

Political Discourse in Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe

EDITED BY
MARTINA BERROCAL AND
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Edited by Martina Berrocal and Aleksandra Salamurović

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Introduction

Martina Berrocal and Aleksandra Salamurović

The linguistic study of political discourse and its genres has become a central research topic within various branches of the humanities, based on the entanglement between language as the most important means of communication and cognitive, social and communication processes that essentially define what we call “doing politics” (e.g. Pelinka 2007; Wodak 2004: 381). The nature of political discourse necessarily invites cross-disciplinary considerations which have been reflected in a great number of empirical and methodical research studies. Since the pragmatic turn in linguistics (e.g. Hart & Piotr 2014; Angermuller & Maingueneau & Wodak 2014; Roth & Wengeler & Ziem 2017), the study of the political ‘text and talk’ (Chilton & Schäffner 2002) has evolved rapidly, taking a wide-ranging view on the dialectic relationship between language and social practice. Many influential theoretical and methodological frameworks have been developed and successfully applied since then (e.g. Critical Discourse Analysis, cognitive pragmatics, socio-pragmatics, interactional pragmatics etc.). These were, however, mostly developed on the basis of Anglophone material, which necessarily influenced the analytical structure and categories. Accordingly, the Anglophone material has received full and close scholarly attention, while the scope and focus of the discourse research in other languages has been quite narrow and limited.

For this reason, the editors of the present volume aim to fill this gap by presenting this collection of studies which have been conducted on discourses in Slavic-speaking countries in Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe. The volume pursues *discourse-centred approaches* (Wodak & Forchtner 2018: 5) in two respects: firstly, it follows the conceptualization of the discourse given by Wodak and Reisigl, who define discourse as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotics, oral and written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres” (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 36). Secondly, the volume focuses on the linguistic analysis of written and spoken texts (Wodak & Forchtner 2018: 5) within political discourse as institutional, public and media discourse (Fetzer 2013). The depth of the linguistic analysis is determined by the selected method and the specific research question. At

any rate, it reflects different levels of linkage between language and social practice constituting the discourse. Hence, the editors have included both an article that uses a Multi-Level Discourse Prominence Analysis (MDPA) to analyse inflectional morphemes as relevant discursive-linguistic devices, given the rich inflectional system is a specific feature of the Slavic languages (cf. Cvrček and Masako), and an article that emphasizes how social and political order is shaped and communicated within ethnically fragmented society and with what consequences (cf. Majstorović). Although the volume encompasses material from several Slavic languages, it does not aim to demonstrate a comparative typological approach but rather to offer an insight into a variety of topics and methods which have proved analytically useful for the contemporary political discourse in the countries under analysis.

Slavic countries in focus

Almost three decades after the fall of communism, the Slavic speaking countries under scrutiny are often perceived in scholarly analysis within social studies as belonging to one, although not quite homogenous, post-communist group. In one of the latest volumes in the Routledge series on East European politics from 2018, the editors, prominent political scientists and regional specialists, Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecký, give a convincing argument for the denomination *post-communist*, stating that the numerous legacies of communism “have shaped and continue to shape political processes, both formal and informal” in these regions¹ (Fagan & Kopecký 2018: 4). The breakdown of communism was followed by a period of substantial transformation processes that influenced all elements of political and social life to the present, and which form, content, success and/or failure have been greatly influenced by the preceding communist era. These multilayered transformation processes (democratization, marketization, nation-(re)building, Europeanization, inter alia) in the countries in focus can be viewed as a specific type of communication crisis marked by a permanent identity struggle. The new contextual features of the changing political and social situations are reflected in the gradually changing symbolic communication structures. Within the frame of our case studies, a question is posed whether the power system change and the system “breakdown” in politics and economy brings about changes in communication and discourse practice. And if so, in what ways? The chapter by Holger Kuße, for example, provides a number of answers to this question examining verbal violence and aggression from a diachronic perspective in Russian political discourse since Lenin.

1. The term “Eastern Europe” used by the authors in this volume comprises Central Europe, the Baltic republics, South Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans as well as the countries of former Soviet Union geographically belonging to Europe (cf. Fagan & Kopecký, 2018: 4).

There is one more, rather intrinsic argument in favour of speaking about the countries in focus as post-communist countries. The linguistic exploration of political discourse within Slavic studies, to which the editors of the volume belong, has used the notion of the communist and post-communist eras, respectively, as analytically relevant. We will refer to that in the next section in more detail. Notwithstanding this denominational uniformity, one must not forget the heterogeneity of political and social processes in the Slavic speaking countries of Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe which are relevant for the linguistic study of political discourse. The chapters of the present volume are explicitly compiled under the umbrella of topical diversity which originates in particular as problem-oriented heterogeneity in each of the analysed countries. While in Poland and the Czech Republic, the interest for institutional discourse prevails, the issues of identity which are being (re-)built are of particular importance in three South-Slavic countries. The current Russian propaganda in media, specifically addressed to the non-Russian-speaking audience is the subject of two papers (Koller and Cvrček & Fidler) and the shape of the political discourse in Russian language of the other two.

As the report of the European Commission shows, the division between the post-communist countries and the Western European countries is far from being closed (Balázs et al. 2014) and clear cases of the East-West divide are observable continually and repeatedly. Even without holding a (Western) Eurocentric view in our approaches, we cannot overlook the discrepancies in the value systems which form and influence the communicative and discursive practice, as, for example, the LGBT issue discussed in chapter by Veronika Koller. In addition, she offers a comprehensive methodological framework within socio-cognitive critical discourse studies which is applied in another chapter of this volume (cf. Salamurović).

State of the art in research on political discourse in Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe

The research on political discourse in Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe has several different foci and applies a range of methodological frameworks that are concerned with different discursive levels. An important development of political discourse analysis came only after the fall of the communist regimes. It means after the democratic revolutions in Poland and Czechoslovakia² in 1989, societal change and post-Soviet transformation, and after the dissolution of multi-ethnic states within the realm of the new state- and nation-building, especially in South Eastern Europe (Krzyżanowki & Galasińska 2009; Šarić & Gammelsgaard & Hauge

2. Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries on the 1st of January, 1993.

Ra 2012; Felberg Radanović 2008). Thus, the country-specific heterogeneity in the political and social development is reflected in the variety of research topics, theories and methodological frameworks that have been employed within linguistically oriented discourse analysis. In the next two sections, we will present an overview of topically and methodologically relevant studies preceding this volume.

Political discourse in Central and Eastern Europe

Political discourse after the fall of communism has developed taking a departure either from the existing communist discourse or from the discourse that was in the direct opposition to it (Holý 1996). In addition to the totalitarian newspeak, it was highly influenced by, as well as assimilated the (new) administrative, advertising and colloquial styles (Ožóg 2004).

During this initial period, scholars either republished their articles which had been originally published in exile or they took up topics,³ such as newspeak, propaganda or language of ideology,⁴ which during the communist regime they were not able to do research on for political reasons.

After the turn of the millennium, the focus of the studies gradually turns to new⁵ styles, formats and phenomena. For example, there are several studies on election campaign communication (Ožóg 2004; Trysińska 2004; Banasik 2002) which explore the underlying mechanisms of the communication during an election campaign, scrutinize new phenomena, such as political marketing, and gather valuable empirical material and propose a method of (rhetorical) analysis.

Apart from that, there has been relatively prolific research on political TV debates. This genre, which is based on discussion and dissent, was completely new, as the communist politicians were rarely (if ever) publicly challenged. These first studies analyse the settings and structure of the debates, define and discuss the roles of the participants and outline some of interactional strategies, for example,

3. There is a number of publications on the underlying general features of political discourse in the Czech Republic and Poland (for example, in Poland: Kamińska-Szmaj 1994a, Walczak 1994; Piotrowski 1996, in the Czech Republic: Bartošek 1993; Hlavsová 1997, Švehlová 1999).

4. Newspeak (for Russian: Weiss 1986, 2003, for Polish: Głowiński 1990, 2009; Majkowska 1993), propaganda (for Russian: Weiss 1995, 1998, 1999, for Polish: Frasz 1997; Kamińska-Szmaj 1994b, Bralczyk 2001, 2007; Karamańska 2007; Dobek-Ostrowska, Frasz, and Ociepka 1997; Fidelius 1998; Gammelgaard 2008)) or language of ideology (for Russian: Stephan and Sternin 1991; Stephan 1993; Zybatov 1995, for Polish: Siewierska-Chmaj 2005, for Czech: Čermák, Cvrček, and Schmiedtová 2010; Schmiedtová 2013; Veselá 2011).

5. New in the context of the post-communist political discourse.

answering a question with a question, inserting a meta-linguistic commentary when challenged etc. (for Czech Čmejrková 2003, Čmejrková and Hoffmannová 2012a, b; Bozděchová 2003; Bartošek 2005, for Polish Poprawa 2006b; Poprawa 2006a, 2009, for Slovak Orgoňová and Bohunická 2009).

The investigation of the Slavic researchers was greatly influenced by their Western colleagues. This is especially observable in research on parliamentary discourse that has been very fruitful for the last 15 years. An important inspiration for this strand of research was Bayley's book *Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse* (2004), which raised many topics, such as the relevance of parliamentary context, insults and conflict resolution. Parliamentary debate as a research objective also appeared in the volume *Politics as Text and Talk* (Chilton and Schäffner 2002) and in Chilton's book *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice* (2004). Similarly, the volume *European Parliaments under Scrutiny* (Ilie 2010) explored, among others, the topics of parliamentary roles, identity building and parliamentary rhetoric and argumentation. Importantly, it featured the contributions by Madzarova Bruteig (2010), who pinpoints some of the main features of the current "Czech debating style" and gives insight into frequent arguments and communication strategies and by Ornatowski, who described in his article *Parliamentary Discourse and Political Transition: Polish Parliament after 1989* (2010) the changes in the function of applause and humour in parliamentary deliberations.

This and similar research by Western scholars acts as an incentive for the authors in the Slavic countries, however, they concentrate merely on a few selected topics. For example, Weiss examines the main features of Russian parliamentary discourse (Weiss 2013b)⁶ and the way how parliamentary interactions are recorded in the electronic transcripts (Weiss 2013a), in other words, what is kept and what is edited out. Similarly, Wintr (2010) published an interesting book on the Czech parliamentary culture which combines a juridical perspective based on legal provisions with the analysis of parliamentary electronic transcripts with a special focus on obstruction, recess and repetition of voting. Furthermore, Hoffmannová's (2003) discursive study examines conflicts which arise from the violation of standing orders between opposing sides. The author assumes that debates are dissenting in nature, however, she observes that tensions can be eased through the use of conversational humour. Polish parliamentary discourse from the perspective of speech act theory was analysed by Laskowska (2004). In addition, Majkowska (2012) describes the

6. Weiss describes the less formalized nature of Russian parliamentary discourse. One of the key features he pays attention to is the fact that rigorous time limitations lead to chaotic situations during the sessions which have to be linguistically and interactionally dealt with.

discourse structure of the *Sejm* debates as well as the unfilled expectations concerning the impolite formulations of the MPs. As can be seen, the first twenty years after the fall of communism were dedicated to the study of totalitarian discourse and its characteristic features and to the linguistic explorations of new phenomena in the post-communist discourse.

The rising interest in the research of political discourse in Slavic speaking countries resulted in the volume edited by Kreß (2013b) which is, however, still dedicated mainly to the totalitarian discourse in Slavic-speaking Eastern and East Central European countries. Kreß, in the introduction to this volume, acknowledges that the retrospective studies of the [post-] communist regimes in Eastern Europe are still very popular among Slavic scholars and that the study of contemporary language of politics is not very frequent (Kreß 2013a: 7). Another successful attempt to gather the scholars who focus on the political discourse in Slavic speaking countries took its form in the special issue, *Contemporary Eastern European Political Discourse* of *Zeitschrift für Slavistik*, with contributions covering Russian (Sivenkova 2016; Weiss 2016; Ryazanova-Clarke 2016; Lunde 2016; Anderson 2016), Polish (Nowak 2016; Thielemann 2016) and Czech political discourse (Berrocal 2016).

Political discourse in Balkan Europe

The study of the language used in political and media discourse in the successor states of former Yugoslavia had been for a long time linked to the military conflicts of the 1990s. In these analyses, particular attention was dedicated to the communicative-linguistic phenomenon of hate speech by focusing mainly on lexical features within the scope of linguistic structuralism (cf. Slapšak et. all 1997; Bugarski 1997, Škiljan 1998, Žuljević 2004) or discourse features of specific media types (Savić & Valić-Nedeljković 1996). Since the end of the 1990s the countries in the region have undergone transformation processes, both in the form of political and social order (cf. Ramet 2010; Brunnbauer & Voss 2008), and in the form of re-establishing symbolic orientations by semiotic and linguistic means. The latter was especially reflected against the background of the Anglophone research tradition in the field of linguistic analysis of political and media discourse (especially work in the context of Critical Discourse Analysis – CDA, cf. Wodak & Meyer 2009; Hart & Cap 2014; Angermuller, Maingueneau & Wodak 2014). The semiotic-linguistic analyses of specific elements characteristic of the complex transformation process in the Western Balkans were carried out within particular branches of studies. Although applying different methodological tools, all these analyses share the inherent critical standpoint and the problem-orientation. To

illustrate this, some studies addressed general challenges of Europeanization (Petrović 2009) by pointing at the entanglement between the EUrope⁷ Self-images and the images of the Balkans as the Europe's Other. Special attention was paid to the stereotypes produced in the political and media discourses by the means of nomination (the particular usage of the term "Western Balkans") and metaphors related to the image of the EUrope. Metaphorical models within the EU-discourses in Croatia before its EU accession were examined (Šarić 2005). The results point to the fact that the commonly used metaphors do not differ substantially from the metaphors used in other European countries prior to their EU accession (such as EUROPE IS A FAMILY, ACCESSION TO EU IS A JOURNEY etc.). Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is especially interesting in regard to the process of Europeanisation since it is strongly influenced by external forces, i.e. by the EU representatives. Danijela Majstorović (author in this volume) uses CDA for the cultural analysis of the postwar and post-socialist context tackling political discourse from a variety of theoretical angles, historical perspectives and types of texts. She has analysed ethnic attitudes in the public and private sphere, and especially among youth (Majstorović and Turjačanin 2013), gender (Majstorović 2016, 2017) and, more recently, social movements (Majstorović, Vučkovic and Pepić 2015) and class in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Majstorović and Vučkovic forthcoming). Whereas she delineated carrot-and-stick style Europeanization during the first decade of the international community's peace and state-building in postwar Bosnia (Majstorović 2007), in her later work she detects visible signs of the postcolonial condition including perpetual transition and a state of exception both in terms of politics and economics in a variety of media and political texts in different phases over a more than twenty-year long involvement of the international community (Majstorović & Vučkovic 2016).

Another body of studies addresses the war conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, especially their discursive representations in both foreign (cf. Lakić 2010) and domestic media (cf. Erjavec 2009). These studies have focused on the narrative structure of media representations and the recontextualization of the dominant nationalistic discourse. The analysis on war apologies issued by high-ranking officials after 2000 from several Balkan states in connection to the war conflicts (Vuković & Bratić 2015) is very thought-provoking both in terms of the text genre and the specific results within the Balkan context. Until recently, political apologies as a text genre were not so often investigated. Based on the pragmalinguistic analysis

7. The term EUrope was coined by the Danish communication scientist Sine Nørholm Just. It emphasizes the metonymic relation widely used within political and media discourse between "Europe" and the "EU" and it is also suitable as an analytical concept (Just 2009: 265).

(apology as a speech act) and the discourse-historical approach within the CDA (by Wodak), the authors conclude that although almost all analysed apologies contain a formulaic expression such as *I apologise*, other elements, such as accepting responsibility, admission of injustice, and promising to punish the perpetrators, are articulated only partly or less clearly. Victims are identified mostly geographically, and the element “praise for victims” is completely absent, which is a distinctly Balkan feature, according to the authors.

A particularly large field of research relevant to the Western Balkans deals with the politics of remembrance and its discursive-linguistic representations (see edited volume Šarić, Gammelsgaard & Hauge 2012). Interestingly, while regarding some elements of the recent past in the countries of the Former Yugoslavia, “the rhetorical break with the past” is actively pursued (Gordy 2005; see also Pavlaković 2012 on the contested commemoration of the World War Two antifascist resistance movement in Croatia), there are many elements in the national and political culture in the Balkan countries that seem to be memorized in “timeless eternity” (Zimmermann 2012: 13). The memory culture and politics is highly relevant because not only is the past remembered through the commemoration practices, but the future is simultaneously envisaged (Ensink & Sauer 2003; Reisigl 2008; Wodak & de Cilia 2007). The issue of how collective memory is currently produced, thus, has a major impact not only on reconciliation in the region, but also on the stabilization of democratic structures and future conflict prevention (cf. i.a. Zimmermann 2012: 22; Bieber 2014; Bieber 2005). This is also the reason why this topic still occupies a highly prominent place in the political discourse analysis.

Goals and overview of the present volume

The present volume aims to resume the endeavour to study the current phenomena, styles and contexts of Slavic political discourse. Particularly, it focuses on discursive and linguistic means deployed in the political “texts and talk” accounting for the broader communication setting, i.e. participants, context, communicative genres and their effects.

In this volume, the authors and the editors pursue two clear objectives: firstly, to explore the relevant genres of political discourse in Slavic speaking countries which differ from country to country. Hence, with regard to the contents, the present volume comprises studies on parliamentary debates, commemorative and presidential speeches, mediated communication, and literal and philosophical essays. Secondly, our aim is to discuss the application of several theoretical and methodological approaches, such as pragmatic theories, corpus linguistics, approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis, etc.

By following these two goals, we hope to facilitate new insights into the contemporary production and dissemination of relevant socio-political discursive practices in the countries in question. In general, we aim to encourage the application of different methodological frameworks within the linguistically-oriented political discourse analysis.

Overview of this volume

As stated above, the totalitarian communist discourses played a decisive role in forming the new (post-communist) political discourses. The relation between the past communist discourse and the current political discourse becomes evident in the chapter “Diffuse Messages as Aggression and Violence in Political Discourse” by **Holger Kuße**, who applies the principles of speech-act theory with the aim to examine verbal violence and aggression from a diachronic perspective. Kuße differentiates between *hate speech* and forms of aggressive communication which aim to overtly hurt and humiliate others and the diffuse messages that relate to political correctness and hidden violence. According to Kuße, diffuse messages are “one of the instruments of violence in the form of seemingly friendly communication” and are characterized by an unclear illocutionary and/or axiological direction and referential or/and semantic vagueness. The author shows that diffuseness is aggressive when it is an instrument to wield power over the recipients, predominantly in totalitarian and authoritarian discourse. Kuße tests his theoretical considerations on instances from Russian political discourse and analyses speeches and statements by Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev and Putin. Through doing this, he makes a link between the political discourse of the past, communist Russia, and the present one.

Another view of past events and their discursive representation in Russian Parliament (Duma) and its counterpart in Poland (Sejm) is offered in the chapter by **Daniel Weiss**. He focuses on the representation of one significant historical event: the mass executions of 21,000 Polish prisoners, mostly military officers, carried out by the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in spring 1940 in the Katyn’ forests, Kalinin and Kharkiv, and he looks at their repercussions in post-Soviet times. The event in question has been and still is subject to historical and legal analysis and discussions. Besides providing the relevant historical and legal background, this study is the first linguistic analysis of the conflicting Polish and Russian discourses over Katyn. Weiss examines the Katyn debate in the Russian State Duma (the lower parliamentary chamber) on the 26th of November 2010 that marked the peak of the Russian – Polish rapprochement in the controversy over the Katyn’ massacre. In doing so, he focuses on the linguistic characteristics of this debate in terms of the pragmatically informed discourse analysis and highlights the role of historical parallels and quotations within the competing argumentations.

One of the main controversies arises from the nomination issue as the event is represented as *tragedija* (tragedy), which prevails in today's Russian official statements, *prestuplenie* 'crime' or even *zlodejanie* 'atrocities'. The nomination debate produces specific argumentation patterns and some affective elements characteristic of the Russian official discourse. A specific feature of the Russian parliamentary debates in general and of this one in particular is the high frequency of the so-called "xenquotations", a term coined by Weiss to denote all quotations from extra parliamentary sources including literary fiction, children literature, fables, fairy tales, proverbs and popular sayings, citations from popular Soviet film comedies and animated films (Weiss 2016). In addition, numerous indirect references are highlighted that, according to Weiss, make the Katyn' debate exceptional in comparison with *Duma* debates on other controversial topics. Weiss underlines the frequent representations of those experiences and actions which can potentially bring the two nations together. Nevertheless, the numerous declarations and the parliamentary debates failed to achieve the desired rapprochement of the two states and Weiss concludes that their dialogue resembles a dialogue of two deaf people.

Discursive struggles over the representations of people, actions and events are central to political discourse. As a further illustration of this, the chapter by **Veronika Koller** reports on diverging representations of the issue of gay rights in Russia as mediated in two news articles from *The Guardian* and *Russia Today* in the context of the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi. The relevance of this case study has to be seen in pointing to the ideological tensions between the West and the East, represented in the metonymic use of the LGBT population as a symbol of Western cultural and ideological "decline" and "threat" in contrast to the Russian state and its cultural nationalism and traditional "upright" values.

The study is situated within the socio-cognitive approach to critical discourse studies and focuses on the analysis of the concepts of social categorization, prejudice and discrimination at three mutually interconnected levels: the social context, discourse procedures and concrete linguistic realization, such as the representation of social actors and cohesion, and especially the conjunctions and lexical repetition. At the level of the discourse practice, Koller focuses on intertextuality and the audience design. The article demonstrates the productivity of the socio-cognitive approaches when investigating the mediation of ideologies, because they make it possible to create a connection between the individual discursive levels and facilitate the fruitful interpretation of their interplay.

Koller corroborates that some Russian media heavily sponsored by the Russian government, such as *Russia Today* (RT), aim to disseminate preferred representations and interpretations of the events in Russia and outside the country.

From a different methodological perspective, **Václav Cvrček** and **Masako Fidler** explore a similar material source, namely the texts from Sputnik Czech Republic,

which is a news and opinion portal that brings Russia-related topics and mediates Russia's image to a non-Russian speaking audience, in this case the Czech one.

Moreover, the authors devise a Multi-Level Discourse Prominence Analysis (MDPA), a method by the means of which a comprehensive analysis of discourse come to its realization. It sets out from the principles of keyword analysis (KWA) which are transmitted into the analysis of morpho-syntactic features. The authors carry out a prominence analysis on the sentence level of lemmas, groups of lemmas and inflectional morphemes, which are the case markers in almost all Slavic languages. The conclusions show that MDPA is a valid holistic method by which it is possible to uncover covert discursive strategies which "implicitly direct[s] the reader towards a target of sympathy and a source of authority" (Cvrček and Masako this volume), that is to say, to implicitly influence the reader's affective attitudes in a certain direction.

The inclusion of the morpho-syntactic features in discourse analysis is particularly important in a language with rich inflexional systems, such as the Slavic languages. Its empirical validation and its further application would substantially enrich the way the discourse analysis has been conducted until now.

The chapter by **Martina Berrocal** focuses on Czech political discourse. Concretely, it examines and describes discursive strategies used in the Czech Parliament in the constant rhetorical struggles and clashes with the aim to undermine the position of the opposing parliamentary group or MPs and to delegitimize them. Her theoretical approach sets out from the findings of interactional pragmatics, especially from Spencer-Oatey's approach, which takes into account the distinction between the individual and group face, but more importantly, factors the sociality rights and obligations which as the analysis shows, play an essential role in weakening an opponent's position in a parliamentary context. Methodologically, the analysis combines a qualitative and a quantitative evaluation of data. The quantitative results are obtained from a corpus which was created and annotated with user-defined categories in UAM Corpus Tool, which enabled the author to fully define the focus of the annotation without being "influenced" by the pre-defined categories of some corpus tools. The combination of the two methodological approaches offers several analytical benefits. The quantitative results give substantial support to the detailed qualitative description of the individual strategies and provide an interesting insight into their use. The qualitative analysis can rely on the transparently processed data for a detailed characterization of the analysed strategies and an easy access for any successive verifications. The results report five main delegitimization strategies being used in the Czech Parliament, out of which the negative positioning of one's political opponents and their actions is the most frequent one. A fine-grained analysis of this strategy established that the most common targets of the attacks are the actions carried out by the political opponents and

the results of thereof as well as the motivation behind them. Altogether, the chapter shows that it is possible to assume that it is not the face but the sociality rights and obligations that are decisive in delegitimizing the political actors.

Similarly to Berrocal, the study by **Bartolomäus Nowak** takes up the topic of impoliteness and gives an insight into the use of questions in the Polish Lower Parliamentary Chamber (*Sejm*). He grounds his research in the findings of interactional pragmatics, especially (im)politeness research, and in the pragmatic research of questions. He develops a productive approach which enables him to consider the relation between form and functions and describe the implications for the face-threatening potential. Using this analytical approach, he corroborates and extends the current findings of pragmatic parliamentary research. For example, analogically to the research from the Czech Parliament (Wintr 2010), the author identifies a practice of posing questions which are designed to enhance the face of the Minister or colleagues from the same political party. This study also corroborates the existence of several faces which align with an affiliation to different political and social groups. The quantitative results which transparently represent the questioning practice in the Polish Sejm are highly valuable, showing that the right-wing opposition is prone to use face-threatening questions three times more frequently than the left-wing opposition. This study substantiates the relevance of quantitative evaluation of data for obtaining a more reliable and complete description of the institutional practice, for example, in relation to the party membership, to the discussed topic or to the concrete genre.

The chapter by **Sonja Riehn** deals with the most prominent event from recent Croatian history, the Homeland War (1991–1995), which set the foundations of Croatian independence. This is the reason why the official commemoration is highly important for forging of the particular collective, i.e. national identity. Riehn analysed 13 commemorative speeches delivered between 2004 and 2016. By doing so, she complements the existing analysis of the commemoration practices in Croatia (Šarić 2012). She deploys the Discourse Historical Approach introduced by Wodak and Reisigl (cf. e.g. Wodak 1998; Wodak & Meyer 2009) which focuses first on the content of the discourse, then on the discursive strategies, and finally, on the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations. The emphasis is on the discursive presentation of Self and Others and therefore on drawing up the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The analysis shows that the Croatian ‘We-Group’ is mostly represented positively as members who belong to a democratic, independent, modern and European country, mostly referring to the ethnic Croats, or as evidence suggests through the collocation “Croatian citizen”. The author also pursues the question whether the political changes in 2011 (when a coalition under the Social Democratic Party won the elections) and 2016 (when the Croatian

Democratic Union HDZ won the elections) also mean a change in the way of “Homeland War” official remembrance. As far as the representation of the war ‘aggressors’, similar rhetoric is used across the whole political spectrum. Moreover, a double victimhood is identified in several speeches, as Croatia is not only the victim of Serbian military aggression, but also of non-cooperative international political actors. Riehn concludes that in Croatia, we still deal with a strongly biased memory which does not allow a critical debate on the past and on victims from other ethnic groups.

Danijela Majstorović investigates the dominant epistemes of the current Serbhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that legitimize the 1992–1995 war and the current social hegemony. The author combines the archaeological-genealogical approach by Foucault and discourse analysis, looking at three dominant discourses shaping cultural politics: the poetic, the philosophical and literary discourse. She aims to examine the narration of the past and the legitimation of the future with respect to the Serb role in the war and their identity afterwards. More specifically, she focuses on the trope of “history repeating”, which also realizes its argumentative potential and becomes a *topos of history*, visible in the legitimation of the Srebrenica genocide pre-empting the potential Serb pogrom like the one in World War II, securing the epistemic warranty of contemporary Serb nationhood and providing a *raison d’être* for the Republika Srpska, one of the three clearly marked ethnic spaces in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The chapter by **Aleksandra Salamurović** examines the communication-linguistic structures expressed in eleven commemorative and jubilee speeches within the socio-cultural context of the commemoration and celebration of the 20th anniversary of independence and 10th anniversary of signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2011 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The analysis resists the trend present in the culturally oriented studies of the Balkans and takes a fresh linguistic approach that combines a corpus-based approach with qualitative analysis. The latter is based on the recent findings of cognitive-oriented Critical Discourse Studies, that is, a socio-cognitive approach to collective identity (Koller 2012) and cognitive pragmatics. It combines close readings of the speeches and a detailed scrutiny of selected keywords and their collocations. Special attention is paid to the function of the metonymy *Macedonia*, which proves to be the most frequent term in analysed speeches. The prominence of this particular metonymy and its possible resolution is relevant not only for the internal nation-building processes in the Republic of Macedonia, but even more for the external legitimation (cf. Takovski & Markovikj 2017). The current political processes following June 2018, when the highest representatives of the Macedonian and Greek government signed the agreement on the new state name (the state is renamed “Republic of

North Macedonia”), highlights the pertinence of the topic. In the analysis, two socio-cognitive representations of nation, i.e. KULTURNATION and STAATSNATION, are identified, followed and described in terms of their use and their alternation in the given speeches. The author traces the semiotic transformation of the model of NATION that encompasses complex cognitive strategies and linguistic devices with different pragmatical strength such as clearly marked linguistic opposition of social actors, argumentation patterns and affective semantics and polysemy of the metonymic use of the name *Macedonia*. Finally, the results transparently demonstrate a moderate tendency towards socio-cognitive representations of STAATSNATION over KULTURNATION.

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Diffuse messages as aggression and violence in political discourse

Holger Kuße

Diffuse messages are characterized by an unclear axiological and/or illocutionary orientation. If this diffuseness is used to mislead addressees and to domineer over someone by misleading him or her, then the diffuse message can be seen as an act of aggression and linguistic violence. Diffuse messages are a rhetorical practice which can often be observed in authoritarian and totalitarian contexts, where they are used to wield power over the interlocutor. Examples are given from Russian political discourse from the early periods of the Soviet Union up until now.

Keywords: diffuse message, axiological orientation, illocutionary orientation, totalitarianism, political rhetoric, pragmalinguistics, aggression, linguistic violence, Lenin, Brezhnev, Putin

1. A soft voice

Unquestionably, “The Wolf and the Seven Little Goats”, collected by the Brothers Grimm, is a popular fairy-tale. The well-known behavior of the wolf is undoubtedly an act of violence against the young goats. What is interesting from a pragmalinguistic point of view is the wolf’s communicative strategy he uses to outwit his victims. The first time, the wolf didn’t distort his voice with his paws, and “the little kids knew it was the wolf by the hoarse voice”. The second time, “the wolf had put up his black paws against the window, and the kids seeing this, cried out, ‘We will not open the door’”. But the third time, the wolf came and had “a soft voice” from “a lump of chalk” that he had eaten and “white paws” from “the white meal” that the miller had strewed upon the paws. That was why the kids didn’t recognize him and opened the door (Grimm & Grimm 1993: 44–46). The wolf deceived his victims by hiding his aggressive intentions. In principle, there is nothing aggressive about a soft voice and white paws by themselves, however, they could be seen as instrumental to the violence that is to follow and therefore part of the violence. Similarly, the function of the ‘soft voice’ can be observed in some diffuse messages

in political rhetoric. They do not appear as acts of aggression or violence, but they do form part of an aggressive communicative strategy.

There is abundant scholarly literature on the subject of verbal violence/aggression. The scholarship currently focuses on issues related to political communication and computer-mediated communication. Research on hate speech and other aggressive communicative behaviour that aims to hurt and humiliate others was conducted by: Butler 1997; Sharonov 2004; Gelber 2002; Cortese 2006; Shcherbinina 2006 & 2012; Dymarsky 2008; Herz & Molnar 2012; Ryazanova-Clarke 2016. Other relevant topics include political correctness, hidden violence or humiliation and its associated criticism (that can be related to several terms), euphemisms, positive discriminations etc. The third form of violence and aggression is related to communicative acts that seem to be acts of peace and understanding, but rather they aim to harm the other. Diffuse messages are one of the instruments of violence in the form of seemingly friendly communication. That implies that verbal violence and aggression are mainly defined by the interlocutor's intention and not by the form of an expression, like the use of discriminatory words or hate speech (cf. Shcherbinina 2006: 13–14). But even if there are no linguistically explicit signals of aggression and violence, the act of violence can be already described on the level of expression. In the history of metacommunicative evaluation, the critique of false positive speech, such as *to flatter*, *to bootlick*, *to cajole* or *to adulate*, became a common topic. For instance, the Archpriest Avvakum (1620/21–1682), the leader of the Old-Believers in 17th century Russia, mentioned in his “Life Written by Himself” that his enemy, the patriarch Nikon, was “like a fox”, persuading the clergy to elect him by using friendly and sweet words (cf. Kuße 2008: 44). Alongside this, a famous writer in 18th century Russia, Denis Fonvizin (1744–1792), saw in the “poison of flattery” the main sin of the Russian court, not to mention that the Antichrist in Vladimir Solovyov's (1853–1900) “A Short Tale of the Antichrist” had a pleasant voice and seemed friendly towards everybody (ibidem).

In the case of diffuse messages as acts of violence, the interrelation of form, function and intention is more complicated, because these messages are characterized by an unclear illocutionary and/or axiological direction. They are not outright lies like the false positive expressions which are criticized by Avvakum, Fonvizin or Solovyov, but they can be intentionally used to mislead the addressees, i.e. to outwit someone like the goats in the “The Wolf and the Seven Young Kids”, and also to provoke hostile emotions against others or at least to confuse the addressees. Diffuseness can be an instrument to make someone feel insecure or to lead him/her into uncertainty and helplessness. But whatever the effect of a diffuse message may be, when it is intentionally used to wield power over the recipient, it has to be seen as an aggressive act and a type of violence (Kuße 2005: 634; Köhnken & Bliesener 2002).

2. A monument

Diffuse messages can be realized not only as elementary speech acts but also as complex communicative acts like paintings, monuments, architecture or movies, especially in their interactions of visual and verbal information. Before analyzing examples from the Soviet and Russian political rhetoric, I will illustrate the nature of diffuse messages with one example from contemporary Russian political discourse. In 2013, a monument of the orthodox Patriarch Hermogenes (1530–1612), who was murdered by Polish forces in 1612 during the Time of Troubles and glorified by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1913, was unveiled in the Alexander Garden in Moscow next to the Kremlin. Now, a hundred years later, the nearly forgotten plan of a monument from 1910 was realized in the year of the glorification jubilee.

The rather anachronistic monument seems to be an innocent act of remembering, 400 years after the death of the hieromartyr and 100 years after glorification. But in 2013, it has to be seen as a part of the Putin-regime's nationalist propaganda, i.e. the message that Russians are saints, victors or martyrs, whereas the others are aggressors. In 2013, one could imagine other monuments, for example a monument for the Polish victims of 1863 (150 years ago), as a kind of expression of sorrow towards Russia's Slavic neighbours. But it is rather improbable that such a monument would be erected nowadays, when even monuments for the victims of the Stalinism, especially the victims from other countries, such as Ukraine (*holodomor*), are hard to find.

The monument for Hermogenes is not an act of direct anti-Polish or anti-European aggression, however, that entails some part of it. Therefore, it fulfills the criteria for diffuse messages, i.e. not showing the intention that stands behind them. Furthermore, this non-linguistic example illustrates the fact that diffuse messages are not lies in a narrow sense. The underlying case is: Hermogenes was murdered by the Polish army and glorified in 1913. However, these facts presented in the form of a pseudohistorical monument (it looks like it was established in 1910) tend to lead to false assumptions, i.e. that Europe and especially Poland are the historical aggressors against the innocent and saintly Russia.

3. Diffuseness and vagueness

Like the monument for Hermogenes, intentional diffuse messages in general hide one's true interests (cf. Dönninghaus 1999: 211). However, not all diffuse messages are intentionally diffuse and not every intentionally diffuse message is an instrument of aggression. Diffuseness can be caused by other elements than violence. It



Figure 1. Patriarch Hermogenes (1530–1612) (Photo: H.K.)

can be produced by stress, uncertainty or anxiety. In some cases, diffuse messages can be seen as a test of intelligence, empathy or other skills of the interlocutor. For instance, the answer of the oracle of Delphi to the question of the Lydian king Croesus (from 560 to 547 BC) whether he should attack the Persians or not, is diffuse, but not aggressive.

- (1) If you make war on the Persians, you will destroy a great empire.
(Waterfield 2006: 22)

The answer is pragmatically diffuse, because Croesus could not know if it was ADVICE or a WARNING. Croesus' mistake was that he interpreted the oracle in the way he wished the answer to be, but there is no ground to assume hostile intentions towards him. Therefore the diffuse message is not an act of violence. It arises as an interplay of form and intention. But what we can discern in the oracle's answer is one of the typical though not necessary features of diffuse messages. The diffuse illocutionary orientation is based on vagueness of the locution. "You will destroy a great empire" is referentially vague, because it does not specify which empire is going to be destroyed: whether the Persian or the Lydian one.

From the perspective of referential vagueness, (1) is semantically vague because it includes the vague term *great* and Croesus relates it to the Persian Empire (about *vagueness* see Pinkal 1995; Dönninghaus 2005: 268–281). In this case and in general, referential or/and semantic vagueness is an instrument of diffuseness, but it is not the necessary instrument.

For example, the monument for Hermogenes is not vague in its reference. On the other hand, there are vague utterances without diffuseness. That is the case in the following Example (2):

- (2) Marcia and Ted are debating on the issue of abortion. Ted, who is pro-life, argues: "There can be no abortion when the fetus becomes a person." Marcia replies: "That's hopelessly vague! There is no way to exactly define when the fetus has become a 'person'. You don't have a leg to stand on there!"
(Walton & Reed & Macagno 2008: 118)

Ted clearly expresses an opinion, and Marcia interprets his speech-act in this assertive way. The problem is that the opinion cannot be approved because of the vagueness of the term 'person', but it is not diffuse neither in its illocutionary intention nor in its axiological orientation.

We have seen that diffuseness can be evoked intentionally or unintentionally. In the case of intentionality, it is often more than a rhetorical device, i.e. an act of aggression which is intended to mislead the recipient or to leave him unsure about his situation. The aim of aggressive diffuse messages is to wield power over the recipient. In the next chapter, some examples of intentional diffuseness in the Soviet and Russian political rhetoric are presented.

4. Diffuseness in political rhetoric

In this chapter, I will analyze diffuse messages in Soviet and contemporary nationalist Russian political discourse, which can be classified as totalitarian or nearly totalitarian. The analysis includes examples from Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev and Putin, who represent both time periods under scrutiny. The use of rhetorical devices is neither isolated nor idiosyncratic but embedded in historical traditions. Despite the collapse of the Soviet regime, forms and instances of its political persuasion style are still applied today, and some of the ways of totalitarian thinking and speaking not only persist, but they have been actively renewed for the last decade. Thus, the current political discourse cannot be described without making references to the past.

Soviet political discourse has been analyzed several times. However, when examined from the perspective of linguistic violence, the focus often lies on openly aggressive forms like those of Stalin's prosecutor Andrey Vyshinsky (cf. Kuße 2013; Kuße 2015). His invectives against the accused in the show trials – that they should be “shot like dirty dogs!” and that the “people are demanding one thing: crush the accursed reptile!” (Report 1938: 697) – are well known and often cited. These forms of hate speech from the official side of the state were complemented by the rhetoric of gloriousness and the celebration of the magnitude of the empire.

On the other hand, these forms also include a lot of the more formal, administrative and bureaucratic style the so-called *newspeak* or *langue de bois* (Weiss 1986). Both the offensive rhetoric of aggression with its humiliations, accusations and threats; and the bureaucratic style, contributed to the diffuseness of the messages which were intentionally used by the Soviet leaders. This can be observed in the speeches of Vladimir I. Lenin, although his rhetoric of war and revolution seemed to be illocutionary and axiologically unambiguous.

Lenin

In Vladimir I. Lenin's rhetoric, it seems to be obvious what is good and what is evil, who are the friends and who are the enemies. Undoubtedly, the good have to fight against the bad, they have to pursue them and kill them. Nevertheless, a lot of ambiguous evaluations and references can be observed. In these instances, it was not always clear who should be treated as a friend and who as an enemy. This concerned rather large groups of society, among others, the peasants who together with the workers were frequently mentioned in Lenin's speeches during the civil war.

- (3) Средний крестьянин не враг, а друг рабочего, друг Советской власти.
(Lenin 1969b: 235)
- The middle peasants are not enemies but friends of the workers, friends of Soviet power.
(Lenin 1972: 244)

The assertion seems to refer in a friendly manner to the so-called middle peasants. In fact, it is diffuse and aggressive not only against the group of big landowners, but also in reference to the group it refers to.

As aforesaid, diffuseness is based on semantic and referential vagueness. Firstly, it has to be mentioned that the designation *middle peasant* is intensionally and extensionally as vague as the term *friend*, and they depend on the will of the regime. However, the vagueness alone doesn't make the expression diffuse. The proposition entails an important generalization which is realized by the Russian generic singular. This generalization that all middle peasants should be friends of the workers and the Soviet power, and the implicit identification of *workers* and *friends with the Soviet power* makes the message diffuse.

In fact, not all the middle peasants were friends of the bolsheviks. The concept itself is diffuse since middle peasants are seen as peasants with land ownership, which is, however, smaller than the land possessed by that of the big landowners (the so-called kulaks). But the border between these two groups wasn't defined. A *similar* false generalization was made about the working class. There were a lot of skeptics and oppositional thinkers among the workers as well. Thus the expression *sredny krest'yanin drug* (*middle peasants are friends*) is a directive: "You have to see friends among middle peasants", rather than a description. As pointed out by Charles Morris, such descriptive directives are common in political discourse (Morris 1946: 145–146). But there are other illocutions included in this short axiological assertion. These illocutions are THREAT and JUSTIFICATION.

Lenin's words threatened the *kulaks*, who were peasants not accepted as members of the middle class. Furthermore, the statement pressured everybody who was not a friend of the Soviet power. Those who cannot be seen as 'real' middle peasants are thus the enemies. The statement indirectly justifies the persecution of peasants. It is diffuse because it can be regarded as an act of friendship and inner appeasement on the one hand, but also as a threatening act justifying the ongoing terror. The next Examples (4) and (5) follow this line of interpretation.

- (4) [Б]ой против кулаков мы называем *последним*, решительным боем. (Lenin 1969a: 40)
 [W]e call the fight against the kulaks the *last*, decisive fight. (Lenin 1974: 56)
- (5) Рабочий класс не может помириться с кулаком, а с средним крестьянином он может искать и ищет *соглашения*. (Lenin 1969a: 41)
 The workers cannot come to terms with the kulak, but they may seek, and are seeking, an *agreement* with the middle peasant. (Lenin 1974: 57)

Referential and semantic vagueness are repeated. Who should be called a *kulak* (4), who is a *middle peasant* (5)? And what cannot the workers come to terms with

(*pomirit'sya*) (4), and what agreement do they seek (*soglashenie*) (5)? Only the call to battle in (4) makes clear that *ne pomirit'sya* (5) means *to annihilate, to murder*. The peasants that are referred to as *kulaks* are therefore the enemies. Due to the fact that (4) precedes (5), the latter can be understood as a threat that allows the so-called middle peasant nothing else than to agree to that 'offer you can't refuse'.

Stalin

In totalitarian regimes, public persuasion in the form of propaganda and agitation increases in order to stabilize the system through controlling the speech both at the level of content and form to justify violence (Kuße 1998: 71). In the Stalinist era, the propaganda was accompanied by a pathos of freedom, self-determination and understanding, which made the whole propagandistic discourse diffuse, as the next example illustrates. It is often cited in textbooks on Stalinism not only as a form of criticism but also as a way of glorifying the era in current times.

- (7) Болтают о демократии. Но что такое демократия в партии? Демократия для кого? Если под демократией понимают свободу для пары - другой оторванных от революции интеллигентов болтать без конца, иметь свой печатный орган и т.д., то такой « демократии » нам не нужно, ибо она есть демократия для ничтожного меньшинства, ломающего волю громадного большинства. Если же под демократией понимается свобода для партийных масс решать вопросы нашего строительства, подъём активности партийных масс, втягивание их в дело руководства партией, развитие в них чувства хозяина в партии, - то такая демократия у нас есть, она нам нужна, и мы её будем развивать неуклонно, несмотря ни на что.

(Stalin 1949: 327)

There is talk about democracy. But what is democracy in the Party? Democracy for whom? If by democracy is meant freedom for a couple or so of intellectuals divorced from the revolution to engage in endless chatter, to have their own press organ, etc., then we have no use for such "democracy," because it is democracy for an insignificant minority that sets at naught the will of the overwhelming majority. If, however, by democracy is meant freedom for the mass of the Party membership to decide questions connected with our work of construction, an upsurge of activity of the Party membership, drawing them into the work of Party leadership, developing in them the feeling that they are the masters in the Party, then we have such democracy, that is the democracy we need, and we shall steadily develop it in spite of everything. (Applause)

(Stalin 1954: 335–336)

The Neo-Stalinists quote these words¹ to praise Stalin as the only ‘right’ and ‘true’ democrat. However, the statement itself and its Neo-Stalinist interpretation are contradictory, because the speaker openly denies the main features of democracy: the freedom of opinion and free speech. The enemy group stays vague and it is unclear what the “freedom for the mass of the Party membership to decide questions connected with our work of construction” means. This is the reason why the message can be characterized as diffuse. It can be understood as a top down initiative of democratization but also as the exact opposite. Furthermore, the statement can be regarded not only as an opinion but also as a threat and a justification of mass extermination.

Brezhnev

The next example is known as the *Brezhnev Doctrine*. It was delivered in a speech to the Polish Communist Party after the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

- (8) КПСС всегда выступала за то, чтобы каждая социалистическая страна определяла конкретные формы своего развития по пути социализма с учётом специфики своих национальных условий. Но известно, товарищи, что существуют и общие закономерности социалистического строительства, отступление от которых могло бы повести к отступлению от социализма как такового. И когда внутренние и внешние силы, враждебные социализму, пытаются повернуть развитие какой-либо социалистической страны в направлении реставрации капиталистических порядков, когда возникает угроза делу социализма в этой стране, угроза безопасности социалистического содружества в целом – это уже становится не только проблемой народа данной страны, но и общей проблемой, заботой всех социалистических стран. (Brezhnev 1970: 329)

The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country determine the specific form of its development along the road of socialism with consideration for the specific condition of its nationals. However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to halt the development of any socialist country and restore the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, or a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a common problem, concern for all socialist countries. (cit. by Glazer 1971: 169–170)

1. [<http://red-sovet.su/post/16089/weakling-stalin> (retrieved: 26. 04. 2016)]

In the political context three months after the invasion, there is one possible interpretation of this declaration. It was undoubtedly regarded as a justification of the military intervention and as a demonstration of the leading position of the Soviet Union among the socialist states. Nevertheless, the form of the message is diffuse. Whereas the diffuseness of (3)–(7) is based on semantic and referential vagueness, the diffuseness in (8) rests on the semantical-syntactic vagueness of the adversative structure of the whole text. The argument is diffuse, the first part of the doctrine explicitly confirms the autonomy of all socialist countries, however, considering the historical and political context, the second part represents a mighty declaration of Soviet imperialism.

Putin

The model of diffuse rhetoric that can be observed in the Brezhnev Doctrine can also be identified in a number of prominent statements by Vladimir Putin. The following Example (9), delivered on the brink of Euromaidan at a press conference in September 2013, is highly diffuse.

- (9) Ну, посмотрим, каким будет выбор украинского руководства. К любому, какой бы выбор ни был сделан, мы отнесемся с уважением и, безусловно, будем продолжать работать. Но вопрос просто только в том, как будем работать, что мы должны будем предпринять для защиты своих собственных интересов. Ну, видно будет. (Интервью Первому каналу и агентству Ассошиэйтед Пресс, 4 сентября 2013 года)

We'll see what the Ukrainian leadership will choose. No matter what choice is made, we will treat it with respect and continue our work. But the question is just how we will be working, what we will need to do to protect our own interests. We'll see. (Interview to Channel One and Associated Press

news agency, September 4, 2013. Retrieved May 1, 2016 from <http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143>)

The statement concerns the upcoming signing of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement by President Yanukovich, which actually did not take place in the end. At first sight, the statement seems to be a sign of respect, supporting the autonomy of former Soviet republics. But the argument shifts to the opposite. As a result of its adversative connection between the first and the second part, the statement becomes a threat to the Ukraine government. The rhetoric was effective and Yanukovich, to whom obviously the comment was indirectly addressed, understood the threat and backed away from signing the agreement.

The next examples come from Putin's speech on March 18th, 2014. The justification of the intervention in Crimea includes features of a light form of hate speech with overall defamations.

- (10) [X]орошо понимаю тех, кто с мирными лозунгами вышел на майдан, выступая против коррупции, неэффективного госуправления, бедности. Права на мирный протест, демократические процедуры, выборы для того и существуют, чтобы менять власть, которая не устраивает людей. Но те, кто стоял за последними событиями на Украине, преследовали другие цели: они готовили государственный переворот очередной, планировали захватить власть, не останавливаясь ни перед чем. В ход были пущены и террор, и убийства, и погромы. Главными исполнителями переворота стали националисты, нео-нацисты, русофобы и антисемиты. Именно они во многом определяют и сегодня ещё до сих пор жизнь на Украине.

(Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года)
 I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day. (Address by President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>)

In the first part, the Maidan protest movement is treated in a positive manner: “I understand those who came out to Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty.” But further on, these friendly words have only one function: to defame the actual activists, the parliament and political leaders. The same structure can be observed in nearly every part of the speech, which can be considered as one of the finest examples of diffuse political discourse in the last ten years.

- (11) Не верьте тем, кто пугает вас Россией, кричит о том, что за Крымом последуют другие регионы. Мы не хотим раздела Украины, нам этого не нужно. (Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года)

Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that.

(Address by President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>)

The words “Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia” can tranquilize the hearer, but how should the commitment “We don’t want to divide Ukraine” be understood, followed by the comment “we do not need that”? The possible

consequences of this commitment remain vague. What if under changing circumstances the standpoint changes, and the empire then wishes to divide its neighbor country? One cannot know if this is a commitment to peace or an announcement of aggression with the wolf's "soft voice" from the "lump of chalk". In this line, we can see the emphatic commitment of brotherhood which is repeated several times and not only in this speech (cf. Gorham 2014: 146–148). In (12) Putin firstly speaks about *the fraternal Ukrainian people*.

- (12) А отношения с Украиной, с братским украинским народом были и остаются и всегда будут для нас важнейшими, ключевыми, без всякого преувеличения. (Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года)

Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance for us.

(Address by President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>)

The importance of common historical grounds and therefore family ties between Ukraine and Russia is underlined by the formula of stability *byli i ostayutsya* (*have always been and will remain*) which is well-known from the Soviet Newspeak (Weiss 1986). However, Putin goes further than this and moves from speaking about *bratskiy narod* (*fraternal nation*) to *odin narod* (*one nation*).

- (13) Скажу прямо, у нас болит душа за всё, что происходит сейчас на Украине, что страдают люди, что они не знают, как жить сегодня и что будет завтра. И наша обеспокоенность понятна, ведь мы не просто близкие соседи, мы фактически, как я уже много раз говорил, один народ. Киев – мать городов русских. Древняя Русь – это наш общий исток, мы всё равно не сможем друг без друга. (Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года)

Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see the people's suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.

(Address by President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>)

The term *odin narod* (*one nation*) is justified by the common (medieval) roots of Ukraine and Russian history. It is hardly surprising that the 200-year history of suppression (from the expansion of the Russian Empire under Catherine II up to

the dismemberment of the Soviet Union), which could be treated as an argument against any emphasis of brotherhood, is not mentioned here. In later speeches, interviews and press conferences, Putin mostly uses the expression *one nation* as, for example, at the National Youth Forum in August 2014. There, the President explicitly excludes serious historical references which could deny the presented political mythology.

- (14) Вообще это огромная трагедия, до которой мы дошли, – столкновения на Украине. Вот люди, которые имеют свои собственные взгляды, здесь историков очень много, на историю нашей страны, могут поспорить, но мне кажется, что русский и украинский народ – это практически один народ, вот кто бы чего ни говорил. (Всероссийский молодёжный форум «Селигер-2014», 29 августа 2014 года)

This is an immense tragedy, this conflict in Ukraine. There are historians here, and people with their own views on our country's history might argue with me, but I think that the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are practically one single people, no matter what others might say. (Seliger 2014 National Youth Forum, August 29, 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46507>)

The commitment to “brotherhood” or “unity” is diffuse, because it could be understood and treated as a commitment to peace, friendship, and respect towards the ‘brothers and sisters,’ but also as a legitimation of the intervention and the suppression, with the underlying idea put forward that the ‘stronger brother’ knows better what is good for him and his ‘uneducated relatives.’ This diffuseness can be identified in the short speech during the so-called *Concert celebrating Crimea and Sevastopol’s reunification with Russia*, in which Putin directs his words directly to the Russians and indirectly to the Ukrainians (15):

- (15) Дорогие друзья! Мы всегда в России считали, что русские и украинцы – это один народ.
Я так думаю и сейчас. Конечно, крайний национализм всегда вреден и опасен. Уверен, что украинский народ ещё даст достойную и объективную оценку деятельности тех, кто довёл страну до такого состояния, в котором она находится сегодня.
Мы со своей стороны будем делать всё, что от нас зависит, для того, чтобы Украина прошла этот сложный период своего развития как можно быстрее, и всё для того, чтобы восстановить нормальные межгосударственные связи. (Концерт, посвящённый воссоединению Крыма и Севастополя с Россией, 18 марта 2015 года)

Friends, we in Russia always saw the Russians and Ukrainians as a single people. I still think this way now. Radical nationalism is always harmful and dangerous of course. I am sure that the Ukrainian people will yet come to an objective and worthy appraisal of those who brought their country to the state in which it is in today.

For our part, we will do everything we can to help Ukraine get through this difficult period in its development as soon as possible and establish normal interstate ties.

(Concert celebrating Crimea and Sevastopol's reunification with Russia. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47878>)

Against the background of the diffuseness, which follows from formulas like *one nation* it seems rather unclear what should be meant by such announcements like “we will do everything we can to help Ukraine get through this difficult period”.

5. Conclusion

Diffuse messages are one of the instruments of violence in the form of seemingly friendly communication. Examples can be found in different political systems, but they are a typical device of totalitarian or authoritarian communication, where axiological positive names and terms like *friends*, *brothers*, *freedom*, *security*, are used to hide hostility or to justify it. Intentionally diffuse messages can often be seen as acts of aggression due to their semantic vagueness and unclear axiological and/or illocutionary orientation that mislead the recipients and leave them in an ambiguous situation. Diffuseness is aggressive when it is an instrument to wield power over the recipient. Well known examples from the Soviet period, i.e. Lenin's speeches about ‘middle peasants’, Stalin's words about democracy, and the so-called Brezhnev doctrine are clear illustrations of this rhetoric. Today it can be found especially in Putin's statements about the ‘brotherhood’ and ‘unity’ of the Russian and Ukrainian people.

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The conflict about the 1940 Katyn' massacre and the 2010 declaration of the Russian State Duma

Daniel Weiss

The execution of 22,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in the forests of Katyn' in 1940 constituted a stumbling block for the relations between the two countries for several decades. Although the investigation conducted by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office (1991–2004) already confirmed Soviet responsibility for the crime, Russia refused to recognize the massacre as a war crime or genocide and was not willing to declassify the Russian archive materials and to express a posthumous rehabilitation of the victims. On March 22, 2005, the Polish Sejm protested against this stance by requesting that the Russian side provide access to the Katyn' files. In April 2012, the European Court of Human Rights recognized the Katyn' massacre as a war crime. In the meantime, the Russian resistance had weakened: 67 out of a total of 183 volumes of the criminal case were transferred to Poland, and Andrzej Wajda's film about the Katyn' crime was shown on Russian television in 2007. After the official expressions of regret pronounced by Gorbačev, El'cin and Putin, the Duma eventually approved a resolution that blamed Stalin and the NKVD for the crime (November 26, 2010).

Besides the historical and legal background, the article is devoted to the analysis of this debate as well as its Polish forerunners and subsequent reactions. Special attention is given to the position of the Communist Duma fraction, which kept denying any Soviet guilt. Moreover, the role of historical (counter) arguments and quotations is examined in detail. Based on a speech-act theoretical approach, the study finally gives a negative answer to the question whether the Russian government and/or parliament have ever delivered a full-fledged apology for the Katyn' massacres.

Keywords: apology, European Court of Human Rights, genocide, Katyn massacre, historical parallels, quotations, parliamentary debate, Polish-Russian relations, political reconciliation, war crime

1. Introduction

The impressive bulk of literature on the mass executions of 21,000 Polish prisoners committed by the NKVD in spring 1940 in the Katyn' forests, Kalinin and Kharkiv and their repercussions in post-Soviet times is still growing. However, due to the complexity of this topic – it involves four different countries (Russia, Poland, Ukraine; the role of Belarus still remains unclear), relates not only to various political levels, such as governmental vs. parliamentary interaction, but also to legal and media discourse and comprises national as well as international institutions –, the literature already available does not cover this domain entirely. For example, Etkind et al. (2012: 110) briefly summarise the Katyn' Declaration of the Russian State Duma from 2010 but do not mention its Polish counterpart, viz. the 2005 resolution of the Sejm. Legal aspects such as the genocide controversy are usually not presented in detail, and there is no discussion of the exact status of the alleged Russian apologies. Moreover, recent developments call for permanent updates that are not reflected in the existing literature: for example, Etkind et al. (2012) do not include the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. This holds of course to an even greater extent for Cienciala et al. (2007), otherwise a valuable historical overview with a selection of the most important sources translated into English.

For the time being, linguistic analyses on the conflicting Polish and Russian Katyn' discourses are completely lacking. In view of the complexity of the whole issue, the present study can cover but a very modest part of it: it investigates the debate of the Russian State Duma (the lower chamber of the federal parliament) on a declaration on the Katyn' massacre from November 26, 2010, and its final outcome (Zajavlenie 2010). The analysis aims at the following goals: (i) it tries to situate the debate in the context of the historical background and the complex interplay of different political and legal discourses; (ii) it examines the debate itself against this background by revealing parallel threads of argumentation, but also specific traits and thematic omissions and by pointing to inconsistencies detectable in the stance of both supporters and adversaries of the declaration; (iii) it focuses on the verbal characteristics of this debate and highlights the role historical parallels and quotations play within the competing argumentations. Moreover, (iv) it addresses a linguistic problem of wider bearing: have post-Soviet Russian representatives ever officially apologized (in the full sense of the term, see Section 7 below) for the Katyn' crime? Finally, the impact of the plane crash at Smolensk that took the lives of 96 high Polish officials on April 10, 2010, on the Katyn' discourse will be briefly discussed. Due to reasons of space, the Ukrainian and Belarusian scenes of the tragedy had to be left aside.

The study is based on the electronic transcript of the debate on the draft of the Declaration in the Russian State Duma and its output, the Declaration itself (26 November 2010); all in all, these excerpts encompass 11,614 words. In terms

of methodology, my approach is mainly qualitative and based on pragmatically informed discourse analysis. The study analyzes the rhetorical devices used, such as conventional metaphors and their replicas in other documents, and quotations. Given the striking number (145) of the latter, the study examines the inventory of sources referred to, their functions, clustering, mutual relations, quantitative characteristics and some unusually framed references to these sources. Grammar is involved in ambiguous syntactic constructions. Most attention is paid to the numerous pro- and con-arguments from both sides, their adequacy (especially when discussing historical parallels) and their inconsistencies.

2. The broader context: Political vs. legal interactions

Before tackling our main subject, it may be worthwhile recalling the main historical events that led to the conflict under examination.¹ Based on the Secret protocol of the treaty of non-aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, on September 17, 1939, Soviet Union started an undeclared war against Poland, an event that was anticipated as the « fourth partition of Poland » by the Soviet deputy minister V. P. Potemkin in 1938. As a result, about 500,000 Polish citizens were seized by the Soviet troops, 130,242 eventually remained arrested. In April 1940, the Soviet NKVD executed 21,857 Polish prisoners (mostly belonging to the intellectual and social elite) in the forests of Katyn' (Smolenskaja oblast'), in Mednoe near Kalinin and in Kharkiv (Ukraine). The question why exactly these men were murdered while other Polish citizens retained in Soviet camps escaped execution will probably never be answered. The tragic senselessness of the Katyn' massacre becomes even more evident if we recall that not much later, after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin initiated the formation of a Polish army, which was conscripted from the Gulag, to fight the Nazi invaders under the command of general W. Anders.

In February 1943 relics of the victims were discovered by the German field police in the Katyn' forest. The findings were published by Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, and an international investigation committee attributed the responsibility for this crime to the Soviet NKVD. The Soviet authorities denied being involved and accused Germany to have committed the crime in 1941; this claim was supported by the investigation conducted by the so-called Burdenko commission. At the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945–1946, the Soviet prosecutor Ju.V. Pokrovskij accused the Germans of being guilty of the massacre, but the latter were acquitted in the final judgment. The Soviet side maintained its denial till April 13, 1990, when

1. For a comprehensive timeline of the main events, see Etkind et al. (2012: xiv–xxviii).

the Burdenko report was repudiated and President Gorbačev handed a preliminary list of victims of the executions to President Jaruzelski during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1990. The Soviet government now officially acknowledged Soviet responsibility for the Katyn' massacre (Zajavlenie TASS 1990):

- (1) Выявленные архивные материалы в своей совокупности позволяют сделать вывод о *непосредственной ответственности* за злодеяния в катынском лесу *Берии, Меркулова* и их подручных. Советская сторона, выражая *глубокое сожаление* в связи с катынской трагедией, заявляет, что она представляет одно из тяжких преступлений сталинизма.

The detected archival materials allow concluding that Berija, Merkulov, and their subordinates are directly responsible for the crime in the forest of Katyn'. Expressing its deep regret because of the Katyn' tragedy, the Soviet side declares that it represents one of the fatal crimes of Stalinism.

As can be seen, the text combines a factual (acknowledgment of the Soviet responsibility) and an emotional (regret) element. This combination has become mandatory in all later statements on the Katyn' massacre (see Section 7). What is striking, though, is the designation of the event itself: besides *tragedija*, which prevails in today's Russian official statements, we find *prestuplenie* 'crime' and *zloдеяние* 'atrocities', which nowadays (with the notable exception of Putin's speech on the seventieth anniversary of the crime) almost never occur in official discourse.² In this regard, the Russian 1990 declaration is closer to the terminology used in Polish documents about Katyn' with *zbrodnia* 'crime'³ as dominating term than most subsequent Russian governmental statements.

The 1990 exchange initiated a long-term interaction between the governments of both countries. During his term as Polish president, Lech Wałęsa visited Katyn' in 1992, and Boris El'cin visited Warsaw in 1993, where he laid a wreath at the Katyn' memorial. Then a long-lasting interruption followed that was obviously due to a change of the Russian strategy: the Russian side now downplayed the significance of the Polish losses and stressed the presence of Soviet victims in the Katyn' area, allegedly composed by nine thousand civilians executed by the NKVD

2. On the other hand, *prestuplenie* is still in use in publications of the NGO "Memorial".

3. In Polish penal law, the term *zbrodnia* functions as a hyponym of *przestępstwo* 'crime' and denotes crimes that are punished by imprisonment for a term of minimally three years, whereas its co-hyponym *występek* is intended for lesser offences including those for which only fines are imposed. In everyday language, *zbrodnia* simply designates a more serious crime that is especially condemned by society. Frequent collocations with a multitude of victims involved are *zbrodnia wojenna* 'war crime' or *zbrodnia przeciw ludzkości* 'crime against humanity', where *przestępstwo* would be inadequate. The Polish-English dictionary (Słownik online) offers for *zbrodnia kатыńska* only the English equivalent "Katyn massacre".

and five hundred prisoners of war, killed by the Nazis. The Russian side deplored “the escalation of demands presented to the Russian side”, as B. El'cin put it in his letter to L. Wałęsa (Cienciala 2007: 348). Not surprisingly, El'cin did not attend the ceremony of laying the foundation stone at the Polish Katyn' memorial by Wałęsa.

Russians also exerted pressure on the Poles to agree to a joint memorial without marking national boundaries. On the whole, the ideology behind the commemoration of the fallen was now oriented towards the victims of totalitarianism altogether (Etkind et al. 2012: 129 f.). Thus, the execution of Polish prisoners of war was deprived of its exceptional character. As will be shown below, the “symmetrical, wartime Katyn' victimization narrative” (Etkind et al. 2012: 129) permeated also the Duma Declaration from 2010.

It may be surmised that the outcome of the legal investigation in 2004 (see below) provided the next backlash to the Polish-Russian governmental dialogue. Only on 7 April 2010 did the Prime Ministers Donald Tusk and Vladimir Putin meet at a joint ceremony to commemorate the seventieth anniversary at Katyn', where Putin stated that there was no justification of this crime (*prestuplenie*), and the political, legal and moral condemnation of the wrongdoings (*złodejanija*) of the totalitarian regime would never be revised. At their common press conference, he however avoided answering the journalists' questions about the declassification of further legal documents, the rehabilitation of the victims and the disclosure of the perpetrators' names (Putin 2010). Three days later, the Polish plane with a delegation of 96 persons including President Lech Kaczyński and his wife crashed on their way to commemorate the same anniversary near Smolen'sk, killing all passengers. This catastrophe marks the end of immediate contacts between highest-ranking representatives of the two countries.

In the meantime, legal action had been intensified. From 1991 to 2004 an investigation conducted first by the Russian Military Chief Prosecutor and then by the Prosecutor General's Office confirmed Soviet responsibility for the crime, but Russian authorities refused to recognize the massacre as a war crime or genocide and were not willing to declassify the majority of Russian archive materials – out of 183 volumes of documents, only 67 were transferred to Poland (Boćkowski & Dzienkiewicz 2007) –, provide access to them and to express a posthumous rehabilitation of the victims. The place where the murdered officers had been buried was not indicated, nor were the culprits identified due to the alleged destruction of the pertaining documents. For the same reason, only part of the victims are known today. Eventually, the investigation was abandoned “because of the death of the perpetrators”; in other words, there has never been a trial related to the Katyn' executions at a Russian tribunal. Even the rehabilitation of the victims still constitutes an unresolved problem. To quote the leader of the Russian NGO Memorial, this produces an evident paradox (Gur'janov 2015):

- (2) То есть, с одной стороны, Россия официально признает, что были расстреляны 22 тысячи польских граждан, а с другой – как только поступают заявления о признании жертвами расстрела конкретных военнопленных с фамилией и именем, Россия отказывается в этом признании. Это означает, что официальная Россия стремится изо всех сил эту 22-тысячную массу жертв удержать в состоянии анонимности, безликости.

In other words, on the one hand Russia officially acknowledges that 22 thousand Polish citizens were shot, but on the other hand, as soon as there appear claims to recognise concrete WOPs with first and last names as victims of the execution, Russia declines the acknowledgment. This means that official Russia by all means strives to keep this mass of 22 thousand victims in a state of anonymity, facelessness.

The closure of the Russian investigation provoked a threefold reaction from the Polish side. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance started its own investigation. At the same time, 34 descendants of Katyn' victims filed complaints in Moscow courts, but all claims were rejected. Appeals to the Supreme Court met the same fate. 15 relatives of 12 Katyn' victims now took a complaint against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. In April 2012, the 'basic' seven-judge chamber published its verdict: "(The applicants) suffered a double trauma: losing their relatives in the war and not being allowed to learn the truth about their death for more than 50 years". It continued: "The approach chosen by the Russian military courts to maintain to the applicants' face... that their relatives had somehow vanished in the Soviet camps demonstrated a callous disregard for the applicants' concerns". But it delivered a fatal blow to the Polish genocide claim in stating that "It (the court) found that the mass murder of the Polish prisoners by the Soviet secret police had been a *war crime*."⁴ Moreover, "The Court also said it could not rule on the merits of the Soviet investigation as it related to events that had taken place before Russia ratified the Human Rights Convention in 1998" (Russia-massacre-court 2012).

This result was unsatisfactory for the Polish plaintiffs, as a representative of the Polish Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich put it: "Despite this Russia may see the verdict of the ECtHR as beneficial mainly because it does not pose any legal consequences for Russia (it does not impose an obligation on Russia to resume the investigation into the Katyn massacre, to declassify the documents, change the legal qualification of the crime or to rehabilitate the victims). The court chose not to evaluate whether the Russian investigation into the Katyn massacre had been thorough, arguing that this was beyond its jurisdiction. It thus failed to set a precedence, which the Russian side had feared – the legal consequences of recognising the Katyn massacre

4. For the different definitions of genocide and war crime, see (Rome Statute 1998). Note that all emphasis in quoted examples is mine, D.W.

as a Stalin's atrocity and imposing the liability (including financial) upon Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. For this reason, the verdict has been received favourably in Russia and recognised as balanced and based on compromise. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former advisor to the Kremlin, stated that this issue requires serious moral and political debate but cannot be the subject of a court verdict. This is representative of the mindset of a part of the Russian elite concerning the Katyn issue." (Rogoża 2012). An appeal to the Grand Chambre, which consists of 17 judges, did not alter the outcome: on October 21, 2013, the Court ruled that it was incompetent to judge whether Russia's investigation into the 1940 Katyn killings of Polish war prisoners was inadequate because the Katyn' crime took place before the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 (Final ruling 2013). Thus, the legal track proved inappropriate to enforce the execution of the Polish demands.

The third reaction took place in Parliament: on the 65 anniversary of the massacres on 22 March 2005, the Polish Sejm adopted a protest resolution in which it stated: "Wyrażamy ubolewanie z powodu umorzenia śledztwa w sprawie zbrodni katyńskiej przez prokuraturę generalną Federacji Rosyjskiej" "We express our regret that the Prosecutor General's office of the Russian Federation has closed the investigation of the Katyn' crime" (Sejm 2005). Besides this, it made the same claims that were issued through legal action: recognition of the Genocide character of the crime, disclosure of all circumstances, above all the locations of tombs still unknown, identification and condemnation of all those responsible for the crime (both those who gave the order and those who executed it), and delivery of all documents collected during the investigation. At the end, the resolution stated:

- (3) Zbrodnia katyńska nie może być traktowana jako jedna z wielu wojennych "tragedii". Jej wyjątkowość musi zostać rozpoznana i uszanowana w imię fundamentalnych zasad sprawiedliwości i międzyludzkiej solidarności po to, by już nigdy w przyszłości nikt nie považał się popełnić podobnie haniebnej i bestialskiej zbrodni.

The Katyn' crime must not be treated as one of numerous war "tragedies". Its exceptional character must be recognised and respected on behalf of the fundamental principles of justice and solidarity so that in the future nobody will dare to commit a similarly shameful and monstrous crime.

This exceptional character, which was particularly propagated by the Polish right parties, turned out to be one of the most controversial questions in the whole Katyn' issue. Those who adhered to this view could not be satisfied by such statements as that made by Sergej Karaganov, a member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, who complained that "the country had not yet found the strength to admit that the whole of Russia is one big Katyn" (Etkind et al. 2012: 111). Interestingly enough, a similar metaphorisation of

Katyn' took place in the Baltic republics with regard to the mass deportation and execution of the own elite by the Soviets. Here we find formulations like "Lithuanian Katyns" (Etkind et al. 2012: 91); this did however not encounter protests from the Polish right.

The Sejm resolution did not trigger any echo whatsoever from Russian authorities, nor was it ever mentioned in the Russian parliament. On the whole, unlike in the Polish Sejm, the Katyn' issue played a marginal role in the State Duma. Whereas the word *Katyn'* figures 671 times in the electronic transcripts of all Sejm debates covering the period 2005 – 2015,⁵ the corresponding number in the Duma debates reaches only 56 instances or 8.3% of the Polish amount. The Sejm statistics shows a first peak in 2007, may be due to Wajda's film (see below), and a second one in 2010–2011, which reflects the 60th anniversary of the massacre and the plane crash at Smolensk. In the Duma debates, half of all instances (28) occur in 2010, the year of the Duma Declaration to be explored in this study.

At this point, a flashback to the year 2010 becomes necessary. The plane crash near Smolensk on 10 April produced a wave of public mourning and spontaneous support in the Russian society, which in the eyes of Polish observers revealed "a new face", "the Russia of emotions, of compassion, of the human impulse of help and solidarity" (Etkind et al. 2012: 144). During the question hour of the State Duma on 19 May 2010, Russia's minister of foreign Affairs S. Lavrov called this emotional break-through a unique chance for establishing true good-neighbourly relations with Poland. The new rapprochement also enabled the primetime screening of Andrzej Wajda's film "Katyn'" on Channel One on 11 April, which met an enthusiastic reception from the Russian TV audience.

3. The Duma Declaration from 2010

The same spirit of reconciliation manifests itself in the Declaration of the Russian State Duma from 26 November 2010 (Zajavlenie 2010), on which we will now focus. Its importance is generally underestimated; only the director of *Memorial* points out that it indicates a new stage of the official treatment of the Katyn' crime (Gur'janov 2015):

- (4) Впервые это был официальный документ столь высокого государственного уровня. [...] А 26 ноября 2010 года был принят официальный документ, что действительно мы признаем, что преступление совершено советскими органами, что жертвами преступления пали 22 тысячи польских граждан, что это тяжкое преступление сталинизма.

5. All Polish data was collected and analysed by Bartholomäus Nowak.

This was the first official document of such a high ranking level [...] On 26 November, 2010 an official document was adopted that we really recognise that the crime was committed by Soviet organs, that 22,000 thousand Polish citizens died and that this is a felony of Stalinism.

This assessment reflects rather the optimistic expectations of those days than Polish-Russian relations today: on the long run the Declaration did not have a sustainable impact on the Katyn' discourse due to the hostile attitude of the Polish right forces after the Smolensk catastrophe.

The spirit of reconciliation is metaphorically expressed in the Declaration:

- (5a) Решительно осуждая режим, пренебрегавший правами и жизнью людей, депутаты Госдумы от имени российского народа *протягивают руку дружбы польскому народу* и выражают надежду на начало нового этапа в отношениях между нашими странами, которые будут развиваться на основе демократических ценностей.

By categorically condemning the regime that defied the rights and lives of [these] people, the deputies of the State Duma *stretch out their hands* to the Polish people on behalf of the Russian nation and express their hope for the beginning of a new stage in the relationship between our states, which will develop on the basis of democratic values.

What is more, the Duma also acknowledges the need of further investigations, thus complying with a repeated demand of the Polish side:

- (5b) Депутаты Государственной Думы уверены, что эта работа должна быть продолжена – необходимо и дальше изучать архивы, выверять списки погибших, восстанавливать честные имена тех, кто погиб в Катynи и других местах, выяснять все обстоятельства трагедии.

The deputies of the State Duma are convinced that this work must be continued: it is inevitable to further explore the archives, verify lists of casualties, rehabilitate the honorable names of those who perished at Katyn' and in other places, and clarify all circumstances of the tragedy.

Note that the term *prestuplenie* 'crime, felony' is not avoided in this text: it occurs together with *zlodejanie* 'felony, atrocity' and *tragedija* (three times) 'tragedy'.⁶ In the debate preceding the adoption of this declaration, the root *prestup-* occurs ten times, four of which as part of a quotation and five times with reference to the

6. This should be borne in mind when criticising the Declaration for speaking of "unjustified repressions", a term referring to Stalin's atrocities and coined at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956 (Etkind et al. 2012: 110). Moreover, the alleged terminological identity is not correct: the Declaration has *aktom proizvola totalitarnogo gosudarstva* 'an act of despotism by the totalitarian state'.

Stalinist repressions in general; only V. Žirinovskij, a declared enemy of the Soviet past, uses it referring to the Katyn' massacre. Otherwise, the latter is denoted as 'tragedy' (five times), including the title of the bill to be discussed.

The debate on the draft of the Declaration on 26 November was quite extensive (the published transcript contains 11,614 words).⁷ The draft was lively opposed by the Communist party: during the discussion on the order of business, we find six unsuccessful attempts launched by communists to remove it from the agenda (another 1053 words), and during the debate the CP members tried to contest the reliability of the crucial historical sources. According to these voices, the whole Declaration was based on Goebbel's falsifications and soiled the reputation of Soviet bravery in the Great Patriotic War. One of the Katyn' deniers (L. I. Kalašnikov) also explicitly denied the mass terror during Stalin's ruling, a statement denounced as blasphemous (*koščunstvennoe utverždenie*) by Kosačev, the spokesman of the committees in charge of the draft.

The language used in these speeches was heavily pathetic and emotionally loaded, cf.

- (6) *Как внук фронтовика, погибшего под Ленинградом, не желаю участвовать в акте национального унижения и позора.*
As the grandson of a front-line soldier, I do not wish to take part in this act of national humiliation and shame. 26.11.2010 Lokot' A. E., KPRF
- (7) *И что, вы сегодня хотите проголосовать за то, что победители, спасшие мир от фашистской чумы, наши отцы и деды такие же преступники? Я против такой политической шизофрении, я возмущён.*
So what, today you really want to vote for a statement that the victors who saved the world from the fascist plague, our fathers and grandfathers are at the same time criminals? I am against such political schizophrenia, I am shocked. 26.11.2010 Obuxov S. P., KPRF
- (8) *ну сколько же можно предавать свою историю и подставляться под очередные инсинуации! С моей точки зрения, злейшие враги России готовили этот проект постановления, и желательно бы посмотреть фамилии тех, кто его готовил.*
How many times can one betray one's own history and expose oneself to the next insinuations! In my view, the most malicious enemies of Russia prepared this draught of a resolution, and I would like to have a look at the names of those who prepared it. 26.11.2010 Kolomejcev N. V., KPRF

7. All Duma data is retrieved from <http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/>. Due to the lack of available video archive materials (the archive is accessible only since 12.9.2012), the exact duration of the debate could not be determined.

The same emotional overheat characterises the metaphors used by another communist deputy:

- (9) Нам пора прекратить *поливать грязью* собственное прошлое, тогда и другие не будут *плевать на могилы наших отцов*.
It is high time to stop *pouring mud* on our own past; like this, others will not *spit on our fathers' graves*.
Kalašnikov L. I.

The next argument intended to prevent the House from passing the bill was based on financial arguments (see below, example): a communist deputy presented a shocking sum of two trillion Euros allegedly demanded by the relatives of Polish victims as financial compensation. Besides this, some deputies used a 'tit for tat'-strategy by accusing the Poles of having committed even worse crimes during the Polish-Russian war in the early twenties (see Section 5). At the end of the debate, communist deputies moved no less than 15 amendments, all of which were rejected. Two amendments provided attempts to remove the terms (Soviet) "regime" and "totalitarian state" from the draft. Kosačev reminded their author that Stalinism had also enriched the world with the term "GULAG". The frustration of the communist opponents culminated in deputy Kolomejcev's accusation that Kosačev had insulted the whole Communist Party. Another deputy also took offence, treating this as a moral issue ("*tak vesti sebja nel'zja*" 'one should not behave like this') and pointing out that among those present in the audience, more than 360 had once been members of the Communist Party including more than 180 deputies of the ruling party "United Russia". The Duma eventually passed the bill with a majority of 342 to 57 votes.

Since the deputies of the remaining three fractions supported the project unanimously, the debate was otherwise harmonious and still permeated by the spirit of reconciliation, fostered by the Smolensk plane crash. This is best shown by the statement of Kosačev K. I., member of the ruling party "United Russia" and Head of the Duma Committee of Foreign Affairs:

- (10) Мы обращаемся к тем в Польше, для кого *Катынь* – *последнее препятствие, чтобы поверить новой, современной России*. Но прежде всего это обращение к нашему собственному народу, и я глубоко убеждён, что россияне правильно оценят шаг своих депутатов. Они уже стихийно проявили самую искреннюю солидарность с польским народом, когда в апреле случилась *страшная катастрофа под Смоленском*, и они также готовы сделать вместе с нами этот шаг не только к дальнейшему примирению с поляками, но и к тому, чтобы самим жить в XXI веке без груза трагедий прошлого.

We address those in Poland for whom *Katyn' is the last obstacle to trust the new, modern Russia*. But above all, this is an address to our own nation, and I am deeply convinced that Russians will correctly evaluate this step of their deputies. They have already spontaneously shown their solidarity with the Polish people when in April that *horrid catastrophe at Smolensk* happened, and they are ready to take this new step together with us not only for the further reconciliation with the Poles but also for us ourselves in order to live in the XXI century without the load of past tragedies.

As can be seen, the link to the recent Smolen'sk catastrophe facilitates the task of approaching the Poles emotionally. Metaphors used by the partisans of the Declaration tended to be pathetic, cf.

- (11) Катинь никогда не станет лишь предметом научных изысканий. *Всегда, пусть незримо, будет довлеть над нами злоба её, никогда не разойдутся над этим местом тучи, которыми пытались прикрыть свою вину те, чьими руками была сотворена эта трагедия.*

Katyn' will never become an object of mere scientific explorations. Always, even if invisibly, will this evil weigh heavily upon us, never will the clouds over this spot drift apart by which those who caused this tragedy strived to cover their guilt.

Kovalev N. D. United Russia

Interestingly enough, a former criticism was revised. In 2005 the same politician had blamed the Poles for their inconsistent stance in claiming that the Katyn' crime be declared a genocide while not making the same claim to the Ukrainians who were responsible of a much greater massacre:

- (12) Kosačev K.I., ED ... Можно было бы вспомнить историю с Вольнью, когда силами Украинской повстанческой армии там, под Вольнью, было уничтожено до ста тысяч поляков, причем уничтожено именно по национальному признаку, что несет в себе *все признаки геноцида*. Но однако в Польше это дело не расследуется, оно закрыто по причине того, что виновные в этом преступлении не дожили до наших дней. И при этом дело по Катини, также широко известное, но *очевидно не носившее характер геноцида*, польскими властями активно поднимается вновь и вновь.

Kosačev K.I., 27 May, 2005

We could recall the Wolhynia history, when up to 100,000 Poles were exterminated because of their national identity; this shows *all characteristics of a genocide*. But in Poland this investigation is closed since the perpetrators are dead. On the other hand, the well-known Katyn' case, which *by all evidence does not constitute a genocide*, is again and again put on the agenda by the Polish authorities.

Note that the reason given by the Poles for the closure of the Wolhynia case⁸ is identical with that given by the Russian General prosecutor in the Katyn' procedure in 2004. In 2010, this inconsistency has obviously ceased to be relevant in the eyes of Kosačev:

- (13) В результате так называемой *волынської резни бандеровцями* было уничтожено гораздо больше поляков, чем в Катыни, но и там народы смогли примириться, и теперь Польша и Украина совместно проводят чемпионат Европы по футболу. Очевидно, нельзя только политикой объяснить, почему именно *Катынь остаётся ноющей раной* в душе поляков, сумевших простить других. Полагаю, *оскорбительна* для соседнего народа прежде всего ложь – ложь, которую пестовали десятилетиями, на которой выросли поколения у нас в стране. Kosačev K.I., 26 November 2010
- As a result of the so-called *Wolhynia slaughter* committed by Bandera's fighters, much more Poles were destroyed than at Katyn', but even there the nations found a way to reconciliation, and now Poland and Ukraine are organising the European Soccer Championship together. Obviously, the question why exactly Katyn' remains to be an aching wound in the soul of the Poles, who forgave others, cannot be explained by politics alone. I guess, that it was the lie which was the biggest offence to our neighbouring nation.

This statement is remarkable in two regards. First, it does not mention the still controversial genocide issue, second, it reveals the deeper reason for the never-ending Polish frustration: the lie that during decades covered the Katyn' massacre. Interestingly enough, Kosačev here adopts one of the crucial arguments of the Polish side: what he characterises as his own guess had in reality already been deplored by Polish victims' families, writers (Etkind et al. 2012: 16 ff.) and politicians since decades. The crucial role of the Katyn' lie had already been emphasised by Lech Wałęsa, then Polish president, in his letter to B. El'cin, where he stated that "Katyn became a symbol of truth, a test of sincerity between our two nations. *The lie about the Katyn Forest* served to enslave my fatherland. That is why we Poles are so sensitive to the name of Katyn" (quoted after Cienčila 2007: 347). The wording of the 2005 resolution of the Polish Sejm is even closer to Kosačev's speech (Sejm 2005):

8. On 12 July 2013, the Polish Sejm refuted a bill that aimed at declaring the Wolhynia massacre a genocide (*ludobójstwo*) and at establishing a special commemoration day (Książka 2013: 280–292). In the debate preceding this verdict, many deputies voiced their fear that the endorsement of this bill would be illadvised in the moment where the association treaty between the EU and the Ukraine was at stake.

- (14) Jesteśmy przekonani, że tylko ujawnienie pełnej prawdy o zbrodni, a także napiętnowanie i ukaranie wszystkich jej sprawców będzie służyć *zabliżnieniu ran* i kształtowaniu dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Federacją Rosyjską. Pojednanie i przyjaźń między narodami są możliwe jedynie na fundamencie prawdy i pamięci, a nie *przemilczeń, półprawd i kłamstw*.

We are convinced that only the disclosure of the full truth and the stigmatisation and punishment of all their perpetrators will serve the purpose of *healing the wounds* and creating good-neighbourly relations between the Polish Republic and the Russian Federation. Reconciliation and friendship between nations are only possible when based on truth and remembrance, not *concealment, half-truths and lies*.

The link between the wound metaphor and the Katyn' lie that was reused by the Russian deputy five years later belonged to the invariants of the Polish official discourse: it also occurs in the speech by the Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek at the ceremonial opening of the Polish war cemetery at Katyn' on 28 July 2000 (Cieniala 2007: 351):

- (15) Still, there is *no deeper wound for all Poles than the one which remained unhealed for so long*, regardless of whether or not our family members lie in this cemetery. For Katyn was not only a terrible crime carried out under the majesty of Soviet law; *it was also a lie; a lie repeated thousands of times*, but one which, for all that, did not cease being a lie. The word "Katyn" will, for whole generations in Poland and in the whole world, signify genocide and a war crime.

The adoption of this argument from the Polish side together with the wound metaphor by the head of the Gosduma Committee of Foreign Affairs marks a decisive step within the Russian Katyn' discourse: the pursuit of reconciliation reaches its peak here.

Another reconciliatory strategy consists in stressing the commonalities shared by both nations. In the given case, this may best be reached by pointing out the common tragic fate and the grief caused by it. In the case of Katyn', the victims were even united by the same location. In the Declaration we read (Zajavlenie 2010):

- (16) *Разделяя скорбь с польским народом, депутаты Государственной Думы помнят, что Катынь является трагическим местом и для нашей страны. В Катынских рвах покоятся тысячи советских граждан, уничтоженных сталинским режимом в 1936–1938 годах. – Именно на них отработывалась технология массовых убийств, которая затем в том же месте была применена в отношении польских военнослужащих. Рядом находятся и могилы советских военнопленных, расстрелянных гитлеровскими палачами в годы Великой Отечественной войны.*

By sharing the grief of the Polish nation, the deputies of the State Duma remember that Katyn' is also a tragic site for our own country. In the Katyn' trenches, there lie thousands of Soviet citizens, destroyed by Stalin's regime in 1936–1938. It was on them that the technology of mass murder was first elaborated that was subsequently applied to the Polish military servants. Alongside, the graves of Soviet prisoners of war are located, who were shot by Hitler's henchmen during the Great Patriotic War.

This is, however, a risky path: as may be recalled, the Polish side insisted on the unique character of the Katyn' crime. Therefore, the treatment of two other categories of victims on a par with the Polish victims ran counter to the Polish intentions. Moreover, it was not based on any factual symmetry: unlike the Polish prisoners, the Soviet victims of the NKVD still remain anonymous and their number, as well as the location of their burial sites, are unknown, whereas the alleged 500 Soviet prisoners executed by the Nazis are by all evidence another propagandistic lie concocted by the Burdenko Commission (Etkind et al. 2012: 128–130). Nevertheless, all three categories of victims are today represented by separate memorials on the same territory, and during the opening ceremony of the whole Katyn' memorial in 2000 the official procession first laid wreaths at the Soviet graves and the memorial plaque for the fictitious Nazi victims before proceeding to the Polish burial site (Etkind et al. 2012: 130). Thus, not only were the commonalities pushed to the extreme, but also priority was given to the own Soviet losses.

The closing words of the Declaration again combine three different categories of victims. They could hardly satisfy the expectations of the Polish side, all the more so as they offer a rather inadequate solution for the rehabilitation issue:

- (17) Достижение такого результата будет лучшим памятником жертвам Катинской трагедии, которых с исчерпывающей очевидностью уже реабилитировала сама история, воинам-красноармейцам, погибшим в Польше, советским солдатам, отдавшим свои жизни за ее освобождение от гитлеровского нацизма.

The achievement of this result will be the best memorial for the victims of the Katyn' tragedy, whom history itself has already rehabilitated with sufficient evidence, for the Red Army warriors that perished in Poland, [and?] the Soviet soldiers which gave their lives for its liberation from Hitler's Nazi regime.

As can be seen, the scope now widens by including two new and rather unexpected groups of victims: Red Army men and Soviet soldiers, both fallen in Poland. The asyndetic link between these two NPs in the Russian original allows two alternative interpretations. The first one treats the two groups as identical, with "Soviet soldiers" simply rephrasing "Red Army warriors". Such a coreferential link between the two terms would be perfectly in line with the lexical practice of World War II.

In the Declaration, this would, however, be the only instance of such a paraphrase relation. Moreover, textual cohesion points to the second interpretation, which was judged much more natural by native speakers: the two groups are referentially distinct, and the whole passage reads as an enumeration of three different categories of victims. For this ominous distinction to make sense, we are left with only one possible reading: the Red Army warriors refer to Russian soldiers that disappeared after the Russian-Polish war in 1920 (i.e. before the creation of Soviet Union), whereas the Soviet soldiers fell while fighting the German troops in 1944–1945. The riddle behind the former category will be resolved in Section 5. If the second interpretation turns out to be true, mentioning these people would be much more of a provocation than a reconciliatory gesture towards the Polish side. Be this as it may be, the reminder that the Polish addressees owe their liberation from the Nazis to Soviet troops may trigger the implicature that these losses are comparable to the Polish losses at Katyn’.

All in all, one may thus conclude that the Duma Katyn’ Declaration from 2010 in some respects considerably contributed to improving Polish-Russian relations since it not only acknowledged Stalin’s personal guilt but also condemned the historical lie perpetuated by Soviet authorities. In other respects, however, it did not mark any progress: the symmetrical treatment of Polish and Soviet losses and the rejection of the rehabilitation and genocide claims remained stumbling stones on the path to full reconciliation, and a small part of the Soviet lie (the fictitious Soviet prisoners executed by the Nazis) survived.

4. How to do things with quotes⁹

One of the most striking features of the Katyn’ debate is the abundance of quotations to be found here. There is a twofold reason why quotations play such a prominent role. The first relates to the often discussed general logocentricity of Russian culture and the predilection for learning literary texts by heart fostered by Russian curricula; this leads to a far more frequent use of quotations in the Russian parliament than, for example, its Polish and Czech equivalents. Such “xenoquotations” (a term coined by me to denote all quotations from extraparliamentary sources) include literary fiction, children literature, fables, fairy tales, proverbs and popular

9. This section is related to a research project on implicit communicative strategies in today’s Russian, Polish and Czech political discourse, conducted from 2012 to 2015 (for details see <http://www.research-projects.uzh.ch/p17097.htm>). Within this project, three studies were devoted to the typology and functional diversity of intertextual references in the Russian State Duma (Weiss 2012, 2013b, 2016), whereas two other studies illuminated various other aspects of Duma debates (Weiss 2013a, 2015).

sayings, citations from popular Soviet film comedies and animated films (Weiss 2016). The second stimulus is provided by the Katyn' issue, which involves a host of historical and/or legal sources both from World War II and from the recent controversy on Katyn'. Intertextual references and allusions to literary works and films constitute only a marginal part (5 examples). Most noteworthy is the absence of proverbs, which are so dear to speakers in other parliamentary debates.¹⁰ All in all, the Katyn' debate offers no less than 145 citations, which is an unexcelled record among all forty odd Duma debates investigated so far; second comes the debate on Russia's abstention during the debate of the International Security Council on the Libya resolution (23.3.2011), which yielded 32 quotations.

In what follows, we will focus on certain particularities of the Katyn' debate that do not occur in other Duma debates. Sometimes we find unusual indirect references to the given source. The first illustration is taken from Kosačev's introductory speech (see above, ex.):

- (18) но ложь Катыни никуда не девалась. Как сказано в священной для обоих христианских народов книге, нет ничего тайного, что не сделалось бы явным, и наша задача сегодня – убрать с дороги эту ложь.
 But the Katyn' lie was still there. As the holy book of both our Christian nations says, there is nothing secret that will not become manifest, and it is our duty today to remove this lie from our way. Kosačev K.I. 26.11.2010

What strikes us here is the circuitous reference to the Bible. At first glance, it violates the Gricean maxims of quantity and modality in not naming the source directly. In reality, however, the circumlocution “the holy book of both our Christian nations” serves a higher-ranking purpose: it underlines the religious and cultural common ground of the two nations, their shared core values. The quotation itself (“there is nothing secret...”) is less significant, it does not even violate the Relevance Maxim in the given context, but simply enhances the argument already formulated: the Katyn' lie has to be denounced once and for all. Another seemingly unnecessarily detailed reference occurs in the following fragment:

- (19) Как говорил один из героев *фильма русского режиссёра Тарковского по роману польского писателя Лема*: “Здесь, скорее, что-то с совестью”. Полагаю, это действительно вопрос нашей совести: принять наконец, после стольких лет отрицаний и умолчаний, заявление, которое закрыло бы эту страницу истории, открыв при этом, как всегда это бывает, новую страницу истории

10. Within the sample of 300 tokens analysed in (Weiss 2016: 199–200), this type of source yields most examples (41 quotations or 14% of the total).

‘As one of the main characters of *the film by the Russian director Tarkovsky based on the novel by the Polish writer Lem* put it: “here is probably something that has to do with (a bad) conscience”. I think this is really a question of our conscience: after so many years of denials and concealments, we should finally adopt this declaration that would close this page of history and open, as it always happens, a new page of history. Kosačev K.I.

Why not name the film directly by its title “Solaris”? Most probably, not everybody in the audience was able to recognise the source of the quotation, but that seems rather irrelevant. What is highlighted instead is the common cultural achievement of the two nations: a novel by a Polish author was adapted to a film by a Russian director. As the context surrounding the quotation from the scenario shows, the only link between the quoted words and the ongoing argumentation is provided by the term “conscience”, and the subsequent string adds nothing new to the moral issue of overcoming the Katyn’ lie. As has been argued above, the assumption that the Declaration would put the final word on this page of history turned out to be quite illusionary.

The next quotation combines two references to Polish film productions, one to Wajda’s *Katyn’* and the other one to a TV serial “*Czterej pancerni i pies*” from 1966 that became extremely popular in both countries:

- (20) И не правы те, кто стыдливо убирает с экранов фильм “Четыре танкиста и собака”, это тоже во многом правда, как правда и фильм “Катынь” Анджея Вайды.

And those who ban the film “Four tankers and a dog” from the screens out of a feeling of shame are not right, this film is also true in many respects, as true as is Andrzej Wajda’s film “Katyn”.

Kosačev K.I.

What unites these two productions is their global script (World War II). Their plots mark, however, two opposite poles, because the TV serial tells the story of a Polish tank crew (with one Soviet soldier) fighting the German troops in Soviet Union and thus celebrates the Polish-Soviet brotherhood in arms. Once again, this speaker strives to counterbalance the dark message of the Katyn’ massacre by adding a more reconciliatory note. As for the quotation format, note that this time no concrete text fragments are cited. The global message conveyed by the two film titles is easily deciphered anyway: ‘not all Poles are against us because of the crimes we committed during the war, there were also those who fought together with us’.

In all these cases, the quotations introduce well-known and commonly accepted sources (argument from authority) and serve to underpin the speaker’s current argumentation (argument from analogy). By functioning this way, the quotation may additionally target the opponent’s stance. To the objections raised by communist deputies against the authenticity of the official documents Kosačev replies:

- (21) Я могу в качестве примера продемонстрировать только вот эту книгу “Катынский синдром...”, изданную в прошлом году, под которой стоят подписи представителей Российской академии наук, государственного архива Российской Федерации, Уполномоченного по правам человека в России и многих других авторитетных учёных, подчеркну, учёных-историков. Так вот, *эти выводы основываются на документах, которые были взяты из архива вашей партии, из архива КПСС, где они хранились.*

As an example, I can show you just *this book*:¹¹ “The Katyn’ syndrome”, published last year and signed by representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the State archive of the Russian Federation, the Commissioner of Human rights and many other authoritative scholars, I emphasise: scholarly historians. *Their conclusions are based on documents that stem from the archives of your own party, from the archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where they were stored.*

As can be seen, several sources are involved in this fragment: the scientific publication presented by the speaker during his current speech and the sources it is based on. Since the latter stem from the Communist Party’s own archives, the speaker succeeds in compromising his opponents by this quotation.

Stacked quotations are a characteristic feature of the whole debate. In the next example, double stacking occurs together with inclusion of two sources into a set:

- (22) Я хотел бы обратить ваше внимание на то, что в апреле этого года, после того как на сайте Федерального архивного агентства России по поручению Президента России были опубликованы электронные образцы оригиналов пяти документов, которые сейчас так активно обсуждаются в контексте Катынского дела, включая известную записку Берии на имя Сталина с известной резолюцией Сталина “за” на этом документе...

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in April this year after the publication of the electronic copies *of five original documents on the site of the Federal Archive Agency*, commissioned by the President of Russia, which are now so hotly debated in the context of the Katyn’ case, including *Beria’s well-known note to Stalin with Stalin’s well-known decision “yes”* on this document...
Kosačev K.I.

When trying to disentangle these sources, we find four different communication events involving six textual documents: Putin’s commission triggers the publication of five documents; these encompass a very brief exchange between Beria and

11. Most likely, in this moment the speaker produced a physical instance of the source. Unfortunately, this could not be verified in the video archive (see note 7).

Stalin on the same sheet. The cognitive effort required for decoding this passage is however reduced, since unlike in all preceding examples, the quotations involved do not engender any Gricean implicatures.

The trustworthiness of a given source is not always beyond any doubt. The communist deputy Kašin tries to torpedo the declaration by presenting absurdly high financial claims made by the Polish Katyn' families:

- (23) Подобное постановление потянет за собой следующую, на наш взгляд, составляющую. Сегодня в Польше уже заявили, что цена этого признания составляет 2 триллиона евро. Это пятнадцатилетние доходы всего нашего нефтегазового комплекса.

Such a decision will in our view trigger the following component. Today it *was communicated in Poland* that the price of such a recognition will be two trillion Euro. This equals 15 years' Russian earnings from the oil and gas sector.

This preposterous exaggeration could easily be rejected by another quotation:

- (24) Докладываю, что на настоящий момент в Европейском Суде по правам человека находится четыре коллективных иска против России родственников погибших польских офицеров, четыре.[...] В двух из этих четырёх исков нет вообще требований о компенсации, в одном – *требование символической компенсации морального вреда в сумме 1 евро и в последнем, четвёртом, – в размере, который Суд сочтёт справедливым.*

I can report that currently there exist four collective complaints made by the relatives of Polish officers against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights, four! [...] Two of these complaints do not involve any demands for compensation, one claims one Euro as moral recompensation and the last one leaves the amount to the decision of the Court. Kosačev K.I.

The abundance of historical and legal sources cited is best shown by the following figures: when replying to the insinuation that the Declaration was based on fabricated documents, Kosačev evokes 30 sources (repeated mentions included) in one turn. In his turn, the communist deputy Il'juxin refers to 25 sources. The range of historical sources spans from Lenin's lists of people to be executed to Cičerín's diplomatic note to Goebbel's diary to Churchill's letter to Stalin, etc. Legal sources encompass not only archival documents but also criminological and graphological expert pieces of evidence, the judgement of the Nuremberg trial (which triggered 5 exchanges between a communist deputy and Kosačev!), complaints to various courts, etc. Some references anticipate future statements, such as "future generations will accuse us..."; other obviously involve fictive historical documents. None of these references requires a decoding by means of Gricean implicatures or other inferential procedures.

In sum, intertextual references in parliamentary discourse serve mainly argumentative purposes, no matter whether they convey an implicit message or not. As an additional effect, they may lend themselves to discrediting, if not compromising the opponent. What makes the Katyn' debate exceptional is the indirect reference to certain sources: on the one hand, this complicates the proper decoding of the original, on the other hand, the speaker may thus highlight those experiences and achievements that unite the Polish and Russian nations.

Otherwise, the share of implicit strategies is much smaller than in other Duma debates on controversial topics. Creative (fresh) metaphors do not occur, and rare are instances of embeddings of a conventional metaphor in an unexpected context, cf. *podžariti sebe jaičnicu na požare mirovoj vojny* 'to fry one's scrambled eggs on the conflagration of World War II'. Irony is practically inexistent: only once, the group of deputies that prepared the Declaration is called *tajnaža večerja* 'the last supper' by a communist opponent (for the sarcastic "Let us repent", see below, Example (25)). Except for the last two examples, humorous accents are completely absent, which does not come as a surprise in view of the tragic background of the discussion. Rhetorical questions are less frequent and never ambiguous since they do not allow for an alternative literal reading, as is often the case in other debates. Unintroduced switches between the own and the other's perspective (Weiss 2015: 173), which especially mark Žirinovskij's style, are also missing, as well as other devices borrowed from spontaneous speech.

5. The role of historical parallels¹²

Not surprisingly, historical reminiscences are frequently evoked in the Katyn' debate. In particular, historical parallels offer an especially welcome source of arguments to opponents of the Declaration. The communist deputy Iljuxin reminded the Poles of their own crimes committed against Russian and Soviet citizens in the early twenties:

- (25) Тогда давайте каяться, каяться за то, что в 1919 году поляки расстреляли нашу миссию Красного Креста вместе с Веселовским. Давайте каяться за то, что поляки расстреляли нашего посла в 1927 году. Давайте каяться за то, что в 1920 году в польский плен попало сто тридцать тысяч красноармейцев. В 1921 году Чичерин пишет в ноте временному поверенному в делах Польши в России, что через год в польском плену исчезло шестьдесят тысяч красноармейцев, а по нашим данным, уничтожено было восемьдесят шесть тысяч красноармейцев.

12. For the general impact of historical parallels on Russian political argumentation, see Weiss 2017.

So let us repent for the *shooting of our Red Cross mission together with Veselovskij by the Poles*. Let us repent for their shooting of our ambassador in 1927. Let us repent for the capture of 130,000 Red Army soldiers who became Polish prisoners in 1920. In 1921 Cičerín writes to the Polish representative in a note that within one year there disappeared 60,000 Red Army men in Polish captivity; according to our own calculation 86,000 Red Army men were destroyed.

Iljuxin V. I., KPRF

Note that this reminiscence includes an intertextual reference (Cičerín's letter). The religious term *kajat'sja* 'repent' instead of 'regret', 'feel sorry' or 'excuse' is not used by other speakers. It adds to the sarcastic note of the whole speech. At the same time, it contradicts another deputy's metaphorical assessment: Bagdasarov had stated that the Duma would not put ashes on their head (*praxom golovu posypaem*) by adopting the Declaration. The episode of the Russian prisoners that disappeared in Poland (cf. also Example 26) is by all evidence identical with the one referred to in the closing words of the Declaration (see above, Example 17). Curiously enough, the historical link between the two events was also evoked by V. Putin, who at the joint press-conference with D. Tusk on 7.4.2010 interpreted the Katyn' executions as Stalin's personal vengeance for the defeat against the Poles in 1920, in which Stalin was involved himself as a member of the "Revvoensovet" of the Southwestern Front (Putin 2010).

A second communist counter also refers to the twenties, targeting the genocide issue:

- (26) Я хочу напомнить, что речь идёт о той самой *панской Польше*, которая на территории оккупированных Белоруссии и Украины осуществляла политику государственного геноцида по отношению к народам этих стран. Речь идёт о той самой Польше, на территории которой бесследно исчезли шестьдесят тысяч пленных красноармейцев в 20-е годы. Речь идёт о той самой *панской Польше*, которая совместно с Гитлером растерзала Чехословакию, а затем предложила ему свои услуги для войны с Советским Союзом.

I would like to remind you that we are talking of the same Poland of the *Panowie* that conducted a policy of state genocide against the population of the territories of Belarus and Ukraine, then occupied by the Poles. We are talking of the same Poland on whose territory 60,000 Red army prisoners disappeared without trace in the twenties. We are talking of the same Poland that dismembered Czechoslovakia together with Hitler and offered him their service for a [future] war against Soviet Union.

Ulas V. D., KPRF

This historical 'tit-for-tat' strategy produced no reaction from other members of the Duma, although it would have been easy to reject in the given case: Poland

and Russia had been historical antagonists for centuries and had waged many wars against each other, which ended only with Poland's partitions in 1772–1795. Two bloody uprisings smothered by Russian forces followed in 1830 and 1863. Thus, the 'tit-for-tat' strategy could well open an endless loop of arguments reaching back to the late Middle ages. A deputy of "Just Russia" appealed to the House to put an end to this historical hostility by resorting to the somewhat unexpected argument that getting on friendly terms with the Poles would help avoid Russia's political isolation:

(27) Если же мы будем говорить: "Польша – наш извечный враг" и так далее, и вот это тоже наши враги, – ну тогда извините, а где же у нас союзники-то? Союзников, по всей вероятности, у нас нет.

If we will say: "Poland is our eternal enemy" and so on, and these are also our enemies – well, excuse me, where are our allies? Most likely, we just don't have any.
Bagdasarov S.A., SR

6. Some echoes

The Duma Declaration from 2010 cannot be interpreted as a belated reaction to the appeal of the Polish Sejm from 2005. On its turn, it did not produce an immediate collective reaction of the Polish Sejm. Only four years later do we find an indirect echo. The issue at hand is the election of a new Speaker of the Sejm (*Marszałek Sejmu*). Among the merits of R. Sikorski, the former minister of foreign affairs now running for this post, figures the Duma Declaration:

(28) O czym być może nie wszyscy pamiętają, *Duma rosyjska przyjęła uchwałę potępiającą mord katyński*. To są osiągnięcia niezwykle ważne, które dzisiaj umykają naszej uwadze, ale o których naprawdę warto pamiętać. (Oklaski) One świadczą o zdolnościach dyplomatycznych i koncyliacyjnych Radosława Sikorskiego.

There is one thing that perhaps not all remember: *the Russian Duma has approved a resolution that condemns the Katyn' murder*. These are most important achievements that escape our attention today but merit being recalled. They attest Radosław Sikorski's diplomatic and reconciliatory talents.

Rafał Grupański (PO), 24.09.2014, Wybór Marszałka Sejmu

This somewhat unexpected link surely does not adequately render the real story behind the Duma Declaration. The Declaration did however not pass unnoticed in the Sejm: individual members evaluated it positively.¹³ Grzegorz Schetyna,

13. All Polish statements are translated from Russian and quoted after (Pol'skie politiki 2010).

then Speaker of the Sejm, called it an important symbolic step before President Medvedev's visit to Poland, Stanisław Żelichowski also considered it a positive symbol. The former Polish president Lech Wałęsa commented: "Better late than never", but called it a step in the right direction. Aleksander Kwaśniewski had the impression that with this Declaration the Russian government wanted to clear the Katyn' issue up once and for all. Jarosław Kaczyński, then leader of the right oppositional party PiS, expected concrete steps after the Declaration. "It's good if there is any progress, but now there are two ways: either they recognise, apologise and pay compensations or not. If not, all these are only superficial manifestations". Note that the same politician not much later accused the Russian authorities of having caused the plane crash at Smolensk, continuing the chain of evil that started at Katyn'. Curiously enough, the more controversial elements of the Declaration, such as the treatment of Polish and Soviet victims on a par and the legend of the 500 victims of the Nazis, not to mention the question of the Russian prisoners in Poland that had disappeared in the early twenties, did not encounter any protest from the Polish side.

Thus, one may conclude that the Duma declaration failed to initiate a real dialogue between the two parliaments, but numerous Polish officials welcomed it as a right step towards sincere reconciliation. The rapprochement between the two sides had now reached its peak. Soon after, however, the Smolensk conspiracy theory launched by the Polish right should poison the climate again. Katyn' reappeared the first time on 17.5.2011 in the Gosduma, when the Communist deputy Aparina aired her indignation about these Polish insinuations:

- (29) Вызывает недоумение то, что президент Медведев уже несколько раз извинялся за события в Катыни, однако до сих пор нет отклика от польской стороны. Наоборот, снова начинается наступление на нас по поводу той трагедии, которая произошла в Смоленске.

What we find frustrating is the fact that president Medvedev has already apologized several times for the events in Katyn' but *so far there has been no echo from the Polish side*. On the contrary, we witness again a campaign against us because of the *tragedy* that took place *near Smolensk*.

We will return to the question of the alleged Russian apologies in the next section. At any rate, contrary to the intention of putting an end to this deeply-rooted controversy dividing the two countries that was expressed in the Duma Declaration, Katyn' turns out to be a never-ending source of conflict. This holds even for those Poles who do not adhere to the PiS ideology. In spring 2015 B. Komorowski, then still the incumbent President, emphasised the relevance of Katyn' for the Polish freedom:

- (30) *XX wiek nie zna drugiej takiej zbrodni* – powiedział prezydent Bronisław Komorowski podczas uroczystości poświęconych 75. rocznicy zbrodni katyńskiej, które odbyły się przed Grobem Nieznanego Żołnierza. [...] Nasza wolność to efekt ofiary i wysiłku kilku polskich pokoleń, ale fundament naszej wolności była, jest i będzie pamięć o zbrodni katyńskiej i walka o prawdę. Walka długotrwała, *niezakończona jeszcze dzisiaj*.
The twentieth century knows no similar felony, President Komorowski said at the 75th commemoration of the Katyn' crime at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. [...] Our freedom has been achieved by the sacrifices and the endeavour of several generations of Poles, but the memory of the Katyn' crime and the struggle for the truth were, are and will be the basis of our freedom. A long-lasting struggle *that is still not finished yet today*. 03.04.2015

Such a statement could not pass without sharp protests both from parts of the Polish and Russian public. The Polish party “Samoobrona” criticised that the Polish president obviously had forgotten how many Poles had been annihilated by the Nazis and how many slaughtered by Ukrainian nationalists. Similar voices were heard in Russian media, for instance the TV channel Rossiya 24. In his microblog on twitter, the speaker of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs A. Puškov also regretted Komorowski's not mentioning the Polish victims of the Ukrainian *Banderovcy* (Puškov 2015). The connection of this new backlash of the Polish-Russian relations to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict that had begun a year before is all too obvious. Once more, the Katyn' issue became involved in a greater political turbulency that threatened to obscure the original source of the conflict.

7. Has there ever been an official Russian apology?

Many Russian politicians insist that Russian officials have repeatedly and officially apologised for the Katyn' crime. To begin with, we may quote the communist deputy V.I. Iljuxin from the Duma debate:

- (31) Скажите мне, пожалуйста, а какое решение должны и могли принять следователи после четырнадцати лет расследований – умышленно тянули, осознанно это делали, – после того, как *сначала президент Горбачёв извинился перед поляками, затем Ельцин, затем Путин?*
 Tell me, please, what kind of decision should and could the prosecutors adopt after fourteen years of investigations – they protracted it on purpose, they were aware of what they did – after the apologies of Gorbačov, then El'cin, then Putin to the Poles?

In his book “Pol’skij krest Rossii”, he airs the same frustration: “What do you want? It seems that our presidents have apologised to you” (Etkind et al. 2012: 103). A couple of months before, another communist deputy had complained that the Poles would never be satisfied:

- (32) *Казалось бы, признались во всём, даже в том, в чём не были виноваты, объявили национальный траур в связи с трагической гибелью польского руководства, передали секретные архивные документы по Катыни одним словом, уступки новой России в этой области не имели себе равных, а что получили взамен? В польской прессе начали появляться подобные заголовки: “Путин признал вину, но не извинился перед поляками”.*

It seems that we confessed all, even for what we were not responsible, we declared national mourning because of the tragic death of the Polish leaders, we transferred secret archival documents related to Katyn’, in one word: the concessions of the new Russia had no equals, but what did we receive for this? In the Polish press, there began to appear headings, such as: “Putin has admitted responsibility, but has not apologized to the Poles” Obuxov S.P., KPRF, 19.5.2010

But even outside the communist camp we find similar voices, for example on the Internet (Semicvetov 2011):

- (33) “Россия устами президента Медведева и премьера Путина все извиняется перед поляками « за Катынь »”. Хватит извиняться перед поляками!
Russia keeps apologising to the Poles “for Katyn’” through President Medved’ev and Prime Minister Putin. Enough with apologies to the Poles!

In view of these voices of protest, the exact wording of said Russian official statements matters all the more. As may be recalled, on April 13, 1990, the Soviet side had expressed its deep regret because of the Katyn’ tragedy. Similar formulations were used by all Russian presidents, together with the assignment of responsibility to the Soviet authorities. A notable exception occurred during El’cin’s visit to Poland in 1993, where on August 25 he deposited a wreath at the Katyn’ monument on the Powązki cemetery and bending over it uttered the words *Prostitute nas* ‘Excuse us’. Due to this setting, one may still argue the direct addressee were not the Polish nation, but the victims of the execution. This was perhaps the reason why El’cin’s behaviour was perceived as a personal gesture (Cienciala 2007: 260). As for Putin, the above-mentioned quotations from communist deputies run counter a report of the journal *Kommersant* (Kommersant 2016), which stated that “the Polish side requested him repeatedly to apologise for Katyn’. But the Russian leader evaded this question (*obxodil étot vopros storonoj*)”. Thus, the prediction of the communist deputy Obuxov, who in a Duma debate on the very day of Putin’s meeting with Tusk on 7 April 2010, the 70th anniversary of the crime, had said: “Today, Mr. Putin

will again apologise for Katyn', as did Gorbačev and El'cin", did not come true. On the other hand, Putin laid another wreath at the memorial.

One may, of course, wonder why these words of official regret were repeated so many times: would it not have sufficed to utter them once and for all? Was this the effect of the missing acknowledgement of the apology from the Polish side? At any rate, it seems tempting to compare these findings with the linguistic analysis of the speech act "apologise" in modern Russian provided in Rathmayr 1996. The author states that unlike in other languages, the expression of one's regret is not the appropriate form of independent acts of apology in Russian (Ratmayr 1996: 79 f.). Moreover, utterances with impersonals such as *ja sožaleju, čto tak polučilos'* 'I regret that this happened' even express a denial to accept the responsibility for the given incident. On p. 91, the author adds that "in official situations the acceptance of guilt or responsibility is not a conventionalised apology" ("In offiziellen Situationen ist die Explizierung der Schuld- oder Verantwortungsübernahme allerdings keine konventionalisierte Entschuldigung"). This holds especially for forensic practice, where the acknowledgment of guilt does not equal an apology. On the other hand, *prosti(te)* or *izvini(te)* count as explicit apologies. All this boils down to the statement that only B. El'cin's utterance qualifies as an explicit apology, which would mean that the Poles were right when insisting on this act.¹⁴

What also remains debatable is the distribution of roles: who is in the given context entitled to officially express an apology, and who to forgive? The first category undoubtedly includes the head of state, since he "represents the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations" (Article 80.4 of the Russian Constitution), but would the Parliament not qualify as well? As Article 94 of said Constitution states, the Parliament of the Russian Federation is "the representative and legislative organ" of the state. Thus, it may well be considered another representative voice of the Russian nation on a par with the President. As for the second category, Etkind et al. (2012: 27) quote "a poll asking whether and under what conditions the Poles could forgive Russia for Katyn included the question of whether forgiveness should come from the Sejm or from the Katyn families. Opinions were evenly divided on the issue".

14. It may be added that the exact wording of an apology also matters in other international conflicts. President Clinton's apology for the unintended bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrad in 1999 was translated as *yihan* 'I regret', not as *daoqian* 'Please forgive me', which would have been the only appropriate wording in this situation (Tages-Anzeiger 2001).

8. Conclusions

The State Duma Declaration from November 26, 2010, marked the peak of the Russian – Polish rapprochement in the controversy on the Katyn' massacre. It was not intended as a reply to any Polish intervention (in particular the resolution of the Polish Sejm from 2005) and left many Polish claims unsatisfied; however, it was meant as a gesture of reconciliation (hence the central metaphor 'the deputies stretch out their hands to the Polish people') and could have reopened a dialogue that had long been frozen. It turned out otherwise: the Smolensk catastrophe and its exploitation by the Polish right fostered new conspiracy theories and gave rise to increased tensions between both sides. Thus, the declaration remained just another episode without consequences in this everlasting conflict. The Katyn' discourse still resembles a dialogue of two deaf.

The debate preceding the adoption of the Declaration exhibited a few particularities that distinguished it from an average Duma debate. Several speakers invoked the cultural values shared by both nations. The spokesman of the committee that had prepared the document denounced the Katyn' lie as an aching wound, thus using a faithful replica of the often heard Polish complaint both in form and content. The debate also drew heavily on historical sources and therefore abounded in historical reminiscences and intertextual references, among which legal documents played a prominent part. Those opposing the Declaration, all members of the Communist fraction, tried by all means to undermine the reliability of these historical sources. At the same time, they employed a historical tit-for-tat strategy by accusing the Poles of having committed similar, if not more atrocious crimes against Russian subjects in a more remote past. This line of argumentation was doomed to failure since the adversaries could still have added other wrongdoings for which Russians were responsible. Such an infinite regress did however not start off since other fractions simply ignored the communist strategy. Thus, the communists remained alone in refuting Soviet responsibility for the executions.

On the other hand, the declaration cannot be considered an apology to the Polish nation and stays even behind Russian presidential statements intended as apologies. As a result we must conclude that Russian leaders have never apologised for Katyn' in the full sense of the word with the doubtful exception of El'cin's words at the Katyn' memorial in Warsaw, which were perceived as a private act and discredited by his later behaviour.

The Declaration followed a different strategy. In underscoring the commonalities linking the two peoples, it made another attempt to treat the Katyn' massacre not as an isolated event, but as part of the whole complex of Stalinist state terrorism which also affected millions of Soviet citizens. In this way, Polish victims became paralleled with all other victims of totalitarian violence, which ran counter to the

Polish argumentation that insisted on the exclusive character of the Katyn' martyrdom. In the same line, the Declaration continued the legend of the Soviet citizens allegedly executed by the Nazis at Katyn', thus boosting the symmetrical victimisation of Polish and Soviet citizens. If the preferred reading of Example (17) above is true, the declaration even contains a provocative instance of the abovementioned tit-for-tat-strategy in hinting at the Red Army warriors that disappeared in Poland after the war of 1920. And finally, the mention of the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives when fighting the Nazis on Polish territory may imply that the Poles owed at least as much to the Russians as they had to blame them for.

As for the legal side of the conflict, many Polish claims still remain open and will probably never be satisfied. This holds in particular for the recognition of the Katyn' crime as a genocide, which was ultimately rejected by the European Court of Human Rights. The identification of the subordinate (immediate) perpetrators is another act that will most likely never take place. On the other hand, the posthumous rehabilitation of the Polish victims is still feasible and overdue, and the same holds for the search of their burial sites.

To repeat another metaphor used by one of the Duma deputies, it seems that “*never will the clouds over this spot drift apart*”.

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Gay rights as a symbol of ideological struggles between Russia and the West

A socio-cognitive discourse analysis

Veronika Koller

This chapter will investigate how two news articles, from the British Guardian and from Russia Today, report on the issue of gay rights in Russia, as mentioned in a press conference given by Russian president Putin in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The analysis will employ a socio-cognitive approach to critical discourse studies. Similarities and differences in social actor representation and cohesion in the two texts will be explained as illustration that both Putin and the writers of the articles seek to engage in strategic ideological communication to effect social categorisation, construct in-groups and out-groups, and design their texts for particular audiences. The findings will be discussed against a background of increasing geopolitical and ideological tensions between Russia and some Western countries.

Keywords: cohesion, critical discourse studies, gay rights, ideology, media discourse, Russia, social actor representation, social categorisation, social cognition

1. Introduction

In August 2016, there was widespread media coverage in the UK and elsewhere on a report by the World Anti-Doping Agency that showed systematic and allegedly state-sponsored doping of Russian athletes, most recently during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (Russia) in 2014.¹ Those Games had made negative headlines in Western media before: in the months before the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi, there were calls from lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) rights activists

1. More recently (November 2018), Russia has been mostly in the news for investigations into how far the Russian government sought to influence the US presidential election of 2016.

and others to boycott the Games after the Russian Duma had passed the so-called anti-LGBT propaganda law in June 2013.

In this chapter, I will investigate how two news articles, from the British Guardian and from Russia Today, report on the issue of gay rights in Russia, as mentioned during a meeting on 17 January 2014 between Russian president Putin and volunteers for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games.² Similarities and differences in social actor representation and cohesion will be explained as both Putin and the writers of the articles engage in strategic ideological communication to effect social categorisation, construct in-groups and out-groups and design their texts for particular audiences. The findings will be discussed against a background of increasing geopolitical and ideological tensions between Russia and some Western countries. My own subject position as a researcher is that of a Western European who advocates LGBT rights, and although I will endeavour to represent both sides of the argument, this background will inevitably influence at least the explanation and discussion of the findings.

The aims for this chapter are twofold: firstly, I intend to show how fundamental geopolitical changes in Russia and the subsequent search for a national identity have influenced both discourse and discourse practice. In particular, the chapter will demonstrate how the notion of LGBT rights has become a symbol of discrepancies between Russian and Western value systems, and how such ideological tensions are realised in media texts. To demonstrate this struggle over values, I go beyond media in Russia, not least because the discourse practice of the country's government involves attempts to influence Western audiences, e.g. through news channels such as Russia Today. In that context it is also important to look at Western representations of Russia in order to understand what Russian government-supported media react against. The second aim of this chapter is to present socio-cognitive discourse analysis as a methodological framework to analyse mediated ideologies.

To meet these two aims, I will in the following first discuss some relevant notions from social cognition research and then outline how they can be integrated into a framework for the critical study of discourse. After those theoretical and methodological considerations, Section 3 sketches some of the background to the data, which consists of an article each from the online version of the UK newspaper The Guardian and the news network Russia Today, both of which report on comments from Russian president Putin in the run-up to the Sochi Winter Olympics. Section 4 will present the analysis of the two articles, explaining the textual and intertextual evidence in the light of the ideological conflict between Russia and some Western countries, which was thrown into relief by the controversy around

2. See <http://en.kremlin.ru/press/announcements/20075>; a video of the meeting can be found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3t3WGPUtIo0>. Retrieved 30 April 2019.

gay rights and the Winter Olympics in Sochi. The chapter will finish by sketching the implications that a socio-cognitive approach has for critical discourse studies and providing an outlook on possible future research.

2. Social cognition and critical discourse studies

2.1 Social cognition

Social cognition research, which combines insights from both social and cognitive psychology, first developed in the US in the 1970s (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Tajfel 1974) and has a wide scope, comprising concepts and representations, memory, affect and motivation, attribution (i.e. causal explanations), attitudes, self and identity, and social categorisation, prejudice and discrimination. The latter three concepts are of particular interest to a socio-cognitive approach to critical discourse studies, because they help explain how discourse producers use language to construct an “antonymy US vs. THEM, which is ... part and parcel of ideological categorization” (Dirven et al. 2003: 8).

Social categorisation (Abrams and Hogg 2006) involves identifying the self or others as part of a social membership group, regardless of whether membership is ascribed and more or less permanent (e.g. ethnicity) or acquired and hence reversible (e.g. party membership). Self-categorisation can be achieved collectively, as a group, or personally, as a member of a group. Collective self-categorisation becomes salient when perceived differences between in- and out-group are seen, or constructed, as much greater than perceived intra-category differences within the in-group (Brewer and Gardner 1996). While this kind of identity formation is not in itself problematic, intergroup differentiation can be discriminatory, leading to in-group bias, favouritism and/or out-group denigration, i.e. the us-vs-them thinking that has been addressed in much of critical discourse studies for its potential to cause or exacerbate social problems. Intergroup differentiation is a particular concern when out-groups are perceived to be competing with the in-group, in which case they are often disparaged on the basis of “unrealistically negative stereotypes” (Bodenhausen et al. 2012: 313). While in-groups and out-group are the most common constructs achieved by social categorisation, I want to suggest a third category, i.e. that of the affiliated group (see also Crapanzano’s [2017] notion of “The Friendly by Other”). Members of that group are neither perceived as belonging to the in-group, i.e. being at the deictic centre of the discourse producer (see Chilton 2014), nor are they part of the often negatively evaluated out-group represented as distant from the speaker or writer. Instead, they are seen as sympathetic or at least neutral towards the in-group and as sharing some of its goals,

norms and values. Members of the in-group and affiliated group are likely to have a positive attitude towards each other. The phenomenon of affiliated groups can be found in a range of social, including institutional, contexts, including coalition partners in politics or allied nations.

As mentioned above, social categorisation is not problematic as such, indeed it fulfils an important epistemic function in that it organises stimuli in social contexts and thereby contributes to cognitive economy: if we did not have semi-automatic categorisation, we would be permanently overwhelmed by our daily impressions and encounters. The identity-constitutive function of categorisation further aids in creating a sense of belonging and connection for perceived in-group members, a positive attitude towards perceived affiliated group members, as well as – and this is where problems can start – differentiation from perceived out-group members. In-group vs out-group demarcation can be subject to an accentuation effect (Tajfel 1957), where intra-category similarities and inter-category differences are perceived as greater than they are, leading not only to in-group cohesion but also to potentially prejudiced intergroup differentiation. The concomitant generalisations about social groups can serve both ego-gratifying and system-justifying functions (Jost et al. 2004).

As Cuddy et al. (2007, 2008) have shown, stereotypes lead to more or less positive or negative emotions and behaviours towards social groups. Thus, members of the in-group or other normative groups are seen as both warm and competent and are often admired. One example is the ‘hard-working families’ beloved by British politicians of all persuasions. Groups that are seen as warm but not competent – e.g. disabled people – tend to evoke pity and are often subject to victimisation (Krzyżanowska 2010: 106: n.1), while those who are perceived as competent but not warm usually trigger envy. In different social, political and economic contexts, rich, East Asian or Jewish people have all been categorised as the latter. Finally, some groups are seen as neither warm nor competent – in the British case, welfare recipients are a case in point, while in parts of Eastern Europe (Chojnicka 2015; Graff 2006; Krzyżanowska 2010) and most of sub-Saharan Africa (Nordling 2015; Reddy 2002) the role falls to gay people, leading to anger, disgust, resentment and contempt being directed at them. This attitude can lead to actively harming group members, e.g. through legal persecution, sanctions, hate speech and physical violence. By contrast, groups who evoke envy can expect to meet with passive facilitation, e.g. cooperation when it is convenient for the in-group. These categorisations are dynamic and the same group can be differently perceived by others, depending on their values; note the conflict between the 2015 ‘culture of welcome’ (*Willkommenskultur*) that some Germans showed towards refugees, whom they perceived as warm but incompetent, while other Germans saw the same group as neither warm nor competent and set fire to refugee shelters. In addition, majority behaviour towards certain groups can change over time, as when envy towards a

group no longer leads to convenient cooperation but to active harm. The genocide of Jewish people in Europe, and in Germany in particular, is the most horrific example of such a change. However, attitudes and behaviour can also change for the better, as has been the case for LGBT people in Western countries, where over half a century, legal prosecution has given way to legal recognition.

In the following sub-section, I will show how the above notions of social categorisation can be harnessed for critical discourse studies.

2.2 A framework for socio-cognitive critical discourse studies

Insights from (social) cognition research have informed critical discourse studies in various ways, from drawing on cognitive grammar to combine construal operations and discursive strategies (Hart 2013), to discourse space theory and proximation (Cap 2013; Chilton 2014), and context and event models that are used to identify macro-propositions and analyse local meanings (van Dijk 2008). In the following, I will outline a different socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis based on an adapted version of Fairclough's (2010: 133) well-known three-level model and informed by van Dijk's notion of the discourse-society-cognition triangle (1994: 122).

In this model, discourse analytical procedures are combined with socio-cognitive categories to describe language use in texts and explain it with recourse to discourse practice and social contexts. Those contexts are understood to be dynamic across time and interactions, and to be in a relation of mutual influence with discourse and language. The discourse analytical procedures involve the descriptive analysis of the content and semiotic features of texts at the micro-level as well as the explanatory analysis of contexts at the meso- and macro-levels. The three levels of discourse, and the generic research questions they entail, are represented in Figure 1.

This three-level model can be linked to an approach that distinguishes between discourse features and concrete linguistic devices, which are relevant at the text level, and discourse goals and functions as being involved at the context levels. To illustrate, it could be the overall aim, i.e. discourse goal, of a text producer to engage in out-group construction and denigration. Particular discourse functions are the means, as effects of language use, by which such discourse goals are realised, one example being the association of the out-group with negatively connoted traits or behaviours. Linking context to text, discourse functions translate into discourse features, e.g. social actor representation or cohesion, which in turn manifest in concrete linguistic (more broadly: semiotic) devices, such as adversative conjunctions. The analysis can work top-down, starting from the discourse goal and identifying the functions, features and devices that feed into it. However, given that discourse goals can only be assumed, not known, it may be better to work bottom up, by first

identifying linguistic devices and the discourse features they express, then ascertaining discourse functions and inferring possible goals.

It is at the context levels that socio-cognitive concepts become most relevant, but they are also reflected in the discourse features and linguistic devices analysed at the text level, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 1. Levels of critical discourse analysis (adapted from Fairclough 2010: 133)




Figure 2. Cognitive aspects of critical discourse analysis

Discourse analysts who are interested in social categorisation engage in content analysis to address the question as to what groups and individuals are represented. Ascertaining presences and absences in the text already forms part of analysing the discourse feature of social actor representation (van Leeuwen 2008: 23–54), which bridges content and linguistic (or more broadly semiotic) analysis at the text level. Descriptive text analysis looks at what linguistic devices, such as passivation or collectivisation, are employed to construct social actors, that is, at the particular ways in which they are represented. This step will involve investigating the links between different discourse features, which can reinforce, supplement or contradict particular textual representations of social actors. It is important to note that textual representation is linked to discursive construction: by representing actors etc. from a particular perspective, text producers at the same time construct socio-cognitive representations (Koller 2012) of social groups, including beliefs and knowledge about them, attitudes towards and expectations of them, as well as the emotions that accrue to such belief etc. In this model, then, discourse is both a vehicle for communicating pre-existing socio-cognitive representations of actors as well as a means of influencing such representations by reinforcing or contradicting them.

While social actor representation is of central importance, other features feed into it to provide cumulative evidence. It should be understood, however, that there is no definitive list of features and devices; while it is advisable to aim for consistency in applying analytical categories across texts, individual instances of language use will show different characteristics depending on what genre they represent, what audience they are aimed at and what discourses they instantiate. Therefore, any list of discourse features and linguistic devices should be handled flexibly enough to incorporate features and devices that are particularly important for the text under investigation, and to disregard those that are not. Having said that, studies of social categorisation in and through language use will likely include the aforementioned social actor representation as well as, among others, modality and evaluation to see what goals, norms and values are associated with a group, cohesion to see what beliefs about social actors are reinforced, contrasted or associated with each other, and, to the same end, possibly identify metaphors in the text (see Koller 2012).

In contrast to descriptive text analysis, context analysis is explanatory, seeking to explain what possible discourse goal is met by (not) representing particular social actors in particular ways. In explaining the results of the text analysis, context analysis takes recourse to social and discourse practice contexts, and their cognitive underpinnings. When looking at the meso-level of the discourse practice context, the analyst focuses on the roles of, and relationships between, members of a discourse community, asking who is communicating to whom about what, and whether the text is designed for a particular audience, e.g. by drawing on assumed

shared knowledge or values. Investigating the discourse feature of intertextuality bridges text and context analysis by looking at whose voices are integrated into the text and allowing the researcher to identify the discourse functions of including or excluding individuals and groups. Analysing intertextuality thus helps identify inter-group relations as it can be used to align the text producer and intended audience with the producers of other texts, or distance them from other writers and speakers.

Discourse practice and its socio-cognitive underpinnings not only impact on the micro-level of text, but are in turn also influenced by the macro-level of social context. Thus, socio-cultural/-economic conditions give some discourse participants preferred access to means of production and distribution, while simultaneously endowing them with a certain degree of credibility. Context analysis also aims to identify what ideologies are relevant, where ideologies can be defined as a relatively stable network of beliefs that gives rise to expectations, norms and values about, and hence attitudes towards, events, ideas and people. Categorisation occurs when we encounter people or hear ideas expressed about them, and compare those experiences against ideologies. This is both a cognitive and an affective process in that categorisation can give rise to feelings of like or dislike for social groups. Like categorisation, ideologies organise social life by giving meaning to encounters and experiences, and constituting coherent in-groups (Koller 2014: 8). Context analysis thus helps to account for the findings from text analysis by discussing what roles the wider social context and the ideologies at stake in it allocate to social actors, and why.

Section 4 will provide a sample analysis of the model outlined in this sub-section. First, however, I will give some background to the data.

3. Background to the analysed material

The controversy around the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi has to be seen against the backdrop of a growing distance and hostility between Western Europe, including Britain, on the one hand and Russia on the other. It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the increasing tensions, and the reasons for them, between Russia and Western Europe in the past decade or so, but a few events are worth mentioning. First, the Russian parliament (Duma) passed a law in early 2006 that requires all NGOs receiving funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents”, making them subject to increased government scrutiny. Second, and also in 2006, former Russian Federal Security Service officer Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in London, with a public enquiry set up by the British government concluding in January 2016 that the murder was “probably” approved by Russian

president Putin (“Alexander Litvinenko” 2016).³ And thirdly, tensions with Western European countries escalated in the winter of 2013/14, when pro-European protests in Ukraine led to an overthrow of the pro-Russian government: Russia subsequently annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014, leading to sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, while pro-Russian separatists started fighting government troops in eastern Ukraine, a conflict that still persists at the time of writing.

Nine months before the Crimea crisis, the Russian Duma in June 2013 unanimously passed the “Law for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values”, which had been introduced by Yelena Mizulina, Chair of the Duma’s Committee on Family, Women, and Children. Soon dubbed the “anti-gay propaganda law” by Western media, it is modelled on local laws previously passed in St Petersburg and other cities (Stout 2012)⁴ and “bans the ‘promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors’” (Nickmanová 2014: 3–4). Although homosexuality was decriminalised in Russia in 1993 and remains legal, Pride parades in Moscow have not been authorised since 2006 and activists’ demonstrating regardless have been arrested along with nationalist and religious counter-protesters (Wyatt 2015). Furthermore, public opinion is increasingly turning against gay and lesbian people: even though only 28 per cent of Russians think that being gay or trans should be a crime (ILGA 2016: 6), a mere 16 per cent of the Russian population say that society should accept homosexuality, down from 20 per cent in 2007 and compared to 76 per cent in Britain (Pew Research Center 2013). A poll by Russian marketing and polling company VCIOM moreover reports that 80 per cent of Russians rather or strongly disagree with same-sex marriage, up from 59 per cent in 2005, and that 41 per cent of respondents think that gay and lesbian people should be persecuted by the state (VCIOM 2015). Even if those results may have to be taken with a large pinch of salt, given that VCIOM is a state-run company, their publication would still show a thrust on part of the Russian government to portray LGBT people and issues as unacceptable to much of the general population. It is not surprising then that LGBT and human rights groups reported an increase in homophobic violence by far-right groups after the “anti-propaganda bill” was passed, with additional homophobic reporting in some Russian media (Human Rights Watch 2014).

With the 22nd Olympic Winter Games starting only eight months after the passing of the bill, and against the background of increasing geopolitical tensions between Russia and parts of the West, LGBT activists in the US and many Western

3. In March 2018, dissident agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were poisoned with a nerve agent in Salisbury. The poison turned out to have been administered by Russian agents, and the attack and its aftermath led to a further deterioration in Russian-British relations.

4. A similar law was also passed in post-socialist Lithuania in 2008 (Chojnicka 2015: 142).

European countries took the Winter Olympics as an opportunity to put pressure on sponsors to boycott the Games, staging protests in Western capitals, launching online petitions and registering their solidarity with LGBT people in Russia.⁵ Some Western media, especially those of a liberal persuasion,⁶ echoed those sentiments, e.g. by awarding the World Press Photo award 2014 to Mads Nissen for his photo of a gay male couple in St Petersburg, and by integrating voices of Russian LGBT groups and individuals in their reporting about the controversy.

One of the articles analysed below is from a liberal Western European news website, *The Guardian*, while the other reports on the same press conference from a Russian point of view. The data will be introduced briefly in the next section before I present findings from the textual and contextual analyses.

4. Sample analysis

4.1 Data

One of the two articles analysed in this chapter was taken from the website of the UK paper *The Guardian*, a so-called broadsheet that is known for its left-leaning, socially liberal views. Founded in 1821, it had 3.68 million unique visitors to its website worldwide per day in 2012, with an additional daily print readership of ca. 205,000 in the UK (“Our audience story” 2013). The other article was sourced from the website of the news network Russia Today (henceforth RT). Founded in 2005, RT is a multilingual news network of websites and TV channels that, in its own description, “provides an alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints international audience [sic] with a Russian viewpoint”. As such, it is available to 700 million potential viewers in over a hundred countries (“About RT” n.d.). Both articles report on the same event, a meeting of Russian president Vladimir Putin with international volunteers for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, during which he, among other topics, answered questions about how the then recently passed anti-LGBT promotion law would affect gay visitors and athletes coming to Russia. Both articles also use the same photo of Putin, dressed in a blue suit and white shirt but no tie, standing in the centre of a large semi-circle of young, mostly female volunteers in colourful uniform clothing. The articles were published on 17 January (*Guardian*) and 18 January (RT) 2014, and comprise 433 (*Guardian*) and

5. For example, <https://go.allout.org/en/a/russia-attacks/>, retrieved 30 April 2019.

6. Tubaltseva (2014: 48) reports that the Sochi Olympics coverage by leftist-liberal US and UK newspapers focused more on the anti-gay promotion law than the one by more conservative papers in the same countries. Bolshakova (2016: 460) identifies the same focus in her study of *The New York Times*.

589 words (RT), respectively.⁷ While the Guardian article addresses only the issue of gay rights, the RT article closes with just under 200 words on the uncontroversial topic of the contribution of the volunteers. Those final paragraphs were disregarded in the analysis; the articles, or their relevant sections, can be found in the Appendix. During the meeting with international volunteers that the articles report on, Putin spoke Russian, so the quotes and reported speech in the articles are translations. Without any knowledge of Russian, I can only analyse the grammatical and lexical features of those translations, but am aware that they may or may not be congruent with the original. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile investigating what discourse features and linguistic devices Putin is presented as having used.

In the following sub-sections, the articles will first be analysed at the text level, looking at social actor representation and cohesion, in particular conjunctions and lexical repetition. The bulk of both articles consists of represented speech, focusing on actors rather than events and showing that “much of what we think of as news is actually the report of what people considered socially or politically significant have said” (Semino and Short 2004: 211). The analysis of the discourse practice context will therefore focus on intertextuality, followed by audience design. The analysis will be completed by explaining the findings in view of the wider socio-political context.

4.2 Text analysis

This sub-section will address the discourse features of social actor representation and cohesion, analysing the linguistic devices by which they are expressed and looking at what socio-cognitive representations are communicated about Russia, Western European countries, gay people and any other relevant actors.

4.2.1 *Social actor representation*

Looking first at who is present, backgrounded or absent in the texts, we can see that it is the Russian president who is mentioned most often. He is nominated with proper nouns that are both formal (surname only: “Putin”) and semi-formal (given name and surname: “Vladimir Putin”), with or without titulation (“president”) (see van Leeuwen 2008: 41 for sub-categories of nomination). Although both articles refer to him with comparable frequency (Guardian: eleven times or 2.54 per cent of the text, RT: nine times or 2.43 per cent), the UK news platform uses more instances of formal reference without titles and, where titles are mentioned, specifies

7. The two texts were sourced from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/vladimir-putin-gay-winter-olympics-children> and <https://www.rt.com/news/putin-sochi-2014-volunteers-817/> (both retrieved 30 April 2019). Attempts to seek permission from both sources were unsuccessful.

that it is the “Russian president” they are quoting. The RT author, writing from a Russian point of view, tends to refer to him simply as “the president” or “President [Vladimir] Putin”. Putin’s quoted and translated self-reference is overwhelmingly in the first person plural, an inclusive ‘we’ denoting Russia as a country (e.g. “We do not have a ban on non-traditional sexual relationships”, Guardian line 14), making this an instance of collective self-categorisation along national lines.

In his translated comments, Putin contrasts Russia with the objectivated out-group of “some countries” (Guardian, line 30) or “many other countries” (RT, line 52), which are either stricter than Russia in that homosexuality is illegal in them or unduly liberal in allegedly discussing the legalisation of paedophilia. Through these intergroup differentiations, Russia is positioned as holding a middle ground.⁸ Some of the other countries are identified in collectivised and relational terms by Putin as “our [international] partners” (Guardian, line 35; RT, line 58). They are not so much an affiliated group but a sub-set of the out-group that is somewhat closer to the deictic centre of the speaker (see Cap 2013 on proximation), even though Putin’s expectation that they respect Russia can be interpreted in pragmatic terms as a warning. Still, Putin’s reference to them is translated as “partners”, suggesting a group of countries that is seen as distant but competent and with whom it is opportune and convenient to cooperate.

The most varied social actor representation can be found for gay people. They are mentioned as an activated collectivised actor in *The Guardian* (“Russia’s gay community has reported an upturn in homophobic violence and threats”, lines 23–24), while RT combines collectivisation with functionalisation “openly gay athletes” (line 70). RT is quite close to Putin in this form of representation: in translated indirect speech ascribed to Putin, gay people are either passivated (“gay people will be not be subjected to harassment”, line 8) or their actions are modalised to put them under an obligation (“gay people must observe law banning ‘homosexual propaganda’”, lines 2–3). In the translated direct quotes from Putin, we find only one classification (“homosexuals”, RT line 45) and otherwise abstraction (“homosexuality”, Guardian line 19; “homosexual relations”, RT, line 46), sometimes combined with dissociation in order to construct an out-group (“such kinds of relations”, Guardian line 21). Both RT and, to a greater extent, Putin thus either avoid reference to gay people as social actors or represent them as passive. They are thereby made to appear as distant from the speaker, and as lacking in agency and specific characteristics. This suggests an out-group that is alienated from the speakers and the in-group they represent.

8. Macgilchrist (2011: 130) has shown how Western reporting similarly constructs Russia as a dual other, an extremist one and one which “could still be civilized and integrated into the West”.

In both articles, anti-gay actions, when negated, are couched in agentless passives. Thus, we find Putin being quoted directly or indirectly in translation as saying that “the Games would be held ‘without discrimination’”; that “gay people will be not be subjected to harassment” (Guardian, lines 28 and 8) and that “nobody is being grabbed off the street” (Guardian, line 20). When it comes to affirmed anti-gay legislation or action, the speaker is presented as using abstraction to background the actor even further: “propaganda of homosexuality ... and pedophilia... are prohibited” (RT, lines 46–47). Another device to background those who engage in controversial anti-gay action is to transfer agency to an objectivated, non-human actor, as in “The law stipulates fines” (RT, lines 61–62). Surprisingly, even the Guardian writer employs agentless passives (e.g. “Gay rights rallies are also banned in Russia”, lines 24–25), passing up the chance to criticise the Russian government directly, just like the quoted anonymous member of the International Olympic Committee does not take the opportunity to criticise the US government for “gay rights hav[ing] been established” (RT, line 71).

The two articles differ in which other social actors are present. Next to mentioning and picturing the volunteers that provide the occasion for Putin’s comments, the writers of both articles have chosen the same quote for the headline, putting the focus on children as the goal of someone’s action. In addition, RT mentions a group of critics of Putin, but follows this up with both an affiliated group and an individual defending the Russian government. The Guardian, by stark contrast, integrates the speech of the collectivised and classified “Russia’s gay community” (lines 23–24). Again, we can see how RT aligns itself with Putin while The Guardian seeks to include the social actors that both the Russian news platform and the Russian president construct as an out-group.

4.2.2 Cohesion

Cohesion serves a number of functions in the two texts. Given the construction of out-groups as more or less distant from the speaker, the function that is realised most often is that of contrast. One contrast is set up “between the ban on gay propaganda among underage minors in Russia and criminal prosecution of homosexuals in some countries” (RT, lines 44–45). As this example shows, the main us-vs-them contrast is between Russia and other countries, either because the latter are represented as less tolerant (“Putin also added that Russia was more liberal than some other countries”, Guardian, line 18) or too tolerant in their sexual politics (“in some countries the issue of legalizing pedophilia has been discussed openly”, RT, line 55). The countries and regions that are portrayed as too liberal are chiefly the US (RT, lines 69–71; but see Guardian, lines 18–19, where Putin is quoted as referring to parts of the US as *less* liberal than Russia) and (Western) Europe: “[Putin] added ... that Russia was a traditional country, and refused to accept European values on

sexual orientation” (Guardian, lines 29–30). Although it is syntactically ambiguous who refuses such values – Putin or Russia – the contrast that is set up between the country/its president and Europe still stands. That contrast may also be subject to an accentuation effect, with both in- and out-group constructed as homogenous entities in themselves, as well as to a “bifurcation” by which the two groups are not only different but fundamentally contradict each other (Chojnicka 2015: 152–153).

The lemmas translated as ‘traditions’ and ‘traditional’, as well as ‘culture’, are quoted repeatedly from Putin in order to characterise Russia and demarcate it from the West. He is reported to mention “our own traditions [and] our own culture” (Guardian, line 34; RT, line 57), which he asks “our [international] partners” to respect and thereby reciprocate the respect Russia is said to have for them (Guardian, line 35; RT, line 58). ‘Tradition(al)’ sets up another contrast as well, namely that between Russia and gay people: There may not be “a ban on non-traditional sexual relationships” (Guardian, line 14), but the effect of depicting Russia as a traditional country and using “non-traditional” as a synonym for “homosexual” is that homosexuality is constructed as un-Russian. In fact, “traditional family values” are part of the name of the law that triggered the controversy, and its proponent, Yelena Mizulina, argued during the first reading of the bill that “Russian society is ... very conservative, so an adoption of this law is justified” (quoted in Nickmanová 2014: 32). She and other supporters also repeatedly used the Russian equivalents of ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’ (Nickmanová 2014: 35 and 47). Still, Putin’s reported speech positively evaluates Russia as lenient towards gay people, at least on the face of it: not only is he quoted in translation as using additive conjunctions to reinforce that message (“We are not forbidding anything and nobody is being grabbed off the street, and there is no punishment for such kinds of relations”, Guardian, lines 20–21), but in addition the “Russian president vows no discrimination” (Guardian, line 2), says that “gay people will be not be subjected to harassment at the Winter Olympics in Sochi” (Guardian, lines 8–9) and assures volunteers and athletes that they “can feel relaxed and calm” (Guardian, line 21; see also RT, line 54). However, each of these clauses is followed by an adversative or concessive conjunction, either in a direct quote (“...but leave [the] children alone please”, Guardian, line 22; RT, line 54) or in the journalist’s representation of his speech (“...but says gay people must observe law banning ‘homosexual propaganda’”, “...as long as they stay away from children” (Guardian, lines 3 and 9). Through these devices, the in-group is represented as positive in that it is tolerant even of an implicitly negatively evaluated out-group.

As mentioned above, children are made salient in both articles because the quote mentioning them has been chosen as the headline. They are represented as either the goal of someone’s action or as circumstantial (“Propaganda among children”, Guardian, line 16; “propaganda of homosexuality among minors”, RT,

lines 46–47) and thereby appear as passive and vulnerable not only semantically but also grammatically. Again, “protecting children” is part of the law’s name and members of the Duma who supported it used related metaphoric expressions when stating that it was “necessary to primarily shield the younger generation from the effects of homosexual propaganda” (quoted in Nickmanová 2014: 29). Constructing information about LGBT issues as a danger to children hints at the homophobic strategy of linking homosexuality and paedophilia, and indeed this is made explicit in the association of the two through additive conjunctions in Putin’s reported and translated comments: “We have a ban on the propaganda of homosexuality and paedophilia” (Guardian, lines 15–16), “propaganda of homosexuality among minors – and pedophilia in particular – are prohibited” (RT, lines 46–47).⁹

In asserting Russian laws and constructing national values, Putin engages in collective self-categorisation, while his association of gay people with paedophilia seems to serve the complementary discourse goal of out-group denigration. At the same time, he uses the meeting and photo opportunity with the volunteers to re-assure international delegates, thereby engaging in convenient cooperation with another out-group. However, the relationships negotiated through the articles are more complex than the Russian president (in)directly addressing his fellow Russians as well as volunteers and athletes: the respective journalists also use the texts to align with Putin’s ideology, or distance themselves and their readers from it. These discourse practices will be addressed in the following sub-section.

4.3 Context analysis

4.3.1 *Discourse practice*

Both news platforms address a similar audience, but from different vantage points. The Guardian, especially its fast-growing, prominent online site, addresses a global readership, with a focus on British, US and Australian audiences. The English-language site of RT likewise addresses Western audiences, but implies a bias in what and how events are covered in Western news media when saying that it reports on

major issues of our time for viewers [and readers] wanting to Question More, delivers stories overlooked by the mainstream media to create news with an edge [,] provides an alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints international audience [sic] with a Russian viewpoint. (“About RT” n.d.)

9. In the 2012 St. Petersburg bill, “any display of homosexual conduct that could potentially be seen by minors [was] dubbed as promoting pedophilia” (Stout 2012).

We could therefore say that while the Guardian may be more concerned with reinforcing perceived socio-cognitive representations of Russia and its government in their intended readers, RT seeks to challenge those beliefs, values, expectations and attitudes. One central feature through which the respective writers aim to realise their goals is intertextuality.

The text consists largely of quotes and as such meets expectations of the genre. Distancing quote marks help to confirm or challenge negative beliefs about, and expectations of, Russian policies: where the Guardian distances itself from the notion of propaganda (“the law on ‘homosexual propaganda’” line 23), the RT represents as distant the name of the law used in Western media (“The so-called ‘gay propaganda’ law”, line 60). Although both journalists have chosen the same quote for their headline, cumulative evidence suggests that RT may have done so to reinforce Putin’s negative construction of gay people as an out-group, while the Guardian writer may have wished to reinforce the intended audience’s assumed negative beliefs about the Russian government as homophobic. In doing so, the latter journalist echoes his colleagues in other Western media, who occasionally even fall prey to a what social cognition researchers call a ‘fundamental attribution error’: presenting anything negative about Russia as inherent to the country, independent of any external situational context (Bolshakova 2016: 453). The different stance can perhaps best be seen when comparing the reporting verbs framing the translated direct and indirect quotes from Putin (Table 1).

While RT portrays Putin as explaining, emphasising, demanding and recalling, thereby imbuing him with authority and credibility, the Guardian has him vow, say, claim and decline, thus throwing into doubt his credibility. The opposite attitude taken by the writers is encapsulated in the photo caption, with RT saying that “President Vladimir Putin ... meets with the volunteers” (line 40), whereas the Guardian titles the picture “Russian president Vladimir Putin poses with volunteers” (line 5).

We can summarise that both Putin and the journalists express beliefs and reinforce expectations of Russian politicians and Western European values. Putin also expresses negative beliefs and expectations of, and invokes negative emotions about, gay people, and both he and the writers make sense of the other, themselves and their audiences through ideological categorisation. The final sub-section of the analysis will elaborate on the socio-political context and its dominant ideologies.

Table 1. Reporting verbs in the two articles

Guardian	Russia today
Russian president <u>vows</u> no discrimination (line 2)	–
“We do not have a ban on non-traditional sexual relationships,” <u>said</u> Putin. (line 14)	President Vladimir Putin <u>explained</u> ... the difference between the ban on gay propaganda among underage minors in Russia and criminal prosecution of homosexuals in some countries (lines 43–45)
“We are not forbidding anything ...” <u>said</u> Putin. (lines 20–21)	“We neither disallow anything [homosexual] ...” the president <u>emphasized</u> (lines 51–53)
Putin also <u>added</u> that Russia was more liberal than some other countries, <u>claiming</u> that in certain US states homosexuality was still punishable by law ¹⁰ (lines 18–19)	“we have no criminal liability for such relations – as opposed to many other countries of the world,” the president <u>emphasized</u> (lines 51–53)
“You can feel relaxed and calm, but leave children alone please,” <u>said</u> Putin. (lines 21–22)	“So you can feel calm and relaxed – but leave the children alone, please,” Putin <u>demanded</u> (line 54)
<u>claiming</u> that some countries were even discussing the legalisation of paedophilia (lines 30–31)	<u>recalling</u> that in some countries the issue of legalizing pedophilia has been discussed openly (line 55)
He <u>declined</u> to specify which countries (line 31)	–

4.3.2 Socio-political context

As outlined in the background section of this chapter, the Sochi Winter Olympics in early 2014 became a focal point for the worsening relations between Russia on the one hand and especially Western European countries and the US on the other. A few weeks after the Games, Russia annexed Crimea, eclipsing the controversy around gay rights in the country. However, the international prominence gained by any host of Olympic Games provided an opportunity to both criticise and defend Russia on its LGBT legislation and its effects, such as increased violence against gay people.

In his comments as translated and reported in both the Guardian and RT, Putin employs a number of strategies to construct a traditional Russia as the in-group, and Western countries and gay people as out-groups who are affiliated with each other (see Macgilchrist 2011: 22–23 for this “logic of equivalence” and “antagonistic frontier”). Apart from social actor representation and cohesive devices at the lexico-grammatical level, his argumentation features denial of discrimination

10. In fact, there are nine US states with limitations on how educators can talk about homosexuality (Ford 2014).

(“Putin said the Games would be held ‘without discrimination on any grounds’, Guardian, lines 28–29), a claim that has been taken up by Russian print media and television chat shows (Scheller-Boltz and Althaler 2016: 198). Putin is further presented as appealing to tradition (“But he added ... that Russia was a traditional country”, Guardian, line 29) and as employing the slippery-slope argument that represents homosexuality as leading to general moral depravity (“claiming that some countries were even discussing the legalisation of paedophilia”, Guardian, lines 30–31) (cf. Chojnicka 2015: 162). He thereby expresses a “weak homophobia” that tolerates gay people as long as they are not publically visible (Chojnicka 2015: 157). Crucially, he and his anonymous defender (RT, lines 68–71) also construct a binary opposition where LGBT rights metonymically stand for European or Western values and thus become entangled with national and cultural identity. It has already been noted in the text analysis that Putin constructs ‘gay’ as opposed to ‘Russian’, thus justifying anti-gay legislation in the country. Notably, the communications director of state-owned Russian polling company VCIOM, Aleksey Firsov, also makes that point when observing the widening gap in attitudes between Russians and Western people: “strengthening the rejection of homosexuality we are moving contraflow and contrary to the world trend. This is why this figure can be a characteristic of national identity” (VCIOM 2015). This link between homophobia and anti-Western nationalism can also be seen in Putin’s refusal to “accept European values on sexual orientation” (Guardian, lines 29–30) and rejecting the notion of Russia as “an obedient lap dog” (Guardian, line 33) or, depending on the translation, “weak-willed underlings” (RT, lines 56–57) following the West’s lead. How can we account for this relation between anti-gay and anti-Western sentiment?

Putin has alternated between the roles of president and prime minister of Russia since 2000, and has – in the view of his critics – used his power to strengthen nationalism and the Orthodox Church while curtailing freedom of expression, in effect building a “consolidated authoritarian system” (Kuzio 2016). The EU enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013, which saw eleven post-socialist countries join the union, widened the gap between the Western orientation of Central and Eastern European countries, and a re-emerging Russian nationalism that was founded on military prowess, Orthodox Christianity and not least traditional family values. Eastern European countries, including EU members, are facing tensions between Western orientation and “traditional values represented by the nation, family and the Church” (Chojnicka 2015: 138). Indeed, the taboo of homosexuality in socialist times casts a long shadow: Lithuania passed an anti-gay promotion law in 2008 already and at the time of writing, an equivalent law has passed its second reading in the Kyrgyz parliament (although no date has been set for the final reading), and similar legislation is being discussed in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and Latvia (Caroll 2016: 11 and 40 n.18). In addition, the phrase ‘promotion of

homosexuality' was "widely used in Polish politics and the media" (Krzyżanowska 2010: 108). By contrast, in 2016 there were 40 countries, or jurisdictions within countries, where same-sex partnerships or marriages are recognised, with the vast majority of the respective laws passed since 2001. Of the countries recognising gay relationships, 31 are in Europe (including four in Eastern Europe), North America or Oceania, but the list also includes a number of South and Central American countries as well as Taiwan, Japan and South Africa. Still, just under half of Russians consider homosexuality a Western-world phenomenon (ILGA 2016: 9), a perception likely to be driven by discourses that construct it as opposed to Russian national identity and thereby use anti-Western, including anti-gay, stereotypes to justify a different political system.

And the systems are becoming more different: after a lull in tensions in the post-socialist 1990s, the geopolitical interests of Russia, led by Putin in one capacity or other since 2000, are again at odds with those of Western European countries. At the time of writing, this can most clearly be seen in the military conflicts in Ukraine, which is split along loyalties towards the EU or Russia, and in Syria, where an American-British-French coalition and Russia support different warring factions in a proxy war. The military conflict is mirrored in an ideological conflict between social conservatism, nationalism and close links between Church and state on the one hand, and liberalism, multiculturalism and secularism on the other. In this geopolitical and cultural competition, the respective other is denigrated with exaggerated, homogenising stereotypes and LGBT rights have come to metonymically stand for dominant Western ideologies that are seen as colonising and posing a threat to national identity (Krzyżanowska 2010: 125, Scheller-Boltz and Althaler 2016: 191). Graff, speaking about the Polish context, notes that "[a]ttitudes toward lesbians and gay men are 'the litmus test for Polish democracy' [while] Polish conservatives believe them to be the litmus test for Polish 'independence' and national 'identity'" (2006:448). In some parts of Eastern Europe and in Russia (and indeed much of sub-Saharan Africa), "sexual minorities ... seem to be caught up in the ideological struggle between old and new, tradition and modernization, nationalism and multiculturalism" (Chojnicka 2015: 170), while liberal Western media and activists peg much of their criticism of Russia on its anti-LGBT laws and the homophobic violence they have spawned. From a liberal Western perspective, homophobic out-group members have become a "folk devil" (Hall et al. 2013), i.e. the reverse personification of positive social images of the in-group, which threatens to displace 'our' society for an illiberalism that, in the Western narrative, has been relegated to history (Opratko 2016). Vice versa, recognition of LGBT rights is seen as part of an alien ideology that, if superimposed by the Western out-group, endangers the in-group (see also Scheller-Boltz and Althaler 2016: 192). In either case, LGBT people are instrumentalised as a proxy in a much wider conflict.

5. Implications

This chapter has shown how ideological conflict as expressed in discourse can be analysed in texts and their contexts by combining discourse analytical tools with socio-cognitive categories. While only a sample analysis was presented here, a full-fledged study would triangulate theories, methods and data to a greater extent to demonstrate how collective self-categorisation and the resultant identities develop not only over time, but also in moments of contestation. A focus on language is crucial in this regard as it illustrates how such identities are constructed through text and discourse, and how macro-level ideologies are mediated by discourse practice to impact on the selection of discourse features at the micro-level. In short, a socio-cognitive critical discourse analysis can enrich discourse analysis, social psychology and social cognition research by showing how and what socio-cognitive processes influence who is represented in texts, how they are represented and why in a particular way.

Throughout this paper, I have hinted at how LGBT rights have become a *pars pro toto* of (anti-)Western ideologies in Russia. It is hoped that this chapter not only promotes socio-cognitive approaches in critical discourse studies but also encourages more work into discourses that instantiate ideological struggles between Russia and Western countries.

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Appendix

Guardian article

- 1 **Vladimir Putin: gay people at Winter Olympics must 'leave children alone'**
- 2 Russian president vows no discrimination but says gay people must observe law banning
- 3 'homosexual propaganda'
- 4 [photo]
- 5 Russian president Vladimir Putin poses with volunteers after arriving in Sochi to inspect
- 6 preparations for the Winter Olympics. Photograph: Sasha Mordovets/Getty
- 7 Shaun Walker in Moscow
- 8 Vladimir Putin has said that gay people will be not be subjected to harassment at the Winter
- 9 Olympics in Sochi, as long as they stay away from children.
- 10 Putin is currently in Sochi reviewing preparations for the Games, which begin in three weeks.
- 11 During a meeting with some of the thousands of volunteers who will work during the
- 12 Olympics, he was asked why their uniforms were rainbow coloured, given the recent Kremlin
- 13 anti-gay initiatives.
- 14 "We do not have a ban on non-traditional sexual relationships," said Putin in comments
- 15 reported by Russian agencies. "We have a ban on the propaganda of homosexuality and
- 16 paedophilia. I want to underline this. Propaganda among children. These are absolutely
- 17 different things – a ban on something or a ban on the propaganda of that thing."
- 18 Putin also added that Russia was more liberal than some other countries, claiming that in
- 19 certain US states homosexuality was still punishable by law.
- 20 "We are not forbidding anything and nobody is being grabbed off the street, and there is no
- 21 punishment for such kinds of relations," said Putin. "You can feel relaxed and calm [in
- 22 Russia], but leave children alone please," said Putin.
- 23 Since the law on "homosexual propaganda" came into force last year, Russia's gay
- 24 community has reported an upturn in homophobic violence and threats. Gay rights rallies are
- 25 also banned in Russia, and there has been much discussion over whether athletes or
- 26 spectators displaying rainbow flags or gay rights placards could be arrested during the
- 27 Olympics.
- 28 Earlier this week, Putin said the Games would be held "without discrimination on any
- 29 grounds". But he added on Friday that Russia was a traditional country, and refused to accept

30 European values on sexual orientation, claiming that some countries were even discussing the
31 legalisation of paedophilia. He declined to specify which countries, saying it was easy to find
32 out about such things on the internet.

33 Putin said: “What, are we supposed to follow along like obedient lapdogs, towards whatever
34 consequences await? We have our own traditions, our own culture. We have respect for all of
35 our international partners and ask that they also respect our own traditions and culture.”
36

37 Russia Today article (*italics for direct speech omitted*)

38 **‘Leave children alone’ – Putin on gay rights in Russia**

39 [photo]

40 President Vladimir Putin, center, meets with the volunteers taking part in preparing and
41 holding the 22nd Winter Olympic Games and 11th Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi. (RIA
42 Novosti/Aleksey Nikolskiy) / RIA Novosti

43 President Vladimir Putin explained to Sochi-2014 Olympic Games volunteers the difference
44 between the ban on gay propaganda among underage minors in Russia and criminal
45 prosecution of homosexuals in some countries.

46 “There is no ban for homosexual relations in Russia, yet propaganda of homosexuality among
47 minors – and pedophilia in particular – are prohibited,” Putin said during a Q&A session with
48 volunteers at the Sochi Winter Olympics.

49 The president stressed that a ban on certain kind of relations and an interdiction on
50 propaganda of such relations are “totally different things.”

51 “We neither disallow anything [homosexual] nor bust anybody [who’s gay], we have no
52 criminal liability for such relations – as opposed to many other countries of the world,” the
53 president emphasized.

54 “So you can feel calm and relaxed – but leave the children alone, please,” Putin demanded,
55 recalling that in some countries the issue of legalizing pedophilia has been discussed openly.

56 “We’re not going to take up that lead towards unknown consequences like weak-willed
57 underlings,” the Russian president stated. “We have our own traditions and our own culture.
58 We treat with respect all of our partners and we anticipate that our traditions and culture are
59 respected.”

60 The so-called “gay propaganda” law introduces fines for propaganda of non-traditional sex
61 relations to minors, including in the media, on the internet and via viral adverts. The law
62 stipulates fines for giving children propaganda about homosexuality.

63 Earlier in January, a group of 27 Nobel laureates wrote an open letter to President Putin
64 urging him to repeal the so-called “gay propaganda law” as it “inhibits the freedom of local
65 and foreign” LGBT communities.

66 But the International Olympic Committee says that Russia’s legislation doesn’t violate the
67 Olympic movement’s rules.

68 Moreover, on Friday a senior Italian member of the International Olympic Committee has
69 urged “not to let politics interfere with the Olympics” and slammed the US for its decision to
70 include openly gay athletes in its official Sochi delegation just to “demonstrate” that in their
71 country gay rights have been established.

More than keywords

Discourse prominence analysis of the Russian Web Portal *Sputnik Czech Republic*

Václav Cvrček and Masako Fidler

The interpretation of a text usually starts with finding what is striking. Keyword analysis is a widely used corpus linguistic method that helps identify words as possible carriers of prominent topics in a text. It identifies words with significantly higher relative frequency in a target text when compared with a reference corpus. However, as our analysis of the Russian opinion portal Sputnik Czech Republic reveals, examining keywords alone does not produce an explicit account of discourse ideology in a text. Focusing predominantly on the image of Russia reflected in Sputnik, this study not only demonstrates the importance of a multi-level, quantitative approach to text, but also the importance of discourse functions of morphosyntactic units.

Keywords: discourse analysis, keyword analysis, ideology, corpus linguistics, Czech, Russia, Eastern Europe

1. Keywords as a starting point for discourse analysis

Morphemes, inflected word forms, lemmas, phrases, and sentences constitute parts of the meaning of a text. These linguistic items, especially those that are prominent (i.e. those that are striking to the reader), are expected to facilitate our interpretation of texts. Corpus-based keyword analysis (KWA) is a widely used method that helps identify such prominent items on the level of words by extracting what Scott (1999) coined as “keywords” (KWs). KWs constitute a set of expressions that are preferred over others¹ and are expected to be unusually frequent in a given text.

1. The process of KW identification is conceptually different from the method of finding words with thematic concentration (Popescu et al. 2007), which is based solely on the distribution of frequencies in a single text and does not involve comparison with reference corpus; the set of thematic concentration words in a text is therefore invariant.

KWs in this sense should therefore not be confused with query terms in search engines or cultural keywords (Williams 1976). They are not handpicked words that carry specific associations and values within a community (Firth 1935: 40–41). Instead, KWs are obtained from the target text (Ttxt, i.e., the text/set of texts to be analyzed) against the background of another (usually) larger corpus (the reference corpus, RefC); the latter is often a corpus that represents general language use. A word is a KW (or “keyed”) if two conditions are met: (1) there is a significant difference between the relative frequency of the word (i.e., raw frequency divided by the size of the text) in the target and reference corpora; and (2) the relative frequency of a word in the target corpus is higher than in the reference corpus (Scott and Tribble 2006). As KWs are obtained statistically, they are reproducible, and the size and representativeness of the reference corpus ensure a high degree of objectivity.²

To compare relative frequencies in the target and reference corpora, researchers use common statistical tests, such as log-likelihood test, chi-square test, or Fisher exact test (Bertels and Speelman 2013). However, statistical significance itself cannot be the measuring stick for prominence. Since these tests are typically “asymptotically true”, p-values derived from these tests (especially when computed on a large data sets) do not inform us of whether the difference between the frequencies in the target text and the reference corpus carries any descriptive value (cf. Wilson 2013). As a result, recent studies combine statistical significance with effect size estimation.³

KWA helps answer various research questions about texts. Studies focused on analysis of literary texts apply KWA to investigate the speech style specific to each character in Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet* (Culpeper 2002 and Walker 2010), or to describe the style specific to *Romeo and Juliet* (the entire play) compared to Shakespeare’s other plays (Scott and Tribble 2006). Corpus-assisted discourse studies examine the nature of public discourse on major social issues as represented by newspapers or journals: e. g., LGBT discourse (e.g. Baker 2005), representation of refugees and asylum seekers in the media (Baker and McEnery 2005), and discourse on crime (victims, offenders) in British and German newspapers (Tabbert 2015).

The selection of a RefC depends on the type of research questions. A RefC can help researchers probe reader reception of a text. In the KWA of New Year’s addresses of Gustáv Husák, the last communist president of Czechoslovakia, we

2. Identification of KWs “is less subject to the vagaries of subjective judgments of cultural importance ... [and] it does not rely on researchers selecting items that might be important... but can reveal items that researchers did not know to be important in the first place.” (Culpeper and Demmen 2015: 90)

3. For more detailed discussion and the advantages of DIN, our effect size estimator, see Fidler and Cvrček 2015a.

alternated RefCs and compared outputs (Fidler and Cvrček 2015a).⁴ This approach was based on the assumption that readers' perception of what is unexpected or surprising can change as their exposure to stylistic norms and language use changes over time.⁵ The results from the KWA indicated different receptions of the same texts during the socialist and post-socialist periods.

KWA outputs also provide different types of information. A prominent lexical item (a lemma) informs us about the topic of the text. But not all word forms of this lemma may be comparably prominent. Frequent word forms suggest the most likely syntactic function of the lemma as well as its most likely discourse function(s): e.g. the lemma may be more frequently represented as an agent rather than a patient, or vice versa.

Nor can extracted KWs be used for text analysis in isolation, as KWs are just "pointers" to the topic and style of a text (Scott 2010: 43). Isolated words themselves are of especially limited use in discourse analysis, as their functions can vary in different contexts; to use Stubb's formulation, "collocations create connotations" (2005: 14). Contextual properties of keywords can be examined by their links (Scott and Tribble 2006) to other keywords (i.e. co-occurrence of KWs within a textual span), and their frequent collocations.

This chapter will address some of the issues related to political propaganda as reflected in the Kremlin-backed news-opinion portal *Sputnik* (for Czech speakers). Our analysis is based on corpus linguistic methods of the identification of prominent (or key) items on different linguistic levels (for further details about the methods see Fidler & Cvrček 2018).

2. Multi-level discourse prominence analysis

Noting the potentially different types of information provided by prominent linguistic units, various studies continue to extend the notion of keyness beyond the level of the word. Culpeper (2009) identifies prominent parts of speech (personal pronouns, interjections, groups of nouns, selected prepositions, cardinal numerals, articles) to analyze stylistic characteristics of characters in *Romeo and Juliet* (key POS analysis). Mahlberg identifies several types of keyed five-word clusters (e.g. *his hands in his pockets, with his hands in his, hands in his pockets and, with his*

4. For discussion about influence of the reference corpus on the output of KWA see also Scott (2013).

5. The reference background, with which we compare, is of utmost importance here because there is no such thing as one proper interpretation. It always depends on the expectation of a reader and his/her experience.

hand to his) and their collocations and examines their roles in discourse; e.g. the author identifies Body Part clusters, and observes that they are central to the story (either by providing accompanying background information for the main story or highlighting the appearance or behavior of a character) (2007: 25). Fisher-Stark (2009) shows high frequency phrases (e.g., *I do not know, she could not help, as soon as they, and her uncle and aunt*)⁶ and their collocation-colligation patterns in addition to KWA. Other studies analyze texts using key semantic domains – the semantic tags that group together lexical items under an overarching property, as seen in Baker (2009) and Culpeper (2009). The prominence of more than one KW can be measured if KWs share the same semantic property with the help of the automatic semantic tags annotation system (Wilson and Thomas 1997; Rayson 2008); e.g. words such as morality, ethical, moral, humane and rights belong to “ethics-general” tag (Baker 2009).

To our knowledge, KWA studies have predominantly focused on texts in English, and this influences conclusions about the nature of methodology. English offers few opportunities for detailed examination of keyed word forms separately from keyed lemmas. A scarcity of inflection also leads to a language-specific conclusion. Data based on English suggests that grammatical information reflected in parts of speech contributes little to existing KWA (Culpeper 2009: 54–55). This view, as our present study will show, does not apply to every language.

Nominal expressions in Czech contain case markers and allow the examination of keyed inflectional morphemes. More importantly, prominence of inflectional markers suggests specific discourse properties of the text. For instance, prominence in the animate accusative case (and not in the animate nominative case) points to a discourse style in which explicit references to individuals responsible for actions are suppressed. We will show that such a “keymorph analysis”,⁷ used in conjunction with extraction of prominent lemmas, can explicitly inform us whom the reader is expected to sympathize with. We will also propose discourse prominence analysis on the sentence level to support and expand the findings from the analysis on the inflectional morpheme level.⁸ The data from this level will also demonstrate the relevance of proper noun KWs, which are often dismissed as uninteresting in

6. These are the novel’s most frequent 4-grams and 4-frames (Fisher-Stark 2009: 521)

7. The discourse styles of four presidents in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic were examined using keymorph analysis in Fidler and Cvrček (2015b). It is important to note that keymorph analysis is not the same as extraction of word forms. Czech has case syncretism (e.g. *Rusku* can be the dative singular or the locative singular case); keymorph analysis involves grammatical tagging and differentiates *Rusku* dat. and *Rusku* loc. cases.

8. By sentence we mean an utterance delimited by a period, question mark, exclamation mark or a headline of an article.

KWA-based discourse analysis; we will show that proper nouns can implicitly steer the reader's compassion and trust in a certain direction.

We will refer to our approach as Multi-level Discourse Prominence Analysis (MLDPA), as it differs from the KWA in two aspects. First, MLDPA brings in linguistic properties that have not been investigated in KWAs: inflectional morphemes. Second, and more significantly, the current study is not a mere extension of KWAs; MLDPA includes not only frequency counts, but also observations based on the *combined* effect of KWs within the same sentence. This method is different from measuring keyness of semantically tagged KWs or keyness of multi-word units as a whole. The goal of our analysis is to show how discourse prominence on all levels points to a covert discourse strategy: to implicitly direct the reader towards a target of sympathy and a source of authority; in short, to indicate to the reader whom s/he is expected to trust. We therefore studied prominent units on the levels of inflectional morphemes, lemmas, groups of lemmas, and individual sentences.⁹

Section 3 will present the MLDPA data followed by observations. The subsections will show how data from different levels strengthen and build on the lemma-level hypothesis. We present our conclusions in Section 4.

3. Data and interpretation

3.0 Corpora used

The target corpus SPU consists of all the texts containing the word stem *rusk-* during March 2015 in a Czech edition of the *Sputnik* portal (<http://cz.sputniknews.com>). *Sputnik Česká republika* 'Sputnik Czech Republic' is a Russian news and opinion portal for audiences speaking languages other than Russian.¹⁰ The collected text files are expected to show how *Sputnik* projects the image of Russia to the Czech-speaking audience.¹¹ The slogan used by this portal at the time when

9. In a more full-blown study (Fidler & Cvrček, 2018) we also add analysis of prominent word pairs.

10. Different editions in multiple languages exist, including pages in English, western and east European languages, languages of the former Soviet republics, Arabic, Turkic and Asian languages. The multimedia *Sputnik* includes the Russian edition and the target audiences are slightly different from the written texts (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html>).

11. Selection of the seed word (*rusk-*) has also important consequences on results; the target corpus is from the creation skewed and biased towards the presence of words formed from this stem (*Russia, Russian* etc.). This property of the corpus, however, is suitable for the present study that focuses on the image of Russia.

this analysis was carried out was *Sputnik mluví o tom, o čem jiní mlčí* ('Sputnik tells the untold'); the portal stated that it provided an "alternative view" and "shows a multi-polar world where every country has its own national interests, culture, history, tradition".¹² The RefC used for the analysis is SYN2015 (Křen et al. 2015), which reflects the general language usage pattern of contemporary written Czech. Table 1 shows a comparison of the corpora used.

Table 1. Description and size of target corpus and reference corpus

Name	Description	Size
Target corpus: SPU	A compilation of texts containing a word form <i>rusk-</i> published between March 4 and April 4, 2015 in <i>Sputnik Česká Republika</i>	80008 tokens 68259 words (excl. punctuation)
Reference corpus: SYN2015	A balanced representative corpus of written Czech texts published mainly in 2010–2014	121,666,414 tokens 100 838 568 words (excl. punctuation)

In this section we will first examine prominent lemmas.¹³ Next, we will show how data from the other levels, in particular the inflectional morphemes and prominent sentences, augment the hypothesis previously drawn from the lemma-level analysis.

3.1 Highly ranked prominent lemmas

A common procedure in studies using KWA is to examine the list of prominent words. A lemmatized corpus¹⁴ of *Sputnik* was analyzed and 593 prominent lemmas were extracted from the target corpus.¹⁵ Some of the top 100 lemmas (Table 2) suggest a striking property of the *Sputnik* texts.

12. cz.sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html (accessed 03/16/2016). This self-evaluation is no longer available at the Sputnik web site.

13. The distinction between inflected word forms and lemmas must be made explicit for an inflectional language such as Czech. A lemma is the basic underlying form of a lexicon. Thus, *hrad* 'castle' is a lemma of all the word forms, *hradu*, *hradem*, *hradě*, *hrady*, *hradů*, *hradům*, *hradech*.

14. For lemmatization and tagging we have used the MorphoDiTa tool (Straka and Straková 2014).

15. Minimal frequency was set at 5 (occurrences in the SPU corpus); log likelihood was chosen as the statistical method to determine significance with significance level at 0.001, and DIN (at least 75) to rank the KWs. Only nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs and pronouns were examined. The difference between words in the upper and lower case was ignored.

Table 2. Top 100 high-ranking lemmas

#	Lemma	#	Lemma
1	<i>Dadajev</i>	51	<i>Hrabyně</i>
2	<i>MH (flight number MH 17)</i>	52	špiónský ‘of spying, spy (adj.)’
3	<i>Durycká</i>	53	protiruský ‘anti-Russian (adj.)’
4	<i>Němcovův</i>	54	<i>sputnik</i>
5	<i>Anzor</i>	55	třístranný ‘tri-lateral’
6	<i>Hatoyama</i>	56	<i>Donbas</i>
7	<i>Němcov</i>	57	<i>Obrtel</i>
8	<i>Puškov</i>	58	<i>Mazur</i>
9	<i>Šerstobitov</i>	59	<i>Parry</i>
10	<i>UCRG (abbr. Universal Credit Rating agency)</i>	60	<i>Rossija</i>
11	<i>VEMEX</i>	61	<i>DLR (abbr. Donetsk People’s Republic)</i>
12	<i>Děmčyšyn</i>	62	<i>Kiseljov</i>
13	<i>LLR (abbr. Luhansk People’s Republic)</i>	63	<i>Uljanov</i>
14	<i>Bachajev</i>	64	<i>Hammond</i>
15	<i>Basmanný</i>	65	<i>Tsipras</i>
16	<i>Gubašov</i>	66	<i>Steinmeier</i>
17	<i>Kondrašov</i>	67	podněsterský ‘of Transnistria (adj.)’
18	<i>majdan</i>	68	<i>Azarov</i>
19	<i>mm</i>	69	volyňský ‘of Volyně (adj.)’
20	<i>Nachtmannová</i>	70	kompromitace ‘act of compromising, undermining’
21	<i>Segodnia</i>	71	<i>Yukio</i>
22	<i>VGTRK (abbr. All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company)</i>	72	doněcký ‘of Donětsk (adj.)’
23	<i>CFE (abbr. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe)</i>	73	<i>Izvestija</i>
24	<i>departament</i> ‘department’	74	<i>OBSE</i> ‘OSCE’
25	<i>Psakiová</i>	75	<i>ria</i> ‘RIA Novosti’
26	<i>Němcov</i>	76	<i>masmédiu</i> ‘masmedia’
27	<i>Nulandová</i>	77	konzultativní ‘advising (adj.)’
28	<i>Dalnij</i>	78	rozmístování ‘[repeated] deployment’
29	<i>Konašenkov</i>	79	<i>SNS</i> ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’
30	<i>Lavrovův</i>	80	normanský ‘of Normandy (adj.)’
31	<i>Armata</i>	81	démonizace ‘demonization’
32	<i>Breedlove</i>	82	<i>BRICS</i>
33	<i>Bortnikov</i>	83	<i>reuters</i>
34	ochotský ‘of Okhotsk (adj.)’	84	<i>Kišiněv</i>
35	<i>Ranh</i>	85	<i>Moldávie</i>
36	<i>Mogheriniová</i>	86	<i>Čarnogurský</i>

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

#	Lemma	#	Lemma
37	rusofobie ‘Russophobia’	87	<i>Madsen</i>
38	<i>Zaur</i>	88	zahraničně ‘international-’ (part of a composite adjective: international-political, international-economic, etc.)
39	<i>RF</i> (abbr. Russian Federation)	89	<i>Aden</i>
40	<i>Naftogaz</i>	90	tender ‘offer’
41	<i>Stratfor</i>	91	<i>Porošenko</i>
42	<i>Peskov</i>	92	<i>Smirnov</i>
43	<i>MZV</i> (abbr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	93	<i>Jaceňuk</i>
44	<i>minský</i> ‘of Minsk (adj.)’	94	<i>Podněstří</i>
45	<i>Lavrov</i>	95	<i>Kadyrov</i>
46	<i>Šojgu</i>	96	<i>Rusín</i>
47	domobranec ‘homeland defender’	97	<i>ČLR</i> (abbr. People’s Republic of China)
48	<i>Volodymyr</i>	98	<i>Krym</i> ‘Crimea’
49	<i>Mistral</i> (french assault ship)	99	<i>Gazprom</i>
50	<i>luhanský</i> ‘of Luhansk (adj.)’	100	<i>malajsijský</i> ‘Malaysian’

Many of these lemmas in this group are proper names: e.g. *Dadajev* (one of the suspects in the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, an anti-Putin statesman), *OBSE* ‘OSCE’ (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), *Nulandová* (Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State), *Donbas*, *RIA* (Russian International News Agency), ethnicities (*Rusín* ‘a Rusyn’), or lemmas derived from proper nouns (e.g. *Lavrovův* ‘Lavrov’s’, *minský* ‘of Minsk’). The proper names are in the italics in Table 2.

Among this group there are two lemmas that clearly point to *Sputnik*’s specific concern: *rusofobie* ‘Russo-phobia’ (ranked 37), *protiruský* ‘anti-Russian’ (53). These lemmas by themselves indicate apprehension over anti-Russian actions and/or sentiments.

There are also other lemmas that report anti-Russian actions (in bold) in conjunction with the surrounding context: *kompromitace* ‘act of compromising, undermining’ (70), *rozmístování* ‘(repeated) deployment’ (78), and *démonizace* ‘demonization’ (81):

- (1) *Lavrov označil verzi Reuters o výbuchu malajského Boeingu za lživou **kompromitaci**.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150319/130969.html>, accessed 24 June 2015)

‘Lavrov described Reuter’s version about the explosion of Malaysian [Air] Boeing as a false incrimination.’

- (2) *rozmístování sil NATO u hranic Ruska nezůstane bez následků*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150311/84504.html>,
 accessed 24 June 2015)
 ‘[continuous] deployment of the NATO forces near the borders of Russia will not remain without consequences’
- (3) *Bude-li rozmístování PRO u ruských hranic pokračovat, bude zcela jasné, že ve skutečnosti se předpokládá využít [sic]¹⁶ těchto systémů proti Rusku.*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150404/213049.html>,
 accessed 23 June 2015)
 ‘If the [continuous] deployment of PRO [anti-missile defense] near the Russian borders is to continue, it will be totally clear that use of these systems is actually assumed to be against Russia.’
- (4) *Peskov hovořil o příčinách demonizace Putina na Západě*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150331/191192.html>,
 accessed 21 June 2015)
 ‘Peskov talked about the reasons for demonization of Putin in the West’

The lemmas in (1)–(4) differ from *anti-Russian* or *Russo-phobia*, which inherently report anti-Russian sentiments. The anti-Russian nature of the actions emerges when the words are placed in context.

3.2 Groups of prominent lemmas

The examination of individual lemmas might overlook low-frequency lemmas that form a larger semantic category (Baker 2006). One method of circumventing this problem is to group together lemmas under an overarching meaning (analogously to grouping word forms under lemmas). In KWA researchers frequently identify a group of prominent words (word forms, lemmas) based on semantic or thematic criteria¹⁷ (e.g. Baker 2009; Fidler and Cvrček 2015a). Baker uses the automatic semantic annotation system (UCREL Semantic Analysis System)¹⁸ (Wilson and Thomas 1997; Rayson 2008); this system tags words such as *reasonable*, *absurd*,

16. This use of the infinitive *využít* ‘to use’ in combination with *předpokládá se* ‘is assumed’ is likely to be a Russianism.

17. To our knowledge, there is no reliable tool for automatic semantic annotation for Czech; the grouping of words in Fidler and Cvrček 2015a is based on researcher decisions.

18. The current semantic tagger in English does not distinguish literal and metaphorical meanings (Culpeper and Demmen 2015: 103).

rational, ridiculous, sense, sensible, and illogical under the semantic tag “sensible”. Fidler and Cvrček (2015a) examine groups of inflected word forms that are typical of the Czechoslovak socialist press (e.g. *ksč* ‘C[ommunist] P[arty of] C[zechoslovakia], *socialistický/socialistického/socialistickou* ‘socialist’ in different inflected forms).

As the data from Table 2 suggest that representation of actions against Russia might be highly prominent in SPU, we examined prominent verbs and nominalized events-states that point to conflict situations. As these situations imply aggression or threat, we grouped them as AGR (aggression) verbs and AGR nominalizations. The prominence of the whole group of AGR items was compared to that of non-AGR items (tables in Appendix 1 and 2).

The relative prominence of AGR lemmas and non-AGR lemmas shows an overall higher prominence (median) for the former, both for verbs and nominalizations (Figure 1). AGR verbs and nouns are systematically more prominent than non-AGR ones. A lower dispersion in the prominence of AGR versus non-AGR lemmas indicates that the former is much more consistent in its effect than the others.¹⁹




Figure 1. Prominence of AGR vs. non-AGR verbs and AGR vs. non-AGR nominalizations

The results indicate that the representation of conflict situations is prominent in SPU discourse, but the data themselves do not inform us of who is involved in these conflict situations, how they are presented, and whether they contribute to the representation of anti-Russian situations or Russo-phobia that we hypothesized

19. Interquartile range (IQR) for verbs are 5.7 for AGR expressions versus 8.9 for Non-AGR expressions. The difference between nominalizations’ IQRs is somewhat smaller: 7.8 for AGR expressions versus 8.6 for Non-AGR expressions.

in Section 3.1. The concordances, however, suggest that Russia might be presented as the target of AGR situations:²⁰

- (5) *Moskva je vážně znepokojena zprávami o záměru USA zahájit rozsáhlé dodávky zbraní na Ukrajinu.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150305/52539.html>, accessed 18 June 2015)
‘Moscow is seriously **disquieted** by the news about the US intentions to defend the extensive supplies of weapons to Ukraine.’
- (6) *“Nestabilita v regionu může být vyprovokována nikoli Ruskem, ale samotnou Amerikou a jejími spojenci, [...]”; soudí expert.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150312/90190.html>, accessed 29 June 2015)
‘“Instability in the region can be **provoked** not by Russia, but America itself and its allies, [...]”, the expert assesses.’
- (7) *Americký prezident Barack Obama prodloužil ještě o rok platnost sankcí proti Rusku, z nichž první byly uvaleny v březnu roku 2014.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/41201.html>, accessed 23 June 2015)
‘The American President Barack Obama extended the effect of the **sanctions** against Russia for one more year, out of which the first [sanctions] were imposed in March 2014.’
- (8) *Peskov hovořil o příčinách demonizace Putina na Západě* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150331/191192.html>, accessed 20 June 2015)
‘Peskov talked about the reasons for **demonization** of Putin in the West’
- (9) *Ministr zahraničních věcí RF Sergej Lavrov označil verzi agentury Reuters, podle které byl malajský Boeing-777 na Ukrajině sestřelen domobranou, za lživou kompromitaci.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150319/130969.html>, accessed 24 June 2015)
‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergej Lavrov considered the Press Agency Reuters’ version, according to which the Malaysian [Air] Boeing-777 was shot down by the homeland defense, as a false **incrimination**.’

These handpicked concordance examples portray Russia as a victim, with a possible intention to arouse sympathy for Russia: Russia is subject to (unfair) external actions: e.g., sanctions, accusations of causing instability in Ukraine or of shooting down the Malaysian Air passenger plane, demonization, and the deployment of NATO forces. Data from inflectional morphemes in the next subsection will provide more systematic evidence for such representation of Russia.

20. Detailed examination of concordances also reveals the type of objects used in the context. They show contrast between the representation of Russia vis-à-vis the EU and the USA in terms of unity vs. lack of unity.

3.3 Prominent inflected nominal forms of a lemma

Studies based on inflectional languages have the potential to explore in detail how a word (in this case *Rusko* ‘Russia’) is portrayed in a text. Below is an illustration of how inflected nominal forms can provide more evidence to support the interpretation based on lemmas.

The high-ranking lemmas *protiruský* ‘anti-Russian’ and *rusofobie* ‘Russo-phobia’ suggest *Sputnik*’s tendencies to present Russia as a target of outside forces and prejudice; in other words, these lemmas suggest that Russia might be frequently subject to unfavorable situations. The results from Section 3.2 do indeed point in this direction, but they do not by themselves show the role played by Russia in such situations. The predominance of inflectional forms reporting patient-hood confirms such a role.

The relative prominence of case forms for *Rusko* in SPU shows far greater prominence of the dative case, followed (far behind) by the accusative case and by the instrumental case as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Distribution and prominence of inflected word forms of *Rusko* ‘Russia’

Case	Word form	Frequency in the Ttxt	Frequency in SYN2015	DIN*
Nominative	<i>Rusko</i>	175	2088	7.9422
Genitive	<i>Ruska</i>	164	2351	-1.2186
Dative	<i>Rusku</i>	93	493	45.0417
Accusative	<i>Rusko</i>	60	546	21.1786
Locative	<i>Rusku</i>	53	2457	-53.6355
Instrumental	<i>Ruskem</i>	66	613	20.2006
Total		611	8548	

In this case, the DIN* was calculated differently from 3.1 and 3.2 (hence the asterisk). The frequencies of word forms were normalized not according to the size of the respective corpora, but according to the total of all occurrences of the lemma (*Rusko*) in each corpus. This allows us to compare the frequencies of individual word forms in SPU and in SYN2015 as if the overall frequencies of the lemma *Rusko* were equal. These DIN values can thus be interpreted as prominence of a word form (case) relative to the total frequencies of the lemma in both corpora to demonstrate which word forms appear more prominently than others.

The negative DIN for the locative case indicates that the word *Rusko* is used to represent a participant in events rather than a location, as the predominant use of the locative is to report location.

The prominence of the dative, accusative, and the instrumental case forms²¹ corresponds to the most likely semantic roles played by the lemma *Rusko*.

In Czech the use of the **dative** entails “experiences or actions directed towards the dative entity” (Janda and Townsend 2002: 69–70).²²

- (10) *To dám mamce^{dat} k narozeninám*
I will give this to **mom^{dat}** for [her] birthday’
- (11) *Thajsku^{dat} hrozí epidemie*
Epidemics are threatening **Thailand^{dat}**
- (12) *Ty zlé děti nám^{dat} rozbily hračky, vid’?*
‘Those naughty children broke **our^{dat}** toys, didn’t they?’
(cited and translated in Janda and Townsend 2002: 75)
- (13) *Představ si, on ti^{dat} si mi^{dat} sedl na klín!*
‘Imagine, [I’m telling] **you^{dat}** he sat down on my lap [lit. on the lap on **me^{dat}**]!’

The dative form in (10) refers to the recipient of a gift; the act of giving is directed towards the mother. In (11) the entity is subject to threat. (12) is an utterance by “an adult who is not a co-owner of the toys” (Janda and Townsend 2002: 75; cf. Cvrček et al. 2010: 172). The dative pronoun *nám* ‘lit. to us’ indicates that the speaker shares the addressee’s loss (“you and I are together in the sadness of being affected by the destruction of the toys”). In (13) the 2nd pers. sg. pronominal form *ti* ‘lit. to you’ signals the speaker’s invitation to the addressee to share with him/her the feeling of surprise over the situation (“Look, isn’t it surprising that he sat on my lap!”). In both (12) and (13) the dative forms thus invite the interlocutor(s) to share the speaker’s perspective.

Dative forms in Czech can be used with or without a preposition. Among the prepositions that govern the dative case, *k* ‘to, towards’ and *proti* ‘against’ are the strongest colligations in contrast to others in contemporary Czech (SYN2015). This is also commensurate with the semantic role of entities and individuals to which/whom an action is directed.

SPU texts containing the dative case of *Rusko* confirms that Russia is portrayed not only as a recipient but specifically as an entity that is subject to negative forces:

- (14) *Obama prodloužil sankce proti Rusku^{dat} o rok* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/41201.html>, accessed 23 June 2015)
‘Obama extended the sanctions against **Russia^{dat}** for a year’

21. The differences between SPU and SYN2015 for dative, accusative and instrumental are statistically significant (chi-square-test; $p < 0.0013$).

22. All examples for which sources are not indicated are from SYN2015.

- (15) *Ukrajina se integruje do struktur NATO a Evropské unie a mění se v stát nepřátelský vůči Rusku^{dat}*. (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/30480.html>, accessed 15 June 2015)
‘Ukraine integrates into the structures of NATO and the European Union and changes into an unfriendly state towards Russia^{dat}.’
- (16) *Jak republikánští “jestřábi”, tak i demokraté trvají na nutnosti ozbrojit Kyjev s konečným cílem zasadit Rusku^{dat} smrtelnou ránu, [...]* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/30480.html>, accessed 15 June 2015)
‘Both Republican “hawks” and Democrats insist on the need to arm Kiev with the final goal to strike a fatal blow to Russia^{dat}.’

Frequency counts of prepositions used with *Rusku^{dat}* relative to other prepositions²³ in SPU further inform us of the most likely syntactic role of the lemma *Rusko* and how the lemma is likely to function in discourse. Table 4 shows the much more frequent use of *proti* ‘against’ (56.6%) in contrast to other dative prepositions in SPU. Compare this pattern in SPU with that in SYN2015 – both for all nouns in the dative case and for the word form *Rusku^{dat}*.

Table 4. Distribution of prepositions with dative for all nouns in the RefC with the word form *Rusku* in both RefC and SPU

Prepositions with dative	All nouns in SYN2015		Dative <i>Rusku</i> in SYN2015		Dative <i>Rusku</i> in SPU	
	AbsFq	RelFq	AbsFq	RelFq	AbsFq	RelFq
<i>k</i> ‘to, towards’	404138	77.5%	130	40.1%	18	23.7%
<i>proti</i> ‘against’	36609	7.0%	105	32.4%	43	56.6%
<i>kvůli</i> ‘due to’	26871	5.2%	8	2.5%	0	0.0%
<i>díky</i> ‘thanks to’	22644	4.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>vůči</i> ‘towards, in relation to’	9187	1.8%	79	24.4%	15	19.7%
<i>oproti</i> ‘compared to, against’	5705	1.1%	1	0.3%	0	0.0%
<i>navzdory</i> ‘despite’	3577	0.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>naproti</i> ‘across’	1087	0.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>vstříc</i> ‘towards’	939	0.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>blízko</i> ‘near, close to’	248	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>napospas</i> ‘at the mercy of’	246	0.0%	1	0.3%	0	0.0%

The accusative case in Czech is used mainly as the direct object of most verbs (Cvrček et al. 2010: 171). Janda and Townsend formulate the function of the Czech accusative as follows: “The accusative case is the case of destinations, marking the

23. The dative form without prepositions is used only in 16 out of 92 occurrences of *Rusku^{dat}*.

entity that something or someone arrives at or goes through. In an abstract sense the direct object of a verb is the destination of the verbal energy created by the subject of a sentence.” The accusative case in Czech, however, does not always report entities that are affected by the action (e.g. to destroy (17)), as it can be the direct object of possession (e.g. to have (18)), and the effected object (e.g. entities that come into being because of the action) (19). All these examples are from SYN2015.

- (17) *Zloděj rozbil okno^{acc} do stodoly u rodinného domku*
 ‘The thief broke **the window^{acc}** into the barn near the family house’
- (18) [...] *měla trochu nepříjemný^{acc} hlas^{acc}*
 ‘[...] [she] had a little **unpleasant^{acc} voice^{acc}**’
- (19) *řekla mu své^{acc} jméno^{acc}*
 ‘[she] told him [her] **own^{acc} name^{acc}**’

The semantic role of the accusative as a case indicating an entity or individual to which or whom an action is directed is thus less clear than that of the dative case. However, prepositions that show strong colligation with the accusative case are *na*, and *v*, which indicate direction towards entities and individuals, and *pro*, which indicates a recipient. The lower prominence of this inflectional morpheme compared to the dative case suggests that SPU systematically represents Russia not as a simple direct object of any verb, but as an entity that is targeted by some force.

The examples below show that *Rusko* in the accusative case plays a more diverse semantic role than the dative case. There are samples in which *Rusko* is the entity affected by an antagonistic action:

- (20) *Prakticky všechna zahraniční média, vyjma Sýrie, nabízejí čtenářům materiály více či méně očerňující Rusko^{acc} a jeho lídra, prezidenta Vladimira Putina*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/ceskarepublika/20150304/30303.html>,
 accessed 12 June 2015)
 ‘Practically all the international media, excluding Syria, offer materials to the readers more or less denigrating **Russia^{acc}** and its leader, President Vladimir Putin’
- (21) *Bašár Asad je spojencem Ruska a hlavním úkolem Obamovy zahraniční politiky je porazit Rusko^{acc}, nikoli islámský extremismus, píše Global Research.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/41698.html>, accessed 29 June 2015)
 ‘Bashar Assad is an ally of Russia and the main task of Obama’s international politics is to defeat **Russia^{acc}**, not the Islamic extremism, writes Global Research.’

However, the accusative case is frequently used as the direct object of many other verbs. *Rusko^{acc}* does not necessarily portray Russia as the target of action:

- (22) *Prohlásil to americký historik, odborník na SSSR^{acc} a Rusko^{acc} Stephen Cohen v interview [...]* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/34544.html>, accessed 15 June 2015)
 ‘The American historian, specialist on the USSR^{acc} and Russia^{acc} Stephen Cohen stated it [...]
- (23) *Podle výzkumu společnosti IHS, první pětka exportérů zbraní v roce 2014 (stejně, jako v roce 2013) zahrnovala USA^{acc}, Rusko^{acc}, Francii^{acc}, Velkou^{acc} Británii^{acc} a Německo^{acc}.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/byznys/20150308/69121.html>, accessed 29 June 2015)
 ‘According to the research by the firm IHS, the top group of five exporters of weapons in the year 2014 (the same as in the year 2013) included USA, Russia^{acc}, France, Great Britain, and Germany.’

The instrumental case of the lemma *Rusko* is nearly as prominent as the accusative case in SPU. According to Janda and Townsend 2002, “an instrumental entity serves as a conduit for an event, realized as a path, a way or means to do something, an instrument, or a passive agent. In relation to another entity, the instrumental entity can be a label for it, an accompanying entity, or a nearby landmark (these latter two uses require prepositions)” (80). However, the top left collocate within the range of -5 and -1 is the preposition *s* “with” in SYN2015, which is likely to indicate either partnership or an opposing relationship, as in Examples (24) and (25) from SYN2015.

- (24) *Naprostá většina komunikace s klienty^{instr} je dnes čistě elektronická*
 ‘The absolute majority of communication with clients^{instr} is today purely electronic’
- (25) *později se objevily konflikty s některými^{instr} kolegy^{instr}*
 ‘later there appeared conflicts with some^{instr} colleagues^{instr}’

Texts from SPU with the instrumental case tend to present a positive or negative relationship with Russia: collaboration with Russia (26), Obama’s “war” with Russia (27), argument between Russia and the West (28), and defense system to protect Europe against (lit. before) Russia (29):

- (26) *Rozšiřování spolupráce s Ruskem^{instr} odpovídá zájmům České republiky.*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/ceskarepublika/20150304/39123.html>, Gajane Chanova, accessed 12 June 2015)
 ‘Expansion of collaboration with Russia^{instr} responds to the interests of the Czech Republic.’
- (27) [Obama] *Obětuje všechno kvůli své „válce“ s Ruskem^{instr}, píše kanadský server.*
 (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150304/41698.html>, accessed 29 June 2015)
 ‘[Obama] sacrifices everything for the sake of his own “war” with Russia^{instr}, the Canadian server writes.’

- (28) [...] *domnívá se novinář, že hlavním předmětem sporu mezi Ruskem^{instr} a Západem není dobročinnost, ale moc a území.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150307/64103.html>, accessed 20 June 2015)
 [...] the journalist supposes that the main subject of dispute between Russia^{instr} and the West is not philanthropy, but power and territory.
- (29) [...] *může NATO prohlásit, že má právo na protiraketovou obranu pro ochranu Evropy před Ruskem^{instr}.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150404/213049.html>, accessed 23 June 2015)
 [...] NATO can proclaim that it has the right to anti-rocket defense for protection of Europe against [lit. before] Russia^{instr}.

The prominence of the dative, accusative and instrumental forms of the lemma *Rusko* in SPU suggests that Russia as a state is less likely to be presented as the agent of actions than as the patient affected by actions. The particularly high DIN for the dative case and the frequencies of prepositions used in SPU further indicates that Russia is likely to be depicted as a target or victim; such discourse is thus likely to lead the reader to sympathize with the country. As discussed earlier, Table 2 and tables in Appendix 1 and 2 suggested that anti-Russian forces might be highlighted in SPU discourse; Table 3 in this section provides quantitative evidence for this hypothesis that SPU presents the portrayal of Russia as a target of anti-Russian forces. There is, however, another striking feature with respect to Russia, as will be seen in the following subsection.

3.4 Prominent sentences

Discourse prominence on the sentence level can be indicated by the number of prominent tokens relative to the sentence length. In other words, it reflects the density of prominent lemmas within a sentence.

The Table 5 contains data from the top 100 prominent sentences. It shows the number of sentences containing the grammatical subjects that refer to various entities. Noun phrases representing Russia or Ukraine may refer to state representatives, names of the capitals, and nominalizations (e.g. *ruská vláda* ‘The Russian government’, *Moskva* ‘Moscow’, *ruská podpora* ‘the support by Russian [lit. the Russian support], *Ukrajina* ‘Ukraine’, *ukrajinský prezident Petro Porošenko* ‘The Ukrainian President Petro Porošenko’). “Others” are subject noun phrases representing a country other than Russia or Ukraine (e.g. *Nulandová*, i.e. Victoria Nuland representing the USA), multi-state entities (e.g. *EU*, *NATO*), more than one country (e.g. *Tyto tři země a kromě nich ještě Maďarsko, Slovensko, Rakousko a Španělsko* ‘These three countries and besides them Hungary, Slovakia, Austria and Spain’), and nominalizations (e.g. *kancléřino rozhodnutí* ‘The chancellor’s

decision' – implicit reference to Germany).²⁴ The impersonal sentences were separated from all the others.

Table 5. The percentages of grammatical subjects representing Russia and others among the top 100 prominent sentences (subdivided to those sentences containing titles and names of representatives versus the sentences with impersonal representation)

Grammatical subject (in the nominative case)	Total number of sentences	State represented with a human referent (full name and the title)	State represented with a non-human referent
Representation of Russia	46	27 (58.7%)	19 (41.3%)
Representation of Ukraine*	12	2 (16.7%)	10 (83.3%)
Others**	36	3 (8.3%)	33 (91.7%)
Impersonal sentences (no grammatical subject in the nominative case)	6	0 (0.0%)	6 (100.0%)
total	100	32 (32%)	68 (68%)

* The number includes two sentences where the subject is *Krym a Sevastopol* 'Crimea and Sevastopol'

** The number includes *odbočka* [sic] *CNN* 'branch of CNN'

As SPU texts necessarily contain *rusk-*, it is anticipated that grammatical subjects referring to Russia are more frequent than those referring to other countries.^{25,26} This is reflected in the raw number of prominent sentences (46). Table 5, however, also shows that a large portion of the grammatical subjects representing Russia consists of the individuated referential expressions: nominal phrases that contain both the first and last name and the professional title. Below are some examples:

- (30) *V pátek to prohlásil zástupce tajemníka ruské Veřejné komory, předseda Ruské veřejné rady pro mezinárodní spolupráci a veřejnou diplomacii při ruské Veřejné komoře Sergej Ordžonikidze.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150313/98205.html>. Accessed 29 June 2015)
 'Deputy secretary of the Russian Civic Chamber, Chairman of the Russian Civic Council for International Cooperation and Civic Diplomacy at the Russian Civic Chamber Sergej Ordzhonikidze announced it on Friday.'

24. Some grammatical subjects refer to more than one country (e.g. noun phrases referring to Russian and/or Ukraine in combination with other countries).

25. References to Ukraine are also expected to be relatively high because of the period from which the data was drawn.

26. "Others" include nominal phrases referring to a combination of countries, including Russia and Ukraine.

- (31) *Zprávy britského tisku o hrozbách Moskvy použít jaderných zbraní označil tiskový tajemník prezidenta Ruska Dmitrij Peskov za pokus o “démonizaci Ruska”.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150403/205533.html>, accessed 19 June 2015)

‘Press Secretary of President of Russia Dmitry Peskov called the news of the British press about the threats of Moscow to use nuclear weapons as an attempt for “demonization of Russia”’

In contrast, grammatical subjects that represent other countries are often non-human (33) or nominalizations (32) as in the following examples:

- (32) *Hrozby ze strany Kyjeva na adresu ruských podnikatelů se začaly množit už od jara, kdy se Krym znovu stal součástí Ruska.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150402/197208.html>, accessed 12 June 2015)

‘Threats from Kiev’s side to Russian businessmen started increasing already since spring, when Crimea became part of Russia again.’

- (33) *Česká masmédiá šíří panické zvěsti o osudu českých společností, které obchodují na ruském trhu: [...]* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/byznys/20150304/30707.html>, Gajane Chanova, accessed 12 June 2015)

‘The Czech media is spreading panicky rumors about the fate of the Czech companies that are conducting business on the Russian market: [...]’

A country can be referred to by difficult-to-identify entities, as in the example below:

- (34) *Ukrajinské úřady, a také USA a EU nejednou obviňovaly Moskvu z toho, že se vměšuje do událostí na Ukrajině.* (<http://cz.sputniknews.com/politika/20150328/177184.html>, accessed 16 June 2015)

‘The Ukrainian offices, and also the USA and EU more than once accused Moscow that it interferes with the events in Ukraine.’

In (34) above it is not clear what *ukrajinské úřady* ‘the Ukrainian offices’ represent. Names of individuals or titles are not used to refer to the USA or the EU.

Referents with a full name do not present states as an abstract anonymous entity, but as individuals to whom one could relate and with whom the reader should feel compassion. A professional title furthermore presents an individual as a responsible person for the actions of the state, and provides prestige and more trustworthiness than an individual without any title. Proper names, often considered uninteresting in KWA, therefore prove to be useful in the analysis of discourse strategy.

The results in this subsection and the data from prior subsections suggest that the implicit strategy in SPU is to steer the reader towards an angle from which s/he

should view Russia. More specifically, SPU discourse suggests (unfair) measures against Russia. It presents Russia with a human face (i.e. the reader is implicitly led to feel compassion towards Russia), prestige and trustworthiness. This is a more complex picture of what we found in key-lemma and morpheme-based analysis. As this is seen as a consistent pattern in SPU, it is conceivable that this constitutes a core ideology that runs throughout the account of Russia in *Sputnik Česká republika*.

4. Conclusions

This chapter is the first attempt at a multi-level approach to discourse analysis (for a more comprehensive presentation of Multi-level Discourse Prominence Analysis (MLDPA) see Fidler & Cvrček 2018). This method benefits from searching for discourse prominence where the English-based KWA leaves off. MLDPA takes into account inflection as another key linguistic item. In contrast to the implicit view based on English key POS analysis, MLDPA showed that grammatical information serves as a methodologically explicit mode of investigation that has thus far not been fully utilized. The most distinct feature of MLDPA concerns sentence-level prominence analysis. The results from this analysis reveal a complex view of an implicit ideology that cannot be easily mined by KWA. This study illustrates how prominent features from all linguistic levels contribute to the holistic interpretation of a text. The interplay of prominent features on different levels can help triangulate interpretation with better precision and certainty.

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Appendix 1

Verbs relevant to conflicting situations (AGR) vs. others from the list of all 593 prominent lemmas.

Ranking	AGR verbs	Ranking	Other verbs
219	sestřelit 'shoot down'	123	ratifikovat 'ratify'
240	uvalit 'impose [sanctions]'	187	poznámenávat 'note'
252	znepokojit 'disturb, worry'	200	vyložit 'disembark'
254	zatykat 'arrest'	280	havarovat 'crash [in accident]'
284	pobouřit 'rouse [anger]'	288	zřít [se] 'disown'
312	vyprovokovat 'provoke'	316	upevňovat 'consolidate'
379	znepokojoval 'worry [repeatedly]'	340	zaslat 'to send'
505	zablokovat 'block'	344	projednat 'discuss'
547	porušovat 'violate'	351	projednávat 'discuss [process]'
		356	oznámit 'announce'
		359	zdůraznit 'emphasize'
		378	podotýkat 'point out'
		390	prohlásit 'declare'
		397	pozastavit 'suspend'
		408	vyzývat 'call for'
		424	zdůrazňovat 'emphasize [repeatedly]'
		450	prodloužit 'extend'
		457	přednést 'present [speech]'
		483	zúčastnit [se] 'participate'
		490	vyvrátit 'refute'
		497	komentovat 'comment'
		500	zahynout 'perish'
		504	napomoci 'help'
		510	soudit 'judge'
		512	vyslovit 'pronounce'
		515	objednávat 'order'
		526	napomáhat 'help [repeatedly]'
		531	pokládat 'consider [something as...]'
		533	zveřejnit 'make public'
		574	podotknout 'remark'
		575	označit 'indicate'
		586	zaujímat 'take [a stance]'
		590	prohlašovat 'declare [repeatedly]'
		591	hovořit 'talk'

Appendix 2

Nominalizations relevant to conflicting situations (AGR) vs. others from the list of all 593 prominent lemmas

Ranking	AGR nominalizations of events and states	Ranking	Other nominalizations
37	rusofobie 'Russophobia'	78	rozmístování '[repeated] deployment'
70	kompromitace 'incrimination'	112	urovnání 'settlement'
81	démonizace 'demonization'	158	pozastavení 'suspension'
104	uchvácení 'usurpation'	159	vyslání 'delivery'
125	sankce 'sanction'	243	přihlédnutí '[taking into] consideration'
127	destabilizace 'destabilization'	249	celistvost 'wholeness'
134	odzbrojení 'disarmament'	267	těžkost 'hardship'
144	zasahování 'intervention'	296	dodávka 'supply'
166	zadržování '[repeated or process of] paralyzing'	297	zasedání 'convention'
168	znárodnění 'collectivization'	306	přehlídka 'parade, exercise'
172	zbrojení 'armament'	318	příměří 'armistice'
183	embargo	319	rezoluce 'resolution, mandate'
194	eskalace 'escalation'	338	ručení 'liability'
218	bojkot 'boycott'	347	prověrka 'review'
239	zadržení 'paralyzing'	354	dohoda 'agreement'
253	převrat 'coup-d'état'	385	mínění 'opinion'
264	agrese 'aggression'	389	nestabilita 'instability'
271	provokace 'provocation'	409	vývoz 'export'
272	nátlak 'pressure'	412	plnění 'fulfilment'
308	sebeobrana 'self-defense'	414	uskupení 'grouping'
335	konflikt 'conflict'	415	vyznamenání 'awarding'
345	palba 'gunfire, bombardment'	417	prohlášení 'proclamation'
348	propaganda	419	poskytnutí 'provision'
349	vražda 'murder'	420	stažení 'withdrawal'
367	hrozba 'threat'	430	obnovení 'renewal'
369	vpád 'encroachment, invasion'	431	osvobození 'liberation'
403	porušování 'violation'	432	skandál 'scandal'
437	konfrontace 'confrontation'	440	dovoz 'import'
496	zločin 'crime'	443	zaplacení 'payment'
516	mučení 'torture'	444	monitoring
519	likvidace 'liquidation'	445	prostřednictví 'mediation'
539	obvinění 'accusation'	452	vysílání 'broadcasting'
573	oslabení 'making weak'	458	bezpečnost 'safety'
		464	vyšetřování 'investigation'

Ranking	AGR nominalizations of events and states	Ranking	Other nominalizations
		474	partnerství 'partnership'
		477	obrana 'defense'
		479	prodloužení 'extension'
		481	opozice 'opposition'
		491	platnost 'validity'
		495	účast 'participation'
		509	vítězství 'victory'
		511	rozšiřování 'widening'
		513	autonomie 'autonomy'
		517	odmítnutí 'rejection'
		525	posílení 'strengthening'
		530	zastavení 'termination'
		534	předání 'handing over'
		542	přerušení 'interruption'
		548	prognóza 'prognosis'
		550	odvolání 'retraction'
		551	dialog 'dialog'
		553	zastupitelství 'prosecution'
		556	tragedie 'tragedy'
		565	rozhodnutí 'decision'
		576	cvičení 'exercise'
		581	velení 'leadership'

Delegitimization strategies in Czech parliamentary discourse

Martina Berrocal

Parliamentary debates are characterized by constant conflict of opposing discourses in the struggle for positions, resources and political power. This rhetorical conflict, which is often more performed than real, aims, among others, to undermine the image of the political rivals and to question their professional, political and moral legitimation.

From the theoretical perspective, the questioning of identities and the face-threats are essential to this practice. They concern not only the individual face-threats, but the verbal attacks target frequently qualities related to the group-face (Spencer-Oatey 2009). However, these face threats form part of the parliamentary performance (staging) and the political rivals, unlike in the everyday interaction, seldom take a real offence which could seriously harm the interpersonal or intergroup relations (cf. Harris 2001: 468).

The research is conducted applying the pragma-rhetorical approach to parliamentary discourse which have proved useful in several studies of parliamentary discourse (Ilie 2003, 2010a, b, Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2010, 2012). However, some structural levels had to be added to Ilie's approach in order to use its whole potential and convey the interplay of the different discourse levels in the parliamentary talk. By this endeavour, the approaches of Klein (1998) und Blas-Arroyo (Blas-Arroyo 2011) were also helpful.

This article aims to list delegitimization strategies used in the Czech Parliament. The main focus is on the strategies by which the fellow MPs are accused of lying, clientelism or by which their moral and intellectual capabilities are put in question.

Keywords: delegitimization, rapport management, parliamentary discourse, discourse strategy, Czech

Introduction

In the vein of the present volume, this study aims to examine the linguistic and discursive means applied in the text and talk of the Lower Chamber of the Czech Parliament (*Poslanecká sněmovna*). The focus of this study is to trace the discursive strategies used to delegitimize political opponents, i.e. to harm their image by questioning their professional, political and moral legitimation, which then systematically undermines their political positions. The objective of this analysis is to describe the discursive strategies as well as the rhetorical devices that are brought into action to enhance one's own status, image and to consolidate one's political position and power resources and to undercut those of their political rivals.

Several factors were considered when making the choice to analyse this topic. First, the fact that political discourse in the Czech Republic has not been intensively researched and the studies on Czech parliamentary discourse are limited to a few, not very extensive research papers (Hoffmannová 2003; Wintr 2010; Madzharova Bruteig 2008, 2010). Second, the field of research dealing with parliamentary discourse has undergone a very productive phase in the last two decades. The results of this research have provided a number of interesting research incentives, which span from a heterogeneous repertoire of analytical methods to a wide span of research topics. Lastly, it was the current research in the area of interactional pragmatics, especially the approaches to (im)politeness, that were crucial in forming the research focus. (Im)politeness plays an important role because parliamentary interaction takes place mainly as dissent communication and the representations of one's own actions and attributes as well as those of other's and it adopts Spencer-Oatey's theoretical findings (e.g. 2000, 2008, 2009) within the field of interactional pragmatics.

Methodically, the study applies the pragma-rhetoric approach, which has been developed specifically for the analysis of parliamentary discourse (Ilie 2003, 2009, 2010a, c). The existing pragma-rhetoric approach (Ilie 2006; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, Roibu, and Constantinescu 2012) was adopted and refined in order to facilitate the analysis of the interplay of several discourse levels (macro, meso, micro). Apart from the delegitimization strategies that are common in the parliaments of other European countries, attention was dedicated to the strategies that are characteristic of parliamentary discourse in the Czech Republic and conceivably belong to the discursive style of post-communist countries.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical cornerstone of this study is the rapport management approach developed by Spencer-Oatey (2000a, b, 2005b, 2008, 2009). Spencer-Oatey defines rapport as “relative harmony and smoothness of relations between people” (Spencer-Oatey 2005a: 96). The management of rapport is manifested in several different forms: rapport enhancement, rapport maintenance, rapport neglect and rapport challenge. These forms result from the interplay of several factors: management of face, management of sociality rights and obligations and interactional goals (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 12–17).

The concept of “Face” is similar to that used by Goffman (1964, 1967), i.e. as an “image of self, delineated in terms of approved social attributes”, which means that face is linked to such social attributes that are “affectively sensitive to the claimant” (Spencer-Oatey 2007: 644).

Sociality rights and obligations are “concerned with social expectancies and reflect people’s concerns over fairness, consideration, and behavioural appropriateness” (Spencer-Oatey 2000a: 13–14). The basis of sociality rights and obligations are contractual/legal agreements and requirements, explicit and implicit conceptualizations of roles and positions, and behavioural conventions, styles and protocols (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 15).

The successful achievement of the interactional goals, both relational and transactional, influence rapport considerably, since failure to achieve one’s goal can cause annoyance or dissatisfaction. Achieving one’s goals, however, tends to contribute to rapport-enhancement (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 17).

Delegitimizing is considered as principally impolite and as such this analysis focuses mainly on how behaviours which threaten the sensibilities of face, both individual and group, violate the sociality rights or address the non-fulfilment of the sociality obligations linked to the social role of a parliamentary or governmental politician.

Legitimation and delegitimization

Legitimation and delegitimization are umbrella terms for numerous strategies that aim to construct one’s own positions as well as those of others’. They have become established as research topics mainly in political science (e.g. Alagappa 1995; Boswell 2009), sociology (e.g. Suchman 1995; Vaara and Tienar 2008), critical discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk 1998; van Leeuwen 2007; Chovanec 2010), and pragmatics (e.g. Chilton 2004; Cap 2010). In this analysis, a wide-ranging definition linking the cognitive and evaluative aspects of legitimation research serves as the starting point:

Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. (Suchman 1995: 574)

The basis for advocating one's own legitimacy claims rests on the authority that derives from the relative power between the speaker and the addressee and that conveys a claim to correctness (Habermas 1982). The grounds for such claims emerges in parliament from the social and political roles as well as the assumed authority (Chilton 2004: 43). Chilton and Schäffner (1997) regard legitimisation/delegitimization among three strategic functions that include coercion and representation/misrepresentation. These three strategies are often closely linked: "The legitimisation function is closely linked to coercion, because it establishes the right to be obeyed, that is, 'legitimacy'" (Chilton 2004: 46).

Similar views are held by van Dijk who relates legitimisation with "the rights and duties, politically, socially or legally associated with that [social and political] role of a position" (van Dijk 1998: 256). Moreover, van Dijk (1998: 255) points out that from a pragmatic point of view legitimisation is a "speech act of self-defence". Legitimation as a communicative act comprise sequences of speech acts (Rehbein 2000: 108). Importantly, van Dijk supports this view of legitimisation as a "broadly defined communicative act that usually requires more than the utterance of one single proposition" (van Dijk 1998: 255). It concerns rather a complex on-going discursive practice. Legitimation is achieved through several discursive strategies, situated at the macro level and their linguistic form and structure is then observed at the micro level (Chovanec 2010: 62). The reasons for legitimisation can be brought forward implicitly or explicitly. The speaker appeals to voters' wishes, they position themselves positively by highlighting their own performance and achievements and in setting-out their ideological principles (Chilton 2004: 46). Since politics involve a struggle for scarce resources, delegitimization, the negative counterpart of legitimisation, often takes place. Resorting to the abovementioned definition, delegitimization can be described as a discursive strategy which gives reasons why the position of the political opponent is (supposedly) invalid. The opponent is presented in a negative light, the position differences are staged and boundaries are constructed. The speech acts of delegitimization are accusations, reproaches, insults etc. (Chilton 2004: 46). They encompass negative evaluations of political opponents, their attributes, their actions and their motivations for past, future and imaginary actions.

Method

The pragma-rhetorical approach was chosen as the method for this study. This approach was developed by Cornelia Illie specifically for multi-layer analysis of parliamentary discourse. The pragma-rhetorical approach to parliamentary discourse has been shown to be analytically useful in numerous studies (Ilie 2003, 2009, 2010a, c, Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2010; Constantinescu 2012; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012). It combines the pragmatic and the rhetorical perspective. Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu (2012: 9ff.) legitimates the combination of the two disciplines into a single approach using their common research interest, “language in use”. The similarities can be found between the rhetorical nature of the “goal-oriented speech situation” as stated by Leech (1983: 15) and the “rhetorical situation” in modern rhetoric which is “the source and ground of rhetorical activity” and as such gives rise to a rhetorical response (Bitzer 1992: 6). From the pragmatic perspective, concrete manifestations of parliamentary discourse, as a genre of political discourse, are shaped by institutional constraints in the form of written rules and non-written practice. These are reflected in “concrete discursive features”, i.e. parliamentary discourse is to a great extent dissent-oriented and multi-addressed, and used in “ritualised interaction strategies” (Ilie 2010a: 62). The approach is mostly interested in the regularities of the institutional use of language and in the arising patterns, however, it also examines irregularities in institutional language practice.

The pragma-rhetorical approach provides a suitable framework for a description and an analysis of structure and strategic orientation of speech at the macro-level and the linguistic choices made at the micro-level. This way, several discursive dimensions (pragmatic, rhetoric and argumentative) can be considered within the same framework, and can reflect the complexity of actional and interactional aspects of speech (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012: 11ff.). The division into these two levels is methodologically and operationally useful. However, in order to implement it successfully, a slight refinement of the framework was necessary. For this purpose, Blas-Arroyo’s (2011: 201) discourse levels, which arose from a critical reflection on Culpeper’s impoliteness strategies, were adopted, i.e. the functional/cognitive, linguistic and interactional levels. Blas-Arroyo (2011) identifies a number of strategies (functional level) which are primarily face-threatening: e.g. “tell the opponent that he is lying”, “show a low opinion of him”, “construct unfavourable contrasts”, “criticise him/her for being contradictory” (Blas-Arroyo 2011, translation MB). Blas-Arroyo (2011) places the general rhetorical devices such as irony and social deixis at the linguistic level. He identifies their different realisations as ironic intonation, inclusive and exclusive use of “we”, etc., however, he does not reserve a separate discourse level for them. Development of the analytical framework also benefits from Klein’s study of discourse strategies in politics (Klein

1998: 376ff.) in which he establishes the following three strategies: basic strategy, concealing strategy and competitive strategy. In his view, there are no explicitly political strategies and the ones used on the political field originate in everyday rhetoric. These three strategies show numerous similarities and they reflect the basic discourse tendency in political discourse. Strategically, political action can be summarised in a meta-strategy: “strengthen your position and weaken the position of your political rival”.

Further subtle distinctions reflected in the typology of Klein are considered in the fine structure of the lower (micro-)discourse levels. For this purpose, Jacob’s definition of rhetorical strategy is useful: “rhetorical strategy is the manipulation of the materials of ordinary discourse, the arrangement of its elements, the formulation of expressions, the style, manner and timing of their presentation” (Jacobs 2009: 58). Accordingly, discourse in parliament is not created anew, but rather is built from the parts of existing discourses which are arranged in an adequate order and presented at a suitable moment. The rhetorical strategy is determined by an interactional goal, which in the present analysis is to undermine the position of the political opponent or group and to delegitimize them. With this in mind, the key point of this analysis is the interplay of the rhetorical and pragmatic elements in parliamentary discourse.

The applied structure covers four analytical levels:

1. **Meta level:** Strengthen your position and weaken the position of your political opponent
2. **Macro level:**
Discourse strategies:
 - a. Accuse your political opponent of a fact that challenges his/her political legitimation; e.g. lies, clientelism, lack of moral integrity.
 - b. Depict the political action of your opponent negatively. Criticize his/her political action.
 - c. Voice a challenge/make an appeal which is connected to the political position (action, abilities, and legitimation) of the political opponent.
 - d. Quote/paraphrase utterances of your political opponent that weaken his/her position.
 - e. Utter an amusing or witty comment that mocks the political action or personal attributes of the political opponent or group.
3. **Meso level: concrete speech act**
4. **Micro level: linguistic manifestation of the rhetoric/pragmatic strategy**
 - a. **abstract:** e.g. metaphor, irony, personal deixis etc.
 - b. **concrete:** e.g. politics as a game, ironic intonation, use of “we”

Material

The analysed corpus comprises parliamentary debates that discuss voter-sensitive topics, such as the state budget, extradition of MPs, the “Third Resistance”¹ or debates politically linked to corruption and clientelism. These rhetorically elaborated debates are in political studies called the “speech parliament” (Steffani 1977: 247, Klokočka 2006: 341, Sarcinelli 2011). The debates chosen for analysis concern the state budget (2010–2014), the extradition of MPs (2011 – 2013) and the last presidential elections² which took place in the Czech Parliament in 2008. These debates are argumentatively and rhetorically more complex than debates that formally implement decisions made in parliamentary commissions and fractions.

Budget debates are traditionally the “show case” of governmental policies and its politics. At the same time, they are an excellent opportunity to question the performance of the government, its motives and capabilities. Due to the fact that every budget bill reading has different objectives and retains different features, all three readings were included for each year. The objective of the first reading was to reject a bill that has no chance of approval and to present the party position that will be taken during the concrete deliberations. The second reading is designed to amend the submitted bills. The debates concerning second readings are usually quite extensive and speaking time is not limited, even though the option to limit the time to ten minutes exists, however, it is rarely applied. The third reading is used to find and correct technical and other errors (Syllová et al. 2008: 238). The debates that deal with requests to waive the parliamentary immunity do not fulfil the primary legislative function, but rather they give the accused party an opportunity to state their case. Often the speaking time is used to incriminate others rather than to defend oneself. Parliamentary debates preceding the presidential election are used to praise one’s own candidates and to criticize the opposing candidates. These debates are rhetorically highly elaborate with the goal of convincing undecided voters.

Material processing

The corpus was processed using the annotation and corpus query program *UAM Corpus Tool*.³ This software facilitates the annotation of traditional categories, such as POS, grammatical and syntactic annotation, image annotation (using the Image

1. The “Third Resistance” refers to the resistance movement against the communist regime after 1948.

2. In 2008, the last presidential debate took place in the parliament. Since 2013 the Czech president has been decided on by direct popular vote.

3. <http://www.wagsoft.com/CorpusTool/features.html>

Annotation Tool), and annotation of user defined categories. This last function proved very useful for the present analysis. It enables the researchers to define research-tailored annotation categories so that they fully serve the needs of the research objective. In contrast, the types of software that implement pre-defined categories may distort the research focus, because the research is adapted to the categories and not the categories to the research. The undeniable advantage of such software-supported data processing is the fast retrieval of annotated data, transparency of results, immediate result validation and statistical evaluation.

During the corpus annotation, it was observed that more than a few could not be assigned only and exclusively to just one category. This was due to the fact that the analytical categories defined were not exact enough, or better that they were not localized at the macro level.

The schema for the first annotation:




Figure 1. First annotation

When applying this annotation scheme, it became apparent that only a thin line could be drawn between the defined categories. In particular, the mixing of micro, meso and macro categories appeared to be a serious defect. This resulted in the need for a second round of annotation, which focused exclusively on the macro level categories. In effect, the micro categories were no longer regarded to be in the global scheme. Another reason behind the decision to leave micro categories out of the global scheme was the fact that some rhetoric devices (implicitness, irony,

metaphor...) are manifested in several macro strategies and, thus, their depiction in the global scheme is irrelevant. They are considered in a detailed description of the linguistic output form.




Figure 2. Second annotation

The five strategies represented in the scheme can be unequivocally matched with the strategies identified in the text corpus. The analysed corpus holds 338 979 tokens and 387 cases of delegitimizing were identified. These discursive strategies are at first evaluated quantitatively in order to determine their prevalence. Next, they are described qualitatively and illustrated by selected text passages.

Quantitative evaluation

A basic quantitative evaluation of the delegitimising strategies is provided in the following passage. In addition, detailed analytical samples are provided for each strategy.

Table 1. Delegitimization strategies – Quantitative evaluation

Quantitative evaluation	N = 387	
Delegitimization strategies	Number	%
Depict your opponent negatively.	223	58.66
Criticize his political action		
Quote/paraphrase your political opponent	65	16.80
Accuse your political opponent of a fact that challenges his legitimisation	54	13.95
Utter an amusing or witty comment	22	5.68
Voice a challenge/appeal	19	4.91

The most commonly used delegitimization strategy was the negative positioning and criticism which occurred in 58% of the cases ($n = 223$). A more detailed view of this strategy revealed that political actions or results of these actions were most frequently attacked (60.54%; $n = 135$), followed by cases in which negative motivation was ascribed to the opponent (12.56%; $n = 28$) and instances in which the opponent was criticised for the absence of action (12.1%; $n = 27$).

Table 2. Delegitimization strategies – Quantitative evaluation – Criticism

Quantitative evaluation	$n = 223$	
Depict your opponent negatively Criticize his political action	Number	%
Action/results of political action	135	60.54
Motivation	28	12.56
Absence of action	27	12.11
Own positive positioning	10	4.48
Abilities/attributes	23	10.31

The lively interactional dynamics within the Czech Parliament are reflected in the quoting/paraphrasing of one's political opponent, and is the second most commonly used delegitimization strategy. It generally refers to quotes of individual politicians (87.7%; $n = 57$).

The discourse strategy of accusing one's opponent came in third place (14%; $n = 54$). The majority of cases involve accusations of lying (70%; $n = 38$), while fewer cases involved accusations of clientelism (29.6%; $n = 16$).

Qualitative evaluation

The strategic level of discourse serves as the main thread for the presentation of analytical results. The strategies are formulated in the imperative second person singular. On the one hand, this could lead to the conclusion that they are meant as guidelines for how to undercut the political opponent; on the other hand, this form is commonly used in scholarly literature (e.g. Blas-Arroyo 2011).

First strategy: Accuse your political opponent of a fact that challenges his/her political legitimisation (e.g. lies, clientelism, lack of moral integrity).

This strategy aims to challenge the political opponent's professional ethics and legitimation. Their actions are depicted as unfair and corrupt which is in flagrant contradiction to the idealized image of political elites whose actions are thought

to be moral and ethical. In this regard, the question of truth and lies is frequently considered. While lies and pretence are occasionally considered to be useful political instruments (Machiavelli 1532 [2007]), they are regarded as something condemnable (Jarren, Sarcinelli, and Saxer 1998: 77ff.) in moral philosophy. Similarly, the search for the truth is one of the underlying framing elements of the modern (American) political discourse. It must not be overlooked that, in discourse, the truth is not discovered but rather is staged. Hodge (2008: 1) observes that with respect to political TV debates, both sides claimed the truth for themselves. When a political rival has a differing opinion, he is either accused of not knowing the truth, or deliberately concealing it. In parliamentary debates concerning proposed bills, political actors' (government, opposition, individual political parties) positions are negotiated. Occasionally, the speakers turn to metalinguistic dialectics about the truth, lies and manipulation. Lying is reproached both implicitly and explicitly in the analysed material. The output form often encompasses metalinguistic categorising and labelling:

- a. explicit metalinguistic categorizing – a lie (to je další lež – “that is another lie”)
- b. metalinguistic negation – (ona to není pravda – “that is not true”, prostě to není pravda – “that is simply not true”)
- c. labelling: putting the utterances in a dubious light (jsou to špinavé pomluvy – “that is filthy gossip”)

Lies are explicitly pointed at through verbs from the semantic field “to lie” (nalhat/ “to lie”, “dupe”; balamutit/ “to fool”; podvádět/ “to cheat”, “to swindle”; fabulovat/ “to fabulate”; lhát/ “to lie”; vymýšlet si/ “make up”). Accusations of lying most frequently appear during state budget debates, and the most frequent targets have been Finance Minister Miroslav Kalousek and Prime Minister Petr Nečas. The following extract is taken from the second reading of the 2014 budget bill. The speaker is Jaroslav Faltýnek, the vice president of ANO⁴ and chair of the ANO parliamentary group. He accuses Finance Minister Miroslav Kalousek of having lied during the presentation of the budget bill. The whole statement is structured into three utterances: First, the speaker addresses the plenum and apologizes (for no apparent reason). Second, he assigns his political rival positive characteristics and, finally, he accuses him of lying in the form of a request. This passage again illustrates the fact that delegitimization is a complex communication act.

4. ANO (Akce nespokojených občanů – “Action of unsatisfied citizens”) – is a Czech populist party, the leader of which is multimillionaire Andrej Babis.

- (1) JF: Vážení kolegové, strašně se omlouvám, ale chtěl bych prostřednictvím pana předsedy Sněmovny poprosit pana poslance Kalouska, kterého stále ještě považuji za velmi úspěšného rétora, inteligentního člověka, bývalého a je otázka do jaké míry úspěšného ministra financí. Jenom jednu prosbu mám: aby nelhal, nefabuloval, nevymýšlel si.

JF: *Dear colleagues I am terribly sorry, but through the Speaker of the House, I would like to make a request of MP Kalousek, whom I still consider to be a very successful rhetorician and an intelligent person, the former and the question remains to what extent successful Finance Minister. I have just one wish [of him]: that he should not lie, should not fabulate or fabricate.*

The apology is realised through a conventionalized formula (se omlouvám/“I am sorry”) which is further intensified by a colloquially marked adverb *strašně* (“terribly”). An explicit reason for the apology is not given. Generally, apologies are used to mitigate utterances with face-threatening potential, but that is not the case in this instance. Here, it serves as a connection to the third step of the strategy – to the accusation of lying. Similarly to Weiss (2014), “an obvious axiological conflict between a seemingly respectful and a contemptuous component” takes place, which aggravates the conflict. The assigning of positive attributes precedes an indirect address through the Speaker of the House, which is stipulated by standing orders and to a certain extent mitigates the conflict potential of the utterance. The assigning of positive attributes (*velmi úspěšný rétor*/ “very successful rhetorician”, *inteligentní člověk*/ “intelligent person”) within a delegitimizing communication act is interesting. As Miroslav Kalousek is described as a competent rhetorician, it is implicitly suggested that he uses his oration skills unethically, i.e. he lies and manipulates the truth. This representation that Kalousek is lying and he is also intelligent enough to do so manipulatively, leads to a further aggravation of the face-threat. The assumption is further enhanced by a sequence of three different verbs from the same semantic field “to lie” (*lhát*/ “lie”, *fabulovat* / “fabulate”, *vymýšlet si*/ “make things up”).

Second strategy: Negative positioning / criticism: Depict your opponent’s political action in a negative manner. Criticise his/her political actions

In order to delegitimize one’s political opponents, their actions are addressed directly inside the political institutions and mediated in public and social media. For example, special attention is dedicated to budget bills that do not have the necessary footing in valid legislation, to horse-trading deals, or to police investigations that are under suspicion of having been influenced politically. The issues and circumstances in the hands of pertinent political actors are especially targeted.

This strategy is frequently used in state budget debates where the main objective is an evaluation of validity claims, i.e. the justification of one's own claims and the denial of the claims of the others (Klein 2001: 1316). The central position within this strategy evaluates negatively concrete actions, finds fault with the expected but not yet realised actions of the rival group or individuals. Apart from these, current, past, and anticipated results of rivals' actions are targeted in the form of implicit and explicit face-threats. In general, it is, with few exceptions, the collective of political actors that is addressed. In contrast to the first strategy, this second strategy takes aim at concrete political ideas, decisions, actions and their results. This representation of a criticised situation is often linked to an explicit evaluation and the speaker's disassociation from the issue. This disassociation takes place in form of *verba cogitandi* (myslím si/ "I think", pamatuji si/ "I remember", přiznám se, že nechápu/ "I admit that I do not understand", rozumím tomu/ "I understand that"), *verba timendi* (bojím se/ "I fear that", obávám se/ "I am afraid that") and through the evaluative predicate (odmítám/ "I refuse", to je mi nejen líto a mrzí mě to/ "I am sorry that"). Furthermore, evaluative adjectives are used to put forward speakers' negative attitudes. The direct form of address has relatively high conflict potential and is mitigated in the Czech parliament by MPs addressing each other through the Speaker of the House. What may be observed is the rival group being addressed in the 2nd person plural (vy chcete zkomplikovat situaci/ "you want to complicate the situation", vy nenavrhujete nic jiného než ožebračování/ "you are proposing nothing other than impoverishment", umíte kritizovat/ "you only know how to criticise", neumíte navrhnout řešení/ "you are incapable of proposing another solution", umíte jen nadávat/ "you only know how to complain").

What follows from the general description is that this is an admittedly heterogeneous strategy with many different output forms. One form that can also be observed in other European Parliaments (Pursch 1992: 63–64) is labelling one a demagogue and the action as demagogic. In order to better understand this sub-strategy, a simple definition of demagoguery follows: exerting influence over a social group using untrue argumentation aimed at producing an emotional effect (e.g. giving unrealistic promises, uttering cheap and catchy slogans, appealing to low or irrational instincts). Otherwise, as with the first strategy where explicit references are made to lies and untrue information, this second strategy pinpoints the inadequate actions of the political opponent. As the following passages show, the rival is presented as an ideological agitator who is incompatible with a democratic debate. These two passages were taken from Prime Minister Petr Nečas' speech during the 2011 budget debate, on October 21, 2010.

- (2) PN: [...] přesto že tady opět uslyšíme demagogickou kanonádu o tom, jaké fatální sociální dopady budou mít kroky které navrhuje vláda.
 PN: [...] *despite the fact that again we are going to hear a demagogic cannonade about the fatal social impact the steps proposed by the government are going to have.*
- (3) PN: Já chci především zdůraznit, že se nejedná o plošné snížení mezd ve veřejném sektoru o 10%, jak někdy bývá demagogicky vyhlašováno jak představiteli levice, tak někdy i představiteli některých odborových svazů.
 PN: *I would primarily like to emphasise that this is not about blanket 10% salary cuts in the public sector as is sometimes demagogically claimed by left-wing representatives, and sometimes even by some trade union representatives.*

In this passage, the adjective demagogický/ “demagogic” is supplemented by the metaphorical noun kanonáda/ “cannonade”. According to Lotko (2009: 115), such metaphors highlight the staging character and the dramatic art of a situation and they intensify conflicts and dissonance in dissent-imbued contexts.

Drawing on the concept of face, it is possible to argue that assigning a demagogic action to a (left-wing) political actor has a face-threatening potential that is linked to sociality rights and obligations and to the conceptualization of the parliamentary politician as a co-creator of the legislative process. The implicit conceptualization of the left-wing politician’s role encompasses the task to watch over the social impact of the budget structure. Critical comments from the opposition clash with the government’s endeavour to quickly pass the budget bill as their own, and other discursive objectives and positions are implicitly or explicitly presented and evaluated. The face-threats against government members are put forward metalinguistically (jak je demagogicky vyhlašováno, uslyšíme demagogickou kanonádu/ “as is demagogically claimed”, “we will hear a demagogical cannonade”); the discursive positions of the opposition are further labelled as demagogický/ “demagogical”.

The negative positioning of political opponents is often associated with the construction of one’s own positive image. The following passage is from the first reading of the 2011 budget bill, on November 2, 2011. The speaker is Finance Minister Miroslav Kalousek.

- (4) MK: To, že umíte sice kritizovat, umíte zdržovat, umíte dělat obstrukce, ale neumíte navrhnout řešení. Neumíte navrhnout řešení ani tehdy, když vám to ten zákon říká. Že to jediný, co můžete udělat, je, že navrhnete jinou alternativu než tu, kterou vláda předkládá. To neumíte. Umíte jenom nadávat a zdržovat.
 (Potlesk z pravé části sálu.)

MK: The fact is that you know how to criticise, you know how to delay and you know how to obstruct [the proceedings], but you are unable to propose a solution. You are unable to propose a solution, even when it is stipulated by law. The one and only thing you can do is that you suggest an alternative to the governmental proposal. You are unable to do that. You are only able to complain and to delay [the proceedings]. (Applause from the right side of the house)

In this passage, repetitions play an important role. The construction of a negative image is achieved by linking the verb *umět*/ “can, be able to” with a negative action and, by the same token, the negated form of the verb *neumět*/ “cannot, not be able to” is associated with positively evaluated actions. Correspondingly, applicable legislative stipulations constraining the manoeuvring room are brought to the attention of the opposition. This explicit reference to operation limitations poses a threat to sociality rights, as the action is implicitly labelled as unproductive and a hindrance to the legislative action. In this manner, the freedom of action is undercut (to *jediný*, *co můžete*/ “it is the one and only thing you can do”) and the opponent’s capabilities are devaluated (to *neumíte*/ “you are not able to do that”).

Third strategy: Challenge/appeal: Voice a challenge/make an appeal that is connected to the political position (action, abilities, and legitimation) of the political opponent

As with the previous strategy, this strategy concerns sociality rights and obligations. While criticism and negative positioning focus on concrete issues from the political program or the action taken, the challenges and appeals are mostly aimed at fundamental moral attitudes, intellectual capability, and political ability pertaining to the given political action. According to classical works on politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 1983), direct challenges involve face-threats which, depending on the concrete situation, are mitigated or not. The corpus material contains challenges that rest upon social expectations which result from the legal provisions that stipulate MPs’ institutional tasks. While challenging the opponent, shortcomings are identified and an urgent request to remedy them is uttered. This does not necessarily pose a direct face-threat; however, it does undermine social and political positions.

In the following passage, the communist MP Jiří Dolejš reacts to the speech of civil-democratic MP David Šeich. In order to get a better account of the intertextual embedding, an extract from Šeich’s speech has been provided as well:

- (5) DŠ: [...] Druhá poznámka mě napadá, když jsem slyšel některé příspěvky kolegů z KSČM, tak při pojmu evropské plánování mě spíš napadla slova, která příslušela jejich předchůdcům – pětileté plánování- a při anglických slovech leadership v době krize mě napadla spíš slova jako perestrojka v době krize, ale to jsou jen mé osobní reminiscence [...].

DŠ: [...] *something else came to my mind when I heard the speeches from colleagues in the Communist Party. When I heard the term European planning I thought instead of words that were typical of their predecessors – five-year planning – and when I heard the English words leadership in times of crisis, words like perestroika in times of crisis came to my mind; but this is just my own personal reminiscence.*

JD: [...] Takže nebojte se pojmu perestrojka, ale nepředvádějte to, čemu se kdysi říkalo maďarský ekvivalent tohoto pojmu a to je papaláš čardáš. Vy tady tancujete čardáš nad svými řekněme výtobytky pro elitu, ale nezapomínejte, že jsou tady také lidé dole a že ti chtějí možná tancovat něco klidnějšího, ale hlavně něco, co by neohrožovalo tuto zemi. Děkuji.

JD: [...] *so do not be afraid of the term perestroika, but neither should you perform something that the Hungarian's used to call by a Hungarian term 'papaláš czardas'. You are dancing czardas here over achievements that favour the elite, but you should not forget that there are people down there, and they may want to dance to something calmer, most importantly, something that does not endanger this country. Thank you.*

Here, two opposed political views clash. In his reaction, David Šeich refers to terms that were actually used in some previous speeches (evropské plánování, leadership/“European planning”, “leadership”) and (pětileté plánování, perestrojka/“five-year planning”, “perestroika”) that are considered to be keywords from the communist past (Pullmann 2011: 226). It is implicitly conveyed that the communist MP’s mentality is obsolete, and that communist MPs are not fit for contemporary politics and irrelevant to the decision-making process. It is interesting that a purely personal and unfounded opinion is used as an argument against another parliamentary group. Communist Jiří Dolejš firmly rejects this verbal attack (nebojte se pojmu perestrojka/“do not be afraid of perestroika”) and labels the opponent with the action papaláš⁵ čardáš which cast him in a negative light. This label originates from an old joke wherein it refers to a (pseudo-)Hungarian term for a “summit meeting”. Additionally, it is used in the media for nepotistic restaffing of political

5. The word *papaláš* is a derogatory expression for a party official bigwig who is typically arrogant, insolent and abuses his position. Etymologically, it was originally a Slovak word. The root *pap-* comes from the verb *papuloval'* (eng. twaddle, prate). *Papaláš* is then a twaddler in a high political position (Šlosar 1985: 23ff.)

posts. Dolejš takes advantage of the expression's derogatory potential and accuses the government of behaving manipulatively and abusing its power in favour of an unspecified elite class. This sharply conflicts with the government's ethical codex which is put in a dubious light. Later, he challenges the government when he focuses on two aspects of the rival group-face. Dolejš reproaches the government by saying that it has turned away from voters and everyday reality because it does not keep voters' needs in mind. He also alleges that measures taken by the government have put the country in danger. Group sociality rights are threatened by this challenge. Although the government's social role is recognised, fulfilment of its obligations and rules (which result from pertinent provisions and protocols) is deemed insufficient. As a result, and in line with Spencer-Oatey (2000a), the entitlement to take part in pertinent social relations (i.e. in the political enterprise) is challenged, because expert knowledge, certain leadership skills, moral and ethical attitudes are regarded as "basic equipment" of parliamentary politicians. Hence, the challenges in the Czech Parliament are often targeted at (allegedly) absent or doubtful moral and ethical attitudes.

Fourth strategy: Quoting the opponent: Quote/paraphrase utterances of your political opponent which weaken his/her position

Walton and Macagno describe two basic communicative functions of quotations: to support one's argument or to attack the rival's in argumentation (Walton and Macagno 2001: 29). According to Fetzer, quotations are intended "to align with the audience by sharing past experience" (Fetzer 2012: 72). In this sense, Constantinescu (2012: 265) claims that quotations may enhance the speakers' ethos; and thus bring forth their erudition and wide spectrum of cultural knowledge. Furthermore, spontaneous (non-ready-made) interventions demonstrate the speaker's cognitive abilities, i.e. they are able to memorise shorter or longer passages of text and quote them on the spot. Similarly, Gruber (2012: 95) links the form of the quotation to its function: direct quotations can be used to introduce someone's "own political claim" or to implicitly evaluate the source text. Embedding the utterance of a political opponent in one's speech has great delegitimizing potential which unfolds through its re-contextualization, as such chosen utterances are generally already contentious.

The following passage comes from the parliamentary debate on MP Rath's appeal against the decision of the Mandate and Immunity Committee which took place on March 25th. According to that ruling, he was ordered to apologize to MP Miroslav Kalousek for claiming that he had been drunk. The interactional history of the two politicians is marked by several conflicts and this specific case is quite

interesting. MP Rath accused Minister Kalousek of drunkenness; consequently, the latter filed a complaint at the Mandate and Immunity Committee. No technical debate to clarify the circumstances was intended, given that MP Rath organised a screening of YouTube-videos that showed Minister Kalousek drunk and behaving vulgarly. In the following passage, MP Rath justifies his claim and attempts to delegitimize Miroslav Kalousek by referring to his utterances.

- (6) DR: Dámy a pánové, celé to začalo tím, že si stěžoval pan ministr Kalousek, že se cítí dotčen mými slovy, která odcituji. A ta slova zněla přesně: Tady pan ministr financí... Já to nechci opakovat – ta vaše vulgární slova.

Jenom například. Pan Kalousek říká: “vzhledem k tomu, že pan poslanec takto blouzní nejenom ráno, ale často i v poledne a večer”. Jindy – nebudu vás zdržovat těmi daty, mám to i s nimi. Pan poslanec Kalousek, ministr, říká: “že jste mě špatně slyšel, pane poslanče, anebo proto, že jste málo chápavý?”. Další slova pana poslance Kalouska: “Lžete, to je lepší, než kdybyste tomu nerozuměl.” Nebo jindy pan poslanec Kalousek říká na adresu jiného poslance: “Já bych docela rád, kdybyste doložil jakýkoliv zdroj kromě svých vlastních halucinací.” Nebo dále pan poslanec Kalousek zde prohlásil, v této sněmovně: “Něco takového může udělat jenom nezodpovědný grázl.” To řekl na adresu jiného poslance v této Poslanecké sněmovně. Nebo zase jindy pan poslanec Kalousek na adresu svého kolegy: “Běžte si to ověřit do chlívku, pane místopředsedo. Koneckonců tam většinou čerpáte většinu svých informací.” Já myslím, že naprostý důkaz jemnocitného vychování a vrcholné slušnosti pana ministra Kalouska. Nebo citát: “Tohle už není z chlívku, tohle je z estébáckých technologických procesů. Jste účelový lhář.” To řekl zase jinému kolegovi. Dalšího kolegu zde pan ministr počastoval slovy: “a dovolím si položit řečnickou otázku, zda opravdu tato Sněmovna chce být rukojmím zbytnělého ega z kolotočářsko-veksláckého prostředí”. Opět téměř vyjádření absolventa lycea pro šlechtičny. Další: “Pane kolego nebo pane poslanče, vy se chováte jako debil.”

DR: *Ladies and gentlemen, it all started when Minister Kalousek filed a complaint because he was offended by my words. I quote. His words exactly: Here Minister of Finance... I do not want to repeat your vulgar words. Just to give you an example. Mr. Kalousek said [to another MP]: “... due to the fact that the MP is delirious in this way not only in the morning but often at noon and in the evening”. Another time [he said], I will not keep you with the details, even though I do have them. MP and Minister of Finance Miroslav Kalousek said: “is it because you have not heard me properly, or because you are dim-witted?” More words from MP Miroslav Kousek: “you are lying; that is better than if you did not understand.” Or another time, MP Miroslav Kalousek when MP Kalousek says to another MP: “I would be pleased if you could present any other evidence apart from your own hallucinations.” Or, furthermore, MP Kalousek declared*

here in this Parliamentary House: “Only an irresponsible bastard could have done something like that.” He said that to another MP. Or another time when MP Kalousek told his colleague: “Go to a pigsty to corroborate it, Mr. Vice-Chair, that is where you get most of your information anyway.” I think that the most convincing evidence of MP Kalousek’s genteel education and common decency is the following quote: “This is not even from a cowshed, this was taken from the technological procedures of the secret communist police. You are a calculating liar.” He said that to another colleague. Here, the minister addressed another colleague with the following words: “and I allow myself to pose the rhetorical question of whether this house of parliament wants to be hostage to a bloated ego from a milieu of carousel operators and illegal money exchangers.” And this is again a statement from a graduate of a lyceé for aristocrats. Another [claim]: “Dear colleague or Rt.Hon. MP, you behave like a moron.”

It is obvious that the opponent is exposed through these quotes. The utterances by Kalousek that Rath chose for his speech were extremely insulting for the addressee. The stylistic inappropriateness entailing a number of vulgar and disregarding expressions is further enhanced through their use in institutional settings.

In order to understand the mechanism of how insults work, three essential elements should be mentioned:

- a. the speaker makes a predication about the target person (or about some part of his/her identity);
- b. the predication is regarded as inappropriate and demeaning;
- c. the target person (optional element) experiences this predication as face-threatening;
- d. the insulting potential of the utterances points to their author, or a part of his identity that is relevant in that particular context. (Taavitsainen et al. 2000: 71, as cited in Ljung 2011: 117)

MP Rath dissociates himself from the utterances of M.Kalousek as he hesitates to reproduce them, allegedly because they are too vulgar for the given context (Já to nechci opakovat – ta vaše vulgární slova/ “I don’t want to repeat – your vulgar words”). Their negative evaluation already occurs implicitly through selection of the utterances used. Rath only mentions quotes that do not concern him personally and are directed against other MPs. In this manner, his position appears more objective and the impression is given that, irrespective of the conflict with Rath, Kalousek is an aggressive person who attacks his colleagues. In the quoted utterances, Kalousek evaluates the intellectual performance of his colleagues (blouznit/ “to be delirious”, mít halucinace/ “to hallucinate”, chovat se jako debil/ “behave like a moron”), assigns his colleagues (deliberately) negative actions and approaches

(lžete/ “you are lying”, jste účelový lhář/ “you are a calculating liar”, to může udělat jen nezodpovědný grázl/ “only an irresponsible bastard could have done something like that”, běžte si to ověřit do chlívků/ “go to a pigsty to corroborate it”, tohle je z estébáckých technologických procesů/ “this is taken from the technological procedures of the secret communist police”) or he assigns his opponent a pertinence to a dubious social milieu (zbytnělé ego kolotočářského – veksláckého prostředí/ “a bloated ego from a milieu of carousel operators and illegal money exchangers”). The chosen insults challenge that part of the identity (cognitive abilities, moral integrity) which is essential for parliamentary work. An important aspect worth mentioning that intensifies the effect of the uttered insults is the juxtaposition of context-appropriate, polite form of address (pane kolego nebo pane poslanče/ “dear colleague or Rt. Hon. MP”) and the disrespectful swear words (debil/ “moron”) or insulting utterances běžte si to ověřit do chlívků/ “go to a pigsty to corroborate it”).

The reproduced utterances that are inappropriate for the institutional setting of the Czech Parliament, disqualify Miroslav Kalousek as a legitimate actor in the political field. Furthermore, the legitimacy of Kalousek’s complaint is questioned and his political actions are cast in a dubious light.

Fifth strategy: Amusing/witty comments: Utter an amusing or witty comment that mocks the political action or personal attributes of the political opponent or group

As the wording already suggests, this strategy is closely linked to situational comedy. Although it would seem that parliamentary deliberation provides no room for it, numerous studies have shown that humour holds a special place within a parliamentary action (Hoffmannová 2003; Wintr 2010; Horan 2012). According to Hoffmannová (2003: 65), the contrast between expectations for a serious action in an institutional setting and falling short of these expectations gives rise to a comic effect. Strategically, the function of humour is both constructive (as an expression of solidarity) and destructive (as a challenge to current power relations) (Yoong 2012: 267). Humour is used to enhance group cohesion and cooperation, but also to undermine authority (Rogerson-Revell 2007; Mareš 2013). Humour works as a “bonding” as well as a “bounding” element, i.e. to create distance and new conflict, and intensify current discord. According to Horan, there is another aspect to consider:

the status of humour within parliamentary ‘workplace discourse’ differs to the extent that parliamentarians are expected to engage both in ‘bonding’ and ‘bounding’ (aggressive jokes; ridicule), without the latter necessarily having negative consequences. (Horan 2012: 258)

This quote reflects well the staged nature of parliamentary actions. In this sense, the face-threat actually takes place, but the person (or group) in question does not suffer from serious face-damage. Mocking utterances are part of the ritualized discursive practices in parliament and they do not usually have serious consequences (Harris 2001: 468, Weiss 2014). On the contrary, “there is an expectation by the public and amongst politicians themselves that humour and ridicule/witty, sarcastic remarks – will form part of political discourse” (Horan 2012: 269). It is also assumed that participants of parliamentary interactional practices have the pragmatic competence to use and to interpret witty and amusing utterances and to bear with them (Horan 2012: 269). Another key point is that humorous verbal attacks have low information value and the primary focus rests upon rapport management, the bulk of which takes place as a contention of one’s own and the other’s image. Humorous comments focus on one or various aspects of the face of the political opponent, while at the same time giving the speaker space to demonstrate his own cognitive abilities and his/her rhetorical skills. In terms of face-damage, amusing comments count as a mild form of the delegitimizing political game. According to Hoffmanová (2003: 78), humour works as a valve releases excessive pressure; in order to prevent serious face-damage from taking place.

Amusing and witty comments fulfil two functions:

- a. target a group or an individual;
- b. aim to revive and lighten up the deliberation routine.

The following two passages are from the first (December 6th) and second 2014 budget bill readings. The speakers are MP Miroslav Kalousek, the Vice-Chair Jaroslava Jermanová (a parliamentary rookie) and MP Věra Jourová (who was appointed a Minister for Regional Development a month later).

- (7) JJ: Pane Kalousku – pane poslanče Kalousku. Omlouvám se.
 MK: Můžete mi klidně říkat Mirku, paní místopředsedkyně.
 (Bouřlivý smích a potlesk)
 JJ: *Mr. Kalousek – Rt. Hon .Kalousek, I apologize.*
 MK: *Feel free to call me Mirek, Madam Vice-Chair.*
 (thunderous laughter and applause)
- (8) VJ: A poslední poznámka k panu Kalouskovi prostřednictvím paní předsedající: Navrhuji zkratku s odkazem na římský senát. Možná by stačilo říkat: “Agrofert musí býti zničeno.” Děkuji
 JJ: S přednostním právem pan poslanec Kalousek
 MK: **Ponechávám stranou, že prostě ten poslanec nejde přes ústa. Prosím, tak jak jsem žádal paní místopředsedkyni Jermanovou, řikajte mi, paní poslankyně prostřednictvím paní předsedající, radši Mirku. Já vím, že vás to mrzí, že jsem ten poslanec. Ale voliči měli jiný názor.**

- VJ: *A final comment to Mr. Kalousek through Madam Chairwoman: I propose that a reference to the Roman Senate be added. Perhaps, it would be sufficient to say: "Agrofert must be destroyed".* JJ: *With a priority right to speak Rt. Hon. Kalousek.* MK: *I leave aside the fact that Rt. Hon does not come easily out of your mouth. Just as I told Madam. Vice-Chair Jermanová, you should, through the Madam Chairwoman, rather call me Mirek. I know that you are sorry that I am an MP. But the voters had a different opinion.*

Interactionally, (8) builds on (7). In (7), the Vice-Chair accidentally used the every-day neutral form of address (pane/paní / "Mr./Mrs." + surname); however, this form is not appropriate in the parliamentary context where politicians are addressed as parliamentarians: (vážený) pane poslanče/(vážená) paní poslankyně/ "Hon [MP]", MPs with other parliamentary functions pan/paní(místo)předsedo/ (místo)předsedkyně/ "Mr./Madam. Vice-Chair"; MPs with partisan functions (pane předsedo/ "Mr. Chairman"); or government members according to their government function (pane ministr/paní ministryně / "Mr./Madam Minister") (Berger 2001). Miroslav Kalousek seized an opportunity and turned it into a witty comment. The comic effect arises when MP Kalousek, who had not been properly addressed, rejects the inappropriate (but nevertheless a polite, commonly used address) and suggests that the Vice-Chair could even use the more familiar hypocoristic form of address (Mirek). The comic effect is acknowledged by laughter and applause from the audience. From a strategic perspective, the speaker mockingly assigns the Vice-Chair with lack of competence and experience. The speaker acquires control over the situation and turns out to be the interactional winner. (Zajdman 1995: 333).

In (8), Kalousek uses this interactional history to mock Minister Jourová for the inappropriate address. The core of the interaction is the same in both passages. In (7), Kalousek refers to the situation that has arisen and proposes a familiar form of address. In (8), the comic effect is further enhanced through a standard indirect address via the Chair-person and threefold correctly used institutional address.⁶ The humorous delegitimization implies that the politicians of the second strongest party do not possess basic institutional competences (use of the institutional form of address).

6. V. Jourová is addressed as paní poslankyně/ "Rt. Hon [MP]"; J. Jermanová according to her institutional function místopředsedkyně/ "Vice-President" and later on by her present function (předsedající/ "[Madam] Chairwoman").

Conclusion

This analysis identified the delegitimising discourse strategies used in the Czech Parliament and illustrated the stylistic and rhetorical means of their realisation. Delegitimization is manifested as a complex communication act which aims to cast opponents' ethical concerns, political mandates and motives as well as past and expected future actions in a questionable light. The theoretical framework involves not only the individual and the group face, but also the sociality rights and obligations that encompass the individual and social entitlements of the political actors. These are linked to (largely idealized) conceptualizations of the social roles that often form the core of delegitimization, in the sense that they highlight the insufficient fulfilment of these idealizations. Quantitative evaluation of the material shows that the most commonly used strategy is the criticism/negative positioning, which addresses previously unsuccessful approaches and actions, or current approaches and actions with negative expectations. The negative position is always assigned to the political opponent. The second most commonly used strategy is quoting the opponent; however, use of this strategy is greatly dependent upon the discussed topic. Quoting is observed in debates of high rhetoricity, such as a presidential campaign debate, or an appeal against a mandate and immunity committee ruling. The quotes mainly inform the audience of past events and utterances and serves as a means of getting closer to the audience. At the same time, quoting is a delaying strategy to obstruct proceedings. Quotes convey authenticity and they can be efficiently embedded in argumentation. Moreover, their sources are not easily verified; thus, they can be well manipulated. The undeniable advantage for the speaker is that they cannot be held responsible for the content and they are able to reveal a negative aspect of their opponent. A strategy that is used just as frequently is accusation. Delegitimization potential rests on the implicit understanding of professional ethics and the idealized image of morally and ethically acting political agents. In addition to the universal accusation of lying, denouncing connections to the criminal underworld and objecting to the clientelistic behaviour of the political actors appear to be part of the post-socialist heritage. In particular, the use of "Godfather" topos (i.e. implying that the opponent has a connection with the criminal underworld) disqualifies the political player and hinders any further debate. Apart from negative positioning, the strategy of a political challenge/appeal, other than the negative positioning, aims at attacking moral attitudes and competences that are associated with the political practice. Lastly, while the amusement of witty commenting enhances the inner group solidarity, it also aggravates conflicts and challenges current power relations. These comments are often linked to interactional history and give the speaker room to demonstrate his creativity. The comic effect usually stems from a contrast between high and low in relation to what is

regarded as appropriate language use in parliamentary settings, and what is brought about by the humorous framing of the interactional situation. The face-threat potential is relatively low. This strategy confirms once more the constant balancing act between the endeavour to maintain parliamentary operations going, and the conflict to delimit and to assert individual and group positions.

The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches facilitated meaningful insight into the quantification of discourse strategies at the macro level and detailed description of their realisation at the meso and micro levels. This analysis can also provide additional incentives for further research. Topics such as the new “creative” transformation of conventional metaphors, the use of “we” as a means of exclusive distancing, and from the quantitative perspective, comparisons of keywords from individual speakers or parties over different time periods could be very engaging.

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Impoliteness in parliamentary questions

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This chapter aims to examine Polish parliamentary discourse by linking (im)politeness theory with approaches describing questions. To achieve this, a corpus from four Polish Question Times was created, analyzing the degree of impoliteness in all of the 336 questions contained within it. In order to minimize the uncertainty of interpretations concerning the politicians' intentions, scholarly literature from political sciences on parliamentary questions was also applied. Overall, the quantitative analysis revealed a high occurrence of face threatening acts via questions, and a substantial difference according to the political orientation of the opposition. The use of impolite questions by the right-wing opposition far exceeds the use of similar questions by the left-wing opposition. The qualitative analysis shows the full range of impolite questions, from weakest to strongest. Even within the ruling coalition, MPs deal with face threatening questions attacking their "own" government. They mitigate the face threat by using, for example, indirect formulations or the conditional mood. Apart from that, MPs pose partisan questions which enhance the face of their party's ministers and simultaneously damage the one of the opposition.

Keywords: impoliteness, parliamentary discourse, questions

1. Introduction

The research on questions as well as the area of (im)politeness would be sufficient to flesh out several monographs. The motivation for such a linkage of linguistic fields is based on the significance of questions in politics. Talk show hosts pose questions to their (political) guests. In newspaper interviews, asking questions is a fundamental means to gather information from the interviewee. Probably, the most important reason to consider questioning in political discourse is that posing questions to the government is the fundamental right of the opposition in democratic societies. The appropriate arena in nearly all Western countries is the parliament. True, the use of this monitoring function is not limited to obtain previously unknown information. On the contrary, Norton and Franklin (1993b) emphasized

in a survey of Members of the House of Commons that “[a]sking for information as a peg on which to attack or praise the government usually involves information that is already known” and only “[f]ew members would run the risk of asking [...] a question without knowing the likely answer” (Norton & Franklin 1993b: 112). This confirms Chester and Bowring’s claims whereupon deputies ask questions “in order to seek information, to press for action in pursuit of particular grievance or a matter of general concern, to make a party point, to seek an answer that a minister wants to give (‘inspired question’), or for personal publicity.” (Norton & Franklin 1993b: 104; cf. Chester & Bowring 1962: 200–227). The fundamental right of the oppositions to pose questions allows them to check and control the ruling party and the civil service (cf. Martin 2012: 7).

This chapter does not cover the whole political discourse but only its parliamentary subgenre by analyzing questions posed during parliamentary debates in Poland. In the literature on parliamentary language, it is the British House of Commons that is most elaborated on linguistically (cf. Ilie 2006). The House of Commons is a Westminster parliamentary system characterized by a marked culture of debating in the chamber. In the German literature, such a parliament is labeled as *Redeparlament* (“debating parliament”). In contrast to this, parliamentary systems, e.g. the US Congress or the German Bundestag are called *Arbeitsparlament(e)* (“working parliament”). The two systems mainly differ in the way they work on bills. In Westminster systems, the work on bills is carried out during plenary debates. However, in “working parliaments” that work on bills takes place in commissions with less publicity. This setup leads to differences in the balance between confrontation and consensus. In general, working parliaments are more consensus oriented, whereas the design of Westminster parliaments stimulates confrontation. The object of the present study, the Polish Parliament (Sejm), belongs to the group of consensus-parliaments.

There is a large body of linguistic literature on the House of Commons (cf. Ilie 2006, 2010), or the German Bundestag (cf. Burkhardt 2003, 2004). In contrast, English-written literature on the Polish Parliament is rare. The papers worth mentioning are the ones by Ornatowski (2010, 2014). Among the Polish-written literature, the monographs by Laskowska (2004) and Majkowska (2012) provide useful linguistic analyses of language in the Polish Sejm. Both authors show in detail that the speech contributions of Polish MPs are biased evaluatively, i.e. the MPs’ parliamentary talk is based on ideology. Certainly, this evaluative bias affects parliamentary questioning. It is worth mentioning that on the one hand, the Polish parliamentary system belongs to the oldest in Europe, and on the other, the contemporary post-communist system is one of the youngest. In other words, the impact of the communist era partially survived in parliamentary proceedings (Ornatowski 2010: 234), e.g. in the mitigated interaction between speakers resulting in a specific turn taking system. The absence

of immediate question-answer patterns, even during Question Time (*informacja bieżąca*) proves this point. Oral questions and answers are given *en bloc* instead of in adjacency pairs (i.e. answers immediately follow the question).¹

The properties of the specific proceedings are constituents of the parliamentary “activity frame” (Ilie 2003, 2006). Regarding this frame, the issue emerges of how to analyze the use of questions in the Polish Parliament from a linguistic perspective. In this vein, this chapter is a contribution aiming to portray the contemporary Polish Parliamentary Discourse on the basis of parliamentary questions (PQs) by the means of interactional pragmatics.

In the literature on form and function of legislatures, the function of parliamentary questions does not entail just soliciting information. PQs can be used as “purely partisan devices with members of the majority/government party asking questions that reflect positively on the government and opposition politicians asking questions merely to score political advantages against their opponents in power” (Martin 2013: 17). Martin calls this “political theatre” – “entertaining” the public without providing any substance (2013: 17). An excessive use of partisan PQs can discourage voters (Martin 2013: 17). This especially applies to oral questions posed during the parliamentary Question Time. However, posing partisan questions is such a common parliamentary practice in developed democracies that the risk of losing voters can be disregarded.

The article proceeds as follows: First, the scholarly literature on questions across different types of discourse is considered. Important aspects will be applied to the Polish Parliament, giving examples if needed. The hypothesis is that certain functions of questions can be observed in Polish parliamentary discourse. Others will be excluded due to differences in the characteristics of the discourse types. The whole analysis will be carried out in the light of impoliteness theory. The reason for this procedure is the claim that political discourse is a genuine adversarial space, allowing for approaches from impoliteness theory to fit in adequately. The reason to take into account political science literature for the study of PQs is that by dealing with intentions and implicatures, pragmatic analyses eventually remain interpretable. Borrowings from other disciplines can help to reduce this gap. However, evaluating questions and marking them as impolite or not remains speculative. Thus, in the second part of this chapter the frequency of impoliteness in PQs will be measured quantitatively to overcome this gap.

1. An exception is the agenda item “questions in current proceedings” (*pytania w sprawach bieżących*). Here, the interviewed ministers and their secretaries of state answer immediately during the session, however, the topic of the questions has to be submitted a day earlier. As evidence shows, these contributions (questions and answers) are prepared beforehand and are read during the parliamentary sessions.

2. Parliamentary questions

2.1 The legislative perspective

Martin and Rozenberg (2012) provide a comprehensive review of the research on PQs in political sciences. The greatest part of this research emphasizes accountability and control of governments. Generally speaking, posing PQs is a tool to achieve control (Martin 2012: 3). Even though most researchers analyze national parliaments, the European Parliament is also considered. Proksch and Slapin (2011) show that the European Parliament is a suitable arena for national opposition parties to control domestic politics. According to Raunio (1996), EU deputies can bring national problems to the attention of the European Council or the European Commission precisely by posing questions (cf. Martin & Rozenberg: 2011).

As well as with political accountability, where questions address national and international policy, in addition they “can tend towards representation of local interests” (Martin 2012: 5), too.

The role play of Members of Parliament (MPs) is another main field of PQ research, i.e. tabling of PQs can disclose the deputies’ true preferences and interests and, thus, reveal the role they play.

Thus, it can be distinguished between the (inter)national politics related PQs and the constituency related PQs. As for the functions of PQs, the most comprehensive overview is provided by Chester and Bowring (1962) in their seminal book on PQs (cf. Norton 1993: 3) and the analysis of PQs by Norton and Franklin (1993a), which both focus on the British House of Commons. In contrast, Martin and Rozenberg (2012) present a volume that analyzes and compares parliamentary chambers from other countries.

Regarding the political research on PQs from a linguistic perspective, it is striking that it lacks a detailed description, or a definition of what PQs are. The authors implicitly treat a PQ as what has either been labeled as a question by the parliamentary authority, or what is happening during question-related parts of the parliamentary debates, such as Question Time. The rules of the House of Commons, for instance, outline the following conditions that MPs formulating PQs must meet:

A parliamentary question must either (a) seek information (‘what, how many, when...’) or (b) press for action (‘if he will...’); not offer or seek expressions of opinion; not convey information nor advance a proposition, an argument or debate; have a factual basis for which the tabling Member is responsible (it may not, for example, seek confirmation or denial of rumours or media reports)

(HoC-IO 2010: 3)

In contrast to the House of Commons, the Polish Sejm does not provide any guidelines concerning the content and function of questions. The Sejm’s Standing Orders

(*Regulamin Sejmu*) only determines formal aspects of PQs, such as the order of tabling questions, or the time ministers are given in order to answer written questions. However, questions are an important element of all readings, because all deputies are allowed to pose questions. Interestingly, Sejm's rules of parliamentary procedure calls these questioning sessions "debate" (*debata*) (cf. *Regulamin Sejmu*: Art. 46), without explaining what a debate should be. Without being clarified by the Sejm's rulebook, usually a reading of a bill contains, besides the text of the bill, the comments by a government representative, followed by the representatives of each group sitting in the parliament. Then the questioning session starts where all MPs are allowed to pose questions about the presented bill. The crucial point is that all questions are posed one after another and the answers follow *en bloc* after the last question is posed. Naturally, this proceeding lacks the opportunity to pose supplementary questions and minimizes verbal interaction. Despite the lack of spontaneity, the small Question Time after nearly every agenda item (cf. Nowak 2016) permits any deputy to get speaking time by uttering a question. Depending on the number of the deputies who want to pose a question, the time slot used varies between 30 seconds to two minutes. Evidence shows that in general the opposition members seize the chance to score political points and pose questions making the governing party uncomfortable.

Regarding the literature on political science, the following quotes highlight that PQs contain an interpersonal dimension:

The main media interest in Prime Minister's Question Time is the clash between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. (Norton 1993: 15)

[O]ral questions are especially fitted for party policies and political confrontation. (Rozenberg et al. 2011: 340)

In sum, oral questions appear to be an efficient tool for blaming the party opposite. (Rozenberg et al. 2011: 340)

[Q]uestions are employed (...) [t]o attack ministers in difficult political situations. (Russo and Wiberg 2010: 217)

It can be stated that interpersonal aspects aiming at controversy are crucial in PQs. Such interpersonal focus leads to PQs "becoming a performance arena where politicians seeking to maximize their standing at the cost of the reputation of their opponents." (Martin 2013: 17). Thus, the linkage between PQs and impoliteness seems to be natural and fruitful to analyze.

Comparing the questioning practice in 17 European parliaments, Russo and Wiberg (2010) create a scale to assess the confrontation potential of PQs.² They

2. The parliaments covered by the study are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

examine “debate on oral questions”, “spontaneous questions” and “debate on spontaneous questions” (Russo and Wiberg 2010: 225). By the term “debate” they refer to an exchange between the questioner and the person questioned with the opportunity for other parliamentarians to join in by posing additional questions (Russo and Wiberg 2010: 221). The term “spontaneous” refers to the possibilities to prepare the answer by the questionee (Russo and Wiberg 2010: 220). In other words, a question is spontaneous if the asked person does not know the question’s content a priori and, thus, not able to give a prepared answer. Following Russo and Wiberg’s (2010) categorization, the conflictive potential of the Polish Sejm is lower than in the 17 national chambers analyzed by the authors.

This anything but complete review of PQs in political science shows how differentiated the issue is being treated scientifically. Considering this from a linguist’s perspective should increase the sensibility for differences across national parliaments. In the present study, the requirements MPs have to accomplish in order to pose a PQ will be taken into account. The specific formal demands on the PQ itself will be considered, too. To put it briefly, a PQ uttered orally is not necessarily spontaneous, and neither is the answer to it. In some cases, even additional questions have to be tabled a priori, as they are anticipating the answer to the initial question. Thus, it can be assumed that impolite verbal behavior in such questions is nearly completely avoided, quite opposite to questions the addressee does not know before.

2.2 From form to function

Quirk et al. (1985: 807–826) provide a classification of questions whereupon they can be categorized in three classes. These classes are: yes-no question, wh-questions (open range of possible answers) and alternative questions (answer options within the question), depending on the speaker’s expectations towards the answer. (Quirk et al. 1985: 807). For Quirk et al. (1985: 808), yes-no questions are already biased towards a positive or negative answer, or neutral. The following negative yes-no question illustrates the inclination towards a positive answer (“Of course, one should”).

- (1) Shouldn’t an increase of health care funding be considered?

Czy nie należy rozważyć jednak podwyższenia wydatków na ochronę zdrowia?

Elżbieta Gelert, Civic Platform (PO), 19th March 2015

In the following positive yes-no question, the speaker expects a positive answer as well:

- (2) Is the minister going to react [to this] in any way?

Czy pan minister w jakikolwiek sposób na to zareaguje?

Marzena Dorota Wróbel, United Poland (SP), 23rd April 2015

Whereas negative yes-no questions are always prone to a positive or negative answer, this bias is missing in positive yes-no questions having neutral polarity (Quirk et al. 1985: 808), as is shown in the following example:

- (3) As far as the libraries are concerned, (...) the monthly wage base of a full-time librarian is 1050 zloty. Is that true?

Jeśli chodzi o biblioteki, to (...) podstawa płacy bibliotekarza w pełnym miesięcznym wymiarze czasu pracy wynosi 1050 zł. Czy to jest prawda?

Jarosław Stawiarski, Law and Justice (PiS), 23rd April 2015

Influenced by the limitations of Quirk's et al. classification, Tsui distinguishes questions "[i]n terms of the *communicative choice*" (1992: 90).³ The communicative choice is the essential argument to categorize questions and not the surface, or synthetic form of the question (Tsui 1992: 98–99). In other words, she considers questions as discursive functioning elements.

According to her, questions 1 and 2 are prone to positive answers. Both questions require confirmation of the speaker's assumption. Contrary to this confirmation function, the neutral polarity question 3 calls for a piece of information (the salary or the correction of the salary).

Generally categorizing all wh-questions as "information questions" (Quirk et al. 1985: 817) is problematic (Tsui 1992: 93–96). Consider an example from the Polish Sejm:

- (4) When is the minister going to make a decision in this matter?

Kiedy zostanie podjęta przez pana ministra decyzja w tej sprawie?

Mirosław Pluta, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

Possible answers to the questioning MP might be:

- a. Never
- b. Next week.
- c. On the 17th of February 2016.
- d. On the 21st of May 2038.

A negating answer as "never" is a priori canceled by the presupposition, and additionally it would be self-damaging to the answerer. It is obvious that neither of

3. Emphasis in original.

the presented answers is expected by the MP, but only such a more or less precise date would uphold the informative character of the question, and thus be treated as lawful. As stated above, in order to be regarded as unaware, it is risky to ask “a question without knowing the likely answer” (Norton & Franklin 1993b: 112). Thus, Example (4) is clearly not a question seeking for information. Tsui’s (1992) finding that *wh*-questions in spoken discourse do not generally seek for information is valid in the case of Polish parliamentary discourse as well.

The third and last class mentioned by Quirk et al. (1985) are the alternative questions. These are questions that already provide the answer in the proposition. The hearer only chooses one of the provided alternatives. Quirk et al. (1985) state that alternative questions can either resemble yes-no questions, or *wh*-questions (1985: 823). Due to this fact, Tsui doubts that alternative questions can be built as a separate question class (1992: 98) and classifies them within information seeking questions.⁴ Along with Quirk’s et al. (1985) description of questions, Tsui (1992) proposes a categorization based on the term “elicitation”. She considers the term “question” as “vague and ill-defined” (Tsui 1992: 101). In this sense, an elicitation requires “an *obligatory* verbal response or its non-verbal surrogate” (Tsui 1992: 10).⁵ Depending on the expected answer, six subcategories can be distinguished: *elicit:inform*; *elicit:confirm*; *elicit:agree*; *elicit:commit*; *elicit:repeat*; *elicit:clarify* (Tsui 1992). The main reason to refer to Tsui’s model in detail is the speaker’s strong orientation towards the prospected answer. In parliaments, the politicians convey their messages to an absent audience without addressing them explicitly. However, the act of posing questions aims at affecting the minds of all (absent) hearers rather than the one of the formal addressee. This can be assumed knowing that the actual answer is expected by the questioner in advance. Politicians are generally aware of the possibilities of multiple addressing (cf. Kühn 1995) and apply such a strategy for political reasons.

Apart from the classical grammatical perception of questions, Athanasiadou (1991) presents four modes of questioning depending on the speaker’s intention. Besides seeking information, the speaker can provide information by using rhetorical questions. Examination questions are used if the questioners want to test knowledge or try to establish facts in a conducive manner. The crucial element of these questions is the attribution of authority to the questioner, stressing his command function when it comes to getting an answer (Athanasiadou 1991: 110). To

4. True, understanding the question “Shall we go by bus or train?” (Tsui 1992: 97; Quirk et al. 1985: 823) as a yes-no question (possible answer: “Yes”) or as an alternative question (possible answer: “By bus”) highly depends on the intonation.

5. *Italic* in original.

exemplify this function in parliamentary discourse, consider the following sample from the Sejm:

- (5) In the meantime, dear Minister, as the initiative audit shows, the level of unpaid credits rose by 90%. Do you understand what we are talking about?

W tym czasie, panie ministrze, jak wykazuje audyt otwarcia, poziom niespłaconych kredytów wzrósł do ponad 90%. Czy pan rozumie, o czym my mówimy?
Andrzej Romanek, Unified Right-Wing (Zjednoczona Prawica), 9th April 2015

Questioning of the government members is the fundamental right of the MPs and, depending on the topic, a minister or their delegate have to be present during the parliamentary session. Thus, it can be argued that the authority lies on the side of the questioner interrogating the government's representatives. Regardless of the speaker's intention, the addressee of the question is obliged to answer. This holds particularly in western democracies, where the parliament is the major locus to express the people's will. An example: during political scandals, the parliament can be the place where politicians involved have to answer questions before and beyond all legal proceedings.

The last mode of questioning mentioned by Athanasiadou (1991) is indirect requesting. Here, the speaker avoids preferring a certain answer to the question. Polite requests, indirect suggestions and invitations are the prototypical examples for this mode. When indirectly requesting, the speaker preserves the addressee's liberty to answer, however, he coerces a decision from the addressee (Athanasiadou 1991: 110).

It is obvious that the approaches mentioned deal with the speakers' assumptions concerning a desired, presumed, or at least, preferred answer. This can be summarized by the term "conduciveness".⁶ According to Bublitz, a conducive question is defined as follows:

[I]f the speaker indicates that he considers either the affirmative or the negative answer as more probable, the question is not neutral but conducive or biased.

(Bublitz 1981: 852)

Analyzing yes-no questions, Bublitz (1981) found out that conduciveness is closely connected with the speaker's expectations about the answer. Especially when an assumption changes during the exchange, the conduciveness in the question increases ("I didn't see" "You didn't see it?" "Well, no I didn't" (adapted after Bublitz 1981: 856)). Due to the lack of dialogue exchanges in the Sejm, a change of assumptions is hard to identify.

6. Labeling a question which is orientated towards a certain answer as "conductive" goes back to Bolinger (1957) (cf. Bublitz 1981: 858)

2.3 The use of questions – The benefit of the addressee

In the preceding section, sample questions were selected from the Polish Parliament. The selection occurred according to linguistic approaches which claim a necessity to overcome pure grammatical descriptions of questions. Theoretical approaches presenting the strategic use of questions across different genres will be discussed. The institutional framework of courtroom discourse (Woodbury 1984), academic discourse (Piazza 2002) and news discourse on TV (Herritage 2002) lead to a specific use of questions. Some of their specificities can be also transferred to parliamentary discourse.

Woodbury (1984) analyzes questions in courtroom discourse where the most common type are the *wh*-questions. These can be broad or narrow, depending on the answering options of the witnesses. Broad *wh*-questions (“What happened then?”) in courtroom discourse are often treated as leading questions which are prohibited during direct examinations (Woodbury 1984: 211; 221).⁷ Broad *wh*-questions in Polish parliamentary discourse are uncommon and they are mostly reminiscent of rhetorical questions. Consider the following sequence of two questions:

- (6) After eight years in office in Poland, the Civic Union and People’s Party bring Zbigniew Ziobro to tribunal for any mystic pressure. Where’s here the appropriateness? Where is the proportionality?

W Polsce po ośmiu latach rządów Platformy i PSL przed trybunałem stawia się Zbigniewa Ziobrę za mityczne naciski. Gdzie proporcje? Gdzie skala?

Arkadiusz Mularczyk, United Poland (SP), 23rd April 2015

Both questions give the addressee the opportunity to elaborate on either long and detailed answers or to only give a short explanation. At the same time, the speaker implicates the answer “nowhere” in both questions.

Besides narrow and broad *wh*-questions, Woodbury (1984) distinguishes alternative, (negative) grammatical *yes/no*, prosodic and tag questions. Making a qualitative analysis by separating both sides, the prosecution and the defense with their “own” witnesses, promises similarity to parliamentary discourse. Table 1 reveals the distribution of question types between direct and cross-examinations, and between the prosecution and the defense.

Regardless of the frequency, all question types can be used for adversary (cross examination) and non-adversary (direct examination) reasons (Woodbury 1984: 210) and they can be used for impolite purposes. Furthermore, we do not find

7. Speakers presuppose by the use of “leading questions” topics (not facts) that are not in evidence (Woodbury 1984: 221)

Table 1. Distribution of questions in courtroom discourse after Woodbury (1984: 208); simplified by BN

	Prosecution		Defense	
	Direct examination	Cross examination	Direct examination	Cross examination
Wh-question	54% (1)	31% (2)	38% (1)	17% (3)
Yes-no-question	42% (2)	51% (1)	32% (2)	27% (2)
Prosodic question	3% (3)	13% (3)	23% (3)	45% (1)

question types used exclusively in an antagonistic way. The preference for yes-no-questions by the prosecution and for prosodic questions by the defense can be explained by their different functions. The aim of posing yes-no-questions is to elicit new information, or to confirm existing assumptions. In adversary examinations, the prosecution wants to blame the defendant on the basis of the presented evidence. On the other side, the defense wants to challenge these facts by telling a different story. Prosodic questions are suitable to achieve this goal (cf. Table 1) due to the higher “pragmatic load” (Woodbury 1984: 208) than grammatical yes-no-questions: “Prosodic questions allow the questioner to indicate to the jury what *he* believes the facts are and what answer *he* expects from the witness.” (Woodbury 1984: 208).

In the Sejm, prosodic questions are being used less frequently than in the courtroom. This can be explained by the general lack of interactional behavior, which means that no real interpersonal exchanges take place. Thus, the speakers tend to mark questions explicitly to avoid any misapprehensions. The prosodic questions found in the corpus can be characterized as touching personal, emotional issues. Considering one example:

- (7) Dear Minister! I come from a family of eight children. My father had 3.5 hectares, he kept four pigs and two cows throughout the year. We subsisted on that and my father still made some profit by selling the pigs in order to buy some fertilizer. How is this comparable to the present situation? **Are these farmers going to praise the agricultural policies?** Mr. Minister, no joking. Thank you very much. Panie Ministrze! Pochodzę z rodziny, gdzie było ośmioro dzieci. Ojciec miał 3,5 ha ziemi, chował trzy, cztery świnie w ciągu roku, dwie krowy. Wyżywiłiśmy się i jeszcze zarobił nasprzedając tych świń, żeby kupić sobie nawóz. Jak to porównamy do dzisiejszej sytuacji? **Ci rolnicy będą chwalić politykę rolną?** Panie ministrze, bez żartów. Dziękuję bardzo.

Józef Rojek, Law and Justice (PiS), 4th March 2015

Unlike most contributions containing questions, the speaker in Extract 7 addresses the minister in a way that resembles a dialogue. I argue that this is the reason why

the prosodic questions work as in the courtroom discourse: the deputy clearly indicates that he already knows the answer to the question.

Based on the mentioned conception of conduciveness (Bublitz 1981), Piazza (2002) considers questions in academic discourse. According to her, negative questions can evoke open or tentative defiance. In the parliamentary context such questions with tentative defiance are posed by MPs to their own ministers, as the next example from a debate about the Polish agriculture shows:

- (8) Shouldn't more attention be dedicated to the Asian markets? Europe is stagnating, however, Asia has a larger population and is developing more dynamically, which means that the demand for food will grow quite fast there. Shouldn't we rather turn our attention to China and to the Asian markets in general in order to diversify our agriculture exports?

Czy nie należałoby zwrócić większej uwagi na rynki azjatyckie? Europa stagnuje, natomiast Azja ma i więcej ludności, i dużo dynamiczniej się rozwija, więc ten popyt na żywność będzie tam dość szybko rósł. Czy nasza uwaga nie powinna być raczej skoncentrowana na Chinach i w ogóle na rynkach azjatyckich, żeby zdywersyfikować nasz eksport rolny?

Marcin Świącicki, Civic Platform (PO), 4th March 2015

The assumption transmitted with this statement is that Asian or Chinese markets do not play any role for the Minister of Agriculture. In order not to directly blame the minister, who is a party colleague, for this situation, the question is being posed with tentative defiance, preserving the face of the addressee. Such a questioning strategy is of high importance to inner party questioning when dealing with sensitive issues.

Utterances indicating that the speaker changed his mind as a result of another MP's questions are not found in the analyzed corpus. Obviously, party colleagues do not directly blame each other in public and political opponents would do anything to avoid publicly admitting a change of mind. Such an obvious change of mind would backdrop to themselves because it would equal the recognition that their prior assumption was "false".

Besides negative conducive questions, Piazza (2002) distinguishes three subtypes of affirmative yes-no questions in academic discourse (see Table 2).

Table 2. Affirmative conducive questions after Piazza (2002) and Bublitz (1981); adapted by BN

Function	Original assumption	New assumption	Sentence form	Expected answer
Conveying surprise	–	+	+	+
Creating an unrealistic situation to reject	–	–	+	–
Reinstating the questioner's belief	+	+	+	+

Generally speaking, the conduciveness of the mentioned types of positive yes-no questions, is more subtle than their negative analogues (Piazza 2002: 527). This fits in with the general characteristics of negative yes-no questions which give the speaker more control over the expected answer than their positive counterparts (Woodbury 1984: 205). These conducive questions are not very common in the Polish Parliament. Once again, the reason is probably the lack of the dialogueness, which would overtly show the change of the assumptions in the speaker's mind. Additionally, why should a deputy employ fairly subtle strategies and take the risk of not being understood correctly?

Besides the presented aspects concerning the functions of questions, it is worth mentioning the analysis of Heritage (2002). His findings on questions in news interviews on TV are generally consistent with the findings of Piazza (2002) and Woodbury (1984). In addition, Heritage states that a specificity of news interviews is that questions "are produced under the auspices of an ideology of neutrality" and, thus, "collude in a fiction that questioning is objective, impartial and neutral" (2002: 1430). The evidence of news interviews shows that, especially, negative questions are "a very conducive form of questioning" (Heritage 2002: 1436).

3. The counterpart of politeness: Impoliteness

The previous chapter has shown that speakers in the *Sejm* use different types of questions depending on the type of answer they want to provoke. The present chapter first seeks to examine the relation between the (potential) answers and the persons who are expected to give such an answer. Second, it will be examined how questions might directly affect the addressee, regardless of the expectations concerning the answer. Both examinations will be done with the help of (im)politeness theory.

This chapter cannot provide a full overview of politeness research as a starting point for the development of approaches to impoliteness. For this reason, a summary concerning the relation of questions and impoliteness is presented.

Brown and Levinson (1978 and 1987) (B&L) is considered the seminal work in linguistic politeness research. The authors use a modified concept of "face" (Goffman 1967), with face being the general desire of every adult member of a group for freedom of action and for the approval of others. The first desire is called "negative face", the second "positive face". B&L (1987) claim that all utterances in everyday communication are potential sources of threat or face loss. Speakers generally should try to avoid the so called "face threatening acts" (FTAs). However, the avoidance of FTAs is not an option in most cases. If that happens, speakers try to mitigate the face threat as much as possible. B&L describe five superstrategies to mitigate FTAs

(1987: 92). These include performing the FTA on-record with or without redressive action, performing the FTA off-record, or not performing the FTA.

According to Lakoff (1989), the B&L model applies well, especially in ordinary conversation, because it mainly focuses on interpersonal relationships. Thus, Lakoff (1989) herself extends politeness theory to other genres by analyzing therapeutic and courtroom discourse. Similar to the genuine adversarial character of courtroom discourse, therapeutic discourse can be regarded as adversarial, too. In this “crypto-adversarial” (Lakoff 1989: 109) relationship, the patient does not want to hear the truth about the state of his health and at the same time, the therapist is under pressure to convey the uncovered truth about the client’s health. Considering that, Lakoff subdivides verbal behavior threefold:

Let us call ‘polite’ those utterances that adhere to the rules of politeness whether or not they are expected in a particular discourse type; ‘non-polite’, behavior that does not conform to politeness rules, used where the latter are not expected; and ‘rude’, behavior that does not utilize politeness strategies where they would be expected, in such a way that the utterance can only or most plausibly be interpreted as intentionally and negatively confrontational. (Lakoff 1989: 103)

The adversarial character of some types of discourse revealing limitations of politeness theory is one reason why researchers developed a framework focused on impoliteness (Culpeper 1996, 2008, 2011; Culpeper et al. 2003; Bousfield 2008). Locher (2004) or Watts (2003), among others, equally consider impoliteness and politeness.

Unmistakably, parliamentary discourse, regardless the country, belongs to the adversarial types of discourse, just as other subtypes of political discourse. This has been observed for instance in the British *House of Commons* (Pérez de Ayala 2001; Chilton 2004; Harris 2001; Murphy 2014), the Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* (Berrocal 2014), the Italian *Camera dei deputati* (Bevitori 2004) the Romanian *Camera Deputaților* (Ilie 2010; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2010), and the Swedish *Riksdag* (Ilie 2004).

Analyzing impoliteness within the parliamentary questioning, Prime Minister Question Time in Britain is a frequent object of analysis: “Question Time is a highly aggressive genre, and Face Threatening Acts are intrinsic to its essence” (Pérez de Ayala 2001: 143). Harris concludes that mitigating strategies in Prime Minister Question Time are largely absent (2001). Whereas during Prime Minister’s Questions the adjacency pair (Sacks et al. 1974: 716) is complete (the question is followed by an immediate response), the questions and answers in the Polish Parliament are temporarily incomplete. In *Sejm*, all answers to the oral questions posed are delayed in time, in minutes or even hours. How long the delay is depends on the number of deputies asking questions before the first addressee can take the floor and respond to all questions at once. Most studies on parliamentary

questions consider the answers, the reactions from the MPs. This makes it easier to understand what the questioner has meant – for the addresser, the bystanders and the researcher.

Since multiple addressing (cf. Kühn 1995) is a specific feature of political discourse, the target does not have to be clear. Even if a PQ is explicitly addressed to a minister, there are other addressees outside the parliament involved, such as the media, the party colleagues who are not deputies, and the people in the constituencies. Considering this, Gruber (1993) introduces the term of a “public face”:

[E]very politician [...] claims the consistent image of himself as being a rational, trustworthy person whose political ideas and actions are better fitted to the wants and demands of the general public than those of his opponents.

(Gruber 1993: 3)

In consequence, politicians permanently try to enhance their own public face while threatening the opponent’s one. The basic means of doing so is conducting off-record FTAs (Gruber 1993: 3–4). The distinction between *face* (seen from traditional politeness perspective) and *public face* is crucial when dealing with impoliteness acts in parliamentary discourse. Another crucial point concerning the face in political discourse refers to forms of bonding and bounding (Chilton 2004: 109). On the one hand, deputies aim to strengthen the bonding with and within their own party. On the other hand, they construct boundaries between their own group and other parties. Thus, in parliamentary discourse, not only is one’s individual face at stake, but the face of the whole group or of the institution represented. Bousfield (2008) demonstrates this point when analyzing samples from documentaries about parking attendants and passages from army trainings. In these, recruits as members of a group are blamed by the sergeant for one’s individual misconduct. A parking offender may direct an impoliteness act to a parking attendant. It is evident that the attacks are against the entire institution that the insulted parking attendant stands for (Bousfield 2008: 242). Bousfield defines the conception of a collective face as follows:

- ‘Group face’ is created by the sum of faces constituted through interactional dyads and is often dependent upon previous, socially cooperative interactions with like-minded, and like-faced people.
- [The] Constitution of the face of one member of a group can have an impact on the face constitution and face expectations of other members of a group. (Bousfield 2008: 42)

In political discourse, this implies that members of the same party defend their party colleagues even in situations in which they are clearly aware of their misconducts. Due to party bonds, MPs feel offended through attacks on their party

colleagues. Failings of one's colleagues can threaten the own face. In addition, each MP who is in the role of the defender now counts on being defended after possible future failings of his own.

Given these aspects on face, I consider verbal behavior as impolite if the speaker intends to attack the hearer and if the hearer perceives the attack as such. This is similar to Culpeper's notion: "Impoliteness [...] involves communicative behavior intending to cause 'face loss' of a target or perceived by the target to be so" (2008: 36). Additionally, and that is the crucial point in parliamentary discourse as well as in political discourse in general, the target has multiple faces, i.e. the attacker can threaten the face of a whole party or of certain colleagues from his own side by formally directing a question to one single person. In sum, an utterance in political discourse can already be regarded as impolite, if a (loyal) voter of a party perceives the intentional impoliteness by the politician from the other side.

4. Method and data the corpus

The study in the present chapter is based on official transcripts (*Sprawozdanie stenograficzne*) of parliamentary sessions. The transcripts are accessible at the *Sejm* homepage.⁸ These shorthand reports are adapted stylistically and are free from content manipulation. Additionally, the shorthand writers attempt to be as verbatim as possible. A "parliamentary week" usually lasts three days (from Wednesday to Friday). Each day one transcript is published at the end of the day. All examples analyzed were excerpted from five transcripts from the final stage of the legislative session in 2015. The session's end was chosen in order to find a broad spectrum of parliamentary speech patterns, which is very likely due to the ongoing election campaign.

The quantitative part of the analysis is based on four Question Times (*Informacja bieżąca*) which are obligatory agenda items of every parliamentary week. In sum, the corpus consists of approximately 40,500 tokens and contains 302 direct and 34 indirect questions.

8. www.sejm.gov.pl

5. Impolite questions

5.1 Motivated impolite questions

In this chapter, questioning, as the essence of parliamentary proceedings, is assumed as a potential source of impolite verbal behavior. However, an important problem is recognizing impolite questions and distinguish them from non-impolite questions. Identifying “motivated impoliteness” (Kasper 1990: 209)⁹ is not always easy:

- (9) Someone said that President Komorowski reads books. **I would like to know from the lady who said that he has recently undertaken this great initiative, which book President Komorowski has recently read.** I would also ask you to tell me... (*MP Zofia Ławrynowicz*: We have not been talking about President Komorowski.)

(*Voice from the chamber*: And what do you read, if anything?)

But ad rem, to the matter.

Ktoś mówił, że pan prezydent Komorowski czyta książki. **Chciałbym się tylko dowiedzieć od pani, która mówiła, że podjął on ostatnio tę piękną inicjatywę, jaką książkę przeczytał ostatnio pan prezydent Komorowski.** Byłbym jeszcze bardzo ciekaw, jakbyście państwo mi powiedzieli...

(*Posel Zofia Ławrynowicz*: Ale nie rozmawiamy o prezydencie Komorowskim.)

(*Głos z sali*: A co pan czytał, jeśli cokolwiek?)

Ale ad rem, do rzeczy.

Jarosław Stawiarski, Law and Justice (PiS), 14th May 2015¹⁰

This Question Time was about the state of the librarianship in Poland. MP Stawiarski refers to a book reading initiative established by President Komorowski. This initiative has been mentioned before by another deputy. Implying that the president does not read at all, he undoubtedly intends to be impolite. The defending responses of two deputies underline the impolite effect. Furthermore, with the utterance “But ad rem, to the matter” the speaker reveals his face threatening intention, revealing previously not talking ad rem. This markedly face-threatening question is later picked up by other deputies, emphasizing its face-threatening potential:

9. Kasper (1990) deals with “rudeness” instead of impoliteness.

10. The passages in round brackets indicate heckling from the chamber. If the speaker is recognized by the stenographer, (s)he will be named. If it not possible to allocate the heckling to one MP, the shouting will be neutrally labeled as “Voice from the chamber”.

- (10) Dear Rt. Hon. MPs! Unfortunately, MPs Stawiarski is not in this chamber anymore. Rt. Hon. MP Stawiarski gave a very pugnacious speech, barely on-topic, he spoke of Poland's division into a rational and a radical part. Panie i Panowie Posłowie! Pana posła Stawiarskiego niestety nie ma już na tej sali. Pan poseł Stawiarski miał bardzo zaczepne wystąpienie, mało merytoryczne, mówił o podziale Polski na racjonalną i radykalną.

Katarzyna Matusik-Lipiec, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

Whereas Matusik-Lipiec considers the entire contribution to be an attack, the MP in the next example refers explicitly to the question posed by MP Stawiarski (9):

- (11) One of the deputies, Rt. Hon. Stawiarski, asked such a pugnacious question: which book President Komorowski had recently read. I just don't know why, make himself visible, or actually to get an answer which book the President has read, even then he would not have to understand or know the book. This is only to react to that bluster.

Jeden z posłów, pan poseł Stawiarski, zadał takie zaczepne pytanie: jaką książkę ostatnio przeczytał prezydent Komorowski, tylko nie wiem po co, chyba po to, żeby zaistnieć, bo pewnie nawet gdyby powiedzieć mu, jaką książkę przeczytał, to i tak by niekoniecznie to zrozumiał czy ją znał. To tylko odpowiedź na tę zaczepkę.

Józef Lassota, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

As in this example, the speaker marks the question as pugnacious. Additionally, he offensively responds to the FTA, saying that even if MP Stawiarski gets the title of the last book read by President Komorowski, he would not know it.

Such motivated face threats marked by the speakers themselves as in Example (9) can only rarely be found in the corpus. However, such an inductive confirmation of the speaker's face threatening intention shows the basic possibilities to deal with impolite questions.

5.2 Avoiding impoliteness

As already mentioned, parliamentary questions often belong to the category of "partisan questions" (Ilie 2006: 195; Martin 2013: 17), i.e. the MPs from the ruling coalition ask questions to positively mark their own position, while the MPs from the opposition ask questions to gain benefits from attacking the government. Whereas motivated impolite questions mostly come from the latter group, partisan questions, naturally, are posed by the government's MPs. In other words, whereas the impolite questions are posed to cause face-damage, positive partisan questions are posed to enhance the face. Consider the following extract from the already cited debate on librarianship:

- (12) I don't know if this does not go beyond the possibilities and competences of the minister, but if one were to think about such a regulation, about such activities which are, of course, permissible; about directing [the matter] to smaller, rural municipalities; not in order to cut operational costs of the libraries in big cities, but in order to increase the readership in small, especially rural regions.

Nie wiem, czy to nie wykracza poza możliwości i kompetencje pana ministra, ale gdyby tak zastanowić się nad takim uregulowaniem, takimi działaniami, które są oczywiście dopuszczalne, nad tym, żeby skierować to do mniejszych, wiejskich gmin nie po to, żeby obniżyć koszty prowadzenia bibliotek w dużych miastach, tylko po to, żeby zwiększyć czytelnictwo w mniejszych obszarach, zwłaszcza wiejskich.

Brygida Kolenda-Łabuś, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

Formulating positive partisan questions, speakers eliminate probable unpleasant reactions beforehand. The speaker in Example (12) follows this strategy so rigorously that she even avoids formulating the question indirectly. The MP handles the question with such care that the directive force of questions – claiming an answer – is canceled. The minister is totally free to give any kind of response, even no response at all. Even if the minister does not accept the propositional content, Kolenda-Łabuś provides a way out, stating that her considerations could go beyond the scope of the minister's remit. Depending on the topic of a debate, positive partisan questions can enhance the face of the addressee, as in 12. They can also reinforce the face loss of the opponents, though, as the following example reveals:

- (13) Are the opinions of the SKOK representatives genuine/real enough that establishing of accounting guidelines by the Minister of Finance has had an essential influence on the SKOK's results since 2012?

Czy prawdziwe są opinie przedstawicieli SKOK, że istotny wpływ na wyniki kas od 2012r. miało określenie przez ministra finansów dla kas szczegółowych zasad rachunkowości? *Teresa Świło, Civic Platform (PO), 9th April 2015*

The topic of the present debate is potentially face threatening to the former government from Law and Justice (*PiS*), the main opposition party at the time of the debate. The deputy from Civic Platform (*PO*), Teresa Świło, is questioning the minister who is from the same party. Choosing a yes-no question combined with an extensive proposition generally restricts the options to answer and limits the possibilities of storytelling. The conduciveness of the present question, which emerges from the context and the lexical content, requires an affirmative answer from the addressee. The impoliteness, i.e. the intentional face loss, also affects third parties which are not directly addressed by the speaker (bystanders). The attacked politician perceives the attack; however, the face loss in the minds of other hearers, the potential voters, is decisive. These “passive bystanders” (Laskowska

2004: 132),¹¹ “virtual receivers” (Batko-Tokarz 2008: 107)¹² or this “wider (present or TV-viewing) audience” (Ilie 2006: 193) – in this case potential voters – are reached through the media. In the case of the Polish Parliament, where the adjacency pair of question and answer is resolved due to a time lag between those two parts, it is sufficient to pose the question to perform a FTA. Journalists will not always take the time to search or wait for the answers given minutes or hours later, not to mention the few live spectators.

5.3 Negative impolite questions

All the questions in the corpus were grouped according to the polarity of the verb. If it was negated, the question is considered as negative, and vice versa. This separation was made because of the bias of negative questions (NQs). Speakers posing NQs are likely preferring either a negative *or* a positive answer, but not a neutral one (Quirk et al. 1985: 808). Only 8.6% of all the questions in the corpus are negative. On the one hand, such a low rate is surprising in parliamentary discourse if we take into account the NQs’ high range of conduciveness and, thus, the extended possibilities to control the answer by the questioner. On the other hand, all the examined 29 NQs require such unambiguous answers that a more excessive use of NQs could awkwardly unmask the MPs’ intentions. Nine NQs were posed by the ruling coalition (*PO/PSL*), 20 by the biggest opposition party (*PiS*). All the opposition’s questions can be classified as impolite, but seven of them were posed by the same deputy in two single contributions. Even if the strategy to pose NQs was an idiolectal feature of the MP, the face threatening character of the utterances still holds. Arguably, the impoliteness is subtle:

- (14) a. Shouldn’t the teachers and the librarians be trusted more?
 b. Wouldn’t it be better to simply give them the money, of which they surely make a better use, because they know which books they need at school?
 c. Shouldn’t the doctors and the hospital management be given more freedom to make a diagnosis?
 a. Czy nie warto bardziej ufać nauczycielom bibliotekarzom?
 b. Czy nie lepiej dać im po prostu pieniądze, które oni zdecydowanie lepiej wykorzystają, bo wiedzą, jakiego typu książki są im potrzebne w szkołach?
 c. Czy nie należałoby dać trochę więcej swobody lekarzom, dyrekcji szpitala, aby móc swobodniej tę diagnozę stawiać? *Dariusz Piontkowski, Law and Justice (PiS), 14th May 2015 (14 a.; b.) & 19th March 2015 (14 c.)*

11. “odbiorca pasywny”

12. “odbiorca wirtualny”

In (14b) and (14c), the questioners make precise proposals to what the responsible department should be doing. In contrast, the speaker in (14a) criticizes the addressee more generally. It can be argued that Example (14a) is more face threatening towards the addressee than questions (14b) and (14c). However, these negative questions posed by the opposition's MP Piontkowski are less impolite than other NQs from his party colleagues. The face threatening potential of Piontkowski's questions is limited. The decisive factor for a question with a high degree of impoliteness seems to be the semantic choice – words with negative connotation (“scandal”; “euthanasia”) are more face threatening than neutral or positive ones, as can be seen in the following example:

- (15) a. Why hasn't the Financial Supervisory Commission reacted for almost two years to the irregularities, of which it was informed by the 'Credit Union SKOK', Ms. Minister?

Dlaczego Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego przez prawie dwa lata nie reagowała na nieprawidłowości, o których była informowana przez Krajową Kasę – SKOK, pani minister?

Elżbieta Kruk, Law and Justice (PiS), 9th April 2015

- b. That means that patients with metastases, with a disease spread who weren't treated earlier, don't get this medicine. Isn't this a scandal? Isn't this euthanasia?

To oznacza, że pacjenci z przerzutami, z rozsiewem choroby, którzy nie byli wcześniej leczeni, nie otrzymają tego leku. Czy to nie jest skandal? Czy to nie jest eutanazja?

Jolanta Szczypińska, Law and Justice (PiS), 19th March 2015

In Example (15a), MP Kruk charges the financial supervision authority rather instead of demanding the reasons for their omission. Activities of a state authority undoubtedly backdrop to the government which had been in office for eight years, represented here by the addressed minister. The NQs posed by MP Szczypińska (15b) are rhetorical. A rhetorical question can work as a statement and as a question within the same utterance (Ilie 1994), especially in parliamentary discourse (cf. Nowak 2016). The possibilities of answers to both rhetorical questions in Example (15b) are restricted to affirmation only, which confirm the underlying statements and truly enhance the face loss of the addressees.

While all NQs posed by opposition members are face threatening, the use of this question type by the governmental MPs is more sophisticated. Table 3 shows the distribution of NQs for the both political groups, seeking to highlight the differences between impolite and non-impolite NQs.

Table 3. Distribution of negative questions

Debate	Topic	Applied for by	Date	Government's Qs		Opposition's Qs	
				Negative Qs	therein impolite	Negative Qs	therein impolite
A	Access to health services	Opp	19th March 2015	1	1*	8	8
B	Credit Union "SKOK"	Gov	9th April 2015	3	3	3	3
C	Preparing presidential election	Opp	23rd April 2015	2	2*	2	2
D	Libraries and readership	Gov	14th May 2015	3	2*	7	7
Total:				9	8	20	20

* FTA is mitigated/canceled

The official proceeding in Question Time is to question a minister or one of the department's secretaries for about 90 minutes on one topic scheduled earlier. All MPs are free to pose a question, but the opposition's deputies especially make use of this opportunity. Government's deputies have to pose questions, though, if they want to reduce the time available for oppositional deputies to pose questions containing FTAs. Naturally, such inner governmental questions are all but face threatening. To give an example, in the following stretch extracted from debate A on the access to health services, only one NQ was posed by a ruling party's member:

(16) Shouldn't we, however, consider an increase in health care funding?

Czy nie należy rozważyć jednak podwyższenia wydatków na ochronę zdrowia?

Elżbieta Gelert, Civic Platform (PO), 19th March 2015

Directing to a party colleague an order which would reverse the previous practice naturally causes face loss. The open revision of the own, prior defended, practice reveals it as false. Hence, such demands for changing are genuine FTAs. In order to mitigate the face threat to a minimum, MP Gelert formulates the NQ with the adversative particle *jednak* ("however/nevertheless"). The adversary particle saves the face of the addressee, attributing the entire issue somewhat beyond his power, and thus legitimizing a possible change of the minister's prior assumption. The proceeding of the government's deputies in debate C is the same. Both impolite NQs are mitigated by particles, one, as in Example (16), by the adversative particle *jednak*, the other by the adverbial phrase *po prostu* ("simple/just").

Besides the strategy of mitigating with the help of particles, two MPs in debate D cancel the impolite character of their NQs switching into conditional mood:

- (17) a. Due to such modest incomes from the present VAT rate, wouldn't it be worth thinking about a total exemption of this tax?

Czy dzisiaj przy tak skromnych wpływach z obowiązującej stawki VAT nie warto byłoby rozważyć całkowitego zwolnienia z opłacania tego podatku (...)?
Henryk Smolarz, Polish People's Party (PSL), 14th May 2015

- b. Wouldn't it be worth unifying the library projects to reduce costs?

Czy nie warto byłoby zunifikować projektów bibliotek, żeby obniżyć koszty?
Tomasz Piotr Nowak, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

Furthermore, both speakers combine the conditional mood with the modal predicative *warto* ("it is worth"). Such emerging modality gives to both the addressee and the addresser the possibility to prevent face loss regardless of whether the answer is affirmative or negative.

Besides grammatico-semantic strategies, ruling coalition's MPs can abandon any mitigation strategy in Question Times on topics which are more unpleasant to the opposition than to themselves. The situation of a so-called credit union ("SKOK") was the issue in debate C.¹³ The basic facts of this political affair – not the details – are well known to the public. This allows the government's MPs to utter impolite questions, as in the following extract:

- (18) Didn't it threaten the resources of millions of Poles gathered at SKOKs funds?

Czy nie zagrażało to bezpieczeństwu środków milionów Polaków zgromadzonych w SKOK-ach?

Renata Zaremba, Civic Platform (PO), 9th April 2015

The only NQ in the present study which was not categorized as impolite was taken from the Question Time on the librarianship and the readership in Poland:

- (19) Don't the libraries guarantee a good project preparation and a settlement of accounts?

Czy biblioteki nie gwarantują również dobrego przygotowania projektu realizacji i jego rozliczenia?

Ryszard Zawadzki, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

Different from Example (18), the properties of the librarianship and the reading habits of the citizen are not assigned to a political group. MP Zawadzki takes the responsibility away from politics by attacking the libraries in order to save the face of the interrogated representative from the Ministry of Culture.

13. The credit union "SKOK" was established and managed by politicians from the current opposition (*PiS*). SKOK as a financial service provider is criticized for activities that remind of a shadow banking system lacking a regulatory supervision. Its critics refer to the partisanship of the credit union which favors and financially supports politicians connected with it.

5.4 Positive impolite questions

One way of categorizing parliamentary questions is according to the MPs' party affiliations. Table 4 has been created for this purpose, also providing the attribution of impoliteness to the MPs' questions.

Table 4. Comparison of government's and opposition's posing of impolite questions

	Government's Qs		Opposition's Qs		All
	Qs	Impolite Qs	Qs	Impolite Qs	Total Qs
Direct Qs (ratio%)	118	24 (20.3%)	184	139 (75.5%)	302 (53.8%)
Indirect Qs (ratio%)	17	6 (35.3%)	17	8 (47.1%)	34 (41.2%)
Total Qs (ratio%)	135	30 (22.2%)	201	147 (73.1%)	336 (52.7%)

5.4.1 *Impoliteness in indirect questions*

Not surprisingly, Table 4 shows a domination of opposition's questions over the government's questions in total and in impolite questions. What is interesting is that while the total number of questions and of impolite questions is significantly higher on the opposition's side, the share of indirect questions deviates only slightly. For example, this speaker from the ruling party finishes her contribution with an indirect question:

- (20) I would like to ask if we may count today on such data from the minister.
 Chciałabym dopytać, czy dzisiaj możemy liczyć na takie dane z państwa strony.
Anna Nemś, Civic Platform (PO), 23rd April 2015

Not only does MP Nemś formulate the request indirectly and in the conditional mood, her question is additionally enriched by modality. She gives the addressee the ex-ante possibility to justify himself if he must reject the demand for data. Doing so, the face loss to the addressee is canceled. The following indirect question by an opposition member stands in contrast to this:

- (21) (...) now we begin to exchange the ID cards, in the new ones there is no address, no place of residence. I would like to ask how the electoral roll will look like.
 (...) w tej chwili zaczynamy wymieniać dowody osobiste, w tych nowych dowodach nie ma adresu, miejsca zamieszkania. Chciałabym zapytać, jak będzie wyglądać spis wyborców.
Elżbieta Witek, Law and Justice (PiS), 23rd April 2015

As far as the content is concerned, this request is nearly the same as in Example (20). Nevertheless, the speaker from the opposition does not use any mitigation strategy. Note that both of the previous questions were tagged as impolite. In Example (20),

the face loss is caused by the lack of information, in Example (21) the speaker doubts that a “tidy” electoral roll can be put together. In the next example the speaker mitigates the FTA, but the question remains impolite, too:

- (22) Mr. Minister, the year 2016 is just around the corner. The librarians and local councilors ask when the applications for a new funding from the long-term program “Kultura +” from the priority item can be submitted.

Panie ministrze, 2016 r. jest tuż-tuż. Bibliotekarze i samorządowcy pytają, kiedy będą przyjmowane wnioski o otrzymanie nowych środków pochodzących z priorytetu: Infrastruktura bibliotek z programu wieloletniego “Kultura +”.

Tomasz Piotr Nowak, Civic Platform (PO), 14th May 2015

The proposition of this face threatening question refers to the omission of the minister. Indeed, the utterance comes from the Deputy Nowak, but he shifts the accountability away by quoting the question. His question still remains face threatening and it can be tagged as indirect and impolite.

5.4.2 *Impoliteness in direct questions*

Direct questions are the most frequent of all impolite questions in the corpus. If the debated topic is rather neutral (as the librarianship) with fewer benefits at stake for the deputies, the share of impolite questions decreases. The data (see Table 5) suggests that this holds for both the opposition and the government.

Table 5. How the topic affects the use of impolite questions

Debate	Topic	Face Loss Potential	Government's Qs		Opposition's Qs	
			Qs	Impolite Qs	Qs	Impolite Qs
A	Access to health services	Great to Gov	30	23.3%	51	90.2%
B	Credit union “SKOK”	Great to Opp	37	35.1%	38	81.6%
C	Preparing presidential election	little	22	0%	66	62.1%
D	Libraries and readership	little	29	13.8%	29	72.4%
		Total:	118	20.3%	184	75.5%

In the analyzed Question Times with little potential of face loss, the topics were librarianship (D) and changes in the electoral system for the upcoming presidential elections (C). Especially in the debate about librarianship, the overall small number of questions coming from the opposition indicates a lack of political explosiveness. In this debate, the impoliteness is often perceived from the question's rearguard:

- (23) How do you see the role of the Polish language in the East, where Polish has the potential of overshadowing such languages as French, English and other western European languages? And this is “obvious obviousness”. We are threatened by the sin of repudiation, a mortal sin of repudiation.

Jak państwo widziecie rolę języka polskiego na Wschodzie, gdzie język polski jest w stanie zdominować takie języki jak: francuski, angielski i inne zachodnioeuropejskie? I to jest oczywista oczywistość. Grozi nam grzech zaniechania, śmiertelny grzech zaniechania.

Piotr Pyzik, Law and Justice (PiS), 14th May 2015

If the question posed by MP Pyzik in the first sentence was taken out of its context, the impoliteness would be nearly impossible to interpret. With the following phrases however, the speaker reveals his impolite intention. First, he asserts a high potential of the Polish language. In a second step, he rejects any doubts the assertion could be false (“obvious obviousness”). Third, the speaker presupposes that there is a lethal threat to the Polish language (“mortal sin”). In sum, MP Pyzik makes the government accountable for the bad scenario he created by using a broad wh-question addressed to the ruling coalition (“How do you see the role [...]?”).

In the next example from the same debate (D), the utterance of a question is sufficient to perform the impolite act:

- (24) By omitting school libraries in the “National program of readership development”, we don’t support this potential. (...) This is huge potential. Why, Mr. Minister, why don’t you exploit this potential?

Jeśli w programach “Narodowego programu rozwoju czytelnictwa” pomijamy biblioteki szkolne, to nie wspieramy tego potencjału. (...) To jest ogromny potencjał. Dlaczego, panie ministrze, państwo nie wykorzystuje tego potencjału?

Krzysztof Sońta, Law and Justice (PiS), 14th May 2015

In both examples, the questions are crucial to perform the FTAs, regardless of the fact that one question is posed before and the other one after the description of the negative status quo. These complex impoliteness strategies stand in contrast to other question strategies which are face threatening without further explanations of the case. Such directly face threatening strategies are quite frequent (see (15b), (15b) and (14a) and the following example):

- (25) In the process of killing the voters, do you first kill the voters of the current opposition?

Czy w procesie tzw. uśmiercania wyborców przede wszystkim uśmierca się wyborców dzisiejszej opozycji?

Ryszard Zbrzyzny, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 23rd April 2015

The question is uttered by a member of the left-wing opposition. Taking a closer look at the opposition, impolite questions are very unevenly distributed among the parties. The right-wing opposition, holding 30% of the Sejm seats, poses 85% of all questions in an impolite way. Questions from the left-wing opposition, holding 18% of the Sejm seats, are impolite only in 25% of all cases. This indicates a rather populist orientation by the right-wing.

5.4.3 *Indirect impoliteness in questions*

As stated previously, the topic of a debate has an influence on the use of impoliteness strategies. Generally, sensitive topics that are politically more dangerous for the ruling parties come up more frequently in Question Time than the sensitive topics for the opposition. It also happens that the ruling coalition puts sensitive topics on the agenda in order to charge the former government. Such topics shall recall suspected wrong doings by the current opposition as they themselves were in office, but such Question Times are the exception. Consider the highly sensitive topic of the “Credit Union SKOK” (debate B): as expected, the share of impolite questions by the government is the highest among all debates (35.1%). However, even a topic which only seems to be dangerous for the opposition does not protect the government from verbal attacks. The highest frequency of impolite questions by the opposition, which was found in the same debate B (81.6%), highlights this point. The opposition pursues a counter strategy to the potential of face threat. The most interesting findings are based on the analysis of the government’s questions:

- (26) How to evaluate in one sentence the activities of the “Credit Union SKOK” within the context of malpractice, or even pathologies, of all that we are reading about in the media, which role did the Credit Union SKOK play?

Jakby jednym zdaniem ocenić działalność Kasy Krajowej w kontekście uchyleń czy wręcz patologii, tego wszystkiego, o czym czytamy w mediach, jaką rolę pełniła Kasa Krajowa? *Jan Kulas, Civic Platform (PO), 9th April 2015*

The intention of MP Kulas can be as followed: The formal addressee from his own party should confirm all the negative presuppositions mentioned in the question. This question concerns face issues of both the minister and the opposition. The strategy offers the addressee a point of attack against the opposition and, threatens the opposition’s face. Simultaneously, the speaker enhances the face of the minister since he can easily give a “good” answer. This strategical proceeding is exclusively reserved to governmental deputies and is most frequent in the debates on topics that are politically sensitive to the opposition.

6. Summary

This chapter deals with questioning strategies in Polish parliamentary discourse. The findings of other studies on parliamentary discourse concerning the insufficiency of the classic view on face (Goffman 1967; Brown & Levinson 1987) are corroborated by the findings from the Polish Parliament. Every politician is a member of various groups, and disposes of several faces.

The analysis shows that questions in parliamentary discourse are more than a means of communication between questioner and questionee. Their intention may exceed the pure elicitation of information, e.g. threats aiming at damaging the opponent's face are omnipresent during the Question Time; they even appear to be the main function attributed to the questions posed during these Parliamentary sessions (cf. Pérez de Ayala 2001).

The quantitative analysis of selected Question Times in the Polish Parliament revealed an imbalance in the use of impolite questions between the government and the opposition. While the percentage of impolite questions by left-wing opposition is 25%, the percentage of the government is 22%. The share of impolite questions coming from the right-wing opposition is considerably higher (85%). In other words, nearly all questions posed by right-wing politicians are impolite, clearly showing their antagonistic orientation.

The grammatical form and the discursive functions of questions are highly diversified (e.g. Tsui 1992; Woodbury 1984), the linguistic form of the questions is further conditioned by the type of discourse. The Polish parliamentary discourse is characterized by the absence of any standards concerning the form of the questions. The deputies therefore use a broad range of question types, which can also be found in other kinds of discourses.

This chapter explores mitigation strategies that the government MPs pursue with the intention of criticizing their party/coalition colleagues. They mitigate impolite questions in order to minimize the potential face loss of their political party or the respective minister. Indirect conditional questions and formulations are the main sources of mitigation. Generally, the political sensitivity of the debated topic is crucial when posing questions in *Sejm*. When debating topics that are sensitive politically, the government's MPs pursue question strategies that enhance the face of their own ministers. These questions are, however, face threatening for the opposition. It is worth noting that the opposition usually formulates face threatening questions rather than non face threatening ones, and tries to maximize their frequency.

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Discursive construction of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

Analysis of commemorative speeches (2004–2016) on the Croatian Homeland War

Sonja Riehn

Commemorative speeches as an annual ritual play an important role in the memory discourse of a society. They construct political and social realities, as well as a collective identity. The following paper discusses the content and the form of official remembrance of the Homeland War in Croatia, which took place from 1991 to 1995. In particular, I will focus on the constitution of the elements of national identity and collective memory of the 1990s within the selected speeches of Croatian political leaders between 2004 and 2016. Hereby, the emphasis is on the discursive presentation of Self and Others. The analysis draws on theoretical and methodological frameworks of the Discourse-Historical Approach within the Critical Discourse Analysis.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach, commemorative speeches, memory discourse, discursive construction of national identity, collective memory, Croatian Homeland War

1. Introduction

Every year on the 5th of August, the so-called ‘Victory Day’ (*Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti i Dan Hrvatskih Branitelja*) is celebrated in Croatia, in remembrance of the day the Croatian Army completely liberated the occupied regions of the Croatian Krajina through ‘Operation Storm’ (*Operacija Oluja*) in 1995. The centre of celebrations on this official holiday is the city of Knin, in Northern Dalmatia. The most important political representatives such as the president, the prime minister and the speaker of the Croatian Parliament as well as the war veterans and other guests participate in the commemoration ceremonies. The anniversary of ‘Operation Storm’ is celebrated as the biggest victory in the so-called

‘Croatian Homeland War’ (*Domovinski rat*).¹ This term alone already emphasizes the high emotional and symbolic value of the war. It is seen as the most important event in the foundation of an independent Croatian State. The German historian Wolfgang Höpken claims that if a war is of such vital importance for a state, its glorification is almost preprogrammed (cf. Höpken 2007: 25). Croatian politician Dejan Jović even refers to the Croatian Homeland War as “the war that is not allowed to be forgotten” (Jović 2012), and points at the close link between the dominant narrative over the Homeland War and the conservative (nationalistic) political discourse.

Official Serbian representatives are hardly ever present at the ceremonies (cf. Jović 2012: 60). On the contrary, political leaders from Serbia and Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity Republika Srpska annually commemorate this day, the Day of Remembrance of the Suffering and Persecution of Serbs (*Dan sećanja na stradanja i progon Srba*) by a one minute’s silence (cf. Pantovic 2016; Andrić, Milekić 2014). In 2016, officials from Serbia and Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity Republika Srpska gathered in the Bosnian village of Busije, which is only around two hundred kilometers away from the Croatian city of Knin and is densely populated by refugees who fled during ‘Operation Storm’. At this event, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić slammed Croatia in his speech for its annual celebration of ‘Victory Day’. He insisted that no such thing would be allowed to happen again. He even used the word ‘pogrom’ when describing the displacements in the 1990s (cf. Pantovic 2016). The president of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, accused Croatia of tolerating increasing Croatian nationalism and the glorification of war criminals as heroes (cf. Pantovic 2016). Each year, relations between Croatia and Serbia worsen as Croatia gears up for the annual anniversary celebration of its ‘Victory Day’ (cf. Pantovic 2016). It becomes evident from this short introduction that the commemoration practice and the political setting around it generates identity struggles among involved parties.

This chapter focuses on the question of how a particular national identity and the particular collective memory of the 1990s is constituted within 13 selected commemorative speeches on the Croatian Homeland War delivered between 2004 and 2016. The emphasis is on the discursive self-presentation and the presentation of others and therefore, on drawing up boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The additional analysis of the topoi of glorification and victimization points to the strong connection between the (re)building of a national identity and to a particular vision of the past. Furthermore, the differences and the changes in the images of the Croatian Homeland War are examined. Did the political changes in 2011 and 2016 also mean a change in the way of the official remembrance? Or to put it in another

1. This term first appeared during the 1990s. Today it is widely accepted in Croatia, not only within the political discourse, but also in education and academia.

way: does a change within the power system bring changes in communication and discourse practice?

Before getting to the theoretical and methodological framework, an informative review of the Croatian War in 1990s as well as a brief insight into the post-Yugoslav memory discourses will be provided.

2. War and memory in Croatia

The long lasting economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia, which started in the 1970s, ultimately resulted in the conflict between the six autonomous republics, as the wish for separation and (ethnic) self-determination increased. In 1990, a new Croatian constitution was adopted in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which 'over night' turned the Serbian population into a minority in their own country (cf. Sundhaussen 1993: 125). In spring 1991, the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica*, hereafter: HDZ) won the first multi-party elections in Croatia and its leader Franjo Tuđman became Croatian president, which resulted in increased nationalistic propaganda. War propaganda and nationalistic slogans from the Croatian and Serbian side led to insecurity and radicalization of the region. In particular, regions with a local Serbian population (*Croatian Serbs* or *Krajina Serbs*)² turned into initial points of violent riots, such as in parts of Dalmatia, Banija, Lika, Kordun and parts of Eastern and Western Slavonia. Marriages, friendships and neighborhoods were destroyed by the politics of ethnic homogenization. On 25th of June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, which resulted in the intervention of the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija*, hereafter: JNA) in Slovenia, followed by an intervention in Croatia. In the same year, the JNA and its adherents in the Republic of Serbian Krajina (*Republika Srpska Krajina*)³ began their open aggression in Croatia, aiming to secure Serb territorial aspirations in Croatia (cf. Barić 2008: 92). As a result, a civil war which lasted four years broke out. Serbian rebels displaced ethnic Croats while Croatian nationalists expelled ethnic Serbs from their houses and villages (cf. Barić 2008: 92). On 1st of May 1995, the first counter-offensive of the Croatian police and the newly formed Croatian military army started with

2. In this context *Krajina* refers to the historical borderland (Military Frontier, *Vojna krajina*) between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires, which existed up to the 19th century. It was a multiethnic region where especially Croats, Serbs and Vlachs lived and worked as soldiers.

3. *Republika Srpska Krajina* was a self-proclaimed Serb parastate within the territory of the Republic of Croatia during the Croatian Homeland War. It formally existed from 1991 to 1995, but was not recognized internationally. Its capital was the city of Knin.

'Operation Flash' (*Operacija Bljesak*), and was followed by many others. On 5th of August 1995, the Croatian Army completely liberated the occupied regions of the Croatian Krajina through 'Operation Storm' (*Operacija Oluja*). The military intervention, which lasted only 36 hours, resulted in the death of an estimated 500 Serbs, of whom many were reportedly civilians, as well as the displacement of an estimated 200,000 Serbs who fled in the immediate aftermath (cf. Human Rights Watch 1996). During and after the military operation, violations of humanitarian law were committed by the Croatian Army. These were: bombardments of retreating Serbian civilians, mass executions of infirm and elderly Serbs who stayed behind, and the large-scale burning and destruction of Serbian villages and property (cf. Human Rights Watch 1996). In the months following the military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and another 110 persons forcibly disappeared (cf. Human Rights Watch 1996). From 1991 until 1995, between 300,000 and 350,000 ethnic Serbs left their homes in Croatia. While in 1991 Serbs made up 12 percent of the population in Croatia, the census from 2001 showed their number had fallen to 4.5 percent (cf. Leutloff-Grandits 2006: 187). Following Croatian government figures from April 2006, approximately 120,000 Serb refugees had returned to Croatia since 1995 (cf. Human Rights Watch 2006). The actual number is believed to be much lower, since many of those who are registered as returnees make only occasional visits to Croatia while still living in Serbia or in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only 60 to 65 percent of the registered returnees are believed to remain permanently in Croatia (cf. Human Rights Watch 2006).

Already in 1999, Höpken argued that the Croatian conception of history blocks any positive joint experience with others, especially Serbs. Whereas the misery suffered by others is emphasized, their own injustice is marginalized and banalized (cf. Höpken 1999: 624). Croatia is not an individual case. Almost all "post-war societies of the Western Balkans have established several narratives of the past that are mostly in conflict with one another and are usually influenced by an ethnocentric point of view" (Dafeld 2015: 1). In all former Yugoslavian countries, the armed conflicts in the 1990s are currently mostly seen as a necessary struggle for independence (cf. Bohnet et al. 2013: 7). The counterparts of the former conflicts are mostly seen as enemies, almost no critical engagement with their own role and committed crimes follows. The political scientist Jelena Obradović-Wochnik states that war crimes are only discussed "insofar as they are negated or justified. They are explained only in terms which are acceptable to the wider political sphere, namely that the wars were purely defensive and if war crimes took place, they were only acts of retaliation" (cf. Obradović-Wochnik 2009: 65). Nataša Kandić, the director of the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, claims that the dangerous result of one-sided victimhood is an inversion in which "those indicted for war crimes are glorified, while their victims are repeatedly denied the right to be treated as victims"

(cf. Ramet 2007: 51). Following Norwegian political scientist Sabrina Ramet, one aspect of the Serbian denial syndrome is based on transposing guilt onto Croats, Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians (cf. Ramet 2007: 41). The Bosnian sociologist Dino Abazović argues that the majority of reconciliation efforts by international and domestic politicians have been insufficient in Bosnia, largely because many of the roots of the conflict still prevail. The reconciliation process is superimposed by a predominant ethnicization of all aspects of Bosnia's social and political life (cf. Abazović 2014). Macedonia Experts Mefail Ismaili and Maja Vaseva claim that in Macedonia ethnic tensions continue too, especially among younger generations (cf. Ismaili, Mefail, Vaseva, Maja: 2015). Politicians, the media and other actors in the country, "need a big boost to begin seriously dealing with dealing with the past" (Ismaili, Mefail, Vaseva, Maja: 2015).

3. Theoretical and methodological foundations

The corpus is composed of thirteen selected commemorative speeches made by Croatian politicians on the topic of the Croatian Homeland War between 2004 and 2016. The term 'commemorative speeches' denotes all political speeches that are delivered within the scope of official holidays and ceremonies to officially remember historical events, in this case the Homeland War. Due to the attempt of analyzing recurrent thoughts and argumentation patterns within the Croatian political discourse, speakers from different political parties have been intentionally selected (for a list of speakers and occasions see Appendix). Seven speeches (G04, G07, G09, G12, G13, G15, G16) were taken from the home page of the Croatian Parliament, five speeches (G05, G06, G08, G10, G11) as audio-data-files from the archive of the Croatian Government and one speech (G14) as a video-data-file from the home page of the Croatian Online-Newspaper 'Dnevnik'. All speeches were transcribed and translated from Croatian into German. For the purpose of this paper, the Croatian examples used are translated into English. The speeches are abbreviated with 'G' (*Govor* – the Croatian Word for 'speech') and are annotated with their respective year.

Since the object of analysis broaches four mutually interweaved fields and aspects (political, historical, linguistic and cultural), the analysis requires a methodologically qualified interdisciplinary approach tying the theory, methods and the research practice. On that account, the theoretical and methodological background of this paper is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), introduced by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl (cf. e.g. Wodak 1998; Wodak & Meyer 2009). The DHA is suitable for this analysis out of several reasons. First, the historical context is analyzed and integrated into the interpretation

of discourses and texts. Furthermore, the DHA is problem-orientated and does not focus merely on specific linguistic items. In addition, the DHA is characterized by the flexibility of categories and tools. They are defined according to the steps of analysis as well as the specific problem under investigation (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2009: 95). Essentially, the approach is three-dimensional: First, specific content of a specific discourse is identified, then discursive strategies are investigated. Finally, the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations are examined (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2009: 93). The DHA perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice (cf. Wodak 1998: 42). The relation between discursive actions, situations, institutions and social structures are considered as dialectical: On one side, discourse is shaped by situational and social contexts, and on the other side, discourse has a forming impact on the social reality (cf. Wodak 1998: 42). In other words, discourse is considered to be “socially constituted and socially constitutive” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 89). Following this perspective of discourse as a social practice, we claim that political speeches as a part of political discourse sustainably form (political) reality.

3.1 Commemorative speeches as a part of political discourse

According to Reisigl, political speeches perform a specific function within the political discourse, since they are covering several political action fields (cf. Reisigl 2007: 32). Political speeches are acting as a catalyst for the official, but also intra-party political opinion-, attitude- and decision-making processes (cf. Reisigl 2007: 32). Regarding the rhetoric of political speeches, Reisigl (2008) distinguishes between different dimensions of politics: polity, policy and politics (cf. Reisigl 2008: 244ff). He states that commemorative speeches next to jubilee, anniversary, birthday and laudatory speeches, as well as speeches of principle, speeches in honor of prize-winners, speeches of consolation and ceremonial addresses, and funeral orations belong to those forms of political speeches which primarily focus on the dimension of polity, concerning the political frame for political actors (cf. Reisigl 2008: 244f).

The dimension of polity “relates to normative, legal, procedural and institutional manifestations, which help to establish the political order. The constitution, the political system, the political culture, political norms and values as well as legal and institutional rules are associated with the dimension [of polity]”.

(cf. Reisigl 2008: 244f)

In addition, Reisigl argues that all forms of speeches that concern the dimension of polity “aim to express common values of a political ‘in-group’ (cf. Reisigl 2008: 246). Therefore, on one hand, political speeches are socially integrative “by contributing

to the formation of transindividual identity and to the foundation of group solidarity" (Reisigl 2008: 251). On the other hand, "they can fulfill disintegrative and destructive functions by mobilizing addressees to social exclusion and, at worst, to violent attacks against those excluded and denigrated by the orator" (Reisigl 2008: 251). When analyzing commemorative speeches, the structure of a political body and therefore the structure of a nation state has to be considered. This leads on to the specific content of commemorative speeches. Their function is to remember officially political and national relevant events or personalities in the nation's past (cf. Klein 2000: 751). These events are mostly connected to a special date. Wodak argues that the topic structure of commemorative speeches is not solely dealing with the narration of a common political history, but with the discursive construction of a common political present and future (cf. Wodak 1998: 174). In other words, political commemorative speeches annually communicate specific versions of the nation's past and at the same time create pictures of the nation's present and the future. Therefore, they can be seen as a part of the 'collective memory'.

The term 'collective memory' is understood as 'common knowledge storage' over the past, which is produced within the present for particular reasons. The past is a central resource of collective self-assurance and political legitimacy and mobilization (cf. Berek 2009: 192). It is not simply there, but is developing – always afresh – by communication (cf. Berek 2009: 192). As a result, 'collective memory' can be described as a discursive process. Following Jović, those who hold political, economic and military power, hold the power over the interpretation of the 'collective memory' (cf. Jović 2004: 98). Additionally, those who control 'collective memory' control collective identities as well:

Whoever wants to address the issue of identity – whether in order to change or to preserve – has to decide what should be (officially) remembered and what should be forgotten. (Jović 2004: 98)

We can thus state that commemorative speeches are reproducing each year a 'common knowledge store' over the past and function as a regular strengthener of the 'collective memory' and collective identities.

3.2 Discursive construction of identity and difference

Following Wodak, the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' is seen as the cornerstone of discourses of identity and difference. According to Political Scientist Ksenija Petrović, the drawing of boundaries can be considered an important characteristic of nationalistic discourse (cf. Petrović 2012: 200). The nationalistic version of reality is based on an explicit segregation between 'own' and 'foreign' and between 'inside' and 'outside' (cf. Petrović 2012: 200). While observing and describing

oneself, the other is excluded and devalued (cf. Petrović 2012: 200). In conclusion, the discourses of national identities are “salient for discourses of discrimination” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 73). According to Wodak, discourses about nations and national identities rely on at least four types of discursive macro-strategies, plus their sub-strategies. ‘Strategy’ here means “a more or less accurate and [...] intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 73). Therefore, discursive strategies are understood as systematic ways of using language and can be located at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2009: 73). Two of these strategies are of great importance for this analysis: First, *constructive strategies*, aiming at the construction of national identities by linguistically producing unification, solidification, but also distinction to other collective groups (cf. Wodak 1998: 76). Secondly, *preservative strategies*, contemplating conservation and reproduction of national identities or narratives of identity (cf. Wodak 1998: 76). Important sub-strategies of preservative strategies are *justificatory strategies*. They concentrate on bygone events that are important for the national narrative and image of history in the present (Wodak 1998: 76).

The first step of the analysis was to investigate the construction of social actors in the selected speeches (nomination). Which social actors are speaking? How are they named? With the help of which linguistical and strategical devices are social out-groups constructed? Devices of the construction of social actors can be membership categorization such as deictics, depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies. In a second step, the discursive qualification of social actors is examined (predication). Which national features and characteristics are ascribed to the collectives? Is the labeling of social actors more or less positive or negative? The third step focuses on the justification of claims of truth and normative rightness (argumentation). By which arguments and argumentation schemes do the specific social actors try to justify and legitimize the exclusion of others? What is said? Which patterns of thinking and arguing are used to describe events of the past, present and future? Realization forms can be metonymies and metaphors, but also catchphrases or active and passive constructions. Devices of the justification of positive and negative attributions can be so-called ‘topoi’, argumentation patterns used to justify (political) inclusion or exclusion. ‘Topoi’ are an important connector between the discursive strategies and the linguistical realization forms. Following Kienpointer, they are the conclusion rules which connect the argument with the conclusion. As such, “they justify the transition from the argument [...] to the conclusion” (Kienpointer 1992: 194). Mostly, the context expressed in form of the conclusion rule is not explicitly mentioned. It is made available and interpreted through the linguistically realized components of the argumentation. This lack of unambiguity

but simultaneous aim for plausibility is the main character of public and political argumentation (cf. Wengeler 2005: 232). Therefore, deconstructing argumentation by separating it into its individual segments (conclusion, argument and conclusion rule) is the main operation for a fruitful analysis of political speeches.

4. Discursive construction of 'Us'

The most important social actors who are discursively constructed in the analyzed speeches are: "Croatian nation" (*hrvatski narod*), "Croatian citizens" (*hrvatski građani*) and "Croatian residents" (*hrvatski državljani*), "Croats" (*Hrvat, Hrvatica*), "Croatian defenders" (*hrvatski branitelji*)⁴ and "Croatian Army" (*hrvatska vojska*). As can be seen from these examples, most nouns collocate with the ethnonym "Croatian". The possessive pronoun "our" (*naš*) is always deployed in context to the toponym "Croatia". Therefore, a 'We-Group', which is described as Croatian, is linguistically constructed. The most frequently used nomination in the analyzed speeches is "Croatian nation" (*hrvatski narod*).⁵ It can be assumed that the term "Croatian nation" describes all natively-born, ethnic Croats, all over the world. Understanding the term 'nation' in this sense contains essential characteristics. The term automatically excludes all other ethnic groups. Other collectives that are used to discursively construct a Croatian 'We-Group' are: "Croatian citizens" (*hrvatski građani*), "citizens of Croatia" (*građani Hrvatska*) and "Croatian residents" (*hrvatski državljani*). The nomination "Croatian society" (*hrvatsko društvo*) is only mentioned in one speech (G15). The term "citizen" is originally used in a context of a political nation state and theoretically includes all citizens of the state, regardless of ethnic origin or minority. Within the analyzed speeches however, the term "citizen" is always used in combination with the attribute "Croatian" and therefore it can be interpreted as ethno-centric. Additionally, neither the nomination "citizen" nor the attribute "Croatian" is explicitly defined.

The lack of clear separation between the two terms may suggest that the speakers intentionally omit a clear definition of the terms in order to let the audience decide who is meant by the term "Croatian citizen" or "Croatian nation". That is to say, who belongs to the 'We-Group' and who does not. In G12, it is striking that the nomination "Croatian citizen" (*hrvatski građani*), is used when referring to situations from the past, meanwhile the nomination "citizens of Croatia" (*građani*

4. The term "Croatian defenders" is officially used in Croatia to designate soldiers in the Croatian Army, who fought during the 1991–1995 war.

5. In Croatian language the word *narod* means 'people' (*Volk*) as well as 'nation'.

Hrvatska) is used when present issues are mentioned. In G13, at the beginning, all Croatian citizens are addressed, but at the end of the speech, the speaker differs between “Croats” and “Citizens of Croatia” as the following examples illustrate.

[...] *a prvenstveno zbog Hrvata i svih drugih građana Hrvatske, koji su svoju demokraciju stekli krvlju, [...] svim Hrvaticama i Hrvatima, svim građankama i građanima Hrvatske u ime Hrvatskog sabora i u svoje osobno ime čestitam Dan državnosti*
(G16, l. 73–89)

[...] but most of all, for the Croats and all other citizens of Croatia, that lost their blood for Croatia [...] I congratulate all Croats, all citizens of Croatia on the Independence Day in the name of the Croatian Parliament and in my own name.

Clearly, a separation between ethnic Croats and all other citizens of the Republic of Croatia is made. It can be assumed that the nomination “Croats” (*Hrvat, Hrvatica*) addresses only ethnic Croats. Only in one speech, it is mentioned that the term “Croatian citizen” includes all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, and therefore all members of the other ethnic groups and minorities living in the country are addressed.

[...] *kao suverenu državu hrvatskoga naroda i građana njezinih državljana pripadnika drugih naroda i manjina, državu parlamentarne demokracije, vladavine prava i tržišnog gospodarstva*
(G12, l. 80)

[...] As a sovereign state of the Croatian nation and all people with citizen status, the members of other ethnic groups and minorities, a country of parliamentary democracy, with power of law and market economy.

Nevertheless, here too, the speaker distinguishes between “Croatian nation” and “Croatian citizens”, i.e. between ethnic Croats and other ethnic groups. From 2015, it seems the nomination “Croatian nation” is replaced by the term “Croatian citizen”, but due to the lack of definition the speeches are still prone to exclude all the non-natively born Croats.

4.1 The Croatian Nation: Democratic, independent, modern and European

The ‘We-Group’ is explicitly described positively. Three predication and argumentation patterns are observable: The emphasis of independency, democracy and the portrayal of Croatia as a recognized modern country.

Hrvatska država je suverena, slobodna i samostalna, ustrojena na vladavini prava, čvrstim jamstvima građanskih i vjerskih sloboda, jednakosti i ravnopravnosti svih naših građana
(G07, l. 56–58)

The Croatian State is sovereign, free and autonomous; built on a rule of law, solid civil guarantees and religious liberty, equality and equal status of all our citizens.

Danas je Hrvatska prepoznata i priznata kao značajan čimbenik stabilnosti u Europi i svijetu (G08, l. 44–45)

Today Croatia is known and recognized as a significant factor of stability in Europe and the world.

The perception of Croatia as a modern country is closely connected to the (upcoming) EU membership.

Sve te vrijednosti, kao i privrženost antifašizmu i antitotalitarizmu, kao sastavnim vrijednostima demokracije i načela na kojima počiva i Europska unija, kojoj će se Hrvatska kao punopravna članica pridružiti sljedeće godine, čini našu državu modernom demokratskom europskom državom (G12, l. 68–71)

All these values, as well as the obligation of anti-fascism and anti-totalitarianism as integrated values of democracy and as basic principles on which the European Union is based – the Union, to which Croatia will associate as a fully entitled member next year – all this makes our country into a modern, democratic, European country.

Hrvatska odlučno kreće svojim putem! Putem slobode demokracije i samostalnosti (G12, l. 31–33)

Croatia is determined to go its own way! A way of freedom, democracy and sovereignty.

The phrase “Croatia is determined to go its own way!” (*Hrvatska odlučno kreće svojim putem!*) can be interpreted as a part of the narrative of ‘Returning to Europe’, which will be further discussed in chapter 5.1. Additionally, the terms “freedom”, “democracy” and “autonomy” can be seen as important keywords, often used in connection with the ‘We-Group’.

Furthermore, a recurring element in all analyzed speeches is the use of the possessive pronoun “our” (*naš*). Three of its main applications will be considered in more detail. First, we notice that the possessive pronoun “our” is connected to the term “home” (*dom*) and “homeland” (*domovina*). “Croatia” is, therefore, presented as the homeland of the ‘We-Group’. The term “home”⁶ appears 61 times within the speeches: 35 times as the term “Homeland War” (*Domovinski rat*), 17 times as “home” (*dom*) or “homeland” (*domovina*), four times as “love of one’s native country” (*domoljublje*) and five times as “native thankfulness” (*domovinska zahvalnosti*). In all speeches, with the exception of G11, “Croatia” is connected to the term “home”. Second, the possessive pronoun “our” is used in connection with the future and independency of Croatia. Propositions like “our task and responsibility” (*naše obveze i odgovornosti*), “our future” (*naša budućnost*), “our problems” (*naši problemi*), “our children” (*naše djece*), “our democracy” (*naše demokracija*), “our constitution” (*naši ustav*), “our freedom” (*naše sloboda*), “our Croatian Parliament”

6. The Croatian word *domovina* could also be translated to “homeland”.

(*naš Hrvatski sabor*), “our aims” (*naše cilj*), “our own interests” (*naše svoj interese*) and “our time” (*naše vremena*). All given examples reveal a close connection of the possessive pronoun “our” with political entities and political and national values. The evaluative nomination “our children” suggests that Croatia is a big family and aims at being associated with the community spirit. Besides, this construction appeals to the sense of responsibility of the addressees. The third elementary link between the nomination “Croatia” and the possessive pronoun “our” is that with the past and the Homeland War, as well as with its actors. These connections are of vital importance for the construction of an imaginary, common history, as well as for the presentation of images of self and the other. This topic will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2 The Croatian Defenders: Timeless, legitimate and unquestionable heroes

As already mentioned, the nominations “Croatian defenders” (*hrvatski branitelj*) and “Croatian Army” (*hrvatska vojska*) are frequently used within the discursive construction of the ‘We-Group’. Both nominations are, amongst others, connected to the possessive pronoun “our”. The expressions “our defenders” (*naši branitelji*), “our Croatian defenders!” (*naši hrvatski branitelji!*), “our honorable fighters” (*časno što su naši borci*), “our soldiers” (*naši vojnici*), “our military forces” (*naše oružane snage*) and “our generals” (*naši generali*) demonstrate that the Croatian defenders as well as the Croatian National Army are presented as a part of the Croatian ‘We-Group’. By the expression “our brothers and sisters”, an emotional closeness of the defenders is evoked. Probably the strongest phrase connected to the usage of the possessive pronoun “our” and the nomination “Croatian defenders” is the following:

Na kraju su pobijedili naša odlučnost, ustrajnost i hrabrost. A jedinstvo i zajedništvo hrvatskih branitelja i hrvatskih građana bili su odlučni za tu pobjedu (G15, l. 50)
In the end, our determination, perseverance and courage won. The unity and the fellowship of Croatian defenders and the Croatian citizens was crucial for the victory.

Here, the unity between the Croatian defenders and the Croatian citizens is represented in multiple layers: Firstly, the expression “our determination, perseverance and courage” merges the characteristics of the Croatian defenders with those of the whole Croatian ‘We-Group’ by the possessive pronoun “our”. Secondly, the unity is directly phrased by the conclusion “The unity and the fellowship between the Croatian defenders and the Croatian citizens was crucial for the victory”. The conclusion is that there would have been no victory in the Homeland War if it had not been for the unity of the Croatian defenders and the Croatian citizens.

Only in G15 does the speaker highlight the fact that not only Croats fought for Croatia's independence, but also other ethnic groups, such as Serbs, Hungarians or Bosnians.

I kao što uvijek naglašavam, iako su velika većina branitelja bili Hrvati, Hrvatsku su branili i mnogi Srbi, Mađari, Slovaci, Česi, Rusini, Bošnjaci i drugi, koji su je doživljavali kao svoju ljubljenu no ugroženu domovinu (G16, l. 38–41)
 And as I always say, although the vast majority of defenders were Croats, Croatia was defended also by many Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, Rusyns, Bosniaks and others, who experienced Croatia as their loving, but threatened homeland.

This integrative thought is quite an exception. In no other speech is either the exact composition of the group of Croatian defenders or of the Croatian National Army explained. The social actors are rather permanently connected with the possessive pronoun "our" which leads to the assumption that only ethnic Croats were a part of the armed units. In this speech however, the speaker highlights the heterogenic ethnic composition of the soldiers. Yet, the heterogeneity is only related to the past and the fight for independency. It is not mentioned that ethnic minorities are also today a part of Croatian society.

The Croatian defenders as well as the Croatian Army are described as courageous, self-sacrificing and determined.

[...] da im najdublje zahvalimo za iskazanu hrabrost, domoljublje, odlučnost i samoprijegor, što su današnjim i svim budućim naraštajima osigurali mir i slobodu (G07, l. 76–78)

[...] to thank them deeply for their courage, patriotism, determination and self-sacrifice to ensure peace and freedom for the present and future generations.

Svakako bez njihove hrabrosti, bez njihove odlučnosti, bez njihove ljubavi prema domovini ne bismo bili slobodni, a onda ne bismo mogli niti ostvariti svoje ciljeve koji su važni za nas danas, a ali i svakako za budućnost naše djece (G11, l. 19–21)
 But without their courage, without their determination, without their love for the homeland, we neither would be free, nor would it have been possible for us to implement our goals that are important to us now, but certainly for the future of our children.

The defenders' courage is directly connected to their love for their homeland. The term "our Croatian knights" (*hrvatski vitezovi*), which is used in G08 and G10, even stresses the courage of Croatian defenders. Peace and freedom are named as their greatest acquisitions. Both, peace and freedom, are described as the most beautiful possible present (*najljepši mogući poklon*) for Croatia. Also, values such as safety, stability and integrity are mentioned.

Oni su snagom oružja, ali još i više mudrom vojnom taktikom i snagom srca Hrvatskoj donijeli najljepši mogući poklon – mir i slobodu. Vratili su joj sigurnost, stabilnost i cjelovitost državnog teritorija te time otvorili vrata razvoju i napretku. Otvorili demokratsku perspektivu i osigurali demokratske vrijednosti (G15, 54–58)

With the power of weapons, but most of all with wise military tactics and the power of the heart, they gave Croatia the most possible beautiful gift – peace and freedom. They restored her [Croatian] security, stability and integrity of the state territory, which opened the doors to development and progress. This opened up a democratic perspective and secured democratic values.

The expression “with the power of weapons, but most of all with wise military tactics and the power of the heart” (*snagom oružja, ali još i više mudrom vojnom taktikom i snagom srca*), connects love and war in an abstruse way.

The most significant expression concerning the actors of the Homeland War, however, is the following metaphor in G12: “Croatia without its defenders is like a body without a soul” (*Hrvatska bez svojih branitelja je kao tijelo bez duše*). The metaphor suggests that the Croatian nation is one human organism, of which the Croatian defenders are an important part. As a matter of fact, the Croatian defenders are not seen as an organ, but as the immaterial part of the human being: the soul. According to Christian faith, the soul is immortal and will live on after death. Even if not interpreted religiously, the term ‘soul’ is understood as the human spirit and closely connected to emotions. The assumption that the ‘body of Croatia’ is without its defenders soulless demonstrates how the speaker wants to convey the high importance of the Croatian defenders for the Croatian society to the audience. The Croatian defenders are metaphorically presented as the very essence of the Croatian state. According to linguist Andreas Musolff, metaphors give its users argumentative advantage by carrying “social, emotional and aesthetic values that influence the interpretation of the utterance” (Musolff 2012: 303).

The analysis has shown that the Croatian defenders are portrayed as heroes of Croatia’s past. Yet, while talking about the past, particular narratives over an imagined future are communicated (cf. Banjeglav 2012: 1). In the following sections, the outlined image of the past will be further discussed. Furthermore, a brief note will be given on the personification of political events by the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman.

4.2.1 *The Homeland War: A legitimate and legal defensive war*

As previously mentioned, the possessive pronoun “our” is connected not only to the defenders, but also to the past in general. In the analyzed speeches, expressions like “our memory on those historical moments of the Homeland War” (*naše sjećanje na te povijesne trenutke Domovinskog rata*), “our eternal recognition and thankfulness” (*naše vječno priznanje i zahvalnost*) and “our history” (*naše povijesti*) can be

observed. These expressions assume a unification of the Croatian nation in regard of the past events, presuppose the common past and underline the common history of the 'We-Group'. They are closely connected to the nationalistic-conservative narrative of the Homeland War that conceives it as a legal, legitimate and defensive war. Since the acquittal of the two Croatian generals, Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter: ICTY) in November 2012, the narrative of the war as being a fair and legitimate war and Croatia as being a victim has grown (cf. Bohnet et al. 2013: 15). The release of the two generals, known for their role in 'Operation Storm', was seen as a liberation for the entire country (cf. Bohnet et al. 2013: 15). This narrative is identified within the analyzed speeches. The most important and constantly recurring argumentation pattern is that the Croatian defenders acted legitimately and justly. Mostly, this notion is argued implicitly through the topos of victim (see chapter 5.2) the few exceptions are the speeches from 2004, 2007 and 2015. By highlighting the right of every nation to live in freedom and peace, the image of the Homeland War as a legitimate, legal and defensive war is underlined.

Međutim, znali smo da je naše pravo, a i pravo je svakoga naroda da živi u slobodi i miru, i da živi svoj na svome. To legitimno pravo svakoga naroda i svakog čovjeka da se brani ako je napadnut bila je naša snaga i snaga pravde na našoj strani

(G15, l. 36–38)

Yet we knew, that it is our right and that it is the right of every nation to live in freedom and peace and on its own territory. It is the legitimate right of every nation and of every man to defend themselves if attacked. It was our strength and the power of justice that was on our side.

Hrvatski branitelji su u „Oluji” pokazali agresoru, ali i svijetu da je želja naroda da živi u slobodi nepobjediva i neuništiva

(G15, l. 53–54)

In [operation] 'Storm' the Croatian defenders showed to the aggressors, but also the world, that the desire of the people to live in freedom is invincible and indestructible.

In these examples the action of the Croatian defenders is connected implicitly to the topos of legitimation. In G04 and G07, the speaker, however, is more direct.

Domovinski rat, a posebno njegove najznačajnije pobjedničke akcije, “Bljesak” i “Oluja”, bili su legalno i legitimno sredstvo suverene i međunarodno priznate države, koja je njima branila svoj opstanak, svoju neovisnost i teritorijalni integritet

(G04, l.101–104)

The Homeland War, especially its most valuable victories 'Lightning' and 'Storm', were legal and legitimate means of a sovereign and internationally recognized country, to defend its existence, its independence and its territorial integrity.

Nasuprot određenim pokušajima da se u pitanje dovede opravdanost i legitimnost oslobodilačkih akcija hrvatske vojske, mi znamo da su one bile legalno i legitimno sredstvo na koje svaka međunarodno priznata država ima pravo. Legalno i legitimno sredstvo jer je utemeljeno na prirodnom pravu na obranu svog suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta (G07, l. 30–34)

In the face of certain attempts to question the justification and the legitimacy of the liberation actions of the Croatian Army, we know that they were legal and legitimate means, to which every internationally recognized country is entitled to. It was a legal and legitimate action, because it was based on the natural law of the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The following example from 2015 expresses the attitude towards the military actions as well.

Nismo pokleknuli jer smo vodili pravedni, obrambeni rat za oslobodjenje vlastitog teritorija od velikosrpske agresije i okupacije. To je povijesna činjenica koju nikada nitko neće moći osporiti (G15, l. 74–76)

We did not succumb, since we fought a just, defensive war to free our territory from the Great Serbian aggression and occupation. This is a historical fact that no one can ever contest.

The expression “This is a historical fact, that no one can ever contest” (*To je povijesna činjenica koju nikada nitko neće moći osporiti*) is an often used statement when it comes to the question of legitimation of the Homeland War, especially during the negotiations of the EU accession process which were closely connected to verdicts of the ICTY. At the next passage, the speaker underlines the resistance towards other interpretations of the war times by saying: “The Croatian victory in the Homeland War stays firm and steady” (*Hrvatska pobjeda u Domovinskom ratu ostaje čvrsta i postojana*).

The text from 2004 shows how strongly the official memory of the Homeland War is guarded.

No, najodlučnije odbacujemo svaku mogućnost, da bilo tko, ističem bilo tko, naruši dostojanstvo i istinu o Domovinskom ratu (G04, l. 115–116)

But we reject any possibility that anyone, I point out, that anyone would undermine the dignity and the truth about the Homeland War.

Only two speeches mention the crimes committed by the Croatian side (G04, G10).

Niti u jednom trenutku ne osporavamo potrebu da se pojedinačni slučajevi kršenja ratnog prava adekvatno sankcioniraju, da se počinitelji nedjela privedu pred « lice pravde ». RH će na tome bezuvjetno ustrajati, [...] (G04, l. 106–111)

At no time do we want to deny the need to sanction adequately the individual cases of violation of martial law and to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Republic of Croatia will insist on this unconditionally [...].

I na kraju svakako, svatko onaj, koji je počinio zločin, svatko onaj, tko je odgovoran i za smrt ovih ljudi mora stati pred lice pravde. O tome dvojbe nema. To je, to je jedan od ciljeva i rada Vlade i funkcioniranja hrvatskoga pravosuđa, to svi znate i u tome imate svoju punu i potpunu potporu (G10, l. 28–31)

And finally everyone, who committed a crime, everyone, who is responsible for a death of another human being, must be brought to justice. This is beyond any doubt. This is one of the goals and one of the tasks of the government and the functioning Croatian judiciary, you know that and you have my full and complete support.

4.2.2 *The personification of political events: The visionary Franjo Tuđman*

Eight out of the thirteen speeches contain the remembrance of the first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and his life's work. Remembering Tuđman means remembering his accomplishments as the first Croatian president. He is seen as the founder of the Croatian Republic.

Uspjesi i postignuća Hrvatske u proteklih 12 godina dokaz su zrelosti hrvatske demokracije i potvrda vjerodostojnosti hrvatske politike od vremena prvog hrvatskog predsjednika Republike, dr. Franje Tuđmana, pod čijim je političkim vodstvom ostvaren tisućljetni hrvatski san [...] (G07, l. 67–70)

The successes and achievements of Croatia in the past 12 years are the proof of the maturity of Croatian democracy and the confirmation of Croatian politics since the time of the first Croatian president of the Republic, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, under whose leadership the thousand-years-old Croatian dream was realized [...].

Zahvalnost moramo iskazati i prvom hrvatskom predsjedniku, dr. Franji Tuđmanu, pod čijim je vodstvom hrvatski narod ostvario svoje tisućljetne težnje i stvorio samostalnu i demokratsku državu (G09, l. 68–70)

We have to express our gratitude to our first Croatian president, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, under whose political leadership the thousand-years-old Croatian aspirations were achieved and an independent and democratic state was created.

For the HDZ, remembering Tuđman is a part of its current political program. As the founder of the party and simultaneously the founder of the Croatian Republic, the HDZ often prides themselves with his name. In G16, he is described as a determined, wise and brave visionary.

Današnji dan je prigoda da izrazimo zahvalnost i duboko poštovanje prema svima koji su pridonijeli uspostavi samostalne i neovisne Hrvatske, u prvom redu hrvatskim braniteljima, ali i prvom predsjedniku dr. Franji Tuđmanu, bez čije vizije, odlučnosti, mudrosti i hrabrosti mnogo toga ne bi bilo ostvareno (G16, l. 43–48)

Today is an occasion to express gratitude and deep respect to everyone who contributed to the establishment of an autonomous and independent Croatia, above all, to the Croatian defenders, but also the first Croatian president, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, without whose vision, determination, wisdom and courage, many things would have not been accomplished.

The personalization of political events is an important criterion of political language (cf. Volmert & Neuland 2003: 4). The credibility of theses and arguments is often measured by the credibility of their famous supporters (cf. Volmert & Neuland 2003: 4). By mentioning the doctor title in all references to the person Tuđman, the role of the first Croatian president as historian and intellectual, his credibility and professionalism is stressed. Tuđman is seen as a synonym of Croatian independence and autonomy. The fact that Franjo Tuđman is also a controversial figure is left aside. The SDP-politician Zoran Milanović also refers to Tuđman in his speech from 2014, probably in order to attract the audience, mainly composed of HDZ-supporters and war veterans.

I ona [vlada] Franje Tuđmana, kojem ovom prilikom također iskazujem poštovanje [catcalls and whistling are getting louder] ... [pause] – i ne mislim da je lijepo da mu se fučka, jer je bio hrvatski predsjednik u vrijeme kada je to bilo najteže i kada je najteže bilo donositi odluke i kada je svaka odluka izgledala jednostavno, a bila je sto puta teža nego danas (G14, l. 48–53)

And the government of Franjo Tuđman, whom I want to show respect on this occasion [catcalls and whistling are getting louder]... [pause] – and I do not think that it is nice, whistling at him, because he was the Croatian president at a time, when it was most difficult to make decisions even though it seemed easy, but it was a hundred times harder than today.

The example illustrates the ongoing importance and relevance of the figure of Franjo Tuđman as the first Croatian president in today's politics. Milanović and the other SDP-politicians perpetuate Tuđman's memory at official ceremonies.

Additionally, a permanent mixture of the nation's past, present and future can be investigated. This mixture can be explained by the great importance of the Homeland War for the current political discourse, especially the one of the HDZ. The prevailing notion within the HDZ is that Croatia could have not successfully separated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and become a democracy if it were not for the Homeland War, lead by Franjo Tuđman.

4.3 Preliminary conclusions

To summarise, the analysis showed so far that the Croatian 'We-Group' is mostly represented positively as members who belong to a democratic, independent, modern and European country. However, due to the lack of a clear-cut definition of the term "Croatian citizen" the boundaries of the 'We-Group' are blurry. Due to that, only native-born ethnic Croats are addressed in most of the speeches. As a consequence, all other ethnic groups are excluded. In all analyzed commemorative speeches, the Croatian Homeland War is seen as an important event for the foundation of the Croatian state and it is placed at the center of the national

Croatian identity. This shows that the war, its actors – the Croatian defenders and the Croatian army – and its remembrance play an important role for contemporary (and most likely the future) Croatian society and politics. Finally, the Croatian Homeland War is described so far as a legitimate, legal and defensive war and as a successful military operation. Only two speeches mention the crimes committed by the Croatian side.

5. The discursive construction of 'Them'

Who are 'the Others' in the speeches? Apart from the Croatian 'We-Group', these are the important social actors mentioned in the speeches: "Europe" (*Europa*) and the "European Union" (*Europska Unija*) as well as the "aggressors / aggression" (*agresija*) and "rebellious forces / insurgents" (*pobunjenici*).

5.1 Europe and the European Union: Inspiring example and antagonist at once

The nominations "Europe" and "European Union" are mostly connected to the most frequent positive keywords, e.g. "prosperity" (*blagostanje*), "democracy" (*demokracija*), "peace" (*mir*) and "safety" (*sigurnost*). The European Union is primarily seen as an ideal for Croatia.

Hrvatska danas uživa jednodušnu podršku međunarodne zajednice na svom putu prema suvremenim i razvijenim europskim zemljama (G04, l. 71–72)

Today Croatia enjoys undivided support of the international community on its way to a modern and developed, European country.

U Europi koja se ujedinjuje, u Europi koja se integrira, to su temeljna načela (G05, l. 46–47)

In Europe that unites, in Europe that integrates, these are the fundamental principles [here: the principle of mutual respect, mutual recognition and the refusal of territorial annexation are meant].

As far as the two proper nouns "Europe" and "European Union" are concerned, the former is used as metonymy for the latter, which is typical for many forms of public communication. This semantic and cognitive equation indicates that "Europe" is more than geographical demarcation (Just 2009: 265), despite being a continent and not a political institution. This nomination is observed very clearly in argumentation patterns and keyword collocations. Other EU-countries are seen as allies of Croatia and Croatia is presented as a recognized member of the European community, even before accession to the EU.

Hrvatska je danas na međunarodnoj sceni prihvaćena kao uvažena članica, spremna i sposobna u svakom trenutku pružiti pomoć u postizanju stabilnosti i mira u svijetu (G09, l. 84–86)

Today, Croatia is accepted as an honorable member of the international community, ready and capable of assisting at all times in preserving stability and peace in the world.

Additionally, a mental world map is traced with boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside Europe’.

Bili smo, činilo se, zauvijek osuđeni ostati izvan Europe, izvan svijeta, kao taoci jedne bezumne i agresivne politike, koja je pod geslom “etničkog okupljanja” sijala smrti i užas zemljama ovog dijela Europe (G04, l. 30–32)

We seemed to have been forever condemned to stay outside Europe, beyond the world, as hostages of an unreasonable and aggressive policy, which under the slogan of ‘ethnic gathering’ sowed death and terror in the countries of this part of Europe.

Here, ‘outside Europe’ refers to ‘outside the world’. Without saying it directly, it can be assumed that the term ‘outside Europe’ points to the Balkans. Therefore, the ‘We-Group’ is clearly located. Croatia’s place is located ‘inside Europe’. The notion that Croatia has always been a part of Europe can be illustrated in the following examples.

Ostajući ujedinjeni oko najvažnih strateških ciljeva, kao dio zajednice slobodnog demokratskog svijeta, mi u Hrvatskoj ćemo nastaviti i dovršiti put započet na ovaj dan, na ovom slavnom mjestu (G06, l. 70–72)

By staying united around the most important strategic aims, as a part of the community of a free, democratic world, we will continue in Croatia the journey that started that day.

Takva Hrvatska postala je prihvatljiv i poželjan partner međunarodnoj zajednici i kao takva uspješno se približava svom prirodnom odredištu – zajednici najrazvijenijih europskih država (G07, l. 60–62)

This Croatia became an acceptable and desirable partner of the international community and as such it is successfully approaching its natural destination – the community of the most developed European countries.

Pobjeda u Domovinskom ratu omogućila je afirmaciju naše demokracije, obnovu zemlje te definitivni povratak Hrvatske u krug razvijenih zapadnih zemalja (G08, l. 40–42)

The victory in the Homeland War enabled the affirmation of our democracy, the reconstruction of the country and the definitive return in the circle of developed Western countries.

The metaphor of ‘returning to Europe’ as of ‘returning home’ is widespread in Croatian political discourse. Already within the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the

motive of the 'thousand-year-old Croatian dream' and the narrative of Croatia as one of the oldest European states was activated (cf. Gross 1993: 75). Previous to accession to the EU, the narrative of 'returning to Europe' was employed by the pro-European actors in order to reduce the fear of the people that they would lose their own national identity (cf. Salamurović 2012: 256). In the speech from 2016, the notion of the centuries-long dream of all Croatians is revisited.

Prije 25 godina Hrvatska je učinila odlučni iskorak prema ostvarenju višestoljetnog sna Hrvata – prema neovisnosti i samostalnosti (G16, l.14–15)
 25 years ago, Croatia made a decisive step towards the fulfillment of the centuries-old Croat dream – about independence and autonomy.

But the speaker describes the situation of the Croatian society critically. Financial crisis and unemployment led to mutual distrust, intolerance and sometimes even hatred. The Croatian dream is declared as not fulfilled and in danger.

I oni i mi koji smo preživjeli, sanjali smo tu drugačiju Hrvatsku i od tih snova nećemo, ne smijemo i nemamo pravo odustati. Naprotiv, snovi jesu tu da ih pretvorimo u stvarnost (G16, l.79–98)
 Both, they [those who gave their lives for Croatia] and we who survived, dreamed of a different Croatia and this dream we cannot and we should not give up. On the contrary, dreams are to be turned into reality.

The Croatian dream and the Homeland war are often connected within the analyzed speeches. An often-used argumentation is that the Croatian soldiers and Croatian defenders fought for the Croatian dream, therefore, Croatian statesmen and Croatian politicians have the responsibility to fulfill it.

Since 2011, when the social democrats took office, the images concerning the EU have changed. Especially after accession to the EU, the preservation of their own sovereignty is stressed.

Hrvatska time otvara put prema gospodarskom napretku, ali to je ujedno i način da bolje obrani i ostvari svoje nacionalne interese u zajednici europskih država (G13, l. 86–88)

Croatia thus opens its way to economic progress, but this is also an opportunity, to better defend and to realize its national interests in the community of the European countries.

Biti član Europske unije ne znači ne braniti svoje interese i ne reći jasno što ugrožava hrvatsku samostalnost, što ugrožava hrvatsko pravo da upravljamo svojim novcem, svojim resursima, svojim prirodnim bogatstvima (G14, l. 39–41)

Being a member of the European Union does not mean, not to defend one's own interests and not to say clearly, what endangers Croatian sovereignty, what jeopardizes the Croatian right to manage its money, its resources and natural treasures.

The text examples highlight the importance of maintaining one's own political aims and interests while approaching the EU. This argument can be most likely seen as a reaction to EU-sceptic citizens. Despite that, the EU is again described as 'the place to be' in 2015, connected with values such as democracy, prosperity, freedom, human rights and rule of law.

Zahvaljujući vama Hrvatska je mogla okrenuti novu povijesnu stranicu – mogla je krenuti u obnovu i u izgradnju, zakoračiti u budućnost, demokratski prosperitetno društvo u Europskoj uniji i NATO-u (G15, l. 62–64)

Thanks to you [the Croatian defenders are meant], Croatia could turn a new historical page – it could embark on the construction and reconstruction, step into the future, into the prosperous democratic union in the European Union and the NATO.

A Hrvatska je demokratska država, članica Europske unije. I mi hrvatske institucije i društvo gradimo na vrijednostima demokracije, slobode i ljudskih prava i vladavine prava. U tome je snaga hrvatskog društva (G16, l. 95–97)

Croatia is a democratic country, a member of the European Union. And we also build Croatian institutions and the society based on the values of democracy, freedom and human rights and the rule of law. That is the strength of the Croatian society.

However, when HDZ under Andrej Plenković took office in 2016, the EU (or the former European Community) is first of all presented negatively and only in relation to the national past and the national interests of the 'We-Group'.

Hrvatska je tih dana zakoračila na put pun neizvjesnosti i rizika. Nasuprot golemoj vojnoj mašineriji takozvane jugoslavenske armije i velikosrpskih pobunjeničkih snaga, nasuprot realnoj opasnosti od vojnog udara, nasuprot nezainteresiranosti, pa čak i otporu međunarodne zajednice – nasuprot svemu tome stajala je Hrvatska, gotovo goloruka i razoružana (G16, l. 22–26)

In these days, Croatia stepped into the path that is full of uncertainties and risks. Against the huge military machinery of the so-called Yugoslav Army and the Great Serbian forces, the real danger of a military strike was in the face of the indifferent, indeed resistant international community – in contrast, Croatia stood almost naked and disarmed.

This argumentation pattern that Croatia defended itself without European partners and did not obtain sympathy or help appears repeatedly in the analyzed speeches.

Time je Sabor međunarodnoj javnosti, koja je nevoljko gledala na osamostaljenje Hrvatske i Slovenije, poslao jasnu i nedvosmislenu poruku: ostanak u tadašnjoj SFRJ za Hrvatsku više nije opcija, Hrvatska odlučno kreće svojim putem! Putem slobode demokracije i samostalnosti (G12, l. 29–33)

This parliament sends a clear and unambiguous message to the international community that reluctantly observed the declaration of independency of Croatia and Slovenia: Staying within the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is no longer an option for Croatia, Croatia is determined to go its own way! A way of freedom, democracy and independence.

Čvrsto ujedinjeni u želji da obranimo vlastite živote i domove, sigurni u opravdanost naših ciljeva uspjeli smo nadjačati i pobijediti vojnu nadmoć agresora i prevladati međunarodne pritiske

(G12, l. 38–40)

Firmly united in the desire to defend one's own life and homes, confident in the justification of our goals, we managed to overpower and overcome the superiority of the aggressors and to withstand the international pressure.

On one hand, the foreign policy of the international and European community is criticized. On the other hand, the international attempt to interfere with the handling of the past is criticized. The different positions between the 'We-Group' and 'The Others' can be demonstrated by the following example.

Niti u jednom trenutku ne osporavamo potrebu da se pojedinačni slučajevi kršenja ratnog prava adekvatno sankcioniraju, da se počinitelji nedjela privedu pred « lice pravde ». RH će na tome bezuvjetno ustrajati, ali ne zbog nekoga drugoga, već isključivo radi očuvanja digniteta Domovinskog rata, zbog očuvanja dostojanstva svih onih koji su u njega ugradili cijelo svoje biće, a mnogi i svoj vlastiti život

(G04, l. 106–111)

At no time do we dispute the need to adequately sanction the individual cases of violation of the rule of law and to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Republic of Croatia insist on this unconditionally but not for someone else, but solely for the purpose of preserving the dignity of the Homeland War, for the sake of preserving the dignity of all those who have incorporated all of its essence into it and many even their own life.

The speaker states that any injustice has to be punished. But this should happen because it is a national interest of Croatia and Croats and not because of demands and impositions from outside, from 'others'.

5.2 The Serbian Rebels and the Yugoslavian National Army: Anonymous enemies

The war opponents are described by the nomination "aggressors" (*agresori*) and "rebels" (*pobunjenici*). Most of the time, imprecise generalizing terms such as "aggression" (*agresija*), "armed aggression" (*oružana agresija*), "warlike power" (*vojna sila*), "terror" (*teror*), "political conspiracy" (*politička zavjera*), "riot" (*pobuna*), "occupation" (*okupacija*), "war terror" (*ratna straha*), "devastation" (*razarač*) and

“military coup” (*vojni udar*) are used. The actual actor remains undisclosed and in consequence anonymous. As such, both war opponent units: Serbian rebels and the JNA are seen as one war enemy. Only from 2012 on are the war opponents named more precisely.

In the speech from 2015, the JNA is exclusively named and described as the “former National Army” (*bivša savezna vojska*). In the speech from 2016, the JNA is described as the “so-called Yugoslav Army” (*takozvane jugoslavenske armije*). By preposing the attribute “so-called” (*takozvane*) the seriousness of the army is denied. At the same time, the speaker distances himself from political and military bodies of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. In this context it is important to mention that none of the analyzed speeches uses the terminology of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. It seems as if this part of the history was completely erased, or it shall not be connected to the ‘new chapter’ of the Croatian history. Both actors, the “great war machinery of the so-called Yugoslav Army” (*golema vojna mašinerija takozvane jugoslavenske armije*) as well as the “Great Serbian rebellious forces” (*velikosrpskih pobunjeničkih snaga*) are represented as a single war opponent that plans a military coup against the Republic of Croatia.

The attribute ‘Serbian’ (*srb-*) had been mentioned since 2012 in only four speeches. It is used mostly in the term “Great Serbian” (*veliko srpski*), in one speech in terms of “Serb-Chetnik” (*srbočetnik*) and of “paramilitary Serbian troops” (*paravojna srpska postrojba*).

Suočeni s velikosrpskom agresijom, svakodnevnim ubijanjima i progonima ljudi, nesmiljenim granatiranjem gradova, razaranjem kulturnih spomenika, crkava i bolnica (G12, l. 35–37)

Faced with the Great Serbian aggression, the daily killings and the displacement of people, with unhindered bombing of cities, the destruction of cultural monuments, churches and hospitals.

[...] *u žarište velikosrpske pobune protiv neovisne i demokratske hrvatske države* (G13, l. 19–21)

In the focus of Great Serbian rebellion against the independent and democratic Croatian state.

[...] *za oslobođenje vlastitog teritorija od velikosrpske agresije i okupacije* (G15, l. 75)

to free the own territory from Great Serbian aggression and occupation.

Nasuprot golemoj vojnoj mašineriji takozvane jugoslavenske armije i velikosrpskih pobunjeničkih snaga, nasuprot realnoj opasnosti od vojnog udara (G16, l. 22–23)

Croatia was confronted with the huge war machinery of the so-called Yugoslav Army and the Great Serbian rebellious forces, the real danger of a military strike.

Naše jedino oružje koje smo tada imali bilo je naša odlučnost i naša spremnost da sačuvamo i obranimo tek rođenu demokraciju, slobodu i državu. U teškim mjesecima silovite srbočetničke agresije na Hrvatsku koji su uslijedili, pokazalo se da je to bilo naše najjače oružje koje je svladavalo i tenkove i topove i avione (G16, l. 28–33)

Our single weapon we had was our determination and our willingness to preserve and to defend the just born democracy, freedom and our nation state. In the tough months of violent Serbo-Cethnik aggression against Croatia that followed, it turned out to be our most powerful weapon that was defeated tanks, guns and airplanes.

Oružja je bilo malo. Nedovoljno za sve koji su željeli bivšu saveznu vojsku i paravojne srpske postrojbe zaustaviti u razaranju i ubijanju, hrvatskih gradova i hrvatskih građana (G15, l. 46–48)

There were not many weapons. Insufficient for anyone who wanted to stop the former National Army and the paramilitary Serbian forces from destroying Croatian cities and killing Croatian citizens.

The term “Great Serbia” (*Velika Srbija*) describes the Serbian nationalist ideology which consists in the creation of a Serb state that would incorporate all regions which were of traditional significance to Serbs, including regions outside Serbia that are inhabited by Serbs. The notion is inspired by the large and powerful Serbian Empire that existed in 14th century Southeastern Europe prior to the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. Also, today, the ‘Great Serbian Idea’ is still pursued by some Serbian parties and groups, in particular by the far-right Serbian nationalist political party in Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS*), which was founded in 1991 by Vojislav Šešelj. Its party ideology is based on Serbian nationalism and the aim of creating the “Greater Serbia” (cf. Bakić 2009). By the late 1980s, it was again Vojislav Šešelj who organized the paramilitary Serbian Chetnik Movement⁷ (cf. Pavlaković 2005: 19) that represented the rebirth of Serbian nationalism as well as the resistance to the communist system (cf. Pavlaković 2005: 19). The linkage between the nomination “aggression” and “aggressors” and the predication “Great Serbian” and “Serbo-Chetnik” implies Serbian ultra-nationalism. The expressions emphasize the radicalism of the war enemy at the time and illustrate ‘the Other’ as fanatic.

7. The Chetnik movement has undergone multiple transformations since its foundation in 1904. Originally, it was established as a monarchist anti-occupation movement. During the Second World War, it took an exclusively anticommunist and increasingly Serbian nationalist character. Throughout the last war, Chetnik forces perpetrated numerous atrocities against non-Serb civilians in Croatia and Serbia (cf. Subotic 2015: 208).

Even if the war opponents are not explicitly named, they are explicitly described. While the Croatian defenders are described as brave, selfless and determined as already indicated in chapter 3.2, ‘the Others’ are portrayed as evil, cowardly and criminal.

[...] *zločinački i kukavički su raketirali naše gradove, ubijajući nedužne civile, te na taj način dokazali svoj zloćudan karakter* (G07, l. 42–44)

[...] criminally and cowardly they bombed our cities, killing innocent civilians and thus proved their evil character.

[...] *u početku kraja jedne zločinačke ideje i bezumne, agresivne politike koja je svima nama ostala duboko urezana u pamćenju, kao izvor zla i terora, kao simbol mržnje i nesnošljivosti* (G07, l. 16–19)

[...] at the beginning of the end of this criminal idea and foolish, aggressive politic that has remained deeply imprinted in our memory as a source of evil and terror, as a symbol of hatred and intolerance.

The positive self-portrayal is in clear contrast to the portrayal of the counter side. All expressions are implying a one-sided (mostly senseless) aggression. The fact that there had been encroachments from the Croatian side onto the Serbian population is not mentioned. While ‘the Others’ are described as aggressive and offensive, the ‘We-Group’ is described as passive and defensive. Fixed victim and aggressor roles are linguistically created by the use of passive and active constructions.

U to vrijeme Hrvatska je bila izložena nesmiljenoj agresiji” (G09, l. 26)

At that time, Croatia was exposed to a relentless aggression.

[...] *i suočeni s vojnom silom, koja je za sebe tvrdila da je nepobjeđiva* (G04, l. 28)

[...] and [Croatia] faced military force which itself claimed to be invincible.

This is the image that is construed within the analyzed speeches: The war was imposed on Croatia through the Serbian aggressions and there was no other option for the Croats than to defend themselves. The two strongest statements in context of the Croatian passivity which is closely connected to the positioning as a victim of the war are the following.

[...] *kao taoci jedne bezumne i agresivne politike, koja je pod geslom “etničkog okupljanja” sijala smrt i užas zemljama ovog dijela Europe* (G04, l. 30–32)

[...] as hostages of an unreasonable and aggressive politics which sowed death and terror under the slogan of ‘ethnic gathering’ in the countries of this part of Europe.

Hrvatska je bila napadnuta, izranjavana i osakaćena okupacijom (G16, l.40)

Croatia was attacked, wounded and crippled by occupation.

These phrases are passive constructions that include very strong images. In the first extract, Croatia is depicted as a hostage of the war opponents, a hostage of death and terror. Croatia is clearly described as a victim to unreasonable and aggressive

politics, completely innocent and passive. The second extract portrays Croatia as a body. The adjectives “wounded” (*izranjavana*) as well as “crippled” (*osakaćena*) only refer to a human body. Musolff, argues that the metaphor of a nation state as a human body has the following implications: “A nation state can be healthy or fall ill; when it is ill, it suffers from specific diseases (e.g. ‘cancer’, ‘tumour’) and needs therapy (e.g. ‘medicine of democracy’); the illness may be the effect of disease-carrying and -spreading agents, e.g. ‘parasites’ that live off the state’s body (‘feast on its blood’) until it is destroyed and ‘decomposed’” (Musolff 2012: 303). Here, the occupation of the Croatian territory is metaphorically compared to the severing of parts of the human body. Croatia was wounded and deformed by the aggressors.

5.3 Preliminary conclusions

In all analyzed speeches, we could notice two distinct discursive representations of Europe as an important social actor. Generally, the EU is seen as an inspiring model and the ‘We-Group’ is clearly located within the European community, since this was Croatia’s place from the very beginning. However, regarding political matters and dealing with the past, the EU is seen as an antagonist that endangers Croatian national interests. While the image of Europe and the European Union has changed over time, the representation of the war enemy has not changed in the twenty years after the war. The same rhetoric is used across the political spectrum when describing the war ‘aggressors’. The ‘We-Group’ is represented as uninvolved in the outbreak of the war and as the victim of ‘the Others’. Furthermore, we can observe a double victimhood in several speeches: Croatia was not only the victim of cruel war aggression, but of non-cooperative international politics as well.

6. Conclusions and discussion

In this article, the construals of the national Croatian identity, in particular the collective memory of the 1990s, has been under investigation through the selection of Croatian Homeland War commemorative speeches (2004–2016). It was concluded that the Croatian Homeland War is an important foundation event for the Croatian national state that is closely connected to the Croatian national identity. Therefore, the remembrance of the war can be seen as a way of permanently reconstructing of the national identity. Furthermore, we could show that the narration of the Homeland War is based on the ‘topos of victim’ and the notion that Croatia only defended itself in legal and legitimate military actions. The analysis showed that the construction of a national Croatian identity is based on the negative ascription

of 'the Others', making the Serbian Rebels and the JNA nameless, but clearly described enemies. The adversity for other ethnic groups, the Serbs in Croatia, is not mentioned in any of the analyzed speeches. The Serbian population in Croatia is not only physically but also linguistically excluded from the annual memorial events. Their destiny of emigration, displacement and loss of their homes are not officially remembered. The stories of 'the other victims' during the Homeland War in Croatia are excluded, which clearly proves that in Croatia there are no different versions of the past. Excluding 'the Others' makes political instrumentalization easier. Different versions of the past with parallel existent memories as well as the lack of consensus over the central meaning of remembrance decrease the possibility of political instrumentalization of history (cf. Kuljić 2010: 30). Following Jović, the exclusion of 'the Others' is one of the main problems of Croatian politics of memory and proves that the nationalistic-conservative narrative of the Homeland War is the dominant narrative in Croatia (cf. Jović 2012: 61–68). He claims that only the 'own' victims are recognized as such, not all victims (cf. Jović 2012: 61). This exclusion entails the danger of denying and downplaying the crimes committed on the Serbs during the war, and more importantly, the danger of accepting their displacement (cf. Wölfl 2013: 68).

As a conclusion, the commemorative speeches can be regarded as an annual ritual of selective and biased remembrance, being another example of unequal memorial discourse in former Yugoslav countries (cf. Bohnet et al. 2013: 7). This strongly biased memory is unsettling for two reasons: First, the biased official remembrance hinders a critical debate by imposing the representation of one's own past and the nationalistic-conservative narratives. Second, by foregrounding the Croatian victims and by holding back the Serbian victims, the public debate about the war past is at a standstill. The more the war is glorified in Croatia, the harder it is to approach the Serbian point of view and come to a perspective that both sides can accept (cf. Wölfl 2013: 70). In addition, a change of mentality in Croatian society seems unattainable when only this one version of the past is permanently brought to mind. As long as the Croatian government does not accept responsibility for the crimes during the 1990s and all victims are officially recognized as such, no government, regardless of political orientation, will find a new approach and a resolution of the 1990s wars.

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Appendix. List of analyzed speeches

- Speech 1 (G04): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Vladimir Šeks on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of military and police action 'Lightning' (*Bljesak*), Okučani, 1st of May 2004 (text-data).
- Speech 2 (G05): Speech of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Sanader on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of military and police action 'Lightning' (*Bljesak*), Okučani, 1st of May 2005 (audio-data).
- Speech 3 (G06): Speech of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Sanader on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Croatian military forces, Zagreb, 28th of May 2006 (audio-data).

- Speech 4 (G07): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Vladimir Šeks on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of military and police action 'Lightning' (*Bljesak*), Okučani, 1st of May 2007 (text-data).
- Speech 5 (G08): Speech of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Sanader on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of military and police action 'Lightning' (*Bljesak*), Okučani, 1st of May 2008 (audio-data).
- Speech 6 (G09): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Luka Bebić on the occasion of Croatian National Day, Vukovar, 25th of June 2009 (text-data).
- Speech 7 (G10): Speech of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Jadranka Kosor on the occasion of the 19th anniversary of the tragic execution of members of the police station in Dalj, Dalj, 1st of August 2010 (audio-data).
- Speech 8 (G11): Interview of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Jadranka Kosor during a wreath-laying ceremony at the Mirogoj cemetery on the occasion of the anniversary of international recognition of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 14th of January 2011 (audio-data).
- Speech 9 (G12): Speech of Vice Parliament Speaker Josip Leko on the occasion of Independence Day of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 8th of October 2012 (text-data).
- Speech 10 (G13): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Josip Leko on the occasion of 'Victory Day' (*Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti, Dan Hrvatskih Branitelja*) and the 18th anniversary of the military-police operation 'Storm' (*Oluja*), Knin, 5th of August 2013 (text-data).
- Speech 11 (G14): Speech of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Zoran Milanović on the occasion of 'Victory Day' (*Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti, Dan Hrvatskih Branitelja*) and the 19th anniversary of the military-police operation 'Storm' (*Oluja*), Knin, 5th of August 2014 (video-data).
- Speech 12 (G15): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Josip Leko on the occasion of the celebrative reception of 'Victory Day' (*Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti, Dan Hrvatskih Branitelja*) 20th anniversary of the military-police operation 'Storm' (*Oluja*), Gradec, Zagreb, 4th of August 2015 (text-data).
- Speech 13 (G16): Speech of the Croatian Parliament Speaker Željko Reiner on the occasion of the celebrative parliamentary session on the Croatian National Day, Zagreb, 25th of June 2016 (text-data).

Epistemes of contemporary nationhood

Narrations of the past, legitimations of the future

Danijela Majstorović

This chapter aims to map the configurations of dominant *epistemes* of the contemporary Serb nationhood in Republika Srpska (RS) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as truth claims in the current social hegemony founded on discourses legitimizing the 1992–1995 wars. By engaging in a combination of archeological-genealogical and a discourse historical approach to critical discourse analysis (DHA CDA), I analyze three types of elite discourses shaping the postwar cultural politics in Republika Srpska (RS): the poetic, the philosophical and political discourse. More specifically, I focus on the trope of *history repeating*, which, as an extended metaphor, also realizes its argumentative potential and becomes a *topos of history*, visible in the legitimation of the Srebrenica genocide preempting the potential Serb pogrom like the one in World War II, securing the epistemic warranty of contemporary Serb nationhood and providing a *raison d'être* for the Republika Srpska.

Keywords: regimes of truth, epistemes, topos of history, Serbhood, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

It is hard to summarize the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its aftermath but the contours for this chapter, which took four years to finalize, can be drawn around three mental images marking its inception in 2013 and end in late 2017. In September 2013, 19 years since the beginning of the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) discovered one of the largest mass graves from the Bosnian war, estimated to be the biggest one in Europe after WWII, hiding around 1000 bodies at Tomašica, in the Prijedor municipality. In 2016, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague sentenced the RS wartime president Radovan Karadžić to 40 years in prison and General Ratko Mladić to life imprisonment in November 2017. Both of them, among other charges, were

found guilty of genocide over the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

These new discoveries entered an environment marked by the legacy of crime and institutionalization of nationally exclusive rule which, after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement had secured peace in the country by granting legitimacy to the current, ethnonational political setup embodied in the two entities: the Federation of BiH (FBiH or Muslim-Croat Federation) and Republika Srpska (RS) and Brčko District. These entities act almost like two separate states and are run mostly by the new ethnonationalist elites who influence and control everything from the judiciary to culture and economy and distribute jobs based on political allegiances and nepotism. By giving political status only to three constitutive peoples, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, the Dayton Peace Agreement as a consociational constitution subordinates citizenship to ascribed ethnic group membership and uses the supposed protection of vital national interest as a wild card to either stir up or calm a crisis when necessary. Any change to Dayton is seen as politically disruptive to the current order and many would rather leave it intact.

The structural legacies of the war in BiH, including poverty, shattered economy, uncertainty, distrust and untrammled influence of politicians over the media and social life are still a far cry from becoming a cohesive factor for the citizens of BiH. Instead, they have become obstacles to reaching any consensus over the past especially in terms of guilt, responsibility and denial (Gordy 2013) in the most recent war in which the gap between the new rich elites and a vast majority of others only grew deeper. In addition, the accumulated institutional weaknesses visible in corruption and political clientelism and a set of established discriminatory practices in all aspects of public life, such as an exclusion of others, not just Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, from participating in the BiH political life¹ have also built barriers to popular understanding of the most recent war with little if any minimum consensus on the past.

Both entities of post-Dayton BiH act like independent states with irreconcilable discourses on what it means to be or act as a Serb, Bosniak, or Croat. In each ethnic space, a growing importance is attached to culturalized politics (Žižek 2007) and to emotions of loyalty, feeling at home, and belonging to a culture or a nation. Being a Serb today is enacted not just in rooting for the tennis player Novak Đoković, currently the most successful Serb figure in international sport, but also in saying

1. An example of this is visible in the so-called Sejdić-Finci case referring to a 2009 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights brought by Dervo Sejdić, a Roma activist, and Jakob Finci, a Jewish politician, who argued that the Bosnian constitution negotiated as part of Dayton was discriminatory because certain electoral posts could only be held by Serbs, Croats or Bosniak Muslims.

that no genocide against Bosniaks during the 1992–1995 war took place. Most people in private discussions will for the argument's sake often resort to history as a reminder of past atrocities, and any contrary opinion is most likely going to be dismissed as unpatriotic, traitor-like, and anti-Serb. These identitarian matrices being discursively constructed within the Serb ethnic culture conveniently legitimize the current post-socialist ethnopolitical order created upon the legacy of the 1992–1995 war, with all of its complexities, devastations and traumas.

The most recent war marked the transition from socialism to capitalism during which the social property and the self-management in Yugoslavia were abandoned and it also created ethnically cleansed territories after 1995 where previously BiH people had lived together. The Dayton agreement has granted legitimacy to the two-entity and three-people structure but has precluded any the possibility for citizens to be citizens, or workers, or anything rather than ethnic subjects (Pickering 2007; Mujkić 2011; Jovanović and Arsenijević 2011).

Our knowledge about the past is discursively constructed and is always established through power (Foucault 1981). Narrative interpretation is the primary form of knowing and telling (Munslow 2006) and only through narratives does a culture become interpretable. The official truth about the war is held by the ruling political elites who use the available media, including the public broadcaster Radio Television of Republika Srpska along with several private ones, and the academia as their mouthpieces in securing the dominant ethnopolitical order and the entity's sovereignty. The struggle for the RS entity's recognition and the more problematic recognition of an ethnically 'cleansed' space where Orthodox Christian folklore combined with Serb victimhood and self-righteousness "against the whole world" occupies a lot of symbolic space and airtime and has practically become a distinct cultural politics. The ethnic and religious identity of (Orthodox) Serbs has in fact become a cultural identity, one that has been constructed in distinction to Croatian (Catholic), Bosniak (Muslim), or Yugoslav (atheist) identities, against all three of which culture wars for social values are constantly being waged.

Crucial for the religious conversion in post-socialism following the Yugoslav breakup is the translation of the language of social critique to the language of cultural critique, or cultural ethnic difference (Buden 2012: 131).² The dominant epistemes in post-Dayton BiH and RS draw upon a rejection of modernity, both the Western capitalist and the Yugoslav socialist ones, which are substituted by the

2. This practice is also visible in the excavation of bodies from mass graves only for them to be compulsorily reburied according to religious rituals. This is another act of erasure – when all the victims of genocide are collectively Islamized (Monument Group 2009: 64), without reference to their relationships to religion before death, the ethnopoliticized and culturalized lives of dead bodies continue.

newly-found Serb Orthodox identity and tradition. Religious and ethnic justice (Mujkić 2010) thus temporarily become substitutes for social justice where, after modern communist secularization as an epoch when God was lost, “the (newly found) liberated god of postcommunism...returns from its epochal lostness as does a post-communist...to his true faith” (Buden 2012: 124).

The stereotype of the Balkans as “burdened with history” acts as one of the most dominant misinterpretations since historical discourses operated with in public are actually a set of disputable truth claims. Still, given that history, and a repeatedly violent one, is considered the key argument in explaining the 1992–1995 war, what is then its function in elite-produced mainstream public discourse and what kind of argumentation is used to this end? This chapter aims to map the configurations of dominant *epistemes* of contemporary Serb nationhood in the RS and BiH as truth claims in the current social hegemony founded on of the discourses legitimizing the 1992–1995 war. By engaging in a combination of archeological-genealogical (Foucault 1972) and a discourse historical approach to critical discourse analysis (DHA CDA), I analyse three types of elite discourses produced by the elites in RS – the poetic, the philosophical and the political to see how the past is narrated and future legitimated with respect to the Bosnian Serb identity in the most recent war and its aftermath.

What “genocide does”: Narrating a “repeatedly” violent history in the BiH context

In addition to the political and economic dimensions of the 1991–1995 Yugoslav conflict, the cultural dimension of this conflict, including history, myth and the past, is crucial for any inquiry on political violence and can help in conceptualizing distinctions between “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing” or “mass killings.” Duijzings (2007: 147) argues that Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia have different ways of “being in history”:

while perceptions of perpetual and/or repeated suffering and victimization in the past have been central to Serb mythology, Muslim memories remained rather inarticulate, and history was less of an ideological force than it was among the Serbs. During the first Yugoslavia, official memories were indeed predominantly ‘Serbian’ in outlook, meaning that Serbia’s role in the struggle for independence and the sacrifices it made towards the creation of Yugoslavia were emphasized.

With Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) collapsing and amidst the raging civil war, the strong media propaganda in BiH only fueled the atmosphere of tensions between created in-groups and out-groups and as the preconditions for

genocide as an aggregate of convenience, revenge and fear (Chirot and McCauley 2006). Civilians were easily constructed by the military and political elites as enemies- in fact, for the genocide in Srebrenica to become possible, the figure of the ‘Muslim-Islamic fundamentalist’, an out-group non-existent in the pre-genocide society of BiH, had to be created (Monument Group 2009),³ and this was the task of the elites. A particular repertoire of myths and fears were mobilized to produce this enemy, just as particular strategies, from silence to minimization, are now used to undermine or deny the result of the Serb politics and actions in the 1990s. One of the major arguments in the Serb public discourse is that no genocide happened in Srebrenica, Prijedor and other municipalities,⁴ and that the civil war was in fact pre-emptive echoing Semelin’s argument of the “actors destroying ‘them’ in order to save ‘us’” (Semelin 2007).

The public discourse of ‘history repeating itself’ gained a lot of popular traction, which also spilled into the private sphere. Relying on common conventions for productive and receptive consciousness for chaining individual texts into finite and coherent wholes (Moranjak-Bamburać 1991: 34), the emerging public discourse justifying the new war, produced mostly by the elites and the media, gave rise to similar justifications of the war in the private sphere as well. Perceived threat of mass killings among the general population strongly resonated during my family gatherings in the eve of the 1992–1995 war as I remember my father saying “the Serbs were not just to willingly lay their heads on the tree trunks like they did in the past war.” As a thirteen-year old in the early 1990s, I recollect the oft-repeated legitimations for this new war at my aunt and uncle’s house stating how “Garavice⁵ should never happen again.” My male family members including my father were born ten or even twenty years after WWII and to them what happened at Garavice and particularly around Kulen Vakuf, the area where he was born, was told second-hand by their family members who remembered the Ustasha violence committed against the Serbs of that region in the summer of 1941 (see Bergholz 2016). It was a narrative of history that became mobilizable in the eve of SFRY’s collapse and every part of Bosnia

3. See more in *Mathemes of Reassociation: Towards the Matheme of Genocide*, *Monument Group* 2009 available at <http://grupaspomenik.wordpress.com/mathemes-of-re-association/towards-the-matheme-of-genocide/>.

4. On July 11, 2013, the Tribunal’s Appeal Chamber reversed the acquittal on Count 1 in the indictment against Radovan Karadžić, who had been charged with genocide in seven municipalities in BiH – Bratunac, Foča, Ključ, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Zvornik.

5. Garavice is a graveyard and an extermination location established by the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II near my hometown of Bihać where over 12 000 Serbs, Jews and Roma civilians were murdered in 1941 at the beginning of WWII, <http://www.jadovno.com/garavice.html>. See more in Dedijer 1992.

had its own Garavice or a similar locality of brutality in near or distant history (see Duijzings in Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007).

“Invocation of larger set of ethnically targeted mass killings...as part of the late 1980s and early 1990s nationalist political mobilization of Serbs in hostility to Croats and Muslims” (Hayden 2013: 138) was part and parcel of a strong, media fuelled moral panic (Cohen 1972) of the early 1990s that “history would repeat” and that Serbs would be exterminated by Croats and their Muslim accomplices like it happened in the Independent State of Croatia⁶ (ISC) (Dedijer 1992; Denitch 1994: 368; Dulić 2005; Yeomans 2012). Interestingly, this fear of a repetition of the extermination of Serbs, as carried out by the ISC in 1941–5, existed even though ethnicized victims and atrocities against specific ethnic populations had not been part of an official master narrative in SFRY. Instead, victims of ethnicized violence were represented as general victims of German and local fascists (Gašić 2010) and her analysis of Serbian history textbooks in the 1990s reveals that past and present were connected in a way that suggested the “inevitability” of these developments, with an ongoing war as a “longue durée” phenomenon in post-Yugoslav Serbia (Ibid.).

Although the preconditions for a conflict like the war in BiH between 1992 and 1995 existed, nobody at the beginning of 1992 could have foreseen the estimated death toll of 95 940, of whom more than 38 239 were civilians (31107 Bosniaks, 4178 Serbs, 2484 Croats and 470 others) (Tokača 2012). The post World War II motto regarding the mass killings and genocide against Serbs, Jews and Roma being ‘never again’, it was striking that during the latest war in BiH the greatest number of atrocities against both civilians and military members, mostly Muslim (Bosniak) were committed at the hand of the Serbs (Tokača 2012; Zwierzchowski and Tabeau 2010; Denitch 1994).

Genocide is inevitably linked to a war, particularly a civil war. The Balkan conflicts, including the 1992–1995 war in BiH, have been so well researched and documented by means of various political, economic and cultural accounts.⁷ Since the late 1980s and by the time of independence referendum for BiH⁸ to secede from Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s subsequent international recognition, the political preconditions for the war over the territories were ready. Discursively, the rest of the job was done through narrativized fictitious othering of former neighbors

6. The Independent State of expanded beyond Croatia’s existing boundaries as a republic to include Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.

7. The list is rather extensive (Žanić 2007; Lowinger 2010; Wachtel 1998; Magaš et al. 2001).

8. The referendum was held on 29 February-1 March 1992 According to the 1991 census in BiH, there were 43.47% Muslims, 31.21% Serbs, 17.38% Croats, 5.54% Yugoslavs, and 2.4% Others. The referendum was held on 29 February-1 March 1992 and most Serbs boycotted it.

supported by belligerent rhetoric at political rallies and religious gatherings and war-time media propaganda (Žanić 2007), and, I would also add, academic/university discourse. Unfortunately this practice continues even twenty odd years after 1995.

Recent literature on genocide combines the strategic or rationalist approach with the ideological approach giving a few more useful insights (Straus 2012; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Semelin 2007). According to the strategic approach, strategies of violence were developed in response to real and perceived threats to the maintenance of political power, because genocide primarily occurs in the context of an armed conflict or civil war (Ulfelder and Valentino 2008). The ideological paradigm (Straus 2012) in studying genocide sees ideology as the binding agent that has connected security fears, identity, and quests for purity the involving destruction of others to save one's own community (Semelin 2007). The model of explaining genocide as a matter of premeditation leading to intention regards genocide as a dynamic phenomenon and suggests that it is rarely the first choice of a political leadership. Instead, genocide is an event that emerges over time in response to leaders' own past failures, developing events, and their opponents' actions (Straus 2012).

The history of fifty odd years between a magnitude of the casualties of 300 000 of mostly Serbs in WWII and the one of 100 000 of mostly Bosnian Muslims during the 1992–1995 war (Hayden 2013: 139) is too short not to be taking these facts lightly. In both conflicts, the casualties were the results of organized attempts to remove the targeted populations from part of the territory in which they and their ancestors were living (Ibid.) and Hayden, risking to be called a “genocide denier”, questions whether or not the application of the terms “genocide” “aids or distorts our understanding of them” (Ibid.).

Genocide has become what Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 118) call the ‘order-word’, bringing or implying a death sentence. Besides its finality in a death sentence or verdict, every order-word also contains ‘a warning cry, or a message to flee’, with flight and death ‘enunciated simultaneously’ (Ibid. 118). So, while order-words bring immediate death sentence to those who receive the order, in the RS recognition of the Srebrenica, genocide is seen as a death sentence, and (if it is even announced at all) something irreconcilable with the entity structure, despite its international recognition since 1995. Another option, usually pandering to populist sentiments, is to flee from the order-word, denying that genocide has ever happened. The denial does not cancel genocide; on the contrary, it perpetuates it.

The option to use or not of the word “genocide” to account for it is irrelevant unless there is a public arena in which genuine mourning, commemoration, recognition, local judicial acknowledgement and empathy of our mutually troublesome past and wrongdoings can be expressed. Whether one but several “genocides” happened or did not happen should not be used to justify that most people in the RS

today either dismiss the official statistics and ICTY verdicts of genocide or consider them legitimate “preemptive military action” on the part of Serbs in Bosnia to prevent a feared genocide at the hands of the Croats and Bosniaks (Mojzes 2011: 141). In this endless tit for tat, Garavice/Srebrenica proverbially keeps happening.

Regardless of accepting that atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb military amount to genocide or not, Serbs in BiH will at some point have to come to terms with the vast number of killed Bosniak civilians in the last war just as most Bosniaks will have to accept that vast Serb casualties during WWII if there is ever to be a lasting peace. I argue that very few people in BiH have a full understanding of the scale, logistics, and the details of the mass atrocities that happened during the last war since it was not in the interest of post-1995 mainstream political or cultural BiH elites regardless of their ethnic background. Instead they wanted to secure their rule in ethnically cleansed territories in the country ravaged by the civil war from within, aided by Serbia and Croatia from without along with the ambivalent role of the international community’s peace keeping forces (see Delpla, Bougarel and Fournel 2012) along with the Dayton Agreement that cemented the war.

Scholars of different conflicts have extensively discussed what a genocide, as an intended act of elimination of an entire population, *is* and how it can be defined, legally, empirically, or theoretically (see Hayden 2013). With respect to the BiH context where I have lived for the most part of my life, I am, however, more interested in what genocide or its denial *does* being discursively woven in the epistemes of nationhood and what the implications of these discourses and politics for coming to terms with difficult past are.

Discourse analysis as a method for cultural research: The “history repeating” trope and its epistemes

The aim to account for the totality of social discourse by “connecting the literary, scientific, philosophical and political fields...to extrapolate transdiscursive rules, to discover vectors of change and to set up a global topology of the prevailing sayable” (Angebot 1995: 3) sets ground for a discourse analysis as a method that “studies and generates differential cultural relations” (Leps 2004: 264). Yet the selection of genres of discourse for analysis in order to find some regularities is necessarily flawed with respect to the scope of discourse. The discourse analysis employed here works with a version of critical discourse analysis that seeks to uncover tropes as grounds for epistemes and is committed to social change. It is an eclectic hybrid version of a discourse historical (DHA CDA) and Foucauldian discourse analysis because it does not only analyse selected discourses but also the underlying cultural and political relations.

Within a discursive formation there are always limits to what is sayable or thinkable (Foucault 1972) as well as how narratives are configured. Time becomes human time only then, when it is organized as a narrative (Ricoeur 1984), which, in turn, is meaningful, to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience as a vehicle for historical explanation and also culturalization. In other words, history cannot exist but in a narrative (Ibid. 3), which becomes meaningful only when circulated within a culture. Yet a caveat should be made here that despite a basic continuity or correspondence between history as it is lived (the past) and history as it is written (narrated) and these are not the same (Munslow 2006).

Narratives easily become mobilized in the process of culturalization as traditions are often invented and reinvented (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) to secure a certain group's social dominance. In this way, culture as a set of shared meanings enables people to understand and communicate with each other (Hall 1997) and is indispensable for securing public understanding but also consensus about a certain matter. In addition from circulating the narratives, material culture including arts, humanities, science and architecture reflect particular national or ethnonational cultural policies. Illustrative examples of this in the Federation of BiH are the Saudi style mosques financed by Saudi money, the banning of alcohol consumption in the vicinity of educational and religious institutions during Ramadan or the expulsion of Santa Claus from Sarajevo in 2008. In Republika Srpska, Andrićgrad in the town of Višegrad was built in 2011 to commemorate the city where the Nobel-prize winner Ivo Andrić's *Bridge on the Drina* is located as 'the repository of the Serbian culture', according to film director Emir Kusturica.⁹

White (1978) thought of historical writing to be influenced by literary writing in many ways, sharing the strong reliance on narrative for meaning, so that it eliminated the very possibility of objective or truly scientific history. In his opinion, any historiographical analysis rests on different interpretative strategies that are connected to modes of ideological implication (White 1978: 70) whereby "history need not correspond to what happened in the past as there is no continuity between lived experience and its narrative representation" (Ibid.). Reversely, a past need not correspond to any particular history but can and often is projected onto a future through a set of expectations (Ricoeur 1994). These expectations are analogous to the memory consisting of an image that already exists and preceding the event that does not exist yet (Ibid.). This image, which is structured as a myth, is, according to Ricoeur (Ibid.) a "sign" and a "cause" of future things which are anticipated, foreseen, foretold, predicted, proclaimed beforehand. "Myths are a type of memory

9. Kusturica now owns a 51% share in Andrićgrad, which was financed from the Republika Srpska budget to the amount of close to 20 million Bosnian Marks (BAM) following his creative vision <http://zurnal.ba/novost/17856/tv-zurnal-prikazuje-pogledajte-film-na-drini-kusturica>

and there is no certainty in memory. Where memories disagree there is often no way to settle the argument...memory tends to color the things it holds” (Viet-Wild 1992: 370). As Kolstø (2009) argues, myths do not function on their own: it is people who employ myths, in more or less harmful ways.

The “history repeating” trope is often invoked when describing the Balkans, most often in the shape of the “ancient hatred” or “powder keg” metaphor. Phrases like “those who do not learn history are doomed to repeat it” or “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” are also common topoi that underlie these tropes. A *tropes* or “commonplace” is a semi-logical, semi-ideological proposition, recognized as *probable* by a social formation, which serves to ground various arguments (Leps 2004: 283). There is a connection between what Ruth Wodak et al. (2009) call *tropes of history*, as an argumentative strategy in legitimating the past and projecting it onto the future in which we must learn and remember revealing the tropic, and also ideological, character of history itself. Instead of establishing some sort of positivistic knowledge aiming to arrive at a ‘historical truth’, this chapter rather seeks to look into what Foucault calls regimes of truth, or truth effects. These are reflected in the “history repeating” trope and legitimized through the topoi that if something is not done about the repeating history, the history will continue to repeat.

Such “truths” are further linked to statements of power, i.e. a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operations of statements (Foucault 1981). In the dispensation of power, what counts as knowledge for a culture in each age is brought alive through epistemes embedded in figurative language use producing truth effects. Every episteme then entails creation, distribution and policing the knowledge through different capillaries.

Episteme...is something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape – a great body of legislation written once and for all by some anonymous hand.
(Foucault 1972: 191)

The interpretation of culture is possible with reference to its ascendant tropic pre-figurations while tropes organize deep structures of human thought (White 1978). From a cultural studies perspective, it is therefore necessary to examine representational and ideological status of both tropes and topoi (Wodak et al. 2009) across discourses. To understand these truth claims or epistemes, we need to look into tropes as the foundations for all historical analysis/figurative structure, representational modes, metaphor-signification and resignification. Aside from tropes as figurative language use, there are also topoi or argumentation strategies defined as “as reservoirs of generalized key ideas from which specific statements or arguments

can be generated” (Richardson 2004: 230) or content-related warrants securing the transition from an argument to a conclusion (Žagar 2009). Most characteristic topoi in political communication have taken the form of mitigation, legitimation, or the representation of a positive self against a negative other (Chilton 2004).

The connection between tropes and topoi has previously been explored in pragmatics in the sense of metaphors fulfilling argumentative functions especially when speakers try to convey the legitimacy of their claims (Oswald and Rihs 2014; Chilton 2005). “Extended metaphors may even be used to provide evidence for the truth of a claim – with the provision of an enabling context” and when “perceived as relevant can also contribute to the long-term stabilisation of a given representation of the world, to the extent that they may be shown as faithful and accurate descriptions” (Oswald and Rihs 2014: 143–144) delivering under the right social conditions “some kind of credibility assurance and epistemic warrant” (Chilton 2005: 40).

In this sense the extended metaphor of repeating history can act “as one of argumentative confirmation of relevance with epistemic implications; if every mapped conceptual property is found relevant, chances are that this will also count as a justification of the overall extended metaphor’s relevance...and...as an attempt to convince the addressee, in light of a complex correspondence matrix, that the proposed construal can in fact be taken as literal” (Oswald and Rihs 2014: 145). While this is especially true for the political discourse, which is not analyzed here, the poetic, philosophical and literary discourses also become political when they culturalize politics by representing it as “naturalized/neutralized “cultural” differences, different “ways of life,” which are given and unchangeable and therefore cannot be overcome” (Žižek 2007).

The network of capillaries producing epistemes in the mainstream public discourse in RS after the 1992–1995 war is vast, and as such a methodological challenge. Investigating some epistemes produced by several prominent Banja Luka scholars and intellectuals, and their underlying tropic and topic structure and how these have resulted in solidifying the collective Serb identity in postwar BiH can at least begin a critical discourse analysis of these important themes, which have gone unnoticed both by local and Western academia for quite some time.

Data

The three texts under analysis make ample use of tropes and topoi that delineate what it culturally means to be a Serb in Republika Srpska after 1995, or the so-called Serb point of view, in relation to:

- a. Orthodox Serb history and “heroic geography” visible in the poetic discourse of poet Rajko Nogo;
- b. transitional justice and the ICTY in The Hague (which is compared to Auschwitz), visible in the philosophical discourse of a notable RS philosopher, Professor Zoran Arsović; and
- c. the threat that Serbs will lose their national identity and that Muslims will carry out a pogrom against them, visible in the culturalized politics discourse of the late Nikola Koljević (an English scholar and university professor, but also vice-president of Republika Srpska between 1992 and 1996), which has been discussed by Assistant professor of political science from Banja Luka, Aleksandar Vranješ.

Krajina vol. 33–34¹⁰ came out as a double issue in the spring/summer of 2010 right before the general elections that took place in October, 2010. Its editorial board consisted of four males: three literature and one philosophy professor. At first glance, the journal has an alarmingly scarce female authorship and unambiguously reflects an unwavering nationalist and patriarchal politics. For instance, it excludes pressing issues such as transitional poverty and class discrepancy in post-socialism and gives precedence to national topics and to themes mainly related to the Serb national identity. These include a wide range of opinion pieces and articles on religion and the return to the Church; despise of the Hague tribunal and some unnamed anti-Serb lobbyists; in memoriams to two dead (male) writers and one pro-Milošević philosopher. Furthermore, they include a selection of poems, which mostly express national dreams of union of all Serbs, praise Serb Orthodox saints, criticize Europeanization and mondialism, describe Serbian politicians as ‘whores’ for betraying Greater Serbia in return for EU membership and state that Hitler is ‘in Washington’.

Looking for the holy grail of nationhood: The poetic discourse

The poem “Rajko’s Tombstone”¹¹ (“Rajkov kamen”) was written by Rajko Petrov Nogo, a Bosnian Serb poet and a long-standing friend of Radovan Karadžić and a member of the Committee for the Truth about Radovan Karadžić,¹² founded

10. <http://www.artprintbl.com/izdavastvo/krajina/57-krajina-broj-33>, *Krajina*, Vol.33, p. 27)

11. All translations are mine.

12. According to Sonja Biserko “almost the entire legal community – notably the people from the Law School – is included in the defense of Radovan Karadžić. And most of them are involved in the Šešelj case as well...Through a variety of pleas the team has managed so far to postpone

on 8th November, 2001 at the Yugoslav Ministry of Justice. The poem manages to compress a span of over 600 years by referring to specific geographic locations and their corresponding historical events in order to locate the chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) of Serb nationhood:

Rajkov kamen
 Priča se a ima i u knjigama
 O Rajkovom kamenu kod Nevesinja
 Pitao sam R. Popovića zna li
 Za Mijatovce i Kalaufe
 Bio si gdje je Vlatko pričestio vojsku
 Eto odatle kreni na Kosovo
 A od Kosova ako pretekneš uz Primorje
 Put ti je pesma označila
 Tako ti se ranjeni imenjaka vraćao
 I pod krstat kamen legao
 Gledan je R. Popović i razborit
 I vičan junačkom zemljopisu
 U Mijatovce se ne ide prečice

They speak, and even write in books
 Of Rajko's tombstone near Nevesinje
 I asked R. Popović¹³ if he knew
 Of Mijatovci and Kalaufi
 You were where Vlatko blessed the army
 So, from there, go on to Kosovo
 And from Kosovo, if there is time, to the coast
 Your road has been marked by poems
 So did your wounded namesake return
 And under the cross-like stone lay down
 Respected is R. Popović and sensible
 And skillful in heroic geography
 You don't take shortcuts to Mijatovci

opening of the trial of Karadžić. It spent most of its energy on the alleged deal between Holbrooke and Karadžić, which is, even if true, irrelevant for the trial. A website at www.karadzic-odbrana.com has also been launched to "explain" the background of the Bosnian war, disintegration of Yugoslavia and the like. However, it carries no names of persons engaged on the defense team. On the other hand, the Committee for the Truth about Radovan Karadžić, presided by Kosta Čavoški, has been compiling and processing documentation for Karadžić's defense for years now (Biserko 2009). See more at <http://pescanik.net/crime-and-punishment/>.

13. A professor of Serbian literature at the Faculty of Philology and a member of *Krajina's* editorial board.

The poem's narrator is asking how to get to Mijatovci and Kalaufi, historical necropolis sites in Herzegovina from the 15th and 16th century. He continues with a direct speech and a sphinxlike response of his interlocutor, R. Popović. Popović gives the first cue by responding "you know where Vlatko blessed the army", referring to Vlatko Vuković Kosača¹⁴ and the Battle of Kosovo. He advises the poet to go to the coast, where poems will mystically guide him as signposts along the road. He finishes by hinting where the grave may be, comparing Rajko-the-poet to his namesake by way of "so" and "return". The poet realizes there is no shortcut to Mijatovci due to its constructed historical paramountcy. The truth of Serb nationhood is buried, but can be recovered by not taking shortcuts through history.

Where did Rajko return from to lie down under the cross-like stone? It cannot have been the Battle of Kosovo, because that happened over a hundred years before the tombstone is estimated to have been erected.¹⁵ Does its cross-like shape signify just Christianity, or Orthodox Christianity in particular, and why were these poetic images brought into connection? Until the late 18th century and the early 19th century, the European population identified themselves mostly with the local region and religious community' (Altermatt 1996: 32). It is therefore 'scientifically unfounded to call 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th century Catholic or Orthodox people from Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and so on 'Croats' or 'Serbs' when their corresponding nations had not yet been formed (Kordić 2010: 196).

It is never been the task of poetry to present truthful facts, and yet there is somehow always more truth in fiction and in history. The truth in this poem is not relevant; what is relevant is the seamless connection of the tissue that makes the Serbian national being, a premodern myth-based narrative of 14th century religion anachronistically naturalized and projected onto a modern 19th century concept of a nation. Even though neither national identity nor culture has a historical continuity, these categories are constructed in poetry and are 'made natural' into a larger chronotope in which Serbhood throughout the history remains a spatial and temporal constant. This obfuscates the scientific data telling us that nation is constructed through ideology and private interest of political elites (Anderson 2006; Kordić 2010: 206). In the same way, the 'heroic geography' presented by R. Popović in the poem and its mystic longitudes and latitudes connect historical periods and

14. Vlatko Vuković was a 14th-century Bosnian duke and one of the best military commanders of King Tvrtko I of Bosnia. Vlatko joined Prince Lazar against the Ottomans in the Battle of Kosovo, in which Serb national identity finds one of the greatest myths and a foundation stone for its history. See Emmert, Thomas Allan (1991). "The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat". *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

15. See the Decision on the Designation of the Historic site of the necropolis with *stećak* tombstones of Rajkov kamen in Mijatovci as a National Monument of Bosnia and Herzegovina http://kons.gov.ba/main.php?id_struct=50&lang=4&action=view&id=2407.

events through persons in order to reconstruct an artificial yet naturalized continuum for the Serb identity, a genealogy of Serbhood that connects Vlatko Kosača, Prince Lazar, R. Popović-the-professor, Rajko buried under the cross-like-stone, and Rajko-the-poet, the friend of Radovan Karadžić.

Reading Agamben and genocide: The philosophical discourse

Zoran Arsović's philosophical piece "Remnants of the Hague" ("Ono što nakon Haga ostaje")¹⁶ in the same issue of *Krajina*, bears a striking similarity to Agamben's (2002) "Remnants of Auschwitz."¹⁷ Despite his claim that "knowing of Auschwitz" and of the Hague escapes as we will never be able to know,¹⁸ in the piece he conveys a similar desire for knowing, understanding and grasping of what happened in Auschwitz or the Hague.

The piece can be read as a superficial critique of postmodernism (constructionism, poststructuralism) and the Americanization of Europe, to which Arsović juxtaposes a version of structuralism (essentialism) and traditionalism ("our ancestors left us more than we can take" ("jer dadoše više no što možemo primiti"). However, he also introduces some poststructuralist notions such as Foucauldian 'truth procedures',¹⁹ presupposing that truth still has to be revealed and that the ICTY should give way to the court of history, and the Deleuzian war-machine,²⁰ which he equates with NATO. If what remains of Auschwitz is so horrible that it is untellable and unknowable, after the Hague Tribunal, there is no knowledge that can be known and it cannot be known due to the discourse/power embodied in the Tribunal (Arsović 2010: 17)

16. The original text in Serbian is given in the brackets for shorter and in the footnotes for longer citations.

17. A little context is required here: reading Agamben with respect to the role of witness and archive took place in an informal reading group assembling scholars, students, and activists at the University of Banja Luka in the spring of 2010. One of the professors who attended the reading and led the first couple of sessions was Zoran Arsović, who a few months earlier published "Remnants of the Hague"¹⁷ (Arsović 2010: 5–25)

18. Hannah Arendt voiced a similar existential experience when she was asked about her first reactions upon hearing about Auschwitz: "Something happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves. None of us can."

19. "Šta ostaje od događaja kad uđe u procedure političkog, tj. kad uđe u politiku kao procedure istine"? (Arsović 2010: 6).

20. Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004) is not explicitly quoted here but only some of its concepts. Also see Deleuze and Guattari's *Wormwood Distribution* – Seattle, WA 2010.

It is obvious that the whole truth of the war has been put in the hands of the ICTY. By processing crimes, it simultaneously gives, issues (creates) truths about the war. Hence, it is the ICTY that establishes the truth, it institutionalizes it-. This institution of truth has become a Balkan dogma.²¹

Arsović builds a philosophical argument that combines perceptions of contemporary currents in philosophy and a particular image of Europe in which he sees the Balkans as a 'lack', a 'figure of war' and a 'European Other' kept at bay during long periods of exclusion. The Balkans is a silent subject that cannot speak, for its ability to speak is defined by various truths. "As the task of the truth is to account for its procedure," he moves on to the process of deconstruction or "unknotting of truth procedures."²² This means "asking what is Good for the Balkans"²³ begging for the so-called European democratic values that have been working together by Capital in "the postmodernist feast" (*postmodernističko pirovanje*) in a history that is not aware of its past but is "only for the day" (*istorija od danas do sutra*) (2011:11–12) and the result of it is the recomposition of the Balkans, which represents for him a "history of rape" (*istorija silovanja*).

Democracy is ill, it devours itself up (it is autoimmune). Not only does it speak about it itself but it also shows it by protecting itself by all means even the undemocratic ones...No..., democracy is not coming because it does not know how. Its connection with Capital is much deeper than its evangelists can fathom. While it threw bombs, it aptly kept silent about its connection with business, oppression and hatred. It is still silent today. (Ibid.)²⁴

In "unknotting the truth procedures," Arsović attempts to demystify myths about the Balkans by pointing to their 'misleading character', while invoking the Socratic *eunoia elenchus* (the good-willed refutation). He says that hatred and fear alone cannot move the war machinery, for "nobody's shooting today" and because "the capacity of hatred and mistrust have diminished." Neither is ethnonationalism the

21. Očigledno je da je sva istina rata stavljena u ruke međunarodnog Tribunala pravde. Procesuirajući zločine on istovremeno daje, ispostavlja (stvara) istine o ratu. Dakle, sud utvđuje istinu, ustanovljuje je. Ova ustanova istine postala je Balkanska dogma.

22. "Kad se kaže "ući u čvor" ne očekujemo nagla rasplitanja" (Arsović 2011: 7). "When we say, "enter the knot", we do not expect abrupt unknotting." Still, I used the word "unknot" here.

23. "Tražiti dobro za Balkan."

24. Demokratija je oboljela, ona samu sebe razjeda (autoimuna je). Ne samo da ona sama to govori, već i pokazuje štiteći se diljem svijeta svim sredstvima, pa i onim nedemokratskim... Ne..., demokratija neće doći, jer i ne umije da dolazi. Sprega sa Kapitalom je mnogo dublja nego to njeni evangelisti mogu da misle. Dok je puštala bombe vješto je ćutala o svojim vezama sa biznisom, tlačenjem i mržnjom. I danas ćuti.

reason for war because “neither the Croats, nor the Serbs, nor the Muslims” own the land any more. If they do, “they just want to sell it” to which Arsović retorts with “didn’t it all used to be ours?”²⁵ His Socratic method of posing an answer to get to the truth could be read as a critique of post-socialism for everything belonged to the workers in the socialist state-managed Yugoslav economy but “the “we” in “ours” remains rather vague.

Arsović’s main key attempt is to deconstruct the presumed myths of the Balkans, including the ancient hatred discourse, and ascribing what is going on to the international community meddling because the hatred in the Balkans seems to persist unlike in other contexts such as the French or German:

And can the hatred among a Serb and a Muslim, a Muslim and a Croat, a Croat and a Serb be different than the one between a German and a French, an Englishman and a French? Hatred is one, either there is hatred or there is not, it can neither be smaller nor different. Different are only the conditions in which it becomes efficient. And the space for hatred was carefully tended by the big powers.

(Arsović 2010: 16)²⁶

In his analysis of the origin of the 1992–1995 war, he starts with “the “favourite” thesis on Milošević and the totalitarian regime as the only culprit for the latest war” (Arsović 2010: 15) in which Serbia’s wartime president and a former ICTY indictee, and JNA (Yugoslav National Army) led the aggression on Slovenia, Croatia and BiH. “The stigma thrown on Milošević is the stigma thrown on Serbia” (“Stigma bačena na Miloševića, ustvari je stigma bačena na Srbiju”) (Ibid.). “The war,” says Arsović, “did not start because of the attacks of the JNA but because of the attacks against the JNA, which was the army of an internationally recognized country (SFR Yugoslavia), which in any other circumstances would be “classified as terrorism.” “Aggression” and “war of defense” were suitable words to cover up the true nature of the war,” which, in his words, “was a civil war” (*građanski rat*) led to justify “the illegitimate and forceful secession of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH” (Ibid.). The true nature of the war, according to him, was a desire of the international community to recompose the Balkans and this desire moved the war machine that was “signed and

25. Evo, rat je prošao, a ko je zemlju uzeo? Nemaju je, i to je očigledno, ni Hrvati ni Srbi, ni Muslimani. Ili je imaju, ali samo na jedan način – ako je prodaju. Zna se ko prodaje (jednakom silinom i potpuno « združeni na zadatku » i demokrate i etnonacionalisti) i kome se prodaje. Onom što prodaje dosta, onom kome se prodaje mnogoviše, a nama uvijek ništa. A nije li sve bilo « naše »? Računica je jasna.

26. I može li mržnja između Srbina i Muslimana, Muslimana i Hrvata, Hrvata i Srbina, biti drugačija od one između Nijemca i Francuza, Engleza i Francuza? Mržnja je jedna, ima je ili je nema, ne može biti ni veća ni manja, niti drugačija. Drugačiji su samo uslovi u kojima ona postaje dejstvena. A prostor mržnje otvarale su i brižno uzgajale velike sile.

sealed by the NATO bombing in 1999,” when the Hague Tribunal needed Serbia as the villain (Ibid. 15–16).

“All the war truth has been put in the hands of the ICTY” (“(Očigledno je da je) sva istina o ratu stavljena u ruke međunarodnog Tribunala pravde”) says Arsović, and anyone who disagrees is seen as a “beast” (*zvijer*) and a “supporter of war criminals” (Arsović 2010: 17). He allows the possibility for anyone including himself to change and transform under the circumstances of the good-willed refutation, which is the precondition for a dialogue. Yet there is no good will, the “ICTY is an insult to the European values” (Arsović 2010: 18) and “a servant to the interest of imperial armies” (Badiou 2006 in Arsović 2010) proceeding then to the “paradigmatic” case of the Serbian Parliament’s adoption of the Srebrenica resolution:

The Hague is an insult to that dignity. Regardless of how much power is at stake there, it cannot under any circumstances become a European value. Except in the politicians and our people’s heads. And if they were asked why is that so? – they would repeat the scene from the Socrates’ dialogues. The answer would be a formulaic political message, some media pamphlet that no one understands. But in contrast to Socrates’ interlocutors who become paralyzed or perplexed due to their ignorance, tailor-made democrats cannot be perplexed under any circumstances. On the contrary, their ignorance activates them even more to start waving with ready-made truths. Paradigmatic here is the havoc on the adoption of the Srebrenica declaration in the Serbian parliament. Let us for a moment accept that animal reactions, more specifically those of an ape, appear as a result of different animal training strategies and are used to cheer circus audiences. If we term those reactions monkey business, then we get a very appropriate word for the behavior of the ruling coalition in the Serbian Parliament (except that it made no one cheerful). They received an impulse from the outside (a trainer’s incentive) and the reaction happened. (Arsović 2010: 18)²⁷

This part of Arsović’s critique is slippery mostly due to his presuppositions of ignorance and misunderstanding as well as “waving with ready-made truths” on the part

27. Hag je uvreda nanijeta tom dostojanstvu. Bez obzira koliki je tu zalag moći, on se ne može nikako prometnuti u evropsku vrijednost. Osim u glavama političara i našeg puka. A kad bi ih pitali zašto je tako? – ponovila bi se scena iz sokratskih dijaloga. Odgovor bi bio neka naviknuta politička formula, neki medijski pamflet pod kojim niko ne zna šta se stvarno misli. Ali za razliku od Sokratovih sagovornika, koji se usljed sopstvenog neznanja ukoče ili zbune, skrojene « demokrate » se ne daju ničim zbuniti. Naprotiv, njih neznanje aktivira da se još silnije i jače trse (pušu, duvaju) gotovim istinama. Kao paradigma mogla bi da služi ujdurma oko usvajanja deklaracije o Srebrenici u parlamentu Srbije. Ako pristanemo da reakcije životinje, konkretno majmuna, koje nastaju usljed dejstva raznih strategija dresera i služe da uveseljavaju publiku u cirkusu, označimo kao majmunisanje, onda smo dobili sasvim pogodnu riječ za opis ponašanja vladajuće koalicije u Skupštini Srbije (s tom razlikom što ovo nikog nije uveseljavalo). Dobili su impuls tj. direktivu izvana (poticaj dresera) i nastala je reakcija.

of the Serbian Parliament and the simile between their behavior with the behavior of trained animals, or, trained monkeys. He calls the Serbian Parliament's signing of the Declaration on Srebrenica as a gesture of public apology "monkey-business" (Arsović 2010: 18) – an apology for "a symbolic Srebrenica" that has come to represent "a symbol of the Serbian evil and the Muslim victim status", "the justification of the Western dismantling of Yugoslavia" as well as its intervention on multiple levels including the bombing and the colonial occupation of Bosnia and Kosovo" (Ibid. 19).

The establishment in power either sees the connection or apologizes without one (also "apologizes for nothing")... If they see it, then they see what no one sees. If they apologize for nothing, then they don't see but blindly listen. (Ibid. 19)²⁸

The common arguments about most authors denying the truth about the recent past is their claim that "truth still has to be revealed" or "not all facts are there and we should wait for a court of history to have its say (Biserko 2009) and Arsović's piece reverberates it. Contrary to that, there are those who insist that "coping with the past is impractical, one should look to the future" (Ibid.), which is, for instance, something that is echoed in the most recent neoliberal discourse of the current Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić. Arsović is explicit here in stating that confronting the wrongdoing of one's own people is necessary, but only when we have arrived "at full and not fragmentary truths". He therefore implies that Srebrenica's current truth status is fragmentary, as well as that Srebrenica is a justification of the Western dismantling of Yugoslavia and not a place where thousands were killed.

He argues that any apology is grotesque backing up his case by the claim that even the prosecutor at the ICTY has found many cracks in trying to establish Srebrenica massacre as genocide. Instead, he suggests taking into account the killings that preceded what he terms 'the Srebrenica massacre', echoing both strategic and ideological genocide theories (Straus 2012), arguing that we will know the truth only if we go back further in history.

Nobody can and should deny the crime that Serb forces committed in Srebrenica. But why do they deny longstanding crimes of the protected Srebrenica enclave against the Serb civilians? Is that some other Srebrenica, is that some other conflict? Can we truly know what happened in and around Srebrenica unless we start our investigations from a certain date?²⁹ (Arsović 2010: 20)

28. Vladajući establišment ili vezu vidi ili se bez veze izvinjava. Ako vezu vidi, tad vidi što niko ne vidi. Ako se bez veze izvinjava, tad ne gleda već slijepo sluša.

29. Niko ne može i ne treba da spori zločin koji su srpske snage izvršile u Srebrenici. Ali zašto se osporavaju dugotrajni zločini iz zaštićene srebreničke enklave nad srpskim civilima? Je li to neka druga Srebrenica, je li to neki drugi sukob? Možemo li saznati šta se uistinu dešavalo u i oko Srebrenice ako događaje istražujemo samo od određenog datuma?

One of the main problems of this piece is a disclaimer of the Srebrenica genocide, which Van Dijk (1993) terms “apparent concession”. The apology of the Serbian government for the Srebrenica genocide relies, for Arsović, on a “fragmentary” truth procedure even though he calls it “a sad and tragic event.” By qualifying what happened in Srebrenica as a “sad and tragic event” and in the same sentence and dismissing the juridical procedure of qualifying the massacre as a genocide rhetorically performs a genocide denial. The horror of what happened in Srebrenica is forced to the background against the potential threat of a genocide verdict and its potential political consequences in a rationalist defense mechanism.

Arsović criticizes the ICTY for precluding the very process of arriving at truth as well as the political economies of truth, i.e. moving the war-machine, such as NATO, backed by the US and Western Europe. Through such argumentation, he arrives at a point where victims are all the same, because “history and wars” are “the history of losers and victims” and where “if we had the courage to look into the face of the victim, then in the victim’s eyes would we be able to see all characters of the Balkan drama.” The ICTY is the law speaking the language of power, and what remains after The Hague, he says, is zero: “for changes cannot be ‘imposed’, but they should be felt as deeply intrinsic or the problems “will come back at us.” He concludes that the new European road, the road of capital, is renouncing traditional European values and creates Agamben’s *volkloser Raum*, a space without people, as a fundamental globalization strategy in which powerful biopolitical regimes will dictate who will be allowed to live and who will be let die (Mbembe 2003).

Official political discourse about Srebrenica in the RS, except for one apology by the then RS President, Dragan Čavić in 2004³⁰ that also represented his political suicide, offers either silence or denial. In 2010, the decision by the RS prime minister then (now RS President) Milorad Dodik to tell a pre-election rally in Srebrenica that genocide had never been committed provoked concerns over Bosnian Serb reluctance to come to terms with the past:

Unborn Serb children cannot be held responsible for something that happened 15 years ago. They cannot and they will not be. And genocide did not take place here. We will not accept claims that what happened here was genocide, because it was not,” Dodik told the crowd of cheering supporters at the September 20th, 2004 rally.³¹

30. <http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/2004/06/22/406220052/?v=2>

31. “Ne mogu nerođena srpska djeca biti kriva za nešto što je bilo prije deset-petnaest godina. Ne mogu i neće biti. I nije bio genocid ovdje. I nećemo prihvatiti da je bio genocid” http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/tema_sedmice_negiranje_genocida_BiH/24232024.html.

Even though Arsović points at different regimes of truth, such as the juridical regime, he foregrounds them at the expense of the major event of the Bosnian 1992–1995 war, Srebrenica. His musings do not go beyond what is already established as truth in Republika Srpska: either Srebrenica did not happen, which is an absolute denial, or the event is minimized or otherwise discursively mitigated. For example, historically events prior to Srebrenica are used in the argumentation: either the slaughter of Serbs around Bratunac and Srebrenica before July 11 1995, or the suffering of Serbs in WWII- all of these involving the trope of “history repeating”. Another strategy is the exaggerated representation of “Serbs who are always the bad guys” and “Muslims who are always perceived as victims”, further extending the actual unwillingness to speak and to deal with the most recent war.

In other words, Arsović’s text is not so problematic for what it contains but for what is missing. Despite his cries against the inclusion and the exclusions along the axis of ‘the West and the rest’, nowhere does he reflect on what is absent among Serbs, especially in Republika Srpska. Throughout his essay, the 1992–1995 war is depicted in terms of generalizations and a constant appeal to a truth that ought to come but it cannot, because of the repressive mechanisms of the West, the flawed nature of the law as reflected by the ICTY and the stupidity and weakness of the Serbian state in the declaration on Srebrenica and its apology (‘monkey business’).

Given that there is no official commemoration or compensation granted in Republika Srpska for crimes committed by Serbs and no public discussion of these events (including the media and academia) takes place, the question is what kind of concrete reconciliation mechanisms he would find suitable for reaching the full not ‘fragmentary truth’ or ‘the change that comes from within’, especially considering his role and responsibility as a university professor. What should a Serb philosopher that calls upon tradition and ancestors propose that would not be the same old topos of ‘all the world is against us (Serbs)’? What other identities are possible for those ethnic Serbs who are against the denials and are risking being called ‘traitors’?

The creation of Republika Srpska: Culturalized politics discourse

In the third text from *Krajina*, a book by Nikola Koljević *The Creation of Republika Srpska* (published by *Službeni glasnik* in Belgrade in 2008, and representing his journal between 1993 and 1995) is reviewed. The text reverberates with a culturalist argument based on polar categories such as the distinction between friend and enemy indispensable for the creation of the political (Schmitt 2007: 27–33). These categories link the state and the sovereignty with politics where the enemy is a “stranger” and an “existential outsider” whose intense hostility and readiness for combat threatens the state and the relations of friendship. The reviewer is a Banja

Luka-based political scientist and professor Aleksandar Vranješ. He finds Koljević's book "an invaluable historical resource" (Vranješ 2010: 282–287) which sheds light "on the causes of future conflicts in BiH" because here "we live with history" (Ibid. 284).³² These were best reflected during the relationship between culture and politics in 1960s and 1970s" (Ibid.). The introduction addresses an invisible audience or an imagined community of Serbs by playing upon their collective identity and continuous suffering through history:

few are those who history remembers to have put up with stoicism with the turbulent times without losing their identity, faith, culture, language, customs, and primarily dignity along the way...for the Serbian people, pogrom is a chronic syndrome happening every several decades.³³ (Ibid. 282)

The presuppositions here are that times are turbulent, that many have lost their identity, faith, culture, language, customs...dignity, and that the Serbian people suffer a pogrom every several decades due to their sacrifice in World Wars I and II. By saying how the Serbs "died for the whole of Europe and were glorified and hated in the process," Vranješ creates a false continuity between the Serb role in both World Wars, as predominantly anticolonial and antifascist, and Serb role in the 1991–1995 war, in which "the Serbs were characterized as aggressors and criminals." Yet Koljević's explicit statement that "the communist, anti-Serb doctrines" are "Yugoslav illusions that we should leave behind," alluding to socialist Yugoslavia, the international character of communism, and the antifascist struggle of the Partisans (a vast segment of whom were Serbs) in World War II, reveals his apparent anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist stance, and his support of more solid, nationalist bedrock.

As cited by Vranješ, Koljević sees the roots of the 'problem' in the "creation of a future 'Bosnian' identity marked by the tendency to produce some Bosnian-Herzegovinian cultural creation which aims to construct the Serbian and Croatian identities as separated from their *maticas*"³⁴ (Vranješ 2010: 283). Expanding this imaginary scenario further, Koljević sees the roots of the separatism in a phantasmagorical continuity of a culture war with concrete outputs such as the subsuming of past

32. I sam Koljević beleži da ono što zapadnjaci ne mogu da shvate jeste da se ovde živi sa istorijom (Ibid., 112) (Vranješ 2010: 284).

33. Malo je onih koje istorija pamti da su ta teška vremena stoički izdržali, a da pri tome nisu izgubili identitet, veru, kulturu, jezik, običaje i prvenstveno dostojanstvo...za srpski narod pogrom (je) hronični sindrom koji se javlja svakih nekoliko decenija.

34. The word *matica* in Serbian, in this case, means "queen bee", implying this organization's purpose of breeding more workers for the Serb cultural hive; this is similar to the meaning of today's *matrix* organization. It spawned the concept of *Matica* in other Slavic countries.

Bosnian-Herzegovinian writers such as Petar Kočić and Aleksa Šantić, who wrote in Serbian or Serbo-Croatian, under the Bosnian-Herzegovinian cultural umbrella. It creates an imaginary of the continuous suffering of Serbs, again through the trope of “history repeating” and the perceived Muslim threat. Alija Izetbegović’s *Islamic Declaration* published in 1969, for which he served 13 years in prison, is seen as the *corpus delicti* and the program for the Islamic rule in Bosnia and a secessionist agenda for which Bosnian Muslims will sacrifice peace (Ibid. 283).

Against this perceived Muslim threat, Koljević proposes “cultural unification with *Matica srpska*, in a pan-Serb assembly where Serb goals and aspirations could be publicly crystallized and where the final result would be the creation of a single cultural and educational field” (Vranješ 2010: 286). It is, however, not clear whether this single cultural and educational field is to operate in the context of the Great Serbia. Both Vranješ and Koljević find the causes of the 1992–1995 war in the cultural plane, especially in the fear among Serbs in BiH of being outvoted and subjected to the Muslim rule.

In a very condensed way, Vranješ tries to preserve the positive self-representation and the negative representation of others by quoting Koljević’s description of how the war actually started and by whom: “the war started with the murder of a Serb guest at a wedding in front of the Orthodox church in Bašćaršija on March 1st, 1992”. This was followed by a cynical commentary in *Oslobođenje*: “and what were the Serbs doing in Bašćaršija”? where the XVI century Orthodox church was” ... “the war caught fire very quickly despite all efforts to prevent it... it did not take much for Serbs to take up the initiative of the militarily strongest side so that the initiators of the war soon asked for Western help, especially by directing the alleged Serb aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Koljević 2008: 112 in Vranješ 2010: 284).

The initiators of the war asked very quickly Western forces for help, especially by fabricating the alleged Serb aggression against BiH. The specificity of BiH is reflected in very complicated interethnic relations burdened by the history, which the international community was never able to demystify. Instead, they approached the BiH war as laypersons not hiding their sympathy for the Muslims and the Croats, acting without any legal and moral ground.³⁵

(Koljević 2008: 112–115 in Vranješ 2010: 284)

35. Inicijatori rata su veoma brzo potražili pomoć od zapadnih sila, posebno režiranjem navodne srpske agresije na BiH. Specifičnost Bosne i Hercegovine se ogleda u veoma komplikovanim međuetničkim relacijama koje su opterećene burnim istorijskim dešavanjima, što pripadnici međunarodne zajednice nikada nisu bili u stanju da odgonetnu, te su laički pristupali građanskom ratu ne krijući svoju nakolonost prema muslimanskoj i hrvatskoj strani, a bez ikakvog pravnog i moralnog osnova.

Even if we temporarily agree to this mixture of combined preconditions, Vranješ reads Koljević seventeen years after the beginning of the Bosnian war in 1992 as in vacuum in which no new knowledge of the war, of the ‘debatable’ ICTY Tribunal has ever existed. Despite severe propaganda and the pre-Internet status of the foreign media in the early 1990s, knowledge about the actual logistics mass graves and mass killings committed by the Serbs, particularly in Srebrenica and Prijedor, had been extended among other things and to a great detail by the ICTY archives including verdicts, testimonies and other material documentation. Yet Vranješ seems completely oblivious to that.

Invoking an imaginary enemy and evocating paternalistic discourse, Vranješ warns that Republika Srpska is in danger yet again from those who advocate a unitary BiH. He addresses Serbs who have forgotten Serbian hearths that were left outside Serb borders. He alludes to the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognized Serb state within the territory of the Republic of Croatia during the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995). He also brings up the metonymy of “Serb disunity” (Ibid. 285) expressed through the metaphor of “contamination of the integration virus” (Ibid. 287). It presumably refers to the EU integration, which prevents the Serbs from having a unified stance in preserving their identity as well as their “Yugoslav misconceptions” (Koljević II 2008: 422 in Vranješ 2010: 287). Vranješ concludes that Koljević’s book is mandatory for all of those “who doubt their own history, reexamine the importance of the war and loosely consider the significance of acts by the leaders who fought for Republika Srpska” (Vranješ 2010: 287) – a eulogy for Karadžić and Mladić as well as for Dodik, whose “fighting for RS” kept him in power from 2006 until today³⁶ despite the fact that he had not even participated in the war.

In lieu of a conclusion

All three discourses show how the history and the past are narrated. This concerns not only the most recent past, the bloody wars of the 1990s, but also the very distant past including the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. All this is brought together in an artificial continuum that serves the purpose of narrating the Serbian past through sacrifice, martyrdom, freedom, and the prevention of a new genocide. The Serbs are usually represented as flawless, peace loving people whom everyone else (wrongly) considers an aggressor. The ICTY is flawed, Serbia is a traitor for it wants to enter

36. As a result of the October 2018 October general election, Milorad Dodik has won the biggest vote in BiH, the total of 367,419, and is going to be a Serb member of the BiH three-partite rotating Presidency for the next four years.

the EU, and none of these discourses raises a smidgen of a doubt that crimes, including ethnic cleansing and genocide in the 1990s wars, could “potentially” have been committed at the Serb hand and on the Serbian behalf. Apart from the denial of Srebrenica genocide, there is mention of neither Omarska, Prijedor nor the most recently discovered mass grave in Tomašica. Crimes committed against the Serbs in Bratunac were invoked, evidence of the historic duty to preempt a new genocide against the Serbs, but no further thought, even a conditional ‘what if’, ever breaks into the discourse.

How are the younger generations of Serbs ever to come to terms with their recent past if such truths including the truth that genocide “may have” indeed happened in Srebrenica never circulate? How are they going to take a critical stance (or to keep a distance), if they are going to be called traitors by their professors, by their poets, by the politicians and the media every time they do so? Even if the distant history presents a suitable employment for the Serb master narrative in the RS, how come there are no Partisans there, no antifascist struggle in which for instance both of my grandfathers participated? Koljević’s anti-Yugoslavism is a part of the master narrative in which there is no room for the truly heroic role of the Serbs in World War II, but a plenty of room for the current and the past war crimes convicts and inditees. Another set of questions to be asked is, whether a Republika Srpska that commemorates and compensates the damaged and the victims could stand some chance of legitimation, or whether the generation of those would need to die at war needs to die before a more critical approach to the past took place?

The vision of a livable Bosnia still remains to be seen. Debunking the myths and narratives about the past across various public discourses and examining their epistemic configurations is the first necessary, albeit painful, step of awakening and coming to terms with the grim postsocialist reality for any ex-Yugoslav people, not just the Serbs. A minimum consensus has to be reached if the Balkans are to abandon or reverse the essentialist “history repeating” trope. The critical analysis of culturalized politics visible in the selected textual evidence identifies peeling layers of metaphors and presuppositions that fulfill the argumentative function of legitimating the totality of mainstream Serb cultural nationhood and its corresponding vision. While our future is unknown, we know at least that our tradition is selective and can be arranged and rearranged if we dare think otherwise.

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Under One Sun?

Semiotic transformation of the cognitive model NATION in the Republic of Macedonia¹ on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of Independence in 2011

Aleksandra Salamurović

The present chapter examines the semiotic transformation of the cognitive model NATION as communicated and discursively constructed in commemorative and jubilee speeches concerning the wider context of the 20th Anniversary of Independence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Theoretically, it draws on the socio-cognitive approach to collective identity and cognitive pragmatics. The methodological framework is based both on quantitative (using corpus linguistics tools) and qualitative analysis. We focused especially on the use of the metonymy “Macedonia”, which is the most frequent term in analysed speeches. Polysemous referentiality and accompanied semiotic events induce, from the point of view of cognitive pragmatics, great contextual effects of this metonymy. Furthermore, ethnonyms, syntactic structures and argumentation patterns are analysed in order to test the hypothesis of discursively erased distinction between different ethnic groups. Finally, the analysis considers possible differentiations caused by participants involved in practices around text, i.e. political figures delivering jubilee speeches.

Keywords: Macedonia, metonymy, collective identity, STAATS NATION, KULTURNATION, socio-cognitive approach, cognitive pragmatics, jubilee speeches

1. Introduction

On September 8th 2011, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia celebrated 20 years of independence with the slogan “Together Under One Sun”. The slogan

1. In February 2019, the Republic of Macedonia officially changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia. cf. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/12/nato-flag-raised-ahead-of-north-macedonias-prospective-accession>, retrieved 16 April 2019.

itself has complex semiotics, both in the use of linguistic means of metaphor and ellipsis, and in the use of specific visual codes. It was also published in both official languages, Macedonian and Albanian:



Figure 1. Advertisement in the newspaper “Nova Makedonija” in the Macedonian language²



Figure 2. Advertisement in the newspaper “Koha” in the Albanian language³

The equivalent treatment of the two most used languages in the Republic of Macedonia should underline the proclaimed goal of the ruling political elites – “common unity, reconciliation and commitment to achieve the key strategic goals

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3. Ibid.

of Macedonia” as stated by Trajko Veljanoski, the president of the Macedonian Parliament, in the speech during the celebration.⁴

A month earlier on August 13th, the 10th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was commemorated. The Ohrid Framework Agreement set the basis for changing the position of the Albanian minority in the country. One of the amended terms relevant for our analysis was the new denomination of the Albanians and other minority groups in the country. The text of the Framework Agreement refers to them as “communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”, in contrast to the former denomination “minority”.⁵ These two events: the celebration of 20 years of independence and the commemoration of 10 years of the Ohrid Agreement mark a reference point for our analysis of the “**semiotic transformation of the idea of nation**” (Reisigl 2007: 8, emphasized by AS).

Since the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia on the 8th September 1991, Macedonia as a state and its national and cultural identity have been highly contested. There are several prominent political and cultural features that have been “problematized” in and outside of Macedonia for the last twenty years. One of the central topics is the so called “name-issue”, a dispute with Greece over the official state name which has been going on since 1995. In order to avoid the contentious issue, a complex name, *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, is used in official and international contexts. Due to that, Greece posed a veto on Macedonian NATO membership in 2008. Macedonia has been officially striving for EU membership since 2001, i.e. since 2004, when the Stabilisation and Association Agreement came into force.⁶ The rapprochement process, however, has been hindered by this highly symbolic issue concerning the official state name. The dispute was formally resolved in June 2018 through the agreement between the highest representatives of the Macedonian and Greek government and under the auspices of “the UN “name” mediator, Matthew Nimetz”.⁷ Accordingly, the state should be renamed as the “Republic of North Macedonia”. The referendum on the name change was held on September 30th 2018, but because of a low turnout that rendered the result invalid, the necessary constitutional changes had to be decided on in parliament. Even if accepted by the political majority of the ruling party, we can expect that the name-issue will continue to be a controversial topic within the political discourse to the near future and beyond.

4. <http://www.sobranie.mk/govori-2014.nspx?page=5>, retrieved 20 April 2015.

5. See Art. 69 and following, <http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf>, retrieved 14 March 2017.

6. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-437_en.htm, retrieved 14 March 2017.

7. “Macedonia, Greece Sign ‘Historic’ Name Deal” in: BalkanInsight Online, 06-17-2018, retrieved on September 30, 2018 from <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-greece-signing-historic-name-deal-06-17-2018>, retrieved 30 September 2018.

Unlike other republics of the federal Yugoslavia, Macedonia was able to separate from the former state in 1991 without a war. Nevertheless, it had to deal with ethnic strains and division, which reached their high point in the armed conflict with Albanians in Macedonia in the first half of 2001. The conflict ended in the aforementioned Ohrid Framework Agreement that was signed by the political representatives of the leading Macedonian and Albanian parties under the auspices of the EU and USA (Brunnbauer 2002: 2). The constitutional and legislative changes brought about by the Agreement resulted, *inter alia*, in emerging bilingualism which is seen as a “threat” to the Macedonian language and culture (Ristovski 2006: 11; Ilievski 2006: 96ff).⁸ The celebrations in the second half of 2011 may give us some insight into how all these features are reflected upon and if there have been any relevant changes.

The slogan of the celebrations “Together Under One Sun” implies neutralization of group related dichotomies that are essential for the notion of the NATION as a cognitive model of collective identity. In the case of Macedonia, this may imply a semi-otic transformation of the model of KULTURNATION, historically prevalent in South East Europe, to STAATSNATION, as a model aspired to in the course of the process of Europeanization. Empirically, this study focuses on the communicative-linguistic structures used in political speeches, since political speeches are important interactional means endowing the public with certain identity politics and models of inclusion and exclusion (Reisigl 2008: 251).

2. Theoretical background

The nation-building processes based on the dialectic relation between the Self and Other are not completed in Southeast Europe at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century (Brunnbauer & Voss 2008). These processes can be viewed as a specific type of communication crisis because they produce permanent identity struggle, as the main features of the changing political and social contexts have to be incorporated into the symbolic and slowly changing communication structures. By communication structures we do not only mean the broader communication settings, *i.e.* participants, immediate context, communicative genres, and their effects, but also discursive and linguistic means deployed

8. The bilingualism has become official after the Parliament adopted the Law on Language Use in March 2018 proclaiming Albanian a second official language, in addition to Macedonian, in the whole state. However, since the president of Macedonia refused to sign the bill, the Law on Language use has not entered into force yet. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-passes-albanian-language-law-01-11-2018>, retrieved 3 December 2018.

in a particular interaction. Making account of the relevant socio-political context and its codependence with communication structures, the analysis draws from the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), especially from the socio-cognitive approach to collective identity (Koller 2012), and cognitive pragmatics (Oswald 2014).

The socio-cognitive approach, rooted primarily in social psychology and in cognitive linguistics, is currently one of the most influential strands in Critical Discourse Analysis (Hart & Cap 2014; Koller in this volume). Similarly to other CDA approaches, it examines concrete social phenomena that are created through discourse (Koller 2014a: 150). The distinctive feature of the socio-cognitive outlook lies in inferring the so-called socio-cognitive representations (SCR) from texts produced in a particular social context. Socio-cognitive representations (SCR) are conceptual structures defined as “organized, coherent, and socially shared sets of knowledge about an object or domain” (Koller 2012: 20). Their main feature is that they are cognitive models shared by members of a group. As a consequence, collective identities are seen as socio-cognitive representations “comprising beliefs and knowledge, norms and values, attitudes and expectations as well as emotions” (Koller 2012: 20).

When analyzing the discourse of national identity within the discourse of collective identities, we deal with specific mental models and cognitive structures that make up the core of the “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). According to Anderson, a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, **yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion**” (Anderson 1983: 49, emphasis by A. S.). Drawing on the presented theoretical framework, we claim that these images of the communion are specific socio-cognitive representations, which are disseminated, negotiated and transformed through communication processes. Regarding national identity in European countries, we can trace two particular SCRs which are essential for the constitution of the nation: *KULTURNATION* – a model derived from German Romanticism that emphasizes a common cultural heritage, common language, religion, high and popular culture, and *STAATSNATION*, which implies a political community of free individuals who share common political values and institutions (Reisigl 2007: 13f). Historically, the former served as a prototype for the nation-building processes in Southeastern Europe. After the collapse of the supranational state of Yugoslavia, all successor states tried to re-invent their national identities following this old 19th-century model. These endeavors resulted in inter-ethnic conflicts and wars in the 1990s. However, after 2000 and the intensified process of the EU- rapprochement, a comprehensive social transformation has started in many countries that includes the transformation from the *KULTURNATION* to the *STAATSNATION*. It should be stated that these two models are not fixed and restricted but rather dynamic and with gradual transitions.

Consequently, the processes of their ongoing semiotic transformation can be well observed in relevant socio-cultural events such as the commemoration of important historical dates. Deploying the socio-cognitive approach, we can disclose the prevailing SCRs, display the elements they currently consist of, indicate dynamics of social transformation and reveal the still existing shortcomings in the social phenomena of collective identification. This is provided by a detailed linguistic analysis of the text corpus, since the socio-cognitive representations “cannot simply be read off texts but have to be inferred from the linguistic findings” (Koller 2014a: 153).

As the most important semiotic means of communication, language and its specific use in the public discourse have an enormous influence on the dissemination of prevalent SCRs of national identity, shared by the members of a particular group. Apart from the semantics and the form of the utterances in a text or a set of texts, it is their pragmatics that enable participants to achieve mutual understanding in a communicative exchange (Liedtke & Schulze 2013: 2; Maillat & Oswald 2011: 67). Since Searle it is well known that even seemingly simple utterances cannot be understood without contextual inferencing, i.e. enriching the literal meaning with information not explicitly uttered:

...what counts as having been *said* for most contemporary authors goes far beyond sentence meaning. Rather, it has to be considered as a complex utterance level combining semantic knowledge and context-driven, pragmatic information as an integrated whole. (Liedtke & Schulze 2013: 2)

Hereby, it is of particular importance that both addresser and addressee share the same pragmatic resources to a great extent. By pragmatic resources we understand that both linguistic and socio-cultural features unfold in the conversational interaction and that they are subject to pragmatic inferencing. The various studies in pragmatics have shown that the ability of pragmatic inferencing is cognitive by nature (Grassmann 2013; Pouscoulous 2013; Hart 2014: 169). Moreover, these findings are supported by many experimental works in the realm of psychological research (Maillat & Oswald 2011: 66ff; Oswald 2014: 103). For that reason, we opt to pursue the cognitive approach to pragmatics in order to determine the current socio-cognitive representations of NATION in the Republic of Macedonia.

Cognitive pragmatics, as defined by Oswald and other authors within the CDA (Chilton, Hart, van Dijk, Musolff etc.), examines the issue of how particular discourses and the employed linguistic devices turn into being effective in the first place (Oswald 2014: 98). Their first axiom, which is consonant with the general CDA approach, is that communication is the matter of intention: everything that is said, is said with intention to achieve some communicative, social and/or political goal. Following the main outcomes of the pragmatic theory, particularly the Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson, two distinct conditions that influence the selection of information in the interpretative processes are specified: first, the

information is relevant if its contextual effects are large, and second, the information is relevant if its processing effects are small (Sperber and Wilson 1995:125 quoted in Oswald 2014: 104):

The assumptions that best satisfy this effort/effect ratio are those that our cognitive system will deem most relevant. (Oswald 2014: 104)

These features apply to both the speakers and the hearers, i.e. to the speaker's utterances as well as the hearer's inference of their intended meaning.

The particular intention of the speaker can be furthermore achieved by employing cognitive strategies of foregrounding and backgrounding. Not only will the speaker choose those linguistic devices that can score the highest communicative impact in a given social context, but also they will employ them in the way to "draw the audience's attention away from the problematic nature of the message (backgrounding) while at the same time foregrounding, emphasizing specific representations" (Oswald 2014: 106) which are compatible with the preferred mental model. Interestingly, both of these strategies: processing information by relevance and manifesting it by foregrounding and/or backgrounding can explain why cognitive and communicative structures once brought into being change slowly.

The following scheme illustrates the relations between the socio-cognitive approach to collective identity and cognitive pragmatics as for which we argue here:




Figure 3. Interplay between cognitive and communicative-linguistic structures

3. Corpus

In order to answer the overall research question of the semiotic transformation of NATION in the Republic of Macedonia, we will focus on the commemorative and jubilee speeches concerning the wider context of the 20th anniversary of independence. Further events and celebrations all around the 8th September 2011 are chosen not only because they refer in form and content to the 20th anniversary, but also to the implementation process of the Ohrid Agreement. These are: Illinden – Day of the Republic on August 2, 2011, Opening of the Museum of Macedonian Battle on September 8, 2011, Constitution Day on November 17, 2011, and the Day of Macedonian Revolution on October 23, 2011.

Analyzed commemorative and jubilee speeches belong rhetorically to the epideictic genre, which is concerned with “... verbalisation of political values and ... of political (inter-party, national or supra-national) consent in the public sphere” on the occasion of “a victory, a jubilee, an anniversary, a birthday, a public personality etc.” (Reisigl 2008: 244). According to Reisigl,

the key social and political purpose of the commemorative speeches is to establish consent, solidarity and identification through inter-subjective, non-partisan assessment of historical and political data, events and personalities. (Ibid. 254)

In regard to nation-building processes, the time axis is of particular importance: the commemorating of the past is discursively communicated as relevant for the present and it has to mobilize people for some actions in the imagined future (Ensink & Sauer 2003; Reisigl 2008; Wodak & de Cilia 2007).

For the purpose of this analysis eleven speeches of prominent political figures holding an official political function were selected. The speakers, the date, the main topic/occasion, and the length of the speech are illustrated in Figure 4.

The speech of Prime Minister Gruevski is the longest and the most structurally complex one. It was the central speech within the musical and theatrical celebration spectacle named “Makedonium”. Since the biggest opposition party SDSM (The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) did not take part in the official commemoration events, no speech of its political leaders Branko Crvenkovski and Zoran Zaev is found with the relevant topical reference.⁹ It should also be noted that the

9. Cf. various newspaper articles about mutual allegations and discussions between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, two major Slavo-Macedonian political parties: “Crvenkovski: Celebration of VMRO-DPMNE is a historical scandal”; “Crvenkovski will go to prime minister Gruevski and to the parliament but not to the main square” <http://www.dnevnik.mk/default-mk.asp?itemID=A2BBBC039DC7B243A155B93C8EDAE0CF&arc=1>; “Gruevski will unite, Crvenkovski is accusing of separation”, *Nova Makedonija*, 7–8 September 2011, p. 5 etc.

Speaker	Date	Topic	Length
Nikola Gruevski, Prime Minister	08.09.2011	20 years Independence	4,622 tokens
Musa Xhaferi, Deputy Prime Minister for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)	13.08.2011	OFA	216 tokens
	13.08.2012	OFA	472 tokens
Giorgje Ivanov, President	19.06.2011	OFA	482 tokens
	02.08.2011	Day of Republic	841 tokens
	12.08.2011	OFA	1,796 tokens
	08.09.2011	20 Independence	2,413 tokens
	09.09.2011	Opening of the Museum	1,175 tokens
Trajko Veljanoski, President of the Parliament	17.11.2011	Constitution Day	1,449 tokens
	24.10.2011	Day of Macedonian Revolution	1,253 tokens
	08.09.2011	20 Independence	711 tokens

Figure 4. Corpus

Albanian party DUI (Democratic Union for Integration), despite being in coalition with the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, stated that they respect the independence of Macedonia but they would not celebrate it.¹⁰ This also explains the divergent topics of the two speeches delivered by Xzaferi, one of the DUI leaders.

4. Methodological framework

The methodological framework is based on the socio-cognitive approach by Koller, who inspired by the work of Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 2010), has developed a tripartite model of macro-, meso- and micro- level of analysis of collective identities (Koller 2012, 2014a, 2014b, chapter in this volume).

The macro-level of analysis studies the issue of the social context, i.e. it points to social factors influencing text and discourse practice. In our case, it is the celebration slogan, “Under One Sun” and the events and celebrations around this central event: 10th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Illinden- Day of Republic, Opening of the Museum of Macedonian Battle, Constitution Day and Day of Macedonian Revolution. Of course, each of these events has its own semiotics and represents a mental model containing particular sets of knowledge, norms

10. Cf. “Gruevski will unite, Crvenkovski is accusing of separation”, Nova Makedonija, 7–8 September 2011, p. 5.

and values which are incorporated in the overall communication practice under analysis. Illinden, to mention one in greater detail, appears to be a *fixed matrix*, as Marko Soldić calls it (Soldić 2012). Not only did St. Elijah's Day, August 2nd, 1903, mark the uprising against the Ottoman reign (the first Illinden), and the first meeting of the Anti-fascist Council for the Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) on August 2nd 1944 (second Illinden), but it also marked the third Illinden, the day of the independence proclamation from Yugoslavia in 1991. "Illinden continuum" is described as: "a mythical unbroken symbolic chain of modern Macedonian nationhood inscribed with myths of suffering and revolution" (Soldić 2012: 193). All these elements are invoked when the keyword Illinden is mentioned in the public communication. Besides the regular reference to struggle, heroism and timelessness, what is highly relevant discursively is the emphasis on multiculturalism concerning the mixed ethnic affiliation of participants of the three Illinden. This feature, however, is often subject to pragmatic backgrounding, as the present analysis shows.

The meso-level of analysis entails the context of discourse practice and the participants involved in practices around text, and their role there. In addition, it points to the relevant genre of the text.

All speakers, depicted in Figure 4 above, held official political functions, being government members and members of the ruling parties. The Slawomacedonian speakers are: Gruevski, Ivanov and Veljanoski, who are members of the national-conservative party VMRO-DPMNE. In addition, Musa Xhaferi is one of the leaders of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), formed in June 2002 by former Albanian guerrilla leaders who had taken part in the 2001 conflict.

Following Reisigl, political speeches are to be seen as "multi-addressed activity patterns" and not as "monological" discursive forms (Reisigl 2008: 243). As a consequence, both the primary and secondary audience is to be considered on the meso-level. Macedonian citizens who are present at the events; members of government; and representatives of media, religious communities, and diplomacy constitute the primary audience (speech addressees). All of the others who watched, listened to the speeches or read them afterwards are the secondary audience.

At the micro-level, a linguistic and semiotic analysis of the text is conducted to determine what collective identities are constructed and how. In the present analysis, it is the discursive construction of national identity and especially of the social groups which are being referred to in the texts (Koller 2014b). In this sense, the research questions posed are: "What social actors are found in the texts: ethnic/social groups or individuals? How are they represented, i.e. are they included or excluded, genericized or specified, activated or subjected? Which group is more salient (foregrounded) in the texts?" (Koller 2012: 23) The answers to these questions will be presented and discussed in the next section.




Figure 5. Methodological framework for the analysis of cognitive model NATION in the Republic of Macedonia according to the tripartite model of Koller

5. United nation under one sun?

Koller's analytical model suggests an in-depth manual analysis of the dataset, especially at the micro-level, which in the corpus of 11 political speeches is quite manageable. In addition, a corpus-based analysis is conducted in order to complement the qualitative close reading of the selected texts (Baker 2006; Baker, Gabrielatos, McEnery 2013: 258). Concretely, word frequency list, concordances and collocations are examined.

5.1 Quantitative findings

The overall corpus consists of eleven texts with 15,430 tokens and 3,976 types. From the word list produced by the program AntConc 3.4.3w,¹¹ words relevant for the defined research question were extracted. The created word list is displayed in Figure 6:

11. <http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/>, retrieved January 2015.

Wordlist		Frequency
Македонија	Macedonia	187
нашата	our	81
Република	Republic	67
договор	agreement	49
ние	we	47
граѓани	citizens	45
држава	state	41
една	one	32
независност	independence	23
ВМРО	VMRO	19
народ	people	16
татковина	fatherland	14
заедно	together	13
пат	path	11
европската	European	10
нација	nation	9
борбата	struggle	7
жртва	sacrifice	7
вечна	eternal	6
херои	heroes	6
владата	the government	5
Европа	Europe	5
Македонци	Macedonians	5
победа	victory	5
името	the name	4
Албанци	Albanians	3
Груевски	Gruevski	3
ДМПНЕ	DPMNE	1
сонцето	sun	1

Figure 6. Word frequency list with query terms emphasized

As the figure above shows, the most frequent word is *Македонија* (*Macedonia*) (187), followed by the possessive pronoun *нашата* (*our*) (81), and nouns *република* (*Republic*) (67) and *договор* (*agreement*) (49) as well as the personal pronoun of the 1st person plural *ние* (*we*) (47). Bearing in mind that Macedonian is a pro-drop-language (personal pronouns are usually omitted and the pertinent grammatical category of person is expressed through a verbal paradigm), the occurrences with the explicit, stressed “we” are counted and considered relevant for the analysis. Further results that stand out are: first, the noun *граѓани* (*citizens*) is more frequent than the noun *народ* (*people*) and any ethnonym. The ethnonyms *Macedonians* and *Albanians* are not very frequent (5 and 3 occurrences

respectively). The noun *држава* (*state*) with 41 occurrences is more frequent than the affective noun *татковина* (*fatherland*) (14). The word *заедно* (*together*) occurs 13 times as an adverb referring to the coalition between concrete political figures, the union of the ethnic groups or the alliance of the citizens and the political elite.

The next step is to generate collocates for the representation of the social actors whose naming and evaluating is relevant to the notion of national identity. The searched query terms are: “Macedonia”, “citizens”, “agreement” and the ethnonyms “Macedonian/Macedonians” and “Albanians”.

The noun *Macedonia* collocates with adjectives: *long lasting, free, stronger, eternal, independent, and democratic*.¹² Regarding evaluation, we claim that a complex cognitive model is construed partly as STAATS NATION (*free, independent, democratic*), partly as KULTURNATION (*long lasting, stronger, eternal*). Furthermore, *Macedonia* collocates with *government, Republic, president, citizens, constitution, state* – all nouns referring to the institutional level of state and nation structure. Additionally, symbolic elements like the nouns *faith* and *fatherland* are identified. Similarly, collocates with affective semantics (nouns and adjectives) are found with the term *нашата* (*our*), out of which the most prominent are *fatherland* and *history*. The noun “citizens” is nearly undefined, because it collocates with the adjective *Macedonian* which refers both to the Macedonian ethnic group and to the citizens of the state. It furthermore collocates with the pronouns *our* and *all* and the nouns *Republic* and *Macedonia*. The finding that the term “Macedonia” occurs as a collocate with every other query term led us to exploit this notion in greater detail. Before doing so, we would like to point out some interesting findings concerning the use of ethnonyms.

The following figure shows the collocates of the nouns “Albanians” and “Macedonian”, as well as the collocates of the term searched with an asterisk, which are mostly adjectives:

Collocates <i>Албанци</i> (Albanians)	Turks, Serbs, fellow compatriot, Roma, Vlachs, Bosniaks, Macedonians, belonging, religious, ethnic
Collocates <i>Македонци</i> (Macedonian)	Turk, tolerant, – Serb, fellow citizen, Rom, Bosniak, Albanian, citizen, religious, tradition, our, national, culture, belonging, respect
Collocates албан* (alban*)	Turks, Serbs, Roma, Vlachs, the Vlachs, Macedonian
Collocates македонск* (macedon*)	struggle, identity, people, history, independence, citizens, state, honored, all, patriots

Figure 7. Collocates of ethnonyms

12. Minimal frequency was set to five to the left and to the right to the query term.

Both ethnic groups are referred to when talking about ethnic communities living in the Republic of Macedonia (*Turks, Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks*). All speakers make a difference between “ethnic” and “national”. “Ethnic” is linked exclusively to the phrase *ethnic communities*, the term “national”, in contrast, covers a bigger semantic field which, however, cannot be strictly defined. When looking at what is perceived as *Albanian* and what as *Macedonian* in terms of attributes, we can observe considerable differences. *Albanian* belongs exclusively to the domain of other ethnic communities and *Macedonian* is more differentiated, as shown by the collocates: *struggle, identity, people, history, independence, citizens, state, and patriots*.

5.2 MACEDONIA as a cognitive concept and a pragmatic tool

As the corpus-based analysis shows, the noun *Macedonia* is used most frequently and it collocates with all other query terms which makes it the most prominent term regarding the social actor representation. It is well known that the media and political discourse make frequent use of linguistic means such as metaphor and metonymy. In the media discourse employment of these rhetorical devices is commonly motivated by referential needs, i.e. word economy, lack of more specific information or a mere signaling of stylistic change within the text. The use of metonymy in political discourse, however, serves specific communicative and pragmatic goals which are congruent with the aforementioned cognitive-pragmatic model of information relevance, particularly because of the large contextual effects.

In the analyzed speeches, *Macedonia* is used semantically as both a metaphor and metonymy. Both linguistic means are suitable for constructing a particular notion of national identity and thus convincing the wider audience and achieving greater effectiveness without being very specific. Metonymy has an enormous semantic potential, because its concrete meaning is resolved by recipients of political messages. This gives message-senders great persuasive power. According to Reisigl, “a nation is a mobile army of metaphors, personifications, metonymies and synecdoches which after a long, persistent use by a group of people seem canonical and binding” (2007: 262; translation by A. S.). In the latest comprehensive work on metonymy, its role and functions in thought and communication, Littlemore (2015) emphasized the function of metonymy in building identity in a discourse community and in strengthening social relationships by invoking shared knowledge (Littlemore 2015: 1). In political discourse, metonymy often serves as a device to emphasize positive traits of the in-group and to develop certain argumentation patterns (ibid 101f.). Although cognitive in nature (Brdar 2009: 59), metonymy can be approached as a very important pragmatic tool since it reinforces the cohesion and coherence within the communication in an extremely efficient manner (Ibid 65). At the same time, it increases polysemy, so that pragmatic inferencing can be challenged

by metonymic indeterminacy resulting in misunderstanding (Littlemore 2015: 7). Considering the relevance theory and aforementioned effect/effort ratio, we assume that the use of metonymy will foster large contextual effects, however, the processing effort can be considerable due to the polysemic nature of metonymic phrases.

Within the realm of cognitive linguistics, metonymy is defined as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model” (Radden/Kövecses 1999: 21). In our case, the toponym *Macedonia* is the source domain that creates specific, mostly referential, relations to the target. Both the source and the target are part of the same, political domain matrix or idealized cognitive model, which entails the notion of state and nation. From the cognitive point of view, metonymies using place names as vehicles were described either as PART AND PART metonymies involving the location ICM (according to the taxonomy of Radden/Kövecses 1999) or as target-in-source-metonymies (in the metonymy model of Ruiz de Mendoza 2014: 147). There are some discourse-pragmatic features emerging from these two models that are relevant for our study. First, metonymies often contain hyperbolic and affective semantics, and they can conceal real protagonists while accentuating their status (Littlemore 2015: 34). The state names, especially if contested as in the Macedonian case, are obvious example of affective semantics which can overwrite the ideological discrepancies of the political agents who use those metonymies. Second, in those metonymies, the whole domain stands for the part which enhances the polysemy of the phrase and possibly the vagueness in the language use. Through pragmatic inferencing, only some aspects of the source and consequently of the ICM are highlighted, which, if the two above mentioned features are involved, can have a persuasive influence within the communicative situation.

To which target the source *Macedonia* cognitively refers, depends not only on cognitive principles, but also on the situational and contextual relevance of the metonymic reference point (Ibid; Littlemore 2015: 27; Ruiz de Mendoza & Perez Hernandez 2003: 38). The speech of the Prime Minister Gruevski illustrates this rather conclusively. Here, the metonymy *Macedonia* was used five times within the first four sentences:

- (1) **Македонија** во минатото даде великани, имиња кои ги изговараме со смирена благонаклоност и со стравопочит. **Македонија** и сега создава големи по душа и неповторливи маченици и херои, подготвени за самопожртвување пред споменот или ликот на кои им симнуваме капа. Јас лично со своите слаби сили и способности не сум направил ништо повеќе од совесно исполнување на долгот кон **Македонија**. **Македонија** им припаѓа на сите нејзини луѓе, без разлика на религијата, нацијата и јазиците, во утрешна слободна **Македонија** и преку неа ќе се здружат сите балкански народи.

Macedonia gave [the world] great people in the past, great names that we pronounce with calm benevolence and with reverence. **Macedonia** still creates people with great soul, unforgettable martyrs and heroes, [who are] ready for self-sacrifice, whose memory and character we commemorate. I personally, with my weak powers and abilities, have done nothing more than conscientiously fulfilling debt towards **Macedonia**. **Macedonia** belongs to all its people, regardless of religion, nation and languages, in tomorrow's free **Macedonia** and through it, all Balkan peoples will be united.

We argue that the target domain of the source *Macedonia* is very wide in these examples, with a myriad of possible references: concrete state, nation which exists in an idealized temporal continuum (in the past, present and future), and *Macedonia* as a concept which has to be yet converted in reality. In these opening sentences, the speaker chooses a particular perspectivisation (Ensink & Sauer 2003: 34) with the widest scope possible. In the course of the speech, Gruevski refers to every possible target in more detail. He starts with the reminiscence of the historic events from the end of the 19th century and the uprising against the Ottoman rulers. Then, he bridges the history and the tradition with the present identification processes which entail language, country name, the overall cultural values, and in his words, "ideas for Macedonia". He finishes with the theoretical program of how he and his government, i.e. the ruling party, sees the further development of the country. His language choice suits the communication goals of a commemoration speech, offering universal norms and values to the public (Ibid 29f.): sacrifice for the homeland, respect of the heroes from the past, the country serving its people and the ideal of a democratic and peaceful society with prominent personal, i.e. ideological reference to all mentioned. We conclude that the quoted utterances comprise the discourse-pragmatic features referred to above: the metonymy *Macedonia* contains clearly affective semantics which arise from the co-text and introduces polysemy, thus it is not possible to derive clear-cut explicatures for each of the uttered examples. From the standpoint of Oswald's cognitive-pragmatic model and Relevance Theory, we argue that the situational factors intensify the contextual effects of this particular metonymy: the speech was held within the theatrical spectacle named "Makedonium" on the main square "Makedonija", passing the celebrating masses through the gate "Makedonija" (macro-event in the terms of Schäffner 2003: 116). The processing effects are enhanced, on the one hand, by the co-text and, on the other hand, by the ideological affiliation of the speakers (national-conservative) and communication setting (commemoration).

The metonymy *Macedonia* is used to express a generic social actor in all analyzed speeches, mostly in the speech of Gruevski, both as grammatical agent and in other semantic roles. Only nine out of an overall 35 instances of metonymic use

of *Macedonia* in the speech of the prime minister, refer to the cognitive model of the STAATSNATION. The main criterion for the metonymic resolution containing the one or another idealized cognitive model of the nation is the co-text. Thereby not only immediate collocates are considered: Republic of Macedonia, state of Macedonia, free and independent state of Macedonia, European and Euro-Atlantic Macedonia for the STAATSNATION and all children of Macedonia, sons and daughters of Macedonia, mutual and unique homeland of Macedonia, eternal and long living Macedonia for the KULTURNATION. Especially in the case of the latter the whole argumentation had to be taken into account. Here are some prominent examples:

- (2) Да се биде Македонец значи да се биде толерантен и да се почитува културата и обичаите на другиот. Така било оддамнина уште пред Христа, така било и во сите епохи и царства кои поминале на овој простор, така е и денес. **Тоа е Македонија!**
Being Macedonian means being tolerant and respecting the culture and the customs of the others. It was so from ancient times before Christ, it was so in every era and kingdom that passed through this territory, it is so today. That's **Macedonia!**
(Djordje Ivanov)
- (3) **Македонија** стана и респектиран партнер во соработката со многу држави во светот. 20 години по историскиот 8 септември, повторно сме соочени со крупни предизвици. Денес, кога судбината не ни зависи од никој друг, туку од нас самите, имаме уште поголема одговорност и поголеми очекувања! Јас сум уверен дека ќе ги совладаме сите предизвици и искушенија! Мораме да го заокружине нашето евроатлантско интегрирање! **Македонија** е Европа, а Европа е **Македонија!**
Macedonia has become a respected partner that cooperates with many countries worldwide. 20 years after the historic September 8th, we face major challenges again. Today, when our fate is not in the hands of others but in our own, we have even a greater responsibility and greater expectations! I am confident that we will overcome all the challenges and temptations! We must complete our Euro-Atlantic integration! **Macedonia** is Europe, and Europe is **Macedonia!**
(Trajko Veljanoski)

In Example (2), the propositional metonymy can be denoted as such due to the preceding statement which introduces the topos of history and allows this metonymy to align with the KULTURNATION model. Example (3) makes use of both possible metonymic resolutions: the first metonymic use of *Macedonia* refers to the state and the second one via the formal topos of the part and the whole (Reisigl 2014: 76) to the cultural space, whereas the whole is introduced by the metonymy *Europe*.

At the end of the speeches, *Macedonia* is used within expressive speech acts, thus instantiating the metonymy resolution of the KULTURNATION model:

- (4) Да живее **Македонија**! Бог да и помогне на **Македонија**! Среќен роден ден татковино, среќен роден ден **Македонијо**!
Long live **Macedonia**! God help **Macedonia**! Happy birthday fatherland, happy birthday **Macedonia**!
(Nikola Gruevski)
- (5) Затоа, ве повикувам сите да се обединиме под знамето на независна **Македонија**!
Therefore, I urge you all to unite under the flag of the independent **Macedonia**!
(Djordje Ivanov)
- (6) Да ни е вечна и вековита **Македонија**! Да живее слободна **Македонија**!
Let our **Macedonia** be eternal and centuries old! Long live free **Macedonia**!
(Djordje Ivanov)

Although alternating in reference, we conclude that the notion of the **KULTURNATION** prevails in the analyzed speeches of the Slavo-Macedonian politicians. The only exception is found in the speeches of the President Ivanov in reference to the Ohrid Agreement (OFA). In these two speeches, *Macedonia* is discursively construed as **STAATSNATION**, since independence, state sovereignty, democratic, European and Euro-Atlantic orientation are foregrounded. This is further underlined by the topos of singularity. According to Ivanov, the Macedonian model of integration without assimilation shows that multiculturalism, as a feature of **STAATSNATION** model, did not fail as some European actors claim. This finding leads to the conclusion that it is the specific topic rather than political orientation or ethnic affiliation of the speakers that influences the metonymic resolution and thus the prevailing SCR in our speech corpus. In the two speeches of the Albanian political representative Musa Xzaferi, only the collocate *Republic (of Macedonia)* can be found. Here, *Macedonia* is perceived as a state of all of its citizens and the topos of democratization and multiculturalism are highlighted.

As mentioned in the introduction, the constitutional changes are to be made regarding the new state name. Variants of the lemma *makedonsk** (in collocations with *identity, state, citizens, people, history, language*) are partly accepted in their existing form. Some, however, will be subject to further modifications, according to the new state name (Republic of North Macedonia). Consequently, the metonymic use of the state name will develop new forms and functions within the political discourse.

5.3 Other social actors in speeches

The quantitative analysis shows (Figure 6) that beside this metonymy, other linguistic means are used to construct social actors. As to be expected within political discourse (Salamurović 2012: 251), the frequency of personal pronouns in the first person plural *we* is quite high. This is especially important in our case, because only the explicit, stressed uses of *we* are considered. The highest frequency is identified

in the speech of the Prime Minister Gruevski, which does not come as a surprise given its length and topical structure of the speech. What is more, the reference of the pronoun alternates significantly. The initial occurrences refer to the party and the government affiliation. The speaker thus emphasizes the great political effort and the sacrifice of the ruling party under his leadership:

- (7) **Ние** не сме согласни со тоа што вие мислите за Македонија. **Ние** не можеме да правиме политика, ниту да дозволиме други да прават политика со Македонија. **Ние** нема да дозволиме други да решаваат дали да живееме или да умреме и кога.

We do not agree with your plans for Macedonia. We cannot do politics, nor allow others to do politics with Macedonia. We will not allow others to decide whether we should live or to die and when. (Gruevski)

These occurrences follow directly the introductory utterances exemplified in (1).

In other instances, we find two alternating SCRs of this personal pronoun: in Example (8) and (9) the concept of STAATSNATION and in (10) the one of KULTURNATION:

- (8) **Ние** сме држава на слободни граѓани.

We are the state of free citizens. (Gruevski)

- (9) **Ние** сме независна нација сигурна во своите одлуки, способна и кадарна да носи одлуки самата, одлуки кои ќе ги определат начините за надминување на тие предизвици.

We are an independent nation confident of our decisions, capable and able to make decisions ourselves, decisions that will determine the ways to overcome those challenges. (Gruevski)

- (10) Да се обединиме **сите ние**, Македонците, Албанците, Турците, Власите, Ромите, Србите, Бошњациите и останатите, христијаните, муслиманите, евреите и атеистите, мажите и жените, сите без разлика на политичка, етничка, верска или национална припадност.

All of us should unite, Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma, Serbs, Bosniaks and others, Christians, Muslims, Jews and atheists, men and women, regardless of political, ethnic, religious or national affiliation. (Gruevski)

In other speeches of the corpus, the deictic *we* invokes either the affiliation to the government or to a collective identity, whereas in many cases, it is not clear who is meant by this collective: ethnic Macedonians, all citizens, or only supporters of the ruling party, and as such distinctive group identity is partly backgrounded. This complies with the proclaimed slogan of the celebrations and aligns with, together with some argumentation patterns (such as state consisting of individuals, democratic values and tradition of the Enlightenment, economic development, education), and the notion of STAATSNATION.

The use of the possessive pronoun *our* is more revealing, since it collocates with *triumph, ancestors, fatherland, culture, language, country, identity, history, family*.

The frequent use of collectives such as *citizens, all* and *Macedonians* are also employed with the pragmatic goal of developing and strengthening collective affiliation. In most cases the use of *citizens* proves to be a clear instance of construing STAATSNATION, which can be substantiated by the concomitant collocates *all* on the left and *Republic of Macedonia* on the right side. The noun *citizens* is used with the adjective *honored* which is the consequence of the communication setting, i.e. the text genre and the obligatory address form of the audience. The most frequent collocate of *citizen*, however, is the adjective *Macedonian*, which here refers mostly to the citizens of the state, but in some instances it invokes an affiliation to different ethnic groups which is achieved through the adversative and negation frame as in (11) and (12). This occurs in the speeches of Slawomacedonian politicians, and interestingly always in the second part of the speech. Very often, the utterances in which those collocates occur are embedded in the argumentation together with the topoi of history, language and culture as important elements of Macedonian identity that advocates a mental model of KULTURNATION:

- (11) Но покрај сите предизвици, закани и уцени, сепак, јасно се чувствуваше дека нашиот народ не се плаши. Дека кај **македонските граѓани**, независно од етничката и верската припадност, **Македонци**, Албанци, Турци, Роми, Срби, Бошњаци, Власи, христијани, муслимани, Евреи, струеше енергијата на оптимизмот и исчекувањето да се случи нешто големо.

But despite all the challenges, threats and blackmail, however, it was clearly felt that our people were not afraid. That among the **Macedonian citizens**, regardless of the ethnic and religious affiliation, **Macedonians**, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, Bosniaks, Vlachs, Christians, Muslims, Jews, streamed the energy of optimism and the anticipation of something big.

(Djordje Ivanov)

- (12) А стремежот на македонските граѓани кон европска и евроатланска иднина е јасен и недвосмислен. За нас, **Македонците**, за Албанците, Србите, Ромите, Турците, Власите и Бошњациите, за **сите** македонски граѓани **независно од верската или етничката припадност**, единствената светлина која не мотивира и придвижува напред е решеноста да се биде рамноправен дел од европското и евроатлантското семејство.

And the aspiration of the **Macedonian citizens** towards the European and Euro-Atlantic future is clear and unambiguous. For us, for **Macedonians**, Albanians, Serbs, Roma, Turks, Vlachs and Bosniaks, for **all** Macedonian citizens, **regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation**, the only light that motivates us and help us move forward is the determination to be an equal part of the European and Euro-Atlantic family.

(Djordje Ivanov)

The use of the indefinite pronoun *all* and the ethnonym *Macedonians* is more ambiguous since they are followed by other ethnonyms, pointing to the distinctive ethnic communities labeled by the Constitution as “communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”. The examples above have shown that these collocates are further embedded in the negation frame that underlines the differences between the groups. Accordingly, the construction of separate group identity still occurs, even though not so prominently.

The speeches of the Albanian politician Musa Xzaferi have a common distinctive feature on the meso-level, i.e. they refer exclusively to the Ohrid Agreement. All this despite the fact that he spoke within the overall temporal commemoration frame, i.e. only one month before the main celebration of the state independence. OFA is constructed linguistically and argumentatively as a groundwork of Albanian identity in the Republic of Macedonia, both in respect to the past and to the future. The actors of the Ohrid Agreement and the previous conflict in 2001 are, however, not specified: Xzaferi uses either the nominalization as a weakening strategy or collective nouns and pronouns in order to conceal information:

- (13) Ова е мировниот договор кој беше и останува најважната наша инвестиција за мирот и стабилноста на државата. Инвестиција која не само што доведе до прекин на конфликтот туку ги вгради и темелите на едно ново општество, подобра иднина за сите нас што живееме во Република Македонија.

This is a peace treaty that has been and remains the most important investment for the peace and stability of the country. An investment that not only led to the end of the conflict, but also has built the foundations of a new society, a better future for all of us who live in the Republic of Macedonia.

Xzaferi speaks furthermore continuously about “different ethnic communities” who live in the Republic of Macedonia, whereas no ethnic group in particular is foregrounded:

- (14) Сега веќе, децентрализацијата на власта, промоцијата и меѓусебното почитување на културата, идентитетот и традицијата на **различните етнички заедници во Македонија**, правичната и соодветната застапеност на **етничките заедници** во институциите на системот, се најважните столбови на новото општество во Република Македонија.

Now, the decentralization of power, promotion of and mutual respect for the culture, identity and tradition of **different ethnic communities** in Macedonia, the equitable representation of **ethnic communities** in the institutions of the system are the most important pillars of the new society in the Republic of Macedonia.

Nevertheless, we can also find the negation frame concerning the distinctive elements of the ethnic group identities in Macedonia in Xzaferi's speech:

- (15) Ова е неговата суштинска вредност. Величината на Охридскиот договор е во врвниот приоритет: гаранција и заштита на етничкиот идентитет односно заштита на интересите на сите граѓани на РМ **без разлика на нивната етничка, верска припадност.**

This is its essential value. The magnitude of the Ohrid Agreement is the top priority: guaranteeing and protecting the ethnic identity, i.e. protecting the interests of all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia **regardless of their ethnicity, religious affiliation.**

6. Conclusion

In order to examine the hypothesized semiotic transformation of the cognitive model of NATION in FYROM, we have explored the communication-linguistic structures expressed in political speeches within the socio-cultural context of the commemoration and celebration of the 20th anniversary of independence and 10th anniversary of signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Our interest for this particular socio-cultural context is based on the circumstance that the nation-building processes are not finished in this part of Southeastern Europe. Moreover, they are carried out within various communication settings instantiating ongoing identity struggle, conducted currently with words and not with arms. The commemoration of this relatively young political independence is all the more important for the Republic of Macedonia since many of the prominent political and cultural features relevant for straightening national collective identity are still questioned. Furthermore, the Ohrid Framework Agreement is considered to be a milestone in the development of a peaceful cohabitation between the ethnic groups of Slawomacedonians and Albanians. It focuses primarily on the future perspectives of EU- and NATO accession. The commemorative speeches on the occasion of the two events under analysis are considered an essential part of the commemoration rituals. As such, they influence considerably both the choice of the subject to be presented and the modality of its presentation.

Theoretically, we employ the socio-cognitive approach to collective identity. In particular, we draw on the notion of socio-cognitive representations that define the national identity as a specific SCR and we determine its integral elements in a linguistic analysis. Furthermore, we make use of cognitive pragmatics in order to evaluate shared pragmatic resources, i.e. socio-cultural and linguistic features and we examine the relevance of linguistic devices used to construct the SCRs of

KULTURNATION and the STAATSNATION. Methodologically, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is applied in order to substantiate the findings in a conclusive manner.

Based on the ethnic and ideological orientation of the speakers as well as the commemoration practice, which are social factors influencing text and discourse practice, we expect the KULTURNATION SCR to be more prominent. However, the proclaimed slogan “Together Under One Sun” induces a neutralization of ethnic differences and straightening of the collective affiliation based on the STAATSNATION model. The analysis conclusively shows that the topical reference influences the prevalent SCR. When speaking about the Ohrid Agreement, both Slawomacedonian and Albanian speakers construct national identity based on shared political values, citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism. In the speeches concerning independence celebration and accompanied events (Figure 5), we trace semiotic transformation of the model of NATION that encompasses complex cognitive strategies and linguistic devices with different pragmatical strength. This transformation is brought about by clearly marked linguistic opposition of social actors, such as *citizens* vs. *people* or *state* vs. *fatherland*. The frequent use of the former foregrounds the SCR of STAATSNATION, in contrast, ethnonyms are used scarcely. Argumentation patterns, depicting a state consisting of individuals, who follow democratic values and the tradition of the Enlightenment and promote economic development and education, bring this model even more to the fore. However, all speeches of Slawomacedonian politicians enfold the SCR of KULTURNATION quite prominently. The quantitative analysis revealed a particular distinction in attributive collocates of ethnonyms, ascribing to “Macedonian” not only *citizens* and *state* but also *struggle*, *identity*, *people*, *history*, and *patriots*. While the general collective affiliation is mostly emphasized in the first part of speeches, a foregrounding of ethnic distinction is noted in their second part. This is achieved through complex cognitive structures, such as negative framing of adversatives, the use of argumentation topoi of history, culture, and language as well as the employment of other cognitively stable models such as *Ilinden*.

The use of PLACE FOR PEOPLE and PLACE FOR EVENT (Markert & Nissim 2006: 159) metonymy proves to be the most prominent feature in the alternation of two SCRs. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis provide evidence for STAATSNATION and KULTURNATION SCR, even though the latter is more frequent and salient. Beside its general cohesive and coherent function, the metonymy *Macedonia* contains hyperbolic and affective semantics which is inferred from the co-text and concomitant argumentation patterns. Moreover, it instantiates polysemy which is reinforced by the alternation of the two SCRs. Accordingly, we can ascertain that affective semantics and polysemy of metonymic use are two

discourse-pragmatic features that facilitate particular ideological influence within an analyzed communicative situation.

When addressing national identification, the leading political actors still appeal to the identification based on traditional features such as culture, history, religion and language. In addition, considering the absence of Albanian politicians as the discursive feature of the overall commemoration event, we conclude that semi-otic transformation of the cognitive model of NATION in Republic of Macedonia is moderately evolving.

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Epilogue

The chapters in this volume focus on a variety of topics and reflect the heterogeneity of the ongoing socio-political changes and multifaceted transformation processes in selected Slavic speaking countries.

Methodologically, they are placed within the broader realm of linguistic and problem-oriented approaches that primarily, but not exclusively, focus on the linguistic features of discourse (Hart & Cap 2014). By analysing languages that are not typically studied within political discourse studies, the authors enrich the theoretical and methodological framework and test it on the authentic language data sets. Cvrček and Fidler, for example, have introduced a Multi-Level Discourse Prominence Analysis (MDPA) as the new corpus linguistic method used to analyse inflexional morphemes as relevant discursive-linguistic devices within ideologically marked discourses. The further application of this method on Slavic and other languages with a rich inflexional system can substantially complement the way the discourse analysis has been conducted until now.

The authors of the chapters in this volume position themselves within the field of linguistics, but at the same time, they acknowledge and adopt the interdisciplinary perspective of the discourse studies that hold the view that “social and political order is constructed in communication” (Angermüller & Maingueneau & Wodak 2014: 4). The authors analyse the applied linguistic structures not only against their pragmatic functions, but also against their specific social and political functions in a given institutional setting. Berrocal has demonstrated that delegitimization in parliamentary debates is manifested as a complex communication act which involves not only the individual and the group face, but also the sociality rights and obligations of the political actors. Koller sets the results of her analysis conclusively within the realm of ideological tensions between the West and the East in the sense that particular language devices can evoke and/ or affirm particular identities based on opposite value systems which are elements of the discursive macro-level. Furthermore, the strength of the volume is that it tackles issues such as the affiliation to different political and social groups within parliamentary settings, national identity, gender and minorities, cultural memory and reconciliation. All of these are relevant topics within current research concerning social sciences, such as in studies of party systems and politics in general, sociology of gender and ethnicity, and peace and conflict studies, to name a few.

In addition, the presented case studies contribute not only to the knowledge about the current discursive-communication practices in the selected Slavic countries, but also to the critical reflection on these practices. Majstorović, for example, links the results of her analysis with the (im)possibility of taking a critical stance towards the war and the post-war society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The issue is that in the educational institutions, the cultural environment and in the media, the young generation are considered traitors each and every time they try to challenge the content of the prevailing public discourse. Without abandoning or reversing the essentialist “history repeating” narratives, even a minimum consensus with other ethnic communities cannot be achieved. Similarly, Sonja Riehn points to the problems of the strongly biased memory towards the past in Croatia; on the one hand, nationalistic-conservative narratives prevail regardless of the at times different ideological orientations of the Croatian governments, whilst on the other hand, the possible reconciliation is hindered because the view of the Serbian minority living in Croatia regarding the Homeland War is hardly considered. These insights, based on a comprehensive linguistic analysis, are beneficial to other agents outside academia, such as NGOs or think tanks, and provide additional incentives and lay foundations for further discussions.

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This edited volume offers new insights into contemporary political discourses in Slavic speaking countries by focusing on discursive and linguistic means deployed in relevant genres, such as parliamentary discourse, commemorative and presidential speeches, mediated communication, and literal and philosophical essays. The depth of the linguistic analysis reflects different levels of linkage between language and social practice constituting the discourse. The theoretical and methodological approaches discussed range from interactional pragmatics over corpus linguistics to CDA. The chapters contain original language material in Russian, Polish, Czech, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian, and the authors address issues such as the affiliation to different political and social groups within parliamentary settings, national identity, gender and minorities, as well as cultural memory and reconciliation.

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