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Edited by
Aleksi Mäkilähde
Ville Leppänen
Esa Itkonen

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Edited by

Aleksi Mäkilähde
University of Turku

Ville Leppänen
University of Munich

Esa Itkonen
University of Turku

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Foreword

The present volume is the product of a number of meetings on norms and normativity in language and linguistics organised at the University of Turku between 2014–2017 as part of the MYK (*Melko yleistä kielitiedettä*, 'Fairly general linguistics') colloquium series, as well as a workshop held at the 43rd Finnish Conference of Linguistics (2016, Oulu). We wish to thank the contributors to the present volume for their chapters and their support during the project, as well as all the participants at the abovementioned meetings for insightful discussions. We also thank everyone who acted as an external reviewer for a chapter; the valuable comments are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we wish to thank Professor Elly van Gelderen and Professor Werner Abraham for accepting the volume into the *Studies in Language Companion Series*, and Mr. Kees Vaes at John Benjamins Publishing Company for his assistance and patience throughout the project.

Norms and normativity in language and linguistics

Basic concepts and contextualisation

Aleksi Mäkilähde, Ville Leppänen and Esa Itkonen

Underlying all the chapters of this volume are the concepts of norm and normativity. In this Introduction we set the stage for the individual chapters: first, by introducing certain basic concepts and relevant terminology; second, by briefly discussing the status of two types of norms in linguistics; third, by providing an overview of the role of normativity in the history of linguistics; and fourth, by presenting an outline of the volume and contextualising it in broader terms.

Keywords: norms, normativity, history of linguistics, philosophy of linguistics

1. Introduction

In this volume, we seek to further our understanding of the nature of language and to demonstrate how this understanding is relevant not only for linguistics in general but also its various subfields. Different branches of linguistics and related disciplines focus on various aspects of language: for example the physical, the biological, the mental, or the social. The chapters in the present volume focus on the last-mentioned aspect in particular, arguing that language should be seen primarily as a social entity – an interpretation which has been put forward several times within both linguistics and philosophy, for example by referring to language as a social institution, a convention, something shared by the speakers of a particular language, or a part of culture. This argument does not imply that the other aspects of language are not important, but merely that it is the social aspect of language that seems to be its primary characteristic. While some version of this view may be fairly widely accepted in many linguistic traditions, what is often overlooked is the *normativity* of language. The concept of normativity, however, is centrally important to the philosophy and methodology of linguistics, and its role and nature need to be investigated in detail. The aim of the present volume is hence to discuss the role of norms and normativity in both language and linguistics from a multiplicity of perspectives.

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According to Winch (1958: 58), "[t]he test of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is […] whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does". This can also be taken as the basic definition of a *norm*, meaning that wherever a mistake can be made, there is a corresponding norm (see also Itkonen 2019: 447). Two particularly relevant aspects of normativity in the context of linguistics are *correctness* and *rationality*. These two dimensions are independent of each other, as shown by the fact that rational actions can be performed by speaking incorrectly, while irrational actions can be performed by speaking correctly. Our first purpose in this introductory chapter is to discuss the nature of these types of norms, our second to discuss their role in linguistics. The central role of normativity for linguistics also finds support in the history of the discipline. Our third purpose, accordingly, is to present an overview of the role of normativity in linguistics, from the earliest eras up to the initial stages of 'modern' linguistics. Our fourth and final purpose is to present an outline of the following chapters and to contextualise the volume as a whole. We suggest three ways of looking at the 'big picture': the paucity of any discussion of normativity within linguistics, the focus on norms in current strands of philosophy, and the status of the 'conventionalist' position in the philosophy of linguistics.

2. Concepts and terms

2.1 Norms in general

A norm can be understood generally as a principle which enables one to judge actions as right or wrong, and which hence can guide people's actions (e.g. Winch 1958: 58; Itkonen 1976: 22; MacCormick 1998: 303; Brennan et al. 2013: 2–3). The normativity of norms refers to their being characterised in terms of 'oughts': the content of norms is about what someone is obligated, permitted, or forbidden to do. Depending on the type of norm in question, actions conforming to or violating them may be described as appropriate/inappropriate, permissible/impermissible, correct/incorrect, and so on. Norms are a prototypical example of social entities; in the context of linguistics, they can be considered (for example) the object of the 'common knowledge' of the speakers of a particular language, the speakers' knowledge of these norms being ultimately based on their intuition.[1] As social

1. Brennan et al. (2013: 3–4) suggest that norms (in a certain sense) have two defining aspects: they are normative, meaning that they involve 'general requirements' to do or refrain from doing something, and they are socio-empirical, meaning that they are "somehow accepted in and by particular groups" (2013: 4). This aptly characterises at least the two central norm categories to be discussed in this chapter. Cf. also Kusch (1999: 186; emphasis in the original): "it is an essential

entities, norms exist only in the human sphere; they determine human actions, not physical events.[2] These facts are of prime importance to our understanding of language as a research object and of linguistics as a scientific discipline. In the following subsections, we discuss some of the main features of those norms which seem to be the ones most central for linguistics. Since this chapter is an introductory overview of the relevant phenomena (and partly due to restrictions of space), we present a deliberately simplified picture of the topic at hand, taking some shortcuts and leaving out details which are not central to the main argument.[3] Many of the issues referred to here, more particularly the various complications and problems related to them, are discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

Norms involved in the human world are of many different kinds and can be classified in various ways according to a number of different criteria. For example, von Wright (1963: 6–15) presents three 'major' categories of norms and three 'minor' ones. The major categories are *rules* (of games, languages, and mathematical/logical calculi), *prescriptions* (e.g. the laws of a state), and *technical norms* or *directives* (which state, basically, that if one wants X to be the case, one ought to do Y). The minor categories include *customs* (e.g. table manners, dress codes, ways of greeting people), *moral norms*, and *ideal rules* (which are concerned not with what one ought to *do* but what one ought to *be*). A similar (open-ended) list is provided, for example, by Brennan et al. (2013: 5–7), who mention such categories as *formal norms* (including *legal norms*; overlap with prescriptions), *moral norms, social norms* (roughly equivalent to customs), *constitutive rules* (equivalent to rules), *aesthetic norms*, and *prudential norms* (probably overlap with technical norms).[4] In addition to different ways of conceptualising norms, there is considerable variation in the terminology used in reference to them. For example, Lewis (1969) and, following him, Clark (1996) use the term *convention* to refer roughly to what we call here *norm* in general. Searle uses the term *convention* in reference to what could also be called a *regularity* of one type, while *rule* is used to refer to norms of various kinds (1969: 12–14, 38–40). In particular, Searle distinguishes between *constitutive rules* and *regulative rules*: the former "create or define new forms of

feature of concepts that they can be applied correctly or incorrectly, that is that they 'ought to' be applied in some ways but not in others. 'Correctly' and 'incorrectly', however, are *normative* notions, and normativity is a social phenomenon. 'Oughts' exist only for members of groups".

2. There are no norms in the inanimate world (unlike, of course, in the *description* of this world; see Itkonen, this volume). The question of whether *non*-human animate beings, i.e. animals, have norms is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

3. For detailed expositions of many of the points raised here, see e.g. Itkonen (1974, 1978, 1983, 2003, 2008)

4. For some additional taxonomies, see, for example, Tuomela (1995); Bicchieri (2006).

behavior", while the latter "regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior" (1969: 33). For example, there are constitutive rules which define a language, and without which the language would not exist. There are also, however, rules which regulate how one ought to use language in specific situations, but which do not directly bear upon the existence of the said language.

The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules has rough equivalents in various norm taxonomies, and it is also one which proves to be particularly relevant for linguistics, including the chapters in the present volume. We will therefore discuss these two norm types in some detail. First, we may note the above-mentioned equivalence apparent through cross-comparison of norm types in various taxonomies. In Table 1 below, the items under A are *roughly* equivalent (or overlap to a considerable extent), as are those under B:[5]

Table 1. A cross-comparison of norm types

	A	**B**
Searle (1969)	constitutive rules	regulative rules
von Wright (1971)	secondary rules	primary rules
Itkonen (1983)	rules	principles

Von Wright's (1963) technical norms, for instance, also overlap to some extent with B's (see also Mäkilähde, this volume). In Itkonen (1983: 65), A's and B's are also called *norms of correctness* and *norms of rationality*: the former determine what is correct (or incorrect) whereas the latter determine what is rational (or irrational). For simplicity, let us call A's and B's *rules* and *principles*, respectively. The simplest way to illustrate what 'rules' of language are like is by way of examples. The following either express or draw attention to rules which any fluent speaker of English is, in principle, able to express:[6]

(1) *The man came* is correct. *Man the came* is incorrect. (cf. Itkonen 2003: 15)

(2) *John Loves Mary*. **Loves John Mary*. (Zlatev 2008: 42)

(3) **Her are my friend*. (Kac, this volume)

5. The terms *primary rules* and *secondary rules* are justified as follows: "Norms of the first kind tell us *that* certain things ought to or may be done. Norms of the second kind tell us *how* certain acts are performed. Often, but not in all cases, a norm of the second kind is needed in order to make compliance with a norm of the first kind possible. Norms of the second kind are therefore, in a characteristic sense, *secondary* in relation to the first" (von Wright 1971: 151; emphasis in the original).

6. That is, they express or draw attention to *basic rules* of English. Examples (6) and (8) are the most obvious cases of a 'description' of a rule.

(4) **A few people have any friends in high places*. (Langacker 1991: 11)

(5) *Two men came* is correct. *Two mans came* is incorrect.

(6) [T]he plural of *man* is *men* and not *mans* or *menren*. (Itkonen 1976: 25; underlining changed to italicisation)

(7) *The boy is running* is correct, *The boy is runnil* is incorrect. (Itkonen 1976: 24; underlining changed to italicisation)

(8) The past tense of *play* is *played*. The past tense of *sing* is not *singed* but *sang*. (Bach 1974: 61)

(9) [*K*]*eep* and *coop* begin with the same 'sound' (Chomsky [1975] 1977: 62; double quotation marks deleted, italicisation and single quotes added)

(10) It is correct to pronounce the first parts of *pin* and *tin* differently. (Itkonen 1976: 24; underlining changed to italicisation)

(11) [*T*]*hree* designates a number […] and not a plant, whereas *tree* designates a plant and not a number. (Itkonen 2003: 16)

(12) *I am an orphan* is synonymous with *I am a child and have no father or mother*. (Leech 1974: 85; single quotes deleted, italicisation added)

(13) *Shakespeare was a better playwright than poet* is meaningful, […] *the slithy toves did gyre* is nonsensical. (Searle 1969: 11; quotation marks deleted, italicisation added)

The examples listed here show that norms of correctness (i.e. 'rules') pervade several levels of language. Examples (1)–(4) address syntax: for instance, (1) is a formulation of the rule according to which the definite article in English precedes its head noun (cf. e.g. Itkonen 1978; Kac, this volume).[7] Examples (5)–(8) concern morphology – for example, (5) and (6) both describe the correct way of forming the plural of *man* – while (9) and (10) concern phonology. The final three examples all relate to semantics: (11) and (12) illustrate the important point that the meaning of each word of a language is governed by a norm, while (13) highlights the independence of these different levels (similar to Russell's *Quadruplicity drinks procrastination*, or Chomsky's *Colorless green ideas sleep furiously*). Thus, (13) expresses something to the effect of a 'meta-norm'. Norms of correctness can accordingly be divided into those which correlate forms and meanings (*rules of correlation*) and those which combine forms with each other (*rules of combination*), the latter covering such phenomena as word-order, agreement, and government (e.g. Itkonen 2003: 16–17; 2008: 293; cf. Clark 1996: 76). What is important about these examples is that their truthfulness should be immediately obvious to anyone who knows

7. There are (at least *prima facie*) exceptions to the more general determiner rule (such as *Ivan the Terrible* or *Look at that man, the fat one over there*); for more details on these, see e.g. Itkonen (1974: 84; 1983: 262–264; 2003: 18–19).

English. Indeed, being able to make these sorts of judgments acts as a criterion for finding out whether someone knows English. The examples could obviously be multiplied *ad nauseam* without much effort; we have included examples used by other researchers to emphasise the fact that these basic rules are often mentioned precisely in philosophical or methodological contexts (for the philosophical relevance of such basic rules and their descriptions, see e.g. Itkonen 2003). It may also be pointed out that the existence of a rule of correctness often becomes apparent when the rule is violated: the exception proves the rule. In particular, those forms which conform to the norms do not make explicit any particular norms. For example, *There are quite a few bottles on the table* does not by itself exemplify any one particular norm, but it should be obvious which norm is violated by **There are quite a few bottle on the table*.

A's, or rules of correctness, form the primary data of synchronic descriptions of languages, such as grammatical descriptions (i.e. grammars). More precisely, such descriptions make generalisations about large sets of A's. Descriptions of A's themselves (such as Examples (1)–(13) above) are *pretheoretical*; they are known with certainty. Depending on the type of grammatical description aimed at, the generalisations presented may range from fairly pretheoretical to fully theoretical. The following examples describe (in highly simplistic form) this 'ascent' from Example (1) first through generalisation to other nouns in (14), then to nouns in general in (15), to other determines in (16), and finally to a hypothesis of a theoretical grammar (17):[8]

(14) *the man, the woman, the book…*

(15) *the* + N

(16) Det + N

(17) $\left[\begin{array}{ll} \textit{phrase} & \\ \text{SPR} & \langle\ \rangle \end{array}\right] \rightarrow \boxed{1} \quad \mathbf{H}\left[\begin{array}{ll} \text{VAL} & \left[\begin{array}{ll} \text{SPR} & \langle \boxed{1} \rangle \\ \text{COMPS} & \langle\ \rangle \end{array}\right] \\ \text{STOP-GAP} & \langle\ \rangle \end{array}\right]$

(Sag, Wasow & Bender 2003: 501)

As for the other group of norms mentioned above, namely B's, they could be preliminarily defined as follows: "They are, approximately speaking, concerned with the *means* to be used for the sake of attaining an *end*" (von Wright 1963: 9; original emphasis). Again, the nature and content of B's are best illustrated by examples.

(18a) If someone asks you how old you are, you ought to give him/her your actual age.

(19a) If someone asks you how old you are, you ought to give him/her some arbitrary number.

8. Example (17) is the 'Head-Specifier Rule', which states that "[a] phrase can consist of a (lexical or phrasal) head preceded by its specifier" (Sag, Wasow & Bender 2003: 501; italicisation removed).

It may seem *prima facie* that (18a) is true and (19a) false, but that is simply because (18a) is a 'default case' of sorts. It presupposes that the speaker's aim is to communicate information to the addressee in an effective manner; in this case, in other words, it is assumed that the cooperative principle (Grice 1975) is upheld. It is, however, easy to come up with situations where (19a) would obviously be true, and therefore these descriptions need to be made more explicit by referring to certain 'wants' on the part of the speaker:

(18b) If someone asks you how old you are and you want to be cooperative, you ought to give him/her your actual age instead of some arbitrary number.

(19b) If someone asks you how old you are and you want to be uncooperative, you ought to give him/her some arbitrary number instead of your actual age.

Grice's (1975) maxims can be seen as formulations of fairly abstract B's of this sort, as can the felicity conditions of speech acts (see Itkonen 1983: 68, 176–177). Example (18b) could thus be subsumed under the Maxim of Quality (i.e. "Try to make your contribution one that is true"). Again, it is obvious that it is not the task of a linguist to list simple principles, such as (18a) and (19a) or (18b) and (19b); however, they are used as explanatory devices in various subfields of linguistics, for example in diachronic and typological explanations. More precisely, these explanations are applications of B's to particular data, rather than simply identical with B's. For illustrations of these explanations, see for example Itkonen (1983, 2003, 2013a, 2013/2014); in the present volume, see especially Itkonen's, Leppänen's, and Mäkilähde's chapters.

Before briefly discussing certain more technical aspects of the above-mentioned two major types of norms, we note in passing that other norm categories are also relevant for specific subfields of linguistics. For example, formal norms or prescriptions have obvious counterparts in the domain of language, namely in the various attempts to set down specific standards for language use by an official institution (the prime example is the Académie française for French) or by specific groups or individuals.[9] However, as Kac (this volume) points out, 'prescriptivism' and 'prescriptions' in the sense, for example, of von Wright (1963) are also a component of such activities as language teaching. He also rightly notes that prescriptivism in this sense should be clearly distinguished from the kind where particular language varieties (e.g. dialects) are considered 'bad' or 'deviant'. This type of activity is not on the whole considered to be part of the linguist's work (see also e.g. Pullum 2019: 205–206), but it is of course something which happens quite naturally when certain varieties gain prestige and others are compared to them.

9. For recent research on prescriptivism (although mostly under terms such as 'norms' and 'normative'), see for example the chapters in Rutten, Vosters & Vandenbussche (eds, 2014).

2.2 Rules and principles: Central features

Ontologically, norms such as the above-mentioned rules and principles possess a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis what goes on in space and time. They exist not as spatiotemporal entities but as objects of *common knowledge*, as defined by Lewis (1969).[10] Epistemologically, our knowledge about the content of norms is ultimately based on *intuition*, not on observation or sense-perception (of spatiotemporal entities).[11] What this means is that speakers know intuitively whether, for example, a sentence is correct, incorrect, or not clearly either one. The phenomenology of intuition is of course a complicated question, which has interested philosophers for a long time. The following may serve as a preliminary characterisation:

> An intuition that *p* is […] just an immediate, unreflective, and untutored inclination, without argument or inference, to judge that *p* (and that anyone who faces the same issue ought also to judge that *p*), where the judgment that *p* is of a kind that is in principle not checkable by sensory perception or by accepted methods of calculation. […] Nor does the term 'intuition', in this sense, connote a form of introspection, since intuitions of the relevant kind may be implicit in spoken judgments without any need, as there sometimes is, for the speaker to search the data of his consciousness. […] An intuition of this kind should be immediate and unreflective, in the sense that it should not be the outcome of considered thought.
> (Cohen 1986: 75–76)

Itkonen (1981b: 128) has argued that, in comparison to other epistemic acts such as observation (of spatiotemporal objects, states and events) and introspection (of subjective mental states, sensations, attitudes, etc.), intuition "pertains [primarily] to concepts or rules existing in an intersubjective normative reality" and secondarily "to spatiotemporal entities exemplifying concepts or rules". Due to this central role of intuition for the linguistic sciences, its methodological role is addressed in several chapters in the present volume. For instance, the distinction between intuition and introspection is addressed in the chapters by Itkonen and Kac; the logical relations between intuition and other methods, such as corpus analysis, in

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10. Cf. Habermas (1970: 160): "Normen beruhen stets auf gemeinsamer Anerkennung". Cf. Lagerspetz (1995: 14): "Conventional facts are like natural facts in the sense that they are not dependent on the beliefs and actions of any particular individual. They are unlike natural facts in the sense that they are dependent on the beliefs and actions of all relevant individuals".

11. Similarly, Trubetzkoy argues: "Solche Normen sind als Sprachwerte zu betrachten" (1958: 18). "Diese Werte sind […] also ganz unmaterielle Dinge, die weder mit dem Gehörsinn noch mit dem Tastsinn wahrgenommen und untersucht werden können" (1958: 16).

the chapter by Pajunen and Itkonen; different types of intuition in the chapter by Zlatev and Blomberg; the use of intuitions in grammar in the chapter by Kac; in the context of variation and change in the chapter by Leppänen; and in the context of multilingual language use in the chapter by Mäkilähde.

As already implied above, a distinction needs to be maintained between norms and the (linguistic) formulations of these norms. Von Wright defines a *norm-formulation* as "the sign or symbol (the words) used in enunciating (formulating) the norm" (1963: 93). Since his discussion focuses on prescriptions, norm-formulations refer in this context basically to utterances which effectively permit, demand, or forbid something. Utterances to the effect that a particular norm exists he calls *normative statements*, and this is basically what is either expressed or implied by (1)–(13) and (18a)–(19b). Such utterances have also been called *rule sentences* in the context of A's (e.g. Itkonen 1978); a more general term could be *norm sentence*. Whatever the terms used, the distinction between these sentences and the norms they describe needs to be maintained: norms either exist or do not exist, whereas norm sentences are either true or false (cf. Itkonen 2019: 447). In what follows, these two types of entity will be designated, respectively, by A/B and A*/B* (i.e. A* is synonymous with 'rule sentence'). A/A*'s and B/B*'s serve different functions in linguistic research. The latter are employed, for example, in such subfields of linguistics as typological linguistics, diachronic linguistics, pragmatics, and applied linguistics (see Itkonen 1983).[12] The role of A/A*'s is rather different. Von Wright argues that "secondary rules […] play no characteristic or important role in the *explanation* of behaviour" (1971: 152; original emphasis). While the main function of A/A*'s may not be explanatory (in the customary sense), they are of course a *conditio sine qua non* for any kind of linguistic research. First, as noted above, A's constitute the basic data for synchronic-grammatical descriptions. Second, A's constitute the logical presupposition for various other types of research (see Pajunen & Itkonen, this volume). These distinct functions clearly play an important role in constituting the nature of linguistics as a discipline.

The two types of norm discussed here also have much in common. In particular, it is a shared characteristic of A*/B*'s that if they are commonly known to be true, they cannot be falsified either by incorrect/irrational actions or – obviously – by correct/rational actions. Thus, A*/B*, if true, can be falsified neither by what deviates from nor by what conforms to A/B (e.g. Itkonen 2003: 15; 2019: 447).

12. As explanations based on B's necessarily involve a reference to a *goal*, they qualify as 'teleological'. Also such (near-)synonyms are in use as 'finalistic', 'functional', 'purposive', and 'rational'. The intricate relations between (the referents of) these terms have been discussed in Itkonen (1981a, 1983, 2011, 2013a, 2013/2014).

Although this may seem surprising, it is in fact the essence of normativity.[13] Indeed, it might be called the *axiom of normativity*. To illustrate:

(A*-1) In English the word *three* expresses the same meaning as the word *drei* in German.
(B*-1) If you want to make the hut habitable [i.e. in the winter, in cold climates], you ought to heat it. (von Wright 1963: 10)

Here the sentence A*-1 describes the rule A-1 while the sentence B*-1 describes the principle B-1. Of course, the two norms could have been described by a number of different sentences. Next, we reformulate (A*-1) and (B*-1), in order to highlight their structural similarity:

(A*-1′) In English, if you want to express the meaning expressed by *drei* in German, the *correct* thing to do is to use the word *three* (and not *tree, boy,* etc.).
(B*-1′) If you want to make the hut habitable [i.e. in the winter, in cold climates], the *rational* thing to do is to heat it.

It is easier to demonstrate the unfalsifiability of A*-1 and B*-1 with the aid of A*-1′ and B*-1′. Suppose someone has to enumerate the first ten integers in English, and s/he begins as follows: 'One, two, *three*, four, …' This action has obviously not falsified A*-1′ because it *conforms* to A-1: the action is *correct*, and A*-1′ is about correct actions (as an aside, it may be added that it is much more natural to say that an action conforms to a norm than to a norm sentence). Next, suppose that s/he begins as follows: 'One, two, *tree*, four, …' (or 'One, two, *boy*, four, …' etc.). Again, the action has not falsified A*-1′ because it *deviates* from A-1: the action is *incorrect*, whereas A*-1′ is about correct (and not incorrect) actions.

The same argument shows B*-1′ to be unfalsifiable. If, in the winter, somebody makes his/her hut habitable by heating it, the action is rational and does not falsify B*-1′. If, under similar circumstances, someone tells everybody that s/he wants to make his/her hut habitable, but fills the fireplace with snow and, as a consequence, freezes to death, the action is irrational (from the point of view of making the hut habitable), and does not falsify B*-1′, which is about rational actions, not about irrational ones. Of course, this *prima facie* irrationality is open to several explanations, which may in turn rely on some further B's.

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13. This is also noted by Lagerspetz (1995: 14): "It is a peculiar property of conventional facts that propositions expressing them cannot be false if they are generally believed to be true and if this belief plays a relevant role in the behaviour of relevant persons. […] Similarly, any individual speaker of a language can have mistaken beliefs about the grammaticality of a sentence. But the whole linguistic community cannot collectively be mistaken". See also Haukioja (2000: 16).

Both A/A* and B/B* gain their significance from the contrast with C/C*, namely observed regularities and the corresponding universal hypotheses. For example, we may observe that a stone dropped from a height falls towards the ground (rather than rising up to the sky); based on multiple such observations, we hypothesise that this is what will happen every time under similar circumstances. Or we may note that water expands when it freezes, or that it freezes at a certain temperature (i.e. around 0 degrees Celsius, not 100 degrees). Or we note that all the ravens we have encountered are black, and we hypothesise that all the ravens we will encounter will be black. These regularities can be described, for example, as follows:

(C*-1) An object will fall towards the ground when dropped from a height.
(C*-2) Water expands when it freezes.
(C*-3) Water freezes at around 0 degrees Celsius.
(C*-4) All ravens are black.

First, it is obvious that C*'s differ from A*'s/B*'s in that they do not contain any deontic or normative terms (e.g. 'ought', 'correct', 'permissible', 'obligatory'), which is of course the essential difference between the statement types. In order to make them more comparable, one could reformulate every C* by adding a universal quantifier, as in C*-4, or the alethic term 'necessarily'. As this implies, C*'s are falsified – in principle – by a single counterexample (cf. Mäkilähde, this volume). This is why C* qualifies as *empirical*, or as Kac (this volume) suggests, *strongly empirical*. It follows that, according to this criterion, A* and B* qualify as *non*-empirical (or *weakly empirical*).[14] Importantly, this concerns only A*/B* (and generalisations about A's/B's), not linguistics *in toto*, since many subfields of linguistics clearly qualify as empirical (see e.g. Itkonen 1976).

Second, it is of course the case that these statements are overly simplistic. This, however, is also the case with Examples (1)–(13) and (18a)–(19b) and all the examples of A*'s and B*'s discussed above. These are all 'basic facts', to be accounted for by different scientific disciplines and with different methods; the scientific pursuit does not as such focus on these simple statements. For example, C*-3 is clearly false in its current formulation, since it does not describe other circumstances (e.g. pressure) at all;[15] the crucial point is that when we notice that water has a lower

14. On the role of normativity in engineering as opposed to physics, see Kac (1992: 19–20).

15. Similarly, C*-4 is false because there are rare instances of albino ravens. A hypothesis to the effect that "Some ravens are black, some are white" would be extremely uninformative, and a natural option is to express the noted regularity in terms of statistics. Of course, in ordinary language use we use such universal statements in a much looser sense. A detailed comparison of C*-4 and an A* to the effect of Example (1) is presented in Itkonen (2003: 15–21).

freezing point in different circumstances, the mistake lies in our proposed hypothesis (and not in the behaviour of water). On the other hand, if someone produces the utterance **Man the came*, it is not (1) which is incorrect but this act (or more properly, the structure produced as part of this act). Third, and related to the second point, people may decide to violate norms (i.e. A's/B's), but nature cannot 'decide' to violate or conform to universal hypotheses. As von Wright notes, "[n]ature does not, except metaphorically, 'obey' its laws" (1963: 2). Some 'laws of nature' may also be interpreted as more abstract C*s – that is, not yet fully theoretical statements (an example might be Archimedes' principle).

It is worth emphasising that generalisations about and systematisations of A's are falsifiable, just as all scientific descriptions must be (e.g. Itkonen 1978: 251–254; 2019: 447). As Chomsky correctly notes, "[t]he problem for the grammarian is to construct a description […] for the enormous mass of *unquestionable data* concerning the linguistic intuition of the native speaker (often, himself)" (Chomsky 1965: 20; emphasis added). It only needs to be added that these 'unquestionable data' are not particular spatiotemporal occurrences (i.e. objects of sense-perception), but rules like A (i.e. objects of intuition). From the philosophical and methodological point of view, this is of course an important characteristic of linguistics as a scientific discipline. Chomsky is also correct to point out that the number of rules is "enormous" (i.e. certainly hundreds of millions for a language like English). Consequently, while A*'s are unfalsifiable, grammatical descriptions are bound to be falsifiable, due to the sheer complexity of what they purport to describe. A*'s must therefore be clearly distinguished from the hypotheses of theoretical grammars, such as Example (17). A possible source for confusion is presented by the fact that it is customary to speak of 'rules of grammar' when referring to such hypotheses, although these 'rules' are not social entities (see e.g. Itkonen 1978; Bartsch 1987).

The same is true – *mutatis mutandis* – of B and B*. While B*-1, for instance, remains unfalsifiable, action *explanations* that result from applying B*-1 are clearly falsifiable. Suppose someone has heated his/her hut in the winter, and we are asked to explain this action. B*-1 might be suggested as the most obvious candidate. After more evidence has been gathered, however, this explanation might well turn out to be false. For example, perhaps this person was a fugitive who wanted to mislead the police into thinking that s/he had been living in the hut, without any intention of actually doing so. Most importantly, the falsity of an explanation based on B*-1 does not falsify B*-1 itself.[16] For a more in-depth discussion of the A/B vs. C (or

16. To reiterate: what is at issue here is the falsification of A*/B*, not A/B. As noted above, the latter have no truth value, while the former – when they are used as descriptive statements – obviously do.

A*/B* vs. C*) dichotomy, together with a collection of arguments against it and corresponding counterarguments, see Itkonen (2003: 15–21).[17]

3. A historical perspective

The history of linguistics offers an intriguing means for arriving at a wider perspective on the role of normativity in linguistics. In this section, we briefly discuss the presence of normativity since the earliest stages of three different linguistic traditions, and the central interest likewise attached to the topic during the early stages of what might be termed 'modern linguistics'. The following historical overview consists in large part of summaries of relevant sections from Itkonen (1991) and (2013b), with additional commentary and updated references as well as links to the following chapters in the present volume.

The linguistic tradition in India is based on Pāṇini's (c. 350 BC) grammar, *Aṣṭādhyāyī* ('[Book of] Eight Chapters').[18] Its most important commentators are Kātyāyana (c. 250 BC) and Patañjali (c. 150 BC). Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* ('Great Spoken-Language [Commentary]') consists of 85 'day-lessons' (*āhnika*). The religious merits to be gained from the study of grammar are expounded in the first half of the first āhnika; the remainder is devoted to explaining how grammar is to be taught. One possibility would be to enumerate either all correct words or all incorrect words. Of the two, the former option seems more justifiable because the number of incorrect words is incomparably greater than the number of the correct ones (Itkonen 1991: 77).[19] Even the number of correct words is nevertheless (practically) infinite: "It is heard that Bṛhaspati taught the Science of Words to [the god] Indra by means of a recital of all correct words and went on doing it for one thousand celestial years [= 1000 × 1 million years], but he could not reach the end" (Abhyankar & Shukla 1973: 20–22; their translation). Correct words cannot, then,

17. We mention in passing another possible objection in addition to those discussed in Itkonen (2003), namely that A*'s such as (1) are implicit imperatives and therefore have no truth value. This objection is related to Wittgenstein's (correct) observation that "[f]ollowing a rule is analogous to obeying an order" (1958 § 206). Although this objection is not strictly false, it is implausible to claim that all the A*'s discussed thus far are neither true nor false. Furthermore, as von Wright argued (see above), although norms and norm-formulations (in the sense of e.g. commands) have no truth-value, normative statements, on the contrary, are true or false.

18. Whether the grammar was composed by means of writing has been a much-debated issue, but is not at the centre of our focus here. On Pāṇini's grammar in general, see e.g. Kiparsky (1993, 2012). On Pāṇini's relevance for computational linguistics in particular, see e.g. Hyman (2007).

19. Consider this analogy: there is in general only one correct answer to the question 'How old are you?', but the mind boggles at the thought of all logically possible incorrect answers.

be taught by means of enumeration; the right method, instead, is "the method of laying down general principles, so that with a correspondingly small effort a man would learn bigger and bigger collections of words" (ibid.). These "general principles" are in turn identical with 'rules', as employed in Pāṇini's grammar.

Itkonen (1991: 78) presents the following analysis of Patañjali's argument:

> By the infinite number of correct words, Patañjali does not mean words that have actually occurred in speech: "It cannot be said that a word is incorrect simply on the ground of its being unused" [(Abhyankar & Shukla 1973: 35; their translation)]. Thus, a grammar does not investigate a [closed] corpus of utterances, but rather the [open] set of all, and only, correct words (and sentences). Such a set also contains rare or unusual words, provided that they satisfy the criterion of correctness: "Although such words are not found in use, they have to be explained in grammar by stating rules, just as sacrificial sessions which last for years have to be sanctioned although they are not current" [(ibid.)]. Then Patañjali goes on to add that the science of ritual must be able to describe even such sacrificial sessions as last a thousand years (although they are not held by anybody as a matter of fact), if only they are (known to be) correct.
>
> (Itkonen 1991: 78; references reformatted within square brackets)

It may be noted that the reference to general principles above already implies that the object of description is not simply a collection of spatiotemporal occurrences of language use. Furthermore, the 'criterion of correctness' mentioned here refers more precisely to norms, namely rules of correctness. For a more detailed discussion, see Itkonen (1991: Ch. 2, esp. pp. 77–78). It is also noteworthy that linguistics is here compared to the study of rituals; in the present volume, analogies between different 'normative domains' are discussed in the chapters by Kac and Mäkilähde in particular.

Within the Western linguistic tradition, it is Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd century AD) who in his book *Perì syntáxeōs* lays the foundations of *sentence analysis*.[20] This, in fact, is how the word *sýntaxis* should be translated in this context (rather than as 'syntax'), given that Apollonius pays equal attention to the meaning of sentences and to their form (Itkonen 2013b: 757). Normativity lies at the very core of Apollonius's work: he first illustrates the notion of (in)correctness, and then explains it. He starts with the following sentence:

ὁ	αὐτὸς	ἄνθρωπος	ὀλισθήσας	σήμερον	κατὰ-ἔπεσεν (> κατέπεσεν)
ho	*autos*	*ánt^{h}rōpos*	*olist^{h}ésās*	*sḗmeron*	*katà-épesen (> katépesen)*
art.	pron.	noun	participle	adv.	prep.-verb
the	same	man	slipping	today	down-fell

20. On the text itself, see e.g. Householder (1981); Blank (1982). On Apollonius in the context of ancient Greek linguistics, see also e.g. Brandenburg (2005: 17–25).

This sentence qualifies as a *clear case* (i.e. similar to Examples (1)–(13), (18a)–(19b)). Itkonen (2013b: 757) notes that

> it is of course Apollonius' own linguistic intuition that assures him of the correctness of this self-invented example sentence. Next, the words of this sentence are deleted one by one, on the correct assumption that only those words whose deletion results in incorrectness are necessary to sentencehood; and, again, the only criterion of incorrectness is Apollonius' own intuition. In this way the original sentence is reduced step by step to [*ánt*^{h}*rōpos épesen*]. (Itkonen 2013b: 757)

It should be added that when the subject is understood from the context, even *ánt*^{h}*rōpos* may be deleted, *épesen* being a complete one-word sentence (Itkonen 1991: 203). On similar 'clear cases' in various linguistic traditions, see also the chapter by Pajunen and Itkonen.

Apollonius expresses the explanatory agenda of grammatical analysis as follows: "So we'd better stop and explain what the actual cause of ungrammaticality is, not by mere citation of examples as some [linguists] do, pointing out the ungrammaticality without explaining its cause. But if you don't grasp the cause, it is an exercise in futility to cite examples" (III, 6; transl. Householder 1981: 155). An ungrammatical or incorrect construction is called a *solecism* (i.e. *soloikismós*; also *an-akólout*^{h}*on, a-katallēlíā*), and is explained as being a violation of the principle of *akolout*^{h}*íā* (or *katallēlótēs*). This subsumes what we would call 'agreement', 'government', and 'semantic compatibility'; it might be translated as 'concord' (see Itkonen 1991: 203; 2013b: 758). The following examples clarify what is at issue. In the active, middle, and passive voices, the first-person indicative aorist forms of the verb *loúein* ('to wash') are, respectively, as follows: *élousa, elousámēn, eloút*^{h}*ēn*. These verb-forms have to be considered both alone and combined with a noun in the accusative (III, 30; see Itkonen 1991: 205):

élousa + ∅	= incorrect	(*'I washed')
élousa + ACC	= correct	('I washed something')
elousámēn+ ∅	= correct	('I washed myself')
elousámēn + ACC	= correct	('I washed something for myself')
eloút^{h}*ēn*+ ∅	= correct	('I was washed')
eloút^{h}*ēn* + ACC	= incorrect	(*'I was washed something')

As these examples reveal, a solecism results from a wrong 'concord' between two units: it is incorrect to combine a zero with *élousa* and correct to combine it with *eloút*^{h}*ēn*, whereas *elousámēn* (with an attendant meaning difference) may be correctly combined either with a zero or with ACC. While 'solecism' is a relational notion, a (non-concord) mistake recognisable in a single word is called *barbarismós*. For further discussion, see Itkonen (1991: Subsection 5.2.3, esp. pp. 201–206).

It is not difficult to find later parallels. Apollonius's 'reduction analysis' is repeated for example by Sapir (1921: 35–36). Itkonen (2013b: 768) presents the following analysis: "Consider the sentence *The mayor of New York is going to deliver a speech of welcome in French*. This sentence can be simplified [while retaining its correctness] by deleting *of New York, of welcome*, and *in French*, but at this point the 'process of reduction' must stop. For instance **Mayor is going to deliver* would be incorrect". In other words, *the* and *a speech* are obligatory (note however that if the verb is used intransitively, *a speech* is not obligatory). Moreover, the 'etiological analysis' originally proposed by Kac (1987 and 1992) can be seen as bringing Apollonius's agenda up to date. Ill-formed strings can be ungrammatical in many different ways, and for each type of ungrammaticality Kac postulates a corresponding 'etiological property'. 'Etiological representations' are descriptions of ungrammatical strings, displaying in each case 'the actual causes of ungrammaticality', exactly as required by Apollonius (cf. above). Non-possession of etiological properties in turn amounts to grammaticality; for details, see Kac (this volume).[21]

Having discussed the roots of normativity in Indian and European linguistics, we move on to the Arabic tradition, inaugurated by Sībawayhi (d. c. 790 AD) in his grammar *Al-Kitāb* ('The Book'). Here the situation is different insofar as Sībawayhi is seemingly trying to dispense with any notion of (norm-based) correctness. He does not succeed, and the reasons for his failure are relevant to our topic.[22] According to Itkonen's (1991: 152) interpretation,

> Sībawaihi [sic; alternative spelling] argues that […] his object of description is the concrete utterance, or *kalām*, not the abstract sentence, or what came later to be called *jumla*. No concept of *jumla* is needed to describe *kalām*. Since *kalām* is what the speaker actually says […] it has no fixed length. It may consist of one word or of an entire discourse. The former type of utterance results from *ellipsis*. However, even though an elliptical utterance does not satisfy the (artificial) criteria of sentencehood, it is a legitimate object of grammatical description (Carter 1968: 198–204). (Itkonen 1991: 152)

Similarly, Carter (2004: 93) notes that "Sībawayhi is concerned only with speech, *kalām*, and therefore there is no word for 'sentence' in the *Kitāb*, though the later grammarians introduced the term *jumla* 'group [of words]' […] for this". It turns out that the manner in which Sībawayhi treats ellipsis becomes quite relevant for evaluating his argument. Itkonen (1991: 153) points out that

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21. Interestingly, there are not only later parallels but also earlier ones, insofar as the Apollonius-type concord was already anticipated by Plato (c. 428–c. 348 BC). For discussion, see Itkonen (1991: 173).

22. Itkonen's interpretation of Sībawayhi's intentions as reported here relies partly on Carter (1968) in particular. Carter (2016) is a corrected and updated edition. On the context of the *Kitāb*, see also e.g. Carter (2004). On Sībawayhi's theoretical and methodological approach in general, see also Baalbaki (2008).

> [w]hen Carter has to spell out Sībawaihi's program in more detail, he must admit that "Sībawaihi is saying … that there is a point where the *sentence* contains enough constituents to be *formally complete*" ([1968: 228; emphasis added by Itkonen]). Similarly, he admits that in ellipsis, or elision, "elided words still count towards the *structural completeness* of the *sentence*" ([1968: 229; emphasis added by Itkonen]). Again, when he speaks of explaining "elisions and deviations from the *normal speech pattern*" ([1968: 240; emphasis added by Itkonen]), he presupposes precisely that concept which he thinks he has abandoned. […] Now 'ellipsis' is synonymous with 'deletion'. It is a simple conceptual point that 'deletion' is a three-place relation: *X* deletes *Y* from *Z*. *X* is the speaker, and *Y* is a word. Now what is *Z*? […] It can only be a *correct sentence* […]. The same is true of 'deviation' as well. A 'deviation' in speech can only be a deviation from a linguistic norm, and a 'deviant' sentence can only be deviant as compared with a non-deviant, i.e. *correct*, sentence.
>
> (Itkonen 1991: 153; references reformatted within square brackets)

In other words, ellipsis presupposes the general notion of abstract sentence, while deviation presupposes the particular notion of correct sentence, demonstrating that the concept of *jumla* (as understood here) is indeed needed to describe *kalām*. It may also be added that Sībawayhi employs incorrect sentences which presumably have not occurred in order to "explain or describe a grammatical rule/behaviour or […] to justify the rule and to provide proof […] to its validity" (Noy 2012: 38; original emphasis removed). For further discussion, see Itkonen (1991: Chapter 4, esp. pp. 151–156). Again, later parallels are easy to find. First, *jumla* and *kalām* are near-synonyms of *langue* and *parole* (see below). Second, the same problems occur in any attempt to establish the focus of linguistics solely as what occurs in space and time (see Itkonen 1978). This matter is discussed particularly in the chapter by Kac.

The primarily social nature of language was also often argued for by early representatives of what might be called 'modern' linguistics. For example, William Dwight Whitney notes that "[w]e regard every language, then, as an *institution*" (1875: 280; emphasis added), adding that "[t]he very earliest dialects are as exclusively *conventional* as the latest" (1875: 297; emphasis added). It is also worth pointing out that Whitney recognised the role of rationality principles (i.e. B's) in historical linguistics: "[What is] involved in the process [of linguistic change] […] is simply the exercise […] of […] the faculty of adapting means to ends, of apprehending a desirable purpose and attaining it. It is different only in its accidents […] and not in its essential nature, from that other process, not less characteristic of *human reason*, the making and using of *instruments*" (1875: 145; emphasis added). This point has an obvious connection to the thorny question of teleology and language change (see on the one hand e.g. Anttila 1989; Itkonen 1982, 1984, and on the other Lass 1997; Luraghi 2010).

Perhaps the best-known representation of the dichotomy between 'language as a social institution' vs. 'language as concrete use' is found in Saussure's *langue* vs. *parole*. He refers to the former as "une convention" (1916: 26) and "une institution sociale"

(1916: 33). Similarly, Trubetzkoy distinguishes between *Sprachgebilde* and *Sprechakt*, noting explicitly that the former consists of rules or norms: "Da das Sprachgebilde aus Regeln oder Normen besteht, so ist es im Gegensatz zum Sprechakt ein System oder, besser gesagt, mehrere Teilsysteme" (1958: 6). He further notes that there is no similar dichotomy to be found in the natural sciences (1958: 15),[23] and that "das Sprachgebilde als soziale Institution eine Welt von Beziehungen, Funktionen und Werten, der Sprechakt hingegen eine Welt der empirischen Erscheinungen ist" (1958: 15): the former belong to the domain of phonology, the latter to that of phonetics. Trubetzkoy's reference to the object of phonology as the "überindividuelle, soziale Werte" (1958: 12) may also be compared to the way language is sometimes characterised as an 'intersubjective' entity; see in particular Itkonen's, Zlatev and Blomberg's, and Möttönen's chapters in the present volume. Other, similar dichotomies have of course often been suggested; one example is the distinction between *system* and *text* (see e.g. Hjelmslev [1943] 1976). This type of 'Saussurean' position is evaluated in detail in the chapter by Laasanen.

Finally, the normative nature of language becomes explicit in the way Saussure, among others, compares language to the game of chess: "la langue est un système qui ne connaît que son ordre propre. Une comparaison avec le jeu d'échecs le fera mieux sentir" (1916: 44). The same comparison has also been made several times in the context of philosophy (of language). For example, Wittgenstein poses the question: "Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here?" (1958: § 83). It may be added that all language, for Wittgenstein, "is founded on convention" (1958: § 355); if a language were not a social entity but a private one, "the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking" (1958: § 380). The comparison between language and games is made even more explicitly by von Wright: "The rules of grammar (morphology and syntax) of a natural language are another example of the same main type of norm as the rules of a game. To the moves of a game as patterns correspond the set forms of correct speech" (1963: 6; emphasis removed). It would, however, be more accurate to speak of rules of *language*. This inaccurate use of 'grammar' is due to the ambiguity of such terms as *morphology* and *syntax*, which refer both to language and to linguistics (i.e. grammar). Furthermore, there is no reason to exclude phonology and semantics from the domain of rules, as demonstrated in the previous sections. The analogy between languages and games is discussed further in the chapter by Mäkilähde.

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23. Trubetzkoy's argument that phonology (and, more generally, linguistics) is fundamentally different from the natural sciences, such as physics, is probably not very controversial. Therefore it may be more important to point out that he also considers linguistics to be fundamentally different from *psychology*, as shown by the non-psychological nature of such a key notion as 'phoneme' (1958: 37–38).

4. The present volume: Outline and contextualisation

The scope of the present volume has already been hinted at above through references to the following chapters. Nevertheless, we here present a summary of each chapter, focusing on the main points. We follow this with a contextualisation of the whole volume in terms of the 'big picture'. This discussion will also highlight the relevance of the present enterprise.

In the second chapter, Esa Itkonen provides examples of the scope of normativity, to demonstrate its fundamental importance and relevance. The chapter begins with a discussion of norms governing scientific activities (in particular the 'macro-norm' according to which one ought to seek the truth) and the descriptive practice of linguistics, exemplified by certain basic methodological norms of early generative linguistics. Next, he demonstrates the relevance of normativity for beliefs and knowledge, arguing for an interpretation according to which beliefs contain both a psychological/mental and a logical component: the former is a primary interest of psychology, the latter of philosophy (in particular epistemology). The rest of the chapter focuses on normativity in particular subfields of linguistics. First, Itkonen discusses the nature of semantics (both linguistic and philosophical): he argues that necessary relations are a central component of semantics and that psychologism cannot cope with these, leading him to further argue for a clear distinction between linguistic and cognitive semantics. Second, he expounds on the role of rationality in the explanation of linguistic actions, including the related concept of *rational explanation*. In particular, Itkonen discusses the role of rational explanation in historical linguistics and linguistic typology – a discussion whose roots can be traced back, in particular, to Itkonen (1983). Finally, he provides a glimpse into the ubiquity of normativity: "anything that can be identified as what it is, and can accordingly be spoken about, is implicitly normative" because there is always the possibility of *mis*identification. Due to its broad and general orientation, this chapter thus provides further background for many of the subsequent chapters.

A similarly overarching approach is adopted by Jordan Zlatev and Johan Blomberg in the third chapter, where they discuss specific philosophical problems related to normativity and propose answers to them by drawing upon insights from phenomenology. They begin with an overview of central concepts in phenomenology, such as *intentionality* and *intuition* (both of which are used in a very specific way in phenomenology, and the latter in a broader sense than for example in this Introduction), *embodied intersubjectivity*, and *life-world*. They proceed to analyse two partly different and partly similar approaches to linguistic normativity: those of Esa Itkonen and Eugenio Coseriu. They note the similarities between the two approaches and argue for a combination of the two in order to solve specific 'puzzles'

of normativity they have identified, including the nature and object of intuitions, the inevitability of linguistic variation, and distinctions between different types of normativity (e.g. pertaining to language vs. to logic). Finally, Zlatev and Blomberg set out to answer particular fundamental questions – such as why there are norms – by applying concepts drawn from phenomenology to their analysis. They argue that norms are needed because "they are the key centripetal forces of social life, without which there would be chaos rather than meaning and communication". Their analysis in general provides another strong argument for the essentially social nature of language.

In the fourth chapter, Michael B. Kac discusses the significance of language as a 'normative domain' for grammar in particular. In addition to presenting arguments in favour of interpreting language as one such domain, Kac elaborates on its specific consequences for the grammarian, touching upon such issues as the interpretation of rules as requirements/prohibitions, the purported distinction between rules and constraints, and the difference between suspending and violating rules. He further presents a critique of the claim that "grammaticality is an illusion", and defends the role of intuition in grammatical analysis. In addition, the chapter includes an overview of 'etiological analysis' of ungrammaticality (see Section 3 above), in which objects are analysed according to their possession of 'etiological properties', or properties which make the object ill-formed. The analysis thus amounts to showing not only that particular linguistic objects *are* ungrammatical, but *why* they are so. Finally, Kac repeats a suggestion put forward in his previous work, namely that "linguistics – syntactic theory, in particular – might profit from undertaking a project which amounts to securing the foundations of traditional grammar". As hinted in Section 3 above, Kac's chapter gains even further relevance when one considers its message from the point of view of various grammatical traditions throughout the history of linguistics.

In the fifth chapter, Tapani Möttönen sets out to scrutinise the implications of normativity for semantics. The chapter focuses on the notion of *construal*, or semantic features related to perspective-taking. Although construal has been understood in Cognitive Linguistics as primarily a mental phenomenon, Möttönen argues that "construal is primarily socio-normative (conventionalized intentionality grounded in intersubjectivity) and secondarily cognitive (supported by individual cognitions and cognitive processes that feature in language use)". He compares the cognitive and social approaches to meaning, and – applying notions derived from phenomenology – suggests a reappraisal of construal whereby both social and mental aspects of meaning are taken into account. Möttönen then presents an analysis of co-referential construal in a stretch of written discourse, demonstrating how the concept can be applied in discourse analysis and providing further support for his argument that construal cannot logically be a matter of individual conceptualisation.

The sixth chapter, by Mikko Laasanen, focuses on Valentin Voloshinov's philosophy of linguistics, more particularly on the suggestion that it could serve as an alternative to the Saussurean position, which Voloshinov sets out to critique. Laasanen first outlines certain central aspects of Voloshinov's theory, in particular his theory of signs, of meaning, and of the utterance. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to Voloshinov's criticism of Saussurean linguistics, especially in relation to the concepts of *langue* and *parole* as well as the notion of synchrony. Laasanen's main argument is that the Voloshinovian 'dialogical' approach does not offer a viable alternative to the Saussurean one because the latter is presupposed by the former, and that Voloshinov's approach should instead be considered an early representative of discourse linguistics. As for more detailed arguments, Laasanen proposes, for example, that a distinction needs to be maintained between *langue* at the ontological and the methodological level, the former representing the point of view of the speaker and the latter that of the linguist; although Voloshinov posits that *langue* is nothing but a methodological abstraction, he still has to accept *langue* at the ontological level. Laasanen also comments on the role of written language in linguistics, particularly in relation to 'written language bias'. He notes, furthermore, that Voloshinov's understanding of norms as something that speakers cannot avoid following is too narrow, and that the creative aspects of language are not in conflict with the normative aspect.

The seventh chapter, by Ville Leppänen, focuses on norms from the point of view of variation and change, in other words from that of sociolinguistics and historical linguistics. Leppänen proposes that in terms of normativity linguistic variation can be divided into three distinct categories. 'Non-normative variation' refers to situations where there are clear cases of correct and incorrect variants, such as when the internalisation of norms has been incomplete or when speakers make 'random mistakes'. 'Normative variation', in contrast, refers to cases where the variants are equally correct, and the distinction may be for example between formal and non-formal uses. 'Grey variation', finally, refers to cases where the correctness or incorrectness of the variants is unclear. Leppänen further argues that rationality principles are central in explaining all three types of variation. The second part of the chapter focuses on the ontology of language change. Leppänen suggests that norm changes are again logically classifiable into three basic categories: the appearance, disappearance, and replacement of a norm. He posits that language change proceeds both logically and temporally from innovation through propagation to what he calls 'normativization', or the interpretation of a regularity as an obligation, and notes that "an innovation *need not* result in widespread propagation on the one hand, and propagation […] *need not* result in normativization". Throughout the chapter, examples drawn from various languages are used to illustrate the relevance of norms of correctness and rationality to analyses in both sociolinguistics and historical linguistics.

In the eighth chapter, Anneli Pajunen and Esa Itkonen discuss the role of intuition and its relation to other methods in linguistics, in particular the use of corpora, questionnaires, and experimentation (in the form of eye-tracking). The authors argue, first, that intuition-based linguistics is both logically and practically a necessary presupposition for corpus linguistics; second, that corpus-research in general relies on several different 'normative filters' through which the data pass. They discuss as an example case five different filters, constituted by the intuitions of language users together with the intuitions and professional knowledge of the linguists analysing the data. The bulk of the chapter focuses on cases where intuitions (of the linguists) by themselves do not suffice, and recourse has to be made to other methods. Pajunen and Itkonen illustrate this by discussing previous studies on Finnish syntax (corpus); Finnish speakers' knowledge of semantic networks, derivation, and rare words (questionnaire); and grammatical agreement in Finnish (eye-tracking experiments). On the basis of their analyses, the authors propose that a 'presuppositional hierarchy' of methods can be identified, consisting of the following four 'stages': intuition (with theoretical reflection) > corpus > questionnaire > experiment. They argue that "the *temporal* order coincides with the *logical* one: what is to the left precedes, and is presupposed by, what is to the right". Overall, Pajunen and Itkonen's position advocates methodological pluralism in linguistics and insists that the various methods are connected both logically and practically.

In the ninth chapter, Aleksi Mäkilähde discusses the relevance of norms for research on code-switching, taking as his point of departure the characterisation of code-switching as a 'rule-governed form of behaviour'. He provides an overview of some approaches to the syntax of code-switching, offers an alternative interpretation of the nature of code-switching in terms of norms, and outlines a methodological proposal, focusing on terminology, the testing of predictions, and the roles of different methods. Mäkilähde argues in favour of a synthesis integrating on the one hand correctness and rationality, on the other intuition and observation. He further illustrates the main arguments by discussing the analogy between languages and games, suggesting that not only are there striking similarities at various levels, but that the analogy "can be applied in the other direction as well, bringing out interesting implications for our understanding of norms in general". The chapter is hence relevant not only for those interested in multilingualism, but for anyone interested in normative domains in general.

The aim of the present volume is basically twofold. The first is to further our understanding of linguistics as a scientific discipline and of language as an object of research. The second is to encourage discussion on the philosophy of linguistics (or metatheory) and its connection to linguistic research. Reflecting on the types of questions that the following chapters set out to answer is a relevant undertaking for any and all linguists, since it clarifies what it is we do, how we do it, and why

this is the case. As for the broader contextualisation of the present volume, there are several ways to view the 'big picture'. The first is the most obvious: the fact that the normativity of language continues to receive surprisingly little attention by linguists. Why this is an important topic for linguistics has been outlined throughout this chapter, and its ramifications for linguistics in general and several of its subfields in particular are discussed throughout the rest of the volume. Importantly, we set out to demonstrate that these questions are not only of philosophical but also of practical interest; for example, some concern the choice of suitable methods in different types of research (for example, when and to what extent we should rely on intuition). In this context, we hope that the volume will succeed in sparking interest among linguists in the philosophy and methodology of their discipline, and in inspiring discussion on the role of norms and normativity in other subfields of linguistics, their relevance to other linguistic phenomena, and the role of other types of norms for linguistics.

The second way to contextualise the volume is in relation to current trends in various fields of philosophy. For example, it has been argued that "[o]ne of the most important – and refreshing – developments in recent social philosophy has been the emergence of analyses of social and other norms" (Gaus 2014). While most of the recent literature does not focus specifically on linguistics (or even language), there are obvious connections which deserve further investigation. We mention some examples from recent book-length investigations whose titles refer to norms or normativity in general.[24]

First, Brennan et al. (2013) propose to deal with three main types of norms: *formal, moral*, and *social* (see Section 2.1 above). The last of these, the most important one, is exemplified by "in our society […] one must wear black at funerals" (Brennan et al. 2013: 6); it is similar to a *custom* in von Wright's (1963) classification. The focus of the volume thus excludes constitutive norms, or our A/A*. However, many of the themes touched upon are relevant for language use as well: for example, different ways of acting in accordance with a norm (e.g. 2013: 218), different ways of breaching a norm (2013: 234–244), ways of using norms in explanation (2013: 245–259), and so on. Second, Wedgwood (2007) sets out to examine "normative judgments that can be expressed by statements of the form '*A* ought to *φ*' [for instance, '*A* ought to buy a new pair of shoes'], when the term 'ought' is used in this more general normative sense [where '*A* ought to *φ*' is equivalent to 'There is a conclusive reason for *A* to *φ*']" (2007: 24–25). In essence, Wedgwood focuses on the technicalities of B/B*, and in this sense the arguments have at least a

24. The much-debated philosophical question of the normativity of meaning is, of course, related to language, but the topic itself is extremely complex, and there are many interpretations even of the meaning of the question itself (for overviews, see e.g. Kusch 2006: 50–93; Whiting 2016).

potential connection with the philosophy of linguistics. An exemplification of this is discussed in Itkonen's chapter, by way of the notion 'correct mental state'. Third, in a similar manner, although the discussion in Owens (2012) has perhaps the most obvious ramifications for such topics as 'duty', 'friendship', 'consent', 'blame', and 'wronging', and although the relevant norms thus overlap with moral norms and customs, there is also a connection to a clearly language-related topic, that of making promises. This is because a major part of the study can be seen as an answer to the question, "How can making a promise create an obligation?" (e.g. Searle 1969: 35). More precisely, the arguments will be of interest to those working in such fields as pragmatics and various types of text linguistics or discourse linguistics. In this second context, then, we hope that the volume will offer insights for philosophers interested in norms: on the one hand by presenting new philosophical insights about norms, on the other by discussing the role of norms in contexts where they have not yet been discussed in detail, such as in the context of language change or multilingual language use.

The third way is to consider various trends in the philosophy of linguistics. Stainton (2014) notes that, in addition to physicalism, mentalism (or psychologism), and Platonism (or 'idealism', 'essentialism'), "[t]here is a fourth [answer] that has received less attention. It treats natural languages as social, cultural activities. […] Languages belong in the same family as religions, folk dances, and games. […] This tradition […] is more diffuse than the foregoing three. It does not even have a widely accepted name". The present volume is, of course, broadly part of this 'conventionalist' answer.[25] However, it is important to emphasise here, too, that normativity is only one aspect of the proposal that languages are social institutions; not all social approaches to language discuss norms in particular, and the account offered by the present volume may not be compatible with all such approaches. In this third context, we hope that the volume will incite lively discussion on the philosophy of linguistics, with new questions and new answers, and with proposals emanating from all different '-isms'. Only genuine discussion between conflicting viewpoints has the potential to truly advance our knowledge.

25. A related though broader question is whether linguistics should be considered, for example, a natural science or a human one. In the history of modern linguistics, arguments in favour of (or implying) the former have been presented for example by Bloomfield (1936), Harris (1960: 16, 20) and Chomsky ([1975] 1977: 77–78, 127; 1976: 315; 1986: 3–4, 26; 2009), while the latter has been argued (or implied) for example by Whitney (1875: 310–311), Paul (1920: 1–22), Sapir (1921: 9–10), Coseriu (1974: 166, 173, 205), Itkonen (1974), Kac (1974), and Ringen (1975). See also Carr (2019), Itkonen (2019).

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Concerning the scope of normativity

Esa Itkonen

Wherever a mistake can be made, there is a corresponding norm. Normativity is divided into correctness and rationality. These two dimensions are independent of each other, as shown by the fact that rational actions can be performed by speaking incorrectly, and irrational actions can be performed by speaking correctly. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the scope of both aspects of normativity. The main focus is on the pervasiveness of normativity in linguistics, exemplified here in particular through linguistic semantics and the use of explanations in the field of 'causal' linguistics (e.g. psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, diachronic linguistics). In addition, it is shown that normativity permeates such broader areas as scientific activity in general as well as our everyday lives.

Keywords: philosophy of linguistics, methodology, semantics, truth, belief, reasoning, rationality, causality, explanation, normativity, norms

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall exemplify the scope of normativity. While the main focus is on the role of normativity in language and linguistics, it will also be demonstrated that normativity permeates such broad areas as science, knowledge and beliefs, and even our everyday lives. This demonstrates the fundamental importance of normativity. The notion of norm is based on the distinction between right and wrong. Norms may be classified in more than one way, but it has proved useful to clearly separate rules of *correctness* from principles of *rationality*. These two dimensions are independent of each other, as shown by the fact that rational actions can be performed by speaking incorrectly, and irrational actions can be performed by speaking correctly. Some background information has already been provided in the Introduction to the present volume. In this chapter, the implications and ramifications of normativity are explored at several levels of abstraction.

Section 2 lays the foundation for the present discussion by focusing on general matters. To begin with, the scope of normativity will be exemplified in the direction

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'science → linguistics'. First, there is one 'macro-norm': "Seek the truth!", and examples will be given of how this norm and its corollaries are violated. Second, there are more specific norms of scientific methodology, and there is of course a huge variety of norms that concern the linguists' descriptive practice, ranging from purely stipulative ones (e.g. how to interpret arrows and different types of brackets) to those with more content. Next, it will be demonstrated how beliefs relate to norms and how they need to be understood when they figure in the explanation of actions. The section concludes with a note on descriptive and prescriptive attitudes vis-à-vis norms.

Sections 3 and 4 discuss normativity in relation to linguistics in particular. Section 3 focuses on normativity in semantics. Both philosophical and linguistic semantics are discussed, and the position of psychologism is refuted. In Section 4, the other main type of normativity, namely rationality, is discussed from the point of view of explanation in linguistics. In Popperian terms, norms belong to the non-spatiotemporal 'world-3'. Causality, by contrast, obtains in space and time. Yet norms can be used for *causal explanation*, with the additional assumption that they have in fact been *internalized* by the agents/speakers in question. Applied, more precisely, to the norms of rationality, the resulting notion of 'rational explanation' underpins such linguistic subdisciplines as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, and diachronic linguistics. It justifies functionalism in linguistic typology, and, being an instance of non-nomic 'agent causality', it releases practitioners of diachronic linguistics from an obligation to search 'immutable laws of linguistic change'. These examples provide a glimpse of the *usefulness* of normativity. Finally, the scope of the discussion is further broadened in Section 5 through a consideration of the implicit normativity of everyday life. Section 6 concludes the chapter.

2. Generalities

2.1 Truth as norm

Science is governed by one 'macro-norm': (T) "Seek the truth!" In the scientific context it would be wrong, i.e. irrational, to follow either its contradictory "Do not seek the truth!" or its contrary "Seek the falsity!" This is not to deny that in some other (e.g. propagandistic or artistic) context it might be rational to endorse one or the other of these two 'perversions' of (T).

The macro-norm of scientific thinking has several corollaries, for instance: (i) "Avoid contradiction!", (ii) "Do not misrepresent the view you wish to criticize!", (iii) "Do not look only for evidence that might confirm your own view!", (iv) "Try to find true generalizations!" These are corollaries in the sense that they are

all entailed by (T). That is, if (T) is rigorously followed, each of (i)–(iv) becomes redundant.

It goes without saying that the annals of intellectual history are littered with unintentional violations of (i)–(iv). Here are some examples, gathered from my own personal experience. More precisely, these examples are taken from the long-running debate concerning the metascientific status of linguistics, starting with Itkonen (1974) and (1976), continuing with e.g. (1996), (2003b) and (2016a), and culminating, so far, in (2019).

Ad (i). Itkonen: "Language belongs to the social-normative 'world-3' (not to the physical 'world-1'), and therefore linguistics is different from physics."
Critics: On the one hand, "language belongs to world-3"; on the other, "linguistics is similar to physics". This is, of course, a nice exemplification of $p \,\&\, \sim p$.

Ad (ii). Itkonen: "Intuition-based 'autonomous' linguistics (= AL) is non-empirical."
Critics: "Itkonen claims that linguistics *in toto* is non-empirical." Notice that I have always insisted on the empirical character of e.g. statistical sociolinguistics and experimental psycholinguistics.

Ad (iii). Itkonen: "AL is similar to formal logic (in particular, deontic logic) and different from physics."
Critics: "Linguistics, autonomous or not, is similar to physics." Thus, in making methodological comparisons, the critics never take deontic logic into account and always concentrate on physics. But if there are no other points of comparison, anything can be conceived of as in some sense 'similar' to anything else.

Ad (iv). Itkonen: "Since AL is similar to deontic logic, there is a true generalization to be made that subsumes both."
Critics: Either: "There is no generalization to be made here", which is false. Or: "There is a generalization to be made that subsumes (autonomous) linguistics and physics", which is false (given that AL is much more similar to deontic logic than it is to physics).

Notice that, for all practical purposes, 'generalization' is synonymous with 'analogy'. Analogy, defined as structural similarity between A and B, is based on a structure common to A and B, while generalization consists in either discovering or inventing such a structure (cf. Itkonen 2005: 22–25; 2016b).

Under this level of abstraction, there are more specific norms of scientific methodology: "So the exercise of intelligence requires not just the possession of a well-attested set of beliefs, but also the conscious or unconscious possession of a set of *norms* or principles for determining whether or not a given set of beliefs is well-attested" (Cohen 1986: 44; emphasis added). This passage continues with the following representative list:

"rules of sentential well-formedness"
"decision procedures for consistency or deducibility"
"criteria of proof or measures for probability"
"rules for ensuring that observations are veridical"
"precepts of experimental method for assessing causality"
"strategies for acquiring and processing statistics"
"guidelines for idealization, simplification, and systematization in theory-construction"

Linguistics encompasses (at least) the methodological continuum 'intuition > corpus > questionnaire > experiment' (see Pajunen & Itkonen, this volume). Each of the four methods has its own norms. Here it is enough to mention the basic norm of intuition-based analysis: "Trust your intuition in the clear cases!" Or more explicitly: "If you want to practice grammatical analysis, the rational thing to do is to trust your intuition in the clear cases." On the face of it, this statement is a tautology. It becomes more informative, first, when the notion of 'clear case' is given an *ostensive definition* by means of (exemplifications of) rules such as A-1 (cf. Introduction) and, second, when the ostensive definition is complemented by an exhortation to generalize this notion to all *similar* cases. Furthermore, the methodological norms of *semantics*, in particular, will be illustrated in Section 3.1.

For further illustration, let us consider some of the basic methodological norms of early generativism: "A grammar is a device for generating sentences […] [i.e.] a sequence […] of statements of the form *X-i* → *Y-i* interpreted as the instruction 'rewrite *X-i* as *Y-i*', where *X-i* and *Y-i* are strings. […] Call each statement of [this] form a *conversion*" (Chomsky [1955] 1975: 67). "There is a natural grouping of conversions by the order of application; e.g., rules that convert phrases into morphemes must apply before those converting morphemes into phonemes" ([1955] 1975: 124). Thus, it would be a serious mistake to apply morpheme-to-phoneme conversions/rules before phrase-to-morpheme ones.

There is a fundamental norm, presupposed by the macro-norm (T), that calls for a distinction between the description and its subject matter; for instance: "We shall distinguish between norm and norm-formulation" (von Wright 1963a: 93; emphasis deleted). Similarly: "[The linguist] must determine which utterances, whether in the corpus or not, are grammatical, hence to be described in the grammar […]" (Chomsky [1955] 1975: 129). The description consists of conversions marked with arrows (cf. above), whereas the data cannot – of course – contain any arrows. Therefore, it might seem impossible to overlook the fundamental distinction at issue.

And yet, it proves surprisingly easy to make precisely this mistake, at least occasionally: "The grammatical sentences of the language [i.e. those to be *described*

in the grammar] are those that are *generated* by the associated sequence of conversions" (Chomsky [1955] 1975: 68; emphasis added). Later this confusion seems to have become more acceptable: "The meanings of the sentences of a language are determined by the rules of *language*, that is the *grammar* […]" (Chomsky 1976: 69; emphasis added).

The seeds of this confusion were sown earlier. Chomsky (1965: 25) adopted the habit of "using the term 'grammar' with a systematic ambiguity (to refer, first, to the native speaker's internally represented 'theory of his language' [= competence] and, second, to the linguist's account of this)". The generative description made by the linguist is known perfectly well whereas its object (= competence, or 'I-language') is completely unknown: it is a hypothetical and unconscious entity to which we have no direct access (see also Itkonen 1996). Eliminating the distinction between the two makes competence appear much more familiar than it has any right to be.

Even more seriously, eliminating the distinction between the description (= A) and its object (= B) entails abandoning the macro-norm (T) (namely, by making it vacuous). Why? Because the truth of A depends on the extent to which it corresponds to B. But if A is proclaimed to be *de facto* identical with B (thanks to "systematic ambiguity"), A becomes 'true' by definition.

Truth is the supreme norm of scientific thinking. Here as elsewhere, there is no norm without norm-violation, as shown by (i)–(iv) as well as by the generativist language/grammar confusion.

2.2 On knowledge and belief

The classical definition of knowledge is 'true justified belief' (cf. Pap 1958: 295; Lehrer 1974: 9–18; Itkonen 1978: 302–304); and justification in turn equals "determining that a belief is well-attested", as noted by Cohen (1986: 44). This definition allows two types of challenge to be directed at one who claims to know that p: (a) 'Is *p* true?' and (b) 'How do you know?' Item (b) can be said to ask for some context-*independent* norm of *attaining truth* (via well-attested beliefs). Cohen's (1986) list enumerates some of the most important such norms. Let us single out what seems to be the simplest one, namely the "rule for ensuring that observations are veridical". In the default case, one ensures that *p* is the case simply by *seeing p* to be the case (or, in the clear cases of grammatical analysis, by having the *intuition* that p).

To the two previous challenges, Hampshire ([1969] 1979) adds a third one: (c) 'Are you sure?' Item (c) is meant to ascertain that the norm involved in (b) has been *correctly* applied. Thus, it can be said to ask for some context-*dependent* norm of *avoiding mistakes* in the attempt to attain truth. This addition is a non-trivial

one because we are inherently prone to making mistakes. For instance, the use of intuition is fully justified in the clear cases, but it may be mistakenly extended to less-than-clear cases. Even mathematical certainty does not make the use of (c) irrelevant: "The mathematical proposition [i.e. '12 × 12 = 144'] has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion" (Wittgenstein 1969: § 651).

The heterogeneous collection of norms subsumed by (c) are only implicitly defined by different types of mistakes, i.e. mistakes due, e.g., to "forgetfulness, oversight and illusion".

2.3 The dual nature of beliefs

The *explanation* of human (including linguistic) behavior will be the topic of Section 4. It seems clear enough that any such explanation must contain a *psychological* component. In particular, any explanation of why someone did A must contain some account both of his/her *goal*, i.e. what s/he wanted to achieve, and of his/her *beliefs* concerning possible means to achieve the goal. But the notion of 'belief' is far from simple.

Let us start with a relevant quote:

> Every belief [and goal] must have both a history and a logic; for they are each concerned with a different element of the belief. 'Believe' is a psychological verb and the history of a belief is therefore a psychological story; what is believed, a proposition, is a logical entity, having only logical properties and relations, which are non-temporal. (Edgley [1965] 1978: 24)

Even at the risk of sounding redundant, it needs to be pointed out that (to quote Edgley) it is the "logical element" of belief, and not the psychological one, which makes epistemic *logic*, i.e. the logic of knowledge and belief, possible:

> Whatever necessity there is about logical truth (valid statements) or about relations of logical consequence (entailment) pertains to the subject matter of what is being talked about and not to anybody's (active) knowledge [or belief] thereof. […] The logical implications of what we know [or believe] do not come to us without any work on our part; they are truths which we can extract, often with considerable labor, from whatever information we already have. (Hintikka 1962: 37)

What emerges is the notion of something like a *web of beliefs*, held together by necessary connections. It has been well illustrated by Davidson (1975):

> Nevertheless, belief is central to all kinds of thought. If someone is glad that, or notices that, or remembers that, or knows that, the gun is loaded, then he *must* believe that the gun is loaded. Even to wonder whether the gun is loaded, or to speculate on the possibility that the gun is loaded, requires the belief, for example, that a gun is a weapon, that it is a more or less enduring physical object, and so on. There are good reasons for not insisting on any particular list of beliefs that are needed if a creature is to wonder whether a gun is loaded. Nevertheless, it is necessary that there be endless interlocking beliefs. The system of such beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a *logical* and epistemic space.
>
> (Davidson 1975: 9; emphasis added)

Of course, in addition to such *deductive* relations between beliefs, there are also *inductive* relations of varying strength, i.e. beliefs which, if true, make other beliefs only more or less *probable*. But it seems fair to say that the *core* of any belief-system is constituted by beliefs held together by necessary connections. Interestingly, the situation proves to be the same as in semantics (cf. Section 3.1). A look at Davidson's examples reveals that he is indeed speaking about *semantic* relations, nothing else.

Much of the discussion in Wedgwood (2007) concerns the validity of the following principle: "Necessarily, if one is rational, then if one judges 'I ought to *p*', one also intends to *p*" (2007: 24–25). For my part, I accept this principle on intuitive, pre-theoretical grounds. One of Wedgwood's related key notions, i.e. "correct mental state" (2007: 153–158), may first seem self-contradictory, but it is easily justified in the light of the preceding discussion. First, let us assume that beliefs are mental states. Second, let us concentrate on the logical aspect of beliefs. Third, if X believes that *p*, and if *p* entails *q*, then – in conformity with Hintikka (1962) and Davidson (1975) – *q* is one of X's correct beliefs, regardless of whether or not X happens to actually believe that *q*.

Let it be added that the set of actual beliefs is just a tiny subset of correct beliefs, given that even the simplest sentence/belief literally entails an infinite number of sentences/beliefs. For instance, *John was born in London* entails *John was* ***not*** *born in Berlin, John was* ***not*** *born in Paris*, and so on *ad infinitum*, as well as *John was born in London* ***or*** *John was born in Berlin, John was born in London* ***or*** *John was born in Paris*, and so on *ad infinitum*.

In the Preface of Itkonen (1983) I formulated the problem that had to be solved:

> I soon realized that only the most concrete and, I think, the most trivial aspects of linguistic behaviour are amenable to something like the causal analysis in the traditional sense. In more complex cases – and particularly at the level of global linguistic behaviour – it is necessary to resort to the notion of rationality. But this is a normative concept and, therefore, apart from having difficulties in reinterpreting it as the core of causal descriptions, I was threatened by a reappearance, though in a new form, of all the controversies connected with Itkonen (1978).

The solution, as it turned out, was to endorse the dual nature of beliefs and goals, or what I then called the "Janus-like character of rationality" (1983: 177–181). This entails that the required explanations cannot be of *purely* psychological nature. Goals and beliefs have already been shaped by the social environment: they are w-2 internalizations of the corresponding w-3 entities. This is how their 'logical' aspect has to be understood.

2.4 Descriptive vs. prescriptive attitude vis-à-vis norms

A norm determines which (results of) *actions* qualify as correct or rational, i.e. actions that *ought* to be done, rather than actions that *are* done as a matter of fact. Norms also determine which *beliefs* are correct or rational, as we saw in the previous sections (irrational beliefs are those supported by no evidence, or even contradicted by available evidence). Now, there is an important distinction to be made, at least *prima facie*, between philosophy and psychology: "The problem for epistemology is not 'why *do* I believe this or that?' but 'why *should* I believe this or that?'" (Russell [1940] 1967: 14). The psychologist, by contrast, is concerned with what people do think or believe as a matter of fact.

On the face of it, the question 'what should I believe?' is ambiguous. First, it may ask for *existing* norms of correct thinking (which already suffices to separate philosophy from psychology). But it may also ask for not-yet-existing norms that will enable us to think *better* than we have done up to now. On the latter interpretation, the question 'what should I believe?' is answered by creating *new* norms (of thinking). It seems clear enough that this is how the proper task of philosophy has traditionally been understood. Notice also that the creation of new norms cannot be an arbitrary undertaking, but must follow some (implicit) norms, or *meta*norms, of its own.

The boundary between the two types of norms is a fluid one and most often ignored. Yet it can be meaningfully investigated. For instance, it has become a focus of attention in *post hoc* assessments of the so-called 'ordinary language philosophy'. In conformity with the slogan 'meaning is use', representatives of this school proposed in the 1950's to practice philosophical meaning-analysis by observing how words are *actually* used. Two things need to be corrected here. First, this agenda was formulated in a misleading way: what was 'observed' was not the actual spatiotemporal behaviour of a group of speakers, but those (existing) norms that they were following (and occasionally violating). Second, the agenda itself was misconceived: clinging to it would have – incongruously – replaced philosophy by (autonomous) linguistics.

The latter point has been argued by several philosophers. For instance, von Wright (1963b) emphasizes that to some extent the philosopher has to *create* the object of his/her investigation: "The idea of the philosopher as a searcher of meanings should not be coupled with an idea or postulate that the searched entities actually *are there* – awaiting the vision of the philosopher. […] The concept still remains to be *moulded* and therewith its logical connections with other concepts to be *established*" (1963b: 5; original emphasis; for discussion, cf. Itkonen 2005: 37–38).

Searle agrees: "As a tool of analysis, the use theory of meaning can provide us only with certain data, i.e., raw material for philosophical analysis; […]" (1969: 148–149). In other words, once the 'meanings-as-use' have been duly recorded, the philosophical analysis itself still remains to be done.

Putnam (1981) constructs an argument to the same effect: if "concepts are norms or rules underlying *public* linguistic practices", and if "*concepts themselves* determine which philosophical arguments are right", then it follows that "philosophical truth is as *publicly demonstrable* as scientific truth". But this conclusion is "simply unreasonable in the light of the whole history of the subject" (1981: 111–112; original emphasis).

There seems to be the same contrast between philosophy and linguistics as there is between philosophy and psychology. Philosophy teaches us how to think better whereas linguistics does *not* teach us how to speak better. But the difference is, in reality, less clear-cut than it seems. Surely theoretical linguistics at its best teaches us how to *think* better than we did before about the way we speak. And the same must, on reflection, be true of (theoretical) psychology as well: it does teach us how to think better about describing those (common-sense) beliefs that we sustain in fact.

3. Semantics

3.1 Necessary truth as the basis of philosophical/linguistic semantics

First, let us make a few terminological remarks: 'entailment' = 'necessarily true implication', 'necessarily true' = 'analytic', 'necessary falsity' = 'contradiction'. Next, let us quote Pap's (1958) succinct characterization of the philosophical method: "the concept of entailment (and the related concepts of self-contradiction and logical incompatibility) is the primary tool by means of which analytic philosophers undertake to analyse concepts" (1958: 92). "Semantic analysis of natural language involves *intuitive* knowledge of necessary propositions" (1958: 396; original emphasis). For instance, the (preliminary) analysis of 'father' as 'male parent' is attained by means of two entailments (1958: 297):

(1) If A is B's father, then A is male

(2) If A is B's father, then A is B's parent

Moreover, the 'father = male parent' analysis is supported by several contradictions, or by the fact that denying (1) or (2) produces a necessary falsity, e.g. (3) or (4) (which again entails, in two-valued logic, that affirming (1) or (2) produces a necessary truth):

(3) If A is B's father, then A is not male

(4) If A is B's father, then A is not B's parent

The point of adding (3) and (4) is that intuitions about contradiction are just as strong as, or perhaps even stronger than, intuitions about analyticity. Notice that these 'philosophical' intuitions are identical with the corresponding linguistic-semantic intuitions.

In the framework of Cognitive Grammar, for instance, the truth of 'father = male parent' is justified less explicitly. Instead of referring to entailments like (1)–(2) or contradictions like (3)–(4), it is just said that the concept 'father' "fully conveys" the two concepts 'male' and 'parent' (Langacker 1987: 293).

Wedgwood (2007) represents the same view of philosophical semantics as Pap (1958): "Prototypically, a conceptual analysis takes the form of a universally quantified biconditional, such as the following:

(5) For all x, x is an uncle if and only if x is the brother of a parent

– where this universally quantified biconditional is usually understood to be not merely contingent but *necessary*" (Wedgwood 2007: 66; with a different numbering; emphasis added).

To give a more informative example, let us return to the classical definition of 'knowledge'. It is achieved by means of a set of entailments (which, to be sure, may be formulated in more than one way):

(6) If A knows that p, then A (also) believes that p, but not vice versa

(7) If A knows that p, then *p* is true

(8) If A correctly guessed that p, then A had a true belief concerning *p*, but A did not know that p

(9) If A believed that p, when *p* was highly probable and yet false, A had a justified belief concerning *p*, but A did not know that p

Taken together, the entailments (6)–(9) *elicit*, one by one, the following 'semantic features' as the definition of 'knowledge': 'true' & 'justified' & 'belief'. More

precisely, (6) shows that knowledge must be a kind of belief; (7) shows that what is known must be true; (8) and (9) show that neither 'true belief' nor 'justified belief' is enough: what is required is 'true justified belief'.

It would be much too dogmatic to demand that all semantic definitions/descriptions *must* conform to this format. For instance, it is not immediately evident whether or not Hampshire's ([1969] 1979) additional qualification can be formulated as a fourth semantic feature characteristic of 'knowledge'. If it cannot, this just goes to show that semantic analysis need not be restricted to the use of features elicited by entailments-*cum*-contradictions. It is certainly a wise policy to allow definitions/descriptions to remain in this sense *open*.

Still, it is *primarily* by means of entailments and contradictions that we perform each and every semantic analysis, whether or not we realize it (and even contrary to explicit denials). This is how we elicit *lexical* meanings, in addition to Examples (1)–(9): The sentence 'A is running' entails 'A is moving', is contradicted by, or incompatible with, 'A is motionless', and is compatible with 'A is smiling'; and so on. *Grammatical* meanings like 'present' and 'singular' are elicited in the same way: 'A is running' entails 'this happens now', and is contradicted by 'this happened in the past'; 'A met a friend' entails 'A met one person', and is contradicted both by 'A met nobody' and by 'A met several persons'; and so on.

These truths are self-evident to the point of being trivial, and therefore we tend to ignore them. Or worse, we may have been misled into thinking that they have somehow been superseded by the latest results of either cognitive science or neuroscience. This fallacy has been repeatedly exposed in Itkonen (2016a).

If any confirmation is needed for what precedes, here it is: "In learning the meaning of words we in effect learn certain simple analytical truths; for these truths are simple, in that knowing them to be [necessarily] true is a necessary condition for understanding their meaning" (Edgley 1970: 25). There was a good reason why Arthur Pap chose the title *Semantics and Necessary Truth* for his monumental 1958 book.

For simplicity, no difference was made between philosophical vs. linguistic analysis in this section. But we should not forget the caveat expressed in Section 2.4.

3.2 Necessary truth as an exemplification of normativity

In sum, what every competent semanticist is practicing could be called 'analysis-by-entailment'. The 'necessity' (i.e. necessary *truth*) of entailments does not mean that people are *forced* to think in accordance with them. It means, rather, that they *ought* to do so; and if they do not, they have committed a *mistake* (or are just intellectually confused). It is perfectly possible that there are people who

fail to understand some, or even all, of the entailments or contradictions (1)–(9). Does this mean that (1)–(9) have been *falsified* by this type of behaviour? Certainly not! This is, precisely, the import of the *axiom of normativity* (cf. Introduction to this volume).

Exactly the same remarks apply to any attempt to reduce *logic* to psychology. This is how Johnson (1987) goes about it: "Metaphorically we understand the process of reasoning as a form of motion along a path" (1987: 38). "The force of logic moves us from one propositional location to another […] *forcing us to conclusions* […] If the force of logic operates to move you to a certain 'place', then you wind up in that place" (1987: 64; emphasis added). To refute this claim, it is enough to show that it fails to apply to any real example. Consider this inference:

1. $A \vee (B \rightarrow D)$
2. $\sim C \rightarrow (D \rightarrow E)$
3. $A \rightarrow C$
4. $\sim C$

---

5. $(B \rightarrow E)$

Is this inference valid? That is, does the conclusion 5. follow from the premises 1.–4.? Yes, it does. First, 3. and 4. yield ~A by *Modus Tollens*, i.e. $[(p \rightarrow q) \,\&\, \sim q] \rightarrow \sim p$; second, $\sim A$ and 1. yield $B \rightarrow D$ by Disjunctive Syllogism, i.e. $[(p \vee q) \,\&\, \sim p] \rightarrow q]$; third, 2. and 4. yield $D \rightarrow E$ by *Modus Ponens*, i.e. $[(p \rightarrow q) \,\&\, p] \rightarrow q$; fourth, and finally, $B \rightarrow D$ and $D \rightarrow E$ yield the conclusion $B \rightarrow E$ by Transitivity of Implication, i.e. $[(p \rightarrow q) \,\&\, (q \rightarrow r)] \rightarrow (p \rightarrow r)$.

But what does it mean to say that we are "forced to this conclusion", in the sense of being "moved from one propositional location to another by the force of logic"? It means nothing, nothing at all. Most of us are just too stupid to be moved in the *right* way, which is another way of saying that there is *no* (intersubjectively valid) "force of logic": "Logical truths are not truths which logic forces on us; they are not necessary truths in the sense of being unavoidable" (Hintikka 1962: 37). What should be said, rather, is that the connection between the premises and the conclusion is a *normative* one: people *ought* to be able to derive 5. from 1.–4. Even a casual look at the (statistical) results of (experimental) psychology of logic is enough to convince an unbiased observer that we are indeed dealing here with two entirely different 'worlds', i.e. w-3 and w-2 (cf. Itkonen 2005: 150–162).

As for the irrelevance of psychology, arithmetic provides an even clearer example, if possible. At least on the global scale, there are certainly those who fail to understand Wittgenstein's example '$12 \times 12 = 144$' (cf. Section 2.2). But it would be absurd to claim that, just for this reason, arithmetic has been 'falsified'.

Does it follow, then, that semantic definitions/descriptions like 'knowledge = true justified belief' cannot be falsified at all? Of course not! First, this description may well have to be *revised* by qualifications like the one proposed by Hampshire ([1969] 1979). Second, it can be argued, more strongly, that the description *has* actually been falsified, namely by the kind of counter-example discussed in Lehrer (1974: 18–22). The important point is that the eventual falsification is provided here by *philosophical* counter-examples, and not by actual behaviour exhibited by those who fail to conform to the relevant norms.

3.3 Normativity prevails over psychology/cognition

The result achieved in the previous section has important implications that deserve to be scrutinized in more detail. Representatives of Cognitive Linguistics in general, and of Cognitive Grammar in particular, endorse the position that meanings are individual-psychological (and largely unconscious) entities, which entails that semantics has to be replaced by psychology: "Meaning is, in the last analysis, a matter of conceptualization" (Langacker 1987: 156). "A conceptualization is the occurrence of a cognitive event" (1987: 138). "Sounds are like other concepts" (1987: 78). "Cognitive events [are] defined as neurological occurrences" (Langacker 1997: 249). "Only as a special case, and to a very limited extent, can we [consciously] monitor our own conceptualizing activity" (Langacker 2007: 451). There is an important sense, to be elucidated now, in which this position is patently false.

Let us, once again, take our cue from Pap:

> It would be unreasonable to require *direct* conformity to [linguistic] usage, in the sense that the analysis should be confirmable by *introspections of meanings*. In other words, the requirement would be unreasonable if it meant that a negative answer to the question 'Is this what I (you) *have in mind* when I (you) use term *T*?' would disconfirm a proposed analysis of the meaning of *T*. Who would maintain that whenever he identifies a figure as a circle he thinks of the concept of the equality of length? Yet, this concept enters into the customary analysis of the concept 'circle', and if it be held that for this very reason the analysis does not give the *meaning* of the term 'circle', then it is obscure in what sense of 'meaning' a somewhat complex analysis could ever express the meaning of a term.
>
> (Pap 1958: 397–398; original emphasis)

Hence, what actually occurs in people's minds is just irrelevant for semantic analysis.

Now, if the normative or anti-psychologistic view of semantics defended by Pap and myself is correct, then it is impossible for Langacker to consistently maintain his (psychologistic) position. He is indeed forced to contradict himself, for instance,

when he notes (1987: 462) that *triangle* and *three-sided polygon*, though not fully synonymous, are nevertheless "expressions with the same composite structure". The important point is that what speakers of English *have in mind* when they use the term *triangle* is most certainly *not* its (near-)equivalence with *three-sided polygon* (for the simple reason that most of them are not familiar with the word *polygon*). But if Langacker is not speaking about (cognitive) events that belong to the psychological 'world-2', what is he speaking about, then? Of course, he is speaking about meanings as inhabitants of the social-normative 'world-3' (just as he – and anybody else – should be).

Notice that the same remarks apply, in principle, to the simpler example 'father = male parent' (cf. Section 3.1). It is at least conceivable that when speakers of English use the term *father*, such ideas as 'male' and 'parent' simultaneously occur in their minds. But this is *not* what Langacker (1987: 293) is speaking about when he says that the concept 'father' *fully conveys* the concepts 'male' and 'parent'. What he is speaking about is the old-fashioned conceptual analysis à la Pap (1958).

If some additional confirmation is needed for the anti-psychologistic position, here it comes:

> The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences. […] Suppose we found a man who, speaking of how words felt to him, told us that *if* and *but* felt the *same*. – Should we have the right to disbelieve him? […] If he *used* the words *if* and *but* as we do, shouldn't we think that he understood them as we do?".
>
> (Wittgenstein [1953] 1958: 181–182; original emphasis)

Psychologism must deny the existence of necessary relations. Why? Because there can be no such relations between temporally separate entities (such as cognitive events). While psychologism has been the prevalent doctrine during the Western history of linguistics, there have always been a few dissenting voices as well, as documented in Itkonen (1991). Generativism and cognitivism are antagonistic in many respects, but they both endorse psychologism, and are therefore open to the same type of criticism. For instance, Katz and Postal (1991: 521) base their criticism of Chomsky-type "conceptualism" (= psychologism) on the fact that it allows "no place for necessary connections in grammatical structure". This leads to a contradiction: On the one hand, Chomsky qua psychologist is committed to denying the existence of analyticity. On the other, he admits that "certain *analytic* connections exist between linguistic expressions, certain truths hold solely by virtue of linguistic facts: for instance, the relation between *I persuaded him to leave* and *He intended to leave*" (Chomsky 1979: 145; emphasis added). "There are principles that are completely linguistic. For instance, in *John sees him, John* and *him* cannot be taken to refer to the same person, […] This is a linguistic *rule*" (1979: 146; emphasis added).

Having pointed out this contradiction, Katz and Postal correctly conclude that "[no] other form of conceptualism [can] escape the defects of Chomsky's version" (1991: 550). These defects are indeed inherent to the very notion of psychologism.

In Introduction we already saw Trubetzkoy's ([1939] 1958) convincing plea for the primacy of normativity. This is what he has to say, in addition, concerning the boundary between intersubjective norms and subjective (= mental) experiences:

> Die Zahl der verschiedenen konkreten *Vorstellungen* und Gedanken, die in den verschiedenen Sprechakten bezeichnet werden können, ist unendlich. Die Zahl der Wort*bedeutungen* aber, die im Sprachgebilde [*langue*] bestehen, ist beschränkt […]. Das Bezeichnete [*signifié*] des Sprachgebildes besteht also im Gegensatz zum Bezeichneten des Sprechaktes [*parole*] aus einer endlichen (zählbaren), beschränkten Anzahl von Einheiten. Dasselbe Verhältnis zwischen Sprachgebilde und Sprechakt besteht aber auch auf dem Gebiete des Bezeichnenden [*signifiant*]. Die artikulatorischen Bewegungen und die ihnen entsprechenden Lautungen […] sind unendlich mannigfaltig, aber die Laut*normen* […] sind endlich (zählbar) […].
> (Trubetzkoy [1939] 1958: 6; emphasis added)[1]

The experiences (related to meanings and sounds) are infinite in number; they constitute (part of) the domain of the *parole*. By contrast, the number of the corresponding norms is limited; they constitute the domain of the *langue*. Therefore, it is the latter, and not the former, which is the proper subject matter of linguistics.

There have been attempts to *reduce* norms to something non-normative. For instance, Brennan et al. (2013: Chapter 2) discuss, and reject, attempts to redefine norms in terms of either (non-normative) social behavior or (non-normative) desires: "we propose instead a *non-reductive* account of norms" (2013: 15). In the same vein, it was customary to claim, in the philosophy of language as practised in the 1970's, that linguistic norms could be reduced either to hearer beliefs or to speaker intentions. It is easy to see, however, that if beliefs and intentions are obviously *wrong* (i.e. absurd, mistaken, or irrelevant), they have to be discarded. Only *correct* beliefs and intentions will do, which means, of course, that there is no way to get rid of normativity (cf. Itkonen 1978: 182–186; 1983: 167–168). As a corollary, the topic of the next subsection may be summarized by saying that linguistic semantics cannot be reduced to (or replaced by) cognitive semantics.

---

1. "The number of those concrete *ideas* and thoughts, which are expressed in different speech acts, is infinite. But the number of word *meanings*, which exist in the linguistic system, is limited […]. In contradistinction to what is expressed in the speech act, what is expressed in the linguistic system consists of a finite (countable), limited number of units. But the same relation between system and act also obtains in the domain of what expresses. The articulatory movements and the corresponding sounds […] are infinitely many, but the sound *norms* are finite (countable)" (translation by E. I.).

3.4 Linguistic vs. cognitive semantics

As we just saw, the primacy of normativity applies equally to meanings and to sounds. Next, let us narrow our focus on semantics, more particularly. Consider these sentences, adapted from Talmy (2000: 104):

(10) This mountain range goes from Mexico to Canada.

(11) *This mountain range goes from Mexico in Canada

(10) is a correct sentence of English whereas (11) is incorrect. Whoever utters (11) commits a *mistake*. Why? Because there is a *norm* which determines how pairs of source vs. goal expressions ought to be used, and this norm has been broken by (11). It is generally assumed that uttering (10) is accompanied by a *mental scanning* in the south-to-north (or upward) direction (ibid.). But let us suppose that someone uttering (10) either performs no scanning or performs a different one. Has s/he made a mistake? No. Why not? Because a mistake can be recognized for what it is only on the basis of *public* or intersubjective criteria, and there are no such criteria for the occurrence of mental scanning or for mental imagery in general (cf. Itkonen 2008a: 24–25).

We *know* both the correctness of (10) and the incorrectness of (11), but we merely *assume* that the one who utters (10) performs a mental scanning as here described. These are two different things. We say that the (in)correctness of (10)/(11) is *known* on the basis of *intuition* whereas the occurrence of mental scannings is *assumed* on the basis of *introspection*.

As argued by Wittgenstein, meaning is (correct) use as determined by 'public' (= socially valid) norms/rules. As a w-3 entity, the meaning of (10) *must* be different from those individual mental scannings which, as w-2 entities, may or may not accompany the uttering or hearing of (10). Of course, endorsing w-3 does not entail rejecting w-2 (to think otherwise is a surprisingly common mistake.) On the contrary, the subjective w-2 experiences of mental scannings may well (causally) *explain* how and why the w-3 norm governing fictive-motion expressions like (10) has come into being, in the first place.

This happens in accordance with the notion of rational explanation (cf. Section 4): I want to express my experiences of mental scanning, and I believe that creating (10)-type expressions is an adequate means to achieve this goal; therefore I begin to utter (10)-type expressions. This is what Coseriu ([1958] 1974) calls *Ausdruckserfordernis* (or *Ausdrucksbedürfnis*), which is the basis of his 'finalistic' explanations (cf. Itkonen 2011). In the same vein, Itkonen (2013: 42–44) utilizes the notion of 'expressive need', anticipated by Whitney ([1875] 1979: 147): "The end aimed at is the supply of a need of expression".

This is *in nuce* the origin of norms: "a repeated pattern of behaviour becomes a binding pattern of behaviour" (Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 85). But as the norm begins to exist, it gradually becomes detached from its origin, i.e. those actions and experiences that brought it into being, in the first place. Having come into being, the norm can no longer be reduced to what initially gave rise to it. For the norm governing (10), for instance, it is irrelevant whether or not it is (still) accompanied by individual mental scannings.

It is interesting to note that Pap (1958) takes our 'intuition vs. introspection' distinction for granted, as shown by the passages already quoted in what precedes. On the one hand, he regards semantic analysis as based on "*intuitive* knowledge of necessary propositions" (1958: 396; quoted in Section 3.1); on the other, he denies that "the analysis is confirmable by introspections of meanings" (1958: 398; quoted in Section 3.3).

The difference between the two types of semantics, linguistic and cognitive, has been fully grasped by Blomberg and Zlatev (2014) and Möttönen (2016: Chapter 4), for instance. This is more than can be said about Langacker (1987: 154–156). First, he envisages two types of semantic description, namely 'dictionary' and 'encyclopedia', where the former equals Pap-type analysis, also exemplified by Katz (1972), while the latter encompasses both cognition and 'world knowledge'. He then claims that "the distinction between dictionaries and encyclopedias is fundamentally misconceived [i.e. vague or gradual]", in order to arrive at the conclusion that "the only viable conception of linguistic semantics is encyclopedic in nature". But this conclusion, apart from being a blatant non-sequitur, is directly falsified by Langacker's own *non*-encyclopedic analysis of 'father' as 'male parent' or of 'triangle' as 'three-sided polygon' (cf. above). What we have here is an exemplification of the following *fallacy*: "If there is no absolute distinction between A and B, then (B being more frequent than A) there is nothing but B."

In the present context it may be good to mention another fallacy as well, more fully discussed in Itkonen (2016a): "If there is no absolute distinction between A and B, there is no distinction between A and B." It is this fallacy which has lured Quine into arguing against the analytic-synthetic distinction, starting already with his 1953 article. His argument is relevant to our topic because, if successful, it threatens the very notion of *necessary truth*.

This is how Quine goes about it. First, he sets up a continuum with two extremes: on the one hand, logical truths like 'No married man is unmarried'; on the other, empirical statements like 'No raven is white'. Second, he correctly notes that while these extremes seem to qualify, respectively, as analytic and synthetic, they are connected by a set of less and less analytic and more and more synthetic items: hence, there is no *absolute* analytic-synthetic distinction. Third, he incorrectly takes this to mean that there is *no* analytic-synthetic distinction.

In so doing, he overlooks the obvious alternative that there is a *gradual* analytic-synthetic distinction: "The distinction between necessary truth and empirical truth appears somewhat less than clear-cut" (Pap 1958: 391). "Es ist selbstverständlich, dass der Begriff der Analytizität in natürlichen Sprachen nur relativ sein kann […] Die Relativität darf aber nicht mit der Nicht-Existenz verwechselt werden" (Itkonen 1970: 8). "[S]ome scientific principles have the character of analytic truths while others are clearly empirical generalizations […] the border between the two categories has often fluctuated in the course of the historical development of a science" (von Wright 1971: 20).

In conclusion, let us widen our perspective so as to have a look at *typological* linguistics. Psychologism reduces language to (linguistic) form and identifies meaning (= semantics) with mind (= cognition), whereas the anti-psychological position equates language with form-*cum*-meaning, keeping meaning/semantics separate from cognition. The latter position is generally endorsed by representatives of typological linguistics, for instance, by all contributors to Bohnemeyer and Pederson (2011). Here the point of departure is the dichotomy between "language and psychology", i.e. semantics and cognition (Pederson & Bohnemeyer 2011: 2–7). Depending on the case at hand, the distance between semantic and cognitive categories may be considered either as large or as (nearly) nonexistent. For instance, while Givón (1991) and Pawley (2011) agree that the English verbs (= A) and the Kalam serial verb constructions (= B) are *semantically* dissimilar, they disagree as to the proper *cognitive* interpretation of this fact. For Givón, A and B are cognitively similar, which entails that languages, instead of directly expressing cognition, just exhibit some sort of surface variation. For Pawley, by contrast, A and B are cognitively dissimilar, which entails that linguistic/semantic differences reflect cognitive ones.

The position of Cognitive Grammar on this issue has been well summarized by Zlatev (2007: 337):

> From the premises 'semantic structure is language-specific to a considerable degree' (Langacker 1987: 2) and 'cognitive grammar equates meaning with conceptualization' (1987: 5), it follows that conceptualization is language-specific. […] [This view] does imply a fairly strong version of linguistic relativity, although this is seldom acknowledged.

To sum up: In typological linguistics, meaning and cognition are two different things whereas in cognitive linguistics they are one and the same thing. There are those, i.e. typologically-minded cognitivists, who want to simultaneously endorse both positions. But this is a contradiction. Maybe a time will come when, in the name of Derridaesque postmodernism, contradictions are no longer frowned upon (cf. Itkonen 1988). But this time has not come yet. And more importantly, it *should* never come.

4. Rational explanation

4.1 Definition

It is my thesis, expounded at length in Itkonen (1983), that human behaviour is, first and foremost, amenable to *rational explanation* (= RE). The basic schema of RE is as follows:

(12) [G:Y & B:(X → Y)] ⊦ G:X} ⇒ X; and if all goes well, X → Y

Outside the curly brackets, X and Y stand, respectively, for actions and goal-states in space and time, while inside the brackets they stand for corresponding mental representations. The prefixes G and B stand for the propositional attitudes of having-as-goal (or simply desiring) and believing. The schema says that if someone has the goal Y and believes that there is an action X (which s/he is capable of performing and) which is the *best* means to achieve Y, then s/he must intend (or want) to do X: This is "the principle of transmission of intention from ends to means" (von Wright [1972] 1978: 52). Having this goal and this belief will then *cause* him/her to do X (unless s/he is somehow prevented from doing so or changes his/her mind). What is inside the curly brackets constitutes the *reason* for doing X; and "reasons are causes" (Davidson [1963] 1968: 87).

The double arrow ⇒ stands for mental causation while the solid arrow → stands for 'general' causation. The entailment sign ⊦ expresses conceptual necessity: given this goal and this belief, the agent *must* intend (or want) to do X. But now we seem to face a problem: If the entailment sign is meant to express that the agent is moving from one psychological state to another, then it cannot express genuine necessity because this does not exist in w-2. Therefore, as already explained in Section 2.3, the only coherent option is to assign to goals and beliefs an *ambiguous* status which makes them inhabitants both of w-3 and of w-2. It is in their former capacity that they can have conceptual w-3 relations (and be shared by several people), whereas it is in their latter capacity that they can be involved in processes of mental causation. This is the "Janus-like character" of rationality (cf. above), and it also answers von Wright's ([1972] 1978: 47) (inconclusive) worry: Are we dealing with "a form of causal efficacy" or with "logical compulsion"?

Characterizing X as "the *best* means to achieve Y", as was done above, is a way to circumvent the following question: while X is certainly the (intended) *cause* of Y, is X (meant to be) *sufficient* or (only) *necessary* for Y to come about? On the former interpretation, X → Y is verbalized as 'if X, then Y' (i.e. as the standard material implication), whereas on the latter interpretation X → Y is verbalized as 'only if X, then Y'. In everyday life, this distinction may not be very important, but

in theoretical analysis it must be accounted for (cf. Section 4.3). In practice, (12) can be abbreviated as $G \& B \rightarrow A$: 'goal-cum-belief causes action'.

RE exemplifies the general notion of *problem-solving*. The problem is: how to achieve the goal? The (tentative) solution is the action that has been chosen to achieve the goal.

In my previous publications I have applied RE e.g. to the following phenomena: the *das* → *dass* grammaticalization in German (and grammaticalization in general); the asymmetry of nominal SG vs. PL marking; the cross-linguistic paucity of *N-and-N* constructions; the role of zero in verb morphology; the emergence of lexical affixes; the distribution of same-subject vs. different-subject converbs. Additional examples will be given in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

4.2 Justification in three different situations

Above, it was taken for granted that there is a need for RE. Now it is time to justify this assumption. All I can do in the present context is to outline and reformulate some of the arguments that have been presented more fully in Itkonen (1980), (1983), (2013), and (2013/2014).

There are two types of laws, universal and statistical. Universal laws are expressed by universally quantified implications of the type $\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$, i.e. 'for all x, if x is A, then x is B'. Statistical (or statistical-probabilistic) laws are expressed by statements like $p(B/A)= r$. For instance, 'for all x, if x is A, then x is B with the probability 0.7'. (More simply, '70% of all x's which are A are B'.) Reformulated in statistical-probabilistic terms, a universal law has the form $p(B/A) = 1$.

Genuine laws differ from accidental regularities by their *nomic* character, manifested by the capacity to support contrafactual statements. A true universal law $\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$ entails that if a, which is not B, had been A, it would have been B, whereas a true statistical law $p(B/A) = 0.7$ entails that if a had been A, it would have been B with the probability 0.7. Genuine universal laws are also called 'deterministic'.

Universal laws (together with initial conditions) *explain why* something happened (e.g. the event described by Aa). Such an explanation qualifies as 'deductive-nomological'. It also *predicts that* something will happen (e.g. the event described by Ab). Statistical laws, by contrast, are not able to explain why something *happened* in fact, but only why something was *expected to happen* (with a certain probability); and the same is true of statistical predictions. This is why von Wright (1971: 14) is entitled to claim that "the two models are much more different than is often thought".

As far as linguistics is concerned, (at least) three different situations need to be distinguished: no laws; statistical laws; universal laws. The use of RE in linguistics will now be justified by showing that it is required in *all three* situations. Certainly no one can ask for more.

4.2.1 *No laws*

'Positivism' designates that type of philosophy of science which demands that human sciences should exhibit laws analogous, prototypically, to those of Newtonian physics. It is generally agreed that historians have never been able to discover any such 'laws of history'. Looking back, Berlin summarizes the situation as follows: "No general laws were formulated – not even moderately reliable maxims – from which historians could deduce (together with knowledge of the initial conditions) either what would happen next, or what had happened in the past…" (1980[1960]: 110).

The situation is exactly the same in *diachronic linguistics*: "The laws of general-historical phonetics or morphology do not suffice to explain a single fact […] we are not able to predict a single future development" (Meillet 1921: 16). "I shall assume here as axiomatic that predictive power in historical linguistics – at least in a sense strong enough to satisfy philosophers or mathematicians – is an impossibility" (Samuels 1987: 239). "Of course the embarrassing fact remains that to date not a single covering-law [= deterministic] explanation exists in history (or in human sciences in general)" (Anttila 1989: 400). More precisely, this fact is embarrassing for a convinced positivist, not for a competent practitioner of diachronic linguistics (who knows only too well that such laws do not exist).

If this is the situation, how should it be understood? There are two basic options. Either we cling to the notion that explanations ought to be *nomic* (or lawlike), which makes explaining impossible. This is the option chosen by Lass (1997: 387): "we still have no convincing explanations for change". Or we abandon the notion of nomic explanation and endorse the notion of *non-nomic* explanation. This is the option that I have been propagating for nearly four decades. It was anticipated e.g. by Coseriu: "Denn im Fall der Sprache sind die einzigen notwendigen Gesetze diejenigen, die eine rationale Notwendigkeit zum Ausdruck bringen" ([1958] 1974: 203; for discussion, see Itkonen 2011).[2]

The fact that we have opted for the notion of non-nomic explanation, this still leaves open the precise contents of this notion. Let us take our cue from Heine (1997: 4): "People use language to accomplish purposes and goals". This is certainly true. But what does it mean? The notion of RE, as here presented, is meant to provide the answer.

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2. "As far as language is concerned, the only necessary laws are those which express a rational necessity" (Translation by E. I.).

Universal laws do not exist in diachronic linguistics. Statistical laws are certainly possible, even if they are not in general use. But notice that the boundary between diachronic and typological linguistics has almost disappeared today; and many feel that statistics provides the right way to deal with cross-linguistic (= typological) data (cf. Section 4.2.2).

It is almost trivial to add that there is no reference to laws of any kind in the domain of *pragmatics* (or, more generally, in the theory of action). Why did I just write this sentence? I can explain my action to anybody's satisfaction by referring to my current goals and beliefs. Because reasons are causes and make actions look necessary, RE provides the notion of *causal necessity* which is generally thought to be the characteristic property of genuine *explanation*. But RE makes use of no laws, either universal or statistical.

Those who claim that "there are no laws" in this or that domain always really mean to say that there are no *non-trivial* laws. It is easy to find trivial laws like 'All people seek one or another kind of happiness'.

4.2.2 *Statistical laws*

Let us simplify universal *implications* as 'if A, then B'. Such statements express perfect *asymmetrical* correlations between A and B. Universal *equivalences* like 'if, and only if, A, then B' exhibit perfect *symmetrical* correlations between A and B. Statistical data are by definition 'messy' in the sense that they exhibit *imperfect* correlations, which also entails that the difference between implication and equivalence loses much of its importance. Imperfect asymmetric correlations are expressed by *weak* implications whereas, correspondingly, imperfect symmetric correlations are expressed by *weak* equivalences (cf. Boudon 1974: 32). In what follows, we shall concentrate on situations analogous to the one described by Figure 1.

	A	*A	
B	35	20	55
*B	15	30	45
	50	50	100

Figure 1.

To fix our ideas, let us suppose that A and B stand, respectively, for the class of smokers and the class of people with lung cancer. As a consequence, not-A and not-B, designated by *A and *B, stand, respectively, for the class of non-smokers and the class of people without lung cancer. Let AB designate the intersection of A and B, i.e. the class of smokers with lung cancer; and similarly for A*B, etc. Figure 1 expresses the following information: There is a sample of 100 persons (which

can be made more representative by adding more zeros to 100); A = 50 smokers; *A = 50 non-smokers; B = 55 persons with lung cancer; *B = 45 persons without lung cancer; AB = 35 smokers with lung cancer; A*B = 15 smokers without lung cancer; *AB = 20 non-smokers with lung cancer; *A*B = 30 non-smokers without lung cancer.[3]

If A*B = 0, then A is a *sufficient* condition for B: to know that A occurs is enough to know that B occurs too. If *AB = 0, then A is a *necessary* condition for B = B does not occur without A occurring too. As already mentioned, statistical data exhibit only imperfect or 'weak' analogues of these two situations. Notice that 'condition' is more general than 'cause'.

If we want to investigate the incidence of B (= lung cancer) in A (= smokers), the crucial number is AB/A (= 35/50), i.e. the number of smokers with lung cancer divided by the number of smokers. It expresses the proportion of B in A: 70%. Assuming the sample to be large enough, this also expresses the *relative frequency* of B in A. For all practical purposes, it is identical with the statistical-probabilistic law *p(B/A) = 0.7*, which expresses the *conditional probability* from the reference class A to the attribute class B. Alternative names for A and B are 'independent variable' and 'dependent variable', respectively.

In practice, statistical analysis consists in the attempt to find new independent variables (such as C) which will make the probability of the dependent variable increase towards 1, for instance:

(13) $p(B|A) = 0.7 < p(B|A\&C) = 0.8$

Indeed, this summarizes Salmon's (1971) notion of statistical explanation (cf. Itkonen 1980: 350–351; 2003a: 191–192).

The relevance of this framework to (typological) linguistics is evident from how it applies to Greenberg's (1966) list of (near-)universals. Consider, for instance, the second universal: "In languages with prepositions, the genitive almost always follows the governing noun, while in languages with postpositions it almost always precedes" (1966: 110). Let ADP(osition) be the superordinate term for both PREP(osition) and POST(position). Then we have (weak versions of) these two inverse implications:

(14) If ADP + N, then N + GEN

3. The 'extensional vs. intensional' distinction is irrelevant in the present context: it is customary to let e.g. A represent both a property (= smoking) and the class of those who have this property (= smokers).

(15) If N + ADP, then GEN + N

If ADP + N = A and N + GEN = B, then N + ADP = *A and GEN + N = *B. Now, (14) & (15) turns out to be identical with (19), as follows:

(16) If A, then B, and if not-A, then not-B

(17) If not-A, then not-B = If B, then A

(18) If A, then B, and if B, then A

(19) If, and only if, A then B

More explicitly, (14) & (15) is abbreviated as (16); (16) is identical with (18), once 'if not-A, then not-B' has been replaced by 'if B, then A', by contraposition (17); and (18) is the very definition of the equivalence (19).

Because Greenberg's (1966) second universal is a weak equivalence, its nature is captured by Figure 1. As noted above, it is *causal necessity* which is generally regarded as the genuinely *explanatory* notion. For instance, a correlation between A and B qualifies as *accidental* precisely in those cases where the connection between A and B is *non*-causal. Let us reconsider Figure 1 from this point of view, with A = smokers, *A = non-smokers, etc.

If 70% of the smokers (= the AB/A group of 35 persons) have lung cancer, this is how we are inclined to interpret this fact: the incidence of lung cancer is *explained* by the statistical law, in the sense that people have lung cancer *because* they smoke, i.e. smoking (= A) is the *cause* of lung cancer (= B). But this is too crude.

First: What about the remaining 30% (= the A*B/A group of 15 persons)? They do not have lung cancer *although* they smoke. Because B fails to occur here, they are of course *not* covered by the statistical law (of A causing B). Therefore, they remain totally *un*explained.

Second: It is true by definition that the AB/A group is covered by the statistical law. Now, although B does occur in the AB/A group, the statistical law nevertheless "admits the possibility that B might have *failed* to occur. It therefore leaves room for an *additional* quest for explanation: Why did B, on this occasion, occur and why did it not fail to occur? It would be the task of a deductive-nomological explanation to answer *this* question" (von Wright 1971: 13). And because there is *ex hypothesi* no such explanation, the occurrence of B remains *un*explained. What is explained, instead, is why the occurrence of B was to be expected with the probability 0.7 (cf. above).

Third: As for the AB/A group, is it *causally explained* by the statistical law? No! To see why, let us consider the *AB/*A group of 20 persons. Its members

> (= 40% of the non-smokers) have lung cancer *although* they do not smoke. In this group, clearly, B (= lung cancer) is due to some unknown causes different from A, to be designated e.g. by E. Now, if E is operative in the *AB/*A group, then – assuming the sample to be homogeneous – E must be operative also in the group AB/A. Therefore, it is *wrong* to simply attribute the incidence of lung cancer to smoking. Rather, the group AB/A consists of *two* subgroups: those who are B because they are A, and those who are B because they are E (cf. Itkonen 1980: 355–356).

This is the general conclusion: The way statistical laws are formulated misleads us into **over**-estimating their causal relevance. This is demonstrated by how Boudon (1974: 60–64) defines the *causal coefficient* for A/*A, namely by subtracting the unknown cause E from the mere correlation AB/A: 35/50 – 20/50 = 0.7 – 0.4 = 0.3.

This is simple enough, but as the number of reference classes (= independent variables) increases, the task of computing their causal coefficients soon becomes mathematically quite demanding, especially when possible causal interactions between independent variables must be accounted for as well (cf. Boudon 1974: 90–93, 175–177). Let us illustrate this with a real example.

The loss vs. preservation of the word-final *-t/-d* has been one of the most extensively studied phenomena in variationist sociolinguistics (cf. Labov 1972: 216–226). This dichotomous dependent variable (= A vs. *A) has been explained by the following three independent variables, which qualify, respectively, as phonetic, morphological, and social: B/*B = *-t/-d* either is or is not followed by a consonant; C/*C = *-t/-d* either lacks or has a grammatical function; D/*D = *-t/-d* either is or is not spoken in a lower social class. As an example, *-t* is lost more easily in *mist* than in *missed*, and if spoken by someone belonging to the lower social class. Following Boudon (1974), a program was designed which computes the causal coefficients for B/*B, C/*C, and D/*D as well as for the interaction between B/*B and C/*C. There is also a second-level interaction between the first one and D/*D, but it could not be computed by programs that were available at the time, i.e. spring 1977 (cf. Itkonen 1980: 360–363; also Itkonen 2003a: 188–190).

Each variationist analysis is based on *correlations* between variables. Once correlations have been discovered, they have to be (causally) *explained*. Applied to the case at hand: why is it that B, C, and D tend to bring about A? The answer is given in broadly *functional* terms, as is typically the case in sociolinguistics (and in sociology, more generally); and functional explanations are defined, more narrowly, as instances of RE (cf. Itkonen 2013/2014). Concretely: It is rational to save energy by not pronouncing *-t/-d*; it is rational not to delete *-t/-d* when it expresses a grammatical meaning (= past tense); it is rational – *ceteris paribus* – to continue

speaking the dialect of your own social class (i.e. not to replace it by the dialect of some other social class).

Figure 1 illustrates two inverse types of problem: in A*B the problem is that B fails to occur although A occurs, whereas in *AB the problem is that B occurs although A fails to occur. It is the purpose of statistical analysis, as suggested by (13) to *reduce* the area of uncertainty by adding new independent variables. Yet, as long as we are dealing with less-than-universal laws, we must accept the fact that statistical explanations contain 'gaps': "They abandon the hold on the individual case", which means that "an event can rattle inside the network of statistical laws" (Michael Scriven quoted by von Wright 1971: 176).

This is, precisely, where RE proves its usefulness, in a *twofold* sense. First, RE has been designed to handle those individual cases which statistical explanation just can*not* handle. Second, even those cases which are, or seem to be, handled by statistical explanation must *also* make use of RE.

4.2.3 *Universal (= deterministic) laws*

Universal laws provide the prototype of causal explanation. We feel that we completely understand particular events subsumed by such laws as 'metal expands if heated' or 'water expands if frozen': being heated or frozen is the cause and expanding is the effect. Such laws may also be found in physiology, for instance, but it is generally agreed that, apart from trivial cases, they are absent in the data studied by such human sciences as historiography, sociology, and linguistics. This was the claim of the two previous subsections.

Let us assume, however, that some of the Greenberg-type universals do satisfy the criteria of universal/deterministic laws. Notice that (20′) results from (20) by contraposition:

(20) If intransitive subjects have overt case-marking, transitive subjects have it too = if A, then B. (cf. Keenan 1978: 92)

(20′) If transitive subjects have no overt case-marking, neither have intransitive subjects = if not-B, then not-A.

(21) If a language has initial consonant clusters, it has medial consonant clusters = if CC-, then -CC- = if A, then B. (cf. Greenberg 1978: 35)

Having discovered these correlations, we must (try to) *explain* them, for reasons exposed by Weber:

> Gesetzt, es gelänge irgendwie der strengste empirisch-statistische Nachweis, dass auf eine bestimmte Situation seitens *aller* […] Menschen […] in […] der gleichen

> Weise reagiert worden sei, […] so würde das an sich die ‚Deutung' noch keinen Schritt weiterbringen; denn es würde ein solcher Nachweis […] uns noch nicht im mindesten in die Lage versetzen, zu 'verstehen' 'warum' […] immer in jener Art reagiert worden sei.
>
> (Weber [1922] 1973: 70; emphasis added; similarly Winch 1958: 115)[4]

Clearly, there is not much point in trying to explain language-particular facts by means of (20)/(20′) or (21), if these laws themselves remain unexplained. What does a possible explanation for (20)/(20′) look like? This is what I suggested in Itkonen (1983):

> It is immediately evident that there is a greater need for differentiation in the latter [transitive] case, i.e. {N,N,V}, than in the former [intransitive] case, i.e. {N,V}. Now, if the required differentiation is to be achieved by overt case-marking, and not (only) by word order, then it goes without saying that there is a greater need to have {N-S,N-O,V} than to have {N-S,V}. And because greater needs are by definition satisfied before smaller ones, it follows that if a language has {N-S,V}, we can 'predict' that it also has {N-S,N-O,V}, but not vice versa.
>
> (Itkonen 1983: 216–217)

This is a very clear example of RE. The *goal* is to distinguish between the basic sentence constituents (= subject, object, verb) and the *means* is to use overt case-marking on the subject. Of course, we can do it both with intransitive subjects, i.e. in the {N,V} situation, and with transitive subjects, i.e. in the {N,N,V} situation. But if it is to be used only in one of these two situations, which one is it *rational* to choose? Of course, the transitive {N,N,V} situation. Why? Because a confusion is less likely in the intransitive {N,V} situation than in the transitive {N,N,V} situation, especially if both N's refer to human beings. And it is a conceptual truth that there is a greater *need* for differentiation where confusion is more likely.

I submit that this reasoning is cogent. But it is also good to reveal how this particular RE was arrived at:

> Although this term may once again seem out of place, one cannot help realizing that such explanations are contrived on the basis of a certain type of *empathy*, or of imagining what *we* would do, if the unconscious goals that we hypothetically assume to exist were our own conscious goals. (Itkonen 1983: 217)

As noted above, prototypical universal laws express cause-effect relations: 'For all x, if x is a piece of heated metal (= A), then x expands (= B)'; or 'if A, then B', for

4. "Assuming that it would somehow be possible to give the strictest empirical-statistical proof that *all* people have reacted to a certain situation in the same way, this would not help the 'explanation' at all; that is, such a proof would not in any way put us into a position to 'understand' 'why' they have reacted in this way" (translation by E. I.).

short. It goes without saying that (20)/(20′) admits of no such *causal* interpretation. Rather, the antecedent and the consequent are connected by a relation of *presupposition*: having overt case-marking in intransitive subjects presupposes having it in transitive subjects (but not vice versa).

The same is true of (21) as well: it does *not* express a relation of causality. Rather, the sentence 'if A (= CC-), then B (= -CC-)' expresses the truth that -CC-, being more frequent than CC-, occurs also in languages where CC- does not. Therefore the presence of CC- *presupposes* the presence of -CC- (but not vice versa). But why is -CC- more frequent than CC-? Because it is *easier* to pronounce.[5]

Let us, for additional clarity, consider a more mundane example: 'If one has money for a TV set (= A), one has money for food (= B)'. Once again, A presupposes, rather than causes (or is caused by) B (cf. Itkonen 2013: 42–44).

There are two related *rationality principles* (= RPs) that underlie all such and similar instances of presupposition. First: 'If people behave rationally, they ought to satisfy primary needs before satisfying secondary needs'. This RP has in turn the following corollary: 'If secondary needs have been satisfied, then (it can be inferred that) primary needs have been satisfied, too (but not vice versa).' This is exemplified by (20)/(20').

Second: 'If people behave rationally, they ought to choose simple means to satisfy a need rather than complex means.' This RP has in turn the following corollary: 'If complex means have been chosen, then (it can be inferred that) simple means have been chosen, too.'

This is the rationale of the Greenberg-type universals (20)/(20') and (21). Taken in themselves, they explain *nothing*. In each case, the explanatory 'causal tie' is provided by the relevant means-ends hierarchy and, ultimately, by the corresponding RE's: goal-cum-belief causes action.

To be sure, presupposition is not the only non-causal relation expressed by Greenberg-type implications. For instance: "If a language is VSO [= A], it is prepositional [= B]' (Greenberg 1978: 40). Or more succinctly: "prepositions are harmonious with VS" (Greenberg 1966: 98). 'Harmony' between A and B is a non-causal property of the data. The (implicit) causal tie that connects A and B must be some notion of *analogy*, i.e. structural similarity, between verbs and adpositions. On this interpretation, "analogy [must be] treated here as a psychologically real phenomenon which has causal efficacy both in language and in culture" (Itkonen 2005: xii).

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5. Notice that, as expressions of causality, implications can go not just from cause to effect but also from effect to cause: 'If the streets are wet in the morning, it has been raining during the night.' But this is not their prototypical use in universal laws.

Clearly, any explanation for (14) & (15) must be along the same lines. This idea was expressed already by Vennemann (1972).

To conclude this section: We have seen that RE is required always, i.e. in these three principal types of situations: no laws, statistical laws, and (quasi)universal laws.

4.3 Theoretical vs. practical reasoning

Having become acquainted with the notion of RE, we are in a position to capture the fundamental difference between *theoretical* vs. *practical* reasoning. This will be done with the aid of the distinction between *sufficient* vs. *necessary* conditions (already mentioned in what precedes).

4.3.1 *Two inverse types of inference*

"The purpose of practical reasoning is to get done what we want, while the purpose of theoretical reasoning is to discover truth" (Kenny [1975] 1978: 73). The two principal types of inference used in theoretical reasoning are Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent (= FAC) and Modus Ponens (= MP). With some simplification, they can be said to summarize the processes of *abduction* and *explanation*, respectively (for a fuller account, cf. Itkonen 2005: 25–35). In (22) the conclusion of FAC expresses the (hypothetical) *cause* while in (23) the conclusion of MP expresses the (observable) *effect*.

(22) FAC A
$\underline{G\text{-}1 \rightarrow A}$
G-1

(23) MP G-1 → A
$\underline{G\text{-}1\quad\quad}$
A

Let us examine an example mentioned by Davidson ([1963] 1968: 83). "Why did Jones go to church? – Because he wanted to please his mother". In other words, the action of going to church was probably the *means* he chose to achieve the *goal* of pleasing is mother. First, as shown by (22), we use FAC in order to tentatively (and abductively) infer G-1 as the cause/goal of the effect/action A. The fact that Jones went to church becomes understandable if we assume that he did so in order to please his mother: if A, then G-1. Second, as shown by (23), we use MP to explain A with the aid of G-1: if G-1, then A. To repeat, a more detailed and more satisfactory account is to be found in Itkonen (2005: 25–35).

Because of its *deductive* character, MP is the prototype of *theoretical* reasoning: it must be the case that if the premises are true, the conclusion is true (it is no

accident that in all standard axiomatizations of propositional logic, MP is the only rule of inference, apart from the rule of substitution; cf. Itkonen 2003a: 64–67). FAC, by contrast, allows for the possibility that the conclusion is false although the premises are true. FAC/abduction, being an integral part of scientific thinking, is a 'fallacy' only from the deductive point of view. The order of the premises in (22) and (23) is significant psychologically, but irrelevant from the logical point of view.

Next, let us consider *practical* reasoning: "This is an inference in which the first premiss mentions an end of action and the second premiss some means to this end. The 'practical' conclusion which results from the premisses would consist in using the means to secure the end […] This is a prototype case of what is usually called *teleological explanation*" (von Wright [1972] 1978: 46, 58; original emphasis). For illustration, let us reproduce Kenny's ([1975] 1978: 63) example, giving the number (24) to it and displaying its basic structure in (25):

(24) I'm to be in London at 4.15.
If I catch the 2.30 I'll be in London at 4.15.
So I'll catch the 2.30.

(25) G-2
$\underline{A \rightarrow G\text{-}2}$
A

These are Kenny's comments on (25):

> Reasonings of this form – which we might call the *modus ponens* of practical reasoning – are as ubiquitous as their counterparts in normal theoretical *modus ponens*. Clearly in some sense we use a *different logic* when we reason practically and when we reason theoretically. For in the ordinary logic used in theoretical reasoning [the expression] *q; if p then q; so p* is not a valid argument form, but the fallacy of affirming the consequent. (Kenny [1975] 1978: 63; emphasis added)

(24) has the same FAC structure as (22), as shown more clearly by (25), except that the conclusions are G-1 and A, respectively. G-1, as used in (22) and (23), is the *reason* (= goal-and-belief) for doing A. By contrast, G-2, as used in (25), is just the goal (to be brought about by A); hence, it is *included* in G-1. Our rational explanation (= RE) is given in (26). When the prefixes G and B are stripped away, the 'truncated' version that remains is identical with (25); let us designate it as (25′):

(26) RE G:Y
$\underline{B{:}(X \rightarrow Y)}$
G:X

(25′) Y
$\underline{X \rightarrow Y}$
X

It is (25)/(25′) which exemplifies the Kenny-type practical inference (a.k.a teleological explanation). It is – to repeat – a *simplified* version of (26) insofar as the propositional attitudes, designated by G and B, remain implicit. (To be sure, (24) contains the 'conative' expression *I'm to be.*) Therefore it would be misleading to say *simpliciter* that RE exemplifies FAC. It is more correct to say that RE *contains* an exemplification of FAC, just as (26) contains (25'). It is only with this caveat that we can accept Kenny's thesis which identifies practical reasoning with FAC.

Now we are in a position to clearly see the gist of this thesis. The crucial comparison is between (23) and (25), or between MP and FAC, with A as the conclusion of both. (23) and (25) contain the implication $p \rightarrow q$ (to use a neutral notation), but in (23) the conclusion is the consequent q whereas in (25) it is the antecedent p. First, p and q qualify as sufficient vs. necessary conditions; and second (as we have agreed), MP and FAC embody theoretical vs. practical reasoning. It follows that the difference between these two types of reasoning boils down to this: the conclusion of a theoretical argument is a *necessary* condition whereas the conclusion of a practical argument is a *sufficient* condition.

A few words of clarification are now in order. It is easy to understand that in the basic implication 'if p then q', p stands for a *sufficient* condition: if p is true, q is true as well. But the truth of p is not *necessary* for the truth of q. The implication $p \rightarrow q$ remains true even if p is false, in which case some *other* condition is sufficient to make q true. On the other hand, it is also easy to understand that in the 'non-basic' implication 'only if p then q', p stands for a *necessary* (but not sufficient) condition; e.g. 'only if I open my eyes, can I see Mary sitting in front of me' (obviously, opening my eyes is not sufficient in itself; Mary must actually be there too). But now comes the intuitively difficult and yet decisive point: q stands for the necessary condition not only in the non-basic implication *only if q then p* but also in the basic implication *if p then q*. The easiest way to see this is to compare these two versions of the *equivalence* (of which the latter explains why 'equivalence' is also called 'bi-conditional'):

if p then q, and [only if p then q] ≡
if p then q, and [if q then p]

The sentences within the square brackets must mean the same thing, based on this principle: if A = (B + C) and A = (B + D), then C = D.

Let us quote Kenny's résumé:

> In theoretical arguments it is reasoning to necessary conditions – deductive theoretical logic – which is *conclusive*, in the sense of ensuring that the conclusion has the value which the reasoning aims at, namely truth; only deductive inference makes it certain that if the premisses are true the conclusion is also. […] On the other hand, in practical inference it is only the logic of satisfactoriness which is *conclusive*, in the sense of ensuring that the conclusion has the value which the reasoning aims at, namely the satisfaction of the reasoner's wants.
>
> (Kenny [1975] 1978: 74)

During the 1980's and 1990's, Roger Lass was the most vocal opponent of teleology or functionalism in diachronic linguistics, e.g. in his 1980 and 1997 books. In the light of the preceding discussion, we can pinpoint the following defects in his position. First, he confuses teleological explanation (25) with abduction (22), apparently because they both exemplify FAC. Second, he wrongly believes that FAC is always fallacious, i.e. also outside of deductive logic: "Approaches to [linguistic] change in terms of […] 'unconscious rationality' […] turn out to be logically flawed" (1997: 336). Third, because "abductions can[not] be guaranteed to be uniform" (*ibidem*), namely in the same way as the conclusions of the *Modus Ponens* (23), he recommends a wholesale rejection of abduction (which would wipe science out of existence). Some background for this discussion is provided by Itkonen (1981).

4.3.2 *Sufficient vs. necessary conclusions of practical reasoning*

The *primary* type of theoretical reasoning, i.e. MP, yields conclusions identical with necessary conditions whereas the *secondary* type of theoretical reasoning, i.e. FAC, yields conclusions identical with sufficient conditions. The *primary* type of practical reasoning, imperfectly exemplified by FAC, yields conclusions identical with sufficient conditions. Now, there ought to be – by analogy – a *secondary* type of practical reasoning which yields conclusions identical with necessary conditions. This is indeed the case. For instance, von Wright ([1972] 1978) argues that Aristotle's original idea of practical reasoning had this characteristic. In explicating this idea, von Wright starts with a first-person premise 'I want to attain the end E', shifts into the third person, reformulates E as a sentence, and finally settles (von Wright [1972] 1978: 53) on the following inference:

(27) The agent intends to make it true that E
He thinks that, unless he does A now, he will not achieve this
Therefore he intends to do A now.

While von Wright regards this conclusion as valid (in the practical sense), he feels uncertain about how to reach the ulterior conclusion 'He does A now'. This is the perennial problem of mental causation, i.e. how to move from thought to action. So much is clear, in any case, that A stands for a *necessary* condition, as expressed by the *unless* conjunction: without it, E cannot be achieved (or so the

agent thinks). This makes (27) analogous to MP, which can perhaps be seen as a virtue. But at the same time it makes (27) less successful than the Kenny-type inference as an explanation of how (and why) people act. Necessary conditions are irrelevant if they do not help in bringing about the goal-state; only sufficient conditions will do. To see this, let us compare the Kenny-type inference (28) with the von Wright -type inference (29):

(28) I want to see Mary
I will achieve this, if I go meet her (and keep my eyes open)
Therefore I will go meet her

(29) I want to see Mary
I will not achieve this unless I keep my eyes open
Therefore I will keep my eyes open

Remember that every necessary condition for E must be included in every sufficient condition for E. Now, under normal circumstances, going to meet Mary is a *sufficient* condition for me to see her (assuming, first, that I am not blind and, second, that I do not keep my eyes closed). On the other hand, opening my eyes in her presence is a *necessary* condition for me to see her (because – obviously – I cannot see her if my eyes are closed). Let us again quote Kenny (1978[1975]: 74): "Having carried out a piece of practical reasoning to necessary conditions, and put the conclusion into action, the reasoner cannot then rest secure in the confidence that what he has done will bring about the state of affairs he wants: there may be *more* that he has to do in order to achieve his goals".

Let us assume that at this moment Mary and I are living in different cities. Then it is an understatement to say that, in order to see her as soon as possible, I must do *more* than just open my eyes, even granting that opening my eyes (= not keeping them closed) is a necessary condition for me to see her. Therefore (28), i.e. reasoning to a sufficient condition, is to be preferred over (29) as an explanation of how, and why, we act.

What follows is a direct confirmation of the preceding argument:

> Third, assuming that a goal has been chosen (in whatever way), it is often, and perhaps even typically, the case that the agent-to-be has at his/her disposal not just one but *several* courses of action each of which, to the best of his/her knowledge, will achieve the goal at (roughly) the same 'cost'. Hence, none of them is necessary, and each is sufficient. Clearly, it is *this* situation which is, in general, characteristic of linguistic change. Therefore it is just *wrong* to claim, indiscriminately, that every (linguistic) change is necessary, and can only be explained as being such.
>
> (Itkonen 2011: 8; similarly 1983: 174)

Hence, what is necessary is the *disjunction* of the actions each of which is sufficient to achieve the goal: one *must* be chosen (but it is not important which one).

4.4 Conclusion

The notion of RE is open to many standard objections, for instance: 'not all actions are rational', 'rationality requires conscious deliberation', 'causality entails nomicity'. For reasons of space, I omit answering these objections here, especially because I have already done so in Itkonen (2013: 56–58). Still, one qualification needs to be made. As exhibited by current diachronic-and/or-typological research, the use of RE may seem 'atomistic' to the extent that it concentrates on a set of disparate phenomena. The logical antidote is to emphasize the sense in which particular phenomena are *also* explained by showing how they fit into the superordinate whole (here: the universal linguistic theory). This is called *pattern explanation*, synonymous with the so-called hermeneutic circle and discussed e.g. by Kaplan (1964), Diesing (1972), and Rescher (1979). It is ultimately justified by the *coherence* theory of truth (cf. Itkonen 1983: 35–38, 123–129, 205–206).

5. The implicit normativity of everyday life

We saw in Section 2.3 that our beliefs are connected by *de facto semantic* relations. Insofar as we are talking about *shared* beliefs (as is typically the case), we must also be talking about *social* relations. And insofar as these are semantic, they must also be *normative*, because meaning is determined by *correct* use.

Next, let us consider actions. Necessary relations obtain not just between meanings of linguistic expressions (cf. Subsect. 3.1), but also between the (meanings of) actions described by these expressions. For instance, it is not only the meanings of *buying* and *selling* which are interdependent with each other just as well as with the meanings of *property, money*, etc; so are also (the meanings of) the corresponding actions and the things involved in these actions. It is logically impossible that my daughter (= A) could have *bought* a bicycle (= B) from my neighbour (= C), without B having been a *property* that C *sold* to A: "If social relations between men exist only in and through their ideas [of selling etc], then, since the relations between ideas are internal relations, social relations must be a species of internal relation too" (Winch 1958: 123).

Still, there seems to be an even more fundamental sense in which our everyday life is permeated by normativity. It is axiomatic that a mistake presupposes the existence of a corresponding norm. Now, consider such a simple action as opening a window. One can do this in a right way or in a wrong way. But one can also be mistaken in a more fundamental sense. One can, for whatever reason, think that one is closing a window (or opening a can), when one is in fact opening a window. Hence this action is implicitly normative, and so are all actions.

And what is true of actions can be generalized to anything else (remember the corollary (iv) from Section 2.1). If one is looking at a window and thinks that one is looking at a dog, one is mistaken. This entails that anything that can be identified as what it is, and can accordingly be spoken about, is implicitly normative. Why? Because it can always be *mis*identified.

Even those who claim that there is no 'foundational' knowledge must agree with the preceding argument. 'Foundational' equals 'infallible'; and if fallible (subjective) knowledge is actually false, it can only be corrected by intersubjective checks. The connection with Wittgenstein's private-language argument should be obvious (cf. Itkonen 2008b: 280–283).

6. Epilogue

Normativity has always been viewed with suspicion by natural scientists: "If rules involve the concepts of right and wrong, they introduce a normative aspect that has always been avoided in the natural sciences … To admit that language follows rules seems to put it outside the range of phenomena accessible to scientific investigation" (George A. Miller 1964, quoted from Koestler 1967: 42). Physical phenomena, as such, are free from normativity. Accordingly, (all-out) *physicalism* is the position (or, perhaps, the 'dream') shared by the majority of natural scientists and whoever wishes to rigorously imitate the model set up by the natural sciences. But it entails a mistake.

In order to show that literally *everything* can be reduced to physics (including the thoughts and actions of those who are engaged in the very act of reducing), it must be possible to describe everything in (what ultimately reduces to) the *language* of physics. But this language (just like any other language) is of *normative* nature, as shown by the fact that those who use it may act either correctly or incorrectly, which is something that physical entities can*not* do. Therefore, even granting that everything *is* physical (= non-normative), any attempt to scientifically *assert* this fact turns out to be self-defeating.

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Norms of language

What kinds and where from? Insights from phenomenology

Jordan Zlatev and Johan Blomberg

After decades dominated by a focus on the "individual speaker" and the "mind/brain" in both generative and cognitive linguistics, recent years have reinstated an older view on language as primarily *social*, i.e. as taking place *between* people more than *within* them. Within such a social conception of language, it is natural to reconsider the notion of *language norm*, but there have been few efforts in this direction. Two eminent exceptions are Eugenio Coseriu and Esa Itkonen, whose approaches to linguistic normativity we here focus on. Even given a combination of their insights, we find that some puzzles remain, especially concerning the question where language norms derive from. We pose this question in the spirit of (generative) phenomenology where the task is "precisely to inquire after how historical and intersubjective structures themselves become meaningful at all, how these structures are and can be generated" (Steinbock 2003: 300). Following earlier work where we have argued for the value of a phenomenological approach to language, we show how the philosophical tradition emanating from Edmund Husserl can both help resolve conceptual puzzles surrounding language norms and clear up the ground for further empirical studies.

Keywords: intentionality, intuition, sedimentation, motivation, variation, norms, normativity

1. Introduction

After decades dominated by a focus on the "individual speaker" and the "mind/brain" in both generative and cognitive linguistics, recent years have reinstated an older perspective on language as primarily *social*, i.e. as taking place *between* people rather than *within* them (Zlatev et al. 2008; Itkonen 2008a; Harder 2010; Dor, Knight & Lewis 2014; Dor 2015). Within such a social conception of language it is natural to reconsider the notion of *language norm*. Rather surprisingly, however,

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there have been few concerted efforts in this direction. One possible reason for this is the common conflation of *norm* and *prescription*, and thus a conflation of a linguistics that studies language norms with a "prescriptive linguistics", of the school-grammar variety. Another reason could be the vague and somewhat elusive character of social norms in general. Thus, questions such as the following remain largely open.

- What is the ontology of (language) norms?
- What are their characteristics – in relation to rules, conventions, laws, etc.?
- How are they known, if at all, by ordinary speakers and by linguists?
- What kinds of language norms are there?
- Where do they derive from?

Two eminent exceptions to the tendency to neglect language norms during the last decades of the past century (which coincided with the heydays of "linguistic individualism", in both generative and cognitive linguistics) were Eugenio Coseriu and Esa Itkonen, whose approaches to linguistic normativity we here focus on.[1] As we show, especially when considering some of their work in combination, answers to most of the questions listed above can be given.

However, some puzzles remain, especially concerning the last question: whence language norms? We understand this question here not primarily in an empirical but in a philosophical sense. More specifically, we understand it in accordance with phenomenology as a question concerning the constitutive nature of norms vis-à-vis language as a historical and intersubjective system of meaning-making, as for example stated by Steinbock (2003: 300): "the task of a generative phenomenology is precisely to inquire after how historical and intersubjective structures themselves become meaningful at all, how these structures are and can be generated". Following earlier work where we individually and jointly have argued for the value of a phenomenological approach to language (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014, 2015; Zlatev 2008, 2010, 2016; Zlatev & Blomberg 2016), we show here how the philosophical tradition emanating from Edmund Husserl can both help to resolve conceptual puzzles surrounding norms and clear up the ground for further empirical studies.

1. There are of course others, such as Bartsch (1987), who similarly to our proposal discusses linguistic norms on different levels (though different from those in our analysis), with "higher" levels having priority over "lower" ones, allowing for flexibility and variation (see Geeraerts 2010: 256–257). Geeraerts' (1997) own work on a social interpretation of prototype semantics could also be given as example. We focus, however, on Coseriu and Itkonen, as their work on this topic naturally allows for interpretations in terms of phenomenology.

We start in Section 2 by summarizing the main phenomenological concepts to be used in what follows, especially since there are widespread misconceptions that phenomenology deals with "private" and "purely subjective" mental processes, which would make it ill fit for an analysis of linguistic normativity. The reader familiar with phenomenology may go directly to Section 3, where we present a brief review of the analysis of languages as consisting of commonly known norms defended by Esa Itkonen. Even though Itkonen seldom if ever refers to phenomenology, we point out several common themes, such as the "ideality" of language norms, aligning language with logic rather than psychology. Similarly to Husserl and unlike Frege, Itkonen links norms closely to the intuitions through which they are primarily known. As we show, this can be interpreted in accordance with one of the main theses of phenomenology: the co-relational nature of intentionality, linking "world" (the norms) and "mind" (the intuitions).

However, some questions remain concerning (a) what the objects of linguistic intuitions actually are, (b) extensive variation in the intuitions (and hence norms) of speakers of ostensibly the same language and (c) differences between the norms of language and logic. Thus, Itkonen's approach turns out to have some limitations, analogous to those of static phenomenology, which describes the *being* of phenomena, in comparison to genetic and generative phenomenology, which both deal with their *becoming* (see Section 2).

In Section 4, we turn to the analysis of language norms that underlies Coseriu's hierarchical layering of language (viewed as activity, knowledge or product) into three levels: (a) the *universal*, concerning what language is as such (conceptually) and all actual languages (empirically), (b) *historical*, concerning specific communal languages, like Swedish and French, or more specifically dialects like Midi-French, *skånska* and various sociolects, and (c) what Coseriu calls the "individual", but we have referred to as the *situated* level (Zlatev & Blomberg 2015) of discourse practices. The question we ask in Section 5 is: why these three particular levels and whence their normative status? To anticipate, we propose that while static and genetic phenomenological analysis can help understand the universal level, accounting for the lower two levels requires us to turn to the generative phenomenology of life world analysis.

In sum, the goal of this article is to explicate the emergence and maintenance of linguistic norms by situating them against phenomenological accounts of intentionality, intersubjectivity, sociality and tradition. Before we begin, let us make three general observations, which we will return to in the concluding section.

The first is that many language norms are practically inevitable, and thus presupposed even by the staunchest rebels. For example, in the surrealist "cut-up technique" used by Dadaists like Tristan Tzara and later popularized by the beat author William S. Burroughs together with artist Bryon Gysin, the text is literally cut up

and re-arranged in apparently random ways. However, it is characteristic that the "cuts" retain the integrity of one or another level of linguistic structure – be that words, sentences or paragraphs.

Second, and in apparent contradiction to the first point, there is always potential for deviation when norms are concerned. Somewhat paradoxically, a norm is not a norm unless it can be broken, either accidentally in a mistake, or deliberately, in protest (Widoff 2018). Of course, the price to be paid for norm deviation is more or less severe social sanctions, and in extreme cases: ostracizing. The typical defensive strategy is to develop counter-norms (e.g. Crandall 1988).

Third, linguistic normativity implies dialectic interdependence between social reality and individual consciousness. Still, it is easier to state this than to actually provide such a synthetic account. References to the fundamentally social nature of language, or at least of *langue* (i.e. the language system), in the canonical text of modern linguistics (Saussure [1916] 1960) are many: "language is a social fact" (p. 6), "language is a convention" (p. 10), "it is the *social* side of speech, outside the individual who can never create, nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community" (p. 14), "language is a social institution" (p. 15), "The individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has been established by the linguistic community" (p. 69). At the same time, there are about as many references that appear to contradict this: "everything in language is basically psychological" (p. 6), "both parts of the sign are psychological" (p. 15). As noted by many commentaries (e.g. Itkonen 1978), this leaves a conceptual gap, which could in part be due to the compilation character of this text.[2]

However, it is also possible that Saussure was struggling to explicate the dual nature of language as rooted in both society and mind, but failed to carry this out, due to his early death. Resolving the apparent opposition between social reality and consciousness is fundamental for linguistics, as it concerns many other basic dichotomies that continue to puzzle, and give rise to controversies: structure and use, semantics and pragmatics, system and change. As we will show, with the help of (generative) phenomenology, all these have to do with that nature of language as both "given" to us, handed-down as a tradition – and at the same time, as belonging to us and being under our control, as is the case with social norms in general.

2. As stated, for example, by Bouissac (2010: 121) "We must keep in mind that the text is a kind of collage of bits and pieces from a variety of sources and that its organization was conceived and implemented by the editors."

2. Some basic concepts and insights of phenomenology

2.1 What is phenomenology?

Phenomenology appeared over a century ago, at a time when rapid scientific discoveries on the one hand and social upheaval on the other, appeared to be dissolving the foundations of philosophy itself, as the quest for "radically unprejudiced knowledge" (Held 2003: 7). Husserl and those who followed and developed his project aimed to reestablish the possibility for such knowledge, without falling into the pitfalls of either idealism or logical positivism (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962).

There may be different schools, and as we note below, different historical stages in the development of phenomenology, but a basic principle can be regarded as central: to base all knowledge on "the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience" (Sokolowski 2000: 2). In terms of ontology, phenomenology claims that the world and (intersubjective) consciousness are co-constitutive, and neither can be truly said to exist on its own: "the being-in-itself of the world is nothing other than its intentional appearing for consciousness" (Held 2003: 23).

2.2 Intentionality and intuition

One of the central concepts of phenomenology is that of *intentionality*, understood as the essential directedness (or "openness", Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962; Thompson 2007) of consciousness to the world: "[e]very act of consciousness, every experience, is correlated with an object" (Sokolowski 2000: 8). Among different kinds of acts of consciousness, perception is the most basic, precisely because it intends its objects as *present*, i.e. existing in the here-and-now. But presence is in constant interplay with *absence*, which is the mode in which objects and events are given in intentional processes such as memory and imagination. On another axis away from perception are sign-based intentional processes such as picturing and symbolizing, where representations mediate between consciousness and its (worldly) objects.

It is important to note that phenomenology places an emphasis on stable, intersubjective features of experience and meaning, rather than on individual, subjective experiences. For example, in the classical analysis of the perception of a cube, there is the *identity* of the cube-as-such, its six different *sides*, and *aspects* in which these sides can be perceived, from a given perspective. None of these are subjective features, since anyone could in principle perceive the cube in the same way from a given perspective. There are, of course, also subjective correlates, which Husserl calls *Abschattungen*, and Sokolowski (2000) somewhat misleadingly calls *profiles* (a term used for a type of linguistic construal in cognitive grammar, see

Möttönen 2016), which are unique for every person, and every single experience in time (based on bodily dispositions, personal histories, moods, etc.), but these are secondary. Perception is fundamentally intersubjective, since when viewing an object such as the aforementioned cube from one perspective, I am implicitly aware that its sides that are hidden from my current view can be simultaneously perceived by other subjects: "My perceptual objects are not exhausted in their appearance for me; rather, each object always possesses a horizon of co-extending profiles which […] could very well be perceived by other subjects, and is for that very reason intrinsically intersubjective" (Zahavi 2001: 271).

Every person can perform the analyses sketched out above, but this is difficult as we are typically caught up in the *natural attitude*, where attention goes "directly" to the objects that concern us in our daily lives: wanting them, hating them and otherwise dealing with them and other people in a relatively unreflective manner. Not to cancel such an attitude, but to put it on hold, along with the naïve belief of the mind-independence of everything "objective", Husserl developed the technique of the Stoics known as *epok^{h}ē* (where one "holds oneself back" and declines to take a position prior to better knowledge) into the *phenomenological reduction*, which executes literally a turning "from the natural targets of our concern, 'back' to what seems to be a more restricted viewpoint, one that simply targets the intentionalities themselves" (Sokolowski 2000: 49). Once such a reflective attitude is adopted, an object (and the totality of the world to which it belongs) is regarded precisely as experienced, or technically as *noema*, along its correlative intentional process, or *noesis* (Husserl 1982 [1913]).

This brings us to a second important notion in ("static") phenomenology: *intuition*. When formulating the so-called "principle of principles" of phenomenology, Husserl states this as follows: "every originarily given intuition is a rightful source of knowledge, that everything that presents itself […] is to be taken as that which it gives itself to be – but also only within the bounds in which it gives itself" (Husserl [1913] 1982: 44). What does this really mean? First of all, we need to clear up the misunderstanding arising from some current uses of the term: "Intuition is not something mystical or magical, it is simply having a thing present to us as opposed to having it intended in its absence" (Sokolowski 2000: 34). As mentioned above, the most basic kind of intuition is that of perception, in which objects are experienced not as "sense data", but as coherent perceptual gestalts. For example, the red apple on the table as it is seen, touched, smelled and tasted – rather than as imagined, named or depicted, in its absence. When we experience the apple so, we can say that we have intuitive knowledge of it.[3]

3. We should note that this notion of intuition is broader than but nevertheless compatible with that used by Cohen (1986) and Itkonen (2008a), to which we turn in Section 3.

But what about more abstract objects like those of language or logic – and correspondingly more complex forms of intuition? When making any kinds of judgments we attribute a property to something, either positively or negatively (e.g. "this food tastes strange", "this sounds odd in English", "this does not follow from what you have said"). In phenomenology, the ability to carry out such attributions is called *categorial intuition*, with which "we have moved from sensibility to intellection, from mere experiencing to an initial understanding" (Sokolowski 2000: 90). But as with simple, perceptual intuitions, the requirement is that the object reveals itself as present, and experienced directly, rather than as absent, or only linguistically labelled. For example, uttering any of the sentences given above without direct experience of the situations in question is not a form of categorial intuition.

Finally, there is the more advanced kind of intuition into the "essence" of an object, called *eidetic intuition*. One way for this to be achieved is to perform a so-called eidetic reduction, in which objects are "stripped" of their properties in the reverse process to the attribution outlined above ("X is not or does not have Y") until the operation cannot go on without dissolving the object itself. For example, food may lack many qualities such as tastiness, etc. but if it is to be something that cannot be eaten, it ceases to be food. We have thus reached eidetic intuition about the nature of food.[4]

It is through such means that Husserl addressed the nature of the most general kinds of objects, including the laws of logic. Battling the theory of "psychologism" (e.g. Lipps 1893) which proposed that logic can be derived from patterns of thinking (or from "image schemas" and "conceptual metaphors" as modern proponents like Lakoff (1987) would have it) Husserl characterized laws such as the "law of the excluded middle" (either p or not p) as *universal norms* to which individual acts of reasoning may either abide or not, without this affecting their validity: "the universality that standardizes our thinking is valid, independent of the factual and empirically comprehensible changes in subjective knowledge" (Held 2003: 12). In this respect, Husserl was in agreement with the logician Gottlob Frege. However, phenomenology does not accept that even the most "ideal" objects, like the laws of logic or of mathematics, possess a mind-independent ontology: "They do not hover in some pedantic platonic heaven of ideas, but are rather bound back to the situated experience of their being carried out in thought" (Held 2003: 12). We return in Sections 3 and 4 to the importance of intentionality, intuition, and ideality for language norms.

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4. Some of our examples may seem trivial, but we provide them here in order to apply the concepts to language norms in the following section, where it gets much less trivial. Also, until recently, the language of phenomenology has inclined towards excessive complexity, making it almost impenetrable for non-specialists.

2.3 Operative intentionality and embodied intersubjectivity

A second stage in the development of phenomenology, which Husserl called "genetic," continued to develop these themes, but added an important temporal dimension: how does the consciousness-world link of intentionality become established in the first place? And where are the grounds for consciousness and intersubjectivity to be found? As indicated by the term *genetic*, it is concerned with the origins of meaning and "the temporal becoming of sense" (Steinbock 2003: 291). Genetic phenomenology primarily turns to the way intentionality emerges on the basis of being "always already" affected by an anterior engagement with the world, or what Husserl called *passive synthesis* (Husserl [1966] 2001). Here "passive" does not imply that we are static or indifferent, just waiting to be acted upon, but in the sense of being subject to involuntary influence and affection, which is by and large a matter of the how the "body constitutes itself through the involuntary formation of habits, motor patterns, associations, dispositions, motivations, emotions and memories" (Thompson 2007: 30). By emphasizing such affective responses, Thompson highlights the fact that our engagements with the world involve a kind of immediate pre-reflective affectivity that imbues all experience with meaning. Prior to the deliberate and reflective manner characteristic of intentionality in a static phenomenological analysis, our experience is such that we are open towards the world, in the words of Merleau-Ponty. Returning to our example of the cube, we might be engaged with it in a different manner than was described above. Without reflectively analyzing the cube as, say, an object comprised of six different sides, we might be drawn to it for one reason or another, repelled by it, or fascinated by it. Dependent on such forms of engagement, we move and adjust our own body accordingly. Though lacking in reflectivity such encounters can be seen as meaningful experiences in their own right. To navigate around in the world presupposes such pre-reflective awareness through which we are already affected by, and hence related to, the world. This openness to the world is an *operative intentionality*, which as highlighted by Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962) involves the body and serves as a precondition for the emergence of reflective intentionality.

One specifically important feature of pre-reflective intentionality is *the dual nature of the body*: on the one hand as "internally" perceived subjectivity and agency, on the other as an "externally" perceived biological entity. To capture this duality, Husserl often refers to the human body with the compound term *Leibkörper*, utilizing the fact that German has two terms for the human body: one term profiles the lived aspect (*Leib*), and another the observed (*Körper*) aspect, respectively. For Husserl, as well as for Merleau-Ponty, this is shown in the experience of *double sensation*, where there is an oscillation between experiencing the body as *Leib* and as *Körper*:

> [W]hen I touch my right hand with my left, my right hand, as an object, has the strange property of being able to feel too. […] the two hands are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched and touching to each other. When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set-up in which both hands can alternate the rôles of 'touching' and being 'touched'.
>
> (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962: 106)

Crucially, this serves as an essential precondition for intersubjectivity, since already at the level of our own bodies we experience others as fundamentally similar to, yet still distinct from, ourselves (Zahavi 2003; Zlatev & Blomberg 2016). To have a body, or to be "embodied", means to be physically limited to one point of view at a given time. By including the bodily perspective of others, the limitation of my perspective is overcome. The appearance of a particular side of an object is hence complemented by the possible perspectives others might have on the same thing. For example, even though we can only perceive one particular side of the cube, it is nevertheless part of the perceptual intuition that it has other sides. Were we to move around it, we expect it to have a backside as well. To account for the way perception is more than just a single presentation, it is crucial to include the perspectives others have or might have on the same thing (Zahavi 2001). We return in section 4.2 to the importance of such embodied intersubjectivity for linguistic normativity.

2.4 Life world, typification and sedimentation

The intrinsically intersubjective character of bodily experience entails that we live in a shared world. This should not be understood in the physical sense (e.g. on a given planet, in a given solar system, etc.), but as the *life world* (*Lebenswelt*): "the unquestioned, practical, historically conditioned, pretheoretical, and familiar world of our everyday lives" (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 91). In this world, the sun rises and sets, there are historical narratives, traditions and norms, which form a tacit non-thematic background for experience, thus functioning as a basic "meaning-fundament" (Husserl [1954] 1970a: 49) from which all knowledge – including scientific knowledge – may emerge. For our purposes, two constitutive features of the life world can be highlighted.

First, it is phenomenologically different from other type of objects, as it cannot be constituted in intentional acts, but remains a "universal horizon" (Steinbock 1995) against which all experience is gauged. The life world does not belong to you or me but is both intersubjectively constituted and recreated across generations.

Second, the life world is relative to human beings, and is in this regard not a static, permanent and objectively existing world, and cannot be explained in such terms. The relation is rather the reverse: to speak of "physical nature" is an

abstraction attained by an objectifying attitude which itself is an attitude *within* the life world. In other words, the life world is "a dynamic, shifting, and intersubjectively constituted existential reality that results from the ways that we are geared into the world by means of our particular situatedness as existential, practical, and historical beings" (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 91). From such situatedness emerge regularities, or "types" (Schutz [1932] 1967): we take things to behave in ways that are stable over time. When they do not, it is rather the thing that is seen as an exception than our expectancy that was flawed. In this way, the life world is *typified*: things, events and even other persons are expected to behave in accordance with the type to which they "belong." As expressed by Schutz and Luckmann:

> I trust that the world as it has been known by me up until now will continue further and that consequently the stock of knowledge obtained from my fellow-men and formed from my own experiences will continue to preserve its fundamental validity. […] From this assumption follows the further and fundamental one: that I can repeat my past successful acts. (Schutz & Luckmann 1973: 7)

Exactly how to delineate the life world has been a question of debate. Husserl used the term *Lebenswelt* to refer both to a panhuman life world involving universal types and regularities as well as culturally specific ones such as "a European life world" with an allegedly shared history and tradition (Husserl [1954] 1970a). Steinbock has proposed to consider the life world not as a monolithic entity but as a matter of different *home worlds*: "normatively significant, geo-historical life worlds formed by various modes of generative constitution" (2003: 296). By virtue of not just being the world we live in, but also a "home", Steinbock continues by characterizing a home world as having a "certain asymmetrical privilege […] through modes of appropriation and disappropriation of sense that are bequeathed or historically sedimented and that extend historically over the generations" (ibid.). That is, there is a normative significance in having a particular home world rather than another, which means that it is primarily accessible for its "inhabitants" rather than to outsiders. In having such an asymmetrical privilege, a home world presupposes a differential relation vis-à-vis all the home worlds of others, which Steinbock refers to as *alien worlds*. As one home world with its corresponding norms is privileged for its inhabitants, it simultaneously sets up contrasts with these alien worlds. Of course, an alien world is the home world for someone else, which in turn means that what is "normal" for them is "strange" for us, and vice versa. In the most general form, we could thereby say that there is no single home world, but always a co-constitutive relation between home world and alien worlds.[5] Somewhat similar

5. "The homeworld is a normatively significant lifeworld that is co-constituted in relation to an alienworld. The alienworld is a lifeworld that is normatively insignificant or normatively

to how absence is a constitutive feature of perception (see Section 2.1), the alien world is needed for the home world for the latter to appear as "home". We live in a particular age different from previous and future ones; the place where we are born has, for better or for worse, its particular laws, habits, and customs. Sometimes, home worlds overlap in complex, complicated, and hostile manners involving historical, political, and social factors. Steinbock proposes that the structure of home/alien does not only operate on the broad level of cultures but can rather be seen to cut straight through sociality as such. We could therefore consider even the notion of HOME in its colloquial sense to display this structure: two families in the same neighborhood have different specific traditions and peculiarities that make them different from each other.

The phenomenological approach to the life world is sometimes called *generative phenomenology*, in the sense that it concerns exactly those phenomena that span across generations, such as history, culture, life and death. Conceived in such a sense, the double meaning of "generative" should be simultaneously activated: "the process of becoming and the process of occurring over generations" (Thompson 2007: 33). The role of how "generative" phenomena emerge and are endowed with sense took on an increasingly important role in Husserl's late work, even to the degree of proposing that all phenomena must ultimately be understood through their historical becoming. Such a position may seem to lend itself to a kind of historicism completely anathema to the earlier tenets of phenomenology – as strongly expressed by Husserl in his criticism of Dilthey (Husserl [1911] 1965). Hence, despite an increasing awareness for the phenomenological importance of history and tradition, this does not mean that phenomenology transforms into a historicist project where knowledge itself becomes bound by its specific historical context. In contrast to such a viewpoint, generative phenomenology focuses both on the *historical* life world conditions for the validity of meaning as intersubjectively negotiated, socially shared, transmittable through history (cf. Husserl [1939] 1970b), and on (potentially) *universal* features of the pan-human life world.

Particularly important for generative phenomena is how knowledge builds on previous knowledge. One of Husserl's own examples is that of geometry. To correctly use a geometrical operation like the Pythagorean Theorem does not require acquaintance of the geometrical axioms. Neither do we need to know what the life world conditions that predated the emergence of geometry looked like. Despite this, geometry began at some point in history and has then been inherited and refined – think of Newton's "standing on the shoulder of giants". Once established as a formal science, it is no longer needed to run through the whole chain that led

significant in ways that differ from home, but through which the homeworld is simultaneously constituted as home." (Steinbock 1995: 60).

to the establishment of geometry. It becomes possible to operate only at the surface level of manipulating geometrical symbols and rules. The context-of-discovery, to use Popper's (1959) term, becomes put out of play and the geometrical rules are transmitted without need to go back to the origin, motivations and reasons that imbued them with meaning in the first place. Over time, the latter become *sedimented* in strata provided by history, with the operative rules and norms for their application sedimented upon them (Zlatev & Blomberg 2016).

Buckley (1992) applies Husserl's analysis of sedimentation to linguistic communication in general. On Buckley's reading, linguistic meaning is historically constituted which means that we do not constantly have to find new ways for expressing meaning but can rely on conventional and already existent forms that we can expect others to know of. In using linguistic expressions, we are operating at the "surface" without reactivating the entire chain that gave birth to the sign in the first place, including pre-predicative motivations emanating from embodiment (Zlatev & Blomberg 2016). By virtue of using existent expressions, we become free "to engage in new productive expressions" (Buckley 1992: 91), sometimes bending and even breaking existing norms, though always against the backdrop of a relatively stable and fixed inventory at every point in time. This "paradoxical elasticity" (Buckley 1992: 90) of language is something we return to in section 4.2.

2.5 Summary

We may in sum consider one of the famous dicta of phenomenology, calling us to *return to the things themselves*. This implies a number of things, but most relevantly: that the life world, with its objects and types, which is experientially closest to us, is something that we may nevertheless remain blind to. It is the minute attention to the complexity of the "obvious" and the "mundane" that is the starting point for phenomenological investigation. Here, we have traced some key aspects of phenomenological thought, from "static", via "genetic" to "generative", such as (a) the intentionality (directedness, openness) of consciousness, (b) the interplay of presence and absence in all experience, (c) different kinds of intuition, from perceptual to eidetic, (d) operative intentionality with its pre-reflective sense-making, (e) the dual nature of the body and embodied intersubjectivity, and perhaps most importantly, (f) the shared life world, with both universal and culturally-specific, historical levels. Such aspects of experience, meaning, and knowledge have been, and continue to be, the theme of phenomenology. In the following sections, we apply these notions, concepts, and analyses to another phenomenon that is both "obvious", and surprisingly complex: the norms of language.

3. Itkonen on language norms, accessible by intuitions

3.1 Norms of correctness and rationality

Esa Itkonen (e.g. Itkonen 1978, 2016; this volume) has for over four decades been one of the staunchest proponents of "the central role of normativity for language and linguistics", the title of one of his key texts (Itkonen 2008a). According to his analysis, languages are not just "based on" or "involve" norms, they are *identical with* norms for correct usage: "any natural language consists of rules that are inherently social and normative" (Itkonen 2008a: 279). The normative nature of the rules of a language follows, according to Itkonen, from the so-called private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953), which purports to show that the idea of a language known by only a single person does not make sense, as a single speaker could not know if they are following a rule or not, and thus possibly even speaking gibberish, if it were not for other people to provide them with implicit or explicit corrective feedback. The rules of language, both grammatical and semantic, are thus socially established criteria for correctness, i.e. norms.[6] These are known *implicitly* by the speakers of the language, and are not identical with the *prescriptions*, which are formulated by one or another authority from a position of power.

To take one of the recurrent examples from Itkonen's publications, English includes the norm/rule expressed by the *rule-sentence* (a descriptive, rather than prescriptive formulation of the norm/rule) given in (1). This is the norm that, inter alia, accounts for the correctness of sentence (2a) and the incorrectness of (2b). It is part of the nature of language norms, like social norms in general, and unlike physical laws like the famous formulation in (3) that they can be broken/trespassed, and indeed occasionally are, on purpose or not. In cases of such breaches this is typically noted by other speakers of the language, and as mentioned earlier, is subject to social sanctions, ranging from incomprehension to punishment (Itkonen 1978, 2003).

(1) The definite article in English precedes rather than follows the noun.

(2) a. The croissant is on the table.
b. *Croissant the is on table the.

(3) $E = mc^2$

6. The argument is here presented in its simplest form without touching on the various interpretations concerning philosophical behaviorism, meaning scepticism and other concerns in the ontology of linguistic meaning. For example, Kenny (1973) and Kripke (1982) offer two quite different interpretations of the relevant paragraphs in *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*.

In addition, Itkonen (1983: 68) analyses language-related norms more broadly in relation to the concept of *rationality*: "I am treating correctness and rationality as different aspects of a unitary phenomenon, namely normativity". Such norms of rationality include both very specific rules (or rather, rule-sentences, formulated as "If <Desire>, then <Action>" statements) like (4), and more general ones like (5), which is a reformulation of one of Grice's maxims of Manner (Grice 1975).

(4) If you want to make the hut habitable, you ought to heat it.

(5) If you wish to be understood, you ought to speak clearly.

How do we know what the norms/rules of a language are and what is our mode of access to them? Itkonen's answer is that as both speakers and linguists we have access to the norms through intuition. The difference is that while the intuitions of ordinary speakers are *pre-theoretical*, linguistics always involves systematic reflection over these norms, by testing their borders and making them explicit. This, according to Itkonen has always been the core of the discipline of linguistics, from antiquity to the present: "Grammatical traditions always and everywhere have been based on intuition, that is, on self-invented example sentences" (Itkonen 2008b: 23).

On the one hand, this places the core of (or as Itkonen writes, "autonomous") linguistics methodologically alongside logic rather than together with the natural sciences and their standard method of theory-based hypothesis formulation followed by controlled experimentation. But on the other hand, Itkonen insists that this does not imply that language norms are either static or in some sense Platonic as "norms are necessarily norms of acting […] and interactions" (Itkonen 2008b: 23).

Itkonen's defense of the methodological autonomy of intuition-based linguistics on the basis of the normative character of language and criticism of the imperialism of natural scientific methods is in fact, very similar to that of phenomenology (Zlatev 2010; Willems 2012). As noted in Section 2, already in *Logical Investigations*, Husserl ([1900] 1970c) provided one of the strongest critiques of psychologism, which attempted to reduce the normativity of meaning in both logic and language to empirical causality. But if the rules of both logic and language are inherently normative, such a reduction becomes impossible. If one person, a dozen or even a thousand believe that (6) represents correct reasoning or that (7) is a correct sentence in English, this does not make them so.

(6) If no student failed the exam then some student failed the exam.

(7) Student no failed exam.

Further, by emphasizing the active and even "embodied" nature of norms, immanent in the (majority of the) actions and judgments of those who know them,

Itkonen's position displays further overlaps with phenomenology. Still, some questions remain if we are to bring the two accounts into a productive dialogue, to which we turn in the next three sub-sections.

3.2 Intuitions and their objects

What does it mean to say that language norms are known through intuition(s)? In particular: whose intuitions, and of what kind? The concept of intuition adopted by Itkonen is that of Cohen:

> […] the immediate, unreflective inclination, without argument or inference, to judge that p (and that anyone who faces the same issue ought also to judge that p), where the judgment that p is of a kind that is in principle not checkable by sensory experience or by accepted methods of calculation. (Cohen 1986: 75)

This definition implies that intuitions are a kind of spontaneous, but still conscious judgments (Itkonen 2008b; Zlatev 2010). As both ordinary speakers and linguists can and do, according to Itkonen, have conscious access to language norms through such judgments, the knowledge of the norms cannot be only a matter of implicit, know-how knowledge, but (also) involve at least some degree of explicit, know-that knowledge. Itkonen distinguishes, as pointed out above, between such explicit, but *pre-theoretical* knowledge of naïve speakers, and the explicit *theoretical* knowledge of linguists, who formulate more or less adequate rule-sentences like (1), generalizing them into descriptions, i.e. grammars (Itkonen 2008b; Zlatev 2008, 2011).

Commenting on the work of Itkonen, Willems (2012) makes a different, through still two-part distinction concerning language intuitions: (a) *primary language intuitions*, which take the form of "tacit knowledge of the procedures that constitute language and the 'technical' capacity to instantiate that knowledge in discourse" (Willems 2012: 669), and (b) *secondary intuitions*, involving explicit metalinguistic reflections on why an expression is "grammatical, acceptable or has the meaning it has" (ibid.).

In fact, we may combine these two divisions in a *three-level* distinction of linguistic knowledge with the help of the phenomenological concepts introduced in Section 2. First, on the level of operative intentionality, which is both pre-reflective and non-theoretical, the norms operate in the background as both constituting and guiding language use, as stated by Willems concerning "primary intuitions". However, as this is a pre-reflective level of knowledge, we must conclude that it is also in a (phenomenological) sense "pre-intuitional", as it does not yet involve any kind of conscious judgment. The second level is that of categorial intuitions, which as shown in Section 2 are still non-theoretical, but at least minimally reflective, as even the most "ordinary" speaker would be able to judge spontaneously that

something is "wrong" with sentences like (2b) and (7). The third level is provided by eidetic intuitions, which are both reflective and, in a sense, "theoretical", as that they operate on systematic variations in imagination ("the sentence would become ok if we changed the word order"), either by laymen, or more adequately by the experts on language known as linguists.[7]

This phenomenological analysis not only helps us reconcile the distinctions made by Itkonen and Willems, but offers a clear answer to the question on the relation between norms and intuitions: as (the phenomenological concept of) intuition requires that the object is given *clearly in presence* (rather than diffusely, in absence), language intuitions are not of the norms themselves (which are rather known implicitly, through operative intentionality) but of the specific utterances such as (2a) and (2b) which either follow the norms/rules or do not. When there is a deviation, this is noted spontaneously, and speakers perform a categorial intuition of the type: "this sentence/utterance/phrase is odd" – which need not be expressed in language and could simply result in raised eyebrows. Most often, ordinary users of the language will not be able to say, or care, which rule is broken, and in which way.[8] This is the role of linguists (or of "language policemen"), who will be able to do this *more or less* theoretically, which we suggest corresponds to the degree to which they engage in systematic, eidetic intuitions, i.e. on reflective, conscious analysis of the implicit norms, not just noticing deviations from them.

In sum, we need to distinguish between three levels of conscious access to language norms: (a) pre-reflective, in which the norms operate in the background as guiding language use (Willem's "primary intuitions"), (b) reflective, but pre-theoretical in Itkonen's sense, which are based on categorial intuitions over deviant examples and (c) reflective and theoretical, based on the intuitions (or

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7. We acknowledge that it is somewhat counter-intuitive to refer to eidetic intuitions as "theoretical", as any philosophical concept of intuition, including those of phenomenology (Husserl/Sokolowski) and analytic philosophy (Cohen/Itkonen) alluded to here, implies *immediacy*, in opposition to "argument or inference". Still, eidetic intuitions are part and parcel of the procedure of eidetic reduction, which as described in Section 2.2 requires *systematic reflection* (more in the case of experts like philosophers and linguists, less in the case of the man and woman on the street) and is thus more properly placed on the theoretical side, of what should be arguably viewed as a continuum. We thank Elena Faur for pointing out the need to clarify this.

8. A reviewer suggests that even naïve speakers could easily make statements such as "the definite articles and their heads should be switched around" but we doubt this, as this is already a highly theoretical statement. Of course, many speakers could indeed make this step, but then they have already adopted the role of (hobby) linguists, which is an option that is of course open: "If the bases of linguistic studies lies each time in this original knowledge […] this means that other people, like all people, can also be – in a sense – linguists or at least beginners in this field; certainly, if they are willing to turn from intuition to reflexivity." (Coseriu 2000: 111).

"reflections" if one would wish to stick to a more immediate notion of intuition), of "experts", who are able to provide explanations (in the broad sense of the word), or rather explications of the norms in question.

3.3 Variation in intuitions and norms

Itkonen analyzes the ontology of language norms as a form of *common knowledge* within a language community, where speakers "know" that everyone speaking the same language shares the same norms. But this would seem to imply that there is relatively little variation across (competent) speakers of the same language. (Children and second language learners, on the other hand, are expected to have gaps in such knowledge.) To the extent that such general norms are reflected by linguistic intuitions, either as directly corresponding to the norms (per Itkonen's account) or indirectly, via specific utterances (as suggested above) we should expect relatively little variation in these as well.

But how can we then make sense of rather extensive variation in "acceptability judgments", documented for example by Dąbrowska (2010)? The author presented sentences like those in (8)–(10) to both naïve speakers of English and to linguists and asked for them to be rated on a 5-level Likert scale, ranging from "very bad" to "fine". Interestingly, while both linguists and non-linguists judged the Examples (8) and (10) similarly, the first toward the top of the scale, and the latter toward the bottom, they differed extensively with respect to examples like (9), with the linguists judging them as close to "good" and the non-linguists like the "bad" examples.

(8) What do you think the witness will say if they don't intervene?

(9) Claire would believe that Jo thinks he said something at the court hearing.

(10) What did you say that works even better? (Dąbrowska 2010: 10)

Dąbrowska discusses factors like familiarity as possible explanations, but in general treats the results as puzzling, and concludes by warning that linguists "cannot simply rely on their own intuitions and assume that they are representative of the community at large" (Dąbrowska 2010: 21). Such results support our argument for a more indirect relation between the intuitions and the norms, with linguists being more influenced by theoretical "metalinguistic" considerations. However, what this shows is not that "intuitions are unreliable", but rather points to the crucial importance of the exact formulation of tests that target conscious judgments. It also shows the need for *intersubjective corroboration* of results based on first-person methods, which is an essential step in the phenomenological method (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008).

But what if there is indeed variation not only in the intuitions, but also in the corresponding norms (and usage patterns) themselves? This could be more easily attested with less grammatically complex sentences than in (8)–(10), for example as in the caused motion construction shown in (11). Some English speakers prefer (11a) but accept (11b) as more correct, while others reject (11a) as incorrect, accepting only (11b).

(11) a. Put it in the box.
b. Put it into the box.

Itkonen has treated such variation in both speaker intuitions and systematic use of basic constructions as indicating a "grey area" of inter-individual variation that signals undergoing language change (Itkonen 2008a). Leppänen (this volume) refers to this as "norm-internal" variation (as opposed to the "norm-external" variation, which amounts to deviating from a norm).

But there are here two different cases that need to be distinguished. First, if the communities of users of (11a) and (11b) are distinct, we have two different dialects, corresponding to different norm systems: either further diverging, and leading to language split, or to one of them replacing the other in language change. The second case is that of an "ambiguous norm" allowing both (11a) and (11b), perhaps modulated by contextual factors. In the first case, we should expect overwhelming agreement in correctness judgments *within* populations, but in the second we should not, as contextual factors will lead even to *intra*-individual variation (and thus to uncertainty).

The point is that in either case there appears to be variation in language norms: either areally (requiring us to limit norms to specific dialects) or contextually (registers). This context-sensitivity becomes even more pronounced once we consider norms of word meaning: the (basic) meaning of many words differs fundamentally across contexts and sub-communities, including the examples in (12).

(12) a. *bad* (negative vs. positive evaluation)
b. *beef* (meat vs. argument)
c. *abduction* (theft/kidnapping vs. form or reasoning)
d. *intuition* (fuzzy feeling vs. clear knowledge)

Of course, these can be analyzed in terms of "polysemy", but without further ado, it would not be clear if the different "senses" are known to the same (community of) speakers, or to different sub-communities. In the first case, it would indeed be appropriate to characterize this as norm-internal variation, but in the latter is rather a matter of alternative norms.

3.4 Parallels and differences between the levels in language and logic

As pointed out, Itkonen usually aligns the norms of language and those of logic, stating that "there seems to be no reason to accept a difference in kind between norms of logic and those of language" (Itkonen 1983: 57). Given that the mode of access of all norms is that of intuition, he characterizes both core/autonomous linguistics and logic as "intuitional sciences" (Itkonen 2003).

At a level of generalization this is certainly valid and consistent with the phenomenological critique of psychologism, as pointed out earlier. But how do we deal with the rather obvious fact that nearly all people are fluent speakers, while relatively few are "fluent" in logic? Of course, fluency does not imply uniformity. To repeat our conclusion from the previous sub-section, while native speakers can be said to know the norms of their native language pre-reflectively with as much certainty as humanly possible (i.e. the "primary intuitions" of Willems 2012), when asked to perform even the most pre-theoretical judgment, native speakers may have difficulty deciding where to draw the border between correct and incorrect sentences, in cases such as those in (8)–(11). In fact, such variation (and hence potential uncertainty) is acknowledged by Itkonen (1983: 76): "The degree to which the (common) knowledge of norms is both objective and certain is inversely proportional to the amount of individual variation". Based on this somewhat variable pool of pre-theoretical intuitions, linguists construct more or less definite, and hence invariant, descriptions of the norms of the language, i.e. grammars. But as is generally acknowledged, these are ontologically and epistemologically secondary.

In the case of logic there appears to be at first glance a similar situation, with variable intuitions on what constitutes valid reasoning on the pre-theoretical level, which can then be explicated into different formal logical systems theoretically: two-valued logics, three-valued logics, intuitionistic logic, etc. To give a simple example, many speakers of English accept the inferences in both (13) and (14) as valid, while (14) is of course not a matter of entailment, but of (generalized) implicature, based on the Quantity maxim: "Be as informative as possible".

(13) All students came. > Some students came.

(14) Some students came. > Not all students came.

Once this is explained, for example, to students, they can make other similar distinctions, with gradually increasing levels of certainty. But this suggests that there is much more uncertainty in logic prior to theoretical explication (and formalization) than in language. Which is hardly surprising, given that even syllogistic logic both presupposes and operates over reflections on language.

Thus, while there is relatively more variation in the (intuitions on) norms on the pre-theoretical level than on the theoretical level concerning both language

and logic, it appears that such variation is more pronounced for logic than for language, implying that intuitions on the rules of logic are predominantly of the "secondary" kind.[9]

In the next section we can see how these three issues: (a) the nature of linguistic intuitions, (b) the inevitability of variation, and (c) variations in certainty can be further clarified with the help of the meta-linguistic framework of Eugenio Coseriu.

4. Coseriu's levels of linguistic normativity

Attempting to characterize language in a more inclusive fashion than is the case in generative, structuralist, functionalist or cognitive approaches, Coseriu (1983, 1985, 1988 – inter alia) proposed that the phenomenon of language exists at three distinct levels, more or less corresponding to three basic senses of the word *language* (in English): (a) Language is general (e.g. "Only humans have language", (b) A specific communal language or dialect (e.g. "the languages spoken in Sweden"), (c) a register or style of using language (e.g. the language of rap songs"). Coseriu referred to these as the "universal", "historical" and "individual" levels respectively, but we find the term *situated* to be more appropriate for the last, most concrete level, as this level concerns both specific utterances in a given context, in the perspective of *energeia*, and, discursive knowledge of specific norms, from the perspective of *dynamis*, as we discuss below. It does not concern "individual minds", which the original term could lead someone to believe (cf. Zlatev 2011; Zlatev & Blomberg 2015).

At the same time, Coseriu pointed out that on each of these levels, language can be approached from three different perspectives, as (i) ongoing activity that is at least in part creative (*energeia*), as (ii) the knowledge that supports this (*dynamis*), and (iii) as the actual utterances produced (*ergon*). While he emphasized the interdependence between these three perspectives, he gave priority to *energeia*, the most creative aspect of language, which is always a step ahead of the norms, and hence of the (common) knowledge of these norms.[10] Still, such knowledge is

9. We wish to acknowledge the help of the editors for helping us rethink and revise this argument.

10. Coseriu does not explicitly refer to normativity but more often discusses "acceptability judgments". The term *norm* is instead used in a somewhat technical sense in contrast to a *system*. The latter concerns all patterns consistent with the structure of the language and would for example include the past tense of *go* as "*goed*". This is excluded by the norm, which specifies the form *went* (e.g. Coseriu 1983). An informative discussion of Coseriu's technical notion of *norm*, in relation to explicitly normative notions such as "correctness" in his later texts is provided by Kabatek (forthcoming).

a crucial dimension, and following the three-level analysis of language, Coseriu characterizes it as follows.

On the *universal* level, this "comprises everything that applies in principle to all languages independently of their respective linguistic structuring, that is a number of principles of thought and the general knowledge of the world" (Coseriu 1985: xxix). On the historical level, Coseriu's conception is close to that of Saussure's *langue* as a "social institution" and Itkonen's understanding of this in terms of common knowledge, but with one important difference: Coseriu insists that "a historical language is never one single "linguistic system", but a "diasystem": an ensemble of 'linguistic systems' between which there is at every stage co-existence and interference" (Coseriu 1967: 33). On the situated level, linguistic competence concerns "*norms of discourse* which do not directly concern the construction of the linguistic expression as such, but rather the so-called 'text macrostructures' or the use of certain expressions in certain types of texts or with respect to certain persons" (Coseriu 1985: xxx).

Similarly to Itkonen, Coseriu acknowledges that the norms on each level can be accessed by intuitions, or as he writes, "judgments". Corresponding to each level, and its norms, there are different kinds of intuitions/judgments, those of congruence, correctness, and appropriateness, which react to different kind of deviations to the norms, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Norm-based judgments in relation to the distinct levels of language (based on Coseriu 1985)

Level	Example of deviance	Competence	Judgments/intuitions
Universal	*The square is round.*	World knowledge; "rules of thought"	Congruent/incongruent
Historical	*Square the is black.*	Grammatical and semantic knowledge	Correct/incorrect
Situated	*I don't give a shit.*	Discursive knowledge	Appropriate/inappropriate

We could say that the normativity of the universal level is concerned with universal aspects of the life world that are valid for all human beings, and it is going against these that makes expressions like *the square is round* incongruent (in principle, as there may be, and in fact are many cultural and ecological differences; for example the notion of 'square' is not an empirical universal, cf. below). But certain sentences like (15) and (16) that are incongruent – the first because it is obviously not true, and the second because it is tautologous – may be both correct and appropriate as "the incongruence is neutralized by the corresponding traditions of the particular languages" (Coseriu 1985: xxxv). In this case, (15) can easily be understood as a metaphor, and (16) as a deliberate flouting of the Gricean "maxim of quantity" (i.e.

do not provide too much information) in order to make the implicature that what I am saying is based on first-person evidence.

(15) He had cold fire in his heart.

(16) I saw it in with my own eyes.

In a similar way, the situated level has its corresponding norms, which to repeat concern "the use of certain expressions in certain types of texts or with to certain persons" (Coseriu 1985: xxx). These norms are the most context-sensitive ones, but also in a sense those that are most powerful, as they can subvert or override the norms of the higher levels. In a novel like *Gravity's Rainbow* (Pynchon 1973), plots from different historical times intersect and weave into one another, thus breaking both logical and communicative principles in the name of artistic expression. A more mundane example is the explicit breaking of standard rules of English in certain contexts like Cockney rhyming slang (Franklyn 1960), where certain words gain the meanings of collocates through an intermediary step of rhyme. For example, in (17) "apples" is used a substitute for "stairs", via the collocation "apples and pears".

(17) I am going up the apples.

Thus, analogous to the asymmetry between the different perspectives on language (where *energeia* is privileged), there is an asymmetry between the levels, so that the norms on the universal level can be "overridden" in favor of those on the historical level, which on their part can be overridden by the situated level – but not the other way around: "Both incongruent and incorrect utterances may be entirely acceptable in speech because of the one-way direction of neutralization of these judgments" (Coseriu 1985: xxxv).

Even with the help of this brief summary, we can notice many similarities between the meta-linguistics of Coseriu and Itkonen (cf. López-Serena 2009), which could perhaps be attributed to the partial overlap between hermeneutics and phenomenology, and Itkonen's indebtedness to the former, whereas Coseriu explicitly points out his connection to phenomenology:

> In linguistics, we deal with an object which is a free activity […]. It is an activity of the type that we call culture, or sometimes, spirit […]. Here – we know facts – in a way – by what could be called "*original knowledge*"; or even "*original science*", in the sense used by Husserl, i.e. by that kind of knowledge man has about himself and about everything he does as creative and free subject. (Coseriu 2000: 109)

Given this common basis, it is natural to combine Itkonen's analysis of language norms with some aspects from Coseriu's framework, and in the process address the three issues that were discussed in the previous section.

First, concerning the objects of linguistic intuitions, we can see that Coseriu is in agreement with the conclusion that was made in Section 3.2, namely that these are neither the norms themselves, nor the "competence" of them, but the actual situated utterances: "Judgements about correctness, as other judgements about acceptability apply to language as activity not as knowledge, to the so-called 'performance', not to 'competence': competence is the criterion not the object of the judgements." (Coseriu 1985: xxxiv). Furthermore, Coseriu's characterization of the "originary knowledge" of language (norms) as *dynamis*, that is, as "technical", i.e. practical and embodied, and yet not unconscious or procedural in a mechanistic way, is fully consistent with the phenomenological notion of operative intentionality (see Section 2).

Second, Coseriu emphasizes that the historical level, where norms of correctness mostly operate, does not consist of a single monolithic system, but of an "ensemble of 'linguistic systems' between which there is at every stage co-existence and interference" (Coseriu 1967: 33). This would seem to be fully consistent with the observed degree of norm variation, discussed in Section 3.3. Furthermore, by privileging the situated level over the historical and the universal levels, and of *energeia* over the norms, the (relatively) creative nature of language use can be acknowledged along with its normativity. At the same time, even poetic language is not unconstrained but rather builds on conventionalized metaphor complexes (Lakoff & Turner 1989).

Third, by distinguishing between the universal level, on the one side, and the historical and situated levels, on the other, it is possible to accommodate the kind of distinction between normativity in language and in logic that was suggested in 3.4, with less certainty on the pre-theoretical level in the case of logic than in language. While speakers of most languages would find locutions like *the square is round* "illogical", or in Coseriu's terms, "incongruent", such judgments require and operate on language-based concepts. But as not all languages have concepts such as *square* or *number* (e.g. Everett 2005; Dor 2015), we need to conceptualize the universal level as one of potential, rather than actual norms. In other words, as *pan-human (universal) motivations for the formation of normative systems* on the historical and situated levels, rather than as norms per se. This, admittedly, requires a somewhat different interpretation of the universal level than that in Coseriu's original framework (cf. Zlatev 2011), but we believe that it does not disturb its internal coherence, and furthermore allows us to elaborate its connection to phenomenology, as we argue in the following section.

5. Levels of normativity and phenomenology

While Coseriu's analysis helped clarify some issues concerning language norms, a few pertinent questions remain. First, why do language norms display such a tri-partite division in universal, historical, and situated? Second, why are language norms indispensable? In other words, his framework does not tell us why there are these types of norms, or why there are norms in the first place. Given the difficulty of these questions, any attempt to engage with them will necessarily be general and with more specific details left unattended. With this in mind, we can start fleshing out our combined Itkonen-Coseriu analysis by appeal to some of the phenomenological notions introduced in Section 2.

Importantly, we may observe that Coseriu's three levels *are not exclusively restricted to language but apply to any domain of social life*. For instance, *morality* can be analyzed as having a similar division between (a) a very general kind of ethical potential, (b) particular moral systems, and (c) situated moral behavior. Similarly to language norms, the "lower" level may over-ride the higher one(s). For example, while human beings may have universal pro-social and altruistic impulses (Sober & Wilson 1999), such a "pre-theoretical" ethics may be overridden on the historical level, by conventional morality which may even involve human sacrifice and ritual cannibalism (Reeves Sunday 1986), or on the situated level, for examples in threatening situations where even the most ethical people may feel justified to engage in violence.

So, why the three levels? Starting with the universal level, as we suggested in the previous section, it is not so much a matter of specific "principles of thought" but of general structures of the human life world, which are not restricted to language-specific and culture-specific norms. As we saw in Section 2, any human life world is structured at various levels of specificity, which in themselves are not universal, but are rather founded on universal pan-human experiential structures such as intentionality, embodied intersubjectivity, and bodily mimesis (Zlatev & Blomberg 2016). Such motivations may be regarded as "proto-normative" as they constrain, but do not determine the norms that become sedimented upon them on the historical level. A common error is to conflate the two levels of universal motivations and culture and language-specific conventions – a mistake often conducted in attempts to reduce linguistic meaning to individual cognition (Lakoff 1987; Talmy 2000).[11] Strong reminders of the need to distinguish between these

11. One possible cause for confusing language-specific meanings/norms with their motivations may reside in conflating the mode of access of the norms, i.e. through various levels of intuition (see 2.1) with the norms themselves (Itkonen 2008b).

two levels are the persistent findings of different norms across languages/cultures – motivated by the same set of universal experiences (e.g. Blomberg 2015).

At the opposite end of the spectrum is the situated level of specific "rationality principles" like (4) and countless others that govern practical actions, as well as stylistic rules of appropriate language use. It is at this level that norms are most often "negotiated" and most prone to vary, as has been emphasized by interactionist and dialogical approaches (e.g. Linell 2009). For instance, there are different rules for how to speak at a seminar in comparison to the "post-seminar" discussion at the pub, but it is not impossible to mix these. In a sense, these situations make up miniature "home worlds" where certain ways of acting and speaking are normatively significant. Thus, such miniature home worlds can have their own norms not tied to a specific language, but rather pertaining to typified situations, such as "how to speak at a seminar". What these differences are, to what extent they are a matter of social interaction, and how rigorous they are for various situations can be detailed and described from sociolinguistic and interactionist perspectives (e.g. Hymes 1971).

How does the situated level feed into the establishment of language-specific norms? We have mentioned repeatedly that the situated level has precedence and is thereby always one step ahead of the historical level. Of course, to use language in a particular situation is also to speak a certain language, which in turn is an instance of saying something at all. Thus, it is not independent of these levels, which constrain and motivate its structures. In addition, it is not only the situated level that is a step ahead, but the actual activity (*energeia*) is also a step ahead of the norms themselves (*dynamis*).

How these are related to one another can be clarified by returning to our discussion of *sedimentation*. As we pointed out in Section 2, language has a "paradoxical elasticity" between "fixed" norms and the latent possibility of a continual drifting away from them (Buckley 1992). On this basis, (language) norms are not only sedimented upon proto-normative structures (e.g. those of embodied intersubjectivity) on the universal level, but also emerge as sedimentations of *energeia*, which may extend, and in some cases break existing norms. In this second kind of sedimentation, the repeatable use of linguistic expressions stabilizes into new conventionalized forms. Language use thus involves a continual moving away from the immediate here and now. The tension between norms and being always able to extend them is thus inherent in the nature of language and communication, and of social action more generally.

We may represent this by reversing the positions of the situated and universal levels, compared to the way they are usually presented in Coseriu's matrix, in a way shown in Figure 1. *Sedimentation* relations are there represented in solid lines, and *motivation* relations in dotted lines. On the "horizontal" dimension, there is

constant dialectic between norms motivating (but not determining) language use, and use leading to normative sedimentations. When it concerns the short time scale of sedimentation of meaningful linguistic actions into situated norms, we may call this *enchronic* sedimentation, following Enfield (2013). Further, there is a *diachronic*, long time scale dialectic between sedimentation and motivation as well, represented on the vertical dimension in Figure 1. Here pan-human universal experiences motivate language use, and the establishment of situated norms, which on their part may "sink" in, and become more stable, characterizing (much of) the language as a whole.



Figure 1. The sedimentation (solid line) and motivation (dashed line) model of norm emergence, on the enchronic (horizontal) and diachronic (vertical) temporal scales

The historical level is appropriately represented in Figure 1 as "sandwiched" between the motivations of the universal level and the more short-term processes and structures on the situated level. It is at this level that language norms are most *categorial*, despite the "*dia*-system" variation that can be seen as inevitable, given that these norms are both sedimented upon the constraints of the universal life world, and emerge from situations of language use. By virtue of differentiating between "correct" and "incorrect", between dialect X and Y, and between "us" and "them", these norms are typically regarded as *the most significant ones*, by both laymen and linguists, and it is therefore fully consistent to regard them as constituting specific languages (as argued by Itkonen). This significance may be naturally related to the notion of *home world* – which exists only in contrast to various alien worlds. The very identity of a language is clearly a matter of an opposition to other languages

and to varieties of the same language. Further, to speak a language is needed to enter a specific cultural home world. Not to be able to speak it is quite clearly to be an alien in relation to that specific home world.

Following this analysis, we can see that the three-part distinction of norms that follows from Coseriu's framework is not arbitrary, but rather corresponds to general features of social life, when applied to more specific characteristics of language and verbal communication, and when viewed with the help of phenomenological concepts like life world and sedimentation. We have also hinted at an answer to the most difficult question of why norms are needed in the first place: they are the key centripetal forces of social life, without which there would be chaos rather than meaning and communication – at the same time as they are more or less constantly negotiated, undermined and extended.

6. Summary and conclusions

Having ventured through the approaches to language norms of Esa Itkonen (Section 3) and Eugenio Coseriu (Section 4) and connected these to relevant concepts from phenomenology in Section 5 we can now return to the five questions from which we departed in the introduction, and thereby summarize our discussion.

What is the ontology of language norms?

Norms, in general, are an inherent part of any socio-cultural life world, corresponding to the *types* that actions need to conform to. Thus, in agreement with Itkonen (2003, inter alia), we may conclude that they are neither part of the physical world nor in the "the mind". However, we find it less helpful to say that they are part of a Popperian "world 3" that is neither physical nor mental, as that would make any account of their emergence from anything that is not already normative problematic (Zlatev & Blomberg 2016). Further, regarding their ontology as a matter of three-level *common knowledge* does not give proper due to the "passive", pre-reflective manner in which they are known. Hence, our conclusion is that language norms, much like other implicit social norms, exist as structures of operative intentionality, setting "invisible" conditions for what constitutes appropriate language use. They are thus *inhabited*, in the words of Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962), rather than intuited, and are constantly being confirmed and sanctioned in interaction with others. Even when not breached, there is positive reinforcement from being understood and not being corrected.

How are norms known?

Despite being indispensable for social cohesion in general, and linguistic communication in particular, norms are usually not made explicit, but rather reside in the margins of consciousness and are attended to only in the case of breaches. In this regard, language norms are clearly a candidate for phenomenological analysis, which aims to bring what is known only vaguely into focus (see Sokolowski 2000; Zlatev 2010). They become the objects of pre-theoretical reflection through a form of categorial intuition whenever they are breached. This can then be extended into eidetic intuition and leading to a more or less theoretical analysis, which was the basic method of linguistics from its dawn, and arguably continues to be so. But apart from being known through pre-theoretical (categorial) and theoretical (eidetic) intuitions based on deviating instances, norms are also known pre-reflectively by being constantly confirmed. Every time we use language while abiding with the norm, we are tacitly affirmed of having used language appropriately, similar to the feedback from pre-reflective operative intentionality when we perform an action with expected outcome. Similarly to how we are pre-reflectively aware of our arms and hands when reaching for a cup of coffee, we have an awareness of speaking in such a way that we make ourselves understood. By living and acting in the world, *we inhabit language norms just as we inhabit the life world by performing different actions*. How we perform these actions and how they are enabled by operative intentionality becomes attended to in breakdown cases, where what we encounter does not match or (collective) expectations.

What kinds of norms are there?

The litmus test of a norm is that when breached, this typically leads to "sanctions", if only of the most implicit kinds, such as raised eyebrows or future avoidance from members of the community. We have seen that there are different types of breaches of language norms, and arguably different types of sanctions. The universal, historical and situated levels concerning language were seen to be quite general and could be mapped to other domains of social life. The universal level, as pointed out, does not so much correspond to any specific norms, but to two kinds of universal experiential structures of the human life world: typification and embodied intersubjectivity. These are among the factors that lead to culture and language specific norms on the historical level, where norms exist in opposition to other norm systems, a special case of the contrast between home world and alien world. As language, on this level, is a key aspect of group identity, it plays an important role in the constitution of a home world for its speakers or inhabitants. However, a home

world is not completely monolithic and closed in on itself. A "guest" can become a member of such a home and with time, even in part change it. This change can feel like a threat, as indicated by the sometimes strong and even violent reactions to both social and language change. The situated level of language norms is the level that is first and foremost affected by such interactions. It is in using language that breaches and changes occur, which can be turned to new norms. There is an inherent necessity involved in this process. The very possibility for linguistic communication presupposes not only the stability of its norms, but also a distance from what endowed the stability with meaning in the first place.

Where do norms derive from?

Norms emerge through a dialectics of sedimentation and motivation processes on (a) a more enchronic and (b) a more diachronic time scale. In the first case, the dialectics is that between norms and creative use, where it is the norms that motivate, and use that is sedimented. For example, initial breaches of language norms may become conventionalized into new situated norms (e.g. *bad* with meaning GOOD). The second case is the much more time-consuming development, in which certain linguistic constructions become conventionalized in some languages but not in other, despite similar motivations from the universal level.

What are the main characteristics of language norms?

Let us then end by returning to from where we began: Three central characteristics of language norms were suggested to be their (a) inevitability (b) breakability and (c) dialectical nature of being both social and individual. Based on our discussion, we can now fulfill the promise to explicate these features.

Language norms are inevitable in narrower and in a broader sense. The first is that they provide, in the words of Dor (2015), a shared "symbolic landscape" (semantically) and "communication protocol" (grammatically), which is taken for granted in any act of linguistic communication. This does not mean that they determine actual language use, which as free activity (*energeia*) is always a "step ahead" (see the "motivation" arrow from norms to use in Figure 1). In a broader sense, they are inevitable in the way that social norms in general are inevitable, as they constitute the meaning systems of a particular social group, in contradistinction to another group or groups, especially on the historical level.

Given this answer to the first question, the "breakability" of language norms ceases to be paradoxical. If there could not be mistakes, the notion of norm would be senseless to begin with, as emphasized by Wittgenstein and Itkonen. But using

the terminology of Grice (1975), norms can also be deliberately *flouted* to achieve communicative effects, and possibly to initiate the establishment of a new norm. Such a dual character of being on the one hand indispensable and at the same time breakable follows naturally from our account of language norms as implicit, sedimented-upon structures of a social-cultural life world.

Finally, we can return to the "Saussurean paradox" of language being on the one hand social, and beyond the control of the individual speaker, and on the other hand made up of signs which are inherently psychological. As far as the ontological issue is concerned, as we stated in reply to the first question, language norms are neither purely psychological not Platonic entities, but structures of the life world, and as such have an objectivity that is constituted through acts of human intentionality, primarily operative and secondarily reflective. Furthermore, with the help of the concept of sedimentation, as a form of dialectic interplay between activity and passivity, we can qualify the claim that "the individual […] can never create, not modify" the language system: not a single individual, but every act of linguistic communication has the potential to indeed modify the system to some extent. At the same time, every creative language act is performed against the background of a system or web of norms, in which language use will rely in order to be creative. In this regard, language norms are a precondition for linguistic creativity.

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A primer for linguistic normativists

Michael B. Kac

A normative domain is a realm of action or thought in which it's necessary to invoke the concepts of requirement/obligation, permission or prohibition. Closely associated with these is that of *correctness*. A rule of grammar, as this term is traditionally understood (e.g., the requirement that determiners precede the nouns with which they are associated) is accordingly normative in nature. This chapter explores some of the consequences of this fact, including: the relationship between the notions of rule and constraint; broad- vs. narrow-scope rules; and ascription of different kinds of ill-formedness to ungrammatical examples. Some attention is also given to the critique of grammaticality-based and intuition-grounded linguistic practice advanced by Sampson and Babarczy (2013), and motivation is offered for a warmer embrace of traditional grammar than is customary among linguists.

Keywords: grammar, grammaticality, etiological property, intuition, normative domain, norms, normativity

1. Introduction

My purpose in these admittedly loose and informal remarks is to give an accessible account of the concept of normativity and its significance for the linguist, making no effort to avoid redundancy where it will contribute to clarity. I will also take up, in Sections 4–5, some ancillary issues; readers so inclined may omit these sections without losing the thread.

The earliest treatment of the significance of normativity for linguistics of which I am aware is Koller 1975, which circulated through informal channels as early as 1967 but remains little known. The canonical works are Ringen 1975 and Itkonen 1974 and 1978, where linguistic normativity is taken to subvert the philosophical doctrine of methodological monism, i.e., the view that all forms of scientific inquiry are pursued in the same way. Note should also be taken of Dretske 1974.

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A full understanding of the matter before us requires an understanding of a key metatheoretical term, namely *empirical*, which Itkonen (opp. cit.), following Popper (1963: 255–256, 267), takes to apply to domains of inquiry whose facts pertain to events locatable in space and time. I've suggested elsewhere (Kac 1992) a refinement of terminological practice according to which empiricalness comes in two forms, strong and weak. To say that a given domain is strongly empirical is to say that it's empirical in the sense just described; in a weakly empirical one, by contrast, all that's required is that the truth of hypotheses be underdetermined by data. The purpose here is not to quibble pointlessly about what *empirical* 'really' means, but merely to make space for a use of the term in keeping with the usual practice of linguists while not leading to confusion.

2. What is a normative domain?

A normative domain is one in which it's necessary to invoke the concepts of requirement/obligation, permission or prohibition.[1] Closely associated with these is that of *correctness*, often best conceived of negatively: an action is incorrect iff taken under conditions prohibiting it and correct under any conditions in which it is not incorrect. If language use presents us with a normative domain in at least some of its aspects, then the associated branches of linguistics, of necessity, lie outside the realm of the strongly empirical since the data consist not of spatiotemporally located occurrences but of facts regarding correctness.

An opponent of the view that language is a normative domain has two potential lines of attack: to argue that normative domains do not exist anywhere or to accept that there are normative domains, but that language does not, in any regard, amount to one. The first is a non-starter: normativity is implicit in such humdrum pronouncements as that Alice was rude, Bob cheated on his taxes, Claire added a column of numbers wrong and Dave drove over the speed limit. A major indicator that normativity is in play in a given domain is the applicability of such words as *crime, error, fallacy, foul, gaffe, infraction, misdeed, offense, solecism, violation* (a very small subset of a large number of ordinary-language terms applied to contranormative actions or their results).

1. These in turn are related in the expected ways: to be, e.g., required or obliged to do *X* under some specified set of conditions is to be not permitted to not do *X* under the conditions in question, and also to be prohibited from not doing *X* under said conditions. By the same token, to be permitted to do *X* under a given set of conditions is to not be prohibited from doing *X*, likewise to not be required not to do *X*, under said conditions.

What, then, about language? To cite a straightforward if shopworn example, to say that English has a rule to the effect that (subject to certain qualifications) determiners precede the nouns with which they are associated amounts to saying that English requires determiner-noun collocations to be formed in such a way that the former precedes the latter. (I'll refer with sufficient frequency to this example to justify our giving it a name, so let's call it the DET-N rule.) Failure to satisfy this requirement produces results traditionally termed "ill-formed" or "ungrammatical".[2]

Since the term *rule* is commonly used in a multiplicity of senses, both inside and outside linguistics, it should always be understood when found in this discussion to be intended as it is in the preceding paragraph, unless some clear indication is given to the contrary. That rules in this sense are not on a par with such principles as physical laws is due to the fact that occurrences of behavior in violation of them does not suffice to falsify them. E.g., that I can emit utterances like *dog the barked* does not – of itself, anyway – falsify the claim that the grammar of English includes the DET-N rule.

I have so far spoken as if normativity were relevant only to the realm of action, but it's easy enough to see that it must extend to that of thought as well. Belief, in particular, is regulated by a canon of correctness: it's correct to hold true beliefs but not false ones. Here language provides a particularly persuasive case in point: it's as incorrect to believe, e.g., that the English word *dog* denotes the set of cats as it is to say 'dog the barked' with the intent of encoding, in English, the information that a certain dog barked. Indeed, such 'misencodings', if I may be permitted the unaesthetic but useful coinage, may themselves be the product of incorrect beliefs. Malapropisms are a good case in point.

A question which naturally arises is that of the sense in which linguistic norms amount to requirements or prohibitions. You can be fined or jailed for reckless driving, sued for slander, ejected from the game for woofing the umpire, excommunicated for heresy; since nothing quite so dire seems to attend on, say, putting the determiner after the associated noun, what justifies the presumption that there are requirements or prohibitions in the grammatical sphere as well? I take this matter up in Section 7.

2. That this is a wrong-headed view has been forcefully argued by Sampson and Babarczy (2013), a matter I take up in detail in Section 4.

3. What is a rule?

Without necessarily being entirely clear as to what they mean by the terms *rule* and *constraint*, linguists often speak as if there is a difference between the referents of these words. There are, however, perfectly ordinary senses in which they're understood and used on which they come down to the same thing. For example, the DET-N rule in English can be fairly said to constrain the language (better: speakers of the language) in such a way that determiner-noun collocations must take the form specified by the rule; conversely, to say that determiner-noun collocations in English are so constrained is tantamount to saying that there's a rule to the effect that said collocations must be so formed that the DET comes first.

The DET-N rule, whatever you call it, is a condition on the well-formedness of meaningful expressions in English (and any other language to which it applies). Generalizing: a grammar of a language *L*, on one view, is simply a set of conditions on the well-formedness of (meaningful) expressions in *L* – which is just to say that it constrains the set of such expressions, admitting only those elements of the stringset over the vocabulary of *L* which do not run afoul of one or more of the aforementioned conditions. Whether we call the statements of the aforesaid conditions rules or constraints is, accordingly, simply a matter of stylistic preference.

I think it fair to say that the view just expressed of what a grammar amounts to is essentially that implicit in traditional grammar. This, of course, does not mean that linguists should embrace it; I happen to think that we should, at least for certain purposes, but a defense of that view would take us far beyond the intended scope of these remarks. I will nonetheless identify later on a few desirable consequences of wrapping our arms warmly around it. Before doing so, however, I need to clarify a few key points.

Perhaps the most important of these points is that to justify the claim that a language *L* (more specifically, its syntax) has rule *R* requires demonstrating that failure to conform to the dictates of *R* leads to ill-formedness/ungrammaticality. For example, the claim that English has the DET-N rule is supported by the fact that if you take a well-formed sentence like *the dog barked* and invert the order of *the* and *dog* leaving all else constant you get something no longer well-formed.

Implicit in this conception is the idea of something that I have elsewhere called *etiological analysis* of ungrammaticality (Kac 1987, 1992, Chh. 1 and 3), which consists of distinguishing different kinds of ill-formedness, and which I'll discuss in detail in Section 8. There is nothing outré about this: on the conception of rules that applies, say, to games and in the legal arena, to attribute to an actor a violation of the rules requires that the particular rule contravened be identified. E.g., an American-football team which commits an infraction cannot be declared merely to have broken the rules: the nature of the foul must be precisely

specified (holding, offsides, roughing or whatever); likewise, one cannot be legally charged merely with unlawful activity – the precise nature of the offense (such as assault, murder, robbery) must be specified. Application of the same conception of rules in regard to grammar has the same consequences: to say that a putative expression is ungrammatical/ill-formed requires that one be able to say *in what way* it is so (e.g., that certain elements are in the wrong order, that the verb of a sentence doesn't agree with its subject, that a predicate hasn't been supplied with sufficiently many arguments).[3] (What I've just said should not be taken as implying that we can do this in every case: the etiology of a given instance might not be known. But this is tantamount to saying that we do not (yet) know how to state the relevant rules.)

This point might seem utterly banal but for the fact that one sometimes hears – at least informally – vociferous objections. Some linguists are evidently persuaded that all you can reasonably expect a grammar to do is distinguish what's well-formed from what isn't, and the matter ends there: certain things are generated, others aren't, and that's that. It may well be that a certain conception of how a grammar is formulated and what information it gives about the language for which it's written does indeed force one to this conclusion (again, see Section 8), but one might well ask if this is the only possible view of the matter. Perhaps it is, though if so it would be nice to have a rigorous demonstration. If it isn't, then one is entitled to ask whether the associated conception is to be preferred over one in which the notion 'rule of grammar' is in keeping with the general idea of what rules are which uncontroversially applies in other domains.

It must also be borne in mind that on the rule-as-constraint conception, statements about individual lexical items may be rules as well. Consider, e.g., a verb which is surface-transitive; to so say is tantamount to saying that there is a rule to the effect that said verb requires an overtly manifested Direct Object. But surely this is as much a constraint on well-formedness as the DET-N rule.[4] The use of lexical items is as rule-governed as any other aspect of language, notwithstanding the fact that the rules involved may have a very narrow scope of applicability. (In short: *rule* in the relevant sense is not synonymous with *generalization*.)

Among the consequences of looking at rules in the way I'm talking about is one that deserves particular mention, and which I'll approach via three specific cases.

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3. Esa Itkonen has kindly brought to my attention that this idea goes back at least as far in the Western grammatical tradition as Apollonius Dyscolus.

4. On the other hand, the part of the entry which indicates the denotation of the verb is NOT a constraint on well-formedness, though it IS a constraint on semantic interpretation.

Case 1

It has long been conventional wisdom that in languages with so-called free word order the grammar must somehow incorporate a mechanism, often referred to as Scrambling, whose effect is to induce permutations in a presumptive basic/underlying order so as to account for all the possibilities.[5] But there is a different way of looking at the situation, namely as indicating that there is simply nothing to be said by the grammar about the sequencing of the relevant elements, since there are no restrictions on it. Rules as constraints are required only in circumstances where some logically available possibilities must be prohibited.

Case 2

Direct quotation, of its very nature, is immune to constraints on well-formedness.[6]

Case 3

There are linguistic milieus which are highly – indeed, arguably maximally – permissive in regard to the formation of names. To use phraseology I owe to Alexis Manaster Ramer, if the parents be cruel enough or the group avant-garde enough, essentially any combination of words can be a name. Insofar as this is so, then no grammatical rules-as-constraints apply within the associated domain.[7] More generally: a widespread pre-theoretical intuition has it that rules are needed only where action must be restricted, entailing that where all logical possibilities are normatively permissible, there are no rules.

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5. There are, of course, linguists who object to the very term *free word order* on the grounds that the choice of a given order is governed by various types of pragmatic conditions. This is based on a misunderstanding. While the terminology may not be particularly felicitous, its intent is clearly to indicate only that all logical possibilities for sequencing, say, S, O and V are grammatically available. Much the same point could be made about free variation: free variants are simply alternate pronunciations of a given word – there is no intent in so calling them to impute lack of systematicity to the variation.

6. Indeed, one may, in speaking a given language, quote in another: 'Louis XIV said "*L'état, c'est moi.*"' is an English sentence part of which happens to be in French – it's not an instance of code switching.

7. This observation might extend even to phonotactic constraints, as suggested by the comic-strip artist Al Capp's character Joe Btfsplk.

4. Is there such a thing as grammaticality? (1)

I turn now to the claim, a vigorous defense of which is mounted in Sampson and Babarczy 2013 (henceforth S&B),[8] that grammaticality is an illusion.[9] Let me begin my argument to the contrary by noting that the issue being addressed here is separate from that of whether there is normativity in language. One reason is that normativity is as relevant to the receptive as to the productive aspect of language use: comprehension is no less subject to canons of correctness than production, a point that will be of great importance to my case later on.

S&B's thinking in regard to this issue is exemplified particularly revealingly by their section 4.5 (op. cit.: 84–86) in which they advance two claims: that if there are any hard-and-fast constraints on grammaticality in English at all, there are very few, among them the DET-N rule; but, further, that even these are questionable. It is the second of these claims that I want to consider here.

What might cause one to doubt the DET-N rule? S&B produce the following example: *Norwegians put the article after the noun, in their language they say things like bread the is on table the*.[10] I'm prepared to stipulate that this is an unexceptionable English sentence; I dispute only the claim that examples of this kind show what S&B think they show. But before I take that matter up, let me digress briefly to quote S&B directly on a point regarding which there could well be misunderstanding:

> If the reader is unpersuaded by our resort to scenarios where one language is used to imitate the structure of another, […] we have some instinctive sympathy with those who find our appeal to such examples to be an unsatisfactory, almost cheating way of shoring up that claim. (op. cit.: 85)

I want to emphasize that I am not making the objection whose validity they are not quite ready to completely write off (though they try to counter it a little later – see below). I have a different objection, to wit:

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8. My thanks to Esa Itkonen for bringing this work to my attention.

9. An anonymous publisher's referee has called my attention to a special issue of *Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory* (No. 3, 2007) devoted to this work, of which I was unaware at the time of the writing of this paper; to the extent that the discussion here and in the next section replicates points already made there, priority credit is accordingly due to the contributors to the aforesaid volume.

10. Reproduced exactly, punctuation included, from the source.

It is a common – if not necessarily universal – feature of normative systems to incorporate 'escape hatches' of various kinds: recognition of cases in which rules do not apply, e.g., the principle which exculpates someone who has performed a normally proscribed act, such as the deliberate infliction of injury or death, under some kind of duress or with a motive that renders the act well-meaning. The admissibility of an action inconsistent with some norm under such conditions accordingly has no bearing on the truth of the claim that said norm exists: the existence of white lies, e.g., does not entail that there is no such thing as (dis)honesty.

It is of the utmost importance to recognize that such provisions are *themselves part of the system to which they pertain*, as much so as the rules whose purview they restrict. They do not sanction violation of the norms; rather, they specify circumstances under which the norms are suspended. Why this is not a distinction without a difference will become clear presently.

A linguistic case in point has already been presented, in Section 3, via the second of the three cases described there – direct quotation – in which the grip of syntax is fully released. (Though S&B do not put the relevant part of their example in quotation marks, it's clear that this is simply an omission, not an indication of some other intent on their part.) But that vitiates the effect of the appeal to such cases.

There remains another line of attack, to which S&B also resort. Anticipating an objection to the effect that the rules of grammar apply to 'normal usage' they ask, not without justification, how the boundaries of normal usage are to be drawn – whether, e.g., a parent's deliberately playful use of language in interacting with a young child does or doesn't count.

It seems to me that there are two plausible responses to this gambit. One is to simply say that it is built into the very concept of verbal play that we have again to do with a condition under which the rules are suspended. The other, to which I incline, is to take verbal play as deriving its status as such precisely from the fact that it involves *deliberate violation* of the rules, which, far from being suspended, remain – and, crucially, are recognized by all the participants in the playful activity as remaining – in full force. I favor this view because it can be held at no cost, or very little, given that we know that many forms of humor and fun derive from deliberate contravention of expectations. This is why it's crucial to distinguish suspension of the rules from accepting deliberate violation of them.

5. Is there such a thing as grammaticality? (2)

I want now to come at the question from a different angle. The examples below will occasion a warm glow of familiarity among linguists of a certain age:

(1) Visiting relatives is annoying.

(2) Visiting relatives are annoying.

(3) Visiting relatives can be annoying.

It is of critical importance that, for reasons evident to a beginning syntax student, the Subject in each of (1)–(3) not only *can* but *must* be construed as singular in (1) and as plural in (2), the option of alternate construals available only in (3). But notice that this unexceptionable view has a consequence, namely that if we replace *visiting relatives* by an unambiguously plural NP in (1) or an unambiguously singular one in (2) the result in either case is, in nontechnical verbiage, odd, funny sounding, not right – whereas no such effect is found with either change to (3), though the ambiguity of the original disappears in the expected way with each substitution. This is, moreover, not a coincidence, in light of what is to be gleaned from the entire paradigm: if things were otherwise, something would clearly be amiss. But the oddity/funny-soundingness/not-rightness alluded to just above is exactly what, in the terminology of grammatical analysis, is called ungrammaticality. You get (un)grammaticality, in other words, as part of the package if you have the right account of what's going on in other respects.

At the risk of overstating the case I want to expand on what an example like this shows. Imagine a linguist interested in syntax who professes no interest in grammaticality, preferring instead to be interested solely in the principles underlying form-meaning correlations. Such an interest is surely not idle or pointless: if anything in language is of any interest, surely form-meaning correlations are. (I doubt that S&B would disagree with me on this point.) But it turns out that there isn't any way to pursue that interest without running up against grammaticality. At the very most all you can do is maintain that there's no point in being interested in it for its own sake, rather than in the service of a more fundamental enterprise. I happen not to hold that position, but the point is that even if you do, grammaticality is going to sneak up and bite you anyway.

As it happens, S&B end up making this very point themselves, if in a different way. In advancing their case against the legitimacy of the idea of grammaticality they appeal partly to history, citing what they take to be a representative and influential nineteenth-century source, Meiklejohn 1886, a training manual in English grammar for teachers.[11] They assert – by their own admission not quite accurately (see below) – that Meiklejohn's approach differs from that of today's grammaticality-obsessed linguistics in being exclusively concerned with positive

11. S&B cite a later edition, from 1902.

examples.[12] Nonetheless, they themselves cite a case where Meiklejohn himself (op. cit.: 23) adverts to an attribution of ungrammaticality in support of his denial that pronouns are surrogates for nouns, observing that "If we say *I write*, the *I* cannot have *John Smith* substituted for it. We cannot say [sic] *John Smith write*." Now, S&B remark about this strategem that its goal is "to query a part-of-speech definition" (op. cit.: 4) rather than to provide evidence of a need to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical; fair enough, but that would seem to weaken their position rather than strengthen it: for not only does Meiklejohn clearly *take it as a given* that there is such a thing as ungrammaticality, he can fairly be credited with the presumption that his audience does too. So while S&B are surely right in their assessment of his purpose, there are grounds for supposing that the reason he doesn't argue for there being ungrammatical instances is that *he doesn't have to* (or at least feels he doesn't) – the point is, if not self-evident, one that he can trust his readers to have long since accepted.

But something more interesting is revealed by this particular and – I take S&B at their word here – unique deviation on Meiklejohn's part from his usual modus operandi. To see what I have in mind consider that he would not invoke ungrammaticality in a case like this unless he were assuming that appeal to it is a legitimate tactic. And insofar as this is so, however much his exposition may differ in style and verbiage from the way in which today's generative linguists talk about these things, the substance of what he's doing is completely unexceptionable from a contemporary point of view. That he gives this kind of argument only once would seem of little probative value in regard to the issue before us: given his agenda (again, I take S&B at their word in regard thereto), one can see easily enough why he wouldn't have much need to talk about ungrammaticality. But that he *does so at all* is highly revealing, making it plain that his background assumptions include exactly those that S&B wish to portray as an artifact of present-day thinking which, they would have us believe, would never cloud the mind of a more sober and clearheaded intellectual forebear like Meiklejohn, fortunate enough to have lived and worked at a time before the benighted present.

12. It needs to be borne in mind that such appeals do not, of themselves, settle questions like the one under discussion. Apart from the fact that the historical record in regard to this issue is not always on S&B's side – see the remarks in the introduction to this volume on the Greek and Indian grammatical traditions – past practice is not always worthy of emulation (there is such a thing as progress).

6. The place of linguistic intuition

I want now to briefly discuss another issue raised by S&B, namely the role of intuition as the principal source of data in grammatical analysis. I'll start by pointing to a confusion which is widespread enough to merit at least a brief mention, having to do with two distinct but often conflated notions: introspection and intuition (more precisely, the exercise of intuition). To say that linguistic knowledge is largely intuitive is to say – correctly – that it is, for the most part, not acquired or exercised consciously or intellectually (and, accordingly, *inaccessible to introspection*). The claim that, e.g., the DET-N rule is part of the grammar of English is the result of a two-step process: the making of an intuitive judgment (such as that *the cat* is a well-formed English NP while **cat the* isn't), and an inductive inference from that judgment, which pertains to a particular example, to the general principle.

Insofar as this is so, that linguists rely on intuition to make the judgments on which their hypotheses are based is not only appropriate but unavoidable. Most of the time, reliance on intuition is so routine in the workaday world of our subject as to pass without notice or comment: for example, semantic judgments – such as the claim that *visiting relatives* in (1) above denotes an activity, while in (2) it denotes a set of individuals – are just as grounded in intuition as any attribution of (un)grammaticality. Intuition is the rock-bottom of all grammatical analysis – even corpus-based analysis (see Pajunen & Itkonen, this volume). For example, imagine how, without any intuitions to guide the analyst, it would be possible to do something as basic as part-of-speech tagging. Indeed, there is a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* here: if you take S&B at their word, corpus-based analysis is useless to the linguist interested in form-meaning correlations; so either you must deny the legitimacy of that interest or accept that there has to be something more than just the examination of corpora.

A word is also in order about another aspect of S&B's critique of intuition-reliant linguistics, namely that it has caused false claims to get abroad (op. cit.: 81–84). To this there is a simple answer: given that intuition can be fallible (witness the garden-path effect), it must, like any other tool, be applied carefully and thoughtfully. To take the fact that it sometimes isn't as a knockdown of reliance on intuition is no more compelling than taking the existence of medical malpractice as a warrant for rejecting the validity of medicine.

7. Normativity and prescriptivism

I remarked earlier (Section 2) that the use of terms like *requirement* and *prohibition* in connection with language use seems rather odd given that putative violations do not appear to call forth sanctions comparable to the ones attendant on, say, committing a crime or cheating at a game. Lest it not have already occurred to the reader, I now hasten to point out that there may indeed be sanctions for violating linguistic rules, though the circumstances under which they're imposed are rather special. Perhaps the most obvious case in point is the institutionalized second-language learning situation. The sanctions for contranormative behavior may be mild compared to, e.g., imprisonment or hanging, but the deduction of points on the exam for saying or writing the likes of *Elle est intelligent* or *I in Germany was born* is no less a sanction for that. Even in the circumstances of everyday life one may risk, depending on the degree of sensitivity of the audience to one's situation, ridicule or worse for failure to conform to norms taken entirely for granted by the native speaker.

This brings us to a related point, namely whether the viewpoint for which I'm arguing doesn't open the door for the linguist's greatest bugaboo to creep back into our discipline: prescriptivism. My response is in two parts.

First, I maintain without shame or worry, that there is an ineliminable element of prescriptivism in our subject, no matter how loudly we protest. Again, the second-language-learning context is where the true nature of the situation reveals itself. A teacher of English as a foreign language who lets pass utterances like *bread the is on table the* on the grounds that there really isn't any such thing as grammaticality except to petty linguistic tyrants deserves not to be commended for generosity of spirit (however much (s)he might be moved by just that) but to be condemned for dereliction of duty.

The second part of my reply is that generations of linguists have been confused about what is really at issue in regard to the difference between descriptive (so called) and prescriptive orientations. What we really disapprove of – rightly, I might add – is not prescriptivism per se but a kind of linguistic chauvinism according to which the label *correct* is taken to apply only to the patterns found in a certain dialect or cluster of dialects to which, for whatever reason, prestige has been accorded by the surrounding society. What distinguishes the scientific analyst of language from the chauvinist is not that the former eschews prescriptivism and the latter embraces it. The difference, rather, has to do with what we choose to be prescriptive about and why.

I want to conclude this part of the discussion by pointing out that the idea of linguistic rules as requirements or prohibitions does not fit well with the idea of something widely taken for granted by linguists, namely that of optional or variable

rules. The difficulty here is, I think, largely terminological, though there may be a bit more at stake.

What exactly does it mean to say, e.g., that NP-preposing is optional in English? This turns out to be not an easy question to answer. In practice, it seems to mean something like this: there is a formula which describes an imagined process by which a non-initial NP in a sentence moves from its underlying position to one somewhere to the left arbitrarily far from the point of origin. Notice that it doesn't make much sense to say that this *process* (or any other) is optional. Rather, what is meant by 'NP-preposing is optional' seems to be something like 'a noninitial NP may, but need not, undergo the process of NP-preposing'. But then one is entitled to ask in what sense this is a rule. It certainly isn't a rule in the requirement/prohibition sense. So does that mean that the idea of rules as requirements or prohibitions is too narrow?

The answer is 'no', because what the idea of NP-preposing coupled with the attribution of optionality to subjecting an NP to it is trying to capture is something that can be captured equally well without any reference to a process at all. Essentially, what's needed is a statement which, roughly put, requires that (in English) an NP serving as non-Subject argument (or part of such an argument) of a predicate δ may occur to the left of δ only if it also precedes the Subject of δ. (That non-Subject arguments of δ are also allowed to occur to the right of δ need not be explicitly stated: as long as nothing is said to prohibit it, this possibility is automatically provided for.) Given, then, e.g., *I like beans* and *beans I like*, the fact that *beans* (qua D.O. of *like*) may occupy either of two surface positions is accounted for without reference to movement processes by a combination of a requirement that occurrence in pre-predicate position is possible only under a certain set of conditions (equivalently, prohibited when those conditions do not obtain) and the lack of any prohibition on occurrence in post-predicate position. (Other conditions, one of which will be discussed in Section 8, put some restrictions on where a non-Subject argument to the right of a predicate may occur.)

In regard to so-called variable rules, I'll say only that what has just been said about optional rules applies equally to them. But there is a bit more to the story, since variable rule analysis is primarily interested not in specifying the variants accounted for by a given rule but with the degree of preference for each variant based on a combination of internal structural and external factors (e.g., topic, audience, and so on). Again, there is nothing in the rule-as-requirement/prohibition which gets in the way. For example, one need not suppose that there's a process of copula deletion to give the zero variant a preference ranking for each context in which it occurs.

8. Etiological analysis: Further discussion

I turn now, to a more detailed discussion of etiological analysis of contranormative objects. I here essentially re-present the content of Kac 1987 and 1992 (especially Chapter 3), though in what I hope is a more accessible (if, *ipso facto*, less rigorous) form.

We begin with the idea of *etiological properties* (henceforth e.p.'s). Such a property is one whose possession by a relevant object suffices to make said object ill-formed. In a system in which there are multiple norms there are multiple e.p.'s, and well-formedness of an object amounts to the nonposession of any e.p.

In syntax, the idea of e.p.'s – plural – is implicit in such commonplace statements as, e.g., that the verb of a given ungrammatical string fails to agree with its Subject, that the Object of the verb is in the wrong case, or that the determiner is on the wrong side of the noun. Such informal talk masks certain subtleties but reflects a view of grammaticality which seems widespread enough to justify taking it as stemming from a widely accepted pre-theoretical intuition.

E.p.'s may be either simple or complex: there are ones which are not decomposable, and ones which are. The latter, in turn, fall into two categories: conjunctive and disjunctive.

A conjunctive e.p. is one whose possession by an ungrammatical string involves the simultaneous possession of two simpler ones, as in

(4) *Her are my friend.

which would be typically said to involve a failure both of Subject-verb agreement and case marking; support for this claim can be given by citing examples which are faulty in one of the two relevant ways but not the other, such as

(5) a. *She are my friend.
b. *Her is my friend.

A disjunctive e.p. is one whose possession by an ungrammatical string is due to the possibility of taking the string as being analyzable in more than one way, each of which entails possession of an e.p. not entailed on any other possible analyses. Example:

(6) *She like him.

I consider two analyses here (there might be more). One takes *like* as in present tense (hence, finite), a choice which entails that the verb is in the form selected by Subjects other than 3.SG ones; we accordingly have to do, in this case, with an agreement failure of the kind exhibited by (5a). The second analysis takes *like* as

tenseless/nonfinite; such verbs don't participate in the agreement system, so the first possibility is eliminated as a candidate; the failure here has to do with the selection of a nonfinite verb in a context where a finite verb is called for (in standard English, at any rate), as in

(7) *She be my friend.

We must also allow for the possibility of one e.p. being a special case of another. For example, the distinct e.p.'s possessed by (5a–b) may each be seen as implying the possession of a more general one. Assuming that English, in contexts of the kind provided by the examples in (5), requires that the Subject of the verb be overtly manifested, both (5a) and (5b) may be seen as alike in failing this requirement, though for different reasons.

An *etiological representation* (e-representation) is a description of the structure of an ungrammatical string possessed of a formal property which represents the e.p. possessed by the string. In the case of (5) we might posit the following:

(8) a. she are …
3.NOM.SG PRES.3.PL
b. her is …
3.ACC.SG PRES.3.SG

as compared to

(9) she is …
3.NOM.SG PRES.3.SG
SUBJ(*is* …)

Critical to the e-representationality of (8a–b) is the absence of the specification of a Subject for the predicate, this being blocked by the person-number mismatch in (8a) and the incorrect case selection in (8b).

All of the foregoing was deliberately selected to be baby-level stuff; things are about to get more interesting (if, perhaps, only in the Chinese sense).

We begin with the observation that e.p.'s and e-representations must relate in a specific way, namely: if possession of the e.p. *p* is a special case of the possession of e.p. *q* then every *p*-representation is also a *q*-representation, where by '*p*- (*q*-)representation' we mean 'e-representation whose association with a string Z is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of *p* (*q*) by *Z*' (analogously for '*q*-representation'). Call this the *parallelism principle*.

In light of the foregoing, ask what e.p. is manifested by examples like

(10) *Which mouse did the cat that ate see a rat?

An answer that one might be (or have once been) tempted to give is that it's in violation of the Complex NP Constraint (or some successor thereto – let 'CNPC' here do duty for the more cumbersome 'island constraint, however formulated, which restricts unbounded movement from complex NP's'). There are two things wrong with this answer.

The first mistake is that the CNPC is a constraint on the well-formedness not of *sentences* but of *derivations* of sentences. So the answer to the question must be modified to go something like this: (10) is ill-formed by virtue of having been derived in such a way as to violate the CNPC. But this can't be right either, since, in the context of the cluster of theoretical frameworks in which the concepts of derivation and movement play an essential role, ungrammatical strings don't *have* derivations, and the whole point of the CNPC is to assure that strings like (10) are underivable. One would accordingly appear to be forced to have to revise the answer further, along the following lines: imagine a pseudo-derivation terminating in (10), well-formed in all respects except in violating the CNPC; one might then fairly suppose that the e.p. possessed by (10) and similar cases can be formally represented by means of pseudo-derivations of the sort just described.

So far, so good. But I said that there are two mistakes in the original answer to the question 'What e.p. is manifested by (10)?' To see the second, note that there is at least one other possibility in regard to this example, namely the possibility of a hypothetical scenario in which there's nothing wrong with the *derivation*, but with the *input* to it. Suppose you started with a structure of the kind sketched below:

(11) $[_{NP}$ the cat $[_{REL}$ … PAST-do eat Δ]] PAST-do see a rat which mouse[13]

The WH-phrase is now in the main clause, and *eat* has (as it's allowed to) a null D.O. This structure, of course, is also inadmissible, since it's incompatible with the subcategorization of *see* by virtue of providing too many potential arguments for it. So the possibility is open of imagining (10) as derived in a way which doesn't involve any inadmissible movement but proceeds from an ill-formed source structure. Bottom line: there are at least two different things that might have gone wrong in the imaginary generation of (10), one involving the derivation and one involving the source thereof. And herein lies a fatal difficulty.

The problem, simply put, is that the foregoing account violates the parallelism principle. Designate by *d* and *s* the properties ostensibly represented respectively by, on the one hand, a CNPC-violating pseudo-derivation from a well-formed source,

13. The order of NP's after *see* may be reversed without affecting anything crucial.

and, on the other hand, a well-formed derivation from the ill-formed source (11).[14] Implicit in the foregoing account is that *d* is a special case of *s*, since having *d* suffices for also having *s*: an NP improperly moved from within a complex NP can be relocated to a main-clause position in a source structure and that (ill-formed) structure taken as the starting point for a (well-formed) derivation. But a *d*-representation (a pseudo-derivation from a well-formed source) is clearly not also an *s*-representation (a well-formed derivation from an ill-formed source).

Now, what is to be made of this depends on your point of view. If you don't care about etiological analysis, you can simply shrug your shoulders and walk away; you might even take the foregoing as a demonstration that etiological analysis of linguistic ill-formedness is impossible. And you might be right: my own doubts notwithstanding, if it turns out that the idea of derivations involving unbounded movement operations is essential to grammatical theory, then you would naturally be led to conclude that there's something fatally wrong with the idea of a grammar as not only partioning a stringset into grammatical and ungrammatical but enabling cases of ungrammaticality to be 'diagnosed' in the manner I've sketched here.

But, of course, there's an alternative, namely to reject the associated conception of a grammar and try something else. For example, imagine a maximally 'surfacy' syntax which includes rules for associating arguments with predicates and identifying the relation borne by each of the former to each of the latter.[15] The process of assessing a string *Z* over the vocabulary of the chosen language consists of trying to build a structural description of *Z* in such a way as to not violate any rules. At each step in the process the result is submitted to an imagined impartial referee who judges (a) consistency with the rules of the action taken, and (b) whether further actions are needed. A point is eventually reached at which one of two results occurs: a representation consistent with all rules has been obtained or an impasse is reached: the representation in its present state is not yet consistent with all the rules but cannot be added to or otherwise changed in such a way as to bring it in compliance with as yet unsatisfied requirements. In the latter eventuality Z is

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14. *s* could be more precisely described as the property of exceeding within a clause the number of argument places of the predicate of that clause ('overloading' in the terminology of Kac 1978: 34, 'overcrowding' in that of Cattell 1976 – the latter converging in an interesting way on the relevant portion of Kac 1978 while proceeding from a different starting point – and 'functional deviance' of a particular type per Brame 1978, Chapter 2). I know of no way of describing *d* beyond what has already been said, except to say that *d* is clearly distinct from *s*.

15. One proposal about how to do this is advanced in Kac 1978 and refined in Part II of Kac 1992. The essential idea is much like the one underlying LFG, except that there's no place for empty elements marking presumptive gaps; the execution of the specifics is also quite different, owing in part to not being driven by concerns with a computational implementation.

deemed ungrammatical and the unfinished representation is ascribed the status of an e-representation. Consider what we might do with (10), repeated below and analyzed categorially as shown:[16]

[$_{NP}$ which mouse]	did	[$_{NP}$	[$_{NP}$ the cat]	[$_{REL}$ that ate]]	see	[$_{NP}$ a rat]
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To count as well-formed this example, so analyzed, must satisfy the following conditions:

i. Each NP (1, 3, 4, or 7 in our example) must be an argument of 5 or 6 (Law of Correspondence).
ii. No two NP's may bear the same relation to a given predicate (Law of Uniqueness).[17]
iii. Each predicate (5 or 6) must have an argument in the relation Subject (Law of Association).
iv. Each predicate is dyadic (lexical properties of 5 and 6).[18]
v. Complex NP's are islands wrt predicate-argument relations.[19]

Independent motivation for (v) can be found in the fact that in, e.g.,

(12) a. The cat ate and saw a rat.
b. The cat that ate saw a rat.

a rat can (though it need not) be taken as the D.O. of both verbs in (12a) but not in (12b).

It should be easy enough to see that it is not possible for (10) to simultaneously satisfy all of (i)–(v): if (iii)–(v) are all satisfied, then 1, 3 and 7 must all be construed with the main verb, 6; whichever one is chosen to be the Subject, the only relational role assignable to either of the others is D.O. of 6; but assigning this role to both is blocked by (ii), and leaving either unanalyzed is blocked by (i). It is this situation – deployment of elements in such a way as to make it impossible to satisfy (i) and

16. What follows is not developed in full rigor but should convey the essence of what's involved.

17. The Laws of Correspondence and Uniqueness both have certain escape hatches none of which are afforded by this example.

18. Take this to entail that non-Subject arguments of each are in the relation D.O. to it and not I.O., and as not requiring that the D.O. place be filled, leaving to the semantics determination of all information associated with an unfilled argument place.

19. This is one of the conditions referred to in Section 7 constraining where non-Subject arguments to the right of a predicate may occur.

(ii) together if all other constraints are satisfied – that is symptomatic of the e.p. of overloading. (10) is, in other words, ill-formed for exactly the same reason as

(13) *Which mouse did the cat see a rat?

which contains no complex NP. There is no conflict with the parallelism principle, since we have just the one kind of structural representation (the notions of movement, hence of derivations involving movement, having been banished).

9. Should we love traditional grammar?

I spoke earlier, in admittedly somewhat overwrought language, about embracing the traditional view of grammatical rules as requirements/prohibitions. I want to conclude with a brief indication of why this might be desirable. To begin with, it should be clear that in some respects it makes life easier (though perhaps harder in others). For example, consider again the case of free word order, which, from the point of view advocated here, presents the syntactician with the ideal situation: one in which nothing need be said, since no possibilities are excluded.

Another reason is implicit in what has already been said about normative domains in general: if language use is among these, and if other such domains are uncontroversially talked about in similar ways, then there is no need to extend the traditional sense of *rule* to cover uses peculiar to a particular subject. Another way of making the same point is that while it cannot be denied that language is in many ways a sui-generis phenomenon, insofar as its use is norm-bound it is, to that extent, less of one: at a high enough level of abstraction the task of describing the grammar of a language becomes no different in kind than that of describing any of myriad other normative domains. Readers interested in pursuing this point further are referred to Kac 1994.

In closing I would like to reiterate a rationale I suggest elsewhere (Kac 1992: 1f.) for thinking that linguistics – syntactic theory, in particular – might profit from undertaking a project which amounts to securing the foundations of traditional grammar. Said rationale is that despite its limitations, which I freely acknowledge, traditional grammar nonetheless has the virtue of informing virtually everything that grammarians do despite differences in theoretical persuasion, thereby amounting to something like a Kuhnian paradigm. So if it's too vague, make it more precise; if it's insufficiently broad or deep in its coverage, broaden and deepen it; and if it's needlessly prescriptive, just throw away the prescriptive orientation (subject to the qualifications entered in Section 7). In the space of a short discussion such as this it's possible only to drop hints as what the results might look like, but a more detailed picture is readily available in work cited above.

10. Summary and conclusion

This chapter has sought to explore some of the consequences of taking language – grammar, in particular – as a normative domain, i.e. one in which the allied notions of requirement/obligation, permission or prohibition and correctness are in play. Insofar as rules of grammar, as traditionally conceived (e.g., the DET-N rule), amount to canons of correctness in the domain of language use, they are accordingly normative in nature. This in turn has consequences for our conception of the relationship between the notions of rule and constraint; broad- vs. narrow-scope rules; and ascription of different kinds of ill-formedness to ungrammatical examples. Some attention has also been given to the critique of grammaticality-based and intuition-grounded linguistic practice advanced by Sampson and Babarczy (2013), and motivation is offered for a more cordial attitude toward traditional grammar than is customary among linguists.

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Appendix

A referee raises the question of how locality fits into the conception of grammatical rules offered here. That the issue arises is largely an artifact of the presentation, specifically my reliance on the DET-N rule as a paradigm case in point, from which one might draw the conclusion (unintended!) that grammaticality can be reduced to satisfaction of a series of local constraints.[20]

As a preliminary to my response I need to point out that there are two distinct questions here. One is whether there are constraints on the well-formedness of subsentential expressions, to which I would give a positive answer. That, indeed, is in effect what the DET-N rule is, a point which the informality of the presentation might obscure. A more (if not necessarily fully) rigorous formulation of the rule would say something like this: within an NP consisting of a DET and an N, the former must precede the latter.[21] For reasons to be discussed presently, there must also be a principle which requires (with, perhaps, certain qualifications) that every DET occur in an NP which also contains an N (and perhaps nothing else).

The second question is whether the grammaticality of entire sentences is reducible to well-formedness of individual expressions such as NP's, to which the answer is negative: in, e.g. a language which does not allow verb-initial order, a string analyzable as having the structure $[_{VP}$ V …]-NP would be inadmissible even if the two component expressions are individually

20. As an example of a system in which this is not the case the referee offers the formal language MIX, the set of strings over {*a, b, c*} consisting just of those in which, for every $n \geq 1$, there are exactly *n* occurrences of each element of the vocabulary, in which grammaticality can be ascertained only by consideration of the sentence as wholes – there are no cases in which ungrammaticality of a string can be ascribed to the presence in the string of an ill-formed substring.

21. A language in which this rule does not hold is Swedish, in which, within NP's of the kind in question, either order is possible, though with different semantic consequences (compare *ett hus* 'a house', *huset* 'the house').

impeccable. I take English to at least approximate such a language, insofar as sentence-initial indicative non-auxiliary verbs are disfavored (see (14b) below).[22] Consider now how what's just been said would apply to the following:

(14) a. *Dog the barked.
b. *Barked the dog.

We can reasonably diagnose the ungrammaticality of (14a) as follows: *the* must be in an NP which also contains an N, and must, within that NP, precede the N in question; but, since there is no following N, there is no way to satisfy the first condition. In the case of (14b) the situation is different: the word order allows the conditions which derail (14a) to be satisfied, but the prohibition on sentence-initial V's is breached. On the other hand, if we combine *the, dog* and *barked* in that order, we obtain a structure which successfully runs the gauntlet of relevant rules – exactly as desired.

A further example may prove instructive:

(15) My neighborhood bakery makes bread the taste and texture of which I like.

about which one might reasonably ask why the presence of the underlined sequence doesn't render it ungrammatical, on the same grounds as (14a). The answer is that there's an N directly following the determiner, namely *taste* (or, better, *taste and texture*), and that makes it possible to satisfy all relevant constraints.[23]

22. That we aren't dealing with a blanket prohibition is apparent from examples like *Love you, babe, Hate to be a spoilsport, but …, Cuts no ice with me*.

23. The referee also raises the issue of how the view for which I've argued here relates to the question of whether language is to be viewed as a cognitive system or an abstract object. I will content myself with the briefest of answers here: language is an abstract object and the *language faculty* – that is, the ability to make appropriate use of this object – is a cognitive system. For details I refer the reader to Katz 1981 and to Kac 1994, with the remark regarding the former that it presents, without citation or other acknowledgment, a number of key ideas for which Itkonen (see especially Itkonen 1978) can justifiably claim priority.

The normative basis of construal

Tapani Möttönen

Normative and cognitive-linguistic accounts of linguistic meaning are often portrayed and conceived as mutually exclusive alternatives. This dichotomy stems from an insufficient understanding of what the phenomenological accessibility of meaning and usage-basedness of language entail. Namely, the theoretical premises of Cognitive Linguistics actually presuppose socially grounded, normative linguistic meanings. The question remains, what kind of entities normative meanings are like. The present chapter makes a case for construal, linguistic perspective-taking usually analyzed as a conceptual phenomenon, as a normative facet of meaning. Analysis presented here suggests that construal emerges as an inherent property of linguistic expressions via conventionalization of intentionality. This analysis does not only expand the area of linguistic normativity but also points to the integral relation between linguistic norms and intentionality.

Keywords: construal, intentionality, intersubjectivity, Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Grammar, phenomenology, semantics, pragmatics, norms, normativity

1. Introduction

It is logically necessary that if language and linguistic expressions are socio-normative entities, linguistic meanings need to be socio-normative as well. A linguistic expression or a rule that governs its formation involves, by definition, both a vehicle and semantic content the vehicle stands for. Hence, a language user's knowledge that pertains to only one of these two relata is insufficient for communication. Conversely, learning language by being exposed to its use, and learning language *as* correct use for various expressions, involves learning meanings as an integral part of each expression. Thus, whether a linguistic meaning is defined as the correct use of an expression or as the usage-based representation that the expression stands for, meaning has a clear normative basis.

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This socio-normative conception of linguistic meaning is not only intuitively graspable but also directly relevant to a theoretical justification of any comprehensive linguistic theory, as has been demonstrated by Itkonen (1978, 1997, 2003, 2008b, this volume). In contrast, it is not immediately clear what the practical implications of normativity for semantic description are. That is, does a socio-normative ontological stance bear on how meanings are analyzed or call into question semantic description based on a different ontological commitment?

The goal of this chapter is to outline some fundamental implications that a normative conception of linguistic meaning has for semantic analysis. In particular, these implications are laid out vis-à-vis the notion of construal, i.e., non-objective meaning analyzed as various types of semantic perspective-taking. In Cognitive Linguistics (e.g., Croft & Cruse 2004; Langacker 1987, 2008; Verhagen 2005, 2007), construal has been defined or described primarily as a mental phenomenon: It refers to the semantic features of an expression that cannot derive from the referent and thus need to be in some sense conceptual.[1] Thus defined, construal would seem inherently incompatible with a socio-normative notion of meaning. Following Itkonen (1997), however, the present chapter demonstrates that construal phenomena are, in fact, normatively grounded and commonly known properties of expressions. This argument is justified logically and by demonstrating the context-sensitive character of various "dimensions" of construal (Langacker 2008: 55–89).

In Cognitive Grammar (henceforth CG), the treatment of construal has had a substantial semantic (*pro* pragmatic) emphasis. CG is a self-proclaimed usage-based theory in that it rightly presumes the semantic and other linguistic units to be acquired in interaction (e.g., Langacker 1988, 2008: 220) until recently, however, CG's primary interest has been the units themselves rather than their use (cf. Langacker 2016a, 2016b). Construal can nonetheless be said to consist of a semantic and pragmatic component. On the one hand, expressions such as *I am going to the office* and *I am coming to the office* incorporate different perspectives on commute that are based on the conventional semantics of the predicate verbs. On the other hand, these expressions can serve as either consecutive reformulations or paradigmatic alternative descriptions of the objectively same situation. Conventional (semantic) perspectives thus make contextual (pragmatic) adjustment of perspective possible.

In what follows, it will be argued that both facets of construal, conventional perspectivity and contextual adjustment of perspective, are irreducibly social phenomena. Conventional meanings exist primarily as normative entities, whereas

1. Reference, in turn, is discussed in relation to different referent-types, e.g., virtual and actual entities. (Langacker 2008: 269–272). Even these types, however, are explicated with regard to different mental domains, where the referents are represented by conceptual entities.

their use in interaction is necessarily grounded in the context shared by both/all interlocutors, making the perspectival adjustment an intersubjective (for an extensive treatment of this issue, see Möttönen 2016a), rather than subjective, activity. While construing in interaction may fail in many ways, construal nonetheless relies on commonly known meanings and a shared context according to which construal is applied to establish reference to the intended designatum. This dependence and its very practical manifestations in discourse make one substantial corollary for the socio-normative approach to meaning. At the same time, this claim has important points of convergence with the so-called social turn in cognitive linguistics, whereby cognitive linguistics has started to show growing interest toward the social foundations and use of language (e.g., Geeraerts 2016; Langacker 2016b). Most importantly, social and cognitive approaches to construal are compatible, but such synthesis requires closer analysis of normativity and its manifestation in discourse.

The remainder of this chapter is organized into three sections, where I consider the theoretical foundations CG's theoretical foundations, definition of construal, and the applicability of construal to the analysis of written discourse respectively.

2. Cognitive and socio-normative approaches to meaning: Bridging the gap

Any potentially fruitful bridging of social and cognitive realms must start with a correct understanding of the mutual dependence of the two categories. Social phenomena consist of activities by multiple intentional subjects, whereas the contents and properties of cognition, to a significant extent, are internalizations of overt social phenomena. This bi-directional dependence is particularly relevant for language. While a cognitive subject, at least in some sense, may exist in the absence of social relations, this is certainly not the case for normal language competence.

Fortunately, the tenet of mutual dependence between language use and internalized linguistic units has been accepted equally among both cognitive linguists and proponents of the socio-normative conception of meaning. In particular, CG has supported a usage-based conception of language and language acquisition (e.g., Langacker 1987: 46–47). Moreover, one recent development within cognitive linguistic research has been an increasing interest toward the social dimensions of language. This development is marked both by extending cognitive linguistic study to areas of discourse (e.g., Jaakola et al. 2014; Etelämäki & Visapää 2014; Langacker 2012, 2016a) and socio-linguistics (e.g., Harder 2010) as well as emerging discussion on the theoretical presuppositions that underlie the paradigm (Zlatev 2010, 2016; Schmid 2016; Geeraerts 2016). Thus, Cognitive Linguistics is certainly not insular or narrow-scoped in that it would deny the social foundation of language

or undervalue the integral relationship between grammar and discourse. If, however, cognitive linguistics builds on a social premise (usage) and there is even a "social turn" (Geeraerts 2016; Langacker 2016b; Zlatev 2016) taking place or already happened in cognitive linguistics, why would a particular discussion on normativity be needed?

The answer, in brief, is that normativity qua specific type of sociality does challenge the way in which a usage-based conception of language has been interpreted within Cognitive Linguistics and how this conception is evoked in justification for the recent social turn. Concretely, in this section, I will argue that a usage-based conception itself presumes the *primary* ontological status of linguistic meanings as normative entities. Normative meanings and their internalizations co-exist, but the former define the latter whereas the opposite does not hold true (see Itkonen, this volume). The process of having a meaning presupposes spatiotemporal continuity from one occurrence (of a particular expression) to another, which is lacking in cognitive events but is present in social norms. This stems from the fact that the content of norms is constituted by overt normative behavior, which in turn remains unchanged by any idiosyncrasies of conceptions individuals may have of norms. Finally, this ontological hierarchy has practical consequences for applying cognitive linguistic methodology to discourse, especially when we aim to describe the function of semantic units and their specific characteristics as a part of communication.

2.1 Usage-based grammar: Social and cognitive facets of language

There is a cognitive basis for any intentional human behavior. It is thus trivially true that any piece of linguistic communication has a mental correlate: act of intending a meaning, understanding, not understanding etc. Moreover, these correlates are likely to involve or derive from routines of cognitive activity that are internalizations from innumerable preceding encounters. Within a usage-based theory of language, then, it seems reasonable to describe language as a bi-directional flow between overt linguistic behavior and covert internalizations of prominent patterns therein (for a similar approach in the broader context of intersubjectivity, see de Bruin & De Haan 2012: 244–246; Zlatev 2007b).

CG adopts such a bi-directional process not only as one of the key theoretical premises but also as a way to describe (natural) linguistic categorization of units and semantic relations between distinct units (e.g., Langacker 1987: 70–71, 133; 2008: 168). Moreover, CG systematically emphasizes a dynamic view of cognition, where the cognitive correlate of linguistic activity is active itself, i.e., dynamic and adaptable (Langacker 2008: 29–31; see Section 2.2 below). Instead of static internal structures, meaning and other facets of language are associated with ongoing

processing activity and general cognitive principles (e.g., Langacker 2008: 8), relative to which a natural language as a symbolic system is described.

It is thus the bi-directional process of internalization and activation, wherein general cognitive operating principles come to determine some of the chief characteristics of semantic units. This sanctions the definition of linguistic meaning as conceptualization (Langacker 2008: 30), i.e., the occurrence of conceptual meaning as a dynamic process. Conceptualization itself is defined from a non-modular or weakly modular conception of cognition (Langacker 2008: 39–40) where language does not involve characteristics that would simultaneously be central and exclusive to it. Consequently, the internalization and activation of linguistic units may and must be describable in terms of global cognitive features that are also present in, *inter alia,* spatio-visual perception (Langacker 1987: 104–109) the temporal integration of experience (Langacker 2008: 108–112), and so forth.

Finally, CG assumes a double perspective vis-à-vis linguistic description (as well as the very formulation of descriptive concepts). Descriptive procedure should combine the analyst's phenomenological first-person grasp of meaning with constraints provided by cognitive psychology (Langacker 2008: 31). In practice, this means that experiential constants, detected in meaning via a phenomenological analysis, are grounded in general extra-linguistic operating principles (Langacker 1987: 13).

A usage-based cognitive grammar is attractive in that it does derive from necessary truths about linguistic meaning as an experience and an empirical phenomenon. The symbolic or signitive function of language does not exist in the absence of a symbolizing or signifying subject, and it is only sensible to aim to disclose cognitive phenomena that feature prominently in linguistic meaning. Similarly, from a methodological point of view, it is indisputable that linguistic analysis is dependent on conscious reflection, in that no pattern of meaning, grammatical structure or interaction is analyzable in the absence of the analyst's pre-theoretical understanding of their function (Itkonen 2008a; Zlatev 2008a). Hence, a hybrid methodology combining first-person analysis and theoretical constrictions is well founded.

The recent interest in Cognitive Linguistics with its theoretical foundation has brought about discussion on the usage-based character of the theories under the "cognitive" label. In a special issue of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* on the historical roots and future developments of the paradigm, Langacker underlines the inherent social character of CG that stems from the essential role attributed to usage (Langacker 2016a: 467–468; see also Langacker 2008: 24). The viewpoint is stated in a context of discussion on the repeated criticisms against the allegedly solipsistic character of CG. The criticism is refuted based on the fact that usage qua social interaction is taken to define linguistic units: as interaction is "inherent to linguistic units" (Langacker 2016a: 467) and "units of language are both cognitive

and social" (2016a: 469). Focusing on the conceptual grounding of grammar and meaning in CG is thus a matter of perspectival choice rather than neglect of the social grounding of language.

In and of itself, the dual ontology of language is indisputable, and from a practical point of view, it is certainly valid to restrict the theoretical focus to either the social or the cognitive facet of language. Moreover, CG has proven a viable theory vis-à-vis its descriptive power and applicability to a diverse array of languages, structures and, as of late, different discourse genres too (e.g., Jaakola et al. 2014; Möttönen 2016a), which all testify to a well-justified choice of perspective.

This success does not immunize CG against ontological or methodological criticisms, however. Most importantly, the two-perspective methodology of CG (processing and phenomenological) seems to lead to the over-extension of cognition, so that it includes objects of analysis that are, in fact, social by their ontology. I argue that this confusion can be alleviated by the systematic inclusion of normativity in the theory, which is also justified by the theoretical premises of CG as a usage-based theory of language.

2.2 Cognitive grammar, meaning, and normativity

While CG claims that meanings are simultaneously social and cognitive (Langacker 2016b: 469), there is no confusion about which one of these two realms is found more central: "Where are meanings to be found? From a cognitive linguistic perspective the answer is evident: meanings are in the minds of the speakers […]" (Langacker 2008: 27). In an effort to locate CG relative to the social-cognitive axis, Langacker rejects Platonism, "objectivism" (truth-condition-based semantics) as well as solipsism. In contrast, Langacker finds affinity between CG and the "interactive alternative", whereby "meanings are seen as emerging dynamically in discourse and social interaction […] negotiated by the interlocutors" (ibid.), and continues:

> In and of itself, the interactive alternative is certainly correct. It is not however an alternative – its ideas are in fact adopted as basic tenets of cognitive semantics. Though common, the portrayal of cognitive semantics as being static and insular is simply wrong. Conversely, a revealing account of communicative interaction needs to acknowledge and characterize the conceptualizations employed in discourse. The cognitive and interactive approaches are therefore quite compatible […].
>
> (Langacker 2008: 28)

In other words, CG and an interactive approach are compatible in that CG presents a dynamic notion of cognition (or conceptualization, cf. discussion above) capable of accounting for meanings emerging in interaction. Yet what remains is that a "single speaker grasps an expression's meaning" (Langacker 2008: 29), and

meaning itself is "conceptualization" which is "broadly defined to encompass any facet of mental experience" (2008: 30). While the former assertion is certainly true, I argue that the latter one is inconsistent both with other parts of the theory as well as with the methodology CG applies in semantic description.

One of the recurring features of CG is its emphasis on conventionalization (societal level) and entrenchment (individual level) of linguistic structures into units of language (Langacker 2008: 21, n. 13). By these partially analogous processes, a reoccurring element of language (e.g., lexeme or syntactic construction) develops into a standard relative to which new occurrences are compared, recognized, and categorized, inter alia for their extent of grammaticality. Here, CG essentially describes the necessary function of the speech community and its overt practices of sanctioning correct expressions and providing continuity that makes novel expressions and interactions sensible. For an individual, understanding an expression presupposes its recognition as an instance of a particular type. This recognition, in turn, presupposes categorization based on multiple previous uses of the expression. These uses, however, serve as a basis for the internalization of the expression only inasmuch as they are constant vis-à-vis the form of the expression form and semantic content.

Whereas the interactive perspective outlined above suggests dynamism, conventionality suggests stability of meaning by social grounding of linguistic units. In and of themselves, these two perspectives do not contradict; rather, they presuppose each other, in that the emergence of novel meanings is describable as a synthesis between conventional semantic units and the context of their occurrence also on a conceptual level (e.g., Langacker 2008: 249–251). I argue, however, that conventionality bears implications that are underspecified by CG: conventional meanings are not *primarily* dynamic conceptualizations, and the phenomenological analysis of meaning does not pertain to analysis of conceptualization but instead it focuses on the analyst's intuitive grasp of socially sanctioned, or normative, linguistic meanings.[2]

As noted, expressions become linguistic units inasmuch as they become conventional at the speech community level (e.g., Langacker 2008: 21, 38). An individual's capability to communicate, in turn, hinges on her capability to internalize conventional units, so they may serve as a standard for recognizing and producing novel utterances. As units are typically pairings of meaning and form, learning a language is also learning meanings that reoccur as conventions in the speech community. It follows that for meanings to be internalized certain criteria need to be fulfilled. First, convention, by definition, exists prior to an individual's recognition of

2. Zlatev and Blomberg (this volume) make the same case from the perspective of generative phenomenology.

it as a recurrent regularity: there is a tradition of using an expression in a particular way. Second, the meaning of the expression is explicit in the use of the expression: the expression becomes sensible by understanding its intended meaning, based on context, prior experiences, other activities by the interlocutors etc.

What follows from these criteria is that the individual's grasp of linguistic meanings is derivative from, and subordinate to, meanings as social entities. Most importantly, the individual's understanding about meaning is not primarily a conceptualization in a psychological sense but the ability to correctly abstract (and reapply) semantic information based on the actual use of an expression. Consequently, phenomenological analysis of meaning is based on intuition, by which the analyst grasps semantic contents as shared by the speakers of the language in question. This intuition is a subjective moment and thus, by definition, fallible. What defines a meaning, however, is not the intuition but the use of the given expression. The intuition is about the constant semantic import of an expression from one usage-event to another (for a similar argument, see Schmid 2016: 546).

This constancy, in turn, presupposes normativity. Linguistic norms and the implications of normativity have been discussed thoroughly in other chapters of this book and elsewhere (e.g., Lewis 1969; Itkonen 1978, 1997, 2008b; Wedgwood 2007). Here I summarize only some key features of a normative concept of meaning that are particularly relevant for the discussion. The essential point of departure is that normativity is logically presupposed by the usage-based character of CG and, to a significant extent, concomitant with the notion of conventionality.

It can be argued that norms are rules of correctness inherent to (in a broad sense) intentional human activities that are characterized by an 'ought to' character. Normative behavior is supported by knowledge and knowhow distributed more or less symmetrically in the society. This symmetry is ideal in the sense that an indefinite amount of micro-variation and overlapping sub-societies with distinctive patterns of behavior exist in almost any society of considerable size. At the same time, a sufficient amount of symmetry of knowledge and knowhow is presupposed by successful interaction between multiple subjects, whenever strictly corporeal activities are excluded: this interaction can mean anything from queuing to feasible behavior in a multinational corporation. The common denominator between various types of normative behavior is that the norm itself remains unchanged by an individual's specific understanding of it: should I fail to grasp the norm in an idiosyncratic form and behave accordingly, I would violate, not alter, the norm (Itkonen 2003: 21; Haukioja 2000: 7–8).

Norms can be argued to be inherent to behavior in that uninterrupted normative actions do not present themselves as explicit knowledge: rather, they are characterized exactly by the absence of metacognitive awareness (see Haukioja 2000: 12). In contrast, norms become explicit when being violated, e.g., when

person A verbally instructs person B who stands on the wrong side of an escalator. What usually still remains implicit, however, is the knowledge against which a violation of norm is detected. As demonstrated by Lewis (1969) and Itkonen (e.g., 1997, 2008b), this kind of *common knowledge* is nonetheless necessary, as it provides a norm with its intersubjective validity. Common knowledge can be explicated in the following three-level form (Lewis 1969: 76; Itkonen 1978: 123; 1997: 55):

A knows x,
A knows that B knows x.
A knows that B knows that A knows x.

This three-level structure is presupposed by norms, in that they bind all members of a society. In particular, to function as an instrument of interpersonal coordination, norms presuppose the third, reflective level, by which I, being "A", may rely on you as adjusting your behavior according to my ability to behave correctly.

Conventionality, to which CG makes continuous reference as the defining property of linguistic units (e.g., Langacker 2008: 38), is clearly a close synonym of normativity on this general level of discussion. Convention, by definition, refers to constitution of an instance-transcending structure or property *at a social level* (Langacker 2008: 459). Convention, as internalized, is then describable as the speaker's knowledge, according to which linguistic units are recognized (ibid. 38). Here, conventionality of language is set apart from regularities or tendencies of behavior. If speakers' knowledge simply pertained to a generalization ("this is what usually happens"), it would not justify use for an expression with the expectation that the expression conveys the intended meaning.

Thus, as conventionality is essentially concomitant with normativity and norms presuppose three-level knowledge that supports them, it follows that also conventional meanings in a usage-based grammar are objects of three-level common knowledge. In other words, CG implies normative meanings, explicable as a symbolic relation between x and y:

A knows that B knows that A knows that x means y.

What this formulation entails is that A, a member of a speech community, has grasped a norm, or convention, as an entity that holds equally for all other community members.

As emphasized above, meaning is not the same as an individual's knowledge about the meaning. Accordingly, the formulation above is primarily of knowledge, which incorporates meaning, the symbolic relation *x means y*, as its object. The symbolic relation itself, I argue, exists primarily as a norm inherent to the way in which x is used for instances of y in actual discourse, but is obviously also a part

of internalized information itself: *x means y* thus exists simultaneously as a part of practice and as an internalized symbolical relation.

A contradiction seems to arise when we try to extend the formulation to cover more complicated symbolic relations, as in CG, where grammar and lexicon are described in uniform manner with often complex semantic motivation. Is it realistic to assume that nuanced facets of meaning, such as various construal phenomena, would exist as objects of common knowledge? If not, is it more realistic to analyze normative meaning and construal as distinct phenomena of different ontological statuses, so that the latter defines individual mental experience, whereby the individual grasps the meaning?

In the present perspective, however, construal needs to be analyzed as a part of an expression's normative meaning. If this were not the case, construal would not constitute a relevant facet of meaning in the first place: for instance, as a facet of implicit language processing, construal cannot ground meaning as the same semantic value can be processed in innumerable different ways (Itkonen 1997; Haukioja 2000: 5; Möttönen 2016a: 3.2.1). Similarly, the comprehensive analysis of various types of construal that CG has developed supports the view that construal is integral to the meaning of practically any expression. If this is the case, construal is also part of expressions as shared in a speech community.

The challenge is thus epistemological both in an analytic/linguistic as well as in a natural sense: how do we get to know, understand and intend meanings that are perspectival by nature? In the following section, I will argue for an answer, which is based on reassessing what is meant by phenomenological analysis of meaning.

3. Construal re-interpreted

Langacker (2008: 55–89) describes, rather than defines, construal as properties of linguistic meaning that are based on how the language user conceptualizes the referent or state of affairs that the expression is about. For instance, the same referent can be denoted as either *tool, hammer* or *claw hammer* (ibid. 56). When these expressions are used as synonyms, they, by definition, cannot be distinguished by any objective properties of the referent. It thus follows that their semantic differences must be in some sense perspectival, i.e., related to *how* they portray their shared referent or group of referents.

Accordingly, CG presents construal in opposition to conceptual content. Whereas content pertains to the information about the referent, construal is the manner in which the content is selected and arranged by a given expression (Langacker 2008: 43). Construal thus captures non-objective characteristics of an expression, but these characteristics nevertheless reside in, and stem from, patterns

of an utterer's cognitive activity. In this section, I will summarize some basic features of construal and provide an alternative account of construal that grounds construal in normativity.

3.1 Construal in Cognitive Grammar

CG divides construal into distinct dimensions according to which referentially synonymous yet semantically distinct expressions can be aligned (Langacker 2008: 55–89). For instance, the following tool names can be arranged according to the dimension of specificity (Langacker 2008: 55–57; arrows symbolize increase in specificity):

tool → *hammer* → *claw hammer*

The semantic difference between these expressions is obvious at once in that the definition or description of each concept from left to right increases with regard to the level of detail, e.g., *hammer* is distinguished from other kinds of tools by its primary use for hitting. CG, however, accepts such referential differences only as a starting point of semantic description: the linguistic goal is to describe the internalized conceptual meaning.

It can be argued that a usage-based conception of language entails an experiential cognitive semantics: the entrenched invariables for a linguistic unit are based on the experienced properties of the referent, e.g., the functions and shapes of different kinds of tools such as a claw hammer. The specificity of an expression is thus the function of its use. *Hammer* is used for ball-peen hammers, claw hammers, sledgehammers and all the other types of hammers, so it is analyzable as a schematization of the invariables these different types share. In contrast, the meaning of an expression that evokes a particular hammer type, say, 'claw hammer', can be said to include invariable semantic properties (=p) that are absent in 'hammer'.

'hammer' = p_1, p_2., p_3
'claw hammer' = p_1, p_2., p_3, $p_4 \cdots p_n$

As meanings for CG are primarily cognitive events, semantic properties $p_1 \ldots p_n$ are properties of cognitive events (conceptualizations). The meanings 'hammer' and 'claw hammer' are thus linked as internalized cognitive entities by their sharing in semantic properties and the categorization of claw hammer(s) as a type of hammer(s).

Both sharing of features and categorization are relevant for the dimensions of specificity. First, the idea of construal as "arranging semantic content" is based on the fact that linguistic meanings are learned in experiential contexts where they

come to relate to their referents a particular, perspectivized sense. The semantic properties of 'hammer' are not primarily those of its extramental designata but result from using the noun *hammer* in a particular way – for a particular scope of objects. Conversely, *hammer* is applicable to an extramental designatum inasmuch as its semantic properties are so applicable as well, despite the fact that more or less specific options are available (see Langacker 2008: 267): the expression can thus serve as a means for explicating certain properties of the designatum despite the overall scope of the properties the designatum may possess objectively. In this sense, construal is describable as a type of linguistic non-objectivity: it is a relation between subject and object with characteristics that cannot be reduced to either one of its relata (Langacker 2008: 95; for discussion, see Möttönen 2016a: 5.2).

Second, and resulting from the first point, construal pertains to a type of selection (Langacker 2008: 131; Möttönen 2016b: 223). If a linguistic expression involves non-objective meaning *a priori*, and multiple construals for a same objective referent exist (e.g., in the same conversation), the actualized linguistic expression can be analyzed as a type of linguistic selection among alternative construals. Note that it is *not* suggested here or by CG that selection is based on conscious reflection on the best possible formulations; instead, the "selection" in question can subsume any kind of reactive adjustment of expression vis-à-vis communicative context. Conscious comparison of, and decision-making upon, alternative construals is nonetheless a constantly existing possibility, as it is a prerequisite for semantic analysis. The comparison of 'hammer' and 'claw hammer' as possible alternate construals, for instance, presupposes that the analyst pre-theoretically knows that they can be used for the same referent in multiple contexts.

Accordingly, specificity as well as the other dimensions of construal are theoretical constructs grounded in expressions that can be known pre-theoretically as possible co-referential synonyms: it is the nature of semantic difference between such expressions that yield different dimensions of construal. For instance, the dimension of focusing (Langacker 2008: 57–65) is meant to capture systematic groupings of expressions that evoke the same conceptual content but organize it differently by selecting different elements of the content for explicit mention. Thus, *Tarzan has a girlfriend* and *Jane has a boyfriend* can be said to refer to the same relation but construe it differently relative to the dimension of focusing, which is used to capture the semantic emphasis that correlates to syntactic arrangement of constituents.

The description of construal thus far utilizes only a few concepts that are primarily psychological (it can be argued that none of them is exclusively so). For example, a schema is a psychological notion projected onto language, whereas the specificity of an expression is not dependent on any particular ontological status: a symbolic representation can be more or less specific whether it resides in social interaction, individual psychology or in an operating system of a computer.

At the same time, it seems premature to exclude the conceptualizing subject from the picture altogether. Dimensions of construal are, after all, plausibly explained as deriving from particular, well-attested cognitive abilities (1987: 99–146). For instance, the dimension of focusing is based on the apparent analogy between conceptual and perceptual realms, both of which are characterized by selectiveness of attention (Langacker 2008: 57–65, 85–86). The wide applicability and explanatory potential of the dimension of focusing in language (e.g., Langacker 2008: 167–170), in turn, presents a strong case for the notion and, thus, for its theoretical basis.

It therefore seems that if construal is to be explained coherently as a socio-normative facet of meaning, the explanation should incorporate a conceptualizing subject in a specific manner rather than to posit construal and the subject as strictly separate matters. We turn next to this issue.

3.2 Construal as conventionalized intentionality

A notion of construal as a socio-normative facet of language may strike one as counter-intuitive: how could something related to human perspective reside "outside" of human cognition? The answer suggested here is rooted in CG's own methodology, i.e., phenomenological analysis of meaning. It is argued here that such analysis falls upon conventionalized linguistic intentionality, i.e., conventionalized relations between subjects and symbolically intended objects (referents, states of affairs). With the phenomenological notion of intentionality, I argue, it is possible to relax the tension between normativity and construal. The analysis I propose here is essentially concomitant with Blomberg and Zlatev's (this volume) formulation of the generative phenomenology of norms.

While various accounts of human intentionality exist in philosophical and psychological literature, the most relevant for the present discussion is the notion of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology (Banchetti-Robino 1997; Husserl [1900–1901] 2001a; [1901] 2001b) and its recent applications in philosophy (Drummond 2012; Zahavi 1997, 2003a, 2003b) and Cognitive Linguistics (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014; Möttönen 2016a, 2016b; Zlatev 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2016; Zlatev & Blomberg 2016). Here, I will concentrate on intentionality in conjunction with another phenomenological concept, viz. intersubjectivity.

In current developmental psychology, there is an emerging paradigm, according to which small infants possess substantial pre-linguistic intersubjectivity skills (e.g., Astington 2006; Gallagher & Hutto 2008; de Bruin & de Haan 2012; Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994, 1997; Stern 1971, 1977, 1985; Trevarthen 1979, 1980; Trevarthen & Aitken 2001). Many of these skills embody "direct" forms of intersubjectivity: an ability to detect and tune into the intentions of the caretaker prior to, and independently of, sophisticated forms of mind-reading (e.g., inferring psychological

motives from behavior). This direct apprehension of the other's intentions, in turn, is likely to ground more mediated forms of intersubjectivity, namely, symbolic communication. Zlatev's mimesis hierarchy model (e.g., Zlatev 2007a, 2007b, 2008b, 2016) develops this premise into a full-fledged theory of language acquisition and language evolution.

Drawing from Donald's (1991) study on the cultural evolution of humans, Zlatev (2008b) suggests that human linguistic capability is based on bodily mimesis and largely innate predisposition to intersubjectivity. The mimesis hierarchy, as the name suggests, is a stage model (applicable to both ontogenesis and phylogenesis) where each developmental level is characterized by certain intersubjective and mimetic skills (Zlatev 2008b: 218–221). As mentioned, direct intersubjectivity presupposes explicitness of intentions: infants are equipped from birth with the ability to sense others' intentions directly in their bodily actions, gestures, etc. (Gallagher & Hutto 2008: 20–23). In the primal interactions between the neonatal and caretakers, this capability is manifest in rhythmically organized series of mutual imitation that evolve from simple dyadic mimesis of facial expressions to triadic mimesis with bodily actions directed toward external objects (ibid.; Trevarthen & Aiken 2001). However, the use of bodily mimesis for expressive purposes implies internalization of meaning: inasmuch as children develop into normally functioning cognizant communicators, they also develop explicit understanding of expressions. The gist of the mimesis hierarchy is that direct apprehension of intentions combined with meaning internalization gives rise to symbolically mediated communication.

The concept by which the mimesis hierarchy accounts for meaning internalization is a mimetic schema: a pre-verbal concept internalized through bodily interaction and imitation between subjects (Zlatev 2007a, 2007b). At bare minimum, mimetic schemas are cross-modal intersubjective conceptual mappings (Zlatev 2007b: 131): in imitation, children manifest cross-modal mapping in mirroring others' activities from visual input into proprioceptive and subsequently motor output. A mimetic schema is therefore a concept that associates a cross-modal activity with a certain expressive purpose.

Even this crude summary reveals some substantial implications for the type of meaning mimetic schemas convey. Most importantly, the intersubjective basis of mimetic schemas suggests that their meaning is objective in the sense of being the same for many (Zlatev 2007b: 143). When engaging in cross-modal mapping, seeing and reconstructing an activity by another, a subject establishes a relationship between a communicative intention and expression. This act, however, presupposes the subject's recognition of the other as another subject of the same kind. Thus, when imitating the other, the subject experiences, intends or understands the act as essentially the same as its counterpart both for its overt expression and for the intention it conveys.

Moving from simple mimetic schemas to full-fledged linguistic communication is evidently marked by a substantial increase in complexity, including complex forms of construal. This development, however, is anticipated by the notion of a mimetic schema and inherent to how the experience of the objective world and mind-independent wholes develop. Starting from recognizing other subjects and coordinating simple attentive and motor actions, children develop increasingly complex forms of synthesis of experience and activity with other subjects. By mimetic schemas, children internalize knowledge that pertains to these interactions as intersubjective mappings of intentions and actions. The embodied mimesis in small children, however, already involves meaning substantial enough to motivate linguistic expressions of which motor verbs make a major example (e.g., Zlatev 2005). In so doing, mimetic schemas model symbolic communication of intentions, relative to which full-fledged linguistic communication is marked by the introduction of arbitrariness and systematicity (Zlatev 2008b).

At the same time, mimetic interactions between small children and their caretakers serve to constitute objects and environment same to us and thus independent of one particular cognition (Zahavi 2001: 154–155). These activities are intersubjective in that they involve constant coordination of perspectives between subjects: objects appear as objective inasmuch as they manage to serve as shared objects for my co-subjects and me. This development is accompanied by what phenomenological literature calls "horizontal" intersubjectivity (ibid.): as we establish objects as independent from a particular subjectivity, we analogously establish them independent from a particular perspective from which an object is experienced. As a blunt simplification, if a normally functioning subject A perceives an object *as such* from perspective x, the object is perceivable *as such* by another subject B from perspective y. An arbitrary expressive act thus appears as meaningful, inasmuch as it can systematically be associated with an intentional subject who intends an object from a particular perspective.

This intersubjective account of objectivity and objective wholes allows us to integrate the notion of construal into the mimesis hierarchy. If linguistic meanings are learned analogously to mimetic schemas, i.e., by the imitation of intentional communicative behavior, they are learned exactly as expressions of communicative intentions that are the same to many. Understanding intentionality, in turn, presupposes mind-independent objectivity as duality of objective wholes and perspectival appearances.[3] It is apparent at once that this phenomenological duality is somewhat analogous to the linguistic distinction between the meaning of an expression and reference (Putnam 1973; or "Sinn" and "Bedeutung", Frege [1892] 1949). While

3. Mind-independent objectivity is meant here in an experiential rather than metaphysical sense.

complexities involved in the meaning/reference relation cannot be discussed here, it seems logically justifiable that semantic content is derivative of experiential referents, relative to which the content posits a particular perspectival representation. The synthesis of phenomenological and usage-based approaches to language acquisition thus seems to yield a notion of meaning where conventional meanings are abstractions of intentions directed at extramental entities. Construal as explication of intentionality, in turn, is a coherent notion only inasmuch as speakers are able to understand it in conjunction with objective, mind-independent wholes (for discussion, see Möttönen 2016b).

These basic tenets of phenomenological analysis of meaning are directly relevant for our understanding of construal and normativity: a usage-based grammar entails that linguistic meanings are inherently non-objective, in that (although they often fall upon mind-external referents) they are learned and grasped as types of subject-object relations. Linguistic construal, then, is directly explainable as intentionality manifest in the use of the expression in question.

It is clear that this view of construal as intentionality contradicts any attempt to derive construal from cognitive processing or conceptualizing activity *directly*. In contrast, the view is compatible with the idea that conceptual capabilities are inherent to the way in which expressions are used and learned as explicit intentions in intersubjective encounters – and thus characterize meaning *indirectly.* What this means is that conceptualization needs to be somehow explicit in the way in which expressions convey intentions, which, in turn, suggests a normative nature of construal. In brief, asserting or understanding an expression involves asserting or understanding a conventionalized intention, of which we know or expect that it is commonly known in the manner of three-level knowledge as represented above.[4]

Normativity of construal, however, is distinct from rules that characterize overt behavior. Unlike overt acts, intentions of linguistic expressive acts remain vague in that an expression typically underspecifies the intention and that the intention itself is somewhat uncertain (if it is not one's own). A coherent notion of normativity thus needs to accommodate various degrees of certainty with judgements of correctness (Itkonen 2003: 30–31). More specifically, when we move from clear cases of semantic correctness (e.g., felicitous and infelicitous referents for *cat*) to

4. Moreover, it is not the case that a construal phenomenon should be explainable primarily as a result from conceptualization *qua* type of thinking: for explicit, socially shared meanings, perspectival semantic features also involve perspectival experience. For instance, it would seem odd to claim that the affective meaning of *How lovely!* would be primarily about a particular conceptual character when the particular affect is a salient part of any instance of the expression. Rather, conceptualization would seem to become relevant for theoretical or semantic description when a direct experiential account falls short, which becomes more likely the more complicated patterns of construal we analyze.

construal, we enter an area where direct judgements of correctness are not possible. Rather, infelicitous construal as a poor grasp of an expression's content or as a pragmatic choice vis-à-vis other interlocutors is judged by secondary means, i.e., based on the context or the successfulness of interaction. Construal as conventionalized intentionality needs in any case to exist as an object of common knowledge for successful and unsuccessful interactions alike, if it is to exist as a motivating factor for linguistic selection. Moreover, although construal itself cannot be observed but only intuited, it needs to exist as true representational value of the expression. That is, construal pertains to the way in which a conventional semantic unit portrays an extra-linguistic entity by organizing, selecting and emphasizing features that pertain to this entity.

Thus defined, construal is primarily socio-normative (conventionalized intentionality grounded in intersubjectivity) and secondarily cognitive (supported by individual cognitions and cognitive processes that feature in language use). This view is supported also by the way in which the dimensions of construal function in the establishment of pragmatic meanings in discourse.

4. Alternative construals in context: The role of normative meaning

It has been suggested above that linguistic construal is analyzable as conventionalized intentionality, i.e., the entrenchment of subject-object relations manifest in concrete linguistic acts. The analysis in the previous section makes use of the notion of intersubjectivity as the experiential basis for this explanation. Linguistic communication, on the other hand, marks a leap from direct intersubjectivity to mediated intersubjectivity, where normativity is necessary for arbitrary symbolization to convey meaning. In other words, there has to be socio-normative (or conventional) construal.

This tenet may still seem trivial, in that CG openly accepts and builds from the existence of conventional meanings. However, as the preceding discussion on normativity has demonstrated, there is a tension between normativity and the notion of meaning as conceptualization. In the previous section, I have aimed to demonstrate that the notion of meaning as conventionalized intention may dissolve this tension: construal is learned as a conventional/normative subject-object relation, which is partially and indirectly characterized by conceptualization but explicit in the way in which an expression is used.

This approach, I argue, is justified by the fact that construal can be used to motivate linguistic selection. If construal phenomena were not explicit and commonly known (though in a vague or schematic sense, see Sub-section 3.2 above), they could not be evoked to explain communication as an attempt to convey meaning

as organized from a particular point of view. This negative definition nonetheless gives room for conceptualization in meaning: inasmuch as patterns of conceptualization are, in some sense, understood to be shared within the speech community, they can explain conventional semantic features and patterns of linguistic selection. Construal, in other words, should be analyzable from a functional perspective as an adjustment of expression according to the context.

This section thus exemplifies the application of construal to written discourse in order to demonstrate both the feasibility of the discourse-analytic application itself as well as the irreducibility of construal to individual conceptualization. In this analysis, we focus on a pattern of co-referential construals within a stretch of written discourse. The idea, simply put, is that by analyzing construal *qua* motivated selection within a specific context it is possible to pinpoint facets of construal qua *motivating* factor: representational organization of the expression in question. Accordingly, inasmuch as construal can be demonstrated to motivate selection, then, it is to be considered an explicit facet of the meaning of an expression, as the contextual accommodation of an expression is a sensible notion only inasmuch as both the context and expression are somehow shared (by present or presumed interlocutors).

The simple "data" used here is an opening paragraph of a magazine article on the social functions of day-time "bar-going" in Finnish suburbs.[5] The paragraph consists of the following sentences (in the original order):

(1a) *Lähiöiden baarit herättävät synkkiä mielleyhtymiä niille, jotka eivät niissä käy.*
'Suburban bars evoke grim associations in those who do not visit them.'

(2a) *Usein ne nähdään alkoholismin ja syrjäytyneisyyden tyyssijoina.*
'Often they are seen as havens of alcoholism and social exclusion.'

(3a) *Niissä uskotaan pesivän kansanterveydellinen uhka, eli itsestään vähänlaisesti terveydellisessä mielessä huolehtivat kaupunkilaiset,*
'They are believed to harbor a threat to the public health, that is, negligent urbanites'

(4a) *jotka kohtaavat terveyspalvelut ainoastaan akuuttitapauksina vahingon jo satuttua.*
'who meet health services as acute cases only after the harm has already been done'

In sentences (1a)–(4a), there are actually two separate patterns of co-reference, one of mental predicates (e.g., *herättävät* 'evoke' and *nähdään* 'are seen') and another

5. *Mielenterveys* 5/2010: 32–33. Mielenterveys is a magazine published by the Finnish association for mental health and directed at volunteers working in the mental health sector.

consisting of the topics of those predicates; here we concentrate on the latter, as highlighted by underlining above:

(1b) *synkkiä mielleyhtymiä* 'grim associations'

(2b) *alkoholismin ja syrjäytyneisyyden tyyssijoina* 'havens of alcoholism and social exclusion'

(3b) *kansanterveydellinen uhka* 'threat to public health'

(4b) *vahingon* 'harm'

The analytical interest in the excerpt is the conventional semantic content that makes a coherent reading possible. At bare minimum, coherence of the excerpt requires that a person is able to establish correct connections between different entities and states of affairs in the sentences (1a)–(4a), so that these form a meaningful whole. For written discourse (where there is no immediate extra-linguistic context shared by multiple interlocutors), this is essentially a cumulative process that makes use of the preceding discourse to constitute a sufficient frame of interpretation. Similarly, coherence can be considered a relevant motivating factor for linguistic selection inasmuch as it is understood in an intersubjective sense: it builds from conventional meanings and is intended as a property of the resulting overall conception of the piece of discourse in question.

We are focusing here on the noun phrases (1b)–(4b) and their conventional meaning, but their interpretation surely involves context (from which only the most central factors may be considered here). In Examples (1a)–(3a), this involves the mental predicates that characterize the whole paragraph as a description of a fictive category (prejudices and preconceptions). Note also that there is only one explicit (and rather vague) mention of an agent for these predicates: *niille, jotka* '[to] those who' in Example (1). It would then seem justified to claim that a coherent reading of the excerpt relies on interpreting the following predicates in (2a)–(3a) as referring to the same process (schematically: imagining) based on the conventional meanings of these verbs. If this is the case, the correlates of the mental predicates (i.e., noun phrases (1b)–(4b)) are interpretable as elaborations that pertain to different facets of one generic scenario: what people think public bars to be. The question is in which way the elaboration of this mental category can be attributed to different construals in the noun phrases (1b)–(4b) and their mutual relations. Below I suggest an answer, where the different conventional meanings in sentences (1a)–(4a) comprise a pattern of focusing triggered by their appearance as mutual elaborations.

In CG, as noted in the preceding discussion, linguistic units are described as arranged into schematic categories or networks, based on the use of expressions (e.g., Langacker 2008: 237–244). Given the global character of cognitive abilities and the dynamic nature of the semantics/pragmatics relation in CG, however, the same

principles should hold for pragmatic understanding and constitution of *ad hoc* categories (see Barsalou 2010; Mauri 2017). Thus, a discourse-initial noun phrase may serve as a category-constituting expression that subsequent noun-phrases elaborate as instantiating category members. This kind of situated or ad hoc categorization, I argue, is in play in Examples (1a)–(4a), and, while being pragmatic, the categorization relies largely on the conventional meanings involved.

In sentence (1a), the plural noun phrase *synkkiä mielleyhtymiä* 'grim associations' establishes a schematic category that could in principle hold any kind of negative conceptions by the non-bar-goers. Note that for CG, there is no fundamental ontological difference between a concept and a category: as long as a concept does not refer to an irreducible "basic domain" such as space (Langacker 1987: 149–151), it can serve as a category for its less specific instantiations. In sentence (2a), *alkoholismin ja syrjäytyneisyyden tyyssijoina* 'havens of…' the noun phrase thus elaborates the associations related to bars – the sentence-initial *ne* 'they' makes direct anaphoric reference to the first mention of bars. Likewise, the genitival modifiers 'alcoholism' and 'social exclusion' specify an 'association' emerging as a cumulative meaning of both (1a) and (2a).

What noun phrase (3b) adds to this is a conception of the bar-goers who embody alcoholism etc. as a threat to public health. The threat is specified as residing in bar-goers by a paraphrase (marked by the conjunction *eli* 'that is'): it is the bodies of the bar-dwellers themselves that serve as a medium for the threat. Then, Example (4) finally actualizes the threat as an explicit mention of *vahingon* 'harm' that has already been induced when the health services are given the possibility to intervene.

The pattern of co-referential expressions (1b)–(4b) may now be simplified here for clarity:

Association > place > threat > harm

It is obvious at once that these rather abstract nouns *per se* would not constitute one conventional category (although 'threat' and 'harm' are clearly semantically related). Rather, an association (related to pubs as places), an (imagined) place, a threat (imagined residing in that place) and harm (as an actualization of a threat) are entities that, with their schematic conventional meanings, can be mutually associated when the overall linguistic context prompts to do so. In addition, the conventional meanings in Examples (1)–(4) can be shown to involve non-objectivity that is necessary for such a coherent interpretation to emerge.

Two dimensions of construal that are particularly relevant are the dimensions of focusing (Langacker 2008: 57–65) and prominence (2008: 66–73), that capture conceptual asymmetries between more and less salient parts of conceptualization (for discussion, see Möttönen 2016a: 61–74). From the present perspective these

asymmetries, such as the one between a concept's referent-defining profile and conceptual base that gives rise to the profile, are explicit features of expressions. Thus, Examples (1a)–(4a) can be analyzed as motivated choices whereby the different noun phrases profile different parts of the same conceptual base. For instance, the noun *mielleyhtymiä* 'associations' in Example (1) profiles the expression's referent, a particular mental entity, a coherent conception of which requires a conceptual base (e.g., a notion of a mental agent, other types of mental entities etc.).

By applying the notions of profile and base from CG, noun phrases (1b)–(4b) can be argued to prompt the following kind of inferences. *Synkkiä mielleyhtymiä* 'grim associations' profiles (i.e., makes direct reference to) a relationship between actuality (the actual bars) and a generic person's imagination but leaving the latter schematic: 'association' can be interpreted either as an image or as a mental path leading to an image, but either way the image itself is relatively unspecified. The following noun phrase (2b) *alkoholismin…*'haven of alcholism' is exactly a specification of that schematic association by profiling both the location (*tyyssijoina* 'havens') and its contents (*alkoholismin* 'alcoholism', i.e., social phenomena with necessary implicit human agents).

Then, the 'threat to the public health' (*uhka…*) in Example (3a) profiles a potential that is interpretable as a direct property of previous genitival modifiers in sentence (2a), namely, 'alcoholism' and 'social exclusion'. Conversely, a threat in CG perspective is a type of a relational noun (comparable to, for instance, kin terms, see Langacker 2008: 67–68) with two conceptual complements (that correspond to the structure of its overt instantiation): a source and a target of the threat. It can be argued, then, that the source of the threat is elaborated by the context of preceding instances (i.e., the genitival modifiers). Finally, in Example (4a) we have another relational concept, *vahingon* 'harm', which, in similar fashion as 'threat' in Example (3a), profiles an entity with a conceptual base elaborated by preceding discourse: 'harm' profiles a negative outcome, which assumes a schematic causal process with obvious candidates for the cause (those of alcoholism and social exclusion).[6]

In sum, the excerpt that is constituted by sentences (1a)–(4a) is analyzable as a pragmatic category, the formation of which is based on the conventional meanings of, *inter alia,* the noun phrases selected here for closer analysis. This category can be described as a series of profile shifts, where the noun phrases profile and specify different elements in the category, each evoked by the conceptual base of some other conceptual profile. Profile shifts, in turn, translate into shifts in the parts of

6. Of course, alcoholism, for instance, is a harm of sorts in its own right but it is also a regressive process with results of its own (also relative to the exacerbation of the process itself), to which the 'harm' here is likely to refer.

the conceptual structure that is responsible for establishing referential relationship (Langacker 2008: 259–262). It can be argued, that a significant factor contributing to cohesion of the excerpt is the capacity of distinct conventional construals to yield a synthesis based on their co-referential meaning (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 31–32).

The profile/base distinction applied here seems to be pivotal for integrating co-referential yet semantically different expressions into a coherent conception. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage semantic integration for expressions like (1a)–(4a) that does *not* derive from parallel profile shifts and contextual elaboration of conceptual base. At the same time, the profile/base distinction *per se* is clearly a part of the conventional meanings attributed to these expressions. Thus, while contextual factors are also in play, it seems a realistic assertion that the profile/base distinction offers a systematic way of describing how concepts such as bars, alcoholism, potential and actual illness do refer to distinct phenomena that are simultaneously interrelated by their shared conceptual content.

Should this analysis be accurate, it adds a further justification for the definition of construal as an explicit, socio-normative facet of meaning. If construal as a conventional facet of meaning facilitates understanding by contributing to semantic integration and coherence in discourse, it is inevitable that construal is directly comprehended as inherent to the expressions in question. This, obviously, suggests the normative basis of construal: it can be only through correct uses of these expressions that we can establish their meanings as something that another subject has intended.

5. Conclusion

In what has preceded, I have aimed to demonstrate the intimate relationship between construal and normativity. More specifically, I have argued for a usage-based conception of language, where normativity is a necessary characteristic of any expression learned from use: inasmuch as meanings are learned in interaction with other subjects, they are learned as socially accessible linguistic intentions. In order to facilitate understanding in novel usage-events, however, these intentions need to conventionalize as part of the context-independent meaning of each expression. Construal, as other facets of a conventional expression, needs to have a normative basis.

The normativity of construal clearly derives from the correct use of an expression, i.e., the public use of an expression in various contexts. The normativity of construal is nonetheless different from the normativity of use, where violations of norm are easily detected. Such as meaning itself, construal is evasive and marked by multiple competing interpretations. Construal is not inaccessible and/

or epiphenomenal, however. Inasmuch as some variety of a usage-based account of language is correct, there is no means by which human perspective could be excluded a priori from linguistic meaning as a central, commonly known facet. Construal can therefore be considered necessary, normative, explicit and vague from the perspective of usage. Consequently, the analysis of construal requires principled selection of semantic concepts combined with some external factors (e.g., contextual analysis or extra-linguistic theoretical support) that serve to restrict speculation or hypothetical explanations provided for particular construal phenomena.

For CG, the analytical concepts and theoretical restrictions partly merge: the analytical concepts are constituted against the backdrop of well-established cognitive principles. The requisite explicitness of construal suggests another possible source of restrictions: analyzing construal in context, where requirements of semantic coherence or overall intelligibility of the expression may reveal construal *qua* necessary semantic features of an expression. These two approaches, I argue, are mutually complementary rather than exclusive. Given the usage-based grounding of construal and socio-normative character of use, however, it is reasonable to approach construal and its cognitive basis as they appear in the use itself.

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Language as a system of norms and the Voloshinovian critique of abstract objectivism

Mikko Laasanen

Valentin Voloshinov's philosophy of linguistics is sometimes presented as an alternative to the Saussurean doctrine, especially in the dialogical approach to language. The purpose of this study is to review Voloshinov's philosophy of linguistics and to critically examine his critique of the Saussurean position, which he calls abstract objectivism, in order to determine whether his critique is accurate, and to ascertain whether his concept of linguistics offers a viable alternative to the Saussurean position. The analysis of Voloshinov's critique is based on the key Saussurean concepts of *langue, parole* and *synchrony*. In addition, the study also discusses Voloshinov's theory of meaning, the role of written language in linguistic study and the normativity of language. Based on the results of the study, Voloshinov's philosophy of linguistics does not offer a viable alternative to the Saussurean position, as it presupposes it.

Keywords: Voloshinov, Saussure, *langue*, *parole*, norms, normativity

1. Introduction

At its core, any language can be considered to be a system of norms, which at the most basic level govern how words should be put together to form meaningful sentences. The concept of language as a system of norms is essentially Saussurean, because a system of norms coincides with Saussure's concept of *langue* as a social fact. As Itkonen (2005a: 358) notes, this conception of language has been widely accepted, although with some terminological differences (e.g. Bhartṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa*, Humboldt's *innere Sprachform*, Paul's *Sprachzustand*, Gabelentz's *Einzelsprache*, Trubetzkoy's *Sprachgebilde*, Hjelmslev's *system*).[1] However, it is

1. It is not suggested here that these terms are perfectly interchangeable. What is suggested, however, is that these terms, and possibly others, are functionally equivalent in that they describe language instead of language use. As stated by Robins ([1967] 1990: 154–155): "An inevitable problem in any serious linguistic thought is the relation between the perceived utterances, spoken

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sometimes claimed that an alternative to the Saussurean conception of language and linguistics can be found in *the dialogical approach* (or *dialogism*). Most often associated with the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895–1975), the dialogical approach argues against the Saussurean view that the true object of linguistic study is to be found in the synchronic *langue*, and instead emphasizes social interaction, social context and the role of the utterance.

Although the term *dialogic* is most often associated with the work of Bakhtin (e.g. 1986), it is in Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov's (1895–1936) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* ([1973] 1986)[2] that the most precise and profound criticism of the Saussurean position can be found. Examined under the heading of *abstract objectivism*, the Saussurean position is completely dissected by Voloshinov and found wanting, especially in regard to its capability to deal with the constantly changing, living language. It is no surprise then that Voloshinov's *Marxism* is a valuable source for those who would endeavor to criticize aspects of the Saussurean position.

The purpose of this study is to argue against the attempts to replace the Saussurean conception of language (understood in a wide sense) by a dialogical theory of language, by critically examining Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism. Specifically, I hope to find out whether the Voloshinovian theory of language offers a viable alternative to the Saussurean position, as claimed by Voloshinov and the representatives of the dialogical approach. The study itself will consist of an analysis of Voloshinov's views on the Saussurean notions of *langue, parole* and synchrony, Voloshinov's theory of meaning, the so-called 'written language bias' (Linell 1982, 2005) and Voloshinov's views on the normativity of language. I will start out with an examination of the dialogical approach and its relation to Voloshinov's theory of language. The third section of the study offers a run-through of Voloshinov's views with some comments. The analysis of Voloshinov's views and the bulk of the commentary, however, is saved for section four. Section five will offer the summary of the study and the conclusions. It should also be stressed that this study is concerned primarily with Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism. For a wider perspective on Voloshinov's conception of philosophy of linguistics, please see e.g. Tihanov (1998), Brandist (2002, 2004, 2015: 125–149) and Alpatov (2004, 2010).[3]

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and written, of a language and the language itself […]. […]. *Langue* and *parole, abstraction* and *exponent, emic* and *etic* unit, *form* and *substance*, are all examples of recent attempts to compass and express this relation."

2. Originally published in 1929 under the Russian name *Marksizm i Filosofiya Yazyka*.

3. In addition, there exists a body of literature on Voloshinov in Russian, including an early critical review of *Marxism* by Rozalia O. Shor (on Shor's review, see Alpatov 2004: 89–90, 2010: 30–31; Brandist 2015: 144–145).

A word on sources is required. As the Voloshinovian critique of abstract objectivism is directed primarily against Saussure and his views, the de facto reference point is of course Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916). The second major reference point of this study is *Écrits de linguistique générale* (2002), the work which comprises both the notes from Engler's earlier critical editions of *Course* (1968, 1974), and Saussure's self-written unfinished manuscript found in 1996. In addition, I will utilize a wider perspective as well, using the history of linguistics as a third reference point, which also acts as the final arbitrator. To put it simply, in the grand scheme of things it is of secondary importance only whether Saussure was right or wrong. As all the references to Voloshinov are to the same edition of the English translation ([1973] 1986), I will offer only page numbers in the text. Following the same principle, all references to Saussure are marked as either *Course* or *Writings, Course* referring to the 2012 edition of the 1959 Wade Baskin English translation of *Course* (Saussure [1959] 2012), and *Writings* to the 2006 Sanders and Pires English translation of *Écrits* (Saussure 2006). All other references are given in full.

2. On the dialogical approach and Voloshinov's theory of language

The dialogical approach can be understood in a wide sense as some kind of an umbrella term that covers a wide variety of approaches to interaction and discourse. For example, Linell (2006: 157) counts different varieties of conversational analysis, context-based discourse analysis, ethnography of speaking, social pragmatism and discourse psychology among others as being at least partly dialogical in orientation. Works such as Marková and Foppa (1990) and Wold (1992) exemplify this, the topics ranging over a multitude of themes, but ultimately converging on *social interaction*. Accordingly, Marková (1990: 4) defines dialogism as an epistemological approach that sees language and speech originate and develop through social interaction and communication.

Dialogism is often contrasted with *monologism* (e.g. Marková 1990; Rommetveit 1990, 1992; Linell 1998). According to Marková (1990: 5–8), monologism sees language as a normative, ready-made, static system of signs and relies on a sender-receiver model of communication, in which successful communication is achieved if the speaker's intended message is transferred intact to the listener's head. This "talking heads" model of communication was allegedly advocated by Saussure,[4] and

4. This interpretation is based on Saussure's famous diagram of a speech circuit (see *Course*, p. 11). It is interpreted as a complete model or theory of communication, for example, by such figures as Harris (1990: 26–29) and Love (1990: 53–54). However, as pointed out by Joseph (1997: 26–27), Saussure never explicitly offers his diagram as any kind of complete model or

is criticized by Bakhtin (1986). As argued by Bakhtin (1986: 68), the listener does not merely participate passively in communication by decoding the intended message, but rather takes an active, responsive stance towards it. Following Bakhtin, it is the central tenet of dialogism that the talking heads model is inadequate as a model of communication. Furthermore, it should be relatively easy to see how the qualities that Marková attach to monologism can also be attached to the Saussurean position (see e.g. Linell 1998: 17–33; Marková 1990). Another aspect of monologism that is criticized by the dialogical approach is the *code model* of language. As noted by Lähteenmäki (1998: 77), a code model of language portrays language as a code that is shared by the speaker and the hearer and used to transfer the speaker's intended message to the speaker (see also Harris 1981, 1987).[5] The code model of language thus turns language into a resource, which exists before communication and is used for communication (see Linell 1998: 26).

According to the dialogical approach, the sender-receiver model of communication and the code model of language fit together (see e.g. Linell 1988) and form the core of monologism. What is missing is the source of this core. As argued by several authors (e.g. Harris 1980; Linell 1988, 1998, 2005; Rommetveit 1988) the answer is to be found in the history of linguistics and the effect of writing and written language. To put it shortly, according to the dialogical approach, the monologistic conception of language and communication is as it is, because it is based on written language (see Linell 1998, 2005). And it is here that we come across Valentin Voloshinov. As noted by Rommetveit (1988: 14), Voloshinov argued already in the first half of the 20th century that the European linguistic thought is based on the study of written artifacts (see *Marxism*, pp. 71–77). It is of no surprise then, that the dialogical approach or *the dialogical alternative* (Wold 1992) have turned (more) to the study of spoken language and especially tape-recorded data (e.g. Linell 1998).

theory of communication, and yet it is interpreted as such and then criticized by Harris and Love. It is interesting to note, that even Bakhtin (1986: 68) makes the jump from Saussure's diagram to "the actual whole of speech communication". However, Bakhtin doesn't explicitly suggest that Saussure offered his diagram as a complete model like Harris and Love do. In fact, Bakhtin could even be read as warning us against such interpretations: "But when [diagrams like these] are put forth as the actual whole of speech communication, they become a scientific fiction" (ibid.).

5. See Thibault (1997: 131–130) for an argument against the view that assimilates Saussure's speech circuit with the code model of communication

3. Voloshinov on the philosophy of language

In this section I will present Voloshinov's conception of language and the study of language. As Voloshinov considers words to be signs, his theory of language falls under his theory of signs. To fully appreciate his philosophy of language then, I will start off with his views on signs. From there I will continue on to review Voloshinov's perspective on linguistics of his time, the notion of abstract objectivism and the mistakes and roots of abstract objectivism. In addition, I will go through his theory of meaning and briefly his theory of the utterance.

3.1 Voloshinov's theory of signs

In Voloshinov's view (pp. 9–12, 33–34), the study of ideology[6] is the study of *signs*, for without signs there is no ideology. Signs are everywhere; side by side with the natural world there exists the *world of signs*. For Voloshinov, signs are converted material phenomena of the external world that reflect and refract another reality, the world of ideology and the world of signs (p. 9).[7] This means that for Voloshinov, physical objects can be turned into signs without ceasing to be a part of the natural world. Consequently, signs are not located in the consciousness like idealism and psychologism claim.[8] Furthermore, "[…] consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs" (p. 11). This means that consciousness becomes consciousness only through ideology and social interaction. The individual psyche is not opposed to the social, because the individual itself is a purely socioideological phenomenon: "[…] the content of the "individual" psyche is by its very nature just as social as is ideology […]" (p. 34). Therefore, an individual is only an individual in the physiological sense and not in the psychological sense.

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6. The term *ideology* refers to the Marxist theory of base and superstructure. On the question of where to place Voloshinov's concept of ideology within the Marxist paradigm, see e.g. Tihanov (1998, 2000).

7. Voloshinov's world of signs clearly resembles Popper's *third world* (see Popper [1972] 1975), with the exception that in Voloshinov's view, a sign may not be divorced from the material reality of the sign. Voloshinov clearly states that ideology (and signs) should not be located in consciousness "or other vague and elusive regions" (*Marxism*, p. 21). It seems then that Voloshinov would probably not have agreed with Popper's *autonomy of the third world* (see Popper [1972] 1975: 115–119, 158–161).

8. Paul ([1880] 1960: 6–7) makes a similar point when he says that it is inaccurate to define the sciences of culture as mental sciences.

For Voloshinov (pp. 12, 22–24, 99), signs can only arise and acquire significance interindividually, through a socially organized social unit. Signs have a *theme* (the sense of the sign, or its thematic unity) that is always socially accentuated. This means that for Voloshinov, a sign is an arena for class struggle: "The ruling class strives to impart a supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgements which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccentual" (p. 23). Because of the constant struggle within the sign, any sign can change its meaning, for example, a word-sign can change its meaning from a curse word to a word of praise. However, this "inner dialectic duality" (ibid.) of the sign only fully emerges in times of social crises or revolutionary changes. At this point it is worth pointing out that the aim of Voloshinov's work is to describe the methodological guidelines for a Marxist theory of language, an area which he felt had been left completely unexamined (see *Marxism*, p. xiii).

As hinted at in a previous paragraph, for Voloshinov (pp. 13–21), words are paradigm examples of signs. Moreover, unlike all the other signs, words are neutral with respect to their ideological function, and can therefore carry ideological functions of any kind. The word is the primary medium of individual consciousness and as such, "[..] the problem of individual consciousness as the *inner word* (as an *inner sign* in general) becomes one of the most vital problems in philosophy of language" (p. 14). Solving this problem, however, is not possible through the concepts used in non-sociological accounts of philosophy of language: "What is needed is profound and acute analysis of the word as social sign before its function as the medium of consciousness can be understood" (p. 15). Furthermore, for Voloshinov, the word is an index of social changes that has the ability to register even the delicate nuances of social changes. The study of these social changes is the subject matter of social psychology. However, since the word only exists in the concrete utterance or *speech act*, it is the study and classification of these speech acts (or *speech genres*), that is one of the most important tasks of Marxism.

According to Voloshinov (pp. 9–10, 37, 68–73, 102–103) signs are *understood* whereas signals are merely *recognized*. A hammer serves its purpose as an instrument of production without standing for anything else. However, it can also be turned into a sign, like in the insignia of the Soviet Union. Like the hammer, a signal-word does not in itself stand for anything else, but merely indicates an object. A signal-word is recognized, but not understood. A sign-word, on the other hand, requires understanding, and this understanding is always tied in with the situation in which the sign is used. In Voloshinov's view, understanding can be either active or passive. *Passive understanding* excludes an active response in principle. *Active understanding*, on the contrary, is dialogic in nature: "Understanding strives to match the speaker's word with a counter word" (p. 102). For Voloshinov, signality and signal recognition are most easily found in the process of learning a foreign

language: "The ideal of mastering a language is absorption of signality by pure semioticity and of recognition by pure understanding" (p. 69). This means that according to Voloshinov, mastering a foreign language turns signals into signs and recognition into understanding. A foreign language that is not yet fully mastered is not a full language in Voloshinov's view, as signality and recognition have yet to be replaced by signs and true understanding (ibid.).

3.2 Two trends of thought

What is the subject matter of the philosophy of language? Like Saussure (see *Course*, pp. 6–17; *Writings*, pp. 3–14, 59), Voloshinov (pp. 45–48) attempts to solve the problem of identifying the real object of study in the philosophy of language. Sound as a mere acoustic phenomenon is not enough, nor are the physiological processes involved in the production and reception of that sound, or the psychological processes experiencing the sound. According to Voloshinov, this complex mixture of physical (sound), physiological (production and reception of the sound) and psychological (experience of the sound) lacks a soul, and this soul is to be found in the unified sphere of organized social intercourse, namely in the social milieu and the immediate social event of communication. However, taking the social factors into consideration expands rather than narrows the object of investigation. What is needed then, is to somehow bring this physico-physio-psycho-social complex into a common denominator and thereby identify and delimit language as a specific object of study.

As a precursor to his own solution to the problem, Voloshinov considers two attempts to solve the situation. The first of these he calls *individualistic subjectivism*, according to which the basis of language is the individual psyche and the individual creative act of speech (p. 48). The object of linguistic study are the laws of linguistic creativity, which are also the laws of individual psychology. According to Voloshinov, the most important representative of individualistic subjectivism is Wilhelm von Humboldt (and later, the Vosslerian school). Although we shall not examine individualistic subjectivism in closer detail, it is worth pointing out that it is precisely the individualistic view of language and of the speech act which makes this line of thinking unacceptable to Voloshinov, for in his view, the speech act is a social phenomenon *par excellence* to which there can be no invidual-psychological explanations (p. 82). It is interesting to note, that the Chomskyan (or generative) paradigm can be seen as a successor to individualistic subjectivism in its attempt to establish linguistics as a part of psychology (on this attempt, see e.g. Itkonen 1996). This can be seen quite clearly in Chomsky's views regarding the Saussurean notion of *langue*, which he criticizes for being merely "an inventory of elements" ([1964] 1966: 23). Moreover, Chomsky's own notion of *competence* is modelled

after Humboldt's notion of *energeia* (see Humboldt 1836: 41), stressing the creativity and the generative power of language (see Chomsky 1965: 4).

The second attempt to define the object of the philosophy of language Voloshinov calls *abstract objectivism*, the roots of which he traces back to the rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries, represented by such characters as Descartes and Leibniz (p. 57). What interests the rationalists is not the relationship between a sign and the actual reality but the relationship between a sign and another sign within a closed system (p. 58). According to Voloshinov, this line of thinking finds its most striking expression in the works of Ferdinand de Saussure, Charles Bally and Antoine Meillet (p. 58, 61). However, it is clearly Saussure that Voloshinov is mostly concerned with. As is widely known, in his search for the true object of linguistic study, Saussure made a distinction between *langage* (language in its totality), *langue* (the language system) and *parole* (speech or the act of speaking) (*Course*, pp. 7–15). For Saussure, it is *langue* that is the true object of linguistics proper; by separating *langue* from *parole* and promoting it over all other facts of speech, "[…] we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other classification" (*Course*, p. 9). At the same time, we separate that which is social (*langue*) from that which is individual (*parole*) and that which is essential (*langue*) from that which is accessory (*parole*) (*Course*, p. 14). In addition, Saussure made a distinction between *synchrony* and *diachrony* or synchronic and diachronic linguistics, the former dealing with language-states and the latter with the evolution or change or language (*Course*, p. 81). The Voloshinovian critique of abstract objectivism is centered around these two dichotomies presented by Saussure.

3.3 The mistakes of abstract objectivism

To start off, we can go back to the critique Voloshinov aimed at individualistic subjectivism, namely that there can be no individual-psychological explanations to the speech act. This is, in fact, the exact same critique that Voloshinov aims at abstract objectivism. In Voloshinov's view, individualistic subjectivism is correct in focusing on the creative act of speech, but incorrect in viewing the speech act as something individual (p. 82). Similarly, abstract objectivism is incorrect in bypassing the speech act as individual and accessory and focusing on a system of normatively identical forms (p. 61, 82). As we shall see later, Voloshinov's own conception of the philosophy of linguistics takes the *utterance* as a social phenomenon to be the true object of linguistic study.

Second, Voloshinov (pp. 65–71) denies the concept of *langue* on the ontological level. For Voloshinov, language as a system is merely an abstraction, constructed for practical purposes (e.g. language instruction). The speaker's focus is directed

at the concrete utterance in a particular situation; at no point in time is the speaker concerned with the abstract language system, but rather with concrete words and utterances in different contexts. Third, Voloshinov denies pure synchrony. From a truly objective point of view, says Voloshinov, "[…] language presents the picture of a ceaseless flow of becoming" (p. 66). However, Voloshinov plays with the idea that a synchronic system could possibly exist from the speaker's point of view but ends up rejecting this idea, too (pp. 66–67).[9] This is because in Voloshinov's view, what is important for the speaker, is the changeability and adaptability of the sign, and not the stability and self-equivalency of the signal (p. 68; on the differences between a sign and a signal, see Voloshinov's theory of signs above). This then, is the fourth mistake of abstract objectivism. By removing language from ideology, abstract objectivism turns signs into signals and understanding to recognition (pp. 68–69). Fifth, abstract objectivism mistakenly singularizes word meaning, even though words have a multiplicity of meanings based on context (pp. 77, 79–81). And finally, normativity of language does not manifest itself except in special cases (e.g. writing or language instruction) (p. 70). Hence it is a mistake to focus on the normativity of linguistic forms like the representatives of abstract objectivism do (pp. 52–53).

These are the main mistakes of abstract objectivism as portrayed by Voloshinov. Before moving on to Voloshinov's own solution to the problem of identifying the true object of linguistic study, we must first examine Voloshinov's explanation for the mistakes of abstract objectivism.

3.4 The roots of abstract objectivism

In *Writings* (pp. 85–86), Saussure criticizes the linguistic school[10] started by Franz Bopp for ignoring language as a phenomenon and only concentrating on the language system through the veil of writing. Interestingly enough, Saussure's critique against Bopp corresponds exactly with Voloshinov's explanation for the mistakes of abstract objectivism – the same trend of thought that Voloshinov counts Saussure to be a paradigm example of!

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9. There is a clear danger of a misunderstanding here, because Voloshinov accepts the soundness of this idea at a theoretical level but rejects it on the ontological level. In other words, Voloshinov says that it is a serious mistake to posit a synchronic system from an objective point of view, but from a subjective point of view, it is at least a possibility (and one made by abstract objectivism). However, after considering this possibility, Voloshinov rejects it as well.

10. Saussure is most likely referring here to the classical phase of the Indo-European comparative linguistics that can be said to have started in the first half of the 19th century, although the only other linguist he refers by name is Jacob Grimm. Saussure also uses the term "the first school of linguistics". (See *Writings*, pp. 85–86.)

According to Voloshinov (pp. 71–77), at the heart of abstract objectivism "[…] lies a practical and theoretical focus of attention on the study of defunct, alien languages preserved in written documents" (p. 71). This practice is, of course, known as philology. And where there was philology, linguistics followed. Guided by philology, linguistics focused on the alien, monologic utterance as a self-contained unit, tearing it away from all context and trying to understand it passively: "The *isolated, finished, monologic utterance*, divorced from its verbal and actual context and standing open not to any possible sort of active response but to passive understanding on the part of a philologist-that is the ultimate "donnée" and the starting point of linguistic thought" (p. 73). In addition, linguistic thought served another purpose, namely language instruction. It is these two tasks of linguistics, the heuristic and the pedagogical, that created the organization of linguistics into phonetics, grammar and lexicon. The problem is that the philology-guided linguistics has been built around the alien, foreign word, without even realizing it. In Voloshinov's view, "[o]ne is sensible of one's native word in a completely different way […]" (p. 75). This then, is the reason why abstract objectivism fails in defining the true object of linguistic study and is simply inadequate as a method for studying the ever-changing, living language.

Next, we shall move on to examine Voloshinov's own attempt to identify and exemplify the true object of philosophy of linguistics. We shall start with Voloshinov's theory of meaning and then proceed to his theory of the utterance.

3.5 Voloshinov on meaning

To start off, let us go quickly over Voloshinov's key points on signs. First, Voloshinov says that a signal is recognized whereas a sign is either actively or passively understood. Second, a sign has a theme which denotes the sense of the sign. And third, what is important for the speaker, is the changeability and adaptability of the sign rather than the stability and identicality or sameness of the signal.

Voloshinov says (pp. 99–103) that all whole utterances possess a *theme*, which can be defined as the unitary significance of the utterance. It is concrete and consists of not only the linguistic forms that comprise the utterance but also the historical situation of the utterance. A singular word can possess a theme, but only if it is used in the form of an utterance. A theme of an utterance can only be grasped through active understanding, which is always dialogic in nature: "Understanding is to utterance as one line of dialogue is to the next" (p. 102). However, utterances also have *meaning*, by which Voloshinov means "[…] all those aspects of the utterance that are *reproducible* and *self-identical* in all instances of repetition" (p. 100). Whereas the theme of an utterance is indivisible, the meaning of an utterance

can be broken down into separate linguistic elements. Meaning, for Voloshinov, is the technical apparatus through which the theme is implemented. According to Voloshinov, theme can be thought of as the upper limit of linguistic significance, whereas meaning is the lower limit of linguistic significance. In Voloshinov's view, the study of meaning can proceed either towards the upper limit or the lower limit. In the latter case, it would be a study of the meaning of a word in the system of language or rather, a study of a dictionary entry. In the former case, it would be a study of "[…] the contextual meaning of a given word within the conditions of a concrete utterance […] (p. 102). According to Voloshinov, only a distinction between theme and meaning and a proper understanding of their relationship can help us in constructing a genuine theory of meaning: "Such discriminations as those between a word's *usual* and *occasional* meanings, between its central and lateral meanings, between its denotation and connotation, etc., are fundamentally unsatisfactory" (p. 102).

In addition, Voloshinov says (pp. 103–106) that all words used in actual speech also possess value judgement in the form of an evaluative accent. This accent can be conveyed, for example, by intonation. The same utterance can be pronounced with different intonations, with the theme of the utterance being carried by these intonations. Evaluative accent is an essential part of any concrete utterance and can only be bypassed by focusing on the abstract system of language. This method, however, mistakenly separates evaluation and meaning and therefore further distances itself from the study of living utterances.

3.6 Voloshinov's theory of the utterance

As implied in the previous section, one of the biggest problems in the linguistic practices of Voloshinov's time was, in his view (pp. 109–112), the morphologization of syntactic problems. This had led to the loss of any sense of the verbal whole and the neglect of the utterance as a whole. Rather than turning the study of syntax into the study of morphology, the study of syntax should be seen as part of the study of discourse and especially of speech acts, says Voloshinov. This, however, requires the re-examination of all the basic concepts of linguistics.

To exemplify his approach, Voloshinov dedicates a third of his book (pp. 115–159) to the study of *reported speech*, which is defined as "[…] speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance" (p. 115). A reported utterance is originally an independent utterance with its own theme that is assimilated within another utterance and thus becomes the theme of that utterance. In Voloshinov's view, it is precisely this assimilation process that can tell us about the social tendencies behind speakers' speech.

Furthermore, it can also tell us about differences between languages and societies in different times, because "[l]anguage reflects, not subjective, psychological vacillations, but stable social interrelationships among speakers" (p. 118).

According to Voloshinov (pp. 119–121, 127), there are two main ways for languages to handle reported speech: either to maintain its integrity and establish clear boundaries between the two utterances, or, to try to obliterate these boundaries by commentary. The former method Voloshinov calls *linear style* and the latter *pictorial style*. As examples of the former, Voloshinov gives us Old and Middle French; of the latter, Renaissance, the end of the 18th century and the entirety of the 19th century. As a special case of the pictorial style, Voloshinov mentions a *decorative style*, where the meaning of the reported utterance is sacrificed in favor of its color. This kind of writing can be found in the works of Nikolai Gogol: "Indeed, in Gogol's case, characters' speech sometimes loses almost all its referential meaning and becomes decor instead, on a par with clothing, appearance, furnishings, etc." (p. 121). Voloshinov sees the pictorial style to be characteristic of Russian language overall.

We shall leave Voloshinov's study of reported speech here, though it can be briefly mentioned that Voloshinov goes on in the remaining pages of his book to examine direct and indirect discourse in Russian literary language (pp. 126–140) and finally, in the last section, quasi-direct discourse in French, German and Russian (pp. 141–159). These studies are not pertinent for our discussion however, so we shall move on to examine Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism in closer detail.

4. On Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism

In this section I will examine and analyze the critique Voloshinov directs against abstract objectivism. I will start out with some general remarks, and then move on to discuss the notions of *langue, parole*, and synchrony, in order. From there I will discuss Voloshinov's concept of meaning, and the so-called 'written language bias'. Finally, I shall finish with a few notes on normativity.

4.1 General remarks

Voloshinov's philosophy of language follows naturally from his theory of signs. As signs for Voloshinov are dynamic, socially determined material things of the external world, and the word is a prime example of a sign, it follows then, that the word too is a dynamic, socially determined material thing of the external world – otherwise it couldn't be a sign. Moreover, since signs require active understanding rather

than passive understanding or mere recognition, it follows that the true object of the philosophy of language is to be found in the process of active understanding, that is, verbal communication or rather, the speech act.

> Language exists not in and of itself but only in conjunction with the individual structure of a concrete utterance. It is solely through the utterance that language makes contact with communication, is imbued with its vital power, and becomes a reality. The conditions of verbal communication, its forms, and its methods of differentiation are dictated by the social and economic prerequisites of a given period. (*Marxism*, p. 123.)

It is the whole, concrete utterance that is the true object of the philosophy of language for Voloshinov, and it is only through an examination and typology of the speech acts that an understanding of social psychology can be achieved. From this perspective it becomes perfectly understandable that Voloshinov holds the morphologization of syntactic problems to be one of the biggest downfalls of linguistic thinking of his time. Furthermore, any non-sociological account of the speech act is from this perspective inadequate, which is why the individualization of *parole* is so unacceptable of a concept for Voloshinov. And finally, the hypostatization of language as a system of normatively identical forms is simply mistaken, for no such system exists.

Those who would turn to Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism in order to criticize certain individual aspects of the Saussurean ideas, be it the concept of *langue* itself or the way the study of *parole* is seemingly deemed of less importance than the study of *langue*, are missing half the point. It is not Voloshinov's primary objective to criticize abstract objectivism or individualistic subjectivism, but to promote a Marxist study of language, a field which he felt had been neglected in Marxist thinking. The critique Voloshinov makes against abstract objectivism is made specifically from this point of view. If one wishes to study the nature of discourse (or speech acts) and the way discourse reflects interrelationships between speakers, it makes sense to search for answers at the discourse level, not at the phonological or the morphological level. The morphologization of syntactic problems is a problem only in relation to Voloshinov's goals, not in itself. Furthermore, the Voloshinovian approach to language as a whole is built on and therefore presupposes the morpho-phonological analysis of language. To put it simply, one cannot study the discourse or speech acts of a language one doesn't know (or have an informant of the said language). The three branches of linguistics (phonetics, grammar, lexicon) that according to Voloshinov were created by the heuristic and the pedagogical tasks of linguistics (see above), necessarily precede any kind of study of discourse. It is only by somehow forgetting that learning a language, be it one's first, second or third language, always starts from the basics, that one can call for methodological primacy for the study of discourse. To wit, there is a reason why

Voloshinov doesn't examine reported speech in the West Greenlandic language. Consequently, if one were to equate Voloshinov's three branches of linguistics with *langue*, it would also mean that at the methodological level, the study of *langue* would be primary, just like Saussure said it is (see *Course*, pp. 7–15). However, methodological primacy should not be simply equated with importance; rather, it is a question of scientific procedure and the order of steps: the question of *what* always precedes the question of *how* or *why*: "Grammatical data is a conceptual precondition of socio- and psycholinguistic data" (Itkonen 1980: 344).

It should also be noted that the Voloshinovian critique of abstract objectivism is directed mostly against *Course*. When compared with *Writings*, the critique loses some or even most of its edge. This is because the Saussurean thought that is presented in *Writings* is far less categorical. For example, whereas some of the passages in *Course* could be read in a way that downplays the importance of *parole* (e.g. on page 14), in *Writings* it is clearly stated that "[a] word only truly exists, however one views it, by being sanctioned in actual use by speakers of the language" (p. 56) and that "[*l*]*angue* is created only with a view to discourse […]" (p. 197). Furthermore, the importance of diachrony is highlighted in several places, for example on page 105, where it is said that "[…] the ceaseless transformation of languages constitutes an absolute principle". It is only through *Course* casting its focus so heavily on certain aspects of the Saussurean thought that the Voloshinovian critique blossoms. Indeed, there are several similarities between Saussure's *Writings* and Voloshinov's *Marxism*. Although they arrive at different answers, they both attempt to define the object of linguistic inquiry: Voloshinov in order to establish a Marxist philosophy of language and Saussure in order to establish "[…] linguistics on a proper scientific footing so that he can return to doing historical work in a more satisfactory fashion" (Sanders in Introduction to *Writings*, p. xxv). In a way then, the difference in their answers is a result of their background: Saussure being first and foremost a student of Indo-European languages and of Sanskirt, and Voloshinov a member of the Bakhtin Circle.[11]

The similarities between Voloshinov's theory of the utterance and Bakhtin's views on language are striking indeed, to the extent that it has been suggested that Valentin Voloshinov was in fact one of Bakhtin's aliases (see Translator's Preface in *Marxism*, pp. vii–xii). True enough, in *Speech Genres & Other Late Essays* (1986) Bakhtin promotes both the idea of the utterance being the true object of linguistic study, and the concept of active understanding, just like Voloshinov does in

11. The Bakhtin Circle was an early 20th century Russian school of thought centered around Mikhail Bakhtin. Other members included Matvei Kagan, Valentin Voloshinov, Pavel Medvedev, Lev Pumpianskii and Ivan Sollertinskii, and possibly others. From the linguistic point of view, the key view of the Circle was the dialogical nature of language.

Marxism. Furthermore, just like Voloshinov, Bakhtin calls out for an examination and typology of different speech acts (1986: 63). It is no wonder then that the editors of Bakhtin (1986) claim in a footnote (p. 61, fn. 2) that "Bakhtin discusses Saussure's teachings in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* as one of the two main trends in linguistic thought […]". As a particularly revealing example, just compare Voloshinov's "[l]anguage exists not in and of itself but only in conjunction with the individual structure of a concrete utterance" (*Marxism*, p. 123) with Bakhtin's "[..] language enters life through concrete utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well" (1986: 63). Despite the similarities, the perspective adopted in this study is the same as the one held by the translators of *Marxism*, namely that *Marxism* was written by Voloshinov until reliably proven otherwise.[12]

4.2 On the concept of langue

As already noted by Coseriu ([1958] 1974: 18), every synchronic grammar ever written presupposes the existence of *langue*. More specifically, "[e]very grammarian describes *langue* (and not *parole*, or actual linguistic behavior). This is true of Pāṇini, Tolkaappiyaṉaar, Sībawaihi, Apollonius Dyscolus, Varro, Thomas of Erfurt, Arnauld & Lancelot, and so on […]" (Itkonen 2005b: 4). Now, according to Voloshinov, *langue* "[…] is merely an abstraction arrived with a good deal of trouble and with a definite cognitive and practical focus of attention" (p. 67). This means that Voloshinov accepts *langue* at the methodological level but denies its existence at the ontological level. Is Voloshinov correct? Is the *langue* Coseriu and Itkonen are referring to merely an abstraction, a construction made by the linguist for practical purposes? To answer this question, let us first separate two different readings of *langue*, namely *langue* at the ontological level and *langue* at the methodological level, and call them *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 respectively.

In *Course* (pp. 6–17), Saussure searches for the true object of linguistics and finds it in *langue*. This is clearly a methodological decision (*langue*-2), arrived at in order to solve the problem of identifying the true object of linguistic study (see also Thibault 1997: 5–6). However, Saussure also speaks of *langue* at the ontological level (*langue*-1), e.g. on page 9 of *Course*, where he says that "[*langue*] is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty". The

12. Lähteenmäki (2002) discusses the intellectual sources of both Bakhtin and Voloshinov and the accusation that Voloshinov might have been plagiarising Ernst Cassirer in his writings (see Poole 2001). According to Lähteenmäki, however, these accusations are grossly overstated.

difficulties in understanding the nature of *langue* arise from the fact that there are no clear boundaries between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2. And the issue is even further complicated by the use of a neutral reading of *langue*, which bypasses the differences between *langue*-2 and *langue*-1. It is important to understand that the distinction between *langue* at the ontological level (*langue*-1) and *langue* at the methodological level (*langue*-2) does not correspond with the distinction between a methodological reading of *langue* and a structuralist reading of *langue*, as discussed e.g. by Thibault (1997). Rather, the difference between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 is that of a point of view between the linguist or grammarian and that of the speaker.

langue-1 refers to the normativity of language, or more specifically, to the norms of language, as argued extensively by Itkonen (see 1978, 2003, 2008; see also the Introduction to this volume). Norms of language for Itkonen are objects of common knowledge, defined as a three-level knowledge system: A knows-1 that X, A knows-2 that B knows-1 that X, A knows-3 that B knows-2 that A knows-1 that X (see Itkonen 1978: 123; 2003: 113). In the clear cases the norms of language are intuitively known with certainty; in the less-than clear cases, for example in connection with variation or extraordinary use of language, intuition no longer guarantees certainty (Itkonen 2003: 33–36). Norms can be either discrete or non-discrete, in the sense that they may be more or less binding. Furthermore, discrete norms may also be prototype-like, which means that norms can have a discrete core that is surrounded by non-discreteness. (Itkonen 2008: 296–297.) In effect, this means that norms govern both the differences and similarities between language forms and their use: in the clear cases speakers know which forms belong together and which do not. This was clearly realized by Saussure: "Every language probably contains certain elements or groups which, for some reason, display *pronunciation tolerance* […]. However, all these highly divergent sounds are accepted – are 'legal' – with the same *value*" (*Writings*, p. 47). It is when we move from the clear cases to the less-than clear cases that at some point the knowledge begins to falter and ultimately fails.

langue-2 is created when *langue*-1 is taken to be the object of linguistic study. As such, *langue*-2 does not exist before linguistic study. Voloshinov is therefore absolutely correct when he says that *langue* is the result of deliberation on language performed by the linguist (p. 67), but with the qualification that what he is talking about is *langue*-2, not *langue*-1. It could of course be theoretically possible for there to be *langue*-2 and not *langue*-1, but this line of thinking amounts to denying the normativity of language (as a counterargument, see Itkonen 1978: 175–191; 2003: 18–21, 136–137, 142–144; 2008; this volume). Furthermore, it could also be argued that the distinction between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 is not necessary. In most cases this is probably true. However, when the question is of *langue*'s existence or non-existence, it is precisely the distinction between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 that can

answer this criticism. Furthermore, the distinction can also answer the criticism according to which *langue*, for being homogenous, is unable to deal with variation. If discrete norms of language are prototype-like, it means that variation, at least in the clear cases, is also part of *langue*-1 (see Leppänen, this volume).

For example, in the Tampere dialect of Finnish, one can find three variants of inessive, namely the standard language variant *-ssA*, and the dialectal variants *-sA* and *-s* (see Mustanoja 2011). Now, native speakers know with certainty that all of these variants mean the same thing in general, in that they designate something to be inside of something else. To say it differently, speakers know that all three variants belong to the same group. In addition, speakers also know that variants of other case suffixes, like the adessive suffix *-llA*, do not belong to the same group as variants of inessive. This exemplifies the fact that norms govern not only differences but also similarities. When the *langue* of the Finnish language is examined, it is in most cases only *-ssA* that is taken to represent inessive, as it is the standard language variant, and all other variants are dropped. This exemplifies the relationship between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2, in that when we move from *langue*-1 to *langue*-2, certain aspects of *langue*-1 are necessarily simplified or dropped. This results in *langue*-2 being necessarily more abstract in nature than *langue*-1. This is rather a simple example of course, and one which bypasses many important problems and questions (e.g. how to define a speech community in itself and in relation to the concept of *langue*), but its main function is simply to demonstrate the more abstract nature of *langue*-2. One might also argue that it is not possible to separate *langue*-2 from *langue*-1, since as soon as we start to study *langue*-1, we move on to methodology and to *langue*-2. This is true, of course. In a way, *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 coincide. But this is also precisely the point. Variation is a part of *langue*-1, but the study of *langue*-1 is necessarily based on invariance, e.g. the concept of phoneme (see Hymes & Fought 1981: 175; Thibault 1997: 85–91).

But let us look at the relationship between *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 from the other direction. For example, it can be pointed out that it is a mistake to postulate the nature of *langue*-1 based on *langue*-2. In other words, one should not define ontology based on methodology (*transitus ab intellectu ad rem*; see Coseriu [1958] 1974: 9–11). But this is a simple mistake. It has already been said that *langue*-1 and *langue*-2 are not the same or strictly similar, but this does not make them completely different either. If speakers know that different variants belong to the same group, or are part of the same prototype, then even *langue*-1 contains certain amounts of abstractness.[13] This was clearly realized by Sapir: "Every typical human

13. What is at issue here is *categorization*: "Since the total range of personal experience which language serves to express is infinitely varied, and its whole scope must be expressed by a limited number of phonetic groups, it is obvious that an extended classification of experiences must

reaction has a certain range of variation and, properly speaking, no such reaction can be understood except as a series of variants distributed about a norm or type" (1925: 38). In a way then the linguist mimics the behavior of the speaker, it is just that he moves at a more abstract and precise level. The transition from *langue*-1 to *langue*-2 lies in the practice of making explicit that which is intuitively known with certainty. It should go without saying that the intuition-based study of certainty is the starting point and should be supported with other methods where available (see Pajunen and Itkonen, this volume).

Although Voloshinov claims that *langue* is merely an abstraction and a result of deliberation on language, in the end he also has to accept *langue* at the ontological level as well, otherwise he would not be able to criticize the representatives of abstract objectivism for concentrating on morphological issues, or to use our terminology, making explicit the morphological structure of a language. This is the exact same point made by Givón, when he speaks of the "grammar denial syndrome" (1995: 175–176). Those who would follow Voloshinov and deny *langue* at the ontological level simultaneously end up denying both the morphological structure and the norms of language, for they coincide. This is a strange and certainly untenable position to be in, especially since even Voloshinov himself has to accept *langue* at the ontological level as well. Like Givón suggests (1995: 175), this position can perhaps be understood as an overreaction against the Saussurean position, but "[o]verreaction to one reductionist dogma has seldom got anyone much beyond another – converse but equally reductionist – dogma" (p. 176).

4.3 On the concept of parole

According to Voloshinov, the biggest mistake (or *proton pseudos* as he calls it) of abstract objectivism is the individualization and neglect of *parole*. Indeed, as has already been noted above, *Course* can be read in a way that downplays the importance of *parole*: "In separating language from speaking we are at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental" (p. 14). The disregard of *parole* finds its extreme form in Hjelmslev ([1953] 1969), where it is claimed that a system can exist even without a process (p. 39). In *Writings*, however, *langue* is clearly said to come into existence only through the use of language (e.g. on pages 56, 80–81, 197),

underlie all articulate speech. This coincides with a fundamental trait of human thought. In our actual experience no two sense-impressions or emotional states are identical. Nevertheless, we classify them, according to their similaries, in wider or narrower groups the limits of which may be determined from a variety of points of view" (Boas [1911] 1964: 121). And the concept of *similarity* is based on *analogy* (see Anttila 1977; Itkonen 2005c).

or to use Hjelmslev's terminology, only through process (see also Coseriu [1958] 1974: 47, fn. 64).

There seems to be at least three reasons for the confusion regarding the concept of *parole* and the dichotomy between *langue* and *parole*. The first reason is a result of *parole* being equivocal as a concept. For example, with *parole* we can refer to the individual act of speaking, to the utterance, to the social speech act, to discourse and more generally to the spatiotemporal use of language, among others. As can be seen from Voloshinov's critique of abstract objectivism, the individual act of speaking and the social speech act do not coincide. In addition, Saussure himself further separates *actual parole* and *potential parole* (*Writings*, p. 39), but unfortunately both concepts are left underdeveloped. This leads to the second reason, namely that Saussure never really managed to develop a science of *parole*, and instead focused on a science of *langue*. It is understandable how this could even further promote the idea of the importance of *langue* over *parole*. As stated by Sanders (Introduction to *Writings*, p. xxiii), *Writings* does correct this balance, but not completely. Finally, it should not be forgotten that *langue* and *parole* are not Saussure's inventions per se, but rather a systematic expression of linguistic practice that has always existed (see Itkonen 2005b: 4). Where Saussure uses *parole*, Gabelentz uses *Rede* and Trubetzkoy *Sprechakt*; where Saussure uses *langue*, Hjelmslev uses *system* and Chomsky *competence*.[14]

In *The State of the Art* ([1968] 1970) Hockett performs a critical analysis of the Chomskyan paradigm. In his discussion of Chomsky's notions of competence and performance, Hockett (p. 65) notes that it is in fact erroneous to think of competence (or *langue*) and performance (or *parole*) as independent objects of study:

> The linguist is led to posit that the observable regularities of actual speech are a matter of habits, resident in the users of language-rather than, say, a matter of automatic chemical response to impinging sunlight. He calls those habits 'language'. This proposal is part of our theorizing about *speech*. It makes no sense to pretend that there can be a separate and distinct theory of *language*.
>
> (Hockett [1968] 1970: 65–66)

As the above quote suggests, it is the habits, or rather norms, that constitute the core of speech, or *langue* to use Saussurean terminology. As such, *langue* and *parole* should not be seen as opposites, for *langue* is a prerequisite for *parole*, both from the speaker's point of view as well as the linguists (see also Thibault 1997: 98–102). However, it is *parole* that creates, maintains, and changes *langue*. As noted by Itkonen (2011: 5), the two points of view, whether they are called *langue* and

14. As explained in Section 1 fn. 2, it is not suggested that these concepts are interchangeable, i.e. that they mean the same.

parole or system and process, have to be integrated. Or as Thibault (1997: 102) puts it: "Both perspectives are necessary in the overall conceptualization of the phenomenon of language."

4.4 On synchrony

Voloshinov denies the existence of a synchronic language system both from the objective and subjective points of view. It should be relatively easy to see that Voloshinov is right, but that it is of no consequence.

A purely synchronic system from an objective point of view would literally amount to the use of a stopwatch, which is of course an impossibility. However, this matters little. Even in sociolinguistic real time studies, where change is observed both at the synchronic and diachronic level, the speed of change is usually relatively slow. It should perhaps be mentioned that even though the observation of change in progress was anticipated by both Bloomfield and Hockett (see Laasanen 2016: 59), for a period of time the general opinion was that in practice it was still unfeasible (see e.g. Chambers 1995: 186). It was only after the work of William Labov (e.g. Labov 1972), that the study of change in progress got started in earnest, first as apparent time studies and later as real time studies (for an overview, see e.g. Bailey, Wikle, Tillery & Sand 1991; Labov 1994: 85–98; Chambers 1995: 193–206; Bailey 2002; Sankoff 2005; Bowie & Yaeger-Dror 2014). Now the point is that sociolinguistic studies of change in progress are most likely the closest that we have gotten to a change in progress, and even there, the time intervals are measured in tens of years. This means that a synchronic system can be called a synchronic system despite the fact that there is no pure synchrony. A synchronic grammar is necessarily an abstraction from real time, because there is no stopwatch.

The subjective point of view is a question of the epistemological nature of speaker's knowledge of language. According to Voloshinov (pp. 67–68), what matters to the speaker is the new and concrete meaning a linguistic form acquires in a particular context, not the stability and identicalness of the form. Voloshinov's view here is so tightly intertwined with his theory of meaning and his views regarding understanding and recognition, that it is not easy to focus merely on the concept of synchrony. However, Voloshinov clearly states that "[t]he speaker's subjective consciousness does not in the least operate with language as a system of normatively identical forms" (p. 67). It should perhaps be noted that what Voloshinov is talking about here is precisely language as a synchronic system, and he is correct of course. In most cases speakers are not aware of their native language as a synchronic system, but they are definitely aware of the fact that words mean roughly the same today and tomorrow as they did yesterday – that is, they are aware of the primarily

synchronic nature of their language. They can also be aware of the diachronic nature of their language, as in the case of "google it!" nowadays having the meaning of "search it over the internet!", but this is of secondary nature only. Synchrony is therefore epistemologically primary to diachrony (and also methodologically, see Itkonen 2010b: 821).

It has already been stated that the importance of diachrony is highlighted in several places in *Writings* (e.g. p. 98, 105, 145). This essentially contradicts the somewhat popular view of Saussure being only interested in synchrony or having a static conception of language. Interestingly, a similar but opposite situation can be found in Hermann Paul, who is mainly regarded as a proponent of diachronic linguistics (on Paul's views on synchronic linguistics, see Koerner 1972; Itkonen 1991: 288–292).

4.5 On Voloshinov's theory of meaning

For Voloshinov (pp. 67–68, 99–100), meaning is the technical apparatus through which the theme is implemented. More specifically, meaning is reproducible and self-identical, whereas the theme is unreproducible and unique. And finally, Voloshinov says that what is important for the speaker, is precisely the theme of the utterance, not the meaning.

The distinction between Voloshinov's theme and meaning is reminiscent of the distinction between the usual and the occasional meaning of the word, as already expounded by Paul ([1880] 1960: 74–105). However, Voloshinov states (p. 102) that the distinction between the usual and occasional meaning of the word is ultimately unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, it mistakenly places greater value on the usual meaning of the word rather than the occasional meaning, and second, it leaves theme unaccounted for as theme cannot be reduced to occasional meaning. The reason for the latter is, of course, that theme can be grasped only through active understanding, which is dialogic in nature. Meaning, on the other hand, whether usual or occasional, is understood passively, which is not dialogic in nature.

The distinction between the usual and occasional meaning of a word can be understood as the distinction between context-independent meaning and context-dependent meaning (see Itkonen 2008: 284). Context-independent meaning can also be understood as the *literal* or *fixed* meaning of a word, the idea here being that "[…] a linguistic expression has an invariant linguistic meaning or a semantic representation independendent of actual situated language use" (Lähteenmäki 2004: 91). Instead of the literal meaning of the word, and following in the footsteps of Bakhtin and Voloshinov, the members of the dialogical approach to language promote the idea of meaning potentiality, which refers to words having

"[…] relatively open *meaning potentials* that are activated, negotiated and enriched, when words are used in situated communicative practices […]" (Linell 2005: 81), instead of literal or fixed meanings. Rommetveit (1988) dubs literal meaning a myth, and finds its roots in abstract objectivism, or more specifically, in the philological study of written texts of dead languages, as described by Voloshinov above.

According to Itkonen (1991: 151–155) the first attempts to get rid of literal or context-independent meaning were already done by Sībawaihi, and following him, Jurjānī. In Itkonen's view, not only did both of these attempts fail, but so have later attempts as well (see Itkonen 1983: 166–169). The reason for this is relatively simple:

> In brief, every speaker, when intending to say something, is confronted with pre-existing semantic rules which impose limits upon what he *can* intend to say by uttering which sentence. To be sure, he may occasionally push these limits a little father, but he can do so only by (knowingly) deviating from the norm of *literal meaning*, which thus remains the ineluctable basis of his intentions.
>
> (Itkonen 1983: 168–169; footnote removed)

That is, you cannot say "What time is it?", and mean "There is a dog over there" without pre-existing rules – you will simply not be understood. Although Voloshinov says (p. 99) that the utterance "What time is it?" has a different meaning each time it is used, there must also be a corresponding, pre-existing semantic rule (or norm) which designates what this sentence usually means – usual corresponding with literal or context-independent meaning. Voloshinov of course realizes this, which is why he separates meaning from theme and says that there can be no theme without meaning (p. 100). Although Voloshinov doesn't put much value on meaning, it is important to note that his notion of meaning is context-independent, and therefore corresponds with literal or usual meaning – otherwise it couldn't work as the technical apparatus through which the theme is implemented. The point here is that it is impossible to replace context-independent meaning with context-dependent meaning (see also Möttönen, this volume).[15] Voloshinov might be right about the theme of the utterance being more important for the speaker than the meaning, but this doesn't matter, for there would be no theme without the meaning.

Moreover, Voloshinov's conception of meaning as a reproducible and self-identical entity means that he must accept a more abstract version of the said meaning as well, which is then used to identify the *sameness* of meanings. To put it more clearly, let us quote Voloshinov himself:

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15. It should go without saying that all linguistic expressions have the potentiality to mean a multitude of things in different contexts and situations. However, this does not mean that there is no context-independent meaning. Rather, the potentiality is an expression or manifestation of the adaptability and creativity inherent in language (see Section 4.7 below). To wit, attempts to replace context-independent meaning with context-dependent meaning are fruitless; language is perfectly capable to handle both.

> The meaning of the utterance "What time is it?" taken in its indissoluble connection with the concrete historical situation, cannot be divided into elements. The meaning of the utterance "What time is it?" – *a meaning that, of course, remains the same in all historical instances of its enunciation* – is made up of the meanings of the words, forms of morphological and syntactic union, interrogative intonations, etc., that form the construction of the utterance. (*Marxism*, p. 100; italics added)

The question is this: How can we identify different enunciations of "What time is it?" as having the same meaning, if there is nothing to guide us to do it? The answer is: we cannot. Identification of *sameness* requires there to be something abstract that tells us that X-1 and X-2 are the same, or have the same meaning. This is the basic principle of analogy (see Itkonen 2005c). And this something abstract is, of course, ontological *langue*, the existence of which Voloshinov wants to deny (see 4.2 above). This is a massive contradiction in Voloshinov's thinking. On one hand Voloshinov claims that *langue* is merely a product of the linguist, but on the other hand his whole theory of meaning is based on its existence. This grave contradiction is also a demonstration of the difficulties that can face those who wish to deny the existence of *langue*.[16]

4.6 On "written language bias"

Voloshinov's account of the history of linguistics is convincing enough that it is easy to see how some have come to overemphasize the effect the study of written texts has had upon linguistics as a whole. The general argument is that the methods and categories used in linguistics are based on writing and written texts, just like Voloshinov stated, and are therefore ill-suited for the study of spoken discourse. For example, Linell, who was the origin of the term *written language bias*, speculates that structuralism might have been completely different had it studied the continuum-like speech instead of written texts (1982: 51). More radical stances can be found in both Coulmas (1989: iix) and Olson (1994: 68, 258, 277), where it is claimed that linguistics and the study of the language system itself became a possibility only after the advent of the writing system. An interesting side point is that while Linell (1982: 31) claims that modern linguistics has mainly focused on the study of written texts, Coulmas (1989: iix) claims the exact opposite.

The claims made by Linell, Olson and Coulmas are easily dismissed with even a precursory knowledge of Pāṇinian linguistics. Pāṇini's grammar (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*),

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16. The problems with Voloshinov's theory of meaning has also been discussed by Brandist: "However, [Voloshinov] slides between pragmatic and linguistic meaning, *smysl* and *znachenie*, so freely that the very linguistic meaning of a word is seen to derive from its context of meaning, and the very character of a language as an institution is effaced" (2004: 107).

which Bloomfield ([1929] 1970: 219) called "one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence", described the spoken language of Pāṇini's time, not the written language, for no such thing existed during the time. More specifically, it describes the *langue* of Sanskrit of the time from a purely synchronic perspective, using methods and categories, which are later used also in the description of written languages (see Kiparsky 1994). According to Kiparsky (1994: 2918), western grammatical theory has always been influenced by Pāṇini's grammar, to the extent that the morphological analysis used in the 19th century comparative studies was learned from it. In fact, Bloomfield ([1929] 1970: 221) says that "[…] the comparative grammar of the Indo-European languages got its start only when the Pāṇinean analysis of an Indo-European language became known in Europe".

Now the point here is that a description of a continuum-like speech was used as a model in describing languages portrayed in written texts.[17] There are two things to be learned from this. First, the written and the spoken languages are not separate and independent entities, but merely different media (see Romaine 1982: 14) of the same phenomenon: there may be differences on the surface, but their core, or *langue*, is the same. To wit, it is not required nor is it in anyway beneficial to split the concept of *langue* "[…] into two distinct but largely overlapping systems, 'la langue de la parole' and 'la langue de l'écriture'", as Linell (1982: 44) suggests, following Goody (1977). Moreover, the differences between written and spoken language can often be the result of different registers (see e.g. Biber 1988). Second, the written language bias as portrayed by Linell (1982, 2005) is a non-phenomenon, at least in its strong form.[18] Instead, one should realize that either spoken language or written language has always been at the focus of linguistic research, depending on the time period and the goals of specific research paradigms. As such, it was perfectly legitimate for Romaine to write in 1982 that sociolinguistic methods and techniques had yet to be applied to the study of written language. The point here is of course that sociolinguistics during that time was de facto a study of spoken language. Pioneered by Romaine, the application of sociolinguistic methods to written texts gave birth to a whole new discipline, namely historical sociolinguistics (see e.g. Nevalainen & Raumolin-Brunberg 2012).

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17. Compare this with Harris (1980: 15): "Without the transition from syllabic to alphabetic writing, the development of phonemic analysis in modern linguistics would be inconceivable".

18. It is possible to understand the written language bias in a weaker form as well, since there are phenomena that written language cannot express in the way that spoken language can, e.g. intonation (see Itkonen 2010a: 116). However, claiming that linguistics could not be possible without the aid of a writing system and written language is an argument that is on a whole other level than an argument that states that those phenomena that are not expressible in written language have not been studied enough due to the influence of written language. It is the stronger version of the written language bias that is scrutinized and criticized here.

4.7 On normativity

At the heart of the Voloshinovian approach to language lies a complete misunderstanding about the role of normativity in language. According to Voloshinov (p. 53), abstract objectivism's conception of language as a system of normatively identical forms chains the user of language into blind obedience:

> From the point of view of [abstract objectivism], meaningful language creativity on the speaker's part is simply out of the question. Language stands before the individual as an inviolable, incontestable norm which the individual, for his part, can only accept. […]. The individual must accept and assimilate this system entirely as is; there is no place in it for evaluative, ideological discriminations-such as whether something is better, worse, beautiful, ugly, or the like. In fact, there is only one linguistic criterion: correct versus incorrect […].
>
> (*Marxism*, pp. 53–54; footnote removed)

Voloshinov sees normativity as a purely prescriptive notion, and in direct opposition with the notion of creativity. This is a special view of looking at normativity. Normativity as a prescriptive concept is mostly concerned with establishing and maintaining a standard language. As such, some kind of authority is usually involved. A non-prescriptive notion of normativity, on the other hand, has no such authority, apart from the social control provided by the society itself (see Itkonen 1984). Now what is missing from the picture painted by Voloshinov is that although norms, or rather rules of language, do dictate as to what counts as a correct sentence of the said language, they not only *can*, but *are* constantly broken. What is the issue here is *Hume's law*, i.e. the doctrine that one cannot reduce *ought* to *is* (or to derive *ought* from *is*). As Itkonen (1978: 143) puts it, "[t]he normative force of a genuine rule resides precisely in the fact that one *knows* what one ought to do". However, knowing what one ought to do does not necessarily mean one is going to do what one ought to do. Furthermore, not doing what one ought to do does not mean that there is no rule dictating what one ought to do. In simpler terms, rules of language can be broken, but breaking them does not mean that there are no rules. Rules of language that are broken give rise to true creativity and ultimately change. Normativity and creativity are therefore in no way opposite notions, as Voloshinov thinks.[19]

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19. Somewhat similar position as Voloshinov's can be found in Hirschkop (1999), where it is claimed that the Sausserean theory "[…] reduces the practical tasks of speaking subjects to the precise reproduction of a given system" and that "[…] the most important task for the speaker is to speak correctly" (p. 218). As argued already by Humboldt, what lies at the heart of speaking correctly, or the normativity of language, is *comprehension*: "Es darf also Niemand auf andere Weise zum Anderen reden, als dieser, unter gleichen Umständen, zu ihm gesprochen haben würde" (1836: 42). Like Voloshinov before him, Hirschkop (1999: 218) fails to understand the concept of normativity in language.

In addition, Voloshinov's claim (pp. 67–68) that what is important for the speaker is the concrete utterance in a specific and new situation and the adaptability and changeability of the sign, is essentially built upon the concept of normativity, for new usage and change in general requires a starting point. To put it differently, there cannot be a new way of use, unless there is an old way of use, from which the new way of use deviates.

5. Conclusion: Language as a system of norms

The purpose of this study has been to critically examine Voloshinov's theory of language and linguistics and especially the critique he makes against abstract objectivism. More specifically, I set out to find out whether the Voloshinovian theory of language offers a viable alternative to the Saussurean doctrine. To these ends, I have first presented a run-through of Voloshinov's view on language and linguistics, and then analyzed the key concepts.

Regarding the first objective of the study, it is clear that the critique Voloshinov aims at abstract objectivism is directed mostly against Saussure's *Course*. When compared with *Writings* instead of *Course*, abstract objectivism fails to find the same kind of support in the words of Saussure. The reason for this is two-fold. First, *Course*, at its core, is an interpretation of the teachings of Saussure. As such, it underlines issues in a way that Saussure himself would not have done.[20] Second, the final arbiter of the Voloshinovian critique of abstract objectivism is not *Course* or *Writings*, but the history of linguistics. And it is history that teaches us that there indeed is a *langue*, and that it is *langue* that is the central object of linguistics, and has been ever since its conception. However, Voloshinov's critique hits its mark when showing us the shortcomings of the Saussurean theory of *parole*, but the reason for this is equally clear: such a theory was never developed. Furthermore, as *Writings* teaches us, Saussure well understood the social nature of the speech act, even though *Course* highlights the individuality of *parole*.

Regarding the second objective of the study, the Voloshinovian theory does not offer a viable alternative to the Saussurean position, because it is built on it. If one of the purposes of linguistic study is to find out and describe the morphological structures of languages, and perhaps compare them to each other and see what

20. Just consider Saussure's thoughts on *langue*: "Should we reveal our true thoughts? It may be feared that a precise view of what *langue* is will lead to doubts about the future of linguistics. It is a science in which the difficulty of obtaining a rationally defined object, and the importance of the object, are disproportionate" (*Writings*, p. 59).

makes them different and what makes them the same, there is no other choice but to examine their morphology – the Voloshinovian approach does not, and cannot, help in this. The morphologization of syntactic matters is a problem only in relation to Voloshinov's own theory. Based on this study then, the Voloshinovian theory of language should be read first and foremost as a precursor to the study of discourse, not as an alternative to the Saussurean position. Like Alpatov (2004: 95–96) says, Voloshinov's *Marxism* anticipated various aspects of discourse linguistics.

During his discussion of abstract objectivism, Voloshinov (p. 67) says that to date, no representative of abstract objectivism had yet to give an adequate explanation as to what kind of reality would language under abstract objectivism have. Itkonen's notion of common knowledge solves this problem. Moreover, the notion of common knowledge can be further expanded when attached to the notion of *intersubjectivity* (Sinha & Rodríguez 2008; however, see also Zlatev & Blomberg, this volume).

According to Itkonen (1978: 126), at the level of common knowledge rules of language do not exist as a system, but as a set of rules – it is the grammarian's task to work out the system in question. This means that the notion of language as a system of rules exemplifies the double nature of *langue*. On the one hand, *langue*-1 refers to the commonly known rules of language as a set of rules. On the other hand, *langue*-2 refers to the system of rules, as described by the grammarian.

The main problem of the dialogical approach is that some representatives of it seem to want to replace invariance and abstractness with variation and concreteness without realizing that this is inevitably impossible. Just as one cannot study variation without the notion of invariance (see Thibault 1997: 87), one cannot study meaning without the notion of context-independence. The right answer is therefore to be found in a combination of approaches, which is also the point of view adopted by Marková (1990).

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Linguistic variation and change

A normative approach

Ville Leppänen

This chapter offers a preliminary examination of linguistic variation and change from the normative perspective. Both key aspects of normativity, correctness and rationality, are discussed in the context of theoretical discussion and demonstrated by concrete examples drawn from the existing literature on normativity, sociolinguistics and historical linguistics. The goal is to show, how linguistic variation and change can be understood as empirical phenomena involving norms as constitutive (as opposed to merely evaluative or prescriptive) entities in the ontology of language. Of the three variation types thus identified, only the one involving indeterminable correctness appears central to language change. Finally, language change is conceptualized and discussed as a process of norm change (i.e. as an appearance, disappearance or replacement of norms).

Keywords: variation, change, sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, norms, normativity

1. Introduction: Normativity, variation, and change

Variation and change are generally acknowledged to be fundamental aspects of a multifaceted entity we call *language*. In this volume, it is argued from a multitude of perspectives that, on the one hand, language as a socially shared system of communication consists of *rules of language* which define the structure and content of correct utterances (i.e. the grammar and lexicon of a language), and, on the other, actual language activity is regulated by *rationality principles* and can be explained by the *rational explanation* (RE). Taking this view as the starting point, my main goal in this chapter is to explore the manifestations of normativity in linguistic variation and change in order to improve our understanding of these important aspects. Furthermore, although the normative view of language is already well-established and its concepts highly developed, adopting new viewpoints

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and, perhaps, introducing extensions and qualifications to the existing conceptual apparatus are certainly fruitful enterprises also for advancing the metatheoretical discussion itself.

Previous studies on linguistic normativity include only cursory or at best schematic looks at variation and change (see, most importantly, Coseriu 1974: 58f; Itkonen 1983: 201f; Itkonen 2008: 295–297), or their concern is rather exclusively rationality (as in Itkonen 1984). Although the foundations for the metatheory of *causal* or *non-autonomous linguistics*, of which sociolinguistics and historical linguistics are part, were laid down in Itkonen (1983), the practical, explicit applications of normativity have thus far remained few (recent examples include Alho & Leppänen 2016; Alho & Leppänen 2017; Leppänen 2017). Nonetheless, as will be shown below, some aspects of the normative metatheory (the implicit application of RE, for example) have at least since the 19th century remained central in most schools of historical linguistics.

In the context of this chapter, the concept of *norm* should be understood as a constitutive element in the ontology of language and in the philosophy of linguistics. Some studies on norms, variation and change (for example Bartsch 1987; Kauhanen 2006; Tagliamonte 2006: 9), however, focus on norm as an *evaluative* or *prescriptive* concept (which indeed are possible definitions or uses of the term). Due to the focus of this chapter being elsewhere, these aspects are not discussed here at length, although they should by no means be ignored in the more general discussion of language activity.

The motivation for examining variation and change jointly originates from the widely acknowledged fact that the two seem to be intimately connected and, perhaps, causally interdependent: countless studies indicate that variation is the starting point of language change and, vice versa, the appearance of variation itself can only be the result of past changes (cf. Anttila 1989: 47; Guy 2003: 370f). There is consensus that the study of language change must take social aspects into account (Salmons 1990; Milroy 2006). However, equating variation and change at the conceptual or practical level in linguistic analysis is not unproblematic (cf. Coseriu 1974: 12f).

Considering the current state of research, within the confines of this chapter only a preliminary analysis of the many aspects, which are discussed or alluded to here, is possible; to be sure, most claims and case studies presented here are more than deserving of book-length expositions. It is hoped that the present contribution will stimulate further interest towards advancing the normative view on linguistic variation and change and encourage sociolinguists and historical linguists to make their metatheoretical standpoint more explicit in their research endeavors.

2. Metatheoretical foundations of sociolinguistics and historical linguistics

Describing language as a synchronic system is the domain of *autonomous linguistics*, while the study of diatopic and diastratic variation (= sociolinguistics)[1] and language change (= historical linguistics) belongs to *non-autonomous linguistics* (see Itkonen 1983: 1–13 for definitions). The difference between the two domains is, roughly, that the former is based on the analysis of intuitively known *rules of language*, while the latter investigates the spatiotemporal manifestations of these rules (i.e. their actual, context-specific output). Like other branches of non-autonomous linguistics (such as psycholinguistics and linguistic typology), sociolinguistics and historical linguistics involve both correctness and rationality. Before exploring these aspects in detail, we need to define linguistic variation and language change (i.e. the subject matter of sociolinguistics and historical linguistics, respectively) more precisely.

2.1 Defining linguistic variation

The most basic definition of linguistic variation (and of the task of investigating said variation), without further qualifications, goes as follows:

> In essence, the study of language variation and change investigates the ways in which language is variable, the distribution of the variants and the many factors that determine the choice of one variant over others. (Krug et al. 2013: 1)

The inherent variability of language is a matter of fact, arising out of a practical necessity: it is not implausible to argue that language without variation would, all things considered, be *dysfunctional* (Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 101). The appearance, or choice, of certain variants over others is investigated with relation to its correlation with certain *variables* such as the age, sex, education, occupation, etc., of the language user. The variants themselves do not typically contrast with each other with respect to meaning or function (cf. Labov 2008: 2–3; Tagliamonte 2012: 4–5):

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1. By *sociolinguistics* I understand the study of all kinds of (non-diachronic) linguistic variation, including such fields as dialectology and variationist (or empirical) sociolinguistics; in this chapter the latter is taken as a prototypic representative of the field. There exist, of course, many subfields with fine-grained distinctions, but, for the purposes of this chapter, this general (albeit simplistic) grouping will suffice.

> Social and stylistic variation presuppose the option of saying "the same thing" in several different ways: that is, the variants are identical in referential and truth value, but opposed in their social and/or stylistic significance. (Labov 1972: 271)

To illustrate this, consider the following examples (from Tagliamonte 2006: 9):

(1) a. I ain't gotta tell you nothing/anything.
b. I haven't gotta tell you nothing/anything.
c. I don't have to tell you nothing/anything.

To this may be added the geographic dimension: different expressions are used for 'the same thing' in different areas, even within the same linguistic community. This brings us to a total of three different types of (synchronic) linguistic variation: (1) *diatopic* (= geographic, dialectal), (2) *diastratal* (= social, i.e. age, sex, class, education, etc.), and (3) *stylistic* variation (cf. Southworth 1990; Tagliamonte 2012: 25f). To conclude, I see no fundamental, ontological differences between the different types of variation (but for a further type, "diachronic variation", see below).

As previously noted, sociolinguistics utilizes both the synchronic grammatical descriptions (à la autonomous linguistics, Saussurean *langue*) and the actual spatiotemporally occurring data (Saussurean *parole*, cf. Krug et al. 2013: 6f), of which the former belongs – in the normative perspective – to the domain of correctness, the latter to that of rationality (see below). An ultra-empiricist position, which totally ignores synchronic, autonomous description, is a conceptual and practical impossibility.[2] Of course, any good definition takes this into account, for example:

> In my view, variationist sociolinguistics is most aptly described as the branch of linguistics which studies the foremost characteristics of language in balance with each other – linguistic structure and social structure; grammatical meaning and social meaning – those properties of language which require reference to both external (social) and internal (systemic) factors in their explanation.
>
> (Tagliamonte 2006: 5)

In normative terms, this means that – although clearly a manifestation of non-autonomous linguistics – sociolinguistics operates with both correctness and rationality aspects of language. These aspects are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

One of the problems of the study of linguistic variation is the definition of *speech community*. It is obvious that speakers of different varieties form different speech communities existing adjacent to (or overlapping) each other, several smaller communities may form larger ones, and a single person may simultaneously

2. On the hierarchy of methods used in non-autonomous linguistics, see Pajunen & Itkonen (this volume).

belong to more than one community, depending on various geopolitical, social and historical factors. But how exactly can the boundaries of a certain speech community be drawn? Variation surely penetrates speech communities, meaning that "a speech community cannot be conceived as a group of speakers who all use the same forms; it is best defined as a group who share the same norms in regard to language" (Labov 1972: 158).[3] The basic characteristics of a speech community include (1) well-defined limits, (2) a common structural base, and (3) a unified set of sociolinguistic norms (Labov 2007: 347–348; Tagliamonte 2012: 100f). This problem will be approached within the normative context in Section 3.

As a final note, it ought to be mentioned that modern sociolinguistics has a strong functionalist focus in its explanatory principles, which already indicates a close affinity with the view on language as a primarily social activity endorsed in this volume.[4] The following quote from an experienced sociolinguist expresses this fact in a concise manner:

> I have come to see that much of the structured variation that exists in language can be ascribed to the social nature of its use, and to the plurality of functions that it serves. (Sankoff 1980: 258)

2.2 Defining language change

Every living language undergoes perpetual change. Language change, especially change that has already taken place, is investigated by *historical linguistics*, another branch of non-autonomous linguistics. The main tasks of the historical linguist are, first, to describe and explain changes in the grammar and lexicon of a particular language, and second, to reconstruct the proto-language of a group of genetically related languages (having, of course, first established such relationships). Although the perspective is by definition diachronic, the starting point (as well as the end point of reconstruction) must nonetheless be a synchronic, autonomous description of a language. It is also often useful to divide the history of a language into several synchronic stages (which, of course, are mere conventional stratifications), for

3. To be sure, Labov's definition of a norm is not exactly the same as its primary one in this volume. Like most sociolinguists, he seems to identify norm as an (exclusively) evaluative concept.

4. Not all sociolinguists agree with this statement. For example, Labov (1994: 547f) is generally critical of functional explanations, but in the context of his study he mainly deals with sound change. Moreover, Labov's definition of *functional* appears to include only the goal of expressing semantic and grammatical meanings – it goes without saying that this is not the *only* function of human language, albeit it certainly is a central one. Walker (2010: 24), in a distinctively programmatic tone, sees sociolinguistic investigations to be basically theory-free, in line with the ultra-empiricist trend in some subfields of 21st century linguistics.

example Proto-Indo-European > Proto-Germanic > Old English > Middle English > Early Modern English > Present-day English.

A key component of historical linguistic analysis is the actually attested data, which almost always occurs in the form of written texts (Rauch 1990; Winter 1990). The investigation of the "raw data" itself is carried out in specific branches such as epigraphy (study of texts written on hard surface), papyrology (study of texts written on papyrus) and philology (study of texts transmitted via copyist tradition), etc. Strictly speaking, these branches are not part of historical linguistics, since their perspective is mostly synchronic, and they do not necessarily engage in directly discussing specifically linguistic phenomena. As a matter of practical fact, however, the practicing historical linguist is often also a trained philologist (vel sim.).

Language change occurs every time and everywhere. It is best perceived by comparing written texts from several periods of the same language. For example (Campbell 2013: 6):

(2) a. *Soðlice þu eart of hym, þyn spræc þe gesweotolað.*
(Old English, *The West-Saxon Gospels*, c. 1050)
b. *Treuli thou art of hem; for thi speche makith thee knowun.*
(Middle English, *The Wycliff Bible*, 14th century)
c. *Surely thou also art one of them, for thy speech bewrayeth thee.*
(Early Modern English, *The King James Bible*, 1611)
d. *Surely you are another of them; your accent gives you away!*
(Present-day English, *The New English Bible*, 1961)

These excerpts (all from Matthew 26:73) deliver, in essence, the same meaning content (which ultimately stems from the original Ancient Greek New Testament) in different versions. What is more, all four excerpts, the language forms they represent, and the linguistic communities which produced them, are situated on a diachronic continuum, following each other in chronological succession. These are the manifest results of language change. The process itself has, at least since Weinreich, Labov & Herzog (1968),[5] been conceptualized as involving two stages: *innovation* and *spread*. How these aspects relate to (and can be understood within) the normative metatheory, will be examined in Section 4.

Sometimes language change has been defined as *variation in time* ("saying the same thing in different times"), but there is a fundamental distinction to be made here: while synchronic variation is omnipresent, it is also *reversible*, meaning that variant expressions can be substituted for one other within certain pragmatic limitations. Diachronic change, however, is *irreversible*, that is, it is

5. This characterization appears, however, already in Coseriu 1974: 58f (originally published in the 1950s).

unidirectional in the sense that expressions, which have changed or fallen out of use, have done so permanently – should a change appear to have been reversed (e.g. the Pre-Latin form **somos* 'we are' developed into Classical Latin *sumus* and finally "back again" into Spanish *somos*), it is not a case of "diachronic variation" but a completely new change.[6]

By a large margin, most historical linguistic research has been conducted in the structuralist-typological-functional (henceforth referred to as *functionalist*) framework; Indo-European studies of the 19th century, for example (including such names as William D. Whitney, Hermann Paul, and Ferdinand de Saussure), are obvious notable precursors of this school. Important 20th to 21st century representatives include, for example, Martinet (1955), Hoenigswald (1966), Coseriu (1974), Anttila (1989), and Campbell (2013) – not to mention the now vast literature on *grammaticalization*, the majority of which also represents this tradition (for example, Heine 1997 and Lehmann 2015). In the latter half of the 20th century, other viewpoints emerged. First, the birth of generative linguistics (even though mainstream generativism has been strongly synchronic) generated several attempts towards integrating that framework with and into historical linguistics, exemplified by King (1969), Lightfoot (1979, 1999), the numerous important contributions of Paul Kiparsky, and more recently Ringe and Eska (2013). In addition to the formalist form of expression, generative historical linguistics differs from the functionalist tradition by denying the relevance of analogy and emphasizing the role of language acquisition in language change.[7] Second, as an alternative to the generativist and functionalist views, some notable scholars (for example, Lass 1997; Croft 2000; Givón 2002) have compared language change with biological evolution, demonstrating that the two phenomena unarguably share several important characteristics (on the role of the *evolutionary explanation* in linguistics, see Itkonen 2013/2014: 16–18), perhaps to the point of being one and the same phenomenon.[8]

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6. To give more absurd examples, it is not possible that variation exists on the diachronic axis in such form as saying *þu* on Mondays, *thou* on Tuesdays, and *you* on all other weekdays, or, saying *þu* when it is raining, *thou* when it is cloudy, and *you* when it is sunny.

7. The latter is manifested in the transmission of grammars from parents to children (King 1990: 254–255) – an idea, which originates from Halle (1962). For a more recent analysis, see Zipser 2012.

8. Comparisons between language change/linguistics and evolution/evolutionary biology are, in fact, much older. This line of thought was pursued in the mid-19th century by August Schleicher (1861/1862), a contemporary of Charles Darwin and a pioneer of Indo-European studies and historical linguistics. On the "biologist controversy" in modern linguistics from a more general perspective, see the discussion in Everett 2005 and the responses that followed (Anderson & Lightfoot 2006; Everett 2006).

Apart from occasional remarks, it is not the task of this chapter to critically evaluate all competing views on language change: the functionalist view is endorsed here without further qualification.

2.3 Rational explanation

As noted above, the most important characteristics of non-autonomous linguistics – including sociolinguistics and historical linguistics – are, first, combining empirically unfalsifiable *correctness* with the empirically observable *spatiotemporality*, and second, the use of the *rational explanation* (RE) in explaining the occurrence of the (spatiotemporal) pieces of linguistic data. But what does this mean in practice? For most linguists working in the functionalist framework, this is self-evident and automatic, albeit not all scholars are explicitly aware of the metatheoretical aspects. I will briefly illustrate everyday sociolinguist and historical linguist practice by discussing a number of prototypical examples.

A stock example of a variationist sociolinguistic study is the one conducted by Labov in three New York City department stores in the 1960s (originally published in 1966, second edition as Labov 2006). The goal was to investigate the distribution of occurrence of the preconsonantal and word-final *r* in the speech of New Yorkers. The phrase under investigation, in all its simplicity, was this (Labov 2006: 46):

(3) *four<u>r</u>th floo<u>r</u>*

The presence or omission of *r* in both casual and emphatic pronunciation of this phrase was then reflected upon several variables, including age, race and occupational group of the interviewee. It was found that – roughly – older white people of higher status tended to pronounce the *r*'s more often than other groups, and more often emphatically than casually. This is obviously an empirical finding, but there is an important implicit rational component involved: the results of the study can be *understood* at two levels. First, since the interviews were carried out in everyday, natural contexts (as opposed to an artificial laboratory experiment), the results reflect the intuitive language use of the interviewees, which itself is entirely rational. Second, the apparent intersubjective and inter-group variation is also rational within the known social context of New York City at that time. Labov's investigation strives, primarily, towards *understanding* the underlying causality regulating the occurrence of the variants. In this strive, RE occupies a central role.

In the interpretation of historical data, the centrality of RE is equally unquestionable. The interpretation of linguistic material from older periods is, however, often limited by the availability of contextual information crucial to understanding the rationality of the language user (although some rationality principles are no doubt universal). In some cases, the attested data of the language is so fragmentary

that it is difficult (or impossible) for the linguist to internalize the norms of the language, that is, to *learn* the language. Moreover, it may appear from time to time that some of the texts that we encounter (short graffitos, for example) are "free" of rationality: so nonsensical that the ultimate explanation for the text or for a particular variant form in it lies beyond our capabilities. Before making such a conclusion, one should at least *try* to explain the text at hand.

An illuminating example of the implicit application of RE on a difficult historical material is Opfermann (2018), where the author attempts to find an explanation for a short inscription, written in Oscan, and for the associated drawing. The piece was originally discovered on a wall of the *Casa del Fauno* in Pompeii. The text reads approximately "**pis.pis dd**" in the Oscan national alphabet and is surrounded by several horizontal and vertical lines (and a small circle), which appear systematic but do not form a clear graphic representation of anything. The first word of the inscription resembles the Latin indefinite pronoun *quisquis* 'anybody' (of which it most likely is cognate), and the two following letters may be an abbreviation of sorts (but its meaning is not obvious). Instead of declaring the inscription and the drawing incomprehensible, Opfermann endeavors to *understand* the motives of the writer of the text by proposing a plausible interpretation. By comparing the drawing to the city plan of Pompeii, he finds considerable resemblance between the two, and the word **pis.pis** is written on the site of the local *forum* (a place where "anybody can go") and the letters **dd** appear on the temple of Jupiter (one possible interpretation is that the abbreviation refers to a religious dedication). Although we may never be entirely sure whether Opfermann has discovered the real meaning of the text and the drawing, the application of RE has nonetheless brought a near-incomprehensible piece of historical data within the grasp of our understanding, first and foremost the indefinite pronoun **pis.pis**, which can henceforth be used as a legitimate piece of evidence for the Oscan language. Opfermann's analysis is also an example of *pattern explanation*. In cases like this, the historical and/or philological interpretation of the data is in many ways similar to *pragmatics*, as observed by Kauko (2015: 13).

In *explaining* linguistic change, RE plays a likewise important role. Let us examine a concrete example from Greek historical morphology (Horrocks 2010: 73): Ancient Greek (forms of the Classical Attic dialect cited here as standard) had a number of irregular verb inflections, which had survived as archaisms of their Proto-Indo-European origins. A small number of verbs exhibit variation between the singular and plural stem forms (person and number are primarily coded by endings in Greek), namely the verb 'to know' (with perfect conjugation but present meaning), and several athematic aorists, exemplified here by 'to put' (these vowel alternations are reflexes of the Proto-Indo-European ablaut). The conjugation of these verbs is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Ancient Greek conjugation of 'to know' and 'to put'

	'to know' PERF	'to put' AOR
1SG	*oĩda*	*ét^{h}ē-k-a*
2SG	*oĩst^{h}a* (< **oĩdt^{h}a*)	*ét^{h}ē-k-as*
3SG	*oĩde*	*ét^{h}ē-k-e*
1PL	*ísmen* (< earlier *ídmen*, cf. Homeric usage)	*ét^{h}ĕ-men*
2PL	*íste* (< **ídte*)	*ét^{h}ĕ-te*
3PL	*ísāsi(n)*	*ét^{h}ĕ-san*

Relatively early in the Ionic dialect, the plural forms were remodeled after the singular stems and the regular (non-alternating) verb classes into *oídamen* 1PL., *oídate* 2PL., *oídasi* 3PL., and *et^{h}ékamen* 1PL., *et^{h}ékate* 2PL., *ét^{h}ēkan* 3PL., respectively. Eventually these forms spread throughout the Greek language and ousted the original forms from use outside high literature. From the structural perspective, the mechanism for this paradigmatic levelling is straightforward: the singular verb stem (the unmarked, most frequent form) is taken as the analogical model and extended into the plural in order to avoid functionally redundant stem allomorphy in accordance with the *one-meaning*, *one-form* (1M1F) principle (for this particular case, see Leppänen 2014: 131). In fact, the 1M1F principle can be rephrased as a high-level rationality principle: simplification of irregular and polymorphic paradigms in order to keep communication simple and effective. Although we lack exact statistical data of the development and spread of these forms, for the 21st century linguist the most important fact is that we can *understand* why Ancient Greek speakers tended to change their language into the direction which they did; we understand their motives and goals and, hence, implicitly apply RE in the explanation for the analogical levelling of the Greek irregular verbs. Similar cases abound in historical linguistic research.

RE may also be implicitly (or even unknowingly) present in historical linguistic research conducted in other than functionalist frameworks. In an interesting paper, Martin Haspelmath (1999) suggests that, rather than assumed to be part of an innate Universal Grammar, the grammatical constraints of Optimality Theory ought to be reinterpreted as (or, in fact, *reduced* into) constraints of language use:

> [W]hat is "good" from the point of view of the theory is good from the point of view of language users. Grammatical optimality and user optimality are largely parallel. […] [W]e can answer the question […] why the grammatical constraints are the way they are: The grammatical constraints are ultimately based on the constraints on language users. (Haspelmath 1999: 186–187)

> If my proposal is correct, then the grammatical constraints are not innate, and are not part of Universal Grammar. They arise from general constraints on language use, which for the most part are in no way specific to language.
>
> (Haspelmath 1999: 204)

Haspelmath's proposal seems quite correct to me.[9] What is more, it turns out that the notion of *user optimality* corresponds very closely to the rationality principles of the normative metatheory, which, in turn, are amenable to RE. It seems that the application of RE in historical linguistics cannot be avoided.

3. Conceptualizing variation in normative terms

In this section, I will examine different types of linguistic variation from the normative perspective. The goal is to try to find adequate conceptualizations for these variation types and to investigate their role in linguistic descriptions.

3.1 Types of linguistic variation

A *rule of language* is a norm that either combines the meaning of a linguistic sign to its physical (typically, but not exclusively phonetic) form or defines the occurrence of such signs in syntagmata, thus determining the correctness of linguistic expressions (see Introduction to this volume). Taking the Labovian definition of variation, i.e. "saying the same thing [= meaning] in different ways [= forms]" (see above), as the starting point, it seems that the issue of linguistic variation is ontologically quite straightforward: since there unarguably exist different forms for expressing a given meaning, and since each meaning-form-pairing represents a separate rule, then such variants must also be manifestations of different rules. This is, of course, cross-linguistically self-evident: for example, a tall plant with a trunk, twigs and leaves is called *tree* in English, *Baum* in German, *arbor* in Latin, *puu* in Finnish, and so forth. But within a single language, such variants also occasionally occur, for example the two English future formations (*will* + INF, *going to* + INF), or the neuter singular form of the simple demonstrative pronoun in German dialects (*das* – Standard German, *dat* – Low German, *des* – Bavarian, etc.). The issue is obviously more complicated than that and deserves closer examination.

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9. To be sure, I do not agree with Haspelmath on his suggestion that the concept of *adaptation* (borrowed from evolutionary biology) would be a necessary component of the theory of language change.

Let us, however, begin by discussing a certain type of variation that certainly occurs in everyday language activity but is practically *never* described in grammars and lexica of languages, namely the occasional occurrence of *incorrect* expressions. This is due to the fact that norms cannot be falsified nor their existence nullified by the occurrence of counter-normative expressions (Itkonen 2003: 22–31; Itkonen 2008: 294; see also Introduction, this volume). Yet, incorrect expressions are by no means seldom, and their occurrence is differently motivated in different contexts.

First, insufficient degree of *internalization* of the corresponding norm, such as during (adult) language learning or (child) language acquisition, may act as a precipitating factor. For example, English-acquiring children of certain age groups tend to produce **goed* or **wented* as the preterit form of *go*, instead of *went* (Kuczaj 1977). Such forms are not recorded in the grammars of English for the simple reason that they are incorrect expressions. In the later stages of language acquisition, such forms are abandoned, as the correct form is eventually learned (i.e. properly internalized). As for learner mistakes, the author of this chapter used to order minced meat in the local supermarket in Munich by uttering *ich hätte gern gemischten* [ACC.SG.M] *Hackfleisch* "I would like to have mixed [of pork and beef] minced meat", until informed by a colleague of his that the German noun *Fleisch* "meat" is actually of neuter gender (the correct expression thus being *gemischtes* [ACC.SG.N] *Hackfleisch* in this context). Yet, **der Fleisch* will (and should) never be mentioned in German dictionaries, since it is an incorrect expression.

Second, outside of everyday language use, abnormal expressions may be differently motivated. This explains, for example, the not infrequent occurrence of incorrect expression in jokes and postmodernist poetry, and the nonstandard language use of intoxicated persons or persons with an innate speech disorder (ranging from stuttering to aphasia). The use of deliberately incorrect expressions may also be useful in teaching, i.e. demonstrating the learners which forms *not* to use. Without doubt, all such cases are amenable to RE, but – once again – the incorrect expressions occurring in such contexts are not represented in (autonomous) linguistic descriptions.

Third, human beings are prone to making mistakes for no particular reasons or motivations (although for some mistakes there certainly is a physiological explanation). This occurs from time to time also in their language activity. Cold and windy weather, for example, tends to render the muscles around the mouth and the lips so numb that pronouncing certain words becomes difficult, but there is no evidence that such phenomena affect language structure. Rapid typing on a computer keyboard results sometimes in such orthographic mistakes as **teh* (for *the*), **occurence* and **improtant*. But there need not exist such overt motivation: random errors occur also by their own virtue. Needless to say, such errors are discarded in

linguistic descriptions due their incorrect nature, but note how this kind of linguistic activity is nonetheless amenable to RE.

It should also be mentioned that language exhibits a certain degree of totally *meaningless* variation. It as an empirical fact that every single utterance of, say, the vowel [ɑ] is acoustically slightly different, even when produced by the same speaker in the same phonetic context.[10] This is called the "fundamental fact of phonetics" by Labov (2008: 2). Such subphonemic variation serves no functional purpose and is only measurable by modern laboratory equipment.

All the above variation types are characterized not only by their incorrect (but rational) nature but also by the fact that a great deal of such variation is not deliberately copied or followed (cf. Polomé 1990: 5). To be more precise, in most cases the incorrect variant occurs *instead of* the correct one, revealing the existence of the corresponding norm. We will now turn to such variation types where (1) the incorrect nature of (some of) the involved variants is not that self-evident, or (2) all the involved variants are (or seem to be) intuitively correct.

Let us consider the following examples, taken from Tagliamonte (2006: 10–11, emphasis original):[11]

(4) a. I did a college course when I *lefØ* school actually, but I *left* it because it was business studies.
b. You go to Leeds and Castleford, they take it so much more *seriously* … They really are, they take it so *seriousØ*.
c. She *were* a good worker. She *was* a helluva good worker.

These examples illustrate the side-by-side occurrence of phonological (*left* vs. *lef-Ø*), morphological (*seriously* vs. *serious-Ø* adv.) and morphosyntactic (*she was* vs. *she were*) variation in everyday speech. What is characteristic for this kind of variation is that the "substandard" variants (*lef-Ø*, *serious-Ø*, *she were*) are not perceived as incorrect by the speakers of this dialect in these particular contexts.

Let us examine the third case, that is, *was/were* variation more closely. First of all, English grammars invariably prescribe *was* for 1SG. and 3SG, *were* for all other persons, the grammatical person of the subject being the only distinguishing factor (as it indeed historically was). This is unarguably the norm in most written registers of English; for example, in a scholarly publication an expression such as **the results was inconclusive* would certainly be judged as incorrect.[12] Second, Tagliamonte

10. For variation among phonological systems of individuals, see, e.g., Labov 1994: 98f.

11. The data originate from the York English Corpus.

12. Although in marginal cases there *do* exist variation, for example, *the data was problematic* vs. *the data were problematic*.

(1998) has identified certain important tendencies in the York corpus regarding the distribution of *was/were*, two of which deserve mention here: (1) negative polarity tends to trigger nonstandard *were*, while existential constructions prefer *was* even with plural subject, and (2) younger speakers and especially females tend to use nonstandard forms more often. The first tendency is, according to Tagliamonte (1998: 162), so strong that she judges expressions such as **We wasn't living there then* to be "impossible" (= incorrect) in York dialect.[13] This is an important finding, since she has apparently identified a *norm* – the possibility of making a mistake being a clear indication thereof. The second tendency indicates that not only the spatiotemporal occurrences but also the degree of correctness varies between certain social groups (qua linguistic communities). Whether certain nonstandard uses of *was/were* have indeed been interpreted as *norms* within young females is, however, not entirely certain, and Tagliamonte does not comment thereupon. As a final note, the variation regarding the use of *was* and *were* has its limits which can be tested by intuition. For example, it is not correct to utter **she is* instead of *she was* (or *she were*), since it no longer means the same thing. Likewise, utterances such as **she wazöc* are of course incorrect in every variety of English. Variation always has its limits.

It is also possible that languages exhibit a certain amount of structural variation in the sense that more than one utterance is equally correct and has no salient functional or sociolinguistic motivation. For example:

(5) a. He*'s got* bad-breath; he *has* smelly feet.
(Tagliamonte 2006: 11, emphasis original)
b. (Finnish) näyttää hyvä*ltä* [ABL.SG.] ~ näyttää hyvä*lle* [ALL.SG.] 'look good'
c. (German, colloquial) und ~ un 'and'

In general, this kind of variation seems to be relatively rare, most likely due to the fact that speakers (and grammars) tend to avoid purposeless variation (cf. Anttila 1989: 180–181). In any case, such variation needs to be conceptualized within the normative framework.

To conclude, an epistemological note concerning linguistic variation is in order:

> *Data* is always uncertain in connection with *variation*: there is no reliable intuition about frequencies of occurrence, investigated in the context of geographical or social dialects or of linguistic change. The same applies to extraordinary use of language. … The data known with certainty coincides with so-called *clear cases*, and the data not known with certainty covers the domain of less-than-clear cases.
> (Itkonen 2003: 34, emphasis original)

13. However, I am not entirely sure whether Tagliamonte's term *impossible* means "does not appear in the corpus" or "is incorrect (in the normative sense)", or both.

3.2 Variation and norms

The existing literature on linguistic norms acknowledges the fact that some norms subsume variation and that incorrect expressions occur occasionally, but a more accurate conceptualization is, in my opinion, a desideratum, towards which an attempt is made here. A single occurrence of an incorrect (or variant) expression is certainly amenable to RE, but I am interested in how the occurrence of such expressions relates to the aspect of *correctness* (which, as argued in this volume, is the most central constitutive aspect of linguistic structure).

Without making any statements about variation leading to, or being symptomatic of, language change, or about the social distribution and conditioning of the variants, it is possible to distinguish three types of variation by observing their relation to correctness:

1. Variation occurring in the context of incomplete internalization of norms, abnormal language use, and random mistakes can be characterized as involving *both* a correct expression *and* an incorrect one.[14] By way of RE, it is possible to explain the occurrence of the incorrect variant *instead of* the correct one (the latter of which, by default, should have occurred). Note that this covers only *clear cases*, that is, variation where the correct expression is *with certainty* known to be correct, and the incorrect one is likewise with certainty known not to be correct.
2. Variation occurring within the grammar of a language (*has got* vs. *has*, *näyttää* + ABL vs. *näyttää* + ALL) or within a certain dialect or register of a language (*she was* vs. *she were*) can be characterized as involving *only* correct expressions, as understood within the rules of the variety in question. This kind of variation consists, basically, of the *variable rules* of sociolinguistics (cf. Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 167). Again, this covers only clear cases, where the correctness of both occurring variants is known with certainty. The choice or preference for a particular variant over the another in a given context is amenable to RE, and is, in most cases, due to social factors (e.g. choosing formal variants in an academic presentation and informal ones in a familiar occasion).
3. Variation occurring outside of the boundaries of with certainty known correctness (such as some uses of *was* and *were* in Tagliamonte's study) belongs to the *grey area* of normativity. This grey area is characterized by the lack of certain knowledge of the correctness status of (some of) the involved variants,

14. According to Itkonen (1983: 178) the principal types of norm-violation are caused by (1) faulty internalization, or (2) free decision to violate the norm.

covering the *less-than-clear cases* mentioned above. This kind of variation is, according to Itkonen (1978: 136, 151, 168), caused by the lack of *social control* at the normative level. There exist, of course, various degrees of "greyness" unique to every particular situation. How the grey area relates to language change will be discussed below.

I will henceforth refer to variation (1) as *non-normative variation* or *occasional variation*, due to its involvement with incorrect (i.e. norm-breaking) variants. Variation (2) will be called *normative variation* or *norm-subsumed variation*, since all the occurring variants are correct, that is, there exists a corresponding norm (or several norms, see below). Lastly, variation (3) will be called *grey variation* because of the grey area metaphor used in previous research (also cf. Pinzuk 2003: 509–510). These variation types are illustrated in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1. Types of variation

This preliminary typology is in many ways problematic, since it may often be difficult for the linguist to distinguish these types from one another in a given case of occurring variation. The main function of this typology is to illustrate that different types of variation relate differently to the notion of correctness, which, in turn, has implications for the existence and nature of rules of language. These variation types are also referred to in the discussion of language change.

Type (2) variation involves a particular problem regarding the nature of the variation-subsuming norm: if the expressions e_1 and e_2 for a given meaning *m* exist and both e_1 and e_2 are intuitively known to be correct (thus indicating the existence of a norm), are e_1 and e_2 subsumed under a single norm N_a, or under separate norms N_{a1} for e_1 and N_{a2} for e_2, which happen to coexist simultaneously? To phrase it differently, does the Saussurean concept of the linguistic sign (form *e* is used to express meaning *m*) involve the possibility of variation regarding the *signifiant* (forms e_1 and e_2 are both used to express meaning *m*)? Moreover, we need to distinguish the ontology of such rules from internalization of such rules (cf. Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 156). This is an important question not only from the ontological perspective but also because it pertains to actual linguistic research.

To demonstrate this, let us examine a recent study (Alho & Leppänen 2016), where the co-occurrence of variant forms in historical data was investigated within the normative framework. The standard government for the Latin prepositions *ex* 'from' and *dē* '(down) from' is the ablative case, but during the first three centuries AD these prepositions occur with NPs in the accusative in a number of brick stamps manufactured in the area around Rome. The stamp texts, which are of highly technical nature and feature much more abbreviations than inscriptions in general, were composed by an assistant of the brickworks owner, most likely a freedman. Although the normative status of *ex/dē*+ABL as the sole correct expression in the high literature (and, no doubt, in the higher registers of spoken Latin) is indisputable, the appearance of such seemingly incorrect expressions as *ex figlīnās* acc.pl. 'from the brickworks' in technical texts is somewhat puzzling. The issue is also problematic, because sociolinguistic fieldwork (in the Labovian sense) is not possible: the only available data of the Latin language consist of ancient texts, meaning that statistical investigations are either not possible at all or their value is limited due to the scarcity of data (cf. Adams 2013: 8–11) – and in any case the existence or non-existence of a norm cannot be induced solely from statistical observations. Considering the social and historical background of Roman brick manufacturing and the nature of Latin prepositional phrases, Alho & Leppänen conclude that the norm governing PP government was variable in the Latin language of the first three centuries AD. The variation was socio-stylistically conditioned: the ablative-governing variant belonged properly to the higher, more formal registers, while the accusative-governing variant was characteristic of lower, more familiar registers (Alho & Leppänen 2016: 12). The occurrence of the lower variant in a "wrong" place was most likely due to the imperfect command of the literary register on the part of the writers of the stamp texts. Thus, this is a case of type (2) *normative variation*. However, Alho and Leppänen are unable to answer the questions, how widespread the variation was and what were its actual conditioning factors. This issue also has theoretical implications, since it is far from clear how norms, variation and the limits of the speech community are interrelated.

3.3 Norms and the speech community

A speech community is typically defined as a group of people who share a set of linguistic norms and the expectations on how to use them, and who share a feeling of community membership (Bloomfield 1933: 42–45). The last criterion is clearly extra-linguistic and is not discussed here. The first two criteria correspond, roughly, to the notions of correctness and rationality, respectively, as expounded in this volume. To put it in other words, *a speech community shares the same norms*.

But the issue is more problematic than that (cf. Kauhanen 2006: 37): first, speech communities typically exist side-by-side and a person is often simultaneously a member of more than one community; second, in large communities (e.g. "the English-speaking world") the borders of adjacent or overlapping sub-communities are sometimes difficult to define in exact terms; third, as a matter of fact both the language used by the community and the community itself are in a state of constant change (Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 102 fn. 5); fourth, normative variation apparently subsumed by norms of these macro-communities and the status of such norms require more extensive explication.

These issues cannot be fully investigated within the confines of the present contribution. However, some preliminary observations can be made on the basis of the above explications and of previous research. First, norms and speech communities have a two-way relationship, which is not always unproblematic: members of the same speech community (i.e. speakers of the same language) share the same set of norms, and, vice versa, people sharing the same set of norms form a speech community. Second, speech communities vary in size and permanence: a friend circle may form a very small speech community (perhaps just 2–3 persons), which may exist only for a short time (e.g. a year), while the speakers of Spanish form a vast macro-community (of over 500 million speakers) that has existed for centuries (and most likely will keep existing in the future). The size of the community has important ramifications regarding the nature of norms in these communities. Third, studies on linguistic variation and change clearly indicate that there exists constant interaction between different speech communities and their norms; the situation where (a set of) norms are not compatible with each other is referred to as *norm conflict* (Milroy & Milroy 1993: 59–60). This aspect is tangible also in practical linguistic research, since – as noted by Kauhanen (2006: 41) – actual language activity is often impossible to categorize into discrete varieties.

In order to solve some of these issues, I suggest that the normative analysis of speech communities and variation should take the *scope* (or *extent*) of the norm into consideration: norms that only exist within small communities have small scope and tolerate less variation, while norms in large communities have large scope and generally (but not always!) tolerate more type (2) normative variation. How the *internalization* of norms relate to scope and variation, is in need of further inquiry. Also the relationship of language change, grey variation and norm conflict deserves closer investigation.

3.4 Statistical description and a methodological note

How, then, should linguistic variation be studied, if the occurrence of different types of variation (especially grey variation) excludes "ordinary", intuition-based grammatical analysis? In my view, empirical sociolinguistics, which employs statistic, empirical investigations (cf. Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 165) to complement autonomous grammatical descriptions, provides the most adequate tools for describing and explaining the occurrence of said variation, that is, statistical description of spatiotemporal occurrences reflected upon the autonomous-normative description, coupled with RE as *the* method for understanding and explaining human actions. Although the use of intuition *alone* in describing linguistic variation is certainly inadequate, so is the *sole* use of statistic (= corpus) analysis: "inessential use of a corpus" ought to be avoided (Itkonen 2005: 365).

The basic methodology for distinguishing different variation types goes as presented in Figure 2 (cf. Pinzuk 2003):



Figure 2. A methodological sketch

Having completed this schema, the linguist still needs to do every bit of actual sociolinguistic work, for example, data collection, correlational analysis, statistical description, causal analysis, and so on. The above explication of norms and variation – albeit preliminary and schematic – will serve as the basis for the investigation of language change from the normative perspective in the next section.

4. Ontology of language change

Since *language* is a social phenomenon, so should *language change* be understood first and foremost as a special case of social change (Itkonen 1984: 204). This was already observed by Meillet in 1906:

> From the fact that language is a social institution, it follows that linguistics is a social science, and the only variable element that we can resort to in accounting for linguistic change is social change, of which linguistic variations are only consequences, sometimes immediate and direct, more often mediated and indirect.
> (Meillet 1926: 17–18, transl. by Labov 2001: 22–23)

Likewise, since the grammar and the lexicon of a language consist of *norms*, then the change of these domains must involve change of norms in one way or another. So far is self-evident. How exactly does language change appear at the ontological (normative) level and what relevance do these aspects have for historical linguistic analysis?

4.1 Change of norms, innovation and propagation

Logically, there are three basic cases of norm change (and, hence, ultimately of language change):

1. The *appearance* of a new norm.
2. The *disappearance* of an existing norm.
3. Both 1. and 2. simultaneously, i.e. the *replacement* of an existing norm by a new one in the same "slot".

These cases concern first and foremost the aspect of correctness (i.e. rules of language), as rationality principles are generally universal, and a change of a rationality principle is very likely influenced by the extralinguistic circumstances of the speech community rather than exclusively linguistic factors.

As for the change of rules of grammar (as opposed to rules of language), we are here dealing with diachronic correspondences appearing in theoretical descriptions, which belong to a higher level of abstraction and is situated outside the "core-normativity", i.e. the pretheoretical rules which are intuitively known with certainty. Thus, change of higher-level rules of grammar concerning for example, phonological change, morphological change (e.g. analogy), grammaticalization, and so on, is a matter of how theoretical generalizations change with respect to the changing empirical data (i.e. manifestations of low-level rules of language), on which they are based. To give a concrete example, the Latin *rhotacism* (*s* > *r* /V_V), taking place at around 350 BC (Weiss 2011: 151), affected a large number of words and word forms that existed in the language at that time, e.g. ACC.SG. **honōz-em* (cf. NOM.SG. *honōs*) > *honōr-em* 'honor', 1st decl. gen.pl. ending **-āzum* (cf. Old Indic pronominal ending *-āsām*) > *-ārum*. Sound changes such as this cannot be directly described as norm changes, as the starting point and the end point of the change cannot be exemplified by (low-level) pretheoretical rule sentences. As such, the

Latin rhotacism is a theoretical generalization, which is based on the observation of diachronic data – ultimately the rules of language of successive diachronic stages of Latin. At the lowest level, the change concerns those rules that define the correctness of individual utterances (typically words), such as the phonological form of *honōrem* and *-ārum*. By observing the change of these rules (and of many more!), the historical linguist is in a position to formulate a generalization, i.e. the sound change in question.[15] This example also illustrates the necessity of taking both the normative and the spatiotemporal aspect into account in historical linguistics.

The normative "slot" mentioned in connection with norm replacement requires elucidation. Sometimes norms appear (or disappear) without replacing (or being replaced by) another norm. This occurs, for example, when a new word is coined or borrowed in order to conceptualize a novel invention (e.g. *radar* in English) or when a word that is no longer required by the speech community falls out of use and is ultimately forgotten (such as agrarian terminology in modern urban societies, e.g. *glebe* 'a field, portion of land assigned to a clergyman'). A typical case, however, is that an already existing norm is replaced by a new one, and the two are different in some respect. Let us consider a typical example of a rule of language that defines the correct phonological form of a lexeme, for example "*tree* means a tall plant with a stock and leaves": the PDE phonological form is /triː/, while its antecedent before the Great Vowel shift was /treː/. Thus, the old rule "/treː/ means a tall plant, etc." was lost and a new rule "/triː/ means a tall plant, etc." appeared, and since the *signifié* of both rules is the same (both can*not* logically exist at the same time in the same language), this is a case of norm replacement. It is also possible that the *signifiant* (i.e. the phonological form) remains the same, but the *signifié* (i.e. the meaning) of the word changes: for example, the old Germanic word for 'human' (e.g. Gothic *manna*, cognate of English *man* and German *Mann*) changed its meaning in some languages, so that the modern words *man* and *Mann* refer exclusively to a *male* human (sound changes have also taken place in individual languages, but this is irrelevant for the semantic content of the word in question).[16] To conclude, the replacement of a norm occurs when *either* the form *or* the meaning of a sign defined by the corresponding rule remains the same. This is the normative "slot" of the rule.

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15. Why normal phonological changes (such as Latin rhotacism) are, by definition, regular and exceptionless, is an important issue in the theory of language change. How change of norms (and normativity in general) relate to the regularity of sound change, requires further investigation elsewhere.

16. See Kluge & Seebold 2011, s.v. *Mann*; Kroonen 2013: 353–354. Cf. also Gothic *ni manna* 'nobody', Modern German *niemand* 'nobody', English *mankind*, etc., all of which are based on the meaning 'human' (rather than on 'man, male person').

Norm changes are not sudden or arbitrary: they typically start in relatively limited contexts and because of a certain external motivation, as results of linguistic actions performed by individual members of the speech community. But, since a norm is an intersubjective entity, it usually takes some time for people to internalize new norms or forget the existence of old ones; and the larger the speech community is in terms of number of members and the geographical extent of the community, the longer it takes for the change of norms to spread throughout the whole community. These aspects, i.e. the appearance of a norm change and its spread within the community, have in the theory of language change been conceptualized as *innovation* and *propagation*, respectively.[17] Let us examine these concepts from the normative perspective.

Innovation refers to the first appearance of a novel linguistic structure or form. This may be a first step towards a phonological (e.g. saying /triː/ instead of /treː/, or *honōrem* instead of **honōsem*), morphological (e.g. *oídamen* instead of *ídmen*), syntactic (*Did he see the dragon?* instead of *Saw he the dragon?*) or semantic (*man* refers only to a male human, not to both sexes) change, but not necessarily: the sole appearance of an innovation does not mean that it will ever be accepted by the speech community.[18] Concerning norms, innovation should not be confused with the process of *normativization*, which includes the "ontological leap" from a tendency into an obligation (see below); thus, innovation is not synonymous with the appearance of a new form. Rather, innovation should be understood as a *spatiotemporal* phenomenon: the first-time occurrence of a not-yet-existing linguistic structure or form appearing in attested text or speech. The explanation for why such a novel entity occurs in the first place, can be sought by way of RE, that is, by exposing the means/ends-teleology of the language user in that particular context. Without closer analysis, it is not possible to determine a priori, whether the innovation involves some of the variation types discussed above. Thus, innovation is first and foremost a pragmatic phenomenon concerned with a particular case of language activity.

Propagation, i.e. the spread of an innovative structure or form throughout the speech community, has often been maintained to be of exclusively non-linguistic and social nature: the spread of an innovation is not dependent on linguistic factors per se, but on social ones, such as prestige. There are, however, good grounds to presume that propagation also has a linguistic perspective: as a rule, *people only accept innovations they themselves could have made*, which is due to the fact that all

17. Alternative terms used for innovation include *actuation* and *Neuerung*, and for propagation *diffusion*, *spread* and *Übernahme*.

18. Or that a successful propagation in one sub-community spreads into the macro-community. See Alho & Leppänen 2017 for a recent study in the normative framework.

speakers are subject to the same structural patterns and rationality principles. Thus, propagation does have a linguistic filter, which is of intersubjective nature. As for the actual occurrence of a particular case of propagation, it, too, is amenable to RE, although also non-linguistic factors certainly play a role. Propagation may occur fast or slow, it may affect the whole linguistic community or only a part thereof: in fact, incomplete propagation in a large community may induce a formation of a sub-community. Under certain circumstances, propagation may also jump from one community into another (a typical case in language contact situations), and even from one language to others (as a *Sprachbund* phenomenon). Like innovation, in my view propagation should also be understood as a spatiotemporal phenomenon: the spread of norms *may* be a special case of propagation, but it concerns first and foremost the actually occurring language activity. The appearance and disappearance of norms are of course intimately involved in both innovation and propagation as language change phenomena, but they still need to be examined separately.

4.2 The "ontological leap" and the role of statistics

Norms differ from (generalizations of) regularities in that the latter concern spatiotemporal occurrences only while the former is not bound by or dependent on them.[19] Curiously, however, normatively correct utterances are in most cases also the most often occurring ones, but this is actually a no-brainer: in most situations, the use of correct utterances is *rational* – unless another factor, also subsumable under RE, motivates the use of an incorrect one. This claim is confirmed in practical terms by an important finding by Labov (1972: 203, emphasis removed):

> The ungrammaticality of everyday speech appears to be a myth with no basis in actual fact. In the various empirical studies that we have conducted, the great majority of utterances – about 75 percent – are well-formed sentences by any criterion. When rules of ellipsis are applied, and certain universal editing rules to take care of stammering and false starts, the proportion of truly ungrammatical and ill-formed sentences falls to less than two precent.

Before examining the methodological issue of how changing norms can be identified in the data, we need to discuss the process of *normativization* in more detail. By that term I mean, essentially, the birth of a new rule of language. This process involves an important "ontological leap": *a regularity is interpreted as an obligation by the speech community*. Note that normativization is different from both

19. Regularity of occurrence should not be confused with regularity of structure in grammatical descriptions (e.g. regular inflection vs. irregular inflection).

innovation and propagation, since these phenomena pertain to the creation and spread of *actually occurring* linguistic forms and structures, irrespective of their correctness value. However, innovation and propagation are, in fact, prerequisites for normativization, and the former thus logically (and temporally) precede the latter: *innovation* → *propagation* → *normativization*. This is nonetheless not a chain of necessity, as an innovation *need not* result in widespread propagation on the one hand, and propagation (especially only a partial one) *need not* result in normativization.

Successful propagation of an innovative linguistic entity typically follows the *S-curve*, exemplified in Figure 3 (Kroch 1989; Labov 1994: 65; Tagliamonte 2012: 90):



Figure 3. S-curve

The starting point is at the left end of the curve, where the entity e_1 occurs in 0% of the possible contexts (or "slots"), and the ideal end point is at the right end of the curve, where e_1 occurs in 100% of the possible contexts. If the novel entity e_1 replaces an existing entity e_2 in the same "slot", the occurrences are mutually exclusive and e_1 follows a rising S-curve, while e_2 follows a descending one. The S-curve is, of course, an idealization: in practical historical linguistic analysis, the scarcity of available data often limits the accuracy of statistical description. Furthermore, the contexts in which the use of linguistic entities occur do not generally recur in absolutely regular intervals.

The basic scheme goes as follows: in a certain context, a means/ends-rationality (amenable to RE) occasions the occurrence of a novel (possibly incorrect) linguistic

entity e_1. This is innovation. The conditions under which e_1 occurs recur, and e_1 is increasingly used in more diverse contexts (by analogy, for example) and by more and more members of the speech community (because of social reasons such as prestige). This is propagation. Once the occurrence of e_1 becomes regular enough, it *may* be interpreted as an obligation, i.e. its occurrence has become a rule, thus completing the "ontological jump". This is normativization. When exactly does this "ontological jump" occur, is a matter of debate: 50% may be a reasonable suggestion (Itkonen 2008: 297), but the issue is complicated. The basic scheme, namely, runs immediately into a serious difficulty: describing propagation and determining the point of normativization depend on the observation of spatiotemporally occurring linguistic activity, but "the existence of a rule cannot be established experimentally or by observing actual behaviour" (Itkonen 1978: 43). Moreover, it is certain that "ontological jumps" are sudden by nature.[20] How such sudden jumps can be interpreted from statistical observations (and keeping in mind that propagation is certainly a *gradual* rather than a sudden process), remains an unsolved issue (but cf. below for a methodological suggestion).

Although pinpointing the exact point of normativization may be subject to contextual interpretation, the whole process certainly involves a period of *grey area* of correctness, during which the novel entity is frequent enough to have made its way into general use but during which the correctness value of that entity is not intuitively known with certainty by the members of the speech community. Such grey area consists of type (3) grey variation, which, as now becomes clear, is characteristic of ongoing language change. I agree with Itkonen (2008: 296) that the most accurate means of describing and analyzing the grey area is by way of *statistics*, even though – as noted above – statistics cannot not replace intuition as the epistemology of norms, and the actual historical data available from different time periods is often fragmentary or unreliable (cf. Labov 1994: 11).

4.3 Phases of norm change: Methodological considerations

In a prototypical case of norm replacement ($N_1 \rightarrow \emptyset$, $\emptyset \rightarrow N_2$, or simply $N_1 > N_2$, concerning the correctness of expression e_1 and e_2, respectively), manifested in, for example, sound change (e.g. **s* > *r* /V_V in Latin), morphological change (e.g. Greek *ídmen* → *oídamen*), and syntactic change (e.g. *Saw he?* → *Did he see*?), five distinct phases can be identified:

20. Also some important grammar changes, such as phonemic restructuring, are sudden (Hockett 1958: 456–457).

1. N_1 in speech community: e_1 correct, e_2 does not occur, no variation.
2. N_1 in speech community: e_1 correct, e_2 occurs but is incorrect, type (1) non-normative variation.
3. Uncertainty in speech community (i.e. the grey area): correctness of e_1 and e_2 is not known, type (3) grey variation. At the individual level, both N_1 and N_2 may be internalized at the same time (cf. Fries & Pike 1949: 41–42).
4. N_1 disappears, N_2 undergoes normativization: e_1 (if it occurs anymore) incorrect, e_2 correct, type (1) non-normative variation.
5. N_2 in speech community: e_1 does not occur,[21] e_2 correct, no variation.

This is actually a refinement of Itkonen's generalization that language change proceeds from a period of certainty, via a grey area of uncertainty, into another (but different) period of certainty. Interestingly, type (2) normative variation is completely absent from this scheme. In fact, if N_1 did not disappear, the result would have been such variation: both e_1 and e_2 would have been correct, and the resulting new norm N_2 would subsume the correctness of both variants. As a side note, I have not found any evidence that the process of normativization (as a part of an instance of a language change) would be *exclusively* dependent on language acquisition, or on intergenerational transition or mediation of linguistic elements (cf. Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968: 109; Labov 1994: 47 n. 4; Labov 2007: 346 n. 4).[22]

The *norm conflict* that has been investigated by Bartsch (1987) does not, in my view, involve language change (i.e. grey variation) directly. Rather, norm conflicts in her sense occur when a language user (or a group of users) belongs simultaneously to several speech communities, the norms of which are not entirely identical (e.g. local spoken dialect vs. national standard language). Conflicts arise in actual language use situations, where different users have internalized different sets of norms in the same "slots", and the non-linguistic social meanings associated with such norms motivate users to judge or evaluate each other's language use. It is certainly possible that norm conflicts lead to language change, but insofar as the existence of the involved speech communities is not threatened by any external factor, the situation is relatively stable, and corresponds to type (2) normative variation from the point of view of the macro-community (cf. the above discussion on the scope of norms).

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21. Of course, remnants of e_1 may remain elsewhere in the language (for example, in petrified sayings), but not in its original meaning.

22. Variation, change and child language acquisition do not seem to have a direct causal connection, since at least certain types of variation are acquired as variable rules (= normative variation) and this acquisition happens exactly as early as that of invariable rules (= norms that do not subsume variation) (Labov 1994: 578–580). The topic clearly deserves further investigation.

5. Conclusions

Examination of linguistic variation and change from the normative perspective was carried out in this chapter in an attempt to bridge the gap between linguistic metatheory and practical sociolinguistic and historical linguistic investigations, and to advance the discussion of normativity with respect to these two important areas.

From the normative perspective, three variation types were identified: (1) *non-normative variation*, involving co-occurrence of correct and incorrect variants of the same expressions, (2) *normative variation*, involving co-occurrence of variants, which are intuitively known to be correct, and (3) *grey variation*, where the correctness of the occurring variants is unknown. Study of linguistic variation includes both autonomous-normative and spatiotemporal elements, and in explaining the occurrence of certain types of variation in certain contexts, RE plays a decisive role.

Language change was conceptualized as *norm change*, consisting either of (1) *appearance*, (2) *disappearance*, or (3) *replacement* of norms. Of the three variation types, only type (3) grey variation was shown to be relevant for language change. RE holds its place also as the most important explanation in historical linguistic analysis.

I am convinced that sociolinguists and historical linguists can benefit from metatheoretical reflections in their actual linguistic analyses, once the general principles of normativity and their application in practical linguistic analysis have been made known to a sufficient degree. Many questions, however, remain open. It is hoped that future studies would examine at least the following aspects in more detail:

1. The role of individual internalization of norms *vis-à-vis* norms shared by the linguistic community, and the role of internalization of norms in variation and change.
2. The scope of norms in linguistic communities of varying sizes, and their co-existence in overlapping diatopical, diastratic and stylistic varieties.
3. Generalizations of spread of norms in as much statistical precision as allowed by the data.
4. The *normativization problem*: How to identify the appearance or disappearance of norms in scantily and fragmentarily attested historical data?[23]

23. I have not discussed the role of language contact for language change at any length in this chapter. Regarding the process of normativization, there is no reason to assume any ontological difference, whether a particular change originates from within a speech community or from another community.

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Intuition and beyond

A hierarchy of descriptive methods

Anneli Pajunen and Esa Itkonen

From the methodological point of view, linguistics is not a monolith. Nor is it an arbitrary conglomerate of unrelated methods. Rather, the methods most commonly used in linguistic description constitute a definite hierarchy that is motivated both logically and temporally, namely: intuition-based research > corpus research > experimentation. The last stage is in turn divided into loose (i.e. questionnaire method) and strict (e.g. eye movement research). It is the purpose of the present article to justify this thesis in some detail.

Keywords: hierarchy of linguistic methods, intuition-based research, corpus research, experimentation, norms, normativity

1. Preliminary remarks

Language has many dimensions, all of which are ontologically real. It is reasonable to demand that this ontological diversity *ought* to be reflected, point by point, as a methodological diversity; and this *is* indeed the case. Moreover, the different methods used in linguistic analysis do not just lie there scattered, as it were, but constitute an exclusive hierarchy, i.e. a hierarchy which *must* be exactly as it is. It is our purpose here to substantiate these claims.

What is it that linguists are supposed to describe, in the first place? The general inclination seems to be to say that it is just whatever has been uttered (= said or written) or, more realistically, a representative *corpus* of such utterances; and there are those who think that this is also the final answer. But, for reasons expounded in more detail in Introduction, this cannot be quite right. In practice, no corpus is ever described in its 'raw' state. Each corpus is, rather, edited in one way or another, which means that, metaphorically speaking, it has to pass through one or more 'normative filters'. This is the topic of Section 2.2.

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The normative filters are ultimately based on the linguist's own intuition (the results of which s/he shares with other speakers). It follows that, the appearances notwithstanding, in the relationship between corpus and intuition it is the latter which proves to be primary vis-à-vis the former, rather than vice versa. This is the topic of Section 2.1.

Intuition has its limits. First of all, it goes without saying that an intuitive grasp of frequencies of occurrence in a corpus is always open to doubt. In a more subtle way, intuition-based claims about structural relations, however plausible, may also be falsified by corpus considerations. This is demonstrated in Section 3.1.

What do ordinary speakers know about their own language? It is obvious at once that the right way to answer this question is to use *questionnaires* (also called 'paper-and-pencil tests'). This method (which also involves a use of corpora) produces results which exhibit considerable inter-individual variation and thus justify a notion of *variable competence* (cf. Coppieters 1987; Dąbrowska 2012). As intuitive certainty gradually vanishes, so does the binding force of the corresponding norms. Three different studies of this kind are discussed in Section 3.1.

The questionnaire method is 'experimental' only in a 'weak' sense insofar as the test persons have a conscious and voluntary control over their reactions, i.e. the answers they give. Eye-tracking investigations, by contrast, are experimental in the strongest possible sense because the test persons react in an entirely involuntary and subconscious way. An example, which also gives a glimpse of the remarkable insights to be gained within this research paradigm, is discussed in Section 4.1.

In Section 4.2, finally, it is shown that every genuine experiment embodies the use of these four methods in an order which is both logically and temporally determined.

2. The primacy of intuition

2.1 Intuition-based linguistics

One need not be a convinced generativist to acknowledge the importance of the 'Chomskyan Revolution' in the recent history of linguistics. The revolution was launched by the 1957 book *Syntactic Structures* (which is a summary account of Chomsky's 1955 dissertation). The entire data-base given in this book consists of 39 self-invented sentences (enumerated, with discussion, in Itkonen 2003: 24–27). Most of these sentences are entirely correct (or grammatical), e.g. *To prove the theorem was difficult*; one is entirely incorrect: ***Of admired John*; and some are in between: *?John enjoyed and my friend liked the play* and **The child seems sleeping*. In the present context, the important thing is that all this data is based on Chomsky's

own *linguistic intuition*, nothing else. There is not a hint of any of the other methods, discussed in the remainder of this paper. In fact, the use of statistical corpus analysis is emphatically rejected as being logically flawed (Chomsky 1957: 16–17).

The generativist intuition-based approach is summarized as follows: "A certain number of *clear cases*, then, will provide us with a criterion of adequacy for any particular grammar" (Chomsky 1957: 14; emphasis added). To be sure, intuition as such does not yet qualify as a 'method'. The requisite method should be more properly characterized as a combination of intuition and *theoretical reflection*. The 'classical' generativist version of intuition-*cum*-reflection can be illustrated by an example taken from Bach (1974: 146–147):



Figure 1.



Figure 2.

Figures 1 and 2 represent, respectively, the deep structure and the surface structure, and the gap between the two is filled by a transformation that converts the former into the latter. Analogues of such 'transformational' description can be found from different periods. More generally, each linguistic tradition starts with the analysis

of self-invented sentences, and in some traditions this remains in practice the only acceptable type of analysis. This claim has been extensively documented in Itkonen (1991), and further complemented by (2000) and (2001). For illustration, let us consider representative sample sentences from different traditions:

(1) Sanskrit:
devadatt-aḥ kāsta-iḥ sthāly-ām odan-aṃ pac-ati
D-NOM log-PL.INSTR pot-SG.LOC gruel-SG.ACC cook-3SG
Devadatta ('god-given') is cooking gruel in a pot with logs

(2) Ancient Tamil:
caattan corr-ai un-ṯ-aan
Saattan-NOM rice-ACC eat-PRET-3SG.M
Saattan ate rice

(3) Cl. Greek: *ho autos anthrōpos olisthēsas sēmeron katepesen*
The same man slipped and fell today (cf. the Introduction to this volume)

(4) Latin:
sedent-em ambul-are est impossibil-e
sitting-ACC walk-INF is impossible-SG.NOM.N
It is impossible for a sitting person to walk

(5) Cl. Arabic:
kataba zayd-un risālat-an
write.PRET.3SG.M zayd-NOM letter-ACC.INDEF
Zayd wrote a letter

(6) Japanese:
kinō niwa de otoko ga inu o nagu-tta
yesterday garden LOC man SUBJ dog OBJ hit-PRET
Yesterday a man hit a dog in the garden

(7) French: *Dieu invisible a créé le monde visible*
The invisible God has created the visible world

(8) German: *Karl fährt morgen nach Berlin*
Karl will drive to Berlin tomorrow

(9) English: *You keep this book and I'll take the others*
I'll stay whether he'll run or not

(1)–(8) were given before 1900. It is obvious at once that all of (1)–(9) have the characteristic 'flair' of self-invented sentences. In this respect, the two last sentences deserve special mention. They were given, respectively, by Leonard Bloomfield and Zellig Harris, the two leading champions of corpus-thinking. In their methodological statements they always insist on the absolute necessity to base any ('scientific')

description on a corpus of actual utterances. But they themselves feel exempted from the oppressive restrictions of their own ideology, as witnessed by (9). This is an eloquent proof of the primacy of intuition.

If additional proof is needed, it can be found in Droste & Joseph (1991), which contains brief presentations of nine distinct grammatical models: Government and Binding, Relational Grammar, Lexical-Functional Grammar, Generalized Categorial Grammar, Logical Semantics, Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar, Functional Grammar, Cognitive Grammar, Word Grammar. Remarkably, *all* nine models are based on data issued *only* from intuitions of their respective proponents.

In sum, the primacy of intuition-based (= 'autonomous') linguistics is both a logical and a practical necessity. This is what the history of linguistics demonstrates, from its earliest beginnings up to the present day.

2.2 Normative filters involved in corpus linguistics

Let us start with a quote from Labov: "The ungrammaticalness of everyday speech appears to be a myth with no basis in actual fact. In the various empirical studies that we have conducted, the great majority of utterances – about 75 percent – are well-formed sentences by any standard. When rules of ellipsis are applied, and certain universal *editing rules* to take care of stammering and false starts, the proportion of truly ungrammatical and ill-formed sentences falls to less than two percent" (1972: 203; emphasis added, original emphasis deleted).

These "editing rules" exemplify the (intuition-based) 'normative filter' through which sociolinguistic data typically have to pass. This is a rather simple situation. Today's computer-aided corpus research involves, by contrast, a whole set of normative filters. This claim will now be demonstrated with the aid of Pajunen (2006), which investigates the overall change of the Finnish verb lexicon between 1950–2000. It is based, in part, on a Finnish-language newspaper corpus of 24 million word-tokens,[1] which turns out to contain 8011 verb lexemes. How is it, exactly, that from 24 million one arrives at 8011? The answer may seem simple: you just have to count the verbs. But things are more complicated, as we now shall see (see Itkonen & Pajunen 2010; see also Aronoff & Lindsay 2014).

When someone writes e.g. a report for a newspaper, s/he corrects him-/herself now and then. The corrections are based on the writer's linguistic intuition. This is the first normative filter.

1. Pajunen (2002); morphosyntactic analyzers Koskenniemi (1995–2017) and Voutilainen (1995); concordancer Virtanen & Pajunen (2002).

Next, the report is printed. In the past, texts to be printed were checked by proof-readers, but today this task is performed by morphosyntactic analyzers, in our case a program called *FinTwol* (Koskenniemi 1995–2017). It is based on the linguistic intuition of its designers, or more precisely on that type of knowledge, which combines their linguistic intuition with their professional competence. This is the second normative filter.

The corpus is now at the linguist's disposal. In the next stage it is analyzed by means of another analyzer called Functional Dependency Grammar, which has been expressly designed for scientific purposes (Voutilainen 1995). Every word is assigned a morphosyntactic description and, in particular, one basic form is assigned to all tokens of one and the same verb. Again, the program is based on the intuitive-*cum*-professional knowledge of its designers. This is the third normative filter.

The analyzer both over- and undergeneralizes while analyzing word forms to their basic forms. In particular, wrong basic forms may be assigned to new verbs which, as it were, still hesitate to enter the Finnish lexicon. Such corrections are carried out in part mechanically, i.e. by means of an additional program, and in part manually by the linguist herself (= A.P.). Her intuitive-*cum*-professional knowledge constitutes the fourth normative filter.

Now that the corpus has passed through four successive normative filters, it is analyzed once more. What needs to be done is no longer correcting mistakes but eliminating what is superfluous. For instance, results of fully productive derivations need not be listed separately; dialectal variants are discarded; and so on. Again, this is done on the basis of A.P.'s intuitive-*cum*-professional knowledge, which thus constitutes the fifth normative filter.

The exact number of normative filters varies according to the task at hand, but some kind of filter is always there. This is also true of conversation analysis which takes pride in describing the original unadulterated data. Here the filter consists in the intuitive knowledge that the recorded speech is e.g. English and not e.g. Chinese. If some Chinese words happen to intrude into what is recorded, they are recognized as such on the basis of this filter.

At first glance, the normative filters seem to have a counterpart in the natural-science methodology which requires e.g. measurement errors to be corrected. But, as mentioned in Introduction, normativity in (e.g.) physics is not what it is in linguistics. In physics all mistakes are made by those who investigate, never by what is investigated, whereas in linguistics this distinction cannot be consistently maintained: those who investigate a given language must be among those who have learned to use it.

3. Beyond intuition

When intuition is no longer enough, a recourse to some *other* method of data-gathering becomes a necessity. This elementary truth will be illustrated in this section.

3.1 Recourse to corpus

In English, complementation may be expressed either by *that*-clauses, as in (10) and (12), or by non-finite constructions, as in (11) and (13):

(10) John knew that the children were asleep

(11) John knew the children to be asleep

(12) John saw that the children were coming home

(13) John saw the children coming home

In Finnish, there is no direct counterpart to (11). Rather, non-finite complementation is uniformly expressed by a participial construction similar to (13). In order to follow the argument, it is enough to know that (10) and (11) are translated into Finnish by (14) and (15), where *että* = 'that', and *nukkuivat* and *nukkuvan* are finite and non-finite, respectively:

(14) John tiesi, että lapset nukkuivat

(15) John tiesi lasten nukkuvan

In what follows, (14) and (15) will simply stand for the two options. Hakulinen and Karlsson (1979: 356) make the following claim about Finnish syntax, adapted to our Examples (14)–(15): "In complementation, (14) represents the norm. Some verbs allow (14) and exclude (15), while other verbs allow both (14) and (15). When this is the case, (14) and (15) are in free variation."

This sweeping claim is simply based on the linguistic intuition of the two authors, and it is rather plausible as long as single example sentences analogous to (14) and (15) are considered in isolation. If, however, corpus data are taken into consideration, then – as has been shown by Pajunen (2001: 375–413), based on a corpus of 22,7 million words – every component of this claim turns out to be false (see Figures 3 and 4):

1. Each of the verbs which are claimed to exclude (15) in fact allows (15).
2. With some of the verbs claimed to exclude (15) in favor of (14), (15) is actually even more frequent than (14).
3. There are some verbs which, contrary to the claim, exclude (14) and allow (15).

4. When both (14) and (15) are allowed, they are **never** in free variation.
5. The difference between (14) and (15) is conditioned by the following factors: (a) the meaning of the governing verb: speech act vs. cognition vs. perception verb, (b) ACT vs. PASS verb forms of the governing verb, (c) same-subject vs. different-subject constructions (in ACT verb forms), (d) the simultaneity vs. non-simultaneity of the events spoken about by the two verbs.



Figure 3. (Itkonen & Pajunen 2010: 63)



Figure 4. SS/DS = same/different subject; S/NS = simultaneity/non-simultaneity of events (Pajunen 2001: 402)

In brief, we have here a good example of the *limits of intuition*. Intuition is perfectly justified in all, and *only*, clear cases, as explained in Section 2.1.

3.2 Recourse to questionnaire (plus corpus)

Next, we shall discuss three studies which investigated the linguistic (= lexical-semantic and/or morphological) knowledge of young adults by means of questionnaire tests (see also Pajunen, Itkonen & Vainio 2015). The median age of the participants was 20. They had a similar educational background, i.e. they had all taken the Finnish matriculation examination recently.

3.2.1 *Knowledge of semantic networks*

The semantic network test makes use of the selective word association format (Schoonen & Verhallen 2008; Schmitt, Wun Ching Ng & Garras 2011). There are 60 *test words* and 8 *comparison words* for each test word. Participants are asked to choose the comparison word which means (approximately) the same as the test word. One half of the comparison words are synonyms or near-synonyms while the other half are not. All test words are nouns belonging to the 5000 most frequent words in Finnish (in a corpus of 32 million word tokens). Frequencies of the comparison words in the corpus vary, but they are, in principle, familiar to young adults according to a familiarity test that was made before the network test.

There were 241 young adults participating in the test. 60% of them did comparatively well (= they knew appr. 70% of the correct choices). 30% did very well (= they knew over 80% of the correct choices). 10% had serious difficulties (see Figure 5). Concrete comparison words referring to human beings, animals or buildings were recognized as synonyms better than words referring to either spatial or abstract entities.



Figure 5. Semantic network test (Pajunen, Itkonen & Vainio 2015)

A huge amount of variation in linguistic knowledge seems to be customary for young adults, according to the semantic network test. The result indicates that these participants did not have any clear intuitions about many members of the networks. The result would probably have been worse if the participants had represented the whole age group, not only those with matriculation examination.

3.2.2 *Knowledge of derivations*

New words are typically formed derivationally in Finnish; all major lexical categories admit of derivation. Nominal compounding is frequent, too, whereas verbal compounds are rare (and mostly loan words). The amount of non-derived base words is comparatively small in Finnish (appr. 6 000, Koivisto 2013), which means that *derivational knowledge* is needed to understand and use new (and rare) words. Until today, the psychology of derivation has been a neglected topic. This is why special attention will be paid to it.

There are appr. 140 derivational suffixes in Finnish. Theoretically, there is no upper limit to the number of derivational combinations in one word but in practice the number does not exceed four or five (Koivisto 2013). Some derivational suffixes are extremely productive: they can be used as long as the result is meaningful. The use of some suffixes is more or less restricted. For example, action nouns can be derived only from verbal (or verbalized) stems. Similarly, the use of momentative/inchoative derivational suffixes is strongly restricted insofar as they are (typically) added only to two-syllable (weak) vowel stems ending in *-a*/*-e*/*-o*. They are not used with longer stems or stems ending with *-u*/*-i* or with consonant stems. Both derivational and inflectional suffixes are always added to the word stem, never to the dictionary form (word base). This could be called the primary derivational/inflectional rule in Finnish.

Knowledge of Finnish derivational system was investigated by means of a paper-and-pencil test where the task for the participants was to choose one of these three options: what they were shown was a real derivative word of Finnish or a possible (but non-attested) derivative word or a (derivative) nonsense word. The 241 participants were the same as those in the semantic network test (cf. above). There were 248 *test words* which were formed using real stem words and real derivational suffixes. In the *first* case, the combination was real (as attested in corpora or dictionaries) even if the corpus frequencies and the familiarity varied. In the *second* case the formation was possible insofar as it was not phonologically or morphologically ill-formed. In the *third* case, the word was clearly ill-formed: the combination of the stem and suffix was not allowed at all, the stem was in the wrong stem form, the suffix did not combine with nominal/verbal stems etc. We discuss the results first in terms of participants and then in terms of test words.

There was a huge amount of variation between participants (Figure 6). The choices of *real* derivative words seem to give results similar to the semantic network test: 75% of the participants made correct choices; 10% had problems with real words (= they knew less than 50% of them); and only 6% knew real words well. About 60% recognized *nonsense* words comparatively well (= they knew more than 70% of them). The situation is different when we look at *possible* words: only a few participants recognized more than 90% of them correctly and almost 50% of the participants recognized less than 50% of them correctly. This general result was more or less expected.



Figure 6. Correct choices of test word types in the derivation test

The sum of correct choices by a participant varied a lot (Figure 7). There seemed to be three types of participants: those who chose the real words and the nonsense words correctly but had difficulties with possible words; those who chose the real words and the possible words correctly but had difficulties with the nonsense words; those who did comparatively well with all test word types.

When comparing the choices of real, possible, and nonsense words made by the participants (see Figure 8–10), it is easy to see that real words were recognized better than possible or nonsense words. It was typical that real and nonsense words were recognized as possible words if incorrect choices were being made. Real and nonsense words were *not* recognized as nonsense and real words, respectively. 5% of every word type was left unrecognized (= 'hard to say'). There was also a huge variation per item. In all test word types there were both very difficult test words and very easy ones. Participants had difficulties with appr. 20% of the real words and with appr. 30% of nonsense words. About 50% of the possible words were most often estimated correctly.



Figure 7. Percentage of all three correct choices by a participant in the derivation test



Figure 8. Real words in the derivation test



Figure 9. Possible words in the derivation test



Figure 10. Nonsense words in the derivation test

It seems possible to interpret the results from three different perspectives: (a) some participants did not have a very good knowledge of Finnish derivation; (b) some test words were genuinely ambiguous; (c) some participants had a comparatively small lexicon. We discuss the two first cases in this section and the third one in the next.

1. Action nouns
   In all, there are 15 action noun suffixes in Finnish. The suffix *-minen* is the most recent and most widely used: every verb can be turned into an action noun by adding *-minen*, regardless of the stem type or syllable structure (*tuo-da* > *tuo-minen* 'bring' > 'bringing'; *kävellä* > *kävele-minen* 'walk' vs. 'walking' etc.). Nouns must be verbalized with other suffixes before allowing nominalization (*routa* 'frost' > *rout-ia* 'to frozen' > *rout-i-minen* 'frosting'). *Minen*-nouns are not lexicalized but the meaning is transparent; the other action noun suffixes are used in more restricted ways.

There were 32 real or nonsense action nouns in our test: 50% were real words and 50% were nonsense words with nominal stems. The result of the test was somewhat astonishing: some real *minen*-words were not recognized correctly and almost all of the nonsense *minen*-words were recognized as possible words in almost 50% of the cases (Figure 11). None of the nonsense *minen*-words was recognized as a nonsense word in each and every case. Some of the nonsense words were such that a verbal origin was in principle possible (i.e. the noun stem ended with final *-i*, *puoli-a* [pro *puoli-ttaa*] 'to divide in two halves' > **puoliminen*). In other cases the stem noun was impossible as a verb in terms both of structure and of meaning (**äiti-minen* 'to function as a mother' mother+action suffix). In Finnish the meaning of 'mothering somebody' must be expressed by means of combining a verb equivalent to 'functioning as' and the noun *mother* inflected in the essive case, e.g. *olla äiti-nä* 'be



Figure 11. Real and impossible action nouns

mother+essive'). Action nouns were supposed to represent clear cases in our data. As a consequence, these results seem to indicate that some of the participants have defective derivational knowledge.

2. Aktionsart
   Aktionsart alternations are very productive although somewhat intricate insofar as they place constraints on the word class and on the form of the stem. We tested verbal chains containing either momentative suffixes (*hypätä* 'jump' > *hypä-htää* 'jump once quickly') or frequentative ones (*hyp-ellä* 'keep jumping around'). Momentatives cannot be formed freely like frequentatives can; the typical stem is a two-syllable verbal *a*-stem. We shall discuss recognition of members of these two chains. There were both ten frequentatives and ten momentatives in the test.

We used the momentative suffix *-htA* and two types of violations in the test: (a) either the stem was not verbal, with the consequence that no sensible meaning could be assigned to the stem-plus-suffix combination (**koura* ['hollow of the hand']-*htaa*, **raja* ['border]-*htaa*', **väylä* ['water way']-*htää*, **sade* ['rain']-*htaa*) or the stem was not an *a*-stem (**istu* ['sit']-*htaa*). The participants reacted more strongly to the latter condition: **istu-htaa* was clearly unacceptable (67% nonsense word, 24% possible). Thus, the most unequivocal nonsense words are those phonologically or otherwise structurally non-Finnish (i.e. they do not look like Finnish at all).

There are nine frequentative suffixes in Finnish. Most of them can be used quite freely, i.e. most verbs have frequentative derivatives if repetition makes sense (*kuolla* 'die' > **kuole-illa* 'keep dying'). Suffix *-ele* is used with verbal *a*-stems, suffix *-ile* only with some stems with long vowels and more freely with nominal ones. Participants

seem to be aware of this because *aukko-ilee* (> *aukko* 'hole') is more often accepted (53%) than not (16%). With *heittä-ilee* (pro *heitt-elee*; > *heittää* 'throw') the situation is an inverse one (impossible word: 67%, possible word: 29%).

Again, the result seems to be that, at this stage, some of the participants had a rather poor mastery of Finnish derivations (due, perhaps, to a delayed onset of adequate analogizing). Semantic violations often created somewhat ambiguous derivatives. To be sure, one syntactic violation was sometimes noticed. But for words to be rejected, it was more often the case that many violations were needed, especially concerning the phonological and syllabic make-up. Children are known to learn Finnish derivatives word by word, not on basis of derivational rules (Kusnetsoff 2017). It is possible that young adults still turn to this word-by-word strategy when they try to recognize *prima facie* odd-looking words. In general, it seems to be true of derivationally complex languages like Finnish and Hebrew that mastery in derivational morphology develops more slowly than e.g. in English (Vainio, Pajunen & Häikiö 2019; Ravid & Avidor 1998).

3.2.3 *Knowledge of rare words*

Those real Finnish words which were not recognized in the derivation test belong to the class of low-frequency words. These are, for ex., words formed by means of very frequent property, action, and causative derivational suffixes (for. ex. *sade-ttaa* '*rain*'+*caus* > '*wet the land*', *säki-ttää* '*sack*'+*caus* > '*put in a sack*'). Participants with large lexica recognized these words while those with more limited lexica did not (which comes close to being true by definition). We also tested separately the familiarity of words with varying frequencies. Both nouns and verbs were used as test words.

In the noun familiarity test there were 910 nouns and 40 participants, who were first- or second-year university students (median age 21). Each participant tested appr. one fourth of the test words and gave his/her answers according to the Likert scale ('not familiar', 'not certain', 'sounds familiar', 'known but not used', 'known and used').

To analyze the results, the test words were divided into frequency groups according to their occurrence in a corpus of 24 million word tokens. There were test words not used in the corpus, those used rarely (0,2–3,8 examples in million words), those used frequently (9,8–39/million words), those used very frequently (99–500/million words), and test words belonging to the basic vocabulary of Finnish (4000/million words).

The result was that the frequency and the familiarity of test words correlated highly (see Figure 12; cf. Keuleers, Stevens, Mandera & Brysbaert 2015). All frequent words were familiar to the participants, but they did not use all of the only



Figure 12. Familiarity of frequent and rare nouns

moderately frequent words. The amount of the choices 'known but not used', 'sounds familiar' and 'not certain' increased as the frequency decreased. Words not familiar at all belonged to the 'not in the corpus' or 'very rare' groups. Individually the participants were of two types: those with very good knowledge of vocabulary and those with more limited knowledge.

We also tested the familiarity of comparatively rare motion verbs. There are appr. 3000 motion verbs in Finnish. Finnish belongs to those languages which encode the motion itself, the manner of motion, and the contour of motion in the verb base. The amount of non-derived motion-verb bases is comparatively small; most motion verbs are either derived or descriptive. There are, for ex., 17 derivatives of the verb *hypätä* 'jump' in Finnish, formed with frequentative, momentative, and causative suffixes. Most of Finnish motion verbs encode walking or running, while path verbs are rare. It is of interest to know how well native speakers master this plethora of motion verbs.

There were 295 motion verbs in the test and 35 participants with the median age of 23. All were 3rd or 4th year university students. The participants tested the familiarity of the verbs using the same Likert scale as was used with nouns. All of the test words had at least one mention in the newspaper corpus with 24 million word tokens and at most 99 mentions (median = 7). The words were divided into four frequency groups, which corresponded to the groups in the rare-nouns test.

The result was that motion verbs were comparatively familiar (see Figure 13). Words with the frequency 0,2–3/million were almost all familiar though appr. 20–30% were not used by the participants. Otherwise the result resembles that of the noun test: the lower the frequency in corpus the worse its familiarity. If the frequency in million words was as low as 0,03 (e.g. one example in 24 million word corpus), 50% of the words were not known or there were some uncertainty of it,



Figure 13. Familiarity of rare motion verbs

25% of the words were know but not used, and appr. 25% of the words were both known and used. There were motion verbs in the test that were not familiar to most of the participants (not part of the lexicon of young adults), and there were participants who had smaller lexica than others.

The conclusion is that the lexica of young adults (university students in their thirties) varies greatly as for the amount of lexemes familiar: frequent words are much more familiar than non-frequent words.

4. Strict experimentation

4.1 An example

Let us consider the *grammatical agreement* between a head noun and its adjectival determiner. In Latin, for instance, nouns and adjectives agree in case, number, and gender, exemplified here by the words for 'daughter', 'dear', and 'son' : *fili-a car-a* (NOM.SG.F), *fili-am car-am* (ACC.SG.F), *fili-ae car-ae* (NOM.PL.F), *fili-us car-us* (NOM.SG.M). In written French, nouns and adjectives agree, in principle, in number and gender, exemplified by the words for 'daughter'/'girl', 'small', and 'boy': *l-a petit-e fille* (SG.F), *l-es petit-es fill-es* (PL.F), *l-e petit-Ø garçon* (SG.M). In Finnish (whether spoken or written) adjectives precede nouns and agree in case and number: *pieni tyttö* ('small girl'.NOM), *pien-et tyt-öt* ('small girls'.NOM), *pien-en tyt-ön* ('small girl'.GEN). In English there is no agreement: *the small girl(s)/boy(s)*.

On the face of it, it is not clear why agreement should exist at all. Jespersen calls it "superfluous" (1922: 352) and even "primitive" (1922: 354). Haiman (1985: 164) agrees: "Grammatical agreement is redundant: not only non-iconic but

meaningless". Therefore any plausible explanations of agreement are bound to increase our understanding.

The research reported here was originally published in Vainio, Hyönä & Pajunen (2003, 2008; see also Itkonen & Pajunen 2010). The adjective-noun agreement in Finnish is investigated by the authors by means of the eye-tracking method. It represents experimentation in the strong sense of the word because the processes under investigation are beyond voluntary control. The simplicity vs. complexity of different constructions is measured, in principle, by finding out how long it takes to read them. But these are not just reaction-time experiments confined to dealing with the end result of processing, or with just *one* dependent variable. The on-line nature of eye-tracking methodology makes it possible to break the reading process down into its constituent parts, which means here, more specifically, distinguishing between *four* dependent variables concerning the target word: (a) first fixation duration, (b) gaze duration, (c) rereading time, (d) probability of rereading.

Three constructions need to be distinguished in the present context: (1) the inflected noun alone; (2) the inflected adjective followed by the inflected noun (where the agreement between the two is expressed by transparent or formally identical suffixes … *-x* … *-x*); (3) the *un*inflected adjective followed by the inflected noun:

(1) N-x
(2) A-x N-x
(3) A N-x

These are (some of) the actual constructions (as they occur embedded in one and the same larger sentence context):

(1) … *orkesteri-ksi* …
(2) … *mainio-ksi* *orkesteri-ksi* …
(3) … *kelpo* *orkesteri-ksi* …

In (1)–(3) the noun is the word for 'orchestra' inflected in the SG form of the 'translative' case. The two adjectives *mainio* (inflected) and *kelpo* (uninflected), are equally frequent and synonymous (with the meaning 'good').

Very detailed hypotheses are offered by Vainio, Hyönä & Pajunen (2003, 2008) concerning the (unconscious) processes which determine how slowly or rapidly each of (1)–(3) is read. In the present context it is enough to indicate the corresponding reading times in the order of decreasing rapidity:

(2) < (1) < (3)

This is a genuinely surprising result: within the sentence context it takes less time to read two words united by agreement, i.e. (2), than one word, i.e. (1). This entails

that in the sentence context the gaze is more likely to return to the single word than to two words welded together by identical suffixes. On the other hand, it is only to be expected that (3) is read the least rapidly because it violates the general norm that adjectives should agree with their head nouns.

In addition to being confirmed, this result was further refined by later experiments: there is no difference between grammatical and semantic (e.g. local) cases; there is no difference between overt and covert (= zero-marked) cases; there is no difference between transparent (= identical) and less transparent suffixes. Taken together, these results show that the agreement effect is neither lexical nor phonological (= due to 'repetition priming') but syntactic; it reflects *syntactic integration*.

It is the very *raison d'être* of experimental methodology not just to confirm what we already know on intuitive or introspective grounds but to produce genuinely new knowledge. In this respect these experiments are quite successful. Their methodological significance resides in the fact that they give a (tentative) *functional explanation* to grammatical agreement. Instead of being "superfluous" or "meaningless", agreement facilitates comprehension.

4.2 The hierarchy of the methods involved in experimentation

Next, let us have a closer look at these eye-tracking experiments, and let us ask: What had happened *before* they were conducted? What do the experiments *presuppose*?

We have seen that the words *mainio* (= inflected) and *kelpo* (= uninflected) are read differently when they function as adjectival determiners. This difference cannot be ascribed to the difference in their grammatical behavior unless all other explanations have first been excluded. Hence, they must have been ascertained to be perfectly comparable in all the other respects. This is achieved by two distinct methods.

First, the two words must be equally frequent, which requires the use of a sufficiently large *corpus*. Second, there must not be any significant semantic or stylistic difference between the two words, which requires the use of a sufficiently detailed *questionnaire* to be filled in by a group of test persons.

But something must have happened already before the experimentalist starts counting the frequencies of *mainio* and *kelpo* in a large corpus. First of all, in order for these two words to be chosen, the experimentalist must know – on the basis of his/her own linguistic *intuition* – that these are words of the Finnish language. Second, before s/he will start counting the relevant frequencies in a corpus, the corpus must have passed through a set of *intuition*-based normative filters (as explained in Subsection 2.2). Third, s/he must construct – again on the basis of his/her *intuition* – the test sentences which the test persons are supposed to read.

Thus, considered as a whole, the experiment is seen to involve the following four stages which, taken together, constitute the 'presuppositional' hierarchy of descriptive methods:

intuition(-cum-reflection) >	corpus >	questionnaire >	experiment
A	B	C	D

In this hierarchy the *temporal* order coincides with the *logical* one: what is to the left precedes, and is presupposed by, what is to the right. B, C, and D represent the most important methods of *empirical linguistics*.

The same methodological pluralism is discussed in Gonzales-Marquez et al. (2007) under such designations as 'introspection', 'corpus analysis', and 'experimental method'; but the methods are presented in a less systematic way. The relation between the three last-mentioned methods (designated as 'grammar', 'sociolinguistics', and 'psycholinguistics') was already explored in Itkonen (1980).

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Norms of correctness and rationality in research on code-switching

Aleksi Mäkilähde

Among different types of norms, two of perhaps the most relevant for linguistics are those of correctness and rationality. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the relevance of both to research on code-switching. I approach the topic from the perspective of the philosophy of linguistics in an analysis of certain ontological and epistemological problems in CS research, and use this analysis to draw methodological implications for the field in general. In particular, a methodological synthesis between intuition and observation is discussed and illustrated with an analogy between languages and games.

Keywords: code-switching, multilingualism, syntax, games, rules, rationality, norms, normativity

1. Introduction

During the past few decades, multilingualism has become a central topic within linguistics. One phenomenon which has received a considerable amount of attention is *code-switching*, defined for example as "the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems" (Gumperz 1982: 59), as "the alternation of languages within a conversation" (Matras 2009: 101), or as "the mixing of two or more languages in discourse" (Poplack 2015: 918). Various aspects of code-switching (henceforth CS) have been examined in previous research from a variety of perspectives, ranging from the syntax of CS to its pragmatic functions. In this chapter, I focus predominantly on the syntactic approaches, taking as my point of departure the lack of consensus among researchers, stemming, according to Poplack (2015: 920), from the "disparate assumptions, goals, and domains of application" of competing approaches. I approach this problem from the point of view of the philosophy of linguistics and attempt to identify common ground for the various approaches, focusing on the concepts

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of *norm* and *normativity*. My aim is to provide an analysis of certain aspects of the ontological and epistemological foundations of CS research, and to use this analysis as a basis for drawing methodological implications for the field in general.[1]

Syntactic studies have emphasised the nature of CS as a *rule-governed form of behaviour*; their aim has been in particular to identify permitted switch sites, in other words to identify which switches are correct (or 'grammatical', 'well-formed', 'permissible', etc.), and to explain them by postulating certain universal or language-pair–specific constraints or principles. One important methodological question in this field concerns the respective roles of different data-collection methods, in particular elicited judgements (i.e. intuitions) versus corpus-based methods. Arguments in favour of either (or both) entail certain ontological and epistemological assumptions as to the object of research. I argue here that CS is rule-governed primarily in the sense that there are certain types of norms which determine the correctness of CS structures, and that these norms can be investigated in the same way as norms in general; the proposed syntactic constraints themselves do not demonstrate that CS is rule-governed in this sense.

In addition to being rule-governed, I also argue that CS is governed by rationality principles, which are a type of norm different from the ones mentioned above. The relevance of these norms is most apparent in pragmatic approaches to CS, which aim in essence to explain why CS occurs in certain contexts and what kinds of functions it has. I have argued elsewhere (Mäkilähde forthcoming) that in general these approaches rely on rationality principles. In this chapter, I demonstrate that such principles are also relevant for syntactic approaches. In particular, they can be utilised at the abstract level in accounting for a proposed constraint on CS, and at the concrete level in accounting for counter-evidence to proposed constraints encountered in corpus data.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the main philosophical concepts and terms, in a discussion of the general notion of 'rule-governed behaviour'. In Section 3, I present an overview of certain approaches to the syntax of CS, focusing on claims as to appropriate forms of analysis in terms of suitable data and methods. In Section 4, I provide a philosophical analysis of the nature of CS as a rule-governed form of behaviour, concluding the section with a discussion of certain methodological implications regarding epistemology,

1. It is worth emphasising that the kind of philosophical (or 'metatheoretical') analysis of a specific discipline (i.e. CS research) undertaken in the present chapter depends on the fact that a considerable amount of data from several combinations of languages has already been collected and analysed by other researchers, and that various approaches and models have been proposed and implemented. The purpose of this analysis is to augment the field, not to shift its focus towards philosophical analysis.

terminology, and testing. Section 5 extends the discussion by focusing on the role of rationality in syntactic theories of CS, while Section 6 moves the discussion to broader questions and addresses the relevance of CS for the philosophy of linguistics and the philosophy of norms in general. In particular, the analogy between languages and games is applied to illustrate a proposed methodological synthesis. Section 7 concludes the chapter.

2. The concepts of norm and normativity

A central finding of early research on CS was that it is an orderly and rule-governed phenomenon. In essence, this idea can be seen as consisting of two related aspects. One is that switching is not unrestricted; there are rules which determine the correctness (acceptability, grammaticality, permissibility) of structures containing CS. The other is that switching is not random or meaningless; rather, it is a strategy which speakers can use to achieve various goals. Some version of this idea is probably accepted by the majority of researchers; MacSwan, for example, maintains that "[i]t is well known and uncontroversial that CS is constrained in the descriptive sense, meaning, simply, that CS behavior is itself rule governed" (2014: 2). Indeed, various researchers have employed the term *rule-governed* in characterising CS (e.g. Pfaff 1979: 294; Poplack 1980: 585; 2015: 918; Azuma 1998: 109; Toribio 2001a: 404–406; Altarriba & Basnight-Brown 2009: 4; see also Hamers & Blanc 2000: 258). This characterisation, and its implications, can nevertheless be interpreted in different ways. In particular, there seems to be no clear consensus as to the ontology and epistemology of the relevant 'rules'; in other words, what they are like and how they should be studied.[2] These various views are discussed in Section 3; here I present a brief philosophical overview of certain general aspects of *norms*, which will form the basis for the rest of the discussion.

2.1 The notion of rule-governed behaviour

The idea that CS is rule-governed echoes a similar claim about language in general. For example, Searle argues that "[s]peaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of behavior" (1969: 12). A statement to the effect that something is rule-governed necessitates a further enquiry into the nature of *rules* in general. According to Winch (1958: 58), "[t]he test of whether a man's actions

2. This problem has been discussed in previous research for example in conjunction with pluralistic explanations for CS behaviour (see e.g. Halmari 1997: 1–4).

are the application of a rule is […] whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does". In a similar vein, Itkonen (1978: 43) argues that "a rule must be learned; and once it has been learned, it gives us a criterion with which we may evaluate actual behaviour as either correct or incorrect". In other words, rules are one type of *norm* (cf. the Introduction to the present volume): all norms "enter essentially into judgement of what it is right or wrong to do, what ought or ought not to be done" (MacCormick 1998: 303).[3] The conceptual hierarchy applied here is based on von Wright's (1963) analysis, where 'norm' is the superordinate category covering such types as rules, directives/technical norms, prescriptions, ethical principles, and customs (see below).[4] In the following discussion, the focus is on two types of normativity, *correctness* and *rationality*, and the two corresponding types of norms, i.e. *norms of correctness* and *norms of rationality*. For clarity, I adopt here the terminology of Itkonen (e.g. 1983), referring to the former as *rules of correctness* and to the latter as *principles of rationality*. These can be considered to some extent similar to von Wright's (1963) rules and directives/technical norms (but see Mäkilähde forthcoming: Section 4.2.4 for a caveat and a brief discussion). Rules of correctness determine the correctness of linguistic structures/forms/acts, while rationality principles determine the rationality of (linguistic) acts (cf. the Introduction to the present volume). Rules in this sense determine which meanings ought to be combined with which forms and how different forms ought to be combined together (e.g. Itkonen 2003: 16–17). For example, the rules of English determine that *cat* refers to a type of animal (and not a type of container), while *can* refers to a type of container (and not an animal); and, furthermore, that *I came home* is correct, while **Me comed home to* is incorrect (for more examples, see the Introduction to the present volume). In this section, I focus on rules in particular (and to some extent on norms in general); rationality principles are discussed in the following section.

Ontologically, the rules of a language are social entities, which means that they are shared by the speakers of that language (e.g. Itkonen 1978: 136; Bartsch 1987: 4, 74–75; Zlatev 2008; cf. Brennan et al. 2013: 3); hence they offer the type of public criteria of correctness which Wittgenstein (1958: § 258) claimed to be lacking in

3. In MacCormick's (1998: 309) terminology, language use could be described as an 'informal normative practice'.

4. There are of course many other ways to organise the conceptual field; for example, MacCormick's (1998) use of the term *norm* is comparable to von Wright's, but other terms, such as *rule*, are used quite differently, while Bartsch (1987: 168–169) considers norms to be a subclass of rules. No strong argument is proposed here in defence of one particular taxonomy over another; however, von Wright's terminology makes explicit the fundamental point that the entities discussed here under the terms *rule* and *principle* are both *normative*.

a 'private' language.[5] Epistemologically, our *knowledge* of such norms is ultimately based on intuition (e.g. Itkonen 2008); from another perspective, we can *justify* our beliefs about these norms by reference to our intuition.[6] As psychological acts, intuitions are *subjective*, but their 'objects' are *social* or *intersubjective* (in some ways, therefore, *objective*; see the Introduction). As Itkonen (1978: 135) argues, in descriptive-normative disciplines such as (certain branches of) linguistics, "temporally definite, subjective acts pertain to something objective, namely rules existing at the level of common knowledge", adding that "common knowledge *constitutes* a rule, whereas intuition *pertains* to it". The internalisations of these rules by individuals are of course mental entities, but the rules themselves are social entities, since they are shared by the speakers (see also Bartsch 1987: 74–75).

The exact nature of these rules of language can be further elucidated by means of negative definitions: in other words, stating how they differ from related concepts, in particular from other types of norms and norm-like entities. For example, they are different from the laws of nature, which are not norms and can be considered *descriptive* in the sense that they describe observed (and hypothesised) regularities in the natural world. They are also different from the laws of a state and the advice given in language usage manuals; these are norms, but can be considered *prescriptive*, in the sense that they have been issued by a specific authority in order to control how people behave. The rules which characterise language do not describe actually occurring correct behaviour or prescribe a preferred form of correct behaviour, but *determine what counts as* correct behaviour (von Wright 1963: 2–8). It should be stressed that it is not a given grammar of a particular language, *qua* descriptive-normative account of its rules, that determines what is correct or incorrect, *but the rules themselves*. Similarly, a distinction should also be maintained between the rules themselves and the *rule sentences* (see the Introduction) which describe them (cf. MacCormick 1998: 309–310).

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5. Cf. also the Durkheimian idea of *social facts*, which includes such institutions as language. On the relevance of Wittgenstein's private language argument for linguistics, see e.g. Itkonen (2003: 120–125).

6. These intuitions themselves do not necessarily need further justification. Cf. Searle (1969: 13): "The 'justification' I have for my linguistic intuitions as expressed in my linguistic characterizations is simply that I am a native speaker of a certain dialect of English and consequently have mastered the rules of that dialect, which mastery is both partially described by and manifested in my linguistic characterizations of elements of that dialect". Similarly, Chalmers (2014: 536–537) characterises intuition in the following terms: "a justification is *broadly inferential* if it is inferential, perceptual, introspective, memorial, or testimonial. […] We can then say that intuitive claims have a broadly noninferential justification: justification that does not derive from any of these sources." It is not claimed here that knowledge of norms is 'intuitive' in the sense of procedural as opposed to declarative; in Section 4.1, I argue that it is both (i.e. manifested in both production and judgements).

In the same way that we defined the nature of a rule (or norm in general), i.e. by comparing it to related concepts, *intuition* can be defined by relating it to other sources of knowledge or justification.[7] Itkonen (e.g. 1983: 8; 2003: 44) employs Popper's 'three worlds' ontology to identify three different 'acts of knowledge' (or 'acts of gaining information'), which are distinguished from one another according to their objects: *observation* pertains to physical events (World 1), *introspection* to the subject's psychological events/mental states (World 2), and *intuition* to concepts and norms (World 3) or their exemplifications (see the Introduction).[8] We might say accordingly that intuition pertains to *social facts* (and *statements about social facts*). The aspect of certainty can be brought to bear to further illustrate this distinction (see Itkonen 2003: 28–31): observations are, of course, fallible, and our knowledge of World 1 is also uncertain to the extent that any proposed universal hypotheses (see the Introduction) could in theory be falsified by further observations. Conversely, it is often maintained that introspections concerning some of our own mental states are certain. If I feel pain in my arm, one may of course argue that it is for example phantom pain, but it would still not make me doubt the fact that I do indeed *feel pain*, whatever its actual cause may be. What, then, about intuition? First, the kind of certainty that one experiences in making intuitive judgements is well captured by Wittgenstein ([1969] 1974: § 370), in his comment on the words he uses: "I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings". Second, it needs to be stressed that intuition is not only an inclination to judge that something is the case, but also that *others ought to* judge the same way (Cohen 1986: 75).[9] Communication in general is made possible by our agreeing on at least some core part of the rules of language, and genuine checks on our intuitions occur constantly in everyday communication. However, our intuitions do not always fully match those of others, and some of our intuitions (or 'intuitions') are untrustworthy (cf. e.g. Dąbrowska 2012; Willems 2012; Itkonen, this volume; Pajunen & Itkonen, this volume). As far as the methodology of linguistics is concerned, Itkonen argues (e.g. 2003: 34) that intuition offers us certainty only in so-called 'clear cases'. The only viable way to determine the reliability of our intuitions is to compare them to the intuitions of others (cf. Searle 1969: 13; Cohen 1986: 101); beyond the 'clear cases', intuition alone does not suffice, and other methods have to be used (see e.g. Pajunen & Itkonen, this volume).

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7. Both the nature and the epistemological role of intuition have been the topic of much philosophical debate (see e.g. BonJour 1998; Bealer 2002; Sosa 2007; Chalmers 2014).

8. These are not, of course, the only possible sources of knowledge/justification, but they are arguably the most central ones.

9. Cf. Itkonen's (2008: 26–27) definition of intuition as *conventionalised empathy*.

2.2 On rationality and the explanation of actions

As noted above, CS is also considered *strategic*: speakers use switching between languages to achieve various goals.[10] This presumes the ability on the speakers' part to engage in reasoning as part of their linguistic actions and in the interpretation of others' actions. In other words, it presumes *(instrumental) rationality*. Rationality should here be understood as "the application of a specific mode of reasoning […] which guarantees inferences from ends or goals to means that will satisfy those ends" (Brown & Levinson 1987: 64), and vice versa. Some such notion is central in any type of research on social behaviour, even if not always explicitly mentioned (cf. e.g. Goffman [1967] 2005: 36; for the philosophical notion itself, see e.g. Gibson 1976; Nozick 1993; Wedgwood 2011). The means-ends type of reasoning provides a basis for understanding the structure of an action, which can be described as follows: "What the agent *wants* is his *goal*, and he *believes* that his action will serve as a means for attaining the goal" (Itkonen 2003: 58; boldface changed to italics). This is a version of the classic type of action explanation, where the agent's goals and beliefs cause the agent to perform (or refrain from) certain actions (e.g. Davidson 1963). Itkonen (2013/2014: 10–11; this volume) proposes the following formalisation of a rational action:[11]

$$\{[G{:}Y \;\&\; B{:}(X \rightarrow Y)] \vdash G{:}X\} \Rightarrow X; \text{ and if all goes well, } X \rightarrow Y$$

This schematic representation says, basically, that if an agent (A) wants Y and believes that X will cause Y, that entails that A will want X, which in turn causes A to do X (for a detailed exposition, see Itkonen 2013/2014: 10–11; see Mäkilähde forthcoming: Chapter 4.2 for an extended analysis). The formula is at the same time both a schema of action and an illustration of 'rational explanation', exemplified by such forms as *A did X in order to achieve Y*, *A did X because A wanted Y to be the case, A did X to bring about Y*, and so on. The relevance of this discussion is to point out that explanations exhibiting these forms are customarily used in the explanation of human actions, including the functions of CS, and that the use of such formulations implies something about the way we understand the logical structure of actions (see Mäkilähde forthcoming: Chapter 4.2).[12]

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10. In other words, it is teleological. For more detailed discussion of the following points, see Mäkilähde (forthcoming).

11. Here G = a volitional attitude, Y = its object (e.g. a state), B = a belief, X = a means (e.g. an action), $\rightarrow$ = ordinary causation, $\vdash$ = entailment, $\Rightarrow$ = mental causation. The mental part of the formula is located within the curly brackets, and the spatiotemporal part after the mental causation sign.

12. The *function* of an act should in the present context be understood as "the purpose that an act serves or a goal that it attempts to achieve" (Mäkilähde 2018: 301 fn. 2; cf. Itkonen 1983: 31, 156–157; Leech 1983: 13–14, 48; Givón 2013). See also Mäkilähde (forthcoming: Chapter 5.4).

As noted in the preceding section, rationality and correctness are both normative concepts, and the corresponding objective criteria for determining the rationality or irrationality of behaviour are *norms of rationality*, or *rationality principles* (see also the Introduction to the present volume).[13] They are at least in part similar to *directives* (or *technical norms*), which von Wright (1963: 9) describes as being "concerned with the *means* to be used for the sake of attaining a certain *end*", and the basic formulation for which is *If you want Y, you ought to do X* (1963: 10). As noted by Itkonen (1983: 68, 176–177), Grice's maxims are a prime example of descriptions or expressions of (fairly abstract) rationality principles, as are the felicity conditions of speech acts (for further examples, see Section 5 below).[14] While rules and principles are in many ways similar entities, there are also important differences between them; for the present argument the relevant aspects of principles are that they are normative, that the truth of their formulations is known (at least in principle) by intuition, and that they are social entities in the sense that they are objects of common knowledge (see above). I discuss the similarities and differences between rationality principles and other norms such as directives briefly elsewhere (see Mäkilähde forthcoming: Section 4.2.4).

It may be added that the distinction between norms themselves and speakers' internalisations of them is here perhaps clearer than in connection with rules of correctness (see Itkonen 1983: 65–66; 2013/2014: 11–12): the part within the square brackets in the above formula constitutes the agent's *reason* for doing something; we hypothesise the reason to be of a certain kind because we know a principle which governs the type of action we are attempting to explain.[15] As implied by both the

13. Cf. the distinction between the terms 'rule-governed' and 'principle-controlled' in Leech (1983: 21–24).

14. It should be added that these principles do not refer to what is also known as 'the principle of rationality' (see e.g. Popper 1994: Chapter 8), which refers basically to the assumption of rationality (of one or the other kind) in the explanation of actions.

15. Rational action is also a central notion in the Markedness Model (e.g. Myers-Scotton 1999; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001), which aims at accounting for the social motivations of CS (and other strategies). I argue elsewhere (Mäkilähde forthcoming: Section 3.1.4.4) that rationality as conceptualised in the model is not identical to instrumental rationality as defined here (i.e. 'ordinary' or 'common-sense' rationality). It is worth mentioning that Myers-Scotton (1999) also discusses the role of norms (as opposed to rationality) for the strategic use of CS, although these relevant norms seem to count as what von Wright (1963) terms *customs* (see also Mäkilähde forthcoming: Section 3.1.4.4). There are, in other words, differences in both what we are arguing and how we use these central terms. I address the role of customs very briefly in Section 6 below.

schema and the preceding discussion of norms, reasons as understood here are mental entities and rationality principles are social entities.[16]

To conclude this section, I add a brief remark on regularities and their explanation. As noted above, being rule-governed does not mean simply that the phenomenon in question exhibits certain regularities, since these are also found in connection with natural phenomena which have no normative dimension whatsoever. However, linguistic behaviour, including observed regularities or patterns of behaviour, may in turn be explained by reference to the existence of norms: for example, a certain choice is regularly made because it is considered correct (reference to rules of language) or a suitable means to a certain end (reference to rationality principles). Both types of explanation may of course be used in conjunction with each other. I illustrate these explanations in more detail in the following sections.

3. Syntactic research on code-switching: An overview of approaches

The rule-governed nature of CS was proposed in seminal studies as an explanation for observed regularities in switching patterns (see e.g. Pfaff 1979; cf. Toribio 2001a: 404). One interpretation of the attested facts was that the rules governing CS constituted additional constraints, which determined in which syntactic positions CS could occur while retaining the correctness of the sentence, and in which it could not. Even within the constraints-based approach, there is considerable variation in the interpretation of the nature of these constraints. For example, some proposed constraints apply to specific structures (e.g. switching between certain types of constituents), while others apply to switching in general. Some researchers have proposed categorical constraints, while others have formulated them in probabilistic terms. Here I briefly illustrate some of these different approaches. I do not discuss the advantages or disadvantages of the models themselves (e.g. in terms of their predictive power or their way of distinguishing between CS and borrowing), but focus instead on those aspects which are relevant for the topic of this chapter: the nature of the proposed constraints, the type of data used, and the primary research methods.

Gumperz (1976, 1982) provided one of the early discussions on the syntax of CS. The types of constraints he identified were specific to certain constructions; for example, he determined that a switch between a verb and its complement was

16. There are also types of reasons which are not mental (see e.g. Alvarez 2018); although they may indeed figure in the explanations of actions, the crucial point for the present discussion is that they presuppose reasons of the mental type.

permissible, while a switch between an auxiliary and the main verb was not, and that a switch before a conjunction was permissible, while a switch after it was not (Gumperz 1982: 88).[17] The method he used to identify these constraints was the elicitation of judgements from speakers in the bilingual communities he studied (Slovenian-German in Austria, Hindi-English in India, and Spanish-English in the US). He employed substitution frames created on the basis of recorded conversations, from which the base forms were collected. The variants were presented to the judges together with the original context of the conversation, and they were asked to rank them according to their acceptability. Since the constraints applied to all three language pairs, they had at least some tentative claim to universality (Gumperz 1982: 86–87).[18] Although Gumperz suggested that there were some syntactic constraints on switching, he argued that they were in turn motivated by pragmatic considerations (1982: 90). In fact, there is an inherent ambiguity in Gumperz's discussion regarding the nature of the constraints. He states that speakers must be able "to distinguish between meaningful and nonmeaningful code contrasts" (1982: 86), implying that acceptability judgements are tests of meaningfulness, while meaningfulness in this context seems to refer to pragmatic meanings in the sense of inferences drawn by hearers (cf. 1982: 61). In other words, judges would not in fact be evaluating the correctness of expressions (based on rules of correctness), but whether those expressions would make sense in a particular context (based on rationality principles). However, Gumperz also states that one of the basic findings of his study was that CS is "governed by grammatical rules" (1982: 99), implying that the constraints do indeed relate to the correctness of CS structures.

Another approach is represented by Poplack and her collaborators. The model developed by her involves two constraints. According to *the free morpheme constraint*, "[c]odes may be switched after any constituent in discourse provided that constituent is not a bound morpheme" (Poplack 1980: 585–586). The most important implication of this constraint is that a switch between a lexical morpheme and a bound affix is disallowed unless there is phonological integration in either direction.[19] When such integration occurs, the model treats the product as a borrowing. According to *the equivalence constraint*, "[c]ode-switches will tend to occur at points

17. Similar results were reported for example by Timm (1975).

18. Counterexamples have been presented in many studies (see e.g. Poplack 1981: 174–175; cf. Gumperz 1982: 99).

19. MacSwan's (e.g. 2005a: 5–6) PF Disjunction Theorem makes effectively the same claim. At a more general level, the free morpheme constraint is similar to certain principles observed in speech errors, such as 'phonetic accommodation': the phonetic forms of stranded inflectional affixes are determined by their new environment (see e.g. Butterworth 1981). The MLF model (see below) is partly motivated by evidence from speech errors in language production.

in discourse where juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language, i.e. at points around which the surface structures of the two languages map onto each other" (Poplack 1980: 586).[20] For example, if one of the languages has a Det+N+Adj order and the other has Det+Adj+N, switching would be expected after the determiner but not between the noun and the adjective. Both constraints, then, are general. The equivalence constraint is explicitly probabilistic, while the free morpheme constraint is at least implicitly so (Poplack 1981: 182–183), especially if it is meant to include the prediction that major constituents are more likely to be switched than minor ones (ibid.). Poplack initially proposed these constraints based on her research on Spanish-English CS in a Puerto Rican community in the US, the data consisting of recordings gathered in both formal interviews and informal conversations.[21] The constraints were deemed to explain the data satisfactorily, while being "restrictive enough not to generate instances of non-occurring code-switches" (Poplack 1980: 585). Violations of both constraints did occur in the data, but their number was very small (less than 1% of the total number of switches; Poplack 1980: 600). The constraints have also been successfully applied to other language pairs (for an overview, see Poplack 2015: 923), but apparent counterexamples have likewise been produced, along with other criticisms of both constraints (see e.g. Myers-Scotton 1993: 27–32; MacSwan 2014: 6–8).

Perhaps one of the best-known syntactic models of CS is Myers-Scotton's (e.g. 1993, 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model. The model distinguishes between *the matrix language* (ML) and *the embedded language* (EL): both may contribute morphemes to a clause, but the ML sets the abstract syntactic frame, and there can therefore be only one ML per clause.[22] In addition, a distinction is made between *content* and *system* morphemes (Myers-Scotton 1993: 99–101). According to the model, if a morpheme contains the feature 'quantification' (e.g. quantifiers, determiners, tense and aspect markers), it is a system morpheme.[23] Morphemes which do not contain the feature are content morphemes if they assign/receive thematic roles (e.g. nouns, pronouns, verbs, prepositions), and system morphemes if they do not (e.g. dummy pronominals). A more fine-grained classification of

20. Cf. the constraints proposed by Pfaff (1979).

21. The initial study (Poplack 1981) focused on one informant, and the follow-up (Poplack 1980) – which was published earlier – on twenty informants of various skill-levels.

22. More precisely, the unit of analysis in the later versions of the model is the complementiser phrase (see Myers-Scotton 2002: 54–57). For convenience, I refer here to clauses; the distinction is not relevant for the present discussion.

23. A morpheme contains this feature if it "involves quantification across variables", such as individuals or events (Myers-Scotton 1993: 100).

morphemes is provided in the 4-M model (Myers-Scotton & Jake 2000), which introduces conceptual activation as an additional distinctive feature. Conceptually activated morphemes consist of content morphemes, which assign or receive thematic roles, and *early system morphemes* (e.g. markers of definiteness, person, number, and gender), which do not. Those morphemes which are not conceptually activated are *late system morphemes*, and are divided into two groups according to whether the morpheme type "looks outside its immediate maximal projection for information about its form" (Myers-Scotton 2002: 73). Those that do not are called *bridge system morphemes* (e.g. the English possessives *of* and *'s*), and those that do are *late outsider system morphemes* (e.g. case and agreement markers).[24] Finally, the model identifies three different types of constituents within a bilingual clause: *ML islands* and *EL islands*, both of which contain morphemes from only one language, "show structural dependency relations" and are "well-formed in their language", and *mixed constituents*, which contain morphemes from both languages (Myers-Scotton 2002: 57–58). The main constraint contained in the model is represented through two principles which only apply to mixed constituents. The *Morpheme Order Principle* states that the surface morpheme order comes from the ML; the *System Morpheme Principle* states that all late outsider system morphemes must come from the ML (Myers-Scotton 1993: 83; 2002: 59–60, 87–88, 110).[25] These constraints can be characterised as general and categorical.

The type of data used in the most in-depth discussions of the MLF model (Myers-Scotton 1993, 2002) consists for the most part of recordings of non-elicited conversations. Indeed, Myers-Scotton argues that "while grammaticality judgments (i.e. speaker intuitions) may have their uses, there is no substitute for studying naturally occurring data in regard to bilingual clauses" (2002: 11). In Myers-Scotton (1993), the bulk of the examples come from Swahili-English and Shona-English CS, but she also discusses examples from a host of other language pairs, drawn from the research literature. The model has also been tested by other researchers with various language pairs, with some supporting it and others providing counterexamples or more theoretically oriented criticism (see e.g. Gardner-Chloros & Edwards 2004: 116–120; Auer & Muhamedova 2005; MacSwan 2005a, 2005b, 2014: 15–17).

Finally, there have been various attempts to account for CS with the principles of major grammatical theories. These include, in particular, different versions of generative grammar, such as Government and Binding (e.g. Di Sciullo, Muysken &

24. Since semantically similar morphemes in different languages do not necessarily share the same features, testing the hypotheses of the model is not at all straightforward.

25. Other principles and hypotheses cover for example the occurrence of EL islands and the use of various 'compromise strategies'.

Singh 1986; Halmari 1997) and Minimalism.[26] I briefly discuss the 'constraint-free approach' as proposed by MacSwan. The main idea behind it is based on the principle that "[n]othing constrains CS apart from the requirements of the mixed grammars" (MacSwan 2014: 18), which entails rejecting any constraints which refer specifically to CS (e.g. the other constraints discussed in this section, which would be vacuous in monolingual contexts). MacSwan has further argued for an implementation of the constraint-free approach within the framework of Minimalism. In general terms, if a certain lexical category in L1 contains features differing from the same category in L2, there may be a 'crash' during feature-checking at a particular point in the derivation of a bilingual clause (for illustrative examples, see e.g. MacSwan 2014: 20–24). With regard to methodology, MacSwan (2005b: 278) has argued that the perspective required is "one which makes careful use of all linguistic data, attending to their inherent messiness and special limitations"; he notes in particular that grammaticality judgements are needed in order to produce ungrammatical (i.e. incorrect) examples.[27] This was in reply to Jake, Myers-Scotton and Gross, who state for example the following: "if certain structures do not occur in large CS corpora, we argue that this is equivalent to negative evidence – in fact, we would argue that it is superior" (2005: 271). They note furthermore that grammaticality judgements are problematic in multilingual contexts due to the negative attitudes even bilingual speakers themselves often have towards the phenomenon (ibid.).

4. An alternative interpretation and a methodological proposal

As demonstrated in the preceding section, views on both the nature of CS as a rule-governed form of behaviour and the methods for studying its syntax vary considerably. Furthermore, any discussion among representatives of different paradigms or research programmes seems to be marred by a lack of common ground in crucial aspects, and by differences in the point of departure (cf. Poplack 2015). In this section, I present a philosophical analysis of the nature of CS and certain methodological implications, taking into account the differences noted above. I begin with a reinterpretation of the rule-governed nature of CS, which should serve as the necessary common ground and shared point of departure.

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26. On the grammatical theories themselves, see especially Chomsky (1981, 1995).

27. Although for example Di Sciullo, Muysken and Singh (1986) do not explicitly discuss the roles of these different data sources, they employed both grammaticality judgements and corpus data.

4.1 A reinterpretation: Back to basics

If CS is a form of rule-governed behaviour in the sense discussed in Section 2.1 above, the claim is that there are rules which determine the correctness or incorrectness of CS behaviour, and that the correctness or incorrectness of structures containing CS is known by intuition. In order to justify this claim, we should simply be able to demonstrate that speakers have such intuitions and that there are both correct and incorrect instances of expressions containing CS (cf. the Winch quotation in Section 2.1). A reasonable starting point would therefore be to see whether it is possible to elicit judgements as to the correctness of bilingual clauses from bilingual speakers – as has indeed been done in many studies (cf. e.g. Toribio 2001a). Consider the following Finnish-English examples from Halmari (1997: 113; the italicised elements retain their English phonological forms; glosses from Halmari, with one expanded abbreviation):

(1) Minä siivosin *building*-in [ACC].
'I cleaned the building.'

(2) Minä *clean*-as-i-n [verbal marker-PAST-1SG] *building*-in [ACC].

(3) *Minä *cleaned the building*.

(4) **I* siivosin rakennuksen.

Halmari constructed these sentences and elicited grammaticality judgements from American Finnish-English bilingual speakers.[28] According to her (ibid.), the results were clear: Examples (1)–(2) were considered grammatical and (3)–(4) ungrammatical (i.e. correct and incorrect, respectively). Similar instances are of course found throughout the research literature, which would already strongly suggest that, at least in some cases, the correctness of expressions containing CS is accessible to intuition. It is worth adding that one does not have to be a member of the Finnish-American community to make exactly the same judgements about these sentences. For example, as a native speaker of Finnish, the present author would certainly judge that (1) is a correct sentence, and that anyone who knows Finnish and is taught the meaning of *building* ought also to consider it correct; similarly, I would intuitively judge (2) to be correct, while (3) and (4) seem to me to be incorrect.[29] It should be added that this judgement does not depend on any reasoning

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28. The L1 of all 21 subjects was Finnish, and most of them had first learned English in school, either in the United States or in Finland; some had spent all their life in the United States, while others had arrived fairly recently (Halmari 1997: 38–40).

29. It could be argued that the correctness of Examples (1) and (2) is due to the fact that the English words are treated in them as borrowings, although there is no phonological integration

as to *why* they are correct or incorrect (cf. Cohen 1986: 75; but see Section 4.2 below). Furthermore, even if someone else considers Example (1) incorrect (perhaps with absolute certainty), this in no way eliminates the fact that both I and this other person *are basing this judgement on our intuition* (cf. the discussion over Example (10) below). A continuum of correctness can also be detected here; for example, Halmari's informants were not certain about a construction where a longer NP replaces the pronoun in Example (4), with a corresponding change in the verb to the third person (Halmari 1997: 114). This reflects the distinction between clear cases (correct or incorrect) and unclear cases, as discussed above in Section 2.1.

Certainty (or lack of it) can be further illustrated with the following examples of Spanish-English CS:

(5) I saw *la casa*.

(6) ?I saw the *casa*.

(7) *I saw *la* house.

According to Bhatt (2014: 145), bilingual informants judged (6) to be "slightly degraded" compared to (5), while (7) was considered "completely unacceptable". There are differing opinions as to the correctness of (6) in particular (ibid.), but this is only to be expected because speakers' intuitions will not always coincide or may simply be uncertain (particularly in the 'grey area'; see the Introduction to the present volume). Since a sentence can be considered correct only with respect to certain rules, differences in judgement mean either that speakers have *internalised different rules*, or that they are *following different rules*. What I mean by this distinction is that in the former case two speakers have internalised sets of rules which differ from each other in one or more crucial aspect, while in the latter case the sets of rules may correspond, but speakers differ as to the rule they deem to be in force in a certain context.[30] It should be added that even if someone's intuitions are not shared by anyone at all, this does not make them unworthy of serious linguistic enquiry (Cohen 1986: 110). There is, however, a clear difference between relying on intuitions to study rules (or norms in general) and studying these intuitions themselves. In the

into Finnish (cf. Poplack, Wheeler & Westwood 1989). Halmari rejects this interpretation, arguing that "at least for Finnish-English codeswitching it is only full integration into the borrowing language (including not only morphological but also phonological integration) which makes the introduced item a borrowing" (1997: 171). I discuss the problems with the CS vs. borrowing distinction in detail elsewhere (Mäkilähde forthcoming: Chapter 3.1).

30. I am not claiming here that speakers acquire identical mental internalisations of the rules of a language (for a critique of such a view, see e.g. Dąbrowska 2012). What is important in this context is that applying the rules produces the same outcome.

former type of research, the aim is to construct a descriptive system of rules (i.e. a grammar); in the latter the aim is to find out what kind of judgements people make based on their internalisations of the rules of a language.[31]

Many approaches to the syntax of CS emphasise the role of corpus data collected in informal situations; it therefore needs to be added that intuitions are of course also relevant in linguistic behaviour. There is an intimate connection between *knowing* a rule and *conforming to* or *violating* it (one may also speak of *following/breaking* a rule, and so on).[32] As Cohen points out (1986: 87), both grammaticality judgements and actual linguistic occurrences "are signs of an intuition of grammaticalness", but in the former case this is explicit, in the latter implicit. In the preceding, I have focused only on the fact that speakers know and have access to certain rules; I will therefore add a few comments on the contents of these rules. As implied above, following different rules will of course have different outcomes both in elicited judgements and actual production. Consider the following examples of Latin-Greek CS in Cicero's letters:

(8) χολὴν ἄκρατον noctu eieci. (Cic. *fam*. 14,7,1)
cholèn ákrāton noctu eieci
'I threw up *undiluted bile* at night.'

(9) ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον longe omnibus anteponat (Cic. *Att*. 2,16,3)
ille tuus *tòn praktikòn bíon* longe omnibus anteponat
'Your friend prefers *the active life* over everything by far.'

In the case of (8), one might ask, first, why the suffix on the Greek noun is *-ēn*, and not for example *-in*. A satisfactory answer would arguably be that it is because this is the *correct* form of this particular word for the required case and number (i.e. the accusative singular) (but see the following section on the idea of 'monolingual bias'). In other words, the existence of a rule can be brought up in an explanation of linguistic behaviour, as outlined in Section 2.2 above.[33] Second, one might ask why the Greek adjective is in the accusative and not, for example, in the dative (i.e.

31. For example, the mistakes that children make when they are still acquiring a language (e.g. **goed* instead of *went* as the past tense of *go*; cf. Leppänen, this volume) may be irrelevant data for a descriptive grammar, but they provide information about the way languages are learnt and the types of inferences people make as part of this learning process.

32. On the distinction between norm-conforming and norm-following, see e.g. Brennan et al. (2013: 218–233).

33. It may be added that it is irrelevant whether the person producing this structure is violating the rules of Latin; the rules of Greek are what govern this particular aspect of the structure, not those of Latin. Delegating and/or sharing duties between the norms of several languages seems in fact to be what characterises CS in general.

akrā́tō(i)); a reasonable explanation would be that the person who produced this form was following the rules which govern agreement in Greek. Finally, one might ask why the Greek NP is in the accusative and not, for example, in the dative (i.e. *cholē(i) akrā́tō(i)*). We could say that the person who produced this sentence was following the government rules of Latin, since at the pretheoretical level we know that there is a rule in Latin according to which, for example, *sanguinem eieci* is the correct form for the meaning 'I threw up blood', while *sanguini eieci* is an incorrect form for this meaning. However, we could also argue that the person was following the rules of Greek (e.g. on the analogy of a verb such as ἐκβάλλειν *ekbállein* 'to throw out', which requires the accusative for its object) – or even both at the same time. Whatever the correct interpretation may be, it seems that at least for some bilingual Latin-Greek speakers, the Greek accusative sufficiently satisfied the requirements of the Latin verb, as indicated also by Example (9).[34] Whether the rules of Latin or of Greek (or both; see also the following section on the problem of 'monolingual bias') should be evoked in explaining the choice of case is not quite clear in the context of only a few examples,[35] but in either case normativity remains present. The crucial point is that if the speaker is either following or violating a rule of any kind, then the production of the relevant expression is *by definition* rule-governed. Since people do not of course always conform to the rules, the fact that a form has been produced does not guarantee that it is correct or that the speaker considered it correct.

Perhaps the most obvious context for variation in judgements would be in comparing monolinguals to bilinguals. It is only to be expected that they would follow different kinds of rules; or, more accurately, that they have internalised different sets of rules from among which to find the ones to follow. To return once more to Examples (8)–(9): the Greek phrases have obviously been formed according to the rules of Greek. In other cases, the speaker/writer might have a choice over which rules to follow, as in the following example:

(10) ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt. (Cic. *Att*. 12,52,2)
apógrapha sunt, minore labore fiunt.
'They are *copies*; they are produced with little effort.'

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34. The Latin verb *anteponere* in the sense 'to prefer something over something else' requires the accusative and the dative, while analogous Greek verbs such as προκρίνειν *prokrínein* and προτιθέναι *protithénai* in the same sense require the accusative and the genitive. In other words, the case of *omnibus* (i.e. the dative) only follows the rules of Latin.

35. To clarify: this question moves beyond the pretheoretical domain and beyond the access of intuition. Different theories of CS would posit different answers to it.

Here, the form of *apógrapha* (nominative plural) could be based on the rules of either Greek or Latin, since in both cases *-a* would be the required suffix. In other words, it is impossible to say whether the form has been morphologically integrated into Latin (cf. the Finnish-English examples above). The use of the Greek alphabet may be interpreted as a lack of (phonological) integration into Latin, but whether this is what appeared in the original letter is of course uncertain. In some cases, the identity of a word would naturally be more clearly discernible from its form (even without diacritics), as in *philosophos* (Greek) vs. *philosophus* (Latin). When either form appears, it is therefore possible to identify the rules the speaker/writer was following. Furthermore, although bilingual speakers might consider either form correct (at least in certain contexts), a monolingual speaker might judge differently. In that case, the speakers would nevertheless be making their judgements *based on rules*. This situation reflects the above-mentioned 'signs of an intuition' both in judgements and actual linguistic behaviour (i.e. production).[36]

4.2 Methodological implications: Terminology, methods, testing, explanation

The preceding discussion offers a reinterpretation of the rule-governed nature of CS as a shared point of departure or common ground for researchers working with various frameworks and approaches. In this section, I discuss some of the methodological implications of this analysis, beginning with a few remarks on relevant distinctions which may become obscured as a result of terminological variation. The first distinction pertains to the difference between a *language*, as a set of rules, and a *grammar*, as a theoretical systematisation of those rules.[37] The former is what is described by means of the latter (cf. Section 2.1 above), and proposed theoretical constraints on CS could be included in the latter as well. In accordance with the distinction between a language and a grammar, a distinction needs to be maintained between what is sanctioned by the rules of a language and what is sanctioned by a particular grammar or theoretical model. For example, in one of the studies discussed above, Poplack (1980: 600) noted that "there were virtually no instances of ungrammatical combinations" of Spanish and English. However, this apparently referred to the 1% of instances which violated the constraints she had proposed, and were therefore 'ungrammatical' *according to the model*. Whether the instances were incorrect according to the actual rules of either language (or their combination, or some additional non-monolingual rules, etc.) would of course have to be determined by means of grammaticality judgements. The specific terminology employed

36. Cases similar to Example (10) are also discussed in Mäkilähde (forthcoming).

37. Instead of 'grammar', one might refer for example to a *model*.

(e.g. 'incorrect', 'grammatical', 'well-formed') is less important; using the same term to refer to different concepts, however, is prone to mask important distinctions and may lead to confusion.[38]

As noted in Section 3, there are varying views as to the use of elicited judgements (i.e. intuitions) and corpora in research on CS. Many researchers who favour using corpus evidence nevertheless recognise that elicited judgements also have their uses (e.g. Myers-Scotton 2002: 11; cf. Halmari 1997: 22–23). The precise roles of these different methods in the study of CS syntax, however, are often left implicit. For example, Poplack (2015: 921) argues that "all kinds of data […] have their place in CS research […], but crucially, they are not interchangeable", and advocates the use of corpora as the 'gold standard' (cf. Myers-Scotton's comment quoted above). Similarly, although MacSwan (2005b) advocates a pluralistic approach, the nature of intuitions and the rationale for their use is not discussed in detail.

Since it has been shown quite conclusively in previous research that the correctness of expressions containing CS is accessible to intuition (cf. Toribio 2001a: 405; Gardner-Chloros & Edwards 2004: 110), the analysis presented here leads to the conclusion that it is fully legitimate to use elicited judgements to determine whether a given multilingual expression is correct or not. This should also enable us to identify the 'clear cases', or at least those cases which are much clearer than others. Whenever speakers judge differently, the reason for the disagreement needs to be probed by investigating, for example, the rules on which the speakers base their judgement (cf. above).[39] There is clearly considerable variation in intuitions concerning CS, and this variation is itself worth investigating in detail. One factor which should be taken into account, for example, is the extent to which individual

38. Since in formal logic a *well-formed formula* is a string of symbols generated by the formal grammar (or a string which has been constructed according to the rules of a particular model), one possibility would be to refer analogously to sentences generated by a grammar as *well-formed* and those conforming to the rules of a particular language as *correct*. However, as noted above, what is at issue is not the particular terms chosen, but rather that a distinction is made one way or another (subscripts would be another option). I note in passing that the term 'correct' has been used throughout the discussion deliberately in a strict sense; the question is not whether the examples discussed above are norm-conforming at the level of discourse, in other words whether they 'make sense' (see Coseriu 1985). In the latter case, we would be dealing with rationality principles (or some other types of norms). On grammaticality vs. acceptability in generative linguistics, see e.g. Riemer (2009) and López-Serena (2009).

39. For example, although Halmari accounts for her data with a specific theoretical framework, her observation (1997: 115) that the lack of subject-verb agreement is the reason for the incorrectness of Examples (3) and (4) is a more theory-neutral explanation of the situation (and hence a starting point for the more theoretical account).

speakers' intuitions are affected by their competence in the relevant languages, i.e. which sets of rules they have internalised.

Toribio (2001a: 432) reports the interesting finding that bilinguals who are not competent users of CS themselves are still able to offer judgements similar to those of more competent switchers. She has suggested the use of mixed methods (i.e. different types of tasks) in tapping speaker intuitions (2001a), and has proposed methods for collecting 'traditional' judgements (2001b). Her method of using pairs of sentences is similar to Gumperz's method of using test-frames (and the one used by Halmari, as discussed above); some such system is desirable, since it is the only way to ensure that only a single element in the expression is manipulated at any one time. However, it is worth investigating whether speakers' judgements differ when they are provided with a context for the utterance and when they have to judge the expression in isolation. It is also important to ensure that the informants understand the task at hand; in Gumperz's (1982) study, for instance, it was apparently not made clear whether the judgements were to be on correctness or rationality (see Section 3 above).

Variation in intuitions has been mentioned above several times, and it is therefore necessary to address briefly the idea of 'monolingual bias' in CS research. As described by Verschik (2008: 9–12, 23), 'monolingual bias' refers (*inter alia*) to the assumptions that languages are discrete and homogeneous entities, and that CS behaviour is describable in terms of two (or more) monolingual varieties; these assumptions may lead to a disregard of the fact that, first, in a multilingual community the 'monolingual' varieties may differ considerably from 'standard' varieties, and second, that there may in fact exist a separate 'multilingual' variety, with its own rules (which are not part of any 'monolingual' variety). I would argue that there is no danger of such bias in the account presented here. First, it has been argued (e.g. Itkonen 2003: 14, 37) that the 'languages as systems of rules' approach treats languages as homogeneous and discrete entities only as a methodological idealisation; the inherent variance and fuzziness of languages is evident, for example, in the continuum of clear and unclear cases and in the corresponding variation in intuitions. Second, 'monolingual' varieties are used as reference points only to the extent that they (a) are able to sufficiently account for the phenomena, and (b) are justifiable by the relevant socio-historical factors (e.g. what we know about Cicero's linguistic competence, habits and so forth). Third, it has been implied several times above that if speakers have internalised different rules, their intuitions will differ accordingly. This accommodates the possibility (attested in other studies) that new norms emerge in multilingual communities while other norms may disappear, and so on. As Verschik notes (2008: 12), these situations are initially caused by changes in the multilingual speaker's intuition, which of course accords well with the manner in which linguistic norms change in general (see e.g. Leppänen, this volume).

As for the role of corpus data, the occurrence of a particular form (as noted above) does not guarantee that it is correct. Theories which posit that only certain forms are correct therefore cannot be falsified simply by pointing to the occurrence of a single counterexample in a particular corpus: one would also have to demonstrate that it is, in fact, correct, and the only way to ascertain this is to rely on intuition and elicited judgements.[40] However, our use of certain modal terms may lead to ambiguity regarding the actual predictions and how they might be falsified. For example, MacSwan argues that "[w]e cannot confidently assume that the absence of a form in naturalistic data means that the structure is not permitted; it may be absent because it *cannot* occur, or it may be absent because it *has not* occurred" (2005a: 2; emphasis in the original, small caps changed to italics). Similarly, Di Sciullo (2014) refers to 'possible' and 'impossible' switch sites. The problem here is the equivalence drawn between two different modalities, those of permissibility (i.e. correctness) and possibility. The difference between them can be clarified by considering different forms of modal logic.

In alethic modal logic (i.e. a type of logic which deals with necessity and possibility), we have to account for the fact that the following implication is known by intuition to be true: 'If it is necessarily the case that *p*, then it is the case that *p*'. In order to account for this, a system of alethic logic should, from the semantic perspective, be reflexive, and the formalisation of this implication, $\Box p \rightarrow p$, should be a theorem of the system.[41] On the other hand, it is intuitively the case that, in a system of deontic logic (i.e. a type of logic which deals with obligation and permission), the corresponding formula, $Op \rightarrow p$ (e.g. 'If one ought to see to it that *p* is the case, then one will see to it that *p* is the case'), should not be a theorem.[42] In terms of the present argument, what is relevant is that while $\sim\Diamond p \,\&\, p$ (e.g. 'It is not possible to be the case that *p*, and it is the case that *p*') is inconsistent in a system of alethic modal logic, $\sim Pp \,\&\, p$ ('One is not permitted to bring about the situation *p*, and one

40. One should not draw from this argument the extreme conclusion that everyday speech is somehow 'degenerate' (for discussion, see e.g. Itkonen 1983: 61–63). Furthermore, when dealing with extinct languages or earlier stages of modern ones, even the most basic rules (e.g. what a particular word means, what the correct plural of a certain form is, and so on) may have to be inferred from extant texts, which of course has a bearing on the degree of certainty that can be reached.

41. From another perspective, the same is achieved by adding $\Box p \rightarrow p$ as an axiom to the system. The difference in perspective is not relevant for the present argument.

42. The deontic formulae could be expanded to indicate a particular agent (or to explicitly cover all relevant agents). Instead of 'the situation *p*', one might more precisely say 'the situation truthfully described by the proposition *p*'. Background information as to these concepts can be found in various introductory-level texts on modal logic (or deontic logic in particular); for the relevant points, see e.g. Cresswell (2001: 139); Hilpinen (2001: 162–163). See also von Wright (1951: 15; 1981: 6).

brings about the situation *p*') is not inconsistent in a system of deontic logic; and both of these cases are intuitively obvious. In other words, if something does occur it cannot be *impossible*; but it can be *forbidden* or *incorrect*.[43] It needs to be stressed that I am not arguing here that terms such as 'can' and 'possible' should always be avoided; both in ordinary language and in scientific contexts they are perfectly acceptable substitutes for the more accurate deontic or normative terms. It all depends on the context: often they are used unambiguously as such substitutes, especially if they vary with terms such as 'acceptable', 'correct', 'grammatical', or 'permissible' (cf. e.g. Gumperz 1982: 87–90). Terminological choices are not important when confusion is unlikely to arise – something which is arguably not the case if 'not permissible' and 'cannot occur' are equated. The argument in the present chapter is of course in agreement with MacSwan's actual point, namely that the absence of a form in a certain dataset does not by itself mean that the form is incorrect, but if a hypothesis predicts that something cannot occur, even a single counterexample will disconfirm it. In certain contexts, therefore, "some terminological choices are more apt than others because they reflect a more nuanced or precise understanding of the relevant concepts and are less likely to lead to (or arise from) confusion and mistakes" (Alvarez 2018: 3306). In other contexts, terminological clarity is not of primary concern, and the same is of course true of many other terms as well.[44]

A converse situation to the one mentioned (where a prediction about incorrectness is not falsified by the occurrence of a form) can also be identified: probabilistic predictions about occurrences cannot be falsified simply by demonstrating the incorrectness of a particular form. For example, MacSwan argues that Poplack's equivalence constraint "does not hold up to empirical tests" (2014: 6). He demonstrates this with two Spanish-English sentences, noting that the constraint "predicts that both examples should be well formed" (2014: 7), although one of them is judged to be incorrect.[45] However, the constraint actually states where switches *tend to* occur, and it therefore needs to be falsified by showing that this tendency (however strong it is supposed to be) is not actualised in a particular dataset. Nevertheless, it is true that the constraint cannot *explain* the incorrectness of the switch if it occurs at an equivalence point. I return to the roles of intuition and corpora in Section 6.

Finally, with regard to the nature of the actual constraints discussed in Section 3, since they are part of the descriptive account of a language as theoretical hypotheses, they are of course non-normative entities. In other words, the discovery of any

43. For related criticism of the use of the term 'possible' instead of 'correct' in different contexts, see e.g. Itkonen (2003: 143); Mäkilähde & Hynönen (forthcoming).

44. Some examples (of various types) include 'sentence' vs. 'utterance', 'sound' vs. 'phoneme', 'word' vs. 'lexeme'.

45. A similar case could be made for the Finnish-English Examples (3) and (4).

purported constraints on CS does not make it a rule-governed form of behaviour in the sense discussed in Section 2 above. Since these general constraints may indeed be significant generalisations, it is important to seek explanations for them in turn. This will be discussed further in the next section.

5. Explaining code-switching: The role of rationality

In this section, I extend the preceding account by connecting it to the other type of norm mentioned in Section 2, namely rationality principles. I argued there that CS is strategic, in other words a type of behaviour involving reasoning of the ends-means type. Strictly speaking, using the terminology introduced above, CS behaviour is both rule-governed and *principle-governed*. My purpose in this section is twofold: to show, first, that analyses of the syntax of CS, including in particular the various constraints mentioned in Section 3, are amenable to explanation in terms of rationality principles, and second, that these principles are needed (together with the notion of correctness) to account for *prima facie* counterexamples to a specific theoretical account of CS syntax. To set the stage, I begin by commenting briefly on the role of rationality in research on the functions of CS.

Studies which focus on the strategic aspect of CS generally attempt to explain why switching occurs in certain contexts. Although such explanations can be of various kinds, most often they deal with the pragmatic functions of CS; in other words, the focus is on what speakers (try to) do by switching between languages, how they accomplish certain goals, and so on. Gumperz (1982: 82) has argued that where speakers agree on the interpretation of an occurrence of CS, "one can assume that this agreement is based on similar linguistic perceptions". He makes an explicit connection to Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims, stating that interpretations of CS elicited from bilingual informants can be explained by reference to these same maxims (Gumperz 1982: 94–95). I have argued elsewhere that rationality, rationality principles and the rational explanation schema discussed above are present in practically all function-oriented approaches to CS, although their methodological significance has received little attention (see Mäkilähde forthcoming). In sum: it is not possible to explain an action without understanding it, and understanding an action is to rationalise it, in other words to posit that the action was a means toward a particular goal. Explanation needs to include reference to this goal; whether or not it is convincing can be evaluated objectively by evoking certain rationality principles.[46]

46. Note that rational explanation is not the only type of explanation which is relevant in pragmatic studies (see Mäkilähde forthcoming: Chapter 4).

The link between constraints on CS and rationality principles was mentioned already in Section 3, in reference to Gumperz's (1982: 89–90) claim that the constraints he proposed were motivated by pragmatic considerations. It is not, however, fully clear how this claim should be interpreted. Many grammatical features of individual languages can also be assigned functional or 'pragmatic' explanations; for example, Pajunen and Itkonen (this volume) discuss the finding that grammatical agreement facilitates comprehension and is therefore not redundant. This is a prime example of rational explanation as outlined in Section 2.2: the phenomenon is explained by interpreting it as a means toward a particular goal. As discussed in Section 3, it is not clear whether Gumperz's informants actually focused on the correctness or rationality of the expressions, but in either case the aspects which he proposes as relevant to the "ease with which a sequence can be switched" are amenable to rational explanation. Many of them are somehow connected to the unity of structures, where the explanation seems to presuppose some principle of cohesion; in other words, a principle according to which those forms which belong most strongly together should 'go together' accordingly (cf. Itkonen 1983: 158). To reiterate: it is unclear whether this explanation accounts for the fact that structures where such unity is broken are deemed *incorrect* or that they are deemed *pragmatically non-meaningful*.

Since many of the tenets of the MLF model are based on findings in psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics, the primary explanations for its constraints can be connected to issues of language processing and production. Similarly, since it is the case that approaches within the Minimalism framework (such as MacSwan's) attempt to model linguistic knowledge (i.e. competence), one could try to relate the 'constraints' imposed by feature-checking to the mental capacities of speakers, for example in terms of processability.[47] In both cases, a functional explanation in terms of rationality principles could also appeal to ease of comprehension, similarly to the agreement example mentioned above.

The two constraints proposed by Poplack are quite different from each other with regard to their motivating factor. The free morpheme constraint is more 'transparent', and can be explained by reference to cohesion, but it may also be accounted for by such explanations as ease of pronunciation and the principle of least effort. The same explanation applies regardless of whether the constraints aim at predicting what is correct or what is more probable.[48] The equivalence constraint is more problematic in terms of this difference. If its aim is to predict what is correct

47. It should be pointed out that, according to the argument in Section 2, grammars in the sense of descriptive accounts or theoretical systematisations of rule systems do not describe knowledge of a language but the language itself.

48. 'Predicting' that a form is correct needs to be understood in a very specific sense (see e.g. Itkonen 1978: Chapter 9; cf. Riemer 2009; López-Serena 2009).

in structures containing CS (as mentioned in Sections 3 and 4, its formulation does not support this interpretation), then the prediction is basically that sentences containing CS should not violate the combination rules of any of the languages involved. If, however, its aim is to predict where CS is more likely to occur, then the prediction is simply that, most of the time, CS will occur at equivalence points. As mentioned above, it would not matter in this case if switching at some particular equivalence point was judged incorrect or if switching at a conflict site (see Poplack & Meechan 1998) was considered correct. A possible third scenario is where the fact that switching is only sanctioned at equivalence points is taken as a premise, and the prediction is actually that speakers will tend to favour this type of CS *because* it is correct. The relevant rational explanation for the constraint under the first two interpretations would probably be again related to ease of production/comprehension and the principle of least effort. In the third case, the existence of norms in itself is what explains the regularity of CS behaviour, and a rational explanation for it could attempt to explain why people follow norms *in general* or why this norm is worth following *in particular*.

Finally, rationality principles are relevant in accounting for data which contradict the proposed theoretical constraints. Myers-Scotton (1993: 236), for example, discusses one occurrence in her corpus which violates the Morpheme Order Principle, arguing that "the speaker is making a structurally marked choice to draw attention to the details of his question". It is not mentioned, however, whether (a) the produced structure is correct, or (b) whether the speaker considered the structure correct: not all marked forms are incorrect. If the structure in question was in fact incorrect, it should not be considered a counterexample to the proposed constraints (assuming that the model does not literally predict what is possible but what is correct; cf. Myers-Scotton 1993: 3 and Section 4.2 above). In any case, the explanation provided by Myers-Scotton is another prime example of rational explanation, and the relevant rationality principle is known by intuition. The handful of counterexamples to the free morpheme and equivalence constraints identified in Poplack (1980), for example, remain completely unaccounted for within the model since their degree of correctness is not established, and their occurrences are not given any kind of rational explanation, although presumably they should be amenable to such explanations.

6. Discussion: Syntheses and analogies

In addition to the synthesis between correctness and rationality, I suggest that syntactic research on CS calls for the type of methodological synthesis between the use of intuition and observation required in linguistics in general (see e.g. Itkonen 2005b; Kertész 2014; cf. Cohen 1986: 87). At the most basic level, the roles of these

different types of method are connected to the object of research and to the questions we are attempting to answer. Facts about norms of correctness and rationality are accessible to intuition, while actual behaviour and relative frequencies are not; they can only be ascertained by (corpus-based) observation. A synthesis of both methods makes it possible to (attempt to) answer, for example, (a) which forms are clearly correct/incorrect and which are unclear; (b) which forms falling into these three categories actually occur, and which are frequent/rare; and (c) why particular forms are used in certain situations. Arguably, the aim of linguistics should be to account for all of these aspects of CS. In order to further illustrate the type of methodological pluralism advocated here, and to connect this discussion to a broader philosophical context, I comment briefly on the analogy between languages and games.

The game analogy has often been evoked in connection with the philosophy of language or linguistics (e.g. Saussure 1916; Wittgenstein 1958; Searle 1969; Kac 1994; Itkonen 2003, 2005a: 187–188; see also Kac, this volume).[49] Consider, first, the following two types of action: punting in American football and 'pulling the goalie' in ice-hockey. There are rules governing both actions, namely when players are permitted to perform them and how they ought to be performed. For example, a team is not permitted to punt when it is on defence or during half-time. It is of course possible to seize the ball and kick it in any case, but it will be considered an incorrect manoeuvre (cf. the analogy to different types of modal logic above). The rules of ice hockey allow for the goalkeeper to be exchanged for an extra forward or defenceman, but it is against the rules to bring out ten players in exchange for the goalkeeper. A descriptive account of either game would be incomplete without specifying the relevant rules for performing these actions.

Of course, in order to find out what actually happens, one would need to conduct empirical research with a corpus (i.e. a record of past games) and to take into account a host of different variables. Anyone familiar with either game, however, will probably have some idea as to when these acts would in fact be performed. Punting, for example, probably happens in most cases on a fourth down, especially when the offensive team is fairly close to their own end-zone. Similarly, the goalkeeper would probably be pulled close to the end of the game (and every time there is a delayed penalty to the opposing team). The inkling one has about the possible outcome is of course due to not only one's recollection of past games, but also an intuition about the *rationality* of these actions in certain contexts; these are basically rational explanations of imagined frequencies (or hypotheses based on one's knowledge of the relevant rationality principles). It would be unexpected for

49. Cf. also the analogy between language and dance (see e.g. Itkonen 2005a: 163–164 and the references therein), which highlights the cooperative nature of both activities.

a team to pull their goalkeeper when they have a 6 to 0 lead, with a minute remaining before the end of regulation time. If that were to happen, the act would remain incomprehensible until a rational explanation for it could be offered. For example, the purpose might be to insult the other team by implying that they do not pose any sort of threat. Similarly, one would try to rationalise the action if the offensive team lines up for a punt on a first down, forty yards from their own end-zone. What is crucial is that these unexpected acts would in any case be perfectly *correct* according to the rules of either game.

It might be objected that the game analogy falls apart because of the existence of rulebooks (see e.g. Kac 1994: 44). However, this only means that a more apt analogy could mention informal games, namely backyard and playground varieties where the rules are not codified anywhere.[50] Although the 'classic' analogy is to such games as chess, in the present context this kind of sports activity may be more illuminating because of the inherent 'messiness' such games contain, especially in their more informal varieties. For example, people may notice midway through the game that some of the players are following (partly) different rules than others. Similarly, rule conflicts may occur: following one rule may violate another.[51]

In sum, language and games call for strikingly similar research methodologies. Providing a descriptive-normative account of the rules of correct behaviour is one aspect, and in this we need to rely on the knowledge of those who *have learned* the rules and hence possess *agent's knowledge* about them (see Itkonen 2005a: 187). When we want to describe what actually happens when the games are played, observation is needed (along with statistics).[52] However, when individual spatiotemporal acts – whether correct or incorrect – are to be *explained*, we need to once more rely on intuitive knowledge about the relevant rationality principles governing the actions in question. To reiterate: my argument is that this kind of synthesis should also be applied to research on CS, and on language (use) in general.

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50. In von Wright's terminology (see Section 2.1), rulebooks could in many cases be considered sets of prescriptions.

51. For different types of norm conflicts in general, see e.g. Bartsch (1987: 294–326).

52. Games also illustrate well how being rule-governed and systematic in no way excludes the possibility of creative acts (see also Laasanen, this volume). Matras (2009: 136) notes on the nature of CS that "despite efforts to describe its formal regularities, codeswitching remains to a considerable extent the creative, improvised composition of individual speakers wishing to take advantage of the enormous assortment of nuances that their complex, multilingual repertoire affords." Whether CS is more creative than linguistic behaviour in general is difficult to say, but whatever the case may be, this kind of creativity is also found in games. For example, every single play in American football contains potential creative elements, and some of the most impressive plays are indeed *improvised* (i.e. when plans have to be changed 'on the go').

Finally, the analogy can be applied in the other direction as well, bringing out interesting implications for our understanding of norms in general. In fact, phenomena comparable to CS can also be identified in the domain of games. First, there are some examples of game activities where different types of acts are governed either by different sets of norms or by different types of norms. An example of the former situation might be the inclusion of bidding systems in bridge, where two different sets of rules are in effect simultaneously, although with different scopes. The basic rules of bridge determine for example what kind of bid is permissible at what time and by whom, while the rules of the bidding system determine what the individual bids mean in communication between partners. An example of the latter situation would be fighting in ice-hockey. It is governed primarily by the rules of the game, which for example determine what counts as fighting and what the penalties for it are; there are, however, also 'unwritten rules' which are more similar to norms of good conduct, or what in von Wright's (1963: 8–12) terminology correspond perhaps to either *customs* or *moral norms*. A violation of the rules of the game results in a penalty, while the unofficial code of conduct is enforced for example by disapproval (cf. Brennan et al. 2013: 46).[53] Similar norms are of course in force in other games as well. There are many possibilities for future studies to elaborate on such situations and to develop the analogies further. For example, the connection between CS and borrowing could be compared to situations where customs in games have eventually become established rules (cf. the case discussed by Brennan et al. 2013: 111). Similar phenomena could also be investigated in other normative domains.

7. Conclusion

I have presented a philosophical analysis of CS in terms of the concepts of norm and normativity, and have argued that this analysis could serve as the common ground to establish the type of consensus which Poplack (2015) has claimed to be currently lacking. In terms of CS as a rule-governed phenomenon, I have highlighted certain methodological implications of the analysis with regard to terminological clarity, the testing and falsification of theories and their predictions, and the roles of different methods. In terms of CS as behaviour governed by rationality principles, I have illustrated briefly the role of rationality in research on the functions of CS, and more extensively in syntactic research, demonstrating its relevance at both the abstract (i.e. in explaining CS constraints) and the concrete level (i.e. in

53. Also relevant to the present discussion is Ullmann-Margalit's (1977: 120) argument that sanctions are more important for Prisoner's Dilemma type norms than for coordination norms.

accounting for individual occurrences). Finally, I have argued in favour of a type of methodological synthesis between intuition and observation, as illustrated by an analogy between languages and games. I hope to have demonstrated the relevance and usefulness of philosophical discussion in advancing the self-understanding of linguistics, including the field of CS research. Many of the issues could only be touched upon briefly, and it is hoped that future studies will attempt to fill the gaps in this chapter and to expand upon the issues discussed.

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Index

This volume sets out to discuss the role of *norms* and *normativity* in both language and linguistics from a multiplicity of perspectives. These concepts are centrally important to the philosophy and methodology of linguistics, and their role and nature need to be investigated in detail. The chapters address a range of issues from general questions about ontology, epistemology and methodology to aspects of particular subfields (such as semantics and historical linguistics) or phenomena (such as construal and code-switching). The volume aims to further our understanding of language and linguistics as well as to encourage further discussion on the metatheory of linguistics. Due to the fundamental nature of the issues under discussion, this volume will be of interest to all linguists regardless of their background or fields of expertise and to philosophers concerned with language or other normative domains.

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