


IHD  
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY *of*  
HEIDEGGER'S  
PHILOSOPHY



FRANK SCHALOW

THIRD  
EDITION

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The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays of the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

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# Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy

*Third Edition*

Frank Schalow

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## Editor's Foreword

More than just an outstanding philosopher, in many ways Martin Heidegger was also an exceptional philosopher. He was conversant with more strands of philosophy, from the ancient Greeks to his German contemporaries, than most. He developed his own thinking by adopting what he approved and rejecting what he disapproved, thereby creating a distinctive path. This path never stopped, nor did Heidegger ever feel satisfied, showing as much growth in his later as his earlier periods. Unlike many philosophers, he could also admit he had not always been right and could undertake a “turning.” Also, unlike most, he put his philosophy into practice and engaged in politics, arguably his worst mistake, yet one that should not negate his many positive contributions.

Alas, his writings are considered dense and obscure, especially for beginners. This makes the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* particularly helpful, and this enlarged third edition yet more useful. First, the chronology briefly traces a long and busy career. Then, the introduction takes a closer look at his personal and philosophical evolution. The Dictionary then presents his contributions, with a primary emphasis on key concepts and works and a secondary one on contemporaries and others who influenced him or were influenced by him. The appendixes provide short translations of essential terms in German and Greek. The bibliography provides the basic literature, including works by Heidegger, works about Heidegger and his philosophy, and broader ones that situate both in their context.

This third edition was produced by Frank Schalow, building on the text of the first edition by Alfred Denker (and the collaboration between them on the second edition). Dr. Schalow is a university research professor of philosophy at the University of New Orleans, whose specialization is the work of Martin Heidegger. Along with articles and lectures, he has written several books on Heidegger, including *The Renewal of the Heidegger–Kant Dialogue*, *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred*, *The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in Heidegger's Thought*, and most recently, *Departures: At the Crossroads between Heidegger and Kant*. He has also written about the application of Heidegger's thought to the study of current social issues, most notably in *Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction: Embodiment, Technology, Transcendence*. He is coeditor of *Heidegger Studies*, the secretary convener of the 1992 North American Heidegger Conference, and the co-secretary convener in 2004.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor





## Preface to the Revised and Enlarged Third Edition

Dr. Alfred Denker authored the 1st edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* (2000). The 2nd edition, which was published in 2010, was based on a collaborative effort between Alfred Denker and myself. This (revised and enlarged) 3rd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* builds on the structure, organization, and insight embodied in the previous editions. While the 3rd edition incorporates significant changes as well as additions, I wish to acknowledge my debt to Dr. Alfred Denker for initially undertaking this arduous task of outlining the key terms and historical sources that have shaped the development of Martin Heidegger's thinking. As Dr. Denker realized, defining Heidegger's terms poses special challenges. While it is not an easy task, this dictionary seeks both to clarify his complex terminology and provide a context for its deeper understanding today.

During the past decade, both the understanding and appreciation of Martin Heidegger's thought have continued to change, broaden, and deepen, underscoring his stature as one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th century, as well perhaps its most controversial. Spearheading this development is the continual publication of the volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (Complete Edition), along with the English translation of his writings and lecture courses contained therein. As a result, student and scholar alike have a wealth of new material to explore and appropriate, yielding diverse perspectives from which to address the unifying thread and path of inquiry of Heidegger's thinking: the question of the meaning of being.

In the interval since the publication of the previous two editions of the dictionary, the manner in which it is "historical" has taken on an even richer meaning. More than any thinker in the Western tradition, Heidegger envisioned his task as a critical appropriation, dialogue, and *Auseinandersetzung* with his predecessor. Most of all, through his original conception of time and temporality, he realized that history is neither simply static nor merely a record of past influences. Rather, history is animated by the possibility of rediscovering and retrieving these influences in terms of their relevance for the future. Over the previous decade since the publication of the 2nd edition of the dictionary, it has become increasingly evident (1) that the impact of Heidegger's thinking continues to broaden and evolve and (2) that the degree

of “influence” extends forward, as well as reaching back, to include the novel ways in which other philosophers have been inspired by as well as criticized his thought.

This dual axis of history that shapes the sense in which the dictionary is “historical” is further supported by the ongoing publication of Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* or the Complete Edition of his writings. Of the projected 102 volumes of the Complete Edition, close to 100 have now been published. Within the last decade, the addition of this new material has provided the impetus for revising and expanding the 2nd edition of the dictionary through this present 3rd edition. The outline of the changes entail (1) including new terms to reflect the thinking that Heidegger enacts in the recently published volumes of his Complete Edition; (2) in this light, refining some definitions from the 2nd edition and expanding others; (3) adding summaries of recently published English translations of Heidegger’s works, including those of volumes from the Complete Edition, as well as from anthologies of his writings; and (4) adding bibliographical references to philosophers who either influenced or were subsequently influenced by Heidegger. As a result, the 3rd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy* is not only more comprehensive; it is also in many respects more detailed. The introduction has been amended and expanded in line with the various changes that have been made to enhance the dictionary’s usefulness and expand its scope. In order to reflect the exponential growth of the scholarly literature during the past decade, the bibliography has also been updated. The bibliography now includes scholarship in the English language, which spans 60 years. Although this dictionary is designed for an English speaker, it reflects the fact that research into Heidegger’s thought has become a global pursuit and thereby traverses many languages.

The addition of a list of new definitions, biographies, and discussions of recently published (and translated) volumes of Heidegger’s writings constitutes the most noteworthy change in the 3rd edition. Yet it is equally important to emphasize that each and every definition and entry of the historical dictionary has been reviewed, and in many cases either refined or expanded for the purposes of clarity and elucidation. This is necessary because the understanding of Heidegger’s thinking and its accompanying scholarship continue to evolve both in scope and degree of erudition. Even the most casual glance at the bibliography will reveal the proliferation of books devoted to grappling with the unmatched complexity of Heidegger’s philosophy and the remarkably nuanced character of its use of terms. Moreover, the fact that volumes of Heidegger’s Complete Edition are still in the process of being published and translated into English poses a further challenge for compiling a comprehensive dictionary of his philosophy, which is different from developing such dictionaries on the philosophies of his German predecessors.

Indeed, Heidegger's unusual coinage of words and idiomatic expressions, and their specific nuancing in different writings and at various stages of his thinking, requires renewed reflection on the most appropriate English cognates and, in some instances, the creation of neologisms to express the meaning of his key expressions—not to mention the importance of addressing the methodology of translation itself. Another dynamic occurring in the 3rd edition of the dictionary thereby becomes evident: the challenge of translating Heidegger's writings requires a new appreciation of the singularity of his terms, and vice-versa, the distinctions that come to light by virtue of this task of translation casts new light on his thinking. Heidegger once stated: "Tell me how you conceive of translation, and I will tell you who you are." As more and more of his writings have been translated into other languages, as well as English, the differences among these various translations and the corresponding awareness of the task of translation itself have yielded new questions within the overall landscape of interpreting Heidegger's philosophy. The translations of Heidegger's 2nd most important work, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (which had not been published at the time when the 1st edition of the dictionary was in production), and its companion text, *Mindfulness*, have been major catalysts in spearheading this development. The concern for how to translate the key terms of his philosophy becomes increasingly important especially when we consider how novel, challenging, and groundbreaking his own German lexicon is. In this way, the 3rd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* serves notice to the transformative character of human understanding and the signature of the hermeneutical method that Heidegger helped to pioneer.

As a primary example, the 3rd edition of the dictionary gives increasing importance to Heidegger's "being-historical" texts. These writings—which comprise several volumes of his Complete Edition or *Gesamtausgabe*, including volumes 65 (*Contributions to Philosophy*), 66 (*Mindfulness*), 69, and 71—bring to the forefront his quest to understand the history of metaphysics as the history of being, that is, to enact being-historical thinking. The translation of these texts into English marks an important development in the scholarship on Heidegger's thinking, as well as for compiling the lexicon of his philosophy. The 3rd edition also includes, in the introduction as well among its entries, detailed discussions of the newly published *Black Notebooks* of Heidegger's Complete Edition (beginning with the publication of the 1st volume in 2014). The publication of the *Notebooks* is significant for two reasons. First, they are among the last volumes of his *Gesamtausgabe*, and second, they have sparked new controversy within recent scholarship by providing a snapshot of the cultural *Zeitgeist* of 1930s Germany as well the tension pervading Heidegger's involvement in and yet criticism of the politics of his day.

My hope is that the 3rd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* not only adds both to the breadth and depth of the previous editions, but also sharpens and refines the discussion of the key terms and themes presented throughout the work. In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient location of information and to make this book as useful a reference tool as possible, extensive cross-references have been provided in the dictionary section. Within individual annotations, mentions of terms that have their own entries are in **boldface type** the first time they appear. Entries for related terms are indicated by *See also* references. *See* entries are provided for terms that do not have their own annotations, to refer the reader to other entries that deal with the topic.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the support and guidance of April Snider at Rowman & Littlefield and Jon Woronoff, the editor of the Historical Dictionaries series. The completion of this book was made possible through a course release in the spring semester of 2019, which was funded by the Carl Muckley and Donald K. Hanks Endowed Philosophy Fund of the University of New Orleans.

## Reader's Note

In the photograph section the reader will find a portrait of Heidegger and some pictures of the most important places in his life. Given the historical orientation of this volume, a chronology of his life has also been provided. In the introduction to this Heidegger dictionary, I provide an overview of Heidegger's life and thought, which should enable the reader to situate the entries of the dictionary in the context of his path of thinking.

Within annotations, the words printed in boldface have their own entries in the dictionary. In some instances, I have provided *See also* cross-references at the end of an entry. These refer to other important entries that are not discussed in that particular annotation. This is especially important in the entries on philosophers. In the *See also* references, I list the entries on Heidegger's most important texts in which he discusses his thought. This system of reference should enable the reader who is not familiar with Heidegger's thought to get a clearer idea of his philosophy. Those readers who are well versed in Heidegger do not have to follow all the references to other entries. At the same time, this system makes it possible to read the dictionary as a book on Heidegger. In all the entries, save those on persons and places, I give the German original of the term in brackets after the title of the entry. I have included entries on all of Heidegger's writings that have been translated into English and a few on the most important texts that have not yet been translated.

I have also provided three appendixes. The first appendix contains a complete list of Heidegger's German writings, lectures, courses, and seminars. Here I give the titles under which Heidegger's courses were originally announced. I also list every publication separately and refer to the volume or journal in which it was published as well as the volume of the *Gesamtausgabe* in which it is or will be published. The second appendix is a German-English glossary that should enable users who read Heidegger in German to find their way in the dictionary. It also enables the English-speaking reader to check what translations we have used. This may be important, because the same German word is often translated in different ways in the different translations of Heidegger's works. The third appendix contains a Greek-English glossary. The titles of Heidegger's lecture courses used in the dictionary are the ones under which they are published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (Complete Edition of his works). If a title differs from the one under which Heidegger originally announced his course, then the original title is given in appendix I.

I have included an extensive bibliography at the end of the dictionary, organized so as to be instructive and informative. Most titles refer to scholarship in Heidegger's thinking in English, but key entries for books in German and French are also included. In the bibliography, I provide a complete list of the 102 volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* and list the books that were published independently by Heidegger. Appendix I will enable the reader to find where all of Heidegger's texts were published. For further details on the bibliography, the reader should consult its introduction.

Finally, the 3rd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* follows the more recent precedent, both in the English translations and the scholarship, of rendering the key German word *Sein* in lowercase as "being," rather than capitalized as had been the custom since as far back as the first translation of *Being and Time* in 1962. Conversely, the word that Heidegger contrasts with *Sein* or *Seiende*, as designating the specific things we encounter within the world, has been rendered as "entities" (rather than as "beings") in order to reinforce Heidegger's own emphasis on the *difference* between these terms (i.e., the "ontological difference"). In this way, a conscious attempt has been made to strike a balance between reflecting the increased sophistication in understanding Heidegger's thought, on the one hand, and avoiding confusion on the level of the novice, on the other. In instances where there are two distinct precedents for translating one of Heidegger's terms, the alternative rendering of the German word is also listed along with a *See* reference, directing the reader to the definition (and the English cognate) actually provided.

## Photographs



**Martin Heidegger, 1889–1976**




**The Country Path (*Der Feldweg*)**





**The Hütte in Todtnauberg**



**Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg-im Breisgau**



**Martin Heidegger**



## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>GA</b>	<i>Gesamtausgabe</i> (Complete Edition of Heidegger's works).
<b>ID</b>	<i>Identität und Differenz</i>
<b>MHDR</b>	Martin, Bernd (Hrsg.). <i>Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich": Ein Kompendium</i> . Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989.
<b>NzH</b>	Schneeberger, Guido (Hrsg.). <i>Nachlese zu Heidegger</i> . Bern: Suhr, 1962.
<b>VA</b>	<i>Vorträge und Aufsätze</i>
<b>ZS</b>	<i>Zollikoner Seminare</i>
<b>ZSD</b>	<i>Zur Sache des Denkens</i>
<b>Arendt/Heidegger</b>	Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger. <i>Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse</i> . Herausgegeben von Ursula Ludz. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998.
<b>Biemel &amp; Herrmann 1989</b>	Biemel, Walter, and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Hrsg.). <i>Kunst und Technik: Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger</i> . Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989.
<b>Buchner 1989</b>	<i>Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt Meßkirch zum hundersten Geburtstag Martin Heideggers</i> . Im Auftrag der Stadt Meßkirch herausgegeben von Harmut Buchner. Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1989.
<b>Frings 1968</b>	Frings, Manfred S. (ed.). <i>Heidegger and the Quest for Truth</i> . Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968.
<b>Jaspert 1996</b>	Jaspert, Bern (ed.). <i>Sachgemässe Exegese: Die Protokolle aus Rudolf Bultmanns Neutestamentlichen Seminaren 1921–1951</i> . Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1996.
<b>Löwith 1981</b>	Löwith, Karl. <i>Sämtliche Schriften</i> . Band 1, <i>Mensch und Menschenwelt. Beiträge zur Anthropologie</i> . Stuttgart: Metzler, 1981.

- Neske & Kettering 1990** Neske, Günther, and Emil Kettering (eds.). *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*. Translated by L. Harries. New York: Paragon House, 1990.
- Ott 1993** Ott, Hugo. *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*. Translated by A. Blunden. New York: Basic Books, 1993.
- Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1990** Papenfuss, Dietrich, and Otto Pöggeler (eds.). *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*. Band 2, *Im Gespräch der Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.
- Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1991** Papenfuss, Dietrich, and Otto Pöggeler (eds.). *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*. Band 1, *Philosophie und Politik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
- Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1992** Papenfuss, Dietrich, and Otto Pöggeler (eds.). *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*. Band 3, *Im Spiegel der Welt: Sprache, Übersetzung, Auseinandersetzung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.
- Sallis 1970** Sallis, John (ed.). *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970.
- Sheehan 1988** Sheehan, Thomas. "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*." In *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years*, edited by J. Sallis, G. Moneta, and J. Taminiaux. *Phaenomenologica* 105. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.

# Chronology

**1889 26 September:** Martin Heidegger is born, the son of Friedrich Heidegger, cooper and sexton in Meßkirch, and Johanna Heidegger-Kempf.

**1892** Heidegger's sister Marie is born.

**1894** Heidegger's brother Fritz is born.

**1903–06** Heidegger stays at the Konradihaus in Constance to continue his high school education and start preparations for the priesthood.

**1906–09** Heidegger continues his studies at the gymnasium in Freiburg and stays at the seminary. In September 1906 Conrad Gröber presents him with a copy of Franz Brentano's dissertation, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*.

**1909 30 September:** Heidegger begins his novitiate with the Jesuits in Tisis. Due to health problems, he is released on **13 October**.

**1909–11** Heidegger studies theology and philosophy at the University of Freiburg. He publishes his first articles and reviews and begins to study the writings of Edmund Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey in 1910.

**1909–13 Summer of 1911:** Heidegger abandons his plans to become a priest and gives up his theological studies. He obtains an endowment to study Catholic philosophy. He also takes courses in natural science, mathematics, and history.

**1913** Heidegger obtains the doctorate in philosophy with his inaugural dissertation, *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*.

**1915** Heidegger obtains his *veni legendi* with his qualifying dissertation *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*.

**1915–16** Heidegger gives his first lecture-course on the basic trends of ancient and scholastic philosophy. During this course he meets the woman who will later become his wife, Elfride Petri, who is studying political economy.

**1915–18** Heidegger serves in the army at the military Control Board of the Post Office in Freiburg and for the final months of the war as a meteorologist.

**1917 21 May:** Heidegger marries Elfride Petri in a Catholic ceremony officiated by his friend Engelbert Krebs and a week later in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of her parents.

**1918** Heidegger befriends Elisabeth Blochmann.

**1919 January:** Heidegger breaks with the system of Catholicism. His first child, Jörg, is born. Heidegger and Karl Jaspers meet for the first time on Husserl's birthday in Freiburg.

**1919–1923** Heidegger teaches as an unsalaried lecturer and acts as Husserl's private assistant.

**1920** Heidegger's son Hermann is born.

**1922** Heidegger writes the introduction to his projected book on Aristotle. Paul Natorp is so impressed with this short text that he gets Heidegger appointed to the junior position in philosophy at the University of Marburg in 1923. Elfride offers Heidegger a wood cabin in Todtnauberg, which later will become famous, as a present.

**1923** Heidegger moves to Marburg and befriends Rudolf Bultmann.

**1924** Hannah Arendt comes to Marburg to study under Heidegger's supervision. They fall in love and start an extramarital affair that lasts five years. Heidegger's father dies at the age of 73.

**1926** Arendt leaves Marburg to continue her studies under the direction of Karl Jaspers.

**1927** *Being and Time* is published. Heidegger's mother dies at the age of 69.

**1928** Heidegger is appointed Husserl's successor to the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg.

**1929 March:** Heidegger travels to Davos, Switzerland, and engages in an epic debate with Ernst Cassirer. Heidegger delivers his important inaugural lecture, *What Is Metaphysics?* (**24 July**), and publishes his famous book, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

**1930** Heidegger rejects his nomination to the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin.

**1933 21 April:** Heidegger is elected rector of the University of Freiburg. **3 May:** He becomes a member of the Nazi Party. In the summer, he delivers several lectures in support of the National Socialist revolution and issues a number of statements in support of Hitler and his policies. He visits Jaspers for the last time. **October:** Heidegger rejects his second nomination to the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin and a nomination to the chair



of philosophy at the University of Munich. He writes letters of recommendation for some of his Jewish students, such as Karl Löwith, and friends, such as Elisabeth Blochmann.

**1934 23 April:** Heidegger hands in his resignation as rector of the University of Freiburg.

**1935** Heidegger delivers his famous lecture *The Origin of the Work of Art* in Freiburg for the first time.

**1936** Heidegger and Jaspers break off their correspondence. **April:** Heidegger travels to Rome, where he meets Löwith and delivers his lectures *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry* and *Europe and German Philosophy*.

**1936–38** Heidegger writes his second major work, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*.

**1938–39** Heidegger writes the sequel text, *Mindfulness*.

**1936–40** Heidegger gives several lecture-courses on Friedrich Nietzsche in which he comments critically on the National Socialist doctrine of power. The Gestapo observes Heidegger's courses.

**1944 November:** Heidegger is drafted into the *Volkssturm*.

**1945 January and February:** Heidegger is in Meßkirch to safeguard his manuscripts. From April until June the philosophical faculty moves to Wildenstein Castle near Beuron. After the defeat and surrender of Germany to the Allies on **7 May**, Heidegger delivers his lecture *Die Armut* ("Poverty"), to a small audience on **27 June**. In July, Heidegger faces the commission of de-Nazification. Heidegger asks Professor Friedrich Oehlkers, a member of the de-Nazification committee, to inquire about his supposed anti-Semitism, intimidated by Jaspers. In reply, Jaspers writes a negative report that ultimately leads to Heidegger's forced retirement without license to teach.

**1946** Jean Beaufret visits Heidegger for the first time. He will become a close friend and work on Heidegger's behalf in France. Heidegger writes his *Letter on "Humanism"* in reply to Beaufret's questions and also meets Medard Boss, who will later organize the famous seminar in Zollikon near Zurich. **28 December:** The French military government prohibits Heidegger from teaching.

**1949 July:** The French military government issues its final statement on Heidegger's Nazism, classifying him as "a fellow traveler without reconciliation." **September:** The prohibition against Heidegger's teaching is lifted. **December:** Heidegger delivers his four famous lectures (*The Thing, Enframing, The Danger, The Turning*) in Bremen under the common title *Insight into That Which Is*. The correspondence with Jaspers begins again.

**1950** Heidegger delivers lectures on various occasions before the Bavaria Academy of Fine Arts and at Bühlerhöhe. Arendt visits Heidegger, and they resume their friendship. Heidegger is granted his retirement and publishes *Holzwege (Off the Beaten Track)*.

**1951** Heidegger begins to teach again at the University of Freiburg, and gives his first course under the title *What Is Called Thinking?* The Baden government grants Heidegger emeritus status.

**1952** Arendt visits Heidegger again.

**1953** Heidegger meets and becomes a friend of Erhard Kästner. He delivers his lecture *The Question concerning Technology* before the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. *Introduction to Metaphysics* is published.

**1954** Heidegger publishes *Vorträge und Aufsätze (Lectures and essays)*.

**1955** Heidegger delivers his memorial address for Conradin Kreutzer in Meßkirch and the lecture *What Is Philosophy?* in Cérisy-la-Salle in France. He also visits Paris and Georges Braque in Varengeville.

**1957 27 June:** Heidegger delivers his lecture *Identity and Difference*, commemorating the 500th anniversary of the founding of the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg.

**1958** Heidegger delivers his lecture *Hegel and the Greeks* in Aix-en-Provence, where he meets René Char, and in Heidelberg at the Academy of Sciences. He travels to Vienna and delivers his lecture *Words* on the poetry of Georg Trakl.

**1959 27 September:** Heidegger is named honorary citizen of Meßkirch. He is elected a member of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences.

**1961** Heidegger publishes his two-volume work *Nietzsche*. **17 May:** He delivers his lecture *Kant's Thesis about Being* in Kiel.

**1962** Heidegger travels to Greece for the first time. **18 July:** He delivers his lecture *Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache* ("Traditional Language and Technological Language") in Comburg.

**1964** Heidegger travels to Greece for the second time and visits Agina.

**1966 23 September:** Heidegger gives his first seminar in Le Thor, France. Heidegger gives an interview to *Der Spiegel*, which will be published posthumously in 1976. He travels to Greece for the third time, visiting Lesbos and also Istanbul in Turkey.

**1967** Heidegger travels to Greece for the fourth time in April and delivers his lectures on the origin of art and the determination of thinking at the Academy of Sciences in Athens. **May:** Heidegger makes his fifth and final trip to Greece and visits the islands in the Aegean Sea. Arendt visits Heidegger and will continue to do so each year until her death in 1975. Heidegger's famous collection of essays, *Wegmarken (Pathmarks)*, is published.

**1968** Second seminar in Le Thor.

**1969** Third seminar in Le Thor.

**1973** Seminar in Zähringen.

**1975** The summer semester 1927 lecture-course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is published by Vittorio Klostermann as the first volume of the Complete Edition of Heidegger's works.

**1976 26 May:** Heidegger dies at his home in Freiburg. **28 May:** He is buried at the cemetery of Meßkirch.



# Introduction

## *Martin Heidegger's Life and Path of Thinking*

### **THE EARLY YEARS: AS YOU WERE YOU WILL REMAIN (1889–1919)**

Martin Heidegger was born on 26 September 1889 in the south German town Meßkirch; he would become one of the greatest and most controversial philosophers of the 20th century. His father was a cooper and a sexton of Saint Martin's church, where Heidegger served as an altar boy. His mother was born and raised on a farm in nearby Göggingen, where Heidegger spent most of his holidays as a boy. His parents were neither poor nor rich. The family home seems to have been a happy place. The fundamental role of life was to keep within the bounds and limits that were determined by the Roman Catholic Church. Order ruled God's creation, and every human being needed to respect that order in the conduct of his life. The ringing of the church bells determined the rhythm of everyday life and reflected the divine order of creation.

Heidegger began his schooling in Meßkirch. But when he was 14 years old, he left Meßkirch to continue his education in Constance. For boys from modest families, the financial support of Roman Catholic endowments was necessary to finish their high school education. In return, they were expected to study theology and become priests. While attending the gymnasium, Heidegger lived from 1903 until 1906 at the Konradihaus, the seminary where Conrad Gröber was rector. Gröber became not only Heidegger's fatherly friend, who gave him a copy of Franz Brentano's dissertation on Aristotle as a birthday present in 1907, but also the archbishop of Freiburg. From 1906 until 1909, Heidegger lived in Freiburg, where he graduated from high school in the summer of 1909. As expected, he began his novitiate with the Jesuits of Tisis in September, but after two weeks he was dismissed for reasons of health. He moved to the seminary in Freiburg and continued his theological studies at the university.

As a student of theology, Heidegger published a number of essays and reviews in Roman Catholic journals that reflect the conflict between modernity and traditional Christianity in his life. We find the same tension in the books he read and authors he studied. On the one hand, he was strongly influenced by Aristotle, Scholasticism, and his teacher of speculative theolo-

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gy, Carl Braig. Heidegger read the very conservative antimodernist journal *Der Akademiker*, in which he published most of his earliest writings. On the other hand, he started studying Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey as early as 1910. He discovered the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin and Rainer Maria Rilke, Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Will to Power*, and Fyodor Dostoevsky's novels. He was introduced to Søren Kierkegaard and Georg Trakl in Ludwig von Ficker's avant-garde journal *Der Brenner*. He studied the writings of the well-known German modernist Hermann Schell and Maurice Blondel's *L'Action*.

In February 1911, a deteriorating heart condition forced Heidegger to abandon all plans to become a priest. In October 1911, he took up studies in mathematics, history, and natural science. In philosophy, Professor Heinrich Rickert became his most influential teacher. In his seminars, Heidegger learned to understand what philosophical problems are, and he also acquired insight into the basis of modern logic. At the same time, he acquired a deep understanding of modern philosophy from Immanuel Kant onward. Rickert also introduced Heidegger to the writings of Emil Lask, a former student who was killed in action during World War I. On 26 July 1913, Heidegger received a doctorate in philosophy with his inaugural dissertation, entitled *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*.

Heidegger's future looked promising. Philosophy professor Arthur Schneider and history professor Heinrich Finke began grooming the promising young scholar for the Freiburg University's chair of Catholic philosophy. A grant from the Catholic Church enabled Heidegger to start working on his qualifying dissertation. On the advice of his mentors, Heidegger decided to write on Duns Scotus's system of categories and meaning. At this time, Heidegger still thought his lifework would be taken up with a comprehensive presentation of medieval logic and psychology in the light of modern phenomenology. It came therefore as a great shock and bitter disappointment when a year after he had successfully completed his qualifying dissertation, the department of philosophy accorded the chair to Josef Geyser.

*Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning* is a milestone on Heidegger's path of thinking. It marks the transition in his philosophical development from neo-scholasticism and neo-Kantianism on the one hand, to phenomenology and life philosophy on the other. In this original work, the influence of Lask reaches its zenith. Heidegger discusses the doctrine of categories of Duns Scotus in relation to his doctrine of meaning. He uses the modern logic of Husserl and Lask to interpret a scholastic treatise that was, as was later proven, not written by Scotus himself, but by his pupil Thomas of Erfurt. At the same time, Heidegger uses the medieval doctrine of categories and meaning to criticize contemporary theories. The great advantage of Scotus's doctrine over modern logic is its metaphysical foundation. The distinctive form of medieval life experience is anchored in the transcendent

relationship of the soul to God. As Heidegger writes in the final chapter, which was later added to the commercial edition, in the long run philosophy cannot do without the insights of metaphysics.

As the final requirement to receive his license to teach at the university level, Heidegger delivered his test lecture, *The Concept of Time in the Science of History*, on 27 July 1915. In his lecture, he distinguishes between the concept of time in the science of nature and in the science of history. This historic concept of time is of great importance for the development of his thought. Heidegger shows that historic epochs are qualitatively incomparable. This implies that the being of entities is experienced in different ways in different epochs. There can be no *one* truth of being, or as he was to conclude later, the manifestation of being is inherently historical. The factic life experience of primordial Christianity was different from that of the Greeks, and they both differ from the factic life experience of modern times.

As an unsalaried lecturer, Heidegger was set to work at the Control Board of the Post Office of Freiburg by the military authorities. He was thus spared the nightmare of the trenches of World War I. He served only for a couple of months in 1918, as a meteorologist behind the line of fire. His first lecture-course, in the winter semester 1915/16, focused on the basic trends of ancient and scholastic philosophy. During this course, he met Elfride Petri, who was studying political economy. They fell in love and later got married, on 21 March 1917, first in a Catholic ceremony officiated by his friend Engelbert Krebs and again a week later in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of Elfride's parents. In June, Heidegger learned that he would not be nominated to the chair of Catholic philosophy. This disappointment and the fact that his wife was a Protestant would ultimately lead to his break with Catholicism in 1919. A new start was made possible by the arrival of Edmund Husserl as the successor of Rickert. Husserl had helped Heidegger with the publication of his qualifying dissertation on Duns Scotus in 1916, and by the end of 1917 Husserl looked forward to the occasions of *symphilosophiein* with his most valuable coworker. During the years 1917–29, Heidegger continued to learn through his close association with Husserl. The results of their collaboration would become evident in Heidegger's first lecture-course after World War I, in which he turned away from neo-Kantianism and neo-scholasticism.

## THE SEARCH FOR A NEW PATHWAY

When Heidegger started teaching again after the war, he made a fresh start. Since his break with Catholicism on the one hand and neo-scholasticism and neo-Kantianism on the other, he faced two major problems: What can philosophy be after World War I, along with the bankruptcy of 19th-century culture

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and philosophy? Is it still possible to be a Christian in the 20th century, and what does it mean to live a Christian life? Together, these questions became the guiding star of Heidegger's path of thinking. It became the fundamental task of his philosophy to teach us what individualized existence is and how we may achieve it. What is the meaning of life, or what is the meaning of being?

In his first lecture-course in Freiburg (1919–23), Heidegger followed the goal of Husserl's famous *Logos* essay to further philosophy as a rigorous science. Here he first identified and named the subject matter of his philosophy, which would assume a series of different names over the years: the singularity of what becomes manifest, the concrete enactment of life, the historical I, the situation-I, facticity, being-there, being, enowning (*Ereignis*). Philosophy is the science of life in and for itself, or as he would later call it, being-there (*Da-sein*). Heidegger's use of the German expression *Da-sein* became the signature term by which he launched his new approach to ontology or his distinctive inquiry into the meaning of being. Since this is a more primordial phenomenon than either nature or spirit, we can approach it neither with the method of natural science nor with that of the humanities. In principle, they are both incapable of disclosing life as the phenomenon from which nature and spirit spring. Life in and for itself can only be disclosed in phenomenology. Philosophy is only possible as phenomenology. However, since phenomenology can only be the pretheoretical science of life, and not of consciousness, Heidegger had to transform the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl into a hermeneutic phenomenology.

Life is in and for itself historical. Historical development can never be given in intuition; it can only be understood. This is the reason Heidegger would attempt to integrate Husserl's phenomenology as a strict science and Wilhelm Dilthey's life-philosophy and doctrine of understanding in his early Freiburg lectures. Despite its appearance as a life-philosophy, it is the opposite of a worldview. A worldview objectifies and immobilizes life at a certain point in the life of a culture. In contrast, phenomenology is never closed off; it is always under way in its absolute immersion in life as such. This immersion in life in its genuineness is possible only through the genuineness of a personal life. Philosophy is, in other words, an outstanding possibility of human life.

In his first lecture-course after World War I, *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, Heidegger offers his students a destruction of the critical-teleological method of neo-Kantian value-philosophy. In the second phenomenological part, he rejects the neo-Kantian starting point of philosophy in the fact of knowledge and replaces it with the primordial fact of life and experience. As the original science, philosophy begins with a "leap" from the primordial phenomenon. The only way to get at this original sphere is by pure dedication to the subject matter, that is, the lived experience of life



itself. This environmental experience is the condition of possibility of the neo-Kantian experience of pure givenness, which is nonobjective and impersonal. In a discussion of Paul Natorp's objections to phenomenology, Heidegger transforms Husserl's principle of all principles—that is, the primacy of originary giving and so of intuition—into a nontheoretical and hermeneutic principle, that is, the primacy of understanding. This transformation is the hermeneutic “breakthrough” in phenomenology. Philosophy becomes a distinct possibility of life itself. Life is meaningful and expresses itself in and through the individual's experiences and self-understanding.

The importance of philosophy for Heidegger's personal life becomes evident in his religious crisis of 1919 and the most important question of his personal life: How is an authentic and genuine Christian life possible in modern times? This question poses three additional questions: (1) What is a Christian life?; (2) What is the basis of modernity?; and (3) Is a uniquely Christian life possible in the modern world? To get to the uniqueness of Christian life, Heidegger developed a phenomenology of the life world, of primordial Christianity in an interpretation of the letters of Saint Paul. The life of a Christian begins with acceptance of the gospel. We become Christians when we receive God's word with much concern and with the joy of the Holy Spirit. The how of this receptivity is characterized by a constant being in trepidation. The receptive appropriating of Christian faith leads to needy distress as the condition of Christian life. A Christian lives his/her life for and in hopeful anticipation of the Parousia, that is, the Second Coming of Christ. This hopeful anticipation is at the same time a steadfast enduring in the face of the Parousia. This enduring is in turn defined by absolute worry and need, which define every moment in the life of a Christian. Even Paul himself admitted twice that he could endure it no longer. Since we are weak, we need the help and grace of the Lord to remain steadfast and opposed to the power of evil and its temptation of sin.

As Heidegger outlines in his lecture-course from the winter semester 1920/21, *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, there is no certainty in the life of the first Christians, because the Parousia comes as a “thief in the night.” Nobody knows when the day of the Lord will come, and there is nothing anybody can do to bring it closer. The only possible preparation for Judgment Day is to be prepared. The “end-time” does not lie indefinitely in the future, but instead is already imminent and unfolds in the “moment.” Paul incites his fellow Christians to remain watchful and vigilant. This life of observance and vigilance involves a distinctive movement of insight, a *kairos*, that comes with the full alertness to our situation. Christian life begins with the kairological decision to accept God's word and lives one's life in anticipation of the Parousia. A Christian makes every decision in his/her life in light of the Parousia, the uncertain certainty of which determines the factic life experience of the Christian. How the Parousia stands in my life refers

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back to the full temporal enactment of my life. Christian religiosity experiences temporality as such. The life of the original Christians was enormously difficult, always actualized in need and worry. The intensification of need and worry gives the becoming Christian the feeling that it is beyond him/her to endure this life. Without God's help and grace, the Christian is lost. A Christian life is lived before the face of God. Everyday the Christian must relive his/her conversion and endure in his/her faith. Is this kind of life still possible in the modern era?

What is the nature of modernity? As Heidegger sees it, scientific and technological awareness determine modernity. Science expands even further into other areas of life and culture, such as politics, art, and religion. The development, growth, and acceleration of technology determine the direction of science, which despite its "theoretical" focus becomes ensnared in the pursuit of technized, "practical ends." In modern times, people expect scientific answers even to existential questions. The modern human no longer creates works of art; he/she develops aesthetic theories about art. He/she is no longer politically active; he/she leaves politics to paid experts. He/she no longer dances for God in "fear and trembling"; instead, he/she misuses him as the keystone of his/her morality. Theoretical consciousness and the subject-object relation determine science. One of the consequences of this objectifying of reality is that we have begun to regard ourselves as objects in the midst of other objects. According to Heidegger, Greek philosophy is the origin of the theoretical and contemplative attitude toward life. For the Greeks, reality was a cosmos. They enjoyed aesthetically the magnificent spectacle that took place before their eyes. The ultimate expression of the life experience of the Greeks is Platonism and its doctrine of eternal ideas, which we can behold only in pure contemplation. As a consequence, modern factic life experience is at odds with Christian factic life experience, which is dominated by need and worry. It seems unlikely that a Christian life is still possible in the modern era.

The other main element in modern life experience, a historical self-understanding or awareness, betrays a Christian origin. The concept of history was foreign to the Greeks. In an eternal cosmos, there can be no creation and no Last Day. The factic life experience of modern times is an inauthentic mixture of Christian and Greek life experiences, which contradict each other. This implies that modern man faces an inordinate challenge of seizing hold of the unique possibilities of life. In his early lecture-course in Freiburg, Heidegger tried to unravel this incongruity in what he called the "destruction" of Greek and Christian factic life experiences. This de(con)struction is not destructive in the ordinary sense, but a careful scraping off of layers that cover up the original life experience. The intertwining of Christian and Greek life experiences began with the church fathers, who used Greek philosophy to explain Christian faith and thus corrupted both Greek and Christian factic

life experiences. In his summer semester 1921 lecture-course on St. Augustine and Neoplatonism, Heidegger tried to separate the Greek and Christian elements in the saint's factic life experience. In order to distinguish between original Greek and Christian elements, Heidegger also had to disclose the original factic life experience of the Greeks. This element of his destruction would lead to his yearlong study of Aristotle. Heidegger found the source and the focus of Greek life experience in Aristotle, not in Plato or Parmenides.

What did Heidegger discover in Aristotle? While interpreting Aristotle's writing on practical philosophy and rhetoric, he discovered that worry and a kairological experience of time play an important part in Greek life after all. He found an original experience of *kairos* paralleling that of primordial Christianity in Aristotle's account of *phronèsis* as a way of beholding the true in *Nicomachean Ethics VI*. *Phronèsis* is the moment of insight that ends the deliberation about what the right action is toward the right person in this situation, the basis of balanced judgment. Heidegger identified it as conscience already set in motion to make an action transparent. This discovery would ultimately lead to Heidegger's discounting the importance of Christianity in his phenomenology of life. The two most important elements of Christian life experience were expressed more clearly in Greek philosophy and the historical consciousness of modernity. In his *Physics IV*, Aristotle developed an explicit theory of time as a series of nows. This doctrine became the paradigm for all later theories of time.

In the winter semester 1922/23, Heidegger discovered that *ousia* for the Greeks means constant or permanent presence. Heidegger tried to understand being in terms of time in its fullest sense. Aristotle pointed to an important, albeit unquestioned, relationship between being and time. His conception of logic as a productive science of truth, or the unconcealment of entities in their being, along with his grasp of the "situated" character of action, would provide important clues to the development of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In his final course as an unsalaried lecturer, Heidegger developed for the first time a phenomenology of human being-there as the condition of the possibility of Greek, Christian, and modern factic life experiences.

The existential drift of his phenomenology had also brought Heidegger and Karl Jaspers together after their first meeting in 1919. For more than a decade, they would remain close friends. Heidegger visited Jaspers regularly in Heidelberg to work in a joint community battle against university politics and the "professors" of philosophy. They shared a love for Søren Kierkegaard, and Heidegger's critical comments on Jaspers's book, *Psychology of Worldviews*, were at the heart of their discussion.

In January 1922, Husserl learned that Natorp would be retiring shortly, that Nicolai Hartmann would take his place, and that as a result the junior position in philosophy at the University of Marburg would be vacant. Natorp

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had been impressed by Heidegger's book on Duns Scotus. By 1922, Heidegger was renowned in university circles as an outstanding teacher. Within the student body the "rumor of the hidden king" resonated ever louder. The only problem was that he had published nothing since the book on Scotus's thought. For this reason, plans were soon initiated for Heidegger to publish a work on Aristotle. After months of intense labor over the manuscripts of his courses on Aristotle, he produced the introduction to the projected book, in which he founded and developed the hermeneutic situation within which he would interpret Aristotle's writings. This introduction has since become famous. When Natorp read his copy in October 1922, he marveled over finding so many of his own ideas there on the development of the German spirit, from Meister Eckhart to Martin Luther and on to Immanuel Kant and German idealism. It was therefore not surprising that Natorp used his considerable influence to get Heidegger appointed.

### **THE MARBURG YEARS: *BEING AND TIME* (1923–28)**

The years in Marburg were among the most creative of Heidegger's life. Here he conceived *Being and Time*, delivered important lectures, and gave some of his most interesting courses and seminars. For a short period, Heidegger enjoyed the company of Natorp, who was one of the main influences on his early life and thought. They were kindred spirits, who could keep silent on their many walks through Marburg. Heidegger would soon also become close friends with Rudolf Bultmann. They studied Luther together and jointly held seminars in theological exegesis. Bultmann was strongly influenced by the existential analysis of being-there, which he used for his demythologizing interpretation of the Bible.

In 1924, 18-year-old Hannah Arendt came to Marburg to study with Heidegger, the "hidden king" of German philosophy. They soon fell in love and had a passionate extramarital love affair that lasted almost five years. Heidegger was twice her age and had two sons. According to Heidegger, she was the only person who understood him and his work. In 1926, Arendt took Heidegger's advice and moved to Heidelberg to study with Jaspers.

Heidegger's arrival put his colleague, Nicolai Hartmann, under great pressure. The latter finally gave in and moved to Cologne in 1925 to join forces with his friend Max Scheler. The faculty wanted to name Heidegger the successor of Hartmann to the chair of philosophy, but the ministry of education hesitated because he had not published anything in a decade. Under pressure from his peers, Heidegger decided to publish his yearlong phenomenological investigations in the form of a book. In March 1926, he retired to Todtnauberg and wrote in four weeks the first 175 pages of *Being and*

*Time*, the work that would be published in Husserl's *Jarhbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1927 and bring Heidegger world fame. Heidegger spent the summer of 1926 in Todtnauberg, where he continued to work on *Being and Time* and stayed at the Brender-Hof, a farm where he rented a room, while Elfride and the boys stayed in their cabin.

*Being and Time* is a milestone on Heidegger's path of thinking and one of the most important and influential philosophical works of this century. In a sense, it is the answer to Heidegger's existential question of 1919: How can I live as a Christian in the modern world? This vital question is the most concrete and personal question that we can ask ourselves. But—and this is Heidegger's decisive discovery while he was writing *Being and Time*—the most concrete question—Who am I?—can be answered only if we know what it means to be. Heidegger reformulates the traditional question of being—What is an entity as entity?—as the question about the meaning of being. This question is ambiguous and yet reciprocally implicating, for it can entail both what is the meaning of being and the meaning of my existence. The reciprocal implication between the entity who questions “who” it is, or being-there, and the larger, perennial question of being (the “to be” of everything) forms what Heidegger calls the hermeneutical circle of philosophical inquiry. Heidegger's development of hermeneutics as a distinctly philosophical method provided the major catalyst by which he transformed Husserlian phenomenology into an original study of being or fundamental ontology.

What it means “to be” is something we can experience only in terms of our own existence. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses being-there as a formal indication of the way of being of humans. The phenomenon of being-there shows itself in its being through the complex structure of care. We care for each other and ourselves. We take care of things, people, and animals. Being human is caring, which indicates that we are not disinterested spectators, but active participants in this great enterprise called “being.” We care about our being and have to take care of our potential “to be.” In the complex phenomenon of care, three ways of being human are interlaced. Being human is being-in-the-world, being-with-other human-beings, and being-with-oneself. Being-in originally means being familiar with. Being-in-the-world is not primarily a spatial quality, the way beer is in a glass and the glass is in a pub. We always find ourselves as being-in-a-world with which we are familiar. Being-with is the phenomenon that we are never alone, but always among other human beings. Finally, the phenomenon of being-a-self shows that factic life experience is always mine. The mineness is a formal and not a material concept.

Being can only reveal itself in relation to being-there. The comportment of being-there toward the being of entities is determined by understanding. In everything we do and say, we have an implicit or preontological understanding of being. According to Heidegger, this vague and implicit understanding

is an undeniable fact. However, there is no direct, conclusive answer to the question of being. We can only experience being in the interlacing of structures that constitutes being-there as the unconcealment of being. Since being-there is determined by mineness, we can only discover how being can manifest itself through our own existence. To ask the question of being is a distinctive possibility of being-there. To philosophize is in this sense an existential exercise and demands the reciprocal willingness to place ourselves into question. Heidegger's invitation to ask the question of being once again enables us to understand *Being and Time* as his *protrepticus*, that is, an invitation to philosophize, or a summons to start thinking out of need, because we want to know who we are. In this thinking out of need, we can hear the echo of his earlier critique of the decadent, modern world. We need to return from the pleasures, comforts, and diversions of modern life to care about our "ownmost," authentic being. This dimension, of what Heidegger will later call "mindfulness" (*Besinnung*), runs through and guides his path of thinking. The greatest need and gravest danger of our time is that we are threatened by nothing. There is no more need for us.

As Heidegger sees it, being is a phenomenon that reveals itself through our understanding of being. Being-there is the unconcealment of being and so the clearing in which being can be experienced. The structure of understanding needs to be explicated in order to disclose being and articulate its meaning in words. This implies that being can be revealed only from the prearticulated or "clearing" whole of the existential structure of being-there. Three major problems arise. First, as Heidegger emphasizes, the phenomenon of phenomenology or being, far from immediately and completely showing itself, instead withdraws into concealment. As a necessary repercussion, the question of being itself can easily slip into indifference. To acknowledge this "counter" tendency of neglect, phenomenology must initiate its investigation from the standpoint of the everyday, preontological understanding of being and then, having accounted for the negativity of this indifference, re-ask the question of being by projecting open the horizon for any possible understanding thereof. Second, we are ourselves the entities whose way of being is defined as being-in-the-world. In an ontic sense, nothing is "closer" to us than being-there, but in an ontological sense nothing is "farther." We are, after all, always already beyond ourselves in the world, and we return, as it were, from the world to ourselves. This is also the reason we understand our own being in terms of the being of nature or natural entities. The naive acceptance of this immediate proximity explains why the classical definition of human being is the "rational animal." In order to get a clear view of the structure of being-there, we must first strip away the deposit of this natural point of view. This destruction is the task that Heidegger planned to undertake in the second part of *Being and Time*, which was never published. Third, due to its transitoriness and finitude, being-there is always under way and

never “complete” and “whole.” I can never analyze the entirety of my being-there as long as I am still alive and therefore not yet “finished.” What we can do, however, is disclose the whole structure of the temporality that makes my being-there possible. Heidegger names the structures of being-there existentials, in contrast to the categories of traditional ontology.

The meaning of being resides in temporality. The temporality of being becomes phenomenologically explicit in and through the ecstatic, finite temporality of being-there, including the projecting of its own mortality. Accordingly, the central problem of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time. Heidegger characterizes being-there in terms of its “can-be,” that is, the projection of its possibilities, including the extreme, utmost possibility of ceasing to be altogether, or death. Being-there is literally its “own” having to be, of always confronting its “existence” as an issue. The formal existence of being-there is simultaneously the possibility of its individualized expression as “mine.” As a result, the possibility of being-a-self, or the potential for selfhood, belongs to existence, in such a way that each of us can either seize hold of who one is uniquely—that is, in an “owned” manner—or on the contrary, neglect to do so by fulfilling the expectations of others—that is, in an “unowned” manner. Because one’s ownmost individuality points to an issue and task that is always up for grabs, Heidegger emphasizes that the proper philosophical question is not “what is man?” but “*who* is being-there?”

Being-there’s most basic capacity to live and cope skillfully within the world, with others as well as itself, is understanding. Understanding expresses itself in the disclosedness of being-there that uncovers the being of entities and brings them thereby into unconcealment. We discover the being of entities that are ready-to-hand as equipment, which is suited for certain uses. A hammer is a piece of equipment that lies in proximity and is suited for hammering. We discover the being of entities that are present-to-hand objectively, that is, independently of its relation to our being-there. This distance characterizes natural science, which describes entities objectively. These descriptions are objectively valid for all subjects. When we carry out a scientific experiment, the outcome is independent of the subject that performs the experiment.

We discover the being of other people as being-with. I discover my own being-there as the “for-the-sake-of-which” of my existence. Existential understanding has always the structure of a projection. Being-there has already been thrown into possibilities and projects itself upon them, developing some in exclusion from others. Through selecting, developing, and prioritizing its possibilities, being-there first experiences its capacity to be free. From the acceptance of its limitations, and powerless of its thrownness, being-there is first awakened to its guilt. By guilt, however, Heidegger does not have in mind simply the regret surrounding a wrongdoing, but instead

something much more fundamental: an awakening to one's own finitude and the corresponding readiness to assume responsibility for one's existence. This guilt is the source and condition of the possibility of original sin in the biblical sense. The disclosedness of this capacity for choice creates the "play-space" within which being-there can discern and develop its unique possibilities. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes this self-illuminating disclosedness as the clearing (*Lichtung*), which would become even more prominent in his later philosophy.

Heidegger examines the meaning of being-there in light of its temporality, in order to provide subsequently an ontic foundation for ontology. Being-there can exist either in an owned, individualized way, or in an unowned, undifferentiated manner. And so Heidegger faces the question of whether he should study being-there in terms of its owned or unowned existence or alternative ways to be. We should not mistake ownedness and unownedness for moral qualifications. They are equivalent existential characters. Unowned existence is not less than owned existence, insofar as the former designates the way in which being-there primarily exists and thereby must be addressed in order to account for a complete phenomenological description of its being as care. In its unownedness, being-there understands "who" it is primarily in terms of the world and the expectations and conventions of the "they." We project our possibilities in everyday life out of our concern for conforming to the expectations of the "they." Being-there is first and foremost lost in its concern for entities or things in the world, fallen to the everydayness of the "they" and not its ownmost existence. And yet, mineness remains the condition of the possibility of the unity of our being-there. This implies that even in being-there's total dissipation in the world and the "they," the possibility of owned existence must be preserved. The ultimate and most unique possibility that is and remains prominent as long as being-there exists, is death.

In its being-toward-death, being-there anticipates the possibility of its death as possibility. The possibility of death is the impossibility of all comportment, and as such the possible impossibility of existence. In the anticipation of its own death, being-there understands the impossibility of its own existence as an inevitable possibility. Being-there is possible nonbeing; is not something and therewith a pure can-be that has to be. I can project my own possibilities and can avoid being determined by anything, be it the world or the "they." Since as finite being-there we remain being-in-the-world and being-with, we can never completely actualize this possibility. It is no coincidence that death as the liberation from all external influence is at the same time the end of my existence. To determine ourselves as who we want to be through this possibility, we disclose our factual fallenness into the world and the "they" of our everyday existence. Death is a possibility that being-there cannot actualize completely, since the actualization of its death implies the end of its existence. In anticipating my death as the most unique possibility



of my existence, I become aware of my own unique and once-only existence. Death is always my death of being-there in its individuality. Heidegger does not found the mineness of being-there upon the soul, the *cogito* or the “I,” but in the structure of being-toward-death. Owned existence keeps open all possibilities and makes it possible for being-there to exist as a whole.

The being-toward-death of being-there is at the same time the self’s finding who it is in anxiety for its own can-be. Anxiety understands the possibility of existence as the ultimate possibility. In being-toward-death, the possibility of a unique potentiality for being-a-whole is disclosed as an ontological possibility. Because being-there is first and foremost lost in its concern for the world and fallen into the idle talk of the “they,” the liberation from unownedness requires a transformation. The call of conscience calls to being-there and invites it to heed the possibilities of its own unique existence. The call of conscience calls upon us to remember the possible ownedness of our existence and our responsibility of our own being-there. In the call of conscience, being-there calls to itself. It calls being-there forth into the unique situation of its own can-be. There is no general ideal of being-there. I have to be, and I can be owned or unowned. My responsibility is grounded in this having to be. My life is my answer to the call of conscience. This answer is an ongoing story, indeed, the “sojourn” of my being-in-the-world. The ownedness of my existence slips away time and again. It is never a finality. By virtue of my self-understanding, I must project and interpret my existence every time anew.

This always having to be, and to take ownership for one’s existence, is the guilt that is given with the fact of our being-there. Being-there has been thrown into existence, not by itself but to itself. This is the primary facticity of being-there: I find myself with others in a world and have to be, whether I like it or not. I have never asked to be born, but now that I have been born, I have to be who I can be. Existence brings with it the task of having to be. With the gift of being-there arises the challenge and task of having to be. This having to be is the price or “debt” I pay continuously for my own existence; that is, in my endeavor to act self-responsibly, I must appropriate my own existence even if I will never be fully in control. The mandate to be a unique individual, as expressed through the call of conscience, provides the existential ground for my ability to “answer” any moral commandments.

I have to be, and so I am faced with the question of who I can be in each instance. As Heidegger emphasizes, “higher than actuality stands possibility.” In resoluteness, or the repeated choosing of who I am, being-there acquires insight into its situation and discovers the possibility of its unique selfhood. The situation is always a concrete situation of action that is disclosed in a concrete understanding. This concrete understanding is not the representation of a possible situation and a hypothetical musing on what we might do in such a situation; the concrete understanding of a situation is the

projecting of a resolute choosing. For Heidegger, resoluteness is not merely “willing” something to be the case, but rather the “unlocking” of those possibilities that testify to my uniqueness and translate into specific courses of action within a concrete situation. Resoluteness is in its most profound sense that which I have to be in the concrete, unique, and once-only situation of *my* existence. In anticipatory resoluteness, my fortitude in facing up to the inevitability of death provides the key to unlock the set of possibilities distinctly my own. My situation brings me into the situation of my existence as a whole. My existence is an ecstatic standing out as a whole within the clearing of the “there.” Being-there stands out in the openness of being.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger formulates four theses with regard to temporality: (1) temporality is constitutive for being of human existence or care; (2) temporality is ecstatic; (3) temporality exhibits a circular movement, arising originally from the future, returning from the past, and unfolding in the present; and (4) primordial time is finite. The structure of care as a whole is being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-a-world as being-with (others). Being there’s being-ahead-of-itself is grounded in the future. In its being-already, having been announces itself. Its being-with is actualized through the unfolding of the present. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality (thesis 1). Temporality is not made up of past, present, and future, but “temporalizes” itself through the interplay of the three “ecstases” (thesis 2). In the ecstatic disclosedness of its understanding, being-there projects temporality and comes “into its own” unique understanding of itself in the process. This self-understanding can occur only if being-there exists in such a way that its most unique possibility can come toward it, and it holds out this coming toward *as* a possibility. Only because it is futural can being-there be originally its having been. Future is the primordial phenomenon of temporality (thesis 3).

Primordial time is disclosed in being-there’s ownmost *existentiell* self-understanding. Heidegger introduces the “moment” as a formal indication of the ecstatic or kairological present. The moment is the instant or “flash” of resolute insight. The projection of resoluteness discloses the situation in the moment. Resoluteness projects a temporal expanse or clearing within which we can become who we have to be. Because I disclose my being-there as a moment within the whole of its temporal expansiveness, primordial time is finite (thesis 4). Owned existence is the understanding of my finitude, that is, the temporality of my existence.

Temporality always temporalizes possible ways of itself. These temporalizations make possible the manifold modes of being-there’s being and especially the basic possibility of owned and unowned existence. Heidegger emphasizes that we cannot say that temporality “is,” but instead that “there is” time. Thus, “there is” time in the temporalizing of the unity and equiprimordiality of the ecstases, which Heidegger names: future, present, and having-

been. Being-there actualizes its “to be” in different “temporal” ways. These different ways are grounded in the uniform structure of care. Temporalizing is the interweaving of the “directionality” of the temporal ecstases, as they sculpture out and project open the expanse of being-in-the-world. With an eye to Kant’s doctrine of schematism, Heidegger refers to “horizontal schema” to describe the directional indexing of the temporal ecstases as mapping out the backdrop of the world. Temporality emerges and discharges its disclosive potential across the expanse mapped out by these horizontal schema. According to Heidegger, traditional ontology failed to understand the being of being-there from temporality and thus made it impossible to disclose the meaning of being through its reciprocity with original time. The critical appropriation or destructive-retrieval of Kant’s insight in the temporal schematizing, ordering, and rendering of the possibilities of human experience becomes very much the central leitmotif leading from Heidegger’s magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1927), to the end of that decade.

In the existential thrust of Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions, it is easy to overlook the larger task he envisioned, namely, re-asking the question of being. The analysis of the temporality of being-there receives its guidance from and serves this larger task of undertaking this inquiry into the most perennial of all philosophical questions. If being-there is temporality through and through, as is its capacity to understand, then the same holds true equally for its possibility of understanding being. To understand something, in this case being, we project it upon that in relation to which it first becomes intelligible or meaningful, specifically time or temporality. Through its projection upon time, being is first disclosed, and having been uncovered and understood in this way, its “meaning” can then be expressed and articulated in words. Just as we might say that a student understands the subject matter when he/she can express it, for example, in a written essay, so the goal of philosophy is to express the meaning of being, rather than simply to intuit it in vague terms. The linchpin for recognizing that temporality provides the backdrop or “horizon” for understanding being, and the hermeneutic principle or intermediary for “translating” its meaning into words was the simple (albeit brilliant) observation concerning the grammar of the word “being” itself. Specifically, Heidegger saw that the declension of the verb “being” in terms of tenses, of future, past, and present—that is, as a “time-word” (*Zeitwort*)—suggested that the possibility of its understanding and its expression were interwoven. Thus, by projecting being upon the backdrop of time, it simultaneously became evident that temporal idioms provided the key to express the “meaning” of being and permitted its conceptualization in philosophical terms. To take a simple example, Heidegger recognized the simple correlation between the tense of the verb, for example, the “present,” and a specific dimension of time, which forms a hermeneutic tapestry for understanding being in terms of the Greek sense of “presencing.” A cluster of

meanings thereby forms around the temporal dimension of the “present,” to designate the “basic concepts” of philosophy, for example, *phusis* as self-emerging presence, or even God as eternal presence.

Yet to reap the fruits of this simple insight, it was necessary for Heidegger to simultaneously develop it on a historical front and explore why its importance had largely eluded the philosophical tradition whose basis it formed. In other words, Heidegger also recognized that while the Greek thinkers understood being in terms of time, they never paused to ask why this was so and hence never explicitly formulated the question of being as such. This omission was not a simple oversight, but rather gained momentum on its own to result in an increasing neglect for the question of being over the centuries, until the present day, slipping completely into dormancy. Heidegger characterized this key historical development, or gradual deterioration, as it were, as the “forgottenness of being.” According to him, this forgottenness had two important and closely interwoven elements. The first level of forgottenness occurs with the initial Greek presumption of defining being in regard to time, without simultaneously formulating the question of being. The second level occurs when the Greek thinkers, having naively conceived of being in terms of *ousia* as “permanent presence,” and given this preorientation, define time according to an ontological model that privileges a single dimension of temporality or the “present.” A derivative concept of time thereby results, which immediately leads to its false polarization as either the transitoriness of successive moments or the eternality of an enduring present. The beginning of metaphysics, then, is overshadowed by a double falsehood, a dual error, which overlooks the intimacy of the connection between being and time and then, having done so, inverts their relation by patterning a concept of time on an already, “naively” formulated understanding of being.

Once time has become merely an afterthought, there is no simple avenue for undoing the twofold confusion on which the origin of metaphysics rests. Heidegger thereby proposed as a further phase of ontology the need to expose the source of this double error, thereby offsetting the initial inertia of “forgottenness,” and then, ultimately, providing an occasion for inaugurating a countermovement of “recollection.” The counterpole of the forgottenness of being, of course, is its recollection. Both are coupled as possibilities in the history of philosophy, and conversely, Heidegger’s attempt to re-ask the question of being spans each. By undertaking this task of recollection, he aimed to uncover the original reciprocity between being and time and thereby shift the focus away from either term in favor of the grammar of the connective, the “and” itself. The “turning around” of the question itself, whereby the “and” itself enters the forefront, entails transposing the focus of the inquiry from “being and time” to “time and being.”

Upon the heels of examining human existence in its everydayness, the first division of Part I, and subsequently unfolding the structure of human temporality as the theme of the second division, Heidegger proposed a third division earmarked with precisely this mission under the title “Time and Being.” This third division was never explicitly published. Nor was Part II published, in which he proposed a “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology,” that is, a plan to undo the layers of the forgottenness of being and thereby set in motion the possibility of its recollection. Heidegger devised this plan in three stages, working back from the insight into temporality that Kant displayed in his doctrine of schematism, to the confusions generated by René Descartes’s subject-object dichotomy, to the initial treatment of the problem of time in Aristotle. Although Heidegger delivered several lecture-courses after *Being and Time*, which can be construed as filling out the gaps in this mosaic, only *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, the first book he published after his magnum opus, can be directly correlated with any of the unpublished divisions (e.g., Division I, Part II). Ironically, one of the greatest philosophical works of the 20th century was never formally “completed.” While there may be several reasons for this, three stand out.

First, in light of the path that Heidegger traveled after *Being and Time*, it became evident that the task proposed under the rubric of “recollecting” being implied a concept of history that was still to be worked out. Not only was it necessary to consider history “vertically” in terms of its expression in and as the philosophical tradition, it was equally important to view history “horizontally” in terms of the origin, direction, and unfolding of the worldwide or global crisis that had become evident in modernity. Thus, in order to illustrate this more radical conception of history, Heidegger critically appropriates Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical depiction of the “death of god” and nihilism as the hidden “destiny” of Western culture. By the same token, Heidegger recognized that the “crisis” originating from the forgottenness of being could not be reserved to the academic venue of philosophy, but instead spiraled outward to the imminent danger posed by the emergence of modern science and technology.

Second, as Heidegger observed later in his famous essay *Letter on “Humanism”* (1946), he was hindered by a vestige of the metaphysical language of the past, which prevented him from completing *Being and Time* according to the design of its original plan. Just as Nietzsche’s philosophy provided a new beacon, so Heidegger found in the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin a nuance of expression that would assist in him in forging a deeper responsiveness to language. Although perhaps a little too simplistic, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s apt description, that Hölderlin helped to “free Heidegger’s tongue,” illuminates this problem.

Third, in his 1962 essay *On Time and Being* (which is distinct from the title of the unpublished third division of Part I of *Being and Time*), Heidegger makes one of his rare admissions of his mistake in attempting to derive spatiality from temporality. In this way, he suggests that in connection with the need to radicalize his concept of history, it was necessary to think of the *reciprocity* between being and being-there, in such a way that the latter undertakes the task of allocating a “place” for the manifestation of the former. In his epic work *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger describes the play of time-space (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) in order to emphasize the dynamic that creates an entry point for being’s arrival into history and its accompanying withdrawal. This simultaneous gifting and refusal of being, as Heidegger would later show, constitutes its destiny. By the same token, being-there becomes the clearing in which being reveals itself as the mirror-play of the fourfold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals.

The controversy continues to rage concerning the “completion” of *Being and Time* and the alleged drawback of Heidegger’s not doing so. In retrospect, talk of the “failure” of *Being and Time*, or even its “demise,” is ultimately extraneous and beside the point. As Heidegger emphasizes in his 1938/39 work *Mindfulness*, the designation “Being and Time” (and its corollary “Time and Being”) does not simply refer to the title of a book, but instead points to and carries forward the task of thinking.

## **THE RETURN TO FREIBURG AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1928–33)**

When Husserl retired in 1928, Heidegger was the logical choice to succeed him as the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg. In the summer of 1928, Heidegger returned to Freiburg and presented himself, in his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1928/29, *Introduction to Philosophy*, as the person who had brought the phenomenological revolution to its conclusion. In this course, he rejected Husserl’s project of making philosophy into a rigorous science, because philosophy is not a science, and this not out of lack but rather out of excess. It springs from the ever superabundant and ebullient appropriation of being-there itself. After some intense discussions with Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg, Heidegger gave up his attempt to finish the unpublished part of *Being and Time*, although he would still publish *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* in 1929. The turning along this path of thinking is the key to his philosophical development and begins to take momentum in the inaugural lecture in 1929, *What Is Metaphysics?*

Heidegger delivered his inaugural lecture on 24 July 1929 in the assembly hall of the University of Freiburg. It was published the same year. In his lecture, Heidegger takes up a particular metaphysical question: Why are there entities at all and not rather nothing?

In the first part of the lecture, Heidegger distinguishes sharply between science and metaphysics. In metaphysics, each question is itself always the whole. This implies that the questioner as such is also “there” within the question and thus placed in question. Metaphysics must be posed as a whole from the essential position of the entity, specifically, being-there, who questions. Although there are many different fields of inquiry in science, we always approach what is essential in all things. In the pursuit of science, human being irrupts into the whole of entities, in such a way that the irruption breaks open and shows what entities are in their being. Science studies entities and “nothing” else. In science, the questioner remains outside the objective field of study and does not question himself. Science wishes to know nothing of the nothing. And yet when it tries to express its basis—that is, the study of entities and nothing else—it calls upon nothing for help. In this duplicitous state of affairs, a question has already unfolded: How is it with nothing?

Heidegger elaborates the question of the nothing in the second part of his lecture. The nothing is not an entity, another “thing,” and so we come face-to-face with the problem of how we can encounter the nothing. Heidegger defines the nothing as the complete negation of the totality of entities and can then ask how entities in the whole can be given to us. Being-there finds itself in the midst of entities in the whole. Although in everydayness we concern ourselves with particular entities, entities in the whole may become manifest in certain moods, for example, deep boredom. Heidegger describes how entities conceal the nothing from us the moment we come face-to-face with them. Is there an attunement in which we may be brought before the nothing itself? Heidegger can now point to anxiety as the mood that makes the nothing manifest.

In the third part, Heidegger answers the question of how it is with the nothing. The nothing reveals itself in anxiety but not as an entity. In anxiety, human beings shrink back before the nothing. This wholly repelling gesture toward entities in the whole that are slipping away in anxiety defines the nothing as such: nihilation. The “nothing” nihilates (*nichtet*). Nihilation manifests entities in their fullness and unique mode of presencing. In the “clear night” of the nothing of anxiety, the original openness of entities as such arises: that they are entities and not “nothing.” The encounter between being-there and entities is made possible by the original manifestation of the nothing. Being-there is held out or “suspended” into the nothing. Only because the nothing is manifest on the ground of being-there can the uncanniness of entities overwhelm us and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder does

the “why” loom before us. Only then can we inquire into the ground and question entities. It is only because we can question and ground things that we ourselves are put into question.

Heidegger’s inaugural lecture is in many ways a foretaste of things to come. This new “forest trail” would ultimately lead to the clearing of another nonmetaphysical kind of thinking and the attempt to overcome metaphysics. In 1930, Heidegger delivered his lecture-course *On the Essence of Truth* on various occasions. This is a further development of the concept of truth in *Being and Time*. Heidegger claims that primordial truth is not the correspondence between the intellect and the matter that is expressed in judgment. According to this traditional doctrine, the proposition that the table is white is true if the table of which being white is asserted is indeed white. Heidegger harks back to the Greek concept of truth, *alètheia*, which he translated as unconcealment. As the term “unconcealment” indicates, the being of entities is discovered or unconcealed in truth. The truth of entities is wrested from concealment. Unconcealment is the dynamic interplay of revealment and concealment. Truth can therefore never be fully transparent. In the unconcealment of entities, being as such remains concealed. As Heidegger sees it, truth is the appropriation of, and way of becoming “enowned” by, the unconcealment of being, where entities appear and being withdraws and is preserved in its mystery.

Being-there and entities encounter each other in the openness of unconcealment. In this openness the play-space emerges that makes possible the distance between being-there and entities. In this open space or clearing, human beings can relate to entities. Heidegger understands being-there more radically as the “there” or “place” of being’s manifestation, where human beings and entities encounter each other, and not as the being-there or existence of human beings. In the interplay of human beings and entities, he discovers a double-sided kind of freedom or letting-be. On the one hand, entities let themselves be in truth or unconcealment. On the other hand, human beings are free to let entities be what they are in truth. Truth is essentially freedom and as such an open relation and interaction between human beings and entities that needs to be enacted time and again. We must experience truth and refrain from proclaiming the truth once and for all. We must in each instance “let be,” that is, allow entities to show themselves in their truth.

Heidegger made the question of human freedom the central topic of his lecture-course in the summer semester of 1930. Freedom occurs as the “letting be” of entities and provides a new basis for undertaking the inquiry into being. Within the “open” lies the space for revealment and concealment, for truth and errancy, and for being present and being absent. Human beings exist within this dynamic structure, within the “midpoint” of this “between” (*Zwischen*). When human beings shape the “there” of their being in the form



of the self-revealing concealment of being as such, they create the movement of history. Truth lies in the play-space between human beings and entities, where the truth of being unfolds and is appropriated. The relation between human beings and entities is determined by moods or modes of attunement. These moods can be individual or collective. In the mood of anxiety, human beings experience being as the nothing and the possible impossibility of their own existence, or death. The collective mood of deep boredom determines the being-there of modern man. In this fundamental mood, we can hear the sound of the finitude of our existence.

Heidegger's conception of truth is a retrieval of the Greek experience of *alētheia* as unconcealment. Unconcealment is the "there" of being where the encounter of human beings and entities happens. Being-there is no longer exclusively the being "there" of human beings; it has become the "there" (*Da*) of being as such. Heidegger would later describe the dynamic structure of unconcealment as the mirror-play of the fourfold. The "gifting refusal" of the truth being has its own history, a topic that became increasingly important to Heidegger throughout the 1930s.

The year 1929 marks not only a new beginning on Heidegger's path of thinking, but also a decisive break in the history of Germany. Although World War I had ended with Germany's defeat, the humiliating treaty of Versailles, and political chaos, Heidegger saw in it the dawn of a new day. Another page in the book of life would be opened, and as he wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann, the "chance to make a new start made it a pleasure to be alive." Many people thought Judgment Day had come with the communist revolution in Russia. In Germany, the Republic of Weimar, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, rose from the total chaos of 1919. Germany followed the way of capitalism and parliamentary democracy. The Industrial Revolution had gathered momentum in Germany at the end of the 19th century, and its results only became manifest in their full extent after 1919. The social relations of family, church, and village began to lose their unifying power. Small-scale production in agriculture and manufacturing could not compete with industrial production and the power of large capital. The population deserted the countryside and moved to the big cities in search of work in factories. The masses of humanity grew ever larger in the slums, where an existence worthy of a human being was impossible. Nobody made a product; everybody performed his/her monotonous task as a part of the process of production. The machine determined the tempo of production, not the worker. The difference between the anonymous worker and the machine ultimately became blurred.

The Weimar Republic, which had been under intense pressure from the beginning, collapsed under the stock market crash and the Great Depression that followed. The ever-increasing problems and disasters led to a mood of crisis among the population. It finally became clear that World War I had not

really solved any problems, despite its horrors. Around this time, the topic of crisis made its first appearance in Heidegger's lecture courses. The danger of a mood of crisis is that nobody feels the need for deliberation and discussion. We want only that the crisis be dealt with in an energetic fashion. A crisis demands the interference of the man of action and not the critical reflection of philosophy. The man who would answer the call for leadership of the German people had already begun his march in the beer cellars of Munich. Crisis is a word that we should use reluctantly and carefully. All too often the remedy turns out to be worse than the disease.

Heidegger, too, was sensitive to the mood of crisis in 1929. He searched for a remedy in the hope of finding a solution. In this yearlong search, he was for a time influenced by the work of Ernst Jünger. This German writer claimed that World War I marked the beginning of a new era that was determined by the will to power. Like Oswald Spengler, whose book *The Decline of the West* was a best seller, Jünger was a passionate follower of Nietzsche. The will to power expresses itself in the striving for world domination of capitalism and communism. The struggle for power between both factions will lead to war again and again. War is no longer the continuation of politics by different means; peace has become an arms race and as such the "total mobilization" that subordinates everything and everybody to the holy cause: final victory. The total mobilization blurs the differences between the soldier and the worker. The new overman is a fighting machine. In his writings, Jünger celebrates the manly virtues of the worker. During World War I, he had experienced the massacres of the battlefields with a macabre kind of aesthetic pleasure. In an almost mystical experience, he understood the violence and horror of the trenches as the ultimate revelation of what is. To a large extent, Heidegger agreed with Jünger's analysis of modernity. However, on two points he disagreed with Jünger. First of all, he could not find any aesthetic pleasure in the vision of the future Jünger painted. He was horrified by it. Second, he rejected the metaphysical necessity of the total mobilization of the worker. Hölderlin had taught that in the gravest danger the "saving power" also grows.

Heidegger saw an important task for the German people. Contrary to the United States and Russia, Germany was not a land of scientists and technicians, but a people of thinkers and poets. The German people needed to do battle against the total mobilization and the will to power. Heidegger rejected not only communism, but also capitalism and its parliamentary democracy. The total mobilization is made possible by technology, which in turn develops the possibilities of the mathematical science of nature. The mechanization of the scientific worldview is a product of modernity and began with the dream of Descartes and his quest for indubitable knowledge. The real can only be that which I know for certain, and only that which I can calculate mathematically can I know for certain. Therefore, everything real must be

measurable and thus calculable. Heidegger crossed out all of the attainments of modernity. He wanted to undo the leveling-off of human being to a labor force and of nature to raw material, and replace it with mutual respect for each other's qualities in a corporate society and a careful and cautious use of natural resources.

The German people had to accomplish their task through a retrieval of the uniquely creative existence of the other people of thinkers and poets, the Greeks. Likewise, the being-there of the German people needed to grow roots in its homeland. Heidegger's political solution for the crisis of modernity was a provincial national socialism. It was of course the task of the philosopher, and Heidegger in particular, to ensure that the German people would actualize their being-there in a singular way. Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism was motivated by both political and philosophical considerations. The untenable situation of the Weimar Republic and the bankruptcy of the old university system in the early 1930s demanded a solution. Like many Germans, Heidegger saw in the rise of National Socialism the unique possibility of a new beginning. His concept of the history of being enabled him to interpret the National Socialist revolution as a first and necessary step toward the overcoming of technology and nihilism. When he later rejected National Socialism, he did so on philosophical and political grounds. In his view, the historical reality of National Socialism was an appearance of the will to power and hence an "ideology" incapable of confronting the deeper crisis of world history.

Heidegger's philosophy was strongly influenced by his yearlong and passionate exposition of Nietzsche. We can distinguish two periods in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. In the beginning, he was deeply impressed by Nietzsche's philosophy, with its analysis of nihilism and doctrine of the overman. The second phase started in 1936 with his famous lecture-courses on Nietzsche. In these courses, he coupled the doctrine of the will to power with the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same, and he also interpreted the history of the Western world as a process of decay that itself is nihilism.

In the first phase, Heidegger developed an account of "the work" and its unfolding through the tension between mechanistic production or labor, on the one hand, and craftsmanship or art, on the other. In *Being and Time*, he has interpreted the being of entities as the readiness-to-hand of equipment and the presence-at-hand of objects. He supplements and radicalizes this interpretation with his critique of the modern age. If we can discover the being of all entities only as equipment and raw material for further use, reality does indeed become Jünger's gigantic factory. In his search for an alternative interpretation, Heidegger retrieved once again the philosophy of

Aristotle. Aristotle had discovered the being of entities as *energeia*, that is, that which is working. An entity is that which works and has its efficacy: the work.

Heidegger distinguishes between three kinds of work: the work of art, the work of thought, and the work of the political state or polis. As the work of art is the creation of the artist and the work of thought the creation of the philosopher, the work of state is the creation of the great statesman. This conception of “great” politics is antidemocratic. It will not come as a big surprise that, according to Heidegger, the political being-there of the German people during the Weimar Republic was cut off from a spiritual vision of the future. Conversely, Heidegger believed his own task was to disclose the possibility of how the individual could “win back” a sense of individuality that had been stripped away by the modern drive toward conformity. But could this vision also be translated into the possibility of concrete political “engagement” and action?

### **THE METAPHYSICAL AWAKENING AND THE SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY (1933–36)**

Heidegger saw in the rise of National Socialism in the early 1930s a sign that the time had come to put his own vision of “political renewal” into practice. He supported the Nazi Party because the National Socialist movement seemed to promise the possibility of an “inner self-recollection and renewal” of the German people and a path that would allow it to discover its historical vocation in the Western world. In Heidegger’s view, it was the task of the university to contribute to this inner self-recollection of the German people. For this reason, he saw in the rectorate an opportunity to lead all capable forces back to this necessary process of reflection and renewal. In this manner, he hoped also to counter the advance of unsuited persons and the threatening hegemony of the party apparatus and doctrine. On 21 April 1933, the professors of the University of Freiburg elected Heidegger rector almost unanimously, with the exception of their Jewish colleagues, who were banned from voting. He was nominated as a candidate for the election by the resigning rector, Professor Wilhelm von Möllendorff, whose position as a Social Democrat had become untenable.

As a supporter of Adolf Hitler, Heidegger lent his name and efforts to the National Socialist revolution as rector. He became for a short time an outspoken proponent of Hitler’s policies. During his rectorate, the “cleansing laws” (beginning in April 1933) were applied to the Freiburg University student body and thus ended financial support for anyone who fit the description of non-Aryan under Nazi law. The “Führer principle” was established at

the university on 1 October 1933, thereby making Heidegger the virtual dictator of the campus. It is therefore remarkable, and an often-overlooked fact, that he appointed only nonparty members (including his predecessor, Möllendorff) as deans of the departments. Heidegger also stood firm against the proposed plan of book burning by the National Socialists, most notably the texts of Jewish authorship. He tried to reform the university in conformity with his own ideas, which were shared to a large extent by Karl Jaspers. When dealing with Heidegger's political involvement, we should not forget that nobody knew what horrors were going to occur subsequently. As late as 1936, the whole world would join Hitler in Berlin for the Olympic Games, despite threats of boycott by some Western nations. Like many people, Heidegger believed Hitler would one day right the wrongs and excesses that are the unfortunate by-product of any true revolution.

On 27 May 1933, on the occasion of the ceremonial transfer of the rector's office, Heidegger delivered his frequently (and too easily) misunderstood rectoral address. In this lecture, he outlines his thoughts on the nature of the German university, its need for transformation, and its historical mission. His assumption of the rectorate is his commitment to the spiritual leadership of the university. His following of teachers and students can grow strong only in a joint rootedness in the nature of the German university and its development of a philosophical vision. The leaders themselves must be led by the fate of this spiritual mission. The university should aid the German people to fulfill its historical mission, that is, the retrieval of the awakening of Greek philosophy. This beginning still is; it does not lie in the past but stands before the German people. Greek philosophy is the source from which all sciences have sprung.

The National Socialist revolution is the great awakening of the German people. The university teachers must take the lead and advance to the most extreme posts of danger amid the constant uncertainty of the world. The essential will to knowledge requires that the people be subjected to the greatest inner and outer danger in order to enjoy their true spiritual world. The German students are on the march. The academic freedom of the old university will be replaced by a new series of obligations: labor service, military service, and the service of knowledge. Teachers and students must form a community in service to the people in their state. All capacities of the heart and the body must be unfolded through struggle, intensified in struggle, and preserved as struggle. Heidegger closes his address with the words of Plato—"Everything great stands in the storm"—and thus indicates that the project of a renewal of both the university and being-there of the German people is threatened from all sides. At this time, he still believed the National Socialist revolution could lead to a renewal of the being-there of the German people. In his address, Heidegger also emphasizes the importance of philosophy's reaffirming its role in unifying the different scientific endeavors, which had

become increasingly fragmented in their pursuit of specialized areas of knowledge, most notably, with a “technical” bias toward usefulness and practicality.

The rectorate was at the heart of Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism. On 3 November 1933, he told the assembled students that “the *Führer* himself and he alone *is* the German reality and law, today and for the future.” A week later, he took to the radio to urge ratification of Hitler’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. In reply to requests by the Baden Ministry of Culture, Heidegger wrote negative reports on Professor Hermann Staudinger and Eduard Baumgarten in 1933. He had known Baumgarten, a distant cousin of Max Weber, personally. In 1930, he had appointed his former student, Werner Brock, as his assistant rather than Baumgarten, because he thought Brock was the most promising and talented of the two. In 1938, he prevented his student Max Müller from getting an academic position by informing the administration of the Freiburg University that he was unfavorably disposed to the Nazi regime. On the other hand, he helped former students and friends such as Karl Löwith, Elisabeth Blochmann, Helene Weiss, and Werner Brock to settle abroad, and as rector he tried to avoid the forced retirement of his colleagues Eduard Fraenkel and Georg von Hevesy in 1933. Fraenkel was fired, but von Hevesy was able to stay on.

At the end of February 1934, Heidegger told the Baden minister of culture, Otto Wacker, that he wanted to resign as rector because he did not want to replace von Möllendorff and Erik Wolf as deans. Wacker asked Heidegger to keep his resignation secret until a successor could be found. After two failed attempts, the minister found Professor Eduard Kern willing to take over. While in the meantime Professor Adolf Lampe had been negotiating behind his back with the Ministry of Culture, Heidegger forced the issue and resigned officially as rector on 23 April 1934. He announced the news to the deans of the various departments on the same day. They also resigned, out of solidarity. Heidegger’s attempt to reform the university had been frustrated by both the party apparatus and his colleagues.

On Heidegger’s path of thinking, a second important development took place in 1934. He now began to turn away from Nazism as the political reality of National Socialism. The about-face is the result of his further Nietzsche studies and of his becoming aware of the criminal character of the Nazi regime. He was deeply shocked by the lawless killings (e.g., of 30 June) as he began to learn of some of the Nazi atrocities. He distanced himself from Nazism and formulated in his courses a covert critique of the Nazi movement. At least up until very shortly after the end of World War II, he claimed no knowledge of the horrors of the Holocaust, and, when shown a photograph of a concentration camp (at Dachau) by a visitor at his home, Heidegger expressed shock at a national conspiracy perpetrated by the “criminality” of Germany’s leaders. Although, as this incident dramatizes, Heidegger came

increasingly to recognize that his involvement with National Socialism was the biggest mistake of his life, he did not feel obliged to confess his guilt publicly even after 1945. His writings on this period in his life, the *Spiegel* interview and *Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts*, were, after all, published posthumously.

## THE INTERLUDE OF THE *BLACK NOTEBOOKS* (1931–51)

Regardless of their philosophical and political implications, the *Black Notebooks* provide something of a microcosm of the various challenges and difficulties that pervade the interpretation of Heidegger's thought. By the same token, these texts can neither masquerade as nor provide a substitute for the open-ended thinking and questioning that he pursued throughout his entire writings. On the simplest level, we must keep in mind that the eclecticism and mindfulness we bring today to our understanding of global events is much different than Heidegger's perspective, not to mention the advantage of hindsight that we possess as critics of this tumultuous period in world history.

As Heidegger began the decade of the 1930s, Germany was coming apart at the seams; he was also seeking a new approach to the task he had undertaken in his magnum opus, *Being and Time*. As part of this process, he sought a subtext from which to “read off” a deeper historical origin and significance of the motifs he had developed in 1927 to re-ask the question of being. That subtext translates the monumental attempt to recollect the question of being into a new way of preconceiving the development of a more comprehensive (philosophical) landscape, which could encapsulate the entire trajectory of the Western tradition, indeed, of civilization itself, as playing off this philosophical crisis. History could then provide not only the temporal but also the linguistic field for interpreting the unifying thread connecting all that is distinctly Western throughout the course of civilization. How can philosophical history inscribe itself in a text that can decode all that is relevant to what is essentially historical in its endeavor to think of being (even if that enterprise is misconstrued as such by so-called historians)? Conversely, Heidegger can read off his own inquiry into being, not only from a phenomenological explication of the basic structures of human existence, but also against the backdrop that history provides and that comes to light through key idioms spawned by the philosophical tradition. Even if only in its infancy, in the early 1930s Heidegger was on the way to forging a “being-historical perspective,” which can encapsulate the entire trajectory of philosophical history, and in a way that directly intersects with the course and development of Western civilization as such.

Enter the *Black Notebooks*. First of all, the *Black Notebooks* are “notebooks” or journals in which Heidegger began to formulate new philosophical strategies and refine the language for advancing his project. Second, the *Notebooks* receive their distinctive title from the color of the materials, “black” (*schwarz*), from which they were made, rather than from the false intimation of a presumed dark and sinister philosophical content. The transcripts of the *Notebooks*, as edited and published as separate volumes of his Complete Edition (*Gesamtausgabe*), provide a piecemeal recapitulation of the emergence of a new path of thinking (and simultaneously of dead ends as well), as Heidegger sought to chart a wider philosophical landscape. The attempt to arrive at a new fore-conception of his task, the most comprehensive and yet distant of all philosophical horizons, amounts to charting such a landscape; this is the task undertaken in the *Notebooks*, which comprises the underlying subtext that Heidegger was seeking. By the same token, the fragmented character of the several texts now published in the Complete Edition reveals that they can offer hints and intimations of the direction of Heidegger’s inquiry, rather than representing either definitive examples of his thinking or replacements for his philosophical project overall. As such, the endeavor to seek a more original and encompassing fore-having or pre-understanding, to employ the terminology of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, takes on an even more concrete and literal character. The *Notebooks* mirror his search for such a hermeneutic or interpretive fore-having as a pre- or fore-grasping in the pragmatic sense of “getting a hold” or “handle on” the confluence of issues that promise to reshape and advance his inquiry into the question of being. Or, put in terms of a search for a new topography of inquiry, Heidegger was seeking a new hermeneutic foothold for recasting the task ventured in his *Being and Time*.

There are a projected seven volumes comprising the *Black Notebooks* (of which six volumes, up through volume 99 of the Complete Edition, have been published). The first of the *Notebooks*, entitled *Ponderings II–VI (1931–1938)*, includes as an epigraph on its opening page Heidegger’s precautionary remark that the discussions undertaken there are venturesome attempts; those discussions should not be viewed as stand-alone statements and assertions that comprise a philosophical system. Nevertheless, the timeline offers a window into Heidegger’s personal observations and reflections into the *Zeitgeist* of 1930s Germany and how his newly forged insights into temporality from the 1920s can be translated into a language capable of depicting the deeper philosophical heritage of the Western tradition. Up for grabs, as it were, is a new account of what qualifies as “historical.” In the mid-1930s, Heidegger began to enact in his thinking this more original sense of the historical in what would become his second major treatise, *Contributions to Philosophy (1936–38)*. Conversely, what emerges as the guiding insight of this text can be seen as both reaping the fruits of his preliminary



efforts in *Ponderings II–VI*, and in retrospect, as yielding the philosophical directive to reinterpret or “read back” the relative import of his scattered ruminations throughout the *Black Notebooks*. The *Notebooks*, then, pose a special challenge for interpretation. On the one hand, Heidegger is beginning to formulate his profoundest insights into being-historical thinking. On the other hand, he also engages in ruminations that are not “historical” (*geschichtlich*) and ontological in the original sense, but rather take the form of a digest of prominent, albeit uncritically held beliefs, prejudices, and social mores of his era in 1930s Germany.

The vexing question that arises from the *Notebooks* is to what extent the scattered passages in which Heidegger employs anti-Semitic stereotypes and the suggestion of ethnocentrism impact his legacy as one of the handful of great thinkers of the 20th century. There are intimations of culturally held biases that would become central to mainstream National Socialist ideology, even though he himself consistently and vehemently opposed the Nazi propaganda of Aryan superiority based on biology and birthright. Recently, Heidegger’s son, Dr. Hermann Heidegger, has written of his staunch conviction that his father was not anti-Semitic. We must keep in mind, however, that what we understand today with respect to the importance of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity remains far removed from what was recognized as such in 1930s Europe or even in the segregationist era of the United States prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That being said, the aim of this dictionary is not to mediate such an important and contentious dispute, but rather to bring it to the reader’s attention, as well as to provide the scholarly tools for him/her to make his/her own evaluation. At the very least, the controversy surrounding the *Black Notebooks* invites further study of how the foremost traditions and institutions of Western society, not the least of which is Christianity (in both its Catholic and Protestant forms), have helped to create a climate in which anti-Semitism could develop and become interwoven with the intellectual fabric of modern Europe.

## THE “TURNING” AND BEING-HISTORICAL THINKING (1936–47)

After the biggest error of his life, Heidegger again took up the task of thinking in 1934. He followed the trace of Nietzsche’s word: “God is dead.” This enormous saying is not a verdict about the dying of a god. It refers to the slow decline of Greek-Christian norms and values in modern times, that is, the process of nihilism as the inner movement of Western history. The traditional values have become worthless. This moral “crisis” is a problem we still have to confront today. We have no answer to the question “why?” Nietzsche’s resolution of the problem of nihilism is in theory as simple as it

is effective. However, reality is frequently more complicated than even great philosophers may realize. If all values have become worthless, then it becomes necessary to reevaluate all values. Since all our values are of Platonic origin, and as Heidegger saw it, Christianity was Platonism for the “common people,” Nietzsche wanted to bring about a reversal of Platonism through his reevaluation of all values. In a sense, he stood Plato on his head. We should search for values neither in the transcendent reality of the Ideas nor in heaven as the Kingdom of God, but in our natural desires and passions. This reevaluation should lead to the birth of a new human being: the overman who has the courage to live fully without paying attention to slavish moral rules and obligations.

During his study of Nietzsche’s writings, Heidegger discovered that Nietzsche, precisely because he turned Platonism upside down, remained fully dependent upon the tradition he tried to overcome. His philosophy as a reversal of Platonism remained nihilistic, and with this insight Heidegger could take another step. He identified the history of nihilism and the history of metaphysics from Plato through Nietzsche. Hegel’s system of absolute idealism was the consummation of Platonism. Metaphysics comes to an end in Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism as its last and ultimate possibility. This end is at the same time the beginning of our being without a measure in our relation to God, nature, and ourselves. The scientific quest for truth has become a shameless pursuit of control over and subjection of nature and no longer attempts to do justice to it. We have abolished the moral world and now know only the law of money and the strong. We have begun to experiment with our own bodies and accept no limitations. This “withdrawal” of being into concealment and its corresponding “abandonment” of entities (including human beings) to manipulations was at the heart of Heidegger’s conception of the history of being.

The history of metaphysics starts with Plato and ends with the nightmare of Jünger. This implies also a self-criticism of Heidegger. The thought that we could solve the crisis of the modern world by taking decisive action remains an expression of the will to power and only strengthens nihilism. We cannot overcome the will by force of will. This also implies that politics cannot solve the problem of nihilism. Does this mean that all hope is lost? No, because the history of metaphysics is a distinct era that started only with Plato. The being-there of human being that has been actualized in the history of metaphysics is only a possible and not a necessary way of being-there. It remains tied to a certain area and a certain time. Heidegger is thus faced with two alternatives. In non-European cultures, other ways of being-there may have been actualized. This is the reason Heidegger attempted to start a dialogue with Chinese and Japanese philosophy on his later path of thinking. This undertaking is difficult and wrought with peril. On the one hand, European culture and technology have begun to dominate all other cultures. This

is what Heidegger calls the process of “Americanization.” On the other hand, a dialogue between East and West is only possible by way of translation. Translation transmits that which is “other” or “foreign” in Far Eastern culture into our language and thus allows it to come into “its own.” According to Heidegger, essential translation is an act of “safeguarding” the word and thereby serves the historical “coming in its own,” or enowning (*Ereignis*) and appropriation of the truth of being.

The second alternative is the Greek beginning of European being-there. Greek being-there is older than metaphysics. Heidegger therefore tries to discover another possibility than that of metaphysics in the Greek beginning of our being-there. In his retrieval of the original thinking of Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, Heidegger finds traces of a premetaphysical kind of thinking and being-there. The origin of Greek culture is the experience of *alètheia* or the unconcealment of being. Unconcealment is the truth of being as the clearing where human beings and entities can encounter each other. In this clearing, being reveals itself through its withdrawal into the surrounding darkness. Because the manifestation of being can occur only if it withdraws, being comes to presence in the clearing as the “nothing.” It is therefore no coincidence that being was forgotten in the course of the history of metaphysics. But how does the history and “destiny” of being also harbor the possibility of its recollection?

The uniquely Greek manner of being-there, which is not so much a merit of the Greeks as a destiny of being, is the epic poetry of Homer. The voice of poetry bids all that is—world and things, earth and sky, divinities and mortals—to gather into the onefold (*Einfalt*) of their intimate belonging together. Poetry is thus the “founding and giving” (*Stiftung*) of the unconcealment of being and so the origin of the history of a people. The Greek work of the thing was preceded by the work of poetry. In Heidegger’s new conception, the poets must also lay the ground for the postmetaphysical era. As Heidegger sees it, Friedrich Hölderlin is the poet prefiguring what is uniquely ownmost to the being-there of the German people. Hölderlin is the messenger of what Heidegger, in *Contributions to Philosophy*, describes as the “last god” or the historical foretelling of the “flight and arrival” of the gods. Since we are finite, we cannot overcome metaphysics on our own. Only an awakening to the mystery of a god can “save us” from the triumph of technology. The destiny of human beings is the “letting be” of entities in their unconcealment. The power to let things be is what Heidegger calls “releasement” (*Gelassenheit*). Releasement is essentially a way of becoming open to the mystery of being. As “shepherds” or guardians of being, we must preserve and safeguard the being of entities.

Heidegger’s later philosophy follows two tracks: (1) he elaborates the history of being and the history of metaphysics as nihilism in great detail; and (2) as a possible answer to the crisis of modernity, he begins to develop

another nonmetaphysical kind of thinking. This new thinking is a commemoration of the mystery of being and a letting-be of entities as they are. As such, it is an alternative to the calculative thinking of science and technology and a preparation for a new possibility of being-there as “dwelling.”

First (1), in the history of being, Heidegger retraces the historical transformations of the relation between human beings and being, or how the latter manifests itself to the former in different “epochs.” This originally hidden process determines our history. Being emits or “sends” the truth of being. With the Greek experience of *alètheia* as the unconcealment of being, the era of philosophy begins. The original thinkers, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, named *alètheia* as the unconcealment of being but could not think of *alètheia* as the clearing of being in its “difference” from entities. This was not a failure on their part, but the destiny of being itself.

The history of metaphysics begins with Plato and Aristotle. *Alètheia* becomes truth as correctness, and being becomes the “beingness” of entities, which is grounded in God as the highest entity. Metaphysics has an onto-theo-logical structure and is determined by the forgottenness of being as the concealment of its difference from entities. The history of metaphysics finds its consummation in the absolute idealism of Hegel and its end in Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism. The end of philosophy is not a mere stopping, but has to be understood as a “completion” in the sense of unfolding the extreme possibilities of metaphysics. Philosophy is metaphysics, and metaphysics is Platonism. Nietzsche achieved the most extreme possibility in his reversal of Platonism. The completion of metaphysics is the triumph of the malipulable arrangement of a scientific technological world and its social order. The present age of nihilism is determined by the will to power and technology. Being “sends” itself as enframing into the clearing and withdraws as such into concealment. Heidegger tries to overcome metaphysics in an attempt to think of its concealed, “unthought” origin and thereby cultivate a “mindfulness” of the hidden possibility of the other beginning. He finds traces of this other beginning in early Greek thinking, mythology, and poetry. The other beginning is also announced in the poetry of Hölderlin, who names the gods that have fled. It is the task of a nonmetaphysical, “inceptual” thinking to explore this first possibility and so prepare for the other beginning of thinking.

Heidegger distinguishes between the “first” and the “other” beginning of philosophy in the seminal work he held back and whose subsequent publication was greatly anticipated. The set of manuscripts written between 1936 and 1938 was finally published posthumously to commemorate the 100th anniversary of his birth. The title of this unique and complex work is made up of two parts, one the “public title,” *Contributions to Philosophy*, and the other the guiding or “essential heading,” *From Enowning*. His *Contributions to Philosophy* consists of a preview, an order of six arrangements or “join-

tures,” and a concluding resume of what preceded. Heidegger formulated his mission to think the truth of being in its diverse historical manifestations, a task he calls “being-historical thinking.” He describes being-historical thinking as stretched out between two beginnings, in such a way as to prepare for the transition from the end of the first beginning to the “other beginning.” The first beginning arises from the withdrawal of being and leads to the subsequent neglect of the question of being through the development of metaphysics. The other beginning is the thinking of the truth of being as the clearing of self-concealment and the sheltering of its hidden mystery throughout the history of metaphysics.

In the preview, Heidegger elucidates the directives that thinking needs to follow in order to experience enowning through its dynamic of gifting refusing, that is, as the promise of rediscovering the truth of being in the wake of its historical forsaking. He distinguishes between the guiding question of metaphysics—what is the beingness of an entity—and the basic question of inceptual thinking about the ground of metaphysics. The attunement is wonder or astonishment, the Greek *thaumazein*. The other beginning is reservedness (*Verhaltenheit*) or the grounding attunement and response of the human being’s relation to being, which keeps back its “gift” of unconcealment and preserves its mystery.

Heidegger shows how the guiding question of metaphysics beckons thought to the basic question of the other beginning of thought. At the end of the history of metaphysics, thinking experiences the “echo” of being as withdrawal and abandonment. The other beginning of thinking is only accessible through a “leap” (*Sprung*) of thought into the truth of being itself. We must not try to “represent” being, but let the silence of being be heard through our thinking. Through the leap of thought, the being-there of human beings and expanse, where the truth of being comes to pass, are grounded. Heidegger calls for the “ones to come” (*die Zukünftigen*) to prepare for the historical decision of appropriating the truth of being and for the inception of the other beginning. In a careful meditation on the beckoning of the last god, Heidegger prepares for its arrival and the sheltering of its mystery. The last god heralds the “turning relation” of being to man and foretells the arrival of the other beginning. The ones to come must prepare for this arrival by shouldering the risk of a “leap,” which at the same time is the grounding of being-there in its relation to the truth of being. Significantly, in *Contributions to Philosophy* Heidegger employs the 18th-century, orthographic spelling of the word *Seyn* (translated in English through the hyphenation “be-ing”) in order to distinguish the thinking thereof from the confusions surrounding the metaphysical concept of *Sein*.

Second (2), in his lecture *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger tried to understand art as an original and unique way in which unconcealment happens. Art can teach us how we can discover the being of entities in a different

way than in the calculative thinking of technology. In this sense, art may open our eyes to a different world. The aim of the lecture is to arrive at the immediate and rich possibility of the work of art in order to discover in it the abiding of truth as unconcealment.

In the first part, *Thing and Work*, Heidegger outlines the essential difference between a thing and a work of art. What is a thing? The concepts with which philosophy tries to understand things as things derive their meaning from the being of equipment. Equipment resembles the work of art insofar as it is the product of human work. When we compare Vincent Van Gogh's painting that depicts a pair of shoes with the shoes themselves, their difference becomes clear. Reliability determines the being of the shoes as equipment. The shoes are there when we need them, and we can rely on them to perform their function. When we wear our shoes, we understand what they are. Van Gogh's painting reveals the singularity of shoes as manifested within the wider expanse of the world. It lets us know what shoes in truth are. The work of art opens up the being of entities. This opening-up is the revealment of the truth of being and happens in the work of art. In the work of art, truth sets itself to work. Heidegger thus comes to the next question: What is truth as the setting-itself-to-work?

In the second part, *The Work and the Truth*, Heidegger first discusses the way of being of the work. A work, like a Greek temple, sets up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which emerges as native ground. This setting-up of a world is making space for the worlding of world, that is, the liberation of the open and the establishment of its structure. The work of art lets the earth be an earth and thus makes the dwelling of human beings possible. Truth happens as the primordial "strife" between revealing (world) and concealing (earth). Art and truth are joined, since beauty is one of the ways in which truth occurs as unconcealment. But how does truth happen in the work of art?

Heidegger tries to answer this question in the third part, *Truth and Art*. The happening of the truth is the strife between world and earth. Truth happens only by establishing itself in this struggle and clearing the open. It establishes itself in the work of art as the strife between earth and world. All art as the letting happen of the advent of the truth is, as such, essentially poetry. Poetry is the saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their struggle, and thus the place of all nearness and farness of the gods. In its ownmost enactment, poetry is the grounding of truth and may be considered from three points of view as a gift, a founding, and a beginning.

## THE CRITIQUE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE END OF METAPHYSICS, AND THE TASK OF THINKING (1949–76)

The period immediately following the end of World War II was as fruitful as it was tumultuous for Heidegger, given the fact that he found himself for the most part isolated; he had been prohibited from teaching as punishment by the Allies for his connection to National Socialism. Heidegger's increasing awareness of the threat posed by technology, and a need to foster in response a more original sense of "dwelling," on the one hand, and on the other, to alleviate the growing misunderstanding of his thought, converged as the creative impetus for writing one of his most important and lucid essays, *Letter on "Humanism"* (1946). In this essay, Heidegger makes one of his rare allusions to an "original ethics," which aims to direct being-there to the possibility of its ownmost dwelling on the earth without assuming the validity of any traditional normative principles. In the process, Heidegger emphasizes that he has not abandoned his earlier concept of being-there, but instead thinks of it more originally as the ecstatic "place" for the unconcealment of being, and, conversely, that the radicalization of this concept of human existence as "ek-sistence" diverges sharply from the "existentialist," albeit subjective notion thereof as espoused by his French counterpart, Jean-Paul Sartre. By making this contrast, Heidegger simultaneously clarifies the "turning" (*die Kehre*) that directs his own attempt to bring the relationship between being and thinking into the forefront. He thereby underscores his key insight, first expressed in the initially unpublished manuscript *Contributions to Philosophy*: that the turning constitutes a transformation, which brings being and humanity into reciprocity with each other and allows the former to speak as a "claim" voiced to the latter.

Heidegger delivered a lecture called *The Turning* to the club at Bremen in 1949, along with three other lectures that would form the cornerstone of his critique of technology. The aforementioned "transformation" can only occur at the zero point, where the "danger" of technology is most pronounced and, conversely, by harboring the possibility of a wider unconcealment otherwise hidden in the otherwise one-dimensional exploitation of nature for instrumental purposes. Heidegger's view of technology often appears ambivalent or "Janus-faced." On the one hand, he argues that it is the end game of the extreme concealment of being, culminating in the opportunity to exploit entities; on the other, he suggests that the outstretching of metaphysics to this extremity can suddenly "turn around" so as to illuminate the danger of technology and welcome an alternative way for human beings to let entities be in their uniqueness (beyond the "mechanistic" tentacles of exploitation and manipulation).

Through his critique of the impending doom of technology, Heidegger stands out as one of the greatest visionaries of the 20th century. He does not simply provide a sociological-economic account of what this threat may be, but instead couples it with a criticism that extends back to the origins of Western civilization and philosophy. Accordingly, Heidegger's critical appropriation of the Western tradition, on the one hand, and his critique of technology, on the other, are not two separate themes, but are intimately intertwined. A sociological-anthropological critique of what is wrong with Western culture does not cut deeply enough to address the origin of the danger that is emerging on a *global* scale today. Only when the edge of historical criticism is forged on the cusp of being-historical thinking can it respond to the scope of today's worldwide crisis and trace it back to the roots of its ancestry. By the same token, thinking can no longer be an idle pastime reserved to academics. Instead, thinking must enter the crucible of historical conflict, where the past omission of neglecting the question of being prompts a future "decision" as the possibility of an alternative way to manifest nature apart from its contemporary, constricted appearance for the purposes of technological exploitation (e.g., extracting oil and harvesting trees). To be sure, Heidegger would not live to see the full impact of the computer age, the ubiquitous use of cell or smartphone, which reduces knowledge to "information" and champions the fickle interests of immediate gratification. Nevertheless, he continues to stand out for his foresight in anticipating the "globalization" of technology and offering a philosophical critique thereof.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger first identifies the inner dynamic, impetus, force, and configuration of technology, that is, "machination" (*Machenschaft*). In this way, he offers an important preview into the pivotal lectures that he delivered on the danger of technology to the Bremen Club in 1949. When Heidegger's essay *The Question concerning Technology* was first translated into English in 1977, an ambiguity (if not confusion) immediately surfaced about the extent to which Heidegger could distinguish between the *Wesen* of technology and the machines (from airplanes to telephones) indicative thereof. Through his discussion of machination, he makes explicit this distinction as well as the countertendency within technology to mask itself and thereby create the illusion that machines are simply human inventions to be used for our benefit and are under our "control." In this way, machination points both to the impetus toward globalization at the heart of technology and to our entanglement in its illusion that we can master its multifaceted dangers, which place human civilization on the precipice of self-destruction.

Precisely because of this destructive potential, Heidegger also sees technology as an occasion to provoke thinking, that is, for the inception of mindfulness (*Besinnung*) as an awakening to our own place within history and the need to spark new interest in the "question of all questions," the question of



the meaning of being. If it is true, as he suggests, that what is most “thought-provoking in our thought-provoking age is that we are still not thinking,” then part of the “saving grace” hidden in technology may be that it points back to the *withdrawal of the mystery* pervading our “mindless” and superficial pursuit of convenience, comfort, power, and self-aggrandizement. In this regard, we cannot separate Heidegger as the critic of technology from Heidegger as the meticulous and innovative interpreter of the greatest thinkers of the philosophical tradition. Indeed, the hallmark of what is most unique in Heidegger’s thinking shines as brilliantly in his interpretation of past philosophers as anywhere.

In his lectures *The Thing* and *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger attempts to reply to the crisis of modernity, the danger of technology, and the homelessness of modern humankind. He therefore describes an original dwelling and being at home in the world that is rooted in a homeland. People may only dwell if there is a place where they can be at home. Heidegger formally indicates this abode as the fourfold. It is the primordial unity of earth and sky, divinities and mortals that is unfolded and folded together time and again. The unity of the four is a mirror-play. The four do not form a static unity. The fourfold is a dynamic structure that is given form continuously. It gathers the unity of the four on the ground of the homeland and is as such a place where human beings may dwell. The mortals dwell on the earth under the key in the oneness of the fourfold. The sky is not only the vaulting path of the sun and the course of the moon; it is also the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the change of the seasons, the light of day, and the gloom of night. Earth is the serving bearer that lets things come to presence. The work of art is “strife” between the world that it opens and the sheltering of the earth from which it rises. The divinities are the messengers of the godhead. Out of its holy sway, the god appears in its presence or withdraws into absence. In dwelling, the mortals wait for intimations of the coming of the divinities. Divinities and mortals, earth and sky are joined together in the oneness of the fourfold. Human beings are the mortals because they can die. Only humans die, and they die continuously, as long as they dwell on earth, under the sky, before the divinities.

The feast of life is celebrated in the fourfold. Heidegger’s conception of the fourfold is a retrieval of the Greek cosmos in an attempt to heal our fragmented world. The being-there of human beings in the fourfold is dwelling. Dwelling gathers the fourfold into the unity of the home. It gives us an anchor that safeguards us and lets us abide in the homeland as the place where we can grow roots. Dwelling is in its more profound sense a “homecoming.” The basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve. In dwelling, mortals preserve the fourfold in its essential being, that is, its way of presencing. In dwelling, mortals take their measure from the way that the world fits together and lets entities show themselves as they are. Dwelling is

building a home in the world. According to Heidegger, the stem of the German verb *bauen* (to build) bears affinity to the form of the verb “to be” (*ich bin, du bist*). Building as dwelling unfolds by cultivating living things and in creating different abodes or similar artifacts. For example, a bridge gathers to itself in its own way the earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The location of a bridge allows the fourfold to enter into a site by arranging it into different spaces, where everything has its place.

As Heidegger illustrates in his meticulous phenomenological description of a simple thing like a jug, the jug’s jug-character consists in the poured gift of the pouring-out. The gift of the pouring-out can be a drink for mortals or a consecration for the divinities. In the gift of the outpouring dwells the simple onefoldedness of the fourfold. A thing gathers and unites earth and sky, divinities and mortals. This gathering brings the four into the light of their mutual belonging. The thing means gathering into nearness. Thinging the things gathers the united four, earth and sky, divinities and mortals, into the simple onefold of their self-unified fourfold. The four mirror each other. The appropriating mirror-play of the single onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals, is the world. The world comes to presence through its “worlding.” Since the thing stays the fourfold, it also “things” the world. Things appear as things out of the ringing of the world’s mirror play. Human beings attend in their dwelling to the world by responding in their thinking to the address of being.

Dwelling designates the fundamental structure of being-there as it sojourns in nearness to entities. As Hölderlin says in one of his poems, man dwells between heaven and earth. This “between” is a dimension that allows for a measure. Since man dwells in this dimension, it is his task to do the measuring. Only insofar as man measures out his dwelling can he be in harmony with his mission of providing a place for being’s unconcealment. Yet being also needs an “abode” in which to reside, a residence within which to “gift” its truth and simultaneously preserve its mystery. Accordingly, that unique residence is language, which, as Heidegger so eloquently states in the *Letter on “Humanism,”* is the “house of being.” Thus, the ultimate measure taking of human beings involves poetizing-thinking. In this distinctive way of caring for and “safeguarding” language, human beings take over conservatorship or guardianship of enowning and thereby become custodians and “shepherds” of the truth of being.

Language, poetry, and thinking belong together. Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being, and as such the “home” in which its truth resides. In this home, human beings also dwell by safeguarding the word and cultivating it as the “place” for being to manifest itself. Human beings must first let themselves be claimed by being before they can speak and take the risk that they will seldom have much to say. In this way, philosophy relinquishes its pretense of “absolute knowledge” and gives way to the “poverty of think-

ing.” As Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, human beings do not possess language as a tool or instrument. Instead, language speaks through them when they listen to the “ringing stillness” of language and thereby answer the claim of being. In this respect, speaking is first and foremost a way of hearing and responding, in which the *unsaid* and unspoken depths of language can reverberate in what is said. Language thereby speaks in the silent attunement of this simple “saying.” Speaking as the hearing of language lets saying be said to it, in order that what has previously remained unsaid can echo across the corridors of history.

Language achieves its completion in poetry. In poetry, it listens to the intonation of the word and thereby invites things to gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities, and thus lets the world be. In thinking, being-there responds to this appeal by trying to commemorate the truth of being and by “giving thanks” for the “gift” of its unconcealment. In this way, human beings come full circle in their dwelling by allowing their concession of poverty to mirror the inestimable wealth of being’s diverse possibilities of manifestation. In the words of Hölderlin, human beings may learn to dwell on this earth, “full of merit and yet poetically.”

By the time Heidegger passed away on 26 May 1976, he had become perhaps the most seminal, as well as controversial, thinker of his age. The publication of the Complete Edition of his writings and lectures was under way, and his works were translated into many different languages. Many of his former students, including Hannah Arendt, Walter Biemel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Pöggeler, had become important philosophers and thinkers in their own right. He had inspired countless others, such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, and Jean-Paul Sartre. The breadth of Heidegger’s thinking also had immense influence on the development of other disciplines outside philosophy, including psychiatry and psychotherapy, environmental ethics and deep ecology, theology and religious studies, and literary criticism. His greatest legacy may not hinge on the brilliance of any single work or even on the unparalleled creativity he showed in reinterpreting the history of philosophy. Even before his prophetic insight into the danger of technology, his pathway truly endures. The singularity and steadfastness of his path directs us to what is most question-worthy, in order to remain with the task of thinking as such. In a technological era in which information masquerades as knowledge, he emphasized that the resolve to think what is “unthought” holds the key to restoring our capacity to dwell on the earth. As he once said at the close of his lecture *The Question concerning Technology*: “Questioning is the piety of thinking.”



# A

**ABANDONMENT OF BEING** (*Seinsverlassenheit*). This term becomes prominent in Heidegger's discussion of **machination** in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). In addressing the rise of machination and **technology**, Heidegger describes the extreme point of the **forgottenness of being** as an occurrence in which **entities** appear exclusively in terms of their potential to be used and exploited for instrumental purposes. In this historical epoch of the dominance of modern technology, entities cease to appear in their uniqueness and singularity, but instead manifest themselves only one-dimensionally in terms of their instrumental **value**.

For Heidegger, the grammar of the double genitive “of” in the abandonment of **being** has special relevance. That is, the abundance of being's **possibilities** for manifestation has been obscured in the onslaught of technology, while entities themselves are forsaken or deprived insofar as they are reduced to their instrumental uses within a framework of production, consumption, and exploitation.

**ABGROUND** (*Abgrund*). The **mystery** inherent in the **concealment of being** includes a nuance of hesitation, refusal, or **reservedness**. The mystery of being precludes the establishment of an absolute **ground** for **entities**, in the sense that **metaphysics** might ascribe to the **highest entity** or **God**. The refusal and staying away of a ground also implies the role that **absence** plays, as well as **presence**, in determining the dynamic of **temporality**.

When confronting the threshold of **death**, the **self** may **experience** this lack of ground as an abyss.

*See also* FINITUDE (*Endlichkeit*).

**ABSENCE** (*Abwesenheit*). Absence as a dimension of the **concealment of being** is the condition of **possibility** of the **presence** of **entities**. **Being-there** is the nothingness or **clearing** in which entities can be present. In the **unconcealment** of entities, being itself remains concealed. In Heidegger's early writings, this clearing is opened up by the ecstatic **temporality** of being-there. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes the **turning**

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relation of **be-ing** (*kehrige Bezug des Seyns*) to **man**, whereby the possibility of unconcealment is always preserved and **sheltered** in its opposite. Being-there participates in the clearing by providing a **place** for being's unconcealment, for example, through such activities as **thinking**.

*See also* ENOWNING (*Ereignis*); FORGOTTENNESS OF BEING (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

**ABSENCING** (*Abwesenung*). Absencing pertains to the dynamic of **temporality** and the way in which **being** becomes manifest in contrast to what "is" or **entities**. By the same token, presencing is not confined to what is merely given in the "**present**"; rather, through its interplay with absencing, it pervades the **retrieval** of the **past** and the arrival of the **future**.

**ABYSS** (*Abgrund*). *See* ABGROUND (*Abgrund*).

**ACCEPTANCE** (*Empfängnis*). Acceptance is a key concept in Heidegger's **philosophy of art**. The true artist acknowledges the **address of being** to which he/she accedes. He/she accepts this **gift of being** by manifesting it in the work of art as the coming-to-pass of **truth**.

**ACQUIESCENCE** (*Gelassenheit*). *See* RELEASEMENT (*Gelassenheit*).

**ACTUALITY** (*Wirklichkeit*). Higher than actuality stands **possibility**. For Heidegger, the most fateful development in the history of the **forgottenness of being** is the orientation of **being** toward actuality. When we think the being of **entities** as actuality, we reduce **world** to a sum totality of independent **things present-at-hand**. Each thing stands in itself independently of other things. The **origin** of this development lies in **Greek philosophy**. The **philosophy of René Descartes** is its outcome. Since thought and extension are two different **substances**, the "existence" and "actuality" of the external world becomes a major problem. According to Heidegger, we are not initially worldless subjects who somehow establish contact with the outside world; we are **being-in-the-world**. Only because we are always already in a world can we disclose the **being of entities** as actuality.

**ADDRESS OF BEING** (*Zuspruch des Seins*). The address of **being** to **being-there** takes the form of a silent appeal that is made manifest through the **attunement** of being-there. **Anxiety** is one of the most important attunements corresponding to being because in this **mood** we experience the non-being of **entities**. In the disclosure of being as the **nothing**, the wonder of all

wonders, “that entities are,” is revealed. Being-there responds to the address of being by letting itself be as the “there” of being. Being itself calls the tune, and being-there should heed its call.

**ADMINISTRATOR** (*Verwalter*). In his lecture-course from the summer semester 1930, Heidegger emphasizes that the **human being** is the administrator or manager of **freedom**. Human beings participate in freedom as a power that we are granted, and which, through that administration or management, we appropriate in the endeavor of making decisions. Through such administration, **being-there** appropriates freedom as outlining the **expanse** of possibilities. In this way, freedom emerges as the power of **letting-be**, rather than as an exercise of the **will** alone.

*See also* RESOLUTENESS (*Entschlossenheit*).

**AFFECT** (*Affekt*). The **disposedness** of **being-there** makes it possible for being-there to be touched by something that shows itself in an affect. Our affects and feelings reveal how we are disposed in everyday **life**.

**AFFECTEDNESS** (*Betroffenheit*). Affectedness belongs to the **existential** constitution of **being-there** and has its corresponding **mode** of **understanding**. The prior **disclosedness** of the **world** belongs to **being-in** and makes it possible that we can encounter **entities** in **circumspection**. Being-there can only live in a meaningful **world** because the entities it encounters can affect it. The affectedness of being-there makes it possible that we **care** about entities and **human beings**.

**AFFLICTION** (*Bekümmern*). *See* WORRY (*Bekümmern*).

**AGAMBEN, GIORGIO (1942–)**. Giorgio Agamben participated in Heidegger’s seminar in Le Thor in 1966 and 1968. Subsequently, the Italian philosopher became a leading thinker in the early part of the 21st century. Among his foremost accomplishments, Agamben advanced an **understanding** of the **being** of **animals** by engaging in a **dialogue** with Heidegger’s **thinking**. Agamben sought to mark the interface between the **openness** of **being-there** and animals by addressing the understated and **unthought** dimension of Heidegger’s interest in the problem of embodiment. Following this **path of thinking**, Agamben also addressed the topics of sexuality and gender, which remained latent in Heidegger’s discussion of the **self**’s capacity for **bodying forth**.

*See also* FOUR SEMINARS (*Vier Seminare*).

**AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE** (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*). In this lecture on the **grounding** of the world picture of **modernity** through **metaphysics**, delivered in Freiburg on 9 June 1938, Heidegger claims that modernity is the age of the **world** as “picture” and explains how the world becomes “framed” in this way. Every age is grounded through its metaphysics, which determines the **being** of **entities** and the **experience** of **truth**. Every new age starts with a metaphysical revolution. At the beginning of his lecture, Heidegger describes five fundamental **phenomena** of modern times: (a) modern **science**; (b) **machination** and **technology**; (c) the nature of **art** as **lived experience**; (d) the realization of **values** in culture; and (e) the “de-godding” (*Entgötterung*), that is, the flight and disappearance of the **gods**. In his lecture, Heidegger only discusses modern science and the metaphysical revolution that made it possible.

Modern science is essentially research and as such is dominated by method. It limits itself to specific regions of entities that are grounded in characteristic features of **reality**, for example **movement**, and each is studied with specific methods. Because modern science limits itself to method, it can achieve levels of strictness and exactness that were unthinkable to the Greek *epistèmè* and medieval *doctrina et scientia*. In his own little corner, every researcher follows the method of his science as strictly and exactly as possible. Modern science has been institutionalized and has thus become a business. The metaphysical foundation of modern science is the objectification of entities, which in turn is grounded through method. Modern science no longer concerns itself with the **being of entities**, but only with objects. How did entities become objects? This transformation is only possible when entities are no longer disclosed in their being, but are represented by subjects. An entity is only an entity if a subject perceives it. Truth can then no longer be *alètheia*, the **unconcealment** of entities in their being; it becomes the certitude of **representations**.

**René Descartes** was the first philosopher to determine the being of entities as representations and truth as certitude. The scientific revolution of modernity is at the same time a metaphysical change in what it means “to be” human. **Human beings** became subject and, as **subjectivity**, the foundation of all entities in their being and truth. The world as the **whole** of entities became a representation or picture. **Modernity** is the age of the world picture.

**ALÈTHEIA.** *Alètheia* is the Greek **word** for **truth**. Heidegger was first struck by the alpha-privative of *alètheia* as early as 1921. As **unconcealment** it is related to **concealment**, *lèthè*. This insight prompted his recognition of the fundamental trait of *ousia*, the **being of entities**, as **presence**. **Truth** presupposes a **clearing** or opening in which **entities** can be unconcealed. The unconcealment of entities is at the same time the concealment of **being** itself.



In every truth, something remains hidden. **Plato** and **Aristotle** transformed the **original** Greek **experience** of truth as *alètheia*. Through the Platonic primacy of “idea” (*eidos*) over *alètheia*, truth became the correctness of **perception** and expression. As *alètheia*, truth resides in the entity itself, in its manner of self-showing; as correctness, truth becomes a characteristic of the human **compartment** toward entities. Whereas Plato and Aristotle were still aware of the **ontological** dimension of truth, medieval philosophers reduced truth to correctness. Truth became the correspondence between the mind and the thing: *Veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei*. In modern **philosophy**, truth lost all relation to being and entities. **René Descartes** reduced truth to the certitude of knowledge.

**ALÉTHEIA [HERACLITUS, FRAGMENT 16] (*Alètheia [Heraklit, Fragment 16]*)**. In this essay, Heidegger discusses the problem of *alètheia* as the interplay of revealing and concealing. Heidegger examines this fragment very closely and interprets it to mean: “From the **clearing** which never disappears into **concealment** because always arising from it, how could anyone remain concealed?” The clearing is the **open** in which **entities** reveal themselves. The revealing or coming-to-light (*Lichten*) of entities in the clearing is at the same time the concealment of **being** as such. The source of the **forgottenness of being** is not the laxity of **being-there**; rather, it is intrinsic to being itself. The relationship of being-there to the clearing is nothing else than the clearing itself, insofar as it gathers in and retains being-there. The interplay between the clearing, being-there, and being is **enowning**, which is not only the “wonder of all wonders” addressed throughout Heidegger’s **thinking**, but also central to the thought of Heraclitus. They both try to think the **mystery** of being in an **attunement** of **openness**, **reservedness**, and free surrender.

As Heraclitus says in fragment 123, self-revelment, or *phusis*, needs concealment in order to come to presence as **unconcealment**. This self-revealing concealment of being in the clearing is the common denominator of all the **grounding words** and names that characterize Heraclitean thought. The movements of self-revealing and self-concealing form one (*hèn*) identical process. In this process, the light and the dark complement each other and are in harmony (*harmonie*). Heraclitus describes the harmony of contraries also as discord or **strife** (*polemos*) between the positive and the negative. It is a process in which the opposites are meshed into a single pattern of **joining**. Fire (*pur*) gathers its force together (“*logos*”) into the process of the **coming to presence** of being as ornament (*kosmos*). In the clearing of the **world**, being “**gifts**” itself as **destiny** and withholds itself in concealment. The movement of concealment and revelation is the coming to pass of *alètheia*.

In the multiplicity of different names, Heraclitus thinks the fullness of what is the same: the coming into its own, **sheltering**, and preserving of the **truth of being**.

**AMBIGUITY (*Zweideutigkeit*)**. In its everyday **being-with**, **being-there** encounters **entities** in the way that they are accessible to everyone, and about which everyone can say anything. This also means that our everyday **understanding** becomes ambiguous. It is practically impossible to decide when the **being of entities** is disclosed in a genuine way and when it is described in the **idle talk** of the “**they**.” Ambiguity holds sway also in the way being-there projects itself and encounters its **possibilities** because these possibilities have also been publicly interpreted. Thus, being-there’s understanding in the **publicness** of the “**they**” constantly goes wrong in its **projections**, as regards the genuine possibilities of being-there. Being-there is always ambiguously “**there**,” torn between the **modes of ownedness** or “**authenticity**” and **unownedness** or “**inauthenticity**.”

**ANAXIMANDER (611–547 BC)**. Anaximander, **Parmenides**, and **Heraclitus** are the original thinkers in Heidegger’s **history of being**. This beginning is not only the **origin** of the **forgottenness of being**; it also harbors the **possibility** of the **other beginning**. In his **interpretation**, Heidegger tries to understand the premetaphysical thought of the early Greek thinkers from a postmetaphysical standpoint. Anaximander has thought the process by which **entities** are **coming to presence** in **unconcealment**. Every entity leaves **concealment** to abide in unconcealment, before it passes away into concealment. The process is ruled by *dikè*, which arranges the pattern of entities in their **being**.

*See also* ANAXIMANDER’S SAYING (*Der Spruch des Anaximander*); GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*).

**ANAXIMANDER’S SAYING (*Der Spruch des Anaximander*)**. This essay, written in 1946, deals with Heidegger’s conception of the self-revealing **concealment** of **being** and its relationship to **being-there** as its shepherd. Heidegger’s essay is a dialogue that takes the form of a **translation** of the oldest **saying of philosophy**: “according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice.” **Anaximander** speaks to us from the earliest **beginning** of the **history of being** as **metaphysics**, which is at the same time the start of the **forgottenness of being**. Could it be that at the end of philosophy, a new beginning is announced in the saying of Anaximander to those who are listening?

Heidegger's dialogue begins with the **interpretation** of the Greek **understanding** of being: *eon*. *Eon* is the **word** for that which is present. Every **entity** is, because it has arrived at its **while** in **unconcealment**, *alètheia*. Entities are only insofar as they are **coming to presence**; they are coming to presence insofar as they emerge into unconcealment. Entities that are present through unconcealment, however, remain concealed in what they were and shall be. Heidegger can now interpret two words that bear faithful testimony to Anaximander's thought. *Genesis* is the coming forth and arriving at the unconcealed. *Phthora* means for that which has thus arrived to leave the unconcealed and pass into concealment. *Genesis* and *phthora* are complementary moments of the same dynamic process by which entities come to presence. Every entity leaves concealment to abide in unconcealment for a time, before it passes away into concealment.

*Adikia* denotes literally the privation of *dikè*. Entities proceed out of concealment to reveal themselves in unconcealment before returning to concealment. This intermingling of revealment and concealment is the **presencing** of entities: a dynamic process of **joining**, *dikè*, of assembling and gathering entities in their being. *Adikia* refers to the tendency of entities to disjoin by refusing to abide and repose. Since this pull toward disjoining is only a tendency, the pattern of joining maintains the upper hand. The pattern of joining ensures that entities "while" and abide in compatibility with each other within the **region** of unconcealment. Heidegger can now interpret the second part of Anaximander's **saying**. All entities come to presence insofar as, in compatibility with each other, they overcome the tendency within themselves to deny their passing away, that is, the condition of their coming to presence. Entities can only emerge into unconcealment if they make place for each other when their time has come to withdraw and disappear from unconcealment.

According to Heidegger, we have in the first three words of the saying *kata to chreon* the oldest name by which **thinking** brings the being of entities into presence. He **translates** *chreon* as *Brauch*, which means use and handling. Anaximander suggested that being hands out entities in that by which they come to presence. Being gives entities their limits. As a nonentity, being has no limits; it is limitless (*apeiron*). Anaximander named being and its relationship to entities, but the **ontological difference** between being and entities remained forgotten. In the unconcealment of entities, being itself remains concealed and forgotten. Heidegger thereby emphasizes that the forgottenness of being is the forgottenness of the **difference** between being and entities.

**ANDERS, GÜNTHER (1902–92)**. Anders was born in Vienna as Günther Stern and became a prominent 20th-century philosopher and social critic. He received his doctorate under the direction of **Edmund Husserl** and subse-

quently studied with Heidegger in the 1920s. Anders and **Hannah Arendt** were married during that time (1929), only to divorce years later. Diverging from Heidegger, Anders focused his criticisms on one aspect of modern **technology**, calling attention to the **danger** of the atomic age in the aftermath of the detonation of two hydrogen bombs in Japan in August 1945.

**ANGELUS SILESIUS, JOHANN (1624–77).** Angelus Silesius was a German Catholic mystic and poet; he was born and raised Lutheran but converted to Catholicism in 1653. In *The Principle of Reason*, Heidegger cites the following “mystical **words**” from Angelus Silesius: “‘The rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms, / It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.’” Heidegger appeals to these lines of **poetry** to indicate a deeper **ground**, that is, the **abgrund** (*Abgrund*), than that which can be accessed by reason (*Vernunft*) or rationality alone. In these poetic lines, Angelus Silesius highlights the **mystery of being**, on the one hand, and on the other, suggests the **disposition of letting-be** as the true **measure** of our **relation** to what is.

**ANIMALS (Tiere).** Heidegger addresses the **being** of animals in his lecture-course from the winter semester 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. He considers how animals are capable of a **comportment**. This comportment distinguishes their way of relating to the **environment** (*Umwelt*) but diverges from the potential that **being-there** displays in creating a **world** or **projecting a horizon of possibilities**. In comparison with human beings, animals are “world-poor”; that is, they lack the **freedom** to **disclose** possibilities over and above the immediacy of overt concerns in their environment. Through his distinctive analysis of the animal’s way “to be,” Heidegger counters the dominant biological and evolutionary based theories that depict animals as determined by a confluence of preset needs, desires, and urges.

**ANTHROPOLOGISM (Anthropologismus).** According to Heidegger, anthropologism is a naturalistic form of **philosophical anthropology**, which seeks to extract generic characteristics to define what it means to be human. These generic characteristics may combine cultural and physical attributes to construct a theory of human nature. Heidegger rejects anthropologism because it conceals the deeper connection between **being** and **being-there**, falsely reducing the latter to a generic set of **ontical** characteristics.

In Part IV of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between **fundamental ontology** as an inquiry into the structures of **care** and **Max Scheler’s** philosophical anthropology. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger advances a more radical critique of anthro-

pologism. He argues that such theories are themselves an expression of **machination** and thereby stem from the **forgottenness of being**. This criticism provides an important point of divergence between his own thinking and the attempt by **National Socialism** to develop anthropological and biological stereotypes of ethnic groups.

In *Mindfulness*, Heidegger emphasizes that anthropologism distorts the **relation** between **be-ing** (*Seyn*) and **being-there**, viewing human nature as a spectrum of positives and negatives based on a concept of “man” as the rational animal.

*See also* RACE (*die Rasse*).

**ANTHROPOMORPHISM** (*Anthropomorphismus*). Heidegger employs this term in section 61 of *Mindfulness* (1938–39). He construes anthropomorphism as an impulse within **modernity** to impose a human image on the manifestation of **entities**. Anthropomorphism is thereby based in the drive of the **will to power**. Heidegger’s critique of anthropomorphism previews his later attempt in the *Letter on “Humanism”* (1946) to show how an exclusively anthropocentric approach to **philosophy** neglects the **question of being** and the ecstatic **openness of ek-sistence**.

**ANTICIPATE** (*Vorlaufen*). Heidegger first analyzed the **phenomenon of being-there’s** anticipation in his 1924 lecture *The Concept of Time*. Being-there is truly existent and individualized when it is persistently anticipating the certain **possibility** of its being gone (*das Vorbei*). In the summer semester 1925 lecture-course *History of the Concept of Time*, it became the anticipation of my own **death**. The existential analysis of being-there’s **temporality** in *Being and Time* showed that anticipation is the ontological condition of the possibility of self-understanding. It opens up the **future** as coming toward being-there. As the **owned** or “authentic” understanding of the future, anticipation must win itself from the **unowned** or “inauthentic” future of dispersion and **falling**. In the unowned **understanding** of the future, being-there does not come toward itself in its most unique **can-be**, but **awaits** it full of **concern**. In anticipating its death, being-there understands its most unique and uttermost potentiality-for-being, that is, the possibility of individualized or “owned” existence.

*See also* CONSCIENCE (*Gewissen*); OWNEDNESS (*Eigentlichkeit*); RESOLUTENESS (*Entschlossenheit*).

**ANTICIPATORY RESOLUTENESS** (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*). **Death** is that individualizing **possibility** whose **anticipation** enables the **self** to unlock all of its other unique possibilities. The anticipating of death and resolving to be an individual are reciprocally intertwined in the achievement

of owned or authentic **existence**. Accordingly, anticipatory resoluteness directs the self's pursuit of its individuality, **ownedness**, or authenticity. Heidegger's analysis of anticipatory resoluteness also provides the clue to uncover the structure of **temporality**. Temporality originates from the **future** through the self's anticipation of its death and returns from the **past** through its **resolution** to be an individual. The joining of the **ecstases** of the future and past in this dynamic tension **opens** forth the **present** or the **moment**. Anticipatory resoluteness yields the direction for, and allows **being-there** to experience the **origin** of, the temporalizing of its temporality.

**ANTISEMITISM** (*Antisemitismus*). See RACE (*die Rasse*).

**ANXIETY** (*Angst*). The fundamental **disposedness** of anxiety is an outstanding **disclosedness** of **being-there** in its **being**. That in the face of which **being-there** has anxiety is not an **entity** within the **world**, but **being-in-the-world** as such. In the disposedness of anxiety, being-there finds itself face-to-face with the **nothing** of the possible impossibility of its **existence**, that is, its **death**. **Being-toward-death** is essentially anxiety. Anxiety is anxious about the **self's** uniquely singular or ownmost potential to be or exist. It takes away from being-there the **possibility** of **understanding** itself in terms of the world and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws being-there back upon itself and discloses itself as its "there." In anxiety, being-there finds itself amid the indefiniteness of the nothing and nowhere and is no longer at home in the world. In disclosing the "there," anxiety makes manifest the self's being-toward its most unique **can-be**.

See also CONSCIENCE (*Gewissen*); FEAR (*Furcht*); WORRY (*Bekümmerung*).

**APOPHANTICAL "AS"** (*apophantisches Als*). The apophantical "as" determines the intentional **structure** of the *logos kata tinous*. Speaking as *logos kata tinous* is demonstrative letting-be-seen and discloses something as some thing; for example, this is a table. The apophantical "as" makes **untruth** possible. When we let something be seen as something, we can be mistaken and disclose it as something it is not; for example, that is not a table, but a chair. The "as" structure of **truth** must be wrestled from **concealment** and guarded from loss. In *Being and Time*, the apophantical "as" is the **horizontal schema** of **presence-at-hand** in its three **ecstases** of derivative or "fallen" temporality: **past**, **present**, and **future**.

**APPEAL** (*Anspruch; Anruf*). See ADDRESS OF BEING (*Zuspruch des Seins*).

**APPROPRIATING EVENT (*Ereignis*).** See ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**APPROPRIATION (*Ereignis*).** See ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**APRIORI, THE (*Apriori, das*).** The apriori is the third fundamental breakthrough of **Edmund Husserl's phenomenology**. We live in meaningful **structures** from which we experience the **entities** included within them. These structures are made explicit in **categorial intuition**. **Being** articulates itself and so discloses entities in themselves. The categorial structure of the **disclosedness** of being is the condition of possibility, or enabling background, of **lived experience**. In this sense, **categories** are earlier than any possible **experience**. Heidegger can thus show the link between being and **time**. Being is earlier than entities.

*See also* INTENTIONALITY (*Intentionalität*).

**ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975).** In 1924, 18-year-old Arendt came to **Marburg** to study with Heidegger, the “hidden king” of German **philosophy**. They soon fell in love and had a passionate extramarital love affair for almost five years. Heidegger was twice her age and had two sons. According to Heidegger, she was the only person who understood him and his work. In 1926, Arendt took Heidegger's advice and moved to Heidelberg to study with **Karl Jaspers**. Arendt's marriage to **Günther Anders** in 1929 and Heidegger's involvement with **National Socialism** in 1933 led to a longer separation, which lasted until 1950, when Arendt resumed contact with Heidegger. She helped him get his work published in the United States and checked the translations for him. Until her death, Arendt was both attracted to and revolted by Heidegger's personality. He was, as Jaspers once said, both someone with whom you could be very close and a friend who would betray you when you were not there. Although Arendt's work is in many ways inconceivable without the influence of Heidegger's philosophy, Heidegger never showed any real interest in her work.

**ARISTOTLE (384–322 BC).** The famous Greek philosopher was probably the greatest influence on Heidegger's early thought. Heidegger received from his fatherly friend **Conrad Gröber** a copy of **Franz Brentano's** dissertation on the manifold senses of **being** in Aristotle. Latent in Brentano's quotation from Aristotle on the title page, “an entity becomes manifest in many ways,” was the question that determined Heidegger's thought: What is the **meaning of being**? From 1922 to 1926, Heidegger worked on a book on Aristotle's philosophy that he never managed to finish and abandoned after the publication of *Being and Time*.

According to Heidegger, Aristotle was not only the first phenomenologist; he was also more advanced in **phenomenology** than **Edmund Husserl** and his circle. While studying and teaching Aristotle and Husserl's *Logical Investigations* together, Heidegger discovered that since the time of the Greek philosophers, philosophical knowing has been defined by **intuition**. Heidegger broke with this model for theoretical **truth** and gave primacy to practical and religious truth as it is experienced in **factive life**. Heidegger found an original **experience** of *kairos* paralleling that of primal **Christianity** in Aristotle's account of truth in *Nicomachean Ethics VI*. And yet in *Physics IV*, Aristotle also understood **time** as a series of **nows**, which became the paradigm for all later theories of time. In 1922/23, Heidegger discovered that *ousia* for the Greeks meant constant or permanent **presence**. Heidegger tried to understand being in terms of time in its fullest and most primordial **meaning**. Through Aristotle, Heidegger discovered the relationship between being and time. Finally, Aristotle's conception of **logic** as a productive **science** was the origin of Heidegger's conception of **fundamental ontology**. After the publication of *Being and Time*, Aristotle became less important to Heidegger. In his conception of the **history of being**, **Greek philosophy** became the **beginning** of the age of **metaphysics**. As the last of the Greek philosophers, Aristotle was the father of metaphysics. Although the conception of being in pre-Socratic philosophy became the central topic of Heidegger's studies of Greek philosophy, he would return time and time again to the thought of Aristotle.

See also ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS Θ 1–3: ON THE ESSENCE AND ACTUALITY OF FORCE (*Aristoteles Metaphysik θ 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*); ON THE ESSENCE AND CONCEPT OF *φύσις*: ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS B, 1 (*Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik, B, 1*); PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE: INITIATION INTO PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*); PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ARISTOTLE: INDICATION OF THE HERMENEUTIC SITUATION (*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation*); PLATO: THE SOPHIST (*Platon: Sophistes*).

**ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS Θ 1–3: ON THE ESSENCE AND ACTUALITY OF FORCE** (*Aristoteles Metaphysik θ 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*). This summer semester 1931 course, originally given under the title *Interpretations from Ancient Philosophy*, is a reinterpretation of Aristotelian **ontology** that was inspired by Heidegger's reading of **Friedrich Nietzsche's** account of pre-Socratic **philosophy**. From Nietzsche, Heidegger appropriated the insight into the fundamental difference between pre-



Socratic thought and the philosophy of **Plato** and **Aristotle**. This insight led in turn to his conception of the **history of being**. The course consists of two parts: an introduction to and an interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* θ 1–3.

In the introduction, Heidegger searches for an encompassing **horizon** from which Aristotle's thought may be explained. He sketches the basic **structure** of Aristotelian ontology and focuses his attention on the conflict between the Oneness of **being** and the manifold senses or **meanings** of being. Aristotle states, on the one hand, that being is said in a fourfold way: (1) to be accidental, (2) to be true or false, (3) according to the figures of **categories**, and (4) to be potentially (*dunamis*) or actually (*energeia*). On the other hand, he is still under the spell of the **saying of Parmenides** that being is One. The meanings of being, which determine the being of **entities**, cannot be reduced to each other, and stand in opposition to the Oneness of being. Aristotle tries to explain the relationship between being as one and as manifold by analogy. However, he fails to explain the **essence** of analogy and to show that the relationship between being one and manifold can be understood as analogy. He also does not explain why being unfolds itself in a fourfold way. In the **unconcealment** of being as the fourfold **being of entities**, being as the One remains concealed. The **ontological difference** between being and entities makes truth (*alètheia*) possible and is the forgotten **ground** of Greek thought and the history of philosophy as **metaphysics**.

The main part of the course is a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the essence and **actuality** of force. Force is the *archè*, that is, the setting point for a transformation or **movement** of an entity into something else. Force shows itself as the toleration of or resistance against transformation. Heidegger distinguishes between an **ontological** and an **ontic** concept of force in Aristotle's philosophy. Ontologically, force is the capacity of acting (*poiein*) and undergoing (*paschein*) as one. It is both the starting point of a capacity to transform and a capacity to be transformed. Ontically, force is the actualization of an entity as either the starting point of an action upon another entity or the undergoing of the action of another entity. The opposite of force is incapacity or impotency.

Aristotle understands the actuality of force as a form of having. Having the force or capacity to do something means being able to do something. The Megaric school, on the other hand, holds that the actuality of force is identical to its actualization. According to Heidegger, the real issue between Aristotle and the Megaric school remains implicit. This issue is the basic question of philosophy: What is being? For Aristotle and the Megaric school, as for all Greeks, being means **presence**. Aristotle claims that the Megaric concept of presence is too narrow. He denies that actuality, *energeia*, is the only and fundamental way a force is present and real. He distinguishes three ways in which force can be present: (1) a force can be present as capacity, for exam-

ple, a shoemaker has the capacity to make shoes; (2) a force can be present as the actualization of a capacity, for example, the making of shoes; and (3) a force can be present in its product, for example, the shoe as the finished product of shoemaking.

In the next step of his argumentation, Aristotle shows that **perception**, *aisthēsis*, actualizes itself as the disclosing of entities in their being. The actuality of something **present-at-hand** is only possible if the perceptible is not grounded in the actualization of perception. The unasked question of Aristotle's and all later philosophy is how the unconcealment of being is possible. *Aisthēsis* is a form of uncovering, *alētheuein*, that is, to take something as true or to take something from concealment in perception. Aristotle defines force in its actuality as that for which nothing is unworkable, when it actualizes the capacity that it is said to have. He thus addresses the problem of the essence of an entity in its fullest sense. The essence of an entity is disclosed when the kind of actuality or **existence** that belongs to this essence is revealed. After Aristotle, philosophy fell prey to the **ambiguity** of this **forgottenness**, which is at the same time the condition of **possibility** of the history of philosophy as metaphysics.

*See also LOGOS; PHUSIS.*

**ARRANGEMENT (*Fuge*).** *See* JOINTURE (*Fuge*).

**ART (*Kunst*).** Art became a main topic in Heidegger's thought in 1931–32. His meditation on art is neither an aesthetics nor a **philosophy** of art. The thinker responds to and tries to recall the **saying** of the poet in the **language** of **thinking**. Friedrich Hölderlin's creative **poetry** became the touchstone of Heidegger's thinking, and in the loving struggle between the two, his thinking found a new expressiveness. Art is the setting-into-work of **truth**. In this sense, all art is poetic and the safeguarding of truth. Poetry is the saying of the **unconcealment** of **entities** and the illumination of self-concealing **being**. This light joins its shining to and into the work of art. Beauty is the way in which truth shines forth as unconcealment. The voice of poetry bids all that is—**world** and **things**, **earth** and **sky**, **divinities** and **mortals**—to gather into the **oneness** or simplicity (*Einfalt*) of their intimate **belonging together**. Poetry is thus the founding and giving (*Stiftung*) of the unconcealment of being and so the **origin** of the history of a **people**.

*See also* ART AND SPACE (*Die Kunst und der Raum*); ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART, THE (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*).

**ART AND SPACE (*Die Kunst und der Raum*).** Heidegger wrote the text of this essay on stone. It is a meditation on the relationship between sculpture and **space**. A statue embodies space, but what does space mean in this con-

text? It cannot be the space of natural **science**. If **art** is the setting-into-work of **truth**, sculpture should disclose space in its true and most unique instance. Heidegger tries to find the characteristic features of space by listening to **language**. In the word space (*Raum*), we can still hear the **echo** of making space (*Räumen*), which means clearing. The clearing of wilderness gives the free and **open** where **mortals** can **dwell** and **divinities** can appear. Making space is the release of a **place** that opens **regions** where it can gather **things** into their **belonging together**. Are places the result of making space, or does making space receive its power and dynamic for the reign of spaces that gather things? Things themselves are places and do not only belong at a certain place. Sculpture is the embodiment of the **truth of being** in its work as the founding and giving of places.

**AS WHEN ON A HOLIDAY . . .** (“*Wie Wenn am Feiertage . . .*”). Heidegger composed this essay in the period 1939–40; in it he addresses **Friedrich Hölderlin**’s hymn bearing that title. Heidegger addresses **nature** as the dynamic of growth, of self-emerging presence (*phusis*). In the vibrancy of that which comes to presence, encompassing beings in the whole, the awakening of occurs. But if nature itself has its own voice, **poetry** arises through the aspiration of **spirit** and gives wings to the creativity of the poet. The creativity of the poet is license that aspires to a higher **law**, as captured in Hölderlin’s exhortation: “Let the poets be free as swallows.” According to Heidegger, such poetic rapture ultimately gives way to the attuned response, which directs the poet to his/her highest destination, namely, the **awe** before the **holy**. Insofar as the primary vocation of poetry lies in uttering the holy, such utterance springs from a **future** that is still to be experienced as an incipient order shaping all **history**.

Through this interpretation, Heidegger explores the unique role that poetry has in speaking the auguration of history throughout the entire span of **being-there**’s sojourn on the earth. The primeval ordering of all this is historical from its inception and marks both the **joy** and anguish of the poet, who holds fast to the sway of law (*nomos*) in the midst of the raging chaos.

**ASSERTION (Aussage)**. Assertion and its **structure**, the **apophantical** “**as**,” are grounded in both **interpretation** and its structure, the hermeneutical “**as**,” in **understanding** the **disclosedness** of being-there. According to traditional **logic**, assertion or **judgment** is the place of truth. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows that the **disclosedness** of **being-there** is the condition of **possibility** of the **truth** of judgment. The Greek *logos* is the **ontological** basis of assertion: a simple announcing of something (*Kundschaft*). This

announcement in its widest sense presupposes the **openness** of the **clearing**. The **unconcealment** of **being** is the condition of possibility of the revealing of **entities** in their being and of the disclosedness of being-there in its being.

**AS-STRUCTURE** (*als-Struktur*). The as-structure is the fore-structure of **assertion**, **understanding**, and **interpretation**. It is the basis for determining something as something, becoming explicit through the synthetic nature of **entities**. Because every entity is a collection of different qualities, we can disclose it in different ways as something. For example, this entity shows itself as a table, and as a table it shows itself as wooden and three feet high. Another entity, for instance a hammer, shows itself as well suited for hammering.

*See also* EXISTENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL “AS” (*existenzial-hermeneutische ‘Als’*).

**ASTONISHMENT** (*Erstaunen*). According to Heidegger, astonishment is a fundamental **mood** of **being-there**. In **Greek philosophy**, astonishment is the wonder of all wonders before the **mystery** that “there is” **being**. The wonder of astonishment evokes what is most **question-worthy**, providing the catalyst for all philosophical inquiry.

**ATTUNEMENT** (*Gestimmtheit*). Attunement is the **ontic** counterpart of **disposedness** and is an everyday and familiar **phenomenon**. **Being-there** is always attuned. It is brought before the “there” of its **being** in **moods** and attunements. They disclose **being-in-the-world** and make it possible for us to direct ourselves toward something.

*See also* ANXIETY (*Angst*); BOREDOM (*Langeweile*); FEAR (*Furcht*); RELEASEMENT (*Gelassenheit*).

**AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354–430)**. St. Augustine of Hippo was a crucial and pivotal force in the early development of Christianity. His key writings, the *Confessions* (*Confessiones*), also proved to be extremely influential in both Heidegger’s treatment of **primordial Christianity** and his development of the ontological notion of **care** (*Sorge*). For him, care is a formalization of St. Augustine’s notion of *cura*.

*See also* PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**AUGUSTINE AND NEOPLATONISM** (*Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*). This summer semester 1921 course is one of Heidegger’s two courses on the **phenomenology** of **religion**. The thought of St. Augustine is of the utmost importance to Heidegger’s **destruction** of **factive life experi-**

**ence.** The **facticity** of **modernity** is determined by the theoretical attitude of Greek **science** and the **worry** and **concern** over one's own **life** of primal **Christianity**. In his writings, Augustine explained the life **experience** of primal Christianity in terms he derived from Neoplatonic **philosophy**. The Christian dogmatics of the church fathers was already underpinned with a Greek infrastructure.

The main part of the course is a penetrating **interpretation** of the 10th book of the *Confessions*, that is, the last of the autobiographical books. Heidegger schematizes factic life as caring. The basic direction of life, rising from **care**, is delight. Caring is tried by the opposing tendencies of **falling** into dispersion and fragmentation and the rising toward an integrated and unified **self**. The unified self seeks the happy life that is **truth**, and truth is **God** himself. **Ontologically**, caring is oriented toward things of use versus things to be enjoyed for their own sake. The eternal unchangeable things are to be enjoyed; the temporal changeable things are to be used as a means to that end. We should not worship God for the sake of money, but spend money for the sake of God.

Heidegger's interpretation of Augustine's factic life experience points to the two extant divisions of *Being and Time*. His discussion of *timor castus*, pure and noble **fear**, and *timor servilis*, servile fear of punishment, is the forerunner of the phenomenology of **anxiety** and fear. The three temptations reflect the insecurity of human life. Our life is a trial in which we find or lose ourselves. Augustine's account is foremost an account of the actualization of Christian life and not so much its content. We should not delight in the flesh, but only in the glory of God. The temptation of **curiosity**, the lust of the eyes, has a roaming quality that serves to make all accessible to it, without concern for the value and worth of any particular object. In the absorption of curiosity, the self is lived by its **environment**. In the temptation of worldly ambition, the self as such is the end of the delight. This delight is rooted in the genuine concern for my own life and myself. This tendency can easily degenerate into the love of praise and being pleased with myself.

Heidegger ends the course with a discussion of the difference between the *cogito* in Augustine and **René Descartes**. As Augustine shows, the evidence of the *cogito* must be founded in factic life. It cannot be taken out of this context, as Descartes did. Our self-certitude is ultimately possible only by **faith**: *Crede ut intelligas*.

See also PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**AUTHENTICITY (*Eigentlichkeit*).** See OWNEDNESS (*Eigentlichkeit*).

**AUTOCHTHONY** (*Bodenständigkeit*). Heidegger introduced this term in his summer semester 1924 lecture-course on **Aristotle**. The conceptuality of a concept is determined by three moments: fundamental **experience**, leading claim, and intelligibility. These three moments constitute together the autochthony of conceptuality. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1925, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Heidegger uses autochthony as a **phenomenological** term. The demand of **Edmund Husserl**'s maxim "to the things themselves" means that phenomenological research must provide demonstrations rooted in the autochthony of the **phenomena** and secure this native soil once more. In the 1930s, Heidegger transformed autochthony into a term indicating the "rootedness" of a **people** in the **historicality** of its homeland. In his later thinking, autochthony became a key term in his inquiry into the **nature of language**. **Language** as the **house of being** simultaneously yields the place for thinking to inhabit and **dwell in words**.

**AWAITING** (*gewärtigen*). The **existential analysis** of **being-there's temporality** in *Being and Time* showed that awaiting is an unoriginal, unowned **understanding** of the **future**. In an unowned understanding of the future, being-there does not come toward itself in its most unique **can-be**, but awaits it full of **concern** as a **present** that is not yet **now**. In **everydayness**, we await the beginning of the weekend.

**AWE** (*Scheu*). Awe is the **attunement** of **being-there** in the **presence** of either **being** as the **holy** and the Source, or the Extraordinary. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger characterizes the deep awe that is a prerequisite for engaging in philosophy; awe, along with **startled dismay** and **reservedness**, are the **dispositions** that direct **thinking** toward the **other beginning**. He emphasizes that the startled dismay of such awe is necessary to transpose the inquirer back into a **grounding attunement** that is receptive to the wonder of **being's unconcealment**. The sense of wonder helps to provoke an original inquisitiveness, which marks the dawn of philosophy going back to **Aristotle**.

This moment of awe brings to light how integral an attunement is to the task of **thinking**. The attunement of awe is also a throwback to an abiding sense of **mystery**, which pervades the poetic **experience** of the holy as well as philosophical wonder.

# B

**BASIC CONCEPTS (*Grundbegriffe*).** In the first part of this summer semester 1941 lecture-course, Heidegger understands basic concepts as those concepts that ground everything. They invite us to reflect upon the ultimate **ground** of our **being-there** as **being-in-the-world**. Ever since the **beginning** of **metaphysics**, **human beings** have in their essential nature been touched by **being**. The **disclosedness** of being-there is the **gift** of the **truth of being** and thus the true abode of human beings. Being is the ground of all **entities**. The grounding of being is a double movement. Being reveals itself as the **beingness** of entities and at the same time conceals itself as being. The **concealment** of being in the revelation of its **truth** as being-there is the **origin** of both the **forgottenness of being** in **metaphysics** and the **abandonment of being** in the age of **nihilism**. Metaphysics can only think being as the beingness of entities and ground being in a **highest entity**, for example, **God**.

To go beyond the **onto-theo-logical** nature of metaphysics, we have to overcome the forgottenness of being. This is only possible by coming to experience fully the distress of the abandonment of being. We have to **re-trieve** the beginning of **thinking** and try to commemorate the **saying** of being in early **Greek philosophy**. In a careful meditation on **Periander's** saying, "take **care** the **whole** of entities" (*metéta to pan*), Heidegger explains the **ontological difference** between being, on the one hand, and beingness and entities, on the other, as the differentiation that grounds being-there. Logical thought can never reach being itself, because we cannot grasp being with concepts. Every concept would reduce being to an entity. Being can only be understood as the **abground** (*Abgrund*) from which everything springs.

The second part of the lecture-course is an interpretation of the saying of Anaximander, which is a different version of his **interpretation** than in the later published essay *Anaximander's Saying*.

*See also* CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: THE T/HERE AND THE BE-ING (ENOWNING) (*Beiträge zur Philosophie—Da-sein und das Seyn (Ereignis)*).

**BASIC CONCEPTS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY** (*Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*). In this lecture-course from the summer semester of 1926, Heidegger examines the development of the key concepts of ancient **philosophy** beginning with Thales. By examining the central pre-Socratic thinkers **Anaximander**, **Parmenides**, and **Heraclitus**, Heidegger outlines the historical background of **Plato**'s and **Aristotle**'s philosophy and their contributions to formulating the **question of being**. As the centerpiece of this discussion, he addresses the "opposition" between **being** and becoming as the central problem in the **formulation of the question** of being throughout **Greek philosophy**.

See also BASIC CONCEPTS OF ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY (*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*).

**BASIC CONCEPTS OF ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY** (*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*). In this lecture-course from the summer semester of 1924, Heidegger provides an important account of the roots and implications of **Aristotle**'s **philosophy** for the development of **phenomenology**. Heidegger devotes considerable attention to examining Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and its importance for outlining how the basic **dispositions** of human **facticity** can be articulated. This lecture-course is published as volume 18 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**.

**BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THINKING** (*Die Grundsätze des Denkens*). See PRINCIPLES OF THINKING, THE (*Die Grundsätze des Denkens*).

**BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY** (*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*). Heidegger delivered this lecture-course at the University of **Freiburg** in the winter semester 1919–20. In this lecture-course, Heidegger develops his preliminary **understanding** of **phenomenology** as an attempt to return to the "things themselves," particularly as highlighted by the experiential roots from which **meaning** or sense originates. These experiential roots are in turn grounded in **facticity**, a concept that will become a key motif subsequently as Heidegger develops the hermeneutic side of phenomenology in the 1920s.

Of special importance is Heidegger's attempt to delineate a **science** (*Wissenschaft*) proper to **philosophy** from the natural sciences. As phenomenology, the former seeks to address the dynamic and flow of **experience** as eliciting contexts by which the meaningfulness of what we encounter, understand, and grasp pretheoretically first becomes possible. The latter (i.e., the natural sciences), on the other hand, proceed from a premise of objectifica-



tion to isolate specific regions of theoretical investigation. By developing the pretheoretical standpoint of phenomenology, Heidegger takes the first step along the way of redirecting philosophy from its **beginning(s)**.

Through this lecture-course, Heidegger goes a long way toward breaking the **ground** for the development of a distinctly philosophical method.

**BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY, THE (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*)**. This summer semester 1927 lecture-course is an elaboration of the unpublished third division of the first part of *Being and Time: Time and Being*. The lecture-course circles around the question of the **meaning of being** and consists of three parts. When this was published in 1975, it marked the inception of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**, comprising volume 24.

In the introduction, Heidegger restates his claim that all **ontology** has an **ontic** fundament. He emphasizes that **philosophy** is grounded in human **freedom**. He also discusses the **phenomenological** method. It consists of three stages. Phenomenological **reduction** is the attempt to grasp **entities** in their **being** by returning to the self-manifestation of the **phenomenon** or the "things themselves." The phenomenological construction is the **projection** of given entities with a view to their being and its **structure**, including **being-there's preontological understanding of being**. **Phenomenological destruction** is the critical **dismantling** of traditional concepts and points of view.

In the historical part of the course, Heidegger offers his students a destruction of four fundamental theses concerning being: (1) **Immanuel Kant's** thesis that being is not a "real" predicate; (2) **Aristotle's** thesis that to the **being of entities** belong **essence** and **existence**; (3) The thesis of **René Descartes** that being is either an extended or thinking **substance**; and (4) The logical thesis that the meaning of being is the copula or the "is."

Heidegger tries to come to an **understanding of time** in the systematic part of the course. Through a careful interpretation of Aristotle's vulgar concept of time, he shows how it presupposes the temporal and **existential** structure of **being-there**. In the next step, Heidegger develops the existential-horizonal character of **temporality**. This structure is the unity of **awaiting**, **retaining**, and **making present**. Temporality is the condition of **possibility** of the **understanding of being**. Heidegger regards the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of human existence as a kind of **horizon** whose outward **expansion** at once mirrors the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being. The temporal horizon forms the backdrop "**in-terms-of-which**" (*das Woraufhin*) the preontological understanding of being can be developed, **projected**, and brought to a higher level of determination; in this way, the **meaning of being** can be disclosed in

a way that permits its articulation in **words**. The **grounding words** are themselves temporal idioms (e.g., “**presencing**”) that translate what is pre-understood concerning being into philosophical terms.

At the close of the lecture, Heidegger reinvoles Kantian motifs to suggest that **ontology** is rooted in “**temporal statements**,” which express “temporal **truth**.” As a result, the ontology is a “temporal” and “transcendental” science, which properly constitutes the **science of being** (*Wissenschaft des Seins*). For being to be understood explicitly, that is, in **thematic** terms, its contrast with entities, or the **ontological difference**, must come to light. The disclosure of being explicitly in terms of its **meaning** implies differentiation from specific entities.

At the conclusion of the published text of *Being and Time* (Division Two, Part I), Heidegger asks: “Is there a way leading from primordial *time* to the meaning of **being**? Does *time* reveal itself as the horizon of *being*?” In an extensive way, he addresses these questions throughout *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, if not providing a definitive “answer.” He points to the hidden reciprocity between being and time and thus to the significance of the grammar of the conjunction “and” connecting the two in the title of his magnum opus. Because the role that **language** plays in the **thinking** of being remains for the most part still to be clarified, this lecture-course indicates Heidegger’s difficulty in formally “completing” *Being and Time*.

**BASIC QUESTION (*Grundfrage*)**. Heidegger distinguishes between the **guiding question** and the basic question of **thinking**. The guiding question is the central question of **metaphysics**: What is the **being of entities**? The basic question asks back to the **ground** of metaphysics: What is the **meaning of being**?

**BASIC QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED “PROBLEMS” OF “LOGIC” (*Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte ‘Probleme’ der ‘Logik’*)**. In this winter semester 1937/38 lecture-course, Heidegger presents publicly parts of the fifth **jointure** of his *Contributions to Philosophy*, entitled *The Ones to Come*. The basic question of this course is: Why and how did the original Greek **understanding** of **truth** as *alètheia*, **unconcealment**, become the metaphysical understanding of truth as correctness? **Plato** and **Aristotle** understood truth no longer as unconcealment, but as correspondence between **thinking** and **entities**. Truth became the correctness of the **judgment** in which we say what entities are in their **being**. However, in the unconcealment of entities, being itself remains concealed. The history of **metaphysics** from Plato to **Friedrich Nietzsche** is determined by the **guiding question** of **ontology**: What are entities as entities? Because Plato and Aristotle failed to interpret and ground *alètheia* from its **origin** as the **gifting**

refusal of the **truth of being**, metaphysics became obsessed with entities and neglected to think the **clearing** of being. The **forgottenness of being** in metaphysics is at the same time the **abandonment of being**, which in turn leads to the **need** or “distress” of modern times. This **distress** is the dislocation of **being-there**. Our **existence** has become uprooted and groundless. At the extreme point of the abandonment of being, we can **experience** this distress in its **grounding attunement** and heed its warning.

The task of this nonmetaphysical thinking is to bring the guiding question of metaphysics to the **basic question** of thinking: What is the **meaning of being**? This question is basic, because it inquires back into the **ground** of metaphysics. It inquires after the **truth of being**, that is, the unconcealment of entities, the ground as **abground** (*Abgrund*). In meditating on the **first beginning**, which posited the truth of entities only, postmetaphysical thinking prepares for the **other beginning**. In the transition to the other beginning, **philosophy** asks about the **origin** of truth as unconcealment, in order that thinking can be delivered or “owned over” (*übereignet*) to **be-ing** (*Seyn*). This preparation tries to overcome the forgottenness of being and **nihilism** by embarking upon the path of **being-historical thinking**.

Heidegger cites a passage from this lecture-course in his *Letter to Fr. William J. Richardson, S.J.* (1962), clarifying that there is a **turning** (*die Kehre*) that occurs in the **relation** of be-ing to **human being** and not a changeover in positions from a so-called Heidegger I to a Heidegger II.

**BEAUFRET, JEAN (1907–82).** Beaufret was a French philosopher and educator who is best known for having broached several questions to Heidegger, prompting him to write his famous *Letter on “Humanism.”* In retrospect, Beaufret’s focal question concerning the **possibility** of ethics proves to be crucial for two reasons. First, it is one of the few instances in all of Heidegger’s writings where he addresses the importance of this topic and its connection to the **question of being**. Second, Heidegger responds by distinguishing an **original ethics**, which by championing the importance of **dwelling** stands apart from the normative discipline of ethics traditionally understood as a branch of **metaphysics**. As a result of his dialogue with Heidegger, Beaufret became a key figure in the reception of Heidegger’s thought in France and, ultimately, across the globe.

**BEGINNING (*Anfang*).** Throughout his entire career, Heidegger emphasizes the need to rediscover, **retrieve**, and reenact the beginning. According to Heidegger, the beginning is not only of essential importance to everything that comes later, but it also always retains something within itself. Every beginning holds a promise and **possibilities** that have not yet been actualized. The beginning plays a key role in Heidegger’s **history of being**. The begin-

ning of philosophy in early Greek **thinking** is both the fateful **ground** of the **history** of **metaphysics** and the possibility of the **other beginning**. This other beginning will enable us to experience what was **concealed** to metaphysics: **the truth of being**. The first beginning experienced and posited the **truth** of **entities** without asking about truth as **unconcealment**. The other beginning experiences the truth of being as the **clearing**, and explicitly asks about the **being** of truth.

*See also* CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: THE T/HERE AND THE BE-ING (ENOWNING) (*Beiträge zur Philosophie—Da-sein und das Seyn (Ereignis)*); END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE TASK OF THINKING, THE (*Das Ende der Philosophie and die Aufgabe des Denkens*).

**BEGINNING OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, THE: INTERPRETATION OF ANAXIMANDER AND PARMENIDES** (*Der Anfang des abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides*). In the winter semester of 1932 at the University of **Freiburg**, Heidegger offered a lecture-course on **Anaximander's** and **Parmenides's thinking**. With these lectures, Heidegger embarked upon an important discussion of the pre-Socratics that exemplifies how his **dialogue** with the philosophical **tradition** intersects with his attempt to re-ask the **question of being**. Heidegger's attempt to retrieve the insights of these earlier thinkers forms a cornerstone of his overall task of **recollecting the truth of being**; he envisions the pre-Socratics as standing closest in proximity to the **experience of truth** as **unconcealment**, in comparison with the onset of the metaphysical **tradition** in **Plato** and **Aristotle**.

On the cusp of the **first beginning**, Anaximander addressed the onset of the metaphysical tradition in Plato and Aristotle, underscoring the **question-worthiness** of **being**. He recognized the dynamic of **concealment** at the heart of **unconcealment**, thereby signaling the hidden connection between **temporality** and the **disclosure** of **being**. Likewise, Parmenides pointed to the unity of **thinking** and **being**. According to Heidegger, Parmenides foresaw that the **possibility** of an **understanding of being** provides the **ground** of human **existence**, of **being-there** as such.

Through his **interpretation** of Anaximander and Parmenides, Heidegger develops another side of the **question of being**. Specifically, he addresses the dynamic of **time** as the interplay between **absence** and **presence**. Heidegger thereby casts light on the hidden link between **time** and **being**, insofar as the former allows for both the withdrawal and appearance of the latter.

**BEING (Sein)**. As Heidegger loved to say, every philosopher only thinks one fundamental thought. The guiding start of his entire path of **thinking** is the **question of being**. What is being, and how does it become **meaningful**?

Being is neither an **entity** nor the quality of **beingness**; however, it is defined through the **ontological difference** as the **being of entities**. Being is broader than all entities. It is nearest to **being-there** and yet in its **nearness** furthest removed from it. It can only be understood as the **abground** from which everything comes to **presence**. The fundamental structure of being is the **between** (*Zwischen*), that is, the lightning process in which everything is lighted up. Out of the “between,” the **clearing** arises and allows entities to presence. The **structure** of the clearing is the **fourfold**, as the outcome of the **play of time-space**. From out of the clearing, the **truth of being** arises, as does the **possibility of understanding** its meaning. In the clearing, being lets entities be and reveals itself as beingness. However, insofar as being lets entities be, it withdraws itself from the clearing. In the truth of being, being itself remains **concealed**. It always holds back other possibilities that have not yet been actualized. The **gift** of being resides in **enowning**. Being is not static; it is a **temporalizing** and historicizing dynamic and happening. The **history of being** is the condition of the possibility of human history. *See also* BE-ING (*Seyn*).

**BEING (~~Sein~~)**. In his essay *On the Question of Being*, Heidegger inserts an “X” over the expression “**being**” (*Sein*) in order to designate a dynamic **meaning** of the **word**, which occurs in stark contrast to the **metaphysical** representation of that concept as a mode of **presence**. The “crossing” is the **location** where the four regions of the **fourfold** are gathered.

**BE-ING (*Seyn*)**. In English **translation**, the hyphenated form designates Heidegger’s usage of the old German term *Seyn*, in contrast to the **word** *Sein* (**being**) normally used in his writings. In two major works in the 1930s, *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Mindfulness*, Heidegger employs *Seyn* in its 18th-century orthography in order to contrast the dynamic **meaning** of that key term with a static, substantive variation prevalent throughout **metaphysics**.

**BEING AND TIME (*Sein und Zeit*)**. When *Being and Time* was published in 1927, it became a sensation. This study established Heidegger as an important and original thinker. *Being and Time* is arguably the most important philosophical work of its century. Of the originally projected two parts, each comprising three divisions, only the first two divisions of Part I were published by Heidegger.

In the main work, Heidegger raises anew the perennial question of the **meaning of being**; that is, the central problem of **ontology**. The goal of his project is to work out a **fundamental ontology**. The originality of his approach is expressed in his attempt to ground ontology in an **ontic** fundament.

The fundament is the **being** of an **entity** for which, in its being, its own being is an issue for it, and which thereby displays a **preontological understanding of being**. Heidegger formally indicates the being of this entity as **being-there**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger sets himself two tasks: (1) the development of the **existential analysis** of being-there that should lay bare **time** as the **horizon** for an **interpretation** of the meaning of being in general (Part I), and (2) the **destruction** of the history of ontology (Part II).

The starting point of the existential analysis of being-there is the fact that in its being, being-there has an **understanding of being**. The **facticity** of being-there shows itself in the **equiprimordiality** of the **existentials** that constitute its ontological **structure**. This also has important consequences for Heidegger's method. Existentials cannot be deduced from one another; they can only be described phenomenologically as they show themselves—that is, in their facticity.

In the first division of Part I, *Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Being-there*, Heidegger describes the basic constitution of being-there as **being-in-the-world**. Since in **phenomenology** we have to go from the dark to the light, we must start by describing being-there in its usual **everydayness**, that is, in its **unowned** or “inauthentic” **existence**. Being-there is first and usually not itself, but absorbed by the **world** and the “**they**.” The “they” turns out to be the “**who**” of everyday being-there.

Being-in-the-world is a unitary **phenomenon** consisting of three elements: (1) the worldhood of the world; (2) the “who” that is in the world; and (3) **being-in**. The worldhood of the world expresses itself in the practical structure in which our everyday **life** takes place. **Involvement** and **significance** characterize **worldhood**. Every entity in the world can be a source of concern and have **meaning**. The who of being-in-the-world is being-there. **Disposedness**, **understanding**, and **discourse** determine being-there. In the fundamental disposedness of **anxiety**, being-there understands its essential **finitude**. Being-there is first and foremost **thrownness** and exists in unowned or nonindividualized **modes**. Heidegger describes the unitary basic structure of being, that is, its being, as **care**.

In the second division, *Being-there and Temporality*, Heidegger describes the **possibility** of the **owned** or individualized **self** in its being-a-whole. Being-there's most unique possibility is disclosed in its **anticipating** its ultimate possibility: **death**. The possibility of owned or individualized existence is both expressed and “attested” to by the **call of conscience**. Being-there remains **guilty**, because it can never completely master the circumstances into which it is thrown and accept the limitations of its possibilities. All possibilities of being-there spring ultimately from its possibility of death. Being-there unlocks and discloses its factual possibilities in **resoluteness**, that is, in choosing to be itself.

The original unity of the structure of care lies in temporality. As being-ahead-of-itself, being-there is grounded in the **future**; as being-already-in **having been**; and finally as being-among (entities) in the **present**. Original or **primordial time** is finite. In the **moment** of insight, resoluteness anticipates the possibility of its death and repeats the possibility of its birth. **Temporality** temporalizes possible ways of itself that enable the manifold modes of being-there's being, especially the basic possibility of owned and un-owned existence. The dynamic of temporality is temporalizing in the unity and equiprimordiality of the **ecstases**: future, present, and having been. These different ways are grounded in the unitary structure of care. Temporalizing is an interjoining of the "whereto" of each of the temporal ecstases that Heidegger explains as **schematizing**. Temporality actualizes its different dimensions through various **horizontal schemas**. Traditional ontology failed to understand the being of being-there from temporality and thus made it impossible to disclose the meaning of being from the **horizon** of time.

Heidegger worked out several versions of the third division, "Time and Being," of Part I. Part II exists in the form of lecture notes and works such as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Yet Heidegger was unable to "complete" *Being and Time* according to the initial plan he had outlined. As the **turning** opened up a new **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*), Heidegger would later reflect on this difficulty in such essays as *Letter on "Humanism."* There he would point to his difficulty in arriving at a **language** that could break free from the limitations of **metaphysics**, which was necessary in order to proceed along the path of the turning, and thereby transpose the key terms of inquiry from "being and time" to "time and being." In his effort to **overcome metaphysics**, Heidegger would reconsider being-there in terms of its **belonging together** with being and, conversely, understand time anew from the **history of being**.

*See also* CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: THE T/HERE AND THE BE-ING (ENOWNING) (*Beiträge zur Philosophie—Da-sein und das Seyn (Ereignis)*); ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**BEING AND TRUTH (*Sein und Wahrheit*)**. Two lecture-courses combine to make up volume 36/37 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. The lecture-course *The Fundamental Question of Philosophy* was held in the summer semester of 1933, while the lecture-course *On the Essence of Truth* was held in the winter semester 1933/34. From a historical vantage point, these lecture-courses are particularly noteworthy because they span the period in which Heidegger occupied the position of rector of the University of Freiburg.

In *The Fundamental Question of Philosophy*, Heidegger raises the question of the role that **philosophy** may have in the turbulent period of Germany in the early 1930s. He proceeds through a methodology to **question-back** to

the **origin** of philosophy, by first distinguishing what it is *not*. According to Heidegger, philosophy is not (1) natural science as the theoretical cognition of a specific area within **entities**; (2) a **worldview**; (3) a laying of the foundation for knowledge; (4) absolute knowledge; or (5) an examination of the individual or the self, specifically as exemplified in **Kierkegaard**'s reaction to **German idealism**. In contrast to these five characterizations, Heidegger argues that philosophy is an encounter with the overwhelming power of **being's unconcealment**. Correlatively, through this confrontation and struggle, **being-there** first arrives at its historical mission and **destiny**. This destiny seizes upon **possibilities** that have shaped Western **history** since the dawn of philosophy with the ancient Greeks.

Heidegger lays out this lecture-course from the summer semester of 1933 in four chapters, along with a succinct introduction and conclusion. Each of these chapters is devoted to an overriding theme, namely, the question of whether philosophy can speak to the **moment** in which humanity discovers its historical, spiritual mission, and thereby can enact **decisions** that have political implications. The emphasis on **language** becomes important, because it alone has the power to **disclose being** and thereby meditate the understanding of the highest aspirations of the human **spirit**. The **meaning** of spirit, however, is not self-evident, but must instead be recollected through a **setting-in-opposition** (*Auseinandersetzung*) and critical opposition with previous thinkers. On the heels of his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1930/31, Heidegger identifies **Hegel** as the key thinker in the Western **tradition** who has developed the concern for Spirit into the ultimate theme of philosophy. Thus, much of Heidegger's discussion centers on an **interpretation** of Hegel's thinking and its transformation of metaphysics into its onto-theo-logical form.

Heidegger concludes this lecture-course by emphasizing that the ground for any political engagement remains problematic, because its **question-worthiness** has not been addressed. He thereby remains skeptical about the factual circumstances that surround any such political movement, including **National Socialism**; philosophical wisdom cannot be directly and immediately transferred into the political arena.

In *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger returns to a discussion of Greek philosophy, albeit with a political twist parallel to the preceding lecture-course. Heidegger develops this lecture-course in two parts, which also includes a lengthy introduction and two appendixes containing "Notes" and "Drafts" of the lecture-course. Returning to **Heraclitus**, Heidegger emphasizes that the **experience** of the interdependence of being and **truth** is essential to understanding the dynamic of the latter. Thus, truth as unconcealment impacts being-there directly and shapes its capacity to be a people and occupy a nation. Once again, Heidegger emphasizes that language is necessary to mediate any such **spiritual** and cultural developments. Language, however,



ultimately hinges on the capacity of being-there to **keep silent**, for language harbors the original disposedness and **grounding attunement** by which being-there can participate in unconcealment.

In Part One, Heidegger provides a detailed **interpretation** of the allegory of the cave in **Plato's Republic**. As an overriding theme, Heidegger juxtaposes truth with **freedom**, in order to illustrate the transformation by way of which the **self** participates in unconcealment and thereby acquires the capacity to act as well as think. Accordingly, the cave allegory presents the concrete situation of being-there as vacillating between truth and untruth, unconcealment and concealment, and, correlatively, in outlining the **path** toward emancipation from imprisonment to **error**.

In Part Two, Heidegger provides an interpretation of Plato's *Theaetetus* to raise the question of the endemic trait or **essence** of untruth. Heidegger challenges the conventional viewpoint that the *Theaetetus* is primarily an account of the problem of knowledge. Instead, he argues that untruth is an **ontological** rather than epistemic issue; that is, it originates from the **concealment** of being. Thus, **untruth** is counterposed with truth as unconcealment. Human beings may falsely **perceive** an object and mistake a shadow for an intruder. But on a deeper level, the self encounters untruth as a dimension of its **unownedness** and its struggle to **understand** its historical origins.

At the close of the lecture, Heidegger alludes to the recent chatter (in 1933) by those who invoke the concepts of "blood and soil" as a rallying cry of National Socialism. He emphasizes that these are "not sufficient conditions" to **ground being-there** as a **people**.

*See also ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF METAPHYSICS, THE (Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik).*

**BEING OF ENTITIES (*Sein des Seienden*).** The traditional concept of **being** understands the attribute that all **entities** share insofar as they are and exist. This attribute is **beingness**, that is, the attribute that makes entities what they are, just as beauty is the attribute that makes entities beautiful. Remaining **unthought** in this traditional concept of being is the **difference** between being, as the **expanse** of manifestation or **clearing**, and what becomes manifest, or the entities themselves. Heidegger emphasizes the power of the double genitive, such that being manifests itself through entities and, conversely, entities are always determined in their role of manifesting being.

**BEING-HISTORICAL THINKING (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*).** Heidegger reserves this term to define his own unique and singular mission of recasting the **question of all questions**, or **being**, within the widest historical

context of its emergence and withdrawal from **thought**. The enactment of being-historical thinking then becomes the primary focus that guides his writings, beginning with *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38).

Being-historical thinking proceeds from the premise that the concealment of being also harbors **possibilities** for its **unconcealment**, as if **incubated** in the **past** only to reemerge and arrive in the **future**. Contrary to a conventional model of linear **time**, being-historical thinking also thinks ahead into the future and thereby becomes receptive to a **destiny** that **retrieves** the past. Most fundamentally, being-historical thinking is already under way or directed toward a transition or **crossing** over to the **other beginning**.

**BEING-IN (*In-Sein*)**. Being-in is an **existential** of **being-there**, which has **being-in-the-world** as its essential state. **Disposedness**, **discovery**, and **interpretedness** determine being-in. Heidegger painstakingly tries to eradicate every vestige of spatial containment. “In” is derived from *innan*, which means to reside. It is the “in” of *in-timate in-terest* (**care**, **concern**) *in* the **world**. Being-in is the way in which being-there is intimately involved in habitative **dwelling**.

**BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (*In-der-Welt-sein*)**. As early as 1919, Heidegger emphasized that **life** is always life in a **world**. Being-in-the-world became the **formal indication** of **being-there**’s being in a world in 1923. Being-there is not first locked up within itself; neither does it have to step outside itself to meet the external world. Being-there as **existence** is always already standing out *in* a world. In **everydayness**, being-there is disclosed as a world with which we are familiar.

**BEINGNESS (*Seiendheit*)**. Beingness is the common element that makes **entities** what they are, just as beauty is the attribute that makes entities beautiful. **Metaphysics** addresses entities in terms of what they have in common, without first questioning how these entities can become manifest in their **being**. The misidentification of being with beingness forms the cornerstone of Western **metaphysics**, beginning with **Plato** and **Aristotle**.

**BEING-OUT-FOR (*Sein-zu, Aussein-auf*)**. Heidegger introduced the **formal indication** being-out-for in his winter semester 1925/26 course on **logic**. **Existence** is itself being-out-for its own **can-be**. This implies that existence can never find its end and will remain unfinished. As long as being-there is, there is something in it that still stands out. This outstanding possibility is its own **death** as its ultimate end.

**BEINGS (*Seiende*)**. See ENTITY (*Seiende*).

**BEING-THERE (*Dasein*).** In *Being and Time*, being-there is the **formal indication** of the **entity** that is **ontologically** distinguished from all other entities by the fact that, in its very **existence**, the challenge and **meaning** of existing is an issue for it. Being-there is a **way of being** of **human beings**, which harbors the **possibility** of raising the **question of being**. Being-there is determined in its existence as **care** and as the structure of **being-in-the-world**. From *Contributions to Philosophy* onward, Heidegger understands being-there as the “there” (*Da*) or **place** for the **unconcealment** of **being**.

*See also* T/HERE (*Da*).

**BEING-TOWARD-DEATH (*Sein-zum-Tode*).** Being-toward-death is an **existential**, which makes **being-there’s** being a **whole** possible. Like all existentials, being-toward-death has both an owned or “individualized” and an unowned or “nonindividualized” **mode**. Unowned or “inauthentic” being-toward-death flees in **fear** from **death** as its most unique **possibility**: the possible impossibility of being-there’s **existence**. In fear, being-there tries to remain indifferent to its uttermost possibility and considers death as something that does not concern it just yet. In owned or “authentic” being-toward-death, being-there does not evade death as its most unique possibility. It trembles in **anxiety** for the **nothing** of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety throws being-there back upon itself and thus frees it from its absorption by the **world** and the “**they**.” Owned being-toward-death makes being-there’s **anticipatory resoluteness** possible and therewith the **self’s** individualized being-a-whole. Anticipatory resoluteness is the ontic-ontological prefiguration for tracing out the **structure** of the primordial **temporality**.

*See also* ANTICIPATE (*Vorlaufen*).

**BEING-WITH (*Mitsein*).** Heidegger introduced this term in 1925 to articulate the initial encounter with the other in his/her having to do with the **world** and his/her function in the world along with me, that is, his/her *Mit-dasein* or being-there-with. In *Being and Time*, being-with is one of the equiprimordial **existentials** of **being-there**. Heidegger describes the distinctive way in which being-there **comports** itself and shows concern for the other as **solitude**. As a **formal indication**, being-with refers to the reciprocity of mutual comporting. Others are always there with me, and I am always there with others.

Contrary to **Descartes’s** solipsism in privileging the “I think,” Heidegger shows that the **self** exists through its being-with others and as **situated** within a world.

**BEING-WITH-ONE-ANOTHER** (*Miteinandersein*). This term speaks specifically to the social dimension of **being-there**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had described the concern for others or **solicitude** through the structure of **being-with** (*Mitsein*). In his two lecture-courses from 1933–34, **Being and Truth**, he develops this concept in connection with interpreting both Plato’s and Aristotle’s characterizations of how individuals attain citizenship, belong to, and become members of the state. Heidegger also addresses how being-with-one-another depends upon an exchange of **language** by which obligations can be formed and communities can be developed within the broader context of a shared **world**.

**BELONGING TOGETHER** (*Zusammgehören*). In order to characterize the “**turning** relation” of **being** to **human being**, Heidegger employs the term belonging together. Simultaneously, he recollects the **origin** of **Parmenides**’s famous statement that being and thought are the same. For Heidegger, however, the sameness is not a simple unity, but a tension **between** being and **thinking**. In *The Principle of Identity*, Heidegger addresses the reciprocity between being and thinking that delivers one over to the other, in order that each can come into its own.

*See also* ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**BEON** (*SEYN*). *See* BE-ING (*Seyn*).

**BERGSON, HENRI (1859–1941)**. Bergson was one of the most influential French philosophers of the 20th century. Due to his eclectic contributions in many fields, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1927. His major works include *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (1888/1910) and *Creative Evolution* (1907/1911).

Among his most important philosophical contributions, Bergson addressed the lived-experience of **time**, in a manner that would parallel Heidegger’s account of the **phenomenon** of **temporality**. Bergson emphasized in particular the temporal dimension of duration and its role in the **experience** and formation of human **consciousness**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1927, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger credits Bergson for his critique of the **Aristotelian** concept of time, as well as for his critical appraisal of Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity. Yet Heidegger also argues that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle’s account of time by conflating it with **space**. On the flip side, Heidegger criticizes Bergson for inadvertently privileging the temporal dimension of the present, thereby presuming the **ecstatic** constitution of **primordial time**. In Part IV of *Kant and the*

*Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger extends this criticism of Bergson, who, like **Wilhelm Dilthey**, overlooks the deeper interdependence between temporality and human **finitude**.

Ultimately, the differences between Heidegger's and Bergson's versions of time outweigh the similarities, even though both can be credited with making important breakthroughs in that area of study.

**BETHINGING** (*die Bedingnis*). Heidegger refers to the “thinging of the thing” to describe the dynamic of **thing**'s way of **presencing**. In his essay on **Stefan George**'s poetry in *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger describes the manner in which the word “bethings the thing” by allowing it to first be *as* a thing. He thereby points to the intimacy between **language** and **being**.

*See also* WORLD WORLDS (*Welt weltet*).

**BETWEEN, THE** (*das Zwischen*). The between marks the tension of the **ontological difference**, the dynamic contrast differentiating **being** from **entities**. This differentiation is also the **expansion** of the **clearing** in which being both manifests itself and withdraws and, conversely, allows entities to appear and be encountered as such. The between is the dimension out of which the **play of time-space** occurs. This dimension of differentiation and **crossing** makes possible the encounter of **being-there** and entities, of the **mortals** and the **divinities**, and of **earth** and **sky**.

In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger points to the between as the **open** area of the **self**'s encounter with the **otherness** of the **thing**.

**BETWEEN-SPACE** (*Zwischenraum*). Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). The between-space includes the intermediary zone of differentiation, where **gods** and **mortals** are set apart and thereby stand in relationship to each other. The between-space allows gods and mortals “to be” by virtue of their interdependence.

*See also* LAST GOD, THE (*der letzte Gott*).

**BEYNG** (*SEYN*). *See* BE-ING (*Seyn*).

**BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1881–1966)**. Ludwig Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist of German Jewish descent who, along with **Medard Boss**, probably had the greatest influence on the development of existential psychology and psychotherapy. Like Boss, Binswanger appealed to Heidegger's analytic of **being-there** or human **existence** as **being-in-the-world**—that is, as governed by its environmental and social relations—in order to delineate the

existential basis of mental illness. His most important works include *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* (1942; *Basic Forms and Realization of Human Existence*, 1962).

On 30 October 1965, Heidegger delivered his lecture *On the Question concerning the Determination of the Matter of Thinking* (*Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens*), in honor of Binswanger. However, in his *Zollikon Seminars* with Medard Boss, Heidegger casts a critical light on the underlying premises of Binswanger's existential approach to psychiatry. Specifically, in *Zollikon Seminars* of 8 March 1965, Heidegger takes issue with Binswanger's attempt to establish the **subjectivity** of the **self** as the basis of transcendence as a **movement** of "stepping beyond," rather than vice-versa. In *Zollikon Seminars* of 14 July 1969, Heidegger follows up on this previous criticism. He agrees with Binswanger that the subject-object dichotomy inhibits any psychotherapeutic **understanding** of the self, but then suggests that Binswanger lapses into an exclusively **ontical** or derivative characterization of transcendence, which neglects its **ontological** dimension of **disclosedness**.

**BIOLOGISM** (*Biologismus*). Heidegger consistently rejects **metaphysical** characterizations based on contemporary theories of the **natural sciences**. One such example is biologism, that is, the attempt to construe human nature according to biological **categories**, including physical urges, drives, and the overall **will** toward survival. According to Heidegger, biologism can also provide fodder for stereotypical racial characterizations, that is, in terms of degree of intelligence and physical superiority. He rejected this methodology as both unsound and prejudicial. However, Heidegger's focus in this criticism remained on an **ontological** plane. That is, he saw biologism as an attempt to reduce the **fundamental ontology** of **being-there** to the **ontic** level of physical characteristics. In this way, Heidegger construes biologism as a corollary of **anthropologism**.

In his *Letter on "Humanism,"* Heidegger singles out biologism as a particular mistake that occurs in reducing the ecstatic dimension of being-there to a conception of what it means to be human, as based on physical characteristics or those held in common with **animals**. His disavowal of biologism emerges in a context in which he seeks to differentiate his account of the **t/here** as the **place of being's unconcealment** from **Jean-Paul Sartre's** existentialist vision of the **self**.

**BLACK NOTEBOOKS, THE** (*Schwarzen Hefte*). *The Black Notebooks* are a group of texts comprising the concluding volumes of Heidegger's **Complete Edition** (at least through volume 99). In total, there are (a projected 33) of the notebooks, not all of which have been published. They serve

as something like a diary, reflecting his personal observations on the crisis of his era throughout the period 1931–51. The “black” (*schwarz*) in the title refers to the actual color of the cover or booklet in which the *Notebooks* were contained, rather than to the philosophical content of the texts themselves. Unlike with his other writings, Heidegger employed covers made of part wax called *Wachstuchheft*, in order to collect the texts in a single place (rather than on separate sheets of paper as he had customarily done).

*The Black Notebooks* include texts under the title *Ponderings* (*Überlegnungen*), which are designated by Roman numerals II–VI. *Überlegnungen I* was lost. In the preamble or epigraph to *Ponderings II–VI*, Heidegger emphasizes that the writings contained therein do not advance “assertions” (*Aussagen*) as part of “a planned system” (*ein geplantes System*), but instead are only “delineations” (*Aufzeichnungen*) that qualify as “attempts at a simple naming” (*Versuche des einfachen Nennens*). These attempts are his **venture** into the uncharted waters both of formulating the task of **being-historical thinking** and addressing the rise of **National Socialism** in Germany in the 1930s. Barring any systematic unity, there remain tensions and incongruities in the views that Heidegger presents on both philosophical and political fronts.

The vexing problem that surfaces throughout the *Black Notebooks* pertains to stereotypical conceptions of **race**, particularly anti-Semitism, that became endemic to National Socialism, and which Heidegger notes in his own loosely formulated ruminations. There are scattered passages within these texts in which he seems to endorse a brand of “cultural” racism, despite elsewhere vehemently opposing the **biological** and **anthropological** conceptions of racial superiority held by the Nazis. Certainly in some instances, Heidegger’s “ponderings” are his reflections on the political upheaval of Germany culminating in World War II and its aftermath. As such, his observations reflect the *Zeitgeist* of the 1930s, including many of its cultural stereotypes and biases.

*See also* LEADERSHIP (*Führerschaft*); OBSERVATIONS I–V (BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1942–1948) (*Amerkungen I–V [Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948]*); PONDERINGS XII–XV: BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1939–1941 (*Überlegungen XII–XV: Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941*).

**BLOCHMANN, ELISABETH (1892–1972).** Blochmann, a student, was a close friend of **Elfride Heidegger-Petri**. Very soon she and Heidegger became close friends as well. Their friendship started in 1918 and lasted until her death in 1972. The correspondence between the two gives many valuable insights into Heidegger’s life and work. In the early years of their friendship, Heidegger acted as a mentor. He told her which philosophical books to read and encouraged her in her studies. She was a student of Georg Simmel, Georg Misch, and Hermann Nohl, and became a highly regarded pedagogue

in her own time. When Blochmann was forced to leave Germany in 1934 because of her Jewish background, Heidegger gave her letters of recommendation and helped her as much as he could. After World War II, they resumed their friendship.

**BODYING FORTH (*Leiben*).** Throughout his vast writings, Heidegger rarely refers to the **phenomenon** of the body. Perhaps the most important exception occurs in *Zollikon Seminars*. In his discussions with the Swiss psychiatrist **Medard Boss**, Heidegger refers to the lived-body (*Leib*) as a temporal-spatial **site** wherein the **self** confronts the **facticity** of its circumstances. As simultaneously abounding within a field of **possibilities** and dispersed within specific circumstances, the self exists through the conditions of its embodiment or as bodying forth. Heidegger opposes **René Descartes**'s dualism that opposes body to soul, the physical to the mental. Instead, human beings experience their embodiment as arising from their **thrownness** into, and as expressing their disclosure of, a **world**.

Included within the dynamic of bodying forth is the possibility of sexual differentiation, or the distinction between male and female genders. Sexual differentiation **formally indicates** the character of the self's thrownness into the world, over which the individual has no control, including the inability to select one's parents.

**BÖHME, JACOB (1575–1624).** Böhme was a German mystic whose vision of **God** as an abyss or **abgrund** (*Abgrund*) greatly influenced **F. W. J. Schelling**'s depiction of the Divine. In *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (1936), Heidegger cites Böhme, along with **Meister Eckhart**, as key influences in Schelling's attempt to conceive of God as bearing a light that illuminates its deepest **ground**. Heidegger draws an analogy between **being** as the interplay between **unconcealment** and **concealment** and the Divine as the unity of ground and existence. Analogously for him, being also harbors the deepest **mystery**.

**BOREDOM (*Langeweile*).** In Heidegger's winter semester 1929/30 lecture-course, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, boredom replaces **anxiety** as the basic **mood** of **being-there**. Boredom means literally a long **while**. If time becomes lengthy for being-there, it tries to drive time and its boring character away. Being-there does not want to have a long time. Boredom means almost the same as **homesickness**. The basic mood or **grounding attunement** of modern philosophizing is homesickness and no longer the **astonishment** of **Greek philosophy**. In boredom, the temporal **horizon** of **presence** becomes so wide that entities manifest themselves indifferently. Thus, as Heidegger maintains in *What Is Metaphysics?*, boredom provides



the backdrop of indifference whereby **beings in the whole** withdraw and set the stage for being-there's suspension in the **nothing** through its **experience** of anxiety. Thus pervasive boredom occurs, not through a lack of concern with any specific activity, but instead when this mood envelops being-there and it is thereby "truly bored."

**BOSS, MEDARD (1903–90).** Medard Boss was a Swiss psychiatrist and psychotherapist. His friendship with Heidegger started in 1947 when Heidegger answered his letter full of questions about *Being and Time*. Boss applied the basic precepts of Heidegger's **existential analysis** of **being-there** to provide a concrete foundation for psychotherapy, which diverged from the psychoanalytic school of Sigmund Freud. Boss's most influential work is *Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions: A Daseinanalytic Approach to the Psychopathology of the Phenomenon of Love* (1949). From 1959 until 1969, Boss organized Heidegger's famous seminars in Zollikon, Switzerland.

*See also* ZOLLIKON SEMINARS (*Zollikoner Seminare*).

**BOUNDARY SITUATION (*Grenzsituation*).** The notion of a boundary (*Grenze*) arises in German **philosophy** with **Immanuel Kant**'s attempt to circumscribe the **finitude** of human knowledge, as exemplified in his "Conclusion" to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Subsequently, **Karl Jaspers** reintroduced this concept in his groundbreaking book *Psychology of Worldviews*, which would inaugurate the German philosophy of **existence**. Boundary situations are those decisive situations that are tied to what the **human being** as such is and are inevitably given with finite **being-there**. They all pose ultimate incompatibilities, which underscore the impossibility of grasping the unity and wholeness of our finite **situation**. Thus the boundary situation of **death** contradicts **life**, change contradicts necessity, war contradicts reciprocity, and **guilt** contradicts innocence. As finite beings, we must come to grips with the boundary situations of our lives. The way we react to and try to find stability in relation to these boundary situations determines **who** we are. We can either look death right in the eye or try to hide from it.

As Jaspers remarks, the contradictions of boundary situations remain as antinomies to the boundary of our knowledge in the face of infinities. This means that our consciousness of boundaries must at the same time be our consciousness of the infinite **whole** of life. The **experience** of the antinomy of life is at once the experience of its unity. Boundary situations make the experience of the **transcendence** of our being-there possible, since we can only experience a boundary as boundary when we transcend it. Here our possible existence becomes actual existence. Heidegger welcomed Jaspers's

attempt to illuminate the whole of existence from boundary situations. He would have had to adapt and modify the notion of the boundary situation for use in his **phenomenology of facticity**, since he rejects Jaspers's Kantian methodology and concept of existence. In his summer semester 1919 course, Heidegger replaces the boundary situation with the **situation-I**, which he would develop into the concept of situation in *Being and Time*.

**BRAIG, CARL (1853–1923).** This Thomistic theologian was one of the major influences on Heidegger's earliest thought. As a schoolboy, he came across Braig's book *On Being*, in which he found long citations from **Aristotle**, Thomas Aquinas, and Francisco Suárez, as well as the etymology of **ontological** concepts. Braig developed an **ontology**, which Heidegger could assimilate with Franz Brentano's doctrine of **being**. At the University of **Freiburg**, Heidegger attended some of Braig's lecture-course on **theology**. Heidegger at first supported his critique of modernity in his *Youthful Theological Writings*. Braig, however, was also a major catalyst for Heidegger's interest in German idealism and speculative theology. In *My Way to Phenomenology*, Heidegger acknowledges his debt to Braig.

**BREMEN AND FREIBURG LECTURES, THE (*Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*).** These lectures are among the most pivotal of Heidegger's later attempts to address key topics in the development of his **philosophy**, including issues pertaining to **technology** and the **belonging together of being and thinking**. The lectures are now included in volume 79 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**.

In 1949, Heidegger delivered four lectures to the Bremen Club under the heading "Insight into That Which Is." These lectures comprised his first public presentation after World War II. They include (1) *The Thing*, (2) *Enframing*, (3) *The Danger*, and (4) *The Turning*. The Freiburg lectures were delivered in 1957 under the heading *The Principles of Thinking*. Foremost among these lectures was *The Principle of Identity* (Lecture III).

**BRENTANO, FRANZ (1838–1917).** From 1907 onward, Heidegger worked his way again and again through the first philosophical work that he studied: Brentano's dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. He received this book as a gift from his fatherly friend, **Conrad Gröber**. From Brentano's study, Heidegger learned the fourfold **determination of being** in the Aristotelian corpus. Brentano was not only at the root of Heidegger's study of **Aristotle**; he was also **Edmund Husserl**'s one and only teacher in **philosophy**. In his psychological studies, Brentano developed his celebrated doctrine of **intentionality**, which would become of utmost importance to the **phenomenological** movement.

**BUILDING (*bauen*).** According to Heidegger, the stem of the German verb *bauen* bears affinity with forms of the verb “to be” (*ich bin, du bist*). Building is the manner in which **being-there** dwells in the **world**. Building as **dwelling** unfolds into the building that cultivates living things and the building that erects constructions. A construction, for instance, a bridge, gathers to itself in its own way **earth** and **sky**, **divinities** and **mortals**. The **location** of a building allows the **fourfold** to enter into a **site** by arranging the site into different **spaces**, where everything has its **place**. Building lets **things** be as things and preserves **being** in things. In building its home in the world and letting things shine forth as what they are, being-there responds to the **address of being**. Being at home is the **moment** of appropriating what is most one’s own, becoming rooted, or **autochthony**.

*See also* BUILDING DWELLING THINKING (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*).

**BUILDING DWELLING THINKING (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*).** In this 1951 lecture, Heidegger develops the essential continuity of **being**, **building**, **dwelling**, and **thinking** and continues his meditation on the **thing**. Dwelling is now the fundamental **ontological** structure of **being-there**, its way of **being-in-the-world**. It is the manner in which **mortals** are on the **earth** and under the **sky** and exist before the **divinities**. Dwelling comports two dimensions: mortals are in the **fourfold** inasmuch as they dwell, and in dwelling they take care of and attend to the **entities** that they encounter. The basic character of dwelling is to safeguard, to preserve. In dwelling, mortals preserve the fourfold in its essential **being**, its manner of **presencing**. In dwelling, mortals take their **measure** from the way the **world** fits together or conjoins and lets entities show themselves as they are. Dwelling is building a home in the **world**. Building is being-there’s response to the **claim** of being, inasmuch as being-there reveals things in their uniqueness and singularity. In thinking, being-there responds to this appeal by trying to commemorate the **unconcealment** of being and allow its voice to **echo**. Only in thinking can we become **mindful** of the **difference** between being and entities and experience the **truth of being**.

*See also* THING, THE (*Das Ding*); WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? (*Was heißt denken?*).

**BULTMANN, RUDOLF (1884–1976).** Heidegger and Bultmann became close friends after Heidegger’s appointment as a professor in **Marburg** in the 1920s. They studied the writings of Martin Luther together and jointly held seminars on theological exegesis. Bultmann was strongly influenced by the **existential analysis** of **being-there**, which he used for his demythologizing **interpretation** of the Bible. Bultmann’s interest in the methodology of bibli-

cal interpretation, on the one hand, and Heidegger's religious background, on the other, created a bond in their mutual concern for developing **hermeneutics** in the 20th century.

Heidegger's subsequent involvement with **National Socialism** in the 1930s led to an estrangement between the two. After World War II, they were able to work out their differences and continue their friendship.

# C

**CALCULATIVE THINKING** (*rechnendes Denken*). Calculative thinking is the **ground** of modern **science**. Beginning with **René Descartes**, the **beingness** of **entities** was reduced to **being** as an object for a self-certain subject. The **meaning of being** becomes the **representation of nature** as an object to be used, manipulated, and exploited. As representations, **entities** become measurable. Since modern science is only concerned with measurement, it reduces the being of entities to quantity and thus makes their technological control possible. Entities are used up and reduced to a dull and indistinguishable uniformity. In the age of **nihilism**, even **human beings** have become nameless faces that only count as numbers. **Being-there** itself has become a means to the quest for power for its own sake, the sheer **will** to will. The task of **mindfulness**, or the enactment of **being-historical thinking**, is not to strive for control and power, but to surrender itself to the **address of being**. The **thinking of be-ing** is giving **thanks**. In this sense, modern science does not think. According to Heidegger, science still has to learn how to think.

*See also* SCIENCE AND MINDFULNESS (*Wissenschaft und Besinnung*).

**CALL OF CONSCIENCE** (*Gewissensruf*). Because **being-there** exists first and for the most part in an **unowned** mode, the **fallenness** of the unowned self has to be broken. **Conscience** calls for being-there to address the demands of its own unique **situation** and to choose to be an individual. It summons being-there in its **mineness** to its unique possibilities. By the call of conscience, being-there is called forth into the **truth** of its individual existence. The call of conscience does not present being-there with universal claims of obligation. Instead, by heeding the call of conscience, the self can first become answerable for its choices and its actions. Heidegger thereby grounds the **possibility** of morality in the call of conscience.

*See also* CAN-BE (*Seinkönnen*); HEARING (*hören*); SELF-RESPONSIBILITY (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*).

**CAN-BE (*Seinkönnen*)**. Heidegger first understood **being-there's way of being** as can-be in his 1924 lecture *The Concept of Time*. Being-there has the original **possibility** to be or not to be its “there,” its that it is and how it is. The **I** is always “**who** it can be” and “**how** it is,” that is, in the **mode** of **ownedness** or **unownedness**. Heidegger describes the very **being** of being-there as being-out-toward who it is not, but can be. This **structure** later gives birth to the **formal indication** of **existence**. As existence, being-there is always a going-toward, still under way, a can-be, and therefore it is never complete or finished. It is the possibility of being **free** for its most unique can-be, its **death**. Death is the ultimate can-be of being-there. The **call of conscience** provides being-there with the attestation of its “ownmost,” individualized can-be. The existence of being-there is in each case mine, my own can-be, mine to assume ownership and make my own. That is what I am capable of doing, by assuming responsibility for my existence. I owe it to myself to own up to my existence. Existence is, in its **givenness**, the **gift** of the having to be, of being-there as a can-be. **Understanding** discloses to being-there the can-be “for the sake of which” it is.

**CAPTIVATION (*Benommenheit*)**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger addresses the distinctive character of the **comportment** of **animals**, which he characterizes as a form of behavior. Contrary to **human beings**, animals are **world-poor**, but they also have a capacity to negotiate their **environments**. Heidegger characterizes the narrowness of the scope of animal life in negotiating the specific sphere of its environment as **captivation**. Captivation distinguishes the **being** of animals, their way “to be” or their intrinsic possibility. All the various comportments in which animals engage—for example, hunting, eating, and reproducing—stem from **captivation**. As such, **captivation** is not merely a static condition, but instead is that dynamic or impetus that draws the animal out into its sphere of interest.

In emphasizing the role of **captivation**, Heidegger diverges from predominant, reductionist theories of his time that construe animal life exclusively in terms of a set of drives and impulses, including the evolutionary thesis of the “survival of the fittest.”

**CARE (*Sorge*)**. In his summer semester 1925 lecture-course *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Heidegger replaces **Edmund Husserl's** conception of **intentionality** with the **formal indication** of **care**. Care is, in **being-there's** relation to its **world**, **concern**, and in its relation to others, **solicitude**. The formal **structure** of care is being-there's being-ahead-of-

itself in its always already being involved in something. For being-there, its very **being** is an issue, or in other words, being-there's **existence** matters to and concerns it.

In *Being and Time*, care becomes the **ontological** term for the unity of being-there's structural **whole** of relations, which consists of **facticity** or **thrownness (past)**, **being-with** or **fallenness (present)**, and existence or **can-be (future)**. **Temporality** is the **ontological meaning** of care and its original condition of **possibility**. The basic constitution of care can only be grounded in temporality.

**CARE OF THE WORD (*Sorge des Wortes*)**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester 1942/43, *Parmenides*, Heidegger emphasizes that the task of **translation** involves caring for and safeguarding the **word**, in order to allow **language** to speak. **Care** of the word is a necessary addendum for **thinking**, understood as a conservatorship of the **truth of being**. **Poetry** is also an instance where care of the word is paramount.

**CASSIRER, ERNST (1874–1945)**. Ernst Cassirer was the last representative of the **Marburg** school of **neo-Kantianism**. He first met Heidegger in 1923 in Hamburg on the occasion of the latter's 1 December lecture at the **Immanuel Kant** Society, then again in Davos at one of the special courses that the university organized each year. They worked together in workshops and gave lectures. The highlight of the conference was the famous *Davos Disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger* in the spring of 1929. In 1931, Cassirer wrote a review (published in *Kant-Studien*) of Heidegger's book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in which he criticized Heidegger for overemphasizing the centrality of **schematism** and for his failure to see the importance of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

*See also* CASSIRER REVIEW, THE (*Die Cassirer-Rezension*); ON ODEBRECHT'S AND CASSIRER'S CRITIQUE OF THE KANTBOOK (*Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuches*).

**CASSIRER REVIEW, THE (*Die Cassirer-Rezension*)**. Heidegger's disputation with **Ernst Cassirer** predates their famous debate in Davos in the spring of 1929. In his review of the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, volume 2, *Mystical Thinking*, Heidegger welcomed the attempt by Cassirer to give a systematic philosophical **interpretation** of myth. Foremost in Cassirer's account is the analysis of mythic thinking as a given culture's encounter with the overwhelming and awesome power of magical forces. Heidegger's main point of criticism is Cassirer's failure to answer the questions of how myth belongs to **being-there**, on the one hand, and whether or not myth is a fundamental **phenomenon** for **understanding** the **meaning of being**, on the

other. Heidegger's review was later included as Appendix II of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which was published as volume 3 in the **Complete Edition** of his writings.

**CATEGORIAL INTUITION** (*kategoriale Anschauung*). In his summer semester 1925 lecture-course *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Heidegger discusses the three fundamental breakthroughs of **Edmund Husserl's phenomenology: intentionality**, categorial intuition, and the **apriori**. In categorial intuition, the meaningful **structures** from which we experience the **entities** included within them are made explicit through the free variation of ideation. Husserl illustrated categorial intuition through sense **perception**. Sense perception is fulfilled in the bodily **presence** of its object. Categorial intuition is fulfilled in the presence of the categorial forms themselves. In sense perception we see, for example, a white table; in categorial intuition we see that the table *is* white. This "is" or **being** is never given in sense perception, although it makes our perception of the white table possible. Heidegger rejects Husserl's concept of categorial intuition, because it leads to the objectification of **lived experience**. In his hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger transforms categorial intuition into interpretive **understanding**. Lived experiences are through and through expressed experiences. They are expressed in the definite understanding we have of them, as we simply live in them without addressing them thematically. **Interpretive** understanding makes explicit these pregiven, meaningful structures developed by life **situations** in which the **whole** of life expresses itself.

**CATEGORY** (*Kategorie*). The **meaning of being** expresses itself in the categorial **structure** of *logos*, which determines both the **being** of **entities** and our **thinking**. We live in a **meaningful** or categorially structured **world** and are therefore able to make sense of it. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger differentiates carefully between categories and **existentials**. Categories are only valid for entities that are not **being-there** (**nature, equipment, things, objects**) and should not be used to understand being-there or the meaning of being in general. The structure of being-there is not determined by categories, but by existentials.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger reexamines the Kantian **schematism** of the pure concepts or categories of the understanding (*Verstand*), an example of how transcendental determinations of **time**—for example, the schematized category of cause and effect as "temporal succession"—signify the constitution of the sphere of physical objects or nature conceived as **presence-at-hand**.



*See also* QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**CHIASMA.** The Greek word *chiasma* refers to the shape of the letter X. It means placing crosswise or in a diagonal arrangement. In this sense, Heidegger's **fourfold** is a *chiasma* since the **sky** corresponds with the **earth** and the **mortals** with **divinities**. Because of its **presencing** in the fourfold, **being** withdraws as such into **concealment**. Heidegger uses the *chiasma* to "cross out" being in his later **philosophy** in order to distinguish it from the traditional concept of being as **beingness**. Being hides, as it were, behind the appearance of the *chiasma* of the fourfold.

**CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*).** It is not surprising that Christianity is an important factor in the development of Heidegger's thought. He came from a Roman Catholic background and was destined to become a priest. Both Christianity and **modernity** determined the **facticity** of his **existence**. From 1909 to 1911, he studied **theology** at the University of **Freiburg**. Because of health problems, he abandoned his plans for the priesthood and became a philosopher. As a student, he was strongly influenced by both scholasticism and **phenomenology**. He used the modern **logic** of **Edmund Husserl** and **neo-Kantianism** (**Heinrich Rickert**, **Emil Lask**) to interpret scholastic treatises and show their value for modern **philosophy**. The highlight of this approach is his *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*. At first Heidegger was a staunch defender of the eternal **truth** of the Catholic **faith**. Although he criticized modernity for its superficiality and lack of **transcendence**, he still strove to remedy the ills of modern society by making the truth of Catholicism available to his fellow men and women.

After his marriage to Elfride Petri, Heidegger broke with the system of Catholicism in 1919. In his early lecture-course in Freiburg, Heidegger developed a phenomenology of religious experience in which he highlighted the sorrow, affliction, and **worry** of primal Christianity and contrasted it with the theoretical spectator attitude of modern times. The true insights into the facticity of human **life** in primal Christianity were overshadowed by the theological **interpretation** that derived its concepts from **Greek philosophy**. The fundamental difference between the two **factic life experiences** was blurred. To get to the root of primal Christianity, Heidegger worked out a **destruction** of Christian factic life experience.

The main result of the destruction of Christianity was the insight that the moment of worry and the **experience** of **time** as *kairos* were also expressed in the writings of **Aristotle** on practical philosophy. This led to a change in Heidegger's interpretation of history. The facticity of modern life was no

longer the falsification of the factic life experience of primal Christianity by Greek philosophy; rather, the original factic life experience of the Greeks was falsified by its Christian interpretation. Heidegger later moved away from Christianity. In his 1927 lecture *Phenomenology and Theology*, Heidegger's final word about Christianity is that it belongs to theology, that is, the archenemy of philosophy. Christianity is predicated on faith, rather than on the **freedom** of inquiring into the **truth of being**.

*See also* GOD (*Gott*); HISTORY OF BEING (*Seinsgeschichte*).

**CIRCUMSPECTION (*Umsicht*)**. Heidegger's first description of the **environment** is based on looking around rather than getting around. Circumspection is first so named in 1922, in contrast to inspection (*hinsehen*). In *Being and Time*, dealings with **equipment** subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the **in-order-to**. The sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection.

**CLAIM (*Anspruch*)**. In language, human beings can **hear** the claim of **being**. This claim summons or calls human beings to belong to being and to safeguard its **truth**. In our **thinking**, we can respond to the claim of being by abiding or **dwelling** within language.

*See also* ADDRESS OF BEING (*Zuspruch des Seins*); GUARDIANSHIP OF BE-ING (*Wächterschaft des Seyns*).

**CLEARING (*Lichtung*)**. Under the influence of the **tradition** of *lumen naturale*, Heidegger introduced this central term of his later thought in *Being and Time* to name the **disclosedness** of **being-in**. According to the tradition, the **human being** is lighted within itself and has been cleared. The light that makes **being-there** open and bright for itself is **care**. Only by this clearedness is any illuminating, awareness, **intentionality**, and even self-consciousness possible. Heidegger identifies the lighted clearing of being-there with the unity of **ecstatic temporality**. Being-there is the temporal clearing of the **meaning of being**.

In the 1930s, Heidegger rethinks the clearing within the framework of his account of **truth**. He now interprets *alètheia* as a clearing, that is, the illuminating process in which everything that appears is lighted up. The clearing, as the "there" of being-there, is the **unconcealment** of **being**. Being reveals itself in the clearing as the **beingness** of **entities** and conceals itself *as* being. The lightning process of the clearing makes the **history of being** possible and explains the **forgottenness of being** in **metaphysics**. The **structure** of the clearing is the **fourfold** as the outcome of the **play of time-space**.

The clearing also plays an important part in Heidegger's account of **art**. Art is the setting into work of truth, which is only possible when there is a clearing within **entities in the whole**. The clearing as the **nothing** encompasses all entities and enables the work of art to let entities shine forth in their simple and essential being. In this way, the work of art illuminates the **sheltering** of truth as the self-concealing of being.

*See also* SHINING BACK (*Rückschein*).

**COMING TO PRESENCE** (*wesen*). Heidegger uses *wesen* as a verb, although it is seldom used as such in modern German. *Wesen* as a noun (**essence**) is derived from this verb. However, essence does not mean *quidditas* originally, but rather that which comes to be manifest as **present**. The essence of an **entity** does not simply mean what something is, but also means the way in which something pursues its course, the way in which it unfolds through **time** as what it is.

*See also* PRESENCING (*anwesen*).

**COMMEMORATIVE THINKING** (*Andenken*). Since the history of **philosophy** has ended in the reign of **technology** and the frenzy of **calculative thinking**, Heidegger opposes commemorative thinking to calculation and **representation** as another kind of nonmetaphysical **thinking**. It does not try to determine and dominate **entities**, but attempts to let them be what they are. In commemorative thinking, we open ourselves to the **mystery of being**. It is essentially recollection or the **possibility of retrieving the origin** of philosophy. As recollection, commemorative thinking does not think the **history of being** as something of the past; it tries to respond to the **destiny of the truth of being**. Commemorative thinking commemorates the possibility of the **other beginning** in the history of being. Releasement holds sway in the enactment of commemorative thinking. It is the task of the **shepherd of being** to commemorate the appropriation of the truth of being.

**COMMENTS ON KARL JASPERS'S "PSYCHOLOGY OF WORLDVIEWS"** (*Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen"*). Heidegger's essay was meant to be a review of **Karl Jaspers's** famous book, *Psychology of Worldviews*, for publication in the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*. It was first published in 1972, but in June 1919 Heidegger had distributed a typescript of it to Jaspers, **Edmund Husserl**, and **Heinrich Rickert**. The review is a critique, which tries to bring into sharper focus the true tendency and basic motives of Jaspers's problematic and its method. There are at once positive and negative sides to the critique, since it is a destructively renewing appropriation. In the course of the review, Heidegger time and again amplifies and supplements his radical method of

critique with other aspects of the **phenomenological** method. The review is thus both a treatise on phenomenological methodology and a critique of Jaspers's book. Jaspers tries to answer the basic question of psychology, what the **human being** is, by way of a psychology of **worldviews**, which seeks to describe the limits of the soul and thus provide a clear and comprehensive **horizon** for the psychic. Jaspers tries to illuminate the **phenomenon** of **existence** in and through **boundary situations**. He seeks to understand what ultimate positions the soul can assume in these "limiting" situations of **life**.

Heidegger's critique of Jaspers centers on two points. Jaspers introduces the term "existence" as a Kantian idea, that is, something that counts as the **whole** and marks a boundary. He then traces it back to its sources in **Søren Kierkegaard** and **Friedrich Nietzsche**, for whom existence refers to the life of the present **individuality**. According to Heidegger, Jaspers fails to get at the problem of existence because he uncritically borrows his concepts from the philosophical **tradition**. He is unaware of the historical **situation** of his **interpretation**. The second point of critique is his method and his lack of concern over this issue. Jaspers assumes he can describe existence objectively by just looking at it. He contemplatively holds the whole of life in its unity and harmony, untroubled by any self-worldly **concern**.

Heidegger denies that existence can be approached in this basically aesthetic **experience**, since existence is not an object but a particular **way of being**, a certain expression of the "is," which "is" essentially the **meaning** of "I am." I am in having myself. According to Heidegger, the truly actualized **ground** of **factic life experience** is that my life concerns me radically and directly. The "I am" can only be experienced in its full actuality and **facticity**. This having myself assumes different senses in different regards, so that this manifold of senses must be made comprehensible in specifically historical contexts. Only in the infinite process of radical questioning, which holds itself in the question, can the phenomenon of existence be approached. The genuine insights via the boundary situations into the genuine problem of existence that Jaspers has to offer in his book are thus obscured by his lack of methodological concern. As a critical counterpoint, Heidegger introduces his method of **formal indication** to distinguish the preunderstanding of the "I am" in terms of existence (*Existenz*), as a temporal enactment, rather than as a psychic event or mode of self-consciousness.

**COMMUNICATION** (*Mitteilung*). Communication is a **possibility** that arises within **circumspective concern** and pertains to the manner in which **being-there** can "share" (with others) that which it **interprets** with respect to the **entities** that appear within **everydayness**. For example, in building a house, we communicate to others the availability of the hammer as **ready-to-hand**. In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger shows that communication

becomes possible through **discourse**, by which being-there articulates to others what it interprets. A “sharing with” others is thereby a form of **disclosedness**, which comes to fruition in **discourse** as an **existential** of the “there” and implies our **being-with-one-another**.

*See also* BEING-WITH (*Mitsein*); DIALOGUE (*Gespräch*).

**COMPLETE EDITION** (*Gesamtausgabe*). The collection of Heidegger’s writings, including his books, essays, and the transcripts of his lecture-courses, is organized into 102 volumes as the Complete Edition. Heidegger emphasized that the primary **directive** for working out the Complete Edition should be “ways rather than works.” That is, he exhorted the reader to proceed along a **path of thinking** rather than assimilate a set of ideas or a philosophical doctrine. While Heidegger opposed the idea of an editorial board to organize the different volumes, his personal assistant, **Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann**, became the managing editor.

**COMPLETION OF METAPHYSICS** (*Vollendung der Metaphysik*). In terms of the **history of being**, metaphysics reaches its end and completion in **Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power**. By the completion of metaphysics, Heidegger envisions the historical epoch of **modernity**, which gathers forth and unfolds the extreme **possibilities** stemming from the Western tradition’s neglect and **forgottenness of being**. As the initiation of the epoch of modernity, the completion of metaphysics thereby coincides with the rise of modern **technology** and its total preoccupation with dominating **nature**.

**COMPORIMENT** (*Verhalten*). Heidegger employs this term to describe the way in which **being-there** relates to or behaves toward **entities**. Using **equipment**, for example, when I pick up a hammer, is a comportment. Comportments, then, can be as manifold as the various ways in which the **self** interacts with and encounters entities in the **world**.

**CONCEAL** (*verbergen*). *See* CONCEALMENT (*Verborgenheit*).

**CONCEALMENT** (*Verborgenheit*). Heidegger interprets the Greek concept of truth, *alètheia*, as **unconcealment**. Truth must be wrestled from concealment. There are three forms of concealment: (1) truth brings **entities** forth from their original concealment as not yet discovered and **discloses** them in their **being**; (2) the **discovery** of entities may be forgotten or relapse into concealment; and (3) because truth discloses entities in their being, it may also go astray and conceal rather than reveal entities in their being. The danger of **errancy** always lurks just around the corner from truth. In the

unconcealment of entities, being reveals itself as **beingness** and at the same time holds itself back in concealment as being. The **truth of being** is the coming into its own of self-unconcealing concealing and self-concealing unconcealing.

*See also* ENOWNING (*Ereignis*); RESERVEDNESS (*Verhaltenheit*); SHELTERING (*Bergung*).

**CONCEPT OF TIME, THE (*Der Begriff der Zeit*)**. Heidegger presented this public address on 25 July 1924 to the **Marburg** Theologians Society. It contains the core **structure of *Being and Time***. The central topic of the lecture is the question: What is **time**? Heidegger analyzes first the everyday concept of time. Time is related to **movement**. **Aristotle** and Albert Einstein agree that time exists only because of the events that happen within it. In natural **science**, time is measured by a **now** that is so much later than an earlier now and so much earlier than a later now. Yet as St. Augustine has shown, we can measure time only through our **disposedness**. Time is clearly related to the **being-there** of **human beings**.

The **way of being** of being-there is determined by its **particular while-ness**. The **life** of a human being is a succession of the particular **whiles** of its **situation** and is extended between its birth and **death**. Being-there is primarily a **being possible** or **can-be**. Death is the undetermined certainty of being-there's most unique **possibility** of being at an end. When being-there **anticipates** the certain possibility of its ceasing to be, it is with itself individually and truly existent. It thus becomes visible in its unique here-and-now and the once-and-for-all of its unique **fate** in the possibility of its one-and-only givenness. Being-there is its **present** in **everydayness**, its **future** in anticipation, and its **past** in **historicality**. Being-there is time, and therefore the most proper **determination** of time is that time is temporal. Heidegger reformulates the opening question of his lecture, "What is time?" as "**Who** is time?" Are we ourselves time, or am I my time? If I were my time, being-there would become a question for itself. With this statement, Heidegger ends his lecture on the threshold of *Being and Time*.

**CONCERN (*besorgen*)**. Concern is the actualization of **care** as a possible way of **being-in-the-world**. **Being-there** concerns itself with activities it performs and **things** it uses. As the relation between being-there and the things that it encounters within the world, concern is characterized by **circumspection**.

*See also* EQUIPMENT (*Zeug*).

**CONSCIENCE (*Gewissen*).** In *Being and Time*, conscience makes it possible for **being-there** to free itself from its **fallenness** into the **world** and the “**they**.” Conscience calls for being-there to address the demands of its own unique **situation** and to choose to be an individual. The **call of conscience** does not present being-there with universal norms of **existence**. Instead, conscience summons being-there in its **mineness** to its unique **possibilities**. By the call of conscience, being-there is called forth into the **truth** of its individual existence.

**CONSCIOUSNESS (*Bewußtsein*).** Consciousness is a **structure** that Heidegger avoids attributing to the **human being**. In this way, he diverges from the modern emphasis on the **subject**, as espoused by philosophers from **René Descartes** through **Edmund Husserl**. Just as Heidegger argues that **transcendence** provides the **ground of intentionality**, so he maintains that the **disclosedness of being-there** is more basic than consciousness and ultimately belongs to the **clearing of being** itself.

In his *Introduction to “What Is Metaphysics?”* (1949), Heidegger revisits his claim that the **care** of human **ek-sistence** is more primordial than consciousness.

**CONSTANCE (*Konstanz*).** Constance is the town on the Lake of Constance where Heidegger began his preparation for the Roman Catholic priesthood in October 1903. He entered the equivalent of the freshman year of high school at the Heinrich Suso Gymnasium. Simultaneously, he took up residence in the Konradihaus, the archdiocesan high school seminary that had been named after the city’s patron saint. Heidegger’s fatherly friend, **Conrad Gröber**, was the rector of the Konradihaus. Heidegger lived in Constance for the next three years, while pursuing the first half of his secondary education.

**CONTENT SENSE (*Gehaltssinn*).** Heidegger first showed in his winter semester 1919/20 course on the basic problems of **phenomenology** that **fact-ic life** has motives and tendencies. Every tendency has a certain content. This content is a lifeworld that itself becomes a motive for the **self**. The content sense refers to this motive and shows what it is.

*See also* ENACTMENT SENSE (*Vollzugssinn*); RELATIONAL SENSE (*Bezugssinn*); TEMPORALIZING SENSE (*Zeitigungssinn*).

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY (FROM ENOWNING) (*Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis*).** Heidegger was holding back and sheltering his second main work for a long time. The set of manuscripts written between 1936 and 1938 was finally published posthumously to commemorate the 100th anniversary of his birthday. The title of the unique and

complex work is made up of two parts, one the “Public Title,” *Contributions to Philosophy*, and the other the “Essential Heading,” *From Enowning*. Heidegger’s contributions to **philosophy** consist of a preview, an order of six **jointures**, and a concluding resume of what preceded. Heidegger attempts to think **being** in its historical unfolding as **enowning**. In order to do so, he returns to the old German usage of **be-ing** (*Seyn*). He describes the **mission** of **being-historical thinking** as stretched out between two **beginnings** and prepared for the crossing from the end of the first beginning to the **other beginning**. The **first beginning** originates from the **concealment** of being in the transition from the pre-Socratic thinkers to **Plato** and **Aristotle**. The other beginning marks the inception of **thinking** of the **truth of being** as the **clearing** of self-concealment.

In the Preview (*Vorblick*), Heidegger elucidates the directive that thinking needs to follow in order to **experience** be-ing as enowning. He distinguishes between the **guiding question** of **metaphysics**—What is the **beingness** of **entities**?—and the **basic question** of **inceptual thinking** concerning the possibility of disclosing being. The **attunement** of the first beginning is wonder or **astonishment**, the Greek *thaumazein*; that of the other beginning is **reservedness** (*Verhaltenheit*), the grounding attunement (*Grundstimmung*) of the **turning** relation of being to **human being**, which holds in reserve, **shelters**, and preserves the truth of being as **gifting** refusal.

Contrary to a system, *Contributions to Philosophy* is structured according to six **jointures** or joinings: (1) Echo, (2) Playing-Forth, (3) Leap, (4) Grounding, (5) The Ones to Come, and (6) The Last God.

The first jointure, “Echo,” addresses the withdrawal of being, which in the modern era occurs as the **abandonment of being**, culminating in the rise of **machination**.

The second jointure, “Playing-Forth” (*Zuspiel*), outlines the prospect of crossing-over to the other beginning.

The third jointure, Leap (*Der Sprung*), examines the **essential sway** of being, that is, the dynamic of the **clearing** as the tension between concealment and **unconcealment**. This essential sway redirects the relation between **being-there** and be-ing, such that the former occurs in reciprocity with the latter. Ultimately, this reciprocal relationship hinges upon enowning, which mutually appropriates be-ing and the **t/here**. As Heidegger shows, the other beginning of thinking is only accessible through a leap of thought into the truth of being itself. The thinker belongs to being as that which governs thought and brings it into its own. We must not try to conceptualize being, but let the **ringing stillness** of being be heard through our thinking.

The fourth jointure, “Grounding” (*Die Gründung*), describes how through the leap of thought, the “t/here” (*Da*) and the **expanse**, where the truth of being comes to pass, are grounded.



The fifth jointure, “The Ones to Come” (*Die Zukünftigen*), addresses how those “from the **future**” prepare for the historical decision of the enowning of being and thus make the other beginning possible.

The sixth jointure, “The Last God” (*Der Letzte Gott*), is a meditation on the beckoning of the last god. We can experience its **nearness** in the withdrawal and flight of the **gods**. The ones to come must prepare for its arrival by leaping toward the precipice of “**decision**,” the crossing that is simultaneously the grounding of the truth of being. In this sixth jointure, Heidegger also outlines the **turning in enowning** as the historical momentum, which brings being and being-there into reciprocity with each other.

The last part of *Contributions to Philosophy*, Be-ing (*Seyn*), amounts to a final gathering and culmination of the entire work and the enactment and movement of being-historical thinking accomplished therein.

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: THE T/HERE AND THE BEING (ENOWNING)** (*Beiträge zur Philosophie—Da-sein und das Seyn (Ereignis)*). In this brief excerpt, Heidegger outlines “notes” (organized in 18 brief passages with Arabic numerals) to his seminal work, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, thereby underscoring key aspects of the **thinking** enacted therein. He emphasizes how **enowning** yields what is most **question-worthy**, that is, by bringing **be-ing** (*Seyn*) and thinking into reciprocity with each other. Most significantly, he alludes to the **turning unto** (*Zukehr*) each to the other, for example, of **t/here** (*Da-sein*) and be-ing, in order to describe the dynamic interdependence of that **relation**. **Being-there** reappears as the t/here, **who** endures the separateness of seeking a home, an abode of **dwelling**, within the **uprootedness** of **machination**.

**CONVERSATION ON A COUNTRY PATH ABOUT THINKING** (*Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken*). In this essay, published in 1959 (and arising from the period 1944/45 toward the end of World War II), Heidegger introduces the **expanse** as a **formal indication** of **being**. The expanse is the open domain wherein **entities** may abide and appear in their singularity. In this conversation, Heidegger describes the enactment of thought as the **thinking** of being as expanse. **Being-there** belongs to the expanse, and the expanse would not be what it is without being-there. Being “**gifts**” itself as this expanse, which at the same time is the expanding and **projecting-open** of the “there” of being-there. The expanding process is both the **releasement** (*Gelassenheit*) and being-there’s **letting be** of being.

**Being-historical thinking** originates from **enowning**, that is, the safeguarding and giving of the **truth of being**. Thinking in accord with this **origin** is the ecstatic **structure** of being-there’s **openness** to the **open** and its

projecting open and **inabiding** within this expanse. Heidegger describes thinking with being in terms of **forbearance** or waiting. Waiting is grounded in the fact that being-there appertains to that for which it waits. The thinker must assume the attitude of responding to being and let being arrive as expanse. In waiting, we must leave that for which we wait to open forth, because waiting lets the open be. Waiting is both the liberation from **representational thinking** and a release into the open. The liberating movement of thinking requires a touch of willing that disappears in being-there's release into the expanse and is completely extinguished in releasement. In releasement, being-there comes into its own through the **belonging together** of being and thinking. The hallmark of essential or originative thinking is open resolve, projecting open, and **dwelling** within of the truth of being. Only when the thinker perseveres and exercises forbearance in this stance of **resoluteness** may he/she be said to repose in himself/herself as **who** he/she is. This state of response is and in dwelling.

**COUNTER-TURNING (*Widerkehr*)**. Heidegger's emphasis on the **turning** brings to light one of the most important concerns within his **philosophy**. The turning is a **movement** that mirrors the circular dynamic of **temporality**. Because the turning is not simply a linear process, Heidegger points to the **need** for a counter-turning. The counter-turning defines the interlude, transition, or intermediary stage within the turning itself, which traces the path from **modernity** to the inception of the **other beginning**. As such, the counter-turning directs **thinking** in its encounter with the negativity of the **concealment** of being, as a prelude to heeding and **experiencing** the arrival of the **truth of being**.

The counter-turning unfolds within the dynamic of the **gifting** and **refusing** of being's potential for **unconcealment**. Thinking begins to "turn" in another direction when it proceeds along this arc. As Heidegger emphasizes in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), the counter-turning occurs within the **turning in enowning** (*Ereignis im Kehre*). In describing the counter-turning, Heidegger has in view the image from **Friedrich Nietzsche's Zarathustra** in which the **overman** (*Übermensch*) must first "go under" in order to "cross over."

**COUNTRY PATH CONVERSATIONS (*Feldweg-Gespräche* 1944/45)**. This text includes three discussions that Heidegger develops in a dialogical form. They comprise volume 77 of his **Complete Edition**, although key sections from the first discussion were published separately in 1959 under the title *Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking (Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken)*.

**COURAGE (Mut).** For **Plato**, courage is one of the three key virtues, along with wisdom and temperance. **Friedrich Nietzsche** viewed courage as necessary in order to convert adversity into self-affirmation through the love of fate (*amor fati*); love of fate is a Dionysian virtue by which the **overman** confronts the depths, abyss, or **abgrund** (*Abgrund*) of human suffering. Heidegger construes courage as a necessary **compartment**, which is required if **thinking** is to meet the arduous challenge of formulating the **question of being**. In volume 71 of his **Complete Edition**, *Enowning* (*Ereignis*), Heidegger emphasizes the unique role of courage in the philosophical quest to heed the **claim** of the **first beginning** of **philosophy**. The philosopher displays the greatest courage by transitioning from the security of everydayness and by welcoming the uncanny summons or **address of being**. He/she can then learn to abide within the simplicity and **poverty** of the **craft** of thinking.

**CROSSING (übergehen).** The fact that **thinking** travels along a path entails that there are key junctures of its transformation. The **origin** of **philosophy** is granted only through the **possibility** of its arrival from the **future**. The anticipation of this arrival summons thinking to undertake a crossing, and thereby to heed the **address of being** as it **echoes** across the corridors of **history**. The crossing specifically involves the traversal of thinking to the **other beginning**.

**CROSSING QUESTION, THE (Übergangsfrage).** Through the crossing question, Heidegger seeks to understand **metaphysics** in the transition from the **forgottenness of being** to the **possibility** of its **recollection**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger equates the crossing question with the “metaphysical ‘why-question’” (*metaphysique Warumfrage*), the perennial inquiry into the **origin** of all this is. In this respect, the why-question springs from the **turning**, in which **human being** and **be-ing** (*Seyn*) **turn unto** each other. **Being-there** is no longer simply the singular **entity who** asks “Why?”; instead it is transformed into the place for be-ing’s **unconcealment**.

The why-question asks “Why are there **entities**, and not rather **nothing**?” Heidegger had made this question the focus of his 1929 lecture, *What Is Metaphysics?* He reiterates that the **nothing** is the otherness of entities and thereby provides the clue or **hint** of the unveiling of be-ing. Within the context of **being-historical thinking**, however, the inquirer into the **t/here** reappears as the **inabiding** and manner of **dwelling** within the unconcealment of be-ing. In this historical transformation, the perennial enigma of metaphysics or why-question reemerges as the crossing question.

*See also* WINNING BACK (*Verwindung*).

**CULTURE** (*die Kultur*). As shaped by **machination**, modern culture displays three basic elements: “massiveness,” “calculation,” and “acceleration” (*Schnelligkeit*). These elements are the vehicles by which, on the one hand, human culture is reduced to the drive of productivity, and on the other hand, how the **abandonment of being** disguises itself at the close of the modern age. In this regard, “massiveness” defines the overwhelming manner by which human beings **experience** the forces of machination, which minimizes the importance of everyday activities. In turn, calculative thinking plants the seeds for the emergence of **cybernetics**, including a digital gestalt for imposing order through the instantaneous gathering and processing of information. Finally, acceleration defines the hallmark of **technology** in two respects: first, by accentuating the “need for speed” through the instantaneous processing and transmitting of information, and second, by rapidly advancing current technologies through new scientific discoveries. Given this acceleration, technology begins to advance under its own impetus. The self-mobilizing character of technology creates the illusion that human beings are its masters, thereby further concealing its ultimate **danger**.

*See also* GIGANTIC, THE (*das Riesenhafte*).

**CURIOSITY** (*Neugier*). Curiosity is the tendency of **being-there** toward seeing, which belongs to **everydayness**. In curiosity, being-there does not try to see in order to understand, but just for the sake of seeing itself. Curiosity leaps from novelty to novelty and does not tarry alongside the **entities** it encounters. Because curiosity does not tarry, it is always concerned with the constant **possibility** of distraction. When being-there is curious, it never dwells anywhere and is delivered over to **idle talk**.

**CYBERNETICS** (*Kybernetik*). Heidegger became familiar with cybernetics through the work of the American scientist **Norbert Wiener**. Heidegger equates cybernetics with the development of information **technology**. He thereby anticipated the rise of the digital age, which today shapes the development and use of technology on a global scale.

In a discussion from *Zollikon Seminars* in May 1965, Heidegger underscores Wiener’s influence on characterizing what it means to be human in technological and mechanistic terms. Not only does such a characterization **conceal** the unique dimension or **essence** of **being-there**, but in doing so it also masks the deeper capacity of **language** for **unconcealment**. In this regard, cybernetics seeks predetermined outcomes and units of information, bereft of any concern for the **hermeneutic** context of **meaning** and the creative power of the **word**.

In *Four Seminars* (Seminar in Le Thor, 1969), Heidegger concludes his discussion by singling out cybernetics as an example of the **forgottenness of being**. He thereby claims that the prepackaging and transmitting of information through cybernetics has become a substitute for the **care of the word** and the enactment of **thinking** in both **poetry** and **philosophy**. In his 1964 lecture *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, Heidegger states explicitly that the rise of cybernetics coincides with the demise of philosophy. However, cybernetics still remains indebted to the philosophical vision spawned by **Réne Descartes** and supplemented by the **mathematical projection** of nature that **Immanuel Kant** outlined, and which reaches its zenith in the **completion of metaphysics**. As such, cybernetics epitomizes the calculative model of reducing human **experience** to a collection of raw data, thereby ushering in the digital age.



# D

**DANGER (*Gefahr*)**. Due to its destructive potential, the **modern** age stands out from all previous epochs in the **history of being**. The most ominous **possibilities** of the modern age come to fruition through **technology**, because of the danger it poses to the entire **world**. The greatest danger lies in the illusion that **human beings** can control all the unforeseen consequences of technology and ultimately become its master. In *The Question concerning Technology*, Heidegger emphasizes that human beings must first experience the danger *as* a danger. In this way, they relinquish their pretext of mastery and prepare for a new manifestation of **being** other than revealing **nature** for the purpose of exploitation. In “**The Turning**,” Heidegger underscores the need for humanity to confront the danger of technology as a prelude for illuminating the **clearing of being** apart from the **will** to control, dominate, and exploit nature.

In December 1949, Heidegger delivered a lecture entitled “**The Danger**” to the Bremen Club.

**DANGER, THE (*Das Gefahr*)**. The lecture that Heidegger delivered to the Bremen Club under this title in 1949 marks an important step along the way of formulating the question concerning **technology**. He draws a distinction between instruments of mass destruction and the ominous signs of humanity’s complete capitulation to a global network of technology, which lulls **being-there** into the complacency that prepackaged formulas of **calculative thinking** can replace a deeper inquiry into what it means to be human.

Heidegger certainly had firsthand experience of the destruction perpetrated by the weaponry of World War II, not to mention the fear resulting from the detonation of two atomic bombs in Japan. Yet he calls attention to the threat that technology poses to what is most essential and unique to being-there in terms of its ability to question, think, and ponder the **meaning of being**. The **danger** lies in how **thinking** can be subverted by calculation, knowledge by information, and craftsmanship by mass production. Most of all, the danger

consists in the self-disassembling, self-disguising character of technology, which evolves under its own impetus and makes an instrument of humanity, rather than the reverse.

**DASEIN.** *See* BEING-THERE (*Dasein*).

**DAVOS DISPUTATION BETWEEN ERNST CASSIRER AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER** (*Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger*). This disputation occurred in connection with Heidegger's and Ernst Cassirer's lectures on **Immanuel Kant** at the second Davos Hochschule in the spring of 1929. The Grand Hotel Belvédère in Davos, Switzerland, provided the lodging for the speakers and a wide range of prominent attendees, including **Emanneul Levinas**. The discussion centers on the **interpretation** of the entirety of Kant's critical **philosophy**. Both Heidegger and Cassirer emphasize the importance of the productive power of **imagination** in its role of **schematism**, but the former makes that problematic the key to reinterpreting Kant's thought as an **ontology** of **finitude** and **temporality**, while Cassirer does not. Instead, Cassirer argues that the finitude of **human being** becomes transcendent in Kant's ethical writings, that is, through reason's self-legislation of the moral law. Heidegger, on the other hand, shows that the human **self's** freedom to act morally depends on finitude, rather than presupposing an infinite **ground**. Through its capacity to exercise choice, the self becomes free through the limitations of its **facticity**.

**DEALINGS** (*Umgang*). *See* GETTING AROUND (*Umgang*).

**DEATH** (*Tod*). The **origin** of Heidegger's understanding of death is **Karl Jaspers's** description of death as a **boundary situation** in his *Psychology of Worldviews*. From 1919 on, and especially in *Being and Time*, Heidegger described death as the ultimate and most unique **possibility** that is and remains impending as long as **being-there** exists. In its **being-toward-death**, being-there **anticipates** the possibility of its death *as* a possibility. The possibility of death is the impossibility of all **comportment** and as such the possible impossibility of **existence** as such. In the anticipation of its own death, being-there understands the impossibility of its own existence as an inevitable possibility. Being-there is possible nonbeing, is not something, and therewith a pure **can-be** that has to be. I can project my own possibilities and can avoid being determined by anything else, be it other **entities** in the **world** or the **"they."** Since, as finite, we remain **being-in-the-world** and **being-with**, we can never completely actualize the possibility of death. It is no coincidence that death, as the liberation from all external influence, is at



the same time the end of my existence. In determining ourselves as **who** we want to be through this possibility, we disclose our factual **fallenness** into the world and the “they” of our everyday existence.

Death is related to nothing else than my ownmost unique can-be, which is individualized through this relation. In anticipating my death as the most unique possibility of my existence, I become aware of my own unique and “one-chance” existence. Death is always my death of being-there in its individuality. Heidegger does not found the **mineness** of being-there upon the soul, the *cogito*, or the **I**, but in the **structure** of being-toward-death. Owned or “authentic” existence keeps open all possibilities, unlocking the unique ones for me, and makes it possible for being-there to gather forth its **whole** existence.

In *Being and Time*, death is the highest jurisdiction of our can-be. In our being futural, we shatter against death so that we are at once thrown back upon the “there” of our **facticity**. We are free for death, free for **fate**, and free to commit ourselves at the decisive moments in world **history**.

After his break with **National Socialism** and his insight into the **turning** in *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger grounds the **finitude** of being-there in its **thrownness** toward death more primordially upon its mortality. In the **fourfold**, the **mortals** and the **gods** are united. Human beings are now called the mortals, because they can face death *as* death. Only humans die, and they die continuously, as long as they  **dwell** on the **earth**, under the **sky**, before the **divinities**.

**DEBT** (*Schuld*). See GUILT (*Schuld*).

**DECISION** (*Entscheidung*). In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger defines decision as involving a reciprocity in which **being** and man **belong together**, rather than an exercise of the human **will** alone. Such decision is thereby based on a vector of holding open the widest **expanse** of **possibilities**, within which **human beings** choose from out of the open expanse of this **clearing** or its abundance of **possibilities**. The open-ended character of decision has implications for the political by indicating that **freedom** is a **gift** of being, which cannot be reduced to the self-serving aims of any ideology. Heidegger often hyphenates this term (*Ent-scheidung*), in order to distinguish it from choosing in the narrow sense of willing.

See also RESOLUTENESS (*Entschlossenheit*).

**DEMIGOD** (*der Halbgott*). This term figures prominently in Heidegger’s lecture-course from the winter semester of 1934/35, *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine.”* A demigod is that which “goes between,” clearing the space for the transmission of messages from **gods** to **mortals**. In

his discussion of **Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry**, Heidegger emphasizes the **ontological** dimension of this **in-betweenness**. The demigod, analogous to the “messenger-god” of **hermeneutics**, provides an image of the **between** (*Zwischen*), thereby marking the open **expanse** for the manifestation of **being** and the **unconcealment** of **entities**. In a poetic sense, the demigod serves as an intermediary for transmitting a **mystery** otherwise hidden and withdrawn from finite **human beings**.

**DEPARTURE** (*Abschied*). Throughout his writings, Heidegger employs various expressions to indicate the **origin** of philosophical inquiry, including attention to its starting point. Already in *Being and Time*, he had underscored the importance of the **hermeneutic** path of inquiry, which both begins from and returns to the **existential analytic of being-there**, and specifically, its mode of **everydayness**. Within the context of **being-historical thinking**, Heidegger employs the term departure in volume 71 of his **Complete Edition**, *Enowning* (*Das Ereignis*) (1941–42). He emphasizes departure as a way of embarking upon a **path of thinking**, specifically, which confronts the **ambiguity** of the **ontological difference** as both shaping the trajectory of the Western **tradition** and remaining for the most part **unthought**. Departure is the **need** or necessity for a **beginning**, thus underscoring the importance of the **hermeneutic circularity** that returns to gather up the set of **presuppositions** directing the **question of being**.

*See also* RETURNERSHIP (*Rückkehrerschaft*).

**DERRIDA, JACQUES (1930–2004)**. Among French philosophers, Derrida is credited with developing **phenomenology** in a **postmetaphysical** direction. More so than his French counterpart, **Emmanuel Levinas**, Derrida appropriated key motifs of Heidegger's **thinking** and gave them a **radical**, “postmodern” **meaning**. Specifically, Derrida developed his own strategy of deconstruction by extending and radicalizing Heidegger's practice of a **phenomenological destruction** of the **history of ontology**. According to Derrida, all texts harbor hidden levels of **meanings**, which require deconstruction. Even social institutions can be approached as texts to be deconstructed, for example, insofar as those in positions of **leadership** express noble intentions on one level, but engage in self-serving practices on another level. Exposing these incongruities and disparities is at the heart of deconstruction. To achieve this goal, Derrida also incorporates and radicalizes Heidegger's emphasis on the **ontological difference** as the key to the manifestation of **being** in contrast to **entities**. Derrida, however, construes **difference** as “*différance*,” implying a play of distinctions that is carried out within **language**.

According to Derrida, textuality trumps being as the ultimate dynamic of appearance and meaning. The **truth of being** gives way to instances of **truth**, which in turn are equally as unstable as the play of difference.

Derrida also wrestled with the problems posed by Heidegger's involvement with **National Socialism**. By the same token, Derrida did not abandon Heidegger's thinking, but likewise sought to deconstruct his political stance and point out disparities and contradictions within his **philosophy**. As a case in point, Derrida argues that there are environmental and ecological implications in Heidegger's account of the **earth** that are at odds with his presumably anthropocentric conception of **animals** as **world-poor**.

Derrida was a prolific author. His most notable books include *Of Grammatology* and *Writing and Difference*.

**DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650)**. The father of modern **philosophy** is a pivotal figure in Heidegger's history of philosophy. He grounded the **being** of **entities** in the self-certain subject and determined **truth** as certitude. Every entity is either an object or that which objectifies. Heidegger designates this subject reference of all being **subjectivity**. Its three most important consequences are that (1) the **world** becomes a picture, (2) philosophy becomes anthropology, and (3) **values** become the goal of all intercourse between **being-there** and entities.

*See also* AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*); BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY, THE (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*); EUROPEAN NIHILISM (*Der europäische Nihilismus*); INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (*Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*); WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (*Was ist Metaphysik?*).

**DESEVERANCE (*Entfernung*)**. In the first division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger examines the **spatiality** of **being-there**. Human beings are spatial through their ability to allow **entities** to be encountered within the **environment** and larger context of the **world**. In the case of **equipment**, this way of **letting be** encountered specifically involves the dynamic of making close and available what is not immediately **ready-to-hand** or directly within reach. As the ability to bring close what is environmentally remote, deseverance rests on the **disclosedness** of being-there.

**DESTINY (*Geschick*)**. In light of the **turning**, the **forgottenness of being** by **metaphysics** can no longer be understood merely as an accidental oversight of metaphysics, but instead is prefigured within the **history of being** itself. Throughout the history of being, **being-there** could only understand the **meaning of being** as **beingness**, because **being** revealed itself primarily

through the **entities** that became manifest. The **overcoming of metaphysics** cannot be achieved through the efforts of being-there alone; it only becomes possible through the inception of an **other beginning** that both preserves and yields all the **possibilities** of thinking.

**DESTRUCTION (*Destruktion*)**. Destruction is an important element of Heidegger's **phenomenological** method and makes its first appearance of phenomenological critique in the winter semester 1919/20. Its goal is to loosen up the hardened **tradition** and to dissolve the layers of **concealment** that have subsequently resulted. Destruction aims its critique at the **present** and its failure to go back to the **origins** of our **interpretation of being-there**. In the course of **history**, the original **meaning** of these concepts as **expressions** of **experience** is covered up, distorted, and ultimately lost. Destruction is the **retrieval** of the original **facticity** that was expressed in philosophical concepts.

As part of the original outline of *Being and Time*, Heidegger proposed a **phenomenological destruction** of the history of **ontology** as Part II of his magnum opus. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger states that the philosophical confrontation, **setting-in-opposition** (*Auseinandersetzung*), and dispute among thinkers is interpretation as destruction. In light of the **turning**, Heidegger views the task of unloosening the sediment of philosophical tradition as ultimately **destined** by the **history of being**.

**DETERMINATION (*Bestimmung*)**. In the original sense of **phenomenology**, determination involves letting something be seen *as* something. In *Being and Time*, determination arises through an act of **interpretation**. The as-structure of interpretation allows what is to be understood in an **ontological** investigation to be made explicit, conceptualized, and articulated in **words**. In the case of Heidegger's exposition of **care**, determination applies to rendering explicit or interpreting it *as* the **being** of **being-there**. For this interpretation to unfold, however, what is to be understood has to be projected upon a backdrop, in this instance, **temporality, in-terms-of-which** (*woraufhin*) the **meaning** of care, that is, its **ontological** structure, can be revealed in its unity. In this way, the determinateness pertains to rendering something meaningful, so that it can be both disclosed through itself and articulated in words.

As an important development within Heidegger's **hermeneutic phenomenology**, a determination of something corresponds to the **logos**, which in turn expresses in words the uniqueness of the **phenomenon** (e.g., being or the constitutive **structures** thereof), or what shows itself. He refers to the **existential-hermeneutical "as"** to describe the process of weaving together a

mosaic of meaning, or the gathering forth of what is understood into new idioms of expression. The hermeneutical “as” distinguishes what is to be articulated, or made explicit in its determinateness.

*See also* THEMATIZATION (*Thematisierung*).

**DETERMINATIONS OF BEING (*Seinsbestimmungen*).** This term can also be rendered generally as **ontological** determinations. Such determinations define the elements that constitute the **being** of human **existence**, for example, the constitutive **structures** that comprise **care**, e.g., **facticity**, **falling**, and **existence**.

In his magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger points to the most universal determinations of the being of **being-there** as including **existence** (*Existenz*) and **mineness** (*Jemeinigkeit*). The determinations of being can be formally indicated, that is, delimited according to the most universal characteristics embodying what it means “to be.” The aim of **fundamental ontology** is to divulge and uncover the most basic of these determinations.

Within **metaphysics**, **categories** yield determinations of being, albeit restricted to what can manifest itself within the sphere of **nature**.

**DIALOGUE (*Gespräch*).** As a form of **disclosedness**, **language** invites the participation of the other. The fact that Heidegger claims that **human beings** can speak only because they possess the capacity to listen necessarily reserves an opportunity for the other to reply and participate in a forum of exchange. The **self’s** ability to enter into discussions with others not only forms the basis of human **communication**; it also embodies the very dynamic that propels the exchange between the greatest thinkers. Dialogue is thereby an essential part of **philosophy**, because it springs from the disclosedness out of which language speaks and allows the **word of being** to be uttered.

The goal of dialogue, however, is not merely to exchange opinions or personal viewpoints. Rather, dialogue stands in service of **truth as unconcealment**. The opposing stances of the participants mirror the dynamic whereby being arises from unconcealment out of its opposite, or **concealment**.

**DIALOGUE ON LANGUAGE, A (*Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache*).** In this **dialogue** between a Japanese professor (Tomio Tezuka) and an inquirer (Heidegger), the **possibilities** and dangers of a dialogue between Japanese and German culture are discussed. The great danger of this dialogue is that the **relation** between the two cultures can only be discussed in either of the two languages. Since the Japanese and the Germans speak different languages, they live in two different **houses of being**. In their journey as “on the way” to language, Heidegger and his Japanese guest come to

the conclusion that what is uniquely singular to language, its silent depths, can only be disclosed in a dialogue that speaks from and out of language itself, instead of about it. Only in a dialogue that wants to **keep silent** can language reveal itself in its stillest depths as **saying**. Heidegger determines saying in two different ways, as what is said in it and what is to be said. Language as saying hints at **being** and reveals in its beckoning and **echo** the **unconcealment** of the **twofold**.

*See also* TRANSLATION (*übersetzen*); UNSAID (*Ungesagtes*).

**DIFFERENCE** (*Differenz*; *Unterschied*). While it is initially important to contrast **being** with **entities**, it becomes increasingly necessary to think the dynamic tension between them. Where Heidegger once spoke of the **ontological difference**, he later emphasizes the interval of the **between** (*Zwischen*), which allows that differentiation to occur. Heidegger provides one of his most important and illuminating discussions of the difference *as* difference in *The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics*. Heidegger's strategy of thinking the difference as difference strongly influenced subsequent post-modern philosophers, including **Jacques Derrida**.

**DILTHEY, WILHELM (1833–1911)**. Heidegger studied the works of Dilthey as early as 1910 and continued to do so until the publication of *Being and Time*. Dilthey had a profound influence on Heidegger's thinking. From Dilthey he learned that **life** has always already expressed itself in forms and **structures** that it can understand. Life is always **lived experience**. Heidegger used Dilthey's concept of **hermeneutics** to turn **Edmund Husserl's** **transcendental** conception of **phenomenology** into a hermeneutic phenomenology. He transformed Husserl's three early breakthroughs—**intentionality**, **categorial intuition**, and the **apriori**—into **care**, interpretative **understanding**, and **time**. He also transformed Dilthey's emphasis on the **historicality** of **human being** into the **temporality** of **being-there**.

*See also* LIFE PHILOSOPHY (*Lebensphilosophie*).

**DIRECTIVE** (*Weisung*). A directive is a guideline for **thinking**, a way of leading it along its proper **path**. Such a directive is neither a product of human thought nor a rational principle, but instead arises through the reciprocal relation between **being** and thinking and the manner in which the former calls or addresses the latter. A directive implies a **grounding attunement**, which acclimates thinking and makes it receptive to the **voice of being**. The need for such a directive is a throwback to the manner in which **hermeneutic phenomenology** requires guiding precepts to “lay out” or **interpret** the **structures of care** and, ultimately, the **horizon** for any possible **understanding of being**.

In *What Is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger appeals to a line from **Friedrich Hölderlin**'s poetry that we are a "sign that is not yet read." In this light, directives serve as markers or signposts along the **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*).

*See also* ADDRESS OF BEING (*Zuspruch des Seins*); EXISTENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL "AS" (*existenzial-hermeneutische 'Als'*); FORMAL INDICATION (*formale Anzeige*); HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE (*hermeneutischer Zirkel*).

**DISCLOSEDNESS** (*Erschlossenheit*). Disclosedness is the **ontological** term for **being-there**'s being lighted and cleared within itself. Being-there is "in" its "there" and is not locked within itself. Being-there is a **structure** and it has no inside. In its very **being** it stands open. This fundamental **openness** of its **existence** makes it possible for being-there to encounter anything at all, including its own **self**.

**DISCOURSE** (*Rede*). In *Being and Time*, discourse is the **existential-ontological** foundation of **language**. It determines equiprimordially the two ways in which **being-there** is its "there": **disposedness** and **understanding**. **Hearing** is constitutive for discourse, of which **keeping silent** is an essential **possibility**.

*See also* DIALOGUE (*Gespräch*).

**DISCOVERY** (*Entdecktheit*). The discovery of **entities** within the **world**, which are **present-at-hand** or **ready-to-hand**, is grounded in **being-there**'s **disclosedness** of the world. Being-there can only discover entities, because it is familiar with the signifying **structure** of the world.

**DIS-ENOWNING** (*Ent-eignis*). In order to think the **truth of being**, it is necessary to consider the contrary dynamic of **errancy**. Through its **concealment**, **being** divests itself of its **truth**, allowing errancy to prevail. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger describes this **refusal** and divestiture of truth as dis-enowning. The historical **enactment** of this errancy is not arbitrary and random, but instead belongs to the **destiny** of being and is thereby the counterpoint or "counter-sway" of **enowning**. Accordingly, dis-enowning pervades the philosophical **tradition**, underscoring the way in which the **history of metaphysics** is the history of the **forgottenness of being**.

*See also* ABANDONMENT OF BEING (*Seinsverlassenheit*); TIME AND BEING (*Zeit und Sein*).

**DISMANTLEMENT (*Abbau*)**. Heidegger employs this term as a precursor to his plan for a **destruction** (*Destruktion*) of the history of **ontology**. To dismantle the philosophical tradition is to unbuild the layers of confusion and obfuscation that mask and distort the **meaning of being**.

**DISPLACEMENT (*Verrückung*)**. Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) to describe a movement whereby what is most intrinsic to humanity, or the **human being**, is recast and grounded anew as the **t/here**. This displacement makes explicit a paradigm shift, in which the metaphysical question “What is man?” gives way to the deeper query “**Who is being-there?**” Ultimately, the **turning relation** of being directs this transformation.

**DISPOSEDNESS (*Befindlichkeit*)**. Disposedness is the **ontological** term for **being-there**’s being attuned, its **mood** or **attunement**. It is a fundamental **existential** of being-there. Disposedness discloses being-there in its **thrownness** and proximally and generally in the manner of an evasive turning away. It is an “**existential**” **mode** of the equiprimordial **disclosedness** of **world**, **being-with**, and **existence**. Being-there’s **openness** to the world is constituted existentially by its disposedness. It is the way in which being-there is its “there” and the way in which the **self** experiences its thrownness into the world. **Anxiety** is a fundamental and ownmost disposedness of being-there.

**DISTRESS (*Not*)**. Distress is a **grounding attunement** of **thinking** that arises in **modernity** to highlight the threat that philosophical indifference poses. Distress makes explicit the pervasiveness of an opposite **disposition**, namely, complacency and acquiescence. While ostensibly negative in character, distress also serves a positive role (1) by awakening thinking to the **forgottenness of being** and (2) by calling attention to our blind acceptance of **technology**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes that what is most disconcerting is the distress of ceasing to **experience** distress. Within the context of **being-historical thinking**, distress reveals the ambiguity that defines the modern age. Distress marks the **thrownness of being-there** into the **turning relation of being**, thereby providing a catalyst for crossing-over to the **other beginning**.

*See also* NEED (*Not*).



**DIVINITIES, THE** (*die Göttlichen*). The divinities are the messengers of the godhead. Out of its holy sway, the **god** appears in its **presencing** or withdraws into **concealment**. In **dwelling**, the **mortals** await the intimations of the coming of the divinities. Divinities and mortals, **earth** and **sky** are joined together in the oneness of the **fourfold**.

**DOSTOEVSKY, FYODOR (1821–81)**. Along with **Leo Tolstoy**, Dostoevsky was one of the greatest Russian novelists. His most famous novels include *Crime and Punishment* (1866), *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880), *The Demons* (1872), and *The Idiot* (1869). His novella, *Notes from the Underground*, serves as a preamble for 20th-century **existentialism**. Dostoevsky was one of the few literary figures who inspired Heidegger; he kept on his desk a picture of the Russian novelist. Heidegger shared with Dostoevsky a common concern for the uprootedness of modern society. In *Ponderings XII–XV*, Heidegger cites a passage from Dostoevsky's *The Demons* to highlight the connection between the grounding of a **people** (*Volk*) and the need for a **God**; he emphasizes further that such **needfulness** is ultimately sustained by **be-ing** (*Seyn*). In his Nietzsche lecture *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the Will to Power*, Heidegger credits Dostoevsky, albeit briefly, for bringing the concern for **nihilism** to the forefront in a literary genre.

**DOWNWARD SPIRAL** (*Absturz*). In the first division of *Being and Time* (Part I), Heidegger distinguishes an extreme form of the **self's falling** that intensifies and spirals downward. This downward spiral provides a **formal indication** of **being-there's** tendency to “never dwell anywhere,” that is, to plunge into the turmoil of “uprootedness.” On an **existentiell** level, this downward spiral yields the direction for the dispersion and fragmentation of the self, which occurs in such extreme instances of falling as addiction.

**DUNS SCOTUS' DOCTRINE OF CATEGORIES AND MEANING** (*Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*). Heidegger wrote his qualifying dissertation on Duns Scotus in 1915. In this original work, he discusses the doctrine of **categories** of Duns Scotus in relation to his doctrine of **meaning**. Heidegger uses the modern **logic** of **Edmund Husserl** and **Emil Lask** to interpret a scholastic treatise that was, as was later proven, not written by Scotus himself, but by his pupil Thomas of Erfurt. At the same time, Heidegger uses the medieval doctrine of categories and meaning to criticize contemporary theories. The great advantage of Scotus's doctrine over modern logic is its metaphysical foundation. As Heidegger writes in his final chapter, which is a later addendum to the published edition of 1916, “in the long run **philosophy** cannot do without its optics **metaphysics**.” Heideg-

ger's original approach to philosophy and its history brought him to the attention of **Paul Natorp**, who in 1923 would play a pivotal role in Heidegger's appointment as a professor at the University of **Marburg**.

**DWELLING** (*wohnen*). In light of the **turning**, Heidegger describes the **being-in-the-world** of **being-there** as dwelling in the **fourfold**. In dwelling, being-there builds its home in the **world**. Dwelling is the manner in which **mortals** are on the **earth** and under the **sky**. Dwelling comports two dimensions: mortals are in the fourfold inasmuch as they dwell, and in the dwelling they take **care** of and tend to the **entities** that they encounter. The basic character of dwelling is to forbear, to preserve. In dwelling, mortals preserve the fourfold in its essential **being**, its **making present**, and take their **measure** from the way the world fits together and lets entities show themselves as they are. Saving the earth, receiving the sky, awaiting the **divinities**, and initiating mortals are all the coming into its own of dwelling. Man dwells poetically.

*See also* BUILDING DWELLING THINKING (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*); . . . POETICALLY MAN DWELLS . . . (. . . *dichterisch wohnet der Mensch* . . .).

# E

**EARTH** (*Erde*). Human beings dwell as **mortals** on the earth. Earth constitutes, with **sky** and mortals and **divinities**, the simple oneness of the **four-fold**. Earth is the serving bearer that lets things **come to presence**. The work of **art** is the **strife** between the **world** that it opens and the **sheltering** of earth from which it rises.

Beginning with his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger makes the earth a central notion of his **philosophy**. Subsequently, in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), he discusses the importance of safeguarding the earth against the potentially destructive forces of **machination**. In *Building Dwelling Thinking* (1951), Heidegger emphasizes further that to dwell is “to save the earth.”

*See also* SKY (*Himmel*).

**ECHO** (*Anklang*). The fact that the **truth of being** can never be completely expressed allows for the **possibility** of intimating what remains **unsaid**. This unspoken dimension reverberates in the form of an echo, which preserves, shelters, and carries the **mystery** of **being** throughout the epochs of the philosophical **tradition**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger considers the echo as crucial for appreciating the role that **attunement** has in directing **thinking** and acclimating it to heed the **voice of being**.

**ECSTASIS** (*Ekstase*). In *Being and Time*, the ecstases of **temporality** are the **phenomena** of **futurity**, **having been**, and **present**. Temporality temporalizes itself equiprimordially in the unity of the ecstases. Within this **equiprimordially**, the **modes** of temporalizing are different, because temporalizing can determine itself out of the different ecstases. Temporality, as the original out-of-itself in its toward, back, and among, opens the ecstatic **expanse** that defines the **ontological structure** of **existence**. To every ecstasis belongs a whither to which we are carried away. This whither is the **horizontal schema**. The individualized, **owned** mode of having been is **retrieval**, of

the present it is the **moment**, and of futurity it is **anticipation**. The undifferentiated, **unowned** mode of having been is **forgottenness**, of the present it is **making present**, and of futurity it is **awaiting**.

**EDUCATION** (*Ausbildung, Erziehung*). For Heidegger, education pertains primarily to the task of **philosophy** and to development of the philosopher. He discusses the importance of education in his lecture-course dealing with **Plato's** allegory of the cave in *Being and Truth* (1933–34). In this discussion, Heidegger makes two key points. First, education, in the original, Greek sense, involves the transformation of the **self**, which occurs in its ascent from ignorance to **knowledge**, as illustrated by the individual's rise beyond the concealing ignorance of imprisonment in the cave into the light of wisdom. Accordingly, philosophy is a chief vehicle for challenging the self to confront **who** it is and render **question-worthy** what it means to be human. Through this **interpretation** of Plato's thought, Heidegger counters the modern notion of education as merely an academic program or the cultivation of an individual's talent. Second, Heidegger employs this distinction between the ancient and modern concepts of education to draw a contrast between philosophy as an ontological quest for self-discovery and **truth** and **philosophy** as merely a **worldview** or a product of culture. Like the prisoner in the cave who seeks liberation through knowledge after having been unchained from the shackles of ignorance, so the philosopher pursues the **freedom** that comes from entering into the light of **unconcealment**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger suggests that education involves cultivating awareness of what is most **question-worthy**. By extension, the preparation to heed what is essential to **thinking**, for example, through an awakening to the **ontological difference**, lies at the heart of education. When seen in this light, education approximates the development of a lifelong craft, as in the craftsmanship of thinking, rather than learning a doctrine within the confines of a classroom.

**EK-SISTENCE** (*Ek-sistenz*). Heidegger employs this term in *Being and Time* (1927) to distinguish the manner of **being-there's** "standing-out" (*Hinaus-stehen*) in its **disclosedness** versus a sense of merely "existing" as **present-at-hand**. Two decades later, in his *Letter on "Humanism,"* he reinforces the distinction in order to differentiate his inquiry into **being** from **Jean-Paul Sartre's** **existentialism**. Heidegger maintains that ek-sistence is the way in which **human beings** provide the **place** for being's **unconcealment**, rather than as only making individual choices in a specific set of circumstances.

**ELUCIDATIONS OF HÖLDERLIN'S POETRY** (*Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*). This text appears as volume 4 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**, with minor amendments and additions to the manuscript first published in 1944. The text includes essays spanning the period 1936–68, beginning with *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry* (from an address given in Rome 1936) and concluding with *The Poem* (1968). In this significant collection of essays, Heidegger marks the intersection between poetizing and **thinking** by addressing the “poet of all poets.”

The themes of safeguarding **language**, of **caring for the word**, as well as Heidegger's strategy for interpreting poetry, figure prominently in this volume. In the “Preface to the Second Edition” (1951), Heidegger, appealing to a verse from **Friedrich Hölderlin**, compares elucidating poems to “a snowfall on the bell”: the **interpretation** must recede in favor of the **presencing** of the poem.

**ENACTMENT** (*Vollzug*). Enactment is a fundamental element in Heidegger's concept of **phenomenology**. It always refers to the way we enact or fulfill **structures** and functions of our **being-there**.

*See also* ENACTMENT SENSE (*Vollzugssinn*).

**ENACTMENT SENSE** (*Vollzugssinn*). Heidegger distinguished for the first time between the **content sense**, **relational sense**, and enactment sense of **situations** in his winter semester 1919/20 lecture-course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. These three directions of the life-stream circumscribe the self-sufficiency of **life** and allow us access to it in its **origin**. The enactment sense is the most important one, since it springs from the spontaneity of the **self** and determines the way we live our lives. In the 1920s, Heidegger broadened the application of these three forms to include the **factive life experience** of **human beings**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses these three facets of sense or **meaning** to analyze the **structure** of **being-there**.

*See also* ENACTMENT (*Vollzug*); TEMPORALIZING SENSE (*Zeitigungssinn*)

**END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE TASK OF THINKING, THE** (*Das Ende der Philosophie and die Aufgabe des Denkens*). In this 1964 lecture, Heidegger tries to answer two questions: (1) What does it mean that **philosophy** has entered its final stage in our time? and (2) What task is reserved for **thinking** at the end of philosophy?

The end of philosophy is not a mere stopping, but has to be understood as completion. Philosophy is **metaphysics**, and metaphysics is **Platonism**. **Friedrich Nietzsche** achieved the most extreme **possibility** of philosophy in his reversal of Platonism. The **completion of metaphysics** is the triumph of

the manipulable arrangement of the scientific-technological **world** and its social order. Heidegger characterizes this development, which provides the historical backdrop for the 21st century, as **cybernetics**. The splintering of philosophy into the different areas of the empirical, positive sciences and their subordination to a technological plan of processing and transmitting information gives way to cybernetics as the gestalt of all knowledge.

The end of philosophy is the complete actualization of the metaphysical possibility of thinking. In the Greek **beginning** of thinking, however, a first nonmetaphysical possibility of thinking remained concealed. It is the task of nonmetaphysical or **being-historical thinking** to explore this first possibility and so prepare for the **other beginning** of thinking.

In philosophy's beginning, **Parmenides** spoke about the **clearing of being** as such, although it would remain **unthought** in philosophy. **Alètheia, unconcealment**, was equated with **truth** as the correspondence of knowledge with **entities** or truth as the certainty of knowledge. Unconcealment, however, is not the same as this modern concept of truth. We must think *alètheia* as the clearing, which first grants being and thinking their **belonging together** to and for each other. The task of thinking relinquishes metaphysics to the determination of the matter of thinking, that is, to, **enowning**.

*See also* WIENER, NORBERT (1884–1964).

**ENFRAMING (*Gestell*)**. The dominion of enframing defines the ultimate possibility of **technology** as the end and **completion of metaphysics**. It is the ordering of every **entity** as **standing-reserve**. As standing-reserve, every entity is controlled and stands ready for use. Even the **being of being-there** is reduced to standing-reserve and therefore needs to be put to good use. Enframing is the **mode** of being's **revealing** itself, in which it reveals itself by withdrawing. The **truth of being** in the **age of nihilism** is the **forgottenness of being**. Enframing reveals itself most clearly in the **will to power**. Because enframing originates from the destiny of **being**, being-there cannot willfully escape from it. All that remains for us to do is to prepare in anticipation for the coming of the **last god**.

*See also* TURNING, THE (*Die Kehre*).

**ENFRAMING, THE (*Das Gestell*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture to the Bremen Club in 1949, as one of four lectures that paved the way for his pivotal essay *The Question concerning Technology*. Through various examples, he shows how enframing lies in the positioning and organizing of all that can become manifest as **standing-reserve**. Standing-reserve involves the stockpiling of resources, including the manufacturing of power plants to produce electricity. As Heidegger emphasizes, **human beings** can also be put to use as resources, for example, as pools of labor. Thus enframing is a

macro-organizational gestalt that resides in **machination**, as he first described this global, **technological** force in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38).

According to Heidegger, enframing brings to **actuality** the hidden connection between the natural sciences, specifically physics, and their application for the explicit purpose of technological progress. This development is witnessed in the “energy” industries, which propel commerce as well as the military. As a foremost example, atomic physics unlocks the devastating potential of the hydrogen bomb.

Among Heidegger’s most interesting and prophetic observations is how enframing leads to the development of mass media in the form of radio and film. Such developments annul all distances, however, without allowing the **nearness** of the **thing**, the uniqueness of the work of **art** or the beauty of **nature**, to become manifest. Ultimately, these media forces will also provide the framework for the management of political affairs in and between nations.

As a global force, technology also infiltrates activities previously confined to rural areas, such as farming. The use of motorized technology, including tractors, propelled by oil products and the combustion engine, begins to take over agriculture. The agricultural industry usurps farming. With this observation, Heidegger gives credence to today’s animal rights advocates who rail against the brutality of the “factory farm.” However, in the same breath he makes one of his most controversial and perhaps regrettable remarks, juxtaposing the “mechanized food industry” with mass warfare, the “extermination camps,” and the “production of hydrogen bombs”—all of which are gathered together and come to fruition through the organizing matrix of enframing.

*See also* LABORING ANIMAL (*arbeitende Tier*).

**ENOWNED THINKING (*Ereignisdenken*)**. In heeding the **truth of being**, **thinking** is transformed by the very activity in which it engages. It is not apart from, but always in reciprocity with, **being**, that thinking comes in its own and pursues its unique task. The double **directive** whereby thought is both the recipient and guardian of the truth of being comes to light in enowned thinking.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger points to **enowning** (*Ereignis*), the reciprocal relationship by which **being** addresses **being-there**, and the latter is commissioned by the former. Through this **relation**, thinking belongs to being and thereby bears both the necessity of its historical appearance, its **destiny** (*Geschick*), and the contingency through which its **truth** is sheltered and preserved in the counter-sway of **untruth**. Thus, enowned thinking confronts the **dis-enownment** (*Ent-eignis*) pervading the **history of being**, in order to prepare for the arrival of the **other beginning**.

See also GUARDIANSHIP (*Wächterschaft*).

**ENOWNING (*Ereignis*)**. Enowning is the key **directive** of Heidegger's entire **path of thinking**. It identifies the **leap** of the dynamic relationship between **being** and **being-there** and the mutual **belonging together** by which each "comes into its own" by virtue of that reciprocity. Heidegger makes use of the "own" meaning of *eigen* to read the sense of the verb *ereignen* as to make one's own.

Heidegger's seminal text from 1936–38 bears the title *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. In this work, enowning (*Ereignis*) comes to light as that which determines the way in which being can be granted to thought, as much through its potential to recede as to manifest itself. In this way being is conjoined with its **truth**, equally through its capacity for **concealment** as **unconcealment**. Enowning thereby points to the **origin** of the diversity of being's manifestations, and hence to history as the amphitheater for unfolding its dual possibilities of revealing-concealing. By the same token, the negativity of concealment originates from enowning as a way to **shelter** and preserve the **mystery** of being. Through the preservation of this mystery, the historical concealment of being belongs to a greater **destiny**, which also harbors the counter**possibility** of its unconcealment and remembrance to thinking.

To characterize the dual **gifting** and refusing of being, and conversely, its way of inviting thought to enter into this reciprocal relationship, Heidegger refers to **being-historical thinking**. Enowning thereby marks the source and dynamic of the "call" or "claim" that beckons thought and elicits the responsiveness whereby thinking heeds being and becomes its custodian. In this sense, enowning issues the **address of being** not only by inviting thought, but also by exacting the commensurate response, such that thinking is "owned over" (*übereignet*) to being. This manner of "ownership" and of eliciting what is "ownmost" to thought lies at the heart of what Heidegger understands as the conservatorship or **guardianship** of being. In this way, enowning pervades the relation between being and thinking, commissioning the latter to serve the former. Thinking can then emerge as a task and mission, precisely because it is "commissioned" in this way. The delivering of thinking over to this mission is the key directive of enowning.

To distinguish further the unique character of this directive, as arising and "issued" historically, Heidegger speaks of the "**turning in enowning**." That is, the unique reciprocity occurring between thinking and being is historically enacted as a "**turning**," which establishes the togetherness of the belonging as the key to each "coming into its own"—in contrast to the polarizing of either term into an opposition between subject and object. By issuing its directive from the concealed origin of the history of philosophy or the **first beginning** and thereby inaugurating the inception of the **other beginning**,



enowning “throws-forth” or emits the entire history of **metaphysics**, along with the possibility to redirect its momentum through the futural arrival of the **truth of being**. The turning in enowning both previews and grants the **destiny of being**.

Heidegger’s new conception of enowning leads to three key changes in his **philosophy**. First, he determines **language** as the unique manner in which being addresses thinking and thereby seeks a **site** for its manifestation. Under the directive of enowning, language ceases to be merely a tool and capacity of **human beings** and instead becomes the abode that they inhabit and also safeguard as the **house of being**. Second, **history** constitutes the thrown trajectory of “projecting open” the truth of being and thereby grounds the **historicality of being-there**. Heidegger thereby addresses the question of the **temporality** of being. Accordingly, human beings belong to, and are “enowned” by, the historical **clearing** of being, for example, when they undertake the task of thinking. Third, enowning takes on further permutations in granting the **fourfold** and its **nearness to things**. The unity of the fourfold **comes to presence** as the worlding of the **world**, that is, the open **region** where **sky** and **earth** and the **divinities** and **mortals** meet and are preserved in what is “ownmost” to each.

*See also* TIME AND BEING (*Zeit und Sein*).

**ENOWNING, THE (*Das Ereignis*)**. Heidegger composed this text during the period 1941–42. It was later published as volume 71 of his **Complete Edition**. The title bears special significance, because its inscription embodies that which is foremost to the **matter of thinking**. As such, *Enowning* develops the key motifs that Heidegger first broached in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) and *Mindfulness* (1938–39).

In this text, Heidegger explores the task of thinking as a uniquely **Western** endeavor. Much of the treatise is devoted to examining the inception of Western **philosophy**, its emergence from the ancient Greeks, and its unfolding out of the **first beginning**. In addressing the first beginning, Heidegger emphasizes the pre-Socratic thinkers **Anaximander** and **Heraclitus**. Each of these thinkers emphasized the **concealing** dimension of *alètheia* as integral to the Greek **experience of being**. Having considered these Greek **origins**, Heidegger then considers the onset of the **forgottenness of being**, which culminates in the end and **completion of metaphysics**. He examines Nietzsche’s notion of the **will to power** as epitomizing the metaphysics of **subjectivity**. The will comprises a metaphysical characterization of how **entities** reveal themselves as a locus of power that seeks to rise above itself in the highest expression of willing and self-mastery.

Heidegger then considers the keys to **overcoming metaphysics** and **winning back** (*Verwindung*) its hidden **truth**. To this end, he reexamines the **ontological difference** as the differentiation between being and entities.

When thought more originally, the ontological difference speaks to the **clearing** out of which entities first rise forth into appearance and recede into **nothingness**. The diversity of the appearance of entities, however, must also be read off the backdrop of the historical epochs comprising the Western **tradition**. Heidegger then shifts his attention to addressing the manner in which **enowning** (*Ereignis*) shapes the destiny of the **West**, that is, to the enactment of **being-historical thinking**. In this context, he employs the archaic spelling of **be-ing** (*Seyn*). Correlatively, in rethinking being-there's participation in the clearing, Heidegger also utilizes the archaic spelling for the **t/here** (*Da-seyn*). As the t/here, the **human being** is commissioned by be-ing to provide a **place** for **unconcealment**. As enowning, a dynamic **relation of belonging together** occurs in which human being is appropriated to or **owned-over** to be-ing. Heidegger reemphasizes that a **grounding attunement** pervades and makes possible the relationship between the t/here and be-ing. As a foremost example, **thanking** becomes an enduring gesture by which the t/here receives the **gift** of unconcealment, in both its abundance and poverty. In this way, the human being summons the courage to face the profoundest hardship and even **pain** of (*Schmerz*) while embarking upon the **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*). The shouldering of this burden is met with the spirited **joy** of meeting the challenge of thinking as a self-inquisitive **venture**.

Thinking can only undertake its task through a reciprocal awakening to its dependence on **language** and its **care of the word**. In section 185 of *Enowning* (*Das Ereignis*), Heidegger refers to the “treasure of the word” as the creative wellspring for engendering new idioms that speak to the simplicity of the verbal form “to be.” Words are not simply shells of thinking, but instead convey the **claim** (*Anspruch*) of be-ing and enable human beings to participate in the clearing. As such, thinking finds an ally in **poetry** in the common effort to say what remains **unsaid**. For Heidegger, poetizing and thinking safeguard the word and together thrive only when **hearing** takes precedence over speaking.

**ENOWNING-THROW** (*ereignender Zuwurf*). Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) to address the manner in which the **conversation** between philosophers is both shaped by and gives rise to the different epochs in the **history of being**. The enowning-throw pertains to the historical trajectory within which **thinking** seeks to project open a new **understanding** of the **meaning of being**. Thinking finds itself **thrown** into a crucible of historical conflict (*Streit*) in its endeavor to confront different manifestations of **being** and thereby appropriate the insights of the philosophical **tradition** as a whole. The enowning-throw illustrates the

inherently historical (*geschichtlich*) character of the **question of being**, on the one hand, and on the other, of the need for **philosophy to leap** into the crucible of **history**.

*See also* HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE (*hermeneutischer Zirkel*).

**ENTITIES IN THE WHOLE (*das Seiende im Ganzen*)**. Everything that is, or **entities**, occur together in an ensemble, rather than in isolation. The character of this **whole** entails that a prior backdrop of the **world** is required in order for specific entities to become manifest. The manifestation of entities within the whole is a corollary of the fact that, as an entity in its own right, the **self** is already situated within the context of the world.

**ENTITY (*Seiende*)**. Entity is the **ontological** term for any actual thing that is. Everything is an entity. Heidegger contrasts an entity (*ein Seiendes*) with **being** (*Sein*). Historically speaking, the failure of **metaphysics** has been to misconceive being an entity or as something else that “is,” that is, to blur the **ontological difference**.

*See also* ENTITIES IN THE WHOLE (*das Seiende im Ganzen*).

**ENVIRONMENT (*Umwelt*)**. In his 1919 lecture-course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, Heidegger describes the environmental **experience** of a chair in a meaningful context that gives us a **world**, or as Heidegger likes to say, it worlds (*es weltet*). We encounter every **entity** in our environment in a referential context as meaningful. In winter semester 1919/20, he juxtaposes the environment or world-around to the **with-world** and the **self-world**.

**EPISTEMOLOGY (*Erkenntnistheorie*)**. Epistemology means theory of knowledge, pertaining to one of the major areas of **philosophy** devoted to studying how human knowledge is possible. Heidegger considers epistemology to be a derivative discipline. In Division I (Part I) of *Being and Time*, he argues that “knowing” is founded on prior activities by which being-there interacts with **entities**, for example, items of **equipment**, and discovers **who** it is within the broader context of the **world**.

Heidegger’s critique of epistemology factors into his divergence from the **neo-Kantian** school of philosophy, which was biased in favor of the study of human knowledge. The converse of his stance occurs in his reinterpretation of **Immanuel Kant**’s philosophy as prefiguring the task of **fundamental ontology**, rather than as presenting only a “critique” of the nature and limits of human knowledge. This bone of contention with neo-Kantianism becomes most evident in Heidegger’s *Davos Disputation* with his German counterpart, **Ernst Cassirer**.

See also KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*).

**EQUIPMENT (Zeug).** Heidegger describes the **entities** that **being-there** encounters in **concern** as equipment. Equipment is essentially something **in-order-to**. A knife is something in order to carve. To the **being** of equipment always belongs a totality of equipment, that is, its **involvement**, in which it can be what it is. This totality is constituted by various ways of the in-order-to, such as serviceability and usability. The **way of being** of equipment is **readiness-to-hand**.

**EQUIPRIMORDIAL (gleichursprünglich).** The **existentials** that constitute the **care** of **being-there** are equiprimordial and cannot be deduced one from the other. They are all given at the same time within the structural unity of care and can only be **interpreted** together and through each other. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasizes that the existentials, namely **existence**, **facticity**, and **falling**, comprise this structural unity, and as unified within **temporality**, are equiprimordial with each other.

**ERRANCY (Irre).** In his lecture *On the Essence of Truth* (1930), Heidegger describes errancy as the essential counter-pole of **concealment** to the original occurrence of **truth** as **unconcealment**. It is the condition of the **possibility** of error and falsity. Truth unfolds as dynamic tension between unconcealment and concealment, uncovering and withholding. The **forgettiness of being** is not the fault of **being-there**, but is due to errancy. Because **being** discloses itself as the **beingness** of entities, being itself remains concealed. In this way being-there is led astray by errancy. Errancy itself as leading astray can be experienced by being-there, because it is as much disposed toward truth as “untruth.” This experience makes it possible for being-there to resist errancy.

In Part IV of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger identifies the double error that shapes the **history** of **metaphysics**: first, the failure by ancient philosophers, most notably **Plato** and **Aristotle**, to address the necessary link between being and **time**, and second, the failure to address time as the ecstatic **transcendence** of human **finitude**, which originates from the **future**, returns from the **past**, and opens up into the **present**. Due to this double oversight, being is conceptualized as **permanent presence**, and time is construed as a linear succession of “nows.” Hence the **forgettiness of being** overshadows the **first beginning** of **philosophy**.

In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger revisits his lecture from 1930 in order to underscore the necessity of **thinking** errancy as a prelude to addressing truth as unconcealment. In **releasement**, we can experience the **mystery**

of being: its dynamic of gifting-refusal. Given this **ontological** tension between **concealing** and **revealing**, errancy can provide a signpost or a roundabout inroad to the **truth**.

*See also* DIS-ENOWNING (*Ent-eignis*).

**ESCHATOLOGY OF BE-ING** (*die Eschatologie des Seyns*). Heidegger explores the historical trajectory of Western **metaphysics** as the **forgottenness of be-ing**. There is a direction and **destiny** to this development, which Heidegger describes as an eschatology. His use of that term differs from that ordinarily employed in Christian **theology**, insofar as the historical development does not necessarily lead to an ascent and a climax, but on the contrary, spirals downward into the sedimented layers of forgottenness comprising the philosophical **tradition**. In *Observations I–V*, Heidegger emphasizes that **enowning** (*Ereignis*), or the appropriation of the different historical epochs, governs and pervades the eschatology of be-ing. In his essay *Anaximander’s Saying* (1946), Heidegger emphasizes that eschatology is the interpenetration of different epochs, which demarcate different philosophical periods and together indicate an overall direction or **destiny**.

**ÉSKHATON**. *Éskhaton* is the Greek word for end-time, referring to the completion and fulfillment of what has been prefigured from the inception of history. In early Christianity, the *éskhaton* refers to the climatic **moment** of Christ’s return.

In his discussion of **primordial Christianity**, Heidegger argues that the end-time of salvation does not lie indefinitely in the **future**, but instead is already prefigured in and unfolds within the moment. Heidegger’s **interpretation** of the end-time provides a clue to the **origin** of **temporality**, in which the future and **past** are **ecstatic** dimensions that are conjoined in the breakthrough and **disclosedness** of the **present**.

*See also* PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**ESSENCE** (*Wesen*). From the perspective of **metaphysics**, essence is the quality whereby an **entity** is what it is. Within scholasticism in particular, the essence of an entity is its **nature** or “what it is,” independently of its **existence** or “that it is.” In *Being and Time*, Heidegger overthrows traditional metaphysics when he says that the “essence” (*Wesen*) of **being-there** lies in its existence. In his later work, Heidegger emphasizes the verbal sense of the term as the dynamic of **presencing**. Essence is not a quality but an activity, the way of **being**.

*See also* BE-ING (*Seyn*); ESSENTIAL SWAYING (*Wesung*).

**ESSENTIAL SWAYING (*Wesung*).** In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger employs the term “essential swaying” (*Wesung*) in connection with the Old German usage of **be-ing** (*Seyn*). The term describes be-ing’s dynamic potential to **gift its truth**, that is, to unfold the diversity of its manifestations throughout history. Heidegger contrasts essential swaying with a static sense of **essence** as a **metaphysical** determination of the **beingness of entities**.

**ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME (*ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*).** The eternal recurrence of the same is one of **Friedrich Nietzsche**’s most basic philosophical concepts, which he presents in his epic work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. For Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence prioritizes the ultimacy of each “**moment**” (*Augenblick*), as presenting an opportunity for the **overman**’s self-affirmation and fulfillment. Heidegger’s account of the elliptical arc of **temporality** in some ways reflects Nietzsche’s portrait of **time** as cyclical, that is, as recurring in each and every moment.

**ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME, THE (*Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*).** In the first section of this summer semester 1937 lecture-course that was published in *Nietzsche I*, Heidegger sketches the four divisions he intends his course to have. The first is a preliminary presentation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same in terms of its genesis, configuration, and domain. In the second division, the essential nature of a metaphysical position is defined, and such positions in prior **metaphysics** are discussed. The third division is an **interpretation** of **Friedrich Nietzsche**’s metaphysics of the **will** as the last possible one. In the fourth division, the end of **philosophy** and the **other beginning** of **commemorative thinking** are discussed. As is often the case with Heidegger, only the first division receives full treatment. The conclusion of the course is a brief sally into the second division.

Heidegger interprets the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as the fundamental thought of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche stands in fundamental opposition to **Platonism** and **Christianity**. Nietzsche communicated the thought of the eternal recurrence reluctantly, because it is the hardest of all thoughts to bear. It is important to note the fundamental shift in Heidegger’s interpretation. In his preceding lecture-course, *The Will to Power as Art*, he understood the will to power as the **being of entities** and the eternal recurrence as the temporal **meaning of being**. In this course, he interprets the being of an entity in its **essence** as will to power and in its **existence** as eternal recurrence.

Heidegger's interpretation centers on the death of **God** and the humanization of the **being of entities**. Humanity, not God, is the center of the eternal return of the becoming **world**. What returns eternally is neither God nor the Platonic idea, but the will to power as constant **presence**.

The **guiding question** of philosophy, "What is being?," is answered in metaphysics without developing it as the **basic question**: "What makes the **unconcealment** of being possible?" The question "What is being?" is always answered by naming an entity as the **ground** of the **beingness** of entities. Nietzsche's philosophy is the last **possibility** of metaphysics, because he answers the guiding question by interlocking the answers of **Parmenides** and **Heraclitus** in his doctrine of the eternal recurrence and the will to power. He insists that being "is" by virtue of becoming. In this sense, his philosophy is inverted Platonism and the grandest and most profound gathering of all essential fundamental positions of philosophy.

**ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME AND THE WILL TO POWER, THE** (*Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Wille zur Macht*). Heidegger projected this lecture to serve as a conclusion to his three lecture-courses on **Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Will to Power as Art, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, and The Will to Power as Knowledge***. It consists of an introduction and six sections. Heidegger's overriding claim is that Nietzsche's **philosophy** is the **completion of metaphysics**. The **guiding question of metaphysics**, "What is being?," is answered by determining being as the permanence of the **presence of entities**. The doctrine of the **will to power** and the eternal recurrence converge in Nietzsche's philosophy as the final metaphysical position.

In the age of **nihilism**, being refuses to reveal itself as itself and abandons **being-there**. The **being of entities** is reduced to manipulability and disposability. The meaninglessness of being expresses itself in the measurelessness of the self-overpowering power. And yet we can **experience** the withdrawal of being. In the **clearing**, being reveals itself as self-**concealment**. This self-concealing revealing of being is both **mysterious** and worthy of question. When we accept **guardianship** over the clearing and refrain from the **will** to dominion, a new and **other beginning** in the **history of being** becomes possible.

**ETERNITY (*Ewigkeit*)**. Heidegger discounts the traditional notion of "eternity" as timelessness. He maintains that eternity in this sense rests on a derived, **unowned**, or inauthentic grasp **of time** as based on a perpetual **now**. In terms of **primordial time**, Heidegger links eternity to the **disclosedness** of

the **moment** (*Augenblick*). In section 238 of *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger suggests that **human beings** can **experience** eternity as in the lightning flash and **shining back** of the **clearing**.

*See also* LIGHTNING-ALIKENESS (*Blitzartigkeit*).

**ETHICS** (*Ethik*). *See* ORIGINAL ETHICS (*ursprüngliche Ethik*).

**ETHOS**. For Heidegger, the Greek word *ethos* pertains to the situated dwelling of being-there. He **retrieves** the **possibility** of ethics by seeking its **origin** in the Greek notion of the *ethos*.

Accordingly, the Greek sense of the *ethos* provides the stepping-stone for formulating an **original ethics**. Given the *ethos*, the new premise of ethics is the **possibility** of being-there's abiding within and the providing the **place** for **being's unconcealment**. In this way, the fulcrum of ethics shifts away from simply championing the **good** of human interests and can also include concern for the welfare of the **earth** and **animals**. The **guardianship** or stewardship of the earth becomes an overriding concern for an original ethics.

*See also* LETTER ON "HUMANISM" (*Brief über den "Humanismus"*).

**EUROPEAN NIHILISM** (*Der europäische Nihilismus*). In this 1940 lecture-course, published in *Nietzsche II*, Heidegger confronts **Friedrich Nietzsche's interpretation** of **nihilism**. This course unfolds in three stages. Heidegger first offers an account of nihilism, the **will to power**, and valuation in Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche understands nihilism as the collapse of all valuation. The revaluation of **values** must revert to the **eternal recurrence of the same**, because the will to power is essentially enhancement. Only the **overman** (*Übermensch*) is able to affirm the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche tries to overcome nihilism by the will to power's revaluation of all **values**. His **philosophy** is a **metaphysics** of the will to power. He answers the **guiding question** of metaphysics, "What is **being?**," by grounding the being of **entities** in the will to power.

In the middle section, Heidegger explains the convergence of the will to power and valuative thought. Value thinking is the **essence** and fulfillment of the metaphysics of **subjectivity**. **Nietzsche's** humanization of metaphysics and morals is the consummation of the tradition from **Protagoras** to **René Descartes**. For Descartes, the **human being** is the *subjectum* as the **ground** of the **representation** of entities in terms of **truth** as certitude. The "quest for certitude" is determined by the goal of unconditional dominion over the **earth**. **Nietzsche's metaphysics** of the **will to power** is dependent on Des-



cartes's fundamental metaphysical position. The **being of entities** remains for Nietzsche representedness. Modern **value-philosophy** conceals the collapse of the **meaning of being** and truth.

**EVENT, THE (*Das Ereignis*)**. See ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**EVERYDAYNESS (*Alltäglichkeit*)**. Everydayness is the undifferentiated **mode** in which **being-there** first and foremost **exists**. Heidegger calls this undifferentiated character of being-there averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*). Everydayness distinguishes the prephilosophical level of understanding in which reside both the **possibilities** of being-there's indifference to, and concern for, the **question of being**.

*See also* THEY, THE (*das Man*)

**EVIL (*das Böse*)**. Throughout his works, Heidegger rarely questions the **origin** and **ground** of evil. Yet in his lectures from the summer semester of 1936, he does secondarily consider evil in examining **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's** examination thereof as the cornerstone of his **philosophy** of human **freedom**. According to Heidegger, evil harbors an **ontological** ambivalence by displaying the **will's** opposition to the rule of **law** on the one hand, and on the other hand by marking the emergence of the human capacity to choose between alternatives, for example, between **good** and evil. Heidegger suggests that **human beings** can **experience** evil only given the depths of being-there's potential for **nihilation**.

*See also* ORIGINAL ETHICS (*ursprüngliche Ethik*); SCHELLING'S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*).

**EXISTENCE (*Existenz*)**. In scholastic **ontology**, existence is the quality whereby an **entity** is. Heidegger gives existence a new meaning in his *Comments on Karl Jaspers' "Psychology of Worldviews"*. He suggests that existence can be regarded as the **formal indication** of the **meaning of being** of the "I am." In his 1923 lecture-course *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, existence is the formal indication of **being-there's** most unique **possibility**. After he develops a universalized sense of **possibility** in his winter semester 1925/26 course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, existence becomes the formal indication of the **way of being** of being-there as **ek-sistence**. Being-there stands out in its being, its ecstatic **openness**, and has outstanding possibilities. It understands itself in terms of its existence, the possibility to be itself or not itself.

**EXISTENTIAL (*Existenzial*)**. Heidegger introduced the term existential in *Being and Time* to distinguish between the existentials as the **formal indications** of the ontological **structures** of **being-there**, which are determined by its **existence**, and **categories** as the concepts that refer to the ontological structures of **entities** other than being-there.

*See also* FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY (*Fundamentalontologie*); ONTOLOGY (*Ontologie*).

**EXISTENTIAL (*existenzial*)**. In *Being and Time*, existential refers to the ontological designation of the **existentials** to distinguish them from the **ontic** and **existentiell** level of individual **life**.

**EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS (*existenziale Analytik*)**. **Being-there** is distinguished from all other **entities** by the **fact** that in its **being** it has an **understanding of being**. In his introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines the way of being of being-there as existence. As existence, being-there has the **possibility** to be itself or not itself. The existential analysis takes apart the “**ontological**” **structures** that constitute being-there. Heidegger calls the context of such structures **existentiality**. The existential analysis is a **phenomenology** of the fundamental **ways of being**, or **existentials**, of being-there. Because being-there’s **understanding of being** is the condition of the possibility of all **ontologies**, the existential analysis begins by examining **everydayness** as the cornerstone of a pretheoretical or **preontological understanding of being**. Accordingly, the existential analysis is the first or preliminary step in re-asking the **question of being**. It leads to **fundamental ontology** as the attempt to explicate time as the horizon for an **interpretation** of the **meaning of being**.

**EXISTENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL “AS” (*existenzial-hermeneutische ‘Als’*)**. In Chapter Five (Division I) of *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes between the “as” of **interpretation** and the **apophantical “as”** of assertion. He calls the former the existential-hermeneutical “as” (or simply the hermeneutical “as”). The hermeneutical “as” lends **determination** to whatever it is we seek to understand and grasp the **meaning** of. That determination extends both to our **understanding** of the **entities** we encounter within the world and, implicitly, their **being**, for example, the **readiness-to-hand** of the hammer that is used in the act of hammering a nail. The hermeneutical “as” also directs the **thematic understanding** of ontological **structures** in the course of philosophical inquiry. Ultimately, the hermeneutical “as” governs the philosophical interpretation of the **meaning of being**, that is, its **thematization** and expression in **language**. The existential-hermeneutical “as” al-

lows for the formulation of explicit philosophical **directives**, or broadly speaking, “hermeneutic guidelines,” in order to map the course of **ontological** investigation.

**EXISTENTIALISM** (*Existenzialismus*). Although Heidegger developed in *Being and Time* a **fundamental ontology** by way of an **existential analysis** of **being-there**, his **thinking** was misinterpreted for many years as a **philosophy** of **existence**. Through this fruitful misunderstanding, he became one of the founding fathers of existentialism. *Being and Time* is a work on **ontology**, not on human existence or **philosophical anthropology**.

The origin of existentialism is **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling**’s distinction between a negative philosophy, in which the necessary **categories** of the **essence** of reason are systematically developed, and a positive philosophy, in which the existence of **freedom** in a **world** determined by those categories is explained. **Søren Kierkegaard**, who attended Schelling’s lectures in Berlin in the early 1840s, would later use the distinction between essence and existence, or necessity and freedom, to overcome **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**’s system. As Kierkegaard saw it, the relation between God and man determined human existence. In the 1920s, Kierkegaard became the philosopher in vogue in German **theology** and philosophy. Since both **Karl Jaspers** and Heidegger were strongly influenced by the Danish writer and had made existence a central concept of their philosophy, the existentialist misunderstanding was born. It remains remarkable that Heidegger strenuously avoided the existentialist vocabulary in his early lecture-course and only started to use it while writing *Being and Time*.

One of Heidegger’s oldest students, **Karl Löwith**, was the first to misinterpret his philosophy as a form of existentialist philosophy. We find the same misunderstanding in **Rudolf Bultmann**’s theological reading of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. In his famous essay *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, **Jean-Paul Sartre** wrongly claimed that he and Heidegger belonged to the atheistic wing of existentialism.

**EXISTENTIALITY** (*Existenzialität*). Existentiality is the context of the **structures** that constitute **existence**.

**EXISTENTIELL** (*existenziell*). In *Being and Time*, existentiell refers to the ontic side of being-there. The question of **existence** can only be unraveled by the act of existing itself. The individual’s self-understanding, which always leads along this way, is called existentiell.

*See also* EXISTENTIAL (*Existenzial*).

**EXPANSE** (*Gegnet*). Expanse is another **word** for the **truth of being**. It is that domain which in gathering **entities** together opens itself up in such a way as to establish and maintain the **open**. In the open, every entity can emerge and repose within itself as what it is. Being gives itself (*es gibt Sein*) as an open expanse, which simultaneously expands the “there” of **being-there**. Being-there’s **releasement** or **letting be** of entities transposes it into the expanse, where it has to wait and attend to the **mystery** of being.

**EXPATRIATION** (*Unheimlichkeit*). See UNCANNINESS (*Unheimlichkeit*).

**EXPERIENCE** (*Erfahrung*). **Life** is essentially experience. It expresses itself in and lives out of meaningful structures that it can **understand**. **Phenomenology** as an understanding **science** (*verstehende Wissenschaft*) can lay bare these structures in a **retrieval** of the original experience.

See also FACTIC LIFE EXPERIENCE (*faktische Lebenserfahrung*); LIVED EXPERIENCE (*Erlebnis*).

**EXPLANATION** (*Erklärung*). In his early lecture-course in **Freiburg**, Heidegger often uses **Wilhelm Dilthey**’s influential distinction between the explanatory and the understanding sciences. Natural sciences are theoretical and explain events by universal laws of **nature**. The humanities, on the other hand, try to **understand** human **life** in its individual manifestations, such as the work of **art** and historical persons and events. Life in its **facticity**, or as Heidegger would later call it, **being-there**, cannot be explained, but only understood.

See also LIVED EXPERIENCE (*Erlebnis*).

**EXPRESSION** (*Ausdruck*). **Life** is **lived experience** and expresses itself in meaningful **structures**. These expressions can only be understood in hermeneutic **phenomenology** by vital participation in the distress or **need** of the **self**. By going back again and again to the original **experience**, phenomenology can understand these expressions without objectifying them. This constant striving for **retrieval** constitutes the strictness of phenomenology as a **science**.

**EXPROPRIATION** (*Ent-eignis*). See DIS-ENOWNING (*Ent-eignis*).

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**FACT (*Faktum*).** Being-there's vague and average **understanding** of being is a fact. With the term fact Heidegger indicates that being-there is an ultimate and undeniable **givenness**. It can only be understood through itself. Whenever being-there is, it is a fact, and the factuality of such a fact is being-there's **facticity**. A fact, then, is an **expression** of facticity as **lived experience**, rather than a characteristic of objects or events.

**FACTIC DISPERSION (*faktische Zerstretheit*).** Concomitant to the **self's thrownness** into the **world** is the **fact** of its embodiment and its differentiation in terms of gender, as either female or male. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger makes one of his few references to the **origin** of human sexuality.

**FACTIC LIFE EXPERIENCE (*faktische Lebenserfahrung*).** Factic life experience was Heidegger's **formal indication** of the matter of **hermeneutic phenomenology**. It was later replaced by **facticity** and, in *Being and Time*, by **being-there**. **Life** gives itself as **experience**. As lived experience, life always expresses itself in **structures** that it can **understand**. Lived experience is factual, because it is the first and last **givenness** that can neither be denied nor explained.

**FACTICITY (*Faktizität*).** Facticity is the **formal indication** of **being-there** that is already charged with its hermeneutic **expression** in **structures** that we can **understand**. Facticity includes the distinctive **facts** of an individual's circumstances. As a formal indicator, facticity is understanding as the matter itself of **phenomenology**. We can understand everything in **life** except the fact that life itself is understandable.

*See also* FACTIC LIFE EXPERIENCE (*faktische Lebenserfahrung*).

**FAITH (*Glaube*).** In his famous 1927 lecture *Phenomenology and Theology*, Heidegger distinguishes theology as the positive science of faith from **philosophy** as the **science of being** itself. The "positum" of theology is the

factual **mode** of existing of a believing Christian, whose **existence** is determined by the cross. Faith expresses itself in the rebirth of the **self**. Only in faith can we experience what it means to be a Christian. Because faith posits the existence of **God** as the **ground of being**, faith is the **existentiell** enemy of philosophy. The task of philosophy is to disclose the **meaning of being** and therefore cannot be guided by faith.

*See also* CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); ONTIC SCIENCE (*ontische Wissenschaft*).

**FALLENNESS** (*Verfallenheit*). Fallenness is an “**existential**” **mode of being-in-the-world**. In its **everydayness**, **being-there** does not exist in an owned and individualized mode as itself, but in fallenness to the **world** and the “**they**.” As not being itself, being-there is absorbed by the world in its **concern** and **understands** itself in terms of the world as a natural **entity**. In its fallenness to the world, being-there is simultaneously absorbed by **curiosity** and the **idle talk** of the “they.” Being-there in its **facticity** has the tendency to fall from its potential for individuality or **ownedness**. This falling originates as an existential **possibility** through a mode of **temporalizing**, which prioritizes the immediacy of the present.

Falling (*Verfallen*), **existence** (*Existenz*), and facticity (*Faktizität*) constitute the essential **structures of care**, or what it means to be human.

**FARNNESS** (*Ferne*). The correlation between farness and **nearness** allows Heidegger a wordplay of which he never tires in his later work. For **being-there**, **being** is far, simply because it is not an **entity** and can never be fully conceptualized by being-there. Being conceals itself behind the entities, to which it gives **presence** in the **clearing**. Being is near, because it is that by which entities that are near “are.” In this respect, being is the **origin** of all nearness and is thus nearer to being-there than any entity could ever be.

**FATE** (*Schicksal*). Fate is **being-there**’s ownmost **historicality**. Its being free for **death** gives being-there its ultimate goal and throws it back into its **finitude**. Once being-there has grasped the finitude of its **existence**, it is brought into the simplicity of its fate. In **resoluteness**, being-there hands itself down to itself, **free for death**, in a **possibility** that “it has both inherited and chosen,” that is, its fate.

**FEAR** (*Furcht*). Fear is a falling **disposedness** of **being-there** that is made possible by **anxiety**. Heidegger considers fear from three points of view. First, that in the face of which we fear is the threatening. The threatening is always a specific **entity** within the **world**. As fearsome it draws close, but also carries with it the **possibility** that it may pass us by. Second, fear is the

**mood** in which we let something matter to us as fearsome. Third, what the fear is about is the entity that is afraid, that is, being-there. Fear discloses being-there as endangered and abandoned to itself.

**FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762–1814).** Along with **George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling**, Fichte was one of the founding fathers of German idealism, and among the first to question the foundations of **Immanuel Kant's philosophy**. With the exception of his lectures from the summer semester 1929, Heidegger only rarely addresses the importance of Fichte's philosophy. In these lectures, Heidegger suggests that Fichte's attempt to define the "positing" of consciousness as a "fact-act" points to the **facticity** of human **existence**.

*See also* GERMAN IDEALISM: FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL AND THE CONSTELLATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT (*Der deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling Hegel und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*).

**FINITUDE (Endlichkeit).** As **being-there**, the **self** is defined by its limitations, including its ultimate finality or the **possibility** of **death**. As the ultimate possibility, death limits all of the self's other possibilities and indicates the finite span of time allotted to each individual. The emphasis on human finitude yields the clue that the **future** constitutes the key dimension from which ecstatic **temporality** originates in opening the **clearing** of being-there. Because being-there is inherently finite, as is its temporality, **understanding** can develop only within a limited horizon. The possibility of understanding **being** is also rooted in finitude, because what is understood must be projected upon the backdrop of temporality. Like **Immanuel Kant** previously, Heidegger concludes that philosophy is an inherently finite enterprise. But in contrast to Kant's **philosophy**, finitude also occurs as the **nihilation** that pervades being in its tendency toward **concealment**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes the refusal of a **ground**, or the **abground**, as the basis for being's concealment and the **origin** of finitude as such.

*See also* NIHILATION (*das Nichten*).

**FINK, EUGEN (1905–75).** Eugen Fink was a student of **Edmund Husserl** and also his personal assistant, later emerging as a key figure in the development of the **phenomenological** movement. In the winter semester 1966/67 at the University of Freiburg, Fink collaborated with Heidegger to offer the *Heracitus Seminar* (*Heraklit Seminar*). Fink also studied with Heidegger, attending his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30. Upon learning of Fink's death on 25 June 1975 (in Freiburg), Heidegger dedicated

the forthcoming volume of the *Gesamtausgabe* (**Complete Edition**) to him, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (which was published in 1983 as volume 29/30).

**FIRST BEGINNING** (*erster Anfang*). Heidegger traces the birth of **philosophy** to the pre-Socratic thinkers. The **origin** of philosophy, however, is inherently ambiguous. On the one hand, the pre-Socratics experience for the first time the **awe** of **being**'s manifestation. On the other hand, they do not explicitly formulate the **question of being**, thereby yielding to its **forgottenness** and paving the way to the inception of classical **Greek philosophy** via **Plato** and **Aristotle**. The first beginning thereby holds the unfulfilled promise of developing the question of being. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger contrasts the first beginning with the **other beginning**.

**FISSURE** (*die Zerklüftung*). Fissure pertains to a depth that pervades our **understanding of being** and introduces a fault line in the historical attempt to bring its **meaning** to expression. The fissure is reminiscent of the **ab-ground** (*Abgrund*), which precludes the formulation of any authoritative or stand-alone assertions concerning **truth** or the **meaning of being**. Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38).

**FORBEARANCE** (*die Langmut*). The historical enactment of **thinking** is not linear, but proceeds according to its own pace. Thinking requires forbearance in order to stay steadfast along its path and thereby invite the manifestation of **being**. As a concrete example of forbearance, Heidegger states in *What Is Called Thinking?* that it may be advisable to read Aristotle's work for 15 years before attempting to work through the labyrinth of **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s writings.

**FORE-CONCEPTION** (*Vorgriff*). The everyday **interpretation of circumspection** is grounded in fore-conception, **foresight**, and **fore-having**. Fore-conception is something we have grasped in advance and with which we try to conceptualize that which we have in fore-having and foresight.

**FORE-HAVING** (*Vorhabe*). Everyday circumspective **interpretation** is grounded in **fore-conception**, fore-having, and **foresight**. The fore-having is something we have gathered in advance and which provides a preliminary outline to define or determine that which we have in foresight.

**FORERUNNING** (*Vorlaufen*). See ANTICIPATE (*Vorlaufen*).



**FORESIGHT** (*Vorsicht*). Everyday circumspective **interpretation** is grounded in **fore-conception**, **fore-having**, and foresight. Foresight is something we see in advance; it takes the first cut out of what has been taken in our fore-having and does so with a view to a definite way in which this can be interpreted. In terms of Heidegger's **hermeneutics**, the foresight begins to put in view whatever it is that can be determined "as-something."

*See also* HERMENEUTIC SITUATION (*hermeneutische Situation*).

**FOREST TRAILS** (*Holzwege*). Ways of thinking can resemble the trails in a forest. These trails lead into the depths of overgrown foliage, which must be opened up again in order to continue the journey. According to this analogy, **thinking** is a journey in which the light of the **clearing** is counterbalanced by the darkness of **concealment**. Like the trail in a forest that must be cleared of overgrown brush, so a **path of thinking** must be forged in order to enter the clearing of **being**. In confronting an impasse, thinking must sometimes take a detour, as Heidegger himself experienced with the problematic status of the third division (Part I) of his magnum opus, *Being and Time*.

*See also* OFF THE BEATEN TRACK (*Holzwege*).

**FORGOTTENNESS OF BEING** (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The history of **metaphysics** is determined by the forgottenness of **being**. While being revealed itself as the **beingness** of **entities**, metaphysics neglected the **ontological difference**. Being became equated with the **presence**, permanence, and usefulness of entities. Because being includes the potential for self-concealment, **philosophy** is not to be blamed for the forgottenness of being, which must be understood in terms of the **destiny** of being. In the course of the history of philosophy, the forgottenness of being intensifies. The end of this development is modern **technology**. The **abandonment of being** is the greatest **danger**. Yet the experience of this **danger** makes possible the **turning** of the forgottenness of being to **recollection** as the **clearing** and **sheltering** of the **mystery** of being.

**FORMAL INDICATION** (*formale Anzeige*). Formal indication is an essential part of Heidegger's phenomenological method. It is conducive to the **understanding of phenomenology**. It points the way and guides the deliberation. It makes it possible for us to view a **phenomenon**, but as *formal* indication it has nothing to say content-wise. Formal indication leads us to the matters themselves and guards us against assuming that the **relational sense** between the phenomena and us is theoretical. It makes it possible for us to be drawn into the **situation** out of which we can learn how a phenomenon must be approached.

Formal indication distinguishes the full immediacy of the individual human situation expressed in the indexical particularities I, here, and now, and captured in the unique **experience** of **being-there**. By way of the **intentionality** of being-there, it indicates the formal structure of **relations** that already traverse this immediacy: with others, amid **entities**, and so forth. Formal indication seeks to formalize the immediacy of **time** as the underlying background of the intentionality of being-there in its full structural dynamics and thus catch it in the act of its individualizing contextualizing.

Formal indication provides a preliminary outline of what Heidegger called the “**hermeneutic circle**” and the circularity of the inquiry into **being**. Formal indication is the concrete way and methodology by which the example of the **self**’s own existence can point to the more general structures, which **ontology** would seek to **thematize** in its investigation. Conversely, these general structures, which pertain to being-there’s being—for example, **care**—and beyond that to the **temporal** disclosure of being as such, are not “free-floating” phenomena; instead, they point back to the concrete examples by which they first become explicit and understandable. **Hermeneutic phenomenology** remains true to the “things themselves” by always returning to the preliminary view or outlook that the concrete examples provide.

**FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION (*Fragestellung*)**. The **question of being** exhibits a definite **structure**, which coincides with the outline of **being-there**’s **understanding**. Heidegger thereby speaks of the formulation of the question of **being** to indicate both being-there’s intrinsic interest in undertaking that inquiry and the role that the **preontological understanding of being** has in guiding the development of the inquiry itself.

**FOR-THE-SAKE-OF-WHICH, THE (*das Worumwillen*)**. The for-the-sake-of-which pertains to the **being** of **being-there**, by which it first shows **concern** for its **existence**. The for-the-sake-of-which determines the **structure** of **understanding** by which being-there reveals itself in light of its **possibilities** and as defined through **care**. The instrumental series of the “**in-order-to**” and “**for-which**” all find their termination in the “for-the-sake-of-which” as the end of the enviroing **world**. In *On the Essence of Ground* (1928), Heidegger describes the **projection** of that-for-the-sake-of as the primary dynamic by which the **self** opens up and abounds within a horizon of possibilities.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger seeks a more primordial ground of the for-the-sake-of-which in the reciprocal relationship between **being** and being-there. The care that is **formally indicated** by the for-the-sake-of-which is designated anew as the **guardianship** of **be-ing**.

**FORTUNE** (*Schicksal*). See FATE (*Schicksal*).

**FORWARD-LOOKING THINKING** (*vordenken*). Forward-looking thinking is a way of **thinking** ahead in **anticipation** of a **destiny** that is still to arrive. At the end and **completion of metaphysics**, **philosophy** becomes closed off within the epoch of modern **technology**. But in envisioning the **other beginning**, thinking looks ahead beyond the calculable determination of **entities** within **machination**.

Forward-looking thinking complements **commemorative thinking**. Both mirror dimensions of the **history of being**, the **fate** of which as arising from the **past** is still impending vis-à-vis its arrival (and appropriation) from the **future**. In *The History of Being* (1938–40), Heidegger emphasizes the importance of philosophers “thinking ahead” to prepare for a decision originating from **be-ing** (*Seyn*). Only through such preparation can humanity become **open** to both the saving power as well as the **danger** of technology.

Forward-looking thinking is a further permutation or enactment of **being-historical thinking**, which Heidegger outlines in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38).

**FOR-WHICH, THE** (*das Wofür, das Wozu*). The for-which of usability of **equipment** is **disclosed** in **being-there’s circumspection**. That for-which a hammer is usable is hammering and not writing.

**FOUNDING** (*Begründung*). In his essay *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger describes founding as one of the three elements in the process of grounding. The process enables **being-there** to encounter **entities** by making them manifest in and as themselves. Founding thereby pertains to how finite **transcendence** allows the **world** to reveal entities through the **place** established by the **self’s disclosedness**.

**FOUR SEMINARS** (*Vier Seminare*). Of the four seminars, the first three (1966, 1968, 1969) took place in Le Thor, where Heidegger also visited his friend René Char, and the last (1973) in Zähringen. In the first seminar, Heidegger discusses the poem of **Parmenides** and the fragments of **Heraclitus**. This seminar is to a large extent a prelude to the winter semester 1966/67 seminar on Heraclitus that Heidegger conducted with Eugen Fink.

The second seminar is an **interpretation** of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy** based on his famous early essay on the difference between the systems of **Johann Gottlieb Fichte** and **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling**. This interpretation is a stepping-stone to an explication of

the **unthought** origin of philosophy and the danger of effacing the **ontological difference**. When we view this difference from the shadow of **metaphysics**, we tend to represent **being** as an **entity**.

The third seminar circles around the difference between the Greek and the modern **experience** of the **being of entities**. The starting point is **Immanuel Kant**'s essay on the only possible fundament for a demonstration of the **existence** of **God**. Heidegger also sums up his entire **path of thinking** and searches for ways to overcome **enframing**.

The seminar in Zähringen is a return to the *Logical Investigations* of **Edmund Husserl**. Heidegger explains how he overcame Husserl's dependence on **consciousness**. He also develops his concept of **phenomenology** as the making manifest of what does not show itself. The only question of Heidegger's path of thinking is the question of the **meaning of being**.

*See also* HERACLITUS SEMINAR (*Heraklit-Seminar*).

**FOURFOLD, THE (Geviert)**. In Heidegger's later philosophy, **being-in-the-world** as the fundamental **ontological structure** of **being-there** gives way to the fourfold. The fourfold is primordial oneness of **earth** and **sky**, **divinities** and **mortals**. It is the appropriation of the **truth of being** and so the **clearing** in which **things** can be and appear in their singularity.

*See also* BUILDING DWELLING THINKING (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*); ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART, THE (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*); THING, THE (*Das Ding*).

**FRAMEWORK (Gestell)**. *See* ENFRAMING, THE (*Das Gestell*).

**FREEDOM (Freiheit)**. Freedom is a central topic of Heidegger's path of **thinking**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger reveals **being-there** as the **possibility** of its being free for **death**. The **way of being** of being-there is **can-be**. Being-there has constantly to develop and cultivate its possibilities. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly defines freedom as choosing on behalf of one's limitations, that is, in accepting that the **openness** of choice lies in choosing one possibility to the exclusion of others. On the basis of this **finitude**, being-there can be itself in an impassioned freedom toward death, that is, a freedom that has been released from the illusions of the "**they**," and which is factually concrete, certain, and open in its **anxiety**.

In his 1930 essay *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger's concept of freedom begins to shift. In *Being and Time*, freedom lies in being-there's most unique possibility to be itself or not itself. In the 1930 essay, Heidegger can identify freedom with **truth**, because every **entity** has to be liberated from **concealment**, and the resulting **unconcealment (alétheia)** is truth. Freedom is the openness of being toward the **open** and that which is disclosed. To

render entities free is to let them be manifest as what they are. Freedom is the **letting-be** of entities. The condition of the possibility of being-there's freedom is the **fact** that being-there is ecstatic. It yields to the openness where it can allow entities to be. The open is the **clearing** and thus the **truth of being**.

In his lecture-course from the summer semester 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger emphasizes that freedom is no longer a "property of man," but man is the "property of freedom." The **turning relation of being** to man, which Heidegger addresses in *Contributions to Philosophy*, makes explicit this transposition in the focus of freedom. In light of the turning, it becomes evident that freedom originates from being, and it is by virtue of participating in this openness that being-there becomes free, that is, receives the power to make **decisions**. The freedom of being-there reposes in the freedom of being, in engaging in the openness of letting be, and is no longer a merely human capacity.

*See also* SCHELLING'S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*).

**FREEDOM FOR DEATH (*Freiheit zum*)**. A primary aim in anticipating death is to overcome its **fear** and the **self's** tendency to misidentify with those aspects of **entities** that falsely promise a sense of security. The **owned** relation to death is also liberating. Through this liberation, the individual **experiences** its freedom for death.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger appeals to **Friedrich Nietzsche's** concept of "free death," which he outlines in his famous work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. **Zarathustra** emphasizes the (right) time of death as one in which the individual avoids "becoming too old for one's victories." In citing this passage, Heidegger characterizes freedom for death as an act of giving oneself up to one's morality, as a prerequisite for the self's disclosing its unique set of **possibilities**.

**FREIBURG-IM-BREISGAU**. This city in Baden-Württemberg is the economic and cultural center of the Black Forest, where Heidegger lived for most of his life. From 1906 to 1909, he was a pupil at the Berthold-Gymnasium, and from 1909 to 1913, a student at the Albert-Ludwigs-University. On 27 July 1915, the university granted Heidegger the license to teach in philosophy. After World War I, Heidegger became **Edmund Husserl's** assistant. After his years in Marburg, 1923–1928, Heidegger returned to Freiburg as the successor to Husserl's chair and remained there until his death in 1976.

**FROM THE LAST MARBURG LECTURE-COURSE** (*Aus der letzten Marburger Vorlesung*). This essay, first published in 1964, is an excerpt from Heidegger's summer semester 1928 lecture-course, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. In this text, Heidegger summarizes his attempt to disclose the guiding thread on the basis of which **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz** determines the **being** of **entities**, that is, the determination of a **ground** on which entities can appear in their interconnectedness with each other.

**FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT** (*Grundbegriff*). A fundamental concept is used to **thematize structures** of **being** or make them understandable in a philosophical way. Such fundamental concepts may function analogously to their metaphysical ancestors, albeit as directed in advance by a **grounding attunement**. Such an **attunement** maintains a concrete orientation, in order that the concepts can grasp the nuances of the **phenomenon** itself, particularly as pertaining to human **existence**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, Heidegger equates a fundamental concept with a comprehensive concept (*Inbegriff*). Comprehensive concepts develop in a two-fold way: first, by implementing a metaphysical grasp of the **whole**, and second, by implicating the situation of the inquirer and his/her existence within that wholeness. In this way, the metaphysical grasp of the whole does not escape into abstract universals, but instead is grounded on the concrete stance of the self-questioning of the inquirer.

**FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS, THE: WORLD, FINITUDE, SOLITUDE** (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*). In this winter semester 1929/30 lecture-course, Heidegger determines the **origin** of **philosophy** as **metaphysics**. Metaphysics is not an overstepping of the sensible world to another and higher world; it is a revolution in our everyday way of questioning. In metaphysics our own **being-there** should become a question for us, and in this sense metaphysics is a fundamental occurrence in our lives. Heidegger addresses the question concerning **world**, **finitude**, and **individualization** (*Vereinzelung*).

In the first part, Heidegger shows how philosophy springs from a fundamental **mood**. The fundamental mood of his time is deep **boredom**, which expresses itself in the attempt to control and satisfy all **needs**. The defense against need makes it impossible for us to **experience** our need as a **whole**. As being-there, we no longer experience our **being** as the task of having-to-be. The **mystery** of being-there, which gives being-there its greatness, remains hidden. Heidegger tries to evoke the mood of deep boredom in his students. After an extensive analysis of boredom, Heidegger addresses in the

second part the fundamental question of metaphysics concerning world, finitude, and individualization. As usual, Heidegger will not have enough time to address all three questions. He only discusses the question of the world.

What is world? Heidegger distinguishes between the stone that has no world and is worldless; the animal that is **world-poor**; and being-there, which shapes its world or is **world-forming**. He formally indicates world as the manifestation (*Offenbarkeit*) of **entities in the whole** and analyzes its structural constitution. In the exposition of the **essence of life**, Heidegger shows how the manifestness of **entities** as such is the “there” of the **openness** of the world. The manifestness of entities as such and the openness of the world are intertwined. Only because being-there exists in the midst of entities can it get close to the essence of life. In our nearness to life, the **phenomenon of nature** shows itself.

Heidegger shows next how being-there and nature belong together. The **nearness** of being-there and nature manifests itself in the intertwining of **thrownness** and **projection**. Nature can only be disclosed in the **clearing** of an **understanding** of world. In understanding, the openness of the world is opened up. The phenomenon of world is formally indicated in the fundamental character of the manifestness of entities as such and in the **whole**. As a structural moment of manifestness, the “as” refers to the **structure** of the *logos*. This explains why metaphysics took the *logos* as its starting point. In a destruction of **logic**, Heidegger takes a **step back** into the **ground** of the structure of *logos* as **assertion**. This original dimension is the triple structure of world-formation, as the fundamental occurrence of being-there in the depths of its **freedom** and **finitude**. This triple structure is, as the holding sway of world, at the same time the manifestation of the **being of entities** and thereby the letting hold sway of being-there’s projection of world.

**FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY (*Fundamentalontologie*)**. For Heidegger initially, **philosophy** is **phenomenology** as the pretheoretical original **science of factic life experience**. **Facticity** opens the way for the inquirer to develop its concrete relation to the **question of all questions**, the question of the **meaning of being**, the prelude to fundamental ontology from which regional ontologies receive their **ground and meaning**.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger related fundamental ontology to an **existential analysis of being-there** as preparatory to re-asking the question of **being**. Its aim is to elaborate this question from the **understanding of being** that being-there itself displays. In this existential analysis, Heidegger shows that the being of being-there is **temporality** and that its understanding of being is made possible by the temporality of being itself.

The existential analysis is at the same time a **destruction** of the history of **ontology**, because being-there has always explicated its being through **categories** derived from the natural **world** in which it lives. The categories of

traditional ontology are unsuited to lay bare the **structure** of being-there. Fundamental ontology thus becomes the analysis of temporality and reflects the **ontological difference** between **entities** and being itself. Since all ontologies spring from fundamental ontology, which is **ontically** founded on being-there, fundamental ontology must be supplemented with regional ontologies, or as Heidegger called it in 1928, a **metontology**.

Metontology is a metaphysical ontology of **entities in the whole**, consisting of categories and **existentials**. Fundamental ontology, the destruction of the history of ontology, and metontology constitute the full concept of metaphysics. In the wake of the **turning**, the project of fundamental ontology undergoes transformation. Heidegger seeks to **overcome metaphysics** by executing a **step back** into the **origin** of its **onto-theo-logical** structure.

**FUTURE (*Zukunft*)**. Future is the primary **phenomenon** of primordial, ecstatic **temporality**. It is the coming toward itself of **being-there** in its most unique **can-be**. The **ecstasy** of the future is that in relation to which the **self** in its **ownedness** holds open the **possibility of death**. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger emphasizes that temporality temporalizes primarily from out of the future.

**FUTURITY (*Zukünftigkeit*)**. In *Being and Time*, futurity is one of the three **ecstases** of **temporality**. The ownmost or “authentic” mode of futurity is to **anticipate**, and its unowned or “inauthentic” mode is to **await**. The unique **possibility** of the futurity of being-there is its **death** as the possibility of the impossibility of its **existence**. When being-there anticipates its death, it brings its most unique **can-be** before itself in **resoluteness**. The **horizontal schema** of futurity in which **being-there** comes to itself out of the future is the **for-the-sake-of-which**.



# G

**GADAMER, HANS-GEORG (1900–2002).** In 1922, Paul Natorp showed Gadamer his copy of Heidegger's *Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation*. Gadamer was very impressed by Heidegger's work and decided in 1923 to move to **Freiburg** to study with him. Gadamer moved back to **Marburg** with Heidegger and became one of his most important students. He was deeply influenced by Heidegger's hermeneutical turn and his controversial reading of **Greek philosophy**. Gadamer and Heidegger became lifelong friends. After World War II, Gadamer played an important part in Heidegger's rehabilitation. Of Gadamer's many philosophical achievements, *Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode, 1960)* illustrates both his appropriation and development of Heidegger's **phenomenology**.

**GATHERING TOGETHER (Sammlung).** In its philosophical context, the term gathering together mirrors the etymological **meaning** of the Greek **word logos**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger distinguishes the manner in which a synthetic judgment in Kant's sense still faintly harbors this nuance of gathering together, whereby the predicate of a statement is "connected" with its subject.

In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger employs the term gathering together in the title of Part XXVI. The gathering together is the dynamic whereby **being-there** enters into a relation with **be-ing (Seyn)** and is redefined by the reciprocal safeguarding of its **truth**. Being-there is gathered unto be-ing in two respects: first, as enowned by or **owned-over** to its power of **unconcealment**, and second, by engaging in a **dialogue** or conversation by which the **truth of being** can be historically transmitted and appropriated. In these dual ways, being-there becomes **mindful** of its own capability as constituting the **t/here** or providing the **place** of unconcealment. For Heidegger, such gathering together is ultimately rooted in the **stillness of language**.

**GENERATION (*Generation*).** Since **being-there** is always **being-with**, it belongs to a generation. Being-there's fateful **destiny** in and with its generation goes to make up the completely owned coming to pass (*Geschehen*) of human **existence**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger outlines the "handing down" of **tradition**, as a dynamic enactment of **temporality** that spawns different generations.

The central event for Heidegger's generation was World War I and the ensuing chaotic years of the Weimar Republic.

*See also* HISTORICALITY (*Geschichtlichkeit*); PEOPLE (*Volk*).

**GEORGE, STEFAN (1868–1933).** Stefan George as a German poet and translator. He had considerable influence on Heidegger's attempt to set the context for investigating **language** in his later writings. In his "Notes" from a graduate seminar in the summer semester of 1939, Heidegger cites passages from George's poetry as an inroad to addressing the innerconnection between **being** and language. In his attempt to grasp the role the naming has in allowing the **thing** to become manifest, Heidegger appeals to George's poem "The Word." The final refrain from this poem will set the stage for Heidegger's seminal inquiry in *On the Way to Language*: "So I sadly learned to forsake: No thing may be where the word does break." Language allows an **entity** to be an entity, in such a way as to belong to **be-ing** (*Seyn*) and the inception of its **clearing**.

**GERMAN IDEALISM: FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL AND THE CONSTELLATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT (*Der deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling Hegel und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*).** The text of this lecture-course from the summer semester of 1929 comprises volume 28 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. In these lectures, Heidegger undertakes a critical exposition or **setting in opposition** (*Auseinandersetzung*) of the leading figures of German idealism: **Johann Gottlieb Fichte**, **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling**, and **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. These lectures are unique in that they offer one of the most explicit accounts of Heidegger's **interpretation** of Fichte's **philosophy**. According to Heidegger, Fichte's attempt to define the "positing" of consciousness as a "fact-act" points to the **facticity** of human **existence**. Heidegger also examines Schelling's "nature philosophy" (*Naturphilosophie*) as an attempt to grasp the interconnection of **finite** (*Endlichkeit*), **world**, and **entities in the whole**.

Heidegger consummates his analysis by addressing Hegel's philosophy as an example of "absolute idealism" (*absoluten Idealismus*). In this context, Hegel's philosophy provides a point of departure for the problematic of **temporality** and Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical privileging of the

“**present**” (*Gegenwart*) as the primary dimension of **time**. Even in Hegel’s attempt to establish the dialectical mediation between time and **eternity**, the **present** still emerges as a measure of both the dynamic of becoming and the permanence of the Absolute or **God**. The metaphysical concept of **being** as permanent or constant presence provides the presupposition of Hegel’s “speculative” depiction of Absolute Spirit. By showing how the temporal problematic of finitude and **transcendence** underlies the German idealist rendition of time, Heidegger clears the way for singling out **Immanuel Kant** as the figure who comes closest to establishing the finite basis of metaphysics as **fundamental ontology**.

*See also* KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*).

**GETTING AROUND** (*Umgang*). In *Being and Time*, getting around is the **formal indication** of the different ways in which **being-there** gets around in the **world**. These dealings, interactions, and occupations are disclosed in **circumspection**. Heidegger first **thematized** the **structure** of getting around in winter semester 1921/22.

**GIFT** (*Schenkung*). In the work of **art**, **truth** sets itself to work. This coming to stand of an **entity** in the light of its **being** is only possible through the **unconcealment** of being itself, which bestows itself in pure bounty as a gift. The **truth of being** is a gift of being and as such is given to **being-there**, which at the same time is given over to its **existence**. The metaphor of a gift is also important in Heidegger’s analysis of the **fourfold** and the **thing**. The gift of things in their **presenting** is the mirror-play of the fourfold. In *The History of Being*, Heidegger speaks of impoverishment as a gift, which directs **mortals** away from their **preoccupation** with and **falling** into **entities**.

For Heidegger, the gift is never simply by itself, but is always counterbalanced by a parallel refusing of being’s potential for self-manifestation. Due to its participation in the **openness**, human **ek-sistence** is also a gift, which exacts from mortals a reciprocal willingness to entrust and protect.

*See also* COUNTER-TURNING (*Widerkehr*).

**GIGANTIC, THE** (*das Riesenhafte*). The gigantic epitomizes the calculative potential of **machination** to re-create the entire realm of **nature** according to the highest scale of productivity. Within machination, productivity and mastery over **entities** increases according to a magnitude of boundless proportion. For Heidegger, machination is not merely quantitative. Rather, the gigantic entails a new **gestalt** in which entities are revealed in terms of calculative standards of expediency and usefulness.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger suggests that the gigantic is that in relationship to which everything else appears to be small, inconsequential, and even trivial. In this way, **entities in the whole** are diminished by virtue of how they appear within an instrumental matrix of replaceable parts. The gigantic is the drive toward homogeneity and the reduction of everything to monotonous sameness for the benefit of exercising control. The gigantic thereby epitomizes the dynamic of the **will to power** as the heart of **technology**.

**GIGANTOMACHIE.** *Gigantomachie* is a term taken from Greek mythology, which in ancient **philosophy** refers to a battle between giants of opposing philosophical positions. At the beginning of the introduction (Chapter One) to *Being and Time*, Heidegger alludes to the “Battle of the Giants,” which **Plato** references in *The Sophist*. In Part IV (section 44) of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger revisits this passage from *The Sophist*, which he cites at the outset of his magnum opus. In this section from the Kant-book, Heidegger clarifies further that the “battle” over the ancient **understanding of being** in part stems from a neglect to work out in advance the **question of being** itself. In this context, Heidegger alludes to a “first *gigantomachie*,” foreseeing a second battle to be waged by wrenching from the **forgottenness of being** a new **possibility of understanding** what it means “to be,” that is, in light of **temporality**.

**GIVENNESS (*Gegebenheit*).** Givenness is an important moment in Heidegger’s conception of **phenomenology** as the science of **things** as they show themselves. It reveals the thing itself as it is given in original **experience**. The **phenomenon** is never given as an irrational reminder, which can never be grasped. As immediately given, it is determined by its givenness, or the way in which it shows itself. This givenness is a **structure** that can be analyzed and laid bare. For this reason, phenomenology only describes its phenomena and does not construct them. Givenness is the condition of **possibility** of any given phenomenon. **Being-there** is given as **existence**. Its givenness is at once an unfinished task. The **gift** of existence is the having to be of a **can-be**.

**GLOBALISM (*Planetarismus*).** Globalism is a historical development that occurs at the end of **modernity**. Heidegger employs this term in *The Black Notebooks* to describe how human institutions are dominated by a drive for the acquisition of power that indiscriminately reveals **entities** for their instrumental **value**, organizing them within a larger gestalt of **machination**. In *Ponderings XII–XV*, globalism provides the stage for the emergence of “power politics,” which is a euphemism for the ideologically divided politics

of the modern age. Heidegger emphasizes that in globalism **human beings** become entrenched in a “mass order,” which corresponds to the rise of machination.

**GOD (Gott).** The God of Heidegger’s youth is the personal God of Christian revelation. Heidegger became a student of **theology** with the clear intention of becoming a Roman Catholic priest. He defended the eternal **truth** of the church against the dangers of **modernity**. For reasons of health, Heidegger ended his study of theology. He became a scholastic phenomenologist. His marriage to Elfride Petri and the ensuing religious crisis led to his break with the system of Catholicism in 1919. As a “free Christian” and personal assistant to **Edmund Husserl**, he worked on a **phenomenology of religion** as a **destruction** of Christian **lived experience**. The religious **experience** was the paradigm of lived experience and thus essential to phenomenology itself.

In *Being and Time*, God disappears into the background of Heidegger’s thought, from which the concern for a Christian deity would seldom emerge. Out of **awe**, Heidegger prefers **keeping silent** about God in the domain of **thinking**. Philosophy is unable to disclose the godliness of the living God. The onto-theo-logical **structure** of **metaphysics** reduces God to an **ontological** principle. Heidegger interprets **Friedrich Nietzsche**’s diagnosis of the “death of God” as the end of the god of **metaphysics**. In contrast to Nietzsche, he tries to leave room for an encounter with the divine within the **truth of being**. In silence, a calm **mindfulness** may be nearer to the living God than any metaphysical discussion of God’s nature could ever be. The **holy** is the sheltered **clearing** where being-there may encounter God or the **gods**. Heidegger’s thought is especially attractive to theologians because he limits himself to a description of the **possibility** of the encounter with God. The coming of the **last god**, which Heidegger announces in his *Contributions to Philosophy*, is the **beginning** of a new era that can only begin with the prophetic **word** of the poets. The task of the thinker is to preserve being-there’s **openness** for the arrival of the last god.

*See also* CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); GODS (*Götter*).

**GODDING (Götterung).** Heidegger uses this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* to refer to appearing and shining forth of anything **divine**. He remains intentionally neutral about the character of such an epiphany, whether it originates from **God** or the **gods**. For only through the light of the **clearing**, which simultaneously preserves a **mystery**, can any such epiphany occur. Godding refers to the preservation and unfolding of the mystery distinctive of any god and thereby precedes the distinction between polytheism and monotheism, Christian and pagan.

See also CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); LAST GOD, THE (*der letzte Gott*).

**GODS (Götter).** The gods make many appearances in Heidegger's writings and lectures on **Friedrich Nietzsche** and **Friedrich Hölderlin** in the 1930s. They are the Greek gods who have fled before the coming of Christ, but who may return. In his later work, Heidegger equates the gods with the **divinities** of the **fourfold**.

**GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1742–1832).** Goethe was one of the most influential and eclectic intellectuals of the modern era. He is known both as a literary figure, for such works as *Faust* and *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, and as a pioneer in the development of natural **philosophy** and romanticism. Throughout his writings, Heidegger makes scattered references to Goethe's **poetry**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1941, *Basic Concepts*, Heidegger appeals to Goethe's poem "'Above all summits/Is rest)'" to illustrate the power of the elemental **word**, "**being**," in its verbal expression ("is"). In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger credits Goethe for grasping the nuance of "**bethinging**" (*die Bedingnis*), as the key to understanding how the thing **presences** in its being.

**GOING UNDER (Untergang).** Heidegger employs the term going under in a manner analogous to how **Friedrich Nietzsche** used it, as a prelude to a higher stage of development. For Nietzsche, going under is an expression that **Zarathustra** coins to describe a descent that relinquishes the traditional **values** of Christianity, in order to pave the way for the ascent to the **overman**. For Heidegger, going under implies a similar encounter with the **nihilism**, although stemming from the deeper root of the **forgottenness of being**. Going under, then, marks the end of the first **beginning**, in contrast to the **possibility** of crossing-over to the **other beginning**. Because Heidegger engages Nietzsche's **thinking** in several lecture courses, going under becomes an idiom that harbors a double **meaning**: first, in describing Zarathustra as a transitional figure who prophesizes the "death of **God**" and the crisis of **modernity**, and second, as showing how the **destruction** of **metaphysics** paves the way to recollecting the **truth of being**.

**GOOD (Güte).** Because Heidegger tends to eschew the topic of ethics, he equally avoids discussing the possibility of either good or **evil**. In addressing **being-there's** **historicality** in the second division of Part I of *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that a sense of goodness can be attached to the

transmission of our heritage. The “good” is thereby revealed through the dynamic of being-there’s **temporality**, as the creative tension joining the **future** with the **past**.

*See also* ORIGINAL ETHICS (*ursprüngliche Ethik*); SCHELLING’S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*).

**GRACE (Huld).** The **address of being** takes the form of a voiceless appeal that is disclosed through **being-there’s attunement**. In the attunement of **awe**, **being** reveals itself as grace. Only when being is present for being-there as grace is it possible for **human beings** to  **dwell** on the **earth**. Grace is the **gift** of being’s **presence** in the **fourfold**.

**GRAMMAR OF THE WORD (Die Grammatik des Wortes).** Heidegger’s emphasis on **language** extends to underscoring the grammar of the **word “being.”** In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1935, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he emphasizes the verbal form of the word (e.g., “to be”) in order to recall its dynamic **origin** and hence the link to **temporality**. Emphasizing the verbal over the nominative form of the word “being” becomes a crucial step in the task of **overcoming metaphysics** and its tendency to reify being by equating its **meaning** with **entities**.

**GREEK PHILOSOPHY (griechische Philosophie).** With some exaggeration, we could say that Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* is a series of notes in the margin of Greek **philosophy**. **Franz Brentano’s** dissertation, *On the Several Sense of Being in Aristotle*, kindled Heidegger’s interest in philosophy in 1907. Latent in Brentano’s statement from **Aristotle** on the title page, “an **entity** becomes manifest in many ways,” was the question that would determine Heidegger’s **path of thinking**: What is the **meaning of being**? We can distinguish three periods in his confrontation with Greek philosophy.

From 1922 until the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger worked on a book on Aristotle’s philosophy that he never managed to finish. According to Heidegger, Aristotle was not only the first phenomenologist; he was also more advanced in **phenomenology** than **Edmund Husserl** and his circle. While studying and teaching Aristotle and Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* together, Heidegger discovered that since the Greeks, philosophical knowing has been defined by **intuition**. Heidegger broke with this model for theoretical **truth** and gave primacy to practical and religious truths as they are experienced in **factive life**. Heidegger found an original **experience** of the **kairos** paralleling that of primal **Christianity** in Aristotle’s account of truth in *Nicomachean Ethics VI*. And yet in *Physics IV*, Aristotle also understood **time** as a series of **nows**, which became a paradigm for all subsequent theo-

ries of time. In 1922/23, Heidegger discovered that *ousia* for the Greeks means permanent **presence**. Heidegger tried to understand **being** in terms of time in its fullest and most fulfilled sense. Through Aristotle he discovered the relationship between being and time. Finally, Aristotle's conception of **logic** as a productive **science** was at the **origin** of Heidegger's conception of **fundamental ontology**.

After the publication of *Being and Time*, Aristotle became less important to Heidegger. In his conception of the **history of being**, Greek philosophy became the **beginning** of the age of **metaphysics**. As the last of the Greek philosophers, Aristotle was the father of metaphysics. Although Heidegger's attention would later turn first to **Plato** and then to pre-Socratic philosophy, he would return time and again to the thought of Aristotle.

Heidegger's reading of **Friedrich Nietzsche's** diagnosis of the **nihilism** of Western culture and his **interpretation** of **Platonism** sparked his interest in Plato in the early 1930s. Plato was the pivotal figure who transformed the early Greek **thinking** of being into metaphysics. He conceived being no longer as *phusis* but as idea (*eidos*), that is, the form in which entities show themselves. His new **understanding of being** led also to a transformation in the process of *alètheia*. The early Greek thinkers understood *alètheia* as the **unconcealment** of being. Plato transformed *alètheia* into truth, that is, the correctness of the correspondence between idea and entity. For Plato, philosophy was no longer a **saying** of being; it had become the determination of the **beingness** of entities as idea and the **founding** of the **being of entities** in the idea of the good as the **highest entity**.

In light of the **turning**, Heidegger began to develop his conception of the history of being, which in turn led to his decade-long interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy. **Heraclitus**, **Anaximander**, and **Parmenides** are the original thinkers in the history of being. They speak to us from the earliest beginning of philosophy. This beginning not only is the origin of the **forgettiness of being**, but also contains the **possibility** of the **other beginning**. In his interpretation, Heidegger tries to understand the premetaphysical thought of the early Greek thinkers from a postmetaphysical standpoint.

Anaximander has thought the process by which entities come to **presence** in unconcealment. Every entity leaves **concealment** while in unconcealment for some time, before it passes away into concealment. The process is ruled by *dikè*, which arranges the pattern of entities in their being.

Heraclitus disclosed the being of entities as *phusis*, self-revelment that needs concealment in order to come to presence as **revelment**. The movement of concealment and revelment forms one identical process. In the **clearing** of the *logos*, being gives itself as **destiny** and withdraws into concealment. Heraclitus is the thinker who identifies the **gifting** refusing of being.



The saying of Parmenides that being and thinking are the same has become the **fate** of Western philosophy. Parmenides has named *alètheia* as the unconcealment of being. In the revealment of the being of entities, being as such withdraws into concealment. In the poem of Parmenides, the being of entities is disclosed as constant presence.

**GRÖBER, CONRAD (1872–1948).** Conrad Gröber was the rector of the Konradihaus in **Constance**, where Heidegger stayed as a pupil from 1903 to 1906. He became Heidegger's spiritual mentor and a fatherly friend. In 1907, he gave Heidegger a copy of **Franz Brentano's** dissertation on **Aristotle**. Gröber later became archbishop of **Freiburg**. His friendship with Heidegger received a severe blow in 1919, when Heidegger turned his back on the system of Catholicism. During the de-Nazification trials after World War II, a besieged Heidegger turned to his old friend for help. He intervened on Heidegger's behalf and wrote several letters to the French military authorities. Despite his efforts, Heidegger would not be reinstated as a professor at the university until 1950.

**GROUND (Grund).** In *Being and Time*, **temporality** is the ground of **care**. Heidegger first discusses the problem of the ground in depth in his famous essay *On the Essence of Ground*. Here he tries to gain access to the **meaning of being** through a meditation on the **origin** of ground. The ground belongs to the realm of **transcendence** as a fundamental **structure** of **being-there**. The origin of the ground is freedom, because freedom is the freedom to lay the ground or found. This **founding** is orchestrated in terms of **projection** of **world**, taking possession, and **ontological** founding of entities. Freedom is the threefold strewing of ground, whose ultimate **meaning** is **temporality**. Freedom is finally understood as the **abground** of being-there.

In light of the **turning**, Heidegger distinguishes between the **guiding question** and the **basic question** of **philosophy**. The former is concerned with the **beingness** of **entities**; the latter asks about being in respect to the **finitude** of its ground. The ground of being is **truth** as **unconcealment**.

In his 1955/56 lecture-course *The Principle of Reason*, Heidegger is concerned with the **question of being**. He discusses the principle of reason—that is, nothing is without reason or a sufficient ground—as **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz** first formulated it. He shows that Leibniz's formulation of this principle was a response to the **address of being** and thus the result of the history of **metaphysics**. The **history of being** mirrors itself in the history of the principle of reason or ground.

**GROUNDING ATTUNEMENT (*Grundstimmung*).** To proceed along its “ownmost” or proper path, **thinking** requires orientation from **being** in order to receive and respond to its **claim**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger speaks of a grounding attunement that governs thinking and brings it into its reciprocity with **be-ing** (*Seyn*). Heidegger points to **reservedness** as an example of such a grounding attunement; specifically, the **sheltering** of the **truth of being** evokes in thinking a proportional response to safeguard and protect its **mystery**.

**GROUNDING WORDS (*Grundworte*).** In his 1942/43 lecture-course *Parmenides*, Heidegger characterizes the most basic philosophical idioms that shape the **language of being** as grounding words. The grounding words **echo meanings** that reverberate across the entire **history of philosophy** and thereby enact the task of **being-historical thinking**.

**GROUNDING-EXPERIENCE (*Grunderfahrung*).** Throughout his early writings, Heidegger’s notion of **factic-life experience** provides the directive to ensure the concrete **grounding** of philosophical insight. Factic-life experience directs the **ontological** inquiry into both the structures of human **existence** and its **understanding of being**. But implicitly, **thinking** also requires an experiential access of its own in order to remain grounded in the self-showing or manifestation of the **phenomenon**. There is a grounding-experience for thinking, which acclimates it to a specific **attunement** through which what is most question-worthy can appear. The grounding-experience directs thinking toward, and keeps it centered on, this **question-worthiness**.

The grounding-experience makes explicit the historical **thrownness** of all philosophical inquiry, its entryway into history. By experiencing this thrown trajectory, thinking can gain the hermeneutic foothold required to grapple with its **guiding-question**. In *Mindfulness*, Heidegger suggests that metaphysical thinkers also depend upon a grounding-experience, by which each is historically directed toward a unique manifestation of **entities in the whole**, that is, through the **clearing** of a specific historical epoch. For example, the attempt to base the **truth of entities** on human **subjectivity** defines the grounding-experience of the modern era, as epitomized in **Friedrich Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power**. Ultimately, the grounding-experience is the concrete way in which the greatest thinkers respond to the **voice of being**, and, reciprocally, how that call “en-owns” those who embark upon the **path of thinking**. For Heidegger, **enowning** both yields and configures the grounding-experience, by which the thinker exercises **guardianship** over the **truth of being** and is thrust into the historical **venture of overcoming metaphysics**.

**GUARDIANSHIP (*Wächterschaft*)**. Guardianship takes on greater importance in Heidegger's later writings. **Being-there** is a guardian or steward or the **truth of being**. In *Mindfulness*, Heidegger states that **human being** can exercise its guardianship by virtue of its **belonging together** with **being**; conversely, **who** we are essentially, or our way "to be" as **care**, is determined more primordially as the capacity for guardianship.

The purview of guardianship also extends to the task of cultivating and safeguarding the earth. The cultivation of the *ethos* of poetic **dwelling** is itself a form of guardianship. Through its poetic dwelling, being-there guards the truth of being. There are also ethical implications for such dwelling, insofar as guardianship implies a **measure** by which human beings seek to strike a balance between their own interests and the welfare of **animals**. Through their guardianship, human beings **let be** the diversity of **nature** in its potential for manifestation.

**GUARDIANSHIP OF BE-ING (*Wächterschaft des Seyns*)**. The **guardianship of be-ing** is a specific way by which **human beings** reciprocate for receiving the **gift** of the "to be" and of **existence**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger employs this term by invoking the archaic German spelling for **be-ing** (*Seyn*). He emphasizes that human beings are commissioned by or **owned-over** to be-ing. The guardianship of being extends the exercise of **care** toward the manifestation of **entities** in their uniqueness, including the encompassing realm of **nature**. This guardianship makes explicit the manner in which being-there and be-ing **belong together** and are conjoined by that relationship.

Ultimately, the guardianship of be-ing is made possible through **enowning** (*Ereignis*).

*See also* MINDFULNESS (*Besinnung*).

**GUIDING QUESTION (*Leitfrage*)**. In the 1930s, Heidegger begins to distinguish between the guiding question and the **basic question of thinking**. The guiding question is the central question of **metaphysics**: What is the **being of entities**? The basic question asks back to the **ground** of metaphysics: What is the **meaning of being**?

**GUILT (*Schuld*)**. The **call of conscience** imposes on **being-there** in its **everydayness** the demand to live up to its ownmost **individuality** and wholeness. In this call, being-there is told of its own guilt, which is not specific and determinate, but general and unconditional. The mere **existence** of being-there makes it guilty, because it is not itself the **ground** of its own being. Being-there never has power over its most unique **being** from the ground up. This inability belongs to being-there's **thrownness**, which is shot

through with nullity. In **anxiety**, this nullity by which being-there is determined in its ground is unveiled as thrownness into **death**. This thrownness is a source of guilt for being-there, insofar as it can never master the circumstances of its **situation**, but can only reaffirm its **finitude**.

Guilt (*Schuld*) literally involves paying back a debt. Heidegger emphasizes, however, that guilt should not be construed in a moralistic sense, as implying remorse for a wrong action. Rather, being-there is already guilty at the ground of its thrownness, prior to the evaluation of any of its action. The acknowledgment of guilt, through the call of conscience, precedes any expression of moral **values**, thereby suggesting that **self-responsibility** provides the existential basis on which to develop an **ethic**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger argues that the **freedom** by which the individual exercises self-responsibility is the prerequisite for an ability to administer concern or **solicitude** for others.

*See also ORIGINAL ETHICS (ursprüngliche Ethik).*

# H

**HANDINESS** (*Zuhandenheit*). See **READINESS-TO-HAND** (*Zuhandenheit*).

**HAVING BEEN** (*Gewesenheit*). In *Being and Time*, having been is one of the three **ecstases** of original temporality. The ownmost coming toward-itself of **anticipatory resoluteness** is at the same time a coming back to one's most unique **self**, which has been thrown into its individualization. In this **retrieval** or **owned** way of having been, **being-there** brings its **thrownness** before itself. Having been makes it possible for being-there to take over resolutely the self that it already is. We should not confuse having been with the **past**, because as long as being-there exists, it is never past; rather, the **self** is as already having been in the sense of "I am as having been." The **un-owned** way of having been is **forgottenness**. Being-there can forget itself in its most unique, thrown **can-be**.

**HEARING** (*hören*). Hearing is an "**existential**" possibility of **speech** itself. It is constitutive for **discourse**. Hearing is **being-there**'s existential way of being open as **being-with** for others. It constitutes the singular way in which being-there is open for its most unique **can-be**. Being-there can only hear and respond to others because it is capable of **disclosedness**. By virtue of its capacity to hear, **self** and other can participate in the **openness** through the process of reciprocal exchange or **dialogue**.

**HEGEL** (*Hegel*). In volume 68 of his **Complete Edition**, Heidegger takes up anew his **interpretation** of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**'s **philosophy**. This text combines two manuscripts: "Negativity: A Confrontation with Hegel Approached from Negativity" (1938–39, 1941) and "Elucidation of the Introduction to Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'" (1942). The first treatise consists of a series of notes on "negativity" characteristic of a presentation to a small audience familiar with Hegel's thought. The second treatise

appears to be preparatory for a work published in 1950 under the title *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (and later included in volume 5 of Heidegger's Complete Edition, *Off the Beaten Track*).

Heidegger's **setting-into-opposition** (*Auseinandersetzung*) and **dialogue with German idealism** generally, and Hegel's philosophy in particular, occurs at different intervals over a period of several decades. In his treatise on "negativity," Heidegger addresses the foundational concepts that shape perhaps the most impenetrable of any text in the philosophical **tradition**, Hegel's *Logic*. In this work, Hegel employs his dialectical method to mediate the complex synergies of connections between an abstract concept of "**being**" bereft of all determinations, which is equivalent to "nothing," and its transformation into the **movement** of becoming. According to Heidegger, Hegel's attempt to think "being" betrays its intimate connection to negativity. Yet Hegel presupposes the **differentiation** (*die Unterscheidung*) between being and **entities**, or the **ontological difference**, which grants **meaning** to the **nothing**, to the "not" of negativity. Prior to the indeterminacy of "being" is the withdrawal and withholding of **presence**. Heidegger shows that the **refusal** of any **ground** or the **abgrund** (*Abgrund*) precedes the negativity of the dialectic; while **be-ing** (*Seyn*), which is given only in tension or opposition with its **refusal**, unfolds from a depth that exceeds the indeterminacy of the concept of "being." He concludes by outlining the interdependence of be-ing, abgrund, and the nothing, the confluence of which remains **unthought** in Hegel's philosophy.

In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1930/31, Heidegger addresses the opening sections of Hegel's monumental work *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In his critical exposition from 1942, Heidegger concentrates on the pivotal introduction to the *Phenomenology*, in which Hegel lays out the **structure** of his dialectical methodology. Heidegger begins his analysis of Hegel's introduction by addressing his *Encyclopedia* as the blueprint for a philosophical system, which includes the "Science of Logic," the "Philosophy of Nature," and the "Philosophy of Spirit." Heidegger emphasizes that such an encyclopedia does not simply compile the totality of human knowledge, but instead poses a metaphysical problem as to the self-revelation and appearance of **spirit** (*Geist*) in its completeness and inner necessity, that is, as constitutive of the Absolute or **God**. The sense that Hegel ascribes to "Science," as the hallmark of the philosophical system, is nothing other than the expression and articulation of this inner necessity.

Given this background, Heidegger begins by examining how for Hegel **consciousness** employs its own internal criterion of self-examination, that is, for determining the adequacy of its comprehension of an object in its dialectical progression toward Absolute knowledge. Heidegger provides his own phenomenological version or **retrieval** and recapitulation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the "science of the **experience** of consciousness."

Human consciousness or spirit experiences its transition to higher stages of self-comprehension as a journey that each of us (as instances of this process) can undertake. Beginning with an exposition of such basic motifs as consciousness, appearance, and experience, Heidegger then shows that that dialectical progression toward the Absolute is an example of the **metaphysics** of **subjectivity**. Hegel's attempt to equate the Absolute with God is also an attempt to redefine being exclusively in terms of presence, which provides the hidden foundation of Hegel's metaphysics. Heidegger thereby recasts his dialogue with Hegel—initiated more than a decade earlier—within the broader compass of a critique of the Western philosophical tradition. The **representation** of all entities, as an extension of how they appear to and are grounded on subjectivity, prefigures the metaphysics of the **will**. Hegel re-emerges as a vanguard of modern metaphysics and its eventual completion in **Friedrich Nietzsche's** metaphysics of the **will to power** and eternal recurrence.

*See also* HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT" (*Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"*).

**HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831).** In his history of **metaphysics**, Heidegger considers the **philosophy** of Hegel to be the completion of **Platonism**. After Hegel, only **Friedrich Nietzsche's** reversal of Platonism remains as a genuine **possibility** of philosophy. Because Hegel is a pivotal figure in the **history** of metaphysics, Heidegger interprets his writings time and again. Despite his importance for Heidegger, Hegel had very little influence on the development of the former's thought. For Heidegger, Hegel was both the villain and hero of the history of philosophy.

*See also* HEGEL AND THE GREEKS (*Hegel und die Griechen*); HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE (*Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*); HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT" (*Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"*); ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF METAPHYSICS, THE (*Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*).

**HEGEL AND THE GREEKS (*Hegel und die Griechen*).** Heidegger gave this lecture on 26 July 1958 at the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences. The title names the whole of the history of **philosophy**, from its Greek **beginning** to its Hegelian culmination. Heidegger's lecture is a meditation on the end of philosophy and the matter of **thinking**.

**Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** gave the first philosophical **interpretation** of the whole **history** of philosophy. According to Hegel, the history of philosophy is the necessary progress of **spirit** toward **truth** as absolute knowing, in which the **beginning** is as important as the culmination. The three dialectical steps of this process also determine the history of philoso-

phy. The first step, the positing of an object, is the immediate and undetermined **consciousness of objectivity**, which abstracts from the object's relation to the subject. The unfolding of this beginning of philosophy is the history of **Greek philosophy**. The next step, or negation, is the reflection of the relation between subject and object, in which we become conscious of the fact that the object is a **representation** of the subject. The unfolding of this new beginning is the history of modern philosophy from **René Descartes** to **Johann Gottlieb Fichte**. The third step, or negation of the negation, is the becoming conscious of the fact that the mediation of objectivity through the reflection of the subject is itself the inner movement of spirit. The movement determines the method of philosophy. Hegel's "speculative" philosophy is the synthesis of the modern subjective philosophy of reflection (*Reflexionsphilosophie*) and the objective **ontology** of Greek philosophy.

Heidegger discusses Hegel's **interpretation** of the four **grounding words** of Greek philosophy: (1) *hèn* or the one of **Parmenides**, (2) *logos* or the reason of **Heraclitus**, (3) *idéa* or the concept of **Plato**, and (4) *energeia* or the actuality of **Aristotle**. Because Greek philosophy is not grounded in **subjectivity**, it represents philosophy at the level of "not yet." The goal of philosophy is truth as certainty. In Greek philosophy, spirit does not know itself as subject. The Greek concept of truth, *alètheia*, cannot therefore determine truth as certainty. Heidegger shows that *alètheia* as **revelment** does not have its place in the absolute subject; revelment is the place where a representing subject can be. According to Heidegger, metaphysics begins with the thinking of being as **presence, ousia**. The holding sway of *alètheia* is the condition of possibility of **presencing**. *Alètheia*, which is earlier than philosophy, is as such the "not yet" of that which has not yet been thought and remains to be thought as the **matter of thinking**.

*See also* END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE TASK OF THINKING, THE (*Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*).

**HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE** (*Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*). This 1950 essay is based on Heidegger's 1942/43 seminar on **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Aristotle**. It is both a detailed **interpretation** of the introduction to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and a critique of Hegel's **philosophy**.

The starting point of Heidegger's **interpretation** is **René Descartes's** discovery of **subjectivity** and its absolute self-certainty. If Descartes sighted new land, Hegel takes full possession of it. He elevates philosophy to the level of absolute knowing. Absolute knowing is freed from its dependence upon objects. The process consists of three steps: (1) absolve, that is, the tendency of knowing to release itself from its dependency on objects; (2) absolve, that is, the striving to make this release complete; and (3) absolutation, that is, the actual **freedom** from objects, which is achieved in the pro-



cess of knowing. Knowing is presentation as a form of **presence** or the self-consciousness of the knowing subject. Self-consciousness expresses its **nature** as the self-manifestation of the **being** of the subject, which Heidegger defines as **subjectivity**.

The heart of Heidegger's interpretation is his analysis of Hegel's concept of **experience**. The process of absolve, which constitutes absolute knowing as self-consciousness, is governed by three principles: (1) **consciousness** is for itself its own concept, (2) consciousness supplies of itself its own norm, and (3) consciousness examines itself. Experience is the process by which absolute consciousness comes to presence as itself. Consciousness or **thinking** determines the **being of entities**.

In his implicit critique, Heidegger shows the limits of Hegel's philosophy. Because Hegel expands the absolute certainty of consciousness into being itself, the subjectivity of modern philosophy culminates in his absolute idealism. Hegel could not disclose **truth, alètheia**, as the process by which entities emerge into **unconcealment**. In the history of philosophy, the **truth of being** remains **unthought**.

**HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT"** (*Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"*). This 1930/31 lecture-course is Heidegger's most comprehensive **interpretation** of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. Hegel came to be of particular interest to Heidegger in the late 1920s, when he replaced the **formal indication** of **being-there, existence**, with **transcendence**. Transcendence is for Hegel the crossing of **finitude** and infinity and the dialectical liberation of absolute knowing from its dependence on the **objectivity** of **entities**. Heidegger understands transcendence as the transcending of entities by finite being-there. These two conceptions of transcendence form an antithesis and underscore his own preference for **Immanuel Kant's** emphasis on human finitude as the basis of **ontology**.

Heidegger's course is a running commentary on sections B, "Consciousness," and C, "Self-consciousness," of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. His **understanding** of the **origin of metaphysics** as onto-(ego)-theo-logy is the starting point of his interpretation of Hegel's thought. **Philosophy** understands **being** from *logos*. The *logos* is grounded in **God** as the **highest entity**. In modern philosophy since **René Descartes**, *logos* is understood as knowing, which is grounded in the self-certainty of the ego or subject.

Heidegger sees in the *Phenomenology* an attempt to overcome and further develop Kant's revolutionary philosophy of reflection (*Reflexionsphilosophie*). The central part of the *Phenomenology* is therefore the chapter "Force and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World," in which Hegel discusses the limits of Kant's philosophical position and lays the foundation for the absolute position of his own idealism. This chapter is the

transition of the finitude of consciousness to the infinity of the **spirit**. Heidegger pays close attention to Hegel's attempt not to disclose self-consciousness from knowing, but to disclose it out of an **understanding of being**.

In his discussion of the chapter on self-consciousness, Heidegger focuses his attention not on the objectivity of the object, but on the standing of the **self**, the standing on itself of being itself. This standing on itself of self-consciousness is the **actuality** of spirit. At the end of the course, Heidegger interprets the *Phenomenology* as the **fundamental ontology** of absolute ontology. The **question of being** is understood from the *logos*, which is disclosed as *idein* or **representational thinking**.

*See also* KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*).

**HEIDEGGER, FRIEDRICH (1851–1924)**. Heidegger's father was sexton of Saint Martin's church in **Meßkirch** and a cooper. Like his wife, he was a devout Roman Catholic. He worked hard to provide for his family and to make the family home a happy place. He was introverted and strict. Like his son, he knew how to keep silent for days.

**HEIDEGGER, FRITZ (1894–1980)**. Heidegger's brother was a real character with a great sense of humor. He worked his whole life at the local bank in **Meßkirch**. Although he and his brother were in many ways exact opposites, they were very close. He was very popular with all of Heidegger's visitors in Meßkirch. Because he stuttered when he became serious, he pronounced *Dasein* always as *da-da-sein*. He followed his brother's philosophical career with great interest and pride. He not only typed out most of Heidegger's manuscripts and lecture courses; he also understood his brother's work better than most professional philosophers did. Throughout his life, Heidegger would remain grateful to "his only brother."

**HEIDEGGER, HERMANN (1920–)**. Martin Heidegger's sons fought on the Western and Eastern Fronts during World War II. After the end of the war, they spent several years in prisoner-of-war camps in the former Soviet Union. His son Hermann obtained a doctorate in history and was an elementary teacher for three years. Thereafter, he became again a professional officer in the German army. Heidegger appointed him executor of his literary estate. Hermann attended several of his father's courses, seminars, and lectures and was closely involved in the working out of the conception of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Since his father's death in 1976, he has been the staunchest defender of his father and his philosophical legacy.

**HEIDEGGER, JÖRG (1919–2019).** After serving in the army during World War II and spending several years in a Soviet prisoner-of-war camp, Heidegger's oldest son became a university-trained engineer and then a teacher in the practical arts. Being of a more practical nature, he was much less interested in his father's work than his younger brother **Hermann**. Heidegger often mailed photographic cards to his friends that were made by Jörg.

**HEIDEGGER, MARIE (1892–1956).** Marie was Heidegger's only sister. Her husband was a chimney sweep. There is very little known about Marie. In most writings on Heidegger's life, she is not mentioned at all.

**HEIDEGGER-KEMPF, JOHANNA (1858–1927).** Heidegger's mother was born and raised on a farm in Göggingen, where Heidegger as a boy would spend most of his holidays in the company of his nephew, Gustav Kempf. She was a good-humored woman and proud of her farming background. As **Fritz Heidegger** remembered later, she used to say that life was so pleasantly organized that there was always something to look forward to. Martin Heidegger was his mother's darling and often spoiled. She was a strong supporter of his choice to strive for the priesthood. His decision to abandon his study of **theology** and his later break with Roman Catholicism came as a great shock and bitter disappointment to her. When Heidegger became a professor, she seems to have accepted her son's existential decisions. Heidegger presented his mother with a copy of *Being and Time* on her deathbed. As he wrote to **Karl Jaspers**, it was almost an apology.

**HEIDEGGER-PETRI, ELFRIDE (1893–1992).** Elfride Petri was the daughter of a Saxon officer. She met Martin Heidegger in the fall of 1915 at the University of **Freiburg**, where she was studying political economy. They were married on 21 March 1917 in a Catholic ceremony and a week later in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of her parents. She was a Protestant and did not convert to Roman Catholicism. Although she is often depicted as the evil genius of Heidegger's life, she supported him through thick and thin. Their marriage survived the financial difficulties of their early years together, the tensions caused by Heidegger's love affair with **Hannah Arendt**, and the troubles of the Nazi period and the de-Nazification process after World War II. It is a fitting tribute that Heidegger dedicated the **Complete Edition** of his works to his wife.

**HERACLITUS (611–547 BC).** Heraclitus, **Anaximander**, and **Parmenides** are the original thinkers in Heidegger's **history of being**. They speak to us from the earliest **beginning** of **philosophy**. This beginning is not only the

**origin** of the **forgottenness of being**, but also contains the **possibility** of the **other beginning**. In his **interpretation**, Heidegger tries to understand the premetaphysical thought of the early Greek thinkers from a postmetaphysical standpoint. Heraclitus disclosed the **being of entities** as *phusis* or **self-revelment**, which needs **concealment** in order to come to **presence** as revealment. The **movements** of concealment and revealment form one identical process. In the **clearing** of the *logos*, being emits itself as **destiny** and withdraws into concealment. Heraclitus is the thinker who recognized the unique dynamic of the **sheltering** of truth as **enowning**.

*See also* ALÉTHEIA [HERACLITUS, FRAGMENT 16] (*Alètheia [Heraklit, Fragment 16]*); HERACLITUS SEMINAR (*Heraklit-Seminar*); LOGOS (HERACLITUS, B 50) (*Logos [Heraklit, Fragment 50]*).

**HERACLITUS (*Heraklit*)**. This title bears the name of one of the most important and influential pre-Socratic thinkers. It is published as volume 55 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**, comprising texts from two lecture-courses that he delivered at the University of **Freiburg** during the summers of 1943 and 1944: *The Inception of Occidental Thinking* and *Logic: Heraclitus's Teaching of the Logos*.

In the first lecture-course, Heidegger examines Heraclitus's overall importance as a thinker of the **first beginning**. Much of the difficulty surrounding his **thinking** lies in the alleged "obscurity" surrounding his attempt to address being on the cusp of its retreat into **concealment**. Correlatively, Heidegger suggests that Heraclitus's ability to meet such a challenge unfolds in the subtlety of his language and his appreciation of the Greek *logos*. Heidegger then provides detailed expositions of several of Heraclitus's fragments, including Fragment 123, wherein the latter addresses the dynamic of **being** as emerging and unfolding through self-concealing. In this regard, Heidegger emphasizes that traditional **logic**, by invoking the principle of noncontradiction, cannot address the tension of opposites in play in Heraclitus's portrayal of the **unconcealment of entities**.

Heidegger also addresses the manner in which Western thinking proceeds from Heraclitus's rendering or **translating** of the key terms and **grounding words** that comprise the philosophical **tradition**. As an example, Heidegger points to the need to "translate" **Immanuel Kant's** *Critique of Pure Reason* as a prelude to understanding and interpreting this text. As such, translation is an act that orients thinking or provides the directives for its enactment, that is, by appropriating the **origin** of the philosophical tradition.

In the second lecture-course, Heidegger raises the broader question of the relation between **logic** and *logos*. The inability to address the dependence of the former on the latter proves to be a crucial step in the **forgottenness of being**, which pervades the Western **tradition**. According to Heidegger, in its origin or inception, the *logos* marks the entryway of **entities** into unconceal-

ment, an insight owing to Heraclitus, which gradually becomes veiled in subsequent **Greek philosophy**. *Logos* originally entails the **gathering together** (*Sammeln*) that pervades both the manifestations of entities—allowing them to appear as such—and the power by which **human beings** can address “what is” in **language**. In this way, Heidegger transposes his critical appropriation of Heraclitus’s thought in a broader conversation about the dawn of Western **metaphysics** and the ultimate premium that is placed on the development of logic.

**HERACLITUS SEMINAR** (*Heraklit-Seminar*). This winter semester 1966/67 seminar was Heidegger’s last teaching engagement at the University of **Freiburg**. Eugen Fink, **Edmund Husserl**’s last assistant, conducted the seminar. Heidegger commented on Fink’s **interpretation**. This seminar offers a wonderful impression of Heidegger’s teaching skills. The main thrust of his interventions is the ongoing attempt to understand **Heraclitus** as a premetaphysical thinker. This attempt is grounded in our postmetaphysical **hermeneutic situation**. The interpretation of Heraclitus should thus at the same time be an **understanding** of our **being-there**.

**HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED (1744–1803)**. Herder was a student of **Immanuel Kant** who subsequently became one of his first and most important critics. Herder pointed to the incompleteness of Kant’s account of **language** within his transcendental **philosophy**, thereby marking a turning point in the philosophical study of language. Herder embarked upon such a study in his pivotal *Treatise on the Origin of Language* (1772). Not surprisingly, Heidegger recognized Herder’s pioneering efforts to address the **origin** of language and to make it **question-worthy** as a **phenomenon** in its own right.

In the subtitle of his seminar from the summer semester in 1939, Heidegger references Herder’s *Treatise on the Origin of Language*. In this lecture-course, Heidegger addresses Herder’s provisional attempt to address the human capacity to speak terms of the lived dimensions of tone, inflection, and gesture, rather than as an offshoot of knowledge and cognition. By the same token, Heidegger argues that Herder’s account of language remains within the scope of **philosophical anthropology**, without considering how the **disclosive** power of the **word** first grants to **human beings** the power to speak.

See also ON THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE: THE METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE ESSENCING OF THE WORD; CONCERNING HERDER’S “TREATISE ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE” (*Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herders Abhandlung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache”*).

**HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE** (*hermeneutischer Zirkel*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the problem of the hermeneutic circle. In order to work out the **question of being** adequately, he must make the **ontological structure of being-there** transparent. In order to uncover the **meaning of being**, Heidegger must define the **being** of that **entity** whose potential for self-understanding already implies the possibility of **understanding** being. The circularity of this understanding belongs to **hermeneutics** and is a positive **possibility** of knowledge. Only through an implicit understanding of being can we come to an explicit **interpretation** of the meaning of being. Every new interpretation leads to a new understanding, which in turn makes possible a new interpretation, and so on.

*See also* PREONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BEING (*vorontologisches Seinsverständnis*).

**HERMENEUTIC INDICATION** (*hermeneutische Indikation*). Toward the end of his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1926, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, Heidegger suggests that finite knowing, as **Immanuel Kant** explores it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reveals the same circular arc of human **understanding** (*Verstehen*) that comes to light through hermeneutic analysis. The pure concepts that Kant delineated as the key to knowing the objects of **nature** must likewise, due to their finite origin, hermeneutically indicate the circular structure that pervades all human understanding. The premise of Heidegger's comparison with Kant, however, rests on recasting the latter's epistemic, formal notion of understanding (*Verstand*) in terms of an existential mode of a historically and culturally enriched mode of understanding (*Verstehen*) that **Wilhelm Dilthey** first uncovered.

**HERMENEUTIC INTUITION** (*hermeneutische Anschauung*). Heidegger employs this term in his lecture-course from the war emergency semester of 1919, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*. Hermeneutic intuition uncovers the immediacy of human **experience** in its concreteness and as **meaningfully** arising from a **situation** in which the inquirer finds himself/herself.

**HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY** (*hermeneutische Phänomenologie*). Heidegger departed from his mentor, **Edmund Husserl**, by developing a hermeneutic **phenomenology**. Hermeneutics adds the dimension of **interpretation**. The act of interpretation involves explicating the guidelines of what is preunderstood, which in advance directs the inquiry into **being** and, reciprocally, implicates the self-understanding of the inquirer. Hermeneutic phenomenology, then, begins from the ultimate presupposition, the **preontological understanding of being**, which each of us possesses and which is expressed in **everydayness**.

A hermeneutic phenomenology, then, brings to a conceptual level of expression what is understood beforehand in the preontological understanding of being and its implications for **thematizing** the **ontological** constitution of **being-there** as **care**. By developing this circular path of inquiry and interpretation, the **meaning of being** can be conceptually **determined** or made explicit through its **projection** upon the backdrop of **temporality**. Heidegger reserves the term **existential-hermeneutic “as”** to distinguish the dynamic rendering and **disclosure** of the structures of care and the **possibility** of understanding being through the prism of temporality.

In section 56 of *Mindfulness*, Heidegger refers to the “hermeneutic-phenomenological” (*hermeneutisch-phänomenologisch*) attempt to rethink **being-there** as abiding within the **between** (*Zwischen*) and as belonging to the **clearing**. The study of hermeneutic phenomenology thereby stands in stark contrast to that of anthropology, including **philosophical anthropology**.

*See also* HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE (*hermeneutischer Zirkel*).

**HERMENEUTIC SITUATION** (*hermeneutische Situation*). The hermeneutic situation determines the **situation** and context of our **understanding**. Every **interpretation** is made possible by the **structure** of our **fore-having**, **foresight**, and **fore-conception** of the phenomenon, which determines the **possibility** of our understanding. This situation can be seized originally or simply assumed and provides us with the way in which past **being-there** is to be apprehended in advance, and in regard to which thus apprehended is to be interrogated. In this way, the constitutive structures of what it means to be human can be preconceptualized, standing ready for a **thematic**, appropriative understanding of those very structures of **care**. The original seizure of our hermeneutic situation is at the same time a **destruction** of the **tradition** in which we stand and a critique of our era, which may inhibit or obstruct the development of this **ontological** or philosophical insight and understanding.

**HERMENEUTICAL “AS”** (*hermeneutisch “Als”*). *See* EXISTENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL “AS” (*existenzial-hermeneutische ‘Als’*)

**HERMENEUTICS** (*Hermeneutik*). As a student, Heidegger carefully studied the hermeneutics of **Wilhelm Dilthey** and Friedrich Schleiermacher. In his lecture courses in the 1920s, Heidegger incorporated their teachings in his conception of **hermeneutic phenomenology**. He enlarged the scope of **hermeneutics** to include the inquiry into **being** and made it fundamental for his phenomenological method. He no longer opposed the scientific methods of **understanding** and **explanation**, but made understanding an **existential** of **being-there** itself. Being-there is **disclosedness**. **Disposedness**, projective understanding, and **discourse** determine this fundamental **openness** of be-

ing-there. Being-there has always already understood the **world** into which it is thrown through the **projection** of its **possibilities**. These projections are interpreted in **discourse**. **Interpretation** makes the projections of being-there explicit.

*See also* HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE (*hermeneutischer Zirkel*).

**HERO (Held)**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that every **generation** chooses its heroes. The hero is someone who embodies a way of **existence**, pointing to the possibility that epitomizes the **self's freedom** to make choices. Because the hero's **projection** of **being-there** is constitutive for a generation's conception of existence, the hero gives each generation its distinctive unity. The choice of the hero calls each individual to uphold the challenge of existence and stand apart from the expectations of the "**they**." In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger cites **Immanuel Kant's** claim of choosing the "hero in one's soul" to exemplify the responsibility that each individual faces in making choices. In *Ponderings VII–XI*, Heidegger defines heroism as a capacity to stand on the cusp of the **ab-ground** and become open to the depths of human **existence**.

*See also* SELF-RESPONSIBILITY (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*).

**HERRMANN, FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON (1934–)**. Heidegger's **Complete Edition** or *Gesamtausgabe* was published under the auspices of the executor of his estate, **Hermann Heidegger**, and the chief contributing editor, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Before being selected by Heidegger for this position, von Herrmann served as Heidegger's personal assistant for four years (1972–1976). Like many who worked and studied with Heidegger, von Herrmann emerged as a key expositor of Heidegger's thought, writing a three-volume commentary on *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*). Von Herrmann helped to explicate Heidegger's terminology by amplifying further permutations, such as the "theological difference" (*theologische Differenz*), a motif that underscores how the **mystery** of **be-ing** is preserved as a **gift**, in contrast to its reification through an ultimate **ground** like **God**. Von Herrmann's major works include *Hermeneutik und Reflexion: Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Husserl and Heidegger* (2000; Hermeneutics and reflection: Husserl's and Heidegger's concept of phenomenology, 2013), and most recently, *Transzendenz und Ereignis: Heideggers Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)—Ein Kommentar* (2019; Transcendence and enowning: Heidegger's contributions to philosophy [from enowning]—a commentary).

**HIGHEST ENTITY** (*das höchste Seiende*). The highest entity is a **metaphysical** characterization of **God**. **Theology** conceives of the highest entity as the *causa sui*. For Heidegger, being (*Sein*) can never be equated with any



single **entity** (*ein Seiendes*), including God as the highest entity. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger distinguishes between the task of fundamental ontology as the inquiry into being and theology as the study of the highest entity; the latter investigation is reserved to the discipline that **Immanuel Kant** described as one of the three areas of *metaphysica specialis*.

In *The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics*, Heidegger shows how the misidentification of the highest entity as God with being is a major stage in the historical **forgottenness of being**. This forgottenness masks or conceals the **difference** between being and **entities**.

**HINT** (*der Wink*). The hint is a way of distinguishing nuances in the **relation** between **being** and **being-there**, which cannot be directly **thematized** or conceptualized. The attempt to think the two in their manner of **belonging-together** requires a deeper unfolding of **language**, which refrains from separating either term from its interdependence with the other. In section 94 of *Mindfulness*, Heidegger alludes to the hint by which the **t/here** abides in its reciprocity with and **turning unto be-ing** (*Seyn*).

**HISTORICALITY** (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Heidegger follows **Wilhelm Dilthey** in making historicality central to his hermeneutic **phenomenology** of **facticity** and human **existence as being-there**. The immanent historicality of our existence is the **experience of factic life experience** that spontaneously gives us an **understanding** of our **being**. With the **possibility of death**, our understanding of history hinges upon our **futurity**. Historicality receives its fundamental sense from a more comprehensive, kairological **temporality** singling out the historical individual and its **generation**. **Anticipating** one's death is at once anticipating one's **fate** and the fate of one's generation. The **having been** that still "is" comes to meet us from the **future** in an anticipating **retrieval** of possibilities, which are transmitted from an **owned** or "authentic" heritage. Retrieval is the ownmost understanding of our historicality that delivers us over to the unique and decisive **moment** of our existence. Retrieval makes possible both the **destruction** of our tradition and an understanding of our **hermeneutic situation**.

**HISTORICISM** (*Historismus*). Historicism was a **worldview** that was strongly opposed by **Edmund Husserl**. It considers all knowledge, culture, and **values** to be historical products and as such relative to a particular **time** and place. Historicism denies that there are universal values and truths. Husserl's phenomenological method was an attempt to overcome historicism and naturalism through a return to the things themselves. Because **phenomenology** describes only what shows up as it presents itself in our experience, its

findings are apodictic and universally valid. As a student, Heidegger made use of phenomenology to criticize historicism. Although he would later transform Husserl's phenomenology into a **hermeneutic phenomenology** and emphasize the significance of **finitude**, **world**, and **historicality** for our **hermeneutic situation**, his concept of time and conception of the **history of being** prevented him from adhering to historicism.

**HISTORIOLOGY (*Historie*)**. Heidegger introduces the concept of historiology in its distinction from **historicality** in his unpublished review of the correspondence between **Wilhelm Dilthey** and Graf York von Wartenburg in 1924. Because **being-there** is determined by its historicality, it has the specific **possibility** to uncover explicitly the **past** for its **present**, that is, to study the past in order to narrate the course of events that have shaped civilization.

**HISTORY (*Geschichte*)**. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger distinguishes between history and historiography (*Historie*), a term associated with reckoning and recording **past** events. In Chapter Five, Division Two (Part I) of *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger had already differentiated the temporal dynamic by which **being-there** develops, appropriates, and transmits **tradition** (*Überlieferung*) from the simple chronicling of the past under the rubric of a scientific discipline. The former, or **historicality**, is based on **primordial time**, which originates from the **future**, returns from the past, and unfolds in the **present**. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger extends this concept of **temporality** to include the task of interpreting the philosophical tradition as a rediscovery or **retrieval** of the insights of previous thinkers in future **possibilities** still to be developed. He argues that what is determinant in **Immanuel Kant's thinking** is not merely what is written in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, but instead what can still be unearthed futurally as remaining **unthought** and **unsaid**. As an element of history (*Geschichte*), the act of retrieval (*Wiederholung*) aims to preserve a philosophical problem or question and reopen it *as* a possibility.

History, in contrast to historiography, emphasizes the development of a philosophical tradition that addresses the different possibilities by which being can manifest it, and reciprocally, summon the participation of **human beings** through such activities as thinking. Such human participation is secondary to, or depends upon, the gifting, refusing, and **destining** of these specific occurrences of **unconcealing** (and **concealing**), which are thereby set forth into distinctive epochs. These epochs comprise the **history of being**. The **directive** of this history, however, is not simply the accidental succession of these epochs (throughout the philosophical tradition), but instead the potential for **enowning** or appropriating each of them. Ultimately, enowning

shapes the trajectory of history, discharging the different philosophical epochs through a tension that contrasts the **first beginning** in the pre-Socratic thinkers with the possibility of the **other beginning**. These different historical fronts are both set apart and mediated by the extreme possibilities, on the one hand, of the **forgottenness of being**, and on the other hand, of its recollection.

History, then, does not process along a linear path, but instead pivots along a circular path, in which presumably recollecting the **truth of being** begins to overtake the opposite possibility of forgottenness. Heidegger calls this transformative **moment** (*Augenblick*), in which all the possibilities of history are gathered back into its **origin**, the **turning** (*die Kehre*). The driving momentum, force, and destining (*Geschick*) of history in which human beings directly participate, and which they **experience**, lies in the interdependence between the consummation of the **modern** epoch via the completion of metaphysics and what is thereby revealed or the onset of **technology**. The decline of the first philosophical beginning in metaphysics and the rise of modern technology are interconnected in a singular history. Modern technology is already prefigured in metaphysical shifting toward prioritizing entities. The **abandonment of being in entities**, including **nature** presented exclusively as a resource, leads to their one-dimensional appearance for the purposes of production, consumption, and exploitation. Herein lies the hallmark of **machination**, which unfolds as the dominant mode for revealing entities in the consummation of modern metaphysics.

The directive of history does not lie in any philosophical eschatology, but in the poetic image of **Friedrich Hölderlin**, who states that we live in a “destitute time” in which “the old gods have fled and the new ones have not yet arrived.” The last god traverses this entire historical (*geschichtlich*) arc, and thereby, as Heidegger states in *Contributions to Philosophy*, marks the “other beginning of immeasurable possibilities for our history.”

Humanity becomes historical only through its *relation* to and reciprocity with be-ing (*Seyn*). In section 273 of *Contributions to Philosophy*, titled “History,” Heidegger states that human being is still to become historical. On the contrary, **being-there** only becomes historical by self-questioning **who** it is and thereby formulating the **question of all questions**. In this way, being-there comes to **knowing awareness** of its **fate**. Heidegger argues that **ontical** and biological conceptions of **race** can never reach to the depth of what is historical.

**HISTORY OF BEING (*Seinsgeschichte*)**. Heidegger worked out his conception of the history of **being** through the **turning**. It is the **experience** of the transformations of the **relations** between **human beings** and being, leading to the configuration of different historical epochs. This originally hidden process determines history. In its **gifting** refusal, being allows the **truth of**

**being** to unfold historically in conjunction with the historical **dwelling** of **mortals**. With the Greek experience of *alètheia* as the **unconcealment** of being, the era of philosophy begins. This is the **first beginning**. The original thinkers, **Anaximander**, **Heraclitus**, and **Parmenides**, named the unconcealment of being but could not think of *alètheia* as the **clearing** of **be-ing** (*Seyn*) in its **difference** from **entities**. This was not a failure on their part; it was the **destiny** of being itself.

The history of **metaphysics** begins with **Plato** and **Aristotle**. *Alètheia* becomes truth as correctness, and being becomes the **beingness** of entities, which is grounded in **God** as the highest entity. Metaphysics has an **onto-theo-logical** nature and is determined by the **forgottenness of being**. The history of metaphysics finds its completion in the absolute idealism of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and its end in **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s reversal of **Platonism**. The present age of **nihilism** is determined by the **will** to will and **technology**. The clearing of being **shelters** itself in the technological **mode** of **enframing** and thereby withdraws as such into **concealment**. Heidegger tries to **overcome metaphysics** in an attempt to think its **origin** and through the imminent **mindfulness** of the hidden **possibility** of the other **beginning**. He finds traces of this **other beginning** in early Greek **thinking**, mythology, and **poetry**. The other beginning is also announced in the poetry of **Friedrich Hölderlin**, who named the **gods** that have fled. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger prepares for the coming of the **last god**. Its "passing" marks the turning relation of be-ing to man and inaugurates a new era in the history of being.

**HISTORY OF BE-ING, THE (*Die Geschichte des Seyns*)**. This text comprises volume 69 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. It includes two treatises: *The History of Be-ing* (1938–40) and *Kovón: Out of the History Be-ing* (1939–40). Also included is the brief text *Draft for Kovón: On the History of Be-ing*. In this volume, Heidegger enacts the task of **being-historical thinking**, which he had initiated in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). He addresses the interface between **be-ing**'s manifestation in different historical epochs and human **ek-sistence**.

At the beginning of *The History of Be-ing* (1938–40), Heidegger points to the close connection of his inquiry with **Mindfulness** (1938–39), along with *Contributions to Philosophy*. **Mindfulness** forms the "middle" or linchpin between the other two major inquiries. As indicated in the title, he employs the archaic spelling of be-ing (*Seyn*) to mark the inception of history from **enowning** (**Ereignis**) and thus to emphasize the development of a being-historical vocabulary or lexicon that seeks to overcome **metaphysics**. There is a subtle shift in which the emphasis turns to the manner of **saying** through which **being-there** can heed the **claim** (*Anspruch*) of be-ing.

Heidegger defines what is historical in connection with the **history** of metaphysics. Within metaphysics, **being** appears only derivatively in terms of the **beingness** of **entities**, reaching its consummation in **modernity**. Heidegger characterizes this manner of **forgottenness** as the **abandonment of bei-ng** (*Seinsverlassenheit*), in which entities are “abandoned” within a technocratic framework strictly for the purpose of their usefulness. The history of metaphysics comes to fruition and reaches its extreme **possibility** through the onslaught of **machination**. The interconnection between modernity, machination, and metaphysics determines a new trajectory for history. Rather than construing history as a chronicle of human events or historiography (*Historie*), Heidegger considers history as a dispensation of enowning that invites the participation of **mortals** through the complementary endeavors of **thinking** and action. Heidegger advances a basic insight of his later writings that the history of being **grounds** the **experiences** that **human beings** consider “historical,” that is, as exhibiting a direction or **fate**.

Heidegger’s pivotal distinction between *Geschichte* and *Historie* also has implications for **understanding** the sphere of human engagement and action that comes to light, for example, in politics. Within the context of machination, however, the political primarily takes the form of the acquisition of power. Within the scope of this treatise, Heidegger addresses the themes of power (*die Macht*) and violence (*die Gewalt*). He construes the latter as an assertion of force that operates within the scope of technology, which is predicated upon a one-dimensional way of revealing entities. Violence in this narrow sense stands in contrast to the creative clash (*Auseinandersetzung*) with convention in opening up new possibilities for interpreting a text as Heidegger does, for example, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

Heidegger appeals to the notion of the **last god** to highlight the circular arc of history in its arrival from the **future**. The last god defines the “passing by” and returning of different epiphanies of the divine and thereby mirrors the historical trajectory in which the gift of be-ing’s unconcealment is both granted and refused. **Friedrich Hölderlin**’s poetic imagery of the arrival and flight of the gods serves as a **formal indicator** of the path that history traces along the dual vectors of forgottenness and commemoration. When seen from the perspective of enowning, history is thus set in motion through the tension between the **first beginning** of philosophy and the hidden promise of the **other beginning**. According to these dual vectors, metaphysics is propelled by an untruth, which considers only the **truth** of entities but not the **truth of be-ing**. History thereby arises as the **abground**, the groundless ground, which also holds in abeyance or **reservedness** the promise of truth as the **clearing**. Human beings first experience history via their **thrownness** onto this abground, from which they **venture** to make the **decisions** that are epoch-making or historically significant.

Heidegger composed the treatise *Koinón: Out of the History of Being* (1939–40) during the onset of World War II. He casts a philosophical light on “his time,” making it **question-worthy** in terms of his being-historical thinking. The precarious position in which the thinker stands between war and peace reveals another side to the challenge of addressing the **danger** of machination. Within machination, the concern for power emerges as the basic gestalt for organizing social relations. Politics is transformed in this way, oscillating between the extremes of achieving power and losing it, ultimately becoming powerless over the relentless drive to impose control. The acquisition of power becomes an end in itself, escalating to the level of an “addiction.” The political becomes assimilated to this gestalt, nationalistic politics reemerges on a global stage, and power becomes concentrated in the hands of the few. Heidegger emphasizes, however, that the grounding of politics in the quest for power, and its **origin** within machination, remains **unthought**. This being-historical perspective on politics mirrors Heidegger’s statement in *Overcoming Metaphysics* that politics is reduced to a struggle between those individuals who are in power and those who aspire to come to power. The appendix to volume 69 provides additional materials for *Koinón*. Heidegger offers a brief account of the interconnection between power and race. He points to a representational model, in which various racial characterizations are made that are advanced exclusively in support of power interests. A “politics of culture” emerges that becomes a means for “empowering power.”

See also HERO (*Held*); RETURNERSHIP (*Rückkehrerschaft*); WILL TO POWER (*Wille zur Macht*).

**HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME: PROLEGOMENA (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*)**. This summer semester 1925 lecture on the history of the concept of time, with the subtitle “Prolegomena to a **Phenomenology of History and Nature**,” is the penultimate draft of *Being and Time*. As Heidegger outlines in § 3, it was supposed to have three parts: the first deriving the **concept of time**, the second disclosing the history of the concept of time, and the third elaborating the **horizon** for the **question of being** in general and the being of history and nature in particular. In the actual course, Heidegger completed only an extended introduction and the first of the three parts.

Heidegger begins his lecture with a characterization of the **situation** of **philosophy** and **science** in the second half of the 19th century. The decisive event of that time was the breakthrough of **phenomenology** as philosophical research. He discusses and counters several misunderstandings of **Edmund Husserl**’s three essential discoveries: **intentionality**, the **apriori**, and **categorical intuition**. He then advances his own critique of how phenomenology has not done justice to its own call back to the things themselves, and raises

the question of their enabling dimension. Heidegger shows how the thematic of **being-there** and **being** emerges from the phenomenology of Husserl and **Max Scheler**. He discloses its unseen presuppositions, that is, the neglect of the question of the being of intentionality and the neglect of the question of being itself. The lecture is thus an important step in Heidegger's hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology.

In the main part of the lecture, Heidegger investigates the condition of the **possibility** of phenomenology's three essential discoveries. Here we find many themes, such as the famous fable of **care**, that he will elaborate upon in *Being and Time*. Intentionality is secondary to being-there's concerned **being-in-the-world**, where it discovers things in their **presence-at-hand** and **readiness-to-hand**. **Understanding** finds its conceptual realm and receives its first systematic treatment. It is the primary **ontological** relationship of being-there to the **world** and to itself. **Being-with**, care, **solicitude**, and the **with-world** are analyzed, and the concept of **involvement** is introduced for the first time.

The most important aspect of the lecture is Heidegger's **formal indication, to-be**, as the constitution of being-there. It is noteworthy that the **existential** vocabulary is largely absent from the source. Being-there is the entity that **I** myself have to be and can be in each instance. Being-there as **time** temporalizes its being.

**HÖLDERLIN, FRIEDRICH (1770–1843)**. Heidegger read Hölderlin's poems when they were first published in an edition by Norbert von Hellin-grath in 1914. The late hymns especially hit him like an earthquake. He became interested philosophically in Hölderlin's **poetry** when he worked out his conception of the **history of being** in the 1930s. Heidegger's **interpretation** is a **dialogue** between the thinker, who has the task to proclaim the **truth of being**, and the poet, who has the mission to name the **holy**. Hölderlin felt himself to be a messenger between the **gods** and the **people**. Hölderlin is the poet of the poets because he puts into **words** for the first time the task, mission, and calling of poetry. He is also the poet of the **future**. Not only did he name the gods that have fled, but he also **grounded** the possibility of the **other beginning** in the history of being.

The naming of the holy makes possible the **turning** relation of being to **human being** and thus clears the way for the coming of the **last god**. Hölderlin stands on the razor's edge. His poetry is the **moment** when the old gods have fled and the new gods have not yet been revealed. Because language is essentially poetry, Hölderlin was also important for Heidegger's inquiry into **language**.

*See also* HÖLDERLIN AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY (*Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*); HÖLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE ISTER" (*Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"*); ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART, THE

(*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*); . . . POETICALLY MAN DWELLS . . . (. . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch . . .*); WHAT ARE POETS FOR? (*Wozu Dichter?*).

**HÖLDERLIN AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY** (*Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*). In this beautiful essay written in 1936, Heidegger gives an **interpretation** of five pointers taken from **Friedrich Hölderlin**'s writing in order to disclose the **essence** of **poetry**. Heidegger chooses Hölderlin for his interpretation because he is the poet of the poets. Poetry is the most innocent of occupations. The domain of this occupation is language; hence we can only grasp the mission and calling of poetry when we comprehend how **language** itself speaks. Language has the task of making **entities** manifest in their being and preserving them in **unconcealment**. It is the most dangerous thing of **being-there**'s possessions, because it makes our **existence** in the **clearing** possible. Only where there is language is there **world**; only where world predominates is there history. Language has at its disposal and grants the supreme **possibility** of human existence.

The being of being-there is founded on language, and the **human being**'s manner of **dwelling** within it is **dialogue** or conversation. We are an ongoing conversation, and that means we can listen to one another. The unity of this conversation is grounded on the essential **word**. This unity can only become manifest in the light of something permanent and enduring, that is, **time**. Since language becomes actual as conversation, the **gods** have acquired names and a world has appeared. Poetry is the bestowal (*Stiftung*) of **being** by means of the word.

The bestowal of being is both the pure **gift** of being and a process of grounding by being-there. In the process of the **letting be** of things by naming them in their being, the poet illuminates the entire clearing where the gift of being is bestowed. The poet has been cast out into the **between**, between the gods and the **people**. In this "between," it is decided who we are and where we settle and inhabit our existence.

Hölderlin is the poet in the destitute time because our time finds itself in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and the not-yet of the arrival of the new gods.

**HÖLDERLIN'S EARTH AND HEAVEN** (*Hölderlins Erde und Himmel*). Heidegger first gave this lecture to the Hölderlin meeting in Munich on 6 June 1959. Heidegger's interpretation centers on a draft of the poem "Greece" ("*Griechenland*"). The poem speaks of the **relation** between heaven and **earth** in a way that is reminiscent of the play of the **fourfold**. The earth extends toward and shelters what is heavenly, while heaven marks the **origin** of the earth and provides a **measure**. Heidegger points to the **expanse**



of human **dwelling**, the establishment of its coordinate that gives its depth, rootedness, and the potential by which **mortals** can be called to a higher **destiny**.

**HÖLDERLIN'S HYMN "REMEMBRANCE" (*Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken"*)**. This text from the winter semester of 1941/42 comprises volume 52 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition** and culminates the series of Heidegger's lecture-courses on **Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry**. As indicated by the title, Heidegger highlights the importance of "remembrance" or **commemorative thinking** (*Andenken*), in a further effort to characterize the trajectory of Western **history**.

In this text, Heidegger interprets Hölderlin's hymn ("Andenken") in order to cast light on the primordial power of the **word** and its connection to **poetry**. In Part One, Heidegger emphasizes that the nuances of Hölderlin's poetry cannot be reduced to any theory of metaphor or symbol. For example, Heidegger cites Hölderlin's characterization of a "greeting," which is neither literally a sign of human interaction nor a symbol of something more esoteric. Rather, the greeting marks the poet's entryway into the singularity of **time-space** and thus the invitation to become **open** to the power of the word. In Part Two, Heidegger addresses the link between history and remembrance. History depends on the recollection of **origins**. In this way, remembrance is also the rejuvenation and celebration of a **people**, indeed, a "festival." The festival is always a way of paying homage to the **gods**. Heidegger outlines the way that, according to Hölderlin, a **demigod** extends the "**between**" (*Zwischen*) as the intermediary zone wherein the consecration of the **holy** can occur and be conveyed to and evoke the devotion of humans.

In Part Three, Heidegger examines Hölderlin's depiction of the fatherland. Hölderlin speaks of the heights that must be climbed in order to reach the fatherland. Such an ascent requires the greatest **forbearance** (*Langmut*). In this way, human beings exercise **care**, which is required in order that they can  **dwell** on the **earth** and become capable of residing in a homeland. In Part Four, Heidegger returns to address the importance of language, insofar as it comes to be enacted through **dialogue**. Only through the capacity to listen does such dialogue become possible. Appealing once again to Hölderlin's depiction of a festival, Heidegger refers to the vibrancy of **love**, which fills mortals with a **joy** by which they can embrace **who** they are and thus come into their own. This is one of the rare instances in which Heidegger discusses love as an essential dimension of the human way "to be," that is, as distinctive of our **ek-sistence**.

**HÖLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE ISTER" (*Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"*).**

This summer semester 1942 lecture-course is the last one Heidegger devoted to **Friedrich Hölderlin**. It is an **interpretation** of the hymn "The Ister" (The Danube) and consists of three parts. In the first part, Heidegger exposes the ebb and flow of the stream. Hölderlin distinguishes the dynamic of the stream by the tension of being-at-home and wandering. The poet cares for the homecoming of the **people**. To what is ownmost and singular to homecoming belongs the wandering in foreign places.

The second part is an interpretation of wandering in a double dialogue between Hölderlin and Sophocles, on the one hand, and Heidegger and the Greeks, on the other. As Sophocles showed in his tragedy *Antigone*, the **human being** is the most homeless of all **entities**. The hearth is the place where human beings are at home. According to Heidegger, we must understand the hearth to be **being** itself.

The third part is a further exposition of being homeless and homecoming, in which Heidegger shows that what Hölderlin has named in the stream is the essential nature of the demigods. The **spirit** of the stream is the poetic spirit.

**HÖLDERLIN'S HYMNS "GERMANIA" AND "THE RHEIN"**

(*Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"*). Heidegger's interest in **Friedrich Hölderlin's** poetry comes to the forefront in this lecture-course from the inter semester of 1934/35, which is published as volume 39 of his **Complete Edition**. This is the first of three lecture-courses devoted to Hölderlin's poetry, preceding the lecture-courses from the winter semester 1941/42 (*Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"*) and the summer semester of 1942 (*Hölderlin's Hymn "Remembrance"*), respectively. The text is divided into two parts, in which Heidegger explores two of Hölderlin's poems, "Germania" and "The Rhein," respectively.

In Part I, Heidegger portrays Hölderlin as the poet who speaks for the poets and thereby is **attuned** to the way in which poetry reveals the **disclosive** power of **language**. Poetry depends upon a **grounding attunement**, which acclimates the poet to the singularity of the **word** and historical roots of its idioms. The poet answers to a calling and heeds what is still emerging to shape the **destiny** of **human beings**, including the arrival of the **gods** and the intimation of what is **holy**.

Heidegger's exposition of Hölderlin's poetry also intersects with addressing the unique calling of the philosopher. The vocation of poetry makes explicit what is initially only implicit to the task of **thinking**, namely, the way in which speaking defers to the ability to **hear**. The priority of hearing reveals (1) that language depends upon an unspoken element and (2) that the attunement to language is a prerequisite for a **meaningful** exchange between speakers that comes to fruition through **dialogue**. According to Heidegger,

Hölderlin's suggestion that "we have been a conversation" reveals how the synergy between language and **history** makes possible a **people** (*Volk*), allowing **mortals** to  **dwell** in proximity with and in homage to their **origins**.

In Part II, Heidegger examines Hölderlin's attempt to express the ineffable role of the demigods in announcing what is holy. A demigod (*Halbgott*) marks the arena "in-between" **mortals** and gods and thereby brings into question the difference that holds each in its relation to the other. The separation and yet intersection of this area **between** (*Zwischen*) allows for both the manifestation of **be-ing** (*Seyn*) and the founding of a **world** in which human beings can dwell. The in-betweenness of the demigod evokes an ambiguity in which the sense of exile, of forsakenness, harks back to the **possibility of a homecoming**. Once again, Heidegger looks to the poet to find inspiration for **thinking** the **ontological** origin of the **homeland** (*Heimat*), not simply in geographical terms, but as the gathering of the possibilities of dwelling on the **earth**.

Heidegger sets Hölderlin apart as the poet who foresees the **future** of the Germans, because he anticipates a manifestation of be-ing that grounds the possibility of a homeland and the potential for **human beings** "to dwell poetically" on the earth.

*See also HÖLDERLIN AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY (Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung).*

**HOLY** (*das Heilige*). It is the task of the poet to name the **mystery of being** and safeguard it as holy. The **gifting** and bestowing of being, in its potential to remain concealed as well as unconcealed, is the holy. The holy is **awe** provoking and unsettling insofar as it dislodges by its **coming to presence** all **experience** from the ordinary patterns of everyday **life**. The holy is the eternal heart of **entities**, since being is the ecstatic **origin** of their **presencing**, and joins the modality of presence with its opposite of **absence** and withholding. The holy is the condition of the **possibility** of the divine. The **clearing** of being is that by which the **gods** are and that by which they are holy. The holy is the **openness** of the **fourfold** into which being calls forth **mortals** and the **divinities**.

**HOMELAND** (*Heimat*). The homeland is a place where a **people** can grow roots and **dwell** on the **earth**. It makes the **autochthony** of a people's **being-there** possible and is closely related to its **language**.

**HOMELESSNESS** (*Heimatlosigkeit*). The concern for homelessness becomes an increasingly important topic in Heidegger's later writings. On the one hand, homelessness reflects the lack of being-there's capacity to establish a **place of dwelling**. On the other hand, the condition of homelessness

emerges as a primary condition born from the onslaught of modern **technology**. The dissociation of any sense of nearness and the annulling of all distances, for example, through air travel and mass communication, leads to the uprooting of **human beings** from their **homeland**. In this respect, homelessness is closely aligned with **nihilism** and originates within modernity as a result of historical change leading to the rise of technology, namely, the **abandonment of being**. The divestiture of diverse ways of **being**'s manifestation leads to the uniformity of technocratic rule, which underlies modern homelessness.

Within the abandonment of being, homelessness also displays a positive side by kindling a sense of **homesickness** and thereby a longing to return home, that is, to hold forth the **possibility** of a homecoming. When seen in this historical light, homelessness is a prelude for being-there's return to an abode of dwelling. Heidegger's emphasis on the earth, and the invocation of poetically dwelling upon it, underscores the importance that concern for homelessness has in his writings.

*See also* FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS, THE: WORLD, FINITUDE, SOLITUDE (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*); . . . POETICALLY MAN DWELLS . . . (. . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch* . . .)

**HOMESICKNESS (*Heimweh*)**. Homesickness is a fundamental **mood** or **grounding attunement** that leads to **philosophy**. If it is the fundamental mood of the philosopher, then only those who are nowhere at home can become philosophers. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger appeals to Novalis's description that the origin of homesickness stems from an "urge to be everywhere at home." But what, then, does being at home everywhere mean? It means being every time and above all in the **whole** that is the **world**. Philosophers are not yet in the world, but are under way toward the world. In this not yet and unrest of being under way, the **finitude** of our **existence** shows itself. Finitude is the fundamental **way of being** of **being-there**. As finite **entities**, we have to take **care** of our finitude. Finitude is only in the true individualization in which **human beings** concentrate themselves on their being-there. In this **solitude**, we are near the **being** of **things**, which shows itself through the world. In this **nearness**, philosophy begins.

**HORIZON (*Horizont*)**. In Edmund Husserl's **phenomenology**, the horizon is the background of relations from which the object of intentional **lived experience** is given. A horizon is a meaningful prefiguration (*Vorzeichnung*). In Heidegger's early lecture courses, horizon makes several appearances, as the horizon of **significance** of the **world**, the horizon of **historiolo-**

gy, and the distressful horizon of the expectations of **existence**. The concept of horizon takes center stage in Heidegger's **fundamental ontology**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows how **temporality** projects open the horizon for any and every **understanding of being**. The **formal indication** of **being-there** is existence. Being-there stands out in the **clearing** of **being**. The spatial and temporal **openness** prefigures the **meaning of being**. This prefiguration is a horizontal unity that is projected through the interplay of the three **ecstases** of being-there's temporality. The horizon gives both shape and trajectory to the movement of being-there's transcendence, its **world-forming** power. The extreme **possibility** of **death** takes the **self** beyond the secure confines of the everyday **world** and throws it back upon itself. As a movement of transcendence, every ecstasis has its own horizon. The horizon of the **future** is **death**, that of the **past** is **thrownness**, and that of the **present** is the world. To every ecstasis belongs a whither to which one is carried away. This whither is the **horizontal schema**.

In light of the **turning**, the need for a horizon diminishes. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, the "**transcendental**" horizontal perspective of fundamental ontology gives way to **being-historical thinking**. The latter addresses **be-ing** (*Seyn*) through the historical clearing of its **gifting** refusal rather than from the standpoint of a horizon. Being-there is now the "there" of being, that is, as the "enowned" **projecting-opening** of its **truth**. The meaning of being is bestowed and transmitted through the **destiny of being**. Being-there stands forth in the **between** (*Zwischen*) of the **difference** between being and **entities**, and this open **expanse** of **unconcealment** supplants the horizon.

**HORIZONTAL SCHEMA** (*horizontales Schema*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses horizontal schemas to explain that the **temporality** that makes possible **being-there** can also project forth the **horizon** of the **world**. The horizontal schema is the whither of the temporal **ecstasis**. The four **ways of being** (owned and unowned existence, presence-at-hand, and readiness-to-hand) each have three horizontal schemas, which correspond to the dimensions of temporality: future, past, and present. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger shows how the horizontal schemata can outline the **expanse** in terms of which the **meaning of being** can be projected, disclosed, and ultimately articulated through temporality.

*See also* SCHEMATISM (*Schematismus*).

**HOUSE OF BEING, THE** (*das Haus des Seins*). In his famous *Letter on "Humanism,"* Heidegger refers to **language** as the house of **being**, that is, the place for its **unconcealment**. By helping to project open this unconcealment, **being-there** also **dwells** in language and safeguards the **word**.

**HUMAN BEING (*Mensch*).** In light of the **turning relation of being** to man, **being-there** is not simply the **formal indication** of the **way of being** of humans. It becomes the activity of projecting open the **truth of being** itself. Human beings exist in the **fourfold**. Here they are the **mortals** who **dwelt** between **earth** and **sky** and before the **divinities**. In their **relation** to being, they are the **shepherds of being** who **care** for the being of **entities**.

*See also* HUMANISM (*Humanismus*).

**HUMANISM (*Humanismus*).** In his *Letter on “Humanism,”* Heidegger describes humanism as the liberating of **human beings** into the dignity that is proper to their nature. The fundamental conception of human being in humanism is *animal rationale*. This is the reason humanism shares the same **fate** as **metaphysics** and cannot cure the homelessness of modern man. Humanism fails to think human being from out of the ecstatic **openness** of **being-there**. Heidegger claims that **Jean-Paul Sartre** calcified metaphysics further in the **forgottenness of being** with his reversal of the dichotomy between **essence** and **existence**. We should therefore try to interpret human being purely out of its **relation to being**.

**HUSSERL, EDMUND (1859–1938).** As a student, Heidegger was influenced by **phenomenology** years before Husserl assumed the chair of **philosophy** at the Albert Ludwig University in **Freiburg** in 1916. Husserl helped Heidegger with the publication of his qualifying dissertation on Duns Scotus and, by the end of 1917, looked forward to the occasions of *sumphilosophiein* with his favorite coworker. During the years 1917–1920, Heidegger learned constantly through his association with Husserl. During this period his influence was as strong as **Aristotle’s**.

In Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious **experience**, terminology drawn from Husserl’s *Ideen I* (1913) abounds. Yet Heidegger shows a growing sense of the hermeneutical rationality of all **lived experience**. He begins to set over against Husserl’s pure ego of empty potentiality a historical ego fulfilling itself in historical **situations**. This marks the beginning of his step-by-step transformation of Husserl’s **transcendental** phenomenology into a hermeneutic phenomenology.

Heidegger publicly criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology in his winter semester 1922/23 seminar on *Ideen I* and his summer semester 1923 course *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Heidegger shows that a **phenomenon** is not merely an object, but more basically a way of access and apprehension. We can only get to the things themselves in a **destruction** of the **tradition**.

The first lecture-course at **Marburg** in the winter of 1923/23, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, continues this historical criticism by a comparison of Husserl with **René Descartes**, who infected Husserl with a concern for knowledge that led to an ideal of certainty and evidence. Thus, it was decided in advance that consciousness ought to be the main theme of phenomenology. The summer semester 1925 lecture-course *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* contains Heidegger's most sustained and detailed critique of Husserl. He indicts his mentor for the double **ontological** neglect of the **being of intentionality** and the question of the **meaning of being** itself. The primacy of **perception** and its overt bodily presence in Husserl's method is reduced back to the more immediate presence of equipment, which is founded upon the nonobjective presence of **concern** and its **environment**.

Heidegger dedicated *Being and Time* to Husserl for his incisive personal guidance and free access to unpublished investigations during their Freiburg years. The dedication page, along with the rough manuscript of *Being and Time*, was presented to Husserl on his birthday in April 1926. The shock of alienation was immediate when Husserl finally got a good look at the long-awaited book. Their differences became even more explicit during their collaboration on a joint statement defining phenomenology for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, which ended in failure.

In 1928, Heidegger's edition of Husserl's lectures on inner time-consciousness appeared. Heidegger returned as Husserl's successor to Freiburg in late 1928, but there was no philosophical interchange between them. On 8 April 1929, on the festive occasion of Husserl's 70th birthday, Heidegger formally presented the Festschrift to Husserl with a short speech. The Festschrift is a testimony that Husserl's students wanted to follow his leadership, not a proof that they had succeeded in being followers. Later that year, Husserl studied Heidegger's writings and rejected them both in method and content. In his *Nachwort zu meinen Ideen*, he publicly denounced the new philosophy of **existence**. In a letter to Alexander Pfänder in 1931, Husserl bared his soul over the entire course of his relationship with Heidegger, one of the difficult ordeals of his life. Because of illness, Heidegger was conspicuously absent from Husserl's funeral in 1938. In his later autobiographical essays, Heidegger acknowledges his lasting debt to Husserl's principle of phenomenology for his own **path of thinking**.

*See also* FOUR SEMINARS (*Vier Seminare*); MY WAY TO PHENOMENOLOGY (*Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*); PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).







**I, THE (*das Ich*).** Heidegger repeats time and again that the I can be understood neither as subject nor as **substance**. The I is not a *thing*; it is an intentional **structure**. As such it is both situated and historical. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the **formal indication** of **mineness** to disclose the individual character of **being-there**. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger emphasizes that the I is not an isolated ego, but instead emerges within the **play-space** of finite **transcendence**.

*See also* INTENTIONALITY (*Intentionalität*); SITUATION-I, THE (*das Situations-Ich*).

**IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLDVIEWS, THE (*Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*).** This war emergency semester 1919 lecture-course was Heidegger's first teaching assignment after World War I. Its title reflects the goal of **Edmund Husserl's** program expressed in his *Logos* essay to further **philosophy** as a rigorous **science**. Philosophy is neither a theoretical science nor a worldview. It is the plunge into **life** itself in its ownmost **individuality**.

In the first part, Heidegger denies with Husserl that philosophy has anything to do with a worldview. He offers his students a **destruction** of the critical teleological method of neo-Kantian **value-philosophy**. In the second, phenomenological part, he rejects the neo-Kantian starting point of philosophy in the fact of knowledge and replaces it with the primordial fact of life and **experience**. In a discussion of **Paul Natorp's** objections to **phenomenology**, Heidegger transforms Husserl's principle of all principles, that is, the primacy of originary giving and so of **intuition**, into a hermeneutic breakthrough in phenomenology. We can only experience these intentional **structures** in our **factive life experience**. Philosophy itself becomes a distinct possibility of life, which uses **formal indication** to disclose the orienting comportment of life itself. Life is **meaningful** and expresses itself in and through its self-experience and spontaneous self-**understanding**.

**IDLE TALK (*Gerede*)**. Idle talk is Heidegger's description of a positive **phenomenon** that constitutes **being-there's** everyday **understanding** and **interpretation**. Being-there is delivered over to the **interpretedness** occurring within the averageness and publicity of the "**they**." Idle talk is the **possibility** of understanding everything without previously making the matter that we talk about our own. In this sense, idle talk closes off access to the things themselves.

**IMAGINATION (*Einbildung; Einbildungskraft*)**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1927/28, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"* and in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger retrieves **Immanuel Kant's** concept of the power of imagination in order to illustrate the dynamic of **temporality** that pervades human **understanding** and **existence**. When its role in generating the dynamic of **temporality** becomes explicit, imagination appears in direct connection with **being-there's disclosedness**. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger points to imagination as paralleling the occurrence of **unconcealment**.

**INABIDING (*Inständigkeit*)**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger addresses the manner in which **being-there** stands within the **clearing of being** and abides within that **truth**. Inabiding defines the reciprocal relationship in which being-there stands to being. Inabiding grants to **human beings** their own distinctive way of **dwelling** upon, and becoming a steward of, the **earth**.  
*See also* GUARDIANSHIP (*Wächterschaft*).

**INAUTHENTICITY (*Uneigentlichkeit*)**. See UNOWNEDNESS (*Uneigentlichkeit*).

**IN-BEING**. *See* BEING-IN (*In-Sein*).

**IN-BETWEEN (*das Inzwischen*)**. Heidegger refers to the in-between to accentuate the tension of **differentiation** within which **mortals** can abide in their reciprocal **relation to being**. The in-between enacts the contrast whereby the **clearing (*Lichtung*)** and what appears within it or **entities** become distinguishable. Through the in-between, **being-there** both enters into and seeks to maintain the open **expanse** of the clearing. According to the dual vectors of this participation, **human being** is grounded more originally as the **t/here**.

In this same context, Heidegger coins a variation of this expression, or "inbetweenness" (*Inzwischenenschaft*). Inbetweenness refers to the encompassing space of differentiation that holds **world** and **earth**, being-there and the

**gods**, in tension with each other, along with being and entities. The in-betweenness makes explicit the intersection at which mortals and gods are counterposed and each appears in its relation to the other by virtue of the **clearing**. The inbetweenness marks the **play of time-space** through which the **t/here** can provide the **ground** for the **ontological difference**.

In section 91 of *Mindfulness*, Heidegger emphasizes that it is by virtue of the in-between, and by abiding within it, that being-there first belongs to and is **owned-over to be-ing**. The in-between is determined not only by breadth but also by depth as the **abground** (*Abgrund*). Being-there reappears as the **t/here** of this abground, as the swinging **midpoint** through which the clearing unfolds.

*See also* BETWEEN, THE (*das Zwischen*); QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**INCEPTUAL THINKING** (*anfängliches Denken*). Only by both abiding within and safeguarding **language** can **thinking** come into its own and heed the **truth of being**. Inceptual thinking epitomizes this responsiveness to **be-ing** and the awareness of its mission in its **care of the word**. Inceptual thinking directs **philosophy** toward the **other beginning** by making it mindful of its place within the history of being. Heidegger addresses inceptual thinking in his seminal work *Mindfulness*.

**INCUBATION PERIOD** (*Incubationszeit*). An incubation period pertains to a historical interval in which insights into **being** have remained dormant, albeit preserved in spite of the **concealment** thereof. That which is concealed is also **sheltered** and maintained throughout the incubation period. Heidegger employs this term in *The Principle of Reason* to suggest how a deeper **understanding** of reasons or **grounds** remains preserved in the **forgottenness of being** that pervades the philosophical **tradition**.

**INDIVIDUALITY** (*Einzigkeit*). Heidegger emphasizes the individuality or uniqueness that is novel to **being-there** and the **enactment** of its **ek-sistence**. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), he refers to the “individuality of the **t/here**” (*die Einzigkeit des Da-seins*) as abiding within and constituted through the **play of time-space**.

**INDIVIDUATION** (*Vereinzelung*). Individuation is a potential that sets **human beings** apart from all other creatures. The fact that **being-there** is in each case **mine**, and thereby can pursue its ownmost potential to be a **self**,

entails a capacity for individuation. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger employs this term in connection with **solitude**.

**INNOVATIVE THINKING (*Er-denken*)**. Innovative thinking is an attempt to break out of conventional and customary patterns of **understanding**, particularly as embodied in **representational thinking**. However, innovative thinking is not simply a product of fancy, but exhibits its own rigor by heeding the directives of **enowning**. Heidegger introduces innovative thinking in *Contributions to Phenomenology* (1936–38) as a way of “enabling” our power to think. Innovative thinking displays its own inner logic as a **reticence in silence** (*Sigetik*); such thinking develops its originality by deferring to the **disclosive** power of **language** in order to evoke new idioms of expression. Innovative thinking thereby proceeds from the **between** (*Zwischen*) of being’s differentiation from **entities**, rather than presuming prepackaged metaphysical formulations that define entities generically in their **beingness** (*Seiendheit*). In his treatise of 1941–42, *The Enowning*, Heidegger considers innovative thinking as following the **hint** of what is most **question-worthy**, in its endeavor to traverse the **crossing** to the **other beginning**.

*See also* ENOWNED THINKING (*Ereignisdenken*).

**IN-ORDER-TO, THE (*das Umzu*)**. The in-order-to belongs to the essential **structure** of **equipment**. In the in-order-to lies a reference of something to something. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the in-order-to within a totality of equipment. The in-order-to of each piece of equipment is discovered in **circumspection**. In Heidegger’s analysis of **temporality**, the in-order-to is also the horizontal schema of the **present**.

**INSTANCE (*Inständigkeit*)**. *See* INABIDING (*Inständigkeit*).

**INTENTIONALITY (*Intentionalität*)**. Intentionality is one of the fundamental breakthroughs in **Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology**. Husserl took from **Franz Brentano** the insight that the defining characteristic of **consciousness** is its intentionality. Husserl distinguishes between the **meaning** of a conscious act and the object it is about. Heidegger transformed Husserl’s conception of the intentionality of consciousness into a hermeneutic conception of the intentionality of **being-there**. The “to be” of being-there lies in its **existence** or being-out-toward, that is, a **compartment** within the **world** whose **mode** of intending is as much a matter of practicality as theoretical knowledge. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes among three different notions of intentionality and its relationship to the world: (1) the inten-

tionality and world of theoretical **intuition**; (2) the intentionality and world of practical **concern** and **circumspection**; and (3) the primordial intentionality and **worldhood** of being-there's **understanding**, in which the first two are grounded. For being-there, world always "worlds" (*weltet*). The starting point of phenomenology is neither a **fact** nor a principle, but the pure **facticity** of the "it worlds."

**IN-TERMS-OF-WHICH** (*das Woraufhin*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines **meaning** as the "in-terms-of-which" or "upon-which" of **being-there's projection**, which is shaped by the threefold fore-**structure** of its **hermeneutic situation**. This threefold structure is constituted by the "where-in" (*das Worin*) of the world's **significance**, the "toward-which" of the "**for-the-sake-of-which**" of being-there's **existence**, and the "through-which" (*das Wodurch*) of the **interpretation**. The **apriori** framework of projection forms the very **horizon** of **temporality**.

In *Being and Time* and in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger shows that temporality yields the backdrop "in-terms-of-which" **being** first becomes understandable, meaningful, and ultimately articulated in **words**. Temporality emerges as the horizon for any possible **understanding of being**.

**INTERPRETATION** (*Auslegung*; *Interpretation*). Heidegger uses the term interpretation in two different senses. In the larger sense, interpretation (*Interpretation*) is basically the making explicit of our **understanding** of something. Since every understanding is historical, every interpretation is at the time a **destruction** of the **tradition** from which we understand something. In this sense, Heidegger's interpretation of the **meaning of being** is also at the same time a destruction of the history of **ontology**. As Heidegger states in his lecture-course from the summer semester 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, philosophical interpretation is necessarily destruction.

In the stricter sense, interpretation as *Auslegung* (interpretative exposition) is the development of the possibilities of being-there's **projections**. In every interpretation, the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood and thus becomes determinate. Interpretation is the working out of possibilities projected implicitly in understanding. This means that it is possible to give an *Interpretation* of an *Auslegung*, but not the reverse.

**INTERPRETATION OF NIETZSCHE'S SECOND UNTIMELY MEDITATION** (*Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässer Betrachtung*). Volume 46 of Heidegger's Complete Edition include notes for a weekly three-hour seminar held in the winter semester of 1938/39 in Freiburg, which was devoted to an **interpretation** of **Friedrich Nietzsche's** *Second Untimely*

*Meditation.* Heidegger had already addressed this in the briefest terms in section 76 of *Being and Time* (Part I, Division Two, Chapter V). In his subsequent discussion in 1938/39, Heidegger reexamines Nietzsche's account of **history** from the perspective of **being-historical thinking**. Thus, Heidegger views Nietzsche's **philosophy** as an attempt to confront the limitations of **modernity** without recognizing, however, that his critique of the modern age is overshadowed by a more primordial enactment of **history** as the **forgottenness of being**. Nietzsche applies anthropological motifs such as "culture" and "life" to grasp the relation of humanity to **entities in the whole**. By contrast, Heidegger appeals to the reciprocal **relation** between **being-there** and **be-ing** (*Seyn*), as enacted through **temporality**, to interpret the **ground of history**.

**INTERPRETEDNESS** (*Ausgelegtheit*). Interpretedness is the **formal indication** of the everyday **interpretation** of human **life** as it is promoted by the "they." In ordering **being-there's** capacity for articulation and **discourse**, interpretedness already proceeds from the prior disclosure of **entities** within the worldly network of everyday **involvements**.

**INTONATION** (*Anstimmung*). Intonation refers to the resonance or vibration of the **attunement**. For Heidegger, intonation points to the **stillness**, which gathers the capacity for speech from what is **unsaid**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1939, *On the Essence of Language*, he shows how intonation is central to the **experience** of the **word**, which precedes all speech acts.

**INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS** (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*). This summer semester 1935 lecture-course is a more radical development of the **question of being** than Heidegger had worked out in *Being and Time*. The course consists of four parts.

In the first part, Heidegger interprets the fundamental question, "Why is there something rather than **nothing**?" as the greatest, deepest, and most original question. It asks about **entities** as such and in the **whole**, or as it was called in **Greek philosophy**, *physis*. Heidegger wants to introduce his students to this fundamental question. For logical and scientific **thinking**, the nothing of the second part of the question is strange and alienating. The first part of the question, "Why is there something?," questions the everyday fact that **entities** are and thus opens up the domain of **being**. The fundamental question of **metaphysics** concerning entities and the nothing thus leads to the more basic question, "How does it stand with being?" The question of being

determines the historical **fate** of the occident and is concerned with historical events such as the flight of the **gods**, the destruction of the **earth**, and the standardization of **human beings**.

In the second part, Heidegger discusses the grammar and etymology of the word “being.” The infinitive mode refers to an abstraction of its **meaning** from all particular **relations**. Being is an empty word that has many senses or meanings. Heidegger emphasizes the importance of **retrieving** the verbal form “to be” over the nominative form, whose prevalence in metaphysics gives priority to entities over being itself.

In the third part, Heidegger addresses the question of the **understanding of being**. Does the emptiness of the word “being” not hide the **possibility** of a multiplicity of meanings?

The fourth part is a discussion of the basic metaphysical opposition or polarities: Being and Becoming, Being and Appearance, Being and Thinking, “Being and the Ought.” In harmony with **Greek philosophy** and **poetry**, Heidegger tries to make a fundamental **experience** of being possible. The question about the **meaning of being** is at the same time the question about the meaning of **being-there**, because through its **temporality**, being-there is the **site** for the disclosure of being. Because being-there is temporal in its depths, **time** was the perspective governing the disclosure of being in the **beginning** of Western philosophy. This perspective as such has remained hidden. *Being and Time* is the first attempt to make this perspective explicit and points in a different direction than metaphysics.

**INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH** (*Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*). This winter semester 1923/24 lecture-course is the first of Heidegger’s courses in **Marburg**, later published as volume 17 of his **Complete Edition**. It is both an introduction to phenomenological research and a critique of **Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness**. Guided by the **things** themselves, Heidegger develops his conception of a phenomenology of **being-there**. The course consists of a clarification of phenomenology and a discussion of the initial breakthrough to phenomenological research in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and its ensuing course in modern **philosophy**.

The first part of the course begins with a clarification of the term “phenomenology” through an **interpretation** of *phainomenon* and *logos* in **Aristotle’s** writings. Heidegger shows that Aristotle is concerned with the **being** of the **world** and **life** as **being-in-the-world**. Modern philosophy, on the other hand, is guided by the **care** of certain and clear knowledge. The ideal of mathematical strictness makes it impossible for **entities** to show themselves in their being. In an interpretation of Husserl’s essay *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, Heidegger shows that his conception of phenomenology was still

dominated by the care of certain and clear knowledge and the **concern** for already known knowledge. The concern for certainty and clarity marks the beginning of modern philosophy with **Réne Descartes**.

In the second part of the course, Heidegger provides an extensive interpretation of the *res cogitans* in the philosophy of Descartes, which is guided by the question of the **meaning** of the **truth** of knowledge. Descartes not only determines truth as certainty, but also retains scholastic **ontology**. To understand Descartes, Heidegger must also give an explication of truth and being in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In the third part, Heidegger shows how Descartes failed to ask the question of the being of the *res cogitans* because his research was dominated by the concern for certain knowledge. Husserl took over from Descartes the ideal of certain and clear knowledge and could therefore not disclose being-there in its being. Where Descartes emphasized the priority of the “I think,” Heidegger underscores the concrete **fact** that “I am.” Heidegger’s course is not only a **destruction** of phenomenological research, but also a return to the things themselves, to the **facticity** of the “I am,” and ultimately, to being-there itself.

### **INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (*Einleitung in die Philosophie*).**

As **Edmund Husserl**’s successor at the University of **Freiburg**, Heidegger gave this lecture-course during the winter semester 1928/29. The text of this lecture-course is now published as volume 27 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. It marks the **beginning** of the **turning** on this **path of thinking**, because Heidegger abandons Husserl’s project of transforming **philosophy** into a rigorous **science**. Philosophy is not a science in this sense, since it springs from the ever-abundant and ebullient enactment and coming into its own of **being-there**.

At the beginning of the course, Heidegger divided his introduction to philosophy into three parts: philosophy and science, philosophy and **world-view**, and philosophy and history. The second part became so extensive that Heidegger did not get to the third.

In the first part of the course, Heidegger develops the difference between philosophy and science out of the **origin** of **truth**. The object of science and its truth are grounded in the essential condition of being-there, that is, **transcendence**. Transcendence is the disclosing of **entities** in their **being**. This disclosure can only happen if being-there **lets be** entities as they are.

The second part is a discussion of the connection between philosophy and worldview on the basis of the fundamental **determinations** of being-there: **being-in-the-world**, transcendence, and the **understanding of being**. Because being-there has been delivered over to the superior power of entities, it is insecure and without a hold. From this insecurity and being without a hold spring two fundamental **possibilities** of worldview: worldview as security



(**religion**) and worldview as hold (philosophy). Philosophy is an outstanding way of worldview as hold: the letting happen and forming of transcendence as **freedom**.

**INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY—THINKING AND POETIZING** (*Einleitung in die Philosophie—Denken und Dichten*). This text includes a lecture from the winter semester 1944/45, which was ultimately cancelled after the second session. This is the last public lecture that Heidegger delivered at the University of Freiburg before the end of World War II, and now it is published as Part II of volume 50 of his **Complete Edition**. As indicated in the subtitle, he examines **thinking** in its connection with poetizing. Heidegger makes this comparison by naming premier examples of each endeavor: **Friedrich Nietzsche** as the “last great thinker of the West” and **Friedrich Hölderlin** as the “poet of the poets,” respectively.

In Chapter One, Heidegger addresses the **attunement** guiding Nietzsche’s thinking. While Hölderlin points to the “flight of the **gods**,” Nietzsche emphasizes that there have been no new gods since the birth of **Christianity**. Yet Nietzsche remains bound within the perspective of **modernity**, which with its bias of **subjectivity** envisions the gods as human creations whose deposing culminates in the age of **nihilism**. The “**God-less**” character of **human beings** corresponds to an attunement in which they are also worldless and homeless. In the **absence** of the gods, the condition of modern humanity is **homelessness**. Conversely, the **need** to address this condition and render it **question-worthy** gives way to the anticipation of a future god. The identification of nihilism with homelessness harbors a yearning for a home (i.e., a **homesickness**), which resonates through Hölderlin’s leitmotif of seeking an abode in which to reside, a domicile for poetic **dwelling**.

In Chapter Two, Heidegger addresses the extreme condition of homelessness, which comes to light in Nietzsche’s **metaphysics** of absolute subjectivity. The bereftness of this negativity does not lie simply in its closure, but also is preparing for a transition in which **truth** can be **experienced** in its interplay with untruth. Nietzsche’s thinking of the **will to power** seeks its complement in the poetic rendering of homelessness as the flight of the gods. Through this complementarity, the **belonging together** of thinking and poetizing comes to light for the first time.

**INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION** (*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*). This winter semester 1920/21 lecture-course is divided into two parts, an introductory methodological part and a second part devoted to the phenomenological explication of religious **experience**. The second part, focused on the **interpretation** of St. Paul’s eschatological epistles, has become famous. Just before the Christ-

mas break, Heidegger broke off his methodological explanations as a result of objections from students who had complained to the dean about the philosophical faculty over the lack of religious content in the course.

The first part is centered upon the self-understanding of **philosophy**. It springs from the **factic life experience** that is at once both the experiencing activity and that which is receptively experienced. Experiencing and the experienced are interlaced. Factic life experience tends toward the determination of objects and the objective regulation of **life**. By making factic life experience the central **phenomenon** of philosophy, Heidegger raises the possibility of reversing this decadent tendency. After a destruction of Ernst Troeltsch’s philosophy of **religion**, Heidegger clarifies the core phenomenon of the historical, which permeates the **meanings** connecting the three key terms of the course title. These are three ways in which the **present** seeks to protect itself from history: (1) the **Platonic** way, a radical renunciation of the historical; (2) the exact opposite, a radical surrender to history (**Oswald Spengler**); and (3) a compromise between these two extremes (**Wilhelm Dilthey**, Georg Simmel, **Heinrich Rickert**, and Wilhelm Windelband). Heidegger shows that we can only discover the historical in factic life experience through **phenomenological** explication. The direction of this explication is prefigured by **formal indication**.

The second part is a phenomenological explication of primal Christian life experience in conjunction with Paul’s epistles. Through an interpretation of Paul’s epistles to the Galatians, Heidegger obtains access to the **lifeworld** of primal **Christianity**. Christian life is actually factic life experience itself and lives **temporality** as such.

The central phenomenon of Christian life-experience is apostolic proclamation, which takes us to the heart of Paul’s **self-world** in its vital relation to the **environment** and **with-world** of the first congregations. In his interpretation of Paul’s epistles to the Thessalonians, Heidegger focuses his attention on the temporality of Christian religiosity, which is dominated by the deciding **moment** or *kairos* of the Second Coming of Christ.

*See also* PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**INTRODUCTION TO “WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?”** (*Einleitung zu: “Was ist Metaphysik?”*). This text from 1949 is included as an essay in *Pathmarks*, volume 9 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. He contrasts **metaphysics** as the inquiry into **entities** from his own investigation into the **truth of being**. Correlatively, Heidegger shows how **being-there** not only provides an alternative characterization of **humanity** to the description of **consciousness**, but also establishes a new point of **departure** for the investigation first undertaken in *Being and Time* (1927).

Heidegger points out that the prioritizing of **time** opens up a new landscape or topography for investigating the **meaning of being**. The **temporality** of what it means "to be," or alternatively, the **time of being**, points to the challenge of **overcoming metaphysics** as focused exclusively on the generic constitution of entities as entities. Thus, time becomes a provisional name for the truth of being. In this way, Heidegger shows how the time of being yields a new problematic, which undercuts the traditional dichotomies of Being and Becoming, Being and Appearance, Being and Thinking, and Being and the Ought. Heidegger outlines these oppositions or dichotomies in his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1935, *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

**INTUITION (*Anschauung*)**. Heidegger agrees with **Edmund Husserl** that the principle of all principles of **phenomenology** is intuition. This intuition, however, is not some theoretical comportment, as in the **philosophy of Immanuel Kant**, but an understanding or **hermeneutic intuition**. Heidegger transforms Husserl's conception of a phenomenology of pure **consciousness** into a hermeneutic phenomenology. The hermeneutic intuition understands the **world** prior to any theorizing, and the **facticity** of this understanding is the starting point of Heidegger's philosophy.

**INVOLVEMENT (*Bewandtnis*)**. Heidegger adopted **Emil Lask's** alternative term for form in his qualifying dissertation to indicate how a matter is to be viewed. In his summer semester 1925 lecture-course *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, involvement replaces the **structure** and constitution of "sense" to specify the orientation to be taken in **relation** to the other, in accord with the other's involvement with the **world**. In the winter semester 1925/26 course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, the sense of involvement is restricted to define the state of functionality, compliance, and usefulness of **entities** that are **ready-to-hand**. In *Being and Time*, it becomes the very **being** of the ready-to-hand as a **whole** of relations forming the backdrop of world.



# J

**JASPERS, KARL (1883–1969).** Jaspers and Heidegger met for the first time at a birthday party for **Edmund Husserl** in 1919. Their shared love of **Søren Kierkegaard** and Heidegger's review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* brought them together in the "loving struggle" of friendship. Their long philosophical discussions at Jaspers's house, where Heidegger stayed as often as possible, led them to join forces in their struggle against the **philosophy** of the university professors and form a battle community. The end of World War I signified the end of 19th-century culture and philosophy. Heidegger and Jaspers both saw the necessity of a university reform, which in turn would lead to a political revolution. In his famous talk on the calling of **science**, Max Weber made clear that science had no answer to offer to the most important questions of human life: What would we do; how should we live?

The philosophical starting point of Heidegger and Jaspers was existence or personal life. From this point of view they set off in different directions. Heidegger followed Husserl and his project of philosophy as a rigorous science. He developed a new concept of science that makes possible a scientific answer to our most important and intimate questions. **Phenomenology** could provide insight into the **facticity** of our lives, since **meaningfulness** is given with the bare **fact** of our **existence**. Jaspers, on the other hand, followed Kierkegaard and tried to illuminate existence by way of **boundary situations**. He had the feeling that Husserl's concept of phenomenology as a rigorous science denied the possibility of philosophy in the sense that it was meaningful to him. The philosophical conversations of Heidegger and Jaspers would never reach the ideal of loving struggle for which Jaspers had hoped. It would, however, take them a long time to bring their philosophical differences to light. Their **dialogue** would gradually lapse into separate monologues because they hardly ever studied each other's writings.

In light of his later critique of Heidegger, it is noteworthy that Jaspers agreed with much of the content of Heidegger's rectoral address. In 1933, they were both convinced of the need for radical renewal, and both were fascinated by the *Führer* principle. The current situation had opened up

extraordinary **possibilities** that would never return again, although Jaspers, contrary to Heidegger, also saw the extreme danger. Heidegger stayed with Jaspers for the last time from 30 June until 1 July. Their correspondence broke off with Heidegger's four-page letter of 16 May 1936. When Jaspers was forced to retire from the University of Heidelberg in 1937, Heidegger failed him badly, and the gulf that opened up between them could never be closed again. They continued to send each other their publications until the outbreak of World War II. In 1939, the former friends broke off all contact.

In 1945, Heidegger asked Professor Friedrich Oehlkers, a member of the de-Nazification committee, to ask Jaspers about Heidegger's supposed anti-Semitism. In reply, Jaspers wrote a negative report that would ultimately lead to Heidegger's forced retirement without license to teach.

In 1949, Jaspers wrote to Heidegger in an effort to resume communication between them. "There was something between us which bound us together. I cannot believe it has been extinguished. The time seems ripe, so I turn myself to you in the hope that you will join me in the wish to exchange a word." Heidegger answered: "That you have written is to me a great joy." He went on to explain that he had stopped his visits in 1933 because he was ashamed and not because Jaspers's wife was Jewish. However, their attempts to resume their friendship were doomed to fail. Heidegger simply could not explain his involvement with **National Socialism** to Jaspers's satisfaction and seemed incapable of assuming full responsibility for his actions and words under the Nazi regime. Heidegger also rejected Jaspers's notion of collective guilt. He was no war criminal, and therefore he saw no need for a public discussion of his **rectorate** and acts during the Nazi period.

**JOINTURE (*Fuge*).** Jointure is Heidegger's **translation** of the Greek *dikè*. It plays a prominent part in his interpretation of *phusis* and *logos*. *Phusis* is the coming-to-pass of *alètheia*, **unconcealment**. In the **clearing** of the self-revealing **concealment of being, entities** are gathered together into an ordered collection. This is only possible when the gathering (*logos*) is at the time a joining (*Fügung*), which terminates in a jointure that is an articulated **whole**.

The term "jointure" is crucial to Heidegger's description of the unique composition of his text *Contributions to Philosophy*. Rather than being constructed upon the traditional model of a philosophical system, Heidegger emphasizes that *Contributions to Philosophy* is composed of six "joinings," the tension of which facilitates the **saying of be-ing** (*Seyn*), that is, the nuanced **language of being-historical thinking**.

**JOINTURE OF BEING (*Fuge des Seins*).** In his *Letter on “Humanism,”* Heidegger emphasizes the reciprocal **relation** between the **coming to presence** of **entities** and the unique manner in which they appear by virtue of the capacity of **being-there** to **let be**. This point of intersection is the jointure of being. The jointure of being also yields the **grounding** within **entities** for the endeavors that **being-there** undertakes under the heading of **building, dwelling, and thinking**.

**JOY (*Freude*).** In comparison with Heidegger’s emphasis on such basic **moods** as **anxiety** and **boredom**, the human **experience** of joy receives little attention. Curiously, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger singles out the **self’s** liberation in accepting the **possibility** of its **death** as one such instance of joy. Another instance occurs in *What Is Metaphysics?*, in which Heidegger identifies the joy that **being-there** experiences upon confronting the uniqueness of the other (person). It is safe to say that Heidegger stands far afield from the utilitarian search for “happiness” as an ultimate good in its own right.

**JUDGMENT (*Urteil*).** The doctrine of judgment runs like a continuous thread throughout Heidegger’s lecture-courses. It was the topic of his 1914 dissertation, in which he supported **Edmund Husserl’s** rejection of **psychologism**. In his early lecture-course in **Freiburg**, Heidegger worked out a **destruction** of the traditional doctrine of judgment as the place of **truth**. He shows that the famous definition of truth as the correspondence between the intellect and the object (*veritas est adaequation intellectus et rei*) is a misunderstanding of **Aristotle’s** doctrine of truth. The truth of judgment signifies that it uncovers the **entity** as it is in itself. It lets the entity be seen in its uncoveredness. The being true of judgment is being-uncovering, but this in turn is **ontologically** possible only on the basis of **being-in-the-world**. Being-true is a **way of being** for **being-there**. The **disclosedness** of being-there is the condition of the **possibility** of truth.

In Heidegger’s **philosophy** after *Being and Time*, the emphasis shifts from the disclosedness of being-there to the **clearing** of **being**. He distinguishes now between the original Greek **understanding** of truth as **unconcealment (*alètheia*)** that was expressed in the fundamental sayings of **Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus**, on the one hand, and **Plato** and Aristotle’s logical understanding of truth as correctness, on the other. Aristotle’s doctrine of truth now becomes the **origin** of the correspondence theory of truth.

*See also* ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*); PLATO’S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*).

**JÜNGER, ERNST (1895–1998).** Heidegger developed his concept of **technology** in constant dialogue with Jünger's writings, especially *The Worker*, *Dominion and Gestalt*, and *Total Mobilization*. He found in these writings a discussion of the nature of technology and **nihilism**, on the one hand, and a fundamental understanding of **Friedrich Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will**, on the other. Jünger's writings strongly influenced Heidegger's **interpretation of National Socialism**. Throughout the 1930s, he discussed Jünger's writings with circles of like-minded associates. Heidegger and Jünger became personal friends. After the end of World War II, Heidegger encouraged Jünger to reprint *The Worker*. Heidegger's most extensive commentary on Jünger is the essay *On the Question of Being*.



# K

**KAIROS.** In the **factive life experience** of primal **Christianity**, *kairos* refers to the **moment** of the Second Coming of Christ. The whole community lives in the **anticipation** of the decisive moment in history. Nobody knows when this moment will occur, although it is certain that it will come. Heidegger contrasts this nonobjective **experience of time** with the scientific conception of time as a series of **nows**.

In his reading of **Aristotle**, Heidegger finds both experiences of time. In his *Nicomachean Ethics VI*, Aristotle shows that our temporally particular **situation** admits of no absolute and once-and-for-all norm. As each situation is new, we must think anew and act anew. The right middle of passion and action is hard to find and easy to miss. This is why it is hard to be good. The end of action varies according to the *kairos* or the proper moment. In action we seek the *kairos*, that is, feeling and acting at the right time, for the right purpose and in the right manner.

In *Physics IV*, Aristotle develops another **understanding** of time as a series of nows. This objective understanding of time would determine the history of the concept of time until **Edmund Husserl**. In *Being and Time*, the moment of insight (*Augenblick*) and **decision** constitutes a Kierkegaardian elaboration of the *kairos*. Heidegger later identifies the term *Augenblick* as **Søren Kierkegaard**'s most prescient insight.

**KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804).** The neo-Kantian **Heinrich Rickert** introduced Heidegger to Kant's **philosophy** when he was still a student at the University of **Freiburg**. Kant's influence on his thought remained marginal until the lecture-course from the winter semester 1925/26, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, and his seminar on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the winter semester of 1927/28. In the doctrine of **schematism** of the productive **imagination**, Kant had discovered the rudimentary connection of our most incipient **understanding of being** with **time** and glimpsed a more primordial **origin for temporality**. The productive imagination is the capacity of finite **human beings**, which puts them in touch with the dynamics of their **existence**. Although Kant can be seen to **shrink back** (*Zürückweichen*) from this

fusion of being and time, he became the leading figure in Heidegger's **phenomenological destruction** of the history of **ontology**. It is not surprising that *Being and Time* receives a Kantian overlay and impetus.

Heidegger's **interpretation** of Kant culminates in his famous book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. As Heidegger began to rethink the task of *Being and Time*, he ceased to focus his destruction of ontology upon Kant. Although **Friedrich Hölderlin** and **Friedrich Nietzsche** would emerge at the forefront, Heidegger would return time and again to Kant's philosophy.

*See also* GERMAN IDEALISM: FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL AND THE CONSTELLATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT (*Der deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling Hegel und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*); KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AND THE TASK OF A LAYING OF THE GROUND FOR METAPHYSICS (*Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik*); KANT'S THESIS ABOUT BEING (*Kants These über das Sein*); ON ODEBRECHT'S AND CASSIRER'S CRITIQUE OF THE KANTBOOK (*Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuches*); ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (*Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*); PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON" (*Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'*); QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS** (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*). Heidegger presented the essentials of his reading of **Immanuel Kant** for the first time during his winter semester 1927/28 lecture-course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."* The Kant-book (*Kantbuch*) is of great importance for the development of his thought, because it takes up and extends several themes suggested in *Being and Time*. We can consider the book a version of the promised **destruction** of Kant's **schematism** and doctrine of **time** in the never-published second part of *Being and Time*.

The starting point of Heidegger's **interpretation** is his claim that Kant's central problem is the **possibility** of **metaphysics**. *The Critique of Pure Reason* is an attempt to provide metaphysics with a foundation. Heidegger rejects the influential neo-Kantian reading of the first *Critique* as a theory of knowledge. Kant's problem is **fundamental ontology** as an **ontological** analytic of the **finitude**, which is to prepare the **ground** for the metaphysics that belongs to human nature. Heidegger's book consists of four parts.

In the first part, *The Starting Point for the Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics*, Heidegger asks the question: Why did the problem of the laying of the ground for metaphysics become a critique of pure reason? For Kant, metaphysics is the fundamental science of **entities** as such and in the **whole**. Through his celebrated Copernican revolution, the question concerning the possibility of **ontic** knowledge reverts into the question concerning the possibility of ontology itself. This means we must ask how it is possible that our synthetic a priori knowledge of entities is connected with the human knower's capacity for transcending or "**passing over**" to the entities themselves. When we ask about our **understanding of being** that springs from **transcendence**, we philosophize in a **transcendental** way.

The second part, *Carrying Out the Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics*, is a discussion of Kant's elucidation of the finitude of human knowledge as receptive **intuition** in contrast to creating infinite intuition of **God**. Finite intuition occurs in reciprocity with pure understanding (*Verstand*). Heidegger interprets Kant's transcendental **imagination** as **temporality** and claims that it is the common root of the two stems of knowledge: intuition and understanding. When intuition and understanding are joined together by the imagination, ontological knowledge becomes possible. It refers to an opening up of a pure **horizon** within which entities can present themselves and be represented by **being-there**.

The third part, *The Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics in Its Originality*, is an extensive interpretation of Kant's doctrine of transcendental imagination. First, Heidegger shows that the transcendental imagination, through its schematizing of the pure concepts or categories, enables the finite knower to determine the constitution of physical objects. Through its temporal synthesis, the transcendental knowledge unifies the human capacity to know, thereby providing the **ground** of theoretical reason in its finitude. Through a succinct exposition, Heidegger then shows analogously that the transcendental imagination also provides the ground for moral or practical reason. Moral reason requires the integration of the spontaneity by which it legislates the moral law with the receptivity by which the practical **self** submits to the authority of this law through the feeling of respect (*Achtung*). The synthesizing, temporalizing power of the imagination defines the receptive spontaneity and the spontaneous receptivity, which both unifies and delimits human reason in its totality. Heidegger argues, however, that Kant stopped short of seizing upon this insight into this radical role of the imagination. Instead, he "shrank back" from this unknown root of the essential constitution of being-there in favor of reaffirming the supremacy of reason (*Vernunft*). As a result, Kant was unable to think the **primordial time** original temporality of transcendental imagination. He failed to recognize time as the enabling ground of the finitude of human **subjectivity** as a whole.

At the conclusion of Part Three, Heidegger outlines the temporal character of the **I** as pure-self-affection, that is, as inducing and forming the dynamic of primordial time in its temporalizing. In traversing this temporal arc, the self originates primordially as an act of transcendence; thus, the Kantian, transcendental I is redefined more fundamentally through its **ecstatic** (*ekstatisch*) constitution.

At this stage of his interpretation, Heidegger makes an important breakthrough. He establishes how primordial time originates ecstatically, in and through the self, that is, prior to its derivative role in determining the sequence of the appearance of objects “within time.” Through his radical **interpretation** of transcendental philosophy, Heidegger shows that Kant’s insight into the **equiprimordiality** of the self and the schematism of its predicates suggests that temporality makes possible any understanding of the **being of entities**. Through his destructive-retrieval of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Heidegger thereby arrives at the key clue that time (*Zeit*) and being (*Sein*) are inextricably linked; hence the **meaning of being** must be understood and projected upon the ecstatic backdrop provided by temporality. Heidegger justifies the **violence** of his interpretation by uncovering the **unsaid** dimension of Kant’s thought, of what he “intended to say.” Specifically, his laying of the ground of metaphysics houses the more original problematic of “being and time.”

The fourth part, *The Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics in Its Retrieval*, provides an important linchpin to the overall aim of Heidegger’s project of (1) addressing hidden reciprocity between being and time, which has remained hidden throughout the philosophical tradition, and (2) destroying that tradition or unraveling the false premises on which it rests. Heidegger outlines a basic ambiguity that arises with the inception of **Greek philosophy**, namely, that being is understood through a single dimension of time, the present, and thereby **thematized** in terms of a concept of permanent or constant **presence** (*ousia*). By understanding being uncritically in terms of the **present**, the Greeks take the first step in distorting the **meaning of being** as a fixed and static mode of reality. Inadvertently, the ancients, most notably **Plato** and **Aristotle**, initiate a second misunderstanding; they employ a derivative concept of being as permanent or constant presence as the false premise for conceiving time exclusively as a **mode** of the present. No preliminary attempt, however, is made to question time in terms of its **origin** in ecstatic temporality. As a result, subsequent philosophy succumbs to a false dichotomy of conceiving of time either as the continual presence of eternity or as the transitoriness of a sequence of moments.

By outlining the roots of this conundrum, Heidegger exposes the origin of the **forgottenness of being** as a double error of (1) neglecting the necessary link between being and time and (2) neglecting to address time as the ecstatic transcendence of human finitude that originates from the **future**, returns

from the **past**, and opens up into the present. By marking the origin of the forgottenness of being, Heidegger points to the significance of the title of the proposed third division of *Being and Time* or “Time and Being.” The **errancy** of metaphysics can only be overcome by considering neither being nor time separately, as the ancients did, but instead by prioritizing time’s reciprocity with being. The **retrieval** of the problematic of temporality hidden in Kant’s thought would contribute to overcoming this errancy, as the first step in the proposed destruction of the history of ontology.

An expanded and slightly amended 5th edition of *Kant and Problem of Metaphysics* appeared as volume 3 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition** in 1991. This volume was based on the 4th edition, the publication of which Heidegger oversaw in 1973. In their historical context, the “Preface to the First Edition” (1929), “Preface to the Second Edition” (1950), “Prefatory Note to the Third Edition” (1965), and “Preface to the Fourth Edition” (1973), along with the composition of the six appendixes, are worth noting given the larger import and impact of the work.

Heidegger’s preliminary remarks, and the inclusion of additional material in the appendixes, help to situate his controversial destructive-retrieval of transcendental philosophy, the reception of his **interpretation** within the larger philosophical community, and his appraisal of the development of his **thinking** over several decades. In the “Preface to the First Edition,” Heidegger dedicates his work “to the memory of **Max Scheler**.” In the “Preface to the Second Edition,” Heidegger underscores the controversial character of the Kant-book by specifically citing the “**violence** of [his] interpretation” alleged by his critics. In the “Prefatory Note to the Third Edition,” he emphasizes the ambiguous character of the word “problem” in the title of his book, referencing as “supplements” his book *Die Frage nach dem Ding (The Question concerning the Thing)* and his essay *Kants These über das Sein (Kant’s Thesis about Being)*. The “Preface to the Fourth Edition” is perhaps more significant in terms of its philosophical content; it includes notes that Heidegger penned in his own personal copy of the 1st edition (circa mid-1930s). He highlights the importance of the Kant-book as “under way” toward a **destruction** of the history of ontology and draws specific attention to Part IV by referencing his manuscript “*Beiträge*” (*Contributions to Philosophy*) as the “**beginning** of a new beginning.”

Of the six appendixes, four bear directly or indirectly on Heidegger’s exchange with **Ernst Cassirer**. In Appendix I, Heidegger summarizes the leitmotif of the Kant-book, namely, that what is **unsaid** in Kant’s thinking is “filled with riches,” including the centrality of imagination in its synergy with temporality. Among his first publications prior to *Being and Time*, Heidegger wrote a review of Part Two of Cassirer’s *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, which is reprinted in Appendix II. Of special importance is Heidegger’s argument that “mythic being-there” experiences the overwhelming

power of natural and spiritual forces, for example, “mana,” only on the basis of its own **thrownness** into the world. Here he suggests that different cultural accounts of human nature, including those within the sphere of anthropology, presuppose a common thread of **everydayness** and the structures of **being-in-the-world**. Appendix III provides a summary of Heidegger’s second Davos Hochschule in 1929, consisting of three lectures. These lectures correspond to the first three parts of the Kant-book. Appendix IV recapitulates Heidegger’s famous *Davos Disputation* with Cassirer. Appendix V provides Heidegger’s rebuttal to criticisms of his Kant-book by two of his contemporaries, Cassirer and Rudolf Odebrecht. Appendix VI, *On the History of the Philosophical Chair*, was first published in 1927. In this brief essay, Heidegger recounts the development of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism as the “back to Kant” movement through its culmination in Cassirer’s *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.

See also CASSIRER REVIEW, THE (*Die Cassirer-Rezension*); TIME OF BEING (*Zeit des Seins*).

### **KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AND THE TASK OF A LAYING OF THE GROUND FOR METAPHYSICS (*Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik*).**

This text is a summary of Heidegger’s 1929 course at the second Davos Hochschule (Davos Academy) from 17 March until 16 April 1929. This summary is included in the fourth edition of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. The course consisted of three lectures, which correspond with the first three parts of his Kant-book.

Heidegger shows that **Immanuel Kant**, in laying a **ground** for **metaphysics**, was forced to introduce a third basic source of the human mind, the **transcendental** power of **imagination**, to supplement the other two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding (*Verstand*). This third source is the root of the other two. Kant himself “**shrinks back**” from this discovery. Heidegger wants to go further and sees the necessity of a **destruction** of metaphysics. The ground of the **possibility** of metaphysics is **being-there**, and therefore the **existential analysis** of being-there is at the same time the laying of a ground for metaphysics.

**KANT’S THESIS ABOUT BEING (*Kants These über das Sein*).** Heidegger delivered this lecture on 17 May 1961, in Kiel. The lecture later appeared as a contribution to *Existenz und Ordnung*, a Festschrift for Erik Wolf in 1962, and was republished as a separate essay in 1963. In this lecture, Heidegger once again demonstrates that **being** is worthy of thought, albeit remaining within the purview of human **finitude**. The topic of the lecture is **Immanuel Kant**’s famous thesis that being obviously is not a real predicate,

but merely the “positing” of a **thing** with all its predicates. This thesis contains two **assertions**. The first is a negative one, which denies to being the character of a real predicate. The second is positive and characterizes being as “positing,” as the positioning of a thing qua object over against the knowing subject. In this lecture, Heidegger follows Kant’s episodic elucidations of his thesis about being that appear in the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Although it is not a first principle, Kant effects a decisive turn in the history of **metaphysics**. The **question of being** takes a double form in metaphysics: (1) What are **entities**, in general, as entities?; and (2) Which entity is the highest, and in what way? The **onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics** results from the way the **being of entities** manifests itself. Being manifests itself as **ground**. In Kant’s thesis, being is determined as position, that is, a placing and “positing,” which means to establish a ground. In recognizing that “being” is indefinable objectively as mere things, but instead is a dynamic that determines their **mode** of appearance to a finite subject, Kant faintly intimates the **difference** between being and entities.

Kant says that “is” qua mere existence is the absolute positing of a thing. Existence is such a simple concept that we can say “**nothing**” by way of unfolding it. Heidegger remarks that Kant thinks of “existence” and “being” in relation to the capacities of our cognitive understanding (*Verstand*). Our “positing” of a thing as an object is only possible if something is given to “position” or “place” it in relation to our finite **subjectivity**, that is, via an act of sensory intuition. Positing has the character of a proposition, whereby something is placed before us *as* something. The “is” of the copula intends the objective unity of apperception. Being and unity belong together. This original synthetic unity of **transcendental** apperception makes possible the **being of entities** as the **objectivity** of objects.

Heidegger points out that Kant never questions his guiding thread that it is possible for being and its **modes** to be determined from their relation to our cognition. “Being and thinking” is the main title for the **interpretation** of the being of entities. For Kant, **thinking** means **representational** thinking that posits and judges.

In the section on the postulates of empirical thought in general in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant determines being in its modalities, that is, being actual and being necessary, as a transcendental predicate. Because being in its modalities is thought of as a predicate, being is still a positing. Thought determines the modalities of being and positing. These determinations are discovered in a reflection (*Reflexion*). Being is positing; thinking is reflection. Kant thus elucidates the relation between positing and reflection.

Heidegger now asks what the “and” in “being and thinking” means. According to the famous saying of **Parmenides**, being and thinking are the same or identical. In **Greek philosophy**, being is that which grants **presence**.

Being appears as **presencing**. Here the concealed relation between being and **time** faintly appears. Thus, it becomes clear that the guiding title of metaphysics, “Being and Thinking,” does not really pose the question of being. For Kant, the **belonging together** of being and thinking, like the **difference** between being and entities, remains **unthought**.

Throughout this essay, Heidegger brings his appropriation of Kant’s thought into the wider orbit of **being-historical thinking**. Heidegger accentuates the differences that separate his thinking from Kant’s and thereby allows for a **dialogue** between them to occur.

**KÄSTNER, ERHART (1904–74)**. Kästner attended Heidegger’s 1950 lecture on the **thing** in Munich. They soon became close friends and met each other regularly. They shared a love of **poetry** and Greece. Kästner got Heidegger elected as a member of the Prussian Academy of Fine Arts in 1957. He also arranged Heidegger’s trip to Greece in 1962 and later convinced him to grant an interview to *Der Spiegel*, which was published posthumously.

*See also* THING, THE (*Das Ding*).

**KEEPING SILENT** (*schweigen*). In *Being and Time*, discourse is the articulation of **meaning** and belongs to the **disclosedness** of **being-there**. **Discourse** involves communication when it uses **language** as a tool but is not necessarily a matter of speaking. We can sometimes express our **understanding** of something most effectively by keeping silent. Silence belongs to the disclosedness of discourse, because it enables us to hear and grasp the understanding we communicate to each other.

*See also* RETICENCE IN SILENCE (*Sigetik*).

**KIERKEGAARD, SØREN (1813–55)**. Kierkegaard is one of the hidden influences on Heidegger’s early thought. It is remarkable that Heidegger wrote so little on Kierkegaard. **Karl Jaspers**’s *Psychology of Worldviews* first awakened Heidegger’s interest in the Danish philosopher. In *Being and Time*, Kierkegaard is one of Heidegger’s sources for the **phenomenology** of **anxiety** and **fear** as **moods**, on the one hand, and of the **moment** as an **ecstasy** of **temporality**, on the other.

Within the context of **being-historical thinking**, Heidegger revisits Kierkegaard’s thought from a more critical perspective. In *Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics* (1941), Heidegger points to the juxtaposing of Kierkegaard and **Nietzsche** as two thinkers who are joined together in the end and **completion of metaphysics** despite their diverging convictions concerning faith. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche become mired in anthropological conceptions of what it means to be human, which remain embedded in **meta-**



**physics** as the **forgottenness of being**. Thus, Heidegger maintains that with his notion of human existence, Kierkegaard still remains trapped within the metaphysics of **subjectivity**.

**KNOWING-AWARENESS (*Wissen*)**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger points to a way of achieving philosophical knowledge through a **grounding attunement to be-ing** (*Seyn*), which allows be-ing to speak without converting it into an object of cognition. Knowing-awareness develops an appreciation of what is most **question-worthy**. Heidegger distinguishes knowing-awareness from a cognition that imposes **representational** schemes in order to know. Contrary to **representational thinking**, knowing awareness allows be-ing to appear by **letting-be**.

**KREBS, ENGELBERT GUSTAV HANS (1881–1950)**. Heidegger and Krebs met in mid-July 1913 and became friends. In his function as a Roman Catholic priest, Krebs officiated at the marriage ceremony of Martin Heidegger and Elfride Petri in 1917. Krebs profited from Heidegger's knowledge of modern **logic**; his friend could benefit from the wealth of his studies in medieval **philosophy** and **mysticism**. Because he was not familiar with this area, **Heinrich Rickert** asked Krebs to write an evaluation of Heidegger's dissertation, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*. Krebs's response to Heidegger's work was very positive. Their relationship became more distant when Heidegger broke with Catholicism in 1919 and ended in 1923 when he moved to **Marburg**.



# L

**LABORING ANIMAL** (*arbeitende Tier*). In his essay *Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger outlines the transformation in **modernity** in which the classical definition of humanity as the “rational animal” is usurped by a development in which human beings are redefined by their potential to function within an economic system of production and consumption. As **Karl Marx** first envisioned in his critique of capitalism, human beings have the power to transform **nature** by virtue of their productivity, capacity for labor, and willingness to become assimilated within a global workforce. For Heidegger, however, laboring is an outgrowth of the **metaphysics** of the **will to power**, which in turn is rooted in the **abandonment of being**, rather than merely a development within a capitalistic economy. As the laboring animal, humanity becomes as much the victim as the benefactor of **technology**.

*See also* MACHINATION (*Machenschaft*); PRODUCIBILITY (*Machsamkeit*).

**LANGUAGE** (*Sprache*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses language within the framework of his **existential analysis** of **being-there**. Being-there has language. The **human being** is the **entity** that speaks or is capable of *logos*. Heidegger rejects the traditional theory of language, according to which we must understand language in terms of **expression**, symbolic form, or **assertion**, as ways of making known our lived **experiences**. This theory understands language as the expression of **meanings** that are given independent of and prior to language. According to Heidegger, **discourse** is the **existential-ontological** foundation of language. It is the articulation of intelligibility of **being-in-the-world**. The **whole** of meanings is put into **words**. Discourse gets articulated in language. **Hearing** and **keeping silent** are **possibilities** belonging to discursive speech. Hearing is the existential **openness** for the **being-with** of others. Keeping silent is the counterpart of **idle talk** that has lost its relation to the **being** of entities it talks about.

In light of the **turning**, language as discourse does not simply comprise one of the elements of being-there’s **disclosedness**, as Heidegger initially established. Rather, language allows **unconcealment** as such to occur. Lan-

guage is not the expression of a living entity, but instead resides in the **sheltering** of what is **unsaid**. It is the **clearing-concealing** abode of being itself, and as such the **house of being**. In the home provided by language human beings  **dwell**. Human being must be summoned by being before speaking, and assuming the risk that under this **claim** perhaps very little may be said. Language speaks originally, and human beings speak when they respond to its address. Language achieves its completion in **poetry**. In poetry, language invites **things** to gather to themselves **sky** and **earth, mortals** and **divinities**, and thus lets **world** be.

*See also* DIALOGUE ON LANGUAGE, A (*Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache*); LANGUAGE (*Die Sprache*); LANGUAGE IN THE POEM (*Die Sprache im Gedicht*); NATURE OF LANGUAGE, THE (*Das Wesen der Sprache*); WAY TO LANGUAGE, THE (*Der Weg zur Sprache*); WORDS (*Das Wort*).

**LANGUAGE (*Die Sprache*)**. In this 1950 lecture, Heidegger attempts to give an account of the **nature of language**. He rejects the dominant view that language is an activity of **human beings** in which they express their feelings and thoughts. The distinctive character of language is that it speaks (*Die Sprache spricht*). To understand the nature of language we must bring it to its place of **be-ing**, that is, its own gathering unto **enowning**. Language spoken purely is **poetry**. Accordingly, Heidegger approaches language through a poem by Georg Trakl, “A Winter Evening.”

Language speaks, but what is “to speak” in this sense? A poem speaks when it names **entities** in their being. The naming calls and thus brings closer what it calls. The call brings the **presencing** of what was previously uncalled into a **nearness**. Yet in calling it here, the call has already called out to what it calls. The calling calls into itself and therefore always calls here into **presence** and **t/here** into **absence**. When language calls, it bids **things** to come to presence as **sheltered** in absence. Bidding is inviting, and inviting invites things to gather to themselves **sky** and **earth, mortals** and **divinities**. Things called in this way let the **fourfold** stay with them. The gathering is the thinging of things, that is, the unfolding of **world**, in which things abide. Language bids things to come to world and world to come to things. The two **modes** of bidding are different but separated. World and things traverse a middle in which they are one. The intimacy is a **difference**. The intimacy of world and thing is present in the separation of the **between**, that is, the difference. The intimacy of the difference is the unifying element of the *diaphora*. It carries out world in its worlding and things in their thinging. The difference of world and things discloses and appropriates things into bearing a world and world into the granting of things. In the bidding that calls things and world, what is really called is the difference.

The difference keeps world and things in repose. To keep in repose is to still. It is in the double stilling of the difference that stillness takes place. Language speaks as the **ringing of stillness** (*das Geläut der Stille*). Human beings are delivered or **owned over** to language as the reverberation of this stillness. Only because human beings as mortals belong within the ringing of stillness are mortals able to speak. Thus the speech of mortals is also a calling that names and a bidding that bids things and world to come. In its purest form, mortal speech is spoken in the poem. Human beings speak in that they respond to language. Responding is a speaking that listens to the stillness of the difference.

*See also* NATURE OF LANGUAGE, THE (*Das Wesen der Sprache*).

**LANGUAGE IN THE POEM** (*Die Sprache im Gedicht*). In this 1953 essay, Heidegger discusses **Georg Trakl's** poetic work. This discussion is no more than a **thinking** about the **location** that gathers his poetic **saying** into his poetic work. Like every other great poet, Trakl creates his **poetry** out of one single poem, which remains unspoken. Every poem speaks from the **whole** of this single poem and says it, but yet it can never say it all. Heidegger's discussion of Trakl's poetry is a **dialogue** of thinking with poetry that aims to call forth the **nature of language**, so that **mortals** may learn again to live in **language**. In a discussion of selected stanzas, Heidegger discovers the location of Trakl's poetic work: apartness (*Abgeschiedenheit*). The language of his poetry answers to the homecoming of unborn humankind in the quiet **beginning** of its stiller nature. This language sings the song of the homecoming in apartness, which from the lateness of decomposition comes to rest in the earliness of the more still, and still impending, beginning. Trakl is the poet of the yet-concealed evening land.

**LASK, EMIL (1875–1915)**. The importance of Lask for the young Heidegger can scarcely be exaggerated, even though it was a transitory influence. Lask was one of **Heinrich Rickert's** most famous students, whose works Heidegger first came to know through Rickert's seminars. Lask was important to Heidegger for two reasons. First, he tried to listen to the Greek thinkers in his mediation between Rickert and **Edmund Husserl**. Second, Lask played a unique role in appropriating the *Logical Investigations*, because he took up Husserl's contributions in the Sixth Investigation of the second volume. In his *Logik der Philosophie*, Lask was strongly influenced by the sections of the Sixth Investigation on sense intuition and **categorical intuition**, while his *Lehre vom Urteil* was influenced by the sections of the investigation on evidence and **truth**. Lask sought to overcome the limitations of **Immanuel Kant's** transcendental **logic** by giving it an **ontological** grounding in the realm of transcendental, intelligible **validity**. He asserted the

autonomy of what is intelligible, which is performed in acts of **judgment**, and opened Heidegger's eyes to the crucial role of the categorial intuition of **beingness** in Husserl's **phenomenology**.

**LAST GOD, THE (*der letzte Gott*)**. Heidegger develops the concept of the last god in his groundbreaking work *Contributions to Philosophy*. The last god appears as the title marking the culmination of this work, the sixth **jointure** as the gathering point for **thinking** the **truth of being**. The last god pertains equally to the **mystery** of being's **concealment** as the possibility of its **unconcealment**, and hence exemplifies the historical **clearing** presupposed in any religious epiphany or experience of the **divine**.

Given its role in the inception of history, the last god refers neither to the **God** of Christianity nor to the **gods** in general apart from any religious tradition. Instead, the last god defines the possibility of any appearance of the **holy** or, conversely, its **absence** and refusal. As such, the last god marks the entire trajectory of the "flight and arrival" of the gods, and thus the possibility of the inception of **history** as such. In section 256 of *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes the last god as demarcating the **other beginning** of "immeasurable **possibilities** for our history." There are **hints** of the last god in the **turning** and in the **resoluteness** and **sacrifice** by which individual **human beings** prepare for the other beginning.

Heidegger emphasizes that the last god precedes any characterization of religious belief, including theism and polytheism, or nonbelief, including atheism and agnosticism. The last god makes explicit the priority of **being's** historical clearing, on which the appearance or nonappearance of any religious epiphany depends.

*See also* RELIGION (*Religion*).

**LAW (*Gesetz*)**. For the most part, Heidegger forgoes any appeal to law and lawfulness. Yet lawfulness can also spring from the reciprocity between **being** and **being-there**, such that the former commands the latter to **let be** all that is. In *Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger speaks of the "inviolable law of the **possible**," which directs being-there into the **openness**. In this essay, he also refers to the "law of the earth" to describe the place of refuge or **sheltering** where **mortals** can **dwell** apart from the destructive forces of **technology**. Language also exhibits its own unique form of lawfulness. In *On the Question of Being*, Heidegger suggests that the **word** displays lawfulness, insofar as its creativity is bound by the **freedom** to let be.

For Heidegger, the relation of the law to the political remains an underlying question. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger suggests that the political rests upon the **possibility** of a **people's** discovering its freedom to be bound by law.

**LEADERSHIP (*Führerschaft*)**. This term that became prominent in the year of Heidegger's **rectorate** (1933–34). In his two lecture-courses during that period, published as *Being and Truth*, he emphasizes the “urgent need” for leadership through a questioning that returns to the **ground** of **philosophy** and goes against the prevalent conventions. While such references harbor a distinctly philosophical **meaning**, they also mark his closest alliance to the politics of **National Socialism** and to the *Führer* principle.

**LEAP (*Sprung*)**. Heidegger mentions **Paul Natorp**'s wordplay on the **origin** as primal leap (*Ursprung*) in his war emergency semester 1919 lecture-course, *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, before using the metaphor of the leap in *Being and Time*. In **curiosity**, the **making present** leaps away from the **thing** that is present to what is coming next. In **solicitude**, **being-there** can leap-in for the other and take away its **care**. It can also leap-ahead of the other in its “**existentiell**” **can-be**, in order to give care back to the individual as an opportunity for choosing oneself. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasizes that the **hermeneutic circle** can only be accessed through a leap by which the inquirer embraces the presupposition of his/her own **existence**, as the premise for undertaking the larger task of investigating the **meaning of being**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger points to the occurrence of **enowning** in order to identify the very source and **prime leap** (*Ur-Sprung*) of the dynamic relationship between being and being-there. In the third **jointure**, *Leap (Sprung)*, he makes it clear that the **other beginning of thinking** is accessible only through a leap of thought into the **truth of being** itself.

*See also* LEAPING-OFF (*Absprung*).

**LEAPING-OFF (*Absprung*)**. Heidegger employs this term in Part IV of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) to describe the **projection** of a new **horizon** of inquiry. Leaping-off is an initiative, which seeks out and enters into a new trajectory for understanding **being**. As becomes evident in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), the **abground** provides the point of departure for such a leaping-off, that is, by shaping the trajectory of **thrownness** by which **thinking** enters the tension between **concealment** and **unconcealment**. Within this text, the motif of a **leap** (*Sprung*) assumes special importance by defining a key **moment** in the enactment of **being-historical thinking**.

**LECTURES AND ESSAYS** (*Vorträge und Aufsätze*). This collection, which Heidegger first published in 1954, includes some of his most important contributions and writings from 1936 to 1953. It now comprises volume 7 of his **Complete Edition**. *Building Dwelling Thinking* and *Overcoming Metaphysics* are among the foremost essays included in this volume.

Most notably, Heidegger undertakes the task of **being-historical thinking**, that is, by outlining the **history of metaphysics** as the **forgottenness of being** (*Seinsvergessenheit*), on the one hand, and seeking to redirect **philosophy** toward the **other beginning**, on the other.

**LEEWAY** (*Spiel-Raum*). See PLAY-SPACE (*Spiel-Raum*).

**LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM (1646–1716)**. Heidegger's **interpretation** of Leibniz was very important for his exposition of the modern **metaphysics of subjectivity**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger discusses Leibniz's definition of **substance** as force and the latter as **representation**. The monad is determined by representation in its double **meaning** of *perceptio* and *appetitus*. The *perceptio* signifies any interior spontaneous expression or representation of the universe. Both are types of presentation or proposing: *perceptio* represents the universe; *appetitus* proposes the perfection of **life** toward which the monad strives. Leibniz thus anticipated both **Friedrich Nietzsche's** philosophy of the **will to power** (force) and the modern **philosophy of worldviews**, which depicts the **world** as a presentation of the subject.

See also METAPHYSICS AS HISTORY OF BEING (*Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins*); PRINCIPLE OF REASON, THE (*Der Satz vom Grund*).

**LETTER ON "HUMANISM"** (*Brief über den "Humanismus"*). Heidegger wrote this letter in the fall of 1946 in reply to three questions posed by the French philosopher **Jean Beaufret**: (1) How can we restore **meaning** to the concept of **humanism**? (2) How can we determine the relation of **ontology** to a possible ethics? and (3) How can we preserve the element of adventure that all research contains without simply turning **philosophy** into an adventure? Although he only discusses the first question at length, this letter is an important path marker in Heidegger's way of **thinking**. In it he rethinks some of the main points of *Being and Time* in light of the **turning** and tries to move beyond **metaphysics**.

Heidegger rejects the term humanism because it remains tied to the metaphysical conception of **human being** as a rational animal. This conception fails to take into account the turning relation of **be-ing** (*Seyn*) to **being-there**. Heidegger defines the existence of human being as ecstatic **openness**, that is,



standing in the light of **being**. The difference between his thinking and **Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism** is that while Sartre is dealing with a level where there are principally human beings, Heidegger is dealing with a level where there is principally being.

Being-there exists in the "there" of being as the **clearing**. The being of the "there" has the **structure** of existence, that is, taking a stance within the **truth of being**. The **existentials, projection, thrownness, fallenness, care** and **historicality** determine being-there. Since in the **unconcealment of entities** being refuses itself at the same time, being remains hidden as **destiny**. **Errancy** belongs to the innermost dynamic of **truth**. This also means that the **forgottenness of being** in the history of metaphysics is due primarily to being itself. Only when we heed the destiny of being is there a chance of experiencing the "saving grace." This thinking of being has to take into account that being conceals its truth in revealing itself as the **being of entities**, since being is not an entity. This negating **moment** of being belongs to being as the dynamic of **reservedness** or the preservation of its **mystery**. The thinking of being must heed the **silence** of this **nothing** and proceed along the path of **language**, because language is the **house of being**. The coming to pass of *alètheia* among entities is entrusted to being-there. Being-there should guard truth, serve as a steward, and be the **shepherd of being**.

Thinking lets being be when it unfolds the relation **between** being and being-there. Like language, thinking is a response to the **address of being**. Language comes into its own when it becomes a **saying** of being. When this happens, being-there is **dwelling** in the house of being. All true and essential thinking is a saying of being. Thinking as such is bound to the unconcealment of being, to being as unconcealment.

*See also ORIGINAL ETHICS (ursprüngliche Ethik).*

**LETTER TO FATHER WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, S.J. (*Brief an Pater William J. Richardson*).** Heidegger's response to a query from William J. Richardson, SJ, was first published as the foreword to his book *Heidegger: From Phenomenology through Thought* in 1963. This letter, which Heidegger composed in Freiburg in early April 1962, has been republished in Volume 11 (*Identität und Differenz*) of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**.

In retrospect, the "letter" takes on historical importance for two distinct but related reasons. First, as a response to Richardson's proposal of distinguishing stages in the development of Heidegger's **philosophy** (a so-called Heidegger I versus a Heidegger II), Heidegger indicates there is no essential shift of viewpoint from "early" to "later," but only the singleness of the **question of being** itself. Heidegger thereby emphasizes that his own characterization of a **turning (Kehre)** pertains to a transformation of how thinking both addresses and "is addressed" by **being**, rather than a "rever-

sal” of viewpoints that constitutes the abandonment of his “earlier” phenomenological exposition of **being-there** in favor of a “later” meditation on the **truth of being**. Second, the publication of the “letter” in 1963 spearheaded a controversy in the scholarship on Heidegger’s philosophy, which continues to rage today, regarding the unity of Heidegger’s thought and the import of the “turning.”

The posthumous publication of Heidegger’s seminal text, *Contributions to Philosophy*, clarifies the root of the confusion stemming from Richardson’s query by characterizing the **turning in enowning** as a **turning relation** of be-ing and man. This characterization forecloses any subjective portrayal of the “turning” as a “reversal” of an “earlier” viewpoint by a “later” one. When the issue is cast in this light, it becomes evident that Heidegger had all along tried to circumvent any such misunderstanding when he cited a passage from his lecture-course from the winter semester 1937/38, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, which prepared the way for the text of *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). In this lecture-course, Heidegger states that these ways of inquiry—in which provisionally “we are questioning man in relation to **being**” (as the entry point into **ontology**), and in the turning, “we are questioning being and its truth in relation to man”—are the “same.”

**LETTING BE (*sein lassen*).** **Being-there** stands in a relationship to **entities**, as well as **being**, that is ultimately reciprocal. Being-there does not create entities, but allows them to become manifest in a manner proper to their being. Heidegger calls this act of allowing entities to manifest themselves letting be. In *Being and Time*, letting be occurs in the **everyday** manner by which being-there allows entities to be encountered as items of equipment within the larger context of the **world**.

**LETTING-BE (*Sein-lassen*).** In Heidegger’s essay *On the Essence of Truth* (1930), letting-be defines the fundamental enactment of **truth** in which **being-there** is simultaneously engaged in projecting forth and yielding to the **openness**, within which the manifestation of entities can first occur. He employs the hyphenated form of the term in order to highlight the interdependence between **freedom** and openness. Letting-be defines freedom, not as an expression of the **will**, but rather as an engagement with, and participation in, openness. The complete synergy between truth as **unconcealment** and letting-be becomes explicit in Heidegger’s description of **releasement**.

**LETTING BE SEEN (*sehen lassen*).** Letting be seen is the way in which the investigation into **being** allows the **phenomenon** to show itself or ultimately appear in **language**. Heidegger defines the activity of letting be seen

in outlining the formal conception of **phenomenology** in Chapter One of his introduction to *Being and Time*. There are two components of phenomenology: the phenomenon and letting be seen. Returning to the Greek etymology of the term, letting be seen pertains to the *logos*. In allowing the phenomenon to show itself, the activity of letting be seen does not impose linguistic structures, but instead develops expressions and idioms in concert with the singularity of what becomes manifest throughout the phenomenological inquiry into the **meaning of being**.

*See also* LETTING SHINE FORTH (*Erscheinenlassen*).

**LETTING ENCOUNTER (*begegnen-lassen*)**. Even entities that come to be known, for example, as objects, must first appear in relation to the knower. The knower allows the objects to appear as objects in a reciprocal act of letting encounter. The letting encounter entails that the knower **who** I am participates in the **play-space** through which the manifestation of entities first becomes possible. Heidegger emphasizes this dynamic of letting encounter in his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, in order to illustrate the mutual entrance of the knower and its object within the intermediary zone of **openness**, or the **between** (*Zwischen*). This dynamic of letting encounter provides the ontological **ground** for the synthetic a priori knowledge of objects, which **Immanuel Kant** outlines in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

**LETTING SHINE FORTH (*Erscheinenlassen*)**. Letting shine forth distinguishes how **human beings** participate in the **clearing** (*Lichtung*). Through this participation, human beings let shine **being** in its potential for appearance, that is, as a **phenomenon** in its own right capable of showing itself. In using this term, Heidegger recalls his formal conception of **phenomenology** in the introduction to *Being and Time* as the letting be seen (*logos*) of the phenomenon in its unique manifestation. Specific endeavors in which human beings engage, for example, **thinking**, are reserved for this creative **venture** of letting shine forth. The need to let shine forth, however, stems from the deepest recesses of the **mystery** of being. Through **language** we can address this mystery, and be addressed by it, but its depths can never be exhausted even by the simplest and purest **sayings**, for example, through the poetic **word**. In this regard, the power of letting shine forth serves notice to “the finitude of the matter of thinking” (*die Endlichkeit der Sache des Denkens*).

Within the context of **being-historical-thinking**, the endeavor of letting shine forth honors **Heraclitus**’s self-description of the philosopher as the one called the “obscure” or the “opaque,” despite dwelling in the light.

*See also* LIGHTNING-ALIKENESS (*Blitzartigkeit*).

**LEVINAS, IMMANUEL (1905–95).** Levinas was a French philosopher of Jewish Lithuanian heritage, who became one of Heidegger’s foremost critics. As a student, Levinas attended Heidegger’s pivotal *Davos Disputation* with **Ernst Cassirer** in 1929. In 1931, Levinas became a French citizen, eventually emerging as one of the most innovative minds in the development of **phenomenology**. Levinas criticized Heidegger on two fronts: (1) for subordinating ethics to **ontology** and (2) for failing to recognize the “other” (person) as the fulcrum of moral responsibility and obligation.

Levinas developed a phenomenological ethics that was centered on the **possibility** of heeding the “face” of the “other,” as the focus for eliciting compassion from the **self**. Correlatively, the self is not defined as an individual subject, but instead is constituted through its **relation** to and capacity to respond to the other. Levinas’s foremost works include *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Along with **Jacques Derrida**, Levinas developed **phenomenology** in a postmetaphysical direction, sparking a **conversation** about the importance of ethics.

*See also* LOVE (*Liebe*).

**LIFE (*Leben*).** Life is one of the early **formal indications** of the lifelong topic of Heidegger’s **philosophy: being**. In his 1919 lecture-course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, he defines **phenomenology** as the investigation of life itself. **Intentionality** and **meaningfulness** determine the **facticity** of life. In its being, life has an **understanding of being**. Heidegger later replaced the formal indication of life with the historical and/or **situation-I, factic life experience, facticity, being-in-the-world, and finally being-there**.

*See also* LIFE PHILOSOPHY (*Lebensphilosophie*); LIFEWORLD (*Lebenswelt*); LIVED EXPERIENCE (*Erlebnis*).

**LIFE PHILOSOPHY (*Lebensphilosophie*).** Life philosophy was a late-19th-century philosophical movement that was inspired by **Søren Kierkegaard** and **Friedrich Nietzsche**. **Henri Bergson** and **Wilhelm Dilthey** became its main representatives. The starting point of life philosophy is that life expresses and understands itself immediately in **lived experiences**, which can be understood in **hermeneutics** (Dilthey) or biology (Bergson). According to Dilthey, **historicality** determines human life. His influence on Heidegger’s early thought was very profound and far-reaching.

**LIFEWORLD (*Lebenswelt*).** Since **life** is determined by its being out-toward or **intentionality**, it always finds itself in a **world**. In his early lecture-courses in **Freiburg**, Heidegger calls the different worlds in which we already find ourselves lifeworlds. He differentiates among scientific, aesthetic,

ethical, and religious lifeworlds, which motivate our behavior in different ways. We can only understand life in its **facticity** from its specific lifeworld. The teleological dispersal of **values** constituted by a plurality of lifeworlds must eventually be returned to the values' archaeological **origin** in the **self-world**, which is simultaneously the with-world-around-us.

**LIGHTNING-ALIKENESS (*Blitzartigkeit*)**. Heidegger employs this term to describe the flash of light that both illuminates and radiates from the **clearing** (*Lichtung*). He refers to the **turning** as a momentary flashing of the clearing, in which **being** appears through the light of **unconcealment**, having previously withdrawn in its **forgottenness** into the darkness of **concealment**.

*See also* TURNING, THE (*Die Kehre*).

**LIMIT SITUATION (*Grenzsituation*)**. *See* BOUNDARY SITUATION (*Grenzsituation*).

**LIVED EXPERIENCE (*Erlebnis*)**. Human **life** is lived experience. The basic **structure** of lived experience is **intentionality**. In his early lecture-course at the University of **Freiburg**, Heidegger takes over from **Wilhelm Dilthey** and **Edmund Husserl** the term “lived experience” and uses it as the **formal indication** of **facticity**. The meaningful **structures** of lived experience are developed by life **situations** in which the **whole** of life expresses itself. Lived experiences are through and through expressed in a definite articulation, by an **understanding** we have of them as we simply live in them without regarding them **thematically**.

**LOCATION (*Ort*)**. *See* PLACE (*Ort*).

**LOGIC (*Logik*)**. Logic is one of the most important topics in Heidegger's **philosophy**. He devoted many writings, courses, and lectures to logical problems. Logic, the **science** of the ways in which **being** is addressed and articulated, is closely related to **ontology**, the science of being. This means that logic is not the science of the laws of reasoning; it is the **philosophical logic** of **origins**. Already as a student, Heidegger stated that the task of original logic is to produce the fundamental concepts, which articulate the incipient **ground** of all reality as well as its particular domains as the starting basis for further scientific research in those areas. He would later transform this doctrine of science into a **hermeneutics of facticity** and then into an **existential analysis** of **being-there**. His hermeneutically **ontological** logic operates at the interface between being and **language**.

The correspondence or identity of being (*phusis*) and language (*logos*) is expressed in the copula of **judgment**. In his **destruction** of the history of ontology, Heidegger discovers that the **truth** of judgment presupposes the **unconcealment** (*alètheia*) of being. In the philosophical sayings of **Anaximander**, **Parmenides**, and **Heraclitus**, the unconcealment of being is named *logos*. Why this **relation** between being and *logos* was forgotten in the **history of being** is one of the main questions of Heidegger's later philosophy. *Logos* became judgment, unconcealment became truth as the correspondence between the intellect and the object, and being was reduced to the "is" of the copula. Logic stems, in other words, from the **destiny** of being.

*See also* KANT'S THESIS ABOUT BEING (*Kants These über das Sein*); LOGIC (*Logik*); LOGIC AS THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE (*Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*); METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC, THE (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*).

**LOGIC: THE QUESTION OF TRUTH** (*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*). This winter semester 1925/26 lecture-course is a milestone on the way to *Being and Time*. It moves toward the interface where **language** is born. Heidegger wants to develop a philosophical **logic** that can discover **existentials** and their hermeneutically indicative sentences. In the first part of the course, he rehearses his own prior steps toward such a logic. After a discussion of **Edmund Husserl's** critique of **psychologism**, he criticizes the **neo-Kantian** sense of judicial **truth** as **validity**. To get to the **origin** of truth, it is necessary to return to **Aristotle's** prejudicative truth of *nous* or simple apprehension. This truth of **intuition** binds Aristotle and Husserl together in a juxtaposition of Greek and German **thinking**.

Husserl's principle of all principles is **intuition**, that is, the giving and having of an **entity** in its bodily **presence**. Heidegger shows that underlying intuition, there is a more fundamental **understanding** of that intuition that at once understands itself. The primary form of simple apprehension is a "having" of something *as* something in the ways we can use it. We discover entities first as pieces of **equipment**, which are given in their **in-order-to**. The "as" of primary understanding is the original articulating of my **getting around** and dealings with the **world**. In this we acquire the habits of our habitat that constitute our most immediate having. The "as" of primary understanding makes it possible for us to explicate in assertions the **structure** of our **being**. The "as" of primary understanding can thus become the hermeneutic "as." Assertion is a demonstrative letting something be seen or uncovering. Heidegger can now distinguish between worldly assertions, which let entities be seen in their being and categorical assertions or existentials, which indicate the being of **being-there**.

After the Christmas break, Heidegger abandoned the original outline of his course. Instead of **Aristotle's** question of truth, he discusses **Immanuel Kant's** doctrine of **schematism**. Heidegger appeals to the schematizing of the **categories** as an example of how the **self projects its understanding** of the **being of entities** upon the backdrop of **temporality**. As Heidegger would later reflect upon the importance of this Kantian breakthrough, his "eyes were opened anew" when he read the *Critique of Pure Reason* against the background of Husserl's **phenomenology**.

Heidegger developed his account of schematism further in his lecture-course from the winter semester 1927/28, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, which would culminate in his later book, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Heidegger shows that the original **self-affection** of the "I" or pure **consciousness is time**. Time gives itself unthematically as the constant precursory encounter that lets entities be. It lets entities be seen and makes our apprehension of entities possible. The **making present** of any entity as something is a **compartment** of being-there, for being-there is itself time. The present or now as making present is a basic possibility of the being of being-there, that is, **existence**. Here, at the end of the course, Heidegger introduces the **existential** vocabulary that would dominate *Being and Time*.

See also EXISTENTIAL-HERMENEUTICAL "AS" (*existenzial-hermeneutische 'Als'*); HERMENEUTIC INDICATION (*hermeneutische Indikation*).

**LOGIC AS THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE** (*Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*). This lecture-course from the summer semester of 1934 provides an important step in Heidegger's attempt to initiate an inquiry into **language** and to establish its synergy with the **question of being**. The relation of language to **logos**, on the one hand, and to the **truth**, on the other, emerges as a foremost theme of his **hermeneutics**. Specifically, language emerges as an endowment or power granted to **human beings** by virtue of which they can speak and engage in **dialogue** (*Zwiesprache*) with each other.

In this lecture-course, Heidegger also extends his understanding of **resoluteness** and its link to responsibility, in a way that casts additional light on his discussions thereof in *Being and Time*.

**LOGOS.** *Logos* is one of the **grounding words** of **Greek philosophy**. It names the process that gathers **entities** into **unconcealment**. As the **structure** of the unconcealment of entities, *logos* is at the same time the **saying of being**. When human **language** and **thinking** correspond to and commit

themselves to this original saying, **truth** comes to pass. The **destiny** of *logos* is the coming to pass of the history of **metaphysics** in which the original **meaning** of *logos* is forgotten.

*See also* LOGIC (*Logik*); LOGOS (HERACLITUS, B 50) (*Logos [Heraklit, Fragment 50]*).

**LOGOS (HERACLITUS, B 50) (*Logos [Heraklit, Fragment 50]*)**. This careful reading of **Heraclitus's** Fragment B 50 is a formal study of **logos**. Heidegger tries to explain how *logos* passed from the original **meaning** of gathering to mean **language**. We must understand *logos* in terms of *legein*. Heidegger claims that the original meaning of *legein*, which means to speak or to say, is to lay down or to lay before. *Logos* is the original **saying** of **being** that makes human language possible. In the gathering of *logos*, a permanence holds sway by reason of which what is gathered together is preserved and guarded as a **whole**. The genuine meaning of *legein* is letting-lie-forth-as-a-collection. The lying forth is at the same time a coming into **unconcealment** and thus the appropriation of truth. The process of **truth** that comes to pass in *legein* is the **coming to presence** of **entities**. Through *legein*, **being-there** lets entities be.

*Logos* is the absolutely original source out of which the gathering process proceeds. Heraclitus's formula *hen-panta* describes the way in which *logos* functions. *Logos* is the one (*hen*) that unifies all entities (*panta*) in themselves, insofar as it gathers them into themselves and lets them lie forth in unconcealment themselves. In the way it gathers all entities into **being**, *logos* is the **destiny** of being. It lays the **ground** for entities and at the same time comes to pass as ground in and through the entities that it grounds. In *logos*, being reveals itself as ground.

The place where the process of *logos* take place is the "there" of being and is as such the **clearing** where being-there exists. The original gathering process of *logos* as unconcealment makes possible the gathering process of human **thinking** as the process of truth. When our *legein* corresponds with the *legein* of the original *logos*, truth comes to pass. Truth is the **letting be** of *logos*, and thinking is the thinking of *logos*.

**LOVE (*Liebe*)**. Heidegger rarely addresses such "positive" **experiences** as love or **joy**. The primary reason for this reluctance is his desire to avoid the anthropological connotations of the term "love" as stemming either from **humanism** or **Christianity**. This strategy is most evident in the *Zollikon Seminars*, where he argues that love is founded on the **being** of **human being** as **care** and, ultimately, upon a prior **understanding of being**. One noteworthy exception occurs in Heidegger's 1936 lecture-course from the summer semester of 1936 on **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's** philoso-



**ophy of freedom.** There, Heidegger describes love as the counterpart of conflict and opposition, a cosmic struggle into which human beings are **thrown** in order that they can participate in the light of **unconcealment** arising from the darkness of **concealment**. Love is necessary for human beings to experience this light as the surrender and self-submission of freedom as **letting-be**.

*See also HÖLDERLIN'S HYMN "REMEMBRANCE" (Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken").*

**LÖWITH, KARL (1897–1973).** The wounded war veteran Karl Löwith met Heidegger for the first time in 1919, when he became his student in **Freiburg**. He later followed him to **Marburg**, where he would become the first student to write a qualifying dissertation under Heidegger's supervision. They became close friends. When Löwith was forced to flee Germany in 1933, Heidegger wrote letters of recommendation for him. Heidegger's involvement with **National Socialism** led to a break in their friendship. After World War II, Löwith became one of Heidegger's severest critics. He returned to Germany and accepted a chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The former friends would occasionally meet and try to be civil to each other.

**LOYALTY (Treue).** Heidegger employs this term in Chapter Five (Division Two) of *Being and Time* in discussing the **historicality** of **being-there**. Loyalty is a commitment to the **past** by rediscovering its relevance for the **future**. In this regard, loyalty enacts the **self's resoluteness** or way of choosing again **who** it is, in the course of transmitting its heritage to subsequent **generations**. Through its loyalty, the self temporalizes through its **retrieval**, appropriation, and transmission of **tradition**.



# M

**MACHINATION** (*Machenschaft*). In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger addresses the **danger** posed by the modern trend toward machination, as a prelude to later formulating the question concerning **technology**. Machination does not simply involve the development and use of machinery, but instead entails the **origin** of the machine age as a global **phenomenon**. The rise of machination parallels that of **modernity**, insofar as each stems from neglecting the importance of **being** in favor of what is revealed as specific **entities**. In carrying out the extreme phase of the **forgottenness of being**, modernity defines entities exclusively in terms of their instrumental uses, that is, one-dimensionally. As a result, the domain of **nature** can only appear in terms of its potential to be used, dominated, and exploited for human purposes.

Machination, however, is not merely an accident of history, but instead is a necessary counterpart of modernity as marking the extreme phase of the forgottenness of being. When Heidegger later formulates the question of technology, he addresses it in the context of the modern rise of machination.

**MAKE PRESENT** (*gegenwärtigen*). In *Being and Time*, the primary **ecstasis** for **fallenness** is making present. It has its **existential** meaning in the present. Yet as a **mode of temporality**, making present also remains included in the **future** and the **having been**. When **being-there** makes an **entity** present, it can become absorbed in the **being** of entities and its own preoccupation with them. Being-there thus **forgets** the **possibilities** of its own being and falls into the **readiness-to-hand** and the **presence-at-hand** with which it concerns itself. In **resoluteness**, being-there can bring itself back from fallenness and into the **moment** of vision, which is the ecstasis of the ownmost or authentic present as a way of temporalizing the **self's existence**.

*See also* TIME (*Zeit*).

**MAKE ROOM** (*einräumen*). Making room is an **existential of being-in-the-world**. It lets **entities** within the **world** be encountered by giving them **space**. This making room for entities consists in freeing the entities, whose **way of being is readiness-to-hand** for their spatiality. Space is in the world, insofar as space has been disclosed by **being-there** in its making room. In his lecture-course from the winter semester 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger argues that the making room is the existential **ground** for the advance spatializing of the pure intuition of space in **Immanuel Kant**'s account of the human sensibility.

**MAKEABILITY** (*Machbarkeit*). Makeability is a term that Heidegger employs in both *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Mindfulness* to describe the gestalt by which **entities** are **revealed** in conformity with modern **technology**. Things are created in the image of utility and instrumentality. Makeability defines a generic standard by which entities are defined for the usefulness that they have within the totalizing **structure of machination**.

*See also* ABANDONMENT OF BEING (*Seinsverlassenheit*); PRODUCIBILITY (*Machsamkeit*).

**MAN** (*der Mensch*). *See* HUMAN BEING (*Mensch*).

**MARBURG**. Heidegger taught as a professor of **philosophy** at the Philipps-Universität of Marburg from winter semester 1923/24 until summer semester 1928. The years in Marburg were among the most creative of his life. Here, he conceived *Being and Time* and fell in love with **Hannah Arendt**. His friendship with **Rudolf Bultmann** led also to some intense collaboration and joint seminars.

**MARCUSE, HERBERT (1898–1979)**. Some of Heidegger's students became prominent thinkers in their own right, if not proponents of his **philosophy**, including Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse studied with Heidegger at **Freiburg** from 1929 to 1932 and subsequently became a leader of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. With the publication of such influential books as *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse emerged as one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth century.

**MARTIN HEIDEGGER IN CONVERSATION** (*Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*). This text is a transcript of Richard Wisser's interview with Heidegger on 17 September 1969. It was aired on television on 24 September as a tribute to Heidegger in honor of his 80th birthday. In the interview, Heidegger denies that it is the task of **philosophy** to change society. Insofar as the **turning relation of being** defines **being-there**, his meditations on the **for-**

**gottenness of being** in **metaphysics** are also a rethinking of humanity's place in the **world**. As part of his **ontological** meditation, Heidegger tries to disclose the difference between philosophy and **science**. Science is a consequence of **technology**, whose basic form of enactment is **enframing**. Since the triumph of technology implies the end of philosophy, his later work is an attempt to formulate the task of **thinking** after the **completion of metaphysics**.

**MARX, KARL (1818–83)**. Karl Marx was one of the greatest and most influential thinkers of the 19th century. He was a student of **German idealism**, particularly of **Hegel**, and founded the communistic system of economics and politics. Given the materialistic thrust of his **philosophy**, Heidegger construes Marx's thinking as the inversion of an idealistic vision, culminating in **Hegel's** thought and originating with **Plato's** theory of the forms. Accordingly, Heidegger groups Marx with **Nietzsche** as marking the end and **completion of metaphysics**.

Throughout his writings, Heidegger does not give nearly the attention to Marx's thought that he does to **Nietzsche's**. Nevertheless, Heidegger credits Marx with transforming politics into economics and thereby recognizing the **technological** appearance of **entities** in terms of a cycle of production and consumption. Humanity is also **revealed** as a cog in this economic system of production. While Marx emphasized the alienation of human beings within a system of labor, Heidegger characterizes humanity as the **laboring animal** whose entire efforts are devoted to production and consumption. Among 19th-century thinkers, Marx stands out for his insight into the **technological** dimension of **metaphysics**. As a result, Heidegger states in his *Letter on "Humanism"* that Marx's vision of history surpasses all other viewpoints.

*See also* PRODUCIBILITY (*Machsamkeit*).

**MASTER RACE** (*Herrenvolk*). *See* RACE (*die Rasse*).

**MATHEMATICAL PROJECT** (*mathematischer Entwurf*). Heidegger explores the **origin** of modern **science** as the key to understanding **technology** as **machination**. Modern science employs the concept of magnitude to outline in advance the parameters for defining **nature**. This way of grasping nature according to a numerical preconception of it requires mathematically projecting the essential properties of physical reality. In the modern period, **Immanuel Kant** is the pivotal figure who employs this mathematical project to map the preconditions and parameters of scientific knowledge. Through his famous Copernican revolution, Kant showed how the **whole** of nature must be understood in advance by the specific conditions of the knower.

In his lecture-course from winter semester 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger writes another chapter in his dialogue with Kant. Heidegger shows how the mathematical **projection** of nature originates from the **openness** that encompasses both **human being** and **thing**. The mathematical projection of nature provides the clue that **technology** is not merely a product of human ingenuity, but rather originates from a prior way in which **being** reveals itself and claims **being-there** in the process.

**MATTER, THE (*die Sache*)**. For **Edmund Husserl**, the chief matter or topic of **philosophy** is the “thing itself,” or “what shows itself.” For Heidegger, the matter is **being** itself, or that which is given us to think, the **difference** between being and **entities**. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger describes the matter as the **question of all questions**. Heidegger thereby describes the matter of **thinking** as the chief philosophical task.

**MATTER OF THINKING (*Zur Sache des Denkens*)**. Heidegger published the essay *Zur Sache des Denkens* in 1969. What **calls thinking** forth into its own vocation is also what defines the topic of thought. The matter of thinking is the most **question-worthy** way in which **being** reveals itself to thought. As such, the matter of thinking also includes what remains **unthought** throughout the **history** of **metaphysics**, specifically, the **difference** between being and **entities**.

*See also* OTHERNESS OF THE MATTER OF THINKING (*Verschiedenheit der Sache des Denkens*).

**MEANING (*Sinn*)**. Meaning is an **existential** of **being-there** and must be conceived from the **disclosedness** that belongs to **understanding**. It is the “**toward-which**” of a **projection, in-terms-of-which** an **entity** becomes intelligible and understandable in its **being**. Meaning gets its **structure** from a **fore-having**, a **foresight**, and a **fore-conception**.

Meaning also includes the way in which being is **disclosed** to understanding and can then be articulated in words.

**MEANING OF BEING, THE (*der Sinn von Sein*)**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger takes up the Greek **question of being**: What is the **meaning** of **being**? What does it mean to be? This fundamental question must be made transparent. The **question of being** is **being-there’s** **mode** of being. Heidegger must therefore first give a proper explication of being-there with regard to its being before answering the question about the meaning of being. The **understanding of being** belongs to the essential constitution of being-there. In everything it says, thinks, and does, being-there implicitly displays an understanding of being. But how can we make this understanding explicit? Is

there a way from primordial **time** to the meaning of being? As **Aristotle** remarked, being becomes meaningful in various ways. On Heidegger's **path of thinking**, the **being of entities** shows various determinations, including **existence**, **readiness-to-hand**, **nature**, and **presence**. Since the meaning of being arises from the **destiny** of being itself and has its own history, there can be no final answer to the question about the meaning of being.

**MEASURE (Maß).** In various places throughout his writings, Heidegger ponders whether there is a **directive**, gauge, or measure for **thinking** and human action. In his *Letter on "Humanism,"* Heidegger brings this questioning to the forefront. Such a measure pertains to the manner in which **being-there** can correspond to **being** and heed its **claim (Anspruch)**. By heeding such a measure, being-there brings its own capacity to think and to act in concert with the **truth of being**. Heidegger suggests that the observance of and compliance with such a measure precedes, and provides the **ground** for, the formulation of ethical principles.

Most fundamentally, the **dwelling** of mortals proceeds from a **measure** in order to strike a balance or uphold a sense of proportionality, thereby directing all human endeavors to bring the **openness** or **truth of being** to fruition. In this way, being-there fulfills its task of **dwelling** "poetically" on the **earth**.

In his lecture ". . . *Poetically Man Dwells . . .*," Heidegger asks, echoing **Friedrich Hölderlin**, "Is there a measure on the **earth**?" Here, Heidegger emphasizes the need for such a measure, which can direct human beings to dwell poetically apart from the calculative standards of modern **technology**. To safeguard and protect the earth constitutes a primary way by which being-there can heed the **claim** of being.

**MEASURE-SETTING (Maßsetzung).** In *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Letter on "Humanism,"* Heidegger suggests that a **measure** is necessary in order to direct action as well as **thinking**. Such a measure provides an alternative to a rational principle or standard derived from reason. Only by answering the address of being can being-there experience a measure and thereby uphold it as an explicit guideline. The measure-setting power is not, then, a human product, but instead resides in how **being-there** responds to a **claim** of being and experiences the depths of its expression in **silence**. Ultimately, the **silence** of **language** is measure-setting.

**MEISTER ECKHART (Eckhart von Hochheim, ca. 1260–ca. 1328).** Eckhart was a medieval German philosopher and theologian, best known for his entrée into the deeper realms of **mysticism** and spirituality. He had an enormous influence on the development of Heidegger's **thinking**. In his early lectures in **Freiburg**, Heidegger appeals to Eckhart to develop a more

concrete **understanding** of religious experience. Specifically, mysticism provides an inroad to religious experience as a way in which the self encounters, and becomes receptive to, the otherness of the Divine.

In Heidegger's exposition of **freedom** as **letting-be**, the connection to Eckhart's mysticism becomes most profoundly evident. In his lecture-course from the summer semester 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger redefines freedom more radically than he did in *Being and Time*. He shows that **human being** is a **possibility** of freedom, rather than freedom consisting of merely a human property. In his essay *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger equates freedom in this more original sense with **openness**. **Being-there** participates in this openness by letting be, that is, by allowing **entities** to manifest themselves in their singularity and uniqueness. In order to explicate this more radical notion of letting be, Heidegger addresses freedom as a relationship in which being-there reciprocates for having been granted the gift of **unconcealment**. To think this reciprocity in which being-there submits to the power of openness in order to let be, Heidegger appeals to **Meister Eckhart's** mystical notion of **releasement** (*Gelassenheit*). Being-there becomes free through its abdication and suspension of **willing**, in order to be released into and transposed within the openness.

In *Country Path Conversations*, Heidegger brings Eckhart's notion of releasement to the forefront. Human being does not induce releasement, but belongs to and experiences its sway by participating in the openness. In this way, being-there is released from the **technological** hold of willing. Thus, the **self** is released over to (*überlassen*) the open **expanse** of the **truth of being**. In the "Supplements" to this text, under the subheading "On Letting Go of Things," Heidegger cites four quotations from Eckhart to illustrate the power of releasement as the renunciation of the will.

*See also* MYSTERY (*Geheimnis*); PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**MEMORIAL ADDRESS.** In 1955, Heidegger delivered this memorial address to commemorate the 175th anniversary of the birthday of the **Meßkirch** composer Conradin Kreutzer. He later published it under the title *Gelassenheit* (**Releasement**) in 1959.

In this address, Heidegger discusses the **need** and distress of modern times. **Being-there** has lost its foundation and roots. He distinguishes between metaphysical **representation** and **mindfulness** as the explication of **meaning**. Modern man is fleeing from mindfulness. The triumph of **technology** threatens what is ownmost to the **human being**, because it makes our **dwelling** impossible. The only solution is releasement as the necessary attitude of simultaneous acceptance and rejection of technology. In releasement, we let things be as they are and open ourselves to the **mystery of being**. This attitude might allow us to escape the **danger** of homelessness that threatens



us in the age of technology and **nihilism**. Releasement may enable us to grow roots in the **ground** of our home and make the **autochthony** of our dwelling possible.

*See also ORIGINAL ETHICS (ursprüngliche Ethik).*

**MEßKIRCH.** Heidegger was born and raised in this small town in central southern Germany. The town is defined by the church of Saint Martin, the patron saint of the city, where Heidegger served as an altar boy. The other important building is the castle, with its beautiful park where the **pathway** begins. Heidegger was buried at the small cemetery of Meßkirch on 28 May 1976.

**METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC, THE** (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*). This summer semester 1928 lecture-course, given under the title Logic, was the last Heidegger taught at the University of **Marburg**. During this course, he delivered a memorial for **Max Scheler** on 21 May 1928. The course pursues the metaphysical foundations of **logic** in light of the **question of being**. It belongs to the transitional phase in Heidegger's thought from the **existential analysis of being-there** in *Being and Time* to the task of **overcoming metaphysics** in his later thought.

In the introduction, Heidegger describes traditional logic as the **science** of determining **thinking**, which expresses itself in **assertions**, and contrasts it to what he calls **philosophical logic**. **Plato** and **Aristotle** transformed the latter into the former. Heidegger's course thus becomes an attempt to develop a philosophical logic through a **destruction** of traditional logic.

In the first main part, *Dismantling Leibniz's Doctrine of Judgment Down to Basic Metaphysical Problems*, Heidegger attempts to uncover the metaphysical foundations of logic through an **interpretation** of **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's metaphysics** with regard to the function metaphysics has as the **ground** for his logic. He focuses his attention on Leibniz's definition of **substance** as force and of the latter as **representation**. Leibniz thus anticipated both **Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power** (force) and the modern philosophy of **worldviews**, which regards the world as a representation of the subject.

The second main part, *The Metaphysics of the Principle of Reason as the Foundational Problem of Logic*, is both a confrontation with the philosophy of Scheler and an introduction to *Being and Time*. Heidegger converts **fundamental ontology** into **metontology**, in which the latter "overturns" the former. Metontology has for its proper theme the **being of entities in the whole** (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) and is also the domain of the metaphysics of **existence**. It is only possible on the basis and in the perspective of the radical

**ontological** problematic. The problematic demands an **interpretation of being-there** on the basis of **temporality** and, from this interpretation, an elucidation of the intrinsic **possibility** of our **understanding of being**. Fundamental ontology is the **whole of founding** and developing **ontology**. The **existential analysis** of being-there, and the analysis of the temporality of being, turn at the same time into metontology. In their unity, fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the complete concept of metaphysics.

The introduction to the problem of **time** leads to an extensive discussion of **transcendence** and **intentionality**. They are both attempts to think the basis of the subject-object-relation. In their last long conversation, Heidegger and Scheler agreed on four points: (1) the problem of the subject-object-relation needs to be raised completely afresh; (2) it is not a question of epistemology; (3) the problem has central import for the possibility of metaphysics; and (4) the **moment** is here to develop metaphysics from the ground up.

Heidegger would later develop the detailed investigations of the concept of world in conjunction with the problem of ground into his treatise *On the Essence of Ground*.

**METAPHYSICS (*Metaphysik*)**. Heidegger's relation to metaphysics is ambiguous. In his first major publication, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*, he wrote that **philosophy** cannot for long do without its authentic optic, metaphysics. In his early lecture-courses, he attempted to develop an original metaphysics through a **destruction** of the history of **ontology**. *Being and Time* is more skeptical of a renewal of metaphysics, although it is an attempt to develop a **fundamental ontology**. A new metaphysics presupposes an explicit restating of the **question of being**. In his writings *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, *On the Essence of Ground*, and *What Is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger agrees with **Immanuel Kant** that everyone takes an interest in metaphysics. It belongs to our nature as **human beings**. Heidegger now calls fundamental ontology a metaphysics of **being-there**. In light of the **turning**, Heidegger renounces the term metaphysics for his own philosophy. In his course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he uses the term in an ambiguous way. Metaphysics is the attempt to inquire about **entities** in general and in the **whole**, and yet it also conceals **being** as such. For Heidegger, philosophy from **Plato** to **Friedrich Nietzsche** is ultimately metaphysics.

The **guiding question** of metaphysics is: What is being? Not having explicitly raised the **question of being** in its connection with **time**, **Aristotle** asks simply: What is the **being of entities**, and what is their ultimate **ground**? This transformation engenders the **forgottenness of being**. Metaphysics is determined by its **onto-theo-logical** constitution. As **ontology**, metaphysics names **beingness** as the fundamental quality, which makes an entity what it is and that it is. As **theology**, metaphysics reduces being to the **highest**

**entity**, or **God**, and thereby obscures the **difference** between being and entities. **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**'s system is the **completion of metaphysics** and Nietzsche's reversal of **Platonism** its end. Our age is the age of **nihilism** and the triumph of **technology**, and as such is also the period of the complete **abandonment of being**.

In his later work, Heidegger tries to **overcome metaphysics** through a detailed reading of the premetaphysical thinkers **Anaximander**, **Parmenides**, and **Heraclitus**. He listens also to the announcement of the **other beginning** in **Friedrich Hölderlin**'s **poetry**. In dialogue with the cultures of the Far East, he tries to develop a nonmetaphysical **thinking** that does not talk about being, but is a **saying** of being.

*See also* METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC, THE (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*); METAPHYSICS AS HISTORY OF BEING (*Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins*); ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF METAPHYSICS, THE (*Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*).

**METAPHYSICS AS HISTORY OF BEING** (*Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins*). The 1941 essay was published in the second volume of Heidegger's **interpretation** of **Friedrich Nietzsche** (1961). It is a presentation of the decisive moments in the history of **metaphysics**, which begins with the distinction between *essentia*, what an **entity** is, and *existentia*, that an entity is. This distinction arises from the **concealment of be-ing**, which marks the **origin** of metaphysics. Heidegger reduces the distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* to its Greek origin. He shows how the Aristotelian concept of *energeia* becomes **actuality** or the work of causes. He also explains the transformation of **truth** into certitude and of *hupokeimenon* (substratum) into subject.

The second part is an **interpretation** of the relation between actuality and **subjectivity** in the **philosophy** of **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz**. For Leibniz, every entity as an entity is either a subject or a monad. The monad is determined by **representation** in its double meaning of *perceptio* and *appetitus*. The "perception" signifies any interior spontaneous expression or representation of the universe. The *appetitus* is the tendency of the monad to pass from one perception to the other in quest of a more and more adequate perception of the universe. Both are types of presentation or proposing: *perceptio* represents the universe; *appetitus* proposes the perfection of **life** toward which the monad strives. In his 24 metaphysical theses, Leibniz says that there is a reason in nature why something exists rather than **nothing**. This **ground** is **God** as the necessary entity, which causes the being of all other entities.

In the third part, Heidegger explains the difference between **subjectivity** and **subjectivity**. Since **René Descartes** grounded the being of entities on the self-certain subject, every entity has become either an object or a subject as

that which objectifies. Heidegger calls this subject reference of all being subjectivity, which constitutes both the objectivity of objects and the subjectivity of subjects.

The fourth and final part contains the 24 metaphysical theses of Leibniz, which Heidegger considers to be the highlight of his metaphysics.

**METONTOLOGY** (*Metontologie*). In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger converts **fundamental ontology** into a metontology, which results in overturning the basis of **ontology** in search of grounding its departure in the **existential analysis of being-there**. Metontology has for its proper theme the **being of entities in the whole** and is also the domain of the **metaphysics of existence**. It is only possible on the basis and in the perspective of a radical **ontological** problematic. This problematic demands an **interpretation** of being-there on the basis of **temporality** and, from this interpretation, an elucidation of the intrinsic **possibility** of our **understanding of being**.

Fundamental ontology is the whole of **founding** and developing ontology. This founding is made possible by the existential analysis of being-there and the analysis of the temporality of being. The temporal analysis of being reverts at the same time into metontology. In their unity, fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the transcendental-horizonal perspective for re-asking the question of being. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger takes up this question more radically from the perspective of **being-historical thinking**.

Metontology allows for the development of certain concrete questions that are relevant, but not necessarily central, to the development of fundamental ontology. Specifically, Heidegger suggests that within the domain of metontology, the possibility of ethics can first be addressed.

**MIDPOINT** (*Mitte*). Midpoint is a term that Heidegger employs in both *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) and *Mindfulness* (1938–39). The midpoint pertains to the reciprocal relationship in which **being** and **being-there** stand toward each other, and the precise dynamic of that **relation**. The midpoint is the pivot that allows for the opening of the **between** (*Zwischen*) through which being can first manifest itself in its **difference** from **entities** and being-there can abide within that tension of differentiation. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger characterizes this dynamic as the “swinging of the midpoint” (*Wesensmitte*). In *Mindfulness*, he refers to the midpoint as a **gathering** through which being-there is thrust forth into the center of the manifestation of entities and thereby serves as the **place** for the clearing to

unfold. The countertension in which being-there is appropriated by and participates in the clearing is the “conveyance of this midpoint” (*die Ermittlung dieser Mitte*).

The midpoint also marks the interface in the **strife** between **world** and **earth**. An instance of this occurs in the **work of art**, and specifically, through the creativity of the artist who rages in the conflict between **unconcealment** and **concealment**.

**MINDFULNESS (*Besinnung*)**. Mindfulness is the active unfolding of the **truth of being** in and through **thinking**. It is opposed to **calculative thinking** and **representation** and so should not be confused with a subject’s reflection (*Reflexion*) on an object. It is a self-awakening and self-surrender to that which is most worthy of question and thought. Mindfulness lets itself be determined by the **matter of thought**. In its enactment, mindfulness is a **venturing** after and responding to **truth**. In philosophical mindfulness, thinking becomes aware of its task as commissioned by **being**. Mindfulness is not an attempt to determine and dominate **entities**, but rather strives to let them be what they are. Mindfulness is a calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is **question-worthy**, that is, the **mystery of being**. In this sense, it is the **piety** of thinking.

*See also* RELEASEMENT (*Gelassenheit*).

**MINDFULNESS (*Besinnung*)**. The next major work in which Heidegger takes up the task of **being-historical thinking**, following *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), is *Mindfulness*. Although Heidegger composed this text in 1938/39, it was not published until 1997 as volume 66 of the **Complete Edition**. This volume, which contains the original German text, was edited by **Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann**; it also includes an appendix that contains two other texts. In the first of these, “A Retrospective Look at the Pathway” (1937–39), Heidegger ponders the development of this thought from his doctoral dissertation in 1913 to *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). In the second one, “The Wish and the Will” (1937–38), he outlines his unpublished writings in seven parts.

*Mindfulness* is among the most subtle and provocative of all of Heidegger’s voluminous writings. He provides a leitmotif of the volumes with this brief remark: “We do not know goals, but are only pathways.” Following this statement, Heidegger shows how **philosophy** comes to an explicit self-awareness of its task by enacting being-historical thinking. Philosophy does not attain self-understanding of its character as one academic discipline among others, but rather arrives at this awareness by proceeding along the **path of thinking**. This path spans the entire **history** of philosophy and ultimately originates from the **other beginning**. **Mindfulness (*Besinnung*)**

marks the arrival of **inceptual thinking**, which in the self-understanding of its task is equally aware of the **danger** posed by the **modern** epoch of **machination**. Following in the footsteps of *Contributions to Philosophy*, *Mindfulness* exemplifies Heidegger's initial attempt to outline the nexus between the **metaphysics** as the **concealment of being** and the rise of the modern program to reduce **entities** to their instrumental uses and exploit **nature**. Heidegger thereby provides one of the first glimpses into his attempt to address the **origin of technology** and the global **danger** it poses.

In *Mindfulness*, Heidegger outlines the key elements of **being-historical thinking**. But at the center of this work is the importance of cultivating the **words** to facilitate that task, the distinctive **language** for thinking the **truth of being**. In *Mindfulness*, Heidegger initiates this journey that is already on the way to language. The path of this journey emerges, insofar as **thinking** both safeguards its **grounding words** and discovers in language its proper place of **dwelling**. In this way, *Mindfulness* follows the curvature of the **turning** that brings thinking into its own by virtue of its residence within language.

The unique composition of the text merits attention. For Heidegger, *Mindfulness* epitomizes the task of thinking, which is neither a system nor a doctrine, but is to be understood as "leaps of inquiry." The emphasis on the **leap** of thinking is endemic to the comparison text, *Contributions to Philosophy*, and points to the **hermeneutic** requirement of tentativeness and patience that any such investigation must follow in order to adhere to the **matter of thinking**. Thus, the headings in *Mindfulness* (designated by Roman numerals I–XXVIII) describe topics that are themselves fundamental stepping-stones along the path of thinking, and simultaneously hold in tension what remains **unthought** with respect to enowning. As a case in point, "Errancy" (XIX) contains only two short paragraphs (Section 73). Yet in the brief discussion, Heidegger casts light both on his account of truth in the pivotal section 44 of *Being and Time* and in his 1930 lecture *On the Essence of Truth*. When addressed in terms of being-historical thinking, **errancy** is a crucial development in the unfolding of **truth** and the way in which the **clearing** can appear historically only by illuminating its opposite.

**MINENESS (*Jemeinigkeit*)**. Heidegger's meditations in his early lecture-courses in **Freiburg** on phronetic insight (*phronesis*) into the decisive uniqueness of what is to be done here and now, and the place of the particular in **ontology**, formed the background of the introduction of **being-there** in summer semester 1923. As a technical term, phronetic insight indicates the particular **while** (*Weile*) that each of us is and has. The term is displaced by mineness in *Being and Time*. The **being** of being-there is in each case mine. This is why being-there can never be taken **ontologically** as an instance of some genus of **entities** as **things** that are **present-at-hand**. Because being-

there has in each case mineness, we must always use a personal pronoun when we address it: **I** am, you are, in the entities we are. The entities, whose being is in each case mine, comport themselves toward their own being. For being-there its being is an issue. Being-there is in each case mine to be, such that we choose whom we want to be or not to be. Mineness thus is the condition of the **possibility of ownedness and unownedness**.

The mineness of being-there expresses itself also in the **existentials** “**being-towards-death**” and “having a conscience.” Insofar as death is, it is in “each case mine.” The mineness of death implies that no one can take the other’s dying away from him/her. **Conscience** is also, as based on **care**, in each case mine. The **call of conscience** is an appeal to our most unique **can-be** that arises from the entity that in each case I myself am.

**MISSION (Auftrag)**. Heidegger employs this term frequently in his lecture-course of 1933/34. He poses the possibility of whether there is a **spiritual mission** that is possible for **being-there** as it seeks to uncover its historical **situation** and **destiny**. A mission is an endeavor that grips the **self** and exposes it to the **danger** of the interplay between **concealment** and **unconcealment**, untruth and **truth**. In a political sense, Heidegger also equates mission with a commitment to the **National Socialist** movement, as he understood it while he was rector of the University of **Freiburg**.

**MODE (Modus)**. Entities can actualize their different ways of being in different modes. **Ownedness** and **unownedness** are, for example, the two modes of **being-there’s existence**. In Part I of the first division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes knowledge as a “founded” mode of **being-in-the-world**. That is, a vague **understanding of being** precedes any explicit or theoretical act of knowing, which thereby constitutes a secondary way in which being-there relates to or comports itself toward **entities** in the **world**.

**MODERNITY (Neuzeit)**. **Réne Descartes’s** emphasis on **subjectivity** as the **ground** for determining the **beingness** of **entities** ushers in the modern age. Modernity develops the most extreme **possibility of metaphysics** that defines entities in terms of their **representation** by a human subject, rather than in themselves through the uniqueness of their manifestness. This representational **thinking** culminates in **Friedrich Nietzsche’s metaphysics** of the **will to power**, which brings the entirety of **nature** under the control of the **will** to will in its drive for complete mastery. Modernity signals the rise of what epitomizes this will to total domination and mastery, or **technology** as **machination**.

*See also* AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*).

**MOIRA (PARMENIDES VIII, 34–41)** (*Moira [Parmenides VIII, 34–41]*). This essay belongs to Heidegger's lecture-course from the winter semester of 1951/52 and the summer semester 1952 but was not read at the time. It is a careful meditation on the relation between **thinking** and **being** by way of an **interpretation** of selected fragments from the famous poem of **Parmenides**. According to Fragment III, thinking and being are the same. The task of thinking is to take under its **care** the being of **entities** (*noein*) and to let it lie forth (*legein*) in **unconcealment** (*alètheia*). Thinking must accept being as the unifying (*hen*) element (*logos*) in the coming forth (*phusis*) of entities. The mysterious **word to auto**, the same, is the process of *alètheia*, which constitutes the **history of being**. It allows both being and thinking to arise. This imparting (*moira*) of the **belonging together** of being and thinking in their ambivalence is the **destiny of being** itself. In the unconcealment of the ambivalence of thinking and being, being itself remains concealed and **unthought**.

**MOMENT** (*Augenblick*). As early as 1917, Heidegger underscored the importance of the moment in his reading of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In his early lecture-course on **Aristotle**, he uses the term as a **translation** of *kairos*. Phronetic insight is regarded as the way in which the full moment is held in **truth**. In *Being and Time*, the moment becomes the **ecstasis** of that **present** that is held in primordial **temporality** and is thus primordial itself. Heidegger now underscores the visual sense of *Augenblick* as a moment of *insight*. This shift is probably due to his reading of **Søren Kierkegaard**. The moment of vision means the resolute rapture by which **being-there** is carried away to whatever **possibilities** are encountered in its **situation**. In the moment of vision, being-there is held in **resoluteness**. The moment of vision also discloses the primordial **boundary situation** of **being-toward-death**.

**MOOD** (*Stimmung*). To **being-there** belongs the **thrownness** of its **existence**. It always finds itself in a certain disposedness that makes it possible for being-there to find itself in a certain mood or **attunement**. By mood, Heidegger means the prearticulated **meaning** of how we find ourselves to be. Moods belong to the **ontic** constitution of being-there. In *Being and Time*, moods first disclose being-there in its thrownness in the manner of an evasive turning away. They not only disclose the "there" of being-there, but also close it off. A mood assails us and arises out of our **being-in-the-world**. Every mood discloses our being-in-the-world as a **whole** and makes it possible to direct ourselves toward something.

In his later work, the term **grounding attunement** (*Grundstimmung*) displaces **disposedness**. In the *Postscript to "What Is Metaphysics?"*, **anxiety** is the grounding attunement determined by the **nothing**. In his lecture-course



for the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger describes deep **boredom** as the grounding attunement of his time. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger makes explicit the link between attunement and tonality as a way of heeding the distinctive “tone” of and responding to the **voice of being**. Here, he distinguishes between the attunement of the Greek **beginning** of **philosophy**, **astonishment**, and the **attunement** of the **other beginning**, **reservedness**.

**MORTALS, THE** (*die Sterblichen*). In his later **philosophy**, Heidegger calls **human beings** the mortals because they can die. Only humans die, and they die continuously as long as they **dwell** on the **earth**, under the **sky**, before the **divinities**. Earth and sky, divinities and mortals, are joined together in the **oneness** of the **fourfold**.

**MOVEMENT** (*Bewegung*). In the **beginning** of Greek **philosophy**, **being** was named *phusis* or self-emerging **presence** and thus **revelment**. The central **phenomenon** of *phusis* or *kinèsis* is movement. This is the reason the **ontology** of **Aristotle** became physics, based on an investigation into the **being** of movement and its causes. The **destruction** of physics is a topic to which Heidegger returned time and again in his lecture-courses. The dynamic character of Aristotle’s **philosophy** is preserved in Heidegger’s own **thinking**, which is always under way.

Aristotle’s definition of **time**, as that which is counted in the movement that we encounter within the **horizon** of the earlier and the later, determined our understanding of time as a stream of **nows**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempted to rethink time in light of the **temporality** of **being-there**.

**MY WAY TO PHENOMENOLOGY** (*Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*). The autobiographical essay, written in 1963 as a contribution to the Festschrift for Max Niemeyer in honor of his 80th birthday, describes Heidegger’s way into **phenomenology**. **Franz Brentano**’s dissertation, **Carl Braig**’s treatise on **being**, and **Edmund Husserl**’s *Logical Investigations* were very important for his philosophical development. He also refers to the writing of **Emil Lask**. From 1919 on, he learned much from Husserl as his assistant. His rethinking of **Aristotle** would lead to his lifelong topic of the **question of being**. The first edition of *Being and Time* was published by Max Niemeyer, who in 1953 also published the *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

Heidegger concludes this essay by quoting a passage from the introduction to *Being and Time*, namely, that phenomenology is not to be identified with a specific philosophical school, but instead denotes a “**possibility**” that is higher than any actuality.

**MYSTERY (*Geheimnis*)**. Why **being** reveals itself to us in the being of **entities**, and yet at the same time withholds itself as such in **concealment**, constitutes a deep mystery for Heidegger. In his **memorial address**, he calls the comportment that enables us to remain open to the **meaning** hidden in **technology**, as a **destiny** of being, the **openness** to the mystery. This openness and **releasement** toward **things** belong together. They grant us the **possibility** of **dwelling** in a **world** without being imperiled by technology. The **gift** of our **understanding of being** is the mystery of being.

**MYSTICISM (*Mystik*)**. The importance of mysticism for the development of Heidegger's thought becomes evident in his early book, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*. In this work, he tries to show that the same perennial problems are operative in medieval and modern **philosophy**. The inner **existence** of the medieval **lifeworld** is anchored in the transcendental primal **relation** of the soul to **God**. This is why scholasticism and mysticism belong together for the medieval **worldview**. Heidegger's interest in mysticism was strengthened by his religious crisis of 1914–19, which ended with his break from the system of Catholicism.

In his early lecture-courses in **Freiburg**, the mystic **experience** is a paradigm for the **phenomenology** of **factic life experience**, because it is determined by **worry**. Mystic experiences can never be described theoretically without **unliving** the experience. The **phenomenon** of mysticism is determined by the immediacy of **lived experience** and thus shows that **human beings** are **entities** for which their **being** is an issue.

Heidegger often uses mystic metaphors and concepts in his later philosophy. The best known example is his use of the term *Gelassenheit* (**release-ment**), which he borrowed from **Meister Eckhart**. This mystical vocabulary does not imply that his later thought is ultimately a form of mysticism.

# N

**NATIONAL SOCIALISM** (*Nationalsozialismus*). Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism was motivated by political and philosophical deliberations. The untenable situation of the Weimar Republic and the bankruptcy of the old university system in the early 1930s demanded a solution. Like many Germans, Heidegger saw in the rise of National Socialism the unique **possibility** of a new **beginning**. His concept of the **history of being** enabled him to interpret the National Socialist revolution as a first and necessary step toward **overcoming** the bondage of **technology** and **nihilism**. In his view, humanity could be saved from the technological nihilism of both capitalism and communism only if **human beings** would be granted another encounter with **being** that was as powerful as the **beginning** granted by the Greeks. Only a **people** that "resolutely" answered the challenge of their **fate** could make such an encounter possible. Yet hidden in that **resolve** was a **self-responsibility**, which projects **open** the **future** transformation of the individual through a newly found reciprocity with being.

Heidegger believed that only by confronting the singular challenge of their fate could the German people turn away from nihilism and fulfill the sense of heritage and the **autochthony** of **being-there**. This is the reason he supported National Socialism and became the rector of the University of **Freiburg**. After his resignation in 1934, Heidegger began to criticize Nazism for its betrayal of the "inner **truth** and greatness" of the National (German) Socialist movement. However, he would never unambiguously renounce his own version of National Socialism, and he also never explicitly addressed the horrors of the Holocaust.

*See also* DECISION (*Entscheidung*); RECTORATE 1933/34: FACTS AND THOUGHTS (*Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken*); SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY, THE (*Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*).

**NATORP, PAUL (1854–1924)**. Natorp was one of the main influences on Heidegger's early life and thought. He was Hermann Cohen's successor as the main representative of the **Marburg** school of **neo-Kantianism**.

Contrary to most of his contemporaries, he was well aware of the importance of **metaphysics** for **philosophy** and of **Edmund Husserl's phenomenology**. He wrote one of the first reviews of Husserl's *Ideas*. Natorp was also an important scholar of ancient philosophy. Heidegger studied many of his writings carefully. The **destruction** of Natorp's general theory of psychology is a recurring theme in his early lecture-course in **Freiburg**. Heidegger's ideas on the transformation of the German **spirit** from the **theology** of **Meister Eckhart** and Martin Luther into **German idealism** were very similar to Natorp's. In 1923, Natorp was responsible for Heidegger's appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Marburg. They were kindred spirits who could **keep silent** on their many walks through Marburg.

**NATURAL SCIENCE (*Naturwissenschaft*)**. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger seeks to establish a philosophical **science** (*Wissenschaft*) in contrast to the natural sciences. To this end, he proceeds from the distinction that his predecessor, **Wilhelm Dilthey**, formulated between natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaft*) and the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*).

Prior to Dilthey and the rise of natural sciences in the 19th century (including Charles Darwin's theory of evolution), German thinkers such as **Kant** and **Hegel** had already equated science with **philosophy**.

In his rectoral address in 1933, Heidegger reasserts the primacy of philosophy as a science, in his preliminary vision of reorganizing the University of **Freiburg**. His basic concern is that the pursuit of knowledge has been fragmented into various competing disciplines, with the natural sciences gaining the upper hand. In retrospect, assuming this position of **leadership** in part explains Heidegger's allegiance with **National Socialism**, although his **rectorate** would ultimately be doomed to failure.

Beginning with his lecture-course from the winter semester 1935/36, however, Heidegger revisits the ontological **origin** of the natural sciences. In contrast to the science of **ontology**, which addresses the **question of being**, the natural sciences, for example, physics and chemistry, are *ontic* in character; that is, they circumscribe specific areas of investigation within the realm of **entities**, then develop theoretical models from which principles of empirical knowledge can be induced. He gradually realized that the ontic-ontological distinction was insufficient alone to facilitate a deeper dialogue between philosophy and the natural sciences in order to address the **ground** of the latter. On the contrary, over and against Dilthey, Heidegger realized that the rise of the natural sciences was more than simply symptomatic of the decline of philosophy. Rather, the natural sciences were predicated on a new epoch in the **history of being**, in which nature manifested itself within the narrow confines of its potential to be quantified, that is, according to a **mathemati-**

**cal project.** With the inception of **modernity**, a more dramatic and earth-shaking development was already in play that he described as **machination** in his second major work of 1936–38, *Contributions to Philosophy*.

As his own questioning of **being** is incorporated into the inquiry into **technology**, Heidegger gives increasing attention to the role of the natural sciences, albeit in a critical light. Yet he continues to reassert, for example in *What Is Called Thinking?*, that for all of their marvelous achievements, the natural sciences still do *not* engage in thinking as such. In *Country Path Conversations*, Heidegger considers the perspective of the (natural) scientist, although in contrast once again to formulating the task of thinking.

*See also* QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**NATURE (Natur).** Heidegger's **philosophy** of nature is based on his reading of **Greek philosophy**. Natural **entities** (*physei on*) have the tendency to reveal themselves in **unconcealment**. They thus become accessible and intelligible even if their accessibility and intelligibility are shot through with **untruth** and **finitude**. As **Aristotle** has shown in his *Nicomachean Ethics VI*, there are different ways in which we can understand the **being of entities**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes it clear that the first and most basic way in which we disclose entities is instrumentally. We understand the **being** of entities as **readiness-to-hand** and the entities themselves as **equipment**. When we objectify entities and thus separate them from both their relations to our **comportment** and their involvement within a **whole**, natural **science** becomes possible. This objectifying procedure reduces the being of entities to **presence-at-hand** and **conceals** the essential fullness of nature.

In light of the **turning**, Heidegger develops his conception of the **history of being**. He realizes that modern **technology** is not the final result of **meta-physics**, but the condition of its **possibility**. The Greek **understanding of being** was already technological in its **origins**. Heidegger's later philosophy is an attempt to preserve nature as a whole of **meaning** that lets entities become manifest in their being. With his conception of the **fourfold**, he attempts to revive a cosmological understanding of nature and return entities to their natural **locations**. His poetic view of nature was influenced strongly by **Friedrich Hölderlin** and early Greek **thinking**.

**NATURE OF LANGUAGE, THE (Das Wesen der Sprache).** In these three lectures on **language** in the *studium generale* at the University of **Freiburg** in winter semester 1957/58, Heidegger brings us face-to-face with an **experience** of language. To undergo such an experience means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the **claim** of language. We must enter

into and submit to language. This experience with language is something other than gathering information about language as a tool of communication. In an experience with language, language itself brings itself to language or speech. In everyday language, it holds itself back and so enables us to speak a language.

To undergo an experience with language, Heidegger gives an **interpretation** of Stefan George's poem "**Words**." In this poem we experience the **word** as that which gives things their **being**. Because the **being of entities** dwells in the word, language is the **house of being**. The nature, ownmost character, and "sway" of language is a way that moves everything. This **movement** of language is the **saying** of the **fourfold** that takes place in the stillness of the **play of time-space**. Saying means the lightning-concealing-releasing **gift of world**. As the being of language, saying swings back into the **presencing of nearness**. Saying moves the regions of the world's fourfold into their nearness. This soundless gathering call is the **ringing of stillness**.

**NEARNESS (Nähe)**. The correlation between nearness and **farness (Ferne)** allows Heidegger a wordplay, of which he never tires in his later work. **Being** is near to **being-there**, because it is that by which **entities** that are near are. In this respect, being is the **origin** of all nearness and is thus nearer to being-there than any entity could ever be. For being-there being is far, simply because it is not an entity and can never be conceptualized in this way. Being conceals itself behind the entities to which it gives **presence** in the **clearing**.

**NEED (Not)**. Heidegger speaks of need in two different ways. In *On the Essence of Truth*, he explains that **being-there** must submit to a double influence: the oppression of **errancy** and the prevalence of the **mystery**. From this results a tension in being-there in the form of a need, which arises out of the constraint and **reservedness** imposed upon it by errancy and mystery. The full dynamic and enactment of **truth**, which includes within itself **untruth** of errancy and of mystery, retains being-there in need. Being-there needs to think the **truth of being**.

In his summer semester 1935 lecture-course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger says that **being** itself needs being-there as the "there" of its being. The "there" as the sphere of **openness** is the "necessity" of being. The need of being is that it needs being-there in order to become manifest.

*See also* POVERTY (*Armut*).

**NEGATIVITY (Nichtigkeit)**. *See* NULLITY (*Nichtigkeit*).

**NEO-KANTIANISM** (*Neukantianismus*). Neo-Kantianism is one of Germany's most important philosophical movements of the later 19th and early 20th centuries. Wilhelm Windelband, **Heinrich Rickert**, and **Emil Lask** were the main representatives of the Southwest German school. They tried to supplement **Immanuel Kant's** theory of knowledge with a **value-philosophy** and a methodology for the humanities. They divided reality into two different realms: the theoretical realm of the facts of **natural science** and the practical realm of **values**, which were studies in the humanities.

Hermann Cohen, **Paul Natorp**, and **Ernst Cassirer** belonged to the rival school of **Marburg**. This school used Kant's theory of knowledge to explain the **possibility** of science and thus reduced his philosophy to **epistemology**.

**NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH (1844–1900)**. Heidegger started reading Nietzsche as a student around 1910. His great confrontation with the philosopher with the hammer took place in the 1930s. Nietzsche became the pivotal figure in the **history of being**. He was the first to discover that **entities** count for "**nothing**" in **metaphysics**. He also disclosed that the **being** of entities is grounded in the **will to power**, while being itself is **presence** as the **eternal recurrence of the same**. Since **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's** system is the **completion of metaphysics** as **Platonism**, and Nietzsche turned Hegel upside down, his philosophy is the final **truth** of the first **possibility** of metaphysics. Nietzsche's attempt to overcome metaphysics through his re-valuation of all values resulted in the final consummation of **nihilism**. His **philosophy** is thus both the final completion of the history of metaphysics and the beginning of the dominance of **technology**.

*See also* ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME, THE (*Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*); ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME AND THE WILL TO POWER, THE (*Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Wille zur Macht*); NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS (*Nietzsches Metaphysik*); NIHILISM AS DETERMINED BY THE HISTORY OF METAPHYSICS (*Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*); VALUE-PHILOSOPHY (*Wertphilosophie*); WHO IS NIETZSCHE'S ZARATHUSTRA? (*Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?*); WILL TO POWER AS ART, THE (*Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*); WILL TO POWER AS KNOWLEDGE, THE (*Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis*); WORD OF NIETZSCHE, THE: "GOD IS DEAD" (*Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'*).

**NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS** (*Nietzsches Metaphysik*). This text, written in 1940, was originally announced as a lecture-course for winter semester 1941/42. Heidegger replaced it at the last moment with the course on **Friedrich Hölderlin's** hymn "Remembrance." The starting point of his **interpretation** is that **Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy** is a unified **meta-**

**physics**, since he thinks **entities in the whole** in their **truth**. His attempt to clarify the hidden unity of Nietzsche's thought is grounded in the fundamental **experience** of *Being and Time* that the **truth of being** has remained **unthought** in the history of philosophy. It is a discussion of the five fundamental expressions of Nietzsche's metaphysics: **will to power**, **nihilism**, the **eternal recurrence of the same**, the **overman**, and justice.

The **being of entities** is grounded in the will to power. Nihilism is the awareness of the emptiness of **values** and of the fact that the being of **entities** counts for **nothing**. The eternal recurrence of the same names the **presencing** of **being**. The overman thinks the **essence** of **human being** as the reversal of **subjectivity**. Justice is the supreme representative of **life** itself.

The essay closes with a series of questions concerning the ground and **origin** of metaphysics. Behind these questions lies Heidegger's conviction that Nietzsche's philosophy is the **completion of metaphysics** as its final truth.

**NIHILATION** (*das Nichten*). Since **being** is not an **entity**, **being-there** can only grasp it as that which is not a thing. The **nothing** is the nihilating element in being itself that makes possible the **presence** of entities and being-there. This nihilation is the **abground** of the **ontological difference**.

**NIHILISM** (*Nihilismus*). For Heidegger, nihilism and **metaphysics** are one. Nihilism is the fundamental hidden **movement** within the history of metaphysics. Metaphysics is nihilistic in a double sense. First, **Friedrich Nietzsche** discovered that **entities** are **nothing** but expressions of the **will to power** and therefore are unable to ground the **meaning of being**. Second, what remained hidden for Nietzsche is that in metaphysics, **being** itself withdraws. Metaphysics is the **forgottenness of being**.

Nietzsche's **philosophy** as an attempt to overcome nihilism is in reality the final **completion of metaphysics** as nihilism. After Nietzsche, nihilism became the normal condition of **being-there's** **existence**, and it reaches its final consummation in the dominance of **technology**.

To overcome nihilism, we must attempt to turn toward its **unthought origin**. This **turning** is the first step on our way to leaving nihilism behind. We must learn to deny the will and listen to the **claim of being**.

*See also* NIHILISM AS DETERMINED BY THE HISTORY OF METAPHYSICS (*Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*).

**NIHILISM AS DETERMINED BY THE HISTORY OF METAPHYSICS** (*Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*). This essay, written between 1944 and 1946, begins with the question of whether **nihilism** as such is overcome in **Friedrich Nietzsche's** **metaphysics**. Nietzsche



insists that the **being of entities** is the **will to power** in the **mode** of the **eternal recurrence of the same**. Since he leaves no room for the **nothing**, it seems that nihilism is overcome. And yet he misses the **origin** of nihilism, that is, the history in which there is nothing to **being** itself. He insists that being is a **value**, but if being is a value, there is nothing to it. In this sense, his **philosophy** is the **completion of metaphysics**.

Metaphysics is essentially onto-theo-logical, and therefore we could call Nietzsche's thought negative **onto-theo-logy**. He neglects to think **unconcealment** as the **truth of being**. The **relation** of being to **being-there** becomes the crucial problem for Heidegger. The **forgottenness of being** is the **gift** of being itself. To overcome nihilism, **thinking** must encounter the **mystery** of being. In this encounter, it can **experience** the withdrawal of being. In the **need** and **danger** of the present age, we can only prepare for the **other beginning**.

**NOTHING** (*Nichts*). In *Being and Time*, the nothing is experienced in the fundamental **mood** of **anxiety**. The nothing is that in the face of which we are anxious, for example, the possibility of **being-there** ceasing to be, that is, **death**. In his inaugural lecture, *What Is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger develops a **phenomenology** of the nothing. In anxiety, being-there is suspended in the nothing as **entities** slip away into **absence**. The nothing negates **entities in the whole** and thus frees being-there from its absorption and **fallenness** in the surrounding entities. Since being-there always already exists in the nothing, entities as such can become manifest in their **being**. In the **being of entities**, the **nihilation** of entities happens. In his later writings, Heidegger describes the nothing as the nihilation in being itself that makes the **presence** of entities and being-there possible. It is the **abground** of the **ontological difference** that makes possible the **clearing** as the **truth of being** itself.

**NOTHINGNESS** (*Nichts*). See **NOTHING** (*Nichts*).

**NOVALIS (1772–1801)**. Novalis was the pseudonym and pen name of Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg. He was a poet of early German Romanticism who figures prominently in the development of Heidegger's account of **homesickness**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger cites Novalis's remark concerning the origin of homesickness as stemming from an "'urge to be everywhere at home.'"

In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1955/56, *The Principle of Reason*, Heidegger cites a passage from Novalis pertaining to an inexhaustible **mystery of being**, which is hidden in ultimate philosophical principles. In this context, Heidegger observes that Novalis was “a great thinker” as well as a poet.

**NOW, THE (*das Jetzt*)**. In our ordinary understanding of **time** as a pure sequence of nows without beginning and without end, the ecstatic character of primordial **temporality** has been leveled off. The now belongs to time as innertimeness. It is that in which something arises, passes away, or is **present-at-hand**. Every now is now “no longer” or is now “not yet.”

**NULLITY (*Nichtigkeit*)**. In **anxiety** the nullity is unveiled, by which **being-there** is determined in its **ground** as a finite **entity**. **Death** is the nullity that comes toward being-there as its most unique and utmost **possibility**, that is, the possible impossibility of its **existence**. Nullity also appears as the basis or ground on which the **self** takes over its responsibility for its **existence** or owns up to its potential to be **guilty**.

*See also* ABGROUND (*Abgrund*); NOTHING (*Nichts*); SELF-RESPONSIBILITY (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*).

# O

**OBJECTIVITY (*Objektivität*).** Being-there determines the **being of entities** within its **world** as **readiness-to-hand**. Each **entity** is a piece of **equipment** within the **whole** of its **involvement**. As ready-to-hand, the being of an entity is determined by its **relation** to being-there. Being-there has the **possibility** to step back from the entities within its **world** and **thematize** them as they are objectively in themselves. It frees the entities it encounters within the world, in such a way that it can throw them over against itself and objectify them. Entities thus become the objects of the **representations** of subjects. Theoretical knowledge objectifies entities and reduces the **being** of being-there to **subjectivity**. The objectivity of the object is grounded in the subjectivity of being-there, since it is a **projection** of being-there and therefore presupposes its **transcendence**. In the age of **technology** and **nihilism**, the objectivity of objects is finally reduced to **standing-reserve**.

**OBLIVION (*Vergessenheit*).** See FORGOTTENNESS OF BEING (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

**OBSERVATIONS I–V (BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1942–1948) (*Amerkungen I–V [Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948]*).** This text comprises volume 97 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition** and continues his discussion of *The Black Notebooks* through 1948. These *Notebooks* trace the development of his inquiry as he more fully describes the task of **thinking** as forging a new path or **way** (*der Weg*). **Enowning** (*Ereignis*) directs the thinker along the way (*der Weg*). In this regard, *Observations* reflects Heidegger’s inquiry as “under way,” specifically toward addressing the interdependence of **language** and thinking. The text also includes passages in which he distances himself from the politics of **National Socialism**, and yet also includes the problematic remark about how Western **religion** becomes assimilated into the ideological fabric of **machination**.

In *Observations I*, Heidegger suggests that Judaism as an “ism” represents views that become entrenched in the **completion of metaphysics**. At the end of modernity, religions become fragmented into opposing systems of beliefs,

each of which presents a competing **worldview**. However, there are also stereotypical aspects in Heidegger's characterization of Judaism that overlook its deeper **tradition** and origin. In *Observations IV*, he revisits his view concerning the assimilation of religion to ideology by underscoring the unity of Christianity and Judaism (*jüdisch-christlichen Monotheismus*) and its absorption into modern **technology**. In *Observations II*, Heidegger adopts a more self-critical stance toward Germany's politics; specifically, he draws attention to the negative influence of the Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*), which he had earlier addressed in *Mindfulness* (1938–39), and to the thoughtlessness surrounding that form of indoctrination.

In *Observations III*, Heidegger examines the historical trajectory of Western metaphysics under the guise of the **eschatology of be-ing** (*die Eschatologie des Seyns*). He identifies various stages that epitomize the **forgottenness** of be-ing, on the one hand, and on the other, the rise of the **metaphysics of subjectivity**. He identifies **Gottfried Leibniz's** monadology and **G. W. F. Hegel's** dialectic of Absolute **Spirit** as two noteworthy developments that spearheaded **modernity** and its entrenchment in **nihilism**. Heidegger also identifies the link between Joseph Stalin and Hitler as posing a significant threat to the welfare of modern Europe. In *Observations V*, Heidegger concludes his reflections on this tumultuous period in European politics and the challenges posed for continuing to proceed along the path of thinking.

**OCCIDENT.** See WEST, THE (*das Abendland*).

**OFF THE BEATEN TRACK (*Holzwege*).** Heidegger first published this collection of essays in 1950; it was later republished as volume 5 of his **Complete Edition**. These essays span the period from 1936 to 1945 and bring to fruition Heidegger's enactment of **being-historical thinking**. Foremost among these essays is *The Origin of the Work of Art*. This essay marks a crossroads in his attempt to think the dynamic of **truth** as **unconcealment** through its interplay with its opposite and to address the **world** as relocated along a new axis of its opposition or **strife** with the **earth**.

See also FOREST TRAILS (*Holzwege*).

**ON ODEBRECHT'S AND CASSIRER'S CRITIQUE OF THE KANT-BOOK (*Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuchs*).** Heidegger's handwritten notes on the reviews of the Kant-book by Rudolf Odebrecht and **Ernst Cassirer** center on their **interpretation** of the basic question of **Immanuel Kant's** **philosophy** about the grounding of the **finitude** of human knowledge. Heidegger's response to these criticisms is reproduced as appendix V of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which appears as volume 3 of the **Complete Edition** (*Gesamtausgabe*).

**ON THE ESSENCE AND CONCEPT OF φύσις: ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS B, 1 (Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις, Aristoteles, Physik, B, I).** In this essay, written in 1939 and published in 1960, Heidegger claims that Aristotle's *Physics* is the hidden and therefore never adequately studied foundational book of **philosophy**. Aristotle uses the **word phusis** in two fundamental **meanings**. It designates the **being (ousia)** of **entities in the whole**, and the **being of entities** that have in themselves the course of their **movement**. Aristotle's *Physics* is the transition between original Greek **thinking** and **metaphysics**.

In *Physics*, we learn that *phusis* is the principle, *arche*, of movement. The goal of this movement is the *telos* of the **entity**. Movement ceases when an entity reaches its end, and for this reason repose is the culmination of **movement**. When entities reach their end, they present themselves in **unconcealment**.

Aristotle explains the movement of entities as the interplay between form, *morphè*, and matter, *hylè*. Form poses an entity in its appearance, *eidos*, as it is. This process always involves a privation, *sterèsis*, since the coming to **presence** of an entity (such as a fruit) is at the same time the disappearance of what it was before (the blossom). Form is the **essence** of *phusis* as principle, and principle is the essence of *phusis* as form.

*Phusis* is the name **Heraclitus** gave to the unconcealment (*alètheia*) of being. Entities presence out of **concealment**. In Aristotle's conception of *phusis*, the negativity inherent in **truth** disappears. Truth is no longer unconcealment, but resides now in the **assertion** and consists in the correspondence of the intellect and its object.

*See also* GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*).

**ON THE ESSENCE OF GROUND (Vom Wesen des Grundes).** In this 1929 essay, written for the Festschrift in honor of **Edmund Husserl's** 70th birthday, Heidegger thinks the **ontological difference** as the **nothing** between **entities** and **being**. He also provides one of his most important descriptions of the **phenomenon** of **world**, which emerges from his discussion of **Immanuel Kant's** concept of world in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Heidegger begins by showing that the problem of **ground** is essentially one of **truth**. The principle of the ground—that every entity has a ground—is grounded on the truth of **judgments**. This truth is in turn grounded on **ontological** truth as the manifestation of entities in their being. **Ontic** truth is grounded on ontological truth as the unveiling of the **being of entities**. The distinction between ontic and ontological truth presupposes the ontological difference. This **difference** can only be understood by an entity that discloses the being of entities and thus transcends **entities in the whole**. The ontological difference is thus grounded on **being-there's transcendence**. The transcendence of being-there is its **being-in-the-world**.

Transcendence is the **origin** of the ground, insofar as it comes to **presence** from out of the disclosure of world. This unified process of grounding consists of three elements. First is ground as laying-claim (*Stiften*), that is, **being-there's projection** of the "for-the-sake-of-which" as world. Second is grounding as taking ground (*Boden-nehmen*). Being-there transcends entities in surpassing toward the **horizon** of world, but this is only possible because the **self** is already **situated** among entities. To transcendence belongs the taking-ground in the midst of entities in the whole. Third is grounding as **founding**. **Freedom** as transcendence is freedom in relation to the ground as founding, which uncovers from the depths of its **finitude** the basis for any ground. Founding makes it possible for being-there to encounter entities by making them manifest in and as themselves. The origin of the ground is the threefold discharging of the ground process that arises as the **projection** of the world, the taking-ground among entities in the whole, and the ontological founding of the **being of entities**.

**ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY** (*Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*). This summer semester 1930 lecture-course, which addresses the synergy between the question of human **freedom** and the **question of being**, is an introduction to **philosophy** and points to the development of Heidegger's **thinking** after *Being and Time*. The text of this lecture-course now comprises volume 31 of his **Complete Edition**.

In the first part, Heidegger shows how the question concerning human freedom is of central importance to the **guiding question** of **metaphysics**: What is the **being of entities**? Metaphysics asks about the being of **entities in the whole**. Since we also belong to this **whole**, the guiding question concerns us as entities. Metaphysics understands the being of entities as constant **presence**. Presence refers to the **present** and **presentness**. This means that metaphysics understands being in light of **time**. The guiding question is transformed into the question: What is the **ground** of the **relation** between being and time? How does time make possible the **understanding of being** and allow for the articulation of its **meaning in words**?

This is the **basic question** of philosophy. To answer this question, we must ask more radically about the being of **human being**, and this means rediscovering freedom as the ground of the human. The **possibility** of understanding being is the ground of **human being** and reveals freedom as the power that makes us human. According to Heidegger, freedom is not simply a possession or property of human beings; instead, we are possessed by freedom as what most decisively determines **who** we are. The human being thereby reemerges in the inquiry as a **possibility** of freedom. That is, we are delivered over to this power as the **openness** from which all our other capa-

bilities derive. Consequently, the guiding question of metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning freedom and the transposing of being-there into this **expanse** of openness.

In the second part, Heidegger discusses the problem of human freedom by way of a concrete **interpretation** of **Immanuel Kant's** understanding of **transcendental** and practical freedom. He shows that in Kant's view, freedom and causality can be reconciled. Freedom is the possibility to start a causal series. The problem does not belong to practical philosophy as a special discipline, since causality is grounded in freedom, not the other way around. The problem of freedom in turn belongs to the problem of world, insofar as the **fact** of making choices confirms the **facticity** of freedom. In his critical account, Heidegger provides the most detailed treatment in all of his writings of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, specifically the resolution of the Third Antinomy or the conflict between freedom and necessity.

The final part takes up the problem of practical freedom within an ontological dimension, offering Heidegger's most detailed account of Kant's morality and providing clues to an **original ethics**. Heidegger argues that Kant's account of autonomy as the self-legislation of the law can be reinterpreted on existential grounds as **self-responsibility**.

Heidegger concluded by showing how the question of human freedom provides a new point of departure for re-asking the question of being. Ultimately, freedom is the condition of the possibility of the manifestation of the being of entities. Our understanding of being is grounded in freedom.

**ON THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE: THE METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE ESSENCING OF THE WORD; CONCERNING HERDER'S "TREATISE ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE" (*Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herders Abhandlung "Über den Ursprung der Sprache"*)**. This text provides notes along with an outline for a seminar that was held in the summer semester of 1939 and is now published as volume 85 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. As indicated in the subtitle, Heidegger approaches J. G. Herder's *Treatise* as a springboard to address the nature of **language** and formulate its broader importance for developing the **question of being**. Conversely, Herder did not recognize that it is only in light of the manifestation of **being** that the nature of language can appear in its **disclosive** power and not merely as a human capacity.

These lecture notes help to mark the transition from a **metaphysical**, anthropological approach to language and Heidegger's efforts to bring a discussion of that topic within a being-historical context. In the process, he repeatedly introduces poetic images as examples to elicit the disclosive power of the **word** over against simply speech acts or conceptual formulas. The interface between **thinking** and **poetizing**, insofar as each exercises **care for**

**the word**, marks the disclosive power of language. Several other key motifs, which prefigure the development of Heidegger's later thinking and his inquiry into language, also emerge. Foremost among these is how the word of be-ing (*Seyn*) arises from the interplay between *earth* and *world*; this deeper level of **differentiation** spawns the birth of new idioms of speech. By appealing to **Stefan George's** poetry in particular, Heidegger uncovers the basic leitmotif for addressing the innermost connection between language and the manifestation of being. The intimation of this interface comes to light in George's simple **saying**, "Listen to what the somber earth speaks."

Heidegger reinterprets Herder's **ontical** characterizations of language as clues to uncover its **ontological** dimension. In his *Treatise*, Herder addresses phonetic aspects of language, including the auditory character of speech, its potential for harkening, and the corollary facet of **hearing**. He attempts to arrive at these primordial intimations of speech in uncovering the root of communication that his mentor, **Immanuel Kant**, had discerned in his account of aesthetic **experience** in the *Critique of Judgment*. Heidegger shows, however, that attentiveness to and hearing rest more primordially on silence as **stillness**. Stillness is the innermost point of gathering (*Sammeln*), which harbors the **strife** between **world** and **thing**. Heidegger thereby suggests that the speech acts, which are ordinarily attributed to language as the practice of communication, depend on a prior gathering of this power within depths of stillness. In this way, language encompasses, but cannot be reduced to, the entire nexus of significations that make up the openness of the world.

Through this careful and painstaking analysis of Herder's treatise, Heidegger takes a significant step beyond the metaphysical-anthropological way of defining language. He characterizes this step as a leap into (*Einsprung*) the **essential sway** (*Wesung*) of the word, as a transition to the **other beginning** of **thinking**. Although fragmentary in some respects, his "notes" to this graduate seminar provide an outline of the key themes that will shape his book *On the Way to Language*.

**ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*)**. This essay was published in 1943 and contains the text of a lecture that Heidegger conceived in 1930 and delivered on various occasions under the same title. The function of the lecture is to analyze the **ontological ground** of **truth** in its connection with **being**. Since the original **meaning** of truth is **unconcealment** (*alètheia*), Heidegger must bring to light the interplay of its opposite (*Unwesen*), or **concealment**.

In the first half of the essay, Heidegger discusses what is truth. The traditional definition of truth is the correspondence of the intellect and its object, *adequatio intellectus et rei*. The measure of truth lies in the correctness of the accordance of an **assertion**, **logos**, with an object. But what makes the accordance possible? Before we are able to make an assertion about an **entity**, we



must have discovered its being. We can only encounter entities in the **open**, that is, the “there” of **being-there**. Through its **existence**, being-there stands out in the open. The **openness** of being-there’s **comportment** makes the **presence** of entities possible.

Heidegger calls being-there’s openness toward the open and the **being of entities freedom**. The ground of truth resides in being-there’s freedom. Freedom is the intrinsic **possibility** of truth as **revelment** of entities through which an openness essentially unfolds. Being-there is grounded in the openness of the open and by participating in it first **experiences** of truth as unconcealment. The enactment of freedom consists in **letting-be**, in order that entities can show themselves in their singularity.

What is the “nonessence” of truth or **untruth**? The revelation of an entity as such is at the same time the concealment of **entities in the whole**. Because concealment is the dissimulation of truth, it also conceals itself. Being’s concealment in the unconcealment of entities is a **mystery** that being-there has forgotten. This is the **forgottenness of being**. Being-there is subject to the domination of the mystery and the oppression of **errancy**. Due to this double dynamic of truth as revealing-concealing, errancy is not merely privation but rather the harbinger of a mystery. The glimpse into the mystery is a questioning that thinks the **question of being**.

**ON THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHAIR SINCE 1866** (*Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866*). This short text was published in the Festschrift *Die Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 1527–1927* in 1927 and later included as appendix VI of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In it Heidegger presents the origin, development, effect, and reconstitution of the neo-Kantianism of the **Marburg** school. Heidegger gives a brief outline of the work of its main representatives: Hermann Cohen, **Paul Natorp**, Nicolai Hartmann, and **Ernst Cassirer**.

**ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF THE MATTER OF THINKING** (*Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens*). Heidegger delivered a shorter version of this text as a lecture on October 30, 1965, in honor of the Swiss psychiatrist, **Ludwig Binswanger**, which was later published in an expanded form in Japan in December 1968. Heidegger underscores the importance of returning to the **origin of thinking**, particularly for casting light on what it means to be human in a century that has witnessed the rise of **cybernetics** and **natural science**. The concern within the medical and psychiatric community for the health and welfare of our **being-there** requires such a philosophical orientation. Our humanity cannot be objectified scientifically, since it originates in and through the **clearing of being** itself.

**ON THE QUESTION OF BEING (*Zur Seinsfrage*).** This 1955 essay presents the unaltered, slightly expanded text of Heidegger's contribution, *Concerning the Line*, to a Festschrift in honor of **Ernst Jünger**. In this text, he discusses all the main themes of his late **philosophy**. The alteration of the title is meant to indicate that the discussion of the nature of **nihilism** stems from the explication of the **question of being** as such. How does **being** manifest itself? This is not a metaphysical inquiry into the **being of entities**, but a regressive **step back** into the **ground** of **metaphysics**.

In the essay, Heidegger comments on a text by Jünger, *Across the Line*. This is the empty **nothing** where nihilism reigns. Jünger wants to push the **movement** beyond the critical point and thus invite a new transformation of humanity in and through nihilism. Heidegger's essay, on the other hand, concerns only the line and does not attempt to cross it. Heidegger criticizes Jünger for moving too quickly. We must first find the **location** of this line. From this location, the provenance of the nature of nihilism and its consummation emerge.

With the consummation of nihilism begins the final phase of **metaphysics**, that is, the reign of **enframing**. If we want to reflect on the historical **origin** and **possibilities** of nihilism, we must first lay out a path that leads to discussing the **history of being**. On this path alone can the question concerning the nothing be discussed. In order to be able to follow this path, we must relinquish the **language** of metaphysics. If a potential shift and turn-around belongs to being, as Jünger thinks, then **being** must initiate this **turning** through its "own" power of **unconcealment**. But then we must use an "X" designating **being (as) "crossed out"** to distinguish it from the concept of being that metaphysics formulates. The crossing out is the location where the four regions of the **fourfold** are gathered together. In the phase of the consummation of nihilism, being as such remains absent and thus conceals itself. The **forgottenness of being** shelters its unrevealed **mystery**. Unconcealment (*alètheia*) resides in the **concealment** of **presencing**. The task of **thinking** is to heed the **address of being** and allow its silent voice to **echo** in language.

**ON THE SISTINE MADONNA (*Über die Sixtina*).** In this brief text from 1955, Heidegger shows how the **work of art** can disclose religious themes. In this case, a picture (*Bild*) of the Madonna with her baby—*Mary and the Child Jesus (Maria und das Jesusknabe)*, by Raphael (1513–1514), evokes the **awe** through which **God** can appear, and, reciprocally, **human beings** can participate in acts of worship. Thus, the painting is not merely a symbolic representation of the divine, but instead the **site** for the breakthrough of **truth** as **unconcealment** and hence the appearance of what is **holy**.

**ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE** (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*). This text includes several essays from 1950–1959, which have been republished as volume 12 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. The title reflects the unique inquiry that he undertakes into the enactment and unfolding of **language**. Heidegger develops his key formulation that “language speaks,” and human beings speak only by first listening to and co-responding to language. In this regard, language provides the **place of unconcealment**, thereby serving as the **house of being**.

As Heidegger first emphasized in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), language is ultimately grounded in silence.

*See also* RETICENCE IN SILENCE (*Sigetik*).

**ONEFOLD** (*Einfalt*). From a methodological perspective, the onefold refers to the unity and sameness of the matter of thinking, that is, as set forth through re-asking the **question of being**. Heidegger employs the term onefold in different contexts. The onefold also defines the **gathering** into unity of the **belonging together** of being and **thinking**. The onefoldedness pre-unites the **relation** allowing this reciprocity between the two to occur.

The onefold also defines the simplicity of the **fourfold** as the interplay of **earth** and **sky**, **mortals** and **gods**. In the stilling of **stillness**, the gathering of this onefold resonates for the first time.

**ONES TO COME, THE** (*die Zukünftigen*). In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger points to a future development of **thinking** beyond the restrictions of the **history** of the metaphysical **tradition**. The unfolding of this **future** also implies a corresponding transformation of man or the **human being** who undertakes this task of thinking. The creative individuals who are the emissaries of this future epitomize the ones to come. They prepare the way for more original and dynamic possibilities of **be-ing** to manifest itself. *The Ones to Come* is the title of the “fifth jointure” of *Contributions to Philosophy*.

**ONTIC** (*ontisch*). An ontic **interpretation** is concerned with an **entity** as an entity. It does not ask the question about the **being** of an entity and the **structure** of its being. A botanical classification of plant is, for example, an ontic interpretation. When we try to determine the way of being of plants in its difference to the **way of being** of animals, we give an **ontological** interpretation of the being of plants and not of plants as such. Heidegger maintains that descriptions of **human being** in terms of biological and anthropological characteristics remain at the ontic level, failing to address the being of **being-there as care** (*Sorge*).

*See also* ONTOLOGY (*Ontologie*).

**ONTIC SCIENCE** (*ontische Wissenschaft*). Any theoretical discipline that restricts its knowledge to a specific area of **entities** can be called an **ontic science**. An ontic **science** does not address the presuppositions of its own discipline, and never seeks guidance from the **question of being**. With the exception of **philosophy**, Heidegger relegates all other disciplines to ontic sciences, including the study of **God** or **theology**. In *Phenomenology and Theology*, he argues that the science of **being** alone can reveal the limitations of the ontic sciences.

**ONTOLOGICAL** (*ontologisch*). An ontological **interpretation** is concerned with the **being of entities**. It does not ask the **ontic** question about the **entity** as such.

*See also* ONTOLOGY (*Ontologie*).

**ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE** (*ontologische Differenz*). The **ontological** difference is the difference between **being** as such and specific **entities**. Being is not any entity or something else that is. The ontological difference not only separates being and entities, but also joins them in a dynamic tension. By virtue of their difference, being and entities belong together. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927) and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928), Heidegger emphasizes that the ontological difference is indispensable for developing a concept of being and articulating its **meaning** in philosophical terms. In his text from 1941–42, *Enowning* (*Das Ereignis*), Heidegger provides a further explication of the ontological difference with respect to the differentiation itself occurring between being and entities.

In *Anaximander's Saying* (1946), Heidegger claims that the **forgottenness of being** throughout the **history of metaphysics** stems from the **forgettleness of the difference** between being and entities. However, in this text, and equally pivotal ones such as *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger simply refers to the “difference.”

**ONTOLOGY** (*Ontologie*). Ontology is the science of **being**. It inquires into the **being of entities**. The task of **fundamental ontology** is to formulate the question of the **meaning of being**, in contrast to addressing only **entities in the whole**. The inquiry into **entities** in the whole, including the all-highest or **God**, defines **metaphysics**. Within the history of **philosophy**, metaphysics and ontology often describe complementary tasks. As Heidegger undertakes his **destruction** of the philosophical **tradition**, he characterizes metaphysics as **onto-theo-logical** through its misconstruing the **highest entity** on an equal par with **being**.

*See also* ONTIC (*ontisch*).

**ONTOLOGY: THE HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY** (*Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität*). This summer semester 1923 lecture-course is an important step on the way to *Being and Time*. As the title indicates, Heidegger characterizes his **ontology** as a **hermeneutics of facticity**. Facticity is the **being** of our own **being-there**. Here, Heidegger describes being-there for the first time as a **formal indication** of the central **phenomenon** of **phenomenology**. It indicates the **particular whileness** that each of us is and has. After a historical overview of the history of hermeneutics, Heidegger interprets hermeneutics not as a **science of interpretation**, but as explicating communication. Its goal is the self-**understanding** of being-there. Since interpretation is an outstanding **possibility** of the being of factual **life** itself, hermeneutics is an essential **possibility** of facticity. In order to keep the term being-there **ontologically** neutral, we must **dismantle** the traditional concepts of human being such as rational animal and person. **Existence** is being-there's most unique and most intense **possibility**. It is being-there's ability to hold itself awake and be alert to itself in its ultimate possibility. After a discussion of the contemporary state of **philosophy**, Heidegger comes to his phenomenological analysis of being-there.

The being of being-there is determined as being in a **world**. In order to characterize the everyday world and to develop the formal indication of being-there as **being-in-the-world**, Heidegger formulates the trio of questions that we also find in *Being and Time*: (1) What does a world mean? (2) What does "in" a world imply? (3) How does being in a world appear? Only the first question is worked out in any detail in the course. We encounter world in three different ways, as **environment**, **with-world**, and **self-world**. Environment is a meaningful context that discloses the being of **entities** as **equipment**. Our everyday **openness** toward entities is made possible by the fundamental phenomenon of **care**. Because in the **everydayness** of our lives we are first and foremost concerned with entities, the potential individuation and **ownedness** of our being-there is at the same time concealed. Heidegger calls this potential ownedness **discovery**. In *Being and Time*, the **meanings** of **disclosedness** and discovery will be reversed.

**ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF METAPHYSICS, THE** (*Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*). This 1957 lecture concludes the winter semester 1956/57 seminar on **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Science of Logic**. Its topic is the relation between **being** and **thinking**. For Heidegger, Hegel's **logic** is a treatise on thinking. For Hegel, thinking means absolute thinking that thinks itself. Since the matter of thinking is historical, every philosopher has his own place within the history of **philosophy**. This means we must also consider Hegel's own place in the history of philosophy. For Hegel, the matter of thinking is the Absolute

Concept, for Heidegger the **ontological difference** as difference. Where Hegel tries to sublimate all that has been thought before, Heidegger attempts to **step back** into the domain of that which has remained **unthought**.

Hegel's philosophy belongs to **metaphysics**. In his *Science of Logic*, the onto-theo-logical **structure** of metaphysics comes to light as foundational thought. Hegel is concerned with the **founding of entities**, that is, **ontology**. In this founding he determines **being** as the **ground of entities in the whole**, that is, **theology**. Because metaphysics is essentially **onto-theo-logy**, it cannot think the difference between being and entities. The difference is sublated in the concept of **God** as *causa sui* in whom the **being of entities** is grounded. When we take a regressive step back to take a closer look at this identity, the ontological difference finally reveals itself as that which is worthy of thought.

**ONTO-THEO-LOGY (*Onto-theo-logie*)**. Since **metaphysics** represents **entities** as entities, it is itself the **truth** of entities in their universality and in the **highest entity**. It is **ontology**, the inquiry into the **being of entities** in general, and **theology**, the **science** of the highest entity in which the **being** of all other entities is grounded. This onto-theo-logical **structure** of metaphysics is the historical root of **philosophy**. Philosophy is onto-theo-logy and thus the reason that being as such remained forgotten in the history of metaphysics.

*See also* ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF METAPHYSICS, THE (*Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*).

**OPEN, THE (*das Offene*)**. The open is a **formal indication** of **being-there** as the **site** of **being's** manifestation. It opens up the **play-space** within which being-there can encounter **entities**. At the conclusion of *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger describes the open as the dimension of the **between (*Zwischen*)** through which entities can become manifest and the **self** can encounter them in its reciprocal capacity to **let be**.

*See also* CLEARING (*Lichtung*); INABIDING (*Inständigkeit*); TRUTH OF BEING, THE (*die Wahrheit des Seins*).

**OPENNESS (*Offenständigkeit*)**. Openness is a **compartment** of **being-there** through which it stands out in the **open**. It is grounded in being-there's **ek-sistence**. This abiding within the openness makes it possible for being-there to encounter **entities**. The openness is also the explicit way in which being-there both **experiences** and participates in **truth** as **unconcealment**.

**ORIGIN (*Ursprung*).** The origin is the source from which something springs. It makes it possible for an **entity** to rise up (*phusis*) as what it is and how it is. *Poïèsis*, for instance, is the origin of the work of **art** and the source of its uniqueness.

*See also* POETRY (*Dichtung*).

**ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART, THE (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*).** This essay contains the text of a lecture Heidegger delivered on various occasions in 1935 and 1936 and included it in a collection of essays published in the 1st edition of *Holzwege* in 1950. The aim of the lecture is to arrive at the immediate and unique unfolding of the work of **art** in order to discover the **origin** of art within it. The text was updated through various editions, culminating in the 7th edition, which was published in Recalm's *Universal Bibliothek* in 1960. This was the version that was reprinted in the text of *Holzwege (*Off the Beaten Track*)*, which was then published as volume 5 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition** in 1977.

In the first part, *Thing and Work*, Heidegger outlines the essential difference between a thing and a work of art. What is a **thing**? The concepts with which **philosophy** tries to understand things as things derive their **meaning** from the **being of equipment**. Equipment resembles the work of art insofar as it is the product of human work. When we compare Vincent van Gogh's painting that depicts a pair of shoes with the shoes themselves, their difference becomes clear. Reliability determines the being of the shoes as equipment. The shoes are there when we need them, and we can rely on them to perform their function. When we wear our shoes, we understand what they are. Van Gogh's painting reveals the **beingness** of shoes. It lets us know what shoes in truth are. The work of art opens up the being of **entities**. This opening up is the revealment of the **truth of being** and happens in the work of art. In the work of art, truth sets itself to work. So Heidegger comes to the next question: What is truth as the setting-itself-to-work?

In the second part, *The Work and the Truth*, Heidegger first discusses the work-being of the work. A work, like a Greek temple, works in the sense that it sets up a **world** and at the same time sets this world back again on the **earth**, which itself thus emerges as native ground. This setting up of a world is making space for the worlding of world, that is, the liberation of the **open** and the establishment of its **structure**. The work of art lets the earth be an earth and thus make the **autochthony** of the **dwelling** of **human beings** possible. We can now ask: What is **truth**? Truth is the **unconcealment** of entities. Truth happens as the primal **strife** between revealing (world) and concealing (earth). Art and truth are joined, since beauty is one of the ways in which truth occurs as unconcealment. But how does truth happen in the work of art?

Heidegger tries to answer this question in the third part, *Truth and Art*. The happening of truth is the struggle of the conflict between world and earth. Truth happens only by establishing itself in this strife and clearing the **openness**. It sets itself into work and establishes itself in the work of art as the struggle of earth and **world**. All art as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of “what is” is as such essentially **poetry**. Poetry is the **saying** of world and earth, the saying of the area of their strife, and thus the place of all **nearness** and **farness** of the **gods**. The nature of poetry is the grounding of truth and may be considered from three points of view as a **gift**, a **founding**, and a **beginning**.

**ORIGINAL ETHICS (*ursprüngliche Ethik*)**. Throughout his vast writings, Heidegger rarely addresses the topic of ethics. One notable exception occurs in his *Letter on “Humanism”* (1946). Heidegger recounts a story in which after the publication of *Being and Time*, a young student asked him when he planned to write a treatise on ethics. Heidegger responded by saying that only when we have re-asked the **question of being** can we clarify the assumptions on which a viable ethics rests. An original ethics simultaneously takes its cue from, and contributes to, the task of **thinking the truth of being**. The **mission** that **human beings** have to cultivate an abode for **being** also directs them in their manner of **dwelling**. An original ethics turns a spotlight on this dwelling, rather than on developing normative principles under the guise of **metaphysics**.

In conjunction with Heidegger’s critique of **technology**, on the one hand, and his concern for safeguarding the **earth**, on the other, an original ethics provides his most explicit treatment of the question of ethics and a possible alternative to traditional morality.

*See also* BEAUFRET, JEAN (1907–82); HOUSE OF BEING, THE (*das Haus des Seins*).

**OTHER BEGINNING (*der andere Anfang*)**. A **thinking** that **retrieves** the hidden **origin** of **metaphysics** makes a transition to a new beginning. This new or other beginning, as Heidegger calls it in *Contributions to Philosophy*, redirects thinking from the **truth of being**, which remains **unthought** through the history of Western **philosophy**. The other beginning preserves, safeguards, and yields the **possibilities** for thinking being more primordially than has occurred from the inception of **Greek philosophy** as **metaphysics**. From the perspective of the **history of being**, the possibility of **overcoming metaphysics** resides in the **other beginning**.

*See also* FIRST BEGINNING (*erster Anfang*).



**OTHERNESS OF THE MATTER OF THINKING** (*Verschiedenheit der Sache des Denkens*). In terms of the **ontological difference**, being reveals itself as other to **entities**. In *The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics*, Heidegger shows that **thinking** experiences being in its **otherness**. For being is not given simply in terms of permanent **presence** or *ousia*, but instead withdraws into **concealment**. Due to this otherness, a **mystery** pervades the manifestation of **being**. In the aforementioned essay, Heidegger draws a sharp contrast between his own **being-historical thinking** and **Hegel's** Absolute Idealism. The latter equates the **presencing** of being with **God**, as a supreme **entity**, in the form of Absolute Spirit.

The otherness of the matter of thinking corresponds to what remains **unthought**. According to Heidegger, the withdrawal and concealment of being harbors this unthought dimension. The otherness of the matter of thinking appears through the attempt to **step back** into what remains unthought, into the hidden **origin** of **metaphysics**. In contrast to **Hegel**, the otherness of the matter of thinking resides in the **difference** as such, that is, in the **perdurance** or active tension between being and **entities**.

**OTTO, RUDOLF (1869–1937)**. Rudolf Otto was an influential German Lutheran theologian whose interest in **religion** led to an emphasis on the irrational or “numinous” encounter with the Divine. In the text of *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger cites in a footnote Otto’s famous book, *The Idea of the Holy* (*Das Heilige*, 1917). Heidegger disputes the supposedly “irrational” character of religious experience, without first addressing its basis in human **facticity**.

**OUSIA**. In ordinary Greek, *ousia* means possessions, household goods, real estate. In Heidegger’s **interpretation** of **Greek philosophy**, *ousia* means the **beingness** of **entities** as constant **presence** (*Anwesenheit*). Entities are when they are present in **unconcealment** (*alètheia*). According to Heidegger, the Greek **understanding of being** is oriented toward only one dimension of **time**, the **present**, after the model of entities present at hand.

**OVERCOMING** (*Überwindung*). Overcoming is the **formal indication** of what Heidegger initially used to refer to as **destruction**. Since **metaphysics** by reason of its **onto-theo-logical structure** cannot think **being** primordially as **enowning**, we must pass beyond it into another kind of **thinking**, that is, **being-historical thinking**. This **overcoming of metaphysics** is a **step back** into the **ground** from which it sprang.

**OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS** (*Überwindung der Metaphysik*). This essay, now included in volume 7 of the **Complete Edition**, *Lectures and Essays* (*Vorträge und Aufsätze*), contains a collection of notes that date from 1936 to 1946. Part of it was published as a contribution to a Festschrift in honor of Emil Preterorius in 1961. In these notes, Heidegger addresses the **possibility** of overcoming metaphysics. The **completion of metaphysics** is the decline of the **truth of being** and the beginning of the reign of **technology** and **nihilism**. **Friedrich Nietzsche** understands his **philosophy** as confronting nihilism by conceiving the **being of entities** as the “**will to will**,” but he fails to think the truth of being as the tension between **unconcealment** and **concealment** and thereby stops short of addressing the **danger** of technology. Nietzsche’s **thinking** provides a signpost pointing from the extreme phase of the end of metaphysics to the **other beginning** unfolding within the **history of being**. **Being-historical thinking** undertakes the task of safeguarding the **mystery** of being. In this sense, **human beings** are the **shepherds of being** and can attempt to prevent the desecration of the **earth**.

**Overcoming** metaphysics defines the unique task reserved to thinking that unravels the confusions arising from the **forgottenness of being**. These confusions include misconstruing being as some ultimate entity, e.g., **God**, or concealing the **ontological difference**, as well as reifying being or turning it into a static concept by subordinating the grammatical form of the verb “to be” to its nominative form.

**OVERMAN** (*Übermensch*). Along with the notions of the eternal recurrence and the **will to power**, the overman is a key term in **Friedrich Nietzsche**’s **philosophy**. The overman seeks to overcome the decline of **nihilism** by creating new **meaning** and reevaluating traditional **values**. In his appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought, Heidegger construes the overman as a transitional figure who points ahead to the **completion of metaphysics** and the need for modern humanity to confront the global forces of **technology**.

**OVERTURNING** (*der Umschlag*). Heidegger frequently employs this term in order to describe changes and transitions in the enactment of **thinking**. One of his most important uses of the term occurs in his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Heidegger speaks of the overturning of **fundamental ontology** in his effort to investigate the ontic source of its inquiry, including the formulation of the “**why-question**.” Fundamental ontology is overturned by **metontology**, which takes as its point of departure the **existentiell** situation of the inquirer as **awe-struck** by the manifestation of **beings in the whole**.

**OWNEDNESS (*Eigentlichkeit*)**. Ownedness and **unownedness** are two **modes** of human existing that are grounded in the **mineness** of **being-there**. All **existentials** of being-there are determined by this tension. Being-there always exists either in one of these modes or in the indifference of both. **Anxiety** makes manifest in being-there its **being-out-for** its most unique **can-be**, that is, its being free for the **freedom** of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings being-there face-to-face with its ownmost, individualized **self** and for the **possibility** of coming into its own, which it already is.

*See also* SELF-RESPONSIBILITY (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*).



# P

**PAIN** (*Schmerz*). For Heidegger, pain is an essential point of transformation, rather than merely a psychological condition or state of mind. He associates pain with an incorrigible **phenomenon**. Given that human beings can neither master nor ignore it, pain provides an occasion for an alternative manifestation of **being** apart from the **will to power** of modern **technology**.

In *Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger suggests that the catalytic power of pain can be diminished when it is experienced as merely passive or as a deficiency in comparison with pleasure. The hardness of pain may also include a resiliency by which **human beings** are directed back to a meditative **stillness** pervading their **existence**.

**PARMENIDES (540–480 BC)**. Parmenides, **Anaximander**, and **Heraclitus** are the original thinkers in Heidegger's **history of being**. They speak to us from the earliest **beginning** of **philosophy**. This beginning is not only the **origin** of the **forgottenness of being**; it also contains the **possibility** of the **other beginning** of thought as **commemorative thinking**. Heidegger tries to understand the premetaphysical thought of the early Greek thinkers from a postmetaphysical standpoint. The saying of Parmenides that being and thinking are the same has become the **fate** of Western philosophy. Parmenides has named *alètheia* as the **unconcealment** of being. In the **revealment** of the **being of entities**, being as such withdraws into **concealment**. In the poem of Parmenides, the being of entities is disclosed as constant **presence**.

*See also* GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*); MOIRA (PARMENIDES VIII, 34–41) (*Moira [Parmenides VIII, 34–41]*); PARMENIDES (540–480 BC); PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY, THE (*Der Satz der Identität*); WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? (*Was heißt denken?*).

**PARMENIDES (Parmenides)**. This winter semester 1942/43 lecture-course was originally announced under the title **Parmenides and Heraclitus**. It contains a long meditation on *alètheia* by way of **interpretation** of the famous poem of Parmenides.

Heidegger approaches *alètheia* from four different directions. *Alètheia* means **unconcealment**. We can read unconcealment as *un-concealment* and as *un-concealment*. (1) When we read *un-concealment*, *alètheia* means the coming into its own of **truth** and of **concealment** as **sheltering** this truth. (2) When we read *un-concealment*, it becomes clear that the Greeks discovered in the **essential swaying** (*Wesung*) and dynamic of truth the negation of concealment. (3) The third indication is the relation between *alètheia* and *lèthè*, **forgottenness**. Since truth has to be wrestled from unconcealment, it always risks falling back into forgottenness. Parmenides names the unconcealment of **being**, and yet this simple truth would soon be forgotten. (4) The fourth indication names the **relation** between unconcealment and **clearing**. *Alètheia* clears the **open** within this free region; **entities** can **come to presence** in the way they look, *eidos*. When we free ourselves from the **presence** of entities, we may spring into the **abground** and recollect the **truth of being**. We can then become aware of the **difference** between being and entities.

The saying of Parmenides says the **beginning** of the still-concealed withdrawal of the truth of being. It names the **belonging together** of **human beings** and *alètheia*.

**PAROUSIA.** Parousia is a Greek term that takes on specifically religious connotations through its use in **Christianity** and Christian **theology**. In a Christian context, *Parousia* refers to the appearance of **God**, an epiphany or flash of Divine insight. Heidegger employs this term in his discussion of **primordial Christianity**, specifically in denoting the early Christians' expectation of the return of Christ. In *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (1950), Heidegger refers to the Parousia of the Absolute to describe the supreme and climactic development of **God** or **spirit** throughout the stages of its historical manifestations. Yet this Parousia remains a **metaphysical** extension of the Greek concept of *ousia* as **presence** and thereby masks the **unconcealment of being** as entailing **absence** (*Abwesenheit*) as well presence.

See also ÉSKHATON; PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

**PARTICULAR WHILENESS** (*Jeweiligkeit*). In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1923, *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Heidegger introduces particular whileness as a **formal indication** of the "there" of **being-there**. It indicates the particular **while** that each of us is and has. The "there" of being-there is a brief space of time in which we have to decide what is to be done now and here in our **life**. Heidegger developed his **interpretation** of particular whileness in the light of his study of the Aristo-

telian conception of *tóde ti* (this-here) and *phronèsis* (phronetic insight or balanced judgment). In *Being and Time*, particular whileness is displaced by **mineness**.

**PASSING OVER** (*Überstieg*). In his critical appropriation of **Immanuel Kant's philosophy**, Heidegger defines the “trajectory” of the cognitive act as the subject’s surpassing toward and passing over to an object (*Gegenstand*). Only by virtue of this prior “passing over” can the subject allow the object to be encountered, “stand over against,” and thereby become manifest. Heidegger thereby suggests that the trajectory of finite **transcendence** both grounds and makes possible the cognitive relation between subject and object.

*See also* QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT’S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**PAST** (*Vergangenheit*). The past is one of the dimensions of **time** as we understand it first and foremost in our everyday lives. An **entity** is past when it is no longer present-at-hand. **Being-there** is never past but always a **having-been**. In correspondence with the past are the dimensions of past times as having been and the relapse into **forgottenness**.

*See also* FUTURE (*Zukunft*); PRESENT (*Gegenwart*).

**PATH OF THINKING** (*Denkweg*). More fundamental to **thinking** than any destination is the challenge and perseverance of traveling along a way or path. Heidegger offers the leitmotif “ways not works” as the directive for his **Complete Edition**.

**PATHMARKS** (*Wegmarken*). *Pathmarks* is the English title of volume 9 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. This volume is a collection of some of Heidegger’s most important essays and lectures, spanning the period from 1919 to 1961, including *What Is Metaphysics?* (1929), *Letter on “Humanism”* (1946), and *Kant’s Thesis about Being* (1961). Along with the inclusion of marginal notes by the author, the volume contains two essays that were notes included in the first edition, published in 1967: *Comments on Karl Jaspers’s “Psychology of Worldviews”* (1919/21) and *Phenomenology and Theology* (1927). In the “Preface to the German Edition” (early summer 1967), Heidegger suggests that the **pathway of thinking** leads into a region that unfolds “this side of pessimism and optimism.” Thinking continues to be challenged by what **history** hands down as what remains **unthought**. In this context, Heidegger emphasizes the role of thinking as a calling or vocation, which answers the **address of being**.

**PATHWAY, THE (*Der Feldweg*)**. In this short essay written in 1949 as a contribution to a Festschrift for Conradin Kreuzer, Heidegger describes the pathway he often followed, from the gate at the court garden in **Meßkirch** to the oak wood and back again. It is both an autobiographical essay and the **mindfulness** of the **claim** of his **origin**.

*See also* WAY (*Weg*).

**PATTERNS OF ARRANGEMENT (*Fuge*)**. *See* JOINTURE (*Fuge*).

**PAUL, SAINT (AD 5–67)**. The apostle Paul was one of the most influential figures in the 1st-century Christian world, who played a crucial role in the early founding of **Christianity** as a **religion**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1920/21, *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger offers an original and insightful **interpretation** of St. Paul's "Letters." Foremost is Heidegger's attempt to show how the Christian expectation of salvation as already unfolding in the **moment** provides an example of the circular dynamic of **temporality**. According to Heidegger, St. Paul recognized that salvation is imminent and already appearing as a **possibility** for the community of believers who enact the Christian faith.

**PEOPLE (*Volk*)**. What is ownmost and distinctive of a people is determined by its **language**, and thereby the ability to enter into **dialogue**. Each people lives in its own **house of being** and discloses being in its own, historically unique way. Since the **nature of language** is **poetry**, the poets found the being of a people. Each people has its own **fate**, which is destined by **being**. In the **history of being**, the Greeks are the people of the **first beginning** of **philosophy**. The "ones to come," of which the greatest German thinkers and poets may point the way, are the people of the **other beginning** of **commemorative thinking**. The great poets Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles founded what is distinctive of the Greek people. It is equally the case that the great poets of the German people, such as **Friedrich Hölderlin** and **Rainer Maria Rilke**, have not founded what is distinctly their own as a people, but have only foretold this still future **possibility**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger suggests that "a" people first emerges as such when it "becomes free for its law" and thereby becomes capable of opening forth a place (*Ort*) in which the manifestation of being can occur. A people cannot simply be associated with an extant group of individuals, but instead originates through a moment (*Augenblick*) and transformation within **history** (*Geschichte*).



**PERCEPTION (*Wahrnehmung*).** Heidegger rejects the primacy of perception of Edmund Husserl's **phenomenology**. When we exemplify phenomenological **intuition** through sense perception, we objectify and thus **unlive** the **lived experiences** of **intentionality**. According to Heidegger, the first level of phenomenological intuition arises from the sheer **understanding** of the meaningful contexts in which the **whole** of **life** expresses itself. In *Being and Time*, he proclaims that intuition, perception, and seeing as ways of access to **entities** and their **being** are derivative of the act of **understanding** as **being-in-the-world**.

**PERDURANCE (*Austrag*).** In his later writings, Heidegger attempts to **think** the **ontological difference** in a more original way. To this end, he addresses the tension of differentiation between **being** and **entities**. In *The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics*, he emphasizes the need for **thinking** to enact, carry out, and withstand this tension. Heidegger characterizes the unfolding of this **differentiation** as perdurance.

**PETRI, ELFRIDE.** *See* HEIDEGGER-PETRI, ELFRIDE (1893–1992).

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION (*phänomenologische Destruktion*).** At the close of Chapter Two of the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger proposes the task of a "phenomenological **destruction** of the **history** of **ontology**." This destruction (as it came to be abbreviated) was to consist of three stages, comprising Part Two of his magnum opus, which was never formally completed: (1) a destructive-retrieval of **Immanuel Kant's** doctrine of **schematism**, as providing a clue to the problematic of **temporality**; (2) the overcoming of **René Descartes's** dualisms of subject and object, mind and body; and (3) the reinterpretation of **Aristotle's** conception of **time** and its connection to the ancient **understanding** of **being** as *ousia* or permanent **presence**. Only *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which Heidegger published in 1929, comes closest to matching the first of these three stages of his projected plan for a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology.

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON" (*Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'*).** This lecture-course from the winter semester of 1927/28 focuses on *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the first book of the *Transcendental Analytic*. It is a more precise and detailed section-by-section **interpretation** of **Immanuel Kant's** text than the book *Kant and the*

*Problem of Metaphysics* (1929). Heidegger explains to the last detail the significance of each concept in terms of its content and also considers other parallel passages in Kant's work.

In the introduction, "The 'Critique of Pure Reason' as Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as Science," Heidegger determines the relation between positive **science**, **ontology**, and **fundamental ontology**. Each **science** has for its object a specific realm of **entities**. These objectifications of entities are made possible by **being-there's preontological understanding of being**. Heidegger exemplifies the formation of objectification by the genesis of the modern mathematical sciences. Such an objectification, as for example **nature**, needs to be established by ontology as an objectification of an entity in its **being**. The problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that of the laying of the foundation of **metaphysics** as to the preconditions for the appearance of entities in conformity with human cognition as **finite**. All founding **ontological** knowledge is a knowledge of the preconditions of **experience** and is pure or a priori. Kant's central question is: How are synthetic a priori **judgments** possible? Laying the foundation of metaphysics as science is for Kant not only a laying of a foundation of ontology; it is at the same time a critique of pure reason as a delimitation of its possible knowledge a priori.

The greater part of the lecture-course is a phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Interpretation is a way of laying out the presuppositions that determine Kant's enterprise and ultimately uncover the ontological underpinnings of his inquiry into the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. Within the scope of this lecture-course, however, Heidegger would not provide a complete interpretation of the **schematism** of the concepts of pure understanding (*Verstand*). He only dealt with it in principle. He showed that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible on the basis of the original synthetic unity of the productive power of **imagination**, which in turn is made possible by **temporality**. Temporality is the basic **structure** of being-there. Its **existential** constitution enables being-there to have an **understanding of being** and develop a universal determination in order to articulate the **meaning of being in words**. The possibility of being-there to comport itself toward other entities and toward others is grounded in its temporality.

Heidegger concludes by drawing a parallel between Kant's attempt to outline temporality as the **horizon** of finite **transcendence** and his own effort to delineate **time** as the condition for the **possibility of understanding being**. According to Heidegger, the problematic of *Being and Time* is couched in a destructive-retrieval of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and specifically, the central role of imagination. The "universality of being" and the "radicality of time" then become the interdependent motifs that together denote a new path of inquiry. Heidegger concludes this lecture-course by

observing that when he re-read Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* against the backdrop of **Edmund Husserl's phenomenology**, his eyes were "opened" to a future direction of **philosophy**.

*See also* QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*).

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE: INITIATION INTO PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH** (*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*). This winter semester 1921/22 lecture-course is an introduction to the interpretation of **Aristotle**, which Heidegger developed in the next semester. This **phenomenological** interpretation was also the title of a book on which Heidegger worked from 1922 through 1924. The lecture-course is basically a **destruction** of his earlier work and leads to a new explication of **life**.

The brief first part, on the reception of Aristotle, addresses the need for a fundamental clarification of philosophizing for its history on the level of **factic life** itself, the then fashionable reception of Aristotle as a naive epistemologist, and the problem of the "Greekification" of **Christianity**.

In the second part, *What Is Philosophy?*, Heidegger defines **philosophy** as a phenomenological **ontology** and develops the intrinsically historical character of **ontological** research. Ultimately, there is no difference between the ontological and the historical. Philosophizing takes place within a **hermeneutic situation** that determines the way in which we have philosophy. Since philosophy is not a thing but a fundamental having of the **situation** of our lives, it demands **resolution**. We can have philosophy in a genuine way. This kind of having involves an addressing of the object, and is always grounded in a prior **claim** of already being "had" and standing in **relation** to something. Philosophy is a way of **compartment or intentionality**. The threefold sense of intentionality—**content sense, enactment sense, and relational sense**—is refined, and a fourth meaning is added, the **temporalizing sense**, which comprehends the other three. Temporalization determines the temporalizing sense. We can either have philosophy in the full-fledged sense that concerns my own **existence** or as an object of **curiosity**. The original enactment of philosophy is in the full stretch of the enactment sense itself, pursuant to the temporalizing sense of always being under way. Philosophizing as a fundamental knowing is nothing other than the radical actualization and enactment of the **historicality** of life's **facticity**.

The third part is an ontological revision of Heidegger's categories of life and centers on demonstrating the inherently historical character of the **facticity** of life. The primary ontological category of life is **care**, which is indige-

nous to life itself. Heidegger begins to rethink his analysis of the **environment** in terms of using and making, rather than seeing. **Ruin**, or **fallenness**, as it will be called later, is the dominant tendency of life.

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ARISTOTLE: INDICATION OF THE HERMENEUTIC SITUATION** (*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation*). Heidegger wrote this famous text as a private communication to **Paul Natorp** in connection with his possible appointment as a professor at the University of **Marburg**. In it he finds and develops the **hermeneutic situation** in which **Aristotle's** texts are to be interpreted.

The first part is a kind of research report summarizing his work of the previous three years. Heidegger also breaks new ground and finds a solution to the problem of fusing the historical with the systematic approach in **phenomenology**. He outlines a double-pronged program of a **fundamental ontology** and a **destruction** of the history of **ontology**. The averageness of the public “**they**” and **fallenness** are juxtaposed with the **possibility** of a more original seizure of my own **death**, in order to define an **ontological** way of access to the **temporality** and **historicality** of human **being-there**. Heidegger designates **existence** as the countermovement against **falling**. Here, existence has the **meaning** of **life's** most unique and ownmost possibility.

In the second part, Heidegger discusses the problem of an original **retrieval** of **Greek philosophy**, as rooted in *alētheia*, *logos*, and *phusis*. He also gives an **interpretation** of *Nicomachean Ethics VI* that centers on the different ways in which the soul becomes true (*wahrnimmt*). *Phronēsis* is the interpretative insight into a concrete **situation** of action, coupled with resolute **decision** and **truth** as the countermovement to **concealment**.

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION** (*phänomenologische Reduktion*). See **REDUCTION** (*Reduktion*).

**PHENOMENOLOGY** (*Phänomenologie*). According to Heidegger, phenomenology is not a philosophical movement, but an outstanding **possibility** of **thinking**. During his early study of **Edmund Husserl's** *Logical Investigations* and their later collaboration in **Freiburg**, he learned the essentials of this method.

From his early lecture-course in 1919 until the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger brings phenomenology and **hermeneutics** together in hermeneutic phenomenology. Since the primal **phenomena** are not readily accessible to **intuition** in a spontaneous and transparent self-showing but are concealed, they are in need of the labor of **destruction**. Heidegger therefore replaces Husserl's perceptual **structure** of **intentionality** as intuitive fulfill-

ment of empty **signification** with the most basic structural process of the explication of implicit **meaning**. **Care**, **interpretation**, and **understanding** replace **intentionality**, **intuition**, and signifying acts as the fundamental concepts of phenomenology. The central phenomenon of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is the **facticity of life**, which in its **being** is concerned with its very being. Life is rooted in care and always implicitly interprets itself in **concern**, **solicitude**, and **worry**. Since life in its facticity finds itself always in a historical **situation**, the interpretation of the **temporality** of care as the **ground** of life itself becomes the fundamental task of phenomenology.

In the formulation of the **path of thinking** leading from *Being and Time*, phenomenology is the method of **fundamental ontology**. The **question of being** is worked out in a twofold way: the **existential analysis of being-there** and a destruction of the history of **ontology**. The task of phenomenology is to let the **being of entities** as that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way it shows itself from itself. Since the being of entities shows itself in being-there’s **understanding of being**, this understanding must be interpreted in a phenomenological explication of human **existence**. The understanding of being is the temporal-historical circular movement between being as it shows itself and the specific entity **who** raises the question of the **meaning of being**. Phenomenology takes its departure from the **hermeneutics** of being-there, which, as an analysis of existence, establishes the directive for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.

In his later work, Heidegger no longer uses the word phenomenology to describe the task of thinking, viewing it instead as a possibility granted within the **history of being**. Phenomenology recedes in favor of the **other beginning of thinking**.

**PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEOLOGY** (*Phänomenologie und Theologie*). Heidegger delivered this lecture on two occasions, in 1927 and 1928. **Philosophy**, as the “**ontological**” science of universal **being** itself, differs absolutely from **theology**, which is the **ontic science** of **God** as a particular **entity**. Theology is a positive **science** because it deals with a posited entity, which makes it more like chemistry than philosophy. The *positum* of Christian theology is Christianness (*Christlichkeit*), that is, the factual **mode** of existing of a believing Christian. Christian **existence** is determined by the history that is set in motion by the cross, the crucified, and Christ on the cross. The task of theology is to seek the **Word** that is able to make us believe and to safeguard us in our **faith**. This means that theologies must learn to listen again to the Word of God through a **destruction** of Christian theology. They must attempt to bring the **existential** rebirth that comes by faith to conceptual form. Theology is the science of existing in faith, that is, of existing historically as a Christian.

Theology is founded on faith, which does not need philosophy, but theology as the **ontic** science of faith does. What it means to be a Christian can only be lived and experienced in faith. The cross and sin as **existentiell** determinations of the ontological **structure** of **guilt** can be conceptualized with the help of philosophy. Sin presupposes guilt. Theology can thus receive the direction of its inquiry from theology.

The lecture is also Heidegger's farewell to theology as a matter of personal concern. He now calls faith the **existentiell** enemy of philosophy. To each other they appear to be mere foolishness. Heidegger dedicated this lecture to his colleague at **Marburg, Rudolf Bultmann**.

*See also* CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); PHENOMENOLOGY (*Phänomenologie*).

**PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTUITION AND EXPRESSION: THEORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT FORMATION** (*Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung*). As volume 59 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**, this text comprises his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1920 at the University of **Freiburg**. In this lecture-course, Heidegger paints in the broadest strokes the outline for a **hermeneutic situation**, which orients all philosophical inquiry. He poses the basic question of how to develop this concrete orientation and avoid the abstractness of generic philosophical concepts, which presume a scientific, theoretical attitude. Conversely, Heidegger proposes a strategy to cultivate a pretheoretical standpoint, namely, philosophical **destruction**, in order to arrive at an original, concrete orientation of the **phenomenon** or the "thing itself."

In Part I, *On the Destruction of the Problem of the A Priori*, Heidegger addresses the complexes of **enactment** that form **meaning** or sense. What is meaningful pertains to what is relevant in the **experience** of **life** and its **temporal** unfolding through **facticity**. The development of this concrete orientation of facticity requires destruction or the **dismantlement** (*Abbau*) of the theoretical attitude, which presumptuously invokes static concepts of rationality. To outline an alternative origin for forming concepts, Heidegger develops his groundbreaking method of **formal indication**.

In Part II, *On the Destruction of the Problem of Lived Experience*, Heidegger identifies **Wilhelm Dilthey** as among the first thinkers to seek a new hermeneutic footing for **philosophy**. But Dilthey falls short of developing a philosophical **understanding** of the root of concept formation and the genesis of meaning through **factic life experience**. A further level of destruction is required in order to circumvent the tendency to objectify the "I" and instead seek its **origin**, as it comes into its own, through the temporal enactment of life. In this lecture-course, Heidegger maps out the most elemental steps that will lead to the development of **hermeneutic phenomenology**.

**PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, THE** (*Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*). This text is a combination of Heidegger's lecture-course from the winter semester 1920/21, *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, his lecture-course from the summer semester 1921, *Augustine and Neoplatonism*, and *Outlines and Sketches for a Lecture, Not Held, 1919–1921*, on "The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism." The text has been published as volume 60 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. Through this inquiry, Heidegger offers one of his profoundest accounts of religious experience, as he begins to forge at the same time his early vision of the **hermeneutics of facticity**.

In his *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger draws extensively on his Christian background and his theological training or **education**. Yet religion as a doctrine or set of beliefs harbors preconceptions about its own origin and the experiential roots from which basic commitments of faith become relevant and meaningful. Heidegger explicitly counters the theoretical presumption that religion can be objectified as a field of concern apart from the contextualization through which the **self** experiences its faith and becomes **open** to its transformative power. This contextualizing dynamic unfolds through the life of the believer and hence can only be addressed as a **phenomenon** on the basis of human facticity. Factic life experience yields the pretheoretical backdrop that must be developed in advance in order to establish a new problematic for addressing religion, which implicates the life-situation of the individual in all its difficulty. In this way, the concern for what is religious can reemerge as entailing a response to the divine or God, which speaks directly to the **mystery** and enigma of human existence. Put another way, the phenomenology of religion shifts the fulcrum of inquiry to the "**who**" and "**how**" of the believer, as immersed within the quandary that provokes a need for spirituality. This factic level of **interpretation** makes explicit the phenomenon of religion prior to delineating the "**what**" of an objective-content, pertaining either to a doctrine or a theory that seeks to extract universal characteristics of belief.

As a central thematic, Heidegger examines the "Letters" of St. Paul, insofar as they speak to and implicate the factual experience of faith and the **meaning** of salvation. According to Heidegger, St. Paul speaks to the situational context of Christian experience, rather than presenting the elements of a doctrine or dogma. The idea of the Parousia, of the "second coming," has to be understood anew in terms of the **moment** promising salvation and through living experience of transformation in which the individual abides in and wrestles with the uncertainty of faith. Without reliance on a system of dogma (*dogmatische Systematik*), Heidegger invokes **formal indication** as the way to elicit the preconception of **temporality**; temporality breaks open the moment in which the self experiences salvation as already imminent and as

allowing what is taking shape in the **future** to **presence**. In this concise and penetrating discussion of the letters of St. Paul, Heidegger brings to the forefront the methodological breakthrough of formal indication.

Through this inquiry into the phenomenon of religion, Heidegger makes a methodological advance, which is already on the way to developing hermeneutics. In Augustine and Neoplatonism, Heidegger proceeds along this **path of thinking**. St. Augustine's own experience of the crisis of faith brings to light a factual element that becomes focal in the development of Heidegger's phenomenology, namely, *cura* or **care** (*Sorge*). Human life is inherently conflicted and thereby prone to dispersion and fragmentation. Correlatively, the facticity by which the individual experiences "I am" is the basic sense of being drawn into, confronted by, pressing concerns and allures of the "flesh," for example, lust, which present themselves within a given **situation**. Heidegger describes these attitudinal dimensions in a way that points ahead to a more formalized, ontological conception of **care** and its proneness toward **falling**. The complex of **life**, the enactment sense, points to the situational and environmental context, the world domain, in which the self exists. Through this contextualized facticity, the self stands forth in the nexus of its concerns and thereby takes over the task of becoming who it is.

In the *Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism*, Heidegger addresses religiosity from the standpoint of the mystic. Contrary to the philosophy of religion, he considers how mystical experience arises phenomenally from the contextualized understanding enacted in **Meister Eckhart's** mysticism. A "mystical subject" becomes possible only on the ground of religiosity that can abdicate to an experience of what is radically other and even indeterminate relative to a conception of God. Accordingly, the irrationality of mysticism is not simply opposed to reason, but rather can still be set forth within a contextualized understanding of factual experience.

**PHENOMENON (*Phänomen*)**. Heidegger's hermeneutical transformation of **Edmund Husserl's phenomenology** frees it from its one-sided orientation toward **perception** and theoretical knowledge and leads to an **ontological** reinterpretation of the phenomenon. The phenomenon belongs no longer to **consciousness**. For Heidegger, it is a manifestation of **being**. The phenomenon corresponds to being as what shows itself in itself, which becomes the new theme of phenomenology as the search for the "things themselves." We must distinguish between the phenomenon as what shows itself and the appearance as that which does not appear itself, but announces itself through the appearance of something else. The phenomenon is a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. And yet, a phenomenon can also be concealed. There are three ways in which phenomena can be covered up: (1)



a phenomenon can simply be undiscovered, (2) a phenomenon can be buried over after it has been discovered, and (3) a phenomenon can be disguised as something else and appear as that which it is not.

It is therefore one of the main tasks of phenomenology to reveal phenomena and bring their **being** and **structures** to light. Since being always shows itself in the being of **entities**, it conceals itself as such. As Heidegger emphasizes in his introduction to *Being and Time*, the phenomenon of phenomenology lies precisely in *not* showing itself. As a result, phenomenology must be coupled with **hermeneutics**, in order to elicit the **meaning** of those ontological structures that tend to withdraw and remain concealed. The **unconcealment** of being is the forgotten phenomenon at the heart of phenomenology that Heidegger discovered in his **thinking**.

*See also* HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY (*hermeneutische Phänomenologie*).

**PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY** (*philosophische Anthropologie*). As a response to the question “What is man?,” **Immanuel Kant** wrote his influential book entitled *Anthropology*. Subsequently, **Max Scheler**, as one of the proponents of a philosophical anthropology, broadened the scope of Kant’s question in such pivotal books as *The Eternal in Man* and *Man’s Place in Nature*. In Part IV of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger sharply contrasts his own **fundamental ontology** with Scheler’s philosophical anthropology, arguing that the former alone can provide an adequate foundation to re-ask the **question of being**. Heidegger claims that the Kantian question “What is man?” must be radicalized in light of a problemat-ic centered on the **finitude** of **being-there**.

*See also* WHO, THE (*das Wer*).

**PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC** (*philosophische Logik*). Heidegger employs this term at the beginning of his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Philosophical **logic** is a mixture of questioning and **thinking** that is based on the **possibility** of **understanding being** and the accompanying idea of human existence. Heidegger contrasts a philosophical logic with formal logic or an abstract system of signs, much as **Immanuel Kant** contrasts the same with his own version of “transcendental logic.”

Unlike formal logic, a philosophical logic is connected to the formulation, development, and articulation of the **question of being**. Heidegger characterizes such a logic as “productive” in the sense that its seeds are sowed by the novelty of what is uncovered in the **moment** (*Augenblick*) of self-under-

standing. The **determination of thinking** that follows from a philosophical logic reflects the freedom that is exercised in the course of questioning and philosophizing.

**PHILOSOPHY (*Philosophie*)**. In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger defines philosophy as universal phenomenological **ontology**. **Phenomenology** is the method of ontology. Because **being-there** is the **horizon** and foundation of ontology, phenomenology becomes **hermeneutics**. Heidegger follows **Edmund Husserl**'s motto "back to the things themselves" and understands phenomenology as an outstanding **possibility of thinking**. His **hermeneutic phenomenology** is an attempt to **retrieve** the roots of phenomenology in a more originary way, so as to fit it back into the place that is properly its own as the heart of philosophy. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger defines philosophy most simply as an "inquiring into being."

In his conception of the **history of being**, Heidegger identifies philosophy with **metaphysics**. The **onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics** is the **origin** of the **forgottenness of being**. The history of philosophy begins with **Plato** and **Aristotle**'s metaphysical transformation of the first **beginning** of Greek thinking and is completed in **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s metaphysics of the **will**. The end of philosophy is the reign of **technology** and **nihilism**. Since this end has exhausted all the **possibilities** of metaphysics, the possibility of the **other beginning** reveals itself. In his later thought, Heidegger renounces philosophy in favor of another kind of thinking, which heeds the **address of being**.

**PHUSIS**. *Phusis* (or *physis*) is the Greek **word** for **nature** and has the same double **meaning**. The nature of an **entity** is its **mode of presencing**, while nature can also refer to the **being of entities in the whole**, which shows itself from itself. The appearance of *phusis* is **movement**, *kinèsis*. We find both these meanings in the *Physics* of **Aristotle**.

Prior to the Aristotelian use of the word *phusis*, **Heraclitus** named being *phusis* as that which loves to conceal itself. **Parmenides** identified *phusis* and *alètheia*. *Phusis* names the process of the **unconcealment** of being. This original meaning of *phusis* would be forgotten in the history of **metaphysics**.

**PIETY (*Frömmigkeit*)**. In his lecture *The Question concerning Technology*, Heidegger calls questioning the 'piety of **thinking**.' As he explains in *The Nature of Language*, piety is meant here in its ancient sense: obedient and submissive to what thinking is called to think. In its ownmost nature,

questioning is not the asking of questions, but a listening to the **address of being**. When thinking submits itself to the claim of being, its questioning becomes piety. Thinking itself then becomes **commemorative thinking**.

**PINDAR (522–443 BC)**. Pindar was a Greek lyric poet. He figures prominently in Heidegger’s attempt to explore the Greek *mythos* and address its importance for shaping the preunderstanding of **being** for Greek **philosophy**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester 1942/43, **Parmenides**, Heidegger invokes Pindar’s description of **concealment** as a “signless cloud,” which in its passing obscures or hides the light of the sun. Pindar thereby gives voice to the Greek unveiling of the human **situation**, in which light and darkness, unconcealment and concealment, are intertwined. This preontological **experience** of **being** shapes the human capacity to **comport** itself to and exercise **care** over all **things**.

**PLACE (Ort)**. The concern for place is integral to the development of Heidegger’s **thinking** and is as equally complex. The question about the location of **truth**, whether it resides in **unconcealment**, rather than in **judgment**, as the **tradition** of **metaphysics** maintained, becomes increasingly crucial for Heidegger. As a **formal indication** of space, location refers to specific ways of **being-there’s being-in**. Being-there’s **existential “spatiality”** determines its location and is itself grounded in **being-in-the-world**.

Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger outlines the “there” of being-there as the locus of **disclosedness**. This disclosedness includes the **world** as that “wherein” being-there exists. The manifestation of **entities**, and ultimately **being** itself, requires a place that unfolds in conjunction with the “there” of **being-there**. The determination of this place includes the vectors of **temporality** and **spatiality**. For Heidegger, **history** marks the intersection of these two vectors, the **play of time-space** through which being manifests itself in different epochs. Thus history defines the place of being’s manifestation. Place becomes a key word in Heidegger’s later work.

**PLATO (428–348 BC)**. The history of **philosophy** begins with Plato as the pivotal figure who transforms the early Greek **thinking** of **being** into **metaphysics**. He conceives being no longer as *phusis* but as *eidos*, that is, as the form in which **entities** show themselves. His new **understanding of being** leads also to a transformation in the process of *alètheia*. The early Greek thinkers understood *alètheia* as the **unconcealment** of being. Plato transforms *alètheia* into **truth**, that is, the correctness of the correspondence between idea and what is. For Plato, philosophy is no longer a **saying** of being; it has become the determination of the **beingness** of entities as idea, and the **founding** of the **being of entities** in the idea of the good as the all-highest.

See also GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*); PLATO: THE SOPHIST (*Platon: Sophistes*); PLATONISM (*Platonismus*); PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*).

**PLATO: THE SOPHIST (*Platon: Sophistes*).** In this winter semester 1924/25 lecture-course, originally delivered under the title *Interpretation of Platonic Dialogues* (*Sophist, Philebus*), Heidegger discusses the fundamental problem of **concealment**. The text comprises volume 19 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. Why did the Greeks name falsity, *pseudos*, positively and **truth** privatively, *alètheia*, as if something were lacking in a **phenomenon** that nevertheless rightfully belongs to it? According to the Greeks, **human beings** from the **beginning** had to struggle for and win the **unconcealment** of the **world**. In the struggle between the Greek philosophers and the Sophists, it becomes clear that **philosophy** not only has to overcome the concealment of **entities** in order to get to the matter itself. Philosophy must also do battle with the concealing **idle talk** of everyday life that is repeated by the Sophists. Heidegger will give an **interpretation** of the Sophists, because **Plato** discusses in this **dialogue** the difference between **being** and nonbeing, truth and appearance, and the philosophers and the Sophist. The **hermeneutic** principle of his **interpretation** is the old principle of always proceeding from the clear to the obscure. Heidegger presumes that **Aristotle** understood his teacher better than Plato understood himself.

In the introductory part of the course, Heidegger gives a thoroughgoing exegesis of *Nicomachean Ethics VI*. His intent is to make clear what the Greeks meant when they raised the **question of being**. In Aristotle's treatise of the five movements in which human beings disclose, **entities** are investigated: *technè*, *epistèmè*, *phronèsis*, *sophia*, and *nous*. *Technè* is skilled know-how. *Epistèmè* is **science**. *Phronèsis* is circumspective insight into one's own situation of action. *Sophia* is wisdom or the pure beholding of the eternal and **highest entity**. *Nous* is a pure beholding without **logos**. Of the estimative faculties, *phronèsis* is the highest, of the scientific faculties, *sophia*. The praxis of **being-there** is the principle and goal of *phronèsis*. In a remarkable passage, Heidegger claims that Aristotle has come upon the phenomenon of **conscience**. "Phronèsis" is nothing but the conscience already set in motion in order to make action transparent. *Sophia* is the best habit, because its object is eternal.

The main part of the course is a meticulous exegesis of Plato's *Sophist*. Here, Heidegger comes to the question he will repeat in the opening lines of *Being and Time*: "Since we found ourselves at an impasse from what you say, you will have to explain to us what you mean when you use the **word 'being'**." The question, "What does the word being mean?," is the central concern of the entire dialogue. The "battle of the giants" (*Gigantomachie*) over *ousia*—historically fought by the early Greek thinkers for the middle

ground between matter and idea, the one and the many, being and becoming—is the **origin** of **ontological** research. Plato followed the inclination to transcend the **ontic** toward the ontological. He discovered the difference between being and entities, even though he did not think that differentiation as such.

The milieu of ontological research must be prepared through a concrete **formulation of the question** of being. This consists of an analysis into (1) what is asked for, that is, the **meaning of being**; (2) what is asked about, that is, being; and (3) what is interrogated, that is, the entity whose **structure** is to guide us toward what is asked for. What entity is truly adequate to the **meaning of being**? From this perspective, the Greeks themselves left the question of the meaning of being unasked. For them it was self-evident that being means **presence**. Heidegger would show in *Being and Time* that the question of the meaning of being can be answered only through an interpretation of the being of being-there.

*See also* GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*); PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*).

**PLATONISM** (*Platonismus*). In Heidegger's **history of being, philosophy** from **Plato** through **Friedrich Nietzsche** and **metaphysics** is one. As Alfred North Whitehead once said: "The history of philosophy is a collection of footnotes to Plato." For Heidegger, philosophy is metaphysics, and in its identification of **being** with **coming to presence**, Platonism. Since it is also determined by the **forgottenness of being**, the history of Platonism is at the same time nihilistic. Under the dominance of Platonism, being reverts to **nothing**. The long tale of this history concludes in modern **nihilism**.

*See also* GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*).

**PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH** (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*). This 1940 essay was published in 1942 and is based on the winter semester 1930/31 lecture-course on the **essence** of **truth**. It is an **interpretation** of **Plato's** famous metaphor of the cave in which Heidegger shows how Plato transformed the early Greek **understanding** of **being** as *phusis*, and of *alètheia* as **unconcealment**, into a doctrine of ideas and **truth** as correctness. The **beingness** of an **entity** is an idea, *eidōs*, that is, the way in which it shows itself and comes to **presence**. The privileged relation between apprehending, *noein*, and idea in Plato's **philosophy** is at the **origin** of the explication of **logos** as reason. Since the beingness of an entity is its idea as constant presence, *alètheia* becomes the correctness of the correspondence between knowledge and its object. The correctness is expressed in assertions, and thus **judgment** becomes the primary place of truth.

*See also* GREEK PHILOSOPHY (*griechische Philosophie*).

**PLAY OF TIME-SPACE (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*).** Time simultaneously times the **having been**, the **present**, and the **future**. Time in its timing removes unto and enacts its threefold simultaneity, while holding open for us the **openness of space**. Space spaces and thus throws open **locations**. This **movement** of space and time is the play of stillness that Heidegger calls the play of time-space. Time and spacing are the same play that moves the **fourfold**. Their interplay is the never-ending process of generating the fourfold's **nearness**.

**PLAY OF WORLD (*Weltspiel*).** The motif of play is a thread that runs throughout Heidegger's writings. As early as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), he described the **play-space of disclosedness**, which comes to light through the schematizing power of the **transcendental imagination**. In a correlative way, the world yields the **horizon** or backdrop for the disclosure of all **entities**. In its own right, the world also provides a play of disclosedness by (1) gathering together the fourfold as the interdependence of earth and sky, mortals and gods, and (2) facilitating the manifestation of the **thing** in its singularity and uniqueness. In volume 71 of his **Complete Edition, *Enowning*** (1941–42), Heidegger describes the play of world as a concrete instance of the differentiation between **being** and entities, or the **ontological difference**. In this mode of play, the world corresponds to the open **region of being's unconcealment**.

**PLAYING-FORTH (*Zuspiel*).** Play-forth pertains to the dynamic of questioning and **thinking**, insofar as they are governed by the **essential sway** (*Wesung*) of **enowning** (*Ereignis*). Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) to describe the momentum by which thinking endeavors to **cross over** to the **other beginning**.

**PLAY-SPACE (*Spiel-Raum*).** The **being of being-there** is spatial, as well as temporal. Being-there can only be spatial as **care**. It does not fill up space as **things** do; it takes in **space** literally. By taking in space in its **existence**, being-there **makes room** for its own play-space. The play-space, or space of **freedom**, is a **projection** of our **understanding** and discloses our **way of being**. It determines the **possibilities** of our **being-in-the-world**.

Through its play-space, being-there projects-open an area in which **entities** can manifest themselves, including the possibility of its own **self**. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger suggests that the hallmark of **imagination** lies in creating such a play-space.

**POEM, THE (*Das Gedicht*)**. This is a revised text of a lecture that Heidegger gave in August 1968. In it he draws upon his more than three decades' exposition of **Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry**. Heidegger reexamines a crucial and unique power bestowed upon the poet to speak what is **holy**, and in the process, name the **gods**. Because of this power, the poet engages in a **craft** that is among both the most "innocent" and most "dangerous" of occupations.

. . . **POETICALLY MAN DWELLS . . .** (. . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch . . .*). In this lecture delivered on 6 October 1951, Heidegger undertakes a **dialogue** with **Friedrich Hölderlin**. It is a meditation on the **relation** between **thinking** and **language** and completes the earlier lecture *Building Dwelling Thinking*, in which thinking received only incidental treatment. Since **language** is conjoined with **poetry**, poetizing and thinking also **belong together**.

**Dwelling** designates the fundamental **structure** of being-there as in **nearness** to **entities**. As Hölderlin says in the poem that Heidegger interprets, man dwells between heaven and **earth**. This **between** is a dimension that admits of **measuring**. Since man dwells in this dimension, it is his task to do the measuring. Only insofar as man measures out his dwelling can he be in accordance with his singular and ownmost **way of being**.

The fundamental sense of measure lies in taking a measure. The measure is an appearance of **being** itself. In Hölderlin's poem, being appears in the guise of an unknown **god**. The **mystery** of being is the process of **unconcealment**. The **ontological difference** and the ensuing **forgottenness of being** together conceal the measure of man's dwelling. The **human being** can only take this measure by letting it come to him in **releasement**. Human beings measure out the dimension between earth and heaven wherein they dwell. Thinking lets man dwell in nearness to entities. This kind of dwelling is primordial building. Since the measuring of man's dwelling occurs in language as a response to the **address of being**, Heidegger calls this **measure-taking** "poetizing."

**POETRY (*Dichtung*)**. Since all **art** is the setting-in-work of **truth**, it is in its essential nature poetry. Poetry is the **saying** of the **unconcealment** of **entities** and the illumination of the self-revealing **concealment** of **being**. The light of this illumination joins its shining to and into the work of art. Beauty is the way in which truth shines as unconcealment.

The **voice** of poetry bids all that is—**world** and **things**, **earth** and **sky**, **divinities** and mortals—to gather into the simplicity or **oneness** (*Einfalt*) of their intimate belonging together. Poetry is thus the "founding and **gifting**"

of the unconcealment of being and so the origin of the history of a people. **Friedrich Hölderlin** is the poet of the poets because he poetizes about the task and **destiny** of poetry.

**Language** that is spoken purely is also poetry and lets the world be as the **location** for the **building, dwelling, and thinking of human beings**.

**POIESIS.** *Poiesis* is a Greek term that can be roughly translated as poetry, but for Heidegger pertains more broadly to the advent of **unconcealment** that defines the work of **art**. *Poiesis* is thereby intimately related to truth, that is, as a creative power that brings what has previously been hidden or concealed into the **open**. In this regard, sculpture is every bit as much an example of *poiesis* as the poetic **word**. For Heidegger, openness corresponds to the disclosedness of the **world**. Thus, *poiesis* is a way of opening up a world through the creativity exercised in the work of art; in such a work, whether a poem or a painting, a new schema of **meaning** appears.

In his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1936), Heidegger assigns a special importance to *poiesis* as a creative force. As in the case of sculpture, *poiesis* taps into the hidden power of **nature** (*phusis*) to bring forth what is hidden, for example, from the undifferentiated piece of granite comes a work of consummate beauty, such as a statue. *Poiesis* is a **violent** act, which wrestles from the self-concealing withdrawal of the **earth** the openness of a world, that is, as embodied in a specific work of art. Heidegger's essay includes a transcript of various ruminations and observations that he made during the period 1931–38. Because of its close connection with *phusis*, *poiesis* achieves its originality by cultivating the tension between earth and world. The **strife** between world and earth thereby grants to *poiesis* its creative power. By addressing the ontological **ground** of creativity, Heidegger shows how *poiesis* is an original form of producing or making (*techne*), which takes the form of craftsmanship.

**POLIS.** *Polis* is a Greek term meaning city-state. The composition of the Greek polis, particularly in Athens, was of great significance to Heidegger. For him, the Greek *polis* offered a template for understanding the **possibility** of the political (state), as an alternative to the modern conception of government as a social contract granting “rights” to its citizens.

At the crux of the Greek *polis* is the determination of a **place** (*Ort*) or **site**. The polis literally serves as a hub or “pole” around which all the activities of a community revolve. For Heidegger, such a place is also secured by and **grounded** in the **unconcealment of being**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1942/43, **Parmenides**, Heidegger underscores the importance of place as the key to **understanding** the constitution of the polity, as epitomized by the *polis*. Such a place serves a dual role both to secure the



**dwelling of mortals** and to enact the unconcealment of **entities**, that is, by **letting-be**. Heidegger also suggests that a sanctification of the polis occurs, insofar as such dwelling depends upon acknowledging and paying homage to the **gods**.

**POLITICS (Politik)**. Apart from his discussion of **National Socialism**, Heidegger addresses politics in a more encompassing sense to describe a planned system for the management of human affairs, which takes shape at the end of **modernity**. He thereby associates politics with a plan for the acquisition of **power** that provides the **ground** for the rise of political ideologies, including communism and different forms of fascism. In *Ponderings XII–XV*, Heidegger suggests that the rise of politics in the 20th century correlates with the forces of **machination**. Thus, modern politics remains oblivious to the **question of being** and serves the interest of the acquisition of power that stems from the **abandonment of being** in the dominance of **technology**. Heidegger equates this technocratic form of politics with “pragmatic” or “real” politics (*Realpolitik*).

**PONDERINGS II–VI: BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1931–1938** (*Überlegungen II–VI: Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938*). As indicated by the subtitle, this text constitutes the first of the *Black Notebooks*, comprising volume 94 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. This text includes a transcript of various ruminations and observations that Heidegger made during the period 1931–38. These “ponderings” are his initial attempt to forge a new **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*) after the publication of *Being and Time*, to “break new ground” in the sense that he will later describe in *Contributions to Philosophy* as **innovative thinking**.

Keeping in mind that the first (I) of the *Ponderings* is missing, the text (II) begins with a reformulation of **Immanuel Kant**’s question “What should we do?” (*Was sollen wir tun?*), then develops four **guiding questions** that aim to situate the task of **fundamental ontology**: “Who are we?,” “Why should we be?,” “What are **entities**?,” and “Why does **being** (*Sein*) occur?” The transposing of the question of **philosophical anthropology**, “What is the **human being**?,” into the ontological query “Who (*Wer*) is **being-there**?” mirrors Heidegger’s attempt in his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1930 to address the **origin** of human **freedom**.

In *Ponderings III* (1932), Heidegger considers elements of the *Zeitgeist* that were predominant in 1930s Germany, including the rise of **National Socialism**, the **people** (*Volk*), and the metaphysical approach of “metapolitics.” He envisions “great spiritual decisions” (*grossen geistigen Entscheidungen*) appearing on a philosophical as well as a cultural horizon. These can only be mediated through a **setting-into-opposition** and critical encounter

(*Auseinanderzersetzung*) with the entire **tradition** of Western **philosophy**. In this context, he emphasizes the importance of a **dialogue** with **Friedrich Nietzsche**, which previews an important shift in the focus in Heidegger's strategy for the **destruction** of the history of ontology. Where Kant had provided the fulcrum for Heidegger's confrontation with the Western tradition in the late 1920s, Nietzsche's philosophy of the **will to power** takes on increasing importance. Heidegger also references the connection to the **earth** as well as the **world** as situating a new **understanding** of the direction of history (*Geschichte*) as a whole.

*Ponderings IV* (1934–35) contains “Of Being-there and Being” (*Vom Dasein und Sein*) and “The Question and the Way” (*Die Frage und die Wege*). Heidegger introduces a discussion of **enowning** (*Ereignis*). He points to the “worlding of the world” as the **site** for the **presencing** of **be-ing** (*Seyn*), by virtue of which entities appear and enowning first unfolds. In this discussion, Heidegger employs the archaic spelling of be-ing, suggesting a new, groundbreaking philosophical approach necessary for addressing the crisis of **history** and making it **question-worthy**. He refers to his manuscript for *Contributions to Philosophy* and provides one of his few diagrams illustrating the interconnectedness of world and earth, being-there and enowning.

In *Ponderings V*, Heidegger introduces key themes from *Contributions to Philosophy*, including a discussion of the **last god**. In section 1 (a), he refers verbatim to a passage that appears in section 256 of *Contributions to Philosophy*, entitled “The Last God”: “The last god is not the end but the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities for our history.” In this context, Heidegger asks what is “historical,” not only in the sense of **being-there** as the **ground** of human history, but also as the possibility for a deeper grounding of history in the truth of be-ing. Once again, Heidegger addresses the “who” of this futural **human being** who can be grounded in the history that makes possible the philosophical **tradition**. In this way, he sets the parameters for distinguishing between history (*Geschichte*) and **historiography** (*Historie*).

In *Ponderings VI*, Heidegger begins to address the ontological basis of **technology** (*Technik*). He differentiates between simply using a machine (*ein Maschine*) and the historical basis or distinctive epoch for the appearance of be-ing through which instrumentality becomes possible. He explicitly refers to the **abandonment of being** (*Seinsverlassenheit*) as the historical **ground** for the rise of technology in the modern era. Heidegger also contrasts **mindfulness** (*Besinnung*) with reflection (*Reflexion*), in which the former develops through the **knowing awareness** of **crossing** over to the **other beginning**.

See also ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY (*Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*).

**PONDERINGS VII–XI: BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1938–1939** (*Überlegungen VII–XI: Schwarze Hefte 1938–1939*). The text of *Ponderings VII–IX* comprises volume 95 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. In *Ponderings VII*, Heidegger addresses a crisis imminent in his native Germany and considers whether a proper response can be formulated within prevalent cultural, religious, and anthropological frameworks. He points to his own notion of **history** (*Geschichte*) as offering a perspective that **questions back** into the **origins** of the Western **tradition**, rather than as based simply on knee-jerk reactions of expediency. Heidegger characterizes this questioning back as a **venture**, which enacts basic distinctions: (1) the difference between history and **historiography**; (2) the emphasis on the thoughtful inquiry into **be-ing** (*Seyn*) versus formulating platitudes that apply to entities; and (3) seeking in **being-there** that which is “other” and alien, rather than taking at face value **anthropomorphic** and anthropological properties of man, for example, spiritual longing for wholeness, impulses of survival, and the desire for happiness.

Heidegger begins *Ponderings VIII* by showing how history receives its trajectory from **enowning** and the manner in which **being-there** participates in the linguistic-temporal **clearing**. In this context, he argues against a meta-physical vision concerning the **future** based upon the assertiveness of the **will** alone and thereby upon a shortsightedness of what is evident from the perspective of **entities** “here and now.” By contrast, a **decision** that seeks its **directive** from enowning must counter “historiological and biological” conceptions of the **people** (*Volk*). Thus, such a decision would emphasize (1) the transformation of “man” (*Mensch*) into the self-questioning and abiding within the **clearing** and (2) the importance of safeguarding the originary power of **language**, including its retreat into **silence** and its capacity to serve as an emissary of **be-ing** (*Seyn*). In this transformation, Heidegger emphasizes that the singular trait of **being-there** reemerges through its occupation of the **between** (*Zwischen*), as configured through the differentiation of (1) **gods** and **mortals**, (2) **be-ing** and **entities**, and (3) **world** and **earth**. The enactment of this distinctive way of residing in the “between” Heidegger calls **inabiding** (*Inständigkeit*).

Heidegger concludes *Ponderings VIII* by distinguishing the decisional role that **philosophy** can play in opposition to the **sciences** with their **ontic** focus. He appeals to **Immanuel Kant**’s employment of “critique” as an example of the former. But, as outlined in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Kant’s treatment of the transcendental **imagination** remains confined within a meta-physical consideration of the **beingness** of **entities**, and hence not does not fully appreciate the demarcation between philosophy and the sciences, according to which the decisional power of the former can be unveiled.

In *Ponderings IX*, Heidegger compares the current situation of the **West** (*das Abendland*) with the **temporality** of time-space. He undertakes a counter-critique of the “folkish” (*völkisch*) cultural *Zeitgeist* of Germany, seeking as a balance those thinkers and artists who embody the spirit of his description in *Contributions to Philosophy* of the **ones to come**. In order to illustrate how what it means to be human has become question-worthy in its own right, Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s remark from *Beyond Good and Evil* that “man is the as yet undetermined animal.” Yet even Nietzsche conceives animality on the basis of the metaphysics of **subjectivity**. In section 56, Heidegger appeals to a remark from Ludwig von Beethoven that the search to become a philosopher requires asking about the **resoluteness** that is necessary to withstand the conflict of **thinking**. In this context, Heidegger makes an oblique reference to what will become the leitmotif of his **Complete Edition** (*Gesamtausgabe*), namely, “proceeding along ways” rather than emphasizing “works.”

In *Ponderings X*, Heidegger begins by clarifying the overall aim of this tentative inquiry. He emphasizes again that his ruminations pave the way for a new “inceptional questioning.” In this vein, such questioning takes its bearings from an appropriation of the philosophical **tradition**. He suggests that his project of *Being and Time* is itself only under way historically, that is, as vulnerable to misunderstanding, on the one hand, and on the other, as dependent upon an awakening to and arrival of the **other beginning**. His employment of such expressions as human **existence** and **transcendence** in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* has to be further differentiated from derivative concepts in the parallel fields of **metaphysics** and **epistemology**, respectively. Heidegger attributes much of this distortion to the rise of a “populist” movement whose outreach is an extension of the **gigantic** under the umbrella of **machination**. Implicitly, such populism has its own philosophical antihero in **René Descartes**’s quest for certainty, which mistakenly and uncritically takes the self-assertiveness and willfulness of the human subject as a standard of “truth.” This metaphysical drive of **subjectivity** provides the impetus for the development of shortsighted misconceptions in other fields, including **historiography** (*Historie*) and the scientific disciplines of anthropology and biology. Heidegger concludes by linking the predominance of “cultural politics” to **calculative thinking**, which provides a façade for the consolidation of power through the gestalt of machination.

Heidegger begins *Ponderings XI* by contrasting what is singular and ownmost to philosophy, in opposition to those who espouse a “philosophy of life.” In a manner reminiscent of a phrase adapted from **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling**, Heidegger emphasizes that the philosopher resides in the **between** (*Zwischen*), which plumbs the depths of the **abground** in order to

ascend to the greatest heights. As situated with respect to this abground, the thinker must demonstrate the profoundest **courage** and welcome the transition of **going under** as a prerequisite for traversing the **crossing**.

Heidegger addresses the onset of **modernity** and its culmination in **Friedrich Nietzsche's** thinking. This consummation occurs when entities are revealed in terms of subjectivity, or in Nietzsche's language, as determined through the estimation of **values**. Conversely, **willing** defines what is constant in the self-positing of the subject or **subjectivity**. Heidegger characterizes the encompassing setting in which modernity reaches its crescendo and all these relations play themselves out as machination. Heidegger concludes this volume by emphasizing how Nietzsche's conception of the **overman** remains within the scope of metaphysics, albeit inverting the traditional priority of the supersensuous over the sensuous, and rationality over animality.

**PONDERINGS XII–XV: BLACK NOTEBOOKS 1939–1941** (*Überlegungen XII–XV: Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941*). The text of *Ponderings XII–XV* comprises volume 96 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**. In *Ponderings XII*, Heidegger considers the manner in which **machination** shapes the modern **world**. Machination provides the gestalt in which human activities unfold on both cultural and social levels, and most notably, through **politics**. The political realm is thereby defined as a drive toward the acquisition of power, rather than, as in antiquity, as the governance of the city-state or **polis** for the benefit of the common **good**.

*Ponderings XIII* begins with a quotation that appears in the opening of *Mindfulness* (1938–39): “We do not know goals, but are only a pathway.” With this quotation, Heidegger situates his observations concerning the contemporary political scene, particularly insofar as he interprets the politics of his day as an outgrowth of modernity. Conversely, he attempts to read off from the current crisis signs that modernity embodies a historical decline that is traceable to the **forgottenness of being**. To make this demarcation from **modernity** evident, and to further differentiate his own thinking from **metaphysics**, Heidegger invokes the archaic usage of **be-ing** (*Seyn*). In this context, he also points to the misunderstanding in the “public's” reading of *Being and Time*, specifically the tendency to misconstrue **being-there** in anthropological and existential terms only, rather than as arising from and as participating in the **clearing**. Such misunderstanding indicates how strongly entrenched metaphysical thought becomes in consummating the epoch of **modernity** and its penchant toward subjectivism.

As an example of the diary character of the *Notebooks*, Heidegger casts a satirical light on his contemporaries who seek professional notoriety at the expense of undertaking the **forbearance** of thoughtful inquiry. He makes a lighthearted reference to his Pomeranian dog having a greater sense of the

beauty of the countryside than the academic pundits who boast a capacity for intellectual and aesthetic appreciation. Yet among such personal declarations, Heidegger also acknowledges his inspiration from the “shining blueness” of the heavens, not unlike a similar remark made by **Immanuel Kant** in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Heidegger takes this poetic reference to the stars as an occasion to develop his own ontological cosmology, that is, as outlining the **strife** between **world** and **earth**.

Within these scattered observations, Heidegger develops the thread of his estimation of the political realm, and of global politics, as bringing into play what he first describes in *Contributions to Philosophy* as the **gigantic**. In the realm of opinions, the gigantic also provides the basis on which the trivial concerns of splintered social factions and self-interests can be magnified into disproportionate significance.

Militarism is itself a form of the gigantic, in the sense of striving for the acquisition and the consolidation of **power**. This drive toward power comes to expression in the totalizing impulse of specific political regimes, including socialism and **National Socialism**. As a case in point, Heidegger’s disdain for communism comes to light in a scathing remark directed at Nikolai Lenin’s description that world wars are merely a “tactic” predicated upon the development and deployment of “military might.”

In this vein, Heidegger undertakes a critique of socialism, Bolshevism, and all that is negatively embodied in Russian nationalism (e.g., Russianism). He introduces machination as an important concept to address the deeper metaphysical underpinnings of both Russian and German nationalism (e.g., **National Socialism**). To provide a context, Heidegger invokes a quotation from **Fyodor Dostoevsky’s** *The Demons* (1872; also translated in English as *The Possessed*) about the connection between the grounding of a **people** and the devotion to a **God**. Heidegger suggests that it is **be-ing** (*Seyn*) that grants the space to reveal the mutual need conjoining **mortals** and **gods**. He invokes the motif of the **last god** to distinguish the deeper source of spirituality on which the **life** of a people depends, that is, apart from any denominational and ideological constructions.

Heidegger begins *Ponderings XIV* by emphasizing as a countermeasure to modernity the need for steadfastness and **resoluteness**, which are devoted to and spring from a thoughtful inquiry into be-ing. He points to **enowning** as the **directive** for such thoughtful inquiry. In this context, Heidegger draws a distinction between two kinds of service: a service that heeds the directive of be-ing and participates in the **clearing**, and a service that subjugates **nature** and **entities in the whole** to institutionalized mechanisms of power. This mirrors Heidegger’s emphasis in *Contributions to Philosophy* on the **setting-free** that is enacted in the **leap** toward be-ing and away from a generic way of representing **entities**. The latter is conducive to what occurs in the political realm under the heading of tyranny, that is, submission to a program de-

signed around totalizing impulses. Heidegger also takes issue with an unquestioning and uncritical "political" trend in Germany to extract the concept of a "master race" (*Herrenvolk*) from **Friedrich Nietzsche's** metaphysics of the **will to power** and the **overman**. In this context, Heidegger also detracts from the "Führer speech of 30 January 1940," which disdainfully refers to "poets and thinkers" as "workers."

Heidegger concludes *Ponderings XIV* with vehement criticisms of the Bolshevik regime of Russia and its grounding in a global vision of machination that comes to light in other world powers, for example, England and America, despite ideological differences. He suggests that "world Judaism" also appears on this global stage, albeit not as a "racial question" but as a "metaphysical" one.

In *Ponderings XV*, Heidegger carries forth a distinction interweaving his fragmentary remarks throughout the *Notebooks*, namely, the difference between **history** and **historiography**. He argues that modernity remains oblivious to the deeper enactment of history as a stage for the manifestation of being and the reciprocal challenge posed to human beings to make decisions. On the contrary, the modern age relishes the diversity of opinions at the expense of thoughtful inquiry.

**POSITIONING (*Gestell*)**. See ENFRAMING (*Gestell*).

**POSSIBILITY (*Möglichkeit*)**. Heidegger's entire **path of thinking** is one continuing attempt to disclose **being** as possibility. The being of **entities** is never fixed. Entities are not dead and motionless objects. Their being is always a having of the possibility to change and develop. Even **equipment** has the possibilities of its different uses. **Being-there** is its unique **can-be** and has the fundamental possibilities or **modes of ownedness** and **unownedness** of its **existence**. Being is **sheltered** in its ownmost **mystery** and has the possibility to emit a new **beginning** in the **history of being**.

In *My Way to Phenomenology*, Heidegger reiterates a passage from *Being and Time* that **phenomenology** is to be viewed as a historical possibility of **thinking**, rather than as the **actuality** of a philosophical school.

See also ENOWNING (*Ereignis*).

**POSTSCRIPT TO "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?" (*Nachwort zu "Was ist die Metaphysik"*)**. In 1943, Heidegger added this postscript to his inaugural lecture of 1929. While reflecting on the significance of this lecture, he also emphasizes the role that **language** plays in re-asking the **question of being**. This essay is included in *Pathmarks*, volume 9 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**.

**POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING.** See CAN-BE (*Seinkönnen*).

**POVERTY (*Armut*).** As bound by **need** and **distress**, **thinking** must **experience** the depths of its **finitude**. At the close of his *Letter on “Humanism,”* Heidegger emphasizes that **philosophy** must relinquish its claim to absolute knowledge and descend into the “poverty of thinking.” In his lecture “Die Armut” (27 June 1945), Heidegger appeals to a **saying** from **Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetry** that **human beings** become rich by first embracing poverty. The condition of becoming wealthy corresponds to the **gift** that **being** offers to thought, in contrast to the deprivation of merely clinging to the **actuality of entities**.

In *The History of Be-ing* (1938–40), Heidegger suggests that poverty is a dimension of **enowning**, as the **thrownness** prompting the need or necessity by which **being-there** is thrust into **history**, and first becomes responsive to the abundance of **be-ing’s possibility** for manifestation. He points out that, contrary to common sense, impoverishment (*die Verarmung*) is itself a “gift” that harbors a deep connection to **ownedness**.

**POVERTY (*Die Armut*).** Heidegger gave this lecture to a small audience on 27 June 1945 at Wildenstein Castle, where the philosophy faculty had temporarily taken refuge. The lecture follows on the heels of the final downfall of Germany in World War II. For Heidegger, poverty is a recurring theme, which points to a **grounding attunement** that **thinking** must assume in order to be **released** from the stranglehold of **entities** and cast into the **openness**.

**POWER (*die Macht*).** The concern for power, and its phenomenal appearance, is a central theme in *The History of Be-ing* (1938–40). Power is a dimension of **machination**, which asserts itself in the social and political realms. As Heidegger illustrates throughout his lectures on **Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy**, power is an extension of the **will**, the basic aim of which is to increase its own activity as willing. Power is thereby driven by its impetus for increasing power and imposing its schematics for exercising control throughout **entities in the whole**, including the institutions by which **human beings** manage their social and political affairs. The drive for the acquisition of power operates under the illusion of its own pretense of supremacy and thereby remains oblivious to its ultimate grounding in machination as the **abandonment of being** (*Seinsverlassenheit*).

**PRAGMATIC POLITICS (*Realpolitik*).** See POLITICS (*Politik*).

**PRECONCEPTION (*Vorgriff*).** See FORE-CONCEPTION (*Vorgriff*).



**PREONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BEING** (*vorontologisches Seinsverständnis*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows how **everydayness** provides a prephilosophical grasp of **being** prior to developing an explicit concept thereof. This preontological **understanding** of being, however, yields the clues for **hermeneutics** to first formulate the **question of being** and for **ontology** to get under way. Heidegger thereby claims that the explicit formulation of the question of being is a radicalization of this preontological understanding, which **being-there** exhibits through its own act of **existing**.

**PREPOSSESSION** (*Vorhabe*). See FORE-HAVING (*Vorhabe*).

**PRESENCE** (*Anwesenheit*). The Greeks disclosed the **meaning of being** as presence. The **being** of an **entity** is its being **present** in **unconcealment**, *alètheia*. Entities can only be encountered by **being-there** if they **come to presence** in unconcealment. In presence the **meaning** of being present, the relation between “being” and “time,” comes to light. It shows also that the Greeks understood being through only one dimension of time. The **highest entity** or **God** is the entity that is constantly present. In the being of the highest entity, the being of all other entities is founded.

An entity can be present only if there is an open space or **clearing** in which it can present itself. The presence of entities presupposes the counterdynamic of **absence**. The interplay of presence and absence, the hallmark of the **gifting** refusal of **be-ing**, is what Heidegger calls **enowning**. The **truth of being** is the unconcealment of entities. In their presence, entities can reveal themselves as something they are not but only appear to be. The **essential swaying** of truth is the interplay of **concealment** and **revelment**.

*See also* PRESENCE-AT-HAND (*Vorhandenheit*).

**PRESENCE-AT-HAND** (*Vorhandenheit*). Presence-at-hand is the kind of **being** that is discovered when we encounter **entities** within the **world** purely in the way they look or appear. This theoretical stance disregards the referential **whole** of practical and personal concerns that make up the everyday world. This disregard leads to an objectification of entities as that which stands against a subject. When entities are present-at-hand, they appear as objects for a knowing subject. Of objects we can have objective knowledge, that is, a knowledge that is valid for all subjects.

*See also* READINESS-TO-HAND (*Zuhandenheit*).

**PRESENCING** (*anwesen*). The dynamic by which something appears or an **entity** becomes manifest is its **mode** of presencing. The act of presencing illustrates how **being** can manifest itself in light of a specific temporal dimension, namely, the **present**.

*See also* PRESENCE (*Anwesenheit*).

**PRESENT** (*Gegenwart*). In our everyday life, we understand the present as one of the three dimensions of **time**. It is the **now** that separates the **past** and the **future**. In Heidegger's **phenomenology** of time, the present is one of the three **ecstases** of **temporality**. The primordial **mode** of the present is the **moment**, while its derivative mode is merely to **make present**.

**PRESENTNESS** (*Präsenz*). In Heidegger's winter semester 1925/26 lecture-course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, presentness comprehends both **being** as **presence** and **truth** as **making present**. In the summer semester 1927 lecture-course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, presentness is the **horizontal schema** of making present. It is the condition of **possibility** of **transcendence** as the **projection** of a **horizon** within which an **entity** can be present and made present.

**PRESUPPOSITION** (*Voraussetzung*). **Edmund Husserl** sought to establish **phenomenology** as a presuppositionless **science** with an absolute starting point in pure **consciousness**. By contrast, Heidegger maintained that presuppositions are intrinsic to human **understanding** (*Verstehen*), directing in advance what it is we are seeking to understand. A preunderstanding, which houses presuppositions, governs our ability to understand and lay out the **structures** that render something **meaningful** in an act of **interpretation**. By unfolding what is preunderstood or presupposed in what it is we are seeking to understand and interpret, understanding is essentially a hermeneutical exercise. Taking a clue from **Wilhelm Dilthey**, Heidegger diverges from his mentor, Husserl, by developing a **hermeneutic phenomenology**.

For Heidegger, presuppositions are an outgrowth of the **projective** structure of understanding, that is, its way of casting ahead a precomprehension of what is to be understood and interpreted. Given this structure of projection, human understanding develops in three stages, through **fore-having**, **fore-sight**, and **fore-concept**. Preliminary to all understanding is the **fact** that **being-there** displays a **preontological understanding of being**. The explication of this preontological understanding provides the point of departure for Heidegger's own inquiry into the **meaning of being**. Correlated with and implied in this preontological understanding is the preunderstanding of human **existence** that each of us possesses as an inquirer.

In section 63 (Part I, Division Two) of *Being and Time*, Heidegger lays out the **hermeneutic situation** of his own inquiry. The hermeneutic situation comprises the totality of presuppositions that governs his inquiry into **being**. In this way, he reconciles his methodology with the uniqueness of the phenomenon under investigation. In his lecture-course on **F. W. J. Schelling** from the summer semester of 1936, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger states that the greatness of **philosophy** lies in embracing its presuppositions, rather than denying them.

**PRIMAL SOMETHING (*Ur-Etwas*)**. In his war emergency semester 1919 course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, Heidegger described the primal something as the condition of **possibility of lived experience**. The primal something is **life** as not yet differentiated and not yet worldly. This not-yet is the index for the highest potentiality of life. The primal something has a motivated tendency and tending motivation “to world” out into particular **lifeworlds**.

This primal something is no thing at all, but **intentionality** as such. As life, we immediately understand its potential meaningfulness. The “living out” of this self-understanding can only be explicated through an equally concrete application of the phenomenological method. **Phenomenology** therefore can no longer be the intuitive **science** of **Edmund Husserl**. Heidegger transforms it into **hermeneutics**, that is, the explication of our **understanding of being**.

**PRIME-LEAP (*Ur-sprung*)**. Heidegger employs the term **leap** to describe a fundamental aspect of an inquiry that seeks to address **being** directly without relying on a prior orientation to **entities**. In *Mindfulness*, he emphasizes a prime-leap, which proceeds from a **grounding attunement** of **startled dismay** to open forth a **region** of manifestation otherwise closed off within **modernity**. The prime-leap is the original impetus to bring into the **openness** that which is most **question-worthy**. In section 25 of *Mindfulness*, Heidegger describes the prime-leap as the pivotal crossroads of investigation, in which the **clearing (*Lichtung*)** is intimated through the countervale of **refusal**, that is, as harboring what remains **unthought** throughout the **history** of **metaphysics**.

**PRIMORDIAL CHRISTIANITY (*Urchristentum*)**. Heidegger employs this term in his 1920–21 lectures on **religion**, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. He distinguishes primordial **Christianity** in terms of the **facticity** of the believer **who** answers the call to be religious and live a spiritual **life**. The believer’s life then becomes an example or testimony to the core beliefs

of Christianity, and ultimately, to **God's** grace. In his way, Heidegger contrasts the firsthand testimony of the Christian believer with the development of a doctrine or dogma of Christianity as such.

*See also* FORMAL INDICATION (*formale Anzeige*).

**PRIMORDIAL TIME** (*ursprüngliche Zeit*). As indicated by the title of his magnum opus, *Being and Time*, the concern for explicating the **structure** of **temporality** shapes Heidegger's entire project. Within this inquiry, however, an important subtext also emerges, namely, differentiating an original enactment of temporality from a derivative expression thereof.

He characterizes the former as primordial time, contrasted with the latter or **within-timeness**. This distinction is crucial for establishing the linchpin of Heidegger's entire project, that is, outlining how temporality makes possible any **understanding of being** (*Sein*) versus the appearance of **entities**, for example, the **ready-to-hand**, within the context of the equipmental realm of **everydayness**. Time is called derivative because it entails the **falling** mode by which **being-there** becomes immersed within its everyday preoccupations of dealing with entities, including managing the daily affairs that present themselves within the scope of its **circumspective concerns**. The hallmark of this derivative time is its linear, sequential character, which privileges the temporal dimension of the "present." Derivative time thereby displays the simple dynamic of **making present** whatever entities appear, for example, hammer and nails, within the context of the **self's** everyday comportments and activities.

In order for the distinction between primordial and derivative time to become explicit, the former characterization must be revealed as making possible the **ownedness** or authenticity of the self. In this way, temporality unfolds by originating from the self-understanding of human **existence** (*Existenz*), rather than as based secondarily, that is, derivatively, on being-there's **experience** with and everyday **understanding** of the surrounding entities that it encounters within the **world**. Where derivative temporality is linear, primordial time is elliptical as arising from the **future**, returning from the **past**, and entering into the **present**. In primordial time, the future is the primary **ecstasis** for temporal dimension, from which the dynamic of temporality originates. The future takes priority, because the futural **anticipation** of **death**, and the **resolve** of reaffirming from the **past** choice to be oneself, yields the direction along which the arc of primordial time originates. Conversely, this elliptical movement of primordial time casts forth the owned or authentic present as the **moment of vision** (*Augenblick*), rather than as immediacy of the "now" or the unowned "present." If the owned self becomes possible through **anticipatory resoluteness**, then primordial time enacts this movement. As such, primordial time is inherently ecstatic, transporting the self into the **openness of being-in-the-world**.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger provides a complementary demonstration of primordial time by retrieving the temporal **origin** of the **imagination**. He shows that selfhood is essentially time-forming, originating along the arc of finite **transcendence**. By showing how the self is **equiprimordial** with the origination of temporality, Heidegger distinguishes primordial time from the within-timeness of the cognitive appearance of physical objects according to Newtonian laws.

Heidegger concludes *Being and Time* with the question of whether primordial time offers the key to understanding **being** and whether the hidden reciprocity between the two (e.g., time and being) provides the clue to developing an **ontology** or a science of being.

**PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY, THE (*Der Satz der Identität*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture on 27 June 1957 at the University of **Freiburg**. It is a careful meditation on the principle of identity that looks back at the essential **origin** of **metaphysics** and looks ahead into the domain of **technology** and **nihilism** at the end of metaphysics. The principle of identity expresses the highest law of thinking in the formula  $A = A$ . In this formula, the nature of identity remains **unthought**. With **Plato**, Heidegger tries to clarify the sense of the **relation** of identity.  $A = A$  does not mean that each term is the same. The relation of identity is a mediation and synthesis. The principle of identity neither asserts that two terms are identical nor names the empty self-identity of each **entity**. It expresses the mediation in the **being** of each entity and is therefore a principle not only of thinking but also of being. The mediation of being and thinking finds its completion in the **philosophy** of the German idealists.

What does the identity of being and thinking mean? Heidegger elucidates this essential relation in an **interpretation** of the poem of **Parmenides**. **Human beings** and being belong together and have been delivered over to each other. In the age of **technology** and **nihilism**, the constellation of human beings and being is dominated by **enframing**. **Enowning** is the **abground** of the **belonging together** of human beings and being. In our time, this belonging together has lapsed into **forgottenness**. A return to the origin of the principle of identity may make another **beginning** in the **history of being** possible.

**PRINCIPLE OF REASON, THE (*Der Satz vom Grund*)**. This winter semester 1955/56 lecture-course is the last one Heidegger gave at the University of **Freiburg**. It is a **retrieval** of the fundamental question of **metaphysics** and brings this question to light in the questionability of its **ground**. The principle of reason, **nothing** is without reason, asserts that our **understanding** looks always and everywhere for the reason why something is. Human

**representation** searches everywhere for a **founding**. The **phenomenon** that is brought to light in the principle of reason is older than the explicit formulation of this principle as principle by **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz**. He stated that each **entity** has its reason. Although it is impossible to verify the principle of reason empirically, it asserts something that is necessary. It is the fundamental principle of all other fundamental principles, like the **principle of identity** and the principle of contradiction.

The principle of reason presupposes that we know what a reason is. After an **interpretation** of the different ways in which reason has been thought, Heidegger plays the principle of reason off against the poetic **experience** of **Angelus Silesius** that the “rose is without why.” **Human beings** and the rose are not without reason, but like the rose, human beings can be without always looking for the cause of entities. The principle of reason says that to the **being of entities** belongs something like a reason or cause. Yet we must differentiate between being and reason. Reason does not reach **being** as such. Being is the **abground** (*Abgrund*) and as such without reason. When we recollect this **truth**, we can read the principle of reason in a different way. Instead of *nothing is without reason*, we can also read, *nothing is without reason*. The emphasis lies now on the relation between being *and* reason.

During the **incubation period** of the principle of reason, the **destiny** of being changed several times, although being as such remained concealed. Being withdraws from the **unconcealment** of entities and can therefore never be explained by an entity. Being has no reason. Human beings stand in the **open** of the **projection** of being and thereby have the **possibility** to respond to the **being of entities**. In this way, **thinking** opens itself for the destiny of being and may move beyond metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks being as reason or ground and forgets that if being itself is grounding, being itself can have no ground. Thinking can only reach being if it is prepared to **leap** into the ungrounded abground of its being without why. Or to use a word of **Heraclitus**, being is the **mystery** of play. The other kind of **commemorative thinking** may free human beings from the frenzy and madness of **calculative thinking** and **technology**.

**PRINCIPLE OF REASON, THE** (*Der Satz vom Grund*). Heidegger delivered this lecture on two occasions in 1956. It is more or less a summary of the 1955/56 lecture-course *The Principle of Reason*.

**PRINCIPLES OF THINKING, THE** (*Die Grundsätze des Denkens*). Under the title *The Principles of Thinking*, Heidegger delivered a cycle of five lectures in the summer semester 1957 at the University of **Freiburg**. The

first lecture was published under the same title in a Festschrift in honor of Victor von Gebattel in 1958. The third and most famous lecture of the cycle was *The Principle of Identity*.

The principles of **thinking**, like the principle of identity and the principle of contradiction, organize the activity of thinking. As principles they can be formalized in formulas such as  $A = A$ . Since they are the fundamental principles of thinking, they cannot be proven in thinking itself. Every proof would presuppose the **validity** of these principles. Heidegger's attempt to reflect upon these principles as principles seems therefore doomed from the start.

However, as Heidegger sees it, this problem dissolves automatically when we realize what happened in the history of **philosophy** some 150 years ago. The essential **structure** of thinking becomes dialectical and reaches its completion in **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's** *Science of Logic*. In the realm of dialectic, it is revealed that thinking must necessarily think itself. This dialectical process is at the time the basic movement in the **whole** of the **objectivity** of all objects. What does this critique of the dialectic reveal about an impending **mindfulness** (*Besinnung*) as to the **meaning** of the principles of thinking?

In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel has shown that ordinary thinking does not obey the principles of thinking. Contradiction is the root of all movement and **life**. It is a fundamental dynamic of reality. Heidegger's elucidation of the title of his cycle of lectures brings us to a way of thinking that becomes mindful of its philosophical mission. The title indicates a thinking of thinking. The genitive in the title is an objective genitive, since the principles of thinking are posited by thinking itself. They are not the object of thinking, and in thinking, the subject of the positing of the principles announces itself. As **Immanuel Kant** has shown, all thinking is in its **essence** "I think." **The "I"** in "I think" must be one and the same. Since thinking is the subject of the principles of thinking, the genitive in the title of the lecture must be a subjective genitive. But as Heidegger had remarked before, it is also an objective genitive. Is it the one or the other, or is it both the one and the other? The elucidation of the title thus leaves us in the dark.

What the title indicates is a commemoration of thinking. Thinking determines the **historicality** of **being-there**. This implies that every attempt to become mindful of thinking is related to our history, and conversely, that enactment of thinking is a historical venture. In the later lectures, Heidegger wants to let his listeners **experience** thinking in such a way that they will be able to recognize another way to think and embark upon a new **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*). This different kind of thinking has left its trace in the **beginning** of thinking and is in its **having been** our **future**.

See also BREMEN AND FREIBURG LECTURES, THE (*Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*).

**PRODUCIBILITY** (*Machsamkeit*). In the end and **completion of metaphysics**, entities are revealed in terms of their instrumentality and usefulness. In the **abandonment of being**, entities are subjected to the forces of **machination**, and **metaphysics** becomes an ally of this drive toward production and consumption. Producibility then becomes the hallmark of entities, the “how” of their disclosure within machination, insofar as they are defined through this cycle of disposable resources. When **nature** becomes defined exclusively as a resource, or as **standing reserve** (*Bestand*), then producibility reigns. Within **modernity**, **Karl Marx** explores this anthropocentric dimension of producibility through his critique of capitalism and his depiction of humanity as the **laboring animal**.

*See also* MAKEABILITY (*Machbarkeit*).

**PROJECTING OPEN OF BEING** (*Entwurf des Seins*). In its historical **clearing**, **being** requires a place of manifestation. This place must be prepared, cultivated, and ultimately projected open through the participation of **being-there**. Despite involving and engaging the activity of **humans**, the projecting open is required by being itself. For being also includes the countertension of **concealment**, which can only be alleviated through the **world** disclosive power of humans. **Thinking** is a primary example of this projecting open, which being-there exercises through its own **freedom**. Heidegger formulates the task of the **projecting-opening** of being in *Contributions to Philosophy*.

**PROJECTING-OPENING** (*entwerfen*). The key thrust of **being-historical thinking** lies in unfolding the area of the **clearing** within which **being** can manifest itself. In this way, the projecting-opening of the **truth of being** first becomes possible. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger goes to great lengths to describe **being-there**'s involvement in this dynamic of unfolding and projecting-opening the fundamental **truth of thinking**. The projecting-opening can also be inverted and incomplete, insofar as it does not cultivate the clearing as such, but concentrates only on uncovering **entities**.

*See also* DIS-ENOWNING (*Ent-eignis*).

**PROJECTION** (*Entwurf*). Projection is the **existential** constitution of **understanding**. It projects the **being of being-there** upon both its **for-the-sake-of-which** and **meaningfulness**. The character of understanding as projection constitutes **being-in-the-world** with regard to the **disclosedness** of its ‘there’ of a **can-be**. The projection opens up the **play-space** for the **possibilities** of being-there’s can-be. Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself toward a plan that has been thought out beforehand.



In projection, the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which or **in-terms-of-which** (*das Woraufhin*) it projects, but throws before itself the possibility as possibility and lets it be as such. The projection of being-there's most unique can-be has been delivered over to the fact of its **thrownness** into the "there."

**PROTAGORAS (490–420 BC).** Protagoras was a pre-Socratic thinker, whose statement "Man is the **measure** of all things . . ." is among the most recognized pronouncements of early **Greek philosophy**. **Plato** characterized Protagoras as a sophist because of the suggestion that **truth** can be subjectively determined by what an individual believes or as mere opinion. Heidegger, however, casts Protagoras in a much more sympathetic light. In his essay *Anaximander's Saying* (1946), Heidegger reinterprets the statement that "Man is the measure of all things . . ." Specifically, he shows that it is the unique capacity of **human beings** to experience the **presencing** and **absencing** of **entities**, which allows **mortals** to embody a **measure** (*Maß*), that is, to become **measure-setting** (*Maßsetzung*).

**PSYCHOLOGISM (Psychologismus).** Psychologism is a reductionist attempt to explain the laws of **logic** in terms of material laws of **thinking**. It fails to understand the essential difference between psychical act and logical sense, that is, between **being** and validity. At the end of the 19th century, many psychological theories of logic were developed; since logic is the **science** of thinking and thinking a capacity of the mind, psychologism led to the conviction that **philosophy** should be founded upon psychology. **Edmund Husserl** refuted psychologism in his *Logical Investigations*.

**PUBLICNESS (Öffentlichkeit).** Publicness determines the **disclosedness** of the "they." **Being-there** is thrown into publicness and thus falls away from the ownmost **possibilities** of its most unique **can-be**. Because the **self** understands the possibilities of its **existence** in the way that everybody else does, it projects its possibilities upon the general view that is therefore nobody's view. In the **ambiguity** of this **projection** upon publicness, being-there's most unique can-be remains concealed. The **disclosedness** of the "they" or "anyone" is determined by **idle talk**. Being-there falls prey to the idle talk of the "they" and leaps, curious, from novelty to novelty. It never tarries with the **entities** it encounters and always forgets the unique possibilities of its own existence.

Throughout his life, Heidegger remained very critical and suspicious of the public domain. Public life obscures **individuality** and **ownedness**. He preferred to work in the solitude of his wood cabin in **Todtnauberg**.



# Q

**QUADRATE, THE (*Geviert*).** See FOURFOLD, THE (*Geviert*).

**QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY, THE (*Die Frage nach der Technik*).** Heidegger delivered this lecture on 18 November 1953 in Munich. The lecture was published in the subsequent year in a single volume, *Lectures and Essays (Vorträge und Aufsätze)*. Heidegger's lecture is an enlarged version of his 1949 lecture, *Das Gestell (Enframing)*. In the lecture, he gives an exposition of the **origin** of **technology** and its unfolding within **modernity**. Everyone knows the two statements that answer the question concerning technology: (1) technology is a means to an end and (2) technology is a human activity. Heidegger shows that this instrumental **understanding** of technology is founded upon the **representation** of causality that was developed in **Greek philosophy**. According to **Aristotle**, a cause is that to which something else is indebted for its **being**. Being is understood as **presenting**. The cause induces an **entity** to come forth into **presence**. This bringing forth into presence is *poiësis*. *Poiësis* determines not only human activity but also the **way of being** of **nature**, *phusis*, since *phusis* is the bringing forth of something out of itself. The **word** technology stems from the Greek *techné*, which is the name for both the activities and skills of the craftsman and the arts of the mind and the fine **arts**, and is therefore a way of **revelment**. In *techné*, **truth** is appropriated.

Modern technology is determined by a challenge. In natural **science**, we force nature to answer our questions. In this way of revelation, that which is revealed is disclosed as **standing-reserve** or a stockpile of materials and products that are ready to be used by **human beings**. Technology gathers entities into **enframing**. Enframing defines the globalized, self-aggrandizing force of technology as **machination**. In the **danger** of enframing and the desecration of the **earth**, the "saving power" also grows. The famous **saying** of **Friedrich Hölderlin** indicates the **possibility** of looking for other ways of revelation besides technology. This **mindfulness** of the deeper **meaning** of

technology discovers the **nearness** of technology to *poièsis*. Technology is not the work of **evil**. In its ownmost **origin**, the liberating appeal of revelation holds sway and discloses the nearness to art.

The more questioningly we ponder both the historical origin of technology and the threat it poses today, the more mysterious the “saving power” of art becomes. The closer we come to the danger of technology, the more questioning we become. And as Heidegger says in his closing statement, questioning is the “**piety of thinking**.”

**QUESTION CONCERNING THE THING: ON KANT’S DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLES, THE (*Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*)**. This book contains the text of Heidegger’s winter semester 1935/36 lecture-course, originally delivered under the title Basic Questions of Metaphysics. This text was later republished as volume 41 of Heidegger’s **Complete Edition**. In this lecture-course, Heidegger provides an **interpretation of Immanuel Kant**’s system of the principles of the pure understanding (*Verstand*) in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger thereby provides a complementary account of his earlier interpretation of transcendental **philosophy** in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929). Heidegger’s lecture-course is also significant for marking his interest in the emerging problem of the rise of **natural science in modernity** and its connection to a **technological** perspective, which entered into the forefront of his questioning in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38).

In the first part of his course, Heidegger develops the guiding question of the course: What is a **thing**? He distinguishes between the philosophical question, on the one hand, and the everyday and scientific question, on the other. The difference between these kinds of questions is that in everyday life and in natural science, we ask what particular **entities** are: What is a jug or what is an atom? In **philosophy**, we inquire about the thingness of **things**, that is, the quality that makes a thing a thing.

The first determinations of the thingness of things that Heidegger discusses are **space** and **time**. Things are in each instance “this here,” which seems to be both an objective determination, since all things are in **space** and **time**, and a subjective determination, since this particular thing is next to me. At this point, Heidegger brings **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**’s dialectic of sense-certainty into play. The thing as a particular entity determined by its spatial and temporal relations is described in the **metaphysics** of **Aristotle** as the carrier of qualities. This interpretation of the thingness of things is the foundation of the correspondence theory of **truth**. The primary **location** of truth is the **assertion**. Aristotle’s **ontology** is a historical answer to the **guiding question** of metaphysics, which springs from the **historicality** of **being-there**.

A thing is the carrier of properties, and the corresponding truth has its location in the assertion or **judgment**, which is a relation of subject and predicate. What has not been decided is whether the **essence** of judgment and truth determines themselves from the essence of a thing, or the other way around. Or is there a common **ground** of both? As Heidegger points out, that which determines (*bedingt*) the essence or thingness of a thing (*Ding*) can no longer itself be a thing. It must be an unconditioned (*Unbedingtes*). The nature of the unconditioned is codetermined by what has been established as a thing and as a condition. If a thing is the *ens creatum*, the unconditioned is **God** in the sense of the Old Testament. If the thing is conditioned as an **object for consciousness** or knowing, the unconditioned is the absolute **I** of German idealism.

In the second part of the course, Heidegger analyzes Kant's way of asking the question "What is a thing?" In an introductory section ("The Historical Basis of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*"), he discusses, first, the background of Kant's question along three lines: the problem of **categories**, the development from *logos* via ratio to reason, and the rise of Newtonian science. The beginning of **modernity** is the radicalization of mathematics by **René Descartes**, which leads to the self-certain cogito as the ground of all **being**. From Descartes, the question of the thing was transmitted to Kant by **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz** and Christian Wolff. Within **modernity**, Heidegger claims that the **mathematical projection** of the thing, that is, the disclosure of **nature** as defined by its measurable and numerical characteristics, prefigures the rise of the scientific theories of Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton.

Heidegger's attempt to explore the ground of the physical sciences in the mathematical projection of nature constitutes one of his first attempts to address the epoch of **modernity**. In ushering in the rise of the natural sciences, the modern era marks the inception of the rise of **machination**. The ability to conceptualize nature in mathematical terms leads to developing formulas of predictability and control. The modern **disclosure** of the thing as an extant metaphysical and mathematical object allows for a new grounding of knowledge (and its practical applications) in human **subjectivity**. Thus, the germ of **technology** is planted through the mathematical project of nature as an object to be controlled and mastered by the human subject.

The second section ("The Question concerning the Thing in Kant's Main Work") is an extensive interpretation of the question of the thing in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In a parenthetical remark from the text of this lecture-course, Heidegger states that this subsequent interpretation makes up for a previous shortcoming in his first Kant-book (1929): namely, the need to explicate Kant's principles of understanding, insofar as they express the universal laws of nature. As Heidegger sees it, the system of the principles of the pure understanding is the inner heart and foundation of the whole work.

Since Kant defines the object of experience as nature, the thing is a natural thing or an appearance in contrast to the thing-in-itself. Heidegger's interpretation centers on the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, on Kant's essential definition of judgment, on the highest principle of synthetic judgments, and on the systematic representation of all the synthetic principles of the pure understanding.

In his major work, Kant is confronted time and again with the fact that we encounter objects that we ourselves did not make in the **openness** and within which we let this encounter happen. For Heidegger, it is of the utmost importance that we reflect upon the **between**, the "open" area "between" **human beings** and the manifestation of things. Kant discovers that **thinking** depends upon **intuition**, but he fails to ask explicitly about the **open** as that which is manifest before we encounter the objects of **experience**. The question "What is a thing?" thus leads us to the question "What does it mean to be human?" Heidegger arrives at this conclusion after a careful exposition of Kant's highest principle of synthetic judgments, that is, that the "conditions of *the possibility of experience* are at the same time *the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience*." He emphasizes that this principle not only holds the key to understanding Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, but also distinguishes a pivotal epoch in the **history** of metaphysics.

By reestablishing the ontological ground of Kant's highest principle of synthetic judgments, Heidegger supplements his radical reinterpretation of **schematism** as the central linchpin of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929).

**QUESTION OF ALL QUESTIONS (*die Frage aller Fragen*)**. Throughout all his writings, Heidegger pursued one question, the **question of being**. This question is the most perennial and basic of all philosophical questions. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger describes this question as the question of all questions. He emphasizes that the question he originally formulated in *Being and Time* (1927), or the question of the **meaning of being**, is recast as the question of the **truth of be-ing** (*Sein*). To underscore this development and transformation in questioning, Heidegger employs the 18th-century spelling of the word, but also reiterates that the overall **path of thinking** (*Denkweg*) remains the same.

**QUESTION OF BEING (*die Seinsfrage*)**. The question of **being** is the question: What does it mean "to be?" It is expressed in both the **guiding question of metaphysics** and the **basic question** of Heidegger's **thinking**. The metaphysical question what is an **entity** as entity? can be worked out in two different ways that constitute the **onto-theo-logical structure** of metaphysics: (1) What is **beingness**? and (2) What entity is the **ground** of being?

Heidegger raised the question of being anew in *Being and Time* and showed in his **destruction** of the history of **ontology** that the **meaning of being** had remained forgotten in the guiding question of metaphysics. His **path of thinking** is an attempt to answer the basic question of thinking: How “is there being,” or how is it both granted and withheld through **enowning**?

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger refers to the question of be-ing (*Seyn*) as the **question of all questions**.

**QUESTION-BACK (*Rückfrage*)**. For Heidegger, any advance along the **path of thinking** is only made by **retrieving** the **origins** of Western **philosophy**. Hence, philosophical inquiry is enacted by the attempt to question-back to these **origins**. To question-back is to develop the **hermeneutic circle** by returning to explicate the initial **presuppositions** that guide philosophical inquiry.

**QUESTION-WORTHINESS (*Fragwürdigkeit*)**. Heidegger’s task always revolves around the **question of being**. As such, thinking must be addressed by and address what is question-worthy, that is, the concerns that evoke **awe** and philosophical wonder. As Heidegger emphasizes in *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, the **ontological difference** is one such **phenomenon** that exhibits such question-worthiness. The earliest thinkers, including Anaximander, experienced this question-worthiness, the **awe** and wonder when confronted with the **unconcealment** of **being**, thereby marking the **first beginning** of **philosophy**.





# R

**RACE** (*die Rasse*). The notion of race is very controversial in Heidegger's **philosophy** and, while only briefly addressed, raises important questions. On the whole, Heidegger rejects the biological, anthropological conception of race as a theoretical construct for **understanding** what it means to be human. In a section entitled "Power and Race," from the appendix to *The History of Be-ing* (1939–40), he emphasizes that the concept of race is both a biological representation and a remnant of the **metaphysics** of **subjectivity**. The concern for race is driven by a motive for the acquisition of power, insofar as it is elevated into a **category** to understand culture. Conversely, a "politics of culture" arises to provide a pretext for enabling the acquisition of **power** within **modernity**, particularly as made notorious by **National Socialism**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger points out that in 1930s Germany, the concern for race had become problematically "unambiguous," meaning that such distinctions were unquestioningly and uncritically made in compliance with a preset political agenda, that is, National Socialism. He emphasizes further that the association of racial identity has an ideological basis that **conceals** the **path of thinking**. Thus, in section 273 of that text, Heidegger points out that in the modern era "blood and race" have erroneously become the bearers of history. The biological focus on blood and race blurs the distinction between the discipline of history (*Historie*) as the recording of previous human events and the appropriation of history (*Geschichte*) as an enriched disclosure of **be-ing** (*Seyn*).

In *Ponderings VII–XI*, Heidegger goes further to criticize the attempt to equate **human being** with any ideology of "breeding" or race. In *Ponderings XII–XV*, however, he expresses some stereotypical, ethnocentric viewpoints. Specifically, in *Ponderings XII* Heidegger suggests that the prioritizing of race as an ideological and anthropological concept inhibits **thinking** and becomes an extension of **machination**; but he also fails to distinguish how membership within an ethnic group, for example, "the Jews," can emerge separately from an ideology and thus become a positive impetus of **culture**. Heidegger, then, never dismisses the possibility that membership in a race is separate from the endorsement of a narrowly held racial outlook or theoretic-

cal construction thereof. This stereotypical viewpoint becomes evident when he revisits his break from his mentor, **Edmund Husserl**, suggesting that the latter's advance in developing a phenomenological stance—which is nevertheless of “lasting importance”—is overshadowed by a personal reluctance to dig deeper beyond the self-consciousness of reflection into the **ground of history**. Heidegger then concludes that Husserl's **phenomenology** reinforces the metaphysics of subjectivity stemming from Hegelianism.

*See also* PEOPLE (*Volk*); POLITICS (*Politik*).

**RADICALIZATION (*Radikalizierung*)**. Heidegger maintains that **philosophy** must move beyond conventional wisdom in order to reach a deeper level of **understanding being**. By the same token, **philosophy** reaches such a level by departing from, and seeking a more original *grounding* for, what is preunderstood, for example, from the perspective of **everydayness**. Heidegger describes this transition from the prephilosophical level to the philosophical as one of radicalization. At the close of Chapter One of the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that the attempt to interpret the **meaning of being** is a “radicalization” of **being-there's preontological understanding of being**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1930, he emphasizes that an exchange (*Auseinandersetzung*) with his predecessors proceeds through a radicalization and **destruction** of the philosophical tradition.

**RAPTUROUS TRANSPORT (*die Ent-rückung*)**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger addresses the **turning relation of being** to human **existence**. Through this turning relation, **being-there** is transposed into the **openness**. He describes this specific trajectory of human **ek-sistence** as a rapturous transport or a “removal unto.” Such a transport is the **projecting** outward and beyond of **temporality**. As temporal, rapturous transport is **ecstatic**. In his *The History of Being* (1938–40), rapturous transport corresponds to the **attunement of awe**.

**READINESS-TO-HAND (*Zuhandenheit*)**. Readiness-to-hand is the way in which **entities** as they are in themselves are defined ontologico-categorially. It determines the **way of being of equipment**, which is **disclosed** in **being-there's circumspection**. We can only discover what equipment is in its **in-order-to** by putting it to use. Heidegger emphasizes that the **self's** encounter with the ready-to-hand is always pretheoretical, that is, becomes **understandable** in the specific instances of its use; for example, we grasp the function of a hammer precisely in the process of hammering a nail.

*See also* PRESENCE-AT-HAND (*Vorhandenheit*).

**REALITY (*Realität*)**. Reality is a term developed within modern **philosophy** that complements the concept of **actuality**. Entities that are defined as “real” are determined primarily in terms of their objectness or **presence-at-hand**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasizes that the **ontological** concept of reality defines the nature of entities within the **world** and thereby presupposes the prior **disclosure** of **being-in-the-world** as such.

**RECOLLECTION (*Erinnerung*)**. As the other side of the **forgottenness of being**, there is the **possibility** of its recollection or remembrance (*Andenken*). In Part IV of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger provides a key example of recollection as an act of recalling or how the ancient philosophers projected **being** against the backdrop of **time**, without explicitly asking why the **understanding of being** should be inherently temporal. The recollection of being goes hand in hand with **overcoming metaphysics**.

*See also* RETRIEVAL (*Wiederholung*).

**RECOLLECTION IN METAPHYSICS (*Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik*)**. In this short text written in 1941, Heidegger develops further some of the insights of his lecture courses on **Friedrich Nietzsche** and **nihilism**. Recollection in the **history of being** thinks history as the arrival of the **truth of being**, which has been both **sheltered** and preserved since the inception of **philosophy**. This recollection makes possible the **commemorative thinking** of the truth of being, insofar as it remembers the hidden synergy between **being** as **clearing** and **truth** as **unconcealment**. Being and truth belong together. Their intertwining in the **beginning** of the history of being is still pregnant with a coming **possibility**.

Recollection in **metaphysics** is a necessary epoch in the history of being, which gives us the task to think how being allows for the **unconcealment of entities** and how the **address of being** attunes **thinking**. Recollection in metaphysics entrusts **human beings** to discover that it is by virtue of the **turning** that human being is admitted into the truth of being.

**RECTORATE (*Rektorat*)**. Heidegger would later call the period of his rectorate, from 21 April 1933 until 23 April 1934, the biggest mistake of his life. On 21 April 1933, the professors of the University of **Freiburg** elected Heidegger rector almost unanimously, with the exception of their Jewish colleagues, who were banned from voting. He was nominated for the post by the resigning rector, Professor Wilhelm von Möllendorff, whose position as a Social Democrat had become untenable. Initially, Heidegger supported Adolf Hitler and lent his name and efforts to the **National Socialist** revolution as rector. For a short time, he became an outspoken propagandist for Hitler’s policies. During his rectorate, the “cleansing laws” were applied to the Frei-

burg University student body and thus cut off financial support for anyone who fit the description of non-Aryan under Nazi law. The *Führer* principle was established at the university on 1 October 1933, thereby making Heidegger the virtual dictator of the campus. It is therefore remarkable, and an often overlooked fact, that he appointed only nonparty members (including his predecessor, von Möllendorff) as deans of the various departments. He tried to reform the university in conformity with his own ideas, which **Karl Jaspers** shared to a large extent.

The rectorate is at the heart of Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism. On 3 November 1933, he told the assembled students that "the *Führer* himself and he alone *is* the German reality and its law, today and for the future." A week later, he took to the radio to urge ratification of Hitler's withdrawal from the League of Nations. In reply to a request by the Baden Ministry of Culture, Heidegger wrote negative reports on Professor Hermann Staudinger and Eduard Baumgarten in 1933. He knew Baumgarten, the nephew of Max Weber, personally. In 1930, Werner Brock, not Baumgarten, had become his private assistant on the basis of philosophical merit. In 1938, he prevented his student Max Müller from getting an academic position by informing the administration of Freiburg University that he was unfavorably disposed to the Nazi regime. On the other hand, Heidegger helped former students and friends such as **Karl Löwith**, **Elisabeth Blochmann**, Helene Weiss, and Werner Brock to settle abroad, and as rector he tried to prevent the forced retirement of his colleagues Eduard Fraenkel and Georg von Hevesy in 1933. Fraenkel was fired, but von Hevesy was able to stay on.

The philosophical issue that prompted Heidegger to assume **leadership** of the University of Freiburg cannot be overlooked. If only prefiguring his concern for the rise of **machination**, he saw the university structure beginning to fragment into the applied, **natural sciences**. Heidegger thereby foresaw the compartmentalizing of the university into competing disciplines, each of which, with its technical bias, would ultimately serve the interests of **technology**. There is a further underpinning that comes to light in his rectoral address, namely, that the compartmentalizing of the university into various disciplines prioritized **ontical** inquiries into regions of **entities**, for example, in physics and chemistry, thereby threatening to usurp philosophy as an **ontological** investigation into the **meaning of being**. In his plan to reorganize the university, Heidegger envisioned the **possibility** of unifying the theoretical knowledge of the natural sciences through their deeper **grounding** in philosophy as the science of **being**. Implicitly, from his vantage point, the decline of the university mirrored the **forgottleness of being** itself. In retrospect, Heidegger's attempt to combat an incipient philosophical crisis on a political front proved to be a significant error in judgment, to say the least.

At the end of February 1934, Heidegger told the Baden minister of culture, Otto Wacker, that he wanted to resign as rector because he did not want to replace von Möllendorff and Erik Wolf as deans. Wacker asked Heidegger to keep his resignation secret until a successor could be found. After two failed attempts, the minister found Professor Eduard Kern willing to take over. In the meantime, while Professor Adolf Lampe had been negotiating behind his back with the Ministry of Culture, Heidegger forced the issue and resigned officially as rector on 23 April 1934. He announced the news to the deans of the various departments on the same day. They resigned also, out of solidarity! Heidegger's attempt to reform the university had been frustrated by both the party apparatus and his colleagues.

*See also* RECTORATE 1933/34: FACTS AND THOUGHTS (*Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken*); SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY, THE (*Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*).

**RECTORATE 1933/34: FACTS AND THOUGHTS (*Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken*).** In this short text, written in 1945, Heidegger renders an account of his **rectorate** in 1933/34 and his relation to **National Socialism**. He claims that he was elected rector in April 1933 by the unanimous vote of the plenum of the university; he had no contact with relevant government and party agencies, nor had he been active politically in any way; he had also considered withdrawing his candidacy; and (at that time) he was not a member of the National Socialist party. It was uncertain whether those at the center of political power would listen to Heidegger and whether the university would actively join him to discover and shape its **structure** and direction in a more primordial way.

He saw in National Socialism the **possibility** of an “inner recollection and renewal of the German **people**” and a path that would allow the Germans to discover their historical place (*Ort*) in the Western world. In Heidegger's view, it was the task of the university to contribute to this inner self-gathering of the German people and, conversely, the university's mission to create a broader haven for **education**, which would be grounded in **philosophy** and not compartmentalized in the competing disciplines of the **natural sciences**. For this reason, he saw in the rectorate an opportunity to lead all capable forces back to this process of renewal. In this manner, he hoped also to counter the advance of unsuitable persons and the threatening hegemony of the party apparatus and party doctrine. While rector, he opposed the “book-burning” proposal of the National Socialists, which targeted texts of Jewish authorship. Because of differences with the minister of culture concerning the conception of the university and its place in society, Heidegger resigned from office in 1934.

**REDUCTION (*Reduktion*).** Edmund Husserl pioneered the phenomenological reduction as the key breakthrough in the development of a new philosophical method. The phenomenological reduction brackets out the naturalistic assumption regarding the totality of existing **entities**, in order to return to the realm of pure **consciousness** from which arises our **meaningful** engagement with things. In transforming Husserl's method of **phenomenology**, Heidegger rejects the priority of **consciousness**, opting instead for the **disclosedness** of **being-in-the-world**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1927, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he recasts Husserl's method by outlining the three-pronged approach of reduction, **destruction**, and construction. Heidegger redefines reduction as the questioning that proceeds from the contrast between **being** and entities, that is, the **ontological difference**, in order to arrive at the primordial point of **departure** for developing an **ontology**. But destruction is also required in order to undo the derivative assumptions—arising from the sedimented layers of the philosophical **tradition**—that obstruct the path of philosophical inquiry. Thus reduction, in conjunction with destruction, provides the key steps of a method for constructing a science of being.

Heidegger suggests that Husserl's so-called method of bracketing or suspension of the thesis of the natural standpoint is not merely an artificial procedure, but instead is grounded in the **mood of anxiety**. This **attunement** provides the experiential impetus for the **self** to **step back** from its absorption in entities in order to confront the **nothing**, which provides an entryway to the disclosure of being.

**REFLECTION (*Besinnung*).** See MINDFULNESS (*Besinnung*).

**REFUSAL (*Verweigerung*).** Refusal pertains to the enactment of **being historical thinking**. In order to address the **gifting** of **being** and become truly historical, thinking must also address the opposite movement or countersway of refusal, in which **truth** as **unconcealment** recedes. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, refusal is closely aligned to **reservedness** (*Verhaltenheit*). In the companion text, *Mindfulness* (1938–39,) Heidegger emphasizes the importance of encountering the refusal *as* refusal (*als Verweigerung*), as the initiative to the **prime-leap** of thinking in addressing what is most **question-worthy**.

**REGION (*Gegend*).** The region is the “whither” that makes it possible for **equipment** to belong somewhere and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in **concern**. Within a region, **entities** have their place, and when they have found their place, we can measure the **space** between them.

For every region, some kind of **involvement** is decisive. The discovery of regions is codetermined by the **whole** of its involvements, for which the **ready-to-hand** is freed.

**RELATION (*Bezug*)**. In the **unconcealment** of the **being of entities**, **being** withdraws itself as such and draws **being-there** with it. This condition of being drawn (*Zug*) into the being of **entities** is the relation Heidegger calls **existence** as standing out. Its relation to being makes it possible for being-there to reveal entities in their being. Being-there's relation to being and to entities is **twofold** and determines **commemorative thinking**. Commemorative thinking recollects entities in the **truth of being** and commemorates being as such in the being of entities.

**RELATIONAL SENSE (*Bezugssinn*)**. As Heidegger showed in his winter semester 1919/20 course on the basic problems of **phenomenology**, **life** derives from certain motives and proceeds according to certain tendencies. Life is a sequence of motives and tendencies that are not always conscious. We always live in an **environment**, a circle of tasks, and circumstances of life, where we are with others.

The relation of motive to tendency is the relational sense of life in which it always already lives itself without having itself. We can either live our lives as if our lives do not concern us personally, or we can live our own lives. From 1922 onward, Heidegger defined **care** as the basic relational sense of the factual **movement** of life.

*See also* CONTENT SENSE (*Gehaltssinn*); ENACTMENT SENSE (*Vollzugssinn*); TEMPORALIZING SENSE (*Zeitigungssinn*).

**RELEASEMENT (*Gelassenheit*)**. Heidegger introduced releasement, a term he had come across during his studies of **Meister Eckhart** in 1916, as a key concept of his **philosophy** in his *Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking*. It belongs to the task of **thinking**, inasmuch as thinking is **being-there's letting be** of what is and its yielding to the uniqueness of **being's** manifestation. As forbearance, peace, **way**, and **movement**, releasement is the receptive response toward the **expanse** to which being-there belongs and in which it opens itself up to the **clearing**. The task of thinking can neither be understood from a transcendental-horizonal perspective nor as **calculative thinking**; it must be understood as **commemorative thinking** and **mindfulness**. Releasement is the calm forbearance for the expanse of the concealed **mystery of truth**. In releasement, being-there allows **entities** to manifest themselves in their singularity and uniqueness.

In his **memorial address** at the commemoration of the 175th anniversary of the birthday of the composer Conradin Kreutzer, Heidegger describes releasement as the necessary response of simultaneous acceptance and aloofness toward **technology**. In releasement, we let things be as they are and open ourselves up to the mystery of being. The response might allow us to escape the **danger** of **homelessness** that threatens us in the age of technology and **nihilism**. Releasement may enable us to once again grow roots in the ground of our home and make the **autochthony** of our **dwelling** possible.

**RELIGION (Religion).** Religion, that is, the binding of one's own **existence** to a higher **entity**, is an outstanding **possibility** of human **being-there**. We can distinguish three periods in Heidegger's relation to religion.

The first period ends with Heidegger's break with the system of Catholicism in 1919. His Roman Catholic background was an important element in his philosophical development. As he would later say, his theological provenance first put him on the **path of thinking**.

The second period centers on his **phenomenology** of religion and lasts from 1919 until the early 1930s. During this time, Heidegger understood the **facticity** of his own life as harboring the concrete logic or *logos* of Christian **theology**. To come to an original **understanding** of our own **existence**, we must repeat our Greek-Christian **tradition**. This **retrieval** of our **past** took the shape of a **destruction** of **Greek philosophy** and a repetition of primordial **Christianity**. Beginning with his summer semester 1925 lecture-course, Heidegger gradually de-emphasizes the importance of religion in general and Christianity in particular. In this lecture-course, he remarks that the fundamental questioning of **being** must adopt an "atheistic" stance, in order that **philosophy** can avoid the restrictions of religious **presuppositions**.

Heidegger's conception of the **history of being** is at the **origin** of the third period. The dominant factor in the **facticity** of modern life is no longer Christian theology but **nihilism**. In **Friedrich Hölderlin's** poems on the **gods** that have fled and **Friedrich Nietzsche's** ominous **saying** that "God is dead," the withdrawal of being comes to light. Heidegger's later philosophy is also a search for a new religiosity as a new binding together of **mortals** and **divinities** in the **fourfold** and a **belonging together** of being-there and **being** in the **mystery**.

*See also* INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION (*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*); PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEOLOGY (*Phänomenologie und Theologie*).

**REMEMBRANCE (Andenken).** *See* COMMEMORATIVE THINKING (*Andenken*).



**REMEMBRANCE OF THE POET** (*Heimkunft An die Verwandten*). Heidegger delivered this lecture on two occasions in 1943. It is a meditation on the ownmost **origin** of **poetry** and describes the poet as a wanderer returning home. The poet returns to the **homeland**, that is, the **nearness** to the origin. Poetizing is a process in which **being** in the guise of the **holy** addresses the poet, who responds by putting this invocation into **words**. The address is the **mystery** of the self-revealing concealing of the holy. When the poet abides near the source from which the holy springs, he guards and preserves it as a mystery.

The response of the poet is a commemoration in which being appears through what is as **having been** and is **made present** when the poet accedes to the **claim** of being. In the poems that Heidegger interprets, the **attunement** of the poet is **joy**. Joy in poetizing consists in knowing that in every joyous **entity** that already is encountered, the joyous hails insofar as it holds itself in reserve. The poet needs the help of kinsmen, that is, the thinkers, to guard the full import of **language** and help the **people** to comprehend it. The homecoming of the poet is the **future** of the historical **destiny** of the German **people**.

**REPETITION** (*Wiederholung*). See RETRIEVAL (*Wiederholung*).

**REPRESENTATION** (*Vorstellung*). Representational **thinking** is one of the characteristics of modern **philosophy**. In modern philosophy from **Réne Descartes** to **Friedrich Nietzsche**, every **entity** is an object for a subject by which it is represented. As representations, entities are dominated by and submitted to the control of the subject. An entity can only be an entity insofar as a subject perceives it. The relation between an entity and **being** is thus lost. **Truth** is no longer the **unconcealment** of entities in their being, but the certitude of our representations.

**RESERVEDNESS** (*Verhaltenheit*). **Being-there** stands in a relationship toward **being** that is also open to the **possibility** of the latter's withdrawal and **concealment**. Reservedness involves a **comportment** that is both governed by, and **attuned** to, this distinctive possibility of being.

**RESOLUTE OPENNESS TO THE MYSTERY** (*Ent-schlossenheit zum Geheimnis*). By hyphenating the German term for **resoluteness** (*Ent-schlossenheit*), Heidegger accentuates the dimension of **openness** that pervades the activity of **letting-be**. In his lecture *On the Essence of Truth* (1930), Heidegger emphasizes the interplay between openness or unconcealment and its opposite, thereby preserving the potential for truth even in **concealment**. The concealment harbors a **mystery** that is to be wrenched forth or resolutely

brought forth into the openness once again. The mystery of **being**, or **human existence**, for that matter, is inexhaustible and thereby requires magnifying the receptivity by which we continually cultivate such openness.

**RESOLUTENESS (*Entschlossenheit*)**. Resoluteness is an outstanding **mode of being-there's disclosedness**. It is the singular, unique self-choosing of **care** and makes possible **ownedness** or "authenticity." In this self-choosing, being-there turns away from its absorption in the "**they**" and seizes upon those unique **possibilities** by which it can take action within a specific **situation**. Through resoluteness, the **self** discovers that true **freedom** lies in choosing one possibility to the exclusion of others. Resoluteness is thereby an affirmation of human **finitude**.

*See also* MOMENT (*Augenblick*).

**RESOLUTION (*Entschluß*)**. **Resoluteness**, which understandingly projects itself, exacts a specific course of action. The **self's** steadfast commitment to act in light of its limitations, and thereby be answerable for its **existence**, is resolution. As answerable or responsible in this way, the self decides what it can be and has to do in this particular **situation**. The resolution of a situation, as it is understood in resoluteness, is the disclosing **projection** and determination of what is possible at this time.

**RETAIN (*behalten*)**. **Forgottenness** is the condition of **possibility of being-there's** retaining of **entities** encountered in the world by the concerned **making present**, which **awaits**. Retaining belongs to the ecstatic unity of **temporality**. **Circumspection** is grounded in a retention of the **involvement** of the **equipment** with which being-there concerns itself in awaiting the **toward-which** of this equipment.

**RETICENCE IN SILENCE (*Sigetik*)**. **Being-historical thinking** requires its own guidance, directive, or logic in order to heed the power of the **word**. **Language** resides in **silence**, because what is unspoken reverberates in any attempt to express the **meaning of being**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes the silence of the word as the innermost logic that governs **thinking** in its attempt to express the **claim of being**. The close synergy between language and silence suggests the prior need for a **grounding attunement**, in order for thinking to be directed along its path.

**RETRIEVAL (*Wiederholung*)**. Heidegger uses the concept of retrieval in two different ways. In *Being and Time*, retrieval belongs to the **temporality of being-there**. It is the owned way of **having been** as an **ecstasis** of temporality. Retrieval is "handing down" explicitly, that is, by going back into the

**possibilities** of the being-there which has been. The owned or “authentic” retrieval of an **existential** possibility is grounded in **anticipatory resoluteness**. By retrieval, being-there makes its own history manifest. In this second sense, retrieval is also **destruction**. The destruction of the history of **ontology** is the retrieval of its original possibility. Here retrieval is a repetition of its **beginning** in order to transform it into a new beginning. For example, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger undertakes a destructive-retrieval or critical appropriation of **Immanuel Kant’s philosophy**. Heidegger speaks in this sense about a retrieval of **metaphysics**.

**RETRO-GRASPED** (*zurückgenommen*). Retro-grasped pertains to an enactment within an inquiry, which defers an initial way of questioning to an **ontologically** prior and more fundamental way of formulating or posing the question. In his lecture-course on Nietzsche from the winter semester of 1937/38, the *Will to Power as Art*, Heidegger points to the returning of the guiding question (*Leitfrage*) of philosophy, “What is an entity?,” to the grounding or **basic question** (*Grundfrage*), “How is there being?” The retro-grasped distinguishes a **mode of determination** within **thinking**, which corresponds to what he describes in *Mindfulness* (1938–39) as **knowing-awareness**.

The retro-grasped points to a trajectory within **hermeneutics**, which advances forward in the endeavor to **understand** by returning to uncover what is already preunderstood.

**RETRO-RELATION** (*Rückbezug*). In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger addresses the deeper ontological ground of selfhood, of the potential to be a **self**, as originating through a retro-relation. That which is ownmost to the self, the dynamic of coming into its own, defines the source of uniqueness that distinguishes the “**who**” of **being-there**. The identity of the self cannot be fixed in the static terms of a **substance** (*Substanz*). Rather, the self originates through a **relation** of standing forth within the **openness of being**, and reciprocally, as appropriated or **owned-over** to that **clearing**. In this way, Heidegger overcomes the metaphysical conception of the self both as a substance and as a subject.

**RETROSPECTIVE LOOK** (*Rückblick*). In the appendix to *Mindfulness*, Heidegger offers a brief overview of the **path of thinking**, which arises from *Being and Time*. This is one of the few instances throughout his writings when he entertains such a reflection. In this discussion from 1937/38, Heidegger alludes to the omission of Division Three (Part I) of his magnum opus, to be titled “Time and Being.” He emphasizes that his task is to be understood anew as a way of questioning, rather than merely with respect to

the scope and contents of a book. Most centrally, Heidegger points to the need to address with more originality the interdependence between Dasein and being, particularly in terms of how the former provides the **place** for the manifestation of the latter. In this context, Heidegger introduces the old German spelling of **be-ing** (*Seyn*), in order to accent the transition of his **thinking** toward the other beginning.

**RETURN UNTO (*Einkehr*)**. In his lecture *The Turning*, Heidegger asks how an alternative way of manifesting **entities** can emerge from the one-dimensional way in which **nature** is **enframed** and exploited within **technology**. Natural resources appear exclusively as **standing-reserve**. The prospect of a **turning** within **modernity**, however, suggests that the dominant mode for the appearance of **entities** can revert into its opposite, such that their uniqueness can reappear from the shadow of their generic manifestation as resources to be used and exploited. In this dynamic **moment** of transformation, the **truth of being** reenters or returns unto **entities**, illuminating their uniqueness. Within the **clearing**, **entities** are **released** from the stranglehold of **technology**.

**RETURNERSHIP (*Rückkehrerschaft*)**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes a new direction of thinking, which begins by rediscovering its **origin** in the difference between **being** and entities. The premise of returnership, and ultimately of **being-historical thinking**, is that **philosophy** can advance forward only by simultaneously rediscovering its origins. In this way, the ecstatic dynamic of **temporality** guides the enactment of being-historical thinking.

**REVEAL (*entbergen*)**. See REVEALMENT (*Entborgenheit*).

**REVEALMENT (*Entborgenheit*)**. Heidegger interprets the Greek concept of **truth**, *alètheia*, as **unconcealment**. Truth as the revealment of the **being of entities** must be wrestled from **concealment**. By virtue of its **existence** and **openness**, **being-there** can reveal **entities** in their **being**. However, when it reveals an entity in what and how it is, it conceals at the same time **entities in the whole**. In Heidegger's later work, being-there becomes explicit through its reciprocity with and way of **belonging together** with being. The **truth of being** is the "ownhood" (*Eigentum*) and coming into its own of the self-revealing concealing and its self-concealing revealing. The unconcealment of entities is now destined by being and the **projecting-opening** of its truth.

*See also* PROJECTING OPEN OF BEING (*Entwurf des Seins*).

**RICKERT, HEINRICH (1863–1936).** Rickert was one of the main representatives of the Southwest German school of **neo-Kantianism**. He developed a **value-philosophy** to supplement **Immanuel Kant**'s theory of knowledge. Rickert held the chair of philosophy at the University of **Freiburg** when Heidegger was a student. Heidegger wrote his qualifying dissertation, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*, under Rickert's directorship. He acknowledged his indebtedness to Rickert for helping him see and understand the problems of modern **logic**. He also introduced Heidegger to the work of **Emil Lask**, whose influence on his early thought can hardly be exaggerated. In his first lecture-course in **Freiburg** after World War I, Heidegger deconstructed Rickert's value-philosophy.

**RICOEUR, PAUL (1913–2005).** As a member of the French school of **phenomenology**, Ricoeur became a prominent thinker in the last part of the 20th century. His interests were eclectic, in the sense that many of his investigations were interdisciplinary, spanning diverse areas from **theology** and psychoanalysis, to **hermeneutics** and literary theory, to semiotics and the social sciences. Ricoeur was strongly influenced by Heidegger's **thinking** and his development of **hermeneutic phenomenology**. By the same token, Ricoeur challenged Heidegger's attempt to (1) prioritize ontology and (2) emphasize the radical **finitude** of **human existence** apart from a relation to **God** or the infinite.

Ricoeur shared with Heidegger a devotion to **Immanuel Kant**'s transcendental **philosophy**. Yet Ricoeur also criticized Heidegger, in a way analogous to how **Ernst Cassirer** did, for overemphasizing the role of transcendental **imagination** as a source for the generation of **temporality**. Ricoeur published numerous books, including *Fallible Man (L'Homme fallible, 1961)*, in which he outlines the key elements of a **philosophical anthropology**.

**RILKE, RAINER MARIA (1875–1926).** For Heidegger, Rilke is the poet par excellence of **metaphysics** in its consummation, since he expressed in his **poetry** the **being** of **entities** as a universal **will** whose **essence** is simply to be itself as will. He recognized the danger of **nihilism** and **technology**. His attempt to overcome the **danger** of technology as the unholy implies that he is at least under way toward a naming of the **holy**, and in this sense he, like **Friedrich Hölderlin**, is a poet for our destitute time.

In many respects, Rilke's **poetry** mirrors **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s **thinking**, insofar as both appear as transitional figures at the close of **modernity**. *Sonnets to Orpheus* and *Duino Elgies* are among Rilke's most celebrated and influential collections of poems, which Heidegger cites in his essay *What*

*Are Poets For?* Most of all, he gleans from Rilke's poetry a sense of the **venture** that the poet and thinker share in seeking to bring what is otherwise ineffable and unsayable into speech.

In a way that diverges from his **interpretation** of Hölderlin's poetry, Heidegger portrays Rilke as a poet who is implicitly constrained by the limits of **representational thinking**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester 1942/43, Heidegger argues that even in Rilke's imagistic portrayal of the **animal** as inclined toward the open, the **openness** appears primarily as an extension of animal innocence and a purity otherwise lacking in their rational, for example, human, counterparts. Rilke follows in Nietzsche's footsteps in seeking to invert the priority of the metaphysical conception of **human being** as the rational animal, thereby remaining bound by metaphysics. Yet in a way that is analogous to his critique of Nietzsche's **philosophy**, Heidegger remains fervent in reaffirming Rilke's preeminence among 20th-century poets.

*See also UNSAID (Ungesagtes).*

**RINGING OF STILLNESS (das Geläut der Stille).** **Language** speaks from and withdraws into the depths of silence. In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger describes the distinctive tonality of the **attunement** to language that is necessary in order for **thinking** to heed the **voice of being**. He follows through on his basic conviction that listening precedes speaking and that **human beings** acquire the ability to speak only by first cultivating their power to **hear**.

*See also RETICENCE IN SILENCE (Sigetik).*

**RUINANCE (Ruinanz).** In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1921/22, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger uses the term ruinance as a **formal indication** of the **fallenness** of factual life. It indicates the pull toward taking things lightly and making things easy that is built into **facticity**. In its actualization, ruinance takes away time. In ruinance, we no longer have **time** to **care** about our own **lives**.

# S

**SACRIFICE** (*Opfer*). Heidegger's use of the term sacrifice harbors connotations of the Greek **experience** of tragedy. The prerequisite for sacrifice is embracing the **possibility** of **death** in the fullest sense, in which Heidegger describes the **freedom** of giving oneself up to one's mortality. To sacrifice is to welcome the absenting character of the **nothing**, thereby venturing the **leap** toward **being**, at the expense of relinquishing the security of clinging to surrounding **entities**. Sacrificing, then, is a risky **venture** undertaken by those who are most invested in creativity, specifically, the thinkers and poets.

In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1942/43, *Parmenides*, Heidegger suggests that the sacrifice of creativity is the purest response to the **voice of being** (*Stimme des Seins*). In *Postscript to "What Is Metaphysics?"* (1943), he reiterates this point, emphasizing as well that sacrifice involves a readiness to submit to the claim or **address of being**. **Thinking** is itself an activity that must undergo preparation and **forbearance** into order to experience **unconcealment**.

**SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1905–80)**. The French existentialist writer and philosopher was strongly influenced by **Edmund Husserl** and Heidegger. In Sartre's main work, *Being and Nothingness*, traces of his reading of Heidegger's **phenomenology** of **anxiety**, **existence**, and **nihilation** abound. His reading of *Being and Time* was one of the most fruitful misunderstandings in the history of **philosophy**. He mistook Heidegger's attempt to develop a **fundamental ontology** by way of an existential analysis of being-there for an **existentiell** anthropology. In his famous essay, *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, Sartre claimed wrongly that he and Heidegger belonged to the atheistic wing of existentialism, whereas **Karl Jaspers** and Gabriel Marcel formed the religious wing.

**SAYING** (*Sage*). Heidegger uses the term *saying* in two different ways. In its more traditional **meaning**, saying refers to the cultural **tradition** of a **people** that has been handed down in its sayings. The sayings of a people are its proverbs, anecdotes, and oral traditions, on the one hand, and the tacit

**interpretations** embodied in its customs, rituals, and festivals, on the other. **Poetry** and **thinking** draw on this background and transform the sayings into a configuration that articulates for a people its **understanding of being**. They transform the people's saying so that now every living **word** fights the battle and puts up for **decision** what is **holy** and what is unholy, what is great and what is small, what is brave and what is cowardly, including the "undecidability" of the **being of the gods**.

The second meaning of saying (*sagen*) is speaking silently. The **significance** of the **world** speaks silently to **being-there**. **Human beings** are **hearing** this silent speaking, the **ringing of stillness**, in their **understanding**. As Heidegger says in his later writings on **language**, hearing always precedes the speaking of human beings. This hearing is a listening to the saying in which **presence** is realized. Language makes **entities** present in their being. In this sense, language itself speaks. We hear the speaking of language. The play of the reciprocity of the four **regions** of the **fourfold** is the saying by which human beings are addressed and to which they respond. The saying of language is the condition of the **possibility** of human **speech**, but without the hearing of human beings, the saying of language would remain mute.

*See also* KEEPING SILENT (*schweigen*).

**SAYING (*Spruch*)**. The saying of the original thinkers, **Anaximander**, **Heraclitus**, and **Parmenides**, means the **whole** of their **thinking** as it has been expressed in **words**. It is the one thought that expresses the **first beginning** of thinking.

**SAYING AS MEASURE (*sagenmäßig*)**. In the concluding paragraph of *Contributions to Philosophy* (section 281), Heidegger states that **silence** "holds the **measure**" for the expression of **enowning** within **language**. Silence **gathers together** the **possibilities** for speaking by sheltering what remains **unsaid** in the attempt to bring **be-ing** (*Seyn*) to **unconcealment**. Heidegger calls a way of speaking that corresponds to such a measure **saying** (*Sage*) as measure. In **phenomenological** terms, such saying speaks by **letting be**, that is, by allowing the singularity of what is to show itself or shine forth in its uniqueness. Heidegger distinguishes such saying from the imposing of **assertions** or independently ascribed statements concerning **entities**. Saying as measure, on the other hand, is "from" (*vom*) be-ing, rather than referencing an inadequate basis for what is revealed **ontically** through entities in order to advance unfounded assertions. In section 267 of *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger cites the epigraph from *Ponderings IV* (GA 94) to differentiate a saying that is so measured, that is, which "says be-ing itself out of itself" (*das Seyn selbst aus ihm selbst*).

*See also* MEASURE-SETTING (*Maßsetzung*).



**SCHELER, MAX (1874–1928).** Scheler was a rather independent member of **Edmund Husserl**'s school of **phenomenology**. He perceived new **possibilities** of phenomenology. Heidegger met Scheler for the first time in 1924, when he delivered a lecture on **Aristotle** and **truth** in Cologne. This was the start of an intensive discussion that ended abruptly with Scheler's death. They asked the same fundamental questions: What are **human beings**, and what is their place within **beings in the whole**? They were both very critical of contemporary **philosophy** and tried to break the primacy of theoretical consciousness in philosophy. The problem of **intentionality** needed to be developed in a different way in order to make a new **metaphysics** possible. Their fundamental difference was that, according to Scheler, the **human being** is the naysayer, while Heidegger claimed the foremost designation of **being-there** resides in developing the question "why?" As Heidegger said in his *In Memoriam Max Scheler* during his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Scheler was the strongest force in contemporary philosophy. As Heidegger observed, with Scheler's death a path of philosophy once again "fell back into darkness." Subsequently, Heidegger dedicated *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) to the "memory of Max Scheler," indicating that a last conversation between them helped to give focus to many of the themes in that work. In Part IV of that book, Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between his own **fundamental ontology** and Scheler's **philosophical anthropology**. In this way, Heidegger reinforces his own contention that the investigation into human **ek-sistence** provides a radical point of departure for **leaping off** (*Absprung*) in order to re-ask the broader **question of being**.

**SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH (1775–1854).** For Heidegger, Schelling is the mediator between **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**'s **philosophy** of absolute spirit and **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s **metaphysics** of the **will**. In his most profound work, his essay on the **essence** of human **freedom**, Schelling elevated the will to a first principle. Willing is primal **being**. Nietzsche would later transform Schelling's will of **love** into the **will to power** that governs and rules modern **technology**.

*See also* GERMAN IDEALISM: FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL AND THE CONSTELLATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT (*Der deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling Hegel und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*); SCHELLING'S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*).

**SCHELLING: ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM** (*Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*). As volume 42 of Heidegger's **Complete Edition**, this text includes his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1936, initially published in 1971.

**SCHELLING'S TREATISE ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM** (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*). Heidegger published this book in 1971. It contains the text of his summer semester 1936 lecture-course on *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, and some notes from his Schelling seminars in the early 1940s.

After a short introduction on Schelling's life and work and the background of his **philosophy**, Heidegger gives a section-by-section **interpretation** of Schelling's essay. This interpretation is part of his attempts to **overcome metaphysics**. In the history of the **forgottenness of being**, Schelling's philosophy is the transition between **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's** system of absolute knowing and **Friedrich Nietzsche's metaphysics** of the **will to power**. The inaugural thesis of Schelling's essay is that willing is primal **being**.

Heidegger's interpretation centers on two problems: (1) Schelling's core distinction between ground and existence and (2) the possibility of philosophy as a system.

The starting point of Schelling's treatise is the **fact** of human freedom. In his essay, he attempts to develop a system of freedom. As Heidegger points out, there are no pure facts. Every **fact** needs an interpretive context or system. Schelling's system is nothing other than the exposition of the fact of human freedom. It presupposes **Immanuel Kant's** joining of the two modalities, **possibility** and necessity, in his formal concept of freedom as self-determination on the basis of its own **lawfulness**. Yet this does comprehend the fact of human freedom in its **facticity**. The third modality comes into view only when the fact of **evil** is taken into account. Schelling therefore defines freedom as the capacity for **good** and evil. Evil is the revolt that perverts the **ground** of the essential will into the reverse of **God's**. Because the act that determines the **whole** of man's being occurs beyond or above all time, freedom is necessity and necessity is freedom.

According to Schelling, we must distinguish between the ground and the existence of an **entity**. The ground of an entity is its foundation; its existence is its self-emergence as self-revelation. The root of its core distinction is the will. The becoming of the will is the unifying division and dividing unification. This process is the systematic unfolding of **subjectivity**. The center of Schelling's system is human freedom. In God, the ground of existence is joined inseparably with the existence of the ground. In human beings, this original accord is separable, allowing for the discord of evil. Here is the rift

that threatens the system. As Heidegger sees it, the fatal flaw that makes the conjuncture of archaic being as system impossible is Schelling's positing of the ground in opposition to existence. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger developed another kind of textuality to avoid this flaw. He did not write a systematic work, but rather a nexus of **jointures** to mark the place where being manifests itself to **thinking**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger recasts the question of human freedom in light of the **turning** relation of being to man, thereby circumventing the subjectivity of the will. When viewed in this context, Heidegger's lectures on Schelling provide an important transition on the way to **overcoming metaphysics**.

In his seminar notes, Heidegger works out in further detail some parts of his lecture courses.

**SCHEMA (*Schema*)**. See HORIZONTAL SCHEMA (*horizontales Schema*).

**SCHEMATISM (*Schematismus*)**. Immanuel Kant developed schematism as a procedure for employing **time** to configure the meaning of the **categories** and to facilitate their application as predicates defining concrete objects. Kant's procedure for schematizing the categories provided Heidegger with a blueprint for showing how the **meaning of being** could be articulated through the use of temporal idioms. The temporal **finitude** of **being-there** not only supplies the **horizon** to understand **being**, but also yields the most basic linguistic forms to express its **meaning**. As a procedure, schematism parallels that of Heidegger's own **hermeneutic** method in cultivating **temporality** as an intermediary that allows for what we understand about being to be translated and expressed in actual **words**.

The fact that schematism originates from the creative power of **imagination** supported Heidegger's thesis in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* that imagination, by generating time, usurped reason as the ultimate **ground** of human finitude. In *Being and Time*, schematism is the doctrine of the horizontal schematizing of being-there's temporality. It prestructures the horizon within which the being of various **entities** can be understood and become manifest. In his summer semester 1927 lecture-course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger attempts to work out a satisfactory explanation of horizontal schematizing.

Decades later, in his *Four Seminars*, Heidegger remarks that schematism is the "Kantian way of addressing the problem of 'being and time.'"

**SCIENCE (*Wissenschaft*)**. The essential difference between **philosophy** and science is that philosophy tries to understand the **being** of **entities**, while science tries to discover what an entity is in itself. As Heidegger emphasizes

in his later work, science wants to know how things work and to objectify them through a **mathematical projection** of **nature**. Because science discovers how things work, it is the **origin** of **technology**. In order to be able to study an entity as such, science must objectify it and transform it into an object of research. As objects, entities can be controlled and measured. They become available as **standing-reserve**. In its **essence**, science is **calculative thinking**, because it always takes the measure of its object. This is why Heidegger claims that science does not think.

*See also* AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*); NATURAL SCIENCE (*Naturwissenschaft*); ONTIC SCIENCE (*ontische Wissenschaft*); THINKING (*denken*).

**SCIENCE AND MINDFULNESS** (*Wissenschaft und Besinnung*). Heidegger delivered this lecture on 4 August 1953. It is a meditation on the difference between **science** and **mindfulness**. Science is a decisive way in which all that is presents itself to us. It is the theory of the real. In this statement, the nature of **natural science** comes to light. What does the real mean, and what does theory mean?

The real is the working, the worked, the functional. It is that which brings forth into **presence**. The real presents itself as a stance in **unconcealment**. It stands over against and is therefore the object. In the modern age the **being** of **entities** is objectness (*Gegenständigkeit*). As an object for a subject, the real becomes a **representation**.

The word theory stems from the Greek *theorein*, which means the beholder that watches over **truth**. Theory understood in the modern way lives out of the former and has become observation. In observation we pursue our object and try to entrap it in order to secure it. Theory makes secure at any given time a **region** of the real as its object-area. In the age of **technology**, the objectness of the real is secured as **standing-reserve**. Since each science objectifies **reality** in its own specific way, science as such can never represent objectness itself. This means that science can never arrive as its own presuppositions. We need to pay heed to this inconspicuous state of affairs. Precisely this state of affairs is worthy of questioning.

Mindfulness is the **inceptual thinking** that travels in the direction toward that which is **question-worthy**. Mindfulness proceeds by way of a self-awakening surrender to what calls for **thinking**, the **truth of being**.

**SELF** (*das Selbst*). For Heidegger, the self is neither a subject nor a **substance**. It is instead an ecstatic **openness**, rooted in the **ontological** power to project forth a **world**. Precisely as “**mine**,” **being-there** exhibits the potential

for selfhood, to exist in a way that either wins back its **individuality** or loses it. Because being-there can exist in either of these two modes, the self exists as owned or “authentically,” or as unowned or “inauthentically.”

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that the potential to be a self is ultimately founded on **care** as the **being** of human **existence**. As a corollary, being-there possesses the power to pursue its individuality by heeding its **call of conscience** and choosing to be a self through **resoluteness**. Accordingly, the search for one’s individuality is never consummated, but constitutes a task that each of us undertakes as part of our earthly sojourn.

**SELF-ASSERTION OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY, THE (*Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*)**. Heidegger delivered this rectoral address on 27 May 1933, on the occasion of the ceremonial transfer of the rector’s office. In his opening statement, Heidegger outlines his thoughts on the nature of the German university and its historical mission. The assumption of the **rectorate** is the commitment to the spiritual leadership of the university. His following of teachers and students can grow strong only in a true and joint rootedness through the transformation of the German university. The university should help the German **people** to fulfill their historical mission, that is, the **retrieval** of the awakening of **Greek philosophy**. This beginning still is; it does not lie in the **past**, but stands before the German people. Greek philosophy is the source from which all **sciences** have sprung.

The **National Socialist** revolution is the great awakening of the German people. The university teachers must take the lead and advance to the most extreme posts of danger amid the constant uncertainty of the **world**. The essential will to knowledge requires that the people be subjected to the greatest inner and outer danger in order to enjoy their true spiritual world and be admitted into the **world-forming** domains of **art** and philosophy. Only by abiding and **dwelling** within these domains can **human beings** take “ownership” of their historical **being-there** and thereby become receptive to the **truth of being**. The German students are on the march. The academic freedom of the old university will be replaced by a new series of obligations: the labor service, the military service, and the service in knowledge. Teachers and students must form a fighting community in service to the people in their state. All capacities of the heart and the body must be unfolded through struggle, intensified in struggle, and preserved as struggle. Heidegger closes his address with a quotation from **Plato**—“Everything great stands in the storm.”—and thus indicates that the project of a renewal of both the university and the **being-there** of the German people is threatened from all sides.

Analogous to the issues raised in Plato’s *Republic*, Heidegger left open the question of the concrete role philosophy could play in founding a new **polis** and whether the **freedom** epitomized in the self-interrogative pursuit of the former could be cultivated in the practical activities of the latter.

**SELF-CONCEALMENT** (*das Sichverbergen*). Self-concealment is a basic dimension of **finitude** that pervades both **being** and **truth**, defining their interdependence. The **unconcealment** of being is never complete or final, but instead always occurs in tension with the counter **possibility** of **concealment**. Accordingly, the self-concealment also preserves that which is concealed. For Heidegger, self-concealment allows for the emergence of different epochs, which comprise the **history of being**.

In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger addresses self-concealment as a dimension of the **refusal** and withdrawal of being. In *Mindfulness*, he shows how the **forgottenness of being** (*Seinsvergessenheit*) originates from self-concealment, which in turn provides the cornerstone of **history** of **metaphysics**.

*See also* TRUTH OF BEING, THE (*die Wahrheit des Seins*).

**SELF-CONSTANCY** (*Selbst-ständigkeit*). Self-constancy pertains to the continuity of **who** the **self** is, as developed over the entire course of its **existence**. In **anticipatory resoluteness**, the self renews its commitment to be who it is and seize upon its unique **possibilities** in the **moment**. Self-constancy occurs when this is **temporalizing** not only forward toward the possibility of **death** in anticipation, but also backward to the inception of birth in **resoluteness**. Through self-constancy, **being-there** takes over the task of becoming who it is and thereby pursuing its **ownedness** throughout its entire existence. The constancy of the self forms the cornerstone of Heidegger's account of historicity in Chapter Five, Division II (Part I) of *Being and Time*.

Through his account of self-constancy, Heidegger circumvents the **metaphysical** concepts of **substance**, subject, and the soul. These concepts rest on a derivative **understanding of being** as *ousia* or **permanent presence**. By contrast, self-constancy reaffirms the self's finitude and poses the question of its identity as an issue that the self must repeatedly address over and over again. Through this repetitive reenactment of resoluteness, the self "stretches along" throughout the **ecstatic** openness between birth and death.

Through its self-constancy, being-there seeks to answer the riddle of the **fact** that in each instance human existence is **mine**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger revisits his characterization in *Being and Time* of the instantiation of **care** in each individual. He redefines mineness as "ownness" (*Eigenheit*). Accordingly, the potential "to be" a self is redefined relationally through being-there's reciprocity with be-ing (*Seyn*). In this relational unfolding, who the self is comes into question again. The resoluteness of self-constancy reappears as the steadfastness by which being-there both participates in and cultivates the **clearing** (*Lichtung*).

**SELF-RESPONSIBILITY** (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*). On the basis of **resoluteness**, the **self** becomes answerable for who it is and for the **decisions** it makes. Responsibility is the self's way of responding to its deepest capability to make decisions and to take action within the context of a specific **situation**. The **origin** of self-responsibility lies in the distinctive power by which **care** can transmit the individual's own willingness to become answerable or the **call of conscience**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger shows how self-responsibility provides the existential basis for the exercise of moral choice, or autonomy in **Immanuel Kant's** sense of heeding the categorical imperative or the universal moral law.

**SELF-WORLD** (*Selbstwelt*). From his early lecture-course in **Freiburg** and **Marburg** until summer semester 1925, Heidegger uses the self-world as a **formal indication** to the way in which **I** first have myself tacitly in and through that **world**. He juxtaposes the self-world to the **environment** and the **with-world**. In *Being and Time*, the self-world is displaced by **mineness**.

**SENSE** (*Sinn*). See MEANING (*Sinn*).

**SETTING-FREE** (*Ent-setzende*). Heidegger employs this term in *Contributions to Philosophy*. Setting-free occurs in the **leap** toward **being**, which shifts the focus of inquiry away from a generic comprehension and **representation** of **entities**. A thinking that is thereby liberated is also set-free to return to entities in order to appreciate the diversity and singularity of their manifestation. The **freedom** that is enacted comes to fruition in the activity of **letting-be**.

**SETTING-INTO-OPPOSITION** (*Auseinandersetzung*). Conflict and confrontation are intrinsic to the manner in which **philosophy** wrenches **unconcealment** from **concealment**, **truth** from untruth. The interaction and exchange between philosophers necessarily displays the same character. Philosophical **dialogue** occurs when the greatest thinkers set-into-opposition and counterpose their differences. These philosophical disputes and confrontations serve the greater mission of truth, however, and are not simply contrary opinions between two combatants. Heidegger provides a foremost example of such setting-into-opposition when, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), he seeks to express what remains **unsaid** in **Immanuel Kant's** thinking. In his *Letter on "Humanism"* (1946), Heidegger compares the exchange between philosophers as a "lover's quarrel" that occurs in service of the truth.

**SHELTERING (*Bergung*)**. The **concealment** of **being** also serves to protect and preserve its **mystery**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes this dual character of concealing as sheltering as well as withholding. Only because such sheltering is crucial for the **history of being** can a sense of mystery also pervade the **truth of being**.

*See also* CONCEALMENT (*Verborgenheit*).

**SHEPHERD OF BEING (*Hirt des Seins*)**. The **relation** of **human beings** to **being** determines their **way of being**. When they safeguard the being of **entities**, human beings are the shepherds of being. The coming to pass of *alètheia* is entrusted to their **care**. In their **thinking**, they should commemorate the appropriation of the **truth of being** and treasure its **mystery**.

**SHINING BACK (*Rückschein*)**. Heidegger construes truth or *alètheia* as a **clearing** (*Lichtung*), which includes both **openness** and illumination. By using the term *shining back*, he emphasizes the casting of light as well as lighting up of what is illuminated. The shining back includes the recipient of what is illuminated and reflects the light that is transmitted by the clearing. Heidegger employs this term in volume 71 of his **Complete Edition**, *Enowning* (*Das Ereignis*). In this way, he amplifies the actual occurrence of the clearing, as well as showing how the distinction between appearing and what appears, the casting of light and what is illuminated, parallels the **ontological difference** or the differentiation between **being** and **entities**.

**SHOCK (*Schrecken*)**. *See* STARTLED DISMAY (*Schrecken*).

**SHRINKING BACK (*Zürückweichen*)**. Heidegger employs this term in Chapter Six, Division One of *Being and Time* to describe the connection between anxiety and fear, the dynamic by which **being-there** recoils from the **nothing** of its **existence** and the threats posed within the **world**. In formulating “The Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology” in his introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that **Immanuel Kant** shrinks back from confronting the deeper implications posed by his doctrine of **schematism** by unlocking the problem of **temporality**. In Part Three of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger reiterates this claim as the hallmark of his attempt to **retrieve** the transcendental **imagination** at the expense of overthrowing the primacy of human **reason**.

**SIGNIFICANCE (*Bedeutsamkeit*)**. In *Being and Time*, significance makes up the **structure** of the **world** as that in which **being-there** as such always already is. It is the relational **whole** of **significations** in which **entities** manifest themselves. Being-there in its familiarity with significance is the **onto-**



**logical** condition of **possibility** of discovering entities, which are encountered in a world with **involvement** as their kind of **being**. Significance makes it possible for entities to present themselves as they are in themselves. It is an existential state of being-there and is constitutive of the **worldhood** of the world. On the basis of significance, the world is disclosed as such. Significance thus makes it possible for being-there, as the entity that understands and interprets, to disclose **meanings** upon which **words** and **language** are founded.

**SIGNIFICATION (*Bedeutung*)**. Signification for Heidegger is not something that one imposes on an object, and it is neither a distinctive object of **perception** nor an intermediary between the subject and the object. Heidegger thus rejects the traditional notion of signification and **meaning**. What we understand is not the signification of a **word** but the **entity** itself in its **being**. We grasp entities as entities in their web of **relations** with other entities, not as aggregates of perceptual qualities. Signification involves the holistic way in which something can become intelligible as something in a web of relations. Entities in their being say something to us silently. Since entities can only have meaning within certain interpretative contexts of **significance**, they require **being-there** as the **clearing** of being within which they can present themselves as they are.

**SILENCE (*Schweigen*)**. Heidegger views silence as the wellspring from which utters the power of the **word**. At the conclusion of *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), he maintains that **language** is rooted in silence. In this sense, silence holds the **measure** for what can be expressed concerning the **truth of being** and thereby is ultimately **measure-setting**.

*See also* RETICENCE IN SILENCE (*Sigetik*).

**SITE (*Stätte*)**. Site is the ontological **ground** that sustains and supports **being-there** in its historical (*Geschichtlich*) situatedness. In this respect, site marks the specific interface where **earth** enters into its **strife** with the **world**, and a **place** of inhabitation becomes possible for being-there. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger refers to a site of **dwelling** through which **human beings** participate in **unconcealment**. In *The History of Being* (1938–40), Heidegger describes site as a locus of **decision** (*Entscheidung*) at which human beings become the **t/here** and are called to action through such pursuits as building and **thinking**, as well as dwelling.

Heidegger assigns a specific **meaning** to the term site in connection with the **fourfold**. **Things** like a bridge may gather the fourfold in such a way that they grant them a site. The site of a bridge presupposes its **location**. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands,

there are many places along the river where a bridge may be built. The place where the bridge is built proves to be a location. The bridge does not come to a location to stand in it; the location comes into its own only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge allows a site for the fourfold. The site determines the localities and ways by which a **space** is provided. Within this space, the bridge joins stream, banks, and lands in each other's neighborhood.

**SITUATION (*Situation*)**. In his early lecture courses, Heidegger uses the term situation to formally indicate the fundamental happening that defines me in my motivations. The advent of situation happens to me. **I** make it my own, and it relates to me. **Factic life experience** is an ever-changing confluence of situations.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces situation in connection with **resoluteness**. The "there" of **being-there** is grounded in either **disclosedness** or resoluteness. In **fallenness**, the **possibilities** of being-there's situation are closed off. Resoluteness puts itself into a situation and takes action. The **resolution** of the situation is being-there's choice to be itself, in which it realizes the unique possibilities of its own **can-be**. In resolution, we resolve the dilemma of what we have to do in this situation by taking action. The problem of meeting a beggar in the street can, for instance, be resolved by the giving of alms.

**SITUATION-I, THE (*das Situations-Ich*)**. For Heidegger, the **I** is never a pure ego but is always situated in a certain context. I always already have myself as involved in certain **situations**.

*See also* SELF-WORLD (*Selbstwelt*).

**SKETCHES FOR A HISTORY OF BEING AS METAPHYSICS (*Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik*)**. In these sketches from 1941, Heidegger reflects on several elements and steps in the **history of being as metaphysics**. **Plato** brought *alètheia* under the "yoke of the idea." Thinking as the **saying** of the **unconcealment of being** became **representation**. In modern **philosophy**, the **being of entities** was understood as **objectivity** and founded upon their representation by subjects. Being as such became **actuality**, and actuality was redefined through the self-positing of **consciousness**. **Friedrich Nietzsche** discovered that this self-positing is a manifestation of the **will to power**, which subjected the being of all **entities** to itself. The **completion of metaphysics** in modern **technology** installs the being of entities in the withholding and withdrawal of being.

Heidegger reflects also on the history of the concept of **existence** and the difference between the concepts of **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling** and **Søren Kierkegaard**, on the one hand, and Heidegger's own concept of existence, on the other. For Heidegger, existence is an ecstatic standing in the **clearing** of the "there" of being-there.

**SKY (*Himmel*)**. The **mortals** are **dwelling** on the **earth** under the sky in the oneness of the **fourfold**. The sky is not only the vaulting path of the sun and the course of the moon; it is also the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the change of the seasons, the light of day, and the gloom of night.

**SOCRATES (470–397 BC)**. Socrates is frequently considered to be the "father" of Western **philosophy**. Along with **Plato** and **Aristotle**, Socrates makes up the crucial triad of classical **Greek philosophy**.

Socrates did not leave behind any writings, although his many **conversations** reverberate in Plato's *Dialogues*. In *What Is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger refers to Socrates as the "purest thinker of the **West**," precisely because he stood within the "draft" of the **withdrawal** of **being** and never presented his thoughts in writing.

**SOJOURN IN THE WORLD (*Weltaufenthalt*)**. Through his emphasis on **temporality** and **finitude**, Heidegger maintains that human **existence** is essentially a sojourn. The context of that sojourn is similar to that of **dwelling**, namely, as undertaken within the **world**. Thus, our sojourn in the world defines the transitoriness and temporal trajectory of **being-there**. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that **philosophy** is not merely an esoteric exercise, but arises from our temporal sojourn in the world.

In *What Is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger suggests that our sojourn in the world hinges on the ability to *say* the simple word "is" and bring its **meaning** to expression. Not unlike **Socrates**, Heidegger links the question of what makes our existence meaningful to our ability to philosophize.

**SOJOURNS: THE TRIP TO GREECE (*Aufenthalte*)**. Heidegger traveled to Greece on five different occasions between 1962 and 1967. The text *Sojourns* recounts the first of these visits, in the spring of 1962. In this "journal," he reflects not only on his impressions of the sites, **art**, and landscape, but also on the **origins** of **Greek philosophy** as embodied in such thinkers as **Heraclitus**. In this way, Heidegger's journey parallels his own quest to undertake the task of **thinking**.

**SOLICITUDE** (*Fürsorge*). Solicitude is the form of **care** by which **being-there** shows **concern** for others. It determines the **being-with** of being-there and has two extreme **possibilities**. It can take away care from the other and put itself in his position in concern. It takes over for the other that with which one is to concern oneself. The other is dominated and becomes dependent upon the one that takes away the other's possibility to make choices.

The other kind of solicitude does not "leap in for" the other, but "ahead of" to liberate the other for its own "**existentiell**" **can-be**. This kind of solicitude pertains to being-there's ownmost, individualized way to be and helps the other seize hold of its possibility to enact care and to become free for it.

**SOLITUDE** (*Einsamkeit*). Solitude appears in the subtitle of Heidegger's lecture-course from the winter semester 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. The term is closely connected to individuation, that is, as a singular dimension of the necessity of the **self's** having "to be." While solitude implies aloneness, Heidegger emphasizes the positive character of this **grounding-experience** of **individuality**. Thus, he describes the manner in which the philosopher undertakes the task of philosophizing as a **grounding attunement** to the longing of home or **homesickness**. In this way, homesickness becomes a catalyst for philosophizing, understood not merely as an intellectual development, but as a transformative encounter with the self's **thrownness** into the **world**. **Philosophy** becomes a **venture** with solitude as a way of standing on one's own and seeking what is ownmost among the individual's **possibilities**. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1930, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger appeals to a passage from **Immanuel Kant's** *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, stressing that philosophy must achieve such independence as the "keeper of its own laws."

Solitude is also a recurring theme in the *Black Notebooks*. Specifically, Heidegger emphasizes that much of the courage of philosophizing lies in the thinker's ability to embrace and abide within solitude.

**SOMETHING IN GENERAL** (*Ur-Etwas*). See PRIMAL SOMETHING (*Ur-Etwas*)

**SOPHISTRY**. See PLATO: THE SOPHIST (*Platon: Sophistes*).

**SOPHOCLES (497–406 BC)**. Sophocles was among the most celebrated of Greek playwrights. The Greek **experience** of tragedy, to which Sophocles gives expression throughout his plays, forms the backdrop of ancient **philosophy**, according to Heidegger. The tragic notion of **fate**, which comes to light in Sophocles's majors plays, including *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex*, pro-

vides a mythic underpinning by which Heidegger portrays the conflict and violent interplay between **concealment** and the **unconcealment of being**. While brought to the precipice of self-destruction, the tragic **hero** exemplifies that even in the downfall of hubris insight is always waged through a battle with its opposite. In ontological terms, the **possibility of truth** is always counterbalanced by its opposite or untruth. Sophocles's poetic depictions of fate, sacrifice, heroism, and tragedy define key motifs that will figure prominently in Heidegger's attempts to appropriate the **Western** philosophical **tradition**. As Heidegger demonstrates in his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1936, **F. W. J. Schelling** gives perhaps the profoundest modern expression to these ancient motifs by outlining the historical conflict between **freedom** and necessity.

*See also HÖLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE ISTER" (Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister").*

**SOURCE (Ursprung).** *See* ORIGIN (*Ursprung*).

**SPACE (Raum).** According to Heidegger, **world** is prior to space. Space becomes accessible only if the **environment** is deprived of its **worldhood**. Yet space is also constitutive for the world. The **spatiality of being-there** is the condition of the **possibility** of space. Because being-there is **being-in-the-world**, it makes room for the **being of entities**. Every entity has its place within the **whole of meaningfulness** that constitutes the world. When entities have found their place, we can abstract from the spatial **involvements** that determine their place. Their places get reduced to a multiplicity of positions for random things. They are now in space, and we can measure the distance between them. Things in space are only determined by their extension and their position within the whole of extension. In **natural science**, we abstract from extension to algebraic relations. These relations make room for the possibility of the purely mathematical construction of manifolds within an arbitrary number of dimensions. The space provided for in this manner is the one space of mathematical science within which everything is.

**SPAN OF TIME (Zeitraum).** In his winter semester 1935/36 lecture-course *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger points to the unity of **time** and **space** as a precondition for the manifestation of **things** and **entities** in general. The span of time refers to the duration of natural things. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger distinguishes the span of time from its hyphenated form or time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) when, for example, he alludes to the **play of time-space** as the **clearing of being** itself. The span of time corresponds to what Heidegger in *Being and Time* describes as **within-timeness**.

**SPATIALITY (*Räumlichkeit*).** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes the spatiality of **being-there** in terms of **deseverance** (*Entfernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*), which are both **modes** of **being-in-the-world**. Deseverance is a constitutive state of the **being** of being-there that makes **far-ness** disappear by bringing something close in circumspective **concern**. As deseverting **being-in**, being-there has the character of directionality. Every bringing close has already taken in advance a direction toward a **region** out of which what is “desevered” brings itself close, so that one can come across it with regard to its place. **Circumspection** is the deseverance that gives directionality.

The spatiality of **entities** that are **ontologically** determined by readiness-to-hand is determined by their **nearness**. This nearness regulates itself in terms of circumspective concern. **Equipment** has its place within the totality of its **involvements**.

**SPEECH (*Sprache*).** Since the Greeks, **language** has been represented in terms of speech. Speaking is defined as a kind of human activity. Heidegger abandons this approach, because he wants to **understand** the manner in which language provides a place for the **unconcealment** of **being**. He wants to **experience** language *as* language. Language first shows itself as our way of speaking. Speaking must have speakers who are present in the way of speaking. They **dwell** together in speech. They speak about that which concerns them. Everything spoken stems from the unspoken and **unsaid**. In the **nature of language**, speech and what is spoken reveal themselves as that by which and within which something is given voice and language, that is, makes an appearance insofar as something is said.

Heidegger insists that **saying** and speaking are not the same. Speaking qua saying belongs to the design (*Aufriß*) of the being of language. The unique dynamic of language is saying as showing. Every showing by way of language presupposes the prior **presencing** of that which is shown. In this sense, speaking is itself a **hearing**. Speaking as the hearing of language lets saying be said to it.

**SPENGLER, OSWALD (1880–1936).** Oswald Spengler was a German historian who wrote the influential book *The Decline of the West* (*Untergang des Abendlandes*, 1918). Spengler’s thesis that the political realm mirrors the life cycle of the decay and deterioration of physical organisms captivated a generation of scholars. Heidegger, however, vehemently criticized Spengler’s argument. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger contrasts his own

account of the situatedness of **being-there** with Spengler's anthropological and biological view of the diminution of the human spirit as the hands of its own economic, scientific, and technological progress.

In *Ponderings VII–XI* (VIII, Section 30), Heidegger vehemently criticizes Spengler for falsely constructing a portrait of Western civilization that is as much “blind” to the very **facts** he extols. Most of all, Spengler misappropriates **Friedrich Nietzsche**'s vision of **nihilism** pervading civilization and precipitating its “decline.” According to Heidegger, the pessimism attributed to Spengler's outlook is itself only another historicist label, which does not begin to question the true danger that humanity must confront in the age of **machination**.

**SPIEGEL INTERVIEW, THE (*Das Spiegel-Gespräch*)**. On 7 February 1966, *Der Spiegel* published an article on Alexander Schwan's book, *Political Philosophy in the Thought of Martin Heidegger*, in which Heidegger was falsely accused of ostracizing some of his closest colleagues. As rector, he would have forbidden **Edmund Husserl** to enter the library of the university, and he would also have refused to visit **Karl Jaspers** at his home after 1933, because his wife was Jewish. At the instigation of **Erhart Kästner**, Heidegger accorded *Der Spiegel* an interview in order to defend himself against these serious accusations. Rudolf Augstein interviewed Heidegger in Freiburg on 23 September 1966, after *Der Spiegel* had complied with the demand that the interview be published posthumously. The interview was finally published in 1976 under the title “Only a God Can Save Us.”

In the interview, Heidegger answered questions about his involvement with **National Socialism**, his **rectorate** in 1933/34, and his relationships with Jaspers and Husserl. He explained that at the time, he had thought the National Socialism revolution would make possible a renewal of the whole **being-there** of the German **people**. This renewal should have led to an encounter with and overcoming of the dominance of **technology**. Heidegger claimed he had accepted the position of rector in 1933 to defend the purity of the revolution and to block the promotion of unsuitable persons. In the latter part of the interview, he clarified his conception of technology and reflected upon the task of **thinking** and its relation to **art**.

**SPIRIT (*Geist*)**. Spirit is one of the fundamental concepts of **metaphysics** that Heidegger **dismantles** in his **destruction** of the history of **ontology**. In *Being and Time*, he warns that we should not understand the **being** of humans as a unity of spirit, soul, and body. The **substance** of **human beings** is not “spirit” as a synthesis of body and soul. He puts spirit consistently in quotation marks, because it belongs to the inadequate anthropology of **Christianity**.

It is remarkable that Heidegger uses the concept of spirit without reservations in his rectoral address, *The Self-Assertion of the German University*. He speaks of the spiritual mission of the German **people**. Spiritual is here the opposite of the political. The revolution of **National Socialism** is not so much a political turning point as a spiritual renewal of the German people.

In *Poverty (Die Armut)*, a lecture delivered in June 1945, Heidegger cites a line from **Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry**: ““For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual / we became poor in order to become rich.”” Here, Heidegger refers to the spiritual as a divergence from the materialism of the age, which the political and economic system of communism epitomizes.

**STANDING-RESERVE (Bestand)**. Standing-reserve designates the way in which everything is brought to **presence** by the challenging revealing of modern **technology**. When **entities** are revealed in this way, they have their own standing, in the sense that they stand ready to be used by **human beings**. A tree is no longer a living plant; it becomes a potential quantity of paper for newspapers, which in turn transform the paper into printed opinions that are standing ready to be swallowed by the public. As standing-reserve, entities become a stock of materials and items that are immediately and completely available for consumption by human beings. Even human beings can become standing-reserve, as workers to be used and disposed of within a business, corporation, or the military.

**STARTLED DISMAY (Schrecken)**. Along with **awe** and **reservedness**, startled dismay or shock is a **grounding attunement** that directs **thinking** toward its **matter (Sache)** within the age of **modernity**. Specifically, startled dismay directs **thinking** toward the **other beginning**. Startled dismay serves as a spark or catalyst that enables thinking to address, and be addressed by, that which is most **question-worthy**. As an original mode of **disposedness**, startled dismay marks the abrupt turning-around of thinking from the **fallenness** into the indifference of complacency, which characterizes modern **metaphysics** in particular.

Heidegger underscores the importance of startled dismay in two pivotal texts from the late 1930s, *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Mindfulness*. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), he shows how startled dismay is an interruption of the complacency by which human beings acquiesce to the **abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit)**. In experiencing startled dismay, human beings are jolted from complacency and thrust back into the questioning of how and why “there is” **being**. Startled dismay is a preliminary awakening to the **question of all questions**, which allows being to appear from the opposite front of its **concealment**. At the close of **modernity**, the extreme point in which both **human beings** and **nature** are pressed



in service of **machination** induces the counter **possibility** by which **being-there** is struck by the simple fact that “there are” **entities**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), Heidegger extends his discussion of startled dismay to show how startled dismay is a catalyst for transposing **being-there** into the **clearing** (*Lichtung*), which emerges from and helps to illuminate the tendency toward concealment.

Heidegger’s discussion of startled dismay exhibits similarities with his earlier account of **anxiety** in *Being and Time*. Both dispositions strip being-there of its appeasement to what is most familiar and its overall tendency to slip into or **fall** into indifference.

**STATE OF MIND** (*Befindlichkeit*). See DISPOSEDNESS (*Befindlichkeit*).

**STEP BACK** (*Schritt zurück*). In his inaugural lecture, “**What Is Metaphysics?**” (1929), Heidegger introduced the step back as the formal indication of a possible way to **overcome metaphysics**. The step back is questioning that returns into the **ground** in which the tree of **metaphysics** has its roots. In *The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics*, Heidegger emphasizes stepping back into the origin of the **difference** between **being** and **entities**. The step back should enable us to discover the inceptual (*das Anfängliche*) in the **beginning** of the **history** of **philosophy**. This beginning may harbor another **possibility** for **thinking** at the end of the history of philosophy. The step back is thus at the same time a step forward into the beginning of **commemorative thinking**.

*See also* OTHER BEGINNING (*der andere Anfang*).

**STERN, GÜNTHER**. *See* ANDERS, GÜNTHER (1902–92).

**STILLNESS** (*Stille*). Stillness resides in the silent depths of **language**. **Mortals experience** stillness in its abeyance, that is, in the discreet manner of its enactment as stillness. Thus, Heidegger states that “stillness stills.” Such stillness occurs, for example, when mortals heed their **finitude** and embrace the **possibility** of **death**. Stillness becomes an avenue or occasion for **hearing**. In this way, stillness is the retreat into and protective abode or sanctuary of silence. In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger states that it is through the **ringing of stillness** that language speaks.

Almost paradoxically, stilling is an activity that leads to repose. According to Heidegger, this repose counters the frenzied pace of **technology** and its calculative apparatus. Thus, stillness grants to the **thing** the occasion for its manifestation, allowing it to be revealed in its singularity within the **expanse** of the **world**. While interdependent, world and thing are conjoined through the tension of **difference**. Each comes into its own, or is reciprocally appro-

riated one to the other, by virtue of this **twofold**, which Heidegger describes as a “double stilling.” Ultimately, this double stilling allows for a unity and intimacy to permeate the **relation** between world and thing.

Although stillness is synonymous with silence, Heidegger attributes to it a complex dynamic through which mortals can first  **dwell** within language and thereby heed the call of **being**.

**STOCK** (*Bestand*). See STANDING-RESERVE (*Bestand*).

**STRIFE** (*Streit*). The creative tension of conflict is essential to occurrence of **truth** as **unconcealment**. Because unconcealment always occurs in opposition to **concealment**, strife necessarily lies at the heart of truth. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* as well as in *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger emphasizes the strife that occurs between **world** and **earth**. The unconcealment that occurs through world is always counterbalanced by the opposite tendency toward concealment, which the earth embodies. In the epoch-making challenge of their **decisions**, human beings stand within the crucible of this strife.

*See also* VIOLENCE (*Gewalt*).

**STRUCTURE** (*Struktur*). Structure is one of the most important elements in Heidegger’s **phenomenology**. The central phenomenon of his thought is **intentionality** as a human **comportment**. Every comportment has its own structure, and Heidegger attempts time and again to lay bare the structure of comportment. **Being-there** is defined by its **existence**, that is, a standing out in the **clearing** of the “there.” This outstanding **inabiding** has its own structure. In his **existential analysis** of being-there, Heidegger uncovers the structure of human existence.

His later **philosophy** is also to a large extent an analysis of structures, for example, the structure of the **fourfold**. An **entity** may also be defined by the unfolding of its structure. These structures are actualized and **temporalized** in different ways. Since every structure can unfold itself in different ways, Heidegger can only point to them with **formal indications**. It is impossible to give an essential definition of a structure that would be universally valid.

*See also* METAPHYSICS AS HISTORY OF BEING (*Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins*).

**SUBJECTIVITY** (*Subjektivität*). Since **René Descartes** grounded the **being of entities** in the self-certain subject, every **entity** is either an object or that which objectifies. Heidegger calls this subjective reference to all entities subjectivity.

**SUBJECTIVITY** (*Subjektivität*). The way of being of **human beings** was reduced to subjectivity when **René Descartes** grounded the **being of entities** in a self-certain subject. As subjects, **human beings** are interchangeable and no longer have their unique **possibilities of existence**. When subjectivity reigns, everything is either the object of the **representation** of a subject or a subject that represents the **world** as a picture. The modern age is the age of subjectivity and therefore also the age of the world picture.

**SUBSTANCE** (*Substanz*). Substance is the basic concept of traditional **ontology**. The substance of an **entity** is the quality that makes it what it is and underlies the changing of its attributes. In his **destruction** of the history of ontology, Heidegger shows that substance as a **translation** of *ousia* is misleading, since *ousia* is a **coming to presence** in a certain way and not an unmovable foundation to which attributes are attached. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger plays the meaning of *ousia* off against the concept of substance when he defines the “substance” of **human beings** as **existence**. Existence is having of myself in my own unique **situation** with **possibilities** of my **can-be**.



# T

**TECHNÈ.** *Technè* is a Greek term, which means to produce or to make. It is a term that becomes increasingly important throughout Heidegger's writings. In his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, he emphasizes that *technè* is more than simply the production of artifacts, but instead entails a **mode** of knowing that brings forth something new that has previously been concealed or hidden. As developed in its most original form through *poiesis*, *technè* is a productive endeavor that creates works of arts. Thus, Heidegger equates *technè* in this original sense with craftsmanship.

Heidegger revisits the importance of *technè* in his essay *The Question concerning Technology*. He emphasizes that the Greek sense of *technè* underlies, albeit is **forgotten** in, the modern conception of **technology** as a technical and an instrumental form of production. Insofar as technology is rooted in *technè*, its way of producing depends upon a way of bringing forth. By recovering the etymological root of technology, Heidegger arrives at his overriding insight that technology is a way of **revealing** and hence cannot be reduced to the ensemble of its technical and instrumental products. Even if only in a one-dimensional way, technology reveals **entities** in terms of their usefulness as **standing-reserve**. Conversely, **art** can offer a more original instance of *technè*, which can provide an alternative to the mode of production found in modern technology.

**TECHNOLOGY (*Technik*).** The reign of technology is both prefigured in and is the final result of **metaphysics**. It is the manifestation of the **will to power** that wants to subject everything to its own control. It is not so much the doing of **human beings** as the **destiny of being**. At its **origin**, technology is **enframing**. It reduces the **being** of all **entities** to **standing-reserve**. The greatest **danger** of technology is that it may lead to a naive acceptance of **calculative thinking** as the only way of **thinking**. And yet we should not reject technology as the work of the devil, but learn to live within it by cultivating our capacity of **letting be** or **releasement**. Heidegger also points to the **nearness** of technology, *technè*, to **art**, *poiesis*.

In the **sheltering**-concealing of technology, the saving power also grows, since it contains a liberating appeal as a way to **reveal the being of entities**. Precisely because technology is determined by challenging, we may come to the insight that it is only a way of revelation and that therefore there must be other ways of revealing entities. In **commemorative thinking** and **mindfulness**, we may ponder the **mystery** of the withdrawal of being and overcome technology.

*See also* QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY, THE (*Die Frage nach der Technik*); MACHINATION (*Machenschaft*); TURNING, THE (*Die Kehre*).

**TEMPORAL STATEMENTS** (*temporale Sätze*). Not only does **temporality** make possible any **understanding of being**; the **meaning of being** must also be expressed in terms of a temporal lexicon. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger refers to temporal statements to describe the unique character of the idioms that allow the meaning of being to be articulated and expressed in a conceptual language. All **ontological** claims are then temporal statements, which have the character of temporal **truth**. Philosophy as **ontology** is a “temporal science.”

**TEMPORALITY** (*Temporalität*). In *Being and Time*, the ecstatic temporality of **being-there** projects open the horizontal temporality of **being**. Heidegger would later discover that this **projection** presupposes the temporal **openness** or **clearing** of being itself. In other words, the temporality of being-there mirrors the temporality of being. Since we can discover in the temporality of being-there only the “mirror image” of the temporality of being, being as such remains concealed or **sheltered** in its **mystery**. The **path of thinking** leads from the **unconcealment** of being back to being-there’s temporality and to its capacity to “**let be**.” The temporality of being-there as the “mirror image” of the “temporality of being” is what Heidegger would later call the **truth of being**, or its sheltering unconcealment through **enowning**.

In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1927, Heidegger refers to temporality (*Temporalität*) to distinguish the **transcendental** characterization of time as providing the condition for the **possibility** of any **understanding of being**.

*See also* TEMPORAL STATEMENTS (*temporale Sätze*).

**TEMPORALITY** (*Zeitlichkeit*). Heidegger acknowledged **Edmund Husserl's** original phenomenological **time** and **Henri Bergson's** distinction of concrete duration from objective, cosmic time as proximate sources of his concept of temporality. Temporality is the **meaning of being-there's being** or **care** and the **ontological** basis for being-there's **existentiality**.

Heidegger broached primordial temporality as the ultimate **meaning** and order of **factive life experience** in his winter semester 1919/20 lecture-course on the basic problems of **phenomenology**. **Lived experience** has its motivated tendencies and rhythms that articulate the immediacy of the individual human **situation**. The **temporalizing sense** unifies the threefold way in which **intentionality** unfolds itself according to its **enactment sense**, **content sense**, and **relational sense**. Because time has its **moment** of fullness as the outcome of its ripening process, Heidegger can distinguish between primordial and derived temporality. This distinction enables Heidegger to explain the kairological temporality of **Christianity**. The *kairos* is the moment of the critical juncture at the fullness of time, which decides between owned or "authentic" and unowned or "inauthentic" temporality. Primordial or original temporality is the source from which all other levels of temporality derive.

In *Being and Time*, time is developed from care as the fundamental structure of being-there's **existence**. Being-there stands out in the "there" of its being, which is constituted by **thrownness**, **being-in-the-world**, and **being-toward-death**. In its standing out, being-there can be **owned** or **unowned**. Each of the different ways in which it enacts its existence can in turn be temporalized in different ways. Ecstatic temporality clears the "there" of being-there originally. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger develops four theses with regard to being-there's temporality: (1) temporality makes possible the structure of care, (2) it is essentially ecstatic, (3) it temporalizes itself primarily out of the **future**, and (4) it is finite. To the three dimensions of objective time, **past**, **present**, and future, correspond the three **ecstases** of temporality: **having been**, present, and **futurity**.

**TEMPORALIZING SENSE** (*Zeitigungssinn*). The temporalizing sense unifies the three experiential vectors of **situations**: the **enactment sense**, **content sense**, and **relational sense**. With the temporalizing sense, Heidegger is able to distinguish between the **ownedness** and **unownedness** of our **resolution** of the different situations that constitute our **lives**.

**TENSORS (*Temporalien*).** In his winter semester 1925/26 lecture-course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, Heidegger introduces tensors as the **formal indicators** of **phenomena**, which are characterized *through time* in contrast with the temporary (*zeitliche*) character of phenomena, which take place *in time*. In the last hour of the course, Heidegger renames tensors **existentials**.

**THANKING (*das Danken*).** Thanking is an essential modality of **thinking**. Heidegger characterizes thinking as a **gift**. This gift is granted by **being**, which through its manifestation and **withdrawal** yields the **matter of thinking**, or what is worthy of thought. Thus, thinking reciprocates for this gift by giving thanks.

In his lectures of 1951–52 comprising the course *What Is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger develops the etymological link between thinking and thanking. In Part I, he raises the basic issue that what is “most thought-provoking in our thought provoking time is what we are still not thinking.” But what is thinking; what calls to think? Thanking is also an act of memory, of **commemorating** or recollecting that which is given from and returns us to an **origin**. Thanking is a gesture that honor’s one’s origins and thereby elicits the **grounding attunement** that is essential for thinking.

The interdependence of thinking and thanking fosters a sense of humility from the thinker for the bestowal and **guardianship** of its gift. At the conclusion of his *Letter on “Humanism,”* Heidegger underscores the need to descend into the “**poverty** of thinking.” Through this poverty, the abundance of the gift of thinking becomes evident to the thinker, spawning gratitude and thanks giving.

**THEMATIZATION (*Thematisierung*).** Heidegger distinguishes between the preconceptual, preontological understanding of being and the explicit articulation of its **meaning**. The latter constitutes the act of thematization. In thematizing, we take what is implicitly understood and make it explicit, and render what is preunderstood determinate in a conceptual way. Thematization thereby involves the act of making distinctions, which in turn can be articulated in **language**. In his summer semester 1928 lecture-course, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger emphasizes that the **possibility** of an explicit **understanding of being** depends upon differentiating **being** from **entities**, the contrast that is provided by the **ontological difference**. The development of a thematic understanding of being is the primary goal of **fundamental ontology**.

**THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF “THE PROBLEM OF A NONOBJECTIFYING THINKING AND SPEAKING IN TODAY’S THEOLOGY”: SOME POINTERS TO ITS MAJOR ASPECTS (*Einige Hinweise*)**



*auf Hauptgesichtspunkte für das theologische Gespräch über “Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie”*). Heidegger wrote this letter for a theological discussion that took place at Drew University in New Jersey in 1964. Heidegger sees three themes that are worth questioning in regard to the topic of the meeting.

1. **Theology** as a mode of thinking and speaking that must discuss Christian faith and what is believed therein. With this kept in view, one can inquire into how **thinking** and speaking can correspond to the proper **meaning** and **claim** of faith.

2. Prior to this discussion, it should be made clear what objectifying thinking and speaking is. Heidegger offers five pointers in the form of questions for the treatment of this problem: A. What does objectifying mean? B. What does thinking mean? C. What does speaking mean? D. Is all thinking in itself a speaking and all speaking in itself a thinking? E. In what sense are thinking and speaking objectifying, and in what sense are they not?

3. One must decide to what extent the problem of nonobjectifying thinking and speaking is a genuine problem at all.

**THEOLOGY (Theologie)**. For Heidegger, theology is a positive **science**, because its object is **God** as a particular **entity**. The *positum* of Christian theology is Christianness (*Christlichkeit*), that is, the factual **mode** of existing as a believing Christian. Christian **existence** is determined by the history that is set in motion by the cross, the crucified, and Christ on the cross. The task of theology is to seek the **word** that is able to make us believe and to safeguard us in our **faith**.

Theology is founded on faith, which does not need **philosophy**, although theology as the **science** of faith does. What it means to be a Christian can only be lived and experienced in faith. The cross and sin as **existentiell** determinations of the **ontological structure** of **guilt** can be conceptualized with the help of philosophy. Sin presupposes guilt. Theology can thus receive the direction of its inquiry from **ontology**.

*See also* CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEOLOGY (*Phänomenologie und Theologie*); THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF “THE PROBLEM OF A NONOBJECTIFYING THINKING AND SPEAKING IN TODAY’S THEOLOGY”: SOME POINTERS TO ITS MAJOR ASPECTS (*Einige Hinweise auf Hauptgesichtspunkte für das theologische Gespräch über “Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie”*); YOUTHFUL THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS (*Theologische Jugendschriften*).

**THEORY OF JUDGMENT ACCORDING TO PSYCHOLOGISM, THE** (*Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*). Heidegger's inaugural dissertation, *The Theory of Judgment according to Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Contribution to Logic*, was published in 1913. It consists of two parts.

In the first part, he criticizes four psychological theories, which respectively see **judgment** in terms of a genesis from apperceptive mental activity (Wilhelm Wundt), as consisting of component acts (Heinrich Maier), as a basic class of psychic **phenomena** (**Franz Brentano**), and as something fulfilled through the action of the psychical subject that is demanded by the object (Theodor Lipps). Heidegger's main criticism is that the very questioning in **psychologism** has already from the start turned away from the logical content of judgment to the psychical act of judging. It is therefore not a theory of logic but a psychology. Its failure to understand is a genuine non-understanding. Psychologism omits the essential distinction between the *no-etic* act and the pure *noematic* logical sense to which the act is intentionally directed. Heidegger's critique is to a large extent a **retrieval** of **Edmund Husserl's destruction** of psychologism in the first book of his *Logical Investigations*.

The second, much shorter, part is an outline of a pure logical theory of judgment. Heidegger explains that there are four distinct and irreducible kinds of reality: the realm of the physical, the realm of the psychical, the realm of metaphysical **entities**, and the realm of logical sense. Since the realm of sense is not to be confused with the other realms, we must not say that it exists or that it is, but rather that it validates, it has **validity**. The **being-there** of logical sense has an irreducible givenness that cannot be explained through anything else. We can only show and describe sense through evidential acts of nonsensory **categorial intuition**.

Heidegger concludes his dissertation with the claim that his investigation provides the basis for a pure logic, which would include **ontology** in the form of **categories** that articulate **being** into its manifold senses.

**T/HERE (Da)**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger thinks **being-there** anew explicitly in terms of its reciprocity with and relation to **being**. The emphasis shifts to the t/here as providing the **place** (*Ort*) for the **unconcealment of being**. This place holds in tension proximity and distance, **nearness** and farness. Thus, the t/here harbors a double meaning by merging or combining two topographical indexes, that is, "here" and "there."

**THERE-BEING (Dasein)**. See BEING-THERE (*Dasein*).

**THEY, THE (*das Man*).** In *Being and Time*, the “they” is an **existential** and a primordial **phenomenon** that belongs to **being-there**’s positive **structure**. The “they” is what being-there is in its **everydayness**. The “they” takes the burden of its **existence** away from being-there, since it was always they who did it, and so it was no one in particular.

Initially, being-there is not its ownmost unique **self**, but has already been dispersed in the “they” and must first find itself. The **individuality** and **ownedness** of self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject that has been detached from the “they.” It is rather an **existentiell** modification of the “they.” Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as **ways of being** of the “they,” constitute **publicness**. Publicness controls every way in which the **world** and being-there get interpreted, and yet it never gets to the heart of the matter. It determines the familiarity of the **being of entities** and thus covers up their **discovery**.

**THING (*Ding*).** The unique dynamic of a thing is its “thinging,” that is, bringing into nearness of the **fourfold**. A thing gathers the four—**earth** and **sky**, **divinities** and **mortals**—into the light of their mutual belonging. In its thinging, the thing gathers and unites the fourfold and thus also things the **world**. Things appears as things out of the ringing of the world’s mirror-play.

*See also* THING, THE (*Das Ding*).

**THING, THE (*Das Ding*).** Heidegger delivered this lecture in 1949 and 1950 in Bremen and Bühlerhöhe as part of a cycle of four lectures under the title *Insight into That Which Is*, and in a slightly expanded version in Munich in 1950.

The starting point of the lecture is the fact that today all distances in **space** and **time** are shrinking. Yet the abolition of distance does not bring about **nearness**. What is nearness? **Things** are near to us, but do we know what a thing is?

In a phenomenological description of a jug, Heidegger shows that the jug’s jug-character consists in the poured **gift** of the pouring out. In the drink of this gift, **earth** and **sky** both dwell. The gift of the pouring out can be a drink for **mortals** or a consecration for the **divinities**. In the jugness of the jug, mortals and divinities dwell. In the gift of the outpouring dwells the simple singlefoldness of the **fourfold**.

A thing stays earth and sky, divinities and mortals. This staying **enowning** stays the fourfold in the sense that it brings the four into the light of their mutual belonging. Thing means gathering into nearness. Thinging the thing gathers the united four—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—in the simple **onelfold** of their self-unified fourfold. The four mirror each other. The enowning mirror-play of the single onefold of earth and sky, divinities and

mortals, is the **world**. The world **presences** by worlding. Since the thing gathers the fourfold, it also things the world. Things appear out of the ringing of the world's mirror-play. **Human beings** attend in their **dwelling** within the world by responding to the **claim** of **being** through their **thinking**.

**THINKER AS POET, THE** (*Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*). These poems and aphorisms were written at the cabin in **Todtnauberg** in 1947 and published in 1954. Heidegger originally jotted them down as a form of therapy after his nervous breakdown at the end of 1946. They are impressions from the **experience** of **thinking**. They are both an attempt to answer the **address of being** and an exploration of the **nearness** of thinking and **poetry**.

**THINKING** (*denken*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger avoids using this term. He translates *noein* not as thinking but as apprehending, that is, the simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer **presence-at-hand**. As Heidegger sees it, apprehending became the guiding thread for the **interpretation of being** in **Greek philosophy**. Being is that which shows itself in the pure receptivity of apprehending. In his **retrieval** of the **question of being**, Heidegger overcomes this position by showing that apprehending presupposes **being-there's** caring **being-in-the-world**. This means that thinking and **representation** can only be secondary **modes of understanding**. Theoretical knowledge is only possible on the basis of a modification of **circumspection**. On the other hand, the questioning of *Being and Time* aims to retrieve thinking prior to its metaphysical opposition with practice. The soil of thinking must first be prepared by showing its manner of belonging to, **dwelling** within, and ultimately its possibility of safeguarding **language**.

In light of his discussion of the **turning** in *Contributions to Philosophy*, thinking in the enriched and original mode of **being-historical thinking** takes center stage for Heidegger. The turning relation of **being** to thinking allows the latter to emerge as a response to the "call" or invocation of the former, that is, as a reciprocity or way of **belonging together**. The original thinkers, **Anaximander**, **Heraclitus**, and **Parmenides**, revealed in their **sayings** the belonging together of being and thinking. This belonging together was forgotten in the course of the history of **Greek philosophy**, because being withdrew itself even more into the **beingness** of **entities**. At the end of this process, which is the **beginning of metaphysics**, thinking was no longer the saying of being; it had become the representation of entities. *Alètheia* as the **unconcealment** of being was transformed into **truth** as the correspondence between thinking and **judgment**. In the **philosophy of Plato** and **Aristotle**, there were still traces of the original **experience** of the belonging together of thinking and being. At the beginning of modern philosophy,

**René Descartes** reduced thinking to the representation of objects by self-certain subjects. This inaugurated the triumph of **technology** and **calculative thinking**.

In his later philosophy, Heidegger tries to overcome traditional **logic**. The misuse of thinking should be overcome by a more original or **inceptual thinking**. This inceptual thinking belongs to being and is close to **poetry**. The saying of being of the thinker, and the naming of the holy of the poet, belong together in the essential and fundamental thinking-poetizing experience of being. Thinking comes into its own through its reciprocity with being and thereby is delivered over or “**enowned**” by the **truth of being**. To **overcome metaphysics**, we need to take a **step back** out of philosophy into inceptual thinking.

Heidegger describes this original thinking as **commemorative thinking** and its historical unfolding as **mindfulness**. It is basically a co-responding which, appealed to by the **address of being**, answers within itself to that appeal. This thinking is a kind of **thanking** for the **gift** of being.

*See also* INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*); WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? (*Was heißt denken?*)

**THINKING OF ENOWNING** (*Ereignisdenken*). *See* ENOWNED THINKING (*Ereignisdenken*).

**THROWNNES** (*Geworfenheit*). Thrownness belongs to the **facticity** of **being-there**. It is neither a fact that is finished nor a fact that is settled. Being-there’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, being-there remains in the “thrown” and is drawn into the turbulence of the **unownedness** of the “**they**.” Thrownness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to being-there, for which in its very **being** its own potential “to be” is an issue. Being-there exists factually. It is thrown into **projection**. Projection is the co-original correlate of thrownness.

**TIME** (*Zeit*). “**Being and Time**” names the central **matter** of Heidegger’s entire **path of thinking**. Is being the condition of the **possibility** of time, or is time the condition of the possibility of being, or do being and time belong together through **enowning**, each coming into its own in relation to the other as the **play of time-space**? That there exists an essential **relation** between being and time becomes manifest in the Greek **interpretation** of being as *ousia*. *Ousia* means, in an ontological-temporal way, **presence**. The **being of entities** is understood with regard to the **present** as a definite **mode** of time.

The distinction between original time and objective time is essential to Heidegger’s **concept of time**. Objective time is the time of the **world** and the clock. This is the inertness of all **entities** within the world. Every entity

is within time. Innertimeness is the **origin** of the common concept of time as a stream of nows, of which one is earlier than a later now and later than an earlier now. Original time is grounded in the **temporality** of **being-there**.

Heidegger can then claim that time is the **horizon** for any **understanding of being** and for every way of interpreting its **meaning**. We need to explicate time as the horizon for the understanding of being in terms of temporality as the being of being-there, who understands being. The ecstatic temporality of being-there projects the horizontal temporality of being. Heidegger would later discover that this **projection** presupposes the temporal openness or **clearing** of being itself. In other words, the temporality of being-there mirrors the temporality of being.

In his later **philosophy**, Heidegger thinks time in terms of the clearing of the self-concealing of presence. Now being itself is determined through the **open**, which is projected by the dynamic of time. The projection or temporalizing of time is only possible if thinking observes the clearing of the self-concealment of presence in its care. Time simultaneously times the having-been, the present, and the future and in its timing removes us into its three-fold simultaneity, while holding open the **openness** of **space**. Space spaces and thus throws open **locations**. This **movement** of time and space is the play of stillness that Heidegger calls the play of time-space. Timing and spacing, as the same interplay, gather and unite the **fourfold**. Their interplay is the never-ending processing of generating the fourfold's **nearness**. This process is the origin of the **history of being**.

Heidegger's final word on time seems to be that it gives being through time and time through being. Each lets the other come into its own as the **mystery** of enowning.

**TIME AND BEING (*Zeit und Sein*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture in **Freiburg** on 31 January 1962. His first remark is that his lecture will not be immediately understandable because it presupposes a **mindfulness** (*Besinnung*) of **being** as such and is not merely a treatise on the being of **entities**. We will need to linger, "**while**" or abide a long time, in the **presencing** of what is being said in order to understand its **meaning**.

Why does the title of the lecture bring **time** and being together? Heidegger shows first that in the history of **philosophy**, being means **presence**. Like the **past** and the **future**, presence is a characteristic of time. Being as presence is determined by time through the interplay of the temporal **ecstases**. This means that every **entity** comes and goes at the right time and in between abides during its allotted time. But is being a **thing**? Being is not a thing and therefore nothing temporary, or for that matter, eternal. And yet, it is determined as presence through the temporal dynamic of presencing. What about

time? Time itself is neither a thing nor temporary, and yet it gives itself constantly or temporalizes. Although time and being are not entities, they determine each other.

In a second movement of thought, Heidegger remarks that time and being are both **matters of thinking**. It gives time and it gives being. Being itself gives the presencing of entities in **revelment**. At the **beginning of Greek philosophy**, being was thought not as that which gives, but as its **gift**, that is, the **being of entities**. The gift of being is its **destiny** and has its own history. Time is characterized from the **present** and being present means **presence**. Time is as **now**. In time, we are in the presence and self-manifestation of **entities**. Heidegger calls this the open, that is, time-space. In time-space, the future, **having been**, and the present play out their tension to yield presence and in this way reach each other in the **clearing of openness**. The unity of the three dimensions of time is grounded in their reaching each other, which brings them near to each. Time gives this **nearness** and enables us to be with entities and each other.

It gives being as gifting-refusal and as the destiny of presencing in its epochal changes. It gives time as the clearing, reaching of the four-dimensional realm of the **open**. Heidegger next asks what this “It” is that “It gives.” Does time give being and being time? Time and being belong together, and this belonging together is the **enowning** that joins the gift of being with its simultaneous refusal. The “It” that gives time and being is the dynamic of enowning that preserves each through the other and thereby allows time and being to come into their own. Heidegger ends this lecture with the remark that the elucidation of enowning is no longer the topic of his lecture.

**TIME OF BEING (*Zeit des Seins*)**. In the final paragraphs of *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger began to raise the question of how time belongs to being and vice versa. He had planned to address this interdependence in the projected Division Three (Part One) of his magnum opus, which remained unpublished. The thinking that corresponds to this ongoing task comprises the problematic of the time of being, or, alternatively, the **temporality** of being, in contrast to (but not to the exclusion of) the temporality of **being-there**. The grammar of the possessive or the “of” (*des*) indicates the reciprocal implication of each, such that “there is being” only insofar as “there is time.” The time of being, then, points to the dynamic of the **clearing** itself, the **openness** through which **presencing** also occurs. The time of being, however, makes explicit that **absencing** is as integral to the **ecstatic** trajectory of temporality as is presencing. In his brief set of 18 notes, *Contributions to Philosophy: The T/here and the Be-ing (Enowning)*, Heidegger emphasizes that the time of being appears through the **lightning-likeness** or flashing of the **moment**.

As **mortals**, we **experience** the time of being through our participation in **history** and the unfolding of its various epochs, that is, as comprising a **destiny**. In his 1962 essay *Time and Being*, Heidegger distinguishes **enowning** (*Ereignis*) as the complementarity joining time with being, that is, by virtue of which each “comes into its own” through its interconnection with the other.

**TIME-SPACE** (*Zeit-Raum*). In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes the play of time-space as the key to understanding the **clearing of be-ing** and its unique dynamic. **Temporality** conjoins with spatiality to create a **place** for be-ing’s (*Seyn*) manifestation and the **presencing of entities**.

**TIME-WORD** (*Zeitwort*). An important clue to uncovering the **meaning of being** lies in the verbal form of the **word**. **Being** is a time-word because the declension of the verb as present, past, and future **formally indicates** the possibility of **understanding its meaning through temporality**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1929/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger addresses the importance of being as a time-word.

**TO-BE** (*Zu-sein*). Heidegger uses to-be as a **formal indication** of the characters of the **being of being-there** in his winter semester 1924/25 and summer semester 1925 lecture-course. “Having to be” determines the **ways of being** of being-there as **possibilities**. To-be recurs in *Being and Time*, but is by and large displaced by **existence**.

**TODTNAUBERG**. In this little hamlet deep in the Black Forest, about 30 kilometers from **Freiburg**, **Elfride Heidegger-Petri** had a cabin built for her husband in 1922. In the famous *Hütte*, Heidegger could work in solitude and tranquillity. He spent as much time as he could in Todtnauberg. Here, he wrote most of his works and received close friends, such as **Hans-Georg Gadamer**, and noteworthy guests, such as Paul Celan and René Char.

**TOLSTOY, LEO (1828–1910)**. Tolstoy was one of the most famous and influential Russian novelists, best known for his epic work *War and Peace* (1869). He was also revered for many of his short stories, most notably *The Death of Ivan Ilych* (1886). Heidegger cites this story in a footnote in *Being and Time* (Chapter I, Division Two, Part I). In developing his own **existential** conception of **death**, he appeals to Tolstoy’s account of the **everyday** tendency to deny and **flee** from one’s **finitude** and mortality.



**TOWARD-WHICH, THE (*das Worauf*)**. The “toward-which” is first explicitly mentioned in winter semester 1920/21 as the **formal indication** of an object. In winter semester 1921/22, it is identified with the **content sense of intentionality**. In his *Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation*, Heidegger uses the “toward-which” in a more general sense as the “**in-terms-of-which**” (*das Woraufhin*) something is interpreted as something. **Time** itself emerges as the preordering in Heidegger’s interpretation of **Immanuel Kant**’s doctrine of **schematism** in winter semester 1925/26.

**TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY (*Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*)**. This text comprises an early lecture-course, which Heidegger delivered in **Freiburg** in 1919, and which is now published as volume 56/57 of his **Complete Edition**. Included are key lectures *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* and *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value*, as well as *On the Nature of the University and Academic Study*.

In *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* (war emergency semester 1919), Heidegger offers his earliest formulation of the problem of philosophical method. He outlines and criticizes contemporary approaches, including that of **philosophy**’s offering a worldview or vision of **life** as a normative emphasis on the role of validity and **value**, and finally, a psychological account of the **experience** of **consciousness** and self-awareness. Heidegger identifies a hermeneutic intuition as the key methodological step which, on the one hand, can arrive at what is meaningful on the pretheoretical level of lived experience, and on the other, can avoid the tendency to “objectify,” “delive,” “unworld,” and otherwise distort the immediacy of human experience as such.

The title of the lecture from the summer semester of 1919, *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value*, bears directly on the path of Heidegger’s inquiry. He shows how “phenomenological critique” seeks foundational “evidence” (*Evidenz*), which speaks from the **origins** of experience. This critique exposes the derivative character of a **philosophy of value**, which stems from a neo-Kantian school through such figures as **Heinrich Rickert**. The transcendental emphasis on “concept formation,” which arises from **Immanuel Kant** and is subsequently developed by Rickert, provides a clue to how human experience can become understandable as a theme of philosophical inquiry. But to grasp that theme in its originality and thereby develop concepts that are oriented by the immediacy of human experience, Heidegger shifts the focus of inquiry to include a reference to the inquirer’s self-understanding. In this way, the hermeneutical dimension of **phenomenology**, which implicates the “preunderstanding” of the inquirer, begins to become apparent.

In “On the Nature of the University and Academic Study,” Heidegger outlines in the broadest strokes the constitution of the spheres of knowledge that make possible different regions of investigation or disciplines. Once again, Heidegger appeals to the situational context of the inquirer, who is engaged in different forms of investigation. Academic disciplines are not merely theoretical abstractions, but instead arise from, and become meaningful through, the **compartment** of the inquirer **who** is already situated within the sphere of life.

**TRADITION** (*Tradition, Überlieferung*). Because of its **historicality**, **being-there** has developed both into and in a traditional way of interpreting **being**. By this traditional **understanding of being**, the possibilities of being-there’s **existence** are disclosed and guided. This tradition may remain hidden from being-there and be considered something only of the **past**. But being-there can discover tradition, preserve it, and study it explicitly. The **destruction** of tradition is not a critique of the past, which would be useless, since it would not change anything but our present **understanding** of the past, that is, its **having been**.

In the larger sense, tradition (*Tradition*) is our culture with the distinct ways of revealing the **being** of **entities** and disclosing our being-there. In a more restricted sense, tradition (*Überlieferung*) refers to the **sayings** of a **people** that have been handed down from **generation** to generation.

**TRADITIONAL LANGUAGE AND TECHNOLOGICAL LANGUAGE** (*Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache*). Heidegger delivered this lecture on 18 July 1962 in Comburg (site of a Benedictine Abbey in Germany). He shows how technology develops linguistic systems that strip **language** of its **disclosive** power. These systems include the specialized languages that the natural sciences employ to objectify regions of inquiry, for example, in physics. In its most extreme forms, technical language develops a universal code for transmitting information through computers. The subsequent development of **cybernetics** confirms how dominant technical language has become at the close of **modernity**, infiltrating all areas of education throughout universities otherwise dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge.

Through his discussion of technical language, Heidegger makes evident that the **danger** of technology does not lie only in its overt destructive powers. Rather, the danger lies in the more innocuous yet insidious assimilation of all areas of inquiry to technicity-based language. This assimilation occurs at the expense of inhibiting the power of language to **let shine forth** (*Erscheinenlassen*) the manifestation of **entities** in their singularity and uniqueness, rather than according to the uniformity of a generic linguistic system.

**TRAKL, GEORG (1887–1914).** Trakl was an Austrian poet who had considerable influence on the development of Heidegger's understanding of **language**, particularly in its connection with **poetry**. In his 1953 essay *Language in the Poem* (*Die Sprache im Gedicht*), Heidegger appeals to Trakl in order to address the distinctive **attunement** to language and the manner in which silence provides a sounding board for the expression of the **word**. Of his various **dialogues** with the poets, Heidegger accents the subtlety by which Trakl allows language to speak and thus elicit hidden depths of **meaning**.

**TRANQUILLITY (*Ruhe*).** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains that **idle talk** and **ambiguity** develop the supposition that **being-there's disclosedness**, which is so available and so prevalent, guarantees to being-there that all of its **possibilities** will be secure. This supposition of the “**they**” that one is leading a full and genuine **life** brings being-there a certain measure of tranquillity. The tranquillity in unowned **existence** does not come to rest, but only aggravates the **fallenness** of being-there.

In Heidegger's later work, tranquillity refers to the repose of **thinking in logos**. *Legein* has also the **meaning** of laying-oneself-down-to-rest. The resting in the *logos* as the **belonging together** of **being** and **human beings** is the tranquillity of **commemorative thinking**.

**TRANSCENDENCE (*Transzendenz*).** Heidegger uses transcendence in two different ways. In *Being and Time*, he calls **being** the transcendence pure and simple, because being and its structure lie beyond every entity and every possible attribute an entity may possess. From his summer semester 1927 lecture-course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* onward, transcendence becomes the **formal indication** of the condition of the **possibility of intentionality**. In *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger defines transcendence as the primordial act by which **being-there projects** forth the **horizon of world**. Being-there's transcendence is its surpassing beyond itself in the midst of entities in the **clearing** of being.

**TRANSCENDENTAL (*transzendental*).** Immanuel Kant introduced the term transcendental in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It refers to the conditions of the **possibility** of knowledge and the possibility of establishing **ontology** as the **science of being**. Kant's sense of the transcendental entails aspects of the **possibility of understanding** being that are crucial for Heidegger. These include the appeal to **temporality** as the ultimate precondition for any **understanding of being** and the necessity of contrasting being with **entities**.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the term transcendental for the **disclosedness** of being as **transcendence**. Phenomenological **truth**, that is, the **disclosedness** of being, is transcendental truth. The knowledge of being acquired through finite transcendence is transcendental truth. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger employs the term transcendental to designate the **ontological difference** as the foremost distinction that is required to develop a thematic understanding or knowledge of being.

**TRANSLATION (übersetzen).** In *Hölderlin's Hymne "Der Ister"* Heidegger remarks: "Tell me how you conceive of translation, and I will tell you who you are." For Heidegger, translation is a unique way of **caring for the word**. As such, the ability to translate depends upon the power of **language** to engender new **possibilities** of expression. Thus, translation is not reserved to a linguistic act of rendering a text from one language into another. Instead, translation is correlated with a **hermeneutic** attempt to make the **meaning of being** understandable and expressible in words. In his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1943, **Heraclitus**, Heidegger states that in order to understand **Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason**, it is first necessary to translate it, that is, convert its basic epistemological motifs into **ontological** terms.

The possibility of **disclosing** being in new ways allows for translating the **thinking** from one language into that of another. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1942/43 on **Parmenides**, Heidegger emphasizes that translation is already involved in the thinker's attempt to spawn new idioms of speech, in order to say what previously has remained **unsaid**. In this primordial sense, translation becomes a signpost along the **path of thinking**.

*See also* HERACLITUS (611–547 BC); TRUE TO THE WORD (*wortgetreu*).

**TRUE TO THE WORD (wortgetreu).** In his 1946 essay *Anaximander's Saying*, Heidegger raises the question of **translation** in its connection to **language** and the **question of being**. He emphasizes that a "literal" translation, which relies exclusively on the authority of a dictionary, is not necessarily "faithful" or "true to the word." A translation that is true to the word, on the other hand, heeds the **disclosedness** of language, and its power to spawn original idioms and thereby express the **meaning of being** in new ways.

**TRUTH (Wahrheit).** According to Heidegger, the original **meaning** of truth is **unconcealment, alētheia**. Truth is the **belonging together** of **being** and **thinking**. The belonging together is **language**. Language is the **house of being**. From this basic **structure**, Heidegger derives two different concepts

of truth: **ontic** truth of **entities** and **ontological** truth of being as such. Being reveals itself in the **presence** of entities and at the same time withdraws and thus conceals itself.

The original thinkers, **Anaximander**, **Heraclitus**, and **Parmenides**, experience the unconcealment of being. In their **sayings**, however, they failed to ask about truth as truth. In the **philosophy** of **Plato** and **Aristotle**, truth as unconcealment was transformed into truth as the presence of entities. Truth thus became the correspondence between thinking and its objects, and finds its locus in **judgment**. Philosophy becomes **logic** and is only concerned with the **beingness** of entities. This is the **beginning** of the **forgottenness of being**.

In his essay *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger tries to overcome this ontic concept of truth. Before we are able to judge what an entity as entity is, we must first have discovered its being. This **discovery** can only take place in the **open** or the “there” of **being-there**. The ontic truth of judgment presupposes the ontological truth of the discovery of the **being of entities**.

Since the original meaning of truth is unconcealment, **untruth** belongs to the enactment and **essential swaying** (*Wesung*) of truth. In every **revelment**, **concealment** holds sway as well. This implies that on the way to truth we may wander into **errancy**. The **finitude** of human being is expressed in the link between truth and errancy.

**TRUTH OF BEING, THE (*die Wahrheit des Seins*)**. The **truth** of **being** is the unfolding of the self-revealing-concealing of being, that is, the **unconcealment** of being. In the history of **philosophy**, being reveals itself in the **presence** of **entities** and at the same time withdraws into the **beingness** of entities. As a **destiny**, the truth has its own history. Being reveals and conceals itself in different ways at different times and “sending” of different “epochs.” This destining is the **history of being**. The truth of being shelters and preserves the **mystery** of being.

**TURNING (*Kehre*)**. Heidegger characterizes the transformation that occurs when **thinking** experiences its reciprocity with **being**, and his own inquiry undergoes, in direct response, a turning. The turning, then, constitutes a radical change in the way that being manifests itself to thinking and, reciprocally, how thought formulates the question of the **meaning of being**. In his *Letter on “Humanism,”* Heidegger alludes to the turning to describe the problematic transition to the never published third division of Part One of *Being and Time*, to be titled “Time and Being.” The transposing of the priority of the major terms of thinking, that is, from “being and time” to “time and being,” defines the hallmark of the turning: that is, as a “turning

around” of the **question of being** itself, in a way that allows **temporality** to emerge as the backdrop for disclosing being and expressing its **meaning in language**.

The most distinctive permutations of the turning occur in *Contributions to Philosophy*. Heidegger speaks explicitly of the “turning relation” of **being** to man in which the latter is defined explicitly through its reciprocity with being as providing the place for its **unconcealment**. **Being-there** thereby belongs to being in this more fundamental **relation**, held within the tension of the **gifting** and refusing of the historical **possibility** of being’s manifestation. Heidegger refers to the “**turning in enowning**” to describe the historical dynamic whereby being and **human being** belong together and thereby come into their own by virtue of that relationship. Through the turning in enowning, being-there is commissioned to safeguard the **truth of being** and cultivate the distinctive abode for its appearance, namely, language itself. Ultimately, the turning clears the way for being to be thought and expressed in the most primordial idioms, beyond the constraints of metaphysics, including its subject-object dichotomy.

In 1949 and 1950, Heidegger delivered a lecture at the Bremen Club called *The Turning*. The lecture clarifies the importance of the turning as a historical transformation, in which the **mystery** of being shines forth from the shadow of its **forgottenness** and thereby ushers in the **other beginning** of thinking. The radiance of being’s light, or its historical **clearing**, simultaneously illuminates the **danger of technology** as the global mechanism for exploiting **nature**.

In his *Letter to Father William J. Richardson, S.J.*, Heidegger clarifies his understanding of the turning as a transformation of the **path of thinking**, rather than simply as a change of perspective in his own **philosophy**. Heidegger rejects Fr. Richardson’s characterization of a dichotomy between a “Heidegger I” (of the so-called earlier period of the **phenomenological** approach of *Being and Time*) and “Heidegger II” (of the so-called later period of poetic thinking). On the contrary, the distinction between a “being-historical” and a “phenomenological” perspective necessitates the “back and forth” movement between them. As a result, the phenomenological inquiry into being-there and **being-historical thinking** are always intertwined. The turning relation of being to man clears the way to think the latter more fundamentally, that is, apart from any connotations of **subjectivity**.

**TURNING, THE (*Die Kehre*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture in 1949 and 1950 in Bremen and Bühlerhöhe as part of a cycle of four lectures under the title *Insight into That Which Is*. In this final lecture of the cycle, Heidegger describes the **coming to presence of enframing** as the **danger**, although it does not therewith announce itself as the danger. Enframing is the essential nature and dynamic of **technology**, which hides itself in the **forgottenness of**

**being** and the corollary **presencing** of **entities** for exclusively instrumental purposes. The hidden danger of enframing is that **being** endangers the **possibility** of its **truth**. Enframing is the **destiny** of being. Technology can only be overcome if being presences in another way. **Human beings** can never overcome technology by themselves, because their power and capabilities are equally shaped by the **forgottenness** of being. Since technology arises from this forgottenness, human beings can surmount technology only if they discover the as-yet-hidden truth of being and thus prepare for a new destiny of being. This can only happen if human beings first establish themselves in the **play-space** determining **who** they are and take up their **dwelling** there.

As Heidegger explains, we must first learn how to think before we can ponder the **truth of being** as that which is worthy of questioning. **Language** is the primordial dimension within which human beings can abide, and by heeding its **claim**, thereby belong to being. Through **thinking** we must learn to dwell in the realm where we come to confront the historical roots, as well as the destructive forces, of **machination**.

The danger of the coming to presence of enframing conceals the possibility of the **turning**, in which the forgottenness belonging to the destiny of being will turn of itself. With this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of being will turn into whatever is. In this sense, Heidegger can refer to the words sung by **Friedrich Hölderlin**: “But where there is danger, the saving power also grows.”

The turning of the danger will come to pass suddenly. In this turning, the **clearing** belonging to the **gifting** refusal of being will suddenly clear itself. In the lightning of the turning, the truth of being will flash. When forgottenness turns around, the in-flashing of world lights up the dangerous neglect of the **thing**. This in-flashing is what Heidegger calls **enowning**. The sudden flash of the truth of being into the **errancy** of untruth is, as the title of the lecture cycle indicates, insight into that which is.

**TURNING IN ENOWNING, THE (*die Kehre im Ereignis*)**. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger addresses the question of how **being** can solicit thought and **thinking** can heed the **claim of being**. The reciprocity occurring between being and thought implies that only by safeguarding the **truth** of being can thinking come into its own. The transposing of the relation between the two, in which thinking receives its guidance from being and is thereby commissioned to safeguard its **truth**, defines the turning in enowning. The turning in enowning entails a historical transformation in which the **clearing** of being shines forth as illuminating the **task of thinking**, while directing thought toward its unique mission.

**TURNING RELATION OF BEING** (*kehrige Bezug des Seins*). In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger redefines **being-there** through its reciprocity with **being**, that is, as providing the **place** for **unconcealment**. He characterizes the dynamic of this relationship as the turning relation of being. The turning relation of being is a historical transformation, which extends the **care** that human beings exercise toward themselves into a **guardianship** of the diverse ways in which **entities** can be revealed, including **nature**. This permutation of the **turning** creates a **moment** (*Augenblick*) in which the **disposition** toward **letting be** displaces the self-centered **willing** of human **subjectivity**.

**TURNING TRAJECTORIES** (*Kehrungsbahnen*). Heidegger's use of the term **turning** (*die Kehre*) is exceedingly complex and takes on many permutations. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), he refers to the turning trajectories to describe the different twists and tensions that redirect thinking in its **venture** to **cross over** to the **other beginning**. These trajectories include the **counter-turning** (*Widerkehr*) as the transitional movement from the **forgottiness** to the **recollection** of the **truth of being**.

**TURNING UNTO** (*Zukehr*). Heidegger's attempt to think the **turning** (*die Kehre*) assumes various permutations. One such nuance is the turning unto, which involves the historical transformation in the **truth of being** that permeates, grounds, and appears in the uniqueness of an **entity** (*ein Seiendes*), and reciprocally, summons **being-there** to participate in this grounding by serving as the **place** (*Ort*) for **unconcealment** to occur. By enduring the tension of the **twofold**, human **existence** turns toward **being**, just as the latter also turns in the direction of the “there” (*Da-sein*). In this way, being-there is repositioned anew on the **abground** and thus is redefined more originally as the **t/here** of **dwelling**. In *Mindfulness* (1938–39), the turning unto emerges as what is most **question-worthy**, thereby qualifying as the **matter of thinking**.

**TWOFOLD, THE** (*der Zwiespalt*). The **essential swaying** (*Wesung*) of **being** is the twofold of being and **entities**. Being is the **temporalizing** background from which entities come to **presence** in the **clearing** as the act of **presencing**. This double presence is the twofold that constitutes the “there” of **being-there**.



# U

**UEXKÜLL, JAKOB VON (1884–1944).** Uexküll was a German biologist who entered into debates opposing a teleological view of the development of natural organisms and higher animals, with its mechanistic outlook of evolution championed by Charles Darwin in his theory of evolution. In contrast to Darwin's endorsement of the principle of natural selection, Uexküll questioned more basically the nature of life itself and the synergy between the **animal** and its environment (*Umwelt*). Much of Heidegger's appreciation of the unique **being** of animals and their animalhood (*Tierheit*) can be traced back to his familiarity with Uexküll's writings, including the 2nd edition of *Umwelt und Innerwelt der Tiere* (1921); Heidegger references this book in his "Notes" to a graduate seminar for his lecture-course from the summer semester of 1939, *On the Essence of Language*. Uexküll's theoretical biology figures prominently in Heidegger's major treatise on animal life, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/30).

**UNCANNINESS (*Unheimlichkeit*).** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes how anxiety individualizes **being-there** and makes it feel uneasy. Uncanniness is the fundamental **mood** in which the **self** experiences the unfamiliarity of its **being-in-the-world**. When being-there evades this sense of uncanniness, it really flees from its own **being-toward-death**. Because uncanniness frees **being-there** from its **fallenness** into the **they** and the **world**, it opens up the silent **nothing** in which being-there may hear the **call of conscience**. Uncanniness is closely related to being-there's **finitude, mortality**, and the **nothingness** at the heart of its **existence**. Only human beings can experience the uncanniness of their being-in-the-world.

**UNCONCEALMENT (*Unverborgenheit*).** Unconcealment is the term that Heidegger uses to translate the **word** for **truth, alètheia**. It is the unfolding of the self-revealing concealing of **being**. Being reveals itself in the **presence** of **entities**, while simultaneously withdrawing into the **beingness** of entities and concealing itself in the process.

See also CONCEALMENT (*Verborgenheit*); TRUTH OF BEING, THE (*die Wahrheit des Seins*).

**UNCOVER** (*entdecken*). In its **understanding**, **being-there** uncovers **entities** within the **world**, which have **readiness-to-hand** as their **way of being**. This is only possible because being-there is in its **being-in-the-world** familiar with meaningfulness. The discovery of entities presupposes the **disclosedness** of the world. Only when the **being** of an entity within the world has been discovered can it be uncovered in its pure **presence-at-hand**. The discovery of entities is the **factual** basis for the primordial **phenomenon** of **truth**.

**UNDERSTANDING** (*Verstehen*). Heidegger distinguishes understanding as a pretheoretical way by which **being-there** cultivates **possibilities** and discloses itself through them. In this regard, the term *understanding* has its ancestry in **Wilhelm Dilthey**'s portrait of the cultural and historical enactment of "how" we understand through **lived-experience**. Because in some way **being** is already preunderstood in any act of understanding, Heidegger coins the term **understanding of being** (*Seinsverständnis*). Possessing such an understanding of being distinguishes **being-there** as such. According to Heidegger, a preconceptual, **preontological understanding of being** precedes, and is more basic than, the theoretical mode of understanding (*Verstand*), which **Immanuel Kant** argued defined the scientific knowledge of **nature** through pure concepts or **categories**.

Initially, Heidegger construes understanding as our most basic ability to live and cope skillfully with our **world**, with each other, and with ourselves. Understanding formally indicates the familiarity of **life** with itself. The **intentionality**, **existence**, or **transcendence** of being-there indicates precisely that it is always implicitly or explicitly an understanding of being. Understanding is the **existential** being of being-there's own **can-be**, in such a way that this being discloses in itself what its being is capable of. The structure of understanding is **projection**, and understanding always has a **mood**. Understanding gives the direction for, and develops its possibilities through, **interpretation**.

Understanding projects **meaning** implicitly or explicitly in three different ways, which correspond to being-there's existence, **being-in-the-world**, and **being-with**: (1) understanding projects the being of being-there upon its **for-the-sake-of-which**; (2) it projects the being of being-there upon the **significance** of the **worldhood** of its world, and it holds the relations that constitute the world as world in a prior **disclosedness** of the world; and (3) understand-

ing projects the being of being-there upon the disclosedness of its being-with the other being-there. Being-there's understanding of being already includes its empathy with others.

Since understanding can pertain explicitly to **who** each of is, or in other words, being-there possesses a self-understanding along with its understanding of being, it can be modified as either **owned** or **unowned**, "authentic" or "inauthentic." In its ownmost understanding of its existence, being-there discloses itself through **anticipatory resoluteness**, its wanting to have a **conscience**, and its having an outstanding **guilt**. In misunderstanding its existence, on the other hand, being-there succumbs to **fallenness**; it flees from **death** and closes off the possibility of **resoluteness** or choosing to be a **self**.

In Heidegger's later work, understanding is displaced by **language** as the **belonging together** of being and **human being** in the mutual way each comes into its own, that is, through the directive of **enowning**.

**UNDERSTANDING OF BEING (*Seinsverständnis*)**. **Being-there** has in all its different **ways of being** always an implicit understanding of being. When we say that something is, we already understand it *as* something. To be means in a fundamental sense to be already understood. This does not need to be an explicit **understanding**; most of the time we do not think about **being**, which reveals itself only in our dealings with **entities**. This implicit understanding of being can be made explicit through **interpretation**. Because in our everyday lives we understand **being** as the **being of entities**, being as such withdraws into **forgottenness**. In the history of **philosophy**, **ontology** has always been an interpretation of our **ontic** understanding of being. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger provides for the first time an interpretation of our **ontological** understanding of being.

*See also* PREONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BEING (*vorontologisches Seinsverständnis*).

**UNESSENTIAL (*Unwesen*)**. Heidegger develops basic terms by playing off their opposites. One such example occurs in the essay of the distorting, decaying, and corrupting of what is most essential, singular, and ownmost. The unessential is the "turning away from" by which **being-there** experiences the negation and undoing, for example, of **truth**. The unessential is the encounter with the dimension of deterioration that transpires throughout the **history of metaphysics**.

**UNLIVING (*entleben*)**. Heidegger developed his formally indicative **hermeneutics** in order to overcome a fundamental problem of **phenomenology**. As **Paul Natorp** points out, every description of the **lived experiences of life** objectifies the lived experience and so "stills the stream" of life. This unliv-

ing of lived experience is, as Natorp maintains, the result of phenomenological description. This is the reason Heidegger formally indicates the different **phenomena** of **being-there** and insists that we must experience them in our own lives by reliving the lived experience as such.

**UNOWNEDNESS (*Uneigentlichkeit*)**. As **ways of being**, **ownedness** and **unownedness** are grounded in the **mineness** of **being-there**. All **existentials** of being-there are determined by the tension between ownedness and unownedness. Being-there exists always either in one of these **modes** or in the indifference to both. The ground of unownedness is the **possibility** of ownedness. It characterizes a way of existing into which being-there can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself. In this diversion, the **self** risks losing a grasp on who it is or failing to “win over” its “ownmost” **individuality**. Unownedness does not signify a lesser degree of **being** than ownedness. Rather, ownedness always occurs in tension with the unownedness and emerges as an alternative path to the inertia and fragmentation of the self in its fugitive **existence**.

**UNSAID (*Ungesagtes*)**. The **fact** that the manifestation of **being** can never be completely transparent also entails that its **meaning** is never fully expressible. The tendency of being to withdraw into **mystery** has its corollary in the way that **language** harbors what remains unsaid or unspoken. The unsaid, however, is not simply a drawback, since it also reverberates from the depths of a still hidden **truth**. The **possibility** of recollecting the **truth of being** hinges on evoking the unsaid and intimating its meaning in the profoundest way possible. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger attempts to say what is unsaid in **Immanuel Kant**'s account of the transcendental **imagination** in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

**UNTHOUGHT (*Ungedachtes*)**. Throughout the history of **metaphysics**, **being** withdraws from **thinking**. The unthought, however, does not merely denote a deficiency, but rather prefigures the future direction of **philosophy**. The future challenge of philosophy is to think the unthought specifically as the **difference** between **being** and **entities**, which remains **concealed** from metaphysics. In *The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics*, Heidegger equates the unthought with the **matter of thinking**. Given this unthought dimension, the task of thinking always remains an open-ended endeavor. His attempt to think the unthought is consistent with his overarching suggestion that “questioning is the piety of thinking.”

**UNTRUTH (*Unwahrheit*)**. Since the original **meaning** of **truth** is **unconcealment**, untruth belongs to the occurrence of truth itself. In every **revelment, concealment** holds sway as well. This implies that on the way to truth we may wander into **errancy**. The **finitude** of **being-there** is expressed in the belonging together of truth and errancy.

*See also* ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*).

**UNWORLDING (*Entweltlichung*)**. When the **world** as a **whole** of **equipment ready-to-hand** is reduced to a context of extending **things** that are **present-at-hand**, it is deprived of its **worldhood**. This deprivation of worldhood is what Heidegger calls unworlding. In unworlding, the world is objectified into the pure extendedness of **space**.

Heidegger states that in **modernity** the world no longer “worlds.” As the backdrop for the manifestation of **being**, world is also **concealed** within the epoch of **technology**. Instead, only **entities** appear insofar as they are **revealed** instrumentally as objects to be used and exploited. As such, the unworlding of the world is a further indication of the concealment of the **ontological difference**. The unworlding of the world also entails the **uprootedness** of **human beings**. The world is no longer the **expanse** of **dwelling** or the **openness** that arises in opposition to the self-concealing of the **earth**.

*See also* AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*); WORLD WORLDS (*Welt weltet*).

**UPON-WHICH (*das Woraufhin*)**. *See* IIN-TERMS-OF-WHICH (*das Woraufhin*).

**UPROOTED (*Entwurzelung*)**. For Heidegger, humanity becomes uprooted in the sense of succumbing to **homelessness**. To be uprooted is not simply to be denied a homeland, but rather to be bereft of the capacity and **disposition** for **dwelling**. The manner in which human beings become uprooted is the hallmark of **modernity**. As the result of **technology**, human beings can travel to all corners of the globe in less than a day. The eradication of all distances is a primary condition of uprootedness. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger describes the frenetic pace of modern life, in which human beings cease to dwell anymore, unable to allow the **nearness** of **things** to unfold.

**UTTERANCE (*Sage*)**. *See* SAYING (*Sage*).



# V

**VALIDITY (*Geltung*).** Rudolf Hermann Lotze introduced the term validity in his *Logic*. It became a central concept in the Southwest German school of **neo-Kantianism** of Wilhelm Windelband, **Heinrich Rickert**, and **Emil Lask**. In his early writings, Heidegger borrowed the terms from Lask and called it a felicitous German expression. Validity means basically three things in his student writings.

1. Validity means the “form” of ideality possessed by the **meaning** of a **judgment**, which does not exist in **space** and **time**. Next to an “it is” there is an *es gilt*, it validates, it has validity, it holds, it is effective.

2. Validity also means the validity of a predicative sense of a judgment for the logical subject of the judgment. “The book cover is yellow” means that “being-yellow has validity for the book cover.” The copula “is” means nothing more than the predicative meaning-content (being yellow) has validity for the meaning-content in the subject position (book cover). The **meaning of being** of the copula “is” in the judgment not only means the validity of one meaning-content for another, but also entails the validity of these meaning-contents for the sensible **entity** about which the judgment is made.

3. Validity finally means the universal and normative bindingness of the ideal sense of judgments on all judging agents. Valid sense functions as a norm for physical acts of thought. Heidegger wanted to develop a pure **logic** as a phenomenological **ontology** of the **existence** of the categorial sense of the **being** of entities, which is valid in the triple sense of ideality, validity-for, and bindingness.

After his **destruction** of value-philosophy in his early lecture-course, Heidegger would denounce validity as a word idol in *Being and Time*.

*See also* VALUE (*Wert*).

**VALUE (*Wert*).** In the **value-philosophy** of the neo-Kantian school of Wilhelm Windelband, **Heinrich Rickert**, and **Emil Lask**, a sharp distinction is made between facts and values. The **meaning of being** of facts is **existence**

and that of values is **validity**. The realm of values is studied and understood in the humanities. The realm of facts is studied and explained in the **natural sciences**.

Values also play a very important part in **Friedrich Nietzsche's metaphysics** of the **will to power** and a revaluation of all values. Nietzsche understands value as an aspect of the conditions of constancy and surpassing evolution with a view to the complex **structures of life** that have a relative duration within the process of becoming. The will to power poses all values, for all values are nothing more than the self-posed conditions of its own unfolding. In this sense, the metaphysics of the will to power is a **philosophy** of values. The death of **God** has made all traditional "Christian" values worthless. To fill the void left by the death of God, Nietzsche wants to revalue all values. That is, as Heidegger sees it, precisely the reason why his philosophy remains the end of the history of **metaphysics**, despite his attempt to overcome **Platonism**.

In his *Letter on "Humanism,"* Heidegger states that values are the greatest "blasphemy" on the face of being.

*See also* CHRISTIANITY (*Christentum*); VALUE-PHILOSOPHY (*Wertphilosophie*).

**VALUE-PHILOSOPHY** (*Wertphilosophie*). The Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism developed a value-philosophy to supplement **Immanuel Kant's** theory of epistemology. **Heinrich Rickert** and Wilhelm Windelband made a sharp distinction between facts and **values**. The basic sense of facts is **existence**; that of values is **validity**. Values are independent of our **judgment** and reside in a transcendent realm of validity. As a student, Heidegger accepted the central doctrines of Rickert's and especially **Emil Lask's** value-philosophy. In his early lecture-course in **Freiburg**, he dismantles value-philosophy and shows its limits.

As Heidegger sees it, **Friedrich Nietzsche's metaphysics** of the **will to power** is also a **philosophy** of values. In his moral **interpretation** of **Platonism**, Nietzsche identifies **Plato's** ideas and values. The history of **nihilism** is the long story of the devaluation of these values. To overcome nihilism, Nietzsche proposes a revaluation of all values. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome metaphysics is in fact its final completion, because he only inverts Platonism.

**VAN GOGH, VINCENT (1853–90)**. Van Gogh stands out as one of the most prominent and influential painters of the 19th century. In his pivotal essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger discusses Van Gogh's painting, the *Peasant's Shoes*, in order to illustrate how such an artistic creation can provide a **site** for the **unconcealment** of being. The pair of shoes



does not simply represent an item of **equipment**, but instead marks the insertion of the **human being** into the **openness** of the **world** and as situated upon the **earth**. In this way, Van Gogh's painting marks the birth of the **thing** through the dynamic of its thinging and hence as residing on the soil of the **earth**.

**VENTURE** (*Versuch*). For Heidegger, **thinking** always proceeds along a **way** or path. Such movement along the way cannot rely upon a preestablished road map. Hence, he characterizes it as a searching endeavor that may be fraught with risk. This searching endeavor takes the form of a venture. In *Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger points to the precedent that **Friedrich Nietzsche** set in describing philosophy as a risky endeavor, "experiment," or venture by which humanity teeters on the brink, abyss, or **abgrund** (*Abgrund*). In the leitmotif or epigraph to *Ponderings* (1931–1938), Heidegger characterizes the endeavor undertaken there as open attempts (*Versuche*), rather than as seeking the closure of a complete philosophical system.

Heidegger's emphasis on the venturesome, searching endeavor of thinking is consistent with the ultimate leitmotif of his **Complete Edition**, namely, "Ways, not works."

**VIOLENCE** (*Gewalt*). Because being tends to recede and withdraw into concealment, as **Heraclitus** first observed, there is inevitably a violence inherent in the ascent into **openness** and **unconcealment**. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger emphasizes the violent side of the irruption of **entities** into the light of unconcealment. Yet this violence is also endemic to philosophy and various artistic endeavors. In *Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger acknowledges the violence of his **interpretation**, that is, in the arduous attempt to bring to expression what is **unsaid** in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), Heidegger revisits the violent character of his legendary Kant interpretation, making explicit that the transcendental power of **imagination** (*Einbildungskraft*) derives from the light of the **clearing**. He then emphasizes that the violent irruption of the manifestation of entities depends upon an even more primordial gathering of **stillness** within the **truth of being**.

The creativity of the artist also epitomizes this violence by bringing to the full light of the appearance of beauty what is otherwise withdrawn and left slumbering in **concealment**.

**VOICE OF BEING, THE** (*die Stimme des Seins*). In his later writings, Heidegger speaks of the voice of being. **Language** makes possible the **belonging together** of **being** and **human beings**, thereby allowing the voice of being to call forth silently. This **ringing of stillness** hails the poet and ad-

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dresses the thinker. The voice of being evokes the tone of their **attunement**. In the naming of being as the **holy** by the poet and the **saying** of the **truth of being** by the thinker, the voice of being is expressed in **words**.

# W

**WANT OF HOLY NAMES, THE** (*Der Fehl heiliger Namen*). Heidegger wrote this essay in 1974, dedicating it to Hugo Friedrich. By appealing to images from **Friedrich Hölderlin**'s poetry, Heidegger asks how the **holy** can be addressed in this era in which **gods** have absconded or taken flight. As Hölderlin suggests in his hymn "Homecoming," the names for the holy remain "wanting." The **language** that can spawn names to address the holy depends upon heeding what is **concealed** as well as revealed in the epoch of **technology**. The sheltering of the self-concealment of **being** preserves the **mystery** that first allows the holy to appear and become present to **mortals**. Heidegger concludes this essay by suggesting that thinking must experience that want *as* want and abide within that **distress**, in order to prepare for entry into the open **expanse** where the holy can become manifest and such naming can occur.

**WAY** (*Weg*). According to Heidegger, the lasting element in **thinking** is the way. Ways of thinking hold within them the mysterious quality that we can walk them forward and backward, although only the way back will lead us forward in thinking. Heidegger's entire **path of thinking** is a collection of ways, and not of works, on which we are invited to follow him. Sometimes we lose ourselves on the **forest trails**, and sometimes we come to a **clearing**.

*See also* RETURNERSHIP (*Rückkehrerschaft*).

**WAY OF BEING** (*Seinsweise*). To the **essence** of an **entity** belongs a specific **way** of being. As **Aristotle** had already noted, **being** is said in "many ways." Heidegger distinguishes between the way of being of **objects**—that is, **equipment**, **readiness-to-hand**, and **presence-at-hand**—and the way of being of **being-there**, that is, **owned** and **unowned existence**. The distinction between different ways of being is important for Heidegger's attempt to overcome the subject-object dichotomy in his early work until *Being and Time*.

**WAY TO LANGUAGE, THE (*Der Weg zur Sprache*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture on two occasions in 1959 as part of a lecture cycle on **language** and information at the Bavarian Academy of the Fine Arts in Munich and at the Academy of the Arts in Berlin. In the introduction, Heidegger describes language as the foundation of the **human being**. The way to language is the attempt to speak about **speech** qua speech. When language shows itself clearly, this definition will become a soundless **echo**, which lets us hear something of the proper character of language.

Since the Greeks, language has been represented in terms of speech. Speaking is one kind of human activity. Heidegger abandons this approach because he wants to understand the manner in which language has **being**. He wants to **experience** language as language. Language first shows itself as one way of speaking. Speaking must have speakers who participate in the way of speaking. They are **dwelling** together in language. They speak about what concerns them. Everything spoken, however, stems from the unspoken or **unsaid**. The **nature of language** exhibits a great diversity of elements and relations. Heidegger emphasizes the dynamic of language and its power of self-showing. In the nature of language, speech and what is spoken reveal themselves as that by which and within which something is given voice and language, that is, makes an appearance insofar as something is said. Heidegger insists that **saying** and speaking are not the same.

Speaking qua saying belongs to the design (*Aufriß*) of the being of language. The “ownmost” or nature of language is saying as showing. Every showing by way of language presupposes the prior **presencing** of that which is shown. In this sense, speaking is of itself a **hearing**. Language speaks by saying. Speaking as the hearing of language lets saying be said to it. Saying sets all present entities free into their given **presence** and brings all absent entities into their **absence**. It is the gathering that brings together all present and absent entities in the manifold showing and lets all that is shown abide in itself. Heidegger names this moving force in the showing of saying “owning” (*Eignung*). Owing is what brings all present and absent **entities** each into their own, where they show themselves in what they are and where they abide according to their kind.

Heidegger can now name this process of coming in its own “**enowning**.” It yields the opening of the **clearing** in which present entities can come to presence and from which they also recede into absence. He summarizes this dynamic by saying, enowning enowns. In this sense we may call language the **house of being**. As Novalis has said, language is a monologue. It is language alone that speaks authentically, and language speaks lonesomely.

*See also OWNEDNESS (*Eigentlichkeit*).*

**WEIRDNESS (*Unheimlichkeit*)**. *See UNCANNINESS (*Unheimlichkeit*).*

**WEST, THE** (*das Abendland*). For Heidegger, the West refers to the entire trajectory of **history**, whose **origin** stems from the inception of **philosophy** in the ancient Greeks. Literally, the West defines the “evening land,” referring to the **opening** of a **horizon** traversed by the setting sun. The history of **metaphysics** is a decline into the **forgottenness of being**. But that sweep of history also includes the promise of the **other beginning**, a new onset of **thinking**. The Western philosophical **tradition** is thereby shaped by the transmission, **recollection**, and appropriation of the possibilities that still remain **unthought**.

**WHAT ARE POETS FOR? (Wozu Dichter?)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture in 1946 in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of **Rainer Maria Rilke**’s death. In the introduction, Heidegger takes up the fundamental question raised by **Friedrich Hölderlin** in his elegy *Bread and Wine*: What are poets for in a destitute time? A destitute time is the **time** of the **world**’s night, which is determined by the **absence** of the **gods**. It is the darkness of **nihilism** that spreads itself all over the world. This destitution is a **destiny** of **being**. In this darkness, Hölderlin still found traces of the fugitive gods. Dionysus, the god of wine, guards in the vine and the fruit the **belonging together** of **earth** and **sky**, of **divinities** and **mortals**. The **fourfold** is the **site** where traces of the fugitive gods still remain for godless **human beings**.

Poets remain in the trace of the fugitive gods and trace the way toward the **turning** in the **history of being**. The turning can only come in the **holy**, and Hölderlin therefore names the holy in his **poetry**. The world’s night is at the same time the holy night. Heidegger shows that the destituteness of what is destitute in time is the extreme **forgottenness of being**. In a **dialogue** with poetry, **thinking** can discover what remained **unsaid**. To which poet should thinking turn in order to experience the **mystery**? Could Rilke be a poet in destitute times?

The main part of this lecture is a meditation on the place of Rilke’s poetry within the history of being. For Heidegger, Rilke is the poet par excellence of **metaphysics** in its consummation, since he expressed in his poetry the **being of entities** as a universal will whose nature is simply to be itself as will. Rilke uses “nature” in the sense of the *natura* of **Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz**. The **will** comes to **presence** as a will to willing. In his poetry, Rilke tries to overcome this will, and that makes him a poet for our destitute time.

For Rilke, being is a sort of gravitational force that draws all **entities** into their true selves and gives them weight as entities. At the same time, it gathers all entities into a single sphere. For Rilke, the metaphor of the sphere suggests the many-sidedness of being as a conglomerate **whole**. For Heidegger, on the other hand, being is a sphere in the sense of the One of **Parmenides**, which he interprets as the **clearing** that reveals entities in their being and wherein they become present in their presence.

Rilke's most significant **word** for being is the "open." Being is the open insofar as it admits of no enclosures within itself. Being, conceived as the open, is another form of being as universal will. For Heidegger, the **open** has another **meaning**. It is that which renders entities open, hence accessible one to another and capable of encountering each other.

According to Rilke, human beings are different from other entities because they are self-conscious. This power of consciousness is founded on the principle of **René Descartes** that the essential structure of consciousness is **representation**. Entities can only have a presence when represented to and for consciousness. The being of entities and human beings is thus reduced to **standing-reserve** for **calculative thinking**. This implies also that human beings depart from the open and close it off.

Rilke's attempt to overcome nihilism contains a basic difficulty. On the one hand, human beings must overcome the subject-object dichotomy that is the **ground of technology**; on the other hand, they cannot abandon their conscious nature, and that implies also representation. Rilke suggests a reversal of our departure from the open as an antidote to technology and nihilism. In this reversal, consciousness should recollect the immanence of the objects of representation into a presence within the realm of the heart. This is a renewal of Blaise Pascal's **logic**, and as such an alternative to the method of Descartes. Rilke attempts to accomplish this reversal by means of **language**. In the language of the heart, language yields to what is to be said. The poet must receive what is to be said as coming from the fullness. According to Heidegger, Rilke still conceives of language as a tool of human beings. In this respect, he remains locked in **subjectivity**. The nature of language resides for Heidegger in its possessing human beings before human beings "have" language or are possessive of speech. Language speaks, and human beings can speak only if they **hear** the **saying** of language.

Rilke recognized the **danger** of technology. His attempt to overcome the danger of technology as the unholy implies that he is at least under way toward a naming of the holy. In this sense, he is a poet for our destitute time.

**WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? (*Was heißt denken?*)**. In this winter semester 1951/52 and summer semester 1952 lecture-course, Heidegger develops the **question of being** in a **dialogue** with pre-Socratic **philosophy** and **Friedrich Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will**. In the first part, Heidegger diagnoses the manner of **presencing** of our **time**. What is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not **thinking**. The cause of our failure is not that we do not reach out sufficiently and turn to what is to be thought, but rather that what must be thought turns away from us. It withdraws from us and refuses its arrival. We can only learn to

think what must be thought if we unlearn at the same time what thinking has traditionally become, that is, **science**. As **Friedrich Hölderlin** said in his **poetry**: “We are a sign that is not read.”

In a second movement of thought, Heidegger points to the essential link between thinking and history, which is grounded in the **historicality of human beings**. Since the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, **human beings** have **worldviews**. They experience the **world** as will and **representation**. Today our worldview is determined by **science**. As long as science determines our thinking, we will not be able to think what is thought-provoking. This is the reason Nietzsche tries to overcome man as he so far has been. The **spirit** of revenge characterizes the type of the last man. According to Nietzsche, we must liberate ourselves from this spirit. The morality of Nietzsche’s philosophy is founded upon his metaphysics, which is in turn determined by his revulsion against his own time. The will wants only its own eternity. In this willing of itself, the nature of **technology** comes to light.

In the second part of the course, Heidegger asks the question “What is thinking?” in a different way: “What calls us to think?” When we ask this question, we are looking both to what it is that gives to us the **gift** of this endowment and to ourselves, whose **nature** lies in being gifted with this endowment. What calls us to think in **poetry** and thinking is **language**. Language speaks and addresses us. Heidegger can now explicate thinking as thanking and a commemoration of the **presencing** of human being. What gives us to think, its gifting, is **being**, which is at once “food for thought.” The explication of the **relation** between thinking and being belongs to **logic**. But as Heidegger points out, logic has been determined by the **saying** of **Parmenides**. “One should both say and think that being is.” What Parmenides has given us to think is the **experience** of the presencing of what is **present**, that is, the **being of entities**. Thinking is thanking only when it recollects the “one” in thought. This is the **twofold** of being and **entities**. The differentiation is that which gives food for thought, the **difference** as such or what Heidegger had earlier called the **ontological difference**. And what is so given is, as Heidegger remarks at the end of the course, the gift of what is worthy of thought.

**WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (*Was ist Metaphysik?*)**. Heidegger delivered his inaugural lecture on 24 July 1929 in the assembly hall of the University of **Freiburg**. It was published the same year. In his lecture, Heidegger takes up a particular metaphysical question, “Why are there **entities** at all and not rather **nothing?**,” while trying to transform the question as the basic task, mission, and theme of traditional **metaphysics**.

In the first part of the lecture, Heidegger distinguishes sharply between **science** and metaphysics. In metaphysics, each **question** already implicates **entities in the whole**, within which the inquirer is also **situated**. This implies

that the questioner as such is also there within the question and thus placed in question simultaneously. Metaphysics must be posed as a whole and from the essential position of **being-there** that questions. Although there are many different fields of inquiry in **science**, we always approach what is essential in all **things**. In the pursuit of science, **human beings** irrupt into the **whole** of **entities** in such a way that this irruption breaks open and shows what entities are in their **being**. **Science** studies entities and nothing else. In science, the questioner remains outside his objective field of study and does not question himself. Science wishes to know nothing of the nothing. And yet, when it tries to express its **ground**, that is, the study of entities and nothing else, it calls upon the nothing for help. In this duplicitous state of affairs, a question has already unfolded: How is it with the nothing?

Heidegger elaborates the question of the nothing in the second part of his lecture. The nothing is not an entity, and so we come face-to-face with the problem of how we can encounter the nothing. Heidegger defines the nothing as a complete negation of the totality of entities and then asks how entities in the whole can be given to us. Although we concern ourselves first and foremost in our **everydayness** with particular entities, entities in the whole may become manifest in certain **moods**, for example, deep **boredom**. Heidegger describes how entities conceal from us the nothing precisely when we come face-to-face with them in the whole. Is there an **attunement** in which we may be brought before the nothing itself? Heidegger can then point to **anxiety** as the mood that reveals the nothing.

In the third part, Heidegger answers the question of how it is with the nothing. The nothing reveals itself in anxiety, but not as an entity. In anxiety, human beings shrink back before the nothing. This wholly repelling gesture toward entities that are slipping away in anxiety displays the essential character of the nothing: **nihilation**. The nothing itself nihilates. Nihilation manifests entities in their potential to **presence**. In the “clear night” of the nothing of anxiety, the original manifestation of entities as such arises: that they *are* entities and not nothing. The encounter between being-there and entities is made possible by the original showing of the nothing. Being-there is being held out into or “suspended” in the nothing. Only because the nothing reveals itself in the ground of being-there can the **uncanniness** of entities overwhelm us and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder does the “why” loom before us. Only then can we inquire into the ground and question entities in their being. It is only because we can question and ground things that we ourselves are put into question.

In 1943, Heidegger added a “postscript” to the fourth edition of his inaugural lecture, in which he explains that the question “What is metaphysics?” questions beyond metaphysics. It springs from a **thinking** that has already entered into the question of **overcoming metaphysics**. Heidegger then proceeds to discuss some of the central themes of his later thought. Modern



science, **calculative thinking**, and **technology** are manifestations of the **will to power**. Metaphysics is determined by the **forgottenness of being**. Heidegger opposes a more originary kind of **commemorative thinking** to metaphysics. The other kind of thinking is the **echo** of being's **gift**: the **clearing** of being. It is obedient to the **voice of being** and seeks from being the **word** through which the **truth of being** may come to **language**. The thinking of being cares for our **dwelling** in language. The task of the thinker is the **saying** of being, while the poet must name the **holy** in **poetry**.

In 1949, Heidegger placed a preamble at the beginning of the 5th edition, which is included in *Pathmarks* under the title *Introduction to "What Is Metaphysics?"* It is a careful meditation on the metaphor of **René Descartes** in which he describes **philosophy** as a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk of the tree is physics, and the branches that issue from the trunk are all the other sciences. Heidegger uses the metaphor to introduce his **step back** into the ground of metaphysics. Although metaphysics speaks continually of being, it fails to ask the **question of being**. It does not ask this question, because it thinks being only by representing entities as entities. The essential nature of metaphysics is **onto-theo-logy**. Metaphysics has become the barrier that obscures the **turning relation of being** to human being by virtue of which each can come into its own. As a result, all philosophy has fallen into the **forgottenness of being**. If we want to overcome metaphysics, we must attempt to think the truth of being itself. This commemorative thinking attempts to ask the **basic question** of thinking: What is the ground of metaphysics, that is, how does being itself become manifest?

**WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? (*Was ist das—die Philosophie?*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture in August 1955 in Cerisy-la-Salle in France. With the question "What is **philosophy**?" we touch upon the topic of the lecture, that is, an introduction to philosophy. When we ask this question, we talk philosophy, but as long we talk about it, we remain outside of it and do not philosophize in any genuine sense.

Heidegger claims that the word philosophy appeared for the first time in **Heraclitus** and there as an adjective, rather than as a noun. *Philosophos* describes the **human being** who *philei to sophon*, that is, loves the wise. The philosophical man responds to the **address of being**. The original **meaning** of **love** is to be in harmony with the wise *logos*. Wise means for Heraclitus *hen panta*, that is, one is all. According to Heidegger, this means **being** is being, the **meaning** of which he interprets as being's gathering of all **entities** into their singular and distinctive way of **presencing**. For us, this may seem a trivial truth; for the Greeks it was the wonder of all wonders. **Astonishment** is the fundamental **mood** of **Greek philosophy**.

During the era of sophistry, both the address and response took different forms. The **mystery** of being revealed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the charlatanism of the Sophists. In this situation, **Plato** and **Aristotle** try to salvage being from this fallen condition. They search for wisdom beyond the level of **everydayness**. Philosophy thus becomes an erotic search for wisdom instead of an attempt to be in harmony with the *logos*. Aristotle transforms the original **thinking** of being of Heraclitus and **Parmenides** into **metaphysics**. The search for wisdom becomes an inquiry into the first **grounds** and principles of the **being of entities**. The **guiding question** of metaphysics is: “What is **beingness**?” Philosophy is a **saying** of what being is in the sense of beingness. Aristotle’s conception of philosophy is a genuine response to the address of being, since it makes explicit the relation **between** being and human beings in a specific historic way.

**Christianity** transformed the original Greek **understanding** of philosophy and therewith also its fundamental mood. The mood of modern philosophy since **René Descartes** is doubt. This is the reason he searched for the certitude of the being of entities. He founded this certitude upon the self-certain subject. The **completion of metaphysics** is **technology**. For this reason, we must return to the original Greek **experience** of thinking as the saying of the harmony between being and **human beings**. This responding to the address of being serves **language**. The **nature of language** holds sway in both thinking and **poetry**. Both have been determined by the Greek experience of *logos*. Heidegger therefore states that we can learn what philosophy is only in **dialogue** with Greek thinkers.

**WHILE (Weile)**. In his early lecture-course, Heidegger speaks of the **particular whileness** of the **being-there** of **human beings**. This term is dropped in *Being and Time* and displaced by **mineness**. In his later work, the while is a temporal determination of **entities** other than human beings whose **existence** is determined by their **temporality**. Every entity has its particular while, that is, the allotted **time** of its **presence**. The **being** of an entity is its manner of becoming present and whiling in its presence before it passes away. The while comes to presence within the openness of **entities in the whole**. The while of an entity is correlated to the **moment** of vision of being-there’s **resoluteness**.

**WHO, THE (das Wer)**. One of the basic methodological shifts that Heidegger makes in *Being and Time* is defining **human being** in terms of its **individuality** as a “who,” rather than generically in terms of “what” its nature is. Through his **phenomenology**, he transforms **Immanuel Kant**’s pivotal question “What is **man**?” into “Who is **being-there**?” The “who” of being-there points to the **fact** that human existence is defined through its

potential for selfhood, that is, as “owned” or “unowned” depending on the extent of its uniqueness. As Heidegger outlines in Chapter Four of the first division of *Being and Time*, the everyday self is just as likely to forsake its uniqueness as to cultivate it. Accordingly, the “who” of **everydayness** turns out to be the undifferentiated “**they**.”

**WHO IS NIETZSCHE’S ZARATHUSTRA? (*Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture on 8 May 1953 in Bremen. It was published in 1954. Who is **Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra**? It seems this question can easily be answered since Nietzsche wrote a book that bears the title *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the subtitle, he states that it is a book for everyone and no one. As Heidegger sees it, everyone means every **human being** insofar as he becomes in himself a matter worthy of thought. No one refers to the curious readers who imbibe freely of the striking aphorisms in the book. What does the title really tell us? First of all, it gives us the clue that Zarathustra is a speaker in the sense of a spokesman. He speaks on behalf of the circle of **life** and suffering and the coherence of the **will to power**. He teaches the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same and the **overman**. Heidegger’s lecture is a meditation on these themes.

At the beginning and end of the lecture stands the emblem of Zarathustra’s animals. The eagle and the serpent are totems of Zarathustra, the thinker of the eternal recurrence, and talismans for Heidegger, who thinks the **belonging together of being** and human beings. The teaching of the eternal recurrence is marked by dismay for this, Nietzsche’s most abysmal thought. Heidegger interprets the overman as that human being who goes beyond prior humanity, in order to lead that humanity for the first time to its **essence**. While Nietzsche prepares human beings to assume the dominion of the **earth**, Heidegger seeks to save the earth and heed its innermost **law**. In his **interpretation** of the eternal recurrence, Heidegger shows that Nietzsche’s concept of time remains metaphysical. Eternal recurrence is an eternity of recurring **nows**.

The overman is the transition or a bridge between prior humanity and its **future**. Zarathustra calls this bridge redemption from the spirit of revenge as man’s ill **will** toward time and its “it was.” Nietzsche diagnoses such revenge at the heart of all **tradition**. His understanding of revenge is metaphysical, since it determines man’s relation to **entities**. Heidegger’s next step is to ask: What may grant redemption from the revulsion against time? Nietzsche wills that transience lasts forever, which is only possible as an eternal recurrence of the same. Heidegger can now bring **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s** definition of primal being as will into play. In traditional **metaphysics**, primal being is eternity. Instead of leading to the overman and liberation from revenge, Zarathustra’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence stamps being upon becoming. Nietzsche only inverted the Platonic hierarchy and retained

the distinction between true being and becoming. Heidegger thereby concludes that Zarathustra remains a spokesman for the **completion of metaphysics**.

**WHOLE (*Ganzheit*)**. For Heidegger, the whole refers to the gathering together to an interconnected totality. **World** used as an **ontic** concept signifies the whole of those entities that are present-at-hand within the world. In **metaphysics**, we inquire about **entities in the whole**, that is, the **gathering together** of all entities, which is revealed in **anxiety**.

**WHOLLY OTHER, THE (*das ganz Andere*)**. To underscore the importance of the **ontological difference**, Heidegger refers to **be-ing** (*Seyn*) as completely or wholly other than **entities**. In *Ponderings VII–XI*, he emphasizes the “between” as the intermediary zone of **time-space** through which this otherness can be experienced. The “between” yields the **differentiation** through which be-ing can first become **question-worthy**.

*See also* OTHERNESS OF THE MATTER OF THINKING (*Verschiedenheit der Sache des Denkens*).

**WHY DO I STAY IN THE PROVINCES? (*Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?*)**. Heidegger wrote this short text in 1933 after he had rejected the philosophy chair of the University of Berlin. It was aired on the radio in 1933 and 1934 and published in 1934. Heidegger explains that his philosophical work is closely related to the work of the farmers in the Black Forest. At the end of the text, Heidegger recounts how he asked his neighbor in **Todtnauberg**, a 75-year-old farmer, whether he should go to Berlin. The farmer kept **silent** and only shook his head almost imperceptibly, which meant an absolute “no.”

**WIENER, NORBERT (1884–1964)**. Norbert Wiener was an American scientist and mathematician from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who is credited with developing the science of cybernetics and coining the term. Heidegger read Wiener’s pivotal work, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (Boston, 1950), which was published in German under the title *Mensch und Menschmaschine: Kybernetik und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1964). A citation of Wiener’s book appears in a footnote in *Zollikon Seminars*, in which Heidegger points out in a discussion in May 1965 that Wiener equates the **human being** with the capacity to process information. With this brief description, Heidegger begins to uncover the **essence** of cybernetics as we know it today, namely, as information processing.

Heidegger's appreciation for and yet adamant criticism of cybernetics marks the transition from his earlier **understanding** of **technology** in the Bremen lectures (1949) to his later anticipating what we characterize today as the "digital age." Due to his insight into Wiener's vision of cybernetics, Heidegger's critique of technology bridges the "atomic age" of the 1940s and 1950s with today's development of the Internet and the "information super-highway."

*See also* BREMEN AND FREIBURG LECTURES, THE (*Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*); CALCULATIVE THINKING (*rechnendes Denken*).

**WILL (Wille).** In Heidegger's **history of being**, **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling** inaugurates the final phase when he identifies modern **subjectivity** and the will. Willing is primal **being**. The **value** of all **entities** now depends upon the will. For Schelling, the will is essentially the will of a benevolent **God**, although the **freedom** of **human beings** is essentially a capacity for **good** and **evil**.

**Friedrich Nietzsche** takes the next step and shows that the will is in its **essence** a **will to power**. The will no longer strives for anything other than itself, and certainly not for **truth**, beauty, or the good. It only wants to increase its own power.

**Nihilism** emerges in and through the will. This is the reason Heidegger tries to deny the will in an **attunement** of **letting be** in his attempt to **overcome metaphysics**. The failure of his **rectorate** and his involvement with **National Socialism** had taught him that every attempt to willfully overcome the will only increases the hold of the will over human beings. To overcome the will, we must learn to stop willing and let beings be.

*See also* RELEASEMENT (*Gelassenheit*).

**WILL TO POWER (Wille zur Macht).** In his **metaphysics** of the will to power, **Friedrich Nietzsche** describes the **essence** of all **entities** as will to power. The will to power is the only principle of **value** estimation, which means that wherever the will to power manifests itself as the fundamental **way of being** of entities, the value of every entity is estimated in terms of its increasing or decreasing the will to power. The **being** of all entities is grounded in the will to power as the **highest entity**. Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power the culmination of the history of metaphysics as **nihilism**. The most extreme expression of the will to power, as the will that only wills itself, is contemporary **technology**.

**WILL TO POWER AS ART, THE** (*Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*). This lecture-course from the winter semester 1936/37, published in *Nietzsche I*, belongs to Heidegger's encounter with **Friedrich Nietzsche** as a **setting-in-opposition** from one another (*Auseinandersetzung*). The course consists of three parts that are joined together by two transitions.

The final part introduces the theme of Nietzsche as a metaphysician and interprets the **essence** of the **will to power** in his thought. The will to power defines the **beingness** of **entities**. In this sense, his thought is still directed by the **guiding question** of *philosophy*: What is an entity as entity? What is beingness, *ousia*? For Heidegger, the most fundamental work of Nietzsche is his collection of notes for his major work, *The Will to Power*, which was never completed.

In this collection, there are three dominant themes: the will to power, the **eternal recurrence of the same**, and the revaluation of all **values**. They are closely related and form a unity. For Nietzsche, all **being** is becoming, all becoming is willing, and all willing is an **expression** of the will to power. The will to power only wants its own becoming. This never-ending becoming of the will to power is the eternal recurrence of the same. What is the link between the eternal recurrence and the revaluation of values?

In the history of philosophy, "true being" or permanence is distinguished from becoming. Since all values are dependent on true being, Nietzsche's claim that true being is an abstraction from becoming renders all values groundless. The inner process of **nihilism** leads to the necessity of a revaluation of all values. In a discussion of the **will in metaphysics** prior to Nietzsche, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that the essence of the will to power involves a moving beyond oneself and, as such, the original **opening** unto entities.

In the first transition, *The Grounding Question and the Guiding Question of Philosophy*, Heidegger distinguishes between the guiding question and the **basic question** of philosophy. In both questions, the "is" seeks an overture upon **entities in the whole** by which we might determine what they are in their **truth**. For Nietzsche, entities are in truth will to power. Truth and will to power, as the opening up entities in their being, converge in **art**. In the culmination of the history of philosophy, **thinking** and art are rejoined.

The second part of the lecture-course is an interpretation of Nietzsche's five statements on art. First, art is the most perspicuous and familiar configuration of the will to power. The truth of entities is they are will to power. The artist discloses entities as they are in truth. Second, therefore, art must be grasped in terms of the artist. Nietzsche's physiology of art focuses on the **phenomenon** of artistic rapture. As an expression of the will to power, rapture is both the force that engenders form and the fundamental condition of the enhancement of **life**. Form constitutes the actuality of life in the grand style. Third, the other four statements are grounded in this one: art is the

basic occurrence of the being of all entities. Insofar as they are, entities are self-creating, created. As the basic occurrence of the being of entities, art is truth in the sense of **unconcealment** or *alètheia*. Fourth, art is the most potent stimulant of life and as such the countermovement of nihilism. Fifth, as a countermovement to nihilism, art is worth more than truth.

In the second transition of the course, *The Raging Discordance between Truth and Art*, Heidegger tries to understand why Nietzsche stands in holy dread before this discordance. He distinguishes between truth as the truth of true **assertions** and truth as the **essence** of the true, that is, the universal that is always valid, hence immutable, eternal, and transcending **time**. Nietzsche moves the true from the realm of knowledge to the domain of art. But he does not pose the question concerning the unconcealment of truth and the **truth of being**.

In the third part, Heidegger asks why truth for Nietzsche is not knowledge but art. He first elaborates the meaning of the true as an object of knowledge in an **interpretation of Platonism** and positivism. For the former the standard is the supersensible idea; for the latter, the sensible fact. In this sense positivism is inverted Platonism. Since Nietzsche describes his thought as inverted Platonism, must we conclude that it is nothing other than positivism? According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's insight into nihilism as the fundamental transformation of **modernity**, on the one hand, and his recognition of art as the essential countermovement to **nihilism**, on the other, distinguishes his thought from positivism. Heidegger next turns to **Plato's** interpretation of truth and art. He eradicates the **horizon**, which during the long fable of **metaphysics** separated the true from the sensory **world**. Truth in a metaphysical sense is a fixation of an apparition, clinging to a perspective that leads to nihilism and is therefore destructive of life. Nietzsche rescues the sensory, celebrates all perspectives, and enhances life as a countermovement to nihilism. Yet he failed to ask the question of truth as such. The truth of entities presupposes the truth of being. How may the thinker and the artist respond to this truth? With this question, Heidegger ends his course.

**WILL TO POWER AS KNOWLEDGE, THE (*Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis*)**. This lecture-course from the summer semester 1939, published in *Nietzsche II*, is Heidegger's third course on **Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy**. It is an analysis of Nietzsche's progress toward the question of **truth as unconcealment**. In Heidegger's **interpretation**, Nietzsche's view of truth as error is the extreme metaphysical transformation of truth as correctness.

Heidegger opens his course with the claim that in Nietzsche's philosophy we confront the **completion of metaphysics**, in which is decided what **entities in the whole** are. For Nietzsche, the **beingness** of entities is **will to power**, which is also the principle of a revaluation of all **values**. This new valuation should establish the conditions and perspectives for self-preserv-

ing, self-enhancing **life**. In this revaluation, the question of knowledge and truth is addressed, since truth and knowledge are values. For the philosophical tradition, truth is the correctness of **assertions** about **entities**; for Nietzsche, truth is an illusion. And yet this illusion is essential to life. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's thought is a **metaphysics** of life and as such the completion of metaphysics as the **science** of *phusis*. Nietzsche reduces the **categories** of **logic** to schemata devised by and for the preservation of **human beings**. His understanding of the value of truth as holding-to-be-true makes the end of the two-world theory of **Platonism**. Heidegger points out that even if life is becoming and not eternal **being**, Nietzsche retains the concept of correctness, since he claims the truth of Platonism is correct and an illusion.

All valuation interprets the being of entities in the whole as chaos. For Nietzsche, every human being is a body that somehow is alive. In chaos, human beings try to secure stability and permanence. Accordance with each other and reckoning of entities brings about the much-needed stability. This stability is no longer founded upon the eternal ideas; it is brought about by the holding-to-be-true of certain truths that are conditions of the **possibility** of human life. Heidegger can now take up the theme with which his lecture-course on the **will to power as art** had concluded: Nietzsche's overturning of **Plato's** distinction between the true and the apparent **world**. Is Nietzsche's attempt to go beyond metaphysics a liberation from Platonic thought, or did he merely invert Platonic **structures**?

Heidegger pursues two paths to the extreme **moment** and uttermost transformation of correctness in Nietzsche's thought. The first path inquires whether Nietzsche's holding-to-be-true as the commanding perspective of knowledge can save itself from a collapse into mere arbitrariness. The other paths show that **art** and knowledge are fixations of **horizons** and, as such, forms for securing permanence and assimilation to chaos. The raging discordance between truth and art is thus brought to an end. They are now a transfiguration that commands and poetizes, establishes and fixates, different horizons of perspective. Truth and art aim at justice, which is a **mode** of **thinking** that constructs, excludes, and annihilates. Justice is the supreme representative of life. Heidegger next asks whether such justice can provide a standard for the commanding and poetizing element in cognition. This seems doubtful since the will to power does not strive for preservation, but enhancement.

Nietzsche secures the permanence of becoming by means of the **eternal recurrence** of the willing of the will to power. This eternal recurrence is never-ending **presence**. Nietzsche's philosophy of the **will** expresses the final truth of **beingness** and is in this sense the completion of metaphysics. Yet, as Heidegger sees it, he still remained blind to the question of truth, that



is, the self-revealing-concealing of **being**. As the last **word** of metaphysics, his philosophy is bound up with **enowning** and the coming destiny of the **other beginning** for **thinking**.

**WINNING BACK** (*Verwindung*). Heidegger employs this term to describe the appropriation of **metaphysics**, that is, the attempt at winning back, recovering, and restoring its hidden **truth**. In *Enowning* (1941–42), Heidegger points to a transitional phase in which metaphysical concepts must be employed as a reference point in the attempt to **overcome metaphysics**. Rather than simply dismissing metaphysics, it is necessary to win it back by showing how its limitations also point to the **possibility** of **crossing over** to the **other beginning**. In *On the Question of Being*, Heidegger argues that **nihilism** can only be overcome by almost paradoxically recovering **metaphysics** as the **origin** of the Western **tradition**. The winning back of metaphysics makes evident its historical necessity, that is, as an **untruth** that harbors, preserves, and protects the **truth of being**.

**WITHDRAWAL** (*Entzug*). Withdrawal is the tendency to retreat or refrain from presencing. Withdrawal pertains to the interplay between presencing and **absencing**, which is intrinsic to the dynamic of **being**. Within the context of **phenomenology**, being's withdrawal is somewhat inevitable, simply due to its inconspicuousness; that is, the fact that as a **phenomenon** being tends *not* to show itself.

The withdrawal of **be-ing** (*Seyn*) is an important topic in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). Heidegger suggests that **enowning** (*Ereignis*) pre-dates and pervades the withdrawal of be-ing, in such a way as to preserve the tension of the **possibility** of **unconcealment**, even when the emphasis on **entities** becomes predominant in the modern epoch of **machination**.

*See also* DIS-ENOWNING (*Ent-eignis*).

**WITHIN-TIMENESS** (*Innerzeitlichkeit*). Heidegger uses the technical term within-timeness in *Being and Time* to identify **time** as we **experience** it through our encounter with **entities**, insofar as they become manifest within the **world**. Within-timeness presupposes the **origin** of **temporality** and indicates instead the temporal characteristics that specific entities exhibit, for example, succession. Within-timeness is the source of the common conception of time as a succession of “nows.” Thus, the everyday conception of time as succession is based on within-timeness, and conversely, the temporality of **everydayness** follows a linear or sequential pattern.

In Chapter Four, Division Two of *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes between original or **primordial time** and within-timeness. In contrast to the former, the latter is a derivative characterization of **temporal-**

**ity.** Within-timeness pertains to the chronology of events or movements of entities (and objects) that appear within the context of the **world**. In contrast to the elliptical direction of primordial time, the chronology of events and physical movements assumes a linear direction. Thus, the temporal *mode* of **making present**, which prioritizes the extantness of the “now,” establishes the basis of **within-timeness**. In his lecture-course from the winter semester of 1935/36, *The Question concerning the Thing*, Heidegger refers to the appearance of physical objects within the space-time continuum of the Newtonian laws of **nature** as “being-in-time” (*In-der Zeit-sein*). As **Immanuel Kant** outlined in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, the law of cause and effect legislates over the domain of physical objects appearing in time.

*See also* SPAN OF TIME (*Zeitraum*).

**WITH-WORLD (*Mitwelt*).** Heidegger juxtaposed the with-world to the **environment** and the **self-world** in his early **phenomenology of world**. In *Being and Time*, he described **being-there** as **being-with**. Being-there is never alone, but finds itself always already with others. Its **being-in-the-world** is codetermined by this being-with. The world is always already the world that **I** share with others. The other is there in this book as the gift of a friend. The other is here in the nightgown on the chair, because it was she who wore it. This shared world is the with-world.

In his lecture courses comprising *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* (1920–21), Heidegger specifically addresses the with-world a religious community of persons living the Christian faith.

**WORD (*Wort*).** In his reflection upon the nature of **language**, Heidegger agrees with Stefan George’s **saying** in his poem “Words” that where words are lacking, no **thing** may be. The **word** first bestows **presencing**, that is, **being**, by which things can appear as things. In this sense the word **lets be** a thing as a thing. Heidegger therefore names the word the bethinging (*Bedingnis*) of a thing. The “bethinging” power of the word is a **mystery**.

**WORD OF NIETZSCHE, THE: “GOD IS DEAD” (*Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’*).** Heidegger delivered this lecture, published in 1950 in *Holzwege*, on several occasions in 1943. It is basically a summary of his **interpretations** in his five lecture-courses on **Friedrich Nietzsche** from 1936 until 1940. They were later published in his famous two-volume book, *Nietzsche*. In this lecture, Heidegger understands Nietzsche’s thought as the **completion of metaphysics** from the perspective of the **history of being**.

The starting point of Heidegger’s interpretation is an explication of Nietzsche’s **word** “God is dead.” For Nietzsche, God is the Christian God, understood in a non-Christian way as the symbol of the supersensible **world** of

ideas and **values**. As the **highest entity**, God is the final **ground** of the **being** of all other entities. **Plato**'s supersensible world of ideas is separated from the merely apparent world of the senses and ordinary **life**. When Nietzsche claims that God is dead, he is really saying that the metaphysical world has lost its vitality. It has become a fable. We can no longer find our bearings in this world. It has become meaningless and means nothing at all. Nietzsche experiences the **nothing** at the heart of the metaphysical world and explains it as **nihilism**. Nihilism designates the basic **movement** in the history of Europe, which Heidegger identifies with the history of **metaphysics**.

Since the traditional interpretation of the **beingness** of entities has become meaningless, entities have also lost their value. This is the reason Nietzsche proclaims the devaluation of all values, on the one hand, and proposes a revaluation of values, on the other.

For Nietzsche, all being is becoming, all becoming is willing, and all willing is an expression of the **will to power**. Nietzsche interprets the beingness of entities as will to power. This **will** only wills its own becoming, and this never-ending becoming is an **eternal recurrence of the same**. With the will to power, Nietzsche has also found his principle of valuation. What is valuable is that which enhances the will to power.

For Heidegger, the **errancy** of nihilism lies in its taking the truth of entities as such as being. To overcome metaphysics, we must take a **step back** into its **origin**: the **enowning** of being. Nietzsche interprets the **essence** of entities as will to power and their **existence** as an eternal recurrence of the same. His thought is therefore still guided by the two fundamental **categories** of metaphysics, *existentia* and *essentia*. As Heidegger sees it, Nietzsche did not overcome metaphysics. His philosophy is the culmination of metaphysics, because he failed to ask the question of the original enactment of **truth** as **unconcealment** and the truth of self-revealing **concealment**, that is, the **truth of being**.

**WORDS (*Das Wort*)**. Heidegger delivered this lecture on various occasions in 1958 and 1959. It is a meditation on the deepest recesses of **language** by way of an **interpretation** of Stefan George's poem "Words." The starting point of Heidegger's interpretation is **Friedrich Hölderlin's experience** of the fugitive **gods**. Since the gods have fled, the **word** as it once was is withheld. In the **saying** of the poets, the gods no longer approach. This saying is the place of the conflict between **human beings** and the gods. Since the Greeks, the saying of these poetic words has long since lapsed into silence. This kind of saying must remain an enigma to us. Heidegger does not dare to attempt to bid the gods to return. He limits himself to an explication of the enigma of the word as it is told by **poetry** in George's poem.

In this poem, George is saying that where words are lacking, no **thing** may be. It is only the word at our disposal that endows the thing with **being**. In his interpretation of the poem, Heidegger tries to answer three questions: What are words that they have such power?, What are things that they need words in order to be?, and What does being mean, that it appears as an endowment, which is dedicated to the thing from the word?

The poet names **entities** in his poetry. Names are words that portray. They present what already is to **representational** thought. The word first bestows **presence**, that is, being in which things can appear as things. In this sense, the world allows a thing to be as a thing. Heidegger therefore names the word the bethinging (*Bedingnis*) of a thing. This bethinging power of the word is a **mystery**. The mysterious **coming to presence** of the word explains why the poet must renounce explaining what bethinging is. He/she may only name it in his/her poetic saying. As a mystery, the word remains remote, but as an experienced mystery, it dwells in **nearness**.

Heidegger next discovers that there is no word for the mystery of the word. Hence it must remain a mystery. The poet is not granted a word for the being of the word. There is no saying that could bring the being of language to language. The poet teaches us what is worthy of the **thinking** of poetic being. When we let ourselves be told what is worthy of thought, we are thinking. Poetry and thinking belong together. The saying of words is the gathering that first brings what comes to presence to its **presencing**. The Greek word for saying is *logos*, which is also the name of being, that is, the coming to presencing of entities. Saying and presencing, word and thing, thinking and being, belong together. This **belonging together** is what is worthy of thought and what is named as a mystery in poetry.

**WORK (Arbeit).** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explores the work-world in which **being-there** employs items of equipment, for example, a hammer, that are ready-to-hand. He characterizes work as a form of **comportment**, that is, a way in which the **self** uses the **ready-to-hand** within the context of **circumspective concern**. In this context, the work-world is primarily an extension of **everydayness**, of the routine in which each of us goes about his/her daily business.

In the 1930s, however, Heidegger defines work in a more fundamental way in connection with the **being** of being-there as **care**. That is, work becomes an activity in which the self is directly engaged, in such a way as to cast light upon or disclose more basically who we are as human beings. Rather than as a comportment pertaining primarily to the **self's mode of falling** and absorption into the work-world of equipment, work highlights being-there's encounter with and situatedness within **entities in the whole**. Thus, work is an activity or pursuit that can **reveal** the self in terms of its ownmost potentiality or striving for uniqueness.

Even the pursuit of knowledge or learning, as a **possibility** undertaken by a student, can be construed as a work activity, which is **situated** and **grounded** within the wider compass of **being-in-the-world**. Given this fundamental characterization, Heidegger suggests that work is a distinctive pursuit of human beings, by implicating a deeper devotion and commitment to the task. Insofar as **animals** are **world-poor**, he suggests that they are incapable of working in the sense in which human beings can.

Heidegger thereby leaves open the **possibility** of an owned or authentic dimension of work that cannot be found in either **Karl Marx's** economic characterization of labor or **Ernst Jünger's** profile of the complete mobilization of human beings for both economic and military purposes within the **enframing** of **machination**. Ultimately, the disclosive power of work in the fundamental way in which Heidegger describes yields to the creativity that is demonstrated in the *technè* of the work of **art** and the craftsmanship of **thinking**.

**WORKER, THE (*Der Arbeiter*)**. Heidegger sees in the worker an unfortunate form of human **nature** that was brought about by the **will to power**. **Ernst Jünger's** book *Der Arbeiter* opened his eyes to the supra-metaphysical **meaning** of the modern **world**. The form of the worker is only a form of **subjectivity** whose **essence** consists in the certitude of **calculative thinking**. As an **expression** of the will to power, it is the last form of the **truth** of **entities in the whole**. The worker and the limitless subjectivity of man's dominion over the **earth** consist in the unleashing of **machination** as the power to produce, consume, and manipulate. The worker is the extreme counterpart of the shepherd of being as the other **possibility** of **human being**.

**WORLD (*Welt*)**. World has two different but interconnected **meanings** in Heidegger's work. Initially, world is not the sum total of **entities**, but a preobjective, pretheoretical context of meaning already given in **being-there's** implicit **understanding** of **significance**. In his early lecture-course, Heidegger distinguishes among **environment**, **with-world**, and **self-world**, where the last disappears in *Being and Time*. The world is our **hermeneutic situation**—that is, the overall **horizon** of mutually implicated referential contexts, from the use of **equipment** to social life and from **tradition** to **language**—in terms of which everything gets explicated as meaningful to and for **human being**.

In light of the **turning**, the world reappears on a par with **being** as the open **expanse**, **clearing**, and **play of time-space**. Language as the **house of being** is its worlding. The work of art is the **strife** between the world that

opens and the **sheltering** of **earth** from which it arises. The inauguration of world is also glimpsed in the thinging of the **thing** that gathers earth and **sky**, **divinities** and **mortals**, into the **fourfold**.

**WORLD WORLDS** (*Welt weltet*). In Part III of *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger emphasizes that the **world** is not another **entity** that “is,” but rather the “world worlds.” In this way, he emphasizes that the world is distinguished from all entities, including the **whole** or ensemble of them, by providing instead the **horizon** within which everything can become manifest. By distinguishing the “worlding” of the world, Heidegger takes a key step in establishing the **ontological difference** or the **differentiation** between **being** and entities.

**WORLD-AROUND** (*Umwelt*). See ENVIRONMENT (*Umwelt*).

**WORLD-FORMING** (*weltbildend*). Through its **transcendence**, **being-there** actively **projects** the horizon of the **world** in which it is already **situated**. In *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger emphasizes that the potential to form a world belongs uniquely to being-there. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he contrasts the unique capability that **human beings** have as world-forming with **animals**, which lack that capacity or are **world-poor**.

**WORLDHOOD** (*Weltlichkeit*). The worldhood of the **world** is the referential totality of relations, signs, and involvements that constitutes a **structure** of **significance**. Worldhood is that which makes possible world as an encompassing **horizon** within which **being-there** can first engage in its various pursuits and activities. It is the unity of both the **projection** of the nexus of **involvements** and the horizon of the **self's possibilities**. As this referential **whole**, worldhood provides the structure for the disclosure of any specific world.

**WORLD-POOR** (*Weltarm*). In contrast to **human beings**, who **project** the **horizon** of the **world**, **animals** are lacking in this **world-forming** capacity. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger emphasizes that animals are world-poor insofar as they are restricted in their capabilities for interacting with the **environment**. Animals are captivated by their own sphere of interests and needs, rather than **thrown** into an **open expanse** of **possibilities**. Despite the diligence that animals show in reshaping aspects of their environment, Heidegger suggests that as world-poor, they lack the potential to **work** in the holistic manner in which human beings do.

**WORLDVIEW** (*Weltanschauung*). A worldview is the totality of the fundamental **values** and views of human **life** that are accepted in a certain culture or era as the **expression** of the **meaning** of **life**. The life-philosophy of the late 19th century attempted to develop such worldviews. In a similar vein, the **neo-Kantians** developed elaborate systems of all values of **human beings** in their **value-philosophy**. **Karl Jaspers** published a psychology of worldviews that was carefully studied by Heidegger. A worldview determines the way in which we resolve the antinomies of the **boundary situations** of life. In his early years, Heidegger agreed with life-philosophy that it is the task of **philosophy** to develop a worldview. Under the influence of **Edmund Husserl**'s critique of **historicism**, he would later opt for philosophy as **rigorous science**. In his 1919 lecture-course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews*, he denied explicitly that philosophy is or could be a worldview.

**WORRY** (*Bekümmern*). My life concerns me. It matters to me what happens to me. Heidegger discovered the importance of worry for human **life** during his study of **mysticism**. It is central to the development of his concept of **phenomenology**. We cannot disclose the **phenomenon** of worry theoretically. We can only relive or retrieve the worry of human **existence** in our own lives. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger replaces worry with **anxiety**. **Being-there** is **ontologically** distinguished from all other **entities** by the fact that, in its very **being**, its being is an issue for it. Being-there has a relationship to its own being and goes about its being. This is the **formal indication** of being-there's **understanding of being**.







**XIASMA.** *See* CHIASMA.



# Y

**YIELDING** (*das Gönnen*). Yielding is a **formal indication** of the relation between **world** and **things**. World yields things in their thinging, while things give bearing to the world.

**YOUTHFUL THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS** (*Theologische Jugendschriften*). Under this heading are collected the short essays, reviews, and poems Heidegger published between 1909 and 1915 as a student. The majority were published in the Roman-Catholic journal *Der Akademiker*. Under the influence of **Carl Braig**, Heidegger defends the eternal **truth** of Roman Catholicism against the attacks of modernism. The poems reflect his **existential** crisis after the abandonment of his study of **theology**. In his reviews, we find the first glimpses of things to come. It is remarkable that in this small body of writings we already find most of the important themes of his later work: the critique of **modernity** and **technology**, the attempt to rethink the philosophical **tradition**, the problem of **logic** and **language**, and a reflection on the nature of **art**.



# Z

**ZARATHUSTRA.** In Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, Zarathustra preaches the **overman** only insofar as he preaches the eternal recurrence. He proclaims both at once because they belong together. The overman as the **essence** of **human being** and the eternal recurrence as the **beingness** of **entities** belong together. At the end of the **history** of **metaphysics**, Zarathustra's **saying**, that **being** and human beings belong together, is the **retrieval** of the saying of **Parmenides**, that being and **thinking** are the same.

Zarathustra proclaims the need to "go under" as a prelude to making the ascent to the overman. As the protagonist in Nietzsche's epic work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he announces the death of **God** as a key **moment** in the process of both encountering **nihilism** and seeking to overcome it.

**ZOLLIKON SEMINARS** (*Zollikoner Seminare*). This series of seminars started on 8 September 1959, with a lecture by Heidegger at the University of Zurich. The text is now published as volume 89 of his **Complete Edition**. **Medard Boss**, who would become a close friend of Heidegger, organized them in 1959, 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1969. They usually took place at his house. What makes them especially interesting is that the participants were students of medicine and psychiatry. The seminars give the reader a glimpse of Heidegger at work addressing the practical side of human **ek-sistence**. The main topics of the seminars are **care** and **affect**, **being** and **time**, the **origin** of **science**, and **being-there** and medicine. This is one of the few texts in which Heidegger addresses the problem of "embodiment" or the **bodying-forth** of human **existence**.

This book also contains Boss's notes on his conversations with Heidegger and a large part of their correspondence.



## Appendix A

### *Heidegger's Writings, Lectures, Courses, and Seminars*

Author's note: The published volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) appear in **boldface** type. I have listed separately the different texts that were collected in section 3 of GA 60 under the title *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik*, since they were written at different times and for different goals. Heidegger collected these various notes in one file in August 1919 with a view to his planned winter semester 1919/20 lecture-course on mysticism, which he later canceled. This file bears the general title "Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens." The notes have partly been dated according to differences in Heidegger's handwriting. The titles of the seminars in *Zollikon* and *Le Thor* are based on the subject matter of the various seminars.

- 1910a            "*Per mortem and vitam* (Gedanken über Jörgensens *Lebenslüge und Lebenswahrheit*)." In *Der Akademiker* II. Jhg., Nr. 5, March 1910.
- 1910b            Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, *Autorität und Freiheit* [review]. In *Der Akademiker* II. Jhg., Nr. 7, May 1910.
- 1910c            "Abraham a Sankta Clara: Zur Enthüllung seines Denkmals in Kreeheinstetten am 15. August 1910." In **GA 13**.
- 1910d            Cüppers, Ad. Jos., *Versiegelte Lippen* [review]. In *Der Akademiker* III. Jhg., Nr. 2, December 1910.
- 1910e            "Sterbende Pracht" [poem]. In **GA 13**.
- 1911a            Jörgensen, Joh., *Das Reisebuch* [review]. In *Der Akademiker* III. Jhg., Nr. 3, January 1911.
- 1911b            "Zur philosophischen Orientierung für Akademiker." In *Der Akademiker* III. Jhg., Nr. 35, March 1911.
- 1911c            Zimmermann, O., S.J., *Das Gottesbedürfnis* [review]. In *Akademische Bonafitius-Korrespondenz*. 15 May 1911.
- 1911d            "Auf stillen Pfaden" [poem]. In *Der Akademiker* III. Jhg. Nr. 6, July 1911.

- 1911e “Julinacht” [poem]. In Ott 1993.
- 1911f “Ölbergstunden” [poem]. In **GA 13**.
- 1911g “Wir wollen warten” [poem]. In **GA 13**.
- 1912a “Religionpsychologie und Unterbewußtsein.” In *Der Akademiker* IV. Jhg., Nr. 5, March 1912.
- 1912b Gretdt, Jos., O.S., *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*. Vol. I, *Logica et Philosophia Naturalis*. Ed. II. [review]. In *Der Akademiker* IV. Jhg., Nr. 5, March 1912.
- 1912c “Das Realitätproblem in der modernen Philosophie.” In *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft* 25, 1912; in **GA 1**.
- 1912d “Neure Forschungen über Logik.” In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 38, 1912; in **GA 1**.
- 1912e Brief an Josef Sauer, excerpt of letter. In Ott 1993.
- 1913a Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein Kritischpositiver Beitrag zur Logik [“inaugural dissertation”]. Leipzig, 1914. In **GA 1**.
- 1913b Kants briefe in Auswahl [review]. In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 39, 1913. In **GA 1**.
- 1913c *Bibliothek wertvoller Novellen und Erzählungen* [review]. In *Der Akademiker* V. Jhg., Nr. 3, January 1913.
- 1913d Nikolai von Bubnoff, *Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit* [review]. In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 39, 1913; in **GA 1**.
- 1913e Lebenslauf [curriculum vita]. In *Die Lehre vom Urteil m Psychologismus* (1913a) and Sheehan 1988.
- 1914a Franz Brentano, *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* [review]. In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, 1914.
- 1914b Charles Sentroul, *Kant und Aristoteles* [review]. In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, 1914; in **GA 1**.
- 1914c *Kant-Laienbrevier* [review]. In *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, 1914; in **GA 1**.



- 1915a *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* [qualifying dissertation]. Tübingen, 1916. In **GA 1**.
- 1915b “Frage und Urteil” [lecture at Freiburg in Rickert’s seminar]. In **GA 80.1**.
- 1915c W. Wundt, *Probleme der Völkerpsychologie* [review]. In *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 28, 1.
- 1915d “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft” [test-lecture at Freiburg]. In *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 161, 1916. In **GA 1**.
- 1915e “Trost” [poem]. In Heiland März 1915.
- 1915f “Das Kriegstridium in Meßkirch.” In *Heuberger Volksblatt* Jhg. 17, 13, January 1915.
- 1915g Lebenslauf [curriculum vita]. In Ott 1993 and Sheehan 1988.
- 1915/16a Die Grundlinien der antiken und scholastischen Philosophie [course].
- 1915/16b Über Kant, *Prolegomena* [seminar].
- 1916a “Abendgang auf der Reichenau” [poem]. In **GA 13**.
- 1916b Der deutsche Idealismus [course].
- 1916c Übungen über Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles (with E. Krebs) [seminar].
- 1916/17 Grundfragen der Logik [course].
- 1917a “Selbstanzeige: *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*.” In *Kant-Studien* 21, 1917. In **GA 1**.
- 1917b Brief an Grabmann [letter]. In *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 87, 1980.
- 1917c “Über das Wesen der Religion” [lecture at Freiburg, on Schleiermacher’s second speech “On Religion”]. In **GA 60**, pp. 319–322.
- 1917d Das religiöse Apriori. In **GA 60**, pp. 312–315.
- 1917e Irrationalität bei Meister Eckhart. In **GA 60**, pp. 315–318.
- 1917f Religiöse Phänomene. In **GA 60**, p. 312.
- 1917g Phänomenologie des religiösen Erlebnisses und der Religion. In **GA 60**, pp. 322–324.

- 1918a Zu: den Sermones Bernardi in Canticum canticorum (Serm. III). In **GA 60**, pp. 334–336 until line 2.
- 1918b Zu: Theresia von Jesu, *Die Seelenburg*. In **GA 60**, pp. 336–337.
- 1918c Zu: Adolf Reinach, *Das Absolute*. In **GA 60**, pp. 324–327.
- 1918d Das Heilige. In **GA 60**, pp. 332–334.
- 1918e Glaube. In **GA 60**, p. 329.
- 1918f Hegels ursprüngliche, früheste Stellung zur Religion—und Konsequenzen. In **GA 60**, p. 328.
- 1918g Zu: Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube—und religionsphänomenologie überhaupt*. In **GA 60**, pp. 330–332.
- 1918h Probleme. In **GA 60**, p. 328.
- 1919a Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem [course]. In **GA 56/56**.
- 1919b Phänomenologie und transzendente Wertphilosophie [course]. In **GA 56/57**.
- 1919c Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums [course]. In **GA 56/56**.
- 1919d Einführung in die Phänomenologie im Anschluß an Descartes, *Meditationes* [seminar]. In **GA 56/57**.
- 1919e Brief an Englebert Krebs [letter]. In Ott 1993.
- 1919f Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik. In **GA 60**, pp. 303–306.
- 1919g Mystik im Mittelalter. In **GA 60**, pp. 306–397.
- 1919h Mystik (Direktiven). In **GA 60**, p. 308.
- 1919i Aufbau (Ansätze). In **GA 60**, p. 309.
- 1919j Glaube und Wissen. In **GA 60**, p. 310.
- 1919k Irrationalismus. In **GA 60**, p. 311.
- 1919l Historische Vorgegebenheit und Wesensfindung. In **GA 60**, pp. 311–312.
- 1919m Frömmigkeit und Glaube. In **GA 60**, pp. 329–330.
- 1919/20a Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie [course]. **GA 58**.

- 1919/20b Übungen im Anschluß an Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie [seminar].
- 1919/20c Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik [course, not taught]. (The notes listed above as from 1919f–m belong to this course.)
- 1919/20d “Über Oswald Spengler” [lecture at Wiesbaden].
- 1920a Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung [course]. **GA 59.**
- 1920b Kolloquium in Anschluß an die Vorlesung [seminar].
- 1920/21a Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion [course]. **GA 60.**
- 1920/21b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Descartes, *Meditationes* [seminar].
- 1921a Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus [course]. In **GA 60.**
- 1921b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Aristoteles, *De Anima* [seminar].
- 1921c Brief an Karl Löwith [letter]. In Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1992.
- 1919–21 Aamerkungen zu Karl Jaspers *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* [review]. In **GA 9.**
- 1921/22a Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristotles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung [course]. **GA 61.**
- 1921/22b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen II* [seminar].
- 1922a Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles: Ontologie und Logik [course]. **GA 62.**
- 1922b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen II, 2. Untersuchung* [seminar].
- 1922c *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation.* In Dilthey-Jahrbuch 6, 1989.

- 1922/23a      Übungen über: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles (*Ethica Nicomachea VI; De Anima; Metaphysica VII*) [seminar].
- 1923a      Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität [course]. **GA 63**.
- 1923b      Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* [seminar].
- 1923c      Kolloquium über die theologischen Grundlagen von Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, nach ausgewählte Texten, für Fortgeschrittene (with Ebbinghaus) [seminar].
- 1923d      Übungen über: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles Fortsetzung [seminar].
- 1923e      “Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologische Forschung” [lecture at Hamburg].
- 1923/24a      Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung [course]. **GA 17**.
- 1923/24b      Phänomenologische Übung für Fortgeschrittene: Aristoteles, *Physica B* [seminar].
- 1924a      Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie [course]. **GA 18**.
- 1924b      Fortgeschritten: Die Hochscholastik und Aristoteles (Thomas, *De ente et essentia*; Cajetan, *De nominum analogia*) [seminar].
- 1924c      “Der Begriff der Zeit” [lecture at Marburg]. Tübingen, 1989. In **GA 64**.
- 1924d      “Dasein und Wahrsein (nach Aristoteles)” [lecture at Elberfeld-Barmern, Cologne, Dortmund]. In **GA 80.1**.
- 1924e      Der Begriff der Zeit [review of *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und Graf Yorck von Wartenburg*]. In **GA 64**.
- 1924f      “Das Problem der Sünde bei Luther” [lecture in Bultmann’s seminar]. In Jaspert 1996.
- 1924/25a      Interpretation platonischer Dialogue (*Sophistès, Philèbos*) [course]. **GA 19**.
- 1924/25b      Übungen zur Ontologie des Mittelalters (Thomas, *De ente et essential, Summa contra gentiles*) [seminar].

- 1925a Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs: Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Geschichte und Nature [course]. **GA 20.**
- 1925b Anfangsübungen im Anschluß an Descartes, *Meditationes* [seminar].
- 1925c “Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung.” 10 Vorträge (held in Kassel from 16–21, 1925) [lectures at Kassel]. In *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 8, 1992/93.
- 1925/26a Logik [course]. **GA 21.**
- 1925/26b Anfänger: Phänomenologische Übungen (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) [seminar].
- 1925/26c Fortgeschrittene: Phänomenologische Übungen (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I. Buch*) [seminar].
- 1926a Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. **GA 22.**
- 1926b Übungen über Geschichte und historische Erkenntnis im Anschluß an J. B. Droysen, Grundriß an J. B. Droysen, Grundriß der Historik [seminar].
- 1926c “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Marburg].
- 1926d “Begriff und Entwicklung der phänomenologischen Forschung” [lecture at Marburg]. In **GA 80.1.**
- 1926/27a Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant [course]. **GA 23.**
- 1926/27b Übungen in Anschluß an die Vorlesung [seminar].
- 1927a Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie [course]. **GA 24.**
- 1927b Fortgeschrittene: Die Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik [seminar].
- 1927c Luthers *Galater* Kommentar (with Bultmann) [seminar].
- 1927d *Sein und Zeit*. In *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* VIII, Halle, 1927. **GA 2.**
- 1927e “Phänomenologie und Theologie” [lecture at Tübingen]. In **GA 9.**

- 1927f “Phänomenologie und Theologie. I. Teil: Die nicht-philosophischen als positive Wissenschaften und die Philosophie als transzendente Wissenschaft” [lecture at Tübingen]. In GA 80.1.
- 1927g “Kants Lehre vom Schematismus und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins” [lecture at Cologne].
- 1927h “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhls seit 1866.” In *Die Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 1927–1927*. In **GA 3**.
- 1927i Brief an Karl Löwith [letter]. In Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1990.
- 1925–27 “Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität.” In *Heidegger Studies*, 14, 1998.
- 1927/28a Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [course]. **GA 25**.
- 1927/28b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger über Begriff und Begriffsbildung [seminar].
- 1927/28c Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene (Schelling, *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*) [seminar].
- 1928a Logik [course]. **GA 26**.
- 1928b “Vorbemerkungen des Herausgebers.” In Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung IX*, 1928.
- 1928c Phänomenologische Übungen zu Aristoteles, *Physica III* [seminar].
- 1928d “Theologie und Philosophie” [lecture at Marburg].
- 1928e “Zum Thema Kant und die Metaphysik” [lecture at Riga].
- 1928f Gutachten zur Habilitation von Karl Löwith. In Löwith 1981.
- 1928g Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. 2. Teil: *Das mythische Denken* [review]. In **GA 3**.
- 1928h Andenken an Max Scheler. (In memoriam, for Max Scheler). In **GA 26**.
- 1928i Brief an Matthäus Lang [letter]. In Ott 1993.

- 1928/29a Einleitung in die Philosophie [course]. **GA 27**.
- 1928/29b Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger: Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* [seminar].
- 1928/29c Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Die ontologischen Grundsätze und das Kategorienproblem [seminar].
- 1929a *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. In **GA 3**.
- 1929b *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. In *Festschrift für Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag*. Halle, 1929. In **GA 9**.
- 1929c “Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins” [lecture at Frankfurt]. In **GA 80**.
- 1929d “Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik” [lecture at Davos]. In **GA 3**.
- 1929e Disputation in einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft zwischen Heidegger und Cassirer. In **GA 3**.
- 1929f “Edmund Husserl zum siebzigsten Geburtstag” [speech].
- 1929g Der deutsche Idealismus und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart [course]. In **GA 28**.
- 1929h Einführung in das akademische Studium [course]. In **GA 28**.
- 1929i Anfänger: Über Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluß an die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels “Vorrede” zur *Phänomenologie des Geistes*) [seminar].
- 1929j Fortgeschrittene: Vom Wesen des Lebens mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aristoteles, *De Anima*, *De Animalium Motione* und *De Animalium Incessu* [seminar].
- 1929k “Was ist Metaphysik?” [inaugural lecture at Freiburg]. Bonn, 1929. In **GA 9**.
- 1929l “Die heutige Problemlage der Philosophie” [lecture at Karlsruhe and Amsterdam]. In **GA 80**.
- 1929m Brief an Victor Schworerer [letter]. In “Un Sieg: Die Verjudung des deutschen Geistes,” *Die Zeit*, 22 December 1989.
- 1929/30a Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit—Vereinzelung [course]. **GA 29/30**.

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- 1929/30b “Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung: *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*.” In *Heidegger Studies* 7, 1991.
- 1929/30c Für mittlere und höhere Semester: Über Gewißheit und Wahrheit im Anschluß an Descartes und Leibniz [seminar].
- 1930a 1. “Die Heutige Problemlage der Philosophie.” 2. “Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik” [lectures at Amsterdam]. In **GA 80.1**.
- 1930b Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie [course]. **GA 31**.
- 1930c Anfänger: Ausgewählte Kapitel aus Kants *Kritik der Urteilskraft* [seminar].
- 1930d “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Karlsruhe]. In *NzH*.
- 1930e “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Beuron]. Revised draft in **GA 9**.
- 1930f “Augustinus: Quid est tempus?” [lecture at Beuron]. In **GA 80.1**.
- 1930g “Philosophieren und Glauben: Das Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Marburg].
- 1930h “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Freiburg]. Revised draft in **GA 9**.
- 1930i Vorrede zur japanischen Übersetzung von *Was ist Metaphysik?*
- 1930/31a Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [course]. **GA 32**.
- 1930/31b Augustinus, *Confessiones XI* [seminar].
- 1930/31c Fortgeschrittene: Platons *Parmenides* [seminar]
- 1931a Interpretationen aus der antiken Philosophie [course]. **GA 33**.
- 1931b Anfänger: Kant, Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik [seminar].
- 1931c “Gutachten über Hendrik Josephus Pos,” in J. Aler (ed.), *Martin Heidegger 1889–1976: Filosofische Weerklank in de Lage Landen*. Amsterdam.
- 1931/32a Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [course]. **GA 34**.



- 1931/31b Übungen über Kants Kritik der reinen und praktischen Vernunft (Transzendente Dialektik) [seminar].
- 1931/32c Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuches. In **GA 3**.
- 1931/32d “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.” In *Heidegger Studies* 5, 1989.
- 1932a Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) [course]. **GA 35**.
- 1932b Mittelstufe: Platon, *Phaidros* [seminar].
- 1932c “Der Satz vom Widerspruch” [lecture at Freiburg].
- 1932d “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” [lecture at Dresden]. Revised draft in **GA 9**.
- 1933a “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität” [lecture]. Breslau, 1933.
- 1933b “Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz” [lecture]. In **GA 13**.
- 1933c “Schlageter” [speech]. In *NzH*.
- 1933d “Arbeitsdienst (Arbeitsdienst und Universität).” In *NzH*.
- 1933e “Die Universität im neuen Reich” [lecture]. In *NzH*. Gelehrten und einem Weisen; Der Lehrer trifft den Türmer an der Tür zum Turmaufgang; Abendgespräch in einem Kriegsgefangenenlager in Rußland zwischen einem Jüngern und einem Älteren. **GA 77**.
- 1933f “Nationalsozialistische Wissensschulung” [speech]. In *NzH*.
- 1933g “Aufruf an die Deutschen Studenten” [speech]. In *MHDR*.
- 1933h “Deutsche Männer und Frauen (Wahlaufruf von 10.11.1933).” In *NzH*.
- 1933i “Bekanntnis zu Adolf Hitler und dem nationalsozialistischen Staat. Ansprache bei der Wahlkundgebung der deutschen Wissenschaft am 11 November 1933” [speech]. In *NzH*.
- 1933j “Der deutsche Student als Arbeiter” [speech]. In *NzH*.
- 1933k “Die Universität im nationalsozialistischen Staat” [lecture]. In *MHDR*.

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- 1933l "Ruf an die Gebildeten der Welt." Schreiben Heideggers an die Dekane. In *MHDR*.
- 1933m Die Grundfrage der Philosophie [course]. In **GA 36/37**.
- 1933n Oberstufe: Der Satz vom Widerspruch [seminar].
- 1933o Unterstufe: Der Begriff der Wissenschaft [seminar].
- 1933p Brief an Carl Schmitt [letter]. In *Telos* 72, 1987.
- 1933q "Gutachten über Richard Höningdwalds," in W. Schmied-Kowarzik. *Richard H. Höningdwalds Philosophie der Pädagogik*. Würzburg, 1995.
- 1933/34a Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [course]. In **GA 36/37**.
- 1933/34b Über Wesen und Begriff von Natur, Geschichte und Staat [seminar].
- 1934a "Das Ruf zum Arbeitsdiensts" [speech]. In *NzH*.
- 1934b "Mahnwort an das allemanische Volk." In *NzH*.
- 1934c Logik [course]. **GA 38**.
- 1934d Hegels *Jenenser Realphilosophie* [seminar].
- 1934e Hauptstücke aus Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [seminar].
- 1934f "Zur Überwindung der Ästhetik: Zu 'Ursprung des Kunstwerks.'" In *Heidegger Studies* 6, 1990.
- 1934g "Die gegenwärtigen Lage und die künftige Aufgabe der deutschen Philosophie" [lecture at Konstanz].
- 1934/35a Hölderlins Hymnen *Germanien* und *Der Rhein* [course]. **GA 39**.
- 1934/35b Oberstufe: Hegel, Über den Staat (with E. Wolf) [seminar].
- 1934/35c Oberstufe: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [seminar].
- 1935a Einführung in die Metaphysik [course]. **GA 40**.
- 1935b Oberstufe: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [seminar].
- 1935c "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" [lecture at Freiburg]. In **GA 5**.
- 1935/36a Grundfragen der Metaphysik. Published in 1962 under the title *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* [course]. **GA 41**.

- 1935/36b Mittelstufe: Leibnizens Weltbegriff und der Deutsche Idealismus [seminar].
- 1935/36c Oberstufe: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [seminar].
- 1935/36d Zur Überwindung der Ästhetik in der Frage nach der Kunst (with Bauch) [colloquium].
- 1936a “Hölderlin und die Wesen der Dichtung” [lecture at Rome]. In *Das Innere Reich*, 1936; in **GA 4**.
- 1936b Schelling: *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* [course]. Tübingen, 1971. **GA 42**.
- 1936c Oberstufe: Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* [seminar].
- 1936d “Das Dasein und der Einzelne” [lecture at Zurich].
- 1936e “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” [lecture at Freiburg]. In **GA 5**.
- 1936f “Europa and die deutsche Philosophie” [lecture at Rome]. In H. Gander, *Europa und die Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main, 1993, and **GA 80.2**.
- 1936g “Die Unumgänglichkeit des Da-seins (‘Die Not’) and Die Kunst in ihrer Notwendigkeit (‘Die bewirkende Besinnung’).” In *Heidegger Studies* 8, 1992.
- 1936/37a Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht [course]. **GA 43**.
- 1936/37b Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst. In **GA 6.1** (Nietzsche I) [course].
- 1936/37c Unterstufe: Ausgewählte Stücke aus Schillers philosophischen Schriften über die Kunst [seminar].
- 1937a *Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*. Munich, 1937 (1936a).
- 1937b “Wege zur Aussprache,” In *Jahrbuch der Stadt Freiburg*, Band 1. *Allemannland*. In **GA 13**.
- 1937c Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken [course]. **GA 44**.
- 1937d Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen. In **GA 6.1** (*Nietzsche I*).
- 1937e Übung: Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung [seminar].
- 1937f Brief an Jean Wahl [letter]. In *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 37, 1937, p. 193.

- 1937g Brief an Karl Löwith [letter]. In Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1990.
- 1937h Prologue de l'auteur; in the French translation of *Was ist Metaphysik?*
- 1937i "Das Sein (Ereignis)." In *Heidegger Studies* 15, 1999.
- 1937/38a Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählter "Probleme" der "Logik" [course]. **GA 45.**
- 1937/38b Die metaphysische Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens [seminar].
- 1937/38c Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft. In Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1991.
- 1936/38d Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). In **GA 65.**
- 1938 "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" [lecture at Freiburg]. In **GA 5.**
- 1938/39a Einleitung in die Philosophie: Nietzsches II Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung [course]. **GA 46.**
- 1938/39b Unterstufe: Die philosophische und wissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung [seminar].
- 1938/39c Besinnung. **GA 66.**
- 1938/39d Die Negativität: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz in der Negativität (1938/39, 1941). In **GA 68.**
- 1938/39e Die Überwindung der Metaphysik. In **GA 67.**
- 1939a "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις." In *II Pensiero*. Vol. II, Nr. 2. and 3, Milan-Varese, 1958. In **GA 9.**
- 1939b Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis [course]. **GA 47.**
- 1939c Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis. In **GA 6.1 (Nietzsche I).**
- 1939d Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Wille zur Macht. In **GA 6.2 (Nietzsche II).**
- 1939e Oberstufe: Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes; Zu Herders Abhandlung über der Ursprung der Sprache [seminar]. **GA 85.**
- 1939f "Von der Grundbestimmung des Wissens" [lecture at Freiburg]. In **GA 80.**

- 1939g *Koivón*: Aus der Geschichte des Seyns. In **GA 69**.
- 1939/40a ““Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .” [lecture]. In **GA 4**.
- 1939/40b Mittel- und Oberstufe: Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte [seminar].
- 1938/40c Die Geschichte des Seyns. In **GA 69**.
- 1940a Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus [course]. **GA 48**.
- 1940b Der europäische Nihilismus. In **GA 6.2** (*Nietzsche II*).
- 1940c Nietzsches Metaphysik. In **GA 6.2** (*Nietzsche II*).
- 1940d Über die φύσις Aristoteles [seminar].
- 1940e Von Wesen der Wahrheit [seminar].
- 1940f “Der Spruch des Parmenides” [lecture at Freiburg]. In **GA 80.2**.
- 1940/41 Fortgeschrittene: Leibniz, *Monadologie* [seminar].
- 1941a Winke [Privatdruck]. In **GA 13**.
- 1941b “Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .” Halle, 1941 (1939/40a).
- 1941c Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus: Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängende Gegenstände* (1809) [course]. **GA 49**.
- 1941d Übungen über den Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie [seminar].
- 1941e Grundbegriffe [course]. **GA 51**.
- 1941f Anfänger: Kant, Prolegomena [seminar].
- 1941g Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins. In **GA 6.2** (*Nietzsche II*).
- 1941h Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik. In **GA 6.2** (*Nietzsche II*).
- 1941i Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik. In **GA 6.2** (*Nietzsche II*).
- 1941j Ausgewählte Stücke aus den Manuskripten zum Schelling-Seminar SS 1941. In *Schellings Abhandlung: Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*.
- 1941k “Zur Geschichte des Existenzbegriffs” [lecture at Freiburg].

- 19411 *Über den Anfang*. **GA 70**.
- 1941/42a Nietzsches Metaphysik [course, not taught]. **GA 50**.
- 1941/42b Hölderlins Hymnen [course]. **GA 52**.
- 1941/42c Anfänger: Schiller: Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen [seminar].
- 1941-42d Fortgeschrittene: Platons *Siebenter Brief* [seminar].
- 1941/42e *Das Ereignis*. **GA 71**.
- 1942a Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. In *Geistige Überlieferung: Das Zweite Jahrbuch*, Berlin, 1942. In **GA 9**.
- 1942b Hölderlins Hymnen [course]. **GA 53**.
- 1942c Anfänger: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik Kants [seminar].
- 1942d Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* und Aristoteles, *Metaphysik IX, 10 und VI* [seminar].
- 1942e Erläuterung der “Einleitung” zu Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. In **GA 68**.
- 1942f Brief an Max Kommerell [letter]. In M. Kommerell, *Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1919–1944*. Freiburg, 1967.
- 1942/43a Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung. In **GA 5**.
- 1942/43b Parmenides und Heraklit [course]. **GA 54**.
- 1942/43c Fortgeschrittene: Fortsetzung von 1942d.
- 1941/43d Auszug aus den Seminar-Notizen 1941–43 [seminars]. In *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*.
- 1943a *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930e). Frankfurt am Main, 1943. In **GA 9**.
- 1943b Nachwort zu: Was ist Metaphysik? In **GA 9**.
- 1943c “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’” [lecture]. In **GA 5**.
- 1943d “Andenken.” In P. Kluckhohn (ed.), *Tübingen Gedenkschrift zum hundersten Todestag Hölderlins*. Tübingen, 1943. In **GA 4**.
- 1943e “Heimkunft/An die Verwandten” [lecture]. In **GA 4**.
- 1943f *Alêtheia* (Heraklit, Fragment 16). In *VA*. **GA 7**.

- 1943g Chorlied aus der Antigone des Sophokles [Privatdruck]. In **GA 13**.
- 1943h Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit) [course]. **GA 55**.
- 1943i Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [seminar].
- 1943/44a Besinnung auf unser Wesen. Frankfurt am Main, 1994 (Jahresgabe der Heidegger-Gesellschaft).
- 1943/44b Die Herkunft der Gottheit. Frankfurt am Main, 1997 (Jahresgabe der Heidegger-Gesellschaft).
- 1944a Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. Frankfurt am Main, 1944. **GA 4**.
- 1944b Vorbemerkung zur Wiederholung der Rede. In **GA 4**.
- 1944c Logik: Heraklits Lehre vom Logos [course]. **GA 55**.
- 1944d Fortgeschrittene: Aristoteles, *Metaphysik IV* [seminar].
- 1944e Das Wort: Die Bedeutung der Wörter. In Papenfuss & Pöggeler 1992.
- 1944f Die Stege des Anfangs. **GA 72**.
- 1944/45a Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken. In **GA 13**.
- 1944/45b Einleitung in die Philosophie-Denken und Dichten [course]. **GA 50**.
- 1944/45c Leibniz, *Die 24 Thesen* [seminar].
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## Appendix B

### *German–English Glossary*

Abgeschlossenheit	apartness
Abgrund	abground, abyss
Absturz	downward spiral
Abwesenheit	absence
Abwesung	absencing
Affekt	affect
Alltäglichkeit	everydayness
Als-Struktur	as-structure
Andenken	commemorative thinking, remembrance
andere Anfang, der	other beginning
aneignen	appropriate
Anfang	beginning
Anfängliche, das	inceptual, the
anfängliche Denken	inceptual thinking
Angst	anxiety
Anklang	echo
Anschauung	intuition
Anspruch	address, claim
Anthropomorphismus	anthropomorphism
Anwesenheit	presence
apophantisches Als	apophantic as
Apriori, das	a priori, the
Arbeiter	worker
Armut	poverty
Aufenthalte	sojourns
Aufriß	design

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Augenblick	moment of vision
Ausdruck	expression
Auseinandersetzung	setting-in-opposition
Ausgelegtheit	interpretedness
Auslegung	interpretation
Ausrichtung	directionality
Aussage	assertion
aussein auf	being-out-for
Austrag	perdurance
bauen	building
Bedeutsamkeit	significance, meaningfulness
Bedeutung	signification, meaning
bedingen	determine
Bedingnis	bethinging
Befindlichkeit	disposedness, disposition
Begegnen-lassen	letting encounter
Begründung	founding
Behalten	retain
Bekümmern	worry
Bergung	sheltering
Besinnung	mindfulness
Besorgen	concern
Bestand	standing-reserve
Betroffenheit	affectedness
Bewandtnis	involvement
Bewegung	movement
Bewußtsein	consciousness
Bezug	relation
Bezugssinn	relational sense
Boden-nehmen	taking-ground
Bodenständigkeit	autochthony
Böse, das	evil

Brauch	use, handling
Christentum	Christianity
Christlichkeit	Christianness
Dasein	being-there
Denken	thinking
Denkweg	path of thinking
Destruktion	destruction
Dichtung	poetry
Ding	thing
Ding an sich	thing in itself
Durchschnittlichkeit	averageness
Eigen	own
Eigentlichkeit	ownedness, authenticity
Eigentum	ownhood
Eignung	owning
Einbildungskraft	imagination
Einfalt	simplicity
Einräumen	make room
Einzigkeit	individuality, uniqueness
Ek-sistenz	Ek-sistence
Ekstase	ecstasis
elementarste Worte	elemental words
Empfängnis	acceptance
Endlichkeit	finitude
Entbergen	reveal
Entbergung	revelment
entdecken	uncover
Entdecktheit	discovery
Ent-eignis	dis-enowning
Entfernung	de-serverance, de-distancy
Entgötterung	de-godding
Entleben	unliving

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Entscheidung	decision
Entschlossenheit	resoluteness
Entschluß	resolution
Entweltlichung	unworlding
Entwerfen	projecting-opening
Entwurf	projection
Entwurf des Seins	projecting open of being
Entwurzelung	uprooted
eräugen	to place before the eyes
Eräugnung, die	placing before the eyes, the
Erde	earth
ereignen	to make one's own
Ereignis	enowning, appropriation
Ereignisdenken	thinking of enowning
Ereignung	enownment
Erfahrung	experience
Erinnerung	recollection, remembrance
Erkenntnis	epistemology or theory of knowledge
Erklärung	explanation
Erlebnis	lived experience
Erschlossenheit	disclosededness
Erstaunen	astonishment
Es gibt	it gives, there is
Es gilt	it holds, it validates, it has validity
Es soll	it ought
Es weltet	it is worlding
Es wertet	it is valuing
Eschatologie	eschatology
Ethik	ethics
Existenz	existence
Existenzial	existential [adjective]
Existenzial	existential [noun]

existenziale Analytik	existential analysis
Existenzialismus	existentialism
Existenzialität	existentiality
Existenziell	existentiell
Ewigkeit	eternity
faktische Lebenserfahrung	factic life experience
faktische Zerstretheit	factic dispersion
Faktizität	facticity
Faktum	fact
Feldweg, der	pathway, the
Ferne	farness
formale Anzeige	formal indication
Frage	question
Fragestellung	formulation of the question
Freiheit	freedom
Frömmigkeit	piety
Fuge	jointure, arrangement, pattern of arrangement
Fuge des Seins	jointure of being
Fügung	joining, arranging
Führerschaft	leadership
Fundamentalontologie	fundamental ontology
Furcht	fear
Fürsorge	solicitude
ganz Andere, das	wholly other
Ganzheit	whole
Gefahr	danger
Gegebenheit	givenness
Gegend	region
Gegenständigkeit	objectness
Gegenständlichkeit	objectivity
Gegenwart	present
Gegenwärtigen	make present

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Gegnet	expanse
Gehaltssinn	content sense
Geheimnis	mystery
Geheiß	summons
Geist	spirit
Gelassenheit	releasement
Geläut der Stille, das	ringing of stillness
Geltung	validity
Generation	generation
Gerede	idle talk
Gesamtausgabe	Complete Edition
geschehen	come to pass
Geschichte	history
Geschichtlichkeit	historicality
Geschick	destiny
Gesetz	law
Gestell	enframing
Gestimmtheit	attunement
Geviert	fourfold
Gewalt	violence
gewärtigen	awaiting
Gewesenheit	having been
Gewissen	conscience
Gewissensruf	call of conscience
Geworfenheit	throwiness
Glaube	faith
gleichursprünglich	equiprimordial
gönnen	yield
Gott	God
Götter	gods
Götterung	godding
Göttlichen, die	divinities, the



Grammatik	grammar
Grenzsituation	boundary situation
griechische Philosophie	Greek philosophy
Grund	ground
Grundfrage	basic question
Grundstimmung	grounding attunement
Gründung	grounding
Grundworte	grounding words
Güte	good, goodness
Haus des Seins, das	house of being, the
Heil	wholesome
Heilige, das	holy, the
Heimat	homeland
Heimweh	homesickness
Held	hero
Hermeneutik	hermeneutics
hermeneutische Indikation	hermeneutic indication
hermeneutische Situation	hermeneutic situation
hermeneutischer Zirkel	hermeneutic circle
Himmel	sky
Hinsehen	inspection
Hirt des Seins	shepherd of being
Historie	historiology
Historismus	historicism
Holzwege	forest trails
hören	hearing
Horizont	horizon
horizontales Schema	horizontal schema
Huld	grace
Humanismus	humanism
Ich, das	I, the
Incubationszeit	incubation period

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In-der-Welt-Sein	being-in-the-world
Innerzeitlichkeit	within-timeness
In-Sein	being-in
Inständigkeit	inabiding
Intentionalität	intentionality
Interpretation	interpretation
Irre	errancy
Jemeinigkeit	mineness
Jeweiligkeit	particular whileness
kategoriale Anschauung	categorial intuition
Kategorie	category
Kehre	turning
Kehre im Ereignis, die	turning in enowning, the
Kundschaft	announcing of something
Kunst	art
Langeweile	boredom
Leben	life
Lebensphilosophie	life philosophy
Lebenswelt	lifeworld
Leiben	bodying forth
Leitfrage	guiding question
letzte Gott, der	last god, the
lichten	come-to-light
Lichtung	clearing
Logik	logic
Machenschaft	machination
Man, das	they, the
mathematischer Entwurf	mathematical project
Mensch	human being
Metaphysik	metaphysics
Metontologie	metontology
Mitdasein	being-with (others)

Mitsein	being-with
Mitteilung	communication
Mitwelt	with-world
Modus	mode
Möglichkeit	possibility
Mut	courage
Mystik	mysticism
Nähe	nearness
Nationalsozialismus	National Socialism
Natur	nature
Neugier	curiosity
Neukantianismus	neo-Kantianism
Neuzeit	modernity
Nichten, das	nihilation
Nichtigkeit	nullity
Nichts	nothing
Nihilismus	nihilism
Not	distress, need
Offenbarkeit	manifestness
Offene, das	the open
Offenständigkeit	openness
Öffentlichkeit	publicness
Ontisch	ontic
ontische Wissenschaft	ontic science
Ontologie	ontology
Ontologisch	ontological
ontologische Differenz	ontological difference
Onto-theo-logie	onto-theo-logy
Opfer	sacrifice
Ort	location, place
Phänomen	phenomenon
Phänomenologie	phenomenology

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Philosophie	philosophy
philosophische Anthropologie	philosophical anthropology
Platonismus	Platonism
Präsenz	presentness
Psychologismus	psychologism
Raum	space
Räumen	make space
Räumlichkeit	spatiality
Realität	reality
rechnendes Denken	calculative thinking
Rede	discourse
Reduktion	reduction
Reflexion	reflection
Reflexionsphilosophie	philosophy of reflection
Rektorat	rectorate
Religion	religion
Rückbezug	retro-relation
Rückkehrerschaft	returnership
Ruhe	tranquillity
Ruinanz	ruinance
Sache	matter or topic
Sache des Denkens	matter of thought
Sage	saying
Schema	schema
Schematismus	schematism
Schenkung	gift
Scheu	awe
Schicksal	fate
Schritt zurück	step back
Schuld	guilt
Schweigen	keep silent

Seiende, das	entity
Seiende im Ganzen, das	entities in the whole
Seiendheit	beingness
Sein	being
Sein des Seienden	being of entities
sein lassen	letting be
Seinkönnen	can-be, potentiality for being
Sein-lassen	letting-be
Seinsfrage	question of being
Seinsgeschichte	history of being
seinsgeschichtliches Denken	being-historical thinking
Seinsvergessenheit	forgetfulness of being
Seinsverlassenheit	abandonment of being
Seinsverständnis	understanding of being
Seinsweise	way of being
Sein-zu	being-out-for
Sein-zum-Tode	being-toward-death
Selbst, das	self, the
Selbstverantwortlichkeit	self-responsibility
Selbstwelt	self-world
Seyn	be-ing
Sigetik	reticence in silence
Sinn	meaning, sense
Sinn von Sein, der	meaning of being, the
Situation	situation
Situations-Ich, das	situation-I, the
Sorge	care
Sorge des Wortes	care of the word
Spiel-Raum	play-space, free-space, leeway
Sprache	language, speech
Sprechen	saying

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Spruch	saying
Sprung	leap
Stätte	site
Sterblichen, die	mortals, the
Stiften	laying claim
Stiftung	founding and giving, institution
Stille	silence
Stimme des Seins, die	voice of being, the
Stimmung	mood, attunement
Streit	strife
Struktur	structure
Subjektivität	subjectivity
Subjektivität	subjectivity
Substanz	substance
Technik	technology
temporale Sätze	temporal statements
Temporalien	tensors
Temporalität	temporality
Thematisierung	thematization
Theologie	theology
Tod	death
Tradition	tradition
transzendental	transcendental
Transzendenz	transcendence
Treue	loyalty
Übereignen	owning-over-to
übereignet	owned over (to)
Übereignung	surrender, delivered over to
Übergehen	crossing
Überlieferung	tradition
Übermensch	overman (superman)
Überstieg	passing over

Überwindung	overcoming
Überwindung der Metaphysik	overcoming metaphysics
Umgang	getting around, dealings
Umsicht	circumspection
Umwelt	environment
Umzu, das	in-order-to, the
Unbedingt	unconditioned
Uneigentlichkeit	unownedness, inauthenticity
Ungedachtes	unthought
Ungesagtes	unsaid
Unheimlichkeit	uncanniness, strangeness
Unterschied	difference
Unverborgenheit	unconcealment
Unwahrheit	untruth
Unwesen	failing to essentially unfold, nonessence
Urchristentum	primordial Christianity
Ur-Etwas	primal something
Ursprung	origin, source
Ur-sprung	primal leap
ursprüngliche Ethik	original ethics
ursprüngliche Zeit	primordial or original time
Urteil	judgment
Verborgenheit	concealment
Vereinzelung	individuation
Verfallenheit	fallenness
Vergangenheit	past
Verhalten	comportment
Verhaltenheit	reservedness
Verrückung	displacement
Versuch	attempt
Verstand	understanding

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Verstehen	understand
Verwalter	adminstrator
verweilen	to while (away)
Volk	people
Vollendung	completion
Vollendung der Metaphysik	completion of metaphysics
Vollzug	actualization, enactment
Vollzugssinn	enactment sense
Vorbei, das	being gone
Vorblick	preview
Vorgriff	fore-conception
Vorhabe	fore-having
Vorhandenheit	presence-at-hand
Vorlaufen	anticipate
vorlaufende Entschlossenheit	anticipatory resoluteness
vorontologisches Seinsverständnis	preontological understanding of being
Vorsicht	foresight
Vorstellung	representation
Vorzeichnung	prefiguration
währen	last, endure
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrheit des Seins, die	truth of being, the
wahrnehmen	to take as true
Wahrnehmung	perception
Weg	way
Weile	while
Weisung	directive
Welt	world
Weltanschauung	worldview
Weltarm	world-poor



Weltbildend	world-forming
Welten	to world
Weltlichkeit	worldhood
Wert	value
Wertphilosophie	value-philosophy
wesen	coming-to-presence
Wesen	what is ownmost, essential nature, essence
Wesung	essential sway
Wiederholung	retrieval
Wille	will
Wille zur Macht	will to power
Wirklichkeit	actuality
Wissenschaft	science
Wofür, das	for-which, the
wohnen	dwelling
Worauf, das	toward-which, the
Woraufhin, das	in terms of which, upon-which
Wort	word
Wortgetreu	true to the word
Worumwillen, das	for-the-sake-of-which, the
Wozu, das	for-which, the
Zeit	time
Zeitigungssinn	temporalizing sense
Zeitlich	temporary
Zeitlichkeit	temporality
Zeitraum	span of time
Zeit-Raum	time-space
Zeit-Spiel-Raum	play of time-space
Zeitwort	time-word
Zeug	equipment
Zueignen	assign
Zueignung	assigning

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Zug	condition of being drawn
Zuhandenheit	readiness-to-hand
Zukunft	future
Zukünftigen, die	ones to come, the
Zukünftigkeit	futurity
Zusammengehören	belonging together
Zu-sein	to-be
Zuspiel	interplay, playing-forth
Zuspruch des Seins	address of being
Zweideutigkeit	ambiguity
Zwiespalt, der	twofold, the
Zwischen, das	between, the
Zwischenraum	between-space

## Appendix C

### *Greek–English Glossary*

Author's notes: In this glossary, I provide Heidegger's translations of the Greek terms. When his translation is very specific, I also provide the usual English translation in parentheses.

adikia	derangement (injustice)
aisthèsis	perception
alètheia	unconcealment (truth)
alètheuein	uncover, trueing (speak the truth)
apeiron	limitless, the
archè	beginning, principle
auto, to	same, the
chiasma	diagonal arrangement
chreon	handling, use (necessity)
diaphora	difference
dikè	pattern of arrangement (justice)
dunamis	potentiality
eidos	appearance, form in which something shows itself, idea
energeia	actuality (reality)
eon	being, that which is present
epistèmè	theoretical knowledge, science
éskhaton	end-time
ethos	situated dwelling
genesis	coming-forth (generation)
harmonìè	harmony
hen	unifying element (one, the)
hulè	matter
hupokeimenon	that what lies before (subject)

idein	representational thinking
kairos	moment of insight (moment of the Second Coming of Christ, proper moment)
kata	as
kinèsis	movement
kosmos	ornament (cosmos)
legein	lay down, lay before, let something lay forth (say, speak)
lèthè	concealment, forgottenness (untruth)
logos kata tinos	concept of something
meleta to pan	care about entities in the whole
moira	imparting of belonging together (fate)
morphè	form
noein	apprehend, take under its care (perceive, think)
mous	pure beholding without logos (mind)
on	entity
ousia	beingness, permanent presence (essence, substance)
pan	all, the
panta	all entities
parousia	appearance or revelation of the Divine
paschein	undergo (suffer)
phainomenon	that which shows itself (phenomenon)
philei to sophon	loves the wise
philosophos	philosopher
phronèsis	conscience, phronetic insight (prudence)
phthora	concealment (destruction)
phusei on	natural entities
phusis (Phusis)	self-revelment, self-emerging presence, process of unconcealment of being, (nature)
poiesis	poetry
polis	city-state
sophia	wisdom
sterèsis	privation

sumphilosophein	philosophizing together
technè	skilled know-how
telos	goal, purpose, end
tode ti	something, 'this-here'



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## INTRODUCTION

During the decade since the publication of the 2nd edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, interest in Martin Heidegger's philosophy has continued to increase on a global scale. Every effort has been made to keep pace with this enormous growth in the scholarship and to update as much as possible the most recent books on Heidegger's thinking. As important as this aim may be, its fulfillment can never be more than a "work in progress." Nevertheless, the 3rd edition of the *Dictionary* compiles a bibliography of scholarship on Heidegger's thought—primarily of works written in English—that extends over a period of 60 years.

A complete bibliography of works by and about Heidegger would exceed the scope of this dictionary. As an example, Hans-Martins Sass's 1982 bibliography contains 1,985 works by Heidegger and more than 5,300 entries on secondary literature! This bibliography is therefore selective, emphasizing classic studies and recent works in English, German, and French. It includes only book-length publications. A satisfactory listing of articles would require at least a volume of its own. If books have been translated into English, only the English translation is given. The bibliographical details of the books mentioned in this introduction can be found here.

The literary estate of Martin Heidegger is preserved at the Heidegger-Archive of the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar in Germany. This collection contains practically all of the manuscripts of his books, lectures, courses, and seminars. Here are also preserved many transcripts of Heidegger's lecture-courses and a large part of his correspondence. Many letters from and to Heidegger are preserved in library archives throughout Germany or still owned by private persons throughout the world. The Herbert-Marcuse-Archiv of the Stadt-und Universitätsbibliothek in Frankfurt am Main and the Hans-Jonas collection contain transcripts of Heidegger's lecture-courses, as well as his correspondence with Herbert Marcuse and Hans Jonas, respectively. The largest collection of Heideggeriana in the United



States, including transcripts of courses, seminars, and lectures, is at the Helene-Weiss-Archive at the Department of Special Collections of Stanford University Libraries.

Vittorio Klostermann in Frankfurt publishes the *Gesamtausgabe* (Complete Edition) of Heidegger's works. Klostermann presented the idea of a complete edition to Heidegger in 1973. After much hesitation and some long conversations with his son, Hermann, Heidegger accepted Klostermann's proposal in 1974. He worked out the conception of the *Gesamtausgabe* with his personal assistant, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, and his former student and close friend, Walter Biemel. He also discussed many questions and problems with his wife, Elfride, his brother, Fritz, and his son, Hermann. Heidegger did not want an editorial board and decided that each editor should be fully responsible for his/her volume. Heidegger also decided that after his death the executor of his literary estate should grant permission for the principles of his writing and the volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*. For over four decades, Professor von Herrmann has been the most important collaborator, and managing editor, of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Since the early 1980s he, together with Harmut Tietjen and Hermann Heidegger, has checked the proof pages of all the newly published volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

Separate, but also published by Vittorio Klostermann, is Patrick Unruh's *Register zur Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, which provides an index or catalog of key terms found throughout Heidegger's writings (up to 2017).

The five major periodical publications on Heidegger are *Heidegger Studies*, the *Schriftenreihe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*, *Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*, the *Heidegger-Jahrbuch*, and most recently, *Gatherings: Annual of the Heidegger Circle*. *Heidegger Studies* is an annual international publication dedicated to promoting the understanding of Heidegger's thought through the interpretation of his writings. It publishes papers in English, French, and German. Many of the published essays focus on recently published volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Issues frequently include an unpublished text from Heidegger's *Nachlaß*. *Heidegger Studies* also includes an updated list of the published volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, as well their translation into English, French, Italian, and Spanish. The *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* publishes articles in German and is edited by Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski. *Gatherings* is primarily an online journal, although individual print copies can be purchased; it includes articles from the proceedings of the "Heidegger Circle" (previously the North American Heidegger Conference) and is edited by Richard Polt.

The Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft is an international society dedicated to promoting the understanding of Heidegger's philosophy. Its membership is open to all interested in the work of Martin Heidegger. The society organizes conferences on Heidegger, publishes a book series, and offers its members

every year a small publication with unpublished writings of or about Heidegger. The address is Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft, c/o Martin-Heidegger-Gymnasium, Am Feldweg 26, D-88605 Meßkirch.

Besides the bibliographies listed in section IV, scholars may want to consult the following bibliographical essays:

Gerber, Rudolph. "Focal Points in Recent Heidegger Scholarship." *New Scholasticism* 42 (1968): 560–577.

Lübbe, Hermann. "Bibliographie der Heidegger-Literatur 1917–1955." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 11 (1957): 401–452.

Paumen, Jean. "Eléments de bibliographie Heideggérienne." *Revue internationale de philosophie* 14 (1960): 263–268.

Pereboom, Dirk. "Heidegger Bibliographie 1917–1966." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 16 (1969): 100–161.

A lucid introduction to the philosophical background of Heidegger's thought is Herbert Schnädelbach's *Philosophy in Germany, 1831–1933*. Readers may also want to consult the well-written book by Michael Großheim, *Von Georg Simmel zu Martin Heidegger: Philosophie zwischen Leben und Existenz*. Of particular interest are the very readable and enlightening autobiographical works by Karl Jaspers, *Philosophische Autobiographie*, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeships*. Gadamer has also published a wealth of important essays on Heidegger's thought, which can now easily be consulted in his collected works (*Gesammelte Werke*) and his classic study *Heidegger's Ways*. Karl Löwith, one of Heidegger's first students, has also written a well-known volume on his former teacher, *Heidegger: Denken in dürftiger Zeit; Zur Stellung der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert* (1984). More recently, Albert Denker has published an extensive account of the intersection between Heidegger's life and thinking, *Unterwegs in "Sein und Zeit": Einführung in Leben und Denken von Martin Heidegger* (2011).

The two major classics on Heidegger's thought are William Richardson's monumental *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* and Otto Pöggeler's *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*. Both books were written in collaboration with Heidegger, and the former is of particular importance because it contains the famous letter that Heidegger wrote in response to a query from Fr. Richardson concerning the proper understanding of the "turning." A new, updated 4th edition of Fr. Richardson's book was published in 2003 by Fordham University Press, which includes the author's "Preface to the U.S. Edition" (composed in 2003). However, since many of Heidegger's unpublished writings have been published in the meantime, scholars may also want to consult Herman Philipse's *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation* and Dieter Thomä's impressive and critical *Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach: Zur Kritik der Textgeschichte Martin Hei-*

*deggers 1919–1976*. Charles Guignon has edited *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, which is a very practical and enlightening introduction for students to the whole of Heidegger's thought and life. The essays in this collection were written by well-recognized scholars. Christopher Macann has edited a wonderful collection of the most important essays on Heidegger published in journals since the 1930s. This four-volume collection, *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, is one of the major publications on Heidegger. Unfortunately, it is cost prohibitive for most individuals. Within the last decade, François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson have edited the *Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*. The volume includes short essays from a diverse list of international scholars on the most basic themes in Heidegger's thinking as well as the foremost historical influences that shaped his philosophy. The 2nd (paperback) edition also includes an appendix in which one of the editors (E. Nelson) briefly addresses the impact of the *Black Notebooks* and weighs evidence about to what extent Heidegger supported aspects of a cultural anti-Semitism.

Within the last 30 years, the publication of Heidegger's early lecture-courses has led to a wealth of publications on his early thought. John van Buren's massive *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* remains one of the best thematically organized books on the early philosophy of Heidegger. Theodore Kisiel's *The Genesis of Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time"* offers another perspective on Heidegger's early development. Within the last decade, Jesus Adrian Escudero has written an insightful book, *Heidegger and the Emergence of the Question of Being*, which casts further light on the origin of Heidegger's thinking. Another example of excellent scholarship on this topic is Scott Campbell's *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*.

In recent years, the strong interest in Heidegger's seminal work, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, has fueled the publication of several important books. Foremost among these is Parvis Emad's *On the Way to Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy."* As the cotranslator of *Contributions to Philosophy*, Emad provides an unparalleled view throughout this text into the nuances and intricacies that shaped the development of Heidegger's thinking. The reader might also wish to consult Richard Polt's *The Emergence of Being: On Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy."* Within the past decade, George Kovacs has written a lengthy book exploring the motif of being-historical thinking, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. In commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the publication of that volume of Heidegger's Complete Edition (GA 65), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann has written a detailed commentary, *Transzendenz und Ereignis: Heideggers Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)—Ein Kommentar* (2019).

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann was Martin Heidegger's personal assistant from 1972 until the latter's death in 1976. He has so far edited 19 volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*. His writings on Heidegger's works are highly recommended for students and scholars alike, most notably his three-volume commentary on *Sein und Zeit*. He is also the author of *Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology* (*Hermeneutik und Reflexion: Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Husserl und Heidegger*). Another excellent commentary on *Being and Time* is Jean Greisch's massive and impressive study *Ontologie et temporalité: Esquisse d'une interprétation intégrale de "Sein und Zeit."* English-speaking readers oriented to analytic philosophy may wish to consult Hubert L. Dreyfus's *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time," Division I*. For those readers who would like to address the rest of the work as well, there is Michael Gelven's study *A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time,"* which is still useful. A more recent alternative is Richard Polt's *Heidegger: An Introduction*.

Werner Marx has written a famous book on Heidegger and the history of philosophy, *Heidegger and the Tradition*. Another classic is Gustav Siewerth's neo-scholastic work, *Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger*. The best studies of Heidegger and ancient philosophy are Markus J. Brach's scholarly *Heidegger-Platon: Vom Neukantianismus zur existenziellen Interpretation des "Sophistes,"* Ted Sadler's *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being*, and more recently, Günther Neumann's *Der Anfang der abendländische Philosophie*. The English reader may also wish to consult Walter Brogan's *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* and William McNeill's *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory*. For an outstanding discussion of Heidegger and the pre-Socratics, see Ivo De Gennaro's *Logos-Heidegger liest Heraklit*. There are remarkably few books on Heidegger and medieval philosophy. The most interesting work is undoubtedly John D. Caputo's well-balanced *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics*.

There is a wealth of literature on Heidegger and modern philosophy. Henri Declève's *Heidegger et Kant* is still one of the most interesting works on this topic. In his book *Continental Divide*, Peter Gordon provides a detailed account of Heidegger's debate with the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer at Davos (Switzerland) in the spring of 1929. Annette Sell, a student of Otto Pöggeler, published the most comprehensive book on Heidegger and Hegel, *Martin Heideggers Gang durch Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes."* The best introduction to Heidegger and Nietzsche is the collection of essays edited by Hans-Helmuth Gander, *"Verwechselt mich vor allem nicht": Heidegger and Nietzsche*. One of the classic and widely read studies of Heidegger and contemporary philosophy is Michael Theunissen's well-balanced *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*.

Another classic is Ernst Tugendhat's *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, which is very critical of Heidegger. The most complete study of Heidegger and Wittgenstein is Thomas Rentsch's *Heidegger und Wittgenstein: Existenzial-und Sprachanalysen zu den Grundlagen philosophischer Anthropologie*. Hermann Mörchen, who studied with both Heidegger and Theodor Adorno, wrote a fair interpretation of their relationship, *Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung*. Those readers interested in the reception of Heidegger's work in France should consult a collection of essays edited by David Pettigrew and François Raffoul, *French Interpretations of Heidegger*. Recently, Raffoul and Pettigrew have also translated Dominique Janicaud's classic work, *Heidegger in France* (2015), originally published in 2001 as *Heidegger en France*.

Lester Embree edited a massive *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, which is the reference book on this subject. Of great interest and importance are of course Edmund Husserl's own comments on Heidegger that were edited in his *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology: The Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. Herbert Spiegelberg's *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* is a classic and instructive study and still obligatory reading for all those interested in phenomenology. Burt C. Hopkins's well-balanced but very scholarly work, *Heidegger and Husserl: The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology*, is one of the few works on Heidegger and Husserl that is not written from a Heideggerian perspective, and it does justice to Husserl's work. It is highly recommended for scholars and graduate students. More recently, Steven Crowell has ventured into the arena of ethical inquiry in a unique way with *Phenomenology and Normativity in Husserl and Heidegger*.

Although Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism has become one of the most discussed topics in contemporary philosophy since the publication of Victor Farias's controversial book *Heidegger and Nazism*, we are still waiting for a comprehensive and equitable work on this important issue. Perhaps to date the book that comes closest to fulfilling this goal is Bernhard Radloff's study, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt*. Those interested in this topic may want to start with the various collections of essays and sources that have been published over the last several years. Bern Martin's *Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich": Ein Kompendium*, limits itself to a presentation of the facts and different points of view. The most comprehensive collection of Heidegger's political writings (and their background, since most of the texts in this volume are not by Heidegger) is to be found in Guido Schneeberger's one-sided *Nachlese zu Heidegger*. The most important collection of essays in English is *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, edited by Günther Neske, in which readers will also find translations of Heidegger's

rectoral address, *The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts*; his interview with Richard Wisser; and the authentic version of the *Spiegel* interview. This version differs significantly from the version published in *Der Spiegel*. Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis edited the more critical volume *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics*. The classic study on Heidegger and politics is Alexander Schwan's *Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers*. Three major works on Martin Heidegger and National Socialism are Tom Rockmore's very critical *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Dominico Losurdo's comprehensive *Die Gemeinschaft, der Tod, das Abendland: Heidegger und die Kriegsideologie*, and Richard Wolin's *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*. Three of the most important books written in defense of Heidegger are François Fédiér's outstanding work *Heidegger. Anatomie d'un scandale*, which has never received the attention it deserves; Silvio Vietta's *Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik*; and Julian Young's *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*. One of the best introductions to Heidegger and the problem of ethics is Joanna Hodge's very readable book *Heidegger and Ethics*. Of equal interest is Lawrence Hatab's *Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy*. The reader might want to consult James D. Reid's *Heidegger's Moral Ontology*, published in the past decade.

The publication of the first volumes of Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* in 2014 has sparked a new debate about his connection to National Socialism. At issue are anti-Semitic remarks that he makes in passages throughout the several volumes comprising the *Notebooks*. David F. Krell's *Ecstasy and Catastrophe: From "Being and Time" to the "Black Notebooks"* (2015) was among the first books to be published in English that addresses this topic; it reevaluates Heidegger's philosophical contributions within this critical framework. Parvis Emad has written a brief but insightful monograph, *"History" and "Nothingness" in Heidegger and Nietzsche: Learning from Beiträge, Part 5–6: The Issue of Anti-Semitism*. He outlines the hermeneutic guidelines for interpreting the philosophical significance of the *Black Notebooks* within the larger context of both Heidegger's writings and the history of anti-Semitism throughout the Western tradition. Emad also cites the first-hand testimony (by the French scholar Frédéric de Towarnicki, from his book *À la rencontre de Heidegger: Souvenirs d'un messenger de la Forêt Noire*), recounting both Heidegger's ignorance of and shock over the Holocaust when showed a photograph of a concentration camp at Dachau (shortly after the conclusion of World War II). In her insightful book *Heidegger, Morality, and Politics: Questioning the Shepherd of Being*, Sonia Sikka provides a comprehensive account of all aspects of Heidegger's engagement. She shows how basic principles of Heidegger's thinking clash with his ties to National Socialism in the 1930s, as well exploring the recent controversy surrounding anti-Semitic overtones to his rhetoric in the *Black Notebooks*.

Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas have edited a collection of essays of internationally recognized scholars that contributes to this debate: *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks 1931–1941*.

In Europe, particularly in Germany, a spirited debate has arisen concerning the importance of the *Black Notebooks* for understanding Heidegger's thinking as a whole. From 2014 to 2015, Peter Trawny edited the first four volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, comprising the *Black Notebooks*. Trawny also wrote an influential book in German, subsequently published in English under the title *Heidegger and the Myth of the German World Conspiracy*. In critical response, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (the managing editor of Heidegger's Complete Edition), in collaboration with Francesco Alfieri, has written a lengthy and detailed exposition of the *Black Notebooks*, explicating the context of the controversial remarks that Trawny upholds as the hallmark of an anti-Semitic message. Under the title *Die Wahrheit über die Schwarzen Hefte*, von Herrmann and Alfieri argue that Heidegger's *Notebooks* have to be understood against the backdrop of his major works during that period, most notably *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* and *Mindfulness*; moreover, his being-historical thinking is neither politically nor ideologically motivated, but instead places into question the possibility of politics on the global stage of machination. In an appendix (*Epilog*) to von Herrmann's and Alfieri's book, Heidegger's son, Hermann Heidegger, reiterates this point, dismissing any suggestion that his father was anti-Semitic ("*Martin Heidegger war kein AntiSemit*").

Joseph Kockelmans has written two classic studies on Heidegger and language and art, *On Heidegger and Language* and *Heidegger on Art and Art Works*. The outstanding book on Heidegger's early theory of language is Pol Vandeveldel's exhaustive study, *Être et Discours: La Question de langage dans l'itinéraire de Heidegger (1927–1938)*. For his later views on language, the reader may want to consult Gerald L. Bruns's important study *Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*. The best introduction to Heidegger and art is Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann's careful and well-thought-out interpretation of the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, published in German under the title *Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst: Eine systematische Interpretation der Holzwege-Abhandlung "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes."* Beda Alleman's *Hölderlin und Heidegger* is the first comprehensive study of the relation between the poet and the thinker. In the meantime, it has been surpassed by Suzanne Ziegler's *Heidegger, Hölderlin und die Alètheia: Martin Heideggers geschichtsdanken in seiner Vorlesungen 1934 bis 1944*. For a more recent book, the reader may want to consult Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei's *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language*.

One of the best books on Heidegger and technology is Michael E. Zimmerman's *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art*, which also discusses the larger context and background of Heidegger's thought. Both students and scholars will enjoy reading this very insightful book. Another justly famous work is Günter Seubold's *Heideggers Analyse der neuzeitlichen Technik*. For a more recent basic book that is primarily expository, the reader can consult Richard Rojcewicz's *The Gods and Technology*. Rainer Bast has written a penetrating but difficult book on Heidegger's understanding of science. His *Der Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heideggers in Zusammenhang seiner Philosophie* is recommended for scholars. Students may prefer to consult the collection of essays edited by Joseph Kockelmans, *Heidegger and Science*.

In his readable book *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature*, Bruce Foltz demonstrates the importance of Heidegger's thinking for ecology. Since the publication of this book, the attempt to bring Heidegger's philosophy into the conversation concerning the need to safeguard the earth and protect the environment has led to a plethora of new literature. Published after the devastating effects of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast in 2005, Ruth Irwin's *Heidegger, Politics and Climate Change: Risking It All* is one such example. Within the last decade, Rentmeester has written an excellent summary of the confluence of ecological issues addressed by Heidegger's thinking: *Heidegger and the Environment*.

The classic work on Heidegger and theology is Anne-Marie Gethmann-Siefert's, *Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken Martin Heideggers*. An important and exhaustive study is Philipppe Capelle's *Philosophie et théologie dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger*. Heidegger's relation to and influence upon Roman Catholic theology is discussed in Richard Schaeffler's *Heidegger und die katholische Theologie*. Gerhard Noller has edited a very useful collection of texts that presents a historical overview of the discussion of Heidegger in both Catholic and Protestant theology, *Heidegger und die Theologie: Beginn and Fortgang der Diskussion*. For a more recent study, the reader may consult Ben Vedder's *Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion: From God to the Gods*. An excellent study that examines Heidegger's concept of the "last god" is Paola-Ludovika Coriando's *Der Letzte Gott als Anfang: Zur abgründigen Zeit-Räumlichkeit des Übergangs in Heideggers "Beiträge zur Philosophie."* One of the very few books on Heidegger and Judaism is Marlène Zarader's *La Dette impensé: Heidegger et l'héritage hébraïque*.

Heidegger's influence on psychology and psychotherapy is evident in the writings of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, who were both psychotherapists. Martin Bartels has written the most famous book on Heidegger and Sigmund Freud, *Selbstbewußtsein and Unbewußtes: Studien zu Freud*



and Heidegger. The most comprehensive study of this topic is Gion Condrau's *Sigmund Freud und Martin Heidegger: Daseinanalytische Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie*. He also published a very readable introduction and overview of Heidegger's influence on psychotherapy, *Matrin Heidegger's Impact on Psychotherapy*.

Heidegger's influence in Japan has been immense. Hartmut Buchner has edited a beautiful volume on Heidegger and Japan, *Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt Meßkirch zum hundertsten Geburtstag Martin Heideggers*, which is highly recommended for everyone interested in this topic. Yoshiko Oshima has written two enlightening and introductory books on Heidegger and Zen: *Zen anders Denken? Zugleich ein Versuch über Zen und Heidegger* and *Nähe und Ferne: Mit Heidegger unterwegs zum Zen*. Graham Parkes has edited the best-known collection of essays on this topic under the title *Heidegger and Asian Thought*. Both scholars and students will find this to be a very useful collection.

To make the following bibliography easy to use, it is divided into 16 comprehensive categories: (I) Works in German, (II) Works in English, (III) Correspondence, (IV) Bibliography and Reference, (V) Background and Biography, (VI) General, (VII) Commentaries, (VIII) History of Philosophy, (IX) Phenomenology, (X) Ethics, National Socialism, and Politics, (XI) Art, Hermeneutics, Language, and Poetry, (XII) Science, Philosophy of Nature, and Technology, (XIII) Theology and Religious Studies, (XIV) Psychology and Psychotherapy, (IV) Eastern Philosophy and Religion, and (XVI) Annals and Yearbooks. Included is a complete list of the *Gesamtausgabe* in category (I) and a list of all English translation in category (II). A superscript number before the year of publication (<sup>2</sup>1998) refers to the edition (in this case, 2nd edition 1998). If no number is given, it is the first edition.

## I. WORKS IN GERMAN

Author's note: Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, publishes the complete edition of Martin Heidegger's works. The volumes without a year have not yet been published.

### A. *Gesamtausgabe* (*Ausgabe letzter Hand*)

#### I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1919–76

- 1. *Frühe Schriften* (1909–16), 1978
- 2. *Sein und Zeit* (1927), 1977

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- 3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), 1991
- 4. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (1936–68), 1991, <sup>2</sup>1996
- 5. *Holzwege* (1935–46), 1977, <sup>2</sup>2003

6.1. *Nietzsche I* (1936–39), 1996

6.2. *Nietzsche II* (1936–46), 1997

- 7. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1954), 2000
- 8. *Was heißt Denken?* (1951–52), 2002
- 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–61), 1976, <sup>2</sup>1996, <sup>3</sup>2004
- 10. *Der Satz vom Grund* (1955–56), 1997
- 11. *Identität und Differenz* (1955–56), 2006
- 12. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–59), 1985
- 13. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1919–76), 1983, <sup>2</sup>2002
- 14. *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1962–64), 2007
- 15. *Seminare* (1951–73), 1986, <sup>2</sup>2005
- 16. *Reden and andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–76), 2000

*II. Abteilung Vorlesungen 1919–44*

**Marburger Vorlesungen 1923–28** 17. *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (winter semester 1923/24), 1994, <sup>2</sup>2006.

- 18. *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (summer semester 1924), 2002
- 19. *Platon: Sophistes* (winter semester 1924/25), 1992
- 20. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (summer semester 1925), 1979, <sup>3</sup>1994
- 21. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (winter semester 1925/26), 1976, <sup>2</sup>1995
- 22. *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (summer semester 1926), 1993, <sup>2</sup>2004
- 23. *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant* (winter semester 1926/27), 2006
- 24. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (summer semester 1927), 1975, <sup>2</sup>1989, <sup>3</sup>1997
- 25. *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants reinen Vernunft* (winter semester 1927/28), 1977, <sup>2</sup>1995
- 26. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe im Ausgang von Leibniz* (summer semester 1928), 1978, <sup>2</sup>1990, <sup>3</sup>2007

**Freiburger Vorlesungen 1928–1944** 27. *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (winter semester 1928/29), 1996, <sup>2</sup>2001

28. 1. *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart* (summer semester 1929). 2. *Einführung in das akademische Studium* (summer semester 1929), 1997, <sup>2</sup>2011
- 29/30. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit* (winter semester 1929/30), 1983, <sup>2</sup>1992, <sup>3</sup>2004
31. *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie* (summer semester 1930), 1982
32. *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (winter semester 1930/31), 1980, <sup>2</sup>1998, <sup>3</sup>1997
33. *Aristoteles: Metaphysik  $\theta$  1–3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* (summer semester 1931), 1981, <sup>2</sup>1990, <sup>3</sup>2006
34. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (winter semester 1931/32), 1988, <sup>2</sup>1997
35. *Der Angang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaxmander und Parmenides)* (summer semester 1932)
- 36/37. *Sein und Wahrheit*. 1. *Die Grundfrage der Philosophie* (summer semester 1933). 2. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (winter semester 1933/34), 2001
38. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (summer semester 1934), 1998
39. *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"* (winter semester 1934/35), 1980, <sup>2</sup>1989, <sup>3</sup>1999
40. *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (summer semester 1935), 1983
41. *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (winter semester 1935/36), 1984
42. *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) (summer semester 1936), 1988
43. *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst* (winter semester 1936/37), 1985
44. *Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen* (summer semester 1937), 1986
45. *Grundfragen der Philosophie, Ausgewählter "probleme" der "Logik"* (winter semester 1937/38), 1984, <sup>2</sup>1992
46. *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II: Unzeitgemäßer Betrachtung "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben"* (winter semester 1938/39), 2003
47. *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (summer semester 1939), 1989
48. *Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus* (II. trimester 1940), 1986

49. *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus: Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling; Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809) (I. trimester 1941), 1991, <sup>2</sup>2006
50. 1. *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (für winter semester 1941/42 angekündigt, aber nicht vorgetragen). 2. *Einleitung in die Philosophie—Denken und Dichten* (winter semester 1944/45), 1990, <sup>2</sup>2007
51. *Grundbegriffe* (summer semester 1941), 1981, <sup>2</sup>1992
52. *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken"* (summer semester, 1942), 1984, <sup>2</sup>1992
53. *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"* (summer semester 1942), 1984, <sup>2</sup>1993
54. *Parmenides* (1942/43), 1982, <sup>2</sup>1992
55. *Heraklit: 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens* (summer semester 1944), 1979, <sup>2</sup>1987, <sup>3</sup>1994
- 56/57. *Bestimmung zur Philosophie* (war emergency semester 1919), 1987, <sup>2</sup>1999
58. *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (winter semester 1919/20), 1992
59. *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung* (summer semester 1920), 1993, <sup>2</sup>2007
60. *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*. 1. *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie des Religion* (winter semester 1920/21). 2. *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus* (summer semester 1922). 3. *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik* (Ausarbeitungen und Entwürfe zu einer nicht gehaltenen Vorlesung 1918/19), 1995.
61. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (winter semester 1921/22), <sup>2</sup>1994
62. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik* (summer semester 1922), 2005
63. *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (summer semester 1923), 1988, <sup>2</sup>1995

### III. Abteilung; Unveröffentlichte Abhandlungen—Vorträge Gedachtes

64. *Der Begriff der Zeit* (I. *Die Fragestellung Diltheys und Yorcks Grundtendenz*; II. *Die ursprünglichen Seinscharaktere des Daseins*; III. *Dasein und Zeitlichkeit*; IV. *Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit*) *Anhang: Der Begriff der Zeit* (Vortrag Marburg July 1924), 2004
65. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–38), 1989, <sup>2</sup>1994, <sup>3</sup>2003
66. *Besinnung* (1938/39), 1997

67. *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*. 1. *Die Überwindung der Metaphysik* (1938/39). 2. *Das Wesen des Nihilismus* (1946–48), 1999
68. *Hegel*. 1. *Die Negativität* (1938/39). 2. *Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"* (1942), 1993
69. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. 1. *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938–40). 2. *Koivón: Aus des Geschichte des Seyns* (1939), 1998
70. *Über den Anfang* (1941), 2005
71. *Das Ereignis* (1941/42), 2009
72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944)
- 73.1/73.2. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*, 2013
74. *Zum Wesen Sprache*, 2010
75. *Zu Hölderlin—Griechenlandreisen*, 2000
76. *Leitgedanken zur Entstehung Metaphysik, der neuzzeitlichen Wissenschaft und der modernen Technik*, 2009
77. *Feldweg-Gespräche* (1944/45). 1. *Ἀρχιβασιή: Ein Gespräch selbst-dritt auf einem Feldweg zwischen einem Forscher, einem Gelehrten und einem Weisen*. 2. *Der Lehrer trifft den Türmer an der Tür zum Turmaufgang*. 3. *Abendgespräch in einem Kriegsgefangenenlager in Rußland zwischen einem Jüngeren und einem Älteren*, 1995, 2007
78. *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (1946)
79. *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. 1. *Einblick in das was ist: Bremer Vorträge 1949: Das Ding—Das Ge-Stell—Die Gefahr—Die Kehre*. 2. *Grundsätze des Denken: Freiburger Vorträge* (1957), 1994, 2005
- 80.1. *Vorträge* (1915–32), 2016
- 80.2. *Vorträge* (1933–67)
81. *Gedachtes*, 2007

#### IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen

82. *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*
83. *Seminare: Platon—Aristoteles—Augustinus*
84. *Seminare: Leibniz—Kant*
85. *Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes; Zu Herders Abhandlung "Über den Ursprung der Sprache"* (summer semester, 1939), 1999
86. *Seminare: Hegel—Schelling*
87. *Nietzsche: Seminare 1937 und 1944*, 2004
88. *Seminare*. 1. *Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendändischen Denkens*. 2. *Einübung in das philosophische Denken*, 2008
89. *Zollikoner Seminare* (1959–69), 2018
90. *Zu Ernst Jünger "Der Arbeiter,"* 2004
91. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*

92. *Ausgewählte Briefe I*
93. *Ausgewählte Briefe II*
94. *Überlegungen II–IV (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*, 2014
95. *Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39)*, 2014
96. *Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*, 2014
97. *Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*, 2015
98. *Anmerkungen VI–IX (Schwarze Hefte 1948/49–51)*, 2018
99. *Vier Hefte I (Schwarze Hefte 1947–1950)*, 2019; *Vier Hefte II (Schwarze Hefte 1947–1950)*, 2019
100. *Vigiliae I, II; Notturmo*
101. *Winke, I, II*
102. *Vorläufiges I–IV*

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- Aufenthalte*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.
- Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1947, <sup>6</sup>1986.
- Begriff der Zeit, Der*. (Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft July 1924). Ed., with a postscript, by Hartmut Tietjen. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989, <sup>2</sup>1995.
- Bemerkungen zu Kunst-Plastik-Raum*. St. Gallen: Erker, 1995.
- Denkererfahrungen 1919–1976*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.
- Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge (Gehalten in Kassel vom 16.1V.1925)*. Ed. Frithjof Rodi. Dilthey-Jahrbuch 8, 1992–93.
- Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953, <sup>6</sup>1998.
- Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1944, <sup>6</sup>1996.
- Feldweg, Der*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1953, <sup>7</sup>1991.
- Frage nach dem Ding, Die: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972, <sup>3</sup>1987.
- Frühe Schriften*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972.
- Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, <sup>10</sup>1992.
- Heraklit* (with Eugen Fink). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970, <sup>2</sup>1996.
- Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950, <sup>7</sup>1994.
- Identität und Differenz*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, <sup>9</sup>1990.
- Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1929, <sup>5</sup>1991.
- Kunst und der Raum, Die: L'Art et l'espace*. St. Gallen: Erker, 1969, <sup>2</sup>1983.
- Nietzsche: Band I and II*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, <sup>6</sup>1998.

- Phänomenologie und Theologie*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970.
- Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*. Ed., with a postscript, by Hans-Ulrich Lessing. Diltthey-Jahrbuch 6, 1989.
- Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1947, <sup>2</sup>1997.
- Satz vom Grund, Der*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, <sup>6</sup>1986.
- Schellings abhandlung über das Wesen menschlichen Freiheit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971, <sup>2</sup>1995.
- Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, <sup>16</sup>1986.
- Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität: Die Recktorat 1933/34 Tatsachen und Gedanken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, <sup>3</sup>1993.
- Technik und die Kehre, Die*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1962, <sup>8</sup>1991.
- Über Abraham a Santa Clara*. Meßkirch: Stadt Meßkirch, 1964.
- Über den Humanismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1947, <sup>9</sup>1991.
- Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache*. St. Gallen: Erker, 1989.
- Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, <sup>2</sup>1990.
- Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Der*. Stuttgart. Reclam, 1960, <sup>3</sup>1982.
- Vier Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
- Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1943, <sup>7</sup>1986.
- Vom Wesen des Grundes*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1929, <sup>8</sup>1995.
- Vorträge und auf Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954, <sup>6</sup>1990.
- Was heißt Denken?* Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971, <sup>4</sup>1984.
- Was heißt Denken?* Stuttgart: Reclam, 1992.
- Was ist das die Philosophie?* Pfullingen: Neske, 1956, <sup>10</sup>1992.
- Was ist Metaphysik?* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1929, <sup>14</sup>1992.
- Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967, <sup>3</sup>1996.
- Zollikoner Seminare*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, <sup>2</sup>1994.
- Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens*. St. Gallen: Erker, 1984.
- Zur Sache des Denkens*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969, <sup>3</sup>1988.
- Zur Seinsfrage*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956, <sup>4</sup>1997.

## II. WORKS IN ENGLISH

### A. English Translations

Author's note: The year and letter in parentheses after items listed below refer to the German titles in appendix I.

*Aristotle's Metaphysics  $\theta$  1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force.* (GA 33). Trans. Walter Brogan and P. Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

*Basic Concepts.* (GA 51). Trans. Gary E. Aylesworth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

*Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy.* (GA 22). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.

*Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy.* (GA 18). Trans. Robert Metcalf and Mark Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

*Basic Problems of Phenomenology.* (GA 58). Trans. Scott Campbell. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.

*Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The.* (GA 24). Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

*Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic."* (GA 45). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994

*Basic Writings.* Ed. David F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, <sup>2</sup>1993. Contains:

1.

- a. *Being and Time: Introduction.* Trans. J. Stambaugh with J. Glenn Gray and David F. Krell. (1927d).
- b. *What Is Metaphysics?* Trans. David F. Krell. (1929k).
- c. *On the Essence of Truth.* Trans. John Sallis. (1943a).
- d. *The Origin of the Work of Art.* Trans. Albert Hofstadter. (1935c).
- e. *Letter on "Humanism."* Trans. Frank Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray. (1946a).
- f. *Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics.* Trans. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutch. (1962a, selection).
- g. *The Question concerning Technology.* Trans. William Lovitt. (1953c).
- h. *Building Dwelling Thinking.* Trans. Albert Hofstadter. (1951a).
- i. *What Calls for Thinking?* Trans. F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. (1971b, selection).
- j. *The Way to Language.* Trans. David F. Krell. (1959c).



- k. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. (1964a).

*Beginning of Western Philosophy, The: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*. Trans. R. Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

*Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

*Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

*Being and Truth*. (GA 36/37). Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

*Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*. (GA 79). Trans. Andrew J. Mitchell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. Contains:

1.
  - a. *Insight Into That Which Is: Bremen Lectures 1949*.
  - b. *Basic Principles of Thinking: Freiburg Lectures 1957*.

*Concept of Time, The*. Trans. William McNeill. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. (1924c).

*Contributions to "Der Akademiker."* Trans. John Protevi. In *New School for Social Research/Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 14, no. 2 and 15, no. 1 (1991). Contains:

1. *Per mortem ad vitam (Thoughts on Johannes Jørgensen's "Lies of Life and Truth of Life")*. (1910a).
2. Förster, Fr.W. "Authority and Freedom: Observations on the Cultural Problem of the Church." (1910b).
3. Cüppers, Ad. Jos. "Sealed Lips: The Story of Irish Folk Life in the 19th Century." (1910d).
4. Jørgensen, Joh. "Travelogue: Light and Dark Nature and Spirit." (1911a).
5. *On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics*. (1911b).
6. *Psychology of Religion and the Subconscious*. (1912a).
7. Gredt, Jos. OSB. *Elementa Philosophia Aristotelico-Thomisticae*. Vol. I, *Logica, Philosophia Naturalis*. Editio. II. (1912b).
8. *Library of Valuable Novellas and Stories*. (1913c).

*Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. (GA 65). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

*Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. (GA 65). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

*Contributions to Philosophy: The Da-sein and the Be-ing (Enowning)*. (In GA 73.1). Trans. Parvis Emad. In *Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge*, ed. Frank Schalow. Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2013.

*Country Path Conversations*. (GA 77). Trans. Bret Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

*Discourse on Thinking*. Trans. J. Anderson and E. H. Freund. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Contains:

1. *Memorial Address*. (1955b).
2. *Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking*. (1944/45a).

*Discussion between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, A*. Trans. Fr. Slade. In N. Langiulli (ed.), *The Existential Tradition: Selected Writings*. New York: Doubleday, 1971. (1929e).

*Early Greek Thinking*. Trans. Frank Capuzzi and David F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Contains:

1. *The Anaximander Fragment*. (1946c).
2. *Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)*. (1951c).
3. *Moirai (Parmenides VIII, 34–41)*. (1952a).
4. *Alètheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)*. (1943f).

*Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*. (GA 4). Trans. Keith Hoeller. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanity Books, 2000.

*The End of Philosophy*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. Contains:

1. *Metaphysics as History of Being*. (1941g).
2. *Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics*. (1941h).
3. *Recollection in Metaphysics*. (1941i).
4. *Overcoming Metaphysics*. (1936–46).

*Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference*. Trans. K. F. Leidecker. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. Contains:

1. *The Principle of Identity*. (1975c).
2. *The Onto-Theo-Logical Nature of Metaphysics*. (1957d).

*Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, The*. (GA 31). Trans. Ted. Sadler (1930).

*Essence of Reasons, The*. Trans. Terrence Malick. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969. (1929b).

*Essence of Truth, The.* (GA 34). Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2002. (1931/32).

*Event, The.* (GA 71). Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

*Existence and Being.* Ed. Stefan Schimanski and intro. by Werner Brock. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1949. Contains:

1. *Remembrance of the Poet.* Trans. D. Scott. (1943e).
2. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry.* Trans. D. Scott (1936a).
3. *On the Essence of Truth.* Trans. R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick. (1930e & h).
4. *What Is Metaphysics?* Trans. R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick. (1929k).

*Existence and Being.* Ed. Werner Brock. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949. Contains:

1. *Remembrance of the Poet.* Trans. D. Scott. (1943e).
2. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry.* Trans. D. Scott. (1936a).
3. *On the Essence of Truth.* Trans. R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick. (1930e & h).
4. *What Is Metaphysics?* Trans. R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick. (1929k).

*For Edmund Husserl on His Seventieth Birthday.* In Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology: The Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. Ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and Richard Palmer. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013.

*Four Seminars.* Trans. Andrew Mitchell and Raffoul (1966–73).

*Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude.* (GA 29/30). Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

*Hegel.* (GA 68). Trans. J. Arel and N. Feuerhahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.

*Hegel's Concept of Experience.* Trans. J. Glenn Gray and F. D. Wieck. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. (1942/43a).

*Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.* (GA 32). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

*Heidegger Reader.* Ed. G. Figal and trans. J. Veith. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. Contains:

1. *The Environmental Experience.* (1919).
2. *Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation.* (1922).
3. *The Problem of Being and Time.* (1928).
4. *Transcendence.* (1928).

5. *Description of the Situation (Fundamental Attunement)*. (1929–30).
6. *The Projection of Being in Science and Art*. (1931–33).
7. *The Rectorship Address: The Self-Assertion of the University*. (27 May 1933).
8. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*. (2 April 1936). (1936a).
9. *On the Origin of the Work of Art*. (first version 1935).
10. “*As When on a Holiday . . .*” (1939–40).
11. *Ereignis*. (1936–38).
12. *On Ernst Jünger 1*. (1939–40).
13. *On Ernst Jünger 2*. (1939–40).
14. *The Age of the World Picture*. (1938).
15. *On Nietzsche*. (1944–45).
16. *Logos and Language*. (1944).
17. *Bremen Lectures: Insight into That Which Is*. (1949).
18. *The Principle of Identity*. (27 June 1957).
19. *The Language of Johann Peter Hebel*. (1955).
20. *Letter to Father William J. Richardson*. (1962). (1962e).
21. *Art and Space*. (1969).
22. *Cézanne*. From the Series *Gedachtes* for René Char. L’Herne, 1971. (last version 1974).
23. *Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger*. (1966).

*Heraclitus*. (GA 55). Trans. J. G. Assaiante and S. M. Ewegen. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.

*Heraclitus Seminar (with Eugen Fink)*. Trans. C. Seibert. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993. (1966/67).

*History of Beyng, The*. (GA 69). Trans. William McNeill and J. Powell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.

*History of the Concept of Time*. (GA 20). Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

*Hölderlin’s Hymn “Remembrance.”* (GA 52). Trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018.

*Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.”* (GA 53). Trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

*Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine.”* (GA 39). Trans. W. McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.

*Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Contains:

1. *The Principle of Identity*. (1957c).
2. *The Onto-Theo-Logical Nature of Metaphysics*. (1957d).

*Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation.* Trans. Ullrich Hasse and Mark Sinclair. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.

*Introduction to Metaphysics, An.* Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. (1935a).

*Introduction to Metaphysics.* Trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. (1935a).

*Introduction to Phenomenological Research.* (GA 17). Trans. Daniel Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

*Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing* (GA 50 [Part II only]). Trans. P. J. Braunstein. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.

*Logic: The Question concerning Truth.* (GA 21). Trans. Thomas Sheehan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

*Logic as the Question concerning the Essence of Language.* (GA 38). Trans. W. G. Torres and Y. Unna. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009.

*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.* (1929a). Trans. James Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962.

*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.* (GA 3). Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

*Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers.* Ed. Gunther Neske and Emil Kettering. Trans. Lisa Harries. New York: Paragon House, 1990. Contains:

1. *The Self-Assertion of the German University.* (1933a).
2. *The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts.* (1945a).
3. *The Spiegel-Interview.* (1966a).
4. *Martin Heidegger in Conversation.* (1979f).
5. *Greetings to the Symposium in Beirut.* (1974d).

*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.* (GA 26). Trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

*Mindfulness.* (GA 66). Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. London: Continuum, 2006.

*Nietzsche I. The Will to Power as Art.* Ed. and trans., with notes and an analysis, by David F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Contains:

1. *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same.* (1937d).
2. *Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?* (1953e).

*Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same.* Ed. and trans., with notes and analysis, by David F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. Contains:

1. *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*. (1937d).
2. *Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?* (1953e).

*Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics*. Ed., with notes and analysis, by David F. Krell. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, David F. Krell, and Frank Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. Contains:

1. *The Will to Power as Knowledge*. (1939c).
2. *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the Will to Power*. (1939d).
3. *Nietzsche's Metaphysics*. (1940c).

*Nietzsche, IV: Nihilism*. Ed. and trans., with notes and analysis, by David F. Krell. Trans. Frank Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1982. Contains:

1. *European Nihilism*. (1940b).
2. *Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being*. (1944–46).

*Off the Beaten Track* (GA 5). Trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Contains:

1. *The Origin of the Work of Art*. (1935/36).
2. *The Age of the World Picture*. (1938).
3. *Hegel's Concept of Experience*. (1942/43).
4. *Nietzsche's Word: "God Is Dead."* (1943c).
5. *Why Poets?* (1946b).
6. *Anaximander's Saying*. (1946c).

*On the Essence of Language: The Metaphysics of Language and the Essencing of the Word; Concerning Herder's Treatise "On the Origin of Language."* (GA 85). Trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Y. Unna. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.

*On the Question concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking*. Trans. Richard Capobianco and M. Göbel. *Epoché* 14, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 213–223. (1968d).

*On the Sistine Madonna*. Trans. E. J. Gyuro. *Existentia* 16, nos. 5–6 (2006). (1955c).

*On the Way to Language*. Trans. P. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Contains:

1. *A Dialogue on Language*. (1953/54)
2. *The Nature of Language*. (1957/58)
3. *The Way to Language*. (1959c).
4. *Words*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. (1958b).

5. *Language in the Poem*. (1952d).

*On Time and Being*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Contains:

1. *Time and Being*. (1962c).
2. *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*. (1964a).
3. *My Way to Phenomenology*. (1963a).

*Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. (GA 63). Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

*Parmenides*. (GA 54). Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

*Pathmarks*. (GA 9). Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Contains:

1. *Comments on Karl Jaspers's "Psychology of Worldviews."* Trans. John van Buren. (1919–21).
2. *Phenomenology and Theology*. Trans. James Hart and JohnMaraldo. (1927e).
3. *From the Last Marburg Lecture-Course*. Trans. Michael Heim. (1964b).
4. *What Is Metaphysics?* Trans. David F. Krell. (1929k).
5. *On the Essence of Ground*. Trans. William McNeill. (1929b).
6. *On the Essence of Truth*. Trans. John Sallis. (1930e & h).
7. *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. Trans. Thomas Sheehan. (1942a).
8. *On the Essence and Concept of φύσις in Aristotle's "Physics B, 1."* Trans. Thomas Sheehan. (1939a).
9. *Postscript to "What Is Metaphysics?"* Trans. William McNeill. (1943b).
10. *Letter on "Humanism."* Trans. Frank Capuzzi. (1946a).
11. *Introduction to "What Is Metaphysics?"* Trans. Walter Kaufmann. (1949b).
12. *On the Question of Being*. Trans. Walter McNeill. (1955q).
13. *Hegel and the Greeks*. Trans. R. Metcalf. (1958c).
14. *Kant's Thesis about Being*. Trans. Ted Klein and W. E. Pohl. (1961c).

*Pathway, The*. Trans. Thomas O'Meara. In Thomas Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger The Man and the Thinker*. Chicago: Precedent Press, 1981.

*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*. (GA 61). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* (GA 25). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

*Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.* (GA 59). Trans. Tracy Colony. London: Continuum, 2010.

*Phenomenology of Religious Life.* (GA 60). Trans. Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei and Matthias Fritsch. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

*The Piety of Thinking.* Ed. and trans. James Hart and John Maraldo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Contains:

1. *Phenomenology and Theology.* (1927e).
2. *Theological Discussion of "The Problem of Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today's Theology"—Some Pointers to Its Major Aspects.* (1964f).
3. *Review of Ernst Cassirer's "Mythical Thinking."* (1928g)
4. *Principles of Thinking.* (1958a).

*Plato: The Sophist.* (GA 19). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

*Plato's Doctrine of Truth.* Trans. J. Barlow. In W. Barrett and H. D. Aiken (eds.), *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 3. New York: Random House, 1962. (1942a).

*Poetry, Language, Thought.* Trans. Alfred Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Contains:

1. *The Thinker as Poet.* (1947b).
2. *The Origin of the Work of Art.* (1935c).
3. *What Are Poets For?* (1946b).
4. *Building, Dwelling, Thinking.* (1951a).
5. *The Thing.* (1950b)
6. *Language.* (1950c)
7. . . . *Poetically Man Dwells . . . .* (1951b).

*Ponderings II–IV: Black Notebooks (1931–1938).* (GA 94). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.

*Ponderings VII–XI: Black Notebooks (1938–1939).* (GA 95). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017.

*Poverty.* (1945b). Trans. Thomas Kalary and Frank Schalow. In Frank Schalow (ed.), *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad.* Dordrecht: Springer, 2011.

*Principle of Reason, The.* Trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.



*Question concerning Technology and Other Essays, The.* Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. Contains:

1. *The Question concerning Technology.* (1953c)
2. *The Turning.* (1949c)
3. *The Word of Nietzsche: "God Is Dead."* (1943c)
4. *The Age of the World Picture.* (1938)
5. *Science and Reflection.* (1953b)

*Question concerning the Thing, The: On Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Principles.* (GA 41). Trans. James Reid and Benjamin Crowe. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

*Question of Being, The.* (1955a). Trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback: New Haven, Conn.: Twayne, 1958.

*Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom.* Trans. Joan Staumbaugh. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985. (1971a).

*Sojourns.* Trans. J. P. Manoussakis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. (1962i).

*Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond.* Ed. John van Buren. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. Contains:

*Per Mortem Ad Vitam: Thoughts on Johannes Jørgensen's Lies of Life and Truth of Life.* (1910). Trans. John Protevi and John van Buren.

*The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy.* (1912). Trans. Philip Bossert and John van Buren.

*The Concept of Time in the Science of History.* (1915). Trans. Harry Taylor, Hans Uffelmann, and John van Buren.

*The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus: Author's Book Notice.* (1917). Trans. John van Buren.

*Conclusion: The Problem of the Categories.* (1916). Trans. Roderick Stewart and John van Buren.

*Letter to Father Engelbert Krebs.* (1919). Trans. John van Buren.

*Comments on Karl Jaspers' "Psychology of World-Views."* (1920). Trans. John van Buren.

*The Problem of Sin in Luther.* (1924). Trans. John van Buren.

*Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation.* (1922). Trans. John van Buren.

*Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview.* (1925). Trans. Charles Bambach.

*Towards the Definition of Philosophy.* (GA 56/57). Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2000.

- “Traditional Language and Technological Language.” Trans. Wanda Torres Gregory. *Journal of Philosophical Research* 23 (1998): 129–145. (1962h).
- “Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question, The.” Trans. Thomas Sheehan and Frederick Elliston. *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 199–201.
- “Want of Holy Names, The.” Trans. Bernhard Radloff. *Man and World* 18, no. 3 (1985): 261–267. (1974a).
- Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics, The*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. In Walter Kaufmann (ed.), *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Cleveland: World, 1975. (1949b).
- What Is a Thing?* Trans. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967. (1962a).
- What Is Called Thinking?* Trans. J. Glenn Gray and F. D. Wieck. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968. (1971b).
- What Is Philosophy?* Trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback. New Haven, Conn.: Twayne, 1959. (1956a).
- Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?* Trans. Thomas Sheehan. In Thomas Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*. Chicago: Precedent, 1981. (1933b).

### III. CORRESPONDENCE

Author’s note: Some of the most important individual letters that have been published are listed in appendix I. Here, only collections of correspondence are listed.

- Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger. *Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse*. Ed. Ursula Ludz. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998.
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## VII. COMMENTARIES

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## About the Author

**Frank Schalow** (BA, University of Denver; MA, Tulane University; PhD, Tulane University) holds the position of university research professor at the University of New Orleans. He is coeditor of the international journal *Heidegger Studies*. In 1992, he served as the secretary-convener of the annual North American Heidegger Conference, and cosecretary-convener (with François Raffoul) of the same conference in 2004. His several books on Heidegger's philosophy include *Departures: At the Crossroads between Heidegger and Kant* (2013); *The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in Heidegger's Thought* (2006); *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith* (2001); and *The Renewal of the Heidegger-Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility* (1992). His interest in Heidegger's thought extends to its application in the study of contemporary social issues, as reflected in his most recent book, *Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction: Embodiment, Technology, Transcendence* (2017). In April 2015, he received the Faculty Distinguished Research Award, granted by the University Honors Program of the University of New Orleans.