Doxastic Dialectics

Rodica Amel

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'Si, au contraire, on prend comme concept général
de départ, non celui de monde, mais celui de culture,
la question revêt aussitôt tout autre aspect.'

Ernst Cassirer, *La philosophie des formes symboliques,* I: 21

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FOREWORD

Each theoretical construction is a RESPONSE to a demand, implicitly or explicitly engaged by the conclusions formulated in a previous stage of the history of ideas.

The scientific/philosophical *demand* of our moment, to which we intend to answer, has two levels of interest: (a) a fundamental one – to express our point of view regarding the philosophical ground of pragmatics; (b) a general one – to propose a re-evaluation of traditional concepts of linguistics, semiotics and philosophy of language. Our critical attitude requires a conceptual nonconformism!

The modern theory of pragmatics can be summarised in the effort of establishing a model of dialogue, suitable to satisfy both communicative and cognitive issues. Since ancient dialectic regained philosophical interest, pragmatics developed in the direction 'beyond pragmatics', by assimilating the results of related domains: of modern semiotics, rhetoric, hermeneutic and especially those of the philosophy of language.

Associated with the collective endeavours in the field of pragmatics and philosophy of language, the present study prepares its answer in re-evaluating the theoretical concepts and conclusions of modern pragmatics.

Some basic books stimulated the conclusions we reached, better said; it was for us a philosophical experience of what 'dialectics of ideas' really means. The *critical* analysis of the history of theoretical ideas – our target in order to bring a genuine result – should be positively oriented towards those aspects which uncover the dialectical perception. Our positive attitude is based on two premises: first, the sense in which we speak about a 'response intention' represents a philosophical step forward which does not destroy the previous philosophies, but is made with the intention of reaching the original sense of a paradigm, its powerful foundation. Second, in each of the quoted books, we try to find a constructive argument.

1. Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund,* 1957, Tübingen, Neske Verlag. The fundamental proposition, *Der Satz vom Grund,* has ontological power. The ***origin of being*** dwells in each affirmation. This could be considered the very true rationality of a dialectical enterprise.

Remark: We should not mistakenly assimilate Heidegger's **origin of being,** which is hidden in each affirmation, as 'Satz vom Grund' with the **existential presupposition** from the analytical logic, because for Heidegger *being* is not a propositional content; it is bursting with language.

2. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini: Essai sur l'extériorité,* 1971, Paris, Nijhoff. We may consider this book a deconstructive process of principles of structuralism '*où tout se tient*', understood as ***totalité.*** This book, subject-oriented, introduces a new philosophical perspective where the subject measures thoughts and actions by referring to the open horizon (***l'infini*** – 'infinity'), instead of remaining grasped within the closed net of allusions and relationships (***la totalité*** – 'totality' = the structure).

3. Michael Billig, *Arguing and Thinking*, 1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The author is the supporter of the *soft rationality,* which during the arguing process activates the rhetorical abilities of the speaker, especially their power of arguments, the *inventio*.

4. Paul Grice, *The Conception of Value,* 1991, Oxford: Clarendon. Grice's concept of *metaphysical transubstantiations* was an argument in favour of our thesis concerning the axiological orientation of doxastic dialectics. The doxastic meaning posited in consciousness is transubstantiated into a moral meaning, which finally is equated with an existential meaning, and so on.

In Part I of our study we will present the general premises of pragmatics, more precisely of linguistic pragmatics.[1] *Doxastic dialectics*[2] is the main issue of Part II of the present study. *Doxastic dialectics* belongs to linguistic pragmatics. The intention to give some important hints about the linguistic pragmatics is to make the main issue of our book – *the mechanism of doxastic dialectics* – easier to understand.

The theoretical deadlock caused by the invasion of extralinguistic facts within linguistics determined a new orientation – the PRAGMATIC studies, especially those regarding the dialogue functions: the communicative function acquired rhetoric relevance or was cognitively oriented. The field was ready to open a new perspective upon what is named the *object-oriented theory* (= the problem of representation). Since this new perspective was cognitively adopted, the necessity to establish the

theoretical place of concepts defining the *argumentative function* of language, which is both *speaker-oriented* and *goal-oriented* (which means the conviction and the persuasion of the interlocutor, conviction formation, discovering the truth and, respectively, constituting the truth).

The *speaker-oriented theory* – especially the way this theory developed by cumulating the rhetorical aspects of the context – brought to the theoretical attention a concept with many approach possibilities: the *subjectivity in language.*

As this concept will be the central theme of a special chapter in Part I of the study, we want to underline only its principal features:

1 According to Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*: 'Die Subjektivität ist nichts subjektives in dem Sinne, daβ damit nur das auf einen eizelnen Menschen Beschränkte, das zufälliger seiner Besonderheit und Beliebigkeit gemeint sein könnte' (p. 137). With Heidegger, subjectivity is not a category of being, but a possibility condition of the ontological categories (2006: 215).

2 The subject has two dimensions: *pragmatical and ontological*, and consequently the language has similar dimensions. In this new perspective, pragmatics is confronted with its own deconstruction. New contradictory aspects demand solutions, a situation which weakens the theoretical unity of pragmatics.

The pragmatic dimension of the subject facilitated the understanding of language as *energeia,* in the way Humboldt defined the idea of language *energeia.* The locutor is the **agent of a linguistic act;** that means speech intentionality (il/locutionary intention), self-referentiality, speech force, intention to establish the rationality of the dialogical interaction, cooperation.

The ontological dimension of the subject means the transformation of the *illocutionary intentionality* into *cognitive intentionality* (remark: we shall explain the difference between illocutionary intentionality and cognitive intentionality in a special chapter, see below).

3 The fundamental interrogation discovered by cognitive subjects goes far from requiring the justification of affirmations by virtue of the sufficient reason – *der Satz vom Grund.* Their dialogical involvement is led towards an ontological justification, when arguments allow the subjects to be confronted with their own consciousness. Language/speech is the way that covers or uncovers

– certainly partially – the subject's final cause. We may consider this affirmation the main argument of Part II of this book. Starting with this thesis we shall develop the idea in conformity to which the *doubt* represents the cognitive force which pushes ahead the cognitive process. Consequently, the doxastic dialectics acquires new territories of reflection.

Notes

[1] Traditionally, the most clear definition of **pragmatics** was given by Charles Morris in semiotic terms (see *Signs, Language and Behaviour,* New York, 1946). According to Morris, pragmatics is one of the three components of **linguistics**: **syntax** – the relationship of signs between themselves; **semantics** – the relationship between signs and their objects of reference; and **pragmatics** – the relationship between signs and their users.

[2] *Doxastic dialectics* is based on the *doxastic logic,* a field developed by Jaakko Hintikka.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PART I

PRAGMATICS – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

There is no intention to explain the pragmatic problems against the background of other disciplines, nor to study the connection between pragmatics, anthropology, social psychology, studies regarding artificial intelligence or other cognitive studies, a connection which seems included within the framework of doxastic dialectics itself. The target of the first part is to prove the paradigmatic limits of pragmatics, its stability or instability paradigmatically speaking. The main problem that should be solved is the following: to question the nature of theoretical shortcomings that the pragmatical analyses uncover. Are the discovered shortcomings signs of a paradigmatic saturation, are they able to push the research beyond the conventional bounds in which pragmatics has been defined until now, towards a theoretical extension, eventually, towards the redefinition of the grounding premises of this discipline?

Our enterprise presupposes a re-examination of the theoretical metalanguage, considering the following aspects:

1. The general design of pragmatics, such as it was stipulated by those researchers involved in the field;
2. The definition of those concepts which compose the theoretical frame (metadialogue, negotiation, subjectivity, etc.);
3. Problems regarding the communicative procedure and the cognitive one as well.

The proposed approach will be dialectic. Each historical step of a science, as any cognitive enterprise, stands in the opening of an interrogation, a heuristic interrogation that engenders a dialectical process of both theoretical and metatheoretical elucidation. The heuristic interrogation regards the paradigmatic autonomy of the science raised for discussion.

The lesson of our critical enterprise has been improved by the experience of different theoreticians or philosophers and their effort to develop classical methods. Regarding pragmatics, its present statute is still dilemmatic. The study of conversation/dialogue, for instance, launches successive interrogations concerning the 'grounding proposition/premise'. We quote in this respect the study *(On) Searle on Conversation,* a book which gathered the papers of many specialists, linguists and philosophers,

participants at a round table on the issue nominated in the title. The volume was coordinated by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren and appeared in 1992, at Benjamins, Amsterdam. It seems that, instead of giving a metatheoretical answer, the researchers tried to extend the field of pragmatic from the cognitive point of view in a direction where the concept of *paradigm is no longer relevant.*

Although we feel great interest in discovering the shortcomings in this field, we do not contest the results obtained until now. By following the scientific history of this discipline, the moments of theoretical saturation become inevitably visible. The necessity to offer a reply, which could change the interpretative horizon, is clear. In the light of a new horizon, old theses and axioms could acquire new pertinence, more suitable for a larger perspective than the old one. In the framework presented above, the following theses will be discussed further:

1. the argumentative inherence of human beings;
2. the reciprocal relationship between *language and thought (concept; idea)* and the dynamic approach of this relationship: *language and thinking (argumentation).*

CHAPTER ONE

PARADIGMATIC (IN)STABILITY

1.1. Pragmatics – definitions

1.1.1. Scientific paradigm

Thomas Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970) was the source from which we have borrowed the scientific definition of the concept of *paradigm*. This quoted philosopher of science has two types of definitions.

– A definition that equates the paradigm with a *sociolect,* the sociolect being the language shared by the members of a social group, which reflects the ideology of the respective social field in a certain period of time. 'A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners. Any study of paradigm-directed or of paradigm-shattering research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups.' (Kuhn's *Scientific Revolutions*, 180)

– A *scientific* definition, in its full sense: 'For present purposes I suggest 'disciplinary matrix': 'disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; 'matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification. All or most of the objects of group commitment that my original text makes paradigms, parts of paradigms, or paradigmatic are constituents of the disciplinary matrix, and as such, they form a whole and function together.' (Kuhn's *Scientific Revolutions,* 182)

The concept of 'disciplinary matrix' is for Kuhn both a scientific programme and a group commitment; in other words, it represents *the shared knowledge* of a scientific group regarding the laws and definitions that configure a certain scientific **theory.** Kuhn proposed to substitute the concept of paradigm with the terms *matrix* or *pattern,* given their *exemplary* character*,* what means to recognise the matricial structure of the

paradigm. The paradigm is a *model,* in the sense of an abstract representation of the theoretical essence of the field under research.

Regarding Kuhn's two definitions mentioned, it is important to add the following commentaries:

The scientific commitment of a social group – scientific researchers or even a larger community – concerning a paradigm represents a coefficient of stability of the respective scientific project. The scientific commitment, equated with the shared knowledge of the members interested to find solutions for the main questions, ensures the scientific communication. The shared commitment is an *authoritative argument* in favour of the common effort, but it can simultaneously obstruct the scientific dialogue by an eventual rigidity. In this case, the scientific matrix becomes a kind of *scientific dogma,* hindering the disputable aspects of the research.

To the second definition, which refers to the theoretical issues of a research field, we add: *In a concise form, a paradigm can be defined by the **explicative principle** followed by the researchers in their research of the respective field. The **explicative principle** is the means of interpretation and understanding of the issues under research.*

The explicative principle comprises a theory, which is based on axioms, theses, hypotheses, laws, norms, procedures – methods and concepts – definitions. All these means constitute the *theoretical metalanguage of the respective matrix/paradigm.*

Katz and Fodor (1963) formulated the same exigencies, which influenced our scientific approach. Here further, the criteria which define the *stability* of a paradigm will be opposed to the criteria which signal the paradigmatic *instability.*

Paradigmatic stability	*Paradigmatic instability*
The explicative principle is affirmed THEORY or a theoretical model	The explicative principle is – confused.
	– extremely general
	– partially valid

The exigencies regarding the stability of a **theory** is manifested by being **unitary** – economic and concise, **exhaustive** and **noncontradictory –** clear**.**

The instability is manifested by: **puzzles, anomalies** and **theoretical crises.**

'For a scientific theory to succeed admirably it does not mean to succeed completely' (Kuhn, 1986: 112). Kuhn was accused by his followers of relativism. We share this relativism, because it gives the possibility to refer the concept of paradigm to the whole field of doxastic dialectics (science, philosophy, art etc.), where 'relativism' actually means the unfinished synthesis of axiological concepts.

1.1.2. The paradigmatic extension of pragmatics

From the linguistic point of view, the pragmatic study has two points of approach:

pragmatic level of language – a speaker-oriented theory, and
pragmatic function of language – a goal-oriented theory.

What can be called *pragmatic level of language* represents the first step of theoretical extension beyond the classical linguistics. The contextual autonomy of language has been unable to explain all linguistic elements: the imperative, the vocative etc. The contextualisation of language elements, which means a kind of *oriented semantics,* opened the chances of an integrative study; language is introduced inside the referential coordinates imposed by speakers, as for instance: *indexes* (Bar-Hillel, *Indexical Expressions,* who studied this issue as part of the analytical logic; Montague, *Pragmatics,* who developed a similar idea to that of Bar-Hillel); the *contextualised interpretation of meaning* had linguistic consequences, by operating semantic distinctions: see the direction mentioned by Grice (*Meaning,* the pragmatic meaning is opposed to the referential one, in Grice's formulation *natural vs. non-natural sense);* or that mentioned by Ducrot (*Dire et ne pas dire*, the *explicit meaning* is coupled with an *indirect meaning*, in Ducrot's formulation: *literal sense vs. implicit sense*).

What can be called *pragmatic function of language* has led to a new theoretical perspective upon pragmatics, based on concepts such as *energeia* of language, *intentionality* and (il)locutionary *force*. Once the 'contextualisation' of language facts was accepted, a new linguistic 'reality' raised the problems of dynamic dimension:

  – Herman Parret (1981) highlights the difference between *referential meaning* and *intentional meaning* (the meaning which carries the locutor's speech intentions);

– John Austin, *How to do Things with Words,* in a philosophical approach introduces the concept of force: *locutionary, illocutionary* and *perlocutionary.*

The substitution of the concept of *sense/meaning* by that of *force* means a change of linguistic paradigm. The same things are differently interpreted. The words do not relate or refer to things any more, but they perform acts (see Amel, 2016). The name of this new paradigm is **PRAXIOLOGY,** or the theory of action.

Linguistic praxiology – the theory of speech acts – has two levels of research: (a) the *speech acts*, the study of their constitutive conditions (cf. Austin, 'felicity conditions of performance'); (b) the *contextualisation of speech acts*. The *speech act* is associated with some concepts:

Act – the change of state or the forbearance to change it, done by an **agent** (see George von Wright, *Norm and Action*, London, 1963): **doing:** pT~p or ~pTp; **forbearance:** pTp or ~pT~p.

Agent – the locutor in the case of speech acts – the efficient cause of a change of state, or of the forbearance to change it. Example: the locutor (the agent) utters a *prayer,* or a *verdict* or *forbears (= remains silent)* from expressing words, in both cases.

The study of speech acts raises the problem of the conditions in which the performance of a specific linguistic act is 'felicitously' performed, respectively: a certain social and cognitive identity of interlocutors, a certain relationship between the interlocutors, the codes they share, etc. All these conditions represent the *presuppositions* of the felicitous performance of a speech act. For instance, a *verdict,* or a *sentence* in a court, should be performed by a person legitimated to accomplish the respective function.

When a linguistic act is oriented towards one of the parameters of communication, the locutor performs a linguistic act charged with a specific **function**. In linguistics, **function** is a polysemantic concept. Roman Jakobson (*Linguistics and Poetics*) translated the communicative parameters in functions of the communication. By starting from the communicative paradigm – and not from the psycholinguistic paradigm as Bühler did – Jakobson was near to the pragmatic approach:

The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To be operative the message requires a CONTEXT referred to ('referent' in another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), sizeable by the addressee,

being either verbal or capable of being verbalised; a CODE fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser and addressee (or in other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message); and finally, a CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication. All the factors that are inalienably involved in verbal communication may be schematised as follows:

Parameters of communication language functions

Parameters of communication	Language functions
CONTEXT	REFERENTIAL
MESSAGE	POETIC
ADDRESSER-----------------ADDRESSEE	EMOTIVE--------CONATIVE
CODE	PHATIC
CONTACT	METALINGUAL

Amel (2016) reorganised the relationships between the language functions, by making a subordination of their forces in a way they could explain the interaction both from the communicative and cognitive points of view. Two modifications are important: the first one – to allow the functional circularity (fc), and the second one – new definitions for each function. Regarding the *phatic* function, it refers both to the physical and socio-psychological channels of communication, comprising the $\pm$ institutionalised relationships between interlocutors.

THE INTERACTION OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS

METALANGUAGE fc
AXIOLOGIC field
(cognitive codes, philosophical options, etc.)

↓

PHATIC fc
the degree of institutionalisation
of role relationships
(socio-psychological conventions)

↓

POETIC fc
A discursive structure

(creative means; sediments of phatic and metalanguage functions;
connotations)

EXPRESSIVE fc.   **CONATIVE fc.**
DOXASTIC field   DEONTIC field

REFERENTIAL fc.
EPISTEMIC field
(language adequacy to the truth of things)

CRITICAL fc.

Jakobson's definitions of each linguistic function are only a point of departure for a more flexible interpretation, suitable for the pragmatic point of view. The priority of performative over interactive functions, is realised by the generalised use of a speech act as a functional means. Since the il/perlocutionary forces have a complex structure in themselves, they are capable of accomplishing several linguistic functions simultaneously. Our affirmation is tantamount to Jakobson's idea that 'we could hardly find verbal messages that would fulfil only one function.'

In conformity with Searle's definition, and including the interactive dimension, a speech act is characterised by the following parameters:

(a) referential function, corresponding to propositional content;
(b) pragmatic function, corresponding to illocutionary forces;
(c) pragmatic-conversational function, corresponding to conversational demand.

The order in which the analysis of language functions will be performed, is the order relevant for the idea of interaction. The CONATIVE FUNCTION corresponds to Bühler's appellative function. In conformity with both Bühler and Jakobson, the respective function is focused on the interlocutor (receiver, hearer). In a very primitive way, we can say that Jakobson's concept equates to Austin's illocutionary act: 'The conative function finds its purest grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative, which syntactically, morphologically and often even phonetically deviate from other nominal and verbal categories' (Jakobson, 1985: 152).

In contradistinction to Jakobson's model, the conversational approach requires the dissociation of the language force which is directed upon the interlocutor in two functionally distinctive orientations: The ACTIVE and REACTIVE powers of language. It is necessary to extend the conative function to include the interlocutor's disposition to respond. When a

speech act is directed to the interlocutor it has an appellative force. Simultaneously, it accomplishes a transformation of the mental (psychological, cognitive) or social state of the addressee. The active transformation makes the appellative force reactively efficient, an opposition corresponding to the already mentioned difference: illocutionary versus conversational.

We propose an extension of Jakobson's model of language functions by supplementing it with what we call critical function. The CRITICAL FUNCTION represents the reactive position of the interlocutor whose conversational attitude is both retrospective (= critical), and prospective (= active), regressive and progressive, interpretative and innovative. The interlocutor's critical position accomplishes a reactive act of validation of a speech act with respect to its fundamental functions: conversational – to accept or hinder the progression; illocutionary – to evaluate the felicitous performance of an act from the point of view of a formally prescriptive procedure, and to justify it from the point of view of the conversational demand, and semantic – to evaluate the truth and relevance of a propositional content.

By including the critical function among Jakobson's concepts, we intend to offer a balanced model of interactional functions of language. We refer to the critical function as a reversible perspective upon the conversation, from the interlocutor's dialogical position back to the speaker's previous intervention. Actually, the critical function is associated either with the active or reactive position, being the selective means of strategic intervention.

Within rhetoric, the critical function is used as a *normative* argument. We accept this point of view, with all of its theoretical consequences regarding the analysis of interaction.

The analysis of the **functional hierarchy** of the dialogue UNCOVERS two important aspects: (a) the structure of dialogue is not homogeneous and (b) the progression is discontinuous.

The reorganisation of the language functions according to a hierarchical scheme emphasises the functional interaction during the dialogue and points out the opposition between *active* and *latent functions*.

Active functions: referential, expressive, conative.
Latent functions: phatic, metalingual, poetic.

We have added a new function – the *critical function*.
Remark*:* the critical function activates the latent functions at the moment the dialogical saturation cuts the conversation.

The most important studies about conversation – Searle, Ducrot, Dascal, van Eemeren etc. – are concerned with two problems: the interactive relationship between interlocutors on the one hand, and on the other hand, the possibility to establish the rationality of these relationships. Regarding the dialogical rationality, Grice's *Logic and Conversation* is the most quoted contribution, due to the four maxims – *quantity, quality, manner and relevance*[1] – relevant for a normal reciprocal understanding.

Habermas extends the concept of interactive rationality by putting the accent on the condition of reciprocity, which he calls 'complete reciprocity' – *die vollständige Reziprozität.* The condition of reciprocity should be intersubjectively assumed (*die intersubjektive Anerkennung*) and should be fulfilled on all linguistic levels: syntactic faultlessness, propositional truth, verisimilar character of speaking intentions and felicitous performance of speech acts.

The question regarding the possibility of establishing norms able to ground a correct conversation – a kind of 'generative grammar' or of a 'grammar' specifying the possibility conditions of correct speech acts – was the main concern of many linguists and philosophers of language. The book edited by Parret and Verschueren, *(On) Searle on conversation* (1992), is an example. The conclusions presented on the occasion of the 'round table' – the object of the quoted book – were rather sceptical: although the linguistic act is recognised as the minimal pragmatic unity, it has no **universal** character, being a concrete unity and not a theoretical construct. The participants at the meeting concluded that it is inadequate to speak about a 'structure of conversation'. The conversation has a free becoming. The dialogical parameters – *discourse universe, shared knowledge, conversational implicature and conversational demand* – highlight the normless dynamics of conversation.[2] During a step-by-step progression of the dialogue, each speech act imposes its conversational demand upon the following speech act: the interlocutor is compelled to react in a proper way.

The theoretical disputes about the 'conversational structure', in which the members of the round table took part, reached the moment of theoretical *crisis.* Our position (Amel, 2016) was to find an adequate solution respecting the exigency of rationality in conversation. By increasing the importance of the *concept of illocutionary force* to which the idea of *rule-governed activity,* borrowed from the *game theory,* was associated we were able to figure out a dynamic concept of *structure*, namely the *organic structure* of conversation.

In our interpretation: *The organic structure of conversation is constituted by linguistic (illocutionary) forces **governed by principles** and not by rigid rules.*

The principles governing the organic structure of conversation have hierarchical importance: the principle of rationality is the dominant one, and three others are derivative principles – reciprocity, commitment and cooperation[3.]

The organic rationality represents a normative self-regulative principle (cf. Amel, 2016):

(a) 'To be governed by principles' means an extensive measure of discursive acceptability.
(b) The reciprocal intelligibility is not exclusively dependent on grammatical rules but also on interpretative and strategic parameters.
(c) Conditions of inner rationality do not represent a regulatory but a justificatory device. Rationality justifies the intention of speech and the selection of efficient means that the locutor does aiming to reach a certain communicative target.
(d) The internal process of cooperation between contradictory forces, requires a minimum *equilibrium* between opposing tendencies which inherently trigger the critical rationality. Inside regular conversations, critical rationality is based on the constitutive role of principles and accomplishes an **autoregulative** role through normative advocacy.

The contextualisation of the speech act inside the conversation presupposes the connection *action-reaction,* which implies another connection: *agent–anti-agent*. Disputes regarding the dynamic mechanism of conversation were, consequently, disputes about the possibilities of a coherent theory of conversation. The studies presented in Part II of this work, by approaching conversation from the cognitive point of view, would raise metatheoretical aspects of the semantic mechanism.

For a sure understanding of the conversational mechanism, the analysis will take over the interactive model of the *rule-governed activity* from the *game* theory. The theoretical accent is put on the conditions imposed on players and, implicitly, on the dynamics of their role relationships during their interaction. In order to obtain a unifying pragmatic theory some preliminary explanations are necessary:

1   the extension of Jakobson's model of language functions (as it was presented earlier);
2   an increased interest in the idea of the normative power of conversational principles.

Although our organic approach of conversation **does not propose changes in the theoretical paradigm,** a turn is done by **supplementing the pragmatic paradigm with an axiomatic premise – a dynamic one.** The concept of 'organic structure' represents a paradigmatic extension of the classical interpretation of conversational parameters.

Being less sceptical and more objective with the theory of linguistics, we may hold that Saussure's affirmation – language is a system *où tout se tient* – is a universal law. Saussure's assertion suits even the conversational terms, which refer to the dynamics of the speaking subject and their coordinates. The paradigmatic extension we are trying to propose (in this work, continuing Amel, 2016) maintains the traditional concept of *structure,* but in the coordinates imposed by the dynamic premise. The explicative principle remains consistent with the idea of linguistic autonomy, a reason to affirm that our programme does not represent a change of paradigm.

Remark: *The **formal** reference to the contextual facts* (so-called extralinguistic) *is not an extralinguistic reference. Any reference to the extralinguistic facts is possible only if the respective facts are part of the **shared knowledge** and consequently, from the conversational point of view, they are part of the conversational **parameters.***

However, during the development of the pragmatic paradigm, both the distinction between the two theoretical objectives – communicative and cognitive – and the intention to settle the systemic anomalies are hindered by the vague definition of the basic principle – THE CONTEXTUALISATION OF LINGISTIC FACTS.

Considering the communicative target of the theory, the concept of *organic structure* is able to conserve the general linguistic paradigm even in the condition of a *praxiological* approach. The theoretical effort is to find a possible interpretation of the dynamic facts in accordance with the classical law *où tout se tient.* The extralinguistic facts gain conversational relevance if the dialogical partners are able to **assume** them. It is a wrong theoretical conclusion to consider the extralinguistic facts as complementary elements. The *shared knowledge* implies facts on the basis of which the speaking partners are able to understand each other and to make rational operations of induction or deduction.

When the conversational analysis is focused on the principle of rationality and its maxims, the concept of *sense* (*meaning*) regains theoretical importance as against the concept of *force*. The meaning is differently approached: *sentence meaning* – the referential meaning, avoiding any contextual aspects; *utterance meaning* – the meaning of the speech act, which is a contextualised sense:

> ELLE: Crétin. Séducteur!
> LUI: Ne m'insulte pas. Ne m'appelle plus séducteur.Tu n'as pas honte?
> ELLE: Je ne t'*insulte* pas. Je te *démasque*.
>
> (Ionesco, *Délire à deux*, 206)

The *speaker's meaning* – the meaning intended by the locutor, by the communicative intention, in the rhetorical context (the conversational context imposes a 'conversational demand' to which the partner should give a relevant answer):

> POL: My lord, the queen would speak with you presently.
> HAM: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in the shape of a camel?
> (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, III.2)

Hamlet does not obey the conversational demand. His intention (*speaker's meaning*) is of 'playing the fool' in order to undermine his partner's position of interlocutor: Polonius considers Hamlet's answer to be incoherent, therefore for him Hamlet is a foolish person.[4]

The contributions of Grice, Searle, Dascal etc. in developing these directions of meaning research are extremely important. The target of the present work is to introduce *an ontological dimension in the concept of sense*, which compels us to operate essential modifications in the perception of the *speaker's meaning* and even of that of *utterance meaning*. This is the moment, when the research opens, theoretically, the way to *pragmatics and beyond*.

The communicative target of the pragmatic theory underlines in to an equal extent the idea of *interactive sense/meaning* and the idea of *illocutionary force*.

The cognitive target implies more complicated aspects. However, the concept of *paradigm* is unchanged – the concept debated by Kuhn – with equal interest for both versions:

- the paradigm as an explicative principle; respectively, the paradigm as a normative principle;
- the commitment of a science community to promote the explicative principles of a certain theory.

1.2. Pragmatic concepts susceptible to reinterpretation

The paradigmatic opening (avoid calling it PARADIGMATIC INSTABILITY) will be studied in connection with the cognitive target of pragmatics. The following issues should be debated:

- negotiation
- metadialogue and metalanguage
- the negotiable dynamics of the metadialogue
- when meanings are negotiated
- 'language and thought' versus 'language and thinking'

The *organic structure of the dialogue* is the theoretical model able to render evident both the dynamic dimension and the autoregulative power of conversation. The optimising mechanism of the dialogue develops negative dynamics, during which the *critical function* activates the normative dialectics of communication. The metadialogical negotiation comprises argumentative acts, formal or informal, as the scheme here below presents:

CRITICAL FUNCTION

Expressing the disagreement   Acts of invalidation
Informal/subjective arguments   Formal/logical arguments

                                          Criteria of invalidation
                                          (NORMATIVE aspect)

The optimising mechanism of the dialogue is taken over by the *metadialogue.*

The ***metadialogue*** is spontaneously engendered the moment an interpersonal conflict is evident. With Habermas (see 'Discursive Ethics', *Moral Conscience and Communicative Action*) the expectation horizon is troubled in an interpersonal conflict. The critical dialectics, presented in the scheme above, tries to establish a common ***metalanguage***.

1.2.1. Negotiation

The issue: Is NEGOTIATION an exclusively normative movement or a reflexive one, content-oriented? Does negotiation represent a procedure that defines only the *regulative* features of the dialogue or, simultaneously, is it a *creative* procedure? We approach this question by opening another one: In what respect and to what extent can we say that negotiation entails the interlocutors' reflective power both to settle a matter, and to judge the validity of dialogue's instruments?

Usually philosophers refer to negotiation in the sense of an *agreement procedure* and any dispute about it regards the pragmatic level of language. In the particular case, we want to speak about negotiation as part of metadialogical *dynamics*. The discussion regards the theoretical level, respectively the *theoretical framework of the metalanguage*. The questions we are concerned with are oriented towards this kind of problem.

Remark: In our interpretation, *metalanguage* has two definitions: on the one hand, we refer to a *metalanguage of the linguistic theory* (1) and, on the other hand, we refer to an *axiological/categorical metalanguage* (2). Our commentary is based on facts belonging to metalanguage (2), but the theoretical target is oriented towards metalanguage (l) to which the *negotiation*, as a theoretical concept, belongs. When specific problems are disputed (at language level), one discovers that categorical/axiological concepts are unclear. By inquiring to what extent negotiation represents a normative or a reflective enterprise, the questions regard the categorical/axiological metalanguage (2), but the conclusions underlying this enterprise regard the theoretical extension of the linguistic metalanguage (1), in our particular case, the extension of the concept of **negotiation**: whether NEGOTIATION is an exclusively normative concept or a reflexive one, content-oriented.

In order to give full pertinence to our theoretical concern, a preliminary commentary about the two types of metalanguage is necessary.

1.2.2. Metalanguage and metadialogue

Any theoretical concept belongs to a paradigmatic frame: it is part of the metalanguage (1) of a particular theory. The solidarity between theoretical concepts and a theoretical paradigm could be better expressed in the reverse way: the theoretical extension of metalanguage concepts (1) reflects the premises by which a theoretical paradigm is established.

The dynamics of both philosophical and theoretical ideas proves that, although the theoretical stability of a paradigm is consolidated at the

moment its metalanguage (1) is crystallised, consequently, when its validity acquires authoritative power, this very authority is limited:

(a) Theoretical concepts could never exhaust the content of their abstract objects. Not a sceptical but a philosophical point of view teaches us that, in spite of the foundation role of metalanguage concepts (1), they are always subject to criticism.
(b) A paradigm evolves progressively and the changes are registered in the 'history' of theoretical concepts (1). See, for instance, how they have influenced the cognitive function of pragmatics: from a study of pragmatic aspects of truth to a dialectically (and intentionally) constituted meaning.

The negotiable feature of interaction can be generalised, because functionally no difference seems essential while negotiating an object matter (peace negotiations; jury negotiations concerning a certain matter) at the dialogical level, or while reaching a consensus with respect to a specific concept at the metadialogical level.

It is very important to notice, however, that the dialogue's negotiable procedure differentiates itself, in conformity with the dialogue's two respective levels: On the one hand, the object (reference) level – interlocutors establish, under negotiation, a certain condition of reciprocity, which is rationally accepted, right, etc.; on the other hand, on the meta level, under the same condition of reciprocity, interlocutors establish what could be considered a *rational* measure of truth, or a *pertinent* point of reference, such as: what are the cognitive, pragmatic, etc. premises or presuppositions, under which the negotiation on the object-level takes place? Frequently, the dialogue glides, explicitly or implicitly, from object-level towards meta level; namely, it glides towards the level where the dialogue parameters are disputed. This level is known as metadialogue level (2).

The **metadialogue** concept will be approached from the theoretical perspective of its negotiable feature. The metadialogue interferes between dialogical exchange by the relationship inversion between *posed* and *presupposed levels.* By gliding towards the locutionary level, those language functions that present dysfunctions are activated. During the metadialogue, the conditions of a rational dialogue are rendered thematic (the interlocutors' standpoint concerning the dialogical issue, the interlocutors' role relationship during the communication, the codes they share or not, etc.). The metadialogue is a complex matter. In its structure, explicative and normative acts interfere. Frequently, during the

metadialogue the interlocutors do not call for normative rules, but negotiate the conditions of reciprocal understanding. By its **negotiable nature,** the metadialogue is 'filter-like', due to which the dialogical functions are dissociated. Both the intention to make explicit the dialogical dysfunctions and the negotiable movements point out the grounding principles of communication: reciprocity and rationality. Two concepts of pragmatics are emphasised as having dialectical importance: THE SUBJECTIVITY IN LANGUAGE and THE ARGUMENTATION.

With regard to the theoretical target of this work, it is important to emphasise that during the metadialogue each dispute emphasises theoretical problems, each demanding negotiation. While the principle of dialogical rationality is disputed, within the framework of the metadialogue, foundational shortcomings become evident. Axiological concepts (the metalanguage 2), their definitions, the consistence of the theoretical premises, all these factors should be explicitly brought up to date.

Within the hierarchy characterising the theoretical paradigm of the dialogue, by which language interactivity could reach an economic and powerful definition, negotiation is not a primary but a derivative concept. In conformity with the theoretical option developed, a moment interferes when a consensus should be reached with respect to a specific theoretical concept, either by developing or by contradicting it (problems regarding metalanguage l).

For instance, a dispute developed on the metadialogue level entails problems regarding the upsetting of priorities: either normative *inherence,* or normative *posed* . The researcher notices the compensatory relationship between the respective terms. Consequently, in order to settle the theoretical conflict, we have advanced, in the study **Conversational Complicity**, the idea that the dialogue can be defined as an *organic structure*. As it was explained earlier, an organic structure shall be considered an autoregulative complex: when the rules of the interaction are not given a priori (as in the case of games), they are disputed (on the metadialogue level).

Remark: The thesis supported in our earlier quoted study – *The Organic Structure of the Dialogue and its Negotiable Inherence* – may be considered as the premise in which the present debate is rooted.

1.2.3. The negotiable dynamics of the metadialogue

The dialogue's lack of norms is inherently compensated by the METADIALOGUE, a special kind of agreement procedure. The

metadialogue is 'naturally' engendered from the dialogue as an extension of the critical function. From the dialogue point of view, the metadialogue can be defined as: (a) inherent; (b) self-reflective; (c) negotiable; (d) regulative.

Within and during the linguistic interactivity, a partner's reaction is always associated with an intolerance towards a possibly invalid sentence or deviated speech interventions. That is the moment when a partner becomes conscious that the dialogic premises (contextual, referential, semantic, pragmatic etc.) are not part of a presumed mutuality. Critical attitude is *intuitively* normative. A fully rational agent proves both a communicative intention and a normative vigilance. The normative vigilance permits an increased linguistic power by means of explicit acts. *The object of the present study is to decide whether the metadialogue itself is exclusively normative or also has creative force.*

The conscience of mutuality, and the effort to delimit the field of that mutuality engenders the complicated dynamics of agreement. There is a procedure of agreement, through which interlocutors discover and fit together the constitutive terms of their cooperation.

The effort to reach consent, is displayed by means of bargaining steps. Each dialogical conflict, concerning formal errors, involves meaning misunderstandings. The dialogue does not start with fully explicit terms.

We shall ignore that the nature of metadialogue is complex and its range is extremely large. The metadialogue's structure is composed both of normative and explicative acts – a dialogical reality of great importance.

By a more profound reflection with respect to dialogue, we have become less confident that the 'consent', regarding all kind of premises involved in communication, could become fully explicit. The cognitive premises, which are the important ones, remain uncertain. Dialogue is the field where a confirmation is expected in order to satisfy not only the principle of reciprocity, but especially the principle of intelligibility. *If the need for communicative 'intelligibility' is limited on the level of understanding the words and avoids reaching the depth of the meaning, the target of human communication is deprived of its real function. In this case, it is impossible to appreciate the dialogical relevance.*

As an example: A regular debate on the election campaign, the issue of which is: 'What is persuasively more efficient during an election campaign – either to emphasise a candidate's personality, their personal features and deeds, or to quote the words uttered by the candidate at different times?' The discussion reaches immediately the metadialogue level: the participants discover that no agreement exists between them, concerning the manipulative role of mass media and the difficulty in

getting, by means of mass media, the real information necessary for everyone to establish individual judgement. The debate turns its interest towards finding an 'agreement' regarding abstract ideas: manipulation of consciousness, the manipulative target of mass media, reasons of the manipulative acts, different forms of mass media and their differently oriented tools of manipulation, and other associatively involved aspects.

Due to the liberty with which criticism is able to emphasise its target, the normative task, overtaken by metadialogue, becomes very complicated. The metadialogue is the moment when interlocutors uncover new dialogical difficulties.

There are many ways of contradicting a sentence and refuting a speech intervention. Due to a too rapidly manifested satisfaction, one would think that we would focus our discourse on the inventive power of negotiation on the extremely prolific Man's ability to contradict. Under the issue, which is perceived differently by each interlocutor, there is an abstract field of intelligibility that each participant tries to reach and about which we are trying to speak.

Due to the bargaining procedure of agreement, each participant takes the position of a referee, a position that is immanent to the dialogue's own progression, and not exterior to it, as it is in a regulated game.

There is an apparently unsettled theoretical contradiction between the conversation's lack of norms and consents (cognitive premises and existential presuppositions being included) and the possibilities that the metalanguage function (2) has for emphasising the relevance of critical arguments. In each act of contradiction a consent is *expected, otherwise the dispute remains a fallacious game, a pure eristic change.*

What does a 'consensus' really entail? If we speak about cognitive consensus, we speak firstly about a kind of posed data (affirmations, opinions etc.) and, secondly, about a posed meaning (a 'semantic consent').

A theoretical problem: the agreement should be conceived of not only as a dialectical movement of reaching a consensus. It does not exclude from conversation the existence of cognitive norms. But we would rather emphasise that the relevance and validity of meanings is susceptible to being contradicted. *Arguments regarding meaning of any kind (*concrete or abstract examples) *are disputable.* The most important thing, relevant for the idea of this book, is that during a debate, each movement of convincing or persuading the interlocutor is simultaneously a movement of *self-persuasion*.

1.2.4. When MEANINGS are NEGOTIATED

Our main inquiry concerns the cognitive function of negotiation. In order to reach a full explanation of the dialectical mechanism, our topic refutes to presume an *exclusively* pragmatic premise concerning the dialogue and its negotiable inherence.

Our second target is metalinguistic, and it is focused on theoretical conclusions, derived from the way the negotiation is understood as a mechanism. It is extremely important to know how the *concept of negotiation* is defined, in order to establish the paradigmatic status of the dialogue.

1.2.5. Cognitive intentionality

Pragmatics is the theoretical paradigm within which the meanings and the truth are grounded by cognitive intentionality. The cognitive intentionality gets its largest extension by means of an interactive process. Truth can be dialectically constituted –the truth under power of contradiction – only by considering the rhetorical context, namely by considering the possibility the speaker has to make the meaning pertinent. Pragmatics does no more speak about truth itself, but emphasises the discursive intelligibility, in order to establish the conditions of *reaching the truth by (reciprocal) understanding*. The metadialogical negotiation – our issue – is less important, in 'traditional' terms, when no real distinction was made between interpretative and normative arguments.

The goal of our thesis is to re-establish the metaphysical autonomy of the cognitive function of the dialogue, when the normative terms of truth are excluded. Each metadialogical step evinces that what is under inquiry is 'the measure of truth'. But what does 'the measure of truth' really mean? Therefore, we are actually trying to demonstrate that any dialectics (= dialogue), during negotiation, extends the object-space of intelligibility. The space of the metadialogue, understood in this way, represents the space where *understanding is reciprocally increased*. By means of interpretative arguments, the meanings of words engender a NOUMENAL (= INTELLIGIBLE) power which is autonomous. Actually, the NOUMENAL power represents the intelligible ground of meaning, which is assumed by consciousness and infinitely deepened *by/in* it.

By putting theoretical emphasis on the argumentative function of the metadialogue to stir the reflective acts, an important issue of the cognitive pragmatics gets another profile as usually accepted. The dialogue's function is to increase, by means of metadialogue, the intelligible force of

cognitive premises. Concomitantly – and this is the thesis we are supporting – the critical function of the dialogue, which was restricted to the normative framework of a '(meta)dialogue raisonné', gets a **reductive power** from an intelligible point of view. For instance, a disguised cognitive target underlies even a jury negotiation, proving its creative potential. When the publication of a book or the approval of a work of art are on trial, standards are called for. In the case of a 'nonconformist' object, standards are challenged and the negotiations inherently entail categorical disputes, inquiring into the *meanings* of the respective categories.

When **meanings are negotiated** on the metadialogical level, the principle of intelligibility activates the mental depth of the respective meaning, and that process represents the dynamics during which BELIEFS are consolidated. At this moment, the cognitive studies go beyond the normative target.

1.2.6. Conceptual procedure

Nobody can contest that when opinions are disputed, speakers try to justify their beliefs. By considering the cognitive orientation of pragmatics, there is no real misunderstanding on the following points:

(a) Pragmatics *approache*s truth by means of opinions/arguments about truth.
(b) Due to the negotiable inherence of the argumentation, a consensus is aimed at by grounding arguments.
(c) The consensus is possible by finding cognitive premises, therefore, through metadialogue: the argumentative/justificatory structure of metadialogue underlies a *discovering* procedure.

The 'truth of opinions' belongs to the field of intelligibility, in respect to which *creativity* means the *effort of conceptualisation*, and *rationality* means the effort of finding *justificatory pertinence of the respective concepts*.

In the chapters of Part II we shall find the proper room to extend the commentary regarding the conceptual logic of meaning, but for a moment we mention that, for the 'deep structure' of meanings the pragmatic paradigm becomes insufficient as a philosophical answer. Theoretically, pragmatics is a stable paradigm in itself, but because cognitive reasons, it is not sufficiently powerful to explain the dialectical mechanism. The paradigmatic position of negotiation proves a functional complexity.

Pragmatics displays the reductive steps of the conceptual procedure.

The 'effort of conceptualisation', extended by the negotiable structure of the metadialogue, cannot be reduced to pragmatics. During the 'discovery procedure', another pragmatic concept becomes relevant, that of *cognitive intentionality*.

1.3. Conclusion

From 'LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT'
to 'LANGUAGE AND THINKING'

Whenever subject- and language-dependence of knowledge is under inquiry a possible question arises: *When and to what extent is argumentative intentionality related to cognitive intentionality?*

Remarks: *illocutionary/argumentative intentionality* belongs to the **pragmatic** paradigm and represents the effort of the speaker to obtain a certain effect upon the interlocutor, by means of the speech acts they perform; *cognitive intentionality* is a concept belonging to the philosophical paradigm of **phenomenology**, and represents the orientation of the consciousness towards a certain object; during this relationship, the cognitive subject reaches the NOUMENAL (*eidetic = the idea)* power of the object.

Although apparently innocent, this question challenges the theoretical premise of pragmatics, namely the paradigmatic premises of pragmatics: Any discussion about intentionality questions the philosophical alternative: can we speak, instead of the subjective dynamics of THINKING, about the classical metaphysics of THOUGHT?

Not exactly. Ignored by pragmatics, the target of the interlocutors' cognitive intentionality returns cognition to its phenomenological issue. The 'persuasive truth' of beliefs represents an 'objective' space developed in consciousness. The negotiable structure of the dialogue should be interpreted as the process of a phenomenological reduction, during which the noumenal intelligibility of meanings is consolidated in consciousness.

The creative power of negotiation is relevant both for the intelligible procedure of meanings (metalanguage 2) and for the theoretical premises of the pragmatic paradigm (metalanguage 1). We discover that the 'classical' definition of pragmatics is only a phenomenological step towards an eidetic discovery.

Notes

[1] The maxims of the conversation have a normative character, designed to ensure the rationality and the intelligibility of linguistic interactions. See Grice's definitions in the annexes.

[2] The concept *discourse universe* refers to the amount of information conveyed during the dialogue; it is the informational 'corpus', part of the *posed data.*

The concept *shared knowledge* refers to the complete data presupposed to be shared by both interlocutors – the *presupposed data.*

The concept *conversational implicature* was introduced and defined by Grice. It has the characteristics of a logical implication: *if p, then q,* which means: 'He has said that *p*; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the cooperative principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that *q*.'

The concept *conversational demand* was defined by Dascal:

'Utterances in a conversation are typically reactive. What each utterance reacts to is what its speaker perceives as the 'demand' placed upon it at that stage of conversation' (1992: 45).

[3] See the definitions in the Annex.

[4] See more on this subject in Amel (2016: chapter 'Critical function of language' and chapter 'Coherence and the principle of rationality').

CHAPTER TWO

SUBJECTIVITY IN LANGUAGE

2.1. Theoretical target

2.1.1. The basic theme

SUBJECTIVITY IN LANGUAGE represents the basic theme of pragmatics. Generally speaking, linguistic pragmatics is defined as the *theory of the contextualised linguistic facts*. This affirmation requires some additional specifications. By following the scheme of language functions, pragmatics is a

- *subject-oriented* (= expressive function),
- *goal-oriented* (= conative function: conviction, persuasion), and
- *object-oriented* (= referential function) theory.

Each of these aspects of pragmatics comprises references to 'extralinguistic' but not to 'extradialogical' facts. Contextualisation presupposes *a shared knowledge* by the participants at a conversation, and all of them can refer, or are able to understand any reference, to particular facts. Contextualisation is an integral part of interaction (conversational/ dialogical).

From the theoretical point of view, linguistic pragmatics has a *communicative* orientation and a *cognitive* approach.

The cognitive enterprise cannot avoid the analysis of the dialogical structure. The speaking subjects, who make affirmations or express their opinions about a certain object/fact/situation, are connected to each other by different relationships. Besides the affirmation or rejection acts, the dialogical structure which has a cognitive target implies acts that can prove or ground the affirmations/rejections in debate. In this condition, the dialogue becomes an **argumentative** interaction.

2.1.2. New concepts

The target of Part I of the work is to explain, first and foremost, the essential problems of *subjectivity in language,* problems relevant for the linguistic theory. The *subjectivity in language* is an issue with theoretical consequences for the concept of *language.* In contrast with the traditional trend, new dimensions of the old concepts are involved and new concepts must be defined:

– referentiality – self-referentiality
– *energeia* – linguistic and cognitive
– consciousness

The concept of 'language' is investigated as against the pragmatic paradigm, the (in)stability of which we intend to prove.

2.2. The concept of subjectivity

2.2.1. A complex and disputed problem

Our investigation concerning the *subjectivity in language* excludes any considerations regarding the subject's psychology, the relationship between conscient/inconscient, the personal reasons of acting, the expressive manifestation of the subjective impulse, etc.
The analysis is focused on the parameters defining the speaking subject:

– *agent* quality: the ability to initiate and to take part in a verbal interaction;
– *strategic rationality:* the decision to take part or to avoid participation, to organise *coalitions,* to *challenge* a dialogue, to *assign* communicative positions;
– *critical rationality:* by which the therapeutic mechanism of the metalanguage is engendered;
– *dialogical and cognitive intentionality;*
– *creativity*: the speaking subject is the '*spokesman*' of a cultural tradition and is also the *innovator* of new patterns of thinking.

2.2.2. **Beyond pragmatics**

From this point of view, our interest is especially concentrated on the balance between judgements (explicit or implicit) and prejudgements/prejudices.

The analysis of the respective parameters allows theoretical syntheses, making evident the point from where the listed parameters extend the research *beyond pragmatics*.

2.3. Discursive subject and discursive dynamics

The subjectivity in language is a problem which for a long time has been exclusively analysed from the pragmatic perspective of communication, the cognitive extension being ignored. The cognitive perspective has a hermeneutical implication, which interferes at the moment the process of ***conceptual synthesis*** takes place*.* Our work has no exhaustive ambitions, the conceptual synthesis referring only to concepts that compose the axiomatic metalanguage. The cognitive stage highlights the importance of the concept of **subject,** due to which a new perspective about the concept of **language** should be formulated.

If the *subjectivity in language* creates new theoretical approaches, the question is whether the theory of conversation is outside the traditionally conceived scientific paradigm of language or not. From the classical perspective, according to which the 'extralinguistic' elements have been excluded, the answer seems to be 'yes'. But by recalling the affirmation uttered above – in a conversation, the *extralinguistic facts are not extradialogical* – the answer is 'no'. The theoreticians and the philosophers of language were constrained to review the linguistic theory. From the philosophical point of view, language has elements that have more communicative functions than the referential one. Even the referential function has a cognitive object. The communicative mechanism enriched by cognitive benefits opened the chapter of argumentative studies. The new theoretical interests engender theoretical and practical difficulties and obstacles of the *puzzles* type.

Subjectivity is present in those linguistic aspects which have remained unexplained by the classical theories: structuralism and generativism. Concomitantly, the researchers have discovered the shortcoming of the pragmatic paradigm caused by the semantic dimension. Despite the powerful principle defining it – the explicative principle – the description of the pragmatic paradigm *cannot be exhaustive*.

Subjectivity is an inherent parameter of language, because it is the bearer of the *creative* and *formative* principles. The new chapters of the theory of cognition entail a transfer of language functions from the communicative to the cognitive field. The theoretical consequences of this movement become the first proofs of the **paradigmatic instability of pragmatics.**

The traditional concept of 'language function' should take into account two problems: the subject's self-referentiality and the subject's destructive function.

2.4. Referentiality – self-referentiality

2.4.1. Self-referentiality and the history of the concept

The *agent* quality of the subject opens a new aspect of research – the self-referentiality of language.

'Self-referentiality' is a new dimension of language. The concept was introduced by Benveniste (1966: *Problèmes de linguistique générale*). The research of the self-referentiality of language represents a new approach of language which is no longer studied exclusively in relation with an *object of reference,* the third person. The first and the second persons of the pronoun have special linguistic functions, when language is referring to itself. The respective linguistic functions, recognised as *conative* acts (acts of the first person while addressing a second person), are linguistically marked by specific signs. While defining the *self-referential* feature of language, Benveniste established the opposition: the act of *énonciation* (English: enunciation) versus the result of the enunciation act – the *énoncé* (English: statement).

Enunciation – the concept introduced by Benveniste – should not be confused with *parole,* the Sausurian concept; *enunciation* represents an *act,* a communicative option, while *parole* represents the individual dimension of language in its dynamics, deprived of communicative intention. *Parole* is a structural concept, while *enunciation* is a pragmatic one.

Oswald Ducrot, the French linguist, attached the concept of *text* to that of *énoncé.* Both concepts 'font l'objet d'un *choix unique* … et dont la fin est déjà prevue par l' auteur au moment où il rédige le début.' (1984:176) Austin's theory of speech acts extends implicitly the idea of self-referentiality of language, by speaking about the **illocutionary force** of language, force activated in the communicative time – in the **present** time of speaking. Austin's concern was philosophical: the scholastic conception

regarding the equivalence between language and thinking did not answer all linguistic facts. The traditional philosophy of language was exclusively oriented towards the problem of referentiality, avoiding to explain those linguistic forms as imperative, vocative, pronoun forms, etc. The illocutionary force assigned the role of *agent* to linguistic subject who, from the cognitive perspective, becomes an active factor of cognition.

The communicative functions, set by Bühler and Jakobson, extended the problem of self-referentiality. The communicative intentionality implies self-referentiality and so it is included inside the communicative scheme. In order to understand the subject's strategic rationality, the communicative scheme offers the possibility to 'visualise' the communicative intentionality in its path that goes through different dialogical levels.

Independently of Benveniste, Bühler considered it important 'to limit the dominance of the representational function of language'. He established a triadic scheme of functions: *expression* (function concentrated on the locutor), *representation* (function concentrated on the object of communication, respectively the object of cognition) and *appeal* (function concentrated on the interlocutor). Bühler's programme was extended by Jakobson. Jakobson's starting point for his theory of language functions was the communicative paradigm and not the psycholinguistic one, as in the case of Bühler, who was a psycholinguist. Jakobson's scheme, based on communicative relationships, is more suitable for our argumentation (see the annexes).

2.4.2. The deconstructive role of the subject

Derrida is the philosopher who underlines the role of the subject inside a structure: the pressure of the institution to which the subject belongs is exercised upon the subject – understood as individual force – and against which he opposes his resistance. At the same time, the subject – in our case the discursive subject – captures the negative force and changes it into a creative force, which engenders ideas and attitudes. According to Derrida, the social commitment of the subject develops a deconstructive force, which is semantically creative and pertinent.

On perçoit la structure dans l'instance de la menace, au moment où l'imminence du péril concentre nos regards sur la clef de voûte [= point of tension - our emphasis] d'une institution sur la pierre où se résume sa possibilité et sa fragilité. On peut alors menacer méthodiquement la structure pour mieux la percevoir non seulement en ses nervures mais en ce lieu secret ou elle n'est ni érection, ni ruine, mais labilité. Cette opération

s'appelle (en latin) soucier ou solliciter [= convergent forces – my emphasis]. Derrida *Force et signification* (1967: 13).

The deconstructive role of the speaker (= the subject) lights up the generative *cause* of the structural organisation of the language. This issue allows the structural approach of pragmatics, but compels us to introduce inside the pragmatic paradigm a principle of force (*the efficient principle*) – the subject.

Remark: The deconstructive force of the subject is an inherent feature of language. In the following chapter – concerned about the argumentative function of language – the 'negative force' represents the argumentative position of the partner in a dispute.

2.5. *Energeia* or the dynamic potential of the subject

2.5.1. Forma mentis

The issue 'the dynamic potential of the subject' explains the reasons the linguistic pragmatics can be equated with the linguistic praxiology, without considering them different paradigms. It is important however to make the distinction between two directions in which a subject's dynamics are moving, a normative and, respectively, a creative direction. It is important to understand that both directions can, to an equal extent, consolidate the pragmatic paradigm, but nevertheless they are signs of paradigmatic instability. For a better theoretical understanding of the issue we should consider the evolution of the concept of *language dynamics.*

Language dynamics, with Humboldt who defined it as *energeia* of language, is a concept which, at the time, marked a turn in language studies. Humboldt's conception of *energeia* is different to what the traditional linguistics conceived as the 'social' circulation of language. Humboldt has introduced in language studies the opposition of **energeia –** the dynamic and creative aspect of language, to **ergon** – the result of the creative act. Under the influence of Humboldt's ideas, language was considered a depository of the people's perception of the world (*Weltanschauung*).

With Humboldt, the conception of language gains cultural importance. It is conceived as a *forma mentis.* Language follows the perception of the world that a community of speakers has. Language reflects the inner feeling of things, the internal sense of life. The changed interpretation of language highlights the creative force of the speaker (the subject).

Wilhelm von Humboldt stated, 'Language is the work of people's spiritual power', and 'We must look upon language not as a dead product, but as an act of the inner mental activity'.

According to Humboldt, language dynamics is a mechanism with a double face: objective – language is a cultural depository, and subjective – Humboldt speaks about the **inner linguistic form (innere Sprachform)**. The Humboldtean concept of *inner linguistic form* refers to the *mental labour,* namely the way the world is mentally conceived, given the specific articulation of the mental power, this window of the mind opened towards language. Language, in the sense of *energeia,* represents a *formative principle*.

Remark: Heidegger considers that Humboldt did not refer to the concept of *energeia* in its original Greek sense (Greek *dynamis* means 'force'), but in a purely subjective sense, following the orientation of Leibniz' philosophy.

Humboldt's interpretation of language was frequently invoked as an argument against structuralism and the static conception of language structure. The target of our reference to Humboldt's idea of *energeia* is to find the argument that proves the instability of the pragmatic paradigm. Humboldt's followers – and we are among them – used this concept to prove the belonging of the pragmatic paradigm to linguistics. The consequences of this step have come so far, showing the paradigmatic limits of pragmatics. If we intend to answer, from the pragmatic perspective, the other two aspects – intentionality and sense/meaning – and if we are going to use Humboldt's principles – language as creative and formative principle – we are caught in a **paradigmatic crisis.** The crisis gets deeper and deeper at the moment the communicative mechanism is separated from the cognitive one.

The **communicative mechanism** can settle the paradigmatic 'anomalies' **introduced** by the two concepts – intentionality and sense/meaning – once the *subject-oriented linguistics* is at stake.

On the one hand, the *communicative intentionality has become more relevant as a concept, once included in the illocutionary force.* On the other hand, the *sense/meaning* has been diversified in respect with the dialogical levels:

sentence meaning (the meaning of the proposition, decontextualised, respectively the propositional content);
utterance meaning (the meaning of the illocutionary act, based on *self-referentiality:* the subject's perspective);

speaker's meaning (the meaning intended by the speaker to be the answer to a partner's *conversational demand*).

The intention to maintain the pragmatic paradigm inside linguistics has been possible by enriching the principle of rationality with Grice's four maxims. Our approach of the same problem has been 'structural' in a dynamic way. In our effort to maintain pragmatics inside the scientific paradigm of linguistics we have developed the concept of **organic structure:** 'où tout se tient'. The *metadialogue becomes the mechanism by which the norms/rules are negotiated.*

The cognitive orientation is based on the communicative scheme of **rationality**, but it is more complex than that. The cooperation in reaching cognitive targets is realised by an operative mechanism which considers the semantic dimension of language. (See Ducrot, Parret, Dascal, Sperber, van Eemeren and many other philosophers of language.)

2.5.2. The crisis of grounding principles

The cognitive orientation is in search of grounding principles that can legitimate the semantic rationality. In Part II of this work, our argumentation will bring more details about the issue 'semantic rationality'. For the moment, we mention that the semantic rationality engenders a paradigmatic crisis caused by the complex concept of *subjectivity in language.* Here are the most important problems:

1. Cognition cannot limit its target on the *pragmatic* level. The *subject* has an *ontological* dimension and cognition begins with a question of being: 'What does "that a thing exists" mean?'
2. The *pragmatic intentionality* (regarding the communicative acts) should be related to *cognitive intentionality* (by which the *subject* is oriented towards the object and creates in their consciousness the noumenal reality of the *object*).
3. Cognition recognises the opposition between *episteme* (the objective truth) and *belief* (convictions as subjective truth).
4. There are reasons not to consider *belief* a preliminary stage of *episteme*.
5. Any cognitive act is an act in *consciousness* (not in a moral sense, but exclusively in the cognitive perspective).

2.6. Pragmatics and the concept of *consciousness*

The crisis of the grounding principles of semantic rationality leads the research **beyond pragmatics.** The research is confronted with a double procedure:

1. the procedure of **grounding the acts in consciousness,** and
2. the procedure of **grounding the subject's self-consciousness.**

The consciousness and especially self-consciousness are the fields of a second reality, the thought, or in Husserlean terms, the noumenal reality. Semantics glides from the existential level towards the noumenal universe by a process called, in Husserlean terms, *Sinngebung* or giving sense. This is a problematic, dilemmatic process, open to heuristic questions regarding the *grounding procedure*.

In the second part of this work, we are going to present several aspects of the grounding process of semantic acts, and will try to explain how to understand the semantic rationality. We share the idea that *belief* cognition has ontological roots, being based on *an innate (idea of) rationality*.

The ontological dimension of the subject engenders cognitive dialectics during which the illocutionary intentionality becomes cognitive intentionality. This process entails the phenomenological turn of the referential sense, which acquires an axiological signification. The commentary about the 'change of face' will be developed in the second part of the study.

The fundamental interrogation of the cognitive subject goes further than the Heideggerian question about *Der Satz vom Grund.* By finding the grounding *Satz,* which can justify the *belief affirmations,* the speaker/the subject is looking for a possibility to justify their position. This is a genuine ontological process of justification, by putting the rational principle under the domination of the final principle.

2.7. Conclusions regarding subjectivity in language

The subject is defined by two dimensions: *pragmatical* and *ontological*.

The pragmatic dimension of the subject was the parameter that made possible the idea that language is *energeia*. The speaking subject is a *linguistic agent,* meaning that they have speaking intention (illocutionary intention). The speech acts are self-referential, loaded with force,

searching justification, rationality and the possibility of dialogical cooperation.

The *ontological dimension* exhibits the transformation of the communicative intentionality in cognitive intentionality. By this transformation, pragmatics is confronted with its own deconstruction.

The fundamental argument of the present study considers subjectivity in its universal dimension. The Heideggerian remark

> Die Subjektivität ist nichts subjektives in dem Sinne, daß damit nur das auf einen eizelnen Menschen beschränkte, das zufälliger seiner Besonderheit und Beliebigkeit gemeint sein könnte (1977: 137)

is the philosophical perspective we share, in order to avoid the interpretative relativism and to prove that the cognitive belief has its own rationality. Our intention is to demonstrate, in what follows, the becoming nature of belief rationality, rather than its pluridimensional character.

CHAPTER THREE

ARGUMENTATIVE DIALECTICS

The topic of the present study – *doxastic dialectics* – can be understood having in mind the historical development of the most important theoretical concepts, linguistic and philosophical and, especially, designed on the screen of general pragmatics, the reasons why we have presented the summary of the problematic aspects of pragmatics in the two precedent chapters. By insisting on the vulnerable points of a paradigm deprived of a clear grounding *Satz*, it was easier to approach the concept of subjectivity and to explain its role in the cognitive procedure.

The philosophical interest in the cognitive dimension of *doxa* (*belief*) was a natural consequence of an extended study regarding the dialogical relationships. When the focus is on the way partners in a dialogue make affirmations, support opinions about a disputed object or reject them, the dialogical structure is more complicated than a change of statements. It implies critical acts, normative ones and especially grounding resolutions. The linguistic interaction is gliding from dialogue to metadialogue in an **argumentative** way.

3.1. About the argument

3.1.1. Polysemy of the concept of argument

In mathematics, the argument is defined as the *variable of a function*; in a *thesis*, a *brief exposition* of a study; in logic, a dialectical model of controversies, the *proof or exposition* of a point of view.

For Walton Douglas, the argument is '*a claim* for a conclusion' (Douglas 1987). To the generally accepted definition, Walton Douglas brings some additions: the argument as a *claim for a conclusion, composed of 'a set of propositions, one of which is designated as the conclusion and the remainder called premises'* (Amel 1990: 16). Amel introduces a dynamic point of view, originating in Aristotle's dialectical model of argument.

Adopting the pragmatic terminology, the argument can be defined as *a speech act* that supports/justifies the performance of another speech act

(by validating the truth value of an assertive speech act, or by validating the illocutionary intention of a directive speech act, a verdictive or a behaviour speech act).

3.1.2. Aristotle's classification
(*De Sophisticis Elenchis*[1], 2: 165a)

In our opinion, we cannot speak about *argument* or *argumentation* ignoring Aristotle's way of approaching this issue and not recalling that Aristotle's study of rhetoric was the systematic beginning of the science of argumentation. We shall use Aristotle's classification of arguments (*apodictic, dialectic, peirastic, eristic*) as a point of theoretical reference.

> II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four kinds: διδασκαλικοι, διαλεκτικοι, πειραστικοι, εριστικοι – Didactic, Dialectical, Examination (Persuasive) and Contentious arguments. *Didactic* arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust). *Dialectical* arguments are those which starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction. *Examination* arguments are those which are based on opinions held by the answerer and necessarily known to one who claims knowledge of the subject involved. *Contentious* arguments are those which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted.
>
> Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, translated by E. S. Forster (*De Sophisticis Elenchis*).

The argument classification gave Aristotle the opportunity to classify the oratory sciences: the *apodictic* (or demonstrative – didactic) argument is specific for exact sciences; the *dialectic* argument is specific for epistemology; the *peirastic* (persuasive) argument is specific for humanistic sciences; the *eristic* argument is used by the lawyer of the devil in any kind of disputes.

The classification of the argumentative fields was the model for the classification of oratory genres: *apodictic* – scientific demonstration (necessary truth); *deliberative* – the political discourse; *forensic* – application of science in criminal and civil laws (judicial discourse); *epideictic* (oratory) – in a public field, praise or blame rhetoric.

With Aristotle, rhetoric is proper for the contingent field, dedicated to human actions, the judgement of which cannot be submitted to principles of necessity. *Rhetoric is the field of the probable*, the truth of which cannot

be justified by everybody on any occasion. Rhetoric, in Aristotelian acceptance, is a derivation of dialectics.

> Rhétorique est l'analogue de la Dialectique: Tous se mêlent jusqu'à un certain point de questionner sur une thèse et de la soutenir; de se défendre et d'accuser. Seulement la plus part des hommes le font les uns sans aucune méthode, les autres grâce à une accoutumance provenant d'un *habitus.* (*Rhétorique,* 1932: 354a).

The most innovating thing for the history of cognition was the opinion of the ancient philosopher about the contingent truth, a persuasive one, which can be real or apparent, and consequently the syllogism which refers to contingent facts can be correct or false. The cognitive-logical priority of the concept of truth led Aristotle to an extended analysis of syllogism, including fallacious syllogisms. He was the first philosopher who studied systematically the rhetorical deviations, drawing up a list of fallacies.

In connection with this issue, Aristotle defines the antistrophic relation between dialectics and rhetoric. It is extremely important for our issue to specify the moment when the two fields where distinctively approached. Here are the cognitive oppositions:

> (real or logical) evidence vs. psychological conversion of logical features
> certainty vs. probability
> *episteme* vs. *doxa* – opinion
> realia vs. sermocinalia
> method vs. strategy

Aristotle, who realised that there is a logic of the contingency, advanced the modern time of the *modal logic.* Plato rejected rhetoric, being interested in the certain truth. Because in ancient times rhetoric was frequently mixed with ethics, it is necessary to underline that in Plato's conception, ethics is an absolute science. Neither was Aristotle adept at the rhetorical foundation of ethics. If in our time ethics is connected with rhetoric, it is a phenomenon of decadence that Aristotle is not guilty of. The decadence is due to the wrong understanding of Protagoras' philosophy that 'Man is the measure of things'. Aristotle was convinced that rhetoric has many vices, to the extent that it is dealing with verisimilar opinions, an approach which means relativisation. The excessive relativity pushes rhetoric towards vulgarisation. This is the case of the sophists, for whom rhetorical ability was only the pleasure of contradicting.

3.2. About dialectics

Aristotle's interest in rhetoric was a sign of a crisis within the field of dialectics.

3.2.1. Etymology

Dialectics has a Greek etymon, διαλεκτική *dialektikē*, with the prefix δια *diá* which means 'through, across' + λέγειν *légein* 'to speak'. The original Greek meaning was *discussion,* usually an exchange of contrary opinions. The historical development of the word was in the philosophical direction, becoming the term for the *science of the logical dispute (of opinions).*

In Platonic use**,** *dialectics* had a meaning near to, but slightly different from the original etymon. It meant **heuristic discussion.**

In the Platonic version, dialectics was a procedure of making evident the limits of the cognitive process by discovering the **antinomies** and making the difference between real and apparent things. For Plato, the dialogue was a means due to which the philosopher detected the **aporia** (meaning a fundamental contradiction which cannot be settled): for instance, Parmenides' monism versus the eternal becoming of things, according to Heraclitus' philosophy; words nature: *thesey* – by convention versus *physey* – by original nature. From the Dialogues of Plato we learn that, in the Socratic way of argumentation, dialectics was a logical procedure consisting of a *question* and a *reply* or *logoi* and *antilogoi (thesis and antithesis).* The Platonic dialectics represents a method of thinking, a kind of self-debate. The fundamental dynamism is related to virtual forms of the intelligible world (the IDEAS). (cf. Ion Banu, 1979, vol. I, *Introduction,* XVII–XVIII).

> Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give any other name than opinion? Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say 'it seems' is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false. (Plato, *Sophist*, 264)

Plato's dialectics applied Socrates' dialectics of question and reply.

After the time of Plato, dialectics was considered both an art and a practice of logical argumentation, employed in investigating the truth of an affirmation; in other words, dialectics became a theory of opinion. Aristotle was more rigorous: His philosophical target, presented in *Topica*

(I, 1), was to find a method able to facilitate the argumentation about a specific thing, by starting with probable premises and avoiding a descent into contradictions. Our choice follows the old tradition, including grounding proof inside the argumentative process.

Hegel's dialectics has a triadic structure (thesis – antithesis – synthesis) and not *dyadic* (thesis/logoi – antithesis/antilogoi) as the argumentative theory assumes. In the Hegelian interpretation, dialectics is led by a unifying principle that enables the transgression of a contest/contradiction.

For the sophists, dialectics was an *eristic strategy* applied in conflictual situations. The fallacies were arms, manipulatory means used for winning a fight not for reaching a consensus. According to Aristotle, eristics was a fake procedure, as far as the argumentation is based on particular aspects. Particular things had no general rule and science was valid only if it was based on general statements.

Aristotle's interest in rhetorical logic was important for crystallising our ideas about *doxastic dialectics*. By connecting doxastic logic (*the modal logic of belief*) with the persuasive dimension of argumentation, our effort has been focused on the semantic dimension of belief, an approach that justifies us to call it *semantic logic*.

Anticipating our analysis of *doxastic dialectics,* we can mention two theses on which the problem of argumentation is based:

- The argumentation, as a cognitive process, is generated by the principle of uncertainty; before the proof that can validate an answer is given, everything may be contradicted.
- To consider dialectics as comings and goings of replies means to neglect the heuristic power of argumentation, and to exclude its reflexive feature.

A heuristic procedure is the cognitive endeavour to discover the essence of things. The heuristic approach is released by questioning the nature of things: the problematisation is the generative point of argumentation.

3.2.2. What does *reflexive feature* of argumentation mean?

The deep effect of the heuristic procedure is self-reflection. The essence of things, once assumed by the consciousness in *noumenal* form, becomes signs of self-identity. The target of this work is to demonstrate the double function of the argumentative dialectics: the grounding process

of consciousness and the grounding process of self-consciousness. There is a difference between the *truth* and *essence* of things, as is between *reason* and *consciousness* (in the noumenal and not the moral sense). The interrogative way of the heuristic process is concomitantly a self-confrontation of the speaker's ego with themselves. Details about this topic will be presented in the second part of this book. By problematising the facts, the subject tries to find proof of self-persuasion and so is able to justify their own identity.

3.2.3. What does 'argumentative dialectics' mean?

In general acceptance, the argumentative dialectics is the procedure of finding the truth about disputed things, or, at least, finding an interpretative consensus between the disputants. An attempt to go further than the game of opinions provided the opportunity to find the possibility of systematising the veritable functions of the argumentative dialectics: dissociative; justificatory; constitutive.

The **dissociative** function enables the distinction between three levels: the level of *opinions* – the discursive (linguistic) level, the level of *beliefs* – the meanings constituted in consciousness and the level of *concepts* – the ideas named by reason.

The **justificatory** function, about which we are speaking here, is different from the argumentative stage of supplying proof (material or logical) in favour of a thesis for example. *Justificatory*, in this context, means finding a 'transcendental' ground, a categorical proof, an a priori threshold of affirmations.

The **constitutive** function is usually neglected, its importance in a dispute being relevant for establishing the metalingual consensus; on the one hand, a consensus regarding the conceptual synthesis, on the other hand, regarding the synthesis of the referential system.

Speaking about the three functions of argumentative dialectics, the discussion reminds us of the *maieutic* function of the Socratic dialogues. The Greek origin of the word *maieutic* resumes our explanation: 'maieutikos' – midwifery, giving birth, from 'maieuesthai – act as a midwife'. *Maieutic* was 'the Socratic mode of enquiry which aims to bring a person's latent ideas into clear consciousness' (see Oxford Dictionaries).

3.3. Horizon of interrogation

3.3.1. Informative questions do not trigger argumentative inquiry

Der Zweifel kann nur bestehen wo eine Frage besteht; eine Frage nur wo eine Antwort besteht, und diese nur, wo etwas gesagt werden *kann*', L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*.

By defining argumentation as a process which stands in the interrogative horizon (a heuristic interrogation), the following affirmations become explicit: (a) The argumentation is engendered by uncertainty; (b) it responds to the principle of contradiction; (c) argumentation, in itself, has a heuristic function.

3.3.2. Interrogation vs. problematisation

With Aristotle a problem, and with Kant a problematic, judgement stands in the field of the probable.

Emphasising the condition of probability, the possibility to find grounding reasons seems uncertain. A grounding *Satz* stands itself in the interrogative horizon. In this cognitive situation the principle of contradiction uncovers its inherent character. By **principle of contradiction** we understand the existence of at least a bivalent answer to a disputed issue, and the effort to find a solution for deciding eventually in favour of one of them. The *principle of contradiction derives from the principle of uncertainty*.

3.3.3. Interrogation vs. doubt/uncertainty/indecidability

The interrogation is a cognitive procedure focused on two targets: the object in research and the method of approach (a strategic objective). The strategic resolution responds to the three functions of argumentative dialectics.

3.4. Argumentation and cognition

An axiom: *the argumentative inherence of human consciousness.*

The essential function of consciousness is to find the 'existential meaning', which is a vectorial sense. Existence, *being,* evades evidence. That is the reason why each human act has an interrogative ground, both

practical and ontological or metaphysical. The last resort of the cognitive process is dominated by the final principle. Discovering the final cause remains a becoming effort, during which the argumentative dialectics cannot go beyond interrogation.

From the ontological point of view, the interrogative foundation of cognition can be translated by the Cartesian doubt: *dubito ergo cogito ergo sum.* There is an essential difference between the Cartesian doubt, which is a fundamental (ontological) interrogation, and the doubt resulting from the principle of uncertainty, namely that situation when before the proof of evidence *anything can be contradicted.* In other words: a disputed thing *can be simultaneously true and false,* as long as we have no proof to decide in favour of one of alternatives.

We are of the opinion that the real objective of argumentation (including argumentative dialectics) is to establish limits for the interrogative process.

How should we understand this affirmation?

There are, however, certain persons who, as we have observed, assert that the same thing may be and may not be, and think conformably to what they assert. But we now assume that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; and through this we have shown that this is the most stable of all principles. (Aristotle's *Metaphisica,* Book IV, Chapter IV, 1006 a)

Aristotle established the necessary and sufficient conditions able to limit the principle of uncertainty, by introducing the principle of rationality. Due to the principle of rationality, the principle of contradiction is limited**,** both on the ontological level – 'we now assume that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be', and on the cognitive level – 'it will not be possible for the same thing to be and yet not be, unless so far as equivocally considered' (Aristotle). If P is true, ~P is false; *tertium non datur*.

(a) Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is fully dedicated to the **principle of noncontradiction**. It is impossible for somebody to conceive simultaneously that the same thing is and is not, said Aristotle. However, there are some who think that Heraclitus said, 'we should not consider somebody's words only in the literal sense', said Aristotle.

(b) Aristotle made comments on the principle of noncontradiction in his treatise *Metaphysics,* the topic of which is dealing with *being as being*. Aristotle made the affirmation that all the principles belong

to *being* and have an ontological character, then they are undisputable. For Aristotle, the principles have axiomatic status.

Remark: The Cartesian doubt should be understood as the cognitive way of proving the ontological certainty of principles.

(c) Leibniz resumes the problems advanced by Aristotle in his treatise *Metaphysics*: the immunity of principles (*de principiis non est disputandum*):

–   the *principle of rationality* (formulated by Leibniz under the form of the causality principle). There is a point of rational reference to the existence of a *sufficient reason – reddendae rationis*: 'Für jede Wahrheit der Grund erstattet werden kann'. With Leibniz, the principle of rationality has an ontological nature – *Nihil ist sine ratione* – which means anything has an explicative cause.[2]

3.5. Conclusions

The interactive pluralism of cognition is justified by the **principle of uncertainty,** which implies the *principle of contradiction.*

The opinable features of arguments and the reductive process of argumentation has a cognitive force of transfer from **probable to necessary** (grounded/justified) truth.

Looking for a generative source of argumentation is part of a rational programme – that of finding categorical proof that could legitimate the subjective opinions/beliefs.

From the perspective of the principle of rationality, argumentation has two levels: what we think (*res cogitans*) and what we say (*loquor*). The consensus between the two levels is a procedure *in rem.* The difference interferes between epistemological and doxastic dialectics, between *realia* and *sermocinalia*. In the second part of this book, we will present *sermocinalia* as a level dominated by semantic logic.

Remark: The field of practical life (political, judicial and social) is included on the level of *sermocinalia*, dominated by subjective (individual or collective) rationality including particular normative possibilities. This field is not the object of our work.

Doxastic dialectics raises the problem of a rationality which is assumed by the subject's consciousness as a significative meaning, namely a meaning able to supply existential reasons (not exactly certitudes).

The principle of rationality represents the guarantee that argumentation has a heuristic power. We underline the importance of making the

distinction between rational truth and 'rational sense' (a legitimated existential meaning 'by consciousness').

Notes

[1] See annexes, the table of the Organon.
[2] The historical commentaries presented above were summarised on the basis of Anton Dumitriu's book, *Istoria Logicii* ('The History of Logics'), București, 1975.

CHAPTER FOUR

ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGY

In the following pages, the commentaries will be focused on the cognitive procedures of establishing *the measure of truth*. Are they the things that give the measure of truth or is it the person who imposes their own measure upon them?

It is necessary to remind ourselves of some general issues. From the cognitive point of view, the argumentation is either a demonstration or a debate (= controversy). In the first case, the cognitive target is to prove the truth of a statement or of a group of statements (a discourse). This is the case of a science like mathematics, for instance, and in this field a specific argument is *demonstrative* (*apodictic*). In the second case, the procedure requires the logical adjustment of the conflict of opinions, using *dialectical* arguments.

In a debate (or controversy), each of the participants highlights an idea, or a thesis that contradicts their partner's ideas or theses. The arguers supply material or logical proof in favour or against the disputed thesis. In a more substantial formulation, argumentation is a grounding process, and, consequently, the arguers question the premises of the dispute, trying to validate them. The proof and the premises should be correct:

– the proof is correct if it is true, genuine and relevant;
– the premises are correct if they are valid (applicable).

Argumentation is a process developing in stages:

(a) starting by ***problematisation***
(b) followed by ***hypothesis-engendering****,* and then by
(c) the ***critical examination,*** which is part of the justification procedure[1]

4.1. A: Adapting the thinking to things

Adaequatio intellectus ad rem

What does ***adaequatio intellectus ad rem*** mean***?***

Could we admit, as a premise, that there is a rationality of things which is discursively reflected by the rationality of thinking?

Starting with Heraclitus, who was a philosopher of becoming, the parallelism between things and language was a current idea: 'the order of speech follows the order of things,' said Heraclitus.[2]

The new Aristotelianism from the Padova School, in the Middle Ages, reaffirms the same analogical relation: 'ordo rerum – ordo idearum'[3].

From the philosophical point of view, it is difficult to admit, purely and simply, the analogy between rationality of things and rationality of thinking, as a premise.[4]

4.1.1. What does 'rationality of things' mean?

It means to admit the premise that things, in their becoming phenomenality, have a measure and preserve their measure in a coherent way; if we admit that things have a measure, it is explicable that the becoming of things represents a causal chain.

It also means to admit the premise formulated by Leibniz that 'truth represents the *divine language* that human language should discover'. According to this premise, it is legitimate to affirm that the measure of things was given by God and language, including human rationality, discovers it – **human language has a heuristic function,** namely: human language has a rationality able to 'read' the divine language. Human language is the means by which a human being discovers the truth.

4.1.2. What does language rationality mean?

First of all, it is about the rational principle of explanation, formulated by Aristotle as the **principle of noncontradiction:** $p \neq -p$.

4.1.3. What does *adequacy* of the mind to reality mean?

It means to admit the premise: *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* ('Nothing is in the human mind which was not before in

feelings'), a scholastic postulate, from which the cognitive premise was deduced.

Some commentaries regarding the idea of *adequacy* of the mind to reality follow.

4.2. Various interpretations

The idea of *adaequatio* was interpreted in various ways:

The scholastic postulate – *nihil est in intelectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,* to which Leibniz brought a complementary postulate: *nisi intellectus ipse* ('except the mind itself'). The complementary postulate acknowledges the *mental a priorism*, an idea developed by Kant and, in linguistics, by Chomsky who speak about grammar as an *innate idea.* Admitting the existence of *innate ideas* means to admit, in an implicit manner, that the mind has an inner structure, due to which it has a formative role in the cognitive process. In other words, it means to assume the cognitive function of the universal subject.

In the sense *adaequatio* = **rationality**; based on this premise, Descartes put the foundation of a universal science, which he called *mathesis universalis*. Descartes was a mathematician and his intention was to found a science (*mathesis* meant 'science') able to configure the universal relationships, without referring to content.[5] *Mathesis universalis* was in Descartes' accepting of a mathematical language that configures the essence of the world using conventional symbols. This theoretical concept continues to have the same meaning, denominating the universal, exhaustive and concise 'language'.

Decartes' project had a very high objective: to introduce *ordo et mesura* in thinking, starting from clear and distinct ideas which reflect the **essence of the world.** What Descartes called 'mathesis universalis' presupposed both the explicative principle – *ars demonstrandi* (deduction) and *ars inveniendi* (invention and intuition). The second determination – *ars inveniendi* – opens the door for cognitive subjectivism, a perspective excluded at a time when the strong rationality was exclusively based on the Aristotelian principle of **noncontradiction.**

Remark: From our point of view, invention is the subjective dimension necessary in semantic inquiry, a supplementary reason to fix our research *beyond the paradigmatic limits of pragmatics.*

Leibniz was concerned about a similar project: to conceive a mathematical language, a kind of universal algebra, which he called *ars combinatoria*. The project was conceived as a combinatory logic, starting with a structure of simple propositions from which more and more

complex structures of propositions can be developed. This project is not a Chomky-like 'generative grammar', but more likely a primitive concept of the symbolic logic.

Leibniz's cognitive rationality was fundamentally ontological, having also an operative function. Even if the *ars combinatoria* was conceived as an *ars demonstrandi*, this 'universal algebra' corresponded ('was adequated') to the way *deus cogitat mundi*.

4.3. The law/rule of rationality

Aristotle: the principle of noncontradiction **p ≠ ¬p**

Leibniz conceived the Aristotelian principle of noncontradiction in detail, under the form of three complementary formulations:

(a) *the principle of identity* (the principle of analyticity)
(b) *the principle of noncontradiction* (if a proposition is true, its contradiction is false)
(c) *the principle of reddendae rationis* (the principle of sufficient reason) – *Quod omnis veritatis reddi ratio potest*, namely 'one may give the reason of each truth'/'*das für jede Wahrheit der Grund erstattet werden kann'*.

It is extremely important to mention that for Leibniz, the rational mechanism of thinking is based on the cognitive immunity of principles – *de principia non disputandum* – given their ontological nature. According with Aristotle, the principles have axiomatic statute, which means the same thing.

From the Kantian perspective, the problem of *adaequatio rei et intellectus* had the amplitude of a great interrogation regarding the discursive thinking. Trying to settle this question, Kant became the founder of a new metaphysics, an inquiry of reason's **grounding principles**. (See 'the pure reason'; Kant is speaking about the a priori categories of thinking)**.**

Conclusion: What was traditionally considered a direct relationship of *adaequatio* – due to many scientific and philosophical arguments – must be understood to be a complex **probatory activity**, mediated by language (cf. Amel 1993, *The Antithetic Reason*).

4.4. The scepticism

Regarding the power of the argumentative rationality

To a greater or lesser extent, the premises that were the object of our commentary reflect the intermediate way in which truth/the measure of things is presented to our mind.

Is the *adaequatio* **intellectus ad rem** an axiom or a premise, applicable only in certain domains of reality? The question remains open.

The adequacy between things and thinking is not evident. Its indirect nature was several times the subject of philosophical investigation. Our remark refers both to those philosophers who affirm a rationalism based on an a priori ground, and to those who adhere to pragmatic positivism. In this second version, to discover that an *adaequatio* is possible becomes a complex argumentative way.

This is the field of *epistemology,* the cognitive target (= the truth/the measure) which is obtained by a dialectical argumentation.[6]

4.4.1. Argumentation – argument

How do you define the relation between the two concepts?

(a) By starting with the question**: What are the reasons to say that X is P?**

There is not the propositional content, which is emphasised, *but the interlocutionary force of an affirmation:* A says '**X is P'** to which an *antithetic reply* might be given: B says, '**X is not P'.**

(b) By transforming the judgement **X is P** into a *higher question: What reason we have to say* 'We know that P means ...' and after that stage of argumentation the following question: 'What are the reasons for the assertion X is P to be true rather than false?' becomes relevant.

4.4.2. Judging arguments

Douglas Walton in his theory about the *Argument Criticism* (1987) critically asked: '**How should we go about judging arguments to be reasonable or unreasonable?'** The author's aim in asking such a question is to find the difference between a (pertinent) argument and a fallacy.[7]

The critical-justificatory procedure implies normative acts.

4.5. Conclusions

Adaequatio intellectus ad rem is an issue that when attentively approached proves to be an indirect question.[8]

In order to justify itself, **the mind becomes an inquiring 'authority'** in search of truth. Going beyond every sceptical temptation, once we affirm that there is a possible *adaequatio* between the human faculty of cognition and the external world, we are confronted with the fact that *adaequatio* is an oblique process rather than an open relationship.

The **mediated** way in which truth is presented to the mind explains *antithetic reasoning* of pro and con affirmations; in particular, it explains why knowing is inevitably contradictory.

Controversy is the **necessary** manifestation of a logic which is:

– *dialectically* (argumentatively) constituted, and simultaneously
– constituted in a *discursive – critical* form.

4.6. B: Adapting the intellect to argument

Adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum

(More precisely: the adequacy of the antagonist's argument to the protagonist's argument.)

The mechanism of any dialectical research presupposes *adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum.* From this perspective, there are two directions of truth investigation and establishing the *measure of things:*

(a) The dialectical constitution of the *epistemic* truth
(b) The dialectical constitution of the *doxastic* truth

In Part I of this work the interest is dedicated to theme (**a**). In Part II, theme (**b**) will be central.

4.6.1. Logic of controversy – antithetic logic

Premises:

– The *opinionable* feature of discoursive truth, at the beginning of any cognitive enterprise;
– The *pluralism* of opinions;

– The 'theatricality' of the dialogical development, in which alternative points of view should observe the maxims of cooperation (rules of intelligibility and rules of pertinence).

The cognitive pragmatics represent the opinionable way of discovering the nature of things. It is a cooperative confrontation of *well-tempered* arguments. The pragmatic field of cognition covers both the necessary (*epistemic*) and the probable (*doxastic*) truth. The two domains correspond to *exact sciences* and, respectively, to *humanistic sciences,* which are *value sciences* (political domain – the deliberative discourse; forensic domain – judicial discourse; moral domain /the blame or praise – epidictic or persuasive argument).

It is well known that the theoretical method of defining things in contrast with similar things has scientific advantage. Consequently, the contrastive analysis of *episteme* vs. *doxa,* will be relevant for the subject of this study.

Epistemology is the theory of scientific cognition. It is a critical study of necessary truth. As the Greek etymon reveals – *episteme:* 'science' – *epistemology* is the science based on logical-analytical means. In contrast with the apodictic and didactic truth, proved by *demonstration,* the way the epistemic truth is constituted is *dialectical – argumentative,* by confrontation of contrary opinions.

4.6.2. The logic of controversy – principle of rationality governed by antithetic logic

The logical premises of controversy: (a) **knowledge is not univocal** and (b) there are **many possibilities to approach reality** (in other words, the *epistemological diversity,* due to *epistemic diversity*) – are characteristic for many scientific fields. With Kuhn, the scientific paradigms based on dialectical research do not exclude the relativism of epistemic truth, the **principle of rationality,** as it was defined by Aristotle:

> Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem proposed to us and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (*Topica,* Book I, 1)

This is the unique warranty that the conclusions obtained by research are correct; even their validity lasts until new discoveries appear in the field.

4.6.3. The logic of controversy – the principle of reciprocity

I and the **Other** are the antagonistic partners in a controversy. Their dialogical position is symmetrical, by virtue of the **principle of reciprocity**. The principle of reciprocity was formulated as the problem of **otherness** (*alterity*). Although the antagonistic partners, **I** and the **Other,** are in a symmetrical position, the concept of **otherness** engenders pragmatic and philosophical (ontological, metaphysical) problems. For the moment, our interest is focused on pragmatic aspects.

The epistemological diversity is a constitutive premise of controversies difficult to defeat. The disputants raise contradictory arguments which are swallowed by the passion of being involved in a dispute. The principle of reciprocity should respect the phatic relation of roles, the authoritative position of one of the partners, if it is the case. For instance, in Romania, the Minister of Justice proposed a judiciary reform. In street demonstrations, people contested this initiative vehemently, although they have no idea about the benefit of the respective measure. They have no juridical training (a dispute deprived of metalanguage). Many magistrates (the specialists) were supporters of the new laws proposed. The argumentative dialectics was deviated in an eristic way, namely contradiction without examining the subject. Leibniz was the philosopher who reformulated in rational terms the sophist idea of many perspectives. In the name of rationality, Leibniz proposed a measure supporting the principle of reciprocity. By calling it the principle of charity*, which requires one to take into account not only one's desires, but also those of the others,* it is possible to reach – said Leibniz – *a balance of rationality*. The best means of *discernment* (*judicandi*) is to listen attentively to the reasons of the partner's arguments, their weight.

Both rules of dialectics are confronted with ontological aspects (discussed by several philosophers – Heidegger (1957) and Levinas (1971), for instance, the most important of them). Their theses were of great help to us in separating *episteme* from *doxa,* a theoretical step in a direction that goes *beyond* the pragmatic paradigm.

4.6.4. The constitutive rule of *episteme*, starting from *doxa*

Admitting the epistemic diversity, the research is caught *apparently* inside the field of the *probable truth*. However, many scientific domains are not 'victims' of *undecidability*. Going further, bringing new arguments, dialectical dynamics can overtake the probable result, finding

proof that supports the correct answer. Dialectics is the discursive mechanism that enables the transfer from opinion/*doxa* to *episteme*.

There are two types of truth:

Episteme	*Doxa*
Necessary	Probable
Deductible: analytical operation	Constituted by semantic interpretation
Synthetic operations	Operations of semantic synthesis

4.6.5. The argumentative way of *epistemic* constitution

This is the rational way of science. To proceed rationally presupposes *to be able to argue*, namely, to be able to justify a thesis or an affirmation (to be able to bring reasons, in conformity with cooperative maxims).

To proceed rationally presupposes, to an equal extent*,* that it is possible to *validate the arguments*. An **interrogative procedure** precedes the validation, when the critical rationality becomes active. See again, Walton's question: '**How should we go about judging arguments to be reasonable or unreasonable?'** which sounds, in the argumentative process, as a barrage entrance. In the process of epistemic constitution, *antithetic logic* is the only way. '[…] *Dialectic in our sense refers to a logical game of dialogue,* a verbal sequence where the objective of each player is *to prove a thesis to the other'* (cf. Walton, 1987: 3).

The same author intended to render the formal (= rational) criterion more flexible, supplementing classical deductive logic with non-classical formal models, like many-valued logic, relatedness logic and graphs of arguments, all bound together into a larger, more subtle pragmatic theory .

Antithetic logic frequently assimilates the *logic of justification* (*ars judicandi*) with the *logic of hypothesis* (*ars inveniendi*) in a global operation, both being proof of the antithetic reason. Against the rule of the 'winner', it points to the necessary openness of thought. The lesson we learn from those who argue by bringing justifications during the contradiction of opinions, is that the **logic of controversy is the same logic of *tertium non datur,*** but it is *other-oriented.*

Conclusion: Regarding the antithetic logic, the antithetic logic governs the argumentative rationality; it is led by the principle of noncontradiction, more precisely, by the three principles nominated by Leibniz: *the principle of identity* – the principle of analyticity; *the principle of noncontradiction*

– if a proposition is true, its contradiction is false; *the principle of reddendae rationis* – the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of rationality, applied in epistemic dialectics, validates the alternation of contrary (or contradictory) judgements to the extent that they follow the heuristic progression.

The antithetic logic is characterised by critical and normative thinking. Eemeren and Grootendorst's studies are important for extending the pragma-dialectical perspective (in the authors' interpretation: *the pragma-dialectical perspective,* 1992: 2004)*.* An original and valuable contribution is that of Dascal, who has developed a whole theory of controversy, starting with Leibniz's ideas about this theme.

4.6.6. The dialectical argumentation

This requires that the protagonist's argument be adapted to the argument of the antagonist. In the argumentative constitution of *episteme,* to proceed rationally means to follow the logic of **adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum.**

For a correct representation of what the dialogical adequacy to the partner's argument means is, first consider the logic of communication, defined by Grice's Maxims. Second, remember the importance and the relevance of the two concepts introduced by Dascal (1977: 1992): *conversational demand* and *speaker's meaning*. These concepts suit the interactive function of a speech act, by satisfying the maxim of relevance. The *conversational demand*: utterances in a conversation are typically reactive. What each utterance reacts to is what its speaker perceives as the 'demand' placed upon it at that stage of the conversation (1992: 45).

'Utterances in a conversation are typically reactive': each speech act opens a field of possible answers, which all should be interpreted in order to be answered. Consequently, the adequacy presupposes a correct interpretation of the former speech act and a relevant/pertinent response (conditioned by the respective language functions) to the *conversational demand.*

The second concept, introduced by Dascal, is that of s*peaker's meaning* which means the sense the speaker wants to transmit. *What does the speaker refer to? What are the possible connections (inter- or intra-textual) of their partner's argument? How do these connections uncover the speaker's meaning?*

Speaker's meaning is different to *speaker's belief,* although in both cases *meaning* is the central issue. In the first case, it is the speaker's *intention* of saying what he says, in the second case the *meaning of the*

belief represents an inner perception of an abstract thing (of a value, for example). One can prove once more that the contrastive test is a good means of defining concepts.

The rational way of *episteme* constitution is a combined procedure of three domains: *rhetoric* – the theory of argumentation, of its effectiveness and its strategy; *the applied logic* or the *(in)formal logic* – the theory of argument validation; *pragmatics* – the theory of linguistic interaction and its formalised models.

Rodica Amel, in *Critical Thinking*[9] and *The Antithetic Reason*[10] brings some special examples of antithetic thinking:

- **Conflict between doctrines:** Alternative points of view represent the conflict of doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (*thesis cum antithesis)* in which no particular assertion can establish superiority over another.
- **Aporia (contradiction impossible to settle):** By reading each controversy with a hierarchical design of problematisation: thesis/hypothesis/theory, antithesis and critical examination/ possible synthesis, one may go beyond controversy itself and follow the stages of the heuristic process of language. In a first stage, the antithetic inquiry of thought implies the critical function of language; in the second stage, when ***aporia is detected***, thinking is compelled to admit epistemological diversity.

If one starts with the formal definition of controversy as a logical tool, one arrives at the real encounters between people (either on philosophical or non-philosophical issues). (cf. Amel, 1993)

The collection of studies published by Fernando Gil, *Scientific and Philosophical Controversies* is a rich source of theoretical information regarding the argumentative logic. The quoted colloquy was important from two points of view: the identification of the cognitive mechanism of the controversy on the one hand, and on the other hand, the effort of detecting the normative means of dialogical cooperation.

Fernando Gil, the organiser of the colloquy about scientific and philosophical controversies, opens the volume with a question that fixes the upper and lower limits of the antithetic reason: 'Comment faut-il comprendre les débats récurrents sur fond de couplages de concepts qui animent le mouvement historique des idées? Comme une *aporetique,* ou comme une *dialectique*?' The debates uncovered that there are *epistemic antinomies* that remain unsolved, and *epistemic contradictions* that during argumentation have more supporters for one of the disputed alternatives.

In a real debate the philosopher, or the scientist, is confronted with a conditioned way. 'They should begin at this point with an **If**' (cf. Amel**).** *Adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum* is intermediated by the opinions of those who search the truth.

During the colloquy, some known epistemic controversies were analysed:

(a) Philosophical antinomies: the conflict between nominalism and realism; is an IDEA the formal cause of the object? *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Heidegger's question); the number: intuitionism or Platonism?

(b) Philosophical questions: is it Man who gives the measure of things? What is the role of the myth in the study of history?

(c) Scientific dilemma: atomism; the animal electricity: a bio-chemical or a bio-physical problem. Has the light an undulatory or corpuscular structure?

(d) Theoretical dilemma: is language form or substance?

Regarding *les fictions bien fondées*: Gil in his intervention *La controverse dans les sciences et la philosophie* made an interesting commentary about the opposition between scientific and philosophical controversies. He put a paradigmatic limit between the two fields: science is the domain of truth and philosophy is that of sense.

As a general conclusion, we shall quote Amel: 'The simplest way to speak about the principle that justifies controversy is to invoke *antithetic reason* as a faculty that acknowledges the relativity of any approach to reality.' (Amel 1993)

We plead for an ***introspective power of thought*** due to antithetic reason, capable of *problematising* its discourse and following, or rather revealing, both a *pragmatic* and a *cognitive* logic.

The logic of controversy might seem arbitrary, because it is difficult to reduce antithetic reason, which has discursive structure, to analytical logic.

Each form of rationality mentioned may be a proof of SUBJECTIVITY in argumentation. This aspect is the most important one, which leads the pragmatic paradigm beyond its *classical* constitution.

4.7. C: Adapting the intellect to common places

Adaequatio intellectus ad locos communes

This chapter has contrastive relevance for the theory of semantic logic, the main issue of this book. In a natural way, human thinking requires categorical arguments in order to be legitimated. In the common way of judgement, common places have this function. There is a grounding modality of thinking: appealing to the 'common measure', remembering the traditional wisdom, or declining the reasoning towards fallacious arguments (dogma, prejudices, etc.)

4.7.1. What does *common places* mean?

In Greek, *topoi* is the name for *common places.* Aristotle, who was the systematic theoretician of the analytical logic, had in mind an alternative logic, that of the *contingent. Topoi* represent forms of 'common' reasoning, which are

– founded on ***probable*** not necessary premises;
– the alternative logic, the logic of the contingent, making operations starting with the *accident, gender, individual characteristics, definition etc.*

Examples:

– The common place of the *accident.* The accident is a predicate, like the gender or the proper, but defining the subject is 'accidentally' and not necessarily.

   To appreciate health (in itself) and to value wealth.

– To make comparative tests, or to give examples using correlative terms:

   The best man is preferable to the best horse.
   To do good for friends, and hurt enemies.

In contemporary rhetoric, Chaïm Perelman, in *Traité de l'argumentation,* resumed this issue. The *common place,* from his point of view, has argumentative function: *'la définition des lieux comme des magasins d'arguments'.* In Perelman's treatise the theme about *common*

places is part of the chapter *Quasilogical arguments.* There are many analogies with Aristotle's ideas. According to Aristotle, *topoi* are informal reasoning; according to Perelman, they are quasilogical arguments. Both speak about relations: of *identity, transitivity, reciprocity, inclusion, analogy,* or relations that reflect the structure of reality of the type: *cause-effect, part-whole, common people–idol, example-model,* etc.

The study of *topoi* belongs to *dialectics,* but instead of leading dialectics to the genuine truth by avoiding contradiction, the reasoning starting with *topoi* is in danger of banalisation. The Romanian philosopher, Mircea Florian, in his *Introduction* to the translation of Aristotle's book *Topica* made the following affirmation: 'The *common place* does not represent a banalisation, neither a trivialisation, as it is understood today, but a necessary clarification'. It is important to mention that the logic of the contingent is dominated by the criterion of the *preference.* The criterion of the *preference* is itself a subjective perception, belonging to the field of the optional and not to that of necessary.

There are some common aspects between doxastic dialectics and the dialectics grounded in *topoi,* a reason to introduce this chapter in the book. Although in both these kinds of reasoning the dialectical strategy follows a value goal and subjectivity is the dimension of reference, in doxastic dialectics the axiological force is strong, and extremely relative in the reasoning based on *topoi.*

Topoi was a subject present in all rhetorical studies of antiquity: Aristotle, *Topica,* VIII, 4; Cicero, *Topica,* II, 7; Quintilianus, *De Institutione oratoriae,* vol. II, cartea V.

Remarks: The antagonists should attentively analyse each intervention, in order to avoid confusion. A dialectical training is necessary in order to avoid the confusion between the accident and the general feature, and to avoid the dialogical misleading towards an equivocal point.

1. The *common place,* in common disputes, has the 'authoritative' position of an axiological category. *Topoi* represents the probable truth (equivalent to doxastic truth). This type of truth is dominated by the principle of *tertium datur.* The best example is offered by the collection of sayings, which define the same thing or situation in opposite ways:

> *The good intention has the value of an act.*
> *The road to hell is paved with good intentions!*

2. The *common place* has frequently a negative connotation because it leads to general conclusions by avoiding critical examination. What is considered a universal judgement is actually a prejudice. In the collective

mentality the prejudice is a *forma mentis* perpetuated by tradition or under the pressure of an axiological system, part of the shared dogma.

Zeitgeist (= the spirit of the time) is the most authoritative premise, to which the axiological judgements refer. *Zeitgeist*, in our opinion, is an anthropological and not a philosophical concept, an easier way to find the 'sense of life'. According to dictionaries, *Zeitgeist* is a concept that defines the *spiritual reality* of a certain historical period. The cultural or humanistic climate is summarised in a formula, a watchword, a device, a motto, etc., the force of which expresses the militant mentality. For instance, after the French Revolution, the motto *liberté, égalité, fraternité* became the national symbol of the French people, and was inscribed in the modern constitution of France. The whole emancipated world adopted the French motto, considering it the ideal target of a society. After the First World War, a deconstructivist idea changed the *Zeitgeist* in a philosophical direction. The fundamental aporia **order vs. entropy** were (and still are) the basic words of existentialism. The energetic spirit is more than a lifestyle; it is the support of philosophical questions.

One should not confuse the concept of *Zeitgeist* with the concept of *trend*. *Trend* is the vulgar alternative for *Zeitgeist*. The *trend* is the stream of a period of time. It raises the *accidental* facts to the level of the general preference, which quickly falls into symbolic disuse. For instance the slogans, or the portraits of social idols printed on T-shirts. Now they are meaningless futilities, with aggressive aesthetic effect.

4.7.2. Enthymeme

The *enthymeme* is the frequent modality of reasoning, characteristic for the logic of the contingent. According to Aristotle, the *enthymeme* is an abridged syllogism, belonging to the field of *probable*.

There are few facts of the 'necessary' type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which we therefore inquire, present us with *alternative possibilities*. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character.

Conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premises that do the same, just as with 'necessary' premises; this, too, is clear from *Analytics*. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary' will for most of them be only usually true (*Rhetoric,* B I 2 1357[a] 20–30).

Now the materials of enthymemes are probabilities and signs which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A probability is a thing that usually happens (*Rhetoric,* 1357^a 30).

Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum is an abridged syllogism which refers to the following premise: *to raise doubt* is a human feature. Although the Cartesian saying is quoted as a classical example of an enthymeme, the premise which is alluded to is part of the necessary truth. *Doubt* can be considered an axiom of human thinking, with ontological evidence.

Loquor – in this variant, the major premise *(ergo cogito, ergo sum, ergo loquor)* is valid from a certain philosophical perspective. The identity of thinking and language is a premise promoted by metaphysical philosophy and rejected by pragmatic positivism.

In common use, the *enthymeme* is a kind of reasoning based on *probable premises;* it is either grounded in the social criterion, or it has a fallacious nature. In this second case, the enthymeme alludes to a proposition that seems to be part of the common judgements, but actually is not. Frequently, the enthymeme has an equivocal ground.

Example: *Read my lips!* – a slogan used in electoral advertising: 'The lips speak about a person's intentions' = sincerity (the premise is probable and not necessarily true: the movements of lips are not obligatorily sincere!).

I'll be there in a moment! – a delay that could mean the contrary: 'Do not count on my quick return!' The ambiguity is the source of fallacious interpretations: that of the linguistic act: the warning – (on a store's door); that of the ambiguous addressee (to whom the warning is addressed – the customers or the supervisor).

Sleep upon it! – to postpone a decision and take distance for a better judgement. In this type of enthymeme, the major proposition is metaphorical. This structure is typical for the enthymematic reasoning which is involved in the majority of popular sayings. See more:

Misery loves company! or *Birds of a feather flock together!*
As big as life – the first issue of the new *Life* magazine.
A diluted dose of democracy – the limited character of democracy.

4.7.3. General remarks

The enthymeme is based on the *topos* (the common place); *common place*, being a general proposition that belongs to 'shared knowledge', has the position of a presupposed premise in the deductive operations. The

enthymeme is operative in contingent problems, establishing the relationships of practical reasoning:

the structure of the real – the popular ontology;
the evaluation of the real – the popular axiology;
manual of practical utility – practical axiology.

The practical reasoning has ontological support: the reality is constituted on value criteria. Values are oriented towards a *final cause,* but nevertheless they have a practical finality.

When we speak about the values which are constituted on universal judgements with *probable* validity, we recollect the historical finality of those axiologies which are dependent on epochs and collectivities. *Topoi* reflect the practical reasoning, the common mentality, the *Zeitgeist*, features that explain the manipulatory characteristic of enthymemes.

It is extremely important to underline the pragmatic features of the enthymeme. The enthymematic reasoning implies a dialogical operation of the type *conversational implicature,* an operation defined by Grice.

4.8. Conclusion

The problem of *topoi* as well as the *enthymematic* reasoning belong to the pragmatic paradigm. These two aspects maintain the thinking on the contingent level (utility, preference), a cognitive mechanism based on the principle of uncertainty. A *probable* that has a contingent and not a supersensible nature.

Remark: It is important to mention a historical inheritance: according to Plato, the principle of uncertainty is problematised, the sophists, in exchange, speculated it.

Notes

[1] See Rodica Amel (2016), The Principle of Cooperation (chapters: 'Relevance and Strategic Reasoning') applicable in the case of rational argumentation.
[2] See Anton Dumitriu, 1975.
[3] See Anton Dumitriu, 1975.
[4] From the philosophical point of view, one can speak about the ontological condition of **adaequatio**, that of harmonising or tuning (see Heidegger's concepts: *Ent-sprechen; Stimmung, Be-stimmung, Über-einstimmung*) oneself to the language of being.

[5] See Noam Chomsky, 1969 (English Edition 1966). *La linguistique cartésienne suivie de La nature formelle du langage.* Translated by Nelcya Delanoë and Dan Sperber. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

[6] See Aristotle's definition of *dialectical argument.*

[7] Compare with Amel 1990, 'Critical Thinking', *Semiotica,* 1990, a review article about Douglas Walton, 1987.

[8] Compare with Amel 1993, 'The Antithetic Reason' (Review article: Fernando Gil, ed., *Controverses scientifiques et philosophiques,* Lisboa, Fragmentos, 1990), *Manuscrito*, Campinas, XVI (l) (pp. 183–205).

[9] *Semiotica,* 1990, a review article about Douglas Walton (1987).

[10] In 1993, review article about Fernando Gil, ed., *Controverses scientifiques et philosophiques,* Lisboa, Fragmentos (1990).

PART II

DOXASTIC DIALECTICS

INTRODUCTION

Part II of our study is dedicated to **Theme** – ***adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum* – the dialectical constitution of *doxastic truth.***

The logic of controversy – antithetic logic

Premises: *epistemic diversity:*

1. in each cognitive enterprise, the truth is *opinionable;*
2. the *pluralism* of opinions;
3. *multiperspectivism;*
4. from the probable to the necessary truth (from *doxa* to *episteme*);
5. the 'theatricality' of the dialogical development, in which alternative points of view should observe the maxims of cooperation (rules of intelligibility and rules of pertinence).

The rationality of adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum

This is based on the principle of rationality (to consider that a *measure of things* which should be discovered exists), and observing the principle of reciprocity. Regarding the rationality of the dialectical process, the conclusion of our common sense is obvious: the logic of controversy seems to be arbitrary, because it is difficult to highlight the antithetic structure of the discursive reasoning with full evidence.

The premises of the probable truth

When one speaks about the *probable truth,* this can refer either to a reality which has not been proved yet, or to a supersensible reality (axiology, ars, politics, ethics, morals etc.).

The distinction between *sensible reality* and *supersensible reality* was explicated by Kant, who speaks about *Übersinnliches in uns – Freiheit* (the supersensible condition of Man – the liberty); *Übersinnliches über uns – Gott* (the supersensible condition which is above the human condition – divinity, God); *Übersinnliches nach uns – Unsterblichkeit* (the supersensible condition after-life condition – eternity). From the point of

view of *doxastic dialectics,* this distinction refers to the opposition between objectual reality of things/facts and noumenal reality of ideas.

(a) The dialectics for which the supersensible reality represents the main object is a semantic one – namely a **dialectics based on hermeneutic alternatives**.
(b) The rationality of this type of dialectics is based on the rule of *tertium datur.*

The rationality which implies hermeneutical steps could be called **semantic rationality** which highlights the opposition between *reason* (strong rationality) and *reasonableness* **(soft rationality)**. This type of rationality implies dissociative and synthetic operations.

Remark: The last aspect pushes the pragmatic paradigm *beyond* its classical boundaries.

We took the principle of rationality of the type *reasonableness,* which can be called *soft rationality,* from Billig's study *Arguing and Thinking,* 1989. The author is a sociolinguist, interested in verbal interaction from his particular point of view. The original contribution of Billig's book is his **interest in rhetoric**; his rhetoric analysis equates to the modern pragmatic programme.

Billig grounds his research on two premises:

– Quintilian's *principle of uncertainty*: 'We can never capture the infinite variants of human affairs in a finite system of laws'.
– Protagoras' thesis: *Man is the measure of all things.*

Billig's scientific approach is opposed to the analytical rationality, by affirming the alternative of *fluid thinking* which coordinates the argumentative mechanism *of contrary statements,* both considered *reasonable.* The *reasonableness of contrary statements* actually means a dialectics of *tertium datur.*

.Billig took from classical rhetoric aspects important for his idea about *fluid thinking*:

(a) *Inventio* – Billig's interpretation refers to the ability of the one who argues to present subtle arguments and original aspects, considering both the *argumentative context* and *the rhetorical context.* Billig's *rhetorical concept of sense/meaning* can be compared with Dascal's concept of **speaker's meaning**.

(b) *Deliberative attitude* – Billig proposed rethinking an ignored idea of argumentation, namely, to introduce the particular element in the general category to which it belongs. This rhetorical aspect calls for the similar analytical operation to which a semantic base is added. From this moment on, pragmatics touches its paradigmatic limit. Judging in our terms, this aspect corresponds to the synthetic process of axiological concepts (*axiological acquisition*) and leads the research *beyond pragmatics*.

(c) *Belief* – in Billig's interpretation this is not a cognitive concept, as this study proposes. According to Billig, *belief* means 'a reason to adopt a certain *social* attitude'. The original interpretation of Billig is to highlight the rhetorical relevance of beliefs, as behavioural stimulus.

In doxastic dialectics, the logic of **adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum** is similar to that of epistemic logic. It should be referred to as dialogical logic and should observe the norms of critical thinking. The doxastic dialectics extends the rhetorical parameters of the **adaequatio intellectus ad argumentum** by stressing the importance of the two concepts of Dascal: *conversational demand* and *speaker's meaning*.

Speaker's meaning, being a concept based on meaning, observes the principle of intelligibility, which, in doxastic dialectics, deepens the semantic space of an *idea,* and prepares its conceptual constitution, respectively the **doxa**.

Dialogical demand could be relevant for the phenomenological paradigm, considering the dialogue a kind of semantic **reduction (epoch)** from the discursive towards the noumenal/eidetic meaning. The *IDEA* (the *axiological concept*) 'justifies' the particular judgement of value.

Remark: From the point of view of our approach of doxastic dialectics, the logic of argumentative **adaequatio** is fundamentally a constitutive logic.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOXASTIC DIALECTICS*
PARAMETERS; MECHANISM

*We must hear about all things, both the still heart
of persuasive truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which
there is no true conviction.*

(Parmenide, **Poem I,** 28–30)

5.1. Traditional doctrine

It is generally accepted, though in not sufficiently rigorous terms, that doxastic dialectics can be defined as being an exchange of opinions. Because of the principle of uncertainty that governs the subjectively inflected soft rationality of *doxa* – says the traditional doctrine – the cognitive achievements of such a debate are relative.

Instead of minimising the heuristic power of doxastic dialectics, we decided to enquire whether and to what extent it might be possible to affirm *doxa*'s cognitive autonomy regarding *episteme*. While questioning both the subjective and rhetorical involvement of *doxa*, our attention has been focused on the mechanism of decidability in doxastic thinking. The conclusions we reached concern the general philosophy of cognition:

l. Doxastic dialectics engenders cognitive intervals between *belief, opinion* and *doxa;*
2. Doxastic dialectics opens conditions for an alternative truth, semantically constituted, not analytically proved;
3. Doxastic dialectics is the exclusive procedure by means of which the fundaments of axiological ontologies can be established.

While questioning the relationship between the cognitive target and the formal conditions of doxastic dialectics, we stress its subjective dimension and rhetorical involvement (a subject-oriented position) of thought. What we discover is that *doxa's* depreciated features open conditions for an alternative truth. Such a truth is more profoundly uncertain than can be

proved with analytical logic. Trying to define the nature of doxastic truth, the second thing we discover is that the 'alternative truth' belongs to an alternative field, completely **autonomous** with that of *episteme*. The 'truth of *doxa*' belongs to the field of axiology, where any debate, consciously or unconsciously, goes deeper than proving to what extent a point of view is right or wrong.

5.2. Billig's book

Attentively reading Billig's book (1989) and the examples he chooses, we have realised that his book is actually dealing with a special argumentative field – the *field of doxa*. Billig's interest in classical rhetoric – Protagoras' dictum that *Man is the measure of all things* and Quintilian's principle of uncertainty, uncovered, in our eyes, premises for an 'alternative truth', the fundaments of which we are trying to explain here.

On the other hand, our approach of doxastic dialectics has found a philosophical support in Grice's idea about the objectivity of values. Grice sustains in his book (1991) that 'the conception of value' could become objectivity aided by a scientific-like procedure, which he calls *metaphysical construction*.

To simplify, we shall give no other explanation than this: the alternative truth we are looking for is meaning-oriented. It cannot be logically proved, but semantically constituted. This is the reason why we call it the *persuasive truth*. In a free interpretation of Parmenide, *persuasive truth* could be identified with the *truth of supersensible reality*. To postulate the 'existence' of a supersensible reality means to adopt, without further prejudice, a Platonic attitude, namely to recognise the existence of the reality of IDEAS that substantiates empirical reality. In an analogy with the constitution of formal ontologies[1], the nature of which is epistemic, the philosopher can delimit the doxastic field, on condition of acknowledging *doxa's* semantic rationality besides its cognitive autonomy[2].

Technically speaking, we may admit that axiology refers to a supersensible field, if two premises are considered: from the metaphysical point of view – **values represent the relational reality of the world;** and from the ontological point of view – **values are recorded in Man's conditioned being**.

The higher-ordered position of value[3] implies Man's ontological inherence. Our holistic approach to reality gives the explanation of an integrative view about *the idea of value* and can be translated in terms of a transcendental premise (*values are recorded in Man's conditioned being*).

The persuasive way in which the relational reality is disclosed to the mind, due to its supersensible, intelligible, noumenal nature, is defined as the indefinite status of a reality immanent to thinking and cosubstantial *with it*.[4]

'Immanence in thinking' is the ontological condition of transcendentality which compels us to accept that subjective rationality belongs to the original ground. During a moral self-reflection, the immanence of values is introspected. Values compose a hierarchical structure.[5]

Values are recorded in Man's own conditioned being. Therefore, the persuasive truth of values cannot be demonstrated, but can be constructed and justified through doxastic thinking. 'Persuasive truth' means the subjective representation of supersensible reality. To justify the persuasive truth (respectively, the 'truth of values') is a matter of reflection (see further explanation in the chapter *Sign System – Reference System*, later in this book).

5.3. Doxastic dialectics evinces three cognitive functions

Our approach to doxastic dialectics proves, from the very beginning, that the research of the doxastic field presupposes a larger paradigm than that of pragmatics. The self-reflection, in order to find and to assume the persuasive truth of values, goes beyond the pragmatic means of cognition.

In contrast to the usual interpretation, the target we fixed for **doxastic dialectics** evinces the three cognitive functions, specific for each dialectics: dissociative, justificatory and constitutive.

5.3.1. The dissociative function of the doxastic dialectics

The rather loose concept of *belief* and its polysemy[6] creates the false impression that *belief, doxa* and *opinion* stand on the same cognitive level. From our point of view, *belief* is an act (and a content) positing the idea of value in consciousness, *doxa* corresponds to the conceptual representation of the idea of value in reason, and *opinion* corresponds to the belief's discursive and contingent form. The respective three cognitive levels are dissociated during argumentative confrontation. The role of a philosopher is to set different stress for each of these levels, by following the intelligible intervals engendered during doxastic dialectics.

Our discriminative reference to the respective concepts is supported by Crombie's interpretation of the Greek distinction between *doxa* and *belief,* and respectively between *doxa* and *episteme*:

> *Doxazein* is nearer to 'judge' than to 'believe'. For 'judge' implies (more clearly than 'believe') that something is being assessed or interpreted. *Doxa*, though it is the general word for 'belief', tends to carry with it the hidden, but sometimes operative implication, that the belief in question is an assessment of something. This is an important clue to the contrast of *doxa* with *episteme*. For *episteme* implies that the object is not being interpreted or assessed, but grasped. (1963: 33–34).

The philosopher who deals with doxastic dialectics should elucidate the nature of two cognitive movements: a surface one – the correlation between belief and opinion, which is the belief's language-shaped correspondent; and a deeper movement – the belief constitution in *doxa*. Concomitantly the philosopher should understand how and why the principle of uncertainty is differentially active during both these cognitive movements.

The 'cohabitation' between the intelligible representation and the intelligible experience constitutes the belief's immanent rationality. The dialectical goal is to follow the 'destiny' of cognitive immanence in the way belief gains the sense of its rationality (its possibility of being justified). The dialectics of opinions (not the doxastic dialectics!) is formally focused on the opinion's *reasonableness* (inner logic and pertinence). While finding coherent proof for justifying the validity of subjective assertions, our goal is to base these assertions on authoritative premises. As there is no objective basis to which axiological assertions can be referred, the only way to consolidate them is to find the speaker's self-justificative arguments.

5.3.2. The justificatory mechanism of the doxastic dialectics

What is generally said with respect to the dialectics of opinions has in view only the doxastic surface level, ignoring the fact that dialectics is a grounding process and that grounding principles of rationality are adequate to the way the truth is constituted.

The target of our commentary is to demonstrate that the alternative truth doxastic dialectics leads to is conceptually constituted, not demonstratively proved. The dialectical procedure, which tries to establish the pertinence of opinions, actually consolidates the semantic evidence of implicit premises[7]. Usually the logic of argumentative pertinence is

oriented towards finding the justificatory power of justificatory arguments. Since doxastic dialectics involves reflecting judgements, its entire justificatory procedure is supported by a higher degree of logic, where the principle of uncertainty calls upon a principle of transcendence.

Doxastic dialectics is focused on the constitution of *doxa,* which becomes the belief's justificatory arguments of having a certain opinion. Nevertheless, the constitution of *doxa* should satisfy the same condition as does any theoretical enterprise: *how do we establish grounding axioms?* The question that actually should be asked is with regard to the self-referential validity of a priori categories of judgement.

Because the integrative frame is cognitively immanent, it cannot supply objective proof although ontologically it exercises its reductive force. The integrative condition entails a vicious consequence that burdens doxastic dialectics with a fallacious *petitio principi* way of reasoning: *to prove what should be taken for granted,* namely while proving the validity of a judgement – in saying *X is beautiful,* any expressed opinion becomes the proof on which the belief is based – I am trying implicitly to make sensible our opinion about the concept of *physical beauty*. The escape from this circularity requires a heuristic strategy that opens the possibility of making a necessary proof from the integrative premise. Doxastic categories are validated as rational on condition of their being ontologically pertinent. We call this integrative proof *axiological acquisition,* the right understanding of which presupposes to admit that 'persuasive truth' is constituted in conformity with the principle of transcendental logic: **being is grounded on cognition** and not vice versa. The constitution of *doxa* means the conscious acquisition of a dominant ontology, that the cognitive subject transposes in **categories of value** and by means of which they identify their own substance[8].

While looking for an alternative field, one may consider the justificatory procedure of doxastic dialectics through the exclusive way of exploring the grounds of axiology.

5.3.3. The constitutive function of the doxastic dialectics

The goal we established for doxastic cognition seems very ambitious, but this aim may be viable and understandable if by 'alternative field' the philosopher means *another way of thinking.* The alternative way should solve the problem of constructing an ideal object capable of '(re)presenting' the substance of values dominating the empirical world.[9] Doxastic thinking finds its real autonomy in this theoretically more restricted sense, but in a rational sense the procedure is more complicated. This goal constitutes it, and the goal is to constitute subjectivity in such a

way that the power of (axiological) judgement would become self-reflective. By using this procedure, the grounds of axiology are 'objectified' under the form of the MORAL OBJECT.[1] The moral object becomes *doxa's a posteriori referent.*

The persuasive objectivity of the axiological truth, about which we endeavour to argue, is a question touching both Man's ontological and cognitive inherence. We say 'inherence', because the 'reality' we speak about represents Man's *spiritual condition.* The truth of inherence is self-expositive and any discursive way to make it explicit can only be approximate. To make the alternative way of thinking logical, our task will be to prove that dialectical rationality follows the transcendental logic, which is both a conceptualising and an objectifying means. The clarification of the two distinctions is required: (a) metaphysical objectivity – to separate the intelligible perception of the axiological substance from its hypothetical formulation. A philosopher does not discuss axiological objectivity, but the conceptual effort to refer to such an objectivity. (b) Persuasive OBJECTivity – any reference to axiological objectivity is a conceptual effort to substantiate it in the form of what we call MORAL OBJECT. 'Moral' means the subjective reflection of the supersensible reality, and has no ethical involvement. To construct the moral object means to *conceive the inherence,* a cognitive procedure for which a rational possibility of grounding should be established. *Conceiving the inherence* as an operation could be rationally founded by putting Man's subjective thinking under ontological inquiry, this operation leading inevitably to the semantic foundation of truth. The 'ideal reality' of axiology, to which we cannot refer directly, becomes the object of a moral reflection, during which consciousness 'theoretically' ASSUMES the sense of reality by self-reference. Moral reflection is a cognitive act in which the subject is ontologically implied. The original power of self-reflection is transferred into a speech act. Self-referentiality becomes performative: *cogito ergo sum ergo loquor.* That is our definition of *belief.* With Husserl, *belief* is a thetic act, namely a 'speech act' in consciousness. Phenomenology acknowledges the cognitive priority of *belief,* a definition that supports our demonstration: in accordance with Husserl, every experience in relation to all the *noetic* phases, which through its *noesis* shapes itself about the intentional object as such, functions as a *belief-consciousness* in the sense of *protodoxa.* (Husserl, 1931).

> We introduce the term primal belief or *protodoxa,* by which the intentional retro relatedness, elaborated by us, of all 'belief-modalities' is suitably expressed. We add further that we shall use this latter expression (or 'doxic

modality') for all intentional variants grounded in the essence of *protodoxa.*' (Husserl, 1931: 104).

We try to prove that the constitutive OBJECTivity of belief, underlying the doxastic dialectics, could be understandable only through the paradigmatic intersection between pragmatics and phenomenology.[11] Subjective rationality grounds the analytical operations by phenomenological reflection. There is no need to argue that *in belief* the formal and the efficient principles of thinking are *originally* convergent. When rationality refers the pertinence of an opinion to the power of belief, doxastic categories are implicitly or explicitly objectified. If the constitutive procedure of *doxa* is correctly understood, at a certain moment the cognitive effort to 'objectify the subjectivity' becomes the effort of constructing the moral object. The procedure should emphasise two points of rational articulation (constitution) of OBJECTivity: the *self-referentiality* of 'belief-speech acts' and their *categorical* value.

A rationally founded dialectical procedure requires grounding arguments. The possibility to ground axiology through doxastic dialectics is given when we accept that axiology is constructed within an ontologically integrative premise. As a consequence of this premise, the self-referentiality of belief has original power and therefore it is virtually categorical. One cannot support the 'objectivity' of a belief in another way than by admitting that any reflection is born in the horizon that can prove its legitimacy. And even more: originally, belief both searches for and exposes its authoritative argument. Whenever the sense of a belief is assumed, whenever we are conscious of it by means of speech acts, there is a certain categorical sense about which we inquire. This explains both Gadamer's 'inner infinity of the dialogue', and an eternally unfinished human 'literature'.

To 'ASSUME a sense' means here to perform a verdict, namely to promote a sense – using the authority of the self-reference of belief – to a categorical position: to prepare its conceptualisation. DOXA represents – that is our thesis – the intelligible entity which conceptualises the grounds of believing. While doing that, doxa OBJECTifies Man's own substance. **Doxa is the concept of the moral object.** Subjectivity of thinking in axiology is an inevitable consequence of the integrative movement by means of values; the reference to subjective means of decidability, far from being a 'soft proof', is the way doxastic thinking constructs the MORAL OBJECT. Each opinion performs implicitly a categorical speech act.

Our approach to doxastic dialectics is oriented towards the formal mechanism of *doxa* and the theoretical reference to 'grounds of believing'

is also formal. The intention is to find the mechanism of decidability in doxastic dialectics so that, if it cannot miraculously suspend the principle of uncertainty, it can lead us to a coherent understanding of the nature of belief. In order to avoid being excessively troubled with subjective relativity, a risk to which such a study is exposed, it is better to find the terms on which subjective rationality is based. This is the moment when the principle of uncertainty calls upon a principle of transcendence.

The integrative premise on which doxastic thinking operates establishes the coordinates of the original axiology, the terms of which allow the transfer from pragmatics to phenomenology. Because *belief* is a cognitive act in consciousness (a phenomenological definition we accept), self-referentiality gains rational authority, capable of validating the arguments of value. The role of dialectics, starting with this premise, is to consolidate the grounds of believing helped by or in axiological categories, a process during which the MORAL OBJECT may find its determination.

At this stage, our interest in the principle of uncertainty remains purely technical. We are indirectly dealing with value judgement. Both the factual complexity in which a value judgement is hidden, and the cultural extension of *doxa* are emphasised in order to prove the mechanism of *meaning-oriented alternative logic.* While the subjective reasons of believing are dialectically explored, they are OBJECTified in the form of a conceptual synthesis. All the operations are semantic and not analytical. The 'persuasive truth' of supersensible reality could not be proved in another way than by *understanding,* by making it intelligible by means of concepts. Proceeding in conformity with what might be called 'the logic of meaning', our intention is to go beyond justifying the deep relativity of *doxa.* The real problem is to convert the regulative process of dialectics into an OBJECTifying enterprise and to demonstrate the role of semantic operations in constructing the MORAL OBJECT (the *object of self*).

5.4. Doxastic subjectivity and the changed idea of rationality

Because of the immanence of the transcendental premise, moral reflection makes it possible for an explicit object to be identified. But due to the conflict of rationality held in the immanence of thinking and its subjective depth, the hypothetical content attributed to this object introduces a mobile referent within the justificatory procedure. Moral reflection helped by beliefs is cognitively an open act. Its truth cannot achieve a complete saturation. Although it is difficult to legitimise the

content of belief, it is possible to explore its becoming. The cognitive movement of belief, in its unity, is dialectical. The attempt to establish the principle governing it presupposes a change in the idea of rationality.

When the intersection between pragmatics and the phenomenology of belief was argued, the intention was to make from the principle of uncertainty a powerful (constitutive) instrument. That which was at first a weak, subjective point of thinking can be re-evaluated and considered, phenomenologically speaking, an infinite introspection. And what was at first considered to be *doxa*'s unstable structure is actually the grounding openness of the principle of transcendence. The pertinence that a premise acquires during argumentation is progressively extended in consciousness and ASSUMED as a self-expositive IDEA OF SELF.

The formal principle should extend rationality from a discursive-logical level to a substantial dynamics of thinking itself (Billig's *fluid thinking*), a transfer that should appeal to the principle of efficiency in equal degree. In order to support the active role of the principle of uncertainty, we advance three constitutive conditions of doxa:

(a) Condition of Dialectics (the dissociative function of doxastic dialectic): *Doxa (the grounds of believing) is (are) dialogically built and dialogically challenged.*

(b) Condition of Creativity (condition based on a transcendental premise): *Doxastic dialectics is a creative not a regulative process, when 'the persuasive truth' becomes a question of meaning inquiry.*[12]

(c) Condition of Potentiality (condition based on a metaphysical premise): *Any dialectical dynamics of doxastic thinking moves within an a priori inner-determined frame of potentiality (the IDEA of a certain value).* Because of this condition, the cognitive subject may allege by self-reflection a category of transcendence.

The creative dimension of doxastic dialectics is the consequence of the projective power of the formal principle. While trying to 'hear the still heart of persuasive truth', the cognitive subject assumes that this truth lies in the form of infinite discursiveness, in which the constitutive legitimacy remains open. While projecting the power of thinking, *belief* concomitantly names a concept (*doxa*), and approximates its content (*opinion*). In belief, the intelligibility of doxa remains limited (the access to the still heart of the persuasive truth), but the cognitive subject proves nevertheless an unlimited intentionality to approach it. The relativity of belief is not a consequence of the belief's lower rationality (subjectivity

and contiguity). It is the expression of a variable function that defines the intelligibility that the cognitive subject proves during a self-reflective movement. The intelligibility of *doxa* built by belief acts, could neither overstep the hypothetical status nor be certified further in language, given its 'object of reference'.

As a supersensible object, value is *constructed* in thinking (in belief) and *conceptually consolidated* in language. To what might **justice** be referred, for instance, if not to a conceptual representation with which it is associated? Furthermore, what is the possibility of assuming the IDEA of **justice** without naming it? And how could thinking reach the content of the IDEA of **justice** without inventing opinions (called 'ideas')?

Inevitably, a doxastic philosopher is a prisoner of language. The provisional scheme of interpretation (when opinions are delivered) cannot overcome the argumentative ability of the thinker and so the intelligibility of the 'persuasive truth' is frequently obscured by preconceived meanings that are associated with basic concepts. *Doxa,* as a concept, is mistakenly treated as being the corresponding IDEA (the supersensible object of value) that this concept should name.

5.5. Instead of conclusions

A philosopher does not discuss axiological objectivity, but the conceptual effort to refer to such an objectivity. We call this kind of objectivity PERSUASIVE OBJECTIVITY. Any reference to axiological objectivity is a conceptual effort to substantiate it in the form of the MORAL OBJECT.

Knowledge is language dependent. From a doxastic point of view, the intelligibility using language becomes the subject's self-constitutive means. This is a basic rationality of *doxa,* the rationality of belief's subjectivity, the complete understanding of which will be reached by considering both the intentional and the normative dimensions of language. While the intentional dimension maintains the creativity of self-reflection in the proximity of persuasive truth, the normative dimension reduces the intelligibility of beliefs to that limit where 'opinions of mortals have no true conviction'. Within these two extremities, doxastic dialectics extends and destroys its creativity.

Notes

* The first printed form: Rodica Amel, 1999, 'Doxastic Dialectic – The Persuasive Truth', *RRL*, XLIV1–4: 3–12.

[1] Grice's argument in favour of the *metaphysical objectivity* of values (1991: 35) approaches Husserl's commentary about 'formal ontologies' (1931: 410), as *mathesis universalis.*

[2] The reason we call this alternative truth 'persuasive', a truth we assume by *understanding.*

[3] The ontologically higher-ordered position of values is a 'generative' point of view we share. It could be equated with Grice's argument concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation,* a procedure for the redistribution, but not the invention of properties. For example – properties accidentally meant for *humans* become properties of a new psychological type called *persons,* as essential ones (cf. Grice, 1991: 114).

[4] The fact that the cognitive subject alleges a principle of transcendence and defines it using their transcendental experience (see Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Bachelard's book, 1957) proves that consciousness substantially and originally belongs to the ideality by which it stands. The Cartesian *cogito* – consciousness of thinking – is affected by doubt, and Leibniz's consideration about the self-reflective power of *cogito* (*nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe: nisi ipse intellectus*) legitimate the noumenal substance of cognition.

[5] This is an objectifying premise that could be equated with Grice's *finalist* argument. See the stages of metaphysical defence, which he establishes: 1. [There are] cases in which a value concept … attaches *originally* or *directly* to a given bearer; 2. If the concept of value is to be authentic and not merely 'Pickwicking' in character, then it is required that it be supported by a kind of finality which extends beyond the 'overlap' with mechanistically substitutable finality; 3. That metaphysical houseroom be found for the notion of absolute value is a *rational demand.* (Grice, 1991: 116–117).

[6] We shall refer *belief* and *opinion* to the doxastic field considered in the restricted field of axiology, where the functional autonomy of *doxa* can be demonstrated. No reference will be made therefore either to probable (*I believe it will be raining* or *I believe this object is mine*)*,* or to provable (*I believe they intend to climb the mountain,* or *I believe they are able to reach the highest peak of Everest*) or hypothetical opinions (*I believe there is life on planet Mars*).

[7] Doxastic thinking can be referred to what Kant defines as *reflecting judgement*: 'Urteilskraft überhaupt ist das Vermögen, das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeinen zu denken. Ist das Allgemeine (die Regel, das Prinzip, das Gesetz) gegeben, so ist die Urteilskraft welche das Besondere darunter subsumiert *bestimmend.* Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteilskraft bloß *reflektierend.*' (Kant, 1924, Einl IV: 15 XXVI).

[8] The axiom we stipulated – **being is grounded on cognition** – should not be wrongly interpreted as contradicting our own immanent idea, and, consequently, related to Nietzsche's philosophy of morality (*Beyond Good and Evil*). Our study

has the liberty to stipulate an axiom, and to be coherent with this choice, with no further philosophical commentary.

[9] We mean here all conceptually constructed ontologies of values.

[10] From this point on, our constitutive approach follows a phenomenological direction that differs from Grice's 'metaphysical construction' or *hypostasis* (1991: 107).

[11] Due to this intersection, the philosopher establishes the moment when the argumentative intentionality is related to cognitive intentionality (see here the phenomenological concept of intentionality: 'It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something'. Husserl, 1931: 119). This transforms the rational objectivity into an OBJECT for consciousness.

[12] The *creativity* of argumentative thinking is one of Billig's central ideas in his book *Arguing and Thinking*.

CHAPTER SIX

SEVEN STEPS OF CONFRONTATION*

or
'Upon a lie** seven times removed'

Touchstone: Faith, we met, and found the quarrel was upon the
seventh cause.

Jaques: How seventh cause?

……………………

Jaques: But, for the seventh cause; how did you find the quarrel on
the seventh cause?

Touchstone: Upon a lie* seven times removed ... I did dislike the
cut of a certain courtier's beard; he sent me word, if I said his
beard was not cut well, he was in the mind it was: this is called
the **Retort Courteous.** If I sent him word again, 'it was not well
cut', he would send me word he cut it to please himself: this is
called the **Quip Modest.** If again, 'it was not well cut', he
disabled my judgement: this is called the **Reply Churlish.** If
again, 'it was not well cut, he would answer, I spake not true:
this is called the **Reproof Valiant.** If again, it was not well cut',
he would say, I spake not true: this is called the **Countercheque
Quarrelsome:** and so, to the **Lie Circumstantial** and the **Lie
Direct.**

Jaques: And how oft did you say his beard was not well cut?

Touchstone: I durst go no further than the **Lie Circumstantial,** nor
he durst not give me the **Lie Direct;** and so we measured
swords and parted.

Jaques: Can you nominate in order now the degrees of the lie?

Touchstone: O, sir, we quarrel in print, by the book; as you have
books for good manners: I will name you the degrees: The first,
the **Retort Courteous**; the second, the **Quip Modest;** the third,
the **Reply Churlish**; the fourth, the **Reproof Valiant**; the fifth,
the **Countercheque Quarrelsome;** the sixth, the **Lie with
Circumstance;** the seventh, the **Lie Direct.** All these you may
avoid but the **Lie Direct**; and you may avoid that too, with an

If. I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel, but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an **If, as 'If you said so, then I said so'** and they shook hands, and swore brothers. Your **If** is the only peacemaker; much virtue in **If**.

Shakespeare, **As You Like It,** Act V, Scene 4

6.1. Preliminary considerations

The little fragment drawn from Shakespeare's play *As You Like It* is a 'joke' with ironical value regarding the futility of the situation. The didactic conciseness and the 'imitation' of a theoretical speech are the defining features of this text that allow us to present it as an example for a pragmatic conflict on matters of taste. The respective passage from the text offers a model of a conflict settlement.

We wish it to be clear for everybody that our presentation is a kind of 'scientific game'. Shakespeare was an excellent expert of rhetoric and frequently used fallacious arguments in his plays, with ironical intention – as the Romanian playwrights Ion L. Caragiale and Eugène Ionesco did. In many writings of these authors, who excel by their intelligence, the theoretician may find clues to their ideas. The appeal to this example has no interpretative intention, but is proving a cognitive-pragmatical illustration.

1. Even if our ideas were well illustrated by Shakespearean replies and rhetorical structures several times, their aesthetical relevance was never in the objective of our commentaries. The play *As You Like It* gives a certain liberty of interpretation both for the theatre audience and the reader. Nevertheless, this liberty of interpretation, always subjective, constitutes the target of our demonstration.

2. Touchstone – the 'brave clown', by relating 'the quarrel on the seventh cause', presented them as genuine proof of 'good manners': *'O, Sir, we quarrel in print by the book as you have books for good manners ...'* This presentation was a suitable example for the conflict analysis produced by us in several studies (Mihailă-Amel 1981, 1989, 1992, 1993). In our previous approaches, the respective issue was focused on two pragmatic concepts: the *conflict progression* and the *saturation levels* in a dialogical interaction.

3. This time, the most important thing that we discover in this excerpt is the way Shakespeare presents a possible 'settlement of a conflict':

I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel; but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an **If, as If you said so, then I said so** and they shook hands, and swore brothers. Your **If** is the only peacemaker: much virtue in **If**.

The commentary of the present study underlies the relevance of *if* from a doxastic perspective, an issue the theoretical aspects of which were discussed in the previous chapter.

6.2. The progression of a quarrel on the seven causes

The conflict progression, as it is developed in the Shakespearean 'model', increases the communicative misunderstanding: it begins politely and ends violently; the conflicting partners find progressive reasons to forget the polite behaviour and to choose to measure swords.

Touchstone: I will name you the degrees: The first, the **Retort Courteous**; the second, the **Quip Modest;** the third, the **Reply Churlish**; the fourth, the **Reproof Valiant**; the fifth, the **Countercheque Quarrelsome;** the sixth, the **Lie with Circumstance;** the seventh, the **Lie Direct.** Jaques**:** And how oft did you say his beard was not well cut? Touchstone: I durst go no further than the **Lie Circumstantial,** nor he durst not give me the **Lie Direct;** and so we measured swords and parted. All these you may avoid but the **Lie Direct**; and you may avoid that too with an **If.** I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel; but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an **If, as If you said so, then I said so** and they shook hands, and swore brothers. Your **If** is the only peacemaker: much virtue in **If**.

6.2.1. A coherent contradiction

In conformity with a pragmatic classification, the Shakespearean 'model' may be considered a *coherent contradiction,* by which we understand the firm solidarity of contrary utterances/arguments with respect to a thematic constant. In this example, the subject of contradiction is about 'the way the beard of a courtier was cut'. The partner of the bearded man considers that the beard is *not well cut,* while the bearded man does not accept this opinion and affirms the contrary.[1]

By approaching the theoretical issue regarding the coherent or non-coherent progression of a dialogue (see, for instance Harper quoting Carlson 1987),[2] some important aspects should be considered, especially because they are relevant for our present analysis:

The partner's agreement to play the role of interlocutor;
The correct approach of the thematic issue;
The relevance of the illocutionary act performed by the interlocutor in respect to the thematic constant.

The rhetorical quality of the Shakespearean 'joke' is evident, easily discovered if we compare it with a sport contest which has normative rules. Shakespeare enumerates the 'essential moves' in a contest of taste, as if it were a fencing confrontation. He does not avoid mentioning a wrong move, which was uncovered on the seventh step. If we approach the contest from a pragmatic point of view, the wrong move is *ab initium* (point b, above) The locutor's remark, regarding the beard of his partner is inopportune: the cutting of the beard is a personal option, and a polite behaviour compels everybody to avoid a dialogue on this subject – which means the forbearance of a speech act which might be offensive. Our commentary has in view Austin's classification of illocutionary speech acts. So, a first pragmatic remark: the locutor engenders a conflict by discarding the norms of correct performance in behavioural speech acts.

This type of conflict is based on a PHATIC DYSFUNCTION – namely, the correct distance between two persons[3] is not observed: it is unwarranted to dispute somebody's decision regarding their personal image. The disregard of the respective 'interdiction', which is stipulated by the code of social behaviour, proves actually a METALANGUAGE DYSFUNCTION. Consequently, this is a dialogue during which Touchstone, one of the characters, does not observe the *book for good manners*, as he pretends he *does*. Neither may we say the misunderstanding is generated by the DYSFUNCTION OF THE REFERENTIAL ISSUE, namely, that the interlocutor is *lying*. It will be a theoretical pedantry to approach Shakespeare's text *ad literam*.

6.2.2. Conflict versus contradiction

Nevertheless, if we cannot escape the temptation to analyse the Shakespearean 'model', we should make the distinction between CONFLICT and CONTRADICTION. With Raven and Kruglanski (1970:70) the conflict is defined as an 'incompatibility between speakers' attitudes', while the contradiction represents a linguistic relationship during which the interventions are divergent with respect to a basic theme proposed for discussion.

The proposed example proves to be more than a contradiction (caused eventually by misunderstanding); it becomes progressively a conflict (a

fight). If the locutor, in our case Touchstone who is also the storyteller, does not change the intention, the example is used by our commentary. The storyteller is the interpreter of the confrontation in which he is a part; he designates each step in accordance with the *book of manners,* each step corresponding to an illocutionary act. For the benefit of our commentary, we shall introduce the notation **LT** – the locutor, Touchstone, who makes the remark about the cut of a certain courtier's beard, and **IC** – the interlocutor, the courtier with the cut beard.

By considering the pragmatic exigencies of a conflict, we may put forward the following commentaries regarding each step of confrontation:

a) **Retort courteous:** *If you said my beard was not cut well, I am in the mind it is.* The dialogue theme is treated differently by the two partners in the dialogue. In spite of the partner's contrary opinion, the interlocutor accepts it.

(b) **Quip Modest:** *If I sent him word again, it was not well cut, he would send me word he cut it to please himself.* The theme is treated as taste judgement.

The taste judgements of LT about IC are contradictory, a legitimate situation in a conflict of opinions. The step from the moment when the interlocutors utter different opinions on a certain theme (the cut of the courtier's beard) to the moment they formulate different taste judgements on the same theme is called by Shakespeare *Quip Modest,* which might be better translated as *polite shift* than as 'polite joke'. It is a strategic behaviour to appeal to a justification: an argument in favour of the legitimate subjectivity of personal opinions.

(c) **Reply Churlish:** *If again, it was not well cut, he disabled my judgement.* Without changing the subject of the dialogue, the interlocutor's reply is offensive. More than that, it is an affront, an *insult*. IC contests LT's competence to formulate taste judgements. IC implicitly challenged LT's right to have personal opinions.

(d) **Reproof Valiant:** *If again, it was not well cut, he would answer, I spake not true.* The rejection is given by the lack of adherence to reality. This is an argument that invokes a REFERENTIAL DYSFUNCTION and does no more concern the taste opinion. The opponent's opinion is contested, being in contradiction with the reality.

(e) **Countercheque Quarrelsome:** *If again, it was not well cut, he would say I lie.* There is a big difference between *he would answer, I spake not true* and *he would say I lie,* that Shakespeare, a good

connoisseur of rhetoric, was able to detect, and the theory of speech acts may prove: there is a difference between a *contest* regarding the validity of a reply and *an insult* (as *an illocutionary act*).

At this step of the conflict, IC makes a process of intention to LT, insinuating that LT does not believe in what he is saying, having the intention to offend IC, the reason to respond by a counterattack, an insult.

About the other two steps – **Lie circumstantial** and the **Lie direct there** was no commentary, because the partners '*measured swords and parted'*. The steps of confrontation reached the moment of dialogue SATURATION when both partners change their behaviour.

In Amel (1989: 10), the state of dialogical *saturation* is defined in the following manner:

> In conversation there occur moments when interaction flags at a critical point or even stops unexpectedly. Either by lack of agreement or by deviation, receptivity and 'communication' are implicitly or explicitly hindered, the conditions that ensure the progression of linguistic interaction are exhausted and the reaction is annulled, distorted or continued ad infinitum.

See the examples:

- If you said my beard was not cut well, I am in the mind it was.
- If you say my beard is not cut well, damn you! – damn you!

In the fragment quoted from Shakespeare, the conflictual progression is fed by the obstinacy with which the partner maintains his unfavourable opinion regarding the beard cut of the opponent.

When the progression is hindered by a certain reason, a strategic move opens a new conversational level in the direction of the dialogue rationalisation, or, on the contrary, glides towards the irrational development of interaction.

In the chosen examples, by ignoring the way Shakespeare names the steps of the quarrel, we remark the following gliding moves: in relation to step (a), steps (b) and (d) could not be considered *deviations*. In (b) the argumentative stress is on the EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION, being an *emotional appeal* – the moment when a taste argument is raised. The taste judgement is an argument that could not be contested. In (d), the stress is on the CONATIVE FUNCTION – the argument being ambiguous, the evaluation is unclear because the IC considers that the LT's reply contradicts the evidence and insinuates the LT's bad faith.

By starting with the basic theme, step (c), in which the LT's competence is contested, means an offence, an *ad hominem abusive argumentum*. The IC's gliding is conflictual, because he changes his behaviour: 'If we cannot attack the argument, attack the arguer' (Pirie 1985: 94). Step (e) represents a double deviation – by insinuating the partner's bad intention (process of intent) and, concomitantly, by explicitly stipulating that the partner is lying. Accusing the partner of bad behaviour is an *ad hominem abuse.*

The progressive saturation of the respective conflict could lead to a new gliding – *argumentum ad baculum* – which in our case is not a rough thrashing, but a chivalrous fight, where the partners '*measure swords',* in order to prove who is the winner. In the Shakespearean version, violent conflict is avoided, because the partners discover the miraculous virtues of the particular *if*.

6.3. De gustibus non disputandum

We try to leave the Shakespearean story and to concentrate only on the conflictual moral he teaches us, by analysing it in pragmatic terms.

> All these you may avoid but the **Lie Direct**; and you may avoid that too with an **If.** I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel; but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an **If, as If you said so, then I said so;** and they shook hands, and swore brothers. Your **If** is the only peacemaker: much virtue in **If**.

In the target of our commentaries stands neither the Shakespearean scepticism nor the irony of his moral. We shall not refer to those conflicts of truth manipulation, when partners intend to cover or to uncover the evidence. The disputed topic, in the quoted example, seems not relevant with respect to the intention the partners manifest in their opinions.

6.3.1. A taste judgement

From our point of interest, it seems important to follow the evolution of a conflict when the dispute is around a taste judgement – therefore, our commentary refers to an axiological dispute.[4] During the game-like dispute the normative character is substituted by a taste judgement, which is a subjective perspective about the truth. The Shakespearean example is a kind of introduction to the very structure of the doxastic dialectics.

By quoting Kant (1981), a judgement of taste should be included in the category of reflexive judgements.[5] For the moment we shall not approach

the complexity of this type of logic. In order to appreciate the doxastic relevance of the particle *if* – considered by Shakespeare to be important in a conflict of taste – we shall refer to two logicians.

Enescu (1980: 204), quoting the logician Goblot, says: 'The speculative reason can demonstrate when a thing is true or false, but cannot demonstrate when it is good or bad/evil'. It is neutral with respect to good and bad. In the sequel of his study, Enescu enumerates the features of axiological propositions, quoting Goblot:

(a) The judgements of value express an approval or a disapproval (of an opinion);
(b) Formally, they do not differ from the cognitive propositions;
(c) They can be true or false;
(d) They belong to the practical reason, not to the speculative one.

Having in mind the feature as enumerated by the logician Enescu, the dispute in the Shakespearean example seems to be justified: there is no (logical) interdiction to express one's opinion about somebody's aspect: if his beard is well cut or not, for example. This type of propositions represents axiological judgements/sentences. There is a natural temptation to consider that value sentences might be judged as true or false (see point (c)). But Enescu admits that point (c) is disputable from the logical point of view. From our point of view, the question about what is scientifically disputable is open: the real question – we say – is not to what extent an axiological sentence could be appreciated as true or wrong, but the way we are able to justify the truth value of a value judgement.

The confusions regarding axiological issues are engendered – and here we may quote Enescu – by mixed justifications of axiological judgements. X says *A is good* for several reasons, and the subjective utterances of the type *I believe A is good*. Another confusion that causes misunderstanding is due to the overlapping of epistemic and doxastic fields. In some cases we are justified in approving doxastic judgements preceding epistemic sentences – *I believe/you believe (there are life signs on the planet Mars)* until proof is gathered to make *I know/you know for sure (there are life signs on the planet Mars)*.

The disputes caused by the opposition *I believe* vs. *you believe* belong to the doxastic field. With Hintikka, the founder of **doxastic logic,** the essential postulate of *belief* judgements is the following: 'It does not follow from what A knows (believes) that not-p ... There is no reason why what is believed should be true' (1962: 5). Consequently, the *value judgements* belong to the doxastic field. On the one hand, *value*

judgements are subjective utterances, as they express opinions; on the other hand, as Hintikka pointed out, the logic of belief sentences is not based on the postulate *tertium non datur*. The two aspects mentioned have a common point: the particle *if*: *if you said so, then I said so*.

The appeal to the miraculous particle *if* does not represent a conciliatory solution, but recalls the logical postulate of *tertium datur*. The cultural 'pluralism' of our days, that admits the liberty to have one's own opinion, is not a halfway decision due to the miraculous power of a particle – the only peacemaker – much virtue in *If*, as Shakespeare said, but the consequence of a specific modal logic on which the **doxastic dialectics** is based*.* Nevertheless, the Shakespearean example offers the concise formulation of the doxastic postulate: the right to admit alternative opinions in a dispute concerning taste judgements.

6.3.2. The Shakespearean 'model'

We cannot escape the temptation to 'apply' the Shakespearean model to the case of other types of disputes, when a lying intention might be suspected.

Example 1

1
(a) **LT:** The parallels have an incidence point.
    IC: No, the parallels never coincide.
(b) **LT:** I believe they do.
    IC: I don't believe so.
(c) **LT:** You have no notions on geometry! And you do not admit it.
      (**Lie with circumstance**)
    IC: On the contrary, you haven't.
(d) **IC:** You are lying.

We continue the dialogue, presenting the two last types – the **Lie circumstantial** and the **Lie direct**:

(e) **LT:** *Maybe you are right.* (The answer is equivocal: it can be a formal agreement with **IC's** saying)
(f) **LT:** *Can you demonstrate?* (The real question is: could he actually demonstrate?)

Example 2

Here, an example which opens a dispute regarding the objective existence of angels, a dispute which turns to an epistemic character:

(a) **LT:** Do angels exist?
   IC: No.
(b) **LT:** I like to believe they exist.
   IC: All this is imagination.
(c) **LT:** *You have no perception of supersensible world.* (In other words: you have a positive nature, words with negative connotation.)
   IC: *Hallucinations!!*
(d) **LT:** Actually, you think the same thing, but you don't want to admit, for fear of being told you are crazy.
   IC: You play the fool!
(e) **LT:** No, I am speaking seriously!
   IC: You pretend to be serious, but you aren't.
(f) **LT:** If you say so, maybe you are right!
(g) **LT:** I believe in angels, because I was visited by them!
   IC: Is that really true?

There is no difficulty in applying the respective model to all kind of opinion confrontation. Considering that the deviation of behaviour is an important aspect manifested during doxastic dialectics, in many more conflicts than those presented here, the gliding from dispute to conflict is very slight.

6.4. Conclusions

6.4.l. The theoretical model

Under the disguise of scientific humour, our paper opens a debate about 'the seventh cause of a quarrel', by considering a fragment from Shakespeare's play *As You Like It* (Act V, Scene 4) presenting a 'theoretical model' of conflict resolution. The seven steps of a quarrel proposed by Shakespeare are seriously analysed from the pragmatic point of view, and the conciliatory idea of finding in the word ***if*** a peacemaker ('as if you say so, then I say so') seems intuitively suitable for explaining the doxastic logic, on which the dialectics of opinion is based and by means of which it can be settled.

The chosen example raises interest both for its rhetorical elegance and for the sharp faculty of perception. The passion with which the interlocutors manifest their opinions in a dispute is a real aspect of human nature. Human beings usually do not objectify their behaviour, neither the social nor the mental type.

6.4.2. About the negotiation steps

The steps enumerated by Shakespeare are actually steps of a fallacious progression. There is no sign of intending to rationalise the dispute, as far as the replies open up chances to turn the disagreement into a conflict. The dispute develops, but the step of negotiation is avoided. The interlocutors manifest a 'brave attitude', in accordance with the chivalrous mentality. In the end, the disputants do not reach a truth solution, they measure swords and shake hands – *treatment* by which each of the fighters remains sovereign in his field. The Shakespearean dispute ends by a chivalrous conciliation: 'One of them thought but of an **If, as If you said so, then I said so;** and they shook hands, and swore brothers.' The 'conciliation', intermediated by the miraculous particle *if*, represents the real interest we manifest in Shakespearean example. 'Your **If** is the only peacemaker: much virtue in **If**' – the right for everybody to have an opinion of their own.

By underlining this final remark, we shall leave the Shakespearean frame, not forgetting to mention that the quoted example was about a dispute regarding taste judgements.

The main problem of doxastic dialectics is to direct the attention beyond the taste judgements, beyond the right the subjective opinion has to be considered in itself. This **beyond** has a categorical justification which can be obtained by reflection, in accordance with the following steps:

- by establishing the dialogical distance between the interlocutors;
- by progressive verification of the thematic consensus;
- by negotiation regarding the axiological measure.

The main target of any dispute is to reach an agreement by negotiation – agreement regarding the 'measure of truth'. Explicitly, or implicitly, when values are disputed, the dialectics is led towards the level where the real dispute is about the axiological concepts which should be clarified. The axiological concepts found the axiological judgements. At this moment of the theoretical debate the question regarding Protagoras' thesis

is interposed: *Man is the measure of all things!* Which is the correct philosophical interpretation of this thesis?

The philosophical controversies are divided into disputes that justify certain categories of value, and disputes that destroy any intention to establish axiological norms. Frequently, such controversies deepen the axiological confusion; they reach the aporetic level. The steps trying to clarify an aporia are more numerous than those established by the Shakespearean example, without giving the liberty to say that the axiological field could be treated *As You Like It.*

Notes

* The first printed form: *Limba Română – Aspecte sincronice și diacronice;* Actele celui de al 5-lea Colocviu al Catedrei de Limba Română (8–9 December 2005), Ed. Universității București, 2006: 373–382.

** We are inclined to think that, in this fragment, Shakespeare speculated the ambiguity of the word *lie,* between *lie[1]* – saying untrue/false things; imposture and *lie[2]* – idle talk, cause for quarrel.

[1] In a *non-coherent contradiction* the progression is not homogeneous; the change of illocutionary acts is gliding from one theme to another and frequently the thematic incoherence engenders leaps from the dialogical level to the metadialogical one. By the respective movements, the interlocutors are trying to re-establish the dialogical rationality: to justify or to refute the 'deviant' steps.

There is a reversibility between the dialogue features and those of a running text, a reason for which we considered irrelevant for our present analysis to oppose a real dialogue to a reported one, as is that from the Shakespearean example.

[2] Harper quoted Carlson's model, *Dialogue Games* (1983). Carlson's model could be considered the 'generic model'. It presents an illocutionary progression based on the rationality of the retort sequence. The progression presented by the respective authors includes the transition from dialogue to metadialogue.

[3] Our pragmatic option takes into account Jakobson's model of language functions with the modification presented in the above chapter (Part I).

[4] There is a classification of propositions in accordance with the modal logic: **alethic** propositions (cognitive propositions, measured by the values *necessary* and *contingent*); **epistemic** propositions (cognitive propositions measured by the values *true* and *false*); **doxastic** propositions (propositions where the cognitive force is based on the speaker's *belief,* what the speaker believes is *right* or *wrong*); **axiological** propositions (cognitive propositions based on *value judgements*); and **deontic** propositions (*normative* acts or propositions containing a normative truth).

[5] Doxastic thinking can be referred to what Kant defines as *reflecting judgement* (See note 7 p 67).

CHAPTER SEVEN

CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF PREJUDICE[*]

Nature is not a 'natural' concept, but a cultural construct.

This conclusion is not unanimously shared. It is known that the collective emotions are particularly linked to false reasons and to fraudulent perceptions. Consequently, those of average intelligence are convinced that nature is a 'natural' concept and, therefore, *nature* is 'natural'. In connection with this cognitive prejudice, many people accept the idea that somewhere in the world people who live their life 'naturally', namely, in consent with *nature,* have been living for long.

Patapievici, Horia-Roman. 'About the resentment in the nostalgia of origins', in *Politicals,* Humanitas ed. II. 1997: 129.

7.1. Preliminary remarks

7.1.1. A cultural construct

Generally speaking, we may affirm that *prejudice* is a cultural construct.

What is defined as a 'cultural construct' is a mental reality, an ***idea*** or a concept constituted by cognitive synthesis, representing a fundamental explanation of the way the human condition is reflected in the collective consciousness. The multiple meanings condensed in a cultural construct are able to direct human actions and to justify their finality. That explains both the function and the cultural dynamics of the respective concepts.

A cultural construct has the linguistic form of generic concepts or general propositions. A prescriptive illocutionary force that influences the mechanism of life is active, in virtual form, in all cultural constructs. Maxims, exemplary narratives or stories, myths, etc. – all the linguistic forms that, besides having sententious formulation imply value judgements, are able to adjust the social behaviour due to their cognitive-normative function.

7.1.2. The Kantian critique

As the title of this chapter suggests, the idea we intend to develop touches on the third Kantian critique, namely the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*[1] – 'Critics of the power of judgement' where 'judgement' has verbal meaning: 'act of judgement'.

Although there is a reference to Kantian philosophy, from which we borrow the classification of judgements as *determinative* and *reflexive,* with the respective definitions, the objective of our argumentation is to explain the 'power of prejudices', on the one hand, and on the other hand, to critically analyse their conditions of (ir)rationality. The argumentation follows the pragmatic logic of conversation, the maxims of which were formulated by Grice. It is the proper moment to recall that the theoretical model of Grice's Maxims was influenced by the Kantian philosophy of a priori categories of reason, presented in *Critique of Pure Reason.*

7.2. Some possible definitions of prejudice

7.2.1. The common intuition

Prejudice – say the dictionaries (Hornby Dictionary) – expresses an opinion, like or dislike, formed before one has adequate knowledge or experience.

Prejudice is the embodiment of a *belief* that reached a *forma mentis* – the authority of a mental structure (a conceptual form). Within communicative relationships, the conceptual form of the prejudice is not relevant by itself, only **the force by which the conceptual form** is able to configure the preferences and determine the mental or behavioural options of a person, or of a community.

In accordance with the common intuition, that which is stipulated in explicative dictionaries, it is important to underline the social dimension of prejudice. It defines an idea shared by a collectivity, it is imposed by the social entourage, by education or *Zeitgeist.* Prejudice expresses a collective *belief;* it is even assumed subjectively. Given the main feature of prejudice, namely that a prejudice always discloses preferences or the belonging to a certain social group, with no relevance as to which one, it is a mark of a specific social language – it is an element of a **sociolect.** In the extent the prejudice belongs to a certain sociolect, it has normative character and is recognised by the community in its epistemic force of reference. For instance, the negative connotations of class or race prejudices are linguistic elements. Unlike any sociolect, the normative

character of a prejudice has the **cognitive function** of a cultural construct, implying a value judgement. Like any value judgement, the prejudice has sententious power, the dictionaries say: of like or dislike. The normative dimension of a prejudice regards with equal respect both the referential and the prescriptive use. In virtue of these features, the prejudice is commonly understood, approved or disapproved. For instance: the concept of *nature,* in the way H. R. Patapievici interpreted it; see also the increasing accent falling on several 'natural' values such as body, erotism, liberty, fortune, happiness or despair, etc. Advertisement is the best example by which the 'natural' values are interactionally influenced or manipulated, due to the force of prejudices. The prejudice is always the expression of a *parti pris*, and therefore it is the bearer of its proper generative condition.

From the anthropological point of view, culturally assumed, the prejudice is a cognitive-epistemic construct able to engender specific forms of behaviour. From the sociological perspective, the prejudice is raised to the prestige of an institution. Nevertheless, as a **social** construct, the prejudice is **not clear cut**, **never universal,** but this is not the claim of those who share it. The theoreticians do not ignore the fact that the field within which a consensus is active can be approximatively defined. A sociolect is only *presumed* to be part of 'shared knowledge', both with respect to its referential content and its normative function.

7.2.2. Prejudice and prejudgement

An analysis of the prejudice from the perspective of conversational logic requires a clear logical approach. Without opening a theoretical dispute, we include prejudice in the category of value judgements. In the chapter dedicated to *doxastic dialectics,* the axiological 'truth' (the 'truth' of values) was presented in its persuasive characteristics. The semantic/persuasive nature of the axiological truth is referred to as the MORAL, noumenal OBJECT, which cannot be justified otherwise as by finding a principle of transcendence.[2]

The recognition that a prejudice belongs to a certain sociolect having, explicitly or not, a sententious power, goes over the same dialectical steps as any category of value, but corrupted in certain respects. The corruption of this dialectics begins at the moment the critical function is eliminated from the process of reflection.

In what follows, the object of the demonstration is to insist on the critical dysfunctions, which allow the conceptualisation of a value judgement without having a real normative power of transcendence. The

normative power can easily be substituted by the *crowd voice,* which means less than the 'common opinion'.

The problem of *reflexive judgements* is to find the grounding judgement of particular value judgements. The value judgement requires a kind of **deduction by induction** in order to prove the way the subjective intuition can claim universal validity.

We shall resume the conditions that allow the synthesis of the MORAL OBJECT:

1. The axiological concepts have general and generative power;
2. They are constituted by **induction;**
3. Their object of reference is the MORAL OBJECT;
4. The MORAL OBJECT is a *cultural construct;*
5. This is instituted by reflection, in – theoretically speaking – infinite critical debates.

The way the subjective reflection moves forward, in order to gain objectivity is the critical, argumentative way.

The critical approach follows those steps during which the human condition is transposed in a value category, having implicitly a *normative* value.

With reference to the *prejudice,* it will be relevant for our argumentation to affirm: the *prejudice* is a *prejudgement,* namely a grounding judgement, similar to any theoretical or cultural construct.

7.2.3. Prejudice and presuppositions

From the strict point of view of the **conversational logic,** if we say that a prejudice is considered a prejudgement, that means it is included in the category of *presuppositions.*

The difficulty appears when one tries to establish the type of presupposition that prejudice/prejudgement belongs to. Being a referential concept to which particular judgements are related, and simultaneously, a judgement that 'reflects'/uncovers the speaker's preferences, another question arises: is the prejudgement a presupposition of a predicative act or of an illocutionary act? Is prejudgement subordinated to the referential function or to the expressive one? Does the prejudgement belong to a specific axiological code, governed by the metalanguage of one of the interlocutors? The answer is: prejudice can belong to any of these categories.

The preselective function of the prejudgement of value is active on all dialogical levels. Indifferent to which the level is, the prejudgement represents the referential point of particular judgements, and consequently it can be compared with the *existential presupposition.* For instance, the classical example: *The King of France is bald!* Before establishing that the King of France is bald or not, a proposition which can be true or false, it is necessary to affirm that there is (= exists) a king in France, on which the predication says something. Returning to prejudice, for instance, the *smile* in majority advertising scenarios has subliminal (=existential presupposition) value. *Smiling,* even flying with the product in the hand, introduces 'in communication' the *prejudice of happiness,* the guarantee of gain.

The features by which the grounding role of a category of value is defined – being either a semantic construct or a normative principle – are features defining the constitutive conditions of a dialogue. In this respect, the prejudgement has the function of a pragmatic presupposition of a dialogue, part of the constitutive conditions of it. In order to accept the invitation to buy a certain product it is necessary to share the presupposition 'happiness', namely to obtain a benefit in such a way.

We should not ignore a very important reality from the anthropological point of view: each dialogue, in a strong or loose form, is 'played' inside a cultural frame. The accent on the prejudgement corresponds to the virtual role of the law of transfer from the cognitive rationality to practical rationality: *What is good is preferable!*[3] In contrast with the pragmatic presuppositions, considered 'presuppositions of the dialogue', the prejudice as a prejudgement can be equated to the 'possibility conditions' of acting (= the field of praxeology). This affirmation could be resumed by Patapievici's remark: 'Each human being moves in a field active in virtual form, and this field is responsible [for] his choices.' ('Dialogue about the interference of languages', 1997: 291).

We are confronted with a concept the nature of which is unclear. Does it belong to a universal language, to a sociolect or to an idiolect?

7.3. Prejudgement vs. Prejudice

7.3.1. The corrupted nature of prejudgements/prejudices

In the previous chapter, *prejudice* was analysed as a *prejudgement* using technical terms. In what follows we shall speak about the corrupted nature of prejudgements/prejudices.

The *indefinite* statute of the prejudgement of value, which should not be confounded with its *relative* position, explains the cognitive vulnerability of any cultural construct. The preselection of certain concepts or propositions in the position of grounding arguments, and considering them 'possibility conditions' of particular judgements of value, has semantic reasons. Even when prejudgements seem to be relative, they are in fact vague, and therefore corruptible.

(a) From the cognitive point of view, prejudice follows the logic of the *common place*. It is commonly accepted and raised to the level of an authoritative and normative concept by premature reflection.

(b) The prejudice, in its quality of a normative concept, becomes implicitly a referential term having persuasive power: it seems to be supported by incontestable evidence.

(c) Prejudice has the power of *dogma*: '*a system of beliefs put forward by some authority to be accepted as true without question.*' (Hornby Dictionary). A *dogma* is instituted by excluding or distorting the critical examination.

(d) When the prejudgement of a value judgement acquires a pejorative connotation, it becomes a *prejudice,* emotionally charged in virtue of false 'common sense'. 'It is known that the collective emotions are particularly linked to false reasons and to fraudulent perceptions.' (Patapievici, 1997: 129.)

Prejudice, by avoiding the critical step, cannot attain 'objectivity'; it has no measure[4], loaded with excessive good or wrong connotations. The normative power of prejudgements/*prejudices* is fraudulently obtained in the moment when what is valid for a *limited* community pretends to be universally valid. This is the moment when the dialectical corruption begins. The law that stipulates the transfer from the cognitive rationality to the practical rationality, valid with respect to universal values, is wrongly manipulated by those people who vehiculate prejudices, transforming them in cognitive *stereotypes*.

'There are trends of verbal behaviour', says the Romanian linguist and writer Ileana Vulpescu in an interview (Romanian Cultural Post, 11 November 2004). 'On the one hand, we remark a ruffian trend of expression, on the other hand, a trend to use language in a sophisticated way.' Ileana Vulpescu speaks about a certain linguistic dynamics: the anticipation of the public taste, 'because that is the trend' or 'because it is cool'. 'To be on trend', 'to be cool' are prejudices. Those who impose such a way of speaking, without questioning themselves if the 'trend'

corresponds to the public expectation, are guilty of habit distortion. Actually, instead of being an authoritative argument, 'the trend' represents the fraudulent option. It is easy to impose a norm in a field upset by the lack of cultural patterns.

7.3.2. Critical examination

The corrupted nature of prejudices uncovers their ambiguous position inside the pragmatic logic of conversation.

If we try to apply Grice's Maxims to a dialogue charged by prejudices, in order to find the reason that hinders the principle of cooperation, the theoretical enterprise fails. The maxims of cooperation governed by the presumption of rationality, important for a dialogue, have no relevance in respect to doxastic or axiological presuppositions of the same dialogue.

Asa Kasher's formulation of the principle of cooperation states:

> Where is no reason to assume the contrary, take the speaker to be a rational agent. His ends and beliefs, in a context of utterances should be assumed to supply a complete justification of his behaviour, unless there is evidence to the contrary. (Kasher, 'Gricean inference revisited', 33).

The formulation has no reference to the content of beliefs. As prejudices are frequent in disputes about ideas, or in situations reducible to a conflict of ideas, it is wrong in these cases to decide the degree of *i(r)-rationality*, by applying the *maxim of quantity* (the information), or the *maxim of modality* (the conciseness). The *maxim of quality* (the truth) is irrelevant, given the semantic truth of values, as we have demonstrated. In order to establish a correct diagnosis regarding the chances of cooperation, it is necessary to put the referential function in relation to the expressive one under the extension of which we have included the doxastic universe of the interlocutors. It is necessary to verify the speakers' *grounds of belief* (the *forma mentis, speakers' mentality*) in order to define the rational ground of their speech acts. The proof of *relevance* – 'Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply', in the sense of intelligible relationship between dialogical interventions – is of no use in the case in which we want to establish the grounds of the verbal behaviour. Although Grice's Maxims of Rationality have the point of departure in Kant's a priori categories, they are not equivalent to the 'possibility conditions' of doxastic dialectics. They represent only the normative, not the ontological approach of the conditions of the verbal exchange.

Being normative, two of Grice's Maxims – the Maxim of Quality and the Maxim of Relevance – *could be indirectly* useful for the researcher to discover verbal modifications[5]. For instance, some types of prejudices which indicate that the grounding judgements are corrupted:

(a) *The choice of grounding terms*: the corrupted modality regarding the *shared knowledge* hangs over the registers of judgements a kind of confusion: are they belonging to a universal, a collective or a personal code? What does *shared knowledge* really mean? The rhetoric of advertising propaganda (commercial or political) abusively uses stereotypes that pretend to be generally shared. The generalisation of pragmatic preferences in modern times is done by the substitution of the 'presumed shared knowledge', or, more viciously than that, by manipulating the condition of reciprocity.

(b) *The constitution of the grounding terms:* It is well known that the semantic distinctness is disputable.

> Yes. Elite and elitism. One could be considered a human being like the others when there is no difference between he and the mob. In the mind of a man from the crowd all is in common with the others: the thinking, the features, the aspect, the voice. All the characteristics are common because they are collectivised. The man from the crowd contradicts the fundamental giving of creation: the difference, the quality, the excellence, the genius. Each man is different from others, and that not because of his options, but because of nature. In accordance with nature, we are human beings due to our individual personality … The notion of ELITE is a moral and not a sociological concept. It is true that many silly people could be part of the governing elite … A true elite is composed by those who, indifferently of their social origin, are able to reach their proper excellency. (Patapievici, *Dialogue about interference of languages*, 1997: 282)

The political propaganda has in this sense many examples to offer and, frequently, the ambiguity of reference terms is speculated, and persuasively manipulated.

(c) *The tendency to generalise the grounding term*: it is a cognitive fault. Even the philosophers are not exempt from it.

(d) By applying the *logic of the common place:* the legitimation of particular speech acts (considering Austin's classification: verdictive, exercitive, expositive acts, acts of behaviour) by underlying in them the grounding term; when the particular is interpreted as *pars pro toto* (= the general term), the identification of acts is done by extrapolating a single feature, for instance the negative connotation of the concept *elite*. Deforming the specific feature of the particular case in contamination with unspecific aspects is another example: to 'believe' that the mentality of all

who were born in the communist era is affected by the respective ideology.

The critical examination, in the situations presented above, begins by detecting the vitiated arguments during the dialogue. In our opinion, many of them are examples of the classical *fallacies:* the connotations of the grounding terms disturb the conversational logic (especially the *conversational implicature*). The subreptice statute of prejudices engenders wrong routes in the critical enterprise.

When the *conversational implicature* implies the presence of a *common place*, the critical remark should follow the pattern of *enthymematic reason.* We are reminded that*,* in order to prove the way, subjective intuition can reach universality, the judgement of value is *deductive*. On the strength of the mental structure, the reflexive judgement is fallaciously transformed in a determinative judgement. The deduction is fallaciously considered correct or 'relevant', given two corrupted steps: on the one hand, the relevance is verified as against a vitiated concept of reference and, on the other hand, the censorship of belief is avoided.

The *maxim of relevance* is implicitly a *maxim of quality* from which the condition of sincerity is excluded. As the doxastic truth is a 'semantic truth', the possibility to find a moral reference for the cultural construct has the reduced chance of 'persuasion'. The *common place* is a solution to pretend universality. When the universal term has degenerated to the level of the *common place,* the prejudgement has become the 'prejudice'. The concept of reference, implicitly present in the enthymematic rationality, should avoid the common place, in order to be *constitutive for the human universe*:

> You say I am a European of liberal thinking, who practises the hygiene of aesthetic judgement (in our interpretation: the phenomenal reduction) and is the supporter of the principle of elite. It is true. But all these predicates, which are constitutive for me, were denigrated, calumniated, so that it is difficult to make the distinction between the simple and the educated man and to establish who could lose his power of discernment. (Patapievici, *Dialogue about the interference of languages*, 1987: 282).

If there is no clear point of departure – referential, expressive, axiological, phatic – for establishing the grounding terms or the possible dysfunctions of linguistic functions, the dialectics requires the intervention of metadialogue.

More details concerning the critical analysis are beyond the goal of the present topic. We shall remind ourselves of some possible fallacious manipulation of the referential term:

> To presuppose a certain *shared knowledge,* facts or meanings which are presumed to be common. The generalisation is manifested in two directions: the cultural options of a group are *imposed* with a certain collective pressure. In an uncritical way, a social opinion is admitted to be universal. This is a vice of reduction, which becomes evident during the doxastic dialectics. The grounds of beliefs have subjective roots. For instance, *hot sentiments* can easily contaminate human beliefs, pretending to be universal. 'It is known that the collective emotions are particularly linked to false reasons and to fraudulent perceptions.' (Patapievici, 1997: 129.)

The inflexible nature of the prejudice and the arbitrary ground of options are complementary features. Consequently, the tension existing between the metalingual function, which ensures the stability of codes including the axiological ones, and the phatic function in which we have introduced the roles the interlocutors play within the dialogue scenario, leads to false deduction. The common mentality is not derived from the universality of axiological codes, but it is imposed by virtue of the social statute of the dominant group. This is the case when prejudices are imposed as a *dogma.* The ideological dogma is the best example.

- The deductive circularity, known under the name of *petitio principi*, has its roots in a reflexive judgement which is based on a provisional a priori proposition that will be *a posteriori* confirmed. José Gil in his study 'Le problème de l'inconscient' (Gil, 1990) has made a critical examination of the Freudian psychoanalysis. The author invalidates the hypothesis of the respective theory, for the reason of circularity. The results of the psychoanalytical procedure cannot be proved in practice, because it is established in accordance with a thesis formulated in advance.

7.4. How can we explain the 'power of prejudices'?

Two features of the prejudice should be mentioned:

The subreptitious presence of the prejudgement in an illocutionary act, leads to an implicit validation. The critical examination of a prejudice which represents a preconceived idea, frequently deprived of logical or empirical evidence but based on a 'hot sentiment', leads to a partial result: the elimination of the affective component and the conservation of the categorical feature which becomes a universal attitude, an *axiomatic option*.

Hegel's first biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, mentioned that the problem of Judaism remained for Hegel 'a black riddle'. Hegel supported the Jewish emancipation, but could not explain their destiny. In accordance

with this dialectical system, the time of the Jewish people passed, their historical part was 'suspended' (*aufgehoben)*, however they continue to survive. The irony is that the rationalist philosopher of the *absolute* who said *Das Wahre ist das Ganze* ('the truth is the whole'), saw the 'moment of truth' in the particular dogma of his time – for him, Lutheranism was the absolute religion, and the persistence of Judaism an ontological obstinacy. Hegel could not imagine the postponed finality of history. On the other hand, according to Nietzsche who was a critic of culture and rationalism, and according to his *genealogic method,* Judaism was a cultural category which in ancient times knew two periods: one, full of importance – that of the Old Testament – and the other of decadence, which led to Christianity. In the case of Nietzsche, the irony had other roots. In contrast to Hegel, who was an adherent of Christianity, Nietzsche was an open and ardent critic of Christianity. He assigned to contemporary Judaism a Dionysian (Hellenic) part in the construction of the 'new world', anticipated by him. Caught in a vicious circle Hegel and Nietzsche, in spite of their interest in the Jewish emancipation, were victims of their eurocentrism. The particular case of Judaism is not judged in accordance with its grounding category, being an esoteric religion. The rivalry Judaism–Christianity or Christianity–Hellenism is settled by each of the two philosophers in accordance with an a priori option, considered legitimate: Lutheranism for Hegel, Dionysian Hellenism for Nietzsche. (See more commentaries in Yovel, 2000.)

It is extremely difficult to detect the prejudices with critical means: The theoretical aspects of this issue were exposed in the chapter dedicated to *doxastic dialectics*. It is necessary to mention, once more, that all the arguments regarding the subjectivity in doxastic dialectics have in view the original dimension of Ego, and not the relative meanings of his beliefs. With Heidegger, subjectivity is not a category of being, but a possibility condition of the ontological categories (2006: 215).

Doxastic dialectics is a pragmatic-critical procedure governed by cultural reflection (transcendental logic), that directs the synthetic means introspectively – the possibility to consolidate *a posteriori* the MORAL OBJECT/CONCEPT. The historical corruption of the moral object is in itself an *objective* fact. There is a pressure of the *trend,* of all factors representing the *common* ideas. Subjectivity and its inner world is a dynamic reality, susceptible of being corrupted. In this sense, we quote Horia Patapievici once more, in his quality of a critic of ideas:

> I believe it is imperious to reaffirm the conception in accordance with which there is a human nature essentially universal, eternal, and the original Creator is unique, the same in all forms of culture, suited to those a

priori categories about which Kant has spoken. (Patapievici, *Dialogue about the interference of languages*, 1997: 297).

Notes

* First printed form: 'Limba Română – Structură și funcționare', Actele celui de al 4 – lea Colocviu al Catedrei de Limba Română (25–26 noiembrie 2004), Ed. Universității, București, 2005.
[1] With Kant, either *Verstand,* 'understanding', or the judgement, are reflexive faculties by which the concept determines the object. 'Die reine Vernunft als urteilende Vernunft nennt Kant Verstand, den reinen Verstand ... Die Sätze, Aussagen, sind Verstandeshandlungen. Das gesuchte System der Grundsätze aller Sätze ist daher das System der Grudsätze des reinen Verstandes.' (Heidegger, l962: 95.)
[2] The *principle of transcendence* means the possibility – a priori given or mentally constituted – to ground an object from the cognitive point of view, a sensible object or a suprasensible one (moral, theoretical, philosophical). The grounding possibility can be equated with 'possibility conditions' of a phenomenon or of an act which are a priori/*innate* (for instance: the Kantian categories, the Chomskian deep structure). On the other hand, the grounding possibility is constituted by cognitive synthesis, on the base of a transcendental principle that ensures the rational justification.
[3] What we mean by measure of **objectivity** is an introspective procedure, extremely relative, to establish the MORAL OBJECT/CONCEPT by which the Ego can define himself.
Compare with the chapter dedicated to *doxastic dialectics,* a semantic procedure of decidability, in accordance with reflexive steps, the doxastic dialectics is the exclusive way of grounding the axiological ontology, wrongly identified with ideology.
[4] See our commentaries from 'Le discours prescriptif' (1977): 'Le discours moral intervient dans l'activité humaine pour la régler en conformité avec le concept du bien et du mal ... Une prescription est fondée ou motivée par un jugement de valeur qui lui assure l'autorité coercitive.' (p. 380)
[5] From this point of view, our considerations are in accord with Grice's philosophy regarding the 'metaphysical construction' of values (1991). All philosophical and theoretical constructs (concepts, systems, models, etc.) follow the same procedure.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THEORETICAL VULNERABILITIES

8.1. The issue

This chapter is concerned with methodological problems existing in humanistic sciences (including language sciences), which might contradict the idea that *science* (= the principle of rationality) and *democracy* (= the principle of individuation) are cooperative realities (respectively, consensual concepts).

For somebody interested in the philosophy of science, a debate concerning either the relationship or the opposition *science – democracy* is a challenging enterprise, given the following question: could we say that science, respectively, the principle of rationality, might influence the principle of individuation? Our answer is rather sceptical, because the reality proves the contrary. The target of the present chapter is precisely concerned with this topic: to emphasise those theoretical vulnerabilities that could generate fallacious slippages of the humanistic concepts. We will adopt a critical – not a polemic – attitude, by demonstrating that the principle of individuation, active in humanistic sciences, frequently becomes dominant, by using rhetorical means as an impact factor.

The critical examination is limited to some remarks regarding the theoretical (humanistic) argument, namely the distortions due to the ambiguities (of the conceptual extension) of the referential terms. Our intention is to demonstrate that the vulnerability of the theoretical prejudices generates paradigmatic instabilities.

The commentary has in view the main metatheoretical shortcomings of a field which is vulnerable by definition.

8.2. Basic concepts

8.2.1. Theoretical limitation

For the present commentary it is important to stress the idea that in any science, to reach a theoretical step means to introduce a conceptual 'language' of description, in order to ensure a concise and rational

explicitness of the cognitive content. Any form of conceptualisation extends the horizon of understanding.

The scientists formulate synthetic operations of thinking in a hierarchical line of abstraction, dominated by a referential concept. Theoretical languages represent intelligible 'images', which organise the perception of the reality. One does not speak about the *truth of a theory,* but about its *validity. A theory, with its theoretical instruments, is valid* to the extent it is *adequate* for the content under investigation. A theory tries to increase the rationality of the cognitive effort, on condition of being as concise, noncontradictory and exhaustive as it can be.[1]

8.2.2. Field limitation

In what follows we will refer to some of the main theoretical shortcomings of the humanistic sciences, language sciences being included. We remind ourselves that:

1. The area of humanistic sciences consolidates the spiritual universe of beliefs. The cognitive mechanism of humanistic sciences can be analysed in terms of doxastic logic (the logic of *belief*)[2] coupled with hermeneutical investigation.
2. Doxastic logic is the logic of *tertium datur*: the alternative to a given proposition is accepted.
3. The humanistic sciences are based on the synthetic logic, in accordance with which the categories of judgement are not given, but dialogically constituted. Therefore, the referential concepts on which a humanistic theory is formulated cannot avoid ambiguities.
4. Synthetic logic which is based on belief is subject-oriented. The subjective interpretation is dominated by Protagoras' philosophy: Man is the measure of all things (we find this definition especially correct regarding doxastic categories!).
5. Doxastic logic is a dialectical logic.

Doxastic [= belief] thinking was the main topic of many of our previous studies (1999, 2009 and several studies included in this book), in which the scientific effort was to formulate the characteristics of the doxastic rationality. To consider only one characteristic – that the doxastic thinking is defined by soft rationality – is too little.

Being a subject-oriented way of thinking, doxastic rationality establishes the grounds of belief:

- in semantic terms, by following a hermeneutical way of investigation;
- in a dialectical mechanism of argumentation, developed in two stages, in order to obtain a semantic consensus about the categories of judgement; and
- to articulate a hierarchically distributed scale of doxastic categories.

Doxastic thinking, subject-oriented and based on the logic of *tertium datur*, is partially convergent with the principle of individuation defining *democracy*. The characteristics of *humanistic sciences* become relevant if they are set in contrast with the idea of *democracy*.

A correct and reliable examination of the intercourse between humanistic sciences and democracy should be the object of the philosophy of culture. Much more modest, our presentation brings only some hints offered by the communicative studies.

In what follows we will refer to the general sense of *democracy,* excluding any political reference. Within the field of communicative studies:

- *democracy* is representative of the principle of individuation: the right that everybody has to speak and to manifest their opinion, even the right they have to be wrong;
- *democracy* is ruled both by the free will of individuals and by the will of the majority;
- paradoxically, *democracy* – which is plurivocal – is deprived of the sense of reciprocity;
- frequently, *democracy* is a concept abusively, even improperly, evoked, in order to justify the choice of authoritative arguments.

Concerning our investigation, it is important to make the difference between the concept of *democracy* and the *democratic* attitude 'pretending' to hear the *vox populi*. Actually*, vox populi* represents the popular cry. It is the voice of the present, which refuses abstract thinking and takes over the traditional conceptualisation in a time-serving way; the democratic attitude has *no critical discipline*, so it makes room to a relativism 'sans ravage', due to which any mental a priorism is abolished. In this condition, the overturning of values is legitimated.

In extremis, one can speak about the force, even the 'fascination' of the common trend. Impossible to realise a collective control, the collective opinion does not express the collective CONSENSUS. The collective opinion is the open area where ideas are substituted by ideology.

8.3. Conceptual vulnerabilities

A technical approach to two concepts of *theoretical argument* and *theoretical paradigm* is sufficiently relevant, in our opinion, for the present issue. The characteristics of these two concepts disclose the shortcomings of doxastic thinking.

8.3.1. Theoretical argument

A *theoretical argument* is a claim in favour of a category of judgement, of a thesis, of a theory.

The subjective and the temporal features of the humanistic sciences (linguistics being included) represent the main theoretical vulnerabilities of the doxastic arguments. Even if *subjectivity* is a ground (= constitutive) feature[3], and, even if it is an a priori condition, it is in danger of being corrupted by a kind of conceptual 'malpraxis' of the believer. 'Personne n'ignore qu'il y a deux entrées par où les opinions sont reçues dans l'âme … l'entendement et la volonté' (Pascal, *De l'esprit géometrique,* 355).

Those believers who are less reflective adopt and promote clichéd ideas, being 'corrupted by the authority' of the *loci communes.* The validity of the authoritative arguments is difficult to prove. In the best case, the *Zeitgeist* dominates the negotiable way in which the doxastic categories (= the general propositions) are chosen or established. The frame of the present argumentation is restricted to a specific issue and does not allow subtle commentaries about the relationship between the *paradigmatic trend* and the *Zeitgeist,* two different but related concepts.

In order to define the vulnerable point of theoretical arguments, we will use Aristotle's classification of arguments (*apodictic, dialectic, peirastic,*[4] *eristic*).

> II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four kinds: διδασκαλικοι, διαλεκτικοι, πειραστικοι, εριστικοι – Didactic, Dialectical, Examination (Persuasive) and Contentious arguments (Translation by E. S. Forster, *De sophisticis elenchis*).

Didactic arguments are proper for *exact* sciences. *Dialectical* arguments are proper for *epistemic* sciences. In Aristotle's definition, dialectical arguments start from generally accepted opinions in order to establish a contradiction (as *epistemic* sciences do). G*iven* the synthetic nature of *doxastic/belief* sciences, they develop a dialectical procedure, but in a different way than that presented by Aristotle. A negotiable way is imposed in order to reach consensus about the general propositions.

During doxastic dialectics the partners establish, by consensus, in a 'natural way', which is the authoritative argument that can settle the controversy. Being subject-oriented, doxastic dialectics cannot avoid wrong argumentation, namely, making use of *persuasive* (*peirastic*) or *contentious* (*eristic*) arguments, in the way defined by Aristotle: *peirastic* arguments are arguments of those who 'claim knowledge of the subject involved' in order to persuade the others; and *eristic* arguments are of 'those which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted'.

In humanistic sciences it is difficult to adopt a certain point of perception, and it is much more difficult to extend or even to change it. The psychological sensitiveness diminishes the power of reflection on which *doxa* is constituted.

Here, we have some examples:

8.3.2. Linguistic argument

Linguistics, as a humanistic science[5], is much more proper for a strict theoretical description. Apparently, the linguistic argument is deprived of subjectivity, but nevertheless it expresses a 'point of view' and it is time-dependent, both characteristics meaning a subjective approach.

In linguistics, the most conflicting concepts are those of *structure, language, norm, convention,* etc.

The characteristics which Saussure defined as 'la langue', in opposition with 'la parole', constituted the axiomatic form of what later became the *structuralist paradigm,* in spite of the fact that Saussure has never used the word *'structure'*.

Much later, Saussure's axioms defining 'la langue' were considered a static point of view, and, consequently, a reason of being refuted. With his 'generative linguistics', Chomsky has introduced a dynamic point of view, and so on.

At the time the dialogue studies were in full development, the theoreticians questioned the legitimacy of considering them part of linguistics. Problems appeared:

1. Can we speak about structure with respect to conversation?
2. Can we speak about constitutive rules governing conversational dynamics?[6]

A major debate around these questions (see Amel, 1994) proves that many linguists and philosophers are caught in a conceptual blocking. **The**

negative answer to the above questions has the same force as an authoritative argument.[7] In order to avoid blocking traps, the theoretical approaches of conversation should settle some metatheoretical[8] problems and not to go on tracks:

1. To verify the concept of structure, by opposing pure, 'structuralist' acceptance to praxiological interpretation. We have proposed the concept of *organic structure* (2016);
2. To define the concept of norm in new terms. The problem was to verify to what extent the *organic structure* can be defined in terms of normative dialectics 'où tout se tient', as Saussure said.

The subject-dependent limitation of linguistic arguments is that of being theoretically 'a point of view'. One can consider the point of view a psychologically 'non-objective' feature, susceptible to being questioned, extended or reinterpreted.

8.3.3. Aesthetic argument

Humanistic sciences – like aesthetics, ethics, law sciences, literary criticism, etc. – are, theoretically, more vulnerable than linguistics. In a more detailed analysis of humanistic sciences, Aristotle's rhetoric helps us to discover that the subject-dependent way of doxastic thinking is usually adequate to *loci communes*.

When a doxastic argument, in one of the above enumerated sciences, is confronted with Aristotle's classification, it should be referred to the definition of *peirastic (persuasive)* or to that of *eristic (contentious)* argument, and not to what Aristotle defined as being the *dialectical* argument, namely: 'those which starting from generally accepted opinions and reasons to establish a contradiction'. The hermeneutic nature of humanistic sciences modifies the dialectical mechanism of the doxastic rationality. Based on synthetic logic, in accordance with which the general concepts are not given, but dialogically constituted, the negotiable way of reaching a consensus is in search of an authoritative argument. Due to its lack of absolute evidence, a doxastic category is a vulnerable parameter. In these 'theoretical conditions', doxastic subjectivity is a deconstructive agent, rather than a constructive one. In the better cases, beliefs are influenced by the dominant doxastic paradigms, or by the *Zeitgeist*.

Here we have an example, which gave a deconstructive answer to the question: *What does ART mean?*

'Reality should be applied not penetrated' (Klaus Honnef, 1988: 76).

At a moment when the *Zeitgeist* announces the deconstruction of metaphysics, contemporary aesthetics theorises the abolition of the prejudice 'art in itself', with the intention to reduce the metaphysical dimension of art. The classical paradigm of contemplative art is refuted. The artist no longer says that the whole of reality is invested with revealing power, but that *reality should be applied not penetrated.* By mixing art with reality, the real change which is at stake is the 'distance' the receiver no longer takes vis-à-vis the object of art. The idea of artistic convention is extended in such a way that it implies a performative premise. The receiver becomes an active participation in a 'possible world', where the points of reference are no more those of usual life. Modern exhibitions are like an imaginary itinerary or like a *scenario* that should be performed while entering it.

By eliminating the cognitive function of art and by substituting the *contemplation* with *interaction,* the most important art parameter – the *inventio* – becomes the object of pretentious trickeries. The *inventio* is no longer dominated by a symbolic intention, but has complete liberty to pretend to be expressive. By virtue of the individuation principle, each person can be an artist and each artist is right in what they are doing, even if what they do is meaningless.

When the principle of individuation attains a dominant position in thinking, the subjectivity of belief loses its connection with the ontological source and manifests a large opening towards common ideas. Umberto Eco's last book *The Chronicles of a Liquid Society* – the collection of his commentaries published in the Italian journal *Expresso* – is an eloquent example supporting our argumentation, a picture of a society lacking in firm convictions.

8.3.4. Theoretical paradigm

In the preceding paragraph, we investigated the cause that generates a non-critical multiplication of referential categories. In what follows, we will present an opposite direction: a pragmatic subjectivity confident in its power of thinking. Frequently, scientists are less flexible, less democratic; they avoid controversy, being convinced of the validity of their own arguments.

In order to establish the limits within which a humanistic argument can be validated, the theoretical concept of *paradigm* is of much help. In the scientific research in general, humanistic or otherwise, the concept of *paradigm* has a great importance. A *paradigm* allows the systematisation of the scientific field, by establishing research borders. Delimited by a

theoretically specific way of perception, the paradigm is the frame within which a theory displays its scientific instruments: theses, concepts, arguments.

Attempting to discover the source of that difference led me to recognise the role in scientific research of what I have since called 'paradigms'. These I take to be universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. (Thomas Kuhn 'Preface', VIII).

'So, normal science is science conducted when scientists agree in broad outlines' is Kuhn's conclusion. In Kuhn's definition of a paradigm, two features are the most important, clearly emphasised by Bryan W. van Norden in his notes referring to Khun's definition of a *paradigm*: 'A complete WORLDVIEW (one aspect) of a particular community (the second aspect)'.

In the humanistic field, a theoretically consolidated paradigm becomes an 'AUTHORITATIVE EXAMPLE of how to do science' (in the commentary of Van Norden). The *authoritative example* generates a trend in collective mentality. *Structuralism* and *psychoanalysis* are the best examples of paradigmatic invasions. It is difficult to resist the mental trend, up to the moment when the common reception reaches the point of saturation. The collective receptivity is open to accept either a paradigmatic trend or a paradigmatic break (paradigm refutation), because the *premises of perception* remain at a superficial level of subjectivity, being rather solutions of an easy way of judgement.

For the topic of our demonstration, regarding the vulnerability of the argumentative subjectivity, we want to emphasise the importance which Kuhn's definition confers to the role of a community of practitioners 'to provide model problems and solutions'. For the scientists who are engaged in a specific project, the *paradigm* represents the citadel of scientific security and, consequently, it can easily become a false argument of an academic arrogance. There are many examples of scientific elitism which reject other theoretical conceptions. In Marcelo Dascal's book (*Mashav HaRuah – The Gust of the Wind*), one finds a careful debate about the fallacious success of *refutation* based on (academic) *reputation*. The chapter entitled 'The University with Humanistic Opening' displays details about the complicated, much formalised and sometimes wrong system of scientific promotion. Marcelo Dascal, at the time Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, made a great effort to maintain a theoretical balance between different *schools* and different departments within the Humanistic Faculty, arguing that *interparadigmatic* cooperation is possible and scientifically useful.

8.4. Conclusions

From a metatheoretical point of view, it is extremely important to make the distinction between two levels of *subjectivity* in thinking: the *constitutive subjectivity* of the beliefs vs. the *pragmatic subjectivity* of the believer. The doxastic rationality maintains the pragmatic subjectivity under the critical control of constitutive subjectivity, in order to protect the belief power and to avoid fallacious argumentations.

We do not share the philosophical opinion in accordance with which the constitutive subjectivity has no a priori connection with the ontological dimension of being. In their search of categorical propositions, the cognitive subject proves to be a problematising agent. During the hermeneutical interpretation of doxastic concepts, the meaning of words is 'transubstantiated' into an existential meaning. Doxastic thinking, which is meaning-oriented, has axiological finality. It is dialectical in itself, moving between two ontological extremities: *apolinic* vs. *dionisiac.* That means between two times: the time of *forms crystallisation* and the time of *forms decomposition.*

Fernando Gil, the organiser of the Evora Colloquium, *Controversias Cientificas et Filosoficas* 2–7 December, 1985[9], in his inaugural speech has raised the following question, which we quote as an answer regarding the bivalence of human doxastic thinking: 'Comment faut-il comprendre les débats recurrents: sur fond de couplages de concepts qui animent le mouvement historique des idées; comme un *aporétique* – ou comme une *dialectique*?'

Notes

[1] See the first chapter (Part I) about the general pragmatic concepts. See also the Annex: A *theory* represents an abstract study of a specific field of reality. A *theory* is a complex of theses and hypotheses, rules, laws and concepts, models, organised in a unitary logical system.

[2] As we have presented in the previous chapter, the starting point of our approach of *doxastic logic* is Hintikka's theory of *doxastic logic*: from *Y believes x is true, one cannot deduce ~x is false.* In Amel (the chapter *Doxastic dialectics* in this book, note 6), the following restrictions are mentioned: We shall refer *belief* and *opinion* to the doxastic field considered in the restricted frame of axiology, where the functional autonomy of *doxa* can be demonstrated. Therefore, no reference will be made, either to the probable (*I believe it will be raining*), or to the provable (*I believe they intend to climb the mountain,* or *I believe they are able to reach the highest peak of Everest*), or hypothetical opinions (*I believe there is life on the planet Mars*).

[3] We define *constitutive subjectivity* in the sense Heidegger defines the immanent subjectivity: Heidegger, 1957: 137: 'Die Subiektivität ist die wesenhafte Gesetzlichkeit der Gründe welche die Möglichkeit eines Gegenstandes zu reichen**.'**

[4] If *peirastic argument* is translated by *examination argument,* the concept remains confusing. It should be better to put this category in connection with the verbal form: to make a trial, or to prove, being skilled in words. Actually, *peirastic argument* is a *persuasive* argument, based on the claim of authority; cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, translated by E.S. Forster (*De sophisticis elenchis*). See the Annex. A more detailed explanation of the same classification of arguments/reasoning, in Aristotle, *Topics,* Book I (The theory and Practice of Dialectic), Chapter 1 (Dialectic and Deduction).

[5] Starting with *structuralism,* linguists considered that *linguistics* has the characteristics of a theoretical science. See the explanation in the Annex.

[6] See Searle et al., *(On) Searle on Conversation* (1992), and Amel, 'The constitutive rule of a round table' (*Semiotica,* 1994).

[7] In a book published in 2016, we presented a praxiological model of conversation. From our point of view, the conversation represents an ORGANIC STRUCTURE. We define the organic structure as a structure of FORCES (speech acts), governed by principles and not by rules. 'To be governed by principles' means an extensible measure of regularity and acceptability, within which rules/norms are disputed. The principles have constitutive function.

[8] The examination of a theoretical undertaking, from the point of view of its validity, and the detection of theoretical shortcomings – as we have done in this chapter – constitute the object of metatheoretical analyses.

[9] There was a meeting during which the participants presented subjects of an extreme relevance for the present issue. The papers presented during this meeting were published in the book edited by Fernando Gil, *Scientific and Philosophical Controversies* (1990, Lisboa, Fragmentos). See also Amel's commentary in 'Antithetic Reason' (*Manuscrito,* Campinas, 1993).

CHAPTER NINE

THE CHALLENGING FORCE OF DISSUASION*

The issue: In this chapter we are trying to analyse the dissuasive force[1] of those ideas that are dominant within the social life and exercise a negative pressure upon a creative mind. The particular aspect of dissuasion we are interested in is neither discursive, nor explicit, but active in the form of an implied argument, the power of which has normative authority.

The premise: The argumentative force of dissuasion belongs to the doxastic field (the *belief field*) and has axiological foundations.

A remark: This paper continues our research within the field of argumentative dialectics, and the topics of several studies of ours count as premises of the present approach: (a) the mechanism of decidability in doxastic thinking follows the constitutive process of the *moral object* (Amel, 1999)[2]. If our inquiry has in view only the argumentative behaviour with reference to cultural notions, we are compelled to emphasise that the respective system of notions is characterised by argumentative authority and presents the danger of promoting a prejudicial judgement; these considerations introduce two further premises; (b) we may judge *authority* as being sometimes a valid argument and sometimes a fallacious one (Amel, 2004); (c) from the point of view of the conversational logic, *the preconceived idea* has all the features characterising the category of presupposition (it is a prejudgement).

Actually, our contribution represents 'une prise de conscience culturelle', grasped in its dialectical unrest.

9.1. Between psychology and (argumentative) logic

9.1.1. Dissuasion vs. persuasion

There is a temptation to oppose dissuasion to persuasion and to define them as complementary acts. By following a strict pragmatic definition, we cannot reduce dissuasion to a perlocutionary act that guides the interlocutor's thinking in a direction which contradicts their own intentions.

Dissuasion is an exercitive act – a *demand,* [± institutionalised; ± categorical]:

(1) Don't do it, because …

Generally speaking, dissuasion is based on 'reasons' the agent supplies to an inter-agent, in order to make them change their mind and not to implement the plans previously projected. Dissuasion is a particular demand, through which an agent tries by *persuasion,* or even by psychological pressure, to determine somebody to forbear from doing a certain act. If the force of dissuasion is less powerful and the 'reasons' which are given are not sufficiently authoritative, the *demand* can be considered a behabitive act – *a piece of advice* (following Austin's classification of speech acts), an act by means of which a certain agent disconcerts others' plans or ideas.

(2) You, with your foreign accent, don't try to enter this college, because you'll have no chance!

Example (2) represents a piece of advice (the well-meaning force of which cannot be appreciated) given by a teacher to a pupil who speaks Romanian with a Moldavian accent.

Even in the case in which the dissuasion is not a linguistic act explicitly expressed, the illocutionary force it implies can be linguistically translated and it is interpreted as such by the inter-agent.

9.1.2. Rhetorical involvement

The pragmatic definition of dissuasion can be easily reformulated in conformity with the logic of dialectics, if the 'conditions of felicity', by means of which dissuasion reaches an efficient effect, are considered parameters of the argumentative function of dissuasion. In order for it to be convincing, dissuasion should satisfy two conditions: it should be performed from an authoritative position and should supply reasons which are disadvantageous for the person to whom the act is addressed. The argumentative force of dissuasion cannot be considered an indirect speech act, but an implied one, as presuppositions are.

As dissuasion is fundamentally an act that manages somebody's beliefs, the argumentative logic should be coupled with elements belonging to doxastic dialectics[3]. Consequently, the rhetoric involvement of *doxa* is extremely important. The argumentative logic on which

dissuasion is based follows both the logic of rationality and the strategic logic. By using either of these operations, the agent is looking for persuasive means and calculates the interactive advantage they could obtain over their partner.

In order for it to be able to dishearten someone from implementing one's plans, dissuasion, as an act, should satisfy an authoritative condition. This is the first thing the justificatory enterprise[4] of dissuasion brings into inquiry. It is impossible to persuade someone to forbear from doing a certain thing, or implementing their plans, etc., without having a certain authority over that person. Authority can acquire the force of an argument in two cases: (a) a power relationship, within which the advantage one part has over the other is institutionalised and recognised by both partners; and (b) a certain moral superiority; in this case the argument of authority is converted into an argument of credibility.

From the rhetorical point of view of the argumentative dialectics, the two important aspects that are mentioned could be indicated as follows:

(a) authority is a matter of degree, and
(b) the authoritative argument implied in dissuasion is either rationally supported or fallaciously imposed.

9.2. The crisis of the justification device

9.2.1. Cultural axioms

Among the rhetorical arguments that manipulate the 'reasons' that could persuade somebody to be dissuaded, we include the dominant ideas that a community shares at a specific time.

Within a community, there is a tendency to circulate forms of thinking which are uncritically assumed and conventionally instituted, such as cultural axioms. In these particular cases, the state of mind has no value in itself, but it becomes pertinent as 'language' (a system of *doxastic* and, respectively, axiological concepts), summarised in sets of several codes[5] governing speech, thinking or social behaviour. We are confronted with a reality that rehabilitates the Saussurean definition of language as a *social institution*. Social psychology is responsible for this condition – an aspect we do not comment upon, but the fact that such belief, being a kind of socially active *forma mentis*, influences the common behaviour, as authoritative arguments do. The condition of an institution-like mentality is a consequence of the formative principle, which within the *belief field* is excessively productive. *Belief* represents the cognitive 'territory' in search

of forms and expression, therefore the ready-made beliefs are the best and the easiest support of the constitutive effort of axiological thinking. Axiological languages, scientific paradigms being included here, gain more credibility when others share them, than when they are filtered only by one's own mind. A value that circulates represents a reason of pertinence and to conform to it seems natural for the common mind. This explanation tries to summarise the process due to which the mechanism of prejudices is augmented within social life (Amel, 2005). A kind of cognitive laziness neutralises the creative effects of doxastic dialectics and raises the power of intellectual behaviour that has already acquired 'legitimacy' to the level of an institution.

Sometimes, the lack of cognitive proofs or the insufficient pertinence of the meaning of value concepts prepares the axiological field for distortion.

(3) Some physicians say: it is dangerous to eat eyes because they contain cholesterol; later, others, on the contrary, recommend eating an eye every day, because eyes contain lecithin.

(4) One says: 'We should admit social anarchy because it is impossible to fight against it! 'Or because "real democracy" is either an empty term or a utopia.'

(5) Don't try to be a polite and modest person, because you risk being included in the category of '*alte Sachen*'!

When a ruler or the like is interested in imposing an axiological paradigm and preserving it, society is compelled to conform to this paradigm for a certain time. In what follows, there are two examples of ironical forms of dissuasion by indirectly destabilising the dogmatic thinking (to set it in an improper context):

(6) See the ironical but real example: *General şi particular in gândirea generalilor şi particularilor* ('General and particular in the thinking of generals and private persons') – paper presented by a student at the Marxist-Leninist seminar (see Alex Stefanescu, 2006).

Within a scientific society, it is already impossible to imagine another scientific paradigm/language than that which is in fashion:

(7) Let us analyse, in structuralist terms, the poem *Căţeluş cu părul creţ* [*Little dog with curly hair*]! a seminar work (see Alex Stefanescu, 2006).

There are paradoxical examples, when 'deconstructive' attitudes gain social legitimacy and everybody chooses this way. It is extremely typical for people with a gregarious mentality to follow uncritically a nonconformist attitude, each individual cultivating for themselves the illusion of being original. We may see how great the influence still is in the following cases:

(8) The vulgarisation of Nietzsche's attempt of '*Umwertung aller Werte*' (to transvaluate values) (*Antichrist,* last statement)[6];

(9) To follow the nihilist philosophers, in their dissuasive attempt of destroying the fundaments of belief, or the representatives of postmodernism who advocate the neutralisation of axiological oppositions;

(10) To adopt the rebel behaviour of teenage punks;

(11) Or even to speak at a brisk pace (radio or TV reports);

and so on.

In contradistinction to the common language, the institution of prejudices uncovers a kind of semantic vacuum, because the principle of intelligibility neglects the functions of doxastic dialectics. On the other hand, the fact that axiological systems are more flexible than common language and is time- and space-dependent, proves that argumentative dialectics is still active, even at the moments when its importance is minimised.

9.2.2. The gap of the creative mind

Prejudices of any kind become prohibitive means for a creative mind.

The original thinking of a person trying to express ideas in their own language and to behave consequently does not assume predominance without proving the ideas' justificatory power. For this person the rules of intellectual behaviour, which are socially accepted, are usually under cognitive inquiry in order to examine whether they represent authentic beliefs or cultural prejudices (Amel, 2005). In what follows we shall discuss two aspects that prove the way original thinking assumes 'the pressure of (axiological) language' in a critical way:

(a) the active role of a subject within the system of language, and

(b) the nature of the authoritative argument implied in dissuasion.

It is important to remember that dominant ideas are veiled in a kind of ambiguity; they are either rationally supported or fallaciously imposed.

9.3. Critical strategy

9.3.1. Critical shortcoming

Due to the 'presupposition status' of prejudices and their surreptitious presence in illocutionary acts, the critical inquiry is easily corrupted. The implicit validation of prejudices allows a shortcut of criticism, during which only the subjective dimension of prejudices is removed and the categorical one is preserved, a procedure by means of which prejudices gain the normative force of axiomatic options (cf. Amel, 2005). Consequently, once the normative power of prejudices becomes general, they constitute a *sociolect*, namely, a socially accepted code, 'an institution'.

From the history of deconstructive enterprises, we quote a fragment from Derrida's *Force and Signification* in order to emphasise the unstable equilibrium of forces and the role the individual has within *language*:

> On perçoit la structure dans l'instance de la menace, au moment où l'imminence du péril concentre nos regards sur la clef de voûte [= point of tension – Our emphases] d'une institution sur la pierre où se résumant sa possibilité et sa fragilité. On peut alors menacer méthodiquement la structure pour mieux la percevoir non seulement en ses nervures mais en ce lieu secret ou elle n'est ni érection, ni ruine, mais labilité. Cette opération s'appelle (en latin) *soucier* ou *solliciter* [= convergent forces – our emphases] (1967: 13).

Nothing is more unstable than the position of the subject under the pressure of an institution (in our case, the axiological commitment) and against which the interactive subject opposes their own force.[7]

As far as nobody rejects dominant ideas, they maintain their super-personal status, having normative power. But the human mind has a critical inclination, especially when values are at stake. Therefore, the institutional status of axiological concepts triggers contrary effects. In spite of the force the institution of language imposes, by limiting free choices the argumentative attitudes of creative individuals are challenged.

Naturally, we should not forget that 'the pressure of the system' is a question of degree: it is exercised either by the normative force or by the force of the social choice. The concepts are loaded with specific connotations that make transparent both the authoritative argument and the axiological force they imply. In our study about 'justification transfer' (2004), we stated the following: 'The (justification) process' engenders the tension between two completely different parameters: the 'authority of a source' versus the 'authorised source', regarding a certain point of view.

The respective distinction has important consequences upon the interactive subject: in each case, original thinking does not assume dominant ideas without a dialectical trial: 'the pressure of the system' should critically prove its power. If the source gains credibility, the individual resorts to the dissuasive argument:

(12) Smoking is dangerous for Man's health!

It seems rational to conform to the dissuasive force of the above quoted example, because the authoritative argument cannot be doubted.

Sometimes, in spite of the inner resistance, the interactive subject is compelled to adopt a conformist attitude or the strategy of silence.

(13) The totalitarian propaganda discourse imposes a dominant speech that functions as an instrument of power. Language becomes a kind of FORTIFICATION wall, impossible to be demolished. The 'authority of the source' dissuades the interactive subject from manifesting any critical attitude.

(14) Nobody dared to contradict the structuralist approach in the high tide of its development, while today nobody speaks any longer in terms of a structuralist paradigm.

The last example proves that the force of a scientifically chosen paradigm cannot be easily demolished, although there are scientists who can demonstrate the paradigmatic limits using theoretical shortcomings of the concepts supporting the respective paradigm. The scientific inertia is a known fact, because few people are able to reshape their minds.

9.3.2. Axiological doubt

Generally speaking, dissuasion undermines the position of the interactive subject and increases the uncertainty of their own decision; they are caught in a state of axiological doubt. Though it seems paradoxical, this situation triggers the critical attitude. It is less important to inquire as to the 'reasons' which one gives in order to dissuade somebody else, than to ascertain what is the authority that allows the performance of such an act.

In the particular case approached by us, the interactive subject who endures the pressure of the system, brings under inquiry the normative status of the system they belong to. In fact, the subject examines the *argument of authority* that supports the pressure of the dominant ideas: are

they imposed by force (e.g., by totalitarian language), by fashion (the common patterns of the intellectual behaviour), or can they give transcendental legitimacy to the axiolọgical choice of a particular person?

If the interactive subject is under the 'pressure' of a totalitarian institution, they adopt an ambiguous strategy:

> (15) The subject is ready to admit the counterargument: *If you cannot beat us, join us ... or keep silent!*

If the subject discloses that a socially corrupted mentality imposes its rules upon them, their critical attitude is more active.

Due to the dissociative function of argumentative dialectics, the justification process has great importance in the belief formation. On this level, the principle of rationality is based on *meaning*, the 'truth' of which cannot be proved but is assumed by consciousness insofar as it is pertinent for the thinking subject. Consequently, the principle of rationality should be increased by reasons of intelligibility.

A person becomes less passive in their choice when confronted with the dissuasive force of the axiological language which is 'in fashion' (*on trend*) – i.e., the values shared by the members of the society they live in. The critical postulate, on which doxastic dialectics is constituted, and the interactive subject follows, affirms: Since doxastic dialectics involves reflecting judgements (See Kant, 198l: 73–74), its entire justification procedure is supported by a higher degree of logic, where the principle of uncertainty calls upon a principle of transcendence (Amel, 1999: 6).

The principle of transcendence is a self-defining principle of generalisation.[8]

In a reflective judgement, the principle of transcendence is a point of reference, a horizon that can give transcendental legitimacy to axiological choice.

If the first two cases – the totalitarian language and the ideas in fashion – disclose a fallacious authority, which has no rational force, there are in exchange dominant ideas, which define a society at a certain time and space. This case cannot be included in the category of an oppressive system. These types of ideas are representative for what is called *Zeitgeist*. An exigent mind cannot apply censorship in all these cases – Nietzsche's critical radicalism is not the best example to follow. By opening space for a non-prejudiced dialogue, even an exacting mind is caught within the hermeneutical circle, as Gadamer demonstrated: 'Il n'y a pas de compréhension qui soit libre de tout préjugé.' (1976: 347; see also Dascal,

2004:161: 'It is impossible to conceive *iesh mi-ein*', in translation: 'something out of nothing.').

9.4. Conclusion

Our debate is dealing with the persuasive force of dissuasion. It regards the inner mechanism of culture: both its dynamics and its authenticity.

Within the pressure of cultural institutions, a creative mind is never a passive consumer of ideas in fashion, but a critical participant in a collective debate. The most important step is to supply reasons for oneself, to reach the inner conviction that the sense-giving acts are pertinent for the ontological cognition and the configuration of a larger than a priori given *Weltanschauung*.

Notes

* Communication, Sixth International Conference on Argumentation, ISSA, University of Amsterdam, 2006; first printed in *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study for Argumentation,* 73–77, Amsterdam, Sic Sat, 2007.

[1] To be convincing, dissuasion should supply reasons that evaluate a situation, which are disadvantageous for somebody in particular.

[2] The conclusions we reached in the respective chapter concern the general philosophy of cognition: doxastic dialectics has three main functions (actually argumentative dialectics does): (a) *dissociative,* (b) *justificatory* or *critical* and (c) *constitutive*.

[3] See the premises on which this study is based, enumerated above.

[4] See note 2.

[5] Everybody knows what a 'code' means, but we shall quote here a recently given definition that satisfies our culture-based argumentation: 'A speech code is defined as a system of socially constructed symbols and meanings, premises and rules, pertaining to communicative conduct.' (Keith Berry, 2002).

[6] See also the commentary in Yovel, 2000: 188.

[7] See, in this book, the chapter about *Subjectivity in Language*.

[8] When the reflecting subject alleges a principle of transcendence for the axiological choice, the subject defines themselves through this principle, using their transcendental experience: see Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, 1957, and Bachelard's book, 1957.

CHAPTER TEN

THE *QUI PRO QUO* CONSTITUTIVE
CONDITION OF THE DIALOGUE*

Olivia: *Stay; I prithee, tell me what thou think'st of me.*
Viola: *That you do think you are not what you are.*
Olivia: *If I think so, I think the same of you.*
Viola: *Then think you right: I am not what I am.*

William Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night* (Act III, Scene I)

10.1. Two problems

The first one – what do we understand by a '*qui pro quo*' constitutive feature of the dialogue'?

The second one – in what way can we speak about speaker's identity?

The first problem is approached from pragmatic perspective and can be interpreted in two different ways: (a) as a conflict between the subjective dimension of the speaker and the communicative roles they play, considering the *speaker's discursive identity*; and (b) as a conflict between the speaker's genuine identity and the character they play or is compelled to play, considering the *speaker's image as a person* vs. the *speaker's image as a persona*.

The second problem regards both pragmatic and doxastic difficulties in defining the speaker's identity. The strategic reasons which the participants have when they allege a certain image for themselves or for the others are considered, but not as a specific topic.

10.2. Definitional retreat

In order to exclude any ambiguity regarding the target of our present commentary, we should begin with a short explanation of the main concept we use, that of *speaker's identity*. There is no reason to offer a comprehensive definition, but to point out the relevance the respective concept acquires within the dialogical frame. The complexity of this concept can be better approached if

the following two delimitations are specified: on one hand, there is the opposition between the speaker's genuine identity, namely their identity as a human being, and the speaker's discursive identity, namely the speaker's discursive commitment; on the other hand, there is the opposition between the speaker's consciousness of their own identity as a speaker, namely the representation the speaker has of their own knowledge, beliefs, dialogical intentions, etc. and a partner's representation of the speaker's identity (genuine or discursive).

When the idea of 'identity' was referred to that of 'consciousness', the commentary followed a conceptual exigency, and so we have no intention of displaying a philosophical speculation in this respect. By grounding the speaker's identity on the concept of *consciousness* we did not ignore the fluidity of this concept[1], and no less the fact that because the indetermination of such a parameter as the dialogical genuine relationship may be affected. But from the pragmatic perspective of our argument such an aspect cannot be considered 'constitutive', and consequently it has no particular relevance.

10.3. Dialogue as a societal game

Closer examination of dialogical behaviour discloses that a speaker's identity is a kind of fiction. In this context, 'fiction' means an operationally composed reality – a *robot* object, underlying a speaker's identity. This remark regards both interpretative positions: that of the speaker (counting the partner's expectations) and that of the receiver (analysing the speaker's behaviour). When interlocutors interact with each other, they need to approximate the partner's knowledge, beliefs and dialogical intentions, in order to suit their interventions. It is better, therefore, to speak in this case about presumption of identity that participants to (linguistic) interaction may reciprocally project upon the other.

For several reasons, presumption of identity is a less powerful parameter than a rational dialogue requires. In a 'natural way', a speaker's identity presupposes a perfect link between the person themselves – their genuine identity (beliefs, thoughts, intentions etc.) and voice – discursive identity (what they say), due to the general rule of identity: *cogito, ergo sum, ergo loquor.* By considering a speaker's 'social persona'*,* there is an ontological split between participants' natural and conversational conditions, a conflict between the speaking subject and the interactive role they perform.

For participants in linguistic interaction (a dialogue, etc.), the fact that there is no complete identity between the role they play by following dialogue rules and their own universe of beliefs and intentions represents a communicative barrier. Some examples:

(1) The captain of a military company of black soldiers, black himself, during the military training treats the solders very badly, insulting and humiliating them.
   – What kind of a black man are you? said one of the company.
   – I am an American (military) officer! was his reply.
(2) When the belligerent conflict between Germany and Denmark began and Princess Alexandra, Prince Edward VII's wife and the Danish king's daughter, interfered by condemning the German position, Queen Victoria, supporting the German position, compelled her to silence:
   – Now, you belong to England!

The social role the speaker plays in the above examples, being institutionalised, imposes a discursive behaviour different from the private attitude. But the social role should not be obligatorily institutionalised for engendering an identity conflict. Usually, in not institutionalising positions, the conflict that could appear is between a person's genuine convictions and the intention they have in disguising their beliefs or socially manifesting them.

(3) After the performance of a piano concert, somebody congratulates the pianist:
   – 'Very good, very good!'

This remark may express a true conviction or a flattering attitude.

In the last two cases commented on above, the conflict has an ontological nature, being engendered by a *cleavage of justification*, a concept defined in Kasher's article (1986) as follows:

> When a genuine act of assertion is performed, the speaker may be asked both for grounds of his *belief* [our emphasis], that what he has asserted does hold, and *for reasons he has had for saying* what he believes to be the case (p. 286). Kasher emphasises that the two aspects are independent: We consider, first, reason for speech acts, rather than reason for their content or product. (ibid)

For a philosopher of dialogue, the conflict of identity becomes relevant with regard to conversational mechanism. The many voices each speaker has in dialogue, the manifold roles the speaker performs simultaneously, the different justifications they have in openly sustaining a certain position, all these increase the partner's risk of getting from the speaker a false *presumption of identity*. Dialogue is like a game of hazard, given the autonomy of the two conversational parameters: on one hand, the speaker's intention of expressing their own attitude (the conversational freedom), and on the other hand, the speaker's social commitment (the conversational convention), as Kasher

stipulates. The split identity characterising each dialogue participant invalidates the universality of Grice's Maxim of Quality (1975), namely, the condition that interlocutors should 'make their contribution one that is true'. Language, being a mediating tool, may both cover and uncover a person's intentions. Consequently, to a certain extent, each (linguistic) interaction represents a game of *hide and seek,* known as the *qui pro quo* relationship.

10.3.1. Theory of roles and the dialogical voices

The basic thesis of our present study – that the *qui pro quo* relationship represents a constitutive feature of the dialogue – taken as such, sounds less innovatory, rather banal. The socio-psychological theory of roles and the pragmatic theory of dialogical voices (Ducrot, 1984) have largely debated the question regarding the oscillation of interlocutors' identity in connection with communicative functions they perform. But, we are interested only in a specific feature – the ontological datum, and try to exploit it in order to reach cognitive conclusions.

As our interest is directed towards the ontological conflict between the *natural* dimension of speaker's identity and the *social persona*, the study will neglect many forms of *qui pro quo* in dialogue. For instance: we are not interested in analysing those types of *qui pro quo* engendered while flouting Grice's Maxim of Quality, as lies, irony, dissimulation, etc.; neither do we consider the *qui pro quo* relationship established by the intervention of an a priori *game-rule*, like the intervention of a magician troubling the world, as Puck does with his magic flower in Shakespeare's play *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, for instance; we are not interested in analysing the moral scenario of the disguised God descending in the world, scenario displayed in the parable about Jesus and the Samaritan woman; neither are we interested in the adventure of an innocent person overwhelmed by temptations of the devil's voice; nor in inferring and deciphering the divine scenario through complicated proofs of initiation, etc.

The *qui pro quo* condition of dialogue has a constitutive nature due to the intersection of two or more incongruent worlds, representing the subjective, the social, and the meta-interactive (namely, cognitive or axiological) dimensions of voices. *Speaker's voice* is a relative concept, dependent on the world the speaker belongs to.

(4) 'In the king's name, I am arresting you!' This is not a personal decision, nor a personal intention, but a voice through which the king's voice is heard.

(5) Pirandello's theatre is the best example we find to illustrate how speaker's identity is deconstructed due to the incidence in the same person of more than one possible world. In Pirandello's play *Six Characters in Search of an Author* the speaker expresses himself, being the representative of his private life; he is a *dramatis persona,* a 'mask', a 'personage', a character in a conventionally instituted world, that of the *play* on the stage – through speaker's voice sounds the voice of the role he plays; and he is the performer on the stage of an imaginary personage whose voice instantiates the author's voice. The intersection of three autonomous and incongruent worlds leads to a conflict of identity, while the multiple voices of the same speaker are heard at once.

Pirandello's theatre exposes a kind of archetypical example of the problem we discuss, the conclusions of which are extremely serious – equivalent to a theoretical approach of the respective issue.[2]

(6) A similar example, no less important, is that of identity substitution, when through the speaker's voice the interlocutor uncovers 'the voice' of dominant ideologies, ideas not obligatorily shared by the person that affirms them.

(7) In the case of propaganda-like discourse we discover a particular aspect of *qui pro quo* played within the institution of language. Abstract concepts or general statements, which should be the proof of dominant values shared by a community, are loaded with persuasive intention, socially soaked due to distorted illocutionary acts. Assertions are not performed *to be believed but accepted.*

(8) Propaganda discourse displays a similar strategy: a man, a political group or other social organism try to disguise power ambitions, by using dominant speech as means for being themselves legitimated. Language builds a kind of FORTIFICATION wall concealing the identity of the speaker (the genuine intention).

Given the conversational rule that the same speaker belongs to more than a unique world, the principle of intelligibility cannot impose a straight way of interpretation.

In interpersonal relationships, the authority of the principle of intelligibility could be rehabilitated by reinforcing the moral premise of *bona fide.* Avoiding the vicious circle of presumptions, participants use the presumption of identity on 'formal ground', following the alleged intentions dialogically advanced. Sincerity cannot be imposed as a 'rule of the game', being a moral constraint,

but it is efficiently replaced by the commitment rule.[3] We find the same idea in Hamblin:

> A commitment is not necessarily a *belief* of the participant who has it. We do not believe everything we say; but our saying commits us whether we believe it or not (1970: 264).

Walton's approach to the commitment issue (1987) is especially profitable for our point of view. He admits a dark-side commitment store due to which participants have a 'no commitment' option, as a rule. Social conventions of politeness admit, in some circumstances, (speech) acts under disguised identity. Being 'sincere' is not always a recommended behaviour.

10.3.2. In for a penny, in for a pound

The main target of our study is to explain why the ontological condition regarding the split identity of the speaker can be considered a *constitutive rule* of any society game. To a greater or lesser extent, a society game is a *qui pro quo* game. This affirmation becomes pertinent if we start with a strong definition of dialogue, considering it a normative mechanism. During (linguistic) interaction, each participant casts upon their partner the rule of their own game. This is, let us say, a *structural* rule. To accept or to reject this rule, namely to accept or to reject the pressure of being interrelated, depends on social or psychological tension existing between participants. But to ask: 'How strong is the rule imposed upon the speaker by their dialogue partner (or by the other participants in the dialogue)' is less important than the fact that the subject's original identity could be neutralised under the pressure of what their partner believes or under the pressure of the partner's strategic interest. In order to communicate, each speaking subject should share the communicative condition and accept the demand concerning their own identity.

The normative pressure of being interrelated is a *structural* (constitutive) parameter of the dialogue, but a variable one, moving from the condition within which the speaker can express their genuine identity, to that where there is no room for authenticity:

(9) 'Poor him, who doesn't know to keep his mask!'[4] (Pirandello, *Henry IV*).

Given the respective parameter, the game-like model of interaction emphasises the *committing power* of any cooperative activity, wherein the genuine subjective identity of the speaker plays a minor role or is even ignored. The social dimension of language emphasises the autonomy of linguistic

interaction, an autonomy estimated in the extent to which the condition 'où tout se tient' is maintained.[5] The game-like analogy of dialogue calls upon another one, the theatre-like model, based on the same AS IF condition of reality. An AS IF condition defines the ontological nature of any interactive condition, within which any act gains relevance to the extent it is part of the *committing rule.* The conventionally constituted world institutes a reality the nature of which is fictional (in the proper sense); the reason Pirandello names it a 'transcendental irony' (cf. Potra: 20), better said as 'a transcendental joke'. The speaker, as a *subject,* is prisoner of their assigned *role*.

     'To follow a rule' means to be inside the language itself. Actually, there is not the degree of regulation that is essential for a linguistic interaction to hold, but the degree of the interactive 'conventionality', namely the willingness to accept the cooperative commitment. Once a person is *in,* they are compelled to conform to 'rules of the play': *in for a penny, in for a pound!* We may illustrate our argument by reminding ourselves of the conventional value of money, which has no value outside the frame where it is used.

     The *game* runs on as long as the participants take the rule over, as long as the *rule* proves its validity, as long as the participants believe that the fundaments of their game are solid, or they are interested or compelled to take such a rule for granted.

10.3.3. The discursive identity

     In a normal dialogue – if such a thing exists – discursive identity is different but dependent upon the speaker's own personality. The 'discursive identity' is defined on a pragmatic level, considering the communicative roles and the strategic intentions; 'personality', in exchange, is a moral concept defined by individual's knowledge, beliefs, opinions, preferences etc. Being a moral concept, 'personality' is a meaning-oriented parameter, not a formal one. In an absolute sense, *the speaker's voice is representative of the speaker's personality.* Man's personality is 'discovered' through his voice, and consequently, in this respect, all presumptions regarding his identity consolidate the reason to expect a certain reactivity.

     An interactive condition imposes its *structural rule*, defined above, that of being a constrictive relationship. The committing rule of interaction – 'Ich in einem System von Abgrenzungen konstituirt' as Habermas says (1984: 144) – affects a speaker's personality, which is 'abused' by communicative parameters: during the dialogue, the speaker rarely expresses themselves. They express themselves partially, or their personality is completely neutralised. Henry IV, from Pirandello's homonym play, and Hamlet, from Shakespeare's,

are treated by other characters *as if* they were fools. Henry IV is victim of a put-up affair:

(10) 'Till now you have thought I am a fool!' (and treated him consequently), said Henry IV, in Pirandello's play *Henry IV*.

(11) Hamlet is staging himself through the *play* of behaving like a fool, a condition that engages the others.

Before being involved in an interactive relationship, the speaker should consider the register of their voice, the extension of the communicative liberty, in connection with which the communicative intentions are coordinated. In this paragraph we do not discuss the strategic intentions, having in mind a single argument – the idea that we are entitled to speak about a *convention of identity***.**

The speaker, as a *subject*, is prisoner of the *way they are defined*:

(12) 'How can I be cunning, if you believe I am stubborn', says Henry IV.

The *role* a person plays within linguistic interaction is *assimilated* to a certain *character***.** The 'character' the speaker plays is not relevant for their personality, but for the way they are or can be socially identified. The social condition configures moral *typologies, characters* in a classical sense, which are 'typically' illocutionary. Besides the hierarchy of social functions, we can speak about a hierarchy of relationships established in conformity with norms socially assumed, norms defining specific characters, favourably or unfavourably evaluated within the game: the role of a fool, the role of a charismatic person, etc. The *operational construct* that indexes participants' identity is a kind of label, stuck on the forehead of the potential speaker. Either from cognitive or strategic reasons, 'Sometimes, it is convenient for everybody to make someone pass for a fool'.

 Because interaction is a society game, the *rule specifying the conditions imposed upon players* is associated with another one – *the rule assigning positions of advantage.*

10.4. How is a speaker's image constituted?

While the interlocutors approximate the terms for their speech exchange they proceed in virtue of a principle of reciprocity, a principle that governs all the presumptions of interactive insiderness, namely, all the presumptions that allow the principle of cooperation to be active. The set of presumptions of insiderness, undetermined as they are, function as participative conventions and correspond to what Habermas calls *intersubjektive Anerkennung*:

> Intersubjektive Anerkennung für die Wohlgeformheit eines Satzes, die Wahrheit einer Proposition, die Wahrhaftigkeit eines intentionales Ausdrucks, und die Richtigkeit eines Sprechacts. (1984: 356)

By composing a filtering device, necessary to evaluate truth and relevance of performed sentences during conversation, the presumptions of insiderness constitute the corpus of knowledge from which presumptions concerning the interlocutors' identity are reciprocally inferred.

By taking Habermas' concept – *intersubjektive Anerkennung* – as a point of departure, we may apply it during the procedure of reciprocal identification:

Who is the interlocutor? Who is the speaker in themselves? Who am I in the eye of my partner?

These questions are reducible to doxastic inquiry: What does each interlocutor *believe* they are? What does each interlocutor believe their partner is? What are the *justificatory proofs* on which a participant in a linguistic game builds the image of their own, and the image of their partner? We try to settle all these questions both from a pragmatic and a doxastic point of view, being extremely cautious that the principle of intelligibility is differently considered in each of these fields.

10.4.1. The strategy of taking turns

The dialogue is a strategic game. From a strategic point of view, the selective attitude in taking turns begins with an inquiry of reciprocal identification.

Each participant in interaction presumes, at least, the identity of their interlocutor. When interlocutors evaluate their strategic procedure, the following questions are very important– *what does the partner know/believe/ want etc.* and *what does the partner know about what I know/believe/want etc.* and so on.

From pragmatic point of view, the principle of reciprocity governs the inferential operations of identification.

Presumption of identity represents an *operational construct,* conjectured from the universe of shared knowledge and from the set of speech acts each interlocutor performs (all their assertions being included). In the game-like model of the dialogue the respective issue has normative solution. In conformity with the game study, to fix the *identity of participants* in interaction represents *that rule specifying the conditions imposed upon players.* In order to consolidate the power of this rule, the theory of dialogue games puts special importance on another rule, that of *commitment*, due to which the speaker's identity is dialogically under control. The commitment condition in a dialogue game requires explicit knowledge about a participant's position, in every moment of the dialogue progression. In this theoretical context, the rule of

commitment particularises the presumption of reciprocity, since each locutor is concerned with dividing the dialogical 'game-field' in oppositional areas. (cf. Amel, 1998).

Presumed data, and data offered during the dialogue itself compose the 'robot-image' the stability of which, as we have already said, is relative; strategically maintained or strategically manipulated, as in Pirandello's play: 'Sometimes, it is convenient for everybody to make someone pass for a fool, for having good reason to keep him hooped'.

Even in an ideal interaction, one runs the risk of misconstructing the image of the other. Therefore, the operational construct which establishes the presumptions of identity is open for dialectical criticism, pursued in metadialogue. The meta-dialectical procedure is meaning-oriented.

10.4.2. Who is the interlocutor?

Pragmatically speaking, the meta-dialectical inquiry begins by following a structural principle: both interlocutors define the image of their partner through contrastive references. While each participant raises the questions: *Who is the interlocutor? How could I define them? How can this image be constituted?* The procedure is meaning-oriented and reciprocally distributed. The problem we try to settle is to emphasise that through such kind of questions each participant acquires a *belief* (a doxastic meaning): *What I think/ believe my interlocutor is.* Dialogue is the best example that truth is founded in belief.

10.4.3. I and the other vs. I and myself

The way the identity of a human being is established conforms to the general justificatory procedure of making meaning relevant[6] – doxastic meaning precisely.

Not of minor importance is the fact that in dialogue, given its oppositive structure, the identity of the speaker is constituted on two contradictory grounds: *What I think/believe about myself*, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, *what the partner thinks/believes I am.* As against an ordinary meaning conflict, doxastic differences regarding a speaker's identity have deontic power. The definition through which a participant in a game is identified establishes the role they should play within the social game.

10.4.4. The non-saturated measure of identity

Philosophy has questioned many times the following relationships: *I and the other* and *I and myself,* reaching rather sceptical answers. Frequently, both

relationships were conceived through an ontological break (See Kasher's commentaries about the split of identity).

The doxastic approach of 'speaker's personality' uncovers the meaning depth of the respective concept.

Generally, the limits within which belief inquiry (including beliefs regarding a person's identity) is searching its grounding answer (= authoritative arguments) are placed on a lower and respectively on an elevated level. It is profitable to identify the two limits by mentioning E. Levinas' two philosophical concepts – **totalité et infinie**. The first definition says: 'Le négateur et le nié se pose ensemble, forment système, c'est-à-dire **totalité**', and the second definition says: 'l'idée de perfection est l'idée de l'infini'.

For our theoretical need, the concept of 'totalité', namely that of 'système', represents a closed frame of reference, composed by trivial criteria of evaluation: axiological stereotypes, social prejudices, etc.; the concept of 'infinie', in exchange, introduces an open measure for doxastic dialectics. This point of view opens for axiological language a non-saturated measure. Beliefs and their meanings stand in dialogical inquiry, being continuously deepened in consciousness.[7]

10.5. Conclusion

The extension of the original proof is practically unlimited. It could be transformed in a genuine *original procedure* if the critical function goes further than being an inquiry about a speaker's identity. Critical procedure could increase the introspection of meanings if it censures the way (meta)language is itself affected by the *qui pro quo condition:* instead of being genuine reflective concepts, the components that configure the axiological horizon on which Man lives, the referential system in respect of which individual's attitudes, reactions and options are categorically evaluated, are substituted by stereotypical meanings of values and they acquire dominant power under the false presumption that they are representative for the moral condition of a society and for the human condition, in general.

Notes

[1] The pragmatic frame of our argument would be inefficiently troubled if a Bergsonian approach of the concept of consciousness had been adopted. Nevertheless, we should admit that through a deeper analysis of our issue, by considering both the dynamic nature

and the constitutive function of consciousness, the subject could open profitable questions, especially for hermeneutic studies.

[2] The main problem of art (especially of the modern type) is to 'show' that the border between reality and illusion is uncertain. The character who loses their identity, gliding from one universe into another, is very frequent. See, for instance, Ingmar Bergman's movie, *The Rite*.

[3] This is one of the arguments sustained in our book *Conversational Complicity* (manuscript), which represents an extended demonstration about the *organic structure* of the dialogue.

[4] The English translation of the examples taken from Pirandello's texts has been done by the author of this article.

[5] In several of our studies, this subject was approached from the perspective of game-like theory, considered a theoretical construct/model (especially in Amel, 1998). Following our goal, we have introduced a game concept correlative to that of *game-rule*, the *game-field*. The game-field represents the frame of discursive opportunities, the consistence of which is supported, first, by presumption of reciprocity and, second, by presumption of identity with each partner's self, both being derived from dialogue's presumption of rationality.

[6] The principle of intelligibility in dialogue governs a comprehensive procedure, which is not framed only by cooperative rules. Meaning interpretation and reciprocal understanding presupposes explicative acts, a justificatory inquiry being included.

[7] Regarding our interpretation of belief as an original proof, see Amel (1999), reproduced in this book in the respective chapter. We resume here the main ideas concerning the justificatory mechanism of doxastic dialectics: 'Since doxastic dialectics involves reflecting judgements, its entire justificatory procedure is supported by a higher degree of logic, where the principle of uncertainty calls upon a principle of transcendence' (Amel 1999: 6). Consequently, the alternative truth doxastic dialectics leads to (namely the truth of meaning) tries to establish the pertinence of opinions, by legitimating the subject's power of judgement. The original proof is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for grounding beliefs. Doxastic dialectics has both justificatory and creative roles. 'The grounds of believing are dialogically challenged and dialogically built.' (Amel, 1999: 10).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PROBABLE AND THE PROBLEM*

11.1. Premises

Before developing our commentary about the problematic fundament of the axiomatic principles of doxastic paradigms, we should stress that axiomatic principles never lose their constitutive role[1]. Some constitutive aspects should be remembered:

1. *Any argumentative process is placed in the horizon of an interrogation.*

'Une prémisse dialectique est la mise sous forme interrogative d'une idée admise par tous les hommes' (Aristotle, *Topica*, I, 10; 1932 : 14)[2]. Interrogative logic[3] supplies the explanation of the intrinsic relationship between question and answer. The main target of the interrogative logic is to transfer the conditions of truth pertinent to the question to the respective answer, making from both members – the question and reply – a unique issue.

2. *Doxastic dialectics is the exclusive procedure that can establish the fundaments of axiology.*

Given the principle of uncertainty[4] that governs the subjectively inflected soft rationality of *doxa* – says the traditional doctrine – the cognitive autonomy of *doxa* is limited. In this chapter, we are going to prove the cognitive autonomy of *doxa* in the field of axiology: judgements of value, cultural judgements, practical judgements, etc.[5] Certainly we cannot speak about *axiological episteme,* but we can refer the *doxastic thinking* to the scheme of a *transcendental principle.*

3. *Doxastic dialectics belongs to the cognitive field of the probable.*

Médéric Dufour, translator of Aristotle's book, made an explicit commentary of Aristotle's double approach of logic: 'Quant il eut

découvert le syllogisme, Aristote comprit qu'à côté du syllogisme scientifique dont prémisses et, par suite, conclusions sont nécessaires, il fallait admettre, pour la Dialectique et la Rhétorique, un syllogisme plus contingent et plus souple, à prémisses et à conclusion probables.' (1932: 13–14). The *logic of belief,* was defined by Hintikka as follows: 'There is no reason why what is believed should be true.' (1962: 5). Hintikka's definition consolidates the conclusions regarding the probable character of *doxa.*

Even if we acknowledge for the doxastic field contingent roots of rationality, and consequently, even if doxastic dialectics intermingles dialectical with rhetorical arguments[6], the axiological target of *beliefs* cannot be reached without criteria of decidability.

   4. *Doxastic dialectics (axiologically oriented) opens conditions for an alternative truth, semantically constituted and not analytically proved.*

The nature of 'doxastic truth', called by us *persuasive truth*, is more profoundly uncertain than can be proved by means of analytical logic. 'Alternative truth', subjectively and rhetorically involved, actually represents the axiological *meaning* of the disputed issue. While *truth* is matched to things by *adaequatio intellectus ad rem,* as Plato-Socrates required, *meaning* represents a noetic content developed in consciousness through sense-giving acts. Due to the subjective 'reality' of meaning, the thesis of reasonableness of contrary statements can be judged in Protagoras' terms: *Man is the measure of all things*.

11.2. Doxastic dialectics and *loci communes*

Given the considerations presented above and the known fact concerning the doxastic instability due to its 'probable' nature, in this chapter we shall focus our attention on the *mechanism of decidability* in the axiologically oriented doxastic field.

The task is procedural: we find it profitable to follow dialectical steps, in order to establish to what extent axiological arguments claim a justificatory principle. At the first step of our analysis, we are going to question the relevance of 'common notions'. See our commentary in the chapter ***adaequatio intellectus ad locos communes*** about Aristotle's interest (*Topica* and *Rhetoric*) in finding *methods* for practical judgements. With Aristotle, *loci communes* represent patterns of a specific type of *syllogism,* a shortened syllogism named *enthymema,* which is based on *probable premises* (*Topica*, I, 1). The premises on which the practical

judgement is based are part of a fund of common notions, and consequently, *enthymema* refers to that *shared knowledge* in an implicit way. Aristotle was the first who uncovered the mechanism of pragmatic *rationality*. From our point of view, *adaequatio intellectus (argumentum) ad locos communes* supplies normative tests deprived of basic evidence. Hoping to reach a higher degree of *rationality* in the same field, it is necessary to move to the second step, beginning to question the axiomatic power of 'common notions'[7].

   Collective mentality is expressed in an ensemble of 'common notions' which compose the *doxastic code*. Frequently, people in their judgements of value ignore the common codes, and make judgements following rather personal codes. It is less known that doxastic dialectics is a procedure by which the 'measure' for *doxa* is established. In which terms can we actually speak about the measure of *doxa*? Can we find justificatory principles suitable to ground a certain axiological paradigm? From the dialectical point of view, questioning the axiomatic power of 'common notions' means to raise a problem-type question. Given the subjective involvement of *doxa*, the dialectical process of establishing the measure of *doxa* extends in consciousness the reason of meaning inquiries.

   By 'justificatory principle' we do not understand a reasonable proof of relevance, but the transcendental reason for which an axiological definition could be taken for granted.

11.3. Doxastic dialectics and the cognitive process

   In our opinion, doxastic dialectics represents in itself the mechanism of decidability. The interlocutors, by their argumentations, judge the rationality of their beliefs critically. The mechanism of decidability is activated by each intervention. The theoretical requirement is to emphasise whether the doxastic mechanism of decidability reveals a justificatory principle. While questioning both the subjective and rhetorical involvement of *doxa*, we have in view the *meaning-oriented* feature of *doxa*.

   The analysis of doxastic argumentation is usually reduced to the examination of pro and con opinions, with respect to a 'probable' axiological truth. However, it is impossible to imagine a specific argumentation without acknowledging the cognitive fundaments of argumentation in general. In an extended sense, doxastic argumentation is a procedure of reasonable justification, placed within a *hermeneutical* frame. During a veritable doxastic debate, the heuristic gain is obtained by each arguer by meaning inquiry. Instead of being reductive, meaning

stages compose a *creative process,* at the end of which the intelligible object of *doxa* is deepened in the arguers' consciousness.

11.3.1. Doxastic field – a dynamic image

A comprehensive view of *doxa* presents many possibilities of meaningful relationships. The probable nature of the doxastic field engenders paradigmatic conflicts and disputes, by means of which human culture extends its dynamic image. In conflicts and disputes, the interrogative spirit notifies paradigmatic *anomalies* or paradigmatic *irrelevances* manifested in several ways. For many reasons, the irrelevance is due to the difficulty in referring a particular case to an axiomatic basis. In these cases, the critical position questions the relevance of the axiomatic principle: whether its definition is sufficiently coherent, concise or comprehensive. *Problems* inside a paradigm lead to a problem-type question.

A problem-type question engenders a *problematic judgement*[8]. Problematic judgements are reflections within the field of the *probable*[9]. Below, we present some examples.

11.3.2. Paradigmatic anomaly: *The riddle of Judaism*

'The problem' was exposed by the Israeli philosopher Yirmiyahu Yovel (1998: 21, 24). In order to avoid any misunderstanding, we shall quote a passage from the text where the 'riddle' is explained in terms of a paradigmatic anomaly.

'Judaism was a dark riddle which both attracted and repelled Hegel', said his early biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, 'one with which he coped all his life. Hegel was a Christian thinker, but very heterodox. He placed Lutheran Christianity at the height of the world Spirit, yet as a philosopher, he negated it dialectically. In Christian eyes, which Hegel secularised but never abandoned, Judaism's transformation into Christianity is one of the major events in the history of salvation. This is the moment when the redeemer appears on the historical stage and is rejected by his own people. Thereby the Jews depose themselves from their divine mission in favour of Christianity, which absorbs their message while negating its flaws and raising it to a higher, more universal level. Hegel internalised the pattern of this Christian metaphor. He even made it a model of his concept of *Aufhebung,* a concept which means that something is negated but not annihilated; rather, its essential content is preserved and raised to a higher level of expression. For the mature Hegel,

this is a basic pattern of reality and history. Every cultural form makes some genuine contribution to the world Spirit, after which it is sublated (*aufgehoben*) and disappears from the historical scene. Yet the Jews continued to survive long after their *raison d'être* had disappeared – indeed, after they no longer had a genuine history in Hegel's sense, but existed merely as the corpse of their extinguished essence. But how could it be that Judaism evaded the fate (and defied the model) of which it was itself the prime example?'

In the last sentence, Yovel summarises Hegel's *philosophical paradigm* with respect to which Judaism appears as an anomaly, an 'enigma'. In the chapter *The crisis of the power of prejudice* (here above) we analysed the same example, from the specific perspective of the mechanism of prejudgements. In this chapter the focus is on the question raised by the Israeli philosopher: 'But how could it be that Judaism evaded the fate (and defied the model) of which it was itself the prime example?' – a problem-type question.

11.3.3. Paradigmatic break (paradigm refutation)
New premises of reception

In art, truth has no aesthetic relevance.

The aesthetic paradigm leads to a symbolic reception of facts. The order of details is completely different from the real order. 'The narrative function of language is basically referential *(we say something about something)*, while the communicative function of rituals, of cultural signs and symbols, is basically expressive.' (see Amel, chapters above).

11.3.4. Paradigmatic crisis: Wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?

In feeble times, when the gods are dead, what should a poet do? *Wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?* That's the question raised by Friedrich Hölderlin in the Elegie *Brod und Wein*. Disconcerted, unable to synchronise his poetic *credo* with the weakness of the time:

Aber Freund! Wir kommen zu spät. Zwar leben die Götter,
Aber über dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt.
Hölderlin feels that a change of poetical vision is necessary:

Aber sie (*die Dichter*) sind, sagst du, wie des Weingotts heilige Priester,
Welche von Land zu Land zogen in heiliger Nacht.

Heidegger – in one of his philosophical essays, the title of which was inspired by Hölderlin's question *Wozu Dichter?* – displays a long commentary about the moment of the poetical turn, announced by Hölderlin. It is easy to translate Heidegger's remarks into our terms: *die dürftige Zeit* is the moment of a new poetic perception of sacredness, the moment of transfer from one paradigm into another: the poetry of sublimity, illuminated by the presence of gods, becomes anachronistic *in dürftiger Zeit;* visionary poets, finding themselves in deep night, going after *die Spur der entflohenen Götter,* discover the mysterious force which comes from the *Abgrund* (abyss) up: *Die Dichter zogen in heiliger Nacht.* In Heidegger's opinion, who dedicated this essay to the anniversary of Rilke's death, this is the new poetic paradigm, the poetry of Being. Rilke is the best representative of the new poetic vision; he, the poet of Being, took Hölderlin's message further.

There are an infinite number of similar examples of various kinds explicitly or implicitly questioning the foundation of value definition.

The grounding thesis of arguments is *interrogated.* The problem-type question opens an argumentative debate on the grounding level, and the meaning of the grounding proposition is re-evaluated. That is the reason we call the problem-type question a *heuristic question.*

Generally speaking, in everyday life the most difficult problem is to include a particular case into a paradigm correctly. Such an enterprise requires fine meaning analysis and powers of discernment. Irrelevance of particular cases, with respect to a general proposition, demands explanation regarding *common sense.* The rationality of the problem-raising process is judged with hermeneutical means. The process of finding the pertinence of meaning reshapes the entire cognitive scenario dominated by a specific *doxa* and consolidates the beliefs, in each interlocutor's understanding, by sense-giving acts. The three paradigmatic criteria – coherence, concision and exhaustiveness – become stages of the meaning synthesis inside the subjective consciousness. As meaning is assumed in a differentiated way by each one, doxastic pluralism is a legitimate doxastic premise.

The premise of doxastic pluralism can induce a wrong conclusion, namely that doxastic indecidability is inherent, and consequently, doxastic dialectics never reaches an end. Gadamer was the supporter of the philosophy of an *unlimited dialogue,* and, like us, for hermeneutical reasons. The logical shortcomings are of no relevance during a semantic inquiry. For each arguer it is extremely difficult to coordinate the justificatory procedure with semantic tools, because the process of meaning assimilation is endless. During doxastic dialectics, the interest of

the arguer who questions the axiomatic principles is not to contradict, but to notice new associative links within conceptual meanings. By raising a certain problem, both interlocutors cooperate in increasing the meaning of basic concepts.

The dialectical procedure of *doxa* has constitutive finality. The fundamental question of our study, namely the question regarding the criteria of decidability within doxastic dialectics, directs the inquiry towards the problem of an original synthesis which represents the subjects' transcendental constitution. That means when the axiomatic relevance of a particular concept is proved, its meaning is 'objectified' in consciousness under the form of a MORAL OBJECT. The moral object becomes *the a posteriori* referent of *doxa*.[10] A moral object points to a criteria of transcendence by which the subjective dimension of *doxa* reaches categorical justification. By 'moral objects', Man gives the measure of things, and he simultaneously establishes for himself a moral measure.

11.4. Conclusion

While in *truth-oriented dialectics* the justification principle is expressed by the law of *tertium non datur,* in *meaning-oriented dialectics* the justification principle has a subjective dimension. Heidegger emphasises the grounding role of subjectivity: 'Die Subjektivität ist die wesenhafte Gesetzlichkeit der Gründe, welche die Möglichkeit eines Gegenstandes zu reichen kann.' (1957: 137) Given the premise that doxastic dialectics is meaning-oriented, the referent of *doxa* has a semantic nature. Its axiomatic power is established by self-reflective proof. Doxastic thinking discovers Man's own *ratio* (= measure) in an original synthesis.

The cognitive force of the dilemmatic moment challenges the interlocutors' understanding, by giving them the chance to justify the meaning relevance of their inquiry. As we have already said, doxastic dialectics engenders cognitive intervals between *belief, doxa* and *opinion* – respectively, between *belief* as a noetic act, by means of which the idea of value is posited in *consciousness*, *doxa* the conceptual representation of the idea of value in *reason*, and *opinion* the *discursive* form of belief. When the justificatory inquiry is settled, the unity of the three levels is reconstituted under the dominance of the MORAL OBJECT.

The rational procedure of questioning axiological axioms cannot ignore pragmatic criteria: normative and situational. From the normative point of view, a problem-type question becomes relevant in confrontation

with the common mentality. The normative test is relative, because common mentality is dependent upon a historically given moment (upon *Zeitgeist*). In spite of the heuristic target of a problem-type question, its opportunity is measured by rhetorical pertinence. There are moments when certain debates are fresh and hot, and moments when they remain irrelevant, in spite of their rational motivation.

In an interview, Gerard Philipe was asked about the reason he was chosen to play a certain type of character (which means the recognition, from the part of the player, of his belonging to a certain paradigm).

'This is a *pertinent* question', was Gerard Philipe's answer, 'but an *impertinent* one', he added.

Notes

* The first printed form: 'The Probable and the Problem', in F. H. van Eemeren et al. (eds), *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference ISSA,* 29 June–2 July 2010, Amsterdam, Sic Sat, 2011.

[1] In modern mathematical and logical theories, an *axiom* ceased to be defined as a proposition, the truth of which is evident; instead, an *axiom* is defined in virtue of a paradigmatic condition. We call an *axiom* a concept, a proposition or a general definition which are able to impose laws of coherence within a system.

[2] See further: 'Une problème dialectique est une question dont l'enjeu peut être soit l'alternative pratique d'un choix et d'un rejet, soit l'acquisition d'une vérité et d'une connaissance, une question qui soit telle, soit en elle-même, soit à titre d'instrument permettant de résoudre une question distincte d'elle-même, dans l'un et l'autre de ce genre :' (T, I,11; 1967: 16).

[3] See details about erotetic logic, or interrogative logic (Greek *erotema* means 'question') in Grecu (ed.), 1982.

[4] Billig (1982) develops the theory of soft rationality (*fluid thinking,* as he calls it) in argumentation. Well trained in Judaic hermeneutics and antique rhetoric, Billig, who is a sociolinguist, emphasises the role of rhetoric in thinking and appeals to Quintilianus' *Principle of Uncertainty*, in this sense: 'we can never capture the infinite variants of human affairs in a finite system of psychological laws' (1989: 62).

[5] Vattimo Gianni, in one of his essays, *The Structure of Artistic Revolutions* (a chapter in Vattimo's book, 1993), asks himself a question like ours: 'To what extent is it possible to build a discourse, about arts development, analogous to that proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions?'* Vattimo admits that, with respect to arts, such a task is more difficult, but at the same time, much easier (see p. 91).

[6] See Kant's definition of *reflecting judgement*: 'Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben wozu sie das.'
Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteilskraft bloß *reflektierend.*' (Kant, 1924 Einl & IV, 15 XXVI).

[7] We refer to Aristotle's definition of *dialectic* and *peirastic* arguments (1932: 1940). *Dialectic argument* – the argument the premises of which are probable and shared by everybody, invoked with the intention to prove its validity. *Peirastic argument* – the argument the premises of which are probable, invoked with the intention of persuading the interlocutor to accept it.

[8] Aristotle's definitions of both dialectical and rhetorical arguments (1932: 1940) match the way we define the *problematic judgement: problematic judgement* refers to what is possible, neither to what is necessary (*apodictic judgement*), nor to something that is real (*assertorical judgement*).

[9] During the history of rhetoric, the concept of *loci communes* was mistakenly considered the common notion on which practical judgement is based. Later, *loci communes,* translated as *common places,* acquired a depreciative connotation, that of cliché, banality. A better equivalent of what Aristotle calls *common notion* is the concept of *common sense,* which preserves the idea that practical judgements have a rational basis. New rhetoric emphasises the importance to rehabilitate the original meaning of *loci communes,* in order to rehabilitate rhetoric itself. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1968), remarks concerning the definition of *loci communes* as a store of arguments.

[10] For more explanation, see Amel (1999, 2009) and the chapter 'Doxastic Dialectics' in Part II of this book.

CHAPTER TWELVE

LISTENING AND THE WELL-TEMPERED CONTROVERSY*

(With reference to intercultural exchange)

12.1. Preliminary assignments

The issue of this chapter continues the analysis of *persuasive truth* (the 'truth' of beliefs). Our intention is to develop more details from the perspective of subjectivity, which has a grounding role in doxastic dialectics[1].

The semantic logic compatible with the doxastic field is based on subjectivity, in relation to which cognition means *understanding* (the meaning), not *knowing* (the truth).

1. From a philosophical point of view, subjective cognition is led by the same three principles as analytical cognition: the principles of identity, of opposition and of relevance.
2. Within the doxastic field, the principle of opposition (having in mind an intercultural dialogue/respectively, a controversy) governs the efficiency of the other two principles ('searching for identity', and respectively, 'searching for relevance'). To put it simply, our remarks will stress the importance of antithetic reasoning in challenging the subjects' cognitive intentionality.
3. Understanding the meaning of a doxastic expression is more than linguistic perception, more than explaining the *speaker's meaning*. It presupposes a *creative* ability to establish associative links, which weave the tissue of a moral (= inner) experience. Consequently, we have tried to extend the pragmatic concept of *meaning*, by adding a phenomenological dimension.

12.2. Philosophical target and theoretical means

From the pragmatical point of view, the position of listening is reversible, derived from the oppositional principle. While listening, the attitude of each partner is critical: other- and self-oriented. From the phenomenological point of view, listening is a function of *consciousness,* derived from the same oppositional principle. *The consciousness of a listening partner* increases the cognitive functions of both partners: in the first stage, by tempering the subjects' cognitive will, and in the second stage, by increasing the subjects' need to increase the meaning relevance of the controversial issue.

The cognitive intentionality of subjectivity is turned towards itself, trying to objectify the immanent condition (the condition of *self*) by self-reflective proofs. Therefore, a well-tempered doxastic dialectics means a well-tempered subjectivity. During doxastic dialectics, the subjects activate the expressive function of language while referring to a certain thing/fact. Well-tempered dialectics is an issue that regards both the speaker and the listener, by balancing the expressive will with the will of understanding. Due to the control of the oppositional principle, doxastic dialectics could be considered the 'mechanism' of the 'rational' interpretation of meaning. Having in view the principle of probability by which belief is generally defined, the theoretical investigation is to proceed systematically into another direction than that of the epistemic research of controversy. Instead of speaking about the truth of beliefs, we shall search their meaning and develop the process of their understanding, in the hermeneutical sense.

In order to reach this target, we shall make a step backwards, elucidating the question: how can subjectivity, a variable parameter, be tempered during doxastic dialectics?

The philosophical way we follow goes beyond pragmatics, meeting hermeneutics, that of Heidegger. We have in mind Heidegger's interpretation of '*understanding* as a mode of being', and those of Gadamer and Ricoeur[2].

'Well-tempered controversy' – approached, in this study, with reference to intercultural exchange – does not mean bridging oppositions between different points of view, but cognitive movements that subjectivity should accomplish in order to reach objectification of beliefs. Neither is our intention to offer a normative model, but to emphasise the axiological way of getting the *original proof* of relevance. The simplest answer to reach such a target would be to eliminate the fallacious way of 'hot rhetoric', namely to eliminate all arguments subjectively distorted.

The much stronger answer we intend to offer is to reach a deeper level of dialectics and to demonstrate how subjectivity opens itself to dialogue. The subject, which is a closed universe, should learn to 'listen'. The concept of *listening* is used in a larger sense than its sensitivity, being equivalent to *condition of receptivity.*

Subjectivity gains *dialectically* its own sense, maintaining the condition of receptivity[3] under control.

12.3. The principle of opposition

12.3.1. The grounding role of an alternative subjectivity

Controversy is an intersubjective confrontation. The subject's cognitive dynamic joins their pragmatic intentionality with the phenomenological intentionality. During controversy both subjects are intentionally oriented towards their cognitive target, each of them 'affected' by the effort of increasing their creative power of understanding: understanding each other and understanding the issue they are speaking about.

The objectifying intentionality of the subject is not a positive 'measure', but a dynamic approach, an *intention,* a *way towards* what the subject wants to say*, towards themselves.* The subject's effort is to make a bridge between *opinion* (= language) and *belief* (= a content posited in consciousness). The introspective power of the Ego (= the subject) is (*originally*) intentioned to find in the immanent condition the 'stem' of subjectivity, namely the sense of the Ego's existential condition, and to *name* it. In other words, the essential problem debated here regards *the origin of language*[4], language being the *original measure of the subject's own expression*.

While each locutor utters their *opinion,* they challenge both their partner's cognitive intentionality and their own in the same proportion. While interpreting their partner's words the participant in a dialogue, as a subject, is intentionally oriented towards their own self, being on the way of assuming in their consciousness a *sense*, the sense of their beliefs, the sense of themselves. Once an exegetic *opinion* is confronted with another *opinion,* both interlocutors evaluate reciprocally the content of their own *beliefs,* and in this way they can measure the meaning extension of the *expressed* words: the field of debate. By increasing the introspective power of subjectivity, the confrontation between different opinions becomes the *original* way towards understanding. An intercultural controversy begins to be well tempered only when both participants are

ready to listen to each other. They should be *convinced* that the cognitive target could not be reached without a good control on the conditions of reciprocity, and respectively of receptivity. By neglecting this condition, *controversy* would be unable to stimulate the original power of the subjects to assume the *sense* they are looking for in their consciousness.

To be a good listener means to observe pragmatic and hermeneutic conditions: both to understand correctly the partner's/*speaker's meaning* and to detect discursive incongruities. A metadialogue by means of which interlocutors put in order their conditions of reciprocity is engendered. In order to fulfil the condition of receptivity, each partner should manage a phenomenological reduction of their own beliefs, and should impose the same condition on the respondent. Socrates' maieutic inquiry is the best example of a tentative to establish a 'well-tempered' dialogue. In a dialogue, if one of the participants receives an improper relevance[5] of their own or their partner's *speaker's meaning,* they have no adherence to the issue. If they ignore the other's belief(s), or are unable to understand it correctly, then we may actually say the respective partner has no capacity of *listening:* consequently, no further controversy is possible.

As we have already said, understanding the meaning of a doxastic expression is more than linguistic perception. The creative ability to establish associative links introduces higher meaning levels which contain moral explanations.

On another occasion Amel's (2014) article reproduced in this book in the chapter **Petitio Principi**, we have tried to extend the pragmatic concept of the *speaker's meaning*, by adding a phenomenological dimension:

- The *speaker's meaning* is a cognitive parameter, pragmatically defined. If this parameter acquires a moral dimension, the cognitive load is increased, requiring axiological determination. From this point on, the interpretative exigency steps beyond the pragmatical border and begins a hermeneutical inquiry (Amel 2014: 109).
- The phenomenological extension of the concept of the *speaker's meaning* is a guide for the interpreter (= interlocutor), helping them to go beyond what the speaker has said and to detect the speaker's moral attitude. When contradictory opinions are confronted, the listening capacity is increased, because the cognitive intentionality of each participant is alerted: they are cognitively more vigilant. The subjective ground of beliefs is spontaneously explored.

12.3.2. Intercultural field and hermeneutics

Any kind of controversy observes the dialogue's rules of rationalisation, having the same basic structure.

Intercultural relationships represent interactive – frequently semiotical – contacts, but not in a usual communicative way, that of *offer and reply*. In an extended sense, we may say that the cultural phenomenon is a 'language' of signs and symbols, of rituals. When cultures are in contact, each subject or performer – each being representative of a different semiotic system – is trying to decipher the partner's codes. 'Making cultures reciprocally intelligible, despite their differences' means 'give them the chance to *communicate*.' In a time of economic and political globalisation, to communicate means to share standard values. Congress organisers try to remind everybody of the grounding condition of cultural confrontations: the *consciousness of the other*, of a partner, of a reality *different* in shape. The respective remark is not phenomenologically approached. Devoid of substance, this idea has become a *cliché*, because progress, like a big road roller, flattens down historical and national values.

We refute any analogy between cultures in contact and forms of communication, first, because we invoke a formal consideration: the strict dialogical pattern, that of *offer and reply*. Within this pattern, the communicative function of language is basically referential *(we say something about something)*, while the communicative function of rituals, of cultural signs and symbols, is basically expressive. Regarding the possible affirmation that: 'Cultures in contact are more likely as languages in contact …' we want to bring the following remark: Actually, cultures in contact are *not exactly like* languages in contact. Learning 'the other's language' could never saturate intercultural relationships. Behavioural practices exhibit cognitive patterns and emotional habits; by them, the performers express their moral identity. Cultural practices have an inner dimension; they stimulate reflection, questioning the sense of human condition and that of human spirit, transferred in patterns of life.

The implicit target of a *listener,* involved in a cultural debate, is first to uncover their own identity by discovering the *other's* identity, in the symbolic forms each of them shares. Intercultural reciprocity means more than a simple relationship; it is an *exposure* of the existential *Erfahrung,* acquired through hermeneutical steps and structured in opposite terms. Hermeneutical procedure is very different from pragmatic interpretation.[6]

Second, when the sense of communication is too large, it has no formal application. 'Making cultures reciprocally intelligible, despite their differences' is an irrelevant desideratum. Usually, intercultural

relationships are reduced to a societal game of festivals and competitions, the first reaction being: 'with them, like with us', or something like making jazz from Bach music, or discovering Irish motifs in Vivaldi's concertos.

If we choose communicative means within an intercultural contact, what we discover is that the respective means are not strategically oriented, but disposed in a contrastive way. The emphasis should be falling on the contrasting voices, each voice announcing a profession of faith. The expressive dimension encompasses axiological and moral arguments. All together compose a *semantic field*, in which the essence of human life is hidden. Reciprocal discovery displayed throughout the *line forces* of belief is needed before partners in an intercultural confrontation can explicitly emphasise the relevance of their axiological and moral arguments (= opinions). Partners objectify the dialogical distance existing between them, intending to discover a possible unifying horizon.

What we call here (cultural/axiological etc.) 'horizon' is a *paradigmatic and not a pragmatic* determination of meanings. The horizon is explicitly or implicitly established or recognised as being a 'general proposition', a system of reference – concepts, symbols, rituals etc. – for a certain/ particular doxastic expression. We should accept this definition as a formal one.

To the extent to which the systems of reference are dialogically validated by hermeneutical acts, the cognitive interest can be delimited within a horizon. The dialectical constitution of the cognitive interest allows us to refer to the concept of an interactional *field*. Some specifications should be mentioned: (a) within a (dialogical) *game*, the field is a priori delimited; (b) within a *verbal non-regulated interaction* (including epistemic controversy), the field is operationally delimited. The opponents try to establish a metalanguage (a system of reference) in order to control the dialogical terms. We should not forget that the *intercultural confrontation* is a verbal *self-oriented* interaction, and because of this reason it is more difficult to find a common metalanguage.

The theoretical concept of *field* was introduced as a tempering means. Each participant can assume their personal identity – namely, can temper their subjectivity (a variable parameter) in virtue of the principle of opposition, active in the presence of an alternative (partner's) identity.

Within a regular dialogue (even epistemic), the opponents/the 'players' start their interventions following strategic plans of 'gaining the game'. The selective attitude in taking turns begins with an identification inquiry: *Who is the interlocutor?* This is the question raised in any form of reciprocity. Consciously or not, explicitly or not, an intercultural 'player',

while raising the respective question, sets out on the hermeneutically long way into the deep night of signification. By watching one's own and the other's habits and reactions, the 'cultural player' is asking this question for themselves. The contrastive way in which each one uncovers their own identity, within a semantic *field*, engenders creative forces: both interpretative/exegetic and expressive/artistic. What in French is called *prise de conscience*, a self-reflection, becomes well tempered in a contrastive way. *Une prise de conscience,* reached in contrastive conditions, clears the life of symbols within society.

12.4. 'La conquête de l'horizon d'interpretation par fusion d'horizons.' (Gadamer 1976a: 243).

In a cultural controversy, the role of a good listener (an alternative subject) is to urge the expressive function of language (= by belief objectification) and then, to urge the process of doxastic rationalisation (= 'la conquête de l'horizon'). Gadamer's remark regarding 'la conquête de l'horizon' can be referred to two hermeneutical steps: (a) to follow the proper way by means of which *beliefs at issue* could be tempered; (b) to establish the *paradigmatic terms* of the controversial issue. In each of these steps, the *consciousness of the other* has the role of a meaning catalyst. Aiming at the 'fusion of horizons', the partners (both subjects) are 'pushed' to continue the meaning interpretation, a target rarely reached.

12.4.1. The *existential meaning* is not yet a measure

Doxastic dialectics engenders a heuristic interest (= cognitive intentionality) stronger than reaching a name for the meaning posited by each participant in their consciousness. The personal belief is troubled once confronted with an alternative belief. Interlocutors accept cultural pluralism. Each partner while listening to the other's voice is listening to their own. In spite of the lucid consideration that the variable parameter allows cognitively provisional results, partners in a cultural controversy are ready to extend the field of meaning inquiry.

Doxastic dialectics is language dependent, not only during the process of its development, but also in its heuristic finality. Doxastic concepts are introspectively never saturated. Their interpretation is continuously reshaped. The cognitive interest is oriented towards progressively higher levels of axiological determination, opening ever-new axiological horizons.

Meaning becomes relevant if perceived from an ever higher/ paradigmatic level. The meaning-oriented procedure requires proofs of evidence: a meaning horizon.

12.4.2. Common ideas

In our interpretation, a hermeneutical process is well tempered if the *subjects understand the relevance* of those values defining their own existential condition. At this moment, the relevance of *existential meanings* is proved in *confrontation* with common ideas chosen by society at a given historical moment: axiological paradigms – *systems of reference* – semiotic patterns (styles, symbols, rituals etc.). Having in view the critical position of subjectivity, reference systems are submitted to the same control of reciprocity. They are actually (re)constituted, and not given (see Amel, 2008). The meaning interpretation is in an increased process of conceptual synthesis[7]. Doxastic dialectics develops ever-new semantic/semiotic horizons within which the personal *Erfahrung* (the belief represents the intelligible experience) becomes more and more *persuasive/*pertinent. *Value pertinence* is a relative measure, but humanity recognises it if the respective measure *opens a higher horizon of understanding,* if the distance from *nature* to *culture,* from a subjective position to a higher level of relevance could be transgressed. For instance, Nietzsche's memorable interpretation of Man's contingent qualities, which, projected on archetypal structures, gains existential relevance.

> Comment le tempérament grec sait utiliser toutes ses qualités redoutables, l'orgiasme asiatique dans le dionysisme, la reserve hostile de l'individu, dans l'apollinisme! (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1969)

Another interesting example is Baumgarten's philosophical book (2008) in which the belief in 'our daily *blue* heaven' is raised to the level of a philosophical concept: *the principle of heaven.*[8]

12.5. Conclusions

The hermeneutical process, during which subjectivity has the grounding role, never starts from zero.

1. In the hermeneutical context, each ontological interpretation requires perceptive evidence: a basic 'idea' which the subject takes for granted, *a premise*. Ironically, the starting point of existential interpretation cannot be a genuine experience. It is, say the philosophers, prejudiced by tradition or

by time spirit (*Zeitgeist*) with its culturally dominant spirit, or even more dangerous, prejudiced by ideologies, dogmas, loaded words or cultural *cliché*s. The critical attitude of the *self* (both the *self* of the *I* and that of the *other)* detects the void *sound* of irrelevant proofs.

Therefore, the conditions of receptivity are troubled. What is GIVEN (the premise) should be explored. The retroactive movement of doxastic 'logic', called *hermeneutical circle*, inevitably starts with a premise the relevance of which becomes the object of controversy. Doxastic premises are continuously questioned. Nevertheless, this step of hermeneutical interpretation cannot be avoided, because thinking needs a base of receptivity, which represents the very possible condition of thinking: 'Prejudices are simply conditions whereby we experience something' says Gadamer (1977: 9). We totally agree with Gadamer's further remarks:

> Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world (Gadamer 1977: 9).

2. The premises of axiological judgement are searched within a 'language horizon' already given and simultaneously explored. This is a case where *petitio principii* is not a fallacious way of thinking.

Important for our present argument is that *listening* represents an existential involvement. *Listening* represents the very condition for assuming a sense in consciousness. An existential meaning is more than a meaning; it is a *value,* namely, a sense granted with moral objectivity – a spiritual power. Confronted with several *systems of reference* (given or reconstituted) – moral concepts, symbols, rituals, etc. – values are invested with spiritual power and able, in their turn, to ground patterns of life. In this new step, values prove their 'true' (actual) objective relevance.

'Objectivity' regarding values is a virtual feature, a phenomenological way of defining the moral IDEAs as cognitive OBJECTs. Although we affirm the objective 'substance' of values, this 'objectivity' does not mean uncontested autonomy. We share the idea/opinion that values have historical relevance. A *good listener* says: men never get the final sense of life's condition.

Notes

* Communication at *XXII World Congress of Philosophy (International Association for the Study of Controversies),* 4–10 August, 2013 Athens; first printed form in *Philosophy Study* 7, no. 6 (June 2017).

[1] A concise definition of value is necessary in order to offer the reason why the subjectivity plays an important role in axiology: values refer to the moral objects that figure the *meaning of life, the sense Man has* within 'the network of existential relationships'. The *major existential sense* is inscribed in Man's immanent condition. Here, *sense* means both 'meaning' and 'value'.

[2] See Ricoeur's explanation (2004: 10–11): 'The understanding which is the result of the analytic of Dasein is precisely the understanding through which and in which this being understands itself as being'.

[3] Although we share Ricoeur's critical point regarding Heideggerian hermeneutics: that Heidegger 'gives us no way to show in what sense historical understanding, properly speaking, is derived from this primordial (ontological) understanding (2004: 10)', we do not develop Ricoeur's criticism. What we mean by well-tempered doxastic controversy and our whole explanation is only indirectly an answer to the question raised by Ricoeur: 'How can the conflict of rival interpretations be arbitrated? (idem: 10)'

[4] 'Language is the house of being/Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins' (See Heidegger, *Humanismus*, 1957: 24; 1959: 166; 1976: 313). See also Heidegger: 'Im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch' (1976: 313).

[5] It is important to see the difference between *pragmatic relevance* and *hermeneutical relevance*. The concept of *relevance* represents a benefit of meaning. *Pragmatic relevance* is obtained when a dialogical intervention is referentially connected to another. *Hermeneutical relevance* is obtained when the meaning interpretation of an opinion/belief gains conceptual determination. The hermeneutical relevance represents a meaning operation, namely a meaning synthesis (see note 7, following), by projecting the subjective meaning on a moral horizon or idea.

[6] From the pragmatic point of view, the object of 'interpretative' acts is to discover *why* the partner has said what they have, namely, to discover the utterances and speaker's meanings, by making bridges between the posed and the presupposed facts. For instance:

ELLE: Crétin. Séducteur!
LUI: Ne m'*insulte* pas. Ne m'appelle plus séducteur. Tu n'as pas honte?
ELLE: Je ne t'insulte pas. Je te *démasque*.
(E. Ionesco, *Délire à deux*, 206)

The fragment quoted above is an example of an interpretative conflict regarding the 'speaker's meaning': the speaker's intention was not to *insult,* but to *unmask,* to show up the truth.

[7] *Conceptual synthesis* is a semantic operation. In our hermeneutical approach, *conceptual synthesis* represents the *meaning* coagulation on the paradigmatic level. While the subjective reasons of believing are dialectically explored, they are

objectified in a *conceptual* form. All the operations are semantic and not analytical, and they progressively lead to higher levels of understanding.

[8] Baumgerten (2008), based on rigorous exegeses of medieval philosophers and theologians, tries to answer updated questions: Can we speak about the universal unity of thinking, and whether the medieval dispute regarding the *principle of heaven,* as an 'image' of thinking universality, could get relevance? Still from antiquity until recently, says the Romanian philosopher, there are voices, which affirm that although thinking assumes a universal principle (heaven, ideal city, intellect/*nous*), this very principle cannot settle all cognitive interrogations. There remains a *rest* impossible to be reached by the human mind and which represents the 'condition of possibility' of the thinking itself.

13.1. The call of principium

Several times in this book, we have made the affirmation that the doxastic dialectics represents the exclusive way of exploring the grounds of axiology. The ontological premise, the rationality and the finality of the doxastic dialectics were our main argumentative objectives. In our interpretation, the subjectivity of values has an ontological and not a pragmatic dimension. The constitution of *doxa* means the conscious acquisition of a dominant ontology, that the cognitive subject transposes in **categories of value,** and identifying their own substance. Here is a quotation from the chapter dedicated to *doxastic dialectics*: **doxa is the concept of the moral object.**

If one could imagine a starting point to the extended axiological map, within which Man lives, then the question that philosophy should answer would be: on which coordinates can the whole axiological covering of life be conceived of as being 'naturally' rooted in cognitive need? In this chapter, we are going to establish a deep fusion between axiology and semiotics. Actually, our interpretation of the principle of intelligibility, ontologically conceived, is a kind of semiotic approach.

A valid premise would be that of the deep fusion between perception and semiosis, constitutive for consciousness development. Focused on Polanyi's, Dewey's, Peirce's, Bühler's and Cassirer's philosophy, Innis's book (1994) enlightened this idea by a comprehensive and nuanced commentary, displayed in contrastive terms. Another option could be that of admitting a transcendental premise, which is the choice of the present study. The ontological condition of *being-in-the-world,* understood as a global relation of *togetherness,* a whole 'où tout se tient', is consubstantial with Man's own possibility of being part of the whole. The implicit law of the world is originally projected in the being of consciousness, and this interactive virtuality, because it is ontological, constitutes the basis of cognitive inherence. Nevertheless, *being-in-the-world* is a condition that obscures its original cause[1] and so each intelligible representation engenders a fundamental *why?*

By resuming the intelligible position of *being-in-the-world* on the capacity of rendering the world explicit and meaningful, we have reached the starting moment of *language*. In this quality, language is a 'way of being', of being rationally involved in *what it is*. We are still at the beginning, when 'rational' means the human capacity to discover world coherence in sensible forms. By speculating on the deeper movement of cognition, one notices the power language has to approach the obscure. The infinity of the original indetermination is handled and 'translated' into equivalents of finiteness. These special kinds of meaning activators are called *signs*.

In traditional semiotics, that sustains the conventional nature of signs, sign definition says that something present and perceivable represents something absent and unperceivable. This is a definition that perpetuates the scholastic formula, *aliquid stat pro aliquo,* which now seems to give less emphasis to the idea that the intelligible function of signs was originally more like a *call*, the call of *principium,* coming from infinity towards finiteness. 'Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille.' (Heidegger, 'Die Sprache', vol. 12, 1985: 27)

Our concern about the 'final cause of signs' compels us to choose a definition adequate for the 'hearer's' intention of associating a sense to the respective call, and, therefore: *each sign signifies more than the object it represents*. Such a definition of a sign, as an original signal, performs a shift from the semiotics of representation to the *noumenal* semiotics. In conformity with the respective approach, a sign implies the 'cause' of the object it represents as an object and, because of this, it implies its own cause of being a sign. Here we shall bring two parallel signs, with the intention that the second one could enforce in the former the perception of this 'more than itself'. The 'sign-clock' signifies the human idea of time, which is the *cause* of the clock. The clock, in Dali's painting *The persistence of memory,* does not measure time; it is no more the 'sign' of our usual idea of time, but represents the duration of time. By an allusion to Bergson, the idea of time is anamorphotically extended – in the doughy form of clocks – and ironically suspended.

By emphasising that a sign is 'more than itself', our definition points at the interpretative dimension of semiosis, not exactly as Peirce did it, but more precisely in a transcendental sense.[2] The intelligible ground of signs is constituted through an originally interpretative semiosis. What a sign represents, while standing for a 'piece' of reality, is the *original experience (interpretation) of Being* of the respective reality. In progressive steps of transcendence, signs intermediate between contingent and *principium* in an imaginative way. That which originally was a *world-*

call is now instituted in a sign, the meaning of which can be perceived due to an a priori projection of the world-design in Man's mental space. During the effort of representing this design, Man uncovers the transcendent reality by the means of signs. This is the *call*. It seems very important to put the entire sign institution, and respectively the sign function, under the headline of a 'reasonable determination of the *principium*'. In this way, we come closer to *logos* itself. By raising this aspect, we proceed to an enquiry into the 'possibility condition of a cultural sign' as a *moral object*. A cultural sign, in contradistinction to a pragmatic sign, is the result of a second-degree semiosis, which has justificatory power. All signs are pragmatic, namely life-oriented, and all signs are culturally marked. Our thesis regarding the justificatory finality of signs does not exclude the thesis of semiotic perception, but implies it. Therefore, we oppose a powerful concept of a cultural sign, ontologically founded, to a common one. From this perspective, contingent perception and cultural sign (= moral objects) establish two different levels of intelligibility.

Given the premise that the generative cause of language is established on the transcendental level of consciousness, the subjective origin of signs troubles us less because of its relativity. Consequently, at this level, the principle of intelligibility, which governs human semiosis, is less organic than it seems. Even if Man's expressive need is spontaneously delivered in semiotic forms '*ohne warum*'[3], a divine voice[4] already speaks in human speech, which Man tries to make explicit. The innate knowledge of principium is that it gives access to the sense of the obscure. Language (= signs) exists in order to permit this access.

In what follows, we shall explain the inherence of signs; after that, we shall try to argue that signs' constitution cannot be dissociated from Being. During the constitution of signs, the noumenal (= intelligible) reality of Being institutes its own transcendence in the form of a relational substance (= values). The 'relational substance' supports the world-design, and *is* the virtual condition that makes the world we are living an intelligible whole 'où tout se tient'.

13.2. Intelligible inherence

By means of an original extension of language, we are involved in an uninterrupted semiosis.

> Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch.
> Die Denkenden und Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung.
> (Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus,* 1957: 24)

When Heidegger says 'Language is the house of being'[5], he means that Being is intelligible in organic solidarity with *what it is.* The contingent thing brings Being into full disclosure (ἀλήθεια). Heidegger speaks about the Being comprehension ('Sein Verstehen/Seinsverständnis') under the guidance of language, and this philosophical approach determined him to perform the ontological turn of hermeneutics.[6] From the philosophical point of view, the 'linguisticality of understanding'[7] is not a discursive attitude, but rather a pure semiotic one, closer to the presocratic source of λόγος, than to our sense of language. The semiotic constitution has the moral dimension of a creative act. **Comprehension is a semiotic act**, if we may say so, in an attempt to translate Heidegger's idea of an original speech.

Heideger's deconstruction of classical metaphysics[8] with its scholastic roots influences our ideas and is fundamental to our topic:

1. *Comprehension, as well as language, is a way-of-being-in-the-world;* due to the transcendental inherence of language, the principle of intelligibility[9] is connected to consciousness and not to ratio.
2. Comprehension is a *way of being-in-a-dialogue with the world:* Thinking is listening to what is granted/the grant. 'Denken ein Hören der Zusage ist' ('Das Wesen der Sprache', vol. 12, 1985: 170).[10]
3. Heidegger's idea concerning the ontological dialogue emphasises the interaction between the language of Being (λόγος) and cultural semiosis. The principle of intelligibility, homogeneous in both cases, supports our hermeneutical approach to semiotics and renders the target of doxastic dialectics clearer.

The main hermeneutical problem regards the original relationship between comprehension and interpretation. For Heidegger, understanding projects its own possibilities through interpretation, an approach that does not contradict our transcendental premise. Because Heidegger considers interpretation an 'adequate' modality of being, intelligibility becomes a saturated condition of the ontological dialogue. At this moment, we step aside from the Heideggerian frame. Even if we transpose the transcendental dimension of comprehension in an ontological 'scheme', we argue that comprehension, although it is reconstitutive, needs interpretation,[11] and interpretation needs explicit forms.

We do not want to restore the classical metaphysics, but the metaphysics of the dominant relationships that govern the sensible world. Semiotic acts are 'performed' in/by consciousness, in the same way that

flowers bloom '*ohne warum*'. Once signs are instituted, the principle of intelligibility leads consciousness beyond immanence. This principle demands proof to ground the meaning of signs. Logic is invoked not only as an original experience, but also as a justificatory procedure. Why do we speak instead of remaining silent?

Heidegger would answer: because speaking means dwelling within the House of Being in an intelligible way. However, our answer will sound differently, because we are not sure that we are within this house.

13.3. Original proof

How can we prove that we are within the House of Being or at least that we are on the way to this house? Is language a 'phenomenon', the showing-itself-in-itself, or an 'appearance' of a hidden referent?

Why, actually, does human intelligible power demand such a proof?

13.3.1. Meaning has no ontological support

Heidegger's claim concerning the original universality of language extends the intelligible function of signs without needing such proof. Comprehension is a state of grace of consciousness. ἡ ἀλήθεια is undoubted ('fraglos').

Our thesis, which sustains the justificatory finality of signs, on the contrary, demands proof that the relational meaning is posed on the original level of consciousness, otherwise meaning has no ontological support. When meaning – whatever its nature may be: textual, conversational or original – is under question, there is a generalised requirement: it must be proved by pertinence. *Pertinence*[12] is the means by which interpretation, in our case that of consciousness, becomes a determinant procedure. Here *interpretation,* which has neither a semantic nor a pragmatic sense, but represents the original experience of dominant relationships, points towards the formative principle on which the cultural experience is grounded.[13]

From a phenomenological point of view, consciousness is the 'space' of the ontological immediateness. The dominant position of Being is experienced as *relational meaning,* by sense-giving acts.[14] Concomitantly, the original experience of consciousness can be considered a 'probatory device'. Sense-giving acts follow the transcendental logic, which by its nature supplies original proof: the transcendental logic, semiotically framed, underlines the ontological acquisition of meaning.

(a) The transcendental ego introduces a horizon of transcendence, and
(b) The transcendent horizon is experienced by consciousness through sense-giving acts.

The explanation regarding the two features of consciousness, intentional and reductive, needs extension.

1. While consciousness is *intentionally* oriented towards reality, it is oriented towards the structure of reality in itself; during the absolute perception, things are objectified (= the *moral objects*) when the abstract image of dominant relationships is uncovered (in the form of classes and categories). The principles are constituted in this way. The meaning of transcendence is experienced as categorical proof. A 90-year-old woman, pursuing the elaboration of an essay about 'The tree of Jesse', is not only the sign of a sensible reality, but the sign of a supersensible reality: for instance, it could be the sign of intellectual devotion, etc.

2. Regarding the phenomenological *reduction,* it can be considered a valorising procedure. This is the moment when reference systems are (re)constituted on the grounds of the a priori (virtual) scheme that validates the reduction. By means of synthetic operations, the transcendence is conceptually instituted in categories of value.

In contrast to Heidegger, for whom the intelligibility of ἀλήθεια is 'fraglos', we argue that consciousness is problematically oriented towards transcendence. *Causa prima,* the ontological sense of this 'being there' is obscure.[15] While the sense is posed in consciousness, it has both justificatory and formative power. Therefore, we advance the thesis about the interpretative intentionality of consciousness. Instead of being interested in the ontological turn of hermeneutics, we shall speak about the hermeneutical turn of semiotics.

3.2. Reference systems represent the axiological modality of determination. It is not wrong to say that a reference system represents the transcendent principle of determination in the form of supersensible relationships of any order. The reference system is reducible to a category of value. Due to reference systems, meanings of particular signs are coordinated – they can be defined and founded.[16] Reference systems are not given but synthesised by means of reflective judgements, which follow the transcendental logic. In the hermeneutical field of Being, reference systems establish the 'possibility conditions' of the ontological meaning of a contingent sign. The respective particular sign is projected within its own transcendence and its meaning becomes *pertinent* under the dominance of the categorical meaning. Because a reference system

introduces the transcendent principle of a sign, it becomes the justificatory basis for the respective sign.

Intuitively, any cultural exegesis appeals to reference systems. Both a renewed interest in the question of the sign's meaning and the hermeneutical turn of semiotics require an explicitly semiotic approach to reference systems. Transcendental logic is a possible option. But when the reference system is defined as a 'condition of possibility' of the ontological meaning, some arguments become problematic: is a reference system exclusively (re)constituted by original synthesis, or the historical experience of cultural signs cannot be avoided? How can the determinative function of a reference system be established in opposition with the same function of a sign system?

13.3.2. Protodoxa

The categorical position of reference systems is *conceptually constituted* and hierarchically disposed. The transcendence that is experienced in a sensible object is posited in consciousness as a meaning. This supersensible reality, assumed and conceived in its supersensible nature, is experienced through sensible features, which are separately considered, until the *cause* being such and such is reached. When the sign is more than the sign of a contingent object, and opens itself to the IDEA of its own being, the infinity displays the amplitude of the categorical profusion. The relational/categorical meaning, posited in consciousness, equates an ontological certitude, a *belief,* a PROTODOXA (see Husserl, 1931: 301 'Every experience in relation to all the *noetic* phases, which through its *noesis* shape themselves about the intentional object as such, functions as a *belief-consciousness* in the sense of *Protodoxa.*' See also the explanation in this book, in the chapter *Doxastic Dialectics*).

For instance, in Van Gogh's painting, *The Chair,* we contemplate the image of a contingent object, a chair, and we see in it 'the mystery of being an object', and more than that: the stern and inevitably rude solitude of an individuality. In this hypostasis, *the chair* becomes a sign that uncovers the 'condition' of individuality. Consciousness can assume the IDEA that a particular thing discloses. In our example, consciousness assumes the sense of individuality, as stubbornness and solitude.

The constitution of signs goes concomitantly with the institution of their structuring (reference) meaning. Until this point, our argument has seemed essentially not different from the cultural thesis that emphasises the formative power of expressiveness. With a closer look, one can judge that our hermeneutical issue is concentrated on the semiotic constitution of

the transcendent IDEA, and is less oriented towards the subject's expressive will. What makes the meaning of a sign ontologically pertinent is the *categorical meaning,* which can be posited in consciousness and experienced as an autonomous *Being* due to an a priori scheme of transcendence. When reason tries to consolidate in a *concept* the IDEA of an identity, the cultural memory opens for the original experience a horizon of time. The disputed problem of conceptualisation ('*Begrifflichkeit*') cannot be avoided. The Platonism of our point of view does not disconnect the theme regarding reference systems from its tradition. Our argument emphasises the logic that constitutes the reference systems: on the one hand, for the original belief, on the other hand, for the mental abstraction, which is possible given the historical impact. Culture's finality is to establish the noumenal autonomy of reference systems within a tradition.

13.3.3. A reference system is a matter of interpretation

The first reference system of a sign is the category the respective sign belongs to. For instance, the sign of an 'axe' can be referred to the paradigm of edged objects. A sign system can be constituted on sensible properties, or alleging theoretical premises. Any reference to sign systems ensures the epistemic determination of individual signs. Axe, sword, scythe, knife, scissors, etc. compose the paradigm of edged objects, within which 'an axe' versus 'a lot of axes' is an opposition determined by the rational category of quantity. Alternatively, an 'axe' and a 'knife' establish a functional opposition: 'to split' versus 'to cut', etc.

On a higher level, a reference system ensures the ontological determination of value meanings. In our opinion, reference systems emphasise a particular value, a category of quality and the meaning of the respective value is ontologically relevant. In Arman's sculpture, 'a lot of axes' means *a fall* of edges, many in *one* edge. The ontological value of the contingent 'fall of edges' might be that of destiny, etc. What matters is that the stroke of a movement in decline and the sharpness should be perceptible. To choose a reference system is a matter of interpretation and it has many levels of transcendence. Being is originally assumed by consciousness in hierarchical stages of abstraction, and it is, respectively, objectified in a hierarchical disposition of reference systems. Bollnow's extended commentary about human organisation of space in architecture (*Mensch und Raum,* 1963) makes explicit Man's own relationship with himself and with society, as a pragmatic being. However, when a door opens the transcendence of the infinite, as in Magritte's painting *Le*

Poison, a cloud, still belonging to the sky, penetrates inside, casting its shadow on the wall. We reach a higher understanding of the sign 'home'. 'Home' considered in itself, makes us think about the soul's own spatiality.

13.3.4. Hermeneutical logic

The justificatory power of reference systems can be demonstrated by *hermeneutical logic,* which, in our interpretation, is a kind of transcendental logic. *Hermeneutical logic* is not an ad hoc term, used to emphasise the reasonableness of meaning constitution. After Bollnow's evaluation of Misch and Lipps's contribution to hermeneutics (1983: vol. II), the term achieves philosophical legitimacy. In this respect, our argument concerning reference systems can be considered a contribution to hermeneutical logic.

We consider transcendental logic suitable for the interpretation of Being. We want to formulate here three axioms on which our approach to transcendental logic is based:

(a) The original experience is an act of valorisation. The meaning of a particular sign is constituted within the category of quality, which has ontological support. 'Value' here means the vectoriality of Being.

(b) In contrast to Husserl, we consider that transcendental consciousness is not a *tabula rasa.* The IDEAS of value are virtually registered in consciousness as non-thematic categories of togetherness.

(c) The original experience is not valid in itself. It is permanently challenged by the historically constituted cultural memory.

Because the categorical meaning of reference systems is not a priori legitimated, being experienced in a particular thing, it demands validation. The validation is *dialectically confirmed.* The transcendental logic, while supplying original proof, is questioning the cultural tradition. In this way, one can interpret Nietzsche's reversal of values ('Umwertung aller Werte') as an inquiry into tradition and appeal to original proof.

Although the subject's self-reference proof is original, it is only a relative way of 'logical' validation. Therefore, reference systems are deconstructed by reduction and reconstructed by transcendental synthesis. The validation of reference systems belongs to the doxastic field and its

specific dialectic. By means of reference systems, cultural signs are both socially and transcendentally founded.

Due to reflective thinking, reference systems can be progressively structured, proved and reproved. There is no space here to develop an argumentative topic, we emphasise only the importance of the discursive ways to reach the 'house of being'.

13.4. Conclusion: Hermeneutical circle

The goal of our argumentation was to refer semiotics to axiology and to establish, in semiosis, the dominance of the supersensible perception of the sensible sign (which translates the idea that 'a sign is more than itself', presented above). Supersensible perception (the experience of Being) grounds the meaning of the sign function. By starting with a transcendental premise, the intention was to introduce an objective basis within the categorical reference and to make the role of the formative principle logically acceptable. Our argument differs from that of both Heidegger and Cassirer.

Two features of hermeneutical logic engender a fallacy of determination:

1. *Hermeneutical paradox:* Signs institute the categorical meaning by means of which the respective signs are defined.

The transcendent IDEA is open. One 'comprehends' the transcendent IDEA that governs a particular thing by experiencing the particular features of the respective thing in an absolute sense. In spite of the absolute value of the original proof, the hermeneutical procedure leads to errors of categorisation. For instance, consider the example of the 90-year-old woman. As a sign, it could be interpreted with reference to several IDEAs: that of stubbornness, of intellectual devotion or of existential sublimity, a competition between a psychological, a moral and a spiritual category (reference system). Another example, that evinces the vicious power of the hermeneutical uncertainty, is the theme of the sectioned objects in Arman's sculpture: is the piano, sectioned by two motorcycles (*La chute des courses*), a sign of deconstruction or of construction? Are art and beauty demolished or affirmed, when consciousness is confronted with the destructive condition? In Dali's painting, fundamentally ironical, judging *The persistence of memory* on a higher level, we are not sure whether within the question: 'What is a clock?' does the anamorphotic principle in its universality sound or not?

2. *Hermeneutical circle:* 'Alle Auslegung bewegt sich ferner in der gekennzeichneten Vor-struktur. Alle Auslegung, die Verständnis beistellen soll, muß schon das Auszulegende verstanden haben.' (Heidegger, 1960: 152).[17]

Both in Heidegger's and in our terms, the interpretation presupposes a priori structures. Heidegger calls them 'potentialities-for-Being' (*Vorhabe, Vorsicht, Vorgriff*). We call them non-thematic categories of value, which, during interpretation, are proved by self-reflective acts and conceptualised. The transcendent IDEAs are partially disclosed by conceptualisation. As far as SELF is an infinite object, self-reflective acts of consciousness are unable to consider that the 'sense' of the SELF is disclosed, but that it is *in disclosure.* That is the reason we are confronted with a hermeneutical paradox. The distance between original and discursive language is never completely covered, and the opposition between originally given and acquired language is never clear.

During sense-giving acts, consciousness reaches moments of self-saturation and substitutes evaluative acts by normative ones. When language becomes 'the institution of Being', the sense of an IDEA is substituted by an idea in a *concept,* that inevitably does not have an ontological but a rhetorical charge. Each reference to the IDEA of Being is a reference to a preconceived idea. Understanding is prejudicial. The 'hermeneutical circle' is 'structurally' susceptible to being distorted by the vicious movement of *petitio principi.*

Trivial commentaries concerning the intelligible deadlock could be ignored, by raising arguments against the two vices of determination:

1. *Being as Knowing* is a condition developed by inherence. Each act of conceptualisation, even if it brings a provisional understanding, allows the intelligible participation in Being's condition of transcendence.
2. *Being as Knowing* opens conditions of transgression. A prejudice can be eliminated and a vicious circle can be cut down not by alternative prejudices, but by transgression towards a higher level of reference.

If we want to translate the noumenal dynamics of consciousness in semiotic terms, the subjective inherence of language is only a partial explanation. During self-reflective acts of consciousness, language, historically acquired, approaches the House of Being by implicit or explicit transgression, but the house is never reached.

Notes

* The first printed form: 'Sign Systems – Reference Systems', *Kodikas/Code,* 59–68: 3l: 1–2, 2008. The text was adapted to the specific target of this book – the ontological rationality of *doxastic dialectics.*

[1] In ontology, 'cause' has the sense of 'principle', and not that of 'reasonable explanation'. 'Original cause' means *causa prima,* a concept originated in scholastic. Aristotle, in *Metaphysica*, speaks about a 'science' interested in the first principles and causes. He established four causes of a phenomenon: generative, formative, material and final.

[2] With Peirce begins the interpretative orientation of semiotics that enabled semioticians to place semiosis at the centre of perception. See Innis's book (1994) and all the references he introduces. Here we ought to stress the distinction we make between contingent and original interpretation. The contingent experience of 'being-in-the-world' is collected by cultural memory that the original interpretation explores in its privileged moments.

[3] This is an allusion to Heidegger's quotation from Angelus Silesius' poem '*Das Ros ist ohn warum; sie blühet, weil sie blühet*' (see Heidegger, 1957: 68–69) and to his commentary in *Der Satz vom Grund:* 'Die Rose ist zwar ohne Warum, aber sie ist doch nicht ohne Grund. 'Ohne Warum' und 'ohne Grund' sind nich das Gleiche.' (idem: 72).

[4] 'Divine' means here 'a priori', and has no proper sense as in Eco's inquiry into the divine origin of language (1999).

[5] See also Heidegger's *Unterwegs zur Sprache.* There is a great similarity between Heidegger's formula and Antisthenes's *oikeios logos* (όικείοξ λόγος). We commented on the possible influence, in 'Dreapta potrivire a numelor' ('The correctness of names', Plato, *Cratylos,* 2007).

[6] Founded by W. Dilthey, in *Critique of Historical Reason (Kritik der historischen Vernunft),* as an alternative to analytical and epistemic sciences, hermeneutics is now considered the field of humanistic sciences ('Geisteswissenschaften', intentioned to constitute a 'Lebensphilosophie'). Heidegger was the first who placed hermeneutics under the claim of universality, by turning the hermeneutical interest towards the sense of Being: 'Phänomenologie des Daseins ist *Hermeneutik* in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, wonach es das Geschäft der Auslegung bezeichnet.' (Heidegger, 1960: 37) Gadamer's approach to hermeneutics is similar to that of Heidegger: 'Par 'herméneutique' je comprends la théorie de cette experience effective qui est la pensée' (1976: 19).

[7] We use Bleicher's English translation of Heidegger's German syntagma: 'die Sprachlichkeit des Verstehen' (1983).

[8] Heidegger's question of Being: 'Bleibt sie lediglich oder *ist* sie überhaupt nur das Geschäft einer freischwebenden Spekulation über allgemeinste Allgemeinheiten – *oder ist sie die prinzipiellste und konkreteste Frage zugleich?*' (1960: 9) does, actually, not oppose metaphysics, but 'aufhebt' it. See also Pöggeler´s commentary: 'Läßt Heideggers Denken sich etwa begreifen als Vollendung und Ende der Metaphysischen Tradition, vor allem der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik? Walter Schulz hat zu zeigen versucht, daß Heideggers Denken, dem

Selbstverständnis Heideggers entgegen, nicht *gegen* die neuzeitliche Metaphysik steht, sondern *aus* ihr zu verstehen ist' (1983: 202).

[9]   From our point of view, the principle of intelligibility establishes, in the field of meaning, the grounding conditions as the principle of reason does in epistemology. Both are universal principles of cognition, but they belong to different fields. Actually, our interpretation of the principle of intelligibility is ontologically conceived, in the way Heidegger approaches the philosophy of *principium rationis*. See *Der Satz vom Grund:* 'Sein und Grund gehören zusammen. Grund und Sein (<sind>) das Selbe, und nicht das Gleiche, was schon die Verschiedenheit der Namen *Sein* und *Grund* anzeigt'. (1957: 93). The quoted words give a clear account of note 3, (above): 'Alles hat einen Grund, nur der Grund ist ohne Warum', because 'Der Satz vom Grund ist ohne Grund'; 'Sein *ist* der Ab-Grund', says Heidegger.

[10]   The ontological dialogue, about which Heidegger speaks frequently (*Was ist das – die Philosophie? Unterwegs zur Sprache, Holzwege*), means, in his interpretation, the ontological condition of 'adaequatio', that of harmonising or tuning (*Ent-sprechen; Stimmung, Be-stimmung, Über-einstimmung*) oneself to the language of Being.

[11]   Dascal, in his pragmatic works, sustains the same dependence.

[12]   *Pertinence*, in structural linguistics, means the value of an entity within a system of oppositions. In pragmatics and dialogue studies, the *pertinence* (or *relevance*) is a maxim of the dialogical adequateness.

[13]   See Innis's commentary about the centrality of the formative principle in Cassirer's philosophy, a theme that opposed Cassirer to Heidegger: 'To Cassirer's horizon of form, Heidegger opposes the horizon of time' (1994: note 16: 126).

[14]   '*Prendre conscience* ne signifie pas autre chose que tenter d'établir réelement le sens 'lui-même'.' (Husserl, 1957: 13)

[15]   'Das Leben ist unergründlich und unerschöpflich, das ist das immer wiederkehrende Thema aller Lebensphilosophie'. (Bollnow, Band II, 1983: 33) The impossibility of finding a ground for Being ('Being ist ohne Warum') is both a topic in Heidegger's philosophy, and a problem that concerns us. However, while in Heideggerian philosophy, this issue leads to hermeneutics: 'Der Sinn von Sein kann nie in Gegensatz gebracht werden zum Sein oder als tragenden 'Grund' des Seienden, weil 'Grund' nur als Sinn zugänglich wird, und sei er selbst der Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit' (1960: 152); in our approach, it motivates the justificatory finality of semiosis.

[16]   Within the frame of the present study, there is not sufficient room to develop a debate, neither about our conception of value, nor about the relationship between determinative and justificatory functions of reference systems.

[17]   'Aber in diesem Zirkel ein vitiosum sehen und nach Wegen Ausschau halten, ihn zu vermeiden, ja ihn auch nur als unvermeidliche Unvollkommenheit 'empfinden', heißt das Verstehen von Grund aus mißverstehen.' (Heidegger, 1960: 153)

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

PLACE AND PERSON(A)*[1]

14.1. Preliminary explanations

Without any polemic intention, in what follows, I will be concerned with the idea of *corporeality* in its 'soft' interpretation. *Corporeality* is the first characteristic of the human being. The soft interpretation of the idea of *corporeality* allows a better perception of human subjectivity. The target of the present commentary is to see to what extent the formative process of subjectivity is connected with the different images of one's own corporeality.

Usually, subjectivity has been connected with the cognitive determinations of the human being, the fundaments of which are self-referential. The present chapter emphasises the ontological dimension of subjectivity. By the 'the ontological dimension of subjectivity' we mean the process through which the human being is capable of assuming their own existence. When the human being is involved in this process, they build up their individuality, become a persona.

The idea of *corporeality* will be approached within the semiotic extension of the concept of *place/locus* (Romanian *loc,* Latin *locus,* French *lieu/place*, Hebrew *makom* 'place/locus' – *Hamakom* 'the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus'). The relationship between *place and person* will be displayed in conformity with the following three oppositions: (a) *place,* as a physical index vs. as a human symbol; (b) the concept of 'metaphysical transubstantiation' and the opposition place/locus vs. *direction/sense (sense of life)*; (c) the profane dimension of *place* vs. sacred dimension of *place*.

14.2. The principle of individuation

The principle of individuation does not refer exclusively to *res extensa* proper, namely to the physical characteristics of the human body, but applies to the ensemble of particularities which oppose an individual to another.

The corporeal existence ensures the identity of the human being. 'L'existence corporelle' – as Levinas says (Levinas, 1979: 164) – represents the way the human being becomes aware of themselves, demanding a place, which is the sign of 'being there', of being present. Corporeality means 'existence'. From the perspective of a human body, one's own corporeality represents the first formative agent of subjectivity, of the EGO.

In order to avoid an empiric approach, the idea of *corporeality* will be treated within Levinas' philosophical distinction *totality* vs. *infinite*. Levinas' distinction will be approached in a particular modified sense, corresponding to the opposition: *closed* (universe – see history; society)/ *open* (universe).

14.3. Totality – the *closed* universe

Language – respectively, the polysemy of the word *place/locus* – 'tells' the history during which *res extensa* is connected to *res cognitivus*. During this history, the consciousness of the human being is in continuous progress. By developing from the inside out, the human consciousness changes its reflective power, running through several steps: physical person(a), moral person(a), religious person(a).

14.3.1. *Place* as a physical index vs. *place* as a human symbol

From the geometrical point of view, *place* means:

(1) a particular part of space taken by somebody or something.

This is my seat ('place')!

In a civilised society (= mentality), each thing, in particular the human being, has its place in the totality. One's own place can be claimed, vindicated, booked or reserved.

(2) A particular position in a series, or a particular rank in a hierarchy:

My place is at the head/in the third rank ... etc.

The opposition between different entities – in our case, different human beings – reveals the value an entity has in an ensemble. The moment the person is searching their *place* among the others, their

consciousness is value oriented: *place* means *function, part* or *role.* See the following expressions, recorded in language:

> *To find one's place within society.*

> *To lose one's place.*

> *To be out of place.*

> *To know one's place.*

> *To be well placed.*

> *It is not my place to do it.*

The figurative sense in which a human being is searching for their *place* within the world (*totality*) they live in is the natural consequence of being 'in'.

14.3.2. The concept of metaphysical transubstantiation

and the opposition place vs. direction/sense (implicitly, sense of life)

While the human being is searching their place within the world, their effort is to find and to justify the *sense* of life in general, and the sense of their own life inside a 'mechanism'. The concept of 'place' is endorsed by the *function* and the *power* to accomplish the respective function, in virtue of an authoritative idea/law/rule etc.

On another occasion, I made the specification that the entire research, the target of which is 'the sense of life', is part of the doxastic/belief field. The demonstration was based on two arguments valid for the present argumentation, which I will mention here:

(a) Grice's idea concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation* and

(b) The reference to a *transcendental principle* (*reference system*).

Grice developed the idea of *metaphysical transubstantiation,* as an argument in favour of the *metaphysical objectivity* of values (Grice 1991: 35). With Grice, the *metaphysical transubstantiation* is the procedure of redistribution, but not the invention of properties. For example – properties accidentally meant for *humans* become essential properties of a new psychological type called *person* (1991)*: corresponds, in our terms, to a *paradigmatical transfer* from a pragmatic to a moral system of reference. We may speak about a moral transubstantiation of the representation of the body.

In order to reach authoritative power, the moral reference to the human body should be supported by a *transcendental principle,* namely by an IDEA of body as *reference system*.

By raising the 'reality' of body to an IDEA of body, the field of arguments opens cultural, not pragmatic controversies. For instance, two opposite examples:

In the Ancient Greek sculptures, the human body was a symbol of measure; an opposite example is the culture of corporeal austerity as a life conduct, etc.

The authoritative power of the IDEA of body was frequently formulated in geometric terms. In the Renaissance and ever since, the Vitruvian Man – a drawing by Leonardo da Vinci – represents the concise image of the perfect proportionality of a man's body. *Res cognitivus* decides about *res extensa.* The moral reference to the human body is an opportunity to influence both the functionality and the proportionality of the body. From the perspective of the human being, the equilibrium between the body and the power of judgement – resumed by the device *mens sana in corpore sano* – has both a pragmatic and a spiritual relevance. In spite of the justificatory power, any reference to the IDEA of body remains a subjective choice. For a critical mind, such a choice is open to dialogical inquiry.

For the target of the present commentary, it is important to emphasise the axiological concern of subjectivity (of the EGO) to objectify the inner sense of corporeality in relationship with the idea of place. The following example illustrates the value correspondence between place and person:

The right man in the right place!

The example mentioned above, casts, in the context of the present issue, a new light on the relationship place/function – persona. The inner sense of a person, their subjectivity, is to find themselves in the place that represents for them the opportunity to accomplish their task or 'mission'.

14.4. Infinity – the open universe

The fragility of the human body engenders an *interrogative*, even a *problematic* consciousness, questioning the finality and the source of life.

Without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically 'demonstrating' eschatological 'truths', we can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. (Levinas 1979: 24).

When human subjectivity is confronted with a *mysterium tremendum,* which is a power greater than human beings can imagine and explain, and

their corporeality can endure, their problematic consciousness takes a tragic turn. Thrown *beyond* the limits of the universe, beyond the totality which gives reasons to feel 'at home', Man begins a new cognitive journey.

14.4.1. Profane dimension/sense of the *place* vs. sacred dimension /sense of the place

It is not the target of our present commentary to open great philosophical questions, but to point at the moment when the concept of corporeality turns to be an ontological signal. Human consciousness discovers the breaking moment of totality:

(a) by death, or by catastrophic events, which mark the temporal feature of corporeality (see the Heideggerian ontological argument: *Sein zum Tode*).

Another place, *beyond* here and near, alternative to natural conditions of corporeality, which may allow the orientation within the world.

There are two existential experiences: profane and sacred, by which the human mind explains life. The 'profane' space – as Eliade defines it – can be divided up only geometrically. In exchange, phenomena like *hierophanies* or *theophanies* (the extraordinary revelations of the sacred, or of God) give structure and orientation to the world, by establishing a sacred order. As Eliade explains: 'A *hierophany* amounts to a 'revelation' of an absolute reality, opposed to the non-reality of the vast surrounding space' (Eliade 1987: 21). The *hierophany* uncovers the 'fixed point' where human beings may place their corporeality in relationship with the Supreme Power.

See, for instance, the dream of Jacob (Genesis 28: 10–22)

And Jacob riseth early in the morning, and taketh the stone which he hath made his pillows, and maketh it a standing pillar, and poureth oil upon (19) its top, and he calleth the name of that place Bethel, house of (20) God.

(b) Levinas' experience of the Infinity can be invoked as an alternative to the theological ontology:

Levinas' philosophy of EXTERIORITY is an interesting philosophical perception of the Infinity, an ontological argument, with no religious connotation: with Levinas, the way the human being thinks the Infinity, the transcendent, is different from the way they are perceiving an object.

The philosophy of exteriority compresses the idea of corporeality with that of face-to-face. Levinas' idea of Infinity is an ontological and not a cognitive approach.

14.4.2. Makom vs. Hamakom

As far as we know, the Hebrew language is the only one in which one of the many names of God is *Hamakom*[2]. This name represents the articulated form of the name *makom* which means 'place/locus'. In a usual Hebrew/English dictionary, *Hamakom* is translated as 'the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus'.

From a discussion with a specialist in Judaism, Baruch Tercatin, I learned the explanation given in the Talmud for using the name *Hamakom* with reference to GOD, in addition to the more usual name, *Hashem,* which means *the name,* and *Hamakom* represents the *place* where the world *dwells*. The world is not the place within which God dwells. The world is not sufficiently large to include God's Infinity. *Hamakom*, in exchange, includes the whole world and the whole time: the present, the past and the future. This is the reason why *Hamakom* is invoked especially in Hebrew *brachot* ('wishes') or *tanhumim* ('condolences'): *Hamakom inahem othem!* – God shall comfort you!

Without pretending to be right, I will put forward an ontological claim: a possible etymological relationship between the two words – *Hamakom* 'the place' and *kium,* which means 'existence'– seems obvious for someone who knows the deep structure of the Hebrew language (here are two rules: the three-consonant root 'k, wav, m'; and the consonant 'm' as a nominal prefix). See a fragment from Exodus 3, 14:

And God said unto Moses, 'I AM THAT I AM'; and he said, 'Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, 'I AM hath sent me unto you.'

In Hebrew, the verb *to be* has no copulative function and has no complements. When God says *ahie* (God's name): I AM has self-referential meaning, which means self-referential power. I AM! By 'performing'/uttering his *name*, Being is instantiating. Consequently, in virtue of the 'possible' etymology pointed above, we may say that

Hamakom does not mean, but IS the source of Being (the place where Being is springing from).

In accordance with the Talmudic explanation, *Hamakom* could be considered the *grounding Satz* of the Hebraic ontology of Infinity.

14.5. Conclusion

During the progressive becoming conscious of the natural characteristics of the body, the human being crosses several steps of metaphysical transubstantiation, which are as natural as the primitive condition.

The final stage of the metaphysical transubstantiation of corporeality is, surprisingly, a spiritualised image of the human body. The Italian Quattrocento painting is an example. See also Giacometti's sculptures, Modigliani's portraits, or many other many examples of living persons with spiritualised expressions or movements.

Instead of a conclusion, we make the following remarks that will supply a reverse meaning of *corporeality*.

1. The 'Judaic ontology' – as I have formulated it above – introduces a paradigmatic contrast with the ontology grounded on opposable terms (I have in view the Heideggerian ontology). Judaic ontology offers a generative interpretation of *Being* (as the Supreme Power), while, in the Heideggerian ontology, *Being* becomes relevant in opposition to Nothingness.[3] *Sein zum Tode* engenders the meaning of *Being* in the moment corporeality is in danger of being destroyed. The Judaic ontology establishes degrees of Being: human dimension of reality – *the makom* ('the place'), and the supreme dimension of reality – *Hamakom* ('the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus').

2. Within a subjective-based perspective, ontology is connected to cognition. The idea of *Being* is constituted in human consciousness. A human person has ontological function, progressively becoming a Persona. By *metaphysical transubstantiation*, a Person becomes an Individuality, a Persona – a spiritual person. The consciousness of the human person is increased by developing from the inside out, a process during which human consciousness changes its reflective power, running through several steps: physical person, moral person(a), religious person(a).

The physical characteristics of the human body and its development are parts of the existential inherence. During the progressive becoming

conscious of the natural characteristics of the body, the human being crosses several steps of metaphysical transubstantiation, which are as natural as the primitive condition. The final stage of the metaphysical transubstantiation of corporeality is the aforementioned spiritualised image of the human body seen in fourteenth-century art right through to the works of contemporary artists.

In a supreme sense, one cannot invoke the *right place* as the shelter of corporeality. In exchange, we discover situations when corporeality lodges the spirit. *Res extensa* becomes more than *res cognitivus*, it becomes the 'house of grace'.

Notes

* Communication, International Conference IASC, 'Conflicts, Communication and Body', Tel Aviv University, December 28–29 2015, published in the volume *Pragmatics & Cognition* 23, no. 3 (2016).

[1] *Persona* is a polysemantic word: (a) a character played by an actor – this meaning has Latin origin, with the sense of a (theatrical) mask, see also the Etruscan word *phersu* 'mask' and that of Greek *prosōpon,* with the same meaning; (b) a public person, a social role; (c) personality, identity.

[2] Professor Sofia Simitzi from the Department of Philosophy, University of Ioannina, Greece, has informed me during occasional conversation, that in Greek ontology exists a similar concept, that of *Pantahu Poron.*

[3] See Heidegger`s ontology (1967), to which Levinas (1979) has opposed his philosophy of Exteriority.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SPEAKER'S MEANING*

With reference to Dascal's book *Mashav HaRuah*

(*The gust of the wind. Changing winds, humanities in a new-old world*). Jerusalem: Carmel

15.1. Points of view

15.1.1. Common reader's receptivity

After finishing his office as a Dean of Humanities, Dascal, professor of philosophy, much involved in the activity he had run through, reflected upon his experience, both as a person and as a philosopher. He re-examined all the speeches he had uttered in the position of Dean at Tel Aviv University, realising their unitary character, their argumentative value for the/his pragmatic research, and decided to publish them in a book.

In the new form, it becomes obvious that the speeches, thematically organised, are of a less official style than usually expected. Therefore, the book counts as a collection of essays about the most controversial problems characterising Israeli society. The image of 'reality' it presents is much deeper than it seems at first sight. The diversity of issues in debate and the way the subjects are organised in the book allow the reader to grasp the issues.

15.1.2. A book of confession

The book starts with the author's confession (the introduction) regarding his professional and moral concerns before entering office, the need he feels to put order in his mind. By visiting all the departments that belong to the humanities, by inquiring about the work performed by the people there, he became progressively more empathic with his academic colleagues, and more aware about his future duties.

From the perspective emphasised above, Dascal's book can be placed within the literary genre of *confessions,* the author becoming actually conscious, *self-enlightened* about one's own (philosophical) choice. The book is a *confession of faith* – the author's philosophical testimony.

A *confession* is a very intimate narrative, but, in this case the 'intimate' matter the reader uncovers is an intellectual concern, sometimes extremely tense. The reader may be confused by the double game the speaker/writer plays, the superposition of the roles he keeps up: the dean's social and philosophical commitment.

15.1.3. A pragmatic and beyond point of view

In what follows we will embrace a *pragmatic and beyond* point of view. Starting off with the idea that the book *Mashav HaRuah* is a confession, our present study will be focused on the concept of the *speaker's meaning*[1] – an important interpretative tool in Dascal's pragmatic philosophy.

With the intention of using this concept for a better understanding of the author's voice as it is heard in the book *Mashav HaRuah*, we will establish three differentiated levels of approach:

(a) The *speaker's meaning* – what the speaker intends to say and is actually saying (the speaker's discursive intentionality, respectively the speaker's point of view);
(b) The *speaker's meaning* – the speaker's reference to contextual facts (the speaker's referentially selective attitude);
(c) The *speaker's meaning* – icon of the speaker's social, scientific and moral identity (who stands behind the speaker's words).

Once we have said that our commentary will follow a *pragmatic and beyond* point of view, our intention is to pursue pragmatic and hermeneutic inquires. In our interpretation, 'pragmatic' means setting up the author's discursive strategies and the meanings they carry. 'Hermeneutic' means the transubstantiation of meanings into axiological values, respectively, the meaning constitution of axiological concepts, those relevant for *Mashav HaRuah* (author)'s persona.

15.2. Pragmatic inquiry

'Comment extraire de ce qu'un discours quelconque dit et de ce qu'il montre celui de ses sens possibles auquel ce discours est censé nous diriger' represents – says Dascal (1996: 1375) – the main problem of pragmatics. The quoted paragraph is formulated by Dascal in an assertory way. It resumes the pragmatic thesis regarding the discourse comprehension: *to know how* (how language is used), as opposed *to know what* (what language makes reference to).

The same paragraph formulated in interrogative form will direct us 'vers un sens privilegié' (ibid., 1376) – the *speaker's meaning* – the 'sense' in which we should read Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah*. While inquiring as to the *speaker's meaning*, we should establish who the *speaker* is in Dascal's book.

15.2.1. Game parameters

By referring our problem to the same text quoted above, *Game in language,* we may find some considerations useful to begin with our commentaries: 'Faire l'exégèse du texte … l'exégète doit exhiber sa comprehension, en poursuivant comme il faut le jeu (ou les jeux?) exemplifié(s) dans le texte' (ibid., 1373).

Our exegetic strategy proposes an extremely general game scheme[2], in conformity with which we shall establish the role of the author, how many 'voices'/parts he plays, his discursive strategy and commitment, his identity and the identity of the other 'players' in each interaction (if there are more than one) and the dialogical distance between players.

Mashav HaRuah is a book written in the first person. The author is the *speaker*, who performs his speech acts on two registers. First, the author of the book – which is a collection of public speeches – addresses himself to the greater public, an undetermined, undefined 'interlocutor', including the exegete. Then, the author calls the reader to 'witness' an embedded interaction – the dean's/author's speeches addressed to his academic colleagues, interlocutors with a well-determined identity of scholars, their professional power and horizon of perception being more or less presumed by the speaker.

The discursive identity of the author depends on his discursive strategy which is differently oriented in each of the two interactions described above. In spite of the two strategically different targets, the polyphony of the author's voice is maintained: *the voice of the human person,* his consciousness with psychological and spiritual concerns, *the dean's voice,*

the author's social and professional commitment, and the *voice of a scholar,* the author's cognitive identity, his cognitive concerns and experiences, his theoretical arguments and conclusions. It stands in the 'interlocutor's' power of judgement to detect the loudness of each voice and the direction it comes from. Given the discursive formula of this book – that of a confession – it is equally important what the common 'interlocutor' says about the author's identity on the one hand, and on the other hand how the exegete establishes the speaker's identity by finding some limits to his interpretative acts. Due to his conceptual tools, the exegete has a privileged status. For him, the author's identity is a dynamic joining of parameters, an interpretative construction, derived from the speaker's discursive strategies, namely from the speaker's referential and intentional attitude. All interpretative acts are projected by the exegete on an extended background, co-textually and contextually increased[3].

15.2.2. The author's/speaker's discursive strategy

Professor Marcelo Dascal has realised that the publication in a book of almost all speeches he uttered on the occasion of academic opening ceremonies could engender public interest. Since then, he has become much more determined to inform the readers about academic life and also to exhibit the seriousness with which the academic research approaches the conflicting reality of Israel. Under the literal meaning the reader uncovers the author's real intention, that of offering a key for understanding the Israeli reality in order to improve it. Usually, such a collection of public speeches presents rhetoric relevance, but in this case the author has had in view an updated 'document'.

The embedded structure of interaction, in which the book has been conceived, compels us to establish more than one level of interpreting the *speaker's/writer's/author's meaning*. The embedded speeches, which constitute the main matter of the book, represent the authoritative arguments used by the author in order to justify his choice of being an *auteur engagé*.

Engagé, in which sense? A professional, a social or a moral commitment[4]? We will begin with the first aspect; the two others will be analysed in the following chapter.

An exegete familiar with Dascal's philosophical activity may judge the relationship between the *speaker's meaning,* in the book *Mashav HaRuah*, and the whole scientific work of a scholar who has been contributing to the foundation of the theory and metatheory of pragmatics and controversy. From the first glance, by reading the table of contents of the

book, the *speaker's meaning* becomes obvious. The philosophical emphasis laid on each opening speech is 'translated' by the titles of the chapters under which the respective speeches are reproduced. Leader of the theory of dialogue interpretation, Dascal, being a philosopher, pushed the communicative theory in the direction of the new epistemology, that of cognitive studies regarding a truth governed by soft rationality, namely, the truth searched in conformity with the principle of *tertium datur*. Specialist in Leibniz's philosophy, much influenced by him, Professor Dascal extended the principle of 'soft rationality' with two ideas borrowed from Leibniz: to consider not only your own desires, but also those of others – Leibniz's *principle of charity*, and to put yourself in the position of the other – *la place d'autrui* (Dascal, 2000: 27–28). Involved in a comprehensive project of publishing Leibniz's *opera completa,* Marcelo Dascal discovers another Leibniz, Leibniz the *polemist* and the theoretician of controversy.

Led by the German philosopher in his effort to establish the cognitive fundaments of controversy, Dascal finds many similarities between his project and the old Talmudic tradition. By casting a philosophical glance upon the writings of the Masters of Jewish dialectics, he was able to realise an original synthesis and to found his own philosophy of *ars disputandum*[5].

The *speaker's meaning* in the book *Mashav HaRuah* cannot be rightly interpreted without reference to the theses of cognitive pragmatics and epistemology, developed by Professor Dascal. In accordance with Leibniz's metaphysics and Talmudic dialectics, Dascal's epistemological strategy is *other-oriented*. It emphasises the importance of public debates, during which the confrontation of contrary arguments is not a competitive fight, but a creative opportunity for each intervention to contribute in solving a problem, for the benefit of the 'growth of knowledge' (Dascal 2000). Multiperspectivism, cultural pluralism, interdisciplinarity, the will for dialogue, the *balance of reason*[6] are the main issues in Dascal's philosophy of controversy. As these concepts are frequently mentioned in his opening speeches, they make explicit the sense in which one should explain the *speaker's meaning*. For instance: '*to know how* to use language' – p. 72; 'the process of *dichotomisation*'– p. 83; '*ego's strategies*' – p. 105; 'opening the *dialogue beyond ideological and linguistic borders*' – p. 112; '*argumentative strategies*' – p. 133, and many others.

Although the author is the *speaker* in both interactions*,* the speaker's strategy in opening speeches on the occasion of academic ceremonies is different from the *speaker's strategy* of the entire book. The

speaker's/author's strategy in opening speeches should be judged as far as it is part of the *speaker's meaning* of the book. In both conditions we hear the *dean's* and *professor's voice* modulated by the author's consciousness.

The way the speaker is addressing his words to his academic colleagues is equivalent to a form of *captatio benevolentiae,* formulated in theoretical terms. The speaker/the dean tries to establish a common language between different specialties, a bridge for cooperation. A more powerful (*speaker's*) intention is to make the 'interlocutors' (his academic colleagues) familiar with the theoretical methodology of a *debate,* in order to diminish the dialogical distance between conflicting parts.

On the other hand, the reader of the book is informed about the degree of the scholars' commitment to problems which are of current interest and the reader, is 'initiated' in the way the specialists approach the problematic reality. The strategy of taking the reader to 'witness' vital questions is frequently used in television talk-shows. By judging the book from the perspective of the common reader*,* we discover that the 'didactic' reason prevails over the informative one. By bringing all the theoretical issues in 'public debate', the author rejects the taboo of scientific language and emphasises the rational relevance these issues have in understanding current life. Everybody is involved in trivial or serious polemics. The *didactic*-oriented strategy of the *speaker* explains why there are numerous repetitions, why the author makes use of well-tempered scientific language. It is difficult to put a complicated matter in a simple way, and the author, who masters this cognitive operation, follows the reductive strategy with the intention of being part in the process of the general emancipation of the people's mentality.

15.2.3. The author's/speaker's referential strategy

The referential aspect of a discourse – 'ce qu'un discours quelconque dit et … ce qu'il montre' is part of the *speaker's meaning* – the 'sense' in which we should read Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah*[7]. The narrative of the book follows a strategic plan, in conformity with which the author transforms the embedded academic interaction (the dean's illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, performed in opening speeches addressed to his academic colleagues) into a referential field for his confessions. Dominated by a perlocutionary intention (the *speaker's meaning*), the 'content' of the book has got a selective structure. Consequently, we see no reason why not to call this aspect the *speaker's referential strategy.*

In what follows, we shall first present the referential background, and after that the way the author/the dean uncovers the reasons of his selective points of reference.

15.2.4. Comprehensive image of Israeli reality

In the way the dean addresses his words, the reader of the book gains indirectly a comprehensive image of the conflicting reality of Israel, becoming a witness of the academic research and the degree of academic implication in problems largely debated: The murder of Yitzhak Rabin, the grief and beyond; Europe and peace in the Middle East; the web of violence; *Shoa* and the evil; racism and antisemitism; orientalism or epistemological pluralism in Israel? Historical truth or national myth; the *Tanaims* and the importance of dialectics; Arabs and Jews in Israel, dynamic perspectives; Germany – Israel: a culturally multidimensional web; linguistic pluralism; the cryptic meaning of the scrolls, etc. are only some examples.

15.2.5. 'Le tour de la chose'

The book, *Mashav HaRuah,* is not a simple collection of public speeches, but a unitary complex of problems, the matter to which the book refers. The embedded matter in the dean's confession is relevant for the author's referential strategy. Professor Dascal wants to share his *theory of controversy* with his colleagues from different departments. Simultaneously, the dean's speeches explicitly emphasise those problems which, important for the theory of controversy, have public relevance: the weight of rationality in conflict settlement; dialogue without a priori conditions; multistratified identity; the polyphony of polemic texts; hermeneutic and science; three prejudices about the prejudice; Descartes: a permanent polemic; relevant philosophy, etc.

In published form, the referential management opens a new door towards the *speaker's meaning*. Addressed to common readers, the author's confession makes public his intellectual concerns – 'the literal meaning'. He 'presents' his speeches addressed to his colleagues with a *demonstrative* intention. By the many references to theoretical issues, he shows *how* the conflicting reality might be judged more rationally, less impulsively.

To his colleagues, the philosopher presents a theoretically simplified programme. His affirmations, his ideas are submitted to a test of theoretical resistance, challenging reaction, looking for approval. While

reading the book, having a global view, the academic public may better judge the social frame (*context*) within which their debates have taken place, and they may judge the theoretical design formulated by the author (*co-text*). The confession in the afterword – the last chapter – is particularly addressed to them. On the occasion of a colloquy on a geographical topic, the author, having the intention of finding himself on a common ground with his colleagues, opens the debates by an exposition regarding 'geographical metaphors in scientific language'. For instance: *ground, territory, beyond (pragmatics)* etc.

By deciding to publish this book, the author himself is able to approach the whole matter more critically. As he gives the same opportunity to his colleagues, they can make 'le tour de la chose' together (in Leibniz's words, quoted by Dascal) (2000: 33). The published form of the speeches facilitates the step towards objectivity.

15.3. Hermeneutical inquiry

The *speaker's meaning* is the icon of the speaker's social, scientific and moral identity. In certain kinds of discourse, when the interpretation of the *speaker's meaning* regards problematic issues, beliefs, and ideas that concern the person who stands behind the speaker's words, inevitably, the following question arises:

Who is the speaker? This question, in our particular case, cannot be avoided because our exegesis is dealing with a book of *confession,* in which the speaker, becoming conscious of what he is doing, tries to define himself. The *speaker's meaning* in a confession is to express what is most profound in his mind – his beliefs. What in French is called '*Une prise de conscience*' becomes a *confession of* (intellectual) *faith* – a moral commitment.

In order to give a complete account of the *speaker's meaning* in Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah,* the interpretation leads beyond the pragmatical frame, beyond questions regarding the players' identity, beyond the polyphonic problems regarding the 'voices' that are heard in the *speaker's meaning,* but not so far as to search for a metaphysically absolute speaker.[8]

The *speaker's meaning* is a cognitive parameter, pragmatically defined. If this parameter acquires a moral dimension, the cognitive load is increased, requiring axiological determination. From this point on, the interpretative exegesis steps beyond the pragmatical border, and begins a hermeneutical inquiry.

From our point of view, hermeneutics represents the constitutive procedure of the alternative to epistemic truth, the doxastic truth – the truth of beliefs. Doxastic truth objectifies the content of beliefs in language, by dialectically displayed interpretative movements[9]. Because beliefs are subjective acts with cognitively poor relevance, the hermeneutic procedure is more than a semantic interpretative tool, it represents the way the 'semantic truth' of beliefs *could* be validated. Two cognitive stages prepare the validation: the belief's content is assumed by consciousness and then the belief's content is referred to a principle of transcendence. These remarks are necessary in order to confer a new accent to the cognitive steps our exegesis is prepared to make. As our hermeneutical inquiry examines the author's moral concerns, it has no ontological implications.

By making a synthesis of the pragmatical analyses – as Professor Dascal proposes – we obtain the hermeneutical answer to the question *who is the speaker?* In this answer, two perspectives converge: that of the speaker himself, who assumes his professional and social commitment, and that of the reader/the interpreter/ the exegete, who, being interested in establishing the moral significance (relevance) of the speaker's words, 'translates' the pragmatically defined meanings into their axiological correspondents.

15.3.1. The speaker's own image

From Dascal's assertion: 'Hermeneutical theses can be rephrased as pragmatic principles (and vice versa)' (Dascal, 1989: 240), we choose the 'vice versa' alternative: *Pragmatic theses can be rephrased as hermeneutical principles.*

Hermeneutics is a cognitive procedure applied to beliefs which have no other reference than the meanings extended in consciousness.

The cognitive functions of consciousness is governed by two principles: the principle of opposition, and the principle of transcendence.

The inner dialogue of a confession is the best example. The first step in consciousness is taken by the speaker who commits himself morally. *Une prise de conscience*, as we define Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah,* represents a complex act, both cognitive and self-evaluative. Once the *moral commitment* is confessed, the speaker submits his own sense of self-determination to the *other's* judgement. In Dascal's book, the author confesses his professional and philosophical dilemma. The reader finds the dean's concerns regarding his responsibilities both as a dean and as a humanist, his promise never to make a conventional speech, but to speak

about issues that have matter in them, his care for maintaining a comprehensive look upon the academic activity in the Tel Aviv Campus, upon issues that could bring new light for his research.

Once uttered, the personal, intimate troubles are contrastively judged and objectified. The speaker is ready to receive the reader's/interpreter's verdict. A *confession of faith* is *meant* to 'challenge' the interlocutor, in a *virtual dialogue*. The hermeneutical mechanism is triggered and organised due to the two principles that govern the cognitive functions of consciousness: the principle of opposition, and the principle of transcendence.

The cognitive themes of dialectics – the contrast, the confrontation, the *principle of charity, being in the position of the other,* etc. evince the importance of the principle of opposition and its cognitive gain. The dialogue is not only the way of convincing or persuading the other, but the way the speaker wants to become conscious of the question that troubles himself. Frequently, Dascal mentions the retroactive character of the dialogical interventions, but in a different perspective than ours.

A more important cognitive function of the *other* is that of introducing the principle of transcendence. The subject of beliefs shares with his opponent, with the *other,* in *dialogue,* the same need of making possible the validation of a truth which has semantic roots and spiritual (moral) object of reference. In our opinion, the complex philosophy of the *other* – to which Professor Dascal has an important contribution – is inherently placed in the field of value. The question is: how to conceptualise it.

15.3.2. The reader's interpretation of the *speaker's meaning*

An act assumed by consciousness stands in the incidence
of an axiological category

The author's intellectual confession renders explicit *his* choice of reaching a clear-cut conceptual form of expression. The conceptualisation supplies a cognitive gain, by raising the issue from an empiric to a paradigmatic level. In our case, at this point, the *personal voice* of the author's consciousness interferes with the *voice of the scholar. The way* Professor Marcelo Dascal, the philosopher of controversy, conceives of the *conceptualisation* of a problematic matter is dialectically displayed: an open-to-critics inventory of facts, and then, the preparation of the theoretical synthesis.

We speak about *a confession of faith*, which has a value in itself, being a moral act. *A confession of faith* is performed in a virtual dialogue with an

'interlocutor'/the reader upon whom the responsibility of the evaluation lies.

The reader's interpretation of the *speaker's meaning* in confessions should go further than pragmatically explaining the speaker's discursive intentions. An evaluation of the *speaker's meaning* is absolutely necessary, in order to appreciate the authenticity of the confession. From the two principles mentioned above, the principle of transcendence is the most active. The evaluative interpretation performs a semantic transfer, from the empirical facts to the higher-ordered position of values. This operation can be equated with Grice's argument concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation,* a procedure for redistribution, but not the invention of properties. For example – properties accidentally meant for *humans* become properties of a new psychological type, called *persons,* as essential ones (Grice, 1991: 114).

When the confession is focused on intellectual themes – philosophical, etc. – the interpreter (both the speaker himself, with a higher power of self-determination, and the 'interlocutor') tries to reach a correct conceptualisation.

For instance, how to evaluate the dean's concerns? Are they proofs of a professional or a moral commitment? Do the dean's words mean only that he assumes all the difficulties his social/pragmatic duty require, or can one see the intellectual responsibility of an open-minded humanist in a old-new world through them?

The hermeneutical steps towards conceptualisation represent reflective acts, quite creative, that follow the 'dialectical programme' established by Dascal in his *ars disputandum.*

15.4. Instead of conclusions

Two questions:

1. In an explicit way, we adopted for our exegesis a *pragmatic & beyond* point of view. Consequently, how to define hermeneutics as against pragmatics, an extension or a higher theoretical movement?

When beliefs represent the previous step in the dialogical way to *episteme,* the process of their critical analysis belongs to pragmatics. When beliefs represent acts in consciousness, hermeneutics is the specific procedure of their 'rational' interpretation. Hermeneutics is the field inside which the disputed 'truth' has semantic nature.

2. In the last chapter we have made the affirmation that any act/fact assumed by consciousness inherently stands in the incidence of an axiological category. Consequently, does the axiological conceptualisation mean that any belief requires a part of the process of 'transcendantalisation de la pragmatique' (Dascal, 2000: 1376)?

Given the limits of our present exegesis, the answer is negative. In spite of the fact that the axiological determination of the *speaker's meaning* activates the principle of transcendence, the hermeneutical inquiry maintains its controversial character, on the higher level of the axiological metalanguage, without a 'tournure kantienne de cette question' (ibid*., 1376)*.

Notes

* The first printed form in the collective volume *Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication*, Dana Riesenfeld and Giovanni Scarafile (eds.). Berlin: Springer, 2013.

[1] See, in Dascal (1992: 41), his definition of the *speaker's meaning*: 'what is intended to be conveyed by the utterance'. See also note (7), below.

[2] We refer to the classical definition of strategic games, in conformity with which a *game* is an instance of cooperative behaviour, a contest conducted under prescribed rules that lead to conflict resolution.

[3] Dascal (1987; 1990), in his pragmatic procedure of interpretation, applies intertextual techniques: *cotextual* (the appeal to additional texts) and *contextual* (the appeal to situational data).

[4] By 'moral commitment' we mean a commitment assumed by consciousness.

[5] See Dascal's commentary about his recently published study *Art of controversy,* in Scarafile (2010: 11).

[6] See Dascal's explanation of Leibniz's syntagma *balance of reason,* or *image of scales,* in Scarafile (2010: 12).

[7] 'Yet, no matter how minor is its contribution (= literal meaning) to context, it seems to play a crucial role in the process of leading the hearer to the identification of the relevant items of contextual information, which have to be used in order to come up with an interpretation' (1987: 262).

[8] The poetic language could be an example of the ontological constitution of the poetic subject – speaker in language.

[9] Starting with Heidegger (1963), Gadamer (1976: 1977) and other philosophers, we developed our own hermeneutical point of view. For the constitution of doxastic truth see Amel (1999), for its conceptualisation (2008), and for its validation (2010).

Chapter Sixteen

The Synthetic Function of Doxastic Dialectics*

16.1. General remarks

1. The investigation has in focus the *synthetic mechanism of doxastic/belief dialectics* (the dialectics of persuasive truth[1]).

The participants' *bona fide* is the condition in virtue of which we are developing the investigation of doxastic dialectics, and, consequently, it excludes the premise that notices a *cleavage of justification*, as Kasher calls it[2] (1986); namely, it excludes any kind of contextually distorted utterances of belief.

In the chapter *Doxastic dialectics* (Part II), we have mentioned three theoretical functions of doxastic (belief) dialectics: the dissociative, the justificatory and the synthetic functions.

2. Having in view the subjective and rhetorical involvement of the persuasive truth, we find it profitable to approach the 'rationality' of doxastic thinking in phenomenological terms. With Husserl, *belief is a thetic act,* namely a 'speech act' in consciousness. Phenomenology acknowledges the cognitive priority of belief (Husserl, 1931, 301), a definition that supports our dissociative approach. From the cognitive point of view, the dissociative function proves its importance, because it establishes cognitive intervals between *belief, doxa* and *opinion.* In our previous studies the attention was especially focused on the mechanism of decidability in doxastic dialectics, by demonstrating that the justificatory procedure requires operations on the three levels mentioned above.

3. The present chapter, which has in focus only the synthetic mechanism of doxastic/belief dialectics, will approach a single aspect: *metaphysical transubstantiation.* We intend to explain, in personal terms, this idea which was mentioned by Grice (1991) and to which we have briefly made reference several times. Initially, the concept of *metaphysical transubstantiation* gave us the possibility to offer a general explanation of the *dialectical* mechanism of *doxa*. Grice's idea supported our hermeneutical argument: the semantic nature of the 'truth' of beliefs,

structured by antithetic rationality, gets persuasive prestige owing to a paradigmatic transfer: from a pragmatic paradigm to an axiological one. Due to the phenomenological perspective in which our enterprise approaches the doxastic dialectics, the concept of *metaphysical transubstantiation* will be treated inside the laboratory of the hermeneutical synthesis, which is the human consciousness. The *metaphysical transubstantiation* becomes the explanatory key of the meaning enquiry of beliefs, by revealing the rationality of the hermeneutical mechanism.

4. For a comprehensive understanding of the doxastic rationality, our demonstration will develop the thesis in conformity with which subjectivity acquires a cognitive dimension, progressively becoming conscious of it. In phenomenological terms, subjectivity represents the *origin* of the thinking activity. It holds the power of translating sensitive matters into intelligible ones. The beliefs' contents, experienced and assumed by the subject/the speaker in their consciousness, represent thetic acts (acts in consciousness). The reference to the *metaphysical transubstantiation* supports the phenomenological explanation of the MORAL OBJECT[3]. During the doxastic dialectics beliefs acquire objectivity.

If Grice's concept regarding *metaphysical transubstantiation* is conceived *in extenso*, the cognitive dialectics – meaning-oriented – goes through more than one operation of cognitive synthesis. The self-referentiality of belief is finally crystallised in the form of the MORAL SUBJECT (= self-consciousness), ontologically reoriented.

5. The deep logic of belief dialectics explains the dynamics of self-cognition.

16.2. Beliefs' structure of forces

16.2.1. Belief as a speech act

Looking backwards, to reach the origin of the *force* of belief, we discover the 'pragmatic dimension' of beliefs/opinions, in conformity with which we are entitled to say that beliefs have performative force. Two aspects are important to be mentioned: one regarding the subject who expresses their beliefs (utters their opinions), and another regarding the dialogue partner to whom the belief is confessed. In the pre-epistemic stage, the function of dialectics is to demonstrate that the affirmations contained by the subjects' beliefs are correct.

(1) I think/my impression is this child is *well developed* for his age.

When beliefs refer to a supersensible reality (the substance of values), a normal subject is extremely careful to justify their position as a locutor, and to explain the partner and to themselves what reason they have to affirm a certain opinion about a moral reality. The subject is ready to offer explanations that could support their utterance.

(2) (I believe) this boy is very *wise*: Do you know what he once said to me? *Errando discitur!* ('One learns by making mistakes!')
Does he know Latin?
I wonder less he uses Latin aphorisms – to give himself airs – but it is astonishing to see a child reflecting about his own behaviour, trying to improve it … etc.

The self-referentiality of the utterance that contains a belief is explained by the subjective dimension of beliefs. We plead for an *interpretative power* of subjective thinking which is governed by both pragmatic and introspective rationality. A rational speaker, conscious of the Principle of Uncertainty characterising doxastic thinking, becomes responsible for what they say. The speaker is a problematising subject. Their thinking, antithetically[4] developed, engenders a self-reflective attitude. While a (responsible) locutor tells something to somebody, their words are concomitantly oriented towards their own mind in order to measure the extension of the meaning they intend to formulate.

As we have already mentioned, with Husserl belief is a thetic act, namely a 'speech act' in consciousness. The dissociative function of dialectics stimulates the subjective reflection.

(3) This child knows very well what he wants: he has personality.
You think *personality* means to be *voluntary, self-willed* or *obstinate*?
I have said: He knows what he wants.
In my opinion, *personality* means to have *power of discernment.*
You mean *moral personality,* but there are people who have *pragmatic personality.*

In an axiological dispute, the subject's cognitive intention is stimulated by the partner's discursive position, helping them to clarify their own thoughts.

The 'ideal reality' of axiology becomes the object of a moral reflection, during which consciousness assumes the sense of this 'reality' by self-reference. We call the respective cognitive act/moral reflection, an inner experience, deprived from ethical involvement. The original power of self-reflection becomes performative: *cogito ergo sum ergo loquor.* That is our definition of *belief* (see Amel, 1999). The premise of the self-referentiality of beliefs motivates the conclusion that beliefs, as acts in consciousness, ensure the original burst of langue[5].

It is insufficient to say: 'beliefs affirm that and that'. The subject's self-referentiality engenders the subject's will to manifest himself and to 'impose' the meanings of their words on the dialogue partner. *Any belief has the intention to utter a verdict,* which means that beliefs have the illocutionary force to institute reality, a reality that should be followed or avoided. The illocutionary force of expressive acts is not contested, but their validity is. While during epistemic dialectics the principle of rationality requires proof which can validate the referential route of a verdict, during doxastic dialectics interlocutors appeal to semantic/ hermeneutic proofs, an enterprise which is not deprived of rationality. Hermeneutics can justify the subjective authority to promote a sense by four such proofs: original, paradigmatic, normative, generative[6]. In our prior studies about doxastic dialectics, we have developed some of them.

16.2.2. Dialectical proofs within doxastic cognition

(a) The *original proof is given* by the *self-referentiality* of the belief-speech act. 'To assume a sense' in consciousness means to promote a sense – by the 'authority' of being experienced in one's own mind.

(b) The *paradigmatic proof* is given the moment the principle of Uncertainty calls upon a principle of transcendence, when the self-reference of belief is raised to a categorical position, able to prepare its conceptualisation. The doxastic conceptualisation is a synthetic (or constitutive) operation, having a justificatory target. By arriving at this stage, the role of dialectics is to raise the dispute up to the metalanguage level (see the above example: 1 vs. 2, 3), in order to consolidate the paradigmatic grounds of believing by or in axiological categories. During this process the MORAL OBJECT may find its determination.

(4) What do you mean by *being wise,* with reference to a child? What do you precisely mean by *wisdom*?

The moral object becomes the *doxa's a posteriori referent*. The interval engendered by the dissociative function of dialectics between *doxa* and *belief* is temporarily recovered, due to the validity of paradigmatic proofs, but their validity is only probable. Doxastic dialectics is a creative not a regulative process. It is language dependent, and the *persuasive truth* remains a question of permanent meaning inquiry[7].

(c) The *normative proof* was less mentioned by us in our previous studies regarding doxastic dialectics. All the hermeneutic investigations that support the logic of *doxa*, namely that of the 'persuasive truth' of values, are normatively oriented. Categorical proofs extend hermeneutics by many associative operations, including even an inquiry of *Zeitgeist*. At this stage, doxastic dialectics tries to consolidate the axiological hierarchy, universally valid.

(d) What we mean by *generative proof* will be explained in the following chapter.

16.3. Metaphysical transubstantiation

16.3.1. Grice's argument

Grice's idea concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation* is an argument in favour of the *metaphysical objectivity* of values (Grice 1991: 35). It represents the procedure for the redistribution, but not the invention, of properties. For example – properties accidentally meant for *humans* become essential properties of a new psychological type called *persons* (cf. ibid., 114).

Grice's argument concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation* corresponds to what we define as being the *paradigmatical proof,* an argument regarding the axiological consciousness of a (speaking) subject. The way Grice demonstrates the objectivity of values is equivalent to our interpretation of the MORAL OBJECT, a transfer from a pragmatic quality into a phenomenological dimension of belief. Because belief is a cognitive act in consciousness, self-referentiality gains rational authority, able to validate the grounding arguments of value[8]. Our *original* and *paradigmatic arguments* represent the objectifying terms of belief, and they drive dialectics towards its semiotic stage. The process could be equated to Grice's *finalist* arguments. From this perspective, his demand for absolute values becomes rational. See below the stages of metaphysical defence, established by Grice.

1. (There are) cases in which a value concept ... is attached *originally,* or *directly* to a given bearer;
2. If the concept of value is to be authentic and not merely 'Pickwicking' in character, then it is required that it be supported by a kind of finality which extends beyond the 'overlap' with mechanistically substitutable finality;
3. That metaphysical houseroom found for the notion of absolute value is a *rational demand* (cf. Grice, 1991: 116–117).

16.3.2. The two levels of metaphysical transubstantiation

With Grice – who is looking for a proof that could support the objectivity of value – the *metaphysical transubstantiation* represents the transfer from *humans* to *persons.* In our interpretation, the relevance of that proof is *moral*, by its power to objectify the inner sense of human consciousness.

The 'persuasive truth' of supersensible reality could not be proved in another way other than by making it intelligible in the form of a conceptual synthesis. From a phenomenological point of view, the cognitive synthesis passes through two levels of *metaphysical transubstantiation*: conceptual (an axiologic category) and semiotic. Actually, there is more than one operation of transubstantiation: the axiological/moral sense leading to the sense of the *self,* the sense of *human condition* then the *existential* sense, culminating in a semiotic expression. From a comprehensive perspective about belief, the target of doxastic dialectics is not limited to the stage when the moral content is *objectified*. The MORAL OBJECT is transubstantiated into a MORAL SUBJECT (= the self-consciousness), which represents the becoming reality/object of the *self. The deep logic of belief dialectics explains the dynamics of self-cognition.* The rationality of this type of cognition, which examines a dynamic 'object', is given by a *generative proof.* Therefore*,* in this subchapter we shall extend the explanation in this direction.

(a) The *metaphysical transubstantiation* opens two dialectical movements, such as we have mentioned at the beginning of our commentary: one, trying to establish the clear conceptual definition of axiological ideas, and another, during which the formative impulse of consciousness is triggered. In both these directions, the subjects crystallise in their consciousness the conditions for a better evidence of self-referentiality. The synthesis of the *moral objects* (axiological ideas) could be considered, in Grice's terms, as *a rational demand*, in conformity with which the subjectivity becomes a *moral person.*

The major difficulty in bringing paradigmatical proof begins when the metaphysical transubstantiation acquires a phenomenological dimension. This is the moment when the categorical sense of a value is acquired by the subject's consciousness. The paradigmatical proof is a dilemmatic moment. The moment of *doxa*'s conceptualisation opens the 'inner infinity of the dialogue' – as Gadamer said, actually a metadialogue. During the metadialogue, the dialogue partners try to settle the semantic difference between similar concepts, having in view that each of them is relevant for a different level of consciousness (psychological vs. spiritual; temperamental vs. spiritual etc.).

(5) What is the difference between *pride* and *dignity*?
    What is the difference between the *polemic inflammation* and the *intellectual passion?*

The correct conceptualisation of *doxa* is hindered by frequent hesitations with reference to particular situations. In the collective mentality these metadialogues are considered 'semantic exercises', but actually they are phenomenological tests. Due to the conceptual oppositions displayed during doxastic dialectics, the subjects' moral reflection establishes level oppositions – in usual terms called 'values hierarchy' – helping to crystallise the structure of the *self*. The subject, in this hermeneutical inquiry, should be prepared to avoid social prejudices, which are very 'persuasive', because otherwise the hermeneutical effort would be deprived of moral relevance.

(6) In the Romanian public mentality, deeply infused by a specific scepticism called *băşcălie* (a kind of *tongue in cheek in* English), a self-controlled responsible person is qualified as an idiot, a conformist fellow.

Doxa, as a concept, represents the linguistic shape of the supersensible object of value, the *idea* that this concept should name. Frequently, doxastic concepts are mistakenly defined, even mixed up with *dogma,* because of a lack of clear distinction between philosophy and ideology. For a correct definition of the value ideas, doxastic dialectics opens its large field of debates, all trying to consolidate the moral and spiritual representation of life[9].

(b) Generally speaking, the metaphysical transubstantiation has spiritual fundaments. Subjectivity is a moral agent, having the power to spiritualise the life people live in. The effort to establish the clear

inventory of abstract concepts has more than a 'logical' target, that of offering authoritative arguments for individual definitions.

(7) When we are listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, the following question may be asked: Does it express a *Teutonic/heroic feeling* or does it open a *metaphysical/sublime vision*? The real question regards the two opposite concepts, the meaning of which is developed in the mind.

The formative structure of consciousness is intentionally SELF-oriented. The MORAL OBJECTS become the inner objects of reference, due to which the MORAL SUBJECT finds its structural fundaments and acquires objectivity. The world of the Ego is in continuous extension. The moral becoming is looking for a *sense*/a direction in life. There is a natural tendency to get an answer to the big existential mystery, a cognitive process that includes art into it, even the entire human creation. The art productions are considered the *generative proof* of believing, the highest step of understanding, inside which the consciousness is crystallised in a symbolic vision. The figurative meanings associated with each name of contiguous objects represent only the beginning. The human language reflects this tendency.

(8) *Bridge, door* or *window, circle, light and darkness, different animals,* etc.

These examples are part of a long series of symbols to which the mythical thinking makes reference. Subjectivity is cognitively troubled to decode the language of life, as the poet said: *to read the world and to understand it.* 'To read the world' by inventing scenarios, allegories, cryptograms, etc., means to find an interpretative language that has *generative power,* due to which *doxa* extends its moral dimension. The human 'second play' is the symbolic form which concentrates the *idea* of the human condition and in which the contiguous first game (= the everyday life) reveals its meaning.

The formative power of subjectivity was largely debated by art criticism. Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* offers the best argument of what we define as the *semiotic transubstantiation* of the axiological universe. The Romanian philosopher, Gabriel Liiceanu, begins his complex analysis of the semiotic nature of art productions with a definition of the *symbol* in the same terms we have explained metaphysical transubstantiation.

Each general consideration regarding symbolic productions is compelled to consider the double foundation of symbolic work in the human mind: *the need to visualise the abstract and the need to transcend the visible* (2005: 7).

In the same book, we have found an argument regarding the objectifying function of the symbolic forms. The artist, by his introspection, is able to instantiate the inner perception. Liiceanu, based on the book of Börsch-Supan/Jähnig, *Caspar David Friedrich,* München, 1973: 14, says:

> The problem in these pictures isn't what the characters, hypnotised by the horizon, actually see, but what we see, looking at them. And we see what Friedrich says: 'The look which transpierces the profoundness of the landscape is turning back towards the inner self' (of the person who is looking, and whom we see from behind) (p.190).

A superficial explanation may say that the metaphysical transubstantiation leading to symbolic forms is due to a linguistic transfer, from a referential (literal) language to a semiotic (figurative) one. From the cognitive point of view, the symbolic forms wrap up the beliefs in such a way that the deep vision receives ontological substance. The synthetic power of symbolic forms has several degrees of concentration, in conformity with the subject's cognitive clear-sightedness. The most important thing that occurs during the semiotic transubstantiation is the creative effort to reach the level of exemplariness. The metaphysical transubstantiation is part of a subjective dynamics, governed by the same principle of rationality which, during the epistemic process of the *creation of theoretical models,* affirms: the 'theoretical model' should be *consistent* (in our terms 'relevant'), *exhaustive* ('comprehensive') and *simple* ('concise').

It is the moment to remember what Hjelmslev said (1947: 11) referring to the goal of a scientific theory:

> The *aim of a theory* is to elaborate a procedure in conformity with the principles of the theory ... The description shall be *free of contradiction* (self-consistent), *exhaustive* and as *simple* as possible. (p. 11)

The *generative proof* offers the authority or stand under the authority of an interpretative key – a doxastic archetype. The semiotic force of a doxastic archetype is the result of a gradual synthesis operated within the moral contents.

16.4. Conclusions

The synthetic/constitutive function of *doxastic dialectics*, more than the other two – dissociative and justificatory – ensures the ontological fundaments of ethics and aesthetics. The moral sense represents an immanent condition of beliefs, their *ontological density*. A comprehensive view about Grice's concept allows us to see the formative will of subjectivity to get an integrated vision of life in the process of the metaphysical *transubstantiation*. The inner necessity of the Ego to crystallise its *self* represents the cognitive challenge of Man's consciousness. In creating a virtual image of the human condition, the subjectivity has the power to project, in conceptual and semiotic forms, a 'reality' of a second degree.

16.4.1. Belief as a reason to adopt a certain attitude (social or metaphysical)

This seems to be a pragmatic axiom. If we reopen the commentary about the beliefs' structure of forces, the 'rationality' of the projecting power of beliefs becomes obvious (a *persuasive truth)*.

'I believe in the power of ideas to change things' (Dascal, quoted in Scarafile, 18).

From the philosophical perspective, Marcelo Dascal's words and many similar formulations emphasise the point where beliefs and behaviour are connected: *I believe (my belief is) … ideas (beliefs) have force.*

The transubstantiation of the pragmatic sense into the moral sense/object represents only the beginning of a complex synthesis of the *moral subject* (= the 'object' of self-consciousness)*. The competence of subjectivity to establish a clear definition of values and their hierarchical disposition is part of the becoming process of the *self*. The *final cause* of self-consciousness is to be able to refer to oneself as being a *categorical* instance looking for a *sense* in life, for a direction, for a correct *ethical* action.

The opposition *moral object vs. moral subject* presented above is not identical with Grice's opposition *human vs. person*, but represents a cognitive extension of Grice's *rational demand.* The cognitive gain, offered by the synthetic function during the double *metaphysical transubstantiation,* emphasises the power of subjectivity to be the 'point' of an active articulation of thinking. One should not neglect that the synthetic function of doxastic dialectics has normative consequences. After a serious confrontation between generative and normative proofs, the

MORAL SUBJECT acquires ethical legitimacy. Whether this legitimacy is disputable or not is another theoretical/ philosophical problem.

16.4.2. To read the world and to understand it

This is an intuitive remark of spontaneous hermeneutics. With this formulation we are in the neighbourhood of the Heideggerian hermeneutics, which was the point of departure of the approach we have chosen regarding *doxastic dialectics.*

Our argumentation in favour of a progressive abstraction of *doxa,* encourages the idea that the laic hermeneutics of beliefs is a 'rational' way to follow the *persuasive truth.* An interesting similarity between the laic hermeneutics of *doxa* – developed by us through several metaphysical transubstantiations – and the hermeneutics of sacred texts, supports the same conclusion. See the way the Judaic hermeneutics explains the meaning of the sacred texts:

The Judaic hermeneutics of *Torah* (the *Bible*) establishes four methods of interpretation, all united under the acronym **pardas**: *pshat* – plain (interpretation), *remez* – allusive (a kind of 'intertextuality'), *drush* – homiletic and *sod* – esoteric[10].

Notes

[1] The conceptual power of the syntagma *persuasive truth* struck us while reading Parmenide's *Poem* (I, 28–30): 'You must hear about all things, both the still heart of persuasive truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true conviction.'

[2] 'There is a *cleavage of justification.* The speaker may be asked both for the grounds of their *belief,* that what they have asserted does hold, and for the reasons they have had for saying what they believe to be the case.' (Kasher 1986: 286). See also Amel (1994(a)). Pragmatic reasons (such as the *cleavage of justification*), and especially phenomenological ones determine us to mention the theoretical importance of the *dissociative function* of doxastic dialectics (Amel, 1999) (see further on).

[3] This is the moment of intersection between pragmatics and phenomenology. Due to this intersection, the philosopher establishes the point where the argumentative intentionality is related to the cognitive intentionality (see here the phenomenological concept of intentionality: 'It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something' Husserl, 1931: 119) The inner experience of meaning becomes a rational entity – an OBJECT – for/in consciousness.

[4] The antithetic thinking is a structural function of both rationality and perception. See Gadamer's remark about Socrates' art of conversing: 'an exercise of thinking in opposites' (1980: 93). See also the eloquent title of Jacqueline Sudaka-Bénazéraf's book about Paul Klee's illustrations to Voltaire's writings, *Car le blanc seul n'est rien*.

[5] 'Language is the House of Being/Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins' (See Heidegger, *Humanismus*, 1957: 24; 1959: 166), cf. Heidegger (1976: 313): 'Im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch.'

[6] In this theoretical context, *generative* is meant in a Chomskian and not an Aristotelian sense (See the Aristotelian four causes of a phenomenon: generative, formative, final and material).

[7] 'There is a productive ambiguity, the multiplicity of interrelated aspects of meaning, which articulates the field of knowing' (Gadamer, 1980: 111). See also: Gadamer's interest regarding the Platonic turn to discourse (ibid., Gadamer's affirmation 'le dialogue en tant que démarche herméneutique' (1976: 229)), and Gadamer's general idea about the 'inner infinity of the dialogue'.

[8] The cognitive power of self-referentiality can be proved by Heidegger's affirmation regarding the foundational position of subjectivity: 'Die Subiectivität ist die wesenhafte Gesetzlichkeit der Gründe, welche die Möglichkeit eines Gegenstandes zu reichen kann' (1977: 137).

[9] 'Inevitably, a doxastic philosopher is a prisoner of language. The provisional scheme of interpretation (when opinions are delivered) cannot overcome the argumentative ability of the thinker, and, consequently, the *persuasive truth* is frequently obscured by preconceived meanings that are associated to basic concepts' (Amel, 1999: 11). See also Gadamer's philosophy concerning the hermeneutical circle (1976: 1977).

[10] HaRav Menachem Hacohen, *Introduction,* (1996: 5). See also *What is common to all the faces of Torah is their beauty, which gratifies those who want to enjoy the fruits of the tree of knowledge and breathe the flavour of the pardes of Torah* (ibid.).

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

PETITIO PRINCIPII*

With reference to doxastic/belief dialectics

The present intervention tries to settle a problem opened in this book, in the chapter *Listening and the well-tempered controversy*[1]: 'The premises of axiological judgement are searched within a 'language horizon' already given and simultaneously explored. This is a case where *petitio principii* is not a fallacious way of thinking'.

17.1. Introductory explanation

17.1.1. About petitio principii

Petitio principii is a rhetorical form of argumentation, which, in accordance with the argument criticism, is considered fallacious. The proper meaning of *petitio principii* is that of begging the question of an argumentation, the conclusion being based on an assumption that is itself in need of being proved or demonstrated (See Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, 2010: 156–157).

Douglas Walton, in his book *Informal Fallacies,* considers *petitio principii* an informal fallacy, because it might be logically and formally valid, but by analysing the grounding argument one proves its inconsistency. For instance:

(1) I believe in the existence of God, because the Bible teaches us about that, and the Bible is the word of God.

I recently heard that God is a female being.
No, I don't believe it!
Why not?
Because his name is *Dumnezeu/God*, a male name! (= masculine name)[2]

Walton's criticism dealing with so-called informal fallacies has proved much analytical flexibility. Within the argumentation chain – said the philosopher – the detection of informal fallacies is more complicated than can be explained by the traditional deductive logical interpretation. In his criticism of argumentation, Walton's intention was to uncover instances in which the argument, allegedly 'fallacious', may be correct/or at least not unreasonable. 'The would-be "fallacies" are not always fallacious' (see Walton 1987: 4; Amel 1999: 340).

During our demonstration referring to the functions and development of doxastic dialectics, we were confronted with a 'fluctuant premise' – that of *subjectivity* – which engenders the argumentative inconvenient of the *petitio principii* type. With the intention of finding a reasonable answer to the problem of argumentative circularity in doxastic dialectics, the opinion we had about the respective issue (namely regarding the *petitio principii* structure of doxastic dialectics) met Walton's conclusion about the existence of 'not always fallacious fallacies'. In contradistinction with Walton, whose pragmatic criticism follows a semantic-based procedure in order to avoid the immersion of psychology in his theory, we have adopted a phenomenological procedure in 'begging the question' of subjectivity. From the perspective of the issue we are interested in – with reference to doxastic dialectics, our question is whether the *petitio principii* structure of the dialogue is engendered by the paradoxical nature of subjectivity or not.

17.1.2. About paradox

Paradox is generally understood in different ways: as a figure of speech, as a spiritual state, as attitude, existential vision or as multiple ways of admitting the cognitive value of equivocal things. From the point of view of the present argument, *paradox* represents the cohabitation of contrary elements in a single functional unity.

Nota bene: Not the all paradoxical manifestations of subjectivity lead to *petitio principii*.

17.1.3. About doxastic dialectics

A deeper interest in that field of doxastic dialectics compelled us to bring a rectification to the first version of the thesis concerning subjectivity, presented above, by affirming that the target of doxastic dialectics is to find the *grounds of subjectivity* while establishing the grounds of axiology, which sounds extremely paradoxical.

17.2. About doxastic subjectivity

17.2.1. Belief vs. doxa vs. opinion

If I say to somebody:

(3) *The Song of the Earth,* composed by Gustav Mahler, reaches sublimity.

I am of another opinion, comes the reply of my interlocutor. Actually, what do you mean by 'sublimity'? Is that an aesthetic criterion?

'Doxastic dialectics' does not refer to conflicts which regard the correct evaluation of particular things. The above quoted example or other disputable situations as, for instance, if a certain piece of art is beautiful or if a certain person is brave, etc. are examples of disputes that precede doxastic dialectics. During doxastic dialectics, the arguers reach the metadialogical level of the controversy, trying to find grounding arguments for their particular propositions. Our interest was to follow the dialectical process of doxastic conceptualisation, the dialectical effort being to define those doxastic concepts (*doxa*), with regard to which the arguers may justify their evaluative affirmations. Without extending the commentary about what 'exploring the grounds of axiology' means, two things should be mentioned:

(a) The axiological universe has ontological dimension – this can be considered an axiom;
(b) In order to understand the grounds of axiology, a phenomenological explanation of the relationship between *belief* and the general concept of *value* (*doxa*) is useful.

There is a complex dialectical labour of dissociating *belief* (an act or a content by which the idea of value is posited in consciousness) from *doxa* (the conceptual representation of the idea of value in reason) and from *opinion* (the belief's discursive and contingent form). Due to this dissociation, it is easier for the philosopher to stress the cognitive specificity of beliefs and to establish the agentive function of subjectivity. Subjectivity has an important role in the procedure of meaning elucidation of value ideas, a procedure which is stimulated by interactive movements, but not limited to them. Each arguer is trying to 'understand' what, for instance, 'sublimity', 'beauty', 'human courage', 'liberty', etc. mean. *Doxastic cognition represents the meaning constitution of beliefs in the subject's consciousness. Belief is a subject-oriented concept.*

The phenomenological interpretation of beliefs allows us to admit that the supersensible 'reality' of the axiological universe is inherent to human existence. The subjective inherence of values is gradually conceptualised by dialectical movements. Due to the ambivalence (existential and axiological) of the human being, subjectivity manifests its paradoxical function: that of being concomitantly interactive and introspective. Values cannot be defined otherwise than by introspection, but their conceptualisation engages the constitutive process of *doxa,* interactively (= pragmatically) stimulated[3].

By dissociating *belief* from *opinion,* the paradoxical nature of *doxastic subjectivity* (and of subjectivity in general) becomes evident: the fact that the interactive relationship triggers a self-reflecting process. While, in a dispute, the *belief* of the speaker/subject is questioned by the interlocutor, the speaker/subject develops in their mind the meaning of what they believe, they open in their mind a 'space' of understanding, which is different from the pragmatic sense of the *opinion*. The ontological dimension of the mind engenders the need to transform the illocutionary intentionality (= the pragmatic/dialectical intentionality) into cognitive intentionality, due to which the Ego is self-oriented and stimulated to objectify the content and the limits of its belief. During the phenomenological turn of pragmatics, the philosopher can discover another aspect of the same paradoxical feature of subjectivity, that of being concomitantly subject and object.

The conceptualisation of doxastic categories has a hierarchical structure, which is progressively objectified in the subject's consciousness.

> (4) *No day like today*! – says somebody every day.
>   We can translate that as *Carpe diem!*
>   No! Horace's words have a *pragmatic* sense: to enjoy the present!
>   The words you quoted mean almost the same thing.
>   No! There is an exclamation of *wonder*. The *wonder* of being *alive*, of being *present*. The speaker realises *the burst of the present!* as Heidegger said.

During the introspective mechanism, both arguers follow their own way in assuming a certain *doxa* (as in the example quoted above: a pragmatic or an ontological concept). The interpretative reasons 'reflect' the cultural horizon of subjectivity. While establishing the grounds of axiology, doxastic dialectics finds the *grounds of subjectivity*. Due to some steps of *metaphysical transubstantiations,* using Grice's concept (1989), the doxastic meaning posited in consciousness is transubstantiated into a

moral meaning, which finally is equated with an existential meaning, and so on (see Amel 2014). Both arguers assume in their consciousness a particular axiological axis which objectifies for each of them the meaning of their own self. From the phenomenological point of view, *Man* (the subject) *is what he believes (in)*.

Belief is a mental activity of reflection, never saturated in its meaning. Why 'never saturated in its meaning'? This is the main question, the answer of which could neutralise the idea regarding the **petitio principii structure of doxastic dialectics** (see the following chapter).

17.2.2. Different approaches to subjectivity

(a) See Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*: 'Die Subjektivität ist nichts subjektives in dem Sinne daß damit nur das auf einen eizelnen Menschen Beschränkte, das zufälliger seiner Besonderheit und Beliebigkeit gemeint sein könnte' (p.137). With Heidegger, subjectivity is not a category of being, but a possibility condition of the ontological categories (2006: 215). Subjectivity has the quality of being the original grounds of reflective acts, as Heidegger mentioned it: 'Die Subiektivität ist die wesenhafte Gesetzlichkeit der Gründe, welche die Möglichkeit eines Gegenstandes zu reichen kann' (*ibid.*). Heidegger extends the philosophical interpretation of subjectivity, in contrast to the three aspects mentioned by Kant: psychological, transcendental and moral subjectivity.

(b) Pragmatics refers to subjectivity in its quality of a *psychological* concept, which cannot ensure the universal force of judgements.

(c) Doxastic subjectivity, to which our commentary makes reference, is 'a possibility condition' (*condition de possibilité*) to have a belief, and consequently it is a larger concept than the *transcendental* subjectivity.

Doxastic subjectivity represents the *origin* of thinking and reflection. Given the axiological inherence, *belief* is that particular form of getting the sense of one's own self and the process of objectifying the inherence (the axiological dimension of reality) is engendered. In non-philosophical 'literature', the cognitive effort of the *self* to define itself is a natural process, as *Bildungsliteratur* or *Journal literature* might prove it: the Ego tries to understand itself, to 'meet itself'[4], to understand the meaning of life and the direction towards which its life is moving on.

17.2.3. Moral subjectivity

Our approach of 'moral subjectivity' (see the concepts: *moral object* and *moral subject*)[5] has no connection with that of Kant. In our approach,

'moral' refers to the introspective universe of the subject. Subjectivity is a sense-giving agent. The last affirmation explains the paradoxical affirmation: the target of doxastic dialectics is to find the *grounds of subjectivity* while establishing the grounds of axiology.

17.4. *Petitio principii* structure of doxastic dialectics

17.4.1. Doxastic rationality

In our doxastic research, we have advanced and tried to demonstrate the rationality of doxastic dialectics, by presenting its probatory process in virtue of four types of proof: original, paradigmatic, normative and generative (see Amel, 2014 and the respective chapter above).

As a general rule, the dialectical rationality should offer relevant proof capable of supporting a certain thesis. If a *petitio principii* fallacy is detected during the process of argumentation, the dialectical procedure is miscarried. Doxastic dialectics, in this respect, makes an exception. Some particularities should be mentioned. The false impression that **doxastic dialectics has the structure of *the petitio principii* type** is engendered by the paradoxical way the axiological cognition is reached: on the one hand, *the target of doxastic dialectics is to find the grounds of subjectivity by establishing the grounds of axiology*, and on the other hand, *subjectivity represents the grounding/ original proof of axiology*.

In the philosophical sense, the Ego acknowledges itself as the grounds of its determinants, and as grounds of its self-identity. Consequently, doxastic cognition is dependent on the particular way subjectivity ensures the logical development of belief dialectics: subjectivity is looking for a principle of transcendence – a concept of categorical order – in virtue of which the founding acts of reflection are validated and the argumentative proofs are justified *a posteriori*.

By cumulating the above-mentioned functions, subjectivity is able to generate authentic intelligible acts even though they are never meaning saturated. A conflict remains open between the concept of categorical order (= transcendental principle) that governs the doxastic acts and the content of belief posited in mind. This interval is permanently questioned.

The cognitive subjectivity is interrogative and paradoxical by nature.

17.4.2. The goal of the present study

Our theoretical effort is to demonstrate that instead of considering the *petitio principii* structure of doxastic dialectics, a shortcoming of belief

cognition, one should consider it the dialectical way the subject understands himself and gets the sense of life. By assuming the categorical order of *doxa* as self-defining, doxastic cognition gains a reference horizon. The subject is 'on the way to language'. Once 'a horizon' is open in front of the subject, they uncover the sense, the *order* within which they exist, being able to name it and to transfer the nature into culture (to realise how the natural values are *metaphysically transubstantiated* into spiritual ones).

We should remember the following: The philosophical concept of subjectivity is associated with that of *consciousness. The consciousness* is the space within which the meaning of beliefs becomes the 'object' of an interpretative/argumentative procedure. By assuming the meaning of beliefs, consciousness realises its spiritual transubstantiation.

Doxastic dialectics follows a rational procedure, with a modified justificatory proof:

1. The maxim of relevance should be substituted by the self-justificatory proof of subjectivity;
2. The maxim of relevance should be confronted with the normative proof, usually in the form of *Zeitgeist*.

17.4.3. Subjectivity as an original proof

It is difficult to admit that doxastic dialectics can offer an original proof of subjectivity. There is no *zero point* of subjectivity. Such pragmatic evidence invalidates the original proof and might lead to **petitio principii**. From the philosophical point of view, we have another explanation of the original act. Here we have a paradoxical example:

(5) 'I declare not having other biological genitors/ than the cleavage of this poem/ with an exclamation mark' [6]

With these last lines of the poem *Genealogy,* the poet and philosopher Bădiliță excludes, in a metaphorical way, any a priori determination of 'his being'. The poem *uncovers* the 'split' existing between words, opening the vision of an exclamation mark – *to split with wonder. The wonder* is the grounding act posited in consciousness. The original act of belief is void of linguistic meaning, like silence, but once the *wonder* 'is posited in consciousness', one's subjectivity is waiting for the possibility to name the belief which is *in statu nascendi.*

The distance which is opened between the cognitive intentionality and its objectified form reminds us of the controversial issue regarding the *non-arbitrariness of the linguistic sign,* a controversy originated in Socrates' question about the *Orthótes tōn onomáton* – 'the correctness of names'. From the phenomenological point of view, cognitive intentionality is the grounding moment of belief which opens in consciousness the space of the meaning debates. From the philosophical point of view, it is less important that *subjectivity* is a problematic instance (being never sure about its own nature) than the conscious source of *understanding*.

The *belief constitution* entails the constitutive process of consciousness with its entire *interrogative rhetoric*. The fundamental interrogation that troubles the subject's consciousness regards the ontological justification of subjectivity. If we consider this ontological justification being *ein Satz (der Satz vom Grund)*, we might be in a *petitio principii* difficulty. But to the extent to which belief is assumed by the subject as being the content posited in their consciousness (a *noetic* act), then we have sufficient reason for its authenticity.

The last affirmation offers the explanation of why even aberrant beliefs could be motivated as being authentically experienced.

17.4.4. Subjectivity in the search of language

Knowledge is language dependent, the belief is included.

Doxastic subjectivity is a sense-giving agent. It gains progressively formative power, capable of crystallising the meaning posited in consciousness and to adopt a certain conceptualised form of belief (the *doxa*). The ontological dimension of belief is transubstantiated into an intelligible one. The transubstantiation force of subjectivity makes from *belief* a *connecting link* between existential content and intelligible (linguistic or semiotic) form. Subjectivity, as a *gear mechanism*, uncovers its paradoxical nature, being an intersection point between phenomenological and pragmatic dimensions.

The three functions of doxastic dialectics: dissociative, justificatory and constitutive, analysed above (and in Amel, 1999), have only theoretical relevance, because at any moment of the dialectical process, the connection between *belief, doxa* and *opinion* is present. The philosopher puts the right emphasis on one aspect or another. Now, we are at the (theoretical) moment when *belief* – under the form of *a 'volonté cognitive'* – is in search of *expression* (= language). Like in the phrase *to have it on the tip of one's tongue,* when belief is in search of expression, the

dialectical moment opens a large space for rhetoric and the ontological subjectivity 'regains' its pragmatic dimension. The self-justificatory acts of the subject, that substitute the pragmatic maxim of relevance, have less argumentative power. Consequently, the doxastic rationality, in lack of original proof, calls for normative proof, the relevance of which should be accepted by both arguers. As the normative choice itself is subjective, the distinction between normative or deforming means is difficult to make. The principle of transcendence, which is raised for justifying the evaluative acts, 'reflects' the interpretative power of the person who makes the evaluation, the choice depending on their cultural horizon or their spiritual consciousness. The hermeneutical process frequently leads to errors of categorisation. For instance, in the example analysed above, how do you define the attitude of a 90-year-old woman who is deeply involved in writing an essay about a certain issue. Her attitude could be interpreted referring to several IDEAs of value: that of stubbornness, of intellectual devotion or of a noble strength, the concurrence being between psychological, moral or spiritual dimensions. When doxastic dialectics regains the pragmatic frame, the *normative proof* becomes a negotiable measure.

Remark: When we speak about the meaning 'posited in consciousness' and not about the concept 'posited in reason' (*doxa*), the transcendental categories of judgement are constitutive operations, dependent on the choice of the pertinence marks (as for instance, the known concepts taken from the German philosophical literature: *Zeitgeist, Erlebnis, Erfahrung, Umwelt etc.)*. As the relevance of the respective indexes is not obvious (it is a question of belief!) their normative function opens a debate caught within an interpretative circle, named by Schleirmacher, Heidegger and after him, by Gadamer, a *hermeneutical circle*.

With Heidegger, t**he hermeneutical circle** does not represents a vicious circle, but reflects the way the relevance of understanding is obtained: by anticipation and construction. *Heidegger says that the circularity of 'understanding' cannot be avoided.* 'Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have understood what it is to be interpreted' (Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 1973: 194). Interpretation presupposes a priori 'structures'. Heidegger calls them 'potentialities-for-Being'.

If we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways to avoid it, even if we just sense it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up. (Heidegger, 1973: 194)

By 'translating' Heidegger's words, we may say the following: the distance between *original* and *discursive language* is never completely covered, and the opposition between the language which is originally given and the acquired language is never clear. During sense-giving acts, consciousness reaches moments of self-saturation and substitutes genuine acts by 'normative' ones (which actually are conventional meanings). Inevitably, each act of reference to the IDEA of Being (signs of second-degree, axiological signs) is a reference to a preconceived idea. All understanding is prejudicial.

Remark: The 'hermeneutical circle' is structurally susceptible of being distorted by the vicious movement of **petitio principii**.

Meaning anticipation is a cognitive reference.

We make no advance restriction upon the concept of 'meaning' which would confine it to signifying the 'content of judgement'', but we understand it as the existential phenomenon already characterised, in which the formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding, and articulated in interpretation becomes visible (Heidegger, ibid., 156).

The retro movement towards an a-perceptive ground ensures the intuitive possibility to project a sense on a temporal scale and to protect the unclear content of belief from receiving an improper expression. Both interlocutors, rhetorically manipulating their *opinions* (the discursive language), try to mediate the relationship between *belief* and *doxa* in a dialogue during which the cultural tradition is consolidated as a **system of reference.**

Gadamer explains the concept of a *hermeneutical circle* in a relationship with the natural dynamics of **tradition** as equilibrium between *Bewährung* (confirmation) and *Bewahrung* (preservation).

17.5. Conclusions

The **petitio principii** structure of doxastic dialectics is caused by the paradoxical nature of subjectivity. On the one hand, *the target of doxastic dialectics is to find the grounds of subjectivity by establishing the grounds of axiology*, and on the other hand, *subjectivity represents the grounding/ original proof of axiology*.

The axiological concern of subjectivity is to crystallise and to objectify the inner sense of the Ego: (a) being concomitantly subject and object; (b) being *a posteriori* and not a priori rationalised; and (c) the most important of all, being the agent and object of a *metaphysical transubstantiation*.

If we want to translate the noumenal dynamics of consciousness in discursive elements, the authentic experience of value is only a partial explanation.

1   During self-reflective acts of consciousness, language, historically acquired, **approaches the House of Being, but the house is never reached.**
2   The reference to transcendental principles (reference systems), in spite of their justificatory power, remains a subjective choice. For a critical mind, the normative power of the *Zeitgeist,* or of the tradition, or of any other reference system represents a challenge to open a dialogical inquiry in order to reach dialogical legitimacy.
3   The legitimacy of those concepts of value which are invoked as reference systems is debatable for both reasons: as original proof and as normative proof as well.

The hermeneutical interpretation is and remains under dialogical debate, in both directions: phenomenological and pragmatic.

Notes

[1] `*Listening* and the well-tempered controversy (with reference to intercultural exchange)', *XXII World Congress of Philosophy (International Association for the Study of Controversies*), 4–10 August 2013, Athens.
[2] The example is taken from a Romanian TV investigation.
[3] It is philosophically important to have in mind Emmanuel Levinas' definition of subjectivity. In his book *Totalité et infini, Essai sur l'extériorité*, 1971, Levinas emphasises the necessity to define the concept of *subjectivity* by starting with the principle of reciprocity: *subjectivity* as the *consciousness of the other.* In Levinas' definition, the theoretical frame – which is not structural (= la *totalité),* neither pragmatic (the communication), but transcendent (= l'*infini)* – represents the dominant category. The *consciousness of the other* is a variable parameter on a scale continuously improved.
'Ce livre présentera la subjectivité comme accueillant Autrui; comme hospitalité: En elle se consomme l'idée de l'infini: L'intentionnalité, où la pensée reste

adéquation à objet, ne définit donc pas la conscience à son niveau fondamental. Tout savoir en tant qu'intentionnalité suppose déjà l'idée de l'infini, *l'inadéquation* par excellence' (p.12). The philosophical definition given by Levinas could be considered a response to our interpretation of the 'original' proof used in belief dialectics.

[4] A great Romanian artist said some time before his death: 'Finally, I met myself "at the corner"!'

[5] See Amel (1999 and, especially, 2014 and the respective chapter above).

[6] 'Declar a nu avea alţi strămoşi biologici/decât despicătura acestui poem/ cu semn de exclamare!' The last lines of the poem *Genealogy*, by the Romanian poet, philosopher and hermeneutist of the Bible, now living in Paris.

AFTERWORD

Questioning the axiomatic principles is no more a contradiction in terms. Modern philosophers of science, Albert Einstein among them, established the relative status of foundational propositions of any paradigm. In spite of the paradigmatic relativity, the axiomatic principles do not lose their constitutive role.

The progressive axiomatisation of sciences and the constitution of theoretical paradigms in many fields of research entitle us to adopt this method and try its validity in the analysis of *doxa* – the domain we are interested in. '*Doxa,* though it is the general word for 'belief', tends to carry with it the hidden, but sometimes operative implication, that the belief in question is an assessment of something' (Crombie 1963: 33–34).

The intention of speaking about the paradigmatic structure of *doxa* was explicitly manifested by Gianni Vattimo (1993: 90–108) and probably by many other philosophers. Consequently, it is not necessary to supply more proof in supporting our theoretical position. It is important to emphasise that the paradigmatic analysis of *doxa* is, from our point of view, a method rather than a theory, part of the interlocutors' critical device. The formal criteria of a theoretical paradigm – coherence, concision and exhaustiveness, as expressed by Kuhn (1970: 1976), represented our methodological choice in the research of the doxastic field: the points where the cooperative and rational principles of doxastic argumentation can be critically examined, intuitively by interlocutors, explicitly by theoreticians.

The dialectical method, moved on by means of critical arguments, suits the doxastic field for two reasons:

(1) Doxastic dialectics opens conditions for an alternative truth, semantically constituted, not analytically proved;
(2) Doxastic dialectics is the exclusive procedure by means of which the fundaments of axiological ontologies can be established.

We have defined the *axiological paradigm* as the multitude of empirically axiological propositions (judgements of value, practical decisions, norms, orders, etc.) that can be reduced to a *doxa concept.* According to our expressed opinion, the basic *doxastic/*axiological meaning is crystallised in the form of a general definition which grounds

an ensemble of propositions in a coherent, concise and exhaustive way. Paradigmatic analysis of *doxa* refers to traditionally formulated doxastic categories.

Given the subjective nature of *belief,* two cognitive consequences should be mentioned: to consider subjectivity a proof for the truth of a belief, and to consider subjectivity a reason (= a normative objectivity) for adopting a certain behaviour.

As the title of the book alludes, the study comes as a tangent to Kant's third criticisms, *Kritik der Urteilskraft,* observing the Kantian division of judgements into *determinative* and *reflective,* with their respective definitions. However, the real object of the present study belongs to the field of pragmatics.

At the beginning of our exploration of doxastic (belief) field (Amel, 1999), we took for granted the cognitive autonomy of an alternative to epistemic truth, that of doxastic truth, which we call the *persuasive truth*. In contrast with the epistemic truth, which represents the logical determination of *episteme*, the doxastic truth represents the ontological density of *doxa*, intelligibly perceived in its meaning. Regarding the field of investigation – in our opinion, doxastic dialectics does not refer to the pre-epistemic stage of truth, but is limited to the field of supersensible reality (the 'reality' of values), a meaning-oriented cognition. In order to reach a RATIONAL BASE of a doxastic field, the notion of SUBJECTIVITY followed Heidegger's philosophical conception: 'Die Subjektivität ist nichts subjektives in dem Sinne daß damit nur das auf einen eizelnen Menschen Beschränkte, das zufälliger seiner Besonderheit und Beliebigkeit gemeint sein könnte' (*Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 137). With Heidegger, subjectivity is not a category of being, but a possibility condition of the ontological categories.

The speaking subject, defined by its cognitive subjectivity, is a creator of meanings and patterns of thought, by means of which the pragmatic judgements and opinions are reasonably legitimated. The respective cognitive patterns compose the *transcendental level* of current opinions and enter the human cultural dowry.

Any reflective act is a content of thought, a formal perception, a WAY of expressing the *innere Sprachform* – alluding the revolutionary linguistic theory developed by Humboldt.

The transcendental construct that grounds the opinion(s) has historical relevance, it has no universal character, in the way Kant defined the a priori categories of mind. From our point of view, in the case the universal dimension of doxastic reality is affirmed, it should be recognised as a 'formative will' of human spirituality, the will of the human being to give

to themselves a 'measure of understanding the human existence'. From this perspective, Protagoras' philosophy – *Man is the measure of things* – is especially suitable for the doxastic domain. In spite of the historical character of culture, including value opinions, Man's permanent effort to rationalise spiritual perception is most important. The *measure* by which the human being tries to find a 'spiritual standard' is the *measure* that the human being finds for themselves, it is the *horizon* of one's own life, the justificative vector of existence. The relative character of this justificative measure is compensated by the cultural dialogue, a dialogue which has reductive function, cognitively oriented to discover an IDEA of life by destroying the dogmatic power of linguistic patterns. Nietzsche was the philosopher who initiated the critical validation of grounding principles. His concept of the **Übermensch,** the absolute subject, is not a concept of power but of the critical foundation. (See also Gianni Vattimo, *Dincolo de subiect* 'Beyond the subject' p. 34, and Yirmiyahu Yovel, *O enigmă intunecată*, 2000).

The rules of intellectual behaviour, which is socially accepted, should be imposed as authoritative arguments of not giving up to being a creative mind. The original thinking does not assume dominant ideas without proving their justificatory power. In these particular cases, 'the pressure of the system' (the pressure of scientific paradigms being included) triggers a dialectical process, during which the antithetic reason is *solicited* (an allusion to Derrida's philosophy of *force and signification,* from *L'écriture et la différence,* l967: 13).

By taking for granted the analogy between the dialogue and the game-playing as a theoretical model, the present paper was concerned with the special issue regarding the players' identity. In conformity with game study, to establish the IDENTITY of participants in the linguistic interaction represents *that game-rule which specifies the conditions imposed upon players.* However, on closer examination, conversational behaviour discloses a split between the participants' conversational and natural conditions, between the interactive commitment (inherent in the interlocutors' discursive roles) and the genuine speaking personality (the speakers' intention of expressing their genuine beliefs and knowledge during conversation).

The present chapter has opened the discussion about the possibility of projecting upon the partner a false presumption of identity (this aspect represents the *qui pro quo* conversational relationship); the theatricality of the dialogical game, due to which the *qui pro quo* relationship represents the dialogue's constitutive condition, can generate a conflicting condition.

Nevertheless, our interest in doxastic rationality has underlined the strategic choice of avoiding the increasing danger of the *qui pro quo* play.

It is important to mention that the *doxastic dialectic*s was restricted, considering only the participants' *bona fide* – a condition, in virtue of which doxastic dialectics develops its investigations by excluding any kind of contextually distorted beliefs as a consequence of the premise that stipulates the *cleavage of justification,* as Kasher calls it (1986). Within the frame of our argumentation, doxastic dialectics was applied to two cognitive functions: (a) the *antithetic* reasoning, challenging the subjects' cognitive intentionality, and (b) the doxastic *formative* process, during which the pragmatic subjectivity gains a phenomenological dimension.

Doxa's axiomatic mechanism tries to temper the subjective dimension of persuasive truth, by submitting the doxastic proof to the control of the oppositional principle (= antithetic 'reasoning'). Doxastic thinking discovers its own *ratio* (= measure), in a dialectical way, by progressively increasing the relevance of the *listening* capacity.

The concept of *listening* was used in a greater than sensitive sense, being equivalent to *condition of receptivity*.

Our debate regards the inner mechanism of culture: both its dynamics and its authenticity.

Within the pressure of cultural institutions, a creative mind is never a passive consumer of ideas in fashion, but a critical participant in a collective debate, for whom the most important step is to supply reasons for oneself to reach the inner conviction that the sense-giving acts are pertinent for the ontological cognition and the configuration of a larger than a priori given *Weltanshauung*.

An 'original proof' represents a meaning posed in consciousness. Any meaning assumed by consciousness presupposes an interpretative horizon (the authoritative proof), that could render the respective meaning pertinent. The procedure should follow a special kind of logic, called transcendental logic, where each proof should be an authoritative argument constitutive for subjective Identity.

The investigation of our issue shows the danger generated by a frequent doxastic phenomenon: instead of enforcing the original proof by alleging an authoritative argument in a critical and dialectical way, the social commitment imposes a conventionally authoritative argument, and consequently, the procedure is distorted.

Our theoretical option meets Gadamer's affirmation: Being becomes understandable by means of language. The relative authority of cultural premises was dialectically treated, in accordance to those philosophers for

whom the ontological dispute discloses the interpretation of Being as Value. (See the chapter about doxastic dialectics.)

The demonstration – displayed in hermeneutical terms – had explained

(a) to what extent the cognitive power of subjectivity (the belief) represents an 'original source' , and
(b) to what extent the hermeneutical circle is not a 'circle', but rather 'a way to language'.

A philosopher does not discuss the axiological objectivity, but the conceptual effort to refer to such an objectivity. We call this kind of objectivity PERSUASIVE OBJECTIVITY. Any reference to axiological objectivity is a conceptual effort to substantiate it in the form of a MORAL OBJECT.

The grounding process of the persuasive truth (as Parmenide named it) is an open process, during which the heuristic questions regard the *self of the subject,* the *dilemmatic rationality.* The *dilemmatic rationality,* far from being the weak nature of the *self,* represents the inexhaustible power of the *belief* looking for categorical reference, a justification of *Sinngebung* acts. The justification of semantic acts should answer to an *axiological* sense which is a vectorial sense: **why** – as the finalist principle of cognition.

We cannot say these are the final arguments: there are still many problems that could be integrated in our debate about *doxastic dialectics.* With another occasion, we could, for instance, develop the issue regarding the *possibility conditions* of assuming the value meaning in consciousness.

Don't forget: doxastic dialectics leads us **beyond pragmatics**!

ANNEXES

'Each theoretical construction is a RESPONSE to a demand' is the first sentence of this book, by which our intention was to define the progress of science and to place our argument regarding *doxastic dialectics*. The paradigmatic dynamism was one of the targets of our book. On the other hand, the interest of the debate was concerned with the originality of a new theory which is frequently due to a paradigmatic transfer. For a better understanding of the way we have chosen to treat the main problems, we consider it useful to bring some complementary justifications. The annexes embrace the explanation of concepts and issues that stimulated our theoretical approach of doxastic dialectics. A metatheoretical excursus!

1.

AXIOMATISATION OF SCIENCE

To organise a science on a plurality of axioms

The axiomatisation of linguistics

1. *Structuralism* was the first moment, when linguistics reached the theoretical level of being a *science*, rigorously constituted on the basis of an explicative principle.

The explicative principle was recognised by some pairs of concepts, established by Ferdinand de Saussure and systematised by Louis Hjelmslev:

- – langue vs. parole
- – paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic
- – system vs. process
- – invariant vs. variant
- – static vs. dynamic
- – form vs. sense

The definition of the concept of *langue*, such as it was formulated by Saussure, encompasses the *axioms of structuralism*:

- – 'La langue est *forme* et non substance';
- – 'La langue est un système où TOUT se tient';
- – 'La langue est un principe classificatoire' (static structure);
- – 'Dans la langue il n'y a que des differences' (the principle of opposition);
- – 'La langue est ordre/NORME';
- – 'La langue est une des institutions sociales'.

2. Hjelmslev was the first theoretician of the linguistic metalanguage (*glossematics*). Hjelmslev highlighted the importance of establishing the minimal element of the linguistic theory (named *glosem*). The explicative principle, formulated by Saussure in a list of axioms (mentioned above),

was able to ensure the **linguistic autonomy**, and any reference to extralinguistic facts was excluded. The term 'structuralism' was not introduced by Saussure, but later by the School of Prague, which established the grounds of phonetics.

3. In the subsequent stages of the linguistics development, the theoreticians have had the continuing concern of finding the minimal element on which a linguistic paradigm can be built. Chomsky revolutionised the concept of *language* by introducing the idea of generative grammar, starting with a nuclear *phrase structure* to which a number of *generative and transformational rules* were added. (See the classical model: Chomsky, *Syntactic Structure,* 1957; and later *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax,* 1965). During the history of the linguistic ideas, the main theoretical evidence was a continuous concern of finding the minimal entity of linguistic paradigms. Such a research was present even in the pragmatic studies (See the discussions in *(On) Searle on Conversation,* with an introduction by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1992).

The generative-transformational principle, formulated by Chomsky, highlighted the contradictory aspects of the *structuralist* oppositions defining the concept of language (*French: la langue*): exclusively *formal* (by excluding semantics), *normative, static* etc. Chomsky was interested in the mental nature of the speaking attributes of the locutors and, consequently, he claimed in favour of the rationality of language structure (under the influence of rationalism in philosophy – Descartes and the French philosophers of the 'Grammaire Raisonée'). Chomsky introduced the opposition *competence/performance.* The theoretical accent was placed on the behavioural origin of language. The respective opposition became rapidly relevant in many fields of research. On the other hand, Chomsky had proclaimed the *innate nature* of the rationality of language. By recognising the *innate rationality* of the nuclear proposition (named the 'deep structure'), the *theory* of language became *philosophy* of the universal mental structure. The dynamic (generative) character of the theoretical approach was Chomsky's great contribution of the time.

Linguistic Competence:

1 'Linguistic competence,' is a concept introduced and defined by Chomsky and represents the command of the generative rules of language. The difficulty was to suit this concept to pragmatics in such a way as to obtain an integrated theory of language.

2 Habermas is one of the philosophers interested in defining the concept of 'communicative competence'. The concept unfolds the linguistic hierarchy on which communication is built: *Wohlgeformheit eines Satzes* (syntactic correctness), *Wahrheit einer Proposition* (propositional truth), *Wahrhaftigheit eines intentionales Ausdrucks* (verisimilar character of the intentions), *Richtigkeit eines Sprechaktes* (the correct performance of speech acts).

3 Linguists speak about the *dialogical competence,* defined by operational ability and by justificatory rationality, having strategic nature. The strategic rationality is not based on a corpus of rules; a speaker gifted by strategic rationality is able to operate the reasonable selection of the most efficient means with respect to a target which should be reached by consensus between interlocutors.

Remark: The dynamics of mutuality require a permanent reconfirmation and reformulation of strategic decisions. The interactive commitment is not a linear behaviour; the speakers continuously renew their consciousness of insiderness within the dynamic word-world, by means of feedback proof.

4. For a more correct definition of *language,* the linguists and philosophers of language proposed modifications under the influence of symbolic logic, or of other conceptions: the introduction of linguistic indexes in the description of language, or placing the verb in the centre of the deep structure (see McCawley, *Lexical Insertion in a Transformational Grammar without Deep Structure,* 1968; *English as a VSO Language,* 1970; Charles Fillmore, *The Case for Case,* 1968, proposed a deep structure that consider the noun cases; Theban proposed a syntactic-semantic deep structure, under the influence of Panini's grammar, built according to the model of the sacred ceremony).

5. *Aristotle'*s (384–322 BC) contribution to the foundation of sciences cannot be ignored by somebody interested in finding the rational base of language. Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, speaks about a 'science' interested in the first principles and causes (*causa prima*). He has laid the foundations for systematic scientific thinking. The *Organon* is the work that brings together Aristotle's books of logic and rhetoric (organised by one of his followers – Andronicus of Rhodes) (cf. Anton Dumitriu, *Istoria Logicii*, 'The History of Logic'.)

2.

ORGANON

Theoretical Logic	*Practical Logic*
(the necessary)	(the probable)
1. *Categories* (the universal)	4a. *Topics*
(common judgement, based on …)	
similarity	difference
2. *On Interpretation*	b. *Dialectics*
(predicative functions)	(probable argumentation)

3. *Apodictic* 3a. *Prior Analytics* (schemes of deduction) syllogism	5. *Rhetoric* (persuasive argumentation) enthymeme

3b. *Posterior Analytics*
      (real demonstration)
	Eristics
	(argumentation starting
	   by accident)

	Sophistical refutation (treatment of fallacies)

Intellect

Analytical Logic	*Practical Logic (subjective* *or collective)*
Unity	Practical syllogism
Reunion and separation	Inventio
Syllogism	Eliminatory operations

The effort to establish an agreement between several approaches seems to consider the theoretical 'anomalies' transit *times*. Such 'transit time' was the transition from the theoretical interpretation of the discourse to that of the dialogue. In order to avoid the contradictions signalled within a theory, many concepts were eliminated, others modified and new concepts were introduced.

Under the influence of other domains – logic, philosophy, rhetoric – and adopting a dynamic approach of language – new concepts were introduced: locutionary *force,* language *function, conversational Maxims* and *Principles* instead of *rules* or *norms.*

The present study is an attempt – as far as possible – to formulate an axiomatic model of the doxastic domain.

FORCE

John L. Austin (*How to do Things with Words,* 1962) has explicitly introduced the concept of *performativity*, dealing with the actantial property of language. There is a long tradition of linguists, psychologists, philosophers and recently sociolinguists, interested in approaching language as *energeia* (Humboldt's concept). In accordance with Austin, speaking *intentionality* and the (il)locutionary *force* represents the capacity of making the interlocutor recognise the speech *acts* of the locutor. That is the very speaking power of language, which is equivalent/substitutes Grice's concept of 'non-natural sense'. The classification of illocutionary acts made by Austin (*Exercitives, Verdictives, Behabitives, Expositives*) is useful and successfully applied in every discursive interpretation. The distinction made by Austin between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is unavoidable.

FUNCTIONS

1. *Function,* with linguistic reference, defines the relationships between different forms of language. This acception is near to the *mathematical concept* of function. In linguistics, Hjelmslev was interested in applying this interpretation. He considered that the linguistic function is a *variable,* respectively a relationship between two *constant* elements.

2. *Function*, referring to the relation between a linguistic unity and a unity of a superior level, was a concept used by the theory named *functionalism*. In this case, the respective linguists defined by 'function' the role of an element within an ensemble.

3. *Language function* represents the speech force oriented towards an interactive factor. If we speak about the interaction, there is no force deprived of a 'communicative' function.

According to the psycholinguist Bühler, the function is a semiotic relationship between a sign-giver and a sign-receiver. Jakobson's model of language functions suits our target of studying the linguistic interaction (the dialogue). Jakobson's approach to language supplies us with a theoretical method for analysing the diversification of speech forces, so as to ensure an internally dynamic circuit. For our argumentation, Jakobson's model represents the theoretical premise – a kind of general orientation – for a functional reinterpretation of conversation. In conformity with Jakobson, communication is (a) a system of functions, in which (b) a function is oriented towards a communicative target. The communicative parameters compose a hierarchical system of relationships to which stratified levels of conversation correspond.

The order in which the analysis of language functions will be performed, is the order relevant for the idea of interaction. The CONATIVE FUNCTION corresponds to Bühler's appellative function. In conformity with both Bühler and Jakobson, the respective function is focused on the interlocutor (receiver, hearer). In a very primitive way, we can say that Jakobson's concept equates Austin's illocutionary act: 'The conative function finds its purest grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative, which syntactically, morphologically and often even phonetically deviate from other nominal and verbal categories' (Jakobson 1985: 152).

In contradistinction to Jakobson's model, the conversational approach requires the dissociation of the language force which is directed upon the interlocutor in two functionally distinctive orientations: the ACTIVE and REACTIVE powers of language. It is necessary to extend the conative function so as to include the interlocutor's disposition to respond. When a speech act is directed towards the interlocutor it has an appellative force. Simultaneously it accomplishes a transformation of the mental (psychological, cognitive) or social state of the addressee. The active transformation makes the appellative force reactively efficient, an opposition corresponding to the already mentioned difference: illocutionary vs. conversational.

The REFERENTIAL FUNCTION, or the 'denotative' or 'cognitive' function refers to the content of a speech act. Jakobson's term, focusing on the communicative context, might be confusing when this function is applied to interaction. Therefore, we prefer to equate it with the semantic content of Austin's speech acts, or with Searle's referential and predicative

acts. Conventionally, we consider that 'referential function' refers to the main topic of the dialogue. The referential function is representative of the *alethic* field, that aspect of the dialogue in which the truth or falsity of an assertoric proposition is disputed: more specifically, the referential function governs all referential acts implied by all other language functions.

The EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION corresponds to Jakobson's emotive function. It puts the focus on the speaker (sender). Usually, the expressive function is identified with the emotional aspect of language, the linguistic forms of which are active in each speech act through lexical, syntactical (including word order, which is also a mark of poetic function) and phonetic (including intonation) means. The interactional relevance of the expressive function is perceived when it is associated with a conversational (reactive) or phatic function. The conversational enthusiasm or hesitancy of a speaker increases or decreases the reactive power of a speech act. It can also be a semiotic act that exposes the speaker's personality and attitude towards the partner, and makes possible the psychological contact.

In order to make a profitable explanatory parameter of interaction from the expressive function, **we shall extend it, in order to be representative of the doxastic field.** Thus the speaker's universe of beliefs is actualised, and relevant for implicitly or explicitly formulated intentions and feelings. Such an extension is not far from Bühler's idea whereby the speaker's personality and dialogical position are 'expressed' (become manifest). The explicit ways of performing the expressive function represent an act of commitment regarding one's own dialogical position. In a higher degree of dialogical rationalisation, the explicitation of the expressive function is part of a ritual procedure; it emphasises the speaker's attitude (declaration of intention, belief testimony, etc.)

When the expressive function is deprived of explicit linguistic marks, it is implicated in the illocutionary function, and is deducible through conventional implicature. Each speech act actualises an illocutionary intention which formally expresses the speaker's belief or attitude towards the partner. For instance, an act of *reproach* implies or is associated with an expression of contempt, a delivery of fury, etc., which voluntarily or involuntarily increase the perlocutionary effect. Due to its power of commitment, the expressive function is often dissimulated for strategic reasons. The speaker prefers to deflect an utterance by *omission, silence, equivocation, irony, change of topic,* etc.

(From Ruth Amossy, 'The argumentative dimension of discourse', in *Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the ISSA*, 2002) While performing

an illocutionary act the speaker uncovers their conversational *face/personality;* they 'actualise' their beliefs and attitudes towards a partner or regarding the object of the speech. Example:

1 *Reproach* may imply contempt, or is associated with delivery of fury.
2 *Belief:* 'Anguish is stifling me. Nevertheless, I'm reasoning. I clearly understand that the hour of sacrificing my life has come. We will go, we will all go, but we will never more go down these slopes. Here it is!'

The PHATIC FUNCTION, to quote Jakobson, 'serves to establish, to prolong or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works, to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention' (1985: 152). To put it simply, the phatic function is responsible for interactive *contact.* In a systematic description of the interaction, contact should be the generalised term for all conditions of (co-) interagency.

We endeavour to extend the field of the phatic function to refer to all contact presuppositions. Such presuppositions are the pragmatic conditions of linguistic interaction, beginning with 'technical' contact (e.g. audibility), and ending with conditions of receptivity. This is the communicative desire (to want) and its permeability (to be able). The phatic function represents the dynamics of interactive contacts, namely the socio-psychological relationships between interlocutors (including linguistic ones). By means of this function, interactive relationships are elucidated and dialogical distance is established.

Linguistically, bargaining dialogues about the interactive conditions – communicative, psychological or social – perform the phatic function. It is expressed in the committing of sentences: agreements, contracts, conventions*, etc. This is an elastic field, the lower level of which is rendered by spontaneous forms of reciprocity, and the highest level is represented by normative accuracy.

The forms establishing the dialogical contact imply either the expressive function or those particular acts that are representative of the conative function. In this function, a partner's identity is explicated: declarations, appellatives. These are special kinds of behabitives, using Austin's classification. When the complex interaction is considered, the phatic function settles contracts of cooperation, coalitions, etc., increasing the interactive complicity. The bounding relationships invoke the metalanguage function, using symbols of values. An *oath* is performed in

the name of the law, truth, honour or in the name of God as the supreme form of sacrality.

The phatic function should have in charge the regulation of the interactive distance, in conformity with the codes of reciprocity. The highest degree of interactive regulation owes its stability to the compelling force of a 'phatic' contract. In order to increase the authoritative power of an oath, a metalingual level transcends the commissive act.

The METALANGUAGE FUNCTION is focused on codes. By analysing the metalanguage function we have, perhaps, tried to extend its power illegitimately by covering the cognitive field. The proper metalingual function of Jakobson was **extended by us, comprising all axiological metapropositions that support any assertion.** This function should be in charge of *normative codes* and regulate the reciprocal intelligibility by means of the conversation: linguistic codes, including pragmatic conventions and axiologic codes, an undetermined corpus of maxims and general propositions. In contradistinction to the referential function, dealing with the conditions of predicative truth, the metalanguage function operates a normative generalisation, appealing to definitions, normative propositions (universal or general), prescriptions, etc. We call them 'metalanguage' to the extent they provide normative arguments. The transfer from the referential function to the metalanguage function corresponds to the explanatory digression, a terminological definition. **Metalanguage function** is focused on codes.

Remark*: In this context we do not speak about *theoretical metalanguage* (See the commentary about 'negotiation')*, but:*

'Every common culture of which interlocutors might partake, and which they might use in speaking together, includes, among it parts, a part devoted to the symbols and meanings, premises and rules pertaining to the communicative conduct. *A speech code, then, is defined here as a system of socially constructed symbols and meanings, premises and rules, pertaining to the communicative conduct.'* (From Philips (1997), *A theory of speech codes,* quoted by Keith Berry, 'Cut-ups, slams and jabs: verbal aggressiveness or politeness?' in *Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the ISSA*, 2002).

The referential function alternates with the metalanguage function by virtue of argumentative reasons (explanatory or authoritative).

The POETIC FUNCTION governs the *linguistic structure* engendered by the performance of speech acts, or it reflects them making the interlocutors aware of 'what happens in the language' they are using. The realm of poetic function is very large and we consider it the very origin of the material cause of conversation.

The poetic function has a creative linguistic force; because of this force, the speaker displays alternative forms for an utterance. Functionality is disclosed when strategic (= conversational) considerations are involved.

The privilege of the poetic function over the other functions of language is its synthetic power, which can be simultaneously multifunctional. For instance, a *parable*, brought into conversation by the poetic function because of its generalised reference, has the explanatory force of the metalanguage function. The particular case is recognised under the form of exemplary narrative. The parable is used by the strategy of persuasion, appealing to authoritative arguments (given its explanatory force). In other cases, the poetic function disguises the speaker in a play with the intent of confusing the interlocutor. Their figurative speech conceals the expressive function, for instance, ironic contempt or offending insinuations, which are hidden in an allusive meaning and are difficult to grasp correctly. The expected reaction is to perplex the interlocutor and to restrain tentative prying.

We propose an extension of Jakobson's model of language functions by supplementing it with what we call critical function. The CRITICAL FUNCTION represents the reactive position of the interlocutor whose conversational attitude is both retrospective (= critical), and prospective (= active), regressive and progressive, interpretative and innovative. The interlocutor's critical position accomplishes a reactive act of validation of a speech act with respect to its fundamental functions: Conversational – to accept or hinder the progression; illocutionary – to evaluate the felicitous performance of an act from the point of view of a formally prescriptive procedure, and to justify it from the point of view of the conversational demand, and semantic – to evaluate the truth and relevance of a propositional content. The critical function, respectively the *critical rationality* is triggered the moment the interlocutors discover dysfunctions within the interactional mechanism.

(Conversational) MAXIMs

Derived from the principle of rationality

General considerations (*Free Encyclopaedia*): Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them.

(a) It is 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true.

(b) Reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by everyone, or by the majority or by the philosophers; i.e. by all, or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them.

(c) Again, reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are nor really such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted is actually generally accepted.

Grice's principle of rationality:

'Where there is no reason to assume the contrary, take the speaker to be a rational agent. His ends and beliefs, in a context of utterances, should be assumed to supply a complete justification of his behaviour, unless there is evidence to the contrary' (1975: 33).

Grice's Maxims of a rational dialogue:

Maxim of Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (and not less informative). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality: This concerns the condition of sincerity. Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Maxim of Manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief, be orderly.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. It concerns the condition of intelligibility in conversation.

Remark: Grice's Maxims have 'normative' function. From our point of view, the dialogical/conversational rationality has a principle nature. Its 'conditional' formulation *ensures* the (dialogical) relevance, by following a double procedure: (a) the partners in a dialogue should find arguments to justify their and their partners' speech acts; (b) each interlocutor should find arguments in consciousness for self-justification.

Dascal, in his studies about conversation (2003), is interested in explaining the importance of the principle of intelligibility in parallel with that of rationality.

For a high relevance of conversational rationality it should be governed by the *formative principle* in the form of a transparent relationship

between the expressive and the final cause of speech: ***Why are we speaking instead of remaining silent!***

The final word is *doubt!*

Remark: For Descartes, doubt is the means by which (the subject's) consciousness acquires the first certainty of itself, of existence. The language finds its reason to burst out.

MODEL

We call a MODEL a formal system of laws or rules, describing the structure or the functioning of a mechanism. In its representative and abstract form, the model has a heuristic power, the theoretical value of which facilitates understanding of the approached phenomenon.

The theory of the dialogue has renewed the fundamental problem of linguistics: the idea of the existence or absence of an adequate MODEL (*ergon*) that can describe a phenomenon manifesting as *energeia* (this time, interaction). In this respect the following questions arise.

1 What is the proper way to understand the transcendence and the a priori nature of such a model?
2 By formalising language activity, to what extent might a model be identified, or not, with a speaker's dialogical competence?

The correct answer to question 1 depends on the position adopted with respect to question 2. Regarding the second question, we consider it necessary to dissociate between the *model of conversation* and the *model of the locutor's conversational competence*.

The model of the locutor's competence is eloquent in contrast to the model of conversation, which is an ORGANIC STRUCTURE.

If we must choose a model describing the *interlocutor's competence*, then the suitable one is the *strategic model.* STRATEGY is an actional model that is adapted to interactivity. The strategic model supplies an interpretation of interaction from two points of view.

(H1) Linguistic interaction is a dynamic structure conceived from the *inner perspective of an acting subject.*

The second hypothesis concerns the possibility of conceiving the constitutional conditions of a *strategic relationship*:

(H2) As a dynamic structure, linguistic interaction represents the constitutive process of an *intersubjective world*, continuously reshaped from the inside (subjective perspective) outwards (objective reality of the commitment condition).

PRINCIPLE

Amel's definitions of Conversational Principles (2016) should consolidate the structural approach of the dialogue/conversation/interaction.

The principle of rationality – ensures active intervention in the world by a coherent connection between goal and means. The rationality controls the parameters of action.

The principle of reciprocity – before becoming aware of the normative, superindividual, transcendent character of language, an initiator of a dialogue has become aware of an interindividual relationship. This is the *pressure of reciprocity,* by uncovering the complementary existence of the other's subjectivity. Compare with Habermas: 'Ich in einem System vom Abgrenzungen konstituirt' (1984: 144). The principle of reciprocity governs the *cohesion* of the common world of words.

The Principle of Commitment takes into consideration the presuppositions of interaction and their manifestation in linguistic acts (implicated in explicit ones). This principle governs the participation in a common activity as a constraining activity: *in for a penny, in for a pound!* The Principle of Commitment ensures the *coherence* of interaction.

The Principle of Cooperation governs the interactive dynamics, the mechanism of reciprocally conditioning activities: on the one hand its relevance, and on the other hand its strategic means. The Principle of Cooperation, largely analysed by Grice (*Logic of Conversation,* 1975), guides the *progression* of interaction.

STRUCTURE

The *general propositions* defining 'la langue', formulated by Saussure, are considered 'arguments' to the benefit of the concept of *structure*.

The concept of *structure* was introduced by Roman Jakobson, Serge Karcevski and Nikolai Trubetzkoy in their common contribution about the phonematic system, at the International Congress of Linguistics in The Hague.

Expert in comparative linguistics, Saussure had the genius of seeing a new organisation of language. The originality of Saussure's linguistic approach represented a theoretical turn: the beginning of the *paradigmatic* thinking. Eco (1970: 2016), in Section VIII 'About Scholasticism and Structuralism', speaks about the possibility of discovering a kind of 'protostructuralism' in medieval texts. After a renewed reading of Thomas Aquinas in a structuralist key, the philosopher finds structural ascending in the scholastic concept of *forma mentis.* On the other hand, neither

medieval (scholastic) texts, nor modern theories of *structure/system* justify – says Eco – the dialectic movement of language. The conclusions of our argumentation about the *organic structure* could prove the contrary.

We understand an ORGANIC STRUCTURE to be a dynamic system of forces, functionally distributed, governed by immanent and not transcendent causes.

Conversation is a word-world, built up by the cooperative/competitive tension between two subjective forces (interlocutors' conversational intention). The becoming structure of the word-world is ENGENDERED by transformations of adaptive states whose progression is autoreproductive and autoregulative. The constitutive principles that govern the organic structure of conversation are the following: the principle of reciprocity, of commitment and of cooperation, all guided by the principle of rationality. These principles maintain an equilibrium between unstable (subjective) factors. The inner rationality is capable of ensuring functional coherence by compensatory moves of self-regulation.

The conversational universe is divided in two zones: the space of dialogue (A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP) with the inherent errors, and the autoregulative space, within which deviant moves are negotiated. For the speaker, there is an objective impossibility of perfect integration in a system deprived of explicit functioning rules. To constitute a conversational structure, the subject must increase their participative awareness through METADIALOGUE. During the metadialogue, the speaking subject progressively approximates the dialogical relationship, and in this way the universe of mutuality could be extended.

A third hypothesis might be formulated:

In spite of those linguists and philosophers who consider that conversation has no structure (* MODEL): *The reason that conversations do not have an inner structure in the sense that speech acts do is not because conversations involve two or more people, but because conversations as such lack a particular purpose or point.* (Searle, 1992: 20), we are of an opinion that conversation has an *organic structure*.

We understand an ORGANIC STRUCTURE to be a dynamic system of forces, functionally distributed, governed by principles (inherent causes) and not by rules (transcendent causes). Consequently, we may formulate

(H3) *At every moment of its development, an organic structure may be referred to an IDEAL PATTERN which reproduces interactive factors in their nondeviated form.*

(H3) We could probably approach Aristotle's idea of *entelechia*, which governs the autoregulative movement of organic structure through a rule

of normative strategy, intuitively uncovered by a speaker's cooperative rationality.

The *telos* (= the goal) of an organic structure does not reach an actual perfection, but a virtually rational one.

THEORY

The word *theory* derives from a term in the philosophy of Ancient Greek. The word *teoria θεωρια* meant 'a looking at, viewing, beholding', but in more technical contexts it came to refer to a contemplation of natural things (cf. *Free Encyclopaedia*). In the actual acceptance, *theory* means abstract and generalising thinking. A *theory* presupposes several components:

Axiom – a self-evident truth (a proposition that does not require any proof; a universally accepted principle or rule), assumed by itself.

Thesis/logoi – a proposition or a particular theory the truth of which we intend to prove or engage in sustaining it. A thesis may be of a different kind.

Hypothesis – a proposition assumed as a premise in an argumentation.

Postulate – (in mathematics) a claim that assumes the existence of a truth of an unknown fact.

Arguments (which were defined in a special chapter, above).

Proof – evidence or anything serving as such evidence, sufficient to establish the truth of a thing/fact, or to produce belief in its truth; proof can be material, formal, logical etc.

Definitions – the formal statement that explains what a thing is: *genus proximus* and *differentia specifica*.

Demonstration – a logical (in an extended sense) presentation of the way in which given assumptions imply a certain result.

See in Kuhn 1976: 184–185, a critical interpretation of theories.

A third sort of element in the disciplinary matrix I shall here describe as values. Usually they are more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic generalisations or models, and they do much to provide a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole. Though they function at all times, their particular importance emerges when the members of a particular community must identify crisis or, later, choose between incompatible ways of practising their discipline. Probably the most deeply held values concern predictions: they should be accurate;

quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently satisfied in a given field; and so on. There are also, however, values to be used in judging whole theories: they must, first and foremost, permit puzzle-formulation and solution; where possible they should be simple, self-consistent and plausible, compatible, that is, with other theories currently deployed. (I now think it a weakness of my original text that so little attention is given to such values as internal and external consistency in considering sources of crisis and factors in theory choice.) Other sorts of values exist as well – for example, science should (or need not) be socially useful – but the preceding should indicate what I have in mind. One aspect of shared values does, however, require particular mention. To a greater extent than other sorts of components of the disciplinary matrix, values may be shared by men who differ in their application. Judgements of accuracy are relatively, though not entirely, stable from one time to another and from one member to another in a particular group. But judgements of simplicity, consistency, plausibility and so on often vary greatly from individual to individual. What was for Einstein an insupportable inconsistency in the old quantum theory, one that rendered the pursuit of normal science impossible, was for Bohr and others a difficulty that could be expected to work itself out by normal means. Even more important, in those situations where values must be applied, different values taken alone would often dictate different choices. One theory may be more accurate but less consistent or plausible than another; again the old quantum theory provides an example. In short, though values are widely shared by scientists and though commitment to them is both deep and constitutive of science, the application of values is sometimes considerably affected by the features of individual personality and biography that differentiate the members of the group.

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