*
(Babić 2004: 215; emphasis added)

The disease of Americanization of the Croatian language is spreading like AIDS ...

- (10) ... kad je taj *amerikanitis, kolonijalitis već bio uhvatio maha ...*
(Babić 2004: 216; emphasis added)

... when this Americanitis, Colonialitis had already gained its momentum ...

- (11) To su *posljednji trzaji zdravoga hrvatskoga jezičnog osjećaja.*
(Babić 2004: 216; emphasis added)

These are the last twitches of a healthy Croatian language intuition.

The ILLNESS sub-scenario and its metaphors are a good example of how the intensity of danger can be graded and manipulated. At one end of an imagined scale, there are figurations like the poisoning of the peoples’ minds by a linguistic structure (in example (5)), that evokes a presumed partial incapacitation to use the language “properly.” At the other end of the scale, “the Croatian language intuition,” that is, the capacity to select “proper” linguistic choices, is *dead* due to this overwhelming foreign influence (in example (11)). Metaphors involving deadly diseases invite conclusions of this sort (as in example (9)).

4.2 The nation is affected by linguistic changes

Insofar as language is a defining feature of a nation’s identity, it is only natural to conclude that linguistic changes affect the nation in some manner. In the long run, foreign influence in the form of particular, single elements may, if accumulated, *damage* the language in its totality, affect its very fabric, and thus put the nation at a certain risk.

Example (12) addresses English influence on Croatian in a similar manner, as a series of events affecting the very survival of the nation:

- (12) ... taj novi *anglokrobotski nagriža srce i dušu, melodiju, tvorbu riječi i sintaksu hrvatskoga jezika.* A betonske hrvatske glave koje ne shvaćaju da

se radi o *udaru na bitnu odrednicu nacionalnoga bića*, sluganski omogućuju bezočne *prodore*.

(Hitrec (2003: 43) in Bagdasarov (2011); emphasis added)
 ... that new *Anglocrobotian gnaws at the heart and soul, melody, word formation, and syntax of the Croatian language*. But Croatian heads of concrete who do not understand that this is a case of *an impact on an important defining feature of the national being*, submissively allow impudent *incursions*.

The Croatian language is conceptualized as a being with a heart and a soul (see the well-attested LANGUAGE IS AN ORGANISM metaphor in Bermel 2006; Polzenhagen and Dirven 2008) and a “defining feature” or an inextricable part of the *national being*. The *language-nation-organism* blend reflects the romanticist ideal of language as a reflection of nationhood: nationhood is encoded in and merged with language on all levels (word formation, syntax, and intonation). Language contact that disturbs an ideal order, as a consequence, *endangers* and *disturbs* an ideal “national essence” of the language, and presents a violation of the *national being*. LANGUAGE CONTACT is conceptualized as *gnawing at* or a gradual LOSS/DECAY of an imagined INTEGRITY of the language (see LANGUAGE CONTACT IS DECAY in Polzenhagen & Dirven 2008: 285), supporting an old myth of language losing its quality due to some external influence. Moreover, loanwords perform an *incursion*, a violent and forceful breach or attack implying that LANGUAGE CONTACT IS VIOLENCE. As a corollary of the *language-nation* blend, *gnawing at* and *incursion into* language are interpreted as negative impacts or actions performed upon the nation itself.

The *Anglocrobotian* blend reveals another common conceptualization of language – that of a clear delineation and countability of languages and, more importantly, a common attitude to that phenomenon. The result of language contact is a composition of elements coming from two clearly defined and delineated entities (see more on the countability of languages in van der Horst 2008: 93–125). The use of English and Croatian elements results in *Anglocrobotian*, i.e., *Anglocroatian* with an additional “robotic” element. Similarly, as a consequence of the perception of languages as clearly defined and separated units, terms like *Spanglish* or *Engleutsch* have come into being and are employed mainly as derogatory labels for the phenomenon of code-mixing. Communication is presented as devalued and languages as debased if they are perceived as hybrid (cf. the discussion about *Denglich* in Spitzmüller 2007: 273). The “robotic” concept in the blend additionally reinforces the idea of the perceived hybridity as something odd and, above all, unnatural. The blend is, arguably, a hyperbolization of the myth of artificialness of language contact and change, much like *frankenfood* and similar metaphors playing on the dividing line between culture and nature, and what is considered

(un)natural in a society. Finally, as the changes affect the very core of the *national being* (a metaphor, too, or rather a metaphonymy – a metonymy-based metaphor – in which the collectivity is conceptually compressed into one being), it is suggested that the changes in language use are unavoidably detrimental to the nation.

A presumed danger deriving from language contact often takes its figurative conceptualizations from the source domain of WAR or a war-like VIOLENCE. In a newspaper article lamenting the pervasiveness of Anglicisms, one can read:

- (13) Svaka *tramvajska vožnja para uši vokabularom* koji je tako tiho, ali tako stručno i perfidno plasiran kroz naš medijski prostor, *dovevši nas do svojevrsne kulturne i jezične okupacije ...*

(Glas koncila 2013; emphasis added)

Every *tram ride pierces one's ears with a vocabulary* that has been so slowly, but so expertly and perfidiously launched via our media, *bringing us to a kind of cultural and linguistic occupation ...*

- (14) ... jer je hrvatski pod jakom amerikanizacijom, što je jednako *kolonizaciji*.

(Babić 2004: 215; emphasis added)

... because Croatian is under strong Americanization, which equals *colonization*.

- (15) Može li biti da ih je sve *obuzeo totalni kolonijalni mentalitet?*

(Babić 2004: 219; emphasis added)

Can it be that they were all taken over by *an utterly colonial mentality?*

Using foreign vocabulary is interpreted as a cultural and *linguistic occupation* (13). Language is *colonized*, and in more sophisticated and elaborate blends the mentality and the behaviour of the speech community is *colonial*. The colonial metaphors conceptualize foreign linguistic influence as a strong, hostile FORCE capable of overcoming the in-group's culture and way of thinking.¹³ Crucially, it is implied that language contact is a type of VIOLENCE and, possibly, a perpetual source of conflict between the in-group and the out-group.

4.3 Language requires purification

The figurative conceptualizations in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggested actions that left some negative trace on the state of language and nation. The effects, naturally, have to be nullified, which calls for counteraction. Language requires *purification*, *freeing from* undesirable elements or restoring a state prior to the changes that led

13. Colonization and its metaphors in German discourse are dealt with by Rash (this volume), showing the concept in a positive, rather than a negative light.

to its *degradation*. This involves “openness” to allegedly good or proper words and structures.

In 1995, shortly after the Croatian War of Independence, one Croatian politician suggested the imposition of legal constraints on the Croatian language, whereby he attempted to intervene directly in communication practice by introducing fines for those who would not follow his ideal conventions for communication (Vlašić 2010: 185). Examples (16–18) are taken from two publications that were critical of this attitude and that directly or indirectly referred to the politician’s words:

- (16) Ponajprije mora ga se *osloboditi debelih nanosa i mnoštva suvišnih tuđica*, koje su i bez utjecaja srpskoga jezika ... *ušle iz engleskoga, francuskoga, njemačkoga i drugih jezika.* (Lucić 2005; emphasis added)

First of all, *it* (Croatian) *has to be freed from thick deposits and a multitude of superfluous foreignisms* that, even without the influence of Serbian ..., *entered* from English, French, German, and other languages.

- (17) ... *prijeti izgonom 30 tisuća tobože nehrvatskih riječi.* (Lucić 1995: 17; emphasis added)

... he threatens *to expel 30 thousand* allegedly non-Croatian words.

- (18) ... on sada najavljuje *vraćanje dostojanstva* rashrvaćenom *hrvatskom jeziku.* (Lucić 1995: 17; emphasis added)

... now he announces *the restoration of dignity* to the de-Croatized *Croatian language.*

The elements that the politician aspired to eliminate were all foreignisms, but primarily Serbisms, or alleged Serbisms, i.e., pseudo-Serbisms.¹⁴ According to him, they have led to the “de-Croatization” of the Croatian language. On the basis of the *language-nation* blend, whereby the language becomes the essence of the nation, words that are foreign, or belonging to a disliked out-group, are regarded as a means of “de-Croatizing” language; influence of some sort that makes the language lose its essence, its national quality (e.g., in (18)). Moreover, the existence of such elements is interpreted as *a loss of dignity/honour*. *Dostojanstvo* ‘dignity’ is a concept related primarily to people. Language is thus personified (see the LANGUAGE IS A PERSON metaphor in Bermel 2006: 273–274) and given

14. Pseudo-Serbisms are words that are used both in Croatia and Serbia but are, by some people, considered to be typically or “more” Serbian and are therefore not supposed to be used in Croatia.

dignity, as well as the possibility of losing this dignity. The loss of dignity implies an immoral deed, or immoral action on the part of the one who has brought about its violation. The metaphor frames language issues even further into the domain of morality. An *undignified state* calls for a reversal of it or *the return of dignity*, which in language equals the *removal* of the elements that provoked this deplorable state. The action that needs to be “performed on” language to “rectify this injustice” can draw on various source domains. The examples represent more or less forceful physical action of some sort: *freeing from* (in example (16)), *expelling* (in example (17)). The logical consequence of the *removal* or proscription of certain words is the introduction of new ones that are capable of *restoring dignity*. Metaphors in examples (16) and (17) yet again conceptualize LANGUAGE AS AN OBJECT with a clearly defined COMPLETENESS/INTEGRITY whose elements can be removed or added at will. This conceptualization of the loss of, or the need to regain, INTEGRITY is even more elaborated in example (19), in which a Croatian linguist talks of the motivation for the introduction of new lexemes that should replace the *banished* ones:

- (19) To se radi *da bi se oštećeni ili oboljeli dijelovi zamijenili dobro očuvanima ... da (jeziku) ojačaju rastočenu samobitnost.*
(Škarić (2005: 122) in Lučić (2007: 339); emphasis added)

This is done so that the *damaged or diseased parts can be replaced with well-preserved ones ... so that they strengthen the language's dissolved quintessence.*

In similar examples, undesirable elements are conceptualized as AN ILLNESS, diseased parts of an organism, or PHYSICAL DAMAGE (*damaged, dissolved*). This lamentable state requires HEALING. *Oštećen* ‘damaged’ is an adjective that refers to the physical damage of inanimate entities, whereas *oboljeli dijelovi* ‘sick parts’ is a concept clearly related to living organisms. The choice of adjectives *oboljeli* and *oštećen* produces a blend between an ORGANIC ILLNESS scenario and one that potentially refers to non-human entities that can be destroyed or caused to disintegrate. The *poor* or *broken parts* of language have to be *replaced* with *well-preserved ones* and/or, presumably, *healthy* ones. This will *strengthen* the language’s *dissolved quintessence*. Taking into account that one’s linguistic competence and use of the lexical repertoire are a capacity or a skill often used almost automatically, one can only imagine at what cost, to use a psychological term, linguistic replacements occur if the proposed norms are observed in language use.

Example (19) highlights the idea of LANGUAGE being a clearly delineated, limited entity, be it an object or an organism with an essence. LANGUAGE is conceptualized as DAMAGEABLE, susceptible to dissolution and/or some kind

of ILLNESS, and as a healable ORGANISM. All these constructions consequently reflect on the presumed loss of the national essence of LANGUAGE. Non-national elements are *poor* and *broken*. Appeal to a quintessence is yet another conceptualization of a folk idea, or a myth, according to which language is not only able to reach, but has to exist in some exemplary state. Here, the pursued perfection originates in its national qualities. The idea of a language's quintessence negates the dynamicity of language as well as its inherent hybridity with respect to national origins.

4.4 Language needs protection

A default step following the previous actions allegedly performed upon the language is *protection* or *safeguarding*. All the possible negative outcomes that can arise from language contact have to be suppressed. Language is conceptualized as AN OBJECT OR AN ENTITY that is *defended*, *guarded*, *taken care of*. People who are in charge of that task are *guardians*. A state of being aware of linguistic choices (such as selecting particular vocabulary) and “acceptable” communication is portrayed as an act of DEFENCE in examples (20) and (21):

- (20) Kako da prema njima (tuđicama) *stvorimo gust filter* ...
(Babić 2004: 209; emphasis added)

How should we *create a thick filter against* them (foreignisms) ...

- (21) Svako glasilo ih ima, a njima je zadatak *da se brinu za pravilnost i čistoću hrvatskoga jezika*, a jedan bi od njih trebao biti *da budu brana* nepotrebnim i neprihvatljivim anglizmima. (Babić 2004: 231; emphasis added)

Every publisher has one (language editor), and their task is to *take care of the regularity and purity* of the Croatian language; and *to be a dam against* unnecessary and unacceptable Anglicisms should be one of their tasks, too.

- (22) ... ulazimo u novu veoma ozbiljnu fazu *obrane hrvatskoga jezika* ...
(Babić 2004: 221; emphasis added)

... we are entering a new, very serious phase of *defence of the Croatian language* ...

A default reaction to the conceptualization of language contact as VIOLENCE (*incursion* (12), *occupation* (13), *colonization* (14)), or a danger to ORDER and PURITY (a source of *irregularity* and *dirtiness* (implied in (21))), is DEFENCE. This is done by attending to one's communicative choices, by monitoring one's speech production and carefully selecting “local” vocabulary, i.e., elements that are considered to be authentically Croatian. This process is conceptualized as *showing*

resistance in (1) and *creating (thick) filters* in (20). People themselves are *dams* (21) and *defenders* (22).

In the PROTECTION/DEFENCE sub-scenario, people who consider themselves to be in charge of protection, assume the role of *guardians* or *custodians*:

- (23) [A]utoriteti koji propisuju tzv. *jezični čuvari (nadzornici)*, ponašaju se kao da su samo njima dostupne, često transcendentalne, *norme ispravnosti koje oni nadziru ...*
(see Kalogjera (2012: 12) in Starčević (2016: 75); emphasis added)

[A]uthorities who prescribe, the so-called language *custodians (guardians)*, act as if they were the only ones to whom often transcendental *norms of correctness* are available and *which they control ...*

- (24) Ne dirajte Sandu Ham, ona je ... *čuvateljica hrvatskoga jezika.*
(Čatić 2015; emphasis added)

Leave Sanda Ham be, she is ... *the guardian of the Croatian language.*

As shown in example (23), language guardians assume the role of the defenders of the language and usually believe themselves to be (the only) arbiters of what is acceptable and correct in language use and what is not.

5. Construction of identity through discourse and implications of metaphorical language for language users

Identity is one of the elusive and more abstract concepts that one encounters in the social sciences and humanities. Put simply, it is about representing oneself and what one believes one's community to be. Every representation requires discursive and symbolic mediation in order to affirm one's position, so identity is perforce partly a discursive product (e.g., Wodak et al. 2009: 7–30). Furthermore, identity entails classification and is always relational with respect to what one (believes that one) is not and, therefore, entails "bordering" and delineation of boundaries. Disidentification, as a reverse of identification or affiliation, is therefore also performed in discourse. Throughout the discussions of Croatian language identity, we have seen how figurative language, within a broader conceptual framework of a scenario, helps to affirm an ideal conceptual model of Croatian and to draw borders against unwanted or competing conceptions of language. Against the backdrop of national identity negotiation and maintenance, every linguistic puristic act is a symbolic act of delimitation and delineation of borders between the nations whose respective linguistic elements act as instruments in such an event. As shown

in the analysis, figurative language seems to be an inevitable part of idealizations of language, no matter which kind of ideology is promoted. Linguistic censorship that promotes one linguistic form over its less acceptable or unacceptable alternatives bears implications for language users, regardless of whether or not this has been made explicit. Usage that does not conform to an idealized (national) norm seems to be almost a moral transgression, or a kind of dangerous ignorance. A person who *pollutes* the language, or *does not resist* allegedly negative influence, wittingly or unwittingly fails to conform to a common cause. Imperatives of this sort, deducible from and promoted by the majority of metaphorical blends analysed in Section 4, have a particular strength within the framework of national identity construction. Constructed through metaphorical blends as *anomalous*, *dirty*, or *threatening*, targeted semiotic forms become carriers of a social stigma. The “non-conforming” choices are believed to have an effect on the entire collective. As Absillis and Jaspers (2016: 8) point out, utopian projects such as the quest for a perfect language require “the subordination of individual interest to the public cause, resulting in outward uniformity ... and linguistic conformity.” Non-compliance to the project is thus seen as a danger to the stability of the national cause, a lack of co-operation.

Those who accept foreign or pseudo-foreign linguistic influence may be accused of a lack of morals and rectitude. Although example (25) contains no non-literal language, it exemplifies a reprimand to a user who failed to conform to a desirable behavioural pattern:

- (25) ... hvali se predsjednik Zagrebačkoga atletskega saveza umjesto da se stidi što je organizirao *Zagreb maraton*, a nije *Zagrebački maraton*.
(Babić 2004: 221; emphasis added)

... the president of the Athletic Union of Zagreb boasts, instead of feeling ashamed, of organizing *Zagreb maraton*, instead of *Zagrebački maraton*.

In example (25) the author calls for almost an absolute consciousness of one’s communicative choices. *Zagrebački maraton* ‘the Zagreb marathon’ is a noun phrase constructed according to a typical Slavic morpho-syntactic convention, whereas the form officially used for the festival, *Zagreb marathón*, exhibits foreign influence. According to the above reprimand, one should consciously perceive foreign patterns, reject their usage, and select a “proper” structure, as this would presumably be a patriotic act. Failure to do so is met with dissatisfaction and sometimes suspicion.

Figurative conceptualizations also bear moral implications for the members of the out-group. For instance, in the *Anglocrobotian* blend, language contact is conceptualized as an *incursion* and qualified as “impudent” and “disrespectful.” This

particular qualification suggests intentionality and deliberateness, even maliciousness, on the part of the out-group. The agency implied in *incursions* indicates that the process of language contact/transfer is not a phenomenon equally distributed between the in-group and the out-group, but originates among the members of the out-group, who are solely responsible for linguistic *incursions*. Within the specific context of the former Serbo-Croatian area, where there are presently four standard languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian), out-group implications may be an especially sensitive issue. Metaphors that encode an “either-or” attitude to some specific level of language (e.g., orthography) with the aim of delineating Croatian from other standards, present out-group elements in a negative manner. Such value judgments may consequently stigmatize members of the adjacent countries and cultures.

6. Conclusion

Within a community that regards language as an emblem of the nation, linguistic issues are easily permeated with national concerns and transformed into discursive projects of collective identity negotiation. If constructed through discourse as (highly) indexical of a certain group, linguistic elements acquire an additional layer of symbolism and become the instruments of disputes that go beyond a mere question of linguistic form.

This chapter has demonstrated that metaphors for language, such as LANGUAGE IS AN OBJECT, AN ORGANISM, A PERSON, are a springboard for further metaphorical elaborations and blends within the LANGUAGE IN DANGER scenario. Against the backdrop of utopian projects aspiring to an ideal nationally “homogeneous” language, unacceptable modes of communication are figuratively conceptualized as *threatening, harmful forces, pollutants, (carriers of) illness, colonization, biological anomalies*. Negatively framed conceptualizations of language (contact and use), implicitly affect their users, too. While “nationally conscious” users are praised, those that do not conform to a desired linguistic ideal are berated and criticized. Through the lens of the organic metonymy LANGUAGE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY, such conceptualizations of communicative choices are proposed as inevitably consequential for (the survival of) the nation.

Although in the light of the analysis in this chapter, one might be tempted to completely dismiss the ornate and emotional metaphors for language, since they do not reflect a vision corresponding to the reality of language functioning and communication, this would also be questionable and susceptible to criticism. An Archimedean vantage point, offering an objective view of linguistic reality divorced from social concerns, is as utopian and fruitless as are attempts to find an authentic,

“ideal character” of a national language. Rather, being acts of identity performance, incessant and inherently unsuccessful attempts at reaching a perfect order, purity, and homogeneity in language seem to be a constant within symbolic communication. As we do not expect identity negotiations (personal, collective or otherwise) to ever cease, we should not expect arguments over language and identity to cease either. And although it is important to be able to express emotions about one’s language freely, one would expect figurative metalanguage about language employed by linguists and influential public figures to be exceptionally moderate, precisely due to their privileged position in modelling the world views of the society. Within the discourse on Croatian language identity construction and its differentiation from Serbian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin, assuming this ethical, sensitive approach is relevant since stigmatization of a linguistic element indexical of a neighbouring group can easily be interpreted as intolerance towards that same community.

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CHAPTER 6

Metaphors of plant cultivation and flowing liquid in German colonialist discourse (1871–1914)

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This chapter offers a critical analysis of two major metaphor groups, plant cultivation and flowing liquids, using theories of conceptual metaphor alongside Zinken and Musolff's premise that metaphor understanding in the real world is "a matter of engagement in debate" rather than solely a speedy and unconscious cognitive operation (Zinken & Musolff 2009: 4). A qualitative analysis of representative texts produced between 1879 and 1913 will show how metaphors of cultivation and flowing reflect German pro-colonialist ideology at the turn of the twentieth century: Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden's *Ethiopien*, Friedrich Fabri's *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien*, Friedrich Ratzel's *Politische Geographie* and *Der Lebensraum*. Frieda von Bülow's *Tropenkoller*, Robert Streit's *Ein Opfer der Hottentotten*, and, to a certain extent, Leo Frobenius's *Und Afrika Sprach* show some of the less positive aspects of colonialist cultivation and flowing.

Keywords: discourse metaphor, discourse systematicity, Discourse Historical Approach, Critical Metaphor Analysis

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the use of metaphors of flowing and cultivation in German nationalist discourse during an era which was crucial to the development of the German self-image as a colonizing power. From the late nineteenth century, the newly-founded German Empire needed to create a new discourse to legitimate its colonial ambitions. As demonstrated by Wodak et al. (2009), particular metaphors can form part of nationalist and racist discourses in that they support

discursive strategies of legitimation and perpetuation, thus serving various hegemones and unjust ideologies (on metaphor use for the legitimation of ideas see Čičin-Šain in this volume). The present chapter can thus be taken as a case study in which the usefulness of particular metaphors for historical German colonialism is shown to be extendable to other nationalist, expansionist, and racist discourses. In particular, the data show that metaphors which are currently popular in anti-migrationist discourse were once used to present human migration in a positive light.

Germany's first colonies were founded in 1884, thirteen years after the formation of the Second German Reich in 1871. From as early as the fifteenth century, however, adventurous and entrepreneurial Germans had explored the so-called "New World" alongside other Europeans, and from the late eighteenth century, increasing numbers of Germans became interested in emulating British, French, and Spanish colonizing activity. Since Germany did not exist as a unified political whole, there was as yet no prospect of Germany founding its own colonies. In a speech made to the National Assembly of the failed Revolution in 1848, Ernst Dieffenbach spoke of a perceived need for emigration and for the protection of emigrants by a unified German State (Gründer 1999: 46–50). The main message of this speech is that Germans, having founded a new republic, must spread out into the world. Dieffenbach looks forward in his speech to "die Verpflanzung deutscher Sitte und Wissenschaft in die fernste Länder" (the transplanting of German customs and knowledge into the farthest lands). The German past is as a fertile mother (*fruchtbare Mutter*) whose role has been forgotten. Probably referring to the *Ostbewegung* 'eastward migration' of the Middle Ages, Dieffenbach tells of the river (*Strom*) that had once flowed from Germany to nourish foreign deserts, transforming them into gardens full of flowers ("hat wohl Einöden und Wüsten in blühende Gärten verwandelt"). The river consisted of German civilization and the deserts were barren regions (some literally, some metaphorically), where human beings could not prosper, either economically or intellectually. Now new colonies would be needed for German migrants to flourish metaphorically and literally in order to provide markets for the industries of a young German republic as well as providing the raw materials that would be needed for their development. No new German republic was founded in 1848, but potential German colonizers of supposedly under-developed parts of the world continued to travel and seek opportunities for settlement. Germans continued to feel that without overseas territories of their own they were subordinate "hangers-on" in other nations' settlements, where, as Carl Peters later pointed out, they tended to be assimilated into the foreign cultures established by other colonizing powers rather than exerting their own influence:

- (1) Der große Strom deutscher Auswanderung taucht seit Jahrhunderten in fremde Rassen ein, um in ihnen zu verschwinden. Das Deutschtum außerhalb Europas verfällt fortdauernd nationalem Untergang.¹

(Peters 1940: 16)

The great river of German emigration has for centuries flowed into foreign races and disappeared there. Germanness outside Europe is steadily declining.

The second section of this chapter will provide an outline of the methods of analysis employed and theoretical framework within which these are situated. The third section is concerned with the illustration of how the two metaphor types, cultivation and flowing, are used to convey nationalist-colonialist political messages at the height of the German colonial era.

2. Theoretical framework

The texts chosen for qualitative analysis in Section 3 represent a variety of perspectives on German colonialism during the period of the Second Reich (1871–1914). All these texts convey a pro-colonial ideology, although not all present unequivocally positive judgments of the results of colonial activity in Africa. Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden's *Ethiopien* (1879), Friedrich Fabri's *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?* (1879), and Friedrich Ratzel's *Politische Geographie* (1897) all convey the political and economic aspects of colonialist ideology as presented to the German reading public during the early years of colonialism. Hübbe-Schleiden's monograph is simultaneously a document of ethnography and an account of his own journey to West Africa in search of business opportunities. Fabri wrote from the point of view of a politician who saw the need for living space into which Germans could expand and where they could exploit existing natural and human resources. His arguments in this vein were echoed by the geographer and ethnographer Ratzel, who also advocated colonial expansion into regions that were in need of a German civilizing influence. In 1901, Ratzel coined the term *Lebensraum* for 'living space' and defined the need for space and the means of expansion into it as a universal biological phenomenon which affects human beings in the same way as all other biological imperatives.

Leo Frobenius's *Und Afrika Sprach* (1912–13) is a travel narrative of an anthropologist in search of evidence of African cultural history. While not overtly

1. Although published in 1940, Peters's text was written but not published in 1906. Peters died in 1918.

interested in the political and economic advantages of colonization, Frobenius's travel account reveals an awareness the potential for colonial expansion that was a matter of equal interest to Great Britain and Germany during the years leading up to the First World War. Finally, Frieda von Bülow's *Tropenkoller* (1896) and Robert Streit's *Ein Opfer der Hottentotten* (1907) were written from the point of view of settlers living in German colonies, and their texts, a novel and an autobiography respectively, offer views other than the common colonialist attitude which seeks to legitimize its aims and methods. All of the selected works are to some extent representative of a nationalist-expansionist ideology and therefore political; all exemplify the use of metaphors of cultivation and flowing as a way of conceptualizing German colonization of Africa during the period 1871–1914.²

The qualitative analysis presented in Section 3 of this chapter uses the methods of Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) and the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the latter being a specific approach within Critical Discourse Analysis devised by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak et al. 2009) at the University of Vienna for the analysis of nationalist and racist discourse. Wodak et al. have identified a number of “discourse strategies” which work together with particular argumentation topoi, grammatical and lexical features, and verbal imagery in order to make clear the ideological purpose of a text. The strategic dimension of nationalist discourse involves “constructive” strategies, strategies of “perpetuation” (which include “legitimation”), strategies of “transformation,” and “destructive” strategies, all of which have a role to play in the creation of colonialist discourse (Rash 2016: 28). In particular, colonialist discourse relies upon the strategy of legitimation to explain and defend a perceived need to exclude, subjugate, or exploit the colonized Other and thus maintain the societal *status quo* for the Self. The strategy of transformation comes into play when a need is perceived to alter the relationship between the colonized Other and the colonizing Self in line with the purpose of the colonizing activity, for example the civilization by the Self of the Other.

The discourse strategies exploited by colonialist discourse frequently involve the use of metaphors. Underlying the methodology of much metaphor analysis is an understanding of metaphor as a cognitive process based on human bodily and social experience (Lakoff & Turner 1989; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). For Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner, human reality is defined in terms of metaphors which structure all aspects of daily life and form the basis of human action and interaction. According to Zoltán Kövecses, however, the process of metaphor is more than merely bodily and conceptual; it is also socio-cultural, and furthermore, metaphor

2. For analysis of similarly representative German colonialist literature see Rash (2016).

use can be based either on universal conceptual frames or it may vary between cultures. Kövecses's conclusion (Kövecses 2005: 193) is that cultural models are important for the description of the human conceptual system and that they commonly metaphorize abstract concepts. He illustrates the way in which central metaphors relate to cultural models and how metaphor both reflects and constitutes cultural models (Kövecses 2005: 194). An example which is pertinent to the study of colonialism is that of **COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS**, whereby the following conceptual mappings are relevant:

1. the plant → the complex system
2. parts of the plant → parts of the complex system
3. the biological growth of the plant → the abstract, non-biological development of the complex system. (Kövecses 2005: 209)

Kövecses quotes the following examples of metaphorical correspondences from the *Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary*:

- PREPARING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS PREPARING THE GROWING PLANT
- TO START OR CREATE A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS TO SOW A PLANT
- TO MAINTAIN OR TAKE CARE OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS TO CULTIVATE A PLANT
- THE UNSUCCESSFUL OR INAPPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS THE UNHEALTHY GROWTH OF A PLANT
- THE BEST STAGE IN THE PROGRESS OR DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS THE FLOWERING OF A PLANT
- THE BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM ARE THE FRUITS OR CROPS OF A PLANT. (Kövecses 2005: 210–214)

All of the above-listed mappings belong to the primary metaphor **ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE**, which Kövecses categorizes as “internally motivated” in that its emergence from the concrete source domain takes place as follows: **PARTS AND PROPERTIES OF CONCRETE OBJECT → ABSTRACT PROPERTIES OF CONCRETE OBJECT → ABSTRACT CONCEPT** (Kövecses 2005: 216f.). The conceptualization: **PROPERTIES OF CONCRETE OBJECT → ABSTRACT PROPERTIES OF CONCRETE OBJECT → ABSTRACT CONCEPT** can also be taken to apply to the mapping of the property of flowing water onto the movement of concrete entities, such as people, to create the metaphor **MIGRATION IS FLOWING LIQUID**. It is interesting to note that the representative texts examined in this chapter do not make use of **THE CREATION OF AN ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS BUILDING**, a common derivative of AN

ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, preferring THE CREATION OF AN ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PLANTING/FARMING.

The metaphors analysed in this chapter can be more precisely labelled “discourse metaphors.” Such metaphors have been defined as “a relatively stable metaphorical projection that functions as a key framing device within a particular discourse over a certain period of time” (Zinken et al. 2008: 363). This definition fits the two metaphor complexes under review in this chapter, since they were endowed with a particular meaning within a limited time period for a specific purpose within a particular socio-historical situation. For Zinken and Musolff, metaphor understanding is a matter of “engagement in debate” and discourse analysis is the empirical study of “how metaphors are *used*” (Zinken & Musolff 2009: 4; italics in the original); they advocate the study of metaphor use in context so that theoretical metaphor analysis may be enhanced. Furthermore, metaphors of cultivation and flowing tend to appear together in colonialist discourse in a way not common in other discourses. Similarly, colonialist discourse can be seen as having “discourse systematicity,” described by Elena Semino as applicable to situations where certain discourse metaphors are used by particular discourse communities and characterize specific discourse genres. Where a discourse genre has ideological implications, such systematicity is especially significant, since it can reflect “the shared beliefs and assumptions of the members of particular social groups” (Semino 2008: 34). In this respect they are used consciously and deliberately (as described by Šarić in this volume). The metaphors examined for this chapter are typical of their discourse genre and suited to the expectations of a particular discourse community. The metaphors would also have made sense to a wider readership, in part due to readers’ knowledge of specific related discourse genres and the use by these of conventionalized metaphorical expressions of flowing and cultivation. In relation to discourse metaphors, Paul Chilton (2009) differentiates between cognitively “entrenched” and the societally “conventionalized” metaphorical expressions common within “dynamic discourse.” An entrenched metaphor may be accessed from memory and may not need “pragmatic computation on each occasion of its use”; conventionalized metaphors, and it is these which interest us in this chapter, are metaphorical expressions which are “conventionalized in *certain discourses* that are in certain genres sanctioned by the social system” (Chilton 2009: 45; italics in the original).

3. Analysis

This section will describe in detail the use of metaphors of cultivation and flowing liquid to represent colonialist activity during the period 1871–1914. It will first

present the uses of each metaphor group within its historical context and then provide a qualitative analysis of the metaphors in use in a selection of representative German colonial literature.

3.1 Colonization as cultivation

The following section describes the etymology of the German terms *Kultur* ‘culture’ and *Kolonie* ‘colony’ as well as the history of the figurative usage of terms associated with cultivation. It then provides examples of metaphors of cultivation used both in support of German colonialist ideology and in criticism of colonizing practices.

3.1.1 Metaphor histories

The term *Kultur* stems from Latin *cultivus* ‘tilled (land)’, from *cultus*, the past participle of *colere* ‘to till, cultivate, inhabit’. The term *Kolonie* also derives ultimately from *colere* via *colonia* ‘farm, settlement’ from *colonus* ‘farmer, settler’. Microorganisms can be “cultured” to form a “colony,” in which case *Kultur* and *Kolonie* are synonyms. The word *Kultur* in the sense of ‘the cultivation of the land’ or ‘a piece of tilled land’ precedes that of ‘the cultivation of the mind’, which came into use in the seventeenth century in much of western Europe. Over time, the figurative nature of the term *culture* in particular became increasingly obscure, but the agricultural associations of *cultivation* continued to accompany it throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. In German colonialist discourse, the lexical field surrounding *Kultur* and the semantic field associated with its application to the cultivation of the soil is frequently transferred to human referents, particularly where talk is of taking charge of native Africans and their land in order to cultivate both. The notion of “cultivation” is further associated with that of “civilization,” with its etymological base in Latin *civilis* ‘citizen’. Both bear connotations of ordering and improvement when applied to colonization (see also Spalding 1977, *ein Gebiet kolonisieren* ‘to turn (a region) into a colony’, which is extended metaphorically to refer to the development of unused into arable land).

Neither *Cultur/Kultur* or *Colonie/Kolonie* are recorded in the Grimms’ nineteenth-century *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, which is surprising because they are both found in Adelung’s earlier *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch* (1793):

- (2) *Die Colonie* ein Ort, der von Ausländern angebauet worden; eine Pflanzstadt, Pflanzung, dergleichen die Engländischen Colonien in Amerika sind
.... Aus dem Latein. *Colonia*, welche anfänglich bloß eine Meierey, einen Bauernhof bedeutete. ... *Colonist* ... das Mitglied einer Colonie.

(Adelung 1793)

Colonie a place which has been cultivated by foreign migrants: a plantation like the British colonies in America (...). From Latin *colonia*, which originally designated a smallholding or farm (...). *Colonist* (...) a member of a colony.

- (3) *Die Kultur* die Veredelung oder Verfeinerung der gesammten Geistes- und Leibeskräfte eines Menschen oder eines Volkes (...). Aus dem Latein. *Cultura* und Französ. *Culture*, welche zunächst den Feldbau bedeuten.

(Adelung 1793)

Kultur the ennoblement or refinement of the entire spiritual and physical power of a person or a people (...). From Latin *cultura* and French *culture*, originally referring to the growing of crops.

The Grimms' *Deutsches Wörterbuch* does, however, document *Pflanzung* 4 as *ansiedelung*, *colonie* 'settlement, colony' as attested from the eighteenth century, as well as *Pflanzvolk* 'planters':

- (4) zur gründung einer colonie ausziehendes oder dieselbe bewohnendes volk, die gesamtheit der colonisten.
people who migrate to found a colony or who already live there, the totality of colonizers.

Adelung's eighteenth-century German dictionary documents *Pflanzung* in the sense of a colony, "ein Ort, welche durch fremde, dahin verpflanzte einwohner angebauet worden" (a region farmed by foreign migrants who have been implanted there).³

Metaphorical expressions of cultivation in German colonialist discourse include *blühen* 'to bloom, blossom', *Blüte* 'blossom', *befruchten* 'to fertilize', *Frucht* 'fruit', *kultivieren* 'to cultivate', *Kultur* 'culture', *pflanzen* 'to plant', *Pflanze* 'plant', *Pflanzung* 'planting, plantation', *säen* 'to sow', *Saat* 'seed', and *Wurzel* 'root', as well as various derivatives and compounds with these words as their base. Many of these metaphors, common in German and many other European languages, derive from the Bible.⁴ Jonathan Charteris-Black records their usage to conceptualize spiritual

3. English equivalent is *plantation*, used as a metaphor for the planting of crops and people in overseas colonies since the seventeenth century. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) (1989) documents figurative usage for both *colony* and *culture*. The term "culture" and its derivatives were transferred from usage referring to agricultural cultivation to "the cultivation of the human mind" as early as 1510. The figurative usage of *cultivate*, 'to improve and develop by education,' is attested from 1681.

4. Keith Spalding (1970ff.) documents the figurative usage of "experiencing good fortune or success" for *blühen* from the early Middle Ages and *Blüte* in the sense of "most perfect specimen" from the eighteenth century. Similarly, *befruchten* has been used in a figurative abstract

growth, and documents ‘seed’, ‘grain’, ‘fruit’, ‘harvest’, and ‘roots’ as common in parables within the metaphor SPIRITUAL GROWTH IS NATURAL GROWTH, from which are derived HUMANS ARE PLANTS, PEOPLE ARE CROPS, SPIRITUAL ACTIVITY IS FARMING. Charteris-Black sees such metaphors as generally evaluative in nature, since they rarely occur in contexts where human behaviour is not endowed with either positive or negative connotations (Charteris-Black 2004: 192–196; on the evaluative nature of metaphors see Čičin-Šain in this volume).

3.1.2 *Metaphors of cultivation in German colonialist discourse after 1871*

In his lectures of 1893–94, the political historian Heinrich von Treitschke described colonization using metaphors of journey, cultivation, and the foundation of new families. Colonization was conceptualized as the movement of populations (*das Hinausführen der Bevölkerung*) from existing States (*alte Kulturländer*), which become a motherland (*Mutterland*), into a new area, which Treitschke referred to as *ein abhängiges Tochterland* ‘a dependent daughter-land’. The new State is metaphorized as a *Pflanzungsstaat* ‘plantation State’ or as *Pflanzungskolonien* ‘plantation colonies’, reliant upon the *Kulturvolk* ‘cultivating or civilizing nation’ of the motherland for cultural and financial support (Treitschke 1922, I: 119–124). Treitschke was familiar with much of the nationalist-colonialist literature that predated his historical definition of colonization, such as the influential writings of Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, Friedrich Fabri, and Friedrich Ratzel.

Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden (1846–1916) was a founding member with Friedrich Fabri of the *Deutscher Kolonialverein* ‘German Colonial Association’ in 1882. Between 1875 and 1877 he spent two years in the West African state of Gabon, where he investigated opportunities for German colonization. In the account of his journey, *Ethiopien. Studien über West-Afrika* (1879), Hübbe-Schleiden described colonization as a necessarily organic process:

- (5) Wirkliche Colonien aber lassen sich nicht mechanisch gestalten, sie *müssen organisch wachsen*. (Hübbe-Schleiden 1879: 14)
True *colonies* cannot be created mechanically; they *must grow organically*.

Hübbe-Schleiden saw the moral legitimacy of specifically German intervention in world colonization as lying in the nation’s ability to cultivate both lands and

sense since the eighteenth century; *Frucht* ‘result’ or ‘profit’ is attested in Luther’s Bible translation (the Latin *fructus* can also bear this sense). *Pflanze* and *Pflanzung* are attested in Bible translations from the Middle Ages, and *sich festpflanzen* ‘to settle in a place’ is attested from 1862. *Saat* ‘seed’ and *säen* ‘to sow’ are similarly found in figurative senses from the Middle Ages, often combined with the notion of ‘spreading’.

peoples. The parts of the world which still lay fallow (*brach liegen*), both in the literal sense of “remaining uncultivated” and in the figurative sense of needing human civilization (and being “nobody’s country”),⁵ could be best cultivated by Germans:

- (6) Die schönsten Theile unserer Weltkugel liegen noch brach und überwuchern in unerschöpflicher Ueppigkeit, einer bildenden Menschenhand harrend. Und *diese* Menschenhand besitzt das deutsche Volk mehr als irgend ein andres. (...) Welch ein herrliches Arbeitsfeld liegt da dem in der Cultur gereiften Menschen offen!

(Hübbe-Schleiden 1879: 385)

The most beautiful parts of our planet lie fallow and are overgrown with infinite opulence, waiting for the care of a human hand. And the German people have *such hands*; more than any other nation. (...) What a wonderful opening for a people with cultural maturity!

The final chapter of Hübbe-Schleiden’s *Ethiopien* is almost entirely dedicated to claiming legitimacy for the German *race* as the optimal world colonizer. The concept of “cultural fertilizer” is brought into play in relation to the spread of culture and the figurative “blossoming” (*Aufblühen*) of the German race, which will be made possible by Germany’s entry into the race for world economic and political power:⁶

- (7) *Eine* Rasse der Welt erzieht die *andere*, ein Menschenstamm überdauert den anderen, und welches Volk an dieser Fortentwicklung nicht thätig Antheil nimmt, das wird im Kampfe um die Existenz erliegen. Es wird zu Grunde gehen *im Schlamme des Menschengeschlechts*. Wohl möchte Mancher eine ominöse Verwandtschaft ahnen zwischen jenem *Völkerdünger* und diesem *Urschlamme*. Aber wo die Welt-Oeconomie sich ihren Dünger holt, da wird auch frisches Leben geboren, das hinaus verlangt aus dem engen, dumpfen Stall, hinaus auf die weite, grüne Weide. Wo solcher Ueberschuss junger Kraft vorhanden ist, wie in Deutschland, da kann es sich doch nur um richtige Verwendung derselben handeln, um diesem Stamme zum Aufblühen zu verhelfen.

(Hübbe-Schleiden 1879: 381; italics in the original text)

5. On the notion that part of Africa was *terra incognita* or *terra nullius* and belonged to “nobody” see Betts (1972: vii). See also Ratzel (1897: 39) on the term “No-Mans-Land” as applied to parts of North America by British explorers in the eighteenth century.

6. Spalding documents *Kulturdünger* in the sense of “promoter of civilized existence” from 1830.

One world race educates the *other*, one human tribe survives longer than the other, and the people that do not take an active part in this development will succumb in the fight for their continued existence. They will perish *in the mire of the human race*. One may well imagine that there is some sinister relationship between this *human fertilizer* and that *primeval mud*. But fresh life will be born in the place where the world economy fetches its fertilizer, and this life will want to leave its narrow, dark stable and go out onto the wide, green meadow. Where there is a surplus of such youthful energy, as in Germany, it cannot do other than use its strength wisely and help other tribes blossom.

The above quotation conceptualizes the German people as possessing youthful vitality and the potential to go out into the world like a lively horse escaping from its stable to run in fresh new pastures. The “cultivation” of African soil with German fertilizer would be both literal, in that the land would be exploited for agricultural purposes, and metaphorical, in that the native population would be introduced to German material and moral culture before being exploited as a labour force. Failure to seize opportunities in Africa will see Germany metaphorically mired and infertile, and at an economic disadvantage on the world stage. It would thus have lost its fight for survival (*Kämpfe um die Existenz*).

For Hübbe-Schleiden’s colleague, Friedrich Fabri (1827–1891), organized emigration was also a matter of survival, of life or death (*Lebensfrage* (Fabri 1879: 28), *Existenz-Frage* (Fabri 1879: 81)), for the German Empire. According to Fabri, the need for national transformation within a new German Reich was incontrovertible and the government had a duty to use all necessary means to ensure the continued existence of its people, if necessary using force (Fabri 1879). Fabri reminds his readers that colonization, being a new experience for Germany, untrodden and virgin soil (*ein noch unbetreter, jungfräulicher Boden*), can be healthy in many ways (*nach vielen Seiten heilsam*) (Fabri 1879: 110). The positive effects of a transfer of people *in steter Hin- und Herbewegung* ‘in constant movement to and fro’ (Fabri 1879: 41) is exemplified by the British and Dutch:

- (8) Es ist offenbar, daß dieser stetige Kreislauf (...) zu einer höchst fruchtbringenden Quelle nationalen Wohlstandes werden muß.

(Fabri 1879: 42)

It is obvious that this perpetual circulation (...) must become a highly fruitful source of national prosperity.

The geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) was another early advocate of the need for German colonial expansion. He produced two texts of great importance for political colonialists: *Politische Geographie* in 1897 and *Der Lebensraum* in 1901. Like Hübbe-Schleiden, Ratzel conceptualized a human community or State as a living organism and saw the spread of plants, animals, and

human beings into suitable living space as a basic law of nature. Within the theory of biogeography that Ratzel developed in his *Politische Geographie*, the State was conceptualized as a plant that takes root (*Einwurzelung*) in the land upon which it grows:

- (9) ... denn der Staat zieht gerade wie die Wurzeln einer wachsenden Pflanze immer mehr Nahrung aus seinem Boden und wird daher immer fester mit ihm verbunden und auf ihn angewiesen. (Ratzel 1897: 42)
 ... for the State, just like the roots of a growing plant, draws ever more nourishment from its land and thus becomes ever more closely bound to it and dependent upon it.

A new colony was like a well-ordered garden and its settlers were growing plants, it became an offshoot of the motherland (“Das neue Land wird eine *Kolonie* des alten, das neue Volk ein *Ableger* des alten”) (Ratzel 1897: 121). The “daughter States” spread like young seedlings growing around an old tree (“zerstreut wie die jungen Sämlinge um einen alten Baum, der sie ausgesät hat”) (Ratzel 1897: 147). The plant-state, when spreading abroad tended to move in the direction of the sun, towards the West or towards the equator, and thus: “Der Weg der Sonne muß auch der der Kultur sein” (The road to the sun must also be the road to culture) (Ratzel 1897: 86).

For Ratzel, the economic purpose fulfilled by the founding of plantations took on a metaphorical as well as a literal meaning. He writes in 1897 of the linked economic and agricultural thriving (*gedeihen*) of a colony (Ratzel 1897: 86), and of a cultural fertilization (*Kulturbefruchtung*) which results from the introduction of European culture into non-European societies (Ratzel 1897: 147). Planting can be straightforward, the result of political progress (*politische Neuanpflanzung* ‘initial political planting’) (Ratzel 1897: 37), or it can be a forceful colonialist act (*erzwungene Verpflanzungen von Kolonisten* ‘forceful transplantation by colonists’) (Ratzel 1897: 119). The motherland needs cultural heroes (*Kulturheroen*) to found fertile colonies *aus wilder Wurzel* ‘from wild stock’ (Ratzel 1897: 42). Knowledge and care are needed, for a colony can be damaged by over-exploitation, which Ratzel terms the *Treibhauseffekt* ‘greenhouse-effect’ of colonial enterprises (Ratzel 1897: 341).

Whereas Friedrich Ratzel’s *Politische Geographie* treated the concept of sufficient living space within a political context, his later biogeographical text of 1901, *Der Lebensraum*, deals chiefly with the development of plant and animal species within space. Human beings are treated as life-forms that belong to the natural world on equal terms with others. Ratzel rarely writes of *Lebensraum* as a prerequisite for human cultural advancement, yet he does in one place explain that members of the Aryan race are considered to be in particular need of a large expanse

of land to spread into because of the complexity of their language family, which is likened to a many-branched tree:

- (10) Im Falle der Arier verlangen aber auch die knospen- und astartig treibenden Verzweigungen des großen Sprachstammes Der Baum braucht Licht und Luft, um zu wachsen, dieser Sprachen- und Völkerbaum brauchte freien Boden, um sich zu verzweigen. (Ratzel 1901: 172)
 The divergence of a great language family, like the sprouting of buds and knots in a tree, is essential in the case of the Aryan A tree needs light and air to grow; this linguistic and racial tree needs sufficient land upon which to spread its branches.

The notion of racial superiority was also taken up by Leo Frobenius (1873–1938), an anthropologist and traveller to Africa between 1904 and 1912. The account of his expedition, *Und Afrika sprach ...* (*And Africa spoke ...*) demonstrates a somewhat contradictory attitude towards the cultural achievements of native West Africans: on the one hand he sought on his journey to find evidence of an ancient African culture, and was successful; on the other, he never changed his view of the white “race” as superior, which is the noble bearer of a noble culture (*vornehme Träger einer vornehmen Kultur*) (Frobenius 1912–13: 144). One striking example of Frobenius’s feeling of superiority is his failure (presumably deliberate) to remember the names of the two African clerks, whom he dubs *Kulturpflanze I* and *Kulturpflanze II* ‘cultivated plant I and II’. He looks down upon them, although they are *lesekundigen Kulturpflanzen* ‘literate cultivated plants’ (Frobenius 1912–13: 103), because they confirm his prejudice about so-called *Hosenneger* ‘trouser-wearing or Europeanized negroes’ as liars and cheats.⁷

Frobenius’s significance in the field of anthropology lay in his hypothesis of *Kulturkreisen* ‘cultural circles’. According to this theory, cultures develop as a result of contact (*Kulturbeziehungen*) between the cultural characteristics or “elements” (*Kulturelemente*) of different regions, and this explains similarities in the cultures of different regions and races. Frobenius believed in the existence of chains of “cultural symptoms” (*eine Kette älterer Kultursymptome*) which he took to indicate the geographical spread of cultural innovations outward from a central point (Frobenius 1912–13: 328). For Frobenius, the work of an ethnographer involved examining a modern *Kulturkreis* and identifying the pattern of its historical spread in the same way that a botanist or horticulturalist would analyse the spread of

7. Compare Adelung’s record of the word *Früchtchen* in the sense of “a foolish young person.” Spalding documents *Pflanze* applied pejoratively to human beings in the sense of “creature” from 1869.

seeds which may or may not germinate according to the type of land upon which they fall:

- (11) ... die Gesetze, nach denen auch in vergangenen Perioden die Kulturen, als Samen ins Land gestreut, sich fortpflanzten und erstarben – unter Hinterlassung einer letzten Samenausstreung, die dann wieder, entsprechend dem andersartigen Ackergrunde, variierende Pflanzen aufkeimen ließ. (Frobenius 1912–13: 40)
 ... the laws according to which cultures, which in past eras were spread as seeds into a region, then died out, leaving behind a last scattering of seed which then, according to the different type of arable land upon which it landed, germinated, and grew into a variety of plants.

Potential and actual German colonizers of Africa had their Christian missionary parallels, who legitimized their activity by claiming a desire to “cultivate” and “civilize” native Africans in matters of religion and also health and general education. These included Franz Jäger, the chief subject of Robert Streit’s memoir about the Aminius Mission in German South-West Africa, *Ein Opfer der Hottentotten* ‘A Victim of the Hottentots’ (1907).⁸ For Franz Jäger, civilization involved the cultivation of traits which were present in all human beings. Historically speaking, he believed, native Africans had enjoyed fewer cultural advantages than Europeans: weeds (*Unkraut*) had grown over the African soil and dust had settled there. It would be necessary to eliminate the weeds to allow new growth (*Wachstum*) and to brush the dust away so that light could enter (“Helles, weißes Licht soll hinein”) (Streit 1907: 38). We also read in *Ein Opfer der Hottentotten* of Streit’s meeting with an old farmer, who describes what he sees as the true meaning of “cultivation,” using metaphors of plant growth. He accuses political colonialists of throwing a handful of earth at the colonized peoples and commanding *sei kultiviert!* ‘become cultured!’ and *sei christianisiert!* ‘become Christians,’ then wondering why their *Kulturerde* ‘cultural soil’ sticks to the outside of the person only for a short time before falling off (Streit 1907: 82). For true transformation, both in the religious and the secular cultural sense, growth must start from the inside of the colonized people or area and not be imposed from outside (“das Wachstum kommt doch von innen heraus, nicht von außen hinein”) (Streit 1907). The farmer tells Streit that colonizers have occupied the parts of the world named “nobody’s country” by the Europeans who drew the maps:

8. Franz Jäger fell victim to Nama (“Hottentott”) renegades during the Herero-Nama uprising against the German occupiers of South-West Africa 1904–1906.

- (12) Da lebte das schwarze Volk. Da – vor ein paar Jahrhunderten – war die Karte noch ein weißes Blatt. Und da kamen die Weißen, und nahmen die Karte zur Hand und legten sie selbstbewußt vor uns hin auf den Tisch, wie ein Professor, der Unterricht geben will. ... Und die einen sagten: „Das ist mein!“ – Und die anderen sagten: „Das ist mein!“ (Streit 1907: 80f.)

Black people lived there. A few centuries ago that part of the world was still a white space on the map. And then the white people came along. They took the map and placed it self-importantly on a table like a professor giving a lecture And some said: “That’s mine” – and others said: “That’s mine.”

Furthermore, the colonialist “cultivators” of the white spaces did not bring with them the right type of seed, the godly attitude that would lead to success:

- (13) Kein teures Saatgut voll Kraft und Gehalt, kein Saatgut, wie es der Ewige selbst in unsere Seelen gelegt hat, kein Saatgut, das nach innen die Wurzel schlägt, dann von innen heraus wächst und keimfähig und fruchtbringend ist. (Streit 1907: 81f.)
Not precious seed full of strength and substance, not seed such as the eternal spirit has planted within us to take root so that it can grow outward, germinate, and bear fruit.

The romantic heroin of Frieda von Bülow’s *Tropenkoller*, Eva Biron, also acted as a vehicle for criticism of German colonialist methods. Eva’s voice is one of reason in a world of male-dominated power struggles and irrational behaviour. She describes male colonizers as transplanted oak trees (*verpflanzte Eichen*) who try, both literally and metaphorically, to bring inappropriate and unsuccessful German methods of cultivation to Africa: it is “als ob er von der Palme verlangen wollte, daß sie Weintrauben trüge!” (as though he expected the palm-tree to bear grapes) (von Bülow 1896: 5f.).

Metaphors of planting and cultivation, most commonly representing the positive results of colonization, were especially common in German nationalist-expansionist discourse. This is understandable for two reasons, the first lying in the common etymological derivation of the terms *Kultur* and *Kolonie*, and the second being the ease with which literal and metaphorical aspects of colonization can be interwoven in discourse so as to support one another: the literal plantation of colonies and cultivation of crops occurs simultaneously with and results in the cultivation and civilization of human populations, both in real life and in discourse. Such literal and metaphorical combinations strengthen the justificatory message of much colonialist discourse and readers can conclude that the results of colonization are doubly beneficial.

3.2 Colonization as flowing

The following section describes the history of the figurative usage of German terms associated with “flowing.” It then provides examples of metaphors of flowing liquid used both in support of German colonialist ideology.

3.2.1 *Metaphor histories*

Spalding (1970ff.) documents *Flut* ‘flood, sea’ as a metaphor for the movement across land of human beings, especially overwhelming masses of people, since the twelfth century: “als ein vluot vuorin s’ in daz lant” (*Annolied*) and “volkes ein michel fluot” (*Herzog Ernst*).⁹ Grimm’s *Wörterbuch* (1838ff.) only documents figurative usage for *Flusz* in connection with *Rede* ‘speech’, but we find *Abflusz* ‘outflow, seepage (of people)’ and *Zuflusz* ‘influx (of people)’ attested for the eighteenth century, and *Überflusz* ‘overflow’ for the sixteenth century (Luther’s Bible translation). Grimm also has a particularly interesting quotation from Michael Schmidt’s *Geschichte der Deutschen* of 1778: “die englisch-amerikanischen Kolonien brauchten zuflusz von ganz Europa” (the Anglo-American colonies needed an influx from all of Europe). Grimm documents no figurative meanings for either *Flut* or *überfluten*.

Spalding documents *ströme von Menschen* ‘rivers of people’ from the seventeenth century and quotes Goethe for the eighteenth century: “Emigrirten, die ... nach Deutschland strömten” (emigrants who ... streamed into Germany). He also records *anströmen* ‘to flow in’, *ausströmen* ‘to flow out’, *einströmen* ‘to flow in’, referring to people, and the figurative *dem Strom folgen* ‘to follow the stream (i.e., crowd)’, all from the eighteenth century. Grimm has *strömende gauner* ‘streaming rogues’ for 1896 and documents figurative senses for the verb *strömen* ‘to stream’ and *Zustrom* ‘influx’ from the nineteenth century, but not for the noun *Strom*.¹⁰ We also find *überschwemmen* ‘to inundate’ in Grimm: “mit keyserlichen kriegsvolcke ganz erfüllt und überschwemmt” (completely filled and inundated with imperial warriors) (for 1653) and Goethe’s “die emigranten ... werden Deutschland wieder überschwemmen” (emigrants will inundate Germany once more).

9. The *OED* has “an overwhelming concourse or influx of persons” from 1607 for *Flood* 5b and “to come or go in a stream or streams” from the fourteenth century (Wycliffe’s Bible) for the verb *Flow* 3a.

10. The *OED* documents *stream* 5 “an uninterrupted succession of persons” from the seventeenth century and to *stream* 4 “to move together continuously in considerable numbers” from the eighteenth century.

3.2.2 *Metaphors of flowing in German colonialist discourse after 1871*

As with metaphors of cultivation, the conceptualization of human migration as a flowing liquid, HUMAN MASS MOVEMENT IS FLOWING LIQUID, derives from early Bible translations. Metaphors of flowing are, however, less common in the German colonialist discourse of the nineteenth century than those invoking cultivation and generally stem from the notion that colonization is necessary due to the lack of living space in an “overflowing” Germany.

Conceptualizations of migrant peoples as *flowing liquids* and *floods* have taken on negative connotations in post-colonial anti-immigration discourse.¹¹ They belong to a group of long-term mental representations of a supposed threat to the social stability of the modern world (Semino 2008: 87f.). In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German colonialist discourse, however, a *flowing* of people was often portrayed as a good thing, particularly since only the point of view of the colonizers was presented. The positive image of water bringing life and renewal helped legitimize colonial activity. Migration into a “daughter” State could also act as a source of water, a spring, to refresh the national sentiment of a “parent” State (“eine Quelle, aus der das Staatsgefühl Erfrischung schöpft”), and rejuvenate society both at home and abroad through its *heilsame Abfluß* ‘healing outflow’ (Ratzel 1897: 346).

Friedrich Fabri (1824–1891) was a contemporary of Wilhelm von Hübbe-Schleiden and co-founder of the *Deutscher Kolonialverein* ‘German Colonial Association’. His political treatise, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?* ‘Does Germany need Colonies?’ was published in the same year as Ratzel’s *Politische Geographie*. For Fabri, colonization was a positive natural process, a law of nature, *Gesetz der Expansion und Repulsion* ‘law of expansion and repulsion’ (Fabri 1879: 13). He conceptualized colonization as a two-way flow: an outpouring and an influx of energy (*Kräfte-Abfluß; Kräfte-Zufluß*) between colonies and their motherlands (Fabri 1879). Friedrich Ratzel also metaphorized human migration as moving liquid. He conceptualized nations as seas (*Völkermeer*) or landmasses within seas (*Völkerinsel*) (Ratzel 1897: 3). It is as though a nation were moving backward and forward like a slowly flowing mass (“das Volk wie eine langsam flüssige Masse sich vor- oder rückwärts bewege”) (Ratzel 1897: 84). A lack of sufficient living-space in the motherland can cause “overflowing” of people (*Überfließen*, Ratzel 1897: 395;

11. Such metaphors were notoriously common during the National Socialist era in Germany. In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler used metaphors of flowing, overflowing and filling with fluid to refer to population movement and growth. Unwelcome people and ideas were referred to as *Giftstrom*, *Überschwemmung*, *bolschewistische Welle*, *Marxistenstrom*, *Menschenmeer* (Rash 2006: 158).

Bevölkerungsüberfluß, 1897: 132; *Menschenüberfluß*, 1897: 119). Ratzel further refers to *Überschwemmungen* ‘inundations’ (1897: 118) in the context of forceful colonization or conquest (*Eroberung*). Native Africans are portrayed as having more land than they can exploit efficiently, a superfluity of land (*Bodenüberfluß*, Ratzel 1897: 58; *Landüberfluß*, 1897: 135) which leads to its devaluation. Ratzel metaphorizes forceful colonization as storms and deluges of people (*Fluten, Völkerstürme*) (Ratzel 1897: 89). Colonization is particularly successful if the invaded area is thinly populated and cannot withstand incursion from a densely populated land: “Die volkreichen Länder lassen ihren Überfluß nach den dünnbewohnten Nachbargebieten abfließen (...)” (Densely populated lands let their surplus flow into thinly populated neighbouring lands ...) (Ratzel 1897: 90).

Metaphors of cultivation and of flowing can, of course, be combined with one another and, singly or together, with other metaphors associated with colonialist activity, such as the foundation of “daughter states” following the blossoming of the “parent” region. Friedrich Fabri combines the concepts of flowing and blossoming with a family metaphor – a powerful motherland needs space to expand into and colonization can be legitimized through the claim that it will benefit the colonized region as much as the homeland:

- (14) Jeder mächtige staatliche Bestand bedarf in der Zeiten seiner Blüthe eines Ausbreitungs-Gebietes, in das er nicht nur seine überschüssigen Kräfte entlassen, sondern deren produktive Leistungen auch durch einen stetigen Rückfluß ins Mutterland wieder aufnehmen und durch neues Ausströmen in lebendiger Wechselwirkung zu vermehren vermag. (Fabri 1879: 13)

Every powerful blossoming State needs an area into which it can expand, into which it can release its superfluous energy and from which the results of its productivity can flow steadily back to the mother-country; a renewed outpouring of energy will then bring about a lively interaction between the two areas.

Here Fabri echoes a common colonialist view that colonies can provide markets for the products of German industry as well as raw materials for factories in the homeland. Metaphors of flowing back and forth provide the visual image to support this notion.

Leo Frobenius was similarly aware of the political debate in Germany about the need for additional living space in colonies and shortly before the outbreak of the First World War wrote of the need for a fair distribution among Europeans of possessions in Africa. Like Fabri, he conceptualized colonization as a combination of flowing and cultivation, stressing the necessity that the flow of migrants should be evenly dispersed:

- (15) Schwer genug ist der Kampf und die Durchdringung des zähwiderständigen dunklen Geistes Afrikas, hart und opferreich genug die Mühsal der

Einpflanzung europäischer Gesittung in dem fremden Boden! Sicher ist es schwierig und ohne Ellbogenstöße nicht möglich, im Wirtschaftsleben der europäischen Völker in Europa einen Ausgleich der Kräfte zu erreichen. Schwer ist es, für die gewaltig aufquellenden Kultur- und Menschenmassen eine allen gleich gerecht werdende Abflußverteilung zu schaffen.

(Frobenius 1912–13: 144)

The fight to penetrate the resistant dark spirit of Africa is difficult enough, and planting European culture in foreign soil requires hard work and sacrifice! Arriving at a fair distribution of economic advantages for the people of Europe is certainly difficult and not possible without elbowing others out of the way. It will be difficult to disperse fairly the powerful surge of culture and human beings who will pour out to Africa.

This quotation from Frobenius's *Und Afrika sprach ...* (1912–13), published at a time of escalating tensions between Great Britain and Germany, not least in colonial politics, introduces the image of competitors “elbowing” one another out of the way during a “fight” to possess Africa. This competition takes place within a merged metaphorical scenario which reflects reality: the cultivation of land depends literally upon the movement of water and the metaphorical cultivation of people depends upon change, “pouring.” The chief benefits for Germany of “planting European culture” are justified in literal terms: they are economic. The proclaimed benefits for the colonized populations are metaphorical: native Africans will receive German culture and Christianity. Due to an absence of sources, the question will always remain as to how the colonized Africans would have metaphorized the influx of German migrants if they had had a voice.

4. Conclusion

Two major metaphor complexes supported the conceptual system within which colonialism was framed in German political discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: cultivation and the flowing of liquid. They have continuous conceptual histories going back at least to biblical times, when metaphors taken from the two domains were commonly associated with the movement and settlement of peoples. During the German colonialist era the metaphors took on a specific role of describing and legitimizing colonialist activity: particular groups of people and developing national populations were conceptualized as growing plants, and the movement of populations were imagined as flowing liquid. The most common of these metaphors include SETTLEMENT OF COLONIES IS PLANTING, DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIES IS PLANT GROWTH, and UPKEEP OF COLONIES IS TENDING PLANTS; the second, less frequently occurring, set of metaphors is that

of MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE IS FLOWING LIQUID. The two metaphor types naturally overlap and interact with one another, due to the close literal association of irrigation with plant cultivation. Within the latter of the two complexes, OVERCROWDING IS OVERFLOWING was later taken up by National Socialists in the context of their belief that Germans lacked sufficient *lebensraum*. Expressions describing flowing in excessive quantity, which in early German colonialist discourse could metaphorize a beneficial movement of peoples from a central “motherland” to a new home, still commonly refer to migrant populations, but imply unwelcome incursions from outside (on migration discourse see Đurović and Silaški in this volume; on metaphors of unwelcome forceful liquid see Čičin-Šain). The negative ways of referring to immigration have become more varied and widespread, particularly in right-wing discourses, and references to, for example, “inundations,” “swamping,” “tsunamis,” “sinking,” and “drowning” have become part of an unconscious repertoire of racist language to the extent that it is no longer necessary to make an explicit link to human migrants as a danger to society. Metaphors of plant cultivation are, by contrast, less useful to the political discourse of the current post-colonialist era; indeed, a lack of *Lebensraum* ceased to be an issue for mainstream German politicians after the end of the Second World War.

The idea that the Germans were best suited to spreading European notions of civilization throughout the world was widespread among German colonialists from the end of the nineteenth century until at least the end of the First World War. For some, this sentiment survived until the end of the Second World War. This chapter has analysed the use of metaphors by German authors with a variety of reasons to be interested in Africa – political, economic, missionary, and ethnographic – but few expressed any view other than that the colonization of Africa by Germans would bring material and cultural advantages to Germany, to German settlers in Africa, and to the colonized peoples in their native lands. All of the authors used metaphors within a discourse which legitimized their actual or planned presence in Africa and their aims to exploit the continent’s natural and human resources. Planting, cultivation, flowing, and irrigation were described as advantageous to both Germans and Africans in a literal as well as metaphorical sense. While a few voices warned that insufficient care had been taken to care adequately for the needs of native Africans, most German colonialists propagated the message that it was they who had the means and knowledge to bring prosperity and culture to Africa. The assumption on the part of Europeans that they possess an innate superiority over non-European people can still be encountered and an understanding of historical colonialist discourse can assist in educating against this.¹²

12. In 2014 I heard the following remark from a dissatisfied British customer in a restaurant in Sri Lanka: “If they had brains, they’d be dangerous.”

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The meaning of state created through symbols and metaphors

German *Heimat* and Russian Motherland

Agne Cepinskyte

This chapter compares the role of symbols and metaphors in constructing the meaning of the state in its relation to the nation. Building on Paul Ricœur's theory, it considers symbols and metaphors as two different discursive devices and applies this theoretical approach to the analysis of pre-Nazi German (1871–1933) and late imperial Russian (1860s–1917) political discourses as reflected in political speeches, policy documents, government records, correspondence, and other texts produced by political leaders and thinkers. The findings are that the symbol of the German *Heimat* and the metaphor of the Russian Motherland contributed significantly to the discursive development of two distinct types of state-to-nation relations: in Germany, the nation legitimized the state, while in Russia the state dominated the nation.

Keywords: state, nation, nationhood, metaphors, symbols, *Heimat*, Motherland, Germany, Russia, political discourse analysis

When entering the village I felt more clearly than ever before how beautiful it is to have a homeland (*Heimat*) and a homeland (*Heimat*) with which one is bound together through birth, memory, and love. (Otto von Bismarck 1847)

The dictates of this Motherland are indisputable. Sacrifices for this Motherland are inevitable. A sacrifice for some faceless and blind force of a community is meaningless. ... A sacrifice for the honour and glory of the Motherland is sweet and spiritual. (Alexei Losev 1941)

1. Introduction

A state is a territorial socio-political entity whose nature is largely determined by its relation to the nation (Buzan 2007: 67). Some states forge this relation primarily

from above and assume a dominant role over the nation, while in other cases the nation develops its bond to the state from below, thereby legitimizing the whole existence of the state. Pre-Nazi Germany (1871–1933) and late imperial Russia (1860s–1917) are examples of states with such contrasting socio-political links. Whereas the latter epitomizes the state's supremacy over the nation, the former is characterized by a strong civil society that established its relation to the state from the bottom up.

The socio-political nexus between the state and the nation (i.e., between governing institutions and society) is constructed primarily through discourse. Therefore, the unravelling of the origins of state-to-nation relations could start with the following question: how can the meaning of the state be discursively connected to the understanding of nationhood and *vice versa*?

In this chapter, such an inquiry draws on the ideas of conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), which proclaims that the central objects of historical analysis should be social and political concepts rather than events or occurrences (Krzyżanowski 2016: 312; Koselleck 1982; Koselleck 1988). Accordingly, the present discursive analysis focuses on and juxtaposes two conceptualizations of the state that were produced within specific socio-political contexts in Germany and Russia and came to define the relations between these states and their nations.

In German and Russian political discourses from around the mid-nineteenth century until the First World War (WWI) and its aftermath, the symbol of the German *Heimat* 'homeland' and the metaphor of the Russian Motherland contributed significantly to the development of two types of relations between the state and the nation. The *Heimat* symbol in German political discourse facilitated the consolidation of horizontal links between the people, while the Motherland metaphor in Russian political discourse enabled the vertical connection between the state as the higher authority and the nation, which was rendered subordinate to the state.

This chapter compares the role of symbols and metaphors in constructing the meaning of the state in its relation to the nation. It approaches symbols and metaphors as two distinct discursive devices and explores how political leaders can utilize them in creating national and state images. The present analysis builds both on secondary sources discussing the meaning of the *Heimat* and the Motherland in German and Russian history and cultures, and on political discourse analysis of primary sources produced between the mid-nineteenth century and the aftermath of WWI. These sources include political speeches, policy documents, government records, diplomatic correspondence, and other texts issued by political leaders and thinkers, such as their letters, memoirs, and similar personal accounts.

The chapter contains five sections. Following the introduction in Section 1, Section 2 explicates the theoretical premises for understanding the innate differences between symbols and metaphors and their consequently unique roles in discursive

constructions of the meaning of the state and nationhood. Sections 3 and 4 apply these theoretical arguments to the case studies of pre-Nazi Germany and late imperial Russia in order to test the following proposition: in Germany, the *Heimat* symbol's ability to have different meanings for different individuals stimulated a feeling of belonging to one nation across societal, regional, and even international boundaries, which enabled horizontal links between the German people; by contrast, the metaphor of the Russian Motherland reduced the plurality of possible interpretations, as the synthesis of the predicate (mother) and the subject (land) unequivocally emphasized the superior and protective role of the state, thereby consolidating its vertical authority. Section 5 concludes the chapter with observations derived from the analysis of German and Russian political discourses.

2. Imagining a state in symbols and metaphors

Michael Walzer (1967: 194) has remarked that a state has “no palpable shape or substance” and can be comprehended only once it is associated with a certain image. He has suggested that “[t]he state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived.” Symbols and metaphors are often involved in discursive constructions of the meaning of such amorphous entities as the state and nationhood, as several other chapters in this volume explain (for instance, Đurović and Silaški; Grassi; Marks; Perak; Šarić, and Vervaet).

According to Paul Ricœur (2003: 220), both metaphors and symbols create meaning through analogy. However, he distinguishes between a metaphor as a “purely semantic structure” and a symbol as containing “something semantic as well as something non-semantic.” Ricœur (1976: 45–46) proposes that a “[m]etaphor occurs in the already purified universe of the *logos*, while [a] symbol hesitates on the dividing line between *logos* and *bios*” (emphasis in the original). To better understand Ricœur’s distinction between a symbol and a metaphor, it is worth looking more closely at his description of the creation processes of metaphorical and symbolic meanings.

In Ricœur’s explanation, metaphors expressly utter predication through language by attributing an unusual or unexpected predicate to a subject (Ricœur 1976: 52). The communicator of a metaphor semantically connects two words whose literal meanings render them incompatible, for instance, CURTAIN OF NIGHT, SEA OF GRIEF, BROKEN HEART, OR TIME IS A THIEF. Since the literal interpretation of the relation between the subject and the predicate is “nonsensical” and a “significant contradiction,” this interpretation collapses and gives way to the metaphorical interpretation. Thus, the construction of the metaphorical meaning starts from

the “absurdity,” which “is revealed through the attempt to interpret the utterance literally” (Ricœur 1976: 50).

Imagination is instrumental in solving the “literal incongruence” and transitioning to the “metaphorical congruence,” as it illuminates the resemblance and “reveals a generic kinship” between two seemingly incompatible words (Ricœur 1978: 146–147). In this way, imagination resolves the “semantic dissonance” and completes the establishment of the metaphorical meaning (Ricœur 1976: 55; Ricœur 1978: 145–147).

Ricœur (1978: 147–150) emphasizes that imagination is “immanent” and “nonextrinsic” to what he calls a “predicative assimilation”; it is a “concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities.” Thus, in the creation of the metaphorical meaning, imagination is a logical process that remains on the semantic level: “To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode” (Ricœur 1978: 150). Therefore, Ricœur’s theory perceives a metaphor as a “purely semantic structure.”

Symbols are different in this sense. They are rooted in a variety of primary personal experiences and thus contain a “non-semantic element”: “This opacity of a symbol is related to the rootedness of symbols in areas of our experience that are open to different methods of investigation” (Ricœur 1976: 57). As such, unlike metaphors, which are “a free invention of discourse” and occur in “a purified universe of the *logos*,” symbols are inherently bound to life, or *bios* (Ricœur 1976: 61; emphasis in the original).

The resemblance between the predicate and the subject is not “as nicely articulated on a logical level” in symbols as it is in metaphors (Ricœur 1976: 56). In a metaphor, “the assimilation of one thing to another” is brought to language and “clarified in the tension of the metaphorical utterance,” while in a symbol it remains implicit and confused (Ricœur 1976: 69). The creation of symbolic meaning thus entails an element that “never passes over completely into language” – “something powerful, efficacious, forceful” that is bound to human experience and “resists any linguistic, semantic or logical transcription” (Ricœur 1976: 57, 63). Ricœur (1976: 61) concludes that “[t]his bound character of symbols makes all the difference between a symbol and a metaphor.”

There are two implications of this difference between a symbol and a metaphor that are significant for political discourse analysis in the present chapter. First, because of their rootedness in a non-semantic element that emanates from individual human experiences, symbols “give rise to an endless exegesis” and are far more obscure than metaphors (Ricœur 1976: 59–61; Ricœur 2003: 219–220). Second, metaphors become “dead” once the linguistic community accepts them, and the meaning attached to an object via the metaphorical image becomes fixed. Symbols, however, never die; they only transform “because they plunge their roots

into the durable constellations of life, feeling, and the universe” (Ricoeur 1976: 64). In other words, the more a metaphor is used, the less imagination it requires, because over time the image that it creates “tends to become attenuated to the point where it is no longer perceived” (Ricoeur 2003: 219). Symbols, on the other hand, are constantly re-interpreted in the light of diverse personal experiences. Hence, in their meaning they are more dynamic than metaphors.

These theoretical premises suggest that social actors who use metaphors are in greater control of their narrative than communicators of a symbol. In developing this argument further, it seems likely that political leaders, who define the state’s relation to the nation through a metaphorical image, will largely impose the narrative that the image carries from above while limiting room for individual interpretations from below. By contrast, if the government conceptualizes its relation to society as a symbol, each member of the nation can then “intellectualize” that image in the light of his or her own unique experience and context (Ricoeur 2003: 219). As a result of multiple possible interpretations of a symbol – all of which are unified by the similar feelings that they trigger – the construction of the meaning of the state and nationhood is likely to be horizontal across the societal cleavages, and the link between the nation and the state is forged primarily from the bottom up.

Sections 3 and 4 apply such theoretical propositions to the case studies of pre-Nazi Germany and late imperial Russia. The symbol of the *Heimat* played a key role in the discursive consolidation of the German nation, while in late imperial Russia political leaders conceptualized the state through the metaphor of the Motherland. In Russia, the metaphor reduced the plurality of possible interpretations and unequivocally emphasized the superior, nurturing, and protective functions of the state, thereby supporting Russia’s imperial tradition of a strong and indivisible governmental authority, which was necessary to prevent the fragmentation of the nation and, ultimately, of the state itself. By contrast, in Germany, it was chiefly the *Heimat* symbol’s ability to have different meanings for different people that stimulated the feeling of belonging to one nation across societal, regional, and, following Germany’s defeat in WWI, even international boundaries. Section 3 examines the *Heimat* symbol in further detail.

3. The *Heimat* symbol: From individual memory of home to collective memory of homeland

Before the unification of the German people under the German Empire in 1871, the population belonged to various lands of the German Confederation, which replaced the Holy Roman Empire in 1815. Historian James Sheehan (1994: 1) has

stated that Germany simply did not exist prior to the unification, as there was “no clear and readily acceptable answer to the question of Germany’s political, social, and cultural identity.” Indeed, it was then a regionally, socially, politically, religiously, and culturally fractured society that did not share one common past. The stronger lands of the confederation, especially Prussia and Bavaria, attempted to build their own states while rallying regional patriotism. For instance, Bavaria did not support the reform of the confederation until the early 1860s, as it perceived changes to the *status quo* to be endangering the land’s identity as the “first-rank” German power, and ultimately, as detrimental to its independence (Hewitson 2010: 209).

Prussia posed an even more problematic issue in the German imperial nation-building process. It was predominantly Prussia’s leadership in the unification that provoked discontent and mistrust in other German lands, and particularly in the south, where the anti-Prussian sentiment was deeply entrenched as a result of the Austro-Prussian war. It was therefore crucial for political leaders – notably Otto von Bismarck – to prevent the marginalization of multiple territorial lands in the context of Prussia’s domination (Feuchtwanger 2001: xviii).

A common denominator was necessary to reconcile distinct German lands and merge them into one united German Empire. Moulding the national identity was a challenging task since this identity was “elusive in large parts of rural Germany and highly contested in the urban centres” at the time (Berger 2006: 49). Nonetheless, only a few decades later, in 1914, people from a variety of different regional pasts, landscapes, traditions, and cultures “marched united in the name of the [German] *nation*” (Confino 1993: 45; emphasis in the original).

A number of scholars have shown that the forging of the German nation, which transcended regional, cultural, and societal boundaries, was closely linked with the *Heimat* symbol. In her extensive study of the pivotal meaning of the *Heimat* in the German history of the last two centuries, Celia Applegate (1990: 4) has noted that the “*Heimat* has been at the centre of a German moral – and by extension political – discourse about place, belonging, and identity” (emphasis added). While the word translates as the homeland, it is far richer in its connotations than the English translation can capture. Jeffrey Wilson (2007: 332) has explained that the *Heimat* cut across regional, political, and sectarian lines, as it was used “to identify one’s hometown, district, province, state or nation, and connoted an attachment to one’s home, a deep connection to the local soil and fond memories of childhood.”

German political leaders employed the *Heimat* as the central symbol in Germany’s nation- and empire-building process. As a symbol of home, its meaning was unique to each individual, who could complete the narrative of the state and nationhood by connecting it to his or her own life. This was consistent with

Ricœur's understanding of a symbol as rooted "in areas of our experience that are open to different methods of investigation." For that reason, Ricœur has argued, symbols present an opportunity for multiple readings and "no given categorization can embrace all the semantic possibilities of a symbol" (Ricœur 1976: 57).

Indeed, the *Heimat* symbol represented people from diverse groups and allowed them to develop a sense of belonging to one nation despite individual and group differences. Alon Confino (1993: 50) has described the *Heimat*'s capacity to vary in individual meanings as comprising its essence: "such an idea of Germanness which crossed regional, political, class, confessional and gender lines, had to be abstract enough to collapse differences into similarities." Confino (1993: 50) has further explained that "[i]n the minds of Germans, the *Heimat* idea allowed Catholics and Protestants, liberals and socialists, Prussians and Bavarians to remain themselves, yet to inform together a transcendent national community" (emphasis added). In short, the *Heimat* symbol was a means of reconciling the identities of separate German lands with the national identity of the newly established empire.

The *Heimat* symbol linked people's intimate, familiar local places with the distant, abstract national world (Confino 1993: 44). It embodied a relation between ordinary people living in their accustomed local areas on the one hand and the empire as a political organization on the other. As Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman (2000: 23) have observed, the *Heimat* connected the self with the larger entity (the state and the nation) "by stimulating identification whether with family, locality, nation, folk or race, native dialect or tongue." In the early 1900s, the Austrian politician Otto Bauer, who espoused pan-German ideas and advocated Austria's accession to Germany, accurately captured the feeling that the *Heimat* symbol evoked:

- (1) When I think of my nation, I remember my familiar *Heimat*, the house of my parents, the first childhood games, my old schoolmaster, the girl whose kiss I once enjoyed, and from all these visions streams a feeling of pleasure, closely related to the idea of the nation to which I belong.
(Bauer 1907: 124–125; my translation, emphasis added)

The *Heimat* symbol thus harnessed personal memories, local histories, nature, and folklore in order to rally a feeling of togetherness and belonging to one nation. This was illustrated by the proliferation of *Heimat* museums, organizations, studies, and books, which not only promoted the *Heimat* idea but also highlighted the singularity of local cultures and histories and their significance for the empire as a whole (Confino 2006: 35). As Stefan Berger (2015: 271) has concluded, the "*Heimat*, together with empire, ultimately allowed the fusion of the 'small fatherlands' into the larger Germany as it decentralized German national discourse and avoided the need to define a firm and fixed core of the nation" (emphasis added).

All in all, the German nation- and state-building process in the nineteenth century was a complex project that developed a profound conceptual foundation for combining the imperial authority with the preservation of diverse and often unruly regional identities. The *Heimat* symbol allowed people to grasp the nation and the state through familiar local sentiments, images, and personal experiences, and it bridged the gap “between national aspiration and provincial reality” (Applegate 1990: 13). The *Heimat* symbolized German collective memory of home, which consisted of a variety of individual memories, values, and experiences; it was “a piece of earth, which through experiences [was] most closely connected with personal values. It [was] the echo of the personal value system, the value symbol (*Wertsymbol*) of past life” (Kerschensteiner & Müller 1926: 87; my translation).

The importance of the *Heimat* symbol and its role in consolidating the nation did not end with Germany’s unification. Despite the establishment of the German Empire, German nationhood continued to represent not only loyalty to all that was national but also “a patchwork of regions and states, a mosaic of divergent historical and cultural heritages” (Confino 2006: 48). The *Heimat* symbol, which embodied the sentiment of belonging to the “national” and nostalgia for the “local,” remained crucial as a representation of both the local and the national community. The “national” was the core of collective memory to which the multiple “local” lands, villages, towns – and above all the people – were drawn.

When the nation descended into disappointment and confusion amid Germany’s decline in the aftermath of WWI, the *Heimat* symbol did not leave political discourse. Mere months after Germany’s defeat, Gustav Stresemann, who later became Germany’s Chancellor (1923), Foreign Minister (1923–1929), and the foremost diplomat of the Weimar Republic, declared in his speech before the nation that Germany was, at that time, “a nation in distress” that had “to face the terrible collapse of all [its] hopes and expectations.” He further appealed to the German national consciousness:

- (2) We were born as members of the German nation and it is in association with it that our lives can attain their highest perfection. Perhaps it is not the most beautiful country in the world; it is not the land of the blue skies that smile upon Italy; it is not the land of sun, but a land of widespread fogs and clouds. But it is our country, ours in speech and culture, a land which we hold in spiritual possession, the land of our fathers and of our children.
(Stresemann 1918/1930: 95)

Although Stresemann did not expressly articulate the word *Heimat* in this speech, a narrative resembling the symbolic meaning of the *Heimat* is recognisable: a melancholic portrayal of the native land as one that is not perfect but is cosy and familiar, and which unites people not by blood but by language, culture, and

memories. Stresemann referred to both the past and the future (“the land of our fathers and our children”), thereby highlighting the time-transcendent nature of the *Heimat*. In this sense, the *Heimat* demonstrates one of the crucial strengths of a symbol: because of their rootedness in “the durable constellations of life, feeling, and the universe,” symbols never “die” in the way that metaphors do; they only transform as they are re-interpreted in different contexts of human experiences (Ricœur 1976: 64).

Significantly, the *Heimat* transcended not only time but also borders. Following the defeat in WWI and consequent territorial losses, German political leaders faced the challenge of unifying the nation when approximately 24 million Germans were left stranded beyond the territorial borders imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Stresemann (1927) argued that it would be superficial and foolish to maintain that “the intellectual, spiritual, and emotional faculties of a nation were bounded by geographic, linguistic, and ethnic barriers.” Felicity Rash’s study in this volume discusses the role of the metaphors of cultivation and flowing in justifying German colonial ambitions between the late nineteenth century and WWI. In the context of post-WWI Germany’s new reality, when the concern of connecting the German people across the new territorial boundaries prevailed over colonial ambitions, the symbol of the *Heimat* acquired the utmost importance.

Much as in the process of Germany’s unification in the second half of the nineteenth century, the “islands of Germandom” (as lands inhabited by Germans have been commonly referred to) required spiritual, cultural, economic, and political reconnection – except this time, these “islands” found themselves in the territories of other states (Laak 2005: 117). In 1925, when Germans who were living abroad gathered in Berlin for their first annual meeting, Stresemann proclaimed the following in his opening speech:

- (3) Today you are here together in a convention of the Reich’s Germans who have lived abroad, who have spent part of their lives under the foreign sun and as such manifest a connection between the German nationals, which is rooted in the *Heimat* and yet extends to the world; it is a connection without which we Germans would have never managed to survive. ... This abundance of events is primarily a sign of a deeply entrenched loyalty to the German *Heimat* and to Germandom. It is precisely during this time, when we do not live in the sunshine of our international standing, but rather in the darkness and the night, that we can see how all the Germans in the world find their way back to the *Heimat*.

(Stresemann 1925a: 270; my translation, emphasis added)

In this speech, Stresemann referred to the *Heimat* as the gravitational core for Germans abroad, whose loyalty to Germany was “deeply entrenched.” At a time

when millions of German people were scattered around the world, the *Heimat* symbolized collective national memory and as such was their common ground. A few months later, Stresemann once again highlighted the significance of the *Heimat* as a unifying national core:

- (4) The spirit of the people is indestructible. ... They must have a centre. They must know that their *Heimat* is somewhere, and know that this *Heimat* is a respected nation. You must find the way back to it and must cherish the thought that the great idea of the German cultural community exists despite international borders.

(Stresemann 1925b: 473–474; my translation, emphasis added)

Similarly, in 1926, the German historian Karl Alexander von Müller and Professor Georg Kerschensteiner (1926: 87) described the role of the *Heimat* symbol in the nation-building process and presented it as the *geistlich* ‘spiritual’ centre and the source of nationhood:

- (5) The *Heimat* like nature becomes sacred to us through the appreciation of the people, the language, the songs, the legends, the habits, the customs, the practices, the buildings, the rocks, the plants, the mountains, the rivers and the forests. If we cultivate first and foremost the spiritual side of the *Heimat* in our nation-building, we will have access to people’s souls for as long as they preserve their sense of belonging to the *Heimat*.

(my translation, emphasis added)

Interestingly, in his memoirs published in 1951, Müller, who had spent a part of his life in the United Kingdom, reflected on his own experience as a German emigrant. He said that England “remained a second spiritual home” as he “devoted a good part of [his] scientific and academic life work to Anglo-Saxon things.” However, “[a]t the same time [he] *mentally* fought in both wars against England,” because “no political enmity managed to overcome the feeling of deep connection” with Germany (Müller 1951: 386; my translation, emphasis added). Müller’s reflection portrays a twofold nature of the *Heimat* symbol. On the one hand, it represents an eternal connection to the national core that is stimulated by the collective memory of German nationhood. On the other hand, it concerns the nostalgia for childhood and the appreciation of what constitutes home to each particular individual – a local place, wherever that may be.

The so-called German Foreign Calendars (*Deutsche Auslandskalender*), which the League of Germans Abroad (*Bund der Auslandsdeutschen*) published annually in the 1920s, were illustrative of this appreciation. For example, the 1928 edition of the calendar featured photographs of various states around the world in which German emigrants resided. These photographs, along with short descriptions, accompanied each day of the year (see Appendix 1: Figures 1–5). Although

they were taken in hundreds of different locations far away from Germany and from one another, their depictions were similar: the images showed nature and landscapes, villages and towns that represented the diversity and singularity of various places on earth. At the same time, the feelings of home, familiarity, and nostalgia that they evoked connected them all. As such, the photographs in the calendar provided an ideal visual representation of the *Heimat* as a symbol, which alluded to both the particularity of a home and the commonality of a homeland. The *Heimat* symbol's embeddedness in the individual contexts (or, in Ricœur's words, "constellations of life") in which social actors perceive, interpret, and conceptualize it distinguishes it from the metaphor of the Russian Motherland, which is discussed in Section 4.

4. The Motherland metaphor: Consolidating the vertical state authority

In Russia, notions of both the nation and the empire appeared in political discourse simultaneously during the second decade of the eighteenth century (Miller 2012: 2, 7–49). Early ideas of Russian nationalism in the nineteenth century were based on the nation's fidelity to the tsar and to the Russian imperial tradition (Laruelle 2009: 14). In 1832, Sergei Uvarov introduced the triad of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality (*narodnost'*) to gain support for the regime of Tsar Nicholas I. Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the advisor to three Russian tsars, argued that a parliamentary system was "the greatest falsehood of our time" (Pobedonostsev 1808; Tsygankov 2014: 14). Thus, as soon as nationalist ideas emerged in Russian political discourse, they were closely connected with autocracy and loyalty to the dynasty and the empire.

The nationalist thoughts proclaimed by the Slavophiles – and later by the Pan-Slavists and Neo-Slavophiles – were influenced by the German tradition of Romanticism and romantic nationalism. Johann Gottfried Herder's theory of the nation's spirit (*narodnyi dukh* in the Russian version), his praise for Slavs as the people destined to lead other nations, and his admiration of their distinctive spirit were notably integral to the Pan-Slavist movement. Hans Kohn (1960: x) has asserted:

- (6) The picture which Herder drew of Slav life and character, a picture conditioned by his philosophical convictions rather than by history and reality, deeply influenced Russian ... thinking about themselves and their position in the world.

Although Russian Pan-Slavists adopted the ideas of German Romanticism – thus leading to nationalist thought in Germany and Russia sharing certain fundamental

similarities – European conceptualizations of romantic nationalism were alien to a drastically different Russian society, especially among the peasantry. As a result, the Pan-Slavist sentiment detached from the majority of people, and their ideology became “a tiny and floating superstructure” without any legitimate roots in Russian reality (Kohn 1960: 133). The legitimacy of the tsarist empire relied on Russia’s status as a great imperial power, but ordinary Russians did not associate themselves with the ideas of nationality that political and intellectual elites were endorsing at the time.

Russian political elites and the aristocracy embraced the officially-promoted national identity, which positioned Russianness in the *rossiiskii* sense as imperial, Europeanized, and secular. The *russkii* Russianness – an ethnic and Orthodox national consciousness of the peasants – was largely denied by the empire (Hosking 2005: 197).¹ If there were any references to the existing Russian ethnic myths, symbols, and memories, they were made selectively. Geoffrey Hosking (2005: 209) has noted that this selectivity and conceptual inconsistency, which were characteristic of both the Tsarist and the Soviet Russian states, ultimately jeopardized the Russian nation’s support for the empire. Moreover, he has indicated that this was precisely “why the empire collapsed twice in the twentieth century, and why a proper Russian nation-state still does not exist.”

Thus, a genuine link between the empire and the nation was either extremely weak or entirely non-existent. This consequently exacerbated differences in the already fragmented nation. There was a yawning gap between the peasantry, which constituted the majority of the population, and a handful of aristocrats, who ruled the country and possessed most of its wealth. In 1861, Grand Duke Nicholas Alexandrovich travelled through the Russian provinces of Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, and Moscow, where he met local people and observed their everyday lives. He shared his impressions in a letter to his mother:

- (7) You inevitably begin pondering and think to yourself: Great and rich you are, *Mother Russia*. You scatter your grain around half the world. But *holy Rus’* is not rich. Your peasant is poor, trade goes badly, there is no money, there is stagnation, and you ask yourself why is this? And from the start you can’t understand why, and it is painful for the Russian heart.

(Alexandrovich 1861/2000: 420; emphasis added)

As this passage reveals, Nicholas Alexandrovich distinguished between Mother Russia and the Holy Rus’. From his perspective, Mother Russia encompassed the

1. The term *rossiiskii* refers to the relationship with the Russian state, while *russkii* is associated with Russian ethnicity.

idea of a wealthy and powerful state. Such a state, however, was the reality of only Russian aristocrats. Meanwhile, in Nicholas Alexandrovich's letter, the Holy Rus' – a religious concept closely connected with orthodoxy – referred to the everyday Russia of peasant people: impoverished, hopeless, and miserable.

Detachment between the peasantry and the aristocracy became an especially acute problem during the reign of the Russian Empire's last tsar, Nicholas II, as he struggled to build a connection with the nation and gain its support. Widespread grievances and disappointment in the imperial government eventually prompted the 1905 Russian Revolution. The revolution forced the tsar to make a series of concessions, including the establishment of a parliament (Duma). Nevertheless, the tsar retained the power of absolute veto over the Duma's decisions, as well as the right to dissolve parliament altogether. Even though Nicholas II's establishment of the Duma formally limited his own absolute power, he effectively remained the ultimate ruler of the country. In a speech in 1909, Nicholas II expressed "the hope that Russia [would] develop in the unity of the Tsar with the people, and in the close bond of the entire population of [the] native land with [the] Sovereign" (Nicholas II 1909/2000: 392).

As the Russian imperial rulers were unwilling to compromise their unlimited authority, the peasant nation remained disengaged. Much as in the German case, a common denominator was necessary to unify the local and the national – namely, peasants and aristocrats – under the idea of a state. In Germany, the common denominator of the *Heimat* symbol was special in its ability to present unique, individual meanings. By contrast, in Russia, the unifying aspect of the state was conceptualized through a metaphor that imparted the same meaning to every Russian regardless of whether he or she was a peasant or an aristocrat, a believer or a non-believer, poor or rich. This was the metaphor of motherhood, which depicted the Russian imperial state as Mother Russia or the Motherland (*Matushka-Rus'*, *Mat'-Rossiya*, *Rodina-mat'*).

Metaphors, like symbols, facilitate a connection between the real and familiar on the one hand and the abstract and distant on the other. As such, metaphors are cognitive tools for conceptualizing complex and abstract phenomena, such as nationhood (Šarić 2015: 49–50). Similarly to symbols, they enable an individual to relate to the idea of a state. However, unlike that of a symbol, the interpretation of a metaphor is restricted. Once the hearer of the metaphor realizes the absurdity of the relation between the literal meanings of the predicate and the subject, he or she searches for a shared characteristic between them, which can be derived from either their "direct resemblance" or a "common attitude taken to them both" (Ricœur 2003: 94).

Thus, by means of a "bizarre form of predication," a metaphor triggers an image that captures new and surprising combinations of the predicate and the subject. Thereby it presents a "semantic innovation" and "vivifies a constituted

language” (Ricœur 1976: 52, 59–61, 69; Ricœur 2003: 358). In the metaphor of the Motherland, the characteristics of the predicate “mother” are ascribed to the subject “land” (state) in order to stimulate certain sentiments. The most significant of these sentiments are belonging and attachment as well as respect and devotion, which in turn cultivate feelings of national unity, loyalty to the state, and patriotism. As Šarić also notes in her chapter in this volume, nation-building projects commonly employ metaphors to stir people’s emotions.

Paternal metaphors have been prominent in Russia’s political discourse too. Since the seventeenth century, the tsars had been referred to as “little father” (*Batiushka*). Peter the Great was called “Father of the Fatherland” (*Otets Otechestva*), and Stalin was the father of the peoples, wise father and beloved father (Rancour-Lafarriere 1995: 136). The father metaphor denotes strictness, discipline, authority, and the possession of ultimate decision-making power (for a discussion of the “strict father” metaphor and its implications to moral system, see Lakoff 2002: 65–107). Therefore, it is a suitable metaphor to describe the head of an empire or an authoritarian state. The maternal metaphor, on the other hand, relates to the state rather than to a ruler. This is apparent from a Russian proverb, which states: “There are many fathers, but only one mother” (*Otcov mnogo, a mat’ odna*).

Daniel Rancour-Lafarriere (1995: 138) has described Russian society as “intensely matrifocal while at the same time being patriarchal to varying degrees at various time periods.” This suggests a stronger emphasis in Russia on the mother-child relationship than on the father-child or father-mother relationships. The special mother-child relationship is evident in the experiences of the foremost political figures of the Russian Empire. The closest relationship of Tsar Nicholas II was with his mother, Empress Maria Feodorovna, who was the first empress in nineteenth-century Russia to become responsible for her son’s education. Richard Wortman (2000: 318) has characterized her relationship with Nicholas II as “emotional nurturing”: “Maria Feodorovna was both his repository of trust and model for courteous behaviour.” The father of Nicholas II, tsar Alexander III, similarly described the roles of his own parents in his life:

- (8) If there is something kind, good, and honourable in me, I owe it all to my dear nice Mama. ... No matter how many very different and sincere conversations there were, Mama always listened calmly and always found something to answer, to calm, to scold, to approve. ... We loved Papa a great deal, but because of the nature of his obligations and the crushing work, he could not occupy himself with us like nice, dear Mama.

(Alexander III 1884/2000: 179)

Tsar Alexander III thus portrayed the father as often absent from the lives of the children, while the mother was the source of support, comfort, and authority. In peasant

families, the role division between the mother and the father was similar. In late imperial Russia, peasant men increasingly departed from villages to find industrial work, leaving women to take care of the household, agricultural work, and family (Bisha et al. 2002: 9). As such, a mother became ... the guardian, nurturer, and carer of the children – essentially, the unifying core of the family.

The Motherland metaphor, which signalled authority and respect among the Russian people, was an ideal means for imperial Russia to legitimize political authoritarianism. The state, which was analogized to a mother, was intended as the source of national unity; without the central figure of a mother, the family would fall apart. As a result, the loyalty of the people to the state was largely dependent on the existence of a strong superior authority, and it would manifest itself in a readiness to make sacrifices for it. Indeed, in August 1914, following the German and Austrian declaration of war against Russia, Tsar Nicholas II addressed the nation, describing loyalty to the Motherland as a “unanimous impulse of love and readiness for any sacrifice, even of life itself” and a source of “strength and the ability to look calmly and confidently towards the future” (Nicholas II 1914/1927: 31).

The metaphor of the Russian Motherland implies sacrifice and suffering. Rancour-Laferriere (1995: 145) has argued that it is extremely important for the Russian mother to suffer. Furthermore, her suffering is so great that she needs to be saved by her children – that is, by the Russian people. He has additionally suggested the term “matriot” to describe Russians: “Their devotion to Mother Russia is so intense that the underlying maternal fantasy basis of patriotism comes to the surface as maternal imagery, while paternal imagery fades away.” The Russian state was the embodiment of collective suffering for matriots, as their being was inseparable from hers, and they thus had to suffer together with their maternal icon (Rancour-Laferriere 1995: 225). For instance, during WWI, General Lavr Kornilov appealed to the Russian people’s loyalty to the Motherland and reminded them of their obligation to sacrifice:

- (9) I do not doubt for a moment that every loyal son of Russia, whether forming part of my glorious Army, or working for the might of that Army in the interior of the country, or pursuing his own peaceful labor, is imbued with this sentiment, and thinks alike on the subject. A true son of Russia remains at his place to the end and is always ready to make for his country the greatest of all sacrifices, which is his life. (Kornilov 1917/1927: 522)

World War I exhausted the country. By 1917, Russia’s finances were disorganized, and its railways were demolished. Moreover, there was a lack of raw materials and fuel, and a shortage of bread at the warfront and at home. The army was falling apart, and certain places were witnessing land seizures and destruction of livestock. Such chaos and decline aggravated the nation’s deeply rooted

grievances, prompting discontent and unrest (Golder 1927: 351). This all culminated in the 1917 February Revolution against the tsar and aristocratic landowners. The State Council sent a telegram to the tsar to inform him of the situation on the ground:

- (10) Owing to the complete collapse of transportation and the consequent inability to bring in the necessary materials, factories and mills have shut down. This forced unemployment, combined with the acute food crisis, brought on by the said breakdown of the transport, has driven the popular masses into despair. This situation, has been accentuated by the feeling of detestation and grave suspicion of the authorities which has sunk deeply into the hearts of the people. (State Council 1917/1927: 279)

Considering the circumstances, Army General Mikhail Vasiliyevich Alexeev advised the tsar to abdicate the throne. Shortly before the abdication of Nicholas II, General Alexeev delivered a speech at the Congress of Officers of the Army and Navy in which he warned that “Russia [was] perishing; she [was] on the brink of the abyss; another push or two, and she will go over completely” (Alexeev 1917/1927: 406). This statement portrayed Mother Russia as severely ill and taking her final breaths. A few months later, the provisional government also declared that a “contagious disease which has undermined the people’s constitution has come to the surface and has ended in an acute crisis” (Provisional government 1917/1927: 467).

The motif of a dying mother is common in Russian folklore. Elizabeth Jones Hemenway (1997: 106–107, 115), who has assessed the role of gender and the metaphor of Mother Russia in Russian fairy tales in the years leading up to the 1917 revolution, has suggested that a sick and suffering Motherland was the pivotal image that aimed to stimulate unity and brotherhood during the revolt. According to Hemenway, the metaphorical narrative of an ill Mother Russia whose sons were struggling among themselves was representative of the evils of the tsarist regime, the weakness and ineffectiveness of the rulers, the difficulties of the peasants in their relationship with the government and, ultimately, the distress of the Russian nation (Hemenway 1997: 107). In November 1917, the Committee of the First Army appealed to the provisional government and the nation to unite against the German enemy:

- (11) Gather your last forces and hold off the treacherous enemy, deprive him of the possibility of striking us a final blow while we are gathering in strength. Let history be our judge, let all the world know that we are loyal defenders of our suffering mother country and revolution, and if we are fated to die, let the curse not be on those who at the fatal moment called for help, but on those who refused to give it. (First Army Committee 1917/1927: 402)

It is evident in this proclamation that the Mother Russia metaphor served as the axle of the Russian nation. Thus, as with the relation between a Russian mother and her children, the Russian nation's link to the Motherland was predominantly vertical. Without the central figure of a mother, the family (nation) would fall apart. Even though Hemenway has not expressly mentioned the vertical connection, her arguments imply its fundamental importance. She has noted the problem of maintaining national unity when the state weakened: "As Mother Russia falls ill and the nation descends into crisis, her sons struggle among themselves, expressing different visions of where their family (i.e., Russia) should go" (Hemenway 1997: 106). This was precisely the case for Russia in 1917. General Alexeev (1917/1927: 406) mentioned this issue in his speech at the Congress of Officers of the Army and Navy in May 1917:

- (12) The former tradition of devotion to the country has changed to a desire for peace and rest. ... If you look toward the interior you ask, where is that strong power which could compel each citizen to do his duty by his country? ... For the time being, it does not exist. Where, gentlemen, is patriotism? Where is love of country? On our banners is inscribed the big word "fraternity," but it is not inscribed on hearts and minds.

To revive the nation's spirit and forge this "fraternity," political and military leaders utilized the metaphor of Mother Russia and the obligation of the "sons" to sacrifice their lives for her. The Duma resolution issued in August 1917 called for unification "for one purpose – to save the country," and declared that people should be "united in the one thought of saving Russia at all costs" (Duma 1917/1927: 478). Similarly, one of the key political figures of the revolution Alexander Kerenski declared:

- (13) The task of saving the country and the republic [demanded] that ... all citizens work in a spirit of self-sacrifice, doing whatever is necessary to carry on the war, put the army in a fighting condition, and reconstruct the country economically. (Kerenski 1914/1927: 478)

All in all, two key aspects of the Motherland metaphor were apparent in the political discourse of late imperial Russia. First, the incongruence between the literal meanings of "mother" and "land" ("the semantic dissonance," in Ricœur's terms) was resolved by the assimilation of these two seemingly incompatible ideas through their resemblance: both the mother and the Russian state were understood as central figures who hold the family (nation) together. The Motherland metaphor thus emphasized the vertical connection between the state and the nation. Mother Russia was the Russian nation's rallying core, without which the unity of the nation would be compromised. Second, portrayal of the state as the

ailing and frail mother implied the nation's obligation to protect it and make sacrifices for it. The Russian people, envisioned as the children, were encouraged to fight in desperate circumstances for the singular purpose of saving the Motherland *state*, rather than for the *nation's* future.

5. Conclusion

Benedict Anderson (2002: 7) has described a nation as “a deep, horizontal comradeship” – a fraternity – which makes it possible for millions of people to act as one imagined community. This community, however, is not solely about the horizontal links among its members; the way in which it relates to the state is equally important. The relationship between the state and the nation becomes particularly relevant in moments of national crisis. The disastrous experience of WWI fractured the link between the devastated nations and the newly redefined states in both Germany and Russia. Political and military leaders employed the *Heimat* symbol and the Motherland metaphor to re-construct this link and revive the national spirit. In accordance with the conceptual history theory, these two fundamental conceptualizations (*Grundbegriffe*) of the state in Germany and Russia proved to have a remarkable mobilizing force and would become prevalent in political discourse during critical moments of history (Krzyżanowski 2016: 313).

The *Heimat* and the Motherland denote different types of relations between the state and the nation. The spatial symbol of the *Heimat* was associated with nature, landscape, diverse local communities, villages, and hometowns, as well as with fond memories of childhood and nostalgia for home. The familial metaphor of the Motherland emphasized the superior, nurturing, and protective functions of the state and implied the nation's obligation to make sacrifices for it, thereby legitimizing the state's indivisible vertical authority. Thus, even though the states engendered loyalty from their citizens in both cases, this loyalty in Russia was dependent on the existence of a strong authoritarian government. By contrast, in the German case, such loyalty was rooted in a feeling of togetherness that was reinforced through individual memories of home and the collective memory of the homeland – both of which the *Heimat* symbolized.

The analysis in this chapter has highlighted the different characteristics of metaphors and symbols and their consequently separate roles in political discourse on the state and nationhood. The symbolic structure of the German *Heimat* involved a “non-semantic element” and was therefore constantly processed through subjective individual intellectualization. Thus, the symbolic conceptualization of the state was mainly a bottom up process whereby multiple experiences, interpretations, and memories of home merged into a symbol of the homeland state as the union of the people.

The metaphorical structure of the Russian Motherland was much more rigid in this sense, as its interpretation was restricted and reduced to a harmonious synthesis of the subject and the predicate. The metaphorical conceptualization of the state originated primarily at the top and was filtered downwards in an attempt to connect the government with society via a vertical link that was legitimized by the analogy of a protective, authoritative, and hierarchical mother-child relation.

These findings suggest that when political leaders conceptualize a state through a metaphor, they reduce the plurality of possible interpretations, which allows them to maintain control of the narrative that describes the state and nationhood. In contrast, understanding a state as a symbol enables members of society to generate a multitude of individual interpretations that are all connected by a feeling of togetherness and belonging to one nation that legitimizes the existence of the state. Such propositions might be valuable for studying the strategic use of symbols and metaphors in political, media, and other discourses.

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Appendix 1. German Foreign Calendar (1928)

Randomly selected images from the German Foreign Calendar (*Deutscher Auslandskalender*) of 1928.

Source: League of Germans Abroad (*Bund der Auslandsdeutschen*). PA AA, R60250.



Figure 1. German Foreign Calendar, 1928



Figure 2. Latvian countryside



Figure 3. Geirangerfjord, Norway



Figure 4. Innsbruck, Austria




Figure 5. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

CHAPTER 8

“The state of our Union is strong.” Metaphors of the nation in State of the Union addresses

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This chapter discusses the metaphors of the nation used by the last four US presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump) in their annual State of the Union addresses. It is argued that the two main metaphors of the nation used by the presidents, A NATION IS A BUILDING and A NATION IS A PERSON, are key discursive elements which define the essential ideological characteristics of the nation and constitute a hegemonic concept of national identity. The chapter explains elements of continuity and variation in these metaphorical images in the presidential addresses in terms of the ritual nature of the address and the genre theory of the “New Rhetorics.”

Keywords: Critical Metaphor Analysis, genre, ideology, metaphor, nation, nationalism, personification, New Rhetorics, State of the Union

1. Introduction

In his first State of the Union address, delivered on 17 February 1993, President Bill Clinton gave his assessment of the role of the USA and of the challenges he was about to face as a newly-elected president. He started his speech by comparing nations to human beings:

- (1) Like individuals, nations must ultimately decide how they wish to conduct themselves, how they wish to be thought of by those with whom they live, and later, how they wish to be judged by history. Like every individual man and woman, nations must decide whether they are prepared to rise to the occasions history presents them. (Clinton 1993)

In this simile, Clinton maps the activities of nations as if they were rational, sentient beings (*like individuals*) who “decide” what to do, take up the challenges presented to them and are even preoccupied with their reputations among other

nations and in history. The idea that a nation behaves like a human being has perhaps rarely been so explicit in American political discourse as it was in Clinton's simile, but is by no means uncommon or unique in the State of the Union addresses: the discourse of the nation proposed by US presidents in their most important annual speech is structured mainly through another figure of speech, namely metaphor, and metaphors of the nation are central for presidents in defining the role of the USA in history, its values, economy and domestic and foreign policy. Clinton himself, who must have been aware of the discursive implications of comparing a nation to a person, looks only a few words after the simile at the development of the USA in terms of the well-known journey metaphor:

- (2) *Our Nation needs a new direction.* Tonight I present to you a comprehensive plan to set our Nation on that new course. I believe we will find our new direction in the basic old values that brought us here over the last two centuries: a commitment to opportunity, to individual responsibility, to community, to work, to family, and to faith.¹ (Clinton 1993)

This kind of imagery helps to strengthen the effectiveness of the discourse of the nation elaborated in American politics at its highest institutional and societal level. Indeed, nationalism is based on a set of discursive practices (Wodak et al. 2009) which need to be built and shared collectively in order to be credible and relevant within a national community. Such practices involve a constant flagging of national identity, according to certain symbolic systems, both verbal and non-verbal, in which the national community is ritually reminded of its own identity, at both a rational and, crucially for nationalism, an emotional level.

Emotional loyalty to a nation depends on shared beliefs and representations about the essence of the nation, which evolve around a certain dialectic of self-identification within that community and of distance and differentiation between that community and the "others" outside it. Nations are "communities" that are "imagined," to use Anderson's words, because "the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 1991: 7) and nations need their own shared – and *emotionally* powerful – symbolic rituals to consolidate this comradeship both as part of the daily practice of nationalism, or "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995), and on important formal occasions. Nowhere is this more true than in the USA itself which is the "imagined community par excellence" (Campbell 1998: 91) as it depends on the modes of interpretation and representation of itself in order to make its identity concrete. The ontological being of a nation can only be seen in the many practices signifying its existence. America in particular "is

1. Emphasis in quotations from presidential speeches are always my own.

peculiarly dependent on representational practices for its being" (Campbell 1998: 91), and it is these sets of "representational practices," both verbal and non-verbal, from the more "banal" (Billig 1995) to the more serious and "institutional," which delineate the contours of the notions of the nation and the national. As a matter of fact, according to Gellner (2006: 55), "Durkheim taught that in religious worship society adores its own camouflaged image. In a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage." This worship of nations, their existence and durability, as argued by Billig (1995: 18), is communicated to society by complex patterns of discourse which are part of wider historical process, and metaphors are a very important component of such patterns.

This chapter focuses on the metaphors of the nation used in the annual State of the Union (hereafter SOTU) address delivered by the last four American presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump. I analyse a number of interrelated questions about the metaphorical images of the nation developed in the addresses. What kinds of metaphors are used to characterize the nation in such a rite of passage in American political life? If the SOTU address is a ritual act and, therefore, a specific rhetorical genre in US politics, can we expect similarities between metaphors used in addresses by different presidents? What role do metaphors, and specifically metaphors of the nation, in the SOTU addresses play in shaping the idea of the nation? In order to answer these questions, Section 2 discusses the role of the SOTU address in the context of American politics, both in strictly institutional terms and in its role as a favourite instrument of the president's rhetoric. Being a rhetorical genre, the SOTU address is also assessed on the basis of the definitions of genre given by "New Rhetorics." In the second part of Section 2, I analyse the role of metaphor as outlined by those discourse analysts and metaphor scholars who consider metaphor an essential element of political discourse. Section 3 is dedicated to the analysis of the metaphorical representation of the nation in the SOTU addresses delivered by Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump. This analysis will reveal, as discussed in Section 4, a very important aspect of presidential rhetoric: the metaphors used in the SOTU addresses define the framework of the nationalist discourse in the USA beyond party affiliations and personal differences, and are instrumental in creating an ideologically hegemonic view of the nation.

2. Theoretical background

This section will discuss the background of the SOTU addresses according to two theoretical contexts: the addresses will first be located in the context of genre, as the presidents' use of certain rhetorical strategies should necessarily be assessed

in terms of their generic collocation. This will be followed by a discussion of the use of metaphors in politics, which is necessary in order to assess the role of metaphors of the nation in the SOTU addresses.

2.1 The SOTU address and genre

The SOTU address is a message which has been delivered by the President of the USA to the whole nation every year since 1790. Its roots are in the American Constitution itself, which defines its purpose as part of the president's mandate:

- (3) He [the president] shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. (U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section III)

The nature of the SOTU address has changed over the years. In the past, it was often a written message sent by the president to Congress, whilst in modern times it has been delivered in person to the joint sessions of Congress and broadcast to the whole country (Teten 2003). In the SOTU address, the president appears in a multiplicity of constitutional roles: chief of state, chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief and chief legislator, and the address is the only formal occasion on which the president can display his full prerogatives to the nation and the whole world (Rossiter 1956). Hence, given the role and the powers of the President of the USA at home and abroad, the SOTU address is a rhetorical act of the primary importance within public discourse as it fulfils ceremonial functions but also, crucially, “performs symbolic functions for the presidency as an institution” (Campbell & Jamieson 1990: 68).

The SOTU address has always been considered a central text in American political discourse. As early as 1935, historian Charles A. Beard noted: “Whatever may be its purport, the message is the one great public document of the United States which is widely read and discussed” (Beard 1935: 185). To this day, the speech is still the means by which the highest institutional voice of US politics gives his/her vision, in a language which is scrutinized in detail by the political and media community. However, the increasing mediatization of the SOTU address has led to a shift in its function, a function whose nature and effects are still open to debate: on the one hand, it is certainly true that, more than in the past, recent SOTU addresses are directed to the general public more than to institutions and

their actors, and it has indeed been claimed that the SOTU address has nowadays become more an instrument of persuasion than a means of information (Bayley & Bevitori 2015: 62). Writing in 1995, Cohen observed that the address statistically increases the public's interest in the issues discussed by the president, and he suggests that presidential rhetoric restructures the public's agenda (Cohen 1995, 2014). According to Cohen, this is especially evident in foreign policy, the area which presidents have focused upon more frequently in recent years in the SOTU address, and which seems to have most influence on public opinion in the context of presidential discourse (Cohen 1995: 100–101). Foreign policy is also the topic in which it is expected that the identity of the nation projected by the president's rhetoric would emerge very clearly, especially because national identity is developed as different from (and often in opposition to) that of other nations. On the other hand, however, the impact of the SOTU address in terms of persuasion among the US electorate at large remains unclear, and the extent to which a SOTU address can be said to have achieved its aims is still very difficult to assess (Edwards 1996: 208).

The focus of the SOTU address is on the president's policies and actions, past, present and future. According to Campbell and Jamieson (1990), the SOTU address is characterized by three main aspects: public meditations on values, assessments of information and issues, and policy recommendations. The addresses crucially "also articulate the values underlying assessment" (Campbell & Jamieson 1990: 53): presidents create and celebrate their idea of national identity, tie together the past, the present and the future, and sustain the institution of the presidency. What are generally lacking in the address are details about policies, as presidents prefer to focus on issues on which the differences between liberals and conservatives are most evident (Cohen 1995: 97). The address is also a "public meditation" on the underlying values of the presidency and its place in history, and public meditations generally "exemplify the symbolic processes by which a group of individuals comes to see itself as an entity – a group, a community, a nation – with an identity that unifies its members and distinguishes them as a group" (Campbell & Jamieson 1990: 54–55). In so doing, the president outlines the nation's most important ethical and moral principles, and he/she aims at informing citizens and Congress in their respective roles within the nation: we hear the president's voice, but also, metonymically, the voice of the nation, as the president constructs himself or herself as speaking on behalf of the nation and its values.

By encapsulating the past, the present and the future, the SOTU address expresses the president's own vision of the USA and its projected role in history. While in each address the president assesses specific events and circumstances regarding his or her mandate, these events are contextualized in the light of certain values which presidents assume to be fixed and stable through time and are

fundamental to the existence of the nation. In this sense, the address is the textual location of what Foucault calls “discursive formations” (Foucault 1972: 48), that is, dominant interpretations of social and political reality, binding the whole nation to the president’s interpretation of the nation itself and of its place in the world, and excluding alternative interpretations.

The stability of the nation’s founding values is made explicit through the ritual nature of the address itself, which constitutes a well-defined genre, and by the use of certain rhetorical devices, such as metaphors, which are the discursive foundations of the president’s ideology. The importance of the SOTU address as a genre and the recurrence of certain metaphors in the addresses can be explained by the notion of genre developed by Carolyn Miller and the “New Rhetorics.” The SOTU address is part of a clearly identifiable genre, that of political speeches sanctioned by law and with a recognizable function within society. As argued by Miller (1994: 70), genres have specific cultural functions, in that they are repeated acts within certain social contexts, and make the relationship between individual acts (or texts) and “systems of values and signification” visible. Indeed, the SOTU addresses are events which are performed ritually by their speakers, and there are available institutional and rhetorical structures which each president uses when addressing the “rhetorical community” of the nation.

The SOTU addresses belong to a rhetorical genre, and rhetorical genres have certain conventional forms which are repeated over time. A rhetorical genre is a structure of power which can be reproduced in all its generic aspects, including the role of the speaker and the addressee as well as its topical structures. Indeed, ritual speeches “have conventional forms because they arise in situations with similar structures and elements and because rhetors respond in similar ways, having learned from precedent what is appropriate and what effects their actions are likely to have on other people” (Miller 1984: 152). Miller’s account of “rhetorical situations” is based on the familiarity through repetition of certain events, as similarities allow the new event to be recognized as familiar. The crucial point of these situational contexts is that a typification of events is created, is shared through communication and resides in language, as “successful communication would require that the participants share common types; this is possible insofar as types are socially created (or biologically innate)” (Miller 1984: 157). The similarity of situations in which speakers find themselves (in the case of the SOTU address, an annual speech required by the Constitution, delivered to both Houses and broadcast to the whole nation in which presidents talk about the nation’s current affairs and future plans) prompts the reproduction of conventional forms, which provide speakers with certain formal constraints. Recurring situations naturally attract or even generate discourse of a particular type (Miller 1984: 162), as single texts draw

upon a set of already available semantic, syntactic and pragmatic resources, reproducing and sharing them with the community addressed by the texts' authors.

If genre is interpreted as a fusion of form and substance, that is, a "generic fusion... of substantive, stylistic, and situational elements" (Miller 1984: 159) upon which meaning is based, the recurrence of certain lower-level linguistic forms in texts belonging to the same genre, such as metaphors, can be expected to play an organizing role in the definition of the genre itself. In her discussion of the hierarchical combination of form and substance, Miller argues that "the semantic values of a string of words and their syntactic relationship in a sentence acquire meaning (pragmatic value as action) when together they serve as substance for the higher level form of the speech act" (Miller 1984: 159). It is metaphor itself, along with genre and narrative, which is identified by Miller as a key element available to keep a community together, as it is "a dimension of language [which] provides us a wealth of ways to create similarity out of difference, to wheedle, as it were, identification out of division" (Miller 1994: 74).

Miller's argument on genre can find validity in the ritual formula "The state of our Union is strong", which is used, with little or no variation, at the end or at the beginning of 20 out of the 25 SOTU addresses analysed in this chapter²:

- (4) What is the state of our Union? It is growing stronger, but it must be stronger still. With your help and God's help, it will be. (Clinton 1994)
- (5) Ladies and gentlemen, the state of our Union is strong. (Clinton 1998)
- (6) My fellow Americans, I stand before you tonight to report that the state of our Union is strong. (Clinton 1999)
- (7) As we gather tonight, our Nation is at war; our economy is in recession; and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet, the state of our Union has never been stronger. (Bush 2002)
- (8) In their efforts, their enterprise, and their character, the American people are showing that the state of our Union is confident and strong. (Bush 2004)
- (9) So together, we have cleared away the rubble of crisis, and we can say with renewed confidence that the state of our Union is stronger. (Obama 2013)
- (10) And that's why I stand here as confident as I have ever been that the state of our Union is strong. (Obama 2016)

2. The only five addresses where the formula does not occur are Clinton's 1995 address and the four inaugural addresses by Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump. As will be argued below, these "Inaugural addresses" are not proper SOTU addresses, and the absence of the formula is therefore not surprising.

This formula represents an element of continuity between different addresses by different presidents and employs the same metaphor. The “strength” of the Union, a metaphor in which the nation is seen as a human being, evokes a certain vision of the nation: strength is a human attribute denoting physical ability or power, and its repetition by different presidents in itself constitutes an important part of the ritual nature of the SOTU address as it unifies, rhetorically and ideologically, the presidential discourse of all eras.

2.2 Nation and metaphor

The presence of metaphors in American political discourse has been extensively studied by George Lakoff, who considered metaphors mainly in their cognitive dimensions. In his *Moral Politics*, Lakoff interpreted the party-political divide in the USA as a conflict between different versions of basic conceptual metaphors, A NATION (STATE) IS A PERSON, and A NATION (STATE) IS A FAMILY. The core of his argument is the basic metaphorical mapping of A NATION IS A FAMILY, which “allows us to reason about the nation on the basis of what we know about a family” (Lakoff 1996: 154–55; see also Smith 1998: 223–24). The validity of Lakoff’s model of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in political discourse has been questioned on the basis of the small pool of empirical data used by Lakoff (e.g. Musolff 2004). Metaphor is now considered not as a merely cognitive phenomenon, but is explained within a social and ideological view of discourse, as its use and meaning depend on the context in which it is used and on the knowledge of the world and society of those who “receive” it (Goatly 1997: 137).

Charteris-Black (2005) has proposed a method of inquiry into the structure and role of metaphors and their use in language. This method, which he called Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA), is a combination of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In the formulation of CMA, metaphors should be analysed to detect the ideologies underlying language use. CMA does this by employing a three-step methodology: identification, interpretation and explanation of metaphors. Specifically, the explanation of metaphors consists in identifying the ideological motivations behind the choice of certain metaphors, the political functions they fulfil and the political myths they create. In this sense, metaphor is the encapsulation of the rational nature of ideology and its unconscious elements related to myth, and its persuasive force derives from its activating, both consciously and unconsciously, “our intellectual and emotional responses” (Charteris-Black 2005: 30). Not dissimilarly, Musolff (2004, 2010, 2012) has combined the cognitive approach to metaphors with the recognition that metaphor should be localized within the context of the social construction of meaning proposed by CDA. Metaphors used in a political context invite hearers

to access areas of knowledge which may be problematic or difficult to understand, bypassing, for instance, the need to provide data to back up certain claims. Musolff (2012: 303–304) sees this process at work especially in the discourse on immigration: certain conceptual items related to illness are used to characterize the dangers of immigration, and the conceptual items associated with illness form a source domain which by analogy is projected onto the target domain of political actors and actions.

Metaphors can frame political debate by presenting certain arguments within specific structures of knowledge: they can shape the public perception and evaluation of certain issues and can therefore be instrumental in constructing social reality (Walter and Helmig 2008). According to Charteris-Black, along with other rhetorical devices such as lists of three or contrastive pairs, metaphor is an essential factor in lending persuasive force to politicians, especially when it is used in combination with such devices (Charteris-Black 2005: 5). In this respect, metaphor in politics evokes certain frames in terms of emotions, values and beliefs which the audience recognize as familiar. Metaphor is "a central strategy for legitimization in political speeches" (Charteris-Black 2005: 13) because it transfers positive or negative implications of a source domain onto a target domain, giving access to basic social and cultural values and raising certain emotions related to them. For this reason, metaphor is a key resource for social groups in that it is used to legitimize the ideology which is hegemonic in their social existence: metaphor articulates ideology as it makes ideology accessible by using language which appeals to the emotional sphere (Charteris-Black 2005: 21–22). Conversely, delegitimization through metaphor, as shown by Musolff (2010), can induce political action, in the sense that it makes certain actions appear as perfectly moral, as in the case of the persecution of Jews, who were described by Nazi propaganda in terms of animals threatening the "body" of the German nation. Indeed, positive self-representation and negative other-representation often take the form of contrasting metaphorical expressions, for example metaphors of space (proximity vs. distance), which denote different degrees of remoteness from the self and can induce different social and moral evaluations of discourse (Chilton 2004: 57–60). Seen in this perspective, metaphor has a very important ideological function: it can lend persuasive strength to discourse and in turn can construct certain discursive practices at the basis of social realities – including, crucially, social hierarchies.

Metaphor has often been seen as an important linguistic instrument to spread certain assumptions about society and social relations, especially in the service of power (Fairclough 1992: 194–97; 2001: 99–100). Along with synecdoche and metonymy, metaphor has been viewed by Thompson (1990) as an important trope used within ideology to dissimulate social reality, whereby relations of domination are sustained by their being obscured or denied and, in the case of metaphor,

“by representing [social relations], or the individuals and groups embedded in them as endowed with characteristics which they do not literally possess, thereby accentuating certain features at the expense of others and charging them with a positive or negative sense” (Thompson 1990: 63). Metaphor is therefore, in this sense, an instrument in the service of ideology: it can be seen as language use leading to social manipulation in that, by using it, speakers can engage in misleading communication in the context of social representations (Ng and Bradac 1993: 136–42). Ruth Wodak and her colleagues, who developed the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), build on the definition of ideology elaborated by Thompson and on the use of metaphor within it. Wodak and Reisigl (2001) consider the same tropes identified by Thompson, that is, metaphors, synecdoches and metonymies, as key linguistic instruments in constructing an idea of the nation based on sameness and homogeneity. According to Wodak et al. (2009), metaphor is one of the most important instruments used to shape the discursive structures of national identity. In fact, in their analysis of the discriminatory practices of racism, Wodak and Reisigl (2001) argue that the use of certain metaphors is crucial in the topological construction of ingroups and outgroups, i.e. in the referential and predicational self- and other-presentation, which is also at the basis of the sameness implied in the concept of the nation itself. In particular, personifications, that is, metaphors whereby inanimate or abstract entities are given human features, “possess high suggestive force” and “in reference to the mental construct of a nation [they] also imply intra-national sameness and equality” (Wodak et al. 2009: 44). Personification gives more tangible shape in language to “collective subjects” such as races, nations or ethnicities, whose “apparent concreteness and vividness often invites hearers or readers to identify or feel solidarity with the personified entity or against it” (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 58). This is not dissimilar to what Lakoff (1991) himself had argued about the hegemonic implications of the *NATION IS A PERSON* metaphor, which is used to explain how a state acts, but also hides the internal structure of the state and the differences (e.g. in terms of class structure, or ethnic composition) within itself.

Metaphors, and particularly personification, are not the only linguistic means of realizing referential assimilation and promoting sameness in the discourse of the nation. A crucial role in terms of the constructive strategies of the discourse of the nation is the deictic expression “we,” a recurrent element in political discourse which indicates the speaker’s will to communicate widespread consensus. Among the various uses of “we” (Wodak et al. 2009: 45–47), one of its key variations is the so-called inclusive “we”: it includes the speaker and his/her audience, and is a form of “reduction,” in Fairclough’s definition (Fairclough 2001: 106), serving certain ideological aims by stressing the unity of the people and glossing over the ideological or cultural differences that are always present in all nations or social

groups. The use of the inclusive or collective "we" has a long tradition in the presidential rhetoric of the USA and is used by presidents to sympathize with the audience and to feel as one of them (Teten 2003: 342). Whilst it was Woodrow Wilson who first started to use "we" in this sense (Teten 2003: 342–343), it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt who is usually recognized as the president who first used the collective "we" in the SOTU address with much greater frequency than his predecessors (Shogan 2015: 2).

Specific kinds of metaphors, as well as other rhetorical instruments such as the inclusive "we," are linguistic strategies based on ideological sameness which can be used, often in combination, to construct a hegemonic idea of the nation. As argued by Charteris-Black (2005), the efficacy of metaphors in discourse is greatly enhanced when they are used in conjunction with other rhetorical devices, and the following section will show that this happens very often in SOTU addresses. Metaphors of the nation such as those encountered in the SOTU addresses should be considered as examples of what Billig calls the "syntax of hegemony" whereby, in discourse, the part is claimed to represent the whole, and perfectly suits the program of nationalism and its aspiration to uniformity of values, cultures, language and religion. The inclusive "we," which is often used in conjunction with metaphors, constitutes a "deixis of homeland" (Billig 1995: 95) which points to the existence of a nation made by its own people. Indeed, "the people" in modern democracies has become a "discursive formation" and a synonym of the nation (Billig 1995: 94), and this is reflected in metaphors of the nation used in the SOTU addresses, which are celebrations of the nation and its founding values.

3. Metaphors of the nation in Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump

This section will discuss the role of metaphors in the description of the nation used by the last four US presidents in their SOTU addresses. The corpus of speeches analysed here consists of the twenty-five annual addresses given by the last four US presidents: Bill Clinton (1993–2000), George W. Bush (2001–2008), Barack Obama (2009–2016), and Donald J. Trump (2017). As noted above, the SOTU address is an annual speech delivered by the president but, starting with Ronald Reagan in 1981, newly-elected presidents deliver an inaugural "Address before the joint sessions of Congress" which is not a proper SOTU speech: Bush's 1989 and Clinton's 1993 addresses were dubbed "Administration Goals" speeches, and Bush's 2001 and Obama's 1993 speeches focused mainly on the Budget. While technically these are not proper SOTU addresses, they can be considered as such in that they fulfil very similar institutional, rhetorical and discursive functions (Peters 2017).

3.1 Methodology

The twenty-five SOTU speeches are available at the State of the Union Corpus, part of the *Corpling* server compiled by Georgetown University, which includes all post-Second World War SOTU speeches. The length of the four presidents' speeches varies quite considerably: Bush's SOTU speeches tend to be the shortest (the eight speeches include 40,349 words in total, an average of just over 5,000 words for each speech), a length very similar to Trump's only speech (5,154 words), while Clinton's and Obama's speeches are longer (Clinton's speeches contain 60,508 words in total, about 7,500 words on average, whereas Obama's have 53,793 words, 6,724 words on average). In order to discover specific (and manageable) patterns of metaphor use in discourse, I have focused on the use of two sets of lexical items in the corpus of texts: (1) *build* and its derivatives, and (2) *America*, *nation*, and *our country*. The analysis of the presence of the verb *build* and its derivatives will reveal how the nation has been characterized in terms of A NATION IS A BUILDING, a key metaphor of the idea of nation. On the other hand, *America*, *nation*, and *our country* have been chosen to identify the nomination strategies used by Presidents when referring to their own nation, and the three lexical items have been analysed to discover the use of the metaphor A NATION IS A PERSON, or personification. The analysis of these lexical items was carried out using *Wordsmith Tools* (edition 7.0). This allowed finding all concordances quickly, and simplified the analysis of sentences in the texts. I then performed a close reading of the sample of texts where the selected lexical items occurred, checking whether they were actually metaphorical in the given context. Not all metaphors could easily be identified as such, and the decision of whether or not a single word was part of a metaphor was sometimes subjective.

3.2 *Build*

The NATION IS A BUILDING metaphor, with BUILDING categorized here as a noun (a house or a mansion), is one specific application of a set of general building metaphors which are quite common in American political discourse. A building metaphor expresses reification, that is, the representation of some abstract concept through physical attributes, and this often takes place when presidents talk about international relations. It is a metaphor conveying positive evaluation because it is related to a patient, timely effort from those who actively "build" (Charteris-Black 2004: 96–97). In the SOTU addresses, the metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING aims at communicating the idea of a nation as a tangible and visible entity, an entity which is often represented as the result of collective and constructive efforts, led by the commander-in-chief, the end result being the nation conceived as a house or palace.

The presence of A NATION IS A BUILDING in the SOTU addresses may be assessed by looking for the verbs *build* and *rebuild*, their various tenses (infinitive, present, past participle, past simple, *-ing*) and the derived nouns *building* and *rebuilding* and seeing what meanings they convey on the basis of their collocates. A search through the State of the Union Corpus yielded 231 results. Of these, 63 (27.27%) are literal uses of the term (referring mostly to military equipment, infrastructures and homes); 18 (7.80%) are two phrasal verbs, *build on* (appearing 16 times, or 6.93%) and *build up* (2 times, or 0.87%) and the meaning of both is in itself, at least partly, metaphorical, as it is often the case with phrasal verbs (Kovács 2011); the remaining 150 (64.93%) are metaphorical or figurative uses of various kinds. This large figure is evidence of the fact that the building metaphor is ingrained in American political discourse and is crucial to the definition of the president's social and political vision. Most metaphorical uses of *build* relate to "peace" (see Marks, this volume), "future," and "economy," while it is used in metaphorical constructs of A NATION IS A BUILDING in 37 cases, or 16.01% of total use. However, to separate the literal use of *build* from its metaphorical one often obscures the connections which are often established between the source domain and the target domain. Furthermore, the NATION IS A BUILDING metaphor often overlaps with other metaphors.

All four presidents under examination here use the NATION IS A BUILDING metaphor in their speeches. Bush uses it only when referring to the efforts made by the USA and its allies to create new nations or regimes, especially during or after the post-9/11 wars:

- (11) And tonight we are honored to welcome one of Iraq's most respected leaders, the current President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Adnan Pachachi. Sir, America stands with you and the Iraqi people *as you build a free and peaceful nation.* (Bush 2004)
- (12) *The men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation* that is free and proud and fighting terror, and America is honored to be their friend. (Bush 2004)
- (13) *The work of building a new Iraq is hard, and it is right.* And America has *always been willing to do* what it takes for what is right. (Bush 2004)
- (14) In Afghanistan, America, our 25 NATO allies, and 15 partner nations are helping the Afghan people defend their freedom and *rebuild their country.* (Bush 2008)

In most instances where it appears, the metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING, with all its positive and constructive evaluation, merges with personification, or A NATION IS A PERSON, a sentient entity ("a nation that is *free and proud and fighting terror,*"

“*America is honored to be their friend*”). The building metaphor is also applied to parts conceptually related to the nation, such as *institutions* (example 15), or *societies* (example 16):

- (15) [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] will discuss with [Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas] how *we and our friends can help* the Palestinian people end terror and *build the institutions of a peaceful, independent, democratic state.* (Bush 2005)
- (16) The great question of our day is whether *America will help men and women in the Middle East to build free societies* and share in the rights of all humanity. (Bush 2007)

Barack Obama uses the building metaphor to refer to the nation with a certain frequency, and he does so by relating it to the efforts made by the American citizens themselves to build their own homeland:

- (17) Each time I look at that flag, I’m reminded that our destiny is stitched together like those 50 stars and those 13 stripes. *No one built this country on their own. This Nation is great because we built it together. This Nation is great because we worked as a team.* This Nation is great because we get each other’s backs. And if we hold fast to that truth, in this moment of trial, there is no challenge too great, no mission too hard. As long as we are joined in common purpose, as long as we maintain our common resolve, *our journey moves forward*, and our future is hopeful, and *the state of our Union will always be strong.* (Obama 2012)

A similar rhetorical strategy had been used by Bill Clinton in his addresses:

- (18) Now it is time for us to look also to the challenges of today and tomorrow, beyond the burdens of yesterday. The challenges are significant. *But our Nation was built on challenges. America was built on challenges, not promises. And when we work together to meet them, we never fail.* That is the key to *a more perfect Union.* Our individual dreams must be realized by our common efforts. (Clinton 1996)
- (19) We also should recognize that *the greatest progress we can make toward building one America* lies in the progress we make for all Americans, without regard to race. When we open the doors of college to all Americans, when we rid all our streets of crime, when there are jobs available to people from all our neighborhoods, when we make sure all parents have the child care they need, *we’re helping to build one nation.* We, in this Chamber and in this Government, must do all we can to address *the continuing American challenge to build one America.* (Clinton 1998)

- (20) But with barely 700 days left in the 20th century, this is not a time to rest. *It is a time to build, to build the America within reach*, an America where everybody has a chance to get ahead with hard work ... *This is the America we have begun to build*; this is the America we can leave to our children if we join together to finish the work at hand. Let us strengthen our Nation for the 21st century. (Clinton 1998)

In examples (18), (19) and (20), the metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING is interwoven within discourse with the inclusive “we,” a pronoun which is used strategically to include the speaker and his audience and is aimed at communicating that the nation has developed in a certain way because it is a collective entity, made of its citizens, who have “built” it. Obama’s reflections on the US flag employ the same collective view of the nation, whereby *our destiny* as a nation is a collective endeavour *stitched together* under one flag. Furthermore, as seen in examples (17) and (19), the building metaphor is used together with the journey metaphor, whereby American history is viewed in terms of physical movement towards some destination, as in *our journey moves forward*, and *the greatest progress we can make toward building one America*, where *progress* is also semantically related to the idea of a journey.

In some SOTU addresses, there are parallels between the structure of the nation as a target domain and the source domain of activities related to actual buildings. This happens when Obama’s discussion of his infrastructure programme overlaps with the metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING:

- (21) Next, we can put Americans to work today *building the infrastructure of tomorrow*. From the first railroads to the Interstate Highway System, *our Nation has always been built to compete*. (Obama 2010)

In his first SOTU address, Donald Trump uses a very similar image, merging infrastructure building and nation building:

- (22) Another Republican President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, initiated the last truly great national infrastructure program – *the building of the Interstate Highway System*. The time has come for *a new program of national rebuilding*. America has spent approximately \$6 trillion in the Middle East – all the while our infrastructure at home is crumbling. With this \$6 trillion, *we could have rebuilt our country twice*, and maybe even three times if we had people who had the ability to negotiate. (Trump 2017)

In examples (21) and (22), a metaphor of the nation resonates with its source domain when Obama and Trump talk about infrastructures: a nation is also made of infrastructures and is built by building them. The lexical items used as a source term with a metaphorical meaning are also used literally. This is what Goatly calls “Literalisation of Vehicles” (Goatly 1997: 272–79; Goatly 2007: 13), the

“vehicle” being the source of the metaphor. This is a phenomenon which is often used with comical effects but which can provide the literal referents with symbolic values. The building metaphor and the proximity of items which point to the literal meaning of building are also very apt in this discursive context: the metaphor of nation-building (see Marks in this volume) is adapted to the circumstances of the moment (the need to build infrastructures), to the point that it also becomes the pretext for an assertion of values (*our Nation has always been built to compete*) which recalls the discourse of free enterprise at the basis of American capitalism.

The nation may also be characterized as a *builder*, as a living entity who builds. This way, a nation is conceived with the NATION IS A PERSON metaphor (examples 23 and 24), but the USA can also be both a *builder* and an entity made of infrastructures to be built (and, therefore, a “literalization of vehicles”) (example 25). By characterizing the nation as a builder, the positive moral qualities attributed to the concept of “building” itself are preserved:

- (23) Our infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped. South Korean homes now have greater Internet access than we do. Countries in Europe and Russia invest more in their roads and railways than we do. *China is building faster trains and newer airports.* Meanwhile, when our own engineers graded our Nation’s infrastructure, they gave us a D. (Obama 2011)
- (24) We have to do better. *America is the nation that built the transcontinental railroad, brought electricity to rural communities, constructed the Interstate Highway System.* (Obama 2011)
- (25) *Building this new energy future* should be just one part of a broader agenda to repair America’s infrastructure. *So much of America needs to be rebuilt.* We’ve got crumbling roads and bridges, a power grid that wastes too much energy, an incomplete high-speed broadband network that prevents a small-business owner in rural America from selling her products all over the world. During the Great Depression, *America built the Hoover Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge.* After World War II, we connected our States with a system of highways. (Obama 2012)

The metaphor A NATION IS A BUILDING suggests the strength of the nation: a building has physical features with underlying moral values typically associated with the USA. The lexis associated with “building” is also often connected to the infrastructures of the nation, which need to be built by the nation itself, who acts as a person, and specifically as a *builder*. Obama is thus establishing an isomorphic relationship between the source domain and the target domain: hearers are induced to conceive a nation, its structure and actions in terms of their own knowledge of how infrastructure is built.

The apparent continuity in the use of the *NATION IS A BUILDING* metaphor hides certain key ideological differences between the presidents' different discourses. Most building metaphors that Bush uses are applied to the efforts to create new nations or governments by the United States, and never refer to the United States itself as a building. Clinton and Obama, on the other hand, use the *NATION IS A BUILDING* metaphor when referring to the USA only. Obama rejects Bush's policies by rejecting the metaphor his predecessor had used:

- (26) And that's why the third big question that we have to answer together is how to keep America safe and strong without either isolating ourselves or *trying to nation-build everywhere there's a problem.* (Obama 2016)

Obama here refers to Bush's own meaning of "nation building," a political and military theory which consists in establishing nations through the help of other nations, that is "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy" (Dobbins 2003). This use of "nation building" is a comparatively new development of a theory about nation building which became current among US political scientists about a decade after the end of World War II (see Marks in this volume). The older use of "nation building" referred mainly to the integration of state and society and to the contribution that citizens could give to the life of the nation, including its institutions. It is also a notion which is connected with the idea of the strength of the state, which would provide security to its citizens (Stephenson 2005). The institutional and generic continuity between Bush, Clinton and Obama and the lexical coincidence of the different ideas of "nation building" somehow subsumes the ideological differences between the two concepts.

3.3 *America, nation, our country*

In terms of nomination strategies, the concept of the nation is expressed in the corpus mainly through three lexical items: *America* (also as part of *United States of America*), *nation*, and *our country*. *America* is used quite consistently by Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump (it appears 209, 202 and 204 times respectively in the eight SOTU speeches of the first three presidents, an average of 25-26 times per speech, and it appears 28 times in Trump's 2017 speech), while Bush uses the term *nation* more than any other president (92 times out of 247 in the entire corpus), with *our nation* being the most frequent collocation (90 times). *Our country*, on the other hand, is used 122 times in the corpus, and it is again Bush who uses it most often (64 times).³ *America*, *nation*, and *our country* are used mostly as

3. Bush's more frequent use of *nation* and *our country* is even more remarkable, considering that his SOTU speeches are on average much shorter than Clinton's or Obama's.

metaphors,⁴ and the metaphor A NATION IS A PERSON is quite pervasive in all uses, as it appears 314 times out of a combined total of 1,012 occurrences.

The metaphor A NATION IS A PERSON is a personification, a type of metaphor that generally occurs when an inanimate or abstract concept is given features and actions which are typical of a human being. Nations are often turned into concrete discursive elements when they are given human attributes. This is done because people are emotionally more attached to persons than to objects or abstractions: A NATION IS A PERSON metaphor gives “direct emotional access” to an otherwise vague or undefined entity (Šarić 2015: 53) and “may facilitate a sense of identification and emotional involvement on the part of citizens” (Semino 2008: 103). A NATION IS A PERSON also allows for simplification in discourse, as the personified nation is a shortcut to a multitude of agents and actions, which are all encapsulated within the nation itself (Semino 2008: 102). According to Lakoff (1991, 2003), A NATION IS A PERSON is also one of the central metaphors in American foreign policy and is the key metaphor used in the discourse of war by both Bush junior and Bush senior. In this sense, the NATION IS A PERSON metaphor is part of an “International Community” set of metaphors, such as *friendly nations*, *rogue nations*, etc. Indeed, conceptual items associated with the nation carry moral, social and aesthetic values that influence our interpretation of the text, including, crucially, our idea of the nation. It is not unusual to think of nations as human beings, especially when politicians and the media talk about relationships between nations, which are conceived in terms of relationships between individuals or, as in the case of political unions such as the EU, as relationships between members of a family (Musolff 2004).

In the SOTU speeches given by the last four presidents, the metaphor A NATION IS A PERSON is used with a major quantitative difference, as it seems to be a favourite within Bush’s rhetoric. The case of *America* is significant: Bush uses it as A NATION IS A PERSON 132 times, while Clinton and Obama use it so only 67 and 59 times respectively.

Bush uses A NATION IS A PERSON to highlight certain moral qualities of the nation. In his 2004 address, given after 9/11 and in the middle of war with Afghanistan, his metaphorical construction of A NATION IS A PERSON features

4. Within the corpus under examination here, *America* is used figuratively 403 times out of 643 entries, *nation* 212 out of 247, and *our country* 47 out of 122. As the non-metaphorical meaning of these terms, I used the definition of nation when it refers to a geographical and physical space or an institution, that is to say, “a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status” (Merriam-Webster 2018). This includes the adjoining concepts of borders, security and protection.

human qualities mapped onto the USA that are connected with moral virtues and strength:

- (27) By our actions, we have shown *what kind of nation we are*. In grief, we have found the grace to go on. In challenge, we rediscovered the courage and daring of a free people. In victory, we have shown *the noble aims and good heart of America*. (Bush 2004)
- (28) *America is a nation with a mission*, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. (Bush 2004)
- (29) *Our Nation is strong and steadfast*. The cause we serve is right, because it is the cause of all mankind. (Bush 2004)
- (30) *America this evening is a nation called to great responsibilities*, and we are rising to meet them. (Bush 2004)

Perhaps not by chance, the other president who has highlighted the strength of America in relation to foreign policy is Donald Trump:

- (31) *All the nations of the world – friend or foe – will find that America is strong, America is proud, and America is free*. (Trump 2017)

As seen above, Obama and Clinton use personification in their portrayal of the nation much less frequently, but they also connect America with physical and moral strength:

- (32) The common bonds of community which have been *the great strength of our country* from its very beginning are badly frayed. (Clinton 1995)
- (33) If we have stronger families, we will have *a stronger America*. (Clinton 1996)
- (34) We will rebuild, we will recover, and *the United States will emerge stronger than before*. (Obama 2009)

While all four presidents use the concept of personal moral and physical strength to characterize the American nation, they do so with very different aims. Bush and Trump emphasize America's strength as a quality necessary to deal with other nations and meet "outside" challenges, whereas for Clinton and Obama this strength is the premise of America's nature and is not dependent on confrontations with other nations. However, this difference may be partly due to the fact that under Bush's presidency the USA was involved in wars with Afghanistan and Iraq, while military confrontations occurring during Clinton's and Obama's presidencies did not have a similar national involvement and therefore their political discourse did not employ war rhetoric with the same frequency as Bush's. Again, as in the case of the NATION IS A BUILDING metaphor, the consistency in the use of personification associated with the nation goes beyond party differences.

4. Conclusions

The SOTU address is a key rite of nationalist worship, a ritual act in which presidents project an image of unity under their own guidance, and their “compact” with the USA as a nation, its institutions, people and values is renewed. Metaphors play a very important role in defining such values. Indeed, Campbell and Jamieson’s (1990) definition of the SOTU address as a “public meditation of values” and Charteris-Black’s (2004, 2005) emphasis on the function of metaphor as an instrument to spread certain values are not mere lexical coincidences: this chapter has showed that presidents routinely use metaphors to communicate their own value system, and they do so because metaphors can easily evoke the moral and ideological principles they assume they share with their audience. If discourses, in the Foucauldian sense of the word, *produce* the objects they describe, or *construct* reality rather than just describing it, then the language of metaphors plays a key role in determining the “reality” of the nation in political discourse. Given their frequency in the descriptions of the nation in the SOTU addresses, it is clear that metaphors have a central function in terms of the political ontology of the nation: they substantiate and legitimate the nation, its values and images in the consciousness of its citizens.

The use of metaphors in the SOTU addresses proves that presidents of the USA have constantly attempted to describe the nation as a very credible entity in public discourse, as the experiential aspects of these metaphors make nations tangible entities. Nationhood is “flagged” not just at times of war or in important events, but by using a set of discursive strategies which remind us that we live in a nation (and in a world of nations) and that we belong to a collective entity. Metaphor is a discursive strategy by which citizens can reach an understanding of nationhood by framing it within familiar areas of knowledge: when citizens map nations as buildings or persons, they recognize its presence within metaphor in terms of familiarity and similarity with their own concrete life experiences. Indeed, metaphorical reasoning “offers a cognitive mechanism that explains how citizens make sense of the political world by drawing from their nonpolitical knowledge and experiences” (Bougher 2012: 157), and nation is one particular concept which finds in metaphor a favourite linguistic realization. In this sense, the preferred metaphors of the nation in the SOTU addresses, that is, A NATION IS A BUILDING and A NATION IS A PERSON, fulfil the two main criteria determining people’s preferences in the matter of the source domains used in political metaphors: familiarity and similarity (Bougher 2012: 150–151).

The metaphorical constructs of the nation elaborated by American presidents in their SOTU addresses in many ways constitute the main linguistic cusps of a discursive model which is deeply hegemonic, in the Gramscian sense of

the word. Only a relatively small number of metaphorical mappings seem to be available, differences in each of these mappings between presidents are significant in some cases (e.g. Bush's very high moral tone), negligible in most, and no alternative interpretations of nationhood, metaphorical or non-metaphorical, are offered. The similarities in the use of metaphors by the last four presidents tells us that both Democrat and Republican commanders-in-chief make use of a shared repository of tropes in which, with some individual difference, continuity in a common institutional and cultural thread, rather than party difference, is emphasized. Indeed, metaphors of the nation in the SOTU addresses induce a simplification of the complex social and political nature of a nation, promoting sameness and homogeneity between people and repressing or obscuring marginal or dissenting voices at the level of discursive practices (Wodak et al. 2009: 44–45). This is also evident when presidents speak of other nations: they do so by employing the same discursive structures, including metaphors, which they use when they describe the USA, as if realities other than the USA could only be decoded and *known* according to discursive models provided by the hegemonic discourse of the USA and its presidents. Bush's description of post-war Iraq and Afghanistan is a case in point: the presidential rhetoric employs the same metaphor of A NATION IS A BUILDING as that used to describe the USA and its values. New nations are imaginatively configured by applying to them not just a system of discursive representation but also the kind of ideology that goes along with it. Metaphors of the nation in the USA help build up a discursive scheme which provides the national community with a ready-made vocabulary to participate in political discussions, thus preventing alternative linguistic choices and interpretations of social reality.

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PART II

Semi-official and mixed discourses

The role of metonymy and metaphor in the conceptualization of the NATION

An emergent ontological analysis of syntactic-semantic constructions

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This corpus-based study presents an emergent ontological analysis of syntactic-semantic constructions of the concept NATION. Using large Croatian corpora, I analysed the ontological congruence of the collocations of the lexeme *nacija* 'nation' in five types of syntactic-semantic constructions. This approach enabled a formal hierarchical description of the metaphorical conceptualization of the NATION and the cognitive mechanism of eliciting reification, personification and social appraisal of the NATION. Metaphorical mappings are seen as a powerful instrument for conceptualizing the institutional status of the NATION, reinforcing the interaction between MEMBERS, and the creation of collective IDENTITY that influences a PERSON'S self-appraisal, and vice versa.

Keywords: conceptual analysis, ontological model, ontological (in)congruence, meronymy, metonymy, metaphor, pragmatic function, syntactic-semantic constructions

1. Introduction and approaches

Dealing with the role of metaphor in conceptualizing a nation is a multifaceted endeavour. Firstly, we have to define the "terrain," asking ontological questions like: is NATION a material thing, or is it an abstract idea emerging from a complex conceptual construction? As I argue for the latter option, together with many previous authors (Anderson 1983; James 1996: 34; Searle 2010; Borghi & Binkofski 2014), I have to identify the complex componential matrix of the concept NATION and its ontological status. The identification of the componential structure of the

NATION allows formal description of metonymic profiling and metaphorical mappings based on the analysis of ontologically (in)congruent relations between morphosyntactic arguments.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how formal integration of structurally different levels of analysis can lead to comprehensive empirical knowledge about the role of metonymic and metaphorical conceptualization patterns of the NATION in discourse and its pragmatic implications (Lakoff 2008; Charteris-Black 2013; Cepinskyte this volume). The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the systemic approach to the ontological description and linguistic componential analysis of the concept NATION. Section 3 describes the methodology of the most frequent construal types of the Croatian noun *nacija* 'nation' in five salient syntactic-semantic constructions. Section 4 discusses the mechanism of metonymic and metaphorical conceptualization of the NATION. Finally, I assess the pragmatic functions of metaphorical reification, personification and social identification strategies of the NATION in discourse.

2. What kind of entity is the nation?

This section deals with the ontological classification of the NATION from the perspective of social ontology and complex systems theory. I describe the emergence of the NATION concept through the iterative process of classification and meronymy, as well as the essential role of linguistic conceptualization for the establishment of the cultural model of the NATION.

2.1 The emergent constructivist approach to the ontology of the nation

It is unlikely that anyone would claim that *clay* is an abstract concept. A piece of *clay* can be seen, touched, smelled; one can have a direct embodied interaction with it. Its referential entity is a material thing. What about *nation*? Its abstract referential *nation*-ness does not afford direct embodied cognition. However, even if it is not a thing that exists in the observable material world, *nation* has enormous psychological appeal and pragmatic force to shape human life and society.

From the evolutionary perspective, the intention for interaction with other meaningful group members is a bio-psycho-social trait evolved for maximizing individual survival and reproduction strategies (Richerson & Boyd 2005; Chiao & Blizinsky 2016). The idea that other individuals have comparable intentions and desires, similar codes of interaction and shared reverence for symbolic institutions (Tomasello 2000) is the seed of the NATION concept (Searle 2010). In his

research on the emergence of social ontology, John Searle (2010: 7) argued that collective intentionality and the human “capacity to impose functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure” facilitates the construction of status functions. The status functions, in turn, act as the carriers of deontic powers, that is, “rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements” (Searle 2010: 9).

The implication of this emergent constructivist approach is that social reality emerges from the bio-psychological level of self-awareness and self-identity, but at the same time induces reorganization of its constituents. That is to say, self-identity is the epistemic standard for: (a) recognizing another individual's identity as similar to one's own, and (b) accepting deontic powers imposed by social interaction and communication. Dynamic interaction between individual self-identity and socially accepted values implies that *nation* is a dynamic sociocultural concept, constructed from the organization of various bio-psycho-social entities and susceptible to different types of conceptualizations.

2.2 Emergent ontological description as an iterative function of meronymy and classification

The value of a house is partially defined by the material it is made of, for instance, clay, metal, wood, but is not reducible to its constituents. The same emergent constructional reality is true of the abstract sociocultural concept NATION. Two basic system relations that describe ontological emergence of entities, their properties and processes are classification and meronymy.

Classification or in-class inclusion sometimes also called taxonomy or categorization, refers to the recognition of relation properties “Xs are a type of Y.” Classification is established between an entity Y and its hyponyms $X_{1,2,\dots,x}$, as in the proposition *humans are biological organisms*. Cognitive sciences have produced a large volume of research on the embodied cognition mechanism (Barsalou 2007), and sociocultural dimensions (Bennardo & de Munck 2014) of the categorization processes.

Meronymy involves part-whole relations “Xs are part of Y,” as in “people are part of a nation.” Classification and meronymy are distinguished by “kind of” and “part of” expressions (Winston et al. 1987; Storey 1991). For example, the expression *hrvatska nacija* ‘Croatian nation’ activates the classification of *Croatia* into the class *nation*, where *Croatia* is a kind of *nation*. On the other hand, the expression *simbol nacije* ‘the symbol of a nation’ profiles a meronomic relation between the classes *symbol* and *nation*: a symbol is cognized as a *part of* the nation, not as a *kind of* nation.

From the system theory perspective (Capra 1997; Emmeche et al. 1997; Perak & Puljar D'Alessio 2013; Capra & Luisi 2014) the constitution of the material, psychological and social ontological reality of a nation can be described as an iterative, hierarchical, emergent process of establishing aggregated entities in meronomic relations that form in-class relations, with increasing relational complexity and decreasing structural stability of the aggregated entities.

A nation is constituted in an iterative process because the aggregated entities become part of new class constructs that become part of new meronomic relations. For instance, an atom becomes a molecule that becomes a tissue that becomes an organ that becomes an individual that is a cognizer that identifies itself as a member of a social group that institutionalizes a nation through the process of communication. The constitutive process is hierarchical because the iterative process produces constitutive and emergent entities of a different structural order. The final construct is emergent because the properties of constitutive entities are organized in such a way as to produce new properties and functions in the aggregate entity. For example, there is no sovereignty on the biological level of an organism. The increasing level of complexity is derived from synthesis of inherited constitutive properties. This constructive process induces structural dynamics of increasing analytic componentiality with decreasing synthesis stability of the emergent entities.

In order to holistically represent the synthetic complexity system and analyse componentiality of entities, I propose the Emergent Ontological Model comprising of schematized 16 superclasses (see Figure 1). The model is based on the theoretical background of complex systems emergent principles (Emmeche et al. 1997), the description of social ontology (Searle 2010), as well as the embodied cognition perspective (Barsalou 2007) within the cognitive science tradition.

Each superclass in Figure 1 (EXISTENCE, EMERGENCE, etc.) represents entities of a certain material, psychological or social complexity that are interconnected by dynamic bottom-up and top-down relations. Bottom-up relations form emergent features, while the structure of aggregate entities recurrently modifies the self-organization process of the constituent level by top-down relations.

In this model, NATION is classified as a concept, represented by a triangle (see Figure 2), that is connected by an in-class (isA) relation with the INSTITUTION superclass, constituted by the COMMUNICATION superclass and modified by the CULTURAL MODEL superclass. The INSTITUTION superclass is defined as a set of conventionalized norms of communication, interaction, and identity, maintained by the socially distributed institutional power and modified by a cultural model.




Figure 1. The emergent ontological model of material, psychological and sociocultural super-classes




Figure 2. Classification of the nation concept as an institution with communication as the constitutive superclass and cultural model as the modifying superclass. The relation is A defines nation as a member of the institution class

The construal of the NATION concept emerges from the specific organization of its meronomic features. In order to emerge as a relatively stable entity in social ontology, the NATION as an institution requires a synthesis of less complex, constitutive material entities including material entities such as LAND (where people live and claim to have some proprietary rights), ECO-SYSTEM, ORGANISMS with psychological processes of PERCEPTION, AFFECT appraisal and COGNITION that can identify as part of SOCIAL GROUPS (Simon et al. 2015) such as FAMILY, KINSHIP, as well as interaction patterns, RITUALS, social COMMUNICATION via language and other semiotic systems, creating NARRATIVES that constitute a HISTORY of a social group, BELIEF systems that organize NORMS and RULES of social interactions and stratification, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS that enable the exchange of goods, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS that serve as governing principles for the administration of STATE and acculturation of CITIZENS, ECONOMY, LAW and MILITARY institutions (see Nardon and Steers 2009). The NATION is also top-down modified by a shared CULTURAL MODEL.

2.3 Cultural models of the NATION

A cultural model is defined as a set of cognitive schemas that are intersubjectively shared by a social group (D'Andrade 1987: 112). The cultural model of a specific nation are the representations of the NATION concept shared by the members of a culture. Cultural models are institutionally conventionalized constructions that organize the components of the emergent NATION concept in structurally and causatively different ways.

Different cognitive schemas are socially distributed and maintained by discourse. Profiling a certain cultural model of the NATION in discourse is used to highlight the function of a certain deontic power in a social group (Lakoff 2008; Searle 2010) by activating the individual's appraisal of mental states (Bennardo & de Munck 2014: 5) and eliciting collective perceptions of the past by framing, maintaining, and challenging views of the nation and identity (Máiz 2003; Hogan 2009; Pavlaković & Perak 2017).

2.4 The diachronic aspect of the componential analysis

Diachrony is an important aspect in the componential analysis of the cultural models of the NATION. It is closely related to the term “nation-building,” describing the processes of national consolidation that lead up to the establishment of modern states, distinct from previous feudal and dynastic states, church states, kingdoms, empires, etc. (Kolstø 2000: Chapter 2). The phases of nation-building, described by Stein Rokkan's (1975) model (see Marks, this volume), include territorial, economic, social and cultural unification, military and education institutionalization, proliferation of information through mass media, participation in the political system, establishment of public welfare services and implementation of economic policies. All these layers are interconnected in the emergence of the cultural model of a NATION.

2.5 Language as a tool of conceptual construal

The institutional reality of the nation is created and maintained by social communication (see Figures 1 and 2). One of the most important communication tools is language (for the discussion of the use of other media see Grassi this volume).

Linguistic communication is sequentially imposed by means of social interaction, mediated by either a written or a spoken linguistic code. A code is a set of tokens (for the discussion on the institutional conventionalization of language see Čičin-Šain, Vervaeet, this volume) that cognizers identify as a means to express an embodied experience and activate conceptual structures of the communicator(s) (see Figure 3). Discourse is thus a structure of symbolically organized conceptual patterns created in the process of intersubjective communication of perceptions, affective appraisals and cognitive configurations between cognizing agents (see Figure 3).

Linguistic constructions activate concepts relevant for the conceptualization of the NATION. For instance, the Croatian lexeme *nacija* ‘nation’ (see Figure 4, lexemes are represented using a circle) is classified as an entity of the COMMUNICATION class. The lexeme refers to the concept NATION that is classified on the complexity level of the INSTITUTION class.




Figure 3. Schematic ontological structure of the code, concept, lexeme and discourse concepts. The relation *isA* defines class relation, while the *meronomicRelation* indicates meronymic part-of relation

3. Analysis of syntactic-semantic constructions

According to the usage-based theory of language acquisition (Tomasello 2000, 2009; Langacker 2008; Ellis et al. 2015) language users conventionalize linguistic constructions on various structural levels. Linguistic patterns of conceptualization




Figure 4. Ontological lexeme-concept-class relations for the Croatian lexical concept *nacija* 'nation' that is part-of the communication class and refers to the nation concept that is a kind of an institution

reflect frequent ways of construing embodied experiences about the material, psychological and sociocultural reality. Linguistic constructions can, therefore, be used not just to reveal salient entities in a domain, but also to map out the network of causal relations between constituents of an ontologically complex entity, such as the *nation*. Syntactic-semantic networks can be seen as conceptual patterns of construing cultural model(s). This approach enables us to use a corpus as a source for a usage-based analysis of the conceptualization patterns of the *nation*.

3.1 Syntactic-semantic constructions and construal of meaning

According to cognitive linguistic theory, the form-to-form dependency is derived from the cognitive organization of conceptual patterns (Langacker 2008). For

instance, speakers put adjective modifiers near nouns, such as *red clay*, as opposed to long-distance dependencies (Gildea & Temperley 2010), because this is cognitively the most efficient manner to cognize and linguistically represent the information about the properties of an entity. Morphosyntactic structures have an inherent semantic value. They organize the linguistic representation of knowledge about conceptualized entities, their relations, properties and processes.

This study uses corpus natural language processing tools provided by Sketch Engine for the identification of syntactic-semantic structures that contribute to the construal of the *NATION* concept based on data from the corpus of Croatian, hrWaC 2.2. This corpus features 29 predefined morphosyntactic relations for the lemma *nacija* ‘nation’.¹ Each of them has a certain semantic function; however, in this study I present only five types of morphosyntactic relations (see Table 1) that are crucial for conceptualizing the nation: what are relevant concepts that form the ontological domain of the entity *nation*?; what are the properties of the entity called *nation*?; what are its dependent genitival relations to other entities?; what can be done with the lexical concept *nation*?; and what can the lexical concept of *nation* do?

Table 1. Syntactic-semantic grammatical constructions

Relation name	Notation	Syntactic structure	Semantic value
koordinacija	Coordination	C:Noun+“and/or”+Q:Noun	What C nouns are related to the Q <i>nation</i> ?
kakav?	Adjective modifier	C:Adjective+Q:Noun	What are the C properties of the Q <i>nation</i> ?
n-koga-čega	Dependent genitive	C:Noun in nominative+Q:Noun in genitive	What are the C parts that the Q <i>nation</i> is genitively related to?
koga-što	Thematic object in accusative	C:Verb+Q:Noun in accusative	What are the C processes that can be performed on the Q <i>nation</i> ?
subjekt_od	Agentive entity	Q:Noun in nominative+C:Verb	What C processes can the Q <i>nation</i> perform?

1. See <https://the.sketchengine.co.uk/corpus/wsdef?corpname=preloaded/hrwac22>.

For each dependent relation, a query is devised that produces a pattern with: (a) queried lemma (Q) as the ‘From’ node; (b) a grammatical relation as a relationship (R); and (c) collocated lemma (C) as the ‘To’ node. Each pattern was restricted to yield the 50 most frequent collocations.

3.2 Noun collocates of the coordinated construction

The coordinated construction is a simple syntactic-semantic construction that connects two nouns using the conjunction *i* ‘and’. The conjunction *and* functions as a logical operator, yielding nouns that can reveal which entities are conceptualized as ontologically related. The interrelated concepts form a conceptual matrix or a domain (Perak 2017). A domain is defined in terms of sets of ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge and experiences that competent members of a discourse community have about the nation, organized around some ‘prototypical’ concepts (Musolff 2016: 8).

The method for identifying the ontologically domain-related entities from the coordinated construction is performed on the lexical concept *nacija* ‘nation’ using the Croatian 1.2 Giga word web corpus hrWaC 2.2.² The source lemma *nacija* ‘nation’ occurs 56,803 times or 40.6386 per million words in hrWaC 2.2. The target concepts are acquired from a friend-of-a-friend network of 1000 collocates in [*nacija* *i*/ili Noun_x *i*/ili Noun_y] construction, ranked by a measure of syntactic distribution (Rychlý & Kilgarriff 2007). This means that *nacija* ‘nation’ and its 50 collocates have been interlinked with 50 collocates of the initial collocates. The network has been filtered using the page rank algorithm in Gephi software (Brin 1998) resulting in a network that contains eighty lexemes that represent ontologically relevant concepts for the creation of the semantic domain of the NATION. Larger nodes represent a higher value according to the page rank of the network (Figure 5).

Based on the most prominent constituents of this network, such as *čovjek* ‘man’, *obitelj* ‘family’, *politika* ‘politics’, *vjera* ‘belief’, *jezik* ‘language’ we can conclude that the lexeme *nacija* ‘nation’ is highly related to entities from the ontological complex of the following superclasses: IDENTITY, INTERACTION, COMMUNICATION and INSTITUTION. The problem is that the coordinated construction does not offer insight into the conceptualization of causal relations between these related concepts. To find these structures we must investigate dependent syntactic-semantic relations.

2. https://the.sketchengine.co.uk/corpus/corp_info?corpname=preloaded/hrwac22&struct_attr_stats=1&subcorpora=1 (Ljubešić & Erjavec 2011). The same corpus is used in the chapters by Šarić this volume and Stanojević this volume.

Table 2. Collocates of the C:Adjective+ Q:nacija grammatical relation

MATERIAL	PARTONOMY	<i>cijel</i> ‘whole’ 2028, <i>ujedinjen</i> ‘united’ 1280, <i>čitav</i> ‘whole’ 415, <i>različit</i> ‘different’ 253, <i>jedan</i> ‘one’ 171, <i>pojedini</i> ‘some’ 142, <i>nijedan</i> ‘none’ 91, <i>drugi</i> ‘other’ 82, <i>jedinstven</i> ‘unique’ 67, <i>zaseban</i> ‘discrete’ 60
	FORCE	<i>jak</i> ‘strong’ 130
	MOVEMENT	<i>vodeći</i> ‘leading’ 120, <i>napredan</i> ‘advanced’ 55
	SEQUENCE	<i>razvijen</i> ‘developed’ 46
	BIOLOGY – STATE	<i>zdrav</i> ‘healthy’ 104, <i>bolestan</i> ‘sick’ 90
	BIOLOGY–KIND	<i>umjetan</i> ‘artificial’ 50
PSYCHOLOGICAL	AFFECT	<i>drag</i> ‘dear’ 96, <i>ponosan</i> ‘proud’ 80
	COGNITION	<i>izmišljen</i> ‘imagined’ 71, <i>glup</i> ‘stupid’ 66
SOCIAL	IDENTITY	<i>vlastit</i> ‘one’s own’ 251, <i>većinski</i> ‘majority’ 52
	COMMUNICATION	<i>blogerski</i> ‘blogger’ 49
	INSTITUTION – ECONOMY	<i>bogat</i> ‘rich’ 116, <i>suveren</i> ‘sovereign’ 64, <i>siromašan</i> ‘poor’ 63, <i>jadan</i> ‘pathetic’ 62, <i>povlašten</i> ‘privileged’ 54
	INSTITUTION – ETHNIC/STATE	<i>hrvatski</i> ‘Croatian’ 1657, <i>europski</i> ‘European’ 353, <i>srpski</i> ‘Serbian’ 307, <i>američki</i> ‘American’ 261, <i>bosanski</i> ‘Bosnian’ 234, <i>bošnjачki</i> ‘Bosniac’ 202, <i>njemački</i> ‘German’ 151, <i>makedonski</i> ‘Macedonian’ 65, <i>jugoslavenski</i> ‘Yugoslav’ 104, <i>crnogorski</i> ‘Montenegrin’ 59, <i>iranski</i> ‘Iranian’ 58, <i>arapski</i> ‘Arab’ 46, <i>afrički</i> ‘African’ 52
	INSTITUTION–SPORT	<i>nogometni</i> ‘soccer’ 302, <i>sportski</i> ‘sport’ 150
	INSTITUTION–RELIGIOUS	<i>muslimanski</i> ‘Muslim’ 81
	INSTITUTION–POLITICAL	<i>uspješan</i> ‘successful’ 135, <i>moćan</i> ‘powerful’ 80, <i>civiliziran</i> ‘civilized’ 45

componential or constructional aspect of the nation. The emotional and cognitive component of the nation is activated by modifiers such as *glup* ‘stupid’, *ponosan* ‘proud’. Finally, adjectives like *sportski* ‘sport’ indicate the importance of sports for nation representation and national social identification.

Relationship frequency can indicate cognitive entrenchment of the pattern (Ellis & Larsen-Freeman 2009; Schmid 2010; Stefanowitsch & Flach 2016). The classification of adjectives in relation to the profiled entity introduces the embodied view of domain activation: linguistic usage of a lexical item activates a pattern of mental simulation, forming a cognitively entrenched domain of related concepts (Chow et al. 2014; Buccino et al. 2016).

3.4 Noun collocates of the dependent genitive construction

Using the same corpus method, I extracted 50 most frequently collocated nouns in the dependent genitive construction ‘C noun of Q *nacija*’ (Co-occurring Noun + Lemma *nacija* ‘nation’ in the genitive). By applying the domain activation classification, the collocated nouns are ordered according to ontological complexity (Figure 1), from MATERIAL to PSYCHOLOGICAL and SOCIAL³ and represented along with their frequency in hrWaC 2.2 (see Table 3).

Table 3. The collocates of the C:Noun + Q:*nacija* ‘of nation’ grammatical relation

MATERIAL	EMERGENCE	<i>stvaranje</i> ‘creation’ 84; <i>formiranje</i> ‘forming’ 78; <i>stanje</i> ‘state’ 706
	PARTONOMY	<i>jedinstvo</i> ‘unity’ 54; <i>homogenizacija</i> ‘homogenization’ 20; <i>ostatak</i> ‘rest’ 134
	SEQUENCE	<i>budućnost</i> ‘future’ 50
	BIOLOGY – ORGANISM	<i>rađanje</i> ‘birth’ 24; <i>zdravlje</i> ‘health’ 257; <i>opstanak</i> ‘survival’ 54; <i>izumiranje</i> ‘extinction’ 14
	BIOLOGY – PARTS OF THE BODY	<i>lice</i> ‘face’ 253; <i>mozak</i> ‘brain’ 26; <i>oko</i> ‘eye’ 37; <i>obraz</i> ‘cheek’ 14; <i>puls</i> ‘pulse’ 47
PSYCHOLOGICAL	AFFECT	<i>ponos</i> ‘pride’ 68; <i>raspoloženje</i> ‘mood’ 38; <i>mentalitet</i> ‘mentality’ 20; <i>zaglupljivanje</i> ‘stupefying’ 15
	COGNITION	<i>svijest</i> ‘consciousness’ 33; <i>savjest</i> ‘conscience’ 28; <i>poimanje</i> ‘understanding’ 31; <i>pojam</i> ‘concept’ 119; <i>ideja</i> ‘idea’ 52; <i>definicija</i> ‘definition’ 31
SOCIAL	IDENTITY	<i>otac</i> ‘father’ 358; <i>pripadnik</i> ‘member’ 112; <i>identitet</i> ‘identity’ 52; <i>miljenik</i> ‘favourite’ 42; <i>ljubimac</i> ‘pet, favourite, darling’ 33; <i>vođa</i> ‘leader’ 61; <i>heroj</i> ‘hero’ 72; <i>junak</i> ‘hero’ 20; <i>spasitelj</i> ‘saviour’ 31; <i>idol</i> ‘idol’ 51
	INSTITUTION – ECONOMY	<i>interes</i> ‘interest’ 99; <i>bogatstvo</i> ‘wealth’ 23; <i>dobrobit</i> ‘well-being’ 53; <i>prosperitet</i> ‘prosperity’ 17; <i>boljitak</i> ‘prosperity’ 25; <i>blagostanje</i> ‘welfare’ 19
	INSTITUTION – SPORTS	<i>kup</i> ‘cup’ 1093
	INSTITUTION – MORAL	<i>dobro</i> ‘the good’ 20; <i>moral</i> ‘morals’ 22
	INSTITUTION – RELIGIOUS	<i>duh</i> ‘spirit’ 79; <i>sudbina</i> ‘fate’ 36

3. Concepts and domains are indicated by small caps.

Domain analysis reveals that the socio-cultural *nacija* 'nation' concept in dependent genitive constructions is profiled as an OBJECT that is created, formed, has a state, that can be homogenous in its STRUCTURE. However, it is also profiled as a BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM: having a birth, having a father, having various parts of the body, as a surviving or extinct species (for PLANT profiling, see Rash, Stanojević this volume). Likewise, it is profiled as an EXPERIENCER or COGNIZER: having psychological affective and cognitive states. Ontologically closer to its socio-cultural institution class, it is profiled as a MEMBER with a social function. Finally, it is portrayed as an INTERACTOR that has socio-economic goals and moral values imposed by its cultural model. Some of these conceptualizations, such as *rađanje nacije* 'birth of a nation', extend the ontological properties of the collocated nouns; nation is not a material object that can be formed, not a biological thing that can be born, etc. Still, such ontologically incongruent constructions construe new emergent semantic value of the NATION concept. Their semantic and pragmatic implications are essential for metaphorical conceptualization (see Section 4).

3.5 Verb collocates of the thematic object construction

According to the conventions of Croatian syntax, a noun in the accusative following a verb usually functions as a direct object. The query for the thematic construction yielded verbs that refer to processes with *nacija* 'nation' coded as a semantic object. The resulting verbs are classified according to the ontological domain of prototypical objects for the construed process. For instance, a prototypical semantic object for the process *drink* would be something liquid, that is, MATERIAL, LIQUID, BEVERAGE, preferably NON-TOXIC. The prototypical object-of-a-verb classes are ordered schematically from material and psychological to more complex social domains.

This classification shows that *nation* is conceptualized in thematic constructions as a MATERIAL OBJECT, a MOVING OBJECT, a BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM, an EXPERIENCER of psychological states, a COGNIZER of cognitive processes, as an invented or defined CONCEPT, a social INTERACTOR, a COMMUNICATOR and a THEME in social communication. The extension of ontological properties seems to be salient in the thematic construal of the nation. It is important to note that some verbs like *poniziti* 'degrade, humiliate' with its MOTION component 'to lower something' and the social interaction association, are polysemous in nature. Their polysemy is motivated by a diachronic shift in lexical usage and associated ontological reference. A new reference can become a semantic extension, making the ontological classification of prototypical collocations a somewhat nondeterministic process,

Table 4. The collocates of the C:Verb + Q:nacija ‘nation’ thematic construction

MATERIAL	OBJECT	<i>stvoriti</i> ‘create’ 143; <i>formirati</i> ‘form’ 22; <i>homogenizirati</i> ‘homogenize’ 17; <i>ujediniti</i> ‘unite’ 44; <i>ujedinjavati</i> ‘unite’ 11; <i>izjednačavati</i> ‘equate’ 8; <i>uništiti</i> ‘destroy’ 44
	OBJECT IN MOTION	<i>uzdizati</i> ‘elevate’ 17; <i>potresti</i> ‘shake’ 9; <i>mobilizirati</i> ‘mobilize’ 18; <i>zaviti</i> ‘wrap’ 7; <i>motorizirati</i> ‘motorize’ 7
	BIOLOGY ORGANISM	<i>trovati</i> ‘poison’ 17
PSYCHOLOGY	AFFECTIVE – EXPERIENCER	<i>šokirati</i> ‘shock’ 36; <i>plašiti</i> ‘scare’ 12; <i>mrziti</i> ‘hate’ 44; <i>sramotiti</i> ‘embarrass’ 17; <i>osramotiti</i> ‘dishonor’ 15; <i>iznenaditi</i> ‘surprise’ 15; <i>nasmijati</i> ‘make laugh’ 12; <i>nasmijavati</i> ‘make laugh’ 12; <i>razveseliti</i> ‘cheer up’ 17; <i>obradovati</i> ‘gladden’ 8; <i>razočarati</i> ‘disappoint’ <i>zamarati</i> ‘bore’ 7
	COGNITIVE – COGNIZER	<i>podsjetiti</i> ‘remind’ 16; <i>zaglupljivati</i> ‘make stupid’ 11
	COGNITIVE – CONCEPT	<i>izmisliti</i> ‘invent’ 27; <i>izmišljati</i> ‘invent’ 11; <i>određivati</i> ‘determine’ 32; <i>generalizirati</i> ‘generalize’ 7; <i>poistovjećivati</i> ‘identify’ 7
SOCIAL	INTERACTION – INTERACTOR	<i>uveseljavati</i> ‘amuse’ 14; <i>zabavljati</i> ‘entertain’ 40; <i>zabaviti</i> ‘entertain’ 8; <i>maltretirati</i> ‘mistreat’ 18; <i>spašavati</i> ‘save’ 15
	SOCIAL HIERARCHY – INTERACTOR	<i>ponižavati</i> ‘degrade, humiliate’ 9; <i>poniziti</i> ‘degrade, humiliate’ 8
	COMMUNICATION – COMMUNICATOR	<i>uvjeriti</i> ‘convince’ 36; <i>uvjeravati</i> ‘convince’ 32; <i>vrijedati</i> ‘insult’ 25; <i>uvrijediti</i> ‘insult’ 12
	COMMUNICATION – CONCEPT	<i>priznavati</i> ‘acknowledge’ 23; <i>odreći</i> ‘give up, negate’ 19; <i>negirati</i> ‘negate’ 28
	ECONOMIC – INTERACTOR	<i>počastiti</i> ‘complement’ 10; <i>zadužiti</i> ‘be obliged by’ 26; <i>varati</i> ‘cheat’ 11

with fuzzy boundaries that include semasiological and sociolinguistic criteria for meaning construal.⁴

3.6 Verb collocates of the agentive subject construction

Finally, the query for the agentive construction where the noun *nacija* ‘nation’ is the subject of a verb reveals processes where the concept *nacija* ‘nation’ is

4. The complete analysis of this diachronic ontological shift is, unfortunately, too complex to be represented in this chapter.

coded as a syntactic-semantic subject. Again, I classified the identified processes according to the schematized ontological domain of prototypical subjects for the collocated verbs.

Table 5. The collocates of the C:Noun + Q:nacija 'of nation' grammatical relation

MATERIAL	EXISTING MATERIAL OBJECT	<i>postati</i> 'become' 111; <i>postojati</i> 'exist' 78
	EMERGING MATERIAL OBJECT	<i>nastati</i> 'become' 59; <i>nestati</i> 'disappear' 10; <i>formirati</i> 'form' 14; <i>stvoriti</i> 'create' 13; <i>stvarati</i> 'create' 8
	MATERIAL OBJECT WITH PROPERTIES	<i>imati</i> 'have' 41; <i>izgubiti</i> 'loose' 12; <i>moći</i> 'be able to' 44
	MATERIAL OBJECT IN MOTION	<i>pasti</i> 'fall' 8; <i>propasti</i> 'collapse' 8; <i>ostati</i> 'stay' 23; <i>doći</i> 'come' 9; <i>početi</i> 'start' 16
	BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM	<i>živjeti</i> 'live' 9; <i>trebati</i> 'need' 33
PSYCHOLOGICAL	PERCEIVER	<i>vidjeti</i> 'see' 14
	EXPERIENCER OF AFFECTIVE STATES	<i>odahnuti</i> 'sigh in relief' 12
	COGNIZER	<i>izmisliti</i> 'invent' 16; <i>znati</i> 'know' 15; <i>shvatiti</i> 'comprehend' 11; <i>htjeti</i> 'want' 14; <i>odlučiti</i> 'decide' 9
SOCIAL	INTERACTOR WITH SOCIAL INTERACTION INTENTIONS	<i>dati</i> 'give' 14; <i>napraviti</i> 'do, create' 10; <i>složiti</i> 'put together' 7; <i>otkriti</i> 'reveal' 7; <i>pokazati</i> 'show' 19; <i>raditi</i> 'work' 7; <i>uspjeti</i> 'succeed' 15; <i>dobiti</i> 'get' 8; <i>osvojiti</i> 'win' 10
	INTERACTOR WITH SOCIAL INTERACTION AWARENESS	<i>smjeti</i> 'be allowed to' 7
	COMMUNICATOR	<i>reći</i> 'say' 33; <i>govoriti</i> 'speak' 7; <i>dokazati</i> 'prove' 7

Most of the collocations profile the sociocultural concept *nacija* 'nation' as an agentive entity that initiates complex processes and possesses the capacity of conscious and seemingly independent intention to interact with the environment. The subjects of these processes are prototypically related to biological organisms with psychological states, intentions for social interaction, communication skills and comprehension of social and institutional standards. This type of syntactic-semantic construal frequently profiles the NATION as a PERSON with salient instigation of agency.

It is important to notice that it is not just the ontological complexity of the verb, but the very syntactic-semantic coding of *nacija* 'nation' in the place of the subject argument that triggers agentive construal. In comparison to the other three constructions, I argue that agentive construal is the most complex type of

conceptualization pattern because it imposes properties of human cognizing and intentionality on the status function of the concept NATION.

In the next section I explain in greater detail the process of metaphorical conceptualization of the nation and its pragmatic functions in the discourse.

4. Ontological congruence analysis of categorization, metonymy, and metaphor

In the previous sections I demonstrated that dependent morphosyntactic constructions profile specific causal construal between properties, entities, relations and processes of collocated lexical items. Exemplified by the 50 most frequent collocations in four types of dependent morphosyntactic constructions, I noted that construed semantic patterns are not always congruent with prototypical ontological patterns established by the embodied knowledge about the world. There is no *napredan* ‘advanced’ NATION in the spatial-motion sense, nor is there an actual *otac* ‘father’ of the NATION. Neither can a NATION as a sociocultural institution be alive in the biological sense, nor can a NATION know anything as a cognizer. This mismatch between the constituents of prototypical ontological relations and extended meaning imposed by syntactic-semantic construal is termed ontological incongruence of syntactic-semantic arguments. In this section, I explore the implications of that (in)congruence for the conceptualization of the NATION.

I argue that three basic cognitive processes of conceptualization – categorization, metonymic profiling and metaphorical mapping – are derived from profiling of ontological relations: classification, ontological congruence and ontological incongruence, respectively. Based on this congruence analysis, I have devised a methodology for identifying metaphor in discourse using the ontological model of lexical concepts and constructions (OMLCC). The OMLCC considers the functionality of the syntactic-semantic interface as well as the emergent ontological complexity of the entities, properties and processes (see Figure 1) with the goal of revealing cognitive mappings and pragmatic implications of the linguistic construal of concepts in discourse.

4.1 Cognitive profiling of meronomic relations in syntactic-semantic constructions

Meronomic relations are the building blocks of any entity and complex systems in general (see Section 2.2). An aggregate entity has structurally simpler component parts, and can, at the same time, be a part of a structurally more complex entity. Meronomic ontological relationships can be lexically expressed through

meronymic semantic relations. On the level of collocations, meronymy is expressed as a combination of syntactically dependent lexemes that refer to the ontologically prototypical meronymic relations. These relations are an important part of the discourse because they organize the structure of the conceptualization. Can we identify the meronymic relations for different syntactic-semantic constructions of the *nation*?

4.1.1 *Meronymy in the adjective modifier construction*

In the adjective modifier construction (see Section 3.2) the meronymic relation is construed if the adjective properties profile appropriate ontological complexity of the modified noun. One of the methods to establish the complexity level of an adjective is to determine the ontological complexity of the lexically related noun (Spencer 2013). For example, the adjective *sovereign* is lexically related to the noun *sovereignty* that is taxonomically related to the superclass level of INSTITUTION, which is the most appropriate complexity level to meronymically construe the NATION. In the same manner, we can argue that *poor* profiles institutional economic status. Then again, do *stupid* and *proud* form a prototypical meronymic construal of the nation's institutional properties? Obviously not, because these properties emerge on the psychological level of (human) cognition and affective experience. That is not to say that more complex levels like interaction, communication and institution classes do not partially inherit these properties. However, the modifiers *stupid* and *proud* are prototypically related to human cognizers and, consequently, the expression *proud nation* profiles the nation in terms of a collection of human cognizers who are proud. Is this a meronymic construction of the nation? If the adjective profiles a prototypical meronymic component of the nation, we can argue that the construction expresses componential meronymic relations, or metonymy. The meronymic network of properties of a modifier structures the part-whole metonymic profiling A FOR B. In this example: *stupid* HUMAN MEMBERS OF NATION FOR a *stupid* NATION. The pragmatic effect of this metonymic profiling is generalization reduction: the properties of the constitutive entity are projected onto the emergent whole, reducing the properties of the whole to the profiled part. This is a common discursive method to cognitively highlight some constitutive and downplay other features of the construed entity NATION.

Due to the contingency of the part and whole, the metonymic relation PART-FOR WHOLE can be reversed if the adjective profiles ontologically more complex institutional or cultural model properties. For instance, proper adjectives, like *Croatian*, *Serbian*, *Yugoslav*, *Muslim*, profile a specific institutional configuration of the nation's components: land, people, customs, state, ethnicity and religious identity, and so on. These proper adjectives activate knowledge about a cultural model that profiles schematic prototypical reduction WHOLE FOR PART:

the prototypical properties of the emergent whole are projected on the presumed parts. For instance, members of the *Croatian nation* are presumably *Croats*, and in a *Muslim nation* everyone seemingly abides by the Muslim law. Prototypicality reduction is pragmatically used in political discourses to activate a set of values that are part of a referential cultural model: for instance, *Croatian nation* activates the way Croats model their nation as an institution.

4.1.2 *Meronymy in the genitive construction*

The dependent genitive syntactic-semantic construction (C:Noun in nominative+Q:nation Noun in the genitive), or simply ‘x of nation’, construes causal relations between the nation coded in the genitive case and the dependent entity in the nominative case, like *otac nacije* ‘father of the nation’ (see Section 3.3). The method for establishing meronymic relations is defined by a dependent relation of the collocated entity to the lexical concept *nation*. The paronymic (*part of*) structure of the construction ENTITY of NATION can be logically reframed as a componential meronymic relation: NATION HAS AN ENTITY. For example, if there is a father of the nation, then a nation has a father as a meronymic part. The assessment of meronymic profiling of lexical meaning can be much more transparent in this way. The collocation *stvaranje nacije* ‘creation of the nation’, reframed as NATION HAS CREATION (PHASE), profiles the phase of the nation-building sequence, while *pripadnik nacije* ‘member of the nation’ profiles the nation as having members as PARTS. Likewise, the collocation *zdravlje nacije* ‘health of the nation’ should metonymically profile the health of the biological members of the nation.

However, there are some more ambiguous collocations. For instance, *father of the nation* does not profile a male genetic progenitor, but has to do with the male role model that institutes, provides for, and protects his family. The extended FATHER concepts have been partially modified by patriarchal cultural models, ancestor worship, a Christian model for priests, and historical narratives about the founding members of the nation. New conceptualizations focus on some previously established meronymic aspects and diachronically extend the conceptual matrix of the lexeme. All these prototypical extensions (Lakoff 1987) and cultural model modifications of the lexeme *father* are present in the mind, but the ontological nature of the lexeme *nation* as a social institution gets filtered out and prompts the most informationally relevant meronomic component.

Dependent genitive constructions activate cognitive profiling of the ontologically most appropriate entity in the meronymic chain. Appropriateness is established by the complexity of ontological features of the collocated entities as well as the context. Activated senses in the genitive construction are pragmatically useful in the discourse because they construe the *nation* with a rich embodied system of meronymic chains established for each collocated lexical concept.

4.1.3 Meronymy in the thematic object construction

Meronymic profiling of the nation is established with relation to the prototypical object-of-verb class. For example, one of the very frequent processes in this construction is *stvoriti* 'to create'. The ontological complexity level of this process is prototypically related to the emergence of some material object. Schematic features of *creating an object* are inherited by more complex psychological levels for *conceptualizing distinct categories*. This extended meronymic chain is applied to conceptualizing the social institution *nacija* 'nation' as a discrete created thing (for the discussion on the BUILDING mapping see Demata, Marks this volume; Đurović and Silaški this volume, analyse the implications of the CONTAINER mapping). Frequent usage in discourse indicates the importance of this reifying construal for the appraisal of the nation category as an institution and its pragmatic implications.

Extended meronymic chains are more transparent in collocations with ontologically more complex processes, such as *trovati* 'to poison', having biological organisms as prototypical patients or direct argument and the instrument of poisoning as the thematic indirect argument (*to poison somebody*^{PATIENT} *with something*^{INSTRUMENT}).

- (1) Kumice ne tružu naciju, prodaju ispravne proizvode. (Forum.hr)
Sellers [in the open market] do not poison the nation, [they] sell good products.
- (2) ... nacionalna demagogija otrov koji truže naciju uspješnije od ičega drugog. (Sutra.hr)
... national demagogu [is] a poison that poisons the nation more effectively than

One possible analysis of the construction *to poison a nation (with x)* is that the verb metonymically profiles poisoning organisms that are members of the nation (example 1). On the other hand, the meaning of the verb can be meronymically extended to profile the destructive effects of poisoning on more abstract political, economic functions of the nation (example 2). The type of profiling is determined by the indirect argument of the verb that expresses the instrument of poisoning. For instruments of the material class, that is, actual poison, the prototypical profiling ORGANISM FOR NATION is salient; if the instrument refers to the psychological or social class, extended profiling is activated in which the NATION is metaphorically conceptualized as an ORGANISM.

The functions of these constructions are related to the activation of rich embodied knowledge about the influence of material substances on an organism and the subsequent extension of properties to the concept NATION, a conceptual process that enables the metaphorical conceptualization of the nation

as an ORGANISM. Verbs that profile psychological affective experience or cognitive functions, such as *to scare*, *to shame*, *to surprise*, *to make laugh*, *to remind*, saliently profile the COGNIZER FOR NATION metonymic relation. These transitive verbs have prominently human experiencers and cognizers as direct objects. Construing the NATION as an object of these verbs metonymically imposes subjective states of individuals – PART (MEMBERS THAT CAN COGNIZE) FOR WHOLE (SOCIAL GROUP OF COGNIZERS). However, the established metonymic relation can have a reversed emergent meaning that construes the NATION AS A COGNIZER. The pragmatic implication of this construal creates a social appraisal bias that functionally influences the individual's emotions and cognition. The way an individual appraises an event is influenced by the way that other individuals appraise and feel about the same event (Mumenthaler & Sander 2012; Fiske & Taylor 2013).

Lastly, social processes like *to insult*, *to complement*, *to cheat* construe the NATION in terms of PERSONS who can be insulted, complemented, and cheated. However, the metonymic profiling PERSON FOR NATION can have a residual effect of reversed properties projection that imposes PERSONHOOD ON the NATION. This reverse metonymy-based conceptualization of the nation produces a social appraisal bias of adopting and conforming to institutionalized social values (for the discussion of PERSON mappings see Demata, Gomola this volume).

In general, the thematic construction profiles the NATION in the discourse not just as an argument of verbs with appropriate institution complexity, such as *declare* or *institutionalize*, but it frequently construes meronomic components of the NATION as an OBJECT / ORGANISM / PERSON.

4.1.4 Meronymy in the agentive subject construction

Agentive profiling in the agentive construction (see Section 3.4) is established by relating the lexical concept *nacija* 'nation' to the prototypical subject-of-verb class. However, agency is not overt with verbs that profile ontologically less complex types of processes that do not require an agent-like subject, such as *exist*, *become*, *disappear*, *have*, or motion type of processes, like *fall*, *stay* (+participle), *come*. The pragmatic function of these collocations is to frame the nation-building process as a self-emerging entity, avoiding the detailed activation of complex historical and cultural dimensions.

The profiling of agency emerges with verbs related to the biological class. For instance, the verb *živjeti* 'to live' metonymically profiles the presence of nation members or ethnicities, such as *druge nacije koje su živjele u Jugoslaviji* 'other nations that lived in Yugoslavia'. Nevertheless, metonymic construction also projects the living properties onto the lexical concept *nacija* 'nation', creating metaphorical personification effects in the emergent construal. Agency of the nation

is saliently profiled by collocations that profile psychological processes (see example 3):

- (3) To je vidjela cijela nacija.⁵
The whole nation has seen it.

Overt agency in example (3) is avoided by using the adjective *cijela* ‘whole’ that triggers its opposite conceptualization of PARTS and subsequent metonymic profiling. Still, the example frames the nation as a PERCEIVING AGENT. Similar framing with bio-psychological features is present in collocations such as *nacija je odahnula* ‘the nation sighed in relief’, *Hrvatska Nacija je znala*⁶ ‘the Croatian nation knew’, *velike nacije su shvatile*⁷ ‘big nations understood’, as well as in constructions with verbs that profile social interaction: *To je nacija koja je svjetu dala Da Vincija* ‘This is the nation that gave the world Da Vinci’.

The pragmatic function of the agentive subject construction is related to the heightened cognitive relevance and social appraisal when interacting with entities that express features of autonomous agency (Smith & Conrey 2007). The problem is that imposing agency on the constructed social concept is an ontologically complex and a cognitively expensive process. This is corroborated by a significantly smaller number of verbs ($n = 37$) in the agentive than in the thematic collocations ($n = 50+$) in our queries, as well as the overall frequency (subjekt_od: 1523, koga_što: 5019) and collocation scores (subjekt_od: 2.68, koga_što: 8.84). It seems that it is less conventional in discourse, as captured by the hrWaC 2.2 corpus, to conceptualize the nation as a semantic subject rather than a thematic object. Nonetheless, the agentive construction is highly relevant to frame the sense of personhood of a nation and the consequent extensions of its meronymic features for conceptualizing institutional power.

4.2 Metaphor as incongruent profiling of extended meronymic relations

In this section I deal with the emergent process of the discursive conceptualization of the nation – metaphorical mappings. Following conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson 1980/2003; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Lakoff 2008; Musolff 2016), metaphor is defined as a process of understanding one domain in terms of another by using “...one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980/2003: 61). Essentially, metaphorical

5. Source: hrWaC 2.2, index.hr.

6. Source: hrWaC 2.2, politika.com.

7. Source: hrWaC 2.2, zpress.hr.

constructions activate mappings between two concepts that are ontologically unrelated in the referent cultural model.

One of the problems in the formal analysis of metaphor (Gibbs 2017: 58) has been associated with the lack of epistemic and ontological description of concepts. My aim is to formalize the description of conceptual structures by providing an ontology model that indicates the complexity level of construed concepts and meronomic structure of conceptualized entities, properties and processes. Ontological analysis of syntactic-semantic constructions can enable us to detect the emergence of metaphorical mappings from established meronymic relations. Figure 6 presents an example of the ontological analysis of the dependent genitive collocation *rađanje nacije* 'birth of a nation'.

Croatian lexemes *nacija* and *rađanje*, represented as circles, refer to their corresponding concepts NATION and BIRTH that have taxonomic *isA* and meronomic *partOf* relations with other concepts and superclasses. The concept of BIRTH has a meronomic relation to INITIAL PHASE and ORGANISM enabling a meronymic profile of the INITIAL PHASE aspect of the NATION creation sequence and metonymic relation ORGANISM FOR NATION. This established pattern possibly enables the emergent metaphorical conceptualization of NATION AS ORGANISM. A similar process is at work in example (3) *The whole nation has seen it* (Figure 7) (see also 4.1.2).

The verb *vidjeti* 'see' in Figure 7 is represented as a black circle, referring to the process SEE with the prototypical subject SEER, taxonomically related to (at least) the perception class. The construction meronymically profiles the SEER that is meronomically related to the NATION. This leads to the activation of the metaphorical relation NATION AS SEER.

In all these examples, the underlying structure of the *isA* taxonomic and the *isPartOf* meronomic conceptual networks enable the possibility of metaphorical conceptualization of NATION AS X. Essentially, following prominent researchers in the conceptual metonymy and metaphor theory (Barcelona 2000; Radden 2000; Brdar 2007, Stanojević this volume), I claim that metaphorical mappings establish new emergent mental representations using previously established meronymic network relations. Metaphorical constructions meronymically profile a source entity and activate an extension of its meronomic relation that is projected onto the target entity. This new relation violates ontological congruence. The identification of the metaphorical constructions in discourse can thus be formalized as follows:

A syntactic-semantic construction produces a metaphorical conceptualization if the collocated lexemes activate a conceptual representation involving an ontological violation of prototypical relations of the constituents.

The violation is defined as ontologically non-existent in-class inclusion or non-existent mereological relation between lexical concepts that are syntactically




Figure 6. Activation of the metaphorical relation nation as organism in the construction radanje nacije ‘birth of a nation’The n-koga-čega relation indicates thematic syntactic-semantic construal. MeronomicRelation indicates the meronomic ontological relation that a concept has with other concept(s). MeronymicProfiling indicates the profiled concept. MetaphoricRelation indicates the nation as organism conceptual mapping.




Figure 7. Activation of the metaphorical relation nation as seer in the agitive construction. The *subject_of* relation indicates agitive syntactic-semantic construal. *MeronymicRelation* indicates the meronomic ontological relation that a concept has with other concepts. *MeronymicProfiling* indicates the profiled concept. *MetaphoricRelation* indicates the nation as seer conceptual mapping.

joined in the linguistic construction. The metaphorical cognitive function can thus be expressed:

A IsNot B, A hasNotPartsOf B, but process elements of A and elements of B together and map elements of B with A.

The succinct notation *A AS B* captures the definition of the metaphor process more accurately than the conventional, logically incorrect formal notation *A IS B*.

Meronymic profiling and the extension of meronomic properties of the concept of *NATION* establish new conceptual networks that activate new types of conceptualizations about entities, properties and processes related to the framing of the *NATION* in the discourse. We can think of the function of metaphorical mappings of the nation as an inherent human cognitive capability to

expand the knowledge and representation of social reality by using linguistic constructions.⁸

4.3 Pragmatic relevance of metaphors in discourse

Ontological analysis of the syntactic-semantic constructions allows us to reason systematically about the pragmatic functions of metaphorical conceptualizations in terms of discursive epistemic effects. Summarizing the ontological classifications in Sections 3 and 4, the metaphorical construal of the nation has three major mutually complementary cognitive functions: imposing reification, personification and sociocultural identification.

Examples of reification, like *stvaranje nacije* ‘creation of a nation,’ *cijela nacija* ‘whole nation,’ *rađanje nacije* ‘birth of a nation,’ are present in all the examined constructions. The reifying properties cognitively enable the conceptualization of the NATION AS A MATERIAL CLASS OF ENTITY. Specifically, as an EXISTING, EMERGING ENTITY, LOCATED IN SPACE with various PHASES of nation-building processes. Pragmatically, reification imposes a status function on material components of the NATION, such as land, borders, and material symbols.

In constructions like *nacija shvaća* ‘the nation comprehends’⁹ the NATION is conceptualized as a PERSON with a sense of mindfulness and agency. The personification strategy imposes collective intentionality in relation to a social group’s mental states. This can result in social influence bias (Moussaïd et al. 2013) by which individuals adapt their opinion, revise their beliefs, or change their behaviour as a result of social interactions with other people. Collective bias effects are related to manipulating cognitive appraisal of random events and the projection of long-term collective goals as individual desires.

Finally, sociocultural identification profiles the NATION in terms of SOCIAL INTERACTION, CULTURAL NORMS and INSTITUTIONS. In the dominant contemporary understanding of the social identity imposed by global political and economic systems, a person is (at least) administratively categorized as a member of a state. However, that identification is somewhat different from the social identification as a member of a nation. The sense of belonging to a nation is related to the concept of nationalism. Patrick Colm Hogan (2009) defines nationalism as “any form of in-group identification for a group defined in part by reference to a geographical area along with some form of sovereign government over that area.”

8. The metaphors identified in this study are available at the Croatian metaphor repository MetaNet.hr: <http://ihjj.hr/metafore/>.

9. <http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/nobelovac-orhan-pamuk-kritizirao-erdogana-danas-cijela-nacija-shvaca-njegovu-racunicu/847660.aspx>

Nationalism is thus not just identification with a social group that shares positive appraisal and particular political interests based on land, settlement, urban and rural habitation, age and generation, ethnicity, language, etc. Social identification as a member of a nation is defined by the positive assessment of the role that sovereign government has in supporting various political identities and leveraging the process of contesting different political perspectives. We can thus argue that metaphorical mapping like *nacija shvaća* ‘the nation comprehends’ activates the pragmatic frame of imposing the status function on the complex sociocultural entity NATION and modifying the deontic power of its constituents within a particular social reality.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented an ontological analysis method of syntactic-semantic constructions of the concept NATION in Croatian discourse as represented by the hrWaC 2.2 corpus. The premise of this approach is that corpus research of morphosyntactic constructions can reveal culture-specific patterns of metonymic and metaphorical conceptualization in discourse. Each construction can be seen as revealing a layer of components in a multi-layered matrix that represents prototypical conceptualizations of the Croatian lexeme *nacija* ‘nation’. I focused on five types of dependent syntactic-semantic constructions: noun coordination, adjective modifier, dependent genitive, thematic object, agentive subject. The ontological model of lexical concepts and constructions (OMLCC) was used to distinguish meronymic relations in causal configurations that activate the metonymic profile X FOR NATION and enable possible metaphorical processing of NATION AS X. The OMLCC approach shows that the activated metaphorical mappings use established meronymic patterns to form ontologically incongruent extensions and create new emergent metaphorical meanings. The metaphorical conceptualizations of the NATION in syntactic-semantic constructions elicit pragmatic functions of reification, personification and social appraisal. These functions are important for imposing and reinforcing the institutional status of the NATION, a conventionalization of interaction and communication between MEMBERS, as well as the creation of collective IDENTITY that influences a PERSON’s self-appraisal, and vice versa.

The empirical corpus method revealed salient patterns of reorganization and adaptation of communicative knowledge about the nation in discourse. Further research should consider other constructions and show their relevance for the construal of the NATION, as well as detect the cultural, media, genre, gender, personal, or any other type of configuration preferences in different discourses (see Šarić this volume, for a case of cultural analysis).

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Metaphorical and non-metaphorical dimensions of the term *nacija* in Croatian online discourse

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In this chapter I argue that the Croatian term *nacija* ‘nation’ exhibits local rather than global metaphoricity. The study is based on 990 concordances of *nacija* from the hrWaC corpus of online Croatian, combined with several threads focusing on the notion of the nation from an online forum. Metaphors account for one quarter of the corpus examples. They are related to the non-metaphorical aspects of meaning through motivational links, depend on the conceptual characteristics of the grammatical constructions in which they appear, and on conventional extensions of source-domain terms. Forum participants use metaphors to serve current communicative purposes. It is shown that global organizational conceptual metaphors are a sum of local conceptualizations.

Keywords: metaphor, discourse, concepts, nation, Croatian, local, global, Cognitive Grammar

1. Introduction

Metaphors of the nation have a long discursive history going back centuries (see Musolff 2010 for a review; see also Rash, this volume, for a history of German colonialist discourse). Such a view is likely to be valid for a variety of European languages, Croatian included, given the common European heritage. Many of the metaphors identified for English appear in Croatian discourse (see, for example, Šarić 2015). Still, a systematic view of synchronic metaphORIZATION, based on relating corpus concordances and longer stretches of discourse, has not yet been attempted. Generally speaking, it is relatively easy to find metaphorical examples focusing on the idea of nation in Croatian, as in (1a) and (1b):

- (1) a. koga briga kako je u Norveškoj ... pa nećemo valjda zatvarati *cvijet hrvatske nacije*, tko je nama korovu kriv što imamo aute koji se počnu raspadati pri brzini od cca 80 km/h.¹

Who cares what it is like in Norway ... we can't be putting in jail *our nation's best* (literally 'the flower of the Croatian nation'), it's not their fault that we weeds have cars that start falling apart at about 80 km/h.

- b. Uostalom žalosno je što je to jedna ružičasta *ocvala imperijalna nacija* ...

Anyway, it's sad that it is a pink *withered imperial nation*.

Examples (1a) and (1b) show that conceptualizing a nation as a *flower* or *plant* can be easily done in Croatian, tempting the researcher to claim a metaphorical dimension for the terms. Still, the question is where this metaphoricity lies. According to the Lakoffian conceptual view, metaphoricity resides in concepts, embodied in neural networks (Lakoff & Johnson 1999); according to discourse scholars, it resides in individual discourse events (e.g. Cameron 2008). The two views can be seen as complementary, which would suggest a three-dimensional theory, where metaphor is seen as a conceptual, linguistic and communicative phenomenon (Steen 2008).

In this chapter I argue that in metaphor analysis local factors should be taken seriously, without glossing over the details of their semantic, conceptual, historical, discursive and communicative characteristics. Based on a corpus study of the term *nacija* and a qualitative discourse-based study of online forum threads discussing the formation of nations, I claim that the metaphoricity of *nacija* springs from: (1) the non-metaphorical aspects of the meaning of the term, (2) conceptual characteristics of grammatical expressions that are used in potentially metaphorical examples; (3) the conventional metaphorical use of source-domain terms that are combined with *nacija* to form potentially metaphorical examples, and (4) discourse characteristics including metaphor-clustering and what is negotiated in the discourse. I argue that global conceptual metaphors which are often claimed to organize the conceptual structure of a metaphorical concept (such as the nation) are a sum of local conceptualizations. The seeming naturalness of global metaphors arises from their ability to frame aspects of the target concept in a way that is seen as significant, but not because of the natural metaphorical structure of the concept itself.

The chapter starts with a short theoretical discussion of the approaches to metaphors and their methodologies (Section 2). Section 3 describes the methodology

1. All emphases mine, unless otherwise indicated.

used in this chapter, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 contains the discussion and conclusion.

2. Conceptual and discursive approaches to metaphor and their methodologies

The conceptual view of metaphor espoused by Lakoff and colleagues (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Kövecses 2010) relies on claiming the global ability to metaphorize as its basis. The ability to metaphorize has become neural, so that each conceptual connection is seen as a presentation of a neural connection (Feldman 2006). In this view, conceptual metaphors are seen as relatively global. Their globality is evident from the central role a conceptual metaphor may play in the organization of a metaphorical concept. For instance, it has been claimed that the concept LOVE is organized by the LOVE IS A UNITY metaphor, and ANGER by the ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor (Kövecses 1990). Moreover, conceptual metaphors are global in the sense that any time a metaphor is encountered, a set of neural (or at least conceptual) mappings between the two domains making up the metaphor is automatically called up. This is why establishing mappings between concepts is so crucial in the analytical apparatus of the conceptual metaphor approach, as seen from the MetaNet project (David et al. 2014).

It is precisely the establishment of mappings (alongside several other aspects of the theory) that has been criticized from a variety of perspectives (Murphy 1996; McGlone 2007, 2011). In many cases, whether one chooses to posit conceptual-level generalizations based on language data is a matter of one's research position. It is a necessary prerequisite of the conceptual metaphor view. However, discourse theories of metaphors do not go as far as concepts. Cameron's "systematic metaphors" are generalized from discourse events, and, in contrast to conceptual metaphors, are not seen as enduring and conventionalized across genres and discourses (Cameron 2008: 208). Steen's (2008) deliberate metaphor approach is the middle way, espousing a division of labour between various metaphor approaches. Steen does not see linguistic metaphors (*cvijet hrvatske nacije* 'the flower of the Croatian nation' in example (1a)) as being necessarily conceptual metaphors (A NATION IS A PLANT), and points out that certain conventional metaphorical expressions may be explained by lexical disambiguation (as claimed by Giora 2008; see also Steen 2015). He posits that communication is the resolution of the paradox according to which most (linguistic) metaphors are not metaphorically processed. In order to be metaphorically processed, a metaphor needs to be deliberate (Steen 2008), that is, it needs to function as "an instruction for addressees to adopt an 'alien'

perspective on a target referent so as to formulate specific thoughts about that target from the point of view of the alien perspective” (Steen 2014: 180). Based on this, Steen develops procedures for identifying potential linguistic, conceptual and deliberate metaphors (Steen 1999; Steen et al. 2010). In other words, metaphors are global on the conceptual level, but are linguistically and communicatively local. I will return to this matter in Section 5.

2.1 The rationale for the methodology used in this study

Here I would like to offer two methodological extensions: combining a corpus study with a discourse-based study, and exploring each potentially metaphorical example from several perspectives. On the methodological level, the main difference between conceptual and discourse approaches to metaphor is scope. Conceptual approaches tend to focus on a single target domain, emotions being a standard example (e.g. Kövecses 1995, 2012). Certain discourse perspectives also focus on a single target domain, generalizing across discourse events (e.g. Musolff 2004). Other discourse-based approaches focus on metaphorization as a procedure, looking at how metaphors develop for communicative purposes, regardless of source and target domains (e.g. Cameron 2003). I suggest a combination of these approaches, taking a single target domain concept, such as *nacija*, across a variety of uses from a corpus, and combining it with a discourse study. Taking corpus examples permits searching for linguistic metaphors around a single concept, offering a possibility of generalization across different uses, with a potential of finding conventional and non-conventional expressions. The caveat here is that only metaphors containing the lexical concept in question will be found. Thus, examples such as *cvijet hrvatske nacije* ‘the flower of the Croatian nation’ mentioned in (1a) will be found, but examples such as *Hrvatska [je] svojim građanima sve zločestija maćeha* ‘Croatia is an increasingly evil stepmother to its citizens’ (Šarić 2015: 55) will not, because terms for specific nations (such as *Hrvatska* ‘Croatia’) or source-domain words (such as *maćeha* ‘stepmother’) will not be looked for. To offset this problem, I suggest focusing on a brief stretch of running text, which is likely to have metaphorical conceptualizations, and analysing it discursively. This should uncover any conceptualizations that might have been missed, as well as show how metaphors are used for communicative purposes.

Exploring potentially metaphorical examples from several perspectives involves extracting as much information from a single potentially metaphorical corpus example as possible. This includes: checking for source-domain metaphoricality in other contexts, exploring the grammar of metaphorical constructions, and exploring discourse clustering and contestations.

The source-domain word may be checked for metaphoricity in other contexts, which may show whether the metaphoricity of the example is in part due to this fact. Thus, if *cvijet* ‘flower’ in (1a) is used as a source-domain term, what other target-domain terms is it used with, and how? This can provide information on where the metaphorical potential of the entire construction lies: in the combination, or in one of the parts.

The grammatical construction in which an example appears has a bearing on metaphoricity (Stanojević 2009). Potentially metaphorical expressions will primarily be expressed by means of relational constructions, where one word clearly refers to the source domain, and one to the target domain.² This is why metaphors will be expected where the target-domain word such as *nacija* appears as the argument of a verb, as in examples (2a) and (2b) below, or where two nouns are put into some sort of a relationship, for instance by using the genitive case, as in (2c).

- (2) a. ... prodati naciju ...
 ... to sell the nation ...
- b. ... nacija može ... cvasti ...
 ... the nation can blossom ...
- c. otac nacije
 the father of the nation

In contrast, in an adjectival construction such as *velika nacija* ‘a large nation’, the role of the adjectival premodifier is to situate the entity referred to by the noun in the quantitative/qualitative space referred to by the premodifier. Importantly, this space is crucially defined by the entity it relates to. Thus, *nacija* remains *nacija*, and the premodifier *velika* ‘large’ describes one of its characteristics. Premodifiers do not refer to a domain that is outside the concept in question. They are a good diagnostic tool for metaphor, because they refer to a domain that is inherently/internally connected with the target-domain noun (Stanojević, Tralić, and Ljubičić 2014: 150). Constructionality in this grammatical sense is taken up by Perak (this volume).

2. Relationality is defined from the point of view of cognitive grammar, where relations among elements stand in opposition to things (Langacker 2008: 105–12). A “thing” is a technical term for any element that is conceptually independent (typically a noun), and a “relation” is a technical term for any element that is conceptually dependent, typically a verb. From a conceptual point of view, a verbal element (i.e. a relation) requires some sort of a thing to exist (e.g. the verb *walk* is possible only if we think of a thing that is the trajector doing the action of walking).

Each metaphorical example may be discursively linked to others within the same discourse. Potentially metaphorical examples may appear in discursive clusters whereby “speakers or writers suddenly produce multiple metaphors” (Cameron and Stelma 2004: 107).³ This means that the metaphoricity of an expression may be partly due to the fact that the discourse segment is part of a metaphorical cluster. This is the case in example (1a), where the metaphorical expression *cvijet hrvatske nacije* ‘the flower of the Croatian nation’ is closely followed by an expression referring to another group of people as *korov* ‘weeds’. The two metaphorical expressions, *cvijet hrvatske nacije* ‘the flower of the Croatian nation’ and *korov* ‘weeds’ form a metaphor cluster, where the latter is at least in part related to the appearance of the former. Thus, looking at examples where metaphors with *nacija* may be clustered (as in (1a)) will be another clue as to where metaphoricity lies. A variety of critical analyses of metaphor tends to look at examples in this way, primarily qualitatively (see, for example, Vervaet and Čičin-Šain in this volume).

Using metaphors to legitimize and delegitimize different conceptualizations is a staple of political discourse (Charteris-Black 2005). A metaphor may have a “discourse career” (Musolff 2016: 47) where new conceptualizations significantly change the previous ones. A case in point is the “European house,” which may have started as a way for Gorbachev to claim that Russia was simply a part of Europe with all its existing divisions (separate apartments in a block referring to separate countries), and ended up as a cognitive tool enabling the conceptual discussion of the unification of Germany and Europe (Chilton & Ilyin 1993: 28). Each negotiation or contestation lays bare some aspect of the previous conceptualization, in effect changing the metaphor to some extent. Focusing on what aspects are changed, and how, may show what aspects are seen as significant enough to be changed – and hence, again, where metaphoricity lies.⁴

In order to tag each potentially metaphorical expression, a single procedure needs to be used. I adapted the MIV procedure (Metaphor Identification through

3. For an overview of clustering of this type see Kimmel (2010). In contrast, Koller (2003) defines clustering as a property of multiple texts.

4. The process of negotiation and contestation described in this way comes from Critical Discourse Analysis (see, for example, Fairclough 1995). Negotiation may involve taking a term from its original context and recontextualizing it (Linell 1998: 149). Crucial in these descriptions is the intersubjective co-construction of discourse by the participants, as seen in Bauman and Briggs’s view of recontextualization (Baumann & Briggs 1990). Semino, Deignan & Littlemore (2013) describe how metaphor recontextualizations function. In classical conceptual metaphor theory, negotiation and recontextualization are akin to, but by no means the same as, reworking (creating novel linguistic expressions of conventional conceptual metaphors), which is ascribed to poetic language (see Kövecses 2010: 53–55).

Vehicle Terms) developed by Cameron and colleagues.⁵ This procedure is conducive to making individual decisions based on one's own explicit criteria.⁶ To make these decisions easier, the various senses of the target-domain term *nacija* were first defined by combining dictionary data with the most characteristic collocates of the term using the Word Sketch option (Kilgarriff & Tugwell 2001) in the hrWaC corpus.

Based on potentially metaphorical examples, conceptual groupings can be made, which is a necessary step in classical conceptual metaphor analysis. This step, however, has been identified as problematic, particularly in relation to establishing a single conceptual metaphor that would capture a variety of linguistic examples (see, for example, Ritchie 2003). The procedure of going from the linguistic to the conceptual level proposed by Steen (1999) does not lead to unified results because of the need for researcher interpretation, and yields different results if a bottom-up or a top-down approach is taken (Krennmayr 2011: 211–236). In line with this, and Cameron's systematic metaphor approach, I do find value in generalizations, but do not necessarily want to ascribe conceptual reality to thematic groupings (see Deignan 2016 for an overview of argumentation). Therefore I provide thematic groupings of linguistic metaphors on the basis of qualitative analysis techniques.

2.2 The nation and its metaphors

As far as the Croatian lexical concept *nacija* 'nation' is concerned, the results obtained from the corpora and dictionaries will uncover a naïve cultural model of the nation shared by speakers of Croatian. A naïve cultural model refers to structured knowledge determined on the basis of everyday language/understanding (for a definition of folk/naïve cultural models see Kövecses 2010: 325–326). Given that the nation is a social construct, its expert models will to some extent coincide with its naïve model, and boundaries between them will be difficult to draw. Therefore, definitional elements of nations such as "a collective of people," "united by shared cultural features" and "the right to territorial self-determination" (Barrington 1997: 712–713) are likely to coincide. In contrast, elements such as being held together by imagined links (in the sense of Anderson's (1991) imagined

5. <http://creet.open.ac.uk/projects/metaphor-analysis/procedure.cfm?subpage=discourse-data>. Accessed 17 April 2017.

6. In the MIP (Pragglejazz 2007) and MIPVU procedures (Steen et al. 2010), this is done by means of a dictionary. It works well for English, because of corpus evidence used in lexicography. However, corpus-based dictionaries do not exist for Croatian, and lexicographers use their intuition rather than corpora.

communities) are likely to be related to expert models (for some other expert models of the nation see Šarić 2015: 57–60; also see Marks this volume). Looking at models as naïve or expert may also relate to the potential globality of metaphors, which will be taken up in Section 5.

Although there has been no systematic study of metaphorization of the lexical concept *nacija* in Croatian, the existing description by Šarić (2015) gives reason to believe that, similarly to English, personification and family metaphors will prevail on the global level. Looking at each usage event individually will allow an exploration of the extent to which global conceptualizations influence local ones. In other words, going back to examples (1a) and (1b), is the *flower/plant* conceptualization a matter of the metaphorical cultural model of the nation, is it a global factor which will influence our understanding of nations, or is it a matter of discourse development and use? On a more general level, it will be possible to make some claims about why certain conceptualizations were used and whether their metaphoricity lies in their globality or their locality.

3. The procedure used in this study

A three-step procedure was used in this study. In the first step, the most common senses of *nacija* were established by combining dictionary data (from the Croatian Language Portal online dictionary)⁷ with the most characteristic collocates of the term using the Word Sketch option in the hrWaC corpus. This first step establishes a baseline for the determination of potentially metaphorical examples in the following steps. The second step was a corpus study of *nacija* in the hrWaC corpus. Using the lemma function, a total of 56,822 examples of *nacija* were obtained, and reduced to a random sample of 1000 tokens. Examples which were incorrectly tagged (10 in total) were removed, and the remaining 990 examples were manually analysed according to the following procedure:

1. Each example was tagged according to whether it contained a potentially metaphorical expression using the MIV procedure, based on a comparison with the non-figurative senses of *nacija*.
2. Potentially metaphorical examples were grouped according to common source domains.

7. <http://hjp.znanje.hr/>. Accessed 18 April 2016.

3. Each metaphorical example was coded according to the grammatical status of *nacija* in the metaphorical example. A simplified procedure developed by Stanojević (2009) was used, looking for three categories: premodification of *nacija* (e.g. *velika nacija* ‘large nation’), genitive construction (e.g. *cvijet nacije* ‘flower of the nation’), and examples where *nacija* appears as the argument of a verb (e.g. *nacija ... može cvasti* ‘the nation can blossom’, *prodati naciju* ‘sell the nation’).
4. Each source domain term combining with *nacija* was checked to see whether it is conventionally used in other metaphorical expressions.
5. Each potentially metaphorical example was checked for possible clustering within 15–30 words to the left and right of the word *nacija*.

In the third step, a discourse-based study was performed. I used a Webcorp search of the forum.hr domain for all cases of the term *nacija*. Based on this, I identified 6 threads where *nacija* was the central topic, and where it was used at least 10 times. The forum threads ranged from 2004 to 2015, belonged to the “Politics” subforum, and had a total of 42,000 words.⁸ I performed a qualitative analysis of all of the posts, focusing on the type of negotiation of metaphorical items related to *nacija*.

4. Results

In this section the results are presented starting with the aspects of meaning (Section 4.1), followed by potentially metaphorical examples and their thematic groupings (Section 4.2), grammatical analysis (Section 4.3), lexical schematicity (Section 4.4) and discourse-based analysis (Section 4.5).

4.1 Aspects of meaning

Two meanings of *nacija* are listed in the Croatian Language Portal dictionary: (1) a community (ethnic, political, cultural), as in *hrvatska nacija* ‘the Croatian nation’,

8. All of the available pages of the following subforums were analysed:

<http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=300095>, <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=549094>, <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=43160>, <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=893619>, <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=753987>, <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=359739>. All accessed 18 April 2016.

(2) the inhabitants of a country (as in *smeta me čuđenje nacije* ‘the fact that the nation is surprised bothers me’).⁹

Collocational data show that *nacija* refers to people brought together by a *common element* into a single group. This *common element* may be territorial, cultural, or geographic, which is the “classical” definition of nation, as seen from the first meaning in the dictionary (collocates include *američka nacija* ‘the American nation’, *hrvatska nacija* ‘the Croatian nation’, as well as *europske nacije* ‘European nations’). The *common element* seems to have been established through nation-building (as in *nacija stvorena iz* ‘a nation created from’), based on, for instance, shared heritage, values and (in)divisibility. Examples include *homogenizacija nacije* ‘the homogenization of the nation’ (i.e. bringing the various aspects that the nation shares closer together, so that it is easier to find a common element), *duh nacije* ‘spirit of the nation’ (referring to an elusive common element the nation shares), and *nedjeljiva nacija* ‘indivisible nation’ (the common characteristics are so strong that, regardless of disuniting forces, the nation can be seen as a single entity). Nation-building (as a process) is also an element of the expert model of the nation (for an overview see Kolstø 2000: 16 29), itself metaphorical.

In the second sense, people as members of a nation are focused on. Examples include *državljanin nacije* ‘a citizen of the nation’ and *djeca naše nacije* ‘children in our nation’ (non-metaphorical, referring to children who are part of the nation). In addition to being brought together by the territorial or cultural element, people living in a nation may also enjoy a variety of activities, or may have a variety of other characteristics that they may share. Ethnicity or geographic region is taken for granted, and other common characteristics of the people living in a particular space/nation are put to the fore. Examples include *nogometna nacija* ‘football nation’ (e.g. the people from this nation love football), *obeshrabriti naciju* ‘discourage the nation’ (as in making the people in a nation feel discouraged), *debeloguza nacija* ‘fat-bottomed nation’ (as in people in this nation have fat bottoms).

4.2 Potentially metaphorical expressions and their groups

The results presented in Section 4.1 are helpful in establishing the non-metaphorical basis for the determination of conceptual metaphors. They show that a “nation” may refer to people living in a particular region, seen as a single entity or seen

9. http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=e1dlWxA%3D&keyword=nacija. Accessed 17 April 2017.

as a group made out of individuals. Therefore, using a variety of people-related vehicle terms is to be expected from the meaning of the word, as well as from the discourse history of the nation as a person.

Not all people-related combinations are necessarily metaphorical, though, and many are straightforward metonymies. I defined the distinction between metaphor and metonymy in the data based on reference to the nation as a group of individuals or a single reified entity. If the term was seen as a group of individuals (no matter how large), the examples were treated as metonymies, as in the following example:

- (3) ... drastično smanjenje propisivanja uglavnom neefikasnih lijekova, *pretvaranje bolesne nacije u zdravu* ...
 ... a drastic decline in prescribing largely inefficient drugs, *turning a sick nation into a healthy one* ...

In example (3) the construction *pretvaranje bolesne nacije u zdravu* ‘turning a sick nation into a healthy one’ refers to the nation seen as a group of individuals. The healthy nation is healthy because of the literal health of its people, which is not the case in example (4):

- (4) Lustracija je svakako nužna za *zdravlje nacije*. Bez nje nećemo uskoro postat normalna zemlja zapadne uljudbe.
 Lustration is certainly necessary for the *health of the nation*. Without it, we will not become a normal country of western civilizational values any time soon.

In example (4), the health of the nation is metaphorical: the nation is portrayed as a single reified entity, and its health refers to civilizational goals rather than the literal health of the people living there. This type of reasoning was used in all examples where personification was seen as a possibility. Wherever necessary, wider context was included in the decision-making process. This can be seen in example (5):

- (5) Težak i neočekivan poraz *bacio je u očaj cijelu naciju*. Taj je osjećaj najbolje opisao jedan naš navijač, koji ...
 The heavy and unexpected defeat *threw the entire nation into despair*. That feeling was best described by one Croatian fan, who ...

In example (5), the second sentence makes it clear that the feeling of despair refers to individual fans, who are metonymically referenced as *nacija* in the previous sentence. Such use is common when referring to feelings and thoughts of a group of people. In the case of doubts, I erred towards metaphor, using the principle of “when-in-doubt-leave-it-in” suggested by Steen and colleagues (Steen et al. 2010).

Finally, the metaphor-metonymy criterion does not negate the fact that examples like (4) are motivationally metonymic.

Table 1 presents the results of establishing potentially metaphorical examples in this way, and shows that most examples were not metaphorical, nearly a quarter were metonymies of the type presented in example (3), and the remaining 16.46% were metaphorical:

Table 1. Metaphorical and non-metaphorical conceptualizations of *nacija*

Not metaphorical	592	59.80%
Metonymy	235	23.74%
Metaphor	163	16.46%
Total	990	100%

This suggests that the lexical concept *nacija* ‘nation’ is not as metaphorical as some other concepts like emotions, where metaphors account for roughly half of the entire sample, where a similar method has been used (Stanojević, Tralić & Ljubičić 2014: 147).¹⁰

Tables 2 and 3 present metaphorical conceptualizations grouped into common source-domain themes based on a qualitative analysis (see my comments in Section 2 on this process). I am making no claims as to their conceptual status: I see these groupings as common themes, which have been extracted by trying to keep as close as possible to the meaning of each linguistic example.

Table 2. Metaphorical conceptualizations according to thematic groups (people)

Thematic group	Examples	Number of examples
feelings	<i>ponos nacije</i> ‘the pride of the nation’, <i>međusobna netrpeljivost naših nacija</i> ‘mutual hostility between our nations’	28
body	<i>geni hrvatske nacije</i> ‘the genes of the Croatian nation’, <i>mrlja na obrazu nacije</i> ‘a stain on the face of the nation’	15
human activity, behaviour	<i>nacija riskira da srlja u masovni kič i šund</i> ‘the nation risks rushing into mass kitsch and trash’, <i>ako se nacije bune</i> ‘if nations rebel’	13

10. For a different view, which starts from ontology rather what I refer to as “aspects of meaning” see Perak (this volume).

Table 2. (Continued)

Thematic group	Examples	Number of examples
health	<i>zdravlje nacije</i> 'the health of the nation', <i>stanje nacije</i> 'the condition of the nation', <i>održati naciju na aparatima</i> 'keep the nation on life support'	10
family	<i>otac nacije</i> 'the father of the nation', <i>obitelj EU nacija</i> 'a family of EU nations', <i>razmažena djeca nacije</i> 'spoilt children of the nation'	9
mental state/ activity	<i>svijest nacije</i> 'awareness of the nation', <i>nacija hipnotizirana nadom u ... pobjedu</i> 'a nation hypnotized by its hope of winning'	7
possession	<i>opljačkati naciju</i> 'rob the nation', <i>kulturno dobro jedne nacije</i> 'a cultural possession of the nation'	6
birth	<i>rođenje nacije</i> 'the birth of a nation'	6
force	<i>najmoćnija nacija na svijetu</i> 'the most powerful nation in the world'	6
survival	<i>opstanak nacije</i> 'the survival of the nation'	5
communication	<i>nijedna nacija nema pravo kazati</i> 'no nation has the right to say'	4
benefit	<i>dobrobit nacije</i> 'the wellbeing of the nation'	4
interpersonal	<i>odnosi među nacijama</i> 'relations between nations'	4
soul	<i>duša nacije</i> 'the soul of the nation'	3
life	<i>demokratski život nacije</i> 'democratic life of the nation'	3
law court	<i>cijela nacija na optuženičkoj klupi</i> 'the whole nation on the accused's bench'	2
slavery	<i>porobljene nacije</i> 'enslaved nations'	2
clothing	<i>zavio naciju u crno</i> 'make miserable' (literally 'shroud the nation in black')	1
hunger	<i>dobit će nacija [investicije, ideje, tehnologiju]</i> <i>koliko dostaje da ne bude gladna</i> 'the nation will get sufficient [investments, ideas, technologies] so as not to be hungry'	1
	Total	129

Table 3. Metaphorical conceptualizations according to thematic groups (other)

Thematic group	Examples	Number of examples
object, size, manipulation	<i>velika/mala nacija</i> 'large, small nation', <i>prodati naciju</i> 'sell the nation', <i>izgurati naciju s povijesne scene</i> 'push the nation off the historical stage'	20
animals/hunting	<i>čistokrvna nacija</i> 'purebred nation', <i>nacija je katoličkog pedigreea</i> 'the nation has a catholic pedigree', <i>nacija može postati vuk</i> 'the nation can become a wolf', <i>klopka u koju je upala njemačka nacija</i> 'the snare that the German nation fell into'	4
plant/flower	<i>ocvala nacija</i> 'withered nation', <i>cvijet hrvatske nacije</i> 'the flower of the Croatian nation', <i>nacija može opstati i cvasti</i> 'the nation can survive and blossom'	3
building	<i>temelj za naciju</i> 'foundation for the nation', <i>izgradnja nacije</i> 'building the nation'	3
music	<i>novokomponirana nacija</i> 'newly composed nation', <i>prva violina u nacijama</i> 'the first fiddle among the nations'	2
machine	<i>pokretačka osovina nacija</i> 'the driving shaft of nations'	1
weaving	<i>isprepliću [se] različite nacije</i> 'different nations are interweaving'	1
	Total	34

Conceptualizing the nation through a variety of people-related aspects (Table 2) is most common, and accounts for 79.14% of all metaphorical conceptualizations. This is not particularly surprising, given the fact that these metaphors are motivationally related to the above-mentioned metonymy, as well as the discourse history of the term. We can easily talk about nations as people, whether we are referring to a single nation and its development (formation as birth, what it does, how it feels), as well as its relationship with other nations (as friends, members of the family, etc.). Non person-related examples (Table 3) account for the remaining 20.86% of potential metaphors, with most referring to reifying *nacija* as some sort of an object in a three-dimensional space that allows manipulation, or reference to its size.

Looking at the number of examples in each of the common themes, these results suggest that we do not require as complex a matrix of different domains to metaphorize *nacija* as we do for emotions. We mainly transfer our knowledge

about people to *nacija*. Therefore, metaphors around *nacija* may not be global in the sense of being (synchronically) absolutely necessary in talking about the concept, as seen from their overall number, motivational characteristics and types. In order to explore their nature further, we turn to their other characteristics: grammatical and discursive.

4.3 Grammatical characteristics

The examples were classified according to the grammatical structure of the potential linguistic metaphor: whether *nacija* appeared with a premodifier (*velika nacija* 'large nation'), as part of a genitive phrase (*otac nacije* 'the father of the nation'), or as an argument of a verb, a trajector (*nacija može cvasti* 'the nation can blossom'), or a landmark (*prodati naciju* 'sell the nation').¹¹ The results are presented in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Potential metaphors according to grammatical constructions

The results show that premodifiers and postmodifiers account for 12% of the 163 metaphors, with most metaphors appearing in the other examples, which are relational in nature. This suggests that there is no inherent conceptual reason to

11. In Langacker's cognitive grammar, "trajector" and "landmark" are the participants given primary and secondary prominence at any given level of organization (Langacker 2008: 378). In the case of verb-noun combinations, they correspond to the subject and object of the verb.

metaphorize *nacija*. In fact, premodifiers are used with *nacija* in 439 cases, out of which only 18 (4.1%) are metaphorical. Most non-metaphorical premodifiers refer to *nacija* as a country or a geographical area (as in *istočnoeuropske nacije* ‘East-European nations’, i.e. countries in Eastern Europe). Most metaphorical expressions with premodifiers refer to the size of a nation (*mala/velika nacija* ‘small/large nation’), and do not include any other of its dimensions.

Metaphors largely appear in relational examples. The genitive construction, where two nouns are placed in some sort of relationship (e.g. *otac nacije* ‘the father of the nation’), is the most numerous among them. In general, the genitive allows any noun-noun combination as long as there is a way to imagine or construe a relationship between them, with one giving access to the other (Langacker 1993; Stanojević & Cvikić 2010). This is precisely why it can easily be metaphorical. On the one hand, each noun in this construction has a clear reference – one usually to the target domain, and the other to the source domain. On the other hand, the nature of the relationship between the two entities need not be specified. In the case of conventional metaphorical combinations, the relationship will tend to be recoverable from the most frequent meanings of the genitive (e.g. parts/wholes, material, position, family relationship), and in other cases it should be recoverable from the context (or we risk not making sense).

In the trajector and landmark constructions, the grammatical relationship between *nacija* and the verb will also determine metaphoricity. Thus, when *nacija* is the trajector of the verb, it will necessarily be seen as more clearly singled out in the configuration (Langacker 2008: 113), and will hence have more potential for activity. If this activity is not conventionally part of the description of *nacija*, the expression will be more easily seen as metaphorical. In *nacija može ... cvasti* ‘the nation can blossom’, the trajector *nacija* – an active element – is combined with the verb *cvasti* ‘blossom’, which is typically used of flowers. Hence, constructions where *nacija* is used as the trajector are the second most frequent among potentially metaphorical expressions.

When *nacija* is the landmark of the verb, its focal prominence is lower than that of the trajector. Therefore, only very schematic characteristics of the landmark are determined by the verb. For instance, in *prodati naciju* ‘sell the nation’, the verb requires some sort of entity that can be sold, but the characteristics of the entity need not necessarily be very physical (which would make it easier to see the example as a metaphor). The verb is schematic and can be combined with nearly any entity. Although we have counted these examples as metaphorical, in Section 4.4 we will discuss their possible lexical schematicity. This is precisely why these examples account for only 16% of the total metaphorical examples.

The potential for metaphoricity of different grammatical constructions is different depending on their conceptual characteristics. The results for *nacija* suggest

that metaphors appear most frequently when both the target and the source domain are explicitly spelled out by nouns (in the genitive construction), and not when internal dimensions of *nacija* are described using premodifiers. In terms of where metaphoricity lies, then, part of its potential is in the conceptual characteristics of grammatical construction. In this sense, metaphoricity is not only global and conceptual (determined solely by the concept in question), but also local and linguistic (governed by the lexical concept and its use in a particular grammatical construction; also see Deignan 2006).

4.4 Lexical schematicity

Not all of the metaphorical conceptualizations described above are unique for *nacija* 'nation', which is to be expected because various target concepts may employ a number of common source domains (see Kövecses 2010). Thus, metaphorical expressions depend on the aspects of meaning of *nacija*, as well as on the meaning potential of the source-domain lexical item. In effect, if the scope of the source domain is relatively broad, it admits connections with nearly any target-domain item that may have a certain relatively schematic characteristic.

Let us return to *prodati naciju* 'sell the nation', where the nation is seen as a (potentially relatively physical) entity that one can sell (see example (6)).

- (6) ...imamo more predsjednika uprava, direktora i managera, koji su u stanju *prodati naciju* i nacionalne interese za probitak poduzeća u kojemu rade.
... we have a sea of chairmen of the board, executives and managers who would be willing to *sell out the nation* and national interests so as to advance the company they work for.

In example (6), *prodati* 'sell' depends on the cultural model of morality (Johnson 1987) whereby any action is part of the moral world and can be assessed from a moral perspective. *Prodati* 'sell' refers to a negatively assessed action which receives inadequate compensation. In (6), the nation and national interests are somehow sold out (i.e. betrayed) for personal gain (which is seen as morally wrong, based on the cultural model of morality). This meaning depends on the conventional metaphorical meaning of *prodati* 'sell' listed in the dictionary, and is visible from conventional constructions such as *prodavati maglu* 'cheat' (literally 'sell fog'), *prodavati muda pod bubrege* 'cheat' (literally 'sell balls as kidneys'), *prodati dušu vragu* 'sell yourself out' (literally 'sell your soul to the devil'),¹² all of which contain the morality aspect. Therefore, the metaphorical conceptualization

12. http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=dl9lXBE%3D&keyword=prodati. Accessed 17 April 2017.

is not specific to *nacija*. What *nacija* brings to the combination in (6) is further specified by the conventional phrase *nacionalni interesi* ‘national interests’. This phrase hinges on the fact that many people make up a nation, and that their needs taken together (based on the morality conceptualization) outweigh the needs of the few (e.g. individual companies). In other words, it is unnecessary for *nacija* to be considered a single physical entity in this sort of conceptualization; all that we need is a metonymic connection to the morality metaphor, which can be achieved through the non-metaphorical aspect of meaning whereby people live in nations.¹³ Similar argumentation works for other examples where *nacija* is the landmark, where the schematicity of the verb allows use with a variety of items. For instance, *homogenizirati naciju/portfelj/desnicu/javnost/sustav* ‘homogenize the nation/a business portfolio/the (political) right/the public/a system’ does not necessarily require seeing these varied elements as liquids (suggested by *homogenizirati* in its literal sense), but simply as entities composed of varied individual elements.

A similar argument can be adduced for some other genitive examples, such as *otac nacije* ‘the father of the nation’ and *puls nacije* ‘the pulse of the nation’. *Otac nacije* ‘the father of the nation’ refers to a male person who is to be credited with having an important role in the nation-building process (seen as something positive). It can be used of someone only in retrospect (once the nation has been successfully built). Data from the hrWaC corpus shows that *otac* ‘father’ is used in a similar sense with a variety of other terms, including *otac psihoanalize* ‘the father of psychoanalysis’, *otac teorije* ‘the father of the theory’, *otac povijesti* ‘the father of history’, *otac projekta* ‘the father of the project’, *otac perestrojke* ‘the father of perestroika’. All of these are conventional (i.e. appear multiple times in the corpus), and none of them necessitate seeing psychoanalysis, theories, history, projects or the nation as a family, or, more precisely, as children. They require seeing these concepts as being an intellectual exercise, which relies on some sort of abstract, usually mental effort that a single male person has put in for this entity to be realized. If anything, then, they depend on the human ability to have ideas and realize them. In this sense, the crucial part of the metaphor is the aspect of creation, and *otac* ‘father’ is a way of metaphorizing the creator. The entity that is created does not inherently have any other aspects of meaning that depend on its internal structure, other than that of being created by the creator.

13. This is one way in which my approach differs from Perak’s chapter in this volume. The difference boils down to how “liberal” or “conservative” one is in assigning metaphors: my analysis is relatively “conservative” (and takes the metonymic basis of metaphor as crucial), and Perak’s is more “liberal,” taking ontology violation as the defining characteristic.

The children/family aspect is a potential corollary of the expression *otac nacije* 'the father of the nation', but does not entail personification of the nation within a family. Thus, for this particular expression, the family need not be taken as part and parcel of the nation concept. Rather, using the father conceptualization plays on the fact that a nation may be built.

Similarly, *puls nacije* 'the pulse of the nation' refers to ascertaining a shared sentiment of a group of people based on looking at external signs. Data from the corpus and the dictionary show that *puls* is conventionally used in this sense.¹⁴ Large groups of people are referred to metonymically as a single entity or a physical or conceptual area (*puls javnosti/grada/tržišta* 'the pulse of the public/the city/the market'), and ascertaining the shared interest is referred to by a number of verbs (*opipati/oslušivati/ispitivati puls* 'feel/listen to/examine the pulse'). Therefore, *puls nacije* 'the pulse of the nation' depends on the cultural model of emotions captured by the word *puls* 'pulse' (emotions being hidden within us and visible through physical symptoms). It is consistent with the nation being conceptualized as a human body, but this conceptualization is by no means required in the conventional expression.

It is impossible to offer a detailed discussion of every metaphorical example from the corpus in this way, which would be the only way to capture the subtle differences between them. However, I have checked how many of the metaphorical examples in some way depend on conventional expressions that are metaphorical in a variety of other constructions. This happens in 80/163 (49.08%) of the cases. It shows that positing a conceptual link is sometimes a convenient fiction, which does not say very much about the metaphorical construal of *nacija*, but crucially depends on the other combinations of the source-domain term. Rather than being related to how the target domain concept is metaphorized, these metaphorical examples may be more local, and at least to some extent dependent on the other combinations of the source-domain term.

4.5 Discourse-based perspective

In this section I will present the discursive view of the potential metaphorical expressions. I focus on some of the potentially metaphorical expressions from the hrWaC corpus, showing that in some cases their potential metaphoricity depends on the broader discourse. Then, I present the results of the discursive analysis of

14. http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=d11iXBg%3D&keyword=puls. Accessed 20 August 2017.

the forum threads to explore to what extent metaphorical conceptualizations of *nacija* are discussed and contested.

4.5.1 *Discourse clusters and potentially metaphorical expressions*

One of the reasons why some potentially metaphorical examples appear in the corpus is clustering. Let us look at two examples of concordances from hrWaC with a wider context.

- (7) [preporučio bih] ... ovim alpskim Hrvatima (pošto su “*novokomponirana*” *nacija*, kao i bošnjaci) da ...

[I would suggest to] ... these Alpine Croats (given that they are a *newly-composed nation*, just like Bosniaks) to ...

In (7), *novokomponirana nacija* ‘newly-composed nation’ is a derogatory term that refers to the Bosniak nation. It comes from *novokomponirana/novokomponovana muzika* ‘newly-composed music’ used in the former Yugoslavia to refer to a music style which appeared as a hybrid based on the influence of traditional Serbian and Bosnian folk music.¹⁵ *Alpski Hrvati* ‘Alpine Croats’ is a derogatory term for Slovenes negating their national origin. Overall, what seems to be a potential metaphorical expression that relates nations to music to describe nation-building, is also due to the conventional metonymic connection between *novokomponirana muzika* ‘newly-composed music’ and Bosnians. The term *alpski Hrvati* ‘Alpine Croats’ provides a connection with knowledge about the former Yugoslavia (necessary for understanding both expressions), and the derogatory nature of both monikers is a way to establish emotional cohesion in the entire comment (similar to metaphorical working-through discussed by Stanojević and Čičin-Šain (2015)). Similarly, in example (8), the construal depends on reusing a single construction as part of the entire metaphorical cluster:

- (8) ... plaćaju ogromne iznose novca za ‘*izgradnju demokracije*’ na Balkanu. *Izgradnja nacije* je ustvari lozinka za društveni inženjering lijevog krila ...

... they pay huge amounts of money for ‘*construction of democracy*’ in the Balkans. *The construction of the nation* is in fact a code for social engineering by the left wing ...

Izgradnja nacije ‘construction of the nation’ is potentially metaphorical because it refers to the nation as an item that may be constructed/built. However, *izgradnja* ‘construction’ is repeated from *izgradnja demokracije* ‘the construction of

15. <http://www.leksikon-yu-mitologije.net/novokomponovana-narodna-muzika/>. Accessed 20 August 2017.

democracy’, and is also related to *društveni inženjering* ‘social engineering’ following it. Moreover, the definition of *izgradnja nacije* ‘construction of the nation’ as *ustvari lozinka za društveni inženjering lijevog krila* ‘in fact a code for social engineering by the left wing’, contains a negative evaluation of what nation-building in this context refers to, i.e. it is in fact defined as social engineering (a way to manipulate people without them knowing it). Finally, both terms with *izgradnja* ‘construction’ appear in inverted commas, suggesting that the writer of the post is hedging about their use (it is a term used by someone else that the writer does not endorse). Overall, the potentially metaphorical expressions form a cluster, with the source domain of building (as a process) being used across two different target domains. Although we can claim that democracy and nation are conceptually related, the discourse factors of repeating the same expression, and its negative evaluation, certainly need to be taken seriously in their interpretation.

Metaphorical clustering within 15–30 words to the left and right of the word *nacija* appears in 25.77% (42/163) of metaphorical examples. This again suggests that there are at least some examples where potentially metaphorical expressions have a discursive source, which should be seen as at least as important as the conceptual one. This source is local, rather than global: it depends on the current needs of the communication.

4.5.2 *Legitimization and delegitimization in the forum*

One way to extend the discussion of metaphors as discourse-based is to look at what sort of metaphorical representations are produced to contest the metaphors of others. For this we turn to the forum data. The selected forums discuss nations in the Balkans and in Europe (see Section 3 for selection criteria). They are part of a very lively and large *forum.hr* online community, with many participants. In the “Politics” subforum that all of the threads belong to, a relatively clear division between camps is regularly visible, certainly including the rightist and the leftist camps (and, in some subforums, some other camps). The differences between them include, among many others, their attitudes towards the role, status and formation of nations in the former Yugoslavia and in Europe.

As expected, the forum threads abound in examples of disputing, discussing, taking ownership of, and reconceptualizing various concepts that other people use. What is at stake when *nacija* is contested in this way is always very specific rather than global. Even if metaphorical conceptualizations of *nacija* are laid bare by the interlocutors, they do not question the underlying conceptual essence to offer a new conceptualization. Rather, language is always reused as a quote, generally to provide a ludic element. In (9) this is done using the word *pola* ‘half’ when talking about mixed marriages (in the former

Yugoslavian context, mixed marriages referred to the spouses being of different ethnic groups).

(9) A: A šta ako je neko iz mešovitog braka :misli?: Napr. pola Slovenac a pola Makedonac

B: Pa taj je Bosanac ... Tj ... na pola puta ... do Makedonije! :mig:¹⁶

A: And what if someone is from a mixed marriage? E.g. half Slovene and half Macedonian.

B: He is Bosnian then; i.e. half way ... to Macedonia! :wink:

Person A talks about mixed marriages based on the cultural model in which we conceive of people as being the sum of the characteristics and heritages of their parents. If the heritages are different, the person is “mixed,” otherwise they are “pure.” This is in line with thinking about nations as the sum of its people. In the reply, B plays with the location of Slovenia and Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia and the word *pola* ‘half’. This results in a blend (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner 2003), whereby knowledge about physical distances is blended with knowledge about mixing heritage, which allows physical distances to be used to measure heritage in the integrated space. Thus, “a mixed person” is neither in Slovenia nor in Macedonia, i.e. they are half way between the two countries, which is (geographically) Bosnia. This conceptualization to some extent questions the way we conceptualize national purity, which is a metaphorical concept. However, communicatively speaking, the reconceptualization does not serve to provide a different view as a way to legitimize one conceptualization by delegitimizing an existing one. Rather, it is ludic in nature, and its humorous effect provides a way of bringing the forum participants together, rather than to contest representations.

Metaphorical representations may also depend on extending metaphors to refer to a variety of domains, which is done in three instances of referring to sheep in example (10) below.

(10) A: Možda stvarno jednog dana budu svi ljudi samo građani svijeta?

B: Oni će gospodariti, samo dok nas drže izdijeljene (*u torovima*)

C: da budemo kao ameri? bez ukusa, mirisa i osjećaja za stvarnost? ne hvala ... sad su izmislili neku svoju naciju i tradiciju *jer su uvidjeli kolike su u stvari ovce*.

16. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?p=12213824>. Accessed 18 April 2016.

- D: Ma nije nacija nešto loše i negativno, samo obilježje nacije nisu granice, životni čisti prostor, nego jezik, običaji, kultura, bilo bi šteta da se to izgubi ...
- C: Gdje ti živiš čovek. Gdje vidiš te nacije!? *Od njih su ostala samo stada za šišanje i pljačkanje*, a moderne su nacije tzv. liberalne iliti državljanske. Pa ti je danas tvoj “sugrađanin” i Hrvat i Austrijanac, i Amerikanac, i Crnogorac, i Bošnjak, i Nigerijac, i Srbin (iz Srbije) ... – jer su i ako su HRVATSKI DRŽAVLJANI.¹⁷
- A: Maybe one day all people will be nothing but citizens of the world?
- B: They will rule, while keeping us apart (*in sheepfolds*)
- C: So that we can become like Americans? No flavour, scent or feeling of reality? No thanks ... now they have made up some sort of nation and tradition of their own because *they realized that they are nothing but sheep*.
- C: Nation is not something bad and negative, but nations are not defined by borders, clean living space, but by language, customs, culture, it would be a shame if that were lost ...
- C: Where do you live, man. Where do you see these nations? *Nothing but herds to be sheared and robbed* are left of them, and modern nations are so-called liberal or citizenship-based. That’s why your “fellow citizen” is a Croat as well as an Austrian, as well as an American, as well as a Montenegrin, as well as a Bosnian, as well as a Nigerian, as well as a Serb (from Serbia) ... – because they are and if they are CROATIAN CITIZENS.

B’s post where people living in different nations are seen as being kept apart in sheepfolds is an elaboration of nations being separate from each other, being linked to states and having borders. This rests on the conceptualization whereby any bounded space may be conceptualized as a container. It is also connected to our knowledge of people making up nations, and the possibility of metaphorizing people as animals. The dysphemism of herding people as sheep, based on the cultural model of sheep being stupid and blindly following rulers/leaders, is also present. C’s response continues the metaphorical theme by commenting on the fact that Americans had to invent their nation and traditions, having realized that they are nothing but sheep (i.e. stupid). This is a recontextualization of B’s contribution, but it is not metaphorical in the same sense as above, because it is not a comment on the nation in general. In the final post in the segment, C extends this meaning to stupid sheep who are now being sheared and robbed, because of a liberal economy. Shearing the sheep of wool

17. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=43160>. Accessed 18 April 2016.

is metaphorically conceptualized as robbing them of their possessions, which is then connected with liberal economy. What we see in (10) is that potential metaphoricity is based on reusing and recontextualizing a previously mentioned textual element. The conceptual scope is not common, i.e. various aspects of source domain knowledge are employed, reworking the metaphor. The potentially metaphorical items themselves do not lay bare the general metaphorical conceptualization, but are rather local, a way to make a particular point at a particular time in the discourse.¹⁸

The remaining metaphorical reworkings and recontextualizations are similar in this respect, being local rather than global, i.e. depending on the current communicative need. Thus, although they start with an existing metaphor, they do not offer new general conceptualizations, but rather new local ones. This comes as no surprise. Various examples of recontextualized metaphors in public discourse are in fact similar in this respect: one uses an existing textual element and changes it locally. Their global nature springs from a discourse-historical view of its development. This is precisely the reason why *nacija* is not globally questioned – all of the metaphorical aspects that are questioned are local, and would become global only when a sufficient number of language-users employed them in a variety of ways, conventionalizing a particular view. If we take this sociocultural view and extend it to conceptual metaphor, it would suggest that what seems as its current globality stems from its social and discursive aspect at least as much as from the conceptual one.

5. Discussion and conclusion: Where does the metaphoricity of *nacija* lie?

The global metaphoricity of the nation concept uncovered in the literature (Musolff 2010; Šarić 2015) is not reflected on the level of the Croatian term *nacija*: quantitatively only a quarter of all examples are metaphorical, and qualitatively, they depend on conceptual characteristics of the grammatical constructions, lexical schematicity of source-domain terms, and discourse clustering. Each of these levels works locally, rather than globally. This means that metaphors of *nacija* ‘nation’ do not conceptually depend on a global metaphorical basis for the nation, because they can be motivated through other means (discursively, grammatically, through lexical ambiguity). Still, it is difficult to deny the feeling of the validity of the thematic groups proposed in Section 4.2, which clearly correlate with some of the most significant conceptual metaphors posited for the nation. This would suggest that the global view does play a role.

18. I consider all of these reworkings blends of various types, but, due to space limitations, cannot provide a detailed blending analysis.

This indicates that the global conceptual view of the nation is a sum of its local metaphors. Local metaphors are due to the aspects of meaning of the lexical term *nacija* and the communicative needs in specific situations. Their global unification into large conceptual metaphors (e.g. A NATION IS A PERSON, A NATION IS A PLANT) is of a different order: it is not due to the preconceived metaphorical nature of the concept in question. Rather, it is a matter of finding apt local representations, which work well because of their lexical schematicity, easy integration with various aspects of the meaning of the target-domain term, or because of communicative purposes. It is a matter of the ability to metaphorize.

However, some metaphorical conceptualizations seem to be more difficult to “resist” than others, resulting in what seems to be their “natural” and “inherent” quality. I would venture to say that such global metaphoricity in the case of the nation is a matter of (more global) power struggles: struggles for the predominant metaphorical framing, which will have political or scholarly consequences, i.e. will result in a significant political or expert model. This is why global metaphorical systems are merely consistent with the potential metaphors uncovered in this chapter. My selection of data does not facilitate detecting power struggles, but revolves around naïve models. The nation itself is not a contentious issue in the naïve model, but specific aspects of its framing (as the discourse data in Section 4.5.2 suggest) may be. The status of the nation may also be a matter of dispute in expert models. And it is precisely in these cases, brought together by questioning or contesting the dominant framing, that more global metaphors (as framing devices) may occur.

This leaves us with the question of whether global metaphoricity – in the sense of a central organizational metaphor – may appear at all in naïve models, or whether the *nacija* ‘nation’ is a special case. Taking my cue from the locality of grammatical schemas (see Dąbrowska 2010 for an overview), I see all metaphoricity as local. I do not deny the “naturalness” of particular global conceptual metaphors for particular concepts (e.g. LOVE IS UNITY for LOVE), but I ascribe this “naturalness” to the discursive, situational or cultural salience of the way in which a global metaphor frames a concept, which is in line with a prevailing/hegemonic world view. This may result in motivational links (synchronic or diachronic extensions of meaning), which further perpetuate the convenient fiction of globality.

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How to do things with metaphors

The *prison of nations* metaphor in South Slavic online sources

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This chapter examines the *prison of nations* metaphor in South Slavic online sources, focusing particularly on its use and functions in contemporary Croatian discourse as reflected in the Croatian Web Corpus hrWaC. Assuming that certain metaphors in discourse are used consciously and deliberately, and making use of the notions of metaphor recontextualization and recycling, the chapter examines the evaluative force of the metaphor and its strategic use. The metaphor is shown to have different local functions (e.g., persuasion and delegitimization) and to be a shared resource for enacting everyday nationalism within political discourse generally and in the discourse of the political Right in particular.

Keywords: *prison of nations* metaphor, Croatian discourse, evaluative force of metaphors, recycling of metaphors, everyday nationalism

1. Introduction

Just as language users employ language in general to do things, they also use metaphors to do things – or, at least, an intention to do things can be assumed with many metaphors in contextualized text and talk. However, this is perhaps less true for some metaphor types than for others.

Metaphors in discourse can be used with very different aims. In language generally, as noted by Goatly (2011: 154–155), metaphors can, for example, have the function of “lexical gap filling” when a new entity or phenomenon is given a label that is based on a similarity with a familiar entity or phenomenon – for example, in the case of a computer *virus*. Goatly (2011: 164–168) also discusses metaphors used primarily for expressing an emotional attitude: they can be used to juxtapose

positive and negative emotions. They can also fill semantic or affective gaps and thus help their users achieve other, more complex communicative goals, such as explaining particular phenomena and experiences, or fulfilling evaluative and persuasive functions.

The *prison of nations* is a metaphor related to nation-building (in particular, to enacting everyday nationalism), which is itself a metaphor with architecture as its source domain. Nation-building refers to strategies aimed at identity consolidation within states, the construction of a shared identity, and a sense of unity in the population. These strategies include the manufacture and manipulation of cultural and historical symbols intended to create a sense of nationhood (Kolstø 2014). Nation-building is not only a top-down process; it is also a day-to-day practice in which ordinary people participate at the local level, renegotiating various political projects (Polese 2011). These everyday practices are also referred to as “everyday nationalism” (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008).

In nation-building projects carried out from above and below, some metaphors are intentionally used and propagated. They may refer to particular nations, and their aim is to generate positive or negative images of them. Such images can influence emotions and direct actions. Examples include *Rainbow Nation* applied to post-apartheid South Africa (see Bornman 2006) and *prison/dungeon of nations*.

Whereas *Rainbow Nation*, with its positive connotations, has played a unifying role along with the most important national symbols, the flag and anthem (see Bornman 2006), *prison of nations* and its equivalents carry a less positive meaning. Labelled an “ideological-political metaphor” (Vasil’ev 2013), the *prison of nations* metaphor exists in various languages, in some of which it has a rich discourse history (see Section 2), and is used in various discourse realms: in scholarly discourse as well as in everyday/grassroots discourse, semi-official discourse, and official discourse by political elites. The metaphor was, for instance, used in 2016 by Marine Le Pen (and widely reproduced in the media), who claimed that the EU member states have lost their democratic prerogatives to commissions and councils with no popular mandate (Le Pen 2016).

Using *prison* as a source domain theoretically presupposes a specific knowledge of this state institution, and of judicial systems and procedures related to breaking the law and subsequent punishment. However, prison types are subject to historical changes and they differ in different parts of the world. What one knows about prisons in one country cannot simply be transferred to another (see Marks 2004). Regardless of their location, prisons have a complex structure and theoretically provide a very rich structure to the target domain.

Marks (2004) demonstrates the usefulness of the *prison* metaphor in scholarly approaches to international relations: the rich structure of a prison as source domain enables the understanding of the no-less-rich structure of the target

domain. One could perhaps assume that the source domain of a prison would also be beneficial in understanding state- and nation-building. However, “prison” covers a wide range of institutions, not only modern ones, but also historical forms of prisons, or dungeons. In the context of this metaphor, in some languages, the negative connotations of dungeons seem to be crucial. The dungeon as the actual source domain of the metaphor makes possible some mappings only and blocks some others that the source domain of a prison makes possible.

The main aim of this chapter is to examine the evaluative force of the *prison/dungeon of nations* metaphor and its strategic use in South Slavic online sources. The emphasis is on data found in a corpus of Croatian web sources (see Section 4). Other systematized sources of online information were also consulted (e.g., Google Books).¹ The data examined explicitly use the expression *tamnica naroda* ‘dungeon of nations/peoples’. In their corpus studies, Perak (this volume) and Stanojević (this volume) examine another lexical unit, *nacija* ‘nation’ (a near synonym of *narod* ‘nation, people’) in Croatian, concentrating respectively on the most prominent meronymic components of the nation domain lexicalized in Croatian, and local conceptualizations related to the metaphorization of the lexical concept *nacija*. The chapter is structured as follows. After introducing the main theoretical notions in Section 2, Section 3 provides some reflections on the origin and discourse history of the metaphor. Addressing its recontextualization and recycling in its discourse history is necessary to arrive at relevant conclusions about the metaphor’s evaluative force and strategic use in the corpus examined. I present my corpus findings in Section 4. A discussion of the results, specific features of the metaphor’s use, and its functions follows in Sections 5 and 6. The chapter ends with some conclusions.

2. Theoretical background

This study generally follows the cognitive linguistic view of metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), considering them a matter of thought and not of language alone. Conceptual metaphors (e.g., LOVE IS A JOURNEY) include mappings, or structured correspondences, between an often concrete source domain (here a JOURNEY) and an often abstract target domain (here LOVE). The existence of such conceptual metaphors is reflected in some linguistic expressions (e.g., *We are at a crossroads in our relationship*).

1. Google results are always personalized. Google’s dynamic adjustment of search results depends on a range of algorithms that take into account the search term, one’s geographic location, and one’s search history (see, for example, Devine and Egger-Sider 2014). Therefore, the search results are neither objective nor universal.

Metaphors in naturally occurring discourse have varying communicative purposes. Some are unnoticed conventional ways of talking about certain issues (such as *We are at a crossroads*), but others are consciously and strategically used devices aimed at framing an issue of common interest in a particular way, for example, or persuading an audience.

Some research on discourse metaphors (e.g., Zinken, Hellsten & Nerlich 2007) emphasizes the specific nature of metaphorical expressions in discourse that do not relate closely to primary conceptual metaphors (such as *MORE IS UP*, *KNOWING IS SEEING*), but instead rely on knowledge of a specific culture and discourse history. Discourse types/genres in which discourse metaphors are used influence how source and target domains are elaborated in terms of which mappings (i.e., correspondences between the two domains included in a metaphorical thought) will be activated or blocked. Discourse production relies on knowledge (van Dijk 2014), including knowledge of metaphorical processes and the functioning of primary metaphors. Knowledge of the latter is utilized in concrete instances of discourse metaphors. Primary conceptual metaphors are different from discourse metaphors in that, among other things, discourse metaphors often do not rely on any concrete experience outside discourse, or rely on “second-hand” experiences.

The chief assumption this study relies on is that certain metaphors in discourse are used consciously, deliberately, and strategically. When referring to metaphors used deliberately, I follow Cameron (2003: 101), for whom “the deliberateness lies in the use of the linguistic metaphor in its discourse context, for a particular purpose on a particular occasion.” Charteris-Black (2014: 201) refers to similar uses as “purposeful”: they help realize a particular communicative goal. In discourse, conventional metaphors are frequently used unintentionally: for instance, a reference to the construction of abstract entities such as states using the verb *build* is a lexicalized conventional metaphorical extension, often used without any particular aim, and without necessarily having any impact on collective conceptualizations. Some other metaphors are produced intentionally, and are used strategically or deliberately. These metaphors are not identical to those that Steen (2008: 222) labels “deliberate metaphors,” which are typically novel, produced “to change the addressee’s perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual domain or space ...” Strategic use of metaphors has been discussed in the context of political discourse in which social actors, well aware of metaphors’ ability to present political “realities” in a specific way, use metaphors with specific aims, such as to humiliate “the other” (see, for example, Cammaerts 2012).²

2. Posch et al. (2013: 107) single out the strategic use of metaphors among the main persuasive strategies of right-wing politicians.

The assumption here is that any metaphor can be used strategically and deliberately, though not necessarily with the aim of changing an addressee's perspective on the target of the metaphor. Instead, the purpose may be to evaluate a phenomenon, presenting it in a positive or negative light. Positive or negative evaluation can be realized by using either a novel metaphor or a metaphor with a long discourse history.

Discussing metaphors and evaluation, Deignan (2010) summarizes four mechanisms that speakers use to evaluate through metaphor: creating entailments, exploiting scenarios, choosing significant source domains, and mapping connotational meaning. For the evaluative force of the *prison/dungeon of nations* metaphor, the choice of the source domain and the source domain's connotations seem to be particularly important.

A specific set of deliberately and strategically used metaphors (with either positive or negative evaluative force) is important in studying nations and constructing nations in discourse. For nations as imagined communities (see Anderson 2006), language and discourse play an important role, especially in enacting what Billig (1995) labels "banal nationalism," or everyday nationalism. Discourse of banal nationalism socializes "people into seeing themselves as members of a particular nation" (Piller 2011: 64). Nations are maintained by discursive acts involving, for instance, the use of pronouns (e.g., *we*, *our*) and metaphors (e.g., A NATION IS A PERSON). Metaphors are used in nation-building (or nation-destroying) projects by scholars (e.g., historians and nationalism researchers), and in discourse by the general public verbally enacting everyday nationalism. In such grassroots discourses, discourse participants may, for example, evaluate the state system they live in or used to live in, doing this for different communicative purposes.

In their discourse history, metaphors undergo recontextualization and recycling. Recontextualization (see Semino, Deignan & Littlemore 2013) concentrates on what happens when metaphorical expressions from some earlier written or spoken sources are reused in later contexts, genres, and registers that are different from the original ones. In their new contexts, metaphors can convey new meanings and serve new functions. Studying recontextualization recognizes the dynamic and context-bound nature of metaphors.

Referring to specific features of metaphor use in new contexts, Dalia Gavriely-Nuri (2013) notices another tendency, labelling this "recycling metaphors": this applies to situations in which metaphors reappear in new contexts, but are actually preserved rather than related to some new aspects of meaning, which is the case in recontextualization. When recycled, metaphors are more or less static. The *prison of nations* is a good example of such a static metaphor.

A review of the origin and part of the discourse history of this metaphor in Section 3 provides the necessary background for examining recontextualization,

recycling, and evaluative dimensions of the metaphor in the corpus examined in later sections.

3. The metaphor's origin and discourse history

The first use of the *prison of nations metaphor* is often attributed to Lenin (see, for example, Beverley 2004: 14; Nimitz 2014: 102). Its Russian equivalent, *тюрьма народов*³ 'prison of nations', has even entered Russian dictionaries (see, for example, *Slovari i enciklopedii na Akademike* 2017). However, the metaphor goes back to the French aristocrat and writer Marquis Astolphe-Louis-Léonor De Custine (1790–1857) who, after his three-month stay in the empire of Tsar Nicholas I in 1839, described it as “only a prison to which the emperor holds the key” in his travelogue, *La Russie en 1839*⁴ (de Custine 2001: 162). De Custine elaborated the relevant mappings of his prison metaphor in his description of the Russian Empire, referring to Tsar Nicholas I as a jailer of one-third of the globe (“He is a man of strong character and indomitable will – without these qualities it is impossible to become the jailer of one-third of the globe” (de Custine 1996, 2: 23, cited in Vasil'ev 2013: 15)). He also established a link to some elements of the concrete source domain (*prison/dungeon*) by reflecting on actual “terrible underground dungeons” in the empire and people's reluctance to speak. De Custine was apparently referring to the unenviable position of all the peoples under the emperor's immense power, particularly the absence of any civil society and independent public opinion capable of resisting the will of the monarch. His topic was not the oppression of the non-Russian peoples of the empire, which would later become the main topic of the metaphor's recontextualizations.

Over time, de Custine's original expression assumed a new form: to his notion of prison, the component *nations* was added, and the result, *prison of nations*, was applied to the Russian Empire. Russia's revolutionaries took notice of the dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities, and Lenin referred to the empire as a “prison

3. According to the results of a Google Books search (July 27, 2017), *темница народов* 'dungeon of nations' is also used in Russian, but far less frequently.

4. The book, published in four lengthy volumes, went through six printings and was widely read in France, England, and Germany. However, it was banned in Russia until 1917 (Incardona 2011). Nevertheless, because some of the books printed in France were smuggled into Russia, they succeeded in making an impact on Russian society. From 1890 to 1891, fragments of the book were published in Russian journals (*Encyclopedia* 2017). Abridged versions were published in 1910 and 1930, and an unabridged version was brought out in 1996. Russian translations appeared in 1930, 1990, and 1996 (Vasil'ev 2013: 16).

of nations” in his text *On the Question of National Policy* (Lenin 1976). Thus, in his observations Lenin recontextualized the metaphor: he applied it to the tsarist rule’s suppression of ethnic groups in the Russian Empire, specifically focusing on the Russian oppression of other nations (Lenin 1976: 147). In Lenin’s writings, “Great Russians” (i.e., ethnic Russians) play the role of prison guards, or oppressors, whereas the rest are prisoners, or the oppressed. The metaphor of tsarist Russia as a *prison of nations* was widely used not only by Russian revolutionaries, but also many years later by their opponents (see Vasil’ev 2013: 106). Later, the metaphor was frequently repeated in Soviet history books, which included claims about how the non-Russian people were deprived of their rights, and how their culture was persecuted in tsarist Russia (see, for example, *Istorija KPSS* 1970: 12, cited in Vasil’ev 2013: 107). In the view of Tishkov (2008: 8):

The perception of pre-revolutionary Russia as a ‘patchwork empire’ and a ‘prison of peoples’ was invented in Soviet times due to the revolutionary rejection of the past. Recent studies of nationalism suggest that pre-1917 Russia, far from being a historical anomaly, was in some respects an emerging nation state, with its national core being built around the Russian language and culture.

In some subsequent contexts, the metaphor was also applied to the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation (see, for example, Gurdži 2016).

Equivalents of the *prison of nations* metaphor have been used in various languages and in very different national contexts. This is probably due to the fact that de Custine’s book became an immediate bestseller: a short German translation was published in Leipzig in the same year as the French original (Incardona 2011). Soon it was also translated into English (1843) and Danish.

The metaphor has since been used in various genres: in research literature and theory building, in elites’ political discourse, and by the general public. It seemingly provides enough cues to activate some experience (mostly based on discourse consumption and related knowledge of discourse history) with a specific institution, namely a prison, and its historical specific predecessor, a dungeon.⁵

Because of the shared historical experience of the majority of the South Slavs – the experience that this metaphor seems to relate to – I examined its frequency in Bulgarian, Macedonian, Slovenian, and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) sources in Google Books, and determined that the metaphor is non-existent in Bulgarian and is very rarely used in Macedonian. However, it occurs relatively frequently in Slovenian sources (*ječa narodov* ‘dungeon of peoples/nations’), and even more

5. For instance, the metaphor was used by Black Power activists to describe the United States (Berger 2014: 52). The *prison* functioned as both a metaphor for race and an example of racial management during the 1960s and later.

frequently in BCS, in which the most usual form is *tamnica naroda* ‘dungeon of peoples/nations’). Thus, one finds the metaphor in the South Slavic countries that were part of the Habsburg Monarchy, not in those that were part of the Ottoman Empire. Curtis (2013) indicates that Slavic politicians used the metaphor in references to Austria-Hungary in 1918 in the context of national groups’ calls for self-determination: in Austria-Hungary, it “helped the national minorities align their struggle with claims of democracy and liberty.” Austria-Hungary thus appeared in the early twentieth century in the South Slavic context as a new target domain.

In some languages, alternative linguistic expressions of the metaphor exist in which *prison* and *dungeon* are used. For example, *prison of nations/peoples*, and much less frequently *dungeon of nations/peoples* and *prisonhouse/prison house of nations* are used in English; and *Völkerkerker*, and very infrequently *Vielvölkerkerker*, *Gefängnis der Völker*, and *Gefängnis der Nationen*, are used in German.⁶ In the German sources, frequent target domains include tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Habsburg Monarchy, whereas in the English sources frequent targets include the Russian Empire, tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union; less frequent ones are the Habsburg Monarchy, Austria-Hungary, the kingdom of Yugoslavia, and socialist Yugoslavia.

Alternative linguistic expressions that utilize two different source domains – *prison* and *dungeon* – are significant regarding the connotations and evaluative force of the metaphor, and these relate to the differences between modern and historical forms of prisons. In English, the word *dungeon* refers to a dark underground prison in a castle (see Merriam Webster Online 2017); Duden online (2017) describes *Kerker* as: “(früher) sehr festes (unterirdisches) Gefängnis” ((earlier) a very secure (underground) prison). In HJP (2017), the Croatian equivalent of *dungeon*, *tamnica*, is defined as “a room, normally underground or close to the ground of a building where an imprisoned person serves a sentence.” The Croatian word is related to the noun *tama* ‘darkness’. In all three languages, there is a word for modern institutions that is fairly neutral: English *prison*, German *Gefängnis*, and Croatian *zatvor*. The words *dungeon*, *Kerker*, and *tamnica* are marked, non-neutral words, with clearly negative connotations. Only in English, the form referring to *prison* as the source domain seems to be the most widely used form (according to Google Books). In the BCS metaphorical expression, *tamnica naroda*, the expressive word, an equivalent of ‘dungeon’, is used (only a few occurrences of *zatvor naroda* ‘prison of nations’ were found in Google Books). For this reason, in the following sections *dungeon* is used in translations of the Croatian examples with *tamnica*.

6. The frequencies were examined in Google Books in September 2016.

As indicated, the metaphor's initial source domain was tsarist Russia, and it was used in its negative evaluation. In later recontextualizations in the Russian and Soviet context, the metaphor was related to the rejection of the past and it retained its negative evaluative force, as it did in the early twentieth century, when it entered South Slavic political discourse where the metaphor found a new target domain: Austria-Hungary. It was used again to frame the rejection of the past in the name of a new political project.

An important aspect of the metaphor is its source domain: is it a *prison* or *dungeon*? This is one of the aspects dealt with in the following sections.

4. The *dungeon of nations* in the Croatian Web Corpus hrWaC

This section first discusses the frequency of the metaphor in the hrWaC corpus and its distribution across genres, its target domains, and the context types it is used in. Then I set the results in a broader South Slavic context and relate them to the results of previous investigations of Croatian political and historiographic discourse.

My main empirical material and the main focus of this analysis is hrWaC v2.2 (Croatian Web Corpus), "a web corpus collected from the .hr top-level domain" that includes newspaper articles, online comments, discussion forums, and blogs.⁷

4.1 The frequency of the metaphor and its distribution across genres in hrWaC

The frequency of the metaphor relative to the frequency of the word referring to the source domain (*tamnica*) is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Frequency of *tamnica naroda* 'dungeon of nations' in hrWaC v2.2 (Croatian Web Corpus)

<i>tamnica naroda</i> 'dungeon of nations'	385 (0.3 per million)
<i>tamnica</i> 'dungeon'	4,943 (3.5 per million)
<i>tamnica hrvatskog naroda</i> 'dungeon of the Croatian people'	101 (0.1 per million)

7. The current version of the corpus (v2.2), which was last updated in 2016, contains 1,397,757,548 tokens, 1,210,021,198 words, 67,403,219 sentences, 28,771,178 paragraphs, and 3,611,090 documents. The Croatian web corpus hrWaC was built by crawling the .hr top-level domain in 2011 and again in 2014 (Natural Language Processing Group 2017).

A total of 385 examples with the metaphor were found. In these examples, the words *tamnica* and *naroda* were not separated by any other word. All of the case forms were included in the search. The sentences in which the metaphorical expression occurs were extracted from the corpus together with their immediate context. The corpus contains more than these 385 sentences with *tamnica naroda*, though in these further examples the phrase is divided by some other word or words. For instance, the ‘nation’ is sometimes specified as Croatian or Serbian. If one includes examples with *tamnica hrvatskog naroda* ‘dungeon of the Croatian people’, as the search result in the last row in Table 1 shows, the number of examples increases by around one hundred. Looking at the frequency of the noun *tamnica*, it can be seen that *tamnica (hrvatskog) naroda* (all case forms) accounts for 10% of all of the examples with that noun.

The sources of the 385 examples and their distribution across genres are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Sources of corpus examples. Distribution across genres

<i>Tamnica naroda</i> : genres	Examples
Newspaper articles, commentaries, internet portal news	91
Newspaper and internet portal columns	7
Readers’ comments on newspaper articles, and portal news	116
Interviews	8
Blogs and comments on blogs	43
Forum discussions	118
Unidentifiable source	2
(Total)	385

A large number of examples come from a single discussion forum, forum.hr (ninety-nine of the 385 examples): several forum topics containing the metaphor were discussed for several days, or for an entire month. These topics (and forum threads) are, for example: *Titova Jugoslavija: tamnica hrvatskog naroda ili temelj današnje hrvatske države?*⁸ ‘Tito’s Yugoslavia: a dungeon of the Croatian

8. Forum.hr (2004); 241 posts, June 16th–July 8th, 2004.

people or the basis of today's independent Croatia?’ and *Zašto je FBiH tamnica za Hrvatski narod*⁹ ‘Why the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dungeon for the Croatian nation.’ The metaphor was also found in discussions of many other topics (although not in the threads/titles); for example, *Unitarna BiH*¹⁰ [Unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina], ‘*Region*’ s državama bivše Austro-Ugarske monarhije? [A “region” with the states belonging to what used to be Austria-Hungary]¹¹

A significant number of examples found in the corpus are from two daily newspapers, *Večernji list* (around fifty, mostly online comments) and *Slobodna Dalmacija* (forty-nine, of which thirty-six are from online comments). Other frequently found sources include *Dnevnik.hr* (twenty-five examples), *HSP1861.hr* (nineteen), *HKV* (twelve), *Bloger.index.hr* (twelve), *Pollitika.com* (eleven), and *Dnevno* (seven).

4.2 The metaphor’s target domains and context types

Table 3 provides an overview showing which state formations are frequent target domains of the metaphor. In addition, Table 3 shows how the contexts are distributed across three categories: endorsing,¹² critical, and neutral. To determine these categories, I closely examined all of the examples and classified them into (a) contexts supporting the application of the metaphor to a given entity (i.e., claiming that the entity is the *prison of nations*), (b) contexts questioning its application to an entity and/or claiming that the metaphor is not applicable to it, and (c) neutral or unclear contexts. Some of the examples refer to some earlier usages, that is, they quote the metaphor. An examination of the broader context of these examples nevertheless revealed whether they endorse or criticize previous applications of metaphors to certain entities, or are neutral in that respect.

9. Forum (2007a); 268 posts, September 22nd–October 2nd, 2007.

10. Forum.hr (2007b); 273 posts, October 14th–23rd, 2007.

11. Forum.hr (2012); 255 posts, May 25th–June 4th, 2012.

12. “Endorsement” is meta-communicative, meaning that the predication that x is/was y is endorsed, not the fact that x is/was y.

Table 3. *Tamnica naroda* ‘dungeon of nations’ in hrWaC: the most frequent target domains¹³

<i>Tamnica naroda</i> refers to state formation	Examples 396	Of these:	
(socialist, Tito’s) Yugoslavia	230	Endorsing:	142
		Critical:	55
		Neutral or unclear:	33
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, King Alexander’s Yugoslavia	51	Endorsing:	35
		Critical:	6
		Neutral or unclear:	10
A new possible Yugoslavia, or a Balkan federation	7	Endorsing:	6
		Critical:	1
		Neutral or unclear:	0
The European Union	46	Endorsing:	33
		Critical:	7
		Neutral or unclear:	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21	Endorsing:	12
		Critical:	3
		Neutral or unclear:	6
Austria-Hungary	21	Endorsing:	7
		Critical:	7
		Neutral or unclear:	7
Today’s Croatia	6	Endorsing:	6
		Critical:	0
		Neutral or unclear:	0

Table 3 shows that 288 (78% of all of the examples) refer to either socialist Yugoslavia or one of its predecessors, South Slavic unions, or a potential new “Yugoslav” state. The second entity most frequently discussed as a “prison of nations” is the

13. The remaining referents with a few examples include historical and existing states and state unions (East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Iraq), regions (eastern Europe), enforced unions, all of the unions that Croats were part of, federations in general, unions in general, communism, the Yugoslav Encyclopedia, religion, the Yugoslav People’s Army, NATO, the concordat between the Church and the government, and a film title. One usage is non-metaphorical because the expression refers to a specific prison in Brno.

EU. As can be seen, endorsing contexts prevail: in these contexts, discourse participants negatively evaluate certain states claiming that they are, or were, prisons of nations. In some endorsing contexts, discourse participants simply express their agreement with some previous negative evaluations. The metaphor *tamnica naroda* appears in discourse samples claiming severe suppression of Croatian national interests in Yugoslavia or another entity (described as “prisons of Croats”), such as the EU (Hebrang 2014), but it is also used in opposite arguments, claiming that certain political actors in contemporary Croatia depict Yugoslavia,¹⁴ the EU, or another entity as a “prison of nation” to attain some concrete aim. Below are some typical examples of discourse endorsing the metaphor; that is, examples of “metaphor affirmation” (examples (1–3)), and discourse questioning it, or discourse denying the applicability of the metaphor to a target entity (examples (4–6)).

- (1) Narodna Republika Jugoslavija odnosno Savezna Federativna Republika Jugoslavija bila je, od 1945. do 1990. ... praktično velika *tamnica naroda* pod stalnom i totalnom policijskom kontrolom.¹⁵
(Gospicko-senjska biskupija 22/04/2005)

From 1945 to 1990, the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was practically a large *dungeon of nations* that was under constant and total police control.

- (2) Dvadeset i treća je godina otkako je hrvatski narod, u revolucionarnom demokratskom svibnju 1990, srušio velikosrpsku *tamnica naroda* Jugoslaviju i komunistički režim u službi Beograda, ali u Hrvatskoj još nije donijet lustracijski zakon, niti je itko od zločinaca, zlotvornih doušnika, „suradnika-informatora” i državnih nasilnika iz doba druge jugodiktature i „svjetskoga megazločinca iz Kumrovcva,” jednoga od desetorica najvećih državnih zločinaca na svijetu u proteklom stoljeću „Josipa Broza” Tita ...¹⁶
(Dnevno 13/03/2013)

Twenty-three years after the Croatian people overthrew the Greater Serbian *dungeon of nations* Yugoslavia, and the communist regime in the service of Belgrade, in revolutionary democratic May 1990, Croatia has not adopted a lustration law, nor have any of the criminals, evil informants, collaborating

14. For example, an article published in the newspaper *Novi list* (Tomičić 2014). In the online comments accompanying the article, two opposite views are juxtaposed: one presenting Yugoslavia as a *prison of nations* and one presenting it as a promised land (*obećana zemlja*). The online commentators position themselves as representing “right” and “wrong” worldviews.

15. <http://www.gospicko-senjska-biskupija.hr/gospic/87-hrvati-u-kanadi.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=>. All examples are provided in their original form (some examples, for instance, lack diacritics), but the emphasis in italics is mine.

16. <http://www.dnevno.hr/kolumnisti/udbaska-crna-ruka-u-zemlji-hrvata-81261>.

informants, and government thugs from the time of the second yugodictatorship and the “world-class megacriminal from Kumrovec,” one of the ten biggest state criminals in the world in the last century, “Josip Broz” Tito, ...

- (3) EU se danas pretvara u novodobnu *tamnicu naroda*, mjesto koje unistava suverena prava drzava clanica, koje unistava nacionalnu svijest, nacionalne povijesti i simbole ...¹⁷ (Forum.hr 08/08/2008)
 Nowadays, the EU is being transformed into a new-age *dungeon of nations*, a place that deprives its member-states of their sovereign rights, national consciousness, national histories, and symbols ...

Example (1) illustrates the prevailing endorsing contexts in which the metaphor is applied to the most popular target: one of the Yugoslav state formations. Example (2) shows how the metaphor is used in the service of a broader strategy: delegitimizing some historical persons (and current political opponents). It also illustrates modification of the metaphor: the *prison* is specified as Greater Serbian. The adjective *velikosrpski* ‘Greater Serbian’ is strongly negatively evaluative in Croatian discourse. It refers to a political objective, programme, plan, vision, and dream (see Clark 2008: 10–11), signifying “an aggressive drive for territorial expansion.” In the Croatian discourse in the 1990s during the warring conflicts between Croats and Serbs in Croatia, the phrase *velikosrpska agresija* ‘Greater Serbian aggression’ was frequently used (see, for example, Vasiljević 2008). It has survived and is still used in Croatian right-wing discourse for the delegitimization of various people (e.g., political opponents) and for an extremely negative evaluation of different political phenomena. The type of discourse illustrated in example (2) continues the discourse of the 1990s by clustering phrases with strong negative evaluative force (*criminals, evil informants, collaborating informants, and government thugs*). It features overlexicalization and hate speech. Example (3) elaborates the logic of metaphorical mappings by providing details about the target domain that concern what the EU allegedly does to its member states. In terms of mappings, a *dungeon* is conceptualized as a place without freedom. The rights of people in *dungeons* are limited. The central mapping that example (3) relies on is that the rights of the countries in a *dungeon of nations* are severely limited. National consciousness, history, and symbols are seen as parts of one’s identity that one is entitled to, and these are taken away from a person in a *dungeon*.

In some of the examples that question the metaphor, formal signals of questioning are present (e.g., the metaphor appears in quotation marks, or is used with questions and in conditional sentences). Some social actors use the metaphor in reference to previous usages (e.g., they explicitly refer to others’ words by using

17. <https://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=363619&page=5>.

kako kažeš ‘as you say’ in example (4), *kao sto ovaj tip pise* ‘as this guy writes’ in example (5), and *sva nabacivanja* ‘all labelling’ in example (6).

Some discourse samples question certain entailments that are a superimposition of morality based on the victim-perpetrator relationship, in which the victim maps onto the prisoner and the perpetrator on the jailor. If a country had been a prisoner, it could not have been rich and developed. If another country had been the jailor, it should have been rich instead (see example (4)).

- (4) Možeš li mi objasniti, kako to da je Hrvatska u obe Jugoslavije bila bogatija i razvijenija sa daleko boljim standardom???????? U *tamnici naroda* kako kažeš valjda tamničar otme sve pare i on postane bogat, a utamničeni tavori gladan.¹⁸ (Forum.hr 28/08/2008)

How do you explain the fact that in both Yugoslavias Croatia was a richer and more developed country with a better standard of living???????? I suppose that in the *dungeon of nations*, as you label it, the jailer steals all the money and becomes rich, while the prisoners live from hand to mouth.

- (5) Ako je Jugoslavija bila takva zlocinacka tvorevina kao sto ovaj tip pise, odkud onda on na poziciji novinara? Zar je moguće da je kao Hrvat prezivio pakao Jugoslavije i ostao živ? Pa zar nije trebao biti pogubljen kao i 4 milijuna Hrvata koji su svi nestali s lica zemlje, i svi skupa otjerani u logore i pogubljeni i ono sto ih je preostalo u toj „*tamnici naroda*” živjeli su kao ljudska bica u onom klasicu „Planeta majmuna.”¹⁹ (Forum.hr 18/08/2008)

If Yugoslavia was such a criminal creation as this guy writes, how did he manage to work as journalist? Is it possible that he as a Croat survived the hell of Yugoslavia, that he is alive? Was he not supposed to be executed together with four million Croats who all had disappeared from the earth, and were all driven into camps and executed, and those left in the *dungeon of nations* lived like humans in the classic *Planet of the Apes*?

- (6) Ako je ovaj (sic) narod (mislim na Hrvate), imao moderniju državu u potpunom smislu te riječi, onda je to bila Austrougarska, bez obzira na sva nabacivanja u smislu; „*tamnica naroda*,” ... veliki porezi i td. Državu koja je funkcionirala u svakom svojem segmentu.²⁰ (Forum.hr 3/10/2009)
- If this nation (I mean the Croats) has had a modern state in the real sense of the word, then this state would have been Austria-Hungary, regardless of having been labelled the *dungeon of nations* ... high taxes and so on. It was a state that functioned in all of its segments.

18. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=361264&page=10>.

19. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?p=15554139>.

20. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=136961&page=4>.

4.3 Findings from hrWaC in a broader context

I have compared the findings from hrWaC, which only includes the domain .hr, to findings based on a small corpus of online sources collected in a Google search performed on March 13th, 2015 in Norway; that corpus includes Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Serbian sources in addition to Croatian.²¹ The data were collected from online newspapers, internet forums and portals, research articles, popular scientific discourse,²² and so on. Table 4 shows the results of that search, which revealed approximately 29,600 results for Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian *tamnica naroda* (only the nominative of *tamnica* was searched for), of which the top one hundred results were examined.²³

Table 4. States, state unions, and other phenomena: Target domains of *tamnica naroda* (Google searches, top 100 results)

Yugoslavia	42
EU, Europe	11
Austria-Hungary	10
Kingdom of Yugoslavia; Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes	8
Bosnia	4
Tsarist Russia	3
Croatia	2
Yugoslav Encyclopedia	2
multiethnic states	1
Communism	1
Montenegro	1
<i>several entities</i>	1
<i>unclear reference</i>	6

21. Interestingly, the first link displayed in the Google search results was the one corresponding to a Wikipedia article written in BCS (Wikipedia 2014), which defines *tamnica naroda* as “a pejorative and metaphorical expression for multinational states in which the majority of or all nations are in a subordinate position in relation to the ‘governing’ nation; that is, they are oppressed by the elite ‘alienated from its own people.’” The article enumerates all the multinational states to which this expression refers: Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, royal Yugoslavia, communist Yugoslavia, and the USSR.

22. For example, an article titled “Jugoslavija – idealan državni okvir, umjetna tvorevina ili tamnica naroda” [Yugoslavia – An Ideal State Structure, Artificial Structure, or Prison of Nations] (Goldstein 2006).

23. Eight links were repetitions of previous hits and were therefore ignored.

The contexts from the mixed sources (Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian) categorized in Table 4 also contain either endorsements of the metaphor (e.g., certain social actors claim that a certain entity, such as the former Yugoslavia, was a “dungeon of a nation” or of “nations”/“peoples”), or explicit or implicit denials and critiques: discourse participants claim that Yugoslavia was not a “dungeon of a nation” or of “nations.” Some samples reveal ironic attitudes toward the term by some discourse participants, or they question the metaphor and the claims that Yugoslavia was a “dungeon of nations.” Among these one hundred top results (see Table 4), intertextual references to some previous metaphor usages were found, often ironically and critically re-examining them. As can be seen, the most frequent target domains associated with the metaphor coincide in Tables 3 and 4: references to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which ceased to exist early in the 1990s, prevail. A relatively frequent target domain is also the SFRY’s predecessor, royal Yugoslavia (i.e., the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), as is the EU.

The fact that Yugoslavia is the most frequently discussed target domain in the online sources indicates that the discourse participants using the metaphor are intensively engaged in discussions of the recent history of their countries, performing everyday nationalism. The nation is occasionally ethnically specified, for example, *tamnica srpskog naroda* ‘dungeon of the Serbian nation’ and *tamnica hrvatskog naroda* ‘dungeon of the Croatian nation’. The EU is a new target domain to which the metaphor applies in a number of examples. Austria-Hungary is also still an occasional target domain. Interestingly, the metaphor is sometimes applied to entities other than states, such as communism and an encyclopaedia.

The results of the corpora examination relate to research mentioning this metaphor in political discourse and historiography (e.g., Pavlaković 2014; Rezvani 2015), indicating how political and intellectual elites in the successor states tend to use the *prison* metaphor for evaluating their states’ predecessors: for this reason, the elites in socialist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union used the metaphor in references to royal Yugoslavia and the Russian Empire, respectively. Furthermore, the academic and political discourse in some Yugoslav successor states re-contextualized this metaphor in the 1990s, using it relatively often in their nation-building and identity-building strategies, in reference to socialist Yugoslavia. As mentioned, this has not happened in Macedonia (see Section 2), which indicates that the important part of the discourse history of this metaphor in BCS (and Slovenian) contexts was discourse discussing Austria-Hungary; the metaphor was established in that context and “transferred” from it to apply to other targets.

The corpus examples examined relate to previous findings examining the Croatian political discourse of the 1990s, in which Yugoslavia was systematically characterized as the “dungeon of the Croats.” That discourse was filled with neologisms and phrases with extremely negative connotations that “helped

to inscribe negative associations with the Yugoslav past into the national consciousness” (Pavlaković 2014: 32). In that discourse, phrases such as *country of brotherly nations*, *free country*, and *socialism with a human face* were counterbalanced by new phrases such as *Bolshevik rule of terror*, *dictatorial regime*, and *conspiracy of the Communists* (see Velikonja 2008: 14). These phrases and ideas related to them became elements of a new discourse, part of which was also the *prison of nations* metaphor.

Many examples from the hrWaC corpus, which contains many instances of unofficial, grassroots discourse, and the control corpus of BCS mixed sources look like a continuation of that official political discourse of the 1990s. As Pavlaković (2014) notes, in its publications on royal Yugoslavia and consideration of political issues in the interwar period and identity politics, Croatian historiography also often identified a unified South Slavic state as the main source of various problems, rather than taking into account a network of domestic and international factors. Post-communist scholarly publications *a priori* rejected Yugoslavia and focused on the negative impact of Yugoslav state unions on the Croatian lands, neglecting a broader view of interwar Yugoslavia (e.g., the global impact of the Great Depression). The results from hrWaC, which often thematize Yugoslav state unions as a “dungeon,” are also in line with the large-scale IPSOS survey from 2011, in which around 50% of respondents in Croatia deemed membership in any kind of Yugoslav state as negative, and 80% reported that they did not regret the dissolution of communist Yugoslavia (Pavlaković 2014: 34).²⁴

This section has shown that the metaphor is most frequently used (in hrWaC, but also in a broader South Slavic context) with reference to socialist Yugoslavia or one of its predecessors. The contexts in which it occurs mostly endorse the metaphor and negatively evaluate the target domain entity. In the Croatian context, this tendency is in line with the political discourse and historiography of the 1990s.

5. Some specific features of the metaphor’s use

This section examines some recurring features of the contexts in which the *prison/dungeon of nations* metaphor is used: the metaphor in the plural and with quotation marks; metalinguistic devices used in the metaphor’s context; elaboration of the source and target domains; metaphor clusters; and mixing metaphors.

24. To compare, 29% in Serbia and 31% in Bosnia and Herzegovina did so.

In some examples, discourse participants use the metaphor in the plural, as shown in example (7), and also question the metaphor by using quotation marks. The qualifiers *imaginative* and *interesting* positively connote the metaphor in (7):

- (7) Ali, ako [Hrvatska] ostane ovako provincijalno zatarabana i pubertetski samozaljubljena, ukratko sterilna i dosadna, onda je, brate, bolje živjeti i u grješnim, ali sto puta maštovitijim i zanimljivijim „*tamnicama naroda*,” kojih god boja, austro-ugarsko-jugoslavensko-natovskih, one bile.²⁵
(Forum.vidi.hr 08/12/2006)

But, if [Croatia] stays provincial and closed in immature self-infatuation, in short sterile and boring, then, brother, it is better to live in a sinful but hundred times more imaginative and interesting “*dungeons of nations*,” no matter their colours: Austro-Hungarian, Yugoslav, or NATO.

In some examples, the metaphor appears as a referring expression, an alternative name for socialist Yugoslavia, used without any further evaluative elements or elaboration (see example (8)).

- (8) Čuo sam da je jednom imala koncert za vrijeme *tamnice naroda* u Imoti.²⁶
(IMOart Forum Croaticum 12/12/2010)
I heard that once, at the time of the *dungeon of nations*, she had a concert in Imota.

In some examples, the metaphorical expression is explicitly related to the target by metalinguistic devices (e.g., *zvan* ‘called/labelled’). Alternatively, the metaphorical expression is accompanied by adjectival qualifiers (*smrdljiv* ‘stinking’ in example (9)), and the metaphor is juxtaposed with another entity qualified by a chain of positively connoted adjectives. All of this is present in (9), in which the opposite of *tamnica naroda* is Croatia:

- (9) Mogu samo reći da mi je sada još draže što ne živimo u smrdljivoj *tamnici naroda* zvanoj Jugoslavija i što imamo svoju slobodnu, suverenu i nezavisnu republiku Hrvatsku.²⁷
(Forum.hr 03/12/2007)
I can only say that I’m even happier now that we don’t live in the stinking *dungeon of nations* called Yugoslavia anymore and that we have our free, sovereign, and independent Republic of Croatia.

An additional feature of the metaphor’s use is occasional elaboration of the source domain and/or target domain; see example (10), in which the metaphorical

25. <http://forum.vidi.hr/archive/index.php/t-111922.html>.

26. <http://www.imoart.hr/forum/index.php?topic=897.msg46338>.

27. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=210928&page=6>.

mapping between the source domain (dungeon) and target domain (Yugoslavia) is juxtaposed with another ad hoc established mapping in which an element of the source domain of *prison* (*samica* 'solitary confinement') is related to another target domain: Croatia.

- (10) ako je YU bila *tamnica naroda* RH je samica, a ako je YU bila umjetna tvorevina, sta je onda ovaj kiflich od nazovi drzave????²⁸
 (Slobodna Dalmacija 23/10/2011)
 If Yugoslavia was a *dungeon of nations*, Croatia is solitary confinement, and if Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, what is this little crescent of a so-called state????

In example (11), the source domain is elaborated by mentioning two of the elements related to it: handcuffs (*lisice*) and prisoners (*uzapčeni*).

- (11) ... od njih ostaje samo obličje koje podsjeća na *lisice uzapčenika* u *tamnici naroda* koje je okovao svojim gvozdanim sramotnim socijalizmom, nebratstvom i nejedinstvom.²⁹ (Forum.hr 04/05/2007)
 ... of these only the form remains, which resembles *handcuffs of prisoners* trapped in a *dungeon of nations*, which he forged with his shameful iron socialism, non-brotherhood, and disunity.

In example (12), elaboration of the metaphor's target domain is a reaction to someone else's earlier use of the metaphor. By repeating the word *tamnica* four times in addition to using it in the expression *tamnica naroda*, the discourse participant aims to discredit another participant's idea about Yugoslavia as a "dungeon of nations." The usage in the last sentence is embedded in an impolite utterance that serves the same function. The discourse participant exploits the primary meaning of the stem ('dark') innovatively, using *tamnica* to refer to "dark places" in another participant's mind:

- (12) ... one *tamnice* za Hrvate u kojoj su ti isti Hrvati na račun države završavali škole, fakultete, postajali magistri, doktori, bili rukovodeći ljudi u JNA, rukovodili SUP-om, bili ambasadori SFRJ po svijetu, bili vodeći ljudi u ondašnjem političkom i društvenom životu, itd, itd, itd ... jel' na tu *tamnica* misliš??? Zamisli *tamnica* u kojoj su Hrvati bili! Daj Bože svakome takve *tamnice naroda*!!! *Tamnica* je u Tvom poremećenom mozgu ustašetino blesava!³⁰ (Forum.vidi.hr 02/06/2004)

28. <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/146620/darinko-kosor-dok-je-budisa-robijao-za-hrvatsku-drug-darko-je-pisao-pisma-titu>.

29. <http://www.forum.hr/showpost.php?p=8364774&postcount=71>.

30. <http://forum.vidi.hr/archive/index.php/t-44759.html>.

... that *dungeon for Croats*, where, at the expense of the state, these very same Croats were graduating from schools, colleges, earned master's and doctoral degrees, were leading men in the Yugoslav People's Army, were running the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, were Yugoslavia's ambassadors all around the world, were the leading people in the political and social life at the time, etc., etc., etc. ... is this the *dungeon* that you have in mind??? Imagine *this dungeon* where Croats lived! May God give anyone such *dungeons of nations!!!* The *dungeon* is in your disordered mind, you stupid fully committed Ustaša!

This metaphor is also often used together with some other metaphors (its synonyms or antonyms). This complies with the tendency of metaphors in discourse to exist only seldom on their own: they tend to occur in clusters (see, for example, Kimmel 2010).

The implicit or explicit opposite of the *prison* metaphor in my data is a free state or country, as in example (13), in which a synonym of the *dungeon* (*olovna diktatura*, 'leaden dictatorship') is also used. The mapping elaborated in (13) relates a prisoner leaving a *dungeon* to an entity leaving a multinational state:

- (13) Živimo li mi u slobodnoj državi koju smo stvarali kako bi bila humana, pravedna i na korist svih njenih građana ili je ovo postala nekakva nova *tamnica naroda*, nekakva nova *olovna diktatura* nemilosrdnih vladajućih, partijskih ili političko-mafijaških nomenklatura poput one iz koje smo prije dvadeset godina pobjegli?³¹ (Dnevno 08/11/2012)
Do we live in a free country that we have created to be humane, fair, and for the benefit of all its citizens, or has it become some kind of a new *dungeon of nations*, a new *leaden ruthless dictatorship* of the ruling party or of political-mafia nomenclatures such as the one we escaped from twenty years ago?

An antonym found in the corpus is the *promised land*:³² originally from a Biblical context, in its everyday usage it refers to a longed-for place where one expects to find greater happiness or fulfilment.³³

31. <http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/policija-izvela-stih-probu-delozacije-koje-ce-uskoro-postati-hrvatska-svakodnevnica-70681>.

32. See, for example, the text "Večeras u Splitu tribina »EU – tamnica naroda ili obećana zemlja«" (*Slobodna Dalmacija* 2011).

33. See HJP http://hjp.znanje.hr/index.php?show=search_by_id&id=f15IXBh5&keyword=zemlja. Its first meaning is a biblical reference to the land of Canaan, promised by God to Abraham and his descendants as their heritage. The second meaning is free of biblical references, 'happy, rich country'.

In some examples, the *prison* metaphor is combined with another metaphor with a very different source domain: for instance, Yugoslavia is conceptualized as a *dungeon* in one metaphor, and as a *human being* in another in the same context (see example (14)). *Tamnica naroda* functions as a proper name used instead of *Yugoslavia*, and it is personified in the second step. Example (14) illustrates well the evaluative logic that governs the metaphor usage: reference to Yugoslavia is retained throughout the example, regardless of the linguistic expression used. The two referring expressions *mrska nam jugovina* and *tamnica naroda* are both clearly evaluative and indicate negative emotions (hatred towards the target domain entity).

- (14) Danas možemo mirne duše kazati da je dobro što knjiga nije tiskana 1989. jer bi u tom slučaju nosila izvjesna obilježja *mrske nam jugovine* i komunističkog sustava, iako je *tamnica naroda* već ležala na samrtničkoj postelji.³⁴ (DVD Jastrebarsko 2016)
 Today we can safely say that it is good that the book was not published in 1989, because in that case it would have some characteristics of the *hated Yugoslavia* and the communist system, although the *dungeon of nations* was already lying on its deathbed.

In example (15), the metaphor is accompanied by another one. The source domain of *dungeon* is combined with the source domain of humans and family relations (*stepmother*).

- (15) Mogu li uistinu beskrupulozni trgovci našom domovinom zatamniti našu ljubav prema toj istoj domovini? Ako to uspiju, postati će dobro plaćeni činovnici u nekoj novoj tvorevini (*tamnici naroda*) ma kako se ta tvorevina zvala, biti će naša *maćeha*.³⁵ (Pollitika 25/04/2010)
 Can these truly unscrupulous traders of our homeland really suppress our love for this country? If they succeed in doing this, they will become well-paid officials in some new formation (a *dungeon of nations*); this formation will be our *stepmother*, regardless of what it is called.

In example (16), the two metaphors again function as referring expressions in addition to the third, non-metaphorical phrase (*Strossmayer's creation*), highlighting different aspects of the target: the emphasis is on financial aspects and foreign loans, and this explains the reference to Yugoslavia as a *barrel without a bottom*. The *prison* metaphor used subsequently (and elaborated by a phrase that follows its inner logic: *to put a key into a lock*) seems less relevant to the main idea, and it intensifies the negative evaluative stance of the first metaphor:

34. <http://www.dvd-jastrebarsko.hr/content/view/87/>.

35. <http://pollitika.com/balada-o-narayami>.

- (16) Bijela kuća i MMF uskratili su *bačvi bez dna* i *tamnici naroda*, Jugoslaviji, nove stand by kredite, čime je *Strossmayerovoj tvorevini* konačno stavljen ključ u bravu.³⁶ (HSP1861 07/05/2007)
The White House and the IMF denied new stand-by loans to the *barrel without a bottom* and *dungeon of nations*, Yugoslavia, which finally put the key into the lock of the *Strossmayer creation*.

Examples (14–16) illustrate that discourse participants frequently combine negatively loaded metaphors having different source domains in their negative evaluation of the target domains. Simultaneously, by using the metaphor, they express their emotional attitude, trying to influence the emotional responses of others.

Some discourse samples reflect knowledge of the metaphor – that is, knowledge of some segments of its discourse history. These examples provide some details and elaborate some aspects of the target domain that make the relation to the source logical, e.g., references to *nesloboda* ‘lack of freedom’ in example (17), and to a particular people, Croats, that were metaphorically “imprisoned” in example (18):

- (17) AU je bila i nazivana „*tamnicom naroda*” zato što je brojne narode držala u neslobodi i zakidala im identitet.³⁷
Austria-Hungary was called the “*dungeon of nations*” because it held many peoples in a lack of freedom and suppressed their identity.
- (18) Marksistička ili titoistička historiografija koristila je pojam *tamnica naroda* kako bi se time objasnila politička povijest prve Jugoslavije, od 1. prosinca 1918. do 10. travnja 1941. godine, u kojoj je hrvatski narod, uz druge narode u Jugoslaviji, *bio praktički utamničen*.³⁸ (HSP1861 26/11/2006)
Marxist and Titoist historiography used the term *dungeon of peoples* to explain the political history of the first Yugoslavia, from December 1st, 1918 to April 10th, 1941, in which the Croatian people, along with other peoples in Yugoslavia, *were virtually imprisoned*.

Finally, in some of its contexts the metaphor is accompanied by a reference to non-metaphorical prisons and imprisonment, as in *thousands detained ... in dungeons* and *the entire nation ... in the huge dungeon* in (see example (19)):

36. <http://www.hsp1861.hr/vijesti2007-5/07052007-1.html>.

37. <http://www.forum.hr/archive/index.php/t-406568-p-43.html>.

38. <http://www.hsp1861.hr/vijesti11/14112006-3.html>.

- (19) Nemojmo zaboraviti ni one *tisuće zatočene* po jugokomunističkom režimu u *tamnice*, kao što je i čitav *narod bio zatočen* u jednu veliku *tamnica naroda* Jugoslaviju.³⁹ (Hrvatski politički uznici 10/04/2009)
 Let us not forget those *thousands detained* by the communist regime in *dungeons*, as the entire nation was held in the huge *dungeon of peoples* of Yugoslavia.

As some of the examples above indicate, the metaphor is used as a referring expression. The metaphor's negative force is often strengthened by using additional metaphors with negative connotations and/or negatively connoted adjectives. The following section concentrates on the functions of the metaphor's use in the cited examples and in other typical corpus examples.

6. The functions of the *prison of nations* metaphor

A prominent function of the *prison* metaphor in this corpus is persuasion: the metaphor is a means used by discourse participants in their attempt to associate with like-minded discourse participants, and to disqualify or persuade those with opposing ideological views.

As indicated, many examples are from online discussion forums. The discussants in such forums are a discourse community whose members could take for granted that others within the community are familiar with the metaphor. They also share with some members a negative attitude toward some entities, be they the former Yugoslavia, the EU, or another entity. The explanatory and negative evaluative force of the metaphor in the context of forum discussions often serves its persuasive function.

The metaphor is frequently used in delegitimization of certain groups: in example (20) that group consists of people labelled "Croats nationalists" and in (21) "Croatian communists." The speaker in (20) does not endorse the metaphor; it is used in his references to language use by others, by people labelled "Croatian nationalists." Interestingly, in example (20), the link between two target domains that both frequently appear in the corpus, Yugoslavia and the EU, is established:

- (20) Svjedočili smo tako bolnim urlicima *Hrvata nacionalista* kojima je EU naprosto jedna predimenzionirana Jugoslavija, puki surogat za još veću *tamnica naroda*.⁴⁰ (Slobodna Dalmacija 28/01/2012)

39. <http://www.hrvatskipolitickiuzneci.hr/content/view/1787/12/>.

40. <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/misljenja/spurtilom-i-ostima/clanak/id/155862/draga-unijo-cuvaj-nas-od-nas-samih>.

We have witnessed the painful howls of Croatian nationalists for whom the EU is simply an oversized Yugoslavia, a mere surrogate for an even bigger *dungeon of nations*.

- (21) *Hrvatski komunisti*, koji su svjesno, planski i namjerno odveli svoj narod u *tamnicu naroda* - Jugoslaviju, nisu ništa drugo nego najobičniji kvislinzi – domaći izdajnici.⁴¹ (Forum.hr 09/09/2008)
Croatian Communists, who consciously, deliberately, and intentionally took their people to the *dungeon of nations*, Yugoslavia, are nothing else but ordinary quislings, or domestic traitors.

In some forum threads, the metaphor is used in the title and/or first contribution, and then it either becomes a central plank of argumentation in subsequent posts, or is rarely used and simply disappears in subsequent posts, as, for example, in the discussion at Forum.hr (2007c), September 20th, 2007–September 24th, 2007.

The reuse and elaboration of the metaphor contribute to the coherence that is expected of forum posts within the same thread. Furthermore, the use and reuse of the metaphor helps to reinforce a relationship of solidarity among contributors through shared opposition to the target domain entity (or entities), and through additional reference to shared historical and cultural knowledge. In online forum discussions, in which contributors interact via written asynchronous communication, metaphors can be creatively developed, and the communication mode allows for enough thinking and an opportunity to develop metaphorical scenarios in some detail. Semino, Deignan & Littlemore (2013) emphasize that the particular way in which a metaphor is reused and extended across turns can be both a collaborative and a competitive process in which the contributors reinforce their mutual relationship by sharing the same metaphor, but also engage in verbal one-upmanship in trying to outdo one another in the sophistication and originality of their use of the metaphor. The later component, sophistication and originality, is not a feature of the samples examined.

The metaphor's chief function in hrWaC is one of negatively evaluating political systems and states. Specific additional functions – persuading participants in communicative events, delegitimizing groups or individuals, and reinforcing a relationship of solidarity among contributors in online discussions – all relate to that one. In its chief function, the metaphor is used in the verbal expression of everyday nationalism (see, for example, Calhoun 2007; Abu El-Haj 2015); that is, creating an association with a certain nation or state by disassociating oneself from another nation or state, the metaphor's target. Uses of this metaphor in grassroots discourse indicate that it makes sense to pay attention to metaphors and their

41. <http://www.forum.hr/showthread.php?t=379027&page=12>.

potential to stir emotions in studying everyday nationalism: how ordinary people make sense of and enact nationalism, nationhood, and national belonging in their everyday lives (Ichijo & Ranta 2016). The metaphor seems to be an important device in enacting nationhood, and, in the contexts in which it refers to Yugoslavia as the target domain, it perhaps indicates that Nation-building strategies in Croatia have been successful (see Kolstø 2014) in the sense that the majority of users strongly disassociate themselves from the former Yugoslavia and express their association with, and positive emotional attitude to, Croatia.

7. *The dungeon of nations* as a strategically-used evaluative metaphor in nation-building: Discussion and conclusion

Semino, Deignan, and Littlemore (2013) claim that the recontextualization of a metaphor can involve complexity and creativity: this happens when new users of some previously coined metaphor strategically and imaginatively develop both the source and target domains, and the interaction between these domains. In the corpus examined, the source domain is not often developed. Metaphor users often do not refer to detailed elements of the source domain in their argumentation; only in a few cases do their references include jailers, prisoners, closing dungeons, and being freed from dungeons. In the matter of target domains, what certainly has developed in the discourse history is their range. The target domains include not only state unions (historical and current ones), but also other entities.

However, instead of recontextualizing it in a creative manner, the majority of the examples in my data simply recycle the metaphor (see Gavriely-Nuri 2013). The number of mappings involved is limited. The metaphor is thus rather “static.” In some cases, in addition to recycling it, discourse participants provide some evidence of their knowledge of the metaphor’s discourse history. The majority of participants endorse and embrace the metaphor as a fitting representation of their own feelings and experiences; however, a considerable number critically scrutinize the metaphor in different ways and to different extents, but still do not provide it with any truly new aspects. A few reject it by reflecting on the target domain (e.g., Austria-Hungary in example (6) and Yugoslavia in example (4)) and pointing towards the absence of mappings that would make the metaphor really convincing. Some discourse participants use additional metaphors to strengthen their argument (see examples (15) and (16)). Some others elaborate the target domain by adding details that in their view strengthen or weaken the metaphor; they do so in order to explain their ideological position and/or convince others.

In recontextualization, changes can occur in the explanatory function of metaphors, for example, in what exactly a metaphor is used to explain. For instance, if transferred from a newspaper article to a political blog, a metaphor

can experience changes in its evaluative function: whom it evaluates and how it does so can be subject to change. If one recalls the origin of this metaphor in a specific Slavic context, the corpus examined shows that the metaphor has broadened its usage range: it applies to many states of complex structure involving several nationalities. It also applies to organizations (e.g., EU and NATO) and major ideologies.⁴²

The metaphor's evaluative force is stable; it is constantly negative, which also makes the metaphor static in this respect. The social actors engaged in evaluation are occasionally journalists and political analysts, but the majority are anonymous or named participants in semi-official and official discourse.

A large number of sources that use and/or quote the *prison of nations metaphor* are right-wing, conservative sources (e.g., portals of the political parties HSP, HČSP, Hrvatska Uljudba, HKV, and others). On the one hand, these sources continue the Croatian discourse of the 1990s (historiographic and political), and, on the other hand, they align with some recent European right-wing discourse concerning the EU: the metaphor *prison of peoples* has been part of recent discussions regarding the EU and Brexit.

In these sources, especially in online forums, the metaphor is exploited and developed in order to explain a historical or current situation, and to pass judgement and apportion blame in various ways. Negative evaluation plays a major role in recycling this metaphor in the corpus examined.

Regarding the emotions the metaphor is used to express, there does not seem to be much change in these: in its discourse history, the metaphor has been constantly related to negative emotions, with which negative evaluation is inherently linked. Here, these emotions and evaluation are part of everyday nationalism and how ordinary people feel and make sense of the social world.

Negative emotions and evaluation are inherently connected with the metaphor's source domain. Furthermore, with this source domain, only a few mappings are relevant. The elements constantly emphasized are oppression and lack of freedom of the "imprisoned"; that is, the fact that a dungeon's structure (e.g., its walls and location) constrains freedom. The second element of the source domain that is highlighted to some extent is the common enemy in prison communities: jailers. Jailers are mapped onto dominant nations (other groups or institutions) in multinational states.

42. In reference to recontextualization, it should be noted that metaphor users can pick up a metaphor and creatively adapt it to their own purposes, reflecting the flexible and often underspecified nature of metaphorical meanings. This is not an uncommon phenomenon when it comes to the use of metaphor: the source domain or scenario is adapted in order to accommodate the structures and relationships that apply to the speaker's or writer's view of the target domain (Semino, Deignan & Littlemore 2013).

Many important aspects of the *prison* source domain are completely neglected in the data examined (because it utilizes a *dungeon* as the source domain). First, inmates are typically lawbreakers. So why are certain nations repeatedly imprisoned in various multinational state formations? The use of this metaphor (in contexts endorsing it) assumes unjust imprisonment; the imprisoned are innocent: they are put into dungeons as a result of an illegitimate conviction, or simply without any reason. This is achieved by using the word *tamnica* instead of *zatvor* ‘prison’; the historical character of a *tamnica* makes this concept vague and “mystical,” a concept that has much more potential to be metaphorical, to invoke negative emotions and evaluation. The word has strong negative connotations with its reference to a dark, underground place and loneliness, and these connotations are the source of the evaluative force of this metaphor. Further aspects that the domain of modern prisons could have provided had it been used are relations among prisoners. The uses of *tamnica naroda* operate with the assumption that an innocent person imprisoned is more or less alone; consequently, there are no relations or community. The lack of community leads to backgrounding several other aspects that the source domain of a *prison* could have provided (see Marks 2004).

As in the past, groups and individuals continue to use this metaphor to convey an unfavourable image of multinational states, and they do so, for instance, in order to discursively construct a victim identity, and occasionally to criticize or even demonize the target domain – that is, the entity (state union or another phenomenon) referred to as a “dungeon of nations.”

Furthermore, the metaphor is part of everyday “nation talk,” part of people’s everyday expressions of their perceptions of their own nation in the present and in the past, and thus part of the inventory of their verbal everyday “banal nationalism.” Through the strategic deliberate use of the *prison* metaphor, discourse participants seemingly make sense of multinational states and individual nations’ positions in these, but in fact aim at some other communicative goals beyond this. The metaphor’s stable strong negative evaluative force makes it a static metaphor that is deliberately and strategically used by people enacting everyday nationalism.

The corpus examined shows that the metaphor is a shared resource for enacting everyday nationalism, within political discourse generally and in the discourse of the political right in particular. It is primarily the former Yugoslavia’s role in the history of the Croats, but also the EU in the future of the Croats, that is framed by this metaphor.⁴³

43. Research on political discourse considering the *prison of nations* metaphor shows that the use of this metaphor in discourse changes: it is led by concrete political aims. The same political actors in different situations use very different metaphors in depicting the same political

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unit (see, for example, Bagarić 2011, who analyses the conceptualization of Austria-Hungary in Croatian political discourse).

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Guidelines on how to construct a nation

Metaphors in the first episode of the Catalan series *Gran Nord*

Silvia Grassi

This chapter focuses on the analysis of metaphors employed in the first episode of the television series *Gran Nord* (2012–2013) (Great North) broadcast in prime time by Catalan television. The chapter demonstrates that these metaphors contribute to the construction of ideological meanings around the spaces which constitute the fictional universe of the series in relation to the apparently conflicting aspects of the protagonist's identity. In order to achieve this, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and, in particular, Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphorical Representation Theory (1980) and Lera Boroditsky's Metaphoric Structuring View (2000) are employed.

Keywords: audiovisual metaphors, multimodal metaphors, television narratives, national identity, Catalonia, Cognitive Cultural Studies, Catalan television, TV3

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explore a topic which has rarely been addressed: the use of metaphors in a television series and their role in discourses around the construction of national identities. I focus in particular on the first episode of a Catalan television series, *Gran Nord*, broadcast in prime time by TV3, the main channel of the Catalan television public service, between 7 May 2012 and 22 July 2013. This series is particularly interesting for my analysis because it presents an allegory for the processes currently taking place in Catalonia. Indeed, the series' narrative revolves around a small hamlet, Nord, and its attempt to achieve "independence" from Fogony, the municipality to which it belongs. The series explores the mechanisms that this small hamlet employs in order to legitimate its quest: its

inhabitants claim to have a specific language, a distinct history and institutions which predate those of Fogony. I have chosen to focus on the first episode because it creates the fictional microcosm of this television series by using audiovisual metaphors to construct ideological meanings around places and characters, especially related to the construction of personal and collective (including national) identities.

On the one hand, this chapter properly fits the aim of the volume in which it appears by examining the role of metaphors in establishing a sense of belonging to national communities and their role in instrumentalizing this emotional attachment for specific policies. On the other hand, this chapter is also an attempt to contribute with distinctive elements to the diverse and innovative character of the volume. Its aim is to explore the role of metaphors in constructing meanings around collective identities in a Catalan series; the study of metaphors informed by Conceptual Metaphor Theory is an approach which has never been applied to Catalan television narratives. This study is very timely considering the processes currently taking place in Catalonia and the significant role television plays in the current political context. Moreover, this chapter aspires to contribute to the present volume, mainly dedicated to verbal metaphors, with an analysis of a television series. It focuses, then, on audiovisual metaphors.

The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the role of Catalan television in the construction of a Catalan national imaginary; Section 3 presents an overview of the state of the art, theoretical framework and approaches that I adopt for my analysis; Section 4 presents my analysis of metaphors in the first episode of *Gran Nord*; Section 5 explains the interpretation of these ideological meanings as an allegory for conflicted imaginary national communities in Catalonia; Section 6 presents the conclusions.

2. Cultural context: Catalan public broadcasting service and its role as “national media”

Anderson (1991) defines a nation as an “imagined political community,” a group of people who share a sense of communion. Such communion is created through what Homi K. Bhabha (1990) calls a “narrative construction of nation”: a national identity is not something natural, intrinsic to ourselves, but is a representation made of shared experiences and narrated histories. Therefore, it is constructed through discourses. The perception of our national identity is acquired through a socialization process and one of the most powerful socializing institutions is undoubtedly the television medium. As Stuart Hall (1977: 341) states, television content is implicated in the “provision and selective construction of social

knowledge, of social imagery.” Therefore, television narratives represent a resource for the construction of identity projects, both individual and collective.

It is for this reason that, after the transition towards democracy in Spain, one of the most significant actions of the Catalan Government was the creation of a public radio and television system. The *Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió* (Catalan Radio and Television Corporation) has always insisted on defining Catalan public radio and television as national media. According to Lluís de Carreras (1987: 153), television services that perform the function of representing a community which identifies itself as a nation can be defined as national television services.

Drawing on this definition, we can argue that a national television service is a medium that assumes the responsibility of becoming an institution and a platform of nation-building for a community for which it is a primary point of reference and around which it centres its content. As Josep-Anton Fernández (2005: 222) argues, Catalonia’s public television service aspires to produce and disseminate “a national narrative able to compete successfully for loyalties and adhesion” and “to delimit a cultural and media space,” which is also symbolic.

John Fiske and John Hartley (1978: 19) interpret television texts as polysemic sites for the generation of ideological meaning. According to this view, television contains within it “the contradictions which enable viewers to understand the play of ideology” (Brown 1990: 18). Moreover, television texts are not isolated; rather, they gain meaning through their interaction not only with other media but also with broader cultural forms. Cultural representations on television, on account of the “constant accessibility” (Brown 1990: 18) of this medium, acquire great significance, due to “the power of representations to promote or contest domination” (Heywood and Drake 1997: 51). It is precisely this pervasive and omnipresent nature of television which makes it such a fascinating and, at the same time, complex object of analysis.

The role of entertaining programmes such as the series *Gran Nord* as ideological products should not be underestimated. Entertainment plays a crucial role in this sense because, in Terry Lovell’s opinion (1981: 47), even without being “primarily a vehicle for the transmission of ideas ... even the most emotionally saturated entertainment will also produce ideas, and these will certainly be locatable in terms of ideology.” Milly Buonanno (2008) argues that television narratives should be approached as an “interpretative practice” (Buonanno 2008: 72) which contributes to a redefinition of “shared conceptions of what is normal and what violates the norm” (Buonanno 2008: 75).

This is the reason why I will focus on a television series: although the ideological role of this genre may be less explicit than that of other television formats, such as news or talk shows, its power in constructing cultural and political meanings

deserves scrutiny. On the other hand, I consider it a mistake to overestimate the power of the television medium and underestimate the active role of audiences. Therefore, I read television narratives as “resources” for the construction of collective identities, since they are actively appropriated and deployed by audiences in different ways. As Barker (1999: 7) suggests, “television does not construct identity in the manner of a hypodermic needle but provides materials to be worked on. The relationship between media and culture is therefore one of the subtle interplay of mediations.”

3. Conceptual metaphors and audiovisual metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 153) fundamentally changed the study of metaphor by claiming that “metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language.” In this view, metaphor can be considered one of the essential conceptual tools for human beings to make sense of the world. A logical consequence of accepting Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) was that researchers should not only investigate verbal expressions of conceptual metaphors but also consider their non-verbal manifestations.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) state that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.” This is a convenient characterization of the trope, if only because it does not privilege its verbal variety. Of the two “things,” one is the “target” and the other is the “source.” The target pertains to the phenomenon the metaphor is about, whereas the source pertains to the phenomenon that the target is compared to. For something to be labelled a metaphor, the analyst should always be capable of identifying which target domain is connected to which source domain, which is normally represented in the form *TARGET IS SOURCE*. If a metaphor in film and television involves visual images – as it often, but not necessarily, does – the underlying metaphorical *A IS B* has to be construed to an even larger degree than in the case of its linguistic manifestations. The reason for this construal is that there is no shorthand visual equivalent for the copula *is*.

Target and source are both part of “semantic networks” (Forceville 2016: 19): each of them evokes a host of associated elements, emotions, and attitudes. Interpretation of a metaphor boils down to “mapping” one or more features (or a structured set of features) from source domain to target domain. As cognitive research demonstrates, metaphors can act as elementary structures of human thinking and imagination (Danesi 1989; Boroditsky 2000), in this way helping us imagine complex, abstract or invisible ideas, concepts or emotions in terms of embodied schemata and gestalts. As “intermediary structures” in our minds (Danesi 1989),

they integrate cultural knowledge with innate meanings, based on gestalt perception and image schemata. Accordingly, CMT considers metaphors not merely analogies between two words or pictures on the symbolic level. Instead, considering a more basic cognitive dimension, it is argued that metaphors are based on conceptual mappings as a relevant mechanism in the human mind (Johnson 1987; Kövecses 2002). Conceptual mappings project significant sensorial qualities of a source domain to the sensorial and mental qualities of another concept, belonging to a different experiential domain.

However, Lera Boroditsky poses interesting questions that may help me define more precisely the approaches I need to adopt in order to achieve the aim of this chapter:

How do we come to represent and reason about abstract domains like time, love, justice, or ideas? There are at least two interesting puzzles here. First, how do we learn about abstract domains despite the dearth and vagueness of sensory information available about them? And second, how are we able to coordinate our mental representations of these domains enough to agree (at least some of the time) on the fairness of a decision, the strength of someone's love, or the worth of an idea?
(Boroditsky 2000: 1–2)

These questions can be perfectly applied to another abstract domain, that is to say identity: whether personal or collective, including national, how do we come to represent and reason about identity?

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) consider the human conceptual system to be structured around only a small set of experiential concepts that emerge directly out of experience and are defined in their own terms. These fundamental experiential concepts include a set of basic spatial relations (such as up/down, front/back), a set of physical ontological concepts (such as entity, container), and a set of basic experiences or actions (such as eating, moving). According to this view, all other concepts that do not emerge directly out of physical experience must be metaphoric in nature. Although this assertion has been nuanced by more recent theories, Lakoff and Johnson's assumption that metaphoric or abstract concepts are understood and structured through metaphorical mappings from a small set of fundamental experiential concepts is still a landmark in Metaphor Studies.

Drawing on Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphorical Representation Theory, Lera Boroditsky developed the theory known as Metaphoric Structuring View (2000). Boroditsky argues that metaphors are used for organizing information within abstract domains. The job of metaphor is to provide relational structure to an abstract domain by importing it from a more concrete domain. In particular, she demonstrates how the abstract domain of time gets its relational structure from the more concrete domain of space. Similarly, according to Kromhout and Forceville (2013: 101), concrete domains pertain to "the phenomena we have knowledge and

experience of thanks to sensory perception (touching, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting) and thanks to our movement through physical space.”

Given the cognitive character of metaphorical understanding and imagination, it seems obvious that not only language (Kövecses 2002) but also visual and multimodal media operate with the metaphoric schemata and mechanisms that are anchored in our minds. As Forceville (2016) claims, this is all the more evident in entertainment media which tend to strategically “sell” their products by addressing their viewers’ immediate, intuitive understanding multimodally through pictures, sounds, and language. Drawing on conceptual metaphors allows creators of audiovisual media products to communicate complex meanings in an embodied gestalt that their public understands in an instinctive manner.

However, whereas CMT is an established academic approach in linguistics and semiotics, its application to disciplines dealing with multimodal artifacts – whether Media Studies, Film Studies, Television Studies or Game Studies – is less explored. Over the last decade it has been possible to observe a growing tendency in Cognitive Film and Media Studies to discover the potential of analysing embodied aesthetics and meanings of moving images by applying insights from CMT to audiovisual media. The approaches adopted by Forceville (2008, 2016), Fahlenbrach (2008, 2014), and Coëgnarts and Kravanja (2012a, 2012b) and their results have been very useful to my own research on metaphors.

Forceville (2008, 2016) combines research on multimodality in semiotics and CMT when claiming that image schemata and conceptual metaphors can be manifested in audiovisual media not just by visual and acoustic elements, but also by certain combinations of several elements including language and gestures. His studies on multimodal metaphors in comics, advertising campaigns, and films offer relevant instruments for identifying image schemata, realized in image composition, lighting, and colour use, as well as in editing, in the movement of the camera and the depicted objects.

Fahlenbrach (2008, 2014, 2016b) proposes an approach that explicitly deals with metaphorical mappings in audiovisual media on the level of embodied gestalts in pictures and sound. She considers key action places and bodies of protagonists as relevant objects of metaphoric representation, portraying narrative meanings in an embodied metaphoric way.

In their case studies, Coëgnarts and Kravanja (2012a, 2012b) have found that relevant cinematic conventions in mainstream films are metaphorically conceptualized. For instance, in their article on conceptual metaphors and image metaphors in the film (2012b), analysing Antonioni’s film *Professione: Reporter* (1975), they examine the construction of the metaphor *TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT* (Coëgnarts & Kravanja 2012b: 105–106); analysing Fassbinder’s film *Martha* (1974), they examine the construction of the metaphor *MENTAL RELATIONSHIP IS A SPATIAL*

RELATIONSHIP (Coëgnarts & Kravanja 2012b: 106–107); analysing a scene from Nicolas Roeg's *Bad Timing* (1980), they demonstrate how image metaphors can in turn be the trigger for other structural–conceptual metaphors. In particular, in this scene, the structural–conceptual metaphor LOVE IS DEATH is triggered by a series of image metaphors, showing a montage of images where the fragmented and copulating bodies of the two protagonists, Alex and Milena, repeatedly confronted with a series of clinical shots of Milena in a coma. According to Coëgnarts and Kravanja (2012b: 108–109), this metaphor helps to construct Alex's and Milena's relationship as a destructive one. They also take elementary forms of audiovisual composition to be manifestations of embodied image schemata and demonstrate how their metaphoric use has relevantly shaped cinematic poetics.

However, while Metaphor Studies is becoming a recognized field within Film Studies, as the work by Coëgnarts and Kravanja demonstrates, television narratives remain widely unexplored from this perspective. In particular, the analysis of the role metaphors may play in television series to construct ideological meanings around national identity is a virgin field. This is the first study which attempts to explore this issue in a Catalan series.

Furthermore, in Film Studies informed by cognitive theories much has been said recently about the strategies employed in films to address deep emotions in viewers (Smith 2003). Film Studies have explored how embodied, innate reflexes and attributions are stimulated through a complex mixture of visuals, sounds, movements, and so on, that make film viewing an intense experience (Anderson and Fisher Anderson 2007). These considerations can also be applied to the experience of television viewing. However, the field of Television Studies has not sufficiently explored these issues. Therefore, I will pay particular attention to multimodal metaphors and how visuals and sound are combined to generate metaphoric meanings. Regarding the role of soundtrack to contribute to the construction of metaphorical meanings, Fahlenbrach (2016b: 36) emphasizes the role of “specific leitmotifs” in a single film or television series in implying “silent cues for relevant narrative meanings that are potential targets of metaphorical performances”:

If leitmotifs are understood as accentuated elements in the deictic structure of moving images, it can further be argued that they require an evident audiovisual gestalt in order to point directly to a specific narrative meaning ... narrative leitmotifs are prominent objects of metaphoric conceptualizations.

(Fahlenbrach 2016b: 36)

In addition to its still limited attention to television narratives, the CMT approach presents another limit which is particularly encumbering considering the topic and the scope of this chapter. According to Fahlenbrach (2016a: 5), research into

the embodied meanings of moving images tends to neglect the more complex cultural meanings. During a talk at the Society of the Cognitive Study of the Moving Image conference 2013 in Berlin, its former president Carl Plantinga (Reinerth 2016: 220) called for an integrative perspective that he defined as “Cognitive Cultural Studies.” He recognized that cognitive film studies tended to neglect cultural contexts in the development of audiovisual conventions relating to the human mind and emotions. In his opinion, adopting an approach also informed by the field of cultural studies would avoid treating moving images with a one-sided perspective, promoting in this way cognitive approaches that consider the influence of cultural discourses in the creation and reception of moving images. My chapter aims to be a contribution to this new perspective in metaphor analysis that combines Cultural Studies approaches and an attention to cultural contexts in which audiovisual narratives are produced with the examination of audiovisual metaphors through a cognitive approach.

Therefore, CMT and more specifically the Metaphoric Structuring View theory elaborated by Lera Boroditsky inform the theoretical background of this chapter, without ignoring Plantinga’s warning about the importance of cultural contexts in the construction and interpretation of metaphors. This importance is particularly evident when dealing with a Catalan series which employs audiovisual metaphors to construct ideological meanings related to identity, both personal and collective.

In the following section, I will analyse in particular the role played by metaphors in the first episode of *Gran Nord* in creating the fictional microcosm of this television series. I will demonstrate that examining these metaphors is a crucial step in understanding the ideological meanings which the episode construes around places and characters, especially related to the construction of personal and collective identity.

4. *Gran Nord*: Audiovisual metaphors and their ideological role in the narrative

In the first episode of *Gran Nord* the audience is introduced to one of the main metaphors used by the series for the construction of its fictional universe: LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The series begins with Anna, a talented and promising *Mossa d’Esquadra* (member of the Catalan Police) who gets transferred to Fogony, a small town in the Great North, the border zone between Spain and France in the Pyrenees. We are later told that Anna originally comes from Fogony or, to be more specific, from one hamlet of Fogony, Nord.

In order to understand the metaphor *LIFE IS A JOURNEY*, it is interesting to analyse the trailer. The route Anna takes from Barcelona to the Great North is traced on a stylized map of Catalonia in the trailer sequence. Typical for a series, it is always repeated as a starter to each episode. In this way, the audience witnesses Anna's journey at the beginning of every episode. This emphasizes the fact that the journey between Barcelona and the Great North is not only a physical/geographical route but also a journey towards self-awareness (as will become apparent later) – a journey which will inspire Anna to question who she is and the identity with which she has always identified. For this reason, we can also identify the metaphor *SELF-AWARENESS IS A JOURNEY*. Since identity, and the processes of its construction, is an abstract concept which is difficult to define, metaphors such as *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* and *SELF-AWARENESS IS A JOURNEY* are useful to represent it.

A television series, thanks to its episodic structure, can use a longer time frame than a film in order to generate the metaphoric meanings of recurrent motifs; repetition is one of the most efficient strategies to achieve this aim. A repeated motif can progressively generate a metaphoric meaning. Whereas an image metaphor “connects a concrete object to another concrete object” (Gleason 2009: 437), conceptual metaphors such as *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* are not easily visualized due to their lack of texture, as Coëgnarts and Kravanja (2012b: 99) argue. In *Gran Nord*, the trailer sequence facilitates the viewer's interpretation of this conceptual metaphor. Viewers can interpret a metaphor in different ways and the trailer can be used to guide viewers towards a specific interpretation of a metaphor. Moreover, trailer sequences often change their meanings for viewers because their reception is cognitively and affectively “enriched” by the knowledge acquired and the feelings experienced by viewers during the previous episodes. If the first-time viewer can interpret the journey shown in the trailer sequence as a simple car trip, as he/she grows familiar with the series, it becomes increasingly evident that the metaphor *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* applies to this sequence and to the whole series. As Fahlenbrach (2016b: 48) argues:

It is through constant repetition and cognitive reframing that the metaphoric dimension might become obvious. However, the very composition of a trailer sequence surely has to provide image schemata and gestalt-based concepts that evidently act as metaphoric source domains in relation to the metaphoric targets progressively being recognized by viewers throughout a series.

Therefore, the metaphoric meanings constructed around Anna's journey from Barcelona to the Great North and, more specifically, the repetition of this journey at the beginning of each episode, prompt the audience to understand before long that Anna's journey does not end when she arrives to the Great North (see Figure 1). On the contrary, we might say that the inner journey for Anna begins when she gets there.



Figure 1. Anna's metaphorical journey is traced on a map during Gran Nord's trailer

The trailer opens with an image of a suitcase with a picture of a child inside. These two symbols – the luggage and the picture of a child – underpin the metaphor of the journey and, more precisely, of a life journey. During the route from Barcelona to the Great North taken by the car during the trailer, it suddenly starts to rain and nature flourishes. I will later analyse the importance of nature and landscape for the construction of metaphoric meanings around Nord. At this point, it is important to highlight the fact that we see natural elements, such as mushrooms, growing.¹ This emphasis on growing and change reinforces the idea of life as a metaphorical journey. Towards the end of the trailer another element appears that deserves consideration: a flock of flying books. This element links nature more directly to the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Indeed, the series interprets identity as a narrative, constantly written and re-written throughout the journey which constitutes our life. Finally, at the end of the trailer, when the car arrives in Nord (symbolized by a statue with the coat of arms of the town) on the stylized map of Catalonia, it is welcomed by a statue portraying a hand with two fingers raised, the index finger and the middle finger. When we first see the trailer we do not know the meaning of this gesture but we find out during the course of the first episode. It is a gesture only used by the inhabitants of Nord and it means “welcome.” Therefore, the presence of this statue next to Nord's coat of arms can be easily interpreted as “welcome to Nord” (see Figure 2).

1. The choice of mushrooms is deliberate. In rural Catalonia, mushroom-hunting is a common activity. It has almost acquired the status of “national symbol,” so much so that Catalan television has dedicated a programme to this activity: *Caçadors de bolets* ‘Mushroom Hunters,’ which was broadcast every autumn from 2004 to 2014 with great success.



Figure 2. At the end of the trailer, Anna's car is "welcomed" by Nord's symbolism

The metaphor *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* and the fact that this metaphor applies to Anna's journey is made even more explicit by the lyrics of the song played in the trailer sequence:

- (1) Vine a perdre't al cor del Gran Nord. Fuig del que creus ser, et pot fer sentir bé. I vine, somia en el que vols, que no hi ha res que no puguis fer aquí al Gran Nord.

Come and get lost at the heart of the Great North. Escape from who you think you are, it can be good for you. And come, dream about what you want because there is nothing that you can't do here at the Great North.

Although the audience does not know it yet, the song anticipates the meanings constructed around the metaphors *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* and *SELF-AWARENESS IS A JOURNEY* in the series. During her journey Anna will be prompted to question the narrative she has created around her sense of identity (*fuig del que creus ser* 'escape from who you think you are'). However, this questioning is not interpreted as confusion since identity is understood as fluid and constantly under construction. In the same way, the expression "to get lost" is not interpreted in the song as something negative and, as we shall see later, "getting lost" is precisely the prerequisite that Anna needs to start to find out how she can fit into a new place through a reconsideration of her identity narrative. Therefore, the series *Gran Nord* constructs the metaphor *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* through multimodal means, including visual elements and the soundtrack. Indeed, the song heard during the trailer guides viewers in the understanding of the conceptual metaphor constructed by the visuals.

The song also constructs the Great North as a space of freedom. Indeed, as is evident, a journey usually has a place of departure and a destination. Therefore, in

order to fully understand the meanings constructed around the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, it is important to analyse how the first episode of *Gran Nord* constructs the three places around which the narrative develops, which are at the same time physical and metaphorical: Barcelona, Fogony and Nord.

The first shot we see of Barcelona focuses on skyscrapers. The entire scene which takes place in this city shows Anna against the background of modern buildings. It is a city which has none of the picturesque warmth that is normally used to “sell” Barcelona, with its Rambles and beaches. This image is accompanied by fast-paced electronic music, completing the presentation of Barcelona as a modern (and anonymous) city. And yet it is clear to the audience that Anna feels at home in this impersonal city, and she is very upset when she is transferred to what she considers a boring little town in the Great North.

As with Barcelona, the first shot we see of Fogony plays a very important role in understanding the meanings constructed around this place, even more so because this is the only external shot we see of Fogony throughout the episode. It is a shot of the town hall with the official flags in front of it. In the symbolic universe of the series, Fogony represents the authority, the political and juridical control which is rejected by the inhabitants of Nord. The self-explicatory symbol of the flags makes this connection clear. Symbols and metonymies can be used as the basis to create metaphors. In these cases, understanding the meanings of these other tropes is fundamental to interpreting the metaphor they help to create and the ideological meanings attached to it. In the scene I will analyse in the next paragraphs, flags and other official symbols help to create a metaphor which serves the purpose of characterizing the Mayoress of Fogony and, as a consequence, to better outline the meanings constructed around the physical and symbolical place she represents: Fogony. In this sense, the Mayoress can be also considered a metonymy for the town.

The first time we encounter Margarida, the Mayoress of Fogony, she is sitting behind the desk in her office. In her first scene, she is shot only from two angles, which gives a static and “rigid” impression to the audience, who is clearly invited to perceive Margarida as an authoritative figure. Let us focus on the two shots we initially see of her: in the shot from the right angle the audience can see her profile with the official flags in the background; in the front shot we can see her and, on the wall behind her, the official portrait of the then President of Catalonia, Artur Mas (see Figure 3).

Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) list of primary metaphors includes RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES, also defined by Ortiz (2011) as EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY. According to these authors, the allocation of elements in a shot, their positions and the distance between them can construct metaphorical meanings. The level of intimacy between two people or their psychological convergence can



Figure 3. The metaphor IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY, construed through the positions of Margarida and national symbols of Catalonia, helps construct her as the source of authority

be translated by the film or television medium by placing these elements in the same shot. It is evident that a shot which presents different elements does not necessarily contain a metaphor but I argue that it is the case with the two shots of Margarida. My statement is sustained by the highly symbolic functions of the elements involved – a Mayoress, official flags and the official portrait of a President – and by

the fact that these two shots are shown repeatedly. I have already mentioned, when considering the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and the trailer sequence of *Gran Nord*, how important repetition is as a tool for metaphorical constructions in television narratives. In analysing these two shots I apply the metaphor EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY to the ideological sphere. This metaphor is generally employed to represent the emotional implications of interpersonal relationships.²

I argue that the series *Gran Nord* employs this metaphor to portray ideological relations among the different elements implicated in it. The two shots of Margarida I have previously analysed construe the metaphor IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY. Therefore, through these shots and their content (*mise-en-scène*, camera angles), the audience is invited to interpret the three symbols – the flag, the official portrait of Artur Mas and the Mayoress of Fogony – as belonging to the same ideological domain. The choice of the official portrait of Artur Mas, instead of that of the King of Spain, and the fact that the flag positioned next to the Fogony and the European Union flags is the Catalan one and not the Spanish one is important. In the series, Fogony can be considered as a metonymy for Catalonia, which is constructed as an “Other” from the point of view of the inhabitants of Nord. It is the authority of Catalonia and its symbols which are rejected by the inhabitants of Nord. Among these symbols there is also the Catalan Police Force, precisely the most important source of identity for Anna. At the beginning of the series, Anna is first and foremost a *Mossa d’Esquadra* and, thus, an external element to Nord, although she originally comes from this hamlet. When one character of Nord points out the origin of Anna, “Anna és de Nord” ‘Anna comes from Nord,’ another character promptly replies “Aquesta noia no és de Nord. És Mosso i cap ciutadà de Nord és Mosso o polític. Si ho és, perd la nacionalitat” ‘This girl is not from Nord. She is a policewoman and citizens of Nord cannot be members of the Catalan police or politicians. If they are, they lose their nationality.’ An essentialist interpretation of identity is evident in this construction of Catalonia as “Otherness” and in the perceived

2. Ortiz (2011: 1573) explains how this metaphor has often been employed in films: for instance, in one scene of Aronofsky’s film *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), a couple is talking about what they feel for one another. However, they do not occupy the same frame in the shot, since the screen is split down the middle. They say how important they are for each other and they are next to each other. Therefore, they are apparently close. However, the shot shows each one in a different frame, so metaphorically they are not in the same space. They are physically close to one another but they are not enclosed in the same frame. If we consider the metaphor EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY, this shot is indicative of the problem this couple has to connect with each other.

incompatibility between an identity derived from Nord and an identity derived from Catalan symbols, such as *Mossos d'Esquadra*.

At the end of the first episode, we find out that Margarida also comes from Nord. Since she has accepted the position of Mayoress of Fogony, that is to say a politician who represents the authority so strongly rejected by the inhabitants of Nord, she has also “lost her nationality,” as Anna has. Margarida’s origin is also anticipated in her first scene. On the wall facing her desk, there is a poster with an image of a Pyrenean landscape. As will be shown later, the Pyrenean landscape is used in this series to metaphorically construct Nord. The poster is opposite the portrait of Artur Mas and, between them, there is Margarida. Therefore, the position of these two symbols seems to suggest that they represent two aspects of Margarida’s identity. Throughout the course of the series the audience learns that Margarida’s choice of one of these aspects and not the other is only apparently easy since, in fact, Margarida’s sense of identity is much more conflicted. This is also suggested by the position of the symbolic elements in the room. The fact that the desk is placed nearer to the portrait of Artur Mas suggests the choice that Margarida has apparently made and yet the fact that the poster is just in front of her suggests an ever-present element of her sense of identity which Margarida cannot repress entirely.

Moreover, the same image of the poster is reprised by the screensaver on Margarida’s computer (see Figure 3). In this case, the image of the Pyrenean landscape is counterposed to the flags. The symbolic construct is very similar to the one analysed just above. The screensaver is always present in the shot with the flags. The flags represent the authority Margarida embodies which is contrasted with the image of the Pyrenees that represents her connection with Nord. In this shot too, the position of Margarida is revealing: she is almost always seen with the flags in the background and, thus, her figure is almost always juxtaposed with the symbols of the flags. And yet, in the office in penumbra characterized by cold colours, the screensaver is a source of light and bright colours. In this shot, then, the use of light and colours might contribute to suggest a more complex sense of identity in Margarida than seems to be the case. This can also be interpreted metaphorically. Ortiz (2011: 1571) identifies GOOD IS BRIGHT/BAD IS DARK as a primary metaphor frequently used in film. This metaphor is based on the tendency of the human mind to associate positive meanings with light and negative meanings with darkness. Elements in a shot which are in the dark tend to be read as “negative” whereas elements in a shot which are in the light tend to be read as “positive.” This reading can also be useful for this shot where the flags are in penumbra whereas the screensaver is luminous.

Finally, the dialogues in this scene introduce another symbolic element which plays an important role throughout the entire series. When Anna enters

Margarida's office, the Mayoress is not there yet. Anna's attention gets caught by an ancient book. Suddenly, another character, Ermengol, comes in: Ermengol is from Nord and he is one of the strongest supporters of the hamlet's independence from Fogony.³ As Ermengol explains, the ancient book Anna was looking at is the *Llibre de privilegis* 'The Book of Privileges.' According to the legend, this book was given to Nord by Emperor Charlemagne and states a series of laws and rules which the inhabitants of Nord know by heart and follow scrupulously. The people of Nord refuse any other legal or juridical text, starting with the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In Ermengol's words, "el llibre ens fa lliures i iguals" 'the book makes us free and equal' and it is the only authority that the inhabitants of Nord accept. As Ermengol explains, the book disappeared in 1939, at the end of the Civil War. When it was found in Mexico, it was given back to its owner. At that point, however, Nord was no longer an independent municipality and the book ended up at the town hall of Fogony. Since then, the inhabitants of Nord have been trying to bring it back to Nord. The symbolic meaning of the book is constructed through a multimodal metaphor, constituted by the dialogue, and in particular Ermengol's story, and the image. Indeed, the book is always seen with the poster of the Pyrenean landscape in the background. As with the flags, the official portrait of Artur Mas and Margarida, the metaphor IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY also invites the audience to consider the poster and the book as belonging to the same ideological domain (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. The metaphor IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY is also constructed through the association of the poster and the Book of Privileges

3. Later in the series, we find out that Ermengol and Margarida are brother and sister.

The last physical and metaphorical place we need to analyse is Nord itself. In contrast to Barcelona and Fogony, the audience is not initially shown any building in Nord. We are introduced to this hamlet with shots of the landscape that surrounds it. Nord is construed metaphorically through a representation of a picture-perfect Pyrenean landscape, shown repeatedly in several shots which always introduce scenes set in Nord.⁴ In order to understand the metaphor which concludes the first episode, it is important to stress at this point that the series employs the bear as a metonymy for this landscape. When a metaphor is construed in relation with another trope, in this case a metonymy, it is important to first understand the meaning of such a trope, without which the metaphor cannot be interpreted. In the next paragraphs, I will analyse how, at the end of the first episode, the Nord landscape and the bear play an active role in constructing metaphorical meanings and become crucial for Anna's redefinition of her identity.

Despite being originally from Nord, Anna feels completely out of place in this hamlet. Throughout the episode she repeatedly tells people that she does not remember anything of or anyone from Nord. Therefore, this hamlet and its inhabitants are excluded from her sense of individual identity and, as a consequence, she excludes any possibility of establishing herself as part of a collective identity derived from Nord. At the end of the first episode, Anna is walking alone through the forest. Her sense of displacement is rendered explicitly by the fact that her figure is partly hidden by the presence of trees and vegetation. Moreover, we cannot see her entire figure since she is mostly seen through headshots and, thus, only the upper part of her body is visible to the viewers. These shots help to generate a tense atmosphere since the viewers are not "omniscient" and they are not able to see all of her surroundings and what happens around her. Ortiz (2011: 1573) identifies the primary metaphor CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SURROUNDINGS, which derives from the correlation between the physical environment and our mental state. The representation of the surroundings and the relationship between the environment and a character are often used in film and TV series to portray the psychological and the emotional situation of that character. These shots convey the idea that Anna feels out of place, she feels lost – an expression which reprises the lyrics of the song heard during the trailer sequence. However, these shots do not link this to a sense of freedom, as the song suggests, but to a sense of disorientation: Anna feels she has lost control over her life, being transferred against her will in a place she detests. The choice of not showing Anna's entire figure – either because of the

4. Analysing the series *Twin Peaks*, Fahlenbrach (2016b: 41) identifies the metaphor SOCIETY IS A NATURAL PLACE, emphasizing the fact that the town of Twin Peaks is constructed through its association with the wild nature around it. In the same way, the metaphor SOCIETY IS A NATURAL PLACE is also construed in the representation of Nord.

insistence of showing only the upper part of her body or because it is often partially hidden by vegetation – can also be interpreted as a film technique used to convey a sense of a fragmented and non-coherent identity.

Suddenly, Anna sees a bear. When the animal is approaching her, her uncle Quico, who has just arrived on the scene, tells her about an old popular saying of Nord. According to this popular myth, if you see a bear in Nord, there are only three things you can do: pretend to be dead, if it hasn't seen you yet; kill it if it attacks you; or dance. Anna reminds her uncle for the umpteenth time throughout the episode that she has never danced in her life. The dance acquires symbolic meaning here. Indeed, according to the popular myth, only the inhabitants of Nord know the “ball de l'óssa” ‘dance of the bear.’ Anna looks at the bear and slowly starts to dance with the animal.

When Pep, Anna's police partner, arrives, he sees them and tries to shoot the bear with a sedative. However, he misses the animal and hits Anna, who faints. The bear gets close to Anna, touches her and then goes away. The physical proximity of Anna and the bear can be also considered a metaphorical construction related to the primary metaphor *EMOTIONAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY* (Ortiz 2011: 1573). If we interpret the bear as a metonymy of the natural environment of the Pyrenees and we take into consideration the importance that natural environment plays in the construction of the identity of Nord, it becomes clear that the physical proximity of Anna and the bear generates the metaphor *EMOTIONAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY*: through the bear, that is to say the natural environment of the Pyrenees, Anna gets in touch with an aspect of her identity she had repressed, as is demonstrated from both the previous scene in which Anna dances with the bear and the scene which follows (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. The metaphor *EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY* is construed through the position of Anna and the bear, metonymy of the natural environment of the Pyrenees. Anna gets close to what this landscape represents in terms of identity

Indeed, when Anna wakes up, she is shot from a high-angle, that is to say the camera observes her from above. This shot has certainly a literal meaning since Anna is lying on the ground. However, this shot also constructs the orientational metaphor *LOSING CONTROL IS BEING BELOW*.⁵ Unlike the scene in the forest, in this scene positive meaning is attached to the idea of “losing control”: Anna is coming to terms with the fact that the sense of identity she has constructed in Barcelona might not be so clear, fixed, and coherent as she believed. As I have already pointed out when analysing the song of the trailer, “getting lost” and “losing control” are the prerequisites Anna needed to begin her journey towards reflecting on and re-defining her sense of identity, which reminds us of the metaphor *SELF-AWARENESS IS A JOURNEY*.

Moreover, when Anna wakes up, her view is initially blurred. Then, her vision gradually clears until she can completely discern the inhabitants of Nord who have formed a circle around her. The memories of her childhood have come back: she remembers the name of all the inhabitants of Nord, how she related to them (she remembers that, when they were children, she had taught Sisquet how to write his name) and how she felt about them (she remembers she had a crush on Ermen-gol). Therefore, this scene presents a multimodal construction of the metaphor *UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING*. Indeed, besides the image, the soundtrack in this scene guides the audience in the full understanding of the metaphor. According to Albrecht and Wöllner (2016), soundtrack and themes can construe metaphorical meanings. This is particularly true in the case of television series, where themes are often created to identify characters and places. During this scene, the theme that symbolizes Nord can be heard. Therefore, what Anna is finally seeing are not only the inhabitants of the hamlet but everything that this place represents. In Section 3, I have referred to Fahlenbrach’s (2016b) analysis of the role leitmotifs play in films and TV series to generate metaphorical meanings. This scene of the first episode of *Gran Nord* is an excellent example: the leitmotif attached to the hamlet of Nord is employed to help construe the multimodal metaphor *UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING* and to guide viewers in its interpretation.

At this point, Anna’s uncle, Quico, hugs her and tell her “Ja has tornat. Benvinguda a Nord” ‘You are finally back. Welcome to Nord.’ At this point, all the inhabitants of Nord start to perform that gesture with the index finger and the middle finger raised that we see in the statue depicted in the trailer: this gesture, we are told, means “welcome” for the inhabitants of Nord. Quico’s sentence and

5. In orientational metaphors basic and distinct mental schemata of spatial experience are mapped on to cognitive and emotional target domains: we tend to attach a meaning of power to elements put in a higher position and we tend to attach a meaning of powerlessness to elements put in a lower position.

the gesture do not make any sense unless we interpret Anna's journey as a metaphorical one. Anna had already "come back" to Nord: she has arrived two days before this sentence is uttered. And yet, this sentence refers to the metaphor that underpins the entire series: LIFE IS A JOURNEY and Anna's has not ended. On the contrary, at the end of the first episode, it has just started.

5. Anna's conflictive identity as an allegory for the dialectics between (national) identities in Catalonia

The first episode follows Anna's journey from Barcelona to the *Gran Nord* – a journey which is both physical and emotional. In this episode, metaphors are used to connect this journey with Anna's shifting sense of identity. Anna's process of re-definition of her identity is the centre of the entire series and each episode refers to an identity-related issue. Indeed, the metaphor that underpins the entire series is LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The first episode presents an introduction of Anna's conflicted identity construction, focusing on elements which relate to her sense of personal identity – her recovering of childhood memory – and on how these elements influence her sense of collective identity and belonging to the community of Nord. The first episode already presents symbols and metaphors which guide the audience to interpret Anna's personal journey as an allegory for the Catalan and Spanish situation. Already in the first episode, thanks to the use of flags, the portrait of President Mas, the poster of the Pyrenean landscape in the construction of the metaphors IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY, the audience can interpret Anna's conflicted identity as a critique of processes related to constructed national identities.

In the rest of the series the symbolism which constructs its fictional universe is clearly used to present Anna's conflictive identity constructions as a critique for processes currently taking place in Catalonia related to the construction of contradictory national communities and projects (Catalan and Spanish). The symbolism of the series is employed to emphasize processes of construction of sameness and difference in order to negotiate distinct national identities or to present them as incompatible. This becomes evident in the second episode of the series in which Anna is elected by the inhabitants of Nord as *Cavaller protector de Nord* 'Protecting Knight of Nord' and they give her the *Anell del Cavaller* 'Ring of the Knight'. She earns this honour after lying to her boss and the Mayoress of Fogony in order to defend Nord and its inhabitants who had just stolen the Book of Privileges. As they explain to Anna, the Book is not about laws, it is about them: in 1939 the inhabitants of Nord gave everything they had to Anna's grandfather so that he could bring the book to France before the fascists arrived in Nord. He managed to hide the book but he was captured and killed: "El Llibre és la nostra voluntat de ser

lliures. El Llibre som nosaltres Anna. I un no és pot robar a sí mateix” ‘The Book represents our will to be free. The Book is us, Anna. And you can’t rob yourself.’

Anna is so moved by this story that she decides to lie to her boss about the theft and its perpetrators. Afterwards, she feels guilty about failing to carry out her duty as a policewoman. The inhabitants of Nord elect her as their Knight, not because she lied, as uncle Quico is quick to explain to Anna, but because she had done the bravest thing she could do: “posar els interessos de Nord per sobre dels teus ideals, de la teva manera de ser i de pensar. Has estat molt generosa” ‘Putting the interests of Nord before your own ideals, your way of being and thinking. You have been very generous.’ Quico adds “potser estas canviant” ‘maybe you are changing,’ but the dialogue between Anna and Ermengol which follows suggests that Anna is far from reconciling the different aspects of her identity: “Ara treballes per Nord” ‘Now you work for Nord,’ Ermengol tells her. “Ni ho somii! Jo treballa per la Generalitat” ‘Not even in your wildest dreams! I work for the Catalan government,’ Anna replies. Anna’s roles as Knight and Policewoman are allegories of two different aspects of her identity – one related to Nord, the other related to Catalonia. These two identity discourses are represented metonymically throughout the series through the symbols of the badge and the Ring of the Knight.

The second episode of the series thus plays a crucial role in exposing Anna’s journey and her redefinition of her personal identity (and her sense of collective identity) as an allegory of conflicted imagined national communities in Catalonia. At the beginning of the series, Anna considers, as anybody else does, the two identity constructions represented symbolically by her role of *Mossa d’Esquadra* and Protecting Knight of Nord as conflictive and incompatible. Initially, her identity as a policewoman and her sense of attachment to a collective identity derived from Catalonia prevail: she keeps the Ring constantly hidden in her pocket and never wears it. At the end of the first series, Anna realizes that, contrary to what everybody thinks, her identity is complex, but it does not need to be contradictory. The series therefore presents a reflection on and a critique of processes of identity construction based on differences and incompatibility. This is the meaning behind Anna’s journey and the allegory constructed through the metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY and SELF-AWARENESS IS A JOURNEY.

6. Conclusions

This chapter is a contribution to the study of the role played by metaphors in constructing and de-constructing discourses of collective identity and imagined national communities. I have focused on the analysis of multimodal metaphors in the first episode of the series *Gran Nord*. In particular, I have examined how the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, construed through multimodal means, is employed

to signify Anna's trip between Barcelona and the Great North as a journey towards a re-definition of her identity. I have also analysed how the series employs the metaphor *IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY* to expose the contradictions of both Anna's and Margarida's identities. The juxtaposition of elements with highly symbolic (and contrasting) meanings (flags, the portrait of the Catalan president, images of the Pyrenean landscape) suggests an interpretation of identity as fluid and complex, criticizing an essentialist view. Finally, other metaphors such as *CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SURROUNDINGS*, *LOSING CONTROL IS BEING BELOW*, and *UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING* are used to express Anna's psychological and emotional state in relation to her shifting perception of her sense of identity.

Studying the role of metaphors in the construction of national identity in television narratives reveals interesting connections between the way metaphors function in our mind, our perception of our national identity and the intrinsic characteristics of the television medium. As Lakoff and Turner (1989) repeatedly insist in their landmark study of poetic metaphors, metaphorical understanding is endemically conceptual in nature and, thus, the metaphor resides in thought, not in words. Conceptual Metaphor Theory is based on the assumption that one's worldview is constrained and that metaphor plays a significant role in shaping it: "To study metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of ... one's own culture" (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 214). It is precisely in the mostly automatic process through which we understand conceptual metaphors that their persuasive power lies. For this reason, discourses around national identities tend to bristle with metaphors. This "intuitive" quality of conceptual metaphors creates interesting parallelisms between the viewing practices of television narratives and the construction of national identities.

I have stressed how the pervasive nature of television and its familiarity makes it a complex object of analysis. The same is to be said for conceptual metaphors: the almost unconscious level through which they work makes them often difficult to identify and, as a consequence, to question. And yet, doing so provides us with an invaluable tool for deconstructing meanings around national identities embedded in television narratives. We assimilate cognitive models and conceptual schemata, on which conceptual metaphors are based, through our culture. Likewise, we acquire meanings around our national identity through a process of socialization, in which the television medium is a significant player. If, as Lakoff and Turner (1989: xi) state, conceptual metaphors allow us to understand ourselves and our world and they are shared by members of the same culture, then analysing metaphor allows us to question meanings created around identities in that culture. Since national identity is also constructed through discourses and narratives shared by members of the same culture; since metaphors play such an important role in these discourses; since the television medium is such an important

institution for our socialization, it becomes evident how important it is to analyse metaphors constructing national identities in television narratives.

On the other hand, one must not disregard the individuality of each viewer: “because what is meaningful is in the mind, not in the words, there is an enormous range of possibilities open for reasonable interpretation” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 109). As Forceville (2016: 25) warns, it is not appropriate to assert that something “is” a metaphor; instead, it would be more suitable to refer to “construing a metaphor.” There might be scenes in a television series which evidently construct a metaphor, which is unanimously recognized as such. However, in most cases viewers might interpret a scene differently according to their knowledge or experience, they might identify a metaphor and attach to it different meanings. Therefore, the process of interpreting a metaphor is dynamic and it is related to the various aspects that constitute the identity of the viewer – and identity is always complex and dialectical. Indeed, interpreting a metaphor is a dynamic process as the perception of one’s own identity is also dynamic. It might even happen that some viewers identify a metaphor and interpret it in a different way than that intended by its creator, writer or director. I agree with Forceville (2016: 26) when he argues that “in my view, however, such liberties for metaphorical construal are among the privileges of art-lovers, and should be a cause for joy rather than worry.” And yet, we should explicitly recognize the intrusive and certainly not neutral role of the scholar in construing and interpreting metaphors in audiovisual narratives. This is particularly true when examining metaphors dealing with imagined national communities, collective identities and the emotional and ideological strings attached to them.

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Afterword

Nations need (new?) metaphors

Andreas Musolff

A spectre is haunting not just Europe but the world: the re-emergence of nationalism as a prominent political force – and with it debates about what constitutes its conceptual basis, i.e. the nation. The reasons are manifold: massive migration movements leading to socio-cultural/-linguistic “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007; Arnaut et al. 2015), increasingly adversarial International Relations in a multipolar world and the fast spread of a “Politics of Fear” (Wodak 2015) seem to have beaten back the once popular utopia of multicultural communities.¹ In 2016, the British Prime Minister May even ridiculed cosmopolitanism as the opposite of proper, nation-based citizenship in a Party Congress speech: “But, if you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere.” (*Financial Times*, 5 October 2016). How did this renaissance² of nationalism come about, and is there any chance of overcoming it in (re-)conceptualizing *nations*?

The contributions in the present volume show convincingly that metaphors and metonymies are essential for the conceptualization of the nation. They cover key source concept scenarios such as those of the NATION AS BODY, BUILDING/HOME, BOUNDED CONTAINER, FAMILY, PERSON, TERRITORY-BASED LANGUAGE, PERSON, PLANT, PRISON, but crucially they go beyond the mere identification, categorization and application of source concepts to target referents by analysing the respective metaphors’ role in creating persuasive and appealing arguments and narratives. By combining conceptual-cognitive and discourse-oriented methods of analysis they help to explain how metaphors are used to achieve political impact

1. See 2010–2011 statements by the then British, French and German political leaders Cameron, Sarkozy and Merkel, declaring that “multiculturalism” had failed (*Daily Mail*, 11 February 2011: “Nicolas Sarkozy joins David Cameron and Angela Merkel view that multiculturalism has failed,” *The Independent*, 5 February 2011: “Cameron: My war on multiculturalism”; BBC 17 October 2010: “Merkel says German multicultural society has failed”).

2. Whilst the main target of May’s criticism in the context of her speech were “international elites,” the phrase still elicited critique as having played to populist xenophobic attitudes in Britain and even comparisons with Hitler’s rhetoric (King 2018: 103; *The Independent*, 5 July 2017: “Theresa May speech ‘could have been taken out of Mein Kampf’, Vince Cable says”).

in specific discourse contexts. It is in these contexts, not just in references and categorizations that this impact is achieved, and only there can it be changed.

To take an example from the topical “Brexit” debate in the United Kingdom about the nation’s “exit” from the European Union: the NATION AS BODY metaphor would quasi-naturally seem to favour a nationalistic assertion of the need to separate one’s “own” NATION-BODY from an alien, monstrous, overarching corporeal entity (perhaps comparable to those envisaged by Hobbes and Pufendorf in their 17th century warnings against multi-bodied, dysfunctional states and state conglomerations, such as the ‘Holy Roman Empire’; see Hobbes 1996; Pufendorf 2007). In order to counter this well-established, nationalist bias of the NATION AS BODY metaphor, public political voices, ideally with the help of critical discourse and metaphor analysts, have to develop arguments and narratives in which a constructive and productive role of *Britain as an organ or body part of a healthy European super-body* is highlighted, against the entrenched myth of “one nation = one sovereign.” What is needed are not so much new metaphors but creative discourses that breathe new life into critical and emancipatory aspects of those metaphorical concepts that are our heritage.

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Index

A

Austria 183, 199
Austria-Hungary 294

B

blend 10, 19, 122, 133, 138, 143,
146, 149–50, 280
language-nation 137, 140,
143, 145
see also conceptual
integration
blended space 132–33
blending 10, 132–33
body politic 18–19, 78, 87
Brexit 348
Bush, George W. 9, 211–13,
217–19, 221

C

Catalonia 321, 323, 334, 340–41
Catholic Church 76–77, 79, 96
see also Catholic-nationalist
discourse
CDA 102
see also critical discourse
analysis
Clinton, Bill 201–2, 211–12, 214,
217–19

cluster *see* metaphor,
metonymy

CMA 39, 102
see also critical metaphor
analysis

CMT 102–4, 249, 324–28

see also conceptual
metaphor theory

colonialism 157, 159, 173
colonization 141, 147, 150, 158,
161, 163, 165, 169–72, 174
colonizer 156, 164, 168–69, 171
colony 156, 158, 161–63, 166,
169, 171–73
complaint tradition 104,
110–11, 113, 121–22

conceptual integration 10, 132
see also blend

conceptual metaphor
theory 9, 102, 208, 249,
324, 342
see also CMT

concordance 212, 259, 278

construction
adjective modifier 245
agentive 248, 249
dependent genitive 246
syntactic-semantic 244,
246, 250, 253–54
thematic 248

container
see metaphor, image
schema, scenario

CONTAINMENT 64

Côte d'Ivoire 37

critical discourse analysis 5, 11,
60, 102, 158, 208
see also CDA

critical metaphor analysis 11,
39, 60, 62, 77, 102, 158, 208
see also CMA

Croatia 59–60, 109, 113, 130–31

cultural model 159, 245–46,
250, 275, 277, 280–81
naïve 265, 283

D

de Custine, Astolphe-Louis-
Léonor 292

delegitimization 19, 128, 209,
279, 300, 310
see also legitimization

delegitimize 19, 264, 280, 300
see also legitimize

Discourse Historical
Approach 78, 158, 210

discourse
Catholic-nationalist 76–77,
79–84, 86, 92–93, 95–97
colonialist 158, 160–63, 169,
171, 174
German nationalist 24, 155

political 7, 39, 46, 77–79,
81, 86, 173–74, 178, 187,

190, 193–94, 202, 204,
208, 210, 212–13, 219–20,
246, 264, 290, 293, 295,
303–4, 314

see also metaphor
discursive history 11, 105, 122

E

embodied mind 38

embodiment 78, 88, 103, 116,
191

emigrant 156, 186

emigration 156, 165

emotion 7, 11–12, 15, 21, 25,
133, 151, 190, 209, 248,
270, 277, 288, 308, 312–14,
324, 327

emotional 60–61, 133, 150, 202,
209, 218, 309, 312

attachment 1, 7, 14, 18, 322
style 12

ethnie 3

ethnology 3

EU 23, 60, 64–70, 76, 86–89,
95–96, 218

see also European Union,
metaphor

European Union 45, 87–88,
91, 348

see also EU, metaphor

expert model 2, 265–66, 268,
283
see also folk model

F

fatherland 15, 81, 183, 190

fertilize 162

fertilizer 164–65

Film Studies 327

First World War 158, 172, 174
see also WWI

folk model 3

see also expert model

framing 2, 10–13, 21–22, 36, 62,
70, 133, 138, 160, 220, 249,
252, 283, 290

G

- genre 76, 80, 160, 203–4,
206–7, 290–91, 293,
295–96, 323
rhetorical 203, 206
German 209
see also discourse
Germany 156, 164–65, 170–74,
178, 181–85, 187, 189, 194
growth 159, 163, 168, 173

H

- hegemony 156, 211
Heimat 24, 178–79, 181–87,
189, 194
homeland 15, 20, 24, 49, 172,
178, 181–82, 187, 194, 211,
214
homily 80–81, 90, 92–94
Hungary 59, 60

I

- identity 2, 7, 8, 23, 25, 43, 47,
64, 70–71, 76, 80, 85–86,
88, 92, 95–96, 107, 113,
117, 128–30, 132, 142, 148,
150–51, 182–83, 202, 205,
253–54, 288, 300, 303,
323–24, 329–31, 334–35,
340–43
language 128, 130–31, 148,
151
national 6, 16, 60, 64, 66,
68, 71, 76, 78–80, 95, 102,
128, 148–49, 182–83, 188,
202, 205, 210, 322, 342–43
ideological 7, 23, 61, 71, 103–4,
112, 119, 121–22, 158, 160,
208–11, 217, 220, 288, 310,
312, 322–23, 327–28, 332,
334, 336, 343
ideology 18–19, 82–83, 88, 96,
102, 156–58, 161, 170, 188,
206, 208–210, 221, 323
(standard) language 102,
104, 108–11, 121–22, 128,
130, 134, 139
image schema 20, 22–23, 60,
64, 67–71, 325–27
CONTAINER 22–23, 60, 64,
67–69, 71
see also CONTAINMENT

- imagined community 4, 12–14,
77, 84, 194, 202
immigrant 19, 75, 92
immigration 76, 95, 174, 209
“crisis” 92, 96
see also migrant crisis
Islam 92–93, 96, 118
Ivory Coast 37

K

- Kingdom of Yugoslavia 303
see also Yugoslavia
Kowalska, Faustina 82
Kulturnation 3

L

- landmark 273–74, 276
language
contact 139, 141–44, 147,
149, 150
see also blend, identity,
ideology, purism
legitimization 8, 18–19, 21, 128,
209, 279
see also delegitimization
legitimize 264, 280
see also delegitimize
leitmotif 327, 339
Lenin 292–93
linguistic purism *see* purism

M

- mapping 9, 13, 64, 85, 103, 113,
159, 208, 221, 244, 249–50,
252, 254, 261, 289–92, 300,
306–307, 312–13, 324–26
media 6–7, 60–61, 64, 80–81,
95, 322–24, 326
audiovisual 326
memory 3, 6, 160, 181, 186, 340
collective 82, 85, 181, 184,
186, 194
meronymy 245–48
metaphor
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE 159
AFFECTION IS WARMTH 9
audiovisual 324, 328
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE
SURROUNDINGS 337, 342
cluster 260, 264, 278–79, 307
CONTAINER 19, 20, 65–66, 92

COMPLEX ABSTRACT

- SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS 159
CULTIVATING LANGUAGE IS
A WAR 111
DANGER OF WAR IS
INSTABILITY 46
deliberate 261–62, 290
DIALECT IS DOWN 111, 121
discourse 10–12, 19, 22, 62,
116, 160, 290
dungeon of nations 291,
294–95, 298, 300, 303–304,
306, 312, 314
flowing liquid 155, 159, 160,
170–74
EMOTIONAL PROXIMITY IS
PHYSICAL PROXIMITY 338
ETHNIC AND CULTURAL
IDENTITY IS SIBSHIP 16
EU-as-a-house 64, 67–69
evaluative force 289, 291,
294–95, 300, 310, 312–14
EXISTING EU NATIONS ARE
IN THE BUILDING 64
HOUSE 60, 64, 67–70, 121,
212
HUMAN MASS MOVEMENT IS
FLOWING LIQUID 171
IMMIGRANTS ARE
PARASITES 19
LANGUAGE CONTACT IS
DECAY 143
LANGUAGE CONTACT IS
VIOLENCE 143
LANGUAGE IS A
CONTAINER 141
LANGUAGE IS AN
ORGANISM 143
LANGUAGE IS A PERSON 145
LANGUAGE IS A VALUABLE
OBJECT/A TREASURE 118,
122
LANGUAGE IS (THE
CHARACTER OF) A
NATION 116
LANGUAGE NORMS ARE
LAWS 112
LANGUAGE RULES ARE
(TRAFFIC) LAWS/
RULES 113, 121
linguistic 14, 25, 38, 65–66,
69, 261–62, 273, 290

- LOANWORDS ARE A FLOOD 112
- LOSING SOVEREIGNTY IS FALLING 46
- MIGRATION IS FLOWING LIQUID 159
- multimodal 326–27, 336, 339, 341
- NATIONAL HUMILIATION IS RAPE 17
- NATION AS A BODY 19–20, 348
- NATION AS ORGANISM 250
- NATION AS SEER 250
- NATION IS A BUILDING 9, 24, 48, 212–13, 215–17, 219–21
- NATION IS A FAMILY 13–15, 208
- NATION IS A PARENT 15
- NATION IS A PERSON 24, 77, 83, 84, 210, 212–13, 216, 218, 220
- NON-EU NATIONS (AND THEIR CITIZENS) ARE OUTSIDE THE BUILDING 64
- of cultivation 121, 155, 160–63, 165, 168–69, 171–74
- POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF EUROPE ATTACKED BY ISLAM 92
- POLAND IS A DEFENDER OF THE FAITH 85
- POLAND IS A MISSIONARY FOR EUROPE 88, 89
- POLAND IS A PERSON 23, 76, 78–79, 83, 85, 89, 95–96
- POLAND IS CHRIST 94
- potentially metaphorical example/expression 260, 262–70, 274, 278–79
- primary 9, 332, 335, 337, 338
- prison of nations 288, 291–94, 299, 304, 310, 313
- recycling 117, 122, 289, 291–92, 312–13
- resemblance 9
- sociocultural situatedness 11, 12
- SPIRITUAL GROWTH IS NATURAL GROWTH 163
- STANDARD LANGUAGE IS UP 111, 121
- STATE AS A HOUSE 68
- STATE IS A CONTAINER 39–41, 43, 46
- strategic use 289–90
- systematic 10–11, 261
- UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING 103
- UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE PHENOMENON IS A DANGER TO THE NATION 128–29, 136
- used deliberately 290
- WALL 23, 64–65, 67–70
- see also* mapping, personification, source domain, target domain
- Metaphoric Structuring View 325, 328
- metonym 87, 92
- metonymic 15, 20, 119–20, 245, 248–50, 254, 270, 276, 278
- metonymy 85, 119–20, 122, 130, 133, 136, 150, 209–10, 245, 250, 269, 270
- IDENTITY FOR LANGUAGE 130, 136
- LANGUAGE FOR (NATIONAL) IDENTITY 23, 130, 136, 150
- LANGUAGE FOR (NATIONAL) TERRITORY 119, 122
- NATION FOR TERRITORY 120
- ORGANISM FOR NATION 247, 250
- CLUSTERED 121
- migrant 59–60, 64–66, 68–69, 156, 162, 171, 174
- crisis 22, 60–64, 69–70, 92
- migration 50, 52, 59, 61, 71, 156, 171, 174
- motherland 15, 24, 163, 166, 171–72, 174, 178–79, 181, 189–95
- N
- Nasz Dziennik* 76, 81
- nation 2–8, 12–13, 20–21, 36–37, 43, 47–48, 50–52, 69, 77, 82, 84, 116, 120, 128–30, 140, 142–43, 145, 171, 177–78, 181, 184, 194, 201–3, 208, 210–12, 216, 218, 220–21, 253–54, 265–66, 268, 288, 291, 311, 314, 322, 347
- building 6, 8, 10, 35–38, 40, 43–46, 48–53, 129, 182, 186, 215–17, 246, 248, 268, 276, 278–79, 288, 291, 303, 312, 323
- see also* identity
- nationalism 5, 7, 15, 17, 23, 75, 93, 97, 108, 118, 120–22, 129, 187, 188, 202, 211, 253–54, 312, 347
- banal 6–8, 202, 291, 314
- everyday 25, 288, 291, 303, 311–314
- nationhood 6–8, 17, 129, 143, 178–79, 181–82, 184, 186, 189, 220–21, 288, 312
- enacting 312
- New Rhetorics 203, 206
- Niedziela* 76, 89
- normativist 107–108, 112
- see also* prescriptivist
- nostalgia 184, 186–87, 194
- O
- Obama, Barack 35–36, 48–49, 53, 211–12, 214–19
- ontological 202, 244–47, 250, 253–54
- congruence 244, 250
- incongruence 180, 193
- ontologically 245–50, 254
- ontology 24, 220, 250
- other 16, 20, 290, 16, 70, 78, 158, 202, 334
- otherness 71, 334
- Ottoman Empire 294
- P
- patriotism 3, 8, 80–81, 190–91
- peace
- building 38, 49, 50–51, 53
- personification 20–21, 210, 212–13, 218–19, 248, 253–54, 269
- see also* metaphor
- persuasion 68, 78, 93, 205, 310

- plant 118, 159, 162–63, 166, 168, 173–74, 260–261, 272
- Poland 23, 76–77, 79–97
see also metaphor
- Politika* 101–102, 105, 110–11, 113, 115–17, 121
- pollutant 138, 150
- pollution 138, 141
- prescriptivism 23, 108
- prescriptivist 104, 110, 114
see also normativist
- purism 108–110, 130, 138
- Putin, Vladimir 45
- R**
- recontextualization 281–82, 289, 291, 295, 312
- recycling *see* metaphor
 recycling
- Romanticism 117, 122, 187
- Russia 178, 181, 187–94, 264, 292–93, 295
- Russian Empire 292–93, 303
- S**
- scenario
 CONTAINER 63
 exploiting 291
 LANGUAGE IN DANGER 23, 134, 136–37, 150
 metaphor 19, 60, 62, 64, 67, 69–70, 128, 173, 311
 WALL 22–23, 60, 64, 69–71
see also metaphor
- Serbia 53, 59–60, 70, 102–105, 108–111, 113
- Slobodna Dalmacija* 297
- Smoleńsk plane crash 76, 93, 94–95
- social pollution 138
- soil 161, 165, 168
- SOTU address 203–208, 211–13, 215, 220–21
see also State of the Union address
- source domain 9, 13–16, 18–21, 85, 89, 103, 132, 134, 136, 144, 146, 159, 209, 213, 215–16, 220, 263, 274–75, 279, 282, 288–92, 294–95, 305–306, 308–309, 312–14, 324–25
- South Sudan 45
- Spain 323
- standard language 105–115, 118, 122
see also ideology
- state 3, 8, 18, 22, 24, 36–40, 42–45, 47, 50–53, 63, 163, 165–66, 171–72, 177–79, 184, 191, 193, 194–95, 208, 210, 217, 288, 311, 314
 -building 22, 36–38, 40, 43–46, 48–53, 184
 collapsed 37–38, 40–43, 46–49, 51, 53
 failed 8, 41–42, 44
 failure 41–43, 46, 51
 fragile 36–38, 41–43, 46–49, 51, 53
 fragility 38, 40–43, 46–48, 51
 weakness 42
- State of the Union address 24, 201–202
see also SOTU
- symbol 8, 24, 64, 69, 178–85, 187, 189, 194, 288, 300, 330, 332, 335, 340–41
- symbolic 3, 8, 43, 128–29, 132–33, 135, 138, 141, 148, 151, 180, 184, 194, 202, 204–205, 216, 323, 325, 332–33, 335–36, 338, 342
- T**
- target domain 9–10, 13, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 24, 62, 85, 89, 103, 132, 209, 213, 215–16, 262–63, 274–75, 279, 288–90, 294–95, 297–98, 300, 302–306, 308–312, 314, 324
- television 322–24, 327, 329, 342–43
 Television Studies 327
- topos 76, 78, 83, 85, 88–96
- trajector 273–274
- Trump, Donald J. 36, 48–49, 53, 211–12, 215, 217, 219
- U**
- United Nations 37, 46, 49–51
- USA 201–205, 208, 211, 213, 216–17, 219–21
- V**
- Večernji list* 297
- Volksgeist 117
- Vučić, Aleksandar 66, 70
- W**
- wall 53, 59–60, 63–67, 69–71
see also image schema, metaphor
- Willensnation* 3
- WWI 178, 184–85, 191, 194
see also First World War
- Y**
- Yugoslavia 107, 120, 131, 298–99, 302–4, 306, 308, 310, 312, 314
see also Kingdom of Yugoslavia

This edited volume examines how metaphors and related phenomena (metonymies, symbols, cultural models, stereotypes) lead to the discursive construal of a common element that brings the nation together. The central idea is that metaphor use must be questioned to lay bare the processes and the discursive power behind them. The chapters examine a range of contemporary and historical, monomodal and multimodal discourses, including politicians' discourse, presidential speeches, newspapers, TV series, Catholic homilies, colonialist discourse, and various online sources. The approaches taken include political science, international relations, cultural studies, and linguistics. All contributions feature discursive constructivist views of metaphor, with clear sociocultural grounding, and the notion of metaphor as a framing device in constructing various aspects of nations and national identity. The volume will appeal to scholars in discourse analysis, metaphor studies, media studies, nationalism studies, and political science.

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