Hypotyposis in Kant's Metaphysics of Judgment

Symbolizing Completeness

BYRON ASHLEY CLUGSTON

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Contemporary Studies in Idealism

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by Byron Ashley Clugston

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Para mi Sorayita

Contents

Preface

The relish with which Michael Dummett justified his writing a certain kind of Preface for his masterpiece on Frege[1] prompts me to say a little about the processes, external and internal, this work has passed through. In concert with him, the hope here is that such an indulgence is a welcome pre-prandial chitchat, a prolegomenon to the main dish, and a helpful elucidation of the motivations behind cooking it up.

Though the draft manuscript was written in Mexico City during late 2015 and early 2016, I first began sketching thoughts on the topics found here in Sydney in January 2015, having been refreshed by a post-PhD overseas journey during which Stanley Cavell's philosophical music first touched my ears.[2] I had submitted my doctoral thesis on Kant and Hegel in August 2013 and escaped Sydney from December of that year to August of the following. During the trip I found the eight-month marking process for my thesis had come to an end and that I would be required to make some minor amendments to the text. Upon rewriting some bits and adding others I realised a first reading of *The Claim of Reason* had permanently changed my sense of the hopes and possible achievements of philosophy, and had opened up to me fresh ways of conceiving of topics I had been at work on during my doctorate. In addition to this, I would thank the reviewers of my thesis, Angelica Nuzzo, Chris Yeomans, and Simon Lumsden, for their generous and helpful comments; these also gave me guidance in reframing my thoughts. And, beginning from a period which stretches even farther back, I cannot fail to mention the splendid mentorship of Paul Redding of which I had the privilege: without his support, insight, patience, and friendship, I would be in a much worse position than I am, philosophically and otherwise.

The early sketches for the present work began with an eye on issues from my doctorate that seemed worthy of further treatment in connection with one

another, and an ear for an alternate expression of the problems they conjured. The result is a focus on two main ideas: (1) the general role of symbolism in transcendental philosophy, and (2) the relation of such symbolism in single cases to the idea of system and the possibility of symbolizing not only single cases, but a whole system of thinking. I have here proceeded by claiming these two connected topics are keys to understanding Kant, and that they are also of intrinsic philosophical interest. It is further pursuit of the latter train of thought to which this work is a prolegomenon.

Given this confession, it should be unsurprising that the work is not primarily a scholarly one on Kant; it is in a way that, though if the work were to be appraised in terms of its intervention into secondary and tertiary interpretive disputes, it would fall far short of what is desirable. My aim has been to throughout stay focused on the twin concerns just mentioned by pursuing a set of interconnected claims about the structure, function, and method of judgment. And these interconnected claims rest on what I take to be key moments of transcendental idealism. Thus the claim is that (1) and (2) are themes that allow for a compelling expression of topics in Kant such as the idea of an inner/outer to thought, the idea of thought having a structure, and the way in which individual judgments, and their structure, relate to the whole of thought considered as a system. The pursuit of these topics has, since the early stages of my PhD, been most thoroughly inspired by the exemplary work of Beatrice Longuenesse.[3]

My treatment of the topics just mentioned is by no means exhaustive; I have taken a route that connects a range of issues and provides a basis for further development. This is what I take to be the basic conclusion of this work: problems about predication, modality, metaphysical systematicity, and philosophical method can be seen to connect in a very interesting way when one employs the idea of symbolism as a compass.

Given the position at which I have arrived, the reader would be best served were I to confess to similarities I have discovered at a late stage between my thought and that of Nelson Goodman.[4] I do not pretend to approximate to Goodman's brilliance, but rather intend to indicate something of the kind of philosophical reflection that this book participates in.

In *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, Goodman is concerned about the possibility of our knowing how to generalize inductively from experience in some ways and not others; a similar concern arises here in our treatment of abduction and analogy and the issue of how one should rightly move from certain positions of knowing to make a claim by hypothesis and thereby, in generalizing from a case to a set of novel cases, or a single novel case, to form symbolic figures in thought that guide one in forming a systematically unified view of things. I pass over this topic fairly quickly however, and all the time in service of exploring the Kantian thesis about symbolizing completeness that persists through this

work. In future work I would attempt to address the topic of abduction and analogy head-on and with explicit connection to Goodman's insights.

In *Languages of Art*, Goodman offers a theory of symbols and much of what he says there rang familiar bells I had first heard when reflecting on Kant. Since I only came to read Goodman during the period when the present manuscript had already been accepted for publication, it was too late to recruit him as an ally and to write him into my thoughts. I record this fact here as an acknowledgment of his work and as a gesture at the more general interest I see the topics here as having beyond their being grown in Kant's plot.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the debts I have incurred as a would-be author. First, I thank the reviewers at Noesis Press for their generous and helpful comments on my initial submission. In addition to providing much-needed encouragement, this commentary aided me in producing a more satisfactory text. Second, after that former press met an unexpected end, Lexington Books must be generously thanked for a brisk and welcoming road to publication. Due to his involvement in both phases, I would most of all thank the series editor, Diego Bubbio, for his continuing support; without his assistance this book would not have come to see the light of day.

Byron Ashley Clugston
July 22, 2016, Mexico City;
February 20, 2019, Sydney

NOTES

1. Michael Dummett 1973/1981, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

2. I here refer to Stanley Cavell 1999, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, Tragedy*, Oxford University Press, though *In Quest of the Ordinary* 1988, University of Chicago Press, and *Must We Mean What We Say?* 2002, Cambridge University Press, followed closely.

3. Longuenesse's influence is written all over this work. Her 1998, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Oxford University Press, as well as her 2005, *Kant on the Human Standpoint*, Cambridge University Press, and 2007, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, have all shaped my views as expressed here.

4. The works I have in mind are Goodman 1983, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, and 1976, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

Introduction

This work concerns itself with a set of questions and themes that radiate from a single topic: the structure, function, and place of the concept of hypotyposis in Kant's metaphysics of judgment. Hypotyposis occupies an important position in Kant's philosophy since focus on it allows well-documented tensions in his view about the rational judging subject to be understood from a novel angle. This study allows for more than a mere clarification or arbitration of his position, however. Hypotyposis is for Kant the a priori presentation of some concept, or what comes to the same thing, a presentation of an a priori concept; a focused discussion of it and associated themes in the metaphysics of judgment therefore allows for an exploration of the idea of a priori presentation: the idea of something being represented in thought that is not found in the world, but found in us, in the structure of our thought, and, correlatively, the idea of our taking something to be presented in the world that symbolizes something found in us. This contrast, between representation in thought and presentation in the world, is that expressed in Kant's usage of two important pieces of terminology: *Vorstellung* and *Darstellung*; the former is translated into English as "representation," the latter as "presentation." Thus, my investigation here into a priori presentation is effectively an investigation of the idea of that which we represent in thought being presented in external form in the world.

My main concern is with this idea of our discovering thought to have a certain structure, though my exploration of this topic is not conventional to the extent that I do not adhere strictly, and only, to Kant's own pronouncements. I do engage in much exegesis and discussion of Kant, though my interest is with extending and connecting certain major themes in his thinking: the idea of an inner and outer to thought; the idea of limit cases and best cases that guide our thinking; the idea of our thinking being constrained or shaped by

certain conditions; the idea of there being something which is unconditioned, or hidden from us; the idea of our being inaccessible to ourselves.

I begin the work by explaining the service into which the notion of symbolic hypotyposis is put: that of presenting indirectly certain concepts of completeness or perfection, whether moral or aesthetic. Although Kant's usage of the idea of symbolic presentation, the imperfect presentation of certain perfect ideas, is in the context of the moral and the aesthetic, I consider in detail what the general cognitive significance of such an idea is, and I undertake to explain this within the general framework of Kant's transcendental idealism. In doing this, I consider a topic not worked out by Kant himself, and I therefore acknowledge that the notion of presenting symbols of ideas of reason in its theoretical use was unacceptable to him. Yet since my concern toward the end of the work is with evaluating certain general themes of the Critical Philosophy, especially the concept of reason which constitutes its core, I allow myself to extend certain themes and consider alternate possibilities for Kant's philosophical project.

This introduction of the concept of hypotyposis occurs in chapter I. Chapter II begins to work out some of the details of the idea of thought involving certain symbolic forms; thus it focuses on the contrast between ordinary examples and exemplary symbols, on the idea of there being best cases which we model our thinking on. I illustrate certain of the rational activities involved with this in a discussion of analogy and hypothesis, where I put to work some of C. S. Peirce's useful distinctions between different forms of reasoning. Having introduced these ideas, I move to consider the idea of a best case and its relation to a whole of thought, a sum total of all properties that may be thinkable, and I hereby begin to unravel a theme that trails through the rest of the work: Kant's notion of a principle of complete determination and the attendant concept of an "All of reality," or *omnitudo realitatis*. In the section where I speak of the idea of a best case, however, I consider the sense of speaking of completeness in two senses, whether as the best cases of certain properties being instantiated, or as all possible incarnations of certain properties. This idea of total rational structure leads me to consider the judgmental and inferential activity that occurs within such a framework, and from here the concern of the work becomes that of the idea of conceptual determination, as that which occurs in the thinking of rational judging subjects. This is the topic of chapter III.

From here I focus explicitly on Kant's principle of complete determination, as articulated in the Transcendental Ideal, and explore some of the commitments of it, especially the notion of a sum total of properties, as previously introduced. I there move to consider the view on modality which informs Kant's position about this, and am then led to tie these threads together in an exploration, first, of the idea of a communicative context, and then, of Kant's

remarks about the relationship between empirical concept formation and the necessity of the world of sense having a categorial structure. In the former discussion, I add more detail to the previously discussed notions of judgmental and inferential activity, and the idea of conceptual determination. I make these connections with the aid of Kant's talk about the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, where the unity of such use ought to be understood, if coherent and communicable, as involving points of communicative contact between rational judging subjects. Regarding the latter, the notion of categorial structure and Kant's transcendental proof for it, we touch briefly upon a point that is crucial for understanding his views about symbolic presentation; that is, his views about there being such a thing as a best case, or a best token of some type.

Although this latter section is brief, it is important for the following reason: Kant's transcendental proof for categorial structure in the world of sense commits him to the idea that reason ensures our rational cognition of the world involves hierarchy and categorially relevant predication. Apart from illuminating his views about complete determination and the mechanics by which such determination proceeds, this also gives grounds for working out in more detail the structure and function of symbolic thinking in the context of empirical judgment. I stop short of actually working this out, however, and rest content with outlining the Kantian grounds for developing such a line of thought.

In chapter IV, I change pace and topic in order to evaluate the connection between, and consequences of, some of the themes discussed throughout the former three chapters. Here my concern is not specifically with the structure and function of symbolic hypotyposis in Kant's metaphysics of judgment, but rather with the more expansive question of what the image of the rational is such that Kant speaks of hypotyposis and of limits and conditions on presenting perfect or complete concepts in the first place. The importance of these questions is revealed through reflection on the significance of hypotyposis itself: Kant warns against attempts to render theoretical ideas in the world of sense, saying it is the lazy reason (*ignava ratio*) which attempts to find comfort in fixing on a particular rendering of theoretical ideas such as the soul, the world-whole, or God. His philosophy does however involve him in making remarks about a certain image of our thought as having a boundary, on the other side of which there is the in principle unknowable.

This way of speaking is not merely convenient; Kant's theory of reason does partake of certain such imagery that involves a symbolic presentation of the mere idea of a boundary, a division of space into that which is accessible and that which is not. And in considering the shaping effect of this picture on his views about the rational judging subject, I do not so much insist he ought not to have such a sensibilized idea of the rational as I admit such an activity

of symbolizing our thought is unavoidable. The concerns into which I enter in the final chapter are, therefore, related to this question of the pervasiveness of imagery of the rational judge and the idea of a totality of which it is a part, within which it moves, and to which it responds in thought, and which it helps shape in action. I attempt no resolutions here, so instead confine myself to exploring some structural claims about our existential situation and rational vocation as are recommended by the details attended to throughout the piece.

Having introduced the broad ideas in this work by locating them in the narrative, it ought now to serve the reader if we dwell a little on each of the more specific topics that arise. A primary reason for this is that the book does not focus on scholarly debates regarding the interpretation of Kant and indeed follows a somewhat unconventional train of thought by connecting topics in Kant typically treated in isolation. The main background literature for this work, which a glance at the reference list will reveal, is from the analytic tradition; moreover, from some important work that does not actually talk about Kant at all. I can find no better justification for this than to confess I believe inspiration should be allowed to arise naturally and take its course; restriction of it is neither permissible nor required, even if its results are open to critique, and even though recognition of canonical works remains a minimal condition of being scholarly respectable. A reader may justifiably feel a need for this to be explained, however.

As our preface indicated, this work has two guiding thoughts: (1) the role of symbolism in transcendental philosophy, and (2) the relation of such symbolism in single cases to the idea of system and the possibility of symbolizing not only single cases, but a whole system of thinking.[1] The contents shows that the train of thought in the work moves from the former to the latter, by examining the idea of symbolic hypotyposis (chapter I), the contrast between examples and symbols (chapter II), the idea of conceptual determination (chapter III), and the idea of the rational (chapter IV). Even though the work is short, the topics that are treated along the way are numerous; thus, it may be best to outline these and say a little about the motivation for approaching them the way they are here.

In chapter I, paragraph 9, the contradictoriness of Kant's account of our faculties is laid out in explicit form. This contention is a common one and I do not dwell on it; it instead serves as an impetus for the interest in symbolism, since symbolic hypotyposis in this work is investigated partly in order to make sense of the suggestion that ideas both cannot be, and also might be able to be, real forces in, and also share form with, appearances. Appraisal of such contradictoriness could take various forms. Here I do not explore the full gamut of metaphysical concerns that press when seriously considering the issue, but instead keep my analysis neutral and consider what image of the rational fits with a certain view on symbols that invites such apparently

contradictory views of an agent's nature and capabilities. Thus, the work ends with an examination of some general problems in this area, absent the intention to solve them.

Chapter I, paragraph 14 thematizes the notion of a rule and begins the outline of the connection between the idea of rule-following, in thought and language, and that of symbolism. The topic of rule-following is never addressed directly in this work, due to the mountain of scholarship which would have to be engaged with in order to treat it satisfactorily.[2] This theme is one which would need to be developed more fully in order to articulate the picture of symbolic hypotyposis that is sketched here. In any case, the first chapter concludes by noting that Kant never gives a satisfactory explanation of his view about symbols; thus the work proceeds to reconstruct an outline of a Kantian theory of symbols, seen as an essential element of both transcendental idealism and transcendental logic.

A word on rule-following before proceeding. No special commitment to a specific position on the topic is defended here, though given the remarks made above regarding symbols and their interest for a picture of the rational agent it can at least be said that the account of rule-following that would be given as a sequel to this work would follow the lead of writers such as John McDowell[3] and Stanley Cavell[4] to the extent that they decline in both Wittgensteinian and Austinian fashion to give a general definition of that in which following a rule consists. The interest in the topic here is restricted to the idea of going on in language in similar ways to those with which one communes, though special interest is taken in the place of symbolism in a system of thinking that gives priority to certain cases of use, in language, and of performance, in action, in the forming of an idea of what counts as what: as an instance that satisfies a definition, or set of conditions.

Throughout chapter II.I, the connection between analogical inferences and abduction is thermalized and the general significance of symbolism is clarified. This discussion feeds naturally into consideration of the problem Kant faces in using the adverbial phrase "as-if" to characterize the sense in which empirical thought symbolizes ideas that supposedly only reason can think. The contrast Kant draws between mathematical and aesthetic estimations of magnitude is employed to show what such a contrast might consist in. The topic of mathematical and aesthetic estimations of magnitude is taken up again in chapter IV.II.

This issue is one of the deepest and richest touched upon here and compels further treatment. General historical interest begins at least with the Romantic transformation of Kant's conception of the absolute, therefore a key historical thread to take up would be that beginning from the Spinoza Controversy and ending with Hegel. Systematically, the starting point for development of the topic would be the idea of symbolizing completeness that this work as

a whole fascinates itself with. Beyond these vagaries nothing can be added since we are presently tasked with cataloguing topics and not bringing them to a close and ourselves to peace. In any case, the discussion of modality in chapter III.II would also be a natural point of further elaboration and the literature on Kant's views about modality referenced throughout serves as connective tissue for future treatment.[5]

Chapter II.II elaborates upon the idea of a totality in speaking of the idea of a sum total of properties. Here two different interpretations of completeness are introduced, albeit briefly, which influence the discussion throughout the remainder of the book. The two ideas are that of (1), all instances of a property, or all satisfactions of a predicate, and (2), the best case, or paradigm case, of satisfaction of a predicate. The idea of maximal satisfaction of a predicate connects with the idea of categorially relevant predication, for what counts as maximal satisfaction of any given predicate is inseparable from what counts as satisfaction of a predicate *simpliciter*; thus, the idea of categorial levels is here also introduced in conjunction with the terminology of token and type; this prefigures later discussion of categorially relevant predication in chapter II.III and throughout chapter III.

In saying the idea of satisfaction of a predicate, *simpliciter* is inseparable from that of maximal satisfaction of a predicate I mean to say that there is no prior sense that can be given to either; there is no direction of priority accessible a priori that can be appealed to ground the other. Against recent anxieties about grounding in metaphysics, this attitude expresses a basic suspicion about the plausibility and point of giving metaphysically final responses to structural questions; the tales told here offer an account of connected concepts and principles but do not seek answers in the abyss. This agnosticism is undeniably Kantian. The attitude is itself thus at work where the book deals with certain interconnected ideas and pictures of the rational. I do not say one cannot give accounts of such structures as there may be discernible in the rational, since I offer some briefly, though I also do not qualify what I think giving such accounts itself consists in. This quietism is methodological, and I do not defend it explicitly.

Chapter II.III begins to explore the idea of forms of determination, which becomes the topic of chapter III. Specifically, it investigates the structure of judgment and inferential activity in Kant's philosophy in the most general of terms. A main objective here is to make distinctions about the way in which determination may occur; say, as between objects and concepts in different ways, in different forms of judgment, different forms of syllogism that might move toward greater generality or specificity, and so on. Building on chapter II.I, chapter III closes with a statement of how hypotyposis, analogy, and abduction could be argued to fit together in a theory of conceptual determination. At the close of chapter II.III, it is also noted that the determination of

the relation of two structures to one another is that in which analogy consists; as Kant is quoted at the beginning of chapter III as saying, analogy is not "an imperfect similarity between two similar things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things" (4: 357, 108). (Compare here the example given in chapter II.I, paragraph 5.)

Chapter III is the heart of the book and presents the idea central to it: that it is possible to give a general sketch of the structure of the activity of conceptual determination given some presumptions about the metaphysical situation of the human agent as judge. The first assumption here is the platitude that there are limitations on knowledge, that one never knows everything about the world of sense; the second is that conceptual activity moves in two opposed directions, vertically, between the idea of a completely determined individual and the system of which it is a part (I do not touch on horizontal movement yet acknowledge it by referring to categorially exclusionary contraries; I also do not engage messier questions about strictness on structure of thought and talk, though I do admit messiness); a third assumption is that judgment has a certain logical structure, as does system (here I investigate Kant's transcendental logic as a model of this, though I do not claim his is the final word on the subject; I simply leave it open). The first assumption is hardly controversial; the second is a common commitment, perhaps, though it is more controversial than the first; the third assumption is a general thesis with which one may take issue, and which here takes Kantian form. It may take many alternate forms, whether as a development of the second assumption or otherwise.

In speaking of messiness, I acknowledge that though it is possible to make distinctions regarding how different concepts stand to one another, such distinctions are not indisputable; one may find occasion to squabble over differences and some of such cases may constitute no-fault disagreement: it cannot be assumed that all uses of language can be policed and fixed as correct or incorrect, even if truth is something which may be fixed in single cases. The problem is therefore about indeterminacy in language use, not absence of a concept of truth, insofar as truth and meaning are not independently intelligible. This feature of language, that it admits of indeterminacy, is a feature inseparable from the necessity of symbolism to expression of ideals (whether of meaning, intention, or otherwise), for the role of symbols is to offer guidance for how to go on where there is doubt about how to go on, whether in empirical theorizing and therefore application of concepts in novel circumstances, or in following specifically moral or generally practical rules for action. Earlier I referred to the views of McDowell and Cavell with respect to rule-following; here is another point upon which their influence weighs.

The train of thought in chapter III moves from consideration of the generalities just mentioned to an examination of Kant's principle of complete

determination in III.I. To my mind, this principle condenses some of the most interesting features of Kant's philosophy into a single: the relation between the idea of a completely determined individual and the idea of a totality to which it belongs, these being entailments of the principle's proper operation. I move from exploring these ideas to examine some theses about predication that are connected with them. Again, this topic deserves a much more focused and singular investigation, to which the remarks in chapter III sections i and ii are merely prefatory.

Some citations are given in a note to the relevant discussion, which refers to the logic of determinables and determinates. Adequate appraisal of such work on the relation between the old logic and the new, which was produced mostly in the first half of the twentieth century, is key to proper treatment, for the sketch of Kant in this book invites queries about how a Kantian project on logical form may pan out, and which is both mindful of the significance of his overall view as well as properly informed of the epistemic, semantic, and metaphysical consequences of the revolution in logic which began with Frege and Russell and was extended by Carnap and Kripke. Work has been done on this, of course, though there is much to take issue with in the details regarding how to think of logical form in Kant, given his separation of transcendental logic from general logic. The investigation into symbolism here is intended as a contribution to understanding the relation between the power of judgment and the structure of transcendental logic.

Chapter III.II sketches some remarks on how Kant's view of modality informs his view of what a whole of possibility might be. Despite being on an independently interesting topic this section serves primarily as a point of connection between sections I and III of chapter III: the former section's focus on the principle of complete determination reveals it to be a key moment of Kant's transcendental logic insofar as it expresses clearly the relation between an individual and the system to which it belongs, if any; the latter section offers an interpretation of communicative activity by linking the themes already developed with a reading of the distinction between a collective unity of experience and a distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, as well the place of both ordinary examples and exemplary symbols in such a picture. Chapter III.III hereby comments on the way symbolic cognition, cognition of that which is exemplary, fits into a rational structure of conceptual determination, and the focus is on the idea of different kinds of regularities which thought has, as first remarked upon in chapter II.I as the common or ordinary versus the exemplary or extraordinary. A parallel to this structure in cognition is found in communities of rational judges in the contrast between the genius and the commonplace.

The point of the contrast between the common and the exemplary here is to highlight a key moment of Kant's conception of the human rational

vocation: that of forming imaginary endpoints, under the guidance of principles, to augment some dimension of thought or action (either in improvement of moral character, or augmentation of epistemic status). The point of the contrast is decidedly not ideological; there is no suggestion as to weight of genius or exemplarity, as in, perhaps, a Nietzschean sense; the interest is rather structural.

Chapter III.IV treats briefly the topic of categorial structure in Kant's theory of empirical concept formation. That there is a transcendental argument in the offing here is essential to the idea pursued throughout the work; namely, that symbolic cognition serves to aid judging through the exemplification of standard-setting ideal cases. The connection is between (1) the idea that all empirical cognition is categorial, and therefore, at least potentially, of something as of a kind (not to exclude the possibility of singular reference and a semantic role for proper names), and (2) the claim that cognition is guided, in general, by symbols of what counts as a supposed best case, paradigm case, etc., for what counts as what. Kant's actual transcendental proof is that we could not form empirical concepts if empirical cognition were not categorially determined; that is, if things were not judged of as being tokens of some type or other. This idea, regarding appraisal of objects on the basis of their essential or accidental properties, is first expressed in chapter II.I, paragraph 12 and, again, in chapter II.II.

Chapter IV is written from a perspective distinguishable from the former three chapters. It begins by first thermalizing the idea of the rational as itself something that may be sensibilized and imagined, thereby extending the topic of the former three chapters: the value of symbolism for cognition in general. Here a nod is given in the direction of Kant's idea of a pragmatic anthropology as an essential area of theorizing which complements philosophy proper (where for Kant philosophy consists in the analysis of concepts). Having introduced this idea, in chapter IV.I, paragraph 11, I claim that a proper interpretation of the consequence of Kant's view of the transcendental ideas and their function of forming an ever-shifting boundary for our cognition, is as follows: we cannot form determinate concepts of things which are not unified and included in the complete picture of mutual determination of world and self; all determinate cognition is guided by the principles expressed by the transcendental function of the ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God (world-determination is guided by the transcendental cosmological principle; self-determination by the transcendental psychological principle; transcendental theology gives structure to both and a sense of ultimate unity, grounding, and systematicity).

Following these considerations chapter IV.I broaches the topic of picturing the absolute, as taken on by post-Kantian Romantics (as mentioned above).[6] In chapter IV.II, this line of thought is treated briskly by sketching the ways in

which a whole system of thought might be envisioned, in terms of the relation between the known/knowable and the unknown/unknowable (IV.II, paragraph 13ff.). The link between this kind of formal structure and the mythological structure of religion is important, though it is not explored. It can at least be said that the remarks scattered throughout about Kant's transcendental theology are intended as gestures at the pervasive significance of philosophical theology for understanding the metaphysics of grounding conditions, and the concept of completeness (in aesthetic, mathematical, and moral senses of magnitude).

The similarity between formal and mythological structure is that both are forms of picturing,[7] though the formal structure here gives guidelines for conceiving of a space of epistemic possibilities, whereas mythology gives sensible content in precisely the way Kant forbids. Moreover, the formal structure of the relation between the known/knowable and the unknown/unknowable may be linked back to the discussion of analogy and hypothesis as discussed in chapter II.I. The difference is that in chapter IV, the concern is with system and in chapter II, the concern is with single cases of symbolism. Much would be gained through a closer study of the idea of symbolizing systems as wholes, and by comparing this to cases of singular thoughts, and such a study ought to encompass the anthropological both in the properly empirical sense as well as the philosophical.

The final section of the work, IV.III, draws some parallels between the Kantian view of the rational agent and the perspective on the epistemological in Cavell. The idea borrowed from Cavell is that our relation to the ideals of our knowledge, as expressed in Kant by the transcendental ideas qua principles for the systematic unification of knowledge, is "not one of knowing." This idea is also indisputably Kantian, though Cavell's treatment of skepticism as a basic feature of the human situation is exemplary and cannot be ignored as an expression of a vision of uncertainty which may shape us. Here the concern is quite specific, for Cavell not only problematizes our relation to ourselves, yet also specifically outs God and the world as entities toward which we do not stand in a relation of knowing (we may ask whether they are properly called "things"). This is an unadulterated Kantian thesis, and the general framing thought within which the exploration of the concept of symbolism in the book occurs.

In addition to further specifying the idea of the ineffability of limits on us, IV.III also remarks upon a topic first treated in II.III and III.III: the role of communicability in a theory of reason. Here Kant's democratic conception of reason is explicitly noted; a move which confirms the connection made earlier in the work between the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience and the idea of a communicative context: the use of understanding in the experiences of those belonging to a community who are in communicative contact and exchange with one another is unified to the extent that

such use is guided by democratic rationality. Such a democratic conception of rational communication is also that which guarantees symbols are truly rational guides, to the extent that they reveal and represent communally recognized and determined standards. Here the second of Kant's maxims of common human understanding is key: broadmindedness, the ability to think in the position of everyone else. In the context of this work, this idea takes the form of the ability to form a picture of possibly occupiable positions in epistemic space, or to conceive of certain forms of thought and action (one may substitute "forms of thought and action" for the phrase "epistemic and semantic space," and thereby do away with the spatial metaphor in favor of phrasing which restricts itself to human activity). The key Kantian insight is that one is never required to form an idea of how one's position in rational space relates to the idea of the whole of rational space, since the relations between points in rational space are always from somewhere in particular to somewhere else particular.[8]

NOTES

1. I can hardly begin this work without referencing Ernst Cassirer's monumental work *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (volumes 1–4), and his shorter *Language and Myth*, which are the most significant attempts to work out a view of symbols from a generally Kantian perspective. I do not engage with his work here, given the short compass and focused nature of this work, though he cannot be ignored entirely.

2. A preliminary list of work relevant for us here would include writers such as W. V. O. Quine, Saul Kripke, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, John McDowell, Stanley Cavell, Robert Brandom, David Lewis, Donald Davidson, and Wilfrid Sellars, though a fuller treatment of the topic would branch far wider.

3. Here I have in mind some of McDowell's earlier papers, as can be found in *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*, and *Mind, Value, and Reality*, in particular all the papers on Wittgenstein in the latter volume, as well as those on the issue of modesty in a semantic theory and the topics of singular reference and criteria, in the former.

4. Cavell's work in general is an inspiration, though his sustained engagement with Wittgenstein in *The Claim of Reason* is what I refer to here when speaking of his views about rules.

5. Here I refer to writers such as Andrew Chignell, Jessica Leech, Nicholas Stang, Uygar Abaci, and Peter Yong.

6. An excellent recent treatment of this is found in Dalia Nassar 2013, *The Romantic Absolute*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

7. I use the term "picturing" throughout so it is prudent to indicate what is meant by it: I am not gesturing at Wittgenstein's Tractarian picture theory, but rather appealing to a notion of image or representation in the very broadest sense. This kind of picture is more akin to the picture in Wittgenstein's phrase "a picture held us captive" (*Philosophical Investigations*, §115); it indicates a general way of thinking of things.

The vagueness is intentional since clarification of the nature of a picture is far beyond what I attempt here.

8. The theme of how to understand the way in which third-personal and first-personal perspectives on the world cohere is explored in Thomas Nagel's 1986, *The View from Nowhere*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter I

Schematic and Symbolic Hypotyposis

1. My purpose in this work is to focus on some ideas found in Kant's Critical Philosophy as it stood at the time of publication of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (first edition 1790, second edition 1793), and to put them to work in developing a framework for thinking about the logic and metaphysics of judgment. In referring to both the logic and metaphysics of judgment I signal my intention to develop themes at two distinct levels: (1) those pertaining to a Kantian-styled account of formal and informal reasoning processes, which are in turn connected to (2), a view about the rational agent which engages in such reasoning.

2. The ideas of Kant's upon which I focus occur in and are connected in important ways with, section 59 of the third Critique, where Kant contrasts schematic and symbolic hypotyposis. The concept of hypotyposis is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* in the following way, as a

> vivid description of a scene, event, or situation, bringing it, as it were, before the eyes of the hearer or reader.

Kant's own definition of the concept, however, is distinct. Despite the conjunction of the concept's origin being in Greek philosophy, where it was thought of as the rhetorical presentation of an idea, and Kant's dim view of rhetoric and the purpose to which it is put, his metaphysics of judgment nevertheless requires a theoretical account of our capacity, and need, for presenting in external sensible form that which is found in our reason.[1] A focus on this concept brings into view certain themes in the Critical Philosophy which have suffered inordinate neglect, but which when foregrounded offer materials for an encouraging assessment of certain important consequences of Kant's Copernican Revolution. The insistence on explaining the contrast

Kant draws between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, and on developing themes generated from reflection on the function of the latter, arises as a consequence of the belief that not only is this distinction largely ignored in Kantian scholarship but also that the focus on it reveals some important commitments of the transcendentally idealistic position Kant had arrived at by the 1790s. Far from being a merely general metaphysical or epistemological position, the complete critical view bears significant consequences for the philosophy of language and the logic of informal reasoning. I shall develop here, in a fairly narrow though amplificatory fashion, those consequences which radiate from the topic of symbolic hypotyposis.

3. It is these latter themes regarding the nature of language and reasoning that are most interesting, especially since in Kant's hands responses to particular questions raised in philosophical reflection on them are woven into the fabric of a grand, fully developed view of the rational agent. Indeed, one may ask what dependence relations there may be between such specific views and the wider scope of Kant's transcendental metaphysics, yet my primary aim here is not to establish a historical thesis, but rather to develop some issues systematically and at whatever level of philosophical concern and detail the context demands; thus, the connections to philosophical literature will be constructive and systematic rather than historical and interpretive. The reason for this is that my main focus is on the merits of a certain view of the rational agent and its connection to a picture of the logic and metaphysics of the judgments of which that agent is supposedly capable. Developing this picture will require exegesis of key aspects of Kant's texts, although the aim is to take such exegesis as a foundation for the development of Kantian insights that can stand on their own feet.

4. Hypotyposis, according to Kant, is a "presentation, *subjecto sub adspectum* . . . as making something sensible," where that which is made sensible is made so a priori (§59, 225).[2] The two kinds of hypotyposis, the schematic and the symbolic, are made possible by the faculty of the power of judgment and are correlated with the use of the faculties of the understanding and reason, respectively. By "correlated" it is meant that in each case, the schematic or the symbolic, the presentation is an a priori element of thought whose character is imparted by the faculty in question; hence, schematic hypotyposes are presentations a priori of pure concepts of the understanding (the categories), and symbolic hypotyposes are presentations a priori of pure concepts of reason (which are in theoretical cases the transcendental ideas; in practical cases, the idea of moral perfection).[3] So, for Kant, "(A)ll intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a priori are thus either schemata or symbols," where the former are "direct," the latter "indirect presentations of the concept." Note that ideas of theoretical uses of reason cannot, for Kant, be presented symbolically, but only schematically (see the second section of the appendix to the

Transcendental Dialectic, especially the specification of the schemata of the transcendental ideas at A683/B711–A686/B714). This amounts to saying that the logical structure of judgment, of the understanding, is directly presented in actual cases of judging, whereas real elements (not formal elements) of reason are only indirectly presented.

5. It should also be borne in mind that intuitions ascribed to concepts a posteriori are empirical concepts, which Kant refers to as examples (5: 351, 225). I shall have occasion (in chapter II) to develop the contrast between an example and an exemplar, where the latter is synonymous with "symbol." The parallel between Kant's view of exemplarity and that of artistic genius is important here though discussion of it awaits III.III; there we will find it is the analogous structure of the example/exemplar relation and that of common judge/genius relation that is revealing.[4]

6. The above contrast between the two forms of a priori presentation can be clarified. Direct presentations are demonstrative, can be demonstrated as applying directly to a case; indirect presentations of a priori concepts analogical. Direct demonstrative presentations are a product of the power of judgment in its role as a capacity to present a priori features of possible experience in the form of the transcendental schemata discussed by Kant in the Schematism chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The act of so applying a concept is that made possible by the capacity to judge, indeed the necessity of judging, of the world of sense in accordance with the categories. In fact, Kant describes the Analytic of Principles as "solely a canon for the power of judgment that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules *a priori*" (A132/B171). Note that when Kant speaks of a canon here he contrasts it with the Canon of Pure Reason, the chapter from the Doctrine of Method that details the essential dimensions of reason's functioning in determining the modality of knowledge, action, and expectation, or hope (A805/B833ff.), and in the formation of belief, opinion, and knowledge (A820/B848ff.).[5] Meanwhile, indirect analogical presentations are a product of the power of judgment in its role as that which makes reason, despite itself, a force in the sensible world: in effecting symbolic hypotyposes "the power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is merely a symbol" (5: 352, 226).

7. This point about the double task of the power of judgment in cases of symbolic hypotyposis deserves greater scrutiny than Kant dignified it with, in the context of §59 or elsewhere. Although issues about analogical cognition and symbolic presentation are raised and briefly dealt with in illuminating ways by Kant (in the former case, in §57 of the *Prolegomena* and in the sections on analogy in Kant's *Lectures on Logic*; in the latter, in the section

of the *Critique of Practical Reason* entitled "On the Typic of Pure Practical Judgment"), ultimately he never succeeds in showing how his characterization of the power of judgment escapes being deeply contradictory. The general issue of contradictoriness is decided by how one views the dialectics of judgment in the third Critique; whether one can accept the arguments for the necessity of a contrast between the sensible and the supersensible. And this is as much as to decide whether one finds the thesis of transcendental idealism, as defended in the context of the power of judgment, convincing.

8. Consideration of the import of analogical cognition raises more than the question of a nonsubjective standard of taste, for instance, that metaphysical question Kant postpones with a transcendental appeal to the idea of objects of judgment as well as subjects who judge having a share in the same supersensible substratum (§57, 5: 339–40, 215–16). The additional concern for us is by what right Kant could say that, thanks to the faculty of the power of judgment, the world of sense (thinkable of as the system of nature) presents as analogous to ideas of reason at all, given that he thinks that ideas of reason cannot be presented sensibly. The difficulty is not about whether the employment of certain symbols, given that they are presented only "indirectly" and thus not "objectively," can be justified as a matter of taste; as if both objects of intuition to serve as symbols and the standard (the ideas) found in reason were unproblematically given, and that the task were only to connect the two by a questionable, merely subjectively valid standard. The issue is not about a standard being satisfied, about a judgment being justified or justifiable, as if all that were required were the right judge to pierce through a fog imposed by intuition (the "veil of sense"), to grasp *which* object of intuition were a symbol of some idea or other. The image would then be one of matching items in two different lists, the difficulty that of deciding how to match up ideas and their symbolic presentations in the world of sense, that of finding "indirect" but *coherent* satisfactions of ideas. The problem, rather, is about the possibility of making any connection between intuition and reason *at all* and not merely that of making the right connection in *some cases*.[6] The difficulty is that of making sense of a contradiction at the heart of Kant's theory of judgment, but the contradiction is not that supposedly encountered in the antinomy of the critique of taste; the contradiction is a basic feature of Kant's transcendental idealism, yet for our purposes at the level of the power of judgment's being able to grasp both ideas and sense and see their affinity or harmony.[7] This contradiction is that onto which Hegel, and many philosophers subsequent to Kant, cottoned.

9. The famous contradiction is most visible when Kant's view is put thus:

(1) Only reason can think ideas.[8]

(2) In order to judge of sensible objects as analogous to ideas of reason the understanding must be able to employ empirical concepts, the rule of reflection on which is analogous to that expressed by ideas of reason.
(3) By employing empirical concepts whose rule of reflection is conceived this way, one judges of objects of sense as analogous to pure concepts of reason; so the understanding employs empirical concepts whose rule of reflection is the same as that for concepts it *cannot* employ.
(4) Thus, unless there is more to a pure concept of reason than its rule of reflection, the understanding both *can* and *cannot* follow the rules prescribed by pure concepts of reason.
(5) If a concept is the expression of a rule, if it does no more than express a rule (does nothing else, expresses nothing other), the understanding would thereby be said to *be able to use* and *not be able to use* concepts of reason in its reflections on the sensible manifold (since reason guides the activity of the understanding in its attempts to form a systematically unified picture of the experience it necessarily has an effect on the understanding's judgmental activity).

10. This contradiction is structurally identical to that which arises in the dialectic of the critique of taste, and teleological judgment, where in distinct senses it is both appropriate (in a transcendentally ideal sense) and inappropriate (in a transcendentally real sense) to judge an object to be beautiful or purposeful such that the purported fact of it being beautiful or purposeful is taken to transcend one's judgment of it as so, there being a possibility, or even likelihood, that others may judge likewise. Yet the issue with symbolic cognition is deeper and more pervasive: the contradiction is that between the views that reason both can and cannot claim to find satisfactions of its ideas in the world of sense. Or must, on pain of reason being impotent; must not, on pain of reason being merely empirical.

11. A way to live with the apparent contradictoriness of Kant's position, it would seem, would be to dissolve certain fundamental confusions which threaten here, about the relationship in which an example of satisfaction of a rule stands to that rule itself; further, what the different ways of a rule being satisfied tells us about what a rule is, and what satisfying a rule, or being in accord with a rule, amounts to.

12. I do not hereby aim to open a dispute over whether Kant fell prey to confusions about rule-following, in the sense of our following accepted conventions that govern intelligible linguistic activity; it is more interesting to present a variety of readings of the relation between deliverances of sense and dictates of reason, and to decide on what might and what might not constitute an erroneous perspective on such a relation by way of an independent consideration of what rule-following might be about. I do not engage with

such independent considerations here and confine myself to the prior task of assessing the relation between deliverances of sense and dictates of reason. As the Introduction indicated, the concern with symbolism in this work is partly driven by an interest in what the supposed contradiction in Kant's account of our faculties could amount to, and whether it can be conceived as illusory even within the framework of transcendental idealism (I return to this more general issue in IV.III). Having side-lined that concern, it is worth citing Kant's official position on rules and where they fit in his philosophy:

> We have . . . explained the understanding in various ways—through a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility), through a faculty for thinking, or a faculty of concepts, or also of judgments—which explanations, if one looks at them properly, come down to the same thing. Now we can characterise it as the faculty of rules. This designation is more fruitful, and comes closer to its essence. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but the understanding gives us rules. It is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them. Rules, so far as they are objective (and thus necessarily pertain to the cognition of objects) are called laws. Although we may learn many laws through experience, these are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understanding itself *a priori*, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather must provide the appearances with their lawfulness and by that very means make experience possible. (A126)

So the understanding is best characterized as a faculty of rules, where its functioning in terms of rules is to be understood as its making judgments that in turn employ concepts. Concepts, for their part, "rest on functions," where a function is "the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one"; regarding the understanding, it "can make no other use of concepts than that of judging by means of them" (A68/B93); moreover, one can "trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments" (A69/B94).

13. Immediately following the above-cited passage, Kant comments on the essential connection between the transcendental unity of apperception and the possibility of forming laws and rules by which the understanding operates in its cognitions:

> The understanding is thus not merely the faculty for making rules through the comparison of appearances; it is itself the legislation for nature, i.e., without understanding there would be no nature at all, i.e., synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances in accordance with rules; for appearances, as such, cannot occur outside us, but exist only in our sensibility. The latter, however, as the object of cognition in an experience, with everything it may contain, is possible only in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception, however, is

> the transcendental ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience. This very same unity of apperception with regard to a manifold of representations (that of determining it out of a single one) is the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding. (A126–27)

Thus we are told here, as in the B Deduction (especially in §§16 and 17), that the unity of apperception is a condition of us being able to think of all our judgments as being our judgments, judgments made by us. This possibility of combination of cognitions is the synthetic unity of self-consciousness and is that which makes possible the analytic unity of self-consciousness, where the latter is the idea of me being and I having all those cognitions, having first combined them. The latter is therefore that which explicitly stands in the way of forming contradictory judgments. The function of the idea of the soul in Kant's transcendental psychology is similar: that of allowing us to think of our judgmental activity *as if* it belonged to a substance (although we cannot know or experience ourselves as a substance, a unified totality). The common idea is the thought of ourselves as a locus of rule-governed activity, judgmental activity.

14. Understanding how the concept of a rule is placed in the Kantian picture is aided by a study of the specific consequences of references to the place of symbolic hypotyposis in Kant's theory of judgment, and the relation of such a variety of symbolic cognition to ordinary objective, cognitive, empirical judgment about appearances. General themes associated with the interpenetration of various images of the capacity to judge, and of what stands on either side of the limits of knowledge and reason, have been exhaustively explored by a multitude of philosophers since Kant, yet the specific topic of the mechanics of symbolic presentation a priori, and its relation to the schematic presentation of a priori concepts, has not. Yet this contrast tells us much about how the ideas of "limit" and "condition" function in Kant's overall view of judgment, and judgment is arguably the central focus of his philosophy. (Note at this point that "limitation" is the category correlated with infinite judgments of quality [A80/B106].)

15. A framework for thinking about the double task, referred to above, which is performed in the analogical cognition typical of symbolic hypotyposis, affords clarity. Kant portrays the initial phase of the power of judgment's activity as involving:

> applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition.

And then:

> applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is merely a symbol.

The ordering of Kant's phrasing, as of (1) and then (2), is somewhat misleading, since it appears to suggest that the concept in question is applied to the object of a sensible intuition, which will serve as a symbol, *before* that same concept is applied to the object which is symbolized. Kant goes on in this passage to discuss an example, which we will examine shortly, and which raises further questions about what is going on with symbolism. Yet first we ought to recall what a symbolic presentation is: it is a making sensible of an a priori concept, specifically a concept of reason. And since Kant thinks reason does not derive its concepts empirically, it is a mystery why he would imply here that the analogical cognition, constitutive of symbolic hypotyposis, involves the power of judgment *first* applying a concept of reason to the object of an intuition, and then "applying the rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely object of which the first is merely a symbol." Surely the possibility of applying a concept "which only reason can think" to an intuition requires that reason have, a priori, a rule for reflection that is independent of the precise character of the object of the intuition to which the concept of reason is compared by analogy? The difficulty is that the claim that only reason can think the concept appears to be in jeopardy, unless Kant can be let off the hook on the grounds that he says that, although only reason can *think* the concept, the power of judgment indeed makes it possible for the understanding to *judge* an empirical object as being a symbolic presentation of the idea, or to follow a rule in its judging, that is merely analogous to the rule followed by reason in thinking the idea.

16. According to the above, the faculty of the power of judgment would be credited with performing the mysterious, apparently contradictory, act of finding in the world of sense an occasion to apply an empirical concept the rule of reflection for which is analogous to a concept that only reason can think. This is the contradictory aspect of Kant's transcendental idealism, operating at the level of the power of judgment, to which we have referred. One of the capacities of the power of judgment, then, seems to be that of rendering the world of sense, in acts of judgment, as analogous to ideas only reason can think. This raises two important questions that express a basic objection to the Kantian picture of the rational subject and its power of judgment: (1), If indirect presentations of ideas of reason still count as satisfactions of the rule which the concept of reason prescribes, even if only analogously so, then in what does the contrast between indirect and direct presentations of a concept consist? And, more pointedly. (2) What is stopping Kant from saying that ideas of reason are presented in the world of sense, but in a multitude of ways, where more adequate cases are the corollary of the "direct", less adequate or less representative cases the corollary of "indirect"? Of course, one would then have to ask after this multitude of the exemplary and how it were distinct from sub-sets of ordinary cases among the distributive unity of the use of the

understanding in experience (cf. the discussion at the end of the Ideal of Pure Reason at A582–83/B610–11).) That is, it would still need to be explained how the gradations between sub-sets of judgments were established; how certain judgings involved a direct presentation of a concept, and others indirect.

17. The short answer to the two questions begins by noting that Kant employs two distinct senses of existence in his philosophy: that of the Platonic idea of unity, as articulated by reason, and that of the Aristotelian idea of being, as judged about by the understanding. The former is the kind of existence enjoyed by elements of cognition and thought, the latter that had by the world of sense. This short answer presents a picture of Kant as Platonist about the subject and Nominalist about the world of sense, and while such a picture is overly simplistic, it contains a grain of truth. The complexity of the issue, however, can only be resolved by continuing to investigate the particulars.

18. Kant had written in his opening statement of the contrast between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis that in the former presentations for "a concept grasped by the understanding a priori the corresponding intuition is given a priori." Here Kant is referring to the a priori presentations of the categories in the form of transcendental schemata; schemata that, in the Analytic of Principles, are given examples of empirical satisfaction a priori, where a principle of the pure understanding determines that and how synthetic a priori judgments are made regarding how things are with the world of sense.[9] The examples given in the Schematism and the System of All Principles of Pure Understanding involve judgments that are made possible a priori by the status the categories have for cognition.

19. Regarding the categories, Kant says in the Amphiboly that it is transcendental reflection that reveals to us the origins of representations a priori; transcendental reflection on experience is that which reveals to us that the categories are at work in making empirical concepts possible, and that such pure concepts are a product of the understanding alone (A261/B317). After all, although empirical concepts are acquired through a process of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, the fact that empirical concepts have the import for cognition that they do is a result of their sharing some form with the categories. This must be so since otherwise the categories would have no bearing on empirical cognition, since the categories themselves are not instantiated in experience; one does not find occasion to apply the concepts of "cause" and "effect," for instance, except in a sense that reveals objective conditions of the possibility of experience. One of the lessons from Hume Kant took seriously was that if these concepts were merely empirical they would be no more than inductive generalizations, and would thus not be the concepts they hitherto were thought to be. More strongly, if the concepts "cause" and "effect" were simply the result of inductive generalizations they would not *mean* cause and effect, respectively.

20. Recall now Kant's words at the opening of the first book of the Dialectic:

> Concepts of the understanding are also thought a priori before experience and on behalf of it, but they contain nothing beyond the unity of reflection on appearances, insofar as these appearances belong to a possible empirical consciousness. (A310/B366–67)

Importantly for our purposes of examining Kant's view of symbolic presentation, note how the sentence immediately preceding this claim about the categories runs: "However it may be with the possibility of concepts from pure reason, they are not merely reflected concepts, but inferred concepts" (A310/B366). Putting these claims together, we have the following conclusion: Although the categories do not find instances of satisfaction in experience in the way empirical concepts do (there are no examples of the categories, whereas empirical concepts having intuitive content means precisely that they do have examples: their objects in intuition are examples of what the concept applies to), they do make empirical thinking possible by providing a structure for it. And this structure of empirical thinking is discoverable by transcendental reflection on the sources of cognition. So the categories are objective elements of cognition that express the unity of reflection on appearances; pure concepts of reason, meanwhile, are not simply the product of rational reflection on experience made possible by reason's vocation of bringing unity to the understanding (A643/B671ff.), for this would not on its own rule out the possibility of pure concepts of reason being objective features of cognition that one simply never finds instances of in experience, as in the case of the categories. Pure concepts of reason are best thought of as ideas of imaginary termini of infinite chains of syllogistic, mediate inferences about the nature of experience, as made possible by the understanding, and are only subjectively valid elements of cognition whose status is vindicated by the systematic unity they afford (A669/B697ff.).

21. We now need to consider the generalities of Kant's view about the schematized categories. Kant's articulation of his official position begins with the admission that since no empirical intuition is "homogeneous" with any of the categories, it is a mystery how the categories could be objective conditions of the possibility of experience. That is, since causality, for instance, cannot be "intuited through the senses" and is not "contained in the appearance" (A137–37/B176–77), it remains to be shown how its status as an element, let alone a *condition*, of possible experience is to be established. Most urgent is the fact that here pure concepts of the understanding look as epistemologically problematic as pure concepts of reason. This problem, according to Kant, is that which makes "a transcendental doctrine of the

power of judgment necessary" (A138/B177). In order to explain how the categories relate a priori to appearances Kant interposes a "third thing": the "transcendental schema." Transcendental schemata are characterized also as "transcendental time-determinations," and have the property of sharing a form with both the category they correspond to and the tract of appearances which serves as the guarantee of the objective reality of the category in question. Transcendental schemata are "homogeneous" with the former on the grounds of being "universal" and resting "on a rule *a priori*"; a category is the unity of its corresponding transcendental time-determinations (its transcendental schema). On the other side, such schemata are homogeneous with their corresponding appearances "insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold" (A139/B178).

22. The famous problem here is the threat of an infinite regress of mediators: it is not clear interposing schemata between categories and appearances either excludes the postulation of further mediators, or dispenses with the feeling there are still pieces missing from Kant's explanation. Further, The Unsympathetic might wish to object that the categories could have been differently described to accommodate the additional considerations encompassed by the idea of transcendental schemata.[10] Resolving difficulties with Kant's view about transcendental schemata is not my purpose, however. It is worth simply signaling the general problem Kant has about schemata such that his view of symbolic hypotyposis can be subjected to a more nuanced critique than otherwise, since there are common problems with the latter which are moreover exacerbated by the usage of a terminological contrast between "direct" and "indirect" a priori presentation.

23. With these materials in mind we return to the objection acknowledged above, regarding the contrast between direct and indirect presentations of a priori concepts. It is possible the presentation of the idea may here simply be misleading. One may say, charitably, that Kant is assuming the rule of reflection on the object of the intuition, which serves as a symbol of an idea, is already found in reason and is available to the power of judgment in the latter's capacity to present the object of the intuition a certain way, namely, analogically. If so, the initial difficulty with the passage, as a consequence of the fact that the object of the intuition, something empirically given, appears to be said to dictate to reason what the rule of reflection is, dissolves. Empirical objects may or may not dictate to reason certain requirements of the latter's operation, and may suggest a certain image of its place with respect to the world, yet however this may be, Kant's own position forbids the derivation of rational principles from the empirical, and presently it is him we are concerned to understand. Yet even if we adhere to this charitable reading of the passage, as just adumbrated, there is an additional complication.

24. In (2) above it was implied that the object symbolized has the same rule of reflection from (1) applied to it. Namely, whatever capacity to judge reflectively was brought to bear in cognizing the object of intuition, (1), this same capacity is brought to bear in the judging of that which is symbolized, itself an object of some kind or other. At this point, an important question needs to be raised about the status of the object in (2). *What* is this object? What *kind* of object is it? What is the *source* of this object? Is the object's source merely the faculty of reason, it being therefore an object of reason which is in fact more strictly "a concept which only reason can think"? After all, as Frege taught us, concepts are indeed themselves strange kinds of objects; the irresistible interpretation being here that Kant means something similar in speaking of an object being symbolized. Given Kant's original claim that symbolic hypotyposes involve attributing an intuition to such a concept (5: 351, 225), where the intuition inadequately captures the nature of the concept (what could be involved with *adequate* capture?), the point seems to be that the faculty of reason is the source of the second object, in (2). But this would raise some serious questions about the example of symbolic presentation Kant offers.

25. Unfortunately there is only one example given in the context of §59. This however should not lead us to take seriously the fact that Kant offered this particular example and not some other, and not more others; the exact example may be no more than an accidental artifact of the text as presented, so it may not be an essential part of the thought Kant may have wished to express, how he may have elaborated it further (he does admit, after all, the importance of the issue in this context, yet declines to develop his view about symbolic presentation, which leaves us unsure of the seriousness of his attempt to address the issue).[11]

> A monarchical state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in accordance with laws internal to the people, but by a mere machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will, but in both cases it is represented merely symbolically. For between a despotic state and a handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one between the rule for reflecting on both and their causality. (5: 352, 226)

The difficulty here is that symbolic presentation was meant to involve an idea, which only reason can think, and the object of an empirical intuition; the symbolic presentation was meant to be an empirical appearance and the symbolized was meant to be an indemonstrable idea[12] that is presentable only indirectly. So unless Kant is saying that the idea of a certain kind of state is indeed an idea that only reason can think he is misleading his readers. Let us consider what it would mean if Kant's example were apt for his purposes; then we shall consider what it would mean for it not to be.

26. The idea of a state is the idea of a certain sociopolitical configuration; an arrangement of persons and institutions in the sensible world which function, to an extent whose regularity is to be determined, in accord with a certain systematic pattern. In Kant's view the idea of a person is more than sensible; the specifically moral and generally practical dimensions of a person are rather rational and therefore intelligible. Institutions, while manifesting as phenomenal, function in accord with practical reason and like persons are thus more than sensible (institutions are constituted by communities of persons and associated material objects, where the latter are *merely* phenomenal).[13] The essential components of a state may in fact then be more than mere objects of intuition; a state itself arguably functions in accord with intelligible rational principles and can therefore rightly be thought of as instantiating a certain rational structure. But is the state itself an idea in the sense Kant wants to highlight in section 59, in his account of what symbolic presentation is? Is a handmill's symbolically presenting as analogous to a despotic state the paradigm of symbolic hypotyposis? Or is Kant's single example misleadingly unrepresentative?

27. Kant's example cannot be paradigmatic, since one has occasion to employ the concept of a state in the world of sense: there are examples of states that feature as part of the sensible world, and arguably the idea of a state is empirically derived, even if with the help of reason. We may say it is relatively a priori, but not a priori in the way a pure concept of reason is. While a state may (or may not) itself function in accord with rational principles, this is insufficient to make it a paradigm case of an idea of reason. And even if the idea of a state is to be given a supposedly special status as something which, at the limit, we never find occasion to apply in the abstract, thus making the idea of a state in general something which indeed only reason can think, this would not help. Of course, the idea of not having concrete particular occasions to apply a concept in the abstract has the ring of tautology: the same case could be made not only for rational principles and concepts of reason in general, but also for any empirical concept whatever. Ask whether one ever has occasion to apply the concept of a handmill in the abstract. A handmill is indeed an artifact; thus, each particular handmill may (must?) indeed be constructed in accord with a principle, yet surely, there are only ordinary empirical examples of handmills, however much one may wish to say each of them was constructed in accord with the abstract idea of a handmill. The case is the same with states, despotic or otherwise. A handmill is produced through the actions of a will directed at bringing it about that such an artifact exists; states are brought about through the collective will (if we can be permitted a lax usage of this laden term) to a certain sociopolitical structure. But we are not concerned with ordinary examples of concepts; rather with symbols and with that which they symbolize. And it is the conditions of this which we wish

to understand. To be sure, we may arrive at a position where the distinction between ordinary examples and exemplary symbols comes into question. We are not yet positioned to advance such a thesis, however (this awaits, IV.III).

28. The above considerations suggest Kant's single example of symbolism offered in §59 is misleading. The question was not whether certain rational principles could be said to find paradigmatic expression in the sensible world; the question was not about whether there is a best case of their being realized or not, though we will address this below. The question was instead about the relation between an idea of reason and an empirical symbol. The relation between a handmill and a despotic state is a relation between, on the one hand, an artifact created in accord with rational principles, and, on the other, a constellation of human beings and institutions, where the latter act together in accord with rational principles, given their actions being a product of practical reason. So Kant had offered an analogy between an artifact, a created object, and a sociopolitical configuration. But neither of these sides of the relation are cases of a concept found in reason a priori; artifacts are products of practical reason's efficacy as in a will, where that will's instantiation in a human being has been subject to a life in a sensible body which interacts with the deterministic phenomenal world where human purposes are fulfilled subsequent to bodily action (the turning of the handle on a handmill). Neither are states a priori concepts; if reason is taken to include the idea of a state it must be admitted as historical and impure, something Kant would be resistant to admit of elements of rationality (however much we may wish to protest at this point).

29. Thus, far the problem has been this: the claim in (1) was that the power of judgment applies the concept in question, a concept which only reason can think, to the object of a sensible intuition, where the intuition of the object in question thus becomes a symbolic presentation of the pure concept of reason. Given Kant's view about the derivability of the rational from the empirical and the empirical from the rational—that this is forbidden—the claim is deeply mysterious.

30. In tension with the extraordinary image of reason that emerges from Kant's third Critique is a metaphysics of judgment that, Kant´s protestations notwithstanding, smacks of contradiction. Yet despite the inherent difficulties of the view of reason to which Kant was committed, this is not sufficient motivation for discarding the insights contained in the distinction he chose to make between the two varieties of hypotyposis. In fact, it is only with a satisfactory exposition of the nature of reflection and determination, with the reflecting power of judgment and the determining power of judgment, and the related forms of syllogizing expounded in the first Critique, the episyllogistic and prosyllogistic, that the importance of the distinction between the two forms of hypotyposis is rendered sufficiently clear to be of general

philosophical usefulness. We will come to that task at the close of the following chapter, following a more detailed examination of the contrast between examples and exemplars.

NOTES

1. As I noted above in the Introduction, hypotyposis is defined as the "presentation" of an a priori concept. "Presentation" in English is a translation of the German "*Darstellung*," which is contrasted in Kant's philosophy from "representation," which is in German "*Vorstellung*." The former refers to something external to the mind, a written word, physical symbol, or an image, which has semantic content; the latter refers to that which is internal to the mind, the conceptual content of a word, for instance. I am not here concerned with the etymology beyond this bare distinction; as indicated in the Preface, I am interested in the philosophical significance of the distinction between an inner and outer to thought, and of the possibility of finding items in the world, presented in symbolic form, which are taken to symbolize that which is found in our thought, in the realm of representation as Kant understands it.

2. I will here be employing grammatically distinct phrases to make the same point: "concepts presented a priori," "presentations of a priori concepts." As far as I can tell, if a concept is presented a priori it is an a priori concept, and if a concept is a priori it is presented a priori (even if it is presented in the world of sense and therefore a part, a ground, of empirical knowledge; a synthetic a priori judgment). The equivalency turns on the epistemic possibility of finding an instance for a concept to be presented.

3. Note that Kant's principle usage of the concept of symbolic presentation is in the context of admitting that we must be capable of sensibilizing the idea of moral perfection if we are to understand what the moral law demands, though we must realize we can never do this satisfactorily (his referencing the life of Jesus as morally exemplary in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in *Religion and Rational Theology* is the paradigmatic case of this kind of symbolizing of moral ideas). I am not so concerned with the question of the moral dimension in this work, however; rather with the general cognitive significance of the idea of symbolic presentation. For an excellent treatment of the symbolism in the practical context, see Heiner Bielefeldt 2003, *Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press.

Also, see A569/B597 for an explanation of the contrast between the epistemology of the two kinds of a priori concepts as just mentioned in the main text here. I will have occasion below to consider what other kinds of ideas may be admitted into this typology, given that the example Kant offers as a case of analogical cognition involves the presentation of a form of political organization, a certain kind of state, as that which may be symbolized. His giving this example prompts the question of what kinds of predicates can only be symbolized and not acquired as merely empirical concepts are; an answer to this question entails an answer to the question of what may be presented directly, as opposed to indirectly, in experience, and therefore involves

answering the question of what an appearance could be. It also requires that one explain the purported difference between determinative and reflective judgment, and prosyllogistic and episyllogistic reasoning.

4. The principal discussion of genius at sections 46–50 is intimately bound up with Kant's view of aesthetic ideas, which themselves are thematized and contrasted with ideas of reason in §49, and then again in the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment, in §57 and the "Remarks" I & II. The ideas developed in §59 regarding symbolic presentation cannot be properly understood in abstraction from this topic.

5. "I understand by a canon the sum total of the a priori principles of the correct use of certain cognitive faculties in general. Thus, general logic in its analytical part is a canon for understanding and reason in general, but only as far as its form is concerned, since it abstracts from all content. Thus, the transcendental analytic was the canon of the pure understanding; for it alone is capable of true synthetic a priori cognitions. But where no correct use of a cognitive power is possible there is no canon. Now according to the proofs that have previously been given, all synthetic cognition of pure reason in its speculative use is entirely impossible. There is thus no canon for its speculative use at all (for this is through and through dialectical); rather, all transcendental logic is in this respect nothing but a discipline. Consequently, if there is to be any legitimate use of pure reason at all, in which there must also be a canon of it, this will concern not the speculative but rather the practical use of reason" (A796–97/B824–25).

6. Note how the problem in the case of aesthetic judgment is that of determining reasons for subjectively grounded preferences, and disputing about them and their associated terms of evaluation of actual properties of actual objects. In the aesthetic case, the existence of objects of judgment is not in dispute, since the aesthetic judgment entails an aesthetic object, even if its nature is in dispute.

7. An excellent recent account of the contradictory nature of Kant's view of how the intellectual conditions of experience are meant to bear upon the receptivity of sense, as argued for in conflicting ways in the Transcendental Deduction, is given in Addison 2015.

8. Note that only the imagination can imagine aesthetic ideas; imagination provides the ideal of the aesthetic, reason the ideal of the intellectual.

9. Cf.: "*A priori* principles bear this name not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also because they are not themselves grounded in higher and more general cognitions. Yet this property does not elevate them beyond all proof. For although this could not be carried further objectively, but rather grounds all cognition of its object, yet this does not prevent a proof from the subjective sources of the possibility of a cognition of an object in general from being possible, indeed even necessary, since otherwise the proposition would raise the suspicion of being merely a surreptitious assertion" (A148–49/B188). The principles discussed in the Analytic of Principles are only those "related to the categories" (A149/B188); no principles associated with space and time *as such*, qua pure forms of intuition, are discussed, although of course the mathematical (Quantity manifesting as the Axioms of Intuition, Quality as the Anticipations of Perception) and dynamical (Relation as the Analogies of Experience, Modality as the Postulates of Empirical

Thinking) applications of the categories are concerned with their spatio-temporal employment.

Despite this, it is worth simply noting Kant's signaling of the need for the demonstration of the a priori representation of the concepts of space and time: "Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it is that they are represented in the mind completely a priori, would still be without objective validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use on the objects of experience were not shown; indeed, their representation is a mere schema, which is always related to the reproductive imagination that calls forth the objects of experience, without which they would have no significance; and thus it is with all concepts within distinction." (A156/B195)

10. A quick response to this would insist the reason for Kant's failure to do so is due to his view that time is a form of pure intuition, indeed of inner sense, and the categories are purely intellectual, not sensible, and thus exclude conditions on sensibility. However, given Kant's distinction between the form of intuition and formal intuition (in the B Deduction at B160–61, n.*), one could say that since there is an intellectual understanding of both space and time as *formal* concepts, and not merely as pure forms of sense, Kant might have included in the pure forms of the understanding an internal structure that expresses the formal concepts of space and time, and that transcendental schemata just are an expression of this internal structure (the distinction between the transcendental conditions being a consequence of a need to make a distinction between the two moments concerned). I am not going to consider the relevant details of such a possibility here. For a persuasive programmatic explanation of the relationship between the relevant intellectual syntheses in judgment and the sensible syntheses of the manifold of sense involved here the *synthesis intellectualis* and the *synthesis speciose*; see Longuenesse 1998, 13, 243–47). For more detail, examine her elaboration of the case throughout the entirety of Part Three of the book.

11. For some much needed perspective on the empirical dimension of Kant's thought in general, and his moral anthropology in particular, see the work of Robert Louden 1992, 2000, 2003, 2011.

12. I am foreshadowing the important distinction between "inexponible" aesthetic ideas, and "indemonstrable" ideas of reason, which Kant discusses in connection with genius in section 49, and Remark I to section 57. In the former context, Kant writes: "by an aesthetic idea . . . I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for a determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible. . . . One sees readily that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate" (5: 314, 192). For an interesting perspective on the importance of the contrast between aesthetic ideas and ideas of reason, to which I shall return in chapter IV, see Longuenesse 1995/2007, 180.

13. It is pertinent to recall here Kant's contrast between the "visible" and "invisible church" from *Religion and Rational Theology*.

Chapter II

Ordinary Examples, Exemplary Symbols

II.I ABDUCTION AND ANALOGY AS FORMS OF INFERENCE AND OF COMPARISON

1. A suitable way to get into focus the central issues connected with the mechanics of analogical reasoning and symbolic cognition is to draw distinctions between different ways one may employ concepts to orient thinking. If one operates with a scalar conception of magnitude, of greater and lesser intensity or influence or scope, one may confect the following ordinary image of the rational faculty: if concepts are rules, and if such rules may be relatively specific or general, then different concepts may apply to not only different objects but also to greater or fewer numbers of objects, such numbers being decided upon in a myriad of ways (if concepts are said to be logically akin to spheres then they may be said to be, to encompass, parts and wholes of one another). Ordinary examples of conceptual application are cases that are unexceptional and of import for understanding how a concept may be applied primarily where a rule is inductively inferred. There is nothing about the ordinary that could make cases of it useful for the power of judgment in its guiding of the understanding in its capacity to judge, except when the ordinary is found in extraordinary numbers (and, ironically, it is constitutive of the ordinary that it is found in extraordinary, that is, vast, numbers).

2. Exemplary symbols are exceptional cases, special tokens of a type, and are of significant import for the understanding in its judgings, since they may serve, in one way or another, to mark what is distinctive about a conceptual rule, what is a principal consideration in seeing that it is applied, or in applying it.

Injunctions, commands for action, take the general imperative form of

Do A,

where in referencing an exemplary case that serves as a symbol for the concept of the action A, one proffers some singular thought to serve as a paradigm case for the concept of which it is an instance.[1] The same case holds for theoretical, empirical judgments:

This is an O,

where the object referred to as an O is taken to point up what a best case, or a case most indicative of what is meant, should be thought to consist in. There is a potential difficulty here that I shall flag and then ignore: it is not clear what the distinction is meant to be here between "most representative case" and "best case." For one, what counts as a best case of an empirical phenomenon may simply be the most ordinary example, since in empirical inquiry one often wants to know what a typical case is in order to formulate a theory of standard cases. In such contexts is not the most ordinary and common case the "best case"? It may well be. In the moral case where "best" is taken to mean "that which should be emulated," the issue is clearer, especially since best in this context most likely does not mean what is most common and this, if true, would reveal something deep about our conception of morality. In any case, the problem generalizes: when concerned with generally practical or specifically moral behavior what is common may indeed be what is most desirable, and in empirical cases, what is peculiar or uncommon may be a best case for the illustration of a rule (and not simply by way of exception; an exception may suggest or illustrate the existence of a rule or law hitherto unknown).

3. Such talk of concepts being used in greater or fewer numbers of cases, or simply for distinct regions of reality, is ordinary, yet the ordinariness masks complexity; we may question not only judgments about cases, and the supposed analogical relations certain cases may stand in to one another, but also the general system, or picture, of the reasoning that has such judgments, analogies, and inferences as place-fillers. Indeed, analogies are put to work and justified in analogical reasoning, which complements a specific form of syllogistic, the kind of reasoning by hypothesis, or abduction, referred to by C. S. Peirce in his paper "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis," where he proposed to reserve an important place for a kind of inference distinct from either deduction or induction. I take Peirce's article to mark a useful development of a key aspect of the semantico-epistemological framework latent in Kant's transcendental idealism, for although he does not speak of it as so, Peirce himself was steeped in Kant and the place of analogy in Kant's work is a clear point of contact with later developments in pragmatist accounts of

knowledge and meaning. (These remarks may serve as no more than a brief indication of the import I take the following reflections on Peirce to have.) The contrast Peirce proposed was that between the ways a rule, a case, and a result in a given syllogism relate rationally to one another:[2]

Deduction, which involves the *formally valid* inference of a result on the basis of a rule and a given case:

Major premise/Rule. All the beans from this bag are white.
Minor premise/Case. These beans are from this bag.
Conclusion/Result. These beans are white.

Induction, which involves the *probabilistic* inference of a rule from a case and a result:

Minor premise/Case. These beans are from this bag.
Conclusion/Result. These beans are white.
Major premise/Rule. All the beans from this bag are white.

Hypothesis that involves the inference of an *informally valid hypothesis* from a rule and a result:

Major premise/Rule. All the beans from this bag are white.
Conclusion/Result. These beans are white.
Minor Premise/Case. These beans are from this bag.

The last of the three figures of inference, hypothesis, or, inference to the minor premise, or more commonly, inference to the best explanation, abduction, involves an assumption that is structurally identical to an assumption made in analogical reasoning: one is first possessed of a rule that may be applied in reasoning (the major premise), and then one encounters a result, and on this basis infers something to be the case, where the something that is the case is a condition on the result. In Peirce's example, one begins with a rule about the beans from a bag, then encounters some beans, while being ignorant of their origin, and infers from the combination of the rule and the result that it is most likely the case that the beans are from the same bag described by the rule. Of course, such an inference is not formally valid, though as is evident, such modeling of a new case on past cases (beans from a certain bag all being white) is extremely useful, even indispensable, in the acquisition of knowledge: one moves from an epistemic position with positive content (knowledge about a bag, about beans, knowledge of a rule that describes the beans in the bag) to a new position that has consequences for encounters with novel beans of unknown origin. Novel beans of unknown origin are hypothesized to share an origin with beans one has previously encountered, since the rule describing the beans from the known bag also accurately describes the novel beans. The point is that there is a reasonable chance that the beans may be from the bag

one knows about though one does not know this for sure (the inference is only informally, and not formally, valid).

4. The relevance of this Peircean point can be formulated as follows: when one encounters some novel phenomenon that one does not understand, one is inclined to attempt understanding by comparison of the novel with the familiar, since familiar examples or principles may help one, by comparison of a case or in the application of a rule, with comprehension of the novel. In Peirce's example the hypothesis is proposed that the beans that appear similar to beans from some bag may themselves also be from that bag. The color of the beans is taken as a sufficient basis for the inference; the color is taken as a salient property that may indicate what other properties the beans may have (being from a certain bag). The move here involves the inference that a phenomenon may have certain properties on the basis of it having others, and that comparison with relevant cases may indicate what these additional properties may be: the bean *is white*, ergo the bean may be (might be, probably is) *from this bag* (the bag referred to in the rule).

5. This is all straightforward enough; how does it apply to Kant's talk about analogy? The basic move, in Peirce's account of abduction, is to infer additional properties on the basis of some given property. In the case of analogical reasoning, one compares two (or more) phenomena on the basis of how the properties of those phenomena relate internally, that is, in the context of the phenomenon to which they belong, of which they are properties. Consider how Kant's view about symbolic presentation may be portrayed in a simple analogy, as in his example of symbolism from section 59 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*:

> The inner principle of the handmill's functioning *stands to* its parts
> Just as
> The governing principle of a state *stands to* its people.

The analogy here is between the handmill and the state, and the analogy is constructed on the basis of a similarity between how the inner principle of each stands to its parts. The inner principle of each is a property it has, just as the parts and their arrangement within each constitute properties each has. The inference from these two cases, that they are similar, is based on the known internal structure of each. Compare abduction: When one proposes a hypothesis, one, according to Peirce, infers that some novel phenomenon may have additional unknown properties on the basis of it having known ones. Thus hypothesizing involves the assumption that a novel case is analogous to known ones, or some known one. Seen this way, abduction is expected to issue in fresh analogies made possible by the comparison of cases:

> Hypothesis: This novel phenomenon is like (analogous to,
> relevantly similar to) this known phenomenon.

> Analogy: Properties of a novel phenomenon stand to one another as properties of a known phenomenon stand to one another.

Note that in Peirce's example the properties of the novel beans stand to one another as the properties of the known beans do, as follows:

> The whiteness of the novel beans is explained by their being from a bag.
>
> The whiteness of the beans from a bag is explained by the rule governing beans from that bag (that it is a condition on their ending up in the bag that they first be white).

6. Here "explain" is taken in a distinctive sense: clearly the whiteness of the beans is not caused by their being from a bag, though their whiteness is correlated with their being from that bag, because there are only white beans in the bag (most likely, whiteness may be a criterion of a bean's entry into the bag in question, though it of course cannot be ruled out a priori that something in the bag may turn the beans in it white, the interior being coated with white paint, or the like). One needs to consider broader contexts to see how the relation between these circumstances could be illuminating.

7. Take a case where one has stashed thousands of sacks of black beans in one's living room, and consider that one evening one returns home to find a small pile of white beans on the floor. One is intrigued as to why there are white beans on the floor; one's question is why are these beans not black? (One is not confused as to why there are beans at all; one has many other beans scattered about the house.) So one may reasonably seek an explanation of why there are white beans, and the presence of the white beans may be explained by someone having brought over a bag of white beans to trade with black beans, some of the white ones having been accidently spilt on the floor in the process. Thus, the presence of the white beans is explained by, among other things, their coming from a bag that only held white beans, a bag whose contents being mishandled led to the mystery; further, their presence being explained negatively by their origins being other than the bags of black beans that previously populated one's house.

8. Notice that what is at issue here is exactly what fact one seeks to explain. This consideration is what influences the way a hypothesis leads to the formulation of an analogy between two (or more) phenomena. The hypothesis involves the inference to the existence of additional properties on the basis of some limited set (at worst, only one property); the analogy involves the suggestion that the novel phenomenon is analogous to the known phenomenon on the basis of the internal structure of each case being relevantly similar. So if one were to characterize the relation between these two dimensions

of reasoning (hypothesis, analogy), one could begin by formulating the full picture as follows:

i. One is possessed of axioms, rules, etc., which afford deductive chains of formally valid inferences. (Axioms + Deduction)
ii. One may be presented with novel cases that need to be assimilated into one's rational world-picture; these cases may be incorporated through accumulation of cases and probabilistic inferences on their basis. (Induction)
iii. One may be presented with novel cases that merit inclusion in one's rational world picture, but those cases may be only partially known relative to one's epistemic needs at some point in a reasoning process, thus requiring the extrapolation from known properties of these cases to possible unknown properties they might have. (Hypothesis/Abduction)
iv. One may wish to extrapolate from the suggested similarity between the novel case and the known case to form semantic connections between nodes in the epistemic network: by analogy, one may say the internal structure of the novel case is analogous to the internal structure of the known case. (Analogy)

9. At this point, we can introduce some variations on the idea of novelty, familiarity, and their frequency. The above suggestions for how to think of abduction and analogy rely on this trio of concepts, although how one thinks of these will determine what one thinks one is doing in reasoning abductively or analogically. The view taken on these themes may have a myriad of forms most pressingly, metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic.

10. Novelty may denote a characteristic of a phenomenon taken to have not been before encountered; familiarity is its opposite. Frequency describes the magnitude of encounters with the familiar and of the relative lack of familiarity with that taken to be novel. In taking something to be novel, one takes that thing, insofar as it has some aspect, property, quality, or the like, to have not been encountered before. The thing may be possessed of some aspects, properties, or qualities that are not novel, though in taking the thing to be itself novel, one is committed to thinking that the aspect in question is sufficiently salient to qualify the thing as novel. (Whether one would add "novel *in general*" here is, I think, a trivial further complication.)

11. In speaking of novelty and familiarity the tone is decidedly epistemic, but the flavor of the remark generalizes: novelty and familiarity may track, respectively, but in reverse, commonality, and its negation. In saying a phenomenon is common or uncommon, in some respect, one says that at least insofar as the property in question is concerned, it is as so. But what should we take this to mean? There are several alternatives: (i) the particular combination of properties in the phenomenon may have a certain frequency (in

general, or in one's encounters); (ii) the salient property of interest may itself have that frequency; (iii) the type the phenomenon is thought to be a token of may be thought to have that particular frequency.

12. Our list—structure, salient property, and type—affords a way of thinking about abduction and analogy. Let us take an example of a hat to illustrate the point: some hat may have a peculiar and rare combination of otherwise common qualities, such as being (a) peaked (cap), yet being made of leather, being blue, and having a fur lining. How should one evaluate frequency here? In terms of frequency in general, all existing known phenomena of the universe considered? Or frequency by type? If the latter, at what categorial level does one define type? By item of clothing, hat, hat type (cap)? Or does one select a property the object has and define it as object-with-property, rather than type-of-object? What difference would one's botanizing make? One clear difference is at the level of reasoning about the object in question, in placing it with respect to other objects, and objects in general, and, further, the sum-total of all objects considered as a systematic unity.[3]

13. With the general line of interest in the connection between hypothetical reasoning and analogical reasoning established, we turn now to analogy itself, albeit in more detail. It is the place of analogy in the general structure of our reasoning, a paradigm case of which occurs in symbolic hypotyposis, which we now examine. This examination is aided by acknowledgment of the contrast Kant drew between mathematical construction of concepts and philosophical cognition from concepts. This distinction between mathematical and philosophical cognition will here concern us insofar as it bears upon the question of how symbolic presentations fit into the systematic unity of rational cognition in general. We thus do well to acknowledge the main points and consequences of Kant's views of the distinction between these forms of cognition in order that their bearing on the analogical function of symbolic cognition may be understood in the wider context of the idea of a sum total of cognitions considered as a systematic unity. We find the official definition of this distinction drawn in the section of the Doctrine of Method entitled "The discipline of pure reason":

> Philosophical cognition . . . considers the particular only in the universal, but mathematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeed even in the individual, yet nonetheless, a priori and by means of reason so that just as this individual is determined under certain general conditions of construction, the object of the concept, to which this individual corresponds only as its schema, must likewise be thought as universally determined. (A714/B741)

The import of this passage is as follows: since philosophical cognition from concepts, qua analysis, considers the particular only in the universal, it cannot represent a synthetic whole of cognition, but only be guided by a

rule that would bring it about that a plurality or sum total of cognitions be guided under an idea of a singular totality of rational cognition attributable to a subject who may be thought of, regulatively, as having a soul (see the Paralogisms, and the second section of the appendix to the Dialectic), being as-if a substance. Mathematical cognition in its activity of presenting rational ideas of magnitude in intuition, constructs particular, "even singular," cases of universal ideas, as in, for instance, the representation of the idea of a triangle, empirical cases of which are always equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, but the pure idea of which, the triangular figure, need not be any of these three but rather merely be the idea of a three-sided figure.[4] This point is put by Kant in the following passage:

> Now philosophy as well as mathematics does deal with magnitudes, e.g., with totality, infinity, etc. And mathematics also occupies itself with the difference between lines and planes as spaces with different quality, and with the continuity of extension as a quality of it. But although in such cases they have a common object, the manner of dealing with it through reason is entirely different in philosophical than in mathematical consideration. The former confines itself solely to general concepts, the latter cannot do anything with the mere concepts but hurries immediately to intuition, in which it considers the concept *in concreto*, although not empirically, but rather solely as one which it has exhibited a priori, i.e., constructed, and in which that which follows from the general conditions of the construction must also hold generally of the object of the constructed concept. (A715–16/B743–44)

To generalize the point and apply it to the idea of cognition as a whole, we may say the following: any philosophical thought of a sum total of cognition, considered as singular, that is, thought in terms of the categories of quantity: a plurality of particular cognitions thought of as a singular totality of cognition can be no more than a transcendental condition of thinking of one's one thoughts as belonging to a single subject, oneself. This familiar topic is that with which Kant is occupied in the Paralogisms, and, in a related sense, in the Transcendental Deduction. Here we note simply how this idea of a sum total of cognition relates to a mathematical cognition of totality: the concept of totality may be represented in mathematical cognition as a whole, a single plane figure, for instance. The intuition of a figure as an extended expanse is entirely commonplace, although the analogical inference that cognition as a whole, either in one's own thinking, in actual humanity, or in terms of all merely possible thoughts, may objectively be presented as such, in philosophical terms, is entirely devoid of sense. For though it may be permissible, useful, even necessary, for a thinker to represent to themselves some symbol of theirs, or humanity's, actual and possible thinking as a whole, such an analogical presentation a priori of the mere idea of a totality can have no more

than regulative and therefore subjective validity. (The discussion of the regulative function of the pure concepts of reason in both parts of the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic may be favorably compared in this connection; see, especially, A683–87/B711–15.)

14. Further into his discussion, Kant characterizes philosophical and mathematical cognition as involving two different uses of reason: "the use of reason in accordance with concepts" (A723/B751), and "the use of reason through construction of concepts" (A723–24/B751–52). It will be recalled that hypotyposis was to be thought of as the presentation a priori of intuitions that match a concept, where the schematic involves direct presentation, the symbolic indirect. Assuming such hypotyposis to involve philosophical legislation by reason, namely, in it being construed to be the case that empirical matters and rational matters stand in some analogical relation, the question may be raised as to how such construing to be the case may involve some rational construction. It must be asked what kind of rational cognition would be involved with finding the empirical to be analogical to a rational idea; would the a priori presentation of a concept of reason involve either rational cognition from concepts, rational construction of concepts (in intuition), or both? And what would be the consequences of each of these possibilities for a vision of rationality?

15. Incredibly, in the context of offering an explanation of the transcendental function of the categories, Kant frames mathematical cognition in such a way as to suggest that certain components of symbolic hypotyposis may involve something akin to it, or even may involve actual mathematical cognition, even if in an unfamiliar sense, insofar as symbolic hypotyposis involves the merely indirect presentation of a priori concepts. The relevant passage is worth quoting at length:

> To decide about everything that exists (a thing in space and time) whether and how far it is or is not a quantum [the function of the judgments and categories of quantity: universal, particular, singular; unity, plurality, totality], whether existence or the lack thereof must be represented in it [judgments and categories of quality: affirmative, negative, infinite; reality, negation, limitation], how far this something (which fills space or time) is a primary substratum or mere determination, whether it has a relation of its existence to something else as cause or effect, and finally whether with regard to its existence it is isolated or in reciprocal dependence with others [judgments and categories of relation: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive; inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community and reciprocity]; to decide about the possibility, actuality, and necessity of its existence or the opposites thereof [judgments and categories of modality: problematic, assertoric, apodictic; possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency]: all of this belongs to rational cognition from concepts, which is called philosophical. But to determine an

> intuition a priori in space (shape), to divide time (duration), or merely to cognize the universal in the synthesis of one and the same thing in time and space and the magnitude of an intuition in general (number) which arises from that: that is a concern of reason through construction of the concepts, and is called mathematical. (A724/B752)

We are here interested especially in the final sentence, where the topic of determining an intuition a priori is raised. What is meant here in speaking of the a priori determination of an intuition? How might this a priori determination relate to the a priori presentation of a concept, as being instanced symbolically in empirical intuition? A response does well to proceed by way of contrast with schematic hypotyposis: direct presentation a priori of pure concepts of the understanding is discovered to have taken place in cognition through reflection on the nature of experience; reflection on experience reveals to one that the categories are at work as transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience:

> However, it may be with the possibility of concepts from pure reason, they are not merely reflected concepts, but inferred concepts. Concepts of the understanding are also thought *a priori* before experience and on behalf of it, but they contain nothing beyond the unity of reflection on appearances, insofar as these appearances are supposed to belong to a possible empirical consciousness. (A310/B366–67)

Symbolic hypotyposis, however, involves the activity of reason in one taking it that certain empirical items are analogical to ideas that only reason can think. How can such symbolic cognition be permitted the conclusion that the empirical is analogical to the rational? Unlike in the case of the categories, it cannot be said that reflection reveals to one that pure concepts of reason were all along at work in making it that experience was presented as containing items analogical to ideas only reason could think. As Kant writes, the determination of the shape of an intuition in space, the division of it in time as to its duration, *and* even the cognition of "the universal in the synthesis of one and the same thing in time and space and the magnitude of an intuition in general (number) which arises from that," all these actions are the "concern of reason through construction of the concepts, and is called mathematical." Since presentation of certain empirical phenomena as being analogical to concepts of reason necessarily involves the presentation of a rational idea that one cannot be said to find in experience, even reflectively so, might it not, therefore, involve the analogical construction of a nonmathematical concept that nevertheless may be thought in mathematical terms in certain respects,

insofar as it is necessarily subject to mathematical cognition, being an item found in possible experience? What could this mean?

16. Kant tells us in section 26 of the Analytic of the Sublime that "estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic." So, in general, it is the aesthetic power of judgment that makes possible the sensible presentation of concepts of magnitude, yet how does this aesthetic power of judgment connect with philosophical (nonmathematical) concepts of magnitude? The connection must be in the power of judgment's cooperation with reason, in the latter's capacity as making possible philosophical cognition about concepts of magnitude (infinity, totality, etc.). Our suggestion is as follows: nonmathematical rational cognition, philosophical cognition, involved in the analogical presentation of nonmathematical concepts (goodness, fairness, empirical grandeur as sublime, etc.) may nevertheless necessarily involve, and perhaps not merely permit, mathematical concepts of magnitude, thought in various ways (extension, duration, number, etc.).[5] That is, in symbolizing philosophical concepts of magnitude, and in further cognition about such philosophical concepts of magnitude, properly mathematical concepts of magnitude may become involved. Indeed, mathematical concepts may need to be constructed by reason in order that the nonmathematical elements of the rational cognition are adequately presented, albeit analogically. This is to say that certain concepts of magnitude, forms of mathematical cognition, may be indispensable for the power of judgment in making hypotyposes possible. In particular, the rational evaluation of the empirical, where the empirical is taken to be analogical to the rational, involves it being taken so that the empirical has relevant proportions, proportions of goodness, fairness, and empirical grandeur, which, as involving the construction of concepts of magnitude in intuition, are mathematical (and all this despite the fact that when judging of action one judges not what is merely sensible, movement, but "the inner principles of action which one does not see").[6] Thus, the mathematical may be indispensable for the power of judgment in general, and not merely, as is claimed in the Analytic of the Sublime in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, for certain kinds of aesthetic judgments that partake of what Kant calls a "feeling of spirit" (First Introduction, 20: 151, 50), and which, unlike judgments of taste, involve emotion and a "stronger outpouring of the vital force" (5: 226, 111).[7] I will however not yet approach the issue in general terms (we come to that in IV.II); the next section will consider the more specific question of the bearing of the idea of magnitude on the employment of symbolic cognition to frame the idea of a limit and boundary to reason and cognition in general.

II.II QUANTITY AND MAGNITUDE: THE IDEA OF A SUM TOTAL OF PROPERTIES

1. We are faced with questions about how in a generally Kantian view, the concepts of quantity and magnitude stand with respect to the idea of a property (note the subject/accident pair, relevant for talk of properties, belongs to Kant's categorical categories of relation). The foregoing discussion of hypothesizing about possible unknown properties of phenomena alluded to the idea of the ordinary, or common, and the extraordinary, or exemplary, where the former were assumed to be instanced in vast numbers, the latter not. This contrast, and the associated alignment of the ordinary with the common and unexceptional, and the exemplary with the exceptional and rare, may now be clarified a touch. This clarification may take some common features of conceptual activity (since properties are expressed by concepts), and combine them with some general features of Kant's view about the capacity to judge, and the power of judgment.

2. Conceptual activity may be characterized schematically in the following ordinary ways; it

1. Is constitutive of thought, since thought may (typically, although need not in all cases) be true or false;
2. Is constitutive of communication, since utterances may (typically, although need not in all cases) be true or false;
3. Involves concept users following, or attempting to follow, at least in *some* cases, rules (lest they always fail to be intelligible); assuming rule-following consists at least in rule-followers thinking and acting under assumptions about what (thought, action) means what, what (thought, action) signifies what;
   - 3.1 Involves the subsumption of the particular under the universal;
     - 3.11 In thinking of a particular as of a kind, one thinks of it *as* an example, a sample; one takes an individual a certain way; a *singular* is thought of as a *particular* instance of a *universal*.
     - 3.12 To take an individual in a certain way is to prioritize, in one's thought about it, a quality or property it is taken to have. The sphere to which any such qualities or properties belong cannot be determined without doing dogmatic violence to one's modal commitments, unless the restriction is the trivial consequence of choosing to talk *about* something in a certain way.
     - 3.13 In subsuming a particular under a universal (an act of judgment that is expressive of logical quantity) one is open to the question of the extent to which that particular is representative of that universal. This kind of question is expressive of logical

quality, the intensive magnitude of the property that announces itself in sense.

3.14 The intensive magnitude of properties encountered in sense may be defined in a scalar manner ($0 > 1$), where 0 is the imaginary limit of the absence of the property, 1 being the imaginary limit of maximal instantiation of the property.[8] This range of intensity has at each extreme a failure of satisfaction: at 0 the property is absent, at 1, the idea of a perfect (say, complete) instantiation of the property can only be postulated as the ideal terminus represented by Kant's transcendental ideal.[9]

3.141 What is the maximal instantiation of a property? Two responses together capture the scope of a problem about maximality:

i. Maximal satisfaction is the potentially infinite sum total of all possible satisfactions of that property: all variations permissible in all possible (spatiotemporal, if experiential in Kant's sense) circumstances.

ii. Maximality is a property of a singular, an individual, which serves as the paradigm case that gives the rule, is the archetypical expression of what it takes to have followed the rule in question.

3.15 Inevitably, predication, as being determined logically by the metaphysical fact of intensity (a qualitative range of satisfactions of a property) invites comparison, in judgment, between any given particular and the postulated (metaphysically imaginary or empirically chosen) case of an archetype. Thus, to think of a particular as of a type, as satisfying a property, is to open up the possibility of inferences based on groupings and resemblances between instances of the type in question, since this is what being of a type consists in.

3.151 What could the difference between a metaphysically imaginary archetype and an empirically chosen prototype consist in? The former, by definition, has no instances or exemplifications; its import is thus in the form of a rational grouping principle for judgment, its function in the form of a demand for finding (empirically) or creating (artifactually) or (en)acting (generally practically, or specifically morally), its place in thought therefore expressive of what *is not* but yet *might be*.

The latter can only ever be a given particular that is taken *in* its singularity: its individuality expanded from an instance at a time and a place into

a universe of an infinitude of qualities, or tokens of that type of quality (depending on how one employs grouping principles), which no other may duplicate but with which others may be compared. (The imagery is that of a Leibnizian monad.)

Our question here is: Which of these two models is the most appropriate for portraying Kant's conception of a symbol? That is, is Kant's conception of symbolic cognition best thought of as involving (1) maximal satisfaction, qua the potentially infinite sum total of all possible satisfactions of that property, all variations permissible in all possible (spatiotemporal, if experiential in Kant's sense) circumstances; or (2) maximality, qua the property of a singular, an individual, which serves as the paradigm case which gives the rule, is the archetypical expression of what it takes to have followed the rule in question?

3. At first glance, the former portrayal seems a schema, the latter a symbol, for a schema was meant to consist in rulish prescriptions or reflective descriptions of conceptual activity, whereas symbols were meant to indicate what would count as a satisfactory, although ultimately pale, empirical rendering of an idea. A schema would indicate how to find or ascertain or determine which examples or cases satisfied some rule; a schema ought therefore be able to cover all cases, as referred to by the example of a sum total of all that would satisfy a concept. And as the former recommendation for an interpretation of maximal satisfaction above pointed out, such a sum total could be regarded as infinite, given the qualification that all possible instances of a property in all possible circumstances, all possible relations to other objects and properties, cannot be fixed as finite a priori. For its part, a symbol is a singular, yet a singular which is meant to present, imperfectly, the infinitely renewable call for perfection, or the search for perfection, in the world of sense, where its proper form is that of an idea only reason can think. What is the significance of the opposition between these two presentations of the idea of maximal satisfaction?

4. Let us now recall a promissory note issued in chapter I, paragraph 28, regarding the idea of a best case. Earlier we had raised the concern of being able to connect an idea only reason could think with an empirical symbol taken to indirectly present it; we had said the idea of a best case would later occupy us. Here we ought to connect the idea of a best case with the idea of maximal satisfaction in order to remark a little upon what it might take to be a best case, and what maximal satisfaction might have to do with such a thing.

5. Our first description of maximal satisfaction, as of a potentially infinite sum total of satisfactions of some predicate, might not easily be thought of as a case, rather as a set of cases, but even if we accept the equivocation of a set with a case, of a set of cases as itself a case, we may wonder whether the error is merely one of category. The demand that a case be all possible cases strikes us as incoherent, thus we may wish to reformulate the proposal as follows: since

a case cannot present the properties of all possible cases, suppose a given case, the model of a best case, be taken to possess certain of the relevant qualities of this entire set of all possible cases in the following way. Take the example of a uniformly colored object to be evaluated in aesthetic terms; assume a blue object. Now suppose that the way the object is to be evaluated hierarchically with respect to other blue objects is determined, as it must be, by one's interest in the object, interest that is, which is purely aesthetic and based on appreciation and not selfish satisfaction. This aesthetic interest may be cashed out in arguments that defend the virtue of some blue object, which is less of a problem per se than it is a qualification to be noted. Yet, how might one go about comparing cases of different kinds of blue objects, each colored, possible, with an array of vastly different blues, not to mention their occurring in certain contexts and being affected by surrounding colors and their presentations in neighboring objects? How might one, that is, begin to justify the choice of one over others as most virtuous, supposing one takes the task as coherent?

6. Whatever route one takes to justifying some choice of combination of object, color, and context, the rationalization is going to have to defend the virtuousness of such a combination over others. That is, the justification is going to rest on one having chosen, from the potentially infinite set of combinations, some combination rather than any other. Notice the determination of the best case is therefore no more than that which ordinarily takes place in speculation or advent in fiction: determination of what suits, according to certain purposes and preferences. The point is that the selection is here explicitly determined by the range of the sum total of possibilities. How does this compare with the description of maximal satisfaction in our second account above, that of a singular case of maximal satisfaction as in accord with a definition of the best possible?

7. Before accounting for this alternative, let us once again note the way the alternatives were expressed:

> Maximal satisfaction is the potentially infinite sum total of all possible satisfactions of that property all variations permissible in all possible (spatiotemporal, if experiential in Kant's sense) circumstances.

> Maximality is a property of a singular, an individual, which serves as the paradigm case that gives the rule, is the archetypical expression of what it takes to have followed the rule in question.

It was just noted above that if the former characterization were to be employed, it would either constitute a category error, or if coherent would seem to simply lapse into the latter characterization. That is, in determining a best case one selects from the sum-total and employs the idea of a singular object as the unity or locus of those properties that are deemed to together

constitute a best case. But there is a slight complication: there is a coherent sense in which maximal satisfaction is exemplification in all possible cases, even if the logic of categories forbids one from describing the first option as an example of a best case. But is the problem merely terminological? Perhaps maximal satisfaction is appropriate terminology for both of our original descriptions, as above, but "best case" is appropriate only for our second option. Would the consequence be no more than the trivial one that we must follow such reasonable restrictions in employing the two phrases? I suggest there is one worthwhile conclusion here, which points up what is at issue: we may say that maximally satisfying some property is to be thought of not as satisfying it in every possible circumstance, as in the first, but rather as satisfying it better than any other case. For why would one be concerned about all possible cases when one could instance a case that trumps all others? And one could even qualify this insistence with the allowance that what constitutes a best case is contextually determined, there therefore being a best case for any pair of purpose-relative-to-context. This allowance would be a slightly unusual way of stating the platitude that for each person looking to satisfy a purpose in a certain context, there is some best way to satisfy that purpose. And this is hardly controversial if one adds to it that it may be undecidable exactly what such a best case is, though one may wish to say there is one, simply for the purpose of ranking cases against each other. This is so much as to say that no matter how long one spent deciding which blue object one liked best, there could possibly be another that one would rank above it. One may wonder about the sanity of such procedures, though their coherence is hardly to be doubted as a slightly peculiar case of something quite common. The problem for Kant, as we saw in chapter I, was that of deciding how some symbol could count as an indirect presentation of an idea, how reason was supposed to relate to the world of sense. As we acknowledged, it was his formulation of our faculties as common that provided the key to saving what might otherwise appear a strenuous demand on our ordinary thinking; we can say the kernel of the idea is no more odd than saying that there is a collective process of justification of preferences that takes place in ordinary reasoning, and each individual involved both responds to communally determined standards while at the same time contributing to them. What more can be said about this will evince itself below.

II.III JUDGMENTAL AND INFERENTIAL ACTIVITY

1. At the end of chapter I, an account of the judgmental and inferential activity involved with ordinary and exemplary cognition, that is, about examples and symbols, was promised. With the above schema and possible definitions

of completeness offered in II.II, we are now in a position to add an account of the determinative and reflective powers of judgment, as well as of the epi-syllogistic and prosyllogistic activity of reason, and, the connection between these judgmental and inferential structures. Such structure will provide groundwork for chapter III.

2. In the First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment,* Kant presents the following definitions:

> The power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for reflecting on a given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible, or as a faculty for determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the reflecting, the second case the determining power of judgment. To reflect (to consider), however, is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one's faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible. The reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging. (20: 211, 15)

Some distinctions are required here. In saying "the reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging," Kant equates the reflecting power of judgment with the pure understanding, since the understanding is the faculty of judging; thus claiming the understanding is itself essentially reflective. As argued by Beatrice Longuenesse at length,[10] the action by which the understanding comes to the manifold of the sensible given is to be understood first and foremost in terms of the reflective activity made possible by the logical functions of judgment: the forms of judgment are ways by which the understanding organizes its cognitions, which may subsequently be discovered by reflection on experience. The categories are an expression of the logical functions of judgment in the form of single concepts. So the reflective power of judgment involves finding concepts for objects; inversely, the determinative power of judgment involves finding objects for concepts. These inverse structures will occupy us below.

3. In addition to the above contrast, the determining power of judgment is in our citation characterized as involving "determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation." Should we understand the determination of a concept as alike to the determination of an object, a thing, that is, in the attribution of "marks" to it? Suppose we were to do so, this would provide us with the following structure:

i. Determinations of a concept may consist in:

i-a. BY CONCEPT: Positive vertical relations: the superordination of it to other concepts (those included in it: living -> animal -> mammal -> primate -> human);

i-b. BY CONCEPT: Positive vertical relations: the subordination of it to other concepts (which it is included in: human -> primate -> mammal -> animal -> living);

i-c. BY OBJECT: Having objects subsumed under it. Hereby an intension is determined by its extensions.

ii. Determinations of an object may consist in:

ii-a. BY CONCEPT: Categorial placement: definition of an object as of a type, as having essential properties (note that for Kant one can never claim more than empirical necessity that *if* something is of a certain type it would be a certain way, obey certain rules, or behave certain ways, etc.; contrariwise, laws such as that expressed by "every effect has a cause" are transcendentally necessary and are grounded on the categories of cause and effect and the logical function of hypothetical judgment);

ii-b. BY CONCEPT: Property determination: attribution of accidental positive qualities (red);

ii-c. BY CONCEPT: Property determination: attribution of accidental negative qualities (non-red).

NB: Objects are only determined by other objects in a material sense which, as defined in terms of real modality, has conceptual conditions (given transcendental idealism). I shall not be concerned with this topic further, except to say that one of most important ideas for material determination as given in conceptual terms above is the idea of contrary categorial determinations standing in mutual exclusion. This ii-c provides in outline, the key idea here being pursued below in III.II, in connection with Kant's logical form of infinite judgment; for now the above outline of schemas of concept-determination and object-determination will suffice to make the points about judgmental and inferential activity we need to make.

4. The above schema[11] can be converted into an array of points that will serve to demonstrate how the structures of judgmental and inferential activity bear on the ideas of common and exemplary cognitions:

(i) Conceptual superordination and subordination are coeval with classification (20: 214, 18) and involve the development of categorial hierarchy. The inferential counterpart of this activity is the prosyllogostic ascent to the unconditioned (A322–23/B379; cf. A331/B387–88). Classification involves the ascent from the particular to the general.

(ii) Specification, the inverse procedure (20: 214–15, 18), involves the episyllogistic descent to the conditioned (A331/B387–88); here "one specifies the general concept by adducing the manifold under it." Specification involves the descent from the general to the particular by a "complete division" of the former. It is therefore to be compared to the process of syllogizing disjunctively, proceeding from a highest category to a lowest through a continual elimination of alternatives.

(iii) Finding objects for concepts involves both the determination of a concept by objects, as well as the determination of an object by a concept. This process is made possible by the determining power of judgment.

(iv) A concept is determined in determinative judgment by having an object found for it; such determination of a concept consists in the specification of a satisfaction of it, a demonstration of what counts as satisfaction of it, as in its extension.

(v) An object is determined in determinative judgment by being included in the intension of a concept already in one's possession. In determinative judgment an object is added to, and included in, the extension, and thereby specified in the intension, of a concept, either explicitly or implicitly.

(vi) Finding concepts for objects is a determination of an object by concepts, as well as a determination of concepts by an object, and is made possible by the reflective power of judgment.

(vii) A concept is determined in reflective judgment by it being demonstrated what objects fall under it, by it being shown how the intension of that concept subsumes some object.

(viii) An object is not strictly determined in reflective judgment, since reflective judgment consists in subjectively valid predications that place a cognition of an object with respect to other cognitions and the entire faculty of cognition itself, though do not involve finding an objective property of an object.

(ix) The reflective power of judgment, when it is directed at finding concepts for objects in either aesthetic or teleological judgments, is "merely"[12] reflective; that is, aesthetic and teleological judgments fail to determine objects, but rather indicate a certain subjectively valid function that the concept allows the object to have in our thinking.

(x) The reflective power of judgment also, however, is that which is actualized in the pure understanding's activity of forming empirical judgments, as thus in the formation of empirical concepts through the process of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. In this latter activity, which is a precondition for properly determinative judgment about

empirical objects where empirical concepts are applied, the pure understanding performs a double-task of first reflecting on the sensible given, then determining objects as appearances. Note that the phrasing here, as of a "double-task," recalls the language used by Kant in speaking of symbolic hypotyposis.

Since these structures pertain to conceptual determination generally, they may be said to stand equally for all common cognitions. Yet our more pressing question was whether and how cognition of the exemplary, symbolic cognition, may be shown to fit here. The Kantian view examined in chapter I included the claim that symbolic hypotyposes were "as-if" presentations of ideas that only reason could think; symbols of ideas were meant to be inadequate and partial, but nevertheless useful, presentations of concepts of reason. As adduced above in II.II, the idea of a symbol could be thought of in two broad ways; as either a presentation of all that could be thought in a concept, or, as the perfect presentation of a certain concept, here forestalling the question of what a perfect presentation of concept could be. As we remarked previously, in both cases we are presented with an idea of "completeness": completeness as

All satisfactions of a concept
The best satisfaction of a concept

It is clear the latter is that which Kant intends, with the qualification that what counts as "best" or as "complete" is in symbolic presentation limited by empirical conditions. So a symbol is the best satisfaction of a concept possible, within the conditions of experience.

5. The above definition of a symbol as a complete presentation of a concept, as in a best (empirical) case of that which satisfies a pure concept of reason, can now be augmented through consideration of the account given in paragraph 4.III of "finding objects for concepts," as in determinative judgment, and in paragraph 4.IV of "finding concepts for objects," as in reflective judgment. Our question is: Does symbolic hypotyposis count as, or as structurally similar to, finding an object for a concept or as finding a concept for an object? In symbolic hypotyposis, has reason, thanks to the power of judgment, been able to find an object for one of its concepts (say, of moral perfection, exemplary beauty, or the like), or has reason found a concept that one may say is symbolized by the object in question? What is the order of priority here? Note this recapitulates our original concern about indirect presentation as remarked upon in chapter I where hypotyposis was first introduced. In order to answer the question as raised here, it must be asked by what procedure one arrives at a symbolic cognition, in what way one comes

to think symbolically, say in Kant's example of the handmill symbolizing the state. Does one first judge of a handmill, and only then decide cognition of it may be merely analogous to a certain sociopolitical configuration; or, does one have some concept of a sociopolitical configuration, only then to find in the world of sense some symbol for it? (Note the question here is about conditions of possibility, not history.)

6. The question of the ordering of procedure matters here; in claiming an analogy between two things (objects, concepts) one must already have had in mind that which is to be seen as symbolized, for even if, temporally considered, one is first confronted by an empirical item that one only after takes to be analogous to some idea, one must have had that idea in one's thinking prior. And if one is initially meditating on some idea with the intent, inchoate, or otherwise, to express its nature analogically, then one has it in mind prior to judging of an empirical phenomenon as analogical to it. In accordance with the definition of the determining power of judgment as "finding objects for concepts," this would make symbolic hypotyposis akin to the determining of objects in judgment, though in this case, the judgment is a judgment of reason rather than of the understanding,[13] since reason is the source of the concept that is judged to be symbolized by the empirical item in question. However, the comparison is imperfect, since the status of a presentation of a concept only reason can think in judgment, as being analogical, complicates matters. These complications can be expressed as follows:

a. Symbolic hypotyposis is a presentation of an a priori concept in analogical form;

This requires a distinction to be made, internal to the presentation's possibility:

b. Analogy presupposes the possibility of comparing two things, and claiming some basis for their similarity. In Kant's case, the analogy is between the internal structure of the two objects or concepts; their being relevantly similar, the parts of each being related in a relevantly similar way.

Further, the making of an analogy presupposes a further reasoning process, at least implicit in the bringing about of hypotyposis:

c. Abduction, inference to the best explanation, or hypothesis, plays the basic rational role of finding empirical symbols for rational ideas: by hypothesis, it is supposed that some property or properties of some empirical thing can be explained by their being compared analogically to some other thing, whose internal constitution and relations to external causes, etc., are understood.[14]

So since the "determination" of an empirical item as being analogous to some concept of reason only concerns certain of its properties, specifically, their relation to one another (4: 357–58, 108), it may be asked if this determination is determination proper; is the determination of the empirical object, or determination of the relation of the inner structure of the object to the inner structure of a concept of reason? That is, does analogy consist in the two objects or concepts each being determined, or does analogy consist in the relation between two objects or concepts being determined? Or does the latter also anyway imply the former? And can a relation in any case be determined? In anticipation of remarks made below in chapter III, it may be said that it is the peculiar idea of determining the relation of two structures to each other, two analogous internal structures of two separate objects or concepts that is distinctive of the import of symbolic cognition. What we may take from the above account of judgmental structures is that reason's activity in hypotyposis, in conjunction with the power of judgment, is determinative in that reason begins with a concept and seeks out an analogue of it, a symbol of it. The determination, however, is not of that empirical object, but of the relation that empirical object's internal structure stands in to the internal structure of an idea.[15]

NOTES

1. Note Kant uses "instance" (*Beispiel*) and "example" (*Exempel*) as near equivalents. Their commonality consists in their being common, ordinary cases, cases unexceptional.

2. The examples are adapted from Peirce 1992, 188. An excellent discussion of the relation of Peirce's view about abduction to Hegel's view of the logic of judgment can be found in Redding 2003. I take it the points Redding makes about the connection with Hegel give support also to what I have just claimed is a properly Kantian origin of the talk about analogy in the formation of systematically unified knowledge (an examination of the Judgment and the Syllogism chapters of the Subjective Logic suggests Hegel's reworking of Kant's logical functions of judgments involved some integration of points raised by Kant in the *Jäsche Logic* about analogy).

3. On the topic of determination by category in a sense which will become relevant below in III.I, see Prior 1949a.

4. This example is found in the Schematism chapter (A140–41/B180), in the discussion of the function of schemata of the categories in bringing it about that empirical concept formation be guided by transcendental synthetic a priori principles.

5. See section 26 of the third Critique, entitled "On the estimation of the magnitude of things in nature that is requisite for the idea of the sublime."

6. *Prolegomena*, 4: 407, 164–65.

7. Section 9 (also §§39 and 49: "Spirit in an aesthetic significance, means the animating principle in the mind" [5: 313]) of the Analytic of Beauty, "Investigation

of the question: whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former," and Longuenesse 2005, 275, on this.

8. In the discussion of intensive magnitudes in the Anticipations of Perception Kant does not appeal to such a decimal standard as I have here (0 > 1), although the employment of this standard notation does no violence to the thoughts he expresses.

9. See the Ideal of Pure Reason, specifically the Transcendental Ideal, for a discussion of the idea of the *ens realissimum* as the "most real being," which contains all predicates *within* (not merely under) itself. The *ens realissimum*, as Henry Allison has remarked, is the "philosophical kernel of the idea of God" Allison 2004, 396.

10. First and foremost in Longuenesse 1998, yet also in chapters 1–3 of her 2005b.

11. In speaking of the mutual determination of objects and concepts, it is worth noting Kant insists one cannot construct definitions in philosophy, but rather only offer results of analysis of concepts, thereby delivering expositions rather than amplifications of cognition. He says of definitions: "One makes use of certain marks only as long as they are sufficient for making some distinctions; new observations, however, take some away and add some, and therefore the concept never remains within secure boundaries. And in any case what would be the point of defining such a concept?" (A728/B756) See the surrounding context for a more expansive take on his reasoning here, and for the contrast, he draws between philosophical and mathematical definitions; at A730/B758 he insists philosophical definitions are merely analytical expositions, rather than synthetic constructions, as in the case of mathematics.

12. This usage of "merely" is taken from Longuenesse 1998, 163–66, and the general interpretation of the relation between reflective and determinative judgment here is that advanced in her book.

13. On a related topic, concerned with the possibility of moral judgment, see Longuenesse 2003/2005. I am not concerned with the mechanics of symbolized moral ideas here, rather with generalities regarding the idea of symbols themselves, so I will decline to connect Longuenesse's important discussion from the points I am making here.

14. Note we are here recapitulating points from II.I above.

15. I will not here investigate how empirical concept formation might relate to symbolic hypotyposis, where one is endeavoring to judge symbolically and thereby also form empirical concepts which serve as counterparts, for the understanding, of the concepts of reason for which one seeks symbols. If one were to pursue this issue key remarks about empirical concept formation can be found in the third Critique, at 20: 220, 23: "To every empirical concept, namely, there belongs three actions of the self-active faculty of cognition: (1) the apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the manifold of intuition; (2) the comprehension, i.e., the synthetic unity of the consciousness of this manifold in the concept of an object (*apperceptio comprehensiva*); (3) the presentation (*exhibitio*) of the object corresponding to this object in intuition. For the first action imagination is required, for the second understanding, for the third the power of judgment, which, if it is an empirical concept that is at issue, would be the determining power of judgment."

Chapter III

Structures of Conceptual Determination

1. Thus far, I have been considering a Kantian thesis about conceptual determination, about the place that capacities and instances of a priori presentation, or presentation of a priori concepts (of the understanding and of reason) have in a picture of a system of rational thought and knowledge. It stands to be clarified what the structure of this so-called "rational picture" may be, what it takes to have, or to develop such a thing in one's thinking, or collectively. Clarification of the most general outline of this, bases for which I claim to find in Kant, is our task for this chapter; study of requisite credentials, capacities, abilities, or opportunities to bear such tasks or qualities must be postponed as a topic for another place (a beginning on this is made in chapter IV).

2. For now, the central concern is the idea of the conceptual capacities of a rational being involving mediation by, movement between, two poles that stand at either extreme of the conceptual order. This view is well thought of as part of Kant's vision of the epistemic capabilities of the human being as well as of his metaphysical outlook upon what may count as an object of knowledge (the question of whether there are possible objects of knowledge whose nature outstrips our own capacities for knowledge, in other than a natural sense, is a question I shall postpone until chapter IV.II where we consider the idea of reshaping the space of epistemic possibilities). Our focus is with the structuring of Kant's vision by certain rational principles whose conjunction, when augmented and explicated, affords a uniquely compelling theory of what systematically unified knowledge and thought is, and also what it takes to be a rational knower and thinker possessed of such.

3. On the one hand, if a thinker is to think at all they must be possessed of singular thoughts about individual things, which for Kant are given the handle "empirical intuitions"; on the other, rational thinkers are according to him ineluctably led to the idea of a "sum total" or "all," which is an expression

of the systematic unity which purportedly characterizes the conceptual order: that to which all thoughts belong. In the first case, we encounter that which is most specific, most individual, in the latter, that which is most general, most common, and potentially sharable by all inculcated into conceptual capacities in some way or other. This all-encompassing idea may be conceived ontologically as a domain of truths, facts, all predicates or properties,[1] etc.; it may be conceived semantically as communicable information in the form of sentences or parts of speech; it may also be considered epistemically as all of that which is known and held in common. It is important, however, that one not assume from the outset either of the extremes (the individual, the sum total or all) has, considered independently of the way in which it may be thought about, some definite given character or other.

4. What is most curious about this general feature of the Kantian view of the conceptual order is that neither pole of thought is completely conceptually determinable, that is, knowable fully in conceptual terms. And yet rational conceptual activity is that which moves between the idea of the most specific individual, the singular unit of thought, and the idea of the "all" to which it belongs (theoretically, the idea of a law-governed nature; practically, a unified moral image of the world) in transitions that are themselves conceptual: all rational activity, both epistemic and moral, involves us in conduct that is open to assessment. Rational activity is mediated by what have traditionally been called "concepts," publicly available components of judgmental activity that allow a claim to know to be endorsed or rejected, which allow an action to be celebrated or denigrated.

5. The aim now is to explore the general structure of this picture of rationality; a picture, that is, which includes the idea of two poles that may not be determined, and activity between such imaginaries that may be depicted as following certain general categorially structured rules for determinability and complete determination. Kant says the understanding is the "capacity to judge," that judgments are composed of concepts (the subject and the predicate), that concepts are essentially for use in judging, that they "rest on functions," where functions are taken to be ways of our experience (appearances) being ordered, order which may be the subject of a challenge by those also capable of grasping what the functions in question dictate. (The latter point is implied by Kant's three theses about the Enlightenment conception of the rational vocation from section 40 of the third Critique.) How the schematic hypotyposis made possible by the power of judgment, in its enabling the understanding to represent the categories directly, fits with symbolic hypotyposis, will be explained here to the end of understanding what is at stake in saying pure concepts may be represented "directly" as opposed to "indirectly."

6. The point of bringing this distinction from chapter I back into focus is as follows: the basic import of the contrast Kant draws between direct and

indirect presentation of a priori concepts is semantic and epistemic, and the semantic and epistemic import is best understood in terms of the discussion from II.I regarding analogical cognition. For when Kant says that the power of judgment makes possible the direct presentation of certain concepts (of the understanding), and the indirect presentation of certain others (of reason), he is saying that there are certain limitations on knowledge where there are none on thought; that there are transcendental conditions on cognition, whereas there are only logical conditions on thought. Moreover, that the simple fact that reason is possessed of a drive to totality and completeness, and constrained by the single condition of logical consistency, does not entail totality, completeness, and logical consistency are sufficient conditions on knowability. That is, that something may be thought does not entail it can be known, whereas the converse does indeed hold.

7. The bases for this contrast between transcendental and logical conditions are found in the Dialectic, in the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal, where Kant lays out convincing arguments for rejecting the thesis that unconditioned totalities (a soul, a world-whole, and a God) may be known. Yet since noumenal entities may be thought without contradiction, they cannot be entirely dispensed with, and indeed, may be useful for the rational thinker and agent in forming goals for empirical inquiry with unknowable endpoints, in seeking to improve moral character without a view to terminating a quest for perfection. This rational vocation of endless improvement of one's epistemic situation and one's moral character is part of the package deal of Kant's metaphysics of transcendental idealism. Note that endless improvement need not be conceived in any particular way; say, in a vertical manner in terms of the augmentation of particular domains of knowledge or action and skill; horizontal diversification of skill is also a salient way of characterizing improvement.

8. In focusing on the idea of conceptual determination and on the idea of limit cases at either end of the conceptual order, the idea of the possibility of completeness of the single and of the all comes into view, the idea that a thought might be able to be complete, might exemplify all that is relevant at the point of thinking or speaking it, and not simply more or less, regarding what is suggested by some concept; that a thought might be an adequate capture of that which it purports to be a thought of.[2] For in the having of a singular thought one seems to know something about something: some aspect or element of reality, something which is judged to be so. In presuming to know something in an experience, or in judging to thereby presume to overcome in thought obstacles to one's access to some object, one does the same thing: one thinks of oneself as being able to make a claim about how things are, in some limited respect. And a limited respect may be complete in its own way; empirical intuitions themselves exhibit a certain logical completeness.

9. Completeness ought to be regarded as relative to the demands of a context, for completeness is always completeness of some thing or other, not everything; as if all things, or even everything considered as a sum total, could be complete in the same way even if what it, or they, consisted in were different. One's claim to know may be limited and partial, but even limited and partial knowledge is knowledge: In order for a singular thought to be true it need not contain every possibly true claim about the thing about which it makes a claim; indeed, then the thought would not be singular but plural. The singular thought is finite, and the temptation felt in earshot of the calling of the nebulous infinitude of potential thoughts ought to be ignored in its presumption to be an act to follow. And yet it should not be ignored entirely, for the demand for additional possible predicates and further contexts of assessment is that which provides limiting conditions and imparts a sense of the context for understanding thoughts one does have.

10. Put this way, we may see what sense can be made of saying, as is sometimes said, that the finite and the infinite enjoy an internal relation: Each is required to make sense of the other epistemically and semantically, and for the other to be what it is ontologically. But in what each consists is a matter for dispute. Here, in speaking of conceptual determination and the demand for completeness, we are required to give some account of the purported calling of endlessness for that which seems to have terminated, for this is what the claim for the finite and infinite enjoying an internal relation amounts to: to say a singular, an individual, is both finite and infinite is to point to two dimensions of which it is possessed; it is to remark upon the fact it is single, yet that it is in isolation unintelligible. It is intelligible, that is, only as part of the sum total to which it purportedly belongs,[3] even if the sum total cannot be thought of intelligibly as itself singular. This feature of conceptual determination, the relation between the individual and the sum total, requires an account be given of the purportedly interminable illusions of reason in its attempted stranglehold on the unconditioned. It is a philosophical thicket coeval with Parmenidean puzzlement over "the One and the Many."

11. The idea of complete determination of an object of thought or of a rational moral principle in Kant serves to direct the understanding's efforts at judging, in theoretical and practical respects. And since the capacity to judge is constitutive of rational freedom, and thus the dimension of performance by which one's rational credentials are judged, the idea of complete determination serves as a limiting condition of an ability that defines one's status as a rational being. If one's status as a rational being can be conveyed not as a fixity but rather as open for ongoing assessment, then it is more proper to speak of a rational vocation than a status. For what is in question is not mere instances of one's performance, but a lifelong attempt to live up to certain

ideas of the human, which one is partly responsible for and responsive to, if one is to claim belongingness to humanity at all.

12. We may say that the epistemic and moral vocation of the rational being, in Kant, is therefore structured by the demand for complete determination. But what sense can this have for us? It was said above that one might claim an internal relation between the finite and infinite; that one might insist that to make sense of singular thought one must confect some schema or image or fantasy of a whole to which it belongs. Perhaps that fantasy may be one of a system whose rules are due to designs oneself and others have; perhaps the fantasy may instead consist of a faith in an existing structure onto which one latches and about whose nature comprehension is sought. (We may ask how this distinction may be borne out and judged of.)

13. In the former case, situating the singular within the whole would be a feat no more impressive than setting out to determine in what the relation between different concepts consisted, in what the relation of different parts and wholes of conceptual spheres consisted and in what ways they might overlap. We may question whether this task, if completed or somehow satisfied, could lead to a philosophical discovery, or whether the result might not be more akin to waking up, coming clean with oneself, augmenting the sobriety of one's thoughts. Could the process, even if only enjoying partial success, perhaps be a recollection of something once known and since forgotten, in the way Plato spoke of when he spoke of the known being something always potentially so but only sometimes actually recollected? The potential for dispute over this I no more than point to.

14. In the case of seeking the relation between the singular and the whole of a structure whose existence did not depend on one's recognition of it, the fact that the conclusion of one's inquiry would be a discovery is unavoidable. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the inquiry itself is coherent (Kant thought not, at least not at the level of the total of empirical reality), and whether it might not ultimately lapse, not to say degenerate, into the former inquiry. This, I take it, is one way of portraying Kant's Copernican insight: at some point, a well-conceived investigation into structures independent of thought leads to scrutiny of the structure of thought itself, since a proper understanding of the former depends on an adequate self-understanding at the level of the latter (what is one doing in forming thoughts about things?). The dialectic between ways of thinking and things thought about must be subject to perpetual reassessment, if that discourse is to be adequately critical. The suggestion is that one cannot discover anything, in a properly rational sense, without being reflectively aware of at least some of the terms in which the discovery's and the understanding's expression consist.

15. The role of the symbolic is clarified somewhat here: the symbolic bespeaks, imperfectly or obscurely, imagery of the world that might, if

rendered clearly, reveal otherwise unknown dimensions of one's activity.[4] In fact, Kant's words about the analogical value of the noumenal may be appealed to here to clarify what is at issue. In section 57 of the *Prolegomena*, he writes of the distinction between limits and boundaries, where the latter are mere negations, the other side of which is not thought of except as privation of the positive; boundaries, on the other hand, are explained in mathematical terms as the limit of space, outside of which more may be imagined. The imagery is significant, since it repeats Kant's insistence that the rational subject cannot avoid appealing to the in-itself as beyond the boundary[5] of cognition, as thinkable but not knowable. As he writes:

> [W]e hold ourselves to this boundary [of cognition] if we limit our judgment merely to the relation that the world may have to a being whose concept itself lies outside all cognition that we can attain within the world. For we then do not attribute to the supreme being any of the properties *in themselves* by which we think the objects of experience, and we thereby avoid *dogmatic* anthropomorphism; but we attribute those properties, nonetheless, to the relation of this being to the world, and allow ourselves a *symbolic* anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only language and not the object itself.
>
> If I say that we are compelled to look upon the world *as if* it were the work of a supreme understanding and will, I actually say nothing more than: in the way that a watch, a ship, and a regiment are related to an artisan, a builder, and a commander, the sensible world (or everything that makes up the basis of this sum total of appearances) is related to the unknown—which I do not thereby cognise according to what it is in itself, but only according to what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part. (4: 357, 108)

We are here confronted with an entirely peculiar mode of expression: Kant tells us that the *relation* of the supreme being (God) to the world may have attributed to it "properties *in themselves* by which we think the objects of experience." This suggests that the character of experience may be attributed to the relation that a merely intelligible supreme being has to the world. This is opaque, yet is clarified by the second paragraph: the relation between the known (the sensible world) and the unknown (the intelligible world) is responsible for experience having the character it does; that the unknown may be thinkable as related to the known just as the artificer may be credited with production of the artifact. This credit is supported by the premise of transcendental idealism: that there are no metaphysical conclusions to be made either way, in assent to some proposition or other, as to the genesis of appearances and their synthetic collection in thought in each case under the idea of an object. Yet the negative thoughts one may have about noumena include the thought of there being something that is not the appearance but rather that which appears (I will not consider the extent to which this is a positive thesis,

and, the extent to which Kant's metaphysics of transcendental idealism is based on a contradiction).[6] Kant wishes to say that this idea, of that which is responsible for appearances, is indispensible even if problematic, thereby echoing his views from the first Critique regarding the difficulty of entirely shrugging off reason's impossible though encouraging demands.

16. We are told in the sentence beginning section 58 that

> this type of cognition is cognition *according to analogy*, which surely does not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things. (4: 357–58, 108)

Thereby confirming that the essential point in Kant's transcendental theology is that regarding the import of analogical cognition for understanding the boundaries to thinking which may be drawn. Further, patrol of the boundary of cognition is precisely the task assigned to reason itself: "reason is neither locked inside the sensible world nor adrift outside it, but, as befits knowledge of a boundary, restricts itself solely to the relation of what lies outside the boundary to what is contained within" (4: 361, 111). Our concern with symbols has been to bring into focus how this issue of thought having boundaries or limits plays a role in the metaphysics of judgment, in the narrow sense pertaining to issue regarding the logic of predication; yet we are also concerned with what the imagery of boundary and limit may mean in existential terms for an agent who integrates such a picture into their self-image, and, moreover, into their image of the community to which they belong and the world of which they are a part. As I acknowledged, the depth of that question awaits exploration in the next chapter, and for now, we must turn to narrower, less nebulous questions regarding rational structure. Having introduced the topic of this work initially as the contrast between schematic and symbolic hypotyposis, it can now be said the more general purpose of doing so was to allow the role of the idea of completeness, as a limiting condition of the conceptual determination of the world in thought and the will in action, to come into focus.

III.I THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE DETERMINATION

1. In the second section of *The Ideal of Pure Reason*, that chapter of the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason treating of transcendental solution for rational theological confusion, Kant offers two principles that provide structure and conditions for (1) the possibility of concepts, and (2) the possibility of things. The former is equivalent to logical possibility, the latter

real possibility; (1) is the principle of determinability, (2) the principle of complete determination. They are stated thus:

> The principle of determinability:
>
> Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of determinability: that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates, only one can apply to it, which rests on the principle of contradiction and hence is a merely logical principle, which abstracts from every content of cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition. (A571/B599)

Despite what Kant says here, the principle of determinability simply *is* the principle of contradiction, for the only augmentation of that latter principle comes in his claim that it applies to all concepts, and this can hardly be considered a proper augmentation of the principle; if the principle of contradiction is not meant to apply to all concepts, what then is it meant to apply to? Nowhere is it said that some concepts and not others are its targets, nor that it does not apply to concepts, nor not concepts and rather something apart. (That it applies to both concepts and things is an entailment of the fact that "things" for Kant are phenomena, thoughts about which are objective, thus subject to conceptual conditions of thinkability.) There is complement to this principle in the following:

> The principle of complete determination:[7]
>
> Everything, however, as to its possibility, further stands under the principle of complete determination; according to which, among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply to it. This does not rest merely on the principle of contradiction, for besides considering everything in relation to two contradictorily conflicting predicates, it considers everything further in relation to the whole of possibility, as the sum total of all predicates of things in general; and by presupposing that as a condition a priori, it represents everything as deriving its own possibility from the share it has in that whole of possibility. The principle of complete determination thus deals with the content and not merely the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are to make up the complete concept of a thing, and not merely of the analytical representation, through one of two opposed predicates; and it contains a transcendental presupposition, namely that of the material of all possibility, which is supposed to contain a priori the data for the particular possibility of everything. (A571–73/B599–601)

Here Kant misleads us, for he says the principle of complete determination "does not rest merely on the principle of contradiction"; of course, since he had said that one of every "two contradictorily conflicting predicates" must apply to everything, he should have said part of the principle of complete

determination was rather derived from the principle of excluded middle. The point is significant since it means the principle of determinability and the principle of complete determination are complementary: no concept can be contradictory, and everything must be determinable by every concept whether negatively or positively.[8] This first dimension of the principle frames the significance of the second; the second consists in the transcendental import of the idea of a whole of possibility: since everything is in principle determinable positively or negatively by every possible predicate, the merely rational idea of every possible predicate serves as a guiding condition of the determination of every actual empirical thing; the idea of the whole of possibility is regulative for the formation of systematically unified cognition.[9]

2. In the context just discussed, the whole of possibility is regarded as "the sum-total of all predicates of things in general" (also, "sum-total of all possibility" at A573/B601), which is presupposed "as a condition a priori" that "represents everything as deriving its own possibility from the share it has in that whole of possibility" (A572/B600). Otherwise put, the possibility of an individual thing, determined in judgment under the guidance of the principle of complete determination, is derived from the predicates applied to it and which belong to a whole of possibility. What sense is to be given to "deriving"? Is Kant wishing to say that an actual thing, determined in experience by predicates thought of as belonging to a whole of possibility, does not bear an independent modal status; that the modal status of everything is derived from (grounded in?), the idea of a whole of possibility? What could be the point of this? To say that individual things do not have a modal status except as part of a whole? Or that one cannot intelligibly speak of their modal status except in the context of their belonging to a whole? The former would be an ontological condition; the latter an epistemological one. This distinction, once made, highlights the import of transcendental idealism in this context: there is no contrast to be drawn between the question asked at an ontological versus an epistemological level. The question of modal status in Kant is to be thought of as answered at both levels simultaneously. To speak of the possibility of an individual thing, as Kant does here, as deriving its modal status from the whole, means no more than that the idea of modal status of everything is determined by the place that thing has in the systematically unified whole of cognition, where the systematically unified whole of cognition is articulated, in each individual case of the distributive use of the understanding in experience (A582/B611), by one or some of the predicates belonging to the whole of possibility.

3. Having spoken of the whole of possibility, Kant shortly after introduces another term of art: the "All of reality" or the *omnitudo realitatis* (A575–76/B603–4). At first glance, these two phrases differ in that the former has the modal status of possible, the latter actual (real = actual for Kant).

This shift in terminology is significant, and is grounded on Kant's positivism: Kant acknowledges that, among all possible predicates that might be applied a priori to things, some denote a nonbeing, a mere absence or transcendental negation of being (A574/B602), whereas some involve a transcendental affirmation of something, that is, of some, or of there being some, actual thing. This distinction between the whole of possibility and the *omnitudo realitatis* therefore depends on Kant's distinction between the judgments and categories of quality: affirmative, negative, infinite judgment, and the categories of reality, negation, and limitation. These transcendental functions all together shape the idea of a whole of possibility, though predicates belonging to the *omnitudo realitatis* may be predicated of something only when the judgment has the affirmative form, or counts as a case where the category of reality guides thinking. It is easy to see why negative judgments and the category of negation denote that which does not belong to the *omnitudo realitatis*, less so in the case of infinite judgment and the category of limitation. The third case will be discussed later.

So, transcendentally negative predicates, while included in a whole of possibility, are not included in the *omnitudo realitatis*. For its part, the *omnitudo realitatis* is identified with the "transcendental substratum," the "storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken." Moreover, note here Kant says "all possible predicates of things," not "all possible predicates which may be applied to concepts" (as in the principle of determinability). The reason is that concepts are governed by mere logical possibility, things by real possibility; the former comes to no more than noncontradictoriness, the latter, however, includes all of the conditions imposed by activity of the understanding's judging in experience. For instance, a transcendent concept such as an immortal soul, an infinitely complex and vast world-whole, or a perfect and infinite supreme being, are not contradictory, though they conflict with the conditions of the understanding's activity of judging in experience since they cannot strictly be judged of, and in each case denote concepts which cannot be applied to things, can never have an experiential instance of satisfaction found.

4. Following this account of the *omnitudo realitatis*, we have an explanation of the nature of the *ens realissimum*. The latter is the idea of an individual being, a "thing in itself," which includes only one of each pair of contradictorily conflicting predicates which belong "absolutely to being" (A576/B604). The *ens realissimum* is *the* transcendental ideal; the phrase refers to three things: (1) the section where the discussion occurs, (2) the impetus for the process by which reason is led to the idea of an individual being which is absolutely unconditioned, and (3), that individual being itself.[10] The last reference of the transcendental ideal has been equated with "the philosophical kernel of the idea of God,"[11] and with good reason: the

concept is the idea of a singular, unconditioned being containing all predicates contained in the idea of reality. It is Kant's transcendental replacement for the rational theological idea of a supreme being.

5. The question of what purpose the *omnitudo realitatis* and the *ens realissimum* may serve in Kant's transcendental theology may be answered with reference to the relation of this idea and this ideal both to the principle of complete determination. The official description of the principle involves the claim that the complete determination of everything contains a reference to the idea of a whole of possibility from which all predicates to be applied are taken. As we saw, the determination of actual empirical things involves thinking of the whole of possibility in modally distinct terms, rather as the *omnitudo realitatis*; therefore, the latter idea is that which includes all such predicates to be applied to everything. Now, the idea of applying all real predicates to everything in each involves a further thought of the division of all reality into that which does, and that which does not, satisfy the predicate in question; each predicate can be either positively or negatively applied to everything, which means everything either can or cannot have that predicate applied to it. Yet there is a problem: reality is not a genus that can be divided into species a priori (A577/B605). Kant writes:

> Logical determination of a concept through reason rests on a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premise contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a general concept), the minor premise restricts this sphere to one part, and the conclusion determines the concept through this part. (A576–77/B604–75)

Yet no such determination of the concept of reality can be effected a priori, in a way that results in a determinate division; only a principle of "Everything is P or ~P." (Of course "everything" is not strictly equivalent to "All," since the former is a plurality of particulars, the latter a universal unity, but pressing that point further is not now important.) What is important is that this passage alerts us to the role of two logical functions of judgment in Kant's principle of complete determination: the disjunctive and the infinite.[12] The functioning of the principle involves something analogous to a disjunctive syllogism, with an infinite judgment as a minor premise:

> Thus the transcendental major premise for the thoroughgoing determination of all things is none other than the representation of the sum total of all reality, a concept that comprehends all predicates as regards their transcendental content not merely under itself, but within itself; and the thoroughgoing determination of everything rests on the limitation of this All of reality, in that some of it is ascribed to the thing and the rest excluded from it, which agrees with the "either/or" of the disjunctive major premise and the determination of the object through one of the members of this division in the minor premise. The use of

> reason through which it grounds its determination of all things in the transcendental ideal is, accordingly, analogous to its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms. (A577/B605)[13]

Being a disjunctive syllogism the major premise is a disjunctive judgment; the minor premise, in restricting the sphere to one part, involves a negation that eliminates certain possibilities as positively determinable by the concept in question. The form of a disjunctive syllogism[14] is as follows:

S is P or Q: Knowledge is a matter of history or of reason.
S is P: This piece of knowledge was historical.
Therefore, S is ~Q: Therefore it was not a matter of reason.

But what Kant has in mind is, as he says, something merely analogous to this. The idea of the *omnitudo realitatis* is that represented in the analogue of the major premise, leaving us to wonder exactly what the analogue is of the minor premise. As Kant says, the "the complete determination of everything rests on the limitation of this All of reality, in that some of it is ascribed to the thing and the rest excluded from it"; so, some of the *omnitudo realitatis*, certain predicates that is, are ascribed to the thing one is at that point determining, the rest not. So the minor premise involves "the determination of the object through one of the members of this division." But how are we to conceive of the division of the *omnitudo realitatis*? The infinite judgment, as the analogue of the minor premise of the disjunctive syllogism, can be interpreted as two complementary theses about the procedure involved:

i. A set of predicates, S^x, may be truly predicated of some object, O^x. The remaining set of predicates that make up the *omnitudo realitatis* are to be regarded as the negation of S^x, thus: $\sim S^x$. That is, this second set is here regarded merely negatively as those predicates that do not apply to O^x.

   The *omnitudo realitatis* may therefore be divided according to sets of predicates that do and those which do not apply to a given object. The result of this division, in any given case, is two sets: those which satisfy some object, those which do not.

   It cannot be immediately inferred that $\sim S^x$ is, in any given case, itself also an S^y; that is, itself a set of predicates that all together apply to some object, which entails that one cannot hypostatize the set of predicates and thereby presume to confect an object from the mere idea of that which would satisfy a certain set (this is a condition set by real possibility, over against the merely logically possible, a distinction to which we referred above and to which we shall return).
ii. The *omnitudo realitatis* may be divided into objects which do, and objects which do not, satisfy a given predicate.

> We may call the divisions here P^x and its negation $\sim P^x$. Now, in any case in which such a division is performed, the *omnitudo realitatis* is divided into two sets of objects: those which have a certain predicate applied to them, and those which do not.
>
> Such a division of the *omnitudo realitatis* may be performed for as many predicates as are contained in it. And the set of predicates which make up the *omnitudo realitatis* may not be determined a priori, but only empirically (albeit thereby with transcendental conditions).
>
> We may now highlight a difference and an affinity.

In (i) the *omnitudo realitatis* was supposed to be amenable to division into as many pairs of sets (S^x, $\sim S^x$) as there are real objects. And that in any given case, it cannot be assumed that negation of a set of predicates are all together themselves applicable to some object; thus it cannot be assumed that for every S^x there is some $\sim S^y$ to which it is equivalent (or: for every $\sim S^x$ some S^y). In (ii), unlike in (i), a mere predicate's inclusion in the *omnitudo realitatis* entails that there is some object that satisfies it, otherwise the predicate would not be a part of reality. So, in any given case of the division of the *omnitudo realitatis* into two sets (P^x, $\sim P^x$), for both sets it may be assumed that the predicate is part of reality and therefore has at least one object answering to it.

One affinity these two theses have is that both insist that objects and predicates constitute bases for ways in which the *omnitudo realitatis* may be divided, and these two ways, and no other.

6. Before moving to discuss the topic of categorial distinctions that may be drawn on the basis of divisions in terms of objects (which essentially have real predicates applied to them) and of predicates (which essentially apply to real objects), we must acknowledge an important issue about the division of the *omnitudo realitatis* into any given pair of S^x and $\sim S^x$. As Kant was well aware, a mere set of general concepts may apply to more than one object; the same and all of those concepts. Thus, mere conceptual determination is insufficient to distinguish one object from another. This lesson from Leibniz's thesis of the Identity of Indiscernibles was one of the grounds for Kant's insistence on drawing a distinction between intuitions and concepts: spatial and temporal location may very well be described in terms of concepts, and identical description of spatial and temporal location may very well be supposed of multiple distinct objects, but an identical, actual spatio-temporal location may not be shared. Notoriously, polyadic predicates used to describe spatial and temporal location (i.e., "is next to," "is on the table, at coordinates 19° 29' 36'' N, 99° 16' 13'' W, at 1300 hours on November 30, 2015") are not adequately represented by Aristotelian predicate logic, rather better propositional logic; the monadic predicate logic relied upon by Kant cannot express what is common to distinct relational predicates ("is under the table"

and "is atop the table"; "is next to the cupboard" and "is next to the refrigerator"). Spatiotemporal relations, for Kant, are represented instead by distinct objects being represented at distinct spatiotemporal locations, and, as Kant says correctly, in his reflections on the concepts of "identity" and "difference" in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, this is sufficient:

> multiplicity and numerical difference are already given by space itself as the condition of outer appearances. For a part of space, even though it might be completely similar and equal to another, is nevertheless outside of it, and is on that account a different part from that which is added to it in order to constitute a larger space; and this must therefore hold of everything that exists simultaneously in the various positions in space, no matter how similar and equal they might otherwise be. (A264/B320)

The problems with such a reliance on Aristotelian predicate logic or the possibility of transforming or overcoming it within a Kantian framework I shall not contemplate here. And with the acknowledgement of this point about the uniqueness of sets of predicates we may move to consider the categorial dimension of the function of the principle of complete determination.

7. In the above discussion of the divisibility of the idea of the *omnitudo realitatis* into S^x and $\sim S^x$, or P^x and $\sim P^x$ we relied upon the idea of a set of predicates. In the latter case, of a set of objects answering to a predicate and the remainder of the *omnitudo realitatis* not, we are required to make a distinction between contradiction of a statement involving a certain predicate and the assertion of a negative predicate about some object. An example will service the point:

> "The leaf is not green."

This may be interpreted logically as either the contradiction of a statement,

> ~ "The leaf is green," to imply: *It is not the case that* (there is some) leaf (that) is green

or, may be interpreted as the affirmation of a negative predicate:

> "The leaf is nongreen," to imply: There is some leaf, and it is some color other than green.

The former example, of the negation of a proposition, offers nothing to thought beyond confirmation of some fact not obtaining; the latter case provides the thought that there is something that lacks some particular property. The latter sentence contains an existential presupposition: there is some object, *but* it is not like *this*; there is some leaf, yet it is not green; rather, due to the changing of the seasons, one be blessed by a fiery motley.[15]

8. How is this point relevant to the discussion at hand? It will be noted that Kant, in his remarks upon infinite judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction had offered an example of affirmation of a negative predicate as being the form of such judgment. Thus his example, "The soul is not mortal," provided there, was taken by him to involve the division of all of reality into that which was mortal and that was non-mortal, and to involve the placing of the soul into the latter division (A71–73/B97–98). Kant's example, perhaps offered due to the place of the idea of an immortal soul in his philosophy, nevertheless falls short of conveying the full force of the point which may be made here. Neither the soul nor the predicate "mortal" make available the idea of empirically discernible categorial levels, as does our case of the leaf just offered does. Consider the import for cognition of saying some leaf is non-green; one may infer from this that the leaf is one of some range of predicates in a disjunction, to be employed in a syllogism:

The leaf is either green, or red, or orange, or yellow, or, red-orange, or, etc., etc.
The leaf is not green.
Therefore, the leaf is red, or orange, or yellow, etc., etc.

And while affirmation of a negative predicate may not issue in a maximally determinate thought, negation of predicates does narrow the field of permissible predications, thus commencing the process of elimination and putting one on the road to greater determinacy. Here we have the basic claim needed to explain how negation and negative predicates may contribute to the determination of things; when it was suggested above that the analogue of the minor premise in the analogue of the disjunctive syllogism, represented by the function of the principle of complete determination, took such a form, this point about categorial relativity of predication is what was referred to. The affirmation of a negative predicate presumes appropriateness of predicate to object; both, that is, as categorially coeval. Certainly some predicates are more general than others and thus less category specific (color being one, as regards physical objects being in the main amenable to predication-by-color), and doubtless not only do relationships of contrariety (exclusion) exist within categorial levels, but also hierarchy (inclusion). How the mechanics of this kind of determination function, and how they are (1) effected by reason, as well as (2) responsible for a systematically unified rational picture of the world is that with which we will be concerned in the following pages.

III.II KANT'S KINDS OF MODALITY

1. At the opening of the previous section, I had said the principle of determinability and the principle of complete determination each place a condition on

concepts and things, respectively. Clearly any condition on concepts is also a condition on things, given the definition of things as phenomena of objective thought which are thus bound by logical possibility. Within the scope of the topic before us, it will be well to add some additional remarks about modality to clarify the structure and function of the rational concepts of the *omnitudo realitatis*, the *ens realissimum*, and the two principles themselves. To that end, some brief reflection on Kant's position as articulated in the Postulates of Empirical Thought, and elsewhere, is warranted. In particular, the connection between that section and the comments on the concepts of "matter" and "form" in the Amphiboly will help clarify the idea of modal structure in Kant, an idea which we need to make sense of categorial structure (to be discussed in chapter III.IV) as well as that of a picture of rationality (our topic for chapter IV).

2. Earlier we distinguished between real possibility and logical possibility. For Kant, the latter consists in noncontradictoriness, where this also is equivalent to conceivability; the former includes this condition, plus the formal conditions on experience. The three modal categories are defined by him as follows:[16]

> Possibility: "Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuitions and concepts)";
>
> Actuality: "That which is connected with material conditions of experience (sensation)";
>
> Necessity: "That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of experience" (A218/B265–66)

These three definitions apply to objects of experience, to phenomena, to appearances, to the world of sense as judged about the empirically real (hence the label "real possibility"). The central point made by Kant in this section of the first Critique is that such real modality is objectively valid, though the concepts involved are not objectively real (A220/B268). The modal functions of judgment and the modal categories share this character along with the relational functions of judgment and categories of relation, qua grounds for the dynamical principles. Thus the Analogies and the Postulates of Empirical Thought differ from the Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Perception, where the latter pair rest on objectively real mathematical principles of quantity and quality, respectively.

3. Kant's principal way of articulating the view that real modality is objectively valid, but not objectively real, is as follows:

> The categories of modality have this peculiarity: as a determination of the object, they do not augment the concept to which they are ascribed in the least,

> but rather express only the relation to the faculty of cognition. If the concept of a thing is already entirely complete, I can still ask about this object whether it is merely possible, or also actual, or, if it is the latter, whether it is also necessary? No further determinations in the object itself are hereby thought; rather, it is only asked: how is the object itself (together with all its determinations) related to the understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical power of judgment, and to reason (in its application to experience)?
>
> For this very reason, the principles of modality are also nothing further than definitions of the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity in their empirical use, and thus at the same time restrictions of all categories to merely empirical use, without any permission and allowance for their transcendental use. (A219/B266)

We therefore have a negative thesis and a positive one: modal categories "do not augment the concept to which they are ascribed"; yet, they "express the relation [of the concept] to the faculty of cognition." How do modal concepts do this, exactly? And how is this distinct from the way the categories of quantity, quality, and relation guide empirical cognition? First, it is not that modal categories *do* anything, in the strict sense of the word; rather, reflection upon the nature of experience reveals them to be the transcendental conditions of having modal thoughts. And modal thoughts are second-order reflective thoughts in that they articulate the relation of first-order thoughts to the faculty of cognition itself. This means that a modal judgment, if true, tells one something about the relation of some thought to one's faculty of cognition. The relation to the faculty of cognition that the modal predicates indicate is that "to the understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical power of judgment, and to reason (in its application to experience)." So the faculty of cognition here includes all but sensibility. Modal predicates thus indicate (1), the modality of the understanding's capacity to judge, as well as (2), the power of judgment (that articulated in the entire System of Principles), and (3) the modal strength of inferences of reason, as found in syllogisms. (1) would indicate the modality of making a certain judgment, as in the case of saying, "it is possible to judge that"; (2) refers to the same, yet specifically in the context of synthetic a priori judgments as discussed in the System of Principles, it here only being relevant to speak of possibility and necessity, since actuality pertains only to empirical judgment, where there is empirical matter presented in intuition to be judged of; (3) denotes the modal status of inferences in syllogisms, whether they are possible or necessary (again, actuality only applies to that which is given in sensation, and so cannot be thought in connection with inference but rather only individual judgments).[17]

4. We are now in a position to mention some relevant features of Kant's views about the concepts of reflection, as discussed in the Amphiboly. There the concepts of "matter" and "form" are accounted for in a way useful to our

present task of clarifying the structure and function of the idea of the *omnitudo realitatis*. This pair of concepts, it is said,

> ground all other reflection so inseparably are they bound up with every use the understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter its determination (both in the transcendental sense, since one abstracts from all differences in what is given and from the way in which that is determined). The logicians formerly called the universal the matter, but the specific difference the form. In every judgment one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgment), their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being, its components *(essentialia)* are the matter; the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form. Also, in respect to things in general, unbounded reality was[18] regarded as the matter of all possibility, but its limitation (negation) as that form through which one thing is distinguished from another in accordance with transcendental concepts. The understanding, namely, demands first that something be given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain way. (A266–66/B222–23)

Kant therefore offers two definitions each for "matter" and "form": The former, thought in relation to sensibility is sensation; the latter, space and time. Thought in relation to the understanding, the former consists of concepts in a judgment; the latter, the form of the judgment as expressed by the copula. Now, in order to construct a picture of the matter and form of the *omnitudo realitatis* in accord with these ideas, we are required to bear in mind the foregoing discussion of real modality, since the *omnitudo realitatis* is the "All of reality," and thus composed of the entirety of predicates which may be drawn upon to describe empirical reality, those which make up empirical reality, the world of sense.

5. Since reality is not given as a whole, one cannot suppose there is some given totality of empirical predicates; rather one must conceive of the *omnitudo realitatis* as merely the idea of all predicates which one has, and all other rational judging subjects have, occasion to apply in judging the world of sense. While the form of sensibility and of the understanding are both given a priori, the matter of neither is; thus the form of the *omnitudo realitatis* is given a priori, its matter not. In fact, the matter of sensibility is not strictly a component of the *omnitudo realitatis*, since sensation is a subjective affection that serves as a ground of concept formation, though it is not objective and therefore not part of the concept of the *omnitudo realitatis*.[19] The matter of the understanding, the component concepts of judgment, are that to which we referred above in III.I when speaking of ways of dividing the *omnitudo realitatis* in accord with two sets of predicates which either do, or do not, apply to some objects, or into two sets of objects which either do, or do not, have some predicate applied to them. Yet the objects of such judgments, the subjects of judgment, are not strictly included in the idea of the *omnitudo realitatis*;

instead, merely the predicates. Thus, the idea of the *omnitudo realitatis* is the idea of all real predicates that make up the predicate components of the matter of judgments, and which, in turn are (1), grounded in sensation, the matter of sensibility; (2) have the form of a spatiotemporal concept; and (3), whose place in empirical reality is determined by the logical form of the judgment as expressed by the copula in the judgment in which they occur.

6. The mention of empirical reality is important, since though as Kant puts it, the *omnitudo realitatis* is simply the thought of the all of real predicates, not objects, and certainly not judgments, empirical reality cannot be thought this way. In fact, Kant offers an important piece of imagery at the end of the Transcendental Ideal, which provides a contrast between two ways of thinking of empirical reality. As a way of insisting one not confect an image of reality as a singular totality containing all possible predicates, he tells us:

> That we subsequently hypostatise this idea of the sum total of all reality, however, comes about because we dialectically transform the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, into the collective unity of a whole of experience; and from this whole of appearance we think up an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality, which then—by means of the transcendental subreption we have already thought—is confused with the concept of a thing that stands at the summit of the possibility of all things, providing the real conditions for their complete determination. (A582–83/B610–11)

The distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience can be thought of as all extant empirical uses of the understanding, by all extant rational judges; the collective unity of a whole of experience instead as the idea of a singular totality which is the reference of "reality," thus the idea of the empirical reality *as* the *omnitudo realitatis*, the empirically real intellectualized and thought of a rational idea actualized. This error has been remarked upon enough; what is of interest here is, rather, the imagery of a distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, not simply in one's own judgings, but in all extant judgings by rational subjects. The question we ought to raise is: "How does this distributive unity hang together? What makes the distribution of judgments a *unity* rather than an aggregate, a *motley*?" In speaking of a unity, a systematic one, as Kant would have it, one is required to have some notion of connectivity between judgmental positions of which the unity if composed. It is to a brief exposition of that to which we now turn.

III.III THE IDEA OF A COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXT

1. What is the image of communication and rational engagement most readily conjured by Kant's idea of the human agent? We must now consider what is involved with such an agent finding their way about amidst the ordinary

with help from reflection on exemplarity, and therefore ask: What is involved with the hanging together of different subject's worldviews in their attempts at communication? Is there a problem about the possibility of each communicating their private world (Are agent's worlds private? What dimensions of them? In what ways are they private)? Is there a certain level of generality involved with attempts at communication that is essential to facilitating comprehension of distinct points in epistemic and semantic space, of other such points from one such point? What is the rational structure supportive of there being cases of symbolic cognition that are to be given preference over other nonsymbolic cognitions? These questions are to be guided by our discussion as the close of III.II regarding the idea of the distributive use of the understanding in experience.

2. In speaking of points of connectivity between judgmental nodes of a distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience I will employ the idea of a communicative context, for in asking how judgments connect, either in one's own thinking, in others,' or between oneself and others,' or among a full community, one should ask how communication is effected; the notion of communication being effected counts as successful communicative context, the converse not; or better, the converse does not at all count as a communicative context, but a failure to communicate.

3. A communicative context, as just defined in terms of points of connectivity between judgments, may be said to constitute the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, since unity in the sense Kant is after cannot be monolithic (a collective unity of experience), but rather only unified in the sense of logically consistent, and systematically coherent. The former condition of consistency is merely logical, that of systematicity transcendental; the former the condition of analytic unity on individual subjects in their having no contradictory beliefs, the latter for individual subjects a synthetic unity of a manifold of cognitions having common conditions of possibility, as of the kind Kant laid out in the Transcendental Analytic. For a community of subjects, logical consistency equates simply to a potentially commonly held, communicable account of the world, pieced together from distinct epistemic and semantic points; transcendental consistency is no other than the same set of conditions of possibility holding for the whole range of cognitions of individual subjects, considered as present in all subjects as a priori faculties of sensibility as common sense, the common human understanding, and common human reason. I am concerned now with the idea of the individual and the community seen from a transcendentally ideal perspective, although we ought to commence with acknowledgment of Kant's articulation of an Enlightenment conception of rational communication. In section 40 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, the maxims of the common human understanding are laid out:

> (1) To always think for oneself; (2) To think in the position of everyone else; (3) To always think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way. (5: 294, 174)

These maxims should be borne in mind in what follows, since our reflections are guided by them.

4. There are several additional pieces of text that serve to buttress the frame here, the first coming from the appendix to the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment. The text to follow below provides a way of integrating the reading given in chapters I and II of the ideas of hypotyposis and of exemplarity, respectively. The task before us is to examine the idea of there being common examples of empirical, moral, and aesthetic phenomena, as well as common judges; the interest here is in the relation between this idea and the structurally similar idea of the exemplary phenomenon, either empirical, moral, or aesthetic, and the proficient judge, or artistic genius. We are interested in the relationship between the exemplary and the common; ultimately, our interest is in how this dimension of the power of judgment relates to the idea of limits of reason and knowledge. The latter, the idea of limits on, or boundaries for, reason and knowledge will be a principal focus of chapter IV.

5. In the appendix to the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment we find Kant discussing the conditions of development of the imagination as a precondition for artistic or otherwise aesthetic capacity, a capacity which cannot be developed or actualized to its limit if the student of aesthetic phenomena is restricted in their judgment to fixation on actual given examples (5: 355, 229). Positively, it is the stimulation of the imagination "toward suitability for a given concept," and, negatively, "severe criticism" of the suitability of inadequate examples, that can aid one in their aesthetic education (likewise for moral education). The aim for the student is to "prevent the examples set before him from being immediately taken by him as prototypes and models for imitation, as it were not subject to any higher norm"; sights are set on, imaginative insight is thereby opened to, an expansive multitude of possibilities free from limitation by conceptual conditions which might otherwise set the rule for the ordering of representations (and, in the case of the artisanal, the direction of action). Such is what Kant always refers to as the "free play" of the imagination; here the concern is with the necessity of such freedom, "even in its lawfulness," "without which no beautiful art nor even a correct personal taste for judging it is even possible." Our concern, however, is with the personal and private dimension of such imaginative invention and aesthetic judgment, and its communicability, and to this point Kant directly and immediately speaks. "*Humaniora*" or "humanity," he writes,

> means on the one hand the universal feeling of participation and on the other hand the capacity for being able to communicate one's inmost self universally, which properties taken together constitute the sociability that is appropriate to humankind. (5: 355, 229)[20]

The intersubjective dimension of such sociability[21] is put thus, where speaking of the "lawful sociability" by which a people constitute an "enduring commonwealth" and thereby make possible to rational exchange and debate of ideas, Kant says:

> [S]uch an age and such a people had first of all to discover the art of the reciprocal communication of the ideas of the most educated part with the cruder, the coordination of the breadth and refinement of the former with the natural simplicity and originality of the latter, and in this way to discover that mean between higher culture and contented nature which constitutes the correct standard, not to be given by any universal rule, for taste as a universal human sense. (5: 355–56, 229–30)

We are presented here with the thought of not mere variety in the stuff of private worlds, the material content of sensation in affective reaction, or with the sense of specialness of isolated selves as in solipsistic or egoistic thinking; rather, the imagery for Kant, and for us, is that of the necessary mixture of the practical and the useful, the common and comfortable, with the aesthete's lack of concern about practical matters perhaps more fully informed by and imbued with a sense of worldliness and learning, a sophistication afforded by pedagogy whether communal or private. Beginning from the premise that what serves need may proliferate when compared with the ineffective, an assumption grounded in humanity's inherent reasonableness and self-interest, one may conjecture that that which is common is so for such a reason; the comfortable being common and the common comfortable is virtually tautology. The idea of high-mindedness to which I have just referred seems most aptly represented in Kant's philosophy by the activity of reflection on aesthetic objects that, in aesthetic judgment, are the subjects of disinterested contemplation. The very idea of disinterested contemplation is that of freedom from need, the luxury of indulgence in reflection on what pleases, with the further freedom from dependence on the object for pleasure thrown into the bargain. One need not capture the point here as one of practicality and impracticality, but one may; the contrast reveals. The topic to be thematized is otherwise, if related: that of the contrast between activity of life in the form of pursuance of practical ends, and the activity of life as pursuance of a systematic understanding of those ends, qua practical ends, as well as objects of contemplation that may reveal some other hitherto unconsidered dimension of the human being concerned with them.

6. The contrast just drawn may be rephrased and matched with the distinction between the common and the exemplary in the following way: the common is a domain of pursuance of practical ends, commonly intelligible insofar as they are ends pursued for human reasons comprehensible in general by any who fit this category (cultural and biological individual differences notwithstanding); the exemplary is that which is recognized as having some value beyond the common, and which may serve as (1) a guide for reflection on the nature of a certain activity, what counts as doing well with regard to it, as well as (2) revealing some hitherto unconsidered dimension of the human condition, human situation, human character, or even human possibilities, or lack thereof. We consider (1) and (2) in turn.

7. Recalling the claim from chapter I that symbolic hypotyposes are cognitions (at least one of) whose constituent concepts contain a rule for reflection analogical to the rule of reflection on some concept of reason, some concept which only reason can think, the following may be said: The exemplary, qua represented as so, reveals to us designs we may have on our own moral or aesthetic vocation (Kant denies one can symbolize theoretical rational concepts, rather only schematize them,[22] although I shall consider the issue below). Symbolic presentations of moral perfection or of some other rational concept therefore reveal to us what counts as doing well with a certain activity; a result which may or may not surprise. In the former, supposing, say, in the case of some better educated person, or better judge than ourselves, judging thus and bringing us to see the why and how of things; in the latter, where we simply take note of standards, and so on. But these points, with regard to (1) above, already speak to (2): Unless the recognition of the exemplary is entirely routine, it stands to reveal some new human possibilities (whether in thought or in action). And even in the case of judging without prodding or suggestion or recommendation by another, we may find ourselves faced with a case of judgment where we think to ourselves that "this really is something special, this really gets to the heart of matters in a way I'd not considered." An unconsidered dimension of the human condition, human situation, human character, or even human possibilities, may thereby be revealed. Negatively, we may find ourselves judging of a case which suggests a common lack, and this result may even be unsurprising and a mere consequence of some positive judgment about a special case; a special case may suggest to us some foible, some limitation, some constraint, either in aesthetic, moral, or even epistemic and semantic senses. The sense of what is missing may be hard to place; we may find the felt lack is inchoate but nevertheless there. It is in this last position, where we may find ourselves wanting to say more, but unable; we may feel the pressure of the disappointingness of philosophical reflection on such matters as the culprit, rather than human nature itself being inherently disappointing (though we may feel that too, perhaps not wrongly). We

may find ourselves asking Are such problems unavoidable? Are there such problems as I conceive of, or as I conceive of them?

8. The thoughts I have now arrived at are intended to push against Kant's reluctance to speak about symbolic presentation in empirical judgment, to allow symbols of epistemic and generally semantic ideals to play a substantive role in cognition. I am not about to launch a full defense of the interpretive claim that Kant is committed to my proposal in his account of theoretical uses of reason, but I will make some suggestions as to how the making of the case for the aesthetic and the moral domain invites the objection that this splendid idea ought to have been given more prominent place, and that the issues which the symbolic addresses are general and significant for a proper appraisal of transcendental idealism. This usefully extends the thoughts of the preceding paragraph and connects up with our account of analogy and abduction from chapter II. The point is: symbolic hypotyposes analogically present ideas only reason can think, and they thereby reveal to us certain designs we have on ourselves, as well as the world; in moral and aesthetic contexts, they reveal to us the limits and high points of our desire and pleasure; yet what might symbolic thinking in ordinary empirical judgment involve?[23] It at least tells us about designs we have on the world: what we expect from it, what ideal cases we find in it and also create in it (in action and artifact); an examination of symbolism tells us also what we have *accepted* from the world.

Our account of analogy and abduction from chapter II suggests that hypotheses may result in the confecting of an analogy between two phenomena, one known (at least in some relevant respect), one unknown (in respects not included in the analogical comparison). The purpose of hypothesizing is to provide a basis for testing a claim which may advance or in some way augment one's epistemic situation; the relevant move is toward an improved epistemic situation via a hypothesis that something one does not fully grasp may be in some relevant way akin to something one does grasp (the latter at least better than the former in a respect relevant to the hypothesis, and then the analogy). And all of this with a view to discovery on the back of ad hoc assumption. The point is that without a positive epistemic node to leap off from, hypothesis is never possible; one always moves from familiar nodes to unfamiliar ones, guided by hope. And all these concerns are ordinary, empirical.

9. Kant insisted on ideas of theoretical uses of reason, the transcendental ideas, provided schemata, principles for the unification of the use of the understanding in experience, though they could never be presented symbolically. And given at least the ordinary observations that one can never be confronted with empirical vestiges of one's soul, that there are no good grounds for claiming that any experiences of parts of the entirety of the world-whole can be said to symbolize it better than all others,[24] that one can never break

bread with the Divine and claim to have so pictured it, to have understood how such an intelligence were responsible for the blueprint of the cosmos, this is no surprise and less of a concern. But what of the common, ordinary symbolic language undeniably occurring in the vastness of the distributive use of the understanding in experience? How is this to be accounted for beyond our brief and schematic remarks about analogy and hypothesis? It would be easy to simply nod with Kant at the pervasiveness of analogical thinking, and its utility in empirical investigation; perhaps the topic may be said to be best treated in an area of inquiry other than a theory of the power of judgment and of the pragmatic anthropology concerned with the vocation of the human being that we are at work on.[25] We can keep the topic narrow, however, by limiting it to the imagery introduced at the beginning of this chapter, regarding the movement of rational activity as being between two poles, the maximally general and the maximally specific, without determining, or terminating at, either. And we can ask simply how symbolic thinking fits with this picture.

10. Since symbols are taken to be indirect, incomplete, inadequate presentations of rational concepts, they are to be regarded as failures of an item in the world of sense to stand in for something reason demands. We have already spoken of the significance of this in aesthetic and moral contexts; beauty cannot be presented since aesthetic judgments are subjective, qua grounded in feeling, and the purity of practical reason and its demands for moral perfection entail the highest good and the morally best are only guiding ideals, but what of the theoretical, empirical domain? If we say, for instance, that the transcendental ideas provide schemata for the unification of the understanding in experience, but can never be provided for with a symbolic presentation, what are we saying? Concerning the negative part of the point, the insistence is that nothing can even present *as if* it were one's soul, the world-whole, or God. This constitutes a guarding against images which, if employed as symbols, would limit empirical investigation into the unity of our thoughts as in a self-consciousness; into the idea of a systematically unified nature whose interconnectivity, complexity, and limits[26] we can never know fully; into the limitations potentially imposable by the thought of a supreme intelligence that might serve as designer of the cosmos, and whose constitution may be compared to a singular collection of all predicates included in the idea of an "All of reality." The point is that nothing in the world of sense can even be considered analogous to these three ideas. In the words of Stanley Cavell, we may conjecture that our relation to these ideas is "not one of knowing,"[27] or, better, since we must be said to understand the idea if we can understand the demand the idea makes in its guise as a principle for the unification of the activity of the understanding, that our relation to that which the idea is supposed to represent is not one of knowing. That is to say: we do not stand

in a relationship of knowing to a single substance which would serve as a metaphysical ground for all our thought, as our own metaphysical grounding in the form of a collection of all we are in a singular; we do not stand in a relationship of knowing to the world-whole, the system or Kingdom of Nature, the metaphysical grounding for all cognition of the world of sense, but only ever know parts of it; we know nothing of the apparent law-making intelligence pervading the universe, the idea of its being something responsible for the apparent orderliness of nature (we only presuppose this, as Kant repeatedly tells us in the third Critique), and we also know nothing of ultimate reality as a singular containing all predicates that make up the "All of reality." We know nothing of the objects of such conjectures; we suppose them on the grounds of their utility for the ultimate systematic unification of our thought. But what, again, does this contrast, between not knowing and so instead supposing on grounds of utility, amount to?

11. It is easy to see how and why the idea, introduced above at the opening of III, of movement between the two poles of maximal generality and maximal specificity aids thinking: the ideas function to guide rational activity merely in the abstract, merely in thinking that one may obtain more specific knowledge by seeking to further divide concepts disjunctively, by asking whether there might be additional ways which a thing may be said to be, and saying so, such as to specify it; and in classifying something by placing it hierarchically one may institute a certain admirable orderliness in thought, but in such a way as to not expect a determinate thought about a highest genus (reality is not a genus which can be divided into species). Symbols play the role, in this picture of specification and classification, of exemplary cases of certain types (of actions or phenomena); symbols, insofar as they are regarded as such, reveal to us what we think of paradigmatic instances, but not merely determiners of common standards, applicable to all; rather, as that to which all of such a category, all falling under some concept, ought to aspire. It is clear how this works in moral cases: a case of doing something best, fulfilling the demands of the Categorical Imperative better than any other case, is presented as that which ought to be emulated (the symbolic presentation of moral perfection in the story of Jesus). And in aesthetic cases the function may be that of a beautiful artwork being regarded as particularly special (here recall the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good, to be respected, emulated; moral education, for its part being a pre-condition of aesthetic refinement). Because desire and pleasure originate in the human being, there is a human prerogative to symbolize their ideal objects; the case is different with the world. It is the lazy reason, the *ignava ratio*, as Kant tells us in the appendix to the Dialectic, which seeks a dogmatic answer to the metaphysical questions of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology; the task of transcendental metaphysics is to show how a principle for investigation in these areas can suffice, and how

only it can survive critical scrutiny. So the transcendental ideas are essentially principles, and this seems to leave Kant in the awkward position of saying we must follow the principles prescribed by transcendental metaphysics, though we do not "know" these principles. This uncharitable reading is immediately overcome, however, once one sees that what Kant really means is that one cannot foresee the end of the inquiry prescribed by the principle; the principle is meant to function as a principle for the unification of cognition, and if one can understand what reason demands in such a context one then knows all one needs to know. One understands the function of the critical tools and sees that upon which they work, cases of judging of the world of sense, as, in themselves, formless in absence of rational activity, in abstraction from the idea of rational systematic unity. This is the basic insight of Kant's *Revolution*, considered in the context of his theory of ideas.

12. The remarks regarding communicative contexts here serve as preliminary ways into the topic of IV.I, where I shall focus on the idea of picturing the rational itself, as well as the human. What I have so far said about the supposed impossibility of symbolizing ideas of reason in its theoretical use suggests that, although we may understand the function of the pure concepts of reason, and various other rational ideas, most importantly here, the *omnitudo realitatis* and the *ens realissimum*, this amounts to no more than understanding a felt demand, albeit an apparently universal one. Kant's opener in the first Critique comes to mind, where he spoke of metaphysics being a set of questions we can't seem to shrug off. Though he never took on board the deeper question regarding the mystery of why metaphysics so tempts; perhaps there is no (conclusive) answer here; perhaps this is a metaphysical need expressed in an epistemological tone. Much of what Kant wrote does however suggest an answer to this question: that of the transcendental concept of reason being one of a hierarchical structure of conditions for conditioned things, and further, higher conditions of those lower ones:

> [T]he transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of the totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing. Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained through the concept of the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a ground of synthesis for what is conditioned. (A322–23/B379)

That rational activity involves placing things and concepts in such a hierarchy is a tautological consequence of reason being the force which so locates. But we may still want to know why this is so. In the case of empirical thinking, a basic claim of the third Critique is that the assumption that nature presents as lawlike, as bearing general explanations for particulars, is a

transcendental condition or assumption of judging of it in systematically unified ways. Further, that this general assumption is no more than that required to go ahead judging in accord with the logical functions and categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality, as according to Kant, one finds out one does, subsequent to reflection on the nature of experience.

13. We have already mentioned that moral and aesthetic judgment, as resting on desire and pleasure, and therefore being dependent in important ways on the subjective dimension, have a hierarchical structure, although here the hierarchical structure, with the common being contrasted with the exemplary (or symbolic), is no more mysterious than the ranking of choices: your actions yesterday were more virtuous than those of today; the painting in the parlor is more beautiful than the one in the study, etc. Here mystery is lacking, since it is sufficiently familiar that preference is so structured. That we, collectively, may agree on, or dispute about, best cases, symbolic presentations of ideas we have about goodness and beauty, is entirely commonplace. The peculiarity arises when we attempt to think about how such an idea of preference may work if we force it onto the theoretical context, and ask: What if we said that the plastic bag floating in the breeze were a better symbol of the soul than a glass of milk? That the soul were a beery liquid? What if we were to say that the labyrinth better symbolized the cosmos than a worm-eaten apple? Or that the cosmos were a hall of mirrors? And how about the profane suggestion that God were portly and possessed by feelings of power, rather than a cloudlike entity filled with goodwill? What if we said that the mere thought of a designer for the cosmos, an intelligent creator of life, were the idea of a madman, a megalomaniacal infant? One could say just about anything, substitute in anything as an image of the soul, the cosmos, a god, and this is what myth is made of; it is also what makes it so irresistible and, at a certain level, irrefutable. But suppose we say, in a familiar, questionable, purportedly pragmatist spirit that myth does not aim at truth in the same way empirical science aims at truth. Would this reluctance expressed as a dodge be convincingly honest? Does any believer in so-called "myth" think it is not true? Is it possible to simultaneously believe something and believe it to not be true? Certainly, it is not prima facie clear how to go about defending *that* claim.[28]

Kant's point is that no symbol of these ideas captures their transcendental function properly. But we don't need to confine ourselves to his concern; we here begin to reflect on certain topics within what Kant referred to as pragmatic anthropology, the study of the human being and its vocation, its making itself what it is, in community and in the self in isolation. Though the topic will have to await the next chapter, since we must have a look first at Kant's way of arguing transcendentally for categorial structure in the world of sense; this will bring to a close the considerations we entered earlier in the present chapter regarding the principle of complete determination and the activity

of disjunctive syllogizing and of infinite judgment, and the relation of all of these to predicate negation and categorial distinctions.

14. By way of bringing this section to a close, let us return afresh to the remark that the symbolic may reveal some hitherto unconsidered dimension of the human condition, human situation, human character, or even human possibilities, or lack thereof. What I have just said about illegitimate attempts to symbolize pure concepts of reason points us toward a response: the way the highest ideals of desire and pleasure, in the moral and aesthetic keys, are symbolized, has an impact on the way certain forms of practical and aesthetic activity play out, and the way these forms of activity play out is to be viewed from within the realm of freedom, and as properly guided by the symbolic. Our ideas of the beautiful and of the moral reveal to us what our imagination and our reason suggest to us, which together make what we collectively are. Regarding the theoretical dimension, however, no symbols or ideals of knowledge can even guide a system of knowledge, since if the ideas are given content through being hypostatized (A583/B611, fn.*), they become an impediment to understanding. As we noted in chapter II, analogical cognition and hypothetical reasoning play a key role in developing systematically unified knowledge. Though it is only particular cases of knowledge, knowledge of particulars, and of certain general forms of explanation, that may be so aided. We can symbolize certain parts of knowledge and make picturesque certain topics of knowledge (the planetarium as a symbol not only of our solar system but also of subatomic particles, for instance), but we cannot symbolize the whole without seriously misconstruing our own activity, that within which it occurs, and that to which it is directed. The lesson may be the simple mereological one of not confusing the whole with one of its parts; of trying to make the complex simple in a way not so innocent.

15. I concluded in the previous section (III.II) by remarking on Kant's contrast between a distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience and the collective unity of a whole of experience, and I raised the following questions: "How does this distributive unity hang together? What makes the distribution of judgments a *unity* rather than an aggregate, a *motley*?" Speaking of a unity, a systematic one, I had said, would require one have some notion of connectivity between judgmental positions of which the unity if composed. How do the subsequent considerations I have entered aided in responding to these queries? The idea of a communicative context is none other than that where two or more subjects are involved in affecting one another's system of knowledge or belief;[29] one condition of the possibility of this is obviously mutual intelligibility, though more relevantly there is a question about possibility of agreement on exemplary and common phenomena. One important function of symbolic presentations, we have continually remarked upon, is their capacity for aiding moral and aesthetic education. But

beyond this, they reveal to individuals and communities what are regarded, what may be regarded, as high points of the aesthetic and the moral. They are highlights in the aesthetic and moral images of the world, insofar as the world of sense may be judged of in aesthetic and moral terms with eyes thereby on imaginative or intelligible possibilities. It is in this way that the symbolic may reveal some hitherto unconsidered dimension of the human condition, human situation, human character, or even human possibilities, and thereby show us what we may hope, on the basis of what we know and what we think ought to be done.[30] And all of this, as Kant insists, rests on the further agonizing question: What is the human being?[31] We return to this in chapter IV.

III.IV KANT'S PROOF FOR CATEGORIAL STRUCTURE IN THE WORLD OF SENSE

1. In the first section of the appendix to the Dialectic, "On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason," Kant offers a transcendental proof for the claim that the world of sense necessarily presents as having categorial structure:[32]

> If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great variety—I will not say of form (for they might be similar to one another in that) but of content, i.e., regarding the manifoldness of existing beings—that even the most acute human understanding, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (a case which can at least be thought), then the logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain, since it is the understanding that has to do with such concepts. The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes a transcendental one if it is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand only objects that are given to us). According to that principle, sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though we cannot determine its degree a priori), because without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible. (A653–54/B681–82)

The proof structure here is familiar in Kant's procedures, and from late twentieth-century philosophy's obsession with transcendental arguments: one begins with an assumption and seeks to argue that there are certain necessary conditions of the assumption holding, where the assumption is usually of a common sort: that human beings are free, can think and act rationally, can be said to have an at least potentially objective experience of things which are not themselves: other minds, the world, etc.[33] Kant's defense of the idea of the world of sense necessarily having a categorial structure is of interest here for at least two reasons: (1) it adds some more detail to speculative extensions

we earlier entered throughout III regarding the relation between predicate negation in infinite judgment and the notion of categorial structure, and (2), the idea of concepts and objects mutually determining one another, as briefly and schematically presented in II.III. Our objective here now is to simply acknowledge and briefly explain the connection between Kant's frequent assertions to the effect that the world of sense presents as a systematically unified nature, and (1) and (2).

2. At A649/B677, Kant speaks of the process of unifying manifold powers under a fundamental power, a rational process that mirrors the understanding's process of unifying the manifold of intuition under concepts. In both cases, there is an attempt to find the particular as contained under the universal, the activity of the power of judgment, where in the former case of reason which for its part is "the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal" (A646/B674). The concern with the relation of the particular to the universal can be framed in more expansive terms as a concern with the "logical form of a system" (cf. IV "On experience as a system for the power of judgment"):

> The logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given general concepts (of the sort which that of a nature in general is here), by means of which one thinks the particular (here the empirical) with its variety as contained under the general, in accordance with a certain principle. (20: 214, 18)

So the transcendental proof that we could not form empirical concepts without the assumption that nature has a genera-species structure connects with the idea of the form of a system in the following way: since there could be no empirical concepts without an assumption that nature was possessed of a genera-species structure, and since the logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given general concepts in terms of a universal-particular structure, and since the genera-species structure just is an instance of the universal-particular structure, the idea of a form of a system is that which makes empirical concept formation possible. And of course, from the opposite direction: the idea of a logical form of a system would have no sense in absence of there being empirical concepts, since without them the idea has no content. (Notice how familiar this kind of reasoning is in Kant; one cannot fail to hear his words regarding the blindness of intuitions and emptiness of concepts echo here.)

3. Regarding our first concern as raised earlier, that with the connection between the ideas of categorial structure and the idea of predicate negation in infinite judgment, the following may be said: According to Kant, the formation of empirical concepts depends on the assumption that nature has a categorial structure. This means that all concepts formed about natural things have the structure of admitting of hierarchies of conceptual inclusions

and exclusions, and also that concepts of types of natural objects, or things, *qua* types, admit of certain essential and accidental predications; all natural concepts of things, as of types, necessitate certain predications are or can be made of them. For instance, the discussion of predicate negation from chapter III.I, the idea of disjunctions of contrary predicates, is a universal and necessary feature of judgments about (at least) natural things. Moreover, this feature of judgment extends to principles of the understanding, as can be seen in the First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*:

> The principle of reflection on given concepts of nature is that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be found, which is the same as to say that in all of its products one can always presuppose a form that is possible for general laws cognisable by us. (20: 211–12, 15–16; cf. footnote *, 20: 211–12, 15–16)

So it is on the basis of finding genera and species in the world of sense that one can formulate lawlike explanations of the behavior of natural things. This is not exactly startling; what is interesting is how this expansive claim radiates from the transcendental proof regarding the relation between empirical concept formation and the idea of categorial structure as insisted upon in our initial quote above.

4. This point regarding hierarchical structure is supported by Kant's claims in the appendix to the Dialectic at A650–51/B678–79 where he insists the "logical principle of rational unity," that is, the assumption that knowledge is systematically unified and involves thinking in accordance with empirically discovered and transcendental laws, which qua laws are universal and necessary, depends upon a transcendental presupposition: that nature necessarily presents as, and is, lawlike. So, that "the law of reason to seek unity is necessary" (A651/B679), is to be supported by the claim that we could not have the systematically unified, coherent rational experience we do if we did not operate under this assumption. The apparently circular character of this justification—that if we wish to enjoy the kind of experience we enjoy we must assume what we do assume about nature, that is a systematic unity—is revealed to be otherwise upon recognition of an important fact: we could not make nature seem just any way we wished, for nature presents in sense in such a way that if it is to be understood it must be understood a certain way, that is, categorially. There are certain basic recognitional capacities we must have and be able to actualize in order to form thoughts of recurring particulars, and particular instances of universal kinds, in order to have thought at all.[34] It may seem patently incredible that the assumption that nature is lawlike must be assumed in order to for it to be understood, though cannot itself be proven; this however is the central

point of Kant's transcendental idealism: upon reflection on experience and knowledge we come across certain fundamental principles which cannot coherently doubted though cannot be proven either. Whether one is upset by this is a fact whose reasons and curiosities may be sought, though they are not our concern just now.

5. With respect to our second concern as raised in the opening paragraph of this section the following may be said. In II.III we had been briefly concerned to note how Kant was given to speak of concepts and objects determining one another, a way to understand this as being simply in the senses of an object being determined by being subsumed under a concept and having certain marks of its character specified in the concept's intension; a concept, for its part, being determined by having its extension of objects augmented and thereby further specified through the inclusion of an object within that extension. (I here resist unpacking the complex and controversial ideas of intension and extension beyond the description I've just given.) This structure can now be seen in light of an interesting opposition Kant sets up between two principles for inquiry, one sufficiently well known to count as almost a dogma of scientific rationality, the other a curious partner entered on the basis of Kant's valuable fastidiousness about the uncertainty inherent in the understanding's attempts to judge of nature. The former is what is commonly known as Ockham's Razor, and which Kant refers to as "the familiar scholastic rule":

> *Entia praeter necessitate non esse multiplicanda.*
> (Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity).[35]

To this he opposes what he dubs the "law of specification":

> *Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.*
> (The varieties of entities are not to be diminished rashly).[36]

Regarding the former, as Kant notes, "apparently infinite variety should not restrain us from conjecturing behind it a unity of fundamental properties" (A652/B680), where this is a kind of transcendental presupposition coeval with the remark from Kant's transcendental proof cited above regarding thinking of nature as having a genera-species structure. Regarding the latter, which Kant refers to as a logical law, it is supported by a "transcendental law of specification," where this "does not demand an actual infinity in regard to the variety of things that can become our objects," though it does demand one seek to specify where one has ground to, for the reason that if one can do so one increases the subtlety and specificity of one's systematically unified system of rational knowledge. This transcendental law of specification of course does not and cannot demand an actual infinity since no such thing can

be found; as Kant says "the logical principle asserting the indeterminacy of the logical sphere in regard to possible division would give no occasion for that." The demand for specification, Kant rightfully says, is further justified by the following truism: "if there were no lower concepts, then there would also be no higher ones."

6. This latter point which I have just been discussing can be compared with the interpretation of Kant's vision of the activity of the rational judging agent as entered in the opening section of III. There I had spoken of our rational activity as consisting in conceptual determination which was driven in two directions—toward maximal generality and maximal specificity—without terminating, or reaching a final point of conceptual determination, at either. The former push to maximal generality is expressed in Kant's transcendental concept of reason, insofar as reason demands one seek conditions for given conditioned things; the latter push to maximal specificity is expressed by the transcendental law of specification I have just mentioned, and which is usefully explained in the following way:

> The cognition of appearances in their complete determination (which is possible only through understanding) demands a ceaselessly continuing specification of its concepts, and a progress to the varieties that always still remain, from which abstraction is made in the concept of the species and even in that of the genus. (A656/B684)

Given this characterization of the transcendental law of specification, it can be regarded as the demand for the principle of complete determination, as we discussed in III.I, to be applied to the limit of maximal specificity. The principle of complete determination being applied to the limit in the opposite direction, toward maximal generality in the finding of conditions for conditioned things, is that necessitated by the transcendental concept of reason. How do these points bear on the idea of concepts and objects determining one another?

7. As we noted in II.I, concepts may be determined by other concepts either subordinatively or superordinatively, and they may be determined by objects where objects are subsumed under them; objects may be determined by concepts as being of a type, and therefore as being amenable to certain categorially determined forms of predication in terms of essential and accidental properties. As we noted, judging of objects as determined by other objects involves material rather than conceptual determination, though material determination that is having conceptual conditions could be cashed out in terms of the above forms of conceptual determination. Given everything that has been said in this section about the importance of Kant's transcendental proof for categorial structure in the world of sense, and the claim that

proof makes about empirical concept formation being only possible under the assumption of nature being categorially structured, the brief characterizations of the mutual determinations of concepts and objects may also be said to be necessary features of the systematically unified knowledge about nature, insofar as they are entailments of the picture as so far presented and refined in this section. These skeletal points about reason's structure and function may now give way, however, to an investigation of a different kind: that of an exploration of certain of the key concepts and orienting imagery of the Kantian rational subject.

NOTES

1. As Kant claims in the Transcendental Ideal, the construal of God, qua *ens realissimum*, is actually that of the sum-total of all possible predicates thought of as contained in a singular entity.

2. Note the two opposed directions that a singular thought may point in: toward the formal reality of classification and specification, on the one hand, and toward the objective reality of what is classified and specified, on the other.

3. My topic is not Hegel, although the points that in a moment I shall rehearse, regarding Kant on transcendental negation in the Transcendental Ideal, do recommend a reading of the latter as anticipator of the supposedly radical thesis of absolute negativity as found in the *Science of Logic*. For a recent reading of Hegel through the lens of absolute negativity, see Brady Bowman 2013, *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity*, Cambridge University Press.

4. This point is made throughout Bielefeldt 2003.

5. Here note Kant's words from the Doctrine of Method regarding the envisaging of this space: "The sum total of all possible objects for our cognition seems to us to be a flat surface, which has its apparent horizon, namely that which comprehends its entire domain and which is called by us the rational concept of unconditioned totality. It is impossible to attain this empirically, and all attempts to determine it a priori in accordance with a certain principle have been in vain. Yet all questions of our pure reason pertain to that which might lie outside this horizon or in any case on its borderline" (A759–60/B787–88). Cf. also Kant's analogy of reason's domain with a sphere at A762/B790.

6. As quoted earlier, Addison (2015) provides an exhaustive account of how and why Kant's position on the relation between sensibility and the understanding (and here, for my purposes, reason) is contradictory.

7. Despite recent philosophy's fascination with modality the significance of this principle and its place in Kant's philosophy are both disturbingly under-discussed. A recent exception worth noting is Nicholas Stang 2012, "Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgment," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20(6): 1117–39.

8. This point is made also in Wood 1978, 42–44.

9. My concern here is not with recent debates about the historical or systematic status of, or problems with, Kant's views about modality, though much interesting work has been done on the topic in recent years and it is worthwhile mentioning some of this here to indicate what engagement would be required for a more nuanced and detailed working out of the view of Kantian modality sketched here. Articles worth mentioning in this connection are Andrew Chignell 2014, "Kant and the 'Monstrous' Ground of Possibility," *Kantian Review* 19(1): 53–69; 2009, "Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 91(2): 157–92; Jessica Leech 2012, "Kant's Modalities of Judgment," *European Journal of Philosophy* 20(2): 260–84; 2014, "Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the Possible, the Actual, and the Intuitive Understanding," *Kantian Review* 19(3): 339–65; Uygar Abaci 2016, "The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant's Modal Agnosticism in the Postulates'," *European Journal of Philosophy* 24(1): 129–58.

10. This point is made by Longuenesse 1995/2005, 212n3.

11. Allison 2004, 396.

12. This point is noted in Longuenesse 1995/2005, 217–18 and her 2001/2005, 190.

13. It is worthy to note that immediately following this Kant refers back to his associating each of the transcendental ideas with the categorical (soul), hypothetical (world-whole), and disjunctive (God) syllogisms, respectively. Of course, the object of transcendental theology is special, since not only is God a transcendental idea, but is also represented, in the guise of the *ens realissimum*, as the transcendental *ideal*. This might lead one to suggest that transcendental idealism is, first and foremost, a transcendental theology.

14. Kant has in mind exclusive disjunction. I will not comment on inclusive disjunction.

15. Kant acknowledges the difference here between these forms of negation in the *Blömberg Logik*, in his *Lectures on Logic*, Cambridge University Press, 274, 220. This distinction between two different forms of negation could be developed further in a range of ways. Were one to start from the question of the logic of contraries one would be well-advised to examine the literature on the logic of determinates and determinables. Here one ought to begin with W. E. Johnson 1921, *Logic Part I*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, development of him by Prior 1949a, "Determinables, Determinates and Determinants," *Mind* 58(229): 1–20, and 1949b, "Determinables, Determinates and Determinants (II)," *Mind* 58(230): 178–94, and the symposium with Stephan Körner and John Searle, 1959, "Symposium: On Determinables and Resemblance," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 33: 125–58, and Rosenberg's dissertation under Sellars 1966, *A Study of the Determinable–Determinate Relation*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Pittsburgh, University Microfilms Inc. For some recent overviews see Eric Funkhouser 2006, "The Determinable–Determinate Relation," *Noûs* 40(3): 548–69; and David H. Sanford 2014, "Determinates vs. Determinables," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/determinatedeterminables/>. For a different angle which has influenced work on this topic (i.e., Putnam's), see Ludwig Wittgenstein 1929, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 9(1): 162–71.

16. Actually, as listed in the Metaphysical Deduction, the modal categories are three pairs: possibility/impossibility, existence/nonexistence, and necessity/contingency (A80/B106).

17. Well-articulated defense of the view that Kant's modal categories and functions of judgment indicate the modal flavor of inferences one may make on their basis is given in Leech 2012. I will not engage the issue in detail here, although one complication which may be introduced is this: in the above passage a contrast is drawn between three ways modal categories may indicate the relation of a concept to the faculty of cognition, with respect to (1) the empirical use of the understanding (the modal status of an empirical judgment), (2) the power of judgment in experience (as in the System of Principles, so with respect to a priori judgment), and (3) reason, in its enacting of syllogistic inferences. It is only strictly (3) which would be in accord with Leech's reading, although this would depend upon exactly how one interprets the relationship between judgment and inference. By this I mean to say, in cases of (1) and (2), the modal category employed would indicate what further immediate inferences (of the understanding) one would make. Likewise, it may be said that for (3), judgments are nodes in syllogistic inferences, and although modal status may indicate what inferences may be made from some given judgment/s, modal status also categorizes individual judgments themselves. For instance, in Kant's framework one can say certain judgments are possible or necessary simply given the definitions offered in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking; there is no need to reduce the modality of judgment to the modality of inferential connection. One can easily reply by saying that inferential connections themselves indicate nothing more than the ability to judge in a certain way; as in saying that knowing how to infer something from something else consists simply in the ability to judge well. There is no need to introduce such a direction of priority, and such is not warranted by Kant's own words.

18. I follow Longuenesse's 1995/2005 translation of this as "was" instead of Guyer and Wood's "is" (in their translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* cited in the present work), since Kant here intends to indicate a point of view on the idea of the "unbounded reality" which he is rejecting; the replacement for such an idea is the transcendental concept of an *omnitudo realitatis* which we have been discussing.

19. Here one is given to pause and retort: "Yet is not sensation itself an empirical event? How could it be denied a place in the concept of an All of reality?" Of course, Kant would not deny this, though in order to include a sensation within the concept of the All of reality one would first have to judge about it and form a concept to described in order that it be an objective phenomenon (here we are introduced once more to the first-personal third-personal distinction between perception as a subjective experience and perception as an empirical event in reality). I will not focus on this topic here, though an analysis of Kant's distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience would be required in order to explain how he would view what I've just remarked upon. For a nice discussion of the topic which would serve as a useful starting point for developing what I've just said further, see Longuenesse 1998, chapter 7.

20. Cf. §9 "Investigation of the question: whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former," and §39 "On the communicability of a sensation," in connection with this point. See

Longuenesse 2005a, 275ff. for discussion of important themes connected with the issue I have mentioned here.

21. Kant's employment of the phrase "unsocial sociability" is worth recording here; the thought he expressed with that phrase is that of humanity's social situation being conditioned by the mixture of two antagonistic features of the human condition: the social need for others with which to commune, and the selfish desire to have one's ends met.

22. His actual attempts to schematize the transcendental ideas occur in the appendix to the Dialectic, "The final end of the natural dialectic of human reason," at A672–73/B700–701 and again at A684–86/B712–14. I come to discuss this in IV.I.

23. I am not going to focus on Kant's own words about the pervasiveness of the symbolic in our thinking, though in section 59 he acknowledges it, and lists some examples haphazardly; so haphazardly, in fact, that he makes no mention whatsoever of the possible significance of the fact that some of his examples of symbolic language involve invocation of the Categories (i.e., substance, accident). If intentional, this would raise a whole raft of interpretive questions regarding the ways in which activity of the pure understanding might be in some way symbolic.

24. As noted in the Introduction, there are points where some of my concerns converge with Goodman's in his *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*; the question of how to and how to not symbolized is of a piece with the question of how one generalizes from experience in certain ways and not others. My concern is with abduction; Goodman's with induction.

25. Our topics are, of course, hot ones: analogy, hypothesis, and associated concepts like metaphor, are treated not only in other areas of philosophy, but also in linguistics, anthropology, psychology, and so forth. As I have made clear, however, my aim here has not been to engage with the vast literature on these topics, but take a narrow look at some Kantian curiosities.

26. In the section of the *Prolegomena* entitled "On determining the boundary of pure reason," Kant insists mathematics and natural science include limits, not boundaries, whereas theoretical and practical philosophy includes the latter, since it always envisages a space outside itself which its own territory, the interior of the space, is to be compared with.

27. For two separate though related attempts to work out this idea in relation to his persistent theme of the philosophical significance of skepticism, see Cavell 1979, 52–55 and 1969, 322–25.

28. As noted in the Introduction, proper development of this point would require engagement, first of all, with Cassirer's 1965 masterpiece, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, and would require a nuanced working out of the principles upon which a division of anthropology into philosophical and empirical branches would involve.

29. I here simplify matters by holding off talking about the relation between opinion, belief, and knowledge. The relevant discussion of these concepts is in the Canon of Pure Reason in the Doctrine of Method (A820–31/B848–59).

30. Cf. A804–5/B832–33.

31. "The field of philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I

hope? (4) What is the human being? *Metaphysics* answers the first question, *morals* the second, *religion* the third, and *anthropology* the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this to anthropology, because the first three questions refer to the last one. (Ak 9: 25)." Cited in Wood (2003, 38).

32. The official definition for such a form of proof is given in the Doctrine of Method: "In transcendental cognition, as long as it has merely to do with concepts of the understanding, this guideline is possible experience. The proof does not show, that is, that the given concept (e.g., of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause), for such a transition would be a leap for which nothing could be held responsible; rather it shows that experience itself, hence the object of experience, would be impossible without such a connection. The proof, therefore, has to indicate at the same time the possibility of achieving synthetically and a priori a certain cognition of things which is not contained in the concept of them." (A783/B811)

33. For a slightly dated though still eminently useful bibliography of the literature on this topic (which has had less ink spent on it this millennium anyway), as well as an excellent collection of essays, see Robert Stern, ed., 2000, *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. The bibliography, compiled by Isabel Cabrera, is at 307–22.

34. This is the famous line taken by P. F. Strawson in his 1959, *Individuals*, London: Routledge. I am not concerned to here recapitulate Strawson's position, however I must acknowledge my approach to Kant in this work has been heavily influenced by both the work just cited as well as his book on Kant 1966, *The Bounds of Sense*, London: Routledge.

35. A652/B680; the translation is given at the bottom of the page of the English, on 595.

36. A6555/B683–84; the translation is given at the bottom of the page of the English version, on 597.

Chapter IV

Imagining the Rational

IV.I PICTURING THE RATIONAL

1. The discussions of the foregoing chapters have been focused on laying out aspects of Kant's logic and metaphysics of judgment germane to the topic of hypotyposis, the presentation of a priori concepts, particularly the symbolic. I have been interested primarily in providing sketches of important basic ideas, with minimal supporting argumentation; the aim has been to provide some speculative extensions of the consequences of certain of Kant's claims with the goal of seeing where they may be led. Attention is now turned to providing some brief critical commentary on certain of the themes that have been raised. This treatment will be orthodox to the extent that many of the concerns I raise are commonplace in Kantian literature, though my aim is to provide commentary in a way that is somewhat heterodox: the focus is here not on intervention into interpretive disputes in the literature, but rather on piecing together some of the consequences of our investigation for the more expansive question of the situation of the human agent.

2. The flow of this final chapter, therefore, will be directed by demands that certain of the philosophical concepts I have discussed impose. These philosophical concepts I aim to understand in a way that is in concert with Kant's various references to the "common" in his philosophy: a common sense, common human understanding, and common human reason. I proceed by taking seriously the brief sketch of his Enlightenment vision of the rational community offered in chapter III.III, when I spoke of a communicative context. The concepts, or ideas, to which I have just referred, may be listed as follows: symbol, analogy, systematic unity, absolute, rule, condition, limit, and all of these considered in relation to the idea of systematically unified thought and knowledge, comprised of the four faculties of sensibility, the

understanding, the power of judgment, and reason.[1] These concepts I consider within the frame of what might constitute the following of a rule, and of the legislation of a rule, given the problem posed by the idea of symbolic hypotyposis: the finding of occasions in the world of sense to claim that something is analogous to an idea that only reason can think.

3. Before proceeding, it must be noted that the form of theorizing about this topic strays beyond what Kant thought of as philosophy proper; it fits partly within Kant's understanding of philosophy, but partly also within what he called pragmatic anthropology. This divergence is immaterial however, since here I do not place any restrictions on what questions may and may not be discussed in relation to the topic of hypotyposis, and moreover, make no claims about what one ought to name the kind of inquiry we here have been pursuing. Additionally, there is of course good reason to be concerned with the empirical problems of pragmatic anthropology, insofar as they were underdeveloped by Kant and attention to them rewards us with further insight.

4. In chapter I, paragraph 11, I had said that a way to live with the apparent contradictoriness of Kant's position, it would seem, would be to dissolve certain fundamental confusions which threaten regarding the relationship in which an example of satisfaction of a rule stands to that rule itself; further, what the different ways of a rule being satisfied tells us about what a rule is, and what satisfying a rule, or being in accord with a rule, amounts to. The account of symbolic presentation in chapter I involved an examination of Kant's view of what such a moment of cognition involved; namely, thinking of an empirical item as merely analogical to an idea only reason could think, where the empirical item was thought of *as if* it were a satisfactory case answering to the rule the concept of reason in question, that which were symbolized, would prescribe. The contrast here between direct and indirect presentations of a concept raised a question about what is involved with something being in agreement with a concept, thus with what it takes for a thought to count as involving concepts, the thought following rules determined by the concepts by which it may be said to be composed. Chapter II saw us provide a reading of the significance of analogy, and the related inferential activity of abduction, or hypothesis. The point of that investigation was to show that analogical cognition implicitly involved a hypothetical moment, wherein one item presented in cognition were taken to be analogical to some other on the basis of an implicit hypothesis of how each may be relevantly similar, given certain cognitive purposes. All of this is straightforward enough, and nothing more need be said of how this kind of informal reasoning functions, in general; our concern is now rather with the more nebulous and curious metaphysical dimension of such a structure in relation to the transcendentally ideal vision of the human agent.

5. I have just mentioned how the symbolic and the analogical character of one kind of hypotyposis opens us up to some deeper questions of how such concerns fit with the Kantian vision of the rational agent; this dispenses with the first two concepts I just listed (symbol, analogy), and thereby employs them as a frame for the remainder of this section. Regarding the remaining concepts I listed (systematic unity, absolute, rule, condition, limit), the following may be said: symbolic cognition is a moment where the finite rational agent attempts sensible presentation of the supersensible, conditioned presentation of the unconditioned, with a view to giving tangible form to the formless intangible,[2] where this is motivated by a rational need to symbolize completeness, absolute satisfaction in the form of a singular, a singular cognition. The systematicity of judgmental activity in Kant refers to the law-governed distributive unity use of the understanding in experience; thus, systematic unity itself cannot be represented as a singular totality, rather only as a unified plurality (all particulars, particular judgments as belonging to one universal system of cognition). Symbolic cognition thus has the systematic purpose of presenting a case of completeness of some rational concept, albeit imperfectly; such presentation is useful for conditioned agents who wish to give themselves concrete cases of the exemplary which provide a guiding idea of what counts as a best case (at least in the moral or aesthetic sense). The utility of the symbolic however consists in symbols not exhausting what they purport to present; the guiding is done by reason, with the aid of sensible symbols as imperfect cases of satisfaction (we may wonder what a perfect case of satisfaction could amount to). This train of thought is a sketch of how the concepts I have listed contribute collectively to the vision of the rational agent we are about to consider in more depth.

6. I have just noted that it is in the context of aesthetic or moral cognition that symbols play their primary role. The passage with which we began our discussion in chapter I, §59 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, comes from the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment, in a section entitled "Beauty as a Symbol of Morality." In the very brief appendix to that section, Kant notes the connection between aesthetic and moral education in saying that the cultivation of moral capacities is an essential precondition for being able to adequately form aesthetic judgments about sensed phenomena. And in §59 itself, the analogy is drawn between the beautiful and the moral on the basis of both being cases of the merely intelligible toward which our cognitive representations only reach without touching, all the time falling short of the standard envisaged. This symmetry provides us with a way of reintegrating a suggestion from chapter III regarding Kant's theory about the general structure of our cognition, as consisting of rational judgmental activity that extends in two directions, toward the maximally general and the maximally

specific, without terminating at either, or being able to form a maximally determinate conceptual rendering in cognition of either.

7. In chapter III, I had claimed that empirical intuitions were those maximally determinate cognitions which, qua singular, could never be fully determined by concepts; I had also claimed that the maximally general was represented in Kant's thought by the *ens realissimum*, the philosophical idea of God as a singular being, which could never be determined, but only could serve as a guiding idea of the instantiation, in a singular, of all predicates of which the *omnitudo realitatis* (the "All of reality") was thought to be composed. The curious alignment of ordinary empirical judgment with aesthetic judgment now comes into focus in the following way: the maximally determinate but never fully conceptually determinable empirical intuition is a case of that in ordinary empirical experience which can never be fully captured by general concepts, insofar as a full specification of all empirical qualities is a task which one cannot terminate with absolute certainty about its completion (an empirical intuition is to be contrasted with what Leibniz called "complete concepts"). Yet the idea of that which cannot be conceptually determined at all, not merely not completely, and which serves as the sensible ideal of an aesthetic form of completeness, is referred to by Kant as an "aesthetic idea."

8. In invoking the contrast between ideas of reason and aesthetic ideas,[3] Kant construes the former as "indemonstrable" concepts of reason, the latter "inexponible" representations of the imagination (5: 342, 218); the former, that is, cannot be given sensible presentation (except indirectly as symbols), the latter cannot be explicated conceptually (beauty is that which we lay to claim to on subjective grounds, though our aesthetic judgments lack objectivity). In the first place, where aesthetic ideas are mentioned, they are said to be the product of "spirit . . . the animating principle of the mind" (5: 314, 192). With our remarks from III.III regarding a communicative context in mind, let us add to this idea of that which cannot be said by reflecting on what the idea of a limit or condition on cognizability here amounts to. This we can do via a reintroduction of Kant's distinction between boundaries and limits, in relation to reason and knowledge.

9. The aesthetic idea represents for our thinking an ideal of imaginative presentation, an aesthetically ideal presentation that cannot be conceptually determined; it therefore functions as a limit case for conceptual determination: the aesthetic idea is the high point of imaginative capacity and is not, therefore, amenable to fixity by the understanding. Does this mean it cannot be understood? And would such a claim be merely verbal to the extent that that which cannot be conceptualized cannot therefore be said to be determined by the understanding, and thereby cannot be said to be understood? Yet the significance of the point is about freedom of imaginative capacity from fixity by conceptual rules, and what we should ask now is What does this tell us about the human situation, particularly in activities of judgment?

10. Much that is platitudinous may be added here; that our thinking makes us who and what we are, and that the way we think is, under a certain interpretation, a matter of how we individually and collectively like to go about our business. But responses to the entirety of questions raisable about humanity do not all count as mere recitations of platitudes. The language used to speak about what now is, what may or must be (the modal), and the constraints on such talk and such things as may be so spoken about, is unusual, and is hostage to properly philosophical reflection on talk about boundaries and limits. According to Kant, thought of boundaries (at least in extended things) "always presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses that location." So to think of cognition or thought as so bounded is to envisage two spaces: one habitable by thought or cognition, one not so habitable. For their part, "limits require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness" (4: 352, 103). To apply this imagery to thought or cognition would require one to suspend the thought of that which stands on the other side of what is cognized or known, for here one cannot speak of such another side. The former of these concepts, that of boundary, gives a positive interpretation of noumena as that which is not known but which can be conceived of; the latter, that of a limit, gives the mere negative idea of that which is not limited in the way our cognition of phenomena is limited.[4] This contrast can be exploited in service of reflection on the question of the human situation and what kind of metaphysics might be given of it.

11. After characterizing mathematics as a form of inquiry that has limits rather than boundaries, Kant says the following about metaphysics:

> metaphysics, in the dialectical endeavors of pure reason (which are not initiated arbitrarily or wantonly, but toward which the nature of reason itself drives), does lead us to the boundaries; and the transcendental ideas, just because they cannot be avoided and yet will never be realized, serve not only actually to show us the boundaries of reason's pure use, but also to show us the way to determine such boundaries; and that too is the end and use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which bore metaphysics as its favorite child, whose procreation (as with any other in the world) is to be ascribed not to chance accident but to an original seed that is wisely organized toward great ends. For metaphysics, perhaps more than any other science, is, as regards its fundamentals, placed in us by nature itself, and cannot at all be seen as the product of an arbitrary choice, or as an accidental extension from the progression of experiences (it wholly separates itself from those experiences). (4: 353, 104)

Given that Kant here tells us that the idea of a boundary for cognition is to be understood as that provided by the transcendental ideas, we must bring into focus exactly what the functions of the transcendental ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God, are. In the second section of the appendix to the

Transcendental Dialectic, we are given an explicit formulation that is worth quoting at length. Regarding transcendental psychology we are told, first:

> Following the ideas named above [those of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology] as principles, we will first (in psychology) connect all appearances, actions, and receptivity of our mind to the growing thread of inner experience as if the mind were a simple substance that (at least in this life) persists in experience with personal identity, while its states—to which the states of the body belong only as external conditions—are continuously changing.

The immediately following comment expresses the central task of transcendental cosmology:

> We have to pursue the conditions of the inner as well as the outer appearances of nature through an investigation that will nowhere be completed, as if nature were infinite in itself and without a first or supreme member although, without denying, outside of all appearances, the merely intelligible primary grounds for them, we may never bring these grounds into connection with explanations of nature, because we are not acquainted with them at all.

And, in a transcendental theology:

> [We] have to consider everything that might ever belong to the context of possible experience as if this experience constituted an absolute unity, but one dependent through and through, and always still conditioned within the world of sense, yet at the same time as if the sum total of appearances (the world of sense itself) had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside its range, namely an independent, original, and creative reason, as it were, in relation to which we direct every empirical use of our reason in its greatest extension as if the objects themselves had arisen from that original image of all reason.

Kant is then even more explicit regarding what these formulations of the ideas entail:

> That means: it is not from a simple thinking substance that we derive the inner appearances of our soul, but from one another in accordance with the idea of a simple being; it is not from a highest intelligence that we derive the order of the world and its systematic unity, but rather it is from the idea of a most wise cause that we take the rule that reason is best off using for its own satisfaction when it connects up causes and effects in the world. (A672–73/B700–701)

The significance of Kant's remark that "Our reason, however, sees around itself as it were a space for the cognition of things in themselves, although it can never have determinate concepts of those things and is limited to

appearances alone" (4: 352, 103), now takes the following sense: we cannot form determinate concepts of things which are not unified and included in the complete picture of mutual determination of world and self as demanded by the transcendental ideas; we cannot, that is, make sense of that which is outside such a systematic unity because being a part of a such a unity is what gives thoughts sense. Transcendental psychology is the Kantian metaphysics of thinking of our thoughts as our own, and whose coherence is imparted by their being so, as being attributable to a thinking substance; transcendental cosmology is that enterprise that offers an account of the idea of a systematically unified nature which obeys discoverable laws that transcend our own experience of things which in the world of sense are found to obey them, though these laws cannot be said to transcend experience *in general*; transcendental theology is the metaphysical investigation into the idea of concepts such as ultimate order and completeness, and universality and necessity, and ultimate ground. Recall the last, which we discussed in some detail in III.I, is that whose core is a discussion of the principle of complete determination in the Transcendental Ideal, where transcendental replacements for rational-metaphysical concepts such as that of a properly theistic God and an "All of reality" are offered.

12. The outline of transcendental metaphysics just given, and the explanation of its significance, needs both be tied to a clearer explanation of the idea of the determination of a boundary. I have just offered the fairly simplistic explanation that transcendental metaphysics, being a metaphysics of the conditions of possibility of the thinkable and cognizable, concerned itself with determining the boundary of cognition through a specification of principles which shape the realization of such possibility, that allow for such a possible world picture to exist at all. The transcendental ideas just cited constitute these principles of transcendental metaphysics. And since Kant claims that they determine the boundary of cognition, the other side of the boundary is simply that which is not unifiable systematically in cognition and thought in accord with the principles. Yet here we are confronted by a question that plagued Romantics who followed Kant's refusal to speak of the transcendentally real with an attitude that ranged from indignation to horror; the idea of that which is entirely incomprehensible is, considered in the abstract, not in the least sufficient to lead us to frame a sensible cognition of our existential situation, though the idea of the unknown, unknowable, incommunicable, and inchoate, took on after Kant, as it had before him, various symbols, and forms in myth. I am concerned now to say a little about the former abstract idea of the unknown, without committing to a full-blown discussion of this vast landscape.

13. Following the portions of text cited above, Kant raises an important question:

> How does our reason cope with this connection of that with which we are acquainted to that with which we are not acquainted, and never will be? Here is a real connection of the known to a wholly unknown (which will always remain so), and even if the unknown should not become the least bit better known—as is not in fact to be hoped—the concept of this connection must still be capable of being determined and brought to clarity. (4: 354, 105–6)

The relation between the known and the unknown can be thought about in a multitude of ways. When, in II.I, I spoke of hypothesis and its connection with analogical reasoning, I had said that such cognitive procedures played a role in discovery to the extent that a move was involved which took a thinker from a contented and positive epistemic position to a new, perhaps somewhat uncertain position via the assumption that some new content of thought may be analogical to some other. But what if we consider this kind of move in an expansive fashion as concerned with the entirety of knowledge and the entirety of ignorance, rather than with a single case? We can frame this in two ways: (1) If we consider knowledge to be merely limited, we consider it such that the unknown and unknowable is simply the negatively noumenal which serves as the idea of a restriction of that which can be known in principle, given certain conditions on knowability; (2) If we consider knowledge as bounded, in the way we've just cited Kant as conceiving it, we conceive of the realm of the unknown and unknowable as having some kind of content. This content has been known as the infamous realm of the in-itself, or the positively noumenal. We are concerned now with the import of this contrast for our attempts, which I noted above I believe to be unavoidable, to symbolize the idea of a rational space, or to symbolize the nature of our rational activity.

14. The contrast between (1) and (2) is a version of Kant's contrast between limit and boundary, respectively, where he had declared mathematical cognition to involve the former, philosophical cognition the latter. I am not concerned here to investigate Kant's own position about this but instead to speculate about the influence of distinct symbolizations of our rational activity on our conception of ourselves as rational agents. Concerning (1), the idea that our activity may be supplied with a negation—what goes beyond it or is not limited in the way it is taken to be—we are supplied there with a picture where knowledge may be thought of as a single space, or as occurring in and being about the world as such, where such a world is thinkable on analogy to a single space. Here increases in knowledge would consist not only in cognition inhabiting, occupying, or expanding over more of the space in a uniform way, but may in particular cases be seen in terms of an increase in connections[5] between different parts of the space: systematically unified knowledge which involves the distributive use of the understanding

in experience being well-integrated and connected with itself, through laws, and with the self-conscious activity of the agent possessed of such knowledge. Notice here how this constitutes an employment of the transcendental metaphysical principles iterated above, namely, those functions of the transcendental ideas that were taken to determine the boundary of cognition; our concern here, however, is with a way of thinking about limit.

15. Consider (2): In thinking of cognition as bounded and as only part of a total space where the remainder is uninhabitable by thought, we may wonder how increases in knowledge or improvements on knowledge may best be described. As with 1 above, we may consider increases in epistemic virtue and ability to involve only the habitable territory, epistemic space habitable by knowers, to increase in its sophistication, which as we noted above could consist in increases in habitation within the occupiable space—like a take-over of more viable territory—or could consist in increases of connections among existing nodes in occupiable territory. How then would this modeling of the boundary metaphor differ from that of the characterization of limit? Are there further alternatives? Consider a third possible form of improvement of our epistemic situation: knowledge could be augmented by the habitable space itself increasing, not merely our habitation within it increasing. Ruling out an interpretation of this metaphor as one in which our abilities to sense more of the world, which would be naturalistic and beside the point, we are left with the idea that a distinct conceptual frame for organizing knowledge may in fact make more of the whole of possibility a candidate for knowability. Here the increase in knowledge would be potential rather than actual, however, since the space of knowability would be taken to have expanded, rather than actual cases of knowledge having spread out beyond the former boundary of cognition. But what is the significance of that? And how could we ever know that adopting a distinct way of thinking might have led to encroachment of the space of knowability on the space of conceivability? (In contrasting knowability with conceivability, one should recall the discussion from III.II regarding the distinction between real and logical possibility that correlates with the former pair.)

16. The point, I take here is this: the latter proposal for encroachment of the space of knowability on that of conceivability is only coherent in a fairly trivial manner, since any possible reorganization of knowledge's systematic unity, if conceived as augmenting epistemic space, would consist only in a reduction of an absolute space, the space of thinkability as contrasted with the space of knowability, and would therefore involve a finite reduction of an infinite space, which is trivial given Kant's conception of the infinite as absolutely unconditioned. Kant' s point in instituting the original contrast was that mathematics is about the a priori character of spatiotemporal experience and therefore it is incoherent to suppose an outside of mathematical cognition

since it is a structure of intuition and therefore entirely due to us. Thus, any improvements of mathematical knowledge may be considered in terms of the models I proposed above, or something analogous. Philosophical knowledge and activity, however, as being purely conceptual, must admit of a realm of possibility outside it—the realm of thinkability in absence of knowability. The encroachment of the latter on the former can thus be viewed in terms of the expansion of the knowledge of the actual into the thinking of the possible, or, as knowledge of some of the possible as being in fact actual, though this does not require talk of reducing an infinite space by some finite quantity, and such talk anyway confuses the point about the employing the idea of a space to model cognition and thought.

17. These models of epistemic space can be illuminated further by way of reference to some of our remarks in II.I, paragraph 16, regarding not only the contrast between mathematical and philosophical cognition as just discussed but also that between mathematical and aesthetic judgments of magnitude. It is to that task that we now turn.

IV.II SUBLIMITY AND THE EXISTENTIAL SITUATION

1. In II.I, paragraph 16, I referred to a contrast Kant draws between two forms of representing magnitude: either through concepts of number, which is mathematical, or through intuition, which is aesthetic. I now propose to consider this contrast in light of the preceding comments about rational space being construed as being bounded or limited, and by linking these thoughts through a brief consideration of their import for our existential situation.

2. We should ask: what happens in the confrontation of an agent with an incalculable magnitude, or expanse? Kant's treatment of the sublime, and its relation to the unconditioned and the supersensible, communicates some of his response to this inevitable situation of epistemic and semantic incompetence. Incompetence here refers to the apparent incompleteness of our cognition, and our consequent striving for completeness of such discovered incompleteness. Such apparent incompleteness is relative to certain purposes which call upon us, or which we exact as demands upon ourselves. The talk of incompetence recommends a dim view of the cognitive capacities of the human being, though such incompetence is not for the transcendental idealist taken to be merely natural, as if we could be metaphysically better off if we were possessed of distinct or perhaps superior capacities for sense. The perceived deficiency is rather the consequence of an opposed imagined possible completeness that might be had of ordinary perception and knowledge; it is the consequence of a transformation of ordinary natural immensity and impressiveness into a metaphysical model of that which is in principle

incomprehensibility powerful or vast, and which is, moreover, conceived of as having, or begin imbued with, a will. This is one way of understanding Kant's suggestion that the idea of a law-governed cosmos is of a piece with the idea of an intelligence, as if the idea of law-governedness could not be separated from the idea of a willful intelligence.

3. We do well to consider some general remarks made by Kant in the Analytic of the Sublime, in order to frame our discussion. First, the sublime is "found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is thought also as a totality", so that the sublime is taken "as the presentation" of an "indeterminate" concept of reason (5: 244, 128). The confrontation with the sublime, is, moreover, accompanied "by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful outpouring of them"; it is "something serious in the activity of the imagination", and thought of it contains "admiration or respect". Now, importantly, "what is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason"; nevertheless, sensible forms of great intensity, whether of mathematical magnitude or dynamic power, may elicit a feeling of the sublime, which is a consequence of our consciousness of the inadequacy of sensible renderings of the idea which stands, as it were, behind them, and represents a more complete fulfillment of that which they seem to point to: something beyond mere natural or sensorily apprehensible magnitude or power.

4. As Kant goes on to say in his mathematical definition of the sublime, the concept may be taken to refer to that which is "absolutely great" (5: 248, 131); great, that is, without limit, in an absolutely unconditioned fashion. The reason that the sublime cannot be represented sensibly may therefore be explained in the following way:

> In the judging of magnitude not merely the multitude (number) but also the magnitude of the unit (the measure) is involved, and the magnitude of this latter in turn always needs something else as a measure with which it can be compared, we see that any determination of the magnitude of appearances is absolutely incapable of affording an absolute concept of a magnitude but can afford at best only a comparative concept. (5: 248, 132)

Kant goes on to characterize the sublime as infinite, by way of saying that which is absolutely great is infinite (5: 254, 138); moreover, that sublimity in nature may be judged of where the attempt by the aesthetic power of judgment to estimate magnitude fails: "Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which brings with them an idea of its infinity" (5: 255, 138). To connect this thought with the idea of measurement, we find Kant saying:

> [T]he proper unalterable basic measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But since this basic measure is a self-contradictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the absolute totality of an infinite progression), that magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruitlessly expends it entire capacity for comprehension must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substratum (which grounds both it and at the same time our faculty for thinking), which is great beyond any standard of sense and hence allows not so much the object as rather the disposition of the mind in estimating it to be judged sublime. (5: 255–56, 139)

These remarks may be directed at judgments about natural phenomena, though the points regarding sublimity may be generalized to judgments about the absolutely great in general; thus we consider anew the idea of symbolic hypotyposis and the notion that there are ideas of completeness or perfection, of properties in general, say, which may count as sublime, and which elicit in us feelings of respect in the way sublime natural objects may (Kant does, of course, compare the experience of the sublime in nature with the experience of confrontation with the moral law, though as I have said, I am not concerned with that well-documented form of symbolic presentation; rather with the general question of how to conceive of the issue of symbolism itself).

5. The persistent issue about symbolic thinking has been this: there are ideas only reason can think, and which the power of judgment can only present indirectly. Here our reference to sublimity documents the problem with clarity: the sublime, qua absolutely great, is infinite, and as such is the idea of an endless progression represented in a totality. And given what we have said throughout about reason, this kind of representation is coherent if reason thinks the idea as a demand that is never fulfilled and not presented as a fixity; rather that the idea, as I should now like to say, expresses a vocation, our rational vocation (the progression *is endless*, the vocation therefore too). Now, given that a sensible representation, in intuition, must of necessity be not only spatiotemporally bounded but also must admit of constraint by the categories, here, relevantly, therefore, determination by the idea of magnitude; thus no such representation can properly capture sublimity. Notice the structural parallel between our cognition of nature's failure to capture what may be thinkable as nature's supersensible substratum, on the one hand, and, on the other, our ability to think, yet *merely* so, ideas of a complete systematic unity in our thought, as demanded by the transcendental ideas in their functional roles.

6. As is suggested in the preceding section, IV.I, there is a question in the offing regarding just what this idea of the unbounded, unconditioned, absolute might be, what its structure might be, if we employ a spatial metaphor to model the epistemic, as Kant had. Our concern is then with what it might

be in the sense of how it might best be conceived. We consider that question before turning to a question about how these considerations feed into a conception of our rational vocation.

7. The considerations with which we have just been engaged, of an unbounded space and of that which is absolutely great, both partook of a controversial concept: that of the infinite. I am not concerned to adjudicate debates about what could be said about this concept; only to indicate a principal way it functions in Kant's philosophy and to note some attendant well-documented problems. There are here some resemblances between word families and semantic clusters which communicate some of the sense of the infinite: incalculable/incalculability; inestimable/inestimability; unfathomable, unfathomability; unknowable/unknowability; endless/endlessness, etc. The general thought is of that which is beyond the capacity of humanity to understand, in thought, or achieve, in action. The former, theoretical, idea of infinity connects to the thought of an epistemic task that is in principle uncompletable, and to which is connected a vision of partial, perhaps disappointing knowledge; the latter, in the practical context, the concept involves an idea of a moral vocation which is in principle forever incomplete, and which partakes of an idea of moral perfection toward which one might strive but never satisfy or reach. Recalling the variety of models of epistemic space from IV.I, we may wonder what the call for completion, or fulfilment, of our rational vocation, in epistemic and moral senses, may amount to. Given what we said there, there are three coherent possibilities relevant to our concerns, which we first consider for the epistemic case:

1. The expansion of knowledge into more of epistemically habitable space;
2. The increase of connections between nodes in epistemically habitable space;
3. The transformation of habitable epistemic space by way of adoption of concepts which increase it. (We noted this third suggestion was in some sense trivial, though it must be included for completeness.)

How could we conceive of this structure in the moral case? First, consider what we are modeling in the epistemic case: we are modeling the systematic unity of knowledge about the world of sense. In order to understand how to conceive of the structure of the model for the moral case we must first understand what in the moral case corresponds to knowledge. I submit that moral action is the best candidate, since moral action counts as a satisfaction of the moral law and therefore as a positive element in the fulfillment of the moral vocation, just as knowledge counts as satisfaction of certain epistemic demands and therefore fulfillment of the epistemic vocation. The question

then becomes: what stands to moral action as the systematic unity of knowledge stands to an individual case of knowledge? If the systematic unity of knowledge is a representation of the overall epistemic framework, what is the overall systematic picture of connections between nodes that count as cases of satisfaction in the moral case? This, I submit, only the idea of the Kingdom of Ends can satisfy. There the moral law, that which counts as universal and necessary, governs over the moral picture just as the principles of pure understanding and of speculative reason rule over the systematic unity of theoretical knowledge. We must, then, formulate a sketch for the moral case:

1. The expansion of moral action into a greater variety of morally relevant contexts;
2. The increase of connections between forms of moral action;
3. The transformation of the space of moral action by way of adoption of concepts which increase it. (Again, we noted this third suggestion was in some sense trivial, though it must be included for completeness.)

The import of this adapted list can be characterized as follows: it allows a parallel between certain key dimensions of the moral and epistemic vocations of human beings by highlighting two basic key elements: (1) A view of the rational vocation as in both cases involving a concept of expansion, in both spatiotemporal and intelligible senses, as of that which involves more relevant cases; we may think of the accrual of diverse experiences of the world to yield greater epistemic results just as we may think of moral capacities as being tested and borne out through confrontation with novelty; (2) We have, in connection with this, in both cases, a view of the rational vocation as involving the demand for universalisability, insofar as the search for connections between nodes in a moral or epistemic framework is a search for illumination of one context by another.

8. The illumination of one context by another may be understood in a plethora of ways, though principally in terms of such contexts to be amenable to similar forms of explanation, where this may occur in the form of explanations governed by rules or laws, or, by one context being rendered clearer through comparison with another. This last instance is, as we should recall from II.I, an example of reasoning by analogy: something partially known is compared with something known in some relevant respect, by hypothesis, and then the properties of the former are hypothesized to stand to one another as the properties of the latter do by analogy. The claim here is that such a form of analogical cognition fits within the description under 2, as just given, where the rational vocation involves increasing connections between cognitions in order to form a greater systematic unity.

IV.III THE IDEA OF AN EPISTEMIC AND MORAL VOCATION

1. In this final section, we concern ourselves with an apparent paradox, or with what we might at least call an irresolvable tension, in Kant's thought: the idea of humanity's vocation outstripping its capacities; that of epistemic and moral demands asking of us, or implying, that more is asked than can be answered for. In attempting to answer the demand, in an epistemic key, we are saddled with the apparent requirement of removing context-specific conditions from our subjectively enjoyed experience in order to formulate general objective explanations that satisfy our quest for systematically unified objective knowledge.[6] In doing so, we seek to know a world assumed independent of our perception of it; mere perception of which, conditioned but not hopelessly so, is never sufficient for systematic unity.

2. In sticking with the line of thought I have been tracing throughout, and in keeping with the concerns of IV.I–II, my focus in this final section is with the idea of a rational vocation viewed in terms of the idea of expansion and increased connection, and both of these viewed in light of the idea of boundary which we detailed above. My final way of coming at this theme, which has appeared at various points and now has persisted throughout this final chapter, is to be shaped by reflection on a lesson from Stanley Cavell, which is, moreover, fruit of his intense focus on, and interest in, the significance of philosophical skepticism. The Cavellian consideration I raise here can be condensed into the voicing of concern about a single issue; the concern connects directly to our Kantian worry about the possibility of knowing and presenting ideas, as we were concerned with throughout our discussions of symbolic hypotyposis; the single issue is that of the sense in which we have a world and the sense in which we might be said to know it. Cavell's view of the significance of skepticism about the existence of the world is put best in his indirect response: "our relation to the world is not one of knowing," he tell us in two key places in his writings. It is to the texts of interest I here turn in order to derive a lesson and a final way of framing the issue about symbolic hypotyposis.

3. The first place where Cavell discusses the topic to which I have just referred is in a chapter "Austin and Examples" (1979, 52–55); the second is in his essay "The Avoidance of Love", in (1969, 322–25). In the former context, Cavell is concerned with the situation that gives rise to epistemologists concerning themselves with possible problems of knowledge about what he, Cavell, calls "generic objects"; a persistent concern throughout *The Claim of Reason* as a whole is to show how there is something odd and misleading about the conclusions traditional epistemologists reach as a consequence of

this obsession, and to demonstrate how there is something revealing about the nature of the obsession itself; revealing, that is, for the more expansive question of what skeptical problems themselves might tell us about the human situation.

4. The traditional epistemological difficulties Cavell subjects to such scrutiny are those purportedly arising from an attempt by philosophers to account for the possibility of knowledge of ordinary objects; the kinds of problems to which he refers include skepticism about, say, being able to "see *all* of an object" when some of it is necessarily perceptually inaccessible (the back of it, say; a phenomenological point to which Husserl and Merleau-Ponty speak); to say with certainty that one is not dreaming at the present moment; or, that one is not systematically deceived as to other people having minds or not (traditional Cartesian worries). In the context with which I am concerned, Cavell reaches a point where he considers the role of the Kantian thing-in-itself in an epistemological picture that assumes reality is systematically concealed, perhaps in principle, from us. And in reflecting on this he says of Kant that, although one is easily tempted to think Kant excluded certain domains of ontology from epistemic access by human beings, in fact,

> his idea was also to show the possibility of knowledge [not simply its limits], i.e., to show that knowledge is limited not in the sense that there are *things* beyond its reach, but that there are human capacities and responsibilities and desires which reveal the world but which are not exhausted in the capacity of knowing things. This is something his Idea of God is meant to show: that I have, and must have if I am a rational creature, a relation to reality which is not that of knowing. (54)

Although Cavell's concern in saying this had been to argue for a way of rethinking what the concept of an in-itself contained—namely, an idea of externality which all along should have been deduced by Kant, and moreover included in the concept of an object in general, that is, any object whatever that we might entertain as known or knowable—his point is sufficiently plastic to apply to our problem about symbolic hypotyposis. When he writes, in the citation above, that a rational creature must have a relation to reality that is not that of knowing, presumably one way of conceiving of such a relation is on the model of Kant's own pronouncement that we ought to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. And when speaking about capacities which we bring to bear in our dealings with the world, saying that such capacities are not exhausted in our knowing things, the suggestion seems in concert with Kant's way of framing our situation; namely, that the three most fundamental questions confronting the rational being may be put down as questions about what one may know, what one ought to do, and what one may hope

(A804–5/B832–33). The last question involves theoretical answers developed in responding to the first, and moral answers developed in order to answer the second; hope, if it is to be rational, involves calculating what is reasonably likely on the basis of what is known about how things are, and with what is known about what ought to be done.

5. Such hope, or, better, expectation, is one way of framing the relation to the world about which Cavell speaks; his point connects in one way with the specific questions one may ask about our ways of going on using language and seemingly following patterns found in prior usage,[7] and it connects in another way with certain designs we may have on ourselves regarding the envisaged endpoints of our activity, whether we reach such endpoints or whether we can truly be said to direct our activity toward them in a meaningful sense (in the case of simply thinking and speaking our native tongue the whole idea of goals and endpoints may not simply be strained, but downright wrong-headed; is it not better to take note of habit and our common ways of getting on, ways that rather more frequently do not have a clear objective, purpose, or even obviously better ways, or a best way, of being done?).

6. Symbolic hypotyposis can be connected with these two aspects as follows: the notion of following established ways of going on with thinking and acting might indeed be described as the idea of that which is rule-governed, and we may wish to ask whether there is such a thing as an example which gives the rule; gives a demonstration as what counts as following, or having followed, it. A recurrent theme in this work has been with the idea of symbols as such best cases, exemplars, which may give the rule in this way, and we now may re-raise a query entered earlier in chapter I, paragraph 27, as to whether the distinction between ordinary examples and exemplary symbols may come into question, perhaps not entirely, but at least at some level of detail. The question now confronts us anew, and its significance can be laid bare.

7. Symbolic presentations of ideas, qua indirect presentations of concepts of reason, involve a certain license on the part of the subject as to what in an idea they seek to present, as well as what in the symbol they take to present some dimension of the idea. I take it Kant's usage of the adjective "indirect" communicates some of this potential license, on top of the fact that such presentations are not candidates for objectively real presentations of the concept of reason in question. This means that although there may be objectively better ways of acting in a moral sense, and therefore more or less accurate ways of symbolizing moral perfection, there is nevertheless an element of justification of one's choice of a symbol of moral behavior required to the extent that the maxim of any moral action involves some specification of motive and intention, something which must be specified and subsequently justified (one judges of "those inner principles of action which one does not see" (4: 407, 62). We are therefore confronted by the question of whether the sum-total of

both theoretical and practical (here moral) possibility consists of just such examples, not symbols or exemplars, and whether decisions about symbolic presentation are simply subjective preferences for certain interpretations of the significance of reason's demands. This outrageous speculation, of course, does not fit with Kant's philosophy, since it suggests either that one, or all, could be confused about what reason demands, perhaps that one and all failed to hear the voice of reason itself, or that there was no way of conclusively determining what symbolic presentations of ideas could amount to; that there was a difficulty at the heart of the idea, something problematically obscure, about the suggestion that concepts one could only think were to guide one's rational vocation. But if we acknowledge the point above about hope, that the rational vocation of humanity involves a synthesis of theoretical knowledge and of knowledge of the morally right and good, might we not say that symbols present sensible approximations to what is hoped for? But how could we tell this? One way would be to discourse with those who would point up a symbol and determine what it were about it which made it for them symbolic, and this is as common an enterprise as any, and certainly not mysterious. The enterprise is ordinary conversation, a topic which brings us to an important point in Kant's reflections on the nature of reason.

8. I had mentioned above Kant's promulgation of a view of the common in humanity's capacity for sense, understanding, and reason. This general feature can be connected now with our ongoing concern with symbolizing concepts of reason. In the Doctrine of Method Kant speaks of reason as lacking "dictatorial authority," and its claim being never "anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his *veto*, without holding back." (A738–39/B766–67) He writes further of "the original right of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than human reason itself, in which everyone has a voice" (A752/B780), in both cases insisting upon a democratic, open conversation which might deliver verdicts about what could, for instance, count as a best case, whether moral, aesthetic, or empirical, so long as the best case was in accord with reason. The clarification required here is that any determination of symbolic presentations of ideas, if conducted collectively and rationally, rather than individually and therefore subjectively, or perhaps collectively yet coercively, would count as a properly rational process with objectively valid, even if not objectively real, conclusions. So, recalling our suspicion about the distinction between ordinary examples and exemplary symbols, we ought to say that any such distinction could well be valid, though only so as determined by a collective rational determination of reason's demands and their satisfactions in the world of sense.

9. A way of continuing this line of thought about a process of rational communication opens up a question of the relation between the anthropological

and the theological, and therefore serves to clarify some structural issues which have been discussed throughout regarding the idea of a metaphysical totality, or *omnitudo realitatis*, an "All of reality." We can with profit return to a thought from III.III, and thereby ask again here: What is the unity of a communicative context? Does it rest on the possibility of thinking from the other's point of view, and situating oneself appropriately? What of cases where the other is the entirety of possible communicative partners? Is such a supposition coherent? To take the questions in turn, let us first recall the discussion from III.III when it was claimed that a communicative context is simply that where communication is effected (we may indeed raise queries about the conditions on this, though that is not our present interest). The unity of a communicative context is therefore represented by, and incarnated in, the commonly held guiding principles or linguistic capacities that make such activity possible. And this point holds likewise for two persons speaking or for some worldly process much vaster, such as a cultural trend where individuals act on perceptions about common phenomena, whether linguistic or otherwise. Indeed, the effectiveness of such processes, such communicative contexts, depends in part upon adherence to Kant's maxims of common human understanding, which express his commitment to Enlightenment rationalism, which we cited in III.III:

> (1) To always think for oneself; (2) To think in the position of everyone else; (3) To always think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way. (5: 294, 174)

1 Here is a principle of independent thought and 3 a demand for consistent thought, though 2 is what interests us: thinking broad-mindedly, in the position of everyone else, requires one form of picture of possibly occupiable positions in epistemic and semantic space.[8] The broad-minded thinker who attempts to form an idea, perhaps an image, of rational space, will do so by thinking of rational connections between different parts of a particular world-view, internally, and also of rational connections between the whole, and parts, of different worldviews. (Note how this forming of connections about beliefs and knowledge fits with the above discussion, in IV.I–II, about increases in epistemic or moral virtue as involving an increase of connections within the space.) Yet such a process at no point involves a thinker in forming an idea of how their position in rational space relates to the view from the position of the entirety of rational space, for this would constitute forming a connection between that subject's own view, and the fabled view from nowhere.[9] As Kant and his heirs have never tired of reminding us, such a view is fictional, or at the very least unimaginable. The upshot of this is that

forming the idea of a relation between one's own view and the unity of all views does not involve one in confecting an imaginary view from nowhere and seeking to understand how it stands to one's own view. Rather, the basic task is to understand principles which govern all extant views, for these principles are that which constitute the existence of the whole, the unity of it all.

10. The above remarks have answered for us our final question, which moreover open us to the issue of the anthropological-theological opposition in Kant. The question was What of cases where the other is the entirety of possible communicative partners? Is this supposition coherent? We have just characterized the unity of communicative contexts as being akin to certain principles that govern the usage of the understanding across these contexts. We might also refer to this as the distributive unity of the *collective* use of the understanding *across a multitude of experiences of distinct subjects* (recall the distinction Kant draws between two views of the use of the understanding at A582/B610, which we spoke of in chapter III). By rejecting the coherence of communing with a totality of possible viewpoints, and instead settling with the fact of our entering into all communication through finite means and limited circumstances, we echo the discussion from III.I where we spoke of Kant's aim to replace rational metaphysics with transcendental metaphysics. The replacement of the rational-metaphysical idea of God is of a piece with the rejection of the coherence of a nebulous idea of a sum total of all possibility to which we may stand in a relation of knowing. Instead, any workable idea of a sum total of all possibility, a sum total of all possible viewpoints, could only count as the collection of those which, with respect to a given topic, may be seen to fit within the collective rational process we have just remarked upon above.

11. Earlier in one place I have referenced that in Cavell's writings where he recommended we conceive of our relation to the world as not one of knowing, and promised account of another. The second text now becomes relevant for us in speaking about the relation between the idea of the human and the idea of God; between the anthropological and the theological:

> How do we learn that what we need is not more knowledge but the willingness to forgo knowing? For this sounds to us as though we are being asked to abandon reason for irrationality (for we know what these are and we know these are alternatives), or to trade knowledge for superstition (for we know when conviction is one and when it is the other—the thing the superstitious always take for granted). This is why we think skepticism must mean that we cannot know the world exists, and hence perhaps there isn't one (a conclusion some profess to admire and others to fear). Whereas what skepticism suggests is that since we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be a function of knowing. The world is to be *accepted*; as the presentness of other minds is not to be known, but acknowledged. But what is this "acceptance," which caves in

> at a doubt? And where do we get the idea that there is something we cannot do (e.g., prove that the world exists)? For this is why we take Kant to have said that there are things we cannot know; whereas what he said is that something cannot be known—*and* cannot coherently be doubted either, for example, that there is a world and that we are free. (324)

Our relation to not only the idea of God, as of an ideal of moral perfection and of metaphysical completeness, cannot be, as we have said, one of knowing. Though this point stands alike for those other two pure concepts of reason for which Kant sought transcendental replacements in the form of principles: the idea of a world-whole and of our soul, and that of others. We stand to none of these three in a relation of knowing, though as we have acknowledged throughout, this in no way diminishes their realness to us. In closing, it is the question of this relation to ourselves—as of the idea of ourselves as substance, as having a soul, which I should like to pay tribute to.

12. The reference here to a soul may be connected with the question of our inner nature, which with disregard to Kant's own structural forbiddance I shall characterize as the question of the human. To ask after our soul, to use it as a metaphysical reference point for collecting thoughts and cognitions together in relation to a life, is to pair the rational with the animal; to speak of a soul in Kant's transcendental sense is to speak of a person with a moral and epistemic vocation: the soul is the idea of that which serves as the thought of the substance which persists through distinct experiences and judgments about them, carried on with the temporal flux and connected by a chain of causes; and the soul also is the idea of a moral character which ought to be guided by reason. Now, unfortunately, Kant in no place offered a theory of human nature,[10] and so even if we wanted to, we could not connect such a thing systematically to what we have remarked upon thus far. Kant's failure to provide an account of human nature in general, however, was not the consequence of despair about the question, about its coherence or primacy, but rather about a consequence of the state of the inquiry into such a thing at his time of writing. Subsequent philosophy, Romanticism in particular, took his views on the sublime, which we mentioned briefly in IV.II, as the point from which to leap, in their employment of metaphysical theses as starting points for existential-psychological explanations for the human situation (Kant himself regarded empirical psychology, and therefore any folk speculation on that front, to be subsumed within anthropology; he did not, however, regard moral anthropology, the second part of ethics, to consist in mere empirical psychology, rather he left it as an undeveloped part of his moral theory).[11]

13. Kant's own dim view regarding human self-knowledge, one's own reasons for acting in any given case, went a long way to stifling a positive program for general anthropological conclusions which might have been based

on specific questions about human psychology. This last point is important for our current topic: the thought that not only complete knowledge of the world, but also of oneself, is shaped by a fundamentally erroneous epistemology; that it is a nebulous idea, a misguided investigation to enter into, fraught with error. But that there are difficulties about self-knowledge, determination of the self by the self as well as determination of the self by the world, in addition to problems about complete determination of the world, determination of parts of the cosmos by other parts where those other parts include ourselves, does nothing to stem the flow of attempts of the human being to form imperfect, partial, and incomplete presentations of the purposes in symbolic forms, as guides for how we might collectively go on with both these theoretical and practical enterprises.

14. In the context of remarking upon the ideal of reason, Kant offers a brief contrast with the "creatures of imagination," which he likens to imagined products of creative action, as in the case of a painter's hoped for final product, which, like the ideal of reason, guides acting toward the goal. Such an "incommunicable silhouette," it is said, could be thought of as an "ideal of sensibility," though Kant is careful to say the terminology is somewhat improper, presumably given the definition given of an ideal as a rational entity that cannot be realized in intuition. Although so-called "ideals" of sensibility are "unattainable model[s] of possible empirical intuitions," they nevertheless do share a form with actual empirical intuitions: an imagined image and an actual image are alike, though the ideal is not subject to conceptual determination whereas individual empirical intuitions are. The former, ideals of sensibility, are distinct from rational ideals, though, in that they "are not supposed to provide any rule capable of being explained or tested" (A570–71/B598–99). It is this dimension of mystery about the limits of knowledge, about conceptual determination of the maximally general and the maximally specific, of the idea of a world, a God, and of ourselves, our souls as substance, all these key structural features of our existence as a rational judging subject, that fail to be objects of knowledge. But that these phenomena fail in this way does not diminish any significance they might have for us; rather, to the contrary: they are silent though pervasive features of our situation, the human situation.

NOTES

1. For a brief though systematic explanation of the nature of these, see the two introductions to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, esp. the First Introduction at 20: 245–47, 44–46.

2. Given the considerations entered in both II.II and III, esp. III.I in our discussion of the principle of complete determination, we may wish to say the unconditioned is

not strictly formless. We did, after all, expend some ink on showing what structure it might be said to have. The point here, however, is that the unconditioned does not have a form in the sense of it being conditioned. Of course, in Kant's view, there is much to say about the function of the idea of the unconditioned, though perhaps it is best to separate the form of the idea itself from its function, assuming such separation is coherent.

3. Cf. the remark about ideals of sensibility at A570/B598.

4. Cf. here the B Edition of the chapter on phenomena and noumena.

5. Cf. the Doctrine of Method's remarks about connections between concepts and experience in general: "In the transcendental logic we have seen that although of course we can never immediately go beyond the content of the concept which is given to us, nevertheless we can still cognize the law of the connection with other things completely a priori, although in relation to a third thing, namely, possible experience, but still a priori." (A766/B794)

6. At A840/B868 Kant declares the moral vocation is the ultimate vocation of the human being. I have here been concerned with the idea of an epistemic vocation, though have included moral" in the title of this section since throughout, as I have emphasized, I am treating of certain general ideas related to symbolism.

7. For an excellent treatment of the idea of ways of going on in language, as describable in terms of the following of a rule, which I have in mind here, see McDowell's essay "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," in his 1998, *Mind, Value, and Reality*, 221–62.

8. Indeed also moral and aesthetic space, though I have not been concerned so much with those aspects of the problem.

9. See Thomas Nagel 1986, *The View From Nowhere*, New York: Oxford University Press.

10. He did of course remark on the topic; note the following synoptic comments: "The summary of what pragmatic anthropology has to say about the vocation [*Bestimmung*] of the human being and the character of his development is as follows: the human being is destined [*bestimmt*] through his reason to live in a society of human beings, and in this society, through the arts and sciences, to cultivate himself, civilize himself, and moralize himself. No matter how great his animal instincts may be to abandon himself passively to the enticements of ease and comfort, which he calls happiness, [he is still destined] to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature (VII: 324: 5)." Cited in Brandt 2003, 93.

11. On the latter point, regarding moral anthropology as not being mere empirical psychology, but rather a part of moral theory concerned with application of the moral law to human beings as such, see Louden 2003, esp. 67. This specific idea of the application of the moral law to the life of individual human beings is to be compared with the broader scope of the problem of bringing about a moral world, making actual a merely possible Kingdom of Ends from within the confines of a Kingdom of Nature op. cit., 79.

Conclusion

There are a group of themes that I have treated far too hastily in this work, which I wish to acknowledge now. I have throughout referenced some of the connections I see between certain of these ideas and extant philosophical literature; my objective at present is to add a little more commentary and to say something about what I think merits further development and exploration.

In the Introduction to this work, I noted that my interest throughout would be with extending and connecting certain major themes in Kant's thinking. I noted that two major themes in this work were (1) the role of symbolism in transcendental philosophy and (2) the relation of such symbolism in single cases to the idea of system and the possibility of symbolizing not only single cases but a whole system of thinking. From chapter I, where the idea of symbolic presentation was introduced, through to chapter IV, a response is sketched to both (1) and (2), though there, of course, are unanswered queries in both lines of inquiry.

My starting point in the Introduction was to say that the investigation here would be into a priori presentation, where such would be an investigation of the idea of that which we represent in thought being presented in external form in the world. This is a way of framing the topic of symbolic presentation, though since the characterization brings in the terminology of "a priori" it may raise more questions than it answers. The primary interest here is with both theoretical and practical capacities for claiming to find satisfaction of subjective phenomena in objective form; throughout we investigate the idea of a best case and our right to claim there are such things not only in a moral sense but an empirical one also (this is a question at the theoretical level), and we spoke of the role of democratic, communally determined reason in adjudicating such a question (how this functions is a question at the practical level). This approach to the issue suggests, vaguely, that there may be such a

thing as has been spoken of as the "pragmatic a priori," roughly in the sense recommended by C. I. Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars.[1] How one should develop such a line of thinking satisfactorily is unclear; perhaps the inquiry is marred by ineffability, though for now I believe the question is too poorly formulated to require, or deserve, further commentary.

In referring at the commencement of chapter I to the project of exploring the logic and metaphysics of judgment, I signaled my intention to develop themes at two distinct levels: (1) those pertaining to a Kantian-styled account of formal and informal reasoning processes, which are in turn connected to (2) a view about the rational agent that engages in such reasoning. (1) reached its most explicit expression in chapter III, which I indicated was the heart of this book; there I followed various topics that arose in offering part of a Kantian account of the most general formal structure which one could claim to find in thought. A certain conception of (2) guided this exploration and in chapter IV this was explicitly thematized. This pair of ideas has consequences, which I can now comment on.

In the Introduction, I noted that Kant's transcendental proof for categorial structure in the world of sense commits him to the idea that reason ensures our rational cognition of the world involves hierarchy and categorially relevant predication. Apart from illuminating his views about complete determination and the mechanics by which such determination proceeds, this also gives grounds for working out in more detail the structure and function of symbolic thinking in the context of empirical judgment. Though this idea is too involved to have been treated of here, much of what is discussed throughout the work provides pieces of a sketch which can be put to work in an investigation focused exclusively on this fascinating question. Note that symbolism can be studied historically, as in the classic case of Frazer's *Golden Bough* (which has been likened to an empirical counterpart to Cassirer's *The Philosophy of Symbolic Thinking*); my concern here, however, is with philosophical and logical dimensions of the question.

As we have seen, the function of symbolic thinking in empirical judgment can be initially understood in a genetic sense through a study of the mechanics of empirical concept formation. In chapter II, I examined a Peircean account of abduction and connected it with the function of symbolic hypotyposis in Kant; a line was drawn between hypothesis and analogy and this connection would need to be more satisfactorily explained in a proper account of the role of symbolic hypotyposis in empirical concept formation.

This first step would need to be accompanied by a range of investigations. One additional, important component would be a study of the specific inferential and judgmental structure of certain forms of thinking into which empirical concepts of interest fit, and thus their dependence upon a certain

conception of system.[2] As chapter IV of this work contends, although it is not philosophically legitimate to formulate symbolic presentations of the idea of the whole, since such presentations must by definition err (according to the sober Kant), such attempts are inevitable and it is better to go on with models of a whole of thought that are accompanied by awareness of their limitations (in a lecture Sellars once said that "the real danger of over-simplified models is not that they are over-simple, but that we may be satisfied with them,"[3] and certainly this astute remark applies to modeling thought globally as much as it applies to modeling it locally).

This account of symbolism, considered in relation to empirical concept formation, connects with the unruly topic of rule-following, which was deflected several times above. As I hint at, the idea of following a rule ought be treated in connection with symbolism. A first and obvious inquiry is in what way the rule of reflection on an empirical concept relates to the rule of reflection on an idea only reason can think. Even if we neglect Kant for a moment this question looms large, for it is effectively the question of the status of an ideal and its relation to the so-called "ordinary case."

Suppose we wish to say there are some cases that give the rule, be it in ordinary practical terms, special moral terms, in the realm of the aesthetic, the empirical, or whatever; this suggests that some individual case be singled out as that which ought to be studied as a model to follow, either as a guide for action, or as a guide for thought where we wish to know what is what. But there is no formally decidable procedure for determining what it is about a case that gives the rule which allows us to say that is what it does. There is an irremovable element of contingency in empirical judgment that consists in the decision to form conceptual boundaries. The problem here is that of knowing how to generalize from cases to form a rule; then, further, knowing how to apply the rule once formulated. But just because there is an element of contingency in this procedure, and component procedures, this does not mean no philosophical account can be given.

Chapter III.IV comments briefly on the topic of categorial structure in Kant's theory of empirical concept formation. That there is a transcendental argument in the offing here is essential to the idea pursued throughout the work; namely, that symbolic cognition serves to aid judging through the exemplification of standard-setting ideal cases. The connection is between the idea that all empirical cognition is categorial and the claim that cognition is guided, in general, by symbols of what counts as a supposed best case, paradigm case, etc., and thereby provides limiting conditions for what counts as what in general (the idea of a best case is inseparable from the idea of a type). Kant's actual transcendental proof is that we could not form empirical concepts if empirical cognition was not categorially determined; that is, if things

were not judged of as being tokens of some type or other. This idea, regarding appraisal of objects on the basis of their essential or accidental properties, is first expressed in chapter II.I, §12 and again in II.II.

I have just commented on (1) the question of a pragmatic a priori, and (2) the role of symbolism in an account of empirical concept formation, and (3) the connection between symbolism and inquiries into rule-following in language. These quite specific topics relating to language are accompanied in this work by broad metaphysical issues about the limits of thought, which can now be briefly mentioned.

Early in the piece, I remarked on the interest of the idea of there being an inner and outer to thought; the idea of limit cases and best cases that guide our thinking; the idea of our thinking being constrained or shaped by certain conditions; the idea of there being something which is unconditioned, or hidden from us; the idea of our being inaccessible to ourselves. The topic of symbolism has provided a wide lens through which to view all of these metaphysical vagaries; it provides a way of thinking about the tendency to characterize thought as a space for which there is an inner and an outer; it gives form to the thought of that which is unconditioned, the ideals we are guided by (of course, our ideals are conditioned by us, yet it is difficult to articulate that viewpoint without slipping into a radical and unsatisfactory subjectivism). The interest in symbolism here has been restricted to the idea of going on in language in similar ways to those with which one communes (see esp. III.III), though the especial interest has been with the place of symbolism in a system of thinking which gives priority to certain cases of use in language, and of performance in action, in the forming of an idea of what counts as what, as an instance which satisfies a definition, or set of conditions.

In the final phase, chapter IV, our speculations about modeling epistemic space led us to remark upon the significance of Kant´s philosophical theology; that his transcendental replacement for the rational theological idea of God was an epitome of metaphysical grounding. The concern with structure throughout has required us to make this connection, for in the Kantian picture God becomes such a mere grounding principle, its personal, quasi-human quality lost and now irrelevant (except where the mythology of God as human in the Jesus-story allows us to form sensibilized concepts of moral exemplarity). The concepts of perfection and completeness are nice cases of concepts which partake of similar meaning; the point is everywhere the same: the symbol gives the rule, even where in cases of completeness of any kind it cannot.

It is worth remembering, however, that formal accounts of rational structure purportedly absent of sensible content are precisely not so absent. How could they be? It is a condition on their being understood that they be formulable by us in an empirical life, and thereby include purportedly illegitimate

form (not merely content) imparted by the formal systems themselves. A formal language is still a language and no language occurs in a metaphysical vacuum; even merely possible languages are systems which have an outer to their inner. It is for this reason that I enlisted the reminder in the Introduction that formal and mythological structure are both forms of picturing: formal structure gives guidelines for conceiving of a space of epistemic possibilities, whereas mythology gives sensible content in precisely the way Kant forbids. But both have form which owes itself to a life of sense; it is just that the richness of mythology embraces this fact, whereas the formalist engages in ill-conceived abnegation.

NOTES

1. See Lewis 1923 and Sellars 1953a and 1953b.

2. Here is a point at which the investigation I pursue connects with the concerns of inferentialism, as worked by Robert Brandom 1994, *Making It Explicit*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. A case has been made to find inferentialist roots in Kant in Paul Redding 2007, *Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and my account of Kant here provides a basis for developing in tandem the ideas of inferentialism and symbolism as complementary features of a metaphysics of judgment.

3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qN0vh_ewtPA&list=PL024B36D7B43AE8B8 at 0:17–0:22.

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Index

Note on the index: this book employs some ordinary words in a peculiarly philosophical way, and only those peculiarly philosophical instances have been indexed. Philosophical terminology which is near-omnipresent (i.e., the words "concept," "context," "idea," etc.) has been indexed for specific cases and phrases only. There is no entry for "Immanuel Kant," since his name occurs on just about every page; neither is there one for "symbol," for similar reasons.

About the Author

Byron Ashley Clugston completed his PhD in philosophy titled "The Structure and Function of the Idea of "God" in Idealist Logic" at the University of Sydney in 2014. The present work was written in Mexico City in 2015–2016, during which time he worked as a TESOL instructor. He currently resides in Sydney.