DE GRUYTER
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RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPE

ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON A COMPLEX INTERPLAY, VOLUME I

Edited by Rupert Graf Strachwitz

MAECENATA SCHRIFTEN 15

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Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Ed.)
Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe

Maecenata Schriften

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Edited by
Dr. phil. Rupert Graf Strachwitz,
Dr. sc. Eckhard Priller and
Christian Schreier

Volume 15

Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe

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Content

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Foreword

In 2002, the Maecenata Institute for Third Sector Studies, as it was then called, and the Catholic Academy of Berlin jointly organised a conference titled 'The Church between the State and Civil Society'.[1] It became very clear in the discussions that the position of religious communities in modern society was anything but obvious. Since then, it has been my ambition to examine this important issue more fully. Finally, in 2015, the since renamed Maecenata Institute for Philanthropy and Civil Society obtained a substantial research grant to do so. It merits mentioning with gratitude that this research could not have been undertaken without generous financial support from a private institution that wishes not to be named.

Five associates kindly agreed to collaborate with us in determining details of content, reviewing papers, identifying experts, conducting interviews, and contributing to the final outcome. They are:

– Prof. Dr. Rocco d'Ambrosio (Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy),
– Prof. Dr. Paul Dekker (University of Tilburg, Netherlands),
– Dr. Anna Domaradzka (University of Warsaw, Poland),
– Prof. Dr. Johan von Essen (Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden),
– Prof. Dr. Vassilios Makrides (University of Erfurt, Germany).

In addition, a number of other colleagues agreed to act as advisors and contributors. With the associates, we held workshops in Berlin in 2015, 2016, and 2017. A conference to present the findings took place in Rome in November, 2018. Project and findings were discussed at roundtbales in the context of international conferences of the International Society for Third Sector Research, in Stockholm (2016) and Amsterdam (2018) respectively, and on other academic and public occasions. Further efforts to disseminate the findings will be made once the publications are available.

Six work packages were defined and worked on:

1. a legal report, commissioned to Prof. Tymen van der Ploeg;
2. a report on data sources, commissioned to a team of specialists at D-Part;
3. Comprehensive narratives, to include papers written by associates and ourselves, as well as others;
4. a call for contributions;
5. an outreach to connected projects;
6. a comprehensive bibliography.

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1 Graf Strachwitz, R., Adloff, F., Schmidt, S., Schneider, M. (eds.) (2002): Kirche zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft. Berlin.

All papers will be published in three printed volumes in 2019. Broadly speaking, this first volume contains work packages (1), (2), and (6), and a number of papers from work packages (3) and (4). Vol. 2 will contain further papers from work packages (3) and (4), and should the need arise, addenda to work package (6). Volume three will contain papers given at the final conference held at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in November of 2018.

It is more than appropriate to express our most sincere and heart-felt gratitude to many colleagues who have provided expertise, invaluable discussion points, and research papers that together will constitute the findings and results of this project. High-ranking church leaders have made themselves available for interviews, and scholars from all over Europe have assisted in putting a highly complex issue into focus. Special thanks are due to the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, and to Rocco d'Ambrosio in particular for hosting the final conference, and to Sarah Albrecht, who for three years has aptly coordinated the project.

Berlin, in November 2018

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Introduction

For the past three years, together with colleagues in or from Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, we have attempted to analyze the position of religious communities within a framework of society defined by three arenas of societal action outside the immediate private sphere, namely civil society, the state, and the market. In the course of this exercise, academic analysis of a status quo, while preserving academic standards, has to some degree given way to observing and analyzing an increasingly dynamic process of change that is happening both within and outside these communities. The vastly increased interest for anything to do with Islam in Europe, a sensation that religion, albeit not the established Churches, have found their way back into many people's mindsets, the 500th anniversary of Luther's reformation, celebrated in 2017, and accompanied by a flurry of conferences and publications, and last but not least the personality of and approach to Church governance adopted by Pope Francis, form one side of this argument, as does a general feeling that the approach taken by governments and religious leaders in Russia and in some Muslim countries, which sees state and religion as interdependent aspects of political order, may be out of touch with modern thinking. The other side of the argument is dominated by a steadily decreasing membership in established religious communities to the extent that they no longer represent a majority of citizens in most European countries, and a continuing secularization of public bodies, along with a changing perception of how public life should be organised. The separation of Church and State has, in some way or another, become a principle of statehood everywhere in Europe, and all forms of a special relationship between Church and State have become hotly contested, not only by those who do not belong to a religious community themselves. Also, members of diverse religious communities are members of the same political community. All of them enjoy a right to exercise their religion under the respective constitution, while religious minorities enjoy particular protection under the Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in Paris in 1948[1].

Furthermore however, whereas from the 16th to the 20th century, the nation state became widely accepted and was indeed enforced as the overall prime organiser of public life, today's society is moving away from this pattern at considerable speed. Globalization has internationalized the private (business) sector, and citizens' private lives have transcended the boundaries of the nation state to a degree not envisaged even half a century ago. Citizens today entertain very diverse and more often than not mixed identities and loyalties: to their local community, region, or nation, to Europe, or as world citizens; to their employers ("I'm a Coca-Cola man"), their clubs, their

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1 (2018-11-05)

causes ("my loyalty is with the handicapped"), their movements ("I belong to all those who are fighting for a better world"), and in more cases than meets the eye, to their religious beliefs[2]. Indeed, if forced to choose between nation and religion, many people today would put religion first, and this would apply not only to minorities and citizens on the fringes of society. The civic space has emerged as a separate, visible, forceful, albeit very heterogeneous arena of public discourse and action. Is religion part of this arena?

To ask this question, is not only legitimate but also timely. Religious affiliation and loyalty may not be questioned on grounds of a compulsory first loyalty to the state. But what does this mean for religious communities who, for many centuries, have not only enjoyed a hand-in-glove relationship with the state in most European countries, but also a monopoly on defining collective religious and ethical beliefs? Do religious communities have to reassess their position, as they can no longer aspire to be spiritual rulers? Reinhard Marx, then a young bishop, today a Cardinal and Chairman of the German Conference of Catholic Bishops, put it this way in 2002: "The changes in society, to do with seculariization, pluralism and individualism, can neither be slowed down nor held up by the Church. These changes have made the Church lose its monopoly of endowing life with a meaning. Today's civil society is marked by the fact that no one institution or organisation may aspire to this monopoly. Civil society has become a space in which the Church does not enjoy first place but is seen as one intermediary institution amongst others."[3] Marx went on to remark: "Like other players in civil society, she [the Church] follows her own interests within this context."[4] This acknowledgement of being part of civil society, delivered on the record by a representative of a major religious community, is gaining world-wide assent, but is by no means universal. "Oh no, the Church is Sacred Society!" Pope John Paul II's answer to Ralf Dahrendorf[5], when asked whether the Church was part of civil society, still resonates with many people in- and outside of Church hierarchies.

Against this backdrop, the 'Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe' project is a large-scale exploratory research aimed at assessing the position of religious communities as potential or active civil society players in Europe, and at looking into differences in their positioning on legal, historical, cultural, and behavioural grounds. It cannot of course attempt to provide all the answers, let alone determine the position of religious communities in society as such. The project was undertaken by the Maecenata Institute, an independent research and policy centre in Berlin that focusses on issues of civil society, philanthropy, and civic engagement, from 2015 to

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2 The case of Northern Ireland, where citizens see themselves as Catholics or Protestants first, is a tragic case in point.
3 Marx, R., Message, loc. cit., p. 7
4 Ibid.
5 as related orally to the author by Ralf Dahrendorf

2018. The focus was a new one. For while the seemingly vitalizing impact of religion and religiosity on civic engagement is a research topic that has been extensively looked into, both in the Americas and, increasingly, in a European context[6], and while faith based charities have also been objects of scholarly work in the context of civil society theory and empirical studies, what still seems to be missing is an evaluation of the role of institutionalized religious communities, and of circumstances that facilitate or impede their status as civil society organisations. On the other hand, when lecturing on civil society to a public audience, one can be sure that a question asked will be "And what about political parties, trade unions and churches? Are they part of civil society?" We have attempted to seek an answer in respect to at least one these.

One assumption is that the long tradition of a hand-in-glove relationship with the state and persisting close ties render this more difficult in a European context. Since the days of the ancient Egyptians and before, temporal and spiritual rule had been closely intertwined. Religion was a defining element of society. The creation of national Churches, e.g. in Sweden and England, in the 16th century was but a return to very ancient customs. Even the 19th century Swiss constitution that had to accommodate a high degree of pluralism, regulated on the creation of bishoprics, an entirely ecclesiastical affair. To this day, bishops in the Church of England are appointed by the Monarch on advice by the Prime Minister, and churches are full of national symbols, military memorials among them. In Italy, parish priests, who are supposed to don a red, white, and green sash for the occasion, officiate as state officials in declaring church marriages valid under civil law, while in Greece, notwithstanding a constitutional separation of Church and State, newly appointed government ministers take their oath of office in front of the Archbishop. In Germany, the government tax authorities collect church tax and hand in on to the Churches for a fee, and even in France that in theory practices the strictest form of separation, some exceptions were made in Alsace-Lorraine for political reasons.

Today, in most European countries, legal relations between the state and various religious communities (minorities and majorities alike) play a crucial role in shaping the religious communities' scope for action within the arena of civil society. Also, the comparatively new understanding of what actually constitutes civil society has not permeated to areas of study prominent in assessing religious communities. The "modernization of religious consciousness" (Juergen Habermas)[7] as a response to pluralism, modern sciences, the spread of positive law, and secular morality, has not taken place. Therefore, the purpose of this research project, has been to see if and to

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6 See i.a. Dekker, P., Halman, L., Hart, J. (eds.) (2013): Religion and Civil Society in Europe. Dordrecht: Springer.
7 Habermas J. (2013): Im Sog der Technokratie. Kleine politische Schriften XII. Berlin: Suhrkamp: p. 13.

what extent Christian Churches, and Muslim and Jewish religious communities in Europe see themselves, are seen by others, and are possibly on the road as civil society movements.

What we were aiming at in particular, was to see

1. whether and if so, how religious communities are moving away from being part of a system of government, and are becoming part of what is generally termed civil society,
2. what effects this has on these communities,
3. what effects this may have on civil society in general.

Our geographic focus is Europe, with a look at Turkey and a glance at Israel. By its very nature, the project was interdisciplinary, albeit not led by theologians or scholars in religious studies. Most of the researchers involved are social scientists, particularly political scientists. And indeed, our research interest was not theological, and did not touch on dogmatic, moral, and ethical issues that are obviously of extreme importance for the communities proper. We were not concerned with theological arguments; nor were we talking about faith-based charities. Faith-driven volunteerism was but a side-aspect. The academic interest was in civil society as part of a larger society, and was with religious communities ("Churches") within this framework.

The term 'religious community' is seemingly self-explanatory. It is used here to comprise large Christian Churches, e.g. the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Church of England, etc., smaller Protestant Churches, e.g. the Baptist Church, as well as Muslim and Jewish and indeed other religious communities. A number of differences regarding their legal status, self-assessment, theological background, size, history, and traditions will become apparent in the papers that discuss individual cases. They do not affect the overall definition.

On the other hand the term 'civil society' is comparatively new, although it goes back to Aristoteles, was prominent in the theories put forward by Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and others in the 18th century, and is sometimes in English used to describe Hegel's model of society. It must therefore be made clear that none of these meanings of the term apply to what is understood as civil society today. Furthermore, while a broad international consensus exists among academics as to what this term implies, dissenting opinions exist, and a plethora of different descriptions persist in public and political discussions. Therefore, for the sake of the arguments presented in this project, it is necessary to explain what how this term is used in the context of this project. Obviously, the model used here cannot and does not wish to provide a comprehensive system, as Hegel did. E.g., man's relationship with God does not enter into this argument; nor does man's relationship with his natural habitat.

The meaning of the term civil society as used here was first developed in the United States from the 1970s. Since the 1990s, the term has been widely recognized both academically and in practice, as describing a large arena of organised – and increasingly of hardly organised – collective activities that follow certain criteria while

retaining wide differences amongst each other. These criteria may apply to organisations large and small, to institutions as well as to movements, and to hierarchical as well as to heterarchical organisms, regardless of their age, their vision and mission, and their actual contribution to society.

Civil society may be described as the citizens' arena[8], the place where citizens engage by their own free will, participate directly in affairs to do with the common good, and voice their concerns, ideas, criticism, and agreement. Lester Salamon's Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project[9] defined a number of principles that may decide whether an activity, a movement, an organisation, an institution should be considered part of this particular arena:

– access should be voluntary,
– the organisation should not be engaged in core government business,
– making a profit should not be a prime objective,
– the governance structure should be autonomous, and
– any profits made may not be distributed to members or owners.

By applying these criteria, collective societal activities may be grouped in three spheres, sectors, or arenas, grouped around a centre, constituted by the human individual. Man's closest affiliation, his immediate family, is considered to be part of this centre.

Interestingly, while acknowledging in principle that religious communities were part of the 'third sector', as was and of course still is customary in the United States, the empirical research undertaken by Salamon and his associates from 1988 did not include them for pragmatic reasons, thus however setting the tone for social scientists ever since. While there was never any doubt that faith-based charities were to be considered part of civil society, the exclusion of religious communities proper, added to the reluctance of religious uthorities to consider their organisations as civil society players, has left a gap to be filled.

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8 Viz. Graf Strachwitz, R. (2014): *Achtung vor dem Bürger*. Freiburg: Herder.
9 Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H. K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, W. S. and Associates (2004): Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999 / Lester M. Salamon and S. Wojciech Sokolowski (eds.), Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, vol. 2. Bloomfield CT: The Kumarian Press.

Figure 1: Model of social fields
Source: Maecenata Institut

For some years, the term 'third sector' was widely used to denominate what we today would call civil society. The term 'arena' is preferred here, as it implies movement and activity, plus a choice of entering and leaving it. This choice is indeed crucial and refers to the fundamental normative backdrop of this concept: that individual man (to include, of course, woman) is at the centre and outset of all societal action. Man's existence does not, as totalitarian theories have tended to assume, depend on the existence of a state or any other societal organism. Rather, all societal activities depend on the individual, who is adorned with his or her very own unalienable personality and dignity. Or, to put it in a principal-agent frame, the individual is the principal, and no societal organisation can ever aspire to be more than an agent.[10]

Each of these arenas is a necessary component of 21st century society, and each is dependent on the others in order for its players to be able to meet their obligations towards society. The failure to recognize and accept civil society as one of these arenas, while assuming that the state, or possibly the state and the market together were in a position to meet any societal challenge, is one of the reasons why the state and the market are seen as failing, while it is not, as has been suggested, this failure alone that has generated the emergence of the notion of civil society.

Civil society has existed in one form or another at least since the time of 'The Great Transformation', the 'Axial Age', first described by the German philosopher Karl Jas-

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10 See i.a.: Jensen, M. C and Meckling, W. H. (1976): Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976 (October), 3(4): 305–360.

pers in 1949[11], and later in more detail by Karen Armstrong[12] and others, to mean a period between the 8th and the 2nd century B.C., when a world-wide near-simultaneous transformation of thought and subsequently of society took place. Over the last two generations or so, a novel concept of civil society has emerged that differs from previous concepts, including the one put forward by Adam Ferguson in 1767.[13] The reasons why this transformation has taken place, are multifold. But they may have more to do with another 'Great Transformation', described by Karl Polanyi in 1944[14], than meets the eye. Polany analyzes the rise of modern capitalism as the driving force of society alongside and eventually crowding out the state. Implicitly, this generates the need of a public sphere not dominated either by the use of force nor by the persistant urge to compete. That religious communities should be part of this public sphere, may be derived from beliefs held by almost any religion. Again, this does not touch upon their fundamental mission, but resonates with providing services to the community at large, building communities, enabling individuals to seek personal fulfilment[15], often termed personal growth. Religious communities encourage giving as a basic instrument of communication with fellow-man, thus matching the concept of an alternative to mandatory enforcement and trading. In 1960, the French political economist Francois Perroux described giving as the attribute of what we call civil society, while force is associated with the state, and trading is associated with the market.[16]

Though civil society organisations (CSOs) command a considerable full-time and part-time workforce, the arena as such is based and relies heavily on volunteerism and philanthropy, described in modern terms as civic engagement, while this in turn takes place in civil society to a much higher degree than either in governmental or in private sector organisations. It is therefore quite clear that individual religious sentiment as a motivation to engage on one hand, and religious communities' affiliation to civil society make a readily explained match. We must recognize, however, that the resources in volunteer work and donations that civil society can command are nothing compared to what governments obtain from the citizens by way of taxes, and what the business community makes by selling goods and services. In this respect, civil society is the smallest of the three arenas. It requires to be cherished and empowered to help meet the challenges the whole of mankind is facing today and will face tomor-

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11 Jaspers, K. (1953): The Origin and Goal of History. English: Yale University Press.

12 Armstrong, K. (2006): The Great Transformation: The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions. New York: Knopf.

13 Ferguson, A. (1996) An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge University Press.

14 The Great Transformation The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Random House 2001.

15 viz. Foucault, M. (ed.) (1986): english: Care of the Self. New York: Random House.

16 Perroux, F. (1960): *Économie et société : contrainte, échange, don.* Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

row, and this will not change in the foreseeable future. But what is it that civil society can bring to the table?

Though philanthropic giving is by no means the prime source of civil society funding, it is most certainly a major driving force in empowering its agents. Empowered in this way, as Albert Hirschman rightly established in 1970, civil society organisations may engage in tasks that support existing societal systems ("loyal"), may distance themselves from mainstream society ("exit") or become an opposing force ("voice").[17] Under all three of these headings, we may see eight distinct role models for civil society organisms; many organisations are active in more than one:

– service provision,
– advocacy,
– watchdog,
– intermediary,
– self-help,
– community building,
– political discourse, and
– self-fulfilment.

These role models have developed over the past 30 years or so, both in practice and in theory. But since the American economist Richard Cornuelle first spoke of an independent sector beyond the state and the market in 1965[18], the discussion about the overall function of this sector or arena has never stopped. He argued that associations of volunteers could effectively solve social problems without recourse to heavy-handed bureaucracy, while governments in particular would prefer to see these associations and foundations support the government's work in a subservient fashion and neither question government decisions nor adopt any degree of independence. Little wonder that service-providing and intermediary organisations are popular with governments, while the self-help, self-fulfilment and community building roles are habitually overlooked, and advocacy, watchdog and political discourse roles are viewed with suspicion. Responding to pressure from the citizens, advocacy has found its way into tax exemption, and the watchdog role has gained acceptance for watching over excess market behaviour.

The public sector, and, somewhat strangely, the media, tend to belittle the role of civil society and use arguments to do with the rank of representative democracy to enhance their own role, while at the same time accepting the private sector – in other words, business – as a driving and quite regularly decisive force in determining policy.

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17 Hirshman, A. O. (1970): Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

18 Cornuelle, R. (1965): Reclaiming the American Dream. New York: Random House.

The most obnoxious civil society role model in the eyes of those caught up in the present system of government is civil society's demand to be heard as a contributor to public discourse – with one notable exception: In countries the government of which are seen as undemocratic in the sense that they have not taken on and/or said good-bye to principles Western democracies uphold, civil society that opposes the government is hailed as the expression of the people's will. We have seen this happen in the past, not least in the Central and Eastern Europe transformation process in the late 1980s.

There have been instances, when the growth in coherence, power and strength that civil society has gone through over the past generation or two, its ability to post societal needs and drive the issues, have been decisive. Care for the environment, gender issues, individual liberties, and indeed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the whole process of transition in 1989/1990 were driven by civil society action, by determined activists and philanthropists. And we may presume that this will happen again. The heterogenous, heterarchical and more often than not plainly chaotic structure of a CSO is quite obviously better suited to become a hotbed of new ideas and creative, and potentially disruptive innovation, than an orderly government agency and/or corporation. The way many business start-ups operate is proof of this rather sweeping statement. But this does not answer our question. Neither can the fact that a concept of civil society in its modern sense has by now developed over two generations, and that there is every reason to believe that civil society is here to stay, suffice. Nor will success alone make civil society action legitimate.

Civil Society may be seen today as a coherent group of collective movements, organisations, and institutions, which are in many ways hugely diverse, but do bear some common traits that allow us to distinguish them from organisations and institutions that form part of the state or the private (business) sector. If, contrary to Margaret Thatcher's famous quip, society is something that exists, and is not synonymous with the state or the nation, collective action in the public sphere takes place in one of these three arenas. The term arena implies that we are talking about areas of movement, action and change.

Both the impact and the legitimacy of civil society rest on a normative theory. Civil society is by no means inherently good. Just as there are good and bad governments, and honest traders and crooks in business, there exist, of course, CSOs we do not approve of, be this in a fundamental sense or simply because they have different views to ours. The Ku Klux Klan, the National Rifle Association of America, and, to name a German example, Pegida, are examples of the first, while a plethora of associations and foundations whose goals do not correspond to those of other may be among the second. This explains why there can be no representatives of the whole of civil society, much as governments would like to see predefined and universally accepted leaders when discussing and negotiating issues. This said, civil society players and their leaders may well assume overall leadership roles on grounds of personal

authority and reputation, and there is no reason why this role should not fall to religious leaders.

Clearly, normative principles are needed to decide whether or not an organisation may be considered "good", i.e. acceptable to society. Among them, one may determine some very general ones, such as

– a basic belief in the human being as the principal of worldly society,
– respect for other human beings, their distinct and possibly very different ways of life and convictions,
– adherence to basic societal principles such as human and civil rights, the rule of law, and government by the people for the people, and
– a belief in a pluralist society that allows for each and every individual to lead the life she or he wishes, provided this does not infringe on the life of others.

Furthermore, there are some that are specific to civil society, e.g.

– a strict priority for ideals and ideas rather than for personal material gains,
– a commitment to be accountable to the citizenry at large,
– an acknowledgement of everyone's right to assemble and associate, and
– an endorsement of a political role for civil society.

Some key findings of the project can be mentioned here:

1. The behaviour and attitudes of religious communities and their leaders is changing.
2. There remain wide differences in self-perception, ranging from "of course we are part of civil society" to "of course we are not".
3. The inclusion of religious communities changes the empirical evidence to do with civil society substantially.
4. Perception by others and self-perception show a divide between majority and minority communities. While the former may still cherish a notion of being partners of the state in an overall governance system, the latter have long since come to terms with being players in a pluralist arena.
5. Attempts by minority communities to achieve the same legal status as traditional majority communities are based on a dated concept[19], while majority communities might feel persuaded to reassess the underlying theory of their involvement in public affairs.[20]

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19 In Germany, where the established Christian Churches and the Jewish community enjoy a specific public status (Koerperschaft des oeffentlichen Rechts) under 1919/1949 constitutions, some Muslim communities have been lobbying to be granted the same status, while a number of smaller Christian communities and others are content in being registered as private civil law charitable organisations.
20 Pope Benedict XVI. was widely misunderstood – and was perhaps not absolutely clear in expressing what we meant to say, when remarking in a public speech in Freiburg in 2011: "In order to accomplish her mission, she [the Church] will need again and again to set herself apart from her surround-

Recent years have seen more recognition of the role of civil society. Yet, in countries like China, Egypt, Hungary, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and others, civil society is undergoing harassment, legal obstruction, and persecution. In particular, minority religious communities are among the harassed. Furthermore, issues of legitimacy and relevance are still being discussed – by professional politicians who continue to cherish the notion that they are in the drivers' seats, by mainstream academia, by the media who, when mentioning civil society, still prefer to report on the occasional scandal, or on local events rather than offering civil society full participation in the debate on public affairs.

Religious communities, well, albeit more often than not critically observed in the media, are put on the defensive. Arguments that entail their traditional role in society as guardians of public and personal ethics, and that insist on traditional privileges do not go down well.[21] Their position in public life is challenged, with diverse arguments being put forward. Not to be seen as singular institutions, but as part of a larger arena, while not in any way infringing on their mission, might enable them to come to terms with a transformed society. Whether this is a viable proposition and what this would mean for these communities and for civil society, which would, after all, gain a number of important large players, will be examined in the following chapters in this volume and in the second volume to come.

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ings, to become in a certain sense 'unworldly'." https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110925_catholics-freiburg.html (2018-11-06) His remark may be seen as implying that Church should disassociate itself from the worldly powers, i.e. the State, and not, as he was interpreted as having said, from the world as such.

21 E.g., a bitter battle is being fought in Spain, formerly considered to be one of "the" Catholic countries, between the Catholic hierarchy and the national government over the issue of ownership of real estate. The Church is said to be the largest landowner in the country, and is accused of illegitimately having assumed ownership of buildings and land (including the famous Mezquita-Catedral of Cordoba, built as a Mosque in the 8th century and turned into a Christian church in the 12th, incidentally a profitable business due to the fess charged for entering the building as a visitor.)

Pandora Dimanopoulou

From church diplomacy to civil society activism: the case of Bishop Irineos Galanakis in the framework of Greek German relations during the Cold War

1 Introduction

The current economic recession in Greece has renewed attention to two issues in the European political and economic debate. The first concerns the controversy over German reparations for the Nazi occupation of Greece. The second relates to numerous discussions surrounding the property of the Greek Orthodox Church, its tax-exempt status, and the role it should play in humanitarian and social crises. However, in spite of their topical resurgence, neither of these two issues is new; in fact, they have already been linked together in the past. A progressive former bishop of Kissamos and the Greek Orthodox Church of Germany, Irineos Galanakis (1911–2013),[1] sought throughout his episcopal mandate during the post-war years to establish an ambitious programme of economic and social development. Interestingly, this programme was financed not only by German Protestant churches but also by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In order to fully understand the nature of these relations and exchanges between Germany and Greece, we propose a study of developments in the religious field by examining the human networks of which they were composed. This chapter will investigate the role and objectives of intermediary actors both ecclesiastic and secular, clergymen and politicians – with common ideas and interests. It will also examine their establishment of the means of communication and understanding needed to make sense of and to facilitate the common action of such different groups.

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1 Irineos Galanakis was born in Nerochori, Apokoronas, Chania, on 10 November 1911. He studied at the Teaching School of Crete and then at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Athens, from which he graduated in 1937. He worked as a professor of theology at schools in the prefecture of Chania during the period 1938–1945. In 1945, he was ordained as a monk at the monastery of the Holy Trinity in Chania and, one year later, made deacon and then archimandrite. In December 1957, he was elected Bishop of Kissamos and Selinou, and, on 16 December 1971, he was elected Bishop of the Metropolis of Germany by the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. For its pre-eminence, the Metropolitan of Germany was recognised as the third official Church in the country. He resigned in 1980. On 26 January 1981, Metropolitan Irineos reverted to the bishopric of Kissamos and Selinon, from which he submitted his resignation on 24 August 2005 for health reasons.

From this perspective, this chapter aims to illuminate the role of religious organisations as civil society actors and to discuss what functions they can perform and what this history tells us about the role of religion in Greek civil society. In doing so, it attempts to broaden the field of research in two ways: (1) by casting churches as part of the civil society that operates within a field of interaction between public policies and endogenous local (as well as transnational) dynamics and (2) by integrating churches into broader transnational networks where they actively participated in economic exchanges, the transfer of capital and know-how, and the communication of ideas during the troubled Cold War period.

2 International upheaval, religious ferment: Christian churches after the Second World War

The launch of the European Union political project immediately after the Second World War marked the beginning of the quest of European societies to construct a common past through the shared history of European civilisation. The reference to religion as a criterion of identity and inclusion in this broader, but rather indefinable, concept of European civilisation brought a new approach to the relationship between politics and religion. It reintroduced churches and religious actors as part of civil society at the centre of political, social and international affairs. From the churches' perspective, in spite of the divisions that existed between the various Christian denominations and their different branches, willingness to contribute to the construction of a new world order and a shared dream for unity led to fairly serious collaborative initiatives by Christians throughout the twentieth century. With the moral and, more importantly, economic support of American political, civil, and religious actors, European churches sought to occupy a new place in the public sphere after the war and thus contribute to the rapprochement and reconciliation of a divided continent.

Immediately after the Second World War, the emerging 'communist threat' confronted the nations of Europe with a clear ideological battle. The resulting Cold War fostered transnational Christian democratic solidarity and cohesion in the face of Bolshevism as the common enemy. The president of the United States, Harry Truman, as well as European leaders including Winston Churchill tried to forge a religious, international, anti-communist front and endeavoured to make religion one of the principal arguments against communism.[2] Truman deliberately advanced contacts with

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2 While historians in the past ignored or underestimated the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious actors as an important variable during the Cold War period, recent works have begun to emphasise the involvement and the role of religion in this conflict. For example, during the last decade some studies have attempted to examine how religion has influenced foreign policy, interna-

Pius XII, and new relations between the US and the Vatican would serve thereafter as a barrier to communism. For its part, the Catholic Church strongly promoted the idea of a common 'Christian civilisation', constituting the matrix of European culture, in conflict with the materialism and totalitarianism of communism. The Vatican encouraged and supported, materially and morally, the Christian democratic parties that became the hegemonic political force in continental Western Europe instead of democratic socialism.[3]

For their part, the Protestant and Orthodox Churches established the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 in Amsterdam.[4] The formation of this international non-governmental organisation recognised that churches had to play a more central role in moves towards conciliation and unity after the disastrous war. Notwithstanding Karl Barth's admonishment that the function of the WCC was neither to concoct a 'Christian Marshall Plan' nor to pretend to be God's administrative technical experts, henceforward the WCC and its technocratic direction would try to intervene in secular world affairs by offering new, Christian social and political approaches.[5] Pluralistic in its beginnings, given that it had been formed as a fellowship of more than 140 churches, the WCC was wary of the Vatican–American anti-communist agenda. Its

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tional relations, and the domestic social policies of the US and Western Europe. See Chadwick, Owen (2002), *The Christian Church In The Cold War*, London: The Penguin Press; Kirby, Dianne (ed.) (2003), *Religion And The Cold War,* Hampshire And New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Krabbendam, Hans, Scott-Smith, Giles (2004), *The Cultural Cold War In Western Europe, 1945-60*, London and New York: Routledge; Leustean, Lucian (ed.), (2010), *Eastern Christianity And The Gold War*, London and New York: Routledge; Muelenbeck, Philip (ed.) (2012), *Religion And The Cold War, A Global Perspective,* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

3 For example, in the first elections after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 14 August 1949, the CDU/CSU (the alliance of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria) won 31 per cent of the vote—1.8 per cent more than the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In Italy, Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC, Christian Democracy), won 48.5 per cent in the national elections of 1948. In Holland, the Dutch Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP, Catholic People's Party) won 30.8 per cent in the elections for the Second Chamber in 1946, against 28.3 per cent for the Social Democrats. In France, the newly founded Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement) achieved 28.2 per cent of the vote in the national elections of June 1946. In Belgium, the Parti Social Chrétien-Christelijke Volkspartij (PSC-CVP, Christian Social Party) easily became the largest party in 1946, when it obtained 42.5 per cent of the vote in national elections.

4 The WCC is a fellowship of churches. It constitutes the most important initiative for the rapprochement at an inter-ecclesiastical level between the Orthodox and Protestant Churches.

5 Barth, Karl (1948): "No Christian Marshall Plan," *Christian Century*, pp.1330–1333.

first general secretary, Willem Visser 't Hooft,[6] did not hesitate to declare that "the Iron Curtain did not and would not exist for ecumenists."[7]

Two key reasons, among others, lay behind the WCC's attitude. The first was related to the WCC's wish to incorporate the Russian Orthodox Church into the ecumenical movement. As Visser 't Hooft argued, "'The entrance of the Russian Church upon the ecumenical scene would mean the introduction of a definitely political element in our supra-political movement.'"[8] The second motive was dictated by the efforts of the council to support German Protestant leaders who endeavoured to sustain confessional unity and religious freedom in the east of the country. These leaders worried that the division of Germany would leave over 80 per cent of their parishioners under Soviet and East German influence.[9] As a result, the council became increasingly reluctant after 1948 to follow Truman and Pius XII's crusade, despite their deep distaste for communism.[10] Realists rather than anti-communists, the leaders of the WCC did not agree to back President Truman, who met with them personally in June 1950, pleading with them to contribute to promoting 'Christian civilisation' against immoral forces. On the contrary, German church leaders feared that such a policy only strengthened the power of the Soviets and pushed more Germans to embrace communism.[11] But this is not to say that the WCC did not seek engagement on the global political stage. On the contrary, the establishment of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs dates back to 1946.[12]

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6 Willem Visser 't Hooft (20 September 1900–4 July 1985) was a Dutch clergyman and theologian who led the WCC as its secretary-general from 1948 to 1966. He emerged as a pivotal figure in the ecumenical movement during the post-war decades. Visser 't Hooft played a major role in the inclusion of churches from communist countries in the WCC, and he also sought to enlarge the role played by African, Asian, and Orthodox churches in the organisation. His efforts to include the Roman Catholic Church as a member proved unsuccessful, however.

7 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, quoted in Kirby, Diane (2010): "Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti- Communist Front," *Contemporary British History*, 15 (4), pp. 35-70, p.64.

8 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, quoted in Nicole, Jacques and Bitter Jean-Nicolas (1993): "The WCC and the Question of Human Rights in Eastern Europe," *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 21, Iss. 3-4, pp. 257–262.

9 Wyneken, Jon David, "The Western Allies, German Churches, and the Emerging Cold War in Germany, 1948–1952," in Muehlenbeck, Philip (2012), *Religion and the Cold War: A Global perspective,* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, p. 19.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs is tasked with advising on public policy and advocacy. See: Peiponen, Matti (2012), *Ecumenical Action in World Politics: The Creation of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, 1945–1949*, doctoral dissertation, Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

2.1 Irineos Galanakis in Europe

Following his studies at the University of Athens, Irineos Galanakis continued his education in theology and sociology in both France and Germany during the early 1950s. As a fellow of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his residence in France, he had the chance to conceive of a theoretical approach for European churches (Catholic and Protestant) for teachings relevant to the social problems of the time. This theoretical approach was implemented by Christian parties (known today as People's Parties in Europe), which helped in the evolution of European nations (France, Germany, Italy) into post-war European societies.[13]

The historical archives of the Catholic University of Paris show that the curriculum developed by Irineos consisted of four themes. The first included a series of financial and monetary courses that placed special emphasis on political economy, international economic relations, and economic theories of the social economic market immediately after the Second World War, and how they linked with the social doctrine and model of the Catholic Church. The second theme included lessons related to labour law, company law, and business law. The third theme was sociological, with special emphasis on family sociology, demographics, immigration, urbanisation, and the working class. The final theme was intended to be the practical teaching of the programme and was related to the mission of the church in the contemporary world, including visits of students to factories as well as visits to and actions in working, popular, and industrial districts in French cities and provinces.[14] During this period, Irineos was actively involved with the seminar Mission de France, whose course of action had started in 1941 with the goal of counteracting the de-Christianisation of French society via immediate action of clergymen in the social field, in factories, and in rural areas, opposing not only the conservatism and elitism of the urban class but also the progressive Stalinism that aimed to reduce the influence of Christianity.[15]

This quest for a 'third way', which began, in effect, at the end of the Second World War and preoccupied Christian intellectuals, henceforth coincided with Irineos Galanakis's presence in the heart of Europe at a time when discussion concerning

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13 Galanakis, Irineos (1991): Speech in the Historical and Folklore Society of Crete, Chania, 18 December 1991: Στα έτη 1951-52 πηγαίνοντας για σπουδές στη Γαλλία παρακολούθησα Μαθήματα χριστιανικής Κοινωνιολογίας (Λίλλη - Παρίσι) και είδα πως οι Ευρωπαϊκές Εκκλησίες (Καθολικές - Προτεσταντικές) είχαν μια θεωρητική διδασκαλία στα κοινωνικά προβλήματα της εποχής μας και συγχρόνως παρουσίαζαν μια πρακτική εφαρμογή της με τη δημιουργία των χριστιανικών κομμάτων, (αυτά που ονομάζονται σήμερα στην Ευρώπη Λαϊκά Κόμματα) και βοήθησαν το πέρασμα των Ευρωπαϊκών Λαών (Γαλλία, Γερμανία, Ιταλία) στις μεταπολεμικές Κοινωνίες.
14 Archives de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, Institut des Sciences Sociales, Année scolaire 1951–1952, dossier Organisation des études.
15 Cavalin, Tangi, and Nathalie Viet-Depaule (2007): Une histoire de la Mission de France: la riposte missionnaire, 1941-2002, Karthala, Paris.

these issues was at its peak, thus giving him the chance to accustom himself to different post-war conceptual approaches to growth and production. These preliminary discussions held in Christian democratic circles were related to the restoration of a liberal, democratic, humane society and economy. Relying upon the theory of Thomas Aquinas, who condemned borrowing with interest both in general and in terms of Catholic social doctrine, many economists declared that post-war development should be grounded in a new production model. This model would, presumably, equate with neither the antebellum liberal capitalism nor the equally antisocial doctrinal communism but consist instead of the 'social market economy'.[16]

The German sociologist and economist Alfred Müller-Armack,[17] who first used the term social market economy, introduced a new theory and interpretation of the bonds among society, state, and economy, differentiated from hitherto dominant economic theory. According to the social market economy model, these sectors are considered to be connected entities, which liaise in order to achieve growth and sustainability in their targets. Archives of the Catholic University of Paris reveal that Irineos followed a series of lectures by Alfred Müller-Armack at that institution. It seems likely that the influence of the German economist's ideas subsequently led Irineos to Frankfurt. Irineos thus had the opportunity to play an active role in the ecumenical movement and the WCC, establishing a network with not only the Protestant members of the latter but also French Catholics and German Evangelicals. As soon as Constantinople's new Ecumenical Patriarchate Athenagoras[18] was elected, the two men began

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16 Mitchell, Maria (2012): *The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany*, Michigan: Michigan University Press, p. 162; See also: Kalaydjian, Albert, Portelli, Hugues (1988), *Les démocrates-chrétiens et l'économie sociale de marché*, Paris: Economica.

17 Pointing out that economy has to serve humanity, Alfred Müller-Armack introduced the theory of the social market economy in 1946. See: Müller-Armack, Alfred (1965): "The Principles of the Social Market Economy," in Koslowski, Peter, *The social Market Economy, Theory and Ethics of the Economic Order*, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 255–274; Glossner, Christian, Gregosz, David (2011): *The Formation And Implementation Of The Social Market Economy By Alfred Müller-Armack And Ludwig Erhard*, Sankt Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Dietzfelbinger Daniel (2000); "Von der Religionssoziologie zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Leben und Werk Alfred Müller-Armacks," *Politische Studien*, 51 (373): pp. 85-99; Peacock Alan, Willgerodt Hans (1989), *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

18 Athenagoras was born on 6 April 1886 and died on 7 July 1972. During the years 1931–1948, when he was Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, Athenagoras cultivated relationships with United States presidents and other officials. He was respected by President Truman, receiving praise at the White House for his leadership in the work of the Greek War Relief Association. When Athenagoras was elected Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in 1948, the president provided Athenagoras his plane as transport to Istanbul. President Truman viewed Athenagoras and the Ecumenical Patriarchate as influential and crucial partners in the furtherance of US international interests and humanitarian values in the struggle against communism. Athenagoras was Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople from 1 November 1948 until his death. He undoubtedly contributed the

their collaboration. Like Athenagoras, Irineos wished to develop closer relations with the churches of the West in order for the Greek Orthodox Church to participate in and benefit from the international discussions of the Cold War era.

3 A bishop as civil society actor

In 1957, two years after the election of Athenagoras, Irineos was elected Metropolitan by the Synod of the Church of Crete, a semi-autonomous church that fell directly under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople rather than the autocephalous Church of Greece.[19] During this period, the Church of Crete was the only Orthodox church in Europe under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and it was far from bereft of followers. It had an advantage over the Greek Orthodox Church in its independence from the Greek state. Moreover, it was not under the control of the highly conservative mainland religious organisations, also at the service of the state, whose discourse proved to be an obstacle to the Greek Orthodox Church's new relationship with the West. It was within this context that Metropolitan Irineos Galanakis took the initiative to develop a closer relationship with German Protestant churches as well as to secure new financial and technical support for a number of economic development projects.

What was the political, economic, and social context in which Irineos had to work? The Second World War and the Greek Civil War had wrought havoc on the Greek economy and Greek society, resulting in innumerable deaths, the destruction of the basic infrastructure of the state, famine, inflation, and collapse of the currency and of the banking system. Poverty and unemployment were everywhere visible. Moreover, Greece soon became one of the battlefields of the Cold War. Following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the US offered military and financial aid to the Greek state, contributing to the victory of the government's forces over the Democratic Army in the Greek Civil War. This subsidy also made the reconstruction of the country feasible and secured the re-establishment of a bourgeois regime. Neverthe-

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most to the rapprochement between Orthodoxy and other Christian churches during the twentieth century.

19 The status of the semi-autonomous Church of Crete is unique in being under the canonical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which nominates the island's presiding bishop from a list of three Cretan bishops prepared by the Greek Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs. The church's affairs are, however, otherwise handled by the Holy Provincial Synod of Crete.

less, despite the development boosted by foreign aid, the economic and social status of the state remained extremely poor.[20]

Improvement began in 1950. The Greek economy displayed remarkable growth potential, and the indicator of gross national product (GDP), which initially hovered at approximately 100 units, reached the 300-unit level in only a decade. This tripling of GDP – considered as absolute as well as relative magnitude – reflects the growth of the Greek economy during this period. However, development between 1950 and 1970 was not homogeneous throughout Greece, and differences between rural and urban districts raised concern. Athens as a capital became, abruptly, the focus of unprecedented economic activity. The influx of labour, combined with savings from the rest of Greece, increased production, which in turn led to further investment. This peculiar development of the Greek economy, following an also peculiar policy of Keynesianism (according to which activation of investing mechanisms was not based on the expansion of public expenditure), along with a continuous influx of labour, small businessmen, and small capital to a single geographic point, led to a huge wave of rural–urban migration (urbanisation).[21]

With Athens as the development model of the country, the provinces that offered human resources and small funds remained inert and, in certain cases, paralysed. Small and medium-sized urban districts went through a stagnation period or suffered visible inflation, and the rural mainland started to confront an intense demographic problem. Large cities progressed at the expense of rural areas, bringing changes to the terms of commercial transactions between the producers in the rural areas, much to the benefit of the urban environment.[22] It was exactly this disproportionality and the lack of support for the provinces from central state mechanisms, in western Crete and more specifically the provinces of Kissamos and Selinos in the prefecture of Chania, that led Irineos Galanakis to take drastic measures to serve the common good. But what functions could Irineos perform as a civil society actor?

Greek civil society is historically weak in comparison with that of most other European countries. This weakness is attributable to multiple complex causes. How-

20 Iordanoglou, Chrysafis (2009): *The Greek economy in the Long Duration Experience 1945–2005*, Athens: Polis; Millward, A. (1984): *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51*, Berkeley: University of California Press; Hogan, M. (1987): *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

21 Stathakis, George (2002): "Η απρόσμενη οικονομική ανάπτυξη στις δεκαετίες του '50 και '60: η Αθήνα ως αναπτυξιακό υπόδειγμα" (The unexpected economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s: Athens as a development model), in Kaifa, Ourania (ed.) (2002): *Η εκρηκτική εικοσαετία 1949–1967* (The explosive twenty years, 1949–1967), Athens: Society of Modern Greek Civilization and Education, pp.43-65.

22 Stathakis (2002), p. 51.

ever, most scholars agree that church–state relations are among the most important.[23] In Greece, the interdependence of state and church can be traced to the creation of a national autocephalous church at the time of the progressive dissolution of the Orthodox millet of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the necessities and priorities of the nation-state. As Victor Roudemetof argues, the Church of Greece of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople surrendered its autonomy to the state.[24] Autocephaly was envisaged as an instrument for making the church part of the state mechanism. It is noteworthy that autocephaly was proclaimed with a decree in July 1833 by the king of Greece and not by the council of the church. In the years that followed, the Greek state managed to reduce the church's autonomy by offering the clergy some privileges, including salaries and social and political power that sprang from the state's authority and prestige.

This preferential relation between the state and the church provoked the 'nationalisation' of religion, which in turn partly explains the weakness of Greek civil society. Satisfied with its secured status and clear 'national' role, the Greek Orthodox Church has not advanced a strong social presence and civic engagement by means of parallel institutions such as religious schools, charities, and youth associations. Furthermore, the church has been unwilling put pressure on the state in the interest of other social groups that might jeopardise its privileges.

Nevertheless, even though Irineos, as a bishop, was also a civil servant of the state, he was influenced by his time in Western Europe as well as by the social work of Catholic and Protestant churches, and wished to involve the local church actively in social and economic development in his diocese of Kissamos. He began with a strategy to strengthen the education system by creating new structures such as agricultural and technical schools, including boarding schools, to offer specialist training for the growing labour force. Conversely, by organising and developing cooperative societies – public limited companies with many stakeholders in every sector of the economy (e.g. ANEK-ETANAP[25]) – he was able to pursue a new production model that would create higher incomes and more jobs in the agricultural sector.

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23 Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Houliaras & Dimitris Sotiropoulos (eds.) (2015): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline*. Ashgate Publishing ; Danopoulos, Constantine, (2004): "Religion, Civil Society, and Democracy in Orthodox Greece", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Vol. 6, Iss. 1; Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos (2016): Economic crisis and civil society in Greece new forms of engagement & 'deviations' from the past, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1231508 ; Huliaras, Asteris (2014): *The Dynamics of Civil Society in Greece: Creating civic engagement from the top*, The Jean Monnet papers on political economy, available online: https://www.uop.gr/images/files/huliaras.pdf
24 Roudemetof, Victor (2001): Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans, Greenwood Publishing Group, p.106.
25 ETANAP was formed by Irineos Galanakis in 1978 and began operations during 1980. Today, it is a diversified company with important shareholders. Since 2000, its share capital has increased, and

Irineos contributed to the creation of ANEK Lines SA, a cooperative company. The impetus for its creation was the shipwreck of the *Herakleion*, a ferry plying the Chania–Piraeus route, in December of 1966. A few days after the shipwreck, the economist Kostas Archontakis conceived a company with broad public participation in which anyone could buy a share. Archontakis shared his thoughts with his friend and colleague Giannis Tzamarioudakis. Both agreed that the success of the project depended on the establishment of trust. In order to persuade people to invest their life's savings in an unprecedented endeavour with uncertain chances for success, a person with high prestige was needed to lead the effort. Bishop Irineos was the obvious choice. According to Irineos's testimony, "People wanted the church to lead this project and they were looking at me. I replied that my contribution was only to ensure the people's trust. They used to say: 'Irineos is reliable; we shall not lose our money.'" Indeed, Irineos's role was decisive. Even the poorest peasants sold one sheep, or a blanket to buy one share. Moreover, Irineos's personal influence and prestige easily opened the doors of ministries and public offices so that the company's affairs could proceed efficiently.[26] According to Irineos, the role of civil society is not to oppose the state but rather to work with it towards shared goals.[27]

3.1 A religious academy as a hub for exchange, reconciliation, and development

Immediately after the conclusion of the Second World War, German Protestant churches were among the first non-state actors to discuss the subject of German guilt for the crimes of National Socialism. A meeting was convened in Stuttgart in October 1945 by the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany with representatives of various European and American Protestant churches in attendance, during which German churches made an admission of guilt 'for the suffering which was inflicted on many countries and their peoples'.[28] Some years later, during the Synod of the German Protestant Church in 1958, the jurist and German Evangelical Lothar Kreyssig, member of the governing board of the Evangelical Church in Germany, founded the organisation Action Reconciliation Service for Peace (Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste) with a group of Protestants who had been active in the resistance against the Nazi regime. In its appeal for peace, the purpose of the organisation was outlined:

ETANAP has become one of the most modern bottling plants in Greece, with production and sales points worldwide.

26 Irineos Papers, File: Anek.
27 Galanakis, Irineos, (1961): "The Christian's Political Responsibility," speech, Chania January 1961.
28 "Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt," in Hockenos, Matthew (2004): *A Church Divided, German Protestant Confront the Nazi Past*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

> We Germans began the Second World War, and by this, more than anyone else, we are responsible for mankind's immeasurable suffering. Germans, in sinful rebellion against God, killed millions of Jews. Those of us alive today who had not wanted this, did not do enough to prevent it [...] We ask the nations who suffered from our violence to permit us, with our hands and resources, to do something good in your land. Let us build a village, a settlement, a church, a hospital, or whatever else that you want for the public welfare as a sign of reconciliation.[29]

Thus, this group aimed to reconcile the peoples and sections of society that had been subjected to the threat of extermination by German National Socialism, and to develop the means to establish long-term peace.[30]

Crete, of course, was one of the places that had suffered under Nazi occupation. After its rapid occupation of the Greek mainland, the German army was attracted by the island's advantages of a good location in the Mediterranean and 'potentially great strategic value'.[31] The German conquest and occupation of Crete, begun on 20 May 1941, subjected its inhabitants to great brutality. Surprised and angered by the resistance of Cretan civilians and alleging that the Hague Convention[32] guaranteed military courtesy only to professional soldiers, the German invaders felt free to punish and exterminate armed and unarmed civilians indiscriminately for opposing the occupation. The commanding general, Kurt Student, issued an order to begin a wave of brutal punishments against the local population, to be carried out rapidly by the same units who had been confronted by the locals. Among the villages destroyed in reprisal was Kandanos, where on 3 June, two days after the fall of Crete, German forces razed its buildings and executed about 180 of its inhabitants. Before leaving, they erected three signs in Greek and German, explaining their reasons for the massacre and promising that Kandanos would never be rebuilt.[33] After the war, Kandanos became the

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29 Skriver, Ansgar (1961): *Aktion Sühnezeichen. Brücken über Blut und Asche*, Stuttgart: Kreus Verlag, p. 5.

30 Hestermann, Jenny (2014): *Atonement or Self-Experience? On the Motivations of the First Generation of Volunteers of Action Reconciliation for Peace*, Working Paper 129/2014, Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Marom, Lilach (2007): "On Guilt and Atonement. Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste and Its Activity in Israel," in: *Yad Vashem Studies* 35, pp. 187-220; Wienand, Christiane (2012): "From Atonement to Peace? Aktion Sühnezeichen, German Israeli Relations and the Role of Youth in Reconciliation Discource and Practice," in Schwelling, Birgit, *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory: Transnational Initiatives in the 20th and 21st Century,* Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 201-238.

31 Fleischer, Hagen (June 1992): "Γεωστρατηγικά σχέδια της Ναζιστικής Γερμανίας για τη μεταπολεμική Κρήτη" (German Geostrategic Plans for the postwar Crete), *Ta Historika*, vol. 9, nº.16, pp. 135-158; See also: Harper, Glyn, "Crete," in McGibbon, Ian (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 123.

32 "Laws and Customs of War On Land," (Hague IV), Convention signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, available on: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0631.pdf.

33 'Hier stand Kandanos. Es wurde zerstört für die Ermordung von 25 deutschen Soldaten'- «Εδώ υπήρχε η Κάνδανος Καταστράφη προς εξιλασμό της δολοφονίας 25 Γερμανών Στρατιωτικών»; 'Zur Vergeltung der bestialischen Ermordung eines Fallschirmjägerzuges u. eines Pionierhalbzuges durch

focus of German efforts at restitution and reconciliation. Immediately after founding Action Reconciliation Service for Peace, Lothar Kreyssig approached Metropolitan Irineos to propose collaboration for the purpose of rebuilding the village.[34] (Kreyssig was connected by friendship with the Greek professor of theology Nikolaos Louvaris,[35] who had been Irineos's professor in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Athens.) After four years of intense preparations and negotiations between the organisation and the Greek side, a team of German students arrived in Crete and began work in 1963.[36] This effort, which had a much broader scope, was the foundation of the Orthodox Academy of Crete. During a period of transformation and reconciliation in Germany and Greece, the project of the Orthodox Academy emerged from different impulses on both sides: pragmatism and altruism.

Even during the war, a group of active theologians and pastors connected with the so-called Confessing Church, the movement that sought to resist the inroads of Nazi ideology into the Protestant community, had engaged in a continuing dialogue about the role of the church after the hoped-for demise of the Nazi regime. These leaders included Harald Poelchau (1903–1975), Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906–1986), Helmut Gollwitzer (1908–1993), and Eberhard Müller (1906–1989). All these men grew up un-

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bewaffnete Männer u. Frauen aus dem Hinterhalte wurde Kandanos zerstört' - «ως αντίποινων των από οπλισμένων ανδρών και γυναικών εκ των όπισθεν δολοφονηθέντων Γερμανών στρατιοτόν κατεστράφη η Κάνδανος» ; 'Für die bestiale Ermordung Deutscher Fallschirmjäger, Gebirgsjäger und Pioniere von Männern, Frauen und Kindern, zusammen mit dem Pfarrer, sowie, weil sie gegen das Großdeutsche Reich Widerstand geleistet haben, wurde am 3.6.41 KANDANOΣ vom Grunde zerstört um niemals wieder aufgebaut zu werden.' - «Δια την κτηνώδη δολοφονίαν Γερμανών αλεξιπτωτιστών, αλπινιστών και του μηχανικού από άνδρας, γυναίκας και παιδιά και παπάδες μαζύ και διότι ετόλμησαν να αντισταθούν κατά του μεγάλου Ράιχ κατεστράφη την 3-6-1941 η Κάνδανος εκ θεμελίων, δια να μην επαναοικοδομηθεί πλέον ποτέ».

34 Some months later, the Germans decided to disassociate Louvaris from their efforts in Greece because of his collaboration with the occupation regime in Greece and his political views. See EZA, 97/562: 'Je länger ich mir das überlege, desto weniger geeignet scheint mir gerade Louvaris zu sein, den Mittelsmann abzugeben. Abgesehen von seiner politischen Belastung ist er in seinem Alter auch ausgesprochen unzuverlässig und vergisst viel.'

35 Nikolas Louvaris was a Greek theologian, university professor, and member of the Academy of Athens. He studied at Rizarios School (1900–1903) and the Theological School of Athens (1904-1908). Between 1911 and 1914, he studied hermeneutics, theology, philosophy, and pedagogy at the University of Leipzig. Louvaris was influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, was opposed to historical materialism, and remained faithful to his professors' positivism, to Wilhelm Dilthey and Sprangke, and thus to Immanuel Kant. During the occupation of Greece by the Axis, Louvaris maintained close relations with German authorities in Greece, and he served as minister of education during the third occupation government of Ioannis Rallis (7 April 1943–12 October 1944). See: Dardavesis, Theodoros (ed.), *Nikolaos Louvaris: The philosopher, Teacher and Theologian*, Thessaloniki, Filoptoxos adelfotis andron Thessalonikis, 2011; Siotis, Markos, *Nikolaos Louvaris*, Athens, 1965; Spranger, Eduard, "Gedenken an Nikolaos Louvaris", *Universitas* 17, 1962, pp. 457-468.

36 Brot für die Welt Papers, AIII. Diakonisches Werk der EKD, BfdW-P: Vrot für die Welt–Projekte 1959.

der the Weimar Republic, which had shaped their understanding of reality, their personal attitudes to politics and piety, and their position on the role of the church in society. Each represents, in his own way, the new orientation of German Protestantism in different areas of social action after 1945.[37]

Helmut Thielicke, who became an influential theologian after the war, had the idea of founding a new institution as the church's contribution towards preventing tyranny like that of the Third Reich from ever returning to German government. This idea came to fruition with the foundation of the Protestant Academy Bad Boll (Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll), established in 1945. The founding director of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller,[38] had also been affiliated with the Confessing Church and was a passionate anti-Nazi. The idea of the academy spread rapidly, and similar centres sprang up not only throughout East and West Germany but also all around Europe. The Protestant Academy was to have two goals: to train the laity for service to society and to be a place for free and open discussion about social problems, especially between different groups. Dialogue was one of the main concerns in the academy's conception. Müller summed it up in a phrase describing the academy as 'forum, not factor'.[39]

In October 1958, Irineos sent his pupil and closest associate Alexandros Papaderos to Germany in order to undertake doctoral studies at the University of Mainz. Aside from their shared desire to study, the two men, master and disciple, were above all moved by the aim of making Papaderos a sort of emissary between Crete, its ecclesiastical authorities, and German religious and political authorities, establishing a network through which knowledge and capital could be transferred for the modernisation of Cretan society. While Alexandros Papaderos was residing in Mainz, he developed intense and productive relations with the director of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller, and, through him, with the political and ecclesiastical authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany. Located in an economically and socially developed industrial region, the post-war Protestant Academy embodied a perfect model upon which a similar project in Crete could be based. Between 1963 and 1964, Alexandros Papaderos participated in intellectual discussions and religious practices in Bad

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37 Bolewski, Hans (2009): *Die Idee der Akademie: Versuch der Geschichte einer Akademie aus der Sicht eines Beteiligten*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

38 Eberhard Müller was born in 1906 in Stuttgart. He was involved in the German Christian Students' Union and was its general secretary from 1934. In 1946, he co-founded the first Protestant Academy in Germany, which he led until 1972. He died in 1989 in Heidelberg. See: Grünzinger, Gertraud, "Müller Eberhard," in: Betz, Hans Dieter, Browning, Don, Janowski, Bernd and Jüngel, Eberhard, *Religion Past and Present*. Consulted online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_SIM_14553>; Müller, Eberhard (1987), *Widerstand und Verständigung, fünfzig Jahre Erfahrungen in Kirche und Gesellschaft 1933-1983*, Stuttgart: Calwer.

39 Berger, Peter, *The Church as a Forum*, available on: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/03/16/the-Church-as-a-forum/.

Boll, developing an understanding of how the academy was organised that he would later put into practice during his directorship of the Orthodox Academy of Crete.[40]

The capacity of Papaderos to assemble different influential personalities in his network led to the creation of the Orthodox Academy of Crete, financed by Germany and organised according to the model of the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll. His reconciliatory work stemmed both from official, pragmatic contacts and from deeply personal relationships that engendered a genuine change of mind and action from both sides, Greek and German. Greece's argument was that German financing for such a project was a way of asking forgiveness for crimes committed by the Nazi regime: in effect, an indirect compensation for part of the cost of post-war reparations. Dedicated on 13 October 1968, the Orthodox Academy represented something of an innovation for Greece, and it became the starting point for the dynamic interventionism of the Orthodox Church in social affairs and the formation of social doctrine. The academy would take the lead in researching the economic and social problems that, according to its members, should become the focal point of intellectual discussion, not only between Greece and Germany but also in the wider ecumenical community.

Like the German academies, the Orthodox Academy of Crete was founded to serve the renewal of the church as well as the social integration and economic development of the country. Legally, the academy is an independent charitable foundation (corporation under private law). It is under the spiritual sponsorship of His Holiness the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and administrated by a board of nine members. Financially, it is supported through the fees of conference participants, contributions from ecumenical bodies, and gifts from individuals, churches, and organisations.[41]

According to the constitution that was adopted in accordance with the law on 16 January 1970 and confirmed by royal decree on 15 December 1970, the Orthodox Academy pursues the following aims:

1. To nurture and train priests and laymen to enable them to bear, in the context of Greek Orthodox spirituality, a living witness to the Gospel in the modern world;
2. To conduct research into economic, social, and spiritual problems on the basis of the Christian Orthodox point of view and in relation to the traditions and the needs of the Greek people;
3. To contribute to the work of the Orthodox mission, especially in Africa; and
4. To grant technical and material assistance for the development of the country and for charity and community projects.[42]

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40 Papaderos, Alexandros (2014): *Με τον Κισάμου και Σελίνου Ειρηναίον Επί τραχείας οδού* (With the Bishop Irineos of Kissamos and Selinon on a Rough Road), Thessaloniki: Methexis.
41 Orthodox Academy of Crete Papers, Folder: Foundation of the Academy, File: Mandate and Work of the Academy.
42 OAC Papers, op. cit.

In order to accomplish these aims, the academy organised short meetings, seminars, courses, and educational events on the local, national, and international levels.[43] According to the academy, the church was called upon to move beyond its conceptual framework and search for new methods and channels through which it could offer the 'bread of life' in a way that was understandable to the modern world. Thus the academy aimed be a place of encounter where, in the context of a concrete situation or the topic of a conference, an attempt was made to illuminate human existence in the light of the gospel by means of 'social dialogue'. The pursuit of social dialogue has been directly influenced and inspired by the model of the Academy of Plato and the Platonic tradition of *symphilosophein* (philosophising together). German Protestant academies have adopted the same model. Helmut Thielicke, in his 1943 memorandum on future Protestant Academy work, had developed the concept of 'common consideration' through discourse. The founder of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller, also outlined influences from the ancient tradition in his effort to establish the academy as a forum.

Occupying a special place in the work of the Orthodox Academy of Crete, social dialogue refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations, and joint actions involving organisations or persons representing different interests, ideologies, political forces, and professional and economic ties. During a period of transition, Greek society was becoming increasingly pluralistic and thus was being drawn into the confrontation of new questions. In the view of the academy, the church would accomplish its 'ministry of reconciliation' among men and nations only if it authentically proclaimed the gospel of love and peace as the core of social dialogue.[44]

The Orthodox Academy's participation in this dialogue permitted it to assume a broader sociopolitical role than other religious institutions. Some years after the war, when the Greek state faced great economic and political instability, faith in the government was understandably weak. Civil society looked instead to the academy as a vehicle for change. Likewise, the academy sought the participation of civil society in its efforts.

4 From church diplomacy to civil society activism

The Orthodox Academy's role in social dialogue and public affairs within the new political context of the Cold War raises questions surrounding its foundation. It is not clear that Irineos intended to establish an academy. The records suggest that he

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43 Ibid. During the first three years of its work (1968–1971), more than 100 encounters of this kind were organised by the Orthodox Academy of Crete, with the participation of more than 11,000 persons from Greece and abroad.
44 Ibid.

wanted to create an institute for the promotion of social cohesion and economic growth, free from state control and directly involved in economic, social, and political activity. His purpose was to allow the church to offer practical solutions to the problems of the 1960s. But an institute could not be financed by the central aid service for development of the Evangelical Church in Germany, which in turn was financed by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – a federal body that stipulated financial assistance be strictly reserved for third-world countries. As Greece did not qualify for such aid, the term 'academy' was deemed more suitable.[45] Negotiations between the two parties finally resulted in the founding of an academy that would function as a branch of the Protestant academies.

The symbolism of reconciliation that the foundation of the Orthodox Academy offered should not obscure the fact that in this timeframe, the creation of a Greek–German network was desirable at both the ecclesiastical and political levels. It was part of a plan for new Greek–German relations together with the European orientation of Greek foreign policy. In terms of ecclesiastical politics, the connection of Irineos to German ecclesiastic networks put him in communication with the Evangelical Church in Germany, which enjoyed direct contact with western Germany's political and academic elite.

Moreover, Crete was gaining particular geostrategic significance as the Cold War intensified. Discussions about the creation of an academy coincide with a period of intense public dialogue on how the island could benefit from accelerated growth, mostly thanks to the influx of foreign and private funds after two decades of wars. Pressure brought to bear by local authorities and members of parliament induced Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis to include Crete in the regional development programme in 1961. Prime Minister George Papandreou followed a similar policy in his government statements of 1964. In 1962, the Regional Development Agency of Crete was founded and incorporated into the Ministry of Planning with the aim of facilitating the implementation of projects and the provision of information to the executives of the state development plan.

Crete also became an American military base. The history of US interest in Souda Bay goes back to 1947, when the first Hellenic–American defence cooperation contracts were discussed and signed. The idea of using Souda's port was formulated in 1950, and construction started two years later. The first American Mennonites came to Crete as American soldiers were arriving. The Mennonite Central Committee, created in Washington, DC, at the same time, created a considerable network of influence and cooperation with the American government. As soon as the Marshall Plan was put into action, the Mennonites found themselves in Europe, with a base in Germany.[46]

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45 Papaderos (2014): p. 119.
46 Bush, Perry (1998): Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties, Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press; Miller, Keith Graber (1996): Wise as Serpents,

Bishop Irineos invited the Mennonites to assist in agricultural development. His first plan for subsidising his planned institute was submitted to the European service of Mennonites in Frankfurt in July 1960. Both parties agreed that the executive Mennonite committee would assist Bishop Irineos for eight years. Their collaboration began in 1965 with the establishment of an agricultural development centre, a showcase for improved methods of agricultural production providing improved seeds, purebred livestock, and agricultural education for farmers in western Crete.[47] The partnership was not always easy. On the one hand, Irineos needed the Mennonites' moral, practical, and financial support; on the other, he questioned their motives and practices, especially their proselytism.[48] Over time, his clear preference for Germany, shared by Alexander Papaderos, who had become the Orthodox Academy's general director, would leave no place for the Mennonites.

Further complications followed the coup d'état of the junta of the colonels. Despite initial embarrassment, Germany maintained diplomatic relations with Greece, adopting a wait-and-see attitude in an attempt not only to avoid isolating the country but also to secure German interests and transnational agreements. The Evangelical Church in Germany was similarly cautions, encouraging its hierarchy to avoid condemnatory statements that could jeopardise the Orthodox Academy's ongoing work. The academy was finally inaugurated in September of 1968, one year after the imposition of dictatorship.

The colonels' political and economic policy caused them to oppose Irineos Galanakis, who was eventually deposed from his metropolitan throne in Kissamos and transferred to the Metropolis of Germany. (The junta appointed Litton Industries, an American company, to plan and implement Crete's development programme, over protests by the Orthodox Academy.[49]) In Germany, Irineos maintained his policy of clear intervention in society. During his primacy (1972–1980), the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Germany was recognised as the third official church in the country (in 1974), and immigrant associations were set up along with intensive vocational counselling programmes and student aid funds. He followed the ANEK model of business association during his time in Germany. The Co–op of Greek Workers of Germany is the first example of this model. The target was the foundation of co–ops on a broad popular basis, which could serve and represent all Greek workers in an area, organising them in associations as follows:

Innocent as Doves: American Mennonites Engage, Washington, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press.

47 Irineos Papers, Folder: Mennonites. See also: Vallianatos, Aggelos (1999): *Από την Ιεραποστολή στην Επικοινωνία, Η Περίπτωση των Μεννονιτών στην Ελλάδα, 1950-1977* (From Mission to communication, The Case of the Mennonites' presence in Greece, 1950-1977), Athens: Artos Zois.

48 Papaderos (2011): p. 87.

49 OAC Papers, File 3,1.

> ... small funds of workers could be added, taking the shape of Companies and Associations, and be invested in productive projects at the place of their origin, meaning people of Macedonia could invest their money in Macedonia, people from Epirus in Epirus, Thessalians in Thessaly. This way our workers' money in Germany, calculated approximately at 3-4 billion marks, could be distributed and invested in productive works (factories, businesses, etc.) in several districts of the country, and the workers themselves could participate in these projects and find a job when they go back home.[50]

This policy of Irineos coincides with the migration policies of the German state during this period, which attempted to relocate migrants, especially Greeks and Turks, by sending them back to their country of origin. The German ministry bearing responsibility for the migration policy addressed the Greek authorities first, but since there was no response, it turned to Irineos.

Furthermore, we should interpret the political and economic involvement of the Greek and German churches as an attempt to confront communism within the ideological context of the Cold War. This policy of playing a greater role in the development of world affairs was, according to Irineos, largely a response to emerging ideologies claiming ownership over scientific truth. The 'secular religion' of communism, to use Marcel Gauchet's expression, promoted a totalitarian regime that would be enthusiastically received by the masses, furthering its ability to rule them. This so-called totalitarian state would progressively become the instrument with which almost total control could be established over society through the application of its ideological programme to all activities.[51] Yet if the alleged discourse of 'truth' within such ideologies could easily be criticised, their grip on power remained successful principally because liberal democracies were, as Irineos observed, often powerless to react quickly to international crises and issues of social justice, thereby offering a strong contrast with the egalitarian principles they sought to promote.[52] Communism, according to Irineos's analysis, went even further and represented a direct threat to the existence of the church, since it had always engaged in open conflict with the old religions and their beliefs. The reason, according to the Marxist–Leninist doctrine inspired by Marx's thesis 'On the Jewish Question',[53] was that man could only truly be free once he had been liberated from religion, which provided the illusion that a better world awaited him when he departed the terrestrial world of enslavement and oppression. For Marx, science and modern progress were conversely capable of guiding mankind towards the one and only paradise, provided that those with nothing to lose and everything to gain seize their destiny, through armed struggle if necessary, against the ruling elite, a class that had hitherto utilised religion as an instrument to

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50 OAC Papers, Folder Metropolis of Germany, file: Trans-eurokreta.

51 Arendt, Hannah (2002): *Les origines du totalitarisme; Eichmann à Jérusalem*, Paris: Gallimard, pp. 719-811.

52 Irineos, Galanakis (1991): op. cit.

53 Marx, Carl (1968): *La question juive*, Paris: Union générale d'Éditions.

extend its domination. The masses would subsequently liberate themselves from their chains through the transformation of a capitalist economic system into a communist society, thereby establishing social harmony and ending the domination of one segment of mankind over another. The sole aim of the state, according to Marx, is to protect this capitalist system, which was dependent on the exploitation of one man by another – of the working classes for the profit of the bourgeoisie.[54]

Modernisation in the name of class solidarity promoted by communists, with its promise of emancipation, explains the success of their ideology and their seduction of the masses by making the latter feel less excluded from the society of which they were now to be a part. The working classes ceased to be called upon by communist regimes to reshape society for their own benefit. Furthermore, they would be encouraged to purge, disregard, or reject former religious thinking as an obstacle to modernisation and the inevitable trajectory of human progress. At the same time, this ideology did everything it could to acquire the same power over the hearts and minds of the masses as Christian religious structures had once achieved over the body of society, to use Gauchet's expression.[55] Communism should therefore be regarded as a secular religion. It is secular because it emerged within a context in which political developments, beginning with the privatisation and subsequent relativisation of faith in terms of absolute truth and scientific progress, raised profound doubts about traditional beliefs and ideologies. But it is religious in seeking to respond to the problems of doubt, scepticism, and agnosticism through conceptions of good, the invisibility of power, and the indecisiveness of democracy as promoted by modern liberalism. Communists defended the idea of returning to a religious structuring of society that aimed to suppress all notions of individuality in the name of collective action, but by using secular points of reference, such as class and the nation.[56]

It is therefore understandable why the development of such secular religions, imitating the structure of older religious powers while categorically rejecting their beliefs and traditions, was perceived as a major threat to the church. Hence Irineos' interest in improving the lives of the poor and relieving their suffering: at a time when the welfare state did not exist, the church decided to expand its reach to the poorest of the faithful in order to head off the threat of communism while simultaneously distancing itself from the fascists' political pride and egoism by replicating the humility of Christ.[57] The church would therefore use the arsenal of secularism to maintain their presence in the hearts and minds of the people, while communism sought to distract

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54 Marx, Carl, Engels, Friedrich (1999): *anifeste du parti communiste*, Paris: Garnier Flammarion, (1848).

55 Gauchet, Marcel (1998): *La religion dans la démocratie*, Paris: Gallimard, p. 80.

56 Gauchet, Marcel (2011): "Religions séculières: Origine, nature et destin," *Le débat,* 2011/5 - n° 167 pp. 187-192, p.189.

57 Galanakis, Irineos (1967): "Η πολιτική ευθύνη του Χριστιανού" (The Christian's Political Responsibility), *Christos kai Kosmos,* vol. 75.

workers and citizens from the ways of Christianity. The church, according to Greek and German Christian leaders, must not remain indifferent to the fate of its flock, which was at risk of being led astray by idols defacing man's image of God and Christianity. Providing social aid to the poor and to workers in order to divert them from communism while keeping the ruling classes on their side to prevent them from flirting with tyrannical projects were the ultimate missions of Christian actors. Only then could the church still hope to be the patron of true unity and solidarity.[58]

5 Conclusion

How can one assess the significance of Bishop Irineos as a civil society actor and that of the Orthodox Academy of Crete as a civil society organisation? Recent scholarship has pointed out that religion is a significant and diachronic factor in the development and nature of civil society. However, scholars have also shown that religion – more specifically, the interdependence between state and church, as well as the nationalisation of the Greek Orthodox Church – may have contributed to the weakness of Greek civil society. As an institution with protected status, funding, and a sociopolitical role, the Greek Orthodox Church was not obliged to create parallel institutions to secure and reinforce its position.

Could we argue that Irineos constituted an exception to this general paradigm? The answer lies in his attitude towards state–church relations and in his political philosophy. In his political manifesto 'The Christian's Political Responsibility', Irineos agrees with Saint Paul's doctrine as expressed in his letter to the Romans:

> Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be commended. For the one in authority is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God's servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience.[59]

According Irineos, a problem arises when 'Cesar' – the political authority – does not satisfy three conditions: being in God's service, denying or preventing (directly or indirectly) people their welfare and salvation, and claiming everything, even people's

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58 Ibid.
59 Romans, 13, 1-7.

souls, as totalitarian regimes did.[60] In these cases, Irineos borrows Saint Peter's words: 'We must obey God rather than human beings,'[61] and 'No one can serve two masters.' As Christians, we must continue the struggle for the prevalence of God's kingdom among men – that is, for an ideal (utopian) society.

This will to establish a utopian society seems to determine Irineos's position regarding the state as well as his role in civil society. His work must be explained in the context of interaction among state policies, some endogenous local dynamics expressed by the local elite and the work force of the area, and the international relations developed around his network. Therefore, his contribution to the post-war growth of this area should not be interpreted univocally as a response, a reaction, or passive consent of the local community and civil society actors to state initiatives or even to their absence, but rather as a forceful two-way process, presupposing pressure and demands on the central state and at the international level. Clearly, local dynamics strengthened by the local church's action do not operate in a vacuum but in interaction with national state policies to promote growth.

Irineos's conception of the role of the church was also informed by his experiences in France and Germany, where Catholicism and Protestantism had developed social doctrines based on the writings of widely recognised political theologians such as Aquinas and Calvin. Catholic and Protestant churches in both countries were aware of their role in civil society. Furthermore, Irineos had studied the economic tendencies of his time and never acted without strategic planning and a development programme. It seems that his financial model was influenced by the social market economy model as applied in post-war Germany, but clearly adjusted to the peculiarities and requirements of Greek financial reality. From his election onwards he tried to make the local church an interlocutor with the state and the local political and economic elite, mediating between the public and private economies in the free market.

Furthermore, the Orthodox Academy and the Greek–German network surrounding Irineos took an active role in the negotiations, planning, and implementation of a Greek–German project for economic growth of the western provinces of Crete. Greece's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 undoubtedly had a positive impact on the development of political, economic, and cultural relations between Greece and Germany. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer perceived Greece as the cornerstone of NATO, a bastion against communism. Successive postwar Greek governments (Papagos, Karamanlis, Papandreou, and Stephanopoulos) supported the West German government in all major political issues, including those of war reparations. This Greek–German cooperation coincides with Greek foreign policy planning at the time, which sought to connect with Germany and the European Economic Community. In my opinion, the Greek dictatorship's opposition to Irineos

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60 Galanakis, Ireneos (1968): "Christians' Political Responsibility."
61 Acts 5, 29.

Galanakis – leading finally to removal from his bishopric – is attributable to the junta's changes in foreign and economic policy.

Even if some challenge Irineos's role in certain development projects connected with his name, there is no doubt that he facilitated social dialogue and the creation of an economic environment friendly towards investments. Development and economics like to borrow religious terms such as faith, loyalty, and trust. Irineos's efforts and reputation fostered trust among capital, various social actors, and opposed interests, contributing decisively to the economic and social growth of Crete.

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Margarita Markoviti

In the shadow of the 'prevailing' religion: religious communities and civil society in Greece

1 Introduction

Over the last twenty years, the religious and ethnic landscape of Greece has been gradually transforming. No official data on the religious composition of Greece exist[1], yet the 2017 US State Department's Report on Religious Freedom estimated that 98 per cent of the country's population belongs to the Greek Orthodox Church.[2] At the same time, a sizable percentage of the population now declare themselves atheist (14.7 per cent) or belonging to other religions (2.9 per cent)[3]. Yet for a country like Greece that has remained largely homogeneous, the challenge is how to live with, rather than suppress, difference (Yannas 2016). A 2017 survey question administered in thirteen countries in Europe and North America by Pew Research Centre[4] revealed that 54 per cent of people in Greece consider religion essential to national identity, trailed by 34 per cent in Poland and 32 per cent in the United States. According to the United States Department of State's 2017 religious freedom report on Greece[5], 1.3 percent of the population are Muslim, and 0.7 percent other religions. Muslims constitute a number of distinct communities including, according to the Council of Europe's European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, approximately 100,000 – 120,000 individuals in Thrace descending from the Muslim minority officially recognized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. According to local religious leaders and migrant activists, approximately 150,000 Muslim immigrants and foreign workers from Southeastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa

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1 Greece is among several European Union countries that do not collect data on ethnic, religious, or linguistic aspects of their populations because such a declaration would contravene the law on personal data protection.

2 According to the 2017 World Factbook of the US Central Intelligence Agency the Greek Orthodox population is between 81-90 per cent (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html), while 81,4 per cent of the respondents in 2015 nationwide survey by the private company Kapa Research SA stated that they "felt Christian Orthodox" (https://kaparesearch.com/πάσχα-πίστη-και-θρησκεία-στην-ελλάδα/).

3 Kapa Research *ibid*.

4 Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes & Trends: Relatively few say religion essential to national identity (http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/faith-few-strong-links-to-national-identity/pg-02-01-17_national-identity-4-02/).

5 Embassy of the United States, Athens, Greece. 2015 Religious Freedom Report on Greece: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281156.pdf

continue to reside mostly in and around Athens, clustered together based on their countries of origin. Additionally, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that approximately 49,000 recently arrived migrants and asylum seekers remained in the country at year's end – mostly from Muslim-majority countries.

Other religious communities report that their members combined constitute between 3 and 5 percent of the population. These include Old Calendarist Orthodox, atheists and agnostics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, members of polytheistic Hellenic religions, Scientologists, Bahais, Mormons, Sikhs, Seventh-day Adventists, Buddhists, and members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON). In addition to this, and as mentioned above, there is an emerging community of both atheists and agnostics in the country, represented primarily by the Atheist and Humanist Unions of Greece.

Though traditionally a country of emigration, during the early 1990s and, more recently, since the 2000s, Greece has experienced an increasing influx of migrants primarily from the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries and, later on, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. According to the International Organisation for Migration, a major shift in routes of irregular migration by sea to Europe occurred between 2014 and 2015, with about 853,000 migrants arriving in Greece, as opposed to about 34,400 in 2014.[6] The 2017 report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants[7] states that Greece has been the main point of entry for irregular migrants coming to Europe since 2015 (with more than 900,000 having arrived that year). Most of these migrants intended to transit through Greece and travel towards Northern Europe. With the closing of the borders at the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, and following the European Union–Turkey agreement of March 2016[8], 90 per cent of migrants found themselves trying to apply for asylum in Greece.

These migrants and refugees arriving in Greece find themselves in a society that is characterised by two underlining features: severe hardship as a result of the austerity measures in the context of the financial crisis, on the one hand, and a context of close church–state interconnection that has had serious implications for the treatment of religious diversity and the rights of religious minorities specifically[9], on the other. Indeed, the number of European Court of Human Rights judgments involving

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6 IOM's 2015 Global Migration Trends Factsheet: http://publications.iom.int/books/global-migration-trends-factsheet-2015

7 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1709841.pdf

8 For details and a critique of this agreement, see https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/

9 Payne, Daniel P. (2003): "The Clash of Civilisations: The Church of Greece the European Union and the Question of Human Rights". *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 31 (3), pp.261-271.; Pollis, Adamantia. (1992): "Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities, Rights and European Norms". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 10(2): 171-191.

religious freedom-related violations of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the part of Greece – the highest number, in fact, among Council of Europe member states[10] – tells of a significant degree of incompatibility between human rights norms and Greek policies towards religious freedoms.

The position of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ in Greece is established through the 1975 Constitutional provisions and a number of laws that secure its 'prevailing' status, which has come at a detriment to other religious communities in a number of areas[11], including the legal standing of religious minority groups, freedom of worship and freedom of religious expression, education, the funding and establishing of houses of worship, and the presence of religious communities in civil society. Supported by the state, the Greek Orthodox Church (hereinafter Orthodox Church or Church of Greece) has long enjoyed unique privileges in Greek politics and society, which, as Makrides and Roudomet of observe, explains why it has been reluctant to share the 'religious market' with other religious communities.[12] This exclusiveness also applies to the arena of civil society, which, as guaranteed through national legislation, has been identified as the territory of the majority religion. With reference to the latter, Law 590/1977 on the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece establishes the Orthodox Church as an official and de jure partner of the state in matters of social welfare.

For many years, Greece's rankings in volunteerism and levels of social capital have been among the lowest in Europe.[13] Yet recently, scholarly studies and media articles have been covering the emergence of organised civil society initiatives in the country, understood to a great extent as being in juxtaposition with the financial and refugee crises.[14] In the light of such developments, this contribution focuses on reli-

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10 Violation by Article and by State (1959-2016): http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_ violation _1959_2016_ENG.pdf

11 For an analysis of contentious issues in Greek society that have often placed supporters of the Orthodox Church and of minority religious groups in opposite camps, see Yannas, Prodromos (2016): 'Non-Orthodox Minorities in Contermporary Greece: Legal Status and Concomitant Debates between Church, State and the International Community' in Roudometof, Victor and Makrides N., Basilios (eds), Orthodox Christianity in 21st century Greece: the Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics.

12 Roudometof, Victor and Makrides N., Basilios (eds) (2016): *Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece. The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics*. UK: Routledge: p. 12.

13 See 'Volunteering in the European Union', Final Report submitted by GHK, 17 February 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf), which shows the low levels of volunteering in Greece, with less than 10 per cent of adults involved in voluntary activities.

14 See 'Volunteerism sees significant rise during crisis in Greece', Kathimerini, 2013-05-21 and United Nations General Assembly 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on his mission to Greece' (2017-04-24): http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1709 841.pdf; Clarke, Jennifer, Huliaras Asteris and Sotiropoulos, Dimitris A. (eds.) (2016): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece. Civil Society at the European Frontline*. UK: Routledge.

gion and civil society in Greece, understood as "an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interests".[15] It addresses specifically the following question: what are the legal, social, and political factors that either facilitate or impede religious communities from mobilising as civil actors in Greek society?

The literature has examined the wider topic of religion and civil society in the US[16] and in Europe[17], though the case of Greece has not been considered in depth. Similarly, scholars have covered extensively views from within the Orthodox Church on matters of modernisation[18], the economic crisis[19], and specific topics such as the building of the mosque in the capital of Athens[20]. This contribution shifts the focus onto minority religious and conscience-based communities and adopts a grassroots perspective, examining the views of a selection of actors from across the spectrum of religious diversity in the country. The findings draw primarily on empirical research conducted in Greece between 2015 and 2017 in the context of the European Research Council project Grassrootsmobilise, consisting of approximately fifty semi-structured interviews and participant observations, as well as policy and media analysis. The research cited in this contribution was conducted under the auspices of the European Research Council-funded Grassrootsmobilise research program (ERC grant agreement no 338463). The study considers a broad range of religious groups as civil society actors with distinct legal standings and social roles in Greece. In so doing, it seeks to explore the relationship between minority religions and civil society in the context of a 'prevailing' religion and amidst increasing religious diversity. In line moreover with the recent literature[21] that explores non-religious claims to human rights and religious freedoms, this contribution further considers the role of emerging secularist

15 Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred (1996): *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: p. 7.

16 Smidt, E. (ed) (2003): Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good. US: Baylor Universit Press.

17 De Hart, J, Dekker, P. & Halman, L (2013): *Religion and civil society in Europe*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 169-188.

18 Anastassiadis, Anastassios (2010): 'A intriguing true-false paradox: The entanglement of modernization and intolerance in the Orthodox Church of Greece'. In Victor Roudometof and Vasilios N. Makrides (Eds.). Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics. Farnham: Ashgate.

19 Molokotos-Leiderman, Lina (2016): "The impact of the crisis on the Orhtodox Church of Greece: a moment of challenge and opportunity?". *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 32-50.

20 Anagnostou, Dia and Gropas, Ruby (2010): 'Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens'. In Victor Roudometof and Vasilios N. Makrides (Eds.). Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics. Farnham: Ashgate

21 See Beaman, Lori G., Steele, Cory and Pringnitz, Keelin (2018).

mobilisations, represented primarily by the Atheist Union. As will be discussed, the Atheist Union seeks to also enter the civil arena of Greece using a primarily anti-religion rhetoric and by directly challenging the very premise of the prevalence of the Orthodox Church, also in the civil society and philanthropy arenas.

In the following section, the background of the legal status of religious communities in Greece and their role thus far as civil society actors is presented. The chapter then moves to the findings of the empirical research, analysing religious communities on the basis of their role and contribution as civil society actors. The study demonstrates that over the course of the last five years, the emergence of civil society initiatives has been coupled with mobilisations of religious and conscience-based communities. It critically argues that such groups' capacity to enter the civil society arena in Greece is dependent upon the following factors: their claims to historical presence in the country, their legal standing, and, finally, the degree to which they are considered to pose a threat to established norms and to the Orthodox Church.

2 The legal status of religious communities and civil society in Greece

2.1 The Orthodox Church

Until recently, of all religious communities present in Greece, only three had been recognised as legal religious entities under public law: the Orthodox Church, Judaism, and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. As legal persons under public law, the privileges enjoyed by those three religious communities include, among others, the issuance of administrative acts, the payment of the clergy out of the state budget, the granting of tax exemptions, and tax-deductible donations.[22] Article 3 of the Constitution of 1975 establishes the 'prevailing religion' status of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. Article 13 provides for freedom of religious conscience and guarantees freedom of worship for all known religions, provided that these do not offend 'public order or the good usages'. The same article further prohibits proselytism and asserts that freedom of religious conscience is inviolable and that all "known religions[23] shall be free and their rites of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection of the law". According to the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs (henceforth, Ministry of Education) a religion is 'known' when it

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22 Alivizatos, Nicos C. (1999): "The Constitutional Treatment of Religious Minorities in Greece". In L.A. Sicilianos (ed.), *Mélanges en l'Honneur de Nicolas Valticos. Droit et Justice*, Paris: Editions A. Pedone, pp. 629-642.
23 Organisation of the Legal Form of Religious Communities and their Organisations in Greece. Law 4301/2014).

"has no hidden beliefs and dogmas and when its worship is free and accessible to everyone".[24] Lastly "Article 16 of the constitution includes, among the objectives of education, the 'development of students' national and religious consciousness". Coupled with Law 1566/1985 on Education, which provides that religious education should help students '[t]o develop into free, responsible, democratic citizens … in whom is instilled a faith in their motherland and in the authentic elements of Christian Orthodox tradition', this constitutional provision demonstrates a significant degree of intertwining of the Orthodox Church, as the prevailing religion, with one of the core institutions of the state, namely education.

The Church of Greece is a legal entity of public law[25] by virtue of Article 1(4) of Law 590/1977 on the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece.[26] The Church of Greece is autocephalous; it is administered by the Holy Synod of Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod and partially funded by the Greek state. A large part of the literature has covered at length the social and welfare services of the Greece of Greece, certain aspects of which are directly relevant to the questions examined here. In the first place, Orthodox social service is grounded in the concept of *diaconia*, based on solidarity and inspired by Christian values and 'the compassion of God'.[27] The contribution of the Orthodox Church to welfare services today, officially coordinated by the Synodical Committee for Community Welfare and Benefits and several central organisations[28], has been historically linked to welfare provided by the state: for instance, the church's social services are funded by the Church of Greece itself, which in turn is funded indirectly by the state, which pays all priests' salaries.[29] In spite of these institutional frameworks, the Orthodox Church's welfare provision in Greece is largely decentralised. As noticed by Fokas, the Orthodox Church's social services often develop

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24 Ministry of Education, Circular on the Granting of Permission for the Establishment and Running of Worship Places (2016-04-07): https://www.minedu.gov.gr/publications/docs2017/EGYKLIOS_PERI_XORHGHSHS_ADEIAS_IDRYSHS_XOROY_LATREIAS.pdf

25 Under Greek law, a legal entity can be of either a public or private nature or of a mixed character. A legal entity of public law is established by the state for a public, governmental, or quasi-governmental purpose and is governed by public law, whereas a legal entity of private law is one whose purpose is private, for profit, or not for profit, and is governed by private law. Symeon Symeonidis, The General Principles of Civil Law, in INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW 84 (Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J. Kozyris eds., 2008).

26 The same applies to the Church of Crete (which is a semi-autonomous church) and to the monasteries of Mount Athos, both of which are legal persons of public law.

27 Molokotos-Leiderman, Lina (2016): "The impact of the crisis on the Orhtodox Church of Greece: a moment of challenge and opportunity?". *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 32-50.

28 See also the pan-Orthodox humanitarian organisation International Orthodox Christian Charities: https://www.iocc.org/where-we-work/greece

29 Markoviti, Margarita and Molokotos-Liederman, Lina (2017): "The Intersections of State, Family and Church in Italy and Greece". In Molokotos-Leiderman, Lina, Bäckström, Anders and Davie, Grace (eds.) *Religion and Welfare in Europe: Gendered and Minority Perspectives*. UK: Policy Press.

locally and informally at the level of dioceses and parishes, which are autonomous to respond as they see fit, since bishops and priests have direct contact with their local communities and their respective needs.[30]

More recently, the Orthodox Church has undertaken the role of social service and care provider to the individuals affected most severely by the economic crisis and increasing poverty as well as the refugee crisis. In addition to its list of parishes providing food and shelter throughout the country, the Church of Greece founded in July 2012 a centre of support for returning nationals and refugees. This non-governmental organisation (NGO) seeks to guarantee the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers before national authorities by providing legal counselling and undertaking awareness-raising actions on refugee and immigration issues.

While acknowledging the development of the Orthodox Church's network of philanthropic work and charity meals, Makris and Bekridakis criticise the church's failure to grapple with the structural causes of the financial crisis in a politically relevant manner.[31] Molokotos-Liederman also explores the ways in which the church has offered assistance to the overall weak social protection system in Greece, while analysing the impact of the crisis on the social work of the Orthodox Church and as a trigger for public debates about its finances.[32] The same study moreover considers the emergence and popularity of the extreme-right party Golden Dawn (which entered the Greek Parliament following national elections in May and, subsequently, June 2012) as a welfare and social service provider. Golden Dawn's grassroots activities, such as the distribution of food and clothes exclusively to Greek citizens[33], also accentuated xenophobic and nationalist attitudes, which target foreigners living in the country.

This distinction between offering services to Greeks and offering services to foreigners has also surfaced from within the Orthodox Church, setting off intense debates about the latter's support for the neo-Nazi organisation Golden Dawn. While extreme voices from the Holy Synod, such as Bishop Amvrosios of Kalavryta and Bishop Seraphim of Piraeus, have made no secret of their support for Golden Dawn, others, such as Bishop Chrysostomos of Messenia, have positioned themselves firmly

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30 Fokas, E. (2012): "Thiva Case Study Report", in A. Bäckström (ed.) *Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions Related to Religion, Minorities and Gender*, Volume 2: *Continental Europe*, Uppsala: Uppsala University, pp. 262-295. https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:510653/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
31 Makris, Gerasimos and Bekridakis, Dimitris (2013): "The Greek Orthodox Church and the Economic Crisis since 2009", *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* VOl. 13 (2), pp. 11-132.
32 Molokotos-Leiderman, Lina (2016): "The impact of the crisis on the Orhtodox Church of Greece: a moment of challenge and opportunity?". *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 32-50.
33 See 'Golden Dawn nationalists hand out 'Greeks only' food', BBC, 1 August 2012: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19084584.

against such beliefs.[34] Such a division between Greeks and foreigners as recipients of philanthropy and welfare[35] has also been criticised by an Orthodox priest, Father Antonios Papanikolaou, who in 1998 founded the Ark of the World (Kivotos tou Kosmou) in Akadimia Platonos (Athens), a non-profit-making organisation that mostly provides care to mothers and children. A special section on the Ark of the World website explains the reasons for its creation and its objectives, with specific emphasis on the need to provide care for refugees and migrants in Greece:

> Providing services for the refugees was a major point of contention for many of the local citizens as well as the authorities in the broader area, many of who claimed that Father Antonio's efforts should be solely focused on Greek citizens in need and not on refugees. Kivotos, however, welcomes all those in need, irrespective of nationality and religion.[36]

The Ark of the World is an indicative case of the ability of an association that is related to but not dependent on the prevailing religion in Greece[37] to mobilise citizens on the grounds of philanthropy and social services to children and families in need.

2.2 Jewish communities and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace

The links between civil society and the other two religious communities in Greece recognised under public law are very different from those of the Orthodox Church. The legal status of the Jewish religion is recognised by a number of laws.[38] Today, nine Jewish communities – in Athens, Thessaloniki, Larissa, Chalcis, Volos, Corfu, Trikala, Ioannina, and Rhodes – with an estimated 4,000 members exist in the country. As with the Orthodox Church, these communities function as legal entities under public law whose affairs are administered by a local assembly and council elected by their members. Other than the struggle for the compensation of Holocaust survivors, these communities engage in philanthropic activities, which are addressed to their own

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34 See 'Church of Greece split over role of neofascist Golden Dawn party', Apostolos Lakasas, Kathimerini, 2012-11-08: http://www.ekathimerini.com/146002/article/ekathimerini/news/church-of-greece-split-over-role-of-neofascist-golden-dawn-party.

35 For an interesting analysis of the different voices within the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the refugee crisis, see «Αγάπα τον πλησίον σου: Η Εκκλησία και οι πρόσφυγες», Kostas Koukoumakas, Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence, 15 December 2015: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/αγάπα-τον-πλησίον-σου-η-εκκλησία-και-οι-πρόσφυγες-11-10-2015.

36 http://www.kivotostoukosmou.org/el/kivotos-tou-kosmou/pater-antonios.

37 In an interview, Father Antonios Papanikolaou explained that Kivotos receives no financial assistance from the Orthodox Church (http://www.lifo.gr/mag/features/1235).

38 L. 2456/1920, L.F. 367/1945, L. 1675/1951, O.R. of 25 June 1951, D-L 01/106 9 (see UN Special Rapporteur Report on Country Visit – Greece, 1996-11-07: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx).

members in need. As such, the Jewish community of Thessaloniki offers medical care, financial support to young couples, and a nursing home for elderly members. The Jewish communities of Volos and Larissa provide similar kinds of support for their members.

The presence of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace – the third religious group under public law and the only minority recognised by the Greek state – constitutes a remnant of the Ottoman Empire. This specific community has remained in the north-eastern part of the country, close to the border with Turkey, following the forced exchange of populations that put an end to the Greco–Turkish War, which ended officially with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 23 July 1923. Earlier in the same year (January 1923), the bilateral Convention Concerning the Exchange of Populations – which by considering religion as the sole criterion provided for the compulsory exchange of all Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals living in Turkish territory with all Muslim Greek nationals living in Greek territory – was concluded. The convention excluded from its provisions Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace and Greek inhabitants of Istanbul, among others. Today, this minority in Western Thrace consists of approximately 120,000 individuals and is largely treated by the Greek authorities as a matter of foreign affairs.[39] Its continuous segregation and abandonment, in spite of certain limited attempts that addressed specifically the issue of primary and secondary education for the minority[40], has signified that the Muslim minority finds itself in a disadvantageous position, separated from the rest of the country and often turning to Turkey for support. Civil society efforts and philanthropic events initiated from within seek to address the issues of its members, as with the Women's Platform of Western Thrace.[41] Most efforts to provide welfare and social service and support come, however, from certain initiatives outside the Muslim minority, which seek to improve the latter's living conditions and the opportunities offered to its members through various means, such as education.[42]

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39 Indicative of this tendency to treat the Muslim minority with precaution, as a potential 'state within a state', is the fact that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs still holds coordination authority for any legal or political decision related to the minority in Western Thrace.

40 See Education of the Muslim Minority Children in Thrace: http://museduc.gr/en/.

41 An interesting initiative is the Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe, an NGO established in 1988 in Germany. As a civil society organisation, the federation supports, amongst others, efforts to solve problems of the Western Thrace Turkish minority and supports individuals in the defence of their legal, political, and sociocultural rights, as well as in economic difficulties faced (https://www.abttf. org/html/index.php?l=en).

42 For instance, the Project for Reform in the Education of Muslim Children was a collective and interdisciplinary effort initiated by the Greek state in 1997 and funded by the European Social Fund as a means to address the core challenges that the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, as well as the implementation of national laws and practices, pose for minority education in Western Thrace. See Androussou, A., Askouni, N., Dragonas, T., Frangoudaki, A., & Plexousaki, E. (2011). Educational and

Thus, of the religious communities with legal status under public law, only the Orthodox Church of Greece appears to be active in the wider civil society arena. More than simply a matter of legal standing, such a finding suggests the following paradox: a religious community's degree of autonomy from the state may in fact determine its capacity to act as a social service and charity provider. At the same time, the discussion in the following sections demonstrates that regardless of the highly mediatised philanthropic services of the Church of Greece, the latter does not in fact maintain a monopoly over civil society and philanthropy in Greece. Though not as acknowledged, other religious and conscience-based communities have either for many years or more recently been active in the field. The following sections discuss the reasons that have either promoted or prohibited the mobilisations of such communities in the civil society arena of Greece.

3 In the shadow of the Orthodox Church: minority religious communities and civil society

In 2014, following the European Court of Human Rights judgment against Greece in *Canea Catholic Church v. Greece*[43], the Greek Parliament passed a law that introduced for the first time the notion of 'religious legal personality'. Law 4301/2014 on the Organisation of the Legal Form of Religious Communities and their Associations in Greece established an organised framework for the legal form of religious communities and enacted the creation of a coherent, official registration system. Not all religious communities seem to have benefited from the introduction of this law, however. According to Tsivolas (2016, 53-54), Law 4301/2014 recognised, regardless of the number of adherents and without the obligation to follow the general registration procedure, the following communities as 'religious legal persons': the Anglican Church, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Church of Orthodox Armenians, the German-speaking Evangelical Church, the Greek Evangelical Church, and the Assyrian Orthodox Churches.[44] The same law moreover recognised the Cath-

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political challenges in reforming the education of the Muslim minority in Thrace, Greece. *The International Journal of Learning, 17* (11), 227239.

43 Following a property dispute with one of its neighbours in Chania over a surrounding wall, the Roman Catholic Church appealed to the European Court of Human Rights on 28 October 1996, claiming that, as a result of the refusal of civil courts to acknowledge legal personality, it was unable to take legal proceedings in Greece in order to protect land and buildings it had owned for centuries. On 16 December 1997, the court ruled that there had been a breach of Article 14 (on non-discrimination), taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial), of the European Convention on Human Rights.

44 http://www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=LEaNRjQJv14%3D&tabid=855&language=el-GR.

olic Church in Greece as an 'ecclesiastical legal person', henceforth acknowledged as an autonomous religious legal entity with no further formalities and with no need to follow the procedures imposed by the law, regardless of the number of its adherents. By contrast, non-Christian religious communities – particularly ones with a more recent presence in the country – have found it more difficult to be included in Law 4301/2014, which they see as addressing the concerns of specific Christian churches.[45] The following sections thus examine the extent to which this legal form of recognition has facilitated certain religious communities' inclusion in the civil society arena, highlighting the discrepancies with those conscience-based communities that do not benefit from such a form of recognition.

3.1 Historically established Christian churches

It is perhaps no coincidence that the older and larger Christian communities in Greece, which were recognised under Law 4301/2014 as holding religious legal personality, have also been historically active as civil society actors. This is the case with Caritas Hellas[46], a non-profit-making organisation and philanthropic union of the Catholic Church founded in 1978 under the umbrella of Caritas Europa and Caritas Internationalis. Other than its main office based in Athens, Caritas Hellas has branches in different regions and islands across Greece, as in Thessaloniki, the Peloponnese, Crete, Naxos and Tinos, Rhodes, Santorini, Syros, and Chios. It has also developed a special branch working exclusively with refugees, called Caritas Athens Refugee Program (with an office in Plateia Vathis, Athens). This particular refugee-focused initiative was crucial in helping Caritas Hellas gain exposure as part of a wider emergence of civil society projects and volunteerism dealing with the refugee crisis in Greece.[47] As such, and through collaboration with the Municipality of Athens and other civil society organisations (such as the Food Bank), the work of Caritas Hellas have become more visible and known to the wider public, primarily through the media and social networks.[48] In spite of increasing references to their work, repre-

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45 See Markoviti, M (2017): 'The 'Filtering Effects' of ECtHR Case Law on Religious Freedoms: Legal Recognition and Places of Worship for Religious Minorities in Greece'. *Religion, State and Society* 45: 3.4, pp. 268283.

46 http://www.caritas.gr/

47 Among numerous media articles on the topic, see 'Greek Volunteers share UNHCR Nansen Refugee Award', *The UN Refugee Agency*, 2016-09-06: http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/9/57cdec884/greek-volunteers-share-unhcr-nansen-refugee-award.html and 'The idealists of Lesbos: volunteers at the hear of the refugee crisis', Helena Smith for *The Guardian*, 2016-04-15: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/15/idealists-of-lesbos-volunteers-refugee-crisis-pope-francis

48 See 'Σύμπραξη Δήμου Αθηναίων, Catholic Relief Services, Ύπατης Αρμοστείας του ΟΗΕ και Κάριτας Ελλάς για τη Δομή Φιλοξενίας Μονογονεϊκών Οικογενειών', Athina 9.84, 2017-05-25:

sentatives of Caritas Hellas have noted a frequent lack of systematic and responsible coverage by the media that would reflect the important contributions of the NGO during the refugee and financial crises; they have also emphasised the lack of coordination with the Greek authorities in the civil society arena.[49]

In addition to the Catholic Church's organisation, two other historically established Christian churches that have been active in civil society are St. Paul's Anglican Church[50], with an organised social welfare programme in Athens called Church in the Street that is addressed primarily at homeless and elderly people, and the Greek Evangelical Church[51] in Athens, which operates a drug rehabilitation centre called Filimon, nursing homes, and refugee rehabilitation centres. Expressing concerns similar to those of the Caritas Hellas representatives, the legal adviser of the Greek Evangelical Church has spoken in particular about the lack of publicity that their initiatives receive, since, in his view, the media in Greece tends to present the Orthodox Church as the sole civil society actor and philanthropy provider. He described the limited exposure that the Evangelical Church's contribution receives in the following way:

> The Evangelical Church works with drug addicts, with abused women, as well as with the refugees; its work is particularly vast here, as it has its own translators … [and] provides medicine, food. But nobody talks about this … And it also has its missions abroad, in Africa and in other places. The problem is that the Evangelical Church has a very wide philanthropy and charity work that is not mentioned anywhere. Its breadlines are not mentioned; they are excluded [from public and media discourse].[52]

An interesting exception to this category of Christian, non-Orthodox churches that have been recognised under Law 4301/2014 is a small evangelical church called New Life (Nea Zoi). In our interview, the legal adviser of the Greek Evangelical Church clarified that this particular evangelical community does not fall under the umbrella of the official Evangelical Church but rather functions independently. Indeed, according to a minister and representative of New Life[53], their community's small size signified that they could not meet the conditions required for their inclusion in Law

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http://www.athina984.gr/2017/05/25/sybraxi-dimou-athineon-catholic-relief-services-ypatis-armostias-tou-oie-ke-karitas-ellas-gia-ti-domi-filoxenias-monogoneikon-ikogenion/ and «Εκδήλωση για τα προσφυγόπουλα από την 'Κάριτας Αθήνας' και έξι ελληνογαλλικά σχολεία», To Vima, 2016-01-13: http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=768472

49 «Caritas: Βοηθώντας τον πρόσφυγα σε κάθε του ανάγκη», Alexis Gaglias, Huffington post Greece, 1 July 2016: http://www.huffingtonpost.gr/2016/07/01/caritas-ngos--katagrafi-_n_10739602.html

50 See: http://anglicanchurchathens.gr/#pastoral_care.

51 See: http://www.aeee.gr/σύντομο-ιστορικό/. A further example here is the Christian humanitarian organisation Faros, which serves and supports refugee minors in Greece, particularly those who are unaccompanied by parents or relatives: http://www.faros.org.gr

52 Interview, May 2016.

53 Interview, March 2016.

4301/2014[54], particularly the gathering of 300 signatures from members in a given region. Nonetheless, New Life is particularly active in the civil society arena, providing care for issues such as human trafficking and sexual exploitation and seeking to offer alternatives and to empower both women and men in need by providing information, training, and emotional and practical support.[55] The New Life minister further added that their community recently purchased a space in Ilioupoli (in south-eastern Athens) to use for social actions for refugees.

3.2 The case of Scientology

The case of Scientology in Greece is indicative of the suspicion with which civil society initiatives are treated by the authorities when the former stem from a conscience-based community that is not recognised as a known religion according to the constitution. Indeed, the secretary general of religions at the Ministry of Education excluded the Church of Scientology from the list of religious communities with which he seeks to converse as part of his responsibilities.[56]

The Church of Scientology Greece has approximately 400 registered members, though, according to their spokesperson, about 25,000 individuals have, since the early 1990s, visited their headquarters, taken some of their courses, or participated in certain civil society initiatives. Scientology made its first appearance in Greece in the late 1980s and early 1990s, under the direct influences of its central office in the US. According to a Scientology spokesperson consulted, the Church of Scientology Greece was persecuted[57] between 1995 and 1999 with the accusation of drug trafficking, among other offences.[58] Following its eventual acquittal, the community was able to continue its work in the 2000s, also focusing on its civil society initiatives and the dissemination of knowledge about human rights issues through books, social media, and networking as well as films.[59] Scientology nonetheless is not recognised as a religion in Greece; it functions as a registered non-profit-making civil law organisation, while the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece includes it on its list of 'groups that are incom-

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54 For more on the requirements, see Tsivolas (2016).

55 http://neazoi.org

56 Interview, January 2016.

57 In 1997, Scientology was shut down in Greece by a court that determined that the Greek Center of Applied Philosophy, the name that had been used by Scientology in Greece, had obtained its licence under false pretences. Scientology had obtained a licence in Greece as a non-profit-making, public interest organisation. Greek courts found it to be a profit-making group that endangers the mental and physical well-being of its members. See also http://www.sptimes.com/News/32999/Worldandnation/Abroad__Critics_publi.html

58 According to the Scientology spokesperson, this accusation was due to the specific multivitamins that their members use.

59 http://www.scientology.gr/how-we-help/human-rights.html#slide6

patible with the Orthodox faith', or 'para-religious communities'.[60] Indeed, the legal advisor of the Synodal Committee on Heresies has described Scientology as a potentially dangerous influence that can easily brainwash the minds of young people.[61]

In our interview[62], the Scientology representative spoke about a civil society initiative in which they have embarked since 2016. The name of the non-profit-making organisation formed by members of the Church of Scientology Greece is the Citizens' Initiative for a Drug-free Greece.[63] The main objective of this organisation is drug prevention, and its primary targets of its flagship project are are children, adolescents, and young adults. It is for this very reason that the members of the organisation seek to introduce their project primarily in schools, either in the final years of primary school or in secondary schools.[64] The project, which is addressed to children between the ages of twelve and eighteen, consists of four to five short videos with intense images with which young audiences can easily relate, for instance, different social contexts that might lead a young person to consume drugs, as well as the dreadful consequences of addiction for drug users' families and social surroundings. Alongside a screening of this video, a specialist from within the organisation distributes information pamphlets, talks to the students, and answers their questions. The spokesperson however specified that despite the project being financed by Scientology, the latter does not have to necessarily play a role in the project's dissemination, as specific guidelines are also provided to teachers who could be in charge of the procedure.

The Scientology spokesperson explained how after having received (unofficial) permission by the respective schools' deans and teachers, their team had, at the time of our interview, already introduced the project to six schools in the Athens area. In all cases, the reactions of the students were, in her view, positive. For the organisation to be able to implement their drug-prevention project more broadly, however – and indeed, their objective is for the project to be introduced in schools throughout the country – official authorisation from the Ministry of Education is necessary. The Scientology spokesperson had thus submitted a detailed document including all required information about the content and objectives of their project, to the Institute of Educational Policy (IEP), a special branch of the Ministry of Education whose responsibilities include, amongst other, the evaluation of such initiatives. In recalling her meeting with the IEP representative, the Scientology spokesperson characterised the representative's initial reaction to the project as overall positive, especially con-

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60 http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/heresies/omades_outchrist.html
61 Interview, May 2016.
62 Interview, May 2017.
63 http://gr.drugfreeworld.org
64 The Scientology spokesperson also discussed ways in which their initiative had been positively received by Village Cinemas in Athens, which decided to play some of their clips in cinemas, particularly at the time the film *T2 Trainspotting*, which focuses precisely on the consequences of drug use and addiction, was being screened.

sidering the rising numbers of drug users in Greece during the years of the crisis.[65] However, according to the spokesperson, as soon as it was mentioned that the project is funded by Scientology, all initial enthusiasm faded away. The IEP representative's ensuing silence was, a few days later, followed by a letter of rejection from the Ministry of Education, which stated that the Citizens' Initiative for a Drug-free Greece could not be introduced in Greek public schools. The Scientology spokesperson explained that following the advice of its lawyer, their team was considering contacting the IEP to ask for a justification for the rejection of their application.

Though no official justification was provided at the time of rejection, the Scientology spokesperson felt certain that the authorities could not accept any intervention from the Church of Scientology Greece in schools, which they would consider, in her words, to be a form of proselytism – despite the fact that she had emphasised to the IEP representative that other than funding the project, Scientology would play no role in its introduction. The spokesperson described a particular incident that confirmed her belief that the Ministry of Education is in general suspicious of any influence from a religious or conscience-based community other than the Orthodox Church – and particularly from Scientology. The incident concerned a teacher in a public primary school in Athens, who was also a member of the Church of Scientology Greece. When a student's parents realised that the teacher had mentioned Scientology in the classroom, they complained directly to the school dean and asked for the teacher to be dismissed. Such a statement echoes the shared experiences of a number of members of religious minority communities in Greece, who have, indicatively, either reported that the official school textbooks for religious education referred to their community in a derogatory manner or that non-Orthodox teachers were not hired as civil servants in primary schools on the basis of their religion.[66]

In the Scientology spokesperson's view, the obstacles that their community faces in implementing their civil society initiatives are due, on the one hand, to the conservative outlook of Greek society and, on the other, to the control of the Orthodox Church over both beliefs and certain key institutions, such as public education. In her own words:

> This is the case of an Orthodox Church, which rejects any positive initiative and effort within the national education system; [it rejects those] indirectly, of course, through the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. Whose religious affairs? What religion? There only seems to be one religion.[67]

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65 http://cen.acs.org/articles/94/web/2016/09/Drug-use-Athens-rose-dramatically.html?type=paid ArticleContent

66 For a detailed analysis of these incidents as well as of the issues faced by non-Orthodox religious or conscience-based communities in the Greek education system see Markoviti, M. (2018): 'In-between the Constitution and the European Court of Human Rights: Mobilizations around Religion and Education in Greece'. *Politics and Religion*, pp. 1-24. doi:10.1017/S1755048318000020

67 Interview, July 2015.

3.3 Muslim communities and other non-Christian religious minority groups

Unlike for the various Christian communities present in Greece, which can be clustered into separate categories based on their shared and distinct features, such a comparative approach for the Muslim population in the country proves challenging. This is largely due to the heterogeneity that defines the various Muslim communities, who are usually organised depending on their country of origin and their respective denomination and who very often hold different objectives and interests. The one common feature of these groups is that in contrast to the Muslim minority of Western Thrace, which is a legal entity under public law, they are not treated as minorities but rather as migrants.[68]

In addition to the number of legal and other challenges that Muslim communities have been facing – which range from the lack of both an official house of prayer[69] and a cemetery[70] in Athens to the suspicion with which the authorities have been treating them in the light of recent terrorists attacks in the name of Islam[71] – Muslim communities are involved in different ways in civil society initiatives. An indicative example of these initiatives is Equal Society, an NGO working primarily with migrants and refugees and functioning under the umbrella of a Muslim non-profit-making union called the Muslim Association of Greece.

The empirical research has however demonstrated that the primary concern of Muslim communities is to ensure the acquaintance of the Greek population with Islam, particularly in the given context of growing scepticism and racism. Indeed, the attacks on makeshift mosques in Athens by members of Golden Dawn in 2014 are suggestive of the kind of tension, fuelled by racism, which has even led to violence. Fighting such prejudice is, for instance, one of the objectives of the association Islam

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68 For a detailed analysis, see Tsitselikis, Konstantinos (2011): *Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers*. The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

69 Athens is the only European capital that does not have an official mosque for its Muslim population to pray in. For many years, Muslims in Athens have thus been creating their own makeshift mosques in a number of different places, such as garages, abandoned buildings, and pavements. On 24 May 2017—and following decades-long objections from conservative voices (also from within the Orthodox Church as well as from Golden Dawn supporters)—a parliamentary committee approved legislation paving the way for the construction of the capital's first state-backed mosque. See http://www.ekathimerini.com/218690/article/ekathimerini/news/plan-for-athens-mosque-on-course-despite-objections

70 Due to the lack of a Muslim cemetery, relatives have to transport their deceased as far as Komotini in northern Greece in order to bury them in the cemetery of the Muslim minority in that region. See «Τζαμί και μουσουλμανικό νεκροταφείο στην Αθήνα», *Kathimerini*, 2016-06-23: http://www.kathimerini.gr/864567/article/epikairothta/politikh/tzami-kai-moysoylmanikonekrotafeio-sthn-a8hna

71 Interview with a Salafist imam, August 2016.

for Greeks[72], whose imam seeks to disseminate messages to the wider public about Islam, its beliefs and values, and its opposition to any kind of violence and extremism. He calls this effort a kind of 'missionary activism' that, though not directly a philanthropic or civil society initiative, seeks nonetheless to eradicate any stereotypes of or misconceptions about Islam and to aid the integration of the Muslim population into Greek society. The association thus organises events in their mosques, gives public speeches about Islam in Greece, and seeks moreover to express the community's views in the media.

Lastly, an interesting finding from the empirical research concerns certain common features shared by smaller non-Christian religious communities in Greece. Indicatively, actors from various Buddhist communities, the Hare Krishna, and Baha'i communities who were consulted all seem to agree that their primary concerns revolve around securing their communities' religious freedoms. These include establishing and running houses of worship, recognition as religious legal personalities under Law 4301/2014, and dealing with the different kinds of discrimination they may face on religious grounds. It is for this reason that their participation in civil society, if existent, is limited either to their members or to spreading the respective teachings and messages of their religion.

3.4 The Atheist Union of Greece

The last case considered in this chapter concerns an organisation that does not represent religious views but rather promotes a secularist, atheist ideology, which, as discussed in the introduction, has recently gained some popularity in Greece. To the extent however that the civil society mobilisations and welfare services of such groups hold a primarily – anti-religion character, their initiatives need to also be examined in the light of the 'prevailing' religion and its assumed monopolisation over the civil society arena in Greece.

The Atheist Union of Greece was first established in 2010 but acquired the status of a union in 2012. Its president has explained how the choice of name for their group was deliberate: "the term [atheist] has had a negative connotation, so we wanted to criticise this stereotype."[73] This is connected to the overarching objective of the union, which focuses on church–state separation in Greece. According to its president, there are both human rights concerns and financial reasons that currently render the separation of state and church a necessity in Greece.

Members of the Atheist Union organise a number of philanthropic events and social service initiatives to which they invite the wider public through social media, net-

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72 https://islamforgreeks.org/
73 Interview, May 2015.

working, and an online forum. The very names that they give to such initiatives indicate their intention to break any exclusive ties that religion—and, above all, the Orthodox Church—has had to philanthropy in Greece. For instance, once a year, the Atheist Union encourages its members and anyone interested to donate blood and clothing to people in need in an initiative that they call Do Good Without God (Kane Kalo Choris Theo). With its limited financial resources, the Atheist Union participates in civil society mobilisations such as the Antiracist Festival that takes place once a year in Athens and Thessaloniki and various pride festivals in support of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights. It also organises its own gatherings, encouraging its members to bring food, clothes, and school materials that children and families in need may use. Indicative, finally, of their determination to challenge the established role and prevalence of the Orthodox Church over practices in Greece, members of the Atheist Union organise open gatherings and social events that go directly against the traditional celebrations of the Orthodox faith, including the Saint Alcohol gathering on Holy Spirit Monday (Agiou Oino-Pneumatos), playing with the words '*pneuma*' (spirit) and '*oinopneuma*' (alcoholic drinks), and a Visible Supper instead of the Last Supper, contrasting the notion of the Mystikos (secret) Supper during Greek Orthodox Easter.

4 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the role of religious communities in civil society in Greece. In addition to the advantages that emanate from its constitutionally established 'prevailing' position, the Orthodox Church is an official and de jure partner of the Greek state in social protection. Adopting a grassroots perspective, the research has shown that this dual role of the Orthodox Church explains not only its position as the perceived exclusive social service provider but also the obstacles that other communities have been facing in their similar efforts. Indeed, religious communities that do not enjoy the privileges of a similar interconnectedness with the Greek state – or with Greek national identity – find it harder to either enter the civil society arena or to even have their contributions acknowledged. As a significant contribution to the sociolegal literature on the role of religious communities in Greek civil society, the findings thus highlight the following paradox: the less autonomous a religious community is from the state, the more likely its capacity to enter civil society.

This however is not to say that other religious communities have not been active in this field. Rather, the empirical research has further demonstrated that such groups' capacity to enter the civil society arena in Greece is dependent upon their historical presence in the country, their legal standing, as well the extent to which their beliefs and practices appear to challenge the established norms and the Greek Orthodox Church, especially in the field of education. As such, the main concern of

non-Orthodox Christian communities has to do with their belief that their social services are not as publicised as, and thus are being overshadowed by, those services offered by the Orthodox Church, thus raising crucial questions about inter-religious dynamics and cooperation in the country.

This chapter has also demonstrated that in the case of certain smaller and predominantly non-Christian religious communities, the recipients of their social services and philanthropic activities are primarily if not exclusively members of the communities themselves – largely as a result of the legal and other challenges these communities have been facing. It appears that the limited legal and other types of recognition of such communities in Greece has, for different reasons and to different extents, led to a stance of protectionism and defence of the respective community's interests and concerns. Finally, other conscience-based communities, such as the Atheist Union, seek to directly challenge the established control of the Orthodox Church in Greece with civil society and philanthropy.

This research has further shown that the context of increasing religious diversity, combined with the recent economic and financial crisis, has directly affected civil society mobilisations and volunteering levels in Greece. It is, finally, these particular factors that have challenged the assumed monopoly of the majority religion of the Orthodox Church as a social service and charity provider, offering space and an important degree of exposure for the initiatives of other religious and conscience-based communities in the civil society arena.

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Efstathios Kessareas
The Orthodox Church of Greece and civic activism in the context of the financial crisis

1 Introduction

The financial crisis in Greece caused devastating economic, social, and political consequences that by no means can be considered attributes of a robust civil society and a well-functioning democracy: extreme poverty, high unemployment, social exclusion, homelessness, anomie (e.g. violent clashes, suicides), electoral success of the ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn party, widespread distrust in political institutions, and loss of economic sovereignty, to name but a few examples. However, the peaceful mass demonstrations and spontaneous solidarity initiatives of the period can be viewed as signs of civic engagement, especially when compared to the political apathy and individualistic behaviour of the pre-crisis period. More fundamentally, these large-scale citizen mobilisations reflect the socio-economic struggle that was intensified within Greek society during the implementation of the harsh austerity policies. This struggle reached its peak in 2015 when the Greek bailout referendum (the first after the restoration of democracy in 1974) polarised society into two, schematically speaking, opposing camps: those who wanted Greece to remain part of the eurozone at any cost (mainly economic and political elites, and upper-middle socio-economic strata) and those who opposed the austerity policies, even if such opposition could lead to so-called Grexit (mostly those most affected by the crisis, i.e. lower strata).

Most research on Greek civil society during this period either ignores the role of religion or focuses on the charitable activities of the Orthodox Church of Greece (henceforth, the Church), paying little to no attention to the political character of its public interventions vis-à-vis the crisis itself. This chapter aims to fill this gap by focusing on the attitude of the Church hierarchy towards the street and square protests of the period (e.g. the Indignant Citizens Movement) and on its public interventions in such crucial political moments of the crisis as the Euro Summits on Greece and the bailout referendum. I intend to demonstrate that the strong preference of the higher clergy for a spiritual and not anti-systemic outlet for the popular indignation of the time, as well as their implicit or explicit support for the 'yes' vote on the referendum, are related to the Church's traditional role as an ally of the state, the interests of its leadership, its hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, and, last but not least, the dominant inward-oriented, mystical current in Orthodox theology (e.g. Hesychasm, theosis), which extols sacrifice and quiescence at the expense of activist engagement with this-worldly political affairs. Activism, especially when it takes the form of confrontation, is delegitimised as a Protestant alteration of the alleged ontological, agapeistic essence of Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is encouraged when it aims at the

preservation of existing church–state relations and the Church's prominent place in society. The church–state conflicts regarding the ecclesiastical property issue in 1987 and the exclusion of religious affiliation from national identity cards in 2000 are prime examples.

It may thus be evident that I conceive of civil society politically as citizen expression and pro-democracy collective action in the public sphere in response to democratic deficits or violations of rights committed by governments, regardless of whether the latter attributes responsibility to non-state actors (e.g. the Troika) or to so-called faceless markets. Such an understanding of civil society does not underestimate class divisions within society; rather, it considers them crucial catalysts for the formation and outcome of collective action. Religion can play a decisive role here, since it comprises a powerful source of values and beliefs that can facilitate or impede citizen mobilisation, especially in societies like Greece in which people trust the Church more than political institutions and where religion and national identity are closely linked. In Greece, the institutional ties between the Church and the state, the strong anti-activist ethos of Orthodoxy, and the interests of the Church leadership put up barriers against activism, except in cases when areas of the Church's own legitimacy (e.g. faith, church–state relations, sensitive national issues) and, more importantly, the authority of the Church hierarchy are being challenged.

The chapter is organised in eight sections. In the following section, I briefly review recent theoretical discussions on civil society activism, attempting to show that different ways of understanding civil society lead to contrasting evaluations of activism. Then, I present the traditional and the new thesis of Greek scholarship concerning the character of civil society in Greece. After pointing out what I characterise as a neglected area of research, I outline the aims of and methodology behind the chapter. In the third section, I outline some features of the Church concerning its theology, internal structure, and relations with the state and the nation, which are crucial for explaining the hierarchy's attitude within the crisis. This attitude, the core subject of analysis, is examined in the next four sections of the chapter. First, I present the hierarchy's basic explanatory schemes and proposals regarding the crisis while examining whether these encourage an oppositional, activist stance or a supportive one. Then, I analyse the hierarchy's stance towards the public demonstrations of the time, focusing on the meaning and political implications of its counter-proposals (e.g. the 'health revolution' suggestion). The sixth section focuses the inquiry on the hierarchy's public interventions at crucial political moments of the crisis, highlighting its political and financial preferences and choices. The seventh section, which may be described as parenthetical insofar as it fleshes out the context of the discussion, demonstrates – through a brief account of past church–state conflicts – that the hierarchy encourages a defensive activism that aims at securing its own ideological and material interests. The concluding section points out the hierarchy's triple legitimisation of state policies and provides three intertwined reasons to explain its anti-activist stance within the context of the crisis.

2 Civic activism in the context of crisis

2.1 Theoretical approaches

The austerity measures imposed by governments to tackle the severe financial crisis produced mass street protests, occupations of squares, and other forms of grassroots activities. This activism revitalised theoretical interest in the political understanding of civil society, raising the question of the appropriate role of civil society actors during an era of hegemony of the market.

Responses were far from uniform. However, one can easily identify the implicit or explicit theoretical presuppositions of every approach, which lead to contrasting views of activism. On the one hand, those who adopt a liberal, neo-Tocquevillian understanding of civil society, even if they recognise the authoritarian and managerial character of today's democracies, prioritise the role of governments, leaving civil society organisations a complementary, advisory role.[1] Having labelled anti-establishment activism as ineffective and essentialist, they call for pragmatism, namely collaboration with governments, without analysing relations of power and interests. On the other hand, those who are influenced by the Gramscian theoretical tradition underline the importance of power relations and welcome protest as an emancipatory form of action against neoliberal policies.[2] There is no agreement, however, concerning the character and extent of this activism. Some scholars highlight the importance of institutional and cultural changes, as opposed to immediate revolutionary activism[3], while others highlight the need for a truly democratic European public space[4]; still others warmly embrace grassroots activism, recognising that it may even take uncivil forms[5]. The real issue here is civil society's relationship to change, a change that can be pursued in different ways, including, as Fioramonti & Thümler have pointed out, reformist policies, political (or even radical) activism, and/or the search for an alternative, post-growth way of life.[6]

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1 E.g. Clark, J. (2011): 'Civil Society in the Age of Crisis', *Journal of Civil Society*, 7 (3): 241-263.

2 E.g. Howell, J. (2011): 'Commentary: Crises, Opportunities and the Elephant in the Room', *Journal of Civil Society*, 7 (3): 265-271.; Kaldor, M. & Selchow, S. (2013): 'The 'Bubbling Up' of Subterranean Politics in Europe', *Journal of Civil Society*, 9 (1): 78-99.

3 E.g. Fioramonti, L. & Thümler, E. (2013a): 'Civil Society, Crisis, and Change: Towards a Theoretical Framework', *Journal of Civil Society*, 9 (2): 225-232.

4 Pianta, M. (2013): 'Democracy Lost: The Financial Crisis in Europe and the Role of Civil Society', *Journal of Civil Society*, 9 (2): 148-161.

5 Keck, E. M. & von Bülow, M. (2011): 'Commentary: What Can we Ask of Civil Society?', *Journal of Civil Society*, 7 (3): 283-286.

6 Fioramonti, L. & Thümler, E. (2013b): 'Accountability, Democracy, and Post-growth: Civil Society Rethinking Political Economy and Finance', *Journal of Civil Society*, 9 (2): 117-128.

2.1.1 Greek civil society: a revitalisation?

The dominant conclusion in Greek scholarship has been that Greek civil society is weak due to a number of reasons, among which the most important are particracy, clientelism, populism, plutocracy, traditional family relations, and anaemic voluntarism.[7] Adopting the premises of the modernisation paradigm, such approaches opt for institutional and cultural changes that will close what they perceive as a gap that separates Greece from Western Europe. In this perspective, activism is understood as a process of internalisation and dissemination of cultural values and ideas that will lead the country to its final goal, namely that of Europeanisation.[8] Activism that is driven by different values and political aims is viewed negatively as a backward resistance of the adherents of an underdog culture, who oppose the modernising reforms of the pro-European Union (EU) supporters in order to secure their particularistic interests.[9]

However, a number of Greek scholars question the validity or at least the scale of application of the aforementioned conclusion, basing their views on such post-crisis empirical evidence as citizens' solidarity initiatives and the mass demonstrations. They speak instead of a revitalisation and politicisation of Greek civil society[10]; an

7 E.g. Mouzelis, N. (1995): 'Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society'. In Hall, A. J. (Ed.): *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 224-249. Cambridge: Polity Press.;
Mouzelis, N., & Pagoulatos, G. (2005): 'Civil Society and Citizenship in Post-war Greece'. In Birtek, F. & Dragonas, Th. (Eds.): *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey: Social and Historical Studies on Greece and Turkey Series*, p. 87-103. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.
8 E.g. Lyrintzis, Ch. (2002): 'Greek Civil Society in the 21st Century'. In Ioakimidis, P. (Ed.): *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, p. 90-99. Athens: Ministry of Press & Mass Media.
9 E.g. Diamandouros, N. P. (2013): 'Postscript: Cultural Dualism Revisited'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*, p. 208-232. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Diamandouros (2013) says nothing about the particularistic interests of the adherents of the 'reform culture'. In his schema of thought, the aims of these strata do not represent interests, for they are equated positively with modernity, democracy, and the 'strategy for moving forward'. However, he recognises that the reformist policies have 'painful consequences ... for the less competitive segments of society'. For the victims of these reforms he recommends complementary measures that will 'minimize and palliate' their pain (Ibid.: 220).
10 Kavoulakos, K. & Gritzas, G. (2015): «Κινήματα και εναλλακτικοί χώροι στην Ελλάδα της κρίσης: μία νέα κοινωνία πολιτών». In Georgarakis, N. G. & Demertzis, N. (Comps.): Το *πολιτικό πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας: κρίση και η αποδόμηση του πολιτικού*, p. 337-355. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE): Gutenberg.;
Leontidou, L. (2015): 'Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of "Weak" Civil Societies'. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (Eds.): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline,* p. 85-106. Farnham: Ashgate.;
Loukidou, K. (2014): 'Transformations in Greek Civil Society during Economic Crisis: New Challenges, New Perspectives'. Paper for the 64th Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, Manchester, 14-16 April 2014. URL: http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2014/10/ Loukidou-2014.pdf (retrieving date 2016-06-06).

'empowerment'[11] that nevertheless also has a 'dark side', that of extreme violence[12]; or, at least, a profound mobilisation that takes place within a pluralistic but still highly fragmented civic space[13]. Of course, as Simiti has rightly pointed out, this revitalisation occurs in conditions of extreme poverty and social exclusion, and thus it may be more an emergency, and as such ephemeral, response to current social needs than a free and stable choice of citizens who act in a prosperous environment.[14]

Although the above approaches share, with or without asterisks, the 'revitalisation' thesis, they nevertheless diverge in the scale of their optimism and especially in their evaluations of activism, especially when the latter is accompanied by violence. That large sections of the population mobilised peacefully against state austerity policies is not in doubt; however, one cannot overlook the violent clashes of the period between hooded protesters and police, which caused severe injuries and even deaths. No one can deny that these are aspects of a 'dark' (I would say anomic) society. But we should be careful not to put everything (e.g. strikes, occupation of buildings, barricades in villages, deadly neo-Nazi assaults) under the same umbrella, as Sotiropoulos indiscriminately does.[15]

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11 Sotiropoulos, D. A. & Bourikos, D. (2014): 'Economic Crisis, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece', *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance*, 2 (2): 33-53.

12 Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014a): 'Civil Society in Greece in the Wake of the Economic Crisis'. Research paper, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) & the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Athens. URL: www.kas.de/griechenland/en/publications/38533 (retrieving date 2016-02-06).; Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014b): «Το διπρόσωπο κεφάλι του Ιανού: η κοινωνία πολιτών στην Ελλάδα πριν και μετά την έναρξη της οικονομικής κρίσης», *Greek Political Science Review*, 42: 11-35.;
Sotiropoulos, D. A., Clarke J. & Huliaras, A. (2015): 'Conclusions'. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (Eds.): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline*, p. 239-251. Farnham: Ashgate.

13 Afouxenidis, A. (2015): «Η κοινωνία πολιτών στην εποχή της κρίσης». In Georgarakis, N. G. & Demertzis, N. (Comps.): Το *πολιτικό πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας: κρίση και η αποδόμηση του πολιτικού,* p. 317-336. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE): Gutenberg.

14 Simiti, M. (2014): «Κράτος και εθελοντικές οργανώσεις την περίοδο της οικονομικής κρίσης», *Greek Political Science Review*, 42: 36-61.;
Simiti, M. (2015): '"Social Need" or "Choice"? Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis'. GreeSE Paper No. 95, Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, London, UK. URL: eprints.lse.ac.uk/64665 (retrieving date 2017-03-13).

15 Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014a): 'Civil Society in Greece in the Wake of the Economic Crisis'. Research paper, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) & the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Athens. URL: www.kas.de/griechenland/en/publications/38533 (retrieving date 2016-02-06).; Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014b): «Το διπρόσωπο κεφάλι του Ιανού: η κοινωνία πολιτών στην Ελλάδα πριν και μετά την έναρξη της οικονομικής κρίσης», Greek Political Science Review, 42: 11-35. Sotiropoulos gives the impression that he is in favour of activism as long as it does not challenge the current power structures. When mobilisation takes a more radical form (e.g. strikes, occupations of buildings), it is stigmatised as populist or as expressing interests of groups that resist change, failing to see that the proposed state policies are not neutral either.

On the other hand, one can find analyses[16] that support the citizen activism, explaining disobedience and violence as a defensive reaction of protesters to police repression. In this framing, violence is a tool of the state to crush anti-austerity resistance and the associated quest for an alternative socio-economic model. How can we explain these different points of view concerning radical activism? I suggest that the explanation lies in the different ways of conceptualising civil society and, more importantly, in the high political stakes of the period, which reached the crucial point of challenging the position of the country within the eurozone and the EU itself.

2.1.2 Religion and civic activism: the neglected issue

While the aforementioned studies often refer to the social and solidarity services of the Church, a rarely asked question regards its stance towards the mass demonstrations of the period. How can we explain this omission? First, scholars prioritise describing the Church's charitable activities because dioceses and parish churches in Greece traditionally play an active role in welfare provision, filling the inadequacies of the weak Greek social state.[17] No doubt, the Church has mobilised and increased its material resources and volunteer networks in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by the austerity measures.[18] The engagement of the Church here was so significant that scholars[19] who before the crisis argued that the Church does not belong to

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16 E.g. Pantazidou, M. (2013): 'Treading New Ground: A Changing Moment for Citizen Action in Greece', *Development in Practice*, 23 (5-6): 755-770.; Kavoulakos, K. & Gritzas, G. (2015): «Κινήματα και εναλλακτικοί χώροι στην Ελλάδα της κρίσης: μία νέα κοινωνία πολιτών». In Georgarakis, N. G. & Demertzis, N. (Comps.): Το *πολιτικό πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας: κρίση και η αποδόμηση του πολιτικού*, p. 337-355. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE): Gutenberg.; Leontidou, L. (2015): 'Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of "Weak" Civil Societies'. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (Eds.): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline,* p. 85-106. Farnham: Ashgate.
17 See Fokas, E. & Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2004): 'Welfare, Church and Gender in Greece'. In Beckman, N. (Ed.): *Welfare, Church and Gender in Eight European Countries: Working Paper 1 from the Project Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective*, p. 288-338. Uppsala: Institute of Diaconal & Social Studies-University of Uppsala.; Fokas, E. & Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2010): 'The Disgraceful and the Divine in Greek Welfare: The Cases of Thiva and Livadeia'. In Bäckström, A. & Davie, G. (Eds.): *Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe: Configuring the Connections*, Volume 1, p. 167-182. Farnham: Ashgate.
18 Makris, G. & Bekridakis, D. (2013): 'The Greek Orthodox Church and the Economic Crisis since 2009'. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 13 (2): 111-132.;
Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2016): 'The Impact of the Crisis on the Orthodox Church of Greece: A Moment of Challenge and Opportunity?', *Religion, State and Society*, 44 (1): 32-50.
19 E.g. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2008): «Υποθέσεις εργασίας και ανοιχτά ερωτήματα στη βιβλιογραφία για την ελληνική κοινωνία πολιτών». In Kontiadis X. I. & Anthopoulos, Ch. Th. (Comps.): *Κρίση του Ελληνικού Πολιτικού Συστήματος;*, p. 317-330. Athens: Papazisi.

civil society due to its institutional relationship with the state now place it, for this very reason, at the crossroads between civil society and the state.[20]

A second reason for this omission lies in the liberal understanding of civil society, which renders these analyses more focused on the solidarity activities of civil society actors. But even when they refer to the mobilisations of the period, they still pay no attention to how the official policy of the Church constrained or encouraged this activism. Their focus remains exclusively on the soup kitchens and other philanthropic services of the Church. At best, they make a general remark that the Church abstained from taking part in any social activism[21] or that it kept an anti-memorandum stance in its public announcements but, by failing to develop a political theology critical of existing political and economic structures, offered support to the conservatives.[22] As I will demonstrate, this is not the whole picture. As regards the first point, the Church went a step further, depoliticising social activism even though – or to put it more accurately, exactly when – it rhetorically welcomed the indignant protests or, under an anti-memorandum guise, spoke of foreign occupation. As regards the second point, the crucial issue is not only that Church officials did not develop a systematic and coherent critique of neoliberalism and of the Greek political system but that they also made public interventions (especially at crucial moments in the crisis) in favour of the strategic choices of the existing economic and political system and against the demands and organisational characteristics of the anti-austerity mobilisations.

2.2 Aims and methodology

In this chapter, I explore and explain the hierarchy's attitude towards the civic activism of the crisis period, from the first anti-austerity demonstrations in 2010 to the 2015 referendum's popular mobilisation. My core research question is whether the stance adopted by Church leaders was oppositional to or supportive of the status quo. I intend to answer this by analysing their public discourse (e.g. encyclicals and other official letters, sermons, articles, interviews) produced during the period of the crisis and especially at peak times of public frustration and mobilisation, such as during the Indignant Citizens Movement, the Euro Summits on Greece, and the 2015 referen-

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20 Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014a): 'Civil Society in Greece in the Wake of the Economic Crisis'. Research paper, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) & the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Athens. URL: www.kas.de/griechenland/en/publications/38533 (retrieving date 2016-06-02): 6.; Sotiropoulos, D. A. & Bourikos, D. (2014): 'Economic Crisis, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece', *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance*, 2 (2):pp. 33-53, p. 40, note 17.
21 Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2016): 'The Impact of the Crisis on the Orthodox Church of Greece: A Moment of Challenge and Opportunity?', Religion, State and Society, 44 (1): 32-50.
22 Makris, G. & Bekridakis, D. (2013): 'The Greek Orthodox Church and the Economic Crisis since 2009'. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 13 (2): 111-132.

dum. Since the material is vast, I provide indicative examples that support the conclusions of my overall research. I also explain cases that at first sight seem to be exceptions.[23] In the analysis of the hierarchy's discourse, I have paid special attention to the implicit or explicit meanings that are utilised for the legitimisation of existing power relations.[24] Concerning religion's relation to change, I found the organisational approach by Westhues very useful, in particular his critical remarks on the conditions under which a church can adopt an oppositional stance against the status quo.[25]

One may object here that the Church is not only the hierarchy. This is true; the Church consists of different strata, which can support oppositional theological currents in their attempt to move the ecclesiastical organisation into their vision, for instance, to change the hierarchical structure of the Church and the established church-state relations.[26] However, as I explain in the next section, the hierarchs are the most powerful stratum within the religious body, the ones that formulate and express the official policy of the Church. Not only are they the highest executives of the religious administration, but they are also 'traditional' and 'institutional' intellectuals – to use Gramsci's and Mannheim's terms respectively[27] – who produce and disseminate ideas and values to the faithful. Although these ideas and values are portrayed as detached from politics, they are nevertheless political in essence, since the internalised schemata of thought result in specific modes of behaviour that can reproduce or challenge existing power relations.[28] The struggle over legitimacy is intensified during times of

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23 Of course, if one takes into consideration the large number of hierarchs of the Church of Greece (eighty-two, without counting the bishops of Crete and Dodecanese), one cannot exclude the possibility of bishops having developed a different discourse from the one presented here. However, I do not think that such potential cases would carry enough weight to cancel the validity of my conclusions, for the latter are based not only on the discourse of individual bishops but also on the official announcements of the Church, including the ones of its highest authority, namely the archbishop.
24 See Thompson, J. B. (1984): *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
25 Westhues, K. (1976): 'The Church in Opposition', *Sociological Analysis*, 37 (4): 299-314.
26 See Kessareas, E. (2015): 'Orthodox Theological Currents in Modern Greece after 1974: Ongoing Tensions between Reform and Conservatism'. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 33 (2): 241-268.
That is why I have examined elsewhere the religious fundamentalist' attitude to the crisis (see Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', The Sociological Review. 66 (1): 122-137.), as well as the stance of the so-called reformers (see Kessareas, E. (forthcoming): «Από τον "οίκο του Θεού" στον "οίκο της Ευρώπης": Η θρησκεία ως ιδεολογία κατά την περίοδο της κρίσης στην Ελλάδα». Synchrona Themata.). These two texts should be read together, as they constitute parts of the same research inquiry concerning issues of ideology and legitimisation within the context of the crisis.
27 Gramsci, A. (1971): *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers: 7.; Mannheim, K. (2003): *Essays on the Sociology of Culture: Collected Works of Karl Mannheim*. London: Routledge: 155.
28 A recent study on the relationship between social protest and religiosity in Greece has shown that high levels of religiosity are associated with passive forms of political participation (e.g. petition sign-

socio-economic or political disruption, accompanied by 'morbid symptoms' before the establishment of a new, legitimised authority.[29] It is during such periods of crisis, I argue, that traditional intellectuals lose their masks of neutrality, as they are forced by high political stakes to take sides with specific strata of the social formation, forming such alliances that best serve their self-interests.

3 The Church of Greece: aspects of structure and theology

3.1 Hierarchy versus equality

The Church of Greece has a rather hierarchical structure, for both spiritual and administrative powers are concentrated in the hands of the bishops. They are the highest authority within the religious organisation, and their special position is legitimised with reference to Christ itself; they are the ones who serve 'in the place' and as a 'type' of Christ within the Church.[30] According to the – very often quoted by hierarchs – Pauline simile, bishops are the head, while the two other ecclesiastical orders (presbyters and deacons) and the lay people constitute the other parts of the human body. Although – according to the ideology – all these parts have different positions, they function harmoniously in favour of a common aim, namely the maintenance of human life. The obvious implication is that everyone must accept their own position and accomplish their corresponding duties in the interest of the collective. In this framing, the modern idea and value of equality is rejected as a denial of the Church's charismatic (i.e. hierarchical) structure, especially when it takes the form of demands for a democratic administration of the church (e.g. lay participation).[31] The key word here is structure. Since the historical structure of the Church is considered to be a

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ing), and lower levels of religiosity with more dynamic protests (see Stathopoulou, Th. (2015): «Πολιτική συμμετοχή, κοινωνική διαμαρτυρία και θρησκευτικότητα. Η αβέβαιη συνθήκη». In Georgarakis, N. G. & Demertzis, N. (Comps.): Το πολιτικό πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας: κρίση και η αποδόμηση του πολιτικού, p. 108-140. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE): Gutenberg: 112, note 6.). However, this research is based on the analysis of data from the European Social Survey, which come from the period before the peak of the indignant protests in 2011 (see note 6, p. 112).

29 Gramsci, A. (1971): *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers: 276.

30 Zizioulas, J. (1997): *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press: 229.

31 For more on this, see Kessareas, E. (2015): 'Orthodox Theological Currents in Modern Greece after 1974: Ongoing Tensions between Reform and Conservatism'. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 33 (2): pp. 241-268, p. 253-254.

reflection of the divine structure[32], the only legitimate action is one that maintains that structure. On the contrary, action that aims at changing the structure is condemned as an impediment to salvation itself. By analogy, this schema is applied not only to the internal structure of the Church, but also to its external relations, for instance, with the state. The whole current of affairs (be it ecclesiastical, social, political, or economic) is conceived in terms of structure, something that has implications for the character and direction of human action. We should keep this point in mind in explaining the hierarchy's stance towards activism.

As an institution, the Church of Greece is administrated by two collective bodies: the Synod of the Hierarchy and the Permanent Synod (collectively, the Holy Synod).[33] Although the synodical character of these administrative bodies ensures a significant degree of collective governance, in practice the place and role of the archbishop is decisive in the formation of Church policy. The archbishop's power within the religious body is guaranteed via the status and prestige of his institutional position, the alliances that he formed during his election, and the appointment of befriended archimandrites in key supportive positions that will help their chances of becoming bishops in the future.[34] This is not to say that the archbishop has unlimited power in the governance of the Church. He must always take into account the various alliances that are formed among groups of bishops, who also compete for symbolic and material interests, such as their future election to the archbishopric throne or their transfer to wealthier dioceses. Besides, we must not forget that the episcopo-centric structure of the Church means that every bishop has a monopoly over the legitimate exercise of religious power within the boundaries of his diocese.

In sum, the existing structure of the Church secures an over-concentration of power in the highest ranks of the ecclesiastical system. The dominant groups (bishops, archimandrites) receive high salaries, enjoy widespread respect, and have close relations with the political and media systems. On the contrary, the lower clergy serve in small towns and villages, far away from the well-paid positions of the large dioceses.[35] At the bottom of the ecclesiastical pyramid are the lay people, except those

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32 see Metallinos, G. (1996): *Η θεολογική μαρτυρία της εκκλησιαστικής λατρείας*. Athens: Armos.; Zizioulas, J. (1997): *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.

33 The first one is the supreme administrative body, consisting of all the diocesan bishops, and takes place once a year, presided over by the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece. The Permanent Synod consists of the archbishop and twelve bishops and deals with all ongoing administrative issues.

34 These monastic priests, called 'career clerics' by Zoumboulakis (Zoumboulakis, S. (2013): 'The Orthodox Church in Greece Today'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): The Greek Crisis and European Modernity, p. 132-151. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 140.), are in line to be ordained bishops and for this reason occupy powerful positions within the ecclesiastical structure.

35 See Pinakoulas, A. (2006): «Η συμμετοχή των λαϊκών στην εκλογή των επισκόπων», *Synaxi*, 27: 27-41.

who offer well-paid services due to expert knowledge (e.g. lawyers, economists). Although in Orthodox theology the parish is characterised as the 'cell' of the Church's life, lay people essentially do not participate in the administration of the Church. The administration remains the exclusive privilege of the bishops.[36]

A final remark that we should keep in mind is that the clientele of the Church is composed of different social classes that share neither the same values nor, more importantly, the same interests. No doubt the majority of the faithful come from the lower and middle socio-economic classes, but one can also find rich and powerful people who are members of the Church. Why is this important for understanding the hierarchy's stance? As Westhues has observed, a homogeneous membership can exercise decisive pressure on church executives to side with their interests. By contrast, a heterogeneous clientele reduces pressure from below, giving the hierarchy the possibility to evaluate and ultimately choose under which coalition its own interests can be best served.[37]

3.2 The three sources of legitimacy

According to Weber, churches as religious institutions draw their power and legitimacy from the fact that they have a monopoly on the goods of salvation. They claim to possess the holy knowledge and, more importantly, the religious means (e.g. rituals) to meet the various needs of the faithful, especially the existential need of salvation.[38] This is true for the Church of Greece, too, except that it also draws its power and prestige from two additional important sources: the nation and the state.

For Greeks, Orthodoxy is more than merely a religion. It is perceived as an integral part of one's own identity and as a way of life.[39] History plays an important role in the close intertwining of religion and national identity in Greece. Orthodoxy offered to the Greek people a distinct identity during the War of Independence against the Ottomans and was present in every national struggle of the modern Greek state.

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36 Zoumboulakis, S. (2013): 'The Orthodox Church in Greece Today'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*, p. 132-151. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 141.

37 Westhues, K. (1976): 'The Church in Opposition', *Sociological Analysis*, 37 (4): 299-314.

38 Weber, M. (1978): *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 54.

39 See Georgiadou, V. (1996): «Κοσμικό κράτος και Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία: σχέσεις θρησκείας, κοινωνίας και πολιτικής στην μεταπολίτευση». In Lyrintzis, Ch., Nikolakopoulos, E. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (Comps.): *Κοινωνία και πολιτική: όψεις της Γ΄ Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας, 1974-1994*, p. 247-286. Athens: Themelio.; Makrides, V. (1991): 'Orthodoxy as a Conditio sine qua non: Religion and State/Politics in Modern Greece from a Socio-Historical Perspective'. *Ostkirchliche Studie*n, 40 (4): 281-305.

There is neither sufficient space nor need to offer a detailed historical account,[40] but it is important to underline the fact that the Church was actually created by the state when the latter acquired its national independence from the Ottoman Empire. The modern Greek nation-state needed an established church that would promote the national ideas and goals of the state. This meant both administrative and ideological independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which was on hostile ground, ideologically setting the old imperial idea against the new national ideals and aims. The result was the establishment of an ethnocentric and centralised church along the lines and aims of the state.[41] But the relation between these two institutions was not an equal one, in the sense that the state could interfere (and actually did interfere) in the Church in order to serve its own purposes. On the other hand, the Church enjoyed material and ideological privileges that stemmed from its recognition as an established church, but at the expense of administrative and spiritual independence. What is more, the Church's overwhelming embrace of state-nationalistic ideals reached such an extent that it was perceived by the people as the core institution for the protection of Greek identity, sometimes even in sharp contrast to the state. This is best reflected in the ideological image of the Church as the 'Ark of the nation', based on the argument that it preserves the core elements of Greek identity, namely faith, language, and culture. The Church thereby becomes a kind of legitimate medium not only between the faithful and God but also between the people and the nation. The nation becomes that extra sacred entity that fosters the Church's legitimacy in Greek society.

This special position and role of the Church is clearly reflected in the country's constitution, which recognises the Orthodox faith as the 'prevailing religion' in the country and guarantees the Church's administrative organisation as well as its fundamental dogmatic principles.[42] As a legal person under public law, it has the structure of a 'state agency', as Papastathis and Mavrogordatos, among others, have stated.[43] This is obvious not only at the fiscal level of church–state relations (e.g. the

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40 For a historical overview, see Zoumboulakis, S. (2013): 'The Orthodox Church in Greece Today'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*, p. 132-151. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 134-137.

41 Manitakis, A. (2000): *Οι σχέσεις της Εκκλησίας με το Κράτος-Έθνος: στη σκιά των ταυτοτήτων*. Athens: Nefeli.; Zoumboulakis, S. (2013): 'The Orthodox Church in Greece Today'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*, p. 132-151. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

42 See Article 3 of the Greek Constitution of 1975 (Mavrias, K. & Spiliotopoulos, E. (Eds.) (2008): The Constitution of Greece. Athens: Hellenic Parliament. URL: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf (retrieving date 2017-05-20): 20.).

43 Papastathis, Ch. K. (2010): 'Greece: A Faithful Orthodox Christian State. The Orthodox Church in the Hellenic Republic'. In Martínez-Torrón, J. & Durham, W. C. Jr. (Eds.) *Religion and the Secular State: National Reports*, p. 339-375. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University. URL: www.iclrs.org/content/

state pays the salaries and pensions of the clergy in exchange for taking a large portion of ecclesiastical property) but also at the symbolic level: national holiday celebrations have a deeply religious character, and Greek politicians include religious references in their public speeches. In addition, both institutions cooperate closely in many fields of common interest with the aim of mutual financial benefit, for instance, in the field of religious tourism.[44] The fact that Orthodoxy is the religion of the vast majority of the population allocates significant power to the Church, which every political party takes into consideration in the electoral process. In many cases, both the political and ecclesiastical sectors have used Orthodoxy for their own political and ideological purposes, a situation referred to in the literature as 'politicisation' and 'instrumentalisation'.[45] This situation challenges the belief that since church and state have different spheres of interests, religion and politics are totally separate in modernity. Greek politicians treat the Church favourably in order to secure the electoral support of the faithful. On the other hand, the Church enjoys the privileges stemming from its constitutionally guaranteed position as the prevailing religion in the country, providing in return ideological legitimisation to the state.

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blurb/files/Greece.2.pdf (retrieving date 2014-06-10).; Mavrogordatos, G. (2003), "Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case", *West Europen Politics* 26 (1), pp. 117-136.

44 See Ministry of Tourism & Church of Greece (2013): «Πρωτόκολλο συνεργασίας στον τομέα του προσκυνηματικού τουρισμού μεταξύ του Υπουργείου Τουρισμού και της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/tourism/mnimonio_paideias.pdf (retrieving date 2018-01-04).

45 E.g. Dragonas, Th. (2013): 'Religion in Contemporary Greece-A Modern Experience?'. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. & Kouki, H. (Eds.): *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*, p. 110-131. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.; Georgiadou, V. (1995): 'Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism'. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 9 (2): 295-315.; Georgiadou, V. (1996): «Κοσμικό κράτος και Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία: σχέσεις θρησκείας, κοινωνίας και πολιτικής στην μεταπολίτευση». In Lyrintzis, Ch., Nikolakopoulos, E. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (Comps.): *Κοινωνία και πολιτική: όψεις της Γ' Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας, 1974-1994*, p. 247-286. Athens: Themelio.; Georgiadou, V. & Nikolakopoulos, E. (2000): «Ο λαός της Εκκλησίας: όψεις της εκκλησιαστικής θρησκευτικότητας στην Ελλάδα». In Vernardakis, Ch. (Ed.): *Η κοινή γνώμη στην Ελλάδα*, p. 141-185. Athens: Nea Synora-Livani.; Makrides, V. (1991): 'Orthodoxy as a Conditio sine qua non: Religion and State/Politics in Modern Greece from a Socio-Historical Perspective'. *Ostkirchliche Studie*n, 40 (4): 281-305.; Makrides, V. & Roudometof, V. (2010): 'Introduction: Tradition, Transition and Change in Greek Orthodoxy at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century'. In Roudometof, V. & Makrides, V. (Eds.): *Orthodox Christianity in 21st century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics*, p. 1-18. Farnham: Ashgate.

4 The character of the crisis and the proposed solutions

4.1 A spiritual and ethical crisis: human passions

From the onset of the crisis, Church officials engaged in public discourse concerning the causes of and solutions to the crisis. Not only did they discuss the crisis situation within the regular and extraordinary meetings of the Holy Synod, making official announcements[46]; they also issued encyclicals[47] and distributed leaflets to the lay membership, explaining the crisis and suggesting appropriate means for overcoming it[48]. In addition, they preached, gave radio and television interviews, and published articles in secular and religious newspapers. In short, they used all their available recourses in their attempt to address the anxiety and indignation of the lay membership, channelling it in quiescent paths or at least in paths of controlled indignation that would not challenge the system as a whole.

According to the Church hierarchy, the crisis is first and foremost an ethical and spiritual one, an 'existential disease'[49] that has to do with the adoption of a secular way of life characterised by individualism, consumerism, and materialism, in sharp contrast to traditional values and principles of Orthodoxy such as communion, ascesis, temperance, and simplicity.[50] This mode of life, called apostasy, was said to have

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46 E.g. Holy Synod (2010a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2010-10-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1228&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2011a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2011-10-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1324&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2012): «Ανακοινωθέν (2012-03-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1492&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2014): «Το πρόβλημα της οικονομικής κρίσεως (2014-02-03)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1761&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

47 E.g. Holy Synod (2010b): «Εγκύκλιος υπ. αριθμ. 2894: 'Θεολογική θεώρηση της οικονομικής κρίσεως' (2010-03-15)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1181&what_sub=egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

48 E.g. Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

49 All translations are my own.

50 E.g. see Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2010a): «κ. Ιερώνυμος Β'». Ομιλία σε Ημερίδα της Αρχιεπισκοπής Αθηνών (2010-01-30). In *Για μια οικονομία με ανθρώπινο πρόσωπο*, p. 13-30. Athens: Office-Foundation of Youth of the Holy Archbishopric of Athens; Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2010b): «Προσφώνηση ενώπιον του σώματος της Ιεραρχίας (2010-10-05)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?cat_id=&id= 753&what_main=1&what_sub=23&lang=gr&archbishop_who=2&archbishop_heading=Εισηγήσεις (retrieving date 2016-03-23).; Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η

provoked the current crisis as God's pedagogical test or punishment for the sins committed.[51] Since the crisis is pedagogy,[52] so the argument runs, it can become an 'opportunity' for reorientation, namely a return of Greeks to the saving Orthodox traditions of their homeland.[53] In such a setting, the austerity measures, though 'painful', are presented as having 'therapeutic consequences' if they are applied with sensitivity and justice in order not to destroy the unity of the nation.[54]

This constitutes the basic explanatory schema within which all other economic and political causes of the crisis are placed (e.g. low productivity, overconsumption, over-lending, corruption). All these are considered to be symptoms of the aforementioned spiritual crisis, the roots of which can be traced to human passions and sins (e.g. vanity, sloth, greed). Therefore, for the Church hierarchy, it is the interior of the human being that must change and not just the external conditions. Put differently, any effective change in social conditions presupposes a reorientation of the self

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ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/ holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).

51 E.g. Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2010): «Εκλήθη το Δ.Ν.Τ.- άρα η χώρα μας εισέρχεται σε περίοδο κατοχής!» (2010-04-23). URL: mkka.blogspot.be/2010/04/blog-post_23.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28).; Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2015): «Με το χέρι στην καρδιά! Το τίμημα της αποστασίας μας» (2015-07-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/ 2015/07/blog-post_1.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).; Panteleimon, Metropolitan of Veria & Naoussa (2011): «'Οι άφρονες επιστεύσαμεν ότι δυνάμεθα να ζήσωμεν άνευ θεού, πίστεως και Εκκλησίας': Επεσήμανεν ο Σεβ. Βεροίας εις Ι. Αγρυπνίαν δια την αντιμετώπισιν της κρίσεως» (2011-09-30). *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-10-14, 1897: 5.; Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2011a): «Συνέντευξη στο 'Αγιορείτικο Βήμα'. In *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 175, February 2011. URL: www.parembasis.gr/index.php/ el/menu-teyxos-175/1071-2011-175-15 (retrieving date 2016-03-28).; Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/ holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 41.

52 The explanatory scheme of pedagogy is even used by the so-called liberal hierarchs, for instance, by Ignatios, Metropolitan of Dimitriados (2012): «Ο διχασμένος λαός είναι καταδικασμένος». Συνέντευξη στον Ρ/Σ της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος (2012-01-11). URL: http://old.imd.gr/articles/top/synenteyxeis/442 (retrieving date 2017-12-30). It is thereby a deep religious conviction, but it may also reflect the influence of the theological conservatives, who prevail within the Church. Johnson (1998: 299) has pointed out the tendency of liberal and conservative pastors to adjust their views to fit the prevailing viewpoint within their denomination. (see Johnson, B. (1998): 'Theology and the Position of Pastors on Social Issues: Continuity and Change since the 1960's', Review of Religious Research, 39 (4): pp. 293-308, p. 299).

53 Holy Synod (2013): «Εγκύκλιος 2945: 'Οικογένεια και κοινωνία σε κρίση σήμερα', (2013-12-12)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1734&what_sub=egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

54 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011a): «Εισήγηση ενώπιον της τακτικής Ιεράς Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας με θέμα: 'Προς αναθεώρηση και αναδιοργάνωση εκκλησιαστικών πραγμάτων' (2011-10-04)». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/press/ekklisia/2011_october.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).

(metanoia), in practice the espousal of traditional Orthodox values. Such a theological interpretation of the crisis has obvious implications for those religious actors who wished to oppose the implementation of the austerity measures through activist behaviour. The underlying assumption is that this activism is at best an ineffective action, at worst a dangerous one for the unity of the nation.

4.2 An anti-memorandum facade

However, such a theological interpretation could not appeal to people without a further elaboration that also took into consideration the sentiments of the protesters. For this aim, the hierarchy incorporated in its analysis elements from the prevailing anti-austerity discourse of the time, as Makris and Bekridakis have already observed.[55] For instance, the Holy Synod criticised the domestic political system for creating patronage relations in order to reproduce itself.[56] It also criticised itself for having not reacted immediately against cases of 'real or constructed scandals', which traumatised people's trust.[57] Moreover, it criticised in a rather vague way the so-called modern 'Merchants of Nations', namely powerful global elites, for taking advantage of the spiritual decay of Greek society.[58] In this setting, the hierarchs even spoke of 'occupation'[59], a word with strong historical connotations due to the Nazi occupation of the country during the Second World War.[60] But here we must be careful so as not to jump

55 Makris, G. & Bekridakis, D. (2013): 'The Greek Orthodox Church and the Economic Crisis since 2009'. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 13 (2): pp. 111-132, p. 118-119.

56 Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In *ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ*, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15): 2.

57 Ibid.: 3.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.: 1.

60 The Holy Synod (2010c) uses the word very carefully. For instance, it states that the 'country *seems* not to be free anymore but [seems] in essence to be governed by its lenders' (emphasis added) and that by accepting the measures demanded by the lenders, 'we declare that we are a country under occupation and that we execute commands of our ruling lenders' (Ibid.: 1). The ultra-conservative hierarchs had no problem using the word more emphatically (e.g. Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2010): «Εκλήθη το Δ.Ν.Τ.- άρα η χώρα μας εισέρχεται σε περίοδο κατοχής!» (2010-04-23). URL: mkka.blogspot.be/2010/04/blog-post_23.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28). Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011a): «Ο κ. Γ. Παπακωνσταντίνου: Ο 'προστάτης' των Φτωχών!» (2011-06-28). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/06/blog-post_28.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10). Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011b): «Η ιστορία της οικονομικής απάτης στην Ελλάδα. Εθνική ταπείνωση!» (18/07/2011-07-18). URL: mkka.blogspot.be/2011/07/blog-post_13.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10). Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011c): «Η πιο σκληρή Κατοχική Αρχή μας ήλθε! Είναι το 'Μεσοπρόθεσμο Πλαίσιο'» (2011-07-25). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/07/2012-2015.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10)).

to the wrong conclusions. The hierarchs attempted to construct for the Church an anti-memorandum guise, mainly through the adoption of the anti-memorandum vocabulary of the time. However, this anti-memorandum stance was qualitatively different from the one of the protesters, for it was not oppositional and activist-oriented but – though rhetorically critical – supportive of the status quo. In order to make explicit what I mean, let me share a few examples.

The hierarchs attempted to create the image of a church that dares to 'resist', even if that stance provoked the Church's own 'persecution or martyrdom'.[61] In this way, they tried to renounce the accusation of being part of the status quo, thereby also appealing to those who urged them to adopt a more dynamic attitude. Rather than having something to do with the anti-austerity activism of the period, however, this resistance is rather a rejection of any change in the Church's current position in society and state. That is why the hierarchs first and foremost expressed their agony at how the proposed measures aimed to distort the Orthodox culture of the country.[62] To avoid any possible misunderstandings, they emphatically underlined that their resistance was not against the state but against those dark powers that function behind the apparent government and have no philanthropic aims.[63] Adopting here the conspiracy logic prevailing in Orthodox fundamentalism[64], the hierarchy neutralises the importance of activism, for the latter can by no means reach an enemy formulated in such abstract terms. Even when they criticise the entire political system of the post-1974 period, this criticism never reaches the point of challenging the state as a structure, for the latter alongside the Church are regarded as the two pillars guaranteeing the existence of society itself. Actually, an activist stance against the current organisational form of the state would have challenged the Church's own authority as well, for, as I have noted, it is an integral part of the state.

But there is another reason why I contend that this was a disguised anti-memorandum stance that neutralises rather than encourages activism. At a time when large segments of Greek society were mobilising against the austerity measures, the hierar-

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61 Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holy-synod/anakoi-nothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15): 3.

62 Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15): 1.; Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2015a): «Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος στην Ιεραρχία της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος (2015-10-06)». URL: http://ecclesia.gr/epikairotita/main_epikairotita_ next.asp?id=1573 (retrieving date 2016-03-25).

63 Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holy-synod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15): 4.

64 On this see Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', *The Sociological Review*. 66 (1): 122-137.

chy told them emphatically that they, too, were to blame for the crisis – not just the politicians or foreign lenders. The account is well known and can be briefly summarised as follows: the Greeks enjoyed material prosperity with borrowed money; lived beyond their actual means; were lazy, unproductive, and corrupted, interested only in gaining easy wealth, consuming products, and claiming excessive demands and rights through their unions; and so on.[65] Here, the hierarchy actually reproduces the dominant conservative ideology, which conceives of the people as a whole without distinguishing among the different social strata and without analysing the structural causes of the emergence of such behaviours.[66] By putting the blame on people – in line with the 'we ate it [the money] all together' political argumentation of the time[67] – activism loses any real meaning; it becomes the vehicle for the continuation of the crisis, since it is driven by the same causes of the crisis, namely selfish interests and

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65 E.g. Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2010): «Εκλήθη το Δ.Ν.Τ.- άρα η χώρα μας εισέρχεται σε περίοδο κατοχής!» (2010-04-23). URL: mkka.blogspot.be/2010/04/blog-post_23.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28).; Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).; Holy Synod (2010a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2010-10-08)». URL:www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoino-thenta.asp?id=1228&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2010b): «Εγκύκλιος υπ. αριθμ. 2894: 'Θεολογική θεώρηση της οικονομική κρίσεως' (2010-03-15)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1181&what_sub=egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.eccle-sia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2011a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2011-10-08)». URL:www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1324&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2012): «Ανακοινωθέν (2012-03-08)». URL:www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1492&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Holy Synod (2014): «Το πρόβλημα της οικονομικής κρίσεως (2014-02-03)». URL:www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1761&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).; Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011b): «Αν δεν μάθουμε να ζούμε διαφορετικά δεν θα μπορέσουμε να ξεφύγουμε από την κρίση». Συνέντευξη στην εφημερίδα *Ευρυτανικός Παλμός* (2011-08-13). URL: http://evrytanikospalmos.blogspot.be/2011/08/blog-post_13.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28).; Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2011a): «Εγκύκλιος 63η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2011/63.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-29).

66 'Greek collective guilt' remains the predominant explanatory scheme, even when hierarchs attribute a greater share of responsibility to 'politicians and big businessmen'. (e.g. Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2013): «Απόψεις για την επικαιρότητα». Δημοσίευμα στην Kathimerini (2013-09-08). URL: http://www.imth.gr/default.aspx?lang=el-GR&loc=1&&page=197&newsid=722 (retrieving date 2016-03-28)).

67 This statement was made in the Greek Parliament by then-Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos. Despite the controversy it aroused, it was disseminated rapidly into public discourse, affecting the explanatory schemes of the crisis. See Pangalos, T. (2010): «Μαζί τα φάγαμε». URL: http://pangalos.gr/portal/%CE%BC%CE%B1%CE%B6%CE%AF-%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%86%CE%AC%CE%B3%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B5/ (retrieving date 2017-06-02).

individualistic mentality in general. Therefore, it is rejected as ineffective and, what is more (as we will see in the next section), as nationally dangerous, for it is not in accordance with the genuine Orthodox behaviour of sacrifice and patience.

4.3 Salvation through two levels of transformation

Since the crisis situation was framed in terms of a spiritual and ethical crisis, the solution cannot but have the same characteristics: in short, repentance and return to the Orthodox way of life. The proposed solution thereby assumes the characteristics of a religious salvation; however, it goes beyond the religious walls (salvation of psyche), as it is now promoted as the solution to a socio-economic and political problem, that of the crisis. In particular, the proposed salvation entails the transformation of two levels of human existence, the second being dependent on the first. First, it is the transformation of the self, which Greeks are advised to achieve by adopting a frugal and simple way of life (ascesis). Second, it is the transformation of the political and economic field through a process of modernisation that must also entail justice. I contend that both proposals are in line with the political ideology of the time, functioning in the same direction: that of the legitimisation of the austerity measures.

As regards the first proposal, there is no doubt that Orthodoxy is centred on asceticism; however, the urgent exhortations to live with austerity are not politically neutral, since they take place within the context of the austerity measures. It will be sufficient to quote a few examples of such exhortations to confirm this conclusion. As explicitly stated in the Holy Synod's encyclicals concerning the crisis: "Christians must live with austerity"[68], and "the antidote to consumption is ascesis ... [this] is the path of freedom, against the slavery of superfluous things"[69]. Greeks are advised to learn to live with less money and fewer things, since, according to Metropolitan Chrysostomos, "comforts have been proved to be the opium of the People".[70] What is more, austerity and poverty receive a divine legitimisation, as they are directly associated with Jesus's teachings and the 'poor life' that he lived on earth: "Man shall not

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68 Holy Synod (2010b): «Εγκύκλιος υπ. αριθμ. 2894: 'Θεολογική θεώρηση της οικονομικής κρίσεως' (2010-03-15)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1181&what_sub= egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).
69 Holy Synod (2010c): «Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη σύγχρονη κρίση». In ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΛΑΟ, 44, Νοέμβριος 2010, p. 1-4. Athens: Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holy-synod/anakoinothenta/proslao2010.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-15): 3.
70 Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' 2012-10-02)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/ chrysos-tom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 12.

live by bread alone" and "Blessed are the poor".[71] Besides, Greeks are advised to follow the paradigm of their ancestors, who lived poor and simple lives:

> We are frightened by the economic crisis of our time because we have not learned to live like our grandparents: poorly and simply. Let us also begin, my dears, to live such a life, a life of poverty and simplicity ... and not because it is imposed on us by the conditions of our time, but because this is the way we must live as Christians, because our Leader, Jesus Christ, lived such a life. He lived poorly![72]

Metropolitan Hierotheos is very convinced of the primary value of austerity in transforming first the self and afterwards the external conditions: "If we all learn to content ourselves with the necessities of our life ... if we give weight to our internal self and solve the existential gap that exists inside, then we will solve many other external problems that preoccupy us." [73] From this point of view, activism aiming to change social reality without first healing human passions is condemned to failure.

As regards the second proposal, the Church hierarchy espouses the dominant political ideology of modernisation, this time accompanied by the popular demand for justice.[74] The crucial question refers to the character and extent of this justice, namely, whether it coincides with the protesters' demands for justice. My answer is negative because the concept of justice promoted by the hierarchy has a rather limited scope compared to the anti-austerity movement's call for justice, which was framed in terms of authentic democracy and socio-economic equality. In the hierarchy's discourse, justice mainly means a fairer distribution of the austerity burdens and has as its red line the institutional protection of the Church, framed as 'Mother'[75] and as the 'only saving Ark'[76]. Characteristically, the hierarchy urges politicians to

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71 Ibid.; Jeremiah, Metropolitan Gortynos & Megalopolis (2010): «Ως Χριστιανοί οφείλομεν να εφαρμόσωμεν τον τρόπον ζωής του Χριστού μας και των Πατέρων της Εκκλησίας», *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-12-24,1859: 5.; Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Phthiotis (2011): «Μη αναζητήτε την οικονομικήν ανάκαμψιν εις τα προγράμματα των Ευρωπαίων και των τραπεζιτών». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-12-23,1907: 8.; Pavlos, Metropolitan of Sisaniou & Siatistis (2011): «Βάλαμε τον Θεό και την αλήθειά Του στην άκρη και μετατρέψαμε σε 'σκουπίδι' τον άνθρωπο». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-02-11, 1866: 8.
72 Jeremiah, Metropolitan Gortynos & Megalopolis (2010): «Ως Χριστιανοί οφείλομεν να εφαρμόσωμεν τον τρόπον ζωής του Χριστού μας και των Πατέρων της Εκκλησίας», *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-12-24, 1859: 5.
73 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2011a): «Συνέντευξη στο 'Αγιορείτικο Βήμα'. In *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 175, February 2011. URL: www.parembasis.gr/index.php/el/menu-teyxos-175/1071-2011-175-15 (retrieving date 2016-03-28).
74 E.g. Holy Synod (2010b): «Εγκύκλιος υπ. αριθμ. 2894: 'Θεολογική θεώρηση της οικονομικής κρίσεως' (2010-03-15)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1181&what_sub=egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).
75 Holy Synod (2011a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2011-10-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1324&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).
76 Holy Synod (2010a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2011-10-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1228&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

show "more sensitivity and justice [towards] those men who are forced to bear unbearable burdens."[77] But who forces some of the social strata to bear unbearable burdens, and why? This passivisation[78] obscures the agent that carries the responsibility for this unjust policy while at the same time representing the 'unbearable burdens' as a physical phenomenon. What is more, the hierarchy never reaches the point of suggesting economic equality. On the contrary, economic inequality between different social classes is fully legitimised, for it is argued that it constitutes a diachronic characteristic of all societies.[79] The hierarchy's criticism is restricted to the adoption of wealth via unfair means (thievery) and to the absence of a philanthropic attitude. For those who are victims of this austerity policy, the hierarchy suggests 'solidarity' and 'support'. In his speech at the CEO Summit business conference, Metropolitan Gabriel of Nea Ionia left no room for misunderstanding: the church recognises the value of labour while it condemns sloth; ownership and wealth are not impediments to salvation as long as they do not lead to selfish passions; and more importantly, within the Kingdom of God there is no class struggle, since both rich and poor are God's children who work for the common good.[80] Within this framework, we have to understand the exhortations to politicians to 'search for the tax evaders and inspect the capital' and to stop the over-taxation of pensioners and other lower socio-economic strata.[81] If one were to read these phrases out of the aforementioned context, one would reach the false conclusion that the hierarchy adopts here an anti-capitalist stance, which is not the case. To sum up, the justice proposed by the hierarchy entails interventions for the removal of major injustices but not the overthrow of the austerity policy, which is responsible for the impoverishment of large segments of Greek society.

In drawing this section to a close, it is crucial to emphasise the agent who is assigned by the hierarchy the responsibility to carry out the desired transformative action. For the first level, that of the metanoia of the self, the actor is every Christian, whether an ordinary person or a political or religious leader. However, this Christian

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77 Holy Synod (2010b): «Εγκύκλιος υπ. αριθμ. 2894: 'Θεολογική θεώρηση της οικονομικής κρίσεως' (2010-03-15)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/egyklioi.asp?id=1181&what_sub= egyklioi (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

78 For the importance of the syntactic structure in the analysis of ideology, see Thompson, J. B. (1984): Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Berkeley: University of California Press: 137.

79 Holy Synod (2014): «Το πρόβλημα της οικονομικής κρίσεως (2014-02-03)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1761&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

80 Gabriel, Metropolitan of Nea Ionia & Filadelfia (2016): «Ομιλία στο 10ο Επιχειρηματικό Συνέδριο (CEO Summit 2016) στο Μέγαρο Μουσικής Αθηνών με θέμα: 'Η Δύναμη του Ενός στο Μαζί: Είναι η Συν-Εργασία λέξη ελληνική;'» URL: http://www.nif.gr/omilies-imerides-sunedrion/omilia-sebasmiotatou-mitropolitou-k-gabriil-sto-10o-epixeirimatiko-sunedrio-ceo-summit-2016-sto-megaro-mousikis-athinon-me-thema-i-dunami-tou-enos-sto-mazi-einai-i-sun-ergasia-leksi-ellini/ (retrieving date 2017-01-14).

81 Holy Synod (2011a): «Ανακοινωθέν (2011-10-08)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?id=1324&what_sub=announce (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

is not understood as an individual who can search for salvation outside the church. He is perceived more so as an ecclesiastical person, namely as a relational entity imbued with the values and principles of Orthodoxy.[82] "How are we going to persuade ourselves, the people, and our leaders to repent?", asks Archbishop Ieronymos II, clarifying, "not narrowly, ethically, individualistically, but deeply and essentially, as 'persons' .... How are we going to change our mind? How are we going to cultivate that ethos ... in which the holy and the sacred are placed above the economic crises and interests?" [83] Therefore, in order for the Christian to transform himself, he must fulfil the saving religious tasks (e.g. prayer, rituals) within the church. However, the latter is always conceived with a specific structure that guarantees the dominant place and role of the Church hierarchy.

As regards the second level, that of the political and economic field, the agent of history is not any variant of 'the people' (e.g. groups, classes) and by no means the mobilised collectivities;[84] these are conceived as 'desperate masses' who 'make noise' and 'ruin' instead of 'building Altars'.[85] Rather, it is the charismatic leader who implements the political and economic reforms promoted as necessary. This leader, according to Metropolitan Hierotheos, must possess a number of attributes, not the least of which are reflection, prudence, and determination as well as the ability to control and not be influenced by the destructive passions and anger of ordinary people.[86] The antithesis to the atmosphere of public activism of the time could not be more complete. But does this also mean that the hierarchy concedes its primary position to a secular leader? This is not the case, for as Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia characteristically states, in order to be charismatic, the leader must also be imbued with the spirit of Orthodoxy, having 'fear of God', expressing and protecting the Greek Ortho-

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82 For the special position of personhood in Orthodox theology and its political implications, see Kessareas, E. (2015): 'Orthodox Theological Currents in Modern Greece after 1974: Ongoing Tensions between Reform and Conservatism'. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 33 (2): pp. 241-268.

83 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2010b): «Προσφώνηση ενώπιον του σώματος της Ιεραρχίας (2010-10-05)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?cat_id=&id=753&what_main=1&what_sub=23&lang=gr&archbishop_who=2&archbishop_heading=Εισηγήσεις (retrieving date 2016-03-23).

84 Perhaps the only exception is the 'people of God', but only when they are mobilised to protect or promote the interests of the Church hierarchy (see section 7 of this chapter for some indicative examples).

85 Pavlos, Metropolitan of Glyfada (2011a): «Μήνυμα επί τη εορτή της Κοιμήσεως της Θεοτόκου (2011-08-08)». URL: http://www.imglyfadas.gr/portal/gr/details.asp?cdPro={3AC7E09C-E5A6-4D57-BA7A-0E12F44CC937} (retrieving date 2016-12-07).

86 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2010): «Ο υψηλός πυρετός και η θεραπεία του». Άρθρο στην *Kathimerini* 2010-12-25. *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 174, January 2011. URL: http://parembasis.gr/index.php/el/menu-teyxos-174/1078-2011-175-01 (retrieving date 2016-03-29).

dox identity and faith.[87] The implication is that the unity of the two levels, namely the internal self and the external socio-economic conditions, can be achieved only when one accepts and respects the hierarchy both as a general system of categorisation and as the specific group of ecclesiastical authority, for the latter is presented as the worldly manifestation of the divine, the prototype of the hierarchy. This is of crucial importance in order to understand the Church's attitude to the public activism of the time, which forms the core subject of the following section.

5 Civic activism: the context

The parliamentary approvals of the austerity measures produced widespread frustration and public protests throughout Greece. The opposition against austerity reached its zenith in 2011 with the Indignant Citizens Movement, which occupied Syntagma Square in front of parliament as a form of political pressure against the approval of the bailout agreements. It should be noted that this movement had some new traits, compared to pre-crisis protests. It was organised through direct and non-hierarchical relations, and it mobilised individuals and groups outside mainstream political parties: citizens who remained in the public space expressing their opposition to the austerity policies, defending national independence, and even searching for a 'bottom-up' form of democracy.[88] Soon, however, violent clashes broke out between hooded protesters and police, which resulted in widespread violence and police intervention to evacuate the square. The violence changed the focus of the public discourse: anti-austerity activism was altogether condemned as dangerous to the public and national interests. In sharp contrast to oppositional activism, the authorities proposed national unanimity and cooperation in order for the country to be 'rescued', according to the dominant vocabulary of the time, still in use today.

The Church could not but take a position on the anti-austerity mobilisations, not least because they were collective in character, and thus the faithful also took part in them. We should not underestimate the pressure that the laity exercised on religious leaders to take sides with them and not with the political system that imposed measures that deteriorated the living conditions of the majority of the Greek population. Furthermore, the state was accused of implementing policies directed by foreign

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87 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2012a): «Εγκύκλιος 76η». URL: http://www.imml. gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2012/76.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-30): 3.
88 See Douzinas, C. (2013): *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe*. Cambridge: Polity: 172.; See also the results of Vasiliki Georgiadou's survey concerning the political position and beliefs of the indignant protesters: Kollia, E. (2012): «Η πλατεία ήταν γεμάτη ...αγανακτισμένους», To BHMA (2012-07-22). URL: http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=467898 (retrieving date 2017-04-20).

lenders against the interests of the nation, for instance, privatising public wealth and assets. There is no doubt that the lenders set strict bailout conditions, which the Greek administrations accepted in order for the country to avoid bankruptcy and an exit from the eurozone. It is also true that the severe financial situation and the intense austerity pressure from creditors have increased sentiments of xenophobia and political distrust among many Greeks.[89] In this context, those who viewed the Church as a protector of Greek national identity turned to the Church in hope of finding an ally to their resistance. Church officials tried to balance the need to retain the expectations of their religious clientele with their own interests, which stem from their institutional position within the state apparatus. As I will show, that balance was far from accomplished; it was clearly, in my opinion, tipped towards the second side.

5.1 A healthy revolution

The protesters, although not a homogeneous movement, nevertheless found unity in the fundamental sentiment of indignation, a feeling that acquired a political character and direction from the moment it was externalised in the public domain, thereby overcoming its initial locus of reference, that of the self.[90] It functioned as a catalyst that sparked activism against the political system and the banks, which were blamed for the economic crisis. Church leaders expressed understanding towards the mobilisation of ordinary people. However, at the same time, they attempted to neutralise the radical demands of the protesters, which challenged the economic and political status quo (e.g. debt write-off, direct democracy). Such a radicalisation posed a great threat for the Church, too, for it remains one of the most prominent institutions in the system. The basic strategy of the religious leaders was a process of transformation; they used protest slogans and themes but gave them different meanings, which actually reversed the external orientation of action. Some examples will provide clarification.

First, Church officials attempted to relocate indignation to the internal area of the self by placing it under the Christian value system of repentance, forgiveness, love, patience, and prayer.[91] However, citizens of different ages and political preferences

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89 See Stathopoulou, Th. & Kostaki, A. (2014): 'Religiosity, Trust and Tolerance in Times of Recession. The Cases of Spain and Greece'. In Petropoulos, N. P. & Tsobanoglou, G. O. (Eds.): *The Debt Crisis in the Eurozone: Social Impacts*, p. 251-279. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
90 Combining the philosophies of Spinoza and Marx, Lordon views indignation in political and not moral terms, namely as a contagious reaction against the causes of the perceived sadness, see: Lordon, F. (2014): Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire. London: Verso.
91 E.g. Kosmas, Metropolitan of Etolia & Akarnania (2010): «Σε κάθε δύσκολη στιγμή του λαού μας η Εκκλησία ήταν παρούσα». Συνέντευξη στην εφημερίδα *Πολιτεία* (2010-12-26). URL: http://www.imaa.

were already protesting in the streets. This external form of activism was accepted only as a peaceful expression of demands towards the political system, which remained the only legitimate authority to take decisions. People affected by the austerity policies could at most peacefully protest against social injustices but by no means violate or disturb the status quo. Such a challenging attitude was condemned as a great sin, motivated by the devil itself, as Eusebius, Metropolitan of Samos and Ikaria and Vice President of the Synod, stated in his encyclical to the faithful of his diocese.[92] Similarly, in his own message, Metropolitan Pavlos of Glyfada rejected both indifference and revolution, for the first leaves a situation unchanged, while the second causes even more suffering via its associated violence.[93] Instead, he proposed the Christian attitude of love and philanthropy: "neither indifference nor revolution to violently overthrow the status quo offers the solution. Then what is left? Perhaps the solution lies elsewhere, in a revolution that first takes place within our hearts and then starts to embrace the neighbour as an act of life."[94] This religious discourse corresponded to the political one of the time in the sense that it rhetorically welcomed demonstrations as long as they were peaceful and did not impede approval of the austerity measures. The transformative attempt of the hierarchy is even more explicit in the following example.

Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia, a clergyman educated in astrophysics and biomedical engineering at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had no problem using the term 'revolution' in his public speeches, interviews, and encyclical letters.[95] In all these cases, he urged the Greek people to revolt

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gr/2010-12-04-15-27-58/2010-12-29-10-00-47/43-2010-12-29-09-59-00/118-2010-12-29-10-06-45.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28).

92 Eusebius, Metropolitan of Samos & Ikaria (2011): «Η Εκκλησία στηρίζει τους 'αγανακτισμενους πολίτας' αλλά ο αγών τους πρέπει να στηρίζεται εις την προσευχήν». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-06-17, 1883: 5.

93 Pavlos, Metropolitan of Glyfada (2012): «Μήνυμα επί τη ενάρξει του νέου σχολικού έτους 2012-2013 (2012-09-05)». URL: http://www.imglyfadas.gr/portal/gr/details.asp?cdPro= {B03A9524-A886-4383-84E6-105FBFECAF8E} (retrieving date 2016-12-07).

94 Ibid.; see also Pavlos, Metropolitan of Glyfada (2011b): «Εόρτιον μήνυμα Χριστουγέννων 2011 (2011-12-19)». URL: http://www.imglyfadas.gr/portal/gr/details.asp?cdPro={C2EE9B92-6657-449C-A098-1380B9E93D8D} (retrieving date 2016-12-07).

95 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2011a): «Εγκύκλιος 63η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2011/63.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-29).; Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2011b): «Εγκύκλιος 62η: Μήνυμα προς τους μαθητές των Λυκείων Μεσογείων & Λαυρεωτικής με την έναρξη του σχολικού έτους 2011-2012». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2011/62.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-29).; Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2011c): «Όλοι ζητούν από την Εκκλησία». Ραδιοφωνική συνέντευξη στο *BHMA FM* (2011-09-27). *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-10-07, 1896: 6.; Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2012b): «Συνέντευξη στη Μαρία Γιαχνάκη (Briefing News) (2012-12-01)». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/synenteuxeis/SYNENTEYKSH_STH_MARIA_GIAXNAKH_1-12-12.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-29).

in order to change the unbearable conditions of the crisis. At first glance, this appears to be clear support for oppositional activism, for revolution is the highest form of transformative action in the public arena. But on closer inspection, this revolution is of a different kind both in content and in the direction of action. To be more specific, Metropolitan Nikolaos reverses, in a certain way, the initial meaning of the term, ridding it of its radical associations by introducing the terms 'good revolution', 'healthy revolution', and 'revolution of faith'. This revolution is differentiated from the political one not only because it excludes the use of violence but also because it has a primarily inward orientation; it refers to a re-embrace of such fundamental Christian values as metanoia, austerity, and asceticism:

> It is time to rise up. Everything must change …. All the great upturns, all the great changes were achieved by heroic men, especially young men. Not by compromised or by indignant people, but by healthy revolutionaries. All together we have to, we can, and there is need to change our future on our own initiative. Not with violence, but with strength and determination. Not with nihilistic choices, but with clarity, heroism, and intelligence …. The others, be they speculators, foreign interests, or politicians, are not the only ones to be blamed. Our own share of responsibility for our miserable situation today is a significant one. The solution of metanoia and change is the only way forward. We cannot change the others, but we have the possibility and the responsibility to correct our own minds and lives. Let this change begin as a revolution from within ourselves. This is the most heroic …. We have nothing else left but to transform Greece into our homeland again, its history into our identity, the paradigms of our ancestors into our lived experiences; [we have nothing else left but] to return from imprudent new wealth (*νεοπλουτισμό*) to dignified austerity and contentment with little (*ολιγάρκεια*).[96]

So, in a period of mass activism aiming to stop the implementation of the austerity policies, this kind of discourse uses even the word 'revolution' to justify austerity. That this call for revolution has a spiritual character can be also seen in encyclical number seventy-six, which Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia addressed to the faithful of his diocese on the Sunday of Pentecost in view of the then-upcoming elections (17 June 2012) held by technocrat interim Prime Minister Pikrammenos.[97] There, Nikolaos establishes the following bipolar antithesis: on the one hand, the 'pseudo-God of democracy' with the elections and individual rights and, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit and Pentecost. This antithesis forms the context within which his call to revolution takes place; it refers to the restoration of the relation with God through both traditional religious practices (e.g. prayers, repentance, fasts, litanies) and the fulfilment of the so-called Nation's Vow.[98] According to Nikolaos of Mesogaia, Greeks

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96 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2011a): «Εγκύκλιος 63η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2011/63.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-29): p. 2, 4.
97 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2012a): «Εγκύκλιος 76η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2012/76.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-30).
98 The term refers to the promise of the newly liberated Greeks to construct a cathedral dedicated to Christ as an expression of their gratitude to God for liberating them from the Ottoman Empire. The

must wake up and act, however not in aim of such secular successes as debt relief, reduction of unemployment, and avoidance of bankruptcy but for their spiritual rebirth through repentance. The deeply apolitical character of this call is also manifested in his mockery of the resistance song 'When Will It Be a Starry Night' ('πότε θα κάνει ξαστεριά'), which he replaces with the sun of justice, the latter identified with the God of Orthodoxy:

> 'Besides this you know the time, that the hour has come for you to wake from sleep' (Romans 13:11). It is time to wake up. The day won't come by itself; we will bring this day forth. And indeed, [we will bring it] not so much with our good works or our right choices as with our confession of faith and our prayer. The secular political choices look forward to 'when will it be a starry night'; they cannot take us out of the night; they hold hope in small stars. We anticipate day with sun, the Sun of ustice. We do not anticipate a god who will solve the problems of this world .... We believe in Christ, the true God, so that He will accept our repentance and our faith .... Yes! It is possible for glory and great blessing to come out of this awful situation, for 'blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord' (Psalm 33:12).[99]

Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos also spoke of a much-needed 'spiritual revolution' based on education and the Orthodox traditions of the country.[100] This spiritual revolution is offered as the only path for the country to regain its lost sovereignty. According to Hierotheos, the people of Greece should fight for the preservation of their national identity and cultural traditions, especially if the state cannot ultimately retain its sovereignty and freedom. It is believed that the psyche of the nation can survive even without the existence of the state, since the former has greater value than the latter. As historical proof (and model), he offers the survival of the Greek nation after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The spiritualisation of traditional nationalism is a common feature of this ecclesiastical ideology, which extolls the diachronic continuity of the Greek nation and the unique historical mission of Orthodox Greeks as bearers of the unconquerable spirit of *Romiosini* (*Ρωμηοσύνη*).[101] Although Hierotheos uses the hard vocabulary of the indignant protesters, even speaking of a 'state that is being converted into a protectorate', he aims to blunt the scope and ef-

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issue came to the fore many times but, according to Antoniou, acquired the specific meaning of an unfulfilled national vow in the 1960s and especially during the military dictatorship of 1967–1974. (see Antoniou, D. (2016): 'Unthinkable Histories: The Nation's Vow and the Making of the Past in Greece', Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 34 (1): 131-160.)

99 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2012a): «Εγκύκλιος 76η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2012/76.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-30): 2.

100 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2012): «Χρειάζεται μιά επανάσταση». *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 187, February 2012. URL: http://parembasis.gr/index.php/el/ menu-teyxos-187/837-2012-187-01 (retrieving date 2016-03-29).

101 The term *Romiosini* carries a meaning of Greekness that is imbued with Byzantine culture and identity. For its ideological uses, especially by Church intellectuals of the mystical theological current, see Kessareas 2015: pp. 241-268, p.256-258, and note 12, p. 262-263.

fects of this activism.[102] Grassroots activism is considered dangerous due to its potential to burst into civil war. On the contrary, he is in favour of a 'powerful and capable personality' able to guide Greeks within the current situation. People are invited to remain calm and show self-control, for calmness itself is declared a 'powerful "leader"'. As I have already mentioned, here, historical agency is located in charismatic leadership and not in the mobilised collectivities, conceived as being both uncontrolled and prone to civil unrest. For Hierotheos, too, spiritual revolution aims at the transformation of inner man, a process believed to be the prerequisite for the transformation of external conditions, and not the other way around: "To the extent that we are mentally and spiritually good, our social affairs also improve. The peace in the world does not just arise through ideas, systems, pressures, but mainly through people who feel inner fullness."[103]

Perhaps the most emphatic clerical intervention during the period of the mass protests was Archbishop Ieronymos II's article entitled 'Where are we going?', published in the conservative newspaper *Kathimerini* on 5 June 2011, in which he reproduced the ideology of collective guilt that I have already mentioned.[104] It bears mentioning that he (and, as we will see, many other religious executives) published his article in this newspaper, which was (and still is) one of the leading pro-memoranda, pro-neoliberal voices in Greece.[105] The archbishop also indirectly establishes a bipolar antithesis, which is of primary importance concerning the Church's stance towards activism. In the context of the confrontational demonstrations, he chooses to praise the Orthodox theological tradition as providing the foundation for a 'healthier social life'. What are the constitutive elements of this Orthodox social life? In short, they are unity and not civil fighting (the archbishop reminds readers that "Apostle Paul advised: 'watch out, for if you bite and devour one another, you will be consumed by one another'"), recognition of human limits, contempt for wealth and fame, justice, and work. The contradistinction to the activism of the time becomes even more apparent as he extolls the significance of Orthodox forms of social support (e.g. philanthropy; soup kitchens; care of the elderly, youth, and immigrants) as well as secular

102 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2012): «Χρειάζεται μιά επανάσταση». *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 187, February 2012. URL: http://parembasis.gr/index.php/el/ menu-teyxos-187/837-2012-187-01 (retrieving date 2016-03-29).

103 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2011b): «Γραπτά Κηρύγματα: Τα πραγματικά συμφέροντά μας». *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 180, July 2011. URL: http://parembasis. gr/index.php/el/menu-teyxos-180/976-2011-180-13 (retrieving date 2016-12-05).

104 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011c): «Πού πάμε;». *Kathimerini* (2011-06-05). URL: http://www.kathimerini.gr/725465/opinion/epikairothta/arxeio-monimes-sthles/poy-pame (retrieving date 2016-11-08).

105 On this, see Mylonas, Y. (2014): 'Crisis, Austerity and Opposition in Mainstream Media Discourses of Greece', *Critical Discourse Studies*, 11 (3): 305-321.

initiatives inspired by and following the same humanitarian logic (e.g. social solidarity). The implied antithesis can be schematically drawn as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The ecclesiastical perception of activism

Secular activism	Orthodox philanthropy
Interests	Values
Classes	The people of God
Struggle, violence, civil war	Social cohesion, national unity
Passions	Collective guilt: apostasy

Another illustrative example is Archbishop Ieronymos II's response to those extreme voices who urged him to take the flintlock (καριοφίλι)[106] together with the epitrachelion[107] so as to liberate the country from its new captivity, thereby following the example of those clerics who fought against the Ottomans in the Greek Revolution of 1821.[108] The archbishop refused to play such a role for the Church, reminding readers of the distinctive roles played by church and state in the modern epoch.[109] In an article published in the newspaper *To Vima*, another hierarch, Metropolitan Hierotheos, attempted to neutralise the polemical meaning of the flintlock phrase within the context of the protests, adding a more decisive factor for the effective resolution of the problems, that of diplomacy: "The 'revolutionaries' are needed, but if the 'diplomats' do not follow them, then all the efforts fail."[110] Hierotheos gave as an example the national liberation, which was finally accomplished via the diplomatic route, since the rebellion of 1821 was about to be suppressed in the face of war. However, in a television interview, the archbishop left open the possibility of taking the flintlock, thereby signalling that the Church could and would take a fighting stance so as to protect its own interests on issues like ecclesiastical property and church–state rela-

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106 As I have mentioned elsewhere (Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', The Sociological Review. 66 (1): pp. 122-137, p. 129.), this long rifle was used in the Greek War of Independence and therefore carries strong connotations of heroism, unconquerable spirit, and freedom.

107 The epitrachelion is a liturgical stole worn by priests and bishops of the Orthodox Church.

108 For more on this, see Ibid.: 128-129.

109 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011b): «Αν δεν μάθουμε να ζούμε διαφορετικά δεν θα μπορέσουμε να ξεφύγουμε από την κρίση». Συνέντευξη στην εφημερίδα *Ευρυτανικός Παλμός* (2011-08-13). URL: http://evrytanikospalmos.blogspot.be/2011/08/blog-post_13.html (retrieving date 2016-03-28).

110 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2011c): «Αρκεί το 'πετραχήλι και το καριοφίλι'». Άρθρο στο *ΒΗΜΑ* (2011-02-06). In *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 175, February 2011. URL: http://parembasis.gr/index.php/el/menu-teyxos-175/1057-2011-175-01 (retrieving date 2016-03-28).

tions.[111] Actually, these relations in Greece are closely intertwined, with the Church supporting the strategic policies of the state, as I will clearly demonstrate in the next section. Here, suffice it to say, the archbishop himself has admitted that he was asked to give 'consent' when he attended the cabinet meeting of George Papandreou's government at the beginning of the crisis in December 2009.[112] This fact clearly shows the Church's role as an ideological mechanism of the state, for it has great power in formulating people's schemata of thought and corresponding behaviours. The archbishop's reply was positive, though he stated to the cabinet that he could not cross his 'red lines'. What are these red lines? According to the archbishop, it is first and foremost the people's relief within the difficult context of the crisis.[113] However, the red lines refer also to more material interests of the hierarchy, ranging from its direct needs within the crisis (e.g. vacant clerical posts, salary reductions) to more conflicting themes, like the ecclesiastical property issue.

It can be pointed out that the Church hierarchy, despite its critique, offered support and legitimacy to the political system during the period of the crisis. Many examples of this support exist. The following one is representative, for it comes from the period of Syriza (Coalition for the Radical Left) governance. As a self-proclaimed leftist party, Syriza is believed to have tense relations with the Church. Contrary to what might have been expected, the archbishop provided support to the Syriza government precisely during the crucial period of general disappointment and indignation caused by the continuation of neoliberal policies, despite the 'no' vote having won the referendum. In a television interview, Archbishop Ieronymos II criticised those who were seeking more radical solutions after the elections, suggesting instead patience and collective effort within the current power relations:

> It is difficult. But we do not have anything better to do. The best thing we can do is all put our backs together, be united, and help. The people must not be indignant; in what sense? They are given the opportunity to decide; that choice is in their hands. They cannot vote on one day, and the next day say that they rebel. They have all the power in their hands. Aren't the people re-

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111 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011d): «Εύχομαι να μην χρειαστεί ποτέ να πάρω το καριοφίλι». Συνέντευξη στον τηλεοπτικό σταθμό *Alter* (2011-01-24). URL: https://voiotosp.blogspot.be/2011/01/t-alter-2412011.html (retrieving date 2016-01-24).; This statement has to be understood within the context of the discussion at the time regarding the effects of the austerity policies on the Church's position (e.g. the hiring of priests, salaries), which increased the pressure on the archbishop to adopt a more dynamic attitude in protecting the interests of the Church. For instance, Metropolitan Seraphim of Karystos and Skyros urged the archbishop to 'change tactic', stating characteristically that 'the epitrachelion did not bring results; it's time for the flintlock.' See Seraphim, Metropolitan of Karystos & Skyros (2011): «Αντιφώνησις στην Έκτακτη Σύγκληση της Ιεράς Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας (2011-01-17)». Εκκλησία: Επίσημον Δελτίον της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος, 2: 76.
112 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2010a): «κ. Ιερώνυμος Β'». Ομιλία σε Ημερίδα της Αρχιεπισκοπής Αθηνών (2010-01-30). In Για μια οικονομία με ανθρώπινο πρόσωπο, p. 13-30. Athens: Office-Foundation of Youth of the Holy Archbishopric of Athens: 26.
113 Ibid.: 26-27.

sponsible? … Personally, I recommend that we must not panic. We have experienced so many difficulties and critical times in this land. I think this time again we will overcome the difficulties with a little more struggle, with effort on the part of all of us, and with more patience.[114]

Analysing this discourse from the framework perspective[115], it is clear that the archbishop blames the Greek citizens for the cause of their current indignation, since they are the ones who voted for that government. He says nothing, however, about the fact that the government implements policies in sharp contrast to its pre-election commitments. The archbishop's proposed solution is simply to wait for the next elections. In the meantime, he suggests patience and collective work with the government. In order to motivate Greeks to develop behaviours within the aforementioned lines, he attempts to imbue them with a sense of duty: they have to follow the lessons of their history (the difficulties of the past) and respect the value of law (elections), as opposed to succumbing to indignation and rebellion.

Of course, one can find in the discourse of the hierarchical leaders many references to the need for resistance. One excellent example is the message of Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia, which was delivered on 28 October 2013 28, National Day, namely the day on which Greece celebrates its refusal to surrender to fascist Italy in 1940 (the famous 'no').[116] In his message, Nikolaos speaks of the German occupation, urging politicians to finally become worthy of their ancient and modern ancestors who pronounced the heroic '*ΟΧΙ*' ('NO') and '*ΜΟΛΩΝ ΛΑΒΕ*' ('come and take them') to their enemies. Nikolaos of Mesogaia is very clear regarding the appropriate response of the political system to the excessive demands of the lenders: "The NO of 1940 had no logic; however, it had intelligence and dignity. Now the NO has the wisdom of being self-evident and the clarity of being the only solution. Victories do not rely on the YES of compromise; they do rely on the NO of heroism." [117] There is no doubt that this is a sharp speech full of historical heroic references that affect collective thought and feeling and, as such, can motivate activism. However, these references should be understood within the context of the national celebration of October 28, when citizens are accustomed to hearing analogous messages even from politicians. But even in this uncompromised speech, the final solution is expected to come not from the action of mobilised collectivities but from a political leader who will pronounce the big 'no' to the lenders.

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114 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2015b): «Να βάλουμε όλοι μας τις πλάτες ενωμένοι και να σοβαρευτούμε». Συνέντευξη στον τηλεοπτικό σταθμό *Mega* (2015-10-21). URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=cjPkWO9NBak (retrieving date 2016-03-25).

115 Diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation; see Benford, D. R., & Snow, A. D. (2000): 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611-639.

116 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2013): «Δήλωση (2013-10-28)». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/pdf/mhnymata-Mitropolith/dhl-28.10.2013.pdf (retrieving date 2016-12-06).

117 Ibid.: 3.

In all the other cases, the hierarchy's calls for resistance are associated with the safeguarding of 'the holy and the sacred of our Genos' (Γένος)[118], namely the areas from which the Church as an institution derives its legitimacy and power (e.g. faith, language, family). The hierarchy clearly states that only if the so-called prerequisite measures for taking the bailout money were to encroach upon areas of the Church's own legitimacy, would it will become, together with the Greek people, an 'embankment, fort walls'.[119] An illuminating example is the exhortation of Metropolitan Anthimos of Alexandroupolis to the faithful of his diocese to continue their strike against the operation of businesses on Sundays.[120] In this case, the rights of workers are associated with the law of God, so the fight is legitimised and encouraged. As a rule, activism is justified as a struggle against the 'de-Christianisation' of the nation and against the 'desacralisation of life'.[121] Within this context, the usage of the word 'revolution' has a spiritual, Orthodox meaning:

> Today this land needs modern missionaries, leaders, spiritual revolutionaries, who will shake the standing and stagnant water and will spiritually upgrade the land through the one Faith, the Orthodox saving Faith, path and course. Now is the Church's critical moment.[122]

But if the country is under occupation as a protectorate that serves the aims of the foreign lenders, if the political system is untrustworthy and elections offer only pseudo solutions, and if confrontational activism is the work of the devil and sin, then who will solve the undeniably harsh reality? In short, the answer is God. Greeks hit by the crisis can of course express their dissatisfaction peacefully, but they are advised to have faith in God's providence for the solution of their problems.[123] Metropol-

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118 Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)». URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holy-synod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 24.;
The word Genos (Γένος) is usually translated as 'race', suggesting people unified by their descent and common values. It can also refer to the Orthodox community of the Byzantine Empire before the creation of the modern nation-state.
119 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2015a): «Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος στην Ιεραρχία της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος (2015-10-06)». URL: http://ecclesia.gr/epikairotita/main_epikairotita_next.asp?id=1573 (retrieving date 2016-03-25).
120 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Alexandroupolis (2013): «Ο Σεβ. Αλεξανδρουπόλεως καταγγέλλει τον Υπουργόν Αναπτύξεως ότι επαναφέρει την δουλείαν εις την χώραν. Με την επιμονήν του να καταργήση την Κυριακήν αργίαν». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2013-11-22, 1999: 8.
121 Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)».: p. 25. URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holy-synod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).
122 Ibid.: 28.
123 E.g. see Eusebius, Metropolitan of Samos & Ikaria (2011): «Η Εκκλησία στηρίζει τους 'αγανακτισμενους πολίτας' αλλά ο αγών τους πρέπει να στηρίζεται εις την προσευχήν». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-06-17, 1883: 5.

itan Nikolaos of Phthiotis advises the lay membership: "We as Christians have to endure and set our hope on God. At the same time, we have to act lawfully and ethically in order for the failure to be corrected." Any other challenging action is stigmatised as harmful 'nagging', which destroys personal and social cohesion.[124]

In sharp contrast to this activism, the religious leaders counter-proposed the traditional saving means of the church. It will be sufficient to mention two examples. The night vigil organised by Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki after the collapse of the talks at the Eurogroup meeting on 18 June 2015 can be considered representative. There, Anthimos delivered a speech asking for the 'mercy' of God for the solution of the country's problems. He also called for unity and urged the country to avoid the "big temptation of the last days".[125] Although it is not clearly stated, we can assume that this 'temptation' refers to breaking with the country's lenders. Similarly, Metropolitan Nikolaos of Phthiotis urged the lay membership to stop passively or critically watching the government's negotiations, inviting them instead to a "levy of troops for prayer" so as to allow "God to show His mercy and avoid the worst."[126] That the Church traditionally keeps these resources in its spiritual arsenal is not in doubt; however, these were not used as resources for action but for quiescence, since Greeks were advised to pray and await the solution to their socio-economic problems from an extra-historical entity, namely God. Within this context, activism was framed as dangerous or at least ineffective, for Godexpects repentance before He offers His worldly salvation. [127]

5.2 A right-wing revolution

In concluding this section, I would like to make a special reference to the ultra-conservative hierarchs, for their discourse is full of polemic references. Generally speaking, they share the basic explanatory schemes (God's pedagogy, global Zionist conspiracy) and proposals (repentance, resistance) one finds in Greek Orthodox

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124 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Phthiotis (2013): «Πώς θα βαδίσουμε μπροστά». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2013-10-04, 1992: 7.

125 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2015a): «Η Ιερά Αγρυπνία στον Ιερό Ναό Παναγίας της Αχειροποίητου», (2015-06-19). URL: http://www.imth.gr/inst/imth/gallery/deltiatypoy/2015.06.19 deltiotypoyagrypniastinaxeiropoihto.pdf (retrieving date 2016-11-22).

126 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Phthiotis (2015): «Πανστρατιά προσευχής από την Ιερά Μητρόπολη Φθιώτιδος» (2015-07-31). URL: http://www.imfth.gr/news_events/panstratia-proseyhis-apo-tin-iera-mitropoli-fthiotidos (retrieving date 2016-12-04).

127 On the logic of '*do ut des*', see Weber, M. (1978): *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 424.

fundamentalism.[128] The question is whether their more explicit polemical discourse encourages activism – and if so, in what direction?

Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus[129] is an illustrative case, for his discourse was also disseminated through the ultra-conservative, religious weekly newspaper *Orthodox Press* (*Ορθόδοξος Τύπος*).[130] He interprets the financial crisis as an economic tool of the 'Zionist monster' in its secret plan to impose a global government. The domestic political system is accused of serving this aim by implementing policies that strike at the Helleno-Christian foundations of the Greek nation. In this framework, his critique of financial and political aspects of today's capitalism (e.g. banks, loans, investments in bonds, offshore companies) always ends up being an apocalyptic battle between the forces of evil (Zionism) and the forces of good (Greek Orthodoxy). Here again, the proposed action is a 'peaceful revolution' of the traditional Greek ethos, now accompanied by a proposal for collaboration with other European countries against the aims of Zionism.[131]

Metropolitan Amvrosios of Kalavryta and Aigialeia, another ultra-conservative hierarch who, as he proudly states, served as a preacher in the Hellenic Gendarmerie from 1968 to 1976[132], namely throughout nearly the entire military junta (1967-1974),[133] and who is also well-known for his right-wing positions on a variety of themes (e.g.

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128 See Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', *The Sociological Review*. 66 (1): 122-137.

129 Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2010a): «Σεβ. Πειραιώς: Ιδού οι ένοχοι δια την κατάρρευσιν της χώρας». Ανακοινωθέν (2010-02-19). *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-02-19, 1820: 1, 7; Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2010b): «Ο Πειραιώς αποκαλύπτει την καταλήστευσιν του κράτους υπό των πολιτικών της μεταπολιτεύσεως». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-03-26, 1825: 8.; Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2010c): «Σεβ. Πειραιώς προς την Ιεραρχίαν: Να κηρύξωμεν την Εκκλησίαν εν διωγμώ». Δήλωσις δια τα πρακτικά της Ι. Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας της 2010-10-05. *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-10-15, 1849: 5.; Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2011a): «Η σατανοκίνητος λέσχη Μπίλντεμπεργκ, όπισθεν της λεηλασίας, της οικονομικής υποδουλώσεως και εξαθλιώσεως της Ελλάδος». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-06-10, 1882: 1, 7.; Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2011b): «Αι νομοθετικαί πρωτοβουλίαι της Κυβερνήσεως δόλιον εκρηκτικόν μείγμα δια την εκθεμελίωσιν των ιδεωδών του Γένους και της Πίστεως». *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-09-16, 1893: 1, 6.

130 For a description of this newspaper, see Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', The Sociological Review. 66 (1): pp. 122-137, p. 123-124.

131 See Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus (2010a): «Σεβ. Πειραιώς: Ιδού οι ένοχοι δια την κατάρρευσιν της χώρας». Ανακοινωθέν (2010-02-19). *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2010-02-19, 1820: 7.

132 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2018): «Σας ευχαριστώ θερμότατα εξοχώτατε Υπουργέ κύριε κύριε κύριε…Πολάκη!!!!!!!» (2018-01-03). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2018/01/blog-post.html (retrieving date 2018-01-20).

133 According to biographical information obtained from the official magazine of the Church of Greece, *Ekklisia* (1976-09-15/1, vol. 53, n. 19-20, p. 341; see also Ginis, G. (1978): Ιεράρχες διάκονοι της χούντας: Φάκελλοι της ντροπής, εγκύκλιοι, ομιλίες, ευχές, απόρρητα έγγραφα. Athens: (n.p): 96-99.), Amvrosios, having always achieved an excellent performance appraisal, was promoted to the military rank of major.

immigrants, homosexuals), warmly supported the anti-austerity protesters: "I stand by you; together we will fight until the final victory."[134] He even sent a delegation of forty clerics from his diocese to Syntagma Square in order to show his active support for the indignant protesters.[135] He[136] also strongly criticised the official announcement of the Holy Synod[137] during the demonstrations as a moderate one that failed to express the deep anxieties of the protesters. Titles of articles on his personal weblog as well as his press releases are representative: "With all our strength, we stand by the indignant citizens"[138] and "We should all go to the squares; we should all become 'indignant citizens'" [139]. His call is for a 'peaceful revolution', as should be expected from a religious representative:

> Greek men and Greek women! ... Greece is dying out! Greece is floundering! Greece is for sale! In a while we will be foreigners within our own home! So rise up! Why are you sitting? Send the indolence away! Leave the couch of your house! Leave the bars and the cafes! Go out to the streets, put on a peaceful demonstration, and stay there for a few days! Make it a peaceful revolution![140]

But one can notice, in his case, a qualitative difference compared to the peaceful revolution proposed by other hierarchs who attempt to spiritualise and internalise social anger, thereby neutralising the radical content of the revolutionary action. Amvrosios's call to fight, though again peaceful, has a more external and political character but in the direction of a national movement that will save the country from its alleged post-dictatorship decay. For Amvrosios[141], the democracy of the period af-

134 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011d): «Όλοι στις πλατείες!» (2011-06-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/06/blog-post.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

135 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011e): «Οι κληρικοί μας στην πλ. Συντάγματος» (2011-06-06). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/06/blog-post_06.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

136 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011f): «Ανακοινωθέν κατώτερων των περιστάσεων και των προσδοκιών μας» (2011-06-20). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/06/blog-post_20.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

137 Holy Synod (2011b): «Η Ι. Σύνοδος εναντίον όλων εκείνων οι οποίοι έβλαψαν την πατρίδα» Ανακοινωθέν 2011-06-15. *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-06-24, 1884: 1.

138 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011d): «Όλοι στις πλατείες!» (2011-06-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/06/blog-post.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

139 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011g): «Να βγούμε όλοι στις πλατείες! Να γίνουμε όλοι 'αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες'» (2011-05-31). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/05/blog-post_31.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

140 Ibid.

141 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011h): «Γροθιά στην υποκρισία! Η επίσκεψη στον στρατηγό Ντερτιλή!» (2011-08-17). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/08/blog-post.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).; see also Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011i): «Ανδρέας Γ. Παπανδρέου: Εθνοσωτήρ ή ο αίτιος της καταστροφής της Ελλάδος;». (2011-12-19). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/12/ blog-post_17.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

ter the regime change of 1974 (*Μεταπολίτευση*) is a 'falsified' and 'unadulterated democracy' that alienated Greeks from their saving traditions. His revolution is more of a call for a return to a social and political environment imbued with the values of Helleno-Christianity, which the political system and citizens abandoned during the post-dictatorship period, in turn – according to him – causing the current crisis. Here we should keep in mind that the protesters in Syntagma Square came from all parts of the political spectrum, including the right wing.[142] This kind of discourse seems to appeal especially to the sentiments and expectations of far-right protesters.

I would like to make a last remark here, which I will elaborate further in the next section. Despite the fact that the memoranda are being attacked for establishing the occupation of the nation, this envisioned activism by no means challenges the core aspects of the memoranda agreements. Amvrosios accepts that the country has to pay its debt, claiming at best more favourable terms in repaying it: "The representatives of our lenders must take their money back! Yes, this is just, honest, and ethical! But they must not take our souls! … We can renegotiate our debts. We can modify the instalments of the loan! But they cannot drink our blood"![143] Furthermore, he has called for the establishment of a "new government-saviour of the nation … under the auspices of an extra-parliamentary personality"[144] (something that became a reality with the Papademos government in 2012) before the protesters "undertake revolutionary action of a different kind!"[145]

6 Pro-European Union public interventions

I now turn to the public interventions of the Church hierarchy during crucial political moments of the crisis, such as the Euro Summit meetings on Greece and the Greek bailout referendum in 2015. But first, let me make a few preliminary remarks concerning the context. The political landscape was totally new when the self-proclaimed leftist party Syriza and the right-wing party Independent Greeks formed a coalition

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142 Douzinas, C. (2013): *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe.* Cambridge: Polity: 169.

143 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011g): «Να βγούμε όλοι στις πλατείες! Να γίνουμε όλοι 'αγανακτισμένοι πολίτες'» (2011-05-31). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/05/blog-post_31.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).; see also Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011j): «'Σώσον, Κύριε, τον λαόν σου'. Το καράβι 'Ελλάς' βυθίζεται!» (2011-05-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/04/blog-post_12.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

144 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011j): «'Σώσον, Κύριε, τον λαόν σου'. Το καράβι 'Ελλάς' βυθίζεται!» (2011-05-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/04/blog-post_12.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

145 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011k): «28 ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ 2011-ΤΟ 2ο ΜΕΓΑΛΟ ΟΧΙ!» (2011-10-31). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/10/28-2011-2.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

government promising the end of the austerity policies. Contrary to the previous years, citizens now mobilised in support of the government, aiming at giving it more strength during its negotiations with the foreign lenders. The negotiations reached a dramatic point especially after the collapse of the talks in June 2015. It is true that a portion of the population mobilised against the government, fearing that it would implement leftist policies that will cause the exit of the country from the eurozone. But these reactions were in the minority, compared to the pro-government mobilisations of the time. The referendum can be seen as the peak of civic activism, for through it the indignation found a channel of political expression. It also had characteristics of class conflict, as those most affected by the crisis, the lower socio-economic strata, were against the memorandum agreement, even if such opposition could lead to Grexit. In sharp contrast, the upper-middle strata and mainly the economic and political elites wished Greece to remain part of the eurozone at any cost, even if that demanded harsher austerity policies. The Church attempted to retain its image of being above party politics, claiming that its public interventions aimed to unite the Greek people for the good of the nation. However, as I will show, their definition of 'the good of the nation' is not politically neutral; the hierarchy shed its affinity with the political and economic elites, who supported the austerity policies in exchange for more bailout money that would secure the county's place in the eurozone. Let me give some representative examples.

One day before the crucial Euro Summit meeting on Greece (22 June 2015), Archbishop Ieronymos II published an article in the newspaper *Kathimerini* entitled 'Greeks and Europeans: let us make the unity a reality'.[146] There, although he states cautiously that "it is not the job of a priest to become entangled in the fields of the politicians", he takes a clear position in favour of Greece staying in the eurozone: using a series of pro-Europe images and words (e.g. 'European family', 'our common European perspective'), he urges both the Greek and European leaders to reach an agreement. He likens the relationship between Greece and Europe to that of two stones in a river that, because of their common substance and shape, cannot be separated. Regarding the Greek people, he expresses his confidence that despite their 'fatigue', they will continue to "work, double or triple, if necessary" so that the country can organise its domestic life. It is no accident that the archbishop uses here the framing vocabulary of the political ideology of the period. The political importance of this public intervention becomes even more obvious if one takes into consideration

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146 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2015c): «Έλληνες και Ευρωπαίοι να κάνουμε πράξη την ενότητα». *Kathimerini* 2015-06-21. URL: http://www.kathimerini.gr/820246/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/ellhnes-kai-eyrwpaioi-na-kanoyme-pra3h-thn-enothta (retrieving date 2016-12-06).

that this article was reprinted in a variety of secular and religious newspapers and media.[147]

On 26 June 2015, when the talks between the government and the European institutions had reached a dramatic point (for there had been still no agreement), the Holy Synod sent an official letter to the representatives of the European institutions, urging them to repeat the talks and work out a "mutually acceptable solution".[148] Fearing that the failure of the talks could cause Grexit, the hierarchy chose to get directly involved in the political field, justifying its intervention in terms of its "worry for the future of the country" and the "suffering of the Greek people". This was not the first time that the hierarchy took such an initiative. On 14 October 2011, the Holy Synod had sent an official letter to the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in which it criticised the "rules of the faceless markets and the credit rating agencies" as being opposed to "our European acquis."[149] However, it also pointed out domestic causes of the crisis, such as the "unreasonable demands" of the people and "the hubris and disrespect against the state and the laws". Its great agony was that continuation of the current economic policy would disrupt "social cohesion" and, ultimately, the EU and Europe itself. To avoid this, the Holy Synod recommends both "solidarity" and a "new economic anthropology" based on "dignified austerity and contentment with little". This intervention of the hierarchy must be understood in the context of the prevailing concern during that period, which was that the country was in great danger of leaving the eurozone because it did not implement the fiscal target of the first memorandum. It should also be kept in mind that the pro-memorandum rhetoric equated the exit from the eurozone with the exit not only from the EU but also from Europe. Therefore, the hierarchy's intervention in favour of Europe and the EU, and its overwhelming support for the "European vision"[150] was useful resource for those who wanted Greece to remain part of the eurozone at any cost. The Church stood in complete accord with the strategic choices of the domestic economic and political elites, for whom "Greece's position within the euro area is a historic conquest of the country that cannot be put in doubt", as then-Vice President and Minister of Economy Evangelos Venizelos stated, thereby rejecting Prime Minister Papandreou's

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147 For instance, http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=715384, http://www.romfea.gr/epikairotita-xronika/1359-barusimanti-parembasi-tou-arxiepiskopou-prin-ti-sunodo-korufis, http://www.antenna.gr/news/m/article?aid=411984, and http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid= 1500006 500.

148 Holy Synod (2015): «Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου στους Ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς (2015-06-26)». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/epikairotita/main_epikairotita_next.asp?id=1486 (retrieving date 2016-11-23).

149 Holy Synod (2011c): «Προς τον Εξοχώτατο κ. José Manuel Durão Barroso, Πρόεδρο της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής (2011-10-14)». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/epistoles.asp?id= 1328&what_sub=epistoli (retrieving date 2016-03-23).

150 Ibid.

decision for a referendum and opening doors to the political process that led to the provisional government of the technocrat Lucas Papademos.[151]

More examples can be presented to confirm this conclusion. Amidst general strikes and street protests, Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki called for political and national unity in his Sunday sermon while advocating for a new government that would secure the position of the country within the EU. He portrayed Grexit as a "political death ... moral decline and economic catastrophe".[152] Since, according to Anthimos, "these days, Greece is a critically ill patient [...] in the intensive care unit", Greeks should give their "valuable blood", repaying in this way their debt to their homeland. It should be mentioned that this medical metaphor had been used by the Greek dictator George Papadopoulos in his attempt to justify the overturn of democracy in 1967.[153] Here, it is being recycled for the legitimisation of the austerity measures. A few days later, after the formation of the provisional government of Papademos, Anthimos of Thessaloniki published an article in the pro-memorandum newspaper *Kathimerini* titled 'The country's position in the European Union: privileges and obligations', in which he repeated the same pro-EU argumentation urging the new government to implement the 26 October 2011 Euro Summit meeting agreement. He primarily advises everyone to accept the necessary "sacrifices" with "patience" and "solidarity" so that the country can maintain its "permanent and steady" place in the EU. Otherwise, he warns, the country will "wander in the desert and in deprivation like the 'prodigal son' of the Gospel."[154]

At a time when large segments of society were mobilising against the austerity measures, demanding debt relief or even the cancellation of the debt, the hierarchy took a position in favour of repaying the debt. Archbishop Ieronymos II explicitly stated in a radio interview: "Taxes are a necessary evil; we have to pay our debts. We owe, and we must now return all these things we consumed and took from elsewhere."[155] Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki, well-known for his ultra-conserva-

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151 Venizelos, E. (2011): «Η θέση της Ελλάδας στο ευρώ δεν μπορεί να τεθεί υπό αμφισβήτηση» (2011-11-03). URL: http://www.real.gr/DefaultArthro.aspx?page=arthro&id=102834&catID=14 (retrieving date 2017-05-25).

152 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2011a): «Ὁμιλία. Κυριακὴ Ζ' Λουκᾶ» (2011-11-06). URL: http://www.imth.gr/default.aspx?lang=el-GR&loc=1&&page=197&newsid=379 (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

153 For an analysis of the ideological uses of the 'Greek patient' metaphor from 1967 to the first years of the financial crisis, see Tsakona, V. (2012): 'The Greek State and the Plaster Cast: From the Greek Military Junta of 21 April 1967 to the IMF and EU's Rescue Mechanism', Metaphor and the Social World, 2 (1): 61-86.

154 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2011b): «Η θέση της Ελλάδος στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση- προνόμια και δεσμεύσεις». *Kathimerini* (2011-11-20). URL: http://www.imth.gr/default.aspx? lang= el-GR&loc=1&&page=197&newsid=386 (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

155 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011e): «Αγωνιούμε και υποφέρουμε δια το χρήμα επειδή είμεθα άπληστοι και εγωπαθείς. Αναγκαίον κακόν οι φόροι, αλλά δια να ζήσωμεν

tive patriotic profile, nevertheless reached the point of "tolerating the form of multi-national domination" by the Troika as a more preferable "evil" compared to the country's bankruptcy, stating that the exit of Greece from the eurozone would be a "great catastrophe". That is why, he states, we should "pay our debts to Europe, despite that causing us a more deprived life", adding, however, that this should be done without exploitation.[156] Here again, the ecclesiastical discourse simply transmits the hegemonic ideology of the time to religious audiences. In another article in the same newspaper, *Kathimerini*, after again assigning collective responsibility for the crisis, Anthimos of Thessaloniki speaks on behalf of the Greek people when writing that "we do not deny our debts".[157] The red line for Anthimos is the physical death of the debtors, namely that "Europeans do not have to drown us all in the Mediterranean Sea" in order to take their money back. Anything other than this seems to be acceptable for the great cause of retaining the euro currency. To the best of my knowledge, the only hierarchical criticism against the euro came from Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia, who, stating that the politicians should save the people and not the euro, spoke characteristically of "European handcuffs" and of "vassalage to the pro-memorandum Troika".[158] But this reference should be understood within the context of 28 October, National Day, and his call for a "healthy revolution", which is analysed in detail above. Besides, Nikolaos of Mesogaia has also clearly stated that the aim of people's activism should be metanoia and not the cancellation of debt or the avoidance of bankruptcy, leaving the resolution of these issues to God.[159]

The fact that the Church was in complete accord with the strategic choices of the economic and political status quo became even more obvious after the announcement of the referendum of 2015. Three days before the referendum took place, the archbishop made a public statement urging everyone to be responsible so that the homeland could retain its unity.[160] Seen in the light of the conflicting social and political climate of that time, this statement came as no surprise from an institution that

καλύτερα πρέπει να μετανοήσωμεν», Συνέντευξη στο ραδιοφωνικό σταθμό *SKAI* (2011-09-17). *Orthodoxos Typos*, 2011-09-23, 1894: 8.

156 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2011c): «Συνέντευξη του Μητροπολίτη Θεσσαλονίκης στον κ. Διονύση Μακρή για τον 'Στύλο της Ορθοδοξίας' (2011-12-14)». URL: http://www.imth.gr/default.aspx?lang=el-GR&loc=1&&page=197&newsid=404 (retrieving date 2016-11-15).

157 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2013): «Απόψεις για την επικαιρότητα». Δημοσίευμα στην *Kathimerini* (2013-09-08). URL: http://www.imth.gr/default.aspx?lang=el-GR&loc=1&&page=197&newsid=722 (retrieving date 2016-03-28).

158 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2013): «Δήλωση (2013-10-28)». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/pdf/mhnymata-Mitropolith/dhl-28.10.2013.pdf (retrieving date 2016-12-06): 2.

159 Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia & Lavreotiki (2012a): «Εγκύκλιος 76η». URL: http://www.imml.gr/images/documents/egkyklioi/2012/76.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-30): 2-3.

160 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2015d): «Υπέρ ενότητας και ευρώ τάσσεται ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος», Kathimerini (2015-07-02). URL: http://www.kathimerini.gr/821754/article/epikairothta/ellada/yper-enothtas-kai-eyrw-tassetai-o-arxiepiskopos (retrieving date 2016-06-09).

presents itself as the 'Ark of the nation'. However, the archbishop went a step further, adding that the place and accomplishments of the country within the "core of our European family" are "non-negotiable" and that Greeks therefore should not risk what they have already achieved via great effort. The archbishop clearly took sides with the pro-EU camp, even reiterating the core framing vocabulary of the latter, such as "growth", "progress", "European family", and "achievements". The conservative newspaper *Kathimerini* used the following title for this public statement: "Archbishop stands in favour of unity and the euro", but it was not only the head of the Church that took that position. Many other religious executives directly supported the 'yes' vote, for instance, Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki, who publicly stated his preference on this issue on Skai TV.[161]

Metropolitan Amvrosios[162], who supported the square protests in 2011 as a necessary initiative against what he characterised as the 'new German occupation' of the country[163], now stood against the 2015 referendum entirely. Although Amvrosios[164] considered both voting options as catastrophic, he fiercely attacked the 'no' vote option, arguing that it would either bring a harder memorandum or would cause a warlike Grexit. His rejection of the referendum has its roots in his deep distrust in grassroots democracy and in his preference for hierarchical forms of authority: "The People (ο Λαός) has NEITHER THE COMPETENCE NOR THE QUALIFICATIONS TO BE ABLE TO DECIDE WITH a 'YES' or a 'NO' [vote], especially when it does not know the further consequences!" He presents a binary opposite, so common in all authoritarian rhetoric, of 'inexpert and uninformed people' versus 'experts', 'specialists', and 'wise men': in short, on the one hand, the people who must be governed, and on the other hand, the leaders who must rule. In the midst of the high social, economic, and political stakes of the time, citizens' direct decision-making is portrayed as a "total catastrophe". On the contrary, Greeks are advised to repent for their "apostasy" and "return to the road of God" in order for God to waive the "punishment", a core ultra-

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161 Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (2015b): «Σκηνή τραγωδίας η ζωή των Ελλήνων», Συνέντευξη στο *SKAI* (2015-07-01). URL: http://www.romfea.gr/diafora/1580-anthimos-skini-tragodias-i-zoi-ton-ellinon (retrieving date 2015-07-02).

162 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2015): «Με το χέρι στην καρδιά! Το τίμημα της αποστασίας μας» (2015-07-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2015/07/blog-post_1.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

163 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011k): «28 ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ 2011-ΤΟ 2ο ΜΕΓΑΛΟ ΟΧΙ!» (2011-10-31). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/10/28-2011-2.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).; see also Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2011c): «Η πιο σκληρή Κατοχική Αρχή μας ήλθε! Είναι το 'Μεσοπρόθεσμο Πλαίσιο'» (2011-07-25). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2011/07/2012-2015.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

164 Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta & Aigialeia (2015): «Με το χέρι στην καρδιά! Το τίμημα της αποστασίας μας» (2015-07-01). URL: http://mkka.blogspot.be/2015/07/blog-post_1.html (retrieving date 2016-12-10).

conservative religious frame that was employed for the interpretation of the Greek crisis.[165]

Even hierarchs like Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos[166] who are representatives of the ascetic-mystical current in Orthodoxy and have written extensively on the deep theological and general cultural differences between Orthodox Greece and the 'heretic' West reached the point of speaking about the necessity for Greece to remain within the structure of Western Europe, even though the latter – according to them – constitutes the Carolingian distortion of the genuine spirit of Byzantine Orthodoxy. The contradiction here remains unsolved, despite Hierotheos's effort to overcome it through a double construction, namely that Greek identity contains first and foremost Byzantine Orthodox heritage (attributed with the untranslatable term '*καθ' ἡμᾶς Ἀνατολή*') but also those elements of Western Europe (attributed with another untranslatable term, '*καθ' ἡμᾶς Δύση*') that survived undistorted after the conquest of the West by the Francs. Despite his concluding quotation from a speech of Saint Sava, Archbishop of Serbia in the thirteenth century, that "above our heads we acknowledge only the heavenly Jerusalem and here on earth, nobody", theology is clearly defeated by the urgent needs of pragmatism, which Hierotheos himself accepts as a necessity.

Let me present a final example. In his aforementioned speech at the CEO Summit business conference, Metropolitan Gabriel of Nea Ionia[167] speaks like a political or financial actor, advocating a 'national plan' with a twofold aim: to overcome the country's "subjection to the memoranda obligations" and to accomplish its "economic recovery, to regain its lost competitiveness and credibility", all "by working in collaboration with and within the EU". He explicitly states: "our country needs and must thus remain in the trajectory of its European course." However, he establishes distance from Europe's current form: "not in the way we experience it today, which insults human dignity and the value of the human person, but in a Europe as envisioned by its founders ... a Europe of equal member states and of equal opportunities". Despite this critical tone, he does not question the position of Greece in the EU. Quite to the contrary, he reproduces the framing vocabulary of the time, calling for "na-

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165 See, for an analysis of this, Kessareas, E. (2018): 'The Greek Debt Crisis as Theodicy: Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-political Conservatism', *The Sociological Review*. 66 (1): 122-137.

166 Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Nafpaktos & Agios Vlasios (2015): «Η 'καθ' ημάς Ανατολή' και η 'καθ' ημάς Δύση'». *Εκκλησιαστική Παρέμβαση*, 229, August 2015. URL: http://parembasis.gr/index.php/el/menu-teyxos-229/4229-2015-229-01 (retrieving date 2016-03-28).

167 Gabriel, Metropolitan of Nea Ionia & Filadelfia (2016): «Ομιλία στο 10ο Επιχειρηματικό Συνέδριο (CEO Summit 2016) στο Μέγαρο Μουσικής Αθηνών με θέμα: 'Η Δύναμη του Ενός στο Μαζί: Είναι η Συν-Εργασία λέξη ελληνική;'» URL: http://www.nif.gr/omilies-imerides-sunedrion/omilia-sebasmiotatou-mitropolitou-k-gabriil-sto-10o-epixeirimatiko-sunedrio-ceo-summit-2016-sto-megaro-mousikis-athinon-me-thema-i-dunami-tou-enos-sto-mazi-einai-i-sun-ergasia-leksi-ellini/ (retrieving date 2017-01-14).

tional unity, collegiality, solidarity, trust" so that the spirit of business can be reinforced in young people. What about the social struggle against the austerity measures? For Bishop Gabriel, the *locus primus* of the struggle is not the political sphere but the "unyielding Greek heart", which has succeeded in overcoming historical hardships by "placing the national interest first and foremost and then the personal interests of everybody". This national interest is evidently equated with the EU position of the country. Indirectly, those who espouse opposite ideologies and political aims are criticised for their "pettinesses and differences that keep Greece hostage".

7 A defensive and self-serving religious activism

So far, I have been concerned with the hierarchy's supporting attitude within the context of the crisis. In this final section, I would like to briefly present two cases from the past that prove that the hierarchy can develop a politically oppositional stance, mobilizing the Church's constituency around themes of primary interest to it.

The first strong reaction of the hierarchy occurred in 1987, when the PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) government introduced a bill concerning the monastic and ecclesiastical property issue.[168] The new bill had a twofold goal: an economic one, namely the transfer of the Church's properties to the state, and a more administrative one, namely an internal restructuring of the ecclesiastical organisation, including lay and lower clergy participation in Church governance. The new regulations directly challenged the hierarchy's authority, both at the level of its ideological primacy and at the level of its material interests. The government presented the new regulations as being in accordance with its aim of a socialist transformation of society, attempting in this way to regain its socialist profile, which had been severely damaged due to the strict economic policy of that period. The resulting changes were promoted as beneficial to the Greek people as well as to the faithful who could finally participate in all levels of Church governance. On the contrary, the hierarchy attacked the concepts of democratization and socialisation as being foreign to the Orthodox tradition and as a medium for Church captivity by the political authority. While the government presented the democratisation of the Church as beneficial to the nation itself, the hierarchs presented the new bill as nationally dangerous because – according to them – it traumatised the traditional unity between the church and the nation. The conflict ultimately led neither to a change in church–state relations nor to an internal trans-

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168 See Kessareas, E. (2010): Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία και κράτος στην Ελλάδα της μεταπολίτευσης: κοινωνιολογική ανάλυση των ιδεολογικών αντιπαραθέσεων (PhD thesis). University of Crete, National Archive of PhD Theses. URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/27523 (retrieving date 2017-05-14): 116-145.

formation of the ecclesiastical organisation. A compromise between Prime Minister Papandreou and Archbishop Seraphim defused the crisis, and the controversial regulations of the new bill were annulled.

The second serious controversy between political and ecclesiastical authorities took place during the summer of 2000 after the government's decision to abolish religious affiliation from national identity cards.[169] The Church hierarchy, supporting the optional inclusion of religion on identity cards, reacted fiercely by organising mass rallies in Thessaloniki (14 June 2000) and Athens (21 June 2000) as well as a campaign to collect signatures requesting a referendum on the issue. Despite the Church's strong reaction, the Simitis government outlawed the mention of religion on identity cards. During the crisis, both the government and the Church hierarchy attempted to legitimise their positions with reference to such common concepts as 'people' and 'identity'. The proponents of the exclusion of religion from national identity cards defined the above concepts politically, emphasizing the concepts of legitimacy and human rights. In sharp contrast, the supporters of the Church's position defined the concepts of 'identity' and 'people' religiously and existentially, highlighting the close connections between the Church and the nation.

The relevant question, of course, is whether these mobilisations of the faithful can be seen as civil society interventions. To answer that question, we should look beyond the common characteristic of every civil society movement, namely the scale of mobilisation. No doubt, large segments of the faithful took part in dynamic demonstrations to express their sentiments of anger against what they perceived as state violations of their religious identity and rights. However, we need to take into account the character and aims of this kind of religious activism. There is also no doubt that these mobilisations, though oppositional in their character, were nevertheless not change-oriented but essentially defensive. They aimed at protecting the current status quo of the Church not only at the level of its relations with the state but also at the level of its internal organisation. Fearing that the proposed policies would harm its direct ideological and material interests, the powerful stratum of hierarchy mobilised the faithful in support of the Church's existing place and role in state and society. In other words, the public demonstrations and the campaign for a referendum did not seek to strengthen the democratic process but to secure the hierarchy's particularistic interests.

But the above church–state conflicts cannot be sufficiently explained within the theoretical schemes of cultural dualism and populism[170] because such interpretations do not adequately address the social structural causes of divisions and antagonisms

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169 Ibid.: 146-208.

170 E.g. Diamandouros, N. P. (2000): Πολιτισμικός δυϊσμός και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης. Athens: Alexandria: 15.; Stavrakakis, Y. (2002): 'Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case', *South European Society and Politics*, 7 (3): 29-52

but locate the latter primarily at the level of either general culture or subjective identity. Rather than viewing the conflicts as tensions between a traditionalist, populist church and a progressive, modernizing government, it would be more useful to take into consideration major social changes of the post-1974 period.[171] In short, the upper and new middle social classes (characterised by high levels of education and a secular way of life) enthusiastically welcomed the state policy of Europeanism and modernisation as a road to their own economic growth and social mobility. To them, the 'sacred' was an enemy to social and economic progress for the additional reason that it was used to legitimise the pre-1974 authoritarian system; that is why it had to be restricted within the walls of the Church. On the other hand, social strata whose expectations of economic prosperity did not come true—or even worse, whose living standards had deteriorated—turned to the Church because it offered not only existential security but also real material assistance (e.g. philanthropy) or even opportunities for work or career within the ecclesiastical organisation. Therefore, the atmosphere of ideological polarisation ('tradition' versus 'progress') is more accurately explained if we take into account the aims of the political and ecclesiastical authority as well as the interests of the different social layers that constitute Greek society precisely during a period of large social and economic changes. Besides, as this analysis of the hierarchy's attitude within the crisis shows, the Church – whose traditions the conventional cultural dualism approach[172] places rather simplistically within the anti-EU 'underdog' culture in contradistinction to the 'extrovert culture' of the pro-memorandum camp – had no problem aligning itself with the Greek economic and political system in support of the EU position of the country, accepting in exchange the repayment of the debt and the implementation of austerity policies, clothing the latter in the same guise of sacrifices, achievements, progress, modernisation, and so on.

8 Conclusion

The approval and implementation of the austerity memoranda agreements in Greece provoked mass demonstrations and other forms of civic activism. This activism acquired characteristics of a class struggle, since differentiated socio-economic strata mobilised in order to achieve conflicting interests. The struggle intensified as it challenged the heart of the current power system, namely the position of the country in

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171 See Kessareas, E. (2010): Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία και κράτος στην Ελλάδα της μεταπολίτευσης: κοινωνιολογική ανάλυση των ιδεολογικών αντιπαραθέσεων (PhD thesis). University of Crete, National Archive of PhD Theses. URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/27523 (retrieving date 2017-05-14): pp. 195-208, 216-218.
172 E.g. Plakoudas, S. (2016): 'The Debt Crisis and Greece's Changing Political Discourse', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 40 (2): 307-314.

the EU. The powerful hierarchical leaders attempted to strike a balance between the expectations of the lay membership for a dynamic stance of the Church against the austerity policies and the Church's institutional position as a state agency. For this reason, they employed a double strategy, which was nevertheless not free from contradictions. On the one hand, they criticised aspects of the political and financial system, even adopting the anti-memorandum vocabulary; on the other hand, they highlighted society's collective guilt for the crisis, urging both repentance and acceptance of the crisis condition as a divine pedagogy. In this setting, they equated austerity with salvation itself, as opposed to the apostasy of secular consumerism. However, their aforementioned critique was not on the same level; instead, they clearly tipped the balance to the second side, in accordance with the profoundly inward-oriented, liturgical, and mystical character of Orthodox theology, as well as their aims and interests.

Overall, the hierarchical leaders offered a triple legitimacy to the state and its policies during the period of the crisis. First, at the level of interpretation of the crisis, they justified the crisis as a pedagogical lesson from God and promoted the ideology of collective guilt. Second, at the level of the economy, they supported the repayment of the debt, urging people to accept taxes and the austerity measures as necessity treatments. In this context, they utilised the ecclesiastical concepts and practices of ascesis and frugal living as the best route to salvation. For the victims of this policy, they proposed patience and philanthropy, namely a fairer distribution of the burdens. Here, they rejected the radical demand for total equality with references to the unequal character of all historical societies and to the scheme of collaboration (not struggle) between classes within the kingdom of God. Third, at the level of politics, they offered support to the crumbling political system by stating that the administrations in power were doing whatever they could to deal with the crisis.[173] They also called for national unity and political stability within the context of the implementation of the austerity policies, at the same time reiterating the core political argument of the crisis period that otherwise, "the sacrifices of the Greek people are in danger of being lost".[174] Furthermore, they attempted to depoliticise and neutralise the indignation by channeling it back to the interior of the self or by promoting the idea of a 'healthy' and 'good' revolution, as opposed to the disruptive political revolution. More fundamentally, and despite their attempt to construct a 'detached from all interests' profile, they supported at crucial political moments (e.g. Euro Summits, the referendum) the

173 E.g. Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)» URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 21.
174 Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2014): «Προσφώνηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο της Ιεραρχίας (2014-10-07)». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/epikairotita/main_epikairotita_ next.asp?id= 976 (retrieving date 2016-03-24).

strategic choice of the state to remain in the eurozone and in the EU, even if that meant harsher austerity measures and loss of national sovereignty.

In this setting, they accepted a superficial form of activism, which by no means could challenge the two foundations of the existing system, namely the state and the Church. In contrast, they attempted to neutralise the anti-establishment activism by portraying it as inferior compared to traditional, inward-oriented Orthodox practices (e.g. quiescence, prayer, vigils) and as dangerous to the interests of the nation. Rather, they counter-promoted the change of the inner self or called for a charismatic, Orthodox leader who would control the people, perceived as both full of passions and prone to civil unrest. This was also in line with the discussion at the time for an extra-parliamentary, technocratic government, which would implement the necessary 'reforms' without being restricted by re-election interests. Even the ultra-conservative hierarchs, who supported the indignant protests, never reached the point of challenging the core elements of the memorandum agreements, for instance, the repayment of the country's debt. Their support for the activism of the period seems to be more related to their deep abhorrence of the democracy of post-dictatorship Greece and their corresponding vision of a state grounded in the premises of Helleno-Christian ideology.

There are at least three intertwined ways to explain this anti-activist stance of the Church executives that was so supportive of the status quo:

1. The inward-oriented, mystical current of Orthodox theology, which prioritises hierarchy over democracy and equality. Grassroots activism, which is outside traditional, hierarchical channels of expression, is viewed as a threat to society and its basic institutions, namely state and church.

2. The place and role of the Church as a state agency. The Church cannot but follow the strategic choices of the state, for the Church itself is a basic institution of the state with significant ideological functions (e.g. legitimisation). The hierarchical leaders encourage only a defensive activism, namely one that aims to secure their direct material and/or ideological interests, as the two conflicts over the ecclesiastical property issue and the identity cards prove.

3. The material interests of the bishops. Although the Church has its own means of income, such as real estate income, National Bank of Greece shares[175], and voluntary donations from the faithful, it still depends financially on the state, which pays the salaries of its clergymen and owns significant portions of the Church's property. In addition, the Church as an institution receives EU funding

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[175] E.g. see Lakasas, A. (2016): 'Church of Greece scrambling to avoid bankruptcy', *Ekathimerini*, URL: http://www.ekathimerini.com/207660/article/ekathimerini/community/church-of-greece-scrambling-to-avoid-bankruptcy (retrieving date 2017-05-20).; Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011a): «Εισήγηση ενώπιον της τακτικής Ιεράς Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας με θέμα: 'Προς αναθεώρηση και αναδιοργάνωση εκκλησιαστικών πραγμάτων' (2011-10-04)». URL: http://www. ecclesia. gr/greek/press/ekklisia/2011_october.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).

for its welfare services, cultural heritage actions, and so on.[176] Fearing the unknown environment outside the EU and the implications for the Church's financial and state position that the radical activism of the period might have, the hierarchs opted for the existing status quo in line with the interests of the political and economic elites of the country. At the same time and in order to secure the Church against the austerity policies, they reminded the state authorities of the role of the Church in maintaining social cohesion, for instance, by cultivating such values and attitudes as hope and patience.[177] In addition, they searched for new income opportunities within the new context of the crisis, for instance, investments in solar energy[178] and further cooperation with the state in the field of religious tourism.[179]

In sum, the strong anti-activist and hierarchical ethos of Orthodoxy, the close institutional relations between the Church and the state, and the interests of the powerful ecclesiastical stratum of the hierarchy do not facilitate the development of activism, except for when activism can better secure areas of the Church's own legitimacy and power. Fearing that confrontational activism within the conditions of the ongoing extraordinary crisis could harm the Church's interests, the hierarchical leaders sided with the political and economic elites of the country, supporting instead of challenging the status quo.

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176 E.g. see Dasopoulos, T. (2007): 'Έργα αξίας 500 εκατ. στο ΕΣΠΑ από την Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος', *Naftemporiki* (2007-12-26). URL: http://www.naftemporiki.gr/finance/story/153015/erga-aksias-500-ekat-sto-espa-apo-tin-ekklisia-tis-ellados (retrieving date 2017-05-20).

177 E.g. Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)» URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 22, 31.; see also Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens & All Greece (2011a): «Εισήγηση ενώπιον της τακτικής Ιεράς Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας με θέμα: 'Προς αναθεώρηση και αναδιοργάνωση εκκλησιαστικών πραγμάτων' (2011-10-04)». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/press/ekklisia/2011_october.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23).; Symeon, Metropolitan of Nea Smyrni (2015): 'Η συμβολή της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος στην ενότητα του ελληνικού λαού σήμερα', Εισήγηση, 2015-10-08. URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/neasmyrnis_ 08102015.pdf (retrieving date 2016/03/20).

178 Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Patras (2012): «Εισήγηση στην Ιερά Σύνοδο με θέμα: 'Η ποιμαντική της Εκκλησίας στην εποχή των μνημονίων' (2012-10-02)» URL: www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/chrysostom_2012.pdf (retrieving date 2016-03-23): 18.

179 E.g. see Ministry of Tourism & Church of Greece (2013): «Πρωτόκολλο συνεργασίας στον τομέα του προσκυνηματικού τουρισμού μεταξύ του Υπουργείου Τουρισμού και της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος». URL: http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/tourism/mnimonio_ paideias.pdf (retrieving date 2018-01-04).

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Rocco D'Ambrosio

"The Catholic Community and Civil Society in Italy"

Any analysis[1] carried out in Italy on the subject of civil society immediately presents several difficulties, stemming from the fact that the topic remains one of the most complex and pervasive in Western thought. It stands, in fact, at a crossroads of social, political, cultural, and economic visions.[2] To understand it thoroughly, we must begin with some theoretical points, grasping the fundamental framework, and then build on that with a general discussion about the relationship between the Catholic community and the reality of civil society.

1 Some theoretical points

Of course, the phrase *civil society* is a translation of the Latin *societas civilis*, which was offered in the fifteenth century as a translation of the Aristotelian expression *koinonia politikè*. The foundations of our study, then, lie in the original meaning of the *koinonia politikè*. Aristotle's own explanation comes at the beginning of his *Politics*, which opens with these words: "Since we see that every city is some sort of community and that every community gets established with some good in view (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they think is good), it is clear that, while all communities have some good that they are aiming at, the community that has the most control of all and that embraces all the others is doing this most of all and is aiming at the most controlling of goods. This community is the city [*polis*] as it is called, the community that is political [*koinonia politikè*]."[3]

It is clear that for Aristotle, the city (*polis*) is identified as the political community (*koinonia politikè*), our *civil society*. In the *polis*, the political community, the human

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person reaches its perfection, becoming fully itself; this is in virtue of the fact that man – Aristotle makes clear that he refers only to adult, free males; slaves, male and female children, and women were all excluded from the concept – is *politikòn*. Man, he says, "is by nature is a political animal [*zôon politikòn*]."[4]

We cannot, however, overlook the fact that this reference to the term *politikòn* introduces several problems into our discussion. *Politikòn* – we know well – is derived from the Greek word *pólis,* city. To speak of something as being "political" is therefore to say that it regards the *pólis*, it has some relation to the *pólis.* If we were citizens of an ancient Greek *pólis,* this term would not create any problem, so it would only be to define the human person as belonging to a city. For Aristotle, in fact, there exists a close relationship between individual persons and the groups, institutions, communities, cities, or nations of which they are a part. Every human person bears an undeniable relational nature. This is the origin, in Aristotle, of the term *politikòn*. Every person is *politikòn*, that is, relational. However, we can not escape being children of our time, and words like *political*, *politics*, or *politician* evoke a variety of images and issues, most of them negative; this is one of the causes (but not the only one) of the opposition we imagine between civil life and politics. But let us put aside contemporary debates and, above all, its many distortions of language, and stick with Aristotle, bearing in mind that the adjective *politikòn* refers fundamentally to a relational nature. This will help us avoid certain ideologies that have opposed the word *political* to *social*, or *civil*, misunderstanding the original meaning of the terms. Traces of this are clear over many decades of translation of Latin and the modern languages derived from it. As a result, using the adjective *political* without falling into the ideological trap and keeping its original meaning presents a bit of an intellectual challenge today: *politikòn* means relative to the city, to the collective of human relationships. However, for those who are convinced that the ideological baggage of the word is unavoidable, we recommend translating *politikòn* as *relational,* rather than *social* or *civil*.

The meaning of *politikòn* is fundamental and essential to our study of Catholics and civil society. The Aristotelian *koinonia politikè* is the city (*polis*). There is no way, then, to understand *political* in opposition to or distinct from the *civil*. The *polis* represents, rather, the fullness of human relations. No person can attain self-sufficiency (*autarkaia*) apart from the *polis*; neither the family, the household (*oikos*), or the village (*kome*), which is a collective of households, are sufficient to the full maturity of each person. The fundamental community is certainly the family, the household (*oikos*); it provides the basic, daily needs of the person. To meet their more complex needs, persons organise into associations of households, which is the village (*kome*). Villages form higher communites, constituting the polis, the true and complete

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4 Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, tr. Phillips Simpson, P. L. (1997): Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 46.

(*teleios*) community, broad enough to be self-sufficient (*autarkeia*). The *polis* exists "by nature" (*physei*), just as the fundamental community, the household, existed by nature. The household, in fact, arises in support of life; even this most basic community has for its purpose the attainment of the good life (*eu zen*), that is, happiness. Forming the *polis*, the basic communities of family and village attain their end (*telos*). It should be pointed out that for Aristotle, the end that something reaches when it is fully developed is nothing other than its own nature. From this analysis, two corollaries emerge: "the *polis* exists by nature" and "man is by nature a living political being" (*zôon politikòn*).[5] An unbroken line therefore leads from the *political* nature of the human person to the family, from the village to the *polis*, and vice versa.

This brings us to the question: when, in the history of political thought, did the idea of *civil society* become different than, if not opposed to, the concept of *political society*, either the city or the state, that is, Aristotle's *koinonia politikè*? Leaving aside some particular insights found first in Cicero and later in the work of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Ferguson, the most complete answer to our question is provided by Hegel. For the German philosopher, *civil society*, which is also *bourgeois society* (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), must be distinguished from the state. As we know, Hegel proceeds in triads, and in his development of ethics, the family is the first level, civil society is the second, and the state is the third, and the perfect, one. The family generates and educates autonomous individuals, who take part in *civil society* as a system of competition, having to put aside their ethics but, nevertheless, contributing to the universality of relationships. The overall judgment on this is, however, negative: *civil society* is tied too much to the needs of individuals; it is marked by a too limited rationality; it is contradictory, lacks an organic nature, is prone to dissolution, to misery, to physical and ethical corruption.[6] It is necessary therefore to move to the highest incarnation of the ethics, which is the state, in which the particular and universal of the human person and its activities are fully reconciled.

Distinguishing and opposing *civil society* and state, Hegel rejected all theories, especially those of classical orientation, that identify the two by virtue of the principle of voluntary association of citizens in the state. Subsequently, Marx's analysis, through two different phases, also resulted in a conception of *civil society* that is opposed to the state.

Based on this historical development, accepted or not, one can say with Norberto Bobbio that "civil society is the sphere of relations between individuals, between groups, between social classes, that take place outside the relations of power that characterize state institutions. In other words, civil society is represented as the locus of economic, ideological, social, and religious conflicts that the state has the task of

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5 Cf. Voeglein, E. (1957): *Order and History, vol. 3: Plato and Aristotle*, part II, Louisiana University Press, Baton Rouge and London, chapter 1.
6 Cf. Hegel, G. W. F. (1991): *Elements of the Philosopphy of Right*, Cambridge.

solving or mediating or suppressing; as the basis from which the questions asked by the political system are called upon to answer; as the field of the various forms of mobilization, association, organisation of the social forces that move towards the conquest of political power."[7]

In all these areas – of *civil society* – the human person lives its relationality, both from anthropological and ethical point of view. It is absurd to think that those who make up the various organisations of civil society are different from those who make up state institutions. The human person is such everywhere; what changes are the contexts and, with them, the practices, the rules, the goals, the organisational models, and the cultural, economic, religious, and ideological dynamics. That being said, we do not want to assert absolutely that *civil society* as a whole is identified with the state: the Aristotelian approach is put aside on this point because of the rich historical path that followed it, although such an approach still offers important anthropological and ethical insights.

In order to understand differences and similarities between civil society and the organisation of the state, it might be useful to deepen the concept of *institution*. By *institution*, we mean here, with Mary Douglas, *a legitimate social grouping*.[8] If we locate *civil society* and the state on an ascending scale of *institutionalization*, we can interpret their identity and their relationship based on the fact that each group is a collective of people, bound by more or less stable and lasting relationships over time, choosing to agree on certain norms and behaviors that, on the one hand, are generally shared by the members of the group and, on the other, are considered necessary for the group and its members.[9] The group is therefore *institutionalized*.[10] So civil society is generally less institutionalized, while the state, on the other hand, is the institution *par excellence*.

Within this scale of institutionalization, further specifications can be made. For example, Jose Casanova argues that with regard to religion, from a political-theoretical point of view, it is not possible to make a direct association between the two relationships: religion-politics and private-public. In fact, we can distinguish at least three main levels.[11] These levels firstly include, the 'private'; secondly, the 'social-

7 Bobbio, N. (1990): *Società civile,* in N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci, G. Pasquino, *Dizionario di Politica*, TEA, Torino, p. 1065.

8 Douglas, M. (1986): *How Institutions Think*, Syracuse University Press, New York.

9 Cf. my Come pensano e agiscono le istituzioni, EDB, Bologna 2011.

10 Cf. Ostrom, E. (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.

11 Casanova actually distinguishes between three ideal-types of 'the public': state (established state churches: e.g. UK), political society (religious political parties, social movements or lobbying agencies) and civil society (the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society: open public debates on different spheres of the *res publica*, such as public issues, public affairs public policy, and the common good); cf. Casanova, J. (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*, University of Chicago Press; Cas-

public' (in a broader sense, *civil society* – or the 'public sphere');[12] and thirdly, the public as the 'political-public' (or 'institutional'), which could be considered in a distinct way from the second.

2 Civil society in the Italian context

In Italy, there are many who fall into the trap of considering *civil society* to be a compact and homogenous reality, but it is impossible to understand the topic accurately in this way.[13] For this reason, broad references to *civil society* should be avoided. As far as possible, one must identify subjects and contexts of the phrase as precisely as possible in order to avoid harmful overgeneralization and a sometimes demagogic instrumentalization by institutions. A sound relationship between civic realities and other institutions take account of their fundamental differences and respect the identity and autonomy of both.

Here it is necessary to offer some specific comments on the nature of the Catholic community. As it is in many parts of the world, the Catholic Church is a legally recognized institution in Italy. Its relationships with civil society takes on different forms. With Jose Casanova, we can say that the role of the Church in public life varies and changes among the different countries and areas of the world; this role is profoundly impacted by the "structural location any church accepts between state and society."[14]

In sum:

1. The Catholic community is part of civil society because the majority of its members are part of society and the majority of its activity takes place in that context.

2. The Catholic community is an institution, and in its degree of *institutionalization* it bears a closer resemblance to a complex reality like a state than it does to a smaller, simpler community. We see this expressed, for example, in discussions of various types of "power" within a national or local community, which usually include references national, parliamentary, judicial, military, and religious power.

3. The Catholic community, through its activities and its educational work, both supports and obstructs the growth of civil society. However, this entire reality is in a state of development. Roberto Cipriani writes: "In any case, the impact of religion and

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anova, J. (2012): *"Rethinking public religions"* in: Shah, Timothy S., Stepan, Alfred – Toft Monica Duffy (eds), *Rethinking Religion and world affairs,* pp. 25-35; Piccinin, A. (2016): *Catholic public reason: John Rawls and Catholic Social Teaching. From Vatican II to Pope Francis,* LUISS, Rome.

12 "A definition of what is actually 'public', or what does constitute public, is highly controversial" (A. Piccinin, *Catholic public reason,* cit, p. 12).

13 Cf. Moro, G. and Vannini, I. (2008): La società civile tra eredità e sfide. Rapporto sull'Italia, del Civil society index, Rubbettino, Soveria M. (Cz).

14 Casanova, J. (1994): *Public Religions in the Modern World,* University of Chicago Press, p. 70.

religiosity in Italian civil society remains clear, but its connotations are changing. Indeed, we can see on the horizon a new and wide-ranging body of large quantitative and qualitative sociological research (the previous dated back to 1994-95) that is identifying and studying the significance of the new dynamics that are taking shape."[15]

In this essay, I would like to analyze only the third of these aspects and to outline synthetically the type of relationship that the Catholic community in Italy maintains with civil society. In general, one can say that the institutions present in a national community, from the smallest to the largest (which is the state) adopt, in their relationships to civil society, different operational models. These include:

a. *Absolutist*: Following Hegel, the institution considers itself the only point of reference and considers civic society to be imperfect, in need of being overcome by or absorbed into its own institutional logic.

b. *Feudalistic*: The institution recognizes civil realities but seeks to insert itself into them in a relationship of cultural, economic, and practical domination.

c. *Competitive*: The institution puts itself in competition with the civil society, especially in the area of social services and of political representation.

d. *Separatist*: The institution sees civil realities as completely different from and foreign to its own actions, to the extent that a relationship with them is considered to be unnecessary.

e. *Collaborative*: The institution acknowledges the existence the various aspects of civil society and collaborates on specific projects and strategies.

3 The Catholic Church in Italy and the cultural deficit

The models presented here have all in various ways marked the life of the Catholic community in Italy. We should note that the Italian bishops' conference has been, in recent years, quite attentive to civil society in its activities. For example, the official theme of the XLIII Social Week of Italian Catholics (held in Naples in November 1999) was "Which Civil Society for the Italy of Tomorrow?" In addition, many official statements and episcopal documents on specific topics have made prominent reference to the concept of civil society.[16] However, these references have not always been precise:

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15 This quotation is taken from a not yet published text kindly provided to me by the author. See also R. Cipriani, "Sociologie della società civile globale" in Riccioni, ed. (2009): *Comunicazione, cultura, territorio. Contributi della sociologia contemporanea, Mimesis Edizioni*, Milano-Udine, pp. 75-78.
16 A cursory search of the website of the Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (www.chiesacattolica.it) reveals the presence of the term civil society in the great majority of texts and documents.

the term *civil society* is sometimes used to refer to that which is not of the state, at other times to refer to that which is not strictly political, and so on.

These conceptual inaccuracies are thanks in part to the fact that Italian Catholicism, since Vatican II, has had a very conflictual relationship with social and political issues. Certainly in the last thirty years, the Italian church, with the exception of a few noble shepherds and lay faithful, has preferred to concentrate, in its teaching and official statements, more on personal and family ethics than on social, political, and economic issues. Even in the context of the pontificate of Pope Francis, there have been, both quantitatively and qualitatively, few interventions on topics with strong civil connotations, such as opposition to corruption and the mafia, the protection of democracy, personal and political freedom, the welcoming of immigrants, new and old forms of poverty, justice and peace on the local and global levels, solidarity and subsidiarity, economic ethics, and so on. The few statements on social issues that have been made have been offered in the most cautious of tones, as though to avoid offending anyone in power, such as politicians or business leaders.

As with any aspect of personal and communal life, the starting point is formation, and on these social issues, little formation has been offered. Beginning in seminaries[17] and then following into parishes, various groups and organisations, and even entire dioceses, the themes of Catholic social teaching are largely ignored. Giuseppe Toniolo (1845-1918), finding himself in similar circumstances, recalled the example of socially active German parish priests and longed for a clergy, and consequently a laity, that worked to resolve the state of crisis, because "it is equally repellant to Catholics to imagine a clergy either leading the tumultuous turbulence of a particular party's wrath, or to think of a clergy that sits idle and silent before a problem caused by the lack of justice or charity or that does not intervene with peace in the midst of a conflict or, if peace has failed, does not lovingly protect those who are weak from those who are strong."[18] Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959) expressed a similar idea when he described ?? as "a small ancient world, which could be called the antechamber of the seminary, the sacristy."[19]

Circumstances in the church today seem to be closer to those about which Toniolo and Sturzo complained than those to which Vatican II invited us. The Council Fathers encouraged all communities to provide "civic and political formation ... so that all citizens can play their part in the life of the political community ... without regard for their own interests or for material advantages. With integrity and wisdom, they must take action against any form of injustice and tyranny, against arbitrary domina-

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17 It is noteworthy that scarce attention is typically given in seminaries and houses of formation to the insights of the social sciences, despite Vatican policies that such cources be established: cf. Congregation for Catholic Education (1988): *Guidelines for the Study and Teaching of the Church's Social Doctrine in the Formation of Priests.*

18 Sorrentino, D. (1988): *Giuseppe Toniolo*, EP, Cinisello Balsamo, p. 168.

19 De Rosa, G. (1977): *Luigi Sturzo*, Utet, Torino, pp. 45-46.

tion by an individual or a political party and any intolerance. They should dedicate themselves to the service of all with sincerity and fairness, indeed, with the charity and fortitude demanded by political life."[20] The most important resource for such an educational ministry is precisely the Church's social teaching, which offers not only the ethical principles but also a method with which they are to be applied – that is, the "see, judge, act" method.[21] This method remains, as far as I can tell, mostly ignored as a way to help Catholics reach a fuller and more Gospel-based understanding of their civic and political environment.

4 Italian Catholics and civil society: division versus dialogue

The shortcoming in the church's relationship with the social and political world can only be understood through an analysis of the model of church under which a great many Catholics – both shepherds and lay people – have been operating in recent decades. Recent exampes of Italian Catholics putting themselves in opposition to civil society is a reflection of the fact that the attention of most parishes, dioceses, groups, and movements has been restricted to the narrow list of concerns related to bioethics and family issues, while they have ignored urgent social and political issues. It makes clear to us that working in the background, if not always explicitly, are in fact two divergent *models of the church*. Someone has even dared to suggest the existence in the church of a de facto *underground schism*. Whether or not this is so, it is essential that we understand which *model of the church* is most faithful to the mission entrusted to it by Jesus Christ in our day.

Surely the element that marks the dividing line between the two models is the Second Vatican Council, which is truly a *cornerstone* as well as, at times, *a stone which causes some to stumble*. It is difficult today to discuss almost any topic related to contemporary Catholicism, seriously and thoroughly, without making reference to the Council's teaching. And such discussions often boil down, rather quickly, to whether one is in favor of or opposed to that teaching. In fact, for some, the Council is no longer a primary doctrinal and theological reference in understanding the church and the world, but rather a dividing point, a gap. The pontificate of Pope Francis has in

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20 Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, n. 75.
21 See Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, n. 4; Pope Paul VI, Octogesima adveniens (1971): nn. 4, 42; Congregation for Catholic Education, Guidelines for the Study and Teaching of the Church's Social Doctrine in the Formation of Priests (1988): nn. 7-10; Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987): n. 1; Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991): nn. 5, 43, 56-59; Pope Francis, Evangelii gaudium (2013): n. 20; Pope Francis, Laudato si' (2015): the entire text of which is developed following the see-judge-act model.

many respects widened this gap. This situation is difficult to quantify.[22] Are those who have abandoned the spirit and letter of Vatican II a majority? Or a minority? Of what size? Whatever the specifics, it seems undeniable that the life of the church is marked by this reality today.

We can say in summary that the nature of the relationship between the Catholic community and civil society varies radically, depending on which elements within the church we are talking about. There seem, in general, to be two significant groups in question: (1) the traditionalist and anti-conciliar Catholics and (2) the conciliar and collaborative Catholics.

Let us consider briefly the characteristics of these two groups and the manner in which they relate to civil society, giving special consideration to how their opposition to or acceptance of conciliar teaching coincides with opposition to or reception of the priorities of the present pontificate, a magisterium that is in striking harmony with Vatican II.

4.1 The traditionalist and anti-conciliar Catholics

To emphasize personal and family ethics while ignoring social, economic, and political ethics cannot be attributed to simple forgetfulness and even less to some kind of urgency that circumstances demand with regard to the former that does not exist with regard to the latter. No, this sort of prioritization is the result of particular model of what it means to be the church. It is a model that includes strong anti-conciliar sentiments and that has gained ground in Italy (and elsewhere).

I refer to the sort of church that seems to have many certainties and few doubts; that insists on giving attention to certain moral issues while neglecting others; that seeks the numerical majority and cultural pre-eminence; that demands privileges and subsidies from the state; that ignores corruption and the misuse of power; that is clericalized and very hierarchically organised; and that does little to promote the laity. In this model of the Church, there is little room for the themes and issues that are so central to the Vatican II and Francis's pontificate. Francis himself articulated these themes to the United States bishops in these words: "The innocent victim of abortion, children who die of hunger or from bombings, immigrants who drown in the search for a better tomorrow, the elderly or the sick who are considered a burden, the victims of terrorism, wars, violence and drug trafficking, the environment devastated by man's predatory relationship with nature – at stake in all of this is the gift of God, of which we are noble stewards but not masters. It is wrong, then, to look the other way

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22 Cf. Garelli, F. (2006): L'Italia cattolica nell'epoca del pluralismo, il Mulino, Bologna; Cartocci R. (2007): Mappe del tesoro. Atlante del capitale sociale in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna; Cartocci, R. (2011): Geografia dell'Italia cattolica, il Mulino, Bologna; Garelli, F. (2016): Religione all'italiana. L'anima del paese messa a nudo, il Mulino, Bologna.

or to remain silent. No less important is the Gospel of the Family, which in the World Meeting of Families in Philadelphia I will emphatically proclaim together with you and the entire Church."[23]

More briefly, in an interview with the Argentine newspaper *La Voz del Pueblo*, he identified as the greatest evils of the world as "poverty, corruption, and human trafficking."[24] For many in the Church, assimilating these priorities requires a radical change of mindset or, as the Pope has put it, putting aside some established plans. He writes in *Evangelii gaudium*: "God's word is unpredictable in its power. The Gospel speaks of a seed which, once planted, grows by itself, even while the farmer sleeps (Mk 4:26-29). The Church must accept this uncontrollable freedom of the Word, which accomplishes what it wills in ways that often surpass our calculations and wreak havoc upon our plans."[25]

Another reality that can at times "wreak havoc on our plans" is is popular piety. We know well that popular piety is born from the depths of the person and of ecclesial culture, manifesting itself in public contexts. The topic raises a variety of questions, many of which were dealt with by the Italian bishops' 1989 document *Chiesa italiana e mezzogiorno*.[26] It is a difficult topic that never fails to provoke frustration. Italian history demonstrates, over the centuries, how clearly quantity comes at the expense of quality and how opportunism is often more operative than faith. Still, we do not want to dismiss popular devotion as harmful in itself to a life of faith. This would be an unacceptable reduction in all respects. Hundreds of papal and episcopal documents insist that popular devotion, if carefully formed and guided, can promote authentic personal, ecclesial, and even civic growth. In some cases, the church has been too receptive to unhealthy popular pieties, perhaps because they are mistakenly seen as bolstering the number of active Catholics and, correspondingly, their financial contributions. But pernicious forms of piety have at times distorted the church's relationship with civil society. Many manifestations of popular piety (processions, masses, events, religious theater) often take place in our most civic spaces, such as streets, town squares, and other outdoor spaces. The only way of making sense of these events, very often, is to understand the place the Catholic community understands itself as having within civil society. Recent decades suggest a resurgence of a

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23 Francis, Meeting with the Bishops of the United States of America, 2015-09-23: https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_20150923_usa-vescovi.html.

24 "Añoro ir a una pizzería y comerme una buena pizza," *La Voz del Pueblo*, May 31, 2015: http://www. lavozdelpueblo.com.ar/nota-27095--aoro-ir-a-una-pizzera-y-comerme-una-buena-pizza

25 Francis, Apostolic Exhortation (2013): *Evangelii Gaudium* (On the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today's World), November 24, n. 22.

26 Conferenza Episcopale Italiana, Chiesa italiana e Mezzogiorno: sviluppo nella solidarietà, Rome 1989, n. 4; see also my Chiesa italiana e Mezzogiorno: sviluppo nella solidarietà. Il documento e le problematiche etico-sociali in «Rivista di Scienze Religiose», Molfetta (Ba) n. 2/2008, pp. 541-555.

religious factor in society, calling into question broad assertions about secularization as a universal and irreversible process.[27] In several instances, it seems that popular piety has been used by the church to attempt to reassert control over cultural spaces and pastimes that were once (after the war) commonplace, because religious demonstrations were almost the only civic activities in the context of a culture that was dominantly and monolithicly Catholic.

Without education of all the faithful and vigilance by pastoral leaders, popular piety is continually at risk of sliding into various kinds of magic and superstition (for the faithful) or reduction to a financial deal (for certain religious leaders with obvious mafia connections[28]). Not only does all of this offer ineffective witness in a civic context; it also conveys a distorted and not very Christian idea of truly sacred celebration or liturgy. When popular piety lacks adequate formation, it only serves to weaken the boundaries between faith as a commitment to life and faith as a wild spectacle; between a God who is sought out as a beloved Father and a god used as a dispenser of miracles; between authentic liturgy and magical act; between being a church that serves the poor and being a business bent on profit; between a communal spirit and the privatization of saints and popular devotion. "Evangelization, however," write the Italian bishops in *Chiesa italiana e mezzogiorno*, "promotes a transition from a religiosity of rewards and consolations to a faith that is liberating; from individualistic expressions that almost celebrate the difficulties of life to an experience of authentic communion; from a closed and evasive immobility to a true historical commitment."[29]

In this cultural context, often marked by immature faith and religiosity, civil society becomes, for many Italian Catholics, an amorphous and generally atheistic or relativistic reality, upon which Catholic principles must be proposed or even imposed. With regard to this attitude, Giovanni Miccoli has observed that the Italian church has expressed it "support of the authority of government to impose on society norms determined by its own magisterium, in the utopian hope of exercising a sort of supreme influence, a more or less direct control over the movement of history. The authoritarian appeal to the exclusive and specific characteristics of ecclesial identity and a strong reconsolidation of its own ranks, through a recovery of the authority of the church's hierarchy over the faithful laity, constitute the preliminary and essential step."[30]

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27 Cf. Casanova, J. (2000): Oltre la secolarizzazione. Le religioni alla riconquista della sfera pubblica, Bologna.; Berger, P. L., ed. (1999): The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Grand Rapids.

28 Cf. Dino A., (2008): La mafia devota. Chiesa, religione, Cosa Nostra, Laterza, Rome-Bari.; Mantineo, A. (2015). La condanna della mafia nel recente Magistero: profili penali canonistici e ricadute nella prassi ecclesiale delle Chiese di Calabria e Sicilia, L. Pellegrini, Cosenza.

29 Conferenza Episcopale Italiana, *Chiesa italiana e Mezzogiorno*, cit., n. 26.

30 Miccoli, G. (2007): In difesa della fede. La Chiesa di Giovanni Paolo II e Benedetto XVI, Rizzoli, Milan, p. 360.

Many Catholic pastors and laity, then, relate to civil society according to an *ab-solutist* or *feudalistic* model (2.a and 2.b above). This type of relationship is the direct result of an ideological faith. By ideology I mean a compact body of knowledge that is closed to discussion, the exclusive property of a group of enlightened ones who impose it upon others and for whom it is the hallmark of their own identity specifically because it is accepted *in toto* and without question; questions are not permitted; doubts or different emphases are not tolerated; intellectual investigation is stifled by the imposition of rigid and sterile patterns (one thinks of certain areas of philosophical and theological research). On a practical level these assumptions result in:

–   a dogmatic and over-confident approach to articulating the moral principles of bioethics, sexual ethics, and family life (deliberately ignoring other areas, especially social, political, and economic ones);
–   excessive attention to the way these topics are treated in the media (especially television);
–   a refusal to discuss and dialogue with those who think differently, both inside and outside the Catholic Church;
–   an absolute equation of fidelity to Christ with fidelity to these principles;
–   a complete rejection of any possibility of graduality or growth, insisting instead that everything must be accepted fully and immediately.

The result is that we sometimes seem to be in a big supermarket of faith: there are no longer people, only products (as the Pope says, the person becomes "human material"); a few moral principles to take from the shelves, put into one's cart, and take home, immediately and without question; speed, convenience and quality of the product are indistinguishable. You either believe or you are considered to be the opposition. You are either in or you are out.

It should come as no surprise that Francis's gentleness and his smile are, for those who ideologize faith in such a way, a source of scandal. Nor should it be surprising when, in this context, his calls for sincerity, for the rediscovery of God's mercy, and for simple and deep discipleship arouse resentment. And it should also be no surprise that the Pope would reject as inadequate any reference to "non-negotiable values." Let us recall the comment he offered in his *Corriere della Sera* interview: "I have never understood the expression 'non-negotiable values.' Values are values, and that's it. I can't say among all of the fingers of the hand, one is less useful than the others. And so I don't understand how one can speak of negotiable values"[31].

Faith is not an ideology. Indeed, faith is to ideology as day is to night. Francis himself reminds us: "Ideologues falsify the Gospel. Every ideological interpretation,

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31 Ferruccio de Bortoli, Intervista: "'Benedetto XVI non è una statua; Partecipa alla vita della Chiesa,'" *Corriere della Sera*, 2014-03-05: http://www.corriere.it/cronache/14_marzo_04/vi-racconto-mio-primo-anno-papa-90f8a1c4-a3eb-11e3-b352-9ec6f8a34ecc.shtml, my translation.

from wherever it originates, on one side or the other, is a falsification of the Gospel. And these ideologues – as we have seen in the history of the Church – always end up revealed to be intellectuals with no talent, ethicists with no goodness. And let's not mention beauty, because they don't understand it. [Rather,] the way of love, the way of the Gospel is simple: it is the way the saints have followed! The saints are those who lead the church forward, [... those who follow] the way of conversion, the way of humility, of love, of the heart, the way of beauty."[32]

An ideological faith, moreover, tends to be easily ignored by those in political power, especially where the government supports the church with subsidies and privileges. It therefore weakens and destroys the Church's prophetic witness. Not surprisingly, Francis is clear on this point: "True prophecy is never ideological, it is not compared to the institution: it is the institution. Prophecy is institutional. True prophecy is not ideological, it is not "trendy", but is always a sign of contradiction according to the Gospel, as Jesus was. Jesus, for example, was a sign of contradiction for the religious authorities of his time: the Pharisee and Sadducee leaders, the doctors of the law. And He also was for other options and proposals: Essenes, Zealots, and so on."[33]

An ideological faith has nothing to learn from civil society; it seeks only to teach or to impose. It sees no reason to dialogue with this society in order to discover and appreciate the *semina Verbi* (the seeds of the Word, which is Christ) that are present, notwithstanding various problems, in all people and all reality, as St. Justin taught in the second century and Vatican II recovered in the twentieth (*Ad gentes*, n. 1, *Lumen gentium*, n. 17): the *logoi spermaticoi*, the seeds of truth, are sown everywhere, even in civil realities.[34]

4.2 The conciliar and collaborative Catholics

On the other hand, a more careful reading of our society leads us to assert, without shadow of doubt, that *all* ethical problems are serious, those of an individual nature as well as those that are more social and political, both locally and internationally. This is the conviction that has motivated, in different times and places, Catholic shepherds and laity engaged in proclaiming the Kingdom of God to all and in all human contexts, responding to anyone who asks the "reason for [their] hope ... with gentleness and reverence" (1 Pt 3:15).

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32 Francis, Morning Homily in the *Domus Sanctae Marthae* Chapel, 2013-04-19: http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/it/cotidie/2013/documents/papa-francesco-cotidie_20130419_contro-ideologia.html (my translation).

33 Francis, Address to Participants in the Italian Conference of Major Superiors (CISM), November 7, 2014: http://m.vatican.va/content/francescomobile/en/speeches/2014/november/documents/papa-francesco_20141107_conferenza-italiana-superiori-maggiori.html.

34 Justin, *Apologia*, I, 44-46.

Notwithstanding the presence of traditionalist and anti-conciliar Catholics, there are many within the Italian church who maintain a healthy relationship with civil society. This is the case for various pastors and lay faithful, dioceses and parishes, groups and organisations throughout the country. One area in which we see a strong relationship between the Catholic community and civil society is that of social assistance to the weakest. This is especially true with regard to the reception of immigrants, especially those in difficult circumstances. In recent years, regular immigration has actually grown in Italy, while irregular immigration has remained at low levels. On the other hand, the number of people arriving illegally by sea is high and growing. Estimates provided by the ISMU Foundation and published in the Twenty-Second Report on Migration 2016 indicate around 435,000 irregular immigrants present in Italy in 2015. Although this is 31,000 more than the previous year, it is not excessively high; it represents 7.4% of the overall number of foreigners present in Italy, not extraordinary in a democratic state. 2016 is the year with the highest number of arrivals – 181,000 people – up from nearly 154,000 in 2015 and 170,000 in 2014 (Frontex 2017)[35]. This is a trend that seems to be continuing in 2017. The presence of immigrants in Italy is represented by many who have come from the countries of the former Soviet Union; workers who take jobs in industries (in the northern part of the country) and in fields (in the south); those who take the jobs that are described as "Dirty, Dangerous, and Demanding." Beyond the rhetoric of great opportunities, it is a phenomenon, wanted or not, that is irreversible, both in Italy and around the world.

Certain Catholic organisations, especially Caritas (at parish, diocesan, and national levels) and some Catholic NGO's (with different lights and some shadows[36]), are committed to offering not only an operational but also cultural contribution to the various civil and political contexts. In fact, even twenty years ago, Italy was far less prepared to welcome people from other nations. But ongoing efforts by lay Christian volunteers have set in motion an effective organisational effort that has spurred a cultural growth that has already borne fruit. However, these are not as widespread and stable as they could be. Especially in some traditionalist environments (see 4.a.), prejudices remain firm. I am not here to repeat the "it is said" comments about foreigners, which fuel racism and a certain fortress mentality, as well as laws and policies on immigration that are rooted in racism and xenophobia. Failing to understand the various problems of the global village, a culture can grow tired of welcoming and begin to fear the stranger as a possible danger or even as a thief (of work, property, culture, peace, and local identity). The perception of the phenomenon is not always based on

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35 The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, noted on 6 January 2017, that the number of migrants arriving by way of the Central Mediterranean – that is, into Italy – had increased by nearly a fifth over to the previous year to 181,000, the highest number ever recorded. Since 2010, Italy has seen a ten-fold increase in Western African migrants at its sea borders. See http://frontex. europa.eu/news/fewer-migrants-at-eu-borders-in-2016-HWnC1J (accessed 2017-01-09).

36 Cf. Moro, G. (2014): *Contro il non profit,* Laterza, Rome.

real data, but on impressions gathered from some media, which describe the presence of immigrants as though it were a real invasion. But this is not the case. According to Ministry of Interior data from January 1 to July 31, 2017, Italy had: 95,213 arrivals; 5,287 people resettled to other European countries; 86,837 requests for asylum submitted; and 46,224 asylum applications examined. This is not an invasion!

The irreversibility of the phenomenon, however, means that it is essential that we develop systems to make our welcome effective and sustainable and to avoid a fortress mentality which, on the one hand, has sometimes led to violent forms of intolerance and, on the other, risks feeding into the rejection of the stranger based on prejudices and racism. It is clear that multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism is a challenge, but it can also become a source of strength and growth for all, in a wide range of respects: social, cultural, political, labor, and religious. Failure to move from the former to the latter allows prejudices and racism to take root. Catholic organisations that address these issues positively and constructively find in the ministry and teaching of Pope Francis a great point of reference and support.

The conciliar segment of the Italian Catholic community is also distinguished for a style of dialogue with civil society on the important issues of human rights, the relationship between faith and citizenship, bioethics, and family life. These Catholics are carrying out the kind of dialogue that Pope Paul VI described in *Ecclesiam Suam*, his programmatic first encyclical released during and inspired by the Second Vatican Council. In that document, Paul proposed to all Catholics the practice listening humbly to the world, based on "consideration and esteem for others ... understanding and ... kindness" and in a way that rejects "bigotry and prejudice, malicious and indiscriminate hostility, and empty, boastful speech." Such listening seeks always the good of the other party, out of a "desire to respect a man's freedom and dignity," with the aim of "a fuller sharing of ideas and convictions."[37]

5 Conclusion

The relationship between the Italian Catholic community and civil society is, in every context and at every moment of history, a complex reality. Indeed, all institutions, including the church, are complex phenomena; they can be fully understood and evaluated only through careful examination of all that makes them up. Not everyone needs to be a specialist in institutional analysis, but everyone should, for their own good, understand an institution's processes to a degree proportionate to their role in it. In the case of the church, this becomes a duty and a necessity for all pastors and

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37 Paul VI, Encyclical *Ecclesiam Suam* (On the Church), 1964-08-06, n. 79: http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_06081964_ecclesiam.html

pastoral leaders. In particular, it is important to acquire the tools to help us understand what the human sciences have to teach us. Drawing from them, we can equip ourselves with the basics that will allow us to make a fair assessment of the anthropological and ethical processes that most strongly mark the church's life.

We too often approach and evaluate modernity superficially, too. The nature of "today's world" and all its crises is a recurring theme in our ecclesial discourse: homilies, catechesis, pastoral writings, publications. But it is not easy to talk accurately about the world we live in. The first difficulty lies in always keeping in mind the fact that the contemporary world is a complex reality. Like any complex reality, one needs good tools to see and understand it. In a monolithic culture, one or two "pairs of glasses" are enough to "see" reality; in a more complex culture, we need several more. Any blanket statements about the contemporary world being one thing or another end up being nothing more than trivial and even stupid generalizations.

What world are we talking about? "Today's world," "people," "the contemporary mentality" – such categories are each too broad to mean anything, and we would be wise to avoid them. They say everything and therefore say nothing. In a society that is no longer monolithic, positions and opinions are too many and too diverse for such generalization. Maybe – if I could hazard a guess – that is why Pope Francis prefers to approach issues relating to the contemporary world by starting first with their anthropological aspects, which he then reads in the light of Scripture and church tradition.

More than ever before, we need to study the contemporary context and institutions, including the church, through a combination of disciplines, that is, using tools that draw on different kinds of knowledge to investigate human realities: anthropology, ethics, theology, sociology, psychology, political science, law, economics. No one, including educators and intellectuals, is expected to master *all* of these disciplines – that would be an inconsistent and foolish demand. But what is necessary is an ability to synthesize the information that is available, in order to help and especially to teach others. Making such a synthesis provides one with a map that enables us to find our way through the maze of this world. It also provides a foundation upon which one can, if she chooses, build a true expertise, even if for the purpose of living more authentically as a person and as a believer. To put it very simply, it would be much better if our catechesis, homilies, and pastoral guidance include more phrases like "it sometimes seems that...," "the world seems to have trends like...," "it's easy to encounter common attitudes like...," and so on.

The complexity of the modern world demands on the part of pastors, educators, parents, and catechists a degree of respect and caution in assessing the reality around us. Perhaps more than ever before, these roles demand both a great love for the people one serves and a love of learning. Calmness, patience, courage, and vision are all necessary to process and assess all that goes on inside and outside the Christian community. This is true in both our personal and ministerial relationships. The Wisdom that "comes from above" (James 3:17) perfects and enlivens all that is genuinely hu-

man. In other words, "grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it." To academics and cultural leaders gathered at Cagliari in Italy, Francis recommended: "It is important to interpret reality by looking it in the face. Ideological or partial interpretations are useless; they only feed illusion and disillusionment. It is important to interpret reality, but also to live this reality without fear, without fleeing, without catastrophism... Discernment is neither blind nor improvised: it is carried out on the basis of ethical and spiritual criteria; it involves asking oneself about what is good, it entails thinking about our own values regarding man and the world, a vision of the person in all his dimensions, especially the spiritual and transcendent; the person may never be considered "human material"![38]

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38 Francis, Meeting with the World of Culture, 2013-09-22: https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/september/documents/papa-francesco_20130922_cultura-cagliari.html.

Paul Dekker

Religion and civic engagement: European patterns and digging deeper in the Netherlands

1 Introduction

Most papers in the Maecenata Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe project focus on collective aspects of religion: organisations, groups, media, etc. This paper focuses on individuals and their activities. In the first part we compare European countries on the relationships between religion, in particular attendance at religious services, and civic engagement, in particular volunteering. The second part looks in more depth at some aspects of this relationship in the Netherlands. The main purpose is to obtain a better understanding of how differences between people mirror the impact of religious communities on civil life.

We focus primarily on an outline empirical description of differences. Whilst these draw in part on earlier research and theoretical reflections, we will devote virtually no explicit attention to those sources here (for more information, see the publications listed in the references).

2 European patterns

In this section[1] I start with the relationship between religion and volunteering for and in a large number of European countries and finish by discussing the relationship between religion and civic action for a smaller number of countries.

2.1 Volunteering

Figure 1 presents an overview of data on religious belonging and volunteering for 44 countries. Volunteering was measured by asking people whether they carried out unpaid voluntary work for a combination of organisations, movements and activities,[2]

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1 The first part of this section, with EVS 2008/9 data, is based on De Hart & Dekker (2013; see this publication for references to literature). These are still the best available data for our topic. EVS 2017-2018 data are on their way but will not be available before 2019.
2 See Appendix for the measurement. To indicate 'secular voluntary work' we exclude item 2 from the list presented in the survey.

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plotting religiosity (regarding oneself as belonging to a religion) against the performance of non-religious or secular voluntary work. If religion is a source of social engagement, this relationship is more interesting than that between sermons and working for one's own parish.

The figure has the appearance of a swooping flock of birds, headed by Turkey and Georgia, with a great deal of religiosity and very little volunteering, and at the rear the Czech Republic and Estonia (with the least religiosity) and the Netherlands (with the most volunteering). It transpires that there is a *negative* relationship: the more religious people there are in a country, the less non-religious volunteering is performed (-0.36; p<0.05, n=44). At the individual level, the correlation between belonging to a religious community and performing non-religious volunteering varies from -0.14 (p<0.001) in Albania to 0.08 (p<0.01) in the Netherlands. The average of the 44 national correlations equals exactly 0.00.[3]

Figure 1: Religious belonging and non-religious volunteering in 44 European countries (as % of population aged 18+)
Source: European Values 2008/2009

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3 But this differs between religious communities: for Catholics from -0.08 (p<0.01) in the Czech Republic) to 0.15 (p<0.001) in Romania (average .01); for Protestants from -0.04 in Ireland to 0.18 (p<.001) in Latvia (average 0.02); for Orthodox from -0.16 (p<.001) in Estonia to 0.10 (p<0.001) in Bulgaria (average -0.01); and for Muslims from -0.12 (p<0.001) in Albania to 0.09 (p<0.01) in Belarus (average -0.02).

From a North-western European and North-American perspective[4] this is a remarkable finding. The finding that religion is good for participation in voluntary work is a consistent research result for these parts of the world, and the expectation would then be that countries with more religious inhabitants also have more volunteers. What is going on here? The answer is not that we would have found a positive relationship if we had used religious participation instead of just belonging to a religion: the correlation between the national percentage of people attending religious services and the percentage non-religious volunteers is even more negative, standing at -0.46 (p<0.01; n = 44).

Figure 2 offers more information about the relationship between churchgoing and non-religious volunteering in all 44 countries. Where the figure states 'churchgoer', this includes attendance at mosques, temples and synagogues, but for the sake of legibility, terminology is drawn from the Christian tradition.

In most countries, those who attend religious services volunteer more than those who do not. In a few countries there is no clear difference and in a few cases (Greece, Malta) the non-attenders might volunteer more often. The correlation between attending and volunteering at the individual level varies from -0.07 (p<0.01) in Greece to 0.21 (p<0.001) in Austria. The average of the 44 national correlations is 0.05.

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4 Smidt, C.E., de Dulk, K.R., Penning, J.M., & Koopman, D.L. (2008): *Pews, prayers, and participation. Religion and civic responsibility in America*. Ashington DC: Georgetown University Press; Putnam, R., & Campbell, D.E. (2010): *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. New York: Simon & Schuster.; De Hart, J., & Dekker, P. (2005): Churches as voluntary associations. In S. Roßteutscher (ed.), *Democracy and the Role of Associations*. London and New York: Routledge, 168-196.; De Hart, J. & Dekker, P. (2013): Religion, spirituality and civic involvement. In: J. de Hart, P. Dekker & L. Halman (eds.), *Religion and civil society in Europe*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 169-188.

Figure 2: Non-religious volunteering and church attendance in 44 European countries (as % of population aged 18+)
Source: European Values 2008/2009

The level of volunteering differs between countries dependent upon dominant religion and denominations.[5] The level is highest in countries where Protestantism is dominant, in combination with Catholicism or otherwise. Churchgoing Protestants (and Catholics)[6] are clearly the most active, but in these countries religious participants with other religious convictions and people who do not participate at all and who do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion also score above the European average. There thus appears to be an environment in which broad swathes of

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5 not shown in figure, see De Hart, J. & Dekker, P. (2013): Religion, spirituality and civic involvement. In: J. de Hart, P. Dekker & L. Halman (eds.), *Religion and civil society in Europe*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 169-188.; Bennett, M. (2015): Religiosity and Formal Volunteering in Glbal Perspective. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.
6 In the predominantly mixed Catholic/Protestant countries, churchgoing Protestants do voluntary work fractionally more often than churchgoing Catholics (54% and 49%, respectively); non-churchgoing Protestants and Catholics do not differ (32% and 31%, respectively). Traditionally Protestants used to volunteer more, explained by a greater emphasis on individual responsibility as well as a stronger tradition of self-organising smaller communities than the more hierarchical Roman-Catholic tradition. Related to the Catholic – Protestant divide is a positive effect of diversity (religious competition) and being in a minority group. We will not go into these discussions here, but see for instance Bekkers 2004, Schwadel 2005, De Hart & Dekker 2013, Hustinx et al. 2015).

people are more often mobilised as volunteers. The differences between countries which are predominantly orthodox Christian or Islamic are considerable, with an intermediate position being taken by countries that are predominantly Roman Catholic. In all three categories, participants in minority religions are active as volunteers at least as often. In sharp contrast to countries where Protestantism dominates, people in predominantly Islamic countries who are not involved in religious life are more often active as volunteers.

2.2 Civic action

Having looked briefly at the situation as regards volunteering, we now turn to another form of civic engagement: civic action.[7] In Figure 3 we use data for 22 European countries from the European Social Survey 2016/2017 (there is no volunteering indictor available in this data set).

There is evidently no strong relationship between religious belonging and civic activism. The correlation is weakly negative (-0.30 (p=0.18; n=22)). Once again, replacing belonging by participation makes the relationship between religion and civic engagement more negative. The correlation between country levels of attendance and activism is -0.43 (p<0.05; n = 22).

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7 Civic action is measured as follows: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? ...contacted a politician, government or local government official? / ...worked in a political party or action group? / ...worked in another organisation or association? / ...worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? / ...signed a petition? / ...taken part in a lawful public demonstration? / ...boycotted certain products? / ...posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter?'
Civic action can be seen as a type of volunteering, but many volunteers will distance themsevles from an activist vocabulary and many activists will not agree with a volunteer identity. In social research and policymaking, too, civic action and volunteering are partly separate. More can be found on this topic in a forthcoming special issue of Voluntas edited by Adalbert Evers and Johan von Essen.

Figure 3: Religious belonging and civic action in 22 European countries (as % of population aged 18+)
Source: European Social Survey 2016/1017

In the same way as we showed the relationship between church attendance and volunteering using EVS data in Figure 2, we show this relationship between church attendance and civic action using ESS data in Figure 4. Correlations vary from -0.12 (p<0.001) in Poland to +0.07 (p<0.001) in Germany; average is -0.01.

Figure 4: Secular volunteering and church attendance
Source: European Social Survey 2016/2017

3 The Netherlands

We focus here on the Netherlands, the country with the highest percentage of secular volunteering in Figure 1. We will focus on Christians and nonbelievers only because other religions are not well represented in the available general population surveys. In another project, we found less secular volunteering among religiously active Muslims than among Christians. Rather like orthodox Christians, Muslims seem to limit their involvement more to their own communities.[8] The content of religion and the norms and values of religious communities matter, then; it is not just about associational ties and social interaction.

3.1 Exploration 1: Types of volunteering

Thus far we have written about volunteering in general and non-religious volunteering in particular, but what kind of volunteering are religious participants and non-participants actually doing? Table 1 shows this for the Netherlands.

Not surprisingly, religious volunteering is popular among churchgoers but not at all popular among non-churchgoers. The percentage among churchgoers might however come as a surprise: over a third of them are engaged in religious volunteering. The second most popular form of volunteering among churchgoers is providing care for neighbours, elderly and disabled persons. Care professionals and care policymakers call this 'informal care', which is a correct term from their perspective. However, respondents were asked about activities they carry out for organisations in this field, and should therefore have excluded purely informal help provided to people around them, but we do not know if they actually did so in all cases.[9] Care activities are also the second most popular form of volunteering among non-churchgoers, though at a lower level; their most popular field of voluntary activity is in sport, which is the biggest volunteers' sector in the Netherlands. Both differences may be partly explained

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8 See Dekker (2008) for a comparative analysis of urban populations in 2006. In the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations in the Netherlands, the overall participation in voluntary work is considerably lower than in the native population. On the other hand, Muslims who attend the mosque volunteer more than those who do not. The highest percentage of volunteering is found in the small group who do not follow Islam. These are mainly younger people with a high education level who are closely integrated into Dutch society. Religious participation and social integration are to some extent competing stimuli for participation in voluntary work. In a more recent (2015) countrywide comparative survey the participation rates of Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations are about half (18% and 22%, respectively) of that of the native Dutch population (38%) (Van Houwelingen et al. 2016: 187).
9 We do know that the percentage of people providing informal care is larger, and we also know that people consider informally arranged regular activities carried out for someone who is not a family member more as voluntary work than organisationally arranged activities for their own children, etc.

by age: churchgoers are older, and older people have more people needing informal close to them, and they are less active in sport themselves (and have fewer children at home in sports clubs asking their parents to volunteer). Another area where churchgoers are clearly more active is in cultural activities; this may be related to their greater involvement in choirs.

Table 1: Participation in areas of voluntary work, Dutch population aged 18+ (%)

	churchgoers	non-churchgoers	difference (p<0.05)
Religious or ideological organisation	38	1	+
Organisation helping neighbours, elderly or disabled persons	21	10	+
Sports club	12	17	-
School, crèche or playschool	11	8	+
Singing, music or drama society	8	3	+
Idealistic organisation (human rights, environment, etc.)	7	6	
Neighbourhood or community centre	7	5	
Hobby club	6	4	
Political organisation	3	1	+
Trade union, employees' or employers' organisation	1	1	
Specific association or (self-)organisation for people with a migration background	1	0	+
Other association(s) or organisation (s)	13	10	+
Any of the above	67	44	+
Any of the above excluding 'religious or ideological organisation'	54	43	+
Volunteering overall (time spent weekly, not about organisations)	48	25	+

[a] 'For which of the following associations and organisations do you carry out unpaid voluntary work?' Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands & Quality of Life Survey 2016-2018 (combination of 2 modules) (N = 3,370 – 3,975)

At the bottom of the table we again see that churchgoers are overall more active in volunteering than non-churchgoers. The difference in volunteering measured by a question about weekly time spent volunteering is relatively greater than for volunteering measured by activities in (voluntary) organisations. This might indicate that churchgoers do more on a regular basis and perhaps more for non-voluntary organisations such as hospitals.

3.2 Exploration 2: More than volunteering

Just as we broadened the perspective from volunteering to civic activism in the first comparative part of this paper, we look here at some other indicators for civic engagement as well. In Tables 2a and 2b we use two recent Dutch data sets to describe differences in volunteering, informal care and some more political types of involvement. Besides the percentages of active churchgoers, the results of logistic regression analyses are presented to see whether the differences survive adjustment for demographic variables (are churchgoers still more active in providing informal help when we take into account the fact that they are older?) and additionally for other activities (are churchgoers still more willing to protest when we take into account the fact that they volunteer more?).

Table 2a: Participation by churchgoers and non-churchgoers, Dutch population aged 18+

participation (intention) indicators[a]	% of church-goers (17% attending at least monthly)	% of non-churchgoers 83% attending less often or never)	odds ratios for churchgoers/ non-churchgoers[b]		
			unad-justed	adjusted for back-grounds	+ adjusted for activities
informal help	55	47	1.40***	1.39***	1.07
voluntary work	51	30	2.50***	2.49***	2.43***
intention to vote	92	84	2.16***	2.21***	2.04***
willingness to protest	21	17	1.39**	1.32*	1.28*

[a] Informal care = 'Some time' in reply to the question 'How much time on average per week do you spend giving help, not through an organisation, to people outside your household such as someone who is sick, neighbours, family, friends or acquaintances? (no or virtually no help = 0 hours)'
Voluntary work = 'Some time' in reply to the question 'How much time on average per week do you spend volunteering, i.e. performing unpaid work on behalf of organised by an institution or association? (no or virtually no volunteering = 0 hours)'
Intention to vote = 'Yes' in reply to the question 'If a general election was held now, would you go and vote?'
Willingness to protest = '(Very) great in reply to the question 'Suppose Parliament was debating a bill that you consider very unjust or wrong. How likely is it that you would try to do something to protest about it?'
[b] An odds ratio of 1 means no effect of church attendance. The higher the value above 1, the stronger the positive statistical effect of church attendance (overrepresentation of churchgoers); the lower the value below 1, the stronger the negative effect. Levels of statistical significance (two-sided): * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 and *** p< 0.001. Correction for backgrounds = for effects of gender, age and education level; for activities = for effects of paid work, informal care and/or voluntary work.
Source: Citizens' Outlooks Barometer 2017/3-2018/2 (combination of 4 quarterly surveys) (N = 4,665)

Table 2a suggests overall more civic engagement for churchgoers.[10] The difference might reduce a little after adjustment for other differences), but only in the case of informal care does it disappear (mainly because churchgoers are older on average than non-churchgoers and older people provide more informal care which is included in informal help).

We see the same for informal help in Table 2b. We see a weak opposite effect for collective action: churchgoers do not differ significantly from non-churchgoers, but taking into account other differences between the groups (the issue is again probably age) churchgoers tend to be more active. Intentions to vote and willingness protest produce different results in Tables 2a and 2b: in the former, churchgoers show significantly more engagement because the differences in the sample are greater and the sample is larger.

Table 2b: Participation by churchgoers and non-churchgoers, Dutch population aged 18+

participation (intention) indicators[a]	% of church-goers (15% attending at least monthly)	% of non-churchgoers 85% attending less often or never)	odds ratios for churchgoers/ non-churchgoers[b]		
			unad-justed	adjusted for back-grounds	+ adjusted for activi-ties
informal help	30	25	1.29*	1.21	1.11
voluntary work overall	48	25	2.78***	2.82***	2.78***
non-religious volun-teering	54	43	1.55***	1.58***	1.57***
collective action	29	25	1.20	1.28*	1.26*
intention to vote	88	86	1.22	1.25	1.19
willingness to protest	17	14	1.22	1.18	1.04

[a] Non-religious volunteering = 'any of the above' excluding 'religious or ideological organisation' in Table 1.
Collective action = Affirmative reply to 'Have During the last two years, have you taken action to-gether with others for an issue of 1) national importance or an issue relating to a global problem such as peace or poverty?/2) the common interest, for a particular group in the community or for your neighbourhood?'.' Other indicators are (almost) identical to those shown in Table 2a.
[b] An odds ratio of 1 means no effect of church attendance. The higher the value above 1, the stronger the positive statistical effect of church attendance (overrepresentation of churchgoers); the lower

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10 Or better: prosocial engagement: when a stricter definition of 'civic' is used, there are good reasons to exclude informal care (people do not provide this as a citizen but as a human being, family member, due to personal ties, etc. From this perspective we might discuss the 'civicness' of volunteer activities as well (see note 5). For more indicators of prosocial behaviour and attitudes and their relationship with religion, see for instance Heineck (2017).

the value below 1, the stronger the negative effect. Levels of statistical significance (two-sided): * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 and *** p< 0.001. Correction for backgrounds = for effects of gender, age and education level; for activities = for effects of paid work, informal and/or voluntary work.
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands & Quality of Life Survey 2016-2018 (combination of 2 modules) (N = 3,370 – 3.975)

In both data sets the differences in volunteering between churchgoers and non-churchgoers are greater than for the other engagement indicators. For Table 2a and overall volunteering in Table 2b, this might be caused by the fact that religious volunteering – in this case volunteering for one's own religious community – is included. But the difference is substantial and robust also for non-religious volunteering in Table 2b.

3.3 Exploration 3: Conviction or community?

Which brings us to our third exploration: what makes churchgoers more involved in volunteering outside the religious field, i.e. their religious community? Is it their beliefs (a religious duty to help other people and to are about the larger community and politics) or is it the social contacts and connections of the religious life which mobilises them? Is it conviction or community[11], norms or networks[12]? According to Bekkers, the endorsement of interpersonal values (altruism, trusting others) is the most important explanation for the high level of volunteering by religious people in secular institutions.[13]

In Table 3 we explore the effect of a number of factors on participation in secular volunteering. In addition to the percentages of these volunteers per population group, or of groups of people holding a particular view or performing a particular activity, the table also presents odds ratios. These indicate the extent to which – adjusted for effects of other items included in the same column – the category in question, when compared with all others or with a reference category ('ref.'), makes doing voluntary work more likely (a value greater than 1) or less likely (a value smaller than 1).

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11 Wuthnow, R. (1990): Religion and the voluntary spirit in the Unites States. In: R. Wuthnow & V.A. Hodgkinson (eds.), *Faith and philanthropy in America*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 93-114.; Wuthnow, R. (1991): *Acts of compassion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12 Ruiter, S., & De Graaf, N.D. (2010): National religious context and volunteering. *American Sociological Review* 75 (1), 179-184.
13 Bekkers, R. (2004): *Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and psychological perspectives*. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht.; Bekkers, R., & Schuyt, T. (2008): And who is your neighbor? Explaining denominational differences in charitable giving and volunteering in the Netherlands. *Review of Religious Research*, 50(1), 74-96.

Table 3: Participation in nonreligious voluntary work, Dutch population aged 18+ in 2016-2018

	% volun-teering[a]	adjusted odds ratios				
		religious membership	+ religious participation	+ demo-graphics	+ values	+ religious volunteering
does not attend church	41	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
attends less than once a fortnight	53	1.67***	1.65***	1.55***	1.54***	1.48***
attends at least once a fortnight	53	1.67***	1.76***	1.77***	1.70***	1.18
not a member of a church or religion	42		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Roman Catholic church	52		1.09	1.14	1.15	1.16
main Protestant church	54		1.10	1.11	1.12	0.97
other church or religious group	43		0.72	0.72	0.73	0.61**
man	46			ref.	ref.	ref.
woman	43			0.92	0.94	0.94
18-34 years	36			0.57***	0.57***	0.57***
35-54 years	50			ref.	ref.	ref.
55+ years	44			0.87	0.88	0.88
low education level	33			0.60***	0.62***	0.62***
Intermediate	45			ref.	ref.	ref.
high	52			1.36***	1.26**	1.26**
thinks most people can be trusted	49				1.28**	1.26**
does not think this	39				ref.	ref.
thinks helping neigh-bours is a duty	48				1.10	2.95***
does not think this	44				ref.	ref.
does religious voluntary work[e]	69					
does not do that	43					ref.
Nagelkerke pseudo R^2		0.02	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.08

[a] Doing unpaid work for one or more organisations, but not for a 'religious or ideological organisa-tion' (Table 1). See Table 2a/b for the explanation of odds ratios.

[e] Performs unpaid voluntary work for a 'religious or ideological organisation' (Table 1).

Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands & Quality of Life Survey 2016-2018 (combination of 2 modules) (N = 3.370).

Looking at the percentages, churchgoers are more active than non-churchgoers[14] in about the same ratio as members of the Catholic Church and members of the largest Protestant Church are more active than non-members.[15] However, in combination it is church attendance and not membership that makes the difference. Younger people tend to volunteer less and the higher-educated people tend to volunteer more; 34-54 year-olds and those with a higher education level volunteer more often than others,[16] but these demographic differences have no influence at all on the religious factors. This also applies for values; they have some effect but do not reduce the statistical effects of religion. That does happen if we add in participation in religious voluntary work: the effect of regular church attendance then disappears.[17] For frequent churchgoers, religious volunteering is probably an important 'stepping stone' between participation in the religious community and volunteering outside it. Other research has also found a similar spill-over effect.[18]

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14 However, in contrast to comparable analyses in earlier years, it makes no difference how often someone goes to church.

15 We do not find a difference between Protestants and Catholics, whereas we did in a similar analysis using similar data a few years ago: Protestant membership was then associated with doing more secular voluntary work, and this remained the case after controlling for the effects of other characteristics. Catholic members also volunteered slightly more often than non-church members, but this difference disappeared after adjusting for church attendance. Strikingly, the findings of research on differences between Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands show little consistency. For a long time, the substantially greater social engagement of Protestants was a stable given (with the historical explanation being the Protestant communities which developed bottom-up from voluntary associations versus the top-down organisation of the Catholic parishes), but here we find relatively little difference, and other recent research has actually found more volunteering among Dutch Catholics (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008, Vermeer and Scheepers 2012). This calls for further research.

16 The higher participation by the better-educated is a consistent finding in research on volunteering in the Netherlands. The gender difference is not, and as regards age, other research also often finds an overrepresentation of older people. These differences are related to the way in which respondents are asked about volunteering: here, this was done primarily based on membership organisations for which people can perform voluntary activities. If we focus more on unpaid work in the care sector, at schools and in the services sector, we find more women and older people.

17 The same result as in our earlier analysis: De Hart, J. & Dekker, P. (2013): Religion, spirituality and civic involvement. In: J. de Hart, P. Dekker & L. Halman (eds.), *Religion and civil society in Europe*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 169-188.

18 Bekkers, R. (2004): *Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and psychological perspectives*. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht.; Ruiter, S., & De Graaf, N.D. (2010): National religious context and volunteering. *American Sociological Review* 75 (1), 179-184.; cf. Kim, Y., & Jang, S.J. (2017): Religious service attendance and volunteering: A growth curve analysis. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 46(2), 395-418.

3.4 Exploration 4: Higher values

So far, we have focused on individual correlates of religious communities: belonging to an organised community (basically churches) and participation in services (church attendance). Non-members were treated as a large, homogeneous, non-religious category. Of course, religion is about more than just being affiliated to churches, mosques and other places of worship, and there are many good reasons to 'rescue nones from the reference category'.[19] We have tried to save their souls elsewhere[20] and here we will focus on a broader category of higher values than religious ones and explore their importance for volunteering.

A few years ago, we used a survey to explore what Dutch people consider to be 'higher values' (775 Dutch citizens aged 18+), conducted as part of a larger project.[21] Approximately one third of the respondents reported that they believed there was something 'higher'. A large majority were able to state what they consider truly important in life or what makes a person truly happy, for which they had a variety of values in mind. The values that came up most were in the social domain (44 percent) and had to do with being of service to others, contributing to society, caring for one's loved ones, and forming a community. A quarter (26 percent) of respondents mentioned values that we categorise as vital, related to things such as self-development, living a healthy lifestyle and having fun. Values of a religious nature came in third place (18 percent), where the focus was on God, faith, spiritual energy or experiencing oneness. Finally, 12 percent of respondents mentioned everyday values such as having sufficient work or a sufficient income, and the absence of worries.

We also asked respondents about all forms of voluntary work (without the usual restriction of 'in some kind of organised context' or 'in or on behalf of an organisation' and so on) for which they are not paid and which benefits either the greater good or people outside the volunteer's family. 53 percent responded positively to this question. The follow-up questions posed to the volunteers reveal that they are indeed engaged in various activities that take place outside an organisational context (i.e. more informally). We primarily asked them about the number of hours they spend on average per week on their volunteering activities, the type of activity (or activities) and their motives for doing voluntary work. To ascertain the motives of our respondents, we first posed an open question and then followed this up with a list of possible rea-

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19 Frost, J., & Edgell, P. (2018): Rescuing nones from the reference category: Civic engagement among the nonreligious in America. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 47(2), 417-438.
20 De Hart, J., & Dekker, P. (2015): Floating believers: Dutch seekers and the church. In: S. Hellemans & P. Jonkers (eds.), *A Catholic minority church in a world of seekers*. Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy: 71-96.
21 Van den Brink, G. (ed.) (2016): *Moral sentiments in modern society. A new answer to classical questions*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

sons for volunteering, for which the respondents were requested to indicate the importance they attached to each reason.

About a quarter of the respondents were unable to say how many hours per week they spend on average volunteering. This is probably because the pattern of their activities fluctuates significantly or because some activities are concentrated in certain periods (such as holidays). Of those who did specify a time, approximately half (49 percent) said they spent four hours per week, more than a quarter (26 percent) spent four to eight hours per week and a quarter (25 percent) spent more than eight hours per week on volunteer work. The overall average is 5.3 hours per week. A significant amount of organised volunteering involves sports clubs or takes place in a religious context. To give an idea of the type of activities, Table 4 shows a selection of 25 responses, listed in ascending order of age.

Table 4: Examples of volunteer work and the reasons for doing it[a]

who?	What?	Why?
Man, age 19 3 hours per week	Work at the cafeteria [of a football club], supervision of game week (local activities week for children), maintenance work at the football club.	Because I like to do it and also to contribute in some way to various initiatives.
Woman, age 25 6 hours per week	I work as a volunteer for the Dutch Red Cross.	I like helping people.
Woman, age 31 5 hours per week	I'm general coordinator of a kindergarten during school vacation week.	It's super fun!
Man, age 36 2 hours per week	Give advice to a non-profit organisation, for which I make use of my own professional background.	Social obligation.
Woman, age 37 4 hours per week	Support work at a primary school and support work for the elderly.	To stay in touch with school/society.
Man, age 40 4 hours per week	Various management positions and some chores at the local primary school (e.g. school gardening).	Because it's needed, it's an extension of my interests and because I have the skills for it.
Woman, age 41 1 hour per week	I help out at a sports club and I help my grandmother with housework.	There doesn't have to be a reason for everything. Some things you just do.
Man, age 44 5 hours per week	Trainer and team coach for youth football team.	I've always played football and now I coach my son's team.
Man, age 46 6 hours per week	Diaconal work on the board of a church.	Everyone in the church has a task and this task was given to me by God.
Woman, age 47 8 hours per week	Bereavement support group, assisting during funerals, organising commemorations, board member of a foundation.	There are many people who need help, and I like to do this.
Woman, age 51 5 hours per week	Board member of a football club.	To allow members of the club to have fun in their sport and to try to teach values including to the spectators.
Man, age 52 10 hrs per week	Help people with computer problems. Help the elderly.	The elderly need a lot of help. There is simply a shortage of staff in the social services sector.
Woman, age 53 time unknown	I help an old lady shop for food and in good weather I go out with her; she is in a wheelchair.	I have time for this. She has one niece who looks after her, otherwise she has no one.
Woman, age 56 2 hours per week	I provide practical help to people who cannot do things by themselves, look into arrangements on behalf of the elderly, visit elderly people living alone.	To help somebody else with something for which that person lacks the possibility or capability. And to feel useful and perhaps also to hear that I am a good person.
Man, age 57 3 hours per week	Help others (odd jobs).	I also receive help.

who?	What?	Why?
Woman, age 59 10 hrs per week	I work in a Christian bookstore.	I love to help people visiting our store find reading material and/or music that brings them closer to God and gives their life meaning.
Man, age 61 30 hrs per week	To let disadvantaged children from Berlin come to the Netherlands for three weeks' vacation with host families.	Because I'm concerned about the living conditions of children. I think it works very positively if children can experience that there are also good and caring people out there who love them.
Woman, age 66 4 hours per week	I clean the church, babysit grandchildren, do other work for the church as it comes up or whatever is asked.	Because ordinary things also need to be done.
Woman, age 67 5 hours per week	I look through the mail and all banking affairs for someone who is blind.	It's good company and fun work.
Man, age 68 4 hours per week	Help take someone with mental disabilities to school. Contribute to cycling activities.	It benefits the health of the person being helped and therefore his own well-being.
Woman, age 73 time unknown	I do whatever comes my way. Babysitting, helping a child make a doll. Bake something for someone. Repair work, listen, be there for others.	I do this because I feel I was meant to do it. I do whatever comes my way and see what I can do.
Man, age 74 20 hrs per week	Odd jobs in and around a house for people with disabilities. Taking people in wheelchairs on walks. Biking with people with mental disabilities.	Out of a sense of commitment to my fellow human beings. It is very satisfying.
Man, age 74 5 hours per week	I am a sexton in our church.	Because of my faith.
Woman, age 83 time unknown	Visiting the sick. Giving a lift to my fellow human beings.	I'm still healthy and I know that the sick need attention.
Woman, age 85 10 hrs per week	Work for a philatelic association.	Because I have quite a lot of knowledge in this area, and that can benefit the association.

[a] Responses to the follow-up questions to people who say they are volunteers: 'Could you briefly explain what you do? (if relevant, multiple activities)' and 'Could you briefly explain why you do it? (If you do more than one kind of volunteer work, please base your response on the volunteer work on which you spend the most amount of time.)'
Source: The Low Countries and Higher Values Survey 2010.

Asked why they volunteer, very few respondents give reasons that relate to higher values. There are a few references to religious demands and expectations, but other than that the responses are fairly basic: the work simply has to be done by someone, I can do it, it is very satisfying or I simply love doing it. The lack of more exalted motives might suggest a certain degree of bashfulness. It could be that the respondents used fairly basic and pragmatic expressions because they think higher motives will immediately sound melodramatic. On the other hand, this could also point to a strong personal involvement: you do volunteer work because you yourself think it is important and because it gives you satisfaction, not to fulfil a general ideal or the values of your faith.

As regards the statistical relationship with higher values, it appears that volunteering is more popular among people who believe in something higher (and among people who describe the most essential things in life as either sacred or commonplace)[22]. Statistical analysis shows that this belief has a significant correlation with volunteering. If, however, other features are included in the analysis, the effect of this belief in something higher disappears. It turns out that it is the group of frequent churchgoers who are more likely to perform volunteer work, echoing the findings of previous research. Belief in the existence of something higher and religious characteristics are irrelevant here, but they are relevant when it comes to the motivations for doing volunteer work. A sense of duty plays a role primarily for those who believe in something higher, with those who have a religious conception of the most important things in life and with frequent churchgoers. It is more often the elderly than the young who are guided by a sense of duty. For younger volunteers, reasons such as personal benefit and pleasure play a greater role.

Summarising, Dutch volunteers are reluctant to associate their motivation for volunteering with 'something higher'. They prefer to say, for example, 'The work simply needs to be done' or 'I also get a lot out of it'. The most cited reasons were to help other people and to enjoy themselves. Motives that were mentioned less frequently were religious beliefs and a sense of duty. Typical of the attitude of these modern citizens is that helping their fellow human beings and helping themselves are not mutually exclusive. There tends to be a certain mix of motives in which looking after your own interests and supporting your fellow human beings go hand in hand. What is striking is that volunteering is primarily popular among respondents who adhere to a belief in something higher and among those who give a religious or quotidian interpretation to the question of what is most essential in life.

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22 See Dekker, P., Van Ingen E., & L. Halman (2016): The truly important things in life. In: G. van den Brink (ed.), *Moral sentiments in modern society. A new answer to classical questions*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 167-192.

4 Concluding remarks

In this paper we have focused on differences between religious and non-religious people and, more specifically, individuals who do and do not participate in religious communities. We found that the finding for Northwestern Europe that religion 'is good for civil society' could not be simply generalized to the whole of Europe. There is a *negative relationship* between the percentage of religious people or religious participants on the one hand and the percentage of non-religious volunteers and civic activists on the other. The relationship between religious engagement and the performance or non-performance of non-religious voluntary work and civic activism is also a negative one in several countries and for several denominations.

In the Netherlands we do find positive relationships between religious involvement and civic engagement, most pronounced for (organised) voluntary work. Church attendance turns out to be a more important factor than religious denomination and social values.[23] This points to the importance of the religious *community*: as a participant in a community of values, a person is expected to do something, and effective social pressure can be exerted and reciprocity norms can be sustained. Doing voluntary work for one's own community is probably an important stepping stone to volunteering for the wider community.

Our analyses of survey data are complementary to the research on collective aspects of religion in the Maecenata Project Religious Communities and Civil Society. The data we had available allows us to make only the barest sketch of religious community life (church attendance and religious volunteering). As a result, we lack information on certain aspects such as the importance of secular activities organised by religious communities and the 'collective efficacy' that is embodied in congregations.[24]

As their recent mobilisation for the reception of refugees in the Netherlands and other countries has shown, religious communities are still very important for organising activities. The critical factor is then not the individual willingness of citizens to do something when requested, but the capacity to initiate and reliably organise something. The social networks, officers, buildings and institutional relationships of religious communities are then found to be of great importance. That does not come to the fore in the kind of data used in this study.

What did emerge to some extent in the fourth exploration for the Netherlands was the cultural heritage of volunteering in religion: the availability of a language and a

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23 In accordance with the literature, see for instance Yeung, J.W.K. (2017): Religious involvement and participation in volunteering: Types, domains and aggregate. *Voluntas* 28, 110-138.
24 Bellamy, J. & R. Leonard (2015): Volunteering among church attendees in Australia. In Hustix et al., 121-143.; ef. Putnam, R., & Campbell, D.E. (2010): *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

means of talking in a way that provides a foundation for and stimulates voluntary engagement. This is at the heart of what Von Essen terms 'embedded religion'[25]. Given the lack of arguments from young secular volunteers in the Netherlands, this heritage is dwindling.[26] The quantitative significance of religious communities for secular civic engagement in a country such as the Netherlands is likely to decline further in the years ahead due to the ongoing secularisation (or, to be more cynical: the shrinking group of churchgoing older people who are having to focus relatively more and more explicitly on keeping their own community going and on providing mutual care). This might be partly compensated by a further increase of levels of education[27], but probably more for well scheduled types of voluntary work than for self-organising commitment. Society might experience a growing shortage of 'civic religion', *as a culture* that promotes civic engagement *and as communities* that are capable of mobilising and or-ganising the willingness of individuals to be active for others or the society.

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25 Von Essen, J. (2015): *Lost and found in secularization*. In: Hustinx et al., 162.

26 Besides this cultural effect of religion, a more direct heritage issue is the effect of being reli-giously socialized. Vermeer & Scheepers (2012) compared 'first generation' nonreligious people with second and later generations in a panel study and found a positive aftereffect of rekligion. 'Especially a religious socialization which is not too strict was found to be influential on adult non-religious volunteering.'

27 Vermeer, P., Scheepers, P., & Te Grotenhuis, M. (2016): Churches: lasting sources of civic engagement? *Voluntas* 27, 1361-1384.

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Appendix

Religious involvement and volunteering in 44 countries in 2008/9, ranked by declining proportion of volunteers, as percentages of the population aged 18 years and older

country	code	regards self as belonging to a religion[a]					church at-tendance[b]	volun-teering[c]
		none	RC	PC	Orthodox	Islam		
Netherlands	NL	52	23	21	0	1	24	47
Luxembourg	LU	27	65	3	1	2	23	40
Finland	FI	25	0	73	1	0	10	38
Norway	NO	20	2	74	1	1	13	38
Switzerland	CH	29	32	29	2	4	19	37
Denmark	DK	12	1	85	0	0	10	36
Belgium	BE	43	51	1	1	3	19	34
Slovenia	SI	30	65	0	2	2	25	32
Sweden	SE	37	2	58	1	1	8	30
Czech Republic	CZ	72	24	2	0	0	12	29
Iceland	IS	9	2	87	0	0	12	29
Austria	AT	17	73	6	1	2	29	27
Germany	DE	28	34	34	1	2	21	26
France	FR	51	42	1	0	3	12	26
Latvia	LV	35	19	22	23	0	16	23
Estonia	EE	69	1	11	16	0	9	23
Macedonia	MK	8	0	0	75	17	25	22
Italy	IT	20	79	0	0	0	49	22
United Kingdom	UK	44	11	36	0	2	20	21
Ireland	IE	15	80	3	0	0	53	21
Albania	AL	30	9	0	9	52	14	20
Moldavia	MD	7	0	0	89	0	29	18
Cyprus	CY	0	2	0	96	1	51	17
Greece	GR	4	1	0	93	2	40	17
Lithuania	LT	16	79	0	4	0	25	16
Croatia	HR	18	79	0	0	0	41	15
Malta	MT	3	96	1	0	0	82	15
Portugal	PT	19	76	2	0	0	37	14
Belarus	BY	29	9	1	61	0	20	14
Slovak Republic	SK	24	68	7	0	0	44	14
Romania	RO	3	5	2	86	0	47	13

country	code	regards self as belonging to a religion[a]					church at-tendance[b]	volun-teering[c]
		none	RC	PC	Orthodox	Islam		
Bulgaria	BG	27	0	0	59	12	15	13
Spain	ES	26	56	0	1	1	24	13
Hungary	HU	45	41	13	0	0	15	12
Serbia	RS	32	5	1	60	2	21	11
Kosovo	XK	10	1	0	19	69	49	10
Ukraine	UA	25	9	2	48	1	24	9
Poland	PL	7	91	0	1	0	71	9
Bosnia and Herze-govina	BA	24	11	0	32	33	45	8
Montenegro	ME	43	3	0	39	13	14	8
Armenia	AM	6	0	0	90	0	41	7
Turkey	TR	2	0	0	0	98	39	6
Russia	RU	39	0	0	55	4	14	5
Georgia	GE	2	0	0	91	6	38	5

[a] ''Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion?' If yes: 'Which?' on average, 2% in each country have a religion that is not mentioned here (outliers: Ukraine (14%) and Spain (15%)).

[b] 'Not including events such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend a religious service?' The percentages are those who report 'at least once a month'.

[c] Based on a list of 15 types of organisation and activity, the question was: 'Do you undertake unpaid voluntary work for these organisations or activities? Which?'. The percentages are those who do this at least once.

On the list are: 1. Welfare work for older people, people with disabilities or underprivileged people; 2. A religious or church organisation; 3. Education, art, music or cultural activities; 4. Trade unions; 5. Political party or group; 6. Local activities in relation to poverty, employment, housing, racial inequality; 7. Development problems in the Third World or human rights; 8. Nature protection, environmental protection, animal welfare; 9. Professional association or organisation; 10. Youth work (e.g. Scouts, Guides, youth clubs); 11. Sport or recreation; 12. Women's groups; 13. Peace movement; 14. Voluntary work in the field of health care; and 15. Other groups.

This list appears rather arbitrary, but the concluding 'other groups' should make it fairly comprehensive. The question of whether people do unpaid voluntary work for one or more of these causes gives respondents a fair degree of freedom in terms of period (now? At some point in the last few months or years?), extent (occasionally helped clear up or only been involved in larger activities on a regular basis?) and also in terms of content (only work-like activities without self-interest or also coaching at the sports club of one's own children?). The possibility cannot be ruled out that some of the differences between countries are more a reflection of differences of interpretation than differences in actual activities, but nothing can be done about that. On the instability of measurements of volunteering, see Dekker & Van den Broek (2006).

Source: European Values Study 4 (2008/9).

Johan von Essen and Julia Grosse

Religiosity and civic engagement in late-modern Swedish society

1 Introduction

The national surveys on civic engagement have shown that volunteering is extensive in Swedish society.[1] From the beginning of the 1990s has about 50 per cent of the Swedish adult population been engaged in volunteering. Furthermore, not only has volunteering been extensive for a long period of time, but also the amount of volunteering has been surprisingly stable as it has neither increased nor decreased appreciably since 1992.[2]

Because of the popular movement tradition and an extensive welfare state, a large proportion of all volunteers are engaged in organisations for recreation, culture and advocacy in Swedish civil society, which reflects a social democrat civil society regime.[3] However, and in some tension with the welfare state tradition, the number of volunteers engaged in organisations for social services has increased since 2009 (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Volunteering in Swedish civil society (16-84 years) distributed among organisational categories. In percentage of the population.[4]

	1992	1998	2005	2009	2014
Sports clubs	17	19	19	18	17
Organisations for social services	9	10	6	9	13
Housing organisations	5	6	7	7	12
Leisure organisations	12	10	10	9	12
Advocacy & unions	14	15	13	11	12
Religious communities	5	7	6	6	7

1 The present chapter is a revised and updated version of a chapter, previously published in an anthology from 2011, edited by prof. Mia Lövheim and prof. Jonas Bromander (Lövheim & Bromander 2011).

2 von Essen, J., Jegermalm, M., & Svedberg, L. (2015): *Folk i rörelse – medborgerligt engagemang 1992-2014*. Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola.

3 Salamon, L. & Anheier, H. (1998): Social origins of civil society. Explaining the non-profit sector cross-nationality. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations*. 9(3), 213-248.

4 Since almost half of all volunteers are engaged in more than one organisation the columns will sum up to more than the share of the population.

	1992	1998	2005	2009	2014
Organisations outside civil society	2	2	3	2	7
Culture organisations	7	7	5	5	6
Social movements & political parties	6	6	3	4	5
Cooperatives	4	3	2	2	4
Other	0.2	4	2	2	4

Source: von Essen, Jegermalm & von Essen 2015

Although Swedish society is highly secularised, a surprisingly large proportion of all volunteers are engaged in religious communities. Religion also seems to have a general positive impact on volunteering since 12 per cent of all volunteers participate regularly in religious services compared to only nine per cent of the entire population. So, like other societies, there is a positive statistical correlation between religiosity and volunteering. Obviously, there are several factors explaining the extensive scope of volunteering in Swedish society and religiosity is one of them. Religion is thus a resource for volunteering, also in secular Swedish society.

However, there is a widespread pessimism among academics and politicians concerning the future of volunteering and other forms of civic engagement since they fear that it will become fragmented and decrease.[5] Those who are pessimistic about the future of volunteering are often referring to broad societal processes such as individualisation,commercialisation and the fading away of the popular movement tradition of active citizenship.[6] Young people in particular are expected to be less willing to become members of civil society organisations. [7]

An increasing secularisation in society is thought to be an aspect of this societal decline and may contribute to weakening volunteering, and since young people are expected to be more secular than elderly people this process in society may affect them more than older generations. Moreover, it is above all among young people that the understanding of religiosity is expected to change. Since religion is considered to be individualised and understood as a private concern among young people in a late-modern version of religiosity, the positive correlation between religiosity and civic engagement may be weakened. Due to its secular and individualistic character this worry apply especially to Swedish society. For this reason a study of young peoples'

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5 E.g. Bellah, R. N.; Madsen, R.; Sullivan, W. S.; Swidler, A. & Tipton S. (1986): *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
6 Cf. Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers*. Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven.
7 E.g. Vogel, J., Amnå, E., Munck, I., & Häll, L. (2003): *Föreningslivet i Sverige: välfärd, socialt kapital, demokratiskola*. Rapport nr. 98. Statistiska centralbyrån. Stockholm

understanding of religiosity may predict the standing of religion in Swedish society in the future and how they, as middle aged people, will relate to volunteering.

2 Questions

Many, if not all, empirical studies show that there is a positive correlation between religiosity and volunteering. However, religiosity is not a static phenomenon, the perception and understanding of it is constantly changing. A contemporary study of the role of religiosity in civil society has to take the discourse of late-modernity into consideration since the individualisation and detraditionalisation that come with late-modernity are supposed to have effects on both religiosity[8] and volunteering[9]. However, the impact of late-modern religiosity on volunteering, such as the emphasis on spirituality and self-realisation, has been poorly studied. Hence, our aim is not only to study the impact of religiosity as such, but also whether traditional modern and late-modern understandings of religiosity differ in their impact on volunteering.

We will begin by discussing if and how religiosity affects civic engagement among young people. Is it the case that religious youths are more inclined to be engaged in civic organisations, or is it the other way around, that attending religious services means that there is less time to be engaged in civic organisations? Then, we will proceed by investigating in particular whether young people with a traditional understanding of religiosity are as active in civic organisations as individuals with a late-modern understanding of religiosity, or whether these two groups differ with respect to civic engagement. In doing this we will discuss if it matters for civic engagement whether religiosity is individualised and detraditionalised or not. Our first question concerns how young peoples' religiosity affects their civic engagement; our second question does not really concern religiosity per se, but how young people understand religiosity. Thus our research questions are: *a) What kind of relationship can be seen between religiosity and volunteering among young individuals in Sweden? B) Are there any differences between the effects of traditional modern religiosity and late-modern religiosity on volunteering?*

Our second question presupposes that there is a late-modern understanding of religiosity; however, this is not something we can take for granted. For this reason we will use the results from a survey among young people, described below, to explore whether it is possible to differentiate a traditional understanding of religiosity from a late-modern understanding of religiosity.

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8 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge.
9 Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers*. Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven.

3 A post-secular perspective

Religiosity, both as a personal belief and as the rise of the free churches at the end of the nineteenth century, has contributed to the development of Swedish civil society. However, in the research on contemporary Swedish civil society there are just a few studies interested in the role of religiosity.[10] This marginalisation of religiosity in the research on Swedish civil society can presumably be explained by a liberal understanding of society where secularity is taken for granted and religiosity is considered to be a private matter and no longer a societal force in the public sphere.[11] In addition, social scientists interested in Swedish civil society have until recently been more keen to study the historical role of the free churches as actors in Swedish civil society rather than how religion as a belief or outlook on society, also outside religious organisations, has influenced civil society. However, this marginalisation of religiosity in terms of research interest (at least in a Swedish context) has recently been superseded by a post-secular understanding of society where religiosity is considered to be central and vital instead of marginal and moribund (de Vries, 2006). We concur with this standpoint and argue that religiosity is crucial to fully understand the structure and scope of contemporary Swedish civil society.

The role of religion and religiosity in civil society of course encompasses a broad research agenda since it concerns the ideas, institutions, organisations and practices that have shaped the civil society through the years. We limit our interest to the individual level and the interplay between personal values and behaviour. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to shed light on the significance and role of religiosity in Swedish civil society by studying its correlation with volunteer work among young people. However, as we are interested in how personal values, here understandings of religiosity, are shaped by broader societal transformations we see them as context-dependent.[12] Furthermore, a post-secular understanding of society and religion does not imply re-sacralisation and that religiosity is thought to be increasing in society. It rather means that knowledge about religiosity is necessary to understand the structure and dynamic of (civil) society and vice versa. How religiosity might have an impact on volunteering, and to what degree are therefore empirical questions that we will try to

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10 See Pettersson, T. (1992): Välfärd, välfärdsförändringar och folkrörelseengagemang. In Axelson, S. & Pettersson, T. (Eds.), *Mot denna framtid: folkrörelser och folk om framtiden*. Stockholm: Carlsson in collaboration with Institutet för framtidsstudier.

11 Rasmusson, A. (2007): Kyrka och samhälle. In Martinsson, Sigurdson, O. & Svenungsson, J. (Eds.), *Systematisk teologi - En introduktion*. Stockholm: Verbum.

12 F. Hustinx, L.; Van Rossem, R.; Handy, F. & Cnaan R. A. (2015): A cross-National Examination of the Motivation to Volunteer. Religious context, National Value Patterns, and Non-Profit-Regimes. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (Eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.

answer in this chapter. We will define the term "religiosity" later on; for now, we will confine ourselves to the everyday meaning of the term as an expression of religious faith.

4 Religiosity and civic engagement in Swedish society

In Swedish society, civic engagement has been considered a civic virtue and crucial for a vital and democratic society. Within the popular movement tradition, engagement in civic organisations has been promoted as a "school of democracy"[13]. In recent years it has been argued that volunteering can also refine and supplement the services of the welfare state.[14] This is analogous to the international academic and political discussion where volunteering is said to strengthen and civilise society.[15] The fact that important moral values and societal functions have been ascribed to volunteering has also led to a concern among social scientists that voluntary engagement will decrease as society becomes more and more individualistic. [16]

There are also theological reasons for anxiety over decreasing civic engagement since belief is supposed to manifest itself in action and lead to engagement in society.[17] There are theological perspectives considering belief as defective or incomplete if it does not imply action; at least religious belief not implying action would be considered as deviant from how theology has traditionally understood the relation between belief and engagement in society.[18]

There is an anxiety that religiosity will become an introverted, therapeutic interest if it becomes individualised by being dis-embedded from and independent of established religious communities, making individuals rely on their private spirituality instead of tradition and confession. Such a process of individualisation and detradi-

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13 Vogel, J., Amnå, E., Munck, I., & Häll, L. (2003): *Föreningslivet i Sverige: välfärd, socialt kapital, demokratiskola*. Rapport nr. 98. Statistiska centralbyrån. Stockholm.

14 Reuter, M., Wijkström, F. & von Essen, J. (2012): Policy Tools or Mirrors of Politics. Government-Voluntary Sector Compacts in the Post-Welfare State Age. *Nonprofit Policy Forum*. vol 3(2).

15 Dekker, P & Evers, A. (2009): Civicness and the Third Sector: Introduction. *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations*, 20(3):217-219.

16 E.g. Putnam, R. D. (2000): *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.; Taylor, C. (1991): *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.

17 Rasmusson, A. (2007): Kyrka och samhälle. In Martinsson, Sigurdson, O. & Svenungsson, J. (Eds.), *Systematisk teologi - En introduktion*. Stockholm: Verbum.

18 Gerrish, B. A. (1999): *Saving and Secular Faith. An invitation to Systematic Theology*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press: p. 44 ff.; Wingren, G. (1942). *Luthers lära om kallelsen* (Diss). Lund: Lunds Universitet.

tionalisation is not considered lead to engagement with fellow citizens and society.[19] Instead it would result in a decrease of volunteering since individualised religion does not naturally imply civic engagement.

Organised religion has a weak position in Swedish society; less than 36 per cent of the Swedish population think that religion is important, and although the majority of the population are members of a religious community, only about nine per cent regularly attend religious services. Furthermore, the sixth wave of the World Value Survey (WVS) shows that there is strong support for individualistic and post-materialistic secular values among the Swedish population, which becomes visible in the cultural map of Inglehard and Welzels (2005) as Sweden is to be found in an extreme position in the upper right corner.

Figure 1: Cultural map. Sixth wave WVS data.
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/images/Culture_Map_2017_conclusive.png

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19 Halman, L. & Luijkx, R. (2009): The Impact of Religion on Moral Orientations: Evidence from the European Values Study. In Esmer, Y., Klingemann, H-D. & Puranen, B. (Eds.), *Religion, democratic values and political conflict. Festschrift in Honor of Thorleif Pettersson* (Vol. 23). Uppsala: Uppsala University, p. 24.

How the understanding of religion is changing in Swedish society is obviously important for our argument, and therefore institutional change is crucial. The secularisation of Swedish society accelerated during the 1970s on national and organisational levels. From the end of the 1960s there was no longer compulsory religious education in Christianity in school, and from the beginning of the early 1970s the number of non-religious funerals began to increase, paralleled by a decrease in christenings, church weddings and confirmations. So, from the 1970s onwards Swedish society was affected by processes of structural secularism.[20]

For the generations born in the middle of the twentieth century this development implied a loss of or liberation from traditional religiosity. However, for the generations born from the 1970s onwards, it implied that they grew up in a structurally secularised society and with parents who to a large degree had consciously dissociated themselves from religion. For these generations, religion has become peripheral on a structural level compared to older generations. For many in the younger generation in Swedish society religion is not habitual and traditional but a private and reflective belief or standpoint. Some Swedish researchers assert that this might explain the fact that younger people value a religious term as "salvation" to a higher degree compared to older generations.[21] If so, one can presume that religion has changed from being perceived as something old, traditional and habitual or even coerced to something personal, and a non-conformist statement perhaps in opposition to a secular and materialistic society.

Previous findings in international research on the effect of religiosity on voluntarism are inconsistent. Some empirical research fails to find any links between being religious or/and having a religious affiliation and volunteering except for individuals who are active in a religious community where volunteering is part of the congregational setting.[22] Other research suggests that the impact of church attendance on volunteering varies by denomination; in an US context there are variations between conservatives, moderates, Protestants and Catholics.[23] Other findings, however, show

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20 Hagevi, M. (2009): Efter sekulariseringen: förändrade religiösa värden mellan generationer. *Socialvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 16*(3-4), 288ff.

21 Ibid.: p. 294.

22 Cnaan, R., Kasternakis, A., & Wineburg, R. (1993: Religious People, Religious Congregations, and Volunteerism in Human Services: Is there a Link? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22*(1), 33-51.; Wuthnow, R. (1999): Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement. . In Skocpol, T. & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.), *Civic engagement in American democracy.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.; Yeung, A. B. (2004): The Octagon Model of Volunteer Motivation: Results of a Phenomenological Analysis. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organisations, 15*, 21-46.

23 Wilson, J., & Janoski, T. (1995): The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work. *Sociology of Religion, 56*, 137-152.

that religiosity indeed has a positive effect on volunteerism[24] while other researchers claim that religious involvement has negative effects on activities in secular organisations[25]. In Nordic countries such as Denmark[26], and Finland[27], again, there is evidence for a positive relation between religiosity and voluntary work as long it is situated inside the congregation.

Regarding young people, findings show a positive influence of religion on the formation of young peoples' identity and subsequent activities in civil society settings.[28] Gibson showed that intense religiosity, both in terms of behaviour and beliefs, significantly increases the prevalence of adolescents' volunteering.[29] But also the role identity of being a "volunteer" itself has been stated to be a predictor for continued volunteering.[30] Marta, Guglielmetti and Pozzi found that the motivations vary significantly among young people, but can be complex for particular individuals.[31] Thus, we can assume that religious convictions or activities can contribute to explanations for youth volunteering.[32]

In spite of the pessimistic prediction that increasing individualism will lead to decreasing civic engagement, civic engagement in Swedish society has been surprisingly extensive and stable for a long time. According to five national cross-sectional surveys on civic engagement in Swedish civil society between 1992 and 2014 the amount of volunteering has been surprisingly stable among the Swedish adult popu-

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24 Bennett, M. (2015): Religiosity and Formal Volunteering in Glbal Perspective. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.; Lam, P.-Y. (2002): As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*, 405-422.

25 Park, J. Z., & Smith, C. (2000): 'To Whom Much Has Been Given...'. Religious Capital and Community Voluntarism Among Churchgoing Protestants. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 39*, 272.; Wilson, J., & Janoski, T. (1995): The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work. *Sociology of Religion, 56*, 137-152.

26 Koch-Nielsen, I., Henriksen, L. S., Fridberg, T., & Rosdahl, D. (2005): *Frivilligt arbejde : den frivillige indsats i Danmark*. København: Socialforskningsinstituttet.

27 Yeung, A. B. (2008). Free to choose – so why choose volunteering? Exploring independence and social action in the Finnish Church. *Voluntary Action, 9*(1), 36-45.

28 Youniss, J., & McLellan, J. A. (1999): Religion, community service, and identity in American youth. *Journal of Adolescence, 22*(2), 243.

29 Gibson, T. (2008): Religion and civic engagement among America's youth. *Social Science Journal, 45*, 504-514.

30 Marta, E., & Pozzi, M. (2008): Young People and Volunteerism: A Model of Sustained Volunteerism During the Transition to Adulthood. *Journal of Adult Development, 15*, 35-46.

31 Marta, E., Guglielmetti, C. & Pozzi, M. (2006): Volunteerism During Young Adulthood: An Italian Investigation into Motivational Patterns, *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organisations* Vol. 17, 221-232.

32 See also Sundeen, R. A., & Raskoff, S. A. (1995): Teenage Volunteers and Their Values. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 24*(4), 337-357.

lation (aged 16–74).[33] Around 50 per cent of the Swedish population was steadily engaged in volunteering during this period. The share of volunteers among the youngest (aged 16–29) is slightly lower than older generations, but still at about 40 per cent. About seven per cent of the population are active in a religious organisation. This is a surprisingly high figure in the secularised Swedish society, but at the same time still a small group compared to the 20 per cent who are volunteering in sports and recreation. This suggests that from an international comparative perspective, there is a vital and stable civic engagement in Swedish civil society, also including the younger part of the population. Socio-economic factors such as education and occupational status have been the most important explanations for volunteering in Sweden.[34] But there is a positive correlation between volunteering and attending religious services. More than 70 per cent of those who attend religious services at least twice a month volunteer. The youngest attenders of religious services (aged 16–29) are much more likely to volunteer compared to young people not attending services regularly. The difference is significant: 66 per cent compared to 39 per cent.

A study of adolescent volunteers in the Church of Sweden showed that this group comprised both persons with a traditional understanding of religiosity as well as persons with a more detraditionalised and individualistic understanding. The former group, however, tended to have a longer commitment to volunteering.[35] The results may indicate that volunteers with a detraditionalised understanding of religiosity have a more transient engagement, but they may also indicate that parishes in the Church of Sweden have difficulties approaching and including young people with a de-traditionalised understanding of religiosity. The fact that there are both traditional and late-modern understandings of religiosity among young volunteers in the Church of Sweden confirms the assumption that religion is not a uniform phenomenon, so a study of the relation between religiosity and volunteering has to take into account the impact of individualisation and detraditionalisation on religiosity and civic engagement.

5 Religiosity and the discourse of late-modernity

The sociologist Ulrich Beck has discussed how the modern society that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and prevailed during the twentieth century has changed.[36] Beck's point of departure is that the modern society of the twentieth cen-

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33 von Essen, J., Jegermalm, M., & Svedberg, L. (2015): *Folk i rörelse – medborgerligt engagemang 1992-2014*. Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola.
34 von Essen, J., Jegermalm, M., & Svedberg, L. (2015): *Folk i rörelse – medborgerligt engagemang 1992-2014*. Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola.
35 Bromander, J. (1999): *Av fri vilja - på fri tid*. Uppsala: Svenska kyrkans församlingsnämnd.
36 Beck, U. (1992): *Risk society. Towards a new modernity*. London: Sage.

tury changed because of the risks and opportunities it created. This makes Beck use the term "late-modern society", indicating that the emerging late-modern society is a consequence of the traditional modern society and not of another, or a new, post-modern society replacing the previous modern society.

According to Beck the modern society of the twentieth century is structured by fundamental categories such as the nation-state, social classes, religion and gender. In traditional modernity these categories are taken for granted when individuals are trying to make sense of themselves and society. Individuals conceive themselves as man or woman, as part of a nucleus family or single, as religious or an atheist, as a fellow-countryman or a foreigner. These categories, fundamental to society, are how-ever undermined by risks and possibilities caused by modern society. The fact that institutions such as religious communities that previously had central and natural positions in society are changing affects individuals' self-understanding in late-mod-ern society and leads to de-traditionalisation and individualisation.

The academic discussion about late-modernity and its consequences on society encompasses several important topics, including volunteering. Since our interest is the role of religiosity in civil society we will briefly discuss the effect of late-modernity on religiosity. According to the discourse of late-modernity, religious belief in tradi-tional modernity is something that people take for granted since they inherited it from earlier generations.[37] This traditional religiosity has had its havens in primary institu-tions[38], in the Swedish society, the Church of Sweden, the traditional Swedish free churches and immigrant religious communities. However, traditional modern under-standings and expressions of religiosity are supposed to change. Beck & Beck-Gerns-heim argue that the individualisation of late-modernity is a dis-embedding process, since it means a breakdown of "preconscious collective habitualisation".[39]

The dis-embedding dimension of individualisation encompasses four processes: *deinstitutionalization*, where people are leaving traditional institutions, such as churches; *detraditionalisation,* a decline in the popularity of dominant values or be-liefs such as religious convictions; *privatisation,* a decline in the effects of belonging to social collectives on opinions and beliefs; and *fragmentation*, a decline in the co-herence of opinions and beliefs.[40] These processes make religiosity dis-embedded or homeless since people lose their confidence in primary institutions. Mainstream in-

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37 Heelas, P. (1996a): Introduction: Detraditionalization and its Rivals. In P. Heelas, P. & Lash, S. & Morris, P. (Eds.), *Detraditionalization : critical reflections on authority and identity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

38 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge.

39 Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1996): *Individualization. Institutionalized individualism and its so-cial and political consequences*. London: SAGE, p. 30.

40 Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers*. Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, p. 42.

stitutions such as the Church of Sweden and the free churches in Sweden "cease to be the home of the self" to use the language of Peter Berger.[41] Being religious in late-modernity becomes a reflexive project instead of being an inherited tradition, where external authorities such as tradition, scripture, priests or even God are replaced by the choosing self.[42] In late-modernity, a person chooses his or her life and becomes a *homo optionis*.[43]

The dis-embedding process of late-modernity does not however leave the individual completely alone without any constraints or institutional environment. The processes of individualisation pave the way for secondary institutions since individuals are not capable of tolerating the uncertainty of existing without any institutional.[44] This means that the individualisation cannot be understood without its re-embedding process. Late-modern individualisation does not mean total freedom, but rather "institutionally-dependent individual situations".[45] Secondary institutions are more abstract than primary institutions, which are coercive external authorities such as the family, workplace or church. In their place, individuals import secondary institutions such as the regulations of the welfare state, the forces of the consumption market and the values and identities of popular culture into their biographies through their own actions. Late-modern individualisation means a transition from direct to indirect institutional imperatives.[46] It also means that individualisation and secularisation aremacro-sociological phenomena, affecting objective life situations.[47] Thus, late-modern religiosity is regulated by secondary spiritual institutions such as new spiritual outlets offering spirituality to seekers outside traditional religious frameworks, e-spirituality and the role-models that can be found in the entertainment and information industry.[48]

Hitherto we have discussed the effect of late-modern individualism on religiosity. How the individualistic reflexivity of late-modernity will influence volunteer work is

41 Cited in Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 46.

42 Taylor, C. (1989): *Sources of the self. The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 313.

43 Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1996): *Individualization. Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*. London: SAGE, p. 29.

44 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 46.

45 Beck, U. (1992): *Risk society. Towards a new modernity*. London: Sage, p. 130.

46 Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers*. Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, p. 44.

47 Beck, U. (1992): *Risk society. Towards a new modernity*. London: Sage.; Hustinx, L. (2010): Institutionally Individualized Volunteering: Towards a Late Modern Re-Construction. *Journal of Civil Society*. Special Issue: Volunteering and Social Activism. vol. 6(2), 165-179.

48 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 62.

another central, but highly disputed, issue.[49] A pessimistic interpretation predicts that reflexive individualism will lead to fragmentation of community and social disintegration[50], whereas an optimistic outlook interprets late-modernity as a restructuring process with new opportunities for social interaction.[51] Our contribution to this discussion is to study the correlation between late-modern religiosity and volunteering. To do this we will first explore whether religiosity as such interrelates with volunteering, we will then proceed and compare traditional modern religiosity with the presumed contemporary late-modern religiosity in order to see if they differ in their impact on volunteering.

6 Theoretical considerations

We are interested in whether the late-modern understanding of religiosity differs in its effect on engagement in civil society in comparison with a traditional modern understanding of religiosity. Thus, we wanted to distinguish those who describe themselves as seekers or spiritual persons and describe their religiosity as a personal choice and an identity marker from those who describe themselves as believers or religious persons and understand their belief as something they were born into or share with their family and/or culture or consider it as part of their national identity.

To be able to use theories about late-modern individualism in our efforts to find a late-modern understanding of religiosity we used five indicators on how people understand religiosity and worldviews. Each indicator could show both a traditional modern and a late-modern understanding of religiosity. These indicators were taken from theoretical standpoints of the late-modern discourse, mentioned above. They refer merely to attitudes, not behaviour, since we are interested in the relation between a traditional/late-modern understanding of religion and volunteering. The indicators will be briefly presented in this section and then operationalised below in the methodological section.

Working with indicators like these, with the aim of exploring a presumed traditional modern – late-modern bipolarity, we naturally run the risk of over-simplifying

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49 E.g. Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers*. Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, p. 44.

50 E.g. Putnam, R. D. (2000): *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.; Taylor, C. (1991): *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.

51 E.g. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1996): *Individualization. Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*. London: SAGE.; Heelas, P. (1996b): On Things not being Worse, and the Ethic of Humanity. In P. Heelas, P. & Lash, S. & Morris, P. (Eds.), *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

a complex social reality. We therefore do not believe that we can discover two existing *lebensformen*, but rather we use two ideal-typical concepts of how people understand religiosity. Consequently, we do not believe that there are traditional modern and late-modern religious persons, as if they were two groups. Rather we believe that persons can relate to these two ideal-typical forms in different ways, being more or less "pure" high- or late-modern in their understanding of religiosity.[52]

Since there is an implied temporality in the concept of individualisation *processes* it is tempting to think about traditional and late-modernity as two historical stages where the latter era replaces the former. In contrast, we assume that these two ideal-typical understandings of religiosity co-exist, allowing people to understand religiosity and act according to the traditional modern and the late-modern ideal-types, depending on situation.[53] These two considerations, the co-existence of two ideal-types of religiosity, allow for a dynamic analysis of our findings. That a person can be categorised as having a traditional modern religiosity in some respect does not imply that they embrace late-modern religious values concerning something else. It also makes it an open question whether a late-modern understanding is linked to a late-modern behaviour or to more traditional forms of civic engagement.

Encounters with faith and religion. Where one expects or seeks religiosity and/or religious issues is a first indicator when it comes to differentiating between traditional modern religiosity and late-modern religiosity. Primary institutions such as churches, the family, etc. are traditional havens for religiosity, but are at the same time, according to the late-modern thesis, conceived as coercive, and lacking space for the reflective individual.[54] Thus, one first indicator is where one expects to find or finds it meaningful to seek religious encounters. If one seeks religiosity inside the primary institutions it indicates a traditional modern religiosity; if one seeks it outside the religious primary institutions and instead meets and discusses religiosity through media or in popular culture it indicates late-modern religiosity.

Self-concept. To what extent and in what way individuals describe themselves as religious persons is a second indicator. According to the late-modern discourse, religion cease to be a matter of obedience to a given creed or tradition due to detraditionalisation.[55] Religion instead becomes a journey where the individual explores the

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52 Cf. Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers.* Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, p. 64.

53 Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers.* Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, p. 63.

54 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion.* New York: Routledge.

55 Heelas, P. (1996a): Introduction: Detraditionalization and its Rivals. In P. Heelas, P. & Lash, S. & Morris, P. (Eds.), *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity.* Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, p. 2.

mysterious or spiritual depths of this life.[56] Consequently, describing oneself as religious or as a believer indicates a traditional religiosity, whereas describing oneself as a seeker or as spiritual indicates late-modern religiosity.

Motives for religious affiliation. A third indicator is whether an individual refers to the inner self or to external authorities to make sense of their adherence to a faith. The reflexive individuality of late-modernity replaces external authorities with the individual who strives for authenticity by choosing his or her life.[57] Hence, late-modern religiosity is something that is attributed to an inner conviction or reflects one's identity. Referring to external authorities such as culture, nationalism, one's family, etc. to make sense of an adherence to a religious conviction indicates traditional modern religiosity. To refer to a personal decision, or to describe it as an identity marker or something that reflects important values indicates the reflective individual and a late-modern understanding of religiosity.

A fourth indicator is *influences on one's worldview*. This indicator is similar to the former since it also concerns external authorities versus the inner self, but it is broader and concerns not just religiosity but one's worldview. Referring to external authorities such as parents, teachers, religious tradition, political ideologies or science when describing what has influenced a person's worldview is an indicator of a traditional orientation. Instead, referring to friends, media and/or popular culture (for instance celebrities or films) indicates a late-modern orientation.

Worldview. The fifth and last indicator concerns important traits about one's worldview or religiosity, including their context, functions and origin. How one apprehends the origin of the worldview depends on how one interprets oneself in relation to external authorities. To situate one's worldview in the family sphere is expected to indicate a traditional modern understanding, whereas to situate it in a small group or community or understand it as something totally individual indicates a late-modern individualisation.[58] It is an indication of a traditional understanding of one's worldview if it is important that it has the function to give peace and safety, answers about the origin of life and what happens after death and provides rules for a righteous life. If it is important that one's worldview or religiosity gives strong spiritual experiences and answers to the quest for the meaning of life it indicates late-modern spirituality.[59] Finally, if one thinks one's worldview comes from a belief in God or a higher power it indicates a dependence on external authorities and traditional mo-

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56 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 60.

57 Hustinx, L. (2003): *Reflexive modernity and styles of volunteering. The case of the Flemish Red Cross volunteers.* Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Leuven.; Taylor, C. (1991): *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.

58 Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2001): Homeless minds today? In Berger, P. L., Woodhead, L. Heelas, P. & Martin, D. (Eds.), *Peter Berger and the study of religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 64.

59 Ibid.: p. 60.

dernity, but if one's worldview emanates from one's own spiritual self it is an indication of late-modern reflexivity.[60]

7 Material and method

One general problem in social science studies is that it is not clear which phenomenon preceded the other, in our case religiosity or voluntary engagement. Matters are brought to a head when dealing with young people who also presumably are in a phase of life where the search for identity is crucial. Nevertheless, our overall point of departure is that faith or religiousness is rather independent[61], at least in relation to participation in civic organisations, except for religious communities.

Furthermore, religiosity is often thought to lead to volunteering since values are supposed to precede actions. However, from a theological perspective one could turn the argument the other way around and argue that an engagement with other persons and society is a way to find God. Even according to social sciences, encounters with persons, cultures and ideologies may lead to religiosity. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that religiosity and civic engagement affect each other continuously during a lifetime. However, in spite of these objections, when analysing the empirical material, we will assume that religiosity precedes volunteering and other forms of civic engagement. Our point of departure is thus that the process of socialisation in childhood implies religiosity earlier than engagement in civil society organisations.

The data we use was collected by means of a postal survey designed by the Swedish Church's Department of Research and Culture. Data collection was conducted in 2008. The sample consisted of 4,000 participants and the response rate was 1,316, i.e. 33%. The population consisted of individuals, aged 16-24, who were registered as residents in Sweden in August 2008. The sample was stratified through independent random samples within the strata, which were local authority areas. Half of the sample came from four regions represented by two municipalities at the countryside and two metropolitan suburbs, and the remaining half from the remaining regions in Sweden. The responses have been weighted for region, age and gender.[62]

Due to the scarcity of background variables we limit ourselves to exploring tendencies and patterns and do not claim to explain causal relations. That is why we used simple measures of bivariate association and Chi-square analysis to investigate

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60 Taylor, C. (1991): *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, p. 313.
61 See also Becker, P. E., & Dhingra, P. H. (2001): Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society. *Sociology of Religion, 62*, 315-335.
62 This of course means that one easily reaches statistical significances due to the artificially high number of participants. Significance tests and the number of cases refer to the original sample, whereas the percentages and correlations refer to the weighted sample.

whether discrete variables such as values and attitudes varied significantly between different groups of young people. Principal component analysis was used to explore the underlying meaning of religious items. Furthermore, logistic regression analysis was performed on a binomial measure of activity in associations in order to elaborate a 'profile' of a young volunteer and to compare the importance of different predictors. We tried to find out which combination of variables most efficiently explained volunteering. Unfortunately, the data set did not contain background variables enough that might have improved model fit.

Regarding operationalisation, we start with the concept of religiosity. What kind of expressions concerning attitudes or actions should be interpreted as religiosity? Previous research has demonstrated that different kinds of religious participation and different dimensions of religiosity might influence civil society activities in various ways.[63] Attending religious services might be an expected expression of visible religiosity regarding traditional religions, whereas this is not as central in other confessions where other community activities or personal convictions might capture the identity of being a religious person much better. Even though previous research concentrates mainly on attendance at religious services and membership of religious communities, there are examples that also take aspects such as devotional and theological dimensions into consideration.[64] Also, we should remember that participating in religious activities should often be considered a civil society activity in itself. The variables measuring expressions of faith in our data included praying, attending services, celebrating religious holidays and contemplation in religious buildings. The variable for considering oneself a believer included "religious", "believing" and "spiritual". Contrary to other researchers in this field[65], we did not examine the influence of different religions since the responses in our data set were quite homogenous, favouring Christianity, preferably Protestantism (32.3% Christians, 6.0% Muslims, 0.6% Jews, 2.4% Buddhists or Hindus, 5.4 % other religions[66]).

Strategies for operationalizing civil society engagement are not a given either. One could consider membership of civic associations, activities in certain clubs or just in-

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63 Driskell, R. L., Lyon, L. & Embry, E. (2008): Civic Engagement and Religious Activities: Examining the Influence of Religious Tradition and Participation. *Sociological Spectrum, 28,* 578-601.; Lam, P.-Y. (2002): As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*, p. 420.

64 Ibid.: p. 405

65 Casanova, J. (2001): Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam. *Social Research, 68*(4), 1041-1080.; Lam, P.-Y. (2002): As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*, 405-422.; Wuthnow, R. (1999). Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement. In Skocpol, T. & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.), *Civic engagement in American democracy.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

66 Primarily agnosticism, the Æsir cult and atheism.

formal help and socialising as civil society engagement. Due to the specific survey design we only had the opportunity to explore activities in civic organisations without detailed knowledge of membership or types of activities. So the dichotomous variable for civil society activity says something about whether an individual participated in activities arranged by at least one civic association during the previous six months.

8 Findings

Our first question concerned the relationship between religiosity and volunteering among young individuals in Sweden. Generally, religion seems to play a decisive role in engagement in associations (Table 2).

Table 2: Relationship between expressions of faith and engagement in voluntary associations

N = 1310		Expressions of faith	
		No	**Yes**
Activities within civil society	Not active	35.6%	16.5%
	Active	64.4%	83.5%
	Total	100%	100%

***p< 0.001, r=0.185

The correlation was not particularly strong, but it became clear that religious individuals tended to be active in civic organisations to a much higher extent than people who did not show expressions of religiosity. As we will show later on, this also held for several control variables. Regarding other variables there is no definite way to consider a variable spurious or intervening apart from a few exceptions like age and gender. We proceed by studying the variation in the level of religiosity among different types of associations (Table 3).

Table 3: Relationship between religiosity and type of association

Type of association	Percentage of active religious individuals	Percentage of active non-religious	Correlation and sign
Sports club n = 508	45.0%	38.2%	0.06*
Religious assn. n=275	43.5%	4.1%	0.49***
Humanitarian assn. n= 109	13.6%	6.0%	1.2***
Party n=70	6.8%	4.7%	0.04
Environmental assn. n= 90	10.8%	4.0%	0.13**
Hobby assn. n=220	17.0%	14.9%	0.03
Cultural assn. n=329	35.2%	17.3%	0.19***
Student's union n= 264	32.3%	16.1%	0.18***

***= p<.001. **=p<.01. *= p<.05. += p<.10. all two-tailed

Religiosity was significantly related to engagement in civic organisations. This result was not affected by whether visible expressions of faith were in focus or if religiosity concerned an individual's view of him-/herself as a believer or not. Religious individuals were active to a much higher extent in civic organisations than non-religious individuals. This was true for all types of organisations, even if not statistically significant all the time, probably due to low numbers. This was of course most obvious in religious associations, but also in sports clubs, culture organisations or students' unions where religiously active individuals were much more active than young people not participating in religious activities.

In other research, involvement in religious organisations is positively associated with participation in secular organisations, even though, at the same time, these organisations also to some degree compete with secular associations.[67] Our data (Table 3) clearly supports the enhancement theory[68], i.e. involvement in religious organisations enforces the propensity to be engaged also in secular associations. The correlations were generally not particularly strong. However, there was one exception: individuals participating in religious organisations were, to a significant degree, more represented in humanitarian associations than those who did not.

67 Lam, P.-Y. (2002): As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41*, p. 415.
68 Halman, L. & Luijkx, R. (2009): The Impact of Religion on Moral Orientations: Evidence from the European Values Study. In Esmer, Y., Klingemann, H-D. & Puranen, B. (Eds.), *Religion, democratic values and political conflict. Festschrift in Honor of Thorleif Pettersson* (Vol. 23). Uppsala: Uppsala University, s. 23-43.

However, the positive relationship between religiosity and volunteering that we found could be due to sociodemographic characteristics, social resources such as trust, and values other than religious belief. In international research, access to resources, for instance the level of education or high socio-economic status, is a factor that is positively related to civil society activity.[69] This positive relation is also found in Swedish research.[70] The significance of religion in this relationship has not been exhaustively explored. One problem, when thinking in terms of variables, is which aspect should be considered to be independent of the other ones, or at least as preceding the others. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that there are many interdependencies and that there is not always a clear chronological or logical order between them.

Due to the absence of other valuable class or socio-economic indicators in the dataset we concentrated on the level of education. Moreover, as the sample consisted of many younger individuals who had not finished or even started their education in the form of academic studies or vocational training and consequently had different educational levels and economic statuses not only related to socio-economic considerations, we focused on their parents' educational background as a substitute for other socio-economic markers. Controlling for the educational background of the parents, the original correlations for the relationship remained. Moreover, among individuals whose parents had a higher level of education the relationship was consolidated.

We also controlled for trust since trust or the more fuzzy term of 'social capital' are often related to civil society engagement.[71] The known type of correlation was significant for both trusters and non-trusters, but seemed to be somewhat stronger for the trusters. When testing the partial relationships separately there was only a weak connection between trust and volunteering, and no connection between trust and faith.

69 Amato, P. R., & Booth, A. (1997): *A generation at risk. Growing up in an era of family upheaval*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.; Brady, H. E., & Verba, S. (1995): Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review, 89*(2), 271.; Grønbjerg, K. & Never, B. (2004): The role of religious networks and other factors in types of volunteer work. *Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 14*, 263-289.; Wilson, J., & Musick, M. A. (1999): Attachment to Volunteering. *Sociological Forum, 14*(2), 243-272.

70 von Essen, J., Jegermalm, M., & Svedberg, L. (2015): *Folk i rörelse – medborgerligt engagemang 1992-2014*. Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola.

71 See e.g. Diani, M. (2004): How associations matter. An empirical assessment of the social capital-trust-voluntary action link. In Prakash, S. & Selle, P. (Eds.). *Comparative perspectives on civil society, participation, and governance*, London: SAGE Publ.; Putnam, R. D. (2000): *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.; Stolle, D. (2004): Communities, social capital and local government. Generalized trust in regional settings. In *Investigating social capital. Comparative perspectives on civil society, participation, and governance*, 184-206.

Finally we checked if other values affected civic engagement. In the cultural map by Inglehart and Welzels[72], presented above, self-expressive values are thought to be in opposition to survival values and secular values are put in opposition to traditional values. An example of a self-expressive value is to value confidence, whereas survival values value money. An example of a secular value is education, whereas an example of a traditional value is family. The positive relationship between religiosity and civic engagement remained when controlling for these values. However, individuals expressing self-expressive values were much more inclined to be engaged in civic organisations compared to those agreeing with assertions indicating materialistic values. In a similar manner, individuals expressing secular values were more inclined to be engaged in civic organisations compared to those expressing traditional values.

8.1 Understandings of religiosity

So far we have answered our first research question: about the relationship between religiosity as such and volunteering among young people. After controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, resources and other values we can show how religiosity has a positive impact on volunteering. But religiosity is not a monolithic phenomenon. On the contrary, late-modern individualism is assumed to influence religiosity. So we will now take a step further and study whether there are any differences between the effects of traditional religiosity and late-modern religiosity on volunteering.

As mentioned above, we construed five indicators to differentiate between a traditional modern and a late-modern understanding of religiosity. Since these indicators are based on theoretical assumptions, we wanted to test them on our empirical material. Factor analysis was conducted for each of the five question batteries.[73]

When looking at how the particular features behave we found that the dimensions in the form of factors corresponded quite well with our theoretical approach. Nevertheless, not all the dimensions complied with each other. The second indicator did not behave as expected, as there were no differences between being a seeker and being a religious person. These self-concepts did not differentiate between traditional and late-modern religiosity. We further expected that "older" authorities such as political ideologies, parents and teachers would indicate traditional modern understanding. This means that the traditional modern ideologies and presumed late-modern authorities in media are perceived in the same way, as more abstract than concrete persons. This is interesting since it indicates that the expected difference

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72 Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005): *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy. The human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

73 Explorative principal component analysis with varimax rotation.

between coercive external ideologies and popular culture that can be imported into one's self-biography is not supported by the empirical data. When it comes to the fifth indicator, it did not demonstrate a difference between a traditional and a late-modern understanding of the worldview's origin, function and context. Rather, it showed a propensity to emphasise different dimensions of one's worldview such as transcendence, community or self. Perhaps it is possible to interpret those who emphasise the "community dimension" as more traditionally modern and those who emphasise the "self dimension" as more late-modern.

This result has several possible explanations. One has to do with methodological issues, i.e. our theoretical sorting of items corresponding to traditional or late-modern expressions respectively. Another might be found in the characteristics of the phase of life adolescents and young adults are experiencing, where identity construction is a crucial issue and hypothetical behaviours are tested. They experiment with different roles and explore unknown things in general[74], which possible also include the formation of religious conviction, ontologies and epistemological considerations.

Although there are reservations, our indicators showed that about half of all respondents had a traditional understanding of religion and the remaining half had a late-modern understanding. Hence we can assume that the empirical material confirms the theoretically derived differentiation between a traditional modern and a late-modern understanding of religion. Surprisingly, however, the traditional and the late-modern understandings of religion were distributed quite evenly among the respondents, and there were some considerable differences between the two groups. Young people with a traditional understanding of religion more often had parents with university degrees, more often they felt healthy and more often lived in suburbs, first or second generations immigrants were overrepresented, they were more often law-abiding and optimistic.

8.2 The effect of understandings of religiosity on volunteering

There were no significant differences in volunteering between individuals with traditional modern and late-modern values, either for volunteering overall or for certain civic organisations, with one exception; religious organisations. Individuals with more traditional modern values tended to be overrepresented in activities within religious organisations. Therefore, when it comes to volunteerism in religious communities a traditional modern understanding seems to enhance the impact of religiosity on volunteering.[75] An important result of the study is thus that young people with a

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74 Hutchison, E. D. (Ed.). (2003): *Dimensions of human behavior. The changing life course*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, p. 265.

75 Cf. Halman, L. & Luijkx, R. (2009): The Impact of Religion on Moral Orientations: Evidence from the European Values Study. In Esmer, Y., Klingemann, H-D. & Puranen, B. (Eds.), *Religion, democratic*

late-modern understanding of religion are neither more nor less inclined to be engaged in civic organisations (Table 4).

Table 4: Bivariate correlation between dimensions of religiosity and activities in civic organisations

	Traditional modern	Late-modern	Correlation and sign
Civic organisations in general	73.2%	66.2%	-.076
Sports clubs n=508	43.6%	36.4%	-0.074
Religious ass. N = 275	21.8%	8.0%	-0.193***
Humanitarian ass. N=109	7.7%	8.6%	0.017
Party n=70	4.7%	5.8%	0.025
Environmental ass. N=90	6.6%	5.2%	-0.031
Hobby ass. N=220	16.6%	14.4%	-0.031
Cultural ass. N=329	21.8%	22.6%	0.009
Student's union n=264	23.2%	17.9%	-0.065+

***= p<.001. **=p<.01. *= p<.05. += p<.10. all-two tailed

9 Results

The analysis of the results shows that religiosity has a positive impact on voluntary activities. Hence, we were able to confirm that there is a positive relation between religiosity and volunteering among young individuals in Sweden. Religious individuals tend to be active in associations to a much higher extent than people who do not show expressions of religiosity. Furthermore, our data supports the enhancement theory, i.e. involvement in religious organisations strengthens the propensity to be engaged also in secular associations. Our findings are consistent with some other research in this field.[76] Our results appear as a surprising finding for such a secular country as Sweden. They point to the fact that religiosity is an active factor in Swedish civil society at large and not only in religious communities and faith-based organisations, and for this reason religiosity should be included in the research agenda in studies of Swedish civil society. However, some results did make this overall pattern

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values and political conflict. Festschrift in Honor of Thorleif Pettersson (Vol. 23). Uppsala: Uppsala University, p. 24.

76 See e.g. Park, J. Z., & Smith, C. (2000): 'To Whom Much Has Been Given...'. Religious Capital and Community Voluntarism Among Churchgoing Protestants. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 39*, p. 280.; Putnam, R. D. (2000): *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 65.

more complicated. Also values reflecting self-realisation without any overt religious meaning are increasing young people's inclination to be engaged in civic organisations.

However, religiosity is not a uniform phenomenon as new understandings of it are emerging in late-modern society. According to theological standpoints an individualised form of religiosity may run the risk of becoming distorted and may become a private issue meaningful only for one's self-realisation, without any implications for society. There are similar anxieties among social scientists, namely that individualisation in late-modern society may lead to the slow disappearance of society and the decrease of civic engagement. For this reason, we studied whether a late-modern understanding and a traditional modern understanding of religion differ when it comes to the propensity to be engaged in civic organisations.

The study did show that the traditional modern and late-modern understanding of religiosity was evenly distributed among all respondents. Thus, it is not the case that the younger part of the population either are characterised by reflexive individualism or are still embedded in a traditional modern understanding of religion. Both perspectives were evenly distributed among all respondents except for the young people who were religious. Among religious young people the majority had a traditional modern understanding of religion. This is an important result since young peoples' religiosity is supposed to demand new social arrangements outside and alternative to established religious communities. There are some young individuals who are religious and reflect a late-modern understanding of religiosity, but they are a minority.

Among all respondents the likelihood among young persons reflecting a late-modern understanding of religiosity was as high as among young persons reflecting a traditional modern understanding. However, also among those who answered that they were religious it did not matter if one had a traditional or late-modern understanding of religion; both groups were equally inclined to be engaged in civic organisations. Thus we can conclude that there is a positive relation between being religious and civic engagement among young persons, but whether one has a traditional or a late-modern understanding of religion does not matter. Therefore, we can contribute to the discussion about the effect of late-modernity on volunteering by comforting the pessimists; there is nothing in our study that indicates that a late-modern understanding makes religiosity a limited private interest without consequences for other people or society at large. If people are religious it does affect how they act, but how they understand their religiosity does not seem to matter.

10 Discussion

The results negate both the assumption that young people's understanding of religion has undergone a radical change from traditional modernity to late-modernity and that a late-modern understanding would lead to a declining civic engagement. Rather, it seems as if there are different understandings of religion and they may lead to civic engagement, which means that the pessimistic discourse of the decline of civic engagement in late-modernity is not totally accurate. However, how can we explain that the differences between traditional modern and late-modern outlooks of man and society do not seem to affect civic engagement? This conclusion seems to contradict the prevalent assumption that values are causing actions.

A possible answer to this question could be that it is not the values people may have but the religious context in which they are active that leads to civic engagement. The sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow proved that theological or intellectual convictions are not as important for civic engagement as being part of a religious context where people actually care for others and where and engagement in society is held to be a pious act.[77] However, in the present study there were no differences worth mentioning between those who practiced their religion with others and those who answered that they were religious, but not practising their faith in religious contexts. Both groups were engaged to the same degree in civic organisations. This result may indicate that although young persons in Swedish society may be part of a religious context, this does not lead to civic engagement. In that case this would indicate an important difference between US society and Swedish society.

The result of our study seems to weaken the thesis of a late-modern shift regarding religiosity and the idea that there is something like an "uncivic" nature of post-materialism or a "late-modern volunteerism".[78] At the same time, we found traces of a late-modern understanding of religiosity in the material. How could that be explained? One possible hypothesis is that while being religious as such has an impact on behaviour in civil society, here volunteering, the description of how one understands one's religiosity, being late- or traditional modern, can be understood as a tool

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77 Wuthnow, R. (1991): *Acts of Compassion. Caring for others and helping our selves*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.; see also Hustinx, L.; Van Rossem, R.; Handy, F. & Cnaan R. A. (2015): A cross-National Examination of the Motivation to Volunteer. Religious context, National Value Patterns, and Non-Profit-Regimes. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (Eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.
78 For similar results see Hustinx, L.; Van Rossem, R.; Handy, F. & Cnaan R. A. (2015): A cross-National Examination of the Motivation to Volunteer. Religious context, National Value Patterns, and Non-Profit-Regimes. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (Eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.

kit of cultural resources in a sense-making process.[79] To make sense of having a religious conviction or affiliation in a secular country such as Sweden one has to refer to a late-modern understanding of religiosity, where the religious community or the tradition is replaced by the *homo optionis*, or the "choosing I". If this hypothesis is sound, being late-modern has more to do with the accounts that will make sense of religiosity in contemporary highly individualistic Sweden than with motives or causes that will form new patterns of action. Obviously, this hypothesis calls for further research, but the hypothesis that religiosity can, for some people, be used as a self-reflective and non-conformist value, is strengthened by the fact that the Swedish society is highly secular on a structural level and has an extensive civic engagement. Religiosity then, becomes de-traditionalised and being religious or referring to religiosity could be used as a cultural resource to enact or depict one's authenticity. Furthermore, previous research has shown that volunteers make sense of their engagement by using "narratives of authenticity", where volunteer work is depicted as a way to enact one's authentic personality.[80] If this hypothesis is accurate, the language by which young people can make sense of civic engagement has changed and a late-modern understanding of religiosity is one possible cultural resource to do that. Thus motivational accounts may be situated in the intersection between the individual and society.[81]

The fact that there was no correlation between late-modern individualisation and a decreasing civic engagement may be interpreted as a zero-result. However, it shows that a late-modern outlook on society does not necessary imply that society will fade away gradually. This is crucial since there is a worry that late-modern individualisation will undermine common society and decrease people's engagement in society. One could call this a "myth of individualisation" predicting that human relations in society will get more tenuous and the common society will disappear. Obviously society is changing, but the fact that new civic arenas and new languages for civic engagement are emerging does not mean that people will become isolated and society will disappear. This is how we interpret the fact that a late-modern understanding of religiosity also functions as a resource for civic engagement in the individualistic and secular Swedish society.

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79 Swidler, A. (1986): Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review, 51*(2).; Swidler, A. (2001): *Talk of love. How culture matters*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

80 von Essen, J. (2016): On the Meaning of Volunteering. A Study of Worldviews in everyday life. *Foundations of Science*. 21(2), s. 315-333.; Wuthnow, R. (1991): *Acts of Compassion. Caring for others and helping our selves*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

81 Ibid.; see also Hustinx, L.; Van Rossem, R.; Handy, F. & Cnaan R. A. (2015): A cross-National Examination of the Motivation to Volunteer. Religious context, National Value Patterns, and Non-Profit-Regimes. In Hustinx, L.; von Essen, J. Haers, J & Mels, S. (Eds.) *Religion and Volunteering. Complex, contested and ambiguous relationships*. New York: Springer.

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Linnea Lundgren

A Diversity of Roles – The Actions Taken by Religious Communities in Sweden during the "Refugee Crisis" in 2015

1 Introduction

Although Sweden is often regarded as one of the most secularized countries in the world, religion, as well as religious communities[1], still plays a vital, even if sometimes complex, role. Also, in similarity to many societies around the globe, religion and religious communities are increasingly becoming more visible in the public sphere.[2] In Sweden, this is due to several concurring factors, e.g. increasing religious pluralism and the Swedish state's continued relationship with religious communities.[3] Social, demographic and economic changes have endorsed a new interest in religious organisations, especially with regards to social and ethical issues. In accordance with this, the Swedish state is increasingly emphasizing the importance of religious communities for civil society[4], especially in the context of integrative issues and refugee recep-

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1 Religious communities (see also faith communities) are in this paper defined as an organisation, culture association or a group of collaborating churches or mosques whose main focus is to organise religious activities including organised worship and give spiritual and pastoral care. A majority of the religious communities in Sweden are national umbrella organisations and federations with underlying communities such as parishes or local islamic associations. However, in this paper, focus will be on local religious congregations from three of the biggest religious families in Sweden; two Muslim congregations, one congregation from the Church of Sweden and two from the free churches.
2 Casanova, J. (1994): *Public Religions in the Modern World.* University of Chicago Press.; Duffy Toft, M. D, Philpott, D, & Shah, T. (2011): *God's century: Resurgent religion and global politics.* WW Norton & Company.; Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.; Davie, G. (2015): Studying religion in the Nordic Countries: An external view. *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, 28(2), p. 101-116.
3 Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.
4 The concept of civil society often refers to a sphere in society separated from the private sphere, in which family, relatives and friends are included, from the market sphere, where companies act in markets, and from the state sphere in which state and municipal organisations operate. Therefore, civil society constitutes several different types of organisations such as non-profit, non-governmental voluntary organisations, popular movement, religious communities, labour unions, etc. (von Essen 2010). The concept of civil society entered the Swedish language fairly recently and was fiercely debated in the 1990's before it gained acceptance. This debate must be understood in a Scandinavian social democratic narrative where sceptics argued that the concept was ideologically right-wing based, promoting a shift of power from the state towards voluntary organisations, families and religious associations, aspects generally seen as pre-welfare state (Trägårdh, 2008). Although the ideo-

tion. Even if the religious role is still accentuated, their role as social actors is more frequently highlighted, with increased stately financing as a result.[5]

Whilst the changing expectations would seem to have occurred gradually, for religious communities, the acute situation that in a sense brought the changes into the limelight, were the events during the autumn in 2015. Following the peak of asylum applications in Europe 2015, Sweden became one of the countries who received the highest number of refugees[6] per capita in Europe and as a result the Swedish state came under considerable pressure.[7] Due to the states difficulties in coping with the number of refugees coming into the country, as well as the large number of transit refugees merely passing through on their way to Finland or Norway, civil society organisations took a large role in supporting the state in coping with the situation.[8] The Swedish government decided to allocate extra resources to civil society organisations and not least religious communities, as many of them became highly involved in the support of refugees during the so called refugee crisis.[9]

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logical associations also meant that the concept was received with scepticism among academics, the concept was gradually accepted. This acceptance occurred parallel to a transforming welfare state where welfare provision has been moved from an unthreatened public sector towards a market-inspired sector.

5 Prop. 2015/16:1 Utgiftsområde 17. (2016): *Politikens inriktning – trossamfund*. Stockholm: Finansdepartementet: 1.; Bäckström, A. & Svalfors, U. (2015): *Trossamfundens sociala insatser. En preliminär undersökning. Ds 2015:3*. Stockholm: Socialdepartementet.

6 The terms *refugee, migrant* and *asylum seeker* are often used interchangeably in media and have different meanings in different national contexts. In this study, however, the UNHCR definitions will be used and the term refugee will be *"Refugees are people outside their country of origin because of feared persecution, conflict, violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order, and who, as a result, require international protection"* (UNHCR, 2015). However, the group that the local congregations support could also be asylum seekers *"whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed"* (UNHCR, 2015) or migrants, who are a group that *"choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons"* (UNHCR, 2015).

7 Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015*. Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.; BBC. (2016). *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts*. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (2017-05-15).

8 Ibid.; Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). (2015-a). *Civila samhället och trossamfunden stärks med 105 miljoner för arbetet med människor på flykt* .http://www.regeringen.se/ pressmeddelanden/2015/12/civila-samhallet-och-trossamfunden-starks-med-105-miljoner-for-arbetet-med-manniskor-pa-flykt/ (2017-04-09).; Regeringskansliet(Government Offices of Sweden) . (2015-b). *Kraften som finns hos det civila samhället och alla frivilliga volontärer som hjälper vid flyktingmottagande*. http://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2015/11/kraften-som-finns-hos-det-civila-samhallet-och-alla-frivilliga-volontarer-som-hjalper-vid-flyktingmottagande/ (2017-03-31).

9 The term *"refugee crisis"* has been used extensively in Europe for the refugee situation in the autumn of 2015. However, it is widely discussed and contested and Melissa Fleming, an UNHCR spokes-

The fact that religious communities were active in welcoming refugees is in one sense unsurprising. For many refugees, religion is a central and important part of their lives; especially given the traumas they have encountered.[10] It is also unsurprising to see religious communities societally active in times of acute crisis and local or national tragedies. Religious communities have been an important and natural source of support for the Swedish population, not least after for example the tsunami in the Indian ocean in 2004 and the Estonia ferry disaster in 1994, when religious communities played an important role in providing comfort and solace to both those directly affected as well as those indirectly affected.[11] However, in contrast to previous acute situations, the major role in 2015 for religious communities seemed to be a social one, i.e. very similar to many other secular civil society organisations, where providing shelter, food, judicial support, language classes, etc. became central.[12]

Religious communities, in contrast to other civil society actors (even religious organisations and FBOs), are unique given that they already have a specific role in being a place of worship and prayer. This could place religious communities into a conflicting situation with regards to both the internal and external expectation of their

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person, expressed it in terms of, *"This is a crisis for refugees, not a crisis for Europeans".* Whilst most certainly true, the term has been used as a standard description of the situation both by media, politicians, as well as civil society organisations and will therefore be used in this study, despite the terms problematic nature.; Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015.* Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.; BBC. (2016). *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts.* http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (2017-05-15); Hellqvist, K. & Sandberg, A. (2017): *En tid av möten" som kartlägger verksamheten för asylsökande och nyanlända under 2015-2016.* Uppsala: Svenska kyrkan.

Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015.* Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.; Hellqvist, K. & Sandberg, A. (2017): *En tid av möten" som kartlägger verksamheten för asylsökande och nyanlända under 2015-2016.* Uppsala: Svenska kyrkan.

10 Snyder, S. (2011): Un/settling Angels: Faith Based organisation and Asylum seeking in the UK. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 24*(3), p 565-585.; Goodall, C. (2015): *Shouting towards the Sky: the role of religious individuals, communities, organisations and institutions in support for refugees and asylum seekers.* Research Paper No. 275 Geneva: UNHCR.

11 See for example Petterson, P (1996): Implicit Service Relations Turned Explicit: A case study of the Church of Sweden as Service Provider in the Context of the Estonia Disaster. *Service Management, Edvardsson and Modell.* Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus förlag.

12 Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). (2015-b). *Kraften som finns hos det civila samhället och alla frivilliga volontärer som hjälper vid flyktingmottagande.* http://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2015/11/kraften-som-finns-hos-det-civila-samhallet-och-alla-frivilliga-volontarer-som-hjalper-vid-flyktingmottagande/ (2017-03-31); Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015.* Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.

role and mission. Apart from the social and religious roles, an important role within religious communities is the activity of being a critical voice. Especially with regards to immigration and asylum, religious communities often seek to challenge what they see as unfair or overly harsh policies.[13] Previous research has shown that parallel to an increased support and help of refugees, religious communities have become intensely more political, bringing them into more conflictual situations with the state.[14] Coupled with changing expectations from the state regarding an increased social role, as well as increased stately financing, the question therefore arises to what degree a critical voice can be upheld.

Given the changes that have occurred in the Swedish society, in which civil society organisations have either been given, or have taken, new societal roles and functions, the situation for religious communities is particularly interesting. With three roles (religious, social and critical voice) to combine, there is currently a lack of research on how they balance and experience these roles. Also, in government documents and official policies, religious communities are often portrayed as one homogenous group. However, with the different roles to combine, it is perhaps more likely that the self-viewed function of religious communities varies considerably. By studying how local religious congregations experienced their role and function during an acute crisis, it is possible to deepen the discussions regarding the changing expectations on religious communities from the Swedish state. Therefore, by using the so-called refugee crisis of 2015 as a case, the aim of this study is to investigate what role religious communities took and how they balanced their religious and social role, as well as their critical voice in the support of refugees.

Given the lack of systematic research regarding religious communities as a group in Sweden, this study has an exploratory approach. Also due to the absence of studies in the field, this study does not attempt to conclusively determine the roles of all Swedish religious communities during the refugee crisis. Rather, it aims to produce an insight into how local congregations from a diverse number of religions and denominations acted and balanced their roles. The obtained knowledge from this study can then hopefully be a foundation for an interpretative framework for understanding how religious communities acted during an acute crisis. The article, therefore, is based on a case study of interviews with representatives from five Christian and Muslim local congregations where focus was on their self-viewed function and role in Swedish society, specifically in the context of the autumn of 2015. The first part of the study will give a background concerning the Swedish context and the role of religious

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13 Goodall, C. (2015): *Shouting towards the Sky: the role of religious individuals, communities, organisations and institutions in support for refugees and asylum seekers.* Research Paper No. 275 Geneva: UNHCR.

14 Ibid.

communities within civil society in Sweden. The second part of the study will include the case study.

2 Background

Despite Sweden often being regarded as one of the most secular nations in the world, ever since the early Christian period, the church and state have had close ties. During the reformation, these strong ties were strengthened further with the creation of a national church, forcing citizens to follow the same faith and church as the king, i.e. the Swedish Lutheran church.[15] The strong ties between state and church on a national level, and parish and municipality on a local level, lasted well into the twentieth century. However, during the 19th century, the Church of Sweden was also complemented by Christian free churches, promoting religious freedom and criticizing the state church for their monopoly.[16]

With regards to social welfare, the responsibility before the 20th century was predominantly focused on religious charities and other philanthropic organisations. However, from the beginning of the 20th century, the public sector gradually took over much of the responsibilities for social welfare. In contrast to many other countries in Europe, therefore, this meant that churches and other religious organisations were not incorporated as social policy providers.[17]

In the Swedish social democratic welfare model[18], social rights became central, a direct result of the influence of the large group of popular movements. These social rights were a continuation of civil and political rights and constituted the foundation of the welfare state.[19] At the core was the ideology that people shouldn't have to rely on the good will of charity to have their needs met, even though religious actors still kept some of their "avant-garde" role for advocacy and innovations.[20] Generally, however, voluntary organisations, including religious organisations, which provided wel-

15 Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.
16 Bäckström, A. Edgardh, N. & Petterson, P. (2004): *Religious Change in Northern Europe: The Case of Sweden*. Stockholm: Verbum förlag AB.
17 Micheletti, M. (1994): *Det civila samhället och staten-medborgarsammanslutningarnas roll i svensk politik*. Stockholm: Publica.
18 Esping-Andersen, G. (1990): *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
19 Trägårdh, L. & Svedberg, L. (2012): The Iron Law of Rights: Citizenship and Individual Empowerment in Modern Sweden. In Evers, A & Guillemard, A (Eds.), *Social Policy and Citizenship: The Changing Landscape*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 222-256.
20 Fridolfsson, C. & Elander, I. (2012): Faith-based Organisations and Welfare State Retrenchment in Sweden: Substitute or Complement. *Politics and Religion, 5*, p. 634-654.

fare and social services, have only had a minor role in Sweden compared to many other European countries, like Germany for example. Also contrary to many other western countries, faith-related associations and other non-profit organisations working with social services were historically viewed by the general public as pre-welfare state, relating to social inequality and paternalism.[21]

The welfare state in Sweden was, up to the 1960 and 70's, fairly unchallenged, with a national economic growth and general optimism. During the 1980's and 1990's however, new, predominantly liberal, ideas emerged regarding the role of market actors, a deregulation of economic systems and an introduction of neo-liberalism, therefore affecting the structure and organisation of the welfare state.[22] During the last decades, Sweden, in similarity to many other European countries, has experienced processes of financial difficulties as well as a restructuring of the welfare state. This has created space for new organisational providers, both market and civil society organisations, within the welfare arena. Sweden has experienced societal transformations in society as a whole, a renegotiated and changing social contract, and the creation of new contractual relationships.[23] Demographic, social and economic change, as well as the growth of a societal exclusion, has also increasingly led to new needs and demands for the welfare state.

With the welfare state increasingly under pressure to maintain a high standard of service, governments at both local and national level are now extensively turning towards religious, as well as other civil society actors, for complementary support. A new arena has therefore been created with increasing dialogue and new potential collaborations between the state and civil society organisation.[24]

With regards to religious actors, there have also been changes related to their relationship to the Swedish state. After centuries of a clearly privileged position as the state church, the Church of Sweden was separated from the state in 2000. This meant that a new legal form was introduced (Religious Community Act, 1998:1593; Law about the Church of Sweden, SFS 1998: 1591), where other religious communities could become registered faith communities and thereby considered equal, formally and legally, to the Church of Sweden. Importantly, however, the Church of Sweden

21 Qvarsell, R. (1993): Välgörenhet, filantropi och frivilligt socialt arbete – en historisk översikt., *Frivilligt socialt arbete: Kartläggning och kunskapsöversikt*. Stockholm: Fritzes. p. 217-241.

22 Blomqvist, P. (2004): The choice revolution: Privatization of Swedish welfare services in the 1990s'. *Social Policy and Administration*, 38, p. 139-55.; Hartman, L. (ed) (2011): *Konkurrensens konsekvenser: vad händer med svensk välfärd?* Stockholm: SNS förlag.

23 Wijkström, F. och Lundström, T. (2002): *Den ideella sektorn. Organisationerna i det civila samhället*. Stockholm: Sober förlag.

24 Harding, T. (2012): *Framtidens civilsamhälle*. Underlagsrapport 3 till Framtidskommissionen. Stockholm: Fritzes.; Fridolfsson, C. & Elander, I. (2012): Faith-based Organisations and Welfare State Retrenchment in Sweden: Substitute or Complement. *Politics and Religion, 5*, p. 634-654.

still has a "semi-official" status in relation to the state.[25] In total, 40 registered faith communities now exist in Sweden with over 750,000 members[26] and a new religious landscape has been created with space for a more diverse arena of religious communities to act within. The increased number of registered faith communities has also been affected by immigration and globalization that has led to an increased religious diversity in Sweden and a growing visibility of new forms of religion and religious communities. Not least, immigration and globalization has resulted in an increase and new visibility of Muslim congregations.[27] Alongside the increased visibility, there are also tendencies that religious organisations are traversing towards more social and ethical involvement rather than merely focusing on religious activities (Bäckström, 2015).[28] By doing so, religion becomes increasingly present in the public sphere as well as religious communities becoming gradually more visible as civil society actors, adopting both a social role in the welfare arena as well as being a critical voice in the public debate.[29]

In accordance with this, the social role of religious communities is an aspect that is increasingly being expressed and emphasized by the government, not only in government documents but also with increased funding to religious communities from the state. This development, alongside a growing plurality, has prompted moves towards increased regulation and control of religious communities.[30] This is not least seen in the ongoing government investigation with the purpose to have stricter controls in funding religious communities that do not follow democratic guidelines.[31]

This growing diversity of religious communities could be viewed as somewhat challenging the secular discourse of Sweden, creating, at times, rather complex relations between the state and religious actors. For example, in situations where reli-

25 Bäckström, A. (2014): Svenska Kyrkan som tillitsmakare och religiöst problem i välfärden. in Bäckström, A. *Välfärdsinsatser på religiös grund. förväntningar och problem*, 63-111. Skellefteå: Artos & Norma bokförlag.

26 SST (2014a): *Trossamfund i Sverige. Statsbidragsberättigade trossamfund: presentationer och aktuell statistik*. Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund.

27 Borell, K. & Gerdner, A. (2011): Frivilligt socialt arbete i svenska muslimska församlingar: Tradition, organisation, integration. *Socionomens Forskningssupplement nr 29*, Hans Svärd (red.), Stockholm.

28 Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.

29 Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.; Fridolfsson, C. & Elander, I. (2012): Faith-based Organisations and Welfare State Retrenchment in Sweden: Substitute or Complement. *Politics and Religion, 5*, p. 634-654.

30 Bäckström, A. (2015): Religion in the Nordic Countries: Between private and public. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 29(1), p. 61-74.

31 Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). (2016). *Utredning tillsatt för att utreda statens stöd till trossamfunden*. http://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2016/06/utredning-tillsatt-for-att-utreda-statens-stod-till-trossamfunden/ (2017-02-03).

gious communities receive contract-funding from the state, there is a complexity in that the state often welcomes their practical contributions, though simultaneously resists the religious impact and values from the religious civil society actors.[32] This complexity, as well as the new contract relations between the state and religious communities, seems likely to play a crucial role in affecting the actions and roles played by of religious communities in the civil society arena.

2.1 Roles and Functions of Religious Communities within Civil Society

There have been several attempts in Sweden, the past decades, trying to classify different roles or ideal types that civil society organisations can have in society.[33] A common distinction, in a Swedish context, is one of civil society organisations providing advocacy and service. These two roles differ in the aspect of what is communicated (*advocacy*) and what is delivered (*service*). In the advocacy role, civil society organisations often have a lobbying role with the purpose of criticizing or influencing government policies or the actions of market actors. The service role, meanwhile, is rather the act of practically providing a service to the public. Although this role can vary, in regard to the focus of this paper, the service category specifically refers to the organisations' social role. Importantly, the definition of a social role can differ and it is important to distinguishes between organisations that are mainly concerned with self-help and those who perform social services for the public.[34] For example, civil society organisations play an important role in creating social networks and stimulating a sense of community amongst the members of the organisation. The social role can also be services, otherwise delivered by the state, that are either delivered on behalf of the state, or without government funding. Examples include providing services such as healthcare, social care, education, sports and culture.

With regards to religious communities, and in contrary to other civil society actors, a third role exists; the religious role. The religious aspects and dimensions of so called "religious" organisations and faith-based organisations has been widely dis-

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32 Snyder, S. (2011): Un/settling Angels: Faith Based organisation and Asylum seeking in the UK. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 24*(3), p 565-585.

33 See for example: Lundström, T. & Wijkström, F. (1995): *Från röst till service?* Stockholm: Sköndalinstitutet skriftserie nr. 4.; Blennberger. E. (1993): Begrepp och modeller. *Frivilligt socialt arbete: kartläggning och kunskapsöversikt*. Socialtjänstkommittén, Stockholm: Fritzes, 1993, p. 33-55.; Harding, T. (2012): *Framtidens civilsamhälle*. Underlagsrapport 3 till Framtidskommissionen. Stockholm: Fritzes.

34 Lundström, T. & Svedberg, L. (2003): The voluntary sector in a social democratic welfare state: The case of Sweden, *Journal of Social Policy*, 32(2), p. 217-238.

cussed.[35] Unruh has characterized several of the religious elements present in religious organisations. These include organizing religious activities, communicating religious messages, conveying religious values, etc. The religious dimension could be divided in to two dimensions in regard to Uruhs elements. The first concerns the practical acts, such as organising worship and prayer, elements that are also required in order to receive government funding. The second dimension concerns the overall faith identity that involves issues such as conveying religious values.[36]

However, identifying the role of religion in different religious communities is complex as they differ in cultural, historical and theological background meaning that the religious dimension should not be understood in a narrow and static manner. Within many denominations and religions, social responsibility is understood as part of religion and don´t need to involve any visible religious dimensions. Therefore, even if the social actions of a religious group may, from society's perspective be understood as secular, it could from a theological perspective be understood as highly religious. In terms of these differences, the scale made by Monsma can be helpful as it differentiates between when religious elements are integrated or separated from the religious organisation's social work. I.e. faith-based/integrated or faith-based/segmented.[37]

An important aspect of the religious dimension is the observed transference of organisations' faith identity during the last decade, in which religious communities have moved from an estrangement to an engagement of faith identity.[38] Given this possible increase in engagement of faith identity, coupled with the increased social role related to the expectations from the state, the question arise how religious communities in Sweden today balance their religious, social and critical role. Is it possible, for example, to be an active social actor with strong relations to the state and simultaneously be active in advocacy as well as allowing the religious values to permeate throughout the organisation? If not, are certain denominations, perhaps due to their historical roles, more inclined to lean towards one role, whilst others choose a different role?

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35 See for example Bielefeld, W. & Cleveland, W. (2013): Defining Faith-Based Organisations and Understanding Them Through Research. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,* 42(3) p. 442-467.;
36 Unruh, H. R. (2004): Religious elements of church-based social service programs: Types, variables and integrative strategies. *Review of Religious Research.* 45 (4), p 317-335
37 Monsma, S. V. (2003): Nonprofit and faith-based welfare-to-work programs. Springer, S.V. Society (2003) 40: 13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-003-1047-3.
38 Clarke, G. & Jennings, M. (eds.) (2008): Introduction. In *Development, Civil Society and Faith-based Organisations. Bridging the Sacred and the Secula*r. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1-17.

2.2 The Case Study

During 2015, Sweden was the OECD country with the highest number of asylum seekers per capita following a large influx of refugees during the latter half of the year. Whilst many other European countries also experienced large numbers of refugees, Sweden, largely to the generous asylum rules regarding family reunion for refugees from Syria, had a particularly dramatic increase of asylum seekers and transit refugees.[39] This increase in asylum seekers placed government agencies in Sweden under considerable pressure, ultimately leading to an acute reversal in government policies in November 2015 with stricter border controls in January 2016, in order to limit the inflow. By doing so, Swedish migration politics reversed from being one of the more generous in Europe, to applying an "EU minimum".[40]

With government agencies under considerable pressure and difficulties to cope with asylum seekers and transit refugees, religious communities and other religious actors, alongside other civil society actors, came to play an essential role in providing aid as well as welcoming refugees throughout Sweden.[41] Particularly with regards to transit refugees, civil society actors were many times the only supporting actors as the government was unsure how to handle the situation, given that the transit refugees were in Sweden illegally.

With the considerable involvement of existing civil society actors, as well as new movements, such as *Refugee Welcome*, the Swedish government decided to allocate extra resources to civil society organisations, in order to support their work in supporting refugees.[42] The Swedish government meant that civil society actors played a crucial, and in many cases essential, role in supporting government agencies.[43] Amongst these civil society recipients were religious communities as they were viewed as central actors that took on supporting refugees with shelter and other acute

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39 Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015.* Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.

40 Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). (2015-c). *Regeringen föreslår åtgärder för att skapa andrum för svenskt* flyktingmottagande. http://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2015/11/ regeringen-foreslar-atgarder-for-att-skapa-andrum-for-svenskt-flyktingmottagande/ (2017-03-31).

41 Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015.* Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.; Hellqvist, K. & Sandberg, A. (2017): *En tid av möten" som kartlägger verksamheten för asylsökande och nyanlända under 2015-2016.* Uppsala: Svenska kyrkan.

42 Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). (2015-a). *Civila samhället och trossamfunden stärks med 105 miljoner för arbetet med människor på flykt* .http://www.regeringen.se/ pressmeddelanden/2015/12/civila-samhallet-och-trossamfunden-starks-med-105-miljoner-for-arbetet-med-manniskor-pa-flykt/ (2017-04-09).

43 Ibid.

needs.[44] However, whilst receiving funds, religious communities were also clearly visible in the public debate, criticizing immigration politics.

Although the autumn of 2015 was an extraordinary situation, it was not the first time religious communities were involved in supporting refugees. Rather, this has been an important role for centuries given that religion has a significant role in the life of many displaced people's lives. For many, churches and mosques are a safe haven and for many, religion and the religious communities can provide strength in difficult times as well as a help in integrating into new societies.[45]

3 Materials and Method

In line with the overriding aim of this article; to investigate what role local religious communities took and how they balanced their religious, social and critical role in the support of refugees during 2015, an interview study was conducted. Using semi-structured qualitative interviews, representatives from five different Christians and Muslim local congregations in a large city in Sweden were interviewed. Interviews were held in Swedish and an exploratory approach was assumed.

3.1 Material

The five congregations were purposefully selected based on a number of selection criteria. Firstly, a majority of previous studies have studied specific denominations and religions, such as merely the Church of Sweden or Muslim congregations. Given the increasing number of different denominations in Sweden, congregations from several denominations were included in this study in order to pay attention to their different identities. This was not least seen as particularly important given that in government documents, religious communities are often described as one homogenous group, despite indications of considerable differences between religious communities. Secondly, Muslim congregations were purposefully included in the study. In terms of religious communities in Sweden, they are a large growing group and it has been highlighted in previous research that when studying Islam in Sweden, this should be studied in the context of religion and religious communities as a whole, in

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44 Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015*. Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.
45 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2011): Introduction: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement, *Journal of Refugee Studies, 24*(3), p. 429-439.; Snyder, S. (2011): Un/settling Angels: Faith Based organisation and Asylum seeking in the UK. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 24*(3), p 565-585.

order to limit the view of Muslim communities as different, thereby increasing alienation.[46] Thirdly, many studies and reports regarding social work from religious communities have merely included congregations that are active in providing social support meaning that there is a considerable risk of a biased description of religious communities.[47] Therefore, no selection was made based on a prerequisite knowledge of how the organisations acted during the events of 2015. Instead, local congregations from three of the largest religious families in Sweden; two Muslim congregations, one congregation from the Church of Sweden and two free churches, were chosen. Lastly, the congregations chosen were local congregations in one of the larger cities in Sweden that received most refugees during the crisis.[48] The increase of newly arrived refugees affected local communities and congregations considerably and although the whole of Sweden was affected, certain cities were affected to a larger degree.

Combined, therefore, five local religious communities from three religious families in a larger Swedish city were chosen to be included in this study. All religious congregations that were asked to participate agreed to take part. Below is a short description of each of the five local congregations.

A large Islamic culture centre – a large local Muslim congregation based in a purpose-built mosque. The mosque has a variety of activities ranging from daily prayers and religious rituals to plenty of social activities, open-days for the public and education programs. Although mostly Sunni, the mosque is open to all, regardless of religious background. It is connected to one of the Islamic umbrella organisations. (Respondents M1 and M2)

A medium-sized Islamic culture centre – a medium-sized Muslim congregation, located in a large rented office building. The organisation is Sunni, performing religious rites, prayers, worship, etc. Currently, the largest project is raising funds for building a new purpose-built mosque. Is connected to one of the Islamic federations. (Respondent M3)

A Pentecostal congregation – a congregation connected to the Swedish Pentecostal movement. Are predominantly involved in organising worship, youth clubs, bible groups, etc. Collaborates with other Pentecostal congregations and have a long history as a movement in Sweden involved in social support. (Respondent P1)

A Church of Sweden congregation – a part of Church of Sweden, the largest church in Sweden, that was previously a part of the state. This local congregation is focused

46 Larsson, G. (2013): *Islam och muslimer i Sverige - en Kunskapsöversikt*. Stockholm: The commission for government support for faith communities (SST).
47 Fridolfsson, C. & Elander, I. (2012): Faith-based Organisations and Welfare State Retrenchment in Sweden: Substitute or Complement. *Politics and Religion, 5*, p. 634-654.
48 Asp, V. (2017): *Frivilligresurser under flyktingsituationen: Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer och trossamfunds förmåga att möta samhällets behov hösten 2015*. Stockholm: Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies) Agency, MSB.

on worship and preforming religious rituals. They are also active in organising several different social projects. (Respondents S1 and S2)

An Independent Free church congregation – a very multicultural, charismatic independent church. Organises daily worship services, prayer groups, lunches for homeless people, missionary work, etc. Contrary to the other congregations, they do not receive any funding from the state. (Respondent I1)

3.2 Method

Seven semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with leaders and centrally placed representatives and employees of the organisations. One of the Christian and one of the Muslim communities were larger than the others and in those two communities; two people from each organisation were interviewed. In order to ascertain that the interviewee, to the best of their ability, represented the organisation, only representatives centrally placed in the organisation and who had worked there for more than five years, were included.

Contact with the organisations was originally taken through both e-mail and phone in which the purpose of the study was described. Meetings were then held with the organisations to further answer any questions, particularly surrounding the difficulties of anonymity that could arise. Written consent was collected from the interviewees. Due to the interviewees being seen as representatives of the organisations, representing the organisations opinions and experiences, rather than their own, no factors such as age, gender and profession were included in the analysis. The purpose of the study was not to organisations but rather to find possible variations in the experiences of the organisations.

Using a semi-structured approach, variations between the different interviews was possible. Whilst some themes and common questions were asked in every interview, given the different perspectives and ideas raised by the different individuals, interviews varied although were centred around the aim of the study. In order to obtain as much information and detail as possible, interviews were conducted in a conversational manner, also resulting in differing lengths and focus from 40 minutes to 70 minutes.

The interviews were analyzed using content analysis, a method in which both manifest and latent content can be revealed.[49] The interviews were transcribed verbatim after each interview had been carried out and coded. After transcription, the texts were read through several times in order to obtain a general impression and broad understanding of the text. The material was then read in depth and theme and cate-

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49 Nelson, C. Robert, H. Woods, Jr. (2014): Content analysis. In Stausberg, M. & Engler, S. *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. New York: Routledge, p. 109-122.

gories, according to the aim of the study, were identified. In order to validate the findings, the themes and categories identified were discussed with a fellow researcher. Illuminating quotes are presented in the results to clarify how the empiric data supports the analysis.

3.3 Ethical considerations

This study has followed the ethical guidelines as stipulated within the chosen method. Amongst others, the four main criteria, as specified by the Swedish Research Council; information, agreement, confidentiality and usability have been followed (Swedish Research Council).

All participants in this study were asked to participate personally by the author of this study. All participants were informed regarding their rights to withdraw their participation at any time before or during the interviews. They were also informed regarding their anonymity and in regard to this aspect; the information about each organisation and the organisation's activities is limited.

3.4 Method Discussion

As mentioned previously, there is a lack of systematic research regarding religious communities as a group in Sweden. Therefore, there are very few indications of how different congregations balanced their roles during an acute crisis. With this in mind, this study, rather than attempting to conclusively determine the roles of all Swedish religious communities during the refugee crisis, aims to produce an insight into how local congregations from a diverse number of religions and denominations acted and balanced their roles. For this reason, religious congregations from different denominations and religions were purposefully chosen, meaning that although the sample was small, it is relatively representable. However, despite this, it cannot be determined that differing results wouldn't be obtained if more individuals were interviewed, more congregations were included or if the study was repeated in other parts of Sweden.

Most importantly, the size of the sample limits the analyses that can be accomplished. The internal diversity within each denomination can vary considerably, especially within the church of Sweden and this must be considered in regard to the results presented. However, given the lack of research within this area, there is a need to compare denominations and give indications for future research in the field. Therefore, despite this study being based on a relatively small sample, it could also be argued that given the purposeful selection and the exploratory approach of the study, the interviewed representatives can be seen as not only representing their organisation but also indicating the direction within the religious denomination. Therefore,

whilst not producing a comprehensive, national description, the results from this study can be viewed as a foundation for an interpretative framework for understanding how religious communities act during an acute crisis.

4 Results and Analysis

In the analysis of the interviews, an important, common theme permeated throughout. All of respondents, regardless of denomination, highlighted the central role the congregations play in society, especially in the integration and supporting of newly arrived refugees. They all report, although in very different ways, that religious communities are a vital part of civil society, especially in integrating, welcoming and showing hospitality to newcomers. All the studied local congregations want to take part in working for the common good in society, albeit in very different ways. The events of 2015 also highlighted the representatives' belief in that religious communities will take a greater role in civil society, given the difficulties experienced by the state. This change was generally viewed with optimism by all organisations, further highlighting the ambition to take a larger societal role.

Although all of the studied religious communities argue that they have a vital role to play in supporting and integrating newcomers, as well as reporting that they have a large role to play in society, their approach differs. Whilst some religious communities see themselves as a resource to society, grounded in religion, others view themselves as a place of mainly community building, mission and being an alternative voice. These differences and diversity in how religious communities relate to the secular state also seemed to govern how their role transpired during the refugee crisis. Perhaps due to this, the role and actions religious communities took during the acute situation of 2015 largely seems to depend upon how they see their role and function in society in general. I.e. there seems to be a strong similarity between how they view their role in a state of normality and their role in a state of emergency, rather than adopting a different balancing of roles during acute situations. This also seemed to have effects on the collaboration with the surrounding society and other civil society actors as well as their relationship to the state.

As will be seen below, the resulting analysis from the interviews indicate three possible ideal type groupings of religious communities; *Emergency Responders*, *Community-based Continuers* and *Spiritual Integrators*. All three groups differ in their attitudes towards their societal, religious and advocacy role, as exemplified in their actions and experiences during the refugee crisis of 2015. With regards to the three roles, for each group these are summarized and compared in the table below in order to facilitate comparisons between the groups (Table 1). Following the table, each group will be presented in detail.

Table 1: Ideal type groups of religious communities in relation to their actions during the refugee crisis of 2015

	Emergency Responder	Community-based Continuer	Spiritual Integrators
Social role	Social actions were vital. Took a large social role during the refugee crisis, clearly identifying themselves as an integral part of the surrounding society, thereby acting similarly to other non-religious civil society organisations. Collaborated with a large number of organisations across society and engaged large numbers of volunteers.	Their support to newcomers was intensified during the autumn of 2015 in partnership with other similar congregations. The social role was strongly connected to a sense of community in which worship and prayers were important tools in helping and integrating individuals.	Had a limited social role and were largely uninvolved during the refugee crisis. Supported newly arrived by inviting them to prayer and worship. Focused on inspiring members to do good deeds in society.
Religious role	Whilst religion was a foundation for the Organisation, religious activities were largely separated during social activities. Many of the volunteers had no previous connections to the congregations.	The religious role was highly integrated in all work for the organisation, regardless of activities. Volunteers were part of the congregation and partnerships were mainly with congregations of the same background.	The religious role was highly integrated in all activities, with the aim of changing people's hearts and deepening their faith.
Advocacy	They argued that actions speak louder than words and some of the respondents were very wary of criticising government policies. They were generally positive to partnership with the surrounding society and the state.	This group challenged asylum policies regularly and were active in the public debate. They saw problems of combining their religious values with society's values. In this aspect, they saw themselves as an alternative religious voice in society.	They were somewhat critical to asylum policies. Mainly they wanted to take a greater role in the public debate based on their "religious values" that they argued stood in contrast to the values of the surrounding society.

4.1 Emergency responder

The first group, including the large Islamic culture centre and a local Church of Sweden congregation, were quick to respond to the acute situation of 2015, focusing on giving emergency support to transit refugees and social help in supporting and integrating newcomers. Critically, however, not only did the included organisations react quickly during the refugee crisis, but this is not different to their activities during times of normality. Being a societal actor appears to be central role for them and a large part of their work is social and their social activities are often separated from their religious activities.

> I would say that 95% isn't religious. Perhaps 5, 10% is religious, the rest is social help, helping schools, children, family, etc. That is our strength. (M1)

Whilst this type of claim could indicate that these organisations are merely social civil society actors, it is important to note that worship and praying is the foundation and inspiration of everything they do.

> Nothing we do attracts as many visitors as our services, so that's central. That also has a strong social grounding which is very healing. We could of course just be a place for social help but during worship and prayers, that's when the magic happens! (S1)

One of the Imams that were interviewed also pointed out that religion is at the core of their organisation. However, their religious identity is formative which could explain their large focus on social engagement.

> We are religious and above all we're a religious organisation. However, our view and interpretation of religion is wider, more flexible. Our activities are religious, cultural and social. (M2)

In this societal role, thereby further enhancing the focus on social role, a sense of inclusion is obvious. There is a clear disregard of religious denomination amongst those who need help or those who volunteer with them, all are welcome. This meant hundreds of volunteers were engaged, including many that had no connection to them before the autumn of 2015.

> If you look at the volunteers, there are three separate groups. First, those who were already involved in the congregation, like the choir that took part in making up the beds at night. Then there was a group that went from one reception unit to another and to where their help was needed the most. Then the third group, that was also the most exciting! In this last group, there were people who said 'I haven't been to church for 30 years, but now it's become a relevant place for me again!' (S1)

Their social work during the crisis drew people from all over society to come and work with them. The focus was not placed on what religious values that differentiates them

as a religious actor from the rest of society, but rather of what united them with the rest of society.

> I think some groups are different from each other but I'm quite sure that we human beings are considerably more alike than different, regardless of religion or background. There are human values and these values unify people. (M2)

This social, inclusive attitude was clear in their response to the influx of newcomers during the autumn of 2015, when both the mosque and church supported hundreds of transit refugees and organised plenty of social activities for newcomers and asylum seekers. For the large mosque it was natural to get involved, not least as they also in times of normality see themselves as being a societal crisis resource.

> If there is a crisis, we just open the door and welcome people in. There's a roof over their heads, toilets, water, and more. You can survive one night, two nights and more during a crisis. It's easy! We have a big building and we just open up! This can work at any time. During a crisis or an emergency, Mosques can change! (M2)

For the congregations in this group, social activities, collaborations and partnerships with a large number of civil society organisations, as well as the local council and different government agencies, were already in place prior to the refugee crisis. These collaborations and networks merely continued and were intensified during the autumn of 2015.The large mosque, for example, had a long history of actively supporting refugees and asylum seekers. When comparing themselves to other civil society organisations, as well as the state, the respondents mentioned several advantages. Most notably, a unique flexibility to act quickly compared to others, as well as language, religious and cultural skills that helps in welcoming newcomers.

> We're a big organisation but we don't have to wait for decisions to be taken. In some situations, we can just act and that's an advantage. Not having to wait. You just make a decision and keep going. (M1)

The local Church of Sweden congregation lacked the same experience in relation to refugees and chose therefore to collaborate actively with other organisations, including Muslim organisations, given their competency in culture and language, aspects that their church was missing. The congregation received some internal criticism regarding the partnership and by collaborating in this unconventional manor, as well as the fact that the church was opened for refugees, rather than for worship. However, generally, the partnership was strongly supported, not least through social media where also a recruitment of volunteers took place, meaning that the church took a very active social role during the events of 2015.

Although the societal role taken during the refugee crisis, for both the Muslim and Christian congregation, was largely a continuation of their role in times of normality, the crisis affected the organisations, albeit in different ways. For the local

church of Sweden congregation, the collaboration with other partners and recruitment of volunteers meant that many experienced a renewal of the organisation and the representatives experienced that the church had again became relevant in a modern context. For the larger mosque, however, not all effects were positive. The active and prominent social role meant that the mosque was centrally placed in the media spotlight, meaning that their work suddenly became visible in the society. This has encouraged them to more openly try to show the Swedish society what they do.

> In 2015 we became visible in the media. Before 2015 we hadn't shown society what we do. So now we regularly organise open house meetings where we show visitors the activities we do. We want people to see what role we are taking in society and that's fantastic! (M1)

However, along with the more visible role, they also experience that they receive more suspicion from media, politician and society at large, predominantly with claims that they are trying to infiltrate society and are an extremist Islamic organisation. Aspects that affect both the organisation and their members very negatively.

> When you start being visible in the media, they say, 'ah, they're trying to get their religion into our society' (M1)

As with almost all respondents in this study, the respondents in this group want to improve the Swedish society. However, contrary to the other two groups, in this group all the respondents highlight the importance of being a part in the society, working together with the state, local councils and other civil society actors. As one respondent argues, although these organisations are clearly based on their faith, in many ways the religious aspect of these religious communities is hidden, therefore differing themselves very little from other civil society actors.

> When we talk about what we do, they [other civil society actors] are surprised that it isn't just religious activities that we do, but rather the same work as them. This is a change, but this is also normal, it just hasn't been visible. (M1)

Perhaps due to the strong identification as a societal actor, working alongside other actors and the local council, there seems to be an unwillingness to criticize immigrations policies, etc. Although they did criticize the changed asylum rules by signing or organising petitions, compared to the other two groups, there was an unwillingness to get involved in the public debate. Rather, they preferred to let their actions speak louder, meaning that change could not be accomplished by writing debate articles. Rather than criticising, the respondents highlighted the importance of respecting the Swedish state and current laws, focusing on supporting those present in Sweden.

> We help those who are here and try not to get involved in those who aren't. We try not to get involved. We've signed a few petitions regarding the rights to asylum and that's important. But we have to follow the law and accept what the government and parliament decide. (M2)

In summary, this group, clearly took a very active social role during the events of 2015, acting as an emergency responder similar to many other civil society organisations and in partnership with others. Whilst the actions during the refugee crisis were comprehensive, they were in fact merely intensifying the social role they already take in a state of normality. Their religious activities are often separated from their social work both in a state of emergency and normality, making it easy to collaborate with other organisations and engage volunteers from outside the congregations. However, religion is an important foundation and a fundamental part of their work even if it is not always visible. With regards to their advocacy role, there is some visibility in the signing of petitions, but this group is clearly the least critical group towards the state and surrounding society. This seems to coincide with their view of being closely integrated in society. For the local Church of Sweden congregation, this is unsurprising given the long history as the state church. The Islamic culture centre, who lacks this history, are regardless keen to highlight their wish to be an integrated part of society, working alongside society and to ensure that they are not mistaken for a more conservative and extremist part of Islam.

4.2 Community-based Continuers

This second group, whilst also active during the events of 2015, compared to the *Emergency Responders* the manner in which this was accomplished was clearly different. During the refugee crisis, *Emergency Responders* collaborated with other civil society organisations, regardless of whether these were secular or religious, and regardless of denomination. In this group, including the local Pentecostal congregation, however, collaboration was centred on partnerships with other similar religious organisations in projects that were already established. Although the social role increased in intensity during the refugee crisis, the central role was clearly integration through the organisation's community and through worship. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the fact that services were translated to several different languages. By doing so, not only were newly arrived refugees welcomed and integrated into the community, but they were also given comfort in coping with their experiences.

> During the autumn of 2015, a Syrian man who had arrived in Sweden on the Saturday evening could take part in the service on the Sunday. I just think that's amazing! He could be a part of the worship, the congregation, and could be comforted. He'd lost his whole family and was all alone. That still touches me. (P1)

Throughout, the importance of highlighting the role religion in integration, as well as in the support of newly-arrived refugees, is clear for *Community-based Continuers*. Due to the importance of religion amongst many refugees, this group report that they speak the same "religious language", thereby facilitating the process of integration in the Swedish society.

> I think the church, and this is my point, has a big role because we speak the same language as them [the refugees]. They understand us and we understand them and we can explain that not everyone in Sweden thinks in this way. (P1)

With regards to the refugee crisis, the social role of the *Community-based Continuers* was based on the same principals. The traditional view has been to be actively engaged in societal issues, especially with regards to those most marginalized by society. During the refugee crisis, the refugees were those most in need, therefore the *Community-based Continuers* saw that a gap needed to be filled.

> Historically, we've taken a huge responsibility. Not because we haven't trusted the state but because there's always been a need, a gap, that has led to people losing out. It's that gap that we can fill. Not just historically, but now and with the refugee crisis (P1)

This principal, i.e. filling a gap left by the state, is similar to the attitudes and responses given by *Emergency Responders*. In similarity to *Emergency Responders*, *Community-based Continuers* declared that they have no personal agenda. Rather, they see themselves as a supportive organisation to the state.

> How are all of these people going to be integrated? I don't think the state and municipality can cope by themselves and that's when we have to step in. We need to get people integrated in society and into work. I would say we have the same agenda as the state. We want to help people into work rather than living on hand-outs. That's also what the bible tells us; that we have to work, do what's right and be a blessing for the country and place you live in. (P1)

However, as mentioned above, the two groups differ in regard to how the religious role interconnected with the social role. This is clearly visible during the support of newcomers, where talking about faith-related issues during social work was seen as natural and important, for example in having a prayer when visiting a reception unit that they support. Also in the approach to the societal role, the importance of a central religious message amongst *Community-based Continuers* is clear, not least due to the fact that a large part of the social work is performed in collaboration, or with the blessing, of national councils within the same denomination.

A central aspect in the support of refugees, as well as others in need of help and support, is the driving force of wanting to help. In the interviews it was clear that they had experienced that both members of the congregation, as well as other members of the public, expected them to take an active role. For example, clothes were left outside the church which were then distributed by the congregation to those in need. A central aspect, therefore, was of instead not waiting to be asked by society, but rather actively taking a societal role, purposefully placing themselves in the forefront of a changing society.

> We haven't been given a responsibility from the municipality! We've taken a responsibility! I haven't experienced that the municipality have actively given us any responsibility. Sweden is a very socialist country, it's not the responsibility of the civil society to do things. Rather it's the

> responsibility of the municipality. You shouldn't help the poor, because that's the responsibility of the state. In many ways that's a good thing but it also leads to things like loneliness. (P1)

Whilst clearly supportive of the state, there appears to be no conflict to simultaneously be critical towards the state and their policies. In the Pentecostal tradition, it would seem that there rather is an expectation to combine a societal role with a critical voice. During, as well as after the refugee crisis, the congregation, in line with their national councils, heavily criticised the state regarding the changed asylum rules. Together with others within the same denomination, several debate articles have been written standing up against the changing refugee politics, arguing for generous asylum rules but also taking a stand against all form of Islamic extremism. Taking an active standpoint in these issues is seen as natural, particularly with regards to their religious backbone. In other words, also in their role as a critical voice, religion is central, governing the choices made by the organisation.

> It's about having generous laws regarding asylum seekers. It's about welcoming people. It's about the excessive fear of other people. That's what it's about. That's the message of love. (P1)

Although this central role of religion is of upmost importance for this group, it is also clear that there are problems combining this with their social role. Whilst the respondents observe that civil society actors increasingly are given a greater role in society, this developed is in one sense limiting the freedom in the societal role. Specifically, they experience that alongside state expectations of religious communities taking a bigger role, there are also indications that their faith and religious values are not welcomed.

> We react when they want to change us, our opinions! They want us to change how we work, that we should do things their way. But we have been given a role from the bible. Even if you don't want to see it as religious, our way of working is based on experience from thousands of years. (P1)

For this group, therefore, there is a complex paradox given that their willingness to support marginalized groups is based heavily on their religious identity and values. When these religious values differed from society at large, they argued that these differences could potentially generate considerable conflicts with regards to an increased supporting role.

In summary, this group mainly intensified their already ongoing work in partnering with other congregations within the same denomination. On the local level, their main focus was to welcome newcomers through their services, an approach traditionally used. Their social role is largely based on welcoming people into their community in worship and prayer groups as they argue that they share the same religious language and values of many newcomers. Their religious activities are therefore integrated in all of their social activities and at the core of their work. This group has openly challenged the changing asylum policies and see themselves as an alternative

voice. This is problematic in that they want to take a greater role in civil society whilst simultaneously arguing that there is a narrowing space for them to act given that they are religious actors with visible religious values.

4.3 Spiritual Integrators

Compared to the previous two groups; *Emergency Responders* and *Community-based Continuers*, this group *Spiritual Integrators* differs considerably. Whilst *Emergency Responders* seems to use religion/spirituality as a foundation, and *Community-based Continuers*, including the medium-sized Islamic culture centre and the independent, free church, seem to use religion as a central compass, *Spiritual Integrators* seem to rather use religion as a tool for improving society.

In similarity to the previous groups, the respondents within this group see themselves having a critical role in integrating newly arrived asylum seekers into the Swedish society. However, in terms of "how" a successful integration occurs, this group differs greatly. Specifically, integration is seen to occur through *spiritual integration.* By attending praying or worship, the respondents argue that refugees and new citizen will integrate into the Swedish society and become better citizens. Particularly the respondents from the local Mosque argued that through the Mosque is it possible for newly arrived people to find social and cultural attachments, i.e. connections to the individual's roots.

> I imagine that people who meditate, who can find themselves, can also find an inner peace and meaning in life and can then give back and function better in society. It reminds me of a quote from a French philosopher who said 'if you don't want to build juvenile detention centres, build Mosques'. That's how it is if everything works. Integration. Having roots. (M3)

In other words, for this group, before any other commitments, be they social or critical, the religious role is highly prioritized. A similar attitude was seen amongst the respondents from the Independent church where the central, prioritized role was to work to change people's lives from the inside. Whilst this in turn leads to social activities such as supporting the homeless, bible classes, etc., these activities seem to be a tool in reaching this goal, rather than being the goal in itself.

> We work with what is most difficult; changing people's hearts. All of society is blindly searching for their basic values (I1)

In similarity to the previous two groups, this group's role and reaction during the refugee crisis mirrors the attitudes and roles apparent during a state of normality. Although they mention a willingness to actively take a social role, a lack of financing as well as a wish to highlight their religious views, meant that as organisations, very few specific social actions were performed. However, whilst the organisations in this

group did little in the response to refugees in the autumn of 2015, members communities were active, with the moral support from the organisation.

> Those who come here, they're involved [in helping refugees] in their work or through other organisations, but they are rooted in their Christian values. They come here to get inspired, to gain strength, in order to continue their work. (I1)

Although they gave moral support, for the organisations, it would seem that they rather saw that specific acute help was given by other organisations who have this as their central role. For example, no refugees were allowed to sleep in the Mosque due to security issues. Also, rather than giving out donated clothes directly to refugees, these clothes were sent to other secular charity organisations. These examples highlight the self-experienced role of predominantly being a religious actor, albeit with societal connections and knowledge. This attitude is also true in times of normality when the Mosque is a place where individuals ask for help, support or advice. Whilst happy to help in pointing people in the right direction, they are clear that solving the issues at hand is not their responsibility.

> Many of the refugees don't trust the Swedish authorities, they're used to authorities being corrupt. So they come to us and ask us about all kinds of things and we tell them, if you need help you can apply for that with the social services. But they're always welcome to come and ask. (M3)

A consequence of adopting this stance seems to be that the organisations have very few collaborative partners and are relatively isolated from the state and society at large. Whilst the refugee crisis highlighted the needs of individuals as well as the demands on religious civil society organisations to step in and take a larger responsibility, the way in which this responsibility is taken on, differs greatly from *Emergency Responders* and *Community-based Continuers*. Rather than supporting from a societal perspective, one of the organisations has now started missionary work (through for example concerts and charity work) in the less well-off suburbs. Expanding in this manner, however, highlights the paradox of being a civil society organisation where the religious identity is central in all other fields of work. Any expansion in their societal role, whether this is related to supporting refugees or starting schools, will be grounded in their religious identity and values. This does not hinder them from wanting to take a greater role as a social actor in civil society and also take a greater role in the public debate. However, the organisations experience that these attempts at societal expansion or public debate are increasingly met with a considerably tougher climate in the public debate, as well as, in regard to the Muslim community, islamophobia.

> In Sweden you can talk about everything but not religion! In the future we hope that Mosques will have an opportunity to debate and discuss using our arguments. We're not there yet but when the opportunity arises, it will be interesting. (M3)

Very similar views were seen amongst the respondents from the Independent church, clearly showing the observed differences in values and the feeling of restrictions in their civil rights by society.

> We like to talk about the 'narrowing of society's corridors'. In these corridors are accepted values and points of view, and these are increasingly becoming fewer. If you step outside of the corridor you're quickly labelled as an idiot in the societal debate. At least that's what we experience (I1)

In summary, this group differs the most from the two other groups in terms of what role they took during the acute situation of 2015, given that their social support to newcomers was very limited. However, this group argues that they play a vital role both by inspiring their members to become good human beings and therefore performing good deeds in society, for example by welcoming newcomers, but also that their religious activities help to integrate newcomers into society by becoming good citizens. The religious role is highly integrated in all their work in regard to integration and they highlight their importance as an alternative voice, standing up for religious values in society and therefore working with advocacy. However, in similarity to the *Community-based Continuers*, they claim that there is a narrowing space for them in proclaiming their religious values in the public debate.

5 Discussion

The aim of this study was to investigate the role religious communities took during the so -called refugee crisis of 2015 and how they balanced their religious, social and critical role in the support of refugees. Based on the interviews conducted with representatives of different religious congregation a number of important results have been presented. One of the most central findings in this study is the diversity in how religious communities reacted to the refugee crisis. Whilst the visibility of religious communities greatly increased during the autumn of 2015 and some did respond quickly, some chose to merely continue practicing their traditional role of being a place of worship and organising religious activities. Crucially, although clear differences in the role and actions taken by the local congregations in the study were evident, these were not random. Rather, it would seem that the actions taken during a state of emergency are largely governed by how an organisation perceives itself during a state of normality.

Regardless of how the different local congregation acted, in line with previous research regarding the new visible role of religious organisations in civil society in Sweden and Europe, most of the respondents reported that they in different ways want to take a more active role in civil society. This includes increasing their social activities and acknowledging that they have a vital role to play in integrating newly arrived. Crucially, this active, social role seems to be taken, rather than given from

the state. Perhaps as a consequence, the form of the social role differed considerably between the different congregations in the study. The role and function played by the different religious communities, therefore, seems to be highly dependent on how they view their role in larger society, as integrated or as more separated from society, as a promotor of their religious values or of "society's values". It also seems to depend upon their religious identity. In other words, the results from this study regarding the social role and function of religious communities during the refugee crisis seem to also represent the views on their roles in civil society in a general sense.

With regards to how they view their relationship between state and religion, the *Emergency Responders*, for example, describe themselves as a central part of society where although religion is at the core of their social role, the visibility is limited. Collaboration with both the state and other civil society organisations is common and they clearly aim to be integrated in the Swedish society. Interestingly, whilst this could be merely coincidental, the *Emergency Responders* are decidedly less critical of the state than the other two groups. In the two more critical groups a feeling of being pressured from the state is apparent, where the state is almost described as "anti-religious", therefore obviously making collaboration more challenging. They are more open in criticizing the state both in terms of refugee policies but also more generally. An integration with the broader society seems to be less important compared to the *Emergency Responders* and rather than reducing the visibility of their religious identity and values, these are highlighted as different from the surrounding secular society. Perhaps therefore, collaboration is almost solely with other similar religious organisations. This result is interesting for several reasons, as the contract between religion and state is changing, it would seem that the growing regulation of religion by the Swedish state is affecting some of the religious communities greatly. There is a general fear that the space for them in shrinking in society in terms of their ability and freedom to express their religious values as this seems to challenge the supposed secular homogeneity of the Swedish society. Despite these difficulties, all representatives in all interviewed congregations agreed that religious communities have an important role to play in society and no one reported a view that religious communities should become more separated from society but rather report that they see themselves as an important part of civil society. However, the underlying conflict, with growing tension between some organisations and the state is apparent and this needs to be studied further.

Although the results of this study are limited, the different forms of religious identity, visible between the groups, could be described as some of the congregations having a more liberal, and others a more conservative, view on religion. The scale made by Monsma[50] can also be helpful as it differentiates between when the religious ele-

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50 Monsma, S. V. (2003): Nonprofit and faith-based welfare-to-work programs. Springer, S.V. Society (2003) 40: 13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-003-1047-3.

ments are integrated or separated from the religious organisation's social work. Simplified, the more liberal the form, the simpler it would seem for an organisation to merely have a foundation in religion and to separate religious activities when one is in a social context and role. Likewise, with a conservative religious form, disregarding religious activity, even temporarily, seems to be viewed as unnatural and religion is a highly integrated part in all of their activities. An interesting finding, although the empirical evidence in this paper is limited, is that this seems to transgress different religions. Importantly, however, the religious dimension should not be understood in a narrow and static manner when discussed in this manner but rather understood in a broader sense, in terms of social, political and spiritual dimensions of religion. For some, therefore, this would mean that the religious dimension is to mission and transform people's hearts and debating societal issues with religious values. For others the religious dimension is the core and the foundation for social or political action.

Although the religious communities in the study differ considerably in how they express their mission and identity, given their differences in regard to their history and religious background, this is largely unsurprising. Instead, the historical context of the organisations most likely plays a substantial role in their actions and how they view their role. The local Church of Sweden congregation, for example, has a strong historical bond to the state, given that the separation only relatively recently occurred. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that the organisation still has difficulties in criticising the state. Similarly, the Free Churches in Sweden have historically seen charity and missionary as two process that are combined, a combination also seen during the refugee crisis. Also, perhaps most importantly, the Free Churches were founded independent of the state and they still clearly identify with this independent role.

Combined, therefore, this study clearly shows the complexity in discussing different roles of religious communities in a unified manner. Depending upon several different inherent orginisational factors, or even the organisation's basic values, religious communities seem to have viewed their role very differently during the refugee crisis. Whilst some worked alongside and in a similar manner to other civil society actors, thereby receiving the media spotlight and becoming visible, others preferred to focus on their religious role and therefore stayed out of the spotlight. However, these groups, it can be argued, attempted to take the media spotlight through their critical role. Due to the important role of media in increasing visibility, for many outside of the religious communities, including the state, it may be that only the social role of the *Emergency Responders* was seen and therefore their work came to define how religious communities acted during the refugee crisis. Whilst no attempts at quantification can be made from the results of this study, the results do suggest that the media-highlighted role of the *Emergency Responders* perhaps only represents a smaller part of all the work accomplished by religious communities during the autumn of 2015. This suggest that there is need to continue the study of the different faces of religiously motivated action in civil society.

As highlighted previously, regarding the approach to their roles, there appears to be little that distinguishes Muslim or Christian organisations from each other. Rather, other factors, irrespective of religion seem to play a larger role. However, some important factors differentiated the Muslim organisations from the Christian, with regards to the refugee crisis. Given that a large majority of the received refugees were from Muslim dominated countries, from a language, culture and religious perspective, the Muslim organisations took a particularly important role. However, despite being grouped differently (one organisation was categorized as an *Emergency Responder* and the other as a *Spiritual Integrator*), both experienced an increase in islamophobia regardless of whether very little social work was done and a greater focus was placed on religion, or whether religion was set aside and focus was on the social role. This is interesting from several different aspects. Primarily, however, it highlights the fact that it would indicate that the form or role taken by a Muslim congregation has a limited effect on the public response. Whether there is a lose-lose situation for Muslim religious communities, i.e. if a Muslim organisation is societally involved they are suspected of trying to infiltrate society, but if they choose to not get involved they are critivised for placing themselves outside of society, needs to be studied further.

6 Conclusions

In conclusion, the results show that local congregations in Sweden, during the refugee crisis of 2015, acted and functioned in a manner strongly connected to how they view their role in society. I.e. the actions taken during a state of emergency by religious communities seems to be a representation of how they view their role in a state of normality. Contrary to the promoted view, therefore, this study can show a considerable diversity in regard to the content and balancing of roles during the refugee crisis, as highlighted in the three ideal types. The difference in how they combine the roles, therefore clearly illustrates the complexity in presenting religious communities as one homogenous group. Whilst this study does not attempt to claim that all religious communities in Sweden can be categorized as in the results of this study, the results do provide an interpretive framework. This framework indicates key potential conflicts that may constitute an analytical point of departure for further research on the roles of religious communities in late modern societies.

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Ahmed Kulanić

The Islamic community in the secular state: its organisation, role, position, and functioning – a case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1 The Islamic tradition of Bosniaks and Bosnian Islam

The continuous presence of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) dates back to the early fifteenth century.[1] During Ottoman times, according to Ottoman censuses, the majority population in BiH was Muslim[2], while due to the wars and migrations, the first census organised by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1879 indicated that Ortho-dox Christians had become the majority[3]. During the first (1918–1941) and the second (1945–1992) Yugoslavia, Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims) were the largest group in BiH but, due to different socio-political circumstances, did not constitute a majority in any region.[4] According to the last census of BiH (2013), 50.1 per cent of citizens are Bosniaks (roughly 1.8 million out of 3,531,159, while 50.7 per cent are followers of Is-lam in the confessional sense), meaning that Bosniaks again form a majority in BiH.[5]

Over the course of a long history – from Ottoman times and Islamisation, to the rule of Austro-Hungarian Empire (1878–1918) and the migrations, and in the first and thes econd Yugoslavia and religious suppression – Bosnian Muslims have been de-veloping their identity, culture, and tradition, which are unique among Muslim world cultures. As a consequence of the last aggression on BiH, i.e. the Bosnian War (1992–1995), for the first time in history Bosnian Muslims have migrated westward, and even religious and devout Muslims have preferred Western countries to those with Muslim majority populations, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.[6] Therefore, it has been justifiably argued that Bosniak or Bosnian Muslims represent a native or indig-enous Muslim community in Europe that has its own unique tradition, culture, and

1 Imamović, M. (1998): Historija Bošnjaka, Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture "Preporod".

2 Handžić, H. M. (1940): Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine i porijeklo bosansko-hercegovačkih mus-limana, Sarajevo: Islamska dionička štamparija: p. 38.

3 McCarthy, J. (1996): "Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878," in Pinson, Mark (ed.), The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press: p. 81.

4 Filandra, Š. (1998): Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija: p. 157.

5 Federalni zavod za statistiku (2016): Census of population, households and dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013, Sarajevo: FZS.

6 Emirhafizović, M., et al. (ed.) (2013): Migrations From Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: Ministry of Human rights and refugees and Faculty of Political Sciences.

understanding of Islamic teaching while still belonging to the *umma*, i.e. the collective worldwide Muslim community.[7] Thus, as the most Western organised Muslim community and as the majority population in BiH, Bosniaks have been the subject of many studies conducted by local and international scholars. However, most of the literature involves historical analyses based on archives and secondary sources as well as some anthropological studies, while few studies have been based on primary sources and data collected through empirical research.

Thus, Caner Sancaktar has studied and examined the historical construction and development of the Bosniak nation and Bosniak identity. According to him, the Bosniak nation and Bosniak national identity are products of historical processes that have lasted for centuries. Major historical events and phases that have shaped and affected the historical construction and development of the Bosniak nation are as follows: (1) the Islamisation process in BiH during the Ottoman Empire; (2) the Bosnian Muslim rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s; (3) the armed resistance and political opposition of Bosniaks against the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries and the foundation of the Muslim National Organisation in 1906; (4) the political opposition of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, established in 1919 against Serbian and Croatian nationalism within the first Yugoslavia, in the 1920s and 1930s; (5) clashes between Bosniaks and Chetniks (Serbian paramilitary forces) and between Bosniaks and Ustashas (Croatian paramilitary forces) during the Second World War; (6) official recognition of the Bosniak nation as one of six constituent republics in socialist Yugoslavia (the second Yugoslavia) under the 'Muslim' national name; (7) the significant economic, political, social, and cultural progress of the Bosniak nation in the second Yugoslavia; (8) the foundation of the Party of Democratic Action prior to the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia; (9) Bosniak armed resistance against Serbian and Croatian militaristic nationalism during the Bosnian War; (10) post-Dayton BiH, in which Bosniak political elites have taken on influential political roles; and (11) newspapers, magazines, journals, and periodicals published by Bosniak intellectuals, associations, and political parties from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until today.[8]

Along this line and in the context of Bosniak national identity, Željko Boneta and Boris Banovac claim that the process of odernisation that took place in socialist Yugoslavia,which brought about the process of secularisation, changed the essence of-Bosnian Muslim identity such that 'Muslim' as a national name lost its link with Islam

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7 Karčić, F. (2008): Islam u sekularnoj drzavi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine in *Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa "Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive*, Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske.

8 Sancaktar, C. (2012): Historical Construction and Development of Bosniak Nation, *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2012: pp. 1-17.

and established a link with socialism.[9] French historian Xavier Bougarel claims that in socialist Yugoslavia, it was no surprise that in addition to Muslim political leaders in the League of Communists and Marxist intellectuals linked to the process of 'national affirmation', the Muslim population at large and even the *ulama* (religious authorities) of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, IC) became strongly committed to the principles of Tito's Yugoslavia.[10]

Dženita Sarač discusses the failure of secularism and secularisation in socialist-Yugoslavia and the role of the IC in strengthening the religious identity of Muslims inBiH in the 1980s.[11] Dino Abazović, has determined that the process of de-secularisation has been much more visible and conspicuous than the process of secularisation in Bosniak social and public life; consequently, these processes have neither shown the same trend nor had the same effect – whether at the public (social) level or in the personal (religious) lives of Bosniak individuals.[12]

Fikret Karčić has examined the first encounter of Bosniaks with the challenges of European modernity in the late nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, especially with the establishment of Habsburg rule in Bosnia in 1878. Namely, the most significant challenges posed by modernity to Bosniaks living under non-Muslim rule were in the domains of social life, institutions, and social ethics. Karčić explains five issues faced by Bosniaks: the dilemma of whether to emigrate or to stay under non-Muslim rule, service in a non-Muslim army, establishment of a Muslim communal organisation, institutional links with the sites of Khalifa, and relations between Islam and European culture. In terms of solutions suggested and frames of reference, Bosniak intellectuals offered responses that are comparable to those of other Muslims living under non-Muslim rule in the same time period. This resulted from similarities in their historical situations, the common challenges of European modernity, and the Muslim mentality.[13]

Karčić defines the most important elements of the Bosniak Islamic tradition as (1) adhering to Sunni Islam, including the application of Maturidi thought in *aqidah* and

9 Boneta, Ž., Banovac, B. (2007): Religioznost i nacionalizam na hrvatskoj periferiji – veliki scenariji za male zajednice, *Migracijske i etničke teme* 23 (2007), 3: pp. 163-184.

10 See Bougarel, X. (2003): Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea in *Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 1918-1992* in Dejan Djokic (ed.), London: Hurst&Company: London: pp. 107-108.

11 Sarač, D. (2009): Neuspjeh Sekularizacije i Jacanje Religijskog Identiteta Pocetkom 1980-ih Godina u Bosnni i Hercegovini [Failure of Secularization and Strengthening of Religious Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Beginning of 1980s] in *Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks],* Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju: pp. 153-184.

12 Abazović, D. (2009): Bosanskohercegovacki Muslimani na Pocetku Novog Milenija: Socioloski Pogledi [Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims at the beginning of a New Millennium: Sociological Views] in *Rasprave o Nacionalnom Identitu Bosnjaka [Discussion on the National Identity of Bosniaks],* Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju: pp. 190-240.

13 Karčić, F. (1999): *The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times*, Sarajevo: El-Kalem.

the Hanafi school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence, with respective Sufi orders (*tariqas*); (2) belonging to the Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone; (3) involving elements of 'Islamised' practice among the inhabitants of pre-Ottoman BiH; (4) a tradition of Islamic reformism in the interpretation of Islam; (5) the institutionalisation of Islam in the form of the IC; (6) the practice of the expression of Islam in a secular state.[14] While elaborating on the position of Islam in a secular state and using BiH as a case study, Karčić defines a secular state as one that guarantees individual and collective freedom of religion, treats individuals as citizens regardless of their religious affiliation, and constitutionally is not linked to any religion or belief and does not promote or interfere in any religion.[15] After examining BiH, Karčić concludes that it has accepted all elements of the definition of a secular state, i.e. freedom of religion or belief, citizenship free from religious affiliation, and separation between religious communities and the state.[16] He also concludes that in a given country, the acceptance of a secular state significantly influences the manifestation and institionalisation of Islam, which itself comprises belief (without limitation) and the Islamic normative system (limited to worship and social affairs).

Šaćir Filandra argues that since 1990, the Islamic component has been replaced by Bosniak identity and belief in Bosnia as homeland. The change of name from 'Muslims' to 'Bosniaks' in 1993 is utmost indicative of the national secularising trend within the group.[17] Ahmet Alibašić, examining elements of the Bosniak Islamic tradition in the Bosnian context, identifies five thematic areas that intellectuals should focus their efforts on in future research: (1) legitimising an Islamic institutional framework in BiH, (2) continuous/permanent scrutiny of the Bosniak Islamic tradition and its reconciliation with Islamic sources, (3) Islamic practice/exercise and functioning in democratic conditions, (4) Islamic social thought for post-conflict societies in transition, and (5) basic *aqidah* topics of contemporary times.[18] Thus, the Bosniak Islamic tradition should not be observed as static and monolithic but as vibrant and dynamic.

The Bosniak Islamic tradition currently faces challenges to many aspects, but three could be enphasised as most dominant: theological interpretation, the administration of Islamic affairs, and diaspora and the European context. The challenge to theological interpretation emerged with the invasion of different Islamic literatures

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14 Karčić, F. (2006): *What is "Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks"?*, Sarajevo: Preporod, December 7.

15 Karčić, F. (2008): Islam u sekularnoj drzavi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine in *Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa "Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive*, Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini.

16 Ibid.: pp. 423-436.

17 Filandra, Š. (1998): Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija: pp. 199-210.

18 Alibašić, A. (2008): Pravci i elementi razvoja islamske tradicije Bosnjaka u bosanskom kontekstu [Developing Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: The Bosnian Context] in *Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa "Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive*, Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini: pp. 491-509.

published within as well as outside BiH but mostly distributed to Bosnian Muslims; missionaries; and graduates from Islamic faculties mostly in the Arab world, Turkey, or Malaysia who emigrated to these countries during the last war or in the post-war period. Although the IC attempts to manage and reduce the influence of these groups (by not allowing use of its mosques for their purposes or lectures), due to the availability of social media and the use of modern technologies, these groups have been successful in bypassing and challenging IC authorities. The second area of challenge arises from the first and is usually manifested by challenging IC authorities over a perceived monopoly over the interpretation of Islam; *zakat* (almsgiving); the education of imams, *khatibs* (imams leading and preaching on Friday prayer ceremony), and *muallims* (Islamic religion teachers); or the organisation of pilgrimages to Mecca (*hajj*).

The third challenge that the Bosniak Islamic tradition faces is related to the very widely dispersed Bosniak diaspora. Due to different cultural zones and influence from other Islamic traditions (such as, for instance, the Arab Islamic tradition in Europe) or due to the influence of other religious traditions (such as Protestantism), Bosniaks living abroad may depart from their native Islamic tradition and sentiments and sometimes even become more radicalised. The change in European context and narrative in this relation is of great importance due to the fact that Bosnian Muslims are not always considered indigenous European Muslims, but rather migrants from some other part of the world. Despite all these internal or external challenges, the IC has existed for a more than a century as an institutionalised Muslim organisation, which is discussed below.

2 The development of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Throughout its history, BiH has been characterised as a multicultural and multi-religious state, and religion and the religious identity of Bosnian people have always played important roles in society. Both the relationship between the state and religious communities as well as freedom of religion have been regulated in various ways over the last centuries.[19] Under Ottoman rule, Islam had the status of being the state religion, while the Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish communities were 'recognised religions' with full freedoms of religious expression and application of religious laws in issues related to the personal lives of its adherents.[20]

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19 see Kulanić, A. (2016): Socio-political position of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Ogurlu & Kulanić (eds.), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Law, Society and Politics, Sarajevo: International Univeristy of Sarajevo: p. 195.

20 See Hukić, A., (ed.). (1977): *Islam i muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovin,* Sarajevo: pp. 21-22.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire during its rule in BiH also accepted and implemented the model of recognised religions and religious organisations. According to Article 8 of the National Constitution (Statute) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proclaimed in 1910, the following religious organisations (communities) existed: Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelical, and Jewish.[21] Recognised religious communities had the status of organisations regulated by public law, in accordance to which they had the right of public expression, exemption from payment of taxes, and the right to levy religious surtaxes. During this period, state officials usually took part in religious events and attended religious ceremonies, while the state maintained the right to exercise, control, and monitor churches and religious communities.

This model of the organisation of state–religion relations was preserved in BiH after the region became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1919.[22] The provisions of the treaty became the first constitution of the kingdom (the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921), which stated that all religious communities that had been recognised in any region of the new state gained the status of 'recognised religion' throughout the kingdom. It also guaranteed equality before the law to all religions, as stated in Article 12: "Freedom of religion and conscience is guaranteed. Adopted religious beliefs are equal before the law and may publicly profess their religious doctrines".[23]

The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of a new era in state–religion relations with the introduction of the secular state model. This has been characterised by the full separation of religion and state affairs and a narrowing down of religion to the private sphere, while the protection of freedom of expression of religious beliefs and conscience was guaranteed by Article 5 (25) of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted on 31 January 1946:

> Citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religious belief. The church is separate from the state. Religious constitutions whose doctrines are not contrary to the Constitution are free to conduct their religious affairs and perform their religious rites. Religious schools for training priests are free and under the supervision of the state. The abuse of religion for political ends and the existence of religiously-based political organisations are prohibited. The state may provide material assistance to religious communities.[24]

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Yugoslavian politics were dominated by an idiosyncratic ideological variation of Marxism that came to be known in Marxist circles as Titoism. As in most Marxist discursive frameworks, religion was

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21 See Imamović, M. (2008): *Vjerske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji izmedju dva svjetska rata*. Sarajevo: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu.

22 Filandra, Š. (1998): Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija: pp. 57-92.

23 Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1920): Article 12.

24 Constitution of the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia (1946): Article 5 (25).

viewed in a negative light in Yugoslavian politics, though it was not formally banned as it was in the Soviet Union. The separation of the state from religion resulted in the loss of the legal force once enjoyed by the various religious communities in BiH. As a consequence, there were closures of many religious institutions (such as Sharia courts and religious schools) during this period.[25]

One-party systems often impose party policies over constituent interests and weave together state and party policies. During this period, the state sought to mitigate the role of religion in society. This was achieved by putting pressure on religious leaders, scholars, and representatives to conform to the interests of the state. Furthermore, implementation of the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonisation (adopted on 23 August 1945) and expropriation of land from religious communities under the slogan that 'land belongs to those who work it', along with the justification of building Yugoslavian national unity, resulted in religious communities losing much of their property. Article 8 of the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonisation limited the maximum amount of land that religious communities could preserve for their own needs:

> Places of worship, monasteries, and religious institutions may, pursuant to local conditions in each individual instance, be permitted to retain gardens, vineyards, orchards, meadows, pastures, and forests of a maximum total area of ten hectares for their own use or for humanitarian institutions and national associations. If these institutions are of major historical importance, they may retain ownership over a maximum of thirty hectares of cultivable land.[26]

These provisions almost entirely exhausted the economic basis of religious communities that from then on were forced to rely on voluntary contributions from their followers. The next stage in relations between the state and religious communities in Yugoslavia was characterised by the use of different tools and methods of the state for reducing and limiting the activities of religious communities to the spiritual domain, usually by forcing religious representatives to obey and follow the instructions of the state regime. This resulted in the marginalisation of the social role and position of religion in socialist Yugoslavia.[27]

During this period, the Islamic attire of women became characterised as an obstacle to the emancipation of Muslim women. The movement for the abolishment of the veil (*zar*) and headscarf (*feredža*) was initiated by the Antifascist Women's Front (Antifašistički front žena, AFŽ). In its second congress, the AFŽ produced a resolution proclaiming that the veil and headscarf were 'a symbol of the past unequal position of Muslim women and the legacy of a difficult past that now hinders their full partic-

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25 Karčić, F. (2008): Islam u sekularnoj drzavi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine in *Zbornik Radova naucnog skupa "Islamska tradicija Bosnjaka: izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive*, Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini.

26 Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonialization (1945): Article 8.

27 Karčić, F. (2009): *Religija i društveni život*, http://fikretkarcic.wordpress.com/2009/08/01/religija-i-drustveni-zivot-u-bih (last access: January, 2017).

ipation in political, social, and economic life' (AFŽ, II kongres Antifašističkog fronta žena Jugoslavije: održan u Beogradu 25, 26, 27 januara 1948). The resolution itself indicates that Muslim womeninitiated this process under pressure, while it was accepted by the AFŽ, which described the veil and headscarf of Muslim women as backward traditions and not as religious duty. The issue of the veil and headscarf in BiH is controversial even today. A recent decision rendered by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council banned religious symbols (primarily aimed at disallowing the veil and headscarf) in Bosnian courts and brought back old memories of discrimination against Bosnian Muslim women.

The following Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted in 1974 and continued to advocate full separation of state and religion, respecting freedom of religious expression and conscience while proclaiming unconstitutional the use of religion or religious activities for political purposes.[28] Based on the provisions of the constitution, BiH adopted in 1976 the Law on the Legal Position Religious Communities, which guarantees the following: the right to publish religious literature; the right to provide religious education; the right to establish schools to train priests, imams, rabbis, etc.; the right to perform religious rites and to conduct religious affairs; and the right to acquire, hold, and own material goods.

Based on Article 15 of the above-mentioned law from 2004, BiH as a state can make agreements between the BiH Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the governments of entities, and churches or religious communities on common matters. Based on this article, BiH entered into the Basic Agreement Between the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 April 2006, with the Holy See as the universal authority of the Roman Catholic Church; the additional protocol of the agreement was signed in September of the same year. Important characteristics of this concordat are that it has the status of an international agreement, and the official language is English. It also guarantees more rights than had been prescribed by Bosnian law. The Catholic Church has to be informed prior to the prosecution of priests[29], Church property had to be returned to the Church or justly compensated within ten years of the signing the agreement[30], and the state of BiH must ensure non-working days to Catholics on five major holydays[31].

The second religious community to make a similar agreement with the state was the Serbian Orthodox Church in what is known as the Basic Agreement Between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed by Patriarch Pavle and Minister for Human Rights and Refugees Safet Halilović, with authorization fromt he BiH Presidency. However, this agreement has yet to be ratified. The IC was the third

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28 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslav (1974): Article 174.
29 Ibid.: Article 8.
30 Ibid.: Article 10.
31 Ibid.: Article 9.

religious community in BiH to begin negotiating a similar type of agreement with the Bosnian state, in March 2008. The agreement was adopted by the Council of Ministers more than seven years later, in September 2015, but has yet to be signed or ratified by the Bosnian Parliament and Presidency.

The Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities of 2004 confirmed the legal status of the historically traditional religious communities in BiH, namely the IC, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Jewish community, while it enables the registration of new religious communities under the condition that they do not bear the same name as an already registered religious community. The registration of new religious communities is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, which is obliged to keep all records of the various registered religious communities in the country.

3 Islamic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

More than six centuries of the presence of Islam in BiH led to the establishment and formation of the IC as the central, organised community of Muslims in the Balkan region. The turbulent history of the Balkans, with frequent changes and overturns of political systems, affected the institutional framework as well as the organisational structure of the IC. During Ottoman rule, Muslim religious life and institutions in BiH were oranised under the centralised Ottoman Islamic institutions that existed within the Ottoman state. The Austro-Hungarian Empire brought changes to the organisation of the Islamic institutions of Bosniaks. These changes were perceived as the consequence of moderation between the Ottoman tradition and state modernisation project of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As the outcome of Austro-Hungarian rule, the institutional framework of Islam in BiH has since consisted of four main aspects: religious education, charitable endowments (*waqf*s), Sharia courts, and the hierarchy of the *ulama*, whose authority is based on two principles: knowledge, and election by the Bosnian Muslim population.[32] This structure remained until the end of the first Yugoslavia, in 1941, and the beginning of the Second World War.

Changes in political organisation and state ideology after the Second World War had enormous influence on the institutional organisation of Islam in BiH, which had become one of the six republics of socialist Yugoslavia. The oppressiveness of the Yugoslav state towards religion in general, but especially towards Muslims, led to the closure of all Sharia courts in 1946 and almost all religious schools in 1952 (except one, Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa in Sarajevo) and the subtraction of many *waqf* proper-

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32 Karčić, F. (2015): The Other European Muslims: A Bosnian Experience, Sarajevo: Center for Advanced Studies.

ties from the IC through the process of nationalisation (1945–1958), which resulted in difficulty for the organisation, self-sustainability, and independence of the IC.[33] Besides these issues and obstacles, the IC managed to survive until 1990. Then, with the fall of communism and the collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims became the victims of the Greater Serbian nationalists and the subjects of war crimes and genocide, while their institutions were either destroyed or damaged during 1992–1995. During this time, more than half of all congregational mosques (620 out of a total of 1,149) were damaged, and an additional 307 congregational mosques were totally destroyed (see Table 1).

Table 1: Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia (1992–1995)

Type of building	Number damaged			Number destroyed				Total	
	By Serb extremists	By Croat extremists	Total damaged	By Serb extremists	By Croat extremists	Total destroyed	Number before the war	Number damaged or destroyed	Per cent damaged or destroyed
Congregational mosques	540	80	620	249	58	307	1,149	927	81%
Small neighbourhood mosques	175	43	218	21	20	41	557	259	47%
Qur'an schools	55	14	69	14	4	18	954	87	9%
Dervish lodges	3	1	4	4	1	5	15	9	60%
Mausoleums, shrines	34	3	37	6	1	7	90	44	49%
Religious endowments	345	60	405	125	24	149	1,425	554	39%
Total	1,152	201	1,353	419	108	527	4,190	1,880	45%

Source: Based on Maya Shatzmiller (2002). Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign. Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Queens University School of Policy. P. 100.

After the Dayton peace agreement ended the Bosnian War, the Bosniaks once again succeeded in rebuilding many of its Islamic institutions and cherishing their Islamic tradition in BiH under the principles of freedom of religion in a democratic society.[34]

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33 Ibid.: p. 135.
34 Kulanić, A. (2016): Socio-political position of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Ogurlu & Kulanić (eds.), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Law, Society and Politics, Sarajevo: International Univeristy of Sarajevo.

Since the end of the war, the IC has had two constitutions (1997 and 2014), which mainly define the institutional structure of the organisation. The constitution of 2014 (currently in force) consists of ninety-three articles covering the following: the characteristics and principles of the IC, general provisions, the obligations and rights of adherents and members, the property of the IC, its organisation (structure), its electoral system, the functions of bodies and institutions during states of emergency and war, the adoption of and amendments to the constitution, and transitional and final provisions.[35]

3.1 The constitutional organisation of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In its constitution, the IC states that it is the "sole and united" community of Muslims in BiH; those in Sandžak, Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia; other Bosniaks outside their homelands; and other Muslims that accept the IC as their community.[36] The organisation and institutionalisation of the IC as well as its activities are based on the Qur'an, the Sunna (practice) of Prophet Muhammad, and the Bosniak Islamic tradition as well as the demands of the time.[37] The IC aims for all its members to live in line with Islamic norms, the interpretation, protection, and authentication of which are overseen by the Islamic authorities within the community. Furthermore, the IC dedicates itself to providing the necessary conditions for a fulfilling Muslim life, including the protection of family values and the institution of marriage as well as the organisation of social and support actions for the overall improvement of life for Muslims.[38] Also, according to its constitution, the IC establishes cooperation and agreements with other Islamic organisations as well as organisations of other religious traditions in order to promote tolerance, understanding, peace and stability, and goodwill among all people.

Chapter V of the constitution defines the internal structure of the IC as such: *jamaats, majlis, muftiluks,* the Riyasat, the Assembly of Muftis, the Rais-ul-ulama (Grand Mufti), the Council of the Islamic Community, and the Constitutional Court. The basic organisational unit of the IC is the *jamaat*, which is formed in an area with at least 200 Muslim households.[39] A *majlis* is a higher organisational unit that consists of a minimum of seven *jamaats* and is operated by an executive board and a chief imam (*glavni* imam) who is the religious leader for a designed territory.[40] A *muftiluk*

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35 See Constitution of Islamic Community (2014).
36 IC Constitution (2014): Article 1.
37 Ibid.: Article 3.
38 Ibid.: Articles 4-5.
39 Ibid.: Articles 34-38.
40 Ibid.: Articles 39-42.

consists of several *majlis* that form a territorial unity and is headed by muftis whose appointments are confirmed by the Council upon the recommendation of the Rais-ul-ulama. Currently, there are eight territorial *muftiluks* in BiH – Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar, Travnik, Banja Luka, Bihać, and Goražde – and one mufti of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides these, four *muftiluks* are located outside of BiH, namely in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Germany.[41]

The Riyasat is the highest executive body for the religious, educational, economic, financial, legal, and other affairs of the IC and is headed by the Rais-ul-ulama. It consists of heads of directorates that are organised in administrative units that correspond to their specific jurisdiction. The Riyasat, in general, deals with the appointment and replacement of chief imams, imams, *khatibs*, *muallims*, deans of faculties, and directors of madrasas; approves curriculums for Islamic educational institutions; supervise sthe collection of *zakat*; approves new endowments; cooperates with other Islamic organisations around the world; and supervises the organisation and work of IC institutions in the Bosniak diaspora.[42]

The Assembly of Muftis is the body that is responsible for religious affairs and the religious lives of IC members. It consists of all IC muftis and is headed by the Rais-ul-ulama. The main aims of the Assembly of Muftis are to provide the authentic interpretation and understanding of Islamic norms, to control all normative acts in line with Sharia teachings, and to deal with religious life overall within the community.[43]

The Rais-ul-ulama is the head and highest Islamic authority of the IC and represents the unity of religion (*deen*) and Muslim community (*umma*). The Rais-ul-ulama plans, leads, directs, and supervises religious life; appoints imams and chief imams; suggests the appointment of muftis to the working bodies of the Assembly of Muftis; and has the mandate to suspend any IC decision not in accordance with Sharia law. Furthermore, the Rais-ul-ulama presides over sessions of the Riyasat and the Assembly of Muftis and issues fatwas (Islamic legal pronouncements). The Rais-ul-ulama is elected for a seven-year term from among at least two candidates and by a secret vote by a body that consists of the members of the Council, the members of the Riyasat, muftis, the presidents of *meshihats (highest organisational units of IC outside BiH headed by muftis)*, deans and directors of Islamic institutions, chief imams, and presidents of the executive boards of *majlis*.[44]

The Council of the Islamic Community is the highest legislative and representative body of the IC; it consists of eighty-seven members who are elected from electoral districts of the IC, respecting the principle of proportional representation.[45] Finally,

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41 Ibid.: Articles 43-51.

42 IC Constitution (2014): Articles 56-57.

43 Ibid.: Article 60.

44 Ibid.: Articles 61-66.

45 Ibid.: Articles 68-70.

the Constitutional Court of the Islamic Community is the highest body for the interpretation of the constitutional provisions of the IC. It consists of five members who represent the highest level of legal and religious expertise in the IC and whose role is to supervise the rule of law within the IC. The decisions of the court are obligatory and binding for all bodies and units of the IC.[46]

3.2 Islamic religious education and the educational institutions of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Based on Article 4 of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities of 2004, religious education in public and private schools is made available to any religious community and will be conducted by officially appointed religious teachers from each respective religious community:

> Everyone shall have the right to religious education, which shall be provided solely by persons appointed [to do so] by an official representative of his Church or religious community, whether in religious institutions or in public and private pre-school institutions, primary schools and higher education [,] which shall be regulated according to the specific regulations.[47]

The implementation of this right relies on the ministries responsible for the implementation of education in BiH – thirteen in total, due to the complicated political structure of the country, but all of the rights are based on the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a national law adopted in 2003 that emphasises freedom of religion and belief: "Schools shall promote and protect religious freedom, tolerance and the culture of dialogue. Having in mind the diversity of convictions/faiths in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the pupils shall attend religious classes only if they are in line with their conviction or convictions of their parents".[48]

Therefore, besides religious educational institutions, religious education has also become available in public and private schools. In practice, state-run schools organise religious education according to the majority religion in an area. In the entity of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious education is organised at the primary and secondary levels. In some cantons, religious education is optional (Sarajevo Canton, Zenica-Doboj Canton), while in others, it is required once elected (Tuzla Canton, Una-Sana Canton.) On the other hand, in the entity of Republika Srpska, religious

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46 Ibid.: Articles 71-74.

47 Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities (2004), Article 4.

48 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 9.

education is organised only at the primary level and is usually considered required in majority Serbian (Orthodox Christian) areas.

In addition to religious education in private and public schools in BiH, the organisation of religious educational activities has been enabled through religious educational institutions.[49] Islamic education and the development of Islamic educational institutions in BiH date back to Ottoman times. The establishment of the Ottoman educational system on Bosnian soil at the beginning of the fifteenth century aimed at the education of leaders, diplomats, teachers, and religious figures (imams) for the needs of the local community but also for the needs of the Ottoman state. The influence of the Ottoman educational system led to the formation of the following Islamic educational institutions in BiH: the *maktab* (primary school), the *muallimhana* (lower secondary school), and the madrasa (secondary school).

From the Arabic verb *kataba*, which means 'to write', *maktabs* were originally built as parts of local mosques. However, due to the increasing Muslim population, *maktabs* were also built as separate buildings next to or near mosques. *Maktabs* reflected the Ottoman style of architecture and appeared similar to Ottoman residences. Their names were usually decided by the founders (*waqifs*) of endowments and usually referred to the *maktab* as a house of knowledge or learning. During Ottoman rule, more than 1,000 female and male *maktabs* flourished. They emphasised reading and writing skills and basic religious education and upbringing. This religious education included Islamic dogma, rites, and ethics. The Arabic language was often the main medium of instruction and learning. Teachers in the *maktabs* were called *muallims*. Today, *maktabs* are often used for the purpose of basic religious education that is organised under the IC in BiH.

The *muallimhana* was an institution that provided a higher form of education, the purpose of which was to educate students who intended to work as teachers in the newly established *maktabs*. Graduates gained the title of *muallim*. The first *muallimhana* was built in Sarajevo in 1477 and was known as Ajas-bey Muallimhana. In this educational institution, the first imams and religious teachers were educated. In modern times, the role and purpose of the *muallimhana* have been largely transferred to the madrasa.

Madrasas were established mainly by prominent state dignitaries, *sanjak-beys* (district governors), *valis* (magistrates), and other influential and rich members of society. With regard to architectural style, Bosnian madrasas continued the tradition of Seljuk madrasas with open courtyards. Education in the madrasa was organised in a traditional manner. Students were not divided according to year of study but according to circle (*halka*), that is, the mastered materials and acquired knowledge. This

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49 The remainder of this section first appeared, slightly differently and less elaborated, in Kulanić, A. (2015). Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islamic Schools. (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t343/e0125).

form of education allowed for a more efficient advancement of students depending on their own individual efforts. The scope of the madrasa was mostly based on religious sciences such as *tafsir* (interpretation of the Qur'an), *hadith* (tradition), *ahkam* (law), *kalam* (apologetics), and other sciences that were required by customs, tradition, and the time.

In the former Yugoslavia, religious schools were limited in their ability to serve the needs of the community, and their primary aim became the preservation of their own religious identity. Due to the suppression of religious freedom by the communist regime and its negative perceptions of religion, interest in religious education decreased, and most madrasas were closed, their work forbidden. As mentioned above, the only madrasa that survived was the Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa, named for its founder, a grandson of Sultan Bayezid II. Since 1995, religious educational institutions have been transforming themselves in order to meet the requirements of postwar BiH and the needs of the modern world. They have become more open and more involved in inter-religious and intercultural dialogues. The curriculum of the madrasa was also transformed in order to meet the requirements set by the Ministry of Education and Science. Therefore, along with Islamic courses, madrasas nowadays also offer non-religious courses, similarly to secular high schools in BiH. Madrasa graduates, the number of which varies from 400 to 500 every year, have the opportunity to continue their undergraduate studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies as well as any other faculty of their choice. Many of them have become religious leaders, politicians, prominent philosophers, scientists, and academicians.

According to some sources, the number of madrasas in BiH during Ottoman times exceeded 100. Today, eight madrasahs provide education to students, namely Gazi Husrev-bey Madrasa in Sarajevo, Karađoz-bey Madrasa in Mostar, Behram-bey Madrasa in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa in Travnik, Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa in Cazin, Osman ef. Redžović Madrasa in Visoko, Gazi Isa-bey in Novi Pazar (Serbia), and Dr. Ahmed Smajlović Islamic Secondary School in Zagreb (Croatia). Under the jurisdiction of the IC, three faculties are also operated, namely the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, the Faculty of Islamic Pedagogy in Zenica, and the Islamic Teachers' Academy in Bihać. Other education-oriented institutions under the supervision of the IC are the El-Kalem publishing house, which publishes Islamic and Bosniak-oriented books; Gazi Husrev-bey Library; the Al-Wasatiyya Centre for Dialogue; and the Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, which conducts empirical and theoretical research on the Bosniak tradition.

3.3 Religion in Bosnian media and Islamic religious media

Religious issues and topics are more present in the media in post-war BiH than they were in the previous socio-political system. According to Karčić (2009), 'the visible presence of religion in the public sphere is a consequence of the democratisation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 'State and entity media services began to cover religious activities and events with more intensity after the independence of BiH. However, the information presented especially by mainstream media is marginalised and usually reserved for the very end of certain news programmes, except during specific religious holidays such as Eid, Christmas, and Easter.

Specialised religious television and radio programmes were introduced after the war via Bosnian public broadcasting services. However, the representation of different religious communities in these programmes is neither equal nor proportional to their number of followers in BiH, and coverage is even divided along entity and cantonal lines. Therefore, RTRS (Radio Televizija Republike Srpske, the public broadcasting service of Republika Srpska) launched the television programme *Pravosljavlje* (*Orthodoxy*), exclusively focusing on Orthodox Christianity, in 1998, while it introduced an additional interreligious programme, *Iz vjerskih zajednica* (*From Religious Communities)*, dealing with the issues of other (Jewish, Catholic, and Islamic) religious communities, in 2001. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FTV (Federalna TV) broadcasts the weekly programm e*Mozaik religija* (*Religious Mosaic*), which is divided in the sense that it does not cover religious communities within a single episode but instead dedicates separate episodes to the major religious communities, e.g. the Islamic community has its own show every third week. The state-level public broadcasting service offers its own interreligious documentary series, *Duhovni mostovi* (*Spiritual Bridges*), which has aired on the television station BHT 1 since 2005 and aims to promote tolerance, understanding, and interfaith dialogue among the four major religious traditions in BiH.

On the one hand, traditional religious communities in BiH have not yet formed clear strategies for cooperation with the media, especially public media broadcasters, while on the other hand, there are not enough journalists who are informed about issues related to religion and the promotion of religious activities within the media. However, Bosnian media have contributed to the promotion of positive images and tolerance among major religious traditions in post-war BiH. An earlier study, published by the Sarajevo office of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in 2007, showed that religion was, at that time, processed separately in most media, that the media did not emphasise the multi-religious character of Bosnian society, that newspapers had neither special media rooms nor sections devoted to religion, and that some media predominantly followed only certain religious communities. It was also noted that while there was no negative journalistic attitude toward religion in general, there were negative media views in the reporting of events in specific socio-political context.

The IC operates its own media services, including a news agency, newspapers, a radio and television station, and official websites. Among the most influential are:

– MINA (Muslim-Informative News Agency), established in 1990 and since then acting as a news service providing other media outlets with IC news and relevant information;

- Preporod Islamic Informative Newspapers, established in 1970 to provide IC members with relevant information about the community and the wider Muslim world through news coverage and analyses as well as religious, educational, and motivational texts;
- Glasnik, the official, bimonthly gazette of the IC, established in 1933 and publishing, besides official reports, original articles on topics such as history, culture, literature, and economy as well as translations of relevant articles from different languages;
- The radio and television station BIR, established in 2008 as a media service for Bosnian Muslims (although its television component is still in development, due to the large investment required);
- Takvim, an annual prayer timetable first published in 1934;
- *Novi Muallim*, a journal edited by *muallims* in BiH and mostly dealing with educational themes; and
- the official website of the IC (www.islamskazajednica.ba) and many other official websites of *muftiluks*, *majlis*, and even some *jamaats*.

In addition to the more mainstream coverage published by or under the supervision of the IC, the Bosnian Muslim media scene is even more diversified. Since the end of the Bosnian War, the segment of the media that partially or fully devotes its coverage to Islam, Islamic topics, Bosniaks, or Muslims is huge. During the last twenty years, many such outlets have been established and have disappeared, and there is no official record of their number, especially as some were published in BiH while others, given the growth of the internet, were published in the Bosniak diaspora. In post-war BiH, several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have published weekly or monthly magazines targeting Muslim populations inside and outside the country or conceptualised as Islamic magazines, namely *Novi horizonti*, published by Selam (based in Zenica); *SAFF*, published by GID Saff (Sarajevo); *Bosanska Sumejja*, published by Udruženje Sumejja u Bosni I Hercegovini (Tuzla); *Kabes*, published by Islamski centar Mostar; *Zehra*, published by Ž.E.O. Kewser (Sarajevo);and *El-Asr*, published by Stichting Hidžra (Amsterdam, Netherlands). Furthermore, there are numerous websites published in the Bosnian language and mainly targeting Bosniaks around the world.[50] In addition to magazines and websites, there are also two important Islamic-oriented television stations present in BiH, namely MTV Igman, established in 2000, and Televizija 5, founded in 2016.

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50 Some of the most popular are www.islambosna.ba, www.minber.ba, www.n-um.com, www.akos.ba, www.bosnjaci.net, www.itv.ba, www.saff.ba, and www.novihorizonti.ba.

4 Civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Throughout history, there have been several types of NGOs present in BiH, which differ in terms of role, mission, size, and activities, with the latter ranging from philanthropy and humanitarian efforts to cultural and scientific work. Prior to the 1990s, civil society in BiH was highly diversified and usually dealt with major issues for society such as education, religion, and various issues of national awareness.[51] Under socialism and communism, civil society mainly consisted of labour unions, youth organisations, scout groups, and sport associations; however, the state heavily regulated all aspects of life, including those organisations. The main characteristic of civil society organisations during that time was their narrow scope and focus on specific issues in society, while they were also used as tools of political control and dependency on the state and the Communist party.[52] Organisations that were connected or related to religious communities were forbidden, while many others with different agendas were tolerated.[53]

The elements of a modern civil society – one that aims to mediate and interact between the state, economy, and family, based on the voluntary gathering of citizens for a certain cause – emerged with and after the first multi-party elections, in 1990. This breakup of one-party governance enabled the re-emergence and re-establishment of certain humanitarian organisations, such as Merhamet, Caritas, Dobrotvor, and La Benevolencija. However, the Bosnian War redirected and to a certain extent prevented or postponed the development of civil society in BiH. While in many other South-eastern European countries the main reason for the formation of NGOs was a change of political system and ideology as well as the removal of legal and political obstacles, in BiH, this process took place in a state of war as the response to the needs of citizens. The destruction from war and post-war reconstruction decisively shaped and influenced the goals, type, and missions of many organisations. Approximately 30 per cent of aid for BiH was spent by United Nations agencies and international NGOs, and hence the formation of a local NGO sector was a main task.[54] Currently, civil society in BiH has a small but important role. It remains, at this stage, at a low level of development and sustainability, economically weak and largely dependent on foreign donors. Therefore, one segment of civil society, represented by NGOs, emerged as an authentic, natural emanation of humanitarian aid and as a conse-

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51 Zgodić, E. (2001): Civilno društvo i demokratska država, objavljeno u Civilno društvo i lokalna demokratija, Sarajevo: Centar za promociju civilnog društva.

52 Stubbs, P. (2000): Partnership or Colonisation?: The Relationship between International agencies and Local Non- Governmental Organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Civil Society, NGOs and Global Governance, GASPP Occasional Papers No 7/2000.

53 Korjenic, O. (2006): "Civilno Drustvo i politicka drzava", *Most*, Vol.107. No. 196, Mostar.

54 Papić, Ž. *(1997): Međunarodne humanitarne aktivnosti i civilno društvo, Sarajevo: VKBI.*

quence of the domestic needs of the post-war society. The other segment of civil society emerged as the result of the efforts of certain domestic and international actors aiming to change internal power relations, developmental trends, and policies via different aspects of social life.[55]

The Bosnian War influenced all segments of society, and the NGO sector is no exception. So far, the local NGO sector has undergone several stages of development. During the war, it actively participated in humanitarian issues. After the war, it participated mainly in psychosocial assistance and youth and women's issues, usually as the smaller partner of top-level international organisations and agencies in reconstruction, reconciliation, and peace-building processes. However, it gained a greater role after the war by participating in the promotion of civil society and human rights and the development of democracy, where it perhaps shows the greatest potential. Major achievements were made in large cities such as Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica, where NGOs and like-minded organisations were in close contact with international organisations, which had their headquarters or branch offices in these cities.

The development of civil society in post-war BiH was barely monitored due to the complex internal administrative structure and provisions of the Dayton Agreement, according to which the registration of NGOs was processed at fourteen different offices (ten different cantonal ministries, two entities, Brčko district, and the Ministry of Justice) that were not integrated and did not maintain a unified register. As a result of this decentralised model, estimates of the number of registered NGOs in BiH range from 12,000 to 20,000; many of these, however, are not active or operational because some (especially those in rural areas) were sponsored only by international donors.[56] Two recent milestones in the development of civil society in BiH are the signing of an agreement between the state and the organisations of civil society in November 2017 and the support of the European Union in introducing a centralised online register of NGOs[57] that enables access to basic information on civil society organisations in BiH (active, inactive, and closed ones) for the very first time.

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55 Filandra, Š. (1998): Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Sarajevo: Sejtarija.

56 Dmitrović, Tijana. (2011). Stvarni uticaj civilnog društva u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Inicijativa za bolju i humaniju inkluziju –IBHI.

57 available at www.zbirniregistri.gov.ba

4.1 The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian civil society

In the broadest definition of civil society, religious communities are understood as a part or segment of civil society and as one of the main agents of socialisation. Since its formal establishment as a separate (in an organisational sense) religious community in BiH, the IC has been the main aggregator of the social activism and organisation of Bosnian Muslims. The religious revival and the return of religion from exile after the breakup of the Communist regime placed the IC at the forefront of social action in BiH through its diversified actions. The activities of the IC during the postwar period and in the context of civil society can be analysed according to two main aspects, namely the IC as a civil society organisation and the IC as a mediator between the state and other civil society organisations, especially local grassroots organisations with an Islamic background.

The role of the IC as a civil society organisation can be analysed through the activities that it realises on the part of various centres, agencies, directorates, and institutions, which include educational institutions, humanitarian organisations, social service providers, drug rehabilitation centres, media outlets, different scientific institutes, and even the Agency for Halal Quality Certification. The internal restructuring and reorganisation of the IC that occurred with the 2012 changes to its constitution enabled the establishment of centres and activities aimed at assisting the modernisation of Bosnian society in different ways. The establishment of the centralised Office for Social Care in 2013 enabled the IC to systematise and provide information at the institutional level, creating a framework for the IC to present itself as a socially responsible religious organisation in BiH. The two most recent reports of the office show that the IC provided support for the needy, both in BiH and abroad, with more than 25 million convertible marks spent on projects ranging from humanitarian aid to the reconstructions of houses after the 2014 floods in BiH in the period 2014-2016[58]. Beside these projects, the IC also supports the formal education of young Bosnians by cooperating with other NGOs in BiH and in the Bosniak diaspora to provide around 500 scholarships per year for talented but needy Bosnian students, no matter the faculty in which they are enrolled.[59] In addition to formal support for education, the IC organises informal educational activities, seminars, and professional development opportunities with other NGOs or through different IC institutions, especially in the context of the prevention of drug addiction and the rehabilitation of drug addicts.

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58 Report of the Office for Social Care, 2015 and 2016, ICBiH
59 IC (2017), http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/vijesti/aktuelno/25937-rezultati-konkursa-za-dodjelu-stipendija-fonda-bosnjaci.

Besides these activities, in 2013 the IC adopted the Platform on the Cooperation of the Islamic Community with Organisations of Islamic Orientation[60], which outlined several key principles in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities of 2004.[61] According to the platform, the IC ensures full authenticity of the interpretation of Islamic teachings and practices in BiH and has complete autonomy in providing formal Islamic education, while NGOs can establish informal Islamic educational seminars upon prior approval of the IC. Furthermore, the IC will cooperate with all NGOs and civil society organisations that aim to improve Bosnian society as a whole, no matter their religious background, if any. In order to improve these relations, the IC will organise annual meetings with the representatives of such NGOs. Through this platform, the IC enlarged its scope and created more opportunities for it to contribute to the progress of Bosnian society.

5 Conclusion and recommendations

BiH has officially adopted a secular model of relations between religious and political authorities. In practice, historically there has been mutual respect and cooperation between members of different religions. These relationships have had successful and less successful gradations over the long history of BiH. The complex Bosnian political structure, coupled with egregious examples of ethnic cleansing and genocide as well as troubled times of war, led to the segregation and ghettoisation of adherents of certain religious communities. Unofficial favouritism of certain religious communities on the part of the state is still widespread in BiH, depending on the entity and canton or municipality in which these communities are the majority.

Compared to what life was like for religious Bosniaks under Tito, it is obvious that religious communities are more visible in public life today than they were before. This visibility could be understood in the context of the democratisation process, the postwar condition, and the rejection of a state-centred economic model. As Karčić (2009) has pointed out, "BiH remains a state in transition towards modern liberal democracy and a more transparent political culture. It is therefore 'necessary to [not only] improve upon the tradition of [religious liberties] in a free state that protects individual and collective manifestations of religion' but to also prevent the 'political instrumentalisation of religion (Karčić 2009) – as well as favouritism of certain religious tradi-

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60 IC (2014), http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18958:platforma-o-saradnji-iz-sa-organizacijama-islamskog-odredenja-koje-djeluju-u-bih&catid=201&Itemid=457.

61 Official Gazette of BiH, 5/04.

tions in certain territories".[62] A state such as BiH, in which around 90 per cent of the population belong to a religious community, must ensure that freedom of religion, belief, and conscience is guaranteed, protected, and respected in all its regions, especially in areas where certain religious communities are the minority.

More specifically, the position and relations of the IC in BiH as well as the rich experience of Bosniaks living in multi-religious, multicultural environments and representing indigenous European Muslims could provide a platform for the organisation of Islamic communities from other traditional backgrounds, such as Arab or Turkic. In this regard, there are multiple benefits that Western societies could gain from greater interaction with, and consideration of, Bosnian Islam and Bosniak Islamic tradition. As Alibašić convincingly argues, Western European Muslims might especially benefit from a closer consideration of the following: (1) "[t]he way Islamic authority is institutionalized in [BiH] and Muslims are represented in it"; (2) "the Bosnian Islamic educational system … [which]combines religious and secular, modern and traditional Islamic education"; (3) "[i]ntellectual legacy and the responses of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals to the challenges of modernity and European culture"; (4) "[p]olitical and social experience"; and (5) "[i]nter-religious cooperation and dialogue".[63]

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62 Karačić, F. (2009): *Religija i društveni život*, http://fikretkarcic.wordpress.com/2009/08/01/religija-i-drustveni-zivot-u-bih (last access: January, 2017).

63 Alibašić, A. (2007): *The Profile of Bosnian Islam and how West European Muslims Could Benefit from It*. Paper Presented at "Bosnischer Islam fur Europa", Akademie der Diozes Rottenburg-Stuttgart & Vereinigung islamischer Gemeinden der Bosniaken in Deutschland (VIGB), Hohenheim: pp. 5-7.

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Fabio Battaglia

Report on Faith-Based Organisations and Civic Engagement in Europe

1 Goal and Overview of the Report

The following report provides information about the availability of data on faith-based organisations and their role, activities and engagement with society in twenty-five European countries. Overall, most information is being made available by churches in the form of annual reports, which makes the availability of primary datasets more limited. Such reports themselves, however, are sometimes difficult to locate and only some countries have English translations available which may mean that some sources remain undetected at this stage. In some countries, certain faith-based organisations do not even have a website to consult, or if they do have one they do not update it constantly (if at all), meaning that if they actually collect data it is difficult to find out about it. Aside from few cases (Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom in particular) the kind of information available usually refers to the *activities* these organisations carry out (and e.g. the number of people involved or assisted) rather than the *impact* these activities have. Nonetheless, in relation to the former there is a substantial amount of information available. Furthermore, data often refer to particular religious organisations only (e.g. the Catholic Church) – perhaps because only larger organisations can afford the costs of researching and publishing data – and for some countries there do not seem to be many data available except for membership rates. This means that the data we have at the moment only show us a selective picture of the level of civic engagement of faith-based organisations and may not cover all areas of civic engagement of faith-based organisations in the countries analysed, which should be taken into account when utilising the data.

Throughout the report, sections will be divided first by looking at multi-country studies and then by countries separately. For each dataset or report available information about e.g. accessibility or year of publication will be provided. Indicate key results from data sources and emanating reports will be briefly highlighted in order to help the reader gain an understanding what sort of analyses either have been conducted using the data source or what sort of findings could easily be extracted if used. A spreadsheet attached to this report summarises information about the major datasets identified, dividing sections in this case by themes. The rationale behind this is to highlight differences and reveal best practices among nations in the report and providing a brief overview and highlighting organisations that are more active in reporting or measuring the impact of their activities in the spreadsheet.

2 Faith-Based Organisations and Civic Engagement: a Definition

Before carrying on, it is important to clarify what is meant here by faith-based organisations and civic engagement. In regard to the former, we will refer to the definition provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR'). The UNHCR defines faith-based organisations in this way:

> [t]hey include religious and religion-based organisations/groups/networks; communities belonging to a place of religious worship; specialized religious institutions and religious social service agencies; and registered or unregistered non-profit institutions that have a religious character or mission.[1]

Since the focus in this report is more on organised religious communities, we will not take into consideration registered or non-registered charities/non-profit institutions here. However, we will discuss in a final section the importance of considering some of these institutions for a broader and better understanding of the level of engagement of faith-based organisations.

With regard to the latter, civic engagement is intended here as the "broad set of practices and attitudes of involvement in social and political life that converge to increase the health of a democratic society"[2]. To put it in other words, we mean those activities carried out by faith-based organisations aimed at improving the (quality of) life of their communities.

3 Multi-Country Studies and Surveys (and Additional Material)

Although the majority of data identified refer to specific countries only, there are in any case some multi-country studies available. For instance, a project conducted with the cooperation of five different universities (Lund, Glasgow, Tartu, Helsinki and Münster) between 2001 and 2004, titled *Churches and European Integration*, analyses the role of churches in promoting European integration.[3] Another report by the Euro-

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1 UNHCR (2004): *On Faith-Based Organisations, Local Faith Communities And Faith Leaders*, p. 8, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/539ef28b9.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-19].
2 Banyan, M. E., Civic engagement, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, n/a, available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/civic-engagement [Accessed: 2018-01-19].
3 Lauha, A. (2004): *Churches and European Integration*, available at: http://www.helsinki.fi/teol/tdk/ pdf/opiskelu/Laitokset/khl/CEI_FINAL.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-18].

pean Christian Political Movement briefly discusses the contribution made by faith-based organisations, especially Christian ones, to the welfare and social cohesion of European Union (EU) member states.[4] A report by the Open Society Foundations looks instead at the current situation of Muslims in 11 European cities.[5]

Most importantly, there is a series of national reports available online for free on *Faith-Based Organisations and Social Exclusion in European Cities*.[6] Such reports were the result of a 2-3 year project financed by the EU called FACIT which looked at "the present role of Faith-Based Organisations [...] in tackling different forms of social exclusion in urban contexts".[7] Seven countries were analysed: Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, Turkey and The United Kingdom (UK). While not formally included in the project working plan and final report, a study on an eighth country – Hungary – is also to be available (see section 'Hungary' below). The national reports are very detailed and provide very helpful and interesting insights on the role of faith-based organisations and the impact of their activities on society, especially at the urban level.

Two other similar and relevant studies include the Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective[8] (WREP) and the Welfare And Values In Europe: Transitions Related To Religion, Minorities And Gender[9] (WaVE) projects. A final report from both projects is available online in English for free (see footnotes).

Data on religious affiliation and social exclusion at the European level are also available in the European Social Survey. The survey is conducted biennially and it generally includes many (but not all) European countries plus Turkey, the Russian Federation and Israel (but participating countries can change at every round). Data, as well as information about the methodology employed and the questions asked, can

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4 Vodo, T. (2016): Faith-Based Organisations. The role of Christian Organisations to Social Cohesion in in EU Member States, available at: https://www.ecpm.info/FBOs-Paper.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-18].

5 Open Society Foundations (2010): *Muslims in Europe*, , available at: https://www.opensociety foundations.org/sites/default/files/a-muslims-europe-20110214_0.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-22].

6 Dierckx, D., Vranken, J. and Kerstens, W. (eds.) (2009): *Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in European Cities. National context reports*, available at: http://www.academia.edu/21024325/FBOs_and_social_exclusion_in_Sweden [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

7 *ivi*, p. 11

8 Institute for Diaconal and Social Studies, Welfare And Religion In A European Perspective. A Comparative Study Of The Role Of The Churches As Agents Of Welfare Within The Social Economy, n/a, available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9026/022ce9394535fd6fca61cd84b66e57b7dbd5.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-08].

9 Bäckström, A. (?), *Welfare And Values In Europe: Transitions Related To Religion, Minorities And Gender*, 2009, available at: https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/publications/1243/124376741-19_en.doc [Accessed: 2018-05-08].

be found online for free (to download data, a free registration is needed).[10] While this data is based on individual-level responses, aggregations thereof give an insight into meso-level concerns, such as the differences in compositions of people who identify with particular religious groups and their respective institutions.

Similarly, data are available from the European Values Study, a "large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program" which "provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe".[11] The survey has been conducted four times (in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008) and a fifth round is currently being undertaken. Survey findings, as well as longitudinal files, are available online for free but a registration is needed.[12] Among other things, participants in the survey were asked about their religious denomination and frequency of church attendance; whether churches give adequate answers to moral questions, problems of family life, spiritual needs and social problems of the country; and to express their attitude towards the separation of church and state.[13] Information on the methodology employed or the kind of questions asked can also be found online.[14]

Other similar data are also available from the International Social Survey Programme which, similarly to the previous two surveys, looks at people's attitudes and behaviours. Data on religion are available for the years 1991, 1998, 2008 and are soon expected to be available for 2018 as well.[15] A list of relevant topics covered is available.[16]

There are also a range of cross-national reports that aggregate information from relevant data sources, and are worth considering for overviews of cross-national data usage related to the topics of interest and to aspects that may be not as intuitively, but tangentially related in potentially very meaningful ways. A very concise report by Eurofound contains a lot of information which could be used for 'snowballing' on the

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10 Datasets on religion are included in the *Subjective Well-Being, Social Exclusion, Religion, National and Ethnic Identity* theme and can be accessed here: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/themes.html?t=wellbeing [Accessed: 2018-05-01].

11 European Values Study, *About EVS* [Online], available at: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/about-evs.html [Accessed: 2018-05-05].

12 Data can be downloaded here: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/surveys.html [Accessed: 2018-05-05].

13 For more variable included in the latest survey available see https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=4800&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12458 [Accessed: 2018-05-05].

14 In particular, questions on religion can be found here: https://dbk.gesis.org/EVS/Variables/compview.asp?db=QEVSLF&id=ZA4800&mid=,ZA4800&all=&lang=en&id2=&var2=&lang2=en&vsearch=&s1=1&s2=1&s3=1&vsearch2=&bool=&var=v130 [Accessed: 2018-05-05].

15 Datasets for every year can be downloaded here: http://www.issp.org/data-download/by-topic/ [Accessed: 2018-05-08].

16 See https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=4950&search=issp%202008&search2=&field=all&field2=&DB=e&tab=0&notabs=&nf=1&af=&ll=10 [Accessed: 2018-05-08].

topic of religion in the workplace across different EU countries.[17] Among other things, the report looks at the role of faith-based organisations in, for example, changing legislation or promoting compliance with rules. While not directly related to the idea of civic engagement discussed herein, the report can still be a relevant source of references and information which might prove useful to outline a broader picture of the activities and impact of faith-based organisations on society.

A chapter by Pippa Norris titled "Does Praying Together Mean Staying Together? Religion and Civic Engagement in Europe and the United States" is purchasable online for 23.94£.[18] Based on the abstract, the chapter seems to look at whether religious affiliation can increase philanthropic work, social and civic engagement as well as civic activism in Europe and the United States.

A report by Stephen Bullivant on young people's religiosity in twenty-two European countries, analysing data taken from the European Social Survey, can be found online for free.[19] While the report is mainly focused on Europe, Section 3 looks specifically at France and the UK.

It is also worth mentioning journals like the *Review of Religious Research* (published by Springer) which contain several relevant articles such as, to mention just an example, "Social Networks and Civic Participation and Efficacy in Two Evangelical Protestant Churches"[20] by Schwadel *et al.* (purchasable at the price of 35.94£).

Finally, some databases are available containing data on church membership rates for many European and non-European countries, such as for instance the UN-Data database. While looking for data directly on national statistical offices' websites was the preferred research method adopted here, such databases are in any case quite useful especially when national ones are hard to use as in the case of Austria (see below).

17 Eurofound, *Religion in the workplace* [Online], 2017, available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef1738_religion_in_the_workplace_topical_update.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
18 Norris, P. (2013): 'Does Praying Together Mean Staying Together? Religion and Civic Engagement in Europe and the United States' in (eds.) de Hart J., Dekker P. and Halman L., *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*, Springer, Dordrecht. Available for purchase online at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6815-4_15 [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
19 Stephen Bullivant (2018) *Europe's Young Adults and Religion Findings from the European Social Survey (2014-16) to inform the 2018 Synod of Bishops* [Online], available at: https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/benedict-xvi/docs/2018-mar-europe-young-people-report-eng.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
20 The article can be purchased here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13644-015-0237-y [Accessed: 2018-05-03].

4 National Context

(in alphabetical order)

4.1 Austria

4.1.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures can be found on the UNData database[21]. Information is available in English and data can be sorted by sex and geographical area, as well as be presented as a total. Overall, in 2001 the largest religion in the country was Roman Catholicism with 5,915,421 members, followed by Protestants (376,150) and Muslims (338,988). Data are also available directly on the Statistics Austria's website[22]; however, the portal is slow and is much more complicated to use. Data are only updated as of 2001 since no data were collected on religious belonging in the 2011 census.

4.1.2 The Catholic Church

Yearly statistics about the Catholic Church can be found on the website of the Katholische Kirche Österreich (Catholich Church Austria).[23] Apart from that, no other relevant information is available.

4.1.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

No relevant information has been identified.

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21 The database can be accessed here: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3a28 [Accessed: 2018-04-17].
22 The website can be accessed here: http://statcube.at/statcube/opendatabase?id=deregz_zr_vzrz _hh [Accessed: 2018-04-17].
23 Katholische Kirche Österreich, *Statistik*, 2017, available at: https://www.katholisch.at/statistik [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

4.2 Belgium

4.2.1 National Membership Figures

Precise official membership figures are not available. Still, according to the CIA Factbook's 2009 estimates, 50% of Belgians are Roman Catholics, a rough 5% are Muslims and more than 30% of Belgians declare no religious affiliation at all. Similar percentages are also found in the 2015 special Eurobarometer survey on Climate Change, Biodiversity and Discrimination of Minority Groups.[24]

4.2.2 Faith-Based Organisations

No relevant information has been identified at this stage.

4.3 Czech Republic

4.3.1 National Membership Figures

Official data by the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) are available online in English but are only accessible through digital archives as such data are not available anymore on the CSO's website.[25] Data refer to the last three censuses carried out by the CSO and show an overall sharp decline in the amount of people who self-declare to belong to any religious faith. Nonetheless, in 2011 Roman Catholicism remained the most practiced religion in the country (1,083,899 members), followed by the Evangelical Church (51,936) and the Czechoslovak Hussite Church (39,276). It is interesting to note that, while between the 1991 and the 2001 censuses there was also a small negative variation in the Czech population (so a small decline in the people who declared to belong to a certain religion could be expected), the decline in religious membership in 2011 comes even at an increase in the Czech population.

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24 Percentages can be found here: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?headers=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V11&previousmode=table&stubs=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V294&study=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FZA6595&V294slice=1&mode=table&v=2&weights=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V499&V294subset=1+-+12&analysismode=table&gs=7&V11slice=AT&top=yes [Accessed: 2018-04-18].
25 The archived file can be accessed here: https://web.archive.org/web/20150221184947/ http://www.czso.cz/sldb2011/eng/redakce.nsf/i/tab_7_1_population_by_religious_belief_and_by_ munici-pality_size_groups/%24File/PVCR071_ENG.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

4.3.2 The Catholic Church

The Katolická církev v České republice (Catholic Church in Czech Republic) publishes very brief summaries/press releases about its activities which include some interesting key data, but these documents are only available in Czech.[26] Another more detailed report on the activities of the Catholic Churches in the country is available, again only in Czech, for the price of 86 Czech Koruna (about 3€).[27]

4.3.3 The Evangelic Church Of Czech Brethren

The Church has been publishing annual reports on its activities since 2008 (although no 2017 report is available yet).[28] Reports are available online for free; however, they are only written in Czech.

4.3.4 The Czechoslovak Hussite Church

The Church has a very basic website and no relevant document/information has been identified.

4.4 Denmark

4.4.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are provided by Statistics Denmark on its website on a quarterly basis. The website looks quite simple in style but is very easy to use. Overall, in the first quarter of 2018, 4,352,507 Danes belonged to the 'National Church' (*i.e.* the Evangelical Lutheran Church), corresponding to 75.2% of the population.[29] Similar statistics (provided again by Statistics Denmark) referring up to 1990 and sorted by

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26 Katolická církev v České republice, *Výroční zpráva Církve římskokatolické za rok 2016*, n/a, available at: https://cbk.blob.core.windows.net/cms/ContentItems/20613_20613/vyrocni-zprava-cirkve-rimskokatolicke-za-rok-2016.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-16].
27 The report can be purchased here: https://knihy.heureka.cz/katolicka-cirkev-v-ceske-republice/specifikace/#section [Accessed: 2018-01-16].
28 Reports can be downloaded here: https://www.e-cirkev.cz/rubrika/799-kdo-jsme-Soucasnost-Vyrocni-zpravy/index.htm [Accessed: 2018-04-18].
29 Data can be found here: https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/kultur-og-kirke/folkekirken/medlemmer-af-folkekirken [Accessed: 2018-05-03].

city/province can be found on the website of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs.[30] In regard to other religious groups, Statistics Denmark estimates Muslims to be about 5% of the population and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates others such as Roman Catholics, Jews and Buddhists to be less than 1% of the population, each.[31]

4.4.2 The Lutheran Church

The Lutheran Church does not publish annual reports on its activities online, neither on its Danish[32] nor on its English[33] website. Some annual reports are available anyways, probably on the activities carried out by the Church online.[34] Annual reports (årsrapporter) by many dioceses can be found online, but – apart from the fact that they are only written in Danish – they all seem to be just financial reports, which is why they have not been taken into consideration.

4.5 Estonia

4.5.1 National Membership Figures

Official data by Statistics Estonia are available online in English. In particular, a very easy-to-use database allows to sort data by religion, place of residence and sex.[35] Data refer to the 2011 census. Overall, we know, to mention just few examples, that in Estonia in 2011 there were 176,773 Orthodox, 108,513 Lutherans, 4,501 Roman Catholics, 142 Hindus, 1,508 Muslims and 1,925 Earth Believers. The majority of Estonians declares no religious affiliation.

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30 Data can be found here: http://www.km.dk/folkekirken/kirkestatistik/folkekirkens-medlemstal/ [Accessed: 2018-05-03].
31 *Op. cit.* in U.S. Department of State (2016): *International Religious Freedom Report – Denmark*, available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiation/269052.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-03].
32 The Danish version can be accessed here: http://www.folkekirken.dk/ [Accessed: 2018-05-03].
33 The English version can be accessed here: http://www.lutheranchurch.dk/ [Accessed: 03/05/2018].
34 Examples of these reports can be found here: (2017) https://www.folkekirkensit.dk/fileadmin/Kirkenettet/Dokumenter/OEkonomi/Aarsrapport-2017.pdf; (2016) https://www.folkekirkensit.dk/fileadmin/Kirkenettet/Dokumenter/OEkonomi/AArsrapport-2016. pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-03].
35 The database can be accessed here: http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=PC0451&lang=1 [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

4.5.2 The Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church

The Eesti Evangeelne Luterlik Kirik (the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church) publishes annual reports online about its activities.[36] Reports, which contain aggregated data on the Church, are, however, only written in Estonian.

4.5.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

A map of Orthodox churches provided by the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate is available online[37], but no other relevant information has really been identified at this stage.

4.6 France

4.6.1 National Membership Figures

France is famous for it's strict separation of the political (public) and the religious (private) spheres. Perhaps, partially because of this the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) does not provide collected data about religious affiliation. At any rate, according to a 2010 Eurobarometer survey, 46% of French respondents do not believe in God or do not know whether they believe in any God, 27% declare to believe in God and the remaining 27% in "some sort of spirit".[38]

It is also worth recalling here the report by Stephen Bullivant on young adults' religiosity which contains a section on France and the UK (see Multi-Country section above and note no. 19).

4.6.2 The Catholic Church

The Conférence Des Évêques De France Et Ses Services (Bishops' Conference of France) has published annual reports in the past about its activities but there are no

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36 Eesti Evangeelne Luterlik Kirik, *Aruanded*, n/a, available at: http://www.eelk.ee/et/kiriku-korraldus/ aruanded/ [Accessed: 2018-01-15].
37 The map can be found here: http://www.orthodox.ee/welcome.html [Accessed: 2018-04-18].
38 European Commission, *Eurobarometer 73.1 Biotechnology* [Online], 2010, p. 378[381], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf [Accessed: 01/05/2018].

updated reports available. The only reports which could be found are the 2013-2014[39] and the 2014-2015[40] ones. Reports are available online for free but have only been written in French. A recent report on the role of the Catholic Church in suburbs, containing some statistics and accounts, can also be found online, again in French only.[41]

The Église catholique en France (Catholic Church in France), which shares the same website with the Bishops' Conference of France, provides some yearly statistics (referring up to 1990) online for free in French, but has not updated them since 2015.[42] It also provides a list of all Catholic organisations based in France, divided by category depending on the field of activity (e.g. youth, health, solidarity).[43]

4.6.3 The Protestant Church

The Fédération Protestant de France (the Protestant Federation of France) has recently published an annual report containing information, among other things, on the activity of Protestant churches in France.[44] The report, comprising 650 pages, is titled *La France Protestante – 2018* and is only available for purchase at the price of 45€. The report includes information about, for instance, the role of educational institutions, Protestant mass media or leisure and hospitality centers run or owned by Protestant churches in France. A 2017 report is also available online at a discounted price[45]. Both reports have been written in French only.

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39 Conférence Des Évêques De France, *La Conférence Des Évêques De France Et Ses Services. 2013-2014 Rapport Annuel* [Online], available at: https://www.eglise.catholique.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/05/RapportAnnuelCEF-13-14.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
40 Conférence Des Évêques De France, *La Conférence Des Évêques De France Et Ses Services. 2014-2015 Rapport Annuel* [Online], available at: https://www.eglise.catholique.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/05/RAP2014-15.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
41 Conférence Des Évêques De France, *Église En Périphérie Le Rapport 2017* [Online], available at: https://eglise.catholique.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/10/Eglise-en-P-2017-Final-web-1.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
42 Such statistics can be found here: https://eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/guide-de-leglise/leglise-catholique-en-france-et-en-chiffres/371402-statistiques-de-leglise-catholique-en-france-guide-2017/ [Accessed: 2018-05-01].
43 Église catholique en France, *Liste des mouvements et associations de fidèles*, n/a, available at: http://eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/guide-de-leglise/mouvements-et-associations/mouvements-associations/ [Accessed: 2018-01-09].
44 Fédération Protestante en France, *La France Protestante – 2018*, 2017, available at: http://www.protestants.org/index.php?id=31234&user_bookreview_pi1[id]=442&cHash=01adb 48bff [Accessed: 2018-01-09].
45 The book can be purchased here https://librairie-7ici.com/278-annuaire-la-france-protestante-2017.html

4.6.4 The French Interministerial Mission For Monitoring And Combating Cultic Deviances

The Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires (Interministerial Mission for Monitoring and Combating Cultic Deviances), also known as MIVILUDES, has published reports which contain several aggregated data on its activity, whose aim is to prevent and fight ('jihadist') radicalization and sectarian deviations in France. The 2016 report shows an increase in the number of cases the Mission has been asked to intervene in (they were 1,825 in 2010 and 2.500 in 2016)[46]. Reports are freely accessible online but they are written in French and have not been published regularly over the years.

4.6.5 Other Faith-Based Organisations

The Union Bouddhiste de France (Buddhist Union of France) has been publishing bulletins in French about its activities regularly throughout the year since 2009.[47] The Assemblé des Évéques Orthodoxes de France (Assembly of Orthodox Bishops of France) does have any detailed information available on its website about its activities (many web pages exist but they are empty, e.g. the one about Publications or the one about Movements and Associations).[48] Similarly, the Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith) does not have any publication nor any specific data available about its activity or interaction with civil society, aside from news articles which, in any case, are only rarely published.[49]

4.7 Germany

4.7.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures can be found in English on the Statistisches Bundesamt's website. According to the 2011 census, 24,869,380 Germans (31.2% of the population) belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 24,552,110 (30.8%) to the Evangelical Church, 1,050,740 to Orthodox Churches (1.3%) and 83,430 (0.1%) to Jewish Commu-

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46 MIVILUDES, *Rapport annuel 2015*, 2016, available at: http://www.derives-sectes.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/publications/francais/Miviludes%20rapport%202015%20web.pdf [Accessed: 09/01/2018].
47 Bulletins are available here: https://www.bouddhisme-france.org/ubf-infos/ [Accessed: 09/01/2018].
48 The main website can be accessed here: http://www.aeof.fr/ [Accessed: 2018-01-09].
49 The main website can be accessed here: https://www.cfcm.tv/ [Accessed: 2018-01-09].

nities.[50] Data can be sorted by sex, age, marital status, migrant background, citizenship and other variables.

Other statistics can be found on the Religionswissenschaftliche Medien- und Informationsdienst e. V. (REMID)'s website.[51] REMID also has info graphics available in JPG format which can be purchased for few Euros[52] as we all as time series and official statistics referring to the year 1911[53] and to the Weimar Republic[54] which are instead available for free.

4.7.2 The Catholic Church

The Catholic Church publishes annual reports with "facts and numbers" which can be downloaded online for free.[55] Reports are only written in German but seem to contain a fair amount of aggregated data about the composition of the Church, as well as information about its activities in the country and beyond. The latest report available refer to the year 2016/2017.[56]

4.7.3 The Evangelical Church

Aggregated data on the activities of the Evangelical Church can be found in the Church's annual reports which are available online in German for free.[57] A report on 'Engagement and Indifference' conducted by the Evangelical Church is also available

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50 Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Länder, *Population depending on sex, age (ten years age groups) and religion (in detail)* [Online], 2014, available at: https://ergebnisse. zensus2011.de/?locale=en#StaticContent:00,BEV_10_15,m,table [Accessed: 2018-04-28].
51 REMID's webpage containing statistics for different religions practiced in Germany can be found here: http://remid.de/info_zahlen/ [Accessed: 2018-04-28].
52 For more information see http://remid.de/info_zahlen_grafik/ [Accessed: 2018-04-28].
53 The document, written in German, can be found here: https://ia800500.us.archive.org/27/ items/HessischeZentralstelleFrLandesstatistik1911/ZentralstellefrLandesstatistik1911.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-28].
54 The document, written in German, can be found here: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/ deu/JEW_RELIGIONZUGEHTABELLE_GER.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-28].
55 For a list of all the reports available see https://www.dbk.de/kirche-in-zahlen/kirchliche-statistik/ [Accessed: 2018-05-06].
56 The 2016/2017 report can be downloaded here: https://www.dbk.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Zahlen%20und%20Fakten/Kirchliche%20Statistik/Allgemein_-_Zahlen_und_Fakten/AH294_Zahlen-und-Fakten-2016-2017_web.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-06].
57 The latest report (2017) can be downloaded here: https://archiv.ekd.de/download/ broschuere _2017_internet.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-28].

in German for free.[58] It examines the membership base of the church and investigates the social role that membership plays.

4.7.4 The Role Of Faith-Based Organisations In Helping Refugees

A report by the Bertelsmann Stiftung foundation addresses the extent to which attending services or engaging with a religious community have an impact on people's willingness to help refugees. The report is available online for free in German, but a summary in English is also available. Among other things, the study found that

> 'for both Christians and Muslims, there is a relatively strong correlation between ties to a religious community and involvement in helping refugees. However, those who show the strongest commitment to these efforts are not the people who regularly attend Sunday church services or Friday prayers, but those who are regularly involved in their faith communities outside of religious rituals. Among Muslims, the participation rate of this group is as high as 72 percent; the relevant figure for Christians is about 40 percent. In the absence of such strong ties to the community, the share of volunteers drops to 40 percent among Muslims and to 17 percent among Christians'.[59]

4.8 Greece

4.8.1 National Membership Figures

Unfortunately, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) does not provide data about religious affiliation. However, the U.S. Government estimated 98% of Greeks in 2017 to be Orthodox and 1.7% to be Muslims.[60] The figures are similar to those found in the 2015 special Eurobarometer survey on Climate Change, Biodiversity and Discrimination of Minority Groups.[61] ELSTAT, in any case, publishes data regarding the

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58 Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, *Engagement und Indifferenz Kirchenmitgliedschaft als soziale Praxis* [Online], available at: https://archiv.ekd.de/download/ekd_v_kmu2014.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-29].

59 Nagel, A. K. and El-Menouar, Y., *Engagement für Geflüchtete – eine Sache des Glaubens? Die Rolle der Religion für die Flüchtlingshilfe* [Online], 2017, p. 53, available at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/51_Religionsmonitor/BSt_ReligionsmonitorFluechtlingshilfe_3_2017_web.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-28].

60 U.S. Department of State (2016): *International Religious Freedom Report – Greece*, available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269064.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

61 Percentages can be found here: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?headers=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V11&previousmode=table&stubs=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V294&study=http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FZA6595&V294slice=1&mode=table&v=2&weights=

amount of religious and civil marriages practiced in the country – while the former were largely more practiced in 2009 (34,375 vs. 24,837)[62], the latter became more practiced in 2015 (23,778 vs. 25,854)[63].

4.8.2 Faith-Based Organisations

No other relevant information has been identified at this stage.

4.9 Hungary

4.9.1 National Membership Figures

Aggregated data on religious membership collected in the 2011 census can be downloaded online in English on the Hungarian Central Statistical Office's website.[64] The Excel file made available by the Statistical Office also includes 1930, 1949 and 2001 figures and all data can be sorted by sex. Overall, in 2011 there were 1,753,565 Catholics, 519,968 Calvinists and 95,493 Lutherans. While the numbers of members of *all* churches decreased in ten years since 2001, it must be pointed out that compared to 2001 there was a very large increase in the amount of people who refused to answer (560,783 in 2001, 1,312,216 in 2011).

4.9.2 Reformed (Calvinist) Church In Hungary

The Reformed Church in Hungary has some basic statistics available in English on its website[65]. The Church also publishes free annual reports in English about its activity – however, these have not been published since 2013 and no 2012 report is available.[66]

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http%3A%2F%2F193.175.238.79%3A80%2Fobj%2FfVariable%2FZA6595_V499&V294subset=1+-+12 &analysismode=table&gs=7&V11slice=AT&top=yes [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

62 ELSTAT (2015): *Greece in figures*, available at: http://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/ 301069/GreeceInFigures_2015Q3_EN.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

63 ELSTAT (2018): *Greece in figures*, available at: http://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/ 1515741/GreeceInFigures_2018Q1_EN.pdf/e90e9c60-ed92-40a7-a1e0-9a58d542d596 [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

64 An excel file can be downloaded here: http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/tables/regional/ 00/00_1_1_7_1_en.xls [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

65 These can be accessed here: http://www.reformatus.hu/mutat/6819/ [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

66 Annual reports can be accessed here: http://www.reformatus.hu/mutat/9993/ [Accessed: 18/04/ 2018].

4.9.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

A report on the role of faith-based organisations in fighting poverty and social exclusion is available online for free.[67] The report is available in English and, although it is not included in the FACIT report aforementioned (see Multi-Country section) it seems to have been conducted within the FACIT project anyways. Apart from this report, no real dataset is available in a directly accessible format, except for an unofficial and voluntary directory of churches over the country.[68]

4.10 Iceland

4.10.1 National Membership Figures

Official data are available in English on the Statistics Iceland's website.[69] Data can be sorted by year, religion and sex and go back as far as to 1998. The database is user-friendly and is very similar to the Estonian one. Overall, in 2017 338,349 people declared a religious affiliation, 236,481 of which to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 12,901 to the Roman Catholic Church Diocese and 642 to the Jehovah's Witnesses community (to name just few examples).

4.10.2 Church Of Iceland

The Hin evangelíska lúterska kirkja (the Church of Iceland), of Protestant faith and the largest one in the country, has been publishing free annual reports of its activities on its website since 2009.[70] Reports are only available in Icelandic – yet they seem to contain lots and very detailed information about the engagement of the Church with

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67 Z., and Tünde, V. (2011): *Faith-Based Organisations And Their Role In Combating Poverty In Hungary*, available at: http://archivesyslab.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/publications/viragvidrafaithbased-organisationspovertyhungary.doc [Accessed: 2018-01-16].
68 The website is in Hungarian and apparently it enables people to upload pictures of any Church they find in the country, meaning that there might be churches which are not listed because nobody has uploaded any picture of them. The website is accessible here: http://www.templomaink.hu/ [Accessed: 2018-01-16].
69 Data can be found here: https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Samfelag/Samfelag__menning__5_trufelog/MAN10001.px/?rxid=e9b67606-d567-44f2-a62d-92903ddcca5d [Accessed: 2018-04-18].
70 Reports can be found here: http://kirkjan.is/utgafa/utgefid-efni/ [Accessed: 2018-01-14].

its members and society in general. Aggregated data on memberships of the Church of Iceland can be found online for free, divided per categories such as age and sex.[71]

4.10.3 Other Information

A visually compelling map of all churches in Iceland can be found online.[72] Apart from that, no other relevant information has been identified at this stage.

4.11 Ireland

4.11.1 National Membership Figures

Results from the 2016 census, containing official membership figures, are available online in English on the Central Statistics Office's website.[73] Overall, the vast majority of Irish people declare themselves to be Roman Catholics (3,729,100), followed by members of the Church of Ireland (126,400) and Muslims (63,400). It is important to note, however, the large increase in people who declare not to belong to any religion at all (269,800 in 2011, 468,400 in 2016).

4.11.2 The Irish Council Of Churches

The Irish Council of Churches, comprising churches of Protestant, Orthodox, Reformed and Independent tradition, publishes free annual reports online about its activity.[74] While they do contain some data, such reports look however more like short summaries/bulletins. The Council does provide more specific information about its projects and civic engagement in its Project Reports, though, which are also available online for free.[75] However, there are only four such reports available, the last one having been published in 2012. In this last report, the question of how religious organi-

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71 The dataset can be found here: http://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Samfelag/Samfelag__menning__5_trufelog/MAN10296.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=8a509468-d29f-4bca-bb80-2ceda78a1d38 [Accessed: 2018-01-14].

72 The map can be accessed here: http://www.kirkjukort.net/ [Accessed: 2018-01-14].

73 The census can be downloaded here: https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/census-2016-summary-results-part-1-full.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-18].

74 These reports can be found here: https://www.irishchurches.org/resources/annual-reports [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

75 Project reports can be found here: https://www.irishchurches.org/resources/project-reports [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

sations engage with society and local authorities at the local level, particularly in the city of Dublin, and how to promote interfaith dialogue, as well as the importance of adopting a bottom-up approach, was discussed.[76] Another report, inclusive of maps and aggregated data, is instead available on the 'ecumenical development' of Ireland, *i.e.* "the formation of interchurch groups".[77]

4.12 Italy

4.12.1 National Membership Figures

The Italian National Institute for Statistics does not collect data about religious belonging. The only relevant data it collects deals with the number of religious and nonreligious marriages celebrated in the country. While the former have generally been decreasing over the years (122,297 in 2012, 107,873 in 2016), the latter have been increasing (84,841 in 2012, 95,385 in 2016).[78] Still, while no precise and official membership figures are available, a survey conducted by EURISPES in 2016 found that 71% of Italians identified as Roman Catholics.[79] Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and other Christians account in total instead for about 5% of the population, with 24% of Italians declaring no religious affiliation at all.

4.12.2 The Catholic Church And Migrants Hospitality

The role of catholic churches seems to be particularly advanced in Italy, especially with regard to migrant hospitality. The Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (Italian Episcopal Conference, CEI according to the Italian acronym) published a *vademecum* in 2015 in which it stated that more than 22,000 out of 95,000 migrants were being hosted in 1,600 faith-based buildings, such as parishes and religious communities.[80] The CEI also conducted in 2015-16 and 2016-17 a questionnaire to monitor hospitality by Italian dioceses. In 2015-16, it found slightly more than 23,201 people being hosted

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76 Cristea, A. (2012): *Integration and Interfaith: Faith/City Engagement in a Multicultural Context*, available at: https://www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/resources/Reports/DCIF-Project-Report.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].
77 McKinley, P. (2011): *Inter-Church Directory. Presentation of Results*, p. 5, available at: https://www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/resources/Reports/LocalEcuDir.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].
78 Data can be found here (in Italian): http://demo.istat.it/altridati/matrimoni/2016/tav1_2.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
79 *Op. cit.* in U.S. Department of State (2016): *International Religious Freedom Report – Italy*, available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269072.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
80 CEI (2015): *Vademecum per le diocesi e le parrocchie*, http://www.vita.it/attachment/17238746-af79-4b38-b080-fd0afd813d0c/ [Accessed 2018-01-07].

by churches, faith-based reception centers or families.[81] In 2016-17, the number of dioceses involved were 136 out of 220 and the number of people being hosted increased to 23,300.[82] These data have been provided by the CEI Secretariat and have been used by several organisations to write joint reports on international protection in Italy (which is where the aforementioned data have been taken from). These reports have been published yearly and they are freely accessible online; however, data are available only at the aggregated level and little information is provided on the precise methodology employed (e.g. what kind of questions dioceses were asked, time and way of completion, reliability of results, non-response rate, etc.).

The increase in hospitality followed Pope Francis's call in 2015 "on European parishes and religious communities to offer shelter to a migrant family".[83] Yet, while Italy has experienced an increase in the number of migrants hosted by religious communities, such increase did not come without troubles. Since 2015 dioceses have indeed "witnessed a great supportive movement which, however, found it hard sometimes to turn into hospitality".[84] Not only hospitality, but integration, too, seems to have proven problematic in some dioceses. Yet many churches have still tried to be as open as possible. The *Vasi Comunicanti* (Communicating Vessels) report by the Italian Caritas shows, for instance, the cases of two cities, Ventimiglia and Como, in which local churches provided shelter or food for hundreds of migrants. In the case of Ventimiglia, the local church of S. Antonio, with help from French Muslim organisations, "seemed to be the only one capable of temporarily manage hospitality", especially compared with the inadequacy of Italian institutions.[85] In less than a month and a half, the church in question hosted about 6,000 migrants (the majority of which – 65% – came from Sudan).[86] In the case of Como, instead, the local diocesan Caritas organised a meal center for hundreds of refugees and it proved itself very engaged considering that after a call for volunteers was published online it received more than 300 hundreds replies in few hours.[87] Three other churches also offered hospitality to refugees and many shops donated food or goods.[88]

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81 ANCI, CARITAS, CITTALIA, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale Dello Sprar and UNHCR (2016): *Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia*, p. 133.

82 ANCI, CARITAS, CITTALIA, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale Dello Sprar and UNHCR (2017): *Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia*, p. 127

83 Vatican Radio, *Pope asks all European parishes to take in a refugee family*, 6 September 2015, available at: http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/09/06/pope_asks_all_european_parishes_to_take_in_a_refugee_family/1169953 [Accessed 2018-01-07].

84 Caritas (2016): *Rapporto Vasi Comunicanti*, p. 92, available at: http://s2ew.caritasitaliana.it/materiali/Pubblicazioni/libri_2016/Rapporto_VasiComunicanti.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-07] (author's translation).

85 *ivi*, p. 93.

86 ibidem.

87 *ivi*, p. 94.

88 ibidem.

As these two cases demonstrate, there are also some data available at the local level which show how churches engage with civil society in regard to migrants' reception, hospitality and their integration. Data are generally summarised through stories rather than simply listed in formal grids. It must be pointed out, however, that while these kind of data are available for free and can be found in reports such as the ones quoted above, all such reports are written in Italian and information written in English at that level is rare.

4.12.3 The Catholic Church And The Provision Of Free After-School Supervision For Students

Many churches in Italy provide the so-called *doposcuola, i.e.* "supervised study and recreation after school hours"[89]. Data are not available for the whole country, yet some have been collected at the local or regional level. In the Lombardia Region, for instance, there were 267 *doposcuola* (*i.e.* 267 parishes providing such service) in 2010.[90] Data are available only at the aggregated level and aside from this report no other, similar studies were found to be available on this topic.

4.12.4 Providing Food To The Homeless

There are lots of data on the amount of homeless people living in Italy, yet very little about the activity of churches in helping them. A 2014 report by the National Institute for Statistics, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, fio.PSD and Caritas Italiana provides some useful insights, especially with regard to financial resources. In particular, 35.8% of street volunteers who distribute clothes, duvets, food or medical assistance to homeless people are financed by churches or other religious organisations.[91] Note that no English translation of the report is available, and no similar data could be found in online repositories.

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89 Collins Dictionary Online, available at https://www.collinsdictionary.com/it/dizionario/italiano-inglese/doposcuola [Accessed: 2018-01-07].

90 Caritas Ambrosiana (2010): *I doposcuola parrocchiali nella diocesi di Milano. Rapporto di ricerca*, available at http://www.caritasambrosiana.it/Public/userfiles/files/Report%20di%20ricerca_%20I%20doposcuola%20parrocchiali%20nella%20diocesi%20di%20milano%202_indd.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-07].

91 ISTAT, Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Caritas Italiana and fio.PSD (2015): *Le persone senza dimora*, available at: http://www.caritasitaliana.it/caritasitaliana/allegati/6167/Persone_senza_dimora%20_10-dic-2015_Testo_integrale.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-07].

4.12.5 Muslims In Italy: Integration, Mosques And Associations

The only data available on the integration of Muslims in Italy takes the form of surveys. A survey by IPR Marketing, for instance, revealed that over a sample of 500 Muslims, one out of three apparently reported no willingness to integrate.[92] Data, however, are only available in form of graphics and the methodology employed is only partially explained.

There are, however, some other data available. In 2016, in response to a question posed by Nicola Molteni MP, the former Ministry of the Interior Mr. Angelino Alfano declared that the Minister had just collected data on Muslims in Italy and censed 1.205 related facilities or buildings of which 858 are places of worship while 343 are associations.[93] Despite the Minister's own declaration, neither raw data nor any document providing more information about the figures aforementioned has been made publically available so far (and no English translation is available).

4.13 Luxembourg

4.13.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are not available. A study co-conducted by the Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio Economiques / International Network for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development (CEPS/INSTEAD), a research center sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, estimates however 68.7% of the population to be of Catholic faith, 1.8% of Protestant faith and about 25% to have no religion affiliation at all.[94] A final report of the study is available online for free; however, the report itself is written in French and no English translation is available. The report also includes other interesting data. For instance, some respondents declared in 2008 not to be religious anymore compared to the past.

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92 Antonio Noto, 'Un islamico su 3 ammette: non voglio integrarmi', *Quotidiano Nazionale*, 19 September 2017, available at: http://www.quotidiano.net/politica/musulmani-in-italia-1.3406983 [Accessed: 2018-01-07].

93 Angelino Alfano, in *Resoconto stenografico dell'Assemblea. Seduta n. 603 di mercoledì 6 aprile 2016*, 6 April 2016, p. 44, available at: http://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0603&tipo=stenografico#sed0603.stenografico.tit00070.sub00020 [Accessed: 2018-01-07].

94 Borsenberger, M. and Dickes, P. (2011): *Religions au Luxembourg. Quelle évolution entre 1999-2008?*, available at: http://www.statistiques.public.lu/catalogue-publications/cahiers-CEPS/2011/02-religions.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

The estimates provided by CEPS/INSTEAD are similar to the results of the Special 393 Eurobarometer Survey. There, indeed, 68% of respondents identified themselves as Catholics, 1% as Orthodox, 3% as Protestants and 2% as Muslims.[95]

4.13.2 Faith-Based Organisations

No other relevant information has been identified at this stage.

4.14 The Netherlands

4.14.1 National Membership Figures

Official statistics regarding religious affiliation and practicing can be found on the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (the Central Office for Statistics)'s website. Latest religion-related statistics available refer to 2015[96]. In 2015, the majority (50.1%) of Dutch had no religious affiliation, while, among those who declared to belong to any religion, the majority of them were Roman Catholics (23.7%). Other data available include, for instance, percentages on religious observation and attendance to services. These data are quite interesting. To make just an example, despite having the highest number of members, the Roman Catholic Church in the Netherlands shows nevertheless the lowest attendance rates in the country. Older statistics – going back as far as to the 1970s – are also available in English.[97] Some data on the topic of youths' affiliation and participation to religious life are also available, but only in Dutch.[98]

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95 European Commission (2012): *Special Eurobarometer 393. Discrimination In The EU In 2012 Report*, pp. T98-99, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_393 _en.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

96 These can be found here: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/51/helft-nederlanders-is-kerkelijk-of-religieus [Accessed: 2018-04-19]. A more detailed PDF Report is also available, in Dutch, at the following URL: https://www.cbs.nl/-/media/_pdf/2016/51/religie-regionaal-2010-2015.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

97 These can be found here: (1) https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2001/01/dutch-less-devout,(2) https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2002/52/religious-devotion-among-the-dutch, (3) https://www.cbs. nl/en-gb/news/2003/42/nearly-as-many-muslims-as-calvinists-in-the-netherlands, (4) https://www. cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2008/24/only-few-dutch-people-go-to-church-or-mosque-regularly, (5) https:// www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2003/52/six-in-ten-people-religious [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

98 Data can be accessed here: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2017/08/aandeel-godsdienstige-jongeren-gedaald [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

4.14.2 The Catholic Church

A brief report, published in 2015 and containing some statistics about the Church is available online, but only in Dutch.[99]

4.14.3 Impact Of Faith-Based Organisations

A report on faith-based organisations and their work on social exclusion in The Netherlands as part of the FACIT project is available online for free.[100] Other information is available in other academic articles such as "Faith-Based Organisations And Urban Social Justice In The Netherlands" by Beaumont and Dias.[101]

4.14.4 Open Society Foundations Report On Muslims In Amsterdam

Like for other European cities, a report by the Open Society Foundations on Muslims in Amsterdam is available online for free.[102] Data are only provided at the aggregated level and, as for the other reports, the focus is more on the micro- rather than the meso-level.

4.15 Norway

4.15.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures can be found in English on Statistics Norway's website[103] – probably the most well-presented and detailed website among those taken into consideration for this report. Not only are data easy to find and well-visualised, but information is also available on the exact dates data were updated as well as those of

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99 The report can be accessed here: https://www.rkkerk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Ad-Limina-rapport-van-de-Nederlandse-Bisschoppen%C2%AD-december-2013.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-07].
100 Davelaar, M., *et al. (*2011): *Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands*, available at: https://www.verwey-jonker.nl/doc/participatie/3636_(s)Faith-based-Organisations-and-Social-Exclusion-in-European-Cities_FINAL.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-12].
101 Beaumont, J. and Dias, C, (2008): Faith-Based Organisations And Urban Social Justice In The Netherlands, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 99(4), pp. 382-392.
102 Open Society Foundations (2010): *Muslims in Amsterdam*, available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-muslims-amsterdam-report-en-20101123_0.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-12].
103 Statistics on 'Religion and life stance' can be accessed here: https://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-fritid?de=Religion+and+life+stance+ [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

future updates. Overall, in 2017 3,758,070 Norwegians belonged to the Church of Norway (71.5% of the whole population), with an average of 90.9 participants per service[104], while 619,222 Norwegians declared to belong to other religious denominations[105]. Of these, 339,492 (54.8%) were Christians (152,022 of which belonging to the Roman Catholic Church), 153,067 (24.7%) were Muslims and 92.919 (15%) believed in Philosophy. Data can also be sorted by county and be downloaded as CSV-files or Excel tables. A portal – identical to the Estonian and the Icelandic one – is also available to identify specific variables more quickly.[106]

4.15.2 The Norwegian Church

Den Norske Kirke (The Norwegian Church) publishes annual reports which are accessible for free on its website.[107] Reports contain a fair amount of aggregated data; however, these have only been published in Norwegian.

4.15.3 Other Information

Data which seem to relate to the work of Catholic churches in Oslo in regard to migrant hospitality can be found in a report published somewhat recently by DAWN Norge (uncertainty is due to language barriers as the report is only available in Norwegian).[108]

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104 Data can be accessed here: https://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-fritid/statistikker/kirke_kostra [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
105 Data can be accessed here: https://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-fritid/statistikker/trosamf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
106 This can be accessed here: https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/list/trosamf/?rxid=68b47fd8-f1e7-49f3-8f61-504aa17fa3cf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
107 The 2016 report can be found here: https://kirken.no/globalassets/kirken.no/om-kirken/slik-styres-kirken/kirkeradet/2017/mars/kr_09_1_17_aarsrapport_kr_mkr_skr_2016.pdf [Accessed: 13/01/2018].
108 DAWN Norge, *Kartlegging av migrantmenigheter i Oslo*, available at: http://www.norgeskristnerad.no/ doc//Flyktningenettverket/Rapport%20kartlegging%20av%20migrantmenig heter%20i%20Oslo%20(2).pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

4.16 Poland

4.16.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are provided by the Główny Urząd Statystyczny (the Polish Central Statistical Office). According to the 2016 Statistical Yearbook (which is available in both English and Polish, although not all information has been translated into English), in 2016 the Catholic Church had 33.214.758 members (corresponding to 94.3% of the whole population), the Orthodox Church 504,400, the Protestant Church 61,690, while the Islamic community could count on about 5,000 members.[109] Other statistics are also available; in the same year the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, had 10,248 parishes and 30,925 priests all over the country.[110]

4.16.2 The Catholic Church

The Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego (Institute of Statistics of the Catholic Church) has published a report in 2014 containing a huge amount of aggregated data on the development of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1991 to 2011.[111] Although it is accessible online for free, the report itself has only been written in Polish.

4.16.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

No relevant information has been identified at this stage.

4.17 Portugal

4.17.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Institute for Statistics). Data are only available in Portuguese and can be sorted by geographical area. Overall, according to the 2011 census, 7,281,887 Portuguese

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109 Główny Urząd Statystyczny (2016): *Statistical Yearbook Of The Republic Of Poland*, pp. 196-7 available at: https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/en/defaultaktualnosci/3328/2/16/1/ statistical_yearbook_of_the_republic_of_poland_2016.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
110 *ivi*, p. 198.
111 Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego (2014): *Kościół katolicki w Polsce. 1991-2011.*, available at: https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5515/12/1/2/rs_kosciol_ katolicki_1991-2011.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-16].

(about 81% of the whole population) were Catholics, 75,571 were of Protestant faith and 20,640 were Muslims.[112]

4.17.2 The Catholic Church

The Anuario de Igreja Catolica em Portugal (Directory of the Catholic Church in Portugal) provides an online database of every person, building or organisation affiliated with the Catholic Church in Portugal.[113] Data are freely accessible but information is only available in Portuguese. To make just few examples, there are 44 educational centers run by the Catholic Church in Portugal, 477 parishes, 65 associations or movements and one Ecclesiastical Court.[114] Some statistics are also available but only for the dioceses of Porto and for the years of 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014.

4.17.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

In general, Portuguese faith-based organisations do not publish data on their activities nor there seem to be, at least from an initial search, many reports or data on their engagement with and impact on civil society. The Jewish Communities in Porto, Lisbon or Belmonte, for instance, do not publish data on their activities. The Lisbon Community used to publish bulletins in Portuguese but it has not been doing so since 2009.[115] Similarly, neither the Comunidade Hindu Portugal[116] (the Hindu Community in Portugal) nor the Comunidade Bahá'í de Portugal[117] (Bahá'í Community of Portugal) and the Orthodox Catholic Church of Portugal[118] publish data or annual reports on their websites. The majority of these organisations, in fact, only publish very few and basic key facts on their websites such as the fact that the Uniao Budista Portu-

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112 Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2012): *XV Population Census*, pp. 530, available at: https://www.ine.pt/ngt_server/attachfileu.jsp?look_parentBoui=156749170&att_display=n&att_download=y [Accessed: 2018-04-19].
113 The website can be accessed here: http://www.anuariocatolicoportugal.net/dioceses/lista_ estatisticas.asp?dioceseid=15 [Accessed: 2018-01-10].
114 ibidem.
115 Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa (2009): *Boletim da CIL*, avaialable at: http://www.cilisboa.org/bulletin.htm [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
116 The website can be accessed here: http://www.comunidadehindu.org/ [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
117 The website can be accessed here: https://www.bahai.pt/ [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
118 The website can be accessed here: http://www.igrejaortodoxa.pt/english/index.html [Accessed: 2018-04-19].

guesa (Portuguese Buddhist Union) has 8 temples and 25 monks[119], or that about 50,000 Muslims are estimated to reside in the country[120].

4.18 Romania

4.18.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures can be found on the Institutul Național de Statistică (National Institute for Statistics)'s website. Latest data available refer to the 2011 census and are downloadable for free in Excel format.[121] Different datasets are available but information is only provided in Romanian. Among other things, data can be sorted by sex, geographical area and authorities. Overall, in 2011 16,307,004 Romanians belonged to the Orthodox Church (81% of the population), 870,774 to the Roman Catholic Church, 600,932 to the Reformed Church and 64,337 declared to be Muslims. For comparison purposes, 2002 data can also be downloaded in PDF format[122] – however, less religions were censed compared to 2011. 2002 datasets also include data sorted by sex[123] and level of education attained[124].

Another helpful reading is the report on *State and Religions in Romania* published in 2015 by the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, which is available online for free both in Romanian and English.[125] The report mainly looks at the relationship between religious organisations in Romania and the State. However, chapter 6 (from page 86 to 111) provides short yet concise and detailed information on every recognized religious organisation in the country. According to the Secretariat – to mention just few examples – there were 49,280 Jehovah's Witnesses in 2011, the majority of which were Romanians (72%), for a total of 546 congregations and with availability of 364 houses

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119 Uniao Budista Portuguesa, *Budismo em Portugal*, n/a, available at: http://uniaobudista.pt/ budismo-em-portugal/ [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

120 Comunidade Islamica de Lisboa, *Quantos somos*, n/a, available at:
http://www.comunidadeislamica.pt/pt/comunidade-islamica/comunidade-islamica-em-portugal/ quantos-somos [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

121 Datasets can be downloaded here: http://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-2/ [Accessed: 2018-04-26].

122 2002 datasets can be accessed here: http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/ titluriv4. htm [Accessed: 2018-04-26].

123 Data sorted by sex can be found here: http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/ t18.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-26].

124 Data sorted by education level can be found here: http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/ vol4/tabele/t13.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-26].

125 State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, *State and Religions in Romania (translated by Della L. Marcus)*, 2015, available at: http://culte.gov.ro/fg-content/BookEN.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

of worship.[126] Similarly, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania can rely on 87 places of worship over 39 different communities, for a total of 3,211 censed Jews in 2011.[127] Finally, in the same year the Romanian Orthodox Church had 14,809 churches and 14,933 among priests and deacons all over the country.[128]

4.18.2 The Orthodox Church

The Biserica Ortodoxă Română (Romanian Orthodox Church) does not provide activity reports or detailed information about its activities. It does, however, occasionally publish some information in Romanian regarding, for instance, the activity of the Church in Brussels (to monitor and influence EU politics) or the presence of the Church in other countries such as the United States (where the Church has 5 deacons, 28 parishes and 2 monasteries).[129]

4.18.3 Faith-Based Organisations And Their Impact

A Report on *The Engagement of Religious Organisations in the Social Economy of Romania* is available online for free.[130] The report includes aggregated data on faith-based organisations in Romania. While the report has been written in Romanian only, an abstract written in English is also available. According to it, in Romania faith-based organisations provide

> not just religious assistance [...] [, they] also offer additional services in the form of religious education, biblical studies, and training in special arts and crafts like religious painting or the manufacturing of cultic goods. [...] Notwithstanding the ongoing economic crisis, the number of religious and faith-based organisations has been growing steadily in the last years (a growth rate of 90.74% between 2000 and 2010). [...] The most developed category of services offered (and for which the rate of accreditation is highest) is generic social and socio-medical care for children and families in distress, and care for the elderly. Social and socio-medical services include direct

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126 *ivi*, pp. 108-109.

127 *ivi*, pp. 106-107.

128 *ivi*, pp. 89-90.

129 Biserica Ortodoxă Română, Activităţile desfăşurate, în anul 2015, de către Sectorul relaţii bisericeşti, interreligioase şi comunităţi bisericeşti externe, Biroul Protocol şi Reprezentanţa Patriarhiei Române pe lângă Instituţiile Uniunii Europene [Online], available at: http://patriarhia.ro/activitatile-desfasurate-in-anul-2015-de-catre-sectorul-relatii-bisericesti-interreligioase-si-comunitati-bisericesti-externe-biroul-protocol-si-reprezentanta-patriarhiei-romane-pe-langa-institutiile-uniunii-europene-2871.html [Accessed: 2018-04-26].

130 Conovici, I. (2013): *Organizaţiile cu profil religios angajate în economia socială în România*, available at: http://www.ies.org.ro/library/files/raport_organizatiile_cu_profil_religios_angajate_in_economia_sociala_in_romania.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

assistance, care for abandoned children, home care and homes for the elderly, etc. These are followed by educational services, more frequently kindergartens. Social inclusion services, professional training etc. are less developed for the moment, though the number of (mostly unaccredited) services in the area is also on the rise.[131]

4.19 Slovakia

4.19.1 National Membership Figures

Membership data referring to the 1950, 1991, 2011 and 2011 censuses are available for free in Slovakian on the Ministry of Culture's website.[132] Overall, in 2011 3,347,277 Slovakians, 62.2% of the population, belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 316,250 to the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Slovakia (5.86%) and 17,222 (0.32%) were Jehovah's Witnesses. The Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic also provides detailed statistics about the 18 main religions in the country. Data can be accessed online for free but information is again only available in Slovakian.[133] After clicking on the religion's name, aggregated data about e.g. the number of priests, catechists or members divided by sex can be accessed by clicking on the word 'KULT' (if the Church has allowed for publication). Depending on the religion, different time series are available but latest data available seem in all cases to refer to 2014.

Other official data can be found in the Statistical Yearbook published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. Yearbooks can be accessed online for free and are written in both Slovakian and English – however, they are only available online eight months after their publication (the 2017 yearbook being still currently unavailable). To make just few examples of the kind of data that is available, in 2015 the Roman Catholic Church had 959,333 church services and 2,379 priests; the Greek Catholic Church had 135,504 and 438 respectively, while the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Slovakia had 35,009 and 346.[134]

4.19.2 Faith-Based Organisations

No other relevant information has been identified at this stage.

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131 *ivi*, pp. 20-22.

132 Data can be accessed here: http://www.culture.gov.sk/extdoc/6627/veriaci [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

133 A list of all the religions for which data is available can be found here: http://www.culture.gov.sk/registrovane-cirkvi-a-nabozenske-spolocnosti-f9.html [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

134 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2017): *Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic* [Online], pp. 225-228, available at: https://slovak.statistics.sk/PortalTraffic/fileServlet?Dokument =85759 d90-e722-4faf-b0ae-73582ad3ba7a [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

4.20 Slovenia

4.20.1 National Membership Figures

The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia did not collect data on religious affiliation in its 2011 census and seems likely not to be collecting them in future ones.[135] Latest data available therefore refer to 2002, when the Office identified 1,135,626 Catholics, 14,736 Evangelicals and 47,488 Muslims.[136] Data are presented in English and can be sorted by region (e.g. in 2002, Osrednjeslovenska was the region with the highest number of Catholics).

4.20.2 The Catholic Church

The Katoliška Cerkev v Sloveniji (Catholic Church in Slovenia) has been publishing free online reports about its activity in the country since 2015.[137] The reports seem to contain a fair amount of aggregated data but the reports themselves are written in Slovenian and no information in English is available.

4.20.3 Other Faith-Based Organisations

From an initial search at least, other faith-based organisations such as the Evangeličanska Cerkev (the Evangelical Church) or the Islamska skupnost v Republiki Slovniji (the Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia) do not seem to publish reports about their activities. In some cases, some organisations do not even have a website available to consult.

4.21 Spain

4.21.1 National Membership Figures

The Instituto Nacional de Estadística's website (National Institute of Statistics) is quite old-style and no particularly user-friendly, especially when compared to other

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135 For clarification check: http://www.stat.si/popis2011/eng/Faq.aspx?lang=eng [Accessed: 2018-04-27].
136 Data can be accessed here: http://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati_html/REG-T-18ENG.htm [Accessed: 2018-04-27].
137 Reports can be accessed here: http://katoliska-cerkev.si/dokumenti-in-publikacije [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

European countries. Furthermore, no data was available on religious affiliation. However, according to a survey conducted recently by the Centro de Investigacion Sociológicas, 68.5% of respondents defined themselves as Catholic while more than 25% declared to be either self-categorising as atheist or saying that they simply do not believe at all.[138]

4.21.2 The Catholic Church

The Conferencia Episcopal Española (Spanish Episcopal Conference) publishes annual reports on the activities of the Catholic Church in Spain. Reports are accessible for free online and are very detailed. In 2015, in Spain there were 69 dioceses, with 22,999 parishes, 18,576 priests, 101,751 catechists and more than 12,609 other faith-based entities such as organisations, confraternities and foundations.[139] In the same year, the Church distributed 302 millions of Euros in 'community activities' and 4,791,593 people were assisted in one of the 8,966 community centres run by it.[140] In 2014-2015, 2,593 catholic educational centres were censed in the whole country, with a total of 1,476,918 students and 125,517 employees.[141] The Catholic Church estimates an extra 40% added value in terms of 'social impact' for students studying in catholic educational centers as compared with students studying in non-catholic ones, an extra 100% for those obtaining a bachelor, and an extra 30% brought by catholic universities in general.[142]

4.21.3 National Database Of Worship Places – The Observatory Of Religious Pluralism In Spain

The Directorio de lugares de culto (the Database of Places of Worship) developed by the Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso en España (Observatory of Religious Pluralism in Spain) provides aggregated and disaggregated data on places of worship for almost every religion practiced in Spain. It combines data from two datasets (one from

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138 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2018): *Estudio nº3203. BARÓMETRO DE ENERO 2018* [Online], p. 19, available at: http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/3200_3219/3203/es3203mar.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-27].
139 Conferencia Episcopal Española, *Memoria Anual De Actividades De Iglesia Catolica En España Año 2015*, 2017, pp. 7, 26 and 30, available at: https://www.slideshare.net/xtantos/memoria-de-actividades-2015-de-la-iglesia-catlica-en-espaa?ref=http://www.portantos.es/memoria-de-actividades-2015 [Accessed: 2018-01-09].
140 *ivi*, pp. 21, 55, respectively.
141 *ivi*, p. 39.
142 *ivi*, p. 43-45.

the Ministry of Justice and one from the Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia) amended for spontaneous corrections sent by religious representatives themselves.[143] The database – which is freely accessible online but which is available only in Spanish – allows users to see on a map where places are located as well as to identify the regions with the highest number of places of worship. It also allows users to make comparison between regions for every specific religion. To mention just few statistics, there are 6,956 places of worship in the whole country, of which 3,831 are Evangelical, 1,569 Muslim, 208 Orthodox and 15 related to Scientology.[144] Spain is the only country, among those analysed in this report, to have such a detailed, complete and reliable database on this topic available.

The Observatory has also an interesting list of publications available about the history, integration and presence of religious minorities in specific cities, towns or regions of Spain. Every report deals with one of these, e.g. *Umbrales. Minorias religiosas en Navarra* (Umbrales. Religious Minorities in Navarra).[145] The reports are only available in Spanish and can either be downloaded for free or bought in print.

4.21.4 Other Faith-Based Organisations

In general, key facts and numbers about the activity of religious organisations can be found by looking online for their "memoria de actividades" (tr. activity report). The dioceses of Orihuela-Alicante, for instance, in 2016 provided assistance for 75,987 people and it financed 20 development projects.[146] While not all religious organisations provide data on their activities, some information can still be found in their online websites. For instance, the Comision Islamica de España (Islamic Commission of Spain) publishes monthly bulletins about its activity.[147] However, there is generally no access to raw data and information is predominantly written in Spanish.

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143 Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso en España, *Directorio de lugares de culto*, n/a, available at: http://www.observatorioreligion.es/directorio-lugares-de-culto/ [Accessed: 2018-01-08].
144 ibidem.
145 The report is available here: http://www.observatorioreligion.es/publicaciones/coleccion _pluralismo_y_convivencia/umbrales__minorias_religiosas_en_navarra/ [Accessed: 2018-01-10].
146 XTantos, *Memoria de actividades 2016 – Diocesis de Orihuela-Alicante*, n/a, available at: http://www.portantos.es/memoria-actividades-orihuela-2017 [Accessed: 2018-01-08].
147 Comision Islamica de Espana, *Boletines*, n/a, available at: http://comisionislamicadeespana. org/ bolet%C3%ADn-cie-enero-2018 [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

4.22 Sweden

4.22.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are not readily available and Statistics Sweden does not appear to collect information on religious affiliation (no longer at least). According to the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities, however, in 2015 113,053 Swedes belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 106,819 to the Pentecostal Movement and 20,294 to the Swedish Alliance Mission.[148] The Church of Sweden collects instead statistics on its own monthly[149] and claims to have more than six million members in the country.[150] The Church also provides other statistics on, for example, the number of parishes, baptisms or employees.

4.22.2 Faith-Based Organisations And Their Impact

A report on faith-based organisations and their role in tackling social exclusion in Sweden, with aggregated data summaries can be found in the final FACIT report which is available online for free.[151] Another report on the contribution of civil society to Sweden's GDP can be found on Statistics Sweden's website.[152] The report is only available in Swedish; however, a summary in English is also available.[153] In 2014, according to the report, religious organisations' value added to the economy corresponded to 15 billion SEK (about 1.5 billion EUR).[154]

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148 Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, *Statistik 2015. Antal bidragsgrundande* personer (betjänade) i trossamfund relaterade till SST, 31 december 2015* [Online], available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20170211081210/http://www.sst.a.se/statistik/statistik2015.4.50877827159454eb8c36207.html [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

149 More detailed monthly data can be found here: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/default.aspx?id=1747009 [Accessed: 2018-04-27]. While other data are published in English, monthly bulletins are however only available in Swedish.

150 Key figures from the Church of Sweden can be found here: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/statistik [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

151 Dierckx, D., Vranken, J. and Kerstens, W. (eds.) (2009): *Faith-based organisations and social exclusion in European cities. National context reports*, available at: http://www.academia.edu/21024325/ FBOs_and_social_exclusion_in_Sweden [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

152 The report can be downloaded here: https://www.scb.se/contentassets/4a04d0ef03714ae 084c368b845389877/nv0117_2014a01_br_x105br1601.pdf [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

153 This can be found here: https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/business-activities/structure-of-the-business-sector/the-civil-society/pong/statistical-news/civil-societys-contribution-to-gdp-was-3.2-percent/ [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

154 ibidem.

4.22.3 The Svenska Kyrkan

The Svenska Kyrkan (Church of Sweden), of Evangelican-Lutheran faith, has been publishing Review and Financial Reports about its activities and financial assets since 2011.[155] The Reports are written in English and can be downloaded online for free. The 2016 report, to make just one example, contains information about the activities the Church of Sweden has been involved in the previous year such as a series of seminars it co-organised at the Göteborg Book Fair 'including one in which artist and author Patti Smith met the former Archbishop KG Hammar, as they both share an interest in Dag Hammarskjöld'.[156] The report also contains other information about the work of the Church regarding refugees, welfare and culture, not to mention its relationships with other faith-based organisations and the Sami people.

Similarly, the Church of Sweden also publishes Reports on Responsible Investment which provide aggregated financial data on the investments the Church makes in the field of sustainability, especially in the light of the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals.[157] Other potentially relevant documentation can be found in the *Church of Sweden Research Series*, a peer-reviewed journal under the auspices of the Church.[158]

4.22.4 Social Life And Integration Of Muslims In Sweden

A study by Elandera, Fridolfssonb and Gustavssona analyses the way Muslims integrate and try to interact with society in Sweden. The article is purchasable online[159] but a free electronic version published by the author themselves has also been made available[160].

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[155] The reports can be found here: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/economyandfinance [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

[156] Svenska Kyrkan, *Review And Financial Summary 2016. The National Level Of The Church Of Sweden*, n/a, p. 13, available at: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/economyandfinance [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

[157] Reports can be found here: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/responsibleinvestment [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

[158] The research series can be found here: https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/forskning/church-of-sweden-research-in-english [Accessed: 2018-04-30].

[159] The article can be purchased here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 09596410. 2015.1013324?needAccess=true [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

[160] Such version can be found here: http://liu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:807870/ FULL TEXT01.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

4.22.5 IMPACT

The University of Uppsala hosts the Uppsala Religion and Society Research Centre which runs a programme called The Impact of Religion: Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy, better known as IMPACT, whose aim is to understand "how the increased visibility of religion translates into substantive changes in Swedish/Nordic society".[161] More information can be found for each of the six different thematic research areas the programme is divided into, and a list of publications, that make use of a range of data, for each of such programmes is also available. Information on IMPACT can be found in English but some of the publications available are only in Swedish.

4.23 Switzerland

4.23.1 National Membership Figures

Official membership figures are available on the Bundesamt für Statistik's (Swiss Central Statistical Office) website. More in detail, an Excel file can be downloaded in German, French or English for free containing aggregated data about the most practiced religions in the country.[162] Data are well-presented and can be sorted by sex, age, nationality, previous nationality, employment status, type of employment and level of education attained. To mention just few examples, in 2016 2,550,646 of Swiss belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 1,713,116 to the Protestant Church and 362,973 were Muslims. Of all Roman Catholics, 1,578,819 (61%) were employed, while only 999,040 Protestants were (58%).

4.23.2 Faith-Based Organisations In General

A report on faith-based organisations in Switzerland, comprising some aggregated data, is available online for free but only in German.[163] Overall, there were 5,734 religious organisations/communities based in the country in 2011, the Roman Catholic

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161 Uppsala Religion and Society Research Center, *Research at CRS*, n/a, available at: http://www.crs.uu.se/research/about-impact/ [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

162 The dataset can be downloaded here: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/4242778/master [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

163 Stolz, J. et al. (2011): Die Religiösen Gemeinschaften In Der Schweiz: Eigenschaften, Aktivitäten, Entwicklung. Schlussbericht der National Congregations Study Switzerland (NCSS) im Rahmen des Nationalen Forschungsprogramms 58, available at: http://www.nfp58.ch/files/news/126_Schlussbericht_Stolz_Chaves.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-16].

Church being again the one representing the most of them.[164] Another similar report by the Fonds National Suisse (Swiss National Science Foundation) is available online for free in German, French and English.[165]

4.23.3 The Adventist Church

The only data which seem available about the Adventist Church of Switzerland are statistics about e.g. the number of members or 'social structures' owned/run in Switzerland.[166]

4.23.4 The Catholic Church

Similarly, several statistics about the Catholic Church in Switzerland are also available.[167]

4.24 United Kingdom

4.24.1 National Membership Figures

According to the 2011 census conducted by the Office for National Statistics, Christianity in England and Wales had more than 33.2 million members, more than 2.7 million people were Muslims and 25% of the population (14.1 million people) had no religious affiliation of any sort.[168] Other information available include data about e.g. sex, ethnicity and employment status of the members of religious groups.

In regard to Scotland, datasets can be downloaded for free in Excel, CSV and PDF format on the Scottish Government's website; in particular, according to the 2011 census conducted by the National Records of Scotland 1,718,000 Scots belonged to the

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164 *ivi*, p. 12.

165 Fonds National Suisse (2006): *Religions in Switzerland*, available at: http://www.snf.ch/SiteCollectionDocuments/nfp/nfp58/NFP58_Programmportr%C3%A4t.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-16].

166 Freikirche der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten in der Deutschschweiz, *Statistik,* available at: https://www.adventisten.ch/adventisten/statistik/ [Accessed: 2018-01-15].

167 Schweizer Bischofskonferenz, *Statistik der katholischen Kirche in der Schweiz*, available at: http://www.bischoefe.ch/wir/schweiz/statistisches [Accessed: 2018-01-15].

168 ONS, *Full story: What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?* [Online], available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/full-storywhatdoesthecensustellusaboutreligionin2011/2013-05-16#introduction [Accessed: 2018-04-27].

Church of Scotland, 841,000 were Roman Catholics, 6,000 identified as Jewish and 77,000 as Muslim.[169]

4.24.2 Information On The Catholic Church

Detailed data on *Catholicism in England and Wales* can be found in a report written by Stephen Bullivant for the Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society, a research center within St Mary's University.[170] The Report, which is downloadable online for free, analyses aggregated data that were previously collected for the British Social Attitudes survey. Among other things, the report also contains statistics on retention, conversion and church attendance rates.

The Centre for Religion and Society has also other publications available which contain aggregated data on the impact and activities of the Catholic Church in the UK. Another report, for instance, aims at providing evidence against the claim that Catholic churches tend to favour middle classes in the selection of school pupils.[171]

4.24.3 The Church Of England

The Church does not seem to publish annual activity reports. A report containing accounts of and statistics about the Church in rural areas of England and Wales, however, is available online for free.[172]

4.24.4 The Cinnamon Faith Action Audit

The Cinnamon Faith Action Audit (CFAA) is an annual report published by the Cinnamon Network since 2015 which deals exactly with the impact of all faith-based or-

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169 Scottish Government, *Summary: Religious Groups Demographics* [Online], available at: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/Equalities/DataGrid/Religion/RelPopMig [Accessed: 2018-04-27].
170 Stephen Bullivant, *Contemporary Catholicism in England and Wales: A statistical report based on recent British Social Attitudes survey data*, n/a, available at: https://faithsurvey.co.uk/download/catholicism-report.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
171 Montemaggi, F. E. S., Bullivant, S. and Glackin, M, (N/a): *The take-up of free school meals in Catholic schools in England and Wales*, pp. 1-20, available at: https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/benedict-xvi/docs/free-school-meal-report.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
172 The Church of England, *Growing the Rural Church* [Online], 2015, available at: https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/GS%20Misc%201092%20Released%20for%20Mission%20-%20growing%20the%20rural%20church.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-07].

ganisations on the British society. No similar piece of research has been found in the other 25 countries analysed. CFAAs for 2015[173] and 2016[174] (no 2017 CFAA has been published yet) can be accessed for free online but data are available only at the aggregated level. Not only does the Cinnamon Network provide national CFAAs, but also separate CFAAs are available for more than 80 individual local areas.[175] In brief, in 2016 the work of the Cinnamon Network, through CFAAs, basically consisted in approaching

> 6,537 local churches and other faith groups. 3,003 responded saying that they were actively working to support their local community. These 3,003 groups were generating almost 195,000 volunteer roles and 12,500 paid staff activities to support 5 million interactions with individual beneficiaries each year. The time given by churches and other faith groups alone in our survey was worth over £315 million. Nationally this puts the time given by churches and other faith groups into their communities through social action projects at more than £3 billion a year.[176]

More information about the methodology employed can be found at the end of each report. However, the methodology is only explained briefly and the methodology section at the end of each local report is actually the same as the one found at the end of national reports – *i.e.* the page has been copied, so no specific details are provided about the way data were collected for each individual area (since no specific details are provided for national CFAAs).

4.24.5 Faith-Based Organisations And Social Exclusion

A 2009 report by Cloke, Williams and Thomas as part of the FACIT project addresses the question of how faith-based organisations tackle the issue of social exclusion in the UK.[177] In the context of the FACIT project, the case of the UK has been described 'as probably the best illustration of the impact of welfare state retrenchment on pov-

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173 Cinnamon Network (2015): *Cinnamon Faith Action Audit*, available at: http://www.cinnamonnet work.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Final-National-Report.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
174 Cinnamon Network (2016): *Cinnamon Faith Action Audit*, available at: http://www.cinnamonnet work.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CFAA17-National-Report-update.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
175 Separate reports for local areas can be downloaded here: http://www.cinnamonnetwork.co.uk/faa-reports/ [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
176 Cinnamon Network (2016):, *Cinnamon Faith Action Audit*, p. 6, available at: http://www.cinnamonnetwork.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CFAA17-National-Report-update.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].
177 Cloke, Williams and Thomas (2009): *Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in European Cities 1. Mapping the Activity of National-level FBOs in the UK*, available at: https://www.mindmeister.com/generic_files/get_file/7818875?filetype=attachment_file [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

erty and social exclusion and, subsequently, the role of FBOs [faith-based organisations] in combating these social ills'.[178]

4.24.6 Other Statistics, Reports And Studies

Statistics about churches of different denominations can be found in *UK Church Statistics 2: 2010-2020* by Peter Brierley. The book can be purchased for 27£ but a table of content is available for free online.[179] Another famous document in the faith-based organisations literature which might be of use, especially as background literature, is the 2006 *Faithful Cities* report by the Commission on Urban Life and Faith. The report can be purchased online for 9.99£.[180] It is also worth recalling again the report by Stephen Bullivant on young adults' religiosity which contains a section on the UK and France (see Multi-Country section above and note no. 19). Last but not least, a report on *Religion or belief in the workplace and service delivery* by NatCen Social Research[181], as well as an article by Ingrid Storm titled *Civic Engagement in Britain: The Role of Religion and Inclusive Values*[182] which looks at the role of religion in promoting volunteering through bonding, are also available online in English for free.

4.24.7 The Position Of Muslims In London And Leicester

The Open Society Foundation has published two reports on the current situation of Muslims in the Borough of Waltham Forest, London[183] and three districts of Leicester (namely, Evington, Spinney Hills and Stoneygate).[184] Both reports are accessible

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178 European Commission (2013): *FACIT – Results In Brief,* available at: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/91157_en.html [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

179 Such table can be downloaded here: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54228e0ce4b059910e19e44e/t/56e680818259b5a6841bd169/1457946755518/CS2+Page+0.1+Contents.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

180 The report can be purchased here: https://www.chpublishing.co.uk/books/9781858523156/faithful-cities [Accessed: 2018-01-12].

181 Mitchell, M. *et al.*, *Religion or belief in the workplace and service delivery. Findings from a call for evidence* [Online], available at: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/rob_call_for_evidence_report.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-01].

182 Storm, I., Civic Engagement in Britain: The Role of Religion and Inclusive Values, *European Sociological Review*, 31(1) [Online], available at: https://academic.oup.com/esr/article/31/1/14/458836 [Accessed: 2018-05-01].

183 Open Society Foundations (2012): *Muslims in London,* available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/muslims-in-london-20120715.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

184 Open Society Foundations (2010): *Muslims in Leicester,* available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-muslims-leicester-20110106_0.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-11].

online for free. However, as in all other Open Society Foundations reports on Muslims the focus is more at the micro level, *i.e.* on the level of integration/participation/engagement of Muslims in civil society rather than the level of engagement of Islamic organisations in civil society (although one might say that individual participation could be influenced by one's belonging to any of these organisations).

4.24.8 The Church Of Scotland

Annual reports by the Church of Scotland are available online for free. In particular, one can download 2016[185] and 2015[186] reports but no previous report seems to be available. Other relevant reports can be found using the website's internal search engine – an example includes a report by the Priority Areas Committee briefly describing, among other things, its engagement 'with Wider Church and Society'.[187]

4.25 Ukraine

4.25.1 National Membership Figures

The State Statistics Service of Ukraine's website is quite old-style and not particularly user-friendly as that of some other European countries. The search tool is unavailable (despite being clickable) and some information is only available in Ukrainian (even if linked in pages that have been translated into English). Perhaps also because of all these issues, no official data seems to be available on religious affiliation (it is even hard to find results of national censuses).

4.25.2 General Statistics About Faith-Based Organisations

General statistics about faith-based organisations, including the number of registered or active communities, the number of mass media owned and the number of educa-

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185 The 2016 report can be downloaded here: http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0014/40118/Annual_Report_2017.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-04].
186 The 2015 report can be downloaded here: http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0006/32739/Church_of_Scotland_Annual_Report_2015.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-04].
187 Church of Scotland's Ministries Council Priority Areas Committee (2015): *Annual Report 2015* [Online], p. 4, available at: http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/ 30334/ priority_areas_annual_report_2015.pdf [Accessed: 2018-05-04].

tional centers and students enrolled within them are available online for free.[188] Data refer to 2017 and information is in Ukrainian only (but online translation software enable quite easily the reader to understand what the data refer to). Data come from an annual report commissioned by the Ukrainian Minister of Culture which investigates the relationship between religious organisations and the State in Ukraine. The official dataset can be downloaded in Excel format online for free[189] (but in this case no translation can be made). Datasets by the Minister of Culture are published yearly and with constancy, and indeed one can download datasets that refer up to 1997. Aside from these datasets, there does not seem to be other relevant data available, at least from an initial search.

5 External Affiliated Religious Organisations

As discussed in the introduction to the report, there are a range of organisations that fall outside the explicit remit of this report, as they do not represent organised religious communities institutionally directly, but instead those organisations are affiliated or sub-groups attached to the institutional structures that are at the core of the project and have been reviewed above. We therefore do not investigate those organisations in much detail, but briefly outline data on them below, in case researchers wish to expand their work into this realm of affiliated organisations.

5.1 The Role of Churches in Providing Aid, Assistance, Education and Spiritual Development

Many organisations linked to national churches (or churches themselves) are highly involved – either directly or indirectly – in the provision of aid and assistance to the poor as well as education and spiritual/personal development through e.g. scout groups. Despite not falling within the definition of faith-based organisations herein employed, their activities significantly contribute to the level of civic engagement of national or local churches (not least because they often co-operate and churches often sponsor or assist in the organisation of their activities). Furthermore, these organisations are motivated by and aim at promoting religious principles or values which are generally the same principles and values promoted by the religious denomination they belong to, and they are also usually directly or indirectly financed by these. Since

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188 Data can be accessed here: https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resources/statistics/ukr2017/67269/ [Accessed: 2018-01-14].
189 The original dataset in Excel format can be downloaded here: http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/ document/245234300/Form1_MCU_Nakaz260-29032017.xls [Accessed: 2018-01-14].

these organisations purely match the meso-level analysed herein, and since their impact on society seems quite significant, a final and separate section has therefore been added to highlight some information that was identified in their regard and which should not be underestimated when assessing their level of civic engagement.

5.2 The Role of The Sovereign Military Order of Malta (cases of: Italy, Germany and Spain)

The Order of Malta publishes Activity Reports annually about the activity of the Order globally[190]. Reports are published in German, English, Italian, French and Spanish and are downloadable online for free. The Order of Malta is particularly active in Europe, especially in countries like Italy, Germany and Spain. In Italy, for instance, in 2015 the Great Priorate of Rome provided more than 100,000 hours of assistance to homeless people or migrants, it served more than 22,000 meals in the meal centre near Termini Train Station and in 2014 the Order opened a new meal centre for homeless people in Pompei, Naples.[191] In Rome, the Order also runs the Hospital of St. John The Baptist, with more than 240 beds and more than 350 patients visiting its clinic daily.[192] It is also worth remembering that the Order's headquarters are based in Rome itself.

The Order of Malta is also very active in Germany. As the Order itself indeed states in its 2016 Report,

> [w]ith almost a million supporters, 23,000 professionals, 48,000 active volunteers and around 8,000 members in its Malteser Youth Organisation, the Order of Malta in Germany is one of the busiest entities in the Order, performing 7.8 million hours of work in 700 locations around the country in 2014.[193]

With regard to Spain, instead, in the cities of Madrid and Seville the Order provides more than 220,000 meals yearly to the homeless, it manages 84 beds in the nursing home of San Juan Bautista a Aldea del Fresno and it organises activities for children throughout the year, especially for disabled ones.[194]

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190 Reports can be downloaded here: https://www.orderofmalta.int/publications/ [Accessed: 2018-04-28].

191 Sovereign Order of Malta (2017): *Rapporto di attività 2016*, p. 108 available at: https://www.orderofmalta.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2016%20Rapporto%20di%20Attivita% 20Ordine%20di% 20Malta.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

192 ibidem.

193 Sovereign Order of Malta (2017): *Activity Report 2016*, p. 105, available at: https://www.orderofmalta.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2016%20Activity%20Report%20Order %20of%20Malta.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

194 Sovereign Order of Malta (2017), *Rapporto di attività 2016*, p. 113, available at: https://www. orderofmalta.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2016%20Rapporto%20di%20Attivita%20Ordine %20di%20Malta.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

5.3 Caritas (case of: Germany)

Similarly, Caritas is also very active throughout Europe. Unfortunately, not all national branches publish reports and statistics on their activities. Some, like in the German case, do publish some information online instead but have not been doing so with constancy. For instance, while some info graphics with some aggregated data from the German branch of Caritas can be found online in English and for free[195], data refer to 2014 and no updated information is available. At any rate, as of 2014 Caritas seemed well-rooted in Germany with more than 600,000 employees, 500,000 volunteers, 24,000 facilities and 12,000,000 people assisted by the provision of healthcare, youth services and other forms of assistance.[196] With such a large presence in Germany, as well as in many other European countries, organisations such as Caritas should not be overlooked.

5.4 Scout Organisations (cases of: Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK)

The role of churches in providing resources (mostly through the provision of buildings and spiritual personnel) for scout organisations should not be underestimated.

In Italy more than 180,000 people are members of the AGESCI, the Italian Association of Italian Catholic Guides and Scouts.[197] [198] [199] The AGESCI is the largest scout organisation in Italy[200], comprising more than 80% of all scouts in the country. Since AGESCI scout groups can only generally be created within parishes, the role of catholic churches is crucial.

The Federacion de Escautismo en España (The Federation of Scouting in Spain, which is made up of two different member organisations, the Movimiento Scout Catol-

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195 German Caritas Association, *Caritas in Germany – Tasks, organisation, and financing*, n/a, available at: http://www.caritas-germany.org/cms/contents/caritas-germany.org/medien/dokumente/ infographic-on-task/caritas-infografik-2016_en-version_170421.pdf?d=a&f=pdf [Accessed: 13/01/ 2018].
196 *ivi*, pp. 1-2.
197 AGESCI, *La dimensione internazionale dello scoutismo*, n/a, available at: https://www.agesci. it/?wpfb_dl=1999 [Accessed: 2018-01-07].
198 World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, *Italy*, available at: https://www.wagggs.org/ en/our-world/europe-region/member-organizations/Italy/ [Accessed: 2018-01-07]. Data from WAGGGs should be read in conjunction with data from the World Organization of the Scout Movement, *World Scouting*, available at: https://members.scouts.org.uk/factsheets/FS260010.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-07].
199 Roberta Benvenuto, 'La seconda vita dei giovani col fazzoletto', *La Repubblica*, 29 September 2014, available at: http://inchieste.repubblica.it/it/repubblica/rep-it/2014/09/29/news/l_alfabeto-96066571/ [Accessed 2018-01-07].
200 ibidem.

ico and the Federacion de Scouts-Exploradores de España) has fewer members than its Italian counterpart but it still counts roughly 60.000 members.[201] [202] Scouts groups are active members of civil society as highlighted by several press news[203] – their members are indeed part of other organisations or platforms which deal with social justice, the environment or the third sector such as the Plataforma de ONG de Acción Social[204] or the Consejo de la Juventud de España[205].

In Germany, there is instead a long list of different faith-based scout associations and the Ringe deutscher Pfadfinderinnen- und Pfadfinderverbände, the German Scouts Association, is formed by four different scout organisations which make up a total of about 182,000 members.[206]

In the UK, the UK Scout Association claims to have recently reached 600,000 members in its latest report[207] (note that the UK Scout Association is one of the only which publishes annual detailed reports with both quantitative and qualitative aggregated data about its activities).

With more than 1.7 million members declared all across Europe[208], the Scouting movement represents a large group of people that is not necessarily but often associated and strongly linked to faith. Being it generally aimed at improving the quality of life of their communities, Scouting arguably contributes significantly – although to be sure indirectly – to churches' civic engagement in Europe.

201 Federacion de Escautismo en España, *Somos*, n/a, available at: http://scoutsfee.es/about/ [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

202 World Organisation of the Scout Movement, *World Scouting*, available at: https://members.scouts.org.uk/factsheets/FS260010.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

203 See, for instance, Mónica Setién, 'Scouts, mucho más que niños jugando', *abc*, available at: http://www.abc.es/familia/educacion/abci-scouts-mucho-mas-ninos-jugando-201702201319_ noticia.html [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

204 Plataforma de ONG de Acción Social (2018): *Quienes somos – Entitades membros*, available at: http://www.plataformaong.org/entidades-miembro.php [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

205 El Consejo de la Juventud de España, *Qué es el CJE?*, available at: http://www.cje.org/es/que-es-cje/ [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

206 This number has been obtained by adding all members from each individual organisation. Please refer to each organisation's dedicated page for individual membership figures, which are available at: http://www.pfadfinden-in-deutschland.de/ueber-uns/mitgliedsverbaende/ [Accessed: 2018-01-13].

207 The 2016-2017 report can be found here: http://scouts.org.uk/media/879334/Annual-Report-2016-17_WEB.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-21].

208 European Scout Region, *European Region* [Online], available at: https://www.scout.org/europe [Accessed: 2018-05-06].

5.5 The Catholic Church and Universities (case of: Spain)

The role of the Catholic Church in providing education is quite significant, especially when it comes to higher education. To make just an example, in Spain 16 universities are run by the Catholic Church or affiliated entities such as the Opus Dei or the Society of Jesus. These include, e.g. the Universidad Pontificia Comillas of Madrid, the Universidad Catolica de Valencia San Vicente Martir and the Universidad Catolica de Murcia. The Universidad Pontificia Comillas of Madrid enrolled 11,970 students in mid-March 2017 and employed 2,029 faculty or administrative staff (a full breakdown is freely available on the University website in PDF format but data are only available in Spanish).[209] The Universidad Catolica de Murcia, instead, in 2014/2015 enrolled 15,541 students and another 50,000 in Massive Open Online Courses.[210]

With hundreds of thousands of students enrolled across all Europe, the role of churches in providing education should not also be overlooked since religious schools or universities deliberately aim at promoting within their education the same values, principles and view of the world that their denominations promote.

6 Initial Conclusions

As already outlined in the introduction, there are some data available which could help us to identify to what extent faith-based organisations engage with and are integral to civil society. However, some countries lack such data, they do not provide information in English or the information they provide refer to the micro- rather than the meso-level (e.g. reports by the Open Society Foundations which, even though they look at individuals from specific religious backgrounds, still keep their focus on individuals). Furthermore, while we generally know what kind of activities religious organisations generally promote within society, less data are available about the *actual* impact that these activities have. In some countries some data in this sense are in fact available, such as for instance in Sweden (where official statistics are available on the overall economic impact of faith-based organisations on society) or in the UK and Spain (where such data are provided by private charities or Churches themselves, respectively). However, this is the exception rather than the rule.

A challenging task is, nonetheless, the assessment of the reliability of all these data. Indeed, methodologies employed are not always explained in detail (as, for instance, in the case of CFAAs in the UK or the CEI questionnaire delivered in Italy).

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209 Universidad Pontificia Comillas (2017): *La universidad en cifras 2016/2017,* available at: http://www.comillas.edu/Documentos/Comillas_Cifras.pdf [Accessed: 2018-01-08].
210 Universidad Catolica de Murcia, *La Universidad*, n/a, available at: http://www.ucam.edu/ universidad [Accessed: 2018-01-08].

Another issue deals also with the difficulty in finding official data about religious affiliation. First, not all national statistical agencies collect such data and while it seems pretty easy to find 2011 results, data collected in previous censuses are often hard to find online. Second, even when data are available, only few statistical agencies (especially the Scandinavian ones) provide clear and detailed figures, have user-friendly websites or portals and enable the researcher to make searches or sort data by variables like e.g. sex or employment status. In fact, the website of some national statistical agencies' (e.g. Spain and Ukraine) are not developed well, so that is hard to even search for the data one is looking for.

The increasing decline in religious affiliation should also not be underestimated. While the focus of this report is not on secularization, the increasing indifference to religion clearly bears consequences on the level of civic engagement of faith-based organisations. First, because relatively fewer people are now part of these organisations than in the past; second – and also as a consequence of this – because fewer people in society might be willing to get closer to and use the services these provide.

The role of some affiliated/external/non-profit religious organisations or institutions should also not be overlooked. These organisations, while not formally falling within the definition of faith-based organisations employed herein, are anyways well-rooted and often deeply involved in society, significantly contributing to churches' level of civic engagement. To some extent, they can be argued to act as 'intermediaries': while not directly managed or run by faith-based organisations themselves, they often collaborate with them and, above all, promote the same values and principles. It is only worth recalling here the case of catholic scout associations which actively try to make young people engage with their society through the promotion of religious values and principles (the same ones promoted by the Catholic Church itself).

That being said, it was also possible to identify some best practices the application of which should be encouraged among faith-based organisations and other relevant institutions. From a third sector- or church-perspective, the Spanish database of religious organisations, as well as the UK CFAAs or the various reports by the Order of Malta or Caritas – albeit not always perfect for sure – are definitely good candidates. From a statistical perspective, Scandinavian statistical offices are with no doubt the ones that provide more detailed and accessible information among the countries analysed in this report. Exploring why this is the case and promoting similar approaches in other countries would with no doubt prove extremely beneficial – not only for statistical offices themselves, but for researchers and the wider public.

Similarly, studies such as those conducted within the FACIT project should also be strongly encouraged and their conduct promoted for other countries as well, especially those for where very little or no information on faith-based organisations is currently available. The conduct of CFAAs in other European countries than just the UK would also prove very useful.

To conclude, it seems fair to argue that the evidence identified and available so far does not fully capture the value brought and added by faith-based organisations

in the society they operate in, not least because the activities of these organisations often lie outside of the lens of statistical measurement. Only larger organisations tend to publish reports about their activities (although not all of them do so and some publish them with inconstancy), perhaps because doing so is in effect resource-intensive, therefore making it harder to find out what the level of engagement of smaller religious organisations is. Consequently, since faith-based organisations often work at the local level it might well be that their level of belonging to and engagement in society is actually higher than what statistics and initial findings suggest.

Table 1: Structured list of all identified datasets
Source: one representation

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Membership **Austria, official membership figures**	Membership figures, 2001.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Austria.	Statistics Austria	Freely accessible online in English on UNData online database.	Country (total, urban and rural level)	Different formats available	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Only 2001 data available.
Belgium, membership figures	Membership figures, 2009.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Belgium.	CIA Factbook	Freely accessible online in English on CIA Factbook's website.	Country	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Only 2009 estimates available.
Czech Republic, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Czech Republic.	Czech Statistical Office	Freely accessible online in English.	Country (and municipality)	PDF	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Denmark, official membership figures, National Church	Membership figures of the National Church, 2018.	Membership figures of the National Church in Denmark.	Statistics Denmark	Freely accessible online in English.	Country and local	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated quarterly.

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211 1) Output Format; 2) Organisational Background; 3) Reliability; 4) Updating.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Estonia, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Estonia.	Statistics Estonia	Freely accessible online in English.	Country (and place of residence)	Web page	1) Database; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
France, membership figures	Eurobarometer 73.1, 2010.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in France.	European Commission	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Survey; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off.
Germany, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Germany.	Statistisches Bundesamt	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Greece, membership figures	International Religious Freedom Report, 2016.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Greece.	U.S. Government	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Hungary, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Hungary.	Hungarian Central Statistical Office	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Excel	1) Excel dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Iceland, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2017.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Iceland.	Statistics Iceland	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Web page	1) Dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of 2017.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Ireland, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2016.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Ireland.	Central Statistics Office	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2016 census.
Italy, membership figures	(quoted in) International Religious Freedom Report, 2016.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Italy.	(EURISPES, quoted in) U.S. Government	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Not clear.
Luxembourg, membership figures	Religions au Luxembourg. Quelle evolution entre 1999-2008?, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Luxembourg.	CEPS/INSTEAD	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off.
The Netherlands, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2015.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in the Netherlands.	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek	Freely accessible online in English.	Country and local	Web page (English), PDF (Dutch)	1) Text/Report depending on language; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of 2015.
Norway, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2017.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Norway.	Statistics Norway	Freely accessible online in English.	Country and local	Different formats available	1) Text/Excel or CVS dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Information on updates on Statistics Norway's website.
Poland, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2016.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Poland.	Główny Urząd Statystyczny	Freely accessible online in English but not all information has been translated.	Country and local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated yearly.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Portugal, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Portugal.	Instituto Nacional de Estatística	Freely accessible online in Portuguese.	Country and local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Romania, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Czech Republic.	Institutul Naţional de Statistică	Freely accessible online in Romanian.	Country and local	Excel	1) Excel dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Slovakia, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2017.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Slovakia.	Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic/Ministry of Culture	Freely accessible online in Slovakian and English.	Country	PDF/ Web page	1) Report/Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Slovenia, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2002.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Slovenia.	Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia	Freely accessible online in English.	Country and regional	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Not likely to be updated.
Spain, membership figures	Estudio nº3203. BARÓMETRO DE ENERO 2018, 2018.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Spain.	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Freely accessible online in Spanish.	Country	PDF	1) Survey; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Probably updated quarterly or yearly.
Sweden, membership figures	Statistik 2015. Antal bidragsgrundande personer i trossamfund relaterade till SST, 31 december 2015.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Sweden excluding the Church of Sweden.	Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities	Freely accessible online in Swedish.	Country	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Will not be updated.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Switzerland, official membership figures	Membership figures, 2016.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Switzerland.	Bundesamt für Statistik	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Excel	1) Excel dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Not clear but possibly every five years.
United Kingdom (England and Wales), official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in England and Wales.	Office for National Statistics	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
United Kingdom (Scotland), official membership figures	Membership figures, 2011.	Membership figures of faith-based organisations in Scotland.	National Records of Scotland	Freely accessible online in English.	Country and local	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated as of the 2011 census.
Catholicism **Austria, statistics**	*Statistik*, Austria, 2003-now.	Statistics about the Catholic Church in Austria.	Katholische Kirche Österreich	Freely accessible online in German.	Country	Web page	1) Text; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated yearly since 2003.
Czech Republic, statistics	Katolická církev v České republice, Czech Republic, 2013.	Statistics about the Catholic Church in Czech Republic.	Katolická církev v České republice	Freely accessible online in Czech.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Does not look updated.
France, report, statistics	The Conférence Des Évêques De France Et Ses Services, 2013-15, 2017.	Statistics and stories about the Catholic Church in France (with particular attention to suburbs).	The Conférence Des Évêques De France	Freely accessible online in French.	Country and Local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Does not look to be updated yearly.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Germany, report, statistics	Katholische Kirche in Deutschland. Zahlen Und Fakten.	Statistics and information about the Catholic Church in Germany.	Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz	Freely accessible online in German.	Country and Local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Italy, report, school supervision	I doposcuola parrocchiali nella diocesi di Milano. Rapporto di ricerca, Lombardia Region, Italy, 2010.	Study on after-school supervision for students provided by catholic churches in the Lombardia Region, Italy.	Caritas Ambrosiana, institution dedicated to charity which belongs to the Milan dioceses.	Freely accessible online in Italian.	Regional	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off study.
Italy, report, homeless, volunteering	Le persone senza dimora, Italy, 2014.	Research on homeless people in Italy with some data on religious organisations.	Government institutions and NGOs.	Freely available in Italian.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Only available for 2011 and 2014 data available.
Poland, report, long-period Development	Kościół katolicki w Polsce. 1991-2011, Poland, 2014 (year of publication).	The evolution of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1991 to 2011.	Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego	Freely available online in Polish.	Country	PDF	1) Report/Study; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off study.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Portugal, database	*Anuario de Igreja Catolica em Portugal*, Portugal, different years available.	Database of every person, building or association affiliated with the Catholic Church in Portugal.	n/a	Freely accessible online in Portuguese.	Country	Text	1) Text/ Web page; 2) n/a; 3) Not clear whether data are fully reliable; 4) Some statistics are only available for specific years, while information available at the moment refers to 2016.
Slovenia, report	Letno poročilo Katoliške cerkve v Sloveniji, Slovenia, 2015, 16, 17.	Activities carried out by the Catholic Church in Slovenia throughout the year.	Katoliška Cerkev v Sloveniji, the Catholic Church in Slovenia.	Freely available in Slovenian.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated yearly since 2015.
Spain, CEE, report	Memoria Anual De Actividades De Iglesia Catolica En España Año 2015, Spain, 2007-2015.	Activites carried out by the Catholic Church in Spain throughout the year.	Conferencia Episcopal Española, Spanish Episcopal Conference.	Freely available online in Spanish.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Reports have been published since 2007. However, the last report published in 2017 refer to the year of 2015.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
UK, report, statistics	Contemporary Catholicism in England and Wales: A statistical report based on recent British Social Attitudes survey data, UK, n/a.	Statistics about Catholicism in England and Wales, data taken from the British Social Attitudes survey.	Bullivant, S.	Freely available online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off study but other papers by the commissioning Centre also available.
Protestant-ism (and related branches) **Czech Republic, report**	Výroční zprávy, Czech Republic, annual (2008-2016).	Activities carried out by the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren throughout the year.	Českobratrská církev evangelická, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren	Freely available online in Czech.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) n/a; 4) Updated yearly but no 2017 report available yet.
Estonia, report	*Aruanded*, Estonia, 2013-2016.	Activities carried out by the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church throughout the year.	Eesti Evangeelne Luterlik Kirik, the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church.	Freely available online in Estonian.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Presumably updated yearly but referring to 2016 at the moment.
France, report	*La France Protestante – 2018*, France, 2017 (year of publication).	Role of institutions or centres run by the Protestant Church in France.	Fédération Protestante en France, Protestant Federation of France	Reports must be purchased (at about 45€) and are only written in French.	Country	n/a	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) n/a; 4) Only reports for 2017 and 2018 are available.
Germany, report	Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Germany, annual.	Activities carried out by the Evangelical Church in Germany.	Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland	Freely available online in German.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) n/a; 4) Updated yearly.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Germany, report, engagement and indifference	Engagement und Indifferenz Kirchenmitgliedschaft als soziale Praxis, Germany, 2014.		Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland	Freely available online in German.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off.
Hungary, report	*Annual Report*, Hungary, different years.	Activities carried out by the Reformed Church in Hungary throughout the year.	Magyarországi Református Egyház	Freely available online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Not updated yearly.
Iceland, statistics	Population by parishes, congregations and deaneries 1 December 2016, Iceland, 2016	Statistics about membership of the National Church of Iceland.	Statistics Iceland, official statistical agency.	Freely accessible in English.	Country/Local	Text	1) Text/ Web page; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Presumably updated yearly but referring to 2016 at the moment.
Norway, report	*Årsrapport 2016*, Norway, 2016.	Activities carried out by the Norwegian Church throughout the year.	Den Norske Kirke, the Norwegian Church.	Freely accessible online in Norwegian.	Country (+ Local?).	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Presumably updated yearly but referring to 2016 at the moment.
Scotland, report	*Annual Report and* Accounts, Scotland, 2015 and 2016.	Activities carried out by the Church of Scotland throughout the year.	The Church of Scotland	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Presumably updated yearly but no previous and no 2017 reports available at the moment.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Islam **Academic journal**	Yearbook of Muslims in Europe. Volumes 1-8; n/a, 2009-now.	Information about Muslim communities and organisations in Europe.	Edited by Scharbrodt, O, *et al.*	The Yearbook, available in English, can be purchased for 179€.	Multiple-country	n/a	1) Yearbook; 2) n/a; 3) n/a; 4) 9th Volume recently published in 2017.
Mixed **Ireland, report**	Annual Reports and Project Reports, Ireland, 2007-now.	Activities carried out by the Irish Council of Churches throughout the year.	Irish Council of Churches	Reports are available online for free in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Multiple-Country Studies, Surveys, etc. **Multiple-country study, report, European integration**	*Churches and European Integration*, Multiple-country, 2004 (year of publication).	The role of churches in promoting European integration.	Five different European universities involved.	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off research.
Christian Party, report, social cohesion, EU	Faith-Based Organisations The role of Christian Organisations to Social Cohesion in EU Member States, Multiple-country, 2016 (year of publication).	Looks at the contribution made by Christian churches to the welfare of several EU countries.	European Christian Political Movement, a Christian political party.	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	PDF	1) Report; 2) potential bias; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off research.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
FACIT Project, multiple-country studies, report, social exclusion	FACIT – Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in European Cities, multiple-country, 2007-2009.	Series of national reports financed by the EU looking at the role of faith-based organisations in fighting poverty and social exclusion.	Jan Vranken (Project Coordinator), Danielle Dierckx (Project Manager), Research Centre on Inequality, Poverty, Social Exclusion and the City (OASeS) University of Antwerp.	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off research.
WERP Project, multiple-country studies, report	Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective, multiple-country, 2003-2006.	Study of eight European countries about welfare and religion.	Institute for Diaconal and Social Studies at the Uppsala University.	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off research.
WaVE Project, multiple-country studies, report	Welfare And Values In Europe: Transitions Related To Religion, Minorities And Gender, 2006-2009.	EU-financed project on welfare and values in Europe.	Fifteen European universities.	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	Word	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off research.
Open Society Foundations, report	*Muslims in – [city name]*, several countries, different years depending on country.	Integration and other information about Muslims in specific cities.	Open Society Foundations, grant-making NGO.	Freely available online in English.	Local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Look reliable; 4) One-off studies.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
European Social Survey, attitudes and behaviours	*European Social Survey*, several European countries, biennial.	People's attitudes and behaviour; specific questions on religion.	European Research Infrastructure	Freely available online in English upon registration.	Multiple-country	Registration needed first	1) Dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Biennial.
European Values Study, attitudes and values	*European Values Study*, several European countries, almost every ten years.	People's attitudes and values; specific questions on religion.	Tilburg University, Department of Sociology	Freely available online in English upon registration.	Multiple-country	Registration needed first	1) Dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) About decennial.
International Social Survey Programme, attitudes and values	*International Social Survey Programme*, 45 European and non-European countries, different years depending on topic.	People's attitudes and values; specific questions on religion.	International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)	Some datasets are freely available online in English but others must be bought.	Multiple-country	Registration/payment needed first	1) Dataset; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Apparently every 10 years *circa*.
Book chapter, Europe, US	Does Praying Together Mean Staying Together?, Europe and US.	Impact of religion on philanthropic work and civic engagement.	Phippa Norris, in (eds.) Dekker, P. and Halman, L.	Purchasable online for 23.94£.	Multiple continents	Purchase first needed	1) Book chapter; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) n/a.
Academic journal, research on religion	Review of Religious Research.	Academic research conducted on religion.	Published by Springer	Price depending on article or journal but some articles are available for free.	Depending on article	Different formats available	1) Academic journal; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Constantly.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Database, religious membership rates	UNData, multiple countries, different time series available depending on countries.	Database with membership rates for multiple countries (but not all European ones).	The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).	Freely available online in English.	Multiple-country	Online text or XML	1) Database; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Depending on countries.
Faith-Based Organisations in General **Italy, report UNHCR, migrants**	Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia, Italy, 2016.	Migrants' hospitality and reception in Italy.	ANCI, CARITAS, CITTALIA, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale Dello Sprar and UNHCR.	Freely available online in Italian.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Germany, report, refugees	Engagement für Geflüchtete – eine Sache des Glaubens? Die Rolle der Religion für die Flüchtlingshilfe.	Impact of engagement with a religious community on one's willingness to help refugees.	Nagel, A. K. and El-Menouar, Y. for the Bertelsmann Stiftung foundation	Freely available online in German but a summary in English is also available.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off study.
Romania, report, social economy	Organizaţiile cu profil religios angajate în economia socială în România, Romania, 2013 (year of publication).	The role of religious organisations in the 'social economy' of Romania.	Conovici, I.	Freely available online in Romanian, but an abstract in English is also available.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) One-off study.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Romania, report, state and religions	*State and Religions in Romania*, Romania, 2015 (year of publication).	Relationship between religious organisations and the State; also provides a register of all such organisations in the country.	State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, official institution.	Freely available online in English.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) One-off study.
Spain, database	Directorio de lugares de culto, Spain, n/a.	Database of all places of worship, irrespective or religion.	Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso en España.	Freely available online in Spanish.	Country	Text/ Map	1) Text/ Web page; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Presumably updated yearly but referring to 2016 at the moment.
Switzerland, report	Die Religiösen Gemeinschaften In Der Schweiz : Eigenschaften, Aktivitäten, Entwicklung. Schlussbericht der Nationalen Congregations Study Switzerland (NCSS) im Rahmen des Nationalen Forschungsprogramms 58, Switzerland, 2011 (year of publication).	Statistics about faith-based organisations in Switzerland.	Stolz, J. *et al.*	Freely available online in German.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Apparently a one-off study.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
UK, report, Cinnamon Network, impact	Cinnamon Faith Action Audit, UK, 2015-now?	The impact of religious organisations in their communities, both at the local and the national level.	Cinnamon Network, a network of various religious associations.	Freely available online in English.	Country and local	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable but methodology not fully explained; 4) Presumably updated yearly but referring to 2016 at the moment.
UK, statistics	UK Church Statistics 2: 2010-2020, UK, 2014 (year of publication).	*Compendium* of statistics about churches in the country.	Brierley, P.	Can be bought for 27£.	Country (and local?)	n/a	1) Compendium; 2) n/a. 3) n/a. 4) n/a.
Ukraine, statistics	Detailed statistics about faith-based organisations, Ukraine, 1997-now.	Detailed statistics about faith-based organisations.	Ukrainian Minister of Culture, official institution.	Freely available online in Ukrainian.	Country	Excel	1) Excel sheet; 2) n/a; 3) Reliable; 4) Updated yearly.
Academic journal	European Journal for Church and State Research, n/a, 1994-2004.	Studying the relationship between the State, religious organisations and society.	Editor: prof. R. Torfs (Faculty of Canon Law, K. U. Leuven).	Journal must be bought (prices not available online).	Country, local	n/a	1) Journal; 2) n/a. 3) n/a; 4) No longer published since 2004.

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Data (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality[211]
Affiliated Organisations **Scouts, report**	Country reports or membership figures for scout organisations, national, depends on countries.	Some country (e.g. UK) publish annual reports about their activities while other just release data on memberships.	World Association of Girl Guides and Girls Scouts, World Organisation of the Scout Movement – the two main scout organisations in the world.	Freely available online, depending on the country in question English translations might be available.	Country	PDF	1) Report or Text/Web page, depending on country; 2) n/a; 3) Partially reliable (figures are often incomplete or it is unclear how they were calculated); 4) Not updated with constancy.
Order of Malta, report, volunteering, poverty	*Activity Report*, global, 2000-01, 03, 05, 07, 10, 13, 16.	Activities carried out by the Order throughout the year analysed.	Sovereign Order of Malta	Freely accessible online in five languages (including English).	Country (in a global report)	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Not updated with constancy.
Caritas, report, volunteering, poverty	Names differ from country to country, multiple countries, usually updated yearly.	Activities carried out by the Caritas throughout the year.	Caritas	Freely accessible online, might not be available in English. Not all countries have reports available.	Country	PDF	1) Report; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Usually updated yearly.

Table 2: Structured list of all identified datasets. Further databases not included in the report (but potentially tangentially relevant)
Source: one representation

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Date (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality
Religious Freedom **Religious freedom, US, ARDA**	International Religious Freedom Data, Aggregate File (2003-2008), 199 countries, 2003, 05, 08.	Aggregated data on religious freedom.	Association of Religious Data Archives.	Freely accessible online in English.	Country (in a global report)	Different formats including Excel and Stata.	1) Data; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Data refer to specific years.
Religious Minorities **Religious minorities, Europe, DRES**	*Mineurel*, multiple countries, year depending on countries.	Information/data on religious minorities in Europe, divided by country, religion or topic.	DRES (Droit, religion, entreprise et société).	Freely accessible online in French and English.	Country	Text or Links to Text.	1) Text/Web page; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Usually updated.
Religious minorities, religion and State	The Religion and State Project, 175 countries, 1990-2008.	Data on 566 religious minorities around the world.	Fox, J. (Bar Ilan University).	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Different formats including Excel and Stata.	1) Data; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Updated but presumably not wit constancy – second round available now (first round covering from year 1990 to 2002).

Religion (or topic) + keywords	Date (name, location, year)	Topical focus	Source	Accessibility	Level of analysis	Format	Quality
Faith-Based Organisations in General **Religious organisations, Europe, EUREL**	Eurel – sociological and legal data on religions in Europe and beyond.	Source of information on religious organisations in Europe, good for 'snowballing''.	EUREL (EUrope RELigion), network of experts providing information about religious organisations in Europe	Freely accessible online in English.	Country	Mostly links that redirect to relevant research.	1) Text/Web page; 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Does not look updated.
Christianity, database	*World Christian Database*, multiple countries, various years.	Data on main Christian denominations in the world.	Johnson, T. M. (General Editor, Center for the Study of Global Christianity).	1.750€ (free 30-day trial available). Available here.	Country	n/a	1) Text/Data? 2) n/a; 3) Looks reliable; 4) Looks updated.

Tymen J. van der Ploeg

Relations Between the State and Religious Organisations in Europe From a Legal Perspective

1 Introduction

This contribution looks at relations between the state and religious organisations[1] from a legal perspective[2], both in general and more specifically in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. These countries have rather different histories regarding relations between the state and religious organisations. Apart from Turkey (except for Thrace) and Israel, the countries concerned are situated in Europe. These countries were selected by participants of the workshop "Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe".

The following section offers some remarks about international principles and developments regarding relations between the state and religious organisations. All countries have bound themselves to these principles. Section 3 introduces the different models that are used by the states concerned regarding their relations with religious organisations. In Section 4, the ways in which religious organisations in the countries included in this contribution obtain legal personality, and thereby autonomy, are compared. In Section 5, the extent to which religious organisations are active in society (in public spaces), comparable to civil society organisations, is described. Section 6 examines a related aspect, namely whether states are neutral towards religious organisations or whether they treat religious organisations conducting societal activities in a non-discriminatory way regarding subsidies, tax relief, and financial reporting. Based on these general comparative observations, the situations in the countries concerned are more specifically described in Section 7, which presents country reports in alphabetical order.

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1 'Religious organisations' is used in this contribution as a neutral term for (generally) national organisational structures. Other terms like 'religious communities' and 'churches' seem to refer to local groups and Christian organisations, respectively.
2 This research is part of the Maecenata Institute's Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe project. That the nature of relations between the state and churches/religious communities determines whether such communities are viewed as part of the state or as part of civil society was rightly noted by Sarah Albrecht (2016: 2). This contribution is also meant to provide material for addressing the questions of whether and to what extent religious organisations are part of civil society.

2 International principles and developments regarding relations between the state and religious organisations

The relations between the states examined here and the (dominant) religion(s) in their territories have rather different historical developments. An important event in all countries was the introduction of freedom of religion, which took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Through the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) of 1950, there is now a common set of principles of human rights, including freedom of religion (art. 9), which is in force in all European countries discussed in this contribution. Countries are bound to these principles in their own legislation and policy. Freedom of religion (and worldview) is also recognised in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of the United Nations of 1948, in which all countries concerned participate.

Freedom of religion does not only apply to individuals but also to religious organisations.[3] According to Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, building on the UDHR, this freedom may be limited only by law and only as much as necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public security; for the protection of public order, health, or good morals; or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This framing of the possibility of limiting freedom of religion has, however, not lead to the unification of relations between states and religious organisations. The European Court of Human Rights allows states a great deal of freedom in regulating their relations with religious organisations (the margin of appreciation doctrine). Several developments have influenced these relations over time.

– In certain periods in some countries, liberalism has had a dominant role in politics. In the liberal tradition, freedom of religion is merely a matter of the relation between the state and individuals. Special relations between the state and religious organisations do not apply.

– Since the end of the First World War, many countries in Europe have developed into welfare states.[4] In most of these countries, that meant that health care, social care, and education, which had been previously provided by religious organisations, became state activities, or at least activities controlled by the state through subsidies. This clearly changed relations between the state and religious organi-

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3 I will not go into the applicability of freedom of religion for civil society organisations.; see *X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden*, App No 7805/77, (1979) 22 Yearbook 244.
4 See Ferrari, S. (1988): Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society, *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 533-547.

sations. At the end of the twentieth century in most countries, the state reduced its spending on welfare due to economic crises, but this did not automatically restore religious organisations to their previous position.

– In the last century, religious adherence of the population has diminished, especially among (traditional) Christians but less so among Muslims. When the societal strength of religious organisations weakens, it will become easier for the state[5] to approach them as private (civil society) organisations.

– In every country, the state and ultimately the court have to decide what is 'religious' and when an organisation is a 'religious organisation'.[6] From the country reports in Section 7, it is clear that judgments about certain disputed 'religious organisations', such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Church of Scientology (all originating in the United States), differ among countries and may change in the course of time.

It is suitable to remark here on the suspicion of infringement of public order by new religious movements. Freedom of religion may be limited for reasons of public order. Especially when countries have a mono-religious culture, the arrival of new religious organisations, usually from the United States, is approached with at least mistrust. In Belgium and France, there are institutions dedicated to discerning (undesired) sects from (serious) religious organisations.[7] In several countries with state churches or preferred religious organisations, membership in these religious organisations is perceived as good and patriotic. Belonging to a minority religious organisation is often seen by the majority as unpatriotic. In some countries, members of these minority religions are sometimes considered sectarians and are discriminated against in society. Although I will not go into detail about measures taken to fight terrorism that may be religiously inspired, these measures have to be in line with the allowed limitations on freedom of religion as formulated in the ECHR and the UDHR.

Religious communities and organisations also enjoy freedom of association, according to Article 11 of the ECHR and Article 21 of the ICCPR.[8] To limit this freedom, a

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5 Ferrari (1988: 537-8) points out that the state has also changed its position; it is now more a mediator/facilitator than a legislating authority.

6 What 'religious' constitutes is to be decided by the state on 'objective' grounds. For the recognition of certain behaviours, practices, and dress codes as religious, a more restricted interpretation seems suitable (see Vermeulen 2007: 79; Post 2014: 360ff.; see also Sullivan 2005, who is more doubtful about the usefulness of the concept of freedom of religion).

7 See Ferrari, S. (2004): Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After September 11, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2004, no. 2, pp. 357-382.

8 See about freedom of association in relation to freedom of religion in the framework of the ECHR: Lehnhof, L. S. (2002): Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organisations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002, no. 2, pp. 561-609.

country should take into account the same types of restrictions as those regarding freedom of religion. Religious organisations can rely on both freedoms. Both freedom of association and freedom of religion presuppose a certain autonomy for (religious) organisations in relation to the state. The ways in which states regulate the establishment, internal organisation, and supervision of religious organisations are rather different in the countries concerned (see Section 4).

Religion is, according to Article 14 of the ECHR, a characteristic that not may be used to discriminate against persons in their enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in the Convention.[9] In Protocol 12 of the ECHR, this is extended to a more general right to equal treatment. For religious organisations, these rules do not seem to add much; theoretically, these organisations may enjoy the rights of non-discrimination and equal treatment.[10] It seems more important that members of these organisations may apply these principles when discriminated against because of their membership.

On the basis of freedom of religion and freedom of association, the existence of a democracy (including a certain separation between state and 'church'), and the principle of non-discrimination, one could formulate the following principles[11]:

– The state should not meddle in the affairs of religious organisations, and religious organisations should not meddle in politics. Advocacy by religious organisations is allowed.
– The state should be neutral regarding religion, in the sense that it does not judge religious doctrines.[12] This does not mean that all religious organisations are treated in the same way.
– When religious organisations perform societal activities, they should, however, be treated the same as civil society organisations (see Section 6).

3 A survey of relations between states and religious organisations

Each country has its own history out of which the actual relations between the state and religious organisations have developed. Centuries ago, states in Europe had strong connections to specific religious organisations under the principle of *cuius re-*

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9 See Ovey, C., White, R. and Jacobs, F. G. (Eds.): (2006). *The European Convention on Human Rights*, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 412ff.

10 Lehnhof, L. S. (2002): Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organisations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002, no. 2, pp. 588-589.

11 Pierik, R. and Van der Burg, W. (2014): What Is Neutrality? *Ratio Juris*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 496-515.

12 This is laid down in several constitutions and laws, for instance in Germany (Doe 2011: 90).

gio, eius religio.[13] After – and in light of – the French Revolution in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea that the state should treat its citizens equally without discrimination concerning their religious belief spread in many places in Europe. This, together with the introduction of freedom of religion, among other things (see Section 2), has led to a variety of relations between the state and religious organisations in the countries concerned.

There are theoretically seven different models of relations between the state and religious organisations. Five of these models are practiced in the countries examined here.[14] In many countries, more than one model is used. Based on historical developments in Europe, where the relationship between the state and dominant religious organisation(s) has been generally very close since mediaeval times, I have scaled the seven models from the closest to the most distant (or non-existent) links. Here I will describe the models but not evaluate them.

1. The *theocratic* model, in which a specific religion is the only tolerated one in a country and which is also normative for the state. In Vatican City, the Roman Catholic Church is, as far as I know, the only religious organisation allowed to operate.

2. The *state church*, meaning a religious organisation whose religion has by law a special status as the national religion combined with (mostly) financial support for the organisation and (some) formal influence of the church on the state and/or influence of the government on the internal organisation of the church. A state church is an entity of public law but is not necessarily part of the state. We see this model in Greece, unofficially in Turkey, and in the United Kingdom. According to Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey of 1982, Turkey is officially a secular state, but in Article 24 of the Constitution it is also stated that education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. The government has commissioned this task to a special state department (the Diyanet), which generally takes Sunni Islam as the basis for religion. Imams and mosques from this religious denomination are thus financed. The government thereby also expresses its opinion that Sunni Islam has the correct interpretation of Islam.[15]

   The legal system in England is, for the most part, based on common law. The specific position of the Church of England does not prevent the flourishing of other religions. How much space they are permitted is largely dependent on

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13 This principle was accepted in the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555.

14 compare also Madeley, J. T. S. (2013): Religion, State and Civil Society in Europe. Triangular Entanglements. In J. De Hart, P. Dekker and L. Halman (Eds.): *Religion and Civil Society in Europe.* Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 58ff.

15 Although not wishing to discuss the legitimacy of the Turkish claim of being a secular state in general, I cannot bypass the close relation between the organisations of Sunni Islam and the state.

court decisions, not on legislation.[16] In the United Kingdom, the state does not support the state churches as such.

3. The state gives one or more religious organisations a *preferred position*, mostly by providing them public law status. Preferred religious organisations obtain their positions by law, decree, or agreement. In some countries, like Italy and Poland,[17] the Roman Catholic religion – and therewith the Roman Catholic Church – has received a normative place in the constitution. Other countries with preferred religious organisations are Austria, Belgium, France (in Alsace-Moselle), Germany, Greece (regarding three non-Orthodox religious organisations), and Israel. In Israel, Orthodox Judaism has a preferred position because family law based on Orthodox Judaism regulates the family matters of all Jewish people, irrespective of their beliefs.[18]

4. The states *recognise religious organisations individually*, either by law, decree, or agreement. The state sets the conditions for this recognition,[19] which provides religious organisations legal personality as such, making it possible for them to be serious participants in society. This type of relation can be seen in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Israel, Italy, Sweden, and Ukraine. Several of these countries have concluded concordats (contracts) with the Roman Catholic Church, Vatican City (the Holy See).[20] When a state has concluded a concordat with the Vatican, this implies that the state guarantees that the Roman Catholic Church may nominate its officials in that country.

Models 2, 3, and 4 can be grouped together as one category in which the state and one or more religious organisations have established relations.[21] Some of

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16 Ferrari (2012: 142, 145) calls the common law pattern a special pattern. He suggests that courts in the United Kingdom take more care in guaranteeing freedom of religion than courts in other European countries, because fewer legislative limitations exist in the UK. I would say that in continental systems, also more freedom of religion can be provided. For instance, the Dutch system is similarly dependent on courts.

17 The Roman Catholic Church in Poland has a constitutional position but a private law character.

18 Lerner, N. (2013): Religion and the Basic Legislation in Israel. In Durham, W. C., Jr, Ferrari, S., Cianitto, C., Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 162-163.

19 The rules or policies in relation to this recognition mostly imply discretionary power for the government.

20 There are now concordats of the Holy See with Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Sweden (see Holy See n.d.).

21 The term 'established churches' has a more specific meaning.; see Overbeeke, A.J. and Sap, J. W. (2014): Het recht van Europese Unie over religie en geloofsgemeenschappen [The Law of the European Union on Religion and Religious Communities]. In L. C. van Drimmelen and T. J. van der Ploeg (Eds.): *Geloofsgemeenschappen en recht* [Religious Communities and Law]. The Hague: Boom Juridische, pp. 268-270.

the states operating under models 2 and/or 3 use one religion as the normative one for society.[22] Examples are Greece, Israel, Italy, and Poland.

5. The state recognises religious organisations as such but does not have special relations with one or more religious organisations. The state *does not recognise religious organisations individually*, but the general law provides them equally freedom to operate.[23] This is the system in the Netherlands, where the state has only informal relations with religious organisations. Here, the state is secular but benevolent.[24]

   One can also group models 2, 3, 4, and 5 together as cooperation models[25] and models 3, 4, and 5 as pluralist models.[26] [27]

6. The state has a strict *separation* between the state and religious organisations. Religious organisations are considered equal to associations because the state considers religion a private matter of its citizens.[28] The state takes a secular position; freedom from religion in public places is essential.[29] The *laïcité* model of France, which is rather hostile towards religion, compared to model 5[30], is an example of this. Formally, Turkey has a strict separation between state and religion, but its system is intrinsically contradictory. Separatism is also the model that has been deliberately chosen in the United States.

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22 Ferrari, S. (2012): Religion in the European Public Spaces. A Legal Overview. In S. Ferrari and S. Pastorelli (Eds.): *Religion in Public Spaces. A European Perspective*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 139-156.

23 See about the relation between freedom of religion and equality: Ferrari, S. (1988): Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society, *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 545ff.

24 Compare Leigh, I. and Ahdar, R. (2012): Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away, *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 75, no. 6, pp. 1069-1070.

25 Madeley (2013: 62) inserts between cooperationist and separationist models a special, third category: accomodationist, as in the Netherlands. I am not sure that this is correct; other cooperationist countries may have the same approach. See Madeley (2013) for references regarding secularisation and pluralism.

26 See who acknowledges that there is cooperation between the state and religious organisations everywhere in Europe: Vermeulen, B. P. and Kanne, M. J. (2004): Kerk en staat en de mensenrechten [Church and State and Human Rights]. In Van Drimmelen, L. C. and van der Ploeg, T. J. (Eds.): *Kerk en recht* [Church and Law]. Utrecht: Lemma, pp. 70-71.; Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.28.

27 However, Doe (2011: 39, see also 29) incorrectly suggests that the Netherlands practices a separationist system instead of a hybrid system.

28 Ferrari (2012: 141) suggests that in this model the state relies on secular principles because religious traditions are too weak for building social cohesion and national identity. I am not sure that this is historically correct. In the United States, which has a clearly separatist model, religion is not weak. The choice for secularism may be made without prejudice against religion.

29 Leigh, I. and Ahdar, R. (2012): Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away, *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 75, no. 6, pp. 1065.

30 See Ibid.: 1070-1071.

7. The *atheistic* model, in which the state does not allow religion and where religion has no place in society.

Table 1: Models of relations between the state and religious organisations

	From close to very distant relations					
1. Theocracy	**2. State church**	**3. Preferred religious organisation**	**4. Individually recognised [31] religious organisations[32]**	**5. Generally recognised religious organisations**	**6. State has no specific relation with religious organisations**	**7. Religious organisations forbidden**
Vatican City	England[33] Scotland	Austria	Austria	The Netherlands	France (rest of country)	Not in Europe
	Greece	Belgium	Bosnia and Herzegovina			
	(Turkey)	France (Alsace-Moselle)	Greece			
		Germany	Israel			
		Greece[34]	Italy			
		Israel	Sweden			
		Italy	Ukraine			
		Poland				
		(Sweden)				
		Turkey[35]				

In Table 1, several countries are mentioned under more than one model. In these countries, religious organisations can occupy different positions, depending on the

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31 This category includes religious organisations that are registered as such, as is the case in Sweden.

32 Benyamin Neuberger (1999) has nearly made the same distinctions. However, he also suggests, regarding recognised religious organisations, that all major religious organisations are treated equally and considered to be public; that the state finances religious service and activities; and that there is close cooperation between religious organisations and the state (Neuberger 1999: 71-3). Neither state financing nor public law status are, however, normal for this category.

33 The Church of England was disestablished in Wales in 1914. It has thus a separationist model (see Neuberger 1999: 68).

34 This regards the Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim communities.

35 Regarding some non-Muslim religious organisations.

legal form they have obtained. This makes it clear that, apart from the secular models, countries do not have only one type of relation to religious organisations. The model that is considered characteristic of a country concerns the relation of the state with the dominant religious organisation or with the largest religious organisations. In all the countries concerned, it is possible for a religious organisation to establish a secular/civil law form. Apart from its purpose and fundament, the religious organisation is then legally comparable to other associations and foundations.[36]

The European Court of Human Rights accepts in principle the different models that exist, which means that the (unequal) treatment of religious organisations is left to the margin of appreciation of national laws and politics (policy).[37] [38] It is, however, clear that the use of a particular model in a country – as opposed to any other model – influences the development of religious organisations and the nature of their relations with the state and with other religious organisations. The different legal approaches to new religions, as Islam was in the twentieth century in Europe, also influence the acceptance of new religions in society.[39] The problem with the acceptance of Islam, however, is also that the ways in which the Islamic faith and community function do not correspond (easily) with the democratic states and societies that exist in Europe.[40]

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36 In England, they may choose to register as a charity for the advancement of religion because forms such as association and foundation are not used (see Doe 2011: 97).

37 for a strong defence of this, see Leigh, I. and Ahdar, R. (2012): Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away, *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 75, no. 6, pp. 1069-1070.; on the court's decision in *Lautsi and others v. Italy* [GC], App No 30814/06, [2011] ECHR 2011-III (extracts), (2012) 54 EHRR 3.

38 Doe (2011: 29) states that the Council of Europe promotes real separation of state and religion as well as state neutrality, while the European Union respects the existing relations between states and religions. However, Leigh and Ahdar (2012) also observe that, by way of the *Lautsi* decision, the European Court of Human Rights (and therewith the Council of Europe) leave countries their margins of appreciation in this respect.

39 Compare Rath, J., Groenendijk, K. and Penninx, R. (1993): De erkenning en institutionalisering van de Islam in België, Groot Brittanni en Nederland [The Recognition and Institutionalising of Islam in Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands], *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 53ff.

40 See for instance Esmer, Y. (2013): Democracy, Civil Society, and Islam. In J. de Hart, P. Dekker and L. Halman (Eds.): *Religion and Civil Society in Europe.* Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 267-284.

4 Autonomy and the ways of obtaining legal personality by religious organisations

It is generally understood that collective freedom of religion means that religious organisations determine their own religious creeds and their internal organisation.[41] The state has also neither the authority to make religious statements nor to determine whether the decisions of bodies of religious organisations – for instance, about the appointment of an officer – are correct or incorrect.[42]

However, when there is a state church, the link between the state and the church may be so close that state law also partly regulates the internal matters of the concerned church. As long as both the state and the state church want to continue this type of relation, there is no infringement on freedom of religion. The scale of influence of the state on the church and vice versa is not the same everywhere.

A state church may have its own legal personality of public law as provided by law or custom, or it may use the legal personality of the state when entering society. The Church of England does not have its own legal personality. In a common law country like England, this is less of a problem than on the European continent.

It is highly practical and in fact indispensable for other religious organisations to have their own legal personalities. Thanks to legal personality, organisations can in their own names buy or rent real estate for places of prayer or worship; appoint ministers, priests, imams, rabbis, et cetera; and receive donations. Without legal personality, this is much more complicated. According to the European Court of Human Rights, religious organisations have the fundamental right to obtain legal personality.[43] Based on the ECHR, guidelines about the legal personality and registration of religious organisations have been issued.[44]

In countries without state churches, except France, there exist one or more specific forms of legal personality for religious organisations.[45] To obtain legal personal-

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41 This freedom of internal organisation is a specific consequence of freedom of religion. Such a freedom does not follow in the strict sense from freedom of association (see van der Ploeg 2008a).
42 see *Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria* [GC], App No 30985/96, (2002) 34 EHRR 1339; *Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova*, App No 45701/99, (2002) 35 EHRR 306.
43 *Canea Catholic Church v. Greece*, App No 25528/94, [1997] ECHR 1997-VIII, (1999) 27 EHRR 521.
44 See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)/ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (2014): Joint Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities, Opinion No. 673/2012, CDL-AD(2014)023. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.; see also OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief and European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2004): Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion and Belief. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR.
45 In Italy, not the community but the central office of a religious organisation formally receives legal personality.

ity, recognition of the religious organisation is generally necessary and given based on certain criteria, such as the length of time it has been settled in the country, the size of the group, or a clear internal structure. From a human rights perspective, it is important that recognition is not made on discretionary grounds. Discretionary decision-making may exist when recognition is refused because of the fear that an organisation will operate contrary to good morals[46] or public order.

In Germany, recognised religious organisations (including the Roman Catholic Church) and in Italy, recognised religious organisations with agreements with the state receive public law status, which provides some preferences, like tax levy via the state. In Turkey, there are some religious organisations that were already recognised by law or treaty long ago, but there is no actual procedure for recognition of religious organisations. In the other countries concerned, recognised (or registered) religious organisations are organisations with private law character.

In the Netherlands, there is a specific legal person for religious organisations: the *kerkgenootschap* (church society). Obtaining this legal personality is not linked to recognition. To become a religious organisation with legal personality as such *(kerkgenootschap)*, no formality is required, but the presence of some characteristics of a religious organisation[47] and the intention to be a legal person as a religious organisation are necessary. For new religions and non-Christian religious organisations (Islam, Hinduism), this entrance to legal personality is generally rather unclear.

In France, where religion is supposed to be of a purely private nature, religious organisations may choose a specific form of association (the *association cultuelle*). For this, a decree of the State Council is required.[48]

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46 For example, the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Scientology were refused recognition in Germany, as they are supposedly not loyal to the country (see Grim & Finke 2006: 6).

47 These material characteristics are formulated in the literature and used by courts; the government does not think it suitable to formulate these itself.

48 In France, the Jehovah's Witnesses had previously been refused *association cultuelle* status because they were considered not to have a religion.

Table 2: Legal forms for religious organisations per country

	State church	Religious organisations of public law	Individually recognised[49] religious organisations of private law	Generally recognised religious organisations of private law	Associations or foundations (secular private law forms)	Trusts or corporations (secular forms)
Austria		*	*		*	
Belgium		(*)[50]			*	
Bosnia and Herzegovina			*		*?	
England	*		*			*
Scotland	*					*
France		*[51]			*[52]	
Germany		*			*	
Greece	*	*	*		*	
Israel		(*)	*		*	
Italy		*	*		*	
The Netherlands				*	*	
Poland		*[53]	*		*	
Sweden			*		*	
Turkey	(*)		*[54]		*	
Ukraine			*		*	

In all the countries examined here, there exist religious organisations that do not want to be recognised by the state, that do not meet the criteria for recognition (or were refused recognition), or that have not had the opportunity to be recognised by the government. They also enjoy freedom of religion, as this is not dependent on legal form. They may use a secular form, like association or foundation, to obtain legal per-

49 Or registered.

50 Under Belgian public law, religious denominations can be recognised. A denomination is either a religious organisation or a religious current to which different religious organisations may belong.

51 This applies to the Alsace-Moselle region.

52 The *association cultuelle* form is only available to worshipping organisations.

53 The Roman Catholic Church in Poland has a preferred but private law status.

54 This refers to some older, non-Muslim communities.

sonality.[55] This means that these religious organisations use legal forms for which there is legislation with requirements about membership and democracy (regarding associations) or about court or public supervision (regarding foundations). These civil law rules may not suit the internal organisation of religious organisations.[56] One may wonder if this conforms to the collective freedom of religion, but I will not go deeper into this aspect here. In any case, religious organisations may on a voluntary basis make use of secular forms of legal personality and are then subject to the applicable civil law rules for these forms (associations and foundations). They may also use a contractual form to operate in society.[57]

5 Performance of societal activities by religious organisations

In all the countries concerned, including France, the state asks religious organisations[58] to help guarantee freedom of religion for persons confined in penitentiary institutions and for those participating in military service because such individuals are not free to attend the religious services (or receive the pastoral care) that they desire. Ministers, priests, imams, rabbis, and others deliver services and administer pastoral care. Countries have different rules about the religious organisations that can provide these services. In countries with state churches, the state church is given solely this responsibility.[59] In states with recognised religious organisations, these organisations are given the possibility to provide these services.[60] In other countries (the Netherlands and France), several religious organisations may provide these services. Generally, the state pays for these services (for example, by paying ministers and their equivalents).

On the same grounds, the state supports pastoral care in healthcare institutions (and nursing homes), but payment is then usually provided by the institutions and

55 In the UK, these religious organisations can be registered as charities for the advancement of religion (see Doe 2011: 97).

56 Freedom of religion allows more internal autonomy than freedom of association (see Ferrari 1995; van der Ploeg 2014).

57 An important element in the guidelines of the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief and European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2004: 17) is that religious organisations cannot be forced to register.

58 See also Dübeck and Overgaard (2003).

59 For instance, in England; see Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 204–205.

60 In Germany, only religious organisations with public law status may provide pastoral care in penal institutions and for those participating in military service (see Strachwitz 2009: 13).

by health insurance companies. Another indication of the state's care for the freedom of religion of its citizens, especially parents and children, is the facilitation of religious education by religious organisations.[61] In countries with state churches or with preferred religious organisations, such services are generally provided by these religious organisations.[62]

Religious organisations are also active in society in ways other than religious services and pastoral care. They run healthcare institutions, nursing homes, primary and secondary schools, and orphanages; establish and maintain cemeteries and maintain historical sites, especially churches; are active in social work, development aid, and microcredit; print books and have bookshops; broadcast; and even operate breweries and guesthouses. In Western Europe, it was Christian (state or established) churches that had already introduced hospitals, orphanages, and assistance for widows in the Mediaeval Period.[63] These societal activities have a connection to the message of the religious organisation; they are expressions of its religion. In society, these activities perform the same function as those of other (civil society) organisations and individuals. Quite a few of these activities can be seen as public service provision.

The extent to which these activities receive support from the state depends on the general regulations in the different societal sectors. In some cases, the state relies almost exclusively on the activities of religious organisations. An example is social work in the Netherlands, which is almost entirely performed by the Salvation Army. In Germany, the Protestant and Catholic welfare organisations have established positions in financed welfare work. Immigrant churches also often provide help with integration into society to their own members and to others in the concerned immigrant community.

Some religious organisations also fulfil advocacy roles in society, not only for their own members but also for larger parts of society.[64] This is especially the case where a religious organisation represents a substantial part of the population. On ethical subjects such as abortion and euthanasia, smaller religious organisations also raise their voices.

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61 To treat worldviews equally, humanist organisations are generally also allowed to teach their worldview in the same way. On this point, the statement by Ferrari (1995: 423) that religious organisations have here favourable arrangements compared to others has to be relativised.

62 Regarding Germany, see Puza, R. (2001): Relations Between Church and State in the Federal Republic of Germany in 2000, *European Journal for Church and State Research – Revue européenne des relations Églises-État*, vol. 8, p. 35-60.

63 See Brodman, J. W. (2009): *Charity and Religion in Medieval Europe*. Washington, DC: Catholic University Pres.

64 Examples of this are the attitude and actions of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland under the Nazi and communist regimes and those of Ukrainian churches in times of civil conflict. I do not cover here the role that religious organisations play as authorities for ethical and behavioural norms for their members.

Many traditional religious organisations own historical churches or other places of worship as well as cemeteries. They are obliged to maintain these. As these places are not only important for members of religious organisations but also for the general public due to cultural reasons, financial support from the public and from the government is appropriate.

Often, religious organisations provide the above services through foundations or other legal persons of private or ecclesiastical law. Regarding the specific legal persons of private law, I include here only those that are established and/or dominated by (a) religious organisation(s).[65] Whether a religious organisation can be active in one or more of the mentioned areas of society will depend on the organisation's focus and financial situation. Generally, religious organisations with long histories in the field will have easier entrances than new religious organisations that lack finances and qualified personnel.

6 Neutrality of the state and subsidies and tax relief for and financial reporting by religious organisations

Due to historical developments in many countries, as explained in Section 2, the state does not treat all religious organisations the same. State churches and preferred religious organisations fulfil a function for the state in society. Religious organisations without such a status may be recognised, but that alone does not provide them with a public position. Religious organisations that are disadvantaged by this do not often complain, as doing so could have repercussions on their societal acceptance. As shown in Section 3, the European Court of Human Rights does not require strict equal treatment of religious organisations. It leaves a broad margin of appreciation to the national states.[66] The preferential treatment of a dominant religious organisation should, however, not harm other religious organisations (ibid.).[67] Stricter interpretations are possible.[68] It should be noted that inequality in the treatment of religious

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65 Not included are other legal persons of civil law with a religious basis that are not connected to (a) specific religious organisations(s).

66 See Svensson, E. (2013): The Constitutionalization of Freedom of Religion in the European Union. What Changes Are the Charter of Fundamental Rights Expected to Bring About? In Durham, W. C., Jr, S. Ferrari, Cianitto, C. and Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 192-210.

67 Ibid.

68 Lehnhof (2002: 588-9) suggests that religious organisations may apply for equal treatment based on Article 14 of the ECHR.

organisations by the state also influences the enjoyment of freedom of religion by individuals.[69]

Another norm that the democratic state should observe towards religion and religious organisations is neutrality, which includes impartiality in terms of not judging the merits of different religions. It is not necessary for the state to treat all beliefs and worldviews in the same way or to prevent religions from presenting themselves in.[70] Regarding societal activities of religious organisations, the state is still obligated to treat religious organisations as well as (other) civil society organisations (faith-based organisations and non-religious organisations) equally regarding taxes, subsidies, contracts, and so on.[71] The state may only treat them differently on reasonable and objective grounds.[72]

Regarding subsidies, one may expect that, in countries where the state does not have a monopoly on public service provision and where freedom of religion and freedom of association exist, religious organisations can apply for the same financial support for pursuing activities for public benefit as other (secular) organisations. The separation between state and religions/religious organisations should be combined with a neutral approach of the state towards religious organisations. Subsidies should only be given for societal activities, not for proselytising. Religious organisations should also meet the same (qualitative) criteria as secular organisations must in relation to the activities. Generally, the activities have to be open to all, regardless of religion.[73] State subsidies for societal activities of religious organisations, therefore, should not be considered support from the state for religious organisations as such but for the concerned activities, irrespective of the religious basis of an organisation. In reality, this is not the case in several countries.

When a religious, ethnic, and/or cultural minority is disadvantaged, the overall situation of this minority has to be taken into account in order to promote (some) in-

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69 Ferrari, S. (1988): Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society, *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 543ff.

70 Shetreet, S. (2007): The Model of State and Church Relations and Its impact on the Protection of Freedom of Conscience and Religion. A Comparative analysis and a Case Study of Israel. In W. Brugger and M. Karayanni (Eds.): *Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American and International Law*. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 130-140.

71 Overbeeke (2014: 263-5) notes that, according to Article 14 of the ECHR, the awarding of a subsidy by the state should not be dependent on the religion or non-religion of an organisation.

72 Leigh, I. and Ahdar, R. (2012): Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away, *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 75, no. 6, p. 1092.

73 An interesting question is whether subsidised religious organisations have the freedom to establish conditions regarding the beliefs of the employees or volunteers performing the activities, or whether the government has the freedom to request that the organisation abstain from religious conditions for employees and volunteers.

tegration of the minority into society.[74] To support such a minority, the government may develop a policy by which it subsidises (also) religious activities.[75]

When religious organisations receive subsidies for certain activities, they have, like any subsidy recipient, to render accounts to the subsidising government[76]. Also, when religious organisations want to receive tax relief and when they want their members and any other donors to receive tax deductions for their donations, the state wants to see the organisations' balance sheets. The key concern here is the extent to which religious organisations are in a different position than that of (other) civil society organisations.

Regarding religious organisations with public law status, there will presumably be an obligation to submit financial statements to the government to account for the spending of the support received. For religious organisations with a private law character, this will generally not be the case. When religious organisations are recognised as such, such an obligation may be a condition. In the Netherlands, where recognition is not required for obtaining the specific legal persons form of *kerkgenootschap*, there is also no obligation in the law to submit or publish financial statements.

For religious organisations that are established in the form of associations or foundations, the obligation to publish financial statements is dependent on the legislation for associations and foundations. For associations and foundations, the obligation to make financial statements is generally laid down in law, and in several countries there is also the obligation to either submit (some type of) financial statement to the supervising authority or to publish them in public registers.[77]

When civil society organisations receive subsidies and tax relief because of activities for public benefit, the state requires the submission or publication of financial statements annually and/or at the end of subsidised projects.

It seems logical that financial statements (balance sheets) and their submission or publication are also required from religious organisations that are subsidised or

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74 Compare Noor, F. A. (2007): Integration, civic participation and citizenship: Muslims in Europe or European Muslims? In: E.A.J.G van der Borght (ed.), Studies in Reformed Theology, 'Freedom of Religion', Vol. 17, Leiden/Boston Brill.

75 Compare Ferrari, S. (1988): Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society, *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 543ff.; Ferrari, S. (2004): Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After September 11, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2004, no. 2, pp. 379ff.; Van der Burg, W. (2009): *Het ideaal van de neutrale staat. Inclusieve, exclusieve en compenserende visies op godsdienst en cultuur* [The Ideal of a Neutral State. Inclusive, Exclusive and Compensating Visions on Religion and Culture]. The Hague: Boom.

76 I do not deal here with direct financing from the government to religious organisations (see Doe 2011: 175ff. about this).

77 Van der Ploeg, T. J., Van Veen, W. J. M. and Versteegh, C. R. M. (2017): *Civil Society in Europe. Minimum Norms and Optimum Conditions of its Regulation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch. 4, para. II.5, pp. 132ff.

receive tax relief.[78] For receiving subsidies, religious organisations have to actively provide public services in society. In relation to the subsidy of societal activities, religious organisations establish separate legal persons for these activities (mostly foundations and, in England and Wales, charities). Religious organisations may do so because they do not want to mix funds from subsidies with other sources of financing and because they do not want to submit or publish their entire organisations' financial statements, as this would be disproportionate.

For receiving tax relief, religious organisations have only to function as religious communities. The existence of a religious organisation or community is supposed to be beneficial to society, although this is nowadays more of an implicit presumption.

The accountability of religious organisations to the authorities is a delicate matter. Since recently in the Netherlands, religious organisations have to publish their balance sheets on their own websites in order to receive tax relief.[79]

7 Country Reports

In the remainder of this contribution, I will describe the situations regarding relations between the state and religious organisations in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

7.1 Austria

Austrians and Austrian religious organisations enjoy freedom of religion, but the state maintains various relations towards religious organisations.

Austria has a large Roman Catholic community (more than five million members). Other communities form rather small minorities. In 2016, there were 700,000 Muslims, 500,000 Orthodox Christians, and 300,000 Protestants in Austria. Next to those, there are many other small religious organisations.[80] More than 10 per cent of the population are not members of a religious organisation.

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78 Tax exemptions and benefits for religious organisations relate to gift and inheritance tax, estate tax, and, for members and other donors, tax deductions on income tax.
79 The data requirements regarding governance and the financial statement are less detailed for religious organisations than for associations and foundations.
80 Various Sources, Medien-Servicestelle Neue ÖsterreicherInnen and ÖIF (n.d.): *Anzahl der Gläubigen von Religionen in Österreich im Zeitraum 2012 bis 2016*. URL: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/304874/umfrage/mitglieder-in-religionsgemeinschaften-in-oesterreich (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).; compare Schinkele, B. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Austria. In L.

Since the Act of 20 May 1874, Concerning the Legal Recognition of Religious Societies, a religious organisation can be recognised as a 'religious society' (*Religionsgemeinschaft)*. Recognition as a religious society is made by ministerial ordinance (or exceptionally by law) and establishes such organisations as legal persons of public law. This means that these religious organisations may make use of the opportunity to collect church tax, that their religion teachers in public and private schools are financed by the government, and that their own schools are also financed by the government.

Originally, the conditions for becoming a religious society were rather lenient. Since 1998, they have become stricter and include a minimum number of members equivalent to 0.2 per cent of the population, ten years of existence as a registered community, and a positive attitude to state and society. In practice, such recognition is no longer feasible.[81] Although religious societies have public law status, they cannot exercise public competences. It also does not mean that the government has a say in the internal affairs of religious societies. They enjoy explicit autonomy.[82]

Since the Federal Law on the status of Religious Belief Communities of 1998, religious organisations may apply for legal personality of private law as 'religious belief communities' (*religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaften)*. For this category, less strict criteria are laid down in the law. To apply, groups must have at least 300 members and must submit to the government written statutes describing their goals, rights, and members' obligations, as well as their membership regulations, officials, and financing.

Groups must also submit written versions of their religious doctrines, which must differ from that of any religious society recognised under the 1874 act or any confessional community established under the 1998 law. Recognition by the government of a religious organisation as a religious belief community does not imply approval of the creed of the religious community. There will be a marginal test of the creed. When it could be used to incite violence and other crimes, recognition will be refused.[83] According to the 1998 law (sec. 7), religious belief communities and sub-entities with legal status are obligated to report the names and addresses of those legally responsible as well as any changes in statutes immediately to a governmental office (since

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Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 37-44.

81 Ibid.: pp. 38-39.

82 See art. 15, Basic Law of 21 December 1867, on the General Rights of Citizens.; This law has constitutional status by Article 149(1) of the Federal Constitutional Law of 1 October 1920.; compare Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 115-116.

83 compare Schinkele, B. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Austria. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 30.

2014 the Federal Chancellor).[84] The right received from this law is apparently registration and thereby official recognition. Two religious organisations that have experienced difficulties being recognised as such in several countries – the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Bahá'í Faith – have gained the status of confessional community in Austria.

Religious societies have substantive preferences above religious belief communities. There is discussion on the legitimacy of these differences, as Article 7 of the Federal Constitutional Law proclaims equal treatment.[85] Other religious organisations that either do not meet the criteria for religious societies or confessional communities or do not want to apply for state recognition as such may still obtain legal personality by establishing an association of civil law. According to the Federal Act on Associations of 2002[86], religious organisations may perform societal activities irrespective of their legal form.

7.2 Belgium

Freedom of religion and freedom of church organisation are guaranteed by Articles 19 through 21 of the Constitution of Belgium of 1831.

In Belgium, religious organisations may request recognition of their denomination from the state.[87] Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism were already recognised under the earlier (French and Dutch) regimes. The government's position is that new denominations (*erediensten)* can be recognised based on five informal[88] criteria: a considerably large group of believers (in the tens of thousands), being well-structured, a presence in Belgium for some decades, social importance, and not threatening social order.[89] In fact, these criteria are only used in the recognition of the

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84 Not acting according to this duty can result in severe sanctions. Refusal must be notified in writing when the governmental authority discovers that the appointment of any responsible person is in violation of the statutes or that the change in statutes would give reason for rejection according to Section 5 of the Federal Law on the Legal Personality of Religious Belief Communities of 1998.

85 Schinkele, B. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Austria. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 40.

86 Recognised associations are registered in local registers, which are connected to the central register of the Ministry of the Interior.

87 For Islam (1974) and Orthodoxy (1985), the 4 March 1870 Law on Temporal Aspects of the Denominations (*erediensten)* was amended. Protestantism (1802) and Judaism (1808) had already been recognised under French rule.

88 There is still no formal legislation on the recognition of religions.

89 The information about this can also be found on the website of the Federal Public Service Justice (Federale Overheidsdienst Justitie n.d.).; see Torfs, R. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Belgium. In Friedner, L. (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 25, 27.

Orthodox denomination. It seems that the state takes decisions regarding recognition of other denominations and local branches on a rather discretionary basis. Under this constitutionally based regime, the following denominations have been recognised: the Church of England (1835), Islam (1974), Orthodoxy (1985), and, after a change in the constitution in 1993, the Humanist Movement (2002).[90]

The existence of an *eredienst* means that local religious communities belonging to the concerned *eredienst* may enjoy all sorts of preferences.[91] State authorities do support local religious communities, for instance by paying the salaries of ministers and their equivalents[92], by providing access to places of worship, and –through an ecclesiastical administration (*kerkfabriek*, which has legal personality of public law[93]) – by being financially co-responsible for the budgets of local religious communities. Religious education in public schools is provided by teachers appointed by the representative bodies of the recognised religions; they are paid by the government.

The Roman Catholic Church is the majority church in Belgium. Around 50 per cent of the population are members of this church. More than 40 per cent of the population do not belong to a religious organisation. Around 5 per cent of the population are Muslim, and less than 3 per cent adhere to a Christian denomination other than Roman Catholic.[94]

By this public regulation of the financing of denominations, which as such is financially very attractive for religious organisations, it is not required that local religious communities obtain legal personality apart from the legal personality of public law of the ecclesiastical administration (*kerkfabriek)*. To operate as a legal entity in society outside the area of the *kerkfabriek*, religious communities must establish associations (most commonly) and/or foundations. This applies not only to religious organisations that do not belong to recognised denominations but also to religious communities/organisations that are recognised as belonging to recognised denominations.

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90 Buddhists have also applied for recognition as a denomination (*eredienst)*. The procedure has not yet been completed, but a representative body of Buddhist communities already receives funding from the government.

91 About the system of state funding of denominations, see Christians, L. L. and Wattier, S. (2015): Funding of Religious and Non-Confessional Organisations: The Case of Belgium. In F. Messner (Ed.): *Public Funding of Religions in Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 51-74.

92 According to Article 181 of the Constitution of Belgium, the salaries and pensions of 'ministers' of denominations (*erediensten*) are for the account of the state. Article 21 of the Constitution states that the government may, however, not be involved in the appointment or installation of ministers of (recognised) religions.

93 The rules for ecclesiastical administrations (*kerkfabrieken*) find their origin in the 4 March 1870 Law on Temporal Aspects of Denominations.

94 Voyé, L. and Dobbelaere, K. (2012): Portrait du catholicisme en Belgique. In A. Pérez-Agote (Ed.): *Portraits du Catholicisme. Une comparaison européenne*. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, pp. 5-6.

The idea behind this model of state-religion relations is that religion represents a social and moral interest and is thereby in the public interest. At its origin, the system was compensation for the expropriation of Roman Catholic Church goods (during the French regime).[95] A disadvantage of this system is that the state expects the creation of representative bodies for every recognised denomination (*eredienst*), which may not be acceptable for the religious communities that fall under certain denominations. This will not be problematic for recognised Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism, but it forms a threat for the organisational autonomy of more pluralised religions, such as Protestantism, Orthodoxy, and Islam.[96] This may prevent certain local communities from applying for recognition, which means that they have to finance themselves.

The Belgian system is rather suspicious towards religious denominations that are new and that do not want to be recognised. A Centre of Information and Advice Centre on Harmful Sectarian Organisations and an administrative interagency body to coordinate the fight against harmful sects were established by the 2 June 1998 Law. The centre performs research and provides information, while the interagency body is more active regarding so-called sects.[97]

The Constitution of Belgium states in Article 11 that rights and freedoms can be enjoyed in Belgium without discrimination. The fact that the Humanist Movement is treated equally regarding government financing (and has a status comparable with the older recognised religions) makes it clear that this is taken seriously.

Religious organisations may perform societal activities in society in the same ways as secular organisations.

7.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a young country, created in 1992 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which was a socialist country in which religion did not play a public role.

Three religions play important roles for different parts of the population: Islam for Bosniaks (45 per cent), the Orthodox Church for Bosnian Serbs (36 per cent), and

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95 Rath, J., Groenendijk, K. and Penninx, R. (1993): De erkenning en institutionalisering van de Islam in België, Groot Brittanni en Nederland [The Recognition and Institutionalising of Islam in Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands], *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 53-75.
96 About problems concerning the Islamic representative body, see Overbeeke, A. J. (2009): *Geduldig wachtend op de oogst? Dertig jaar islambeleid in België* [Patiently Waiting for the Harvest? Thirty Years of Policy Regarding Islam in Belgium]. In P. Kreuiniger (Ed.): *Recht van de Islam*, vol. 23. The Hague: Boom Juridische, pp. 17-41.
97 See Denaux, A. (2002): The Attitude of Belgian Authorities Toward New Religious Movements, *Brigham Young University Law Review,* vol. 2002, no. 2, pp. 237-267.

the Roman Catholic Church for Bosnian Croats (15 per cent).[98] In fact, the country is divided into regions that correspond to their dominant ethnic groups and religions. It should be noted that Muslims had already been secularised for a long time. This was partly true for the other groups, but after independence, de-secularisation took place among all groups.[99]

An important event in the relations between the state and religious organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the introduction of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in 2004.[100] This law meets the need for simple, clear, non-discriminatory rules. The law respects freedom of law and separation between the state and religious organisations. In the law, the first statement is that the country has a multi-religious identity and wants to promote mutual understanding without any discrimination. Other fundamental principles are that Bosnia and Herzegovina may have neither a state religion nor a state church or state religious organisation and that the state may not interfere in the affairs and internal organisation of churches and religious communities.[101]

Existing churches and (other) religious organisations that were listed in the 2004 law have legal personality according to the law. They must register at the Ministry of Justice. New churches and (other) religious organisations have to apply for registration at the Ministry of Justice. They need to submit signatures from 300 members and a document with the signatures of thirty founders and in which their founding is laid out and the names of its officials are provided. A document detailing official religious teachings also has to be submitted. The Ministry of Justice may only refuse registration when the content of these documents is contrary to the law or when manifestations of the religion are contrary to the legal order or public morals or damages the lives, health, or rights and freedoms of others.[102]

Remarkable is that the 2004 law states that churches and (other) religious organisations may be active in society in different fields and may establish corporations, institutions, and associations; they may not, however, distribute income to individuals unless this action has a charitable character.[103] Churches and (other) religious or-

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98 Briggs, B. (n.d.): *Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. URL: http://www.religlaw.org/portal.country. php?pageId=22&countryId=26 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

99 See Iveković, I. (2002): Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States, *Social Compass*, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 530.

100 for more on relations between the state and religious organisations, also before this law, see Stuebner, R. (2009): *The Current Status of Religious Coexistence and Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/11/current-status-religious-coexistence-and-education-bosnia-and-herzegovina (retrieving date: 2017-11-08), pp. 1-9.

101 see art. 14, Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities.

102 Compare ibid. art. 18.

103 compare ibid. arts. 9, 10, & 14.

ganisations may enjoy the benefits and privileges that are characteristic of non-profit organisations.

On the other hand, the state has assumed the responsibility of regulating pensions, disability, and health insurance, especially for religious servants, in an agreement with the churches. In the law it is also regulated that the state may provide material assistance for healthcare, educational, charitable, and social activities of churches and (other) religious organisations, but only on the condition that these services are provided without discrimination on any grounds[104].

The model of relations between the state and religious organisations used in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems rather optimal. It depends on the actual players in the field as to whether these relations have the same quality in practice. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, freedom of religion has increased, but religious intolerance, mostly combined with ethnic intolerance, is still dominant in many places.[105]

7.4 France

In former times, most of the French population belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. During the French Revolution (at the end of the eighteenth century), the privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church was successfully attacked. Many properties from the Roman Catholic Church were expropriated. The revolutionists were also suspicious of private organisations. Gatherings with twenty persons or more were forbidden. In the restoration period that followed, the Roman Catholic Church regained its properties and partly its position. The French state funded four official religions into the twentieth century: Roman Catholicism, Calvinism (Reformed Protestantism), Lutheran Protestantism, and Judaism.[106] These religions could be considered as having public law character. The state built churches, temples, synagogues, and other religious buildings from taxes levied on the entire population.

By the Law of 9 December 1905, however, separation between state and church in France was established.[107] This separation is taken seriously and is also formulated in the Constitution of the French Republic. According to Article 1 of the Constitution

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104 The general principle of non-discrimination is stated in Article II (4) of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. Citizens can complain about infringements on their human rights by government agencies at the Human Rights Ombudsman (Law on the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

105 Human Rights Watch (2017): *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Events of 2016*. URL: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/bosnia-and-herzegovina (2017-11-08).

106 See Tuffery-Andrieu, J.-M. (2015): Funding of Religious Activities in France 1790–1905. In Messner, F. (Ed.): *Public Funding of Religions in Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 99-108.

107 The law of 1905 formally ended the privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church (see Boyle & Sheen 1997: 295).

of 4 October 1958, France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic that ensures equality before the law of all citizens, irrespective of origin, race, or religion; it respects all beliefs. The 1905 law rules that the republic does not recognise, remunerate, or subsidise any religious denomination. This means, in the first place, that the state wants to treat all religious organisations in the same way. The state does not meddle into the affairs or internal organisation of religious organisations.

Ideologically, there is freedom of religion, but this freedom should be enjoyed in private. Religion has no place in the public realm, as this may cause discrimination. This principle of secularism, or *laïcité*[108], also prohibits public manifestations of religion, such as the wearing of scarves or veils.[109] Another symbol of the French government's fear of mixing religion with public activities is the fact that religious ministers are not allowed to be teachers in public secondary schools. There are other examples of anti-clericalism in France, as well.[110]

The law of 1905 dissolved the existing religious organisations of public law and expropriated their property and stated that religious organisations should be re-established as religious associations (*associations cultuelles*).[111] The law also allowed properties to be made available for free for religious use by *associations cultuelles*. Religious organisations may ask for approval of their articles of association from the Council of State in order to become legal persons as *associations cultuelles*. The Council of State may in turn judge that organisations do not have the purpose of exercising worship.[112]

For private associations in general, the first law after the French Revolution was the Law of 1 July 1901. According to Article 5 of this law, legal personality can be obtained by depositing an organisation's relevant documents at the office of the regional authority and by publishing its articles of association in the official gazette.

Religious organisations may use both types of associations. Religious associations (*associations cultuelles*) may have as their aim only the exercise of worship (*culte*) and not the performance of any other activities. The Catholic Church initially refused to use the religious association form in protest against the law of 1905. In 1924, however, France and the Holy See concluded an agreement in which France

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108 See Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 295.

109 Compare Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 298-300.

110 Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 132, 143-144.

111 See arts. 13 & 18, Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat [Law of 9 December 1905 Concerning the Separation of Churches and the State]. JO du 11 déc. 1905, p. 7205.

112 The decision taken by the Council of State regarding both the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Scientology (see Basdevant-Gaudemet & Messner 2007: 103). Interestingly, Robert (2003: 643) states: 'The principle of religious liberty precludes the operation of any type of distinction between religions, whether the religion is practiced by a 'cult' [sect] or by a traditional church.'

recognised the Catholic hierarchy and the Holy See recognised the secular character of the French state.

The other form of association (generally the so-called *association culturelle,* or cultural association) may be used for worship and for other activities. Muslim communities usually use the cultural association form, as this suits them better in relation to their activities.[113]

At the moment, roughly a quarter of the population are not members of a religious denomination. More than 60 per cent are Christian, 83 per cent of which are Roman Catholic and 14 per cent of which are Protestant. Around 7 to 9 per cent of the population are Muslim.[114]

The fact that the law of 1905 prevents the state from financing religion does not, however, prevent the state from providing religious organisations in the form of *associations cultuelle* with tax relief. Several Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Jehovah's Witnesses associations have tax-exempt status.[115] When religious organisations want to provide societal (public) services, they have to use the normal (cultural) association form. Associations may perform such activities when they have been recognised by the Council of State as being for public benefit. Only with this recognition may they provide services for the public. A condition is that services are provided to everyone without discrimination.[116] Associations recognised as being for the public benefit (*associations reconnues d'utilité publique*) enjoy tax benefits.

The French ideology of the rather strict separation of state and church (secularism) and of the necessity of assimilation of newcomers often creates tensions in society and between the state and religious groups. In practice, people do not leave their religious beliefs or life philosophies (identities) at home when they go out in public. In fact, the historical development of human rights has in France been accompanied by anti-papism and anti-religiousness. One speaks of public liberties instead of human liberties. Current French politics/policy can also be considered anti-Muslim.[117]

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113 Robert, J. (2003): Religious Liberty and French Secularism, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2003, no. 2, pp. 655ff.

114 Sawe, B. E. (2017): *Religious Demographics of France*. URL: http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-demographics-of-france.html (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

115 According to the US Department of State (2010), 109 Protestant associations, 15 Jewish associations, 100 Catholic associations, 30 Muslim associations, and more than 50 associations of the Jehovah's Witnesses have tax-free status. This last religious organisation has apparently had success in appealing the Council of State's decision that it is not a religion.

116 Compare Robert, J. (2003): Religious Liberty and French Secularism, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2003, no. 2, p. 641.; see regarding places of worship: Fornerod, A. (2012): The Places of Worship in France and the Public/Private Divide. In S. Ferrari and S. Pastorelli (Eds.): *Religion in Public Spaces. A European Perspective*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp 323-337.

117 See Dericquebourg, R. (2015): Religion and Human Rights in France. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective*. Cham: Springer International, pp. 31-44.

Apparently, the law on religious organisations does not suit Muslim organisations; there appear to be not enough mosques available and a lack of serious representatives.[118]

A fear of strange or foreign religious opinions is also characteristic of the French model. The state wants to protect its citizens from undesired influences that are against the public order. Since 1978, the need to fight 'sects' has been discussed in the French Parliament.[119] In 2001, a law against sects[120] came into force.[121] It remains a controversial law from the perspective of freedom of religion.

A different regime exists in Alsace-Moselle, the reason being that this region belonged to Germany when the law of 1905 was introduced in France. The regulation that was in force in Germany and therefore Alsace-Moselle at that time remained in force after the region became a part of France once again in 1918. In Alsace-Moselle, there are (recognised) churches of public law and churches of private law. Public law churches are the Roman Catholic Church, the Reformed and Lutheran churches, and the Jewish religion. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, no other churches have been recognised, and there is no procedure in place for recognition.[122] Private religious communities use the form of the normal association (from the local civil code), not the *association cultuelle* as in the rest of France. In this region, the state supports the recognised churches.[123]

118 Robert, J. (2003): Religious Liberty and French Secularism, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2003, no. 2, pp. 655ff.; Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 296-298.

119 See Ibid: 302; Robert, J. (2003): Religious Liberty and French Secularism, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2003, no. 2, pp. 655ff.; Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 647ff.; about the relation between the promotion of freedom of religion and the fight against sects, see Dericquebourg, R. (2015): Religion and Human Rights in France. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective*. Cham: Springer International, pp. 31-44.

120 Loi n° 2001-504 du 12 juin 2001 tendant à renforcer la prévention et la répression des mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentales [Law No. 2001-504 of 12 June 2001 to Strengthen the Prevention and Punishment of Sectarian Movements Violating Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]. JO, 2001-06-13, p. 9337.

121 See Basdevant-Gaudemet, F. and Messner, F. (2007): Entités religieuses comme personnes juridiques – France [Religious Entities as Legal Persons – France]. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 103.

122 Ibid: p. 105.

123 For more details, see Messner, F. (2015): Public Funding of Faiths According to Local Law in Alsace-Moselle. In F. Messner (Ed.): *Public Funding of Religions in Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 83-98.

7.5 Germany

Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Articles 4 and 140 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949. The connected right to religious education is regulated in Article 7 of the Basic Law.[124]

Article 140 of the 1949 Basic Law incorporates Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution *(Reichsverfassung)* of 11 August 1919. In Article 137(5) of the 1919 Constitution, it was determined that churches that were at that time corporations of public law could retain that status. This applied to Christian churches and to the Jewish community.[125] Article 137(5) also states that other religious communities can be granted the same status by the federal state in which they are located if they can guarantee durability by their constitution and by their number of members.[126] Special loyalty to the state is not required for this status.[127] Several smaller Christian churches as well as non-Christian communities are organised as public law corporations: the Baptist Church, the Anglican Church, Christian Science, the Mennonites, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, and also the Humanist community.

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124 According to Article 7 of the 1949 Basic Law, there is the right to religious education in public schools as well as the right to abstain from such, and additionally the right to establish private religious schools

125 The Weimar Constitution of 1919 explicitly stated in Article 137 that Germany has neither a state church nor established churches.

126 Regarding temporal durability, the requirement is in practice thirty years. There must be also a clear organisational structure and the number of members should be at least 0.1 per cent of the country's population. In its decision regarding the Bahá'í Faith, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht stated that strict criteria regarding numbers were not suitable (BVerwG [2002] 6 C 8.12).; compare Mückl, S. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Germany. In L. Friedner (Ed.) *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 109.; Strachwitz, R. G. (2009): Das Problem der Staatsbindung bei der Zuordnung der Kirchen zur Zivilgesellschaft [The Problem of State Ties for the Inclusion of Churches in Civil Society]. In A. Bauerkämper and J. Nautz (Eds.): *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge. Christliche Kirchen in den europäischen Zivilgesellschaften seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* [Between Welfare and Pastoral Care: Christian Churches in European Civilisations Since the 18th Century]. Frankfurt: Campus, pp. 7ff.

127 The Jehovah's Witnesses had been denied this status not because they did not believe in democracy but because they were deemed to be not loyal to the law, demonstrated by their refusal to accept blood transfusions and their coercive measures against members wanting to leave the organisation. However, since revising their practices regarding the latter concern, they have received public law status (see BVerfG [2000] 2 BvR 1500/97: 102, 370ff.; see also Puza 2001: 35-36, 46-50; compare Neuberger 1999: 72; see also Robbers 2001: 650-1; Boyle & Sheen 1997: 311-2).

In Germany, around 27 per cent of the population belong to the Protestant Church (*Evangelische Kirche*) and 29 per cent to the Roman Catholic Church. A quarter of the population are non-denominational, and roughly 5.5 per cent are Muslim.[128]

Being a religious organisation of public law creates certain advantages in Germany as regards employment law and tax law (*Kirchensteuer*) as well as the right to self-regulation.[129] Religious organisations of public law are not part of the state system; they have autonomy (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) and their own internal law (*Kirchenrecht*).[130] One of the rights connected with public law status is the parish right, i.e. the right of the church to oblige ipso jure all members living in a certain area.[131] A non-legal advantage is that they enjoy more societal recognition.

According to Article 137(4) of the 1919 Constitution, religious organisations can (normally) acquire legal personality through the provisions of civil law. This principle is, by Article 140 of the 1949 Basic Law, still valid. Practically, religious organisations become legal persons of private law – generally, associations – either when they do not want public recognition or when they do not meet the standards. For obtaining legal personality as an association, a religious organisation has to register with the court.[132] Muslim communities are mostly registered associations.[133]

In the 1990s, there was a serious debate about sects and how to fight them. This did not, however, lead to legislation in this area, unlike in Belgium and France.[134]

Generally, religious organisations registered as associations have to follow the civil law on associations, but the federal court has decided several times that the civil

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128 REMID (2017): *Religionen & Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften in Deutschland. Mitgliederzahlen*. URL: http://www.remid.de/info_zahlen/ (retrieving date: 2017-11-08); compare Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 309.

129 Mückl, S. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Germany. In L. Friedner (Ed.) *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 112.

130 Strachwitz, R. G. (2009): Das Problem der Staatsbindung bei der Zuordnung der Kirchen zur Zivilgesellschaft [The Problem of State Ties for the Inclusion of Churches in Civil Society]. In A. Bauerkämper and J. Nautz (Eds.): *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge. Christliche Kirchen in den europäischen Zivilgesellschaften seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* [Between Welfare and Pastoral Care: Christian Churches in European Civilisations Since the 18th Century]. Frankfurt: Campus, p. 8.; Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 116, footnotes 21-22.

131 for other advantages, see Mückl, S. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Germany. In L. Friedner (Ed.) *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 112-113.

132 Sec. 21, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] vom 18.08.1896, RGBl. S. 195.

133 Governments conclude contracts with councils of Muslim communities and other Islamic associations about cultural rights, integration, and the use of land for places of worship. The most important aspect is that both parties express their wishes to cooperate and to solve problems together.

134 There is a great deal of hostility on the part of German authorities against the Church of Scientology; they deny its religious character and therewith any tax relief (see Boyle & Sheen 1997: 312-4).; about the sect debate, see Robbers, G. (2001): Religious Freedom in Germany, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2001, no. 2, pp. 659-663.

code has to be interpreted in a manner compatible with the religious needs of that (religious) association. For instance, they exempted the Bahá'í Faith from the need to have a management board in every local branch.[135]

One may question if it is (still) legitimate that religious organisations of public law have advantages in certain areas over religious organisations of private law.[136] The equal treatment principle is, in Article 3 of the Basic Law of 1949, explicitly formulated for human beings. Indirectly, this includes the equal treatment of religions. A practical interpretation of this principle regarding religious organisation is: "Equal treatment of religion does not require identical, but adequate and proportional rights for all religions".[137]

Both religious organisations of public law and those of private law may provide public services. They may also receive subsidies from the government for this, on the condition that they deliver services without discrimination. In the field of social welfare, a Protestant organisation (Diakonisches Werk) and a Roman Catholic organisation (Caritas) maintain also legally prominent positions.

It seems that for the provision of pastoral care to military personnel, the state has only contracted with the Protestant Church. This seems contrary to the general stance that contracts are concluded with several religious organisations, including those of public law as well as those of private law character.[138]

In various areas of societal activity, representatives of religious organisations hold seats on advisory boards and committees.[139]

7.6 Greece

Article 13 of the Constitution of Greece of 2001 recognises freedom of religion and conscience. Its interpretation has, however, been rather limited; there have been several cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has criticised Greece regarding

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135 Ibid: p. 647.

136 Strachwitz, R. G. (2009): Das Problem der Staatsbindung bei der Zuordnung der Kirchen zur Zivilgesellschaft [The Problem of State Ties for the Inclusion of Churches in Civil Society]. In A. Bauerkämper and J. Nautz (Eds.): *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge. Christliche Kirchen in den europäischen Zivilgesellschaften seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* [Between Welfare and Pastoral Care: Christian Churches in European Civilisations Since the 18th Century]. Frankfurt: Campus, p. 8.; Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-9, 15-16.

137 Robbers, G. (2001): Religious Freedom in Germany, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2001, no. 2, p. 667.

138 Schnabel, P.R. (2007): About the relationship between state and religion, Berlin, p. 5.

139 Robbers, G. (2001): Religious Freedom in Germany, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2001, no. 2, p. 666.

restriction of religious freedom.[140] Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the state's neutrality regarding religion. Every 'known' religion is free to be practised.[141] Proselytising is, however, a criminal act.[142]

In Greece, the Greek Orthodox Church is the state church. Ninety-five per cent of the population have been baptised in this church. Around 1 per cent is a member of other Christian religious organisations, and 1 per cent is Muslim. Some 3 per cent consider themselves non-religious.[143]

Not all religious organisations have the same legal status. In Article 3 of the Constitution of 2001[144], it is stated that the Greek Orthodox Church is the prevailing religion and a self-governing church. In the relation between the state and the church, the latter seems to occupy a strong position. There is not much control from the state's side. The highest authority in the church is its own holy synod of bishops. The charter of the Greek Orthodox Church is approved by the Hellenic Parliament, but its holy canons may not be changed by the Parliament; matters of liturgy and doctrine are matters for the church alone.[145] The Greek Orthodox Church enjoys many privileges at the government's expense, including payment of salaries and for religious training of clergy, financing for building maintenance, exemption from tax, and the provision of religious instruction in primary and secondary schools.

There are other recognised, but unregistered, religions with public law status: the Roman Catholic Church (since the London Protocol of 1830)[146], Jewish communities (since Law 2456/1920), and the muftis' offices for the Muslim minority in the Thrace region.[147] They enjoy as such legal personality.

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140 See for example *Kokkinakis v. Greece*, App No 14307/88, [1993] ECHR 20, (1994) 17 EHRR 397.; *Canea Catholic Church v. Greece*, App No 25528/94, [1997] ECHR 1997-VIII, (1999) 27 EHRR 521.

141 'Known' religion means a religion that does not require initiation, whose doctrines are authentic, and whose worship takes place in public (see Boyle & Sheen 1997: 333).

142 The Greek National Commission for Human Rights, which maintains a consultative status in relation to the state, has proposed to repeal this rule (see Maghioros & Tsironis 2015: 89).; see art. 13(2), The Constitution of Greece as Revised by the Parliamentary Resolution of April 6th 2001 of the VIIth Revisionary Parliament [official English translation, 2004]. URL: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gr/gr220en.pdf.; about the history and meaning of this rule, see Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 334-335.

143 See Papadopoulou, L. T. (2014): *Law and Religion in Greece*. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract =2509449 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

144 This position of the Greek Orthodox Church also existed in earlier Constitutions (see Maghioros & Tsironis 2015: 86-7).

145 Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 125.

146 According to Konidaris (2007), the Roman Catholic Church has a private law character.

147 under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, in 1923; see Papadopoulou, L. T. (2014): *Law and Religion in Greece*. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509449 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

By law, the government appoints all three muftis of Thrace in consultation with a committee of Muslim leaders.[148] The muftis are financed by the state.[149] The Muslim minority in Thrace has since the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 the right to maintain social and charitable organisations (*waqfs*). In this region, Sharia is recognised, and muftis hold judicial power in family and civil matters.[150] Muslims outside the area do not receive these rights. Not all Muslims accept this situation; some have appointed their own muftis, but these are not paid by the government and may not perform official weddings.[151]

The other religious entities in Greece have a private law character. In 2014, Law 4301/14: Organisation of the Legal Form of Religious Communities and Their Associations, applicable to religious organisations other than the Greek Orthodox Church, the Jewish religious community, and the Muslim communities in the muftis' territory, went into effect.[152] With this law, it seems that freedom of religion is available to more religious organisations. These other groups can request registration in the special public register of their communities as legal persons at the courts of first instance of their seats.[153] The court must acknowledge the confession of a community as a 'known religion'.[154] The interpretation of 'known religion' is under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights to be broader than a religion being known by the public; the current interpretation of the Greek courts is that the religion has no hidden beliefs but only clear creeds and that its worship is free and accessible to everyone. There are rather specific conditions regarding the registration form and the statutes.[155] Religious communities receive in this way legal personality of civil law. The Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs keeps an electronic register of all religious organisations and ministers.[156] Before this law, there were serious obstacles, including

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148 See Papadopoulou, L. T. (2014): *Law and Religion in Greece*., p. 14. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509449 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08)

149 See ibid.: p. 17.

150 This has been disputed by the National Commission for Human Rights and by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights because it represses women.

151 US Department of State (2011): *July-December 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom. Greece*. URL: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168314.htm (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

152 Ibid.: art. 16.

153 Ibid.: art. 2.; In Article 13 of this law, the Roman Catholic Church and many other religious organisations that existed in 2014 are recognised; they do not have to follow the procedure of Article 2 of the 2014 law.

154 Ibid.: art. 1.; Until 2014, the Church of Scientology, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (the Hare Krishnas), and the Bahá'í Faith could not obtain legal personality as religious organisations, only as civil associations. Having a place of worship is not enough to be registered as a religious entity.

155 See Ibid.: art. 3ff.; For instance, Article 8 of Law 4301/2014 states that the religious minister has a prominent role; in fact, the administrative board (if present) may not convene without this minister.

156 Ibid.: art. 14.

necessary approval by Greek Orthodox and governmental authorities, for non-Orthodox and non-preferred religious organisations to establish places of worship and to carry out religious ceremonies.[157] These obstacles are no longer present when a religious organisation is registered, except regarding the establishment of a place of worship.[158]

When a religious organisation is not registered as such, it can operate as a legal person in the form of a civil law association or foundation.

It is clear that religious organisations in Greece in fact are not treated equally by the state.[159] The rights that the Greek Orthodox Church enjoys, or the rights of the preferred religious organisations are not routinely extended to other religious groups. Some of the other religious organisations of public and private law have attempted to receive treatment equal to that of the Greek Orthodox Church regarding tax benefits, but without success.[160]

7.7 Israel

Israel was established as a state in 1948 to provide a safe home for the Jewish people. In 2015, 75 per cent of the population were Jewish (ranging from Orthodox to secular).[161]

Israel has no constitution but basic laws. The Basic Laws of Israel together with, inter alia, decisions of its Supreme Court recognise and protect freedom of religion. Protection of freedom of religion and protection of holy places as well as prohibition of discrimination on religious ground were included in the British Mandate for Palestine and the Palestine Order in Council, both of 1922.[162] In the Declaration of the Es-

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157 See Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 336-337.; Konidaris, I. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Greece. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 116-117.

158 Registered religious organisations have to request permission for the establishment of prayer houses from the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs. Apparently, this process takes a very long time, for example, in the case of Muslim communities in Athens (see Maghioros & Tsironis 2015: 90).

159 In the observation of Papadopoulou (2014: 4) there is no problem with equality in Greek law and practice.

160 See Papageorgiou, K. (2011): Greece. In M. Hill (Ed.): *Religion and Discrimination Law in the European Union – La discrimination en matière religieuse dans l'Union Européenne*. Trier: European Consortium for Church and State Relations, pp. 165-168.

161 Central Bureau of Statistics (2016): *Population, by Religion*. URL: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton_e.html?num_tab=st02_02&CYear=2016 (retrieving date: 08/11/2017).

162 See Shetreet, S. (2007): The Model of State and Church Relations and Its impact on the Protection of Freedom of Conscience and Religion. A Comparative analysis and a Case Study of Israel. In W.

tablishment of the State of Israel of 1948, this was promulgated. In the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, freedom of religion is implicitly recognised, and human dignity is explicitly protected. In this context, freedom of religion is interpreted as being included.[163]

Israel has not ratified the UDHR or the ICCPR[164], but Israeli courts state that Israel, as a democratic and enlightened country, adheres to these principles.[165] Although equality seems to be part of the legal system, for Arabs, it apparently does not apply.[166] This is closely linked to the unresolved conflict and longstanding tensions between the Israeli and the Palestinian people.

In Article 1 of the Basic Law of 1992, the country is defined as a "Jewish and democratic state". This suggests that Jewish people can find a home there. The Jewish people have common religious roots, but a Jewish state does not mean a state based on the Jewish faith. There is no Jewish state 'church', and officially the (Orthodox) Jewish religion (religious organisation) is not a preferred religion.[167]

In its legal accommodation of non-Jewish communities, the state of Israel relies on the practices of the Ottoman Empire and the British administration.[168] According to this system, religious communities have to request from the government recognition in order to use their own family law and to maintain their own jurisdiction.[169] Five religions, all belonging to the Abrahamic family, are state recognised: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Druzeism, and the Bahá'í Faith. Several Christian denominations have been recognised in the course of time, including Roman Catholicism,[170] Anglicanism, many churches from the Middle East, and a union of Protestant churches. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics[171], the country's population in 2015 was roughly 75 per cent Jewish, 18 per cent Muslim, 2 per cent Christian, and 1.6 per cent Druze, with the remaining roughly 4 per cent not classified by religion.

Brugger and M. Karayanni (Eds.): *Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American and International Law*. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 124ff.

163 Ibid.

164 Israel has been a member of the United Nations since 1949.

165 Mautner, M. (2011): *Law and the Culture of Israel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 75ff.

166 Heins, V. (2012): Three Meanings of Equality: The 'Arab Problem' in Israel, *Res Publica*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 79-91.

167 Lerner, N. (2013): Religion and the Basic Legislation in Israel. In Durham, W. C., Jr, Ferrari, S., Cianitto, C., Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 161ff.

168 Under these regimes, the recognised communities' system was followed (Lerner 2013: 163). During the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim communities gained semi-autonomous status as *millets* (see Boyle & Sheen 1997: 387-8).

169 Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 440-441.

170 There is a concordat between Israel and the Holy See.

171 Central Bureau of Statistics (2016): *Population, by Religion*. URL: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton_e.html?num_tab=st02_02&CYear=2016 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08)

Both being Jewish and belonging to one of the recognised non-Jewish religions have legal effects. All Jewish citizens, irrespective of their beliefs or lack thereof, are regulated by family law that is inspired by Judaism. Whether this is legitimate is heavily debated.[172] Regarding family law, freedom of religion is more available to members of non-Jewish communities than to members of Jewish communities[173], as the former are governed by their own rules. Secular Jewish people have freedom of religion but no freedom from religion.[174]

The state recognises the jurisdiction of the rabbinic courts over all Jewish inhabitants in personal matters.[175] Jewish citizens have the choice of whether to bring cases to religious or to secular courts. This decision may lead to different results. For instance, religious courts do not accept equal rights for women, although the Israeli Supreme Court has stated that, on the basis of law, woman should be treated equally.[176] The Supreme Court reviews the application of civil (secular) law as well as the application of religious law by secular and religious courts.[177]

The state subsidises religious organisations. The Ministry of Religious Affairs allocates most of this budget to ultra-Orthodox educational and cultural activities. Smaller amounts of money are also given to synagogues and mosques, to the Chief Rabbinate, to religious courts, and for the development of cemeteries for all religions. Originally, there were no norms according to which the state should distribute subsidies. In 1985, specific criteria and the principle of equal treatment were introduced through the Budget Foundations Law 5745-1985, but the Ministry of Religious Affairs still decides, according to its own wishes, in favour of certain religious institutions. It

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172 Neuberger (1999: 77ff.) states that certain characteristics of Israel's legal system do not comply with liberal democratic norms, inter alia the ECHR.

173 Lerner, N. (2013): Religion and the Basic Legislation in Israel. In Durham, W. C., Jr, Ferrari, S., Cianitto, C., Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 162.

174 Compare Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 438.

175 The same is true regarding jurisdictions of other recognised religious organisations.; Lerner, N. (2013): Religion and the Basic Legislation in Israel. In Durham, W. C., Jr, Ferrari, S., Cianitto, C., Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 164.

176 Shetreet, S. (2007): The Model of State and Church Relations and Its impact on the Protection of Freedom of Conscience and Religion. A Comparative analysis and a Case Study of Israel. In W. Brugger and M. Karayanni (Eds.): *Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American and International Law*. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 130-140.

177 Lerner, N. (2013): Religion and the Basic Legislation in Israel. In Durham, W. C., Jr, Ferrari, S., Cianitto, C., Thayer, D. (Eds.): *Law, Religion, Constitution. Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law*. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 164.

can still support 'preferred' institutions, motivated by political considerations under the disguise of legal equal criteria.[178]

Recognition of a religious organisation is not required for practicing the concerned religion as such. Members of non-recognised religions are free to practice their religions.

The Jewish state character does not prevent non-Jewish religious and (other) voluntary organisations from being active in society.[179] They are free to do so as long as they respect Israeli law.

The Israeli situation seems to be accurately described as, however, lacking "a clear constitutionally guaranteed system in the state-religion relationship, not only for Orthodox and secular Jews but for all religions and denominations, as well as non-believers".[180]

7.8 Italy

In the Constitution of the Italian Republic of 1947, the principles of religious freedom and equality are introduced. According to Article 8 of the Constitution, religious organisations in general have equal freedom before the law. However, the Roman Catholic Church has a special position. This position, including legal personality, is laid down in Article 7 of the Constitution.[181] The Roman Catholic Church is not a state church, but it is still a preferred church. The state and the Roman Catholic Church are each within their own ambit independent and sovereign.[182] The Roman Catholic Church's relations with the state are regulated by the Lateran Pacts and any amendments agreed by both parties. Relations between other religious organisations and the state are regulated by law and based on agreements with their respective representatives.

Most of the Italian population are Roman Catholic, with small minorities belonging to Muslim and Protestant communities. Historically, the state and the Roman Catholic Church have cooperated in different areas of society.[183]

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178 Shetreet, S. (n.d.): *Human Rights in Israel: Freedom of Religion*. URL: http://www.jewishvirtual library.org/freedom-of-religion-in-israel (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

179 This applies to Lutherans, Baptists, and Quakers (Lerner 2013: 164).

180 Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 435.

181 It has this position based on the Lateran Pacts (concordat with the Holy See) of 1929 and its successors (recently, the concordat of Villa Madama of 1984).; Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39, 93.; Ferrari, S. (1995): The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe: The Italian Model, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 1995, no. 2, pp. 428.

182 Ibid.

183 Ferrari (1995: 425) states that the prevailing trend toward a strictly defined cooperation between the state and the churches has been tempered by the principles of religious liberty and equality.

For religious organisations that are not Roman Catholic, there are three levels on which they may operate. The highest level is when a religious organisation has, on a voluntary basis, concluded a bilateral agreement with the state. By this, the state can specify the relation with the concerned religious organisation.[184] Generally, it allows for tax relief and for the possibility to appoint pastors or their equivalents for penal institutions and military personnel, as well as the possibility to provide religious education in public schools. It may also include state support for the religious organisation's social and healthcare activities. In 2007, there were six recognised religious organisations that had concluded such agreements.[185] Recognised religious organisations with an agreement with the state have, like the Roman Catholic Church, public law status.[186]

The state seems to have rather discretionary power in relation to these agreements, which leads to discrimination between the religious organisations.[187] For instance, regarding the content of the agreements, one can observe that Muslims and the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot benefit from state collected taxes or the deduction of church donations from members' income taxes.[188] Religious education in primary and secondary schools that is provided by the Roman Catholic Church is subsidised, while religious education provided by the other religious organisations with agreements with the state do not receive financial support from the government.

Religious organisations that want to conclude such agreements with the state first need to be recognised as such. This is the middle level on which organisations may operate. Based on Law 24 June 1929, No. 1159 on 'admitted cults', religious organisations may apply for recognition. An organisation must show that it is truly a religious group with a minimum of organisation. Rituals were for a long time one criterion for the courts, but since a decision of the Council of State in 1989 regarding the Buddhist Union, this characteristic is no longer necessary.[189] Recognition leads to legal personality (of a private law character) of the central office of a religious organisation, not of the organisation itself.[190] It provides certain tax advantages but also in-

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184 The agreement can only be amended when both parties agree.

185 The Waldensians, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, the Assemblies of God, the Jewish community, the Baptists, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Pending in 2007 were the applications of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Italian Buddhist Union (see Ferrari 2007: 145).

186 There is a limited agreement with the Islamic Cultural Center in Rome (see US Department of State 2013).

187 Ferrari, S. (1995): The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe: The Italian Model, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 1995, no. 2, p. 433.

188 Ferrari, S. (2007): Entités religieuses comme personnes juridiques – Italie [Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Italy]. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 143ff.

189 See ibid. p. 144.

190 See ibid. p. 143.

volves state supervision of transactions regarding property used for religious purposes.

The lowest level on which organisations may operate is occupied by religious organisations that do not meet the criteria or that do not want governmental supervision. They can operate in the form of an approved or not approved association of civil law.[191] They enjoy the freedom of religion as stated in Article 8 of the Constitution, and their ministers may, when registered, conclude marriages.[192] Both religious and non-religious organisations may provide public services in society.

7.9 The Netherlands

Since the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 11 October 1848, there has been freedom of religion in the Netherlands (and not only, as before, for religious organisations that were already present in the country). According to the law regarding the supervision of *kerkgenootschappen* (the Law on Church Societies), religious organisations were free to operate but had to submit their 'statutes' to the Ministry (originally Department) of Justice, which maintained a list of registered church societies.[193] The Ministry exercised no control over this. According to the Civil Code of 1838, organisations allowed in the country had legal personality. The Netherlands has neither a state church nor preferred religious organisations[194]. It also does not have a recognition procedure for religious organisations. The law provides a specific legal person form of *kerkgenootschap* (church society) for religious organisations without conditions.

Until 1983, the state maintained financial relations with certain religious organisations (although on a small scale). In the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 19 January 1983, separation of state and religious organisations was formalised, and the financial relations were ended. In Article 6 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1983, freedom of religion was extended to non-reli-

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191 Ibid. p. 140.; Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 96.
192 In Italy, religious ministers, when registered, can conclude (religious and) civil marriages. Ministers from non-recognised religious organisations in the form of associations can also be registered to obtain this competence (see Ferrari 2007: 142).
193 Van der Ploeg, T. J. (2009): Registratie van kerkgenootschappen en de vrijheid van godsdienst in historischen rechtsvergelijkend perspectief [Registration of Church Societies and Freedom of Religion in Historical and Comparative Perspective], *NTKR, Tijdschrift voor Recht en Religie*, no. 2009/3, pp. 28-40.
194 Until the Batavian Republic of 1795, the Dutch Reformed Church was a preferred church in the republic. In the beginning of his reign, from 1814 onwards, King Willem I regulated—also as public law—the church regulations of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Dutch Israelites (the Jewish community), and the Lutheran Church in the Netherlands.

gious belief systems. The principle of equal treatment was also introduced in the Constitution of 1983, in Article 1.

An interesting example of the state bestowing equal rights to religious organisations is the practice of providing pastoral care for military personnel. This process was initiated with a report in 1983 and ended successfully in 1988 with a solution in which six denominations (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and the Humanist Movement) obtained proportional rights to provide pastoral care financed by the government.[195]

Since the mid-twentieth century, the Netherlands has been strongly secularised. At present, around 50 per cent of the population have no connection with a religious organisation. Nearly a quarter of the population belong to the Roman Catholic Church, and around one-fifth belong to Protestant (reformed) churches. Roughly 5 per cent are Muslim, and there is a small Jewish community.[196]

Legal personality of religious organisations (*kerkgenootschappen*) had for a long time been accepted by case law.[197] There were no formal requirements, and the material requirements were a matter for the court (and for the legal literature). The literature's analysis is that in order for there to be a *kerkgenootschap*, there should be a permanent union of persons with the purpose of jointly worshipping God on the basis of common religious ideas.[198] Later, another element was added; the organisation should have the intention to be an independent church society and not a division of an existing church society.[199] In 1976, when Civil Code Book 2, about legal persons, came into force, the *kerkgenootschap* became regulated in Article 2(2), fixing case law.

195 See Waardenburg, J. (1983): *Religieuze voorzieningen voor etnische minderheden in Nederland. Rapport tevens beleidsadvies van de niet-ambtelijke werkgroep ad hoc* [Religious Provisions for Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands. Report and Policy Advice from the Non-governmental Ad Hoc Working Group]. Rijswijk: Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur.; Commissie van advies inzake de criteria voor steunverlening aan kerkgenootschappen en andere genootschappen op geestelijke grondslag (1988): *Overheid, godsdienst en levensovertuiging. Eindrapport van de Commissie van advies inzake de criteria voor steunverlening aan kerkgenootschappen en andere genootschappen op geestelijke grondslag* [Government, Religion and Non-religious Belief Systems. Final Report of the Advisory Commission for Governmental Support for Churches and Other Societies on a Spiritual Basis]. The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Stafafdeling Constitutionele Zaken en Wetgeving.
196 Schmeets, H. (2016): *De religieuze kaart van Nederland, 2010-2015* [The Religious Map of the Netherlands, 2010-2015]. The Hague: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
197 See van der Ploeg, T. J. (2008b): De overheid en de rechtspersoonlijkheid van kerkgenootschappen [Government and the Legal Personality of Church Societies], *NTKR, Tijdschrift voor Recht en Religie*, no. 2008/1, pp. 79-95.
198 Duynstee, W. J. A. J. (1935): *Praeadviezen over het rechtskarakter en de vertegenwoordiging van kerkgenootschappen en kerkelijke instellingen* [Pre-advice on the Legal Character and Representation of Church Societies and Church Institutions]. The Hague: Belinfante-Schinkel, p. 15.
199 Maeijer, J. M. M. (1997): *Mr. C. Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. 2. Vertegenwoordiging en rechtspersoon. Deel II. De Rechtspersoon*, 8th ed. Deventer: Kluwer, no. 205ff.

Article 2(2) also regulates that autonomous subdivisions (like parishes) of church societies and bodies in which church societies are united (in the case of a federal type of church) have legal personality. The law has not, however, fixed the material criteria for being a *kerkgenootschap*. This is left to the courts. Most important is that a religious organisation explicitly wants to use this form.[200]

Registration has never been a requirement to become a legal person as a church society. The duty to submit statutes ended in 1988 as the law of 1853 on *kerkgenootschappen* was repealed as being obsolete. However, since 2007, church societies have had to register in the trade register.[201] This duty is, however, rather limited. Neither church regulations nor the board members of church communities are registered. Not all church societies and autonomous subdivisions have to be registered – only the legal persons on the highest level of the church organisation. Nevertheless, the trade register has an important function. In this way, (new) religious communities, which may be uncertain as to whether they may operate as church societies (and legal persons) without any official recognition or registration, can feel more certain about this.

Although according to most scholars, the legal form of 'church society' is available for all religious organisations, not all religious organisations use this form. For non-Christian religious organisations, the term itself sounds too Christian. For new Christian groups, it sounds too established. The lack of registration also made it problematic to perform legal and financial transactions when religious organisations would operate as an unknown church society. Quite a few religious organisations have, therefore, chosen to establish associations or foundations and to obtain in this way legal personality. For this, a notarial deed is necessary, and the association or foundation must be registered (extensively) with the trade register.[202]

An intensive cooperation between the state, local governments, and private organisations in all sorts of societal areas has developed in the Netherlands since the beginning of the twentieth century.[203] By that time, private organisations had begun to be segmented according to religion and/or ideology, such as Roman Catholic,

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200 The legitimacy of this choice may be denied by the court.

201 Art 6 para. 3, Laying Down Rules on a Basic Register of Companies and Legal Entities (Trade Register Law 2007)], *Stb.* 2007, 153.; Art. 18, Concerning the Adoption of a New Trade Register Decree (Trade Register Decree 2008)], *Stb.* 2008, 240.

202 Arts. 2 para. 26ff. & 2 para. 285, Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 2 (1976) [Civil Code Book 2 (1976)], *Stb.* 1976, 342.

203 See Burger, A. (2001): *Verzuiling en verzorgingsstaat. De non-profitsector in historisch-theoretisch perspectief* [Pillarisation and the Welfare State. The Non-profit Sector in Historical-Theoretical Perspective]. In A. Burger and P. Dekker (Eds.): *Noch markt, noch staat. De Nederlandse non-profitsector in vergelijkend perspectief* [Neither Market nor State. The Dutch Non-profit Sector in Comparative Perspective]. The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, p. 87.

Protestant, socialist, liberal, and so on.[204] In the Protestant pillar of society, churches were generally more indirectly involved, while in the Catholic pillar, the role of the church was stronger.

There is a long tradition in several areas of society in which the state takes responsibility for subsidising and planning while allowing civil society organisations to provide public services. Religious organisations may also apply for subsidies on the same conditions. The services that are provided should be provided to all, without discriminating by religion. According to the equal treatment principle, the state should give the same chances to religious organisations as to secular organisations.[205] Subsidising has had significant impacts on the organisations involved, as this may lead to dependency on the state.

Unlike in France, the state does not keep religion away from the public realm.[206] At the local level, relations between the government and religious organisations are mostly good.[207]

Religious organisations are not treated differently by the government when they do not have the form of a church society. The public and most civil servants are not aware of the legal form when they have contact with a religious organisation. In colloquial speech, all religious organisations are called church societies, regardless of their legal form.

Tax relief for religious organisations is generally equal to those of private public benefit organisations. On some points, they do receive special treatment.

7.10 Poland

The Roman Catholic Church is very important in Poland, not only because of its membership but also because of its principal role in building Polish national identity in the absence of state institutions during the period of partitions in the nineteenth century. Its position was further strengthened during the communist era after the Second World War, as it was a stronghold for those who wanted to escape the oppression of the political system.[208]

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204 See Lijphart, A. J. (1968): *The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
205 Equal treatment is not always interpreted in the same way; compare the contributions on equality in Dijkman 2011.
206 There are, however, tendencies in national politics that go in the direction of *laïcité*.
207 The Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (2009) issued a very positive report on the possibilities for good relations and for support from municipalities for religious communities.
208 Zielińska, K. (2015): The Roman Catholic Church and Human Rights in Poland. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective*. Cham: Springer International, p. 141.

Nearly 90 per cent of the Polish population (approximately 33 million people) adhere to the Roman Catholic Church. Other religious organisations are in comparison very small. Orthodox churches have 506,000 members, the Protestant churches have 130,000, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have 121,000.[209]

Freedom of religion as well as of conscience is guaranteed in Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997. In the Constitution, the Roman Catholic Church has a special position,[210] but it is neither a state church nor a legal person of public law.[211] Relations between the Polish state and the Holy See (Roman Catholic Church) are regulated in a concordat and ratified in a statute. Relations between the state and other religious organisations are also regulated by statutes, pursuant to agreements between the two sides.[212] In reality, it seems that several statutes have been passed without agreements having been signed with (other) religious organisations.[213] The legal personality of a religious organisation has no effect on the legal status of its dioceses, parishes, and other church entities, unless this has been explicitly included in the concerned law or assigned to them by the Ministry of Interior and Administration upon request of the religious organisation.[214]

The legal recognition of a religious organisation guarantees the group some privileges, including, among others, the duty-free importation of office equipment, reduced taxes, and the right to organise religious education in schools. In Article 53(4) of the Constitution, it is formulated: "The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organisation may be taught in schools." The state finances specifically Roman Catholic religious teachers in private and public schools.

According to Article 25 of the Constitution, religious organisations shall have equal rights. This seems to be only in theory when considering the position of the Roman Catholic Church.

Religious organisations that are not in the position to conclude agreements with the state may, since the introduction of the Act of 17 May 1989 on the Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion – the executive act of Article 25 of the Constitu-

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209 Central Statistical Office of Poland. (2016): *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2016*. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, pp. 96, 115-116.

210 The Catholic Church received this special position in the Constitution of 1921. The first concordat with the Holy See was signed in 1925, renewed in 1993, and ratified in 1998 (see Doe 2011: 37; see for more detail Krukowski 2014).

211 In the concordat between Poland and the Holy See, the legal personality of the Roman Catholic Church is recognised (compare Rynkowski 2007: 177, 180).

212 Compare art. 25, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997], (1997 r. DUD Nr 78, poz. 483).

213 Rynkowski (2002: 281) states that no such agreements have been concluded, although several statutes have been passed by Parliament (compare Doe 2011: 96; Zielińska 2003).

214 However, in the concordat with the Holy See, possible legal entities according to canon law are included.; Rynkowski, M. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – Poland. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 180-181.

tion – register as such at the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. The conditions for registration are mentioned in this act,[215] as well as the status, rights, and duties that result from registration.

Registration is not required for religious organisations; they may function freely without registration.[216] After 1990, many new religious movements appeared in the country. They were considered to be sects and had problems finding places of worship to rent. Roman Catholic Church representatives promoted intolerance against these religions instead of tolerance.[217]

As such, the Polish government wants to cooperate with religious organisations, in practice especially with the Roman Catholic Church[218]. In areas where religious organisations are traditionally active, such as healthcare and education, organisations will be treated like other (voluntary) organisations operating in these areas. It seems that religious organisations (the Roman Catholic Church) and civil society organisations act separately in society.[219]

7.11 Sweden

Until 2000, Sweden had a state church constitutionally:[220] the Church of Sweden, an Evangelical Lutheran church. Then, by the Church of Sweden Act of 1998, the Church

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215 The organisation should have a minimum of 100 Polish citizens as members (increased in 1998 from fifteen); should provide information about its religious life and activities; and should submit the address of its headquarters, the addresses of its members of management, and its statutes (arts. 30-4, Act of 17 May 1989; see also Rynkowski 2007: 178-9; Zielínska 2003; Doe 2011: 102ff).

216 Non-recognised religious organisations can obtain legal personality as associations but not as foundations, as organisations in the latter form have to fulfil socially or economically useful purposes (see Kurczewski 1997: 247-8).; Zielińska, K. (2003): Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Poland. Myth or Reality? Paper Presented to CESNUR 2003 International Conference, Vilnius, 9-12 April 2003.

217 See for instance US Department of State (2015): *International Religious Freedom Report for 2015. Poland.* URL: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=256 229 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08); see also Zielińska, K. (2003): Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Poland. Myth or Reality? Paper Presented to CESNUR 2003 International Conference, Vilnius, 9-12 April 2003, pp. 143-144.

218 About the problematic relation between the church and democracy and human rights, especially freedom of religion and women's rights, see Zielińska, K. (2015): The Roman Catholic Church and Human Rights in Poland. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective.* Cham: Springer International, pp. 137-149.

219 Mariański, J. (2008): The Roman Catholic Church in Poland and Civil Society: Contradiction or Complementarity?, *Religious Studies and Theology*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 21-42.

220 From 1951 onwards, the monopoly of the Church of Sweden slowly eroded (see Sjöborg 2015: 174).

was formally separated from the state. The Church has, however, retained a special position in some aspects.[221]

Sweden is a secularised country.[222] Membership in the Church of Sweden has diminished from more than 90 per cent of the population in 1975 to less than two-thirds nowadays. Due to immigration, Muslims make up around 5 per cent of the population. Other minorities are formed by members of free church movements (Baptist, Pentecostal), members of the Roman Catholic Church, and members of the Eastern Orthodox Church.[223]

When the Act on Religious Communities of 1998, by which the Lutheran Church of Sweden became a registered church, came into force, other existing religious organisations were also invited to use become registered as a religious community (*trossamfund)* and thereby to obtain legal personality.[224] The law established objective requirements for receiving this registration.[225] One is that the religious organisation must organise religious services.[226] Another requirement for receiving this status is that the applying religious organisation has to already be a legal person as a not-for-profit association. Apart from public recognition as a registered religious person, this status has the advantage that religious organisations can apply to use the state tax system to collect contributions from members. Religious organisations may also receive state subsidies, but on historical grounds, quite a few religious organisations receive subsidies from the state without being registered.[227]

Religious organisations can without any problems operate in civil law forms such as associations or foundations in order to function in society.

Religious organisations in any form may be active in society – for example, by providing services in the areas of health, education, and care for the elderly – in the same ways as secular civil society organisations with a public benefit purpose. In Sweden, most public services have been historically provided by the state. A general

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221 The Church of Sweden still has, for instance, certain rights regarding taxes and religious education. Also, members of the royal family must be of Lutheran faith to have rights to succession (see Act of Succession).

222 About this secularisation, see Ekenberg, A. (2016): The Church in Sweden: Secularisation and Ecumenism as Challenges, *Polonia Sacra*, vol. 20, no. 2(43), pp. 23-45.

223 Compare US Department of State (2009): *International Religious Freedom Report 2009. Sweden.* URL: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127339.htm (retrieving date: 2017-11-08).

224 Art. 5, Lag (1998:1593) om trossamfund [Act on Religious Communities].; According to Friedner (2007: 217-8), the organisation receives the form of registered religious person. How this conversion works is not, however, clear to me.

225 Requirements are written statutes and clear internal structures (not necessarily democratic) (see Doe 2011: 106).

226 Humanist organisations are therefore not accepted (see Friedner 2007: 218).

227 Friedner (2007: 219) states: 'A religious organisation that wants to use the state's tax collection system receives less direct subsidies.'

rule for providing services to the public is that services should be available to everyone without discrimination, including that on religious grounds.

7.12 Turkey

Since 1924, Turkey has been a secular state, according to Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. In Article 24 of the Constitution, freedom of religion and worship is guaranteed. The same article forbids the use of this right to threaten the constitutionally established secular nature of the country or to violate the indivisible integrity of the state within its territory. This article also gives the state an important role in the area of religion: education and instruction in religion and ethics are conducted under state supervision and control. For this task, the state has established a Presidency of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet). This institution performs the role of control and supervision regarding Islam.[228] In relation to education and instruction of religion, the Diyanet also oversees the interpretation of the Koran.

Of the Turkish population, 99 per cent are officially Muslim. More than two-thirds of this segment are Sunni Muslim; 15 to 20 million people are Alevi Muslim. All other religious organisations are represented by less than 1 per cent of the population, mostly residing in Istanbul and other large cities. An estimated 2 per cent of the population are not religious.[229]

The Diyanet is focused on Sunni Islam. Only in relation to this denomination does it appoint and pay the salaries of muftis and imams, finance mosques and other buildings, and pay for the professional training of imams.[230] In Article 24(4) of the Constitution, the compulsory nature of religious culture and ethics education in elementary and secondary schools is regulated. In practice, this means education in Sunni Islam.[231] The state has full control over the religious organisation of Sunni Islam and that there is no separation between the state and this particular religious organisation. Therefore, this denomination can be considered a state religious organisation.

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228 In accordance with the principle of secularism, the Diyanet has no political role, as Boyle and Sheen (1997: 392) observe.

229 US Department of State (2004): *International Religious Freedom Report 2004. Turkey.* URL: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35489.htm (retrieving date: 2017-11-08); The Turkish Statistical Institute does not provide data on religion.

230 For more about financial support for religious organisations from the state, see Çitak, Z., Erdemir, A. and Tanyeri-Erdemir, T. (2015): Differential, Disguised and Deterritorialized. State Funding of Religion in Turkey. In F. Messner (Ed.): *Public Funding of Religions in Europe.* Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 199-220.

231 Only the minorities mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne are exempt from this (see Oktem 2002: 387).

Alevi Islam is not recognised by the government as a separate religion;[232] they have no right to have their own places of worship (*cemevi*).[233] Their spiritual leaders (*dede*) are not legally entitled to their titles. The European Court of Human Rights decided in 2016, however, that the Turkish government's approach towards the Alevis denied them freedom of religion. Turkey does not respect the choice of the Alevi community to be of a denomination other than the dominant Sunni Islam.[234]

In the Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne in 1923, between the Turkish state and several European powers and Japan, specific guarantees were given to the Greek and Armenian Orthodox and Jewish communities.[235] Those guarantees have not been granted to other minority groups.[236] These recognised religious minorities are regulated by a separate government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*). That is to say, the management of their property is in the hands of foundations. The General Directorate for Foundations must approve all operations of churches, monasteries, synagogues, religious hospitals, schools, orphanages, and other similar organisations.[237] These religious organisations may not add to the property they already possessed in 1923. The General Directorate may even require that a title to an existing property is given (back) to the state when a religious organisation cannot support the property. Given the decreasing Christian population, this does occur.[238] These recognised religious organisations have the right to maintain places of worship, which is apparently not the case for other religious organisations, although Article 24 of the Constitution seems to guarantee unconditional freedom of worship. In addition to places of worship, these non-Muslim recognised communities have established charitable institutions in the areas of education, health, and welfare. The Treaty of Lausanne states in Article 42 that these minorities have the same

232 Compare Hurd, E. S. (2014): Alevis Under Law: The Politics of Religious Freedom in Turkey, *Journal of Law and Religion*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 416-435.
233 See Yıldırım, M. (2013): The Right to Establish and Maintain Places of Worship in Turkey, *Religion and Human Rights*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 203-222.
234 The Alevis complaint that they were not permitted freedom of religion was successful (see *İzzettin Doğan and others v. Turkey* [2016], especially paras. 110 & 121); see also Overbeeke 2016: pts. 11-2 regarding this decision).
235 In 2002, the Turkish researcher Oktem (2002: 401) stated that the relationship between Muslims and Jews in modern Turkey is good, as it was in the Ottoman Empire.
236 See Erickson, J. and Helme, M. (2016): *The Republic of Turkey. Law and Religion Framework Overview*. URL: https://www.religlaw.org/common/document.view.php?docId=7125 (retrieving date: 08/11/201.
237 Oktem, N. (2002): Religion in Turkey, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002, no. 2, p. 371.
238 Ibid.: p. 376.

rights and conditions regarding the establishment of these institutions as other Turkish organisations.[239]

There are other religious minorities that, although present in 1923, are not recognised by Turkey as minorities according to the meaning in the Treaty of Lausanne. The Syrian Orthodox, Chaldean, Syrian Catholic, and Roman Catholic Churches belong to this group.

Other religious organisations may apply for registration as associations (and foundations) of civil law with the government,[240] but this leads – at least, in the case of foundations[241] – to a legal person alongside the religious community. When civil legal personality has been obtained, a religious organisation can be active in society and, for instance, rent property for religious meetings. When civil legal personality does not cover the religious community but is separate, this has the disadvantage that the board of the legal person and the leadership of the religious community may get into conflicts.

It is clear that equal treatment of religious organisations takes place neither in theory nor in practice. The European Court of Human Rights stated in in 2016 that the Turkish state should consider as its duty the maintenance of religious pluralism.[242] For most of the population as well as for the government, this perspective does not seem possible. It seems that to be anything other than a Sunni Muslim (or a member of another recognised religious organisation) is to be considered unpatriotic.

7.13 Ukraine

Although the government worked against religious organisations and denied their existence during the Soviet era, religious organisations were indeed present in Ukrainian society, although mostly underground.[243] After the transformation in 1989, there was a tremendous growth in the number of religious communities. The churches in Western Ukraine were still more developed than in Eastern Ukraine, as the western part did not belong to the Soviet Union before the Second World War.

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239 Compare Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 394.

240 The government often refuses registration of non-(Sunni) Muslim groups (see Erickson & Helme 2016). See also the 15 March 2010 opinion of the European Commission for Democracy and Law (Venice Commission) (2010), in which it is made clear that Turkey, without legitimation, does not grant legal personality to non-Muslim religious communities.

241 It seems that religious organisations still can still be formed as associations (see Oehring 2008).

242 *İzzettin Doğan and others v. Turkey* [GC], App No 62649/10, [2016] ECHR, para. 178.

243 Yelensky, V. (2002): Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era: The Case of Ukraine (With Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues), *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002.

There was a great deal of trust among people in the church as a social problem-solver, but in fact the church was not capable of meeting this expectation.

Freedom of religion and conscience are protected in Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996[244], and separation between state (and schools) and religious organisations is guaranteed. There is neither a state church nor a preferred religious organisation.[245]

The religious landscape is rather differentiated. There is no dominant church in Ukraine. There are three orthodox churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), both of which count 10 per cent or more of the population as members, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, with around 1 per cent of the population. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church represents 5 per cent of the population, while the Roman Catholic Church represents slightly more than 0.5 per cent. The total membership of Protestant churches, with many denominations included (Pentecostal, Baptist, et cetera), makes up around 1 per cent of the population. Islam, especially in the Crimea, and Judaism have still smaller shares of the population.[246] The majority of people in Ukraine (more than 60 per cent) are, however, not members of a religious denomination.

Relations between the Christian churches are often poor.[247] In urban areas, Protestant churches are more developed; in rural areas, Orthodox and Greek Catholic are. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church considers the other two Orthodox churches to be heretical. The Orthodox churches do not accept the Greek Catholics[248] and accuse the Roman Catholics of proselytising. Both the Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church have warned the government and the public about new religious movements (sects).[249] The Jewish and Muslim minorities support the government. There are also significant differences regarding religion between the three regions of Ukraine

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244 The exercise of religion may only be restricted on the grounds mentioned in the ECHR.

245 According to Boyle and Sheen (1997: 401), local governments may give specific religious organisations preferred statuses, such as that given to the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia.

246 Compare RISU (Religious Information Service of Ukraine) (n.d.): Religions in Ukraine. URL: https://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference (2017-11-08); Balakireva, O. and Sereda, I. (2013): Religion and Civil Society in Ukraine and Russia. In J. de Hart, P. Dekker and L. Halman (Eds.): *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer. In Vyshnevska (2015), which provides statistical data on Ukraine, there are no numbers about membership in religious organisations.

247 Compare Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, p. 403.; Balakireva, O. and Sereda, I. (2013): Religion and Civil Society in Ukraine and Russia. In J. de Hart, P. Dekker and L. Halman (Eds.): *Religion and Civil Society in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 218-229.

248 These were persecuted during the communist era and only recognised after the transition.

249 Yelensky, V. (2002): Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era: The Case of Ukraine (With Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues), *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002, no. 2, pp. 485-486.

(Western, Central, and Eastern). Despite the aforementioned troubles between the religious organisations, Ukrainians tend to be rather tolerant of those belonging to other religious organisations.[250]

In order to regulate religious organisations, Law No. 987-XII on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was introduced in 1991, soon after the transition. Religious organisations have to register with the Ukrainian State Committee for National and Religious Affairs in order to obtain legal personality.[251] For this, ten members are needed.[252] Although religious organisation have the right to be registered, this is not made easy, and the State Committee exercises discretionary power.[253] Everyone has the right to appeal to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights for the protection of their human rights.[254] The law explicitly states that all religious organisations should be treated equally.[255] In practice, however, this is not the case. One reason why equal treatment is considered inappropriate is that following this principle would result in resources being given to new religious organisations from abroad, which are comparatively richer than domestic religious organisations.[256] This effect of equal treatment would be unfair.[257]

All religious organisations – not only those that are registered – enjoy freedom of religion. Religious organisations may use civil law forms of legal personality to act in society and to avoid registration. In practice, their operations are strongly limited by the government. Foreign ministers and their equivalents are only permitted to preach and perform services and other religious ceremonies when invited by registered religious organisations and upon official agreements with the registering state body[258].

Several attempts have been made to amend the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations in the direction of ECHR requirements, including a 2005 Coun-

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250 Yelensky, V. (2015): Religion and Human Rights: The Case of Ukraine. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective*. Cham: Springer International, pp. 195-206.

251 Religious organisations are also required to register their regional offices, religious centres, monasteries, et cetera.

252 For secular civil society organisations, the number of members required is three.

253 See Boyle, K. and Sheen, J. (1997): *Freedom of Religion and Belief*. London: Routledge, pp. 401-402, 404.

254 Art. 55, Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine] (BPP, 1996, № 30, p. 141.; Based on Article 101 of the Constitution, the parliament has a Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights.

255 Art. 5, Law No. 987-XII; art. 24, ibid.

256 for a different view, see Yelensky, V. (2002): Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era: The Case of Ukraine (With Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues), *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2002, no. 2, pp. 484ff.

257 Another argument was that new religions could lead to the loss of identity of Ukraine.

258 This became law by an amendment of Law No. 987-XII in 1993 (see Yelensky 2002: 486).

cil of Europe memorandum[259], but the major denominations have blocked these attempts. According to the government and the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, the Council of Europe has not listened to the domestic churches and is not aware of the actual situation; the Council of Europe's memorandum is, in their opinion, too theoretical.[260] The State Committee on Nationalities and Religious Affairs, which advised the Ukrainian Parliament on legislation, was to the regret of the churches terminated by President Yanukovych.[261]

Religious organisations are active in Ukrainian society, for instance in social services and aid to the poor. According to Article 24 of Law No. 987-XII on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, they may engage in charity, cultural, and educational activities. They may also receive subsidies from the government for these purposes.[262]

Although it is forbidden for religious organisations to meddle in governmental matters, they have been a major voice in speaking up against the government regarding human rights.[263]

7.14 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has two state churches: the Church of England in England[264] and the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland in Scotland.[265] In Wales, the Church of England was disestablished and replaced by the autonomous (Anglican) Church in Wales in 1920.[266] In Northern Ireland, there is no state church. The largest Protestant denomi-

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259 Severinsen, H. and Wolhwend, R. (2005): Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine: Explanatory Memorandum, Doc. 10676. Strasbourg: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, para. 219.; OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief (2006): Comments on the Draft Law of Ukraine 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations', Opinion No. REL–UKR/072/2006. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR.

260 see more about the need for redrafting in Druzenko, G. (2012): Redrafting of the Ukrainian Law on Religious Freedom: Ukrainian Churches vs. Ukraine's Obligation to the Council of Europe. *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 2012, no. 3, pp. 811-833.

261 Ibid.: p. 817.

262 Ch. 4 art. 23, Закон України від 23.04.1991 № 987-XII «Про свободу совісті та релігійні організації» [Law of Ukraine Dated 23 April 1991 No. 987-XII on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations] (BPP, 1991, № 25, p. 283).

263 Yelensky, V. (2015): Religion and Human Rights: The Case of Ukraine. In H.-G. Ziebertz and G. Črpič (Eds.): *Religion and Human Rights. An International Perspective*. Cham: Springer International, pp. 204ff.

264 The Church of England was established by parliamentary statutes (see Doe 2011: 32).

265 See McClean, D. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – United Kingdom. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 222.

266 Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33.

nation in Northern Ireland is the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, which is closely linked to the Church of Scotland in terms of theology and history.

The strength of the relation between the Church of England and the state is derived from the fact that the church's bishops are appointed by the Crown, while some of its bishops participate in the House of Lords.[267] The church's regulations have to be approved by Parliament. The strong relation between the Church of England and the state is also symbolised by blasphemy legislation.[268] Interestingly, the state does not finance the Church of England. The Church of Scotland has always been more independent[269] and is also not financed by the government.

Regarding pastoral care in penal institutions, the military, and healthcare institutions as well as religious education in public schools,[270] the state ensures more pluriformity than one might expect from a state with state churches.

As in other Western European countries, quite a large number of people (some 50 per cent of the population) have no religious affiliation. Around one-fifth of the population adhere to the Church of England, less than ten per cent are Roman Catholic, and 5 per cent are Muslim. Smaller 'churches' are Presbyterian churches (Church of Scotland), Hinduism, and Judaism.[271] (In the United Kingdom, the term 'church' is used for all religious organisation. The following discussion will adopt the same convention.)

Although the Church of England has strong links with the state, it is considered a religious organisation and not a department of the state.[272] As a church, it can raise its voice against the state. In a rather secular society, a state church can legitimately remind the state of the importance of religion. In other cooperative systems of state and religion, effective communication between religious organisations and the state is more dependent on the political composition of the government.[273]

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267 About the specific characteristics of the Church of England as a state church, see Sandberg 2011: 60-70.

268 The law against blasphemy exclusively protected Christianity and certain doctrines of the Church of England. This law was abolished in 2008.

269 See McClean, D. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – United Kingdom. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 225.

270 Compare Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 192, 207.

271 Office for National Statistics (2012): *Religion in England and Wales*. URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales 2011/2012-12-11 (retrieving date: 2017-11-08)

272 See Doe, N. (2011): *Law and Religion in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 32-33.; The British monarch is the titular Supreme Governor of the Church of England. The twenty-six most senior bishops in the Church of England are Lords Spiritual and have seats in the House of Lords of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

273 This idea came to me after a positive remark about the Church of England made by an Islamic religion researcher, born in Pakistan and living in London.

Other churches in the United Kingdom can register places of worship[274] and, combined with that, register such buildings for solemnising marriages.[275] They may also register charities for the advancement of religion.[276] This registration provides tax relief. There is no registration of religious organisations as such. Churches are treated as voluntary organisations. There is also no financial support from the state to religious organisations as such, but the state finances – directly and indirectly – several activities of churches.[277]

The larger churches use corporate bodies to hold property,[278] while the smaller ones use trusts. Some older Christian and Jewish religious communities have received, upon their request, special acts of Parliament. This regulates their governance and especially their property affairs. In 1993, a small Hindu church and, in 2000, the United Reformed Church also received such legislation.[279] Even when regulated by acts of Parliament, these churches maintain their internal independence.

The positions of religious groups other than the state church may, for certain laws, be the same as that of the Church of England and are further dependent on the courts. International human rights will also be taken into account, but they are not always unambiguous. The state's approach to the different churches highly depends on the circumstances and on the specific rules for each situation. There is freedom of religion, and the state generally regards churches positively. When in conformity with planning conditions, churches are allowed to build their places of worship.[280]

Religious organisations are in some areas, such as social work, active in service provision. The state may finance religious organisations for this as it would other charities doing the same type of work. They are treated in the same way by the government.

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274 See Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict c 81.; compare Rath, J., Groenendijk, K. and Penninx, R. (1993): De erkenning en institutionalisering van de Islam in België, Groot Brittanni en Nederland [The Recognition and Institutionalising of Islam in Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands], *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 53-75.

275 See Marriage Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo 6 c 76. sec. 41**.;** Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, c 30., secs. 4-5.

276 See further Picarda, H. (1995): *The Law and Practice Relating to Charities*, 2nd edn. London: Butterworths.

277 See extensively Cranmer, F. (2015): Paying the Piper? Public Funding and Supervision of Religion in a Secularized society (United Kingdom). In F. Messner (Ed.): *Public Funding of Religions in Europe.* Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 181-192.; compare also McClean, D. (2007): Religious Entities as Legal Persons – United Kingdom. In L. Friedner (Ed.): *Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons*. Leuven: Peeters, p. 226.

278 According to old English law, church offices can hold property as 'corporation sole' even when the office is vacant (McClean 2007: 222-3).

279 Ibid.: p. 225.

280 Municipal authorities do not always treat religious organisation equally. The allowance of Muslim prayer houses is generally more restricted (see McClean 2007: 225).

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Contributors

Fabio Battaglia is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Edinburgh. He is currently looking at progress and well-being indices in Scotland and Italy trying to identify what factors inhibit, and what factors promote, their adoption and influence in the media and in policymaking.

Rocco D´Ambrosio is Professor of Political Philosophy at the Faculty of Social Science of the Pontifical Gregorian University, Holder of Archbishop Rembert G. Weakland and O.S.B. Chair in the Social Teaching of the Church in the same Faculty. Besides that, he is Professor of Ethics of Public Administration at Dipartimento per le politiche del personale dell'Amministrazione del Ministero dell'Interno, Roma. He is author of several books, among others "Will Pope Francis Pull It Off? The Challenge of Church Reform" (2017) and with F. Giannella "La corruzione: attori e trame" (2018).

Paul Dekker is Professor of Civil Society at Tilburg University and Head of the Participation, Culture & Living Environment Department of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research. He studied Political Science in Nijmegen and West-Berlin and most of his research has been in the field of Political Sociology. He is series Editor of Springer Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies, Vice-Chair of IPSA-RC Political Psychology, and Editorial Board Member of the Journal of Civil Society. His field of expertise is the civil society, ranging from the economic nonprofit sector via volunteering and voluntary associations to public opinion and political attitudes and participation.

Pandora Dimanopoulou graduated with a B.A. in History and Archaeology from Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, and holds an M.A. and a PhD in History and Civilization from the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. She was research associated at the Political Institut of Paris, at the Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam, as well as at the Center for Modern Greece of the Freie Universität Berlin, where she worked on the agency of the Churches as social non-state actors in the International Relations. She has taught in graduate and postgraduate courses and seminars in France and Greece.

Efstathios Kessareas studied Greek Philology at the University of Crete and Sociology at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens. He obtained his M.A. in Religious and Development Studies at the University of Leeds and his PhD in Sociology at the Department of Philosophy and Social Studies of the University of Crete. His postdoctoral research at the Department of Sociology (Center for Social Theory) of Ghent University is focused on the religious perceptions of the Greek debt crisis and their political implications.

Ahmed Kulanić is currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, at International University of Sarajevo. He also works as a lecturer at Department of Social and Political Sciences and withholds a Managing Editor position at the Epiphany - Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies. He was and still is involved in several domestic and international research projects. He published several scientific articles, policy papers, columns, participated at numerous international and national academic conferences and edited several books.

Linnea Lundgren is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for Civil Society Research at Ersta Sköndal Bräcke University College in Stockholm, Sweden. She holds a MA in Theology from the University of Uppsala and her research interests are religious actors within civil society and the role of religion in secular societies. Alongside her research, Linnea lectures on courses regarding the role of religion in late modern societies, migration and civil society.

Margarita Markoviti is political scientist, currently post-doctoral researcher at CEVIPOL, Université Libre de Bruxelles. She is also research fellow at the European Research Council project 'Grass-rootsmobilise' (Eliamep) and Visiting Assistant Professor at the IE University (Madrid). Her research and publications focus on the governance of religious pluralism, counter-radicalisation policies, and on the social, political and legal dimensions of religious freedoms in a comparative European perspective.

Bernhard Matzak studied art history, German studies and Pedagogy in Bonn. He did his postgraduate training as a scientific documentary at Südwestfunk in Baden-Baden and the Institute for Information and Documentation in Potsdam. Since 1991 he worked, among others, at the Humboldt University Berlin, Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance and the Federal Association of German Foundations. Since 2016 he is working as head of the Maecenata Library at the Maecenata Foundation.

Rupert Graf Strachwitz graduated in Political Science and History in 1974 and holds a PhD from Muenster University. He founded Maecenata Management, one of Germany´s first specialized consultancies in 1989 and remained its director until 2011. Today, he is the Executive Director of the Maecenata Foundation and Director of the Maecenata Institute, Berlin, which he founded in 1997. He has published and lectured widely on philanthropy and civil society matters and taught at several universities. International philanthropy and European affairs are his special fields of interest.

Tymen J. van der Ploeg studied Law at Leyden University, The Netherlands. He worked from November 1972 until his retirement in August 2012 at the Faculty of Law of the VU-University at Amsterdam, since 1992 as Full Professor in civil law, especially law on legal persons and partnerships. He taught company law, law on associations and foundations and on religious communities and published – and still publishes - about these topics, also from a comparative perspective, as well as from the perspective of the freedom of association and the freedom of religion.

Johann von Essen wrote his doctoral thesis at the department of Theology at the Uppsala University "On the meaning of volontary work. A study of people's worldviews". Since March 2008 he is employed as a Researcher at Institute for Civil Society studies at the Ersta Sköndal Bräcke University College, Stockholm. His work also includes project management for ongoing projects and he is responsible for a seminar series about the concept of civil society in the history of ideas.

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