RAMI ZEEDAN

ARAB-PALESTINIAN SOCIETY IN THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM

Integration versus Segregation in the Twenty-First Century

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Printed in the United States of America

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Abbreviations

ADP	Arab Democratic Party
AMC	Arab Movement for Change
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel
DFPE	The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality
FCLA	Financial crisis in local authorities
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
JL	Joint List
LMP	Local management policies
MK	Member of the Knesset
NDA	The National Democratic Assembly
NPP	National public policies
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	Prime Minister
SE	Socioeconomic characteristics
UAL	United Arab List
UN	United Nations

Acknowledgments

The book is the outcome of two research projects that have spread over a few years while working in several academic institutions. The first part, focusing on Arab politics in Israel, was conducted during my postdoctoral stay at the Taub Center for Israel Studies in New York University (NYU) during the 2014–2015 academic year. I am thankful to Prof. Ronald Zweig, who offered me this position and opened the way for me to engage in postdoctoral study, to conduct the research, and to get involved in the highest level of academic work. I would like as well to thank Dr. Shayne Leslie-Figueroa for her support during my stay at NYU.

The second part focused on the crisis of Arab municipalities in Israel. It was conducted during my postdoctoral stay at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO). I am grateful to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation who supported me with a grant throughout the 2015–2016 academic year. Their grant enabled me to carry out field research in Arab municipalities in Israel. Without their support, this project could not have been completed. I want to thank Prof. Ulrike Freitag, who supported my application to the Fritz Thyssen grant, hosted me at the ZMO, and provided guidance in writing and publishing. A special thanks to Dr. Silke Nagel who offered support whenever it was needed during my stay at the ZMO.

I want to thank the Berkeley Institute for Jewish Law and Israel Studies, Prof. Ron Hassner, Prof. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Dr. Rebecca Golbert, and their staff. They have provided me an exceptional opportunity to strengthen my scholarship through various venues, while dedicating the required time to finalize this book for publication during the 2017–2018 academic year. My stay at the University of California at Berkeley was supported by the Israel Institute, for which I am very much grateful.

A preliminary version of portions of this book was presented in various academic venues and discussed with other scholars. The comments I was provided with were valuable for advancing the outcome of the book. I'm thankful to all of those scholars who participated in these meetings at the Taub Center for Israel Studies, New York University (NY, USA); the Center for Jewish Studies (Heidelberg, Germany); Researchers Forum of the ZMO (Berlin, Germany); the Berkeley Institute for Jewish Law and Israel Studies, the University of California, Berkeley (CA, USA); the Institute for Israel Studies, University of Texas, Austin (TX, USA); the Younes and Soraya Nazarian Center for Israel Studies, University of California, Los Angeles (CA, USA).

It is with great honor that I want to mention my MA and PhD supervisors at the University of Haifa, who taught me how to become a researcher and supported the advancement of my academic career to the next level. For that, I am thankful to Prof. Yoav Gelber, Prof. Yossi Ben-Artzi, and Prof. Eran Vigoda-Gadot.

Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers, who provided invaluable suggestions that improved the final version of the book, and to Lexington Books for working with me on publishing my manuscript at the highest academic rigor.

My biggest debt, of course, is to my family: my wife Mervat and my children Sarj, Shadan, and Mia. They have been so patient and were a great help to me in the past few years, through our transition from one city to the other, and especially with my commitment to completing this book. No words can describe how much I thank them for just being my family.

Introduction

INTRODUCTION TO THE
ARAB-PALESTINIAN SOCIETY IN ISRAEL

Palestine before the First World War was part of the Ottoman Empire for nearly 400 years.[1] The results of the First World War brought to an end of the Ottoman Empire and resulted with the British and French control over Middle Eastern terroirs that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire.[2] As part of this change, the League of Nations[3] instated mandates in some of those territories.[4] As part of the Mandates structure, the League of Nations granted Britain the Mandate over Palestine[5] that lasted until 1948. The relatively short period of 30 years of the British Mandate over Palestine was fraught with massive changes. The British Mandate determined the Palestinian territory as we know it in modern history.[6] This contributed, among other societal changes along with the national awakening in the region, to the establishment of Palestinian society.[7]

The 1948 War brought dramatic change for the Palestinians, who refer to the war as "al-Naqba"—the disaster.[8] By the end of the war, following the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 181,[9] the British Mandate over Palestine was ended, and Israel was established.[10] However, the other part of the UN resolution—the establishment of an Arab state beside the Jewish state—has never been yet implemented. Instead, as a result of the 1948 War, the territory of Mandatory Palestine was split between Israel, Egypt, which took over the Gaza Strip, and Jordan which took over the West-Bank. The Palestinians were split between many political entities in the Middle East, either because they fled, were expelled, or were not allowed to return.[11]

Few tens of thousands of those Palestinians who remained in their homes were now under the sovereignty of the new state of Israel. Like other

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Palestinians, they suffered from the results of the 1948 War; however, those under Israeli sovereignty dealt with unique challenges. First, they transformed from being part of the Arab majority in Palestine under the British Mandate to becoming a minority in Israel along with a Jewish majority (see table 0.1). Second, as a result of the war, the processes of modernization, urbanization, and the establishment of a sustainable middle class had stopped.[12] Most Arabs who stayed in the territories that were now part of Israel were peasants living in small towns and villages.[13] Third, the Arab leadership that stayed in those territories was mainly traditional leadership, while the Palestinian national leadership was absent.[14] Lastly, Arabs in Israel were left without their political institutions on the national level, which was developed during the British Mandate over Palestine.[15]

In the coming years, the Arab population in Israel grew, and their percentage out of Israel's population has been growing due to higher birth rates among Arab families.[16] The Arab-Palestinians in Israel, which in 2018 amounted 1.9 million Arabs, constitutes about 21 percent of Israel's population (see table 0.1). Arab-Palestinian citizens live in all areas of Israel. However most of them are in the Galilee in Northern Israel (48%), in the "triangle" area along the "Green Line", close to the center of Israel (22%), and the Negev in southern Israel (15%).[17] Most of the Arab population lives in ethnically homogeneous cities and villages—about 69 percent of them, as shown in table 0.2. The others live in mixed cities, such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Lud, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Ramla, Acre, and Upper Nazareth. The geographic spread varies between the different religious groups among Arabs.[18]

Arabs in Israel include three main religious groups: Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Most of Arabs in Israel are Muslims. Sunni Islam is the religion of more than 80 percent of Arabs in Israel, as shown in table 0.3. As of 2015, there were about 1.5 million Muslims in Israel; about 64 percent of them live in 64 cities and villages with a Muslim majority (906,000).[19] The others live in 35 mixed towns and villages, where Muslims are a minority (380,000: 288,000 of them are in Jerusalem).[20] Major cities with Muslim majority are Nazareth, Rahat, Umm al-Fahm, Tayibe, Shefa'Amr, Tamrah, Sakhnin, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Tira, A'ra'rah, A'rabeh, and Kafr Qasim.

A subgroup of Muslims are the Bedouins.[21] They differ from other Muslims in their social structure and some of their traditions.[22] For example, the individual is committed entirely to his tribe, and there are special Bedouin rules that are not relevant to other Muslims.[23] The majority of the Bedouins live in the northern Negev, most of them in unrecognized villages.[24] Other Bedouin tribes are situated nowadays in villages in the north of Israel. Another subgroup of Muslims in Israel is the Circassians.[25] As of 2015, there were about 4,000 Circassians in Israel, living mainly in two villages with a Circassian majority: Rehaniya and Kafr Kama, both in Northern Israel.[26]

Table 0.1 Arab Population in Israel (Chosen Years)*

Year	Jews and Others (thousands)	Arabs (thousands)	Jews and Others (%)	Arabs (%)	Total Population (thousands)
1948	717	156	82	18	873
1949	1,014	160	86	14	1,174
1955	1,597	192	89	11	1,789
1961	1,996	239	89	11	2,235
1965	2,299	299	88	12	2,598
1972	2,771	454	86	14	3,225
1983	3,435	684	83	17	4,119
1989	3,717	843	82	18	4,560
1990	3,947	875	82	18	4,822
1995	4,542	1,004	82	18	5,546
2000	5,181	1,189	81	19	6,370
2002	5,367	1,264	81	19	6,631
2010	5,803	1,574	79	21	7,377
2014	6,451	1,683	79	21	8,134
2018	7,094	1,878	79	21	8,972

Notes: Population within proper Israel: Arab population of East Jerusalem is included in the total Arab population since 1968.
*The author's calculations based on the Central Bureau of Statistics website, section of population in Israel: https://www.cbs.gov.il [in Hebrew].

Table 0.2 Arab Municipalities in Israel (2012)**

Type of Municipality	Arab Homogeneous Municipality	Arab Population (thousands)	Arab Population: Percent Out of all Arabs in Israel (%)
City	11	406.2	25
Local council	70	697.7	42
Regional council	4	27.3	2
Total Arab homogeneous municipalities	85	1,131.2	69
Arabs living in mixed cities*	—	513.6	31
Total population	—	1,644.8	100

Notes: *Most of them in East Jerusalem (300,000 residents).
**The author's calculations based on the Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel, 2013 [in Hebrew].

Table 0.3 Arab Population in Israel by Religious Groups (in Thousands)*

Year	Muslims #	Muslims %	Christians #	Christians %	Druze #	Druze %	Total Arabs (of all Israel) #	Total Arabs (of all Israel) %
1955	131.8	68.7	42.0	21.8	18.0	9.3	191.8	10.7
1961	166.3	69.5	49.6	20.7	23.3	9.7	239.2	11.3
1972	339.2	74.7	77.3	17.0	37.3	8.2	453.8	14.6
1983	524.6	76.6	94.0	13.7	65.6	9.5	684.2	17.1
1995	811.2	80.7	101.4	10.0	92.2	9.1	1,004.9	18.2
2000	970.0	81.6	111.4	9.35	103.8	8.7	1,188.7	18.7
2003	1,072.0	82.6	115.7	8.9	110.8	8.5	1,298.5	19.1
2008	1,240.0	81.9	153.0	10.1	121.0	8.0	1,514.0	20.6
2015	1,488.0	83.0	165.9	9.3	137.3	7.7	1,791.2	21.2

Notes: Percentage of Muslims increased mainly due to higher birth rates compared to Christians and Druze in most years; population within proper Israel.
*The author's calculations based on the Central Bureau of Statistics. *Population by Religion in Israel- 2015*. Jerusalem, 2016 [in Hebrew].

This Muslim community does not consider itself as Arabs.[27] They originally escaped from the North Caucasus, which was part of the Russian Empire, and settled in the Middle East in the nineteenth century.[28]

Another 10 percent of the Arab population are Christians, and another 8 percent are Druze. Christians in Israel are about 166,000, as of 2015.[29] Most of Christians in Israel live in mixed municipalities with Jews, Muslims, or Druze, such as in Nazareth, Haifa, Jerusalem, Shefa'Amr, Ibilin, and Upper Nazareth, which is in line with their history in the region. Since the late nineteenth century, Christians in Palestine have been highly urbanized.[30] As of 2015, 40 percent of them live in large cities in Israel. Only a few of them live in five villages with Christian majority—all in Northern Israel: Jish, Kfar Yasif, Me'ilia, Eilabun, and Fasotah.[31]

Druze in Israel are about 137,000, as of 2018.[32] The vast majority of them (87%) live in 15 municipalities with a Druze majority, such as Daliyat al-Karmel, Yarka, Beit Jann, and Isfiya. The others live mainly in mixed municipalities with Muslims and Christians, such as: Shefa'Amr, Abu-Snan, and Rameh.[33]

Despite the differences within this society, throughout the book, we will refer to Arab society within the Green Line in Israel as Arab-Palestinians or Palestinian-Arabs which is currently the standard terms used to describe them.[34] This is in-line with their self-identification as it is concluded based on public opinion surveys conducted in recent years (see extended discussion in chapter 2). However, for precise writing, the book may refer to this society also as Israeli Arabs, or Arabs of Israel, or Arabs in Israel, or Arabs.

ARAB-PALESTINIANS AS AN ETHNIC MINORITY WITHIN ISRAEL AS A NATION-STATE

There are several approaches to define an ethnic minority. However, following international declarations and treaties,[35] it is well agreed that in some cases indigenous people—who were living in the specific place—can be classified at the same time as an ethnic minority, when they are different from the majority regarding ethnicity, language, and nationality.[36] As such, this book will adopt the following definition in the Israeli case: the Arab minority as an indigenous people.[37] Arabs in Israel consider themselves as such indigenous people who are under the rule of a majority that is foremost nonindigenous.[38] This point of view strengthens their self-awareness and their national demands.[39] Official recognition of Israeli Arabs as indigenous would allow them to receive collective rights as a social group within Israel.[40] External and internal aspects also influence it. An example of external elements is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arabs in Israel see themselves as part of the Arab society in the region and part of the Palestinians.[41] An example of internal

aspects is the attitude of the Israeli state toward its Arab citizens, which is influenced by inequality in individual and collective rights and discrimination in allocating budgets.[42]

The declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel invited Arabs who remained in Israeli sovereign territories to become citizens and promised them equality.[43] Since the end of the 1948 War, all Arab-Palestinians living in "proper Israel" (within the Green Line) are legal citizens of Israel.[44] As citizens, they were granted the right to vote.[45] In light of that, the temporary government decided that Arabs can become part of the temporary parliament, part of the temporary government, and part of the judicial system.[46] The decision was made by Prime Minister (PM) Ben-Gurion, despite the opposition in his party and among military commanders, for the sake of potentially using the Arab vote for his party's advantage.[47]

The Arab-Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem are considered as legal residents and are granted most of the legal rights of other citizens.[48] However, they are not citizens and thus not entitled to vote to the *Knesset* or run for office;[49] another exception is the Druze living in the four municipalities in the Golan Heights. In both cases, following the official annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights after the 1967 War, the Israeli law allows residents in those territories to apply for Israeli citizenship.[50] However, not many of East Jerusalem's Arabs applied for Israeli citizenship, and in any case, most applications were denied.[51] Same as the case for the Druze of the Golan Heights, whom most of them refused to apply for Israel citizenship due to their self-identification as Syrians.[52] From the other hand, the Law of Return (1950)[53] grants Jews the right to live in Israel and to gain citizenship under relatively less strict qualifications.[54] Criticism against this law claims that applying it only for Jews contradicts with the basics of a democratic state.[55] Moreover, a family reunion of Arab families in Israel is rarely approved by the Israeli government, also when one of the persons involved is already a legal citizen.[56]

The Israeli policies throughout the years have influenced Arabs in Israel. Those policies have usually derived from four main problems.[57] First, the security aspect; Arabs are considered a threat from the Jewish-majority perspective.[58] They were preserved as "fifth column" or potential traitors.[59] Second, land issues; Israel has confiscated hundreds of thousands of dunams[60] of Arab lands that were used for military purposes as well as for establishing new settlements for Jewish Israelis.[61] In recent years the problem has transformed into a new form of fight over planning and housing in Arab cities.[62] Third, the socioeconomic gaps;[63] this includes the low quality of services provided[64] (such as education and health) and economic inequality when compared to their Jewish counterparts.[65] The forth and the most critical aspect is the identity. Given that Israel was established in 1948 as the national home of the Jewish,[66] there is a fundamental contradiction between the primary

identification of Israel as a Jewish state with the identity of its Arab non-Jewish minority. Furthermore, there is a contradiction between the determination of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and the declared intentions of the founders to maintain social and political equality[67] when compared to reality.

All these problems and more are reflected in the Israeli policies. Beginning with its establishment as a nation-state and until the mid-1960s, Israel focused on designing and implementing policies in various areas:[68] foreign policy, which was based on its hostile relationship with the Arab world;[69] and internal societal and economic policy;[70] and collective identity formation, which focused on strengthening the Jewish-Zionist character of the state of Israel.[71] Within these three areas, there was a particular element of consideration for Arab society: in foreign policy, Arab Israelis were considered part of the Arab world and therefore an enemy of Israel; thus, they were perceived as a threat to national security.[72] Based on this assessment of the threat, Israel established a military government regime in Arab-populated areas that was abolished only in 1966.[73] This included (1) most of the Galilee—including Nazareth, Acre, and Shefa'Amr; (2) Wadi Ara—including Umm al-Fahm and Baqa al-Gharbiyye; (3) the "triangle" area—including Tayibe, Tira, and Kafr Qasim; (4) areas in the corridor from Tel Aviv-Jaffa to Jerusalem; and (5) Bedouin areas in the Negev.[74] Military government meant limitations on, and supervision of, Arab freedom of movement (travel permits were required), political expression, massive confiscation of private Arab lands, restrictions on entering the labor market, and tempered Arab political participation and representation.[75] Regarding internal policy, Arabs were not part of the Israeli collective and were excluded from the melting pot—the ingathering of exiles—of the new society.[76] Consequently, Arabs remained at the margins of Israeli society, a position that they have been struggling to change since that time even after Israel abolished military administration of Arab areas.

INTEGRATION VERSUS SEGREGATION OF THE ARAB-PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM

Arab's position at the margins of Israel's society is no exception. Ethnic minorities in nation-states live on the margins of society.[77] Throughout history, the response of the majority toward the minority has ranged from elimination or expulsion to integration or assimilation.[78] The general reaction is more associated with withholding individual or collective rights from the minority[79] or the outbreak of any level of ethnic tension[80]—from either side—that in some cases leads to ethnic-based violence, as in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010,[81] or even massacres or genocide, such as in Rwanda in 1993

and 1994.[82] Other examples include mass expulsion of an ethnic minority by the majority, such as Vietnam in 1978, Bhutan in 1991, and Ethiopia in 1998.[83] In some rare cases, nation-states accept specific minorities as part of the nation, such as the case when Germany granted Sorbs cultural rights.[84] In other examples, ethnic minorities are integrated or assimilated into the majority.[85] Furthermore, some minorities seek ways of becoming integrated, whereas others pursue territorial autonomy or secession.[86] The likelihood of the violent rebellion of minorities is influenced by the level of power that the minority has vis-à-vis the majority, ethnic fears, and the level of political discrimination.[87]

Scholarly research on ethnic minorities in nation-states is well established. Many scholars have focused on the integration of ethnic-migrant-minority, regarding employment, housing, education, and health.[88] Some also added issues of citizenship, rights, social relations, or cultural issues.[89] In this book, we are interested in the process of integration versus segregation of ethnic minorities in the nation-state, however not in the case of an ethnic-migrant-minority. Instead, our focus is on the case of Arabs in Israel as an ethnic-indigenous minority within the nation-state of Israel.

The case of the integration versus segregation of Arabs in Israel has been widely researched. Some focus on subsocial groups among Arabs, such as on Arab Christians in Israel: McGahern (2012) or Mack (2013) for example.[90] Or on Arab-Bediouns in Israel: Shamir (2017), Abu-Saad (2008), Nasasra et al. (2014), and Schechla (2001) for example.[91] Some focus on Circassians, such as Stem (1991).[92] The Arab-Druze community in Israel has been the subject of an extensive investigation with a focus on their identity and political behavior. For example, Amara & Schnell (2004), Firro (2001), Halabi (2014), Kaufman (2004), Nisan (2010), Saba-Sa'di (2018), and Aboultaif (2015).[93]

Within that, some also focus on the special case of the Druze in the Golan Heights or the special situation of Arabs in East Jerusalem. For example, Rempel (1997), Hasson (1996), Lustick (1997), Sheleff (1993), or Yishai (1985).[94] Others investigate different aspects of the Arab society, such as Rosenfeld (1978) examining the class situation,[95] or Etgar et al. (2011) examining dissimilation and service equality,[96] or Forman (2006) and Alfasi (2014) examining settlements and planning.[97] Arab economy was also under examination such as by Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2011) and by Sheha-deh and Khalidi (2014).[98]

However, the topics that were examined the most were the self identification and political aspect of the Arabs in Israel, including Arab citizenship, Arab political behavior, and Arab representation. Many Israeli and non-Israeli scholars contributed to the extensive scholarly debate surrounding Arab identity and politics in Israel; this include Ghanim (1998 and 2001), Peled (1992), Katz (1997), Jamal (2003), Young (2005), Rekhess (1988, 2007, and 2014), Abu-Rayya (2009), Rekhess and Rudnitzky (2007), Neuberger (2003),

Smooha (1990), Zureik (1993), Gelber (2013), Korn (2000), Kedar (2016), Saabneh (2004), Rosenthal et al. (2018), Akirav (2014), Mendales (2018), Benziman and Mansour (1992), Herzog (1986), Al-Haj (1993), Reiter and Aharoni (1993), Rudnitzky (2016), and Hitman (2013).[99]

Following this discussion on integration versus segregation, this book aims to outline a comprehensive, updated, and detailed situation of the contemporary political trends of Arab-Palestinian society within the Israeli political system. The book traces the historical development of Arab politics in the three branches of power in Israel and at the local level. The first two chapters concerns the politics at the national level. It examines the political trends and possible consequences on the Arab-Palestinians identity in Israel. Special attention is given to the fragmentation of the Arab vote until the formation of the *Joint List* in 2015 and the Arab political trends since. Hence, this study examines the effect of the 2015 elections on the political participation of Arabs of Israel, the formation of their self-identification, as Arab-Palestinians and as Israelis, and the impact on the Arab leadership in Israel.

The final chapter concerns the politics at the local level—Arab cities, towns, and villages—that are experiencing a long-term crisis. It discusses the central government allocation of budgets to the Arab minority in Israel, as well as their local management policies, and the relationship between these two different reasons for the crisis occurring within the local municipalities.

This book aims at providing answers to questions on the integration of Arabs within the Israeli political system, their leadership, their political trends, their identity, and the relation between all these. Questions include the following: What is the significance of Arab participation in the electoral process? What is the importance of Arab involvement in the Israeli elections? What influence did the Arab representatives have on Israeli political system? In which ways were Arabs involved in the three branches of power in Israel? To what extent Arab leaders are integrated into the Israeli political system? In which essential cases they influenced significant Israeli policies (if any)? What is the relation between Arab political trends and their social identity? How has their social identity changed in the twenty-first century and especially around the 2015 elections (if at all)?

At the local level, this book aims at answering these questions: How did the local self-governments of Arabs develop in Israel? What are the sociodemographic characters of the Arab localities in Israel? How have elections in Arab localities been characterized? Additionally, it aims at answering questions on the financial stability of Arab localities: How has the financial management of Arab localities in Israel develop in different periods? Did the distribution of central government budgets to Arab localities change over time? What is the financial situation of Arab localities? Finally, what are the reasons for the financial crisis in Arab localities? Is it due to discriminatory

government policies? Is it because of internal ill management and leadership? Alternatively, is it something else?

Above all, following the answers to the above questions, what the findings of the book conclude regarding the definition of Israel as a "Jewish and Democratic" state? Or in other words, to what extent Israel is a democracy?

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Chapter 1

Arabs in the Three Israeli Branches of Power

Israel has no constitution. Instead, its legal system is based on 13 basic laws and other regular laws and formal an informal arrangements.[1] The Israeli system of government is based on Parliamentary Democracy in which voters entrust sovereignty to the parliament, as the case for example in Canada, Germany, Greece, UK, and Sweden.[2] The separation of powers in such parliamentary democracies is not absolute because the executive is an extension to the legislature;[3] this means a partial overlap between the legislative and executive branches.[4] Therefore, separation, at its best, exists only between the legislative and executive branches on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other.

The *Knesset*, the unicameral Israeli parliament, approves a new government, can overthrow the government, approves laws, elects a president, elects the state comptroller, and more.[5] The executive branch has extensive and exclusive powers to manage the affairs of the state, such as policy formulation and implementation, enforcement of laws, emergency regulations, declaration of war, and local authorities.[6] The Judiciary in Israel is independent, even if the appointment of judges in Israel is made by a joint committee of the executive branch, the legislative branch, the judiciary branch, and public representatives.[7] In such a regime, the president is not the head of the executive, but holds only a position of a ceremonial head of state.[8]

In such a type of regime, citizens vote only to choose their representatives in the parliament.[9] In Israel, the general election is held every four years with universal suffrage.[10] Elections to the *Knesset* are general, nation-wide, direct, equal, and confidential.[11] The whole nation acts as one electoral district. Citizens vote for parties, not directly to candidates, in a closed-list framework. With the election results, the 120 seats in the *Knesset* are allocated to parties according to the percentage of the vote each party received in the election; however, only to those parties that passed the threshold which was increased

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to 3.25 percent since the 2015 elections. The political system is based on a multiparty structure.[12] On average more than 30 parties have candidates that run for office, of which an average of 12 parties are allocated seats in the *Knesset*. After election day, a government is formed from within the parliament through negotiations to form a coalition between parties.[13]

Arab citizens of Israel have been part of the political system since the first general elections in 1949 and the first *Knesset.*[14] In light of that, chapters 1 and 2 of this book explore the Arab-Palestinian politics at the national level in Israel. Chapter 1 will focus on the political leadership of Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel and their integration in the three branches of power of the Israeli political system: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. While chapter 2 will focus on the political behaviors of Arabs in Israel and its relation to their social identity.

Chapter 1 examines recent changes in the national political leadership of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel and the integration of Arabs in the Israeli political system. Arab leadership has been developing since the establishment of Israel, following the development of the self-identification of Arabs in Israel which emphasizes the contradiction between civic identity—the Israeli—and national identity—the Arab-Palestinian (see more in chapter 2). In light of that, Arab-national discourse has been challenging the concept of political participation within the Israeli polity. It has questioned the significance of their participation in the electoral process and the lack of influence of Arab representatives on the Israeli political system.[15]

On the other hand, significant parts of Israeli society have increasingly adopted a discourse in which Arab society has become more marginalized. As previous scholars already mentioned, despite the many voices and trends existing within Israel's party system regarding a multitude of issues and topics, Jewish voters overall express hatred toward the Arab-Israeli minority and its Arab-Palestinian national identity.[16] This has been particularly noticeable in light of the latest Israeli nation-state bill that was discussed in 2013–2014[17] and then approved as a basic law in 2018.[18] With other anti-Arab legislative initiatives that were debated during the 19th and 20th *Knesset,* it shaped the political discourse that tries to exclude Arabs, both in the Knesset and in the Israeli society,[19] and caused severe damage to the sense of belonging to Arab citizens.[20]

In light of these recent changes, this chapter will examine the following questions: How did the Arab leadership develop in Israel? What is the significance of the Arab participation in the Israeli elections? To what extent Arab leaders are integrated into the Israeli political system? In which essential cases they significantly influenced Israeli policies if any? To answer these questions, an extensive examination was conducted on the official data of Israel's elections,[21] and data from the *Knesset* website,[22] the official websites

of Arab political parties in Israel,[23] media outlets, scholarly publications, and other primary sources.

ARAB LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL

Arab leadership in Israel had emerged from a leadership vacuum following the consequences of the 1948 War which shook their political infrastructure.[24] Before and during the war, most of the nation level Arab-Palestinian leadership, only recently established during the British Mandate period, left Palestine.[25] The only Arab leadership present in the Arab areas of the new state of Israel were the traditional leadership,[26] such as a head of a tribal group (i.e., clan, subclan, or an extended family), some of the wealthy people, some religious leaders, and members of the *Israeli Communist Party (Maki)* who were not popular at the time.

During the military governance period over Arab-populated areas (1948–1966), the Israeli administration preferred this traditional leadership rather than allowing new Arab leadership to arise.[27] Following this preference, in some Arab villages and towns, the military administration chose the local *Mukhtar* or *Sheikh* while in other localities a local committee was appointed.[28] After few years, in a slow process, when the Israeli government started to establish official Arab municipalities, the first council members and mayors were usually chosen by the Israeli administration, and not elected by the people.[29] This was done in order to give those loyal to the state an advantage in the forthcoming first local elections. During the military governance period, these new Arab leaders were mostly pragmatic as they were busy with day-to-day problems, while they were not available to, and not allowed to, deal with joint issues or nation-level issues.

No success was achieved in several attempts to reestablish Palestinian political parties, which were active during the British Mandate period.[30] No progress was made in establishing a new political party that would gain massive support from Arab society.[31] The only political party since 1948 that had the potential for Arab leadership was *Maki* or later the *New Communist List (Rakah)*,[32] which was a cooperation party between Jewish and Arab members and had an Arab sector led by Tawfiq Tubi and Emile Habibi. However, this party was excluded by the dominant political party until 1977: the *Workers' Party of the Land of Israel (Mapai)* and its successor the *Labor*.[33] It was as well excluded by the military administration, at a time when *Mapai* and the military administration controlled the Arab vote;[34] thus, neither *Maki* nor later *Rakah* did achieve significant support from Arab voters in the first two decades,[35] although it adopted the nationalist line of supporters of *Hajj Amin al-Husseini*.[36] A later attempt to form a new party, *al-Ard* (The Land), in the

late 1950s did not prove successful in part due to the Israeli Supreme Court decision to disqualify them when they attempted to run for office in the 1965 elections. *Al-Ard* was established by university students and graduates who believed in pan-Arabism and the leadership of *Gamal Abdel-Nasser.*[37]

Regarding political participation, during the period until 1974, the turnout among Arab citizens was mostly higher than the general turnout (as shown in table 1.1), and most of the Arab votes were given to the Arab satellite lists.[38] These lists did not represent parties, but rather a group of candidates with no specific agenda besides supporting *Mapai* and its successor the *Labor* as if they were an integral part of it.[39] *Mapai* chose traditional Arab notables to be on those lists and helped them get elected by using the military administration's influence on the Arabs. Thus, the relation between *Mapai* and Arabs were characterized as clientism.[40] Those new members of the *Knesset* (MKs) became the new rising Arab leaders. Such Arab leadership in the first two decades of Israel reflects the Arab-Palestinian national consciousness at that time,[41] which was relatively subdued.[42]

The period after 1967—termed as the process of *Palestinization*[43]—is known as the starting point of the national awakening of Arabs in Israel (see chapter 2). This boosted the development of the Arab leadership to a new level. New Arab political institutions were established, such as the National Committee of the Arab Mayors in Israel (1974), the National Committee for the Fight for the Arab Lands (1975), the National Coordination Committee (1980), the High Follow-up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel (1982), and the 40 Association (1988). This symbolized the shift to a leadership focused on collaboration with other Arabs in Israel on common problems, such as lands, education, local services, and relations with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[44] As part of that, for example, the first Land Day was announced by Arab leadership to protest expropriation of private Arab lands by the government. The High Follow-up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel became the leading organization to represent the Arabs in Israel. Its members include members of the National Committee of the Arab Mayors, the Arab MKs, political representatives of other political parties, representatives of nonpolitical organizations, students representatives, and others.[45] As of 2018, it included nine working committees[46]: Committee for the Defense of Land and Housing; Strategic Studies and Planning Committee; Committee on Culture and Education; Committee on Finance and Economic Development; Follow-up committee for social guidance and reform; Committee on Information and Public Relations; Committee against "civil service" and mandatory and voluntary military service; Freedoms Committee and follow up on the issues of political prisoners and commemorate the martyrs; Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons. However, it is not clear whether all these committees are active.

Table 1.1 Arab Vote by Year and *Knesset*

Year	Knesset	Arab Turnout (%)	General Turnout (%)	Difference in Turnout (%)	Percentage of Eligible Arab Voters[a] (%)	Percentage of Permanent Arab Residents Out of the Israeli Population[b] (%)	Percentage of Arab Vote to Arab Parties (%)	Percentage of Arab Vote to Zionist Parties[c] (%)
1949	1st	69.3	86.9	−17.60	9.5	13.6	22.2	77.8
1951	2nd	85.5	75.1	10.40	11.6	11.4	16.3	83.7
1955	3rd	92.1	82.8	9.30	9.0	11.2	15.6	84.4
1959	4th	88.9	81.6	7.30	8.2	10.9	11.2	88.8
1961	5th	89.3	81.6	7.70	7.7	11.3	2.5	97.5
1965	6th	85.8	83.0	2.80	8.3	11.4	23.7	76.3
1969	7th	88.2	81.7	6.50	8.4	14.4	30.3	69.7
1973	8th	80.0	78.6	1.40	8.4	14.7	37.4	62.6
1977	9th	76.3	79.2	−2.90	9.2	15.7	51.6	48.4
1981	10th	69.7	78.5	−8.80	9.8	16.4	39.0	61.0
1984	11th	73.6	78.9	−5.30	13.0	17.2	49.6	50.4
1988	12th	73.9	79.7	−5.80	14.3	18.1	58.4	41.6
1992	13th	69.7	78.2	−8.5	13.3	18.2	47.7	52.3
1996	14th	77.3	79.3	−2.0	10.3	18.0	62.4	37.6
1999	15th	75.2	78.7	−3.5	11.0	18.4	68.6	31.4
2003	16th	62.0	67.8	−5.8	13.0	19.1	69.2	30.8
2006	17th	56.3	63.5	−7.2	13.0	19.8	71.9	28.1
2009	18th	53.4	64.8	−11.4	14.0	20.5	81.9	18.1
2013	19th	56.5	67.8	−11.3	14.0	20.6	77.2	22.8
2015	20th	63.7	72.3	−8.6	15.0	20.7	83.2	16.8
2019	—				16.0	21.5		

(Continued)

Table 1.1 Arab Vote by Year and *Knesset**—(Continued)

Year	Knesset	Arab Turnout (%)	General Turnout (%)	Difference in Turnout (%)	Percentage of Eligible Arab Voters[a] (%)	Percentage of Permanent Arab Residents Out of the Israeli Population[b] (%)	Percentage of Arab Vote to Arab Parties (%)	Percentage of Arab Vote to Zionist Parties[c] (%)
2029	—				17.4	22.6		
2033	—				17.6	23.0		

Notes: [a]Median expected percentage of voters for 2019, 2029, and 2033 was calculated according to already-born Israeli citizens under the age of 18, and given that no significant societal change is expected; [b]percentage of Arab permanent residents of Israeli population for 2019, 2029, and 2033 is according to median CBS calculations, and given that no significant societal change is expected; [c]Votes to the satellite lists were added to the Zionist parties.

*Data of the 2015 elections is the outcome of the author's calculations based on official data from the Israeli Central Elections Committee website: http://www.bechirot2 0.gov.il/election/Pages/HomePage.aspx. Data of previous elections is based on the Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1955.* Special Series Number 51. Jerusalem, 1956 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1959.* Special Series Number 111. Jerusalem, 1961 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1961.* Special Series Number 166. Jerusalem, 1964 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1965.* Special Series Number 216. Jerusalem, 1967 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1969.* Special Series Number 309. Jerusalem, 1969 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1973.* Special Series Number 461. Jerusalem, 1974 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1977.* Special Series Number 553. Jerusalem, 1978 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1981.* Special Series Number 680. Jerusalem, 1981 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1988.* Special Series Number 856. Jerusalem, 1988 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1992.* Special Series Number 926. Jerusalem, 1992 [In Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset 1988.* Special Series Number 855. Jerusalem, 1988 [In Hebrew]; Atmor, Nir and Friedberg Chen (eds.). *Voter Turnout in Israeli General Elections.* Policy research no. 106. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2015 [In Hebrew]; Bligh, Alexander. "Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote in parliamentary elections." *Israel Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2013): 21–50; the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) website: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader; the Israeli Central Elections Committee website; http://www.bechirot20.gov.il/election/Pages/HomePage.aspx.

Following these changes in identity and leadership, it was time for more Arab-national political parties such as *Abnaa al-Balad*. It was the first significant attempt to form a new Arab political organization when a young group of academics aligned with the principles of the *Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)*. Given their agenda, at the time, to abolish Israel as a Jewish state and form a secular state in all of Mandatory Palestine, they were not in a position to run for the Israeli elections.[47] In 1971, the *Islamic Movement* was established by *Abdullah Nimar Darwish* and focused on welfare services for Muslims; however, refrained from participating in the national elections until the mid-1990s. Therefore, the 1970s was the time of *Rakah* (later part of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality [DFPE][48]), which succeeded *Maki*, to become the leading party among Arabs.[49] At the same time when the Arab satellite lists were dissolved after the 1981 elections and Arabs were accepted to become members of Zionist parties,[50] thus increasing the vote of Arabs directly to Zionist parties.[51] However, as shown in table 1.1, all in all, fewer Arabs participated in the national elections.

The first Intifada (1987–1993) was another turning point in Arab politics in Israel. It positioned Israeli Arabs at the periphery of both Palestinian and Israeli societies.[52] As a response, Arab leaders started to be more involved in international relations with the Arab world and the peace process with the Palestinians, and its future expected influence on the situation of the Arabs of Israel.[53] New Arab political parties emerged during the 1980s and the 1990s, with a wide range of ideologies and modes of action,[54] such as the *Progressive List for Peace* (1984)—a Jewish-Arab party that lead later to the estabilshment of an Arab party led by Mohammed Miari, the *Arab Democratic Party (ADP)*[55] (1988) led by Abdulwahab Darawshe, Arab Movement for Cahnge (AMC) (1990) led by Ahmad Tibi,[56] and the *National Democratic Assembly (NDA)* (1995) led by Azmi Bishara.[57]

The *Oslo Accords* in the 1990s[58] gave the Arab leadership in Israel the opportunity to help the Palestinian cause[59] and to be a relevant part of the Israeli political system while minimizing conflict between the two.[60] This was possible since the beginning of the first years of the 1990s, as the majority of Arab leaders at the national level were all well educated or in white-collar professions.[61] The new leaders were already familiar with the Hebrew language, Jewish culture, and the Israeli political system, as opposed to the majority of Arab leaders until the late 1980s.

Regarding participation, since the early 1990s, fewer Arabs voted for Zionist parties, while the Arab vote shifted to the newly established Arab parties. At the same time, the *Islamic Movement* had gained more support in local elections, especially in the triangle area and later among the Bedouins in southern Israel. Ahead of the Israeli national elections in 1996, the *Islamic Movement* split into two branches. The northern branch led by *Raed Salah* argued that the movement should continue to boycott the Israeli national

elections. The southern branch led by *Ibrahim Sarsur* decided to participate in national elections for the first time in 1996 as part of a joint list—*United Arab List (UAL)*[62]—with the *ADP*.

A decade later, a change was noticed following the *October 2000 Clashes.* It was a wave of Arab protests and riots in Israel. The police responded to the disorders with harsh countermeasures that led to 13 Arab demonstrators killed by the police.[63] During and after the *October 2000 Clashes*, the political activity of the Arab MKs had increased to a new level of demands from Israel to stop the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to stop any Israeli violence against their Palestinian brothers.[64] However, following the outcome of the *October 2000 Clashes*, in 2006–2007 a series of *Arab Vision Documents*[65] were produced to reflect the future of Arabs in Israel in the eyes of the Arab leadership as well as Arab academic scholars, artists, social activists, and intellectuals.[66] The documents aimed at suggesting solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as suggesting changes in the Israeli political system that will be more inclusive of Arab citizens of Israel. However, as of 2018, these suggestions were mainly ignored by the Israeli governments, Zionist parties, the Hebrew media, and the general Jewish-Israeli discourse. The only exception is the security threat implications that were discussed, as it was seen as aiming at eliminating the Jewish character of the state and encouraging separatism.[67]

In regard to tunrout in elections, until 1999, the Arab turnout had increased, influenced by optimism and expectations from the *Oslo Accords*. However, due to the *October 2000 Clashes*, the 2001 special elections were a turning point in favor of the separatists. At the time, the northern branch of the *Islamic Movement*, *Abnaa al-Balad*, and NDA called for a total Arab boycott of the elections, resulting in only 18 percent turnout among Arabs in the special PM elections of 2001. The following elections until 2013 continued the same trend of decreasing Arab turnout and increasing Arab vote to Arab parties.

Instead of political activities, Arab society shifted to social activities due to disappointment with the existing political system and its inability to give solutions to actual, individual, economic, and political problems.[68]

ARAB REPRESENTATION IN THE 19TH *KNESSET* AND THE 20TH *KNESSET*

The 19th *Knesset* (2013–2015)

Before the 2015 elections, and during the term of the 19th *Knesset*, three political parties represented Arab citizens of Israel: *DFPE* with four seats

(one for Jewish MK); *UAL* (including *AMC*) with four seats; and *NDA* with three seats. Also, there were two Arab MKs in Zionist parties: one Arab MK in *Meretz*—a left-wing Zionist party—and one Arab MK in *Yisrael Beytenu*—a right-wing Zionist party. All in all, there were 12 Arab MKs, which comprised 10 percent of all MKs. This reflects underrepresentation at the national level compared to the proportion of Arabs out of Israeli society and also if compared to the percentage of eligible Arab voters.

Thus, the fragmentation of the Arab political map along with the decreased turnout among Arabs were an increasing challenge to the Arab parties. A new law approved during the term of the 19th *Knesset* in March 2014 challenged, even more, the smaller parties and among them those Arab parties. The minimum threshold for a party to enter the *Knesset* was set to 3.25 percent instead of 2 percent.[69] It was clear that any party with three seats in the current *Knesset* will not be represented in the following *Knesset* without increasing their share of votes to the new minimum. Preelection polls suggested that one or two out of the three Arab parties will not receive the new minimum votes.[70] The leading assumption was that it is almost impossible to achieve cooperation between the Arab parties. Therefore, eventually it will lead to less Arab representation in the 20th *Knesset*.

The declared intention behind the higher threshold was to maximize governability by minimizing the fragmentation of the Israeli political map.[71] However, some of the politicians that led the approval of this new threshold, such as MK Avigdor Lieberman—leader of *Yisrael Beytenu*—intended also, or perhaps mainly, to minimize Arab representation in the *Knesset*.[72]

Following the declaration in December 2014 of early elections, the need for change was highly debated in the Arab media and among everyday citizens.[73] All parts of Arab leadership took part in such discourse—MKs, mayors, traditional leaders, Non-governmental organization leaders, activists, intellectuals, and academic scholars. The debate focused on a possible merger to form a single list of candidates. Arab leaders from the Palestinian Authority and around the world also supported this idea.[74] However, such cooperation was questionable, given the differences in agenda and the history of competition on the same potential voters for more than two decades. Here is an examination of the agenda of those parties, as shown in table 1.2.

DFPE is a party of Arab-Jewish cooperation.[75] It includes Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze members and elected representation. It includes *Maki*, and as such, it includes the ideas of communism alongside socialism for the achievement of equality between all citizens of Israel, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, and gender. This party accepts the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by establishing the Palestinian state based on the Arab Peace Initiative (2002).[76] *DFPE* calls for full integration of the

Table 1.2   Breakdown of Arab Parties in the 19th *Knesset* by Agenda*

Name of the Party (Name in Arabic; Acronyms in Hebrew)	Agenda and Other Characteristics
The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) (Al-Jabha; Hadash)	a. Arab-Jewish cooperation party b. Socialists and Communists agenda c. Secular agenda d. Full integration of the Arabs in Israel, excluding military service or civil service, and equality for all Israel's citizens

The United Arab List (UAL) (AL-Qaima al-Arabiyya al-Muwahhadah; Ra'am-Ta'al)	a. Religious-based and Arab-Palestinian party
	b. Cooperation between two parties:
	   1. *The Islamic Movement in 48 Palestine*—the southern branch with Islamic religious agenda (pan-Islamism) and Arab-Palestinian nationalism.
	   2. *Arab Movement for Change (AMC)* with liberal-democratic and Arab-Palestinian nationalism agenda.
	c. Religious agenda (except *AMC*)
	d. Partial integration of the Arabs in Israel, with self-management (partial autonomy for the Arabs in Israel)

The National Democratic Assembly (NDA) (Al-Tajamua'; Balad)	a. Arab-Palestinian party b. Democratic and Arab nationalism agenda (pan-Arabism) c. Secular agenda d. Full autonomy for the Arabs in Israel, turning Israel into a state for all its citizens, and equality for all Israel's citizens

*Based on Ghanim, As'ad. *The Palestinian-Arab minority; DFPE* website, The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, agenda section: www.aljabha.org/ (accessed August 10, 2015) [In Hebrew and in Arabic]; *AMC* website, Arab Movement for Change, agenda section: http://www.a-m-c.org/ (accessed December 15, 2015) [In Arabic]; *NDA* official Facebook website, The National Democratic Assembly official page on Facebook, "about" section: https://www.facebook.com/tjamoa/?ref=stream (accessed December 15, 2015) [In Arabic]; Abdel Fattah, Awad. "On the eve of the seventh conference: A big established project and its implementation depends on the ability to renew." *Arab48*, April 30, 2016 [In Arabic].

Arab citizens in Israel. This excludes the military service in the IDF or civil service, which they believe will be difficult for an Arab citizen, given the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[77]

   UAL is a religious Islamic-based party, as their members and representatives are all Muslims.[78] The list is representing mainly the southern branch of the *Islamic Movement in 48 Palestine* that has been running for office together with the ADP since 1996. In the 2013 elections, they joined forces with *AMC*, thus having Arab-Palestinian nationalism and Islamic religious agendas, even pan-Islamism: the agenda of the unity of Muslims under one Islamic state with Islamic principles and rules.[79] The southern branch of the *Islamic Movement* is different from the northern branch by accepting

the existence of Israel and willing to take part in Israel's elections. *AMC* which has a liberal-democratic and Arab-Palestinian nationalism agenda is more secular than their partners.[80] *UAL* accepts the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with some minor differences from *DFPE*. *UAL* calls for the partial integration of the Arabs in Israel while giving the Arabs the responsibility for self-management in several issues, such as education, culture, and religion.[81]

NDA is an Arab-Palestinian and secular party.[82] The members are mostly Arab-Muslims, Christians, and Druze- with a minority of Jewish members. All representatives of the *NDA* were Arabs, while Jewish members were usually situated in relatively lower positions that were far away from being elected. The *NDA* is focusing on democracy and Arab nationalism, even pan-Arabism: the ideology of amalgamating all the countries in the Middle East into one Arab nation.[83] However, due to the developments in the Middle East and abandonment of the pan-Arabism idea, the members of *NDA* currently changed their strategies. Currently, *NDA* accepts the two-state solution by establishing a state for the Palestinians besides Israel, however also calls for cultural autonomy for Arabs in Israel, turning Israel into a state for all its citizens, and equality for all its citizens.[84] Some members of *NDA* still promote the idea of the one-state solution in Palestine, that will have an Arab majority and Jewish minority. Other members hold a third idea of full autonomy for Arabs inside Israel, almost total separation, except foreign affairs and security.

Given the above examination of the different agendas, it is evident that all of them share the primary political focus on two major topics: generally accepting the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and demanding collective and individual rights for Arabs inside Israel. Other than that, these parties do not agree on the specific policies or solutions.

The *Joint List* (from now on *JL*)

The different agendas resulted in difficulties in bringing these parties to agreements in the negotiations. During the talks, *AMC* disengaged from *UAL*, and thus *UAL-AMC* no longer existed as a unity. Hence, the talks were between four parties: *AMC*, *DFPE*, *UAL*, and *NDA*.

During the negotiations, there was an opposition to the idea of joining forces. Some of the opponents were members of *DFPE* whom as socialists or communist supporters were not supportive of being together in the same political platform with a religious party, *UAL*, nor with nationalist party, *NDA*. Other *DFPE* opponents of this idea were some of the Jewish members of the party.[85] They were concerned because of the reason for the merger—on the name of Arab unity—which threats to fade the Jewish-Arab cooperation

in the new platform. After reviewing the results of the 2015 elections by cities, it appears that the only city that the number of voters to the *JL* (compared to the voters to the Arab parties in 2013) has decreased was Tel Aviv-Jaffa (from 3.6% in 2013 to 3.2% in 2015). It may be assumed that the decrease was mainly of Jewish supporters of the *DFPE* who opposed the merger, thus did not vote for the *JL*.

Other opponents of this merger were other Arab parties that were not represented in the 19th *Knesset*, thus were excluded from the negotiations. For that, some political activists decided to run for office as part of *The Arab List* or *The Hope for Change*. They argued that they should be part of the negotiations and have representation in the united list. Some reinforced their argument with the relatively low proportion of representation from Arabs of southern Israel. Moreover, there was an Arab debate of opposition to this idea, from academic scholars, social activists, and leaders at the local level.[86] Those criticized the four Arab parties that they are trying to merge for the first time only as an act of political survival. They cited the media reporting that the difficulties in the negotiations were solely on the position of each candidate. These groups of leaders and activists were not satisfied that there would be representation only for the four active political parties, without giving the opportunity for new leadership that is not part of the existing establishment.

After the decision was made, those academic scholars, social activists, and leaders at the local level did not act against it. While examining the results of the 2015 elections, the evidence suggests that the opposition parties—*The Arab List* and *The Hope for Change*—which both challenged this Arab unity, were primarily criticized in the media and ignored in the ballots. They received together less than 1 percent of the Arab votes in 2015.

After two months of negotiations, nevertheless avoiding agenda issues, the decision was made to establish one united list of candidates.[87] This new platform was named *Al-Qaima al-Mushtarakah* (from Arabic, the Joint List). The agreement included the position of the representatives of the four parties.[88] The head of this new list was chosen to be the *DFPE* leader.[89] The deal was later approved by each of the four parties, which were also responsible for electing or appointing their representatives for the list of candidates. The agreement was achieved only after the involvement of a committee of traditional Arab leadership and Arab academic scholars, who solved the central issue not agreed by the parties themselves: the assignment of seats in the positions from 12 to 15 in the list of candidates. It was decided that these seats would be exchanged after half of the term of the 20th Knesset. Candidates in places 12 and 13 were expected to resign and allow the candidates in positions 14 and 15 to be sworn in instead of them as MKs.

To avoid agenda issues, it was agreed that the new merger would not be a party but a list of candidates only. Every member-party would keep its agenda. During the campaign, each member-party worked to bring its supporters to the ballots and promoted the party's plan, as in previous elections. The agenda of the *JL* was approved for campaign purposes only, based mainly on the agenda of the *DFPE*,[90] with these significant points: achieving equitable peace based on the UN resolutions; full national equality and citizenship; against racism and fascism; employees' rights and social and environmental justice; gender equality; support and empowerment of arts and culture; against the imperialistic involvement in the internal affairs of countries in the region; and nuclear and mass destruction demilitarization of the Middle East, including Israel.

The 20th *Knesset* (2015–2019)

After the elections, it was evident that the efforts were successful for the *JL*. The Arab parties were able to deal successfully with most of their major threats. It solved the consequences of the fragmentation of the Arab political map, such as uniting the divided Arab society between several parties which were previously working against each other; minimizing wasted votes given to smaller parties that did not pass the threshold; and minimizing lost votes due to not having a surplus agreement with other parties.

Another substantial change was the decrease in Arab votes given to Zionist parties while achieving the highest rate ever given by Arab voters to Arab parties (77.2% in 2013 compared with 83.2% in 2015). However, it was significant only among Muslims and to some extent among Christians. During the campaign, the formation of the *JL* was used to convince a growing number of Arab voters to participate in the elections, which eventually helped, to some extent, solve another problem—the low turnout[91] (Arab turnout increased from 56.5% in 2013 to 63.7% in 2015).

While among Druze citizens the vote for Zionist parties remained high (81% of voters). The main reason for that is the correlation between the political trends of the Druze in Israel and their self-identification (see chapter 2). Another explanation is the lack of representation of Druze in the list of candidates, while Druze candidates were positioned in potential seats in Zionist parties.[92] The *JL* did include a Druze candidate. However, the position given to that candidate was planned for half of the term of the *Knesset*, according to the agreement between the parties.[93]

As a result of all these changes, the *JL* received 13 seats in the *Knesset*, which is an increase compared to the previous elections when the Arab parties were separated—11 seats in 2013—and compared to the threat it was dealing with—the higher threshold. The *JL* became the third largest political faction in Israel, after the *Likud* and the *Zionist Union*.[94]

The *JL* represents all subgroups of Arab society in Israel, as shown in table 1.3. Among the thirteen elected MKs, there were nine Muslim representatives (including the Bedouins, in the south and the north), two Christians, and one Druze. It also included the former Jewish supporters of *DFPE*, represented by one Jewish MK. The list included two women, which is only about half the average in the 20th *Knesset*. Furthermore, all the geographic areas with Arab population in Israel were represented—there are seven representatives from the north, five from the center (the "triangle"), and one from the south. Moreover, it is a very educated list of representatives. Among the elected thirteen MKs there were three PhD and three MD holders—the highest among any other party—along with one MA and six BA degree holders.

In addition to the thirteen MK of the *JL*, there were another six Arab MKs in Zionist parties: from the left-wing parties—one in *Meretz* and two in the *Zionist Union*; from a center party—one in *Kulanu*; and from right-wing parties—one in the *Likud* and one in *Yisrael Beytenu*. All in all, Arab representation in the 20th *Knesset* has increased to reach 19 MKs, which is 15.8 percent. For the first time surpassing the percentage of their proportion out of all the eligible voters in 2015 (15%).[95] As shown in table 1.4, this amount of Arab MKs is the highest ever in the *Knesset*.[96]

ARABS IN THE ISRAELI LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The importance of the representation of cleavages has been previously discussed. Specifically, scholars already argued on the significance, in Democratic regimes, of the representation of minorities.[97] However, quantity is not the only measure of success. Despite their presence in the *Knesset* since 1949, Arab MKs has not been particularly influential, except for a few critical cases.

In various occasions, Arabs in the *Knesset* were not considered as part of the decision-making by both the Jewish-Israeli left and right wings. During the first two decades, Arab satellite lists were included several times as part of the coalition and in some cases since 1969 as part of the government (see in the executive branch section). While the Arab representatives of *Maki* or *Rakah* and in most years also an Arab MK of the left-wing party, *Mapam, were part of the opposition.*[98] However, it is worth noting that those satellite lists were managed by *Mapai*; the Arab notables were initially chosen by *Mapai* to become MKs, and the MKs representing those lists voted in the *Knesset* as if they were part of *Mapai*. For all of that, it cannot be considered an actual representation of Arabs within the government and the coalition.

Table 1.3 The *JL* Representatives*

#	Original Party	Name	Elected\Not Elected	Ethnicity/Religion	Occupation before Been Elected	Education	Municipality	Region	Gender
1	DFPE	Ayman Odeh	Elected	Muslim	Lawer	BA	Haifa	North	M
2	UAL\IMS	Masud Ghanaim	Elected	Muslim	Teacher	BA	Sakhnin	North	M
3	NDA	Jamal Zahalkah	Elected	Muslim	Doctor of Pharmacy	MD	Kafr Qara'	Center	M
4	AMC	Ahmad Tibi	Elected	Muslim	Medical doctor	MD	Tayibe	Center	M
5	DFPE	Aida Touma-Salesman	Elected	Christian	Journalist, social activist	BA	Acre	North	F
6	UAL\IMS	Abd al-Hakim Haj Yahia	Elected	Muslim	Engineer, Mayor	BA	Tayibe	Center	M
7	NDA	Hanin Zoa'bi	Elected	Muslim	Teacher	MA	Nazareth	North	F
8	DFPE	Dov Hanin	Elected	Jewish	Lawer	PhD	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Center	M
9	UAL\IMS	Taleb Abu-A'rar	Elected	Muslim-Bedouin	Teacher, Mayor	BA	A'ra'rat an-Naqab	South	M
10	DFPE	Yosef Jabareen	Elected	Muslim	Lawer	SJD	Umm al-Fahm	Center	M
11	NDA	Basel Ghatas	Elected. Resigned in March 2017 due to a criminal conviction	Christian	Engineer	PhD	Nazareth	North	M
12	AMC	Osama Saadi	Elected. Resigned in September 2017 due to a rotation agreement	Muslim	Lawer	BA	A'arabeh	North	M

(Continued)

Table 1.3 The *JL* Representatives*—(Continued)

#	Original Party	Name	Elected\Not Elected	Ethnicity/ Religion	Occupation before Been Elected	Education	Municipality	Region	Gender
13	DFPE	Abdullah Abu-Maa'ruf	Elected. Resigned in August 2017 due to a rotation agreement	Druze	Medical doctor	MD	Yarka	North	M
14	NDA	Juma'a Az-Zbargah	Appointed in March 2017 due to the resignation of MK Basel Ghatas	Muslim-Bedouin	Medical manager	BA	Lakiyah	South	M
15	UAL\IMS	Saa'eed el-Kharumi	Appointed in August 2017 due to a rotation agreement	Muslim-Bedouin	Mayor	N/A	Shaqib al-Salam	South	M
16	UAL\IMS	Hijazi Ibrahim	Appointed in September 2017. Resigned in October 2017 due to a rotation agreement	Muslim	N/A	MA	Nazareth	North	M

17	*DFPE*	Youssef A'tauna	Appointed in October 2017 and resigned in February 2018 due to a rotation agreement	Muslim-Bedouin	Teacher and Head of Municipal Education Department	MA	Hura	South	M
18	*AMC*	Wael Younis	Appointed in January 2018, and resigned August 2018 due to a rotation agreement	Muslim	Businessman	BA	Ar'ara	Center	M
<u>19</u>	*NDA*	Niven Abu Rahmoun	Appointed in August 2018	Muslim	Teacher	BA	Bu'eine Nujeidat	North	F

Note: Underlined # indicates acting MKs as of January 2019.
*The author's production based on the *Knesset* website, section of MKs portfolios by *Knesset*: www.knesset.gov.il.

Table 1.4 Arab Representation in the *Knesset* by Year**

Year	Knesset	Elected Arab MKs*		Arab MKs with Changes during the Knesset Term		Percentage of Eligible Arab Voters (%)	Difference between the Percentage of Representation and Percentage of Eligible Arab Voters	
		#	%	#	%		Compared to Original (%)	Compared to "After Changes" (%)
1949	1st	3	2.5	3	2.5	9.5	−7.0	−7.0
1951	2nd	8	6.7	8	6.7	11.6	−4.9	−4.9
1955	3rd	7	5.8	8	6.7	9.0	−3.2	−2.3
1959	4th	7	5.8	7	5.8	8.2	−2.4	−2.4
1961	5th	6	5.0	8	6.7	7.7	−2.7	−1.0
1965	6th	7	5.8	7	5.8	8.3	−2.5	−2.5
1969	7th	6	5.0	5	4.2	8.4	−3.4	−4.2
1973	8th	6	5.0	6	5.0	8.4	−3.4	−3.4
1977	9th	7	5.8	7	5.8	9.2	−3.4	−3.4
1981	10th	5	4.2	5	4.2	9.8	−5.6	−5.6
1984	11th	7	5.8	7	5.8	13.0	−7.2	−7.2
1988	12th	5	4.2	6	5.0	14.3	−10.1	−9.3
1992	13th	8	6.7	8	6.7	13.3	−6.6	−6.6
1996	14th	11	9.2	12	10.0	10.3	−1.1	−0.3
1999	15th	13	10.8	13	10.8	11.0	−0.2	−0.2
2003	16th	10	8.3	11	9.2	13.0	−4.7	−3.8
2006	17th	11	9.2	12	10.0	13.0	−3.8	−3.0
2009	18th	12	10.0	16	13.3	14.0	−4.0	−0.7
2013	19th	12	10.0	13	10.8	14.0	−4.0	−3.2
2015	20th	16	13.3	19	15.8	15.0	−1.7	+0.8

Notes: *Including Arab MKs in Zionist Parties.
**See sources of table 1.1.

The leading right-wing opposition party, *Herut*,[99] had already debated in 1951 against the dependence of an Israeli government on a coalition that is not all-Jewish.[100] At the time, the third *Ben-Gurion* government was based on a coalition of 65 MKs, of which 5 were Arabs. However, *Herut* did join the 15th government for two years while it was based on a coalition that included four Arab MKs from the satellite lists. In 1984, while debating whether to form a coalition that will include Arab MKs, MK *Shamir* stated that there is no option to form a coalition with non-Jewish members.[101] In 1992, MK *Sharon* noted that Arabs should not be allowed to participate in any referendum that will decide upon critical issues in Israel.[102]

However, when the *Labor* party was able to form a coalition in 1992, it was much dependant on the Arab MKs. *DFPE* and *ADP* granted PM *Rabin* their vote in the *Knesset* as part of the "Block" to help approve the new government in 1992, and later to help rejecting votes of no confidence which were suggested by the right-wing opponents of the *Oslo Accords*. This was critical at a time when the *Rabin* government did not have the majority in the *Knesset*. Even though *DFPE* and *ADP* had an agreement with the government,[103] the Arab MKs were not officially part of the coalition nor did hold any positions within the executive branch. One of the results of the agreement was the implantation of a five-year plan in 1992 to improve the situation of Arabs in Israel.[104]

DFPE and *ADP* members voted for the approval of the *Oslo Accords*, which was approved by 61–59 votes. Their vote did make a difference. The fact that the *Rabin* government in general and the *Oslo Accords* in particular were not based solely on "Jewish majority" was one of the main reasons that led to huge protests among the Jewish Israelis all around Israel, claiming on the non-legitimacy of the *Rabin* government and the *Oslo Accords*.[105] In a protest against the *Rabin* government in early October 1995, MK *Netanyahu,* at the time the opposition leader, declared that the *Oslo Accords* were approved by a "non-Zionist majority, including five representatives of Arab parties that are affiliated with *PLO*."[106] Such a principle was at the core of excuses of the incitement campaign that led to the assassination of PM *Rabin* in 1995.

The second occasion that Arab MKs did make a difference in the *Knesset* was in 2005. During the term of the 16th *Knesset*, Arab members of *DFPE-AMC* and *UAL* supported the Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005 by giving the minority government of PM *Sharon* ad-hoc support in votes of no confidence. Those challenges to the *Sharon* government were suggested by opponents of the disengagement plan.[107]

In recent years, the Arab MKs became more integrated into the committees of the *Knesset*, except for two committees: the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and the Committee for Immigration, Absorption, and Diaspora

Affairs.[108] The *Knesset* rules give the Arab parties seats in these two commit-
tees, as the same as any other party; however, usually, Arab parties prefer to
exchange their seats in these specific committees to seats in other committees,
where they claim that they have more interest to represent their agenda and
to influence on issues related to their constituencies. Arab MKs from Arab
parties were only twice members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Com-
mittee.[109] Even then, MK *Hashem Mahamid* (*UAL* member of this committee
during the 15th *Knesset*) and MK *Taleb As-Sanea'* (*UAL* member of this
committee during the 17th *Knesset*) were not members of subcommittees,
where secret details were revealed.

A recent study has found that despite the odds, Arab MKs manage to set
their agenda and contribute to the public debate about their part in Israeli
society.[110] Another concludes, that along with efforts made by Arab may-
ors, the National Committee of the Arab Mayors, and the High Follow-up
Committee, also Arab MKs engage in meetings, discussions, and other cor-
respondences with the Israeli PM, ministers, and other officials within the
executive to promote their agenda and to improve civil matters of Arabs in
Israel.[111]

In comparison to other parties in the 20th *Knesset*, a recent study found that
the *JL* is reasonably situated in the fifth place (out of ten parties) in overall
performance in the *Knesset*, when including all tools available to *Knesset* mem-
bers.[112] They were ranked number one in "submitting queries" and "one-minute
speeches," number two in "speeches in the general assembly," and number
three in "submission of motions." However, they were ranked at the bottom of
the list regarding "participation in votes in the general assembly," in "involve-
ment in committees," and "approval of the new legislation." Their "approval of
new legislation" was noticed to be lower by far from any other party; however,
when joining other MKs in an already submitted legislation proposal, their per-
formance is much better. This indicated the isolation that the *JL* is experiencing
by not being regarded as a relevant partner within the *Knesset*.

The 20th *Knesset* marked the third occasion when MKs of Arab parties
did make a difference. The 34th government led by PM Netanyahu prepared
a five-year plan to invest an estimate of NIS15 billion in Arab localities in
Israel—known as Decision 922.[113] MK Odeh, leader of the *JL*, was personally
involved in formulating the plan, together with other Arab MKs of the *JL*.[114]
This cooperation is significant, due to the different positions of the JL and PM
Netanyahu, his *Likud* party, and his right-wing dominated government. It sets
an example to how Arab MKs can influence their constituencies and improve
their socioeconomic situation and the services provided to them, even if Arab
MKs are not part of the coalition or the government.

Even for Arab MKs in Zionist parties, it took a few decades to be more integrated into the *Knesset* work. The first Arab MK to be appointed as chairperson of a permanent *Knesset* committee was MK *Ghaleb Majadele* from the *Labor*. *Majadele* chaired the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee (during the term of the 16th and 17th *Knesset*). In 2017, MK *Issawi Frej* from *Meretz* was appointed as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the 20th Knesset. It was still criticized almost from all the other parties, even though he is a member of a Zionist party.[115]

As of the 20th *Knesset*, Arab MKs are members of all the *Knesset* committees except for the same two committees previously mentioned. For the first time, an Arab member, and a woman, of an Arab party—MK *Aida Touma-Suleiman*—was chosen as chairperson of a permanent *Knesset* committee—the Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality.[116] Also, MK *Ahmad Tibi* was appointed deputy of the *Knesset* speaker for the fourth time, alongside with other Arab MKs who represent the opposition- *Issawu Frej and Hamad Amar*.[117]

As shown in figure 1.1, for the first time following the 2015 elections the Arab representation in the Knesset (15.8%) surpassed the percentage of eligible Arab voters (15%). This is the result of higher turnout among the Arabs while keeping a low percentage of Arabs vote to non-Arab parties. Only in two previous elections, Arab representation was close to the proportion of eligible Arab voters, in 1996 and 1999 (14th and 15th *Knesset*). This was mainly

Figure 1.1   Arab Representation in the *Knesset:* The Percentage of Arab MKs Out of all 120 MKs. *Source*: Author's calculations based on *The Knesset website*, section of MKs portfolios by *Knesset*: www.knesset.gov.il.

explained by the rise of new Arab parties, by the high Arab turnout in these years (77.3% and 75.3%, respectively), and the high relative turnout (0.97 and 0.96, respectively). Another explanation for the high Arab representation in 1996 and 1999 is the direct vote in these years to elect the prime minister.[118] In these two elections, many Arab supporters of Zionist parties decided to vote directly to their chosen PM candidate, however, were convinced to vote to an Arab party for the *Knesset* instead of their regular vote to a Zionist party. This was evident mainly in the leading parties that their leader was a candidate for PM (the *Likud* received 2.2% in 1996 and 1.3% in 1999 of the Arab votes compared to 8.9% in 1992; the *Labor* party received 16.6% in 1996 and 7.4% in 1999 of the Arab votes compared to 20.3% in 1992).

ARABS IN THE ISRAELI EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Arabs as Ministers and Deputy Ministers

During the negotiations to form the first government, PM Ben-Gurion set his famous principle for forming coalition governments: "*Without Herut or Maki.*"[119] This principle aimed at setting the legitamate political boundaries that are accepted for inclusion in his government: excluding the extreme left-wing party that is communist and non-Zionist—*Maki*—and excluding the extreme right-wing party, *Herut*. Therefore this principle did not exclude the Arab satellite lists that were formed by *Mapai*.

Although the satellite lists were part of the coalitions since 1949, they were included as part of the government for the first time only in 1971, during the term of the 15th government.[120] The 1st and 2nd governments in 1949 and 1950 were based on coalitions of 73 MKs including two Arabs of the *Democratic List of Nazareth*.[121] The 3rd government in 1951 was based on coalition of 65 MKs including 5 Arab MKs, three of *The Democratic List for Israeli Arabs*, one of *The Progress and Work* party, and one of *Agriculture and Development*. In that case, Ben-Gurion's government was reliant on the support of the five Arab MKs,[122] especially during its last three months when the coalition was based only on 60 MKs. However, even then they were not part of the government. The 4th and 5th governments were based on broad support of an 87 and 89 MKs, respectively, including 5 Arab MKs from the same lists as in the 3rd government. The 6th government was again as the 3rd, based on a coalition of 65 MKs, including five Arab MKs from the same satellite list as mentioned above. The 7th to the 14th governments were based on varying support of 67 to more than 80 MKs including 2–5 Arab MKs with some changes in the lists throughout the years (e.g., the new list of *Cooperation and Brotherhood*).

The 15th government marked a change when the first two Arab MKs were appointed as deputy ministers (see table 1.5) in 1971, Abd al-Aziz al-Zoubi from a Zionist party, *Mapam,* and the other from a satellite list affiliated with the *Labor- Jabr Mua'di*. It was the first member of a satellite list to be appointed for a position in any government, and also the last one. Since then, all non-Jewish ministers and deputy ministers were members of Zionist parties.

The trend of appointing Arab MKs as deputy ministers continued during the term of the 16th and 17th governments. However, following the Israeli

Table 1.5   Arabs in the Israeli Government: Ministers and Deputy Ministers*

#	Name	Portfolio (Years in Position)	Religion	Party
1	Abd el-Aziz el-Zoubi	Deputy Minister of Health (1971–1974)	Muslim	UWP (Mapam) then part of Labor party
2	Jabr Mua'di	Deputy Minister of Communications (1971–1975) and Deputy Minister of Agriculture (1975–1977)	Druze	Progress and Development, a satellite list affiliated with the Labor
3	Nawaf Massalha	Deputy Minister of Health (1992–1996) and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1999–2001)	Muslim	Labor
4	Walid Haj Yahia	Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (1992–1996)	Muslim	Meretz
5	Saleh Tarif	Deputy Minister of the Interior (1995–1996) and Minister without Portfolio (2001–2002)	Druze	Labor
6	Majalli Wahabi	Deputy Minister in the Ministry in the Prime Minister's Office (2005–2006), and Deputy Minister of Education, Culture, and Sport (2006), Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister (2007–2009)	Druze	Likud party (2005–2006) and Kadima (2007–2009)
7	Ghaleb Majadele	Minister without Portfolio (2007) and Minister of Science, Culture, and Sports (2007–2009)	Muslim	Labor
8	Ayoob Kara	Deputy Minister of the Development of the Negev and Galilee (2009–2013), Deputy Minister of Regional Cooperation (2015–2017), Minister without Portfolio (January to May 2017), and Minister of Communication (May 2017)	Druze	Likud

*Based on *the Knesset website,* section of MKs portfolios by *Knesset*: www.knesset.gov.il.

legislative election of 1977, which was characterized with the transfer of power
to the *Likud*, and due to the unity-governments during the 1980s and the dissolu-
tion of the Arab satellite lists, no Israeli Arab was part of the executive between
1978 and 1992. Some Arab MKs were still part of some of the coalitions, such
as one MK from the Likud, MK *Amal Nasser al-Din,* and others from the
Labor, when it was part of the coalition. However, they were not appointed to
any positions within the executive. The 25th government that was formed by
PM *Rabin* in 1992 included once again two Arab MKs as deputy ministers-
MK Nawaf Massalha and MK Walid Haj Yahia. The following short-termed
26th government of PM Peres added a third Arab MKs as deputy ministers-
MK Saleh Tarif. The first government led by PM *Benjamin Netanyahu*, the 27th
government, did not include any non-Jewish ministers or deputy ministers, as
the same as the previous governments led by the *Likud*. The 28th government
of PM Barak of the Labor included one Arab MK as deputy minister.

In 2001, the 29th government, which was the first to be formed by PM
Ariel Sharon as leader of the *Likud*, included the first Arab minister. It was
the first government led by the *Likud* to include an Arab in a position within
the executive. MK *Saleh Tarif*, a member of the *Labor*, which was part of the
coalition, was appointed as the first non-Jewish minister in Israel.[123] He was
appointed as minister without portfolio in 2001. The second *Sharon* govern-
ment (the 30th government) included once again only one Arab deputy min-
ister- MK Majali Wahabi. The 31st government led by PM Olmert of Kadima
included the appointment of an Arab deputy minister and the second Arab
minister ever, but the first with a portfolio. MK *Ghaleb Majadele*,[124] a mem-
ber of the *Labor*, which was part of the coalition, was appointed as Minister
of Science, Culture, and Sports in 2007.

PM *Netanyahu* has been leading the government since the 32nd govern-
ment. During the term of the 32nd government, there was only one Arab
appointed as deputy minister. The 33rd government was the first since the
27th to not include any Arab member in the government. In the 34th govern-
ment there was one Arab member as minister of Communication. MK *Ayoob
Kara,*[125] a member of the *Likud*, was the third Arab-Israeli to be appointed to
any position as minister. However, he is the first from the *Likud*.

All in all, as shown in table 1.5, over Israel's history three Israeli Arabs,
members of Zionist parties, were appointed as ministers (and previously as
deputy ministers) and five Arab MKs were appointed as deputy ministers.
The majority of them were Druze—a minority among Arabs.

Since the satellite lists were dissolved, the "real" Arab parties have always
been part of the minority in the *Knesset*—the opposition to the government.
They have never been invited to become a relevant part of the majority in
the *Knesset* nor part of the Israeli government. Usually, Arab MKs in Arab
parties declare that they prefer not to be part of the Israeli government until a
peace agreement is achieved with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip and full equality is achieved for the Arab citizens inside Israel.[126] This attitude contradicts with the trends among Arab-Israelis in 2016, the majority of which are in favor of the inclusion of Arab parties in the coalition and Arab MKs as ministers and deputy ministers in the executive.[127]

However, even though this issue is controversial between the member-parties of the *JL*, some members of the *JL* declared that after the 2015 elections they would actively support the formation of a left-wing government by granting an outside vote to the coalition, rather than being part of the government.[128]

The 2015 elections gives us the opportunity to examine this process. The right-wing parties received 44 seats in the *Knesset*, religious parties received 13 seats, the left-center received 42 seats, and the center—with 2 parties opposing the *Likud* agenda and leadership—received 21 seats. Even with these results, still, the right-wing parties headed by the *Likud* declared a victory. It was posible that a coalition and a new government could be formulated based on left-wing parties, left-center, and center parties with a total of a majority of 63 seats in the *Knesset*. This hypothetical possibility of forming a left-center government, based on opposing the *Likud* agenda and leadership was not discussed due to the inclusion of the Arab MKs of the *JL* as part of this hypothetical coalition. This inclusion was not considered despite their recent success in raising their representation in the parliament, as they are excluded continuously from the calculations as if the Arab representatives are not "part of the game." Most of the Zionist parties do not consider the Arab parties*,* as part of the left-wing—instead they are considered as a separated political block. This attitude is in-line with the trends among Jewish Israelis in 2016, the majority of which oppose the inclusion of Arab parties in the coalition and Arabs as ministers and deputy ministers.[129]

During the term of the 20th *Knesset,* there were talks of a possibility to overthrow Netanyahu's government and replace it with a government led by MK Herzog, leader of the *Zionist Union*. The consideration set by the leader of the left-center was on "*Collaboration with a Zionist block of moderate, social, and responsible partners to replace the prime minister.*"[130] This attitude is highly influenced by the controversial statements made by PM Netanyahu during the last day of the 2015 campaign when he urged the right-wing supporters to vote for the *Likud* and save the right-wing government because "*Arab voters are heading to the polling stations in droves.*"[131]

In other words, the JL and any Arab party is expected to achieve actual change for the Arab citizens by using their power to influence the Israeli policy, but this influence is limited to the parliamentary work as part of the opposition. This is by definition very limited.

In any case, the same pattern is evident with Arabs in the executive branch as the same as in the legislative. Even for Arab MKs in Zionist parties, it took a few decades to be more integrated into the Israeli government. As shown in figure 1.2, Arab representation in the executive branch is neglected. In most

Figure 1.2 Arab Representation in the Executive Branch: The Percentage of Arab Deputy Ministers and Ministers Out of All Political Positions in the Executive Branch. *Note*: Percentage of Arab ministers and deputy ministers are the peak situation following changes during the term of the *Knesset*. All ministers and deputy ministers are members of Zionist parties. *Source*: Author's calculations based on *The Knesset website*, section of MKs portfolios by *Knesset*: www.knesset.gov.il.

years there has been no Arab representation at all. Only in less than half of Israel's history, there has been some Arab representation in the executive. However, even when there is a representation, it is 5 percent of the political positions or less. This is below the percentage of Arab voters and far below the rate of Arab population out of all society in Israel. The highest Arab representation in the executive in political positions as ministers and deputy ministers was during the Rabin government in 1992–1995, with 10 percent of the positions held by Arabs.

Arabs as Government Officials

A more noticeable improvement is in the government departments and affiliated agencies and companies. As shown in figure 1.3, it is evident that the government efforts to include more Arabs in public service are somewhat successful. This is a result of a turning point in 2007 during the term of the *Olmert* government. The government decided then to promote appropriate representation of Arabs in the public service[132] and set a goal of at least 10 percent Arab employees by 2012.[133] The results indicate an increase of Arab officials in the Israeli government from about 5 percent in 2007 to 10 percent in 2016. It is worth noting the progress done in the past decade, although the

Figure 1.3   Arab Officials in the Israeli Government (2007–2015). *Source*: Author's calculations based on table 1.1 and State Service Commissioner. "Report on equal employment of Arabs, including Druze and Cirracassians in the state service, 2015." Jerusalem. 2016 [in Hebrew]. Available online (accessed December 15, 2018): https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/representation2015/he/representation2015.pdf.

modest goal of 10 percent was met after the deadline and it is still far less than the Arab percentage of the population—21 percent.

In addition to this, there is still underrepresentation of Arabs in senior positions and in offices that can affect and work to minimize the inequality of the Arab society.[134] The breakdown of the percentage of Arab officials in the government, as of 2016, shows a variation between departments.[135] Here's a list of those departments with amount of Arab employees above 70 and percentage above 3 percent[136]: *Public Health System,* 4,227 (3.9%); *Ministry of the Interior,* 423 (51.5%);[137] *Ministry of Justice,* 364 (9.1%); *Ministry of Social Services,* 340 (11.1%); *Tax authority,* 337 (6.3%); *Ministry of Education,* 188 (8.7%); *Fire and Rescue Services,* 177 (6.5%); *Ministry of Economy,* 85 (6%); and *Ministry of Transportation,* 75 (8.1%).

This data is limited due to two main exclusions. First are the teaching staff in all Israel's public schools. Although they are employees of the Ministry of Education, they are not counted as part of their data as stated above. As of 2017, there were 175,000 of teaching staff,[138] out of which about 41,000 work in Arab-teaching schools (24%).[139] Although there are no legal or other official limitations, teaching staff is segregated; Jewish teachers work in Hebrew-teaching schools, and Arab teachers, such as Muslims, Christians, and Druze, work in Arabic-teaching schools.[140] As of 2012, in Hebrew-teaching schools less than 1 percent of teaching staff are Arabs,[141] and in Arabic-teaching schools, about 1.5 percent of teaching staff are Jewish. Given this

information, we can count that about 41,000 Arabs are working as teaching staff, which is about 24 percent of the entire teaching staff in public schools in Israel. This is higher representation than the percentage of Arabs out of Israel's population.

Second, the data does not include the Ministry of Defense, the IDF, the Police, and all other security agencies, where most Arabs would prefer not be employed and in any case, they are excluded. The compulsory service in the IDF, which is also considered as a requirement to work for any security agency, is imposed only on the Druze.[142] Other Arabs are exempt but have the option to volunteer.[143] As a result, the number of Arabs and their percentage of total employees in the security sector is estimated as lower than in other government departments. In other words, the reported total percentage of integration of Arabs in the Israeli public service—10 percent as of 2016—is, in fact, lower when we calculate all the public service, including the security sector. For comparison, the report above includes about 72,000 employees. While data on employees in the security sector in Israel is censored of publication by Israeli laws, we can estimate that it is higher than the 72,000 used for the data above. Thus, the conclusions on the integration of Arabs in the civil service are limited by definition.

ARABS IN THE ISRAELI JUDICIAL BRANCH

In the judicial authority, the status is not much different. As of the end of 2014, there were 52 Arab judges in the Israeli judicial system. This is about 7.7 percent, a low percentage compared to the Arab population or compared to eligible voters, as shown in figure 1.4. However, it is worth noting the improvement since the 1990s when only 4 percent of the judges were Arabs.

In the Supreme Court, the first Arab to be appointed was Justice *Abd el-Rahman el-Zoubi*. Justice el-*Zoubi* was appointed in 1999 for a temporary term of nine months.[144] He was succeeded by Justice *Salim Joubran*.[145] Justice *Joubran* was appointed in 2003 for a temporary position, and in 2004 for a permanent position untile he retired in 2017. Justice *Joubran* was also the first Arab to hold the position of Chairman of the Central Elections Committee. He held the position during the election toward the 20th *Knesset*.[146]

In early 2017, the judicial appointments commission was about to decide on the next appointments. Among the remaining 28 candidates for a vacant position at the Supreme Court, there were 2 Arab judges: *Khaled Kabob-* and *George Kara-*. Justice *Kara* was chosen and appointed later in 2017.[147] Hence, as shown in figure 1.4, the percentage of Arabs as justices in the

Figure 1.4 Arab Judges in the Israeli Judicial System (1949–2014). *Source*: Author's calculations based on tables 1.1 and 1.4 and Luria, Guy. Appointing Arab Judges to the Israeli courts. *Court and Governance*, 16:1–2, pp. 307–315. Haifa: 2014 [in Hebrew]. Available online: http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Journals/lawGov/Volume16/06.pdf

Israeli Supreme court has been around 7 percent of the seats since the first appointee in 1999 and until 2018.

The Israeli judicial branch also includes religious courts for the different official religions in Israel. Religious courts consist of the Sharia Courts for Muslims and the Druze Religious Courts. Other than being the third branch of the Israeli political system, the judges are also considered as representatives.[148] In the case of the Arabs in Israel, it also includes the religious courts. In some cases, judges use their position to represent their constituences' interests among the other two branches: the legislature and the executive.[149]

The jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts includes marriage and divorce, legal capacity and guardianship, custody of children, the genealogy of children, Wakf (religious endowments), and prevention of domestic violence, conversion of religion to Islam, financial relationships between spouses, and others.[150] At the end of 2016, there were a total of 15 Muslim Kadis spread in one Sharia Court of Appeals (3 Kadis) and Sharia Courts in 8 cities in Israel:

Jerusalem (3 Kadis), Nazareth (2), Tayibe (1), Beersheba (1), Acre (2), Jaffa (1), Haifa (1), and Baqa al-Gharbiyye (1).

Following the recognition of the Druze as a separated millet in the early 1960s, Druze Religious Courts were established in Haifa in 1963 and included one Druze Religious Court and a Druze Court of Appeal.[151] In 1988 the Druze Religious Courts were moved to Acre to be closer to most of the Druze localities, which are located in the Galilee. After the 1967 war, Israel established in 1972 a Druze Court in *Mas'adeh* in the Golan Heights. The jurisdiction of the Druze Religious Courts on the Druze community is similar to the Sharia Court's jurisdiction on Muslims in Israel.[152] At the end of 2016, there were nine Druze Kadis appointed in the Druze Court of Appeal (three Kadis) and in two Druze Religious Courts, in *Acre* (three) and *Mas'adeh* (three).

All those 15 Muslim kadis and nine Druze kadis are in addition to the 52 Arab judges in the judicial system.

ARABS IN THE ISRAELI THREE BRANCHES OF POWER: CONCLUSION

Following the findings of this chapter, it is suggested that the formation of the *JL* is a new level of the national leadership of the Arabs in Israel. This is a continuation of the development of this leadership since 1948: from the traditional leadership to the formation of national committees in the 1970s and 1980s, and the creation of new political parties in the 1990s. Following the *Oslo Accords*, as Ghanem and Mustafa[153] suggest, the development of this leadership was the outcome of the shift from the level of individual rights to the level of collective political rights. Later it led to the Arab vision documents published in 2006–2007. These documents were a result of joint efforts that, among other things, showed profound changes in Arab leadership. However, as stated by Jamal[154] at that point, the different documents highlighted the internal differences within the Arab society that was then still stronger than the uniting forces within it.

Forcing a higher threshold in 2015 helped them to overcome their differences and begin working for unity. Although the reason for unity came as a response to outside changes, this chapter suggests that the formation of the *JL* is another milestone in the process of rebuilding the Arab society in Israel as a single united society with a unified leadership.

While working together in one political platform, Arab parties gained success in the 2015 election. There were some solutions to problems that affected the participation and representation of Arabs in the past. The first step was the turnout itself that once again increased while somewhat closing the gap with the general turnout. The main progress in this regard is convincing significant parts of Arab society to abandon the ideological boycott of the Israeli

elections. It has helped keeping significant parts of the Arab society to search for integration in the Israeli polity, rather than segregation.

Second, the formation of the *JL* and canceling the fragmentation of the Arab political map has succeeded in increasing the amount of Arab representation in the *Knesset*, which is the highest ever. In case the same political patterns continue—increase in Arab turnout and continuous voting for one united list of candidates—it is expected to help close the gap of Arab underrepresentation in the *Knesset*. At the same time, it might help to shift the trend to political representation of Arabs rather than politics of representation, as suggested by Rosenthal, Zubida, and Nachmias.[155] However, this is a challenge by itself, due to the different agendas and the political competition between the parties, as detailed in this chapter.

On the other hand, by formulating the *JL*, most Arabs segregated themselves from Zionist parties: less Arab representation in those parties and less Arab turnout for those parties, except the Druze. In this sense, parties in Israel are becoming even more segregated in terms of religion and ethnicity. Arab MKs-Muslims and Christians alike- as representatives of Arab parties and Jewish MKs as representatives of Zionist parties.

At the third level, the participation of the Arab MKs in the *Knesset* work has not yet changed dramatically, except for the first-ever elected Arab MK from an Arab party as a chairperson of a permanent *Knesset* committee. Improvement is happening in the last two decades in the integration of Arabs in the three branches of government: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The progress that has been done in the judicial system and the number of Arab officials in the government is not yet sufficient, but it is a good example for the future.

These three first steps, participation in elections, representation in the three branches, and participation in the *Knesset* work, are all leading to the descriptive representation of Arabs in Israel, which is very important. Descriptive representation, in general, refers to sharing citizen's characteristics with their representatives, such as race, ethnicity, and gender.[156] Therefore, it is crucial to encourage Arab political participation and Arab representation in the three branches of power. It is expected to help reduce feelings of political alienation and reduce political estrangement.[157] It can increase trust between the legislature and constituencies, enhance the feeling of inclusion, and increase the legitimacy of the political system[158] which is critical for stability in representative democracies such as in Israel.

However, descriptive representation is not enough. The fourth step—and the most important one—is the influence on Israeli policy. Turning the electoral participation to an actual part of the decision-making process is still a challenge for the Arab representatives, thus maintain the feeling among Arab voters that voting is worthless. In this aspect, Arab politicians are facing a new challenge that arises from the increasing expectations from the political system to give the Arab representatives the power to lead a change in the society, while those

Arab representatives are de facto excluded from coalitions within the Knesset and from political positions within the executive branch.

Several challenges will face Arab leadership in Israel after this new level: to keep the formation of one united list while trying to work together despite the differences in their agendas; to follow the different agendas, which matters to the member-party supporters, and not to let it be a price of unity or find other ways to cooperate; to include new societal groups to this political platform, while keeping the existing; to integrate in the Israeli political map and become a non-neglected part, while breaking the ceiling of glass for an Arab MK in an Arab party as deputy of the *Knesset* speaker or chairperson of a *Knesset* committee.

NOTES

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20. Rekhess, "The Arab minority in Israel," 187–217.

21. For sources of the data, see table 1.1.

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the *Labor,* was the dominant party in the Israeli political system as it won the elections and formed the coalition and the government from 1949 to 1977. For more on *Mapai,* and the *Labor*, see, for example, Medding, Peter Y. *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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36. Gelber, "Israel's policy towards its Arab minority, 1947–1950"; Hajj Amin al-Husseini was an Arab and Palestinian nationalist and the leader of the Muslims and Arabs of Mandatory Palestine.

37. Mendales, "A house of cards."

38. Ibid.

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47. Hitman, "Israel's Arab leadership," 121–138.

48. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), also known as *Hadash*, which is an acronym from Hebrew of *HaHazit HaDemokratit LeShalom uLeShivion*. Its original name in Arabic is *al-Jabhat al-Diymuqratiat liLsalam Walmusawa*.

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51. Rekhess, "Jews and Arabs in the Israeli communist party," 121–139.

52. Al-Haj, "The impact of the Intifada on Arabs in Israel," 64–75.

53. Rabinovitch, Dani and Haula Abu Bakr. *The Upright Generation*. Jerusalem: Keter Publishers, 2002, pp. 153–54 [In Hebrew].

54. Hitman, "Israel's Arab Leadership."

55. The *Arab Democratic Party (ADP)* also known as *Mada*, which is an acronym from Hebrew of *Miflaga Demokratit Aravit*. Its original name in Arabic is *al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Arabi*.

56. Arab Movement for Change (*AMC*), also known as *Ta'al*, which is an acronym from Hebrew of *Tnu'a Aravit LeHithadshut*. Its original name in Arabic is *alArabiat Liltaghyir*.

57. The *National Democratic Assembly (NDA),* also known as Balad, which is an acronym from Hebrew of *Brit Le'umit Demokratit*. Its original name in Arabic is *al-Tajamua' al-Watani al-Diymuqrati.*

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61. Reiter and Aharoni, *The Political Life of the Israeli Arabs*.

62. United Arab List (UAL) also known as Ra'am, which is an acronym from Hebrew of *HaReshima Ha'Aravit HaMe'uhedet*. Its original name in Arabic is *aL-Qaima al-Arabiyya al-Muwahhadah.*

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76. *DFPE* website, The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

77. Ibid.

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90. *DFPE* website, agenda section—the *Joint List*.

91. Rudnitzky, "Back to the Knesset?" 683–696.

92. Aboultaif, "Druze politics in Israel," 533–555.

93. *Statement of the Commission on National Reconciliation*.

94. *The Knesset website,* section with list of current MKs: www.knesset.gov.il (accessed December 15, 2015); The *Zionist Union* was a joint list of the *Labor* and *The Movement* and thus was considered as center-left wing party.

95. We decided to include the Arab MKs in Zionist parties, who serve as trustees by focusing on the welfare of all citizens, despite their difference from Arab MKs, who serve as delegates by focusing on their constituents' demands. For more on this issue, see Akirav, "Catch-22."

96. During the term of the 18th *Knesset,* four Arab MK replaced other Jewish MK in several parties, thus achieving 13.3% Arab MK out of all, which is the second after the 2015 elections.

97. For example, see Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas Wüst. *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters*. London: Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies, 2011.

98. *The Knesset website,* section with lists of MK by *Knesset*: www.knesset. gov.il (accessed August 26, 2018); Mapam is the acronym in Hebrew of Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhedet, which is United Workers Party. It was a left-wing party in Israel that merged into Meretz in 1992.

99. *Herut,* meaning freedom in Hebrew, was established in 1948 by Menachem Begin as a successor to the Revisionist Irgun. It served as the leading right wing opposition party until 1977, when it was merged into the *Likud* that won the elections that

year. *Herut* agenda was right-wing nationalist. For more on *Herut*, see, for example, Shapiro, Yonathan. *The Road to Power: Herut Party in Israel*. SUNY Press, 1991.

    100. Mendales, "A house of cards."

    101. Galnoor, Itzhak and Dana Blander. *The Political System of Israel*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 2013, p. 937 [In Hebrew].

    102. Ibid.

    103. Coalition agreements of the 25th government led by PM Rabin. Available online: https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/government/Pages/CoalitionAgreements.aspx [In Hebrew] (accessed November 12, 2018).

    104. Coalition agreements of the 25th government.

    105. Galnoor and Blander, *The Political System of Israel*.

    106. Ibid.

    107. When voting on the disengagement plan, the new government already had a majority in the *Knesset*. This allowed all the Arab MK from *DFPE-AMC*, *UAL*, and *NDA* to choose to abstain, without leading to the disapproval of the plan.

    108. The *JL*, as previous Arab parties, decided not to cooperate with these three governmental offices: the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Ministry of Immigration, Absorption, and Diaspora Affairs. As such, they do not take part in the *Knesset* committees dealing with the same issues. These offices are seen as "Displaces [and excludes] Arab citizens," as stated by MK Odeh in: Kornbluh, Jacob. "Israel's Arab party leader ditches meeting with Jewish group in NY." *The Jewish Insider*, December 10, 2015 (Retrieved December 15, 2015). *The Jewish Insider* website. http://jewishinsider.com/5574/israels-arab-party-leader-ditches-meeting-with-jewish-group-in-ny/.

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    110. Akirav, "Catch-22."

    111. Hitman, "Israel's Arab leadership."

    112. Data based on Shapira, Assaf, Avital Fridman, and Shahaf Zamir. *Parliamentary Work Index for Israel's Political Parties*. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2018. Available online: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/24407.

    113. Decision 922: Government Activities for Economic Development in the Minority Population, 2016–2020. The 34th government, PM Benjamin Netanyahu. December 30, 2015. Available online: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/government_decision_922.

    114. Elran, Meir, Eran Yashiv, and Muhammed Abu Nasra. "The five-year plan to integrate the Arab population in Israel: A quantum leap forward?" *INSS Insight No. 792*, February 2, 2016. Available online: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-five-year-plan-to-integrate-the-arab-population-in-israel-a-quantum-leap-forward/.

    115. Shay, "Interview with MK Issawi Freij (Meretz)."

    116. The Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality, the Knesset website: https://knesset.gov.il/committees/eng/committee_eng.asp?c_id=11.

    117. The Knesset website: http://knesset.gov.il/mk/heb/DeputySpeakersCurrentforsp.asp.

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119. Shlaim, Avi. "The Likud in power: The historiography of revisionist Zionism." *Israel Studies* 1, no. 2 (1996): 278–293.

120. *The Knesset website,* section with lists of MKs by *Knesset:* www.knesset. gov.il (accessed August 26, 2018).

121. Ibid.

122. Mendales, "A house of cards."

123. The *Knesset* website, section of MKs by Knesset.

124. The *Knesset* website, section of *Knesset* members. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

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128. For example, the announcement of MK Ahmad Tibi—leader of *AMC*—during a conference in Tel-Aviv University four days prior to election day (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2015).

129. Oman, *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*.

130. Zerchia, Tzvi. "Here it begins: Herzog spoke with Kahlon—'We will try to replace Netanyahu.'" *TheMarker.com*, March 18, 2017 [In Hebrew]. Available online: https://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.3936064.

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135. State Service Commissioner. *Report on equal employment of Arabs, including Druze and Cirracassians in the state service, 2015*. Jerusalem, 2016 [In Hebrew]. Available online (accessed December 15, 2018): https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/ reports/representation2015/he/representation2015.pdf.

136. Some examples of lower than 3% Arab employees: *Ministry for Social Equality*, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, *Ministry of Finance*, *Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of the Development of the Periphery, PM office, Bank of Israel, Israel Aviation Authority, Water Authority (Mekorot), Electric Authority.*

137. The high percentage of Arab employees in the Ministry of the Interior—51.5%, is slightly misleading, because most of them are employed by the Religious Services department, in positions related to Islamic and Druze religious services where only Muslim and Druze can take the job.

138. Ministry of Education. *Opening of the 2018–2019 Academic Year—Selected Data.* Jerusalem: Economics and Budget Administration, August 2018 [In Hebrew]. Available online (accesses January 18, 2019): http://meyda.education.gov.il/files/MinhalCalcala/NetunimTashahh.pdf.

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141. Weininger, *A Look at Arab Education.*

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145. Ibid.

146. The Central Elections Committee for the 20th Knesset website: http://www.bechirot20.gov.il/election/Committees/Pages/Knest20Composition.aspx.

147. Judicial Authority website, Judges section.

148. Warren III, John L. "Holding the bench accountable: Judges qua representatives." *Washington University Jurisprudence Review* 6 (2013): 299–342.

149. For example, the letter that the Supreme Sharia Court of Appeal sent to the Israeli president to ask his support to convince MKs not to approve a bill limiting the Adhan. See Statement issued by the Supreme Sharia Court of Appeal, especially on the proposal of the Law of Adhan. The High Moslem Court of Appeal. November 28, 2016 [In Arabic].

150. The Sharia Courts official website [In Hebrew]: http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/BatiDinHashreim/Pages/default.aspx.

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152. The Druze Religious Courts official website [In Hebrew]: http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/BetDinDroziLerorim/About/Pages/Odot.aspx.

153. Ghanem and Mustafa, "The Palestinians in Israel."

154. Jamal, "The political ethos of Palestinian citizens of Israel."

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Chapter 2

Arab Identity and Political Trends in Israel

This chapter examines the political behavior of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, as far as national elections are concerned, and its relation to their identity. In the past three decades, their self-identification developed a contradiction between their civic identity—the Israeli—and their national identity—the Arab-Palestinian.[1] This complex self-identification has had a significant influence on the political behavior of the Arabs. In light of that, the Israeli elections in the past two decades highlight the discourse among Arab citizens of Israel concerning the significance of their participation in the electoral process. Moreover, a central issue in this debate is the low level of influence of the Arab representatives on the Israeli political system (see chapter 1).

Following this, the questions of Arab-Palestinian identity, vote fragmentation, representation, participation in the political system, and above all the Arab influence on the Israeli policy are some of the significant questions which were at the highlight of discourse among the Arab society in particular ever since the *October 2000 Clashes*. In this chapter, we discuss the changes in the turnout, vote fragmentation, and possible consequences on the Arab identity in Israel, following an examination of official data from the Central Election Committee.[2] This was tabulated from every polling station in all of the Arab homogenous cities, towns, and villages, which include more than 85 percent of the Arab citizens of Israel. This excludes Arabs living in mixed cities and towns with a Jewish majority.[3]

ARAB IDENTITY AND POLITICAL TRENDS
UNTIL THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel have been active in the Israeli political system since the first legislative elections in 1949, by participating in the elections and by the representation of Arab MKs.[4] However, previous scholars have already indicated that their ideological development followed by political participation trends, changed over three periods[5] which are in-line with their national identity development.

First, during the military governance period 1948–1966, Israel established its Jewish-Zionist identity. Arabs were considered as a threat to national security,[6] and therefore they were apart from the Israeli collective. As a result, following the establishment of Israel, Arab-national consciousness in Israel was relatively subdued, given the military government regime imposed in Arab-populated areas and the physical isolation from the Arab world and Palestinian society in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the refugees in other Arab countries.[7] As a result, in this period their identity was mainly characterized from a civic perspective as *Israelis*.[8] This attachment to Israel also reflects the desire to become part of regular life in the country.[9] As part of that, Arab citizens participated in the electoral process, which led to high Arab vote in the national elections even more than the general turnout, as shown in table 2.1 (relative turnout ranging between 1.14 and 1.05, except the first elections in 1949). As a result of the control of the military administration,[10] most of the Arab vote was given to the Arab satellite lists, which were affiliated with Zionist parties (see chapter 1). The education system played a significant role in this regard. The state institutions controlled and supervised the Arab education system, and used this to weaken the development of independent Arab collective identity and political leadership.[11] The segregation of the Arab school system marginalized the influence of Arab leadership on education policy, thus weakening further the Arab collective identity.[12] As a result of the Israeli policies toward the Arabs in this period, Arabs were segregated from the Israeli polity.

The second period, from 1967 to 1993, has already been characterized as symbolizing the national awakening of the Arabs in Israel, and is called the *Palestinization* process.[13] This was strongly influenced by several elements: the rise of the Palestinian national movement when in 1964 the *PLO* was established, and the leadership of Yassir Arafat made it easier to align with a cause and with a dominant leader;[14] the elimination of the military administration in 1966 that allowed free movement and relatively more freedom of speech for Arabs in Israel was another factor that contributed to the national awakening;[15] the results of the 1967 War allowed a renewed contact between Arabs within the Green Line to Arabs in the West Bank and

Table 2.1 Arab Relative Turnout in the Legislative Elections*

Year	Knesset	Arab Relative Turnout	Special Characteristics
1949	1st	0.80	Military administration
1951	2nd	1.14	Military administration (highest relative participation)
1955	3rd	1.10	Military administration
1959	4th	1.09	Military administration
1961	5th	1.05	Military administration
1965	6th	1.06	Military administration
1969	7th	1.00	First elections held after the 1967 War and after abolishing the military administration
1973	8th	1.02	
1977	9th	0.96	First national elections after the *Likud* came to power
1981	10th	0.89	
1984	11th	0.94	First elections without Arab satellite lists
1988	12th	0.95	First elections after the beginning of the *First Intifada* (1987)
1992	13th	0.89	First *Labor* party victory since 1977
1996	14th	0.97	With direct elections of the PM. First elections after the *Oslo Accords* (1993) and after the assassination of PM *Yitzhak Rabin* (1995)
1999	15th	0.96	With direct election of the PM
2001	–	–	Special elections for PM without parliamentary elections
2003	16th	0.91	First parliamentary elections after the *October 2000 Clashes*
2006	17th	0.89	First elections after the Israeli *Disengagement from Gaza Strip* (2005)
2009	18th	0.82	First elections after *Operation Cast Lead* (2008).Lowest relative participation.
2013	19th	0.83	First elections after *Operation Pillar of Defense*(2012)
2015	20th	0.88	The formation of the *Joint List*

Note: In "relative participation," the value 1 means equal to the general turnout, higher than 1 means more than the general turnout, and less than 1 means less than the general turnout.
*With some modifications, based on Bligh, Alexander. "Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote in parliamentary elections," 21–50.

Gaza Strip. However, different approaches suggest that the ethnic citizenship model dominant in Israeli political culture does not incorporate the national or cultural identity of all Israeli citizens equally, rendering Israeli patriotism among Arab citizens more questionable.[16] As a result, Arab patriotic attachment has gradually shifted from civic Israelis to Palestinian patriotism since the late 1960s.[17]

Despite that, regarding political participation, the 1970s and the 1980s are considered as the integration period of the Arabs in the Israeli political system.[18] The main reason was the increasing amount of Arabs voting directly to Zionist parties, mainly to the *Labor* that included for the first time Arab candidates in its list,[19] while the Arab satellite lists were dissolved and had disappeared from the Israeli political map. From the other hand, in general, fewer Arabs participated in the national elections, and for the first time less than the general turnout (relative turnout dropped to less than the general turnout since 1977, and since then ranged between 0.89 and 0.95). Therefore, the second period is considered a more integrative period of Arabs within the Israeli polity.

During the third period, since the *Oslo Accords*, the national identity dilemma of the Arabs in Israel had increased. Following the first Intifada in the late 1980s, they remained at the margins of both the Palestinian society and the Israeli society.[20] As a result, a new identity had been formulated: Arab-Palestinians on the one hand and Israelis on the other. This led to defining this period as the "*Localization of the National Struggle*,"[21] concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its implications on the Arab citizens of Israel. New Arab parties were established, while fewer Arabs voted to Zionist parties (see chapter 1).

Regarding participation, until 1999 the Arab turnout increased given their expectations from the *Oslo Accords*. It was once again very close to the national average (0.96–0.97). In this sense, the period until the late 1990s continued the trend of integration of Arabs within the Israeli polity.

These external and internal aspects developed a contradiction between the civic identity—the Israeli—and the national identity—the Arab-Palestinian. However, recent studies refer to the Arab-Palestinians identity in Israel as a multidimensional identity.[22]

First part of their identiy, the civic identity, Israelis, is a formal and legal definition. The legal system is a component of the civic identity, as Arab citizens pay taxes in Israel, they have Israeli identification cards, they participate in local and national elections, they benefit from the welfare state advantages, and more. Arab society is also part of the daily life of Israel. Such as in sports, Arab teams and Arab players play in the Israeli leagues and competitions. For example in recent years, Sakhnin, a town in the Galilee, has a soccer team playing in the first Israeli Premier League—"Ligat ha-'Al." Bnei Sakhnin FC won the Israeli state cup in 2004.[23] Arab players are also invited to represent the Israeli national team. For example, as of 2018, there were six Arab players in the Israeli national soccer team (out of 23 players): Ayid Habshi, Beram Kayal, Dia Saba, Taleb Tawatha, Mahmoud Kandil, and Moanes Dabour.[24]

Second part of their identity, the national identity, Arabs and Palestinians: Arab citizens in Israel consider themselves as part of the bigger Arab society in the world; they have the same language, similar traditions, and shared history. To continue the example of sports, Bnei Sakhnin FC managers, with the help of local Arab-Palestinian leaders in Israel, have succeeded to convince Qatari leaders to contribute millions of dollars to the team on the name of Arab mutual support.[25] For that, the name of the Bnei Sakhnin FC stadium is "*Doha*," named after the capital of Qatar. The other side is the belonging to the Palestinian nation as they share unique traditions, same history on this land, and shared concerns regarding the future.

Third part of their identity, the religious identity: the Arab society in Israel includes Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Every group holds religion as part of its identity.[26] Fourth part, the regional identity: some of the Arabs in Israel differ themselves from others in the region of living, such as the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev. Even within a specific religion, there are differentiations between regions; for example, the Druze of Galilee, the Druze of Mount Carmel, and the Druze of the Golan Heights.[27]

The self-identification of the Arab-Palestinians in Israel has been recently well-researched. Results from recent surveys of the self-identification of the Arabs in Israel give the following answers:[28] Israeli-Palestinian or Palestinian in Israel (42.1%), Arab, Arab-Israeli, or Israeli (36.6%), Palestinian or Arab-Palestinian (17.5%). It is noted that the share of the Israeli part of identity is in decline since such surveys have been conducted in the 1970s.[29]

Another essential aspect of self-identification is the differences among groups within the Arab-Palestinian society. Recent studies found that conversely to other Arabs in Israel, the Druze self-identification, from the religious aspect, was found as the dominant, followed by the Israeli and Arab identities, with some differences between interviewees.[30] Moreover, the Palestinian identity was not found as part of the Druze self-identification. Several scholars have already debated that this is a product of a Druze decision to distinguish themselves from the other Arabs in Israel. While other scholars debated that this is a result of the Israeli policy—"Divide and conquer."[31]

Several scholars have previously examined all these changes in the Arab-Palestinian political trends and self-identification, mainly separately without examining the relations between the two. However, the question remains: whether these political trends and sense of identity continued since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Is it a new period in the development of the Arab identity in Israel, or a continuation of the third period since the early 1990s?

THE 2015 ELECTION FOR THE 20TH
KNESSET: A MILESTONE?

Changes toward the 2015 Elections

Recent studies confirmed that in recent elections the voting patterns of the Israeli Arabs is strongly indicative of a marginalization process, indicating that national elections are becoming less significant for them.[32] This process is not present in the local elections, as the participation in Arab local elections is relatively far higher than the general turnout,[33] mainly due to the kinship-based character of the elections[34] and the importance of these elections in the perspective of the Arabs themselves compared to the national elections (see chapter 3).

As described in chapter 1, the results of the 2013 elections led to three parties passing the threshold and entered the *Knesset* to represent the Arab citizens of Israel. These parties were *The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality* (DFPE); *the United Arab List* (UAL); and *the National Democratic Assembly* (NDA). This fragmentation of the Arab political map, along with the decreased turnout among Arabs, was an increasing challenge for the Arab parties. The lower turnout was derived from several factors such as the shift in the Arab society from political to social activity and participation .[35] It was also derived from the growing importance of their Palestinian side of identity, which led to growing attention to the Israeli policies toward the Palestinians in the West Bank and more specifically in Gaza Strip. For that, conversely to the increase in the Arab turnout during the 1990s, since the *October 2000 Clashes* and the *Second Intifada*, it decreased once again due to an ideological boycott of the elections.[36] Following *Operation Cast Lead* and *Operation Pillar of Defense* and their influence on the Israeli Arabs' identity, the gap widened between Arab turnouts compared to the general turnout since 2009 (relative turnout ranging between 0.91 and 0.83, until 2013). Also, the pattern of more Arabs voting to Arab parties continued while fewer Arabs are voting for Zionist parties (see chapter 1). However, scholars still regard the period since the 1990s as a one period in terms of the self-identity and political behavior of Arab-Palestinians.

These challenges along with the new threshold of 3.25 percent helped to bring the Arab parties to consolidate into one list of candidates: the *Joint List* (JL) (see chapter 1).

Democratic Participation

As mentioned in table 2.1, Arab participation in the electoral process of the 2009 elections has significantly decreased to reach the lowest relative

participation ever (0.82, except the 1949 elections). In the 2013 elections, and moreover in the 2015 elections the Arab turnout had increased after four consecutive campaigns of decrease (from 1999 to 2009), as shown in figure 2.1. The 2013 elections had changed the pattern when the Arab turnout increased once again to its level as it was in 2006. However, the general turnout also has been increasing since the 2009 elections. Thus, when compared to the general turnout it stayed at about the same percentage (relative turnout increased only from 0.82 to 0.83). In this concern, the 2015 elections seem to be different. The formation of the *JL* was used in the campaign to bring more Arabs to the ballots. The data suggest that their efforts were successful, as even though the general turnout also increased, the relative Arab turnout still increased more (from 0.83 to 0.88).

Another point of view of the Arab turnout is when compared relatively to the Arab proportion of the general population and proportion of eligible voters. As shown in figure 2.2, the Arab proportion of the general population has only increased slightly over the past 15 years and stayed around the 20 percent of the population (increased from 19% in 2000 to 20.7% in 2015). From the other hand, the Arab proportion of eligible voters has been increasing during the same period in a more distinct way (from 11% in 2000 to 15% in 2015) due to higher percentage of youth in the Arab society.[37,38]

Vote Fragmentation

As mentioned in chapter 1, previous studies suggested that the trends of vote fragmentation among Arabs have changed dramatically over the years. In


Figure 2.1   Arab Turnout and General Turnout by *Knesset*. *Source*: Based on table 1.1.

Figure 2.2   Arab Turnout and Arab Votes to Zionist or Arab Parties, by *Knesset*. *Source*: Based on table 1.1.

most election cycles and until 1992, most of the Arab votes were given to Zionist parties, either directly or to the Arab satellite lists which were affiliated with Zionist parties (until they were abolished in the early 1980s). As shown in figure 2.2, in these years, Arab support to Zionist parties ranged from as high as 97.5 percent in 1961 to as low as 41.6 percent in 1988. Also here, it is worth noting the difference between the military administration period with an average of 84.8 percent Arab vote to Zionist parties and then decreases during the period from 1969 to 1992 when an average of 55.1 percent Arab vote to Zionist parties.

Since the 1992 elections (13th *Knesset*) a steady decrease was noticed, each election cycle, in the amount of Arabs voting to Zionist parties that reached a low of only 18.1 percent in 2009. The formation of the *JL* in 2015 had helped continue this pattern when the Arab vote for Zionist parties was the lowest ever, 16.8 percent. The average between 1992 and 2015 was 26.5 percent, a decrease of 58.3 percent on average compared to the military administration period, or a decrease of 28.6 percent on average compared to the period 1967–1992.

Conversely to previous elections, most of the Arab votes in the 2015 elections were given to one party, the *JL*. Other Arab parties that challenged this Arab unity were primarily criticized and ignored in the ballots (*The Arab List* received only 2,760 Arab votes, and *The hope for change* received 1,147 Arab votes, which are together less than 1 percent of the Arab votes in 2015). As shown in figure 2.3, the *JL* received 81.7 percent of the Arab votes while

only 16.6 percent of the votes were given to Zionist parties. Almost half of these votes were given to left-wing/left-center parties, that is the *Zionist Union* (4.8%) and *Meretz* (2.6%). Less amount of votes were given to right-wing/religious parties (5.8%), or other center parties (3.4%).

However, examining the results per subsector within the Arab-Palestinian society, as shown in table 2.2 reveals different patterns. The percentage of voters to Zionist parties was higher among Bedouins (from the north; 21%), Christians (26%), Circassians (85%), and Druze (80%). When excluding these subsectors, the *JL* received 90.5 percent of the Arab-Muslim voters (without the Bedouins), and only 9 percent went to Zionist parties. The majority of which went to left-wing/left-center Zionist parties. An unconsidered amount of Arab-Muslim voters supported other riligious/right-wing parties. To better understand this trend, we calculated the percentage of the voters for the *JL* in every locality.[39] In all of the Arab-Muslim localities, excluding the Bedouins, the *JL* received more than 75 percent of the votes. All the localities in which the *JL* received less than 75 percent were with a majority of Bedouins, Circassians, Christians, Druze, or were mixed cities or towns with Arab-Muslims majority but included Christians and/or Druze, such as *Shefa'Amr, Abu-Snan,* and *Rameh.*

These significant findings suggest that the idea behind the *JL*—an Arab unity and excluding Zionist parties—became the dominant idea in all the Arab-Muslim localities and among most Christians in Israel. At the same time,

Figure 2.3   Breakdown of Arab Vote by Parties (2015). *Source*: The author's calculations based on the Israeli Central Elections Committee website, the 2015 results section: https://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/heb/home.aspx. Retrieved: August 2015 [In Hebrew].

Table 2.2   Arab Vote by Subsector (2015)*

Category (region)	Localities	Turnout (%)	Arab Vote to the Joint List (%)	Arab Vote to Zionist Parties (%)	Arab Vote to Other Parties[a] (%)
Bedouins (north)	24	56	74	21	4
Bedouins (south)	35	47	86	10	3
Alawites[b]	1	47	3	96	1
Muslims of the "Triangle"	18	69	93	5	1
Muslims of Jerusalem area	4	61	81	16	3
All other Arab-Muslim localities[c]	40	69	89	10	1
Total: Arab-Muslims	122	64	89	9	2
Ciraccasians[d]	2	50	12	85	3
Christians[e]	6	66	72	26	1
Druze (without the Golan Heights)[f]	12	56	18	80	2
Druze of the Golan Heights[g]	3	14	2	93	5
Total—all	145	64	81.7	16.6	1.7

Notes: [a]"Other" Arab votes include invalid votes and votes given to the other Arab parties, *The Arab List* and *The Hope for change*, which neither passed the threshold; [b]the only Alawites in Israel live in *Ghajar;* [c]all the localities in Northern Israel with Muslim majority, excluding the Alawites and the Bedouins; [d]most of the Circassians in Israel live in two homogenous localities: *Kfar Kama* and *Rehaniya*. Ciraccasians are Muslims, but they don't consider themselves as Arabs; [e]Christian localities include those with a majority of Christians (more than 50% of the population): *Fassuta* (99%), *Mi'ilya* (99%), *Eilabun* (71%), *Jish* (64%), *Kafr Yasif* (52%), and *Rameh* (50%). About 20,000 Christians live in these towns and villages, which is only 12 percent of the total Christians in Israel. The others live in an urban-based community within mixed cities with Jews, Muslims, or Druze; 40 percent of them live in large cities, such as *Nazareth, Haifa, Jerusalem, Shefa'Amr, Ibilin,* and *Upper Nazareth;* [f]The vast majority of the Druze in Israel lives in these 12 villages with the Druze majority (more than 50%). The rest of the Druze mainly live in three mixed cities with Muslims and Christians (*Shefa'Amr, Abu-Snan, and Rameh*); [g]There are four Druze villages in the Golan Heights, which includes only Druze residents. Most of them did not obtain Israeli citizenship; hence there are only about 1,000 eligible voters in 3 out of the 4 villages: *Majdal Shams, Buqa'ta*, and *Masa'de*. In *Ein Qiniyye* there was no election station.
*The author's calculations based on The Israeli Central Elections Committee website, the 2015 results section: https://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/heb/home.aspx. Retrieved August 2015 [In Hebrew].

the other subsector groups are distinguishing themselves from this collective; however, among Druze and Circassians, this distinction is more significant.

ELIGIBLE VOTERS AND REPRESENTATION

Another examination was conducted on the difference between the percentage of Arab population, 21 percent; the percentage of eligible voters,

15 percent; and representation, 10 percent. First, the percentage of eligible Arab voters out of all eligible Israeli voters was 15 percent in 2013.[40] This difference of about 6 percent, compared to the population, is explained by excluding the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem who are not citizens. Thus they are entitled to vote in municipal elections but not entitled to vote in national elections. It also excludes the Druze inhabitants in the Golan Heights, whom most of them refuse to become Israeli citizens and thus are not entitled to vote in national elections. The inclusion of the potential 200,000 Arab voters of East Jerusalem and the inclusion of potential 12,000 Arab voters of the Golan Heights would have increased the total percentage out of all voters from 15 percent to 17.3 percent. A similar problem of the difference between the portion of inhabitants and eligible citizens/voters regarding an ethnic minority was noted in some other countries with a national majority and ethnic minority or minorities (e.g., Kurds in Turkey, Russians in Estonia, and Chinese in Malaysia). This in fact questions the extent to what these countries, including Israel, are democratic especially toward minorities' rights.[41]

Moreover, the difference is explained by the higher percentage of youth in the Arab society under 18 years, the minimum age to become eligible to vote (45%) compared to the Jewish society (34%). It explains the remaining gap of 3.3 percent. However, this is expected to be narrowed in the upcoming years, given that no external societal change is expected.[42] These more Arab youth citizens will eventually become eligible to vote, at the age of 18, then this will increase the percentage of eligible Arab voters (expected to become 17.6% by 2033).

Given that the Arab percentage out of all voters in 2013 was 15 percent, how do we explain the lower percentage of representation in the Knesset, 10 percent? It is suggested that there is an internal problem within Arab society. As shown in this chapter, there is a lower turnout among Arabs compared with the Jewish society. As of the 2013 elections, the Arab turnout is less by 11.3 percent compared with the general turnout. According to the 2013 elections results, a seat was given to a party for every 29,366 votes.[43] As such, if this 11.3 percent gap was filled, it could have resulted in 2–3 seats more to the Arab representation. However, even if we hypothetical add this to the amount mentioned above of seats, 12, we will then receive a representation of 12.5 percent, which is still shorter than the 15 percent.

The explanation of the gap of more than 1.5 percent lays in the consequences of the fragmentation of the Arab political map. Some Arab votes are given to parties that did not pass the threshold; the decision of the *UAL* not to have surplus votes agreement with another party leads to the wasting of such surplus. In 2013 the *DFPE* had a surplus agreement with the *NDA*, thus leaving the *UAL* the only option of having such agreement with one of the Zionist parties, which the *UAL* refused to do. In 2013 the *UAL* had a surplus of 20,986 votes and was missing more 8,380 votes to receive another seat.

However, the fragmentation of the Arab political map is not explained only in the Arab parties. Still, a percentage of the Arab votes were given to Zionist parties (22.8% in 2013) and not to Arab parties. These are calculated as about 89,500 votes, which are equal to three seats in the *Knesset*. However, this only resulted in two MKs in Zionist parties. This is an addition to the Arab underrepresentation.

However, when compared to the percentage of eligible Arab voters, the least difference was recorded in 1996 (−0.3%) and 1999 (−0.2%); the high turnout mainly explains this in these years (77.3% and 75.3%, respectively) and almost no difference in turnout compared to overall turnout (−2% and −3.5%, respectively). Another explanation for the relatively high representation in 1996 and 1999 is the direct vote in these years to candidates for the position of PM (see chapter 1).[44]

ARAB IDENTITY AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN ISRAEL: CONCLUSION

Previous studies described the political and ideological development of the Arabs, followed by political trends, over three periods which are in-line with their national identity development. It was suggested that the years 1948 to 1966 as the first period of self-identification as Israelis, and characterized by controlled political participation by the military administration; 1967 to 1993 as the second period of self-identification as Palestinians, but characterized as the integration period of the Arabs in the Israeli political system; in the third period, since 1993, the self-identification shifted to Arab-Palestinians while contradicting with the Israeli part of identity.

Following the findings of this chapter, it is suggested to redesign the third period. It should include two subperiods that are different in some ways: from 1992 to 1999 as a first subperiod and then a second subperiod from 2000 on. There are some shared characteristics for the two parts of the same third period. In both subperiods, the clash is underway between the two competing parts of identity—being Arab-Palestinians and at the same time being Israeli. Each of the two subperiods, however, reflects a different track in dealing with this contradiction. Some political trends continued during the two subperiods that distinguish them from previous periods, such as the increase in Arab representation in the *Knesset*, increase of Arab vote to Arab parties, and Arab representation that reached new levels with increased appointees in the executive and the judicial branches (see chapter 1).

First subperiod is during the years of the 1990s that are characterized by the hope among Israeli Arabs of being an integral part of Israel and its future. It highlights the desire to become more integrated into the Israeli polity

while being invited to integrate by Jewish Israelis and their representatives in the government. During this period Arabs in Israel were trying to examine whether both identities of being Israeli and Palestinian can coexist with each other.

It is evident in many of the factors that were presented in this chapter as well as in chapter 1, that during most of the 1990s more Arabs felt as being Israeli (as high as 60%)[45]; Arab turnout increased for the first time after many years of decrease since the late 1960s. It increased once again to 77.3 percent and 75.2 percent in 1996 and 1999, respectively; Arab representation in the *Knesset* increased from the average of 5 percent until the late 1980s to a new level—by 1999 it reached 10.8 percent; Arab representatives were involved in the executive branch during the Rabin government and the following Peres government (1992–1996) more than any other previous time. They were also hoping for similar involvement in the Barak government (1999–2001). There were more Arabs, from Zionist parties, appointed as deputy ministers than in any given government (reached 10% out of all deputy ministers and ministers). Some MKs of Arab parties were for the first time aligned with the coalition. Although not part of the government, they helped to approve the *Oslo Accords* and the five-year plan to improve the situation of Arabs in Israel; Also the representation in the judicial system was increased to a new level, when for the first time an Arab justice was appointed to the Supreme court in 1999 and the overall percentage of Arab judges in the judicial system increased in the 1990s (from 2% to 5%).

The first subperiod ended with the disappointment from the results of the *Oslo Accords*, the *October 2000 Clashes*, and the beginning of the *Second Intifada* in 2001. Hence, the second subperiod started in 2000, when Arabs become more sympathetic with the Palestinian cause, and thus feeling less Israelis as it emerges from recent public opinion surveys conducted in the past decade (decrease from 60% to as low as 40% after 2000).[46] This process continued later following *Operation Cast Lead* in 2008, and *Operation Pillar of Defense* in 2012. As opposed to the first subperiod, since 2000 Arab turnout has been decreasing drastically until 2013 (as low as 53.4% in 2009) and more Arabs are voting to Arab parties. During this period more Arabs in Israel are tending to believe that both identities of being Israeli and Palestinian cannot coexist with one another, because of the push back from the Jewish Israelis who do not accept the fact that Arabs in Israel define themselves also as Palestinians and sympathise with the Palestinians in the West-Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus this second subperiod highlights the segregation of Arabs as a society within the Israeli polity.

It is not surprising that the *Arab vision Documents* were published during the second subperiod,[47] to reflect the new perspective in political trends and more importantly in self-identification.[48] These documents have highlighted

the shift among Arabs in Israel to the "indigenous" discourse, in which Arabs are demanding to be recognized officially as the indigenous people of Palestine, and demanding collective national rights within the Israeli polity, in addition to equal individual rights.

In this sense, the 2015 elections and the formation of the *JL* are a milestone in the political participation of the Arabs of Israel and is a continuation of the progress of their self-identification in the third period, as part of the Israeli polity, but as a distinct group that is seeking more autonomous status from within.

The formation of the *JL* is another milestone in reformulation the Arab society in Israel as a united society with clear leadership and institutions. This is noted in the higher turnout achieved, eliminating the waste of votes due to non-fragmentation for the first time during the 2015 elections, and the low vote for Zionist parties. All these political patterns helped to increase the Arab representation in the *Knesset*. It also helped to overcome the trend of boycotting the Israeli national elections among Arabs, which may have led to disengagement of significant parts of the Arab society from the Israeli society. In other words, while the 2015 elections and the *JL* symbolize the continuation of the self-identification as Arab-Palestinians, their attempt to stay in the Israeli political map helps to keep their Israeli side of identity. This keeps, to some extent, the Arabs as part of the Israeli society, or leastways as part of the Israeli political system.

Their struggle to distinguish themselves from the hegemonic Jewish majority has been the character of their political patterns in the past three decades, since the *Oslo Accords*; however, it has reached a milestone by forming a unique political platform that most of the Israeli Arabs had felt committed to it. Thus, the internal struggle of the Arabs between integrating into vs. segregating from Israel has not yet been decided. They still see themselves as Arab-Palestinians, as well as Israelis (although less than it was in the 1990s) and still take part in the Israeli political system, however in a more segregated way (segregated party and less vote to Zionist parties).

However, not all subsectors are part of this consensus. This is the case mainly for the Druze and Circassians. The most common characteristic of these subsectors is their higher tendency to integrate into the Israeli society compared to the other Arabs. As part of this, a significant role is the service in the IDF which is compulsory for Druze and Circassians since 1956 an 1957 respectively.[49] The findings of this research show that these subsectors are different in their political trends from the other Arabs, such as in lower turnout among Circassians (50%) and Druze (56%).

The findings were more distinct among the Druze when compared to Muslims or Christians. The Druze differ not only in religious terms but also in political trends from the other Arabs in Israel, both Muslims and Christians.

A primary characteristic is the Druze self-identification. Among Druze, their religious identification was found as the dominant,[50] while the Palestinian identity was not found as part of their self-identification, conversely to the self-identification of the other Arabs in Israel.[51]

Following this argument, it is not surprising that in recent elections the Druze vote fragmentation was a negative mirror of the Arab vote. Most of the Druze vote was given to Zionist parties (more than 80% in 2015). Moreover, a high proportion (28%) of what we found of the Druze vote given to the *JL* in 2015 came from the town of a Druze candidate—*Yarka*—situated in the 13th position of the *JL*.[52] It follows a trend in many Arab localities in Israel to vote for the "Native candidate" regardless of his/her political agenda or party affiliation.[53] Hence, the conclusion is that the actual support of Druze citizens in the *JL* is lower than is presented in our data, while the Druze support of Zionist parties is higher than previously reported.[54]

Thus, especially for the Druze, it is suggested that the 2015 elections are a milestone in political participation and their self-identification. Given that the *JL* was formulated in the name of the Arab unity in Israel, it is self-evident that when the *JL* didn't succeed in increasing the Druze vote to Arab parties (received only 18% of the Druze vote), this is a clear statement of the Druze themselves that they are not taking part of Arab politics. This is an added significance to our conclusion regarding the Druze self-identification and political trends, which are getting more and more separated from the Arab society in Israel.

The recent developments in summer 2018 following the approval of the nation-state basic law[55] reaffirms the conclusions regarding the segregation of the Druze from the Arab society in Israel in terms of self-identification and political trends and integrating them more in the Israeli society compared to other Arabs in Israel.

The nation-state basic-law, which was approved by the *Knesset* in July 2018, reaffirms the difinition of Israel as the "State of the Jewish People". It highlights its Jewish symbols and purpose to care for Jews while ignoring the democratic character of Israel and ignoring its ethnic minorities. In response, many Israelis—Jewish and non-Jewish alike—protested the new legislation, however, the most high profile protests were held in August. One was a protest led by Druze and the other one led by the Arab leadership in Israel, without the Druze.

The Druze were the most vocal in their outcry to protest the new legislation, because the new law, as they see it, did not include them as part of the "Israeli nation."[56] Compared to other Arabs, the Druze felt more "Israelis," due to the positive peace that was achieved with them.[57] Therefore, they felt the need to fight against the new legislation more than others who did not feel as such. Even in the protest itself, the Druze saw themselves as part of the

Israeli collective and did not see themselves as part of the Arab collective; the Druze protest did use Israeli symbols such as the flag and anthem, included a list of Jewish speakers who are veterans of security agencies, IDF, and the public sector. All these were absent in the other protest led by the Arab leadership. Moreover, the protest that was organized by the Druze gained much attention and support from the Jewish Israelis and Hebrew media,[58] conversely to the protest that was led by the other Arabs.

NOTES

1. Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs in Israel," 175–193.

2. The Israeli Central Elections Committee website, the 2015 results section: https://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/heb/home.aspx. Retrieved: August 2015 [In Hebrew].

3. All the other 15 percent of Arab citizens live in mixed cities or towns with Jewish majority, such as *Haifa*, *Lud*, *Tel Aviv-Jafa*, *Ramla*, *Acre*, and Upper-*Nazareth*. Based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel (1966 to 2014) [In Hebrew].

4. Peled, "Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship," 432–443.

5. Rekhess, "The evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian national minority in Israel," 1–28.

6. Gelber, "Israel's policy towards its Arab minority, 1947–1950," 51–81.

7. Yiftachel, "Between nation and state," 285–307.

8. Rekhess, "The evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian national minority in Israel," 1–28.

9. Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs."

10. Gelber, "Israel's policy towards its Arab minority."

11. Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People*.

12. Agbaria, Ayman K. "The 'right' education in Israel: Segregation, religious ethno nationalism, and depoliticized professionalism." *Critical Studies in Education* 59, no. 1 (2018): 18–34.

13. Rekhess, "The evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian national minority in Israel," 1–28.

14. Jamal, "On the morality of Arab collective rights in Israel," 65–88.

15. Horowitz and Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia*, 41–43.

16. Jamal, "On the morality," 65–88.

17. Ibid.

18. Rekhess, Elie. *The Arab Minority in Israel: Between Communism and Arab Nationalism; 1965–1991*. Tel Aviv: Hakibutz HaMeuhad, 1993 [In Hebrew].

19. Ben-Dor, "The military in the politics of integration and innovation," 339–369.

20. Al-Haj, "The impact of the Intifada on Arabs in Israel," 64–75.

21. Rekhess, Elie. "The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the national struggle." *Israel Studies* 7, no. 3 (2002): 1–44.

22. Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs."

23. Sugden, John. "Teaching and playing sport for conflict resolution and co-existence in Israel." *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 41, no. 2 (2006): 221–240.

24. The Israel Football Association website [In Hebrew]. http://football.org.il/national-team/?itemid=%7BB5274482-A7A7-450D-8E02-E5AC51A46973%7D&national_team_id=3. Retrieved: September 28, 2018.

25. Bernstein, Alina and Lea Mandelzis. "Bnei Sakhnin through the documentary looking glass: Telling the story of Arab football in a Jewish state." *Sport in Society* 12, no. 8 (2009): 1054–1064.

26. Halabi, "Invention of a nation," 267–281.

27. See, for example, the relation of language and identity: Isleem, Martin. "Druze linguistic landscape in Israel: Indexicality of new ethnolinguistic identity boundaries." *International Journal of Multilingualism* 12, no. 1 (2015): 13–30.

28. Smooha, Sammy. *Still Playing by the Rules Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2012 Findings and Conclusions*. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2013

29. Ibid.

30. Halabi, "Invention of a nation," 267–281.

31. For more on this, see Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs"; Firro, "Reshaping Druze particularism in Israel," 40–53; Halabi, "Invention of a nation," 267–281; Kaufman, "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation," 53–82; Nisan, "The Druze in Israel," 575–596; Saba-Sa'di and Sa'di, "State power and the role of education in the constitution of natives' subjectivities," 817–835; Aboultaif, "Druze politics in Israel," 533–555.

32. Bligh, Alexander. "Political trends in the Israeli Arab population and its vote in parliamentary elections," 21–50.

33. Halabi, Yakub. "Democracy, clan politics and weak governance: The case of the Arab municipalities in Israel." *Israel Studies* 19, no. 1 (2014): 98–125; Zeedan, Rami, Eran Vigoda-Gadot, and Yossi Ben-Artzi. "Causes of (and solutions for?) financial crises in local governments insights from local Arab authorities in Israel." *Administration & Society* (2014): DOI: 0095399714556501.

34. Zeedan, Rami. "Predicting the vote in kinship-based municipal elections: The case of Arab cities in Israel." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 38, no. 1 (2018): 87–102.

35. Jamal, "Sovereignty and Leadership."

36. Haider, Aziz. "The boycott of the elections among the Arab society: Perspective of a decade (1996–2006)." In: E. Rekhess (ed.), *The Arab minority in Israel and the 17th Knesset elections*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Konrad Adenaur Foundation for Jewish-Arab Co-operation, 2007, pp. 89–92 [In Hebrew].

37. The website of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), population section: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Israel. Website: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader. Retrieved: August 2015 [In Hebrew].

38. The website of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

39. The term "localities" refers to cities, towns, and villages, some of which don't have a separated local government, but either are part of a regional council or are not recognized as an independent local government by the central government. At any case, in each locality there were official ballots.

40. The website of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics; In the 2013 elections, there were 81 percent Jews, 15 percent Arabs, and 4 percent others (non-Arab Christians, and citizens with no religion record); the website of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), population section: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Israel. Website: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader. Retrieved: August 2015 [In Hebrew].

41. For more on this debate regarding Israel as a democracy versus "Ethnic democracy" versus "Ethnocracy" see, for example, Ghanem, A. As'ad, Nadim N. Rouhana, and Oren Yiftachel. ""Questioning" ethnic democracy": A response to Sammy Smooha." *Israel Studies* 3, no. 2 (1998): 253–267; Yiftachel, "Between nation and state"; Smooha, "Minority status in an ethnic democracy," 389–413; Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic democracy: Israel as an archetype." *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (1997): 198–241; Smooha, Sammy. "The model of ethnic democracy: Response to Danel." *The Journal of Israeli History* 28, no. 1 (2009): 55–62.

42. Such a change occurred in fact in the 1990s when about 1 million Jewish immigrants came to Israel from former Soviet Union countries. Then it resulted in reducing the percentage of Arabs in the Israeli society and the percentage of eligible Arab voters from 14.3 percent in 1988 to 10.3 percent in 1996.

43. The 2013 Israeli Central Elections Committee website: http://www.bechirot2 0.gov.il/election/Pages/HomePage.aspx.

44. Direct elections to the position of PM in Israel were conducted only three times: in 1996 and 1999 with legislative elections, and in 2001 without legislative elections. In the 2001 elections, many Arabs decided to boycott the elections following the *October 2000 Clashes*, which led to an Arab turnout of 18 percent.

45. Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules*.

46. Ibid.

47. The *Arab Vision Documents* refer to "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel"; "The Democratic Constitution"; "Equal Constitution for All"; "Haifa Statement." For more details, see chapter 1.

48. Jamal, "The political ethos of Palestinian citizens of Israel," 3–28.

49. For more details on the minorities' service in the IDF, see Zeedan, *Battalion of Arab- The History of the Minorities' Unit in the IDF from 1948 to 1956*; Zeedan, "The role of military service"; Geller, Randall S. *Minorities in the Israeli Military, 1948–58*. Lexington Books, 2017.

50. Halabi, "Invention of a nation," 267–281.

51. Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs," 175–193.

52. A high proportion (28%) of what we found of the Druze vote given to the *JL* came from the town of a Druze candidate—*Yarka*—situated in the 13th position of the *JL.*

53. Cohen, Ra'anan. *Strangers in Their Homeland: A Critical Study of Israel's Arab Citizens*. ISBS, 2009.

54. Moreover, most of the remaining votes of the Druze given to the *JL* (54%) came from three mixed localities shared with Muslims and/or Christians- *Mghar*, *Isfiya*, and *Peqi'in*. In fact, these localities have the least majority of Druze.

55. "Basic Law: Israel—the nation state of the Jewish people" (p/ 1989/20). Downloaded from: www.knesset.gov.il, approved laws section.

56. Personal encounter with protesters during the event on August 4, 2018.

57. Zeedan, "The role of military service."

58. Rasgon, Adam. "Druze revolt: Why a tiny, loyal community is so infuriated by nation-state law." *The Times of Israel*, August 8, 2018.

Crisis in Arab-Palestinian Municipalities in Israel

The legal status of the local governance in Israel has been debated since the 1st *Knesset*.[1] However, it was decided to keep the legal basis of local governments on the British Mandatory Palestine legislation, mainly the Municipalities Ordinance (1934) and the Municipal Councils Ordinance (1941).[2] Both laws were amendments of the Ottoman *Wilayahs* law (1864) and the Ottoman Municipalities law (1877). In the 1950s and the 1960s, no significant changes were made.[3] The two British Ordinances were approved by the *Knesset* as official Israeli laws, in 1964 and 1965, respectively. In the 1970s, it was decided to change the mayoral elections to direct elections which were first implemented in 1978.

Conversely to the legal status, which has not changed dramatically over the years, an extraordinary change occurred in the financial management of the municipalities in Israel.[4] The Zanbar Committee[5] was appointed in 1976 to examine the sources of income of the municipalities. It suggested, among other issues, that the central government will pay the municipalities to deliver to their residents' a "package of services." This trend was strengthened until the beginning of the 1980s when the external income became higher than the local income.[6] It was in-line with global trends of decentralization, however without allocating enough budgets to support it.[7] For that, in many countries, the relationship between the central government and the municipalities range between total dependency and full independence, while it varies in many characteristics such as the level of fragmentation of the municipalities, level of functional decentralization, the degree of political autonomy, financing methods, and the degree of local democracy, to name few.[8]

Globally, the role and responsibilities of local governments vary widely.[9] Local governments in Israel are responsible for these services: education, culture, sports, social welfare, transportation, health, security and some

emergency services, construction and development, sanitation and cleaning, business licensing, water supply and sewage, and management of the local authority as an institution.[10] Israeli local governments' tasks were divided into two categories: local services, such as sanitation and cleaning, construction and development; and government services such as education and welfare. Thus, the central government in Israel considers the local government as an agent to carry out activities and for providing the necessary services to residents.[11]

As already explained in the introduction, most of the Arab-Palestinians in Israel live in Arab-majority localities. Thus, when aiming to give a comprehensive outlook on the Arab politics within the Israeli polity, we must examine in depth the local political history of the Arabs in Israel. This will be the focus of this chapter.

Moreover, the municipality is the lowest tier of administration within a given state and directly provides significant services to citizens on behalf of the executive branch. Therefore, the central government's policies are reflected in municipalities. As an ethnic minority in the "Jewish and Democratic" State, Arabs has been affected by the government policies. These cities, towns, and villages have been experiencing a long-term crisis. The Arab leaders accuse the central government of discriminating against their local municipalities and point at the government as the cause of the crisis.[12] The central government, however, points at the local Arab leaders as the cause of the crisis because of corruption or for adopting inappropriate local management policies.[13]

This chapter presents the Arab local governance from its beginning, through the political process, and the ongoing crisis of the 2000s, its sources and potential solutions. It will provide answers to these questions: How did the Arab local self-governments develop in Israel? What are the sociodemographic characters of the Arab localities in Israel? Has it changed over time? When do these Arab localities hold elections and how are those elections characterized? In the last part of this chapter it will answer these questions: How was the financial management of Arab localities in Israel in different periods? How was the central government budgets distributed to Arab localities over time? What is the actual financial situation of Arab localities? Finally, what are the reasons for the financial crisis in those Arab localities?

To answer these questions, an extensive examination was conducted on official data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of the Interior, the *Knesset* website, media outlets, scholarly publications, and other primary sources. The examination included all 76 local Arab governments that existed in "proper Israel" between 1970 and 2011, see appendix 1.[14] The last part of the chapter includes a statistical analysis to determine the sources of the financial crisis.

RECOGNITION OF ARAB MUNICIPALITIES IN ISRAEL

In conjunction with the Ottoman Municipalities law (1877), Palestine included 22 recognized cities.[15] The government of the British Mandate over Palestine approved only a few more Arab local councils. By the end of the British Mandate, there were only 53 Arab localities with a recognized municipality out of 887 Arab localities in Palestine. *Mukhtars* were responsible for the remaining localitie*s*.[16] In Jewish localities, the British recognized eight localities as local councils, while other localities remained as unrecognized as the same as Arab ones.[17]

After the end of the 1948 War, Arabs were under military administration control until 1966.[18] Following the consequences of the 1948 War, many Arab localities were abandoned and destroyed. The Arab population in the new state of Israel was estimated at 156,000 in 1948, about 83 percent of them lived in 104 localities.[19]

We divide the development of the Arab localities in Israel into three periods, similarly to our division of the development of their identity, political trends, and leadership—as described in chapters 1 and 2. The first period is from 1948 to the early 1970s, the second period is from the early 1970s until the late 1980s, and the third period is from the late 1980s to the early 1990s onward.

The main characteristic of the first period is the military administration until 1966 that continued to influence for years afterward. The military administration officers, who were entirely responsible on the population, were subservient to the IDF chief of staff. However, in matters of policy they were directed by the Minister of Defence.[20] In the first years, this resulted in some conflicts with several government ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Health who desired to apply their policy in the Arab-populated areas. After the issue was debated in the Israeli cabinet, it was decided to grant the military administration the exclusive authority on the Arab localities.[21] Following, in May 1950 the military governors were given the same authority that was given to district managers in the Ministry of the Interior, thus were responsible on all aspects of civil life in their jurisdiction. However, as shown in table 3.1, at that time there were only two recognized Arab municipalities: *Nazareth* and *Shefa'Amr*. The mayors of *Nazareth* and *Shefa'Amr* were approved, by the military governors, to continue their position which started during the British Mandatory period. On the contrary, all other kinds of local governance that were approved during the British Mandate were abolished.[22]

Instead, the military governors, in consultation with the Arab's department within the Ministry of the Interior, started to appoint a *Mukhtar* or *Sheikh* as head of a village or a neighborhood. Choosing a *Mukhtar* was used as a

Table 3.1 Recognition of Arab Municipalities in Israel, by Year**

Type / Year	Local Councils				Cities			
	All Israeli Local Councils	Of Which Arab	Percentage of Arab Local Councils (%)	Percentage of the Arab Population in Local Councils Out of all Arabs (%)	All Israeli Cities	Of Which Arab	Percentage of Arab cities (%)	Percentage of the Arab Population in Cities Out of all Arabs (%)
1951	64	4	6.3	N/A	20	2	10.0	N/A
1960	105	20	19.0	N/A	24	2	8.3	N/A
1970	115	44	38.3	11.1	29	2	6.9	10.1
1980	122	52	42.6	36.8	36	2	5.6	8.3
1990	141	58	41.1	43.7	44	3	6.8	13.8
2000	141	68	48.2	51.5	66	9	13.6	21.4
2008*	122	61	50.0	52.1	75	12	16.0	26.6
2014*	125	70	58.7	42.2	76	11	14.5	24.6

Notes: Data is accurate for the beginning of the year. *In addition, four Arab regional councils were recognized (two in 2000 and one in 2005 which was split into two in 2012). They are 7.2 percent of all regional councils in Israel, and only 1.7 percent of the Arab population lives within the jurisdiction of these four regional councils.
**The author's calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [in Hebrew].

tool to support Arab notables who were in-line with the Israeli policy,[23] and also those who were found as possible allies to the *Mapai* party.[24] The Israeli administration preferred this traditional leadership rather than allowing new Arab leadership to arise.[25] In villages that included more than 800 people, an advisory committee was appointed to assist the *Mukhtar* in his duties.[26] These duties included collecting taxes, supplying information on suspected individuals, collecting intelligence, delivering information from the military administration to the residents, water delivery, security, and the burial of the dead. All of which were under the supervision of the military administration, thus in this period it is not considered as local self-governance.

Besides *Nazareth* and *Shefa'Amr*, in 1951 four Arab local councils were recognized: *Kafr Kama*, *Daliyat al-Karmel*, *'Isfiya*, and *Kefar Yaseef*. Three of these municipalities had a Druze or a Circassian majority, except *Kefar Yaseef* that had only a Druze minority. Furthermore, during the 1950s another 16 Arab local councils were recognized.

As of the beginning of 1960, the local Arab governments included two municipalities and 20 local councils. During 1960 another 24 Arab councils were recognized, and in 1963 the Arab village of *Tarshiha* was merged with *Ma'alot,* a neighboring Jewish town.

After abolishing the military administration in 1966, the ministries and governmental departments started to take responsibility on the Arab localities.[27] Arab localities were for the first time free from the authority of the military administration, thus started to act as ordinary local governments. However, at that time less than a third of Arabs of Israel lived in cities or villages with a recognized local municipality.

At the beginning of the second period, the early 1970s, there were already 44 Arab recognized local councils and two Arab cities. In the 1970s, eight Arab local councils were recognized. Which lead to a total of 51 percent of the Arabs living in cities or villages with a local municipality by the end of the 1980s, a first time when more than half of the Arabs in Israel were living in a locality with a recognized local government

The third period, starting with the late 1980s, was a time of change for some of the Arab localities. As a result of the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, some Arab localities were merged, *Umm-al-Fahm* was recognized as a city, and further eight Arab local councils were recognized. Following all these changes, at the beginning of 1990, the local Arab governments included 58 local councils and three cities. The 1990s was a continuation of this process, as six more Arab localities were recognized as cities: *Tayibe, Tira, Rahat, Sakhnin, Tamrah,* and *Baqa al-Gharbiyye*. Other 16 Arab localities were recognized as local councils. This resulted in a total of 68 Arab local councils and nine cities as of 2000, which includes about 69 percent of the Arab population in Israel. At the first decade of the new millennium, a new Arab city was

recognized—*Qalansawe*—and, for the first time in Israel, three Arab regional councils were founded: *Al-Batuf Regional Council, Bustan al-Marj Regional Council, and Abu Basma Regional Council.* Also, the Israeli government implemented a plan in 2003 to merge local councils to reduce expenditures.[28] This included 13 Arab local councils that were merged into four municipalities. However, due to the massive opposition of the Arab residents of the merged localities, these mergers were abolished a few years later.[29]

Following this review, it is evident that the most critical decades in which Arab localities were recognized were the 1960s and the 1970s, with 32 new local councils, in particular in the last years of the military administration and a few years later. However, recognition of new local councils or municipalities differs by region. In the Haifa and the North districts, recognitions were made mainly in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, in the South district the first recognitions were made only in the 1980s. As of 2016 many Arab-Bedouin localities are still unrecognized by the Israeli government. The residents do not receive any local basic services, such as electricity and water supply. They are required to travel to the nearest village or town for any services such as education or health services. As of 2007, there were 92 unrecognized Bedouin localities, 59 of which were in southern Israel. According to some estimates, 75,000 Arabs were living in such places among them 65,000 Bedouins in the south.[30]

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERS OF ARAB MUNICIPALITIES

Size of Arab Municipalities by Population

An essential character of the Arab localities is that most of them are small villages or small towns, as shown in table 3.2. In the first three decades, there was an increase in the amount of recognized Arab localities with less than 5,000 residents. However, this trend reversed since the 1980s, when the number of such small localities declined until it reached 16 percent in 2007 out of all Arab localities. This is mainly due to a natural increase in the population with minimum emigration from these localities.[31]

Conversely, since the 1960s there was a steady increase in the amount of recognized Arab localities that had more than 10,000 residents. This, to the point, that almost half of the Arab localities had more than 10,000 residents, in the period toward the end of the first decade in the new millennium. However, only a few of them reach above 15,000 residents. Thus, most of the Arab localities in Israel are small villages and towns with no big cities that include more than 100,000 residents.

Table 3.2   Arab Municipalities in Israel, by Population Size*

Year	Arab Localities with Less than 5,000 Residents		Arab Localities with Less than 10,000 Residents		Arab Localities with More than 10,000 Residents	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
1951	4	67	1	17	1	17
1960	16	73	5	23	1	5
1970	35	76	7	15	4	9
1980	28	52	18	33	8	15
1990	20	33	27	44	14	23
2000	22	29	31	40	24	31
2007	12	16	27	36	37	49
2014	12	13	38	41	43	46

*The author's calculations are based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [in Hebrew].

Type of Arab Municipalities

Thus, a low percentage of them are recognized as cities: 12 Arab cities as of 2008, which is 16 percent of all the cities in Israel, as shown in table 3.1. The lack of clear criteria for recognizing new municipality may, to some extent, have resulted in a differentiation between Jewish and Arab localities. It is worth noting that the approval of the new municipality is given by the Minister of the Interior. It is common to appoint an investigative committee that recommends whether to change the status of a local council to become a city.[32] Based on the findings of the investigation, the Minister of the Interior is empowered to declare whether a given local council is given the status of a city.

Previously, such recognition of Jewish small settlements—ranging between 10,000 and 20,000 residents—were made following a government policy to increase the investments in development towns, such as *Yavne* that was recognized as a city in 1986 and *Beit She'an* that was recognized as a city in 1999, while each of them included 15,000 residents.[33] Another example is *Kiryat Shimona* that was recognized as a city in 1974,[34] while it had less than 15,000 residents. Following this, an examination was conducted to find recognized cities in Israel that had fewer than 20,000 residents. There were four such cities in 2014, all of which are with Jewish majority: *Or Akiva* (16,800 residents), *Beit She'an* (17,300), *Ariel* (18,400), and *Tirat Carmel* (18,900). Furthermore, as shown in table 3.3, as of 2014 Arab municipalities are more than half of the localities that serves more than 15,000 residents and are not yet recognized as cities. This indicates that the recognition of a locality as a city remains as another way of Arab marginalization by the central government.

Table 3.3 Municipalities with More than 15,000 Residents that Are not Recognized as Cities (2014)*

#	Name	Number of Residents (thousands)	Majority of Residents are: Arab/Jewish
1.	Pardes Hanna-Karkur	37.6	Jewish
2.	Gederah	25.8	Jewish
3.	Mevaseret Zion	24.3	Jewish
4.	'Ar'ara	23.6	Arab
5.	'Arabeh	23.5	Arab
6.	Zikhron Ya'akov	22.0	Jewish
7.	Gan-Yavneh	21.8	Jewish
8.	Mughar	21.3	Arab
9.	Kefar Kanah	20.8	Arab
10.	Shoham	20.0	Jewish
11.	Jadeidi-Makr	19.7	Arab
12.	Kadima-Tzuran	19.6	Jewish
13.	Hura	18.8	Arab
14.	Kuseife	18.6	Arab
15.	Reineh	18.2	Arab
16.	Kefar Manda	18.1	Arab
17.	Tel as-Sabi	17.9	Arab
18.	Yafat al-Nazareth	17.9	Arab
19.	Be'er Ya'akov	17.6	Jewish
20.	Kiryat Tiv'on	17.6	Jewish
21.	Kefar Kar'a	17.4	Arab
22.	Daliyat al-Karmel	16.6	Arab
23.	Yarka	16.0	Arab
24.	Ganei Tikva	15.6	Jewish
25.	Ar'arat an-Naqab	15.3	Arab
26.	Giv'at Ze'ev	15.1	Jewish

*Based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [in Hebrew].

Geographic Spread

As noted in general in the introduction, Arabs live in all areas of Israel. At the beginning of the British Mandate over Palestine in 1918, Palestine was divided into three districts: Jerusalem, North, and South.[35] Later it was divided into six districts: Galilee, Haifa, Samaria, Jerusalem, Lydda, and Gaza.[36] After 1948, Israel applied similar districts as the British division; however, in 1957 the districts were changed, and six new districts were formulated: North, Haifa, Center, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and South.[37]

As shown in table 3.4, as of 2008 most of the Arab municipalities are part of the North district (65%), including 44 local councils, 5 cities, and

Table 3.4   Arab Municipalities by District (2008)*

District	Arab Local Councils in District		Arab Regional Councils in District		Arab Cities in District		Total Arab Localities in District	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
South	6	9.8	1	33.3	1	8.3	8	10.3
Jerusalem	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	1	1.3
Centre	4	6.6	0	0	3	25	7	9
Tel Aviv	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haifa	6	9.8	0	0	3	25	9	11.5
North	44	72.1	2	66.7	5	41.7	51	65.4
Total	61	100	3	100	12	100	76	100

*The author's calculations are based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [in Hebrew]; The Minister of the Interior divides the country into six districts (excluding the West Bank). Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv are metropolitan districts that include the relevant city and its surrounding metropolises that may include other big cities along with smaller towns and villages. North, Center, and South are spatial districts that by definition cover a larger territory than the metropolitan ones. There is no overlap between districts.

two regional councils. The Centre district includes four Arab local councils and three cities, all as part of "the Triangle" that is close to the Green Line. The Haifa district includes six Arab local councils and three cities. In the South district, there are six Arab local councils, one regional council, and one city.

None of the Arab municipalities belong to the Tel Aviv district, only one belongs to the Jerusalem district, and only four local councils with three Arab cities belong to the Centre district. Thus, the majority of Arab localities are geographically at the periphery and not close to the center of Israel. The Peripherally Index[38] helps to explain that. According to it, no Arab locality was found with Peripherally Index of 5, meaning not peripheral, and only six Arab localities received Peripherally Index of 4, meaning relatively close to the center. Peripherally Index of 3, meaning not close to the center, however not in the far peripheral, was the index associated with 27 Arab localities. This leaves the majority of Arab localities in the peripheries of Israel. With a peripheral index of 2, a total of 36 Arab municipalities were found. Moreover, among the most peripheral localities in Israel, with a peripheral index of 2, nine Arab localities were found.

Most Arab-majority localities, local councils (72.1%), regional councils (66.7%), and cities (41.7%) alike, are located in the North district that covers the Galilee and the Golan Heights. As a result, this is the only district in Israel that is an Arab-majority district with 53 percent Arabs.[39]

Socioeconomic Situation

The fact that most Arab municipalities in Israel are at the geographic periph-
eries of Israel, among other explanations, had also influenced their economic
situation. Apparently, the essential character of the Arab localities in Israel is
their socioeconomic situation: in 1983, third of the Arab municipalities were
indexed in the lowest levels 1–3, third indexed at 4, and third indexed at 5 and
above, while 10 is the highest index for the top tenth of the socioeconomic
situation in Israel. It is worth noting that the distribution changed in 1992,
1995, 1998 due to changes in the way the index is calculated. As shown in
table 3.5, since 1999 no major change in the distribution between the differ-
ent levels.

The data reveals that residents in these Arab-majority localities are at the
bottom of the socioeconomic situation in Israel. In 2006, about 77 percent
of them were in the three lowest levels. Moreover, in levels 1–3 most of the
localities were Arabs, while only a few Jewish-majority localities were at this
low socioeconomic level.

Crosschecking the socioeconomic data with other characters reveals
some interesting findings. All the Christian localities were found with
socioeconomic level 4 or above. Conversely, only four Muslim locali-
ties were found with socioeconomic level 4 or above. Among Druze,
there was an improvement between 1999 and 2001. Their socioeconomic
situation was found better than among Muslim localities and less than
the Christian ones. Population size was found as an indicator of a lower
socioeconomic level.

Table 3.5   Arab Municipalities by Socioeconomic Index*

	Arab Localities in Levels 1–3		Arab Localities in Level 4		Arab Localities in Levels 5 and Up	
Year	*#*	*%*	*#*	*%*	*#*	*%*
1983	19	32.8	16	27.60	23	39.70
1992	44	66.7	12	18.20	10	15.20
1995	32	47.8	27	40.30	8	11.90
1998	31	47.7	27	41.50	7	10.80
1999	61	80.3	12	15.80	3	3.90
2001	61	77.2	13	16.50	5	6.30
2003	62	78.5	14	17.70	3	3.80
2006	58	77.3	14	18.70	3	4.00

*The author's calculations are based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special
    Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [in Hebrew].

ELECTIONS IN ARAB MUNICIPALITIES

Arab politics at the national level were discussed in depth in chapters 1 and 2. Contrary to the national elections, the local level is more convenient for Arab politicians where it allows them to influence local problems.[40] The local politics among Arabs is more critical than in Jewish localities because the political institutions at the national level, along with other public institutions, are dominated by Jewish citizens with no significant influence by Israeli Arabs (as described in chapter 1). Therefore, Arabs see their local councils and municipalities as the central stage for their political aspirations and a place where they can influence local interests as well as interests on the national level.[41]

There is no ideological boycott of the local elections.[42] Thus the local turnout has been higher than in national elections, as shown in table 3.6. While in national elections, the Arab turnout has been decreasing, the Arab turnout of local elections has been relatively steady. When compared to the Jews , the Arab turnout in local elections has been higher of about 50 percent or more, while in national elections it has been lower with about 17–18 percent less in the last two cycles. In some Arab villages, the turnout reaches even more than 90 percent in local elections.

The high participation of Arabs in the local elections indicated the importance that the Arabs hold for them as well as the significant role of the clan and the extended family in local elections.[43] Local parties are usually extended family or clan lists that depend on the number of voters in each family or clan, but not on ideology or ideas.[44] The democratic character of Israel's political system was expected to eliminate the influence of the clan; however, this is not yet the case. When the Israeli government started to establish Arab municipalities, as described at the beginning of this chapter, the first council members and mayors were usually appointed by the Israeli administration, and not elected by the people.[45] These appointees used the advantage of being in office to promote their candidacy to become elected leaders in the first election that followed. Throughout the military governance period, these new Arab local leaders were mostly pragmatic as they were busy with day-to-day problems. Even in the 1950s and 1960s most of the Arab local council's discussions dealt with a local problem only.[46]

The first ever elections in any Arab locality in Israel was held in *Nazareth* in 1954. In 1955, local elections were held in five additional Arab localities: *Shefa'Amr, Tayibe, Tira, Fureidis, and Baqa al-Gharbiyye*. The average turnout in these elections was already high, 94 percent. Local lists that were

Table 3.6 Arab Turnout in National and Local Elections (1949–2015)*

Knesset Elections			Local Elections			
Year	Arab Turnout (%)	Arab Turnout Out of General (%)	Year	Arab Turnout (%)	Arab Turnout Out of General (%)	Arab Localities Where Elections Were Held
1949	69.3	80	1950[a]	N/A	N/A	N/A
1955	92.1	111	1954–1955[b]	94.3	120	6
1959	88.9	109	1959[c]	88.0	110	22
1965	85.8	103	1965	91.2	110	32
1969	88.2	108	1969	93.0	117	33
1973	80.0	102	1973	90	123	37
1977	76.3	96	1978	84.0	147	N/A
1984	73.6	93	1983	88.8	150	N/A
1988	73.9	93	1989	91.7	150	49
1992	69.7	89	1993	89.6	159	58
1999	75.2	96	1998	90.7	158	59
2003	62.0	91	2003	87.1	177	53
2009	53.4	82	2008	88.3	169	54
2013	56.5	83	2013	85.0	170	72
2019	N/A	N/A	2018	84.7	154	79

Notes: [a]In 1950 no elections were held in Arab localities; [b]In 1954, local elections were held only in Nazareth. In 1955, local elections were held in five Arab localities: Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Tayibe, Tira, Fureidis, and Shefa'Amr; [c]In 1959 elections were also held in Abu Ghosh, Jaljulia, Iat, Daliyat al-Karmel, Tur'an, Yarka, Kafr Yasif, Kafr Kama, Kafr Kar'a, Maghar, Me'Ilia, Isfia, Peki'in, Qalansawe, Rama, and Tamrah.

*National elections' turnout based on table 1.1; Local elections' turnout based on the Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1955.* Special Series Number 51. Jerusalem, 1956 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1959.* Special Series Number 111. Jerusalem, 1961 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1965.* Special Series Number 216. Jerusalem, 1967 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1969.* Special Series Number 309. Jerusalem, 1969 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1973.* Special Series Number 461. Jerusalem, 1974 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Local Election Results 1989.* Special Series Number 885. Jerusalem, 1990 [in Hebrew]; Galnoor, Itzhak and Dana Blander, *The Political System of Israel.* Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 2013, p. 936 [in Hebrew]; The 2013 results based on the results published by the website of the Ministry of the Interior: moin.gov.il [in Hebrew]; Ghanem, As'ad and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar. *The Municipal Elections in the Arab Sector in Israel, November 1993, Results and Analysis.* Gevat Haviva, 1994 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior website, Election results of 2018: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/general/results-elections-municipal-2018 [in Hebrew].

affiliated with *Mapai* won in most cases. Representatives of the *Communist party* also won seats in three of five localities.[47] The second election cycle in Arab localities was held in 1959 and included 22 localities. Once again, clan and family lists that were affiliated with *Mapai* received significant support in the elections. Those were followed by the *Communist party*, which gained success in half of the localities, and with other clan and family lists that were affiliated with other Zionist parties such as *Mapam*, *the National Religious Party*, *the Progressive Party*, *Herut*, *the General Zionists*, and *Ahdut HaAvoda*.

The internal conflict between the traditional leadership and the new leadership in the Arab society in Israel started mainly in the late 1960s and early 1970s when more localities were recognized, and local elections were held in a total of 37 Arab localities in the 1970s. The recognition of a new local council or municipality encouraged a more democratic discourse and sort of modernization. There was for the first time a local institution that is responsible for the services: housing, health, education, water supply, transportation, and others. However, the conflict remained upon the local leadership. The traditionalists claimed that new well-educated leaders could emerge. However, they will still be representatives of the current social and political structure based on the clan and extended families. The opposition claimed that new leaders would emerge by new political parties while abolishing the old political clan-based structure. The 1970s signaled some weakening of the clan-based lists. However, they still controlled the local politics in which a successful candidate is one that gained the support of the majority of a big clan or a coalition of clans.[48] During this period, discussions in many Arab local councils started to shift from dealing only with local problems to dealing with the general Arab-Palestinian problems.[49] This gave the opportunity for new parties, which focus on Arab-national issues, to be more successful in Arab local elections.[50]

The direct vote for mayors since 1978 was an opportunity for the new local leaders. It came at a time when the national awakening of the Arabs was already in progress (see chapter 2). Arab support of Zionist parties started to decline, while Arab parties, such as *Abnaa al-Balad*, gained support in some local elections.[51] The newly established Arab parties since the 1980s, such as *The Progressive List for Peace*, *The Arab Democratic Party*, and *The National Democratic Assembly*, as well as the *Islamic Movement* in the triangle area and later among the Bedouins in the South, gained some support in local elections (31%–35%). The support for the Communist party and local lists with affiliation to Zionist parties has decreased.[52] However, the majority of Arab vote in local elections remained with the independent local lists that are based on the extended family and clan, as shown in table 3.7.[53]

Table 3.7   Arab Vote in Local Elections, by Type of Lists (1978–2013)*

Year	Vote to Local Lists (%)	Vote to Arab Parties (%)	Vote for Zionist Parties and Others (%)
1978	71	23	6
1983	64	31	5
1989	63	35	2
1993	66	31	3
1998	71	25	4
2003	75	23	2
2008	81	15	4
2013	81	16	3

*Turnout in local elections is based on the Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1955*. Special Series Number 51. Jerusalem, 1956 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1959*. Special Series Number 111. Jerusalem, 1961 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1965*. Special Series Number 216. Jerusalem, 1967 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1969*. Special Series Number 309. Jerusalem, 1969 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Election Results to the Knesset and the Local Governments 1973*. Special Series Number 461. Jerusalem, 1974 [in Hebrew]; The Ministry of the Interior. *The Local Election Results 1989*. Special Series Number 885. Jerusalem, 1990 [in Hebrew]; Galnoor, Itzhak and Dana Blander. *The Political System of Israel*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 2013, p. 936 [in Hebrew]; The 2013 results based on the results published by the website of the Ministry of the Interior: moin.gov.il [in Hebrew]; Ghanem, As'ad and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar. *The Municipal Elections in the Arab Sector in Israel, November 1993, Results and Analysis*. Gevat Haviva, 1994 [in Hebrew].

Since 1989, the support for Arab parties has been declining in local elections to a lower level than in the late 1970s: 15–16 percent in the last two election cycles. Clan-based lists have been once again more influential in Arab local elections. For example, most of the elected mayors in Arab localities in 1998 were affiliated with local lists.[54] In many cases, it was a wave of more educated candidates that still used the clan-based structure.[55] Recent studies claim that in the last decade the influence of the clan was strengthened in Arab cities and villages; for example, only 11 mayors were elected in 2003 as representatives of a political party, and all the other 42 were representatives of a clan or an extended family.[56] In the first years of the twenty-first century, the clan structure has adopted semi-democratic practices such as holding primaries to elect the candidate of the clan in a manner to keep the clan unity in the upcoming elections.[57] In 2008, 81 percent of the seats in local councils were given to local lists, and 83 percent of elected mayors in Arab localities were affiliated with local lists. This pattern continued in 2013. Thus, the evidence suggests that national parties are not much present in Arab local elections and that new leaders of the local Arab governments have been mainly representatives of the old traditional kinship-based politics.[58] Arab parties are still trying to run for local elections in some Arab cities. Further variations of the Arab cities than the Arab local councils include a lower turnout in the larger cities.[59]

Another aspect of the sectarian and clan split in Arab localities is the relatively high number of local lists running for local elections. The average

number of lists in Arab localities has been higher than in Jewish localities until 1998, at about twice the number of Jewish localities.[60] However, this amount has decreased since the 2003 elections.

Other than local services, local Arab leaders have been dealing with national politics since 1967.[61] Issues like unemployment, government budgets, planning, and housing, among others, have fed the sense of discrimination and frustration among Arabs. During the 1970s and the 1980s, in some Arab localities, these common issues on a national level were debated more than local issues and led to a nationalistic discourse. This, in turn, led to higher participation in local elections until the 1990s, as shown in table 3.6. The decrease in Arab participation in the national level compared with the ongoing high participation in the local elections highlights the growing importance that the Arabs in Israel feel about the local elections and their ability to change on local issues. Participating in national elections, in their point of view, is not leading to any significant change.

One of the main products of the discourse on shared problems was the establishment of new Arab political institutions, as described in chapter 1, such as the National Committee of the Arab Mayors in Israel. These examples of activities among Arab local councils and municipalities that are aiming at shared problems at the national level represent the importance that Arabs see in the local leadership and institutions. It had emerged due to the lack of confidence among Arabs in the Israeli national political system, that, from their point of view is not acting as a place that can solve their problems. On the contrary, the local arena is seen as a place that Arabs can influence local issues and produce practical solutions. Local politics had also been a solution from a personal perspective to some Arab intellectuals, academics, and young leaders who used local politics as a take-off for a political career at the national level.[62]

Although this is not at the focus of this book, it is worth noting that Arab council members are also part of city councils in mixed cities. Arabs have been council members in Haifa, Acre, Upper Nazareth, Ramla, Ma'alot-Tarshiha, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and Lud.[63] In these cities, the influence of the political parties is higher, the lists of clans and extended families are not much present, and Arab women have been elected, conversely to their absence in Arab local councils and municipalities.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN ARAB MUNICIPALITIES

In Israel, the central government and the local governments are interrelated in complicated ways. For example, the central government sets the legal

framework for local governments in Israel, decides upon the services they
are responsible for providing to their residents, decides the budgets and grants
that are allocated to them, and audits their performance regularly.[64] Such rela-
tions tend to turn more complicated in a nation-state with an ethnic minority,
such as the case in Israel where most Arabs live in Arab-majority localities
in Israel.

Several studies conducted in Israel have suggested that local Arab govern-
ments are less financially sustainable than other local governments in the
nation.[65] As shown in table 3.8, as of 2009 out of 257 local authorities in
Israel, 28 were run by an appointed committee rather than by elected offi-
cials, out of which 16 were Arab localities. This means that about a fifth of
Arab localities were not led by elected officials. Moreover, as of 2007, more
than two-thirds of Arab localities were under strict financial auditing. As of
2015, none of the Arab localities were among the 24 "strong" localities, nor
among the 65 "stable" localities according to criteria set by the Ministry of
the Interior.[66]

This part of chapter 3 attempts to better identify the causes of this financial
crisis[67] in local Arab governments in Israel. For that purpose, we position
our study between two dominant paradigms in the field: the internal and
external approaches. The internal paradigm is represented by a "local man-
agement approach"[68] and focuses on the political and financial management
of a municipality, that is, on features related to the distribution of power and
management of resources. The internal causes of financial crises for local

Table 3.8   Arab Municipalities with an Appointed Committee (2009)*

#	Locality	District	Type
1	Abu Basma	South	Regional council
2	I'billin	North	Local council
3	Baqa al-Gharbiyye -Jatt	Haifa	City
4	Daburiyya	North	Local council
5	Zemer	Center	Local council
6	Tuba-Zangariyye	North	Local council
7	Tur'an	North	Local council
8	Tayibe	Center	City
9	Yarka	North	Local council
10	Kafr Kanna	North	Local council
11	Kafr Manda	North	Local council
12	Ma'ale Iron	Haifa	Local council
13	Nahf	North	Local council
14	Carmel City	Haifa	City
15	Ar'arat an-Naqab	South	Local council
16	Shaghur	North	City

*Israel Ministry of the Interior, Department of Audit of Local Authorities. *Financial Data Report of Local
    Authorities*. Jerusalem, Israel, 2008 [in Hebrew].

authorities (FCLAs) originate with local authorities' local management policies (LMPs).[69] For example, Park[70] investigated LMPs by examining the relationship between municipal size and fiscal crisis and found that fiscal crises were avoidable and that appropriate interventions by local authorities could prevent or minimize them. The second approach, the "socioeconomic decline approach,"[71] contrasts with the first approach by focusing on the external causes of crisis, such as socioeconomic characteristics (SEs), and structural circumstances that are beyond the control of local officials, such as national business cycles, declines in local business activities, and national public policies (NPPs).[72]

Therefore, the primary goal here is to answer the following question: Are financial crises in Arab municipalities in Israel caused by local authorities' LMPs, by NPPs established by the central government, or by the SEs of local authorities? We thus explore the extent to which each of these factors contributes to FCLAs.

The financial management of the Arab localities was examined in three different sections: factors that represent local management, factors that represent national policy, and factors that represent a financial crisis.

LOCAL MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL POLICY, AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Local Management

Local management factors that are presented in figures 3.1 and 3.2 include percentage of self-income out of all income, self-income per resident, self-income from local taxes per resident, expenditure per resident, percentage of employment expenditure out of all expenditure, employment expenditure per resident, and activities expenditure per resident.

Income Factors

Income factors indicate that Arab localities in Israel were found behind Jewish localities. The percentage of self-income out of all income has been declining in a multiyear examination. In the 1970s it has been relatively close to the national average, due to low self-income in all the Israeli localities. However, as Jewish localities succeeded to increase their self-income, Arab localities stayed in stagnation while relying on national budgets for financial stability.

However, to better understand this trend, a more in-depth examination is required of the self-income per resident. In this factor, we notice an increase from as low as 0.13 in the 1970s to as high as 0.37 at the beginning

Figure 3.1   Local Management Factors in Arab Municipalities: Income. *Note*: 1.0 equals the average in Israel in the same year. *Source*: Author's calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local authorities in Israel, special series*. Jerusalem, Israel: Author. Yearly published from 1966 through 2013 [in Hebrew].

of the twenty-first century. However, this increase is relatively not as much significant as it reached only a third of the national average. Thus, this represents the major problem of the Arab localities in Israel when they are not able to produce self-income on a competitive basis compare to Jewish localities.

Three main reasons are indicated for such a problem. First, the existence of industrial zones in Jewish localities which produce the ability to collect more taxes, while not existing in Arab localities mainly due to systematic discrimination over the years. Second, the lower socioeconomic situation of the Arab residents prevents them from being able to pay the same taxes as in Jewish localities. Third, the self-income from collecting local taxes per resident is very low in Arab localities. In the 1970s it has been as low as 0.2 and decreased to 0.09. From the early 1980s it has been increasing again, however only to reach 0.2 at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As long as the self-income from local taxes per resident in Arab localities is as low as fifth from Jewish localities, this will keep these localities dependent on central government budgets, keep them vulnerable to financial recurring financial crises, and not able to supply services to residents.

Figure 3.2   Local Management Factors in Arab Municipalities: Expenditure. *Note*: 1.0 Equals the Average in Israel in the Same Year. *Source*: Author's calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local authorities in Israel, special series*. Jerusalem, Israel: Author. Yearly published from 1966 through 2013 [in Hebrew].

Expenditure Factors

Conversely to the income factors, the expenditure factors among Arab localities have a different route over the past 40 years. Percentage of employment expenditures, for the municipality employees, has always been above the Israeli national average. In the early 1970s, the percentage of employment expenditures was as high as 1.2 and increased to the highest point at 1.4 in the early 1980s in Arab localities.

Since, it has been decreasing, however still equal to the national average (1.0) at the beginning of the twenty-first century. To better evaluate these data, it is worth looking at the expenditure per residents. This indicates a relatively low expenditure in the 1970s and the early 1980s (as low as 0.24). Since it has been increasing until the late 1990s (highest level at 0.89). Since

the early years of the twenty-first century, the expenditure per residents among Arab localities has been decreasing once again to a level of 0.76 out of the national average. In other words, while the expenditure for municipalities' employees per residents has been lower than the national average, it was the same as in Jewish localities when compared as a percentage out of the entire budget. This leaves fewer resources to be invested in local activities, while most of the money is spent on salaries to the municipalities' employees.

Indeed, when examining the expenditure per resident and expenditures for activities, the Arab localities in Israel are found behind Jewish localities. In the early 1970s, the expenditure per residents in Arab localities was as low as 0.21 of the national average. Since the early 1980s, it has been steadily increasing to as high as 0.87 at the end of the 1990s. Since 1999 it has been decreasing to reach 0.76 in 2007. This could have been a good sign for better services for residents, however as already noted above it also indicates an increase in employment-related expenditure.

In any case, this still indicates an improvement in services provided in Arab localities, as the activities expenditure factor shows. Activities expenditure was as low as 0.18 in the early 1970s, indicating almost no activities provided to residents. Since then it has been steadily increasing, with an unexplained outlier in 1987, until 1998 with 0.81 out of the national average. Through the first years of the twenty-first century, activities expenditure in Arab localities has been decreasing to a level of 0.70 out of the national average. This suggests fewer services provided in Arab localities or lower quality of services.

Income and Expenditure by Socioeconomic Factors

Size of a locality by population and its standing does not affect its financial performance. However, the type of locality did matter. In Arab cities, we found better local financial management compared to Arab local councils. Whereas the main difference between the two types is the kinship-based elections in smaller localities, which is less evident in the bigger cities. This is mainly evident in the factors of self-income since the 1990s. Comparing the results by district revealed no much difference, except in the South where there was lower self-income compared to other districts.

We found a better local financial management in localities with a Christian majority, compared to localities with Muslim majorities. This was most evident in the self-income factors. In the Druze-majority localities, there has been an increase in the self-income factors since the early 1990s. However, these localities have had higher expenditure compared to Muslim-majority localities.

National Policy

National financial policy factors that are presented in figure 3.3 include central government budgets out of local income, central government budgets per residents, the percentage of the general grants out of the local income, and general grants per residents.

In a multiyear perspective, an increase is noticed in the central government budgets given to Arab localities. The turning point was between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Until the late 1980s, Arab localities were receiving on average half of the budgets from the central government compared to Jewish localities. However, since the mid-1990s, the central government have been granting increasing amounts of financial grants to Arab localities, even up to twice the national average.

In the early 1970s, the central government budgets out of local income were the primary source of income in Arab localities. Thus, in the mid-1970s the central government budgets out of local income were equal to the national average. As long as the Jewish localities gained more self-income over the years, and the central budgets remained for both Jewish and Arab localities at the same level, this resulted in increasing

Figure 3.3   National Financial Policy Factors in Arab Municipalities. *Note*: 1.0 Equals the Average in Israel in the Same Year. *Source*: Author's calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local authorities in Israel, special series*. Jerusalem, Israel: Author. Yearly published from 1966 through 2013 [in Hebrew].

dependency of the Arab localities' income on the central government budgets. Thus, the central government budgets out of local income among Arab localities had steadily increased. Already in the mid-1980s, it was 1.5 times higher than the national average. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it reached 2 times higher than the national average. This is in conjunction with our findings in the previous section.

Examining this data while applying it to the number of residents produces the factor of central government budgets per residents. This was found as lower in Arab localities than the national average until 1993. In the 1970s it was as low as 0.22 out of the national average. This was the main reason that led some Arab mayors to approach the Ministry of the Interior and declare that they are not able to provide essential services to residents. The investigation committee that was established found that Arab localities were discriminated in government budgets. It highlighted that among Muslim and Christian localities the government invested 7 to 10 Israeli pound per resident; among Druze: about 20 Israeli pound; while among Jewish localities it was between 40 and 100 Israeli pound. It was clear that even when the Ministry of the Interior approved budgets to Arab localities, these budgets were not transferred.[73] However, this report did not dramatically change Israeli policy. It led to a modest increase to 0.59 by 1985.

The central government budgets per residents have been increasing until a peak point of 1.58 times the national average in 2000. Then it decreased to 1.44, thus still above the national average. The central government budgets per residents passed the nation's average in 1993. Once again, this confirms the change in the national policies of allocating budgets to an equal non-discriminatory system. This policy, since the mid-1990s, takes into account the socioeconomic situation of the localities, thus providing relatively more grants to Arab localities.

The percentage of the general grants out of the local income was around the national average throughout the 1970s. In the 1980s it increased from 1.17 to 2.31 times the nation's average. However, it is once again more important to examine the data relative to the number of residents. The general grants per residents were as low as 0.15 in the early years of the 1970s. It had modestly increased until 1983 to reach only 0.48 out of the national average. Once again, we notice a dramatic change in the mid-1980s when the general grants per residents in Arab localities reached the national average. Since the early 1990s, it has been above the national average and reached as high as 2.23 of the national average by 2007.

National Policy by Socioeconomic Factors

Size of a locality by population, by district, by socioeconomic status, or by its standing does not significantly affect its financial performance. The government budgets out of local income were higher in localities with a Christian majority compared to localities with a Muslim majority. Since 1992, localities with Druze majority had higher government budgets than other Arab localities.

Financial Crisis

To examine the volume of financial crisis among Arab localities in Israel, we examined the following factors: the financial deficit per residents, the yearly deficit per residents, cumulative deficit per residents, and percentage of cumulative deficit out of yearly income. These factors are presented in figure 3.4.

These factors indicate an increase in the financial crisis of Arab localities when compared to Jewish localities in Israel. It has overpassed the nation's average in all factors between 1993 and 1998. In the 1970s and 1980s the financial deficit per residents in Arab localities was as low as 0.02, and even in some years, there were minor surpluses at the end of the year. However, by the end of 1996, it increased to reach the national average. By 2007, the financial deficit per resident had even reached ten times the nation's average. The yearly deficit per resident presented similar results.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the cumulative deficit per residents in Arab localities was lower than the nation's average and had been decreasing from 0.52 in 1970 to 0.11 in 1981. Following a gap in the official date, in 1996 the cumulative deficit per residents in Arab localities was reported at the level of 0.84 of the national average. In the following years, it has increased to more than two times the national average. The same trend was noticed in the percentage of cumulative deficit out of yearly income. In the 1970s and 1980s it was at a lower level than the nation's average, and decreasing over the years. While from 1996 it has been increased to reach as high as almost three times the nation's average.

Financial Deficit by Socioeconomic Factors

The size of a locality by population, by the district, or by its standing does not significantly affect its financial performance. However, the type of locality did matter. By mid-1990s there were no significant differences between types of the locality. From the mid-1990s the financial

Figure 3.4   Financial Crisis Factors in Arab Municipalities. *Note*: 1.0 Equals the Average in Israel in the Same Year. *Source*: Author's calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local authorities in Israel, special series*. Jerusalem, Israel: Author. Yearly published from 1966 through 2013 [in Hebrew]. In these factors there were relatively more missing data than other factors examined in this chapter.

crisis among Arab local councils is much greater than in Arab cities. Localities with a Druze majority, during the 1970s and the 1980s, did not suffer from the fiscal deficit. While since the 1990s, localities with Druze majority had experienced financial deficit that was worse than other localities.

Financial Crisis in Arab Localities by Years

Following the findings mentioned above, we can indicate that there has been no significant improvement in the local financial management of Arab localities in Israel. There has been no improvement in income. The self-income per residents has not much improved, including the collection of taxes. However, there has been an increase in expenditure. For more expenses, the localities needed sources of income which came mainly from the central government. Thus, since the mid-1980s, the percentage of self-income in Arab localities has been decreasing, and they have been relying on the government's budgets. The government's budget had increased by two points: since the late 1980s and then in mid-1990s. By then, the government granted the Arab localities far fewer budgets than the Jewish localities. However, since the mid-1990s the government budgets given to Arab localities had reached twice the amount compared to Jewish localities.

At the same time, Arab localities had increased even more their expenses. These expenses went to actual activities toward services, however also for

employment-related expenses that had increased per resident even if this does not overcome the nation's average.

Despite the increasing government budgets, it did not cover the much higher increase in expenses. Thus, leading Arab localities in Israel to an ongoing financial crisis since the mid-1990s and throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. Since 1996 the deficit of Arab localities in Israel passed the nation's average deficit.

SOURCES OF THE CRISIS

After presenting the development of the financial crisis in Arab localities in Israel, it is essential as well to examine the sources of this crisis. To determine the sources of the crisis, a thorough examination has been conducted to assess the influence of LMPs and local financial crises, in comparison to the influence of national policies and local financial crises. Crises experienced by local authorities can be categorized as financial crises, management crises, or crises related to service quality. When focusing on the financial aspects of a crisis, researchers must examine the local authority's success in reducing deficits, in reducing municipal loans, or in achieving a budget surplus.

The research findings confirmed that there is a negative relationship between LMPs and FCLAs regarding the regular budget (see appendix 2). This can be summarized as follows: higher self-income per capita is associated with lower annual budgets and per capita budget deficits. In other words, the financial crisis in Arab localities in Israel is significantly more associated with local management.

In addition, there was a negative correlation between the explanatory variables, including the extent of government contributions to local authority revenues and the extent of government contributions to per capita revenues, but the effect of socioeconomic characters was eliminated and not considered as significant. In other words, the financial crisis in Arab localities in Israel is not significantly associated with central government policies or socioeconomic characters as they are more related to local management. Many studies conducted in Israel[74] have found the contrary to this finding that national policy factors are the primary financial problem in local Arab authorities. The findings also conflict with the results of previous studies that have claimed that socioeconomic issues explain fiscal crises.[75]

We found that LMPs exert the most significant influence on the FCLAs of local Arab governments in Israel. The financial crises of local Arab authorities are less severe, and the regular budget deficits are lower when per capita income is higher, and per capita, municipal expenditures are lower. Although

SEs such as district, socioeconomic context, and sector characteristics predicted the FCLAs of local Arab authorities in Israel, these characteristics were less predictive concerning FCLAs than LMPs. Furthermore, we cannot conclude that there is a definite link between NPPs and FCLAs from this study, particularly concerning irregular budget data. Although this relationship is not statistically significant, the findings indicate that per capita loan debt and the ratio of loans to overall income decrease as the government contribution to development budget revenues increases.

CRISIS IN ARAB-PALESTINIAN MUNICIPALITIES IN ISRAEL: CONCLUSION

To conclude this chapter, the local political institutions are the most critical arena for Arabs in Israel. Though the Israeli government had limited those institutions for decades. From 1948 to 1966, under the military administration, most Arab localities were not operating with a recognized municipality, thus eliminating any official local governance. This policy has changed in the following few decades, until the 1990s, which resulted in recognized local municipalities in most of the Arab villages, towns, and cities. Still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were 92 unrecognized localities with about 75,000 residents.

The slow process of recognizing Arab municipalities in Israel resulted in weak local governance that meant under-experienced politicians and officials and weak institutions when compared to Jewish-majority localities that were developing at the same time. Even in recognition of localities as cities—a process that has the potential of advancing the locality—Arab localities were discriminated against.

Moreover, the sociodemographic characters of Arab municipalities reveal a segregated society that the majority of it live in separated municipalities with Arab majority. Most of those Arab municipalities are small villages and towns without big cities. The majority of Arab localities are at Israel's geographic peripheries and suffer as well from a very low socioeconomic situation.

However, a more critical characteristic of Arab municipalities in Israel is the political and social structure that is based on sectarianism and tribalism-clans and extended families. This results in a kinship-based election that is still evident in most Arab-majority municipalities as of the begining of the twenty-first century. It has been challenged during the 1970s and the 1980s by more educated young Arab intellectuals who demanded democratization of the local electoral process. This struggle ended so far with victory of the

kinship-based structure that still influences the outcome of local elections and the performance of most of the Arab municipalities.

The examination of the financial crisis of Arab municipalities in Israel suggests a negative relationship between LMPs and FCLAs. This relationship was significantly stronger than the relationships between financial crises and factors such as NPPs and SEs. Two variables are the primary contributors to this relationship. First, higher self-income per capita is associated with lower per capita budget deficits. Second, lower per capita expenditures are also associated with lower per capita budget deficits. Therefore this chapter confirms the "local mangament" approach.

As other studies have previously shown, our data also revealed the existence of discrimination in allocating resources to the local Arab authorities. However, discrimination in allocating those budgets has decreased over the past 15 years. Thus, it was expected that more money would decrease the likelihood of financial crises. The data shown in this chapter show the opposite. The additional budgets for some authorities were mainly used to increases in both municipal salaries and expenditures that exceeded such budget increases.

The most important contribution of this chapter is that we found a very low correlation between increasing intergovernmental grants and decreasing financial crises in the long run that is lower than the correlations with other NPP factors (regarding national governmental grants). Therefore the conclusion is that the major problem that causes the financial crisis in Arab municipalities is an internal problem. It is the local management in these municipalities that lead to the crisis. It is influenced profoundly by the kinship-based political and social structure in these localities. without such a change in the internal political structure, we can expect that no real change will occure in the financial situation of the Arab localities and the servises they provide.

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Conclusions

Integration versus Segregation and Internal versus External

This book presents a comprehensive and updated situation of the Arab-Palestinian politics in the Israeli political system, as of the beginning of the twenty-first century. The self-determination of Israel as a "Jewish and Democratic" state has influenced this status, and in return, it has influenced the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. In recent years Israeli Arabs have been even more challenged by a Jewish-Israeli discourse that has been moving toward accepting ideas of limiting the Arab's citizenships or ideas of conditional citizenship for Arabs depending on loyalty to the state. The average sentiment by Jews toward Arab Israelis is of animosity and reluctance.[1] The atmosphere in the *Knesset* is in favor of excluding Arabs from the political system and the Israeli society.[2]

In the past two decades, fewer Arabs in Israel feel that they are Israelis and instead are Arab-Palestinians by their self-identification. However, the Israeli part of their identity is still present even if recently decreasing. In this term, the Druze population is different from other Arabs-Muslims and Christians alike. Most Druze citizens in Israel feel that they are Israelis, while the Palestinian part is almost not present in their self-identification, this, mainly as a result of their compulsory military service since 1956. These different patterns of self-identification have influenced the particular political behavior of each of those social cleavages while the Druze are more integrated in the state of Israel and segregated themselves from the other Arabs in terms of self-identification and political behavior.

In the first two chapters, the book focused on the national perspective of Arab politics in the Israeli political system. Local and national Arab politics have different levels of integration. At the local level, most Arabs are separated and manage their local issues in their self-local governments. This excludes the minority of Arabs who live in mixed cities with Jews (less

95

than 15%). However, at the national level, Arabs are integrated, to some extent, into the *Knesset*. Arab citizens vote for parties that are running for office in the *Knesset,* and their representatives are part of the parliamentary work. Despite their presence in the parliament, Arab politicians were rarely included as part of the Israeli government and their influence on the Israeli policy is limited. Only in three major cases, Arab MKs did make a difference: The Oslo Accords, The Disengagement from Gaza Strip, and Decision 922.

Regarding the relation between identity and political trends, in this book we adopted the well-established claim that among Arabs of Israel their self-identification, their leadership, and their political behavior have changed over three periods: from 1948 to the late 1960s as the first period, followed by a second period until the early 1990s, and the third period since the early 1990s until nowadays.

Following the findings of this book, it is suggested to redesign the third period in a way that it will be divided into two subperiods—first subperiod from 1992 until 1999 and then a second subperiod from 2000 until nowadays. As previous scholars already mentioned, these two subperiods have many similar characters. For example, some political trends continued during the two subperiods and distinguish them from previous periods, such as the increase in Arab representation in the *Knesset*, increase of Arab vote to Arab parties, and Arab representation that reached new levels with increased appointees in the executive and the judicial branches.

However, the main issue is the struggle between the two sides of identity that Arabs in Israel have been dealing with since the early 1990s: being Arab-Palestinian and at the same time being Israeli. The findings in this book suggest that each of the two subperiods, however, reflects a different track in dealing with this contradiction. During the first subperiod, in most of the 1990s, Israeli Arabs were hoping to become an integral part of Israel and its future. Their self-identification, their political behavior, and their representatives in the *Knesset* all contributed to this conclusion of increased integration of Arabs in the Israeli polity.

In contrast, the second subperiod started with the disappointment from the results of the *Oslo Accords*, the *October 2000 Clashes*, and the beginning of the *Second Intifada* in 2001. Since then more Arabs in Israel are tending to believe that both identities of being Israeli and Palestinian cannot coexist with one another. Also, fewer Arabs are identifying as Israelis, and their political behavior is tending toward segregation. Thus this second subperiod highlights the segregation of Arabs as a society, however within the Israeli polity.

In this sense, the formation of the *JL* during the 2015 elections is a milestone in the political participation of Israeli Arabs and is a continuation of the progress of their self-identification in the third period, as part of the Israeli polity, but as a distinct group that is seeking more autonomous status from within. Forming the *JL* as a united political platform for Arabs has helped the

continuation of the self-identification as Arab-Palestinians, and at the same time, their attempt to stay in the Israeli political map helps to keep their Israeli side of identity. Therefore, the struggle between the two sides of identity continues, however, taking the form of limited integration with more unity from within.

The formation of the *JL* is also a new level of the national leadership of the Arabs in Israel. Arab leaders were able to overcome their differences and begin working for unity. As a result, the amount of Arab representation in the *Knesset* had increased. On the other hand, by formulating the *JL*, most Arabs segregated themselves from Zionist parties: less Arab representation in those parties and less Arab support for those parties. However, the challenge remains if the parties that make up the *JL* are capable of continuing cooperating despite the differences in agenda.

In terms of integration in the three branches of government—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—there is a noticeable improvement in the last two decades in the integration of more Arabs. Specifically, the progress in appointing more Arab judges in the judicial system and in appointing more Arab officials in the government is an excellent example to increase the integration of Arabs in the Israeli polity. All these characters represent a process of descriptive representation of Arabs in Israel. It is suggested that allowing and encouraging more descriptive representation in the government will more likely increase the integration in society. In any case, descriptive representation will not be enough. The next step is moving toward actual influence on Israeli policy, by being part of the decision-making process. As shown in this book, the problem is more external to the Arabs; it relies on the Jewish majority to invite them and give them the opportunity to integrate.

This debate does not ignore the different approaches among the Arabs themselves. The main trends among Arabs are as follows:[3] First, the integrating camp. It mainly includes those Arabs represented in the Zionist parties, who advocate in favor of full integration. Many internal and external changes have led to the weakening of the integrating camp among Arabs in Israel. The findings of this book suggest that those Arabs in favor of the integration camp are becoming a minority within the Arab minority. The Druze among them are becoming the majority. Second, the separatist camp is by nature not represented in the *Knesset* due to their ideological boycott of the Israeli political system. They have been gaining support that was noticed through the decreasing Arab turnout from 2000 to 2013.

In between the two camps, Arab parties have been advocating for integration but keeping some autonomous status. *DFPE* as well as *UAL,* and the NDA do have different views on this issue. However, all of them advocate, to some extent, integration in the Israeli polity while calling for a

change in its characteristics. The *JL* continued this pattern in general. It is up to them to seek more integration; however, without an invitation from the majority to become an integral part, the result will remain marginal. Hence, Arabs are only partially integrated into the political system, and without an external change in Jewish-Israeli society, there is no expected improvement.

Different conclusions were drawn in the chapter that focused on the status of Arab politics at the local level. The local political institutions are the most critical arena for Arabs in Israel, though the Israeli government had limited those institutions for decades. Chapter 3 focused on the central problem of the Arab localities in Israel which is the kinship-based politics. It was also the most crucial evidence from the financial examination. That is, despite the discrimination of many decades in allocating budgets by the central government, still Arab local governments succeed in achieving better results, whereas local leadership has implemented better local management approaches and methods. This conclusion was more significant in the past decade where Arab localities received relatively more government budgets. The worsening financial crisis in those Arab local self-governments is occurring at the same time when, since the early 2000s, there is a noticeable emergence of the kinship-based elections that have left no place for a more democratized process.

This debate concludes by pointing out that the significant problems among the Arabs in Israel rely on the external, regarding national politics, but regarding the local politics, it is derived from the internal. To fix the problems of local politics, an internal change is needed. Israeli Arabs need to find a different political system than the current kinship-based one, that is, a political system that will better serve the sole purpose of self-local governance, supplying the required high-quality services to their residents. Fixing this core issue is likely to contribute to solving the other problems in the Arab localities. Hence, the conclusion is that at the local level, Arabs are segregated in their municipalities and in order to improve them, an internal change in the Arab society is required.

IMPLICATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF ISRAEL AS "JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC"

In the next pages, we offer a discussion on the question: What do the findings of the book mean regarding the definition of Israel as a "Jewish and Democratic" state? In other words, what are implications on the classification of the type of regime that is in Israel?

Classification of regimes is well debated. One of the most popular approaches to clasify regimes was suggested by Hague and Harrop[4] and divided regimes into three basic models: liberal democracy; illiberal democracy; and authoritarian regimes. However, it is worth noting the work of Huntington who argued that political regimes would never match precisely to defined models.[5] Furthermore, regimes are not static, as changes happen, and a country may shift from one regime to the other.

First, liberal democracy is common in many Western countries. Some of its characters include that following:[6] a representative government which is limited through laws that provide an acceptable framework for political competition; regular elections that are based on free choice, that are general, free, and fair; it is legal in a liberal democracy to be organized in political parties; almost all citizens have the right to vote; it allows independent media to operate freely; a crucial part of a liberal democracy is the preservation of individual rights, including freedom of expression and assembly. These rights are protected by courts which are independent of the government. In a simple definition, liberal democracy is based on the rule of law and stable institutions.

The second type is the illiberal democracy. Illiberal democracy has some characteristics of liberal democracy and also others that are like authoritarian regimes. Other names are used to describe this type, such as hybrid regimes, electoral democracy, representative democracy, or procedural democracy.[7] Some of its characters include the following:[8] leaders are elected with minimal or no falsification, however the leaders take advantage of their position to prevent fair competition; to undermine potential opponents, leaders interfere in the rule of law, in the media, and in the economy; protection of individual rights is unstable, and the judiciary is weak to a level that it is not able to protect individual rights; a common practice in illiberal democracy is pushing the opposition to the margins. In a simple definition, illiberal democracy is based on a strong leader rather than on powerful institutions.

The third type, authoritarian regime, is not democratic and not liberal. Some of its characters include the following:[9] leaders are above the law, and they have no responsibility toward the people; the media is audited, controlled, and usually afraid; the political participation is usually limited and is not promoted. Authoritarian regimes often do not hold elections; if it exists, then it is limited. A large part of the population does not have the right to vote. In authoritarian regimes, it would not be unusual to fake the election results.

Following this, the question is where do we position Israel? In other words: To what extent is Israel a democracy? The main argument is surrounding the definition of Israel as a "Jewish and Democratic state."[10] Not only that there is an underlying tension between the two parts of this definition, but the

Types of regimes:	Liberal Democracy		Illiberal Democracy or Hybrid Regime		Authoritarian
Classification of the type of regime in Israel:	Israel is a Liberal Democracy- Rubinstein and Yakobson (2008)	Israel is a Liberal Democracy with some faults- Neuberger (2003)	Israel is an "Ethnic Democracy"- Smooha (1997)	Israel is not a democracy= "Ethnocracy"- Yiftachel (2006)	

Figure C.1   Classification of the Type of Regime in Israel: Four Main Approaches.
Source: Author's interpretation based on Neuberger, Benjamin. "Israel—A Liberal Democracy with four flaws." *The State of Israel: Between Judaism and Democracy* (2003): 361–70; Yiftachel, Oren. *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006; Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic democracy: Israel as an archetype." *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (1997): 198–241; Rubinstein, A., and A. Yakobson. *Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights*. London: Routledge, 2008.

meaning of each part of it is also not agreed.[11] This is a well-researched topic for the past two decades.[12] We can identify four primary positions on the type of regime in Israel,[13] as shown in figure C.1. Among these four positions, two are much contradicting: the first states that Israel is not a democracy, and the second states that Israel is indeed a liberal democracy, the same as any "Western" country. Between these two positions, there are two other approaches: the third states that Israel is an ethnic democracy, and the fourth states that Israel is a liberal democracy with some faults.

The first approach states that Israel is not a democracy. Thus most scholars who hold this position approve Yiftachel's claim that Israel is an Ethnocracy.[14] It is a type of regime that aims at serving the interests and needs of the dominant group at the expenses of all the others.[15] Most of these scholars hesitate from labeling Israel as a country with an authoritarian regime, given the fact that there are some democratic characters in Israel such as an elected parliament, competitive political system, free elections, relatively generous individual rights, free media, and an independent judicial system. As authoritarian characters of Israel are mentioned: inequality and exclusion of citizens, the right to vote is not given to all adults, minorities are not protected, there is no reasonable possibility for Arabs to be in power, the borders are not clear and do not include all the citizens, but on the other hand they include a special status for the Jewish diaspora. This approach concludes that Israel is a democracy toward its Jewish majority and antidemocratic toward its Arab minority. For that, it is called Ethnocracy, as an example of the tyranny of the majority toward the minority.

The second approach labels Israel a liberal democracy. Most scholars who hold this position, such as Rubinstein and Yakobson,[16] claim that Israel is a full liberal democracy, the same as any Western country. It claims that all liberal democracies are not perfect and do not have all the characteristics of liberal democracy. However, they are still considered as such. Per those scholars, this also applies to Israel.

The third approach states that Israel is an ethnic democracy, an idea that was developed by Smooha.[17] It claims that Israel is a Jewish state and a democracy; however, it is a non-Western democracy. Israel is a democracy of somewhat lower quality that is in contradiction with the Jewish and Zionist characteristic of the state. Six reasons are mentioned for the low quality of the Israeli democracy, they are as follows: the lack of civic and common Israeli nationality; absence of distinction between religion and state, de jure or de facto; the inequality of the Arab citizens of Israel; the lack of constitution; the existence of an emergency state since 1948, which give extended use of power to the security forces; the lack of permanent borders and the ongoing occupation of the Palestinians in the West Bank.

The fourth approach states that Israel is a liberal democracy with some faults, an idea that was developed by Neuberger.[18] It claims that in the 1960s and the 1970s, Israel was headed to become a full liberal democracy. However, since the 1980s the Israeli democracy is in regression, following a political divide on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As of twenty-first century, Neuberger considers Israel as a democratic state with some faults, in a manner that is very much close to liberal democracy. The faults are the lack of a constitution, the status quo in the relations between religion and state, the status of the Arab minority, and the issue of the Palestinian territories and their influence on democracy within Israel.

While trying to illustrate the importance of such a debate, we can use the example of Arab participation in the Israeli political system. Those who consider Israel as an Ethnocracy argue that it is worthless for Arabs to participate in Israeli politics and government. The recommendation will change if the essential characteristic of Israel changes, to reduce the extent of its Jewishness and expand its democratic characteristic, or if Israel recognizes the rights of the Israeli Arabs as a national minority.[19] However, both suggestions threaten to challenge the basic structure of the state. Others claim that improving the status of the Arabs in Israel depends on changing the ethnic character of the state and establishing a new political system in Israel:[20] that is, by solving some of the problems in this regard such as granting full citizenship and voting rights to all Arabs (East Jerusalem residents are excluded, for example); protecting minorities and their individual and collective rights; establishing internationally recognized borders to determine who is included in the Israeli polity, and more.

On the other hand, those who consider Israel as either ethnic democracy or a liberal democracy with some faults argue that Arabs need to participate even more in politics and government, and at the same time the state of Israel and the Jewish Israelis should work on reducing the inequality of Arabs and promote their participation and adequate representation.[21] Furthermore, some may suggest creating an Israeli civil nationality that will include all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation and eliminating the emergency state that grants the security forces expanded authority. Others argue that Arabs

in Israel need to be recognized as a national minority and get a significant measure of cultural and educational autonomy.[22]

Finally, those who consider Israel as full liberal democracy argue that Arabs should continue participating in the politics and government of Israel if they desire to. However, they do not see any acute problem to be solved by the state.[23] They claim that the problem is within the Arab leaders who are not keen to fully integrate into the Israeli political system.

The findings of this book regarding participation, representation, and self-identification of Arabs in the Israeli polity contradict the claim that Israel is a liberal democracy. The findings, as of 2015, position Israel somewhere in between the suggestions of Smooha[24] and Yiftachel;[25] however, it is closer to the first, due to the modest progress in the inclusion of Arab leadership in the Israeli politics; in the *Knesset*; in the executive, and the judicial. The progress should not be ignored. Nevertheless, the question remains open: Should the contemporary situation be diagnosed as another step of progress toward a more democratic state? Thus, following what Neuberger claimed as "*fixing the faults*" to restore Israel's regime as a liberal democracy. Alternatively, should this change in the so-far limited inclusion of Arabs in the Israeli political system be seen as a modest change, sporadic, and at the margins, therefore will not be able to change the fact that Arabs will not and cannot become an integral part of Israel? Thus, supporting Smooha's claim that Israel is, and will remain, as an ethnic democracy, therefore a nonliberal democracy.

The conclusion is that the majority, the Jewish-Israelis should lead the future direction to be taken. As already stated by other scholars, the following few options are left for Israel:[26] (1) to become a full liberal democracy, by fixing the "faults"; (2) to remain illiberal, by maintaining the status quo; or (3) to become nondemocratic, by degrading the democratic character of Israel. The recent changes and more specifically the Nation-State Basic Law[27] is a sign that the first option is ignored, becoming a full liberal democracy. It also does not maintain the status quo, but rather reenforcing the Jewish character on the expenses of the democratic character of the state. Therefore, it signals the move towards the thrid option—a less democratic regime in Israel.

To emphasize that, we will focus on the Declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel that had directly promised Israeli Arabs equal citizenship:[28] "*It will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,*" and representation: "*To the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.*"[29] As shown in this book, this promise of equal representation in the government was fulfilled only sporadically and at the margins.

Another example is a proposed bill by few Arab MKs during the term of the 20th *Knesset*: "Abolition of National Institutions (Legislative Amendments)."[30] The proposal asked to abolish the special status of Zionist organizations as "National Institutions"[31] in the Israeli government and society. Those institutions, by definition, favor the interests of the Jewish over the interests of all Israel's citizens. While these institutions enjoy a privileged status within the Israeli polity, they give an inherited advantage for Jews over Arabs. In May 2018 the proposal was removed from the agenda and was not allowed to proceed because it contradicts with the nature of the state of Israel as "Jewish and Democratic." This proposal, if continued, could have forced a vital debate not just about the need for such institutions, but also about the definition of the state of Israel and the status of its Arab citizens. This is in-line with previous decisions, such as the decision in 1985 (and later redefined in 2002), that any political party or candidate that wants to run for office can be disqualified if found by the Central Elections Committee as supportive of the negation of the existence of the state of Israel as Jewish and democratic state.[32] This, by definition, limits the Arab political participation and representation.

Now, the "Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People," in fact, backtracks from the promise of equality, that was made through the Declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, and makes it legal to deal with non-Jews as second-class citizens and therefore it is acceptable that Arabs will remain at the margins of the Israeli political system. The new basic law makes it clear that the state is made for the Jewish and to protect their interests, as stated in section 1b: "*Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People.*" It does not define an *Israelis* that includes the non-Jewish citizens of the state. Moreover, the new legislation applies that the most important cleavage in the state of Israel are those considered as "Jews." As stated in section 7 of the basic law, Israel: "*Views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.*" It means that the state does not see its mission to care also for other citizens. Some, like Minister of Education, MK Naftali Bennett, claim that the new legislation was approved in order to give the tools to the judicial system[33] as a contrast to two other basic laws that passed in the 1990s and set the democratic character of Israel.[34] So that it would be used in future appeals when the Supreme Court is asked for judicial review of any government policy that discriminates non-Jewish citizens.

The outcome of this debate is that Arab citizens in Israel, including the Druze, are officially second-class citizens. Integration in the IDF, as well as integration in the Israeli society and politics, does not make a difference. By taking this route, Israel is approving Smooha's claim and not providing options for full integration of Arabs within the political system. Therefore,

integration of Arabs in the Israeli polity, as an ethnic democracy, is by defi-nition limited. Arabs should seek to fulfill the maximum of what is offered; however, to achieve more than that a change needs to be discussed and imple-mented within the basic structures of the political system.

NOTES

1. Canetti-Nisim, Daphna and Ami Pedahzur. "Contributory factors to political Xenophobia in a multi-cultural society: The case of Israel." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 27, no. 3 (2003): 307–333; Pedahzur, Ami and Yael Yishai. "Hatred by hated people: Xenophobia in Israel." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22, no. 2 (1999): 101–117.

2. Akirav, "Catch-22," 485–508.

3. Hitman, Gadi. *Israel and Its Arab Minority, 1948–2008: Dialogue, Protest, Violence*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

4. Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop. *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Liberal Democracy is common in many West-ern countries like the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Illiberal democracy has some characteristic of liberal democracy and also others that are like authoritarian regimes, like Venezuela, Malesia, Russia, and Turkey. Authoritarian regime is neither democratic nor liberal, like China, Jordan, Iran, and Syria.

5. Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of a New World Order*. New York, 1996.

6. Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*.

7. Dahl, Robert Alan. *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*. Vol. 31. Yale University Press, 1982.

8. Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*.

9. Ibid.

10. Rouhana, Nadim N. and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury. "Settler-colonial citizenship: Conceptualizing the relationship between Israel and its Palestinian citizens." *Settler Colonial Studies* 5, no. 3 (2015): 205–225.

11. Acosta, Benjamin. "The dynamics of Israel's democratic tribalism." *The Middle East Journal* 68, no. 2 (2014): 268–286.

12. See, for example, (other than those cited later on) Al-Haj, Majid. "Multi-culturalism in deeply divided societies: The Israeli case." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 26, no. 2 (2002): 169–183; Lustick, Ian. *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*. Vol. 6. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980; Ron, Yiftach, Ifat Maoz and Zvi Bekerman. "Dialogue and ideology: The effect of continuous involvement in Jewish-Arab dialogue encounters on the ideological perspectives of Israeli-Jews." *International Journal of Intercultural Rela-tions* 34, no. 6 (2010): 571–579; Brake, Salim. "Representation and de-legitimation in semi-democratic regimes: The case of the Arab citizens in Israel." *Sociology and Anthropology* 6, no. 5 (2018): 447–458; Ghanem et al., "Questioning 'ethnic democ-racy,'" 253–267; Peled, "Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship,"

432–443; Dowty, Alan. "Is Israel democratic? Substance and semantics in the 'ethnic democracy' debate." *Israel Studies* 4, no. 2 (1999): 1–15.

13. Neuberger, "Israel—A liberal democracy with four flaws," 361–370.

14. Yiftachel, Oren. *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine.* University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

15. Yiftachel, Oren and Michaly D. Segal. "Jews and Druze in Israel: State control and ethnic resistance." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 3 (1998): 476–506.

16. Yakobson, Alexander and Amnon Rubinstein. *Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-state and Human Rights.* Routledge, 2008.

17. Smooha, "Ethnic democracy," 198–241.

18. Neuberger, "Israel—A liberal democracy with four flaws."

19. Amara and Schnell, "Identity repertoires among Arabs in Israel," 175–193.

20. Ghanem and Mustafa, "The Palestinians in Israel," 177–196.

21. Rosenthal et al., "Voting locally abstaining nationally," 1632–1650; Smooha, "Ethnic democracy," 198–241.

22. Gavison, Ruth. "Jewish and democratic? A rejoinder to the "ethnic democracy" debate." *Israel Studies* 4, no. 1 (1999): 44–72.

23. Yakobson and Rubinstein, *Israel and the Family of Nations.*

24. Smooha, "Ethnic democracy," 198–241.

25. Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine.*

26. Acosta, "The dynamics of Israel's democratic tribalism," 268–286.

27. "Basic Law: Israel—the nation-state of the Jewish people" (p/ 1989/20). Downloaded from: www.knesset.gov.il, approved laws section.

28. The Declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948 [In Hebrew]. Available online: https://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Occasion/Pages/IndDeclaration.aspx; translation to English based on: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-declaration-of-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel.

29. The Declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel.

30. Proposed bill: "Abolition of National Institutions (Legislative Amendments)": p/20/1578 by all MKs of the Joint List. It was first proposed in June 2015, but was first discussed in the general assembly of the Knesset in May 2018 [In Hebrew]. Available online: http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=565342.

31. "National Institutions" in Israel include four organizations: The World Zionist Organization (formerly The Zionist organization); The Jewish Agency for Israel (Formerly the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization; Zionist Commission/ Zionist executive; or the Jewish Agency for Palestine); The Jewish National Fund (KKL); and the Foundation Fund (Keren ha-Yesod). Those institutions were originally intended to bring about the founding of a Jewish Statem. After that goal was achieved in 1948, their goals have changed.

32. Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, "Settler-colonial citizenship," 205–225.

33. As quoted by: Rish, Avia. "Bennett: Not to change the law of nationality, it is essential." *Channel 20*, July 27, 2018 [In Hebrew]. Available online: https://www.20il.co.il/?p=135883.

34. "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 1992" and "Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation 1994."

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Appendixes

APPENDIX 1

Table A.1   List of all Arab Municipalities in Israel (2008)*

#	Name	Type	Year of Recognition	District
1.	Abu Basma	Regional Council	2005	South
2.	Abu-Gush	Local Council	1992	Jerusalem
3.	Abu-Senan	Local Council	1961	North
4.	Umm-al-Fahem	City	1960 Local council, 1984 City	Haifa
5.	Iksal	Local Council	1960	North
6.	Al-Batuf	Regional Council	2000	North
7.	'Ibilin	Local Council	1960	North
8.	Baqa al-Gharbiyye -Jatt	City	2002	Haifa
9.	Bustan al-Marj	Regional Council	2000	North
10.	Bu'eine Nujeidat	Local Council	1987	North
11.	Bir al-Maksur	Local Council	1990	North
12.	Beit Jann	Local Council	1961	North
13.	Basma	Local Council	1996	Haifa
14.	Basmat Tab'un	Local Council	1965	North
15.	Jadeidi0Makr	Local Council	1989	North
16.	Julis	Local Council	1967	North
17.	Jaljulia	Local Council	1957	Center
18.	Jisr az-Zarrqa	Local Council	1961	Haifa
19.	Jish	Local Council	1963	North
20.	Daburiyya	Local Council	1961	North
21.	Deir Hanna	Local Council	1975	North
22.	Zemer	Local Council	1988	Center
23.	Zarzir	Local Council	1996	North
24.	Hura	Local Council	1996	South
25.	Hurfeish	Local Council	1967	North
26.	Tuba-Zangariyye	Local Council	1988	North
27.	Tur'an	Local Council	1959	North
28.	Tayibe	City	1952 Local council, 1990 City	Center
29.	Tira	City	1952 Local council, 1991 City	Center
30.	Tamrah	City	1955 Local council, 1996 City	North
31.	Yanuh-Jat	Local Council	1990	North
32.	Yafat an-Naseriyye	Local Council	1960	North

(*Continued*)

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Table A.1   List of all Arab Municipalities in Israel (2008)—(Continued)

#	Name	Type	Year of Recognition	District
33.	Yarka	Local Council	1959	North
34.	Kabul	Local Council	1976	North
35.	Kaukab Abu al-Hija	Local Council	1984	North
36.	Kuseife	Local Council	1996	South
37.	Kisra-Sumei	Local Council	1990	North
38.	Ka'abiyye-Tabbash- Hajajre	Local Council	1996	North
39.	Kafr Bara	Local Council	1963	Center
40.	Kafr Yasif	Local Council	1951	North
41.	Kafr Kama	Local Council	1950	North
42.	Kfar Kanna	Local Council	1968	North
43.	Kafr Manda	Local Council	1964	North
44.	Kafr Qasim	Local Council	1958 Local council, 2008 City	Center
45.	Kfar Qara'	Local Council	1958	Haifa
46.	Lakiya	Local Council	1996	South
47.	Maghar	Local Council	1956	North
48.	Mazra'a	Local Council	1996	North
49.	Mi'ilya	Local Council	1957	North
50.	Mashhad	Local Council	1960	North
51.	Nahaf	Local Council	1968	North
52.	Nazareth	City	1877	North
53.	Sajur	Local Council	1992	North
54.	Sakhnin	City	1965 Local council, 1995 City	North
55.	Ghajar	Local Council	1982	North
56.	Eilabun	Local Council	1973	North
57.	Ilut	Local Council	1991	North
58.	Ein Mahil	Local Council	1964	North
59.	Carmel City	City	2002	Haifa
60.	Iron	Local Council	1992	Haifa
61.	Arraba	Local Council	1965	North
62.	Ar'ara	Local Council	1970	Haifa
63.	Ar'ara an-Naqab	Local Council	1996	South
64.	Fureidis	Local Council	1952	Haifa
65.	Fassuta	Local Council	1965	North
66.	Peki'in	Local Council	1958	North
67.	Qalansawe	City	1955 Local council, 2000 City	Center
68.	Rameh	Local Council	1954	North
69.	Rahat	City	1980 Local council, 1994 City	South
70.	Reineh	Local Council	1968	North
71.	Shibli	Local Council	1984	North
72.	Shaqib al-Salam	Local Council	1996	South
73.	Shaghur	City	2002	North
74.	Sha'ab	Local Council	1975	North
75.	Shefa'Amr	City	1887	North
76.	Tel as-Sabi	Local Council	1984	South

*Based on the Central Bureau of Statistics. *Local Authorities in Israel* [Special Series]. Jerusalem, Israel [In Hebrew].

APPENDIX 2

Table A.2 Relationships between the Explanatory Variables (NPPs, LMPs, and SEs) and the Dependent Variables (FCLAs)†

Explanatory Variables	Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA1	Yearly Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA2	Cumulative Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA3	Percent of the Cumulative Budget Deficit— FCLA4	Loans Per Resident— FCLA5	Loans as a Percentage of All Income— FCLA6
Year—SE1	0.28**	0.1***	0.14***	0.09**	0.02***	0.02**
District—SE2						
A. South district relative to the north	−3.2**	−1.39**	−1.49***	−1.63***	−0.32**	ns
B. Central district relative to the north	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
C. Jerusalem district relative to the north	−2.45**	ns	−1.19***	−1.28***	0.27***	0.37***
D. Haifa district relative to the north	−1.48**	ns	−0.88***	−1.11***	ns	ns
Municipal status—SE3	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Local authority age—SE4	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Socioeconomic status (ratio of individuals with statuses 1–3 to individuals with statuses of 4 or higher)—SE5	−2.03*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns

(Continued)

Table A.2 Relationships between the Explanatory Variables (NPP, LMP, and SEs) and the Dependent Variables (FCLA)—(Continued)

Explanatory Variables	Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA1	Yearly Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA2	Cumulative Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA3	Percent of the Cumulative Budget Deficit— FCLA4	Loans Per Resident— FCLA5	Loans as a Percentage of All Income— FCLA6
Size—SE6						
A. Ratio of medium-sized cities (5,001–10,000 inhabitants) to small cities (<5,000 inhabitants)	3.01*	1.3**	0.68**	0.51***	ns	ns
B. Ratio of large cities (>10,000 inhabitants) to small cities (<5,000 inhabitants)	3.6*	1.5***	ns	ns	ns	ns
Sector—SE7						
A. The ratio of Muslims to Druze and Circassians	ns	ns	ns	ns	−0.32***	−0.31***
B. The ratio of Christians to Druze and Circassians	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Extent of self-income per resident—LMP1	−54.13***	−26.86***	−6.8***	−7.11***	ns	−1.76***
Extent of local tax collection per resident—LMP2	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns

Extent of expenditures per resident—LMP3	24.99***	28.9***	3.29***	16.06***	ns	ns
Municipal salary expenditures as a percentage of all expenditures—LMP4	−4.51**	7.03***	ns	ns	ns	−0.56***
Municipal salary expenditures per resident—LMP5	ns	−14.13***	ns	ns	ns	0.49***
Municipal service expenditures per resident—LMP6	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Percentage of local authority contributions to development budget revenues—LMP7	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Extent of government contributions to local authority revenues—NPP1	ns	ns	ns	3.48***	−0.13*	ns
General government grants as a component of local authority revenues—NPP2	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	0.08***
Extent of government contributions to local authority revenues per resident—NPP3	ns	ns	ns	−2.6***	0.2***	ns

(*Continued*)

Table A.2   Relationships between the Explanatory Variables (NPP, LMP, and SEs) and the Dependent Variables (FCLA)—(Continued)

Explanatory Variables	Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA1	Yearly Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA2	Cumulative Budget Deficit Per Resident— FCLA3	Percent of the Cumulative Budget Deficit— FCLA4	Loans Per Resident— FCLA5	Loans as a Percentage of All Income— FCLA6
General government grants contributions to local authority revenues per resident—NPP4	ns	ns	−0.21**	ns	ns	ns
Extent of government contributions to development budget revenues—NPP5	ns	ns	ns	ns	−0.08***	−0.1***
Extent of government contributions to development budget revenues per resident—NPP6	ns	ns	ns	ns	0.04***	0.04***
N	846	917	726	727	582	581
MR^2	.37	.67	.40	.42	.57	.47

Note: ns = non-significant; MR^2 = marginal R^2 value; *$p \leq .05$. **$p \leq .01$. ***$p \leq .001$.
ᵃBased on Zeedan, Rami, Eran V'igoda-Gadot, and Yossi Ben-Artzi. "Causes of (and solutions for?) financial crises in local governments: Insights from local Arab authorities in Israel." *Administration & Society* 49, no. 7 (2017): 1065–1083.

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