

Linguistic Approaches to Literature

35



Pragmatics and Literature

Edited by
Siobhan Chapman
and Billy Clark



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Pragmatics and Literature

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Volume 35

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Introduction

Siobhan Chapman and Billy Clark

In this collection we present a range of new work at the interface of pragmatics and literary studies. One of our aims in doing so is to represent the state of the art in the application of ideas developed in pragmatic theories to the analysis of different types of literary text. We do not take a position here on how to define the term ‘literary’ but we assume that the definition is broad enough to include texts in a range of forms and media, including various kinds of dramatic performance and artefact. Our previous collection, *Pragmatic Literary Stylistics* (Chapman and Clark, 2014) represented a significant step forward. It was the first edited collection on pragmatic stylistics for several years, building in turn on – and sharing some authors with – Caink and Clark’s (2012) special issue of the *Journal of Literary Semantics*. A key aim of our earlier collection was to establish and help to define the field described in the book’s title. The current strength of this field is evidenced by a growing number of conference presentations and important publications.¹ There are signs among this work of the emergence of a more structured shape of the field of pragmatic literary stylistics, and this is also reflected in this collection. Questions about inference, implicature and indeterminacy in the production, interpretation and evaluation of texts are central to this research programme. A range of approaches to pragmatics are applied, including generally post-Gricean approaches, more narrowly neo-Gricean ones, and work on aspects of (im)politeness. The discussion is also beginning to explore connections with other approaches to literary texts, including work on cognitive poetics and reader response.

While the chapters here are grouped according to pragmatic framework, the aim is not straightforwardly to put those frameworks in competition with each

1. Conference events include a workshop on Relevance, Literariness and Interpretation at Middlesex University in 2014, a series of Special Interest Group workshops at Poetics and Linguistics Association annual conferences, and sessions organised by the Forum on Linguistics and Literature at the Modern Language Association annual conventions. Publications include Cave and Wilson, 2018; Fabb, 2016; Locher and Jucker, 2017; Mandala, 2018; Rosaler, 2016; Sorlin, 2016.

other. As we suggested before (Chapman and Clark, 2014: p. 7), we believe that the field benefits from exploring two tensions. The first is between theoretical eclecticism (being open to applying different approaches rather than adhering strictly to particular ones) and the assumption that work in pragmatic literary stylistics can help to test particular approaches (by considering how adequately they account for the production, interpretation and evaluation of texts). The second is between the assumption that work in pragmatic literary stylistics is about accounting for interpretations (rather than generating them) and the assumption that it can sometimes help to adjudicate between competing interpretations. Our aim here is to facilitate exploration of what different frameworks have to offer, how they differ, and what might emerge from comparing them. We also believe that grouping the chapters in relation to frameworks may allow shared issues, strengths or problems to become apparent. Examples here include the discussion of markedness in relation to neo-Gricean pragmatics mentioned below and accounts of textual indeterminacies from different perspectives.

In the introduction to our earlier collection, we predicted that pragmatic literary stylistics would continue to explore ‘the tension between the aims of developing specific analyses or understanding and of testing specific theoretical approaches’ (2014: p. 10). The structure of the present volume offers a way of considering how these issues are currently being developed and, we hope, identifying directions for future research.

The studies presented in the individual chapters in this volume encompass the main genres of literature: prose, poetry and drama. They also draw on a range of different theoretical frameworks from present day pragmatics: neo-Gricean pragmatics, relevance theory and (im)politeness theory. All these types of pragmatic theory include some notion of ‘implicature’ as a necessary component. There are significant variations in how this technical term is defined and understood in different frameworks, and much debate in current pragmatic theory centres on the demarcation of this concept. However, the importance of an understanding of implicature to a full account of any communicative encounter is a shared commitment across pragmatic theories, and consequently the application of some theory of implicature to the reading of literary texts could be seen as a common and defining theme of different types of pragmatic literary stylistics; in fact, this shared commitment might be seen as being of more importance than the local differences. As Clark argues, ‘While particular theoretical frameworks may provide particular kinds of insights, it is also possible to cast a significant amount of light on particular texts without explicitly adopting a particular framework’ (Clark, 2014: p. 307).

The term ‘implicature’ is proper to the discipline of pragmatics, having been coined by Paul Grice in his foundational work. We think it will be useful here to summarise some of the points Grice made in developing understanding of this

notion. He introduced the term in the course of a series of lectures on ‘Logic and Conversation’, delivered at the University of Harvard in 1967 and subsequently published piecemeal throughout the 1960s and 70s, most influentially in Grice (1975). He was motivated to do so by a philosophical need to offer a systematic explanation of the variety of ways in which a speaker might communicate information not strictly licensed by the linguistic form of an utterance. In considering the range of such cases, it might not be satisfactory to choose from the set of existing verbs and discuss what the speaker ‘implied’, ‘suggested’ or ‘meant’. He therefore proposed to ‘introduce, as terms of art, the verb *implicate* and the related nouns *implicature* (cf. *implying*) and *implicatum* (cf. *what is implied*)’ (Grice, 1975: p. 24).² This enabled him to distinguish systematically between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ in any communicative encounter, supporting his general thesis that both linguistic factors and other more general features of human behaviour and cognition contribute to meaning conveyed in conversation. In doing so, he was challenging the received assumption of ordinary language philosophy that the meaning of a linguistic form could be identified with accumulated evidence about its use.

‘What is said’ is a central and crucial term in Gricean pragmatics, but Grice himself afforded it a rather sketchy definition. He stated that he intended it ‘to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence)’ uttered and that ‘given a knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said’ (Grice, 1975: p. 25). He further allowed that information about the reference of deictic expressions such as pronouns and verb tenses would need to be input into ‘what is said’, along with the identification of the appropriate meaning of any potentially ambiguous component. But he said little more about ‘what is said’. He was much more forthcoming about the nature of ‘what is implicated’, particularly in relation to the production of what he dubbed ‘conversational implicatures’. In any given context, what is conversationally implicated will ultimately be dependent on ‘what is said’, but will add to it or even contradict it as determined by an overall commitment to rational, cooperative behaviour that is tacitly shared between speaker and hearer. This commitment is summed up in Grice’s cooperative principle, an overarching normative rule of conversation that guides a speaker’s production and, on the assumption that it is being followed, facilitates a hearer’s interpretation: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged’ (Grice, 1975: p. 26).

2. The term *implicatum* is not generally used in current work. Instead the term *implicature* is used both for communicative implying and for what is communicatively implied.

Grice's cooperative principle is worked out in detail in a number of different individual maxims, each of which governs a particular type of communicative behaviour. These maxims are numerous and diverse in nature, but Grice groups them into four distinct categories, which together delineate the nature of cooperative behaviour. The Category of Quantity contains two maxims: 'make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)' and 'do not make your contribution more informative than is required'. The Category of Quality enjoins speakers: 'do not say what you believe to be false' and 'do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence'. The Category of Relation contains one, apparently simple, maxim: 'be relevant'. The Category of Manner, on the other hand, includes a longer and, Grice admits, possibly incomplete list of maxims: 'avoid obscurity of expression', 'avoid ambiguity', 'be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)' and 'be orderly'.

Conversational implicatures arise because of the operation of one or more maxims. Grice elaborates a number of ways in which the maxims may operate, and relates these to a range of different possible conversational implicatures. For instance, the existence of a maxim is often enough to guide a hearer to an implicated interpretation that is not part of 'what is said'. A, who is standing next to a car, tells B that 'I am out of petrol' and B replies that 'There is a garage round the corner'. On the assumption that B is observing the single maxim of Relation, A is licensed to understand that B believes that the garage sells petrol, is open and so on. If B did not have these beliefs it would simply not have been relevant, and hence not cooperative, to have commented on the garage at all. On some occasions, a speaker may apparently go against the requirements of a particular maxim and behave in an uncooperative way. If this is done blatantly, in the full intention that the hearer will notice the apparent problem, then in Gricean terminology the speaker is 'flouting' the maxim rather than unostentatiously violating or breaching it. As a result, the hearer is licensed to recover as a conversational implicature information which is sufficient to restore the conversational contribution as a cooperative one. A philosopher composing a reference for a student who is applying for an academic post writes: 'Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.' Considering simply 'what is said', the writer of the reference seems to be in blatant disregard of the first maxim of Quantity; she is simply not being informative enough to provide an adequate reference, because she has said nothing about Mr. X's intellectual or philosophical abilities. In terms of 'what is implicated', however, the recipient of the reference will be very adequately informed. He will understand that Mr. X is not a strong candidate for the job, and will understand this precisely because of the writer's apparent underinformativeness on the subject of whether he is any good at philosophy.

Examples such as these, which are the mainstay of Gricean pragmatics, are dependent on the operation of the maxims in individual conversational settings. In different contexts the comment about the garage, or the faint praise for Mr. X, would not result in the implicatures described above. These are examples of ‘particularised conversational implicatures’ (PCIs), which Grice distinguishes from a separate category of ‘generalised conversational implicatures’ (GCIs). These do depend on the operation of a maxim but they are not tied to individual contexts of utterance. A GCI will arise by default when a certain form of words is used. Its pragmatic status is confirmed by the fact that it can be explicitly cancelled, or can be prevented from arising by some specific feature of context. It is possible for instance to identify a GCI associated with at least some uses of the indefinite article. In cases where a hearer might reasonably find it interpretatively important for the speaker to be specific in her reference, the use of ‘an X’ generally ‘implicates that X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable person’ (Grice, 1975: p. 38). So, for instance, ‘X went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside the front door’ will give rise by default to the implicature that the house was not X’s own. Again, it is the first maxim of Quantity that is at play here. If the speaker had been in the position to be more informative by providing the detail that the house was X’s own it would have been cooperative to do so.

‘Neo-Gricean’ pragmatic theories share a commitment to many of the fundamentals of Grice’s programme, including his ambition to identify various pragmatic principles which account for the distinction between linguistic meaning and what is communicated in context. Two such theories are particularly significant in relation to the chapters in this collection: that of Stephen Levinson, propounded mainly in Levinson (2000) and that of Laurence Horn, developed in various publications including Horn (2004) and Horn (2007). Both dispense with Quality as a motivating factor in pragmatic interpretation, concentrating on how information is conveyed rather than on the requirement for that information to be truthful, which is seen as primary and distinct. They differ from each other in various ways, the most striking of which are the number of pragmatic principles they encompass, and the ways in which they distribute the maxims from Grice’s remaining categories among those principles.

Levinson proposes three pragmatic principles: the Q-Principle (Quantity), the I-Principle (Informativeness) and the M-Principle (Manner). Each contains a speaker’s maxim, concerned with the way in which an utterance is put together, and a recipient’s corollary, concerned with how the utterance is to be understood. Together, they account for the various ways in which an utterance may convey more than its literal content would seem to allow.

Q-Principle

Speaker's maxim: do not say less than is required (bearing the I-principle in mind).

Recipient's corollary: what is not said is not the case.

I-Principle

Speaker's maxim: do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-Principle in mind).

Recipient's corollary: what is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.

M-Principle

Speaker's maxim: do not use a marked expression without reason.

Recipient's corollary: what is said in a marked way is not unmarked.

For Levinson, the operation of the three pragmatic principles can explain how information can be conveyed economically and efficiently using the finite resources of a language that must be articulated in real time. Pragmatic processing lets 'not only the content but also the metalinguistic properties of the utterance (i.e. its form) carry the message' (Levinson, 2000: p. 6). Central to Levinson's pragmatics is his emphasis on the role of generalised conversational implicatures in this process. These are similar in conception to Gricean GCIs, although they differ in terms of how they relate to linguistic meaning or to what would constitute a Gricean understanding of 'what is said'. For Levinson they explain how many aspects of meaning are conveyed as default interpretation, or 'presumptive meanings'. They depend on the operation of the pragmatic principles, but not on the specifics of context.

Horn reduces the mechanisms of neo-Gricean pragmatics yet further, positing just two principles of interpretation: the Q-Principle and the R-Principle. These labels borrow from Grice's original insights concerning the importance of 'Quantity' and of 'Relation' but are not straightforwardly coterminous with Grice's own maxims or categories. Together, Horn's two principles hold in balance the way in which information is conveyed. They impose apparently contradictory restrictions on the speaker so as to ensure that an utterance is neither too terse to convey adequate information nor too prolix to allow economical processing. The Q-Principle covers the same ground as Grice's first maxim of Quantity and his first two maxims of Manner, and enjoins the speaker to 'make your contribution sufficient' or 'say as much as you can'. It is 'hearer-orientated', in that its effect is to ensure that the hearer receives sufficient information in any particular context. As a result, hearers can access negative implicatures to the effect that if something more informative might have been said but was not, this is because as far as the

speaker knows that more informative statement is not consistent with the truth. Uttered after the end of the tournament in question, ‘Murray reached the quarter finals at Wimbledon’ might reasonably be taken to implicate that Murray did not reach the semi-finals or the final, since if this were the case it would have been more informative to say so. The R-Principle does the work that for Grice was managed by the maxim of Relation, the second maxim of Quantity, and the last two maxims of Manner. It requires the speaker to ‘make your contribution necessary’ or ‘say no more than you must’. It is ‘speaker-orientated’, ensuring that the speaker does not go to more than necessary effort to convey the information which will be sufficient for the hearer in the context. The hearer is therefore able to recover more precise or more informative pieces of content which were not explicitly said because it was not necessary to say them. These will generally be pieces of information that are stereotypical, usual, or predictable in the context. ‘Gerald was wearing Oxford brogues’ will generally be taken to implicate that Gerald was wearing them on his feet, because that is where people usually wear shoes. The hearer can infer that the speaker would have gone to the trouble of specifying where Gerald was wearing the brogues if it had been somewhere unusual or unexpected, such as on his hands or on his head.

Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002; Clark, 2013) is usually referred to as a ‘post-Gricean’ approach, where this term implies that it diverges from some of Grice’s ideas more fully than the ‘neo-Gricean’ approaches. The most important difference is usually taken to be that it does not assume ‘maxim-like’ principles but is instead based on law-like generalisations about human cognition and communication, each of which refers to a technical notion of ‘relevance’ defined with reference to cognitive effects (roughly, the more effects a stimulus or interpretation has the more relevant it is) and effort (roughly, the more effort involved in deriving effects, the less relevant the stimulus or interpretation is). These are expressed as follows:

Cognitive Principle of Relevance

Human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximisation of relevance.

Communicative Principle of Relevance

Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

In simple terms, the key claims are that human cognitive processes aim to ‘maximise’ relevance, i.e. to derive as many positive cognitive effects as possible for as little effort as possible, and that ostensively communicative acts raise fairly precise expectations of relevance (that the communicator has an interpretation in mind which it is worth expending effort in deriving).

These assumptions explain why we go to greater effort in looking for an interpretation when we recognise ostensibly communicative behaviour and they also explain some details of particular interpretations.

There have been some significant developments in relevance-theoretic work over the years. One is a move away from standard Fodorian assumptions about modularity (as expressed in Fodor, 1983) and towards the assumption of a greater number of modules understood as specialised cognitive systems. This approach is often described as the assumption of ‘massive modularity’ (Sperber, 2001). On this view, pragmatic production and interpretation involve the activities of several modules and sub-modules, including a comprehension module which is responsible for a ‘rough and ready heuristic’ (in the sense of Gigerenzer et al., 1999) which guides interpretations:

Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic

Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects:

- a. test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility
- b. stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)

Arguably, this new picture takes relevance theory even further from its starting point in the ideas of Grice, since the interpretation process is further removed from the fairly explicit reasoning he originally outlined.

Another idea which has been presented since the early stages of the development of relevance theory is that interpretation involves ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ where hypotheses about explicatures and implicatures (and other things, such as the construction and access of contextual assumptions) affect each other in online processing.

Two further key ideas concern indeterminacies about whether acts are communicative and about the communicated content (discussed together by Sperber and Wilson, 2015). Related to these are the notions that interpretations extend over space and time (to varying degrees) and that they often involve adjustments in the ‘manifestness’ of assumptions (roughly, their relative salience and their likelihood of being entertained as true) rather than simply the inference of particular assumptions. The picture which has emerged is of dynamic, complex and open-ended interpretation processes. The chapters here which explore ideas from relevance theory are part of the ongoing enterprise of exploring how the latest ideas in relevance theory can be applied in pragmatic literary stylistics.

The final development in pragmatics relevant to the chapters in this volume is (im)politeness theory. The aims of this theory, or perhaps more accurately this group of related theories, are to explain why people choose to frame their utterances as they do in relation to particular social circumstances, and to account for

the interpersonal and wider social effects of such choices. As such, (im)politeness theory is less centrally concerned with the notion of implicature than are the theories discussed above, but even here the notion has an important role to play in explaining how social interaction proceeds. The groundwork of (im)politeness theory can be found in Brown and Levinson (1987) which, although criticised and challenged in various ways in recent years, remains central to how linguistic politeness is understood. Brown and Levinson draw on the notion of 'face' introduced by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1955) in order to explain complex sets of needs that are present in any communicative interaction. Speaker and hearer have both a positive face, which can be thought of as the desire to look good socially, or to appear to be liked, and a negative face, which relates to the desire not to have one's actions impeded, or not to be too easily controlled by others. Conversation often involves a careful negotiation of the sometimes competing needs of these different types of face. Implicatures may be used to get across a message that is in some way socially difficult, particularly if that message constitutes a Face Threatening Act (FTA) in relation to one of the types of face at stake in the social encounter. Conveying information as an implicature can allow the speaker to go 'off record' in achieving this aim.

Recent work has pointed out that a weakness in Brown and Levinson's approach is that it assumed that politeness is always the goal in communicative encounters, and that as a result FTAs are routinely avoided or negotiated. So-called 'impoliteness theory' has developed various frameworks in which to describe interactions in which, on the contrary, linguistic politeness may be eschewed (see, for instance, Bousfield and Locher, 2008; Culpeper, 2011). Impoliteness theorists typically analyse extended pieces of confrontational interactions to assess how impoliteness may be a deliberate communicative strategy, and how FTAs may be produced directly rather than implicitly, in order to cause disharmony in the social encounter. The term (im)politeness is now generally used in pragmatics to encompass the broad field of linguistic study which considers how language is used in context to protect or to damage social relationships and to reflect or to establish power and social hierarchy.

Pragmatic literary stylistics draws on a variety of systematic accounts of linguistic interaction, which were developed independently of literary analysis, in order to explain interpretations of specific texts. As a discipline it can be seen as distinct from the various movements and schools of thought of literary critical theory. Critical responses can, of course, provide valuable input to pragmatic literary stylistics. Indeed, many of the individual studies collected in this volume draw on previous discussions of a particular text by its literary critics. But the discipline has developed from, and continues to be informed chiefly by, work in linguistics and pragmatics rather than in literary studies. Yet, despite their separate

development, pragmatic literary stylistics would seem to have a natural affinity with the broad group of critical approaches which pay particular attention to the role of readers in interpreting literary works; in this volume, Caink explores the properties of pragmatic literary stylistics as ‘a reader-orientated stylistics’. In this, it shares an attribute common to stylistics more generally which, as Whiteley and Canning observe, is ‘grounded on the understanding of literary works (indeed, all texts) as heteronomous objects; that is, objects which are brought into being by the observing consciousness of a reader’ (2017: p. 72).

An account of the effects that a text may have on its readers might be seen as a necessary component of any serious analysis. But the role of the reader became particularly prominent in a collection of critical approaches that developed in the middle part of the last century. These were in part a reaction to the textual autonomy advocated in New Criticism (Ransom, 1941), which saw a work of literature as a locus of stable, independent meaning. Conversely, the various approaches which have become known as ‘reader response criticism’ and ‘reception theory’ understood meaning as being to varying degrees created through the active participation of the reader. For reader response theorists, as Tompkins explains, the effects of a literary text, ‘are essential to any accurate description of its meaning, since that meaning has no effective existence outside of its realization in the mind of a reader’ (1980: p. ix). Although they differed on a number of significant issues, including the extent to which the text could be afforded an objective existence outside of individual instances of reading, they concurred in calling for a more nuanced vocabulary to discuss the reading process itself. Just as it had proved necessary in literary criticism to distinguish between actual historical writers and ‘narrators’, ‘implied authors’ and ‘voices’, so too a distinction was made between specific individual readers, and the type of reader that the text appeared to project or assume. The latter was variously identified, among other labels, as the ‘mock reader’ (Gibson, 1950), the ‘narratee’ (Price, 1973), the ‘implied reader’ (Iser, 1974) and the ‘ideal reader’ (Culler, 1975).

Reader response theorists saw meaning in relation to literature as inherently interactive. Meaning was not located solely in the text itself, nor was it solely a creation of the reader. Rather, it came about as a result of the communicative encounter between text and reader. As such, such theorists could be argued to have much in common with their contemporaries in linguistic pragmatics. Wolfgang Iser is a case in point. Writing at much the same time as Paul Grice was first beginning to publish the component parts of his theory of conversation, Iser (1974) distinguished between ‘the text’ and ‘the literary work’. The latter, the site of the full communicative meaning, is brought into being by the dynamic interaction of the text and the reader. Both have a role to play. ‘The written text imposes certain limits on its unwritten implications’, but the specific implications drawn are not

entirely determined by the text but rather are dependent on the reader. They give a context to the situation described in the text ‘which endows it with far greater significance than it might have seemed to possess on its own’ (Iser 1974: p. 276). It is tempting to see Iser’s picture of communication as akin to Grice’s. ‘The text’ is similar to ‘what is said’; it does not in itself contain the full significance of what is communicated, but places restrictions on what the reader can derive as ‘implications’, just as the Gricean ‘what is said’ constrains but does not entirely determine what the hearer can recover as ‘implicatures’. For both reader response theorists such as Iser, and also for Grice, then, meaning is interactive, a shared product of communicators and interpreters. It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that approaches which focus on the responses of readers are fully reader-focussed and do not recognise the communication of meanings as interactive.

Writing just a few years later, Tzvetan Todorov was also interested in the reader’s input into the processes of the creation, or for Todorov the ‘construction’ of meaning (Todorov, 1980). The term ‘reader response theory’ certainly cannot be applied straightforwardly to Todorov’s account, not least because of his insistence on the autonomous and pre-existing nature of the text itself. Nevertheless, he argues that readers draw on different types of factor in establishing interpretations: factors that include the text but include also their own sense of what is ‘probable’, drawing presumably on background assumptions and encyclopedic knowledge. In considering the information that we as readers may draw on during the process of construction, Todorov includes some assumptions made about the author’s participation in the interaction; ‘we assume that the author has not cheated and that he has provided (has signified) all the information we need to understand the story’ (Todorov, 1980: p. 156). Here, too, there are concurrences with pragmatic theory. Todorov could be seen as offering something like an ‘author-orientated’ principle, which we as readers are licensed to assume has been followed. Specifically, the reader’s assumption has much in common with the various pragmatic principles of quantity, concerned as it is with the amount of information which can appropriately be expected in a particular context.

The term ‘reader response’ is still current in present-day work on literary texts, particularly in relation to literary stylistics where it now has a quite specific application. Here, it encompasses ‘work in which reader response is studied formally through the collection and analysis of “extra-textual” datasets that capture aspects of readers’ behaviour, interpretations or evaluation in response to particular literary works (and in specific contexts)’ (Whiteley and Canning, 2017: p. 72). Such an empirical approach to the study of reader response is not inherent to pragmatic literary stylistics, but is far from incompatible with it. In the present volume, Warner draws on actual responses she has observed and recorded from students in various university settings.

While pragmatic theory and literary criticism may sometimes appear to be propounding similar ideas, the former generally develops these ideas in a more structured and more principle-driven way. Both Iser's and Todorov's 'text' might have something in common with Grice's 'what is said', but their accounts of the actual processes by which the meaning of a work of literature is produced are nothing like as detailed as Grice's system of specific maxims operating to produce a variety of different types of conversational implicature, nor as the subsequent developments and refinements of that system in relevance theory and neo-Gricean pragmatics. One way of envisaging the relationship between the two disciplines, then, is that pragmatics can offer precise descriptive terminology and analytic tools with which to apply the insights of literary criticism and to account for some critical responses. The tools can be used to explain how, for instance, meaning might be created in a particular reading of a specific text. The aim of pragmatic literary stylistics is in general not to arrive at a novel understanding of a text, or a new interpretation not considered by previous readers or critics. Rather, as we argued in the introduction to our earlier collection, 'pragmatic theory can often explain and substantiate such responses and intuitive interpretations' (Chapman and Clark, 2014: p. 6). In so doing, the analyses of pragmatic literary stylistics often serve to highlight the explanatory power of pragmatics when applied to actual instances of linguistic communication.

Understanding literature as a type of communicative interaction necessarily raises the question of the extent to which it is legitimate to consider the author of a text as a purposeful participant in that interaction: that is, it raises the question of authorial intention. Different literary critical schools of thought have taken very different approaches to this controversial question. In the middle of the twentieth century, any reference to the historical, communicating author became more or less taboo; Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946), for instance, argued that 'the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art' (p. 468). Some subsequent theorists have been more open to the possibility of addressing the role of the author. As discussed above, Todorov considered what readers may expect authors to have taken into account in producing a text. More recent work in so-called 'genetic criticism', an approach to literary analysis which emphasises the importance of the stages of production for an individual text, openly acknowledges the importance of a consideration of an author's intentions. Murphy (2011), for instance, explains that 'interpreters have to decide whether the intentions at work in the earlier text(s) or those at work in the later one(s) should guide the interpretation of the text' (p. 72).

Pragmatic literary stylistics would appear, to some extent at least, to be committed to affording a purposeful role to authors. The text which is input into the interpretative process would seem to require the assumption of an author, just as

the utterances discussed in more traditional pragmatic theory require the assumption of speakers. However, affording a communicative role to authors does not commit the analyst to any *a priori* knowledge of or access to author's intentions. To the extent that pragmatic theories draw on communicative intentions, they refer to intentions that are apparent or inferentially recoverable. For instance, in Gricean pragmatics, what the speaker thinks or intends is not something to which the hearer can claim direct access, but something which he must assume or guess for the sake of the communicative encounter. For Grice, the state of mind and the intentions of the speaker are things that must be 'supposed' by the hearer in order for the communication to be successful (Grice, 1975: p. 31). Within relevance theory, a literary text, like any other, is treated as an act of 'ostensive-inferential' (intentional) communication and this activates a comprehension heuristic which seeks an 'optimally relevant' interpretation. One question for relevance theory (discussed, for example, by Furlong, 1996, 2007, 2011) concerns how expectations of relevance might vary when responding to a literary text (another question Furlong discusses is how to define the term 'literary'). For Gricean, neo-Gricean and relevance-theoretic approaches, readers also recognise fictional communicators represented in texts (narrators and characters) and pragmatic principles guide inferences about their intentions too.³

The individual analyses reported in the eight chapters in this collection each focus on one or more literary text(s), broadly defined. Together, they cover a variety of genres and a diverse chronological range of texts. They are grouped here in relation to the type of pragmatic theory which offers the main framework for analysis. The first three chapters are all concerned with some version of neo-Gricean pragmatics. The next four apply some aspect of relevance theory to textual analysis. The final chapter draws on foundational and recent developments in theories of (im)politeness.

In the first chapter, 'Marked forms and indeterminate implicatures in Ernest Hemingway's *Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises*', Siobhan Chapman uses neo-Gricean pragmatics to analyse a short extract from her chosen text. Drawing mainly on Horn's framework of pragmatic principles, the analysis concentrates on a few lexical choices in the dialogue of the characters, and in the way in which that dialogue is presented to the reader. It suggests how neo-Gricean pragmatics can explain the implicit communication of alienation, displacement and disorientation that many of the novel's critics have identified. The analysis also raises questions relating to two types of issues: issues relating to the definition of a 'marked' form in linguistic analysis, and issues concerning whether pragmatic theory should appropriately

3. The application of pragmatic principles to these different sources of communication was recognised in early work on pragmatic stylistics (e.g. by Leech and Short, 1981: p. 237–254).

accommodate implicatures that are ‘indeterminate’ in relation to the information implicitly exchanged between speaker and hearer. Both have been considered, but perhaps not fully developed, in Grice’s original presentation of his ideas and in subsequent work in neo-Gricean pragmatics. In addition to the specific literary analysis it offers, this chapter therefore has three main aims in relation to neo-Gricean pragmatics. It applies ideas from neo-Gricean pragmatics to the analysis of one short literary extract, it considers how this type of analysis may contribute to an explanation of responses to the text more generally, and it illustrates how consideration of a literary text may contribute to the process of challenging, testing and developing pragmatic theory itself.

Steven Pattinson’s chapter, ‘A Levinsonian account of irony in Jonathan Coe’s *The Rotters’ Club*’, offers an application but also a possible extension of Levinson’s three-principled framework. Pattinson proposes an account of different types of irony that utilises Levinson’s framework and assesses this in relation to more prominent pragmatic accounts of how irony is understood. He argues that, while Levinson’s framework certainly allows for the communication and interpretation of PCIs, including irony, Levinson’s own concentration on the role of GCIs in interpretation has tended to overshadow this aspect of his pragmatics. Pattinson begins with a consideration of a range of examples of irony that are familiar from previous pragmatic discussions. He then offers detailed accounts of a number of extracts from Coe’s comic novel, which has been praised by its critics for its skillful and subtle use of irony. This chapter, then, advances the application of Levinsonian pragmatics both by developing it as an account of irony and also by applying it in a sustained analysis of a literary text. Pattinson’s success in both areas offers a strong argument for further attention to and wider application of Levinson’s principles.

In ‘What the /fʌk/? An acoustic-pragmatic analysis of implicated meaning in a scene from *The Wire*’, Erica Gold and Dan McIntyre offer a multimodal pragmatic analysis. Starting from the observation that pragmatic theory has not traditionally taken much account of phonetic aspects of utterances, they argue that acoustic phenomena can and should play a central role in the pragmatic interpretation of spoken utterances. Using methods from pragmatics, particularly Horn’s neo-Gricean framework, together with methods from acoustic phonetics, they analyse a scene from the US television series *The Wire*, in which the dialogue between the two speaking characters is restricted almost entirely to one expletive, *fuck*, and its variants. They measure the acoustic properties of /fʌk/ as spoken by the two characters, paying particular attention to the duration and intensity of the onset (/f/), duration and frequency of the nucleus (/ʌ/), and duration of the coda (/k/). They argue that there are observable differences between the vocalisation of the segments depending on their pragmatic function. This chapter therefore introduces phonetic analysis as a means of augmenting traditional pragmatic

analysis, and also offers a potentially important new way of discussing dramatic performance holistically, rather than exclusively in relation to text-based stylistics.

Kate Scott's chapter, 'Misleading and relevance in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*', applies ideas from relevance theory in analysing how and why characters mislead each other in the play. She considers how we can understand lying and misleading (and the distinction between them) in general before showing how they can be applied in discussing literary texts. This involves a consideration of the nature of fictional texts and what they communicate. Here she draws two distinctions. One is between communication at 'lower level' and at 'higher levels', where the former involves characters communicating with each other and the latter involves narrators communicating with audiences. Another is between 'internal' and 'external' relevance. Assumptions are internally relevant when they are relevant to the world of the fictional text and externally relevant when they are relevant in the worlds of audiences. External relevance can be understood as a case of 'showing' in the sense that the author is showing us what could occur in order to generate implicatures relevant to our world rather than to the fictional world of the characters. Scott explains that it is important to keep these distinctions separate before applying them in analysing three scenes in the play, demonstrating how the misleading interactions can be understood in relevance-theoretic terms and how they achieve external relevance for audience members.

In 'Lexical pragmatics in the context of structural parallelism', Andrew Caink provides a striking example of how pragmatic theory can offer tools and terminology for analysis (coming here from relevance-theoretic work on lexical pragmatics) that were not available to earlier critics (here, Jakobson and other Formalists) who were arguably trying to express similar ideas. Caink applies recent ideas from generative grammar in describing strict and loose syntactic parallelism and ideas from relevance theory in accounting for its effects. He argues that syntactic parallelism can contribute not only to the aesthetic effects of works of art but also that it can contribute to the explicit meanings (explicatures) of texts. He shows, for example, that disambiguation can be influenced by the syntactic structures of forms represented in utterances, with parallelisms strongly influencing processes of disambiguation. He also compares the relevance-theoretic approach to metaphor with Grice's account and demonstrates that it copes better with some examples, commenting also on how its 'deflationary' nature (not treating literary communication as distinct from other kinds of uses) helps to account for specific examples. He argues that these ideas from lexical pragmatics make possible new understandings of how parallelism works and represent more fully the complexities of literary and non-literary communication, while also suggesting a less sharp distinction between 'denotative' and 'connotative' communication than has previously been assumed.

Billy Clark's chapter, "Lazy reading" and "half-formed things": indeterminacy and responses to Eimear McBride's *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*, applies ideas from pragmatics in general and from relevance theory in particular in proposing an account of different responses to McBride's novel. The general ideas are about indeterminacy in explicit and implicit content. The relevance-theoretic ideas are about particular kinds of indeterminacy, about how interpretations can extend over space and time, and about how interpretations can be understood as involving adjustments in the manifestness of a range of assumptions rather than simply whether they are communicated or not. Clark considers three ways in which readers might respond to the considerable indeterminacies in the novel. One is to decide that attempts to find interpretations are too frustrating and as a result to give up. Another is to spend considerable effort trying to resolve the indeterminacies. A third is to continue reading while entertaining incomplete representations of events, characters, thoughts and utterances and to derive conclusions from these incomplete representations. Clark suggests that this last option comes closest to what McBride had in mind when writing the novel. He shows that readers who adopt this tactic are more likely to respond positively to the book. Clark's chapter suggests ways in which this work can interact with literary interpretation and criticism, helping us to understand literary critical practice as well as the practice of writers and readers in general.

In 'Mapping the texture of the Berlin Wall: metonymy, layered worlds, and critical implicatures in Sarah Kirsch's poem "Naturschutzgebiet/Nature Reserve"', Chantelle Warner develops an analysis of the poem which applies ideas from Stockwell (2009) on 'texture', text world theory (Gavins, 2007) and relevance theory. She develops an account of how the poem communicates socially critical implicatures relating to the Berlin Wall and to the East German government. She focuses in particular on metonymy and argues that this is best accounted for by combining ideas about implicature as well as about texture and text world theory. The latter two overlap, of course, since Stockwell applies ideas from text world theory in his work on texture. This combination of ideas from various branches of linguistics is an excellent example of the theoretical eclecticism mentioned above. It suggests ways of combining different approaches which provide fuller analyses than the approaches would offer separately and also suggests ways forward in connecting a variety of methods in stylistic analysis and more generally.

Barbara Leonardi's chapter, 'James Hogg's and Walter Scott's Scottishness: varying perceptions of (im)politeness in negotiating Englishness', offers an application of recent, discursive developments in (im)politeness theory to both the production and the contemporary reception of a specific set of prose fiction texts. She focuses in particular on how notions of (im)politeness can be applied in understanding attitudes to behaviour and hence to notions of Englishness in responses to novels produced by Hogg and Scott in the early nineteenth century.

She shows how Hogg's work was disruptive in two ways, in the use of vernacular Scots and in dealing with difficult themes including prostitution, out-of-wedlock pregnancy and infanticide. While some readers responded negatively to Scott's use of vernacular varieties, his work was less disruptive in that the vernacular voices mainly belonged to secondary characters with relatively low social status. Leonardi identifies differences in the reception of Hogg's work in the United States and in Scotland. Scottish reviewers differed in that they continually and intentionally attacked Hogg's positive face through aggravated impoliteness. Significantly, ideas from (im)politeness theory are applied here in considering the relationships between authors and readers and not only between narrators and readers or between characters.

Although the eight chapters summarised above are independent from each other and are concerned with separate literary texts and different interpretative issues, it is instructive to note some of the common themes which emerge from them. These may be suggestive of issues which pragmatic literary stylistics has been particularly successful in highlighting, or areas where further work in the discipline would be fruitful. Two salient examples relate to questions of indeterminacy and 'markedness'

In this collection, as in pragmatics in general, there is a recurring focus on indeterminacy of implicature, or the prevalence of cases in which something is implicated, but the exact nature of that implicature cannot be identified with certainty. This is a phenomenon which has been identified, and has been seen as particularly characteristic of literary texts, in the major theories of pragmatics. Grice argues that in reading poetry it may not be possible to decide definitely between two different interpretations, a phenomenon he suggests arises 'partly because of the sophistication of the poet' (Grice, 1975: p. 35). In relevance theory, the potential for generating a wide range of weak implicatures, or interpretations which are not clearly licensed by the utterer, is described as particularly likely to generate 'poetic effects' (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: p. 222). Many of the chapters in this collection identify indeterminate implicatures or have something to say about the notion of indeterminacy more generally. For instance, Gold and McIntyre consider attention to acoustic properties of utterances as a potential adjunct to interpretation in cases of indeterminacy, while Clark proposes different responses to indeterminacy as characteristic of different reading strategies for, and likely responses to, a particular text. This serves to reinforce, in relation to a wide variety of types of literary text, the observations made by Grice and by Sperber and Wilson. It suggests future areas for investigation in relation to the complex and relatively under-researched theoretical issues surrounding indeterminacy. It is also suggestive of what pragmatics can contribute to the vexed issue of what makes a particular text, or a particular reading of a text, distinctively 'literary'.

Another theme which occurs in more than one chapter (in those adopting a neo-Gricean approach) concerns the question of what constitutes a ‘marked’ form in linguistic and particularly in pragmatic analysis. Chapman focuses explicitly on some problems with how markedness has been identified in mainstream neo-Gricean theories. She argues that the almost exclusive concentration on length and syntactic complexity oversimplifies the way in which linguistic items may in fact function as ‘marked’ in a process of interpretation, particularly in that it ignores the importance of local or wider textual context. Pattinson also works with a version of the term ‘marked’ in a way that goes beyond the usual neo-Gricean definition, using it to describe a word or phrase that is unexpected because it is ironic. This is a much more context-dependent use of the term than is found in mainstream neo-Gricean pragmatics, determined by features such as incongruity in relation to contextual expectations. Gold and McIntyre point towards the existence of implicatures which are triggered by something out of the ordinary about acoustic vowel production. This is suggestive of a further type of ‘markedness’, in this case in relation to phonetic expectations, and again not one identified in the mainstream neo-Gricean theories. Taken together, these chapters indicate that what counts as ‘marked’ is a focus of current scrutiny in neo-Gricean pragmatics. More specifically, they indicate ways in which individual researchers are seeking to develop or extend the notion of markedness beyond that contemplated in the existing literature. These detailed analyses of literary texts have collectively identified that markedness will remain an important concept in neo-Gricean pragmatics, but one which may need further development and discussion.

Overall, the chapters in this book explore some key ideas in current pragmatic literary stylistics, develop new insights, and identify promising lines of future research. They demonstrate the ongoing development and emerging shape of this field, confirming our impression that pragmatic literary stylistics is a thriving and innovative force within stylistics as a whole, that it is an important arena for testing and developing new ideas, and that research in this area can make significant contributions to understanding of literary production, interpretation and evaluation.

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Marked forms and indeterminate implicatures in Ernest Hemingway's *Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises*¹

Siobhan Chapman

2.1 Introduction

Stylistic analysis is often, appropriately, focussed on small details and precise elements of individual texts. If stylisticians are concerned with the linguistic make-up of texts, then it is beholden on them to examine closely the choices about language that have been made in their production, often at the level of individual sentences, phrases or even words. At the same time, however, concentration on such linguistic units would lead to impoverished analyses if account were not taken of the broader textual context in which they are situated. As Leech and Short (2007) point out, stylistic analysis is rarely an end in itself: “We normally study style because we want to explain something, and in general, literary stylistics has, implicitly or explicitly, the goal of explaining the relation between language and artistic function” (Leech and Short, 2007: p. 11). Stylistics, perhaps particularly literary stylistics, therefore involves a balancing act between linguistic analysis at the micro level and textual and creative awareness at the macro level. As Carter and Stockwell (2008) note, stylistics can “be used both as a descriptive tool and as a catalyst for interpretation” (Carter and Stockwell, 2008: p. 297); attention to both the micro and the macro levels can enable stylistic analysis to fulfil this potential.

In this chapter, I address this balance by analysing a few examples from one short extract from a novel, while keeping in mind that extract's place in the novel as a whole. The passage in question is a short piece of reported dialogue taken

1. Some of the ideas presented in this chapter were initially developed in conversation with Billy Clark, Steven Pattison and Mick Short and I am extremely grateful to all three for their insights and their input. I am grateful also to the audience at a paper I presented at the conference of the Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) at the University of Cagliari in July 2016, for their very helpful discussion and suggestions.

from near the beginning of Ernest Hemingway's 1926 *Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises*. The analysis focuses on just five lines of speech reporting, sixty-seven words in total, although later in the chapter I also consider some examples from elsewhere in the novel for the purposes of context and comparison. I have chosen the passage because it occurs at an important juncture in the narrative as a whole, when key characters and social relationships are being established, and also because it is interesting in relation to stylistic characteristics of the text more generally. I argue that specific linguistic choices at the micro level contribute to the communication of wider themes at the macro level: themes of alienation, displacement and disorientation that have been noted by many literary critics (e.g. Rother, 1986; Savola, 2006; Tomkins, 2008). Two topics which emerge as particularly important in the analysis of this extract are the use of linguistic forms which are in some way "marked" in relation to readers' expectations, and the occurrence of conversational implicatures which are indeterminate as to the exact nature of the implicit meaning conveyed. These are both pragmatic features and have been discussed in the Gricean (Grice, 1975) and neo-Gricean literature (Davis, 1998; Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2007; Saul, 2010; Haugh, 2015). Their salience in *Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises* offers support to claims of their importance in pragmatic theory, if pragmatic theory is successfully to explain meaning in naturally occurring texts. In doing so, it offers an indication of ways in which consideration of a literary text may contribute to the process of testing and perhaps developing pragmatic theory itself.

2.2 The extract

Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises (henceforth *Fiesta*)² concerns a group of Americans living and travelling in Europe a few years after the end of the First World War. In this section, I offer an exposition of details of character and plot necessary to situate the extract for analysis, and to give background to the discussion. In the next section, I consider more general themes and possible interpretations of the novel, in relation in particular to commentary by its literary critics.

The main protagonist of *Fiesta* is Jake Barnes, an American journalist, who at the start of the story is working in Paris. Jake is in love with Brett Ashley, an impoverished English aristocrat who appears to be in love with him too. But Jake is impotent as the result of a war wound and Brett, who is going through a second divorce and engaged to be married to fellow countryman Mike, has several affairs

2. The title itself has a complicated history. *Fiesta* was Hemingway's own working title. The novel was published first in America as *The Sun Also Rises* and subsequently in England as *Fiesta*. Modern UK editions often use the composite title *Fiesta: The Sun Also Rises*.

during the course of the novel. Jake's social circle consists of a group of expatriates in Paris whose heavy drinking he apparently holds in some contempt, at least initially. Jake takes a trip to Spain with his alcoholic friend Bill, where they are joined by others from the group, including Brett and Mike. This journey means that *Fiesta* is divided into two distinct and rather separate parts: the first seven chapters set in Paris and concerned mainly with a series of social encounters in cafés, restaurants and private apartments, and the final twelve set in Spain and concerned mainly with bull fighting, with the fiesta of Pamplona, and with the disintegration of the social group.

The extract on which this chapter focuses occurs in Chapter 3, in the Paris section of the novel. At a loose end one evening, Jake picks up a Belgian prostitute called Georgette, and takes her to dinner. At the restaurant, they meet a group of writers and artists, some of whom Jake knows, and join them for coffee. Jake introduces Georgette to this group, which includes the Canadian Mrs Braddocks, as "Georgette Leblanc" the name of a then-popular singer and actress. The conversation proceeds as follows:

"Are you related to Georgette Leblanc, the singer?" Mrs Braddocks asked.

"*Connais pas*," Georgette answered.

"But you have the same name," Mrs Braddocks insisted cordially.

"No," said Georgette. "Not at all. My name is Hobin."

"But Mr Barnes introduced you as Mademoiselle Georgette Leblanc. Surely he did," insisted Mrs Braddocks, who in the excitement of talking French was liable to have no idea what she was saying. (*Fiesta*, p. 15)

Several individual linguistic choices made here by the narrator draw the particular interpretative attention of the reader. They do so because of their place in the context of the extract itself and of the novel as a whole. They can contribute to an understanding of meanings that are conveyed implicitly in the conversation represented here, and in this passage as it appears as part of the communicative encounter in *Fiesta* between narrator and reader. In literary stylistics, choices which draw particular interpretative attention have been described as "foregrounded"; this characterisation can be related to the notion of "marked" forms in pragmatic analysis. I discuss the specific linguistic choices, which are all in various ways linked to narrative presentation of speech, in Section 4 below. Before that, in Section 3, I consider what has been said about the novel by some of its literary critics.

2.3 The novel and its critics

Literary critics have discussed *Fiesta* in terms of its plot structure, its unifying themes and its narrative stance. Often, they have attempted to relate these to the book's enigmatic epigraphs on the one hand, and to Hemingway's famously terse literary style on the other. The novel's American title derives from a passage from *Ecclesiastes*, quoted at the beginning of the text, which begins: "One generation passeth away and another generation cometh; but the earth abideth forever ... The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down and hasteth to the place where he arose". Alongside this is quoted a comment from Gertrude Stein, apparently addressed in conversation to Hemingway: "You are all a lost generation". Many critics have identified Hemingway's characters as representative of a post-war despair at the prospects of finding meaning, belonging or identity, and a concentration instead on the hard drinking, fatuous conversations and casual relationships, even the travelling, which fill the narrative.

Such readings stretch back over fifty years. Young (1966) links the sense of circularity and inertia in the continuation of the passage from *Ecclesiastes* ("the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again") to the continuous but ultimately pointless movement of Jake and his companions around Europe; "This is motion which goes no place" (Young, 1966: p. 86). Others have commented more specifically on meaning, or its absence, in the novel. Bakker (1972) observes that the events of the narrative take place "in a general context of 'non-meaning'" (Bakker, 1972: p. 75). Watkins Fulton (2004) understands meaninglessness in terms of a futile search; "Through the seemingly pointless pursuit of pleasure, each character searches for meaning in a post-war world that denies the possibility of any sort of meaning at all" (Watkins Fulton, 2004: p. 61). Savola (2006) describes meaning as simply absent; "The novel presents the main characters as aimless, displaced persons without a secure sense of meaning or value" (Savola, 2006: p. 26). Tomkins (2008) notes that this lack of secure meaning is reflected in the language and the conversation of the characters themselves, which are understated and vague, and in which "nonspecific language becomes increasingly popular among the members of Jake's expatriate clique" (Tomkins, 2008: p. 750). For Adair (2012), the listless, unreliable conversations of *Fiesta* in fact characterise the text; it is "a novel of gossip" (Adair, 2012: p. 118).

In a recent and innovative approach to the question of meaning, or lack of it, in *Fiesta*, Sullivan (2013) considers the first manuscript version of the novel, which was severely edited and shortened before publication. She explains that Hemingway cut a long passage from the start of the novel, which apparently contained a scene set in Pamplona and the revelation of Jake's Catholicism. The excision of this passage removes some significant guidance as to how the novel might

be read or interpreted, and perhaps contributes to the disjointed or disorientated nature of its two unequal parts. Sullivan suggests that this cut has consequences for how we read the final version of the text, although these consequences can be difficult to pinpoint; “How exactly does a text resonate with the significance of an absence? What type of thing is that resonance? Is it a fact that can be known (‘Jake Barnes is Catholic’) or an imprecise feeling (a sense of ‘the Quarter state of mind’) or is it a self-producing sense of aesthetic fracture (there is more to be known than we can know)?” (Sullivan, 2013: p. 119).

Sullivan’s account of reading a text partly with an eye to what is absent from it relates particularly to textual content. But it is relevant also to the typical characteristics of Hemingway’s prose style, and to the balance that prose introduces between what is explicitly said and what must be recovered implicitly. *Fiesta* is certainly representative of what has become widely known as “Hemingwayesque” language, in which complex or elaborate vocabulary and syntax are avoided. Gurko (1968) notes that, consonant with Hemingway’s style in general, *Fiesta* is characterised by “stripped vocabulary, simple sentences, monosyllabic diction, repetitive sequences, stress on nouns and verbs and avoidance of adjectives and adverbs, and deliberate hostility to any kind of ornamental rhetoric or overt commentary” (Gurko, 1968: p. 69). He notes that the apparent sparsity of the language is itself a potential vehicle for communication: “Underaccenting does not destroy or eliminate meaning, but only leaves it implied. By leaving it implied rather than stated, a larger amount of meaning can be contained in a smaller space” (Gurko, 1968: p. 72). Gottlieb Vopat (1973) also picks up on this potential for the compression of meaning. This novel, she suggests, is “a masterpiece of concentration, with every detail conveying multiple impressions, and every speech creating both single character and complex interrelationships” (Gottlieb Vopat, 1973: p. 115).

The potential for a text to communicate meaning that is not made explicit, and more specifically the economy of implied meaning, are central themes in pragmatic theory. Levinson (2000), for instance, identifies the problems that would be inherent if speakers were to try to state explicitly everything they wished to communicate; the information to be conveyed would risk overwhelming the resources available to convey it. The solution which he suggests human communication has reached is that of combining explicit and implicit communication in the use of linguistic form: “let not only the content but also the metalinguistic properties of the utterance (i.e. its form) carry the message” (Levinson, 2000: p. 6). Pragmatic theory, then, should have something interesting to say about how meaning beyond the explicit is communicated in Hemingway’s sparse prose. I consider this further in Section 5 below.

As well as offering a characteristic example of style in *Fiesta*, the extract under consideration is important because of where it occurs in the novel, as part of the

brief appearance of Georgette. Although she is present in only one chapter, critics have identified Georgette as central to some of the novel's main themes. She provides an important contrast to Jake's expatriate companions. Spilka (1961) comments that, "like Barnes, she manages to be frank and forthright and to keep an even keel among the drifters of Paris. Together they form a pair of honest cripples, in contrast with the various pretenders whom they meet along the Left Bank" (Spilka, 1961: p. 83). Schmigalle (2005) describes the "skirmishes" between Georgette and Mrs Braddocks as part of the theme of "suffering that the novel's protagonists mutually inflict on one another, without the need for an especially evil character or extraordinary coincidences, but rather through the simple force of circumstances". For Schmigalle this is "the feature which brings [the novel] closest to the tradition of tragedy" (Schmigalle, 2005: p. 15).

Rother (1986) goes so far as to argue that Georgette is central to the structure of the novel. He notes that "we need to have Georgette just where she is", before the first appearance of Brett (Rother, 1986: p. 85). The conversation in the restaurant, and indeed Georgette's presence as a prostitute accompanying the impotent Jake, highlight *Fiesta* as "a novel that is not only about pointlessness (more or less) but also without a clearly summarizable point" (Rother, 1986: p. 81). Georgette's candour and relative wit contrast with the falsity and futility of the conversation of Jake's fellow expatriates.

2.4 Markedness and speech presentation

In this section, I consider some of the ways in which linguistic choices in *Fiesta* might be described as marked. These include both "internal" markedness, which depends on the specific context furnished by the text itself, and more general, context-independent markedness, which depends on factors external to the individual text. I begin with three examples from the extract under analysis. All three relate to speech presentation: the first to interlingual code switching in speech reporting and the other two to linguistic choices in the narrative framing of speech. Following on from this I broaden the discussion to consider marked forms and reported speech in the novel more generally, with specific reference to code switching.

The term "foregrounding" has a long history in the discussion of literary texts, used to describe the psychological effect created when specific features of a text stand out from their surroundings (see, for instance, Mukařovský, 1932; Halliday, 1971). Foregrounding is often seen as particularly characteristic of literary texts; it is an effect of "artistically motivated deviation" (Leech and Short, 2007: p. 39). A foregrounded feature of a text diverges from general linguistic or locally established

norms, and for that reason is likely to draw the attention of the reader and attract greater processing and interpretative effort. There is empirical evidence that readers take longer over foregrounded parts of texts, and therefore by implication that they expend additional interpretative effort on these (see, for instance, Miall and Kuiken, 1994). Emmott and Alexander (2014) link this additional interpretative effort directly to the processes of pragmatic interpretation that a reader undertakes; they argue that inferencing can be directed by stylistic deviance and other types of foregrounding. In Section 5 I link foregrounding to the concept of “markedness” as developed in recent pragmatic theory (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2007), which has striking similarities; a marked form of linguistic expression is one that is in some way unexpected or unusual, causing the hearer or reader to seek for implicated meaning that is also in some way not expected or not stereotypical.

2.4.1 Marked forms

Three examples from the extract which are particularly interesting here are: the presentation of Georgette's utterance in the second line in French, the two uses of *insisted* in the reporting of Mrs Braddocks's speech, and the occurrence of the adverb *cordially* in the third line. It is not immediately clear to the reader what language the conversation in the restaurant is conducted in, or indeed whether the same language is spoken throughout. I argue below that this is a feature shared by many of the conversations represented in the novel. The reader is told at the end of the passage that Mrs Braddocks is excited to be “talking French”, and therefore knows that at least by this point the conversation is being conducted in French. One possible interpretation is that Mrs Braddock begins by speaking in English, and that Georgette's response in French is the point at which the interaction as a whole switches languages. This is certainly not the only possible interpretation; it could also be that the conversation is conducted in French throughout. But a switch at this point might be indicated by the juxtaposition of two different languages in the first and second lines of dialogue, together with the use of italic script. Certainly, whether or not a conversational switch of language has taken place, the narrator has made the striking choice of presenting Georgette's response in a language other than the main language of the text in which it occurs.

For Clark and Gerrig (1990), representation of a passage of speech in French in the context of a novel written in English will always be the marked form, regardless of the language in which the conversation is conducted. They describe quotations, including those of fictional dialogue, as demonstrations, in which a speaker does not merely describe but actually shows what a person did in saying something. However, quotations can only depict selected aspects, never every feature, of the quoted utterance. De Brabanter (2017) endorses Clark and Gerrig's approach,

although he prefers the term “Depiction Theory” to account for the iconic nature of quotations. They are necessarily selective, with speakers having considerable freedom of choice over which properties are depictive, that choice depending on “contextual factors, notably the utterer’s intentions and the current state of the interaction with the addressee” (de Brabanter, 2017: p. 233).

In relation specifically to the choice of language in a quotation, Clark and Gerrig (1990) indicate that speakers can select between their own and that of the original speaker, with the expectation being that the language chosen is usually the speaker’s own. Choosing the original speaker’s language involves deliberately drawing the audience’s attention to that aspect of the referent, following the “Markedness Principle”, which states that “Whenever speakers mark an aspect of a quotation, they intend their addressees to identify that aspect as nonincidental” (Clark and Gerrig, 1990: p. 774). Clark and Gerrig relate their markedness principle straightforwardly to a Gricean notion of cooperation; it can be understood as Grice’s maxims of quantity and manner applied to demonstrations.

According to Clark and Gerrig, then, in the communication between the narrator and the reader in *Fiesta*, the presentation of Georgette’s utterance in French is a marked form, indicating that the choice of language has a purpose. What precisely that purpose is, and therefore what is being implicated at this point in the narrative, is of course not a straightforward thing to determine, but the use of French does suggest that something about this part of the conversation is unusual or noteworthy. One possibility is that Mrs Braddocks asks her question in English and that Georgette responds in French, indicating that it would be more appropriate for the conversation to be held in French. In that case, the narrator would be implicating to the reader that the language of Georgette’s utterance was striking or unexpected because it was different from the one used in Mrs Braddocks’s question. By speaking in French, Georgette might be implicating that it is impolite or unsophisticated of Mrs Braddock to begin a conversation in Paris in English, or that Georgette herself does not identify or sympathise with Mrs Braddock. Another possibility is that Mrs Braddocks’s original question, like the rest of the conversation, is in French. In that case, the narrator would be implicating to the reader that something was unusual or striking about Georgette’s reply in the context. It could be that Georgette speaks French fluently, in contrast to Mrs Braddocks. It could be that some other feature of Georgette is being highlighted, in contrast to Mrs Braddocks as representative of the expatriate community, such as her honesty, her bluntness or her lack of affectation.

Marked forms can be found in the extract not just in the choices made in relation to speech reporting, but in the narrative presentation and framing of the conversation. The two uses of *insisted* in reporting Mrs Braddocks’s speech, and the modification of one of these occurrences by the adverb *cordially*, are marked

in the context of the specific text in which they occur, for reasons discussed below. Clark and Gerrig argue that in any context there will be something marked about switching to a language other than that of narration, but neither *insisted* nor *cordially* need be marked expressions in other textual contexts. Their markedness depends on particular, local norms established in the text in which they occur. They are examples of “internal deviation” in Leech and Short’s (2007) terms: features of language within the text which “stand out’ against the background of what the text has led us to expect” (Leech and Short, 2007: p. 44).

The reason why these particular choices “stand out” can be found in the general characteristics of the text, that is in the “Hemingwayesque” prose features noted by critics. As discussed in Section 3, the novel is characterised by what Gurko (1968) calls “stripped vocabulary”. In relation to speech reporting, Hemingway’s narrator predominantly uses *said* or omits the reporting verb when presenting direct speech both in this scene and in the novel more generally. Gurko notes the novel’s predominant use of nouns and verbs rather than adjective or adverbs. In the local context both *insisted* as a verb of reporting and *cordially*, in a text generally devoid of adverbs, are to some extent internally deviant and are therefore foregrounded. They are marked choices in relation to the reader’s established expectations.

Identifying these linguistic choices as foregrounded or marked in the context provided by the novel does not, of course, give a straightforward key to their interpretation. As with the choice of French as the reporting language for Georgette’s response to Mrs Braddocks, the reader has a sense that some additional, implicit meaning is being conveyed. What exactly is being implicated in these cases is far from straightforward, but there is a suggestion of something unusual or unexpected. It may be, for instance, that the deviant use of *insisted* implicates that there was something inappropriate, or jarring in the manner in which Mrs Braddocks spoke. But it might indicate that she is excessively interested in the matter under discussion. The use of *cordially* may implicate that there was something uncomprehending or foolish about Mrs Braddock’s response to Georgette. But it might also indicate that her politeness is forced or false.

In Section 5 below I offer an overview of what has been said about markedness and about indeterminacy of implicature in foundational and more recent pragmatic theory. I consider how examples such as those discussed here might be accommodated and explained in pragmatic theory, and might also contribute to it. First, however, I consider some further examples of choices concerning reported speech in *Fiesta*. The aim is to provide further context for the analysis of the striking choice of French as the language of representation for one utterance of the conversation in the extract, and also to add supporting evidence to the suggestion that there is often no reliable way for the reader to know what language is being spoken at any one time.

2.4.2 Speech presentation in *Fiesta*

Fiesta is characterised by its inclusion of various French and, in the latter half, Spanish words and phrases. In this, it partakes of what Taylor-Batty (2013: p. 4) has identified as a “preoccupation with language itself” characteristic of modernist fiction. As she explains, “The emblematically modernist themes of exile, travel and intercultural encounter lead, inevitably, to the necessity of representing different languages” (Taylor-Batty, 2013: p. 39). The novel’s preoccupation with language goes beyond the simple inclusion of multilingual elements. A number of different devices are employed in the text that might be taken as indicating that a particular language is being used. Again, *Fiesta* is not unusual in employing these different techniques; they relate closely to the “distinct types or procedures of translational mimesis” which Sternberg (1981) identified as being typically employed in “the mixed representation of polylingual or heterolingual discourse” (Sternberg, 1981: p. 225). What is particularly striking about *Fiesta*, however, is that for every method of translational mimesis apparently established in the novel, examples can be found which appear to subvert or undermine that method. The result is disorientating and confusing; the reader is often not able confidently to establish what language is being spoken. This may contribute to the more general experience of reading a text which is full of unclarity, uncertainty and confusion: a text characterised by indeterminacy.

2.4.2.1 *Syntax/idiom*

As we have seen in the short extract of reported dialogue between Georgette and Mrs Braddocks, utterances in *Fiesta* are not necessarily represented in the language in which they are to be understood as having occurred; the narrator sometimes “translates” the original, fictional, utterance for the reader. One way in which the narrator sometimes suggests that he is doing this is by retaining some trace of the syntax or the idiom of the original language. This process is described by Sternberg (1981) as “verbal transposition”, which derives from “superimposing on the translated quotation one or more of a variety of features and patterns distinctive of the source language but unacceptable in the target language” (Sternberg, 1981: p. 227). It is worth noting that what Sternberg identifies as “verbal transposition” can also be seen as another type of pragmatic markedness; the transposed form is marked in relation to the reader’s expectations of grammatically and lexically “correct” language. An example of this can be found in the exchange between Jake and Georgette on their way to the restaurant. The reader is probably already confident that the conversation is in French; Jake is distinguished by his fluency in the language. The following exchange occurs:

“What are you called?”

“Georgette. How are you called?”

“Jacob.”

(*Fiesta*, p. 13)

The wording of Georgette's question echoes that of the French form (*comment*, which is often used in French when asking someone's name, translates into English as *how*) and serves as a reminder that the conversation is not being conducted in English.

In this particular case, because of the reader's existing confidence that the conversation is taking place in French, Georgette's question is not likely to be read as produced in English by a second language speaker. However, syntactic or idiomatic features apparently at odds with the language in which an utterance is reported cannot always be taken to indicate that the narrator has translated the utterance. This undermines any security that may otherwise have been established in the process of verbal transposition. Sometimes it seems that unidiomatic or ungrammatical English is, rather, the result of a lack of linguistic competence on the part of the speaker. Georgette and Jake leave the restaurant with the party that includes Mrs Braddocks. They go to a dancing club, which is where Brett appears for the first time in the novel. Brett and Jake subsequently leave the dancing club together and move on to a café where they are introduced to Count Mippipopolous. The following conversation ensues:

“How do you do?” said Brett.

“Well. Does your ladyship have a good time here in Paris?” asked Count Mippipopolous, who wore an elk's tooth on his watch chain.

“Rather,” said Brett.

“Paris is a fine town all right,” said the Count. “But I guess you have pretty big doings yourself over in London.”

“Oh, yes,” said Brett. “Enormous.”

(*Fiesta*, p. 24–5)

Brett's implicit mockery of the Count's unidiomatic “pretty big doings” indicates that he is speaking English non-fluently, which in turn indicates that neither this nor the earlier “does your ladyship have a good time?” can be taken by the reader to be examples of “verbal transposition”.

2.4.2.2 “Colouring”

In the exchange between Georgette and Mrs Braddocks discussed in this chapter, just one utterance is represented in French, but it becomes apparent to the reader that all, or much, of the conversation as a whole is also in French. Sometimes in *Fiesta* this technique of reproducing just part of a whole in the original language occurs at the level of individual utterances. A single word or phrase in a different language can be taken as indicating that the whole utterance or the whole

conversation in which it occurs is conducted in that language. The word or phrase “colours” the surrounding dialogue.

Sternberg (1981) draws attention to the phenomenon of “selective reproduction”. This is “intermittent quotation of the original heterolingual discourse” which “usually operates as a kind of mimetic synecdoche” (Sternberg, 1981: p. 225). The part which is reproduced in the original language can be taken to stand in for the whole of the surrounding discourse. Similarly, Weston and Gardner-Chloros (2015) note that isolated words from another language in passages of represented speech can serve as reminders that the conversation being reported is taking place in a language other than that of the text itself. They suggest that this puts a particular kind of interpretative burden on the reader; “such a function is unique to literature, requiring a peculiarly linguistic realization of Coleridge’s ‘willing suspension of disbelief’” (Weston and Gardner-Chloros, 2015: p. 198).

An example of the way in which a single phrase can “colour” a whole exchange can be found in Jake’s conversation with the owner of the dancing club, as he is leaving with Brett:

“If the girl I came with asks for me, will you give her this?” I said. “If she goes out with one of those gentlemen, will you save this for me?”

“*C’est entendu, Monsieur,*” the patronne said. “You go now? So early?”

“Yes”, I said.

(*Fiesta*, p. 20)

The representation of the first part of the owner’s response in French, perhaps along with some verbal transposition later in the same utterance, indicates that the whole exchange takes place in French. Later, the morning after Brett has returned drunk with Jake to his apartment, he has a conversation with the concierge in which she says:

“I’ll speak perfectly frankly, Monsieur Barnes. Last night I found her not so *gentille*. Last night I formed another idea of her. But listen to what I tell you. She is *très très gentille*. She is of very good family. It is a thing you can see.”

(*Fiesta*, p. 46)

The selected use of the original French to reproduce the concierge’s speech can be seen as “colouring” the whole. However, as with verbal transposition, this form of translational mimesis is not secure. Later, Jake and Brett are talking:

“Couldn’t we live together, Brett? Couldn’t we just live together?”

“I don’t think so. I’d just *tromper* you with everybody. You couldn’t stand it.”

“I stand it now.”

(*Fiesta*, p. 48)

Both Brett and Jake are native English speakers. The occurrence of the French form *tromper* (to deceive) in her utterance cannot be taken as colouring the surrounding dialogue; it must indicate that Brett switches into French for this part

of her utterance. This could be for a variety of reasons including, for instance, because she is introducing a taboo concept, because she thinks that in French the word has different or additional connotations, or because the word has special meaning for her and Jake.

2.4.2.3 *Explicit statement*

Occasionally the narrator of *Fiesta* indicates explicitly which language a particular conversation or utterance is spoken in. We saw an example of this in the comment that Mrs Braddocks was amazed to be “talking French.” Sternberg (1981) notes that sometimes reporters make direct statements about the language of the original reported speech, a phenomenon which he labels “explicit attribution” (Sternberg, 1981: p. 231). A further example of such an explicit statement on the part of the narrator occurs when Jake and Bill are on a train from Paris at the start of their journey to Pamplona. Jake has attempted to bribe the conductor in order to gain places in the first service of lunch.

The conductor put the ten francs in his pocket.

“Thank you,” he said. “I would advise you gentlemen to get some sandwiches. All the places for the first four services were reserved at the office of the company.”

“You’ll go a long way, brother,” Bill said to him in English. “I suppose if I’d given you five francs you would have advised us to jump off the train.”

“Comment?”

“Go to Hell!” said Bill.

(*Fiesta*, p. 74)

It is made explicit that Bill’s long utterance is in English, and it is of course also clear that the conductor replies in French. It seems most likely that Bill, although able to understand the conductor, is deliberately speaking only in English, while Jake and the conductor are speaking French. However, explicit statements about language use do not guarantee clarity. As with the comment about Mrs Braddocks speaking French in the earlier extract, it is not possible for the reader to disentangle with certainty the exact pattern of language use being represented in the conversation on the train.

In sum, the overall effect of “translational mimesis” in *Fiesta* is to establish a system of forms of speech representation which is complex and interpretatively demanding, but is also frequently undermined and ultimately unreliable. The reader can rarely know with confidence which language any given character is using. The reader’s experience of the various social encounters in the novel is confusing and incoherent, an outcome which reflects the experience of the characters themselves.

2.5 Markedness and indeterminacy in pragmatics

In Section 2.4 I identified examples in the extract from the “Georgette” scene, and more generally in *Fiesta*, in which some aspect of the language appears to be marked or to stand out from the surrounding text. These are examples of stylistic “foregrounding”. As a result, some extra, implicated meaning is added to the interpretation of the text.

Markedness in *Fiesta* takes many forms; it could be that a word or phrase is presented in a different language from the surrounding text, that a form of expression is grammatically or idiomatically unusual in relation to the norms of English usage, or that localised expectations of linguistic usage established within the novel itself are not fulfilled. In many of these cases, it is difficult or impossible to establish with certainty what is being conveyed about characters, relationships or situations. The issues at stake here concern meaning that is conveyed implicitly; they concern pragmatic meaning. It is therefore instructive to consider what has been said in Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics about both the nature of markedness and potential indeterminacy in implicated meaning.

Markedness is not a term that Grice (1975) uses but arguably it is inherent in the very notion of conversational implicature. One way in which conversational implicatures arise is when a speaker appears to “flout” some communicative expectation, expressed in one of Grice’s maxims of conversation, causing the hearer to seek some alternative, implicated interpretation, which does accord with that expectation. So, for instance, an expression that gives rise to an implicature derived from the Quantity maxims could be seen as marked in comparison with an alternative that would give an apparently more appropriate amount of information. Grice’s famous example of an informatively inadequate reference for a philosophy job (the tutor, A, writes: “Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular”, Grice, 1975: p. 33) is marked in relation to the search committee’s expectations of job references, triggering the implicature that “Mr X. is no good at philosophy”. It is in relation to Grice’s category of Manner, however, that the notion of markedness becomes most apparent. Grice explains that his maxims of Manner relate not “to what is said but, rather, to *how* what is said is to be said” (Grice, 1975: p. 27, original emphasis); choices about forms of expression, or stylistic choices, are of paramount importance in these cases.

The concept of markedness has played an important role in neo-Gricean pragmatics. Levinson (2000) introduces three pragmatic principles, which he labels Q-, I- and M-principles and which in turn introduce three heuristics for interpretation. The third (M- or Manner) guides interpretation in relation to the way in which something is said, and refers explicitly to marked and unmarked expressions. In Levinson’s words (2000, p. 38), “What is said simply, briefly and in

an unmarked way picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be avoided". So, using his examples, "It's possible that the plane will be late" suggests that 'the plane may be late as planes often are' while "It's not impossible that the plane will be late" suggests 'a rather more remote possibility'. Similarly, using a more complicated alternative to a simple verb of causation suggests that the events narrated did not take place in the expected way. "Bill stopped the car" suggests he did so in the normal way, using the foot pedal while "Bill caused the car to stop" suggests he did so in something other than the normal way, such as by using the emergency brake. Levinson's examples therefore suggest both that the notions of simplicity and brevity are the key factors in determining an unmarked form, and also that the concept is to be understood in terms of a binary distinction between a 'marked' and a corresponding 'unmarked' form. He later makes explicit these features of his concept of markedness:

On the formal side, marked forms, in comparison to corresponding unmarked forms, are more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix or periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register. On the meaning side, such forms suggest some additional meaning or connotation absent from the corresponding unmarked forms. (Levinson, 2000: p. 137)

Horn (2007) also makes explicit reference to markedness in relation to implicated meaning. His neo-Gricean system describes the communicative balancing act between the hearer's need for information and the speaker's need for economy. Implicatures are generated by the Q-Principle and the R-Principle, which are concerned respectively with quantity and with relation, although they do not relate directly to Grice's categories of maxims. The Q Principle requires the speaker to "make your contribution sufficient", or to "say as much as you can". The R Principle is in constant tension with this, instructing the speaker to "make your contribution necessary", or to "say no more than you must". These two principles bound the speaker's utterances with respect to prolixity and brevity, and guide the hearer's interpretations.

Q-based implicatures, then, are typically calculated in relation to what might have been said but was not. Scalar implicatures fall into this category; the use of a semantically weaker expression when a semantically stronger and therefore more informative one might have been possible implicates that the stronger expression does not apply. "The soup is warm" typically implicates that the soup is not hot, and "I have eaten some of the biscuits" typically implicates that the speaker has not eaten all of them. R-based implicatures are calculated in relation to the assumption that the speaker was saying as little as she needed to, and therefore that further information can be assumed or added. The further information will generally

relate to what is usual, expected or typical. “I have had breakfast” will generally introduce an implicature that the speaker has had breakfast on that particular day. “John fell off his bike and went to hospital” will generally introduce an implicature that John went to hospital after and as a result of falling off his bike.

Horn’s explanation of the pragmatic interpretation of marked forms involves a “division of pragmatic labour” between his Q- and R-Principles (Horn, 2007: p. 172). He describes a marked form as typically less lexicalised and therefore usually longer and more syntactically complex than a corresponding unmarked form. *Pale red* is marked in comparison to *pink* and, as for Levinson, *not impossible* is marked in comparison to *possible*. The R-principle urges the speaker to say no more than is necessary. If, despite this principle, the speaker uses a longer or more complex form, the Q-principle prompts the interpretation that the unmarked expression is in some way not applicable or not appropriate. So if a longer or more complex expression is used in preference to a potential shorter or simpler expression, there is an implicature that the situation described is in some way marked or is not stereotypical. “Her blouse was pale red” implicates that for some reason the blouse was not straightforwardly pink, because the alternative, shorter form “her blouse was pink” has not been used.

Markedness does not have a prominent role to play in all branches of recent pragmatic theory. For relevance theorists the context in which an utterance is interpreted is a psychological construct, specific to the individual act of interpretation. By constructing an utterance in a particular way, for instance by the use of repetition, a speaker may encourage a hearer to expand the context, with the expectation that the extra processing effort involved will result in some increase in contextual effects, specifically in some additional implicatures. Breheny explains that focal stress, for example, is effective because it “forces certain assumptions to be used in the computation of speaker’s intentions” (Breheny, 1998: p. 105). For relevance theorists, then, “backgrounding and foregrounding” are not distinct linguistic or pragmatic features but follow naturally from the hearer’s tendency to maximise relevance and the speaker’s awareness of that tendency (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995: p. 217). Haspelmath argues that the term *markedness* is superfluous in all areas of linguistics and should be abandoned, since it adds nothing to the range of other simpler and more explanatory terms available, including Gricean principles of interpretation (Haspelmath, 2006: p. 50).

Nevertheless, in neo-Gricean pragmatics, markedness is widely seen as a feature of a linguistic form identified in contrast to a possible alternative form, and defined in terms of structural or other linguistic complexity. This view is echoed by a number of other recent pragmaticists (see, for instance, Katzir, 2014: p. 66; Rett, 2015: p. 87). A neo-Gricean reading of the extract from *Fiesta* suggests that a concept of “markedness” could have an important role to play in accounting for

implicated meaning. But such a reading also indicates that the concept needs a less rigid definition than it has generally been afforded. Linguistic forms produced in a language different from that of the surrounding text are not necessarily linguistically more complex than their counterparts in the language of the rest of the text, but they are certainly marked in relation to those alternatives (see Clark and Gerrig's 1990 "markedness principle"). Other examples of markedness, such as the uses of *insisted* and *cordially* discussed above, may gain their status in relation to the very specific norms of the text in which they occur; their markedness cannot straightforwardly be located in terms either of complexity, or of an opposition to a possible but absent alternative. These examples, in particular, suggest that a concept of markedness sufficient for pragmatic analysis should be defined more broadly, and be more sensitive to individual context than has generally been the case. Such a definition has been developed in stylistics in relation to the concept of "foregrounding", which, as Short and Leech (2007) demonstrate, can often be relative to norms established in individual texts. All the examples discussed here, while not displaying the established marked traits of length or complexity, could be described as unexpected or non-stereotypical, triggering implicatures that there is something striking or noteworthy in the situation being described. As such they could be explained using Levinson's M heuristic (by suggesting that a stereotypical interpretation should be avoided) or Horn's division of pragmatic labour (by suggesting that the greater processing effort demanded by the unexpected form indicates that the situation is in some way unusual or unexpected).

Horn (2007) argues that the precise interpretative effects of markedness may be difficult to pin down. He explains that, if a marked form is used, "the crucial assumption is that if S has expended what may appear to be unnecessary effort in her utterance, there must have been a sufficient reason to have done so – although just WHICH reason may be indeterminate" (Horn, 2007: p. 172, original emphasis). This raises the issue of whether implicature necessarily involves the communication of a single specific proposition, which is intended by the speaker to be recognised by the hearer. Grice himself is unclear and indeed apparently self-contradictory on this issue, but there is certainly evidence that he saw implicatures as being potentially indeterminate, or at least as conveying a disjunction of possible implicated propositions.

For instance, in relation to the first example of implicature offered in "Logic and conversation" (Grice, 1975: p. 24), when A asks B how C is getting on in his new job and B replies, "Oh, quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues and he hasn't been to prison yet", Grice suggests that what is implicated "might be any one" of a number of possibilities, and that which one is intended "might" be clear in the context. Later, however, he defines implicature in terms of specific propositions: "A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* has implicated

that *q*, may be said to have conversationally implicated that *q*, provided that..." (Grice, 1975: p. 30). In relation to some of his examples, such as the inadequate reference for a philosophy job mentioned above, he is quite definite about what single proposition is implicated, but in relation to others he is more allusive. His account of metaphor, for instance, seems to return to a definition of implicature as potentially indeterminate; in the case of "You are the cream in my coffee", "the most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance" (Grice, 1975: p. 34). Grice's own brief excursion into stylistics is revealing; in relation to a literary text he is particularly aware of the possibility of indeterminacy. He identifies a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of the line from a poem by Blake, "love that never told can be"; an ambiguity between 'love that cannot be told' and 'love that if told cannot continue to exist'. He suggests that both possible interpretations are conveyed or suggested. He concludes the first lecture on "Logic and conversation" with the observation that what is implicated may be a "disjunction" of various different explanations of what has to be supposed in order to support the belief that the cooperative principle is being upheld, "and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just the kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess" (Grice, 1975: p. 40).

Since "Logic and conversation" there has been considerable interest within pragmatics in the notion of indeterminacy. Even in cases where it may not be difficult to interpret what a speaker or writer meant by their words, it will not necessarily be the case that one single and simple implicature can be accounted for. Capone (2009), for instance, points out that even Grice's own apparently determinate example involving the philosophy reference may allow for more than one interpretation: "in addition to the implicature that the writer was not supporting X's application, there is another implicature salient, namely that A thinks X is a poor philosopher" (Capone, 2009: p. 57). Capone's analysis of Grice's example is a little problematic, since the supposedly additional implicature is in fact the one that Grice picked out as the implicated meaning of the job reference. Nevertheless, the point stands that the tutor might legitimately be taken to be implicating more than one piece of information that is not present in what is said in the reference.

Davis (1998) argues that indeterminacy is more prevalent than Grice appeared to believe and, even in the metaphorical example that Grice allows to be indeterminate, cannot be explained away as a disjunction or conjunction of different implicated meanings. Sometimes it is not possible to decide with certainty what a speaker means or believes. For Davis, this is a fundamental problem for the whole Gricean enterprise, because it contradicts the "determinacy condition", which he phrases as "the supposition that S believes *p* is required to make

S's utterance consistent with the Cooperative Principle", and which he argues is foundational to Grice's theory (Davis, 1998, p. 62). Grice's account relies on the fact that implicatures can be calculated in context, given the existence of the cooperative principle, and for this to take place it is necessary to have a clear understanding of what precisely the speaker implicated. Saul (2010) has defended Gricean pragmatics against the apparent challenge of indeterminacy, arguing that the determinacy condition should be seen as normative rather than absolute, meaning that individual instances of uncertainty over interpretation are no actual threat to the inherent calculability of implicature. Conversational implicatures are "claims that the speaker makes available to the audience", whether or not the audience recognises them (Saul, 2010: p. 180). Other recent pragmaticists have also tended to see indeterminacy as ubiquitous but unproblematic. Haugh (2015) argues that indeterminacy is often a feature of real life conversational exchanges; "Yet while Grice explicitly stated right from the beginning that what is taken to be implicated by speakers is very often indeterminate, this point has not, for the most part, been well recognised in subsequent theorising of implicatures" (Haugh, 2015: p. 122; see also Rett, 2015: p. 87; and, for a more critical view of Grice, Gibbs and Colston, 2012: p. 62).

Despite Haugh's generalisation, indeterminacy has received more sustained treatment in relevance theory, where it is recognised that individual utterances may generate multiple implicatures across a spectrum ranging from strong to weak. For Sperber and Wilson (1995), progressively weaker implicatures are those which the hearer is given progressively less encouragement to recover, or has progressively less firm grounds for assuming are intended by the speaker. The potential to generate multiple implicatures is shared by most utterances, but the tendency to produce an array of weak implicatures is particularly characteristic of texts with literary properties, or texts which display "poetic effects". These can contribute to an understanding of literary style: "One way in which styles may differ is in their greater or lesser reliance on poetic effects, just as they may differ in their greater or lesser reliance on implicature and in the way they exploit the backgrounding and foregrounding of information in their explicatures" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: p. 224).

The notion of indeterminacy of implicature, a notion of current interest in pragmatic theory, may offer an account of the experiences of a reader of *Fiesta*. The examples of marked forms identified in the extract from the Georgette scene have one feature in common; they alert the reader to an implicated meaning without it being possible to identify with certainty what is being implicated. It may be, for instance, that Mrs Braddocks is foolish, or insincere, or rude. Georgette may find Mrs Braddocks unsophisticated or impolite, or she may simply be more fluent than her in French. Hemingway's narrator conveys much of his meaning by implicature in

the extract analysed above and throughout the novel, often through the use of various types of marked forms. This allows a lot of to be communicated in a short space and contributes to Hemingway's famously terse style, as some of his critics have noted. But the preponderance of implicated meaning also introduces a high level of indeterminacy. The repeated use of indeterminate implicatures builds up a sense of confusion, lack of stability and uncertainty, which mirrors the experiences of Jake as he moves through his story, and is part of what is communicated by the novel.

2.6 Summary

This chapter has focussed on a short extract of reported speech from a single novel. The narrowness of this focus reflects the fact that stylistics necessarily sometimes deals with very small units of analysis, while keeping in mind the wider effects, and the larger interpretative themes, of a text as a whole. This approach has drawn attention to the use of linguistic choices in *Fiesta* which are marked, either in relation to general linguistic norms or to very specific expectations established in the text itself, serving to draw the reader's attention through a process of foregrounding, and to offer a focus for interpretative effort. It has also suggested that, in the case of *Fiesta*, this effort is not necessarily rewarded with specific implicit meaning or interpretative stability. Rather, the search for implicit meaning that the marked form prompts may result in an unresolvable disjunction of possible meanings, or may prove altogether allusive. Two types of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: about what a reading of a specific literary text can offer to current debates in neo-Gricean theory on the one hand, and about what the terminological and explanatory power of pragmatic theory can offer to a reading of a specific literary text on the other.

In the former case, a reading of *Fiesta* appears to lend support to current emphasis on the importance of concepts of "markedness" and of indeterminacy in pragmatic theory. Neo-Griceans such as Levinson and Horn discuss markedness in relation to implicit interpretation, and offer systematic accounts of it in relation to pragmatic principles. But their definition of what constitutes markedness, and indeed the definition of markedness to be found in the pragmatics literature more generally, does not go far enough. In neo-Gricean pragmatics, markedness is generally represented as a fairly rigid category, determined by syntactic or lexical complexity in comparison with an unrealised but fixed alternative. The examples analysed in this chapter suggest that the definition of markedness for the purposes of pragmatic interpretation should be much broader. It includes the very specific type of markedness represented by the switching to a different language and the deviation from established grammatical and idiomatic norms within one

language. But beyond that, markedness can be more localised and more context dependent than definitions in pragmatics would seem to suggest. An item may be marked in relation to the specific norms and expected patterns established in a very localised setting. The interpretative effect is the occurrence of possibly indeterminate implicatures which follow from the assumption that something in the situation is non-stereotypical or unexpected, as is the case with more canonical forms of pragmatic markedness.

Further, a reading of *Fiesta* supports the idea that implicatures may be indeterminate in nature. Grice seems to have been aware, but sometimes uneasily so, that it may not always be possible to establish a single propositional meaning that is communicated in any instance of conversational implicature. Many subsequent pragmaticists have identified the inherent indeterminacy of implicatures. For some, such as Davis (1998) this is a fundamental flaw in the Gricean enterprise while others, such as Horn (2007), Saul (2010) and Haugh (2015) argue that the indeterminacy of implicatures can be accommodated within a broadly Gricean pragmatics. Sperber and Wilson (1995) assume that implicatures are often indeterminate, and they identify indeterminate implicatures as a particular feature of “poetic” texts. *Fiesta* is full of, is almost characterised by, indeterminate implicatures.

The second type of conclusion concerns the interpretative potential of pragmatic theory in relation to literary analysis. Pragmatic theory makes it possible to offer a formal account of a feature of *Fiesta* that has been widely but less technically described by its critics. Frequently, the reader is prompted by a marked form in the text to seek an implicated meaning. But because the nature of that implicature is indeterminate, the reader is left without a clear picture of what it is that is being communicated. The cumulative effect is one of uncertainty and disorientation; the reader is not sure how to understand social encounters or to evaluate characters. Sometimes it is not even clear which language a conversation is being conducted in. The reader's uncertainty as to appropriate interpretations within the extract analysed in this chapter are local manifestations of a more general instability inherent in the scene from which the extract is taken and in the novel as a whole. Characters fail to seek purpose or meaning in the language they use, or seek it in vain. Rother (1986) suggests that the whole episode involving Georgette poses the question of:

How to approach that singularly duplicitous characterization by that writer of a seemingly uncomplicated prostitute whose turf is Paris's Avenue de l'Opera, when as readers in good faith of his novel we are never allowed an evaluative foothold on any other surface than the porous slope of its narrator's presence of mind?

(Rother, 1986: p. 79)

The frequency of indeterminate implicatures means that the reader is not just told about the experiences of Jake and the other characters; he or she engages with a

text that is fraught with unclarity and promotes incomprehension. The instability of interpretation and the unreliability of inferential judgments are part not just of the themes, but of the very experience of the novel as a communicative encounter.

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A Levinsonian account of irony in Jonathan Coe's *The Rotters' Club*

Steven Pattison

3.1 Introduction

Jonathan Coe's novel *The Rotters' Club* (*TRC*) (2002) depicts some of the most significant political and social events which affected the British city of Birmingham during the 1970's. Among these are the notorious Birmingham pub bombing perpetrated by the IRA, the rise of the extreme right-wing National Front, forced redundancies and the role of trade unionism at the Longbridge British Leyland car plant, difficult race relations between the black and white communities and the English and the Irish communities, as well as major shifts in popular culture, including the displacement of avant-garde rock culture as a consequence of the birth of punk.

Irony features regularly among the narrative passages and dialogues contained within *TRC*, and its presence in Coe's works of fiction, including *TRC*, has been addressed by literary scholars, including Gutleben (2016) and Guignery (2016). Humour and the comic are central to Coe's work, and he observes that, "Humour is simply something I can't keep out of my writing, any more than I can keep it out of my conversation" (Jessica Murphy in the *Atlantic Unbound*, March 27, 2002 <https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/interviews/int2002-03-27.htm>). He explains that in much of his fiction, he is "reconciling humour and melancholy" (Coe, 2013, loc 4311), a point which he further elaborates on in an interview with Vanessa Guignery:

To be more precise, what you often find in my books is humour and nostalgia. Nearly all the melancholy in my books comes from nostalgia for something or other, looking back on the past as an era of opportunities which were either not taken or choices which were made badly. (Guignery, 2016)

Discussing Coe's use of humour and his interest in the cruelties of history and society, Gutleben (2016) observes that, "Next to the very light comedy of sexual jokes

and linguistic malapropisms Coe thus constantly introduces instances of ruthless irony.” In Coe’s *TRC*, then, as in much of his fiction, irony plays an important role.

In this chapter, I focus on a selection of different types of irony from the novel, the points of conflict they accompany, and their effects both at the character-to-character and author-to-reader levels of discourse (Short, 1996: p. 257; McIntyre, 2006: pp. 5–11). In my analyses of examples of irony from the novel, I make use of Levinson’s pragmatic theory, which involves the interaction among three principles, namely the Q[quantity], I[nformativeness], and [M]anner principles (Levinson, 2000). While a great deal of work on irony has been conducted within Gricean pragmatics (Grice, 1989: pp. 53–4), relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) and Speech Act Theory (Haverkate, 1990), Levinson’s principles have been almost entirely overlooked, apart from his own brief analysis (Levinson, 2000: pp. 234–5).

The apparent lack of interest in the systematic application of Levinson’s principles to the study of irony and other related tropes may be accounted for, in part, by Levinson’s own concentration on Generalised Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), arguing that more inferences are GCIs than many other scholars working in pragmatics would accept (Levinson, 2000: pp.: 104–108). Levinson nevertheless acknowledges the role of PCIs in communication, clarifying the distinction between them and GCIs as follows:

- a. An implicature *i* from utterance *U* is *particularised* iff *U* implicates *i* only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain.
- b. An implicature *i* is *generalised* iff *U* implicates *i* *unless* there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it. (Levinson, 2000: pp. 16–17)

Hence, while GCIs are stable, PCIs vary in accordance with the context in which the utterance is produced. Because of the role certain contexts play in the interpretation of ironies, they necessarily involve Particularised Conversational Implicatures (PCIs). In this chapter, I extend the application of Levinson’s principles to an account of irony and the generation of GCIs and PCIs involved in the interpretation of straightforward verbal irony. I also apply the principles to examples of so-called dramatic irony and unconscious irony, casting doubt on their status as irony by highlighting distinctions in the steps involved in interpreting them, compared to verbal irony. To my knowledge, Levinson’s principles have not previously been applied systematically to a sustained analysis of a literary text. Nevertheless, Levinson’s three principles appear to lend themselves to an account of *TRC*, the ironies therein, and the novel’s characters and themes.

In both *TRC* and *The Closed Circle*, the second part of Coe’s (2005) fictional diptych, the narrator is Sophie, who is the niece of one of the novel’s main characters, Benjamin Trotter. Across the two novels, the narrative spans a period of

approximately thirty years, and includes considerable detail on the thoughts and actions of an array of characters. The highly emotive events of the 1970s form a backdrop to *TRC*'s different narrative threads, as depicted variously through the points of view of Benjamin Trotter, his friends, members of his family and their milieu. King William's, the public high school which Benjamin Trotter attends, serves as a microcosm of Birmingham's wider society, as the students encounter racism, and politics more generally, alongside more personal, but similarly emotive situations such as acts of infidelity, bullying, and the other trials and tribulations that typically characterise school life. Throughout the novel, conflicts associated with the common concerns and general angst of adolescence are intertwined with issues of great national significance. Consequently, clashes of different kinds and scale are pervasive throughout the novel.¹ It is out of such points of friction that ironies are often produced in the novel.

It is beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to discuss the historical shifts and developments in accounts of irony (for which the reader is referred to the works of Muecke, 1969 and 1982; Booth, 1974; Colebrook, 2000 and 2004; and Barbe, 1995), but I compare two of the more prominent contemporary pragmatic accounts in Section 2, focusing chiefly on the approaches of Grice (1989: pp. 53–54) and Sperber and Wilson (1995: pp. 237–243). However, as a point of departure, Wales (2011) provides a clear, concise and relatively standard definition of verbal irony.

Irony is found when the words actually used appear to contradict the sense actually required in the CONTEXT and presumably intended by the speaker: utterances like *Aren't you clever!* or *What lovely weather!* (When it's raining) found in speech are not to be taken LITERALLY. (Wales, 2011: p. 240)

As Wales defines it, irony is produced when the context is incompatible with the propositional content of a particular utterance. There is an implicit assumption in this definition that the incompatibility is detectable by at least one other participant, and that, while participants identify the speaker's utterance as irony, they also search for a plausible explanation for what motivated its use, which should be compatible with salient features of the context of utterance.

The two examples of irony Wales provides in her general definition can be explained in terms of oppositional conflict (where conflict is meant in a very general sense related to incompatibility), and more precisely, as disappointed expectations. For instance, it is conceivable that (1) could be uttered in response to someone's unwelcome or unexpectedly foolish act, smart aleck comment, or an error that has a detrimental effect on the speaker:

1. For a full synopsis of *TRC*, see Coe's *The Closed Circle* (2005: pp. 431–433).

- (1) Aren't you clever!

Similarly, a speaker who is out hillwalking could react to being caught in a heavy downpour, despite fine weather having been forecast, by saying (2):

- (2) What lovely weather!

As potential irony-triggering contexts, all of these situations involve oppositional conflict: in the first between the speaker and at least one other participant; in the second between the hillwalker and whoever was responsible for the misleading weather forecast.

A brief survey of recent approaches to irony shows general agreement that irony accompanies points of conflict between participants in particular contexts. Grice (1989: p. 54) describes the purpose of ironies as the communication of a negative emotional response, such as indignation or contempt, or a hostile or derogatory judgement of someone or something. Conflict is the probable motivation for using irony to communicate such hostile feelings and/or negative evaluations. For Grice, these antagonistic features distinguish ironies from mere playful utterances in which, he says, the speaker is more likely to be free of any negative emotional or evaluative disposition. For example, when the speaker is well disposed towards the recipient of an utterance like, "What a scoundrel you are!" (Grice, 1989: p. 54), it could be interpreted as merely playful, rather than as irony.

The *echoic mention* account developed within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: pp. 240–241) which has attempted to improve on Grice's approach, agrees that the speaker's attitude in producing irony is consistent with the notion that it is used in response to a conflict:

... verbal irony invariably involves the implicit expression of an attitude, and that the relevance of an ironical utterance invariably depends, at least in part, on the information it conveys about the speaker's attitude to the opinion echoed [...] The attitude expressed by an ironical utterance is invariably of the rejecting or disapproving kind. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: pp. 238–239)

These and other definitions and accounts agree that the use of irony is typically disapproving or rejecting in its evaluation of another person, situation, or object, a view which is broadly consistent with the idea that irony accompanies, and is prompted by, some sort of conflict.² All of the examples from *TRC* which I discuss in Section 4 are consistent with this standard view, since each is triggered by a conflict, or potential one, between two or more characters.

2. Note that Clift (1999: p. 544) questions the view that irony must *always* be hostile, suggesting that there are cases which are characterised by an affinity between the ironist and the target, and that the ironist can possess a sympathetic disposition towards the target.

In Section 2, I briefly introduce two methods of accounting for irony that have emerged within the field of pragmatics. Then, in Section 3, I set out the three principles of Levinson's model of inference (2000) and present an account of how they can be used to analyse individual examples of irony, noting some of the strengths relative to other approaches. Finally, in Section 4, I apply Levinson's three principles to a range of irony examples taken from Coe's *TRC*.

3.2 Accounts of irony

Here, I look briefly at two approaches to analysing verbal irony from within pragmatics.

3.2.1 The Gricean approach

In a Gricean account (1989: pp. 53–54), ironies are marked utterances in that they *flout* one or more of the maxims, always including the first maxim of Quality (Grice, 1989: p. 34). A flout is a particular type of violation which apparently fails to fulfil one or more maxims at the level of what is said. Flouts differ from other kinds of *violation* in at least two important respects: (a) in terms of what is said, a flout ostentatiously fails to fulfil one or more maxims, whereas a *violation* fails to do so unostentatiously; (b) what is communicated by a violation is liable to mislead the recipient, while an utterance which flouts a maxim produces one or more implicatures which allow the assumption that the Cooperative Principle (CP) is being *observed* to be upheld.

A Gricean analysis of “Aren't you clever!” might involve a speaker *S* and her audience *H* (a male friend), both of whom know that the friend, who is also the subject of the utterance, is prone to making blunders which have undesirable effects on others. Given this set of circumstances, it is blatantly obvious to both the speaker and her friend that what she has purported to say is something that she does not believe. Moreover, the friend knows that she knows that it is obvious to him; that is, there is mutual understanding of her communicative intent as wanting to communicate a different proposition to the one she purports to be presenting; but one which is closely related to it. This can be accounted for as a *flout* of the Maxim of Quality. The CP is upheld by the friend's realisation that the speaker's utterance is intended to be interpreted as irony with an inferred propositional form that is a contradiction of what is said, such as (3):

- (3) You're such a fool!

Arriving at this interpretation, the friend will have taken into account features of the context, including whether his action has detrimental effects on her. Prosodic features of the speaker's delivery may also signal her intention that her utterance be understood "ironically". If an interpretation of her utterance as irony involves the derivation of (3), clearly it also involves a critical evaluation of her friend.

3.2.2 Relevance theory and irony

Relevance theory offers a significant departure from Grice, rejecting his approach to tropes as deviations from a literal norm (Pilkington, 1996: p. 160). One of Sperber and Wilson's objections to so-called traditional accounts of irony, with which they associate Grice, is the illogicality and lack of a plausible explanation for why someone would express their intended meaning indirectly through a proposition with the opposite meaning, even though the same meaning could be expressed directly (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: p. 240). They do concede, however, that in cases where the reason for the dissociation is a belief that the stated opinion is false, "the speaker may implicate the opposite of what was literally said" (Wilson and Sperber, 1992: p. 61).

Their alternative account of irony is based on the claim that *all* "ironical" utterances are *echoic*. By *echoic* Sperber and Wilson mean that the speaker's utterance echoes either (a) an explicit source of the utterance, e.g. something previously said by an interlocutor, or (b) a potential source of the utterance, e.g. an opinion someone *could* have expressed. For them, when the attitude the speaker expresses towards the echoed source is one of dissociation, rejection, or mockery, the addressee recognises the utterance as irony.

As I described it above, the context for (2) "What lovely weather!", involves access to an explicit source for the echo: the weather forecast's presenter, and his or her prediction of lovely weather. As such, (2) fits neatly and plausibly into the relevance theory model as an example of dissociation motivated by the speaker's knowledge that the stated opinion is false. For instance, (2) could implicate (4):

- (4) The speaker is complaining that the weather is *awful* for hillwalking.

As well as an opposition between salient aspects of the situational context and the use of the adjective, *lovely*, to describe the inhospitable weather conditions, there is a related opposition between (2) and an inferred implicature such as (4); that is, between *lovely* and *awful*. Hence, although it is possible to explain this example in terms of Sperber and Wilson's echoic mention, an equally plausible description is one that involves an antonymy between contextual factors and what is said, as well as what is said and an implicated proposition. In Section 3, the Q-, I- and M-principles are utilized to show how their application to the analysis of (2) differs from the Gricean and relevance theory approaches.

3.3 Irony and the use of Levinson's principles

Here, and in the remainder of this chapter, I show how Levinson's three principles (Levinson, 2000: pp. 136–137) can contribute to the development of a synthesised account of the different interacting features involved in the production and interpretation of ironies. According to Levinson (2000: pp. 39–41), the three principles interact in an organised way. The Q-principle accounts for implicatures related to the strength of the signal, which may vary with regard to GCIs related to the choice of adjective (compare *good* and *brilliant*), the use of pre- and post-modifiers (compare *moderately* and *extremely*), the use of superlatives and so on. The I-principle accounts for implicatures involved in the amplification of what is said in context, and the M-principle accounts for how clashes between context and utterance, or marked usages, are inferentially resolved (typically PCIs). One of the main advantages of the theory is the way in which interactions among its three principles give explanations for the inferential steps involved in the interpretation of utterances, including ironies.

As noted in Section 1, Levinson's (2000) use of the principles is confined to GCIs and he does not elaborate on how the principles account for PCIs, which are of concern for a pragmatic account of irony. However, I have assumed that the principles can be applied to PCIs because they are presented as an alternative to relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) and a development of Grice's Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims (Grice, 1989). Indeed, the references made to "what can be taken for granted", "the strongest statement consistent with what he knows", and "(non-) stereotypical situation" in the description of the I-principle and M-principle are general enough to suggest that they apply equally well to PCIs. I follow Levinson's notation when presenting implicatures, labelling them as Q+ > for Q-Implicatures, I+ > for I-Implicatures, and M+ > for M-Implicatures.

Below, I show how (2) ("What lovely weather!") can be accounted for using Levinson's three principles. Then, in Section 4, I turn to the more complex examples taken from *TRC* to assess the advantages of using Levinson's principles to analyse ironies and other related phenomena.

In (2), the speaker uses the merit adjective, *lovely*, modified by the emphatic *what*, which she presumably delivers with an intonation indicative of excitement or enthusiasm, as indicated by the exclamation mark. The combined result of this is that Q-implicatures do not obtain, since they are always negative and associated with weaker expressions, such that "good" produces the Q-implicature Q+ > 'not brilliant', in accordance with the Recipient's Corollary of the Q-principle. The recipient can thus take it that the speaker has made a strong statement, if not categorically the strongest possible statement consistent with what he/she knows about the world, or current situation.

However, for the speaker to describe the weather as *lovely* in the particular context of a hillwalker caught in a storm, appears to contravene the I-principle. The operation of the I-principle involves the derivation of implicatures that enrich the propositional form of what is said by adding precision and clarity through saturation, strengthening, expansion and semantic transfer (see Huang, 2007: pp. 220–222). For instance, in (2), through the enrichment processes of strengthening and expansion, the use of *weather* in the immediate context would I-implicate:

- (5) I+ > The stormy weather conditions which I am experiencing at the present time while walking on this hill.

The propositional content of the speaker's sentence would then be:

- (6) The speaker states that the stormy weather conditions she is presently experiencing while walking in the hills are lovely.

However, this proposition is clearly problematic with respect to (d) of the Recipient's Corollary of the I-principle, which requires that the existence of what a sentence is about is consistent with what is taken for granted (Levinson, 2000: p. 115). The idea of the speaker walking in the hills in stormy weather *is* consistent with what is taken for granted, but the notion that she believes that these weather conditions are "lovely" *is not* consistent with what most people would take for granted about stormy weather. Consequently, in regard to the situation described, neither a referential nor a causal connection can be assumed; that is, the stormy weather would not ordinarily prompt someone to describe it in such positive terms (see Levinson, 2000: p. 114 for (a) of the Recipient's Corollary of the I-principle). The result of this is that the recipient of the utterance realises that the description of the stormy weather as *lovely* is marked, and the amplification process is effectively halted.

The M-principle states that marked expressions are used to contrast with those used to represent a normal, stereotypical situation. For me, markedness applies to uses of language where word length and syntactical complexity, word strength and semantic incongruity are used to draw attention to a situation which contrasts with a norm. Clearly, the abnormal aspect of the speaker's assertion relates to the positive emotional response to the speaker's current state of being caught out in stormy weather atop a hill. To pinpoint why it is abnormal and what the use of the abnormal expression M-implicates, the recipient identifies an unmarked alternative expression that is compatible with what we take for granted about the context of utterance as described. An utterance that is approximately equivalent in meaning is (4), "The weather is *awful* for hillwalking". From this is derived the following propositional form:

- (7) The speaker complains that the stormy weather conditions she is currently exposed to atop the hill are awful.

From this inference, M-implicatures may follow, possibly including the following:

- (8) M+ > The speaker is not enjoying the awful weather conditions.
 (9) M+ > The speaker is complaining about the misleading weather forecast.
 (10) M+ > The speaker intends to be humorous.

In summary, the potential strengths of using Levinson's theory are that (i) the I-principle accounts explicitly for the consistency or inconsistency between what is said and what is taken for granted contextually; (ii) the M-principle accounts for deviant uses of language or the use of marked expressions relative to an alternate unmarked expression; (iii) the Q-principle accounts for how we interpret utterances in terms of the strength of what is said, including excessively strong or weak utterances, as in hyperbole and litotes respectively, and thus potentially flags up an utterance as irony; (iv) Levinson presents an integrated system in which the three principles interact in an ordered way to resolve inconsistencies between different propositions. Hence, by developing Grice's approach, Levinson's three principles provide a fuller account of what is going on in the production and interpretation of irony.

3.4 Application of Levinsonian analysis to ironies from *TRC*

I turn now to a range of examples from *TRC* to consider what Levinson's Q-, I-, and M-principles contribute in terms of accounting for and distinguishing among different ironies and non-ironies. In each example, I present some of the inferential steps which are pertinent to the interpretation of the utterances as irony, or, indeed, in considering whether they count as examples of irony in the first place. I provide explanations for the connections among the inferential steps and the probable implicatures each utterance produces. In the analysis of Example 1, I present a series of inferential steps for the sake of systematicity, but I eliminate some of these steps in the less detailed accounts of subsequent examples. I use the term *op-
 conspicuously inconsistent* in my explanations to refer to an obvious antonymic relation, or inconsistency, between what is said, the context of utterance, and the implicatures generated. In each example, the locus of the irony is underlined.

I begin with a straightforward, central example of irony (Example 1), and then move outwards to definite but non-central examples and finally to two different cases of non-ironies. The irony in Example 2 involves a clash between two fictional

discourse levels within the novel, while the locus of the irony in Example 3 is a false presupposition, embedded in a narrative passage rather than a character-character interaction. In Example 4, the use of litotes, rather than hyperbole, characterises the locus of the irony. Finally, although Examples 5 (dramatic irony) and 6 (unintentional irony) share some of the attributes of irony, I do not consider them to be ironies because they fail to produce M-implicatures.

3.4.1 Example 1: “Such dazzling repartee”

The first example is from a conversation among a group of boys who attend King William’s School. The conversation concerns the boys’ English class, during which Benjamin Trotter, Doug Anderton, and Sean Harding were meant to perform the courthouse scene from Harper Lee’s *To Kill a Mockingbird*. Harding, a perennial joker and prankster, has unadvisedly decided to apply black ink to his face in his portrayal of the African-American defendant, Tom Robinson, which predictably triggers uproarious scenes in the classroom, much to the displeasure of their apparently cheerless English teacher, Mr. Fletcher. The entire group of performers is held responsible for Harding’s ill-judged stunt, and, by way of a punishment, they each receive a penalty of a six-page essay on racial discrimination. Later that afternoon, while Doug and Benjamin are waiting for their bus, they are taunted by their arch-enemy, and fellow student, Culpepper. With his plummy voice and sporting achievements, Culpepper represents privilege and entitlement, effectively creating a divide between him and students like Doug Anderton, who is working class and attends the school courtesy of a scholarship. The conflict between Culpepper and the others relates to a sense of rough justice and Culpepper’s preoccupation with winners and losers, as well as a more general underlying class conflict.

“Busy evening ahead for you boys, then?” said a plummy, prematurely broken voice behind them. They turned to see their old enemy Culpepper: junior rugger captain, junior cricket captain, would-be athletics champion and long-standing object of derision. As always, he was carrying his books and his PE kit in the same bulky sports bag, from which the handle of his squash racket protruded like a permanently erect penis. “Six sides apiece, wasn’t it? That should have you burning the midnight oil.”

“Fuck off, Culpepper,” said Anderton.

“Ooh,” he gasped, in mock-admiration. “Most amusing. Such dazzling repartee.”

“It was only a joke, anyway,” said Benjamin. And he pointed out: “You were laughing with the rest of them.”

(TRC, p. 25)

Culpepper’s utterance is a straightforward example of irony. Anderton has clearly been riled by Culpepper’s taunts about the teacher’s punishment, as seen by his

crude response (“fuck off”). Culpepper counters this by using irony to (a) demonstrate that he has a more sophisticated wit, and (b) to further provoke Doug and Benjamin. Hence, Culpepper’s use of “most amusing” and “dazzling repartee” are intended to point up the witless and unimaginative character of Doug’s utterance. The use of “dazzling repartee” locks in the irony, since it is not otherwise typically used in everyday contexts such as in this example. Benjamin and presumably also Doug understand the irony, as evidenced by Benjamin’s rather defensive response. The possible inferential steps involved in interpreting Culpepper’s utterance as irony, using Levinson’s Q-, I- and M-principles, are presented below.

3.4.1.1 *Inferential steps*

Step 1: Culpepper (the ironist) has said that Doug Anderton’s previous utterance (recipient/target of the irony) is very amusing and an example of dazzling repartee [facts about the interaction].

Step 2: Benjamin Trotter and Doug Anderton assume that Culpepper is cooperating in the interaction and that therefore his utterance has some relevant aim or point [principle of conversational cooperation (Grice, 1989: pp. 22–40)].

Step 3: Benjamin and Doug recognise that the superlative “most amusing”, and “dazzling repartee” modified by the emphatic “such”, are very strong merit adjective phrases, which therefore do not produce any Q-implicatures [based on the Q-principle and the assumption that the speaker produced the strongest statement possible that was consistent with what he knows or believes].

Step 4: Benjamin and Doug cannot amplify “most amusing” and “dazzling repartee” because they are opp-conspicuously inconsistent with salient elements of the context, in particular that Doug has produced a very crude response to Culpepper. The assumptions of mutual animosity between Culpepper, and the two friends, Benjamin and Doug, would also block the amplification of these expressions of merit [in accordance with (d) of the recipient’s corollary of the I-principle (see Levinson, 2000: p. 115) the production of I-implicatures is dependent on what is said being consistent with what is taken for granted (a) linguistically and (b) contextually].

Step 5: M-implicatures are inferred to resolve the intended meaning of Culpepper’s utterance [based on the M-principle and the use of a marked expression relative to an unmarked alternate to indicate a non-stereotypical situation].

Step 6: An unmarked alternate expression to what was said that is consistent with what is taken for granted is:

- (11) Doug Anderton’s retort is banal and witless.

Step 7: There is an antonymic opposition between what is said and what is meant, which marks out Culpepper’s utterance as an instance of irony.

Step 8: For Benjamin and Doug, Culpepper's utterance M-implicates [based on a combination of the M- and I-principles, whereby M-implicatures are accepted if they are compatible with what is taken for granted]:

- (12) M+ > Culpepper thinks that Doug Anderton's retort is banal.
- (13) M+ > Culpepper is criticising Doug Anderton for his lack of wit.
- (14) M+ > Culpepper believes he is superior to Doug Anderton (and Benjamin Trotter).
- (15) M+ > Culpepper intends to be humorous.
- (16) M+ > Culpepper intends to antagonise Doug Anderton and Benjamin Trotter.

In this analysis, the absence of Q-implicatures is an indicator of a strong signal, which, in this instance, is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with the context of utterance. As such, the propositional content of the utterance cannot be straightforwardly amplified, which leads the recipient to (a) observe that the utterance is marked, and (b) identify an unmarked alternate that Culpepper could have used to convey his intended meaning more straightforwardly. This generates M-implicatures (12)–(16) relating to one-upmanship which are compatible with the context of utterance, allowing amplification through the I-principle, and consistent with the conflict that exists between Culpepper and the other students.

3.4.2 Example 2: “showing a lack of judgement and an absence of patriotic decency that can scarcely be credited”

This example is considerably more complex since it involves two fictional discourse levels and a perceived clash between the beliefs of Sean Harding, and those of a persona he has invented. Harding submits a series of letters to the school newsletter, *The Bill Board* under the fictional name of Pusey-Hamilton, MBE, who is a caricature of a bigoted middle-England contributor. Because the novel depicts the Birmingham pub bombing and its aftermath of reprisals against members of the city's Irish community, the letters – expressing extreme right-wing opinions in relation to the Irish problem of the 1970s for instance – have a particularly striking resonance for their readers. Though subversive and controversial in content, the editorial committee of *The Bill Board* eventually decide to publish the letters after reaching a general consensus that “the bizarre fantasy world” Harding had created was part of his “simple anarchic clowning” (*TRC*, p. 255). As such, the letters' content is deemed to express views which are the opposite of Harding's

own actual views.³ The following extracts from one such letter contain a number of ironies, which I have underlined. It is not possible to analyse all of these here, so I concentrate on the final example, which is underlined and bold.

The Billboard Thursday, 28 April, 1977 Letters to the Editor From Arthur Pusey-Hamilton, MBE

It has for some time been rumoured – although why there should be any secrecy about this, I can't imagine – that the British army operate a “shoot to kill” policy in Northern Ireland. Despite having written numerous letters to No. 10 Downing Street, I have been unable to obtain official confirmation of this fact, and yet I thought there was no particular reason why, as a patriotic Englishman, I should not attempt to instigate something similar in our own pleasant, tree-lined avenue. Accordingly I obtained a modest bank loan in order to purchase some ammunition and convert our loft into a small gun turret, and began to keep watch on the street outside. It wasn't long before I noticed that the name on the local butcher's van, which drove past our house every Tuesday and Thursday morning at 10 o'clock, was none other than “Murphy's – Suppliers of Fine Meat and Poultry”. Could anything have been more blatant? The driver might just as well have spray-painted the words “Troops Out” on to his van in six-foot lettering. Right, I thought. Right, you little Provo bastard – I know what your game is. Accordingly, the very next time that he passed by, I let rip with a couple of rounds from my trusty Kalashnikov. [...] the only target I managed to hit, on this occasion, was a dog belonging to an elderly passer-by – it was an Irish wolfhound, I'm pleased to say – while the cowardly blighter Murphy swerved as soon as he heard my fire and crashed into a nearby tree, sustaining what tragically turned out to be only minor external injuries. He then had the effrontery to report this incident to the police, and they, showing a lack of judgement and an absence of patriotic decency that can scarcely be credited, thereupon arrested both myself and Gladys, my good lady wife. (TRC: pp. 235–6)

Embedded in the fictional world of the novel's characters, Sean Harding's invention, Pusey-Hamilton, describes incidents from within the fictional world he inhabits. From the standpoint of the students, Pusey-Hamilton expresses his opinions sincerely within this invented world. The events and views asserted are so extreme that it is improbable that readers of the letters would believe (a) that

3. In *The Closed Circle* Philip Chase is reminded of Sean Harding's letters: 'It brought back many memories of his schooldays, of the increasingly outrageous articles that Harding used to submit anonymously to *The Bill Board*. Sometimes, the arguments over whether it was possible to publish them had been long and vociferous: but they had always succumbed, in the end, to Harding's humour, and to the conviction that no one could mistake the tone of these pieces for anything other than calculated irony. Often that irony had been almost too dark for comfort' (Coe, 2005: pp. 279–280).

Pusey-Hamilton exists, and (b) that the actual author holds these opinions. Hence, while Pusey-Hamilton believes that he is perfectly justified in carrying out attacks on anyone with an Irish name who enters his neighbourhood (in this case Murphy the butcher) without fear of any repercussions, the letter's readers will assume that such beliefs are opp-conspicuously inconsistent with Harding's own beliefs, such that for him, attacks of this kind are unjustifiable and therefore deserving of punishment by law.

The irony contained within the letters is a product of the opp-conspicuous inconsistency between the extreme views stated therein and assumptions about the actual author's stance. The effect of the irony is to draw attention to Harding's critical opinion of the unreasonable and damaging acts of retribution being perpetrated, not only within Pusey-Hamilton's fictional world, but also in the world of the novel.

Because of the complexity of this example, to avoid overcomplicating the Levinsonian analysis that follows, I focus on the discourse level of the novel's characters, in particular Sean Harding and *The Bill Board's* editors. The potential ironies (underlined> leading up to the sentence on which I focus here (in bold font), help to lock in the interpretation of it as irony.

3.4.2.1 *Inferential steps*

It is assumed that Harding (the ironist) communicates cooperatively with the editors and other readers of *The Bill Board* (the recipients), though his letter contains the views of a character that he has invented (Pusey-Hamilton, a pretended target of the irony) about events in his fictional world. Pusey-Hamilton communicates that it was an affront on Murphy's part to inform the police of the shooting incident, and subsequently that it was an indecent and unpatriotic misjudgement on their part to arrest him and his wife. The editors recognise that the strength of "effrontery" and "absence of patriotic decency" do not produce any Q-implicatures, while "lack of judgement" and "can scarcely be credited" though also strong, potentially produce the following implicatures.

- (17) Q + > Pusey-Hamilton does not mean that they showed absolutely no judgement.
- (18) Q + > Pusey-Hamilton does not mean that the police's lack of decency can absolutely not be credited.

The strong expression of criticism against Murphy and the police is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with what the editorial board assume to be Harding's more liberal views, and therefore cannot be amplified through the I-principle. There is, however, consistency with what they know about Pusey-Hamilton's extremely

right-wing bigoted views. The strong language used signals that the fictional content of the letters is marked, and that there is an antonymic opposition between what is “written” by Pusey-Hamilton and what is meant by Harding, which identifies it as an instance of irony. This striking use of language serves as a signal for the marked aspects to be resolved through the M-principle.

M-implicatures are inferred to resolve the meaning of the letter from the point of view of its actual author, Harding. Hence, a possible unmarked alternate expression to what was written, that is consistent with what is taken for granted regarding Harding's supposedly more liberal beliefs, is:

- (19) Within Pusey-Hamilton's fictional world, it is perfectly reasonable for Murphy to report the shooting incident, and for the police to take Pusey-Hamilton into custody, in accordance with the law of the land.

Hence, for the editors, Harding's letter M-implicates the following, which are compatible with what is taken for granted, as required by the I-Principle:

- (20) M+ > The Irish community are justified in reporting violent acts of recrimination against them.
- (21) M+ > The police should exhibit good, balanced judgement in dealing with violent incidents against members of the Irish community.
- (22) M+ > Harding condemns acts of violence by Englishmen against the Irish which are unreasonable and should not be tolerated.
- (23) M+ > Harding intends to be humorous.

There are a range of conflicts here. One appears to be between the narrow, bigoted perspective of middle Englanders and those with more liberal-minded, tolerant outlooks. Another conflict is between the civil rights of Birmingham's Irish population and the bigotry that underlies some of the recriminations against them by other people in the community. Similarly, it points up a conflict between the rule of law and the unlawful behaviour of some people (as represented by Pusey-Hamilton's extreme actions), mistakenly in the name of justice, against members of the Irish community. Hence, the irony focuses attention on the Irish issue, which is one of the major themes of the novel.

The analysis of this example is largely consistent with that of the previous example. What is said is strong semantically and is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with what is taken for granted contextually, meaning that amplification through I-implicatures is blocked. This signals the possibility that the utterance should be interpreted as irony. To resolve the marked aspects of the utterance, a number of M-implicatures, which contrast opp-conspicuously with what is said, are

generated and these M-implicatures are consistent with what is taken for granted, as required by the I-principle. The main difference with this example is that while in the previous examples what is said and what is intended can be attributed to a single speaker, when interpreted from Pusey-Hamilton's point of view, what he writes is not marked because it is consistent with what is taken for granted about him. However, from Harding's point of view, as the inventor of Pusey-Hamilton, the utterance is marked and must therefore be resolved through M-implicatures. Hence, there is an opp-conspicuous inconsistency between the I-implicatures associated with the fictional Pusey-Hamilton and the M-implicatures generated as a result of interpreting the utterance from Harding's point of view.

3.4.3 Example 3: "With these and other such pleasantries"

Benjamin Trotter and Steve Richards, the only black pupil at King Williams', have been given the dubious honour of becoming school prefects. Prior to assuming these duties, they and the other newly appointed prefects have been invited by the school's Chief Master to attend a special dinner. Before dinner is served, the Chief Master engages the boys in small talk, but this turns out to be awkward both for the boys and the Chief Master, not helped by the latter's borderline racist remarks. The novel's narrator uses irony to comment on the Chief Master's ill-judged attempt at humour.

"Sherry, Trotter?" said the Chief Master, handing him a glass almost as soon as he had entered the hall.

"Oh – erm ... Thank you."

"Rather pale, I'm afraid."

"Yes, sir, I know. I didn't sleep very well last night. All the excitement, I expect."

"I was referring to this somewhat anaemic Fino. However, now that you mention it, your pallor is a mite spectral, even by your usual standards. Would you like to go upstairs and lie down for a while?"

"No thank you, sir. I shall be fine."

"As you wish, as you wish. Ah, Richards! No one could accuse you of looking pale, eh, what?"

With these and other such pleasantries, the Chief Master kept his guests entertained before dinner. (TRC, p. 280)

The locus of the irony in this example differs from the loci in the previous two examples where it is part of a statement. Here the locus is embedded in a false presupposition; that the Chief Master's pre-dinner exchanges with the boys qualify as "pleasantries". I map the possible inferential steps involved in reaching an interpretation of this irony below.

3.4.3.1 *Inferential steps*

Sophie (the ironist) has communicated to her companion and the narratee (recipients of the irony) that the Chief Master (the target) entertained the new prefects with his use of “pleasantries”. For the recipients, the use of “pleasantries” does not produce any Q-implicatures since no stronger expression that would significantly affect the overall meaning of the utterance is available. However, Sophie’s use of “pleasantries” is resistant to amplification, in accordance with the I-principle, because what the Chief Master has said to Steve Richards (and Benjamin Trotter) is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with what is taken for granted about the Chief Master’s comments; that (a) they put the guests at ease, and (b) they help the guests to enjoy the social occasion. Hence, the straightforward generation of I-implicatures is restricted on both linguistic and contextual grounds. Although the boys may have been “entertained” by the Chief Master for reasons he did not intend, the recipients will identify the use of “pleasantries” as a false presupposition. As such, the recipients recognise it as being part of a marked expression, and a potential signal that the narrator has produced irony, since there is an antonymic opposition between what is said and what is meant. This leads to M-implicatures being inferred, relative to an unmarked alternate, to resolve the meaning of Sophie’s narration. One possible unmarked alternate expression, that is consistent with what is taken for granted about the Chief Master’s lack of grace as a host, is:

- (24) With these and other such social faux pas, the Chief Master inadvertently kept his guests entertained before dinner.

For the recipients, the narrative may produce the following M-implicatures all of which are compatible with what is taken for granted:

- (25) M+ > The Chief Master amused his guests with his social faux pas.
 (26) M+ > The Chief Master made his guests feel awkward.
 (27) M+ > The Chief Master is socially inept.
 (28) M+ > The Chief Master’s credentials as a responsible educator of young impressionable students is questionable.
 (29) M+ > The narrator intends to be humorous.

The conflicts here are both ethical and ideological in the sense that the narrator’s perspective on the world at the turn of the Millennium is at odds with that of the Chief Master and a larger proportion of the population in the 1970s in terms of discrimination and casual racism. Despite his responsibility to set a good example for the students, the Chief Master casually utters the flagrantly racist remark, which

points up conflicts related to what counts as an acceptable joke. It also points up the conflicts related to racial differences that were more prevalent during the 1970s.

Due to the embedding of the locus as a false presupposition, and the fact that the locus is rather neutral in terms of its strength, the Q-principle does not play such a significant role in the signaling and interpretation of this example. Nevertheless, because the presupposition is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with the salient context, it is resistant to amplification. Hence, despite the relative subtlety of this irony, the interaction among the three principles is largely the same as in the two previous examples.

3.4.4 Example 4: “a drink which differed hardly at all”

Example 4 differs from the previous three in that the locus of the irony is characterised by litotes. Sheila and Colin Trotter host a dinner party for their friends Sam and Barbara Chase, who bring along their son, Philip, a school friend of Benjamin Trotter. The adults have been drinking a bottle of Blue Nun wine, but now Colin and Sam decide to switch to drinking some of Colin’s homebrewed light ale. Here the conflict appears to relate to what constitutes good value for money. There are two complementary ironies in this passage (both underlined), but I concentrate on the second of these two (in bold text).

Places were swapped so that Sam and Colin moved next to each other, and soon they began to supplement their wine with what was indisputably the Trotter household’s alcoholic pièce de résistance: Colin’s homemade light ale, which he brewed in a forty-pint plastic keg in the cupboard under the stairs, using a kit from Boots the Chemist. The cost, as he was always ready to point out, worked out at a little under 2p per pint: **an astonishing price to pay for a drink which differed hardly at all from the commercially manufactured beers**, except that this one tended to come out of the keg looking cloudy and green with a head that took up at least two-thirds of the glass and an after burn like fermented WD40. (*TRC*, p. 55)

The narrator describes the beer’s price per pint as “astonishing”, which suggests that it is exceptionally good value for money. In terms of the quality of the beer, although it can be inferred from “differed hardly at all from manufactured beers” that it is not as good as commercially brewed beers, there is an assumption that there is no *significant* difference in the quality. However, “differed hardly at all” is an example of litotes, that is: “a figure of speech which contains an understatement for emphasis, and is therefore the opposite of hyperbole” (Cuddon, 1999: p. 473). Wales (2011: p. 254) points out that, “in appropriate contexts, where speaker and listener are aware of the discrepancy between literal phrasing and actuality, litotes is often used in irony”. That is the case here as the description which follows

“except” is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with the inferences derived from “differed hardly at all”, which retrospectively locks in the irony. Although it is not stated, it can be inferred that the underlined sections of the extract represent Colin’s opinion of the beer, while the remainder of the sentence describes its actual condition. Indeed, this is how details of the beer are presented in the BBC adaptation of the novel (2005), with Colin effusing over its value, while Sheila points out to Sam and Barbara that it is virtually undrinkable. The following is a Levinsonian analysis of this example.

3.4.4.1 *Inferential steps*

The narrator, Sophia (the ironist) has communicated to Patrick and the narra-tee (the recipient) that Colin believes that his home-brewed beer (target of the irony) hardly differs from commercially manufactured beers. Use of the strong merit adjective in the phrase “astonishing price”, blocks the generation of any Q-implicatures, since there is no obviously stronger alternative available. By contrast, the narrator’s use of the adverbial “hardly at all” to modify “differed” lessens the degree of difference, and therefore does produce Q-implicatures such that:

- (30) Q+ > The homebrewed beer is not a great deal different from commercial beers.

Overall then, the narrator expresses a favourable assessment of the quality and price of the beer, which the recipients recognise is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with the comparison of it to fermented WD40 that follows, a description which suggests that it was barely drinkable. As such, amplification through I-implicatures is blocked and the recipients recognise that the narrative description of the beer contains a marked expression. Moreover, the presence of an antonymic opposition between what is said and what is meant, marks it out as an instance of probable irony.

M-implicatures are inferred to resolve the meaning of Sophie’s description of the beer relative to an unmarked alternate that is consistent with what is taken for granted about the beer, such as:

- (31) Colin’s homebrew tastes awful compared to commercially manufactured beers.

As a result, for the recipients, Sophie’s description may generate some or all of the following M-implicatures:

- (32) M+ > Colin’s homebrew differs considerably from other beers.
 (33) M+ > Colin’s homebrew is virtually undrinkable.
 (34) M+ > Colin is not well skilled or knowledgeable in the art of brewing beer.

- (35) $M+ >$ Colin's attempts at beer brewing are a waste of money (even at 2p a pint).
- (36) $M+ >$ The narrator intends to be humorous.

It is worth noting that the description of Colin's beer as the family's "alcoholic *pièce de résistance*", which is not typically used in the discussion of such commonplace products except for humorous effect, is an additional irony in Sophie's description, though as with the later underlined part of the passage, it is only locked in for the reader once the appearance and taste of the beer have been described. There is no explicit conflict in this example, but it is not difficult to imagine a large keg of undrinkable beer as a cause of some domestic friction between the Trotters.

Because litotes signals this irony, rather than the more prototypical use of hyperbole, it produces at least one Q-implicature (30). Similar to the examples which make use of hyperbole, here the understatement is not compatible with what is taken for granted, meaning the marked utterance must be resolved through the M-principle and NEG-raising to derive M-implicatures that are consistent with what is taken for granted.

An advantage of the systematic way in which Levinson's principles interact is that it is possible to identify deviations in the inferential steps for different kinds of ironies, as well as the points of overlap. This suggests that certain steps are essential to all ironies, e.g. the blocking of I-implicatures due to opp-conspicuous inconsistency with the context, while others vary depending on the particular characteristics of the irony such as whether or not Q-implicatures obtain.

In the final two examples, I further consider the interaction between the three principles and how a Levinsonian approach can help us to distinguish between ironies and non-ironies.

3.4.5 Example 5: "I can safely say that those two won't be seeing each other again"

This is an example of so-called dramatic irony. Sam Chase's wife, Barbara, has been wooed by the extremely verbose and flowery advances made in the form of a series of letters by the Art teacher, Nigel Plumb. After offering minimal resistance, Barbara begins to see Mr. Plumb behind Sam's back, the result of which is to put the future of their marriage in jeopardy. Sam resolves to fight for his wife, by embarking on a course of self-improvement. Acknowledging that he is a largely uneducated man, he determines to expand his vocabulary, not least because this appears to have been a telling factor in the success of Plumb's overtures. Eventually, Sam confronts Barbara with an ultimatum to choose between him and the Art teacher. After telling him to stop talking in clichés, Barbara admits

that he'd been a good husband to her, and agrees to stay with him. This promise is somewhat undermined, however, by her subsequent conversation with Sheila Trotter, from which the reader learns that (a) she has not yet ended the affair, and (b) she is clearly still besotted by Plumb, as evidenced by her apparent obliviousness to Sheila's repeated advice to put an end to the relationship. Within this context, Sam's confident pronouncement to Colin that he has managed to rescue his marriage is notably, and somewhat painfully, wide of the mark:

"I can win her back, Colin. I know I can."

"I think so, too."

"We're over the worst now, I'm sure of that. The clouds are parting and I can see the light at the end of the tunnel. This is the calm after the storm."

"The calm comes before the storm," Colin pointed out.

"Yes, but every cloud has a silver lining."

"That's true," said Colin, and they clinked glasses again.

"I'm not one for making predictions," said Sam, and Colin smiled to himself, for even he had noticed by now that this was his friend's invariable prelude to making predictions, "but I think I can safely say that those two won't be seeing each other again."

(TRC, p. 217)

So-called "dramatic irony" can be defined simply as, "When the audience understand the implication and meaning of a situation on stage, or what is being said, but the characters do not" (Cuddon, 1999: p. 237). As Culpeper (2001: p. 181) observes, having access to privileged, or advanced, background knowledge is vital for the audience to be able to infer implicatures that are not available to other characters, and to thereby experience the dramatic irony effect.

In this example, Sam's confident prediction is based on an erroneous assumption because Barbara appears to have given him false assurances. The reader knows, and Colin possibly suspects, that Barbara has not yet broken off the relationship with Plumb. Hence, Sam's assertion draws attention to the disparity and conflict between his knowledge of the current situation and its probable outcomes, and that of the reader/Colin. We are aware of the strong possibility that Barbara will see Plumb again; Sam is convinced that is no longer a possibility ("those two won't be seeing each other again"). Likewise, Sam is very confident that his prediction is correct ("I can safely say that"), whereas the reader has very little confidence in its accuracy, having evidence to the contrary that the affair will continue. The main effect of this "dramatic irony" on the reader is to elicit feelings of sympathy for Sam, who is unaware that his efforts to save his marriage have been less conclusive than he thinks. If I am correct, there are fewer inferential steps involved in the interpretation of this example, and M-implicatures do not play the crucial role they do in the examples of straightforward ironies we have looked at above.

3.4.5.1 *Inferential steps*

Step 1: Sam has communicated to Colin (the recipient) that it is safe to claim that his wife, Barbara, will never see Mr. Plumb again. The reader of the novel is a recipient of Sam's claim at the narrator-narratee discourse level.

Step 2: Colin and the reader recognise that Sam's use of "I can safely say" expresses a strong degree of certainty, and does not, therefore, produce any Q-implicatures.

Step 3: While for Colin, whose understanding of the situation is based on Sam's account, the expression of certainty is potentially compatible with what is taken for granted about the situation, for the reader, whose knowledge of the context is more accurate, Sam's utterance is opp-conspicuously inconsistent with what is taken for granted. Consequently, the reader cannot amplify "they won't be seeing each other again" because the context blocks Sam's assertion.

Step 4: However, since there is no intention on Sam's part to produce an utterance that opp-conspicuously contrasts with what he takes for granted, the reader does not consider his utterance to be marked per se.

Step 5: In addition, there is no antonymic opposition between what Sam says and what he means, so his utterance is not marked out as an instance of irony

There are clear distinctions between the analysis of this example and the foregoing analyses. These can largely be explained in terms of judgements about Sam's intention and the functions his utterance performs. Crucially, as with Pusey-Hamilton in Example 2, Sam is committed to the truth of what he says and his utterance is intended only to inform and reassure Colin that his marital problems have been resolved. Hence, although the reader's (and possibly Colin's) knowledge contradicts Sam's belief, his utterance is not marked, and there is no expectation on the reader/Colin to derive M-implicatures to resolve Sam's intended meaning. This is a crucial difference from straightforward ironies. For Sam, there is no opp-conspicuous contradiction between what he says and what he means. Nevertheless, his utterance does focus the reader's attention on the gap in his knowledge. In Levinsonian terms, this knowledge gap can be understood in relation to (d) of the recipient's corollary of the I-principle (Levinson, 2000: p. 115). For Sam, what he says is consistent with what he takes for granted, but for the reader, whose knowledge is more accurate, what Sam says is inconsistent with what is taken for granted. As a result, Sam's utterance does not have a *target*, but, rather, it draws attention to his status as *victim*, both of his wife's adulterous behaviour, and his own trusting nature.

3.4.6 Example 6: "The fervour of my gratitude is well-nigh inexpressible"

In so-called 'dramatic irony' the speaker cannot be said to produce irony in any straightforward sense. In this final example, Sam's utterance has the potential to be interpreted as irony because many of its features can be observed in straightforward ironies, such as Example 1, and the context biases the recipient towards such an interpretation. However, here, as with dramatic irony, there is no intent on the part of the speaker to produce irony.

Sam is the coach driver for a group of strikers from British Leyland who are travelling down to London to join a larger protest there. Among the picketers is Bill Anderton, a friend of Sam. They stop for refreshments en route to London and Bill offers to buy Sam a cup of tea. While waiting for Bill, Sam continues with his vocabulary building exercises, which are part of his self-improvement strategy for winning back his wife, Barbara, who has been having an affair with the linguistically flowery Mr. Plumb, the art teacher at their son's school (see Example 5). Sam, identifying an opportunity to practice, decides to try out some of his newly learned vocabulary on Bill, who has returned with his cup of tea.

Bill Anderton arrived with his cup of tea.

"Here you are, Sam, get it down you."

Sam looked at the grey concoction being handed to him in a plastic cup. A mottled, particularly unappetizing film of some sort had already formed on the surface.

"Thanks, Bill," he said; then added, by way of experiment, "The fervour of my gratitude is well-nigh inexpressible."

Bill gave him a worried look and went back inside. (TRC, p. 260)

In an everyday context, an unexpected switch to a very formal register with an overly verbose, hyperbolic style is a common signal that an utterance could be meant as irony. The situational context of this utterance counts as an irony-biasing context, which is a situation in which the interpretation of an utterance as irony is favoured for reasons that might include an acrimonious relationship between the speaker and addressee, an undesirable physical condition, and an event which the speaker judges to be detrimental in some way (see Bryant and Fox Tree, 2002: p. 106, on irony biasing contexts; and Colston and O'Brien, 2000: pp. 1560–1561, on biasing information).

3.4.6.1 *Inferential steps*

The use of "the fervour of my gratitude is well-nigh inexpressible" is a very strong expression of thanks. As such, it does not generate any Q-implicatures, which are produced when a stronger expression could have been used. With regard to the I-principle, Bill recognises that there is linguistic and contextual incompatibility

between such a strong expression of gratitude and what is taken for granted about receiving a cup of tea, especially one which is so unappetising. Bill might consider the possibility that Sam is using the words in a marked, non-stereotypical way, prompting the search for a straightforward alternative, such as:

(37) I am disgusted by this so-called cup of tea which you've given me.

However, despite his concerned reaction, Bill rejects this alternate on the basis that (a) he is unaccustomed to hearing Sam use such language, and (b) it is not consistent with what he takes for granted about Sam's character and their relationship. Therefore, for Bill, Sam's utterance does not produce any M-implicatures which are compatible with what is taken for granted about Sam and the context of utterance.

That Bill does not respond to Sam's utterance as irony may be explained by his assumption that he is being only accidentally verbose. The reader (but possibly not Bill) knows that Sam is merely experimenting with some of his newly-studied communicative techniques, which he has clearly not mastered, and that his expression of thanks is therefore intended straightforwardly. There is, however, a considerable amount of overlap between the inferential steps outlined above and the earlier analyses of ironies. In terms of the Q-principle, Sam expresses his gratitude for receiving the tea from Bill in verbose hyperbolic language. This entails that he could not be more grateful for the tea, and by extension, implicates that it is well-made and appetising. The contextual evidence provided suggests that the tea is barely drinkable, so any potential I-implicatures are blocked. As with the earlier analyses, this leads to consideration that the utterance is marked and the potential need to derive M-implicatures to resolve this markedness. However, this depends on intention and the purposeful use of a marked expression. In Sam's case, the markedness is not produced by design but due to a lack of awareness about how his use of language might affect the listener in this particular context.

Hence, as with dramatic irony, Levinson's principles help us to distinguish between accidental ironies and straightforward ironies in that the lack of speaker intention means that M-implicatures pertaining to an ironic interpretation are either not produced at all, or rejected.

3.5 Summary

The use of irony is pervasive in *TRC*, and often coincides with points of conflict relating to racial, political and personal tensions. In the analyses above, I have used Levinson's three-principled theory to present an account of how both straightforward and more complex ironies could be interpreted. Moreover, I have suggested that the application of Levinson's integrated principles provides a means

of differentiating among and between definite ironies, and other phenomena, such as so-called dramatic irony and accidental irony.

In the course of my analyses, I made observations about how both ironies and non-ironies draw attention to salient contextual aspects of *TRC* and the traits of characters, which contributes to our understanding of conflicts in the novel. For example, the narrative irony of Example 4 focuses attention on the quality of Colin Trotter's homebrew and its supposed value for money. This contributes to our understanding of the married couple and the contrast in their opinions of the beer; Colin's pride in his money-saving brew contrasting with the stoic, but probably thinly-worn patience of Sheila, which is a probable cause of domestic tension between them. Likewise, in Examples 1 and 3, the localized uses of irony point up more general class and racial tensions respectively, while the irony produced in Harding's fictional letter in Example 2 reflects the escalating problems between the English and Irish during the period in which *TRC* is set. Hence, in each case, the irony produced at the point of a localised conflict generates implicatures which are more broadly relatable to the major themes of the novel.

The systematic interaction among the principles, which either generates or blocks implicatures depending on what can be taken for granted linguistically and contextually, offers an alternative to Gricean and relevance theory approaches to irony. In the analyses above, I suggested some of the advantages of using Levinson's three integrated principles in accounting for the interpretation of ironies. For instance, the Q-principle can be used to account for the strength of signal, whether it is characterised by hyperbole or litotes. This is complemented by the I-principle, which accounts for which propositions are compatible with the context, based on their strength and/or accuracy. This enables the recipient to assess whether an utterance is intentionally marked, only apparently or accidentally marked, or not marked, which guides how the utterance is subsequently interpreted including, for instance, as a potential irony. The M-principle works in combination with the Q-principle and I-principle to resolve the marked elements of what was said. As has been shown, this not only helps the recipient to arrive at an unmarked alternate, but also produces a range of M-implicatures which relate to the target of the irony, its functions, and the antonymic relation between what is said, the context, and what is meant. My analyses involve some GCIs, especially in respect to the strength of what is said, but I have also extended the application of Levinson's principles to include production of PCIs, most of which are M-implicatures, which are essential to an account of irony.

To my knowledge, the above study is the first time that Levinson's principles have been applied to an extended discussion of irony and a sustained analysis of a literary text. Although admittedly only brief, this analysis nevertheless suggests that Levinson's principles can be applied productively to both. I would therefore

argue that because of their potential contributions within the study of irony, literary pragmatics, and the field of pragmatics more generally, Levinson's principles are deserving of greater attention than they have thus far received.

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What the /fʌk/? An acoustic-pragmatic analysis of implicated meaning in a scene from *The Wire*

Erica Gold and Dan McIntyre

4.1 Introduction

At the heart of pragmatic theory is the notion that what speakers mean goes beyond the semantic content of their utterances. However, one problem for mainstream pragmatic theories of implicated meaning is that they rarely take enough account of the phonetic aspects of utterances. Grice himself acknowledges that “tone of voice” (Grice, 1975: p. 53) may be important in determining the pragmatic meaning of an utterance, but arguably underplays its significance. So too do most neo-Gricean accounts. What we argue in this chapter is that theories of implicated meaning can be augmented significantly by proper consideration of the phonetic qualities of utterances. Specifically, we argue that acoustic phenomena, which are amenable to objective description and analysis, play a key role in pragmatic interpretation, and that taking account of them can enhance traditional pragmatic analysis. We demonstrate this through a case study of a scene from the acclaimed TV drama, *The Wire*.

One possible reason why pragmatics has failed to take sufficient account of the phonetic aspects of utterances is that most pragmatic analyses are of written texts rather than naturally-occurring speech. That is, in most cases, the object of study for pragmaticians is either an orthographic transcript of speech or an invented written example. This focus on written language is certainly the case when it comes to the pragmatic analysis of literature (see, for example, the constituent chapters of Chapman and Clark, 2014), for the obvious reason that literature prototypically exists in written form. But performance is a key aspect of much contemporary drama so one might reasonably ask why pragmatic analyses of plays or films rarely consider the phonetic level of language. The reason for this is methodological. In the 1980s, pragmatics transformed the stylistic study of dramatic texts by offering

a principled means of analysing the interpersonal relationships between characters (see, for example, the pioneering work of Burton, 1980, Short, 1981 and Bennison, 1993). However, the focus was very much on the text rather than performance since, as Short (1981) points out, texts are stable to an extent that performances are not. That is, each performance of a play is likely to vary, if only slightly, from those that precede it. The text, on the other hand, remains unchanged, meaning that stylistic analyses of a play text (which may result in varied interpretations of that text) are open to falsification in a way that stylistic analyses of ephemeral performances are not. For this reason, most stylisticians of drama focus on the analysis of text rather than performance (a notable exception is Furlong, 2014, who recognises the interpretative importance of performance but does not, in our view, address the methodological conundrum that Short, 1981 raises).

The methodological clarity of Short's (1981) position, however, can be called into question in the case of films, which do constitute stable objects of study since they are not ephemeral like theatre performances. This opens up the possibility of studying dramatic performance using stylistic methods (see, for example, Simpson and Montgomery, 1995; McIntyre, 2008 and Piazza, 2011), and of using a particular dramatic performance as a test case for demonstrating the value of supplementing pragmatic analysis with acoustic methods. Additionally, what we argue in this chapter is that there are cases when it is fundamentally necessary for pragmatic-stylistic analysis of a dramatic text to be augmented by analysis of aspects of performance. These are cases where a text analysis alone cannot fully reveal the pragmatic meaning (i.e. the additional propositional content not literally stated) that utterances in the text can give rise to. A case in point is the text that underpins the performance we analyse in this chapter. This is a scene from season 1 of HBO's critically-acclaimed crime drama, *The Wire*.¹ Detectives Jimmy McNulty and William "Bunk" Moreland are investigating old homicide cases, including the murder of a young woman shot dead in her apartment. McNulty and Moreland visit the scene of the crime to try and figure out exactly how the woman was killed. What makes the scene unusual dramatically is that, engrossed in their investigation, the two detectives communicate with each other using only the word *fuck* and its variants (e.g. *motherfucker*, *fuckity fuck*, etc.). Sometimes they are clearly talking to each other; sometimes it would appear that they are simply thinking out loud. And sometimes there is a degree of uncertainty about the communicative status of their utterances. Nonetheless, somehow, using only this limited vocabulary, McNulty and Moreland are able to express a wide variety

1. *The Wire* was first broadcast between 2002 and 2008 on the US cable network HBO. The scene that we analyse in this chapter is from Episode 4 of Season 1 and is available on YouTube at <http://tinyurl.com/cdzkfoy>

of emotions, ranging from disbelief to frustration to realisation. Moreover, in so doing they convey to the viewer unstated propositional content, as well as the general implicature that theirs is a very close working relationship and that both are highly competent detectives.

Our consideration of the phonetic aspects of dramatic performance fits the recent agenda within stylistics of aiming to take more account of the multimodal nature of texts. However, while advances have been made in the study of non-linguistic aspects of textual meaning, such as typography and visual design generally (see, for instance, Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006 and Nørgaard, 2009), the multimodality of drama remains under-researched. Indeed, multimodal stylistics rarely takes account of phonetics and in those instances where it does, it tends to concentrate on suprasegmental aspects such as intonation or rhythm. A similar situation exists in phonetic-pragmatic analyses of naturally-occurring speech (see, for example, Ogden, 2006), where the segmental aspects of speech are typically ignored.

Our aims in this chapter are (i) to demonstrate the value of acoustic phonetics to the analysis of dramatic performance, (ii) to show how acoustic phonetics can augment pragmatic-stylistic analysis in accounting for the creation of meaning, and (iii) by so doing, to fill a gap in the current pragmatics literature with regard to the importance of phonetics to pragmatic interpretation. We begin by identifying some limitations of pragmatic approaches to implicated meaning, and then move on to outline the methods we employed in our analysis of the scene from *The Wire*. We then present the results of our acoustic analysis before moving on to consider the implications of this for explaining how listeners are likely to infer meaning from the character dialogue in the scene in question. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for pragmatic theories of implicature, as well as related applications for our research.

4.2 Implicated meaning

The scene from *The Wire* includes prime examples of meaning being implicated. That is, in their verbal and non-verbal responses to each other, the characters Moreland and McNulty clearly understand each other to be conveying meaning beyond simple expletives. Consequently, we might initially look to Gricean (Grice, 1975) and neo-Gricean theory (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2004) to provide insights into how such conversational implicatures are being conveyed. However, applying these approaches in isolation to pragmatic meaning turns out to be of limited value for the scene in question. Consider this exchange:

[Context: Moreland and McNulty are looking at a photograph of the murder victim which shows the extent of her injuries.]

Moreland Aw fuck.

McNulty Motherfucker.

Moreland's utterance would seem to express revulsion while McNulty's might be interpreted as an expression of his outrage towards the murderer. In this respect, at the level of what is said, both utterances flout the Gricean maxim of manner (neither character is expressing themselves as clearly as they might) and quantity (neither character is being as informative as is required for the hearer to be confident about their intended meaning). However, it is not clear what is to stop us from deriving implicatures to the effect that, say, Moreland is frustrated at being given this particular assignment and McNulty is angry at Moreland. This is also the case at other points in the dialogue when the characters use the same lexical item (*fuck*) and pragmatic strategy (flouting the maxim of manner) to convey different implicatures, as in the following example:

[Context: Moreland is laying out photographs of the victim on the apartment floor.]

Moreland Fuck.

The issue here is not the indeterminacy of implicature, which is acknowledged by Grice (1975: p. 40), but the problem of calculating the particularized conversational implicature that arises in each case. According to Grice, it should be possible at least in principle to calculate the steps by which an implicature is derived from what is said. Indeterminacy is a component of the Co-operative Principle (Grice, 1975: p. 40), though as Clark (2013: p. 162) points out, Grice "tended to assume far less indeterminacy than would be recognised by most current pragmatic theories with regard to both what is said and what is implicated." Haugh (2014: p. 122) makes the further point that indeterminacy and the interpretative issues associated with it have not been adequately discussed in subsequent accounts of implicature. One of the central problems is the question of whether the fact that implicatures can be indeterminate calls into question the inherent calculability of individual implicatures.

Horn's (2004) attempt to rationalise Grice (1975) allows us to explain the characters' linguistic behaviour more clearly though still does not account for the differences in implicature being produced. For instance, in the case of the second example, in line with Horn's (2004) R-Principle ("Say no more than you have to"), Moreland is indicating that "Fuck" is as much as he needs to say, and therefore that the hearer is licensed to fill in richer meaning, in line with reasonable expectations in context. The issue though is still with how those reasonable expectations are licensed.

What we argue in this chapter is that paying attention to the acoustic properties of speech can provide an insight into the calculability of implicatures, thereby addressing the issue of indeterminacy. The questions related to these issues, that we aim to answer in our analysis, are:

1. Given the indeterminacy of implicature, how do we calculate the particularised conversational implicatures that arise from Moreland and McNulty's utterances?
2. How do we identify the various potential meanings of the expletive *fuck* and its variants?

What would seem to be the case in our example from *The Wire* is that performance is to some extent dictating meaning. This points to the importance of a broader interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of pragmatic meaning than is often taken, specifically one which takes account of the phonetic features of the utterance in question. Pragmatic approaches that do not consider phonetics may still be interdisciplinary, of course; consider, for example, the use of analytical frameworks from stylistics in pragmatic analyses. Our point is that such intradisciplinarity needs to be broadened to include analytical insights from phonetics. The importance of this is increasingly being recognised in pragmatics. In their analysis of the functional effects of impoliteness in discourse, for instance, Culpeper et al. (2003) demonstrate the important role of prosody (i.e. intonation, loudness, speed and voice quality) in impolite exchanges, showing, for example, that the force of a speech act is related to its pitch contour. Their study, though, concentrates entirely on suprasegmental features. By contrast, research that examines the segmental features of speech often stops short of examining the pragmatic significance of these. Gobl and Ní Chasaide (2003), for instance, report on a study of how voice quality can impact on the communication of emotion, mood and attitude, though the pragmatic significance of these emotions is left unexplored. Watt et al. (2013) make the connection between acoustics and pragmatics by investigating what they call "the phonetics of threat", though they do not investigate the acoustic properties of the phonetic cues they identify. Instead, they test the extent to which listeners are able to assign threat ratings to an innocuously worded statement (such as "I know where you live") uttered in four different languages. Despite its lack of focus on the specific acoustic properties of threats, Watt et al.'s (2013) study shares with ours the aim of integrating acoustic and pragmatic analysis; Watt et al. essentially propose that the phonetic values that listeners ascribe to the act of threatening increase our ability to identify cases in which an otherwise innocuous statement might plausibly generate a threatening implicature.

What Culpeper et al.'s (2003) and Watt et al.'s (2013) studies show is that identifying pragmatic functions of speech can be improved substantially by drawing

on insights from phonetics. Our focus in the next section is on what acoustic phonetics particularly can contribute to a pragmatic account of the variable meanings of iterations of *fuck* in the scene from *The Wire*.

4.3 Combining pragmatic and acoustic analytical methods

Given the intradisciplinary nature of this research, the methodology is divided into three parts. The first section (4.3.1) details the pragmatic analysis undertaken, while the second section (4.3.2) presents the acoustic-phonetic methodology employed to measure *fuck* productions. Finally, in order to bring both analyses together, the statistics used to assess the relationship between production and meaning are explained (4.3.3).

4.3.1 Pragmatics

We began by developing a categorisation scheme for recording the various functions of the *fuck* productions in the scene. (We should be clear that the phonetic realisations of the variants are, of course, the result of choices on the part of the actors portraying the characters). To do this we drew on corpus-based and discourse analytic research into uses of the word. In this respect, our pragmatic analysis in this section derives from quantitative and qualitative accounts of usage rather than (neo-) Gricean accounts of implicature.

The most comprehensive study of *fuck* is that by McEnergy and Xiao (2004), who examine its usage in the British National Corpus of 100m words of English from the 1990s. They focus on how the non-linguistic variables of age, gender, social class, education, domain, speech, writing, level and reception influence people's use of the word, demonstrating, for instance, that the people who swear most are those from the lower and higher socio-economic classes. The importance of McEnergy and Xiao's (2004) study for our research lies in the classification scheme they propose based on their observations of the functions of *fuck* in their data. They observe nine different uses for the word. In their data it occurs as a general expletive (e.g. *Oh fuck!*), personal insult (e.g. *You fuck!*) and a cursing expletive (e.g. *Fuck you!*). It can have destinational usage (e.g. *fuck off*) or be used literally (e.g. *He fucked her*). It can be used as an emphatic intensifier (e.g. *fucking great!*) or can act as a pronominal (e.g. *fat as fuck*). And it can occur in a set phrase such as *fuck all*. (McEnergy and Xiao's ninth category is a catch-all group for when there is insufficient context to classify the use as belonging to one of the previous eight categories.)

This interest in function is also shared by Murphy (2009). In her study of the lemma in spoken Irish English she finds that *fucking* is the dominant form

in her corpus and that it “adds force to the emotion being communicated and also communicates a certain attitude, which can be both positive and negative” (Murphy, 2009: p. 46). What is difficult to work out, however, is how hearers are able to determine whether the word is being used positively or negatively (this again points to the necessity of phonetic analysis). Daly et al. (2004) approach this issue by studying the contextual function of expletives in face threatening acts among workers in a New Zealand soap factory. They note that one particular function of *fuck* is as a positive politeness strategy for the expression of solidarity between co-workers.

These studies indicate the range of pragmatic functions that *fuck* has and its capacity to express a wide variety of attitudes and emotions, as well as a range of propositional meanings. Our next step was to synthesise the classification systems outlined in McEnergy and Xiao (2004) and Murphy (2009) in order to generate a manageable system for initially categorising the *fuck* productions in the scene from *The Wire*. Our purpose in developing a categorisation system (as opposed to relying solely on our intuitive responses to the scene) was in order to generate a limited set of non-linguistic variables that would allow us to test for relationships between these and the acoustic measurements of the variants. An intuitive, free-response to the text would not have enabled us to carry out the kind of controlled experiment that we describe below. It would, of course, be possible in future work to assess the robustness of the categories we developed by testing these against the intuitions of other readers/viewers.

Since Murphy’s (2009) system does not capture the broad range of functions identified by McEnergy and Xiao (2004), and McEnergy and Xiao’s system was too wide-ranging for the limited amount of data we had, we took the decision to produce a refined categorisation system rather than simply adopt an existing scheme. By subsuming some of McEnergy and Xiao’s (2004) categories, and by integrating Daly et al.’s (2004) and Murphy’s (2009) insights into the face-threatening function of *fuck*, we developed five categories. These are as follows (each category is followed by an example from the scene we analyse):

1. *Disbelief*: i.e. inability to accept the facts/situation. [Context: Detective examines bullet found embedded in a fridge door; disbelief inferable via number of investigative dead ends before finally hitting on answer] *Fuck me*
2. *Insult*: intention to damage positive face. [Context: Detective examines photos of dead woman and insults killer; insult inferable as a result of previous speaker’s utterance and impossibility that utterance could refer to victim] *Motherfucker*
3. *Functional*: used to modify the following word or to express pain. [Context: Detective hurts thumb on tape measure] *Fuck*

4. *Surprise/realization*: [Context: Detective grasps what direction of travel the bullet must have followed; surprise inferable as a result of gaze direction and camera close-ups] *Motherfuck*
5. *Idiomatic*: i.e. fixed phrase. [Context: Detective identifies location of bullet] *Fuckin A*

Having developed this scheme, we then independently assigned each of the *fuck* productions in the scene to one of these categories. The above exemplars of the categories make clear some of the contextual cues that we were responding to (e.g. the effects of camera angles). In effect, this was an exercise in trying to identify possible triggers for calculating implicatures, before going on to test whether the acoustic properties of *fuck* productions are also likely to have a bearing on categorisation. It is important to note at this stage that the purpose of assigning productions to categories was in order to later test whether there was any relationship between the categorisation and our acoustic measurements of vowel duration. In assigning productions to categories we were not at this stage claiming that the categories themselves necessarily provided the most accurate means of classifying our data. Indeed, on the basis of our statistical analysis, we claim that the above system could be refined in response to the way our data clusters. Having categorised the data according to perceived function, we then moved on to the acoustic phase of the analysis.

4.3.2 Acoustics

The entire conversation/scene between Moreland and McNulty lasts around three minutes, and this investigation uses all the audio data available in the scene. To start, the speech was transcribed orthographically in a TextGrid using Praat (Boersma and Weenink, 2016). Utterances were then attributed to each of the detectives in separate tiers of the TextGrid using the audio as well as visual signal. There were a total of 37 *fuck* productions (i.e. variations), and they were produced evenly between the characters. Detective Bunk Moreland had 18 *fuck* iterations, while Detective Jimmy McNulty produced 19. The counts of variations for both detectives can be found below in Table 1.

Table 1. Number of token productions per variant in *The Wire* scene

<i>Fuck</i> variant	Number of productions
fuck ²	29
fucker	1
fuckin	1
fucking	1
fuckity	1
motherfuck	2
motherfucker	2

As shown in Table 1 above, there were a range of variants produced in the scene. This resulted in variations of phonetic segments present across the productions. However, all 37 productions shared two common phonetic segments: /fʌ/. These are the first two sounds of *fuck* <fu>. We decided to analyse only the vowel /ʌ/, as in the word <strut> or <duck>, as it was acoustically difficult to delimit the boundaries for all the /f/ productions given background noise and the recording quality.

Every vowel was segmented in a single tier of a TextGrid in Praat. Average mid-point measurements were taken for F1~F3 as well as the duration of each vowel. The beginning of the vowel was marked as the onset of periodicity measured at the zero-crossing, and the end of the vowel was marked at the zero-crossing for the final periodic cycle. The analysis did not include fundamental frequency measurements as a large portion of tokens were very short in duration and did not include enough measureable glottal pulses. All formant measurements and durations were then extracted and analysed in Excel.

In addition to the raw data being extracted, differences in the physical dimensions of Moreland's and McNulty's vocal tracts were accounted for through vowel normalization. This was done for statistical purposes, so that differences in vocal tract shape would not influence the results. F1 and F2 were normalized across tokens in NORM using a script implementation (Thomas and Kendall, 2007) of Nearey's (1977) intrinsic vowel normalization technique which uses the F3 values from each speaker. Vowel duration, however, was not normalized across the two speakers and was instead kept in its raw form.

2. Four tokens were included in this category that did not have stop closures following the vowels present in the acoustic spectrogram.

4.3.3 Statistics

After the acoustic and pragmatic data were collected, statistical testing was undertaken to consider any relationships that might exist between the acoustic measurements (how something was said) and the pragmatic classification (what was meant). A Multinomial Logistic Regression was run in *R* (using the “nnet” package; Ripley and Venables, 2016) for the normalized F1 and F2 data along with vowel duration against the pragmatic classifications. Multinomial Logistic Regression was chosen as the data set consisted of discrete dependent variables (pragmatic categories) and we wanted to see if these pragmatic classifications could be explained by any of the continuous, independent acoustic variables (F1, F2, or duration).

4.4 Results

The following sections provide the results of the analysis. Like the methodology, the results are divided into three sections: the pragmatic and acoustic results, followed by the statistical results for the two analyses in combination.

4.4.1 Pragmatics

The outcome of our classification exercise was as follows.

As indicated in Figure 1, our intuitive reactions to the scene were that the most common function of *fuck* was to express disbelief. The second most common function was the expression of surprise/realisation, though one of the issues we encountered with our classification system is the degree of potential overlap between categories. Disbelief, for instance, can be difficult to distinguish from surprise, and it was in the attributing of productions to these two categories that we found we disagreed with each other most.




Figure 1. Types of *fuck* productions across speakers

4.4.2 Acoustics

This section provides an overview of the acoustic measurements for all 37 tokens. For clarity, the formant results have been separated from the duration results, with formant results presented first followed by duration.

4.4.2.1 Formants

Table 2 below provides a breakdown of the acoustic measurements of interest (F1, F2, and duration) by speaker.

Table 2. Summary of vowel formants for both speakers

Speaker	F1 Range (Hz)	F1 Mean (Hz)	F2 Range (Hz)	F2 Mean (Hz)
<i>Moreland</i>	510.1–806.0	607.0	1088.8–1415.2	1262.2
<i>McNulty</i>	457.7–818.3	651.4	1126.9–1451.7	1216.2

Table 2 shows that the majority of the vowels for each speaker overlap in vowel quality (in terms of F1 and F2). This is an indication that even before normalizing the vowels (to account for individual vocal tract differences) vowel quality may not be significantly contributing to a change in functional classification. If the vowel quality was to deviate significantly, then the production would no longer sound like the expected production of *fuck* – i.e. /fʌk/. For example, if the F1s were to increase we might hear some tokens more like /fak/, which contains the vowel like in <father>. Alternatively, if the F2 were to increase dramatically, we may end up with a production like /fɛk/, which contains the vowel like in <dress>. However,

the formant measurements do not appear to present these more deviant productions of the intended /ʌ/.

Figure 2 further illustrates the clustering and overlap of tokens produced by both speakers.




Figure 2. Vowel formant plot of F1 and F2 values of /ʌ/ for both speakers

Figure 2 provides a visual illustration of the vowel quality produced across both speakers for /ʌ/. Although the vowels are all clustered relatively together, Detective Moreland has a tendency to produce a slightly higher and more fronted /ʌ/ than Detective McNulty. However, again, neither speaker shows obvious visual clustering of individual tokens, which would indicate that vowel quality in /ʌ/ was in some way related to meaning.

We can consider this in more detail by looking at a single speaker as an example, and highlighting all the tokens for a single functional classification to see whether they cluster either in terms of their F1, F2, or both.

Figure 3 is similar to Figure 2; however, it only contains the tokens produced by a single speaker, Detective McNulty. Five triangles are solid black and represent all of Detective McNulty's tokens classified as "disbelief". To argue that vowel quality and categorical meanings of the word *fuck* are related, we would expect to see very similar F1 and F2 measurements that were not shared by the tokens in the other four pragmatic categories. Given the data presented in Figure 3, the tokens are restricted to a certain region of the vowel plot; however, there are a number of additional ones that are also amongst the spread of "disbelief" tokens. Therefore,

in this example of “disbelief” in Detective McNulty, the raw data does not appear to suggest a relationship between pragmatic function and vowel quality. This is checked again, statistically, for all pragmatic categories in Section 4.3.




Figure 3. Vowel formant plot of F1 and F2 values of /ʌ/ for Detective McNulty

4.4.2.2 Duration

Table 3 provides an overview of vowel durations across all 37 tokens, including the range in durations produced as well as the mean duration for each of the speakers.

Table 3. Summary of vowel durations for both speakers

Speaker	Duration range (sec)	Mean duration (sec)
<i>Moreland</i>	0.150–0.348	0.168
<i>McNulty</i>	0.030–0.182	0.093

As reported in Table 3, Detective Moreland has a longer mean vowel duration across the tokens he produced, while Detective McNulty has a lower mean duration and small duration range. Box plots have been produced for duration across the five pragmatic categories, and are presented in Figure 4.

The box plots presented in Figure 4 place the five pragmatic categories (as defined in Section 3.1) on the x-axis. The y-axis represents the duration (in seconds) of /ʌ/ tokens. Unlike vowel formants, Figure 3 suggests that pragmatic function may be explained by vowel duration. The “disbelief” and “surprise” categories contain the tokens with the longest vowel durations as well as the longest median




Figure 4. Box plot of /ʌ/ durations by pragmatic category for both speakers

vowel duration. The “functional”, “idiomatic”, and “insult” categories have the shortest median vowel durations. There are, however, a few tokens from the “disbelief” and a single token from “surprise” that also have shorter vowel durations. Despite these tokens, the overall trend is “disbelief” or “surprise” to contain longer vowel durations, while “functional”, “idiomatic”, and “insult” related *fucks* contain shorter vowel productions.

During the pragmatic analysis (see Section 3.1), the assignment of individual tokens to either the “disbelief” and “surprise” categories was challenging. Though possible to force a decision, the boundary between two such functional categories is not so clear. It is perhaps more appropriate to collapse “disbelief” and “surprise” into a single, more unifying category, such as an “unexpected”, simply defined as a production that comes as a result of something unexpected. Such a category would include both disbelief and surprise as they are semantically related to unexpectedness (by virtue of their being hyponyms). It can equally be argued that the three remaining categories – “functional”, “idiomatic”, and “insult” – are more appropriately grouped into a single pragmatic category of “intended”. These three categories are typically produced in an *intended* way such that they serve a purpose in an utterance, that is to modify another word, form part of an idiom or be used to threaten positive or negative face (given more data, it would be possible, of course, to separate out these functions into distinct categories). For these reasons, a box plot is presented of the two newly created categories in Figure 5.

The newly categorized box plot presented in Figure 5 illustrates a much more pronounced divide between longer durations being associated with




Figure 5. Box plot of /ʌ/ durations across speakers, broken into two pragmatic categories (1) unexpected and (2) intended

the “unexpected” category and the short vowel durations being associated with the “intended” classifications. These results are examined statistically in the following section.

4.4.3 Statistics

This section presents the results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression using the five original pragmatic categories as the dependent variables and vowel formants and duration as the independent variables. As stated in Section 3.2, both formant 1 and 2 were normalized for statistical analysis, and the normalized formant data and non-normalized duration data were used in the statistical model.

While using the acoustic data to try and explain the pragmatic classifications, the Multinomial Logistic Regression displayed the strongest coefficient magnitudes for duration. However, across all acoustic categories, the standard errors are relatively high, which most likely comes as a result of the limited number of tokens available. It is important to point out that the largest pragmatic category was “disbelief”, while the smallest category – “idiomatic” – only contained two single tokens. For this reason, it is argued that the statistical analysis only be used to validate what we have already observed through both the vowel formant plots and duration box plots. Out of the three independent variables in question, duration seems to play the biggest role in explaining the pragmatic classification of *fuck* productions.

4.5 Summary

Our chapter has demonstrated the value of segmental, acoustic phonetic analysis in determining the likely pragmatic functions of utterances and the implicatures that arise from them. Although phonetics is on occasion combined with pragmatic analysis, as we have noted, this tends to be at the suprasegmental level (as in Culpeper et al., 2003 and Ogden, 2006). Our analysis highlights the importance of segmental features to meaning. Furthermore, since our results indicate which segmental features associate with which functional categories, we are also able to suggest a mechanism for calculating implicated meaning in cases of indeterminacy, thereby solving a problem with theoretical approaches to this area of pragmatics. For example, in the case of our data, a *fuck* production with a long / Λ / duration is more likely to express disbelief than to function as an insult, and this may well place limits on the implicatures that might be reasonably derived from the utterance in question. To this end, we would argue that our acoustic approach can be used to augment Gricean and neo-Gricean accounts of how pragmatic meaning is conveyed. Indeed, we would argue strongly that such approaches need to take account of insights from phonetics, for a number of reasons. Hearers use the full range of linguistic data available to them when interpreting utterances, and this includes information conveyed on the phonetic level. We should, then, be using the full range of linguistic tools available to us as analysts in order to account for speaker meaning. If we do not, we run the risk of ignoring (albeit unintentionally) significant stylistic choices on the part of speakers. Consequently, it would seem negligent not to build phonetics into theoretical frameworks that account for how implicated meaning is generated. We need to consider how things are said just as much as what is said. What this points towards is the importance of broad interdisciplinary in linguistics and ensuring that boundaries between sub-disciplines (such as phonetics and pragmatics) are seen as fuzzy rather than discrete.

Our analysis is, of course, of “literary” data; that is, a scene from a drama. We maintain that this does not lessen its value to pragmatics generally. Sinclair (2004: p. 51), for instance, is clear that literature should be seen as “language in use”, making the point that any theoretical approach to language must be able to account for language use in literary texts as well as other types of naturally-occurring data. McIntyre and Bousfield (2017) also argue for the value of fiction as a data source, on the grounds that recent multidimensional analyses of fictional and naturally-occurring speech (e.g. Quaglio, 2009) have demonstrated a significant degree of similarity between the two. Literary data such as the scene from *The Wire* provide ideal test cases for experimental pragmatic-acoustic work, since they simulate both the ordinary and the creative elements of everyday conversations (as

noted by Carter, 2004, for instance). The analysis of language data from fiction has much to contribute to pragmatics and to linguistics generally.

Insights from experimental research on fiction can also be applied to real-world problems. For example, our results (and pragmatic-acoustic results more generally) have implications beyond improvements in the analysis of implicated meaning. First, the results may be of interest to speech and language therapists working with individuals who present with pragmatic impairments (e.g. those with autism spectrum disorder [ASD]), who use different techniques to help them understand everyday situations. Second, there is a clear application for such research in the forensic speech science field, where threats and remorse may be called into question in the courtroom. The phonetic-pragmatic work carried out by Watt et al. (2013) and Tompkinson et al. (2016) on threat speech looks at cues in the speech signal that influence a listener's assessment of threatening utterances. Similarly, the work by Hippey and Gold (2017) considers the ability of lay-listeners to perceive remorse in acted apologies to fictional victims. In these types of forensic research, the pragmatic-acoustic crossover is vital to furthering our understanding of the pivotal role phonetics can play in implicated meaning.

What we hope to have demonstrated in this chapter is the significance of acoustic elements in the interpretation of utterances; and, consequently, the importance of taking account of insights from phonetics in the development of pragmatic theories. At the core of pragmatics is the idea that what speakers mean often goes beyond what their words might be taken literally to convey. In determining the implicatures that arise in such cases, hearers rely on a range of linguistic, paralinguistic and non-linguistic information. As we have shown, acoustic phenomena play a significant role in controlling the functions that particular usages might be taken to have, and the implicatures that arise as a consequence. Our case study of one scene from *The Wire* demonstrates a method for investigating this issue and indicates the potential for using literary data in pragmatic research.

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Misleading and relevance in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*

Kate Scott

5.1 Introduction

Misunderstanding and misinterpretation are key themes in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night* (Shakespeare, 1623/1991). The play is, as Freund (1986: p 481) puts it, a “whirligig of interpretation and understanding”, and, according to Booth (1998: p 123), it is “a play about discrepancies between signals and what they are understood to convey”. Before any action unfolds and before we meet any characters, the alternative title of the play, *What You Will*, hints that what is to come will be about interpretation and context. With this in mind, this chapter considers what a pragmatic stylistic approach might reveal about the motivations of both the characters and the playwright.

Much of the plot and comedy of *Twelfth Night* depends on there being a contrast between the state of affairs in the fictional universe of the play and the assumptions and interpretations of the characters that inhabit that universe. As Booth (1998: p 123) notes, “the story line ... depends on a series of invalid and valid conclusions to which the characters jump from variously inadequate evidence”. As Porter Williams (1961: p 194) observes, these misunderstandings, “besides being at the center of the ... deceptions that activate the plot, are also at the center of the rich and psychological revelations that represent the important themes of the play”. The main plot turns on Viola disguising herself as a man, while in the sub-plots, Sir Toby, Sir Andrew and Maria play tricks on the steward Malvolio, encouraging him to believe things which they know to be untrue. Meanwhile, Feste moves between the groups of characters, misleading them for entertainment with his wit, wordplay and puns. One thing which makes the play particularly interesting from a pragmatic perspective is that while the characters intend to mislead one another, they often do so without explicitly lying. Rather they construct their utterances so that their interlocutors will infer a false but intended meaning.

In this chapter I consider three extracts from the play from a pragmatic stylistic perspective. I discuss how and why the characters mislead one another, and how they use their knowledge of their interlocutors' assumptions to predict how their utterances will be interpreted. As the characters within the play often hold different assumptions to the audience, I analyse the extracts both from the perspective of the characters in the play and from that of the audience, considering the stylistic effects that arise from the contrast between interpretations. I use ideas and principles from the relevance-theoretic pragmatic framework (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Carston, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2012; Clark, 2013) in my discussion. I begin by outlining these in Section 2 and I consider how misleading might be characterised within the relevance-theoretic approach to utterance interpretation. Then, in Section 3, I apply these ideas to three extracts from the play to illustrate the role that inference may play in creating various stylistic, plot and character effects.

5.2 Relevance theory and pragmatic literary stylistics

5.2.1 Relevance and interpretation

According to relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Carston, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2012; Clark, 2013), utterances raise expectations of relevance, and these expectations guide interpretation. Specifically, the addressee of an utterance is entitled to presume that the speaker was aiming to make that utterance optimally relevant. This presumption of optimal relevance is triggered, not just by utterances, but by any ostensive act. The definition of optimal relevance is given in (1):

- (1) An utterance or ostensive stimuli will be optimally relevant if it is
 - a. relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it and;
 - b. the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

An input will be relevant to an individual when it interacts with that individual's existing assumptions to produce positive cognitive effects. The input may strengthen an assumption that the individual already holds, it may contradict and eliminate an assumption that the individual held, or it may combine with assumptions that the individual holds to yield new assumptions that were not previously held. The relevance-theoretic framework treats utterances as clues to a speaker's meaning, and hearers must enrich those clues to derive a hypothesis about the speaker's intended overall meaning. This overall meaning includes not only what a speaker is explicitly communicating, but also what she intentionally implicates.

A key component of the relevance-theoretic approach to utterance interpretation is the observation that inferential processes are involved at both levels, not only in deriving the implicitly communicated content, but also in deriving what has been explicitly communicated. As Carston (2002: p. 19) explains, the “meaning encoded in the linguistic expressions used ...underdetermines the proposition expressed”, and a considerable amount of inferential work is involved in working out what proposition has been expressed by an utterance. This inferential work includes resolving reference, disambiguating terms and structures, and carrying out various other forms of pragmatic enrichment. The same linguistic expression will therefore express different propositions when spoken in different discourse contexts. Consider, for example, the utterance in (2):

- (2) He sat on a bench by the bank to eat his lunch.

To derive the proposition expressed by (2) the hearer will have to determine who *he* refers to, whose lunch *he* is eating, and whether the *bank* is a financial institution or a river bank. When performing inferential tasks hearers follow the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, as given in (3):

- (3) a. Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects: test interpretations (e.g. disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
 b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

The principles of relevance and the resulting comprehension procedure make it possible for speakers to predict how a hearer is likely to interpret an utterance in a given discourse context. For example, Scott (2019) argues that when a speaker constructs a referring expression she takes into consideration the contextual assumptions of the intended hearer. In most situations there is any number of different expressions that a speaker might use to guide a hearer to the intended reference of a noun phrase. Ariel (1990), for example, identifies 15 different categories of referring expression ranging from “full name + modifier” to gaps such as *pro* and PRO, and some of these categories, such as definite description, allow for almost unlimited variation in the amount and kind of information they include. I might, for example, choose to refer to a friend in any of the ways listed in (4)–(9) and many more besides:

- (4) Judit.
 (5) My Hungarian friend.
 (6) The woman playing third base.
 (7) She.

- (8) Gabor's sister.
- (9) Stanley's aunt.

Which one I choose to use in any given discourse context will depend, in part, on what I assume my interlocutor to know about my intended referent. Felicitous use of the expression in (9) for example, will depend on the hearer either already knowing Stanley or knowing that my friend Judit has a nephew called Stanley. Alternatively, (9) may be used to inform a hearer that Judit is Stanley's aunt, but this will only be felicitous if it is otherwise obvious who I am referring to. Just as a speaker may have many options available to her, so some referring expressions will be compatible with more than one candidate referent. There may be more than one potential referent that could be referred to as *she* in the discourse context. I may have more than one Hungarian friend or Gabor may have more than one sister. A hearer must choose between these, and according to relevance theory, he does so by following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure given in (3). He will test interpretations in order of accessibility and stop when his expectations of relevance are satisfied. As a speaker knows that the hearer will do this, when constructing her referring expression she must make predictions about the assumptions the hearer holds and the relative accessibility of the various potential candidate referents in the discourse context. This, however, also opens up further possibilities in terms of how the discourse proceeds. First, if the speaker's prediction is incorrect, misunderstandings may occur, and second, a speaker who can predict how an utterance will be interpreted can intentionally mislead an addressee. Indeed, a key notion in the analysis in Section 3 is that speakers can predict a hearer's interpretation and manipulate it by the way they construct their utterance. In the next section, I consider how cases of misunderstanding and misleading fit into the relevance-theoretic pragmatic framework.

5.2.2 Relevance, misleading and misunderstanding

When processing an utterance in context, which interpretation is most accessible and therefore most likely to be tested first will depend, in part, on the assumptions that a hearer holds at the time of interpretation. As Clark (2013: p. 9) explains, misunderstandings may occur when there is "a mismatch between the speaker's estimate of the set of assumptions the hearer can and will access when hearing the utterance and what the hearer does in fact access". Consider, for example, the exchange in (10) which took place as part of the United Kingdom Celebrity Big Brother reality television show in January 2016. Angie has just spoken to the programme's producers who have told her that her ex-husband, David Bowie, has just died. Angie then approaches fellow housemate Tiffany.

- (10) Angie: You can't say a word.
 Tiffany: Nothing.
 Angie: David's dead.
 Tiffany: No he's not! [screams]

To process Angie's second utterance, Tiffany must determine who the name *David* refers to. Angie mistakenly assumes that Tiffany will realise that she is talking about her ex-husband. However, Tiffany instead assumes that Angie is talking about David Gest, another contestant on the show, who, coincidentally has gone to lie down, feeling unwell. The misunderstanding and resulting confusion and conflict arise because of the mismatch between Angie's estimate of the relative accessibility for Tiffany of the two people called David in the discourse context and their actual relative accessibility for Tiffany. In the case of misunderstandings, the intended meaning is not successfully communicated. However, in the examples that I will discuss in Section 3, the act of misleading is intentional. The utterances produced by the characters are compatible with more than one state of affairs in the world, and although one of these is the true state of affairs, the utterance is constructed so that a different interpretation is more accessible to the addressee.

When deceit is intentional, the question arises as to where we draw the line between lying and misleading. Kisieleska-Krysiuk (2016) applies relevance-theoretic assumptions to this question and reaches the conclusion that lying is "a pragmatic act and a linguistic strategy intentionally employed by the speaker to manipulate the hearer's interpretation of an utterance at the level of explicit content" (Kisieleska-Krysiuk, 2016: p. 80). She discusses cases where a speaker seeks to deceive her hearer at this stage in the interpretation process by "potentially leading [her hearer] to relevant, but intentionally false enrichment" (Kisieleska-Krysiuk, 2016: p. 81) of the logical form. For example, consider the disambiguation of the homophone *bear* in (11) taken from Kisieleska-Krysiuk (2016: p. 81):

- (11) A: I've heard they don't have children. Why?
 B: She can't bear children ... They are so noisy.

The claim is that by including the second part of her utterance (*They are so noisy*), B influences A to interpret *bear* as meaning "can't stand" rather than "can't have". If the truth is that they do not have children because she is unable to, rather than because she can't stand them, then B has lied, even though the logical form of her utterance is compatible with the true state of affairs in the world. Kisieleska-Krysiuk draws a distinction between examples like (11) where the lying takes place at the explicit level, which she counts as "lying proper", and cases of lying at the implicit level, such as (12), adapted from Kisieleska-Krysiuk (2016: p. 76), which she classes as "misleading".

(12) [Context: Mary saw Valentino yesterday.]

Speaker: Mary, have you seen Valentino lately?

Mary: Valentino's been sick with mononucleosis all week.

In (12) Mary has made no explicit claim that she has not met with Valentino, even though it is reasonable to expect that this will be inferred from her answer. Misleading, Kisieleska-Krysiuk (2016: p. 83) concludes, involves “asserting truly in order to intentionally lead the hearer to a false belief”. This distinction between lying and misleading will prove a useful starting point when considering how the misunderstanding and misinterpretations in *Twelfth Night* occur, and I will return to these ideas in Section 3. The theoretical principles and distinctions discussed so far are assumed to be general to all ostensive inferential communication. In the next section I briefly consider how they might be applied to literary texts in particular.

5.2.3 Relevance and literary interpretation

Reboul (1987), Sperber and Wilson (1987) and Wilson (2011) have all considered how the nature of fiction interacts with expectations of relevance. As Wilson (2011: p. 77) explains, acts of communication are relevant when they lead to positive cognitive effects “in the context of the audience’s real-life beliefs and assumptions about the world”. However, fictional works are not true descriptions of the world, and so, as Wilson goes on to ask “how can they achieve any positive cognitive effects at all?” To answer this question, Wilson (2011), following Sperber and Wilson (1987), suggests the following:

an author may be simultaneously performing acts of communication on two different levels: a lower-level act of describing a fictional world, and a higher-level act of showing this world to the reader as an example of what is possible, or conceivable. (Wilson, 2011: p. 77)

Thus, when a character in a play speaks a line, two ostensive acts take place. First, there is the lower-level, play-internal ostensive act, by which one character addresses another and thereby creates expectations of relevance in their fictional addressee. These expectations will drive how the utterance is interpreted within the world of the play. When watching a play, an audience must put themselves in the mental shoes of the character that is being addressed, and interpret an utterance from that perspective. Each member of the audience is merely an eavesdropper on the conversations in the play and so cannot presume that the utterances they witness will be optimally relevant to them at this lower-level. However, they can assume that the fictional speaker is aiming at optimal relevance for her intended

fictional addressee. Second, there is the ostensive act by which the playwright¹ shows a scene, a conversation or an action to an audience. Acts of showing are intentional, ostensive acts which raise expectations of relevance in their own right, and the fact that events within a play have been shown to an audience triggers the audience to search for their relevance. Leech and Short (1981: p. 302) make a similar distinction in their discussion of the pragmatics of fictional texts as they observe that, “the pragmatic model of understanding can apply not only to character-character discourse, but also to the way in which authors convey messages to their readers”.

According to Wilson (2011: p. 77), “[t]he expectations of relevance raised by the lower-level act would be “internal”, while the higher-level act would communicate an “external” presumption of relevance”. Internal expectations of relevance “guide the interpretation of the subsequent text” (Wilson, 2011: p. 76), whereas acts of showing “what is possible or conceivable” (Sperber and Wilson 1987: p. 751) can “force a listener or reader to develop or otherwise modify mental models, scenarios, scripts, or schemas” that are relevant outside the events of the fictional world itself.

In these discussions of internal and external relevance by Wilson (2011) and by Sperber and Wilson (1987) the line between internal and external relevance seems to be taken to coincide with the lower- and higher-level acts of communication. The lower-level acts of describing the fictional world are presented as internally relevant, and as contributing to our interpretation of the text. The higher-level acts of showing achieve relevance externally and are intended to cause us to update our beliefs about the world or in some other way affect us outside of the world of the play itself. However, close analysis of the pragmatic processes involved in the analysis of literary texts suggests that the distinction might not be quite so clear cut. There seem to be cases where the higher-level acts of showing can also contribute to how an audience interprets the text itself, and could therefore be classified as internally relevant. Consider, for example, the opening line of *Twelfth Night*, given in (13) and as discussed by Clark (2014: p. 162).

(13) If music be the food of love, play on. (I. 1.1)

Applying Wilson’s notion of lower and higher-level acts, in this example we have the lower-level act of Orsino asking his musicians to continue playing and we have

1. In any given performance of a play, this act of showing will be a collaborative act between the playwright, director, designers and actors. However, for simplicity of argument, I abstract away from these other roles here, to return to this issue in future work. See Furlong (2014) for further discussion of this and the “subtle negotiation of responsibilities that occurs in the interpretation of plays through performance” (Furlong, 2014: p. 77).

the higher-level act of showing this scene to an audience. Both acts raise expectations of relevance. The lower-level act raises expectations of relevance for Orsino's addressees, and will be interpreted as an instruction to the musicians to "play on". The specific formulation of his instruction might also lead to his addressees deriving various implicatures, including perhaps that he loves music, that love is important to him, and that he is in a romantic mood. Any intended implications that we might reasonably attribute to Orsino in order to understand why he has produced this particular utterance will be implicatures of this lower-level act. The higher-level act of showing triggers an expectation of relevance in the audience. By showing us Orsino's request, and more importantly, by showing us the way in which Orsino makes it, we might, as Clark (2014: p. 163) points out, "say that Shakespeare is implicating that Orsino is pretentious". This implicature arises from the act of showing, and so according to Wilson's discussion, would be considered externally relevant. However, it is not likely to cause the audience to update or develop their views about the world outside the play. Rather, it is likely to be used in the interpretation of the text as it proceeds, and thus it seems more accurate to consider this as achieving relevance internally. Thus, it seems that these higher-level acts of showing may achieve relevance internally or externally to the text. The internal effects influence how the text is interpreted, while the external effects relate to the audience's real-world assumptions and experiences. In sum, for the purposes of this chapter, I take internal relevance to refer to cognitive effects that relate to the fictional world of the text and to the text's interpretation, and I take external relevance to refer to cognitive effects which relate to the audience's beliefs and assumptions about the real world, and to those which have some real-world effect such as amusing or entertaining the audience.

As Wilson notes, the external relevance of fictional events is less likely to be achieved via an updating of the facts that the audience holds to be true and more likely to be derived by encouraging the audience to make connections, to "set up new inferential routines" (Wilson, 2011: p. 77), or by contributing to "the communication of an impression" (Wilson, 2011: p. 79). If the words and actions of fictional characters in a fictional world cause an audience to update their actual assumptions by "altering saliences and strengths in the cognitive environment" (Sperber & Wilson, 1987: p. 751), then they will have produced cognitive effects. For example, the brutal, cut-throat world that Brecht shows us in *The Threepenny Opera* may cause an audience to update its views on the virtues or otherwise of a capitalist society. Indeed, it is this external relevance that allows a play to endure across time and cultures, and makes it possible for a work to be successfully revived and reinterpreted. A director can use the words and actions of the characters to show different things to the audience in different productions. So, for example, while the lines spoken in *Hamlet* (Shakespeare, 1603/1982) have not changed

significantly² in 500 years, a director of a present day production may intend the audience to hear Hamlet's declaration in (14) and reflect on the state of affairs not only in Hamlet's world but also in their own contemporary society.

(14) The time is out of joint. (I. v. 196)³

In the next section I consider three episodes from *Twelfth Night* in which characters intentionally mislead one another. In each case I use these ideas from relevance theory to analyse the internal relevance of the extracts, considering how and why the characters choose to mislead and how they are misled. I also consider how the act of showing these scenes to an audience achieves relevance, whether that is internally to guide their interpretation of events within the play itself or externally to update their general beliefs.

5.3 Misleading and stylistic effects in *Twelfth Night*

5.3.1 Viola, Orsino and speaking unspeakable love

In Act II, Scene iv, Viola, disguised as a man and going by the name Cesario,⁴ has found work in the court of Duke Orsino. Orsino has sent Viola to woo his beautiful neighbour Olivia on his behalf. After Viola has returned from an unsuccessful visit to Olivia, Orsino tells her that women cannot feel love and passion as keenly as men. The exchange in (15) occurs as Viola interrupts him to disagree:

(15) Viola: Ay, but I know--
 Orsino: What dost thou know? 105
 Viola: Too well what love women to men may owe:
 In faith, they are as true of heart as we.
 My father had a daughter loved a man,
 As it might be, perhaps, were I a woman,

2. Here I abstract away from differences in pronunciation, abridged versions and, in the case of *Hamlet*, debates over the definitive version of the text given the existence of the first and second Quartos and the first Folio.

3. This was my experience of a production at The Almeida Theatre in London in March 2017 where a contemporary interpretation was encouraged by the staging of the play. The political intrigues of the plot were shown via television reports in a 24 hr rolling news coverage style familiar to contemporary audiences. See also the 2012 film adaptation of *Coriolanus* (Fiennes, 2012) for a similar approach.

4. As *Cesario* and *Viola* are co-referential, I have used the name *Cesario* only when representing the perspective of a play-internal character.

- I should your lordship.
- Orsino: And what's her history? 110
- Viola: A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
 But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,
 Feed on her damask cheek: she pined in thought,
 And with a green and yellow melancholy
 She sat like patience on a monument, 115
 Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?
 We men may say more, swear more: but indeed
 Our shows are more than will; for still we prove
 Much in our vows, but little in our love.
- Orsino: But died thy sister of her love, my boy? 120
- Viola: I am all the daughters of my father's house,
 And all the brothers too: and yet I know not.

At this point, the audience is aware that Viola has romantic feelings for Orsino and that she cannot reveal them. It is therefore apparent that she is, in fact, describing her own situation and drawing on her own experience as evidence. However, Viola clearly cannot do this overtly as to do so would reveal her true identity. We witness her telling her story of unrevealed love to the man for whom that love is felt, and she constructs her utterances so that they are compatible both with the true state of affairs in the world and with an alternative interpretation.

Viola's words are addressed to Orsino, and so he is entitled to presume that they will be optimally relevant to him. He will interpret them against a context of easily accessible assumptions, including, presumably, his assumption that Cesario is a man. As Line 120 confirms, Orsino assumes that Viola is telling the story of her sister, and this interpretation is driven largely by the utterance in Line 108. Viola establishes the protagonist of her narrative using the phrase in (16), made up of the main clause (17) and the relative clause with the relative pronoun *who* omitted, given in (18):

(16) My father had a daughter loved a man.

(17) My father had a daughter.

(18) (who) loved a man.

In (17) Viola asserts that her father had a daughter. This is true if and only if the father of the speaker had a daughter. She makes no claims about who that daughter is and neither does the hearer need to resolve reference on a particular daughter to derive a truth-evaluable proposition. Use of the indefinite description *a daughter* does no more than assert the existence of a daughter. The addition of the relative clause in (18) then communicates the proposition that the daughter

from the main clause loved a man. Again, there is no need for the hearer, in this case Orsino, to resolve reference on a definite person for him to derive a truth-evaluable proposition expressed. Viola's utterance in (16) is true if and only if her father had a daughter and that daughter loved a man. This is indeed the case. Recall that according to Kisielewska-Krysiuk (2016) an utterance is a lie only if it is false at the level of the explicature, and so, according to this definition, Viola has not lied in (16). Furthermore, the main relevance of Viola's utterance comes via its implicatures. She intends for the propositions that she expresses to interact with assumptions that Orsino holds to produce positive cognitive effects for him. A few lines before the utterance in (16), Orsino utters the lines in (19):

(19) Orsino: There is no woman's sides
 Can bide the beating of so strong a passion 95
 As love doth give my heart;

Viola's utterance achieves internal relevance by providing evidence that will contradict and eliminate the assumption that Orsino expresses here, namely that no woman can feel passion as keenly as he. This makes her utterance relevant internally within the discourse context of the play. She provides first-hand evidence that a woman has felt this way previously, which, if accepted by Orsino, would necessarily contradict and eliminate this previous assumption.

We see from Orsino's later utterance in Line 120 that he has inferred that the daughter of Cesario's father is co-referential with Cesario's sister. While this is a reasonable inference for him to make, Viola has not explicitly communicated this. The co-reference between Cesario's father's daughter and Cesario's sister is not explicitly communicated by Viola's utterance and nor is it necessary for the derivation of the implicatures that Viola intends him to derive. However, the fact that Orsino draws this conclusion is also not a case of misunderstanding. Although Viola has not directly or explicitly communicated this, she cannot reasonably expect that he will not infer this, and indeed she has good reason for wanting him to draw this conclusion. Viola is unlikely to persuade Orsino that he is mistaken about the nature of women's passions simply by telling him so. Rather, to achieve her aim, Viola needs to provide direct and convincing evidence, and the closer that evidence is to her own experience, the more convincing it is likely to be.⁵ Thus she constructs her utterance in such a way that Orsino will understand her to be describing her sister, thus providing him with a first-hand account from her own experience.

5. Furthermore, we assume that the exclamation "Ay but I know" in Line 104 is a slip by Viola which now commits her to drawing on something from her own first-hand knowledge.

We, the audience, hold a different set of assumptions to Orsino. We hold the assumption that Cesario is actually Viola, a woman, and that she is in love with Orsino. However, we also hold the assumption that Orsino believes her to be a man. Therefore, we simultaneously process Viola's utterance from two perspectives and entertain two different explicit interpretations. The first is the interpretation which we take to be true, that Viola is talking about her own situation, and the second is the interpretation which we assume Orsino will derive based on his assumptions. Thus the audience becomes aware not only of the juxtaposition of the two interpretations but also of the irony of the situation; Viola describes the pain of her own untold love to the very man from whom she must keep it secret.

While Viola's utterances have relevance within the discourse of the play, they are also part of a fictional world that Shakespeare shows to his audience, and this act of showing generates expectations of relevance in its own right. Viola is not addressing us, the audience directly, and so while we may seek relevance in her words, we cannot expect relevance in the way that an addressee could. However, Shakespeare chooses to show us this scene, and he chooses to represent the fictional exchange between Viola and Orsino in a particular way. This act of showing raises expectations of relevance. I suggest that this particular excerpt achieves relevance in two key ways.

First, the construction of the scene makes manifest the assumptions that Viola and the audience share, encouraging a sense of empathy and shared perspective. Viola is the central character in *Twelfth Night*. The action starts when she and her brother Sebastian are shipwrecked on the coast of Illyria. She wrongly assumes that Sebastian is dead, and we follow the story until they are reunited with each other and until they are both paired up with suitable romantic partners. Much of the success of the play relies on us, as an audience, caring about Viola and her fate. While the exchange between Viola and Orsino in (15) does little to drive the play forward in plot terms (after all, it fails to deter Orsino from his pursuit of Olivia), it reveals to the audience Viola's thoughts and feelings. In doing so it encourages a stronger sense of empathy between the audience and Viola.

For most of the action of the play, we, the audience, hold largely the same contextual assumptions about the play-internal world as Viola. In relevance theory terms we share a relatively large mutual cognitive environment. This becomes particularly apparent in this scene. We, like Viola, can predict how Orsino will interpret her utterances, and we are also aware that Viola is in fact drawing on her own experience and describing her own situation. The contrast between Orsino's interpretation of Viola's utterances and the actual state of affairs in the world of the play makes the audience acutely aware that they share assumptions with Viola that are not available to most of the other characters, and certainly not to Orsino. The fact that we share assumptions with her creates a sense of empathy

and intimacy between the audience and Viola. This will have internal relevance in its own right as it affects how we interpret Viola's words and actions in the rest of the play. However, it also functions as a higher-level communicative act which may encourage the audience to revisit, reflect on or develop existing assumptions about the real world.

This second layer of external relevance is achieved via the juxtaposition of Viola's feelings and experiences with those of other characters in the play. We are shown different representations of romantic love, and the plot and presentation implicitly endorses Viola's experience as more genuine, sincere and laudable. The play encourages the audience to reflect on the nature of love, loyalty and relationships, and Viola is shown, not only as an example of a true and unselfish lover, but also as a character that we can empathise with. Unrequited love and its associated pain are themes which run throughout the play. According to Freund (1986: p. 483), "the central motif of *Twelfth Night* [is] mistaken or misplaced sexual identity". The play opens with a scene that shows us the self-indulgent, melodramatic and stubborn love that Orsino feels towards Olivia, and two scenes before the exchange between Viola and Orsino in (15), we witness the swift onset of Olivia's feelings for Cesario. The feelings experienced by Orsino and Olivia are presented as excessive, misguided and rash, and both are, ultimately, destined to come to nothing. However, in the extract in (15) we are shown that another type of love is possible. Viola's love for Orsino is sincere, patient and self-sacrificing, and she puts the needs of her beloved before her own needs.

The contrast between Viola's experiences and the experiences of Orsino and Olivia combines with our sense of a shared perspective with Viola to encourage us to consider hers as the more appropriate, sincere and worthy type of behaviour and emotions. As Porter Williams (1961: pp. 197–198) notes, it takes "the love of Viola, knowing herself ...to untangle the web of mistakes" that arises from the "deceptions and self-deceptions of Olivia and Orsino", and "it is Viola's love for Orsino that secretly teaches both Olivia and Orsino the true meaning of love". Perhaps we as an audience are also encouraged to learn from this.

In the next section I consider another case of deliberate misleading from the play. However, this next case is driven by very different motivations and achieves relevance in a very different way.

5.3.2 The gulling of Malvolio

The main sub-plot of the play follows the comedy antics of members of Olivia's household as her uncle Sir Toby Belch and her maid Maria plot revenge on the steward of the household, Malvolio. Throughout the play Malvolio is presented as an officious, petty and self-important character. He has no time for the revelries

of the other members of the household and he looks down on their antics. We even witness him fantasising about scolding Sir Toby for his drunkenness. Much of the comedy in the sub-plot derives from the trick that Maria and Sir Toby play to deceive and mislead Malvolio. They leave an anonymous love letter addressed only “to the unknown beloved” (II.v.92) for him to find. They construct the letter in such a way that Malvolio is led to believe that it has been written by Olivia. Furthermore, they leave hints in it that lead him to believe that he, Malvolio, is the intended recipient and thus the object of Olivia’s affections. The letter instructs the addressee to dress and behave in what we the audience know is a ridiculous manner. Malvolio falls for the deceit and follows the instructions. As intended by Toby et al., Olivia interprets Malvolio’s behaviour as “very midsummer madness” (III.iv.55) and he is taken to “a dark room and bound” (III.iv.136) until he is released in the final scene of the play. In this analysis, I first consider the lower-level act depicted in this scene and apply relevance-theoretic ideas to Malvolio’s interpretation of the letter. Then I consider the higher-level act of showing Malvolio’s interpretative processes to the audience. Finally, I briefly consider some non-communicative effects of the scene.

The letter that Maria leaves for Malvolio is clearly addressed to the object of the writer’s affection. While we may look for relevance in utterances that we overhear or accidentally come across, we cannot expect optimal relevance from such information in the way that an addressee of an ostensive act can. Therefore, the success of the trick lies in making Malvolio believe the letter is intended for him, and therefore triggering in him a presumption of optimal relevance. Malvolio must also believe that the letter comes from Olivia, and Maria achieves this by unequivocally deceitful means. We are told that she has written the letter in Olivia’s style by imitating her handwriting and her turn of phrase, and that she has used Olivia’s seal on the envelope. Given the evidence that Maria manufactures, Malvolio’s assumption that the letter is from Olivia seems perfectly reasonable. Having established this, the key to Malvolio accepting that it is intended for him lies in the extract from the letter given in (20):

- (20) Malvolio: [Reads] I may command where I adore; 106
 But silence, like a Lucrece knife,
 With bloodless stroke my heart doth gore;
 M.O.A.I doth sway my life.

In these four lines, Maria, pretending to be Olivia, provides clues to the identity of the beloved. These clues are constructed so that they are compatible with more than one interpretation, and more significantly, so that they are compatible with Malvolio being the object of affection. Maria uses similar techniques to those

used by psychic mediums, fortune tellers and astrologers.⁶ The message is vague enough to be compatible with a range of interpretations, and yet when interpreted against a set of specific assumptions it appears personal and detailed enough to be convincing. Consider the utterance in (21) taken from a televised psychic reading.

- (21) I've got this gentleman trying to connect with me and all he's putting in my mind is cheese and chutney sandwiches (Youens, No date).

While *cheese and chutney sandwiches* seems specific, there are a range of assumptions that an audience member could hold that could combine with this input to yield a relevant interpretation. The gentleman might have loved cheese and chutney sandwiches. However, he might equally have hated them. He might have eaten them shortly before he died or at any significant or personal event during his life or relating to his death. They might, for example, have been served at his funeral wake. Equally, the sandwiches might relate to the audience member themselves or a significant living relative, rather than the dead gentleman. The range of possibilities is huge.⁷

Just as the intended addressee of Maria's letter is unspecified and working out how it is relevant involves working out who the intended addressee is, so the intended recipient of the psychic message is initially unknown. If an audience member can find relevance in the message, then they will take this as evidence that the message is intended for them. The presumption of optimal relevance becomes self-fulfilling as their hope that the message is intended for them drives their interpretation. An audience member who hopes for a message has motivation to look for relevance in it, not only because it might be relevant in its own right, but also because it can be taken as evidence that the dead relative is communicating with them. Likewise, Malvolio is motivated to find evidence that the letter is intended for him, as this strengthens his assumption that Olivia has romantic feelings for him and also gives him licence to assume that the rest of the letter will be optimally relevant for him.

To achieve this in her letter, Maria includes two vague phrases, given here in (22) and (23):

- (22) I may command where I adore;

- (23) M.O.A.I doth sway my life.

6. I assume that none of these has actual supernatural ability, although whether any deceit is intentional or not is outside the remit of this paper.

7. In the actual reading, the audience member replies "My dad used to like cheese. But he weren't allowed to eat it", and this is accepted as confirmation that the message is intended for him. Notice how the chutney and the sandwiches are conveniently overlooked as he settles on an interpretation which he finds relevant.

These identifying phrases will contribute to relevance for Malvolio in two ways if, as he puts it, “I could make that resemble something in me!” (Lines 120–121). First they strengthen the assumption that the letter is intended for him, and second they strengthen the assumption that Olivia has romantic feelings for him. These effects are co-dependent. Unless Malvolio accepts the assumption that the letter is intended for him, then he has no evidence to strengthen his relatively weak and tentative assumption that Olivia loves him. Likewise, Malvolio has to accept the assumption that Olivia loves him as plausible in order to accept that the letter is intended for him and not someone else. However, as he considers the contents of the letter, Malvolio reflects on the way that Olivia acts towards him and recalls that Maria has previously told him that Olivia “did affect me” (Line 24). Thus the seed of this assumption has already been planted, and, like the audience member in the psychic reading, he looks for a reason to believe that the message is intended for him.

The identifying phrases in (22) and (23) are, however, compatible with various interpretations. Given Olivia’s social status, she has command over numerous people, and in fact, most of the characters in the play satisfy the description in (22) in one way or another. As Malvolio notes, it could apply to him, and so “[t]here is no obstruction” (Lines 118–119) to his assumptions in this. He then moves on to consider the sequence of letters in (23). Again, he is looking for relevance in terms of evidence to strengthen his assumption that the letter is intended for him, which in turn would strengthen his assumption that Olivia loves him. As he notes, his name begins with *M*, and all of the given letters are in his name. He briefly wonders why they are not in the right order, but this concern is quickly dismissed, and he finds enough evidence, given his hopes and assumptions, to view the letters as confirmation and to strengthen his assumption that he is the “beloved” addressed of the letter. He accepts that the letter has been written by Olivia for him, and, most significantly, his assumption, fairly weakly held before, that he could be Olivia’s lover, has been strengthened considerably.

The scene is constructed in such a way that, as an audience, we witness Malvolio’s interpretative processes as he weighs up the clues and searches for an interpretation. By showing us Malvolio speaking his thoughts aloud, the scene reveals the assumptions that are being accessed and the interpretative paths that are being followed. Malvolio’s process of interpretation seems to be relatively non-spontaneous in the sense discussed by Furlong (1996) and Clark (2009, 2015). According to Clark (2015: p. 114), a “relatively non-spontaneous interpretation is one which involves devoting more time to exploring possibilities, considering a range of evidence for and against particular conclusions”, and, indeed, we witness Malvolio doing just that in this scene. We are shown his thought processes as he finds, reads and interprets the letter, and in this way we are provided with evidence

about the assumptions that he holds. As with Viola's exchange with Orsino discussed in 5.1, the underdeterminacy of the message itself is key to how we view the situation and the character. Had the letter overtly stated that it was from Olivia and that it was both to and about Malvolio, then there would be little hesitation in concluding that Malvolio had been lied to. The fact that he did not see through the lie might be seen as naïve, but would, nonetheless, be understandable, and would position Malvolio as a victim. However, Maria constructs the letter so that the success of the trick relies on Malvolio's interpretation of a vague and non-specific message. He has to fill in the gaps, and the fact that he does so in the way that he does reveals what he sees as possible in the world. We are shown Malvolio both entertaining and accepting as credible the assumption that Olivia could be in love with him. His interpretation reveals that he already considers the state of affairs described in the letter as plausible. The evidence in the letter does not prompt him to construct a new, previously unconsidered assumption, but rather strengthens an assumption which he previously held, albeit weakly.

As Sperber et al. (2010: p. 369) note, communication "carries a major risk for the audience of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed". However, just because we are ostensibly presented with a new piece of information does not mean that we have to accept it and revise our assumptions accordingly. As Sperber et al. (2010: p. 368) explain, "understanding is not believing", and communicative acts that trigger comprehension also trigger epistemic vigilance mechanisms. They continue:

Factors affecting the acceptance or rejection of a piece of communicated information may have to do either with the source of the information – who to believe – or with its content – what to believe. (Sperber et al., 2010: p. 369)

Malvolio accepts the physical evidence that the letter is from Olivia, and he has no reason to believe that she would lie or deliberately mislead him. However, as with the interpretation of any communicative act, his interpretation, involves inference, and as Sperber et al. (2010: p. 374) explain, "[t]he believability of newly communicated information must be assessed relative to background beliefs which are themselves open to revision". The fact that Malvolio both derives and accepts an interpretation on which Olivia loves him reveals the background beliefs that he holds. The trick would not work if he had a more realistic view of his own status and importance in Olivia's life. This scene is a way to show this to the audience. We witness a man seeing what he hopes to see rather than what is actually there; we witness his deluded inferential processes and the failure of his epistemic vigilance. We might perhaps assume that Malvolio's final humiliation comes from the ridiculous behaviour he adopts and the resulting assumption that he is mad. However, this only comes to pass because he accepts a particular interpretation of

the letter as compatible with a certain state of affairs in the world. This is a state of affairs that the audience knows to be both impossible and ridiculous.

Finally, the scene in which Malvolio finds, reads, and interprets the letter provides comic relief for the audience. As Wilson (2011: p. 79) discusses, “authors have not only communicative but also non-communicative goals, personal, social or aesthetic”, such as amusing their audience. Following Austin (1962), Wilson (2011: p. 79) characterises these goals as “not part of what is communicated, but consequences of the communicative act”. As an audience we share assumptions with the characters that are performing the trick, and so we view it from their perspective as “sport” (II. v. 2), “mockery” and “jesting” (II. v. 18–20). Amusing or otherwise entertaining an audience is likely to be a legitimate goal in its own right, as plays are, after all, commercial ventures whose success at least partly depends on attracting and satisfying an audience. However, Wilson (2011: p. 79) suggests that these non-communicative effects could also “form part of the stimulus for the higher-level act, where [they] can contribute to the communication of an impression”. Here the scene is set for the physical and visual comedy that will occur later in the play as Malvolio follows the instructions in the letter and as the full extent of his delusion is revealed.

While the gulling of Malvolio forms part of the comedy sub-plot, much of the remaining comedy in the play involves the character of Feste and his quick wit and wordplay. In the next section I consider an example of this, and, again, apply relevance-theoretic ideas to shed light on how we might characterise Feste’s contribution to the play.

5.3.3 Feste: A corrupter of words

In the two scenes discussed so far, the audience have been privy to information that has not been available to the character that is being misled. However, in the final case that I will consider, the audience is misled in the same way as the characters. Feste is a clown or jester in Olivia’s household, who moves between all of the various groups and characters in the play. He sings several songs which punctuate and comment on the action of the play and he also engages in verbal banter and wordplay with the other characters on various occasions. As Freund (1986: p. 479) describes, his “verbal conduct in particular exhibits an exuberant awareness of the topsy-turvyness of language”. The extract in (24) from Act III, Scene 1 provides one example of this. Feste has entered holding his tabor (musical instrument) and Viola asks him whether he earns his living by playing it.

- (24) Viola: Save thee, friend, and thy music! Dost thou live by thy tabor? 1
 Feste: No, Sir, I live by the church.

Viola: Art thou a churchman?

Feste: No such matter, sir. I do live by the church, 5
for I do live at my house, and my house doth stand
by the church.

This exchange is typical of his wordplay interactions in that it exploits the multiple meanings of a particular word or phrase. In this case the various senses of the verb *to live by* are evoked in quick succession: to make (enough) money out of, to live by the principles of and to dwell physically nearby. Puns like this rely on sentence meaning underdetermining speaker meaning, and on one form being compatible with more than one interpretation. Consider Viola's question in Line 1, given here in (25) and Feste's reply, given in (26).

(25) Dost thou live by thy tabor?

(26) I live by the church.

To interpret Viola's question, both Feste and the audience must determine which of the senses of *to live by* she intended. Recall that, according to relevance theory, a hearer will follow the path of least effort when testing interpretive hypotheses and will test interpretations in order of accessibility. Several factors make an interpretation on which Viola is asking Feste whether he earns his living from playing the tabor more accessible and therefore most likely to be tested first. Viola has mentioned Feste's music in the utterance immediately preceding her question. Given this, along with accessible general assumptions about why people play music and about how they might earn a living, this interpretation requires relatively little extension of the context. In contrast, the alternative interpretations would require a much greater extension of the context. There are no highly accessible assumptions which link a musical instrument with either principles to live by or with a place of abode.

Feste's reply is compatible with three different interpretations of the phrase *to live by*. The most accessible interpretation should be that he earns his living not from the music but as a clergyman, and this would be relevant as it would directly answer Viola's question. However, Viola has encountered Feste before and knows that this is not the case. Simply being told that something is the case is not necessarily evidence enough for a hearer to revise their assumptions. The most accessible interpretation that is also compatible with her existing assumptions is therefore that Feste lives by the principles of the church. Viola knows that Feste is "a fool" and a "jester", and so she is primed for him to enter into these sorts of verbal duels. She plays along. However, Viola's follow up question in (27) is compatible with only two of the three possible senses of *to live by*.

(27) Art thou a churchman?

It is at this point that Feste turns the exchange on its head, claiming to have intended the other, non-compatible and previously least accessible sense, that of living physically close to the church building. It would, of course, have been ridiculous to interpret Viola's original question as asking whether Feste lived near to his musical instrument. Feste knows this, and deliberately misinterprets her question and produces a reply which could be enriched into various different propositions. The exchange juxtaposes these different interpretations and forces both the characters and the audience to entertain them simultaneously.

There is a contrast here between the most accessible interpretation and the interpretation that Feste ultimately claims he intended. It is a contrast that he could have reasonably foreseen. Therefore, if he did not intend to mislead his interlocutor, he should have constructed his utterance differently. The fact that he did not do so leads both Viola and the audience to assume that he intended this contrast to be manifest and he intended his hearer to be temporarily misled. The extra effort inherent in entertaining one interpretation before having to revise it is offset by the cognitive effects arising from the contrast itself and the associated comic effects. Yus (2003: p. 1300) discusses how humorous discourse can achieve relevance:

If the utterance is not as informative as required, irrelevant, untrue, etc., a search for a more relevant interpretation worth being processed may be activated, despite the supplementary mental effort required. Humorous effects such as the enjoyment in the resolution of incongruity are worth this extra cognitive effort, especially if the hearer is ready to join in the joking game.

Viola is clearly ready to join in the game, and she is likely to derive enough cognitive effects from the jokes and puns themselves to justify her effort. She therefore need not necessarily update her assumptions about Feste's working life, religious beliefs or place of residence as a consequence of processing his utterances. Furthermore, Feste's non-communicative goal of amusing Viola has a clear motivation. His livelihood depends on payments from those he entertains, and, indeed, Viola pays him at the end of their interchange. While Viola and Feste perform a lower-level act in which they apparently exchange information, the extract also involves two higher-level acts of showing. Feste is showing Viola his skill with language and wordplay, which she subsequently rewards financially, and we, the audience, are also able to enjoy the humorous effects as Shakespeare shows us the scene. We follow a very similar interpretative path to Viola, and we are tricked and amused by Feste's quick wit in the same way. Furthermore, Feste explicitly tells us that this is what he is doing. He calls himself a "corrupter of words" (III. i. 36) and explains that:

A sentence
 is but a chev'ril glove to a good wit – how quickly
 the wrong side may be turned outward! (III.i.11–13)

The “wrong side” here equates to the least accessible meaning, and yet, as he explains, a “good wit” can quickly change the discourse context in which an utterance is interpreted, thus turning the interpretation on its head. Unlike Viola's utterances to Orsino and Maria's counterfeit letter, Feste's acts of misleading are intended to be temporary, and indeed, the recognition of the fact we have been misled is, at least in part, how they achieve their relevance.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter I have used ideas and principles from the relevance-theoretic pragmatic framework to demonstrate how examples of misleading and deceit in *Twelfth Night* might be analysed in terms of their relevance, both internal and external. I have considered three instances in which characters mislead one another by producing utterances that are compatible with more than one meaning. In each case, the speaker uses their knowledge of their interlocutor's assumptions, which, coupled with the assumption that the hearer will test interpretations in order of accessibility, allows them to guide their addressees to an intended, albeit false, interpretation. As scenes in a play, these interchanges are also ostensive acts of showing with the audience as the addressee. This higher-level act of showing has the potential to change the audience's interpretation of the text, thus making it internally relevant. However, we have seen that these acts of showing can also be used to encourage an audience to update its beliefs about the world outside of the play, thus achieving external relevance.

To conclude, I return to consider again the alternative title that Shakespeare gave his play: *What You Will*. This seems particularly fitting for a play that depends on confusion and misunderstandings. Perhaps this is an acknowledgement of the inherent risks involved in any act of interpretation, and perhaps Shakespeare was to some degree absolving himself of responsibility and inviting us to draw our own interpretive inferences.

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Lexical pragmatics in the context of structural parallelism¹

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6.1 Introduction

The ways in which we put sounds and words together in human language can often set up patterns that are not dictated by the syntactic, morphological or phonological requirements of the language. Rhyme (the repetition of the nucleus and coda of a syllable) may occur by chance in speech, in which case we are surprised by it and might comment “I’m a poet and I don’t know it”, but that very surprise signals the extent to which this is a chance occurrence and unintended. In verbal art, however, the patterning of sounds, words and phrases in many literary traditions is expected and possibly required by the form and the genre (imagine a rap artist rapping without rhyme). Cross-linguistically, such patterns or “parallelisms” in verbal art may involve various linguistic objects (vowels, word initial consonants, words, syntactic phrases, etc., Jakobson, 1968/1981: p. 93) but the range of patterns is small: Kiparsky notes that one rarely finds patterns that involve repeating sequences of more than three elements (Kiparsky, 1973, in Freeman, 1981: p. 12), though I shall look at one such example in this chapter.

My focus here is syntactic parallelism and the contribution it makes to aesthetic effects, or the wider meanings promoted by the work of art. I examine several examples in the light of lexical pragmatics, a relatively recent field focussed on the pragmatic adjustment of word meaning, in order to argue that syntactic parallelism may contribute directly to the explicit meanings of a work of verbal art. On this view, the contribution such structural patterning makes is not simply an aesthetic “extra”.

1. My thanks to the editors of this volume for their help in improving this chapter, though neither are responsible for any remaining shortcomings. Thanks also to the audiences at PALA and the University of Kent for constructive feedback.

The necessity of word disambiguation and reference assignment was an acknowledged part of the construction of explicit meaning (Grice, 1975: p. 44). However, the field of lexical pragmatics which developed out of earlier work by Barsalou (1987, 1993) and Glucksberg et al. (1997) throws much light on the way in which words are sometimes subject to pragmatically inferred adjustments in their meaning, sometimes termed “free pragmatic enrichment” (Recanati, 1993, 2004). In relevance-theoretic terms, the notion that has replaced Grice’s “what is said”, the explicature, is therefore partly a result of pragmatic inferencing: words regularly undergo processes of narrowing or broadening or both (Carston, 1997, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Carston, 2007; Soria & Romero, 2010; Clark, 2013, chapter 8). I consider how syntactic parallelism may contribute to the reader’s inferences with respect to specific words within the parallel structure.

In Section 2, I characterise the nature of syntactic parallelism. I demonstrate how a theory that employs underlying syntactic structure has the tools to be able to describe accurately the nature of both strict and loose syntactic parallelism. In Section 3, I briefly review the relevance-theoretic account of the construction of a proposition (the “what is said” in Gricean terms). Section 4 examines particular cases of syntactic parallelism in prose and verse and suggests possible word meaning adjustments that the parallel structures may give rise to. Section 5 pursues the theoretical implications of this lexical pragmatic account of syntactic parallelism for stylistics more generally.

6.2 Syntactic parallelism

Whether linguistically trained or not, readers can recognise parallelism when they see or hear it (Jakobson, 1968/1981: p. 93). However, accounting for both a reader’s perception of patterns and the relative salience of different structures is a challenge for any analysis that focuses on the reading process. In this section, I characterise the notion of “strict” and “loose” parallel structures, and consider the difficulties of accurately documenting looser parallelism within a linguistic theory, and the repercussions that has for pragmatic processing. I then consider the role that parallelism has played in stylistic discussions to date.

Some syntactic parallelism can be “strict”, in that much of the diction is repeated and only individual words are changed. Dylan Thomas’s poetry provides many examples, (1) and (2) present the opening lines of the first two stanzas of Thomas’s poem (Thomas, 2014: p. 43, reproduced in Appendix 1):

- (1) The force that [through the green fuse] drives the flower
- (2) The force that drives the water [through the rocks]

There is some variation in constituent order (the bracketed “through” phrase is preposed immediately after the relative pronoun in (1) but not in (2)) which I shall return to later, but otherwise these lines differ mainly at the lexical level. Such strict parallelism when only some words are different is not difficult to describe accurately, or to appreciate how we observe it cognitively.

It is more challenging to capture our awareness of parallelism that is looser. For example, there is a looser parallel between the NP *the green fuse* in (1) and the NP *the rocks* in (2) because the former includes an attributive adjective in its structure. How can we capture this in our linguistic description? One might downplay the linguistic structure altogether and attempt a *gestalt*-based approach that allows the brain to make use of a wider frame with variation within it (along the lines of, say, Stockwell, 2009: pp. 22–55). This places a very heavy onus on our account of the general cognitive mechanisms that observe such associations.

In contrast, Kiparsky (1973) demonstrates that a formal linguistic theory that employs the notion of underlying structure is able to document strict and loose examples of parallelism by capturing exact equivalence within the underlying syntactic structure. For a looser parallel such as that which exists between *the green fuse* and *the rocks* in (1) and (2) respectively, the equivalence lies in the fact that they are both Noun Phrase (NP) constituents. In formal terms, this means that there is an exact equivalence not at the lowest level of the syntactic tree (that of the level of individual lexical items), but a little higher up, at the level of the NP node.

Our awareness of the parallelism in (1) and (2) is complicated by the fact that, as noted, the Prepositional Phrases (PP) headed by *through* are in different positions. The parallel is therefore a little looser, yet still apparent enough for us to perceive it without any linguistic training. Such looser parallelism may also be captured accurately by reference to the underlying structure, but this time by reference to an earlier stage in the syntactic derivation (for models that assume underlying derivations). If the PP *through the green fuse* in (1) is understood as having been pre-posed from an equivalent position to the PP *through the rocks* lower down, then the equivalence is exact before the PP *through the green fuse* has moved. In other words, the phrase *the force that drives the flower [through the green fuse]* before the PP is moved out of its base position is the same as that of (2).

The abstract complexity of syntactic trees and derivations has progressed considerably since the early seventies. For example, the adoption of “bare phrase structure” in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995) means that many syntacticians no longer work with the notion of a level of underlying structure that precedes the preposing of the PP in (1). Instead, the syntactic structure is constructed bit by bit as lexical items are added or constituents move from lower down in the tree. Such movement does not occur freely but is triggered by the checking or matching of features which means that (1) and (2) must differ both in

terms of the position of the PP and the presence of a feature that triggers the PP movement. The notion of movement itself can be seen as a metaphor, reflecting our way of talking about the theoretical model proposed to capture the linguistic facts. How this model is instantiated in the neural structures of the brain is not yet known but may well not involve any sense of movement at all (see Chomsky, 2000: chapter 5, 2002: chapter 3 on the issue of unification in science). Indeed, not all generative accounts employ the notion of movement but capture the facts about syntactic displacement via other mechanisms of feature matching. For our purposes, Kiparsky's point remains valid, that the wordings in (1) and (2) can be captured as equivalent in an abstract sense in the underlying structures. The generative linguistic claim, of course, is that such structure has a psychological reality and reflects psychobiological structures within the brain (Chomsky & McGilray, 2012). Garrett (1967), for example, found empirical evidence for the view that constituent structure is a psychological reality.

Considerably looser parallelism can be exemplified by much of Walt Whitman's verse (Allen, 1933; Warren, 1990). Remaining with syntactic theory of the seventies for clarity, the equivalence is captured at a still higher level in the tree structure (Kiparsky, 1973/1981: p. 15). Consider (3), discussed in (Fabb, 2012):

- (3) To think how much pleasure there is!
 Have you pleasure from looking at the sky? Have you pleasure from poems?
 Do you enjoy yourself in the city? or engaged in business? or planning a
 nomination and election? Or with your wife and family?
 Or with your mother and sisters? or in womanly housework? or the beautiful
 maternal cares? (Whitman, 1855, *Leaves of Grass*, 67)

In the second line in (3), the parallelism is strict apart from the complement of the preposition *from*, where the clauses become different: *from looking at the sky* vs *from poems*. If we think in terms of constituents rather than strings of words, though, the parallel is strictly equivalent at the more abstract level: *Have you pleasure from [...]* where the square brackets indicate the complement constituent to the preposition. If we were to depict the structure of these lines in terms of a tree structure, the equivalence is exact at a level higher than the word level.

In the subsequent lines, the parallelism enables ellipsis of *do you enjoy yourself* in each conjunct after the first conjunct, with the object of the pleasure being different. In the final conjunct, the parallel is at the level of the complement to the preposition *in*, the ellipsis enabled by the parallelism.

It is worthwhile reiterating the significance of Kiparsky's point here because it is relevant to the comparative evaluation of stylistic theories. Any stylistic theory must be able to characterise the linguistic facts in order to then determine their effects on the reader. A stylistic theory that does not employ a theory of language

with the notion of underlying structure must provide an alternative way to document cases of loose parallelism. If the parallelism is simply taken as a given without a demonstration of how the parallel structure can be established as linguistic fact, this must surely undermine the competitiveness of that stylistic theory.

Kiparsky's generative account broadly assumes a Fodorean theory of modularity of the mind (Fodor, 1983): linguistic structure (such as syntax) is not processed in the same way as other patterns we might perceive. It is processed in a discrete encapsulated module of the brain that is fast and automatic. The shared abstract structure that we referred to above in the characterisation of strict and loose parallelism is therefore not simply a stylistician's tool but a psychological reality. Parallelism does not itself play any role in such discrete linguistic processing (there are no mechanisms that utilise parallelism), so the patterns of parallel structures must be themselves processed by central processors dealing with other non-linguistic patterns (such as our perception of poetic lines and rhyme). However, the equivalence between parallel structures can be accurately and precisely captured by abstract linguistic structure and thus draws upon the nature of human language more generally (see Fabb, 2010, for more recent discussion).

Jakobson made parallelism central to a definition of the poetic function (1960: p. 358), but the widely accepted critique of the Formalist/Structuralist enterprise is that whilst it could document the linguistic objects (albeit not to the extent that we have just seen within generativism), it did not have the tools to fully evaluate their significance in terms of the wider aesthetic effect (Riffaterre, 1972: p. 370; Short, 1973). Leech (1965) noted that not all parallelisms are created equal: whilst any parallelism might contribute to the overall "literariness" of a piece of verbal art, occurrences of parallelism will vary in their significance when it comes to interpretation and appreciation. As Leech observed, the relative cohesion of deviation and parallelism is important in the step from documenting the linguistic object to interpreting and evaluating a piece of verbal art. Any subsequent focus on only a subset of parallelisms as part of the interpretation exposes the stylistician to Fish's famous critique of (what he perceived as) pervasive stylistic praxis, that displayed an "absence of any constraint on the way in which one moves from description to interpretation, with the result that any interpretation one puts forward is arbitrary" (Fish, 1980: pp. 72–3).

In fact, Jakobson was not blind to the contribution of contextual meaning. Consider for example his analogy to film, where he employs Spottiswoode's definition of film montage as "the juxtaposition of contrasting shots or sequences to generate in the mind of the spectator ideas that these constituent shots of sequences by themselves do not carry" (Jakobson, 1968/1981: p. 93). This was essentially Leech's point, that the context of a linguistic feature is essential in our interpretation and evaluation. Still, in the wake of Fish's attack on (what he saw as)

pervasive stylistic praxis, one is faced with either the response that, in verbal art, (a) “anything goes” with respect to interpretation, restricted only by the conventions of a given interpretative community, or (b) one must demonstrate that *not* anything goes, by motivating the cognitive processes of the reader in response to that verbal art.

What was lacking in the debate was a suitably articulated pragmatic theory. Such a theory needs to be able to account both for how we approach what is perceived to be a literary text, and the inferences that we as readers make regarding comparative salience or prominence [which features are “foregrounded” in Mukařovský’s (1932/1970) term]. Interestingly, Bradford (1994) has argued that Jakobson’s concept of “the set (*einstellung*) towards the MESSAGE” (Jakobson, 1960: p. 356), which is for Jakobson the poetic function of language, included the speaker, the text and the addressee in a combined endeavour (Bradford, 1994: pp. 15–22). Just as Jakobson’s work was not blind to the role of context, so it had a space for what was to become pragmatics.

Parallelism is often a form of foregrounding. Mukařovský described foregrounding as the subtle relation between “automatized” schematic language, which becomes “normal” and therefore in the background, and language that is in some way prominent or that draws attention to itself in that context (1932/1970). Nothing of itself is “foregrounded”; it will always depend on the nature of the context. Hence we shall see below how the prosodic patterns created by iambic pentameter can become the “norm” against which prose can be foregrounded, even though in most language use, the opposite would be the case. A text that consisted of numerous clichéd parallelisms would not allow any one of the parallelisms to be foregrounded. Foregrounding may occur in many different ways, drawing on both linguistic and non-linguistic structure (Fabb, 2010), and may combine to create a “nexus” of foregroundedness in a work of verbal art (van Peer, 1986). My focus on parallelism in this chapter should not be taken as a suggestion that it is the *only* way in which foregrounding occurs, or that it occurs in the absence of other salient linguistic features.

Traditionally parallelism that is foregrounded is assumed to provide “extra meaning” (Fowler, 1986: p. 95; see also Douthwaite, 2000: pp. 168–9). To a considerable extent, this fits with the Gricean approach to pragmatics, that “what is said” constitutes the literal, or semantic, content of the utterance which is then subject to pragmatic inferencing that derives contextual meaning (Grice, 1989). “Extra meaning” in this sense is pragmatic meaning, as opposed to the “literal” meaning of the linguistic encoding. In such an account, parallelism contributes to the wider aesthetic effect, but as an add-on, at precisely the stage that the Formalist, structuralist and indeed generative tools of research became inoperative. Within Leech’s distinction between “description” and “interpretation”, parallelism is a linguistic fact that can be documented, but its contribution – besides drawing attention to

the “poeticness” for its own sake – is to the wider meaning, or the wider aesthetic effect, and so part of the interpretation. It is not, in other words, part of Grice’s “what is said”, or the narrower linguistic sense of “meaning”, what Leech terms the “cognitive” or “referential” meaning (Leech, 1965, in Freeman, 1970: p. 120; Ogden & Richards, 1923: pp. 149–150, 158–159). However, my argument here is that developments in lexical pragmatics enable a different formulation whereby the contribution of parallelism to the work of verbal art is not simply an “add-on” but at the heart of the explicit communication.

6.3 Lexical adjustment

Building on the earlier work of Barsalou (1987, 1993), Carston (1997) and Sperber & Wilson (1998) argued that inferencing is involved in all determination of word meaning, and hence in the construction of the explicatures. This may involve a relatively minor degree of “loosening” or “broadening” of the meaning of a word or phrase stored in the lexicon of the speaker and (if the communication is successful) the hearer. It may also involve substantially more significant adjustments to the stored meaning. In many cases, it may involve a quite fleeting adaptation of the meaning for a one-off occurrence. The brief account that follows draws on Wilson & Carston (2007), in which hyperbole and many instances of metaphor are subsumed within the wider theory of lexical adjustment.

Lexical narrowing can be demonstrated in (4) by varying the context of the utterance, which in turn promotes distinct inferences as to the meaning of *drinking*.

(4) I’m not drinking

The most rare case might well be one that promotes the full “literal” meaning of the verb: “I am not consuming any liquid” (perhaps for medical purposes or the observance of Ramadan, say). In the context of my home, where we enjoy the occasional glass of wine on weekday evenings, my partner’s utterance of (4) during the week would prompt the inference that she was not planning to drink any alcoholic beverage that evening, a “narrowing” of the meaning of *drink* to refer to only a subset of possible liquids. The accuracy of the inference might well result in me offering a soft drink instead, with no contradiction. But in the context of a culture that commonly involves very high quantities of alcohol, (4) might well mean “I am not drinking spirits” or “I am not drinking a lot”. In my experience in one country, I was usually offered beer after uttering (4). The latter cases involve the narrowing of the meaning of *drink*, but it is significant to note that there is no sense of a “special meaning” being invoked. Notice also that the “not” in (4) may be inferred as meaning “not much” or “not enough” with reference only to

the quantity of drink being consumed: for example, I might utter (4) with the intended meaning “I’m not drinking enough fluids” on those occasions when I am feeling dehydrated.

Alternatively, the meaning of a word or phrase might involve an extension of its meaning to include a wider sense than the basic or “literal” entry in the mental lexicon. Wilson & Carston give (5) as an example (2007: 236):

(5) The water is boiling

The scientific meaning will involve the liquid reaching boiling point (which of course also varies a little as to where you are in the world), so a context that would promote the literal meaning might be a laboratory. More common usages may involve a looser sense that may well include the literal boiling point (I can hear the kettle click off and I am implicating that my partner can make the tea that was promised). If my child screams (5) as I lower him into the bath, this would be called hyperbole, the appropriate inference would be the sense that *boiling* denotes “too hot for a bath”. These can be seen as a broadening of the meaning of *boiling* in the speaker’s lexicon. Finally, Wilson & Carston observe that such an account may be extended to include metaphorical usage: (5) might be uttered to refer to the churning effects of water in a stormy harbour or sewage works.

Note that in these examples, the unspoken time adverbials are crucial to the explicature, the fact that we’re talking about drinking, say, “this evening” rather than “at any time in my life”, despite it not being included in the utterance. A full account of the free pragmatic enrichment of an utterance to construct the explicature includes the recovering of such “unarticulated constituents” (Carston, 2010: p. 219) but is outside the focus of this chapter.

Lexical adjustment might be far more extensive in some cases. Consider (6), said in the context of the early years of this century:

(6) Iraq is this generation’s Vietnam

For some speakers, it is quite possible that their mental lexicon includes notions of complex foreign policy difficulties in its entry for the word *Vietnam*. However, for speakers who do not have such an entry, inferring the intended meaning of (6) is still possible if the hearer accesses the relevant historical knowledge in order to adjust the meaning of *Vietnam* to include this sense. Such a lexical adjustment may be wholly *ad hoc*, implicated and inferred for that one occasion of use only. This (potentially highly fleeting) possibility of lexical adjustment may have a significant role to play in the reading of a literary text.

“Narrowing” and “broadening” are terms used to describe the result of lexical adjustment, not the pragmatic procedure. In some cases, they may occur simultaneously, such as in (7), said of a friend who has been particularly generous or kind:

(7) Caroline is a princess

The sense of “princess” has been broadened to denote not just royalty, but people with particular positive qualities. At the same time, the usage may exclude some other aspects of being a princess (such as “being in line to the throne”, etc.).

The alternative Gricean account of (4)–(7), in the contexts suggested, involves the hearer realising that the speaker is not being literal (and so apparently flouting the maxim of quality) and then inferring what is intended to be communicated. In theoretical terms, the “what is said” involves the literal meaning of the word or phrase, and the context promotes the inferred meaning.

This chapter pursues some of the interesting theoretical ramifications of these two approaches for the reading of literary texts that employ parallelism. We know that verbal art gives rise to a host of weak inferences (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: Chapter 4). In a Gricean account, these are meanings that are pragmatically inferred separately from the construction of the literal proposition, and hence are not part of the linguistic processing *per se*. In the relevance-theoretic account outlined here, at least some of the weakly inferred conclusions promoted by the verbal art may be promoted in the construction of the explicature. They are therefore not “additional” meanings. In the next section I look at some instances where the syntactic parallelism may be contributing to such a modulation of the meaning.

6.4 Syntactic parallelism feeds “what is said”

To begin the discussion of parallelism in verbal art, let us consider a particularly famous instance of parallelism within prose: Brutus’s speech to the citizens in Act III, scene ii of Shakespeare’s *The Tragedie of Julius Caesar*. Part of the speech is given in (8). Brutus and his confederates have assassinated Julius Caesar, and Brutus now addresses the citizens to explain their actions. For context, it should be noted that the citizens are greatly troubled by the assassination: Trebonius states in the preceding scene that “Men, wives and children stare, cry out and run / As it were doomsday.” (III. i. 107–108) and Brutus refers to the multitude as being “beside themselves with fear”, his aim being to “appease” them (III.ii.190). In pragmatic terms, there are of course two distinct levels to be entertained, as in any drama: there is the pragmatics of Brutus’s speech to the citizens, and there is our own (or the audience’s) pragmatic inferencing of events and utterances. I will focus on the use of the word “censure” (in bold) below:

- (8) Romans, Countrey-men, and Lovers, heare mee for my cause; and be silent, that you may heare. Beleeve me for mine Honor, and have respect to mine Honor, that you may beleeve. **Censure** me in your Wisdom, and awake

your Senses, that you may the better judge. If there bee any in this Assembly, any deere Friend of Cæsars, to him I say, that Brutus love to Cæsar was no less than his. If then, that Friend demand, why Brutus rose against Cæsar, this is my answer: Not that I lov'd Cæsar lesse, but that I lov'd Rome more.

[Shakespeare, 1599, *The tragedie of Julius Caesar*, III. ii. ll.12 ff.]

The majority of the play's utterances are in iambic pentameter, as are Brutus's speeches, so it is noteworthy that Shakespeare has given Brutus prose. This is not simply because it is a formal speech because Antony's funeral oration a few moments later is in iambic pentameter. Brian Vickers claims it is inconceivable that associations of Shakespeare's prose with inferior dignity and limited emotional resources could be relevant here (Vickers, 1968: p. 240). Rather, he argues that Shakespeare's use of prose at this point is made to contrast with the metre of Antony's later speech (in which Antony effectively sways the citizens against Brutus). This in itself is foregrounding because the "norm" of the play is iambic pentameter, and so the sudden disappearance of metre is noteworthy (Mukařovský, 1932/1970: p. 43). Vickers argues that the extensive rhetorical symmetry of Brutus's speech suggests it is a "prepared speech", a sense that is strengthened by the foregrounding of its being in prose. The "prepared" nature of the speech with its extensive use of classical rhetorical figures might be said to increase the perception that Brutus lacks feeling. It might also be argued, somewhat contra Vickers, that the "descent" into prose at this moment may provide a weak implicature that Brutus's is "less noble" at this moment.

The use of prose by Brutus in this speech contrasts with Antony's later funeral oration which is delivered in the normal currency of the play, iambic pentameter, and carries little rhetorical patterning beyond repetition (Vickers, 1968: p. 243).

Although it would be a form of category error to suggest a character in the play can be aware of the difference between prose and metre, the distinction contributes to the ultimate persuasiveness of Antony's later speech. The audience of the play may or may not perceive the shift from verse to prose, but the effect is to contribute to the emotional sense of the characters' actions when they mutiny against Brutus.

My focus however is on the contribution that the parallelism gives to the explicit meaning of Brutus's speech. At the end of the 16th century, the word *censure* was more polysemous than it is now. It included the current sense "pronounce adverse judgement, express disapproval, criticize unfavourably" but could also be used without any sense of condemnation: "to form or give opinion of, estimate, judge" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017).

Given this, the word must be ambiguous to both the citizens and the contemporary audience. Brutus may be calling upon the citizens to condemn what he has done, or simply to form a judgement. For the audience, there is a strong

expectation that Brutus is not inviting condemnation, because that audience is aware of the overall drama and Brutus's earlier stated aim to appease the citizens. This expectation might reasonably be present to a weaker degree for the citizens, but at the moment that the word is used in the speech, Brutus's audience has not heard anything more than a request for them to believe in and respect his honour.

Pragmatically, in order for both the citizens and the audience to construct the literal sense of what Brutus has said, they need to establish the intended sense of *censure*. Beyond the mild expectations of the previous paragraph, how is this done? I would argue that it is the parallelism that prompts the hearers to resolve the intended meaning. Consider the relevant lines in a format that highlights the parallels:

(9)

Heare me for my cause; and be silent, that you may **heare**.
Beleeve me for mine Honor, and have respect to mine Honor, that you may **beleeve**.
Censure me in your Wisdom, and awake your Senses, that you may **the better judge**.

Focusing first on the initial two sentences which “prime” the hearer, the pattern that exists sees each imperative sentence begin and end with the same word (the figure *epanalepsis*). Because of the morphology of English, the imperative *heare* “hear” is identical in phonological form to the non-finite *heare* following the modal auxiliary *may*, and the same goes for *beleeve* (“believe”); the imperative and infinitive have the identical phonology. The parallelism is strict in the terms used above but for the second conjunct *be silent / have respect to mine Honour*, where the exact parallel is located higher up the syntactic tree at the level of the Verb Phrase (VP) headed by *be* and *have* respectively.² Of course, these verbs differ in terms of the complements they require; the copula requires a predicative phrase (headed by an adjective, noun or preposition) and the verb *have* requires a direct object, hence the equivalence is at the phrasal level that each verb projects.

The pattern is continued in the third sentence: an imperative verb followed by *me* and a PP with related lexical and semantic parallels with the preceding equivalent PPs (*for my cause, for mine Honor, in your Wisdom*), followed by the explanatory *that*-clauses which are equivalent but for the non-finite verbs following *may*.

The fairly strong assumption the hearer might make by this point is that in speeches, things often come in threes, and this may be such an instance given

2. The definition of ‘Verb Phrase’ used here is the head verb and its complements and modifying adjuncts, not the ‘verbal complex’ assumed in non-formal linguistics (Trask, 1993: pp. 297–8).

the parallels so far.³ A further assumption may be that the verb *censure* will be repeated, or that there will be some contrast in the third member of the set. In fact, Brutus's utterance satisfies both these assumptions by repeating the sense of *censure* but with an alternative wording (*judge*), and with a slightly looser parallelism that locates the exact equivalence not at the lexical level, but a little higher at the level of the VP node. The first two equivalent parallel VPs are headed by intransitive verbs *heare* and *believe* only, and this final VP delivers the intransitive verb pre-modified by an adverbial NP *the better*.

It is then the expectation of a repetition of the verb in each sentence of the parallelism that determines the sense of *censure* that Brutus intends. He is calling upon his audience to come to an estimation of his actions, and to do that all the more effectively as a result of employing their *wisdom* and having awakened their *senses*. The parallelism is therefore instrumental in constructing what is explicitly said in (9).

Disambiguation between senses of a word was an acknowledged part of establishing "what is said" in Grice's account (Grice, 1975: p. 44). However, it is not entirely clear to what extent this case of *censure* is a question of word disambiguation, given that there is a substantial difference between wholly different words that share the some phonology (such as the difference between the "bank" that charges you for an overdraft and the "bank" that constrains a river) and the more subtle distinctions of true polysemy. We might see the adjustment of *censure* here as being a case of narrowing: both senses under consideration involve judgment, but one includes the sense of condemnation which is being excluded in the intended sense. In diachronic terms, it might be argued that our current condemnatory sense was the more recent meaning in Shakespeare's time, for the OED provides no examples with this sense before 1605, whereas the sense of giving or forming an opinion is attested a few decades earlier. The evidence is not strong, however, and the evidence suggests that the now-obsolete meaning that Brutus uses continued to be used well into the eighteenth century. It seems unlikely therefore that we could view this usage as an example of "semantic retention" where the older meaning is retained alongside the new meaning (Clark, 2016; Nicolle, 2011).

There are then three logical possibilities. The word (i) may have had only the negative meaning, (ii) that there was a possibility of adjusting towards the negative sense which Brutus needed to rule out, or (iii) the word was ambiguous and so disambiguation was required (my thanks to the editors of the volume for clarifying this point). For our purposes here it is clear that a substantial degree of crucial lexical adjustment was required for the distinction was potentially a matter

3. This assumption will be all the stronger for an audience familiar with classical rhetoric (Vickers, 1968: pp. 241–5).

of life and death to Brutus, and it is the parallelism that constrains the inference to Brutus's intended meaning.

A further parallelism occurs in relation to the name Caesar:

(10) Not that I lov'd Cæsar lesse, but that I lov'd Rome more.

The parallelism works by establishing a duality between *lesse* and *more* which promotes the inference of an antonymous relation between *Caesar* and *Rome*. But that is simply to acknowledge what we have always known that parallelism can do (Leech, 1969: pp. 67–9). My point is that the parallelism does more than this.

Any name, and particularly that of a public figure, will have a variety of potential meanings that may be denoted at any one time. Wilson & Carston (2007) provide the example “They’ve appointed another Chomsky!” where the name Chomsky is intended to denote something along the lines of “a generative syntactician” rather than denoting the man who works at MIT and has a family life and so on. One could easily imagine, in the right context, the name “Chomsky” carrying even more specific meaning in this utterance, along the lines of, say, “a linguist who believes you can’t seriously study language performance”. Similarly the name Thatcher, thirty years on from her premiership, often carries a substantial degree of adjustment depending on the speaker and the context, with often little sense of her as a human being and all the frailties that that can include.

So with the name “Caesar”, there are many potential variations in meanings that might exist. In order to justify the assassination of Caesar, Brutus needs to undermine human sympathy for Caesar the man, because the assassination was carried out for purely political reasons, to prevent Caesar from becoming a dictator. There will be those among his audience within the play that have much human feeling for Caesar, including adoration and love, hence Brutus’s reference to “any deere friend” in (8). In addressing those that are fans of Caesar, Brutus needs to evoke not so much the man whose corpse is covered in bleeding wounds (see Antony’s earlier speech addressing the corpse: “O, pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth”: III.i.255), but to evoke the political threat he represented as a potential tyrant. The threat was to Rome’s republic, and so it is the parallelism in (12) that supports the adjusted meaning of Caesar from that of a friend in the previous few words to that of the political opposite of all that Rome represented. It promotes a distinct meaning to *Caesar*, the concept *CAESAR (to use the lexical pragmatic conventions to signal an *ad hoc* concept) which denotes a figure who is a threat to what is good for Rome and the citizens. It is this denotation that contributes to the explicit meaning, or explicature, of Brutus’s utterance in (10). It is entirely possible that more than one meaning of *Caesar* is present in the same speech, both the man that one might love and the tyrant of whose actions one disapproved. I would argue that Brutus’s parallelism focuses on the political figure.

Focusing on the more traditionally “literary” aspects of meaning, consider again the parallelism in the opening lines of the first two stanzas of Thomas’s poem “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower”:

- (11) a. The force that through the green fuse drives the flower /Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of trees / Is my destroyer.
 b. The force that drives the water through the rocks /Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams/ Turns mine to wax.

Of course the “set” of the language in Jakobson’s sense is towards THE MESSAGE; any reader expects the poetic function to be to the fore prior to reading because of the layout of the language on the page (in contrast, the line lengths of prose are determined by the width of the page) and probably the knowledge that Dylan Thomas is a poet, and so on. The reader may therefore expect a number of things, including that the intended meaning might involve greater cognitive effort to process. But in relevance-theoretic terms, the reader expects that extra effort to result in a greater array of cognitive effects (and so the language use still comes with a guarantee of optimal relevance) (Furlong, 1996). As part of this, the reader may be alert to the possibility that a relatively large number of weak implicatures will be encouraged (the definition of “poetic effects” in Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Chapter 4). Our interest here are those weak implicatures that are involved in the construction of explicatures. That is, the focus is on lexical adjustments where the reader rapidly constructs hypotheses about contextual assumptions, explicatures and contextual implications which are each modified bit by bit to arrive at an interpretation that meets the reader’s expectations of relevance. This process is described as one of “mutual parallel adjustment”; the model does not assume a linear development from, say, contextual assumptions to explicatures to contextual implicatures. Rather, the model assumes that these rapidly constructed hypotheses about assumptions, explicatures and implicatures are being processed in parallel and thus feed each other in the on-line adjustment of meaning (Wilson & Carston, 2007: p. 248; Carston, 2010: Section 4).

First, let us note the set of small parallel structures in (11) that contribute to the adjustments in the meanings of “drive”. A literal meaning does not include the possibility of “driving a flower”, and so the phrase *drives the flower* in (11a) promotes an adjusted concept *DRIVE that denotes an inner natural force that Magee argues is a deliberate evocation of Schopenhauer’s concept of the noumenon, a blind purposeless force beyond our immediate senses (Magee, 1997: Chapter 19). The phrase is followed by *Drives my green age* which moves us from the concept of an inner force in the world to an abstract notion of a force that moves one’s age. The concept of a force driving “my green age” would arguably give rise to a greater number of weakly implicated adjusted meanings if it were not for the parallel with

drives the flower, and the explicit association that is made between them: whatever *drives my green age* means exactly, it is the same force as that which makes the flower grow, or survive, or multiply (or all three). The parallelism here constrains a little the fecundity of potential meanings of the second phrase by strengthening the explicitly asserted association with the first.

In Stanza 2 (11b), we have a slightly different concept for “drive”, one that involves not an internal force through a fuse but an external force, this time with something of the sense of pushing and a contrasting sense of more traditional power (water and rocks contrasting with the delicacy of the flower). The meaning of “drive” is related to the earlier usage, but also the inferred meaning of the new *DRIVE takes its sense from the new adjacent words. Again, there is a minor parallel in the immediately repeated *Drives my red blood* which again, takes much of its meaning from the preceding parallel, partly because of the verb-direct object structure, and partly because of the association of liquid.

There are therefore two subtly distinct senses to “drive” which are both continued into their adjacent more metaphorical usage. I have suggested that the second usage in each of (11a, b) derives a similar meaning to the initial usage, but this is probably not entirely true: the parallel allows a relation, but in both cases there is a metaphorical usage (that I focus on below in relation to the colour terms *green* and *red*) which almost certainly involves a minor further adjustment of “drive” in both cases.

Before turning to the colour terms, let us finally consider the larger parallel structure between (11a) and (11b). The parallels are setting up similarities in meanings and contrasts at the same time. It is perhaps a rather pedestrian reading, but if we assume that Dylan Thomas is seeking to evoke a sense of Schopenhauer’s concept of the *noumenon* (Magee observes the textual similarity between passages of Schopenhauer and Thomas’s poem: 1997: pp. 415–6), then part of the promoted meaning is that both (11a) and (11b) are examples of the same thing, so creating a sort of “list” reading. The parallelisms are embodying the explicit associations in their form (See Fabb, 2012 on form as meaning in Whitman), promoting the larger inferences with respect to the nature of the world, and, in terms of our focus in this chapter, contributing to the minor contrast adjustments to *DRIVE.

Let us continue to examine the larger parallel structure that exists between (11a, b). The “green fuse” adjacent to “flower” might reasonably be taken to refer to a stem that is coloured green (see section 5 below for the contribution of collocational meaning). This does not close down the possibility of further non-spontaneous inferencing later, such as is common when we read and reread literary texts (Furlong, 1996). A possible metaphorical reading of “green” cannot be ruled out, though at this stage there is little to encourage such a reading beyond the fact that we are clearly reading a poem.

The second use of *green* however, in line 2 of the poem, is metaphorical: someone's age cannot be a colour, that is a category error which, in Gricean terms would alert the reader to the flouting of the maxim of quality, and so encourage the search for the metaphorical usage of *green*. This metaphorical usage is fairly commonplace (that youth is associated with "green"), to the extent that it could be argued to be a "dead", or conventionalised, metaphor. The relevance-theoretic account described above would see this as an occasion of broadening the concept of "green" to include the sense of immaturity. Setting aside a host of other lexical inferences that are needed, let us assume for the sake of argument that the proposition is along the lines of (12):

- (12) The life force that drives the flower through its stem is the same force that drives my inexperienced youth.

The first usage of *green* is literal and the second usage is metaphorical, albeit in a way that requires comparatively little effort to infer because of its fairly common usage. My focus is on how the parallel structure that exists between the equivalent lines of stanzas 1 and 2 primes the reader for the construction of the proposition in (11b). Given the structural equivalence of *drives my green age* and *drives my red blood* within the larger parallel structure documented in (1)/(2), I suggest that the explicit meaning of *red* is broadened to include not just the "literal" concept of the colour red but also the more metaphorical associations of red.

In a Gricean account of the same data, a problem presents itself in relation to "red blood", because there is nothing obviously wrong in referring to blood as "red" and so it is hard to see what might alert the reader to a flouting of the maxim of quality. In other words, in a Gricean account, it is hard to see how "red blood" might be processed metaphorically at all. The account could only draw upon the conventional associations of "red blood" that appear in a reader's mental lexicon.

In a relevance-theoretic account, the meaning of *red* in (11b) is broadened to include the wide array of metaphorical meanings that are available for the colour term. Such common associations for colour terms would often be referred to as connotative meaning rather than the denotative meaning. The lexical pragmatic account changes the relation between these terms: the connotative meaning now becomes part of the denotative meaning of *red* in this context. What is traditionally described as a metaphorical meaning here is not a result of pragmatic inferencing on the literal sense of "red blood", but a result of pragmatic inferencing in word meaning that occurs in the construction of the proposition.

If this argument is along the right lines, we move away from the sense of the "literary" meaning as a sometimes fanciful relation to any "normal" sense of "literal" meaning, and much closer to a recognition that the wider aesthetic meaning is at least partly a result of the "core" propositional meaning. In terms of

the earlier discussion, the interpretive inferential process is also part of the initial linguistic description, and there may be no “literal” reading of “red blood” that exists prior to what Fish criticised as the arbitrary interpretive leap of the stylistician (see Section 3).

In fact, the term “lexical pragmatics” may be somewhat misleading because there may be cases where a phrase is being adjusted (Carston, 2010: p. 253). Wilson & Carston note, for example, that there is evidence to suggest in the utterance “Nixon bombed Hanoi” that it may not be so much “Nixon” that is subject to broadening (because clearly Nixon did not personally bomb the country), but rather the *ad hoc* concept inferred may be *BOMBED HANOI (Wilson & Carston, 2007: p. 253). We might, then, paraphrase *BOMBED HANOI as denoting a sense of “took actions and gave orders that resulted in Hanoi and other areas thought to harbour communist sympathisers being bombed by the US military”.⁴

In the light of this, consider the example of Walt Whitman’s loose parallelism in (3) that introduces a variety of pleasures, including in the list “pleasure from poems”, repeated here as (13):

- (13) To think how much pleasure there is!
Have you pleasure from looking at the sky? Have you pleasure from poems?

The “pleasure from poems” here denotes perhaps a fairly unremarkable pleasure, following as it does the pleasure of looking at the sky. There is arguably just the sense of a list of almost quotidian pleasures. A few lines later, however, the phrase is repeated [here in (14)]. The parallel structure in which Whitman places it now promotes a whole new array of weakly implicated meanings:

- (14) The sky continues beautiful ... the pleasure of men with women shall never be sated ... nor the pleasure of women with men ... or the pleasure from poems;

The pleasure being denoted becomes a particularly visceral, sexually charged *PLEASURE by association with the preceding structures. The salience of this new meaning is all the stronger because of the unremarkable usage slipped into the list of pleasures a few lines earlier. Again, lexical pragmatic theory would make such a fertile *ad hoc* meaning not a pragmatic addition to Whitman’s literal meaning, but part of the explicit proposition.

4. It might also be argued that all three concepts are individually adjusted, with *NIXON denoting, perhaps, the politician and the cluster of advisors around him, *BOMBED denoting both the aerial bombing and other techniques of warfare, and *HANOI denoting certain parts of the country believed to harbour communists or communist sympathisers. My thanks to the editors of this volume for pointing this out.

In this section I have looked at some examples of how parallel structures lead to distinctive possibly momentary denotative meanings that might previously have been regarded as connotative meanings. In the next section, I consider the implications that lexical pragmatic theory has for our grasp of the literary text.

6.5 Theoretical implications

I have suggested that the lexical pragmatic approach to word meaning has the potential to be highly revealing in relation to aesthetic meaning and the widespread use of parallelism in verbal art. Whilst Jakobson and the other formalists were by no means quite as blind to the significance of the context as is sometimes assumed, they simply did not have the pragmatic tools that are available today to contribute to the interpretation and evaluation of the structural parallels they could document. Of course, the examples I have provided are themselves decontextualised. In each case, there will be a host of other contextual factors that come into play, both in terms of the text itself and the cognitive environment of the particular reader. Any theoretical discussion of the cognitive processes involved in inferencing needs to isolate the relevant assumptions and premises for the sake of illustration. Such discussion should not then be taken to imply that any “real life” utterance is confined to just those assumptions, premises or inferences. Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is not to provide a new reading of a given text, or to document an extant reading in the terms of a particular theory. Rather this chapter seeks to draw attention to the explanatory power of one aspect of contemporary lexical pragmatics in relation to verbal art, and to examine its theoretical implications, to which I now turn.

Contemporary lexical pragmatics argues that considerable pragmatic work is involved in the establishment of what is explicitly said in any act of communication. One theoretical implication of this is a rejection of the traditional notion that there is “meaning” and then there is the style in which that meaning is conveyed, like a kind of garment that “clothes” the meaning. Few in stylistics today would entertain such a naive approach, but it was an assumption in Ohmann’s (1964) use of early generative theory to capture distinctions in style (see Leech & Short 2007: Chapter 1, for an overview of different approaches to “style”; also Hickey, 2014: pp. 1–12). However we can go further than this, and note that, just as lexical pragmatics undermines the Gricean distinction between a literal explicit “what is said” on the one hand and pragmatic inferencing on the other, so it undermines the distinction between the “description” and the “interpretation” of a literary text that is assumed in, say, Leech (1965) and Fish (1980). Let us assume, as Leech does, that the initial description of the linguistic text prior to “critical interpretation”

includes what Leech terms “cognitive” or “referential” meaning (1965/1970: p. 120), or “all that would be traditionally accounted ‘meaning’ in a non-literary text” (1965/1970: p. 125). In our terms, the initial description therefore includes the kind of meanings represented by explicatures. If pragmatic inferencing is fundamental to the reader’s attempt to grasp a writer’s explicit communication, then aesthetic meaning, or Leech’s “critical interpretation”, is at least partly located in any initial description of the linguistic text. To put this another way, only a linguistic description of the literary text that eschewed any reference to meaning could exclude considerable pragmatic interpretive work on the part of the reader.

Much that might previously have been seen as “connotative” meaning becomes here denotative. It is arguably the connotative meaning of verbal art that leads the student of literature sometimes to suggest that “anything goes” (Furlong, 1996), surely because much of the wider aesthetic meaning is seen as an “add-on”, additional to the core meaning. Within an approach informed by lexical pragmatics, some aspects of “literary meaning” are placed at the core of a text’s explicit meaning. There is here some convergence with cognitive stylistic approaches to meaning, shared also in the rejection of metaphor as a form of semantic deviation. Where the theories part company is in the claims that are made about cognitive structures.

In a fresh attempt to define the “literary” in linguistic terms, Louw (2007) rejects Jakobson’s characterisation of the poetic function as being centred in parallelism because some literary forms, such as the haiku, are simply too small to exhibit parallelism. He maintains instead that the defining feature of the poetic function dwells within the domain of collocational meaning. The key tools for the stylistician are therefore the corpus and the concordancer which provide the crucial evidence of a word’s collocational associations via the nine-word window of immediate co-text. This enables the stylistician to document the true meanings of words, but he argues that it is an awareness of this same adjacency that is employed by the literary author who modulates and constrains meaning through exploitation of that same immediate adjacency.

Louw’s claim is regarding syntactic parallelism (2007: p. 154); clearly even the smallest of poetic forms may exhibit phonological parallelism. Louw’s case in favour of collocational meaning and the usefulness of the concordancer is well-made, but a problem lies in the fact that the window of text provided by the concordancer is inadequate for capturing the nuanced meanings derived from larger parallel structures. Indeed, if collocational meaning defined by relatively immediate adjacency were all that characterised the poetic function, we should expect verbal art around the world to be characterised by nothing more than word clusters rather than the parallel patterns that are so prevalent. The mistake is, perhaps, to attempt a definition of the “literary” in terms of the text alone, even if we broaden “text” to include the numerous texts of a corpus.

Simply documenting all the parallel structures in a work of verbal art ignores the reader's sense of the relative significance of different parallels, as Leech (1965) observed in his critique of Jakobson. But Louw's rejection of parallelism altogether as constitutive of the poetic form neglects the larger structures that the reader encounters in verbal art and which contribute to their inferred meanings. At the other extreme from this textual focus, Fish (1980) demonstrated in his classroom that *any* text could be a "literary" text if students were told to treat it as such; his point was that there is nothing inherent about a text that makes it a "literary" text. However, the sense of the literary, involving both a text and the reader's approach to it, can be captured by a reader-orientated stylistics that documents the pragmatic processes employed by the reader. Literary pragmatics provides the tools to encompass both the way in which we approach the text as an instance of verbal art *and* the meanings we infer from it.

6.6 Summary

This chapter discussed parallelism in the light of recent developments in pragmatics. It briefly reviewed the argument that a substantial degree of pragmatic work is required on the part of the hearer/reader in constructing and enriching the core meaning of an utterance (the Gricean "what is said", or the explicature in relevance theory), before examining what that brings to our understanding of parallelism. It noted the power of a linguistic theory with underlying structure in accurately documenting both strict and loose parallelism before examining some examples of literary parallelism in the stylistics literature. Observing how the meanings of words and phrases may not only be disambiguated by the parallel context but also adjusted in subtle nuanced ways, it argued that such adjusted representations should no longer be seen as a literary 'addition' to some literal, plain meaning. Rather, many such "poetic effects" derived from the parallel structure are present in the explicature.

This chapter has sought to return parallelism in verbal art back to a position of importance by demonstrating that it is not a literary addition to the explicit or the literal "what is said" but may be fundamental to the communication of meaning.

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A. Appendix

The force that through the green fuse drives the flower
 Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of trees
 Is my destroyer.
 And I am dumb to tell the crooked rose
 My youth is bent by the same wintry fever.

The force that drives the water through the rocks
 Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams
 Turns mine to wax.
 And I am dumb to mouth unto my veins
 How at the mountain spring the same mouth sucks.

The hand that whirls the water in the pool
 Stirs the quicksand; that ropes the blowing wind
 Hauls my shroud sail.
 And I am dumb to tell the hanging man
 How of my clay is made the hangman's lime.

The lips of time leech to the fountain head;
 Love drips and gathers, but the fallen blood
 Shall calm her sores.
 And I am dumb to tell a weather's wind
 How time has ticked a heaven round the stars.
 And I am dumb to tell the lover's tomb
 How at my sheet goes the same crooked worm. (Thomas, 2014: p. 43)

“Lazy reading” and “half-formed things”

Indeterminacy and responses to Eimear McBride’s *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*

Billy Clark

7.1 Introduction

This chapter considers how ideas developed within relevance theory can be applied in accounting for different kinds of responses to Eimear McBride’s novel *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*.¹ The discussion here focuses on the opening of the novel, using this to illustrate difficulties posed for readers by the novel as a whole and to consider how different ways of responding to these difficulties can lead to different kinds of responses.

McBride’s novel is a challenging text which raises issues for pragmatic theories as well as for readers, since it is hard to establish what it explicitly and implicitly communicates. Some readers (including, significantly, some critics and judges for literary awards) have responded positively to the novel. Others (including many literary agents and publishers) have done so negatively. Some readers report beginning with a negative reaction and then becoming more positive. This chapter suggests that ideas developed within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 2015) can help us to understand how texts differ as well as how readers respond differently to specific texts, including McBride’s novel.

The chapter begins by outlining some features of the novel, its publishing history, and different kinds of responses. It then considers some of the pragmatic processes involved in interpreting all texts and introduces ideas from relevance theory which will be used in the later discussion. These concern indeterminacies and the pragmatic processes involved in understanding what texts convey explicitly (seen

1. I am grateful for helpful feedback and discussion to Siobhan Chapman, John Mullan, and to audiences at the Poetics and Linguistics Association conference in Cagliari in 2016, the International Pragmatics Association in Belfast in 2017, the Stylistics Circle in London in 2016, and research seminars at Middlesex University and Sheffield Hallam University.

as partly implicit by many pragmatic theories, including relevance theory), what they communicate implicitly (implicatures), varying degrees of “spontaneousness” (as discussed by Furlong, 1996, 2007, 2011), and the open-ended and ongoing nature of interpretations. The chapter considers how each of these are relevant to understanding and characterising varying responses to McBride’s novel, relating this discussion to an informal characterisation of reading processes suggested in an interview with McBride by the critic and literary scholar John Mullan.

7.2 *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*

A Girl is a Half-formed Thing is about a girl’s experience, starting from before she is born, told in a style which immerses readers in her experience.² Here is the opening of the novel:

For you. You’ll soon. You’ll give her name. In the stitches of her skin she’ll wear your say. Mammy me? Yes you. Bounce the bed, I’d say. I’d say that’s what you did. Then lay you down. They cut you round. Wait and hour and day.

Walking up corridors up the stairs. Are you alright? Will you sit, he says. No. I want she says. I want to see my son. Smell from dettol through her skin. Mops diamond floor tiles all as strong. All the burn your eyes out if you had some. Her heart going pat. Going dum dum dum. Don’t mind me she’s going to your room. See the. Jesus. What have they done? Jesus. Bile for. Tiduals burn. Ssssh. All over. Mother. She cries. Oh no. Oh no no no. (McBride, 2013: p. 2)

This is a difficult novel in at least two senses: first, it is hard for readers to process the text and understand what exactly is happening at particular points in the story; second, it presents a series of events which are traumatic and disturbing. One of the most salient features of the novel is its “fractured language”. The text consists largely of short sentences and fragments, with little guidance to help readers resolve indeterminacies about propositions expressed. This style has led to comparisons with work by Joyce (who McBride has explicitly referred to as an influence), Faulkner and Beckett, among others (see, for example, Wood, 2014).³

The book divided readers as soon as it had any. It took nine years to find a publisher, eventually succeeding after McBride approached the independent

2. The discussion here does not reveal much of the content of the book. For a very useful discussion, including of its writing, editing and reception, see Collard (2016), which the discussion here draws on for several points.

3. Arguably, the linguistic similarity to Beckett’s prose fiction is greater than to Joyce’s, given features such as the large amount of punctuation in the text.

publisher Galley Beggar Press, based near her home at the time in Norwich. Until then, responses from agents and publishers were negative or lukewarm. As Collard points out, some readers in these organisations made positive comments even when reaching negative decisions. He writes (Collard, 2016: p. 21, “What was particularly exasperating was the often positive quality of the negative responses. In one case somebody scrawled across a standard rejection letter ‘*I suppose this is some kind of masterpiece.*’” After publication, it still took some time for the book to receive significant positive responses. A key one came in a review by the writer Anne Enright in *The Guardian* (Enright, 2013). She described the book as “an instant classic”, “hard to read for the best reasons: everything about it is intense and difficult and hard-won” (Enright, 2013). She described McBride as a genius. After quoting the opening lines, she said, “If this kind of thing bores or frightens you, then there are many other wonderful books out there for you to enjoy. The adventurous reader, however, will find that they have a real book on their hands, a live one, a book that is not like any other”.

Significantly, judges for important literary prizes responded positively. Collard quotes Caitlin Moran’s description of her response when reading the book for the 2014 Bailey’s Prize, which the book won. After commenting that Moran “muddled her metaphors”, Collard quotes her as saying, “Ten pages in and all the bells start ringing. It explodes into your chest” (Collard, 2016: p. 27). This reported move from a more negative to a more positive attitude echoes one reported by the novelist Elizabeth McCracken, a family friend, who described her reaction when reading a draft manuscript:

I knew she’d been working on a book – she called it her beast – and when she was finished she’d asked me to read it. I took it nervously ... And for the first page and a half I thought, Oh dear, no, too self-conscious, what a shame. Then about halfway down the second page, my brain figured it out and *the book had me*, and I realised that the prose was the opposite of self-conscious: it just took my self-conscious brain that long to give itself over to the language.

(quoted by Collard, 2016: p. 22)

The book still divides readers. In March 2018, Amazon reviews reflected the range of positive and negative responses, as well as some in-between. The average score was 3 out of 5 stars. Here are three examples (a positive one, a negative one, also mentioned by Collard, and an “in-between”):

All three of these, like many other reviews, mention the difficulties in reading the book. Some of the positive ones, like the one from “Laurenevie”, suggest that it is worth expending the effort to get to the stage where readers begin to enjoy it (if they do).

★★★★★ **Raw, Beautiful and Vulnerable**By [Laureneville](#) on 27 November 2017Format: Paperback | [Verified Purchase](#)

McBride has quickly become one of my favourite authors. Her style of writing really is like no other to me, and though her books take a while to get into, they're really worth the initial persistence. This one tells the story of a young girls relationship with her brother, who suffers from a brain tumour. It's told in the same stream of consciousness style that McBride is so brilliant at, and is just as raw, beautiful and vulnerable as *The Lesser Bohemians* was to me. I just adore the way that McBride writes her characters - in this completely open way where no thought is censored. I loved this book.

☆☆☆☆☆ **i hated almost every minute**By [Empress](#) on 27 November 2015Format: Kindle Edition | [Verified Purchase](#)

so so so awful. i hated almost every minute. pretty sure all the awards are a result of the emperor's new clothes syndrome, as if you rewrote it in English you'd find neither the plot nor the characters interesting, as it is though it's written in pathetic fragments which, painful enough the first time, you are forced to reread far too often because (surprise surprise) the meaning is often lost when you dispense with grammar and half the words you need to say something. felt like marking a never ending self indulgent melodramatic and boring essay by an illiterate teenager with delusions of grandeur. thank god it's over and thank god [spoiler] in the end. what a waste of money. stay far far far away.

★★★★☆ **A book with a half-formed plot**By [Barry Bootle](#) on 14 May 2015Format: Paperback | [Verified Purchase](#)

I was really looking forward to this one, what with all the lavish praise that's been heaped on it, the awards it's received, and the backstory. The last is probably familiar to most of us by now, but just in case you haven't heard it, here it is; McBride searched in vain for a publisher for years, was rejected again and again (with one publisher stating it was "probably a masterpiece" but that it wouldn't find a large enough readership to make it commercially viable), and was finally taken up by Galley Beggar, a small independent. The general consensus seems to be that the UK publishing scene is overly timid, too driven by financial sensibilities, needs it's head read, etc. Well, all these things are probably true. But is the book a masterpiece? For me, probably not.

That's not to say it doesn't contain some masterful moments. The opening chapter, where the unnamed (and as yet unborn) narrator speaks to her older brother is dazzling. Throughout the novel, the portrayal of the relationship between the two is tremendously affecting, and wonderfully well done. The rest of the plot, though, could lifted straight from Irish literature's central casting. Abusive mother? Check. Damp house? Check? Fire-and-brimstone grandfather? Check. Pervert uncle? Check. Lashings of Catholic guilt? Check. Sodomy? Check. (The last seems de rigueur for any modern literature pertaining to be serious, although to McBride's credit, she doesn't attempt to describe it in any particularly hifalutin way, as others, naming no names, have done). I found it all a bit of a melange of misery-lit clichés, and rather wearing. OK, plot is not the most important thing in literary fiction, but if you are going to have one, make it a good one.

My greatest issue, however, is with the style. Stream of consciousness writing works brilliantly (when done well) when it's of the moment, descriptive of the half-formed thoughts we all have, before they coalesce into cogent speech - the closest writing can get, in fact, to depicting how life really feels. And when McBride does it for scenes which are set in the moment, in real time, it is indeed brilliant. But the format doesn't work for, say, describing the passage of several days in a few lines (describing starting a new school, for example, she says "I be the new girl" - why?), and it's problematic to sustain it for an entire novel, set over the course of twenty-odd years. It comes across as dislocated and, at times (sorry to say) pretentious.

I'm not disputing that McBride has huge talent, but I fear proclamations of genius may be premature. I for one will reserve judgement until I see what she does next.

Figure 1. Three online reviews on Amazon's page for *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*, downloaded 5 April 2018. <https://www.amazon.co.uk/Girl-Half-formed-Thing-Eimear-McBride-ebook/dp/B00JID6Y5K/>

One way of thinking about readers, then, would be to allocate them to one of three groups: those with consistently positive responses; those with consistently negative ones; those (like Moran and McCracken mentioned above) who respond negatively at first and then become more positive. What are the features of the novel which lead to these different responses? Collard makes a number of useful comments on this, pointing out that the difficulties come not from the vocabulary, which is very simple, or the length of sentences, which are generally short, but from opaqueness about what is happening, who is speaking or thinking, and what they are thinking or saying. He discusses the opening passage and presents evidence indicating that McBride's style is careful and controlled, with attention paid to linguistic and structural details. He also identifies strengths of the book (which he suggests are reasons for positive responses) in the texture and clarity of the presentation of characters and events. He discusses McBride's own description of her approach as "method writing" (she was trained in Stanislavskian method acting at the Drama Centre in London) and suggests that she has been very successful in creating "real" characters on the page, in representing what the girl in the book is experiencing and in helping readers to feel that they are sharing these experiences. He characterises what the prose represents as "[s]tream of

pre-conscious” and “an attempt . . . to represent thought at the point immediately *before* it becomes articulate speech, before it is ordered into rational utterance” (Collard, 2016: pp. 205–206). He says:

Her use of language is unique and her heavily punctuated “ungrammatical” prose may alarm some readers but . . . The eye and mind soon adjust to the rhythmic syncopations of the words on the page and something quite extraordinary happens, something uncanny and practically alchemical. I can only put it like this: *the book begins to read us*. What happens to the anonymous girl is never described *to* the reader but directly experienced *by* the reader. (Collard, 2016: p. 27)

There is no space for a detailed linguistic analysis here. This would, of course, involve identifying formal features and effects, and offering an account of how the former lead to the latter. Instead, this chapter aims to identify some aspects of the pragmatics of the text (the inferences readers make when reading, and how these vary among individuals) and to suggest how these contribute both to some of its effects and to different kinds of responses. The next section identifies some kinds of inferences which readers (and listeners and viewers) always make, and ways in which interpretations can be seen as indeterminate and open-ended. These ideas are then applied in considering how to account for different kinds of responses to the novel.

7.3 Pragmatics and indeterminacy

Like many other pragmatic theories which have developed from the ideas of Paul Grice (1975), relevance theory assumes a greater role for pragmatic inference in accounting for communication than Grice envisaged. This section considers some assumptions made within relevance theory, about the scope of pragmatics and the kinds of inferences we make, which will be referred to when discussing how to account for reader responses below.

7.3.1 Explicatures and implicatures

Along with other approaches, work in relevance theory has assumed that pragmatic principles guide inferences about directly communicated explicatures as well as about indirectly communicated implicatures (see, for example, Wilson and Sperber, 1981; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2004). In understanding an utterance of the expression in (1), for example, we need to work out (infer) the referent of *that* and the intended sense of *soft*.

- (1) That’s soft.

We can demonstrate that these are context-dependent and that pragmatic principles can play a role in making these inferences by imagining different linguistic and other contexts in which they might be uttered.

- (2) A: This jumper's made of merino wool. Feel it.
 B: Wow! That's soft.
- (3) A: We only give an informal warning the first time a student submits coursework after the deadline.
 B: Wow! That's soft!

In the exchange in (2), we are likely to infer that speaker B is expressing her opinion that the (wool used to make the) jumper feels soft in that it is smooth and pleasant to touch. In (3), we are likely to infer that B thinks the policy on late coursework submission is not very strict. We can account for this not only by referring to assumptions about the context but also by referring to an account of pragmatic inference which explains what guides interpretations.⁴

Relevance theory is in line with other approaches to pragmatics in assuming that there is more to infer in working out what speakers communicate directly than simply disambiguation and reference assignment (including time reference). Other things which need to be inferred include narrowing and broadening of lexical meanings, the recovery of ellipsed material, assumptions about attitudes to propositions conveyed, assumptions about who is entertaining or saying what the utterance represents, and possible metaphorical or ironic interpretations.

As well as inferring explicatures, readers will aim to infer implicatures of the text. The two interact, of course, and a key idea in relevance theory is that inferences about these affect each other in a process of "mutual parallel adjustment". Relevance theory assumes a large amount of indeterminacy here, both with regard to whether particular acts are intentionally communicative and with regard to what they convey.

For methodological and pedagogical reasons, discussion of these ideas often begins with fairly straightforward exchanges such as (4):

- (4) A: Do you fancy going to the pictures tomorrow night?
 B: My parents are coming round tomorrow.

Most people will agree that key implicatures here are that B cannot go to the pictures and that this is because her parents are visiting and so she can't go out. Once we have developed an account of relatively straightforward cases like this,

4. Wilson (2018) takes the existence of inferences about explicit content as one piece of evidence that readers must consider the intentions of authors at least at this level (i.e. as a partial response to claims that authorial intentions are not relevant in literary interpretation and criticism).

we can go on to consider how things change in more complex ones. Recent work in pragmatics assumes considerable complexity even in what seem to be fairly straightforward exchanges.

Sperber and Wilson (2015) discuss the following example:

- (5) *Passenger*: What time is the next train to Oxford?
Railway official: 12.48. (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: p. 121)

They suggest that, if the railway official speaks “in a neutral tone of voice and with an impersonal facial expression”, then it would be reasonable to paraphrase this utterance as communicating only that the next train to Oxford leaves at 12.48. However, small changes in the official’s behaviour could introduce some indeterminacy:

Add an urgent tone of voice or a warning look, and although his assertion would remain the same, part of the intended import would be rather less determinate: he might be implicating, for instance, that the train is about to leave, that the seats are filling up fast, that the platform is further away than the passenger might have thought, that the passenger’s estimated walking speed may not be enough to get her there on time, and so on. In that case, his meaning would be partly precise and partly vague. (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: p. 121)

They go on to suggest that interpretations are generally more or less determinate rather than simply determinate or not. This relates to the idea, developed within relevance theory, that communication can be stronger or weaker, i.e. that communicative acts can convey a narrower or broader range of possible conclusions with more or less certainty that each is intentionally communicated. For example, speaker B in the exchange in (4) communicates strongly that she cannot go to the pictures the following evening and that this is because of the visit of her parents. At the same time, this utterance also provides evidence for other conclusions, such as that B will need to prepare for the visit, that B’s parents care about B, and so on. Each of these is less strongly communicated than the key implicature about not being able to go to the pictures.

Some utterances convey a relatively wide range of relatively weak implicatures and this has been applied in accounting for poetic effects. There are, of course, countless examples to illustrate this in lyric and other poetry, fiction, drama, and other genres. Pilkington (1992, 2000: pp. 102–104) discusses Seamus Heaney’s poem *Digging* (which first appeared in Heaney 1966) and in particular the final line “*I’ll dig with it*” where “*it*” refers to the pen belonging to the poet in the poem and we have a wide range of possible paths to explore in considering what “*dig*” means in this context.

Another part of the process of reading will involve inferences about different layers of communication in fictional discourse. At one discourse level, characters

convey explicatures and implicatures to each other. At another, authors show characters communicating in order to convey other explicatures and implicatures to readers.⁵ There are, of course, a larger number of potential levels of communication. One salient feature of McBride's novel is that it is often difficult to know the status of propositions expressed. Readers are not always able to identify who is thinking or speaking the thoughts or utterances they represent. Clearly, readers struggle to complete a wide range of the inferential tasks involved in arriving at explicatures and implicatures conveyed by McBride's novel.

7.3.2 Open-endedness and spontaneousness

Pragmatic processes are open-ended in the sense that communicators and addressees can choose to go on to think further about what they or others have said or done. Interpretation processes can extend over time and new potential conclusions can be inferred. When speakers reformulate their utterances, this shows that they have been thinking about inferences others might make based on them. Here is a fictional example from the film *Nanny McPhee* (2005, dir. Kirk Jones):

(6) That was my idea! (pause) I mean my fault.

The naughty children in the film have played a series of tricks on guests at a tea party (including putting worms in sandwiches and a toad in the teapot). A cake has just exploded over their intimidating relative Aunt Adelaide. In (6), the speaker, Sebastian, corrects his formulation after thinking about how she is likely to react.

Hearers provide evidence of continuing to think about utterances when they change their mind about an interpretation ("actually, maybe he didn't mean it in that way") or come up with something they wish they had said at the time (termed "*l'esprit de l'escalier*" in French, referring to situations where someone might be halfway down a staircase when thinking of an appropriate response to something which happened upstairs).

Furlong (1996, 2007, 2011) has considered how interpretations can be more or less spontaneous in the sense that addressees can spend more or less time and effort in considering evidence for interpretations. This began as an exploration of what is involved in "literary" interpretations which often involve relative non-spontaneousness. These tend to involve greater time and effort in considering evidence for and against possible readings than other kinds of interpretative practices. Furlong points out, however, that relative non-spontaneousness in this sense is not necessarily linked with literary interpretation.

5. For an early discussion of this, see Leech and Short (1981: pp. 237–254).

Key points suggested by Furlong are that speakers and interpretations vary with regard to how spontaneous they are, that it is always possible to expend further time and effort in thinking about these, and that expending further time and effort is not something which occurs only in literary interpretation. This is clearly relevant to responses to McBride’s novel. Some readers are willing to expend further effort thinking about what the novel might convey. As indicated above, some of this is the author’s responsibility and some goes beyond that. Readers will also vary in the extent to which they explicitly consider what the author might have intended. Some readers, by contrast, decide quite quickly that they are not prepared to put further effort into looking for interpretations.

7.3.3 “Manifestness”

In their 2015 discussion, Sperber and Wilson focus on the notion of “manifestness” both in considering how their approach is an improvement on Grice’s, particularly with regard to his notion of “speaker’s meaning”, and in considering how interpretations can extend over space and time. They suggest the following definition for “manifestness”: “An assumption is manifest to an individual at a given time to the extent that he is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as true.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: p. 134)

Rather than focusing on assumptions being accessed or not, or aiming to distinguish between those which are “activated” and those which are not, manifestness is seen as a matter of degree. An assumption can be manifest or not since an individual can either be able to entertain it (and accept it as true) or not. At the same time, it can be more or less manifest, since assumptions can be more or less salient and we can be more or less likely to entertain particular ones. As I type this, I am able to entertain assumptions about the current weather, whether or not I attend to evidence about this, but I am not able to entertain assumptions about the weather in places I have no information about. Some assumptions are highly manifest to me, including ones about the notion of manifestness which I am entertaining as I type. A range of others are manifest to varying degrees. There are some which I can entertain quickly if I see a need to (e.g. about whose offices are next door to mine on each side). There are others which would require more time and effort (e.g. about whose offices are four doors down from me on each side).

As well as avoiding problems with the notion of “knowledge” (discussed more fully in Sperber and Wilson, 1986), this approach differs from Grice’s in not assuming that communication is always about inducing beliefs. The notion of manifestness is used in defining a “cognitive environment” (the set of assumptions which are manifest to an individual at a given time) and communication is seen as being about adjusting the “mutual cognitive environments” of interlocutors, i.e. the sets

of assumptions which are mutually manifest at a given time. Sperber and Wilson point out that “a given time” may refer to a shorter or longer period. Building on this, they propose a view of communication as being about making assumptions more or less manifest rather than about causing others to entertain them or not. This relates, of course, to the notion of stronger and weaker communication mentioned above. Some utterances strongly communicate a relatively small number of assumptions fairly strongly. Others communicate a wider range, each of which is communicated more weakly. Sperber and Wilson (2015) show how this idea can help to account for the communication of impressions. They consider two ways of describing what happens when an individual (“Robert”) opens his window to check the weather and decides to cancel his plans to go for a walk. One possible explanation refers to perception, premises and “practical inference”:

We might be tempted to say that, on the basis of his perceptions, he has formed new beliefs and used them as premises in a practical inference. Which new beliefs? Well, maybe the belief that the sky is grey and the air is quite cold, that it is therefore likely to rain, and that the weather is not right for taking a walk.
(Sperber and Wilson, 2015: p. 136)

They suggest an alternative account:

When Robert opened the window, an array of propositions became manifest or more manifest to him, in the sense characterised above: they became more likely to be attended to, and more likely to be taken as true, than they had been before, and were therefore more likely to influence his decision. He may have been aware of this increase in the manifestness of an array of propositions, and of their general drift, without entertaining all of them, and maybe even without entertaining any of them as a distinct proposition, except for the practical conclusion that he would not go for a walk.
(Sperber and Wilson, 2015: p. 137)

They suggest that the second account is more plausible and that, “[a]rguably, the vast majority of inferences made by humans and other animals” do not involve explicit reasoning but are close to the second account described above.

The notions that assumptions can be communicated more or less strongly and that interpretation can continue over an extended period of time are both clearly relevant to an account of McBride’s novel. Readers often have very little evidence for particular assumptions and of course they can continue to explore possible interpretations for extended periods of time. As with other texts, the interpretation process can be more or less intermittent or continuous and the changes in readers’ cognitive environments more or less salient (i.e. manifest).

Relevance theory, then, offers a particular way of understanding interpretation processes as open-ended and indeterminate. There is not always a clear distinction

between intentionally communicative and non-communicative behaviour and assumptions. There is not always a clear moment at which interpretation processes stop. Interpretations can be more or less extended and more or less spontaneous. It is not always clear when an interpreter has gone beyond what the communicator intended and is deriving conclusions on their own initiative. It is always possible for interpreters to choose to spend further time and effort considering potential interpretations. The adjustment of the manifestness of assumptions can carry on for an indefinite period of time with varying degrees of salience and explicitness. All of these points are relevant to considering how readers respond to *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*.

The rest of this chapter considers how this approach can account for some of the differences between readers who respond positively to McBride’s novel and those who do so negatively. A key idea is that this has to do with different ways in which readers respond to the considerable indeterminacy in the novel. Some abandon the book. Others continue and some go on to respond positively to it. A key aspect of positive responses, I will argue, is that such readers continue to read the book while accepting that many inferences they would usually expect to make have not been completed. In other words, key parts of the expected interpretation processes are only partially complete (“half-formed” is too precise but can be understood as a loose characterisation).

7.4 “Lazy” readings and other responses

In September 2016, the critic and literary scholar John Mullan interviewed Eimear McBride for the Guardian book club (<https://membership.theguardian.com/event/book-club-with-eimear-mcbride-26195584699>). During the discussion, he pointed out that it is possible for readers of the novel to work out who referents are, whose voice is responsible for particular parts, and what exactly is happening at each point in the book. He suggested, and McBride agreed, that evidence is available for readers to work out the answers to these questions if they put in the effort to do so. He said that he sometimes did this himself when reading McBride’s novel but said that, “. . . sometimes I was just lazy”. We might ask what is involved in reading processes of the type which Mullan described (informally and in passing) as “lazy” and what is involved in the kinds of more “analytical” and careful processes he says he sometimes carried out, i.e. ones where readers work harder to identify referents, speakers, thinkers and so on. What is a reader doing sentence by sentence if they go to the effort of establishing referents, establishing who is

“saying” each sentence, and so on? We might also ask what exactly the more “lazy” readings involve and how they might differ from this?⁶

This is, of course, related to the question of what readers who give up and/or have negative responses are doing. Are their practices more towards the “lazy” or more towards the more “analytical” end of the spectrum? And to what extent do positive responses tend to be associated with more “lazy” or more “analytical” readings? The suggestion here will be that many of the positive readers (like McCracken, Moran and Collard who report effects using phrases like Collard’s “the book begins to read us”) do not go to extra effort to assign referents, decide who is speaking or thinking, etc. At the same time, entertaining incomplete representations involves effort and so “lazy” is not really an appropriate term.

Mullan’s implied “non-lazy” reading strategy seems to be a fairly non-spontaneous one (in Furlong’s sense) and something which is not typical of everyday readers. It is more likely to be carried out by literary scholars and sometimes under the heading of “close reading”.⁷ More significantly, though, this process might be going against what McBride intended and reduce the likelihood of a positive response. It might even be a way of being a “resisting reader” not in the sense in which this is usually understood (developed from the feminist critical approach of Fetterley, 1978), i.e. by resisting or critically responding to cultural or ideological assumptions in the text, but in the more general sense of treating the text in a way the author did not intend. Evidence for this was also provided in Mullan’s interview. He asked about the lack of proper names in the book. McBride answered that this was one of her strategies for reducing “distance” between the girl and readers. Giving characters names would make it easier to represent them as separate from readers and to take a more detached view. Arguably, then, she had in mind a reading process closer to the “lazy” than the more analytical kind.

This chapter is not intended to raise issues about author intentions and their relation to reading practices but to consider different kinds of reading processes

6. In a conversation in May 2018, Mullan told me that his main aim in making his comment was to support McBride’s practice by making clear that there was a sense in which there ‘is a logic’ to what she has written and so to provide evidence against claims that her writing style in this novel is pretentious or unmotivated.

7. “Close reading” is, of course, a problematic term which is understood in a variety of ways. It has been much discussed by literary scholars. While literary scholars moved away from close reading practices for some time, there has been increased interest and increased practice describable in this way in recent years. This was the topic of a symposium at Middlesex University in London in 2017 (<https://londonenglish.live/2017/05/09/symposium-on-close-reading-13th-june-2017/>). For a recent discussion of the history of literary criticism which describes the general move towards historical-contextualist work and argues for a move away from this (and ‘back’ towards approaches which include close textual analysis), see North (2017).

and their effects. Without trying to characterise all of the practices which readers might follow, and taking a very broad approach for now, we might loosely characterize three ways of interacting with the novel as: trying to understand it but then giving up; “analytical” reading processes, which involve taking the time to search all clues, identify referents, work out who is speaking and thinking, etc.; and “lazy” reading processes which involve continuing with the novel without arriving at conclusions about referents, speakers, thinkers, etc.

The next section considers how the ideas from relevance theory discussed above can help us to understand the nature of the text and different kinds of responses to it, including “lazier” and more analytical ones, and a suggestion about what happens when an initially negative reader becomes more positive.

7.5 Accounting for varying responses

How can we develop an account of what different readers do when reading *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing* (or any text)? A natural assumption would be that we work through the text identifying at each point what is linguistically encoded by each expression and a range of different ways in which readers might build on linguistically encoded meanings to arrive at fuller interpretations in context. At this point, we can look for patterns which might relate to different kinds of responses.

There are several problems with this approach. First, it assumes an idealised account of linguistic processing, arguably far removed from what readers actually do. It is not an assumption of relevance theory (nor of at least some other theories) that “semantic representations”, understood as stable representations of what is linguistically encoded by an expression, have a real psychological status in online processing, or that they are represented by interpreters. Rather, interpreters move quickly from the prompts supplied by linguistically encoded meanings to interpretative pathways which lead them to develop interpretations in context. For example, using the convention that items in square brackets represent material which needs to be pragmatically inferred, and simplifying considerably, we might represent the linguistically encoded meaning of the expression *you can* as follows:

- (7) a. *Linguistic expression:*
You can.
- b. *Semantic representation:*
[someone is representing the proposition that] EITHER [somebody is able to] OR [someone is permitted to] [do something] [at some time or in some circumstances]

Of course, no hearer or reader of an utterance of (7a) would actually represent

something like (7b). Rather, they would begin looking for an interpretation of the utterance as soon as (in some cases, earlier than) they hear or read the beginning of it. So they would begin to make assumptions about who is saying or thinking the thought represented right away, and also look for a referent of *you*, and so on. There are, of course, occasions where an interpreter might end up with a thought like (7b) but this would likely be a post-hoc process building on earlier processes involving assigning a referent to *you*, etc.

Furthermore, it is not clear that interpreters represent all of the implicatures of an utterance as fully propositional thoughts. Imagine, for example, that (8) is uttered (with stress on the first syllable *you*) in the exchange below:

- (8) A: Who do you think should introduce the keynote speaker at the conference?
 B: YOU can.

A is likely to infer that B is saying that B will not object to A introducing the speaker and possibly that B wants A to do it. This could but need not involve a stage of understanding that B is saying that A has B's permission to do this (whose status as explicature or implicature will depend on the particular theoretical approach adopted). Implicatures of B's utterance could include any of the list in (9), as well as others not listed here:

- (9) a. B won't be offended if A introduces the keynote speaker.
 b. B wants A to introduce the speaker.
 c. B has no strong desire to introduce the keynote speaker.
 d. B does not want to introduce the keynote speaker.
 e. B thinks A will do a good job of introducing the keynote speaker.

A is unlikely to access each of these, and may reject some, but B's utterance provides at least weak evidence for each of them. A's actually entertaining any one of them is not a requirement for it to count as an implicature. (9e), for example, might occur to A at some later stage or only when something prompts it, e.g. if somebody else wonders whether B would be good at tasks like this. This, of course, relates to the ideas about manifestness discussed above, with interpretation processes extending over space and time and assumptions becoming manifest to greater or lesser degrees as time passes.

Given these uncertainties, could it still be possible to characterise different kinds of responses among readers and different kinds of texts? Despite the issues just mentioned, this section suggests ways of beginning to do this.⁸ It begins by

8. For ways of working with participants to explore inferences, see Clark (1996), Durant (1998). For another way of representing the relative complexity of inferences, see Clark (2009).

considering inferences readers are likely to make about various kinds of indeterminacies in the novel, including about explicatures and implicatures, possibilities for developing more or less spontaneous interpretations, and how interpretations can extend and continue to be developed over time. For each of these, it suggests an initial characterization of how a “lazy” reader might respond to these indeterminacies and what a more “analytical” reader might do. Finally, it makes a suggestion about how “lazy” readings differ overall from others and how this relates to varying responses to the novel. The suggestion is that the difference between “lazy” and less lazy readers is that the former carry on reading while not having found ways of resolving many of these indeterminacies. This means that they continue reading with a wide range of possible explicatures and implicatures becoming more or less manifest as they read on and think about the book. This process is far from “lazy” overall since the interpretation as a whole is complex and so are the continuing effects of interpretations at each stage. This interpretative experience is closer to how we respond to the world in general than the experience of reading much prose fiction.

7.5.1 Explicit content

In responding to any text, readers aim to identify what the text explicitly conveys. This is often difficult at the start of a piece of prose fiction where we have not yet been introduced to characters or situations. Here, for example, is the beginning of Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment*, a novel not seen as particularly challenging for twenty-first century readers:

- (10) On an exceptionally hot evening early in July a young man came out of the garret in which he lodged in S. Place and walked slowly, as though in hesitation, towards K. Bridge.

(Dostoevsky, /1994, orig. 1866, p. 2)

When we first begin reading, we do not know when or where these events take place and we know little about the young man. We discover that the place is Petersburg early in the chapter (on the same page of this edition) and we find out more about the young man as the story develops. This amount of uncertainty at first is not unusual and is unlikely to make readers uncomfortable as we are used to finding out more about characters and situations as we read through novels.⁹

9. Of course, Dostoevsky’s narrative technique, with a 3rd person omniscient’ narrator sharing the perspective of characters in the novel (mainly, the central character Raskolnikov, but shifting closer to that of other characters in various places) was innovative at the time.

Novels vary with regard to how much clarity there is in opening passages, with some clearer than others. As the opening passage (quoted at the start of this chapter) demonstrates, McBride's novel is extremely challenging, with significantly more uncertainty than Dostoevsky's novel. We do not know who *you*, *her*, *me* or *I* refer to. We cannot be sure whether each occurrence of these pronouns refers to the same person. We do not know who is speaking or thinking the utterance or thought represented by each sentence. There are uncertainties about the propositions represented by each sentence (e.g. what will the referent of *you* soon do?) Another difference is that Dostoevsky soon provides ways of helping us to resolve the indeterminacies. McBride, by contrast, provides readers with little help and we develop our understanding of characters much more slowly.

Here is an attempt to represent the linguistically encoded meanings of the expressions in just the first six sentences of the paragraph (without indicating here the parts which need to be pragmatically inferred):

- (11) Linguistic semantics of the opening of *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*.
- a. someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which says that something is "for" in some sense the referent of *you* at some time or in some circumstances
 - b. someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which says that the referent of *you* will soon do something at some time or in some circumstances
 - c. someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which says that the referent of *you* will "give name" in some sense to the referent of *her* at some time or in some circumstances
 - d. someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which says that the referent of *she* will "wear the say" in some sense of the referent of *you* at some time or in some circumstances
 - e. someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which indicates that they are asking a question "mammy me?" at some time or in some circumstances
 - f. someone is thinking or saying "yes you" and so possibly confirming to the previous person that they will indeed be "giving name" to "her"

While it is, of course, logically possible that a reader might only get this far, it is generally accepted that we always make at least some pragmatic inferences even when we only overhear other people's conversations accidentally. Even someone who accidentally overheard a reading of this passage would make some further inferences. We might represent a very "shallow" processing of this sequence as follows (with assumptions being made here for illustrative purposes and represented by informal paraphrases):

- (12) Possible "shallow" processing of the opening of *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*:
- someone is saying or thinking that something is for someone they're addressing as "you" in some sense
 - someone is thinking that whoever "you" is will soon do something or telling whoever "you" is that they will soon do something
 - someone is thinking or saying that whoever "you" is will "give name" in some sense to somebody being referred to as "her"
 - someone is thinking or saying that the person who will be given name will "wear the say" of whoever "you" is
 - someone is asking a question "mammy me?," possibly checking that they've understood that they will be "giving name" to "her"
 - someone is entertaining the thought or producing an utterance which says that something is being agreed with about the referent of *you* at some time or in some circumstances

While a reader who only overheard a reading of the passage might stop there, a combination of linguistic semantic knowledge and contextual assumptions is likely to lead them a little further. They are likely to at least consider the possibility that a mother is telling a child ("you") that the child will name somebody ("her").

Readers can be more or less "lazy" at this stage (more realistically, after reading a little further). They might carry on without fleshing things out much more or they might put in more effort, perhaps rereading and thinking about possibilities. An analytical reader who does what Mullan indicates, considering all of the evidence in order to make fairly confident assumptions about who is doing, saying and thinking what, will eventually end up (after considering evidence from later in the novel) with an understanding something like the following:

- (13) More "complete" representation of what happens in the first six sentences of *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*:

From inside the womb, the girl in the title is hearing her mother speak to her brother. (We understand from later events that the brother has been diagnosed with a brain tumour and is about to go through an operation for that). The mother is telling the brother that he will be allowed to choose the name of his sister when she is born. (We infer from later in the novel that this might even be intended as a "prize" or "bribe" since naming his sister will be a kind of "reward" for surviving the operation and getting better). The girl will carry what her brother chooses as a name with her throughout her life as an important part of her self-understanding and identity (making here a fairly sophisticated reading of "in the stitches of her skin she'll wear your say"). The boy checks his understanding (implying that he is surprised and excited by this possibility). The mother confirms that he is right.

Mullan is right that we can go through the entire novel and develop our interpretations like this (more or less “completing” them). It is important to note, though, that (as always) this partly depends on moving forwards and backwards through the novel, either just by thinking about connections or by explicitly moving in both directions. For example, readers are often unable to identify referents and resolve other indeterminacies right at the beginning of a novel, typically assuming that things will become clearer as they read on, sometimes reading ahead for clarification, and sometimes going back to reread passages when things have become clearer.

With regard to explicit content, then, we might characterize relatively “lazy” readings as ones where readers do not go far beyond the interpretation characterised in (12) and do not get close to the representation in (13). Sticking at something like (12) is relatively “lazy” in that the reader does not expend effort in moving forwards and backwards in the text to look for clues and develop their interpretation. Getting closer to (13), however, will mean that less effort is required in understanding later parts of the novel and in deriving implicatures, the topic of the next subsection.

7.5.2 Implicatures

Difficulties in deriving implicatures are, of course, related to indeterminacies about explicit content. If the opening sentences of the novel do not make clear what is for who (“*you*”) when, what “*you*” will do soon, etc., then we cannot derive implicatures on the basis of propositions this passage expresses. What we can do is to entertain a relatively wide range of relatively weak potential implicatures which are supported to varying degrees by different assumptions about explicit content. This means that the interpretations we entertain have something in common with the examples such as the conclusion of Heaney’s poem *Digging* mentioned above. The situation here is harder, of course, as we have less clear indications about the nature of the explicit content.

A situation like this is common in some kinds of poetry, e.g. lyric poetry where readers do not have enough evidence to assign referents to pronouns such as *I* and *you*. This is also often the case with pop song lyrics (for discussion of the effects of pronouns in pop songs and how listeners can make varying assumptions about them, see Durant, 1984: pp. 202–209). Collard (2016: p. 29) comments on poetic aspects of McBride’s prose, including its rhythm (punctuation plays a key role in this, of course). Indeterminacies in explicit content and the associated communication of a wide range of weak implicatures can also be seen as contributing poetic elements of the book.

So what kinds of implicatures might readers of the book entertain with varying degrees of salience and confidence? Characterising these is much harder than for examples such as Heaney's poem *Digging*. Here are just a few potential implicatures we might derive from an initial reading of the opening passage:

- (14) Potential implicatures derivable from a first reading of the opening of *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*:
- a. something must follow from the thought that something is for someone in some sense
 - b. something must follow from the thought someone will soon do something
 - c. maybe they will be happy to do that thing
 - d. maybe they'll be grateful for being able or allowed to do it
 - e. maybe they will be naming someone
 - f. if they name someone, they will feel important in her life
 - g. maybe their mother is saying they can do this
 - h. if so, then the addressee might be grateful to their mother

People who read fiction fairly regularly will be used to initial indeterminacies about referents of pronouns etc. but will not be used to having to wait so long for evidence which can help them identify referents. A "lazy" reader will presumably carry on reading while not being clear about the explicit content and so not being able to make confident hypotheses about which possible implicatures they should continue to entertain. A less "lazy" reader will presumably move forwards and backwards a number of times in order to work out what is going on. Readers who do this will have varying practice with regard to how many pages they reread, how far they go before coming back, and so on. Ultimately, they will be able to come up with clearer interpretations based on more complete representations of explicit content, i.e. with assumptions such as those in (13). When they have done this, they might come up with a different range of implicatures.

- (15) Potential implicatures from a fuller interpretation of the opening of *A Girl is a Half-formed Thing*:
- a. the boy is excited and happy that he is going to name the girl after she is born
 - b. he is grateful to his mother
 - c. being allowed to name the girl is a kind of treat
 - d. naming her will add to the bond between them which we discover later is very close
 - e. being allowed to name the girl is part of a more general set of behaviours in response to the boy's illness and adds to our sense of the mother's desperation and resolve

Implicatures like these are, of course, stronger. Readers can be more confident that the book provides evidence for them. As they continue to derive further implicatures, they will be doing so with a clearer representation of what happens in the book in their mind. At this stage, they might be seen as no longer reading the book McBride wrote but rather working from a representation of what it communicated to them. This is not unusual and readers of all texts will be in this position after they have finished reading a text. I would argue, however, that reading on while still confused about details of what happens in the book, who speaks and thinks what, and so on, is important for readers to experience the book as McBride intended. This thought is behind the suggestion that we might think of “non-lazy” readers as “resistant”.

7.5.3 Spontaneousness

It seems reasonable also to suggest a correlation between “laziness” and spontaneousness, i.e. that “lazy” readers come up with fairly spontaneous interpretations while other readings are less spontaneous. It seems clear that readers who take trouble to assign referents, resolve indeterminacies and work out what is going on in the book are being non-spontaneous. They are following the practice Furlong describes in making greater effort to develop their interpretations. Spontaneous responses are difficult in this case, though, as the indeterminacies in the text are problematic. To some extent, we could argue that the indeterminacies encourage a degree of non-spontaneousness. Clark (2009) suggests that this is a feature of various kinds of literary and other texts, including jokes and witty comments as well as challenging books, films and other kinds of art works. Even a reader aiming to be quite “lazy” (explicitly or not) is bound to go through some processes we would think of as fairly non-spontaneous, e.g. wondering why McBride has chosen this kind of style, wondering about specific formulations, wondering how the book will develop, etc.¹⁰

As readers continue reading (if they do), non-spontaneous interpretations will develop at the same time as spontaneous responses to individual sections become easier (as we develop our understanding of who the characters are, what they are like, etc.) Reading becomes a bit easier and interpretations become both fuller and stronger in that we have more confidence about conclusions we entertain. As suggested above, at a certain stage, readers will arrive in a situation similar to that

10. During my own first reading, I guessed wrongly that the style of the book would change significantly as the girl aged, i.e. I assumed that a motivation for the style at the beginning was to help us think like a baby or very young child. Like Collard, I also misunderstood the opening and did not realise that the girl was in the womb at that stage.

they find themselves in when reading other texts. A key feature of the novel is the different route readers take to get there.

7.5.4 Open-endedness

As with all texts, it is possible to continue indefinitely to think about the novel and to derive new implicatures and lines of interpretation. This can occur during and after reading. Individuals vary, of course, with regard to how much time they spend reading novels. At one extreme, a novel can be gone through in one “sitting”. At another, individuals might pause frequently and for long periods of time between moments of reading. Even during reading, individuals vary with regard to how much they move in a linear way more or less from one word to the next, how they move backwards and forwards, how much they reread specific passages, whether they look more or less closely at material on covers, jump to the end of books or sections, move around on individual pages, and so on. Interpretations can be developed during reading, between times spent reading, and after reading, as well as during a period of reading. This applies whether readers are relatively “lazy” or not. Some individuals, of course, “give up” fairly quickly and so will not be continuing to think about the book much or at all when not reading it. Others will find themselves developing interpretations as they do other things and sometimes individuals refer to the process of “finding myself thinking about it” as one way in which evaluations become more positive (for discussion of this process in evaluating literary texts, see Clark, 2014).

Given the discussion of indeterminacies in explicit and implicit content above, there is likely to be interesting variation among readers as they progress through the book. Implicatures are likely to be harder to derive, weaker and more varied at earlier stages and easier, stronger and less varied at later stages. It may be that readers are less likely to continue interpretation processes at earlier stages and more likely at later stages.

We might also consider here how texts vary with regard to how likely they are to encourage ongoing (and non-spontaneous) interpretations. Clark (2014) suggests that Chekhov’s short story *The Lady With The Little Dog*¹¹ has come to be highly valued partly because it is relatively easy to represent the story as a whole after having read it and partly because doing so can lead to interpretative routes towards significant implicatures. Furlong (1996, 2011) has suggested that texts vary with regard to how successfully they support and reward ongoing interpretations.

11. As Clark (2014: 58) points out, there are no articles in Russian and Chekhov’s original title translates as “lady with dog” where *dog* contains a diminutive morpheme.

One final point to make in this connection is that McBride's novel can be seen as providing readers with an experience which is more like life in general than many other fictional texts. As we go about our daily lives, we notice various things, pay more or less attention to different things (with intentionally communicative behavior attracting more attention, of course) and our "cognitive environments" contain a vast range of more or less manifest assumptions. As time goes by, ongoing changes take place in how manifest various assumptions are and we have many assumptions which are only marginally manifest alongside some which are quite strongly manifest, and everything in between.

When we read a novel or short story, writers have often "packaged" experience so that we assume we are being told what is important and we derive implicatures based on that. As suggested above, readers will eventually reach a place where their experience of this novel is similar to that of others in that they will have developed a representation of the novel as a whole and derive implicatures based on that (this process taking longer for "lazier" than other readers). Along the way, though, we could argue that their experience is more like that of a person dealing with the world in general rather than with a clearly "packaged" version of part of it. This is surely connected to McBride's comment in the interview with Mullan about why she did not give the girl or other characters in the novel names, i.e. with the aim that readers would come as close as possible to sharing the girl's experience rather than consider it from a metaphorical "distance" which, she suggested, would occur "as soon as she had a name".

To the extent that it is successful with regard to this aim, then, the novel enables readers to feel immersed in the story and to feel that they are sharing the girl's experiences rather than reading about them from a more distanced or detached perspective. The girl's experiences are traumatic and disturbing and this adds both to negative and to positive responses.

7.5.5 Characterising readers and readings

The discussion so far has suggested ways in which more or less "lazy" readers differ from each other. We can build on this to suggest (idealized and simplified) accounts of three kinds of responses to the novel evidenced in discussion by reviewers and online discussions. We might label these: "giving up", "careful" and "lazy". The "giving up" reader will come up with a relatively shallow representation like the one represented in (12) above, continue reading and, at a certain point, find the continuing lack of clarity so uncomfortable that, along perhaps with the developing expectation that there will be no significant clarity, they decide not to read any more. The "careful" reader will develop interpretations like the one represented in (13) above for the entire novel. The "lazy" reader will carry on

and develop something between the representations in (12) and (13) with details becoming clearer to varying degrees as they read on and as they think about it afterwards. Naturally, any reader who completes the novel will be somewhere between the "careful" and "lazy" readings characterized here, i.e. the extent to which they complete interpretations will vary for different parts of the novel.

To be a "lazy" reader, then, involves giving up on pragmatic processes of resolving indeterminacies about explicit content, entertaining a fairly wide range of weakly evidenced explicatures, and deriving a wide range of weakly evidenced potential implicatures on the basis of these. This process will carry on while reading until eventually things become clearer and readers find themselves in a similar situation to other readers with a representation of the novel overall to derive implicatures from. A more careful reader will bypass the process and get more quickly to a place where things are resolved and the range of implicatures is narrower with stronger implicatures.

In a sense, a careful reader is creating a different novel from the one McBride wrote or translating it into something else and then responding to (i.e. deriving interpretations of) that. We could relate this to earlier and ongoing discussion of ideas about reading and interpretation, including ideas about close reading. One relevant example here is Armstrong's (1995) discussion of "close" reading practices. She argues that many close reading practices are in fact attempts to create a distance from texts by analyzing them. She also suggests that these practices often assume an opposition between emotion or affect and rationality. We can interpret non-"lazy" readers as, to some extent, carrying out this kind of analytical work and so avoiding the kinds of emotional and experiential effects which McBride was aiming for.

This chapter has argued that "lazy" readers derive a wider range of weaker implicatures than less "lazy" readers and that they experience something closer to what McBride had in mind. A final thought is that this might be relevant to accounting for readers who begin with a fairly negative response and then become more positive. It seems at least plausible that these readers begin with a more careful and non-spontaneous approach, thinking about how the indeterminacies might be resolved and why they are there, and then at a certain point become more "lazy", continuing without resolution of indeterminacies and experiencing the complex effects which McBride intended. At this stage, they experience something close to the girl's experience, are less detached, and have more profound, personal and "real-world-like" experiences. This is suggested by the quote from McCracken cited above:

I knew she'd been working on a book – she called it her beast – and when she was finished she'd asked me to read it. I took it nervously . . . And for the first

page and a half I thought, Oh dear, no, too self-conscious, what a shame. Then about halfway down the second page, my brain figured it out and *the book had me*, and I realised that the prose was the opposite of self-conscious: it just took my self-conscious brain that long to give itself over to the language.

(quoted by Collard, 2016: p. 22)

7.6 Summary

This chapter has suggested ways in which we can apply ideas from relevance theory in developing accounts of how we respond to texts in general and of varying responses to McBride's novel in particular. It argued that ideas about indeterminacy and the open-endedness of interpretation processes help to account for responses to texts and how they change during and after reading. It suggested that we can understand more by thinking about inferential processes involved in recovering explicit content and about who is understood as the thinker or speaker of expressions in the text which this novel makes it hard for readers to carry out. Some readers give up on the book because of this. Some continue reading and some who do so find the experience rewarding. The chapter argues that this kind of reading process is complex and far from "lazy". It requires readers either to entertain complex representations of interpretative uncertainties or to continue reading while entertaining very partial representations of what they have read so far. Some readers who do this experience effects which are arguably similar to ones McBride had in mind when writing the novel (experiencing something similar to what the girl experiences without the detachment that would come from other kinds of readings). Another kind of reading involves making considerable effort to assign referents, identify speakers and thinkers, and so on. The chapter argued that this constitutes what might be thought of as a kind of resistant reading and, to some extent, amounts to a rewriting of the text in ways not intended by the author. Readers who follow the "lazy" approach are more likely to enjoy the book and to experience it as intended by McBride. While more analytical readers may also have positive responses, some negative responses seem to arise from frustration with the novel's indeterminacies.

The discussion here has aimed to show both that ideas from pragmatics can be useful in understanding responses to literary and other texts and that there is a lot of interesting work to do to find out more. Another line for future research is to consider more fully what is involved in "close reading" practices of various kinds and to consider the pedagogical implications of these ideas.

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Mapping the texture of the Berlin Wall

Metonymy, layered worlds, and critical Implicatures
in Sarah Kirsch's poem "Naturschutzgebiet/nature
reserve"

Chantelle Warner

8.1 Introduction

Sarah Kirsch's 1982 poem "*Naturschutzgebiet*" (Nature Reserve) textually excavates the geographical space upon which a portion of the Berlin Wall stood. Through the use of metonymical references to features of the past and present landscape, the fifteen-line poem is dense with words that seem to simultaneously index multiple moments in the history of this place. For readers privy to these references, this potentially creates a poetic texture (Stockwell, 2009) characterized by the layering of text worlds (Gavins, 2007) corresponding to actual worlds, which overlap in space but not in historical time. A key pragmatic effect for many readers is a range of stronger and weaker socially critical implicatures related to the Berlin Wall and the East German regime that built it.

Naturschutzgebiet (1982)

- 1 *Die weltstädtischen Kaninchen*
- 2 *Hüpfen sich aus auf dem*
- 3 *Potsdamer Platz*
- 4 *Wie soll ich angesichts dieser Wiesen*
- 5 *Glauben was mein Großvater sagte*
- 6 *Hier war der Nabel der Welt*
- 7 *Als er in jungen Jahren mit seinem Adler*
- 8 *Ein schönes Mädchen chauffierte.*
- 9 *Durch das verschwundene Hotel*
- 10 *Fliegen die Mauersegler*
- 11 *Die Nebel steigen*
- 12 *Aus wunderbaren Wiesen und Sträuchern*
- 13 *Kaum sperrt man den Menschen den Zugang*

14 *Tut die Natur das ihre durchwächst*

15 *Noch das Pflaster die Straßenbahnschienen.*

von Sarah Kirsch

Nature Reserve (1982)

The cosmopolitan bunnies

Hop around on the

Potsdamer Platz

With the view of these meadows, how should I

Believe what my grandfather said

Here was the navel of the world

As he, in his young years with his Adler

Chauffeured a beautiful girl

Through the vanished hotel

Fly the swifts

The fog climbs

From wonderful meadows and shrubs

One has just barely blocked entry to the people

Nature does her thing, still growing through

The cobblestones, the streetcar tracks.

von Sarah Kirsch

The inspiration for my work with this poem is rooted in reader responses that I encountered in two different contexts: (1) a graduate seminar on literature and foreign language teaching in Germany, attended by native and expert speakers of German, and which I observed, and (2) multiple instantiations of an intermediate German language class at an American university, which I have observed or taught myself. Readers in both contexts, for the most part, assumed a socially critical message, when they recognized that “nature reserve” in the title referenced the strip of wilderness running along the Berlin Wall. However, they varied widely in the degree of ambivalence they sensed in that critique. In some cases, the second-language readers seemed to lean on their background knowledge and mental models of East Germany, which led them to surmise that a poem about the Berlin Wall must be a critique. The aesthetic pleasure in the poem that some readers (including myself) experienced seemed to derive from the process of “excavation,” the discovery of the layers that the poem offers through the use of metonymical references. This was also associated with a more polysemous interpretation of the poem’s critique. What I present in this chapter relies heavily on my own experience of the poem, but my observations of these other readers have helped to shape the overarching question that guides my analysis, namely how we can account for the relationship between the aesthetic experience of texture and the derivation of pragmatic meanings, such as social critique.

Kirsch’s poem provides an ideal case study for how cognitive-pragmatic theories can help us to connect readers’ experiences of texts and their conceptualization

of past and present social and physical realities and how this in turn can result in socially critical implicatures. While cognitive poetic frameworks of texture and text world theory provide models for understanding the role of metonymy as a world building element, pragmatic theories of implicature and relevance conceptualize its potential effects within a broader account of utterance interpretation. In what follows, I summarize models of texture and text world theory from cognitive poetics, before turning to a discussion of metonymy. I will briefly introduce cognitive linguistic and relevance-theoretic approaches to metonymy, before turning to the cognitive-pragmatic framework that will be the focus of this chapter. I will then analyse Sarah Kirsch's poem as an example of a text that relies heavily on metonymy in the enactment of and manipulation of past and present realities. Based on this analysis, I will argue that cognitive linguistic models of metonymy and cognitive poetic models of text worlds can help us to describe the types of mapping that occur as a reader experiences the poem, but to account for the ambivalent socially critical implicatures inferred by some readers requires a pragmatic theory of relevance.

8.2 Sarah Kirsch and her work

Kirsch first made a name for herself in the 1960s as an author of nature poetry, but it was her political engagement later in that same decade and into the 1970s and 1980s that most shaped her lasting reputation and secured her a place in German literary canons. Born in 1935 as Ingrid Bernstein, her chosen first name "Sarah" was itself an act of protest and a tribute to the Jews who were persecuted during the reign of National Socialism and more personally as a protest against her father's own anti-Semitic viewpoints. The last name "Kirsch" was taken from her first husband, the lyricist Rainer Kirsch, with whom she published her first book "*Gespräch mit dem Saurier*" (Conversation with the Dinosaur), for which both were awarded the prestigious Erich-Weinert-Medaille.

While many of Kirsch's earlier poems are read as having political overtones, beginning in the 1970s her work engaged more overtly with current societal conditions, in particular those of the newly formed German Democratic Republic (the GDR, commonly known as East Germany). In the 1973 collection *Pantherfrau* (*Panther Woman*), for example, she traded poetry for the prose of documentary literature, for a critical recount of the personal experiences of five working class women in East Germany.

Along with many other authors, artists, and intellectuals in the GDR in the late 1960s and 1970s, Kirsch grew increasingly disillusioned with the East German

government in the years following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.¹ Her growing dissatisfaction reached a climax with the expatriation of musician and song writer Wolf Biermann. Biermann was granted permission to go to the west to hold a six-city concert tour in 1976, only to be denied entry back to the East as a consequence of his public criticism of the East German government. He had chosen to come to East Germany after World War II and had committed to remain due to a fervent belief in the socialist principles upon which the state was founded. For this reason, he became a symbol of the diminishing hope that many others felt for the fledgling socialist state. Sarah Kirsch joined the many artists and public intellectuals who signed a public statement protesting Biermann's forced expatriation. This led to an exodus of German artists and authors in the late 1970s, including Kirsch, who arrived in West Berlin as a self-exile in 1977.

Kirsch remained an active and acclaimed author all the way until her death in 2013, but it is these events of German history in the middle of the 20th century that are most prominently at play in her 1982 poem "*Naturschutzgebiet*" ("Nature Reserve"). It is featured in multiple collections and textbooks as a representation of place (Potsdamer Platz in Berlin) and historical time (the era of the Berlin Wall). Highlighting the representational qualities of the poem, however, can overshadow a consideration of what it does beyond depicting a physical and historical reality. The power of the poem arguably lies not in its representational functions but in aesthetic and pragmatic effects that are the focus of the stylistic and literary pragmatic scholarship I will describe in the subsequent sections.

8.3 Texture

As an analytical term within linguistics, *texture* describes those qualities that make a text hang together as a whole. Texture is often associated with the work of M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan. Within their functionalist perspective, the term is largely synonymous with cohesion, that is semantic ties, i.e. "relations of meanings that exist within the text, and that define it as a text" (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: p. 7). For example, in the fourth line of the poem, the expression "*angesichts dieser Wiesen*" (with the view of these meadows) can be understood as a reference back to "Potsdamer Platz" in line 3, which creates cohesion between these two sections of the text. While Halliday and Hasan (1976: p. 9) treat cohesion as the primary source of coherence and thus of texture, later work in systemic functional linguistics ascribes a greater role to contextual aspects. In particular,

1. This sentiment was likely exacerbated by her romantic relationship with the author Christoph Meckel, who lived in the other Berlin.

Suzanne Eggins (2004 [first edition 1994]) develops a distinction suggested by Halliday and Hasan between registerial coherence, relating to the situation, and generic coherence, which relates to the recognition of a genre and its purpose (Eggins, 2004: p. 29). One example which can illustrate both sources of coherence is the opening pages of Sarah Kirsch's book *Die Pantherfrau* (*The Panther Woman*). The cover, white with large black lettering, already spells out clearly the context of what follows:

Fünf Frauen in der DRR (eine Dompteuse, eine Kaderleiterin, eine Abgeordnete, eine Betriebsleiterin, eine Arbeiterin) sprechen von ihrem Leben und ihrem Alltag. Fünf Erzählungen aus dem Kassetten-Recorder.

Five women in the GDR (an animal trainer, a squad-leader, an assemblywoman, a business manager, and a laborer) speak of their lives and their everyday experiences. Five stories from the cassette recorder.

The inside jacket cover goes on to explain that these stories were collected between 1971 and 1972 and recorded with a cassette player before being transcribed to print. The first page then bears the title "*Die Pantherfrau*" and begins ...

Also vielleicht von meinem Elternhaus angefangen. Wir waren fünf Geschwister, ich war das größte, das älteste. Das war in Dresden-Radebeul, das hörn Sie am Dialekt. Mein Vater war der Eisenbahn Zugschaffner. Meine Mutter mußte natürlich auch arbeiten gehen, es hat nicht gelangt. Ich bin ins Kinderballett gegangen ...

...Well, perhaps starting from parents' house. We were five siblings. I was the biggest, the oldest. This was in Dresden-Radebeul, you can hear it in my dialect. My father was a train conductor. My mother of course also had to work, it wasn't enough. I attended the children's ballet ...

These sentences and clauses are also clearly held together by some of the cohesive ties described by Halliday and Hasan, for example, the lexical cohesion of the familial words, and the phrase "*das war*" (that was) referring back to the "*Elternhaus*" (family home) in the first sentence. But the coherence of the passage relies heavily on our recognition that this is a literarily transcribed autobiographical interview and that the work is a form of *Protokollenliteratur*, a documentary genre popular in Germany during the 1970s and early 1980s. This allows us to recognise little jumps between, for instance, the parents' job descriptions and the statement that she went to the ballet school as connected within a coherent autobiographical world that the narrator is building for us.

The concept of texture, for Halliday, Hasan, and those who build upon their functional model, is an answer to the question "what is a text?" In other words, what allows us to read a string of clauses as a coherent piece of discourse. Stockwell (2009) shifts the question from textual function to textual quality. For Stockwell, texture is a cognitive aesthetic phenomenon. "Textuality is the outcome of the

workings of shared cognitive mechanics, evident in texts and readings. Texture is the experienced quality of textuality” (Stockwell, 2009: p. 1). Without disregarding the role of features such as cohesive ties in readers’ experiences of texture, his main argument is that texture is the result of a subjective process of reading rather than an inherent characteristic of a text. For this reason, texture is essential to aesthetic experience. Stockwell even goes so far as to say that “literature is defined by its texture” (Stockwell, 2009: p. 1).

In his exploration of texture as a cognitive poetic phenomenon, Stockwell makes extensive use of text world theory, a cognitive discourse model originally suggested by Werth (1994) and later developed and brought into mainstream stylistics by Gavins (2007). Text world theory posits multiple layers of mental representations that come into play, when reading and making sense out of a text. First, there is a discourse-world, the content and context of interactivity shared by the writer and reader, even in cases where the two are more spatially, temporally, or culturally distal from one another (Gavins, 2007: pp. 18–34). The prominence of the discourse-world in this framework makes space for the rich insights of fields such as sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology, and pragmatics, with their more precise focus on the context of the situation, while still keeping texts in the centre of the model. Text worlds are mental representations of alternate (but not necessarily fictional) worlds created through participants in the act of communicating. Text world theory accounts for the ways in which these worlds are instantiated through world-building elements that the text offers. The success of these world-building elements, i.e. linguistic markers of time, place, people, objects, relies on aspects of common ground knowledge; in order to be accessible, a text-world must be perceived as possible (78). Certain triggers also create sub-worlds embedded within the text world, such as flashbacks, flashforwards, hypotheticals, wish worlds, or the spaces created by direct speech (Gavins, 2007: pp. 52 and 53).

World-building can be dense, taking place over thousands of pages, across texts and even across media (see Gibbons, 2010; Lahey, 2006; Whiteley, 2011), but it can also rely on very few text elements, as it does in the lonely hearts, singles ads that Gavins examines in her book (2007, pp. 1–2, 156–162). By defining texture in sociocognitive terms, instead of based on linguistic ties, the connections between textual cues related to contextual knowledge and the experienced texture of a literary work become clear. It thus also becomes possible to analyse how certain textual cues can be manipulated as world building elements with particular stylistic effects. Werth himself was motivated to develop text world theory in part so that he could better analyse extended metaphors that create a sense of coherence or “gist” over the length of a text. This aspect of the model will play a role later in my analysis of “*Naturschutzgebiet*.” Text-worlds themselves are in large part created through another form of conceptual thinking, namely metonymy. Linguistic cues represent

parts of emergent, whole text worlds, which readers are able to construct based on their existing frame knowledge (see Gavins, 2007: pp. 39–40; see also Dancygier and Sweetser, 2014: p. 101). The next section provides an overview of some recent approaches to metonymy, including recent trends towards cognitive-pragmatic accounts that share in some important ways text-world theory's attention to the interplay between conceptual and context-dependent effects.

8.4 Metonymy

Jakobson (1995[1956]) proposed that there are two poles along which human discourse has developed. On the one end, there is metaphor, which draws a relationship of *similarity* between two things and on the other there is metonymy, which draws *contiguity* between two things. “Contiguity” is to be taken here in a very broad sense, comprising not only spatial contact, but also temporal proximity, causal relations, and part-whole relations, etc.

Despite Jakobson's early contribution, metaphor has received a great deal more attention than metonymy in both linguistics and literary studies, until relatively recently. Following the same trend as metaphor theory, contemporary research on metonymy follows Jakobson's lead in treating metonymy not as an exceptional literary figure but as an aspect of normal human discourse by recognizing that even many so-called literal meanings are related to metaphorical ways of thinking about the world. At the same time there is a broad contrast between those who see metaphor as pervasive in language because it is constitutive of human thought and those who describe metaphor as emerging in the process of verbal communication. Both of these broader approaches can also be understood as part of a trend described by Steen (2005) as “the general movement away from the language of the text as the sole basis for the construction of figurative meaning” (Steen, 2005: p. 1). This has been accompanied by the development of more complex models of figurative language in which the interlocutors, in this chapter the writer and the readers, play a more explicit role. In what follows, I outline these two perspectives, cognitive linguistic accounts and relevance-theoretic accounts of metaphor, before moving to a set of approaches that self-identify as cognitive-pragmatic because they draw from but also critique both of the previous perspectives in order to account for a wider range of metonymic effects. Because I am less interested in the mental capacity for metonymic thinking and more interested in its potential pragmatic effects, this third account in particular will help me to explain the poetic effects associated with the poem's critique, which will feature prominently in my analysis in the second half of the paper.

8.4.1 Cognitive linguistic accounts of metonymy

Cognitive linguistic frameworks are in part a return to Jakobson's underlying supposition that the demarcation between the role of linguistic meaning and knowledge of the world is problematic. In their seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphorical meanings are based on the cognitive effect of juxtaposing two knowledge domains. For Lakoff and Johnson, a metaphor is a mapping (i.e. a set of correspondences) between two conceptual domains where one domain (called the source) serves to structure and reason about another (called the target). In contrast, metonymy is described as a conceptual mapping within a single domain where one entity in a conceptual domain stands for another entity in the same domain or for the whole domain. They also contend that metonymy is used primarily for reference (see Lakoff and Turner, 1989: p. 103) and that metonymies are not random occurrences but, like metaphors, make up conventional conceptual systems. Take the examples of common metonymical relationships presented below:

OBJECT USED FOR USER

The *sax* has the flu today.

The *buses* are on strike.

CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED

Napoleon lost at Waterloo.

A Mercedes rear-ended *me*.

INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE

Exxon has raised its prices again.

You'll never get the *university* to agree to that.

THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION

The *White House* isn't saying anything.

Wall Street is in a panic.

(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: pp. 38–39)

In each of these examples, the relationship of metonymy relies on what Lakoff has dubbed ICMs or Idealised Cognitive Models, complex conceptual structures available to humans for making sense out of their experience (Lakoff, 1987). Focusing on the first example for a moment, the object “sax” can stand for the user, the saxophone player, because of the ICM OBJECT FOR USER. Metonymic models are, within this approach, idealised mental models of how two objects can be related in a conceptual structure.

Lakoff and Johnson further claim that “the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or causal associations” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: p. 39). Fauconnier (1997) in particular develops this idea into a model of metonymy as a “pragmatic function mapping.” Fauconnier's model is pragmatic,

but it is also cognitive. A pragmatic function is understood as a strong, privileged connection between roles in an ICM (for example CAUSE–EFFECT, AUTHOR–WORK, MUSICIAN–INSTRUMENT).

The apparent obviousness of metonymy has led some scholars to claim that metonymy is less “creative” or even less “powerful” than metaphor; however, others working within cognitive linguistics (e.g. Goossens, 1990) argue that metonymy may be more central to our conceptual thinking and underlies much of metaphorical thought. This suggestion has been picked up by scholars working within the cognitive-pragmatic approaches and is discussed in the final part of this section.

8.4.2 Relevance-theoretic accounts of metonymy

Like cognitive linguistic approaches, relevance-theoretic accounts of figurative language view metaphor and metonymy as elements of “normal” discourse. In this way, relevance theory’s treatment of metonymy and of metaphor departs from early pragmatic, notably Gricean, views in which it was posited that figurative meanings could be processed only after literal meanings have been ruled out (e.g. Grice, 1989). In relevance theory this is explained through a general claim that the interpretation of metaphors occurs in the same way as with any other non-metaphorical utterance (see Clark, 2013: p. 198). A listener follows a path of least effort in accessing and testing different interpretations, and will usually cease processing when expectations of optimal relevance are satisfied (Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1986]).

Through what Sperber and Wilson call “explicatures”, language communicates more directly (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1986]: p. 35). But meanings are also expressed implicitly, as “implicatures”. Both implicatures and explicatures come in varying strengths, depending on how much they rely on nonstandard judgements on the part of the interlocutor. Take the metaphorical expression, “The room is a pigsty” uttered by a frustrated mom who has just appeared at her dear child’s bedroom door and is surveying the piles of clothing and toys strewn across the floor (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1986]: p. 236). According to Sperber and Wilson, the child will first access their concept of “pigsty” and look for relevant information, such as the fact that pigsties are usually filthy and untidy. A strong implicature is then that the mother wishes to express to her child that the room is untidy and a less strong implicature inferred by the child is that mom wishes to see it cleaned up. But, like all utterances, this one will likely also give rise to a range of implicatures with varying degrees of strength. For example, the child might assume that she won’t be allowed any privileges like screen time until the room is clean.

This example allows me to illustrate another aspect of Sperber and Wilson’s account of figurative language (which again is largely based on metaphor). Unlike

Grice, whose language philosophies inspired relevance theory, Sperber and Wilson argue that verbal comprehension involves no presumption of literalness. This means that there is no default interpretation which must be ruled out before the listener can access a metaphorical meaning. On the contrary, verbal communication is always context-sensitive and inferential. All human intentional communication involves the production of a piece of evidence, the ostensive stimulus, offered by a communicating individual, and the addressee(s) infer meaning from this piece of evidence and the context. This also means that a single utterance can express a range of implicatures. For example, the child might not only infer that the mother wishes to see the room tidied, but that she would like for that activity to be carried out by the child and perhaps even right this moment. This same propensity for creating a range of implicatures is for Sperber and Wilson the basis of metaphoric expression. As they write, “the surprise or beauty of a successful creative metaphor lies in this extreme condensation, in the fact that a single expression which has itself been loosely used will determine a very wide range of acceptable weak implicatures” (1991[1981], p. 540).

Sperber and Wilson, like many theorists in the 1980s and 1990s, focus more attention on metaphor than metonymy; however, drawing heavily from their research on figurative language, Papafragou (1996) develops a more detailed relevance-theoretic account of metonymy. She positions her relevance-theoretic model of metonymy within a critique of what she describes as “associationist models,” namely those of scholars like Lakoff, Turner, and Johnson (Papafragou, 1996: p. 148). The basis for her critique is that because associationist accounts are concerned with the mental capacity for metonymy, they neglect to incorporate within their discussion a general account of utterance interpretation. She writes, “As they stand, associationist models largely ignore problems of interpretation by pushing them off onto the conceptual structure itself: by definition an association is supposed to spring to mind almost automatically” (Papafragou, 1996: p. 148). A consequence of this, she argues, is that they can only ever begin to address conventionalised metonymies, which leaves them unequipped to deal with really creative metonymic uses, such as those found in literary language. Furthermore, by considering metonymy as a mapping between concepts, associationist models fail to consider the relationship between the outside world, and the role it often plays in reference (Papafragou, 1996: pp. 148–149). Particularly in the case of non-conventional mappings, metonymy is worked out on the basis of the hearer’s existing knowledge, their mental models, of the source and target domains.

Following this assumption that metonymy works because of interlocutors’ shared understanding of the relationships between domains, Papafragou’s most innovative claim is that metonymic expressions are a variety of what Sperber and Wilson dub “echoic discourse” (Sperber and Wilson, 1986[1995], Sperber

and Wilson, 1998), i.e. discourse that reports what someone else has said or thought and expresses an attitude to it. To understand Papafragou's argument, we can return to the previous example, "The sax has the flu" (see also Papafragou, 1996: pp. 157–159). Upon hearing the utterance, the successful hearer will look for an interpretation that is consistent with the principle of relevance and will arrive at the conclusion that the expression "the sax" is used echoically. This results in a proposition that is something like "The person that could appropriately be called 'the sax' has the flu <at time x>" (see Papafragou, 1996: p. 158). On the one hand, metonymy contributes to explicature by expressing information about an individual represented by "the sax", but presumably there are other intended effects that led the speaker to choose this form of reference, rather than, for instance, the saxophone player's name. Papafragou argues that creative metonymic uses, as a form of echoic discourse, achieve their relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures, often to humorous and poetic effects (Papafragou, 1996: p. 164). Even the rather simple, interpretively straightforward example of "the sax" might manifest a shared sense that the saxophone makes the band, so we need to decide whether or not to cancel the show or some other form of relevant implicature.²

8.4.3 Cognitive-pragmatic accounts of metonymy

As the name suggests, the third and final model of metonymy positions itself as an attempt to reconcile aspects of previous theoretical accounts described already in this chapter by more holistically integrating cognitive and communicative dimensions of meaning making. As Panther and Thornburg (2003) caution, there is a risk in characterizing approaches as cognitive-pragmatic given that neither pragmatics nor cognitive linguistics posits itself as a unified field (Panther and Thornburg, 2003: p. 1). Nevertheless, what theoretical approaches that characterize themselves as cognitive-pragmatic share in common is a more deliberate set of claims about the ways in which metonymy as a phenomenon cuts across traditional distinctions between semantics and pragmatics.

A foundation for cognitive-pragmatic perspectives on metonymy is Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez's (1997) critique of previous approaches. While he values relevance theory's recognition that figurative language such as metonymy is

2. More recent work by Ingrid Lossius Falkum (in collaboration with Deirdre Wilson), argues that Papafragou's model should better incorporate the dynamic processes of interpretation captured by the concept of *mutual adjustment* (Falkum, 2011: p. 232), which accounts for the ways in which contextual assumptions guide listeners/readers to incrementally modify the cognitive effects of an utterance; however, the examples cited by Falkum are not poetic, and it is unclear in what ways mutual adjustment might play a role in poetic effects.

interpretive and involves the production of implicitly communicated assumptions or implicatures, he also argues that it overlooks the relevance of the mental mechanisms which underlie both metaphor and metonymy. A result, according to Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, is that relevance theory fails to adequately account for the connections between metonymy and metaphor, the specificity of their mental processing through conceptual mapping, and the ways in which the effects of metaphor and metonymy might intersect in the creation of new meanings (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 1997: pp. 173–174). At the same time, he argues, cognitive linguists have not placed much emphasis on the communicative effects of such mappings. In this sense, the author shares Papafragou’s concern that cognitive accounts of metonymy neglect to consider not only the conceptual nature but also metonymy’s use potential, that is its communicative purpose.

By bringing relevance, in the sense of communicative purpose, into a cognitive linguistic model of metonymy, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez is also able to demonstrate that the difference between metonymy and metaphor may not be as straightforward as cognitive linguistic accounts from Lakoff, Turner, and Johnson originally suggested (see also Steen, 2005: pp. 3–4; Barcelona, 2000). He writes, “Making a distinction between mappings within a single domain and across domains, although tenable, is a rather tricky issue” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 1997: p. 164). This judgement may depend on the perspective of the language users and their respective interest in either contiguity or similarity relations.

Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and his co-authors (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Perez, 2003), along with other scholars (see also Barcelona, 2003: p. 115; Gibbs and Colston, 2012: p. 159; Panther and Thornburg, 2003: p. 35), suggest that the relationship between metonymy and metaphor should not be conceived as a pair of poles (as Jakobson conceptualised them) but rather as a continuum from correspondences involving one mapping and correspondences involving many mappings.³ Metonymy then best describes a range of pragmatic as well as semantic cases along this continuum involving a one-correspondence between either part and whole or whole and part, rather than a clearly unified set of phenomena (see also Steen, 2005: p. 6). Although metonymy often functions referentially, it can also have non-referential functions. This is often the case in verb-based metonymies, like “giggle” in “oh dear, she giggled,” which

3. An example of a one-correspondence might be “You’re eating like an animal,” where a particular aspect of the animal behavior, namely messiness, is mapped onto a person’s dining habits, whereas Pat Benatar’s hit song “Love is a Battlefield” can be considered a many-correspondence metaphor, because love is difficult and a struggle, but also valorous and noble, and also a tool of power and dominion. From a relevance-pragmatic perspective, it also seems likely that more weak implicatures will be at play on the many-correspondence end of this continuum.

stands for “saying something while giggling” (Panther and Thornburg, 2003: p 35; compare Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, Radden and Kövecses, 1999). At the same time, metaphor can rely on a one-correspondence and can also function referentially, as in “My sweet rose abandoned me” (Panther and Thornburg, 2003: p. 35). Relatedly, cognitive-pragmatic accounts following Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez do not associate metonymy immediately with implicature, but view the process of mapping as involved in the explicature. As he notes, “since metonymies are restricted to one-correspondence mappings the number of contextual effects is smaller than with many-correspondence metaphors” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 1997: p. 173).

Following this same premise that the nature of the mapping makes a difference to meaning, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Otal (2002) posit different functions of the two possible domain-subdomain relationships involved in metonymy: source-in-target metonymy and target-in-source metonymy. Source-in-target metonymy, e.g. “The sax has the flu today”, is used to develop a conceptual domain of which the source highlights a relevant aspect, in this case the fact that the individual is a sax player. Target-in-source metonymy focuses on some relevant aspect of the domain that is hard to pin down, an effect described as domain reduction, e.g. “Laura is sunburned”, where all of Laura stands for the part that is affected. In either case, metonymy is connected with an effect described as “metonymic highlighting” (see also Croft, 1993), whereby aspects of the domain are made more salient than they typically are. It is worth noting that this relies ultimately on the conventional conceptual structure of the domain in question, which in part might provide a cognitive-pragmatic justification for metonymy as echoic discourse, as suggested by Papafragou (1996). Exactly because metonyms are more “obvious” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: p. 39) and more “restricted” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 1997: p. 173), understanding the reference and recognizing what is being highlighted as a potentially salient aspect of a domain implies some sort of complicity. Developing a similar line of reasoning, Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) show how the use of creative metonymy in narrative fiction can create an effect of intimacy between the reader and the narrator (or author), by enabling a sense of shared meanings.

Cognitive-pragmatic approaches have also recognised that metonymy in actual language use, especially creative uses, often occurs in connection with other forms of figurative meaning. Several scholars (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 1997; Goossens, 1990; Hidalgo Downing and Mujic, 2011) have argued that metonymy can also serve an additional purpose of supporting metaphorical mapping. In the cognitive-pragmatics approach developed by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Diez (2002), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Peña (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Sáenz (2003), the scholars draw on Fauconnier and Turner’s concept of con-

ceptual integration as a starting point for analyzing how metonymy can optimise or “tighten” metaphoric thinking.

Conceptual integration, or *blending*, explains how mental spaces “blend” to create a third space that is more than a composition of the two. In all cases of conceptual integration, mapping is partial, not all elements are projected from the input spaces, and the new representation has its own emergent structure shaped by elaboration and pattern selection (Fauconnier and Turner, 1999: p. 77; see also 1996, 1998, 2002; Turner and Fauconnier, 1995). For example, Howell (2010) uses conceptual blending to analyse instances of critical humour in responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany that followed 1998. For many East Germans, this was perceived not as a liberation or a partnership of equals, but as a form of colonization and a dissolution of identity. One of Howell’s examples is the phrase “*BeeRDigung der DDR*,” (literally “burial of the GDR,” also known as East Germany, with the three capitalised letters in *BeeRDigung* spelling the initials of the “*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*,” i.e. Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany), which she takes from a student newspaper appearing in 1995 in the eastern city of Weimar (Howell, 2010: pp. 75–77). She shows how elements of the real world narrative of the reunification of the BRD and the DDR and the scenario of a funeral, involving rituals related to the death and burial of the deceased, contribute to a third space, *die Beerdigung der DDR*/Burial of East Germany, in which West German institutions are replacing, i.e. burying, East German ones (76). The socio-critical humor of the blend, *BeeRDigung der DDR*, arises from the counterfactual narrative of a nation being mourned.

Fauconnier and Turner (1998) also posit a key role for metonymy in conceptual blending, in a principle they describe as “metonymic tightening.” In metonymic tightening there is a compression of elements in the blend that stand in metonymic relation to one another. The example that is most often cited is the image of the Grim Reaper as a skeletal figure. In reality, the temporal distance between death and the decomposition of the body to its skeletal form is long, but in the blend the distance between cause and effect becomes compressed and the skeleton is Death. This enables interactants to make use of the skeleton as Death in other complex blends, for example in the demonstrations staged in 1990, in which East Germany in the form of a plastic skeleton in a coffin was symbolically mourned with funeral rites.

Although they also draw heavily from it, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and his colleagues (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Diez, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Peña, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Sáenz, 2003) critique aspects of Fauconnier and Turner’s model of conceptual integration because of their emphasis on the emergent nature of the blend. Because Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and his colleagues also draw from relevance theory for their cognitive-pragmatic model,

the primary distinction between their model (the Combined Input Hypothesis) and Fauconnier and Turner's original argument is that the negotiation of input is understood as happening before the blend rather than as part of the emergent structure of the blend, based on linguistic and contextual information. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the more common term "blending" to describe instances of this phenomenon, but will also assume that relevance-theoretic principles guide their interpretation.

Within cognitive-pragmatic approaches it has been argued that metonymy plays more than just an optimizing role in metaphoric thinking. Díez (2001), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Díez (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Peña (2002) offer a typology of four types of metonymic-metaphoric relations based on two principles: whether metonymy relates to the source or the target and whether the effect is an expansion or a reduction. A summary of these categories with examples is provided in Figure 1.

i. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source <i>The suitor beat his breast.</i> (where the metonymy of a person beating his breast in extreme sorrow is a metaphor for an open pretense of anguish about a situation)	ii. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric source <i>Don't bite the hand that feeds you.</i> (where the hand stands metonymically for the entire person, while biting stands metaphorically for any action of harm)
iii. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target <i>Peter knitted his eyebrows and grumbled.</i> (where the metaphor "knitting eyebrows" is a metonym of angry facial expressions)	iv. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric target <i>He finally won her heart.</i> (where the metaphor of a competition is a metaphor for the art of courtship and the target has a built in metonymy of heart for love)

Figure 1. Types of metonymic-metaphoric interplay. Adapted from Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Díez (2002: pp. 518–528).

While this typology could likely be expanded or critiqued, it offers a valuable starting point for considering how metonymy and metaphor might intersect, both in the creation of conventional examples such as those cited by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Díez here and more creative uses of metonymy/metaphor such as those found in "*Naturschutzgebiet*" (Nature Reserve).

As we move from the theoretical discussion of metonymy and to Sarah Kirsch's poem, a few key points from the discussion of cognitive-pragmatic approaches, which will be central to the analysis developed in the subsequent sections, are worth repeating.

- Cognitive linguistics helps to understand the idealized mental models involved in making sense of metonymy, but relevance-theoretic principles guide the interpretation of metonymy in utterances;

- Metonymy (like metaphor) can relate to both explicature and implicature (often a range of implicatures of varying strengths);
- Metonymy relies on our mental representations of domains, which can result in echoic uses and potentially a feeling of complicity;
- Different kinds of metonymy can contribute to the construction of or strengthening of metaphors.

In the section that follows, I will return to Kirsch’s poem. My analysis will trace first the creation of text worlds and the role of metonymy therein. I will then look at the interplay between metonymy in the extended metaphor of the death strip between the walls as a “*Naturschutzgebiet*” (Nature Reserve) that is developed across the text. Finally, I will consider the socio-critical implicatures that I (and many other readers) have taken from the text and how these pragmatic effects relate back to the layering of text worlds that are conceptually held together through metonymical relationships between elements.

8.5 Textual analysis

8.5.1 Building the text worlds of the Berlin Wall: Metonymies of past and present

Starting with the opening three lines of the poem, which syntactically constitute a complete sentence, the depiction, though a bit odd, can be taken quite literally. There are city-dwelling bunnies hopping along the Potsdamer Platz. The shift from the third to the fourth line, however, begins to initiate a more figurative reading.

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. <i>Die weltstädtischen Kaninchen</i> | The cosmopolitan bunnies |
| 2. <i>Hüpfen sich aus auf dem</i> | Hop around on the |
| 3. <i>Potsdamer Platz</i> | Potsdamer Platz |

Potsdamer Platz was a transport hub in the centre of Berlin during the 1920s and 1930s. During World War II, like the rest of the city, it sustained considerable damage. In post-war Berlin the site happened to fall where the Soviet, American, and British occupation zones converged. With the construction of the Berlin Wall, the area was cut in two, with a large portion of the former plaza falling in the “no-man’s land” in between the two walls that lined the border between East and West Germany.

The buildings that remained after the bombings of Berlin in the Second World War also had to be torn down. Like other areas falling in the strip of land between the two countries, the once urban center became overgrown with grass and weeds.

The space that the Germans describe as the “death strip” (*Todesstreifen*), because of the many lives lost as humans tried to cross the wall, became quite paradoxically a refuge for wild rabbits, the “nature reserve” in the title.⁴

I argue that it is the fourth line that makes this context accessible to readers familiar with the historical situation, by introducing the domain to which the bunnies rightfully belong, the meadow. The German language learners, with whom I worked and who were unfamiliar with this context, struggled with these four lines. Many of them reconciled the incongruity by reading the “bunnies” as a metaphorical reference to the people, which allowed them to access some implicatures but reduced the layering of text worlds and the potential polysemy.

4. *Wie soll ich angesichts dieser Wiesen* With the view of these meadows, how should I

The phrase “Potsdamer Platz” in line 3 has an echoic function here, in that it expresses this place that people call *Potsdamer Platz* because it once was a *Platz*, a plaza, and not a meadow. Speaking of 1920s and 1930s Berlin, Ladd writes, “Potsdamer Platz was Berlin, because Berlin was the city of hustle and bustle” (Ladd, 1997: p. 28). Potsdamer Platz can be understood as a prototype for Berlin in that era, in Lakoff’s (1987) sense of a stereotypical member that comes to conventionally stand for a group.

The “cosmopolitan bunnies” seem to inhabit two text worlds here, the Berlin metropol, which the words “cosmopolitan” and “Potsdamer Platz” point to, and the meadows. For the reader who recognises the plaza and the meadows as the same site, this sets up a layering of two text worlds. These two spaces are connected metonymically because they are both elements of the same target, the vast expanse of land along the Berlin Wall. Their relationship is based on the contiguity of the two spaces, again assuming that this is accessible to the reader. The potential effect is what Gavins (2007: p. 152). describes as “double-vision”, a toggling between two worlds that occurs when participants manage multiple worlds simultaneously.

5. *Glauben was mein Großvater sagte* Believe what my grandfather said

6. *Hier war der Nabel der Welt* Here was the navel of the world

At line 5, the word “*glauben*” (believe) expresses an unrealised epistemic shift that is left as a question. “How should I believe what my grandfather said?” The speaking subject seems unable to reconcile her epistemic state with his. At the end of this same line, there is a shift to reported speech marked by the verb “said.”

4. The wild bunnies on the strip between the walls were such a prominent feature of this landscape that a documentary film was devoted to them. The joint German-Polish production, *Rabbit à la Berlin*, tells the story of the Berlin wall from the point of view of the rabbits. It was released in 2009 and nominated for an Oscar in 2010 for “Best Documentary, Short Subjects.”

Whether understood as free indirect speech or direct speech, the statement in line 6 is again echoic of others' words. The metaphorical expression, "the navel of the world" works ironically. The expression traditionally comes from the notion of a mythological world middle point and has been used colloquially in German to describe a hub of life and activity, not a meadow filled with bunnies. However, lines 7–10 grant us a new perspective, namely the grandfather in his youth, driving a beautiful girl around town in an Adler automobile (a model discontinued in 1957 and therefore itself an association with the past). Here the world switch is initiated by the word "*als*" (as), which anticipates the past tense verb appearing at the end of line 8 in the German (chauffeuré).

7. *Als er in jungen Jahren mit seinem Adler* As he, in his young years with his Adler
 8. *Ein schönes Mädchen chauffierte.* Chauffeuré a beautiful girl.

In lines 9 and 10, there is a switch back to the present, which is delayed until the start of the second of those lines and the appearance of the present tense verb "*fliegen*" (fly). The blended edge of these two worlds, the past and the present, is echoed in the expression "*verschundene Hotel*" (vanished hotel) in line 10. The edges of the worlds are blended once again as the text shifts from the grandfather in his automobile in the 1920s or 1930s to the present moment, where birds fly through a space that is now empty air but would have then been a hotel. The vanished hotel creates what Stockwell (2009: p. 36) has described as a "lacuna effect", a negational figure of perception. The gap of the hole is thus perceived as a coherent object. Like Potsdamer Platz, the hotel seems to function as a metonym for the cosmopolitan Berlin that once existed on this very spot.

9. *Durch das verschundene Hotel* Through the vanished hotel
 10. *Fliegen die Mauersegler* Fly the swifts
 11. *Die Nebel steigen* The fog climbs
 12. *Aus wunderbaren Wiesen und Sträuchern* From wonderful meadows and shrubs

When these 12 lines are taken as a whole, a pattern emerges in which disappeared objects from the past are interwoven with objects from the present (see Figure 2 below). A reader might also notice that two semantically contrasting clusters are set up here: other than the people, the words associated with the past relate to the metropolis, whereas the present objects and enactors (the bunnies and the swallows) relate to nature. The depicted landscape is spotted with objects from the past, perceptible as stylistic lacunae (Stockwell, 2017: p. 100) that do not belong to the same domain as the present view. A reader in 1982 Berlin could be expected to associate with this area all of the objects in the landscape that are conspicuously absent in Kirsch's poem: the barbed wire fences, the watch towers, and the most prototypical of 1980s Berlin features, the wall itself.

Past objects	Present objects
Potsdamer Platz	bunnies
Navel of the World	meadows (repeated twice)
grandfather	swifts
car (the Adler)	fog
girl	bushes
the hotel	

Figure 2. Past and present objects in “*Naturschutzgebiet*.”

8.5.2 Metaphors along the wall: Metonymies of nature and reserve

In the previous section, I have shown how many of the same world building elements that help a reader to create a text world work together by metonymically referring to the historical domains of past and present to which they belong. In this section, I will focus on the ways in which the blending of these two worlds is further facilitated through the development of the extended metaphor of the no-man’s land along the Berlin Wall as a “nature reserve.” Before returning to the title, I will look closely at two words in the poem, which because of their potential polysemy contribute to this extended metaphor.

The first is the word *Adler*, which I previously explained as a car manufacturer from the 1920s and 1930s. The hood emblem on Adler automobiles was a stylised version of the animal from whence the company name was borrowed, the eagle. This same bird was (and is) also a national symbol for Germany that dates back to before the Holy Roman Empire. The official emblem of the Nazi Reich beginning in 1935 was an image of the eagle with its wings spread above a swastika surrounded by a wreath. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany (the West) adopted an up-dated version of the eagle (minus the swastika and the wreath, of course) as its national symbol. In contrast, the German Democratic Republic (the East) used a socialist insignia featuring a hammer and a compass surrounded by a ring of rye, which symbolised the workers, the intelligentsia, and the farmers respectively.

Line 7 of the poem breaks off after the word “Adler” leaving it undetermined until the end of the next line what the grandfather is doing and with what. Because all nouns are capitalised in German, there is no distinction between the proper noun *Adler*, meaning the manufacturing company, and the common noun *Adler*, meaning both the bird and the symbol. Many readers might experience a moment of confusion as I did upon first reading this poem in German. Although the explicature becomes clear at the end of line 8 with the introduction of the action “chauffeured,” all three meanings and their associated elements (Figure 3) are left in play for me as a reader of the text. Their meanings become compressed, I would

argue, because of their metonymic relationship to one another. The bird stands for Germany and its contiguous history all the way up to the Federal Republic and it stands for car company, which in this instance functions as a target-in-source metonym for a particular car owned by the grandfather.⁵

Adler = symbol:	Adler = bird:	Adler = car:
Germany (both <i>Reich</i> and nation state)	wild animal, bird of prey; courageous and strong	1920s/1930s; cosmopolitan Berlin before the war

Figure 3. Possible meanings of *Adler* in the poem.

At the same time, each of these possible meanings potentially connects the word cohesively to other objects in the two text worlds described in the previous section. While the wild bird might feel most at home in the meadow hunting bunnies, the car belongs to the cosmopolitan Potsdamer Platz of the pre-war era. And where does the symbol *Adler* lead if not to this next chapter in German history?

The second word that I will analyze is also a type of bird: the swifts mentioned in line 10. In this case, the explicature is more immediate. The word “flying” at the beginning of the line might already suggest that a bird will be the subject at the end of this clause and the word *Mauersegler* in German (unlike its English counterpart) is unambiguous. And yet, *Mauersegler* is a compound word (literally “wall-glider”) describing a particular behavior characteristic of the swift. The word *Mauersegler* itself is thus an example of a conventionalised metonymy, not all too different from “the sax” in “The sax player has the flu.” That it is a *Mauersegler* flying through the disappeared hotel also makes salient that there is a wall running through it, especially for the reader whose mental map has already placed this location. Like the *Adler*, the *Mauersegler* manages to belong to two domains, NATURE and CITY, but in this case they both belong wholly to the present.

This brings us back to the title. While the German term “*Naturschutzgebiet*” (literally: nature-protection-area) has a slightly different etymology than the English “Nature Reserve,” both carry within them an implied tension between “nature” and “human society.” After all, from what or whom does the nature need to be protected and reserved? The final three lines of the poem provide us with an answer, the people.

5. That the literal meaning of the word would remain activated even after any ambiguity is resolved at the end of the sentence is supported by work on metaphor by Carston (2010: p. 305).

13. *Kaum sperrt man den Menschen den Zugang*
14. *Tut die Natur das ihre durchwächst*
15. *Noch das Pflaster die Straßenbahnschienen.*
 One has just barely blocked entry to the people
 Nature does her thing, growing through
 Yet the cobblestones, the streetcar tracks.

Adler and *Mauersegler* seem to me to constitute pivotal points in the text, which repeat a “thematically significant metaphor” (Stockwell, 2002: p. 111). The effect is what Werth described as “megametaphor” or “extended metaphor” (1994, p. 19), a conceptual metaphor that is extended and sustained across a text through cumulative moments of metaphor and metonymy. In this case, the extended metaphor construes the death strip along the Berlin Wall as a “Nature Reserve.” The next section will consider this megametaphor and how it functions in conjunction with what we might call “extended metonymy”, a metonymical relationship that is developed across a text.

8.5.3 The wall as protection: Metonymy of effect for cause

As I described in the previous section, there is a megametaphor of the strip along the Berlin Wall as a nature reserve that is built across the text. This blend is tightened through the presence of the bunnies, the swifts, the meadows, and the bushes, which are physically present in the actual space and contribute to the blend by making these elements more salient than the barbed wire, land mines, or human deaths. The irony of the metaphor is that an unintended consequence of barricading off a long stretch of land running through the middle of Berlin is made into a cause. Taken as a whole, the gist of the text might thus be a metonymical relationship of EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Taking Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Galera-Masegosa’s categories of metaphoric-metonymic complex, we can see this as an instance of the category “metonymic expansion of metaphoric target” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Galera-Masegosa, 2011: p. 11). The metaphorical correspondence between the death strip and the nature reserve that is sustained as a megametaphor across the text is established. This then positions the extended metonymy, namely an ironic suggestion that the Berlin Wall is a protective structure.

In this case, this is potentially reinforced by the correspondence between the German word “*Naturschutzgebiet*” (nature-protection-area) and the term frequently used by the East German government to refer to and explain the building of the wall, “*antifazistischer Schutzwall*” (antifascist protection wall). The EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy has a political function in this expression. Similar to the “*Naturschutzgebiet*” in the poem, the protection is an incidental effect of the actual

cause, namely limiting the movement of people across the space barricaded by the wall. The result is a potentially echoic effect, which I read as irony. Protection here becomes an act of power and brings with it the question of who is protecting what from whom and whose interests are being served by it. In both of the groups which I observed discussing this poem, the German seminar students and the US German learners, several individuals immediately understood the “cosmopolitan bunnies” in line 1 as a symbolic representation of people who had tried to escape across this stretch, which implies that a socially critical reading was already triggered for them as readers in the early 21st century.

Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Galera-Masegosa (2011: p. 11) argue that metonymy in this form of conceptual integration, i.e. the metonymic expansion of metaphoric target, “serves to obtain the full range of meaning implications to be derived from the metaphor”. In the case of this poem, the metonymic expansion of metaphoric target might give way to an array of weak implicatures or poetic effects. Writing of poetic uses of metonymy more generally, Papafragou (1996, p. 188) notes that in most cases “the aim of the speaker is to create affective rather than cognitive mutuality, and to produce common impressions rather than common knowledge”. The metonymic layering of past and present text worlds and the ambiguous metonymy of the *Adler*, which I described in the first and second sections of the textual analysis, suggest to me a sense of historical continuity that was repressed by the East German government. In the official narrative of the GDR, the West was the legacy of the Nazi regime. As I read the poem, a weak implicature of the image of the *Adler* moving across the Potsdamer Platz was a loose association between the East German government and the Nazi regime. In this way, the complex interplay between metaphor and metonymy contributed to a texture that, according to Sedgewick (2003: pp. 15–16), was “apt to represent crises and fissures of meaning as metonymic continuities”. Like the echoic and ironic meanings of “*Naturschutzgebiet*” and “*Schutzwall*” that I infer from the poem, the implied continuous narrative is counter to and critical of the ideological domain of the East German regime in the early 1980s. But I would argue that the texture of the poem, with its multiple relations of metonymy that leave the reader actively sorting through the layers of history and meaning tied to this single site next to the Berlin Wall, are absolutely crucial to the aesthetic effect of these implicatures, because the social critique arises from a process of discovery on the part of the reader. This has potential implications for readers who are distanced from the context of the poem by time and/or cultural knowledge. While many of the historical references can be explicated, for example through the glossaries that text books tend to provide, it seems likely that the poem would resonate very differently for them, and indeed, my experiences reading the poem with second language learners of German suggest that this is the case.

8.6 Summary

In this analysis of Sarah Kirsch's poem, I have built upon cognitive-pragmatic approaches and their insistence that conceptual thinking and pragmatic inference are interconnected. In our reading of a poem like this, for example, metonymic reason, i.e. relations of contiguity, are tied to communicative purpose and contextual effect. While the poem maps out the space next to the Berlin Wall through the building of text worlds past and present, these layers and the relationship between them only make sense to the reader who can already access both mental representations of this space. The metonymic relationship between the past and present is echoic (Papafragou, 1996), in that it plays off readers' potential ability to draw connections between elements as they move through the layered historical text worlds and to surmise relationships of contiguity across history.

I have also shown how metonymic and metaphoric processes are closely related and at times interrelated across the text. The world building elements of past and present correspond to the domains CITY and NATURE, which sets up the extended metaphor of the Berlin Wall as a nature reserve facilitated by a few key moments in the text including the title. I have argued that this megametaphor integrates with a discourse level metonym of EFFECT FOR CAUSE, in a metonymic expansion of metaphoric target. Whereas text world theory has made extended metaphor an established analytical concept in stylistics and literary linguistics, relatively little has been written to date about extended metonymy. A notable exception is Dancygier and Sweetser's *Figurative Language* (2014), which devotes a section on extended metonymy, which they connect immediately to point of view. My reading of Sarah Kirsch's "Naturschutzgebiet" (Nature Reserve) provides a case study of other potential ways in which extended metonymy can contribute to important poetic effects, such as implicatures of social critique.

Further work in stylistics, including reader response studies, will help us to understand the range of pragmatic and conceptual effects extended metonymy might have in poems and other texts. Speaking of readers' different degrees of receptivity to metaphor, Wayne Booth (1978: p. 65) states that "To understand a metaphor is by its very nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist or reject [him or her], and that is simultaneously to decide either to be shaped in the shape [his or her] metaphor requires or to resist". Following this same sentiment, we also need to consider different degrees of receptivity to metonymy, what textual and contextual elements contribute to affective mutuality, and what the possible implications of this for different uses of poetic texts are, including in the teaching of history and culture.

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James Hogg's and Walter Scott's Scottishness

Varying perceptions of (im)politeness in negotiating Englishness¹

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9.1 Introduction: The politics of Englishness in early nineteenth-century Scotland

This chapter uses discursive (im)politeness theory to develop a nuanced analysis of how early nineteenth-century critics received James Hogg's and Walter Scott's works in their specific historical and social context, and it argues for its usefulness not only in relation to the technical, linguistic analysis of politeness, but also to refer to accepted behaviour in relation to a specific notion of Englishness from the period.

In early nineteenth-century Scotland, the use of polite English and good manners reflected an ideology that distinguished the Lowland Scottish elite who, by monitoring their accent, the style of their language, and the way they dressed and behaved, aspired to be included in the British commercial world and, hence, to compete with the English in the conquest of the empire. They considered the mastering of "proper" English and manners as a means to distance themselves from both the uncouth Highland warriors and the peasantry of the Scottish Lowlands (Sorensen, 2000: p. 151). A working-class author, James Hogg (1770–1835) spoke from a position outside the Scottish literary elite, depicting the protagonists of his works talking in broad Scots, and addressing themes such as prostitution, out-of-wedlock pregnancy and infanticide in quite controversial ways, thereby violating early nineteenth-century literary proprieties which discouraged the use of vernacular languages and the frank treatment of indelicate issues. Contemporary

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reviewers condemned Hogg's stylistic and thematic choices as too coarse for genteel audiences. Conversely, Walter Scott's use of vernacular voices in his Waverley Novels, though likewise attacked by Scottish reviewers, did not disturb the status quo because his Scots voices were mostly relegated to secondary characters like "outcasts, gypsies, and madwomen", whose temporary turbulence only occurred "in the discursive eccentricity of their fragments of song, dark sayings, and opaque tales" (Ferris, 1991: p. 214).

I argue that the recent discursive turn in (im)politeness theory provides an excellent tool of analysis for exploring not only oral speech but also the principles governing the production and reception of literary works, particularly when a political dimension is at the heart of their aesthetic creation. As Mills explains, "[d]iscursive analysts are concerned with a more social model of politeness", and they are keen to explore "the to-and-fro movement between the social, the community of practice and the individual" (Mills, 2011: p. 43). Equally, Leech contends that "polite communication implies that the speaker is taking account of both individual and group values" (Leech, 2007: p. 170). Likewise, in a very much quoted paper, Mao suggests that in keeping or losing face, the individual negotiates the tension between a centripetal force towards adherence to social norms and a centrifugal force towards freedom (Mao, 1994: p. 472). Mao's considerations about the individual's agency are also in line with Sell's assumption that "[a]lthough linguistic and behavioural norms are socially given, a human being is nevertheless a social *individual* [...] whose adaptation to the socially given is not necessarily passive, since there is also the scope for resistance, or for *co*-adaptation" (Sell, 2000: p. 82, emphasis original).

Mills maintains that "judgement is at the heart of politeness and impoliteness behaviour" and that "it is widely recognised amongst discursive theorists that stereotypes about how people *should* behave play a major role in interactants' judgement of whether an utterance is polite or impolite" (Mills, 2011: p. 48, emphasis original). In addition, as Mills argues elsewhere, individuals have to negotiate continuously not only with the gender stereotypes that circulate within their particular social groups, but also "with other variables like race, class, age, sexual orientation, contextual elements, and so on", which influence both their production and interpretation of politeness (Mills, 2003: p. 1). I believe that these ideas are particularly productive for exploring how in the early nineteenth century Hogg and Scott negotiated Scottishness in their novels with a more demanding use of Standard English in the construction of British national identity which contemporary Scottish reviews such as the *Edinburgh Literary Review* and *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* fiercely controlled. As Sorensen points out, the novel of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "while subtly (and not so subtly) instructing in gendered moral codes and related bourgeois values, also educates

its readers in proper language use and literary practices” (Sorensen, 2000: p. 122). Nevertheless, Sorensen continues, “the linguistic value of the standard is not a given, [...] and is certainly not inclusive, [...] but is determined through struggle between social groups” (Sorensen, 2000: p. 128).

In this chapter I argue that both the judgmental values of politeness and the ideology inherent in valuing the use of Standard English to some extent correlate to Bakhtin's insights on literary dialogism. For example, while politeness principles show how participants maintain or break power, social distance, and status by respecting or threatening face, the characters of a literary work can signal the same social dimension through their closeness to or distance from what is assumed to be the official language in the world outwith the text. From a Bakhtinian perspective – and similarly to Mao's above-mentioned argument about the tension between the individual's desire for freedom and their wish to be socially accepted – the use of the Scots language in Hogg's and Scott's novels reflects the struggle between a centripetal and unifying tendency towards Englishness and a decentralising, centrifugal force towards other varieties and more marginal voices which Bakhtin (1981: p. 67) calls “heteroglossia”. Every character of a novel represents a social dimension, as their speech is always ideologically marked (Bakhtin, 1981: p. 334) and, I add, judged as more or less in line with norms of propriety. As this chapter will show, Hogg's contemporary Scottish reviewers were rather critical of his extensive use of broad Scots in place of Standard English, showing class prejudice in their evaluation and very little concern for his poetic skills.

The ideology behind such judgements is well explained by Sorensen who argues that “[i]n the intimate homosocial domains of the Lowland clubs, polite conversation not only offered a chance to exercise one's ‘supra-regional’ English, but also provided the form for the social alliances of emerging political structures within a newly incorporated Britain” (Sorensen, 2000: p. 140). In the same line, Agha (2003) explains that the “enregisterment” of Received Pronunciation (RP) “in public awareness as indexical of speaker's class and level of education” (Agha, 2003: p. 232) and “linked to an ideology of speaker's rank” (Agha, 2003: p. 242) expanded between 1760 and 1900, at the end of which period, “competence in RP was widely recognized as a prerequisite for social advancement, as a gateway to employment, in the upper echelons of government and military service” (Agha, 2003: p. 232). Agha explains that RP was precisely valued for being a “supra-local accent” and thus “for effacing the geographic origins of the speaker” (Agha, 2003: p. 233). I contend that early nineteenth-century Scottish reviewers judged Hogg's and Scott's use of vernaculars as not appropriate according to a contemporary aesthetic discourse of middle-class Englishness preoccupied with the commercial income of an ever-expanding British Empire. Discursive (im)politeness theory can thus illuminate what triggered these contemporary reviewers to accept

and/or critique Hogg and Scott. In addition, the tension that both authors show between adherence to and refusal of Englishness provides evidence in support of Mao's notion of the negotiation of the individual between "the ideal social identity and the ideal social autonomy" that Mao discusses in the article mentioned above (Mao, 1994: p. 451).

After a short section on the ideology of Scotticisms, I will devote a few thoughts to recent research on historical (im)politeness as developed by Culpeper (2011), Culpeper and Demmen (2011), Bax and Kádár (2011), Rudanko (2006, 2011, 2017), Mills (2004, 2011), Fitzmaurice (2010), and Agha (2003), touching on another cornerstone of Englishness in the second half of the eighteenth century, the 4th Earl of Chesterfield's *Letters to His Son* (1774). Here, Chesterfield provides advice on language style and good manners as marks of high class. This will prepare the ground for the discussion of the politeness principles governing Hogg's and Scott's aesthetic production of "heteroglot" voices in their fictional works and the reception of such voices by their contemporary literary reviewers.

9.2 The ideology of Scotticisms

As Mack (2006: p. 53) points out, the Scottish ruling class of the early nineteenth century had developed the notion of North Britain, "a new name to match a new post-Union Scottish identity": lairds, aristocrats, lawyers, intellectuals, and politicians had to mould their "cultural and linguistic norms" to those of "polite England", as this cultural cleansing would smooth the path of their career in the colonial space. Sorensen observes that "the standard language constructed throughout the eighteenth century figured centrally in the national subject's ability to imagine him or herself as a member of a national community"; Tobias Smollett's use of the Scots dialect in *Humphry Clinker* (1771), for example, "institute[d] the insider/outsider distinction used to determine true British status", even though that true status of Britishness did not include women and members of the lower classes (Sorensen, 2000: pp. 13, 22).

Mills argues that "politeness is a crucial element in constituting class difference" (Mills, 2004: p. 184) and this is also shown in the nineteenth-century ideology that proscribed the use of Scotticisms. In this respect, Sorensen maintains that the bourgeoisie's mastering of polite English was a way of marking their meritorious belonging to the higher levels of society rather than acquiring that status through blood lineage (Sorensen, 2000: pp. 140–141, 202). The snobbish attitude implied in the use of polite English reflected a class ideology that served the ambitious members of the Lowland Scottish elite. As a consequence, those who did not conform, including "working-class writers, particularly those who threatened to

disturb moral and stylistic standards, were [...] carefully monitored by the literati” (Alker and Nelson, 2009: p. 9) either by censure or by fierce attacks in the reviews. The critical reviews that appeared for example in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* and *The Edinburgh Review*, Ferris explains, “functioned as the main site for the establishment of literary authority” while “they sought to direct and form” the taste of the “reading public” (Ferris, 1991: pp. 2–3). The Scottish literary reviews of the period, particularly Francis Jeffrey's *Edinburgh Review* (begun in 1802), played an important role in educating the readers' taste to appropriate Standard English. This was the common language of the British nation that represented progress, and the big Reviews discriminated against the use of other regional vernaculars as pertaining to a backwards state of the nation, thereby assuming a distinction between “polite” and “provincial” varieties of English. According to Christie, the Scottish elite were also behind the development of the English periodical press as “Walter Scott and a second generation Scot, the publisher John Murray, were behind” the *Quarterly Review*, begun in London in 1809 (Christie, 2013: p. 124). Christie points out that the big Reviews were central and influential as they were “engaged in the culture of ideas, information, and ideologies in ways that ensured the dissemination of current knowledge, while at the same time contributing to the political and cultural debates” (Christie, 2013: p. 116). The Big Reviews' monitoring of the use of Scotticisms thus shows that the lowland Scottish elite supported the ideology of polite Englishness because this linguistic and cultural appropriation would allow them to exploit the financial and political advantages deriving from being part of the British Union.

9.3 Discursive (im)politeness theory for literary analysis

As Chapman and Clark (2014: pp. 19–20) have explained, in the discussion of literary works (im)politeness theory has been used to evaluate how face needs are addressed during interaction at two different levels: between characters in the text and between narrators and readers. Sell defines the former as a formalistic use of pragmatic principles in that they are confined to the analysis of communication between fictional characters within the text. The same pragmaticist principles, however, can also be applied to the communication occurring between an author and the readers that engage with the text. “All in all”, Sell explains, “formalist literary pragmatics [...] underestimates [...] the extent to which literature itself is a form of communication” (Sell, 2000: p. 74). This would follow when the analysis focuses only on the relationships between or among characters. (Im)politeness theory, in fact, can also be used to define how face needs are maintained between the author – who makes use of the narrative voice to manage the plot construction

and to communicate their ideas about the fictional world – and an implied readership that the author has in mind at the act of creating their fictional world and that, for this reason, is historically circumscribed to the time of writing. This second level of communication is always operative whenever we read a fictional work and goes beyond the author's target of historicised implied readership. The meaning of the text itself, Sell explains, though having been produced in a specific moment, is historically influenced only to some extent, because any reading, either contemporary or subsequent, is always enriched with the personal experience of the reader. This is what Sell implies when arguing for an historically situated literary pragmatics without being historicist.

Sell points out that “[t]he context in which a literary work is currently being read is a cognitive environment which varies, infinitely, and quite beyond the writer's control or knowledge” (Sell, 2000: p. 132), arguing that “the inevitable contextual disparity [...] helps to constitute the act [of communication] as a historical process, communication being a matter of negotiating the contextual disparity” (Sell, 2000: p. 107). In this respect, Sell holds that “perceptions of politeness do vary from one culture to another” (Sell, 2000: p. 220). Likewise, Bax and Kádár point out that Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of politeness theory “does little justice to the cultural and historical relativity of polite language”, arguing that “across the globe, and across historical periods, (im)polite forms vary considerably, not only formally/linguistically but also pragmatically/functionally” (Bax and Kádár, 2011: pp. 15, 13). Christie (2000: p. 157) similarly observes that the limit of Brown and Levinson's politeness theory is the abstraction of a Model Person who is assumed to share the same rationality and face with all other human beings, irrespective of their class, gender, and culture. It is certainly important, as Bax, Kádár and Christie have noticed, to consider the variance in perception of (im)politeness, particularly now as we are witnessing an intersectional turn in both linguistic and literary scholarship according to which gender analysis has to be considered in relation to class and race. However, the ethnographic study of politeness initiated by Brown and Levinson (1987) has contributed enormously to our understanding of why we respect Grice's co-operative principles in communication, in addition to opening up the path to applications of (im)politeness theory to the production and reception of literary texts, as we shall see later in this chapter.

Following the discursive (and intersectional) turn, Culpeper observes that “researchers taking the discursive [...] approach to impoliteness [...] emphasise that the very concept of impoliteness itself and its definition are subject to discursive struggle” (Culpeper, 2011: pp. 22–23). Culpeper explains that “different groups of people – different ‘cultures’ – have different norms and different values”, arguing that “[v]alues and norms are at the heart of impoliteness” (Culpeper, 2011: p. 27), and that discussions about impoliteness need to consider “face, social

norms, intentionality and emotion” (Culpeper, 2011: pp. 36–37). Discursive (im) politeness theory hence plays an important role here because conceiving of (im) politeness as a continuum which changes according to the historical, cultural, social, ethnic, class, age, and gender position of both the author and the reader can be extremely productive for analysing the reasons behind the success or the failure of a literary work. The perception and production of (im)politeness are phenomena that can be analysed both synchronically, in the same epoch among different socio-cultural contexts, and diachronically, explaining why the reception of the same work changes with the passing of time. In the specific case of this chapter, discursive (im)politeness theory provides an excellent tool of analysis for describing the principles behind the ideology inherent in the debate about Englishness versus Scottishness at the time when Hogg and Scott created their fictional works. This frame of analysis is also an important device for exposing how both authors negotiated differently their artistic freedom with regard to the norms of politeness of the period. As Chapman and Clark observe, the aim of literary pragmatics “is not to suggest interpretations or evaluations that have not been identified by literary critics and other readers. Rather, the aim is to understand and explain how such readings, interpretations and evaluations arise, develop and spread” (Chapman and Clark, 2014: pp. 20–21). I argue that an understanding of the principles guiding “such readings, interpretations and evaluations”, particularly regarding judgements of their politeness, can also contribute to a more sophisticated critical analysis of both the production and reception of literary works. In her recent book, Rosaler (2016) argues that a relevance theory framework of analysis is invaluable in exploring how some Victorian novelists were able to avoid the explicit representation of illegitimate pregnancy in “polite” fiction by drawing on the pragmatic phenomenon of implicature. Rosaler’s analysis is certainly important in analysing how an author may negotiate their willingness to represent an important social issue with regard to readerly expectations. The (im)politeness framework can complement this by allowing evaluations about both the author’s production and the critic’s reception of the text. For example, considerations about how an author manages his “face” with respect to their contemporary norms of literary politeness makes it possible to develop a nuanced account of how they negotiated their set of values in the context of the ideology of the period; while the notion of “aggravated (im)politeness” shows the degree of class, race and gender prejudices on the part of the critic when reviewing an author’s literary work.

Rudanko explains that “[i]n assessing the political rhetoric of a historical period, it is not easy to draw a sharp line between what counts as “polite,” “neutral” or ‘impolite criticism’” (Rudanko, 2011: p. 86). This is where the literary pragmaticist critic can intervene, acting as mediator between the period of the literary works under discussion and the twenty-first century, as also argued by Sell

(2001: pp. 28–29, 354). For the analysis of the authors in the present chapter, for example, it is important to highlight the legacy of some nineteenth-century gender stereotypes on current perceptions of polite behaviour as signalled by the relation between norms of politeness, mother figures and female decorum, which I discuss in the following section.

As I have argued elsewhere (Leonardi, 2018a: pp. 1–3; Leonardi 2018b: pp. 20–21), in early nineteenth-century Britain, the well-managed, middle-class, domestic household and peaceful family represented an ideologically constructed model for the politically successful government of the nation, and the figure of the mother played a pivotal role in the discourse of the family as a politically organised unit on which the nation had to be based. In his *Reflection on the Revolution in France* (1790), Edmund Burke depicted the ideal of conflict-free family on which Britain had to model its national relationships “binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties,” and “adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections” (Burke, 1982 [1790], pp. 119–120). Yet, as Mellor (2000) explains, while Burke assigned “the ultimate responsibility for the moral improvement and sustenance of the family estate” to “our forefathers,” Hannah More “assigned that responsibility to [...] mothers” (Mellor, 2000: p. 31). Mellor points out that in her treatise *Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education* (1799) and in her novel *Coelebs in Search of a Wife* (1808), More promoted the “fiscally responsible” and “morally pure woman” who gratifies herself through motherhood (Mellor, 2000: p. 29). More argued that women have “a greater moral purity and capacity of virtue” than men (Mellor, 2000: p. 25). For this reason, she believed in a “revolution in manners” that had to be “carried out” by Western middle-class women in their role of “mothers of the nation” (Mellor, 2000: p. 30; see also Leonardi, 2018b: pp. 20–21).

Similarly to More, in *The Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1995 [1792]), Mary Wollstonecraft endorsed a more substantial education for women than the one promoted in conduct books, an education that would prepare middle-class women to train their children to become good citizens of the nation (Leonardi, 2018b: pp. 18–19). As Kirkley points out, Wollstonecraft promoted “the mother as a legislator-like figure whose duty lies in equipping future citizens with the moral strength to effect social change” (Kirkley, 2015: p. 16). Arguably, the ideology of the mother of the nation is still visible in what Mills describes as the stereotype of Western middle-class women perceived as the upholder of a negative politeness endowed with a “civilising force” (Mills, 2004: p. 178).

As we shall see, the connection between historical politeness and assumptions about female decorum is important to explain the reasons behind contemporary reviewers’ negative reception of some of Hogg’s works addressing prostitution, out-of-wedlock pregnancy and infanticide. On the other hand, Walter Scott was

able to use the ideological assumptions about Englishness and Scottishness to his own critical ends. In *The Heart of Midlothian* (1818), Scott portrayed the secondary heroine Madge Wildfire as insane and speaking in broad Scots. In this way, Madge was “perceived as not completely responsible for her overt sexuality” (Leonardi, 2018b: 29); yet this strategy allowed Scott to depict the reality of working class women while leaving the middle-class ideology of female propriety unchallenged, thereby rendering his work more acceptable to contemporary Scottish reviewers.

Finally, in this chapter I will consider the perception and performance of (im)politeness beyond the analysis of linguistic features, arguing that (im)polite behaviour does not concern solely the way someone speaks, but also a series of factors such as appropriate behaviour, dress, and good manners – all indicative of one’s level of education, sophistication and, by analogy, social status. In discussing Chesterfield’s *Letters to His Son*, Fitzmaurice indicates that the Earl’s “politeness is about etiquette and other highly cultural specific forms of learned behaviour rather than about linguistic politeness” (Fitzmaurice, 2010: p. 102). Discussions of Englishness in the early nineteenth century necessarily need to include a plethora of features that do not stop at one’s appropriate use of Standard English. As Fitzmaurice observes, “Chesterfield’s advice to his son consists of instruction in the appropriate matching of behaviour (including language, conversation, manner of speaking, writing, clothes, etc.) and situation. That is to say, his aim is to provide instruction in politic behaviour for gentlemen” (Fitzmaurice, 2010: p. 102). Similarly, in discussing Scotland’s Anglicization in the eighteenth century, Branch observes that

Before they could be allowed to participate in relatively free and equitable commerce with England, Scots had to show on every cultural level that they were entering into an English system of value and that they accepted both the notion of exchange and the English authority that set its terms of value. [...] Exposure to English luxuries led to rising economic expectations among Scots, but the constant assertion of English cultural superiority in everything from architecture and furnishing to food and drink was at least equally responsible for Scottish desire to mimic English ways. [...] The painful disparity between English good taste and Scottish boorishness seemed especially apparent in clothing.

(Branch, 2004: p. 438)

Importantly for the current discussion of politeness in the reception of Hogg’s and Scott’s works in early nineteenth-century reviews, Branch points out that not only “one’s command of English”, but also “clothing was an especially public sign of one’s Englishness or Scottishness in the years following the Union” (Branch, 2004: p. 438). Likewise, Agha points out that by the mid-nineteenth century, etiquette manuals “directly address[ed] themselves to members of the expanding

middle classes”, noticing that such guides would “link accent to a range of other signs of proper demeanor” such as “habits of dress, carriage, gesture, grooming, cosmetics, and numerous other behavioural displays” (Agha, 2003: pp. 253, 254). We shall see that Scottish reviewers considered manners, clothing, appropriate behaviour *and* language when criticising Hogg’s works, and that Scott, too, took these features into account when constructing his most outrageous characters.

9.4 The Ettrick Shepherd: A bull in a china shop

James Hogg, also known as the Ettrick Shepherd, the literary persona made famous through the dialogues of the *Noctes Ambrosianae* that appeared in *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine* between 1822 and 1835, was a real, self-educated Scottish shepherd who nowadays is mostly renowned for his novel *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner*, published in 1824. Yet he was a prolific author, and wrote far more than just one novel during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Today, he is considered to be one of the most compelling figures of Scottish Romanticism (Mack, 2006; Duncan, 2007), but at his time of writing, his works were rather controversial because his directness in addressing prostitution, as well as his use of broad Scots in contrast to Standard English, disturbed the sense of decorum of his contemporary bourgeois establishment. Hogg’s methods provoked charges of “indelicacy”, particularly on the part of the Edinburgh literary elite who had the power to determine the success or the failure of his publications. On the other hand, American reviewers were inclined to highlight his literary achievement as someone who rose from obscurity, and to set his self-education as an example of democracy to former African-American slaves, for whom education would make a difference in finding a path in their newly emancipated condition. This fact contributed to a more tolerant attitude towards Hogg’s supposed indelicacies, his works were successfully republished, and American periodicals reviewed them more positively.

This section will argue that Scottish, English, and North American reviewers received, interpreted, and evaluated Hogg’s texts differently. Though his social background influenced all reviewers’ patronizing attitude, the Scottish ones were certainly the harshest. Conversely, in nineteenth-century America, “Hogg was popular [...] because his personal narrative appealed to Enlightenment ideals of “improvement” and self-help” (Gilbert, 2012: p. 44). The different grades of acceptance and/or refusal of Hogg’s poetics in British and American periodicals support Mills’s argument that “the perception of politeness at a social level tends to be ideological” (Mills, 2009: p. 1048). The following will provide evidence of the author’s reception in British and American periodicals arguing that discursive

(im)politeness theory is productive when comparing both the synchronic and the diachronic reception of an author in different cultural contexts.

Regarding the perception of impoliteness, Mills observes that the focus should be on “the difference between impoliteness at a social level and at the level of the individual”, because “judgements about impoliteness at a social level tend to be ideological” and to influence the perception of impoliteness of the single person. For example, the British perception of Arabs “as too direct when they are speaking English” is the result of “an evaluation not of the language but of the people and the cultural values that a particular group is assumed to hold” (Mills, 2009: pp. 1049, 1052, 1054). Here the negative criticism of Hogg's works at the time of his first editions comes to mind. Both in Scottish and English periodicals, his social origin was held explicitly responsible for his lack of delicacy, while his literary skills were rarely mentioned or, rather, considered as the traits of a talented but irredeemable writer. For example, regarding the reception of Hogg's “Memoir” prefaced to his collection of poems *The Mountain Bard* of 1821, Alker and Nelson have noticed that the intense negative reaction in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* (August 1821) dismissed his literary talent by “portray[ing] the Ettrick Shepherd as a bestial, polluted creature defined by his labouring body” – traits which were exploited “to justify his rejection by publishers and to undercut his appeal to sentiment and satire” (Alker and Nelson, 2006: pp. 69–70). In other words, Hogg's (im)politeness was judged according to a plethora of features beyond language, features which also informed the ideology of Englishness.

The description of the Ettrick Shepherd in bestial terms accords with what Potkay defines as “a newer ideology of polite style” in the revised essay “Of Eloquence” by David Hume, where many of his “decisive emendations were made in the 1760s”, at a time when “the polite evidently felt a heightened need to protect their distinctive linguistic privileges”. Potkay explains that “[p]oliteness is an eighteenth-century ideology in formation, intended to consolidate the members of the gentry and professional classes, and to differentiate this group from a ‘vulgar’ underclass” (Potkay, 1991: p. 50). As mentioned above, politeness was an ideology encompassing far more than just language, having also to do with manners, appropriate behaviour and clothes. As the negative reviews of Hogg's works testify, this ideology was still extant in the early nineteenth century and did not accord with the Ettrick Shepherd's Scottishness and supposedly uncouth behaviour.

A similar negative reception was suffered by Hogg's novel *The Three Perils of Woman* (1823) for the range of vernacular voices and the depiction of women of dubious fame. Groves maintains that the readers of Hogg's time regarded the novel as a terrible failure for its lustful heroines and its lack of respect for polite social mores (Groves, 1986: p. 192). The *Lady's Magazine* (London, 1823, p. 707) pointed out that his “profuse introduction of the Scottish slang or jargon

is repulsive to southern readers". *The British Magazine, or, Miscellany of Polite Literature* (London, Oct. 1823, p. 365) likewise described his use of the Lowland and Highland vernaculars as "unintelligible to those who have the misfortune not to be born in Scotland", and was critical of the fact that Hogg had described a high society of which he had no knowledge. The *Literary Chronicle* (London, Sept. 27, 1823, p. 615) also critiqued Hogg's use of dialects and indecency, arguing that "his new work sins more daringly and more frequently against religion, modesty, and good breeding". *The London Literary Gazette, and Journal of Belles Lettres, Arts, Science, &c.* (30 Aug. 1823, pp. 546–547), although acknowledging Hogg as "a man of a strong but undisciplined imagination", accused his novel of blasphemy, "coarseness and gross vulgarity", as well as of being characterised by "a dialect of unintelligible gibberish", adding that "no author ought to write what no gentleman could say in respectable, far less in female, society. [...] the frequent allusions to women of ill-fame, and especially Gatty's letter about them, are in the worst possible taste". What outraged these critics is that in *Perils of Woman*, the good-intentioned farmer from the Scottish Borders, Daniel Bell, takes his daughter and son to Edinburgh in order for them to be educated, and leave them with an older lady in an apartment that happens to be in the same building which is also the lodging of a brothel. The following is an extract of Gatty's letter to her father:

I have no news from this great city, and it is no great loss, for I fear it is a sink of sin and iniquity. There are a great number of girls here, and some of them very fine accomplished ladies, that are merely bad girls by profession; that is, I suppose they lie, and swear, and cheat, and steal for a livelihood; at least, I can find no other occupation that they have. What a horrible thing this is, and how it comes that the law tolerates them, is beyond my comprehension. I think there must be some mystery about these ladies, for I have asked Mrs Johnson and Mrs M'Grinder all about them, but they shake their heads, and the only answer that I receive is, that "they are bad girls, a set of human beings that are lost to every good thing in this world, and all hope in the next." (Hogg, 2002: pp. 39–40)

Daniel Bell's choice of the wrong apartment for his children is the first hint at prostitution in the novel. Gatty's letter to her father, with her comments about "women of ill-fame", is an allusion which the anonymous reviewer of the *Literary Gazette* considered extremely offensive. The character of M'Ion – the Edinburgh medical-student with a "shady reputation", who lives in a building with a brothel – suggests a common practice among prostitutes in that period since, as also observed by Dr Tait, young students of law and medicine were frequently supported by prostitutes as their "fancy men" (Tait, 1840: p. 56).

Dr Tait, a surgeon who treated the prostitutes of Edinburgh, observed that the particular lack of factories in the city had created a needle-work market

“completely overstocked, and the price of labour reduced to the lowest rate” (Tait, 1840: p. 107), thus leading many of these young women to resort to prostitution as a means of survival. Hogg was aware of this problem and he empathised with those women who had resorted to prostitution, as shown by some of the finest female characters of his novels: Rickleton’s wife in *Perils of Woman* and Bell Calvert in *Confessions of a Justified Sinner*. Nonetheless, Groves claims that at a time when in a literary context even the theme of pregnancy was considered indelicate, Hogg pushed the limits of decorum too far by introducing a disturbing issue concerned with women’s contemporary urban life and showing the consequences of prostitution in the venereal disease which affects the love-triangle of Gatty, Cherry, and M’Ion (Groves, 1987: p. 129). However, it must be noticed that Hogg never states openly the nature of the malady, implying it more subtly through other allusions and leaving the final interpretation to the reader. Nevertheless, the reviewer of the above-mentioned *Literary Chronicle* felt his face threatened by Hogg’s indirect hints, judging the *Perils of Woman* a novel “not for [...] our family, to whom [...] we must make it a sealed book” (1823: 615). That is to say, this reviewer thought that Hogg should have left bourgeois women – the symbolic signifiers of the British nation – unaware of the disturbing reality of prostitution in their position at the other end of the social spectrum.

Yet the most caustic review of Hogg’s novel was in *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine* of October 1823. In this review, John Wilson focussed very patronizingly on Hogg’s social origin rather than his creative skills, in order to justify his supposed indelicacy. Though acknowledging Hogg’s powerful imagination, Wilson claimed that Hogg was fine as long as he wrote ballads, but when engaging in novelistic output he was quite ridiculous:

It is indeed this rare union of high imagination with homely truth that constitutes the peculiar character of his writings. In one page, we listen to the song of the nightingale, and in another, to the grunt of the boar. Now the wood is vocal with the feathered choir; and then the sty bubbles and squeaks with a farm-sow, and a litter of nineteen pigwiggins. [...] We have, in these three volumes, the cream, and butter, and cheese, of his experience –the pail, the churn, and the press. (pp. 427, 428)

Wilson’s review of Hogg’s novel can be considered as an example of what Rudanko defines as “aggravated impoliteness”. According to Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003: p. 1546), impoliteness is defined as “communicative strategies designed to attack face, and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony”. To complement this definition of impoliteness, Rudanko proposes the concept of “aggravated impoliteness”, arguing that

A strategy of aggravated impoliteness is similar to a strategy of impoliteness in that both are used by a speaker in order to intentionally bring about disharmony in social relations by attacking the face of the hearer. The difference between the two is not one of kind, but one of degree.

(Rudanko, 2006: p. 838; see also Rudanko, 2017: pp. 4, 14)

Wilson's review appears to have been intentionally devised to attack Hogg's status as a literary figure, with no regards whatsoever for Hogg's public face as a writer. This intention is evidenced by an epistolary exchange among a few members of the Blackwoodian circle. In a letter to William Blackwood, relating to Wilson's callous review, of probably mid September 1823, John Gibson Lockhart wrote: "I must have nothing to do with the murder of my own dedicator. You sh[oul]d take out certainly a few coarse words which m[igh]t offend Mrs Hogg". Lockhart felt the vicious tone of the review and given the fact that Hogg had dedicated the novel to him, Lockhart evidently did not want to take part in his critical "demise". Blackwood tried to persuade Wilson to tone down his review in a letter of 20 Sept 1823: "Few of the readers of *Maga* know the beastliness of Hogg, and weak minds would be startled by some of your strong expressions" (see database by Garside, Belanger, and Ragaz, *British Fiction, 1800–1829: A Database of Production, Circulation & Reception*). Discursive (im)politeness theory allows us to foreground the tension between Hogg's working-class background and the early nineteenth-century Scottish literary establishment. Ide (1989) has noticed that politeness plays an important role in indicating the position that an individual has been allocated on the social scale (qtd. in Mills, 2011: p. 24). In view of this, one wonders whether John Wilson would ever have made such harsh comments, had Hogg belonged to a different social milieu.

Concerning the use of vernacular forms, Hogg provides his poetic reasons through the voice of Gatty's father in *Perils of Woman* who, after being rebuked by his wife for not being able to write a letter to his daughter in proper English, responds with a strong defence of the Scots language:

"My dear husband, it is for your honour and future satisfaction that I speak. But, in the first place, there's not a right spelled word in that letter."

"It's a fragrant wuntruth. I'll lay you ony bait there's no wrang spelled word in it a'. Now, if ye daur haud me, ye maun mind that I write Scots, my ain naiteve tongue; and there never was ony reule for that. Every man writes as he speaks it, and that's the great advantage of our language ower a' others. (Hogg, 2002: p. 42)

As I have argued elsewhere (Leonardi, 2016), Hogg's use of language, and of forms from different varieties, was quite sophisticated. In *Confessions of a Justified Sinner*, the Standard English of the prostitute Bell Calvert "signals her upper-class origin and subsequent fall" (Leonardi, 2016: p. 64). Both contemporary reviewers and

current Hogg scholars have contested that the Standard English of Katharine Laidlaw's in *The Brownie of Bodsbeck* (1818) is not the language expected of the daughter of a Scots farmer as she should speak broad Scots. Nevertheless, "[t]he dissonance between Katharine's language and the conditions which should govern her speech as a member of the peasant class is a strategy that Hogg exploits to denote her as a meritorious symbol for the Scottish nation" (Leonardi, 2016: p. 64), because her Englishness is also substantiated by her purity of heart. In her discussion of eighteenth-century Englishness, Sorensen (2000: p. 153) has noticed that politeness generally implies a certain degree of falsity as "polite conversation, far from being an open exchange of one's innermost sentiments, is more often a concealing of them" (Sorensen, 2000: p. 214). This is why in *The Brownie* Hogg has Katharine's father Wat Laidlaw convey his ideas of honour in Scots: his Scottishness marks him as a genuine character. In addition, his use of a vernacular form distinguishes him from the Lowland bourgeoisie, whose Englishness would hide their not-always-honourable intentions behind the exploitation of the British Empire, as Hogg himself would argue some years later in an essay published in the *Quarterly Journal of Agriculture*. Here, he critiqued the loss of benevolence between master and servants. Thanks to the gains from the British Empire, some farmers now owned more than one farm, while "[t]he menial [...] feels that he is no more a member of a community, but a slave; a servant of servants, a mere tool of labour in the hand of a man whom he knows or deems inferior to himself" (Hogg, 1985 [1831–32], pp. 44–45). In Hogg's *Brownie*, the contrast between Wat's Scottishness and Katharine's Englishness in the same social dimension is a strategy to "expose the performative quality of British national identity through language", in order to "counter the ideology of centre/periphery and the rhetoric of inclusion/exclusion implicit in the dialectic between Standard English and vernacular languages so fundamental to the formation of the British Empire" (Leonardi, 2016: p. 64).

Concerning the relation between class and politeness, Mills remarks that "[w]hen interacting with others, utterances which are judged to be impolite are an indication [...] of [...] the relative status, and more importantly, the perception of status difference, of the participants in relation to one another" (Mills, 2009: p. 1049). This is certainly the dynamic that occurred in the reception of Hogg's *Perils of Woman* as well as in the portrayal of Hogg in the *Noctes Ambrosianae*. These were a fictional series of dialogues about contemporary literature between the reviewers of *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, where Hogg was depicted as an uncouth and boisterous shepherd, rather inclined towards whisky. Gillian Hughes has observed that, though the series of the *Noctes* in *Blackwood's* "was undoubtedly good publicity for [Hogg's] work throughout the British empire, [...] it probably had a negative effect on the nature of his fame" (Hughes, 2007: pp. 185–86). When Hogg visited London in 1832 to find a publisher for his collection of tales, "those whose

mental picture of Hogg was drawn from the Shepherd of the *Noctes Ambrosianae* were surprised to find him ‘so smooth, well-looking, and gentlemanly’” (Hughes, 2007: p. 249). The representation of Hogg in the *Noctes* was a discursively devised depiction, influenced by stereotypes of class and polite manners inherent in the ideology of Englishness supported by *Blackwood’s* circle.

On the other hand, the reviews of Hogg’s works in early nineteenth-century American periodicals emphasised his literary achievements, notwithstanding his humble background of origin. The reviewer of New York’s *Minerva* focussed on “[Hogg] winning his way with the firm step of genius” (20 Aug 1825, p. 315). *The American Monthly Magazine* of November 1829 (Boston) argued against the notice on the third edition of Hogg’s long poem *Queen’s Wake* (1814 [1813]), according to which he had received “no education whatever”. This American reviewer noted that Hogg had probably not received “academic or public education, a very different thing [...] from none at all. [...] This assertion can only be received under great limitation. [...] Whatever may have been the education of Mr. Hogg [...] so far as his profession is concerned [...] he may be called an educated man” (pp. 522, 527–528). Boston’s *Athenæum* of 1st March 1831 observed that “[o]f such a man his country may be proud. We respect and we admire him. We respect the energy that has made its own way, – the industry that has done the best with material in its power” (p. 513). This reviewer also contested Hogg’s negative image arising from *Blackwood’s Noctes Ambrosianae*; discussing his collection of *Songs*, the reviewer claimed that “the present volume will greatly raise the poet in the estimation of the public, who are too apt to mistake him for a Noctesian roister, and, though imaginative, a sometimes coarse prose writer” (p. 516). Indeed, the writer of an article entitled “Visit to the Ettrick Shepherd” published in *The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States* in January 1836 (Washington, D.C.) described Hogg as a man who knew how to behave politely. This American visitor, who had met him in his farm in Yarrow, argued that “Contrary to the observations of many who have seen and conversed with him, and whose remarks have been published, his discourse seemed to be entirely free of egotism” (p. 331). In other words, in American periodicals, Hogg’s politeness was described as sincere and his supposed egotism, another sign of Hogg not being used to polite manners, was denied. This American visitor also described his library, a sign of education. When Hogg invited him, he “followed him to the parlor, one side nearly of which, [*sic*] was occupied by his library” (p. 331); while regarding Hogg’s accent, he admitted that “his dialect and pronunciation were decidedly Scotch, though not so broad as that of many well educated persons I met with” (p. 332).

Currie points out that Moses Thomas, an American publisher, “helped to cement Hogg’s American literary reputation as a “poet of considerable rank” [...by] regularly reprint[ing] the most favourable British notices of Hogg’s work in the

pages of the *Analectic Magazine*" (Currie, 2009: p. 231). It is fair to say that the most favourable British reviews of Hogg's works republished in American periodicals were from English magazines such as *The Champion* and *The Eclectic Review*. On 1st July 1815, Thomas republished a very positive review of Hogg's long poem *The Pilgrims of the Sun* (1815) in Philadelphia's *Analectic Magazine* from London's *Eclectic Review* of March 1815. The English reviewer remarked that

It is no easy task for a young man without either title or name that may insure attention, to force his way through the hosts of versifiers that crowd the levee of Fame with their obstreperous claims; and in spite of fashion, prejudice, or envy, to stand forward as the rival or compeer of Southey and Wordsworth, of Byron and Campbell, of Montgomery and of Scott. (*Analectic Magazine*, p. 36)

In *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Hogg would never have been compared to such big names.

9.5 Walter Scott's literary compromise and communicational co-adaptation

Walter Scott, too, made use of voices in vernacular Scotch. In a recent article, Adams holds that Scott's early *Waverley* novels

traverse Scottish and English cultures in a narrative composed of Standard English and Scotch vernacular, unifying the dialects on the page and suggesting an endorsement of the communities who use them. [...] the text's [*Waverley*'s] bilingualism [...] constitutes a persuasive tactic [...] to assent to unification and to be educated in the benefits of belonging to this new community.

(Adams, 2015: p. 950)

The Edinburgh Review, however, was not of the same opinion concerning Scott's bilingualism in *Waverley*, as his novel was considered as "a thing obviously very hastily, and, in many places, very unskilfully written – composed, one half of it, in a dialect unintelligible to four-fifths of the reading population of the country" (Nov 1814, p. 208). This reviewer shows the linguistic prescription of the period supportive of polite Englishness as a patent for the middle classes to access the riches of the empire, while Scott was trying to preserve a sense of Scottish identity in the British Union with England.

In Scott's novels, however, vernacular words were never uttered by the main protagonists but rather by secondary characters whose temporary turbulence, caused by the appearance of their language, did not compromise the status quo. Yet this does not mean that his strategy was less critical of contemporary issues than Hogg's. In fact, Scott adopted a "*media via*" prudence by co-adapting his

willingness to reveal those social issues to the norms of politeness required by the early nineteenth-century ideology of Englishness. For example, Sell (2001) believes that if Charles Dickens had not toned down the disruptive criticism of his novels – which were so revealing of the hardship of the working classes – “its liberating potential might actually have been too intoxicating for a middle-of-the-road Victorian reader” (Sell, 2001: p. 181). According to Sell, “in the nature of a co-adaptive rhetorical concession” Dickens was able to give “the public what it thinks it wants – the decorum, here, of respectable family entertainment – because he is also going to give them something else as well” (Sell, 2001: p. 181). Rather than seeing Dickens as a “cut and dried product” of “the Victorian middle class”, Sell recognises “his simultaneous endorsement and subversion of a homogenizing bourgeois decorum” (Sell, 2001: p. 165), hence his “co-adaptation between the social and the individual” (Sell, 2001: p. 168). This is the type of negotiation that Mao (1994: p. 472) points out when discussing the notion of keeping or losing one’s face in politeness theory as a tension that the individual experiences between adhering to social norms and pursuing their freedom. Sell argues that “Dickens’s reaction to his milieu resulted in two fundamentally different types of textual beauties: a (to us) lesser beauty, which is monologically bourgeois, culturally homogenizing, conventional; and a (to us) greater beauty, which is an ecstatic immersion in the polyphony of a richly differentiated cultural reality” (Sell, 2001: pp. 168–69). Sell (2011) sets the example of Alexander Pope who “saw that *media via* prudence [...] was not necessarily just a matter of satisfying the taste and expectations of a polite *beau monde*. It could also involve concessions offered in the hope of counter-concessions” (Sell, 2011: p. 101). In other words, Sell maintains that “writers of real communicational power are both insiders and outsiders” (Sell, 2011: p. 105). However, while a writer shown to be “too exclusively an insider would merely endorse the status quo”, “a writer who was too exclusively an outsider would also make no difference, through being so alien” (Sell, 2011: p. 105). The “*media via* prudence” was the approach that Walter Scott preferred to embrace.

As I have explained elsewhere (Leonardi, 2018b: pp. 27–31), in *The Heart of Midlothian* (1818) Scott hints at delicate issues such as out-of-wedlock pregnancy, female sexuality, and infanticide. Nonetheless, these issues are portrayed as momentary unrest that only exists in the lower strata of society and whose perpetrators always suffer a sort of poetic punishment through death.

In *The Heart of Midlothian* Scott drew from the real story of Isobell Walker, who had killed her child in the small village of Cluden near Dumfries in 1736. In his novel, Scott blamed a vagabond, Madge Wildfire’s mother, for the apparent death of Effie Deans’s child (Symonds, 1997: pp. 5, 9). Scott based his heroine, Effie’s sister Jeanie Deans, on Isobell Walker’s sister Helen, who had walked to London to convince the Queen to revoke her sister’s death penalty for child murder.

Scott had also in mind the Act Anent (concerning) Child Murder, a 1690 Scottish law according to which any woman who concealed her pregnancy, gave birth alone, and whose child was missing was to be considered guilty of infanticide and doomed to be hanged (Symonds, 1997: p. 5).

In *The Heart of Midlothian*, Effie Deans is seduced and made pregnant by her lover George Staunton, but her child is kidnapped by Madge's mother who sees Effie as a potential rival of her daughter for Staunton's amorous attentions. Scott promoted an appropriate model of motherhood, depicting a woman capable of deep feelings who would not compromise the ideology inherent in the political discourse of the nation as harmonious family. Madge's own child conceived with Staunton out of wedlock is killed by her mother, not Madge, because the former wants to marry off her daughter to an old established man. Madge's already unstable mind is aggravated by the murder of her child.

Scott then exploits the ideology of Scotticisms to render Madge's words less challenging to the British ideal of the family when she describes the murder of a woman by the latter's husband and the infanticide of her own child, as shown in the following dialogue:

"And what sort o' house does Nicol Muschat and his wife keep now?" said Ratcliffe to the mad-woman, by way of humouring her vein of folly; "they were but thrawn folk lang syne, an a' tales be true."

"Ou, ay, ay, ay – but a's forgotten now," replied Madge, in the confidential tone of a gossip giving the history of her next-door neighbour – "Ye see, I spoke to them mysell, and tauld them byganes suld be byganes – her throat's sair misguggled and mashackered though; she wears her corpse-sheet drawn weel up to hide it, but that canna hinder the bluid seiping through, ye ken. I wussed her to wash it in St Anthony's Well, and that will cleanse if ony thing can – But they say bluid never bleaches out o' linen claith – Deacon Sanders's new cleansing draps winna do't – I tried them mysell on a bit rag we hae at hame that was mailed wi' the bluid of a bit skirling wean that was hurt some gate, but out it winna come – Weel, ye'll say that's queer; but I will bring it out to St Anthony's blessed Well some braw night just like this, and I'll cry up Ailie Muschat, and she and I will hae a grand bouking-washing, and bleach our claise in the beams of the bonny Lady Moon, that's far pleasanter to me than the sun[.]" (Scott, 1982: pp. 173–74)

Madge's apparently incoherent speech provides a brief moment of turmoil alongside the ideology of the happy, idealised familial microcosm symbolic of the British nation. Nevertheless, the anonymous reviewer of *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* did not receive the depiction of Madge's insanity very positively, arguing that "[t]he madness of *Madge Wildfire* is pushed rather far, and, if not unnatural, is at least somewhat overcharged ... Insanity, as a disease, ... has a sacredness about it, like all other inflictions of Heaven, which should save it from being unnecessarily

exhibited' (Aug 1818, p. 572). Madge is a Bakhtinian fool through which Scott provides a glimpse of the crude reality of domestic abuse and infanticide on the less fortunate end of the social spectrum, thereby signalling the existence of other, decentralising dimensions of society.

However, in order to contain Madge's radicalism, Scott exploited the ideology of Scotticisms to divest Madge's words of any critical relevance. Scott made those realities more acceptable to the bourgeois milieu by having them voiced by a lady from the margins who is 'unable to speak "proper" English' (Leonardi, 2018b: p. 31) and who, being backwards with respect to the civilising force represented by Englishness, is not completely reliable. As such, Madge is not perceived as a threat to the ideologies of female decorum, motherhood, the family, and the British nation. The status quo is eventually re-asserted because the mob punishes Madge's hypersexuality by killing her. Nevertheless, Scott offers glimpses of harsh realities that the reader cannot easily forget.

9.6 Summary

Recent developments in discursive (im)politeness theory provide more nuanced tools of analysis for discussing how Hogg's and Scott's texts were received by their critics and the varying responses that their works elicited from contemporary reviewers in the early nineteenth century. New considerations of key phenomena such as face management and aggravated impoliteness help us to understand the production and the reception of their novels in their specific historical and social contexts. Discursive (im)politeness theory helps to explain why the reception of Hogg's works varied in different socio-political realities and why Scott's negotiation with Englishness made his linguistic and moral transgressions more acceptable.

Scottish reviewers appeared to have no regards for Hogg's positive face, which they kept attacking intentionally through aggravated impoliteness, thereby keeping his persona of the Ettrick Shepherd as lagging behind progress. Their depiction of him in the *Noctes Ambrosianae* emphasised the negative aspects of real shepherds, in order to impede his social mobility, notwithstanding his great literary achievements. By placing the Ettrick Shepherd as the "other" from whom they differed, Scottish reviewers helped to construct the identity of the Scottish middle class as more decorous and genteel, and more in line with the norms of politeness of the English, with whom they were competing for the conquest of the British Empire. On the other hand, in North America, the image of Hogg was more in line with the rhetoric of the self-made man. American reviewers writing for abolitionist periodicals appeared to build his positive face, and to emphasise the image of the

Ettrick Shepherd for democratic reasons, thus showing how genius and education could actually favour social mobility.

Walter Scott belonged to the middle-class social milieu and was interested in presenting the Lowland Scottish elite as educated and skilful users of Englishness. At the same time, he was also willing to preserve Scottish identity in the political union with England and he did so by placing Scottishness in the voice of the lower classes.

All in all, both authors, though belonging to different social backgrounds, were highly capable of swapping from Standard English to less socially prestigious vernaculars thereby showing that mastering good manners and language is not an innate, essentialist quality following from class and ethnic origins.

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Pragmatics and Literature is an important collection of new work by leading practitioners working at the interface between pragmatic theory and literary analysis. The individual studies collected here draw on a variety of theoretical approaches and are concerned with a range of literary genres. All have a shared focus on applying ideas from specific pragmatic frameworks to understanding the production, interpretation and evaluation of literary texts. A full-length introductory chapter highlights distinctions and contrasts between pragmatic theories, but also brings out complementarities, shared aims and assumptions, and ways in which different pragmatic theories can make different contributions to our understanding of literary texts. The book as a whole encourages a sense of coherence for the field and presents insights from various approaches for systematic comparison. Building on previous work by the editors, the contributors and others, it makes a significant contribution to the growing field of pragmatic literary stylistics.

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